MICRO-PHYSICS OF OTHERNESS: JEWS, MUSLIMS, AND LATIN AMERICANS IN CONTEMPORARY SPAIN

Martina L. Weisz

Contemporary Spain has made significant steps toward pluralism and tolerance. This implies, naturally, a fundamental change in its attitude towards three of its historical Others: Jews, Muslims, and Latin Americans. This objective is, to some extent, fueled by the vision of the important interests, both political and economic, that the bridging between different cultures and continents may bring about in a global context. That is why this new predisposition risks becoming merely an instrumental tool. Ultimately, the true scope of this change will be measured in the dismantling of the extensive self-celebratory monologue through which the Spanish elites have historically constructed their Others.[1]

MICRO-PHYSICS OF OTHERNESS

The concept of otherness is complex and multifaceted, having been dealt with by multiple disciplines. Nevertheless, there is an intimate relationship of complementarity between these different approaches. Moreover, a focused analysis of the phenomenon on the individual, social, and international levels lays bare the existence of a network of relations that traverses these three levels, in way similar to the workings of "power-knowledge" linkage as described by Michel Foucault.[2]

The approach I begin with is that of the feminist critique. In her introduction to *The Second Sex* (1949), Simone de Beauvoir tackles the phenomenon of alterity through the analysis of feminine oppression. In her eyes, men have constructed their own subjectivity by contrasting it to an objectified Other: "the subject can be posed only in being opposed—he sets himself up as the essential, as opposed to the other, the inessential, the object."[3] Despite the fact that the core of De Beauvoir's exploration lies in the Other-female, she significantly expanded the breadth of her analysis by including "Negroes" and "Jews" within the "Other" category. This gesture has rightly been considered by Yael Feldman as an "anticipation of 'multicultural' otherness."[4]

De Beauvoir asserts that the elements used by the male in the construction of his Other are not chosen haphazardly; they have their origin in his own projections, in everything that he considers as inessential. In what concerns women, they represent what men desire and fear, what they love and hate: women are for men All, All in the world of the inessential. Hence their features, like those of all the Others, are inherently ambivalent.[5] At this point, de Beauvoir's philosophical analysis coincides with the gaze of psychology, since from a psychological perspective, the origin of the Other also lies within the One.

In an article dedicated to the analysis of the function that antisemitism fulfills in the construction of Western collective identities, Henri Zukier highlights the fact that the Other, the "outsider," is psychologically constructed as the projected image of the negations and repressions of every society. Once constructed upon this basis, and after having undergone a process of demonization, the Other becomes an emotionally charged object that may be "manipulated, preserved and called up at will" by the members of the group, having also the capacity to trigger powerful "mechanical" feelings and reactions.[6]

Psychologist Edward E. Sampson goes even further, affirming that the whole Western project is marked by the construction by dominant groups of "serviceable others," whose lives are negated through the control of their definition, as well as their reality.[7] Examining

"He says his name is Columbus and he came to discover us."
http://www.katai.org/archives/europeos-malagradecidos

women and African-Americans as expressions of otherness, Sampson highlights the fact that prevailing Western groups have historically carried out a self-celebratory monologue, based on the one hand on the construction of useful Others, and on the other hand, on the negation and repression of the voices and points of view of these vulnerable social groups. In fact Sampson argues that both women and African-Americans, like all Others, are not only represented through those who possess power, but also lack a positive identity, originated in their own experience and points of view.[8] In other words, we are dealing with one of the manifestations of "power-knowledge," which has been described by Foucault as a network of relations "that determines the form and possible domains of knowledge."[9]

According to feminist thinkers like Diana Coole, Spike Peterson, and Anne Sisson Runyan, the West has historically constructed its vision of the world through a series of dichotomies where one of the components holds invariable primacy over the other.[10] Despite its variations along the time and space lines, these opposing pairs are always composed of a "feminine" and a "masculine" element. Invariably, each of the terms associated with masculinity has historically been perceived as positive, while those considered as "feminine" have been granted a negative connotation.[11] If, in this context, we are to analyze the constitutive mechanisms of otherness by using the concept of "micro-physics of power," as proposed by Michel Foucault, we can see the articulation of the Western vision upon hierarchical dichotomies has played a central role in the construction of an otherness that both traverses and constitutes social subjects.

