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NOTES should follow the style of this *Journal* and should be given at the end of the article in numerical sequence according to the order of their citation in the text.

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THE NEW LEFT AND THE JEWS

Nathan Glazer

THE New Left in the United States has origins before 1962—the peace movement and the movement to ban nuclear testing (itself strongly influenced by the stronger English movements, such as the Aldermaston marches), the rise of new interest in Marxist thought in the late 1950s (expressed in such magazines as the *New Left Review* in England, *Studies on the Left* and *New University Thought* in the United States), the concern over slum clearance in the late 1950s, and the rise of interest in community organizing of the Saul Alinsky type as a means of altering it, are all earlier developments that played a role in creating the New Left. Far more significant than any of these early movements contributing to the New Left was the civil rights revolution, which moved into a new stage of activism with the involvement of Negro youth in the sit-ins of 1960. But 1962 appears to me to be the date—others will choose others—of the beginning of that shifting, amorphous, and amazingly successful movement of protest, rebellion, and perhaps shortly now revolution, the New Left, or simply, the Movement. For that is the year in which the nascent Students for a Democratic Society, then still the student branch of the democratic socialist League for Industrial Democracy, met at Port Huron, Michigan, and adopted the Port Huron statement, which in its clear humanism, its refusal to use old radical or even liberal language, its emphasis on a pragmatic effort to involve people in the solution of their own problems, appears to me to be the founding document of the New Left.

In the Spring of 1969, the SDS grew to become the largest and most powerful student movement in American history, with a membership of 70,000, according to the *New York Times*,¹ on 350 campuses. But more significant than its membership, which is shifting, undisciplined, and poorly defined, is its actual power—to disrupt and close campuses, to change the shape of American higher education, to place issues on the national agenda, to draw hundreds of thousands of students to its issues, to arouse the anger of a score of state legislatures, and conceivably—this is in the future—to arouse a reactionary and repressive movement that will be far more serious than McCarthyism.

The history of the New Left is not yet written,² and in any case it still has a good deal of history to go through. It is doubtful whether it has reached its maximum strength as I write in this chaotic Spring of 1969. The aim of this article is to contribute, and only partially, to one aspect of this history, and that is the relationship between the New Left and American Jews. Even there, my aim is a limited one. It is not to explore exhaustively what role Jews have played in the New Left. This too is a task for detailed research, though it is clear that Jews have played a substantial role in it, disproportionately large certainly in contrast with their overall proportion in the population (3 per cent), their proportion in the colleges and universities (5 per cent), and perhaps even disproportionately large when we consider that the chief appeal of the New Left has been to the children of the affluent middle class in the elite colleges and universities, among whom the Jewish proportion is rarely lower in this country than 15 per cent, and often larger. Nor will I go in any detail into the complex and fascinating question of why the New Left has a disproportionate appeal to Jews. The main aim of this article is to analyse the political issues and to some extent the political style of the New Left, and to analyse how it impinges upon Jewish political interests. Ideally, this would require some analysis of just what are 'Jewish' political interests, which I cannot go into here.

Before getting to that, it is necessary to clarify some terms. Just what is the 'New Left'? It is more, on the one hand, than the Students for a Democratic Society—though that is its heart. It is less, on the other hand, than the civil rights movement, which has involved so many Americans since the early 1960s, and less than the anti-Vietnam war movement, which has also involved large parts of the population. These movements have included liberals as well as radicals, and have not as such challenged in any basic way the political structure of the United States, its economic system, or its fundamental values, which I take to be its commitments to individual achievement and to equality, with all the conflicts that inevitably seem to derive from such commitments.³ Many of those who have played some role in the civil rights and anti-war movement have eventually come to be included in the New Left—they have graduated into it, coming to despair of the possibility of peaceful and gradual change in the United States. Many others in these movements have dissociated themselves ever more sharply from the New Left. We must distinguish the large liberal group in the United States from the New Left despite the fact that they have stood together on many issues, and their reactions to certain events (for instance, the Chicago convention riots) are almost indistinguishable.

To define the New Left precisely: the New Left—I do not know the origin of the term—means 'New' in two specific senses; in one sense, it is 'New' simply because there was hardly any Left at all in the 1950s, before the New Left rose. There were liberals, of course. The Com-

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munist Party was half legal and in any case almost non-existent, its Trotskyite and Socialist opponents barely maintained life, and whether because of McCarthyism or of a prevailing conviction that most American domestic problems were or could be easily solved—see the rhetoric of the two Stevenson campaigns and even the first John Kennedy campaign—few people thought themselves to be of the revolutionary left, or even of the reformist left. This was a time when *Dissent*, edited by Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, seemed to be *the* Left in America—it now staunchly opposes (and is opposed by) the New Left. This was the age when everyone spoke of campus conformity and conservatism, when the Far Right made a greater appeal to youth than the Far Left, when a religious revival was believed to be in process on the campuses, and when religious speakers drew larger audiences than the occasional representatives of the Left. But more significantly, the New Left was new in that its members consciously dissociated themselves from the Old Left (by which they meant the Communist Party), and its Marxist critics of Left and Right, the Socialists and the Trotskyites. The New Left consciously rejected three elements in the Old Left.

First and foremost perhaps, was its formal ideology: the study of major classical texts, the attempt to relate current actions to an elaborate analysis of the nature of the society and its direction, etc. They objected to the terminology of the Old Left as stale and dated and incapable of moving people. They did not use terms like capitalism, exploitation, and imperialism; they preferred more concrete and less jargonized words.

Second, they rejected centralized control, particularly marked among the Communists and the Trotskyites, those who followed in the Leninist tradition. The notion of central leadership was anathema—not only should each unit be free to pursue whatever policies it wished, but within each unit action should be pursued only on the basis of a consensus.

Third, they dethroned the working class, the proletariat, from its central position in the ideology and strategy of the Old Left. To these young students, the working classes in 1962 were fat, contented, and conservative, and their trade unions reflected them. The New Left would work with the poor and disinherited—and these did not include the organized workers.

As to its positive elements—we have indicated what the New Left was not; but what was it?

First of all, it was one outgrowth of the striking and successful intervention of youth in the Southern civil rights revolution by means of the sit-ins of 1960, an intervention which transformed the tone of the movement, and which led first to sympathy strikes by white students in the North, and then to the joint work of black and white students and ex-students in the hazardous effort to break the barriers to Negroes' voting and civil rights in the South. Many of the founders of SDS worked

in the South, but the nascent New Left was only one element in the South. Just as many of the workers in the South could not be defined as New Left, so on the other hand the interests of the New Left encompassed far more than the civil rights struggle. It saw itself as the heir—even if opposed to many of its features—of an older American radicalism, rather than a response to the civil rights revolution. In so far as the New Left was embodied in SDS, it saw its main work as being in the North, and directed towards a large change in American society that encompassed but went beyond civil rights for Negroes.

