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LEFT, RIGHT, AND ANTISEMITISM IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION

Abstract

Antisemitism has long been found on both the political far-right and far-left. The recent rise in antisemitism worldwide raises the question of whether current antisemitism is found more with the far-right or far-left, the former a function of right-wing populism and the latter with what has been termed the new antisemitism. This paper uses data from the 2014 round of the European Social Survey in 20 nations to test for the connection between ideological self-placement and antisemitic attitudes in mass publics. Analysis finds greater levels of antisemitism with the extreme far-right compared to the far-left, but extreme leftists appear slightly more antisemitic than moderate leftist. Further, there is less antisemitism than anti-Muslim and anti-Roma (Gypsy) attitudes at all positions on the left-right continuum. The conclusion puts the findings into context and suggests directions for future research.

Keywords: antisemitism, European public opinion, prejudice, political left-right continuum, anti-immigrant attitudes

Historically both the political far-right and far-left have had strong strains of antisemitism. On the right, especially in Europe, antisemitism grew out of Christian teachings and an ideology of racial supremacy, among other factors.² Leftist antisemitism can be traced to Karl Marx's "On the Jewish Question" (1843), where Marx tied Judaism to capitalism and bourgeois society.³ This paper asks

- 1 Jeffrey E. Cohen received his PhD in Political Science from University of Michigan. He is teaching at Fordham University since 1997. His research interests are American politics and policy making. He published extensively in major Political Science journals, including *American Political Science Review*, *American Journal of Political Science* and *Journal of Politics*. Currently he is the editor of the "Polls" for *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. E-mail: cohen@fordham.edu
- 2 Hannah Arendt, *Antisemitism: Part one of the origins of totalitarianism*, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, New York, 2012 [1958]; Walter Laqueur, *The changing face of anti-Semitism: From ancient times to the present day*, Oxford University Press, 2006; and Ruth Wodak, "The Radical Right and Antisemitism," in: *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, edited by Jens Rydgren, New York, Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 61-85.
- 3 Whether Marx was antisemitic is fiercely debated. Hyam Maccoby, *Antisemitism and modernity: innovation and continuity*, Psychology Press, 2006; Bernard Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites: an inquiry into conflict and prejudice*, WW Norton & Company, 1999; and Edward H. Flannery, *The anguish of the Jews: Twenty-three centuries of antisemitism*, Paulist Press, 1985 consider Marx to be antisemitic. Others do not, e. g., Wendy Brown, "Rights and Identity in Late Modernity: Revisiting the Jewish Question," in: *Identities, Politics, and Rights*, edited by Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns, pp. 85-130. Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1995; Iain Hampsher-Monk, *A History of Modern Political Thought: major political thinkers from Hobbes to Marx*, Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 1992; and Jonathan Sacks, *The politics of hope*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1997, Francis Wheen, *Karl Marx: a life* WW Norton Company, New York, 2001. The point here is that some on the left, for a variety of reasons, have at times adopted anti-Jewish attitudes.

the question, in public opinion today, are antisemitic attitudes found more on the political left or right?

After years of hope and optimism about falling antisemitism rates and broad acceptance of Jews in many societies,⁴ antisemitism seems on the rise again.⁵ The Anti-Defamation League reports an increase in antisemitic incidents in the U. S. starting in the mid-2010s. Where the number of incidents had fallen to 751 in 2013, the ADL tallied 1986 in 2017, more than a 2.5-fold increase.⁶ On college campuses the number of antisemitic incidents in the 2000s climbed, along with rising antisemitic attitudes among non-Jewish college students, at least in the U. S. and the U.K.⁷ The Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry at Tel Aviv University, which monitors worldwide antisemitic incidents found much higher rates in the 2000s compared to the last decade of the twentieth century.⁸

Is the recent resurgence of antisemitism associated more with the political far-right or far-left? Some point to revitalized right-wing political and populist movements, especially in Europe and the United States, as a major factor explaining the recent rise in antisemitism.⁹ While not denying right-wing antisemitism, others contend the recent rise comes more from the far-left, an ele-

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- 4 The foremost historian of antisemitism in the U. S. concludes, "antisemitism is too minor an issue to disturb the daily lives of American Jews (p. 565)." Leonard Dinnerstein, *Antisemitism in America: An Update, 1995-2012*, *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism*, Vol. 4 No. 2, 2012, pp. 557-565. Uzi Rebhun, *Correlates of experiences and perceptions of anti-semitism among Jews in the United States*, *Social Science Research*, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2014, pp. 44-60 concurs: "Anti-Semitism in the U.S. is not a strong social and political factor today." (p. 45, ft. 1). Similarly, one observer argues in Britain "Jews constitute a religious and ethnic group that is seen overwhelmingly positively by a majority of the British population, Daniel J. Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain: Key findings from the JPR survey of attitudes towards Jews and Israel*, Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 2017, http://www.jpr.org.uk/documents/JPR..Antisemitism_in_contemporary_Great_Britain.pdf, p. 5).
- 5 Alvin H. Rosenfeld, ed, *Resurgent antisemitism: Global perspectives*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 2013.
- 6 ADL, *Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents*, Anti-Defamation League, 2017, https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/2017/06/Audit20Print_vf2.pdf.
- 7 For the U. S. see Annette Koren, Leonard Saxe and Eric Fleisch, "Jewish life on campus: From backwater to battleground," in *American Jewish Year Book 2015*, 45-88, Springer, 2016; Barry A. Kosmin and Ariela Keysar, *National demographic survey of American Jewish college students 2014: Anti-Semitism report*, Trinity College, 2015, <https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1133&context=facpub>; Leonard Saxe, Theodore Sasson, Graham Wright et al, *Antisemitism on the college campus: Perceptions and realities*, Translator trans. Edited by Editor, *Series Antisemitism on the college campus: Perceptions and realities*, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, 2015; Leonard Saxe, Graham Wright, Shahar Hecht et al, *Hotspots of Antisemitism and Anti-Israel Sentiment on US Campuses*, Brandeis University, 2016, <http://bir.brandeis.edu/handle/10192/33070>; Graham Wright, Michelle Shain, Shahar Hecht et al, *The Limits of Hostility: Students Report on Antisemitism and anti-Israel sentiment at Four US Universities*, Translator trans. Edited by Editor, *Series The Limits of Hostility: Students Report on Antisemitism and anti-Israel sentiment at Four US Universities*, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, 2017; but see Matthew J. Mayhew, Nicholas A. Bowman, Alyssa N. Rockenbach et al, *Appreciative Attitudes Toward Jews Among Non-Jewish US College Students*, *Journal of College Student Development*, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2018, pp. 71-89, and for the UK, Lesley Klaff, *Anti-Zionist Expression on the UK Campus: Free Speech or Hate Speech?*, *Jewish Political Studies Review*, Vol. 22, No. 3-4, 2010, pp. 87-109.
- 8 Kantor_Center, accessed May 13, 2018. http://kantorcenter.tau.ac.il/sites/default/files/Doch_full_2018_220418.pdf
- 9 Werner Bergmann, *Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 64, No. 2, 2008, pp. 343-362; *ibid.*; William D. Rubinstein, *The left, the right and the Jews*, Routledge, New York, 2015; Robert S. Wistrich, *The Anti-Zionist Mythology of the Left*, *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 2 2015, pp. 189-199; Ruth Wodak and Michał Krzyżanowski, *Right-wing populism in Europe & USA: Contesting politics & discourse beyond 'Orbanism' and 'Trumpism'*, *Journal of Language and Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2017, pp. 471-484.

