ANTI-SEMITIC PREJUDICE IN TODAY'S HUNGARIAN SOCIETY

RESEARCH REPORT

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BUDAPEST, 2018

ACTION AND PROTECTION FOUNDATION

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

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CONTENT

1. INTRODUCTION[1]

On behalf of Action and Protection Foundation, Medián Public Opinion and Market Research Institute conducted an overall research in November 2016 about the relation of Hungarian society to Jews:

- about views and opinions related to Jews
- about the frequency and strength of anti-Semitic prejudice
- about opinions related to the Holocaust and remembrance
- about associations related to Jews

The research was conducted with a questionnaire by personal interviews with 1200 participants. Participants were all over 18 years of age. The slight distortions of the sample were corrected by a mathematical procedure, called weighting, using the statistics published by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH). The sample accurately represents the composition of the population according to the type of settlements, gender, age group and school qualification. The sampling error of the published data is maximum 3% depending on the ratio of the answers in the complete sample.

The research methodology was based on the conception[2] elaborated by András Kovács. In the course of the research, we predominantly used the questionnaire applied and used frequently by him since 1995, which presents the change of data from period to period.

In the course of the research, the interviewers of Medián interviewed participants for approximately 30 minutes. Questions about Jews were the focus. Before we present the significant amount of data, we must clarify what is and what is not shown by the data of the questionnaires.

First, we wish to highlight, with indirect evidence how much an average Hungarian cares about the views, opinions and latest news regarding Jews and how important this question is for voters. Keeping this in mind, we find it useful to elaborate on the problems of measuring anti-Semitism and prejudice. After the clarification of methodological questions, we first present the frequency of views on Jews and attitudes towards them, then we examine which groups of society are primarily affected by these attitudes. Next, we list the data referring to associations related to Jews, Israel, the Holocaust, the remembrance of past and George Soros. Finally, we will define which of the analyzed factors is most likely to increase the probability of anti-Semitism.

1 The structure and the method of the study is in line with the study of 2015. The explication of the methodology also stems from it.
2 András Kovács: The Stranger at Hand. Anti-Semitic Prejudices in post-Communist Hungary. Brill, Leiden-Boston 2011.

2. THE PERCEPTION, THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS OF JEWS

This year's data shows, similarly to last year's research, the affairs related to Jews are on the periphery of Hungarian voters' attention. This is not surprising; people's attention is drawn to issues in which they are directly involved.

According to the content analysis of NMHH[3], in 2017, none of the cases linked to Jews made it to the top 20 most noticed topics on the main broadcast channels[4]. In 2014, the debate on the monument at Szabadság square got a measurable amount of publicity but only for one month, with not more than a middle range value. After that, in 2015 and 2016, there was no case linked to Jews among the most frequent media topics.

Our survey shows that news related to Jews only reaches a small group of voters. We studied with the help of open-ended questions (meaning questions without answer choices) how many people mention events that happened to Jews. We can only declare that someone cares about them if he or she is able to name at least one single concrete case. Similarly, to the two previous years, only 12% of the respondents was able to name a concrete case in 2017, but even these answers were proved superficially informative ("creation of a statue", "Jewish festival", "threats against Jews"), so respondents didn't seem to be fully up-to-date in this topic. It is interesting, for the first time, about 1.5% of respondents mentioned Jobbik. We suppose they recalled the change of attitude of Gábor Vona.

Based on this evidence, we have a reason to suppose that the questions made for our analysis, the reference to Jews (social distance, prejudice and attitudes) lag behind on the scale of importance of an average citizen. In the rest of our study, all data needs to be analyzed in this context. Only a small, but significant part of the respondents finds our topic relevant.

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3 *http://nmhh.hu/szakmai-erdekeltek/mediafelugyelet/politikai-szereplok-mediahasznalata*
4 The Hanuka greeting of Gábor Vona and the reactions of the political parties related to this gesture didn't even make it to the top 20 publicity news neither in December 2016 nor in 2017

3. THE MEASUREMENT OF ANTI-SEMITISM AND PREJUDICE

Based on the findings, we can say that the question "How much do you find Jews likable?" can only show the *direction* of the approach, but not the *weight* dedicated to the question.

Whether it is a like or a dislike, even behind the two extreme values, it is not about the significantly important emotion or motivation of the respondent. It is equally important to emphasize that the quantitative survey is able to point out an opinion, a prejudice or an attitude but hardly a real behavior.

According to the interpretation that we find correct, the questions measuring anti-Semitism reveal primarily attitudes. It is about a manifestation of which one characteristic is the variability. It is worth to examine, based on the time scale comparison, whether opinions related to Jews tend to move towards the sympathetic or the hostile direction. During the course of our survey, we differentiated two dimensions of attitudes towards Jews based on the previous methodology of András Kovács: a cognitive rejection based on ideas, misconceptions and conspiracy theories in relation to Jews and secondly affective anti-Semitism based on the level of general emotional rejection and social distance kept. When we sum up the two dimensions, we will be able to see how many of the respondents are characterized by both attitudes and the extent they reach. Those who hardly agree with any statements against Jews are grouped in the category of "non anti-Semitic", those who agree with some of the statements are grouped as "moderately anti-Semitic" and those who agreed with most of the statements are called "strongly anti-Semitic". We emphasize again that these categories don't express the importance of the question and show nothing about the actions of the respondent.

4. THE LEVEL OF ANTI-SEMITISM

COGNITIVE ANTI-SEMITISM

So far, we have measured the content of anti-Semitic prejudice with a questionnaire, frequently used during the past two decades, on ideas and "learning" linked to Jews. We asked the respondents to indicate on a five-point scale how much they agree with the eight statements we stated. The statements contain traditional type of anti-Semitism based on religious beliefs called anti-Judaism and also a stereotype against Jews which stems from the belief that Jews have disproportionate influence. There is a statement suggesting that Jews should be pushed back in different areas of life.

Table I. shows the proportion of those who 'fully', or 'rather' agree with the statements (value of four or five of the scale).

|	Year	Fully agrees	Agrees
(It is a threat that) The Jewish intellectuals control the press and the culture[5]	2006	12	19
	2011	14	21
	2013	11	18
	2015	14	19
	2016	14	18
	2017	**16**	**20**
A secret Jewish conspiracy exists which defines political and economic policies	2006	10	17
	2011	14	20
	2013	15	19
	2015	15	20
	2016	17	19
	2017	**17**	**20**
Jewish influence is too broad today in Hungary	2013	12	15
	2015	15	17
	2016	16	21
	2017	**15**	**21**
It would be the best if Jews left the country	2006	5	7
	2011	8	12
	2013	6	9
	2015	9	11
	2016	8	10
	2017	**11**	**13**
In the case of certain professions, the number of Jews should be limited	2006	5	10
	2011	7	12
	2013	5	11
	2015	8	13
	2016	9	16
	2017	**13**	**17**
The Crucifixion of Jesus is the unforgivable fault of Jews	2006	8	12
	2011	9	12
	2013	7	8
	2015	10	15
	2016	11	14
	2017	**15**	**16**
The suffering of Jews was the punishment of God	2006	7	7
	2011	5	9
	2013	4	7
	2015	7	11
	2016	10	11
	2017	**8**	**12**
Jews are more likely to use sinful tools in order to reach their goals than others	2006	8	13
	2011	9	17
	2013	7	15
	2015	11	15
	2016	13	16
	2017	**15**	**20**

5 In order to be explicit in the questionnaires of 2015, 2016 and 2017, we phrased the statement in a way that „It is a threat that Jewish intellectuals control the press and the culture".

To sum it up, we can conclude that the statements above meet one-third or one-fourth of the opinion of the population. The first three statements are the most popular which refer to "excessive" or "dangerous" influence of Jews. This can be related to the fact that three out of ten respondents agreed with the statement representing the spirit of Numerus Clausus. Maybe the most frightening data is that 24% of the respondents supported the idea of requesting the departure of Jews. There is no major change between the certain years, yet, there is a slight gradual increase since 2006. Seven out of eight statements hit the "top value" with regard to the proportion of those who agreed. There was no single statement with which the respondents agreed on a smaller scale then they did over the past years. *Over the past one year, there was maybe a slight increase in the proportion of those who agree compared to the previous years.*

We can summarize that based on the tendency in terms of time, *cognitive anti-Semitism remarkably increased in Hungary.*

This is shown by the first chart where we created three categories by adding the values of the scale of each respondent for all eight statements. This way, the lowest scale value was eight and the highest was eight times five, so 40 in total. We placed those to the first group (non anti-Semitic) who maybe accept certain discriminating stereotypes but based on the value of their answers, they attained a low point on the scale (from eight to 20 points). We put those to the second group (moderately anti-Semitic) who showed medium level prejudice (from 21 to 30 points) and the third group contained those who are strongly anti-Semitic based on their results (from 31 to 40 points). Finally, we placed those who gave no answers or their answer was "I don't know" in the category of "miscellaneous". Just to be clear, we only show the proportions without the lack of answers.

