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The Jewish Population of Russia, 1989–1995

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A new stage in the dynamics of the Jewish population of the Russian Federation began in 1989. A mass emigration of the Jews from the former Soviet Union (FSU)—which has been named the "great exodus"—seriously exacerbated the already existing unfavorable population dynamics. However, the recent level of assimilation and demographic erosion are not a simple consequence of this great exodus; they have deep roots in the Jewish population of contemporary Russia.

Recent Russian demographic statistics contain the richest data available on the Jewish population in the FSU, and based on this source we can develop a rather detailed picture of Jewish emigration, assimilation and demographic erosion.[1]

1. Population Decrease

According to the last official Soviet census (of 1989), the Jewish population of Russia at the start of the great exodus was about 570,000.[2] This number is based on census data, which depend entirely on the self-declaration of respondents in the census. Conceptually, this corresponds to what has been defined as the "core" Jewish population.[3]

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1. Throughout this article only official data of the Russian Central Statistical Administration (*Goskomstat Rossii*) have been used. Methods to estimate some of the figures presented and other related information can be found in: M. Tolts, "The Balance of Births and Deaths among Soviet Jewry," *JJT* 2(18) (1992), pp. 13–26; idem, "Jews in the Russian Republic since the Second World War: The Dynamics of Demographic Erosion," *International Population Conference, Montreal 1993: Proceedings*, Vol. 3 (Liège, 1993), pp. 99–111; idem, "Trends in Soviet Jewish Demography since the Second World War," in Y. Ro'i, ed., *Jews and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union* (London, 1995), pp. 365–382; idem, "The Interrelationship between Emigration and the Socio-Demographic Profile of Russian Jewry," in N. Lewin-Epstein, Y. Ro'i, and P. Ritterband, eds., *Russian Jews on Three Continents* (London, in press), pp. 147–176.
2. In Soviet/Russian censuses, not all Mountain Jews were recorded as Jews; others were listed separately as "Tats." The estimates here include the latter as well. (On the Mountain Jews, see M. Altshuler, *Yehudei mizraḥ kavkaz* (The Jews of the Eastern Caucasus) (Jerusalem, 1990).
3. S. DellaPergola, "Jewish Demography," in J. Wertheimer, ed., *The Modern Jewish Experience* (New York, 1993), p. 277.

The "core" Jewish population is the aggregate of all those who, when asked, identified themselves as Jews, or in the case of children, were identified as such by their parents; it does not include persons of Jewish origin who reported another ethnic nationality in the census. The alternative definition of the "enlarged" Jewish population includes Jews and their non-Jewish family members. In Russia today this group is significantly larger than the "core" Jewish population (see below).

At the same time, according to Jewish religious law *(halakhah)*, anyone whose mother is Jewish is himself Jewish. The number of Russia's Jews, which includes non-Jews with Jewish maternal antecedents, was estimated at between 700,000 and 800,000 for 1989.[4]

The Russian microcensus of February 14, 1994, which encompassed a 5% representative sample of the total population, presented a new base for the estimate of the "core" Jewish population. Accordingly, this was estimated at about 409,000 for the microcensus date.[5]

By the start of 1996, the number of Jews in Russia had decreased to approximately 360,000 (Table 1). The estimated figures show that during the first seven years of the great exodus, the total number of Jews in Russia fell by 37%. During the same period, the total number of Jews in the entire FSU dropped by 55%, from 1,480,000 to 660,000.

Table 1
Dynamics of the Jewish Population in Russia and the FSU, 1989-1996
(thousands)

	Number of Jews[a]			Decrease,
	1989[b]	1994	1996	1989-1996
Russia	570	409[c]	360[d]	210
Other NIS	910	...	300[e]	610
FSU	1480	...	660	820
Russia as % of FSU	39	50	55	26

a. "Core" Jewish population, including "Tats."
b. Revised estimate based on the 1989 census data.
c. Estimate based on the 1994 microcensus sample.
d. Estimate based on the 1994 microcensus sample, and subsequent vital and migration statistics.
e. Estimate based on the 1989 census data, and subsequent vital and migration statistics.

Sources: 1989 census and 1994 microcensus; vital and migration statistics.

It should be noted that the decrease of the Jewish population in the FSU was much more rapid outside the Russian Federation. Between 1989 and 1996, the Jewish population of the other Newly Independent States (NIS) declined dramatically, from 910,000 to 300,000.