ment of new antisemitism theory.¹⁰ New antisemitism theory argues that many people harbor an antipathy toward Israel which is generalized into negative attitudes to Jews in general, and such attitudes are found on the far-left and among Muslims.¹¹

Most research on far-right and far-left antisemitism focuses on elites, their writings and behaviors, with comparatively little such research on mass publics. One extensive review of the literature, by Kressel and Kressel, could locate only nine studies of antisemitism of the left (p. 212), with the authors concluding that “our understanding could benefit from empirical studies exploring interrelationships among antisemitic, antizionist, racist, anti-Arab, anti-Muslim, religious, left-ist, rightist, authoritarian, and other mind-sets.” (p. 115).¹²

This paper fills in the gap of left/right antisemitism in public opinion, using the 2014 European Social Survey (ESS), with data across 20 nations. The 2014 ESS provides a unique opportunity to study antisemitic attitudes in a large number of nations at the individual level, something that is rarely done. Two recent cross-national studies perform aggregate, cross-national comparisons because they rely on ADL data, which has not yet made its individual level data publicly available.¹³

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- 10 Philip Mendes, “Anti-Semitism and support for Jewish rights: an analysis of socialist attitudes to the Jews”, in: *Jews and the Left*, London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2014; Alvin H. Rosenfeld, ed, *Deciphering the new antisemitism*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 2015; Rubinstein, *The left, the right and the Jews*; Wistrich, “The Anti-Zionist Mythology of the Left”.
- 11 Steven K. Baum and Masato Nakazawa, Anti-Semitism versus Anti-Israeli Sentiment, *Journal of Religion & Society*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2007, pp. 1-8; Peter Beattie, Anti-Semitism and opposition to Israeli government policies: the roles of prejudice and information, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 40 No. 15, 2017, pp. 2749-2767; Danny Ben-Moshe, The New Anti-Semitism in Europe: The Islamic Dimension of, and Jewish Belonging in, the EU, *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2015, pp. 219-236; Monika Bobako, The Palestinian Knot: The ‘New Anti-Semitism’, Islamophobia and the Question of Postcolonial Europe, *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2017, pp. 99-120; Florette Cohen, Lee Jussim, Gautam Bhasin et al, The modern antisemitism israel model an empirical relationship between modern antisemitism and opposition to Israel, *Conflict communication*, Vol. 10 No. 1, 2011, pp. 1-16; Leonard Dinnerstein, Is there a new anti-semitism in the United States?, *Society*, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2004, pp. 53-58; Manfred Gerstenfeld, Anti-Israelism and Anti-Semitism: Common Characteristics and Motifs, *Jewish Political Studies Review*, Vol. 19, No. 1/2, 2007, pp. 83-108; Rusi Jaspal, *Anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism: representation, cognition and everyday talk*, Routledge, New York, 2016; Edward H. Kaplan and Charles A. Small, Anti-Israel Sentiment Predicts Anti-Semitism in Europe, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2006, pp. 548-561; Wilhelm Kempf, Anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel : Methodology and results of the ASCI survey, *Conflict & Communication* Vol. 14, No. 1, 2015, pp. 1-20; Wilhelm Kempf, Anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel: A methodological challenge for peace research, *Journal for the study of antisemitism*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2012, pp. 515-532; Brian Klug, Interrogating ‘new anti-Semitism’, *Ethnic & Racial Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2013, pp. 468-482; Brian Klug, The collective Jew: Israel and the new antisemitism, *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2003, pp. 117-138; Mario Silva, *Antisemitism and the Global Jihad*, Translator trans. Edited by Editor, *Series Antisemitism and the Global Jihad*, Springer, 2017; Arno Tausch, The New Global Antisemitism: Implications from the 100 Data, *Middle east review of international affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 3 2014, pp. 46-72.
- 12 Neil J. Kressel, Samuel W. Kressel, Trends in the Psychological Study of Contemporary Antisemitism: Conceptual Issues and Empirical Evidence, *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2016, pp. 111-126.
- 13 Bergmann, “Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Europe: A Comparative Perspective,”; Tausch, “The New Global Antisemitism: Implications from the 100 Data,”; Tausch, “The Effects of ‘Nostra Aetate’: Comparative Analyses of Catholic Antisemitism More Than Five Decades after the Second Vatican Council,” 2018. Other cross-national survey data exist, such as the World Values Study (WVS), the European Values Survey (EVS), and the Pew Global Attitudes and Trends surveys, which contain single item antisemitism indicators. The WVS and EVS ask about the desirability of a Jewish neighbor (question A124_10). The only studies I could locate analyzing these data at the individual level are Lenka Bustikova and Petra Guasti, Hating Thy Imaginary Neighbor: An Analysis of Antisemitism in Slovakia, *Journal for the study of antisemitism*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2012, pp. 469-493 and Tausch, “The Effects of ‘Nostra

This study, with data for only one time point, cannot directly test whether the left or right accounts more for the recent increase in antisemitism. Still, the frequency of antisemitic attitudes on the far-right versus the far-left is relevant to new antisemitism theory and debates about the sources of recent antisemitism. Moreover, as the ESS asked a religious affiliation question, the analysis compares the attitudes of European Muslims and leftists, controlling for each other, a comparison also relevant for the new antisemitism theory.¹⁴ Finally, the analysis compares attitudes to Muslims and Roma (Gypsies), asking whether the same factors that affect attitudes towards Jews also predict attitudes to these non-Jewish minorities, an analysis that bears on the venerable question of the uniqueness of antisemitism as a form of prejudice.¹⁵ This study, by addressing the impact of political ideology on religious prejudice, also speaks to the emerging field, Politology of religion.¹⁶

Results find greater rates of antisemitism on the right than the left, although there appears a slight increase in antisemitism among the extreme far-left compared to the moderate left. These findings hold for a host of controls prior research also finds associated with antisemitic attitudes. Comparison of antisemitic to anti-Muslim and anti-Roma attitudes detects both similarities and differences, but notably, rates of antisemitic attitudes are much lower than negative attitudes for Muslims and Roma on average and at each left-right position. Finally, Muslims are more likely to hold antisemitic attitudes than non-Muslims.

The paper is organized thusly. The next section reviews the research that links the far-right and far-left with antisemitism, especially in public opinion. Then the data from the ESS are introduced, followed by the data analysis. The conclusion puts the findings into perspective and suggests directions for future research.

Left, Right, and Antisemitism

Into the middle of the twentieth century, a plurality, and at times a majority, of individuals in Europe and the U. S. held antisemitic attitudes.¹⁷ Histori-

Aetate: "Comparative Analyses of Catholic Antisemitism More Than Five Decades after the Second Vatican Council," using the WVS and/or EVS. EVS, which covers most European nations would be a useful database except it does not include an ideology variable. Andreas Zick, Beate Küpper and Andreas Hövermann, *Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination-A European Report*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Forum Berlin, Berlin, 2011 report on findings of a survey across eight European nations in 2008 (France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal), but they combine antisemitic items with prejudice targeted at other groups (immigrants, other races, Muslim, women, and homosexuals) to analyze general prejudice, not antisemitism in particular. They do find high correlations between antisemitic orientations and prejudice to other groups.

