

# Back to the Roots: Are Antisemites Still Authoritarians?

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This study found a significant, yet not very strong, impact of authoritarianism on discriminatory antisemitism in a joint sample of four Central Eastern European countries (N = 6353). Submissive devotion to non-democratic political leadership is found to be the strongest predictor of antisemitism. According to our data, contemporary antisemitism, embedded in an attitude set that expresses rejection of the status quo with its social hierarchy and norms, therefore does not reflect uncritical acceptance of the power structures as the original theory of the authoritarian personality suggests.

*Key Words: Authoritarianism, Conformity, Discriminatory Antisemitism*

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## INTRODUCTION

Ever since the publication of one of the most famous social science volumes in the 20th century, *The Authoritarian Personality (TAP)* (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), it appears that research on antisemitism and authoritarianism has run on totally separate tracks. In the beginning, however, the successors of the Frankfurt School and their American colleagues who participated in the Authoritarianism research project were strongly interested in the research into antisemitism for historical, academic, and personal reasons.

The different members of the research group had started to investigate antisemitism decades before the publication of *TAP*.

Brown (2004, p. 46) offers a concise summary of the motives of one of the prominent members of the working group:

The work was subsidized by the Department of Scientific Research of the American Jewish Committee. One of the authors of the book, a social psychologist with very great talent, was Else Frenkel-Brunswik. Mrs. Brunswik and her husband, the eminent psychologist Egon Brunswik, had been students and teachers at the University of Vienna during the period in which Hitler rose to power. They were Jews and well acquainted with antisemitism.

But the research on authoritarianism, originally a research program supported by American Jewish organizations that was intended to unveil the psychological background of antisemitism in the 1940s in the United States, was finally concluded in a vast amount of researches on the general attitudes to power and social norms and on dominance and submission in general, eventually losing its original interest in antisemitism.

Of course, the original research project and idea behind *TAP* was highly characteristic of the age in which it was developed. The authors were researching the possibility that fascism as a political system may be implemented in other countries as well, and if there is any social potential for fascism behind the surface. The *Zeitgeist* and the preconceptions of the researchers may as well have influenced their data interpretation, just as the prototypical fascist or Nazi shares some antisemitic views; it may have pushed the authors to focus on antisemitism that fits into the so-called “authoritarian syndrome” and ignore other characteristics that did not.

Several researches on antisemitism—the ones in which antisemitism is the dependent variable to be explained—tend to use authoritarianism as an underlying factor to explain antisemitism (see, for example, Enyedi, 1999; Enyedi, Erős, Fábíán, Fleck, & Albert, 1997; Enyedi & Todosijević, 2002; Frindte, Wettig, & Wammetsberger, 2005; Raden, 1999). On the other hand, most researches focusing on authoritarianism—i.e., when it is the dependent variable to be explained—overlook the phenomenon of antisemitism entirely. For example, in the special issue on authoritarianism (2005) in the *Journal of Political Psychology*, the official journal of the International Society of Political Psychology, the word “antisemitism” does not occur even once. Generally speaking, important new approaches and reconceptualizations of authoritarianism show absolutely no interest in antisemitism (see, for example, Altemeyer, 2004; Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010; Kruglanski, 2004; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 2004; Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004).

By tracking the development of authoritarianism researches, it is easy to understand why antisemitism has become peripheral within them. Adorno and his colleagues first tended to use the E (ethnocentrism) scale, a measurement that focuses on enmities toward any outgroups in general, instead of the A (antisemitism) scale, which focuses on the prejudices toward Jews in particular. With this move, the group moved toward Leo Loewenthal’s famous saying that antisemitism has nothing to do with Jews as such (Sanford, 1968). As the original subject of research, antisemitism was reduced to one simple dimension of prejudices toward a specific outgroup; it eventually gave way to research on different kinds of prejudices, gradually disappearing from the focus of researches.

Adorno and his colleagues finally excluded all antisemitism-related items from their final Fascism scales (Adorno et al., 1950; see, for example, Forms 40 and 45). Neither of the revised Authoritarianism scales that were produced in the following decades contained any items regarding Jews.