4. M. Altshuler, "Yehudim ve-Rusim—1991" (Jews and Russians—1991), in D. Prital, ed., *Yehudei Berit ha-mo'aẓot* (The Jews of the Soviet Union) 15 (1992), p. 32. Unfortunately, I do not know of any more recent scholarly estimate for this category of Russia's Jews.
5. See note 2.

At the start of the great exodus, Russia's Jews made up 39% of the total number of Jews in the FSU. Between 1989 and 1996, however, the population decline of Russian Jewry was only 26% of the total Jewish population decline in the FSU. As a result, by the beginning of 1994 Russia's Jews accounted for half the total number of Jews in the FSU; today this share is even greater—about 55%.

This relatively moderate shrinkage of the Jewish population in Russia is due mostly to the character of migration.

2. Migratory Movements[6]

According to official Russian data, 121,900 Jews left Russia between 1989 and 1993. This figure includes 12,000 Jews who emigrated to other parts of the FSU. In the same period, 109,900 Jews emigrated to countries outside the FSU (Table 2).

Table 2
Registered International Migration Events of the Jews[a] in Russia, 1989–1995
(thousands)

Registered events	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Number of arrivals	3.0	3.1	2.4	2.8	2.8	3.5	2.8
from:							
other parts of the FSU	2.9	2.9	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.7	2.0
outside the FSU	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8
Number of departures	14.0	31.9	33.4	23.1	19.5	16.0	13.9
to:							
other parts of the FSU	3.0	3.3	2.4	2.0	1.3	0.8	0.7
outside the FSU	11.0	28.6	31.0	21.1	18.2	15.2	13.2
Migratory balance	-11.0	-28.8	-31.0	-20.3	-16.7	-12.5	-11.1
with:							
other parts of the FSU	-0.1	-0.4	-0.3	0.2	0.8	1.9	1.3
outside the FSU	-10.9	-28.4	-30.7	-20.5	-17.5	-14.4	-12.4
Rate of emigration outside the FSU, per 1,000 Jews	21	56	65	48	44	39	36

a. Excluding "Tats."

Sources: Goskomstat Rossii, *Demograficheskii ezhegodnik Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1993* (Demographic yearbook of the Russian Federation 1993) (Moscow, 1994), pp. 400–401; idem, *Chislennost' i migratsiia naseleniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 1993 g.* (Size and migration of the population of the Russian Federation in 1993) (Moscow, 1994), pp. 45, 47, 49; idem, *Chislennost' i migratsiia . . . v 1994 g.* (Moscow, 1995), pp. 44, 46, 48; idem, *Chislennost' i migratsiia . . . v 1995 g.* (Moscow, 1996), pp. 42, 44, 46; A. G. Vishnevskii, ed., *Naselenie Rossii* (Population of Russia) (Moscow, 1994), p. 143; and unpublished Goskomstat Rossii data.

In 1989–1993, 12,200 Jews arrived in Russia from other parts of the FSU; the registered migratory balance for Russia's Jews with other parts of the FSU was slightly positive—about 200. At the same time, 1,900 Jews immigrated to Russia from out-

6. During the Soviet era, data on international migration were considered to be state secrets.

side the FSU. For example, in the last year of the period, the registered number of such immigrants was about 700. Thus, we arrived at the conclusion that in 1989–1993 the total recorded negative Jewish migratory balance for Russia was 107,800.

The data show that total emigration peaked in 1990–1991, after which it decreased steadily; in 1995 the total number of emigrants just about equaled the 1989 figure. If we take into account the decrease in the Jewish population number, however, the rate of emigration in 1995 was much higher than in the first year of the great exodus.

The data also show that, since 1992, Russia's Jews have had a positive migratory balance with other parts of the FSU. In the two years 1994 and 1995, this was a substantial factor in compensating for the negative migratory balance with countries outside the FSU. Furthermore, we may assume that official data to some extent underestimated the actual number of Jewish immigrants from other parts of the FSU, because these data are based on Ministry of Internal Affairs registration (with the local police *[militia]* department), which in turn is dependent on residence permits *(propiska)*.

For Jewish emigration to other parts of the FSU, official Russian statistics published only one figure for each year. The situation differs for statistics of Jewish emigration to places outside the FSU. In addition to the figures cited above, official Russian statistics[7] provided data on Jews who emigrated "for permanent residence abroad," which are lower: 14,047 in 1993, 13,645 in 1994 and 12,798 in 1995. These latter data, of course do not include people who changed their status in Israel from tourist to immigrant *(oleh)* or became illegal immigrants (from the Russian point of view) elsewhere.

