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On the increase in traditional antisemitism in Poland[1]
Lara Benteler,[2] Michał Bilewicz, Mikołaj Winiewski[3]

Drawing upon two studies carried out in 2009 and 2013 by Bilewicz, Winiewski, Kofta and Wójcik at the Center for Research on Prejudice (Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami) at the University of Warsaw, the following article discusses the structure of contemporary antisemitism in Poland. A special focus of our discussion is the ongoing development of antisemitism in Poland both generally and specifically in the period between the dates of the two studies. The data suggest that, between the first study and the second, an unexpected change occurred in the form in which antisemitism was being expressed, with a noticeable increase in traditional antisemitism. We discuss this development with reference to demographic and psychological factors.

Development of Antisemitism in Poland

Starting as long as one thousand years ago, ethnic Poles and Polish Jews have lived together on Polish territory. Prior to the Second World War, the circa 3 million Jews living in Poland constituted the country's largest minority. Particularly in the last two decades prior to the complete division of Poland among Russia, Prussia, and Austria in 1795, one can speak of a relationship characterized by tolerance – although this should not imply that Jewish stereotypes and prejudices did not exist at that time, as well (Steinlauf, 1997). Following the division, the situation of Jews (and ethnic Poles) depended to a large extent on their new nationalities. In general, Poles initially regarded the Jews as their allies in the battle for independence from the occupying powers. At the turn of the century, however, the pro-Jewish sympathy of the Poles diminished. It was feared that the Jews were interested in establishing a Jewish state on the territory originally belonging to Poland. Further, their disproportionate representation in business and other professions requiring a university degree elicited envy and hostility. The hatred of Jews increased dramatically in the interbellum period and ultimately led to discrimination, violence, and pogroms against the Jews (ibid.).

The debate over the relationship between Jews and Poles in the Second World War has defined Polish-Jewish relations since 1989. The Poles under Nazi occupation found themselves in the ambivalent position of being victims of the Nazi regime as well as witnesses to the Nazi crimes against the Jews, which were carried out to a large extent on Polish territory. The reactions of Poles during the occupation ranged from selflessly risking their lives to support Jews, to indiffer-

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ence, to active participation in the crimes. There were also many opportunities for Poles to benefit indirectly from the fate of the Jews, for instance through the appropriation of Jewish property following the owners' deportation to the Ghettos (ibid.). A well-known excess is the pogrom of Jebwadne in 1941, described in the book "Neighbors" by Jan Tomasz Gross. Catholic Poles from a small town murdered their Jewish neighbors following the retreat of Soviet and prior to the arrival of German forces.

After the War, the number of Jews living in Poland was very small, and this number diminished further to between 5 000 and 15 000 people as a result of three waves of emigration. The first emigration wave was set in motion by another pogrom against the Jews in 1946 (Wetzel, 2000). The last wave, in 1968, was caused by the Communist government, which had exacerbated its antizionist and antisemitic policies significantly in the preceding period (for a detailed discussion of the causes and consequences of this development, see Kosmala, 2000). These policies had their effect on a broad swath of the population, so that general antisemitism increased at this time, as well. Following this new exodus the Jews all but disappeared from visibility in Poland; antisemitic feelings and opinions nevertheless endured. A kind of "antisemitism without Jews" had taken root (Pelc, 2000).

During the period of Communism, moreover, public discussion of the Second World War and the Holocaust was forbidden. In particular, the Poles' role as passive witnesses to the Holocaust was silenced. As a result, the history of the Second World War was paradoxically dealt with only after the Fall of the Wall. The long period that elapsed between the events and their discussion in a public forum made it possible for half-truths to calcify into accepted fact. It also made any dialogue with witnesses and victims of the Holocaust more difficult (Tokarska-Bakir, 2011). In the opinion of the two Polish historians Władysław Bartoszewski and Andrzej Bryk, the failure to deal immediately with the Holocaust led to the absence of any "collective shock" in the Polish consciousness (Tych, 2000). Tych argues further that such a shock probably was (or rather would have been) necessary in order to stem or dampen antisemitic feelings.

As mentioned above, a debate in particular concerning the role of Poland during the Holocaust flared up following the fall of the Communist regime. Jan Blonski published in 1990 an essay on the passivity of the Poles relative to the Holocaust, which was heavily criticized by a public which did not care to be reminded of this dark chapter in its history.

