Trauma, Resilience, and Empowerment

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Dani Kranz

"It took me a few years until I understood that I am, as a matter of fact, Jewish": The Third Generation writ small going large as a generaction

My aim in this essay is to address the diversity of the age cohort 'third generation.' How does the inner-Jewish diversity impact the experiences of individuals falling within the age cohort of the third generation? Does the 'third generation writ small' demand an extended concept of 'generation'? Karl Mannheim (1952) and other scholars in his wake had posited that an age cohort needs to share shaping experiences in order to qualify as a generation. Within this logic, the First Generation – writ large – of post-Shoah[1] Jews in Germany is defined by their experiences of persecution, terror, and their exposure to the Shoah, while the Second Generation – writ large – is defined by being the children of Shoah survivors, and by having been born and/or raised in Germany. A plethora of sources exists covering the First and the Second Generation, as well as intergenerational transmission from First to Second Generation. The Second Generation psychoanalyst Kurt Grünberg (2007) defined the relationships of First Generation parents, and their Second Generation children as 'contaminated intergenerativity', which was defined by the trauma suffered by the First Generation, resulting in dysfunctionalities. By this token, First and Second Generation Jews fit with Mannheim's concept of generation, although in the worst possible way. They fit with the concept of a community of fate, which they oftentimes, and to date, used in fieldwork conversations to relate to each other, while also questioning if "Maybe as Third Generations you (a Third Generation) are less encumbered than we (First and Second Generation) are, and you (Third Generations) less of a community of fate?"

Nearly two decades before Grünberg's concept of 'contaminated intergenerativity' was published, another Second Generation Jew, Cilly Kugelmann (1988)[2], outlined that one needs to consider the specifics of living in Germany among first generation German non-Jews and their children, i.e. the second generation of German non-Jews. Simplified, and from a Jewish perspective, this means living amongst a majority consisting of perpetrators, followers, bystanders, and a few dissidents, which in their totality harboured and transmitted antisemitic attitudes (Schönbach 1961). Contrary to this population, Jews were defined – and trapped – by their victimhood, in which some individual Jewish resistance fighters, as well as the collective Warsaw Ghetto rising, stood out. This common – sense division opens up the issue of locality, and, in particular, that of the German locality: the vast majority of Jews who lived in Germany prior to the migration of Jews from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) consisted of post-Shoah First, Second, and Third Generations. The latter, Third Generations and their 'co-age-cohortists', are at the centre of this paper.

While the German locality remains defined by particular Jewish/non-Jewish relations, the relationship is dynamic. Russian-speaking Jews who fall within the age cohort of the Third Generation came to Germany, and, unlike their parents, and their grandparents, arrived at an age that allowed for a relatively easier integration process. These young FSU Jews learned the German language with ease, they attended German schools and continued to study at German universities. German structures, including local Jewish and local non-Jewish structures, became native to them.

Israeli Jews also entered Germany in significant numbers since the mid-2000s. While the majority of these Israelis fall within the 'Third Generation' age bracket, their passage and settling in Germany is different to those arriving from the FSU. Coming from a Jewish majority society, and speaking Hebrew natively, defining themselves primarily Israeli as opposed to Jew, the shared parameters that are key to their self – definition (Rebhun, Kranz & Sünker 2015) differ from those of other Jews in the country. 70% of the Israeli Jews define themselves as Ashkenazi (Kranz 2016), a third hold German citizenship, and 54% have significant others, who are German citizen (Rebhun, Kranz & Sünker 2015). This is to say that, while these Israelis are migrants to Germany, and while some define themselves as immigrants, others as emigrants, migrants, or

