

EC-275

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 27

Anti-Semitism Among Hungarian College and University Students

Andras Kovács and Gyorgy Fischer



The American Jewish Committee

The American Jewish Committee protects the rights and freedoms of Jews the world over combats bigotry and anti Semitism and promotes human rights for all works for the security of Israel and deepened understanding between Americans and Israelis advocates public policy positions rooted in American democratic values and the perspectives of the Jewish heritage and enhances the creative vitality of the Jewish people Founded in 1906, it is the pioneer human relations agency in the United States

Anti-Semitism Among Hungarian College and University Students

Andras Kovacs and Gyorgy Fischer

András Kovács is professor of sociology at the Loránd Eötvös University Budapest and György Fischer is research director at the Gallup Institute in Budapest

Research for this study was supported by the American Jewish Committee and the Hungarian National Scientific Research Fund. The face to face interviews were carried out by the Szonda Ipsos Institute of Public Opinion Research Budapest. The assistance of the Institute of Sociology at the Loránd Eötvös University and the Gallup Institute is also gratefully acknowledged.

FOREWORD

The fall of communism has made possible the revival of Jewish communal and political life in Central and Eastern Europe. Tragically many of these communities—decimated by the Nazi Holocaust and decades of political repression—are quite small and their future is uncertain. By way of contrast Hungary's Jewish community numbers 80 100 000 the third largest in Europe outside of the former Soviet Union.

Attitude surveys have revealed anti Jewish sentiments in Hungary to be among the lowest in Central Europe but anti Semitic voices can still be heard particularly in the political arena. While right wing and ultranationalist forces were soundly defeated in the recent elections there is obviously a great deal of dissatisfaction with the current program of economic reform. It is unlikely that political and social stability will quickly be achieved.

In such a climate it will matter greatly whether social elites in the country will stand by or actively oppose any new appeals to anti Semitism. It is this group that the authors of the present study seek to examine through their survey of university students—the future social elite—in Hungary. What is their image and their view of Hungarian Jewry and how will their impressions shape the country's attitudes in the coming years?

These questions are particularly relevant since Hungarian Jews are wrestling with their own problems of self definition. Prior to the Holocaust they were unabashedly assimilationist they took pride in their deep roots and easy acceptance in Hungarian society. Following the war and the destruction of more than half a million Hungarian Jews such convictions were severely shaken. Now after decades of communist repression there are genuine possibilities for the full realization of Jewish identity.

While the most secular may continue to describe themselves in whispered tones as Hungarians of Jewish origin and avoid all communal ties many others will surely seek the new opportunities available for Jewish self expression. Unfortunately all Jews will still be challenged by right wing extremists who insist that Hungarian Jewry is a permanently foreign element in an otherwise homogeneous society. Will the emerging social elites in Hungary reject such ideas? If so it would offer hopeful signs that Hungarians are prepared to see their country as a pluralist nation one in which a revived Jewish community can expect to hold a rightful and secure place.

Rabbi Andrew Baker
Director of European Affairs

ANTI SEMITISM AMONG HUNGARIAN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

Anti-Semitism appeared openly in Hungary—as it did in most East bloc countries—after the fall of communism. Some of its manifestations there differ in no way from its manifestations in the Western world. Inarticulate forms of racism—including anti-Semitism—that compensate for social frustrations are spreading among those threatened by unemployment and social marginalization, including skinheads and other youth groups in the subculture.

At the same time, however, a form of anti-Semitism used by certain middle class groups to differentiate themselves from competing groups began to appear more openly in the years following 1990. The first manifestation of this sort of anti-Semitism was the separate incorporation of an organization of Christian doctors (which at the time stirred up strong debate) and attempts to organize an association of Christian teachers. As the organizers of these groups themselves stated, the word "Christian" was to be understood in a wider sense than its denominational meaning. However, a certain reading of their definition allowed for the exclusion of Jews.

After the changes in 1990, political anti-Semitism also reappeared in Hungary. This form of anti-Semitism differs little from the ethnocentric, xenophobic nationalism that appeared between the two world wars and that pointed to Jews as a foreign group dangerous to the nation.

Clearly, we cannot say whether these manifestations of prejudice signal a dramatic growth in anti-Semitism since the fall of communism or whether anti-Semitic attitudes existed all along and are now being openly expressed because of the opportunities provided by the introduction of civil and political freedoms. Although there has been a notable increase in the open expression of anti-Semitism (in comparison with the past regime), anti-Semitic groups remain at the perimeter of society and anti-Semitic ideologies have been rejected in most political circles, even (after some vacillation and struggle) among the leadership of the largest conservative political grouping and the largest party of the government from 1990 to 1994, the Hungarian Democratic Forum. The small, openly anti-Semitic fascist groups are at the lunatic fringe of Hungarian politics today. In the May 1994 parliamentary elections, the extreme nationalist and anti-Semitic party of the previous parliament, the Hungarian Truth and Life Party (MIÉP), which was made up of representatives drummed out of the Hungarian Democratic Forum¹, received only 1.58 percent of the vote. As a result, MIÉP was unable to win any parliamentary seats since Hungary's election rules require a party to win at least 5 percent of all votes to be represented in parliament.

Nonetheless, the open appearance of anti-Semitism has raised concerns among Hungary's 100,000 Jews—concern that what happened after the First World War might happen again.