Also published are the statistics of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, by country of destination, based on exit visas for permanent residence abroad.[8] However, these published data are not broken down by ethnic nationality, and thus cannot help us in the evaluation of Jewish emigration statistics. Moreover, according to the same source, the number of immigrants to Russia from Israel was implausibly small.[9] Since official Russian statistics on international migration are somewhat self-contradictory, the Russian-Jewish migratory balance cannot be determined precisely.

A better understanding of Russian migration statistics demands interpretation of the enumerated migration events according to both departmental instructions and knowledge of how these were fulfilled in practice, information which in many cases is not accessible to us. However, some points can now be defined more precisely.

All the data presented indicate the number of Jewish migrants on the basis of the ethnic nationality recorded in their internal passports. For children who migrated up to the age of 16 (who did not have such passports), nationality was established on

7. See sources to Table 2.
8. Ibid. On these data see Zh. Zaionchkovskaia, "Migratsionnye sviazi Rossii posle raspada SSSR" (Migration relations of Russia after the dissolution of the USSR) in *Migratsionnye protsessy posle raspada SSSR* (Migration processes after the dissolution of the USSR) (Moscow, 1994), p. 35.
9. E.g., 2 in 1989, 9 in 1990, 8 in 1991, 25 in 1992, 31 in 1993, 20 in 1994, and 26 in 1995 (see Goskomstat Rossii, *Rossiia v tsifrakh* [Russia in numbers] [Moscow, 1996], p. 29).

the basis of the parents' nationality. In the case of a migrant child whose parents belonged to different ethnic nationalities according to their passports, the child was recorded as having the nationality of the parent in whose registered form (*listok ubytiia*) he/she was recorded;[10] this was usually the mother's.

A majority of scholars agree that Soviet/Russian census figures on ethnic nationality (adults only) correspond very closely with "legal" ethnic nationality as recorded in internal passports. Thus migration figures for adults correspond very closely with the census. However, all data on the offspring of mixed couples show a clear preference for non-Jewish ethnic affiliation for these children (see below). Consequently, migration data for children under 16 overrepresented Jews when compared with census data.

One may estimate that in the first five years of the great exodus, 1989–1993, 55% of the approximately 200,000 Jews and their non-Jewish family members who emigrated from Russia to places outside the FSU were counted by Russian statistics as Jews. According to official Russian data, the percentage of Jews among those who emigrated to Israel fell from 64% in the second part of 1992 to 60% in 1993, 58% in 1994, and 53% in 1995.[11]

The negative migratory balance was an important factor in the recent Jewish population decline in Russia. As we shall see below, however, the negative vital balance also made a significant contribution to this decline.

3. The Role of Vital Balance

Between the 1989 census and the 1994 microcensus, the Jewish population of Russia fell by 150,000 (this figure does not include the Mountain Jews recorded as "Tats"). Unfortunately, if we want to estimate which part of the drop was due to migration, and which to the negative vital balance, we cannot directly compare this figure with the registered migration balance, which is based on rather problematic statistics.

The method employed here is to estimate the population change due to the vital balance and then to compare it with the total decline in population. In a reconstruction of the Jewish vital balance we must decide which category of births to include.

In an analysis of Jewish fertility, four categories of births may be used: births to Jewish mothers, births to endogamous Jewish couples, all births of children to at least one Jewish parent, and "effectively Jewish" births. The last category indicates the number of newborns who are identified as Jews, and thus corresponds to census figures. This category of births, which includes some children born to mixed couples, has been used in our estimate of the vital balance.

Estimated for the period between the 1989 census and the 1994 microcensus, the

10. G. G. Melik'ian et al., eds., *Narodonaselenie, Entsiklopedicheskii slovar'* (Population, an encyclopedic dictionary) (Moscow, 1994), p. 521.

11. See sources to Table 2. According to the *halakhic* approach, of course, the proportion of Jews among the *olim* was much higher (S. DellaPergola, "The Global Context of Migration to Israel," forthcoming).

vital balance was negative: the number of Jewish deaths exceeded the number of "effectively Jewish" births by about 57,000 (Table 3; data adjusted for the intercensal period). The average annual negative vital balance in this period was more than 11,000; this factor accounted for 38% of the total decrease in the period. Thus, despite large-scale emigration, the role of the negative vital balance was significant. Moreover, since 1994 this factor has approached the size of the migratory balance (compare Appendix 1 and Table 2).