Chart I. The proportion of cognitive anti-Semitic people
in Hungarian society, 2013-2017 (percentage)

| non anti-Semitic | moderately anti-Semitic | strongly anti-Semitic |

● 2013   ● 2014   ● 2015   ● 2016   ● 2017

This dimension of the chart shows that the proportion of non anti-Semitic people has gradually decreased while the proportion of strongly anti-Semitics has increased each year. This shift was significant in 2017. According to our opinion, this tendency can be linked to a current actual phenomenon called "politics after the truth". The voter can hardly isolate reliable information from complete nonsense, especially because disinformation or the dissemination of conspiracy theories form a core part of politician's strategy. If we accept the statement that it is harder and harder to find the way for an average newsreader, then we have to see that it is true for several topics including anti-Semitism. It is becoming more and more difficult to reject misconceptions as their number is increasing and they get publicity as well as political support. We find this a realistic scenario because, as we will see, the emotional and general dislike of Jews haven't recently increased during the past years.

Table 2 illustrates the consistency: based on the three groups, in the great majority of cases it is perfectly "predictable", how the respondents will answer the certain questions on cognitive anti-Semitism. For example, 4% of the respondents among non anti-Semitics believes in the existence of hidden Jewish collaboration and "only" 61% of strongly anti-Semitic people agree with the last statement of anti-Judaism. The eight statements show a very similar pattern in the groups based on anti-Semitism.

Table 2. The acceptance of certain anti-Semitic statements by groups according to the level of anti-Semitism (2017, percentage)

	strongly anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	non anti-Semitic
It is a threat that the Jewish intellectuals control the press and the culture	97	42	3
A secret Jewish conspiracy exists which fact defines the political and economic procedures	91	42	4
Jewish influence is too broad in Hungary today	92	43	5
Jews are more likely to use sinful tools in order to reach their goals then others	93	65	1
It would be the best if Jews left the country	90	24	1
In the case of certain professions, the number of Jews should be limited	96	37	1
The Crucifixion of Jesus is the unforgivable fault of Jews	86	26	7
The suffering of Jews was the punishment of God	61	17	8

THE AFFECTIVE ANTI-SEMITISM

This chart shows the emotional relation to Jews by using three questions. First, we asked the respondents to tell us whether Jews are rather likable or unlikable to them.

Chart 2. The emotional rejection of Jews (proportions by percentage)

„Jews are unlikeable"

| 2003 | 2006 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
| 9 | 14 | 10 | 28 | 24 | 21 | 23 | 26 | 21 | 25 |

The most shocking lesson learned from the chart is the significant increase, the permanent change in public opinion between 2009 and 2010. The earlier attained 10% is now far above 20%. Although the value is always slightly higher in the year of the elections, the sharp increase in 2010 cannot be explained by this. It seems a realistic assumption that one of the reasons of this sharp increase is the dislike against Jews in public speech as it became more legitimate after Jobbik gained ground and became mainstream in public life. The emotional rejection fluctuates between 21-26% since 2010 but last year it increased significantly, almost hitting top scores.

The second question is very similar to that but instead of choosing from two options, respondents had to express their feelings towards Jews and other ethnicities on a scale of 9.

We publish average scores in Table 3, 9 meaning full sympathy and 1 meaning complete dislike.

Table 3. The sympathy index of Jews and other ethnicities on a nine-points-scale (2006-2017)

	Arab	Roma	black	Romanians	Chinese	Swabians	Jews	migrants
2006	3,87	3,33	4,55	4,70	3,77	5,38	5,02	-
2007	3,66	3,03	4,24	4,00	3,80	5,48	5,00	-
2009	4,37	3,39	4,72	4,11	4,09	5,75	5,24	-
2010	4,04	3,64	4,26	4,23	4,01	4,86	4,47	-
2011	3,93	3,63	4,48	4,44	4,11	5,14	4,61	-
2013	4,06	3,69	4,20	4,26	4,12	4,96	4,53	-
2014	4,09	3,64	4,28	4,45	4,33	5,30	4,73	-
2015	3,32	3,29	3,96	4,41	4,44	5,79	5,09	2,84
2016	3,48	3,5	4,12	4,69	4,48	5,87	5,32	2,75
2017	3,44	3,45	3,93	4,58	4,54	5,72	4,91	2,72
correlation coefficient* with the sympathy towards Jews	0,472**	0,402**	0,529**	0,621**	0,610**	0,543**	-	0,428**

* The correlation coefficient is a statistical indicator that expresses the strength of the relationship between two variables. The values of the variable is one if one of the variable is completely defined by the other variable. The value of the variable is zero when they are completely independent from each other. For example, if the correlation coefficient is 0,543 between Jews and Swabians, it means a very strong relation between the two sympathy scales: mainly the same respondents like or dislike both ethnicities. The other relations are slightly weaker but still significant (on the level of 95%, that is what the two stars indicate).

First, what we see from this table is the popularity of each ethnicity. The Roma population previously were the most rejected group of society, but, in 2015, another group became even more rejected: migrants. The predominantly and significantly negative opinion against migrants is marked by the fact that the scores of those ethnicities significantly decreased compared to 2014 who can be identified with migrants by an ordinary citizen, such as Arab and black people. The average score of the Arab people is now on a similar level than Roma's. The perception of the other ethnicities is more favorable, the Jews, right behind the Swabians are the second most accepted group of people. At the same time, data also shows that xenophobia in general is quite a strong phenomenon in society. Only few people gave an average score of more than five to any ethnicity.

When it comes to change in terms of time, the shift between 2009 and 2010 was the most remarkable in most group's cases. The average score of sympathy of Jews hit the top in 2016 but it fell back in 2017.

The last column of table 3 also highlights that the emotional relation to Jews is most probably going hand-in-hand with the like or dislike of any other groups.

The correlation is especially strong between the Jews from one hand and the Romanians, Swabians, Chinese and black people from another hand. This means that mostly the same respondents found Jews unlikable than Swabians and other ethnicities (see footprint under Table 3). Anti-Semitism then goes hand-in-hand with general xenophobia. In our third question, we measured the aversion and the distance kept from Jews and other ethnicities or minorities.

Chart 3. Social distance from certain groups "Would <u>not</u> agree to have a …neighbor(2013-2017, percentage)

It is clear again that "otherness" is not widely accepted in Hungary. Even from the most accepted groups, from one-third to one-fifth of the society would keep distance. The majority of society dislikes gay people and the great majority dislikes immigrants. The relative position of Jews is considered favorable compared to other groups. Similarly to Table 3, what we see is the improvement of scores of Jews until 2016 and then a deterioration since then. The recently presented two sets of data (Table 3 and Chart 3) show that the appearance of migrants in the questionnaire had a strong impact ont he values of other groups as well. When it comes to questionnaires, context has always a strong impact on answers. Just because a strongly rejected group appeared in the questionnaire and respondents identified two groups, Arabs and black people with them, the other ethnicities values increased. The Chinese ongoing, the Jews until 2016 improved their relative position, probably because the respondents rated them *compared* to migrants.

The question concerning neighborhood strengthens the conclusion that anti-Semitism is often the broader manifestation of xenophobia. Those respondents who are not keen on living in the neighborhood of the above-mentioned ethnicities or minorities are more likely to reject Jews (Table 4). This is what the table illustrates: how strongly the like or dislike towards Jews is related to compared to the popularity of other groups. For example, 80% of those

who accept Swabians in the neighborhood would accept Jews as well (Column 1) and out of those who reject Swabians, only 16% would accept Jews (Column 2).

Table 4. The proportion of those who would agree to have a Jewish neighbor… (2017, percent)

|	among those who agree to a … neighbor	among those who would NOT agree to have a … neighbor
black	90	47
migrant	91	55
Arab	95	50
homosexual	90	42
Romanian	88	36
gypsy	86	54
Chinese	85	35
Swabian	80	16
American	80	17
skinhead (data of 2016)	82	67

It is interesting to see that xenophobia affects everyone who is "different": we could intuitively think that Jews and skinheads are rejected by very different people but it is the opposite: the person who rejects skinheads would be very likely to reject Jews too.

