Published in Zvi Gitelman and Yaacov Ro'i (eds.), *Revolution, Repression and Revival: The Soviet Jewish Experience*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007, pp. 283-311.

13

POST-SOVIET JEWISH DEMOGRAPHY, 1989–2004

Mark Tolts

Since 1989 the demography of the Jews in the former Soviet Union (FSU) has changed dramatically. To understand these changes we examine their dynamics in different parts of the FSU according to the results of recent post-Soviet censuses. We shall analyze the severe aging of the Jewish population in the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus based on the results of these censuses. We shall study Jewish emigration from the FSU as a whole, and to Israel (aliya) in particular. The vital crisis of FSU Jewry and the transformation of its fertility as a result of aliya and emigration will also be studied. Out-migration from Israel of FSU immigrants, and return migration from Israel to Russia and Ukraine in particular will be examined. Recent emigration dramatically changed the places of residence of the Jewish population originating from the FSU. The worldwide size and distribution of this Jewry is also examined.

JEWS' NUMERICAL DECREASE ACCORDING TO THE POST-SOVIET CENSUSES

The numbers of Jews reported in Soviet censuses have been entirely dependent on the self-declaration of respondents. Conceptually, these numbers correspond to what has been defined as the "core" Jewish population.[1] The "core" Jewish population is the aggregate of all those who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews or, in the case of children, are identified as such by their parents. It does not include persons of Jewish origin who reported another ethnicity ("nationality") in the census.

Not only did the Soviet censuses not require documented evidence for answers to any question, but in regard to nationality the census takers were explicitly given instructions that ethnicity/nationality was to be determined solely by the person polled—without any corroboration.[2] However, most scholars agree that the Soviet census figures on Jewish ethnic nationality (adults only) were very similar to "legal" ethnic nationality as recorded in internal passports.[3]

A broader definition, that of the "enlarged" Jewish population (which can also be empirically measured), includes Jews along with their non-Jewish household members.[4] In the FSU today this group is significantly larger than the "core" Jewish population.[5] However, even the "enlarged" Jewish population is smaller than the total population entitled to immigrate to Israel; according to the Israeli Law of Return, Jews, their children and grandchildren, and all their respective spouses are eligible.

The last Soviet census was in 1989, giving us a good base against which to measure Jewish population decrease during the recent mass emigration. Questions on ethnicity were included in the censuses of all post-Soviet states conducted since 1999.[6] The results of these questions empirically confirmed the earlier prediction of dramatic demographic decline of the Jewish population in the former Soviet republics (table 13.1).[7]

The census data show that during the decade following the 1989 Soviet census, the total number of "core" Jews dropped in Belarus to 27,800 (by 75 percent), in Kirgiziia to 1,600 (by 74 percent), in Azerbaidzhan to 8,900 (by 71 percent),[8] and in Kazakhstan to 6,800 (by 64 percent). During the intercensal period, this number fell less precipitously in two Baltic States: it decreased to 10,400 (by 55 percent) in Latvia and to 2,145 (by 54 percent) in Estonia. In the third Baltic country—Lithuania—the number of Jews dropped more sharply: it declined to 4,000 (by 68 percent). At the same time, the results of the 2001 Ukrainian census show that during less than 13 years following the 1989 Soviet census, the total number of "core" Jews in this second largest

Table 13.1. "Core" Jewish Population according to Recent Post-Soviet Censuses (in Thousands)

Country	*Census Date*	*Number of Jews*	*Numberof Jews According to the 1989 Soviet Census*	*Numerical Decrease, %*
Azerbaidzhan	27 January 1999	8.9	30.8	71
Belarus	14 February 1999	27.8	112.0	75
Kazakhstan	26 February 1999	6.8	18.9[a]	64
Kirgiziia	25 March 1999	1.6	6.0	74
Tadzhikistan	20 January 2000	0.2	14.8	98.5
Estonia	31 March 2000	2.15	4.6	54
Latvia	31 March 2000	10.4	22.9	55
Lithuania	6 April 2001	4.0	12.4	68
Ukraine	5 December 2001	104.3	487.3	79
Georgia	17 January 2002	3.6[b]	24.8	85
Russian Federation	9 October 2002	233.6[c]	570[d]	59

[a] As published in the results of the 1999 census of Kazakhstan.
[b] Resident (de jure) population, not including Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
[c] For data evaluation, see text.
[d] Including "Tats."
Sources: Post-Soviet censuses; 1989 Soviet census.

community in the FSU dropped dramatically to 104,300 (by 79 percent). The most pronounced decrease after the civil war was recorded in Tadzhikistan: according to the 2000 census, the total number of "core" Jews there was only 213 (1.5 percent of the 1989 figure).

In the Russian Federation, the October 2002 census indicated about 233,600 Jews as against our core Jewish population estimate of 252,000 on January 1, 2003 (derived from the February 1994 Russian microcensus estimate of 401,000 Jews). We assume that the 2002 Russian census undercounted the Jews due to the cancellation of the compulsory item on ethnicity (*natsionalnost'*) on identification documents and in the census. Like the previous Soviet censuses, the 2002 Russian census was based entirely on self-declaration of respondents. However, the post-Soviet Russian Constitution (Article 26.1) expressly forbids collection of information on an individual's ethnicity against his or her will. As a result, in the 2002 Russian census there appeared for the first time a rather sizable group (about 1.5 million) whose ethnicity was not recorded. Clearly, there were some Jews among them.

The census data for Jews were adjusted accordingly, and to this end we used our evaluation of Jewish intercensal demographic decrease.

The 2002 Russian census presented figures as of October 9, 2002, and for purposes of comparison we adjusted our estimate of 252,000 for the beginning of 2003 to the census date. Comparison of the census figure of 233,600 with our estimate of 254,000 (adjusted to the census data) shows a gap of about 20,000.[9]

This gap clearly demonstrates a growing process of Jewish assimilation in contemporary Russia, and shows that a sizable group of Jews in the country does not want to be recorded as Jewish in the census. The changes in the process of Jewish assimilation occurred only after the 1994 Russian microcensus with the introduction of the new internal passport in 1997 that does not record the holder's ethnicity.[10] This fits our findings from an analysis of the recent dynamics of birth statistics that revealed that in present-day Russia a sizable segment among the former "officially recognized" Jews (Jewish according to Soviet passports) now prefer not to declare their ethnicity even if they are not part of a mixed marriage.[11]

The ethnicity of every Soviet citizen was written in his or her internal passport once he or she reached age 16. Anyone with two Jewish parents had no choice but to be registered as Jewish, in many cases without wanting to. Soviet authorities, contrary to their proclaimed goal of assimilation, actually preserved Soviet Jewry by labeling individual Jews as such.[12] Only the offspring of mixed marriages could choose the ethnicity of one or the other parent, and most of these preferred the ethnicity of the non-Jewish parent.[13] In fact, as noted above, the process of Jewish assimilation intensified after the introduction of the new internal passport, which does not record the holder's ethnicity.