Its main interests, in addition to the civil rights movement, were American military and foreign policy—the role of the military in the society and in shaping foreign policy, and the emphasis in foreign policy on anti-Communism—and the poor whites as well as blacks. Underlying all the specific areas of concern was a common outlook which emphasized resistance to large bureaucratic institutions—to urban renewal agencies clearing slums, to public housing agencies administering housing for the poor, to welfare agencies distributing aid, to chain stores and local merchants. The early SDS—in the Newark community organizing project, for example, and others—tended to organize around opposition to large bureaucratic institutions. This was again a feature of distinction from the Old Left, because the New Left saw these institutions as not particularly capitalistic—they were largely governmental—but as simply inhuman, and therefore to be opposed. And it saw them—as C. Wright Mills and Paul Goodman saw them—as being of the same breed as the American military and the American corporation and indeed the American government, overwhelming and of more than human scale and outside human control. In its opposition it emphasized—which is its chief contribution to political theory—participatory democracy. In its early organizing efforts, we find a style of non-assertiveness that is almost Quaker in quality—as if to say, we will simply ‘organize’ people around what *they* see to be their interests, and let them find the action that is most useful for themselves. There was, in these early days, much discussion of whether one should present issues to people, or whether one should let the poor people find them, let them come up from their experience. Would not the first approach be ‘manipulative’? The concern with not infringing on the rights of others to be full persons, to remain undominated—and indeed, almost uninfluenced—is impressive and touching, and somewhat unrealistic. But the SDS was expressing the strong feeling that everyone in the society is influenced and dominated by the mass media and advertising, and cannot find what is in his own interest. The SDS would not contribute to this domination by outside forces even with its own weak efforts.

Obviously, a great deal has happened since 1962. The slum organizing work, after a few hard years, was largely abandoned—it was taken

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over by foundation- and later government-supported community action agencies. In part it was discredited in SDS as having been 'co-opted' by the power structure. In a later stage, with the rapid rise of Black Power, New Left adherents began to feel that the work in the Negro slums and to a lesser extent among Negroes in the South should be left to Negroes (and even if they did not think so, Negroes soon pushed almost all whites out of such work). SDS continued to work in some poor white areas, particularly one in Chicago. But the main change in the locus of SDS activity came after the Berkeley explosion of 1964, when it concentrated its activities on the campus.

There it became increasingly successful. The work of organizing in the slums was hard and unrewarding—the work of organizing on the campus was far more fruitful.

Initially, the shift to the campus involved no change in the general character of the New Left. It was still against Old Left ideology, against centralization, and indifferent or opposed to the organized workers. It was still against bureaucracy and big organization—in this case, university organization—and it was still for participation. But the last few years have seen a number of striking changes. Two variants have arisen within the New Left, both in various senses to the 'Left' of it.

The first variant is what we may call the New Old Left. Its centre is the Leninist-Maoist Progressive Labor group, which now plays a large role in SDS and which in many places is on the verge of disrupting—or has disrupted—it through factional struggles.* The New Old Left reverses all the positions of the New Left: it has new sacred texts (the sayings of Mao, which it quotes with all seriousness, even if it does not study them with the passion that the Old Left applied to its texts). It uses the old language, and to a fault—the din of imperialism, exploitation, blood-sucking capitalism, revisionism, reformism, running dogs, lackeys, now reverberates in our ears, replacing the old humanistic language of the New Left. It is centrally organized and exerts discipline—people are expelled for various ideological sins, etc. Only the cult of a central maximal leader has not yet emerged—it is still organized by committee. And it has taken the working classes and again placed them in the centre of concern—thus, much of the arguments between the New Old Left and the main body of the New Left relates to the primacy of the campus in the political outlook and ideology of the New Left. The Progressive Labor group and its allies, which bear various names, would like to see the Leftist students working in the community, among the poorest, and among the workers. Thus, one issue of *Challenge*, the publication of Progressive Labor, devotes many pages to a strike of Puerto Rican female brassière workers in New York. This oddity can only be

* Since this was written, the SDS has been formally split into two organizations, both claiming legitimacy, one dominated by Progressive Labor.

explained ideologically (workers are important) as well as pragmatically—these seem to have been at that point the only workers that Progressive Labor had ‘influenced’ to take ‘radical’ action.

The New Old Left also has a very different view of participatory democracy. It will take action even that the main group of New Leftists opposes (such as occupying University Hall at Harvard last Spring). It is ‘participatory’ only tactically, in the sense that if you get people to participate with you in action which opposes authority and involves danger of authority acting against you, you may bring along the participants to a higher level of radicalism. But this is actually Leninism, or Maoism—you need the masses, but only the small central group undertakes the action that radicalizes the masses. ‘Democratic centralism’ has returned to one part of the New Left. Thus one important wing of the New Left has abandoned or reversed almost all the positions with which the New Left began to distinguish itself from the Old Left—all that is left is opposition to large organization, to bureaucracy. One wonders how much of that is tactical, and how long that will remain.

Another group has risen to the left of the New Left: they are the Negro militants. These are dissimilar in character, ranging from the fairly tightly organized Black Panthers, to the diverse Black Student organizations (some under Black Panther influence), to the many local militant groups emphasizing varying combinations of local control over public institutions in the ghetto, community control over business, Black nationalism, distinctive Afro-American culture, etc. Between the New Left and the varied spectrum of Negro militancy relations of course are mixed and complex. White New Leftists defer to Black militants, inscribing on their own banners whatever slogans Black militants wish to adopt—among these slogans are to be found, increasingly though in no way centrally, attacks on Israel.⁴ The closest link between the New Left and Black militancy is that between the Black Panthers, centred in the San Francisco Bay Area, and various white New Left groups. There seems to be one Maoist group that gives it considerable support and gets some support in return (recent issues of *The Black Panther*, the movement newspaper, have featured full-page pictures of Mao, and verbatim reprints of the Chinese position in the border conflict with Soviet Russia). The New Left-oriented press, the magazine *Ramparts*, the San Francisco *Express Times*, and New Left-dominated campus publications such as the *Daily Californian*, also strongly support the Black Panthers. And the left wing of the New York literary establishment (best represented by the *New York Review of Books*) also gives some support to the Black Panthers, particularly through extravagant praise and support of the remarkable Eldridge Cleaver.