For the great majority of Hungarian society, "being a Jew" is just another form of being different and *this quality* generates the dislike towards Jews just as towards any form of "otherness".

Based on the first three sets of data, following the tradition of research and sum-marizing the data of Chart 2 and Table 3, we can conclude the level of anti-Semitism in Hungarian society.[6] As it can be seen on Chart 4, affective anti-Semitism increased in 2010 and decreased to some extent since. The ratio of non anti-Semites has increased since 2013 on a yearly basis, then this tendency turned backwards in 2017. In total, it seems that the general emotional rejection of Jews affects three respondents out of ten and within that category, affective anti-Semitism affects less than four people.

Chart 4. The evolution of the ratio of those who reject Jews on emotional basis 2003-2017 (percent)

● strongly anti-Semitic ● moderately anti-Semitic ○ non anti-Semitic

2003	2006	2009	2010	2011	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
69	76	78	55	64	59	64	68	71	68
21	9	11	22	15	23	16	10	12	9
9	14	11	22	21	17	20	21	17	23

6 Those respondents who feel dislike towards Jews and marked a value of 1-5 on the dislike index, we categorized as "strongly anti-Semitic". We grouped those as "moderately anti-Semitic" who feel dislike towards Jews but marked only 1-3 values. All the rest of the respondents fell into the category of non anti-Semitic.

We also examined the consistency of those responses, which were given for the three questions related to the emotional dimension (Chart 2 and 3, Table 3). We considered those people's way of thinking consistent who chose the same direction for all three questions (whether he or she is against Jews).[7]

Based on this logic, we found that two-third of respondent's way of thinking is consistent but one quarter's is non-consistent. Some respondents from the second group gave an anti-Semitic answer to one question and a non anti-Semitic answer to the other (the rest of them gave an answer "I don't know"). This leads us to the integration of the questions into one dimension, but at the same time, it highlights that a great part of the respondents found the questions strange. Respondents were unsure; they had no mature and unshakable position so probably they have never thought about these questions before.

Chart 5. The ratio of anti-Semitic people in Hungarian Society, 2006-2017 (percentage)

- non anti-Semitic
- moderated anti-Semitic
- strongly anti-Semitic

THE RATIO OF ANTI-SEMITICS BASED ON THE ACCUMULATION OF THE TWO DIMENSIONS

The groups of people who think in an anti-Semitic way and feel in an anti-Semitic way are not identical, their membership differ and overlap at the same time. We merge these two dimensions in our analysis. We consider those people strongly anti-Semitic who are qualified as anti-Semitic in both groups or at least in one group and moderately anti-Semitic in the other. We consider those moderately anti-Semitic who fell into this category in both dimensions or those who fell into the category of strongly anti-Semitic in one dimension and non anti-Semitic in the other dimension.

Based on these categories, we can see that about one-third of society is affected by some level of anti-Semitism and one-quarter is strongly anti-Semitic. The tendency based on time is very similar to the partial components. Anti-Semitism significantly increased between 2006 and 2011. Until 2014, it slightly decreased, and it has not changed between 2014 and 2016 but during last year, it increased again. The level of anti-Semitism in 2017 almost reached the top score of 2011. We will use this integrated indicator in the rest of our study.

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	2006	2011	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
non anti-Semitic	66	60	62	69	65	67	64
moderated anti-Semitic	16	14	18	10	12	13	10
strongly anti-Semitic	18	26	20	21	23	20	27

7 We define an individual anti-Semitic in case he or she rather dislikes Jews (Chart 2), who would not move into their neighborhood (Chart 3) and those who expressed dislike by giving 4 or lower scores on the scale of

5. WHO ARE ANTI-SEMITIC?

PREJUDICE AND DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS

When we take a close look at the relation between anti-Semitism and social background, we have to realize that their connection is very weak. *Prejudice to Jews is a characteristic of every social group to the same extent, there is no major divergence*. It often happens that the level of anti-Semitism of one group is higher than the average in a certain year but on the long run, there are no discrepancies. Previous results showed that men were more susceptible to anti-Semitism than women

but there was no difference in 2017. When it comes to age groups, we can see that middle aged citizens (40-59) are more likely to be anti-Semites than the older generation (60 and above). The distribution according to settlements have slightly changed. In 2016, divergences disappeared among the different types of settlement but in 2017, those who live in smaller settlements in the countryside were more likely to show the signs of anti-Semitism.

There is no major difference regarding school education either. Only people having university diploma show a lower ratio of

Chart 6. Anti-Semitism according to affinity of members of social groups (2017, percentage)

● strongly anti-Semitics   ● moderately anti-Semitics   ● non anti-Semitics

anti-Semitism (compared to 2015, this difference is a bit sharper). It would be an exaggeration to say that anti-Semitism is limited to unsuccessful people living at the peripheries of society and experiencing existential threats. Anti-Semitism equally affects physical and intellectual workers and the correlation is considered the weakest in the group of society with the lowest income.

ANTI-SEMITISM AND RELIGIOUSNESS

Several questions were asked in the questionnaire regarding religion and religiousness. We examined if there is a relationship between prejudice to Jews and religiousness, and the frequency of attending and belonging to a church. We did not even perceive as many differences as in the case of demographic properties. The extent of anti-Semitism does not depend on the extent of religiousness of the individual or the type of church he or she belongs to. Maybe we can point out a little bit less anti-Semitic respondents among non-religious people, a little more among Calvinists, but statistically the differences among the values of other groups are not significant. Anti-Semitism based on religious grounds or, anti-Judaism has no significant correlation to religiousness.

Chart 7. Anti-Semitism according to religiousness (2017, percentage)

	strongly anti-Semitics	moderately anti-Semitics	non anti-Semitics
Overall population	27	10	64
Calvinist	37	6	58
religious in his or her own way	34	7	59
doesn't participate at religious life	29	10	61
belongs to a congregation	25	11	64
attends church several times a year	25	10	65
doesn't belong to a congregation	24	9	67
only at major Holidays, family events	21	10	69
non-religious	19	9	72

● strongly anti-Semitics ● moderately anti-Semitics ● non anti-Semitics

ANTI-SEMITISM AND SOCIAL ATTITUDES

We carefully examined the role of attitudes and political views besides the affinity of members of social groups.

Based on the responses, we examined if the agreement with sociopolitical questions increases the probability of anti-Semitism. The results confirmed the previous research findings that anti-Semitic prejudice is in close coherence with beliefs non-directly related to Jews such as rejection of otherness, xenophobia, law-and-order conservative views, trust in certain moral and social norms, rules. The closest correlation is to the rejection of homosexuality, abortion, EU membership and the limitation of the number of people of color. There is also a significant connection with law-and order status; those who support the death penalty and the imprisonment of drug consumers are more likely to become anti-Semites. Being a nationalist also increases the probability of anti-Semitic prejudice.

At the same time, pessimistic sociopolitical attitudes ("In this country, one can only become rich by acting dishonestly" and "The leaders of this country don't really care about the destiny of people like you") show very little correlation with anti-Semitism. This can be a little surprisi-

ng as the feeling of betrayal can feed anti-Semitism, according to several research reports. *It is still justified that sociopolitical attitudes project the potential anti-Semitism of respondents much more clearly than demographic properties.*

Chart 8. Anti-Semitism and sociopolitical attitudes (2017, percentage)

	strongly anti-Semitics	moderately anti-Semitics	non anti-Semitics
Overall population	27	10	64
Would make abortion process more severe	45	12	43
Finds homosexuality immoral	45	13	42
Would limit the number of people of color in the country	44	10	46
Would support death penalty in severe cases	42	6	52
Religious studies should be compulsory at schools	41	11	48
It is still today's moral obligation to stand up against the decisions of the Trianon Treaty.	41	10	49
People with nationalist values should be decision makers.	41	10	49
Would imprison drug consumers	39	11	50
The protection of our national values is more important than the EU membership.	39	8	53
Would make immigration process more severe	36	10	54
In this country, one can only become rich by acting dishonestly.	34	10	55
The leaders of this country do not really care about the destiny of people like you.	30	10	60

● strongly anti-Semitics ● moderately anti-Semitics ○ non anti-Semitics

ANTI-SEMITISM AND POLITICAL PREFERENCES

In the following chapter, we will examine if there is a relationship between anti-Semitism and political self-identification, the choice of political parties and willingness to participate at elections. Based on three questions, our respondents had to position themselves on a seven-points-scale: left-right, conservative-liberal and moderate-radical dimensions.