As Ezra Mendelsohn put it Hungary was then a unique example of how a country good for the Jews is transformed almost overnight into a country wrecked with pogroms and permeated with anti-Semitic hysteria ²

These concerns are valid even if signs of hysteria have yet to appear in Hungary Valid because the open manifestations of anti-Semitism indicate the breaking of a taboo that was established for anti Semites throughout Europe by the war and the Holocaust In Germany Poland and Hungary statements are being openly made in the press that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago It may well be that this new anti-Semitism will remain a marginal aspect of Hungarian society but it also may be that current social and economic crises will prepare the soil for a widespread political movement that will actively embrace anti-Semitism as a way of explaining the world and creating an identity for certain groups

How great in fact is the possibility that political anti-Semitism will grow more powerful in Hungary? History shows that for political anti-Semitism to effectively spread it must not be opposed by social elites For an anti-Semitic party to be formed and spread the active support of some of the elite must be gained and the political alternatives and ideologies anti-Semitism offers to overcome perceived social and political problems must at least not be rejected by a significant part of the elite On the other hand if elites consciously reject anti-Semitic ideologies anti-Semitism cannot be a serious threat It is the determining role of the elite in the spread of political anti-Semitism that motivated us to carry out a survey of anti-Semitic attitudes among Hungarian college and university students the elite of the future

About the Survey

In the course of the survey we interviewed 1 000 students at institutions of higher education in December 1992 and January 1993 The makeup of the sample in terms of sex, age school type and location was representative of all college and university students in Hungary Fifty one percent of those interviewed were men 49 percent women Their age distribution is shown in Table 1 school types and locations in Table 2

Table 1
Age distribution (in percents)

18-19 years	28
20-21 years	39
22-23 years	25
24 years and above	8

Table 2
School type and location (in percents)

<i>School type</i>	
University faculty of law	5
University faculty of humanities	10
University faculty of science	8
University of medicine	13
Technical university	14
University of economics	5
College of engineering	10
College of economics	3
College of teacher training	20
College of agriculture	9
College of arts	3
<i>School type and location</i>	
University in Budapest	31
College in Budapest	14
University outside Budapest	31
College outside Budapest	24

When the survey was carried out scarcely 15 percent of the 20-24 age group in Hungary were college or university students compared to 30-40 percent of the same age groups in Western Europe and more than 60 percent in the United States. This low level of participation in higher education explains why the social status of the families of college and university students is much higher than the national average in Hungary.

Thirty-three percent of the students' families lived in Budapest and only 16 percent in villages. In comparison, only one-fifth of Hungary's total population lives in Budapest and two-fifths in villages. Twenty-five percent of the students' fathers were employed in managerial positions and another 23 percent had lower-level white-collar jobs. Ten percent of the students' mothers were employed in managerial positions and 28 percent held lower-level white-collar jobs. In comparison, only 5 percent of the total working population occupy managerial positions and only 10 percent hold lower-level white-collar jobs.

Thirty-three percent of the students in the sample came from families where both parents had diplomas while 28 percent had at least one parent who had completed college or university. In comparison, only 12 percent of the total population of working age have completed higher education.

Thirty-two percent of the students' families could be categorized as upper class, 25 percent as upper middle class, and only 20 percent as lower middle or lower class.

Thus the sample we tested was—from the standpoint of important demographic and sociocultural characteristics (age, education, social status, cultural background)—remarkably homogeneous. A sample of this kind is representative neither of Hungarian society as a whole nor of the younger generation in Hungary. However, the sample's homogeneity enabled us to examine attitudes toward Jews among the future social and intellectual elite.

Opinions about Jews

According to estimates, between 80,000 and 100,000 Jews live in Hungary; the majority of them in the nation's capital, Budapest. Although the number of publications dealing with Hungarian Jewish history and current social conditions has increased since the mid-80s, our survey shows that Hungary's future intellectuals are ill-informed about the number of Jews living in Hungary. Seventeen percent of our respondents overestimated the number of Jewish people living in Hungary by 400,000 or more (Table 3). Conversely, they tended to underestimate the number of Hungarian Jews killed in the Second World War (Table 4).

Table 3
Students' estimates of the Jewish population of Hungary

Estimate	Percent
25 000-50 000	5
50 000-100 000	14
100 000-250 000	26
250 000-500 000	24
500 000-1 000 000	17
Do not know/no answer	14

Table 4
Students' estimates of the number of Hungarian Jews killed in the Holocaust

Estimate	Percent
50 000-100 000	13
100 000-250 000	16
250 000-500 000	23
500 000-750 000	19
750 000-1 000 000	15
1 000 000-2,000 000	5
Do not know/no answer	9

Table 5
Students estimates of the number of Holocaust victims by
their estimates of the Jewish population (in percents)

Population estimates	Holocaust estimates				Total
	Over estimated	Correctly estimated	Under estimated	Do not know	
Overestimated	14	14	36	3	67
Correctly estimated	2	3	8	1	14
Underestimated	1	1	3	0	5
Do not know	1	2	5	6	14
Total	18	20	52	10	100

Fifty two percent of the students thought that fewer than half a million Hungarian Jews died while in reality more than 500 000 did so

The question arises whether the overestimates of the number of Jews living in the country and the underestimates of the number of Jews killed in the war are related Therefore we attempted to find out whether those who had made overestimates in the first case were those who made underestimates in the second And indeed there was a correlation (Table 5) 36 percent of those who overestimated the number of Jews living in Hungary underestimated the number of Jews killed in the Holocaust

We also wanted to know what sort of person the students imagined when they expressed their opinions about Jews—in other words just who they thought Jews were A majority (61 percent) agreed with the statement that only those who considered themselves to be Jews should be considered Jewish (Table 6) This response—that Jewishness is a question of self definition—reflects the paradigm of assimilation that developed after the emancipation of Jews in Hungary

Measurement of Anti Semitism

The main purpose of our survey was to measure the frequency and intensity of anti Semitic beliefs among college and university students The literature generally differentiates three dimensions of prejudice the cognitive (the frequency of prejudicial stereotyping) the affec

Table 6
Students definition of Jews (in percents)

Definition	Agree	Disagree	No answer
Only members of the religious community are Jews	32	66	2
Only those who define themselves as Jewish are Jews	61	37	2
Everybody is Jewish whose ancestors were Jewish	38	60	2

tive (social distance and the intensity of feeling) and the behavioral (the willingness to discriminate)

We attempted to measure all three by asking the students to decide whether they agreed or disagreed with given statements or whether they considered the statements to be more true than false. The statements were developed in a way that allowed us to separate them into three groups corresponding to the three dimensions of prejudice. Items in each group were picked out of a large number of question items so as to ensure that the items selected measured identical dimensions of prejudice.

In the evaluation of the students' responses we considered that not every anti-Semitic statement was of equally powerful anti-Semitic content. For instance, if someone agrees that Jews are 'wheeler-dealers' he or she is certainly not as anti-Semitic as someone who thinks that Jews destroy the nations that accept them.