But while the movement for Black militancy is supported by the New Left, and in the case of the Black Panthers and perhaps some other groups there are close links, the New Left is primarily a movement of

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white upper-middle class, college-educated youth, and the movement for Black militancy is something quite different, despite the occasional overlap and alliances. In addition, we must indicate the existence of one more group, or group of grouplets, to the 'left' of the New Left, and this is the tendency that appears in such form as the Yippies, the Up Against the Wall Mother——s, and in other groups, sometimes dubbed together the 'Crazies'. These are the people who are for 'revolution for the hell of it', who disrupt meetings (even those by well-known leftists, such as Norman Mailer), and who exalt any form of outrageous and unconventional behaviour in public.⁶

What has been the Jewish role in all this? If we list people who have come to some prominence through their role in creating or developing the New Left—Tom Hayden, Carl Oglesby, Rennie Davis, Mario Savio, Mark Rudd, Abby Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, and others come to mind—we will not find an overwhelming predominance of Jews. In fact, perhaps Jews are *less* obvious among the leaders of the New Left than they were in the leadership of the Old Left. Among the troops—the students who follow these leaders, who are aroused by the issues that the New Left has exploited, and in particular the issues surrounding the Vietnam war (the teach-ins, opposition to the draft and to military and industrial recruiting on campus, the Reserve Officers Training Corps programme on campus, the issues of university complicity with government and war research, etc.)—Jews are numerous. Statistics are not easy to get; the membership of SDS is itself a shifting one, and defines itself as much by action as by formal affiliation. In the case of certain major campus actions (involvement in the Free Speech Movement in Berkeley and the movement against reporting class rank to draft authorities in Chicago), we have studies and they tend to show that more Jews participate in student activist movements than their proportion on campus.⁶

Other studies are under way, and there will be more information on this point. I have discussed in another article, though largely in speculative fashion,⁷ the prominence of Jews in the New Left and the reasons for it. Some writers emphasize the conflict between permissive, liberal, child-centred, idea-oriented environments, such as are to be found in parts of the prosperous middle classes, and the rigid bureaucratic environments the children of these classes find in the high schools and colleges.⁸ They point out that such a clash between an enlightened childhood and restrictive organizations—and to a child whose opinion has been taken seriously, whose wishes have helped determine the actions of adults around him and the nature of his environment, a university with its rules may be seen as such a restrictive organization—may be a factor in encouraging Left attitudes in young people, whose experience will appear to them to contradict the claims of the society to be free and open. These types of childhood would characterize the

professional classes, and are certainly more likely to be found in Jewish than in non-Jewish families, owing to the occupational and economic characteristics of American Jews.

As against this social-psychological explanation, I myself tend to emphasize historical factors in explaining the tendency of Jews to find the New Left more attractive. These historical factors date back to the emancipation. At that time, the right was identified with romanticism, monarchy, hierarchy, tradition, nationalism, and generally antisemitism. The left—and by this I mean liberals as well as radicals of various kinds—emphasized rationality and science, parliamentary democracy, social equality, internationalism, and of course freedom and equality for the Jews. There was a tendency to antisemitism in parts of the Left too, and this has been explored in particular by Z. Szajkowski, in articles in *Jewish Social Studies* and elsewhere. Still, there seemed little question that Jews were better off with the Left than the Right in Europe, particularly when the Left was liberal rather than radical.

This political bias was carried over to the United States. German Jews identified with the Republicans for a while in the North, when this was in certain ways the more 'liberal' party—it opposed slavery. Eastern European Jews, who became the dominant part of American Jewry after 1880, were often Socialists, of one outlook or another. Many others were enrolled in the Democratic machines of the large cities. But even when they were not Socialist, they were more liberal than other Democrats, on such key indices as internationalism, higher government expenditure for public purposes, and government control of business to assist workers and trade unions. It can be argued that Jews, in taking these positions, were defending their self-interest; and in part they were. Certainly, since so many Jews were overseas in countries in which Jews were threatened, it seemed in the Jewish self-interest to defend a more active and internationalist foreign policy. Jewish attitudes in defence of workers' interests seemed understandable enough as long as Jews were workers—in the thirties and forties, the proportion of Jewish workers dropped rapidly while the proportion of Jews in business and the professions (always substantial) increased rapidly. Yet as their economic position rose, the Jews continued to hold liberal domestic political attitudes, breaking the American pattern whereby increased wealth leads to identification with Republicans. Despite some contradictions between the Jewish economic position—predominantly now in business and the professions—and the economic orientation of the Democratic Party (which is the party of heavier taxes, heavier public spending, stronger restrictions on business, and stronger support for organized labour) the non-economic interest of Jews, their interest in a government tolerant and understanding of the non-Protestant minorities, seems to outweigh their purely economic interests.⁹

Jewish identification with the Left today I believe stems in large measure from the fact that the parents of Jews are generally liberals, and many of them were radicals in their youth. If these fathers are liberals, young Jews very often share with them disillusionment with recent political developments, and carry this disillusionment further. Young Jews are not insulated against radical and Marxist thinking by a childhood in which these were considered mad, immoral, or criminal—as is true in so many American homes. This means they do not become radical by reacting against their parents—rather they become radical by seeing themselves as willing to carry the thinking of their parents to its logical conclusion, unhampered by inhibition, caution, or concern for position and family. In their minds they overcome the hypocrisy of their parents, whose thinking is not carried out in action.

If their parents were once radicals, the children often see themselves as carrying out the heritage from which their own parents were deflected by fear, or lack of sufficient strength. Let us not underestimate the significance of this heritage. Perhaps half of the American Communist Party in the 1950s and 1960s was Jewish. While the Party never had much more than about 50,000 members, the turnover was so rapid that perhaps ten times that number or more were party members. This makes a substantial reservoir of present-day parents for whose children to be radical is not something shocking and strange but may well be seen as a means of fulfilling the best drives of their parents. To parents who were Communist, we must add an equal or larger number who were Socialists of one kind or another.

Despite this historical background, there is one striking aspect of the Left position held by many young Jews today: today, for the first time in some decades, to be Left is to contradict some strongly held Jewish interests. To be Jewish and Socialist was understandable—the Socialists were against bigotry, persecution, and dictatorship. To be Jewish and even Communist, whatever the contradictions, was also understandable up to the early 1950s. The Communists claimed to be for an ultimate universal freedom. They were certainly against Fascism, the mortal enemy of Jews; they too had suffered heavy losses from Hitler Germany. To escape to Russia from Nazi Germany, whatever the hardships that later followed, was to live rather than die. The Communists also made a special appeal to Jews. In the thirties and forties, they pointed to the opportunities for Yiddish and Yiddish culture in the Soviet Union. They pointed to the attempt to establish a Jewish autonomous region in Birobidzhan. Whatever the reality of increasing persecution of Jews in post-war Russia, Communists concealed and denied it.

What is striking today in contrast is the open contradiction between certain Jewish interests and New Left positions. In particular, Israel is seen almost everywhere on the Left—and here Russia, China, and Cuba are united—as the enemy of Arab national aspirations and the ally of

the Imperialist West. The bloody and near-genocidal proclamations of the Arab states and guerillas are defended within the New Left. In contradictory fashion, the New Left applauds the justice of every nation's interest in maintaining its independence—except for Israel. Black identity is seen as something that requires every possible support and encouragement. Even groups that are scarcely subject to any substantial degree of prejudice and discrimination in the United States—such as Chinese and Japanese Americans—are seen as being in need of independent cultural institutions so as to escape the blighting effect of schools and mass media which impose on them white middle-class standards. Oddly enough, Jewish leftists see little need for such activity for Jews. This is not true of the entire Jewish Left—small groups of Jewish Leftists are now claiming for Jews what they claim for Negroes, without giving up an inch of their insistence that they are as revolutionary and as antagonistic to American state and society as any member of the New Left.

