

# Summary of the Seventh Report on Racism, Antisemitism, and Right-Wing Extremist Violence in the Netherlands in 2017

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## 1 Introduction

This summary of the Seventh Report on Antisemitism, Racism, and Right-Wing Extremist Violence in the Netherlands presents a concise overview of the incidents that occurred in the year 2017 and compares the developments to the previous years. A more in-depth chapter looks at the trends in antisemitic, racist, and anti-Muslim incidents over the past five years. This report was commissioned by the Anne Frank House. The Anne Frank House is responsible for the house where Anne Frank was into hiding and uses her life story to draw attention to the risks of antisemitism, racism, and discrimination, and to the importance of freedom, equal rights, and democracy. Among other things, the Anne Frank House aims to provide information on and organises educational activities about discrimination and human rights, in order to promote the proper functioning of an open, pluriform, democratic society.

## 2 Racism and antisemitism in the Netherlands in 2017

This chapter opens with a survey of the incidents retrieved from police databases. For every category (antisemitism, antisemitic verbal abuse, racism, and racist verbal abuse) we will quote the number of incidents in 2017 and compare these numbers to previous years. In addition, we will focus on the types of offences involving antisemitism and racism. Finally, we will discuss the number of alleged offenders and the number of police reports filed.

### 2.1 Incidents by category

We retrieved a total of 3,486 incidents of an antisemitic or racist nature that occurred in 2017 from the National Law Enforcement Database (BVH). Compared to previous years, this is a sharp decline. In 2016, for example, 4,038 incidents with antisemitic or racist characteristics were registered, and in 2015 there were 4,165. Table 1 shows how the incidents were distributed across the various categories.

Table 1. Incidents by category 2013-2017

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Antisemitism	61	76	57	35	46
Antisemitic verbal abuse	872	710	424	761	583
Racism	(2189) <sup>1</sup>	(2764) <sup>1</sup>	2732	2247	1902
• of which discrimination against Muslims	35	142	466	364	213
Racist verbal abuse	1346	825	842	945	769
• of which verbal abuse against Muslims	115	88	222	34	27
Total <sup>2</sup>	4283	4092	4165	4038	3486

<sup>1</sup> Due to a change in our data collection method concerning racist incidents incorporated in 2015, we have to be careful when comparing the trend to previous years.

<sup>2</sup> Since incidents may be listed under more than one category, the total number of incidents is lower than the sum of the incidents by category.

The vast majority of incidents (1,902) are racist in nature. In all previous reports, this category contained the highest number of incidents as well. The number of incidents that were racist in nature decreased in 2017 compared to the year before.

When we look at the number of incidents involving antisemitic verbal abuse in 2017, this showed a decrease in absolute numbers compared to the year before. In 2017, for instance, 583 incidents of antisemitic verbal abuse were recorded, compared to 761 in 2016. However, if we also look at the total number of incidents of this type over the years, the number of incidents has remained relatively stable compared to previous years, with the exception of 2015, the only year in which this type of incident was much less frequently reported. The total number of antisemitic incidents has increased to a total number of 46. We have not been able to find a clear explanation for this increase. The decline in the number of incidents of Muslim discrimination that started in 2016 continued in 2017.

With the exception of antisemitism, we see a clear decline across all categories. One possible explanation for this phenomenon may be that although the terrorist attacks in Europe continue, we may be witnessing a certain degree of habituation to the attacks, which means that the police databases show fewer responsive incidents. The decrease in the number of refugees could also play a role in the decline. In any case, it seems likely that the sharp drop in the number of incidents of discrimination against Muslims is related to these developments.

### 3 Antisemitism

This chapter will provide information on the numbers and substance of the antisemitic incidents in the Netherlands in 2017. We will start with a breakdown of the incidents involving antisemitism. We will then go on to discuss the incidents of antisemitism in more detail. In all these incidents, it was determined with some certainty that the antisemitism was directed against people or objects with a (perceived) Jewish background. In addition, we will cover incidents of antisemitic verbal abuse.

#### 3.1 Incidents with antisemitic characteristics in 2017

In 2017, 46 antisemitic incidents were registered in the BVH. Compared to 2016, this is an increase, but it is still not close to the number of incidents reported in the years 2015 and earlier (see table 2). It seems fair to assume that the high number of incidents in 2014 can largely be explained by the escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the summer of 2014. For 2017, we found 538 incidents of antisemitic verbal abuse in the BVH. Compared to 2016, this is a decrease.