returnees, their way to Germany and into Germany has specific qualities. These qualities may be shared between Israelis, but not with the Russian speaking immigrants of their same age group. An additional differentiation between the two (im)migrant groups comes by ways of their recognition – or non-recognition – as Jews within the Jewish ingroup. In their majority, Israelis tend to be recognised as Jews within the Jewish framework in Germany by way of the status, which the Israeli orthodox rabbinate had provided to them. A significant amount of the same age group arriving from the FSU entered Germany as Jews eligible under the *Gesetz über Maßnahmen für im Rahmen humanitärer Hilfsaktionen aufgenommene Flüchtlinge* (HumAG) [literally: Law for the measures of refugees accepted under the framework of humanitarian aid] and became Jewish *Kontingentflüchtlinge* (quota refugees) based on the line 'Jew' under section 5 in their Soviet passports. Upon arriving in Germany, these FSU Jews might turn into non-Jews in the process because of different definitions applied by the German state, and the German rabbinate. The rabbinate decides upon eligibility for membership in a Jewish community. Eligibility for membership bases on matrilineal descent, or a recognised (kosher) conversion. Israelis, on the other hand, entered as self-ascribed Israelis but became categorical Jews in the process, because they fit with local rabbinical definitions of who is a Jew. The opening quote by the Israeli (Jewish) artist Adi Liraz exemplifies this scenario.

All of this diversity, the conflicting definitions, and competing discourses, prompted me to approach the question as to whether a third generation exists, if so, how this 'generation' can be conceptualised. If it exists, then does it need to be written small as the locally raised Third Generations comprise of just one cacophonous nuance within a diverse, increasingly cacophonous general Jewish choir of third generation age cohortists, nevertheless seeking empowerment as Jews, Germans, immigrants, Israelis, post-soviet Jews or something else, that lies beyond, or conflates, these neat categorical vehicles? This analysis filters in that Jews remain constitutive others within German, non-Jewish, society, who at the same time grapple with their internal diversity of Jewishnesses, which might clash with Jewish empowerment across Third Generations, Russian speaking Jewish incomers, and Israeli Jewish citizens: I will argue that they can be conceptualised as a 'generaction'.

The above questions seem more pressing as Jews are bequeathed with symbolic investments by post-war German society (Kranz 2018a; van Rahden 2015). Officially, Antisemitism was replaced by philosemitism domestically (Kreft 2010), and with philozionism within international relations (O'Dochartaigh 2007). Yet, as voluminous research output has evidenced, Antisemitism continued and continues to exist in Germany. The first such study was published as early as 1961, and it evidenced that Antisemitism prevailed, and that it was passed on intergenerationally (Schönbach 1961). This find is the more important to recognise at present, as it underlines that debates about 'migrant' and 'Muslim' Antisemitism need to be seen very carefully. A much more recent study laid bare the sheer number of Germans who do not see a Jew a 'real' German (Ipsos 2017, p. 11), further emphasising that Antisemitism prevails. Still, and despite the claim that (Muslim) migrants are primarily to blame for Antisemitism being fallacious, the migrants arriving to Germany brought their own respective versions of Antisemitism with them (Arnold & König 2016). This is not to say that migrants are necessarily more antisemitic than veteran Germans, but it depicts the complex, multifaceted concept of Antisemitism, which unfortunately continues to resonate with different groups, for different reasons. Antisemitism is shaped by cultural parameters (Kranz 2018a) Jews in Christian dominated European (Chirot & Reid 1997) and in Muslim societies (Anidjar 2003) are defined as 'significant others', but the 'other' means different things in different societies. Jews, as such, are subject to interpretations as well as projections by the majority as Jews, historically, were always in a vulnerable minority situation.

Zygmunt Bauman (1998) referred to this phenomenon as allosemitism, the Semitic other (allos meaning 'other' in Greek). Notions about the Semitic other, the Jew, are located between philosemitism and Antisemitism, both extremes existing concurrently. These notions are independent of real, living Jews, but they have an impact on real, living Jews. Such an impact may include murder in the worst case, or more commonly, in post-Shoah Germany, structural inequality, or a superimposed participation within a theatre of memories (Bodemann 1996), and a demand towards Jews to perform specific, allocated, roles for non-Jewish audiences (Czollek 2018). Some of these issues directly relate to Israel, and the discursively-constructed refugee crisis in present day Germany

(Kranz 2018a). Indeed, only the mass migration of mainly Muslim migrants since 2015 led to the tipping point of appointing (non-Jewish) commissioners for Antisemitism *and* for Jewish life on federal and state levels (incumbent on a federal level since May 2018, emphasis added). Jews, diverse as they are internally, are externally lumped together as 'others' warranting protection, and as a minority whose survival is a raison d'être for Germany. Even so, all along, Antisemitism remains a toxic part of everyday German discourse across different resident groups, and Jews become increasingly victims of symbolic violence, verbal hate crimes (Schwarz-Friesel 2018)[3], as well as physical violence (RIAS 2018). How does this mix of factors, background, locality, the past in the present, and empowerment impact Jews in general, and the age cohort belonging to the Third Generations in particular?