Compared to the overall population, anti-Semites are closer to the right side and radical poles on average but they are only marginally linked to the conservatives. At the same time, based on the average scores, it is clear that even among left-wingers, liberals and moderate voters, there are respondents who agree with anti-Semitic statements. The anti-Semitic interviewees are likely to tend to the right wing from the average score of four, although due to the unpopularity of the left wing and liberal parties, the entire society has shifted to the right. There were no major differences on the conservative-liberal pole, only the strongly anti-Semitics tend to be more conservative than the average. It is interesting to see that strongly anti-Semitic people place themselves precisely to the middle of the moderate-radical scale.

Table 5. Political self-identification and anti-Semitism, 2017 (average on a scale from 1 to 7)

	strongly anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	non anti-Semitic	overall population 2017	overall population 2016
left wing (1) – right wing (7)	5,21	4,81	4,6	4,79	4,50
conservative (1) – liberal (7)	3,25	3,72	3,74	3,61	3,54
moderate (1) – radical (7)	4,03	3,58	3,33	3,54	3,38

Political interest and the closely related willingness to participate at the elections have a weak relation to anti-Semitism. The probability of responses against Jews is slightly increasing in harmony with the increase of activities (chart 9). We assume that anti-Semite voters can be a bit louder, in other words, they are more likely to make public statements so the ratio of this group can be over exaggerated by public opinion.

Chart 9. Anti-Semitism and willingness to participate at the elections (2017, percentage)

Overall population	27	10	64
Would surely participate at the elections	26	11	63
Would probably go to vote	33	8	59
Would probably not go to vote	26	6	68
Would surely not go to vote	21	7	72

● strongly anti-Semitics ● moderately anti-Semitics ○ non anti-Semitics

Political preferences show a much stronger relationship to anti-Semitism than the already presented factors (Chart 10). Forty-two percent of Jobbik voters fell into the category of strongly anti-Semitic and a further 15% were considered as moderately anti-Semitic. At the same time, strongly anti-Semitic voters created absolute majority among Jobbik voters in 2014. Their ratio slightly decreased in 2015 but there was no further decrease in 2016 and 2017. Jobbik's populist decline strategy had very little impact. Compared to the previous years, it is a new and a bit surprising phenomenon that there are more anti-Semitic respondents among the supporters of the Socialist party than the average. In this case, due to small sample size, statistical error is significant. The reality of this correlation would only show if this tendency would remain the same over several years. Similarly to the previous years, the supporters of MSZP tend to position themselves in the "middle" (meaning on average level), similarly to their position on migration issues.[8]

The relation of the supporters of the government to Jews seems to be on average level. Among the supporters of LMP, DK and left wing-liberal parties, anti-Semitism is much rarer.

In any case, data shows that anti-Semitism is not the very characteristic of a certain political party or political side. Four-tenth of respondents voting for Fidesz or for the socialists fell into the anti-Semitic category while the same proportion of Jobbik voters did not.

Chart 10. Anti-Semitism according to political party preferences (2017, percentage)

● strongly anti-Semitics   ● moderately anti-Semitics   ● non anti-Semitics

8 http://median.hu/object.c38fa2c9-5bc2-40c9-ae38-bab5f5a5f72.ivy

6. THE HOLOCAUST
AND THE REMEMBRANCE OF THE PAST

The remembrance of the Shoah is among top wounds both in Hungarian anti-Semitic and Jewish communities. Many conflicts stem from the different interpretations. Therefore, the survey contained a set of questions that focused on the views regarding the necessity of facing the historic past and the responsibility related to the Holocaust during World War II.

Table 6. Opinions on the Holocaust and on the challenges of the past, 2009-2017 (percentage, *positive statements regarding Jews are shown in italics*)

	Rather agrees							
	2006	2009	2011	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
1. During the war, non-Jewish Hungarians suffered just as much as Jews.	56	66	65	65	60	64	70	-
2. There were no gas chambers in death	7	6	7	8	12	11	11	**8**
3. The number of Jewish victims was a lot lower than it is generally stated.	14	12	18	19	23	23	24	**22**
4. Much more should be taught about the Holocaust at schools so this could never happen again.	*45*	*54*	*46*	*50*	*42*	*46*	*52*	**42**
5.Great majority of horrifying stories were made up by Jews afterwards.	9	11	13	14	15	19	18	**17**
6. This topic should be removed from the agenda after so many decades following the Holocaust.	48	40	58	53	54	50	52	**55**

Opinions differ on how much talk and attention should be devoted to anti-Semitism especially in schools: "more" (statement 4) and "less" (statement 6) was supported by 50-50% of society until 2016 but the proportion of those who agree with "more" decreased by 8% in 2017. Although the great majority of voters distance themselves from denying or relativizing of the Holocaust, a non-significant part of the respondents is responsive to it. Complete denial is found among 8% of respondents (statement 2), partial denial and relativizing 17-22% (statement 3 and 5). Moreover, this ratio has increased over the past years (chart 11). As we mentioned it in the case of cognitive anti-Semitism, we find it possible that behind this data, there is growing responsiveness to conspiracy theories ("the politics after the truth") and some general paranoia instead of the open denial of the Holocaust. When it comes to alterations in terms of time, 2011 represents the negative turning point in this case. As for Holocaust denying or relativizing statements, the turning point is 2014. There was no major change in the past three years. Furthermore in 2017, the support of all three Holocaust relativizing statements decreased, even if by small extent, which can bring some compensation in a year when cognitive anti-Semitism significantly increased.

Chart 11. The ratio of those who agree with Holocaust-denying and relativizing statements, 2006-2017 (percentage)

● There were no gas chambers in death camps.
● Great majority of horrifying stories were made up by Jews afterwards.
● The number of Jewish victims was a lot lower than it is generally stated.

When we look at the pattern of responses related to the Holocaust in relation to the categories according to anti-Semitism (Table 7), we end up with a slightly surprising result. We would assume that positive statements related to Jews would fully be supported by non anti-Semites and negative statements by the strongly anti-Semitic. Data shows that each hypothesis is more sophisticated than that. Naturally, the anti-Semitic, mainly the strongly anti-Semitic group was proven to be less emphatic to Jews than the non anti-Semitic group. At the same time, the Holocaust denying or relativizing statements are met by one tenth of non anti-Semitic respondents' opinion. Even more surprising is that according to more than one-fifth of strongly anti-Semitic (and four-tenth of moderately anti-Semitic) respondents' opinion, more talk and attention should be devoted to the Holocaust. This is explained by the assumption that some of them have no clear relation to the hidden dilemmas of the questions or some of them don't even understand them. Anyway, it seems clear that the judgment on the dilemmas related to the remembrance of the past is only partially related to anti-Semitism. As it was phrased in the report of 2013 by Andras Kovacs, "It is a mistake to assume a direct relationship between anti-Semitism and reluctance to face the

past: anti-Semitism is not the reason for the reluctance of facing the past and this latter doesn't necessarily stem from the intention to legitimate anti-Semitism."

Table 7. Anti-Semitism and opinions on the Holocaust, 2017 (percentage of those who agree)

	strongly anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	non anti-Semitic
1. There were no gas chambers in death camps.	24	12	4
2. The number of Jewish victims was a lot lower than it is generally stated.	58	32	10
3. Much more should be taught about Holocaust at schools so this could never happen again.	21	39	48
4. Great majority of horrifying stories was made up by Jews afterwards.	49	19	9
5. This topic should be removed from the agenda after so many decades following the Holocaust.	77	60	44

7. ISRAEL
AND ANTI-SEMITISM

It goes without saying that opinions and emotions related to Israel have a significant role in the perception of Jews. Although the dislike (and the opposite) against Jews doesn't necessarily stem from the criticism of the politics of Israel, it is a general phenomenon when prejudice to Jews is presented in the form of criticism of the Jewish State. Way before Jobbik appeared on the political scene, banalities formed an integral part of Hungarian everyday language, so it seemed to be justified to ask a few questions in the questionnaire and point out the answers of the responses of Jobbik's supporters (Table 8 and 9). The relation to Israel can be measured in the best possible way by asking open questions (without pre-phrased answers) from respondents and test what they associate to by hearing the name of Israel. This way, they will not join to a pre-existing opinion but mention what they first so probably what they really find important. We present the different answers of different respondents in Table 8 by categories, the same type of answers are grouped into the same category without demonstrating 32% of lack of answers.