Table 2. Incidents with antisemitic characteristics 2013-2017<sup>3</sup>

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Antisemitism	61	76	57	35	46
Antisemitic verbal abuse	872	710	424	761	583

#### 3.2 Antisemitic incidents

Antisemitic incidents were likely motivated by the offender's antisemitism. This is to say that the offender utters insults or threats, or daubs graffiti with antisemitic intentions and that these manifestations are directed against Jewish people or locations. In this section, we will discuss the 46 incidents of antisemitism in more detail. Incidents of antisemitism can roughly be divided into three categories, according to their target. These are the categories:

<sup>3</sup> Multiple mutations regarding one incident are reduced to that one incident, unless the mutation contained new information.

1. Incidents directed against people. These concern insults, threats, or assaults directed against Jews, in cases in which it is likely that the offender is aware of the (perceived) Jewish background of the victim, and in which the action is motivated by the victim's (perceived) Jewish background.
2. Incidents directed against objects. This category covers graffiti and the scratching of antisemitic symbols or expressions, or vandalism at (perceived) Jewish locations, such as a Jewish cemetery or a Jewish school, or at locations that are associated with the Second World War.
3. Incidents without victims. This concerns general provocations of an antisemitic nature that are not aimed at specific Jewish people.

Table 3 shows the number of incidents these different types of antisemitism retrieved from the BVH, for 2015, 2016, and 2017. It is striking that in 2017, the vast majority of the incidents were directed against people; the number of incidents more than doubled in comparison to the year before, that is to say from 14 incidents in 2016 to 32 in 2017. Compared to 2015, however, the difference is less significant. Most of these incidents involved insults. Whereas last year the largest group was that of the incidents without victims (19), in 2017 this was the smallest group (6).

*Table 3. Number of antisemitic incidents by target 2015-2017*

Target of antisemitism	2015	2016	2017
Incidents directed against people*	37	14	32
Of which on social media:	9	1	4
Incidents directed against objects	10	2	8
Incidents without victims	10	19	6
Of which on social media:	2	9	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>46</b>

\*Hate speech (insults) differs from hate crime (threats and assaults). Here, they are covered together because this table focuses on the targets of the incidents. In these incidents, the victims are people, in the incidents below, the targets are objects.

### 3.3 Antisemitic verbal abuse

We found 538 incidents of antisemitic verbal abuse in the BHV for 2017. Compared to 2016, this is a decrease of 178 incidents.

Most incidents of antisemitic verbal abuse were registered in Rotterdam and The Hague. A possible explanation for this finding could be that antisemitic verbal abuse is common in the context of football matches, especially when Ajax Amsterdam is playing<sup>4</sup>. It is not known exactly how many of the incidents of antisemitic verbal abuse in 2017 took place in this context. However, it seems likely that this type of abuse mainly occurs in the two cities displaying the most animosity when it comes to Amsterdam and Ajax.

#### *Antisemitic verbal abuse directed against people in public office*

As in previous years, a common type of antisemitic verbal abuse is the verbal abuse directed against police officers, for instance by calling them 'bloody Jews' (or *kankerjoden*, in Dutch). The perpetrators are often alleged offenders, who tend to use many other terms of verbal abuse in addition to the antisemitic slurs. For 2017, 74% (or 428 incidents) out of all incidents involving antisemitic verbal abuse retrieved from the BVH was directed against public officials. In 2016, the percentage was 70 percent. This mainly concerned swearing at the police (381 incidents).

<sup>4</sup> Supporters of Ajax Amsterdam identify themselves publicly as 'Jews' or 'Superjews'. This 'badge of honour' causes supporters of opposing teams to start anti-Jewish or even anti-Semitic chants.

## 4 Racism and discrimination against Muslims

In this chapter, we will outline the racist incidents reported in 2017. By racist incidents we mean incidents involving criminal offences motivated by racism.

Incidents of discrimination against Muslims are included in this chapter about racist incidents. One of the reasons is that the discrimination against Muslims is often, though not always, coupled with racist motives and manifestations. It should be noted, however, that this year at least, a considerable proportion of these incidents were retrieved exclusively by queries on Muslim discrimination. This seems to indicate that over time, there are slightly more cases where Islam was the only ground for discrimination, while in earlier years, it was almost always coupled with racism (or racist verbal abuse).