Table 3
Decrease of the Jewish Population[a] in Russia
between the 1989 Census and the 1994 Microcensus

Population and decrease	Thousands
Jewish population	
1989	551
1994	401
Total decrease	150
due to:	
Vital balance[b]	57
Other factors[c]	93
Vital balance as % of total decrease	38

a. Excluding "Tats."
b. Balance of "effectively Jewish" births and Jewish deaths.
c. This figure consists mostly of negative migratory balance; but also, though much less significantly, of changes in ethnic identification, as well as inconsistent classification of children of mixed origin according to censuses, vital statistics and migration statistics. It was estimated residually, by subtracting the vital balance estimate from the total decrease.

Sources: 1989 census and 1994 microcensus; Appendix 1.

For the period between the 1989 census and the 1994 microcensus, the total size of other factors was estimated at 93,000. If we compare this figure with the previous finding that the recorded negative migratory balance of Russia's Jewish population was 107,800, we see that it is rather close to this negative balance.

The actual gap between the two figures is even smaller if we consider the peculiarities of Russian migration statistics, which we delineated above, and is within a reasonable margin of error for raw data and known discrepancies in the enumeration of specific sectors in the Jewish population (i.e., children under the age of 16) in censuses and other statistics.

The negative migratory and vital balances are the major causes for the dynamics of Russia's Jewish population decline; there do not seem to be any other important factors that could seriously offset these negative balances (such as reaffiliation of offspring of mixed couples or a mass influx of crypto-Jews). This coincides with the 1994 microcensus findings on the very low Jewish ethnic affiliation of offspring of mixed marriages (see below).

The negative balance of births and deaths appeared even before the start of the sizable emigration in the 1970s and would have undermined the demographic base of Russia's Jews even in the absence of emigration. Let us look at the dynamics of the separate factors of the negative vital balance during the period.

4. Fertility Decline and Stability of Longevity

In 1988–1989, the number of births to Jewish mothers was 6,895; by 1993–1994, the number had declined by 4,662 (see Appendix 1). However, emigration and its consequences were not the main cause of this dramatic decline.

We arrive at this surprising conclusion by estimating the expected number of births in 1993–1994, assuming that the age composition and absolute number of Jewish women remained as it was in 1989 (Table 4). According to our estimate, even if the age composition did not change, the decrease in the number of births should have been 3,158. Thus, 68% of the recorded decrease cannot be attributed to the change in age composition that was a consequence of mass emigration.

Table 4
Dynamics of the Number of Births to Jewish Mothers in Russia, 1988–1989 to 1993–1994

	Births		
	Registered	Expected, assuming age composition as in 1989[a]	Expected as % of registered
1988–1989	6,895	6,895	100
1993–1994	2,233	3,737	167
Decrease	4,662	3,158	68[b]

a. According to actual age-sex fertility rates.
b. Percent of decrease due to change in fertility.
Sources: Goskomstat Rossii, vital statistics and 1989 census.

We must seek another cause. Indeed, between 1988–1989 and 1993–1994 the total fertility rate[12] of Russia's Jewish population fell dramatically, by 46%—from 1.5 to 0.8. This coincides with the general negative dynamics of fertility in Russia during this period.[13] Between 1988 and 1994, however, the fertility indicator for the total urban population fell by only 34%, from 1.9 to 1.25 (Table 5). In 1994, even in the two major cities—Moscow and St. Petersburg—the total fertility rate was higher than that of the Jewish population: 1.1 and 1.0, respectively.[14]

12. Total fertility rate is the average number of children that a woman would bear in her lifetime assuming that current fertility remains stable.
13. See, for example, L. E. Darsky and G. A. Bondarskaya, "Fertility in Russia 1985–1994: Situational Crisis or Transition Continuation," paper presented at the 3rd European Population Conference (Milan, 1995).
14. Goskomstat Rossii, *Demograficheskii ezhegodnik Rossii* (Demographic yearbook of Russia) (Moscow, 1995), pp. 80–81.

Table 5
Total Fertility Rate and Life Expectancy at Birth, for Jews and Total Urban Population in Russia, 1988–1989 and 1993–1994

	Males		Females	
	Jews[a]	Total urban population[b]	Jews[a]	Total urban population[b]
Total fertility rate				
1988–1989			1.492	1.896
1993–1994			0.8	1.249
Life expectancy at birth				
1988–1989	69.7	65.4	73.5	74.2
1993–1994	69.6	57.9	73.2	71.3

a. Author's estimates for 1993–1994, based on indirect method.
b. Indicators for 1988 and 1994, respectively.
Sources: Goskomstat Rossii, *Demograficheskii ezhegodnik Rossii* (Moscow, 1995), pp. 78, 89; Statkomitet of the CIS, *Demographic Yearbook 1993* (Moscow, 1995), pp. 245, 257.