Other orientations of the New Left are also in opposition to Jewish interests, but here the argument is not so clear. Thus, the New Left opposition to bureaucracies of all kinds, as well as institutions in which one succeeds through merit, challenges the specific personal interest of many Jews, who have flourished in a society in which rationally determined talents are rewarded. The New Left generally supports the fight of many Negroes in New York City for a reorganization of the school system in which the teachers in public employ (largely Jews) would lose some of their privileges and perhaps their jobs. It supports the demands of Black students—raised most sharply at the City College of New York, which has for sixty years or more had a majority of Jewish students in a student body admitted only on the basis of merit—that colleges should admit Black students without regard to academic qualifications. Jewish advocates of the New Left either see no contradiction to Jewish interests in supporting such demands, or they are indifferent to them, or perhaps—another possibility—they take some actual pleasure in supporting positions that will hurt members of the Jewish group. Perhaps this is an expression of self-hatred; perhaps it is an expression of some degree of masochism, justified by the argument that some must suffer to help others; perhaps they do not feel *they* are affected because Jewish New Leftists are generally from the elite colleges, and from affluent and well-to-do families, and have no fear for *their* future, which will not depend on the protection offered by civil service regulations and admission tests. It is the Jewish working and lower-middle classes who are most affected by the weakening of the civil service and of admission to college by academic qualification—and it is revealing that Jews of lower socio-economic status tend to be much more poorly represented in the New Left than Jews of higher socio-economic status.

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But there is one final contradiction between New Left attitudes and Jewish interests that may affect, in the end, even the children of affluence who form the main Jewish contingent to the New Left. This is the substantial encouragement to domestic violence that has been given by the rise of the New Left. This encouragement of violence has a double character—on the one hand, the disruptions of universities by the favoured youth of the country encourages violence by the authorities; the latter are supported generally by the working and lower-middle classes who are outraged by the radical students' attack on values they cherish. We have seen this violence spread, particularly in the form of police attacks on student demonstrators, on and off the campus. We had feared for a long time that it would intensify to become even more dangerous, vigilante-type, community violence against students, of the kind which has been so common in the South to keep Negroes down. Fortunately there has been almost none of this up to now. It is scarcely possible to believe, if the disruptions which have been so massive in the year 1968–69 continue, that this will not come. Certainly George Wallace's 1968 campaign suggested it would not be hard to raise community (vigilante) violence against radical students.

This violence also increasingly comes from the students themselves; it was first directed against buildings, but later against fellow students, occasionally against university officials, and more frequently against police. While black students have been more forward in such acts of violence than white, white radical students, in their sycophancy—and in any case since the philosophy of Fanon, Mao, and Che plays such a substantial role among them—will not be far behind, and are not.

And obviously one kind of violence encourages the other, and we are in a spiral of increasing violence now.

Can anyone doubt that if regular procedures of government and the maintenance of order through legislatures, elected officials, courts, and police break down, that inevitably minorities, against which a substantial reservoir of dislike already exists, will in the end have to suffer? Jews have never been among those who have glorified violence, even when, as in Israel today, they must be prepared to exercise it at any moment. Thus we find another major contradiction between the New Left and Jewish interests. The question is whether Jewish supporters of the New Left will come to see it.

NATHAN GLAZER

NOTES

¹ *New York Times*, 5 May 1969, 'S.D.S. Scores Big Gains but Faces Many Problems', p. 1.

² There are two good books on the New Left—Jack Newfield, *A Prophetic Minority*, New York, 1966; and Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, *The New Radicals*, New York, 1966. There is nothing as useful for the last two or three years, though there is a substantial literature produced by The Movement (a term widely used within the New Left to characterize this political tendency), and a substantial number of books and articles, particularly on the phase of New Left activity that concentrates on the universities, and began in 1964. See also Mitchell Cohen and Dennis Hall, eds., *The New Student Left*, Boston, Mass., 1966.

³ See S. M. Lipset, 'A Changing American Character?' in S. M. Lipset and Leo Lowenthal, eds., *Culture and Social Character*, New York, 1961, pp. 136-71.

⁴ The best known example is the support of an anti-Israel resolution proposed by the Black Caucus at the National Conference for a New Politics by white and largely Jewish leftists—see for one account, Walter Goodman, 'When Black Power Runs the New Left', in the *New*

York Times Magazine, 24 September 1967, pp. 28 f.

⁵ For a good account of where the New Left stands today, and in particular the various factions within it, see Thomas R. Brooks, 'Metamorphosis in SDS: The New Left is Showing Its Age', in the *New York Times Magazine*, 15 June 1969, pp. 14 f.

⁶ Robert Somers in S. M. Lipset and S. Wolin, eds., *The Berkeley Student Revolt*, New York, 1965, p. 547; Richard Flacks, 'Liberated Generation: An Exploration of the Roots of Student Protest', in the *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 23, July 1967, p. 65.

⁷ See Nathan Glazer, 'The Jewish Role in Student Activism', *Fortune Magazine*, January 1969.

⁸ See Flacks, op. cit.; and Kenneth Keniston, *The Young Radicals*, New York, 1968.

⁹ See Nathan Glazer, *The Social Basis of American Communism*, New York, 1962; Lawrence Fuchs, *The Political Behavior of American Jews*, Glencoe, Ill., 1956; and for recent evidence that this historic bent among Jews still prevails, see Milton Himmelfarb, 'Is American Jewry in Crisis?', *Commentary*, March 1969.

'ANTI-ZIONISM' AND THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE WITHIN THE ELITE OF POLAND¹

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THE defeat of the Arabs in the Six-Day War of 1967 marked, among other things, the appearance of an indurated anti-Israel and anti-Zionist drive in the Soviet Union and some of the eastern European countries. The drive has also achieved a measure of prominence in the New Left circles of the United States and western Europe. But in Poland the campaign assumed the form of a witch-hunt and there it has left the most casualties.

It began with an attack on, and purge of, a few people in prominent positions in the party and public life but it soon broadened to include individuals of Jewish origin in all walks of life. They were harassed and pressured to provide collective and individual proofs of loyalty to the state and party, proofs which, when given, failed to exonerate them. I want to explore the why's and how's of this phenomenon in a country where there was only a small number of Jews and certainly few, if any, Zionists.

When de-Stalinization was ushered into Poland in October 1956, it was hailed by the Poles in general and the intellectuals in particular as the beginning of a new era of freedom. As the late Polish sociologist Stanislaw Ossowski characterized it, the 'Polish October' was followed by a 'period of enthusiasm and hope'.² But the period was short-lived: the enthusiasm and hope gradually diminished among Polish intellectuals and artists, and were given what now seems like the final blow during the 'anti-Zionist' campaign of 1967-68.

Ethnic homogeneity

It is thought-challenging that both the beginning and the end of liberalization in Poland were marked by strong anti-Jewish manifestations. This may be of particular interest to the sociologist because 'Jews'—even as socially defined in Poland, that is, including people who do not consider themselves to be Jews—have constituted a very small

proportion of the total post-war population of the country. It was commonly admitted and not often regretted in Poland in the days following the end of the war that Hitler 'solved the Jewish problem'. The three million Jews in pre-war Poland made up one-tenth of the total population. In 1956—at the beginning of liberalization—there were only 100,000, and in 1967–68—at the end of liberalization—about 30,000 Jews; the total population of the country then was close to thirty-one million.