Finally, we will look into the number of incidents targeting Roma and Sinti.

### 4.1 Incidents with racist characteristics in 2017

In 2017 a total of 1,902 incidents with racist characteristics were registered in the BHV. As shown in table 4 below, the number of racist incidents decreased between 2015 and 2017. One possible explanation for this decline is a decrease in the social unrest in the Netherlands. The year 2015 was characterised by a great deal of social unrest surrounding the arrival of refugees in the Netherlands, which decreased in the course of 2016. In addition, 2015 saw a number of several terrorist attacks that caused a great deal of unrest. Although further attacks took place in 2016 and 2017, there seems to be a degree of habituation to this phenomenon. In this light, it is not surprising that the number of incidents, after a sharp increase in 2014 and 2015, stabilised in 2016 and 2017.

Table 4. Incidents with racist characteristics 2013-2017 (including discrimination against Muslims)<sup>5</sup>

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
(2,189) <sup>6</sup>	(2,764)	2,732	2,247	1,902

#### *Racist verbal abuse directed against people in public office*

Almost one fifth (337) of the racist incidents (18%) was directed against people in public office. These included police officers (157 incidents), people working in healthcare (25 incidents), in public transport (32 incidents), or with other public duties (123 incidents).

### 4.2 Discrimination against Muslims

Part of the incidents inspired by racism retrieved from the BVH involved discrimination against Muslims. Discrimination against Muslims includes insulting, hatemongering, or discriminating against people or groups because of their religion, Islam.

For 2017, we retrieved a total of 213 incidents of discrimination against Muslims from the BHV. This is a sharp decrease compared to 2016, when 364 incidents were retrieved, and a continuation of the downward trend that started in 2015. In the 2015 report, we interpreted the high number of incidents of Muslim discrimination partly as a result of the social unrest that arose after the terrorist attacks in the name of Islam. In 2017, some attacks were covered in the Dutch news, such as the attack during a pop concert in Manchester and on the Westminster bridge in London. It is possible that we are dealing with some degree of 'habituation' because of the frequency of the attacks. After the 2015 attack on Charlie Hebdo magazine, for instance, marches were held and the slogan '*Je suis Charlie*' was shared on social media across the world. Although commemorations were held in 2017 after the attacks mentioned above, the response was nowhere near as comprehensive (at least in the Netherlands). This suggests a habituation to attacks, as a result of which terrorist attacks in the name of Islam may no longer lead to a peak in incidents of discrimination against Muslims.

<sup>5</sup> Multiple mutations regarding one incident are reduced to that one incident, unless the mutation contained new information.

<sup>6</sup> Due to a change in our data collection method concerning racist incidents incorporated in 2015, we must be careful when comparing the trend to previous years. Therefore, the numbers for the previous years have been put in brackets.

### 4.3 Discrimination against Roma and Sinti

As in previous years, the number of incidents directed against Roma and Sinti in the BVH is small. Three incidents were retrieved for the year 2017. In 2016, there were nine, in 2015, we found five.

## 5 Right-wing extremist groups and right-wing extremist violence

This chapter focuses on the development of right-wing extremism in the Netherlands in the year 2017.

### 5.1 The following of right-wing extremist groups

We do not know the exact number of members or supporters of right-wing extremist groups. After all, most of the formations don't have a formal membership structure. If they do keep membership registers, these organisations are usually not inclined to share the number of members. And even if they do, they may pretend to be larger than they are for propagandistic reasons and boast unrealistically high numbers of supporters or members. So, there is no way to gather reliable information about their memberships. For that reason we count active supporters of a group instead of members. That means supporters who are visible at rallies or other public meetings.

For some time now, the right-wing extremist landscape has been becoming more diffuse, making it even more difficult to determine the following of the right-wing extremist groups. Until a few years ago, it was customary for right-wing extremists to join an organisation for a period of time, sometimes even several organisations at the same time. In recent years, that structure seems to be slowly disintegrating. New right-wing extremist groups are founded regularly; most of them are primarily active on the internet, but some are also active offline. Most of these groups disappear after a short time. In addition, much of the right-wing extremist online activism is not very structured and mainly carried out by individual right-wing extremist online activists. Finally, we have seen a new type of right-wing extremist activism in 2017. Its actions are carried out by groups of right-wing extremists who are not tied to any one organisation but who respond to calls for action on social media.