Moreover, our previous analysis revealed that sizable numbers of Jewish emigrants continue to be registered in neighborhood passport office files in the Russian Federation.[14] They probably retain possession of their living quarters, and perhaps rent them out. In addition to this group are those Jews who left Russia as tourists and for various reasons acquired immigrant status in Israel[15] or settled in other countries. Some of these may be included in the results of the Russian census of 2002, and therefore the real number of Jews with unstated ethnicity may be even larger than the above noted gap of about 20,000, which gave us our minimum estimate of the spread of ethnic assimilation.

Thus, despite all recent changes in the Jewish situation in the Russian Federation and the FSU as a whole, such as greater investment in Jewish education, we see a continuation of ethnic assimilation. Moreover, emigration is selective by level of Jewish identity, and is obviously higher among the more strongly identifying Jews.[16] These are the ones most likely to have left—and still leave—the FSU.

THE EROSION OF THE "CORE" JEWISH POPULATION

In order to deepen our study of the contemporary demographic composition of the "core" Jewish population in the FSU, we must utilize data of the recent post-Soviet censuses by age and religion. For children under 5 years of age who were recorded as Jews in the 2002 Russian census we can carry out such an analysis using vital statistics, and based on the 2000 Estonian census, we can evaluate the incidence of apostasy.

ORIGIN OF CHILDREN UNDER 5 RECORDED AS JEWS IN THE 2002 RUSSIAN CENSUS

The 2002 Russian census recorded only 3,130 Jewish children under 5 years of age, a dramatic decrease of 79 percent as compared with the 1989 Soviet census, which counted 14,860 children in this age group in the Russian Federation (table 13.2). However, not only did the number of children under 5 years of age fall noticeably, but also the origins of those children recorded as Jews radically changed.

Since 1989, as a result of both the mass emigration and the decline of fertility rates, the number of births in the Jewish population decreased dramatically (on this see in detail below). Although all the birth categories showed dramatic decline, this was greatest among the children born to endogamous Jewish couples. Compared with the 5-year period preceding the 1989 Soviet census in the Russian Federation the number of births to endogamous Jewish couples had fallen by a full 91 percent by the 5 years preceding the 2002 Russian census. The decline in the number of births to Jewish mothers was less pronounced—by 82 percent.

Table 13.2. Comparison of Number of Children Recorded as Jews at Ages under 5 in the Census and Number of Children Born to Endogamous Jewish Couples in the 5 Years Preceding the Censuses of 1989 and 2002

	1989 *(1)*	*2002* *(2)*	*Dynamics, %* *(3) = (2)/(1)*
1. Children recorded as Jews at ages under 5 in the census	14,860	3,130	21
2. Children born to Jewish mothers in the 5 years preceding the respective census	21,597[a]	3,900[b]	18
2a. Of these with Jewish fathers	11,279	1,000[b]	9
3. Percentage of mixed origin among all children recorded as Jewish in the census (3) = [(1) − (2a)]/(1)	24	68[c]	2.8 times

[a] Registered in 1984–1988.

[b] Estimate, for 1999–2002 we applied the percentage of children born to non-Jewish fathers and the rate of children born to Jewish mothers per 1,000 “core” Jews as in 1998.

[c] Minimum estimate without emigration.

Sources: 1989 Soviet census; 2002 Russian census; vital statistics data.

A comparison of the number of children under 5 recorded as Jews in the 2002 Russian census with the estimated number of children born to Jewish mothers with Jewish fathers in the 5 years preceding the census shows that more than two-thirds (68 percent) of the “core” Jews in this age group were of mixed origin. The analogous comparison shows that among children under 5 recorded as Jews in the 1989 Soviet census in the Russian Federation, only about a quarter (24 percent) were of mixed origin.

The majority of small children labeled by their parents as Jews in the last Russian census are of mixed origin. This is quite a new situation, which is clearly a consequence of the Jewish demographic situation in the Russian Federation. After the mass emigration of the 1990s even the “core” Jewish population became less homogeneous in origin.

APOSTASY AMONG “CORE” JEWS: A CASE STUDY BASED ON THE 2000 ESTONIAN CENSUS

Persons of Jewish parentage who adopt another religion are in theory excluded from the “core” Jewish population. However, we know that not a few cases of apostasy were well documented.[17] Moreover, in Russia and Ukraine a sampling of the Jewish population found that “over

10 percent see Christianity as most attractive."[18] Very important to our analysis is the finding by a study in St. Petersburg that all Jews with two Jewish parents who converted to Christianity continued to identify themselves ethnically as Jews.[19] Thus, because our estimates of the "core" Jewish population are based on census data, Russian/FSU numbers of this Jewish population category are obviously somewhat overstated.

The data of the 2000 Estonian census present concrete information on the incidence of apostasy among people counted as Jews (see table 13.3). According to the 2000 Estonian census data, only 19.8 percent of the Jews were recorded as "followers of a particular faith"; of these, 11 percent stated Judaism as their religion and more that 7.5 percent declared different branches of Christianity as their faith.

Among those who put down Christianity, more than two-thirds are believers of the Orthodox [Christian] church (*pravoslavnye*). This is in striking discord with the fact that Estonian Christians are mostly Lutherans. However, according to the 2000 Estonian census, more than 80 percent of Jews listed the Russian language as their mother tongue, and this closeness to Russians leads to apostasy in the form of a switch to Russian Christian Orthodoxy.

According to the 2000 Estonian census, only 38 non-Jews were recorded with Judaism as their religion, whereas 151 Jews declared different branches of Christianity as their faith. Thus, the balance is clearly negative for Judaism. Of course, all of the above-cited data cannot be utilized for any corrections of the "core" Jewish population: about one-third of the Jews and one-sixth of the non-Jews refused to answer the question regarding religious affiliation or their religious affiliation are unknown. At the same time, data from the 2000 Estonian census clearly demonstrate erosion of the "core" Jewish population by apostasy.

AGING

After the Second World War the Jewish population of the FSU aged substantially, and this is linked to the low fertility level. For Jews in 1959 the median age was 41.2 in Russia and 39.3 in the Ukraine. But, according to the 1989 census, the median age of the Jewish population was

Table 13.3. Jews in Estonia by Religious Affiliation, According to the 2000 Census[a]

	Number	*Percent of Total*
Total	1,989	100.0
Followers of a particular faith	394	19.8
Of these:		
Judaism	219	11.0
Orthodox [Christian]	104	5.2
Lutheran	12	0.60
Roman-Catholic	7	0.35
Baptist	6	0.30
Pentecostal	5	0.25
Other Christian	17	0.85
Buddhist	5	0.25
Hindu	1	0.05
Muslim	3	0.15
Faith unknown	15	0.75
Has no religious affiliation	598	30.1
Atheist	340	17.1
Cannot define the affiliation	327	16.4
Refused to answer	165	8.3
Religious affiliation unknown	165	8.3

[a] People aged 15 and older and those whose age was unknown answered the voluntary census question "What is your religious affiliation?"

Source: The 2000 Estonian population and housing census.

more than 52 in the Russian Federation and only slightly lower in Ukraine.[20]

The recent mass emigration has accelerated this process. In 2002, the median age of the Jews in the Russian Federation reached 57.5 years and according to partial data it was about the same in Ukraine. In Belarus, already during the first 10 years of the contemporary mass emigration, the median age dramatically increased by more than 9 years (table 13.4).

