

ANTI-SEMITIC PREJUDICE
IN TODAY'S HUNGARIAN SOCIETY

REPRESENTATIVE
NATIONAL SURVEY 2018

AUTHORS:
ENDRE HANN AND DÁNIEL RÓNA

BUDAPEST, 2019



ACTION AND PROTECTION
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1. INTRODUCTION¹



On behalf of Action and Protection Foundation (APF), Medián Public Opinion and Market Research Institute conducted a comprehensive research in November 2018 on Hungarian society's relation to Jews, and specifically on:

- views and opinions related to Jews;
- the frequency and strength of anti-Semitic prejudice;
- opinions related to the Holocaust and its remembrance;
- associations related to Jews.

The research was conducted with a questionnaire, Medián took personal interviews with 1,200 participants. Participants were all over 18 years of age. The slight distortions of the sample were corrected by a mathematical procedure called weighting, using the statistics published by the Hungarian Statistical Office (KSH). The sample accurately

ly represents the composition of voting age population according to type of settlement, gender, age group and school qualification. The sampling error of the published data is maximum 3% depending on the ratio of answers in the complete sample. The research methodology was based on the concept² elaborated by András Kovács. In the course of the research, we predominantly used the questionnaire applied and used frequently by him since 1995, allowing us to track changes in data over time.

Interviewers of Medián questioned participants for approximately 30 minutes. Questions about Jews were in the focus of the interviews. Before presenting a significant amount of data, we would like to clarify what is and what is not shown by the data of the questionnaires. At the beginning of our study, we wish to highlight how much an average Hungarian citizen cares about the views, opinions and latest happenings related to Jews and how important these issues are for voters. We also find it useful to detail the problems of measuring anti-Semitism and prejudice. After the clarification of methodological questions, we first present the frequency of anti-Semitic views and attitudes, then we examine which groups of society are primarily affected by such attitudes. Next, we list data referring to the Holocaust, the remembrance of the past and to associations related to Jews, Israel and George Soros. At the end of our study, we define which one of the analyzed factors is most likely to increase the probability of anti-Semitism.

¹ The structure and method of this study is in line with our study of 2017. The explanation of the methodology also stems from it.
² András Kovács: *The Stranger at Hand. Anti-Semitic Prejudices in post-Communist Hungary*. Brill, Leiden – Boston 2011.

2. THE PERCEPTION AND IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS RELATED TO JEWS

Similar to last year's research, this year's data shows that the affairs related to Jews are on the periphery of Hungarian voters' attention. This is not surprising; people's attention is drawn to issues in which they are directly involved.

According to the content analysis of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH)³, none of the cases linked to Jews made it to the monthly top 20 most noticed topics on the main broadcast channels in 2018.⁴ In 2014, the debate on the monument at Szabadság Square received a measurable amount of publicity but only for one month, with not more than a middle range value. In 2015, 2016 and 2017, there was no case linked to Jews among the most covered media issues.

Our survey shows that news related to Jews reach only a small group of voters. We studied with open-ended questions (questions without answer choices) how many people can recall events in relation to Jews. We can only declare that someone cares about such issues if he or she is able to name at least one case. Similar to the last 3 years, only 12% of the respondents was able to name a concrete case in 2018, but even these answers were superficially informative ("Jewish celebration", "Jewish festival", "threats against Jews"). Respondents did

not seem to be fully up-to-date in this area. The one and only substantive issue they mentioned concerned the *House of Fates*, 2% of the respondents named this issue. A following question asked what organizations are behind the House of Fates project. 3% percent of the respondents mentioned Mária Schmidt and the House of Terror Museum, 1% said the Hungarian government and another 1% said "Fidesz affiliates". Only 1 respondent (out of the 1,200 participants) mentioned Slomó Köves and the Unified Hungarian Jewish Congregation (EMIH), which is significantly fewer than the 11 respondents (1%) mentioning the Federation of Hungarian Jewish Communities (Mazsihisz). All in all, only 4-5% of the respondents is up-to-date about the topic, most of the society is indifferent about the issue. Yet, this project received the most media coverage in 2018 out of issues related to Jews, so people know even less about other cases.

Based on the above, we have reason to suppose that the questions of our analysis, the relation to Jews (social distance, prejudice and attitudes) lag on the scale of importance to an average citizen. In the rest of the study, all data needs to be analyzed in this context. Only a small, but still significant part of respondents finds our topic relevant.

³ <http://nmhh.hu/szakmai-erdekeltek/mediafelugyelet/politikai-szereplok-mediahasznalata>

⁴ Even Gábor Vona's Hanukkah greeting and the reactions of political parties related to this greeting did not make it to the top 20 publicity news in December 2016 or 2017.

3. MEASURING ANTI-SEMITISM AND PREJUDICE

Based on our findings, the question “How much do you like or dislike Jews?” can only show the *direction* of one’s attitude, but not the *weight* dedicated to the question. Even in case of extreme sympathy or antipathy, the answer is not necessarily about the respondent’s significantly important emotion or motivation. It is equally important to emphasize that the quantitative survey can reveal opinion, prejudice and attitude but can hardly refer to behavior.

According to the interpretation we find appropriate, the questions measuring anti-Semitism reveal attitudes, and one characteristic of anti-Semitic manifestations is volatility. Based on the time scale comparison, it is worth examining whether opinions related to Jews tend to move towards the sympathetic or the hostile direction. During our survey, we used two dimensions of attitudes towards Jews based on

András Kovács’ methodology: cognitive anti-Semitism based on ideas, misconceptions and conspiracy theories in relation to Jews, and affective rejection based on the level of general emotional rejection and social distance. When we combine these two dimensions, we can see how many respondents are categorized anti-Semitic by both dimensions and the extent they reach. Those who hardly agree with any statements against Jews are grouped in the category of “non anti-Semitic”, those who agree with some of the statements are called “moderately anti-Semitic”, and those who agree with most of the statements fall into the category of “strongly anti-Semitic”. We would like to again highlight that these categories do not express the importance respondents attribute to the issue and show nothing about their actions either.

4. THE LEVEL OF ANTI-SEMITISM

COGNITIVE ANTI-SEMITISM

We measured the content of anti-Semitic prejudice with a set of questions on the ideas and “knowledge” about Jews, these questions were frequently used in the past two decades. We asked respondents to indicate on a five-point scale how much they agree with the eight statements we presented them. Among the statements, there

was anti-Judaism (which is traditional anti-Semitism based on religious beliefs), an anti-Semitic stereotype stemming from the belief that Jews have disproportionate influence in the world, and a sentence suggesting that Jews should be repelled in different areas of life. Table 1 shows the proportion of those who ‘fully’ or ‘rather’ agree with the statements (value of 4 or 5 on the scale).

Table 1. Content of anti-Semitic prejudice (agreement with statements, percentage)

	year	fully agree	agree
Jewish intellectuals control the press and the culture ⁵	2006	12	19
	2011	14	21
	2013	11	18
	2015	14	19
	2016	14	18
	2017	16	20
	2018	16	17
There is a secret Jewish conspiracy which defines political and economic policies	2006	10	17
	2011	14	20
	2013	15	19
	2015	15	20
	2016	17	19
	2017	17	20
	2018	20	20
Jewish influence is too great in Hungary today	2013	12	15
	2015	15	17
	2016	16	21
	2017	15	21
	2018	15	22
It would be best if Jews left the country	2006	5	7
	2011	8	12
	2013	6	9
	2015	9	11
	2016	8	10
	2017	11	13
	2018	10	11
The number of Jews should be limited in certain professions	2006	5	10
	2011	7	12
	2013	5	11
	2015	8	13
	2016	9	16
	2017	13	17
	2018	12	15
The Crucifixion of Jesus is the unforgivable fault of Jews	2006	8	12
	2011	9	12
	2013	7	8
	2015	10	15
	2016	11	14
	2017	15	16
	2018	19	18
The suffering of Jews was the punishment of God	2006	7	7
	2011	5	9
	2013	4	7
	2015	7	11
	2016	10	11
	2017	8	12
	2018	11	13
Jews are more likely to use unethical tools to reach their goals than others	2006	8	13
	2011	9	17
	2013	7	15
	2015	11	15
	2016	13	16
	2017	15	20
	2018	14	19


⁵ In order to be explicit in the questionnaires of 2015, 2016 and 2017, the statement's phrasing was "It is a threat that Jewish intellectuals control the press and the culture".

