World and Regional

Jewish Population Projections

Russian Republic, 1994-2019

(Interim Report)

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This report is dedicated

to the memory of

Professor Uziel O.Schmelz

whose life work was

the investigation of the Jewish population

in Israel and the Diaspora

and who initially conceived this project

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Introduction

This report presents first results of a new series of demographic projections of the Jewish population in the Russian Republic, the largest component of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The projection extends over a period of 25 years, between the mid-1990s and approaching the year 2020, and portrays different scenarios reflecting the most likely developments to be expected in conformity with a variety of assumptions. The present research is part of a comprehensive, long-term project of monitoring, evaluating and projecting the Jewish population in each of the major geographical regions in the world, which is currently in progress.

The aim of the whole project is to portray the current trends of Jewish population worldwide, and their implications for demographic analysis and the planning of Jewish communal services. Of special significance, in this respect, are the expected changes in age composition, namely at the older end of the age spectrum. Final results, including separate projections for each major geographical region and a global synthesis, as well as more detailed results for the Russian Republic itself, will be released at a later stage.

It should be stressed from the outset that population projections are not prophecies, but only the computational product of:

- a set of initial data on the size and demographic composition of the population investigated;
- a set of assumptions concerning the most likely future development of the major determinants of population change, namely: international migration, fertility, and mortality. In the case of a sub-population such as the Jewish

community, defined by cultural boundaries, an additional factor of possible gains and losses may be due to the assimilation of marginal members of the population, or the joining of neophytes.

Quality and detail of the available data, and plausibility of the hypotheses selected, may play a significant role in the reliability of population projections. In the case of Jewish populations, demographic analysis is generally hindered by scarcity of data, and by difficulties inherent in the very definition and coverage of the Jewish population. Some of these limitations exist with regard to the Jewish population of the Russian Republic. The demography of Russian Jewry has been the object of much speculation and conflicting opinions, together with a substantial amount of serious analytical work. The significant mass of statistical information that has become accessible in recent years, since the dismemberment of the USSR, allows for development of a full scale population projection, wholly based on empirical data of a comparatively reliable and consistent nature. Major sets of data on the size, structure, and vital changes of the Jewish population can be derived from the Central Statistical Authority in Russia (Goskomstat), besides information on Jewish migrants available from Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics in Jerusalem, and the Hebrew Immigrant Assistance Service (HIAS) in New York.

Our report relies on most of the available information concerning the recent demographic trends of the Jews in Russia, and the characteristics of Jewish emigrants from that country. The assumptions chosen for projecting the future size and age-structure of Russian Jewry cover a variety of possibilities, but fundamentally assume gradual, non-traumatic developments.

Together with a continuation of the basic thrust of current demographic trends, the following projections assume a number of changes that can be reasonably expected. The variations depend mainly on differing assumptions on possible future emigration.

It should be noted that the present projections deal with the quantitatively more limited concept of the *core* Jewish population (see below). Israel's Law of Return defines a much broader, partially Jewish population, whose socio-demographic profile is quite insufficiently known.

Characterization of Major Demographic Trends

The economic and political crisis that culminated in the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a state in 1991 generated an upsurge in Jewish emigration. After rapidly reaching a peak in 1990, emigration continued, somewhat attenuated, through 1996. While mass emigration is an obvious factor in population decrease, the demography of the Jews in Russia, and more generally in the FSU, has been characterized since the end of World War II by very low levels of *effectively Jewish* fertility (i.e., children designated as Jews by their parents), frequent outmarriage, and heavy aging. As a result, substantial shrinkage of the Jewish population must have taken place.

Data on nationalities (ethnic groups) from the Soviet Union's last official population census, carried out in January 1989, revealed a total of 550,700 Jews (not including Tats) in the Russian Republic. The figure confirmed the declining trend already apparent since the previous three censuses: 875,300 in 1959, 807,900 in 1970, and 700,650 in 1979. Some

underreporting in these figures is not impossible, but it cannot be quantified and should not be exaggerated. One should cautiously keep in mind the possible conflicting effects on census declarations of the prolonged existence of the Soviet totalitarian regime: on the one hand, it stimulated a preference for other than Jewish nationalities, especially in connection with mixed marriages; on the other hand, it preserved a formal Jewish identification by coercion, through the mandatory registration of nationality on official documents such as passports.