It is generally known that acceptance of opinions widely held in a society reflects a lower level of prejudice than belief in unusual and unapproved opinions. Thus we assigned less weight to acceptance of statements that met with widespread agreement and more weight to acceptance of statements that were generally rejected.

To measure the cognitive dimension of prejudice among our students we asked them to agree or disagree with eighteen common stereotypes of Jews (Table 7). These included

Table 7
Students' agreement with Jewish stereotypes

Stereotype	Percent agreeing
1. Jews tend to be wheel-dealers	78
2. Jews tend to be materialistic	75
3. Jews tend to be cynical	69
4. Jews powerfully influence international economics	68
5. Jews tend to be ambitious	63
6. Jews tend to be cunning	61
7. Jews tend to be pharisees	59
8. Jews are partly responsible for anti-Jewish sentiments	51
9. Jews still consider themselves to be God-chosen people	48
10. Jews tend to be greedy	39
11. Jews talk through their teeth	29
12. Jews don't accept Christian values	18
13. Jews tend not to be honest	18
14. Jews tend to be selfish	13
15. Jews generally hide the fact that they work together	12
16. Jews tend to be lazy	5
17. Jews weaken and destroy the nations who take them in	5
18. Jews tend to be dirty	4

Table 8
Students' agreement with attitudinal statements

Statement	Percent agreeing
1. It is important to know whether or not someone's family is Jewish	43
2. Marrying with someone of Jewish descent would be a problem for me	37
3. Jews look down on others	27
4. You've got to be careful around Jews	16
5. There is merit in Jewish marriages where the husband or wife is Jewish	14
6. It is important to know whether or not your friend is Jewish	12
7. There are merit jobs where Jews work too	11
8. There is merit in being a friend of a Jew	7
9. I would not share a department with a Jew	6
10. It is better not to deal with Jews	5
11. I dislike Jews	3
12. It is important to know whether or not your colleagues in university are Jewish	2
13. I'd be comfortable if I had to work with a Jew if I graduated	2
14. The best thing would be for the Jews to leave the country	2

stereotypes assigning negative characteristics (13 5-8 10 13 14 16 18) stereotypes concerning secret Jewish conspiracies (4 11 15) theological stereotypes (9 12) and one stereotype about the destructive Jew (17) The results are shown in the table.

To measure the emotional strength of prejudiced attitudes toward Jews and the social distance maintained from Jews we asked the students to agree or disagree with fourteen attitudinal statements (Table 8)

The third dimension of anti Jewish prejudice—that is the willingness of the students to discriminate against Jews—was measured by asking them to agree or disagree with ten statements advocating discriminatory action (Table 9)

From the three groups of statements presented to our students we constructed scales of prejudiced stereotyping social distance and discrimination When the average for each scale was fixed at zero individual scores became instantly comprehensible when compared to the average any score below the average was negative any above average was positive As a result of this transformation the three scales also became comparable.

Table 9
Students' agreement with discriminatory statements

Statement	Percent agreeing
1 Jews should only have as much influence on the direction the country is to take as their percentage of the total population	39
2. A person who does business with a Jewish businessman can never be too cautious	29
3 Jews cause problems in Hungary	23
4 People who want to limit the Jews' role in public life should be able to freely express their views	21
5 People who regularly make anti Jewish statements should be able to freely express their views	17
6 It would be better for Jews to be present in some occupational groups in accordance with their percentage of the population	15
7 People who want to make the Jews leave Hungary should be able to freely express their views.	12
8 It would be better if the Jews had no influence at all on the governing of the country	3
9 People who want to take violent measures against the Jews should be able to freely express their views.	3
10 The Jews should be stimulated to leave Hungary	2

Table 10
Average scores of five groups of students on three scales

Group	Scale			N
	Prejudiced stereotypes	Distance	Discrimination	
Group 1	-0.8757	-0.5217	-0.5636	390
Group 2	0.5423	-0.0218	-0.4598	316
Group 3	0.4946	0.2452	0.9783	182
Group 4	1.4967	2.3543	1.5270	75
Group 5	-0.8680	-0.2933	1.9602	37

Next, based on the scores measured on the three scales we grouped the students according to the number of prejudiced stereotypes held against Jews the intensity of dislike displayed toward Jews and the social distance maintained from them and the willingness to discriminate against Jews. Using cluster analysis we defined five groups. Table 10 displays the positions of the five groups average scores on the prejudiced stereotyping social distance and discrimination scales.

Group 1 (39 percent of the students) scored below average on all three scales thus showing no prejudiced stereotyping against Jews and no tendency to maintain a social distance from or to discriminate against Jews. In what follows this group will be called the non-anti-Semitic group.

Group 2 (32 percent of the students) displayed a relatively high degree of stereotyping. Their distancing attitudes were generally close to the sample average. Their willingness to discriminate however was lower than the average. We will call them the anti-Semitically inclined group.

Group 3 (18 percent of the students) scored above average on all three scales but these scores—as we will see—were lower than the fourth group's scores. This group can be characterized as having definitely anti-Jewish attitudes which is why we called them anti-Semitic.

Group 4 (nearly 7 percent of the students) scored much higher than average on the prejudiced stereotyping social distance and discrimination scales. We can confidently call this group extremely anti-Semitic.

Group 5 (4 percent of the students) was as unprejudiced as the non-anti-Semites far less likely than the average to distance themselves from Jews but scored high on the discrimination scale.

Our analysis threw light on the reason for this strange—at first glance incomprehensible—constellation of groups. As we have seen the scale measuring discrimination contained four items that asked whether the respondent felt that "people should be able to freely spread" views hostile to Jews. Now agreement with these statements may be an expression of anti-Semitism or it may be a manifestation of extreme liberalism.