Table 8. "What comes to your mind when you hear the word: Israel?" (Data of 2017, open questions, percentage of mentions)

The nature and groupings of hints and the most frequently mentioned items within the category	non anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	strongly anti-Semitic	Voters of Jobbik	entire sample 2017	entire sample 2016
Descriptive, neutral: land of Jews, country, state, religion, Middle-East, Arab, language	65	53	62	59	63	57
Negative but hard to tell if Arabs or Jews are blamed: war, terrorism, explosions, fear, tension	28	24	25	35	27	31
Attractions, rather positive: Jesus, Jerusalem, Wailing Wall, Nazareth, Bible, synagogue, nice country	3	0	4	0	3	5
Negative to Israel: Fanatical, aggressive, murderer, evil, illegitimate, disgust, tyrant	1	17	8	5	4	6
Money, richness, power, influence	2	6	1	1	2	1
World War 2, the Holocaust	1	0	0	0	1	0
In total	100	100	100	100	100	100

The majority of the answers, 63% was descriptive and neutral without any potential emotional conclusion ("land of the Jews", "state", "religion" and other similar answers). 27% thought of the war in the Middle-East, terrorism and attacks, but the associations didn't lead to a conclusion whether the respondents blame the Jews or the Arabs for the conflict. Three percent of respondents mentioned a tourist attraction which is more positive by nature than negative. Only 4% of the respondents made concrete negative remarks concerning Israel (one of the last categories "money", "richness", "influence" got two percent of the answers and it was rather driven by jealousy than respect). If we examine the correlation to anti-Semitism, we see very little differences, only the contemptuous remarks appeared more often among anti-Semitic respondents, but even within this group, only one-sixth or one-seventh of them show this approach. It is a remarkable result that Jobbik respondents do not significantly differ from the entire sample.

This leads us to a conclusion that the first thought of the majority of respondents who are classified as anti-Semitic is not a negative one when they hear the word "Israel" or "Jews", as we will later see. When we call their attention to anti-Semitic aspects or points of view against Israel, they are more likely to agree than others. Anti-Semitism is rather a responsiveness in their case than a stable state of mind.

When it comes to the change in term of time (last two columns), the negative answers appeared less frequently than in 2016. This again is a positive sign that compensates for the overall pessimistic picture resulting from the strengthening of cognitive and affective anti-Semitism. The associations are completed by reactions, agreements or rejections of respondents in relation to Israel.

Table 9. Anti-Semitism and opinions on Israel, 2017
(The ratio of those who agree, percentage; 5 – fully agrees, 1 – doesn't agree at all; agrees = 5 and 4 integrated)

	non anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	strongly anti-Semitic	Voters of Jobbik	overall population 2017	overall population 2016
1. The Jews living here are more loyal to Israel than to Hungary	23	62	79	47	42	31
2. The Hungarian Jews would rather cheer for Israel than to Hungary at a Hungarian-Israeli soccer game.	23	55	76	52	41	30
3. Israel is a legitimate prosecutor of a self-defensing war against the offenses to the country	25	39	43	25	32	33
4. The political system of Israel is more democratic than that of the Arab countries which attack the Jewish state	31	52	52	35	39	29
5. I am more understanding towards Israel than earlier after having seen the more and more brutal Islamic terrorist attacks	33	34	40	26	34	33
6. Israel is an aggressor, carrying out genocide against Palestinians.	21	57	67	51	37	29
7. In certain countries of Western Europe, Jews are more threatened than in Hungary.	38	49	69	51	45	-

The first two questions are almost the same but they are differently phrased, still every fifth respondent gave an opposite answer to them. A further 25% answered, "I don't know" to at least one of the questions. Only 38% answered the questions consistently.[9]

It shows that a good part of the respondents seemed to be unfamiliar with these issues, many people have no clear position (The ratio of the answer "I don't know" was 20% in the case of other statements related to Israel).

In total, we can say that the population is rather dismissive to all statements. Agreement with statements 4 and 5 are almost completely independent from the general views related to Jews. Probably many respondents didn't fully understand this complex issue. The supporters of Jobbik were a bit more critical of Israel, but the differences were much less than we anticipated based on the position of the political party[10].

In the case of the other questions, there was a significant correlation between anti-Semitic predisposition and the repartition of answers but not as significant as in the case of the simpler, locally related questions.

It fully goes against the intuitive expectations that even respondents who were classified as anti-Semitic in other questions stood up for the Jewish state in the same (significant) ratio (statements 3, 4 and 5). If we take into consideration that the very same respondents were the most hostile towards migrant and Arab people, this correlation is easier to understand. *Another conclusion is that the judgment of Jews and Israel only improved in the context of migration which can lead us back to the dislike against Arab and Muslim people who can be easily identified as being migrants. This goes for those respondents who dislike Jews.*

When we analyze the change in terms of time, there is a significant shift in the case of the first two statements. Both show that Hungarian public opinion became more skeptical in relation to the loyalty of Jews. It shows respondent's confusion that the agreement with the positive statement 4 in relation Israel is just as frequent as the negative statement 6.

28

9 Based on the two five-points-scale questions, we regarded those respondents fully consequent who gave the same value to both questions.
10 Even in 2014, Vona wanted a total break in diplomatic relations between Hungary and Israel. *http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20140724_vona_megszakitana_a_kapcsolatot_izraellel*

8. ASSOCIATIONS WITH JEWS

We tested with the help of open questions what comes to people's mind when they hear the word "Jew". Similar to the previous chapters, we grouped similar answers to the same category without demonstrating four-tenth of lack of answers.

Table 10. "What comes to your mind first when you hear the word Jew?"
(2017, open questions, spontaneous answers in groups according to the level of anti-Semitism, in percentage of respondents)

	non anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	strongly anti-Semitic	Voters of Jobbik	overall population 2017	overall population 2016
Neutral hints: religion, ethnic group, customs, culture, Bible, language	29	21	22	12	27	26
Money, power, richness, commerce, USA, influence	14	27	24	23	18	22
Persecution, Holocaust, Auschwitz, World War 2, suffering	20	13	9	8	16	28
Negative characteristics: desire for power, hunger for money, exploitation, avarice, laziness, hatred	5	22	33	21	14	9
Positive: intelligent, tolerant, hard working, human	13	6	3	13	10	6
They are the same as others. I don't care about who is Jewish and who is not.	10	6	4	14	8	4
Palestinian-Jewish conflict	6	2	1	5	4	3
Physical signs (sideburns, nose etc.)	0	2	2	2	1	2
Relative, neighbor, acquaintance	1	0	0	0	1	0
Food (kosher stb.)	1	1	0	0	0	0
Soros György	1	0	2	2	1	0
	100	100	100	100	100	100

The table starts the overview with the most frequently mentioned features in 2017.

This is why the category of neutral and descriptive hints are at the first place in the first position. We have no clear idea about the emotions of the respondent by mentioning the word "Jew". The category of persecution is considered neutral too. In total, these two categories form near-

ly half of the answers. The thoughts such as "money", "power", and "influence" are on the edge. They can be neutral, even respectful, but it is more realistic to assume a negative attitude in the case of this group of 18%. The main driver of anti-Semitism is envy and jealousy. The next category surely contains negative aspects with offensive and degrading characteristics. There were more of these in 2017 than one year earlier but we see increasing amount of positive remarks too. We can consider the statement "they are the same as others" as a positive remark and it is also a good sign when gastronomy comes to somebody's mind in relation with Jews. Some respondents listed external physical signs or mentioned the conflict between Palestine and Israel without taking a concrete side. "

In total, there is a balance between the positive and negative answers; their proportion has not changed compared to 2016. For the first time in our research, there were respondents who mentioned György Soros in relation with Jews, although they only represent one percent of the valid respondents.

(We cannot indicate this in our tables, but in the question of anti-Semitic classification, 2% of invalid respondents associated to Soros).

Similarly to the association with Israel, in respect too, there is a weak relation between anti-Semitism, the choice of political parties and the type and direction of the association. 12% of Jobbik, 3% of strongly anti-Semitic, namely 10% of the overall population shared a positive thought. Many of them associated to a neutral word, the similar amount fell into the ""slightly negative" money-richness-influence category. The only group where we can find a pattern of anti-Semitism is the group of specifically negative remarks, but even within this group, we ""only" find 25% of strongly anti-Semitic people and 23% of the supporters of the radically right-wing party. Again, there are less people who match a negative association to Jews on their own than those who are categorized as strongly anti-Semitic based on their reaction to the pre-written statements of the

questionnaire. At the same time, it is a fact that there were negative or ""partly negative" (money, etc.) mentions in the non anti-Semitic group too, so in total, almost every third respondent falls into the negative field. *We can summarize that there is a perceptible difference between spontaneous anti-Semitism and questionnaire related responsiveness.*

We also asked respondents about the typical Jewish characteristics. Only 29% of them gave available answers so we will not elaborate on this question as the number of the sample is too small to be able to draw conclusions.