In any event, the figures of successive censuses appear to be remarkably consistent with one another and with the known patterns of emigration and internal demographic evolution of the Jewish population in recent decades. Systematic analysis of data on the demographic characteristics and trends of Jews in Russia since 1989 confirms the prevalence of very low fertility and birth-rates, a high frequency of outmarriage, preference for non-Jewish nationalities among the children of outmarriages, aging, and a clear surplus of Jewish deaths over Jewish births.

Just as the number of declared Jews evolved consistently between censuses, the number of persons of Jewish descent who preferred not to be identified as Jews was rather consistent too, at least until 1989. However, the recent developments, and especially the current emigration surge, may have led to greater readiness to self-identification among some persons who did not so define themselves in the 1989 census or before. In terms of demographic accounting, these "returnees" and “joiners” imply an actual net increment to the *core* Jewish population of the Russian Republic, the FSU, and World Jewry.

Jewish emigration has played a major role among the intervening changes. Between 1990 and 1995, over 175,000 people emigrated from Russia to Israel, and over 48,000 went to the United States. Several thousands more went to Germany and to other destinations. These figures refer to the *enlarged* concept of Jews and their non-Jewish family members. The number of migrants to Israel declined from a peak of 44,774 in 1991 to 24,612 in 1994, and 15,707 in 1995. The peak of migration from Russia to the United States was reached in 1992, with 9,904, followed by a decline to 8,473 in 1994, and 6,682 in 1995. These apparently declining emigration figures should not be misconstrued: when compared to the declining Jewish population figures in Russia, they actually demonstrate continuation of a remarkable propensity to emigrate.

At the same time, the heavy deficit of internal population dynamics continued and even intensified in Russia, due to the great aging which is known to have prevailed for many decades. Aging in the communities of origin was exacerbated by the significantly younger age composition of the emigrants.

Definition of the Projection's Base Jewish Population

In our projection we define the *core* Jewish population as the aggregate of all those who, when asked, identified themselves as Jews, or in the case of children, were identified as such by their parents. Only a population census or adequate sample survey can give a dependable basis for the estimation of the dynamics of the Jewish population. According to the

last official Soviet census of 1989, the Jewish population of Russia at the start of the great exodus has been estimated at about 570,000 (including Tats; see Tolts, 1996b). This number is based on census data which depend entirely on the self-declaration of respondents in the census. Conceptually, this corresponds to what has been defined as the *core* Jewish population (Schmelz and DellaPergola, 1996).

The respective figures for the *enlarged* Jewish population - including all current Jews as well as any other person of Jewish parentage and their non-Jewish household members - must be substantially higher than the figures for the core population in a societal context like that of the FSU, which has been characterized by high intermarriage rates for a considerable time. Evidence for the Russian Republic indicates a high ratio of about 2 : 1 in the size of the *enlarged* Jewish population versus the *core* Jewish population.

The first post-Soviet Russian Microcensus, which encompassed a 5% representative sample of the total population as of 14 February 1994, presented a new base for the estimate of the *core* Jewish population. Accordingly, the latter has been estimated at 410,000 for the beginning of 1994 (ibid.). This figure was used as the base population throughout this projection.

The 1994 Russian Microcensus presented composition by age and sex for Jews of Ashkenazi background - 96.3 per cent of the total Jewish population (Tolts, 1996b). These figures were adjusted for the total Jewish population at the beginning of 1994 by five-year age-sex cohorts.

It should be noted that the decrease of the Jewish population in the FSU has been much more rapid outside the Russian Federation. As a result,

by the beginning of 1994 Russia's Jews consisted of half the total number of Jews in the FSU, compared with 39 per cent before the start of the great exodus. Today Russia's share is even greater - about 55 per cent of total Jews in the FSU.

Projection's Main Assumptions

Our assumptions were developed using the collected data on the demography of Russia's Jews, and results of special analyses of demographic trends among them. Changing assumptions on fertility and assimilation, mortality, and migration were used for each of the five quinquennial (five-year) periods between the beginning of 1994 and 2019 (see Table 1). An assumption of stability was adopted regarding developments within each five-year period.