Three main factors can be identified behind this shift. First is a methodological one: the argument was that the authors tried to measure antisemitism without asking any questions about Jews. The researchers decided not to use Antisemitism scales in classrooms with considerable Jewish minorities in order to avoid offending the students; furthermore, one of the local branches of the Anti-Defamation League was protesting against using these scales because, the ADL argued, they could spread antisemitism. The second objection was the theoretical argument that they attempted to find the most important background variables behind the potential fascist personality without focusing merely on antisemitism. Third, the empirical argument was that their results seemed to prove the idea that antisemitism is part of a set of prejudices toward outgroup members in general: antisemites were typically found to be anti-Japanese, anti-Black, anti-Catholic, and anti-homosexual at the same time.

The original research route of authoritarianism began with antisemitism and moved toward a more abstract, more general theory on the personality's relation to power and its various manifestations (social hierarchy, norms, people in power, and people without power). Therefore, after the publication of *TAP*, antisemitism in social psychology researches became merely a symptom of a broader (attitudinal or personality) "disorder" i.e., the Authoritarian Syndrome. There is thus no need to measure antisemitism; it is obviously part of this syndrome.

But is it still self-evident that authoritarianism is strongly associated with antisemitism? Or, to turn the question around: is it still obvious that the most important cause behind antisemitism is still the Authoritarian Syndrome? There are several counterarguments to be raised:

- According to the revisions of the original researches on authoritarianism, authoritarianism is not a "Personality Syndrome," as Adorno and his colleagues asserted. It is, instead, an attitude cluster that is picked up by learning from the broader social environment rather than something that is "imprinted" in the personality in early childhood (see, for example, Altemeyer, 1981, 2006). In line with this statement, according to Jost and Sidanius (2004, p. 41), "It seems plausible that correlations among authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, education, and socioeconomic status could arise from cultural associations rather than personality dynamics per se [ . . . ]. And even if one were to accept the validity of the authoritarian syndrome, the original researchers were

never able to make a convincing case that it was caused by authoritarian childrearing practices.”

- In line with this notion, even the items and the meaning of the items of authoritarianism seem to change to a considerable degree over time; it is not as consistent and stable as it was hypothesized to be. Altemeyer (1981) reported a significant decline in the consistency of authoritarian items and inter-item correlations. This loosening of internal consistency may have an impact on the relation between authoritarianism and antisemitism as well. Raden (1999, p. 323), for example, who conducted research in 1990 among non-Jewish whites, concluded: “The results suggest a diminished role for antisemitism in authoritarian attitude syndromes.”
- The political importance, content, and position of antisemitism on the left-right scale has changed dramatically in the last few decades. As a reaction to growing fears and cultural conflicts over Muslim immigration, some new populist, authoritarian, radical-right movements with a strongly, harshly philosemitic or Zionist political ideological standpoint—such as the Party of Freedom in the Netherlands, the Sweden Democrats, or the EDL in Great Britain—gained a foothold in Europe. Even a number of political forces that have once been strongly antisemitic, such as the Front National in France, have shifted toward a more pro-Israeli, philosemitic position. Political forces in the West that choose to remain on the antisemitic track (such as the BNP in Great Britain) seem to have become out of fashion and marginalized. At the same time, however, antisemitism and anti-Zionism have strengthened their political positions on the New Left and among anti-globalizational leftist movements. These political tendencies could have partly overwritten the relation of antisemitism to authoritarian right-wing tendencies—at least in Western European countries. In these samples, we can assume that authoritarianism may be associated with philosemitic and pro-Israeli attitudes.
- On the other hand, antisemitism is not necessarily a dimension of prejudice that is equivalent in importance attitudinally to any other types of prejudice. As Kovács (2011) noted in his book on post-communist Hungary, antisemitism nowadays serves as a code of identity in political conflicts, where it plays a crucial role in authoritarianism: this is a “revolution” against the democratic status quo, and also a strategy for group identification and a response to identity threats in times of crises and frustrations (on the latter point, also see Duckitt, 1989).

Because of the fact that researches on authoritarianism became so distant from studies on antisemitism, it would be relevant to examine the original assumptions of *TAP* regarding the close connection between authoritarian tendencies and antisemitism—namely, that authoritarian attitudes are the important underlying factors and predictors behind antisemitism.

In our “back to the roots” approach, we hope to find the responses to the following questions:

1. Are authoritarian attitudes (as they are described in the original theory posited in *TAP*) really strong predictors of antisemitism?
2. Which subdimensions of authoritarianism are the best predictors of antisemitism?
3. Are there any particular subdimensions of authoritarianism that can be identified as exclusive predictors of antisemitism? We attempt to respond to this latter question by comparing predictors of antisemitism to predictors of anti-Romaism and generalized racism.