Table 11
Attitudes toward Jews of Hungarian college and university students

Attitude	Percent
Non anti-Semitic	39
Anti-Semitically inclined	32
Anti-Semitic	18
Extremely anti Semitic	7
Extremely liberal	4

Analysis has shown that group 5 had a high score on the discrimination scale because its members strongly agreed with the four items above while simultaneously agreeing with no other anti Jewish statement (as the very low stereotyping and distance scale values show) It seems that these students had high scores on the discrimination scale because they gave doctrinaire liberal answers to the four questions This is why we chose to call them the extremely liberal group

The results of our classification of Hungarian college and university students in the 1990s are shown in Table 11 To sum up we can say that 43 percent of Hungarian college and university students are free of all forms of anti-Semitism while 25 percent are anti Semitic to greater or lesser degrees and 32 percent share some common negative stereotypes about Jews

Who Are the Anti-Semites?

The next question we tried to answer was who the anti Semites and non anti-Semites are The differences in the proportion of various demographic and socio-cultural subgroups among the anti-Semites and non anti Semites are relatively small

We looked first for clues based on sex and age (Table 12) When we looked at differ

Table 12
Students attitudes toward Jews by sex and age (in percents)

	Non anti-Semitic	Anti Semitically inclined	Anti-Semitic	Extremely anti Semitic	Extremely liberal
Total	39	32	18	7	4
Sex					
Female	43	28	19	7	3
Male	36	35	17	8	4
Age					
18 20 years	38	31	19	8	4
21 23 years	41	30	19	7	3
24 and over	37	41	12	6	4

Table 13
Students attitudes toward Jews by residence (in percents)

	Non- anti- Semitic	Anti Semitically inclined	Anti- Semitic	Extremely anti- Semitic	Extremely liberal
Total	39	32	18	7	4
<i>Residence</i>					
Budapest	39	34	19	5	3
County seat	44	28	17	7	4
Other town	31	34	18	10	7
Village	40	30	20	9	1

ences between the sexes we found no significant difference in the percentages of men and women who were members of the anti-Semitic and extremely anti-Semitic groups. However, noticeably more men indulged in prejudiced stereotyping, and thus there were far fewer men than women in the non anti-Semitic group.

With increases in age, the percentage of those classified as anti-Semitic and extremely anti-Semitic falls (from 27 to 18 percent) while the percentage of those anti-Semitically inclined grows (from 31 to 41 percent). No solid connection could be found between the percentage of non anti-Semites and age.

When we analyzed the students' attitudes by place of residence (Table 13), we found that as the size of a student's hometown decreased, the likelihood of his or her being anti-Semitic increased. 24 percent of students who grew up in Budapest or large cities were likely to be anti-Semitic, 28 percent of students from small cities, and 29 percent of students from villages. Only 5.7 percent of students from Budapest or other large cities were extremely anti-Semitic. This percentage reached 9.10 percent among students from small cities and villages. The outstandingly low number of non anti-Semites among students who grew up in small cities is partly caused by the high proportion of extreme liberals in this group.

The most striking result to come out of the examination of the students' attitudes with reference to their parents' education and social status⁴ was that a U-shaped distribution was found in the group of extreme anti-Semites (Table 14). This means that the percentages of those harboring anti-Semitic prejudices were relatively high among the children of parents of high educational and social levels as well as among children of parents of low educational and social levels.

A similar distribution can be observed among the non anti-Semites, with the difference that in this case the U is upside down. Among non anti-Semites, the percentages of those with parents of high educational and social levels and with parents of low educational and social levels were relatively low. According to all indicators, anti-Semitism arises from different sources among these two groups, as we will show below in the examination of the content of anti-Semitism.

Table 14
Students attitudes toward Jews, by parents' education and social status
(in percents)

	Non- anti- Semitic	Anti- Semitically inclined	Anti- Semitic	Extremely anti- Semitic	Extremely liberal
Total	39	32	18	7	4
<i>Education</i>					
Both have university degrees	35	29	21	10	5
One has a degree	44	32	15	6	3
Both completed secondary school	38	36	19	4	3
One completed secondary school	42	31	17	4	6
Both have lower qualifications	37	30	18	13	2
<i>Social status</i>					
Upper class	36	29	20	10	5
Upper middle class	42	34	18	4	2
Middle class	41	32	18	5	4
Lower middle class	43	31	16	6	4
Lower class	35	31	20	12	2

It also follows from these results that anti-Semitic prejudices are more likely to be manifested by students on the fast track of upward social mobility as well as by those for whom the acquisition of a diploma does not represent social mobility. In contrast those whose upward mobility is somewhat slower than that of earlier generations were somewhat less likely to manifest anti-Semitic prejudices.

When we examined the students' attitudes with reference to their families' material conditions (Table 15) we observed other interesting tendencies. Although among children of

Table 15
Students attitudes toward Jews, by parents' wealth (in percents)

	Non- anti- Semitic	Anti- Semitically inclined	Anti- Semitic	Extremely anti- Semitic	Extremely liberal
Total	39	32	18	7	4
<i>Wealth</i>					
Wealthy	22	45	29	2	2
Much property	37	36	17	8	2
Some property	39	28	20	8	5
Little property	41	31	16	8	4
No property	43	34	17	4	2

decidedly wealthy families⁵ the percentage of those who were extreme anti Semites was low the percentages of anti-Semites and anti-Semiticly inclined were however much higher As a result, students from wealthy backgrounds had the lowest percentage of non-anti-Semites (22 percent) Percentages of non-anti-Semites rose with the fall of the students families material well being all the way down to the decidedly poor group of whom 43 percent were found to be non anti-Semites The percentage of extreme anti-Semites was highest among the moderately well to-do (8 percent) and was lower among the two groups at the extreme ends of our scale of wealth When on the other hand we examined the combined percentages of anti-Semites and extreme anti-Semites we found that this percentage was highest among the wealthy (31 percent) As wealth declined the percentages of those holding anti-Semitic attitudes also fell only 21 percent of the poor harbored such sentiments

In reviewing the data according to higher-educational institution (Table 16) the higher percentage of extreme anti Semites attending country colleges or universities (8-10 percent) compared to those studying in Budapest (6-7 percent) was striking Similarly with the combined anti-Semite and extreme anti-Semite data, the percentage of students being educated in the country's capital—Budapest—who harbored anti-Semitic attitudes (21 percent of those at a Budapest university and 26 percent of those at a Budapest college) was lower than among those attending college or university in smaller towns (27 percent of those at a university outside Budapest and 30 percent of those at a college outside Budapest)