The book "Neighbors" (2001), already mentioned above, as well as its sequels "Angst" (2006) and "Golden Harvests" (2012) unleashed another public dispute. Gross described Polish citizens as perpetrators – particularly in "Neighbors" – and this contradicted the prevalent opinion representing the Poles as the primary victims of the War (Krzeminski, 1993). The most common reaction to "Neighbors" was to deny the circumstances it described and to divert responsibility for the crimes to the Germans – or at least to a marginalized, non-representative group (Bilewicz, 2004).

The war trilogy "Unsere Mütter, Unsere Väter" [Our mothers, our fathers] broadcast over German television (ZDF) in 2013 elicited heavy criticism in Poland.

In this film, resistance fighters in the Polish Homeland Army (AK) are depicted as antisemites who refuse to free Jewish prisoners from a train bound for the gas chambers. Many Poles have accused the producers of falsifying history and attempting to relativize Germany's guilt.

The debate described above, which could take place for the first time only once open discussion of the Holocaust became possible, has no doubt been heavily influenced by the fact that a certain view of history and a certain self-image took root in Poland during the many long years of silence. It is not easy to revise such a view of history or such a self-image from one day to the next. This also explains the sensitivity with which Poles respond when long accepted views are drawn into question, particularly when the criticism comes from Germany.

At the same time, public institutions in Poland are increasingly making an effort to push understanding of the common history between Poland and Germany forward, as well as to nurture an awareness of Jewish history and Jewish life in Poland. A good example of these efforts is the building of a new "Museum for the History of the Polish Jews" in 2013. This museum is designed to serve not only as exhibition space but also as a forum for dialogue.

Antisemitic viewpoints in Poland today

Although Jews now represent only 0.1 % of the Polish population, they are viewed as among the least desirable of minorities according to the Polish public opinion research institute CBOS (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej).[4] More than 30 % of the Polish population have an antipathy toward people of Jewish descent. This trend seems to have remained constant over the years. Recent surveys by the Center for Prejudice Research CBU at the University of Warsaw revealed that 12 % of the Poles would not accept Jewish co-workers, 12 % would be opposed to living with Jewish neighbors, and about 24 % would be opposed to having a close relative of theirs marry a person of Jewish descent.

Paradoxically, 90 % of the Polish population do not know a single Jewish person (Bilewicz, Winiewski, Kofta & Wójcik, 2013). According to Sułek (2012), the Polish respondents in surveys such as these are thus thinking not only of Jews living in present-day Poland, but also of those who once lived there – that is, before, during, or after the War. They are thus projecting onto the void an imaginary, abstract ethnic category, the members of which share the same characteristics at any time and in any place. The real number or percentage of Jews within the Polish population is generally exaggerated. This could be explained by the fact that the Poles generally perceive a threatening Jewish omnipresence, which may in turn form part of an antisemitic world view. A much more positive alternative explanation is also conceivable, however: the more one learns about a minority, the more one pays attention to it in one's environment. Exaggeration of the Jewish presence in Poland thus may stem from the fact that so much is being reported about Jewish

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4 The Polish public opinion research institute CBOS, with head offices in Warsaw, gathers representative data relative to opinions among the Polish population on social and political themes.

culture and history and Jewish-Polish relations in the media (Sułek, 2012). In any event, it shows that Jews remain very present in the collective Polish consciousness.

Forms of Antisemitism

Bilewicz et al. (2013) suggest a three-factor structure for today's antisemitism, consisting of traditional antisemitism, the belief in a Jewish conspiracy, and secondary antisemitism. The latter two are viewed as modern forms of antisemitism. Two studies, conducted in 2009 and 2013 by the Center for Prejudice Research CBU, attempted to measure the extent to which Poles today share each of these three forms of prejudice. Before describing the results of this research in detail, let us better define the categories underlying this research – in particular that of traditional antisemitism.

Traditional antisemitism has its roots in early Christianity and is based on anti-Jewish motifs. The murder of Christ represents one of the primary accusations levelled against the Jews. This accusation stems from the Gospel according to St. Mathew, in which the Jews are depicted as responsible for the death of Jesus (Mt. 27, 11-26, [which English translation do you like to refer to ?]). From the historical perspective, this view is untenable insofar as the sentencing of Jesus lay under the jurisdiction of the Roman occupying powers (Mohl, 2011). Presumably, Matthew's statements should be understood rather in the context of the growing competition between Jews and Christians (Bergmann, 2008). Although the crucification of Jesus is viewed as necessary for the redemption of mankind, a collective guilt was thenceforth imputed to the Jews. All following generations of Jews, as well, were seen as accursed of God. Their sole means of saving themselves from this curse was to be baptized. Only with the Second Vatican Council of 1962 were the Jews exonerated of this charge (Mohl, 2011).