14 Muslim attitudes and behaviors towards Jews are often cited as a major source of the rise of antisemitism but is it not clear that Muslims align with the political left. Thus, it is important to distinguish Muslim from leftist sources of antisemitism.

15 Bernard Lewis, *The new anti-semitism*, *The American Scholar*, Vol. 75, No. 1, 2006, pp. 25-36; Robert S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism: The longest hatred*, Schocken, New York, 1994.

16 Mirosljub Jevtić, *Political Science and Religion*, *Politics and Religion Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2007, pp. 59-69.

17 Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson et al, *The authoritarian personality*, Harper & Brothers, New York,

cally, there has been a strong association between the far-right (e. g, fascism, Nazism, right-wing populism) and antisemitism. Even when antisemitism was widespread in mass publics, there appeared to be an association between the far-right and antisemitism.¹⁸ More recent survey research also finds a correlation between right-wing political orientations and antisemitic attitudes.¹⁹

Several individual-level mechanisms have been identified to link the far-right with antisemitism, including authoritarian personality,²⁰ other personality attributes, such as anomie, alienation, dogmatism, misanthropy, victimhood, and low self-esteem;²¹ traditionalism;²² Christian religiosity;²³ economic

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- 1950; Samuel H. Flowerman, Marie Jahoda, The study of man—polls on anti-Semitism. How much do they tell us, *Commentary*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1946, pp. 82-86; Susan Welch, American opinion toward Jews during the Nazi era: results from quota sample polling during the 1930s and 1940s, *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 95 No. 3, 2014, pp. 615-635.
- 18 Milton Ellerin, Rightist Extremism, *The American Jewish Year Book*, 1966, pp. 151-163; Harrison G. Gough, Studies of social intolerance: II. A personality scale for anti-Semitism, *The Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1951b, pp. 247-255; Harrison G. Gough, Studies of social intolerance: I. Some psychological and sociological correlates of anti-Semitism, *The Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1951a, pp. 237-246; Dean Peabody, Attitude content and agreement set in scales of authoritarianism, dogmatism, anti-Semitism, and economic conservatism, *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 63, No. 1, 1961, pp. 1-11; Richard Thurlow, Authoritarians and populists on the English far right, *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1976, pp. 13-20.
- 19 Werner Bergmann, Rainer Erb, "Anti-Semitism in the late 1990s" in: *Germans or Foreigners? Attitudes Toward Ethnic Minorities in Post-Reunification Germany*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, pp. 163-186.
- 20 Adorno et al, *The authoritarian personality*; Edward Dunbar, The prejudiced personality, racism, and anti-Semitism: The PR scale forty years later, *Journal of Personality Assessment*, Vol. 65, No. 2, 1995, pp. 270-277; Edward Dunbar, Lucie Simonova, Individual difference and social status predictors of anti-Semitism and racism US and Czech findings with the prejudice/tolerance and right wing authoritarianism scales, *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, Vol. 27, No. 5, 2003, pp. 507-523; Péter Krekó, Back to the Roots: Are Antisemites Still Authoritarians?, *Journal for the study of antisemitism*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2012, pp. 495-514; David Raden, Is Anti-Semitism Currently Part of an Authoritarian Attitude Syndrome?, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1999, pp. 323-343.
- 21 Giorgos Antoniou, Elias Dinas, Spyros Kosmidis, *Collective Victimhood and Social Prejudice: A Post-Holocaust Theory of anti-Semitism*, Translator trans. Edited by Editor, *Series Collective Victimhood and Social Prejudice: A Post-Holocaust Theory of anti-Semitism*, 2015; Christian S. Crandall, Colby Cohen, The personality of the stigmatizer: Cultural world view, conventionalism, and self-esteem, *Journal of Research in Personality*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1994, pp. 461-480; John Duckitt, "Authoritarianism and dogmatism", in: *Handbook of individual differences in social behavior*, edited by Mark R. Leary and Rick H. Hoyle, New York, Guilford Press, 2009, pp. 298-317; Wolfgang Frindte, Susan Wettig, Dorit Wammetsberger, Old and New Anti-Semitic Attitudes in the Context of Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation—Two Studies in Germany, *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2005, p. 239; M. Brewster Smith, The Authoritarian Personality: A Re-Review 46 Years Later, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1997, pp. 159-163.
- 22 Frederick Weil, D, The variable effects of education on liberal attitudes: A comparative-historical analysis of anti-semitism using public opinion survey data, *American sociological review*, Vol. 50, No. 4, 1985, pp. 458-474; Mark Weitzman, "Every Sane Thinker Must Be an Anti-Semite: Antisemitism and Holocaust Denial in the Theology of Radical Catholic Traditionalists", in: *Antisemitism Before and Since the Holocaust*, edited by Anthony McElligott and Jeffrey Herf, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, pp. 83-113.
- 23 William Nicholls, *Christian antisemitism: A history of hate*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 1995; Kenneth I. Pargament, Kelly Trevino, Annette Mahoney et al, They Killed Our Lord: The Perception of Jews as Desecrators of Christianity as a Predictor of Anti-Semitism, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2007, pp. 143-158; Tausch, "The Effects of 'Nostra Aetate': Comparative Analyses of Catholic Antisemitism More Than Five Decades after the Second Vatican Council."

factors;²⁴ and social/national identity.²⁵

Antisemitic sentiment on the far-right may have been weakening in recent years. Jews have receded as a threat to the far-right, replaced by Muslims as the primary object of far-right threat for several reasons. Muslims in Europe now greatly outnumber Jews and the Muslim population is growing.²⁶ The Pew Research Center estimates there are 25.8 million Muslims in European Union nations plus Norway and Switzerland, and excluding Turkey, but only 1.4 million Jews. The three largest western European nations, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, have much larger Muslims than Jewish populations.²⁷ Related, the Muslim population is increasing because of high birth rates and immigration, while the Jewish population has been declining, especially in Eastern Europe, Russia, and the former Soviet states, due especially to migration to Israel and the U. S. Further, many see Muslims as the major source of worldwide and European terrorism. Moreover, conservatives, the far-right, and Christian religious fundamentalists have grown increasingly warm to Israel, viewing Israel as more likely to protect Christian Holy sites, and allow Christians to visit those sites, than if those sites were controlled by Muslim regimes.

Like the right, the left has often espoused antisemitic ideas. It is hard to do justice to the variety of political thinking on the left, but for purposes here, the left can be categorized roughly into two sets, an older, traditional form of leftism, and a newer leftism, the new left, which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.²⁸ Although the older and newer left share many ideas, there are important differences as well. The antisemitism of the older left arose from its association of Jews with bourgeois capitalism on the one hand, and Judaism, like all religions, as an impediment to progress towards socialism. Antisemitism of the new left developed from the merging of several notions, including anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism, and viewing Israel and Zionism as a form of Western imperialism.²⁹ This complex of ideas also generalized onto Jews worldwide, linking opposition and criticism of Israel with negative attitudes towards all Jews, the

24 Michal Bilewicz, Ireneusz Krzeminski, Anti-Semitism in Poland and Ukraine: The belief in Jewish control as a mechanism of scapegoating, *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2010, pp. 235-243; Michał Bilewicz, Mikołaj Winiewski, Zuzanna Radzik, Antisemitism in Poland: Economic, Religious, and Historical Aspects, *Journal for the study of antisemitism*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2012, pp. 2801-2820; James L. Gibson, Marc Morjé Howard, Russian anti-Semitism and the scapegoating of Jews, *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2007, pp. 193-223

25 Bergmann and Erb, "Anti-Semitism in the late 1990s".

26 In many European countries, the Jewish population is now tiny, especially compared to pre-World War Two, yet strong strains of antisemitism are still evident, even when Muslim populations are also miniscule, leading the paradox of antisemitism without Jews (Leo Cooper, *In the Shadow of the Polish Eagle: The Poles, the Holocaust and Beyond*, Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2000).