University students from both Budapest and the country were less likely to be anti Semites than the students attending colleges⁶ The percentage of non anti Semites was highest among university students in Budapest (43 percent)

Table 16
Students attitudes toward Jews, by place and type of school (in percents)

	Non- anti Semitic	Anti- Semitically inclined	Anti- Semitic	Extremely anti- Semitic	Extremely liberal
Total	39	32	18	7	4
<i>Place of school</i>					
University in Budapest	43	31	15	6	5
College in Budapest	32	41	19	7	1
University outside Budapest	38	31	19	8	4
College outside Budapest	38	28	20	10	4
<i>Type of school</i>					
College of engineering	26	37	26	8	3
College of agriculture	38	28	21	12	1
Univ faculty of law	49	19	21	7	4
University of economics	50	21	25	2	2
College of teacher training	43	28	19	7	3
College of economics	33	43	12	12	0
Technical university	34	37	15	9	5
University of medicine	31	38	18	6	7
Univ faculty of humanities	45	28	18	3	6
College of arts	33	47	10	10	0
Univ faculty of science	54	26	8	10	2

The combined percentages of anti-Semites and extreme anti-Semites were highest in engineering colleges (34 percent) and agricultural colleges (33 percent) In these institutions the percentage of non-anti-Semites was exceedingly low It would not be an exaggeration to say that a strongly anti-Semitic climate pervades these institutions—at least compared with other institutions of higher education (These institutions have the lowest entrance requirements of all in the Hungarian higher-educational system)

Students at law universities economics universities and teacher training colleges can be typified as holding a certain type of polarized opinion regarding Jews The combined percentages of anti Semites and extreme anti-Semites were relatively high (28 percent of those at law universities 27 percent of those at economics universities and 26 percent of those at teacher training colleges) but so were the percentages of those displaying no form of anti-Semitism whatsoever (43-50 percent) This contrast springs from the fact that the percentage of the anti-Semitically inclined was relatively low

A third group of institutions was composed of economics colleges technical universities and medical universities Among students attending these institutions the percentage of anti Semites was approximately the same as the sample average (24 percent) The percentage of non anti-Semites was however somewhat lower than the average (31 34 percent) This was due to the fact that the number of these students who belonged to the “anti-Semitically inclined” group was higher than the average

Finally a fourth group of institutions was made up of the humanities and science departments of the universities The institutions in this group produce the majority of the country’s future teachers Relatively few of the students attending these institutions could be described as anti-Semites (18-21 percent) or as anti-Semitically inclined (26-28 percent) and a relatively high percentage of them were non-anti-Semitic It appears that, of all students attending institutions of higher education in Hungary anti Jewish prejudices are least common among students attending these schools

When we reviewed our data from the point of view of religion (Table 17)⁷ our most interesting finding was that the attitudes of the Calvinists were more polarized than those

Table 17
Students attitudes toward Jews, by religious denomination (in percents)

	Non- anti- Semitic	Anti- Semitically inclined	Anti- Semitic	Extremely anti- Semitic	Extremely liberal
Total	39	32	18	7	4
<i>Religious denomination</i>					
Catholic	38	34	18	7	3
Calvinist	43	26	19	9	3
Lutheran	26	37	29	3	5
Other	40	40	10	10	0
None	44	26	16	9	5

of the Catholics higher percentages of Calvinists proved to be anti Semitic and non-anti Semitic. The percentage of anti Semites among Catholics was identical with the sample percentage but Catholics were somewhat more likely than the average to manifest prejudiced stereotyping. The small numbers of those belonging to other denominations made it impossible for us to come to any conclusion regarding their attitudes toward Jews. The nondenominational group contained the highest percentage of non anti-Semites.

The percentages of anti-Semites and extreme anti-Semites increased in parallel with increases in religiosity (Table 18) only 20 percent of those who were nonreligious were anti Semites or extreme anti-Semites while 33 percent of the most religious belonged to these categories. Conversely as religiosity rose the percentage of non anti-Semites fell (from 46 to 30 percent).

A Causal Explanation of Anti-Semitism

The analysis of our data led us to seek a causal explanation of anti-Semitism. We attempted to discover if the anti Semitic prejudices we measured could be arranged so as to be explained (through regression analysis, Lisrel modeling) by the respondents' social characteristics and attitudes.

We first established that the demographic and sociocultural variables did not adequately explain the presence or absence of anti-Semitic prejudices among the groups surveyed. We then examined whether the attitudes we measured with indirect questions could be used for causal explanation. Out of the answers to these questions we formed six "attitude bundles": (1) xenophobia, (2) intolerance of deviant groups (drug users, homosexuals, prostitutes), (3) religiosity, (4) conservative nationalism, (5) anti Gypsy prejudice, and (6) liberalism.

Xenophobia had the strongest direct correlation with anti-Semitism (0.353) with greater levels of xenophobia associated with greater levels of anti-Semitism.

Table 18
Students' attitudes toward Jews, by degree of religiosity (in percents)

	Non- anti- Semitic	Anti Semitically inclined	Anti- Semitic	Extremely anti- Semitic	Extremely liberal
Total	39	32	18	7	4
<i>Degree of religiosity</i>					
I follow the dogmas of my church	30	36	26	7	1
I am religious in my own way	38	31	19	8	4
I can't tell if I am religious or not	39	33	20	3	5
I am not religious.	42	29	15	9	5
I am definitely nonreligious.	46	32	15	5	2

Liberalism also had a strong relationship with anti-Semitism. The relationship, however, was negative (-0.175). In other words, the more liberal an individual was, the less likely that individual was to harbor anti-Semitic attitudes.

Besides the two factors mentioned above, only anti-Gypsy prejudice showed a direct connection with anti-Semitism, but its effect was extremely weak (0.065). This was due to the fact that incomparably more of our respondents expressed anti-Gypsy sentiments than anti-Semitic sentiments.