The thesis of this paper is that the anti-Jewish occurrences at both times, and especially in 1967–68, were essentially not manifestations of an ethnic problem but rather of the struggle of factions within the Polish political elite, operating in the context of Poland's position in the Soviet orbit. This is not meant to imply that the 1967–68 'anti-Zionist' campaign represents complete historical discontinuity in Poland. On the contrary, in the years preceding the Second World War the 'unmasking' of the Jewish ancestry of political opponents was a frequent manifestation of the left and of the right.³ What I am saying is that in the pre-war years Poland had a major ethnic problem—comparable to the Negro problem in contemporary America—while in 1967–68 Poland had no such problem: it was ethnically almost homogeneous.

Nevertheless, irrespective of ethnic homogeneity, Poland was plagued by a major problem, that of rising expectations. The schools and mass media of communication were emphasizing achievement values but there was little room at the top. Older men were holding on to positions of authority, blocking upward mobility. These conditions were not unique to Poland but characteristic of all the socialist countries of eastern Europe. Rumania made an effort to solve them by pushing economic expansion, Yugoslavia by democratizing the economy. Poland's liberal wing of the political elite aimed at both these solutions, but was defeated by the 'conservatives'.⁴

Although the conservatives were united against the liberals, competing factions existed among them. General Moczar evolved as the leader of such a faction and as the main contender against Gomulka. In his effort to unseat Gomulka, he mounted an anti-Jewish attack, pointing to high positions occupied by so-called Jews which, he implied, should rightfully be available to Poles. Evidently Gomulka tried to steal his thunder by turning the attack into an anti-Zionist campaign, which harmonized with the main line from Moscow. Thus, the Jews were the pawns in this factional struggle. Their removal from high and middle positions met with general approval in Poland.

The antisemitic tradition

In order to understand the general consensus of the anti-Jewish purges, it is imperative to touch on the antisemitic tradition in Poland. Perhaps the briefest way of conveying how widespread and deep

antisemitism was in pre-war Poland is to say that it closely resembled anti-Negro racism in the United States. The Jews were the blacks of Poland. As a result of the mass killing of Polish Jews by the Nazis, post-war Poland, with the exception of a few cities, was *judenrein*, 'free' of Jews. Most members of the younger generation in Poland have never met a Jew. Yet antisemitism survived as children were socialized at home in its myths. One of the strongest myths, quite widespread in all strata of the Polish population, even the intelligentsia, was that Jews were responsible for the difficulties the Polish nation was facing: the Jews in high posts in Warsaw.

We have no reason to assume that Polish communists were emotionally immune from the antisemitism so strongly rooted in the Polish nation. On the contrary, there is evidence that from the very beginning of communist rule in Poland one's origin (that is whether one was of Jewish descent or not) was a very important consideration in communist circles. Adam Schaff, a former theorist of the Polish party, admitted in his book *Marxism and the Individual* (*Marksizm a Jednostka Ludzka*, published in Warsaw in 1965), that antisemitism prevailed among Polish communists.

There is also evidence that it was used repeatedly as a political tool since the communists came to power. For example, in 1951-52 there was the purging of the party apparatus, and in 1954-55 the dismissal from the army, of comrades of Jewish origin. These precedents nevertheless differed fundamentally from the 1967-68 anti-Zionist campaign not only in scope but in the fact that they were unofficial. The previous 'aryanization' measures, as they were referred to in Poland, were taken on secret instructions given to the local party leaders.⁵ In 1967-68 it was the official policy, openly proclaimed through the mass media of communication: radio, television, and the press. The campaign was mainly phrased as one against Zionists rather than Jews. However, among the small number of Jews there were very few, if any, Zionists left in Poland in 1967-68.

Most of those with Zionist leanings who survived the Holocaust or Siberia fled or emigrated from Poland shortly after the war. The anti-semitic campaign that followed liberalization in 1956 caused most of the remaining Jews to leave Poland when Gomulka made emigration possible. And who were the 30,000 'Jews' against whom the anti-Zionist campaign was waged in 1967-68? The commitment to, or sympathy for, communism of a good many of them dated back to pre-war days. Almost all remained in Poland because they considered Poland, not Israel, their homeland. Most of them fell into two broad categories: those with and those without Jewish self-identity, or the non-assimilationists and the assimilationists. The latter considered themselves Poles: not only of Polish citizenship but of Polish nationality. They were linguistically and culturally Polish. Many of them assumed Polish

surnames during or after the Second World War. The intermarriage rate among them and their children was quite high. 'Passing' (that is, either not divulging or denying their Jewish origin) was common among them. Some, including atheists, baptized their children to make them indistinguishable from Poles in general. There were more than a few cases of children who painfully learned from others, not from their parents, that they were 'Jews'.

I was in Poland in 1948, and on the basis of my observation then and of interviews during the last two decades with visitors and emigrés, I would say that these so-called Jews were not more pro-Zionist but, on the contrary, more anti-Zionist and anti-Israel than the rest of the Polish nation. These attitudes are tied to the situation of extreme marginality in which such individuals found themselves from the very beginning of communist rule in Poland.

As for the second category, it consisted largely of pre-war communists or communist sympathizers whose native tongue was Yiddish and who considered themselves culturally Jewish. They tried to band together after the war on the basis of the then (and now) outdated pre-war Soviet principle of nationalities. Shortly after the war they formed the Jewish Cultural and Social Association. Under its auspices they founded the Jewish Historical Institute, sponsored the Jewish State Theatre with Ida Kaminska at its head, and published a newspaper in Yiddish, *Die Folksstimme*, with a supplement in Polish. Most of these Jews also considered themselves anti-Zionist or, at least, non-Zionist. And indeed many of them actively fought the Zionists in pre-war Poland. And now—when the 1967–68 anti-Zionist campaign was launched—some were willing to condemn Zionism and Israel and, in fact, did so. This, however, did not spare them further harassment. Neither did it help that they occupied rather insignificant positions within the party or economy, as compared with the 'Jews' of non-Jewish self-identity.

It is clear then that the targets of the anti-Zionist campaign were not Zionists but people socially defined as Jews, irrespective of their self-identity. The specifics of this anti-Zionist drive will emerge from the discussion below of the struggle of the factions within the Polish governing elite. And to understand the factions one must bear in mind the history of the Communist Party in Poland.

History of the Polish Communist Party

The pre-war Communist Party was illegal and operated underground. It succeeded in recruiting a larger proportion of Jews than non-Jews. But then the Jewish community supplied a disproportionate number of nonconformists in general. The discriminatory policies and measures of the government and the rampant antisemitism of the pre-war years bred alienation among acculturated Jews and especially the young. To them the Communist Party held out the twin promises of full inte-

gration and socialism.⁶ But in 1938 the Komintern dissolved the Polish Communist Party, making it 'one of the last major victims of the great purges'.⁷

As a result of the Soviet-German pact many Polish communists either found themselves in, or fled to, the Soviet Union. In contrast to other communist countries in eastern Europe, the difference between the Polish communists who fought the Germans and those who spent the war years in the Soviet Union became crystallized as early as 1942.⁸ In that year the home-based communists, among them both Gomulka and Moczar, founded their own party, the Polish Workers' Party. (By that time most of the communists of Jewish origin who were still in German-held Poland when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, perished.) But in 1943, with the blessing of the Soviet authorities, an organization was founded in the Soviet Union called the Union of Polish Patriots. Leaders of this organization returned to Poland together with the victorious Red Army; they became known in Poland as the 'Muscovites'.

