



UNDERSTANDING ANTISEMITIC HATE CRIME:

**DO THE EXPERIENCES, PERCEPTIONS AND BEHAVIOURS OF JEWS
VARY BY GENDER, AGE AND RELIGIOSITY?**

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Introduction

This study was commissioned by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). The OSCE – the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe – is the world’s largest regional security organisation, working for stability, peace and democracy for more than a billion people around the world, through political dialogue about shared values and other practical work that aims to make a lasting difference. ODIHR is one of the world’s principal human rights bodies, promoting democratic elections, respect for human rights, tolerance and non-discrimination, and the rule of law.

It has been written by Dr Daniel Graham and Dr Jonathan Boyd, two senior researchers at the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) in London. JPR is committed to investigating a wide range of issues relating to Jewish populations in the UK, across Europe and the wider world, in order to provide an empirical basis for Jewish and non-Jewish organisations to develop policy to support and protect individual Jews and Jewish communal life.

In commissioning this report, the OSCE was particularly interested to understand more about how different types of Jews perceive, experience and respond to antisemitism, with a particular focus on three areas: gender (i.e. differences between men and women); age (difference between different age bands); and religiosity (differences between more observant and less observant Jews, who are also likely to be more or less identifiably Jewish based on the type of clothing they wear).

In seeking to investigate these issues, we needed to identify an existing data source that was sufficiently detailed to be able to provide some answers. By far and away the best candidate was the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) survey of Jewish perceptions and experiences of antisemitism, undertaken in 2012 and published in 2013.¹ With a sample size of close to 6,000, this remains the largest ever survey about European Jews on any topic, and is thus the ideal source for an investigation of this kind. In addition, the research for that study was conducted by JPR in partnership with the international polling agency, Ipsos MORI, so the researchers already had a strong degree of familiarity with it. Indeed, since the publication of the survey results by the FRA, JPR has published three further reports drawing on this data, with two further studies in the pipeline.²

The FRA survey covered Jews aged 16 and above living in nine EU Member States: Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom.³ The Jewish populations of these eight countries together represent approximately 90% of the total Jewish population of Europe. The survey explored a range of issues, including experiences of antisemitic hate crime, levels of anxiety about it, tendency to report incidents and perceptions of what does and does not constitute antisemitism. In addition, it recorded the sex and age of all respondents, as well as several measures

¹ See: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2013). *Discrimination and hate crime against Jews in EU Member States: experiences and perceptions of antisemitism*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Note that the Romanian sample was not large enough to report findings for that country in that report; however, Romanian respondents have been included within this analysis.

² See: L. D. Staetsky and S. DellaPergola (2015). *From old and new directions: Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in Italy*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research; L. D. Staetsky and J. Boyd (2014). *The Exceptional Case? Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in the United Kingdom*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research; and J. Boyd (2012). *Jewish life in Europe: Impending catastrophe or imminent renaissance?* London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

³ For full details of the methodology, see the report cited in footnote 1, pp.69-76.

of their Jewish identity. Thus, all quantitative data within this report are drawn from the FRA survey, providing an analysis of that dataset which has never previously been undertaken. The findings are for the full sample, rather than for specific Member States as in previous publications, thereby presenting a picture of the situation for European Jews as a whole.

In addition, this study involved a series of qualitative interviews with experts in hate crime in general, and antisemitic hate crime in particular, in order to deepen our understanding of the quantitative findings. These interviews were conducted in January and February 2017, and extracts from them are included throughout the report.

The report is divided into three main sections, focusing, in turn, on gender, age and religiosity. We have only included findings where we have identified notable distinctions by each of these categories. In the cases where particular perceptions, experiences or responses to antisemitism are not included, one can assume that no significant distinctions were found.

1. Gender: Does antisemitic hate crime affect men and women differently?

A. Perceptions of antisemitism by gender

In general, Jewish women are more likely than Jewish men to regard antisemitism as being a 'Very big' or 'Fairly big' problem in their country (68% females v 63% males). Jewish women are also more likely than Jewish men to think that antisemitism has increased over the past five years, as opposed to staying the same or decreasing (78% females v 74% males).⁴

In terms of the specific contexts in which antisemitism may take place (such as hostility on the streets and in the media, or antisemitic graffiti), women are more likely than men to perceive antisemitism to be a 'Very big' or 'Fairly big' problem in every arena investigated, with the exception of the Internet, although the differences are small (74% men v 72% women). The largest percentage point difference is for antisemitism in the media (56% men v 62% women) and desecration of Jewish cemeteries (36% men v 42% women).

Respondents were also asked whether they regarded certain statements made by non-Jews as being antisemitic. Whilst some topics and issues are far more likely to cause offence to Jews than others (such as Holocaust denial), of the fourteen items examined, the differences between men and women are small (less than five percentage points).⁵ However, on every statement examined, Jewish women are more likely to perceive them as being antisemitic than Jewish men.

B. Experience of antisemitism by gender

Likelihood of experiencing and witnessing an antisemitic incident

Even though women are more likely than men to perceive antisemitism, men are slightly more likely than women to have been subjected to some kind of antisemitic incident: for example, 22% of men and 19% of women have suffered antisemitic 'Verbal insults or harassment' in the past twelve months. Jewish men are also slightly more likely than Jewish women to have witnessed an antisemitic incident: 27.4% men v 25.9% women. However, when it comes to physical attacks, whilst the proportions are obviously much lower, the discrepancy between men and women grows: 2.1% of men, compared with 1.1% of women, had suffered a physical antisemitic attack in the past twelve months.

These proportions grow somewhat when the definition of a physical attack is broadened, but the contrast between men and women remains much the same. The FRA questionnaire included two approaches: one which asked simply whether the respondent had experienced a physical attack, and another where it included clarifying examples ("by 'physically attacked' we mean "hit or pushed you – or threatened you in a way that frightened you? This could have happened anywhere, such as at

⁴ Note that the data were gathered towards the end of 2012, so in all cases throughout this report, 'the past five years' equates to the period 2008-2012.


⁵ See: FRA (2013), op. cit. pp.22-27.

home, on the street, on public transport, at your workplace or anywhere else”). In the latter case, the proportions increase from those recorded above to 5.6% of males and 2.7% of females.

Antisemitic incidents by type experienced

The FRA survey investigated the extent to which respondents had experienced five different types of antisemitic harassment. In every case, men are more likely to have experienced an incident than women in the past twelve months. Indeed, compared with women, men are twice as likely to have had offensive comments posted about them online, and more than twice as likely to have been followed or had someone loiter or follow them in a threatening way.

Figure 1. Proportions of Jewish men and women who have experienced various types of antisemitic incidents in the past twelve months



Jewish men are also slightly more likely than Jewish women to have experienced discrimination or harassment in the past twelve months on the grounds of either their ‘ethnic background’ (14% men v 12% women) or their ‘religion of belief’ (20% men v 18% women).