We can conclude that one-third or one-fourth of the population agree with the statements above. The first three statements are the most popular, these refer to the 'excessive' or 'dangerous' influence of Jews. This can be related to the fact that every fourth respondent agreed with the statement representing the spirit of Numerus Clausus. The most frightening data may be that 21% of the respondents supported the idea of requesting Jews to leave the country. There has been no major change seen over the years, but there has been a slight, gradual increase since 2006. Four of the eight statements reach the so far highest percentage this year regarding the number of respondents who agree with these statements. *There is not a single statement with which a lower percentage of respondents agreed this year than in previous years.*

Based on tendencies in terms of time, we can conclude that *cognitive anti-Semitism*

has remarkably increased in Hungary: This is shown by Chart 1 where we created the three categories by adding up respondents' scale values for all the eight statements. This way, the lowest scale value was eight and the highest was eight times five, so forty in total. We placed those to the first group (non anti-Semitic) who may accept certain discriminating stereotypes but based on the value of their answers, they attain a low point on the scale (8 to 20 points). We put those to the second group (moderately anti-Semitic) who showed medium level prejudice (21 to 30 points) and the third group was formed by those who are strongly anti-Semitic based on their results (31 to 40 points). Finally, respondents who gave no answers or responded, "I don't know" were grouped in the category of "miscellaneous". For reasons of clarity the chart only refers to the proportions of answers given and does not show the lack of responses.

Chart 1. The proportion of cognitive anti-Semitic people in Hungarian society, 2013-2018 (percentage)



This chart shows that the proportion of non anti-Semitic people has gradually decreased while the proportion of strongly anti-Semites has increased year by year. The shift was significant in 2017. In our opinion, this tendency may be linked to a current phenomenon called “post-truth politics”, which is especially topical today. Voters can hardly differentiate reliable information from complete nonsense – mainly because disinformation and the dissemination of conspiracy theories form a core part of politicians’ strategies these days. If we agree it is becoming more and more difficult for average news readers to decide on what they believe, we must accept that this is the case in several areas, including anti-Semitism, too. It is harder and harder to reject mis-

conceptions as their number is rising and they get more and more publicity, as well as political support. The reason why we find this scenario realistic is because, as we will see, free associations related to Jews have not deteriorated during the past few years.

Table 2 illustrates consistency. Based on the three groups, it is perfectly ‘predictable’ in the great majority of cases how respondents would answer certain questions on cognitive anti-Semitism. Although 8% of respondents among non anti-Semites believe in the existence of a hidden Jewish collaboration, and “only” 64% of strongly anti-Semites agree with the last statement of anti-Judaism, fundamentally the eight statements show a very similar pattern in the different groups.

Table 2. The acceptance of certain anti-Semitic statements by groups formed according to level of anti-Semitism (2018, percentage)


	strongly anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	non anti-Semitic
12 It is a threat that Jewish intellectuals control the press and the culture	94	37	3
There is a secret Jewish conspiracy which defines political and economic policies	92	45	8
Jewish influence is too great in Hungary today	95	44	6
Jews are more likely to use unethical tools to reach their goals than others	95	36	3
It would be best if Jews left the country	77	20	0
The number of Jews should be limited in certain professions	87	29	1
The Crucifixion of Jesus is the unforgiveable fault of Jews	86	44	5
The suffering of Jews was the punishment of God	64	27	2

AFFECTIVE ANTI-SEMITISM

We studied emotional attitudes towards Jews

in this dimension by using three questions. First, we asked respondents to tell us whether Jews are likeable or unlikeable to them.

Chart 2. The emotional rejection of Jews (percentage)



The most obvious lesson to be learned from the chart is the significant increase between 2009 and 2010, a permanent change in public opinion. The earlier attained 10% is now far above 20%. Although the value is always slightly higher in election years, the sharp increase in 2010 cannot be explained by that. It seems a realistic assumption that one of the reasons behind this sharp increase was the dislike against Jews expressed in public speech as it became more legitimate after Jobbik gained

ground and became mainstream in public life. The emotional rejection has fluctuated between 21-26% since 2010, it increased significantly in 2017 and stayed around peak level in 2018, too.

The second question we asked was very similar to the first one, but instead of choosing from two options, respondents had to indicate their feelings towards Jews and other ethnicities on a 1 to 9 scale. We present average scores in Table 3, 9 meaning full sympathy and 1 meaning complete dislike.

Table 3. Sympathy index of Jews and other ethnicities on a nine-point scale (2006-2018)

	Arab	Roma	Black	Romanians	Chinese	Swabians	Jews	migrants
2006	3,87	3,33	4,55	4,70	3,77	5,38	5,02	-
2007	3,66	3,03	4,24	4,00	3,80	5,48	5,00	-
2009	4,37	3,39	4,72	4,11	4,09	5,75	5,24	-
2010	4,04	3,64	4,26	4,23	4,01	4,86	4,47	-
2011	3,93	3,63	4,48	4,44	4,11	5,14	4,61	-
2013	4,06	3,69	4,20	4,26	4,12	4,96	4,53	-
2014	4,09	3,64	4,28	4,45	4,33	5,30	4,73	-
2015	3,32	3,29	3,96	4,41	4,44	5,79	5,09	2,84
2016	3,48	3,5	4,12	4,69	4,48	5,87	5,32	2,75
2017	3,44	3,45	3,93	4,58	4,54	5,72	4,91	2,72
2018	3,51	3,53	4,11	4,64	4,76	5,78	5,26	3,00
correlation coefficient* with the sympathy towards Jews	0,352**	0,294**	0,434**	0,569**	0,456**	0,591**	-	0,335**

* The correlation coefficient is a statistical indicator that expresses the strength of the relationship between two variables. The value of the variable is 1 if the variable is completely defined by the other variable. The value of the variable is 0 when they are completely independent from each other. So, for example, if the correlation coefficient is 0.543 between Jews and Swabians, it means a very strong relation between the two sympathy scales: mainly the same respondents like or dislike both ethnicities. The other relations are slightly weaker but still significant (on the level of 95%, which is what the two stars indicate).

What we first see from this table is the popularity of each ethnicity. The Roma population used to be the most rejected group but in 2015, another group – migrants – became even more rejected. The predominantly and significantly negative opinion against migrants was marked by the fact that the scores of those ethnicities who may be identified with migrants by an ordinary citizen, such as Arabs and black people, significantly decreased as well compared to 2014. The average score of Arabs is now on a similar level to that of Roma. The perception of other ethnicities is more favorable, Jews – right behind the Swabians – are the second most accepted group. At the same time, the data shows that xenophobia in general is quite a strong phenomenon in society. Only few people gave an average score of more than five to any ethnicity.


With regards to change in terms of time, the shift between 2009 and 2010

was the most remarkable in most cases. The situation took a positive turn in 2018, the perception of most ethnicities improved, the scores of Jews reached record levels.

The last column of Table 3 also highlights that the emotional relation to Jews is most probably going hand in hand with the like or dislike of any other groups. The correlation is especially strong between the Jews from one hand and the Romanians, Swabians, Chinese and black people on the other, and it is significant even in the case with other ethnicities. This means that mostly the same respondents found Jews, Swabians and other ethnicities unlikable (see footprint under Table 3). *Anti-Semitism therefore goes hand in hand with general xenophobia.*

Our third question also measured the aversion and the distance kept from Jews and other ethnicities or minorities.

Chart 3. Social distance from certain groups. "Would not agree to have a ... neighbor" (2013-2018, percentage)



It became clear again that “otherness” is not widely accepted in Hungary. Even from the most accepted groups, one-fifth of the society would keep distance. Most of society dislikes homosexuals and the great majority dislikes “migrants”. The relative position of Jews is considered favorable compared to other groups. Similar to Table 3, we see an improvement of the scores of Jews, fewer people would keep distance from them in 2018 than in previous years. The two sets of data (Table 3 and Chart 3) show that the appearance of migrants in the questionnaire had a strong impact on the values of other groups. Context always has a significant influence on answers in questionnaires. Simply because a strongly rejected group appeared in the

questionnaire and respondents identified two other groups, Arabs and black people with them, the values of other ethnicities increased. Chinese and Jews received better values because of this, because respondents rated them *in comparison with* migrants.

This question concerning neighborhood strengthens the conclusion that anti-Semitism is often a broader manifestation of xenophobia. Respondents who are not keen on living in the neighborhood of the ethnicities and minorities in question are more likely to reject Jews, too (Table 4). This is what the table below illustrates, how strongly the like or dislike towards Jews is related to the popularity of other groups. For example, 80% of those who

accept Swabians as their neighbors would of those who reject Swabians would accept accept Jews as well (column 1) and only 16% Jews (column 2).