According to the most recent data, about 37 percent of the Jews in Russia were aged 65 and above. In Belarus, the share of this group grew the fastest: from 20 percent in 1989 to 33 percent in 1999. In the intercensal period in the Russian Federation, the percentages of all age groups under 65 decreased.

Our previous analysis of age composition showed that by 1970 Russian Jewry had already reached what has been defined as the "terminal stage" of demographic evolution.[21] By 1979, Ukrainian Jewry had also

Table 13.4. Jews in Three Slavic Republics, by Age Group, 1989 to ca. 2000 (in percent)

Republic and Year	*All Ages*	*0–14*	*15–29*	*30–44*	*45–64*	*65+*	*Median Age*
Russian Federation							
1989	100.0	8.4	11.4	19.5	33.8	26.9	52.3
1994[a]	100.0	6.2	9.9	16.5	35.0	32.4	56.0
2002[a]	100.0	4.9	10.7	14.2	33.6	36.6	57.5
Ukraine							
1989	100.0	9.7	12.0	19.8	33.2	25.3	51.6
2001[a,b]	100.0	5.8	10.5	14.0	34.6	35.1	58.0
Belarus							
1989	100.0	12.5	13.7	21.8	31.8	20.2	47.0
1999[a]	100.0	5.2	8.8	15.5	37.9	32.6	56.3

[a] Data did not cover some non-Ashkenazic Jews.

[b] According to the data for Kiev city, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, and Odessa Regions, and Crimea including Sevastopol.

Sources: 1989 Soviet census; 1994 Russian microcensus; Post-Soviet censuses.

reached this stage of demographic evolution. Recent data on age composition show that after the mass emigration of the 1990s the Jewry of Belarus reached the "terminal stage" of demographic evolution.

According to the 1989 Soviet census, the "core" Jewish populations of Moscow and St. Petersburg were older than those of the provinces. The median ages of the Jews in Moscow (53.8) and St. Petersburg (53.7) were about the same, but this indicator for provincial Jewry (50.7) was lower by 3.0 years or more.

According to the 2002 Russian census, the "core" Jewish population of St. Petersburg aged more rapidly than that of Moscow. In the intercensal period the median age of Moscow Jews increased only by 3.1 years, whereas that of St. Petersburg Jews by 8.9 years. The median ages of Moscow Jews and St. Petersburg Jews reached 56.9 and 62.6 years, respectively (table 13.5).

As a consequence, the difference in the median ages of the Jewish populations in the two Russian capitals reached 5.7 years. This was due to the different propensities to emigrate of these two Jewries. During the approximately 14 years between the 1989 Soviet census and the 2002 Russian census, the estimated decrease of the "core" Jewish population was higher in St. Petersburg (63 percent) than in Moscow (50 percent).[22]

Table 13.5. Jews in Moscow and St. Petersburg, by Age Group, 1989 and 2002 (in Percent)

	Moscow		*St. Petersburg*	
Age Group	*1989*	*2002*	*1989*	*2002*
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
0–14	7.6	5.1	7.2	3.4
15–29	10.6	11.3	10.7	8.6
30–44	18.1	15.9	18.4	11.7
45–59	24.1	21.2	25.1	21.8
60+	39.6	46.5	38.6	54.5
Median age	53.8	56.9	53.7	62.6

Sources: 1989 Soviet census and 2002 Russian census.

In the intercensal period in St. Petersburg, the percentages of all age groups under 60 decreased. However, in this period in Moscow the share of Jews aged 15–29 years grew slightly. This may be due to immigration of young Jews to Russia's capital from other parts of the Russian Federation and other countries of the FSU in the intercensal period. All the other age groups under 60 in Moscow Jewry decreased.

According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, Jews in the country's various regions were close in age to Russia's Jewry. The median ages of Kiev Jews reached 60.4 years. Unlike Moscow's Jews, Jews in the Ukrainian capital were among the most elderly in that country. It was a result of much higher level of Jewish emigration from Kiev than from Moscow: emigrants are usually younger than those who remain. Furthermore, Moscow—unlike Kiev—has been receiving Jews from the rest of the FSU.

All the data from the recent post-Soviet censuses of the three Slavic FSU countries—for the total Jewish populations and for the inhabitants of the capitals of the Russian Federation and Ukraine—show a dramatic increase in the already high levels of aging.

MIGRATION MOVEMENTS

Since 1989, mass aliya and emigration played a decisive role in the fate of the Jews in the FSU. At the same time, some emigrants returned to their places of origin. Thus, estimating the share of aliya in the total em-

Table 13.6. Emigration of Jews and Their Relatives from the FSU, 1989–2004 (in Thousands)

		Thereof to:			
Year	*Total*	*Israel*	*USA*[a]	*Germany*	*Percent~~age~~ of Total to Israel*
1989	72	12.9	56[b]	0.6	18
1990	205	185.2	6.5	8.5	90
1991	195	147.8	35.2	8.0	76
1992	123	65.1	45.9	4.0	53
1993	127	66.1	35.9	16.6	52
1994	116	68.1	32.9	8.8	59
1995	114	64.8	21.7	15.2	57
1996	106	59.0	19.5	16.0	56
1997	99	54.6	14.5	19.4	55
1998	83	46.0	7.4	17.8	55
1999	99	66.8	6.3	18.2	67
2000	79	50.8	5.9	16.5	64
2001	60	33.6	4.1	16.7	56
2002	44	18.5	2.5	19.3	42
2003	32	12.4	1.6	15.4	39
2004	25	10.1	1.1	11.2	40

[a] Data for 1991–2004 cover only HIAS-assisted emigrants.

[b] Departures.

Sources: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics data and other governmental sources; HIAS arrival statistics; Mark Tolts, "Demography of the Jews in the Former Soviet Union: Yesterday and Today," in Zvi Gitelman, with Musya Glants and Marshall I. Goldman, eds., *Jewish Life after the USSR* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2003), 177; idem., "Demographische Trends unter den Juden der ehemaligen Sowjetunion," *Menora: Jahrbuch für deutsch-jüdische Geschichte 2004*. Band 15 (Berlin/Wien: Philo, 2005), 26–27 [updated].

igration, as well the comparison of out-migration from Israel with immigration to Israel, is among the most important aims of our analysis.

According to our estimates, between 1989 and 2004 about 1,580,000 (ex-) Soviet Jews and their relatives emigrated to countries outside the FSU (table 13.6). Most of this movement (about 962,000, or approximately 61 percent) was directed toward Israel, whereas the rest was divided mostly between the United States and Germany. During this period, the number of Jews and their relatives who emigrated from the FSU to the United States may be estimated at about 320,000. The number of Jews and their relatives who immigrated to Germany was lower, though it exceeded 210,000.

Between 1991 and 1996 the United States ranked second as a receiving country for (ex-) Soviet Jews and their relatives. But from 1997 to 2001, more emigrants went to Germany than to the United States, and Germany became the second-ranking receiving country. After September

11, 2001, the United States ceased to be a major destination for post-Soviet Jewish emigration. In 2002, only about 2,500 newcomers from the FSU were assisted by HIAS, and in 2003 this number was smaller by approximately 900. In 2004, only about 1,100 were assisted by HIAS.