C. Impact of antisemitism by gender

Worry about becoming a victim of an antisemitic attack

There is little difference between Jewish men and women in terms of how worried they are that they will *become* a victim of an antisemitic attack – despite men being more likely to have experienced or


witnessed an antisemitic incident. Compared with women, men are very slightly more worried about becoming a victim of antisemitic ‘Verbal insults or harassment’ within the coming twelve months (47% men v 45% women, ‘Very’ or ‘Fairly’ worried). Similarly, men are slightly more worried than women about becoming a victim of a physical antisemitic attack (34% men v 31% women, ‘Very’ or ‘Fairly’ worried).

Avoidance of Jewish events and places and concealing Jewish identity in public

Compared with Jewish men, Jewish women are more likely to avoid visiting Jewish events or sites at least occasionally because they do not feel safe there or on the way there, as a Jew (21% men v 24% women). That said, Jewish men are slightly more likely to avoid such situations ‘Frequently’ or more often (5.5% men v 4.8% women).

Despite being less likely to experience antisemitism than Jewish men, Jewish women are more likely than Jewish men to ‘avoid wearing, carrying or displaying things that might help people recognise [them] as a Jew in public’, at least occasionally. The examples given referred to removing a *kippa* (skullcap – which is typically worn only by men), Magen David (Star of David – which is often worn as jewellery) or specific clothing, or displaying a *mezuzah* (scroll fixed to a doorpost, designating the home as Jewish) (55% women v 50% men).

Figure 2. Proportions of Jewish men and women who conceal their Jewish identity in public, at least occasionally



* “Do you ever avoid wearing, carrying or displaying things that might help people recognise you as a Jew in public, for example wearing a *kippa*/skullcap, *Magen David*/Star of David or specific clothing, or displaying a *mezuzah*?”

Avoidance of local areas and neighbourhoods; consideration of moving


Jewish men are slightly more likely than Jewish women to report ‘avoiding certain places or locations in [their] local area or neighbourhood,’ at least occasionally, because they feel unsafe there as Jews (28% men v 26% women).

There is little difference between Jewish men and Jewish women in terms of whether they have ‘considered moving to another area or neighbourhood’ in the past five years because they do not feel safe as a Jew (11% men v 10% women). However, Jewish men report being slightly more likely than Jewish women to have ‘considered emigrating’ because they do not feel safe living in their country as a Jew (35% men v 32% women).

Action taken following an antisemitic incident

Of those who had experienced an antisemitic incident in the past five years, Jewish women are slightly more likely than Jewish men to have reported it to the police and/or to any other organisation (24% women v 22% men). Similarly, Jewish women are more likely than Jewish men to have ‘talked about the incidents with friends or relatives’ (85% women v 73% men). Indeed, on most measures investigated, Jewish women report being somewhat more likely to take notable steps following an incident, with the exception of changing their name or appearance, or considering emigrating to another country.

Figure 3. Proportions of men and women who have taken various actions following an antisemitic experience



Summary: does gender make a difference?

In general, Jewish women are more likely to perceive antisemitism and change their behaviour in response to it, but Jewish men are more likely to actually experience it. That said, the differences between the perceptions and experiences of men and women are small in most instances, and gender differentials are not as large as differentials by age or religiosity (see sections below).

Nonetheless, these small differences can be summed up as follows. Jewish women are slightly more likely than Jewish men to:

- consider antisemitism to be a serious problem;
- believe that levels of antisemitism have increased in recent years;
- find certain comments from non-Jewish people offensive;
- avoid visiting Jewish sites or events, at least on occasion, because they feel unsafe there as a Jew;
- avoid displaying their Jewish identity in public because they feel unsafe.

On the other hand, Jewish men are more likely than Jewish women to have:


- experienced verbal antisemitic insults, harassment and physical attacks;
- witnessed antisemitic attacks;
- personally experienced antisemitic discrimination.

2. Age: Does antisemitic hate crime affect different age groups in different ways?

A. Perceptions of antisemitism by age

There is little relationship between age and whether respondents consider antisemitism in general to be a problem in their country. However, the older respondents are, the more likely they are to think that antisemitism has increased ‘a little’ or ‘a lot’ over the past five years, peaking at 79% among those aged 50 to 69 years old. Thereafter, respondents are increasingly less likely to think this is the case (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Proportions of different age bands who think that antisemitism has increased over the past five years



However, the younger the respondents are, the more likely they are to feel that ‘Expressions of hostility towards Jews in the street or other public places’ is a ‘Very big’ or ‘Fairly big’ problem, with the possible exception of those aged in their thirties (Figure 5). This ranged from 63% of those aged under 30 years old, decreasing to less than half (48%) of people in their seventies, and even fewer in their eighties and above. Again, with the possible exception of those aged in their thirties, the younger the respondents are, the more likely they are to feel that ‘Antisemitism in political life’ is a ‘Very big’ or ‘Fairly big’ problem (49% aged under 30 v 31% aged 80 and above).

Figure 5. Proportions of different age bands who say ‘Expressions of hostility towards Jews in the street or other public places’ in your country are a problem





Figure 6. Proportions of different age bands who say ‘antisemitism in the media’ has increased over the past five years



The relationship between age and the perception of whether or not antisemitism has been increasing in specific contexts varies, although in general, respondents in the middle age groups (approximately 40-69 years old) tend to be the most likely to report an increase in antisemitism. For example, people in their fifties are most likely to feel that ‘Antisemitism in the media’ has increased in the past five years (Figure 6). Interestingly, this pattern of peaking in the middle age groups is repeated in several other contexts. It is unclear why this might be the case, but one possible explanation is that those in

the oldest age bands are able to recall the war and post-war periods when levels of antisemitism were higher, and those in the youngest groups do not have long enough memories to recall much change. By contrast, the middle age groups grew up in times where antisemitism was relatively rare, so it may be that they feel they reported recent increases most acutely.


What type of comments made by non-Jewish people are considered antisemitic?

Again, it is not the youngest or oldest respondents who are most likely to find certain statements made by non-Jews to be antisemitic, but rather those in the middle age groups. For example, if a non-Jewish person said “Israelis behave ‘like Nazis’ towards the Palestinians,” younger people are less likely than older people to find this ‘Probably’ or ‘Definitely’ antisemitic, with the peak occurring among people aged in their sixties (85%) and declining thereafter.

Similarly, concerning the theme ‘Jews have too much power,’ whilst this trope is viewed as being antisemitic by the vast majority of respondents, the older the respondents are, the more likely they are to consider it antisemitic up to those aged in their sixties (rising from 85% among the under 30s to 94% among those in their sixties). Yet, among those aged in their seventies and above, the likelihood of this view steadily declines.

That said, differentiation by age on these types of issues was generally small. However, it was more pronounced in the issue of criticism of Israel by non-Jewish people: whereas 25% of under 30 year-olds said this is ‘Probably’ or ‘Definitely’ antisemitic, that figure rose up to 45% of those aged in their seventies. But yet again, the same pattern emerges: sensitivity to this issue appears to drop again among those in the very oldest age groups (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Proportions of different age bands who would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if he or she criticises Israel




B. Experience of antisemitism by age

Likelihood of experiencing and witnessing an antisemitic incident

The younger a person is, the more likely they are to experience a verbal antisemitic attack. For example, one in three (33%) Jewish respondents aged under 30 years old had suffered antisemitic verbal insults or harassment in the past twelve months, more than three times the proportion of Jews aged in their seventies (9%).