## METHOD

### *Sample and Database*

For our investigations, we have used the European Values Study 2008-2009 survey database, which contains representative samples from several European countries. Our focus was on the so-called Visegrad countries—four post-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic [Romania], Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). There were three reasons for running the calculations on a sample of these four countries (in all four countries, similar sample sizes were applied):

1. We can form a broader picture of the background factors behind antisemitism than what we could derive from a simple national sample;
2. We have a bigger sample of antisemites this way than if we only analyzed the results of one country, making our predictions more accurate;
3. These countries share a lot in common regarding their history, political landscape, values, and cultural-religious background—i.e., Catholicism is the dominant religion in all four countries. All this makes it a relevant group to be examined.

### *Measurements*

*Measurement of antisemitism.* In the EVS database, there is only one item on antisemitism: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please tell me any that you would not, generally speaking, like to have as neighbors?” The respondents could choose, using cards, from many groups, including Jews, and select the ones that they wouldn’t like to have as neighbors. This is a rough measurement of antisemitism that can capture only the most extreme, most openly antisemite respondents, whose ratio is pretty

low in the overall population (see Table 2). This item, derived from the traditional Bogardus social distance scale, is mostly able to measure the discriminative component of antisemitic prejudice in the three-dimensional typology of antisemitism: political, religious, and discriminative (see, for example, Kovács, 2011).

*Measurement of authoritarianism.* In choosing the items related to authoritarianism, we took into consideration the methodology of de Regt, Smits, and Mortelman (2011, p. 398), who have used the following items listed below to measure authoritarian attitudes:

- Whether homosexuality, abortion, divorce, euthanasia, and having casual sex are acceptable;
- Whether people prefer a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliaments and elections;
- Whether obedience is an important quality children should learn at home;
- Whether one should always love and respect one's parents regardless of their qualities and faults;
- Whether people believe that greater respect for authority in the future is "a good thing."

Even so, we did not apply their methodology unaltered. The following important modifications were made:

- We did not include items on abortion and euthanasia, as rejecting these can be an element of the traditional conservative Christian approach, and doesn't necessarily imply authoritarianism.
- We found a few more items relevant for our topics that we included in our calculations: "Democracies are indecisive and involve too much squabbling"; "Democracies aren't good at maintaining order"; and "Democracies make the economy worse." We put these attitude statements of the EVS in our scales because they reflect the antidemocratic, efficiency- and leader-oriented aspects of authoritarianism. In addition, we included the "Death penalty is justified" item because we think it reflects the punitive aspect of authoritarian aggression well. We also included items on religiousness, for the reason that it is an inherent part of the originally hypothesized "attitude syndrome" (see the items in Table 1).

For the selection of items, we have applied the following two principles:

- Face validity: based on our "back to the roots" approach, we chose and put together items that resemble the original items of the F scale and can be readily categorized under any of the original components of authoritarianism in *TAP* (see Table 1)—even if we decided to

TABLE 1  
THE ITEMS OF THE AUTHORITARIAN SUBSCALES

The Original Dimensions in the F Scale	Items Belonging to This Scale (EVS 2008-2009)	Cronbach's Alpha
<i>Conventionalism</i> : Rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values.	a025—Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them a042—Teach children at home: obedience e018—Greater respect for authority is important in the future	0.48
<i>Authoritarian Submission</i> : Submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the ingroup.	e114—Political system: strong leader e120—Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling e121—Democracies aren't good at maintaining order e122—In democracies, the economic system runs badly	0.67
<i>"Power and Toughness"</i> : Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures; overemphasis on the conventionalized attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness. We reconceptualized this factor as "authoritarian anti-establishment attitudes."	f144_02—Death penalty is justified	-
<i>Authoritarian Aggression</i> : Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish, people who violate conventional values.	f050—Do you believe in: God f051—Do you believe in: life after death f053—Do you believe in: hell f054—Do you believe in: heaven f055—Do you believe in: sin	0.9
<i>Superstition and Stereotypy</i> : The belief in mystical determinants of an individual's fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories. We changed the name to "Religious fundamentalism."	a165—People can be trusted/you can't be too careful in whom you trust	
<i>Destructiveness and Cynicism</i> : Generalized hostility; vilification of the human.	a168_01—Most of the time, people try to be helpful/people look out for themselves a168a—Most people try to take advantage of you/ Most people try to be fair	0.623
<i>Projectivity</i> : The disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the outward projection of unconscious emotional impulses. We changed the name of this construct to "Anomie."	f118—Do you justify: homosexuality f121—Do you justify: divorce f132—Do you justify: having casual sex	0.67
<i>Sex</i> : Exaggerated concern with sexual "goings-on."		
OVERALL SCALE		0.67

change the name of some components in order for them to fit the questions better.