New Jewish Life!

Between the advent of the 1990's and its (near) suspension in 2004, Jews from the countries of the FSU entered Germany as quota refugees, owing to a specific legal permission within the unification treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Issues regarding both the immigration and the Jewishness of the immigrants soon emerged: Soviet passports carried nationality 'Jew' under section 5. This nationality was typically passed on by the father, and not by the mother, who is decisive for classification under Jewish law, as interpreted by the dominant Jewish religious authorities in Germany (and Israel). The immigrants swerved between being desirable Jews and being less desirable Russians for the Jewish ingroup, and the surrounding German society (cf. collected volume by Körber 2015).

To complicate matters further, the Jews arriving from the FSU had been the victors over Nazi Germany according to FSU master narrative: Atrocities against Jews by German forces and their allies had a lesser part in FSU historiography. While not all FSU incomers adhered to this FSU master narrative, those who self-defined as victors contradicted the German master narrative about Jews as victims in Germany, a narrative shared by German non-Jews and Jews in Germany alike. Franziska Becker (2001) evidenced that 'Russian' Jews amended their biographies to accord with the 'German' and the 'German

Jewish' master narrative of Jews as victims so as to increase their credibility as Jews on location. Her find ruffled feathers as it touches by default upon Jewish/non-Jewish relations, a politically fraught area. In the wake of the Shoah, and owing to the survivor majority in Germany, Jews had been constructed as victims by default, despite some well – known cases of individual Jewish resistance fighters like Jean Améry, collective resistance like the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, and the presence of Jewish soldiers in not only the Russian, but also the British, French, and US armies. Another narrative was also challenged: that of the choice of migration to Israel above all other countries. 'Russian' Jews, as they became known in Germany, came to Germany in larger numbers than to Israel (Schütze 1997). Unrest loomed as FSU Jews challenged the status quo in Germany and beyond, triggering a renegotiation of the realities of Jewish life in Germany.

Until the FSU immigration, the Jewish population of West Germany had been ageing and shrinking. Only around 30,000 Jews were registered members of Jewish communities, with possibly double that amount throughout the country (Bodemann 1996a, b). The amount of Jews in the GDR was even smaller, with only hundreds registered in the organised communities, and about 8,000 in total when including those not registered (Ostow 1996). The figures regarding either part of Germany should be treated with caution as not all Jews were registered members of the organised Jewish communities, and the amount of those not registered can only be estimated. Some Jews never 'emerged' from hiding, and stuck to passing as non-Jews, or, in other cases, individuals did not know about their – categorical – Jewishness or their mixed ancestry, thus failing to regard themselves as Jews. Others self-identified as Jews but lacked acceptable proof in the eyes of the religious establishment, while yet others had Jewish fathers and non-Jewish mothers, rendering them non-Jews according to their respective rabbinates, and ineligible or membership.

What unified the self-identified Jews who had lived in Germany prior to the FSU immigration was the tragic history of the Shoah, which made them appear – and self-define – as a community of fate (Geis 1986). The vast majority were survivors of German and Eastern European displaced person's backgrounds, numbering among the First, Second, and Third Generation. They shared a specific trauma, it was transmitted intergenerationally, and dif-

fered from their (German) surrounding (Grünberg 2007; Inowlocki 2002). The boundary to 'the' Germans on the outside was closely monitored socially (Grünberg 1988, 1989), and the border to physical Jewish spaces was surveyed – not only for security, but also so as to have a safe space where Jews were in the majority (Kranz 2009).