27 Pew (Pew, *Europe's Growing Muslim Population*, Translator trans. Edited by Editor, *Series Europe's Growing Muslim Population*, Pew Research Center on Religion and Public Life, 2017) estimates 4.95 million Muslims in Germany, 5.72 million for France, and 4.13 million for the U. K.. DellaPergola estimates only around 100,000 Jews in Germany, 500,000 in France, and 300,00 in the U. K. Sergio DellaPergola, End of Jewish/non-Jewish dichotomy? evidence from the 2013 Pew survey, *American Jewish year book*, Vol. 114, No. 1, 2014, pp. 33-39.

28 Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and political theory: A conceptual approach*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996.

29 Willie Thompson, *The Left In History: Revolution and Reform in Twentieth-Century Politics*, Pluto Press, Chicago, IL, 1996.

new antisemitism.³⁰ The growing popularity of both the new left and new antisemitism may have laid the foundation for the increase in worldwide antisemitic incidents, and by implication, increased levels of antisemitic opinion in public opinion.³¹

The antisemitic ideas of the far-right and far-left are various and contentious within each political pole. Average individuals also are unlikely to be able to distinguish the debates and survey questions too may have a difficult time differentiating these different ideas. Thus, the research here will not be able to sort through the different strands of far-right and far-left antisemitism, which may not be a highly relevant question for public opinion research anyway. Still, this research can ask and assess whether antisemitism falls more on the right or left.

Data

This study uses 2014 round of the European Social Survey³² to test for the relationship between ideological position and antisemitic attitudes. The analysis includes 20 nations from the ESS, making this one of the larger cross-national comparisons of antisemitism using individual-level data.³³ Included nations come from all regions in Europe, and importantly six former communist states of eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia). There is some concern about high levels of antisemitism in the former communist nations, especially compared to Europe in general.³⁴ Table 1 lists the surveyed nations and sample sizes. There are 37,585 respondents (weighted), with n's ranging from about 1,200-3,000 per nation, and a mean of 1,879.

30 Lewis, "The new anti-semitism,"

31 For a review of such perspectives see Jonathan Judaken, So what's new? Rethinking the 'new antisemitism' in a global age, *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 42, No. 4-5, 2008, pp. 531-560.

32 The data are available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>.

33 Only Israel from the 2014 ESS is excluded.

34 Florin Lobont, "Antisemitism and Holocaust Denial in Post-Communist Eastern Europe", in: *The Historiography of the Holocaust*, edited by Dan Stone, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 440-468.

Table 1. Support for Jewish Immigration in Twenty European Nations, 2014

Country	n	Mean	Std. Dev.
Austria	1,794	3.36	1.34
Belgium	1,768	3.36	1.27
Switzerland	1,528	3.60	1.15
Czech Republic	2,146	2.84	1.31
Germany	3,040	4.17	1.03
Denmark	1,501	3.83	1.11
Estonia	2,051	3.35	1.29
Spain	1,925	3.15	1.31
Finland	2,086	3.26	1.28
France	1,906	3.61	1.15
Great Britain	2,264	3.57	1.21
Hungary	1,697	2.33	1.26
Ireland	2,386	3.20	1.31
Lithuania	2,248	3.07	1.37
Netherlands	1,918	3.57	1.18
Norway	1,436	3.86	1.07
Poland	1,615	3.10	1.32
Portugal	1,265	2.76	1.39
Sweden	1,788	4.27	0.88
Slovenia	1,223	3.16	1.29
All	37,585	3.53	1.28

Source: 2014 European Social Survey. Means and standard deviation are weighted.

Dependent Variable: Support for Jewish Immigration

Research on antisemitism in the mass public has not coalesced around particular survey instruments.³⁵ Studies have utilized numerous and differing survey questions, making comparison concerning the level of mass public antisemitism and factors contributing to antisemitic attitudes difficult. Existing research uses several approaches to measuring antisemitism in the mass public, 1) scales built upon several items, 2) single questions posed to respondents. The most visible current scale is the ADL's, used in its recent report on antisemitic attitudes worldwide.³⁶ Earlier research on antisemitism also developed multiple item

35 Ivar Krumpal, "Estimating the prevalence of xenophobia and anti-Semitism in Germany: A comparison of randomized response and direct questioning." *Social science research* Vol. 41, No. 6, 2012, 1387-1403

36 ADL, accessed May 13, 2018. <http://global100.adl.org/>. Also Jay Greene, P. and Ian Kingsbury, "The relationship between public and

scales.³⁷ There are two types of single questions employed, general questions, such as Pew's favorability question or the ANES feeling thermometer, and more specific questions, such as the WVS/EVS willingness to have a Jewish neighbor.

Generally, scales composed of several items are preferred over single item approaches to measuring attitudes in surveys,³⁸ but the ESS offers only one relevant question: "I am going to ask you about different groups of people who might come to live in [country] from other countries. Using this card, please tell me to what extent you think [country] should allow Jewish people from other countries to come and live in [country]?" Responses categories are: 1) Allow many to come and live here, 2) Allow some, 3) Allow a few, 4) Allow none, and 5) Don't Know. For the analysis, this variable is recoded: Many = 5, Some = 4, Don't Know = 3, Few = 2, and None = 1. Don't Know responses are retained to preserve cases for analysis, although only about 4% of respondents answered Don't Know.

To my knowledge, the ESS question has not been used previously. The value of the question is that it refers to immigration, currently a heated issue in many European nations. Further, the ESS asks the same question for Muslims and Roma (Gypsies), which are used for comparative purposes later in this paper. That the ESS also asks about Muslims and Roma means that attitudes toward Jews are not singled out, perhaps reducing the likelihood of social desirability response bias. Moreover, Jews have not been a focus of recent immigration debates, which may also reduce social desirability response bias. Yet, the ESS question does not tap into traditional antisemitic stereotypes, which may limit it for comparability purposes, and the ESS does not ask Israel, which limits investigation regarding the new antisemitism.³⁹

Europeans appear somewhat positively disposed toward allowing Jewish immigration, with a grand (weighted) mean of 3.53 on the five-point metric. About 67% support allowing many or some Jews to immigrate to Europe, compared to

private schooling and antisemitism." *Journal of school choice* Vol. 11 No. 1, 2017, 111-130 who critique and modify the ADL scale.

37 Gough, "Studies of social intolerance: II. A personality scale for anti-Semitism"; Daniel J. Levinson, R Nevitt Sanford, A scale for the measurement of anti-Semitism, *The journal of psychology*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1944, pp. 339-370; Dunbar, "The prejudiced personality, racism, and anti-Semitism: The PR scale forty years later"; Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain: Key findings from the JPR survey of attitudes towards Jews and Israel*.

38 Adamantios Diamantopoulos, Marko Sarstedt, Christoph Fuchs et al, Guidelines for choosing between multi-item and single-item scales for construct measurement: a predictive validity perspective, *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2012, pp. 434-449.