- Availability: we chose the questions from the EVS database that apply to all four countries.

We have created six scales out of the selected 19 items, with acceptable internal consistency measures and taking into consideration the low numbers of items on the subscales.<sup>1</sup> Then we transformed all of these scales in a 0-1 interval to make them comparable with each other (see the two sections of Table 3 for the mean values in the different countries).

TABLE 2  
SAMPLE SIZES AND RATIO OF ANTISEMITIC  
RESPONDENTS IN THE GIVEN COUNTRIES

Country	Ratio of antisemites (rejecting Jews as neighbors)	Ratio of anti-Roma respondents (rejecting Roma as neighbors)	Ratio of "racists" (rejecting people from other races as neighbors)	Overall sample size (N)
Czech Republic	11.9%	56.9%	22.4%	1821
Hungary	6.4%	38.7%	9.0%	1513
Poland	17.9%	33.4%	12.2%	1510
Slovak Republic	12.5%	51.2%	15.4%	1509
TOTAL	12.1%	45.5%	15.1%	6353

## RESULTS



In Table 3, we can see that according to the 2008 data, the ratio of antisemites is the highest in Poland (17.9%) and lowest in Hungary (6.4%), while the anti-Roma discriminative attitude is highest in the Czech Republic (56.9%) and lowest in Poland (33.4%).<sup>2</sup> Conventionalism is highest in

1. Cronbach's alpha measurements are between 0.6 and 0.9 except the first subscale, but we decided to use it regardless of the low reliability due to the perfect fit of these questions to the construct conventionalism.

2. The fact that the level of antisemitism is the lowest in Hungary compared to other countries in the region deserves more attention, as studies from the past few years indicate that general xenophobia is higher in Hungary than in any other countries of the CEE region (see, for example, a calculation based on the European Social Survey database in Krekó, Juhász, & Molnár, 2011). This specific finding, however, is completely consonant with the findings of the comparative studies in



TABLE 3  
THE VALUES OF AUTHORITARIAN SUBSCALES IN  
DIFFERENT COUNTRIES



Slovakia and lowest in the Czech Republic. Anti-establishment attitudes are almost equally high in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, with lower scores in Slovakia. Religious fundamentalism is, not surprisingly, highest in Poland, and lowest in the Czech Republic. Anomie scores are considerably high in Slovakia and Hungary and lowest in Poland. Sexual concerns are also pretty high in Poland, while they show low levels in the Czech Republic. Authoritarian aggression is highest in Hungary and lowest in Poland. In general, the relation between antisemitism and authoritarianism is not self-evident, even at first glance. In Poland, where the overall authoritarianism (the mean of the six subscales) score is highest among the four countries, the ratio of antisemites is by far the highest, yet we can find the lowest ratio of antisemites in the country where the authoritarianism score is the second highest, i.e., in Hungary.

#### *Predictors of Antisemitism*

Table 4 displays our results in evaluating factors that are significant in predicting antisemitism. Because the dependent variable we want to predict is dichotomous, we used logistic regression calculations to decide these predicting factors and the order of their predicting power.

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the nineties—namely, that the results of a research initiated by the American Jewish Committee in 1991 and a study conducted by researchers in the sociology department at the University of Vienna in the autumn of 1995 and spring of 1996 (both are quoted by Kovács, 2011) reflect a relatively high level of political antisemitism but a relatively low level of religious and discriminative antisemitism in Hungary compared to other countries in the region. The AJS study in 1991 found almost the same order in discriminative antisemitism in the region than the EVS 2008 research we used for this study: the ratio of respondents who said they would prefer not to have Jewish neighbors was the highest in Poland, then came the Slovaks, then the Czechs (the former two from a Czechoslovakian sample), and the study found the lowest results in Hungary. However, the fact that the appearance of Jobbik—a party that uses blatant antisemitic messages—on this party landscape raised significantly the level of visible antisemites in Hungary (the so-called “Jobbik effect”; see Kovács, 2011, and in this issue of the *JSA* on antisemitism in Europe) and decreasing figures of antisemitism in Poland could have changed the order among countries in the region.