Between 2002 and 2004 more emigrants went to Germany than to Israel, and Germany temporarily became the first-ranking receiving country. However, in 2004 the number of Jews and their relatives who immigrated to Germany dropped to 11,200, a decrease of 4,200, which was much higher than that in the movement to Israel—2,300. Recent data show that the number of emigrants decreased for all three destinations. At the same time, in 2002–2004, the proportion of all emigrants who went to Israel stabilized at about 40 percent. In 2005 Israel again became the first-ranking receiving country.

According to official Russian data, in 1992–1998 and 2000 about half the Jews who emigrated beyond the FSU chose Israel, as was the case after the peak of 1990–1991.[23] Only in 1999 did the share of this country among the Jewish emigrants temporarily jump, and according to official Russian data, 68 percent of the total number of Russia's Jews who emigrated to countries outside the FSU chose Israel. In 2001 this share decreased to about 39 percent, and in 2002 it dropped to 36 percent, but in 2003 Israel's share of this emigration returned to 39 percent. In 2004, among Jewish émigrés, the largest proportion chose Israel—42 percent (table 13.7).

The United States' share of Jewish migrants from the Russian Federation fell from a peak of about 35 percent in 1993–1994 to 14 percent in 1999, increased in 2001 to approximately 23 percent, and fell again in 2002–2004 to about 14–18 percent. In 1998 for the first time more registered Jewish emigrants went to Germany than to the United States, and Germany ranked second as a receiving country for Jewish emigration from the Russian Federation. In 2002, more emigrants went to Germany than to Israel, and Germany became the first-ranking receiving country; in this year its share reached a peak of 44 percent. However, in 2003–2004 Germany's share decreased to 39 percent.

In Ukraine some changes preceded those in the Russian Federation: according to official Ukrainian data, until 2000 about half the Jews who emigrated to countries outside the FSU chose Israel. In 1997, for the first time more registered Jewish emigrants went to Germany than to the United States, and from this year to 2000 Germany ranked second

Table 13.7. Registered Emigration of Jews from the Russian Federation and Ukraine to Outside the FSU, by Country of Destination, 1996–2003/2004 (in Percent)

Country and Year	*Total*	*Israel*	*USA*	*Germany*	*Other Countries*
Russian Federation					
1996	100	51	25	22	2
1997	100	48	25	24	3
1998	100	55	16	26	3
1999	100	68	14	16	2
2000	100	54	19	24	3
2001	100	39	23	36	2
2002	100	36	16	44	4
2003	100	39	18	39	4
2004	100	42	14	39	5
Ukraine					
1996	100	52	25	21	2
1997	100	53	21	24	2
1998	100	50	13	36	1
1999	100	55	10	34	1
2000	100	51	10	38	1
2001	100	44	9	46	1
2002	100	31	5	63	1
2003	100	27.5	9	63	0.5

Sources: Russian and Ukrainian governmental migration statistics.

as a receiving country. From 2001 onwards, more emigrants went to Germany than to Israel, and Germany became the first-ranking receiving country for Jewish emigration from Ukraine. In 2002–2003, Germany's share of the emigration of Jews from Ukraine to outside the FSU was as high as 63 percent.

From 1998 onwards Germany's share of the Ukrainian Jewish migration was consistently higher than that among the Jewish migration from Russia. At the same time, from 1997 onwards the United States' share of the Ukrainian Jewish migration was consistently lower than that from the Russian Federation. According to official Russian and Ukrainian data, emigration to all other countries has not been high.

The geographical distribution of emigration to Israel from the Russian Federation shows that the great majority of immigrants originated from the provinces.[24] There is no simple correlation between the situation in Israel and Jewish immigration from different countries; moreover, it has been found that in general the "push" factor is decisive for the regional/country differentiation of emigration to Israel.[25] The emigration from Russia confirms previous observations on this subject; the differentiation by region of origin in the Russian Federation shows that association between quality of life and level of the recent migration to Israel is strongly negative.[26]

OUT-MIGRATION FROM ISRAEL OF FSU IMMIGRANTS

Returning migration from Israel to the Russian Federation was registered in Russian statistics, and these data have been available since 1997 for analysis. These statistics are based on neighborhood passport office registration of immigrants who resumed residence status in Russia.[27]

In 1997 the registered number of immigrants from Israel to the Russian Federation was 1,626. If we compare these immigrants with emigrants to Israel of the same year we see that the ratio between the two movements is 11 percent. In 1999, the number of immigrants from Israel decreased to about 1,400, whereas the number of emigrants from Russia more than doubled. Accordingly, the ratio between them decreased to 5 percent (table 13.8).

In 2003, the registered number of immigrants to Russia from Israel reached its maximum to date—1,808. Concurrently, the number of emigrants from the Russian Federation to Israel had significantly decreased, thus increasing the ratio between them to 37 percent. However, in 2004 the registered number of immigrants from Israel to Russia decreased at the same pace as emigration from Russia to Israel (by 18 percent each). As a result, in this year the ratio between the movements from and to Israel was the same as in 2003. In 2004 the registered number of immigrants to Russia from Israel was lower than in 1997.

In Ukraine the registered number of immigrants from Israel was consistently lower than that in the Russian Federation. In 1997–2001, in Ukraine the ratio between the two movements was 4–6 percent. In 2002, this ratio increased to 15 percent, and in 2003 it doubled.

In any interpretation of the above-cited indicators, we must remember that many people who immigrate from Israel to the Russian Federation and Ukraine in any given year emigrated to Israel in a different year.

Table 13.8. Comparison of Immigration from Israel with Emigration to Israel, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, 1997–2003/2004 (in Thousands)

Country and Year	*Immigration from Israel*[a]	*Emigration to Israel*[b]	*Immigration as Percent~~age~~ of Emigration*
Russian Federation			
1997	1.6	15.3	11
1998	1.5	14.5	11
1999	1.4	31.1	5
2000	1.5	18.8	8
2001	1.4	10.9	13
2002	1.7	6.5	26
2003	1.8	4.8	37
2004	1.5	4.0	37
Ukraine			
1997	1.05	24.1	4
1998	1.2	20.1	6
1999	1.1	23.2	5
2000	1.0	20.3	5
2001	0.9	14.1	6
2002	1.0	6.6	15
2003	1.2	3.9	30

[a] According to the Rosstat and the Ministry of Statistics of Ukraine, respectively.
[b] According to Israel CBS data.
Sources: Israeli, Russian, and Ukrainian governmental migration statistics.

However, the length of time between the dates of their arrival and departure is unknown and, indeed, varies from one individual to the next.

At the same time, for the immigrants from the FSU as a whole who arrived in Israel since 1990 and were still living there we can compute the rate of their out-migration for each year up to 2003 (table 13.9). This indicator is based on the number of FSU immigrants who left Israel for all destinations in any given year and stayed abroad for more than 1 year. According to this data, the rate was highest in 1992 (16 per 1,000), shortly after the greatest wave of FSU immigrants arrived in Israel during the previous 2 years. Over the following years, the rate decreased rather steadily, and in 1999 it fell to 8 per 1,000. By 2002, it returned to the level of 1995—12 per 1,000. However, in 2003, the last year for which we have data, the rate fell again to 11.6 per 1,000.