In addition, it is important to note that this founding mechanism of the Western worldview has played a substantial role in the erection of modern nation-states.[12] As the privileged fruit of Western political culture, the collective One organized as State, could only embody those attributes considered as positive. At the same time, it projected on the Others all those elements which, in spite of being part of itself, were considered as the antipodes of everything the Nation is supposed to stand for. Clearly, this has not been

Spanish campaign of genocide against the population of Hispaniola (present-day Haiti and Dominican Republic), as illustrated by Fray Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566). http://rwor.org/a/091/pope-en.html

gratuitous. The construction of otherness for women, Jews, and African-Americans has historically legitimized their social exclusion, oppression, and in some cases even their physical annihilation. On the international level this same mechanism has fulfilled a fundamental role both in the advancement of colonial projects and in the multiplication and prolongation of conflicts between different ethno-national groups.[13]

SPAIN AND ITS OTHERS

It is within this theoretical framework that I wish to analyze contemporary discussions regarding Spanish national identity. In fact, I consider that the achievements and contradictions inherent in the process of building a democratic and pluralistic identity for contemporary Spain can only be fully grasped if we are to analyze the concrete situation, as well as the perception of three ethnic groups that have historically played the fundamental role of Other within the dominant perceptions of Spanish national identity—from the beginnings of the modern Spanish state at the end of the fifteenth century until today. I am referring to Jews, Muslims (Moors), and Latin Americans.

Let us begin with the Jews. Despite having settled in the Peninsula at an early stage—approximately during the Phoenician era—and having enjoyed periods of relative prosperity in these lands, the Jewish presence in Spain was also marked by a long history of death and persecution.[14] Following an "absent presence" of nearly four centuries, starting with the expulsion decreed by the Catholic monarchs in 1492 (followed

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by an active presence of "Jewish elements" in popular imagination and artistic creation), Jews began their return to Spain during the African War (1859–1860). As a result of several small immigration waves, they reached the current figure of approximately 40,000 souls.[15]

Given the historical identification of Spain with Roman Catholic Christianity, the construction of the Jew as a Spanish Other cannot be separated from the official accusations of deicide promoted by the Catholic Church against the Jewish people until the Nostra Aetate declaration of 1965.[16] Indeed, if pagans

had already engaged in violent xenophobic anti-Jewish attacks from Antiquity, the deicide imputation held against the Jews by Christianity catapulted this hatred to a different qualitative dimension compared to other forms of xenophobia. Once considered as guilty of a crime of cosmic dimensions, the Jews came to be perceived as the incarnation of the desires of Satan, as the physical manifestation of Evil, against which every good Christian should indefatigably fight.[17]

Thus, the Jew as Other has fulfilled, over centuries, a central role in the construction of the image that both Christians and Spaniards have had of themselves. Jews became the physical, psychological, and emotional receptacle for the collective projection of all those attributes considered essentially antagonistic to Christianity. By identifying Evil and everything associated to it with Judaism, the groundwork was set for the proclamation of Catholic Spain as the

Francisco Franco's "Moorish" cavalry.
http://media.photobucket.com/image/guardia mora franco/Langnasen/LeibguardederCaudillo.jpg

A speech by Francisco Franco, attended by his "Moorish" guards.
http://lacomunidad.elpais.com/blogfiles/la-abadia-de-theleme/211607_guardia_mora.jpg

representative of Goodness on Earth, invested with a providential evangelizing mission.