During the period of the Crusades, another religiously motivated accusation was raised: the Jews were now regarded as children of the devil, whose task it was to harm Christians. Jews were thereafter held responsible for every misfortune that Christians experienced (Trachtenberg, 1983).

It was asserted that Jews used Christian blood in their religious ceremonies. Jews were accused of killing Christian children, in order on the one hand to obtain their blood and on the other to repeatedly re-enact and mock the death of Jesus (Erb, 1993). One of the earliest famous cases can be dated to the year 1144 AD in England: a boy named William was found dead in the forest. Shortly thereafter, it was reported that Jews had affixed a crown of thorns to his head and crucified him. For centuries, the so-called blood guilt was used as justification for causing harm to Jews. Throughout all of Europe, Jews were prosecuted and executed on the purported grounds of ritual murder, not infrequently with the support of the clergy (Mohl, 2011).

At approximately the same time as the myth of Jewish blood guilt was circulating, the accusation of desecrating the Eucharist arose. This, too, often entailed anti-Jewish violence. Starting in the 13th century, the Christian church has assumed that in Holy Communion (the Eucharist) bread and wine are transubstantiated into

the flesh and blood of Christ – the purported desecration of the Eucharist would thus be tantamount to repeatedly injuring the body of Jesus (Bergmann, 2008).

In the Middle Ages, church law stipulated that Jews could not be admitted as members in any guild. As a result, they were driven into the business of money-lending, which Christians were forbidden to engage in. This circumstance laid the groundwork for the stereotype of the money-grubbing and power-hungry Jew, which assumed special significance later in modern antisemitism (ibid.).

In studies conducted today, the primary aspects of traditional antisemitism, reviewed above, are generally introduced through questions such as "Are Jews responsible for the death of Jesus Christ?" or "Do Jews use Christian blood for ritual purposes?" (e.g., Bilewicz et al., 2013).

With the Enlightenment in Christian Europe, such absurd accusations against the Jews were made less often. They never entirely disappeared from the rhetoric, however, and thus appeared time and again in the ensuing decades. With them re-surfaced in particular the related negative prejudices against Jews.

Starting at the end of the 19th century, the second form of antisemitism, so-called modern antisemitism, became the more prevalent form. The myth of a Jewish conspiracy to rule the world arose. In modern antisemitism, the Jews are viewed as founders of the Free Masons, the Illuminati, and other anti-Christian organizations. It is further assumed that such a conspiracy has enabled Jews to acquire excessive power in society, excessive control over the banks and media, etc. (Kofta & Sedek, 2005). The focus in modern antisemitism thus no longer lies on the Jewish religion, but rather on the Jews as a social group, which Wilhelm Marr, founder of the League of Antisemites, described as an inferior race (Imhoff, 2010). This stigmatization thus laid the corner-stone for the racist doctrine which reached its most rabid expression later, in the period of National Socialism. The modern form of antisemitism remains today the prevalent form among antisemitic world-views.

After the Holocaust, the debate concerning a third form of antisemitism arose in Germany. This was so-called secondary antisemitism, which refers to the opinion that Jews have taken advantage of the history of the Holocaust or the feeling of guilt prevalent among other nations and thus are themselves responsible for perpetuation of antisemitism today (ibid.). This form is closely associated with deflecting guilt from oneself, for instance by way of denying the Holocaust or reversing the roles of victims and perpetrators. As mentioned at the outset above, the question of Poles' complicity in the Holocaust and their status as victims and perpetrators is hotly debated in Poland. Thus secondary antisemitism is relevant here, as well.

Studies of 2009 and 2013

The aim of the studies conducted in 2009 and 2013 was to determine the various forms and expressions of contemporary antisemitism in Poland. Further, the studies sought to test demographic and psychological correlatives of the various forms of antisemitism. The studies carried out in 2009 also investigated the con-

duct towards Jews that tended to be displayed by respondents as a result of the viewpoints they held – in the first study by means of their own statements relative to intended conduct and in the second by means of observing their actual conduct toward Jews. The following discussion will focus on trends in the forms of antisemitism, in particular in the form of traditional antisemitism. We will discuss and explain differences observed between the points in time at which the two studies were conducted.

Methods

Both studies (2009 and 2013) were conceived as nationwide surveys of a representative random sample of the Polish population. The sample for 2009 included 979 adult respondents; the sample for 2013 included 965.