The trend is similar regarding physical antisemitic attacks. About 4% of those aged under 30 years-old said they had personally been subjected to a physical antisemitic attack in the past twelve months, compared with less than 1% of people aged over 60 years old (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Proportions of different age bands who have personally experienced antisemitic verbal insults/harassment and/or a physical antisemitic attack in the past twelve months



Similar trends are revealed again with respect to witnessing an antisemitic attack. The younger the respondents are, the more likely they are to have witnessed an antisemitic attack (38% of those under 30 v 14% of those aged in their seventies). As seen in some other cases, Jews in their thirties are the exception, being slightly less likely to have witnessed antisemitism than those in their forties (Figure 9). Again, one can only speculate why this might be the case; one possibility is that this age group is most likely to be in the early stages of building a family, and thus, somewhat less likely to be out and about, in situations where antisemitic incidents are most likely to happen.


Figure 9. Proportions of different age bands who have personally witnessed any of the following types of antisemitic incident in their country in the past twelve months



Antisemitic incidents by type experienced


The main pattern that emerges with respect to people’s age and the frequency of them hearing antisemitic comments/slogans from non-Jewish people, is one in which there is very little difference between all age bands under 60 years, but among the oldest groups it is less common. For example, around three out of four respondents in each cohort up to age 59 say they have heard non-Jewish people suggest ‘Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes’ at least occasionally, but there is a steady decline in this proportion among those aged 60 and above (Figure 10). This pattern of similarity among those aged up to 59 is apparent for most types of antisemitic statement: e.g. “Jews have too much power in [country];” “the Holocaust is a myth or has been exaggerated;” “Israelis behave ‘like Nazis’ towards the Palestinians;” “Jews are only a religious group and not a nation;” “Jews are not capable of integrating into [country];” and, as shown in Figure 10, “Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes.” The main exception we see, on occasion, again relates to Jews aged in their thirties, who, in several cases, are notably less likely to report hearing such statements than people aged under 30 or in their forties.

Figure 10. Proportions of different age bands who have personally heard or seen non-Jewish people suggest that “Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes” in the past twelve months



The younger the respondents are, the more likely they are to have experienced three types of antisemitic behaviour: “Made offensive or threatening comments to you in person” (29% under 30 v 3% aged 80 and above); “Posted offensive comments about you on the internet (including social networking websites such as Facebook)” (16% under 30 v 5% of those aged 70 and above) (note again that in both of these instances, people in their thirties buck the trend with slightly lower scores than those in their forties);⁶ and ‘Loitered, waited for you or deliberately followed you in a threatening way’ (8% under 30 v 2% aged 70 and above). However, in one instance (‘Sent you emails, text messages (SMS), letters or cards that were offensive or threatening’), the peak comes with people in their forties (Figure 11).

Figure 11. “In the past 12 months, how often, if at all, has somebody...” [done x to you] “in your opinion, partly or completely because you are Jewish” by age




⁶ The figures shown have been rounded up or down to the nearest percentage point – in both of these instances, those in their thirties score slightly lower than those in their forties.

Frequency of being subjected to an antisemitic attack

The likelihood of being subjected to a physical antisemitic attack is closely related to age, with almost one in ten (9.4%) of those aged under thirty experiencing this in the previous twelve months, steadily declining to 1.1% among the 80 years and above cohort. This is consistent with data on all types of hate crime – younger people are typically more likely to experience it than older people.

Figure 12. Proportions of different age bands who have experienced a physical attack* in the past twelve months because they are Jewish




* “that is, hit or pushed you – or threatened you in a way that frightened you? This could have happened anywhere, such as at home, on the street, on public transport, at your workplace or anywhere else”

Likelihood of being subjected to antisemitic discrimination

The younger the respondents are, the more likely they are to say they have felt discriminated against in the past twelve months, on the basis of their religion or belief. This occurred to one in three (32%) of those under 30 years old, but less than 10% of those aged 70 or older.

Figure 13. Proportions of different age bands who have felt discriminated against and/or harassed in their country in the past twelve months on the basis of their religion or beliefs




C. Impact of antisemitism by age

Worry about becoming a victim of an antisemitic incident

There is little difference in how worried Jews under the age of fifty are about becoming a victim of verbal insults or harassment—around half are ‘Very’ or ‘Fairly’ worried, with the likelihood declining by age steadily thereafter (Figure 14). The picture is very similar with respect to worrying about a ‘Physical attack,’ although the levels are lower—around 35% of each group aged under 60, declining thereafter. This trend is also seen in terms of worrying about family and friends becoming a victim of antisemitism.

Figure 14. Proportions of different age bands who are worried about becoming a victim of verbal insults or harassment




Avoidance of public events and places; concealing Jewish identity in public

Jews under fifty years old are more likely than those aged fifty and above to avoid visiting Jewish events or sites because they do not feel safe as Jews—around a quarter (25%-27%) v 21% or less for older Jews.

The younger the respondents are, the more likely they are also to conceal their Jewish identity in public, although there is little difference across the various age groups under fifty years old, with about 60% doing so at least occasionally. Again, older age groups show a decline in this behaviour (Figure 15).

Figure 15. Proportions of different age bands who avoid wearing, carrying or displaying things that might help people recognise them as a Jew in public




* For example, wearing a *kippa* (skullcap), *Magen David* (Star of David) or specific clothing, or displaying a *mezuzah*.

Likelihood of Jews avoiding local areas or neighbourhoods out of fear for their safety as Jews

The younger a person is, the more likely s/he is to avoid certain local places or locations because s/he does not feel safe there as a Jew. This is the case for 36% of those under thirty years old compared with 16% of those aged eighty and above (Figure 16).


Figure 16. Proportions of different age bands who avoid certain places or locations in their local area or neighbourhood, at least occasionally, because they do not feel safe there as a Jew



Likelihood of Jews considering moving, or emigrating, out of fear for their safety as Jews

The younger the respondents are, the more likely they are to have considered moving to another area or neighbourhood because of fears about their safety as Jews (Figure 17).

Figure 17. Proportions of different age bands who have moved or considered moving to another area or neighbourhood in their country in the past five years because they do not/did not feel safe living there as a Jew




Jews under the age of fifty are most likely to have considered emigrating, although little differentiates between these age groups: 37% to 39% of people have considered emigrating (or have actually emigrated and since returned) because of fears about their safety as Jews. The propensity to do so declines steadily after age 49, falling to 10% for those aged eighty and above. In many respects, this decline is to be expected: in general, older people are considerably less likely to emigrate than younger people.

Likelihood of Jews reporting antisemitic incidents to the authorities

Despite the younger respondents (under forty years old) being most likely to experience antisemitism (see Figure 8), they are considerably less likely to report it to the authorities than respondents aged forty and above (19% or less under 40 v 24% or more 40 and above).

Figure 18. Proportions of different age bands who reported an antisemitic incident* they experienced to the police and/or any other organisation



* Either they reported it themselves, or someone else reported it on their behalf.