TABLE 4  
PREDICTORS OF ANTISEMITISM

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Conventionalism	-.517	.198	6.803	1	.009**	.596
Authoritarian anti-establishment attitudes	.557	.164	11.509	1	.001**	1.746
Authoritarian aggression	.312	.128	5.945	1	.015*	1.366
Religious fundamentalism	.112	.138	.662	1	.416	1.119
Anomie	.494	.169	8.557	1	.003**	1.639
Sex	.189	.157	1.441	1	.230	1.208
CONSTANT	-2.597	.194	178.355	1	.000	.074

We found the following variables to be significant predictors of antisemitism:

- Authoritarian anti-establishment attitudes. This factor seems to be the strongest predictor of traditional antisemitism ( $B = .557$ ,  $p = 0.001$ ,  $\text{Exp B [B]} = 1.746$ ).
- Anomie. Outgroup members are the main target of endemic mistrust, including the Jews ( $B = .494$ ,  $p = 0.03$ ,  $\text{Exp B [B]} = 1.639$ ). From this premise, we can hypothesize that this variable will be a significant predictor of hostilities toward other kinds of minorities as well (see below).
- Conventionalism. Surprisingly, this attitude set seems to be *negatively* associated with discriminative prejudice toward Jews ( $B = -.517$ ,  $p = .009$ ,  $\text{Exp B [B]} = 0.596$ ).
- Authoritarian aggression. The justification of the radical tools of punishment (in our case, the death penalty) appears to be a significant positive predictor of antisemitism ( $B = .312$ ,  $p = 0.15$ ,  $\text{Exp [B]} = 1.366$ ). Aggression toward the weak, however, is not expected to be associated only with antisemitism, but with prejudices toward other ethnic outgroups as well.

We couldn't find a significant impact from the following two dimensions of authoritarianism on antisemitism:

1. Religious fundamentalism. Contrary to the original (Adorno et al., 1950) and also the revised (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981) approaches of authoritarianism, religious beliefs do not seem to be strongly associated with discriminative antisemitism. If we analyze the items one by one, without putting other variables in the logistic model, we can find that a belief in heaven and hell is a view that is a significant predictor of antisemitism, but that its explanatory power disappears after putting stronger predictors in the model.
2. Sex. The overt interest in sexual affairs due to the projection of unconscious motives to outgroups (attributing them especially to Jews, who are generally and stereotypically regarded as a sexually hyperactive group, without any inhibitions) is a core idea of the psy-

TABLE 5  
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

Socio-demographic variables (reference category in parentheses, N = 4.562)	Wald Statistic	Significancy (Wald)	Odds Ratio Exp (B)
Sex (male)	5.048	0.025	0.806
Age (15-24)	1.131	0.951	
25-34	0.065	0.799	0.944
35-44	0.006	0.936	0.982
45-54	0.041	0.839	0.957
55-64	0.047	0.829	0.949
65+	0.616	0.433	0.805
Highest level of education (primary education or lower)	16.493	0.001	
Lower secondary education	6.334	0.012	0.582
Upper secondary education	8.239	0.004	0.576
Tertiary education	16.367	0.000	0.370
Employment status (employed)	9.023	0.061	
Retired	0.442	0.506	0.882
Unemployed	2.033	0.154	0.746
Student	0.028	0.867	0.957
Other inactive	7.901	0.005	0.531
Household income (low)	5.589	0.061	
Medium	3.750	0.053	0.797
High	4.635	0.031	0.752
Size of town (0-2,000)	16.735	0.001	
2,000-50,000	16.313	0.000	0.633
50,000-500,000	1.608	0.205	0.845
500,000+	1.794	0.180	0.793
Religion (religious)	7.597	0.022	
Not religious	2.350	0.125	0.843
Convinced atheist	3.575	0.059	1.403
Constant	2.745	0.098	0.587
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.014		
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.028		
Significancy (Model)	0.000		

choanalytically oriented original authoritarianism theory, but this idea does not seem to be supported by our results.

The overall explanatory power of this model, however, seems to be low (Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = .021).