Intolerance of deviant groups did not show a direct connection with anti-Semitism. However, through xenophobia (primarily), liberalism (a negative correlation), and anti-Gypsy prejudice, it showed a marked indirect effect.

Conservative nationalism similarly expressed its effect indirectly, primarily through the intervention of intolerance and xenophobia (it had a significant effect on these) and—to a smaller degree—through anti-Gypsy prejudice.

Religiosity had a very negative effect on liberalism—that is to say, a religious conviction very likely provoked antiliberal statements. Religiosity also displayed an extremely strong (here positive) effect on anti-Semitism indirectly through liberalism. Religiosity had a somewhat lower indirect effect on anti-Semitism through intolerance and xenophobia.

Anti-Semitic Prejudices

Up to this point we have examined the percentage of anti-Semites among Hungarian college and university students, the strength of anti-Semitic prejudices among these students, and how we could explain the higher degree of anti-Semitism among some of the students—in other words, we attempted to discover which sociocultural factors and which other attitudes give rise to anti-Jewish sentiments. In what follows we will examine the kinds of anti-Semitic prejudices existing among the group surveyed, and whether the anti-Semitic attitudes adopted by a given anti-Semite are dependent to any degree on the demographic and sociocultural factors tested.

As we have seen, in the course of the survey we asked the students whether they agreed with certain anti-Semitic stereotypes. We then formed “opinion bundles” based on the stereotypes that united the various responses.

We established five opinion bundles. The first was composed of statement groups describing Jews as ambitious, wheeler-dealers, pushy, materialistic, greedy, vengeful, cunning, and exerting a powerful influence on international economics. The traditional stereotype of Jews as uninhibitedly profiteering, money-hungry Shylocks was expressed by this bundle.

The second opinion bundle was made up of a long-standing prejudice in the anti-Semitic tradition—the Jewish conspiracy theory. Statements such as “Jews stick together more than others,” “Jews stick together to help one another to get ahead,” “Jews generally hide the fact that they are working together,” and “The majority of Jews in Hungary live better than other Hungarian citizens” comprised this opinion bundle.

The third and fourth opinion bundles were made up of political anti-Semitic expressions. The Jewish Communist seeking revenge for his persecution appeared in the third opinion bundle. (Statements that fit here were "A great number of Jews persecuted in the war became Communists" "The revenge of Jews played a role in politics following the war" "What the Jews did to the Hungarians in the 50s is in no way better than what was done to them during the Second World War" and "The majority of Jews used their Communist Party membership to make their careers")

The fourth opinion bundle contained anti-Semitic statements that appeared in an anti-Zionist form ("Zionism for a Jew is not identical to patriotism for a Hungarian" "Zionism is an extremist form of Jewish nationalism" "Zionism is the expression of Jewish feelings of superiority" "In the end Zionism is a racist theory" "If someone is a Zionist they cannot be loyal to the country they live in" and "A self-conscious Jew cannot simultaneously be a good Hungarian")

In the fifth and last opinion bundle anti-Semitism was expressed as theological anti-Judaism ("Jews still imagine themselves to be God's chosen people" "Jews do not accept the basic values of Christianity" and "Problems with the Jews are primarily religious or church affairs")

In the next step we examined whether there were differences between the individual demographic and sociocultural groups in their tendency to accept one or another anti-Semitic opinion bundle. According to our calculations the Shylock stereotype and both forms of political anti-Semitism were distributed evenly among the students according to sex, education of parents, residence, and wealth. This, however, was not true in the case of theological anti-Judaism, which was significantly more likely to be adopted by students from smaller towns or villages whose parents had low educational levels. In contrast, the larger the student's hometown, the better educated his or her parents, and the wealthier his or her family, the more likely he or she was to believe in the Jewish conspiracy theory. We also found that this type of prejudice was significantly more common among men than among women.

To summarize the results as to the acceptance of the differing anti-Semitic stereotypes, there was a significant difference between the students from families of higher social status and those of lower social status. Anti-Semitic students from families of higher social status clearly regarded Jews as a competing group; this was expressed by the fact that they were most likely to believe in the Jewish conspiracy. In contrast, students from families of lower social status were more likely to express traditional theological anti-Judaic prejudices than students of any other social background.

Interesting differences also appeared when we examined the degree to which supporters of one political party or another were likely to accept or reject the different types of anti-Semitism. According to the survey results, supporters of liberal parties—which generally reject anti-Semitic views—were unlikely to feel affinity for any of the anti-Semitic stereotypes. Voters for conservative nationalist parties—which are most likely to accept anti-Semitic stereotypes—were much more likely than the average to espouse the Jewish conspiracy theory, while, on the other hand, showing no special tendency to accept theological anti-Judaism. The socialist voters were also more likely than the average to accept the Jewish conspiracy theory.

as well as being likely to believe in the Shylock stereotypes. This group however rejected political anti-Semitism and was especially unlikely to indulge in theological anti Judaism

There were also certain differences in the strength of the anti-Semitism reflected by the different types of anti-Semitic prejudices. The more temperate anti-Semites were most likely to believe in the Shylock stereotypes and to reject the political stereotypes. Members of the more strongly anti-Semitic groups naturally accepted each of the stereotype groups to a greater degree than those who were less powerfully anti-Semitic. However the stronger the degree of anti-Semitism the more likely an individual was to accept political anti-Semitism attitudes and to believe in the conspiracy theory and the less likely he was to adopt theological anti Judaism or economic stereotypes

Jews and Hungarians

During the rapid social assimilation following the emancipation of the Jews in 1867 there was a widespread belief among both Jews and non Jews in Hungary that someone who felt Jews belonged to an out group and were describable by social stereotypes was either an anti Semite or someone who did not believe that the assimilation of the Jews had gone far enough—in other words someone who believed that Jews truly did differ from the rest of society and that therefore assimilation had to continue to finally eliminate the "empirical foundation" of anti-Semitism. Marxist ideology shored up this positive assessment of assimilation in the decades following the Second World War. In the course of our survey we wanted to discover the degree to which college and university students considered Hungarian Jews to be assimilated and whether those who felt that Jews differ from other members of Hungarian society should be considered anti-Semitic.