39 Caution is required in using the ESS item. As Gibson and Howard, "Russian anti-Semitism and the scapegoating of Jews," p. 201 argue regarding measuring antisemitism in their study of Russia: "one must always be cautious in using surveys to derive point estimates of public opinion on any given issue. If we asked people to respond to a statement like 'Jews have some undesirable qualities', the answer would most likely be that anti-Jewish sentiment is extremely widespread; but were we to put a statement like 'All Jews ought to be forced to leave Russia immediately' to a sample of Russians, we would likely conclude that anti-Jewish feelings are not very common. The point is simply that the wording of questions – the strength of the stimulus offered to respondents – has, not surprisingly, a great deal to do with the responses given." Krumpal argues that it can be difficult to elicit true and reliable responses to sensitive questions, like those designed to tap antisemitism, Krumpal, "Estimating the prevalence of xenophobia and anti-Semitism in Germany: A comparison of randomized response and direct questioning."

about 29% who want to limit Jewish immigration to a few or none. Support for Jewish immigration also varies by country. Germany and Sweden top the list in support for Jewish immigration, with mean values above 4. Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Portugal provide the least support, with means of 2.3-2.8. Supporting the contention that antisemitism is higher in the former communist nations than the rest of Europe, average national level support for Jewish immigration is 2.98 across the six former communist nations, but 3.54 for the other 14 nations.⁴⁰

Independent Variable: Ideological Self-Placement

The primary independent variable asks respondents to locate themselves on a left-right continuum: "In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?" Overall, Europeans appear moderate. With "Don't Knows" included at the midpoint (6 on the 11-point scale), 39% of Europeans select the middle category (29% without the Don't Knows). About equal percentages, 30-31%, place to the left and right. Figure 1 presents a histogram of placement in the left-right scale. In terms of ideological self-placement, several countries tilt toward the right (Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Norway, Poland), with several others tilting left (Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Spain). Even these countries hover, on average, close to the center.

Figure 1: Ideological Self-Placement, 20 European Countries



Source: 2014 European Social Survey

⁴⁰ The difference at the national level is statistically significant, $p < 0.01$.

Caution is called for in using ideological self-placement. There is some concern that people do not understand the concept of the left-right dimension correctly.⁴¹ Yet considerable research finds ideological self-placement predictive of political attitudes and behaviors.⁴²

Analysis

This paper's primary question asks whether political ideology is associated with attitudes toward Jews, hypothesizing that those on the political extremes should be more negative toward Jews than those nearer the center. Table 2 presents a stripped-down estimation, including only left-right placement, to predict support for Jewish immigration. Analysis uses a multilevel regression to account for country-specific factors. For the ideological variable, the middle category serves as the baseline. Each coefficient can be read as the difference between the category and the baseline. Figure 2 presents a histogram of average support for Jewish immigration by ideological self-placement.

41 Paul C. Bauer, Pablo Barberá, Kathrin Ackermann et al, Is the Left-Right Scale a Valid Measure of Ideology?, *Political Behavior*, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2017, pp. 553-583.

42 Gian Vittorio Caprara, Michele Vecchione, Shalom H. Schwartz et al, Basic values, ideological self-placement, and voting: A cross-cultural study, *Cross-Cultural Research*, Vol. 51, No. 4, 2017, pp. 388-411; Cees van der Eijk, Hermann Schmitt, Tanja Binder, "The Left-Right Dimension", in: *The European Voter*, edited by Jacques Thomassen, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 167-191; John D. Huber, Values and partisanship in left-right orientations: Measuring ideology, *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 17, No. 5, 1989, pp. 599-621; Christophe Lesschaeve, The predictive power of the left-right self-placement scale for the policy positions of voters and parties, *West European Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2017, pp. 357-377; Yuval Piorko, Shalom H. Schwartz, Eldad Davidov, Basic personal values and the meaning of left-right political orientations in 20 countries, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2011, pp. 537-561.

Table 2. Impact of Ideological Self-Placement on Support for Jewish, Muslim and Roma Immigration in 20 European Nation, 2014 European Social Survey


VARIABLES	Jewish	Jewish	Muslim	Roma
Left-Right Self-Placement				
0 Left	0.20*	0.13*	0.11	0.25**
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
1	0.33***	0.19**	0.25***	0.38***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)
2	0.40***	0.19***	0.22***	0.36***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
3	0.34***	0.14***	0.17***	0.27***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
4	0.27***	0.12***	0.16***	0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
6	0.12***	0.03	0.02	-0.07**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
7	0.08*	0.03	-0.09*	-0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
8	0.03	0.02	-0.21***	-0.31***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.07)
9	-0.16	-0.08	-0.36***	-0.39***
	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.11)
10 Right	-0.32***	-0.15**	-0.32***	-0.24***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Controls				
Muslim		-0.23	0.50***	0.06
		(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Immigrants Good		0.18***	0.24***	0.23***
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		0.08***	0.08***	0.08***
		(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age		-0.00	-0.00*	-0.00*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender		-0.03	-0.04*	-0.03
		(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economic Satisfaction		0.02*	0.01***	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Happiness		0.01**	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Health		-0.03*	-0.06***	-0.05***
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Religiosity		0.01	-0.01	-0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)

Discriminated Group		-0.01 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.06)
Citizen		-0.23*** (0.06)	-0.33*** (0.07)	-0.20** (0.06)
Different Friends		-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.02)	-0.17*** (0.02)
Var(Constant)	-0.82*** (0.17)	-1.11*** (0.17)	-0.92*** (0.13)	-0.97*** (0.15)
Var(Residual)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.01)
Constant	3.29*** (0.10)	2.58*** (0.11)	2.17*** (0.13)	1.81*** (0.15)
Observations	34,616	34,616	34,616	34,616
Number of groups	20	20	20	20
df_m	10	19	19	19
Log likelihood	-50594	-47616	-48382	-50394

Multilevel model, Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Figure 2. Impact of Ideological Self-Placement on Support for Immigration for Jews, Muslims, and Roma



Source: 2014 European Social Survey, see results from Table 2.

Ideological self-placement appears to affect support for Jewish immigration. As one moves from the center to the right, support levels fall. Support for Jewish immigration rises as one moves left, but the two far-left categories exhibits lower support than the moderate left-leaning categories. The regression coefficient indicates the center supports Jewish immigration at 3.29, between Don't Know and Allow Some. The moderate right shows increasing support, with a score of 3.4 for the group one-step to the right of center. Then support begins to fall with scores of 3.36, 3.32. The two most extreme right self-placements exhibit lower scores than the center, at 3.14 and 2.97, what differ significantly from the center's.⁴³

In contrast, as one moves left, support for Jewish immigration rises, but the effect is curvilinear. The moderate left demonstrates the strongest support. And while support of the far-left is still high, it is lower than that of the moderate left, providing a hint or suggestion of the new antisemitism among some far-leftists. Moving from center to left, average support scores for Jewish immigration are:

43 The two most far-right also statistically differ, $\chi^2(1) = 3.91; p < 0.05$.

3.56, 3.63, 3.69, 3.62, and 3.49. Still, the extreme far-left is statistically significantly more supportive of Jewish immigration than the center. Those far-leftists are not significantly different from the nearest most left category but are significantly different in support than the category with the highest score. Thus, there is a significant drop off in support for Jewish immigration among the farthest leftists. Importantly, the far left is much more supportive of Jewish immigration than the far right. Traditional antisemitism, located at the far right, appears to still be the locus of antisemitism in Europe.