Summary: does age make a difference?

In general, age is a more important factor than gender in differentiating between Jewish people's perceptions and experiences of antisemitism, and certainly, the younger a Jewish person is, the more likely they are to experience and witness antisemitism. However, in many instances, there is no smooth older-to-younger relationship between Jewish people's age and their perceptions and experiences of antisemitism, or the effects that an antisemitic experience has on them.

More specifically, the data demonstrate that the younger the respondents are, the more likely they are to:

- experience verbal antisemitic insults or harassment and physical attacks;
- witness an antisemitic attack or experience antisemitic discrimination;
- be threatened in person, attacked online, or followed in a threatening way, because they are Jewish;
- avoid certain local areas or consider moving because they fear for their safety as a Jew.

However, looking across all age groups under fifty years old, there is very little difference with regard to:

- how often they hear non-Jewish people make antisemitic comments referencing the Holocaust, Jewish 'power' or Israel;
- their levels of anxiety about becoming a victim of antisemitism (even though the younger age bands within this group are more likely to experience it);
- concealing their Jewish identity in public;
- the extent to which they have considered emigration because of their fears about their safety as Jews.

Moreover, in other instances, the relationship with age is more complex. For example, the older the respondents are, the more likely they are to believe that antisemitism has increased in recent years, and the more likely they are to interpret criticism of Israel as antisemitic, although among the very oldest groups, the propensity to believe this declines. Furthermore, in yet other cases, it is those in the middle age groups (people in their forties, fifties and sixties), as opposed to both younger and older respondents, who are most likely to perceive an increase in antisemitism in certain contexts (e.g. the media), to interpret certain comments from non-Jewish people as antisemitic, or to report an antisemitic incident to the authorities.

3. Religiosity: Does antisemitic hate crime affect Jews differently, according to their degree of Orthodoxy?

Unlike in the previous two sections, where the two variables, gender and age, are clear cut, differentiating between Jews on the basis of their religiosity is rather more complex, as there are no universally agreed definitions. The FRA survey included a number of ways in which respondents could provide information about the nature of their Jewish identity, including scales about the strength of that identity and the level of their religiosity, as well as questions about their religious beliefs and practices.


For the purpose of this analysis, we have used that data to create an **ordinal scale** of Orthodoxy, whereby the entire sample has been divided into quintiles – i.e. five equal size groups. That scale is best understood as running from the least Orthodox to the most Orthodox, with those closest to the ‘Strongly Orthodox’ end likely to be more identifiably Jewish (due to the type of clothing they wear and neighbourhoods in which they live) than those at the other end of the scale. The five labels we have given to the groups (‘Strongly non-Orthodox;’ ‘non-Orthodox;’ ‘Moderate;’ ‘Orthodox;’ and ‘Strongly Orthodox’) are indicative of Jewish practice, behaviour and appearance. **They are not fully formed descriptions of individual’s identity traits, but rather labels to indicate the likelihood of someone behaving in an Orthodox way in their day-to-day lives.** See Appendix A for more details.

A. Perceptions of antisemitism by degree of Jewish Orthodoxy

Perceptions of how bad antisemitism is and whether it is getting better or worse


The more Orthodox a respondent is, the more likely they are to perceive antisemitism to be a ‘Fairly’ or ‘Very big’ problem. 58% of ‘Strongly non-Orthodox’ Jews said antisemitism was a ‘Very big’ or ‘Fairly big’ problem in their country, rising steadily to 72% among the ‘Strongly Orthodox’ group (Figure 19).

Figure 19. Proportions of Jews who consider antisemitism in their country to be a problem, by degree of Orthodoxy



Similarly, the more Orthodox the respondent is, the more likely they are to think that antisemitism has increased a lot over the past five years: 70% among the strongly non-Orthodox rising to 79% among the strongly Orthodox. Almost half (49%) of the Strongly Orthodox believe that antisemitism has increased ‘a lot’ over this period (Figure 20).


Figure 20. Proportions of Jews who feel that antisemitism has increased in their country over the past five years, by degree of Orthodoxy



Perceptions of whether antisemitism is a problem in different contexts


There is a smooth, positive statistical relationship between perceiving antisemitism to be a ‘Very big’ or ‘Fairly big’ problem and respondents’ level of Orthodoxy, regardless of context. Interestingly, the gradient between the strongly Orthodox and the strongly non-Orthodox is steepest in terms of antisemitism in the media (i.e. *not* on the street), suggesting that the distinctions revealed may not be exclusively about how outwardly visibly Jewish the different groups are, and that other factors may also be involved. Indeed, the strongly Orthodox were about 50% more likely to perceive antisemitism in the media as being a ‘Very’ or ‘Fairly big’ problem than the strongly non-Orthodox (47% v 70%). However, at the same time, the strongly Orthodox were also far more likely to say that ‘expressions of hostility towards Jews in the street’ were a problem (63% v 44%) (Figure 21).

Figure 21. Proportions of Jews who consider various manifestations of antisemitism in their country to be a problem, by degree of Orthodoxy



In most cases, the more Orthodox a respondent is the more likely they are to believe that levels of antisemitism have increased in recent years. Again, the steepest gradient (greatest difference) between the least and the most Orthodox respondents is seen in terms of the media. Just under half of the strongly non-Orthodox (48%) say that antisemitism in the media has increased in the past five years, compared with 67% of the strongly Orthodox (Figure 22).

Figure 22. Proportions of Jews who feel that antisemitism in the media has increased over the past five years in their country, by degree of Orthodoxy




Likelihood of interpreting comments made by non-Jews as antisemitic

Statements made by non-Jews about Israel elicit the greatest variation in opinion between the strongly non-Orthodox and strongly Orthodox. For example, 69% of the strongly non-Orthodox consider a non-Jew saying ‘Israelis behave “like Nazis” towards the Palestinians’ as ‘Definitely’ or ‘Probably antisemitic,’ compared with 87% of the strongly Orthodox (Figure 23).

However, and in contrast to all other patterns noted, the statement ‘I would not marry a Jew’ uttered by a non-Jew is more likely to be considered antisemitic by the *least* Orthodox than by the most Orthodox. Almost three out of four (73%) of the strongly non-Orthodox find this to be ‘Probably’ or ‘Definitely antisemitic,’ compared with just under half (49%) of the strongly Orthodox. Again, one can only hypothesise about why this might be the case, but it is likely to be related to the stigma among Jews that is attached to intermarriage, which is far stronger and more prevalent among the most Orthodox than the least.

Figure 23. Proportions of Jews who would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if he or she displayed various attitudes, by degree of Orthodoxy




Note: proportions relate to those who answered ‘yes, definitely’ or yes, probably’ to each of the statements shown.

B. Experience of antisemitism by degree of Orthodoxy

Likelihood of Jews being subjected to, or witnessing, an antisemitic incident


The more Orthodox a person is, the more likely they are to have experienced antisemitic ‘verbal insults or harassment’ in the past twelve months. However, interestingly, there is a considerable difference between the ‘Orthodox’ (21%) and the ‘strongly Orthodox’ (33%) in this regard. A similar picture can be seen in terms of physical antisemitic attacks, although the number of cases in this dataset are too small to have statistical confidence.