Table 4. The proportion of those who would agree to have a Jewish neighbor (2018, percentage)

	among those who agree to have a ... neighbor	among those who would NOT agree to have a ... neighbor
black	76	66
migrant	91	55
Arab	92	69
homosexual	92	61
Romanian	93	50
Roma	90	69
Chinese	87	53
Swabian	80	16
American	85	32
skinhead (data of 2016)	85	73

16


Xenophobia affects everyone who is “different”: we could intuitively think that Jews and skinheads are rejected by very different people, but it is the opposite. The person who rejects skinheads would be very likely to dislike Jews, too. For the great majority of Hungarian society, “being Jewish” is just another form of being *different* and it is *this quality* that generates the dislike towards Jews just as towards any other forms of “otherness”.

Based on the first three sets of data, following the tradition of research and sum-

marizing the data of Chart 2 and Table 3, we can conclude the level of anti-Semitism in Hungarian society⁶. As it can be seen on Chart 4, affective anti-Semitism increased in 2010 and has decreased to some extent since then. The ratio of non anti-Semites increased every year between 2013 and 2015, but it has not changed much since 2015. All in all, it seems that the emotional rejection of Jews affects three out of ten respondents and among them, strong affective anti-Semitism affects two people out of ten.

Chart 4. The evolution of the ratio of those who reject Jews on an emotional basis, 2003-2018 (percentage)

● non anti-Semitic ● moderately anti-Semitic ● strongly anti-Semitic



⁶ We categorized those respondents who feel dislike towards Jews and marked a value of 1-5 on the dislike index as “strongly anti-Semitic”. We grouped the rest of the respondents who feel dislike towards Jews and those who do not feel dislike towards them but marked a value of 1-3 on the dislike index as “moderately anti-Semitic”. Everyone else fell into the category of “non anti-Semitic”.

We examined the consistency of the responses given to the three questions related to the emotional dimension (Chart 2 and 3, Table 3). We considered a respondent consistent if he or she chose the same direction (whether anti-Semitic or not) for all three questions⁷. Based on this, we found that two-thirds of the respondents' thinking was consistent but the thinking of one quarter of them was inconsistent. Respondents of the latter group gave an anti-Semitic answer to one question and a non anti-Semitic answer to another. (The rest of the respondents chose "I don't know".) This makes it reasonable to integrate questions into one dimension, but it also highlights that a great part of respondents found the questions strange and were uncertain in their answers. They had no mature and unshakably solid position so they have probably never thought about such issues and questions before.

THE RATIO OF ANTI-SEMITES AFTER COMBINING THE TWO DIMENSIONS


The groups of people with anti-Semitic views and anti-Semitic emotions are not

identical, most of their membership obviously overlap but not every member is the same. In this part of our analysis, we merge the two dimensions. We consider people strongly anti-Semitic who are qualified as such in both dimensions or are found to be strongly anti-Semitic in one dimension and moderately anti-Semitic in the other. Those respondents are considered moderately anti-Semitic who fell into this category in both dimensions or were categorized as strongly anti-Semitic in one and non anti-Semitic in the other dimension.

Based on this categorization, we can see that about one-third of the society is affected by some level of anti-Semitism and one-fifth is strongly anti-Semitic. The tendency over time is very similar to the tendencies of individual dimensions. Anti-Semitism significantly increased between 2006 and 2011, then it slightly decreased until 2014. It did not change much between 2014 and 2016 and increased again in 2017. In 2018, it went back to levels noted in 2016. All these changes, however, are rather modest.

We use this integrated indicator of anti-Semitism in the rest of our study.

Chart 5. The ratio of anti-Semites in Hungarian society, 2006-2018 (percentage)



⁷ We define an individual as anti-Semitic if he or she dislikes Jews (Chart 2), if he or she would not move into their neighborhood (Chart 3) and if he or she expresses dislike towards them by giving 4 or any lower score on the 9-point scale (Table 3). Obviously, the opposite of all this was considered consistent, too, and we find the middle value of Table 3's question congruent and reconcilable with all other answers.

5. WHO ARE ANTI-SEMITIC?


PREJUDICE AND DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS

When we take a close look at the relation between anti-Semitism and social background, we must realize that their connection is very weak. *Prejudice against Jews is a characteristic of every social group to the same extent, there is no major divergence.* It often happens that the level of anti-Semitism of one group is higher than the average in a certain year but there are no big differences in the long run. This is exactly what we saw for example in the breakdown per type of settlement: the number of anti-Semitic

respondents was higher in Budapest than elsewhere in 2018, while anti-Semitic respondents from other towns and cities outnumbered everyone else in 2017, while the numbers of these two categories were even in 2016. We believe that the high values of Budapest should not be taken seriously until there is a recurring pattern year after year. Based on the time series, there is no significant divergence in this aspect.

Similarly, earlier results showed that men were slightly more susceptible to anti-Semitism than women. Then there was no difference between them in 2017, but men scored higher than women again in 2018. When it

Chart 6. Anti-Semitism in different social groups (2018, percentage)




comes to age groups, there is only one tendency that was valid over several years: the older generation (people above 60) are less likely to agree with anti-Semitic statements than others. There is no major difference between people regarding their school education either. Only people having university diplomas show a lower ratio of anti-Semitism, and people with vocational degrees score higher than others. It would be an exaggeration to say that anti-Semitism is limited to unsuccessful people living at the periphery of society and experiencing existential threats. Anti-Semitism equally affects physical and intellectual workers and it is considered the weakest in the group of society with the lowest income (similarly to previous years' results). All the above-mentioned differences are considered minor.

ANTI-SEMITISM AND RELIGIOUSNESS

Several questions were asked in the questionnaire about religion and religiousness. We examined if there was a relationship between prejudice towards Jews and religiousness, and the frequency of attending and belonging to a church. We did not even perceive as many differences as in the case of demographic properties. The extent of anti-Semitism does not depend on the extent of the individual's religiousness or the type of church he or she belongs to. Even anti-Semitism based on religious grounds, i.e. anti-Judaism has no significant correlation to religiousness. In previous years, we sometimes pointed out a little more anti-Semitic respondents among Calvinists, but this was not at all the case in 2018.

Chart 7. Anti-Semitism according to religiousness (2018, percentage)



ANTI-SEMITISM AND SOCIAL ATTITUDES


Besides social groups, we carefully examined the role of political views and attitudes. We analyzed the responses to first find out whether agreement with different sociopolitical questions increases the probability of anti-Semitism. The results confirmed previous research findings that anti-Semitic prejudice is in close coherence with worldviews non-directly related to Jews, such as rejection of otherness (xenophobia), conservative law-and-order views, trust in cer-

tain moral and social norms and rules. In previous years, the closest correlations were with the rejection of homosexuality, abortion and EU membership, and with views of wanting to limit the number of people of color. In 2018, these were less significant factors in determining the level of anti-Semitism, but the correlations were still notable. We found that being a nationalist, however, greatly increases the probability of anti-Semitic prejudice. At the same time, agreement with statements reflecting pessimistic sociopolitical attitudes ("Leaders of this country do not really care about people

like you”) showed no correlation with anti-Semitism. This can be a little surprising as numerous research reports suggest that the feeling of betrayal may feed anti-Sem-

itism. *It is still justified that sociopolitical attitudes project the potential anti-Semitism of respondents much more clearly than demographic properties.*

Chart 8. Anti-Semitism and sociopolitical attitudes (2018, percentage)



● strongly anti-Semitic ● moderately anti-Semitic ● non anti-Semitic

ANTI-SEMITISM AND POLITICAL PREFERENCES

In the following chapter, we examine if there is a relationship between anti-Semitism and political self-identification, supporting certain political parties and willingness to participate at elections. Based on three questions, respondents had to position themselves on a seven-point scale, in left-right, conservative-liberal and moderate-radical dimensions.

Compared to the overall population, anti-Semites are closer to the right wing and the radical poles on average, but they are only marginally linked to the conservative pole. Based on average scores, it is clear-

ly visible that there are respondents who agree with anti-Semitic statements even among left-wingers, liberals and moderate voters. Anti-Semitic interviewees are likely to tend to the right-wing from the average score of 4. Yet, it is important to note that due to the unpopularity of the left-wing and liberal parties, the entire society has shifted to the right. There were no major differences in the conservative-liberal dimension, only strongly anti-Semitic respondents tend to be more conservative than the average. Strongly anti-Semitic respondents place themselves almost precisely to the middle of the moderate-radical scale. There were no major changes in average scores last year.