One special aspect of the interrelationship between emigration and Jewish fertility in Russia should perhaps be noted here. According to Israeli statistics, the level of fertility among immigrants (*olim*) from the FSU was rather high during their first year in the country:[15] some Jewish women obviously preferred to give birth in Israel.

Actually, the most acute demographic problem in contemporary Russia in general is mortality;[16] the total Russian population has the lowest life expectancy for males of all the developed countries. Between 1988 and 1994, male life expectancy within the total Russian urban population fell by 7.5 years, and the difference between the life expectancy of these males and of Jewish males increased dramatically, to about 12 years. In 1994, male life expectancy among the total urban population was only 57.9.

For 1993–1994, however, the life expectancy of Russian male Jews has been estimated at 69.6, which is about the same level as at the end of the 1980s (Table 5). Given the demographic situation of contemporary Russia, the life expectancy of Jewish males is relatively very good.

From these figures we see that the Jewish population has adapted to the recent economic transition in Russia better than the rest of the population.[17] Nor were the

15. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Immigrant Population from the Former USSR 1994: Demographic Trends* (Jerusalem, 1996), p. 51.
16. See, for example: E. M. Andreev, "The Last [*sic*] Mortality Trends in Russia," paper presented at the 3rd European Population Conference (Milan, 1995); A. Avdeev, A. Blum, and S. Zakharov, *La mortalité en Russie a-t-elle vraiment augmenté brutalement entre 1991 et 1995?* (Did mortality in Russia really increase drastically between 1991 and 1995?) (Paris, 1996).
17. On this problem for the total Russian population see, for example, T. Heleniak, "Economic Transition and Demographic Change in Russia, 1989–1995," *Post-Soviet Geography* 36(7) (1995), pp. 451–453.

dynamics of Jewish life expectancy lowered by the selective character of mass emigration, as one might have supposed. Although unwell people usually have less tendency to migrate and would be expected to raise Jewish mortality somewhat, this factor was offset by successful Jewish socioeconomic adaptation.

The data clearly show that the recent vital crisis of Russia's Jews is not linked to mortality and longevity, but rather to a dramatic decline in the fertility level.

5. Vital Balance and Aging

After the start of the great exodus, the vital balance of Russian Jewry worsened. From 1988–1989 to 1993–1994, the number of births to Jewish mothers dropped by more than half, from 6.3 to 2.8 per 1,000 Jews. During the same period, the Jewish death rate rose by 23%, from 24.4 to 30 per 1,000. Thus the negative balance of births and deaths increased by 50%, to more than 27 per 1,000 Jews (Table 6).

Table 6
Balance of Crude Birth Rates to Jewish Mothers and Jewish Death Rates, Russia and other Republics of FSU, 1988–1989 and 1993–1994
(per 1,000 Jews)

	Birth rate		Death rate		Balance	
	1988–1989	1993–1994	1988–1989	1993–1994	1988–1989	1993–1994
Russia	6.3	2.8	24.4	30.0	-18.1	-27.2
Ukraine	6.6	4.2	23.4	35.9	-16.8	-31.7
Belorussia	8.2	5.2[a]	17.9	32.6[a]	-9.7	-27.4
Latvia	7.0	2.7[b]	18.3	23.5[b]	-11.3	-20.8
Moldavia	7.8	5.9[a]	17.1	34.6[a]	-9.3	-28.7
Uzbekistan	13.4	8.7[a]	10.9	17.2[a]	2.5	-8.5

a. 1993 b. 1994

Sources: U. O. Schmelz and S. DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population, 1993", *American Jewish Year Book 1995* (Philadelphia, 1995), pp. 478, 486; State Statistics Committee of the Republic of Latvia, *1995 Statistical Yearbook of Latvia* (Riga, 1995), pp. 61, 66; Statkomitet of the CIS, *Demographic Yearbook 1994* (Moscow, 1995), pp. 89, 151, 171, 231; Tolts, "The Balance of Births and Deaths," p. 18; Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics, *Naselennya Ukrainy 1994* (Population of Ukraine 1994) (Kiev, 1995), pp. 199, 231; Appendix 1.

In 1988–1989, the Jews of Russia had the highest negative vital balance in the FSU. This was not true five years later: the negative balance had become greater among the Jews of Ukraine and Moldavia, and was about the same as that of Belorussian Jews. This change was due to the fact that the crude Jewish death rates in these countries were higher than that in Russia.

However, the crude death rate of course depends heavily on the age structure. Given the condition of stable longevity, the older a population, the higher this indicator will be. According to the 1989 census, Russia's Jewish population was in fact

the oldest among the Jews of the FSU; accordingly the Russian Jewish death rate was also the highest.