Fertility and Assimilation

The basic total fertility rate (which is the average number of children that a woman would bear in her lifetime assuming that current fertility remains stable) assumed for the Jewish population projection is 1.0 for 1994-1998 and 1.2 for the following periods. This small rise coincides with the assumptions made in the projection for the total urban population of Russia (Statkomitet of CIS, 1996).

To reach our estimate of the *effectively Jewish* total fertility rate (see Appendix) we used figures based on the 1994 Russian Microcensus showing that 80 per cent of the children born to mixed couples in 1993 were not

identified with the Jewish parent. This implies a significant demographic loss to the Jewish population. In order to avoid losses to the Jewish side, at least one half of these children would have to be raised as Jews. Yet, our assumption may be seen as rather optimistic since, according to the Microcensus, among all children of mixed Russian-Jewish origin aged under 16, only 11 per cent were actually reported as Jewish (see Tolts, 1996a).

We estimated the *effectively Jewish* total fertility rate at 0.75 for 1994-1998 and 0.9 for the following five-year periods, and subsequently estimated the appropriate schedule of age-specific fertility rates. According to our computations and evaluations, the percentage of children of mixed Jewish-non-Jewish origin is about 58 per cent of all children in the projected Jewish population.

Mortality

The life expectancy at birth for the Jewish population of Russia for 1993-1994 has been estimated at 69.6 for males and 73.2 for females (Tolts, 1996b). We allowed this level to remain constant throughout the whole projection period. This is consistent with the pessimistic projections for the total and urban populations of Russia (Andreev and Gorzev, 1996; Statkomitet of CIS, 1996). Life expectancies are significantly higher in Israel and in western countries.

Given the demographic situation of contemporary Russia, the life expectancy of Jewish males is relatively very good. In 1994 the life expectancy of males among the total urban population was only 57.9

(Goskomstat of Russia, 1995), that is, about 12 years less than for Jewish males.

One specific reason to expect a stable level of life expectancy for the Jewish population in our projection is the selective character of emigration: an unwell population usually has less tendency to migrate. This would of course be a very serious obstacle to the decline of Jewish mortality in Russia.

Migration

In the projections we assumed four different levels of net migration, broken down by age and sex. The base variant was the actual 1994 migration rate (Variant A). The percent of *core* Jews within the estimated total number of Jews and their household members who emigrated corresponds to that assumed in the recently published estimate of the dynamics of the Jewish population during 1994 (Schmelz and DellaPergola, 1996).

However, in 1995 the estimated number of Jews and their household members who emigrated from Russia was lower than in 1994 by 23 per cent, and in 1996 this declining tendency continued. We therefore developed two variants of decreasing migration, computed as the rate of Jewish migrants as a per cent of existing Jewish population. Variant B assumes a moderate decrease: the average annual rate for the first five-year period (1994-1998) was based on 75 per cent of the 1994 rate; the rate for each following quinquennium was estimated at 75 per cent of the previous one. Variant C assumes a stronger initial decrease of 50 per cent of the 1994 rate in 1994-1998, and a relative 50 per cent decline for each subsequent five-year period.

Variant D is a special case: for analytical purposes, we have assumed a net migration equal to zero. Therefore, any changes in the projected Jewish population according to Variant D is dependent only on internal processes - fertility, assimilation, and mortality.

It is theoretically possible that, under extremely unfavorable political conditions, a variant of total evacuation of Russia's Jewish community should be considered. However, this belongs in the area of political speculation. In this purely hypothetical case, by definition, the Jewish population in Russia would be nil, and no further demographic elaborations would be required.

Method of Computation

The following projections were made using a method of components of population change within demographic cohorts. In implementing our assumptions, separate projections were calculated for males and females for each five-year age-group and for each five-year period of time. The projections were calculated using the program PEOPLE, version 2.0 (Leete, 1990). Some modifications were introduced in the program, in an attempt to incorporate high levels of net migration.

Main Findings

This section presents some of the main results of the projections of Russia's Jewish population for the period 1994-2019. The projected size and

age composition of the Jewish population in Russia mostly reflect the different assumptions concerning migration rates.

Tables 2 to 6 provide absolute numbers and index numbers for the total Jewish population and for each of the major age groups. Tables 7 to 10 provide percentages of Jews in each of the major age groups, according to the various assumptions presented. Table 11 provides a synopsis of the median age of Jewish population expected at each date.