Table 5. Estimated number of active members of right-wing extremist groups 2012-2017

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016 <sup>7</sup> (summer)	2016 (December)	2017
Total	100	120	100	245	420	250	255

According to this estimate, there are 255 active supporters of right-wing extremist groups (see table 5). For the time being, it seems that after the growth of right-wing extremist support in 2015 and 2016 and after the subsequent decline at the end of 2016, the number of right-wing extremist activists stabilised in 2017. This is striking, because prior to 2015, the number of active right-wing extremists had been stable at around 100 for almost a decade. The period of heightened social unrest surrounding the reception of refugees, jihadist terrorist attacks, and 'Zwarte Piet' (Black Pete)<sup>8</sup> has apparently also increased the support for right-wing extremist organisations in the medium term.

<sup>7</sup> The data on 2016 is too ambiguous to provide one solid estimate for the active following of right-wing extremist organisations for the whole year. We have therefore included a number for the middle of 2016 and another for the end of 2016.

<sup>8</sup> Black Pete is a blackface character who appears every year in November and December in large numbers in the Dutch streets as the 'servant' of Saint Nicholas in the period leading up to the Saint Nicholas feast on 5 December. For some time now, there has been a heated and polarised debate in the Netherlands about whether this tradition is racist.

## 5.2 Right-wing extremist public events

Right-wing extremist public events can be divided into non-violent and violent events. Non-violent events include marches, public protest meetings, or the handing out of pamphlets in the street. Violent events may involve assault, vandalism, or threats.

### 5.2.1 Right-wing extremist violence

From the context of 33 violent incidents from 2017 (Table 6), we have concluded that they were inspired by right-wing extremism.

*Table 6. Right-wing extremist violence by category 2013-2017*

Category	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Target graffiti <sup>9</sup>	6	11	16	8	8
Threat	5	13	8	16	9
Confrontation	4	7	8	7	5
Vandalism	1	4	4	7	6
Arson	0	0	0	2	0
Physical abuse	1	7	2	5	5
Total	17	42	38	45	33

This number of right-wing extremist violent incidents is the lowest since 2013.

We have seen that the goals of right-wing extremist offenders have changed in previous years. Until 2016, most of the incidents involved actions that focused on targets selected on account of ethnic origin (antisemitic, racist, or anti-Islamic violence); after 2016, the majority of the incidents focused on targets selected for political considerations (violence against left-wing politicians, activists, or supporters of a more liberal refugee policy). This same trend was visible in 2017, but less marked. In 2017, sixteen right-wing extremist violent incidents were directed against targets for political reasons. In 2017, twelve incidents were anti-Islamic in nature, three incidents were racist in nature, and one incident could be characterised as antisemitic. It is striking that only one incident in 2017 was tied to the reception of asylum seekers or status holders, compared to 26 in 2016.

### 5.2.2 Non-violent events

The best-known form of non-violent political events is the protest rally. The number of right-wing extremist rallies decreased in 2017, from 42 in 2016 to 29 rallies in 2017 (see table 7). In 2016, there had been a sharp increase. This increase was mainly due to a large number of rallies against the reception of refugees in the first half of 2016. After the flow of refugees had declined, the number of demonstrations decreased within the year. This further decline can also be seen in 2017, although the number of rallies remains higher than in the years prior to 2016. The number of larger rallies, of more than 50 people, also decreased slightly. In 2016 there were seven rallies of more than fifty people, in 2017 there were five.

*Table 7. Number of right-wing extremist rallies held in the Netherlands 2012-2017*

2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
5	14	13	15	42	29

In addition to rallies in the Netherlands, Dutch right-wing extremists also regularly

<sup>9</sup> In order to distinguish between the very common, but non-targeted types of graffiti and those directed against specific people or objects, which therefore are more threatening, we have only included targeted graffiti: graffiti applied in specific places that have a direct relationship with the message. General examples include a swastika on a synagogue, a racist slogan on a mosque, or a right-wing extremist sticker on the front door of an immigrant family.

participated in rallies across the national borders. Mainly in Belgium (five times) and Germany (four times), but a large right-wing extremist rally in Poland was joined as well.

## 6 Judicial process

This chapter covers the number of incidents with antisemitic or racist characteristics from 2017 that were retrieved from police databases and handled by the PPS.

When we look at the judicial decisions in incidents with racist or antisemitic elements, it is noteworthy that sentences were passed in more than 80% of the cases. If we look at the types of sentences that were passed, we see that the fine was the most common. When the section of the Criminal Code dealing with discrimination was applied, the offenders were usually punished by a fine, too.