This finding is similar to Staetsky's concerning ideology and antisemitism in Great Britain.⁴⁴ He finds, like here, that far-right individuals are the most antisemitic, but does not detect any increased antisemitism on the extreme far-left. Instead, the far-left is hostile to Israel, not Jews, a finding that counters the new antisemitism perspective. But Staetsky also finds the far-right is hostile toward both Israel and Jews. Still, the results here and Staetsky's are based on a one-variable model. Do results hold up with controls for other variables past research finds associated with antisemitism?

A multivariate model of support for Jewish Immigration

Table 2, Model 2, presents results that include an array of control variables, based on finding of past research on factors that contribute to antisemitic attitudes. One purpose of this multivariate analysis is to test whether the relationship between ideological self-placement and antisemitism is spurious, as several of the controls may be correlated with ideology. The second is to develop a fuller understanding of the sources of antisemitism in European mass publics.

The first set of control variables consists of demographic factors: age, gender, education, religion (Muslim), and religiosity. The guiding hypotheses are that older individuals, those with less education, and the more religious are more inclined to hold antisemitic attitudes than younger, better education, and less religious persons. Oddly, while age is associated with racism,⁴⁵ at least in the U. S. older individuals appear less antisemitic than younger ones.⁴⁶ Research also reports a strong negative association between education and antisemitism.⁴⁷

44 Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain: Key findings from the JPR survey of attitudes towards Jews and Israel*.

45 Karen Gonsalkorale, Jeffrey W. Sherman, Karl Christoph Klauer, Aging and prejudice: Diminished regulation of automatic race bias among older adults, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2009, pp. 410-414; Thomas C. Wilson, Cohort and prejudice: whites' attitudes toward blacks, hispanics, jews, and asians, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 60, No. 2, 1996, pp. 253-274.

46 Gregory Martire, Ruth V. Clark, *Anti-Semitism in the United States: A study of prejudice in the 1980s*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1982; Harold Earl Quinley, Charles Young Glock, *Anti-Semitism in America*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 1979; Gertrude J. Selznick, Stephen Steinberg, *The tenacity of prejudice: Anti-Semitism in contemporary America*, Harper and Row, New York, 1969; Tom W. Smith, Anti-semitism in contemporary america: a review, *Research in micropolitics*, Vol. 5 No. 1, 1996, pp. 125-178; but see: Stewart J. D'Alessio, Lisa Stolzenberg, Anti-Semitism in America: The Dynamics of Prejudice, *Sociological Inquiry*, Vol. 61, No. 3, 1991, pp. 359-366.

47 Martire and Clark, *Anti-Semitism in the United States: A study of prejudice in the 1980s*; Selznick and Steinberg, *The tenacity of*

Gender is included because some research indicates women are less prejudiced than men,⁴⁸ although gender does not appear to affect antisemitism.⁴⁹

As antisemitism historically has strong religious roots, the model includes two variables to tap this dimension, religiosity and being a Muslim. The new antisemitism theory contends that Muslims are more likely to be antisemitic than non-Muslims. There is support for this hypothesis, at both the individual and aggregate level.⁵⁰ Further there is support that among Christians, in particular Catholics, religiosity is associated with anti-Semitic attitudes.⁵¹

A second set of variables refers to satisfaction with aspects of respondents' lives, such as economic, health, general happiness, and whether the respondent claims membership in a discriminated group. The scapegoat hypothesis argues that individuals may displace their personal grievances onto outgroups, blaming the outgroup for problems in their lives. Scapegoating has been a topic of antisemitism studies,⁵² and recent research reports linkages between health with voting behavior and political trust.⁵³

There is also an association between social distance and antisemitism.⁵⁴ In-

prejudice: Anti-Semitism in contemporary America; Smith, "Anti-semitism in contemporary america: a review"; Weil, "The variable effects of education on liberal attitudes: A comparative-historical analysis of anti-semitism using public opinion survey data"; Robert Wuthnow, "Anti-semitism and stereotyping", in: *In the eye of the beholder: Contemporary issues in stereotyping*, edited by Arthur G. Miller, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1982, pp. 128-143.

- 48 Bo Ekehammar, Nazari Akrami, Tadesse Araya, Gender differences in implicit prejudice, *Personality and Individual Differences*, Vol. 34, No. 8, 2003, pp. 1509-1523; Jim Sidanius, Frederico Pratto, *Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social oppression and hierarchy*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999.
- 49 D'Alessio and Stolzenberg, "Anti-Semitism in America: The Dynamics of Prejudice"; Ryan D. King, Melissa F. Weiner, Group Position, Collective Threat, and American Anti-Semitism, *Social Problems*, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2007, pp. 47-77; Charles Herbert Stember, Marshall Sklare, George Salomon, *Jews in the Mind of America*, Basic Books, New York, 1966.
- 50 Baum and Nakazawa, "Anti-Semitism versus Anti-Israeli Sentiment"; Beattie, "Anti-Semitism and opposition to Israeli government policies: the roles of prejudice and information"; Cohen et al, "The modern antisemitism israel model an empirical relationship between modern antisemitism and opposition to israel"; Dinnerstein, "Is there a new anti-semitism in the United States?"; Gerstenfeld, "Anti-Israelism and Anti-Semitism: Common Characteristics and Motifs"; Jaspal, *Anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism: representation, cognition and everyday talk*; Günther Jikeli, Explaining the Discrepancy of Antisemitic Acts and Attitudes in 21st Century France, *Contemporary Jewry*, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2017, pp. 257-273; Kaplan and Small, "Anti-Israel Sentiment Predicts Anti-Semitism in Europe"; Kempf, "Anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel: Methodology and results of the ASCI survey"; Kempf, "Anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel: A methodological challenge for peace research"; Klug, "Interrogating 'new anti-Semitism'"; Klug "The collective Jew: Israel and the new antisemitism"; Tausch, "The New Global Antisemitism: Implications from the 100 Data."
- 51 Tausch, "The Effects of Nostra Aetate: Comparative Analyses of Catholic Antisemitism More Than Five Decades after the Second Vatican Council."
- 52 Julia C. Becker, Ulrich Wagner, Oliver Christ, Consequences of the 2008 financial crisis for intergroup relations: The role of perceived threat and causal attributions, *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, Vol. 14, No. 6, 2011, pp. 871-885; Bilewicz and Krzeminski, "Anti-Semitism in Poland and Ukraine: The belief in Jewish control as a mechanism of scapegoating"; Gibson and Howard, "Russian anti-Semitism and the scapegoating of Jews."
- 53 On voting behavior see, Jacob Bor, Diverging life expectancies and voting patterns in the 2016 US Presidential election, *American journal of public health*, Vol. 107, No. 10, 2017, pp. 1560-1562; Jeph Herrin, Dan Witters, Brita Roy et al, *Population well-being and electoral shifts*, Translator trans. Edited by Editor. Vol. 13, *Series Population well-being and electoral shifts*, 2018; Jason H Wasfy, Charles Stewart III and Vijeta Bhambhani, *County community health associations of net voting shift in the 2016 US presidential election*, Translator trans. Edited by Editor. Vol. 12, *Series County community health associations of net voting shift in the 2016 US presidential election*, 2017 and for political trust Mikko Mattila, Lauri Rapeli, Just sick of it? Health and political trust in Western Europe, *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2018, pp. 116-134.
- 54 Mikołaj Winiewski, Michał Bilewicz, "The emergence of antisemitism in times of rapid social change: survey results from Poland",

teraction with people who are different hypothetically should lessen social distance and increase tolerance. The ESS asks one question that taps social distance: how many close friends respondents have who come from a different racial or ethnic group.