Figure 24. Proportions of Jews who believe an experience of harassment or verbal insult in the past twelve months was due to antisemitism, by degree of Orthodoxy



A very similar picture is revealed in terms of witnessing antisemitism—the more Orthodox someone is, the more likely this is to happen. And again there is an appreciable difference between the ‘strongly Orthodox’ (38%) and the ‘Orthodox’ (28%).


Figure 25. Proportions of Jews who have witnessed various types of antisemitic incidents in the past twelve months, by degree of Orthodoxy



Likelihood of hearing certain types of antisemitic comments


The more Orthodox the respondents are, the more likely they are to have heard non-Jews make antisemitic comments, at least occasionally, in the past twelve months. For example, the strongly Orthodox are noticeably more likely than their less Orthodox counterparts to have heard non-Jewish people claim that the Holocaust is a myth or has been exaggerated (Figure 26).

Figure 26. Proportions of Jews reporting that they have heard non-Jews say that the Holocaust is a myth or has been exaggerated in past twelve months, by degree of Orthodoxy



The more Orthodox a person is, the more likely they are to say that they feel personally blamed for the actions taken by the Israeli government. However, unlike the previous examples, here it is the strongly non-Orthodox who are the outliers, with 66% saying they feel blamed at least on occasion, compared with 77% of the next group along, the ‘non-Orthodox.’


Figure 27. Proportions who feel that people in [country] accuse or blame them for anything done by the Israeli government because they are Jewish, by degree of Orthodoxy



Types of antisemitic behaviour


In general, the more Orthodox a person is, the more likely they are to have experienced an antisemitic incident in the past twelve months. Yet it is striking that the 'strongly Orthodox' are considerably more likely to have experienced an antisemitic incident than even the 'Orthodox,' i.e. the next group along. For example, 30% of the strongly Orthodox have had 'offensive or threatening comments' made to them in person, compared with 19% of the Orthodox. The most strongly Orthodox are two to three times more likely to have experienced an antisemitic incident than the strongly non-Orthodox.

Figure 28. Proportions who have experienced various antisemitic incidents in the past twelve months, by degree of Orthodoxy



In terms of experiencing a physical antisemitic attack, the strongly Orthodox stand out as being twice as likely as even the next group along (the 'Orthodox') to have done so in the past twelve months (8.7% v 3.7%), and 50% as likely in the previous five years (12% v 18%) (Figure 29).

Figure 29. Proportions who have been physically attacked because of their Jewish identity in the past twelve months/past five years, by degree of Orthodoxy




The picture is similar in terms of experiencing vandalism. The more Orthodox the respondents are, the more likely they are to have had somebody deliberately damage or vandalise their home, car, or other property (e.g. with graffiti) in the past five years because they are Jewish. 8.7% of the strongly Orthodox have had this experience, compared to 2.5% of the strongly non-Orthodox. Again, the contrast between the two most Orthodox groups is quite striking (8.7% for the strongly Orthodox vs 4.7% for the Orthodox).

Likelihood of being subjected to antisemitic discrimination


The more Orthodox the respondents are, the more likely they are to have felt discriminated against/harassed in their country in the past twelve months on the basis of their religion or belief. The strongly Orthodox are four times as likely to have experienced this than the strongly non-Orthodox (Figure 30). Focusing particularly on instances of discrimination on the basis of ‘ethnic background,’ the pattern is the same, except that, once again, we find that the strongly Orthodox stand out from all of the other groups, including the one closest to them, the Orthodox.

Figure 30. Proportions who have felt discriminated against or been harassed in their country in the past twelve months on the basis of their religion or ethnicity, by degree of Orthodoxy




In general, the more Orthodox the respondent, the more likely they are to believe that they have been personally discriminated against in the past twelve months. And again, we find that more often than not, it is the strongly Orthodox who stand out by some considerable margin (see Figure 31, panels A and B).

Figure 31, Panel A. Proportions who have felt personally discriminated against as a Jew in various situations in the past twelve months, by degree of Orthodoxy



Note: proportions shown relate to those who have participated in each activity.

Panel B.



Note: proportions shown relate to those who have participated in each activity.

C. Impact of antisemitism by degree of Orthodoxy

Anxiety about becoming a victim of an antisemitic attack

As we have already seen, the more Orthodox someone is, the more likely they are to become a victim of antisemitism (Figure 28). Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the more Orthodox the respondents are, the more worried they are about becoming a victim of a verbal antisemitic attack. One in three (33%) of the strongly non-Orthodox are ‘Very’ or ‘Fairly worried’ about this, compared with almost twice that level (59%) among the strongly Orthodox (Figure 32). The pattern is much the same regarding anxiety about becoming a victim of a physical antisemitic attack, although the proportions here are slightly lower (Figure 34). Note, however, in both cases, the appreciable jump from the Orthodox to the strongly Orthodox in terms of worry, which is reflected by their experience.

Figure 32. Proportions who are worried about becoming a victim of verbal antisemitism , by degree of Orthodoxy





Figure 33. Proportions who are worried about becoming a victim of physical antisemitism, by degree of Orthodoxy




The more Orthodox a person is, the more likely they are to be ‘Very’ or ‘Fairly worried’ about their close friends, relations or children suffering a verbal or physical antisemitic incident. The pattern is very similar to that seen in Figure 32—almost two out of three (65%) strongly Orthodox fear that their family members could become victims, compared with 54% among the Orthodox and 35% among the strongly non-Orthodox.

Likelihood of avoiding public events and places, or concealing Jewish identity in public


People at the centre of the Orthodoxy scale (referred to here, for simplicity’s sake, as ‘Moderates’) are most likely to avoid public gatherings because of fear about their safety as Jews. One in four (25%) of them avoids visiting Jewish events or sites at least occasionally. Here, the strongly Orthodox exhibit the lowest score, so despite the fact they are more likely to experience antisemitism and are most worried about it, they are least likely to alter their behaviour because of it.

Figure 34. Proportions who avoid visiting Jewish events or sites, at least occasionally, because they do not feel safe as a Jew there or on the way there, by degree of Orthodoxy



However, the more Orthodox a person is, the more likely they are to conceal their Jewish identity in public. This is the case for two out of three (66%) strongly Orthodox respondents, compared with less than one out of three (30%) strongly non-Orthodox respondents (Figure 35). It is worth noting, however, that for those at the non-Orthodox end of the scale, this is rarely an issue – they seldom stand out as different in the first place, so there may be less need for them to alter their behaviour in any way in order to conceal their Jewishness.

Figure 35. Proportions who avoid wearing, carrying or displaying things that might help people recognise them as a Jew in public*, by degree of Orthodoxy




* For example, wearing a *kippa*/skullcap, *Magen David*/Star of David or specific clothing, or displaying a *mezuzah*.

Likelihood of avoiding local areas and neighbourhoods

The more Orthodox a person is, the more likely they are to avoid certain areas or neighbourhoods because of fear for their safety as Jews. However, the relationship is not smooth with a very large difference again between the strongly Orthodox (38%) and the Orthodox (27%) (Figure 36).