The results are given for the five quinquennia ending January 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019. The total projected Jewish population is broken down into three large age groups: 0-19, 20-64 and 65 and above. Additional data on the group aged 75 and above were provided due to the special needs and requirements this elderly group carries for various social services.

Russia's Jews are a demographically shrinking population. By the start of the projection period, in 1993-1994, the number of births to Jewish mothers in Russia was fewer than 3 per 1,000 Jews, and the number of Jewish deaths exceeded these births by 27 per 1,000 (Tolts, 1996b). Accordingly, even with an extreme assumption of zero migration (Variant D), at the end of the projection's period, close to the year 2020, the total number of Jews in Russia would be slightly less than half the base population of 1994 (Table 2).

However, it is more reasonable to assume that the true development will be between Variants B and C. Thus, by 1999 the total number of Jews in Russia could be about 300,000. By 2004, there would be between 200,000 and 250,000 Jews, and by the end of projection period, in 2019, the total number of Russia's Jews would be somewhere between 85,000 and 130,000.

Should emigration in all the five-year periods remain at the same level of intensity as in 1994 (relative to the existing Jewish population), the number of Jews in Russia would be reduced to less than 45,000 by the end of the projection period in 2019 (Table 2). However, as noted above, the most recent level of net migration has been lower than that of 1994.

High migration leads to a dramatic decrease in the number of Jewish children and youth expected to remain in Russia (Table 3). As against a current estimate of about 40,000 Jews below age 20 in 1994, according to Variants B and C of the projection, the numbers would be cut down to less than 20,000 by 1999, less than 10,000 by 2009, and to between 2,000 and 8,000 by 2019.

The working age population (20-64), too, is expected to decrease, though at a much more moderate pace (Table 4). Again according to the intermediate Variants B and C of the projection, the current number of 239,000 Jews aged 20 to 64 would be cut by half by 2004, and by another half between 2014 and 2019.

At the same time, 10 years after the beginning of the projection (by 2004), the number of Jews aged 65 and over (Table 5) would have decreased only by one third, assuming a moderate decrease of migration (Variant B), or even by one fourth, assuming a stronger decrease in migration (Variant C). According to these variants, only 20 years or more after the projection's base line, in 2014, would the decrease in the size of the 65 and over age-group be as much as one half.

The decrease of the group aged 75 and over would be even less pronounced (Table 6). According to Variants B and C, by 2004 Russia would

have a Jewish population of more than 40,000 belonging to this elderly age group. In any case, regardless of the assumptions considered in the projection, there will remain in Russia several tens of thousands of extremely aged Jews to be taken care. It can be assumed that many or possibly most of these will be lonely adults, left behind by younger family members who migrated elsewhere.

The projection portrays a dramatic change in the age composition of Russia's Jewry. If in 1994 the percentage of children and youth below 20 was about 10 per cent of the total Jewish population, it would become much smaller by 1999 and thereafter (5 per cent) (Table 7). The percentage of the working-age population out of total Jewish population will also go down substantially (Table 8). This may significantly and negatively affect the ability of the Jews in Russia to support Jewish community services that may develop locally.

The percentage of elderly population (65 and above) which was less than one third in 1994, might rise to more than 40 per cent in 2004 and reach 50 per cent in 2019 (Table 9). By 2019, the percentage of the very old population (75 and above) might approach one fifth to one fourth of total Jews in Russia (Table 10).

In summary, by 2004, considering all probable demographic changes, the median age of Russia's Jews might easily be above 60, and by 2019 it could reach 65, meaning one half of the Jewish population would be below, and one half would be above that age (Table 11).

Concluding Remarks

Our projection clearly shows that Russia's Jewish population is declining very rapidly, yet will not have disappeared by the year 2020. At the same time, the percentage of elderly among Russia's total Jews will probably rise dramatically. It should be noted that similar trends have already been observed among other Jewish populations in Eastern Europe that have suffered considerable stress during World War II, and have been subsequently affected by large-scale emigration. One such case is Romania.