The number of rejected answers was low when we asked respondents about György Soros. We used open questions and only 16% of respondents did not answer, all the others had a stable opinion. Over the past few years, there was an ongoing debate whether the campaign against Soros is considered to be anti-Semitic or not. We wanted to know what came into respondents' mind about Soros without using pre-written questions and we also studied if there is a correlation between the direction of the opinions and the anti-Semitic pre-disposition of the respondent.

It shows the great efficiency of the government's communication that 62% of respondents associated negatively to Soros (the total of the first four statements). Further 18% thought about his wealth and influence but did not associate negative characteristics to these. Only 11% mentioned any kind of positive qualities and only 2% thought that the Soros campaign was an exaggeration. It also shows the government's success that 30% of respondents' first thoughts were migrants and immigrants. 2% of the overall population associated to Jews when mentioning Soros, this proportion was 4-6% among anti-Semitic respondents. At the same time, there is a much bigger overlap between Soros and the Jews on the association map. Hearing the words ""Soros" and ""Jew", every third-fifth respondent thought about money, power, influence, enrichment, mostly in negative context. The proportion of the respondents was about 10% who associated to these same thoughts when answering both questions. In several answer categories, there is a significant correlation between the

Table II. ""What comes first to your mind when you hear the word György Soros?"
(2017, open question, spontaneous answers according to groups of anti-Semitism, proportion of responses)

	non anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	strongly anti-Semitic	Voters of Jobbik	Those who have negative associations about the world „Jew"	overall population 2017
1. migrants, refugees, colonization	30	33	30	29	38	30
2. disgusting, traitor, general abuse	15	23	25	20	24	18
3. power (hunger for)	8	1	13	8	10	9
4. unexplained wealth, undue enrichment, swindler, speculator	5	4	4	1	6	5
5. rich, wealth, influential, businessman, without concrete judgment	19	19	14	16	13	18
6. It is always about him, I am very bored of that (without a judgment on Soros)	2	1	1	0	0	2
7. praise, anything positive (unfair, lies and attacks, generous donor)	15	8	2	15	1	11
8. Jew (anything which contains this word)	1	3	4	6	4	2
9. other	5	8	7	5	4	5
	100	100	100	100	100	100

opinion on Soros and the anti-Semitic approach (either in the case of closed or open questions).

While 15% of non anti-Semitics, only 2% of strongly anti-Semitics quoted a positive thought (although a bit surprising that 15% of Jobbik respondents mentioned positive qualities). When we sum up the first four categories, it is clear that negative associations are mentioned significantly more among those respondents who were classified as anti-Semitic based on other questions too compared to non anti-Semitics (72% versus 58%). In total, we can conclude that there is a significant indirect relation between Soros and the Jews among voters. This relation has an overwhelming nega-

tive context. *For the first time in the history of our survey, there are respondents (even if their number is small) who directly associate to Soros when hearing about Jews and the other way around.*

Finally, we asked the question ""Do you have Jewish acquaintances?", for which 24% of respondents answered ""yes". Although we did not point it out specifically in our analysis, we emphasize here that the existence of a Jewish acquaintance decreases significantly the probability of anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli attitudes. 84% of those who have Jewish acquaintances fell into the non anti-Semitic category, 58% fell into the same category out of those who do not have any Jewish acquaintances.

9. THE PERCEPTION ON THE ANTI-SEMITISM OF POLITICAL PARTIES

In this short chapter, we were not curious anymore about the relation of respondents to the Jews; we rather asked them about their thoughts on the extent of anti-Semitism in the case of those political parties which have parliamentary fractions.

Table 12. Who are anti-Semitics? Is anti-Semitism a characteristic of the parties below? (2017, percentage, in the percentage of valid answers)

	very tipical	a little tipical	non tipical	total
Fidesz	12	42	46	100
Jobbik	43	42	15	100
MSZP	9	39	55	100
LMP	8	35	57	100

It was the first time we asked this question so we have no comparison in terms of time. We can certainly see from the data that the change of direction of Jobbik brought no results (so far) in this respect: 85% of respondents still think that anti-Semitism, to a certain level, is still the characteristic of the party.

In the case of other parties, opinions differ. Some people thought that anti-Semitism is typical to a small extent to certain parties but even more respondents thought that it is not typical at all. Respondents see MSZP and LMP as less anti-Semitic than Fidesz. In this respect, the real gap is not between these parties but between Jobbik and the other parties.

10. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON

International comparisons can be very help-ful when we put data in a broader context even if it is a small quantity referring to 2015.

First, we compared the frequency of rel-ativizing the Holocaust to other Western and Eastern European countries, complet-ed by the supposed frequency of physical atrocities and by the fears they generate.

Chart 12. The supposed frequency of attacks against Jews and relativizing Holocaust in a few European countries (2015, percentage, source: ADL[11])

- ● "Violent attacks are frequent against Jews"
- ● "I am concerned that Jewish people, institutions and symbols will be physically attacked."
- ● "The number of Jewish victims during the Holocaust was much lower than it is generally stated."

There is a major difference in all aspects between Western and Eastern European countries. Although the relativizing of the Holocaust (and other manifestations of verbal anti-Semitism) is more widespread in East-ern Europe, Western Europe citizens rather have to worry about physical atrocities.

Especially, the French Jewish community is endangered, which is the largest Jewish community in Europe.

Based on the monthly monitoring reports of APF on anti-Semitism, we can declare that physical atrocities against Jews are very rare in Hungary. In the light of this state-ment, it seems to be an exaggerated fear that 35% of Hungarians worry about po-tential violent atrocities against Jews. Nine percent of them thought that these attacks happened frequently in 2015.

Another source of data shows if respond-ents would be open to accept ethnic or oth-er minorities as colleagues.

11 http://global100.adl.org/public/ADL-Global-100-Executive-Summary2015.pdf

	gay	Muslim	Roma	People of Color	Asian	Jewish	Disabled
Hungary	29	22	20	18	15	9	8
Average of EU28	13	13	20	6	6	6	3

● Hungary   ● Average of EU28

Hungarians are less accepting that the European average. At the same time, the main difference is between Western and Eastern Europe. Hungary has similar results than other countries in the region. According to our own data, the perception of Roma is probably even worse than that. (Although it is interesting that there was no difference in this respect compared to the EU average). The perception of ethnicities who are identified as migrants severely deteriorated during 2015-2016. Again, it is confirmed that the relative position of Jews is not bad, but we lag behind European average.

12 http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/yearFrom/1974/yearTo/2016/surveyKy/2077

11. FACTORS DETERMINING ANTI-SEMITISM

As a summary of our analysis, we examine how much anti-Semitism can be explained by the different approaches discussed in the previous chapters individually and altogether. We look at the already presented correlations; we compare them to each other in the hierarchy: which seem to be the strongest and which ones are only slightly related to anti-Semitism. Normally, the logistic regression model is the right methodology to point this out in statistical analysis. This is an analysis that includes several variables (questions, statements) at the same time. The analysis has one outcome variable: the one attitude that we want to explain. In our case, this outcome variable is the complex anti-Semitism indicator that we used so far. We integrated the strongly and moderately anti-Semitic groups, so everyone was included who significantly agreed with anti-Semitic statements. The model forecasts, based on the explanatory variables (almost all statements and questions of our research), the probability of integration in the anti-Semitic group (Table 15). Hypothetically speaking, the indicator measuring the strength of the correlation is one if the model explains the explanatory variable in 100%. In other words, if one can predict from the explanatory variables that somebody is a member of an anti-Semitic group or not. The value of the indicator is zero; in this case, the variables of the model are completely independent from anti-Semitism. The explanatory variables of the first model, almost all the questions and statements of our questionnaire which are listed in the annex, are capable of predicting with the probability of 61% who will fall into the anti-Semitic category (this is considered a very high value in political sociology). In other words, anti-Semitism depends on those factors in 39% that are out of the scope of this research.