Table 5. Political self-identification and anti-Semitism, 2018 (average on a 1-7 scale)

	strongly anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	non anti-Semitic	overall population 2018	overall population 2017
left wing (1) – right wing (7)	5,33	4,84	4,38	4,62	4,79
conservative (1) – liberal (7)	3,26	3,62	3,73	3,63	3,61
moderate (1) – radical (7)	4,26	3,79	3,23	3,50	3,54

Political interest and the willingness to participate at the elections, which are closely related to each other, seem to have a weak relation to anti-Semitism. The probability of responses against Jews slightly increases in harmony with the increase of willingness to

vote (Chart 9) but it remains average among respondents who are not willing to vote (Chart 9). We assume that anti-Semitic voters may be a bit louder than others, they are more likely to make public statements. Therefore, public opinion may overestimate their ratio.

Chart 9. Anti-Semitism and willingness to participate at elections (2018, percentage)




● strongly anti-Semitic ● moderately anti-Semitic ● non anti-Semitic

Political party preferences show a much stronger statistical relationship to anti-Semitism (Chart 10) than most previously presented factors. Forty-four percent of Jobbik supporters fell into the category of strongly anti-Semitic, and a further eight percent of them was considered moderately anti-Semitic. However, strongly anti-Semitic voters made up an absolute majority of Jobbik voters in 2014. Their ratio has slightly decreased over the last few years, yet it is still a lot higher than among supporters of any other parties so the impact of Jobbik's moderation and populist strategy has been rather small. Among supporters of the ruling party, the number of anti-Semites is a little higher than average but significantly lower than among Jobbik

supporters. Supporters of MSZP and LMP reach average levels, and it is interesting to note that supporters of these two parties are also in the middle (i.e. average level) when it comes to migration issues⁸. The ratio of anti-Semites among MSZP supporters was higher than among Fidesz supporters in 2017, but the results of 2018 was again like previous years' tendencies. Among supporters of DK, Momentum and small left-wing liberal parties, anti-Semitism affects a lot fewer respondents than average. Data shows that anti-Semitism is not the characteristic of a certain political party or political side. Four-tenths of Fidesz and socialist voters fell into an anti-Semitic category while the same proportion of Jobbik voters are not anti-Semitic.

Chart 10. Anti-Semitism and political party preference (2018, percentage)



⁸ <http://median.hu/object.c38fa2c9-5bc2-40c9-ae38-bab515a5ff72.ivy>

6. THE HOLOCAUST AND REMEMBRANCE OF THE PAST

Remembrance of the Shoah is one the major issues of both Hungarian anti-Semites and Hungarian Jewish communities. Several conflicts stem from their different interpretations. Therefore, the questionnaire contained a set of questions that allow-

ing comparison over time – focused on the Hungarian population’s view on the Holocaust, the necessity of facing the past and the responsibility related to the persecution of Jews in World War II.


Table 6. Opinions on the Holocaust and the challenges of the past, 2009-2018 (percentage, positive statements about Jews are shown *in italics*)

	Rather agrees								
	2006	2009	2011	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
1. During the war, non-Jewish Hungarians suffered just as much as Jews	56	66	65	65	60	64	70	-	70
2. There were no gas chambers in the death camps	7	6	7	8	12	11	11	8	15
3. The number of Jewish victims was a lot lower than it is generally stated	14	12	18	19	23	23	24	22	26
4. <i>More should be taught about the Holocaust in schools so that such things could never happen again</i>	45	54	46	50	42	46	52	42	50
5. A great majority of horrifying stories were made up by Jews afterwards	9	11	13	14	15	19	18	17	21
6. So many decades after the Holocaust, this issue should now be removed from the agenda	48	40	58	53	54	50	52	55	55

Opinions differ on how much talk and attention should be devoted to anti-Semitism especially in schools: “more” (statement 4) and “less” (statement 6) were supported by 50-50% of the society in 2018 (the former was supported by fewer respondents in 2017). Although the great majority of voters distance themselves from denying or relativizing the Holocaust, a not so insignificant part of respondents is responsive to it. Complete denial (statement 2) was found among 15% of the respondents, 26-21% denied and relativized the Holocaust (statement 3 and 5). The ratio of those relativizing the Holocaust has increased over the last few years (Chart 11).

The most frightening result of our research was that a quarter of the population relativizes the Holocaust and a sixth of them – illegally – denies it. As noted in the section dealing with cognitive anti-Semitism, we suppose it is not open denial of the Holocaust but a growing responsiveness to conspiracy theories and an increase in general paranoia that are behind this data. With regards to changes over time, 2011 was the general negative turning point. As for Holocaust denial and relativization, 2014 brought negative changes. Unfortunately, the level of support for misconceptions is increasing year by year and we do not know where this process is going to end.

Chart 11. The ratio of respondents who agree with Holocaust denial and relativizing statements, 2006-2018 (percentage)



When looking at the pattern of responses related to the Holocaust according to categories of anti-Semitism (Table 7), we see surprising results. We would assume that positive statements about Jews would fully be supported by non anti-Semites and negative statements by the strongly anti-Semitic. However, data shows that both cases are more complex and sophisticated than our hypothesis. Certainly, anti-Semites and especially the strongly anti-Semitic group are less empathetic with Jews than non anti-Semites. On the other hand, one-tenth of non anti-Semitic respondents agreed with statements denying or relativizing

the Holocaust. Even more surprising that over one-fifth of strongly anti-Semitic respondents (and four-tenths of moderately anti-Semites) believe more should be talked and taught about the Holocaust. This may be explained by the assumption that some of these respondents have no clear ideas about the dilemmas of our questions and some of them might not have understood them at all. In any case, it is obvious that the dilemmas over the remembrance of past are only partially related to anti-Semitism. As András Kovács wrote in the report of 2013, “it is a mistake to assume a direct relationship between anti-Semitism and

reluctance to face the past: anti-Semitism is not the reason for the reluctance of facing the past and this latter doesn't necessarily stem from the intention to legitimize anti-Semitism".

Table 7. Anti-Semitism and opinions about the Holocaust, 2018 (percentage of those who agreed, positive statements about Jews are shown *in italics*)

	strongly anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	non anti-Semitic
1. There were no gas chambers in the death camps	44	26	6
2. The number of Jewish victims was a lot lower than it is generally stated	66	42	13
3. <i>More should be taught about the Holocaust in schools so that such things could never happen again</i>	23	42	58
4. A great majority of horrifying stories were made up by Jews afterwards	58	45	8
5. So many decades after the Holocaust, this issue should now be removed from the agenda	85	66	44

7. ISRAEL AND ANTI-SEMITISM

It goes without saying that opinions and emotions related to Israel have significant roles in the perception of Jews. Although the dislike against (and the like towards) Jews does not necessarily stem from the criticism of the politics of Israel, it is a usual phenomenon that prejudice about Jews is presented in the form of criticizing the Jewish state. Long before Jobbik appeared on the political scene, banalities had formed an integral part of Hungarian public speech, so it seemed justified to include a few questions about the issue in the questionnaire and have a look at the an-

swers of Jobbik supporters (Table 8 and 9). Attitude towards Israel may be measured best by asking open-ended question (questions without answer options) and see what respondents associate to when hearing the word 'Israel'. So, respondents were not asked to agree or disagree with previously heard opinions but to mention what first comes to their minds, which is probably what they find important. We present their answers in Table 8 in different categories. We grouped answers that were alike into the same categories without demonstrating 23% of the respondents who said nothing.

Table 8. "What comes to your mind when you hear the word 'Israel'?" (Data of 2018, open-ended question, percentage of mentions)

The nature and grouping of answers and the most frequently mentioned items within the category	non anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	strongly anti-Semitic	Jobbik voters	entire sample 2018	entire sample 2017
Descriptive, neutral: land of Jews, country, state, religion, Middle East, Arab, language	65	52	51	47	62	63
Negative but hard to tell whether Arabs or Jews are blamed: war, terrorism, explosions, fear, tension	20	27	32	33	22	27
Attractions, more positive: Jesus, Jerusalem, Western Wall, Nazareth, Bible, synagogue, beautiful country	9	11	9	10	9	3
Negative on Israel: fanatical, aggressive, murderer, evil, illegitimate, disgust, tyrant	4	6	7	7	5	4
Money, richness, power, influence	2	4	1	3	2	2
World War II, the Holocaust	0	0	0	1	1	1
In total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Most answers, 62% was neutral and descriptive without any potential emotional conclusion (“land of Jews”, “state”, “religion” and similar answers). 22% thought of the war in the Middle East, terrorism and attacks, but these associations did not lead to a clear conclusion whether the respondent blamed the Jews or the Arabs for the conflict. 9% of respondents mentioned a tourist attraction which is a rather positive answer by nature. Only 5% of the respondents made particularly negative remarks about Israel (true, however, that the category of ‘money’, ‘richness’ and ‘influence’ grouped 2 percent of the respondents and these mentions were more driven by envy than respect). If we examine the correlation to anti-Semitism, we may see surprisingly little differences between the categories. Only contemptuous remarks were more popular among anti-Semitic respondents than other as-

sociations, but even in this group of respondents, only one-sixth or one-seventh of them gave such answers. It is important to note that the answers of Jobbik voters do not seem to significantly differ from the entire sample. *This leads us to the conclusion that the first thought of most respondents who we classified as anti-Semitic is not a negative thought when they hear the words “Israel” and “Jew”. Yet, when we call their attention to anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli views, they are more likely to agree with them than others. Anti-Semitism and anti-Israelism are therefore more of a responsiveness than solid mindsets.*

Regarding changes over time (last two columns), there has been no significant changes, only the number of positive answers increased between 2017 and 2018.