Because the examination of the background factors of antisemitism was the focus of our interest, we calculated a logistic regression model predicting the antisemitism based on socio-demographic variables (Table 5). The overall explanatory power of this model was almost equally as low as that of the authoritarian attitudes (Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = 0.028, p = 0.000). Education level (less educated persons were more likely to be antisemites),

gender (men were more likely to be antisemites), size of the town (inhabitants of small villages were more likely to be antisemites), and religion (religious people were more likely to be antisemites) proved to be significant predictors of antisemitism. The predicting power of age, employment status, and household income was not significant.

### *Anti-Roma Attitudes*

In order to decide if the different dimensions of authoritarianism that were found to be significantly predicting antisemitism are “antisemitism-specific,” we ran the same logistic regression model, putting discriminatory attitudes toward Roma in the model as the dependent variable (Table 6), along with authoritarian attitudes among the independent variables.

This model also has weak explanatory power that does not differ from the one we established for the explanation of antisemitism (Nagelkerke  $R^2 = .027$ ).

In this case, we found that anomie had stronger predicting power ( $B = .551$ ,  $p = 0.000$ ,  $\text{Exp [B]} = 1.736$ ). Authoritarian aggression (support for the death penalty) is also a significant predictor of anti-Roma attitudes ( $B = .294$ ,  $p = 0.001$ ,  $\text{Exp [B]} = 1.342$ ). Religious fundamentalism is a predictor as well of discriminative anti-Roma prejudice, but in the reverse direction—which means that the stronger the (overwhelmingly Christian) religious beliefs are, the less likelihood there is that the person rejects a Roma as his or her neighbor ( $B = -.394$ ,  $p = 0.000$ ,  $\text{Exp [B]} = .674$ ). The remaining three dimensions (conventionalism, sexuality, authoritarian anti-establishment attitudes) don’t seem to be significant predictors of anti-Romaism.

The three most important differing factors within this logistic regression model and the one that examines antisemitism are:

- Authoritarian anti-establishment attitudes, which was the most important authoritarian dimension predicting antisemitism, yet doesn’t have a significant impact on anti-Romaism;
- Conventionalism, which is not associated with anti-Roma prejudices;
- Religious fundamentalism, which seems to be associated with pro-Roma sentiments (while in the case of antisemitism, there was no significant association, and the direction was positive).

TABLE 6  
PREDICTORS OF ANTI-ROMAISM

Variables	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Conventionalism	.107	.128	.707	1	.400	1.113
Authoritarian anti-establishment attitudes	-.032	.105	.092	1	.761	.969
Authoritarian aggression	.294	.087	11.563	1	.001	1.342
Religious fundamentalism	-.394	.088	20.175	1	.000	.674
Anomie	.551	.103	28.593	1	.000	1.736
Sex	.078	.101	.588	1	.443	1.081
CONSTANT	-.560	.118	22.477	1	.000	.571

*Stereotypes Toward the Abstract Ethnic Outgroup  
(people of a different race)*

In order to examine the original idea of the theory of the authoritarian personality, which stated that authoritarianism is associated with general ethnocentrism, we ran the same regression model using “people of a different race” as the dependent variable (Table 7). In this case, we saw a different template of predictors than in the previous cases. The explanatory power was on the same low level as the previous cases (Nagelkerke  $R^2 = .02$ ).

TABLE 7  
PREDICTORS OF GENERALIZED RACISM

Variables	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Conventionalism	-.145	.181	.639	1	.424	.865
Authoritarian anti-establishment attitudes	.289	.149	3.767	1	.052	1.335
Authoritarian aggression	-.010	.123	.006	1	.937	.990
Religious fundamentalism	-.261	.126	4.315	1	.038	.770
Anomie	.728	.156	21.640	1	.000	2.070
Sex	.303	.143	4.504	1	.034	1.354
CONSTANT	-2.374	.179	176.662	1	.000	.093

We found a significant impact in the case of three variables (Table 7): anomie, with a very strong predicting power ( $B = .728$ ,  $p = 0.000$ ,  $\text{Exp [B]} = 2.070$ ); sexuality ( $B = .303$ ,  $p = 0.034$ ,  $\text{Exp [B]} = 1.354$ ); and religious fundamentalism ( $p = 0.38$ ;  $B = .261$ ,  $\text{Exp [B]} = .770$ )—a negative direction.

The distinctive feature of this model lies in the significant predictor power of sexuality on rejecting “people from a different race” (see the possible explanations below).

