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Date: 2013
Abstract: With the breakdown of the Soviet Union, and with Mikhail Gorbachev’s politics of glasnost and perestroika, suppressed religious and national movements emerged as visible elements of political conflict in what once constituted the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). While in the former USSR this concerned the huge former “Turkestan” region with its religious roots in Islam, and the Orthodox denominations of Russia and the Ukraine, the post-USSR Eastern European satellite states saw an eruption of both nationalism and/or suppressed Catholicism. Mark Juergensmeyer (2008: 152) describes how in Russia, the Ukraine, and Poland “religion became the expression of a nationalist rejection of the secular socialist ideology.” Partly, the free expression of religion was a component of what could be termed a democratic “eruption,” and at the same time it created strong links to “nationalist and transnationalist identities of a bygone era” (Juergensmeyer 2008: 156). The role of right-wing extremism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism ought to be assessed in the context of the transformation of the post-Stalinist political cultures of Eastern Europe and Russia. As much as religion and its institutions were indispensable for the opposition to the Stalinist state, they helped to recreate the old nationalisms of the 19th century (and earlier) of which anti-Semitism was often an integral component. Religious zeal combined with nationalistic patriotism contains ideologies of purity for which “others,” be they ethnic minorities or Jews, were the paramount danger and source of a feared “racial pollution” (cf. Douglas 1966/2007). In the early 1990s, after German re-unification, similar developments could be observed in parts of the former German Democratic Republic. Minkenberg (2002) sees the rehabilitation of the nation state (National-staat) in Eastern Europe in line with the spread of nationalistic rhetoric and the concept of a national ethnic identity. In the context of economic, and partly also cultural crisis, minorities are used as a scapegoat for the problems at hand. Combined with a rejection of internationalism, diversity, and European Union (EU) integration, such resentments seem like “natural” consequences of newly formed national identities (Thieme 2007a, 2007b). In the findings of the European Social Survey (2006), Polish, Hungarian, and Ukrainian populations frequently show more sympathy for conservative (right-wing) politics, gender inequality, and homophobia than Western European societies.
Author(s): Stögner, Karin
Date: 2022
Date: 2001
Abstract: Byford and Billig examine the emergence of antisemitic conspiracy theories in the Yugoslav media during the war with NATO. The analysis focuses mainly on Politika, a mainstream daily newspaper without a history of antisemitism. During the war, there was a proliferation of conspiratorial explanations of western policies both in the mainstream Serbian media and in statements by the Yugoslav political establishment. For the most part such conspiracy theories were not overtly antisemitic, but rather focused on the alleged aims of organizations such as the Bilderberg Group, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission. However, these conspiracy theories were not created de novo; writers in the Yugoslav media were drawing on an established tradition of conspiratorial explanations. The tradition has a strong antisemitic component that seems to have affected some of the Yugoslav writings. Byford and Billig analyse antisemitic themes in the book The Trilateral by Smilja Avramov and in a series of articles published in Politika. They suggest that the proliferation of conspiracy theories during the war led to a shifting of the boundary between acceptable and non-acceptable political explanations, with the result that formerly unacceptable antisemitic themes became respectable. This can be seen in the writings of Nikolaj Velimirovic, the Serbian bishop whose mystical antisemitic ideas had previously been beyond the bounds of political respectability. During the war, his ideas found a wider audience, indicating a weakening of political constraints against such notions.
Author(s): Byford, Jovan
Date: 2003
Abstract: This paper proposes that understanding the causes of anti-Semitic hate crime requires the
recognition of the cultural specificity of anti-Semitism, reflected in its unique mythical and
conspiratorial nature. By neglecting to consider the idiosyncrasies of anti-Semitic rhetoric,
general theories of hate crime often fail to provide an adequate explanation for the
persistence of anti-Jewish violence, especially in cultures where Jews do not constitute a
conspicuous minority, or where there is no noticeable tradition of anti-Jewish sentiment.
This point is illustrated using as an example the emergence of anti-Semitic hate crime in
Serbia in the aftermath of political changes in October 2000. The paper explores this
development in the context of Serbia’s recent past, arguing that the onset of violent
incidents towards Jews entailed two distinct but related stages, both of which are linked to
the conspiratorial nature of anti-Semitic ideology. The first phase – which culminated at
the time of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia – involved the proliferation of the belief in
Jewish conspiracy. At this stage, anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, which were to be found
even in the mainstream media, retained an ‘abstract’ quality and their proliferation did
not, in itself, lead to anti-Jewish hate crime. The onset of anti-Semitic violence is
associated with the second phase, which followed Milošević’s downfall, when, with the
marginalisation of conspiratorial culture, the belief in Jewish conspiracy, as an abstract
ideological position, became reified and transformed into concrete instances of violence
against the local Jewish population. In exploring this two-stage process, the paper
highlights the way in which a closer examination of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories and
other anti-Semitic texts can help shed some light on the dynamic underpinning the
persistence of anti-Jewish hate crime in modern society.
Author(s): Ehsan, Rakib
Date: 2020
Abstract: he Government needs to step up efforts to address attempts by the far-right to blame the COVID-19 pandemic on Jews, according to a think tank report.