Figure 36. Proportions who avoid certain places or locations in their local area or neighbourhood because they do not feel safe there as a Jew, by degree of Orthodoxy



Likelihood of considering moving or emigrating


The more Orthodox a respondent is, the more likely they are to consider moving to another area or neighbourhood in their country. Indeed, the strongly Orthodox are more than twice as likely to have done this than the strongly non-Orthodox (15% v 7%) (Figure 37).

Figure 37. Proportions who have moved or considered moving to another area or neighbourhood in their country over the past five years, because they do not feel safe living where they are now as a Jew, by degree of Orthodoxy



Similarly, the more Orthodox a respondent is, the more likely they are to have considered emigrating. The strongly Orthodox are almost two-and-a-half times as likely to have considered this than the strongly non-Orthodox (44% v 18%), and again, we see that the strongly Orthodox stand out somewhat from the general trend (Figure 38).


Figure 38. Proportions who have considered emigrating from their country over the past five years because they do not feel safe living there as a Jew, by degree of Orthodoxy



Likelihood of reporting antisemitic incidents to the authorities

The more Orthodox respondents are, the more likely they are to report antisemitic incidents to the relevant authorities. The relationship is broadly in line with experience of antisemitism, although for all groups it is notable that the number of people reporting the incident falls far short of the number that experienced it. Even though the highest level of reporting is among the strongly Orthodox, only 29% of those in that group who have experienced antisemitism went on to report it (Figure 39).

Figure 39. Proportions who have experienced an antisemitic incident in their country in the past twelve months and reported it to the police and/or to any other organisation, by degree of Orthodoxy



Summary: does religiosity make a difference?

On more or less every measure, the more Orthodox a person is, the more likely they are to perceive, experience and be affected by antisemitism. In addition to this relationship, the ‘Strongly Orthodox’ group stands out as being disproportionately affected on many measures, even when compared to the next most Orthodox group investigated, the ‘Orthodox.’

More specifically, the more Orthodox a respondent is, the more likely they are to:

- perceive antisemitism to be a problem and to think that antisemitism has increased over the past five years;
- regard statements about Israel as antisemitic, and to feel personally blamed by non-Jews for the actions taken by Israel’s government;
- experience antisemitic vandalism, verbal insults, harassment and physical attacks;
- witness antisemitic verbal insults, harassment and physical attacks;
- hear non-Jewish people make antisemitic comments;
- be discriminated against for being Jewish;
- feel worried about becoming a victim of antisemitism;

- conceal their Jewish identity in public and avoid certain places out of fear for their safety as a Jew;
- consider moving to another area or neighbourhood in their country, or consider emigrating to another country, out of fear for their safety as a Jew;
- report antisemitic incidents.

The 'strongly Orthodox' – i.e. the most Orthodox group investigated – stand out from all other groups, including the next most Orthodox one (named in this report as the 'Orthodox'), in terms of:

- experiencing antisemitic verbal insults, harassment and physical attacks;
- having offensive or threatening comments made to them, and experiencing intimidating loitering;
- witnessing antisemitic incidents and feeling discriminated against or harassed;
- hearing non-Jewish people make antisemitic comments;
- being worried about becoming a victim of antisemitism;
- avoiding certain places or considering emigrating out of fear for their safety as a Jew;
- reporting antisemitic incidents.

Of the three issues investigated in this report – gender, age and religiosity – level of Orthodoxy is the most important determinant affecting Jewish people's perceptions and experiences of antisemitism. Whilst some distinctions can be seen between men and women, and to a greater extent by age band, it is level of religiosity/Orthodoxy that exhibits the largest differences. In many instances, especially where the most Orthodox group stands out, this is presumably related to the fact that the most religiously Orthodox Jews are the most visibly recognisable Jews, both in appearance and behaviour. In addition, there is also evidence to suggest that the more Orthodox a person is, the more sensitive they are likely to be to antisemitism, and the more likely they are to view something as being antisemitic than other, less Orthodox, Jews are likely to do.

4. Summary and reflections on the findings

This report draws heavily on data gathered in 2012 for the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) as part of its investigation into the perceptions and experiences of Jews in nine EU Member States: Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In particular, it explores whether any distinctions can be drawn on the basis of gender, age or religiosity – i.e. whether males and females, younger people and older people, and more Orthodox and less Orthodox Jews experience, perceive and respond to antisemitism differently. In this concluding section, it also incorporates some qualitative findings, based on interviews with several experts in antisemitic hate crime based in Germany, Hungary and the United Kingdom, which were undertaken as part of this study.

Gender

The FRA data demonstrate that men are more likely than women to experience antisemitic insults, harassment and physical attacks. On the other hand, women are more likely to consider antisemitism to be a serious problem, to find certain antisemitic comments offensive, and to alter their behaviour in some way to hide their Jewish identity because they feel unsafe as Jews. When we interviewed the experts in antisemitic hate crime, they largely confirmed the former finding: in the UK, for example, where the most detailed data exist, we were told that male victims outnumber female victims by more than two to one, and in the case of violent incidents the discrepancy is even greater, at four to one. As one respondent told us, “the more it involves face-to-face aggression or violence, the more likely it is that men will be targeted, not women.” Yet, some questioned this, arguing that in Germany, for example, the distinctions by gender are less clear, and that the critical issue is whether people are identifiably Jewish or not. In general, the expert respondents were unable to confirm or deny the finding about higher levels of offense or anxiety among women – as their data are focused on enumerating incidents, they had little to offer on the psychological effects on people by gender.

The experts were also largely unable to differentiate between men and women in terms of reporting. One commented: “We get reports from men and women of all levels of religiosity or communal involvement. It’s not research we’ve ever really done, but I’m not conscious of us having a big gap from women never calling us or that kind of thing.” The FRA data confirm this view: the distinctions between men and women in terms of the likelihood of them reporting an incident are minimal. Women are, however, noticeably more likely than men to talk about an incident with friends or relatives.

Age

Distinctions by age were more pronounced than those found by gender. It is clear that younger Jews are considerably more likely than older Jews to experience and witness antisemitic insults, harassment and physical attacks. They are also more likely to be threatened in person, attacked online or followed in a threatening way. Our expert respondents confirmed this. As one noted, drawing on data from across the continent, “The older you are, the less you are at risk.” However, our analysis also revealed some unusual age patterns concerning anxiety about antisemitism. The distinction between the youngest and the middle-aged groups are minimal in this regard, but the oldest age bands are shown

to be the least anxious. One of our expert respondents characterised the pattern around hate crime in general (i.e. against all ethnic and religious groups) rather differently: the “68-year-old lady has a fear of crime at 100 and a risk of crime is at 1, and the 17-year-old lad has a fear of crime of 1 and a risk of crime at 98. That’s crude, but that’s how every graph I’ve ever seen goes.” The fact that older Jewish people’s levels of anxiety about antisemitism are lower than those among younger cohorts potentially reveals something about the nature of antisemitism today – that it is most likely to manifest itself in the realms of political, media or general public discourse, rather than targeted attacks against the most vulnerable.