As a next step, we broke down this complex model in order to find out the strength of the explanation (forecast) for each question we raised separately in different chapters. In this second model, we exclusively listed the socio-demographic background characteristics. In the third model, we listed political self-identification and choice of political parties. The fourth one contains indicators related to xenophobia. The fifth contains law-and-order, nationalism, the rejection of "rule breaking" and political skepticism. The sixth one contains the negative associations for open questions. The seventh model covers Jewish acquaintances. We listed all questions and statements elaborated for this analysis in the annex. The demographic model is scarcely significant which means that *social group affiliation is only marginally linked to the responsiveness to anti-Semitism.* The impact of the model based on open questions is a little stronger. People are more open to anti-Semitism when they have negative attitudes towards Israel and Jews. The people who think of degrading characteristics when it comes to Jewish features are probably more anti-Semitic. At the same time, this model only explains anti-Semitism by 10% and strengthens the statement of chapter 8 that *the relation is of medium strength between the agreement with anti-Semitic statements ("connection") and spontaneous anti-Semitism.*

The impact of political questions is of weak strength. Based on the choice of political parties and political self-identification, we are able to predict by 6% if the respondent will be the member of the anti-Semitic group or not. A similar impact is measured in the case of the existence of Jewish acquaintances: it decreases the responsiveness to anti-Semitism.

Table 13. The comparison of the explanatory power of models introducing different approaches

Model	The strength of the correlation[13]
1.entire	0,612
2.demographic (age, gender, type of settlement, financial status, religiousness)	0,062
3.political party preference and political self-identification (left-right, conservative-liberal, moderate-radical scales)	0,064
4.xenophobia against other ethnicities	0,265
5.political attitudes (law-and-order; nationalism; euro-skepticism; "rule-breaking", rejection of otherness; pessimism)	0,419
6.open questions, negative associations to Jews	0,103
7.existence of Jewish acquaintance	0,071

Similarly to research findings of the previous years, in 2017, the models of xenophobia and social attitudes show robust explanatory power. Furthermore, among the attitudes, the need for the limitation of numbers of people of color was the strongest factor (see Annex) which is one form of demonstration of xenophobia. A statement of available literature was confirmed by our study: prejudice is very rarely exists in its own. Anti-Semitism is a form of xenophobia too. Authoritarianism, the persecution of rule-breaking, law-and-order and nationalism lead to a political character structure which generates tendencies to anti-Semitism. Although, in total, it is the rejection of "otherness" which increases the probability of anti-Semitism, whether it is the rejection of migrants, homosexuals, drug consumers or other minorities and ethnicities. At the same time, statistical analysis underlines that the outcome, namely who will actually agree with anti-Semitic statements, mainly depends on factors out of our research scope. It is impossible to precisely predict this outcome of a questionnaire.

13 Nagelkerke R-squared value. Its maximum value is one if the variants of the model completely explain the outcome variable (in this case anti-Semitism). Its value is zero if it does not explain it at all, if they are completely independent from each other. For statistical reasons, we coded all of the explanatory factors as so-called dichotomous variable: they can only be one of the two values. (Living in our outside of Budapest, young or old, graduated or non-graduated, etc.) Each model is significant at the level of 95%.
The model contains the following questions:
• *Law-and-Order:* „Would you support a severe prison sentence to those who consume drugs?"; „Would you support the introduction of death penalty?";
• *Nationalism:* „We should stand up more strongly for the Hungarian minorities living in the surrounding countries"; „The defense of national values is more important than the EU membership";
  „In important questions, people with strong nationalist values should be decision makers."
• *Rule breaking", rejection of otherness:* „Do you find homosexuality immoral?";„Would you make abortion process more severe?"
• *Political pessimism:* „In this country, one can only become rich by acting dishonestly"; „The people, if they are really dedicated, have all means to influence the destiny of the country.";
  „Politicians, even if they often make mistakes want the best for the people"; „Nowadays, in may cases, Courts wouldn't do people justice"; „Those are very few who can count on future";
  „Nowadays anything and anyone can be bought."

12. SUMMARY

First, our research aimed to highlight how much focus is given to issues related to Jews by the Hungarian public opinion. We can conclude, based on the high ratio of not applicable answers and on the frequency of inconsistent answers that the majority of respondents cannot form a proper opinion in this topic, the issues we raised are unknown to them. They cannot relate to the questions focusing on Jews. Only one-tenth of the respondents could recall a public issue related to Jews of last year. On the other hand, it is not necessarily a small number. The majority of Hungarian society is even less aware of the situation of other ethnicities and minorities living in Hungary. Secondly, before we present the results, we have to think about what it means (and what it does not mean) to agree with an anti-Semitic statement of a questionnaire. It is certain that it "only" means an opinion or attitude and surely not a behavior or act of discrimination. Although we do not know about the weight of the opinion, even answers with extreme values don't necessarily represent the personal integrity and experience of respondents. We learned a lot about the difference between the two categories: spontaneous anti-Semitic mentions and traditional agreement based anti-Semitism. A good part of anti-Semitic respondents, categorized by the traditional methodology, don't necessarily think of something negative when we mention Israel and the Jews, but if we call their attention to anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli statements, they are more likely to agree with or to "connect" to these. This connection can exist the other way around too: anti-Semitic thoughts can be born even by refusing the anti-Semitic statements. In any case, it seems clear that anti-Semitism rather means a receptivity than a solid state of mind. In our interpretation, this variability is a natural characteristic of anti-Semitism.

When we use this methodology, it is always informative to ask the same questions repeatedly for several years, so we can take a look at long-term tendencies. These pieces of data refer to the popularity of views and misconceptions in relation to Jews (cognitive anti-Semitism) and to the emotional relationship, social distance (affective anti-Semitism). Based on this, anti-Semitism significantly increased in 2010 (according to our opinion in line with the mainstream appearance of Jobbik). Since then there was only very modest shift from that point. Between 2016 and 2017, the number of those respondents who agreed with the anti-Semitic statements increased. This increase in the cognitive dimension is partly due to the phenomenon we call "politics after the truth". In today's information flow, it is harder and harder to decide whether something is true or not. Conspiracy theories and misconceptions get broad publicity and it often happens that politicians intend to generate fear or disinformation on purpose.

The general dislike to Jews and Israel increased, even if to small extent, over the past year not only in the cognitive but also in the emotional dimension. In general terms, we have to be very cautious to state that the level of anti-Semitism increased in Hungary, as the balance between positive and negatives mentions in the case of answers to open question remained unchanged. The increase of the popularity of Holocaust denying and relativizing statements also stopped in 2017. The emotional anti-Semitism of the society is the manifestation of general xenophobia: those respondents who are more negative to other ethnicities are more dismissive to Jews. Of course, anti-Semitism has special features, but for the great majority of Hungarian society being a "Jew" is just another form of otherness (even symbolically) and citizens feel dislike in this respect just as they do to any other ethnicities. The rejection of Jews compared to other ethnicities is not so strong, we find migrants on the top of the list, even more disliked than Roma peo-

ple. The appearance of migrants (and Arab, black people too who are identified with migrants) changed the perception of Jews and placed them to a different context in the questionnaire. Hungarian public opinion became more understanding to Israel; the flow of migrants rather led the dislike of many towards the Arab countries. It might seem a contradiction first that even the strongly anti-Semitic respondents were emphatic towards the Jewish state, but if we note that these are the respondents who are the most rejecting of migrants and Arabs in general, this relation is easier to understand. One of the main questions of the research is to point out social groups and their motivation that are responsive to anti-Semitism. The answer of the analysis is that there is only marginal dependence between anti-Semitism and affinity of members of a social group. There is no relationship between the spread of anti-Semitism and type of work, settlement and religion. Those who have a university diploma, who have the highest income, women, the youngest and the eldest age groups members are less likely to be categorized as anti-Semitic but differences are very small. We can say that the voters of Jobbik and those who identify themselves as rather radical and right-wing voters than moderate and left-wing voters share anti-Semitic views in a bigger proportion, but even these factors give only partial explanation for anti-Semitism. According to the comparative analysis, euro-skepticism, law-and-order, authoritarian attitudes and the rejection of the different forms of otherness (homosexuality, drug consumption, and immigration) rather increase the probability of anti-Semitism. These questions of attitudes, together with xenophobia, are the strongest factors for explaining anti-Semitism. The remembrance of the Shoah deeply divides the Hungarian society. A little less than half of the respondents says that it should be kept on the agenda and slightly more than the other half says we should move on. In this question, the support of statements backing up the open denial and relativizing of the Holocaust increased from 7 14% of 2006 to 8 22% in 2017. The anti-Semitism

of Jobbik's voters moderately diminished from 2014 to 2015 but it remained permanent in 2016 and 2017. The populist strategy was not really successful; the majority of respondents find this party anti-Semitic. Only few people reported some kind of improvement, and the same number of people noticed increasing anti-Semitism. At the same time, we have to add that free associations in relation to Jews showed only minor to moderate differences in cases of Jobbik and non-Jobbik voters.