Finally, since the antisemitism questions asks about immigration, the estimation includes two items that tap immigration orientations, whether the respondent is a citizen and overall assessments of immigration. Citizens may feel threatened in various ways from non-citizen immigrants.⁵⁵ Immigrants may bring foreign cultures and behaviors into the citizen's home nation, with citizens fearing that foreign will alter the nation in unexpected and undesirable ways. Jewish immigrants may be viewed as threatening foreigners to citizens. The immigration support question asks whether immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live. This indicator is used to control for respondent hostility toward immigration in general from negative attitudes toward Jews.

Multivariate Results

Even with these controls, ideological self-placement continues its association with antisemitism at about the same magnitude as in the univariate model. Most of the control variables are also associated with antisemitism consistent with past research. Turning first to the demographics, neither age, gender, nor religiosity are associated with support for Jewish immigration, but education and being Muslim are. Each unit step increase in education leads to a 0.08 increase in support for Jewish immigration. On this 7-step scale, the most educated (=7) are nearly 0.5 units more supportive of Jewish immigration than the least educated (=1), a substantively large effect.⁵⁶ Muslims are less supportive of Jewish immigration than non-Muslims, but the effect is not large, with a coefficient of -0.22 ($p < 0.035$, one-tailed test).

Dissatisfaction with various aspects of one's life reduces support for Jewish immigration. As satisfaction with the national economy rises, so does support for Jewish immigration; the most satisfied individual (=10) will support Jewish immigration at nearly 0.2 steps more than the least satisfied respondent (=0), a modest substantive effect. Generalized sense of happiness, too, is positively related to support for Jewish immigration, but at a slightly lower level than for economic satisfaction, with the happiest respondents about 0.14 units more supportive than the least happy respondents. Finally, subjective health also leads to higher support for Jewish immigration. The health indicator has five positions

in: *Antisemitism in an Era of Transition: Genealogies and Impact in Post-communist Poland and Hungary*, edited by François Guestnet and Gwen Jones, New York, Peter Lang, 2014, pp. 187-214.

55 Jens Hainmueller, Daniel J. Hopkins, "Public attitudes toward immigration, *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2014, pp. 225-249.

56 Based on the formula $(7 - 1) \times (0.078) = 0.47$.

from “very good” to “very bad.” Each unit improvement in subjective health increases support by 0.028 steps; the healthiest person will be 0.11 units more supportive of Jewish immigration than the least subjectively healthy respondent. Overall, then, none of these satisfaction measures has a massive substantive impact on support for Jewish immigration, but all are statistically significant.

Social interaction with people of different ethnic and racial groups is also associated with higher support for Jewish immigration. Those who say they have several such friends are about 0.22 steps more supportive of Jewish immigration than those declaring no such friends. Citizenship has comparable effects, with citizens 0.23 steps *less* supportive of Jewish immigration than non-citizens. Professing to be a member of a group that is discriminated against, however, has no impact on support for Jewish immigration. Finally, attitudes toward immigration in general has a very strong effect on support for Jewish immigration. Those who think immigrants make their counter a better place to live are 1.8 steps more supportive of Jewish immigration than those who argue that immigrants make the country a worse place to live. This is a massive substantive effect, the largest noted yet in the analysis.

With different scales and measurement for the variables uses, rather than compare the extremes values on each variable, it may make more sense to compare standard deviation shifts to get a sense of the relative effect of some variables. Immigration attitudes has a standard deviation of 2.27 and a regression coefficient of 0.18. A one standard deviation shift thus produces a 0.41 shift in support for Jewish immigration. Education, another very strong factor, has a standard deviation of 1.85 and a regression coefficient of 0.078, producing a 0.14 effect, about one-third that of immigration attitudes, but still substantively impressive. It is difficult to compare ideological self-placement due to its curvilinear effects, but as there is a general pattern of increasing support from right to left, it is still worthwhile to make such a comparison. Ideological self-placement has a 2.12 standard deviation and a regression coefficient of 0.029 if it is entered as a linear variable, producing an average effect of 0.06.⁵⁷ This understates the effect of ideological self-placement, because it assumes linearity when it is curvilinear, but still this average effect is quite small compared to either immigration attitudes or education.⁵⁸

Is Antisemitism Unique?

Above analyses indicate that ideological self-placement is associated with support for Jewish immigration across 20 European nations. An important issue

57 Far-left = 0 and far-right = 11.

58 These figures only estimate the direct effect of each variable and does not account for indirect effects, such as the effect of ideology on immigration attitudes. A simple estimation of ideology on immigration finds a statistically significant effect (mixed level regression), $b = -0.16$, $p < 0.000$. More conservative individuals are less positive toward immigrants.

is whether antisemitism is a unique form of prejudice or whether it is highly related to other types of prejudice. Ideology has been an important source of antisemitism historically, especially in Europe, but is it also important for structuring attitudes towards other groups?

Bernard Lewis argues that antisemitism is unique because Jews are judged on a different standard than applied to others, for instance, that Jews and/or Israel are criticized for an action, but others are not when they do the same thing as Jews/Israel, and secondly, that Jews are viewed as “cosmically evil.”⁵⁹ Others arguing for the uniqueness of antisemitism point to its historical longevity, dating to the early days of the Jewish people,⁶⁰ and that antisemitism evolves over time, from once being primarily religiously based, then evolving into both a capitalism critique among Marxists, entwine with race among fascists and Nazis, to its current form, mixing and conflating imperialism, racism (against Palestinians), and anti-Israel attitudes, the new antisemitism. That antisemitism evolves distinguishes it from other form of prejudice.

Empirically, numerous studies have found correlations between prejudice against Jews with prejudice against other types of people, such as racial and ethnic minorities.⁶¹ The ESS asks respondents about immigration support for Muslims and Roma, in addition to Jews, allowing a comparison of attitudes toward the three groups. In the ESS data, support for Jewish immigration correlates at 0.59 and 0.71 with support for Roma and Muslim immigration, while Roma and Muslim immigration correlate at 0.74.⁶² Although individuals who support/oppose Jewish immigration may feel the same about Roma and Muslim immigration, the factors that lead to support/opposition may differ across the three groups. If the factors that lead to support/opposition to Jewish immigration differ from those for Roma and Muslim, then despite their correlation, attitudes towards Jews can be said to be unique (or different), providing support for “antisemitism is unique” perspective. In contrast, finding the same factors predictive of immigration attitudes for Jews with Muslims and Roma provides support for the similarity notion, that prejudice is prejudice no matter the targeted group, at least in public opinion.

Even if the same factors lead one to support/oppose Jewish and non-Jewish immigration, the ideology and/or stereotypes underlying those attitudes still may differ. Jews may be disliked because of their education, power, and other “positive” characteristics, which may threaten the economic and social position of non-Jews. But Muslims and Roma may be disliked for wholly different reasons, such as criminality, poverty, unwillingness to work, etc. Thus, there are limits to how much statistical analysis of common sources of Jewish and non-Jewish

59 Lewis, “The new anti-semitism.”

60 Bergmann, “Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Europe: A Comparative Perspective.”; Wistrich, *Antisemitism: The longest hatred*.