While internally diverse in regard to their practice of Judaism and interpretation of Jewishness (Levinson 1988), Jews appeared rather monolithic on grounds of projecting a unified façade (Bodemann 2008). The sheer (and logical) lack of contact between Jews and non-Jews in the country supported the problematic intergroup relation further (Kranz 2018a, forthcoming a). Even if trauma and boundary management of the Jewish side and a potential avoidance strategy of the non-Jewish, German side is disregarded, it remained rather unlikely to meet a living Jew in person (as opposed to visiting a memorial or seeing a Jewish official representative on television) in countries with populations of 59 million (FRG), and 16 million (GDR) respectively. Thus, somewhat ironically, Jews became a 'thing' of the past, a people to be remembered either as a collective in museums, or as individual Jews for their outstanding credentials. As Levinson (1988), Bodemann (1996a, b), and Kranz (forthcoming a) have argued, research on *living* Jews remains rare, and the last (and only) national study was published by Harry Maor in 1961 (cf. Bodemann 1996b, p. 9). History and literature became the academic disciplines dominating knowledge production about Jews within academic structures of 'classical Jewish Studies' (Kranz forthcoming a). Sociology (and, to an even lesser extent, psychology and anthropology) centring upon living Jews consisted of a few monographs and essay collections, authored by only a handful of academics (Bodemann 1996b; Kranz 2009; Peck 2006; Rapaport 1997), who most often wrote in English, and who were typically not part of the structures of classical Jewish Studies established post-1945 (Kranz forthcoming a). In consequence, little was known about *living* Jews in Germany besides their autobiographies (Bodemann 1996b), as classical Jewish Studies typically ran in German: Knowledge about living Jews hardly entered the German academic and public spheres.

The Jews immigrating from the FSU were differently encumbered by the Shoah, and had a different sense of boundary management towards their German surroundings. They were easier to approach as they were Jewish immi-

grants – *Wiedergutmachungsjuden* [make-good-again-Jews], as Dimitri Kapitelman (2016) sarcastically remarked – and not resident Jews, who expressed suspicious concerning researchers (Grünberg 1988; Freker 1997; Kranz forthcoming a; Kuschner 1977) as they were all too aware that Antisemitism persisted, and their surrounding society comprised of very significant amounts of Nazi followers and sympathisers (Geis 1996), and logically, their children.

Israelis

The immigration of FSU Jews to Germany was followed by another unexpected migration of Jews: Israelis arriving in Germany from the mid-2000s onwards in increasing numbers (Kranz 2016). While Israelis had been a major group of Jewish immigrants to Germany all along (Webster 1995), this 'major' should not be confused with 'significant' as there were so few Jews in the country to begin with. About 20,000 Israeli citizens, dual German/Israeli citizens, and individuals with at least one citizenship which is Israeli, or who are categorised by the statistical parameter 'migration background Israel', reside in Germany to this date (Kranz 2018a). This actual amount is significantly lower than the media hype had suggested. Reports that surfaced since about 2011 mentioned tens of thousands of Israelis in Berlin alone, or talked about an exodus of Israelis to Germany. Garish as these headlines appear, they contain a kernel of truth: While 20,000 Israelis of all sorts live in Germany as residents according to German statistics, a significantly higher amount of Israelis arrive in Germany for visits. The soundscape of Hebrew, which Germans often cannot place, and furthermore the perception that Israelis are noisy make them hyper visible: they stand out. The latter is an issue to which a German speaking, Third Generation, *Yekke* Israeli related when describing growing up in Israel: "It was less noisy in our house than in the homes of other Israelis, but noisier than in the houses of other Germans."

Furthermore, the guestimates of Israelis in Germany were impacted by a doubly distorted vision. In German perceptions, Israelis in Israel are becoming increasingly unpopular (Hagemann & Nathanson 2015). They are directly related to the perception of the State of Israel as the oppressing power within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, which is part of intersecting Middle Eastern conflicts.