The first years of communist rule in Poland were marked by the uneasy co-existence of the two factions within the government in Poland. From the very beginning the 'Partisans' resented the 'Muscovites'. And it did not help matters that the proportion of 'Jews' among the Muscovites—both top and medium level party functionaries—was much higher than among the Partisans. (This is tied to the fact that many more Jews survived in the Soviet Union than in German-occupied Poland.) Gomulka, the first Secretary General of the post-war party, spent the war years in Poland but most others in key positions were Muscovites and a number of them were 'Jews'. Stalin distrusted the Muscovites less than the Partisans. And indeed many of the Muscovites were later to lead the purges which were instituted by Stalin in 1948. The most famous Polish victim was Gomulka who was arrested and charged with 'rightist nationalist deviation'.

Then came the Polish October of 1956. Gomulka, who up to his imprisonment did not enjoy special popularity, now became a national hero—despite his lack of charismatic qualities—and a symbol of Polish liberalism. But the fact is that he was not a liberal. Of working-class origin, self-taught, he distrusted the intellectuals. He wanted a wider margin of independence from Russia for the Polish Communist Party but was against anybody and anything that would weaken communist rule in Poland. And he was convinced that the 'liberals' within the coalition he was heading were pushing the kind of reforms, and creating an atmosphere in Poland, that constituted a threat to communist rule. Among the liberals were some victims of Stalinism but, what is more striking, is that many of the liberals were former Stalinists. And a substantial number of the ex-Stalinists turned liberal were people of Jewish origin. On the personal side, it would be surprising if Gomulka

liked these 'liberals' who in the past denounced him and deposed him but later, as a matter of necessity, invited him back to power.

After his return to power Gomulka began to replace many of the compromised Stalinists. He put his former associates from the wartime underground into key positions in the army, police, and state security. Thus in 1956 he brought General Moczar into the government as Deputy Minister of the Interior, in charge of the secret police. (The Party Congress made him Minister in February 1957.) Next came Gomulka's steps towards the consolidation of power. He took hold of the party apparatus by striking at some liberals, his former allies in the Polish October, and played off one group against another.⁹ But the main way he defeated the liberals was by blocking their proposed major reforms.¹⁰

Factions in the governing elite

From the point of view of the establishment that emerged, the disgruntled liberals and the intellectuals constituted the chief danger to its continuity. Nevertheless, certain factions developed within the establishment. General Moczar, in the strategic post of Minister of the Interior (controlling the secret police and the mass media of communication) arose as the leader of the Partisan faction and the chief contender for Gomulka's post. Again it must be emphasized that in Poland the situation was not that of Stalinists versus liberals. True, the Partisans are former victims of Stalinism but what distinguished them from the Stalinists was not that they were less hard liners but that they were more nationalistic. They, and particularly their leader Moczar, bear deep personal resentment against those liberals, former Stalinists, at whose hands they suffered before 1956. For instance, one of the leading liberals, Roman Zambrowski—an ex-Stalinist and 'Jew'—was the chief accuser of Moczar during the Stalinist purge.

In his effort to unseat Gomulka, Moczar did not strike directly at him. Having the mass media of communication at his disposal, he projected a picture of enemies of Poland boring from within. The frequent question that accompanied the exposés was: 'Why was this danger to Poland kept secret so long?' The implication was that Gomulka was too soft with the traitors and that he, the partisan leader, would deal with them sternly. It is doubtful whether Moczar's campaign would have been as successful—among the lower echelons of the party or among the Polish people in general—had it been directed against the liberals *per se*. He struck at them as Jews, a supposedly foreign element that did not have Polish interests at heart. His line was that the hated Stalinism was imposed on the Polish nation by Jews. And now these same Jews were posing as liberals when in fact they were sheer opportunists. Dark deeds, alleged acts of cruelty before 1956 by some of these liberals, were held up to the Polish nation, tapping the

antisemitic stereotype of Jewish perfidy. Thus Moczar exploited the traditional antisemitic feelings, both the open and the dormant, and appealed to the patriotic fervour for which the Poles are world famous. In this, his role as the head of the strong veterans' association, the Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy, proved quite useful; and he did not hesitate to court the veterans of the anti-communist Home Army of the Second World War and the remnants of the pre-war reactionary and antisemitic camps.

In discussing the political factions within the ruling elite, one must not omit the 'technocratic' one headed by Edward Gierk, party secretary of Upper Silesia—Poland's industrial heartland—and a member of the Politburo. (Gomulka never included Moczar in the ruling Politburo. However, when Moczar's fortune was rising as a result of his anti-Jewish campaign, he was made alternate member in the summer of 1968.) Gierk was seen as holding the balance between the Gomulka and Moczar forces. Before the student demonstrations of March 1968, he seemed to have not only the technocrats and managers behind him, but also many intellectuals who saw him as capable of carrying out major reforms. At times it seemed that Gierk might emerge as the winner from the power struggle in which the main contestants were Gomulka and Moczar.

Anti-Zionist campaign—First stage

As Gomulka was tightening his hold on the country, there were more and more curbs on free expression. The Polish October released a flood of talent and free thought in Poland. The products of this renaissance in art, literature, literary criticism, philosophy, and sociology attracted world attention. Some Polish artists and intellectuals became well known abroad. The growing infringements of freedom caused dissatisfaction among intellectuals and particularly among students who felt that the establishment was betraying the Polish October.

Meanwhile Moczar was gaining ground, especially among the young civil servants. His anti-Jewish campaign opened before them the prospects of finally moving up the social ladder.¹¹ Moczar, they thought, would remove the 'Jews' and the Gomulka men from the higher posts and they could step into them. The fact that Gomulka soon appropriated the Jewish issue as a tactic for keeping himself in power, is an index of how well it worked for Moczar. In passing one may note here that Gomulka's wife is Jewish. So are the wives of a few others in his camp.

The opportunity to undermine Moczar by wielding his own brand of anti-Jewish strategy presented itself to Gomulka with the Six-Day War in the Middle East. In Poland sentiment ran high in favour of Israel, in defiance of the pro-Arab stand taken by the Polish government in the days preceding the war. The Arab defeat was interpreted

in Poland as a dramatic defeat for Russia; and the Poles delighted in the setback suffered by their age-long enemy. One of the common expressions of delight was to chuckle that 'our Jews are giving it to the Russians' ('our' meaning Israelis born in Poland or of Polish-born parents). Poles were praising and vodka-toasting the Israeli victory not because they liked Israel or the Jews but because they hated Russia.