The main difference, in the case of Russia, is the much larger scale of the Jewish population at the beginning of the period reviewed in our projections. Russia is fast becoming the home of one of the most extremely aged Jewish communities in the world context. In the near future, Russian Jews will take a unique position among world Jewry (cf. DellaPergola, 1996), as this extremely aged community will require very significant inputs of assistance for the elderly, and much generous help from Jewish organizations and individuals in the rest of the world.

Over the last several years, emigration has been the leading factor of Jewish population transformation in Russia (and the rest of FSU), and can be expected to continue, even if at a reduced pace. Emigration carries very significant implications not only for the size of the Jewish population that chooses to remain in Russia, but also for its age composition. The more emigration occurs, the more overaged the remaining Jewish population will be. Another significant effect of emigration, enhanced by the prolonged patterns of low fertility and small family size among Jews in Russia, is the

leaving behind of unassisted, very elderly, lonely individuals. The latter will obviously constitute the main target of Jewish communal work in Russia during the next decades.

One interesting problem, not directly dealt with in the present projection but significant for communal policies, concerns the status of the non-Jewish relatives included in the *enlarged* Jewish population. These too are expected to undergo a significant process of quantitative shrinking and demographic aging. Whether these non-Jewish relatives should be included in the communal service frameworks that most likely will develop in support of the Jewish population in the Russian Republic is a significant issue for future Jewish institutional policies. Inclusion may imply a doubling or more of the relevant target population.

Population projections obviously reflect underlying sets of assumptions, along with the actual known characteristics of the group investigated. If some of the parameters assumed in our report were to undergo substantial redirection, or even a more moderate course, such changes would be reflected in the actual demographic developments. Relevant areas in this respect concern the levels of public health, and consequently mortality, and of emigration, that were handled cautiously in our projections; or the cultural characteristics of Jewish community life in the Russian Republic, for which we assumed basic stability. New initiatives and developments, namely on the part of large international Jewish organizations, may affect the level of identification of the Jewish public and the extent of assimilation, which, in turn, currently plays a crucial role in eroding the already low existing levels of fertility.

While the projection points to a number of irreversible demographic trends, the true size and composition of the Jewish population in Russia will be significantly affected by the interplay of general societal developments and the Jewish corporate response to them.

Appendix:

Estimate of the 'Effectively Jewish' Total Fertility Rate

by Mark Tolts

The total fertility rate for the Jewish population of Russia for 1993-1994 was estimated to be as low as 0.8 (Tolts, 1996b). Assuming a moderate increase in fertility, we arrive at an estimated total fertility rate of 1.0 for 1994-1998, and 1.2 for the following periods. However, this total fertility rate is based on births to Jewish mothers alone, and does not take into account those births to non-Jewish mothers and Jewish fathers.

By the start of the projection period, about 68 per cent of all births to Jewish mothers had non-Jewish fathers, and only 32 per cent occurred within endogamous Jewish couples. The input of total fertility from couples with a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father can be estimated at 0.68 (=1.0*68%) for 1994-1998, and 0.82 (=1.2*68%) thereafter. These figures are much higher than the estimated input of total fertility from couples composed of a Jewish mother and a Jewish father: 0.32 (=1.0*32%) for 1994-1998 and 0.38 (=1.2*32%) for the following five-year periods.

To estimate the number of births to non-Jewish mothers and Jewish fathers, we used an estimated ratio of the number of currently mixed-married Jewish males to the number of currently mixed married Jewish females (2.2:1), based on the data of the 1994 Russian Microcensus. We roughly estimated the total number of such births to be as high as 1.50 (=0.68*2.2) for 1994-1998 and about 1.80 (=0.82*2.2) thereafter. Hence, in 1994-1998 the *total* number of children born to mixed couples can be assumed to be at a

level of about 2.18 (=0.68+1.50), and for the quinquennia thereafter, 2.62 (=0.82+1.80).

Effectively Jewish fertility (i.e., the number of newborns who will be raised and identified as Jews, including some of the children born to mixed couples) was estimated by using the percentages of Jewish identification of children according to the Russian Microcensus. About 20 per cent of the children born to mixed couples in 1993 were reported as Jewish (ibid.). Based on this assumption, we computed the *effectively Jewish* total fertility rate to be equivalent to 0.75 (=0.32 [the input of Jewish couples] +2.18*20% [the combined input of mixed couples]) for the period 1994-1998, and 0.9 (=0.38+2.62*20%) for the following five-year periods.