Since 1989, emigration has been much more rapid from other parts of the FSU, and older people usually have a lower tendency to migrate.[18] According to the Russian 1994 microcensus, the median age of the Ashkenazi Jewish population had reached 56. Based on this figure, we have a good indicator of aging for the three countries mentioned above whose crude death rates and negative vital balances were higher than those for Russia (Russia is the only state in the FSU for which there are recent data on the age-sex composition of the Jewish population).

The influence of aging on the negative balance of births to Jewish mothers and Jewish deaths (negative natural increase) can be estimated.[19] Of the decomposition (breakdown) seen from the 1988–1989 data, 81% of the negative natural increase of the Jewish population in Russia was attributable to age structure and only 19% to fertility (see Appendix 2).

By 1993–1994, due to the dramatic decline of the fertility level, a somewhat lower percentage of the negative balance of births and deaths was attributable to the age structure and a higher percentage to fertility: 75% and 25%, respectively. However, aging is without doubt the leading cause of the demographic collapse of contemporary Russian Jewry.

6. Rising Mixed Marriage and Assimilation

An examination of the ratio of women to men in the relevant age groups showed that the recent great exodus has seriously worsened the severe age-sex imbalance which had already existed among Jews of marriageable age. This rising imbalance led to a further increase in mixed marriage.

According to my estimate, at the start of the great exodus, 58% of the men and 40% of the women among all currently married Jews in Russia had spouses from another ethnic group. On the basis of the 1994 microcensus data, this mixed marriage indicator was estimated at 63% for Jewish men and 44% for Jewish women (Table 7), or an increase of five and four percentage points, respectively.

For 1979, the same indicator can be estimated at 51% for currently married Jewish men and 33% for Jewish women; that is, the estimated intercensal increase was seven percentage points for both currently married Jewish men and women. Comparison of these figures with those presented above shows a rather steady rise of mixed marriage during the great exodus.

Rising intermarriage was naturally accompanied by a sizable increase in the proportion of children born to mixed couples. From 1988 to 1995, the proportion of children born to Jewish mothers and non-Jewish fathers, out of all children born to Jewish mothers, rose from 58% to 69%.

18. DellaPergola, "The Global Context of Migration to Israel."
19. On the method used see S. Preston, "Empirical Analysis of the Contribution of Age Composition to Population Growth," *Demography* 7(4) (1970), p. 419.

Table 7
Indicators of Mixed Marriage among the Jews in Russia, 1989 and 1994

Indicator	1989	1994
Percentage currently mixed-married		
Males	58	63
Females	40	44
Ratio of mixed-married males to mixed-married females	2.0	2.2

Sources: Estimated from 1989 census and 1994 microcensus (see Appendix 3).

The data on offspring of mixed couples collected before the start of the great exodus showed a clear preference for non-Jewish ethnic affiliation for the children. According to the 1979 census data for Russia, only 6.1% of the children under 18 of couples consisting of a Jewish husband and a Russian wife were declared Jewish, and even fewer—4.5%—of the children of couples consisting of a Russian husband and a Jewish wife.

According to the most recent data of the 1994 microcensus, non-Jewish ethnic affiliation was clearly preferred for offspring of mixed couples. For children under 16, the percentage declared Jewish was about the same regardless of the composition of the mixed couples—only 11%. Among offspring aged 16 and above, the percentage was even lower: 6.2% for couples consisting of a Jewish husband and a Russian wife and 4.1% for couples consisting of a Russian husband and a Jewish wife (Table 8).

Table 8
Percentage of Children Declared Jewish of all Children Living with Mixed Couples, Russia, 1994

Composition of mixed couples	Age of children	
	under 16	16 and above
Jewish husband, Russian wife	10.9	6.2
Russian husband, Jewish wife	11.6	4.1
Total among Jewish-Russian couples	11.1	5.6

Source: 1994 microcensus.

Thus, despite all recent changes in the Jewish situation in Russia, such as greater investment in Jewish education, we see a continuation of the clear preference for non-Jewish ethnic affiliation for the children of mixed couples.

7. Dynamics of the "Enlarged" Jewish Population

Rising intermarriage has caused an increase in the percentage of Jews living in ethnically heterogeneous households, which, as noted above, are part of the "enlarged"

Jewish population.[20] According to our estimate, between 1989 and 1994 this proportion rose from 49% to 53% of all Russian Jews living in households of two or more persons.