Of all FSU immigrants to Israel since 1990, 84,200 had left the country by the end of 2003 and stayed abroad for more than 1 year. However,

Table 13.9. Out-Migration from Israel of FSU Immigrants, 1990–2003

Year	*Rate, per 1,000*[a]
1990	6.3
1991	11.9
1992	16.2
1993	12.8
1994	11.3
1995	12.0
1996	10.7
1997	9.6
1998	9.3
1999	7.9
2000	9.1
2001	10.1
2002	12.0
2003	11.6

[a] For each given year, the rate was computed on the basis of the number of FSU immigrants who left Israel for all destinations in that year and stayed abroad for more than 1 year; the rate is per 1,000 FSU immigrants who arrived in Israel since 1990 and were still living here by that date.

Source: Author's computations based on Israel CBS data.

a sizable number (11,800) of these had returned to Israel by the start of 2005, and this return is continuing. By the start of this year the registered number of FSU immigrants who left Israel and had not returned to the country was 72,400. In the years 1990–2003, about 939,000 immigrants arrived in Israel from the FSU. Thus, less than 8 percent of this number have left Israel without returning. Out-migration continues to be a rather inconsequential phenomenon compared with the total number of FSU immigrants in Israel.

FSU VITAL CRISES, ALIYA, AND JEWISH EMIGRATION

In 1988–1989 the total fertility rate[28] of Russia's Jewish population was 1.49.[29] For 1993–1994 this fertility indicator was estimated at about

Table 13.10. Births among the Jewish Population in the Russian Federation and the Entire FSU, 1988–2001

	Russian Federation	*FSU*
Children born to endogamous Jewish couples		
1988	1,562	6,849
1998	224	
2001	185[a]	
Children born to Jewish mothers		
1988	3,710	11,591
1998	875	
2001	725[a]	
Children born to at least one Jewish parent[b]		
1988	8,006	21,075
1998	2,177	3,900[c]
2001	1,805	3,000[c]

[a] Applied percentage of children born to non-Jewish fathers and the rate of children born to Jewish mothers per 1,000 "core" Jews as in 1998.

[b] The (unknown) number of children born to non-Jewish mothers and Jewish fathers was assumed twice the (known) number of children born to Jewish mothers and non-Jewish fathers, see note 35.

[c] Guesstimate corresponding to the percentage of Jews in the Russian Federation among entire FSU Jewish population.

Sources: Vital statistics data; author's computations.

0.8;[30] that is, it fell dramatically by 46 percent. This coincides with the generally negative fertility dynamics in Russia at this time.[31] Between 1988 and 1994, the fertility indicator for the total urban population fell by ~~34~~ percent, from 1.9 to ~~1.25~~. And in 1994, in the two major cities of Russia—Moscow and St. Petersburg—the total fertility rates were low: 1.1 and 1.0, respectively. By 1999 the total fertility rate for the entire general urban population of the Russian Federation had fallen to ~~1.07~~, and it was as low as 0.9 in St. Petersburg.

In 1988–1989 the total fertility rate of the Jewish population in the Soviet Union as a whole was only slightly higher than in the Russian Federation—1.56.[32] We have no direct information on the dynamics of this indicator for Jews in other parts of the FSU, but the fertility reduction in the post-Soviet period was very pronounced also outside Russia.[33] For example, by 1995 in Ukraine the total fertility rate of the total urban population had fallen to 1.2, and it was as low as 0.9 in the city of Kiev; by 1999–2000 this indicator was as low as 0.9 in the total urban population of the country. Thus, for the FSU as a whole we would conservatively guesstimate the total fertility rate of the Jewish population at

0.9 in the mid-1990s, and we assume that it would not have risen subsequently.

Since 1989, as a result of the mass emigration and the above noted reduction in the fertility rate, the number of births in the Jewish population has decreased dramatically (table 13.10). Based only on the different categories of births (to endogamous Jewish couples, to Jewish mothers, and to at least one Jewish parent), one can reconstruct the dynamics of fertility decline among Jews in the FSU. However, the figures for each category relate to quantitatively different aspects of internal processes among the Jews.[34]

Although all the birth categories showed dramatic decline, this was greatest among the children born to endogamous Jewish couples, and smallest among those born to at least one Jewish parent. Compared with 1988 in the Russian Federation, the number of births to endogamous Jewish couples had by 1998 fallen a full 86 percent, and by 2001 this percentage had grown to 88 percent. The decline in the number of births to Jewish mothers was less pronounced—by 76 and 80 percent, respectively. In the same period in the Russian Federation the drop in the number of births to at least one Jewish parent can be estimated at 73 and 77 percent, respectively. In the entire FSU this category of births, which is the figure for Jewish fertility as a whole, was even more pronounced—by 81 and 86 percent, respectively. According to our estimate only about 1,800 children were born to at least one Jewish parent in 2001 in the Russian Federation if we assume the number of children born to non-Jewish mothers and Jewish fathers to be twice that born to Jewish mothers and non-Jewish fathers.[35] In the FSU as a whole in the same year this category of births can be estimated according to the same assumption at about 3,000.

In the Russian Federation, from 1988 to 1998, the decline in the number of births to at least one Jewish parent was much faster than that of Jewish deaths, and as a result the estimated negative balance of these vital events increased by 1,100, from about—5,800 to—6,900 (table 13.11).

In Germany, despite the sizable immigration of Jews from the FSU, in the 1990s the vital balance worsened significantly. There was no sizable increase in the number of births in the Jewish community, but the number of deaths increased by 2.3 times from 1990 to 2001. As a result,

Table 13.11. Balance of Births and Deaths among Jewish Population in Russia, 1988–1998

Year	*Births*[a]	*Deaths*	*Balance*
1988	8,006	13,826	−5,820
1998	2,177	9,103	−6,926

[a] Children born to at least one Jewish parent (see Table 13.10).
Sources: Vital statistics data; author's computations.

the negative vital balance increased from—322 in 1990 to—659 in 1998 and—873 in 2001.[36] The attempt to revitalize the German Jewish community through FSU immigration was hardly a great success, at least in terms of natural growth.

Jews who emigrated to Israel escaped the dramatic fertility reduction characteristic of the FSU population as a whole and Jews in particular. In 1999–2004 the total fertility rate among FSU Jewish immigrants was 1.7–1.8;[37] that is, it doubled the post-Soviet level of Jewish fertility in the FSU (about 0.9; see above) and approached the level of the total fertility rate of Israeli non-religious Jews (2.0–2.2).[38] At the same time, according to our estimate, this indicator for FSU non-Jewish immigrants in ~~2001–2002~~ was as low as approximately 1.3, and even lower in 2004—about 1.2; thus, it was similar to the low level of post-Soviet Slavic populations in their home countries.

However, 73 percent of FSU immigrants who arrived in Israel since 1990 and were still living here by the end of 2004 are Jews.[39] Therefore, the vital balance of FSU immigrants in Israel as a whole is decisively positive.[40] Aliya led to tens of thousands of additional births and postponed about the same number of deaths.[41] This demonstrates the very positive contribution of aliya to the demography of FSU Jewry.