First we asked the students if they thought Jews could be recognized. Although almost half of those asked (49 percent) said they thought a Jewish person could be recognized nearly as many (48 percent) said Jewish people could not be recognized. The rest (3 percent) were unwilling or unable to answer the question.

We then asked those who thought Jews could be recognized if they themselves could recognize a Jew when they saw one (Table 19). We also asked those who thought Jews could be recognized to tell us how one could recognize a Jew (Table 20). Each respondent was allowed to choose more than one criterion.

Table 19
Students answers to the question "Do you recognize a Jew when you see one?"

Answer	Percent
Usually yes, immediately	6
Usually yes, after a little while	35
Usually no but it can happen	40
Usually no	16
No answer	3

Table 20
Answers of students who thought Jews could be recognized to the question "Could you tell us how one can recognize Jews?"

Answer	Percent
Their external physical characteristics	85
Their behavior	30
Their foreign-sounding names	44
The way they talk, the words they use	9
The way they think	42
Their typical political viewpoint	13
Other answers	2
No answer	3

Finally we wanted to clear up whether the students regarded Jews as comprising a united out group. Ninety-one percent of the students agreed with the statement "Jews usually stick together" and only 5 percent disagreed. When we asked whether "the Jews stick together more than other groups" 71 percent said yes, 17 percent said no, and 12 percent declined to answer.

The results suggest that for the majority of those interviewed there were indeed attributes that clearly distinguished Jews and Magyars (the dominant Hungarian ethnic group). To the question "Are there characteristic Magyar attributes?" 69 percent said yes, while 29 percent disagreed. The same question about Jews brought an even more decisive 75 percent who said yes, with only 19 percent in disagreement. According to 68 percent of those interviewed, both Jews and Hungarians had their own characteristic attributes, while 4 percent thought only Magyars possessed these, not Jews. Finally, some 17 percent considered neither Jews nor Magyars to have characteristic attributes. On this evidence, the majority of Hungarian college and university students today regard Jews in Hungary as an out group recognizable by characteristic attributes.

But what are these "characteristic attributes"? We asked our students whether twenty stereotypical attributes were typical or untypical of Magyars and of Jews (Table 21). By subtracting the "rather untypical" figure from the "rather typical" figure for each stereotype as applied to each group, and then calculating the difference between the two resulting figures for each stereotype, we can determine which attributes were seen as most clearly distinguish

Table 21
Students' views on the alleged attributes of
Magyars and Jews (in percents)

	Of Magyars		Of Jews	
	Rather typical	Rather atypical	Rather typical	Rather atypical
Ambitious	62	31	63	20
Honest	49	39	61	18
Dirty	10	85	4	83
Meticulous	16	78	71	13
Intelligent	62	27	81	6
Wheeler-dealer	72	23	78	11
Clannish	38	56	88	3
Industrious	54	38	80	8
Pushy	48	44	59	24
Temperate	23	70	40	36
Materialistic	82	14	75	11
Educated	49	39	78	7
Greedy	35	56	39	41
Trustworthy	57	31	59	17
Purposeful	52	40	83	4
Canny	50	42	69	16
Vengeful	32	61	13	68
Cunning	38	54	61	23
Dutiful	52	39	74	8
Lazy	35	56	5	81

ing the two groups We conclude that in the opinion of Hungarian college and university students today the Jews of Hungary differ from Magyars in being much more meticulous clannish purposeful educated hard working, cunning, and dutiful and much less lazy⁸

We next sought to find out to what extent anti-Semitic prejudices were present in categorization and stereotyping. Although seven out of the eight stereotypes distinguishing most clearly between Jew and Magyar (meticulous clannish not lazy purposeful educated industrious and dutiful) were positive or neutral the eighth (cunning) was negative and this changed the complexion of the array as a whole. If a group believes that these eight attributes as a whole distinguish them from another group at least some of the first group may feel threatened by the other whose members are more clannish and more cunning and are believed to possess many attributes important for the achievement of their goals

This hypothesis is supported by a further observation If we divide the interviewees into "anti-Semites and "non anti-Semites it can be seen that these two groups demarcate themselves (Magyars") from Jews according to different arrays of stereotypical attributes As we saw 43 percent of the students interviewed were not anti-Semitic, 32 percent were inclined to accept some anti Semitic stereotypes 18 percent were moderately anti-Semitic, and 7 percent formed an anti Semitic hard core with an inclination to discriminate against Jews In these four groups the eight that most clearly differentiated Jews stereotypical attributes in decreasing order of differentiating ability are shown in Table 22

These results are not surprising The non anti-Semites characterized Jews as a distinct group by means of positive and neutral stereotypical attributes while the more anti Semitic the interviewee the more likely he was to employ negative stereotypes to distinguish Jews from his own group As regards the anti-Semitic stereotypes what is striking is that among the attributes distinguishing the two groups the so-called Shylock stereotypes had relatively little weight, primarily because attributes expressive of the striving for wealth in the business sphere (materialistic, wheeler-dealer) are seen as characterizing both groups equally Thus anti-Semites and non-anti-Semites demarcate boundaries of the Magyar and Jewish groups with stereotype arrays of different meanings This does not, however indicate that it is much more characteristic of the anti-Semites than of the non anti Semites to regard the Jews as an out group As we have seen the majority of those interviewed said that there were attributes

Table 22
Students ranking of attributes most clearly differentiating Jews

Non-anti-Semitic	Anti-Semiticly inclined	Anti-Semitic	Extremely anti-Semitic
1 meticulous	meticulous	meticulous	meticulous
2 clannish	clannish	clannish	clannish
3 temperate	cunning	educated	cunning
4 purposeful	purposeful	purposeful	pushty
5 educated	not lazy	industrious	purposeful
6 industrious	educated	dutiful	greedy
7 dutiful	industrious	canny	canny
8 honest	canny	cunning	educated

that were characteristically Magyar and others that were characteristically Jewish. If we look at the replies from the point of view of the four groups we see that although there are differences between the groups in the proportions that see Jews as definitely an out group more than two thirds even of the non anti-Semites think that they are indeed distinguishable from Jews (Table 23)

We might sum this up by saying that for the majority of the rising Hungarian elite Jews are a social group that can be described by an array of certain attributes. Although non-anti Semites are less inclined to stereotype than are anti-Semites the majority of the former also hold this view. The difference between anti-Semites and non-anti Semites lies not, primarily in the fact of stereotyping but in the stereotypes employed to distinguish between Magyar and Jew. While the non anti-Semites think that Jews are distinguished from Magyars by mainly positive and neutral attributes anti Semites see Jews as possessing negative and dangerous attributes.