When respondents heard the word "Jew", they mainly associated it with three things: religion, nation, country (descriptive, neutral mentions). Many of them thought about the Holocaust and persecution, money, influence and power. It is hard to tell whether this latter association stems from respect or jealousy which is often the motivation of anti-Semitism. At the same time, very negative, degrading mentions (greedy, eager for power, ignoring others) only came up in the case of 14% of respondents and every tenths respondent gave positive mentions too (educated, cohesive, intelligent). Although, the frequency of negative mentions increased slightly, the frequency of positive thoughts increased to similar extent, furthermore the ratio of those who insisted on the idea of similarity of characteristics of all people, regardless of their origin. The ratio was similar when we asked people about Israel; the majority of them had neutral associations. This proves again that there is only a small part of voters, which have a specific conception in mind in relation to Jews whether it is positive or negative. The balance between the positive and negative mentions did not change. In total, the overall picture did not become more negative in this dimension. This is our main argument not to panic about this tendency: the spontaneous thoughts of respondents were negative only to minor extent and they were not less favorable in relation to Israel and Jews than one year earlier. At the same time, this year, we introduced a new question in our questionnaire that drew our attention to a negative phenomenon in relation to the overall judgment of

Hungarian Jews: the link between György Soros and the Jews. For the first time in the history of this questionnaire, there were respondents who directly associated to Soros when hearing Jews and the other way around (spontaneously, without offering answer options). Although, they ratio is only 2%, there were much more respondents who indirectly linked Soros to Jews. One third-fifth of respondents associated to money, capital, power, enrichment, influence rather in a negative than positive context. Every tenth respondent consequently mentioned similar associations to both questions at the same time. The third worrying factor is that the judgment of Soros was not independent from the anti-Semitic approach. The anti-Semitic respondents, categorized by other questions, mentioned negatives significantly more frequently and positives less frequently than non anti-Semitic respondents. One of our main learnings is that the judgment of the American-Hungarian billionaire relies on other factors too. Among all factors, the anti-Semitic attitude is far not the most important one. We suppose, due to the government's campaign, the activity of Soros is rejected by the great majority of society, not only by the anti-Semitic voters.

Finally, international comparison shows that the level of anti-Semitism in Hungary is higher than in Western Europe but not remarkably different from Central-Eastern European countries. The situation of Hungarian Jews is more favorable here than in Western Europe, where they have to face physical atrocities too.

ANNEX

The entire logistic regression model

	Model	Beta	Standard error	Significance level	Exponential Beta (Odds ratio)
Budapest inhabitant	2	0,321	0,352	0,362	1,378
Having university diploma	2	-0,681	0,382	0,074	0,506
Lower income group	2	0,465	0,316	0,142	1,592
Upper income group	2	-0,186	0,288	0,519	0,83
Doesn't attend church regularly	2	0,004	0,284	0,989	1,004
Below 40 years of age	2	0,202	0,262	0,439	1,224
Attended only elementary group	2	-0,417	0,32	0,192	0,659
Man	2	-0,336	0,252	0,182	0,715
Certain voter	3	0,083	0,265	0,755	1,086
Jobbik voter	3	0,563	0,382	0,141	1,755
Self identification: conservative	3	0,053	0,25	0,831	1,055
Self identification: right wing	3	0,444	0,265	0,094	1,558
Self identification: radical	3	0,624	0,291	0,032	1,866
Would accept an Arab neighbor	4	0,289	0,388	0,457	1,335
Would accept an American neighbor	4	-0,901	0,341	0,008	0,406
Would accept a Roma neighbor	4	0,371	0,373	0,32	1,45
Would accept a Chinese neighbor	4	0,121	0,33	0,715	1,128
Would accept a homosexual neighbor	4	-0,176	0,343	0,606	0,838
Would accept a Hungarian neighbor coming from Transylvania	4	-0,707	0,37	0,056	0,493
Would accept a skinhead neighbor	4	0,166	0,39	0,671	1,18
Would accept a black neighbor	4	-0,467	0,311	0,133	0,627
Would accept a Romanian neighbor	4	-0,641	0,34	0,059	0,527
Would accept a Swabian neighbor	4	-0,638	0,503	0,205	0,528
Would accept a migrant neighbor	4	0,289	0,388	0,457	1,335
Would make abortion process more severe	5	0,619	0,311	0,046	1,857
Would make immigration process more severe	5	0,137	0,36	0,705	1,146
Rather religious	5	0,657	0,287	0,022	1,93
Would support death penalty	5	0,239	0,277	0,388	1,27
Find homosexuality immoral	5	0,871	0,267	0,001	2,389
Would sentence severely those who consume drugs	5	0,191	0,304	0,53	1,21
Would limit the number of people of color living in this country	5	1,497	0,341	0	4,466

	Model	Beta	Standard error	Significance level	Exponential Beta (Odds ratio)
Politicians, even if they often make mistakes, want the best for the people	5	0,63	0,296	0,033	1,877
One can only become rich in this country by acting dishonestly	5	0,15	0,29	0,604	1,162
We should stand up more strongly for the Hungarian minorities living in the surrounding countries	5	0,007	0,279	0,98	1,007
The people, if they really want it, have the opportunity to influence the fate of this country	5	-0,563	0,272	0,038	0,569
Nowadays, not even Courts would do justice to the people	5	-0,214	0,275	0,436	0,807
The defense of our national values is more important than the EU membership	5	0,294	0,286	0,305	1,341
There are only few who can trust the future	5	0,212	0,276	0,443	1,236
In important questions, those should be the decision makers who have strong nationalist values	5	0,006	0,264	0,981	1,006
The leaders of this country do not really care about people like you.	5	0,145	0,297	0,625	1,156
Religion should be compulsory at schools	5	0,111	0,283	0,693	1,118
Nowadays everything and everyone can be bought	5	0,055	0,292	0,851	1,056
It is today's moral obligation to take a position openly against the decision of the Treaty of Trianon	5	0,786	0,293	0,007	2,195
Something negative comes to his/her mind when mentioning Israel	6	3,141	0,887	0	23,129
Something negative comes to his/her mind when mentioning Jews	6	2,182	0,504	0	8,864
Something negative comes to his/her mind when mentioning Soros	6	-0,163	0,254	0,521	0,85
Has Jewish acquaintance	7	-0,719	0,354	0,042	0,487
Constant		-4,523	1,492	0,002	0,011

Note: outcome variable: complex indicator for anti-Semitism (cognitive and affective anti-Semitism, see chart 5). Significant variants of 95% are in bold. The number in the model column refers to the category of partial model of the variant (2: demography; 3: preference of political party and self-identification; 4: xenophobia against other ethnicities; 5: law-and-order, nationalism, authority, the rejection of breaking rules; 6: judgment of actual events). The odds ratio expresses how the explanatory variant increases the probability of anti-Semitism. For instance, if someone would limit the number of people of color living in this country, based on his answers, he or she will fall into the anti-Semitic group with a 4.46 higher probability than someone who would not. A person who would accept a Romanian neighbor would fall into the anti-Semitic group with only 0.527% probability (meaning roughly 50%), so it is more likely that he or she will not end up there. According to the multi-variable analysis, the agreement with the limitation of the number of people of color and the associations to the negative characteristics of Jews are the factors that increase most intensively the probability of becoming a member of an anti-Semitic group.

CONTACT AND SUPPORT

Action and Protection Foundation is the civil initiative of a number of Jewish organizations that is ready to take resolute steps to curb increasing widespread anti-Semitic manifestations.

In case anyone faces insults or anti-Semitic abuse due to a supposed or real Jewish background, do not remain silent, let us know, so that we can forward the case through the appropriate channels to the official organs required to take measures!

Notifications of such incidents are received by the Foundation through any of the following means:

HOTLINE (+36 I) 5 I 00 000

The website of Action and Protection Foundation: www.tev.hu/forrodrot
The Facebook page: www.facebook.com/tev-tett-es-vedelem-alapitvany

Action and Protection Foundation's undertaking can only be successful if great numbers share in our commitment to prepare the grounds for the right to fair process for all those who have suffered offenses. In aid of this cause please support the work of the Foundation with your contribution! Donations can be made to the Foundation on the following bank account:

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