This aversion exists hand in hand with a fascination for all 'things' Israeli, which differs from a fascination with things Jewish (Kranz 2018c). Yet, upon arrival in Germany, Israelis often turn into 'welcome Jews' for many German non-Jews. Their presence is often interpreted as a sign that democracy is stable and the past has been dealt with, and, in turn, that one was correct in one's rather sceptical perceptions of Israel (Kranz 2018a). While published in 1996, well ahead of its time, the statement of Y. Michal Bodemann (1996, p. 119) seems to have become a self-fulfilling prophecy: "In a similar vein to Jews yearning for an escape from exile by way of acts of memorialisation, Germans also yearn for their Zion: a country purified from blood and ashes, a country free of guilt."[4] Seen in this light, Israeli Jews fit into a specific yearning of the German non-Jewish majority, a yearning for normalcy. At the same time, these Israelis are much more diverse than the memory infused German imagination would assume: they are not all Yekke descendants or Ashkenazim although these comprise the largest group, but they comprise Mizrahim, as well as Israelis who were born and raised in countries of the FSU, and who might be Bukharim, or Georgians, or whose ancestry hailed from the Balkans. In as much, it is not only the overblown figure that is revealing about German mainstream discourse, but also the overarching assumption of Israelis as Ashkenazim, and as white: in other words, the wish for the return of the lost Jews.

From an Israeli perspective, Israelis who leave Israel are the opposite to the status quo of *kibbutz galuyot*, the gathering of the exiled Jewish people within *eretz yisrael*, the biblical land of Israel. From an Israeli perspective, every Israeli Jew who leaves is experienced as a loss not only in terms of Zionist ideology, but also in terms of biopolitics, as the survival of Israel is strongly tied to demography (Hashiloni-Dolev 2007). The issues which created the framework for their migration left an imprint on the Israelis: some mused about the structures of opportunity and projections upon them in rather blunt terms (Lapidot & Ilany 2015), while others chose to ignore the structures, and their framing (Kranz 2018b). Some worked obsessively on specific issues from the German Jewish past (on the Shoah and its aftermaths, to be precise), while yet others made themselves heard, as in the quote by the artist Adi Liraz, an Israeli of Romaniote descent, which serves as the title of this essay. Within her artistic work, she demonstrates the diversity of Jewish history, its relationship with the

German and Jewish past outside of Israel, and the identity reconfigurations that go hand in hand with migration to Germany.

Caption: Greek written in Hebrew letters: "If I forget you, Ioanina, I forget my right hand." This line relates to Psalm 135, 7 which relates Jerusalem to the right hand. The right hand is constructed in binary opposition to the left hand, with right being positive, and left negative. Photo Dani Kranz, 2018, with the permission of Adi Liraz

Israelis, in other words, are highly diverse, yet they somehow suffered the same fate of becoming part of a German, non-Jewish, dominated identity play of mirrors (Kranz 2018a). Assuming that Germany offers quieter identity waters than Israel, this hope was quickly proven wrong, and they were compelled to swim in the turbulent, roughed up waters which comprise different streams, notions, and desires concerning Jews, Israelis, and Germans.

Some Israelis did not want anything to do with the Israeli bubble in Germany, the Shoah, or their Jewishness: they opted to work in professions without relation to any of these issues such as the medical sciences, engineering, law, or business consulting. Within the quantitative data sets of the project entitled "The Migration of Israeli Jews to Germany since 1990" (GIF I1186-46.4/2012), we found that Israelis of the age cohort third generation constitute more than 80% of the migrants, that they are often university educated, and of Ashkenazi or German backgrounds: 30% hold German citizenship. An additional 30% come to Germany because their partner or spouse is a (non-Jewish) German, and about 25% migrate because they appreciate German culture. Inner-Israeli dynamics, such as the high costs of living, the political situation, and the role of religion in private life, acted as push factors. Germany, despite being the country that masterminded the Shoah was experienced as liberating, and offering alternative lifestyles and opportunities (Cohen & Kranz 2017), although as indicated above, things might become difficult or go plain wrong. Israelis Jews, just like FSU Jews of the same age cohort, thus brought their own hopes, and their own baggage with them to Germany.