On the basis of the 1989 census and the 1994 microcensus, one may arrive at comparable estimates of this population. According to these estimates, the "enlarged" Jewish population was 892,000 at the start of the great exodus, and 716,000 five years later (Table 9). The first figure, however, does not include "Tats," and the second one covers Ashkenazi Jews only. By adding the sectors of the Jewish population which were not covered, we arrived at a rough total estimate of 910,000 for 1989 and 730,000 for 1994. This indicates a decrease of 20% during the first five years of the great exodus.

Table 9
"Enlarged" Jewish Population, by Components, Russia, 1989 and 1994
(thousands)

	1989[a]	1994[b]
1. Jews living in uni-national households	315.5	211.0
1a. Thereof, households with 2 or more members	249.6	165.4
2. Jews living in multi-national households	235.5	183.2
3. "Core" Jewish population [(3)=(1)+(2)]	551.0	394.2
4. Non-Jewish members of multi-national households with Jewish presence[c]	341.0	321.8
5. "Enlarged" Jewish population [(5)=(3)+(4)]	892.0	716.0
6. Ratio of "enlarged" to "core" Jewish population [(6)=(5)/(3)]	1.62	1.82

a. Excluding "Tats."
b. Ashkenazi Jews only.
c. Persons living in households with at least one "core" Jew.
Sources: Estimated from 1989 census and 1994 microcensus (see Appendix 3).

Thus, the "enlarged" Jewish population declined less than the "core" population did. In fact, the decline in the number of non-Jewish members of heterogeneous households was very moderate. According to our new estimate, the ratio of "enlarged" to "core" Jewish population was 1.6 to 1 for the late 1980s, and 1.8 to 1 for 1994.

Interestingly enough, the estimated share of the "core" population within the "enlarged" Jewish population in 1994—55%—is very close to the previously cited percentage of Jews among all emigrants to Israel from Russia in the same year—58%. In 1995 the second indicator dropped as low as 53%. The similarity in figures, however, should not be seen as a sign of equal propensities to aliya for homogenous and mixed Jewish families.

Migratory movements are more frequent at younger ages. Among Russian Jews, the younger the population, the higher the percentage of intermarriage and offspring of mixed couples. Aggregate aliya data are heavily dependent on the age

20. DellaPergola, "Jewish Demography," p. 277.

structure of the "enlarged" Jewish population, and such data cannot show the propensity to aliya for homogenous and mixed Jewish families.

One difficult challenge in the study of Russian Jewish demography remains: determining the composition of the "enlarged" Jewish population, in order to permit a comparison with the composition of the "core" population in Russia and of emigrants to Israel.

Concluding Remarks

From our analysis we see that, since the beginning of the great exodus, the share of the Russian Jewish population among all Jews in the FSU has grown to more than half and continues to increase. The reason for this is the lower propensities of Russian Jews to emigrate, as well as a recent influx of Jews from other parts of the FSU to Russia.

Clearly the great exodus exacerbated the already existing severe aging and the sex imbalance, thereby aggravating the negative vital balance and intensifying mixed marriage. At the same time, the main cause of the impressive decrease in the number of Jewish births was not mass emigration, but rather a decline in fertility. We also established the stability of Jewish longevity during the great exodus, despite the dramatic decline in the longevity of the total Russian population.

Our estimates revealed a more pronounced decrease in the "core" than in the "enlarged" Jewish population, and, correspondingly, a reduction in the relative share of the "core" population. All these factors are accompanied by very low Jewish ethnic affiliation among the offspring of mixed couples.

In Russia, major and rapid changes are taking place in all areas. These economic, cultural, and intellectual changes are likely to have significant effect on the number of Jews in the country and their propensity for emigration. If the economic and political situation deteriorates and/or the regime becomes more unstable, the Jewish population is likely to be seriously affected.

Appendix 1

Balance of "Effectively Jewish" Births and Jewish Deaths in Russia, 1988-1995[a]

Year	Total births to Jewish mothers[b]	Thereof, with		Total births to non-Jewish mothers with Jewish fathers[c]	Total births to mixed couples	Total "effectively Jewish" births[d]	Jewish deaths[b]	Balance of "effectively Jewish" births and Jewish deaths
		Jewish fathers	non-Jewish fathers[b]					
(1)	(2) = (3)+(4)	(3)	(4)	(5) = 2×(4)	(6) = (4) + (5)	(7) = (3)+ 0.2×(6)	(8)	(9) = (7) - (8)
1988	3,710	1,562	2,148	4,296	6,444	2,851	13,826	-10,975
1989	3,185	1,301	1,884	3,768	5,652	2,431	13,048	-10,617
1990	2,436	896	1,540	3,080	4,620	1,820	13,035	-11,215
1991	1,786	587	1,199	2,398	3,597	1,306	12,779	-11,473
1992	1,462	472	990	1,980	2,970	1,066	12,158	-11,092
1993	1,121	361	760	1,520	2,280	817	12,434	-11,617
1994	1,112	341	771	1,542	2,313	804	11,605	-10,801
1995	1,086	336	750	1,500	2,250	786	10,900	-10,114

a. Excluding "Tats."