In the case of Spain, the mechanisms of Christian antisemitism hold special relevance. Unlike in other countries, in Spain the historic identification of the national identity with Catholicism was endorsed by Spanish liberals during the nineteenth century, as well as by many of the "reds" (socialists, communists, and anarchists) during the years of the Second Republic and the Civil War.[18] In our days, despite the 1978 Constitution guaranteeing the State's non-denominational status and freedom of religion and belief, the Roman Apostolic Church perseveres in preserving a privileged status in the country's public institutions.[19] A survey carried out in December 2006 showed that 77.1% of Spaniards viewed themselves as Catholics.[20] Four months later, 19% of the total population affirmed the belief that the Jews are responsible for the death of Christ.[21] Without a doubt, secular Christian antisemitism, strengthened by modern antisemitic movements from other European nations also continues to influence the image of the Jew in Spain.[22] In October 2002, a survey determined that 34% of the interviewees in the country held beliefs that were mostly antisemitic, a higher percentage than the figures registered in France, Germany, Italy, and Poland.[23] Since then, Spain "has been among the countries with the most negative views of Jews."[24] Such prejudices, whose traces remain in the country's present-day popular culture, also affect Spanish opinions about the Jewish State.[25]

There are, indeed, important continuities between contemporary Spain and the society constructed more than five-hundred-years ago by the Catholic monarchs in metaphysical opposition to the image of the Jew. Yet, there have also been some fundamental changes. The process of democratic transition initiated with the death of the dictator Francisco Franco in 1975 established the political and institutional basis for the construction of a democratic and pluralistic Spanish state. In addition to the aforementioned non-denominational status of the Spanish state established by the Constitution and regulated by the organic law of freedom of religion in 1980, an additional series of institutional gestures favored the recognition of the contributions of Jews and Muslims to Spain's culture and history. Some examples are the official declarations made in 1984

and 1989 acknowledging Judaism and Islam as "religions that clearly had deep roots in Spain" (de notorio arraigo en España), and the inclusion of the Sefarad '92 (a working group for the "Rediscovery of Spain's Jewry") and Al-Andalus '92 programs during the celebrations of the "Fifth Centenary of the Discovery of America" in 1992.[26] Naturally, this was strengthened by the significant emphasis placed, at least in declarative terms, by the European Union on pluralism, multiculturalism, and respect for human rights as fundamental to its construction.

We should not underestimate the weight of the changes in Spain in recent decades in dismantling of the status of Jews as Other. There is, however, a pivotal area where this progress has been almost completely ignored—the official reencounter of the Spanish state with its own image as projected throughout the centuries upon its Jews. Indeed, in harmony with the official line established by Spanish diplomacy during the commemorative ceremonies of 1992, the process of "Rediscovering Jewish Spain" took place under the "conciliatory symbol of coexistence and cultural blend that has formed the backbone of the Hispanic nation." It anxiously searches to avoid "negative elements like the memory of the expulsion, the inquisitorial persecution, intolerance, [or] the negative aspects of the colonial past."[27] Examples may be found in the language of the concession act granted by the Prince of Asturias Friendship Prize to the Sephardic communities worldwide in 1990; the speech delievered by King Juan Carlos in Madrid's synagogue in 1992; and most of the publicity surrounding Expo Sevilla '92. The key terms are "reencounter," "friendship," "distancing," "mutual respect," "tolerance," "pluralism," "dialogue," and "bridges."[28]

This attitude brings to mind a 2002 text by Prof. Manuel Reyes Mate relative to the politics of memory of the Spanish Civil War: "The past is used as ammunition for the politics of those who rule. This is a politics of memory that...juxtaposes the victims' and the executioners' past in a kind family portrait."[29] To be sure, such proximity does not dismantle otherness, but merely reestablishes its terms, maintaining the centuries-long monologue that constructed the Jews as a function of Spain's own identity needs.[30] In present-day Spain, the political need that seems to prevail regarding the Jews (among others), is to strengthen, for both political and financial reasons, the national image of the country as a bridge between different cultures and as a symbol of tolerance and pluralism. To a certain extent, this is the aim of the official "re-encounter" of Spain with its Jews. Nonetheless, and more optimistically, I consider that these initiatives have also given cultural legitimacy to expressions more critical and more representative of the experiences and perspectives of the Jews themselves, regarding

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the role they were forced to play in Spanish history. From my point of view, it is precisely there, in the cultural dimension, that the key for the dismantling of the image of the Jew as the Spaniards' metaphysical Other may ultimately lie.