Third Generation writ large

Until the arrival of FSU Jews and Israelis, Third Generation Jews writ large formed the core part of the Jewish population, regardless as to whether they were organised into a Jewish community, and also regardless as to whether they

had one or two Jewish parents. They were born and raised in Germany, and showed various traces of transmitted trauma (cf. Frerker 1997), or alienation from their 'native' country, which most constructed as 'native minus' at the best of times (Grossmann 2018; Kranz 2015; Mounk 2014). Lea Wohl von Haselberg conceptualised, while considering her status as the child of a Jewish father whose parents had been Polish Jewish Holocaust survivors and a non-Jewish, German, mother, that "Non-Jewish Germans frequently perceive me as Jewish, or at least *more* Jewish than most Germans. If only there were such a thing as 'Jewisher'!" (Wohl von Haselberg 2015, p. 227). Yet, the Jewish ingroup might not perceive her as Jewish in religious terms, and thus ineligible for membership within a Jewish community. While children of Jewish mothers did not suffer of ineligibility of membership, they experienced not only that they were Jewisher for non-Jewish Germans, but also that within the Jewish ingroup, their mixedness can be regarded as a stigma. The Third Generation experienced rigid structures from the Jewish and non-Jewish side, and they could not deflect them by way of their Russianness or Israeliness: they were trapped between a rock and a hard place.

In this scenario, it is unsurprising that Jewish vs. German constituted a binary for most Third Generations, of whom a significant number left the country (Kranz 2015). The reasons for leaving were manifold, yet a key reason was a constant feeling of out-of-placeness, alienation, and non-belonging to Germany, as well as sheer emotional exhaustion (ibid.) Third Generation Jews grew up as a tiny minority in this country, but the vast majority of the tiny minority suffered from transmitted trauma. Channah Trzebiner (2013) describes intimately the randomness and violence of her survivor grandfather who could not handle the ease of her childish nature, or the insouciance of her dog. She also describes the dysfunctionality in vivid, touching details impossible to replicate within academic writing, even if it is ethnographic and utterly participants centred (Kranz 2015, 2016, 2018a). Prefiguring the writings of third generation authors, Maxim Biller (2018), a Second Generation, outlines in his autobiographically-inspired fiction the inability of his parents' generation to understand the social contract. First Generations who had been subjected to extreme trauma might never really return to functioning socially, exhibiting traits of behaviour which did not fit with any demands from their surrounding

societies. These patterns of behaviour fall within the contaminated intergenerativity of Kurt Grünberg's (2007) analysis of intergenerational relationships between First and Second Generations on location, in Germany. These issues also impacted upon Third Generations who were the recipients of the trauma of their parents and grandparents, as well as recipients of some cultural aspects of previous life-worlds which had been irreversibly destroyed, in addition to being, or remaining, physically inaccessible for geopolitical reasons.

Similarly and yet differently from Second Generations, these Third Generations were compelled to navigate complex intrafamilial relationships and deal with a surrounding society that differed from their own ingroup, and which often expected specific performances of them (Czollek 2018). Given this mix, it is not surprising that many emigrated. What is surprising, however, is that a significant amount remained, and that these are now shaping the burgeoning and diversifying Jewish present-day scene, which outspokenly addresses issues impacting on their life-worlds. This scene outgrows what Y. Michal Bodemann referred to as a "Judaising milieu" (1996b, p. 13) or Liliane Weissberg (2003) as Jews at play; it is more comprehensive than a milieu, it is an age cohort that has garnered a critical mass and found a critical momentum for empowerment, it is a generaction. Bodemann and Weissberg refer to the fetishisation of Jewish (and, in particular, Eastern European Jewish) culture in the 1990's and 2000's, which was performed by non-Jews, for non-Jews. Given the imago spheres about Jews, the Third Generations, FSU Jews and Israelis might have begun to share an experience of fighting for Jewish empowerment, and, in turn, the quest for a future-driven Jewish diversity.

The Third Generation writ small goes large: Introducing a 'Generaction'

In the early fall of 2018, Max Czollek's polemic *Desintegriert Euch!* [Disintegrate Yourselves!] was published. It demands that Jews define themselves on their own terms, and not by means of non-Jews defining Jews by the triad 'Israel, Antisemitism, Shoah.' Czollek criticises that some Jews fitted themselves into this triangle, but he is swift to outline that a sheer lack of choices, a disempowerment by way of structural inequalities might have rendered the playing along