The conspiracies are said to have permeated every corner of the internet, including encrypted apps like Telegram and everyday digital tools like podcasts. Despite much of the recent political and media focus being on mainstream platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, the report finds the most ardent forms of hatred circulate on peripheral so-called ‘alt-tech’ platforms.

The study — by the Henry Jackson Society — comes as it was revealed that Facebook has taken robust action in banning adverts by extremist group, which have attempted to sow the seeds of division amidst the COVID-19 crisis.

Among the online messages spread by the far-right identified within the report, are that:

Jews are using global lockdowns to “steal everything”.
“Satan in human form”, or Jewish people, are throwing dance parties to celebrate the spread of the coronavirus.
Jewish public leaders are using the COVID-19 crisis to “test the populations [sic] willingness to comply” with authoritarian restrictions on their civil liberties.
COVID-19 is being used as part of a plot to replace the ‘white’ population of Europe.
Those infected with the coronavirus should visit their local synagogue and mosque, and more broadly ethnically-diverse neighbourhoods, in order to spread the disease.
Jews spread the bubonic plague through Europe in the Middle Ages and demonstrate an inherent tendency for killing large numbers of non-Jews through efficient methods.
In response, the author recommends the introduction of stronger forms of internet regulation for alt-tech social media platforms, including a review by the Commission for Countering Extremism (CCE) and extensive training for law enforcement officers on the full scope of alt-tech platforms. The report also recommends that the Home Office establish a new counter-disinformation unit to tackle online conspiracy theories head-on by “exposing their fundamental lack of credibility, through well-organised social media campaigns”.

This material is said to be circulating on both sides of the Atlantic with extremist messaging from the British National Socialist Movement in the UK and the National Socialist Movement in the United States. The similarities between the content across the Atlantic is identified by the author as an area of particular concern
Date: 2021
Abstract: Overt state-sponsored antisemitism ended in Europe with the fall of the Soviet Union. Antisemitic attitudes, however, remain prevalent in Europe, and some European political actors have instrumentalized antisemitism for political gain. This report examines both the conscious use of antisemitism in European politics and the calculated tolerance of antisemitism, demonstrating that the oldest hatred remains a modern political tool.

Unlike antisemitic incidents of violence, vandalism, or insults, the political use of antisemitism does not target Jews themselves. Instead, antisemitic propaganda targets domestic or foreign audiences as a means of gaining political support. Demonstrating tolerance for antisemitism is another tactic of attracting political support. Polling data shows that these strategies have a rational basis. ADL’s 2019 Global 100 survey of antisemitic attitudes found that one in four Europeans polled harbored antisemitic beliefs.

Antisemitic propaganda has as its goal to energize and attract followers. Antisemitic propaganda is also used to tarnish political opponents in the eyes of a specific audience by intimating that someone is Jewish, supportive of Jewish causes or of the State of Israel. Other times, political opponents are slandered as antisemites or Nazis to diminish their reputations with specific audiences. Each of these techniques will be covered in this report, which focuses on the conscious choice of instrumentalizing or tolerating antisemitism for political gain. Antisemitic rhetoric by political actors as an indicator of bias is a much broader topic, and this report does not cover those instances.

The broad categories of the politicization of antisemitism include (1) politically motivated accusations of, or uses of, antisemitism against political opponents; (2) political appeals to antisemitic beliefs among the public, including the conspiracy theories about Jewish control of government, economy, media; and (3) tolerance of antisemitism within political movements as a strategy for increasing popular support. This list not exhaustive of the political instrumentalization of antisemitism, but this report provides illustrative examples from recent years in these broad categories.

Why is this report important? While violent antisemitic attacks receive wide publicity – and rightly so – the politicization of antisemitism can also severely impact Jewish communities. The British Jewish community provides a compelling example.

In January 2015, 11% of British Jews were considering emigrating, according to a poll by the UK’s Jewish Chronicle. That survey was conducted before Jeremy Corbyn, widely regarded within the British Jewish community as an antisemite himself, was even a leadership candidate for the Labour party. In September 2018, after antisemitism had become a serious problem in the Labour party under Corbyn, the Jewish Chronicle poll found that 39% of British Jews were considering emigrating. And in an October 2019 poll by the UK’s Jewish Leadership Council, just prior to the UK General Election, 47% of British Jews said they would “seriously consider” leaving the UK if Jeremy Corbyn were to win the election.

Had Jeremy Corbyn won, leading a major party widely recognized as tolerating antisemitism among its members, and had even 30% of British Jews emigrated as a result of that single event, that number of roughly 90,000 Jews would have been similar to the total of all the French Jews who left France over the past 20 years.