The table of associations presented above is supplemented by respondents’ reactions to common conceptions about Israel:

Table 9. Anti-Semitism and opinions about Israel, 2018
(Ratio of those who agree, percentage; 5 – fully agree, 1 – do not agree at all; agree = 5 and 4 together)

	non anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	strongly anti-Semitic	Jobbik voters	entire population 2018	entire population 2017
1. Jews living here are more loyal to Israel than to Hungary	25	66	65	54	40	42
2. Israel is a legitimate prosecutor of a self-defending war against the attacks they receive	31	34	27	26	33	32
3. After having seen the more and more brutal Islamic terrorist attacks, I am more understanding towards Israel than I used to be	33	42	34	39	35	34
4. Israel is an aggressor and is carrying out a genocide against the Palestinians	19	48	55	47	31	37
5. Jews are more threatened in certain countries of Western Europe than in Hungary	43	63	60	53	50	45

In general, the Hungarian population is rather dismissive to all statements. Agreeing with statements 2 and 3 are almost completely independent from views related to Jews so many respondents probably did not fully understand their relevance. Supporters of Jobbik are a bit more critical to Israel than others, but even that difference is less than we had anticipated based on Jobbik's (previous) politics⁹. In the case of the other statements, there is a significant correlation between anti-Semitic predisposition and the answers given, but it is still not as significant as with simpler, locally relevant questions.

It goes fully against our intuitive expectations that even respondents who were classified as anti-Semitic in other questions stood up for the Jewish state in a sig-

nificant ratio (statement 3, 4 and 5). However, if we take into consideration that these very same respondents were the most hostile against migrants and Arabs, the correlation is easier to understand. Our conclusion is again that *the perception of Jews and Israel may only improve in the context of migration and this takes us back to the dislike of Arab and Muslim people who may easily be identified as migrants. Respondents who otherwise dislike Jews tend to be less anti-Semitic in this regard.*

When we analyze changes over time, the major shift concerns the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. Fewer respondents agreed Israel was an aggressor than last year. None of the changes in this dimension are considered significant however.

⁹ Even in 2014, Vona wanted to break diplomatic relations between Hungary and Israel. http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20140724_vona_megszakitana_a_kapcsolatot_izraellel

8. ASSOCIATIONS WITH JEWS

We examined with open-ended questions what comes to people’s mind when they hear the word “Jew”. Similar to previous sections, we grouped answers into categories, but our table does not include two-tenths of the respondents who gave no answers.

Table 10. “What comes to your mind first when you hear the word “Jew”?” (2018, open-ended question, spontaneous answers presented in groups based on level of anti-Semitism, percentage of those answering the question)

	non anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	strongly anti-Semitic	Jobbik voters	entire population 2018	entire population 2017
Neutral answers: religion, ethnic group, customs, culture, Bible, language	34	31	16	12	30	27
Money, power, richness, commerce, USA, influence	14	30	22	23	18	18
Persecution, Holocaust, Auschwitz, sufferings in World War II	27	11	20	8	24	16
Negative characteristics: desire for power, hunger for money, exploitation, stinginess, laziness, hatred	4	19	33	21	12	14
Positive: intelligent, tolerant, hard-working, humane	9	0	3	13	7	10
They are the same as others. I don’t care about who is Jewish and who isn’t.	8	2	1	14	5	8
Palestinian-Jewish conflict	1	1	1	5	1	4
Physical attributes (sideburns, nose etc.)	1	2	1	2	1	1
Relative, neighbor, acquaintance	1	0	0	0	1	1
Food (kosher etc.)	0	2	1	0	0	0
George Soros	1	2	2	2	1	1
	100	100	100	100	100	100

The Table starts the overview with the answers most frequently mentioned in 2018. Therefore, the category of neutral and descriptive answers is in the first line. Based on these answers, we cannot tell what kind of emotions a respondent had after hearing the word “Jew”. The category of persecution is also considered neutral. These two categories make up almost 50% of the answers. Thoughts related to “money”, “power” and

“influence” are dubious, they may be neutral or even acknowledging but it is more realistic to assume a negative attitude in the majority of this group (18% of population) as the main drives behind anti-Semitism are usually envy and jealousy.

The next line contains negative associations with especially offensive and degrading characteristics mentioned. The statement that Jews “are the same as others” may be considered as positive, and it is also a good sign when somebody thinks of gastronomy in relation to Jews. Some respondents listed physical characteristics or mentioned the conflict between Israel and Palestine without taking a side. All in all, there is balance between positive and negative answers, proportions have not changed significantly since 2017. It was for the second time in our research that respondents mentioned George Soros in relation to Jews, but they only represent 1% of those respondents who answered this question. (We are unable to indicate it in the tables, but 2% of the respondents with invalid answers to the anti-Semitic classification associated to Soros).

This respect is like that of the associations with Israel, there is weak correlation between anti-Semitism, political party preference and the type and direction of

associations. 13% of Jobbik supporters, 3% of strongly anti-Semites – namely 7% of the overall population – shared positive thoughts. Many Jobbik supporters and strongly anti-Semites mentioned neutral words, and only a bit higher number of them belong to the “slightly negative” money-economy-influence group than others. The only group where we see a pattern of anti-Semitism is the group of respondents who gave specifically negative remarks. However, “only” 33% of strongly anti-Semites and “just” 21% of radical right-wing supporters did so. It appears again that those who associate negative thoughts to Jews are fewer in number than those who are categorized as strongly anti-Semitic based on their reactions to the previously written statements of the questionnaire. It is fact, however, that there were negative or “partly negative” (money etc.) answers in the non anti-Semitic group, too. So, all in all, almost every third respondent falls into the negative dimension. We therefore conclude that *there is a perceptible difference between spontaneous anti-Semitism and responsiveness.*

We also asked respondents about typical Jewish characteristics. (In 2017, the number of responses was too low to draw conclusions but 60% of respondents gave valid answers this year.)

Table II. "In your opinion, what kind of Jewish characteristics are there?"
(2018, open-ended question, spontaneous answers presented in groups based on level of anti-Semitism, percentage of those answering the question)

	non anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	strongly anti-Semitic	Jobbik voters	entire population 2018
Neutral: rich, money, business acumen. (It may be praise or criticism)	23	15	27	31	22
Neutral: customs, behavior, thinking, world view, cohesion	18	18	14	13	17
There aren't any, they are the same as others, nothing special	21	12	8	15	19
Hair, facial hair, clothing	10	28	11	4	13
Physical attributes, big nose etc.	5	9	12	12	6
Positive: intelligent, tolerant, hard-working, humane	16	4	2	4	12
Negative: self-important, proud, violent, stingy, use everyone, mean, lazy	8	13	25	21	11
	100	100	100	100	100

Responses showed similar results to previous findings: approximately 10% of respondents associated to positive or negative characteristics, most people mentioned neutral attributes. "Business acumen" and "richness" are likely to be criticism rather than acknowledgment but mentions of clothing, thinking, cohesion are not negative associations. What is more, every fifth respondent refused to make distinctions, which is a sign of liberal thinking (this was more frequent among non anti-Semitic respondents). With regards to anti-Semitic predisposition, there were no major differences among respondents who gave (more or less) neutral answers. Hardly anyone of the respondents categorized as anti-Semitic mentioned positive characteristics and

almost two times as many of them thought of negative attributes than the average of the entire population. Even so, only one quarter of the strongly anti-Semitic respondents associated Jews with negative characteristics, most of them did not bring up offensive statements, and this again highlights the difference between spontaneous anti-Semitism and responsiveness to anti-Semitism.

Only 16% of respondents gave valid answers to the question about how one can tell that somebody is of Jewish origin. Most of the answers said that it is Jews themselves who are open about their origin.