In 2017, this section of the Criminal Code dealing with discrimination was applied in 57 cases, while increased sentences were demanded in 98 cases because of discriminatory aspects in cases of assault or vandalism. If we compare this number to the total number of incidents (3486) described in this report, this is very low. The reason may be that what the police consider to be discrimination and, likewise, what most people see as discrimination, can only be proven in a small percentage of the cases if the provisions in the current sections on discrimination and the discriminatory aspect from the Dutch Criminal Code are to be satisfied.

## 7 Trends in antisemitic, racist, and anti-Muslim incidents


In this in-depth chapter, we look at the trends in antisemitic, racist and anti-Muslim incidents in the past five years (2013-2017). The data we have been collecting on these topics for many years allow us to observe various trends. We look at the quantitative development of antisemitic, racist and anti-Muslim incidents and investigate whether there is overlap with social events. We examine whether the increases and decreases we find with regard to these categories can be explained (wholly or partly) by social events or media topics that took place in the same period. This may help us to gain an insight into the extent to which changes in the number of discrimination incidents can be explained by social events.

To do so, we have investigated which peaks occur in the data on the various categories. We will start by discussing the trends in antisemitic incidents. We will then go on to discuss racist incidents and, finally, anti-Muslim incidents.

### 7.1 Antisemitism

Figure 1 shows the number of antisemitic incidents in the past five years per month.

Figure 1. Number of antisemitic incidents, 2013-2017




The antisemitic incidents of the past five years show one very clear peak, in July and August

2014. This period saw large-scale violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with Operation 'Protective Edge' and the associated struggle between the Israeli army and the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad movements. It seems fair to conclude that the increase in antisemitic incidents during this period was clearly linked to the resurgence of the conflict in the Middle East. In the other months, the number of antisemitic incidents was always between 0 and 10. There were small fluctuations in the monthly averages, but these were minimal differences, caused by only a few incidents. Other events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are not reflected in the number of incidents. In the period from September 2015 to February 2016, for instance, there was another increase in violence in the region, with protests and attacks.<sup>10</sup> However, there is no peak in the number of antisemitic incidents in this period.

## 7.2 Racism

Figure 2 shows the number of racist incidents in the past five years per month, as well as the average number of incidents per month.

Figure 2. Number of racist incidents, 2013-2017



There is one clear peak in the number of racist incidents: in March 2014. This was the month of the municipal elections in which populist right-wing politician Geert Wilders made discriminatory statements about Moroccans on television. The resulting unrest apparently led to other racist expressions and incidents or to an increased willingness to report such incidents.

It is also noteworthy that the number of racist incidents in the years 2014 and 2015 was almost always higher than the monthly average. In the other years, the number was generally lower than average, with the exception of a few months in 2016. However, there are no other peaks: for the years 2014 and 2015, the number of incidents over the average was roughly the same in all months.

We had expected to see that the number of racist incidents would reflect the effect of the heated discussion that takes place in the Netherlands every year in November regarding the character of Black Pete. From 2013 onwards, the discussion about Black Pete has become more heated, both in society and in the media, especially in the period around (the entry of) Sinterklaas, every year in November. However, there is no increase in incidents in the period

<sup>9</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015%E2%80%932016\\_wave\\_of\\_violence\\_in\\_Israeli-Palestinian\\_conflict#cite\\_note-MFA-6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015%E2%80%932016_wave_of_violence_in_Israeli-Palestinian_conflict#cite_note-MFA-6)

from September to December; in most years, the number of racist incidents is even slightly lower in these months than in the other months of the year (see Figure 2). We do not know exactly how to explain this phenomenon. One possibility is that the debate about Black Pete is not limited to the autumn but receives media attention throughout the year, for example when judgments are given in court cases. Another possibility is that the discussion often takes place online and in the media and not so much in face-to-face situations - with the exception of rallies. The fact that incidents of verbal abuse were not included in this in-depth investigation may also play a part.

The effect of the unrest surrounding the refugee crisis is also less visible in the figures than expected and assumed in earlier reports. The situation was most tense in the autumn of 2015 and early 2016. Although the number of incidents throughout 2015 is higher than average, the number did not increase in the autumn; in early 2016, the number of incidents was even lower than average. However, the effect of this unrest was reflected in the anti-Muslim incidents.