WORLDWIDE NUMBER OF "CORE" JEWISH POPULATION ORIGINATING FROM THE FSU

The 1970 Soviet census, taken about the time that the mass Jewish emigration began, showed that there were about 2.15 million "core" Jews in the Soviet Union. To evaluate their subsequent dynamics we must estimate the respective balance of births and deaths, and additions to the "core" Jewish population as a result of ethnic re-identification in the process of migration. All other possible dynamic factors are not as influential as these two, including ethnic reaffiliation of people of mixed origin remaining in the FSU.

For the 25-year period of 1970–2003 the negative vital balance of this population may be tentatively guesstimated at about—0.7 million.[42] However, vital decrease was partially offset by inclusions in the "core" Jewish population as a result of ethnic reidentification in the process of migration. This may be tentatively figured on the basis of the discrepancy between the percentages of Jews among the immigrants to Israel according to the Russian/FSU and Israeli definitions.

Israeli official statistics are based on the Ministry of Interior's Population Register, whose definition of "who is a Jew" is according to *halachic* (religious Jewish) criteria. At the same time, "Jews" according to the official Russian/FSU definition, were only those emigrants (aged 16 and over) who were designated as such in their internal passports. For children without passports, ethnicity was defined on the basis of the parents' ethnicity. If the parents belonged to different ethnic groups, pref-

Table 13.12. Percentage of Jews among Migrants to Israel from the Russian Federation and the Entire FSU, 1990–2002

	Russian Federation		*Entire FSU*
Year	*Rosstat Data*[a]	*Israel CBS Data*[b]	*Israel CBS Data*[b]
1990			96
1991			91
1992	64[c]	82	84
1993	60	82	83
1994	58	77	77
1995	53	73	72
1996	49	67	68
1997	36	60	60
1998	31	55	54
1999	31	51	50
2000	27	47	47
2001	25	45	44
2002	23.5	43	43

[a] Of all emigrants to Israel whose ethnicity was known.

[b] Of all immigrants who entered Israel according to the Law of Return whose ethnicity/religion was known.

[c] Second half of the year.

Sources: Rosstat data; Israel CBS data.

erence was given to the mother's ethnicity, although even in the post-Soviet era non-Jewish ethnic affiliation was clearly preferred by the offspring of such couples.[43]

One consequence of the post-Soviet Jewish vital crisis and of rising mixed marriage is the recent pronounced decrease in the share of Jews among the FSU immigrants to Israel, according to official Israeli data: 96 percent in 1990, 72 percent in 1995, 47 percent in 2000, and 43 percent in 2002. These proportions were almost the same as those among the immigrants from the Russian Federation.[44] According to official Russian data, the proportion of Jews among all those who emigrated to Israel fell from 64 percent in the second half of 1992 to 53 percent in 1995, 27 percent in 2000, and 23.5 percent in 2002 (table 13.12). The different standards for definition of Jewishness in Israel and the FSU explain the divergence in the respective percentages.

Obviously some of the immigrants, who were considered Jews according to their former Soviet internal passports (as well as in population censuses), that is, the offspring of a Jewish male and non-Jewish female, are counted as non-Jews by Israeli statistics, which are based on *halacha*.[45] Nonetheless, many more immigrants are counted as Jews in Israel than were registered as such in the FSU, and many of these had never identified themselves as Jews before. Based on the data above, the number of such immigrants may be tentatively guesstimated at about 150,000, or even more.[46] This recognition of Judaism/Jewish ethnicity of some individuals who had previously neither identified themselves or been seen by FSU authorities as Jews somewhat slowed the decline of the "core" Jewish population originating from the FSU, and contributed some gains to the Jewish population in Israel.

Thus, the above-noted vital decrease (about—0.7 million) was partially offset by accession to the "core" Jewish population in connection with migration (approximately +0.15 million). At the beginning of 2004, there were about 1.6 million "core" Jews worldwide who had originated from the FSU (table 13.13). About one-half of these "core" Jews were living in Israel, less than one-quarter remained in the FSU, and the rest were mostly in the United States and Germany.

In the United States their estimated number of 0.3 million is only a small fraction of the total "core" Jewish population, which numbered just about 5.3 million.[47] The figure for the "core" Jewish population in

Table 13.13. Distribution of the "Core" Jewish Population Originating from the FSU, by Country, 2004 (in Millions)

Country	*Number*
Israel	about 0.8
FSU	0.395
USA	about 0.3
Germany	less than 0.1
Total	1.6[a]

[a] Including other much smaller ex-Soviet Jewish immigrant communities; for Canada, see text.

the United States originating from the FSU corresponds fairly closely to the number (252,000) of FSU "core" Jewish adult immigrants who arrived since 1970 and were registered in the National Jewish Population Survey in 2000–2001 (NJPS).[48] As noted above, after September 11, 2001, the United States ceased to exist as a major destination for post-Soviet Jewish emigration. At the same time the newcomers from the FSU in Germany (more than 89,800) constitute approximately 88 percent of the registered members of the Jewish community.[49]

At the beginning of 2004, in the FSU the number of "core" Jews was estimated at 395,000, of whom 243,000 lived in the Russian Federation and 89,000 in Ukraine. Thus, the numbers of ex-Soviet Jews in these two countries are now lower than their numbers in the United States and Germany, respectively.

In the West, following the United States and Germany, the largest, though much smaller, number of ex-Soviet Jews, now live in Canada. About 25,000 "core" Jews who were born in the FSU and immigrated since 1970 lived in Canada in 2004. This figure includes their children who were born after emigration.[50] All other diaspora ex-Soviet Jewish communities are even smaller.

Out of Israel's Jewish population of 5.165 million at the start of 2004, there were about 0.8 million Jews and their descendants originating from the FSU who had arrived since 1970. According to official Israeli data, there were at that time 671,800 Jews in the country who had immigrated from the FSU in 1990–2003 (this number includes their children who were born in Israel).[51] In the previous 20 years (from 1970 to 1989), 178,500 immigrants arrived in the country from the Soviet Union.[52] Although some of them subsequently emigrated and/or died, this decrease was somewhat offset by their positive vital balance.

To sum up, the estimates (that use the 1970 Soviet census as a baseline) show that, by the beginning of 2004, worldwide there were about 1.6 million "core" Jews who originated in the FSU and their descendants, of whom about one tenth, mostly in Israel, had become part of the "core" Jewish population in connection with their migration. In 2004, in Israel there were about 0.8 million Jews and their descendants originating from the FSU (approximately half of the estimated worldwide number) who had arrived since 1970. Possibly a fifth of them, roughly, had previously neither identified themselves nor had been seen by FSU authorities as Jews.

MIGRATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES

At the start of the recent mass aliya and emigration (1989) the Jewish population of the Russian Federation was the second largest in the Diaspora, and Ukrainian Jewry was in fourth place. Fifteen years later, the Jewish population of the Russian Federation ranked fifth in the Diaspora, and Ukrainian Jewry was tenth.[53] Recent censuses in FSU countries empirically confirmed the previously predicted demographic decline of the Jewish communities there.

The data of these censuses by age and religion show erosion of the "core" Jewish population. After the mass emigration of the 1990s this population became less homogeneous in its origin. Of those children recorded as Jews at ages under 5 in the 2002 Russian census, more than two-thirds were of mixed ethnic origin. At the same time, data from the 2000 Estonian census clearly demonstrate erosion of the "core" Jewish population by apostasy.