Much more respondents provided answers when we asked them about George Soros. Only 11% of respondents did not an-

swer our open-ended question. In the past few years, there has been an intense debate about whether the anti-Soros campaign is anti-Semitic. We wanted to find out what people thought of when hearing Soros'

name and how opinions about him related to Jews. Then, we examined whether there was a correlation between the direction of answers and responsiveness to anti-Semitism.

Table 12. "What comes to your mind first when you hear George Soros' name?"

(2018, open-ended question, spontaneous answers presented in groups based on level of anti-Semitism, percentage of those answering the question)

	non anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	strongly anti-Semitic	Jobbik voters	Those who have negative associations about the word "Jew"	entire population 2018	entire population 2017
1. migrants, refugees, colonization	25	30	27	22	22	26	30
2. vile, traitor, general abuse	13	12	14	10	18	13	18
3. hunger for power	3	7	6	5	8	4	9
4. unexplained wealth, undue enrichment, swindler, speculator	8	11	10	7	12	8	5
5. rich, wealth, influential, without moral judgment	22	15	20	20	16	21	18
6. Everything is about him; I am bored of that (without judging Soros)	2	4	1	5	1	5	2
7. praise, anything positive (unfair lies and attacks, generous donor)	10	6	4	6	5	8	11
8. Jewish (anything that contains this word)	2	3	4	3	5	2	2
9. CEU, university demonstrations	4	4	5	3	3	2	-
10. Orbán's studies were also funded by him	2	1	0	0	0	1	-
11. other (neutral answers, e.g. Orbán's opponent)	9	8	6	20	10	9	5
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The government campaign's effectiveness is reflected by the fact that 51% of respondents had negative associations to George Soros (the first four answer groups). A further 21% thought of his wealth and influence but made no negative comments about these. Only 8% of respondents gave positive answers and 5% said they found the campaign boring by now. It is another success of the campaign that 26% of respondents thought of migrants and immigrants immediately after hearing the question. George Soros is almost completely estranged from Hungarian society.

2% of respondents associated George Soros to Jews. Among anti-Semitic respondents, this ratio was 4-5%. However, a greater number of people associate the same things to Soros and to the Jewish community: every third and fifth respondent mentioned money, power, influence and enrichment from a negative aspect when asked about their thoughts on Soros or Jews. Almost 10% of respondents gave the same answers to these two associative questions.

The overlap is significant because we found correlation between opinions about George Soros and anti-Semitism in numerous cases (in answers given to both

close-ended and open-ended questions). Looking at the first four answer groups, it seems that anti-Semitic respondents, who were categorized as such based on their answers given to previous questions, were more likely to have negative associations than non anti-Semites (60 to 49 percent). Yet, this correlation was even more significant in 2017.

All in all, there is strong indirect relation between George Soros and the Jewish community in voters' mind and this relation has an overwhelmingly negative connotation. For the first time in 2017, there were respondents (even if their number was small) who directly associated Soros to Jews and vice versa.

We also asked respondents whether they had Jewish acquaintances. 16% of them responded with a yes. Although we do not illustrate this separately, we would like to highlight that *having Jewish acquaintances significantly decreases the probability of any anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli manifestations. 74% of respondents who have Jewish acquaintances versus only 60% who do not were categorized as non anti-Semitic.*

We also examined the perception on the anti-Semitism of political parties. We wanted to find out respondents' opinion about how anti-Semitic political parties with parliamentary mandates were.

Table 13. Who are anti-Semitic? Is anti-Semitism a characteristic of the parties below? (2018, percentage of valid answers)

		very typical	a little typical	not typical	total
Fidesz	According to the population	13	37	50	100
	According to their voters	3	28	69	100
Jobbik	According to the population	48	36	16	100
	According to their voters	23	33	45	100
MSZP	According to the population	8	36	55	100
	According to their voters	4	24	72	100
LMP	According to the population	5	33	62	100
	According to their voters	3	27	70	100


Results show that Jobbik's change of direction has not had the desired effect, so far at least. 84% of respondents still think that (a certain level of) anti-Semitism was a characteristic of the party. Opinions differ in the case of other parties, some people thought that other parties were also anti-Semitic to a small extent, but most respondents thought they were no anti-Semitic at all. Respondents considered MSZP and LMP less anti-Semitic than Fidesz, but the real gap is between Jobbik and the other parties. Voters of a given party are usually convinced about the "innocence" of the party but there are exceptions, too, among supporters of Fidesz, MSZP and LMP. About 25% of Fidesz, MSZP and LMP voters support these parties despite finding their politics slightly anti-Semitic. It is also interesting to note that only a minority of Jobbik supporters believe the party was not anti-Semitic. Some respondents may not be bothered by anti-Semitism but there are probably more of them who are indifferent towards the issue and answered our questions without special consideration.

9. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON

International comparison may be very helpful to understand data in context, even if there is only a small quantity available. First, we studied the frequency of relativizing the Holocaust and compared Hunga-

rian research results with relevant data of Western and Eastern European countries. We also had a look at the supposed frequency of physical atrocities and fear from such atrocities.

Chart 12. The supposed frequency of attacks against Jews and relativizing the Holocaust in some European countries (2015, percentage, source: ADL¹⁰)



There is major difference between Western and Eastern European countries in all aspects. Although the relativization of the Holocaust (and other manifestations of verbal anti-Semitism) is more widespread in Eastern Europe, most citizens living in

Western European countries must worry about physical atrocities. The Jewish community in France, which is the largest Jewish community in Europe, is especially threatened. Based on APF's monthly monitoring reports on anti-Semitism, we can


¹⁰ <http://global100.adl.org/public/ADL-Global-100-Executive-Summary2015.pdf>

declare that physical atrocities against Jews are very rare in Hungary. In the light of this, it seems a little unreasonable that 35% of Hungarians fear from and worry about potential physical atrocities against Jews and 9% of them thought in 2015 that such attacks were frequent.

Another data source shows us if people were open to accept ethnic or other minorities as their colleagues.

Egy másik adatforrás arra vonatkozik, hogy munkatársként mennyire fogadna el a válaszadó különböző etnikai és életmód-kisebbségeket.

Chart 13. "Would you feel uncomfortable if a colleague of yours was ..." (percentage of those who agree, 2015, percentage, source: Eurobarométer¹¹)



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
The chart shows that Hungarians are less accepting than the EU average, but it is also important to note that the main difference lies between Western and Eastern Europe. Hungary had similar results to other countries in the region but based on our own data, our perception of the Roma is worse than it is in neighboring countries (interestingly however, we show no difference compared to the EU average). The

perception of ethnicities identified with migrants severely deteriorated during 2015 and 2016. Again, the relative position of Jews does not seem to be too bad, but we do lag the European average.

Finally, it is also important to examine whether anti-Semitism is considered a major problem in Hungary and compare our results with other European countries.

¹¹ <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/yearFrom/1974/yearTo/2016/surveyKy/2077>

Chart 14. "Is anti-Semitism an important problem in your country?" (percentage, Eurobarometer, data of December 2018¹²)



Data shows that Hungarians consider anti-Semitism less of a problem than the EU average does. Anti-Semitism is seen as a major problem in Western Europe, while it is considered less important in Eastern and Central Europe. There are two possible explanations for this: according to one of them, anti-Semitism is indeed a bigger

problem in Western Europe, while the other explanation states it is only perceived bigger there. The second theory could stem from the idea that Eastern European countries face even greater problems, e.g. lower standards of living. Interestingly, Hungary and Poland reach higher values than other post-Soviet countries.

¹² <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/surveyKy/2220>

10. FACTORS DETERMINING ANTI-SEMITISM

To complete our analysis, we examine how much anti-Semitism could be explained by the different approaches discussed in previous chapters, individually and together. We look at the correlations presented, we compare them to each other and set up a hierarchy: which approach seem to be the strongest and which ones are less closely related to anti-Semitism. In statistical analyses, the right methodology for this is using the logistic regression model. This is an analysis that includes many variables at the same time (questions, statements) and has one outcome variable: the question we would like to explain. In our case, this outcome variable is the comprehensive anti-Semitism indicator we used: we integrated the strongly and moderately anti-Semitic groups, so everyone was included if they substantially agreed with anti-Semitic statements. Based on the explanatory variables (almost all statements and questions of our research), the model forecasts the probability of being categorized as anti-Semitic (Table 15). The indicator measuring the strength of the correlation is 1 in the hypothetical case if the model fully explains the explanatory variable – if one can predict with certainty from the explanatory variables that someone is anti-Semitic or not. The value of the indicator is 0 if the variables of the model are completely independent from anti-Semitism. The explanatory variables of the first model – almost all questions and statements of our questionnaire listed in the Annex – can predict with a 52% probability if someone falls into the anti-Semitic category. (This is considered a very high probability in political sociology). We could also say that anti-Semitism depends in 48% on factors outside the scope of this research.