The sections below are select examples of the different ways in which antisemitism has been instrumentalized for political gain by various actors. The purposes and tactics vary substantially, but have the common element of politicizing antisemitism:

The Russian government instrumentalized antisemitism in the forms of propaganda and “false flag” operations to influence domestic and foreign public opinion in its conflict with Ukraine.
Polish political campaigns used overt antisemitic rhetoric during elections to win votes.
The Hungarian government used coded antisemitism in political campaigns against EU migration policies.
The UK Labour party consciously tolerated antisemitism to widen its political support from far-left radicals.
Ukrainian nationalists glorified World War II era fighters to promote nationalist narratives, while trivializing their involvement in the Holocaust.
The far-right Alternative for Germany party trivialized the Holocaust as part of their appeal to “Holocaust fatigue” among German voters.
Other political actors have engaged in similar acts of politicization, and their absence from this report is not indicative of any assessment. The cases below are simply the most blatant examples of the types of politicization to be highlighted.
Author(s): Burke, Shani
Date: 2017
Abstract: This thesis uses critical discursive psychology to analyse anti-Semitic and Islamophobic discourse on the Facebook pages of two far-right organisations: Britain First and the English Defence League. Using the Charlie Hebdo attack as a time frame, I examine how the far-right manage their identity and maintain rationality online, as well as how users on Facebook respond to the far-right. This thesis demonstrates how Britain First and the English Defence League present themselves as reasonable in their anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic stance following the Charlie Hebdo shooting. Ultimately, I bring together the study of fascist discourse and political discourse on social media using critical discursive psychology, in a novel synthesis. The Charlie Hebdo shooting and the shooting at the kosher supermarket in Paris in January 2015 (as well as other attacks by members of the Islamic State) have led to Muslims being seen as a threat to Britain, and thus Muslims have been exposed to Islamophobic attacks and racial abuse. The current climate is a challenging situation for the far-right, as they are presented with the dilemma of appearing as rational and even mainstream, whilst nevertheless adopting an anti-Islamic stance. The analysis focuses on how Britain First and the English Defence League used the shooting at the Kosher supermarket to align with Jews in order to construct them as under threat from Islam, and promote its anti-Islamic stance. I also analyse visual communication used by Britain First to provide evidence that Britain First supported Jewish communities. Discourse from Facebook users transitioned from supportive towards Jews, to questioning the benefits that Jews brought to Britain, and expressing Holocaust denial. Furthermore, I discuss how other far-right politicians in Europe such as Geert Wilders from the Dutch Party for Freedom, portrayed himself as a reasonable politician in the anti-Islamic stance he has taken in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack. Findings are discussed in light of how the far-right communicate about the Charlie Hebdo shooting whilst maintaining a reasonable stance when projecting anti-Semitic and Islamophobic ideology, and how such discourse can encompass hate speech. I demonstrate how critical discursive psychology can be used to show how various conflicting social identities are constructed and interact with each other online. This thesis shows how the far-right use aligning with Jews as means to present Muslims as problematic, and how such alignment has resulted in the marginalisation of both Jews and Muslims.
Date: 2020
Date: 2003
Translated Title: On a new antisemitic moment
Author(s): Birnbaum, Pierre
Date: 2015
Author(s): Knobel, Marc
Date: 2013
Abstract: La France n’est pas un pays raciste ou antisémite. Il n’y existe plus d’antisémitisme institutionnalisé comme cela fut le cas dans les années 40. Il faut donc éviter de dresser des comparaisons obscènes avec l’Occupation et la Shoah, mais on ne peut que constater que les violences, allant jusqu’à l’assassinat, et les menaces contre les juifs et leurs institutions, ont considérablement augmenté depuis l’année 2000.

Marc Knobel explique pourquoi les choses se sont envenimées à ce point, quelquefois dans l’indifférence des politiques et des médias. Il ne convient pas de faire de l’angélisme et d’ignorer la réalité. L’hostilité à l’endroit des juifs s’est largement développée chez les jeunes qui vivent dans des quartiers dits sensibles et qui, souvent discriminés ou victimisés, sont en quête d’identité et s’identifient aux Palestiniens.

Ils glissent très vite de l’antisionisme à l’antisémitisme, d’Israël à Juifs. Le conflit israélo-palestinien joue donc ici un rôle majeur. Notons que ce conflit sert aussi d’alibi à l’expression de l’antisémitisme dans des milieux plus privilégiés culturellement et socialement. De plus, les islamistes font des banlieues défavorisées le lieu préféré de diffusion de leurs idées. Dans les prêches ou à travers Internet, ils présentent une vision d’un Islam qui serait assiégé, menacé par les Américains, les Européens et les juifs.

Cette vision complotiste du monde est d’autant plus grave que de jeunes déshérités entendent et lisent régulièrement leur propagande, s’en nourrissent en pensant y trouver l’explication de leur désarroi dans une société qui n’a pas su les intégrer. Les antisémites pensent que les juifs sont protégés, ils imaginent qu’ils sont tous riches et puissants. Les vieux stéréotypes sont là. L’antisémitisme, tout comme toute autre forme de racisme, est inacceptable.

Il est une injure à la République et ses effets peuvent se révéler dramatiquement, car ceux qui utilisent et manient l’antisémitisme s’illustrent par leurs appels incessants à la haine, à la violence et au meurtre.
Author(s): Kalmar, Ivan
Date: 2020
Date: 2013