There may also be some evidence in these data about the part historical perspective plays in Jewish people’s perceptions of antisemitism. Intriguingly, the age groups most likely to believe that levels of antisemitism have increased are the middle age bands – those aged in their 40s to 70s. Both younger and older people are less likely to believe this. It may be that the oldest groups – i.e. those with the longest memories – are comparing contemporary reality with their experiences around the time of the Second World War, and finding a much improved situation. By contrast, the middle age groups may be using later decades as their reference point, and are sensing a decline since then. The youngest age groups are perhaps least likely to sense a change, because they simply do not have a sufficiently long historical perspective to do so. This pattern also revealed itself when we explored the likelihood of people reporting an incident when one occurs, although in this instance, there was a suggestion from at least one of our expert respondents that the reality may be somewhat different. Referring to Germany, she maintained that “younger people are more likely to report” not least because “they grow up with a kind of pride about it [their Judaism].” In contrast, “older people are most likely to come from Russia or the Baltic countries [in the case of German Jewry], countries where being Jewish was very, very difficult back then and so they just grew up with the attitude ‘the best thing is to hide my Judaism.’ So, they are not very assertive about it.”

The FRA dataset only includes people aged sixteen and above, so we have no way of assessing the perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews younger than this. However, one of the expert respondents, drawing on the UK experience, maintained that “we suspect that amongst the segments of the community which report less would be young people on school buses, that kind of stuff. Every now and again we pick up anecdotal evidence of young people saying, ‘Well, of course, we get stuff shouted at us every day and, no, we never tell anyone, not even our parents or our teachers.’ So, there’s probably a lot of under-reporting there in terms of age.” However, he added, “if school kids are getting antisemitic abuse outside the same tube station they use every single day to go to and from school, then it affects a really fundamental core part of their life.”

Religiosity

With all this said, the expert respondents all felt that neither age nor gender was as significant a factor in differentiating between people’s perceptions and experiences as religiosity and visibility. As one said, fundamentally “it is about if you are obviously Jewish. If you’re obviously Jewish, the chance for you to be involved in antisemitic incidents is as big if you are young or if you are old.” Another added, “if you’re visibly Jewish due to your religious clothing, you’re more of a target.”

The FRA data back up this claim, certainly in terms of religiosity. The more Orthodox are more likely than the less Orthodox to experience, perceive and be affected by antisemitism on more or less every measure investigated. The finding that they are more likely to suffer antisemitic insults, harassment,

discrimination and physical attacks is unsurprising given that more Orthodox Jews are likely to be identifiably Jewish – their clothing, in particular, reveals their Jewish identity, making them more vulnerable to antisemitic attack and abuse. It probably follows that they would therefore perceive antisemitism to be a growing problem, and be more anxious about it than the less Orthodox. However, one expert respondent argued that some Orthodox behaviours may actually shield them from the worst excesses of antisemitism, for example, their tendency to live in strongly Jewish, largely middle-class neighbourhoods, as “that dissipates the risk, because if you were in a more mixed area you would likely stand out.” He added that there tends to be “a fairly safe feel” to middle class locations, with by and large big houses that have not been converted into flats that “haven’t got that high-density population thing.” The same respondent also noted that Jews are also quite likely to be out on the streets in family groups, which may also reduce the risk, because “attacking somebody in a family group feels very different than a 19-year-old lad attacking a 19-year-old lad.” He added, “my sense is, from the Orthodox Jewish community, you’re far more likely to see a family unit in public together than maybe you are a Muslim family and certainly as a family from more working class neighbourhoods. That family unit issue changes the dynamic, doesn’t it?”

Nevertheless, the expert respondents were uncertain about the extent to which the distinctions revealed by level of Orthodoxy were specifically about people’s religiosity, or simply their visibility as Jews. For example, one noted that a significant proportion of non-Orthodox Jewish children in the United Kingdom attend Jewish schools. He pointed out that the school uniforms they wear reveal their Jewishness, and can make them more vulnerable to verbal insults, harassment or physical attack. Furthermore, many non-Orthodox Jews wear Jewish symbols, such as a necklace with a *magen david* [Star of David], or they display a *mezuzah* on the doorposts of their home. One expert respondent from Germany argued that even though “there is a big difference between people who are religious or who are not religious, the only way to be a victim of antisemitic crime is if you are obviously a Jew, and this can only happen by wearing a *magen david* or a *kippa* [skullcap] or other religious symbols.” Either that, or, she noted, Jews can sometimes be identified by listening to the language they speak. A number of Israelis live in Germany, and she maintained that “people who are just talking on their mobile phone in Hebrew to their family in Israel or whatever and who look like ‘normal’ Jews, not religious Jews, get insulted even more.” Thus, Jews may be identifiable in a variety of ways, and whilst their level of religiosity can vary, each of these means of identification can potentially expose them to risk. That stated, they also stressed that being identifiably Jewish can bring positive as well as negative attention.

The only finding on religiosity from the FRA data analysis that surprised the expert respondents was that more Orthodox people are revealed to be more likely to report incidents than less Orthodox ones. One said: “It’s assumed by everyone that the strictly Orthodox communities get more incidents and report fewer of them, but there’s an element of speculation in that.”

Other factors to consider

Some of the expert respondents maintained that the deconstruction of the data into the different categories of gender, age and religiosity may yield deceptive results. For example, discussing a hypothetical case of antisemitism against children in Jewish schools, one said: “So, they wear Jewish school uniforms, which makes them visibly Jewish. So, is it that [that prompts an incident], or is it their age that kids from other schools pick on them because they’re the Jews?” In essence, they argued that sometimes it is difficult to disentangle one variable from another, rendering distinctions of this kind

very complex. It is worth noting, however, that our analysis of the FRA data here indicates that religiosity/visibility is a substantially more important factor than age, which, in turn, is more important than gender.

The expert respondents also pointed to a number of other contextual factors beyond gender, age and religiosity that also affect levels of antisemitism and Jewish responses to it. Temporal factors play a part – for example, it is common to see a spike in antisemitic incidents in Europe during periods of intense conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Improved levels of reporting can also occur at particular times, when the Police and/or other agencies are specifically focused on promoting it. Indeed, one expert pointed to improved levels of reporting in the UK after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, arguing that “it was about a greater awareness and alertness and fear of crime leading to people reporting things that they probably would have just brushed off and seen as a bad thing and not bothered with previously.”

Geographical factors are also involved. As one UK-based expert said: “If you’re a family of *haredi* (strictly Orthodox) Jews walking around the Trafford Centre in the centre of Manchester [i.e. an inner city area with no visible Jewish population], you’re more likely to face abuse than if you’re a secular Jew, not wearing religious clothing and looking English in appearance.” Not dissimilarly, an expert respondent from Germany said: “If you go to the parts of Berlin where lots of migrants live and Muslim people from Lebanon and stuff, and if you run around there with a *kippah*, yes, of course, people will shout at you and say something, “You pig, you Jew and...” In essence, there is a locational dimension to antisemitism, as there is to all types of hate crime, with Jews in some areas more likely to encounter and experience antisemitism than in others.