Many of these considerations are also valid for the analysis of the role played by Muslims and Latin Americans in today's Spain. In the case of the Muslims, one of them stated in a survey that democratic Spain adopts towards his brethren a double standard and contradictory stance. On the one hand, Islamic and Moriscan culture are being rescued and valued as part of the Spanish cultural heritage; but Islam is not part of the construction of the contemporary Spanish identity.[31]

According to a study carried out in December 2007, the Muslim population in Spain reached 1,145,424 souls, approximately 2.5% of the population. (After an absence of nearly 500 years, it was only in 1957, with the end of the Spanish protectorate in Morocco, that Muslims would actually obtain Spanish nationality).[32] In the past decades, the number of Spanish Muslims was significantly increased by the immigration of their co-religionists to the Iberian Peninsula.[33] Like the Jews, the Muslims who had converted to Christianity under pressure (the moriscos) were definitively expelled from Spain in 1609.[34] Their long centuries of absent-presence on Spanish territory were heavily influenced, not only by the memory of the eight centuries of the so-called Reconquista, but also by Spanish expansion in northern Africa between the 15th and 20th centuries.[35]

In addition, the important strategic alliance built during Franco's years between the Spanish state and the Arab nations (known as the "traditional Hispano-Arab friendship"), contributed to a rather schizophrenic Spanish image of Muslims in general.[36] The Franco regime, which supported the Arab wars of independence against French and English colonialism was nevertheless ambivalent, since it fought to retain its own "Protectorate" in Morocco. It could be psychologically organized through a relatively simple mechanism clearly described by Eloy Martín Corrales: on the one hand, the Spaniards preserved a "very negative" image of the Moroccans while simultaneously maintaining "a more or less idyllic perception of the other Muslim nations, helped by the geographical distance that prevented ongoing contact or incidents.[37]

Muslim otherness, it should be remembered, is rooted in historical conflicts and clashes of interest between Christian Spain and specific members of the Arab-Muslim world like the Nazar dynasty or the Moroccan independentists. And yet, the negative images and stereotypes have historically coexisted with changing (though generally mild) doses of Islamophilia.[38] Despite these ambivalences, the image of the "Moor" as essentially inferior did fulfill a fundamental role in the galvanization of a Spanish Christian conscience, and in the legitimization of Spanish expansion and colonial occupation in the Maghreb.[39] Hence, negative stereotypes have not vanished with the resolution of the conflicts that instigated them. As explained by Henri Zukier, once the Other is constructed and the demonization process is installed, it becomes an emotionally charged object with the ability to trigger powerful emotions and reactions in a "mechanical" way.[40]

In present-day Spain, the age-old negative images of the "Moor" continue to affect reality. In a school survey carried out among youths between the ages of thirteen and nineteen in 1997, 24% were in favor of expelling

the "Arab-Moors" from the country.[41] According to other studies, the percentage of Spaniards holding a positive view of Muslims decreased from 46% in 2005 to 29% in 2006, and in 2008 almost two-thirds of high school students declared their unwillingness to work together with young people of Moroccan origin.[42] In addition to the increased feeling of being discriminated against (which haunts the rapidly growing Moroccan immigrant population), several violent racist acts against the community have been carried out during the last years, in some cases implicating officials of the Spanish State.[43]

otherness of the Latin American indigenous peoples is clearly implied in these statements. By denying the fact that these peoples perceive the Spanish conquest and colonization in terms of ethnocide and exploitation, the Spanish representatives relegate them to the place of what Simone de Beauvoir defined as "the unessential."[46] The Spanish representatives neutralized any possibility of developing a genuine dialogue, replacing it with what Edward Sampson called a "self-celebratory monologue" that ostensibly ignores the viewpoint of the Other.[47]