Gomulka and his clique had reason to feel uneasy. The favour he had gained with the Soviet rulers by his strong stand against Israel in the United Nations would soon disappear if he proved unable to control such internal manifestations in Poland. And these were becoming rather bold. It seems that the government anti-Israel propaganda literature destined for the army got 'lost' and no traces of it could be found. Not only were Polish officers toasting the Israeli victory but generals were expressing their dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union's pouring more and better equipment down the Arab drain. They pointed to the inadequate and inferior equipment which Russia was handing out to Poland and the other Warsaw Pact countries.¹²

Gomulka proceeded to strike at such activities by smearing them as Jewish and Zionist and by warning his countrymen against supporting the Zionist 'fifth column'. He launched the first round of his 'anti-Zionist' campaign in a speech before the Trade Union Congress on 19 June 1967. In it he referred to the alleged 'Jewish fifth column', and to its brazen frolics, such as drinking parties celebrating the Israeli victory. He also raised the stereotype of Jewish 'dual loyalty' and cautioned that 'every Polish citizen must have only one country: the People's Poland'.¹³

Evidently the Gomulka propaganda line, that being pro-Israel meant being against Poland, did not meet with much success; and so it was further elaborated by the theme of a 'Bonn-Tel Aviv Axis'. This theme appealed to Polish fears of German revanchism, the fear of losing lands which had belonged to Germany before the war but which have been in Poland's possession since 1945. It alleged that the Bonn government depended on the 'Zionist fifth column' to realize its aims.¹⁴

Thus, both major contending factions of the political elite were involved in the anti-Jewish propaganda campaign which was accompanied by a purge of 'Jews' from Party and official posts. But the version of the anti-Jewish line that Gomulka adopted came closer to the interests of the Soviet Union. As we recall, the theme stressed by Moczar was that of Jews returning from Russia with the Soviet army and grabbing positions of power in which they proved themselves to be lackeys of Russia. (The accusation, though not explicitly stated, was nevertheless quite clear.) Thus it appealed not only to the antisemitic but, perhaps even stronger, anti-Russian sentiments of the Poles. Gomulka also appealed to antisemitic feelings by stressing the non-Polishness and dis-

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loyalty of Jews. But the specifics were different: he attacked their supposed ties to International Zionism which allegedly formed an unholy alliance with the German Federal Republic. The implicit anti-Russian stand of Moczar may have attracted more Poles than the explicit, but far-fetched, Gomulka theme of a Bonn-Tel Aviv alliance. But in the final analysis the latter proved more effective because, together with Gomulka's stand on Czechoslovakia, it won him the support of the Soviet Union.

Anti-Zionist campaign—Second stage

A major result of the anti-Jewish campaigns of the two chief contending factions in the political struggle was the further infringement of intellectual freedom in Poland. By the beginning of 1968 intellectuals and students, but especially the latter, were protesting in organized fashion against the tightening of controls in Poland, including increased censorship. Apart from the immediate grievances which triggered off their protests, the university youth in Poland, as elsewhere, were protesting against the shamelessness and hypocrisy of the establishment. Their leaders were privileged young persons, many of them from the ruling class. They had been brought up on socialist principles and they were protesting against the establishment's deviations in practice from socialist principles: the glaring economic and social inequalities and the privileges of the class in which they were born.

The protests of students met with a thoroughly planned programme of suppression developed by Moczar. In March General Moczar staged what the mass media under his control painted as a major national crisis, and he then proceeded with measures for its solution. He ordered the police to crack down mercilessly on Warsaw University students who were demonstrating peacefully, and alleged that they were involved in the beginnings of insurrection and counter-revolution. The supposed 'workers', who according to the mass media spontaneously appeared on the University grounds in order to protect the People's Poland from the 'traitors', were security agents and police decked in workers' costumes. It was a planned attack on the genuine socialism of Polish students and the bold independence of Polish intellectuals.¹⁵

The steps taken to suppress student protest and the propaganda used to rationalize these steps mark the beginning of the second—and much more comprehensive—phase of the anti-Zionist campaign in Poland. It represents the intensification of the power struggle among the factions within the Communist leadership. The struggle focused on the Fifth Congress of the Party, scheduled for December 1968, where the results would be formalized.

It is significant that, as had been the case with the first phase, the second phase was not initiated by Gomulka. It began with the 'explanations of the events' which appeared in the mass media under Moczar's

control. Two days after the bloody suppression of the Warsaw students, on 11 March, the main arguments of these explanations were enunciated by Józef Kępa, the First Secretary of the Warsaw Region Party, who was then leaning towards Moczar. The student demonstrations were interpreted by him as the work of Zionists, for they were led by 'Jews'. The Zionists, it was alleged, had been active in the university for years under the guise of a political discussion group. While using the dirtiest weapons, these Jews turned attention away from their evil deeds by inventing a story of raging antisemitism in Poland.

Kępa also put forth another theme which became quite prominent in the Polish press: the responsibility of the parents for the political misdeeds of their children. He said: 'I want to state clearly and precisely that the parents of the organizers and active members . . . also bear responsibility. I want to inform you comrades that we have made decisions concerning official steps to be taken against the parents.'¹⁶ And indeed the next day the official Communist daily, *Trybuna Ludu*, carried a front page announcement that the fathers of three arrested students were dismissed from high posts in three Ministries.¹⁷ The sins of the sons were visited on the fathers.

A few days later, Edward Gierek (the head of the 'technocratic' faction), in a speech at a workers' rally, took up this theme and branded the Jewish parents as ungrateful to the Polish people. The People's Poland had accorded them honours, he said: 'It trusted their loyalty in the belief that they would bring up their children—if not to be bound to—at least, to be grateful to the people's government.' But instead, according to Gierek, these individuals, 'to whom the cause of the Polish people is foreign' (meaning Jews), showed the highest degree of 'perfidy and shamelessness in their attempts to exploit trustful Polish youths, to push them against their own country, against their own nation, against the working class.'¹⁸

If Gierek promptly raised the anti-Jewish banner in order not to be left behind in the succession race, Gomulka spoke up only ten days after the Warsaw students' police repression. A furious anti-Jewish campaign was raging in the mass media for more than a week and the purge was in full swing when Gomulka broke his silence and again appropriated the tactic of his opponent, Moczar; but he played the tune less stridently. His speech—which was carried on television, radio, and in the press—was delivered to party activists; he said that it was addressed to the 'often heard question: what is it all about, why do students rise against the government?' In his answer, Gomulka like Moczar pointed at the Jews as the culprits. But he went against the hysterical tenor of the mass media by asserting that Zionism did not at present constitute a danger for socialism in Poland. In the student manifestations, he said, 'an active part was played by university students of Jewish origin or nationality'. The parents of many of them

occupied high posts, he continued. Then he went on to develop the theme that at the root of the problem was 'self-identification' (*samook-reślenie*) and he emerged with a threefold classification of Polish Jews. The first category he discussed were the Jews whom he accused of foreign allegiance. According to him, during the June War some Jews in this category proclaimed their wish to go to Israel and fight the Arabs. 'It is beyond doubt', said Gomulka, 'that this category of Jews, citizens of Poland, are linked in their hearts and minds not with Poland but with Israel.' Then he went on to the second category, the Jewish cosmopolitans who have no allegiance to any country, 'who feel neither Jewish nor Polish'; such people, he affirmed, should be removed from those positions 'where national identity is indispensable'. Finally he mentioned the third category, the most numerous, 'for whom Poland is the only fatherland'. In this connexion he made the distinction between anti-Zionism and antisemitism: 'We fight Zionism as Jewish nationalism and this is right. It has nothing to do with antisemitism. . . . Antisemitism exists when someone is against Jews because they are Jews.'¹⁹