#### CONCLUSIONS

Our “back to the roots” approach seemed to bring about some results that are far from being self-evident. In short, the more-than-60-year-old finding of the authors of *TAP* on the role of authoritarianism behind antisemitism still appears to return some truth. The authoritarian attitude syndrome, however, doesn’t seem to be a robust or strong predictor of antisemitism. On the other hand, our findings seem to support Raden’s (1999) finding on the diminished association between authoritarianism and antisemitism. Authoritarian attitudes don’t seem to be better predictors of antisemitism than of anti-Roma attitudes in Visegrad countries—a result that seems to support the ethnocentrism concept of Adorno and his colleagues.

The components of antisemitism, authoritarian anti-establishment attitudes, conventionalism, authoritarian aggression, sex, and anomie are found to be significant determinants of discriminative antisemitism.

#### *Authoritarian Anti-Establishment Attitudes*

This variable seems to be the most important authoritarian component predicting antisemitism. Those who score high authoritarian anti-establishment points have a 1.75 times higher chance of being antisemites than the ones who have low scores on antisemitism. Furthermore, this submissive, democracy-critical stance seems to be a distinctive, “antisemitism specific” predictor: it is neither a significant predictor of anti-Roma sentiments nor of generalized racism.

The need for a strong leader, along with a critical attitude toward democracy due to its inefficiency and inability to maintain order and discipline, is the central idea behind all authoritarian ideologies. Its specific relation to antisemitism may be rooted in the view that democracies are soft, liberal, “Jewish,” or “Jew-created” systems, or, in more radical form, tools for realizing plans of the Jewish world conspiracy. This is a typical myth of the authoritarian movements and was the central idea behind the *Protocols of Elders of Zion*, which influenced the development of the “Völkisch” ideology that was taken up by Nazi Germany (Cohn, 1996). If we accept that non-democratic authoritarian submissive attitudes are an important background factor behind antisemitism, we may conclude that antisemitism can

be (even if not in all cases, of course) a code of an anti-establishment, democracy-critical stance and an anti-status quo position.

### *Conventionalism*

Surprisingly, this variable was found to be a negative predictor of antisemitism: the high level of conventionalism (agreement with the items: “Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect them”; “Obedience should be learned by the children”; “Greater respect for authority is important in the future”) was found to reduce the likelihood that the respondent is antisemitic by 40 percent (Exp [B] = .596). The need to obey and follow the rules is a key feature of any kind of authoritarian ideology. A plausible explanation may be that antisemitism can be more strongly related to conventionalism in countries where antisemitism is a conventional norm. It could have fit the reality when Adorno and his colleagues made their investigations in the ’30s in Germany and ’40s in the United States, but is definitely not currently true for the countries of post-Holocaust Europe. And it is obvious from the low rate of respondents who expressed their open antisemitic opinions (this view is shared by only 12% of the adult population in these societies; see Table 2, which reinforces that discriminative antisemitism is far from being a norm. The fact that we didn’t find a similar negative relation between conventionalism and anti-Romaism, a tendency that is much more widespread in these societies (a 45% average is anti-Roma) seems to support this explanation. On the other hand, this result raises the question of whether conventionalism and obedience are still the most important features of contemporary authoritarian movements. Krekó and Kovács (2012), for example, have found in their investigations of the voters of Jobbik (an openly antisemitic and authoritarian ultranationalist parliamentary party in Hungary) that they were the second least traditionalist and the least conventionalist group among all voter groups. These results indicate that authoritarianism nowadays, when the core norms of democracy have become widespread in European countries (even, of course, if not totally consensual), and liberal democracy became the norm itself, authoritarianism is much more about questioning and rejecting the status quo and its ruling norms (including tolerance toward Jews) than maintaining them. Contemporary authoritarianism, therefore, should be interpreted more as a revolutionary or rebellious attitude set rather than a conventional and conformist one.



*Authoritarian Aggression*

Authoritarian aggression (in this case: support for capital punishment), according to the original theory in *TAP*, provides a good possibility for the authoritarian personality to have an outlet for its unconscious impulses and hostility that can be directed, without punishment, toward the minority and deviant groups in society (see also Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, & Craig, 1999). In the revised, non-psychoanalytic interpretation of Adorno's theory of right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981), aggression also plays a central role when it asserts that referring to traditional values and authorities serves as a reward for aggression toward minorities. It seems to be a general feature behind ethnocentrism that proved to be a significant predictor of both antisemitism and anti-Roma attitudes.