This attitude is also evident when analyzing the

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Lastly, there is the Latin American population, whose otherness is the most invisible and also the least contested of the triad. The clearest example is the decision taken by the Spanish Congress in 1987 to establish October 12 as the country's National Day. Indeed, even though the representatives of democratic Spain agreed to abandon Francisco Franco's "Hispanidad Day," which celebrated the religious spirit of Spanish colonization in America, the otherness of American aboriginals implicit in this ideological pillar of Francoism remained intact.[44] To be sure, the terms employed by the new law to validate the selection of October 12 as the founding episode in the building of Spanish national identity (despite avoiding any imperial or evangelizing connotation) refer to the "beginning of a period of linguistic and cultural projection beyond European borders."[45] The official characterization of the Seville World Expo of 1992. In fact, from the point of view of the construction of otherness, the concepts of "discovery" and "encounter between two cultures" speak for themselves.[48] Essentially, the only Latin Americans whose existence is recognized by official Spain are those who voluntarily participate in this self-celebratory monologue. At the same time, those Latin Americans denouncing the fact that when such an intimate "encounter" occurs against the will of one of the two parties involved it should rather be called a "rape," are denied any formal legitimacy by the Spanish State.[49]

This attitude was reinforced during a cycle of conferences carried out under the aegis of the Royal Academy of History that culminated in 1997 with the publication of the book *España: Reflexiones sobre el ser de España* (Spain: Reflections on Spain's being)[50]

Historian Gonzalo Anes, referring to the situation of the middle and end of the 18th century, wrote: "*No one* believed that that great whole—the one created by Spain and the Indies—should and could be separated"[51] (my emphasis). Naturally, the aborigines who during this period continued to fight against Spanish domination were deliberately ignored. The same may be said of the article by Demetrio Ramos, which evokes the continuities between "Las Españas de Ultramar" ("Overseas Spains") and the beginnings of the American emancipation movement, affirming: "The fact is that the same attitude of overseas Spains was something that *lived substantially in the peoples' spirit*, and not an artificial fact created by the administrative projection of metropolitan designs. *The existence of the Kingdom lay in the blood of the peoples.* That is why its validity continued, logically, to be manifest when its unity broke apart, until it mingled in today's reality of the Parties" (my emphasis).[52]

Unfortunately, and unlike what has occurred with the Jews and Muslims, the dismantling of Latin American otherness in contemporary Spain has not even obtained declarative or formal support. Without a doubt, this is a pending task whose resolution is becoming increasingly imperative, not only for obvious reasons of a moral and historical nature, but also as a function of factors closer to traditional *Realpolitik*. I am referring to the important migratory flow coming from Latin America and increasingly incorporated into Spanish society, as well as to the growing political weight that the indigenous populations of South America are beginning to achieve in their native countries, after centuries of silencing and exclusion.[53]

CONCLUSION

Contemporary Spain has taken major steps towards unravelling the otherness of Jews and Muslims, although we cannot say the same concerning the Latin Americans. Notwithstanding such progress, the most difficult task still lies ahead. Only a genuine dialogue, capable of giving legitimacy to the experiences and viewpoints of those formerly constructed as Others will dismantle the remaining obstacles. Although painful, the experience of opening our souls to the gaze of the Other is unavoidable if we are to achieve reconciliation with that part of our own selves which has been repeatedly projected outside. The effort is definitely worthwhile, since, as Edward Samson articulates: "The gift that the other gives us is our own selfhood."[54] ■