61 Jolanta Ambrosewicz-Jacobs, Attitudes of young Poles toward Jews in post-1989 Poland, *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2000, pp. 565-596; Bergmann and Erb, “Anti-Semitism in the late 1990s.”


62 Pearson’s correlations, weighted data, all are significant at $p < 0.000$.

prejudice tells us about the uniqueness of antisemitism. Still, doing so provides important information in debates about the special character of antisemitism compared to other forms of social prejudice.

The strategy for testing unique-similar hypothesis asks whether the factors associated with support for Jewish immigration also affect support for Muslim and Roma immigration. Table 2 presents results of mixed-level regressions for Muslim and Roma, alongside results already discussed for Jews.


There are important continuities, as well as differences, across the three estimations. First, ideological self-placement affects support for immigration across all three groups, although the relationship appears much stronger for Muslims and Roma than for Jews. Figures 3 and 4 present predicted support for immigration for the three groups using the multivariate model. Figure 3 plots the results in separate panels with 95% confidence intervals, while Figure 4 plots results on one panel, but without the confidence intervals. The slope is steeper moving from left to right for Muslim and Roma than Jewish immigration. Second, at each ideological position, support for Jewish immigration is higher than for Muslim and Roma, and there is greater opposition to Roma than Muslim immigration than Jewish immigration at each ideological point. On the extreme right, Roma and Muslim immigration locates close to allowing only a few, where Jewish support locates slightly above the center, in the direction of allowing some.

Figure 3. Comparing the Results of Ideological Self-Placement on Support for Immigration for Jews, Univariate and Full Estimations.



Source: 2014 European Social Survey, see results from Table 2.

Figure 4. Comparing the Results of Ideological Self-Placement on Support for Immigration for Jews, Muslims, and Roma, Full Estimations.



Source: 2014 European Social Survey, see results from Table 2.

Turning to the control variables, a large number similarly predict immigration attitudes for all groups. Education, health, attitudes to immigrants in general, citizenship, and having friends of different ethnic/racial groups all predict support/opposition to Jewish, Muslim, and Roma immigration attitudes, yet the coefficients generally are stronger for Roma and Muslims than Jews. Religiosity and being a member of a discriminated group never predict to any of the three immigration attitudes. The other controls variables variously predict to one or two, but not all three, immigration attitudes. Economic satisfaction affects attitudes towards Jewish and Muslim immigration, but not for Roma, while happiness only predicts to Jewish immigration. Results here provide some support for both the uniqueness and similarity perspectives.

Conclusions

This paper asked whether antisemitism in European public opinion is more closely associated with individuals locating at the far-right or the far-left. Using the 2014 European Social Survey, analysis indicates that antisemitism is much higher on the right than the left. Although there is a hint that antisemitism increases among the most extreme leftists compared to moderate leftists, the far-left is less antisemitic than the center, and much less antisemitic than the right, especially the far-right. These results suggest the recent European antisemitism more closely resembles historical, right-wing European antisemitism

than the more modern new antisemitism, with one exception—European Muslims are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward Jews than non-Muslims.

The analysis also suggests there is less hostility toward Jews than Muslims and Roma overall in European populations, but also at each point along the left-right continuum. This finding needs to be put into perspective. First, substantial numbers of respondents still hold antisemitic attitudes, even if greater numbers are more hostile to Muslims and Roma. Further, this comparison was measuring for only one time point. The relative hostility versus acceptance of Jews and others minority groups can change over time, and the possibility exists that hostility toward all three groups (and others) may increase or decrease. With data for only one time point, this study is unable to assess the temporal dynamic of antisemitism and other forms of prejudice.

This study also has implications for new antisemitism theory. New antisemitism theory contends that antisemitism has evolved, with antisemitic attitudes enmeshed in a new complex of attitudes, among them criticism of Israel, anti-Americanism, being a Muslim and a leftist. There are only traces of support for new antisemitism theory in this analysis, with a hint that extreme leftists may be more antisemitic than moderate leftists. But on average, extreme leftists are more supportive of Jewish immigration than rightwing respondents. The strongest support for new antisemitism theory is found in the association between being a Muslim and opposition to Jewish immigration. Still, this analysis could not directly test some of the more important new antisemitism hypotheses, especially the linkage between criticism of Israel and antisemitic attitudes. Overall, findings reported here align more with those who contend that the new antisemitism not so new, that recent antisemitic incidents and attitudes are closely tied to longer historical patterns of antisemitism.⁶³

There are important limitations of this analysis, which suggest directions for future research. First, the antisemitic item used is not only unique, but the ESS only included one antisemitic question. Consequently, it may be difficult to compare findings reported here with other studies of antisemitism in mass publics. A top priority for future research is to develop a better set of antisemitism survey indicators that take into account the various reasons that may underly holding antisemitic attitudes (e. g, stereotypes about Jews) and that allow comparison across questions for their ability to elicit antisemitic responses from survey respondents.⁶⁴ One difficulty in constructing survey questions on antisemitism is that there are some many understandings and definitions of antisemitism,⁶⁵ multiple stereotypes of Jews, and that antisemitism appears to evolve over time,

63 e. g, Judaken, "So what's new? Rethinking the 'new antisemitism' in a global age."

64 Greene and Kingsbury, "The relationship between public and private schooling and antisemitism,"; Krumpal, "Estimating the prevalence of xenophobia and anti-Semitism in Germany: A comparison of randomized response and direct questioning."

65 Kenneth L. Marcus, *The Definition of Anti-Semitism*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2015.

all of which make it difficult to create indexes that are comparable over time.⁶⁶ Future surveys that investigate antisemitic attitudes also need to include multiple questions, not only because indexes constructed from multiple items may better measure attitudes, but also to compare the utility and values of different questions. Only with multiple survey items can we begin to assess the comparative quality of questions employed.

66 Tom W. Smith, A review: Actual trends or measurement artifacts? A review of three studies of anti-Semitism, *Public Opinion Quarterly* Vol. 57, No. 3, 1993, pp. 380-393.

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Џефри Е. Коен
ЛЕВИЦА, ДЕСНИЦА И АНТИСЕМИТИЗАМ У ЕВРОПСКОМ ЈАВНОМ
МЊЕЊУ

Сажетак

Антисемитизам се одавно налази и на политичкој крајњој десници и крајњој левици. Скорији пораст антисемитизма у целом свету поставља питање да ли је овај феномен везан више за десницу или левицу, да ли је у функцији десничарског популизма или да ли постоји нови антисемитизам. Овај рад користи податке из ЕВС-а из 2014. године, који покривају 20 нација, како би тестирао везу између идеолошке оријентације и антисемитских ставова у јавности. Анализа показује да је већи степен антисемитизма на крајњој десници, него ли на левици, али и да је екстремна левица нешто више антисемитски расположена од умерене левице. Даље, постоји мањи степен антисемитизма у односу на анти-муслиманско или анти-ромско осећање на свим позицијама десница-левица. У закључном делу рада, подаци се стављају у контекст и предлажу се нова истраживања.

Кључне речи: антисемитизам, европско јавно мњење, предрасуде, политичка десница и левица, анти-имигрантски ставови

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