As a next step, we broke down this complex model to find out the strength of the explanation (forecast) for each question we raised. In the second model, we only listed the sociodemographic background variables. In the third one, we listed political self-identification and party preferences. The fourth model contains variables related to xenophobia, the fifth contains law-and-order, nationalism, the rejection of “breaking rules” and political pessimism. The sixth model concerns negative associations for open-ended questions, the seventh model covers the question about Jewish acquaintances. We listed all questions and statements used in our analysis in the Annex.

The demographic model is scarcely significant, meaning that *being part of a social group is only marginally linked to responsiveness to anti-Semitism*. The model of open-ended question demonstrates a little stronger impact. People are more open to anti-Semitism if they have negative associations about Israel and Jews. People who think of degrading characteristics when asked about Jewish attributes have a higher probability to be anti-Semitic. On the other hand, this model only explains anti-Semitism by 10% and strengthens the statement of chapter 8 that *the correlation between agreeing to anti-Semitic statements (responsiveness) and spontaneous anti-Semitism is of medium strength*. The impact of political issues seems weak. Based on party preferences and political self-identification, we may predict with a 7% probability if a respondent is anti-Semitic or not. Having a Jewish acquaintance has a lower but still measurable impact, it decreases the responsiveness to anti-Semitism.

Table 15. Comparison of the explanatory power of models introducing different approaches

model	strength of correlation ¹³
1. entire	0,516
2. demographic (age, gender, type of settlement, financial status, religiousness)	0,037
3. political party preference and political self-identification (left-right, conservative-liberal, moderate-radical scales)	0,069
4. xenophobia against other ethnicities	0,285
5. political attitudes (law-and-order; nationalism; euro-skepticism, "breaking the rules", rejecting otherness; pessimism) ¹⁴	0,253
6. open-ended questions, negative associations to Jews	0,104
7. having a Jewish acquaintance	0,012

Similar to the findings of previous years, only the models of xenophobia and social attitudes had strong explanatory power in 2018. Among social attitudes, the desire to limit the number of people of color turned out to be the strongest factor (see Annex), which is a manifestation of xenophobia. *Our study confirmed a well-known statement of available literature: prejudice rarely exists on its own, xenophobia is often manifested as anti-Semitism. Authoritarianism, the persecutions of those breaking the rules, law-and-order and nation-*

alism lead to a political character structure that generate responsiveness to anti-Semitism. However, it is the rejection of "otherness" that mostly increases the probability of anti-Semitism. No matter whether it is the rejection of migrants, homosexuals, drug users or other minorities and ethnicities. Yet, statistical analysis also points out that the outcome, namely who will agree with anti-Semitic statements, mainly depends on factors outside the scope of our research. It is impossible to precisely predict it with a questionnaire.

¹³ Nagelkerke R-squared value. Its maximum value is 1 if the variants of the model completely explain the outcome variable (in this case it is anti-Semitism). Its value is 0 if the variants of the model do not explain the outcome variable at all, if they are completely independent from one another. For statistical reasons, we coded all of the explanatory factors as so-called dichotomous variables: they can only be one of the two values. (Living outside of Budapest, young or old, graduated or not graduated etc.) Each model is significant at the level of 95%.

¹⁴ The model contains the following questions:

- *Law-and-order*: "Would you support a severe prison sentence to drug consumers?"; "Would you support the introduction of death penalty?";
- *Nationalism*: "We should stand up more strongly for Hungarian minorities living in neighboring countries"; "Defending our national values is more important than EU membership"; "People with strong nationalistic values should be the decision makers in important issues"
- *Breaking rules, rejection of otherness*: "Do you find homosexuality immoral?"; "Would you make the abortion procedure stricter?";
- *Political pessimism*: "One can only become rich in this country by acting dishonestly"; "People, if they really want to, have the opportunity to influence the fate of the country"; "Politicians, even if they make mistakes often, want the best for people"; "Nowadays not even courts bring justice to people"; "Only few people can have trust in the future"; "Nowadays everything and everyone can be bought"

11. SUMMARY

Our research first aimed to highlight how much focus is given to issues related to Jews by Hungarian public opinion. Based on the high number of not applicable (“I don’t know”) answers and the frequency of inconsistent answers, we can conclude that most respondents do not form an opinion. The issues raised were so unknown to respondents that they could not relate to more detailed questions. Only one-tenth of the respondents were able to recall a public issue of last year that was related to Jews and even those answers were rather general. On the other hand, this ratio is not significantly low, most of society is even less aware of or interested in issues related to other ethnicities or minorities living in Hungary.

Before presenting any data, it is important to think about what it means and what it does not mean to agree with an anti-Semitic statement of a questionnaire. It is fact that it “merely” represents opinions and attitudes and not behaviors or acts of discrimination. We also know nothing about the weight of a given opinion, even answers of extreme values do not necessarily stand for serious consideration or significance. An important lesson is learnt from the difference between anti-Semitism deduced from spontaneous comments and anti-Semitism based on agreement with statements. The latter is the traditional methodology of categorization, a good part of respondents who were categorized as anti-Semitic this way may not think of anything negative about Israel and Jews, but if we ask them about anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli statements, they are likely to agree or “resonate” with them. The correlation works the other way around, too. People may formulate anti-Semitic thoughts even if they refuse to agree with anti-Semitic statements. In any case, it seems clear that anti-Semitism is more of a responsiveness than a solid mindset. In our interpretation, variability is a natural characteristic of anti-Semitism.

Having this interpretation in mind, it is always informative to ask the same questions year by year so that we can look at long-term tendencies. Such data refer to the popularity of views and misconceptions about Jews (cognitive anti-Semitism) and to the emotional relationship with, social distance from Jews (affective anti-Semitism). Based on this, anti-Semitism significantly grew in 2010 (we believe this was influenced by Jobbik’s appearance in mainstream politics). Since then, there were only modest shifts, the number of respondents agreeing with anti-Semitic statements increased in 2017, then in 2018, it moved back to the level seen in 2016. Increase in the dimension of cognitive anti-Semitism may partly be due to the so-called “post-truth politics” phenomenon. In today’s information overload, it is becoming more and more difficult to decide if something is true or not. Never have so many conspiracy theories and misconceptions appeared and received so much publicity. Politicians may also intend to generate disinformation and fear on purpose.

With regards to the dimension of affective anti-Semitism, the extent of prejudice decreased, even if not significantly. The number of people disliking Jews decreased to record low levels in the case of two indicators designed to measure social distance from Jews. Unfortunately, the good news is overshadowed by the finding that the popularity of statements denying or relativizing the Holocaust had never been as high as in 2018. There appeared a new type of anti-Semitism, typical of the 21st century. Its main characteristic is not a general, negative discrimination (which is not popular in Hungarian public speech) but rather a resonance with ideas that cast poor light on Jews. This is likely to be the result of the aforementioned information overload and disinformation.

The emotional anti-Semitism of society is the manifestation of general xenophobia. Respondents who are negative about other

ethnicities are more likely to be dismissive with Jews as well. Anti-Semitism can have and certainly has some special features but it is important to note that for the majority of Hungarian society, being “Jewish” is just another (even symbolic) form of otherness and people mainly feel dislike towards Jews *in this respect*, just as they do towards other ethnicities. Compared to attitudes towards other ethnic groups, the rejection of Jews was not found to be significant. The least popular are migrants, who are even more disliked than the Roma. The appearance and perception of migrants (plus Arab and black people who may be identified with migrants) changed how people perceive Jews, migrants became the new scapegoats.

In the past few years, Hungarian public opinion has also become more understanding with Israel. The flow of migrants led the dislike of many towards Arab countries. It might seem a contradiction first that even strongly anti-Semitic respondents were empathetic towards the Jewish state, but if we take into consideration that they are the very respondents with the strongest antipathy towards migrants and Arabs in general, the correlation is easier to comprehend.

One of the main goals of the research was to point out social groups responsive to anti-Semitism and their motivation. Results of our analysis show there is only marginal interdependence between belonging to a social group and being anti-Semitic. There is no correlation between anti-Semitism and the type of work one has or the religion they follow. Respondents who have university diplomas, who are in the highest income group, and those in the eldest age group are less likely to be categorized as anti-Semitic, but only small differences were found. In 2018, respondents living in Budapest were more responsive to anti-Semitism than people living elsewhere. Findings of previous years are different, so we do not yet draw conclusions from this data. Jobbik voters and respondents who identify themselves as radical or right-wing supporters, rather than moderate or left-wing, have anti-Semitic views in a much bigger proportion than the average.