Martina L. Weisz *is a fellow of the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem*

1. This paper was originally presented at the symposium entitled "The Other in Contemporary Spain: Practice, Discourse, Representation," at Tel Aviv University in January 2009. The symposium was organized by the S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies, together with the Sverdlin Institute of Latin American History and Culture at Tel Aviv University.
2. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).
3. Simone De Beauvoir, *The Second Sex* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), xvii.
4. See Yael Feldman, "Otherness and Difference: The Perspective of Gender Theory," in *Demonizing the Other: Antisemitism, Racism and Xenophobia*, edited

by Robert S. Wistrich (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999), 172.

5. De Beauvoir, *Second Sex*, 197–98.
6. See Henri Zukier, "Transformation of Hatred: Antisemitism as Struggle for Group Identity," in *Demonizing the Other*, 120.
7. See Edward E. Sampson, *Celebrating the Other: A Dialogic Account of Human Nature* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 4.
8. Ibid., 3–13.
9. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 28.
10. These postulates coincide with those of post-structuralism, as theorized, for instance, by the philosopher Jacques Derrida.
11. See also Diana Coole, *Women in Political Theory: From Ancient Misogyny to Contemporary Feminism* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993); Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, *Global Gender Issues* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999).
12. The building of modern nation-states has been analyzed, among others, by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
13. The intimate relationship between otherness and colonialism has been thoroughly analyzed by such writers as Edward Said, Cynthia Enloe, and Ann Tickner. Regarding the relationship between the Other and the process of "enemizing," see Ofer Zur, "The Psychohistory of Warfare: The Co-Evolution of Culture, Psyche and Enemy," *Journal of Peace Research* 24, no. 2 (1987): 125–34.
14. See Yom Tov Assis, *The Jews of Spain: From Settlement to Expulsion* (Jerusalem: Akademon, 1988).
15. Ibid. See also Oren Cytto, *Jewish Identification in Contemporary Spain—A European Case Study*, Working Paper 57/2007 (Jerusalem: European Forum at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2007), 11–14; and López Alonso in Raanan Rein, ed. *España e Israel veinte años después* (Madrid: Fundación Tres Culturas del Mediterráneo, 2007), 147–54. The current number of members of the Jewish community in Spain was obtained through well-informed sources close to the community. There are substantial differences in the estimations of this data. According to demographer Sergio DellaPergola, in 2006 the Spanish Jewish community numbered 12,000 people; see S. DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population 2006," in *American Jewish Year Book 2006*, edited by D. Singer and L Grossman (New York: American Jewish Committee, 2006), 586. On the other hand, in March 2007 the journal *El País* published an article asserting that: "According to the Federation of Jewish Communities there are approximately 48,000 Jews in Spain...." M. R. Sahuquillo, "La inmigración cambia el mapa religioso," at *ELPAIS.com*, 31 Mar. 2007.
16. For a more detailed analysis on the relationship between Christian theology and antisemitism, as well as the implications of the accusation of deicide against the Jewish people, see Jules Isaac, *L'enseignement du mépris: vérité historique et mythes théologiques* (Paris: Fasquelle Éditeurs, 1962); and Robert S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism. The Longest Hatred* (London: Methuen London, 1991).
17. Ibid. See also Gonzalo Álvarez Chillida, *El antisemitismo en España: La imagen del judío (1812–2002)* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2002), 40.
18. See Christiane Stallaert, *Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España* (Barcelona: Proyecto A Ediciones, 1998), 48–49.
19. See, for example, the article by Juan G. Bedoya, "Estado aconfesional sólo a medias," at *ElPais.com*, 5 July 2008. See also Natalia Junquera's "A sus órdenes, mi capellán," at *ElPais.com*, 26 Oct. 2008.
20. See the Barometer from December 2006, CIS, question no. 28; http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/Artchivos/Marginales/2660_2679/2666/e26600.html (accessed 3 Nov. 2008).
21. See the ADL's report from May 2007, http://www.adl.org/anti_semitism/European_Attitudes_Survey_May_2007.pdf (accessed 3 Nov. 2008).