*Sex*

According to our results, sexuality—the “exaggerated concern with sexual goings-on” (Adorno et al., 1950)—and prudishness are not predictors of antisemitism. The overt interest in sexual affairs as the projection of the unacceptable sexual motives to outgroups is a core idea of the psychoanalytic authoritarianism theory. Because Jews are stereotypically regarded as a sexually hyperactive, promiscuous group who lack inhibitions, it would be plausible to think that prudishness has an impact on antisemitism—a linking that is not supported by the data. On the other hand, this kind of sexual concern seems to be a significant predictor of generalized racism. Such a finding may be explained partly by a general tendency of the “racist” respondents to reject any kind of new stimuli (including “atypical” sexual habits) as well as a motive for maintaining racial and ethnic purity, the “caste-maintenance orientation,” as two new scholars of authoritarianism put it (Sidanius & Pratto, 2004).

*Anomie*

The endemic mistrust toward other people is a predictor of all the three discriminative attitudes examined: antisemitism, anti-Romaism, and generalized racism. Negative, hostile attitudes toward others and the cynical view that everybody is fighting for his or her self-interest are inherent features of the “jungle fighter” approach of authoritarian people, connected to the Social Darwinist view that everybody should fight for his or her own survival. The mistrust of authoritarians is, not surprisingly, strongly articulated toward ethnic outgroups, i.e., the “Strangers.”

*Religious Fundamentalism*

Religious fundamentalism (in this case, strong Christian religiosity), contrary to common wisdom and the findings of former studies, does not seem to be significantly related to discriminative antisemitism. On the other hand, we could establish the significant predictive power of religiousness in the socio-demographic model; furthermore, stronger (Christian) religiosity reduces the chance that the respondent is prejudiced against Roma and has a generalized racist attitude.

Socio-demographic variables also provide a weak explanation for the variance of discriminative antisemitism. Contrary to the general explanation of the Frankfurt School—that social status provides a key to understanding antisemitism and authoritarianism—employment status and income do not explain antisemitism. The prototypical antisemite, according to our data, is minimally educated, male, lives in a village, and is religious. What other demographic and attitude factors may better explain antisemitism should be the target of researches in the future.

This research reveals both the advantages and the disadvantages of using international survey databases at the same time. The advantage is that it allows the researcher to use bigger representative samples and therefore reach more well-founded and better underpinned conclusions regarding the background factors of the target of his or her interest (in our case, antisemitism) that go beyond country-specific researches; the disadvantage is that the measurement of antisemitism (if it is included) is oversimplified in these datasets and therefore is unable to capture the variety of shades of antisemitism. Involving other dimensions of antisemitism (e.g., religious, political) in the investigations may lead to a more sophisticated and even a slightly different picture.<sup>3</sup>

And, of course, the question remains: if not really authoritarianism and not really socio-demographics, what then can explain antisemitism? If we take the above-mentioned code function of antisemitism seriously, party preferences, strong national identification (especially chauvinistic nationalism), and identity and status threats may be the most important factors to better explain prejudices against the Jews—especially political antisemitism and maybe discriminatory antisemitism as well. Another possible explanation may be that discriminatory antisemitism, which is becoming more

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3. The EVS database seems to be a good tool to use for comparing to compare the construct on authoritarianism in these countries. Given that in post-socialist countries there hasn't been any thorough comparative representative research using traditional scales of authoritarianism (F scale, D scale, RWA scale), there is no better solution than using these international "giga-surveys."

marginalized nowadays as an anachronistic form of hostility against the Jews and less loudly articulated by mainstream political forces,<sup>4</sup> may have lost its political psychological importance, giving way to the more subtle and modern forms of political antisemitism and anti-Zionism—and therefore as an “empty” attitude is not deeply embedded in any definable set of attitudes.

But to decide which explanation may be correct, we should analyze datasets in the future, when we are likely to have a better, multidimensional measurement of antisemitism and a broader range of background factors we can use for explaining antisemitism at the same time.

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4. Jobbik in Hungary may be a notable exception, but it is important to mention that their first real political success (entering into the European parliament by gathering 15 percent of the votes) happened in June 2009, after this survey was conducted; therefore, the political impact of Jobbik was much more emphatic afterward.

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