as a non-choice for his (our) forbearers of the First and Second Generations. Armin Langer (2016), a Munich born, but Hungarian raised re-migrant, had already caused a stir about a year earlier when he described his experiences of co-existence in Berlin-Neukölln, a Berlin district with a vast (Arab) Muslim population. Prefiguring the publication of his book, he had harshly criticised the head of the central council of the Jews of Germany for his stance on demanding a limitation to the intake of refugees. Langer underlined that co-existence is possible within any of his output, and that Jews can and should be societal actors, an issue which Olga Grjasnowa (2017) addresses in the undercurrent of her own novel which centres on Syrian refugees. This is in contrast to the FSU authors Belkin (2016) and Kapitelman (2016), who addressed issues of post-soviet identity, such as being of FSU descent in Germany, migration, conversion, and being the children of Jewish fathers and non-Jewish mothers. While some of the issues they raise relate to the issues of central to Czollek, Langer, and Grjasnowa their focus lies on critical issues within German society and, moreover, to themselves being socio-political actors within German – and not only Jewish – society.

Socio-political issues, and especially empowerment as opposed to being interpreted by the non-Jewish majority in an allosemitic fashion (Bauman 1998) are key to these, and other third generation Jews – the third generation writ small. While some publish their output in the biannual periodical *Jalta*, others write (auto)fiction, or contribute to newspapers, and other publications. Yet others are academics, but mostly so outside of the confines of classical Jewish Studies (Kranz forthcoming a). At least some of their academic output on *living* Jews is in German, which means it reaches domestic, German discourse. Yet others are performative artists like Adi Liraz, the Israeli immigrant of Romaniote background. The Romaniote lived historically in the north of Greece, and the city of Ioanina is central to their memory sphere. Romaniote had become diasporic when they trailed along with Roman traders: their language, culture, and Jewish religious practice differs from Ashkenazim and from Sephardim. Their communities, alongside millions of other Jews, were destroyed during the Shoah. Liraz demands that her story be integrated as a trope of entangled Jewish narratives beginning to form a master narrative, a resource dwelling on a collective, diverse, future-driven but historically saturated Jewish conscious-

ness. It fills the categorical Jewishness which Liraz' took years to realise with life.

Liraz, Langer, Czollek, the authors of *Jalta*, politicians like the FSU-born and raised Sergey Lagodinsky (Green Party), and a significant quantity of Jews about whom less is publically known share one specific aim: empowerment and a Jewish life unconfined by specific 'Jewish topics' allocated to them. Thus, it might be possible to talk of a third generation writ small that is highly – and publicly – diverse, and whose shared experience is that of a quest for empowerment and against disempowerment and being typecast: they take action, which is why I refer to them as generaction. While these, and other actors differ in their Jewish praxes, identities, performances, and positions, and while they dissent publicly, this quest, different, and yet shared, might serve as their unifying experience. The third generation writ small goes large as an age cohort not limited to being an age cohort of fate akin to the First, Second, and Third Generations who were defined by being a community of fate, too traumatised, and numerically too small to reach the critical mass of a generaction. By this token, the concept of generation needs an amendment, as it is not shaped by one single major event, but rather by smaller, interlinked issues impacting upon the Third Generaction. Antisemitism, and the lingering local past certainly impact upon the experiences of the third generaction Jews, but, at the same time, their very different backgrounds are not an encumbering luggage, but instead they constitute a rich resource nourishing a diversifying generaction demanding to be heard and to participate. These third generactions live in the present, and, more so, they empower themselves individually and collectively, shaping *their* future.

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Notes

1 Shoah is used in Hebrew for the persecution and mass murder of Jews. I use Shoah specifically as I address Jews in this paper. Sinti and Roma use the term Porajmos, for example. As opposed to Shoah and Porajmos Holocaust refers to the multiple, concurrent genocides. If I address the totality of terror, I will employ the term Holocaust.

2 Although beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that a specific division of labour exists between Jews and non-Jews in Germany (Bodemann 1988). This division of labour relegates the emotional labour of the aftermaths of the Shoah to Jews, which the historian Jael Geis (1996) describes as fatal. While, more than two decades after Bodemann's and Geis' assessment, the situation has mellowed, it is telling that biases remain within specific academic research areas (Kranz forthcoming a).

3 It is beyond the scope of this paper, but Schwarz-Friesel's research proofs an increase in verbal hate crimes, and symbolic violence across e-formats of communication.

4 All translations from German and Hebrew into English are my own.