22. On the influence of modern antisemitism in Spain, see, for example, Isidro González, "El antisemitismo moderno llega a España: el *Affaire Dreyfus*," in, *El antisemitismo en España*, edited by Gonzalo Álvarez Chillida and Ricardo Izquierdo Benito (Cuenca: Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2007); see also Álvarez Chillida, *El antisemitismo en España*.
23. See ADL, *European Attitudes Toward Jews: A Five Country Survey* (New York, Oct. 2002, http://www.adl.org/anti_semitism /EuropeanAttitudesPoll-10-02.pdf (accessed 10/11/2008).
24. See ADL, *Polluting the Public Square: Anti-Semitic Discourse in Spain* (New York, Sept. 2009), http://www.adl.org/main_Anti_Semitism_International/discourse-in-spain.htm?Multi_page_sections=sHeading_5 (accessed 29 Sept. 2009). This tendency has been confirmed by a Pew Research Center Spring 2008 report that found that 46% of the Spaniards rate Jews unfavorably, and a July 2008 survey from an organization dependent on the Spanish Ministry of Education, according to which more that half of the country's high school students would refuse to share their school desk with a Jew. See the Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslim on the Increase in Europe* (Washington: Pew Research Center, Sept. 2008); http://pewglobal.org/reports /pdf/262.pdf (accessed 29 Sept. 2009); see also Castedo, Antía and Berdié, Anaís, "El racismo cala en las aulas," at *ELPAIS.com*, 18 July 2008.
25. See José Manuel Pedrosa, "El antisemitismo en la cultura popular española," in *El antisemitismo en España*; Pere Joan i Tous and Heike Nottebaum, "El olivo y la espada: introducción," in *El olivo y la espada: Estudios sobre el antisemitismo en España (siglos XVI–XX)*, edited by Pere Joan i Tous and Heike Nottebaum (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2003); Alejandro Baer, Alejandro. *"Tanques contra piedras": la imagen de Israel en España*, Real Instituto Elcano, ARI N° 74/2007 (July 2007); Jacobo Israel Garzón et al., *El estigma imborrable: Reflexiones sobre el nuevo antisemitismo* (Madrid: Hebraica Ediciones, 2005).
26. See Stallaert, *Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España*, 170.
27. José Antonio Lisbona, *Retorno a Sefarad: La política de España hacia sus judíos en el siglo XX* (Barcelona: Riopiedras Ediciones, 1993), 351–52.
28. Ibid, 349–70; Penélope Harvey, *Hybrids of Modernity: anthropology, the nation state and the universal exhibition* (London: Routledge, 1996), esp. p. 62; and Carmen López Alonso, "Changing Views of Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in Democratic Spain (1978-2006)", in *Center for European Studies Working Paper Series 149* (Harvard University, 2007), 7. See also the King's speech, http://www.casareal.es/noticias/news/2100-ides-idweb.html (accessed 10 Nov. 2008).
29. Reyes Mate, "Políticas de la memoria," at ELPAIS.com, 12 Nov. 2002.
30. On the construction of "serviceable others," see Sampson, *Celebrating the Other*.
31. See *Perceptions of Discrimination and Islamophobia*, EUMC (2006), 35, http://eumc.europa.eu/eumc/material/pub/muslim/Perceptions_EN.pdf (accessed 17 Nov. 2008).
32. See Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana, from the Observatorio Andalusí, http://mx.geocities.com/hispanomuslime /estademograf.doc (accessed 18 Nov. 2008).
33. Today, 30% of the Muslims residing in Spain are Spanish nationals, while the other 70% are immigrants (50% Moroccan, 20% other). Ibid, 10.
34. See Stallaert, *Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España*, 41.
35. See Eloy Martín Corrales, "Maurofobia/islamofobia y maurofilia /islamofilia en la España del siglo XXI," in *Revista CIDOB d'afers internacionals* 66–67 (October 2004): 39–51.
36. See, for example, María Dolores Algora Weber, "La política árabe y mediterránea de España", in *Revista CIDOB d'afers internacionals*, 79–80 (Dec. 2007): 15–34; and Corrales, "Maurofobia/islamofobia."
37. Corrales, "Maurofobia/islamofobia," 49.