In order to achieve an appropriately representative sample, households were selected and visited based on the principle of randomness. The respondents were interviewed personally by experts from the public opinion institute (CBOS) with the aid of computer-supported data collection techniques.

The structure of antisemitic viewpoints

In both studies, respondents were presented with a list of twelve antisemitic opinions. They were to rate their degree of agreement with each opinion on a Likert scale. The two statements of the traditional antisemitic position (set forth above) were drawn from anthropological and sociological literature on the subject (Krzeminski, 2002; Tokarska-Bakir, 2008). Four statements represented Polish variants on the statements used in the German literature to measure secondary antisemitism (Bergmann, 2008; Frindte, 2006; Imhoff & Banse, 2009). These included, for example: "Jews take advantage of our feelings of guilt" and "it annoys me to talk about Polish crimes against the Jews." As these four questions were drawn from another national context, they were pre-tested on a random sample of 100 sociology students and demonstrated appropriate reliability. The last six statements were drawn from previous research on the belief in a Jewish conspiracy (Kofta & Sedek, 2005). Examples are the statements "Jews would like to rule the world" or "Jews achieve their common goals through secret agreements." In order to determine the structure of antisemitic opinions, an explorative factor analysis with Varimax rotation was carried out, by which three components of antisemitism in Poland could be found. The first scale was referred to as "traditional antisemitism," the second as "secondary antisemitism," and the third as "belief in a Jewish conspiracy." The reliability of all three scales was confirmed.

Further Variables

The respondents were moreover presented with various scales measuring presumed correlatives of antisemitism.

It is assumed that antisemitism is connected with authoritarian personalities (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford, 1950), that is, with individuals

showing a high degree of obedience toward authorities and strict conformity to conventions and norms. Authoritarianism was measured in 2009 with the aid of the authoritarianism scale of Koralewicz (1987). In 2013, it was measured with the aid of the scale for right-wing antisemitism (Altmeyer, 1981).

The connection between social dominance orientation (SDO) – the need for hierarchies and denigration of disadvantaged groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001) – and antisemitism is a subject of debate. Jews are not generally regarded as a disadvantaged group. With regard to an individual's way of dealing with the Holocaust, however, it is conceivable that denigration of the victims could serve as justification for one's own crimes (Imhoff, 2010). Social dominance orientation was measured with the aid of the SDO-scale of Sidanius & Pratto (2001).

Strong identification with one's own group is also considered a correlative of antisemitism. According to the theory of social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), identification with one's own group enables an individual to ascribe positive distinction to himself relative to members of other groups. This process is thus associated with higher estimation of one's own group and devaluation of the foreign group. Such identification was measured in the studies under discussion by means of the group identification scale of Cameron (2004).

The study sought moreover to determine to what extent the various forms of antisemitism were related to actual contact with Jews. To this end, respondents were asked whether they themselves or their friends had any contact with Jews.

The desired degree of social distance from Jews was ascertained as an indication of intended conduct: a modified form of the Bogardus-social-distance-scale, similar to that used in other psychological studies, was employed (e.g., Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995). This scale seeks to measure an individual's readiness to accept social contact with a foreign group in various areas of life.

Other demographic and situational factors which may exert an influence on antisemitism include age, sex, political views, and religiosity. Educational level was measured by reference to the highest degree that had been completed. To ascertain political views, respondents were asked to rate their own right-wing or left-wing orientation on a 7-step Likert-scale. Religiosity was determined by means of the questions: "Do you take part in any religious practices?" and "Regardless of your participation in religious practices, do you view yourself as religious?"

Results on the structure of antisemitism

Both studies showed that a majority of Poles agree with the statements indicating belief in a Jewish conspiracy (65% in 2009) and the statements indicating secondary antisemitism (60 % in 2009). These results did not change significantly from 2009 to 2013.

Remarkably, however, the studies suggest that between 2009 and 2013 a change occurred relative to traditional antisemitism that directly contradicts intuitive expectations: traditional antisemitism won support in the later study. In 2009, 15 % of the respondents agreed with the viewpoints of traditional antisemitism; in 2013, the number was 23 %.

A closer analysis of the survey results only corroborates this trend: the number of respondents who utterly rejected the statements of traditional antisemitism decreased significantly (from 48.79 % in 2009 to 36.89% in 2013), while the number of those who agreed completely nearly doubled (from 5.18 % to 9.03 %).