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Table 1. Assumed Components of Population Dynamics for the Jewish Population of Russia, by Five-year Periods, 1994-2018

	1994-1998	1999-2003	2004-2008	2009-2013	2014-2018
1. Total fertility rate	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
2. 'Effectively Jewish' total fertility rate	0.75	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
3. Life expectancy at birth					
Males	69.6	69.6	69.6	69.6	69.6
Females	73.2	73.2	73.2	73.2	73.2
4. Average annual net migration rate					
Variant A	as in 1994	as in 1994	as in 1994	as in 1994	as in 1994
Variant B	75% of 1994	75% of 1994-1998[a]	75% of 1999-2003[a]	75% of 2004-2008[a]	75% of 2009-2013[a]
Variant C	50% of 1994	50% of 1994-1998[b]	50% of 1999-2003[b]	50% of 2004-2008[b]	50% of 2009-2013[b]
Variant D	none	none	none	none	none

(a) 75% of Variant B for the previous quinquennium.
(b) 50% of Variant C for the previous quinquennium.

Table 2. Total Jewish Population in Russia, According to Different Assumptions, 1994-2019

Year[a]	Assumed Emigration:			
	As in 1994 (Variant A)	Moderate Decrease (Variant B)	Strong Decrease (Variant C)	None (Variant D)
		Thousands		
1994[b]	410.0	410.0	410.0	410.0
1999	263.2	282.6	304.5	357.1
2004	172.0	206.0	242.5	311.3
2009	111.8	153.3	197.2	269.6
2014	71.4	114.7	160.6	231.4
2019	44.7	85.7	130.4	197.6
		Index Numbers (1994=100)		
1994[b]	100	100	100	100
1999	64	69	74	87
2004	42	50	59	76
2009	27	37	48	66
2014	17	28	39	56
2019	11	21	32	48

(a) From the beginning of 1994 to the beginning of 2019.
(b) Base population estimated on the data of 1994 microcensus.

Table 3. Jewish Population at Ages 0-19 in Russia, According to Different Assumptions, 1994-2019

Year[a]	Assumed Emigration:			
	As in 1994 (Variant A)	Moderate Decrease (Variant B)	Strong Decrease (Variant C)	None (Variant D)
		Thousands		
1994[b]	39.9	39.9	39.9	39.9
1999	12.5	15.6	19.6	31.2
2004	4.2	7.8	13.0	25.9
2009	1.4	4.4	9.6	21.3
2014	0.6	3.1	8.3	18.9
2019	0.2	2.3	7.4	17.1
		Index Numbers (1994=100)		
1994[b]	100	100	100	100
1999	31	39	49	78
2004	10	20	33	65
2009	4	11	24	53
2014	2	8	21	47
2019	0.5	6	19	43

(a),(b) See notes to Table 2.

Table 4. Jewish Population at Ages 20-64 in Russia, According to Different Assumptions, 1994-2019

Year[a]	Assumed Emigration:			
	As in 1994 (Variant A)	Moderate Decrease (Variant B)	Strong Decrease (Variant C)	None (Variant D)
		Thousands		
1994[b]	239.0	239.0	239.0	239.0
1999	152.2	164.3	177.8	209.5
2004	90.2	110.7	132.8	174.4
2009	55.7	80.6	107.8	154.0
2014	30.0	53.7	81.1	127.0
2019	15.4	35.7	61.6	105.7
		Index Numbers (1994=100)		
1994[b]	100	100	100	100
1999	64	69	74	88
2004	38	46	56	73
2009	23	34	45	64
2014	13	22	34	53
2019	6	15	26	44

(a),(b) See notes to Table 2.

Table 5. Jewish Population at Ages 65 and Over in Russia, According to Different Assumptions, 1994-2019

Year[a]	Assumed Emigration:			
	As in 1994 (Variant A)	Moderate Decrease (Variant B)	Strong Decrease (Variant C)	None (Variant D)
		Thousands		
1994[b]	131.1	131.1	131.1	131.1
1999	98.5	102.7	107.1	116.4
2004	77.6	87.5	96.7	111.0
2009	54.7	68.3	79.8	94.3
2014	40.8	57.9	71.2	85.5
2019	29.1	47.7	61.4	74.8
		Index Numbers (1994=100)		
1994[b]	100	100	100	100
1999	75	78	82	88
2004	59	65	74	85
2009	42	52	61	72
2014	31	44	54	65
2019	22	36	47	57

(a),(b) See notes to Table 2.