38. Ibid.
39. According to Stallaert, the "Moor" is "the Other catalyst of Spanish ethnic conscience," the "quintessence of the foreigner," *Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España*, 9 (in Spanish).
40. See Henri Zukier, "Transformation of Hatred," 120.
41. Tomás Calvo Buezas, "Relaciones interétnicas en España: esquizofrenia entre el discurso igualitario y la praxis xenófoba," in *Foro Hispánico* 14 (1999): 99.
42. Pew Global Attitudes Project. *The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims view Each Other* (Washington: Pew Research Center, June 2006), 10; see also Castedo, Antía and Berdié, Anaís, "El racismo cala en las aulas," at ELPAIS.com, 18 July 2008.
43. See EUMC, *Migrants' Experiences of Racism and Xenophobia in 12 Member States—Pilot Study* (May 2006). In 2008, a Pew report showed a relative decrease in the negative views held against Muslims in Spain since 2006: from around 61 to 52%. Still, the country continued to have a higher percentage of unfavorable attitudes towards Muslims of all the reported countries, which included Germany, Poland, France, Russia, Britain, and the United States. See Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslim on the Increase in Europe* (Washington: Pew Research Center, September 2008), http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/262.pdf (accessed 29 Sept. 2009).
44. For a more exhaustive analysis of the concept of *Hispanidad*, see Paloma Aguilar and Carsten Humlabæk, "Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy. The Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War," *History & Memory* 14, nos. 1/2 (2002): 121–64.
45. "Law 18/1987, October 7, establishing the date of the National Day in Spain as October 12," *BOE* 241/1987: 22831 (in Spanish).
46. De Beauvoir, *Second Sex*, xiii–xxx. For a brief summary of the main approaches to the fifth centenary of the "discovery" of America, see Steve Stern, "Paradigms of Conquest: History, Historiography, and Politics," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24 (1992): 1–34.
47. Sampson, *Celebrating the Other*, esp. 3–16.
48. See Harvey, *Hybrids of Modernity*, 61, 74; see also Aguilar and Humlabæk "Collective Memory," 139.
49. The perception of the Spanish conquest of America as a rape appears, for example, in the works of the feminist intellectual Gloria Anzaldúa; see AnaLouise Keating, ed., *Gloria E. Anzaldúa. Interviews/Entrevistas* (New York: Routledge, 2000).
50. Real Academia de la Historia. *España. Reflexiones sobre el ser de España* (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1997). The self-declared objective of this enterprise was to "expose a purified version, based upon the materials and methods of the Science [of history] which it heads, regarding the successive realities which this living subject, 'which we call Spain,' has embodied throughout time." See p. 11.
51. Ibid, 240.
52. Ibid, 274.
53. According to the *Anuario Estadístico de Inmigración 2007*, there were approximately 396,000 legal immigrants from Ecuador and 254,000 from Colombia residing in Spain during that year. See Ch. 1, p. 2, http://extranjeros.mtas.es/es/InformacionEstadistica/Anuarios/Anuario2007.html (accessed 29 Sept. 2009). On the historical exclusion of indigenous populations in the Latin American republics, see Carlos Martínez Sarrasola, "La discriminación de las comunidades indígenas en la Argentina: una perspectiva histórica," in *Discriminación y Racismo en América Latina*, edited by Ignacio Klich and Mario Rapoport (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano S.R.L., 1997), 20.
54. Sampson, *Celebrating the Other*, 155.