However, anti-Semitism is only partly explained by even these factors. According to our comparative analysis, law-and-order, authoritarian attitudes and the rejection of the different forms of otherness (homosexuality, drug consumption, immigration) are more likely to increase the probability of anti-Semitism. Being pessimistic about people in general seems to have no correlation to anti-Semitism.

Remembrance of the Shoah divides Hungarian society. A little less than half of the respondents said the issue should be kept on the agenda, a slight majority of them believed we should move on.

The level of anti-Semitism of Jobbik voters decreased between 2014 and 2015 and it has not changed since 2016. Their populist strategy has not proved to be successful as most respondents still consider the party anti-Semitic. It is important to note though that there were only little to moderate differences between the answers of Jobbik and non-Jobbik voters when asked about their free associations to Jews.

Respondents mainly associated the word “Jew” with three things: religion, nation and country (descriptive, neutral answers). Many respondents thought about the Holocaust, persecution, money, influence and power. It is difficult to tell whether such answers come from acknowledgment or jealousy, but the latter is usually a root of anti-Semitism. Only 12% of respondents gave specifically negative and degrading answers (“greedy”, “hunger for power”, “disregarding others”). 7% of them answered by mentioning positive characteristics (“educated”, “cohesive”, “intelligent”) and even more people insisted on the idea that people are the same, regardless of origin. The ratios of positive and negative answers did not change much in the last few years.

The situation was similar when we asked respondents about Israel. Most of them had neutral associations about the Jewish state. This again confirms that only a small number of voters have specific, whether positive or negative, views on Jews. The balance in the number of positive and negative association did not change. The overall picture

has not at all become more negative in this dimension.

In 2017, we included a new question in the survey, and it drew our attention to a negative phenomenon in relation to the perception of the Hungarian Jewish community: the link between George Soros and Jews. For the first time in 2017, there were respondents who directly associated Soros to Jews and vice versa (they did so spontaneously, without the help of answer options). We only talk about 2% of the respondents but there were a lot more respondents who indirectly linked Soros and Jews. One-third and one-fifth of the respondents brought up money, capital, power, enrichment and influence in a negative context when asked about Soros and Jews. Approximately every tenth respondent answered with these associations consistently to both questions. A third worrying factor is that the perception of George Soros is not independent from anti-Semitic attitudes. Respondents who were categorized as anti-Semitic by their answers to previous questions were significantly more likely to

mention negative attributes and were less likely to say positive things about George Soros than non anti-Semites. Another major learning is that the perception of the American-Hungarian billionaire depends on several other factors, too, and anti-Semitic attitude is by far not the strongest. Supposedly because of the government's anti-Soros campaign, Soros' activities are disapproved by the great majority of society, even by non anti-Semitic voters.

Finally, international comparison showed that the level of anti-Semitism is higher in Hungary than in Western Europe, but it is not remarkably different from countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Interestingly however, anti-Semitism is thought to be a more important problem in Hungary and Poland than in other post-Socialist countries. When compared to Western Europe, the situation is "only" worse in terms of anti-Semitic emotions and prejudice, Jews are in a more favorable position in Hungary as they do not have to be as concerned about physical atrocities as Jewish communities in Western Europe.

ANNEX

The entire logistics regression model

	Model	Beta	Significance level	Exponential Beta (Odds ratio)
Inhabitant of Budapest	2	0,954	0,001	2,596
University diploma	2	-0,1	0,726	0,905
Low income group	2	-0,062	0,823	0,94
Upper income group	2	-0,41	0,115	0,664
Does not attend church regularly	2	0,225	0,322	1,253
Below 40 years of age	2	0,264	0,223	1,302
Completed only elementary school	2	-0,617	0,597	0,54
Man	2	-0,036	0,864	0,965
Would surely vote	3	0,467	0,034	1,595
Jobbik voter	3	0,001	0,997	1,001
Self-identification: conservative	3	-0,029	0,895	0,971
Self-identification: right-wing	3	0,455	0,065	1,576
Self-identification: radical	3	0,227	0,36	1,255
Would accept an Arab neighbor	4	-0,357	0,286	0,7
Would accept an American neighbor	4	-0,03	0,925	0,97
Would accept a Roma neighbor	4	0,318	0,241	1,374
Would accept a Chinese neighbor	4	0,245	0,385	1,277
Would accept a homosexual neighbor	4	0,036	0,895	1,037
Would accept a Transylvanian Hungarian neighbor	4	-0,415	0,177	0,66
Would accept a skinhead neighbor	4	0,069	0,793	1,071
Would accept a black neighbor	4	0,192	0,527	1,212
Would accept a Romanian neighbor	4	-0,843	0,001	0,43
Would accept a Swabian neighbor	4	-1,918	0	0,147
Would accept a migrant as a neighbor	4	0,853	0,012	2,346
Would make the abortion procedure stricter	5	0,265	0,266	1,303
Would make immigration process stricter	5	0,866	0,002	2,378
Rather religious	5	0,631	0,005	1,88
Would support death penalty	5	-0,232	0,268	0,793
Find homosexuality immoral	5	0,735	0,001	2,086
Would sentence drug consumers severely	5	-0,282	0,229	0,754
Would limit the number of people of color living in the country	5	1,224	0	3,401
Politicians, even if they make mistakes often, they want the best for people	5	0,314	0,212	1,369

	Model	Beta	Significance level	Exponential Beta (Odds ratio)
One can only become rich in this country by acting dishonestly	5	-0,01	0,967	0,99
We should stand up more strongly for Hungarian minorities living in neighboring countries	5	0,112	0,641	1,118
People, if they really want to, can influence the fate of the country	5	0,046	0,835	1,047
Nowadays, not even courts bring justice to people	5	0,264	0,244	1,303
Defending our national values is more important than EU membership	5	-0,05	0,827	0,951
Only few people can have trust in the future	5	-0,404	0,092	0,667
People with strong nationalist values should be the decision makers in important issues	5	0,606	0,007	1,833
Leaders of this country do not really care about people like you	5	0,456	0,077	1,578
Religious studies should be compulsory in schools	5	0,142	0,557	1,153
Nowadays everything and everyone can be bought	5	0,399	0,099	1,49
It is still a moral obligation to stand up against the decisions of the Treaty of Trianon	5	-0,183	0,452	0,833
Something negative comes to mind when hearing the word 'Israel'	6	-0,334	0,124	0,716
Something negative comes to mind when hearing the word 'Jew'	6	1,403	0	4,067
Something negative comes to mind when hearing Soros' name	6	0,243	0,642	1,275
Have Jewish acquaintance(s)	7	-0,14	0,646	0,869
Constant		-4,957	0	0,007

Note: outcome variable: complex indicator for anti-Semitism (cognitive and affective anti-Semitism, see Chart 5). Significant variants of 95% are in bold. The number in the model column refers to the category of the partial model where the variant fell (2: demography; 3: political party preference and political self-identification; 4: xenophobia against other ethnicities; 5: law-and-order, nationalism, authority, rejection of breaking rules; 6: open-ended questions). The odds ratio expresses how the explanatory variant increases the probability of anti-Semitism. For example, if someone was to limit the number of people of color living in Hunga-

ry, based on his or her answers, he or she would fall into the anti-Semitic category with a 4.46 higher probability than someone who thinks otherwise. A person who would accept a Romanian neighbor would fall into the anti-Semitic category with a 0.527 times higher probability (meaning roughly 50% less of a chance), so it is more likely that he or she will not be categorized as anti-Semitic. According to the multivariate analysis, agreeing to limit the number of people of color and associating to negative characteristics when hearing the words 'Israel' and 'Jew' are the strongest factors in increasing the probability that a respondent is categorized as anti-Semitic.

CONTACT AND SUPPORT

Action and Protection Foundation is the civil initiative of a number of Jewish organizations that is ready to take resolute steps to curb increasing widespread anti-Semitic manifestations.

In case anyone faces insults or anti-Semitic abuse due to a supposed or real Jewish background, do not remain silent, let us know, so that we can forward the case through the appropriate channels to the official organs required to take measures!

Notifications of such incidents are received by the Foundation through any of the following means:

HOTLINE (+36 1) 5 10 00 00

The website of Action and Protection Foundation: www.tev.hu/forrodrot
The Facebook page: www.facebook.com/tev-tett-es-vedelem-alapitvany

Action and Protection Foundation's undertaking can only be successful if great numbers share in our commitment to prepare the grounds for the right to fair process for all those who have suffered offenses. In aid of this cause please support the work of the Foundation with your contribution! Donations can be made to the Foundation on the following bank account:

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