Table 6. Jewish Population at Ages 75 and Over in Russia, According to Different Assumptions, 1994-2019

Year[a]	Assumed Emigration:			
	As in 1994 (Variant A)	Moderate Decrease (Variant B)	Strong Decrease (Variant C)	None (Variant D)
		Thousands		
1994[b]	58.6	58.6	58.6	58.6
1999	44.3	45.7	47.1	50.2
2004	36.6	40.3	43.6	48.8
2009	27.0	32.5	37.0	43.0
2014	21.2	28.9	34.9	41.7
2019	14.1	21.9	27.6	33.3
		Index Numbers (1994=100)		
1994[b]	100	100	100	100
1999	76	78	80	86
2004	62	69	74	83
2009	46	55	63	73
2014	36	49	60	71
2019	24	37	47	57

(a),(b) See notes to Table 2.

Table 7. Percentage of Jewish Population at Ages 0-19 among Total Jews in Russia, According to Different Assumptions, 1994-2019

Year[a]	Assumed Emigration:			
	As in 1994 (Variant A)	Moderate Decrease (Variant B)	Strong Decrease (Variant C)	None (Variant D)
1994[b]	9.7	9.7	9.7	9.7
1999	4.7	5.5	6.4	8.7
2004	2.5	3.8	5.4	8.3
2009	1.3	2.9	4.9	7.9
2014	0.8	2.7	5.2	8.2
2019	0.4	2.7	5.7	8.7

(a),(b) See notes to Table 2.

Table 8. Percentage of Jewish Population at Ages 20-64 among Total Jews in Russia, According to Different Assumptions, 1994-2019

Year[a]	Assumed Emigration:			
	As in 1994 (Variant A)	Moderate Decrease (Variant B)	Strong Decrease (Variant C)	None (Variant D)
1994[b]	58.3	58.3	58.3	58.3
1999	57.9	58.2	58.4	58.7
2004	52.4	53.7	54.7	56.0
2009	49.8	52.5	54.6	57.1
2014	42.0	46.8	50.5	54.9
2019	34.5	41.7	47.2	53.5

(a),(b) See notes to Table 2.

Table 9. Percentage of Jewish Population at Ages 65 and Over among Total Jews in Russia, According to Different Assumptions, 1994-2019

Year[a]	Assumed Emigration:			
	As in 1994 (Variant A)	Moderate Decrease (Variant B)	Strong Decrease (Variant C)	None (Variant D)
1994[b]	32.0	32.0	32.0	32.0
1999	37.4	36.3	35.2	32.6
2004	45.1	42.5	39.9	35.7
2009	48.9	44.6	40.5	35.0
2014	57.2	50.5	44.3	36.9
2019	65.1	55.6	47.1	37.8

(a),(b) See notes to Table 2.

Table 10. Percentage of Jewish Population at Ages 75 and Over among Total Jews in Russia, According to Different Assumptions, 1994-2019

Year[a]	Assumed Emigration:			
	As in 1994 (Variant A)	Moderate Decrease (Variant B)	Strong Decrease (Variant C)	None (Variant D)
1994[b]	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3
1999	16.8	16.2	15.5	14.1
2004	21.3	19.6	18.0	15.7
2009	24.2	21.2	18.8	15.9
2014	29.7	25.2	21.7	18.0
2019	31.5	25.6	21.2	16.9

(a),(b) See notes to Table 2.

Table 11. Median Age of Jewish Population in Russia, According to Different Assumptions, 1994-2019

Year[a]	Assumed Emigration:			
	As in 1994 (Variant A)	Moderate Decrease (Variant B)	Strong Decrease (Variant C)	None (Variant D)
1994[b]	55.8	55.8	55.8	55.8
1999	59.9	59.1	58.2	56.0
2004	62.5	61.0	59.4	56.9
2009	64.6	63.0	61.2	57.8
2014	67.2	65.2	62.6	58.3
2019	69.8	67.0	63.8	58.7

(a),(b) See notes to Table 2.