What should be done?

As part of the interview process, we asked our expert respondents to share their views on what more could be done to combat antisemitism and encourage reporting of it. Whilst this is a topic that has been explored in much greater depth elsewhere, we highlight here some of the key points they made.

One pointed to a situation in the UK a few years ago, where the number of incidents recorded dropped substantially in one particular location from one year to the next. When he investigated the reasons why, the Police explanation was that they had “a big drive on anti-social behaviour that year and it’s the same offenders.” In essence, this respondent argued, antisemitic hate crime should be seen in the larger context of hate crime in general: “if you knock out one, you reduce the other.” The implication is that context matters – working to build an environment in which any form of racism is considered taboo will help to reduce antisemitism.

Others stressed the importance of doing more to take incidents seriously when they occur. One of the expert respondents, from Germany, referred to a clearly antisemitic incident that was not taken seriously by the German Police because the victim reported that she had not been physically injured, even though she had been punched in the face and knocked off a bar stool. As another respondent said, “it’s always about demonstrating to people and persuading people that something will be done. The best way to do that is to show success, to actually prosecute people and publicise it in the right places to the right people. It’s important to show future victims that it’s worth reporting, that the benefit of reporting is likely to bring a result, and the cost of reporting – in terms of the time and the hassle and the stress of going through court and all the rest of it – can be reduced.”

One respondent discussed the role restorative justice can play – creating opportunities for perpetrators to meet with, and apologise to their victims, and learn more about how the incident affected them. “Certainly,” he reported, “our experience of restorative justice with hate crime in Manchester has been very positive.”

At the same time, another respondent pointed to some of the risks in reporting and prosecuting. Pointing to high profile victims, such as British Jewish Members of Parliament, Luciana Berger and Ruth Smeeth (both of whom have suffered from extraordinary levels of antisemitic abuse via social media), he noted that the prosecution of one of the perpetrators “led to Luciana suffering more, massively more, abuse than she suffered before.” Thus certainly in high profile cases, but perhaps in others too, it seems that prosecutions must also be very carefully managed and communicated, with an eye to ensuring that no backlash occurs as a result.

It is clear that social media can be used as a platform for hate speech, and, as one respondent maintained, this raises the questions of where to draw the line between hate speech and hate crime, and, more generally, how to police hate speech online and encourage a counter-narrative. “Our sense,” he argued, “is that role models are probably the strongest, and peers are probably the next approach, but we have to work out how to facilitate counter-narrative in a way that has a real impact, rather than a superficial impact.” He pointed to an initiative in the UK where the police fund a charity to train, support and equip young people to challenge online hate in several ways: supporting victims; reporting material that they believe breaks the terms of use of the service provider; reporting material to the police if they need to; and simply challenging online hostility. Yet he warned that the “misinformation that fuels negative stereotypes has an impact on offending risks,” and that the “whole issue of information and misinformation is probably our biggest challenge going forward, because it’s just hugely influential and has taken over.” Indeed, another expert respondent, relating to the issue in Hungary, argued that “education is really the most important long-term investment.”

Lastly, all respondents related in some way to the importance of monitoring and researching antisemitism in greater depth. Improving methods of how to define, detect and record antisemitic activity, and how best to analyse and understand what they are observing, is widely seen to be an essential prerequisite to all other policy work. It was striking to us how little detailed statistical analysis had been done on antisemitic hate crime data, and it is our observation that part of what needs to be improved are the research methods employed when incidents are recorded: the variables used, the means by which data are recorded and stored, and the sophistication of data analysis.

Appendix

A. Creating a 'religiosity' variable

Since less than 10 per cent of the sample self-described as Orthodox or *haredi*, it was necessary to develop another approach to measuring Orthodoxy. To do so – i.e. to measure different levels of 'Orthodoxy' – it was necessary to operationalise the term in a way that was meaningful to all respondents. To this end, we created a scale based on two underlying variables. The first was a ten-point scale of religiousness (based on the question 'How religious would you say you are? Please position yourself on a scale ranging from 1 to 10, where 1 means not religious at all and 10 means very religious.'). The second was a scale derived from questions about Jewish practice⁷—the more practices respondents reported doing, the more Orthodox they are deemed to be.

These two variables are closely, but not perfectly, related (Pearson correlation = .74 significant at 99% level), indicating that the more religious a respondent reports being, the more Jewish practices he or she is likely to observe. Neither of these variables is sufficient on its own: a person may regard themselves as being 'religious,' but solely in a spiritual way, rather than behaving in a Jewishly religious way according to Jewish law. On the other hand, a person may observe many practices but not necessarily regard themselves as being especially 'religious'—e.g. they may attend synagogue for social reasons or light candles on Friday night because their partner does.

Therefore, the two variables were combined adding together each respondent's scores to produce a scale of religiosity and Jewish practice which we regard as a good statistical approximation of the differing levels of Orthodoxy. To make this 16-point scale more manageable, it was in turn divided into quintiles labelled from 'Strongly non-Orthodox' through to 'Strongly Orthodox.'

B. Terms of reference

The terms of reference for this research, as outlined by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), were as follows:

The research should take into account:

- how Jewish men and women perceive and experience antisemitism;
- what differential impact antisemitic hate crimes have on them, in particular whether there are distinctions to be drawn by gender, age and religiosity.

The gender aspect will explore:

- differences between how men and women experience and perceive antisemitic hate crimes, vandalism and harassment, with a view towards understanding any parallel differences in their security needs.

The age aspect will focus on:

⁷ List of Jewish practices: Attend Passover Seder; Do not switch on lights on the Sabbath; Attend synagogue; Eat kosher meat; Light candles on Friday night; Fast on Yom Kippur.

- any differences in how younger and older Jews perceive and experience antisemitism, with a particular emphasis on the challenges facing youth and young adults.

The religiosity aspect will look at:

- the extent to which distinctions can be drawn between Jews who are Orthodox and – therefore identifiably Jewish – and non-Orthodox.

The paper will broadly cover the OSCE region, with special focus on Europe. Ultimately, the geographic focus will be determined by the available data.

/ ABOUT JPR

The **Institute for Jewish Policy Research** (JPR) is a UK-based research organisation, consultancy and think-tank that specialises in contemporary Jewish issues. Formerly the Institute of Jewish Affairs, JPR has stood at the forefront of Jewish community research for several decades and is responsible for much of the data and analysis that exist on Jews in the UK and across Europe.

JPR's research and analysis offer detailed insights into a wide range of issues, including Jewish population size, geographical density, age and gender structure, education, charitable giving, volunteering, antisemitism, Jewish practice, religious outlook and communal participation. All of JPR's publications can be downloaded free of charge from our website: www.jpr.org.uk.

As well as having its own research programme, JPR regularly conducts research for clients working both within and beyond the Jewish community in order to provide data insight to help inform policy development. Its recent clients have included the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the UK Department for Communities and Local Government, the Jewish Agency for Israel, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the Jewish Leadership Council, Jewish Care, Partnerships for Jewish Schools and the Union of Jewish Students.

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