The data on age composition show that before the mass emigration of the 1990s, Russian and Ukrainian Jewry had already reached the "terminal stage" of demographic evolution. The emigration has dramatically accelerated the process of aging of the FSU Jewish populations. Recent data on age composition demonstrate that now Belarussian Jewry has also reached the "terminal stage" of demographic evolution.

The birth dynamics show that the Jews who emigrated to Israel escaped the dramatic fertility reduction characteristic of the FSU population as a whole and Jews in particular. The 1990s mass emigration seriously decreased the pool of people eligible for maintaining a Jewish population and the recent emigration from the FSU to all destinations has decreased. Out-migration of FSU immigrants from Israel is much lower than that from Western countries.

In 1970 there were about 12.6 million "core" Jews in the world. By 2004 this number had reached approximately 13 million.[54] In the same period, the number of "core" Jewish population originating in the FSU fell by more than a half million, despite the sizable additions to this "core" Jewish population as a result of the official recognition of Judaism/Jewish ethnicity (and self reidentification) of many individuals in Israel who had previously neither identified themselves or been seen by FSU authorities as Jews. In 1970 the share of Soviet Jews among world Jewry was 17 percent whereas by 2004 we estimate the share of "core" Jewish population originating from the FSU among world Jewry as only about 12 percent. During this period a significant number of these Jews changed their places of residence and now they are mostly concentrated in Israel.

NOTES

This chapter is part of a broader research project being carried out by the author at the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics of the Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The author expresses his appreciation to Sergio DellaPergola for his general advice. The author is grateful to Evgeny Andreev, Zvi Eisenbach, Ekaterina Kvasha, Zinaida Palyan, Rafi Pizov, and Emma Trakhtenberg for providing materials, information, and suggestions. The author also thanks Judith Even for editing an earlier draft. Responsibility for the content of the chapter is, of course, the author's alone.

1. See Sergio DellaPergola, "Demography," in Martin Goodman, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002),

807–8. The Soviet census data are regarded as "a good example of a large and empirically measured core Jewish population in the Diaspora." [Uziel O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population, 1993," *American Jewish Year Book* 95 (1995): 481].

2. Brian D. Silver, "The Ethnic and Language Dimensions in Russian and Soviet Censuses," in Ralph S. Clem, ed., *Research Guide to the Russian and Soviet Censuses* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986), 70–97; Ward W. Kingkade, "Content, Organization, and Methodology in Recent Soviet Population Censuses," *Population and Development Review* 15, no. 1 (1989): 123–38.

3. See, e.g.: Mordechai Altshuler, *Soviet Jewry since the Second World War: Population and Social Structure* (New York: Greenwood, 1987), 21–24; Zvi Gitelman, "The Reconstruction of Community and Jewish Identity in Russia," *East European Jewish Affairs* 24, no. 2 (1994): 40; cf. Robert J. Brym, with Rozalina Ryvkina, *The Jews of Moscow, Kiev and Minsk: Identity, Antisemitism, Emigration* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 21–22.

4. See: Sergio DellaPergola, "Demography," 808.

5. We estimate that in the Russian Federation, the ratio of "enlarged" to "core" Jewish population was 1.6 to 1 in 1989, and 1.8 to 1 in 1994 [Mark Tolts, "Jewish Demography of the Former Soviet Union," in Sergio DellaPergola and Judith Even, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography 1997* (Jerusalem: The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; World Union of Jewish Studies; Association for Jewish Demography and Statistics, 2001), 112]. The decreasing share of "core" Jews among the remaining "enlarged" Jewish population offers a serious challenge to community-building in the FSU in the future [see Zvi Gitelman, *A Century of Ambivalence: The Jews of Russia and the Soviet Union, 1881 to the Present*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), chaps. 8 and 9; Mikhail Krutikov, "The Jewish Future in Russia: Trends and Opportunities," *East European Jewish Affairs* 32, no. 1 (2002): 1–16].

6. However, the census in each of the FSU states met with political problems [Dominique Arel, "Demography and Politics in the First Post-Soviet Censuses: Mistrusted State, Contested Identities," *Population* (English edition) 57, no. 6 (2002): 801–28].

7. In 2001, a population census was conducted also in Armenia, but its results regarding Jews were not available in time to be included in this chapter. According to the results of the Moldova census of October 2004, there were only 3,628 Jews. However, this census did not cover Moldovan territory east of the Dniester River. The 1989 Soviet census counted 65,836 Jews in Moldova as a whole. Thus, we may assume that in this country intercensal decrease was very sizable—about 60,000.

8. This figure did not cover "Tats." In the 1999 Azerbaidzhan census, 10,900 Tats were enumerated, but according to the last Soviet census of 1989 there were only 10,200 Tats in this republic. We may surmise that some Muslims started to use this ethnic label; this problem should be studied separately. On Tats in the 2002 Russian census results, see: Mark Tolts, "Demography of North Caucasian Jewry: A Note on Population Dynamics and Shifting Identity," forthcoming in Moshe Gammer, ed., *Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder* (London: Routledge, ~~2007~~).

9. For detailed analysis of the 2002 Russian census results for Jewish population, see: Mark Tolts, "The Post-Soviet Jewish Population in Russia and the World," *Jews in Russia and Eastern Europe* 52, no. 1 (2004): 37–47.

10. Ibid., 45–46.

11. See: Mark Tolts, "Aliya from the Russian Federation: An Analysis of Recent Data," *Jews in Eastern Europe* 47–48, nos. 1–2 (2002): 16–18.

12. Zvi Gitelman, "Recent Demographic and Migratory Trends among Soviet Jews: Implications for Policy," *Post-Soviet Geography* 33, no. 3 (1992): 140.

13. See, e.g.: A. Volkov, "Etnicheski smeshannye sem'i v SSSR: Dinamika i sostav" [Part 2], *Vestnik Statistiki* 8 (1989): 8–24; Mark Tolts, "The Balance of Births and Deaths among Soviet Jewry," *Jews and Jewish Topics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* 19, no. 2 (1992): 21–22.

14. For the period of 1999–2002 their number was estimated at 14,800 [see: Mark Tolts, "Mass Aliyah and Jewish Emigration from Russia: Dynamics and Factors," *East European Jewish Affairs* 33, no. 2 (2003), 76].

15. Their number for the period between the 1994 Russian microcensus and the recent 2002 Russian census was tentatively estimated at 3,800 (ibid.).

16. See, e.g.: Robert J. Brym and Rozalina Ryvkina, "Russian Jewry Today: A Sociological Profile," *Sociological Papers* (Bar-Ilan University) 5 (1996): 1–47; Valery Chervyakov, Zvi Gitelman, and Vladimir Shapiro, "E Pluribus Unum? Post-Soviet Jewish Identities and Their Implications for Communal Reconstruction," in Gitelman, ed., *Jewish Life After the USSR*, 61–75.

17. Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, *Doubly Chosen: Jewish Identity, the Soviet Intelligentsia, and the Russian Orthodox Church* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), *passim*.

18. Zvi Gitelman, "Thinking about Being Jewish in Russia and Ukraine," in Gitelman, *Jewish Life After the USSR*, 51.

19. Boris Wiener, "Konstruirovanie sovremennoi ethnokonfessional'noi identichnosti: ot bezveriia k vere chuzhogo naroda," *Diaspory /Diasporas* 6, no. 1 (2004), 196.