Thus our survey suggests that a portion of those who categorize Jews on the basis of social stereotypes no doubt continue to express their anti-Semitic prejudices in this way. But it is unlikely that the 70 percent of non anti Semites who employ stereotypes do so as a response to a faltering assimilation process on the part of Jews if only because the attributes that they think distinguish Jews most clearly from Magyars are almost all positive or neutral in content. The survey shows therefore that stereotyping does not necessarily imply anti-Semitism and also that it is worth investigating the relationship between anti-Semitic prejudice and attitudes toward assimilation. The responses suggest that among anti-Semites today there are both strong supporters and opponents of complete assimilation just as in the century preceding World War II. Even among non anti Semites inclined to stereotyping there are some who still regard the process of assimilation as incomplete. A comparatively new feature is that although some of those interviewed were free of anti-Semitic prejudice they still regarded Jews as a group with characteristic attributes at the same time they did not expect Jews to shed those attributes and thus assimilate totally to the majority. Those holding such views may think that Hungarian Jews must be considered a national minority. Alternatively such views may indicate that at least some of the future intellectual elite of Hungary are not averse to a more modern conception of nationhood one built on multicultural foundations.

Table 23
Students' views on whether Magyars are distinguishable from Jews (in percents)

	Non- anti- Semitic	Anti- Semitically inclined	Anti- Semitic	Extremely anti- Semitic
Both Magyars and Jews have characteristic attributes.	58	66	60	81
Only Jews have characteristic attributes.	11	11	16	10
Only Magyars have characteristic attributes.	6	2	1	1
Neither have characteristic attributes.	21	13	11	4

Notes

1 Under Hungarian law a member of parliament who changes parties, or even creates his own party may keep his seat in parliament.

2 E. Mendelsohn, *The Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars* (Bloomington. Indiana University Press, 1983) p 98.

3 Cf H J Ehrlich, *The Social Psychology of Prejudice* (New York. Wiley 1973) W Bergmann, Attitude Theory and Prejudice, in W Bergmann ed *Error Without Trial. Psychological Research on Antisemitism* (Berlin. W de Gruyter 1987) pp 271 302, W Bergmann and R Erb *Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Opladen. Leske & Budrich, 1991)

4 Social status is based on education profession, and place in the professional hierarchy

5 Naturally "wealth has to be understood in terms of Hungarian social conditions. In this case decidedly wealthy" means that the families in question have (1) their own—at least three-room—apartment or house (2) a car manufactured in a Western country (3) a summer home and (4) a home well stocked with durable consumer items The other categories were created on the basis of possession or lack of the items listed above

6 The Hungarian higher-educational system is composed of two types of institutions. universities, which students attend for five or six years before being awarded a degree and colleges, which take between three and four years to complete A Hungarian university degree is comparable to an American master's degree, while a college degree can be compared with a bachelor's degree In addition to requiring less time to complete Hungarian colleges are generally easier to enter and provide a lower quality of education. Transferring from a college to a university is extremely difficult. After acquiring their degrees, most college students start to work and do not continue their studies.

7 Seventy-one percent of all Hungarians are Catholic, 21 percent Calvinist and 4 percent Lutheran. One percent of the population belongs to some other denomination and 3 percent are nondenominational. The percentages from each denomination among our sample of college and university students were as follows. 61 percent Catholic, 15 percent Calvinist, 4 percent Lutheran, and 1 percent some other denomination, in a significant variation from the national data, 19 percent of the sample was nondenominational.

8 Taking all twenty attributes into account the average deviation of the auto- and heterostereotypes was 33.26 while for the eight attributes mentioned it was 76.67

The International Perspectives Series

- 1 Harris, *Arab Opposition to Jewish Immigration to Israel*
- 2 Gordon, *The Situation of the Jews in Hungary*
- 3 Gordon, *The Jewish Community of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic*
- 4 Gordon, *The Hungarian Election. Implications for the Jewish Community*
- 5 Gordon, *The Jewish Community of Romania*
6. Gordon, *The Jewish Community of Austria*
- 7 Avineri, *Israel in a Postcommunist World*
8. Gordon, *The Jewish Community of Poland*
- 9 Baram, *Israel and Iraq After the Gulf War*
10. Bandler *Jewish Arab Relations in Israel*
- 11 Gordon, *The New Face of Anti-Semitism in Romania*
12. Avineri, *The Return to History*
- 13 Gordon *Israel and India. A New Beginning*
- 14 Gruen, *Syria, Syrian Jews, and the Peace Process*
- 15 Golub *The Jewish Dimension of the Yugoslav Crisis*
16. Golub *Anti-Semitism in Argentina. Recent Trends*
- 17 Bútorová and Bútorá, *Warness Toward Jews and Post-Communist Paria in Slovakia*
18. Cramer *Germany and the Jews 50 Years After the Holocaust*
- 19 Stern *German Unification and the Question of Antisemitism*
- 20 Lerner *Iran's Threat to Israel's Security Present Dangers and Future Risks*
- 21 *Current Concerns in Germany and in German American Jewish Relations*
22. Gordon, *Muslim Fundamentalism. Challenge to the West*
- 23 Gruen, *Jerusalem and the Peace Process*
- 24 Golub *Anti-Semitism in South Africa. Recent Trends*
- 25 Gruber *Right Wing Extremism in Western Europe*
- 26 Lewis, *Koreans and Jews*
- 27 Kovács and Fischer *Anti-Semitism Among Hungarian College and University Students*

All titles \$2 per copy



The American Jewish Committee
165 East 56 Street New York NY 10022 2746

July 1994

Single Copy \$2 00
Quantity prices on request