Regarding the two questions that measured respondents' position on the traditional antisemitism scale, the answers given to both questions changed similarly from study to study. While in 2009 only 13 % of the respondents agreed with the statement that "Jews are responsible for the death of Jesus Christ," 18 % agreed with that statement in 2013. The suggestion that "Jews use Christian blood for ritual purposes" found support among only 10 % of the respondents in 2009; in 2013 the number was 13 %. These differences are only marginal; but a more significant difference emerges when comparing the number of respondents who rejected these statements out of hand. While in the 2009 study 66 % rejected the first statement, in 2013 only 53 % did so. 46 % of respondents rejected the second statement in 2009; in 2013, only 35 % did so.

As described above, traditional antisemitism is the oldest form of antisemitism. It has its roots in early Christianity, and began as early as the beginning of the 19th century to give way to the other forms. Sociologists have assumed that this form of antisemitism was on the verge of extinction in Poland (e.g., Krzeminski, 2002). An increase in this form of antisemitism in our modern times thus represents an astonishing result.

Also interesting are the significant differences in the prevalence of traditional antisemitism in the various Voivodships of Poland: the two Voivodships in southeastern Poland, Lublin and the Carpathian Foothills, revealed a significantly higher prevalance of traditional antisemitism than the others. Masovia and Pommerania also registered relatively high values. According to Markowski (2006), these Voivodships are precisely the ones in which right-wing political parties have the strongest support.

Correlation between traditional antisemitism and demographic and psychological variables

A change between the two points in time at which the studies were conducted appeared not only in the prevalance of traditional antisemitism, but also in the correlations between antisemitism and some of the demographic and psychological variables presented above.

Table 1: Correlationsbetween traditional antisemitism and various demographic and psychological factors

	2009	2013
Age	.12**	.10**
Sex[b]	.01	-.04
Level of education	-.22**	-.24**
Identification	-.05	.10**

Contakt[b]	-.07*	-.14**
Political views	-.02	.13**
Religiosity	.12**	.11**
SDO	.06	.11**
Authoritarianism[a]	.32**	.16**

* p < .05, ** p < .001

Notes: a) In 2009 and 2013, two different procedures were used to measure authoritarianism b) Point-biserial correlation

The correlation between age and antisemitism was significant in both years – the older respondents were, the more likely they were to express views associated with traditional antisemitism.

The level of education also had a significant influence on the expression of traditional antisemitism in both studies: the lower the education level, the higher the predisposition towards traditional antisemitism. Moreover, the study found that traditional antisemitism was particularly widespread in rural areas and less common in cities. There is further a significant correlation between religiosity and traditional antisemitism. This correlation showed no change from the date of the first study to the date of the second. The correlation between authoritarianism and traditional antisemitism was, despite the use of two different means of measuring the relationship, significant in both years.

Differences between the years of the two studies appeared with regard to the variables identification with own group, social dominance orientation, political viewpoints, authoritarianism, and contact with Jews. While identification with own group, SDO, and political viewpoints revealed no correlation with traditional antisemitism in 2009, a significant correlation between these factors and traditional antisemitism appeared in 2013. That is, the more respondents showed strong identification with their nationality, high SDO values, and right-wing political orientation, the more likely they were to share the viewpoints of traditional antisemitism.

The study moreover revealed that traditional antisemitism is more likely to be expressed by individuals who experience a low level of interaction with Jews. This negative correlation appeared in both 2009 and 2013, but was stronger in the later study.

Interpreting the correlations

Age, level of education, place of residence, religiosity, and authoritarianism appear to be stable correlatives of traditional antisemitism. The other variables shift in significance relative to traditional antisemitism.

Older people and those living in rural areas generally tend to show a stronger leaning toward religiosity, traditionalism, and conservatism. This may explain their increased tendency toward expressing traditional antisemitism, as well. Moreover, it is also possible that older people were socialized at a time when traditional an-

tisemitism was more widespread. In light of the religious orientation of the views associated with traditional antisemitism, it is not surprising that religiosity and traditional antisemitism are closely related. But not only are the primary aspects of traditional antisemitism defined in religious terms, they also reveal highly irrational components – for example, the belief that Jews are carrying out ritual murders. In light of this, one might well have expected that a low level of education is conducive to traditional antisemitism. A regression analysis of the various correlatives with regard to the explained variance of traditional antisemitism showed that an individual's level of education is in fact the strongest predictor of antisemitism, while other variables lose their predictive value. This conclusion implies that a tendency toward traditional antisemitism can be corrected by improved schooling.