The figures do not reflect international events either, such as the failed coup in Turkey (July 2016) or the presidential elections in the USA (mainly autumn 2016).

So, when it comes to racist incidents, we see little connection with social events, with the exception of the unrest during the March 2014 elections. This fits in with our finding in earlier studies that racist incidents are often escalations of other conflicts; in other words, most conflicts arise for other reasons and racial slurs are added to the mix at a later point.<sup>11</sup>

### 7.3 Discrimination against Muslims

Figure 3 shows the number of incidents of discrimination against Muslims in the past five years per month, as well as the average number of incidents per month.

Figure 3. Number of incidents of discrimination against Muslims, 2013-2017



First of all, it is noteworthy that the number of incidents of discrimination against Muslims

<sup>11</sup> See Tierolf et al., 2015, p.65-72.

was considerably higher in 2015 and 2016 than in other years. Almost every month, the number of incidents was higher than average. The most notable peaks are those in January and November 2015. These may be connected to the terrorist attacks on Charlie Hebdo magazine of 7 January 2015 and the combined attacks in Paris of 13 November 2015. There was another peak in February 2016. There seems to be no immediate explanation for this one. However, the refugee debate continued through this month and there had been a bomb attack in Istanbul in January 2016. Still, if these events were linked, we would expect the number of incidents in January 2016 to be higher than average as well.

Where discrimination against Muslims is concerned, we would expect to see peaks in the number of incidents after terrorist attacks carried out in the name of Islam, especially if such attacks were widely covered in the Dutch media.

As indicated before, the terrorist attacks from 2015 are clearly reflected in incident peaks. In other years, however, the expected correlations are absent. In March 2016, attacks took place in Brussels (Zaventem airport and metro), in July 2016 a lorry was driven into a crowd in Nice, and in December 2016 a lorry was driven into a Christmas market in Berlin. All these events were covered on the Dutch news. In July and December 2016 there was a slight increase in the number of incidents, but by no means comparable to 2015.

The same applies to 2017. In March 2017, there was an attack at the Westminster bridge in London, in May 2017 at a pop concert by Ariana Grande in Manchester. March showed a slight increase, but May showed no increase whatsoever in anti-Muslim incidents. So, while in 2015 there were still clear peaks after terrorist attacks, in the years afterwards, there were no marked peaks after similar attacks.

These findings indicate that the public shows signs of habituation to terrorist attacks in the name of Islam, in the sense that these are less frequently followed by an increase in anti-Muslim incidents. This is reinforced by the absence of large-scale responses, in the form of rallies or social media comments, as after the attack on Charlie Hebdo magazine. Even so, the possibility that anti-Muslim incidents still occur but are not reported to the police cannot be ruled out.

Finally, we expected to see the effects of the unrest surrounding the arrival of refugees in 2015 and 2016 on the number of anti-Muslim incidents, as the refugees were mostly from Islamic countries and the narrative of opponents focused on their Islamic background. This effect is indeed visible to some extent, with a relatively high number of incidents in 2015 and a steady decrease in 2016 from the moment the EU-Turkey deal was closed (March 2016) and the number of refugees decreased. However, the numbers vary, so the effect was not constant.

## **8 Conclusion**

Across the board, there has been a decline in racist incidents in general, with the exception of antisemitic incidents. We also see a decrease in the following, violence, and activism of right-wing extremist groups. There is an increase in antisemitism.

Furthermore, the severity of all types of incident is increasing: in antisemitism we see a shift from victimless incidents to person-oriented incidents; in racist and anti-Muslim incidents, we see an increase in more violent attacks. In contrast to the decline in following and activism of right-wing extremist organisations, an increasingly influence of right-wing extremist ideas can be seen in Dutch society and politics.

As we concluded last year, high-profile (international) incidents may lead to an increase in certain types of incidents. However, the analysis of the trends over the past five years shows that if such incidents recur periodically, as is the case with terrorism, the Middle East conflict, or Black Pete, a form of habituation seems to occur, as a result of which we no

longer see any reaction in the form of a clear increase in discriminatory incidents. At the same time, there seems to be a baseline number of incidents of antisemitism, racism and Muslim discrimination that remains stable over the years.

Finally, in the judicial process, the use of the discriminatory sections of the Criminal Code and the application of the discriminatory aspect for the purpose of increasing sentences in the case of general offences lag considerably behind the number of incidents of alleged discrimination identified by the police.