20. For comprehensive analysis of census data on age composition of the Jewish population of the USSR and its republics between 1959 and 1989, see:

Mark Tolts, "Shinuyim be-herkev ha-ukhlusiya ha-yehudit be-Brit ha-Moatsot: Hizdaknut ve-shuk ha-nisuin" (Changes in the Composition of the Jewish Population of the USSR: Aging and the Marriage Market), *Yahadut Zemanenu* 9 (1994): 243–50; idem., "Demography of the Jews in the Former Soviet Union: Yesterday and Today," in Gitelman, *Jewish Life After the USSR*, 196–97.

21. Mark Tolts, "Trends in Soviet Jewish Demography since the Second World War," in Yaacov Ro'i, ed., *Jews and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 368. The "terminal stage" of demographic evolution is the situation when the proportion aged under 15 falls to 10 percent [see: Sergio DellaPergola, "Major Demographic Trends of World Jewry: The Last Hundred Years," in Batsheva Bonne-Tamir and Avinoam Adam, eds., *Genetic Diversity among Jews* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 26].

22. Tolts, "The Post-Soviet Jewish Population in Russia and the World,"49.

23. For detailed analysis of the data for this period, see, e.g.: Mark Tolts, "Russian Jewish Migration in the Post-Soviet Era," *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* 16, no. 3 (2000): 183–99.

24. Tolts, "Mass Aliyah and Jewish Emigration from Russia: Dynamics and Factors," 79.

25. See, e.g.: Sergio DellaPergola, "Aliya and Other Jewish Migrations: Toward an Integrated Perspective," in Usiel O. Schmelz and Gad Nathan, eds., *Studies in the Population of Israel in Honor of Roberto Bachi*, Scripta Hierosolymitana 30 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1986), 172–209.

26. Tolts, "Mass Aliyah and Jewish Emigration from Russia: Dynamics and Factors," 81–87.

27. These data include also some people who previously emigrated to Israel from other parts of the FSU.

28. The total fertility rate is the average number of children that a woman would bear in her lifetime if current age-specific fertility rates remain stable.

29. Statkomitet SNG, *Demograficheskii ezhegodnik 1993/ Demographic Yearbook 1993* (Moscow, 1995), 245.

30. Mark Tolts, "The Jewish Population of Russia, 1989–1995," *Jews in Eastern Europe* 31, no. 3 (1996): 12.

31. See, e.g.: Julie DaVanzo and Clifford Grammich, *Dire Demographics: Population Trends in the Russian Federation* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 2001), 21–24.

32. E. M. Andreev, L. E. Darsky and T. L. Kharkova, *Naselenie Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1922–1991* (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), 90.

33. See, e.g.: Anatoly Vishnevsky, "Demographic Processes in the Post-Soviet States," in Vlada Stanknienò et al., eds., *Demographic Development of the Countries in Transition* (Vilnius, 1999), 23–37.

34. Births to endogamous Jewish couples are the basis of reproduction for the "core" Jewish population (in Soviet conditions in most of the republics, they were about the only source). Births to at least one Jewish parent by definition of course include endogamous births, as well as births to Jewish mothers with non-Jewish fathers and births to non-Jewish mothers with Jewish fathers; these are the figures for Jewish fertility as a whole. Only births to Jewish mothers are considered Jewish according to Jewish religious law ("Halakha").

35. Corresponding to our estimate that according to the 1989 Soviet census and the 1994 Russian microcensus approximately twice as many Jewish males were currently married to non-Jewish females as were Jewish females currently married to non-Jewish males (see: Mark Tolts, "The Interrelationship between Emigration and the Socio-demographic Profile of Russian Jewry," in *Russian Jews on Three Continents* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 154; idem., "The Jewish Population of Russia, 1989–1995," 19).

36. Sergio DellaPergola, *Jewish Demography: Facts, Outlook, Challenges* (Jerusalem: The Jewish People Policy Institute, 2003), 5; P. Polian, "Evreiskaia emigratsiia iz byvshego SSSR v Germaniiu," *Vestnik Evreiskogo Universiteta* 22, no. 4 (2000): 190.

37. Israel CBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2005* (Jerusalem, 2005), table 3.14.

38. See: Dov Friedlander, "Fertility in Israel: Is the Transition to Replacement Level in Sight?" in United Nations Secretariat, Division of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *Expert Group Meeting on Completing the Fertility Transition* (New York, 2002), 9.

39. Israel CBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2005*, table 2.25.

40. See the chapter by Moshe Sicron in this book.

41. See: Mark Tolts, "Demographische Trends unter den Juden der ehemaligen Sowjetunion," *Menora: Jahrbuch für deutsch-jüdische Geschichte 2004*. Band 15 (Berlin/Wien: Philo, 2005), 37–38.

42. Tolts, "The Post-Soviet Jewish Population in Russia and the World," 52–53.

43. Cf. Volkov, "Etnicheski smeshannye sem'i v SSSR: Dinamika i sostav," 8–24; Tolts, "The Jewish Population of Russia, 1989–1995," 15.

44. For similar data for immigrants from Ukraine to Israel in 1996–1999, see: Ilan Riss and Yifat Klopshtock, "Olim miukraina lefi rishum misrad hapnim, 1996–1999" (Immigrants from Ukraine according to the Registry of the Interior Ministry, 1996–1999), in Ludmila Dymerskaya-Tsigelman, ed., *Yehudei brit hamo'atsot l'sheavar b'yisrael ub'tfutsot* 20–21, no. 5 (2002): 348–50.

45. According to Jewish law (halacha), *Jewishness* is defined as being born of Jewish mother or converting to Judaism through a formal religious procedure.

46. At the same time, the role of formal conversions to Judaism in Israel was rather minor: e.g., in 2002 and 2003, only 890 and 918 FSU immigrants, respectively, underwent conversions in Israel (*Ha'aretz*, November 22, 2004, 1A).

47. Cf. Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population, 2004," *American Jewish Year Book* 104 (2004): 502.

48. NJPS 2000–2001, "Jews from the Former Soviet Union (FSU): Reconciling Estimates from NJPS and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS)." www.ujc.org/content_display.html?ArticleID=84102; for characteristics of adult ex-Soviet Jews in the USA according to the data of this survey, see: Jonathon Ament, *Jewish Immigrants in the United States* (October 2004). www.ujc.org/content_display.html?ArticleID=118670.

49. Zentralwohlfartsstelle, Statistical Data as of the end of 2003.

50. Estimated by Robert J. Brym; cited in: Tolts, "The Post-Soviet Jewish Population in Russia and the World," 57–58. This corresponded fairly closely to the reported number of Jews in Canada who were born in the FSU (27,790, including pre-1970 immigrants) according to the 2001 census (Ron Csillag, "Immigration key to growth of Jewish community," *Canadian Jewish News*, June 29, 2005. www.cjnews.com/viewarticle.asp?id=6742).

51. Israel CBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2004* (Jerusalem, 2004), table 2.25.

52. Israel CBS, *Immigration to Israel 1999* (Jerusalem, 2002), table 2.

53. DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population, 2004," 518.

54. Ibid., 500.