By contrast, the factor authoritarianism appears to be personality-defined and therefore less amenable to change. Scholars as early as Adorno et al. (1950) viewed antisemitism as part of the authoritarian personality structure, a type characterized by particularly unconditional obedience to authority and the rejection of groups which deviate from social norms. Adorno thus developed a measure of antisemitism for his authoritarianism scale.

The significant correlation between political viewpoints and antisemitism found in 2013 is in conformity with the finding that Voivodships with a higher prevalance of antisemitism also demonstrate stronger support for right-wing political parties.

The shifting correlation between SDO and antisemitism dovetails with the lack of theoretical clarity discussed above. No clear correlation between the two factors has been demonstrated.

Prediction of social distance to Jews on the basis of the three forms of anti-Semitism

Table 2: Regression of the three antisemitism forms on social distance to Jews

	2009		2013	
	R2	β	R2	β
	.14**		.07**	
Secondary		.07		.01
Jewish conspiracy		.22**		.10*
Traditional		.20**		.23**
* p < .05, ** p < .001				

The predictive validity of the three forms of antisemitism with regard to social distance to Jews also shifted from the time of the first study to that of the second:

In 2009, social distance was predicted with approximately equal accuracy by the belief in a Jewish conspiracy and traditional antisemitism. In 2013, traditional antisemitism was the primary predictor, while the belief in a Jewish conspiracy lost in predictive value but remained significantly predictive. Secondary antisemitism

had no significant predictive value on social contact to Jews in either the first or the second study.

The three forms of antisemitism together explained 14 % of the variance in social distance in 2009, while in 2013 they explained only 7 %.

Interpretation of the predictions

The shift between 2009 and 2013 regarding the predictive value of the belief in a Jewish conspiracy may possibly be explained by the fact that there were elections for the European Parliament in Poland in 2009. The belief in a Jewish conspiracy is, as described above, a rather politically determined form of antisemitism. It surfaces particularly in times in which the respondents' political consciousness is awakened (Kofta & Sedek, 2005) and thus dominates intentions regarding conduct more strongly at such times. Kofta & Sedek assume that the fear of a government oriented in opposition to collective national interests is stronger in the run-up to elections, and that this increases the appeal of the belief in a Jewish conspiracy.

In this connection, it is also interesting to note that secondary antisemitism – although, at 60 %, it is relatively widespread in the population – shows no significant predictive value. The viewpoints associated with secondary antisemitism thus appear to be prevalent in Poland, but without having any significant impact on the desired social distance to Jews.

The combined predictive value of the three forms of antisemitism is significant, to be sure, but not particularly high. That means that the desire for social distance cannot be adequately predicted by antisemitism; other factors must play a role, as well. It is conceivable, for instance, that people in Poland are already accustomed to enjoying a certain distance from Jews as a result of the low level of contact with Jews described above, and that they wish to maintain the distance for this reason.

Conclusion

Although one had assumed up to now that traditional antisemitism was yielding increasingly to the two dominant forms of antisemitism, namely the belief in a Jewish conspiracy and secondary antisemitism, the two studies under discussion surprisingly revealed a renewed increase in the prevalance of traditional antisemitism over the period spanned by the studies. According to Winiewski and Bilewicz (2013), interpreters must use caution when comparing surveys on antisemitism, because it has been demonstrated that differing results can be obtained depending on the phrasing of the questions, the type of scale used for responses, the format of the questions (open vs. multiple choice) and the role of the interviewer. Smith (1993) points out that even presumably minor differences in the texts introducing two studies or in the ordering of questions can produce variations in the results. It is thus conceivable that the differences observed in the two studies under consideration derive in part from methodological limitations. Because, however, in particular the three forms of antisemitism were measured using the same

questions in both studies, we can assume that not the entire effect can be explained as the result of methodological problems.

The shift observed cannot, however, be fully explained by reference to the various correlatives presented. It is therefore advisable to carry out follow-up studies aiming to shed light on changes in the prevalence of traditional antisemitism and, as appropriate, changes in the psychological and demographic variables. Special emphasis should be laid on changes in the general level of education, which has proven to be a significant predictor of traditional antisemitism. To the extent a representative sample has been and will be selected, it can be assumed that the level of education displayed by the random sample corresponds to that of the general population at the point in time in question. This would make a comparison of the populations at both points in time possible. As political events such as significant legislation or upcoming elections can also influence results, these situational correlatives should be taken into consideration. It would also be interesting to see whether this trend has appeared in other countries with comparable antisemitism structures.

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