b. Registered data.

c. Assuming that the (unknown) number of births to non-Jewish mothers with Jewish fathers was twice the (known) number of births to Jewish mothers with non-Jewish fathers; based on the estimate that approximately twice as many Jewish men were currently married to non-Jewish women as were Jewish women currently married to non-Jewish men (see Table 7).

d. Based on the estimate that approximately 20% of children born to mixed couples were reported as Jews at age under one year old in the 1994 microcensus, as well as in the 1989 census (see Tolts, "The Interrelationship," p. 161).

Source: Goskomstat Rossii, vital statistics data.

Appendix 2

Components of Negative Natural Increase of the Jewish Population in Russia, 1988–1989 and 1993–1994[a]

Natural increase and its components	Per 1,000 Jews		% of total negative increase	
	1988–1989	1993–1994	1988–1989	1993–1994
Crude rate of natural increase	-18.1	-27.2	100	100
due to:				
Age composition	-14.7	-20.5	81	75
Fertility	-3.4	-6.7	19	25

a. According to S. Preston's method of decomposition (see note 19).

Source: Estimated from Tables 5 and 6.

Appendix 3

Estimate of the "Enlarged" Jewish Population of Russia, 1989 and 1994

The 5% sample of the 1994 microcensus gave us data on the Jewish uni-national (homogeneous) households: 5,301 with 10,549 Jews, among which 2,280 households consisted of one person and 3,021 households of two or more people, with 8,269 Jews. A total of 19,708 Ashkenazi Jews were counted. Furthermore, according to the sample, we also have data on 6,504 heterogeneous Jewish-Russian households with 20,878 members.[21]

For our estimate of the corresponding number of homogeneous Jewish married couples, we used a ratio for the total urban population in Russia of the number of married couples (i.e., currently married males) to the number of households with two or more people: 0.858 to 1. Based on this ratio, the number of married couples living in Jewish uni-national households was estimated at 2,592 (3,021×0.858). According to the same sample, 6,983 currently married Jewish men and 4,599 currently married Jewish women were counted. Thus, the corresponding total number of currently mixed married Jewish men was estimated at 4,391 (6,983 – 2,592) and that of Jewish women at 2,007 (4,599 – 2,592); the total is 6,398 Jewish mixed couples.

According to the microcensus sample, there were 3,752 Jewish men and 1,539 Jewish women currently married to Russians; the total number of Jewish-Russian mixed couples was 5,291. Thus, we arrived at a corresponding number of Jews currently married to non-Jewish non-Russians: 1,107 (6,398 – 5,291). Also according to the microcensus, the ratio of the number of Jewish-Russian married couples to the number of Jewish-Russian households is 0.813 to 1; the average number of people in these households was 3.21. Applying these figures to heterogeneous Jewish households with non-Russians, we estimated the corresponding number of such households at 1,362, with a total of 4,372 members. The total corresponding estimated number of people in heterogeneous Jewish households is 25,250, of which 9,159 are Jews, and 16,091 non-Jews. After multiplying these results, which are based on sample data, by a factor of 20, we arrived at the estimate of the "enlarged" Jewish population for 1994 presented in Table 9.

For 1989 we have less-detailed data, but have generally followed the approach just described; that is, the total number of Jewish multinational family households and the number of their members were estimated as a whole. To this end we used the percentage of people living in such households within the total urban population, as well as the ratio of currently married men to households and the average number of persons in households for the total urban population.

21. The data used in the estimate were published only in part: Goskomstat Rossii, *Osnovnye itogi mikroperepisi naseleniia 1994 g.* (Main results of the 1994 microcensus) (Moscow, 1995), p. 50; idem, *Tipy i sostav domokhoziaistv v Rossii, Po dannym mikroperepisi naseleniia 1994 g.* (Types and composition of households in Russia, according to 1994 microcensus data) (Moscow, 1995), pp. 62–63; idem, *Sostoianie v brake i rozhdaemost', Po dannym mikroperepisi naseleniia 1994 g.* (Marriage status and fertility, according to 1994 microcensus data) (Moscow, 1995), p. 54.