By pointing to two categories of Jews who supposedly lack allegiance to Poland and by making a distinction between anti-Zionism and antisemitism, Gomulka provided a rationalization for the purges of Jews that preceded and succeeded his declaration. The latter served as an umbrella under which attacks on Jews in the mass media, the forcing of Jews out of jobs and apartments, and personal harassment could proceed simultaneously with disavowals of antisemitism. Obviously, the fact that the campaign was given a different name, that of 'anti-Zionism', was of no comfort to the persecuted. The following saying was circulating in Poland:²⁰

Question: What is the difference between present-day and pre-war antisemitism? Answer: Before the war it was not compulsory.

Antisemitic themes of the anti-Zionist campaign

My content analysis of the Polish Communist daily paper, *Trybuna Ludu*, bore out the above saying. The 1968 'anti-Zionist' propaganda contained all the major themes of the organized pre-1939 antisemitic campaign in Poland. Here then are the prominent themes:

1. *The well-known charge of an international Jewish conspiracy to overthrow governments and dominate the world*

In pre-war days it took the form of the myth of the Elders of Zion or the Communist International as the arm of this conspiracy. Now the Jews of Poland were charged with being part of an international Zionist conspiracy. This conspiracy, Poles were told, operates its own intelligence system in Poland as elsewhere. It also controls, by means of

money, the Western press through which it attacks Poland as anti-semitic. Thus, for example, the Vice-Premier of Poland, Piotr Jaroszewicz, declared in a well publicized speech that 'world Zionism does not hesitate to mobilize against the government and interest of Poland certain Polish citizens of Jewish origin'.²¹ And the Army paper *Żołnierz Wolności* (Freedom's Soldier) ran a shrill article on this theme under the heading 'Zionist Spies in the Service of Imperialism'. It pointed to some prominent defectors from the Polish army and cited their original Jewish names.²²

2. *Jews as traitors to Poland, working in the employ or interest of an enemy power*

In pre-war times Polish Jews were accused of being in the secret service of the Soviet Union. Now, they were condemned as serving mainly Israel but also West Germany and the United States. This note, very prominent in the Polish mass media, was sounded by none else than the Premier of Poland, Józef Cyrankiewicz, who alleged that 'the flood of anti-Polish propaganda emanates from three parallel sources—each dirty and poisoned: from Israel . . . and from the United States and the Federal German Republic'.²³ A number of prominent 'Jews'—including Professor Zygmunt Bauman and the Marxist theoretician Professor Adam Schaff—were branded in the press as foreign propagandists, traitors, and enemies of Poland.²⁴

3. *Jews as an inherently foreign element in the Polish nation and Polish culture*

This was the favourite line of General Moczar and much featured in the mass media of communication. He, and others, charged that Jews were suppressing themes of 'national tradition and dignity'. Wherever they could—for example, as editors of the Polish Encyclopaedia—Moczar said: 'they tried to distort our history and weaken the memory of our national tradition'.²⁵

4. *Jews as avaricious opportunists whose only interest is self-advancement*

This theme took the form of denunciations of individuals, prominent either in the national scene or in the provinces. It showed them to be rigid Stalinists before 1956, mercilessly applying Stalinist terror in dealing with ordinary people, especially peasants. But in 1956 these opportunists saw the wind blowing in a different direction, and, in order to remain in power or to keep their privileges, they became 'humanists' and 'liberals'.²⁶

5. *Jews as ungrateful people, biting the hand that feeds them*

Here the image projected was that of Jews reaching the highest positions in the People's Poland, with their children enjoying special

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privileges; they repaid such kindness with attempts to divide or destroy the country. Let me quote from one such article:²⁷

We have created the fullest conditions for the existence of Jews in the years following the war. We opened to them not only our hearts but the gateway to every position and office. . . . But a number of Polish citizens of Jewish origin betrayed . . . the interest of the Polish nation and of the state. Examples are not hard to find. . . . They are traitors who sold out not only for money . . . but because they were never Poles but Zionists. . . . None of them thanked us for eating Polish bread. All of them repaid us with baseness.

6. *Jews as torturers of innocents*

In 1968 the press in socialist Poland even ran stories on the medieval theme—which was marked in pre-war Polish folk-beliefs—of Jews kidnapping and torturing innocent Christians. This time 'Zionists' were supposedly performing such evil deeds in Poland. In the official communist daily *Trybuna Ludu*, a story appeared under the heading of 'Political Kidnappers' about a young girl of Jewish birth who as a child was saved by Poles. She considered them her parents and they loved her as their child. But she was lured by a Zionist group operating in Poland to visit a supposed uncle in Israel. Once in Israel, all kinds of pressures were used on her to disown her Polish mother; the Zionists 'even tried to convince a boy to rape her' in order to make her stay in Israel. But she managed to return to Poland and testified in court against a certain Jewish woman, employed by the Zionists to lure young people to leave Poland. The article concluded: 'This is the real face of Jewish chauvinism. . . . The baseness of such action beggars the imagination. It can arouse but one emotion in us: disgust.'²⁸

The external factor

The above six themes, with slight variations, were disseminated by the Polish mass media in March and April 1968. Gomulka seemed reluctant about the campaign as compared with the enthusiastic Moczar. Nevertheless, all three factions of the governing elite were busy chasing the Jewish phantom in their effort to win the political contest. But towards the end of April came the first real turn in Gomulka's favour. What was rumoured in Poland earlier now became manifest: the Soviet Union wanted Gomulka to continue in power. The Soviet Ambassador to Poland, A. Aristov, publicly praised Gomulka, calling him a 'faithful son of the Polish people'. (It should be mentioned here that Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky, the commander of the Warsaw Pact Forces, had arrived the day before to confer with Gomulka and his trusted aides.) The occasion of the Soviet Ambassador's speech was the twenty-third anniversary of the signing of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Treaty. The Ambassador emphasized that Gomulka was guarding this friendship

against reactionary forces which were trying to divide the two countries by dragging 'some citizens through the quagmire of nationalism and chauvinism'. The last phrase was interpreted in Poland as an expression of disavowal of General Moczar. It was clear to some observers then, and there is little doubt now, that the Soviet Union's support of Gomulka was tied to events in Czechoslovakia after Antonin Novotny, their trusted ally, had been removed from the Presidency and party leadership.²⁹

The Soviet endorsement of Gomulka coincides with definite attempts by him to curb the raging anti-Jewish hysteria. Evidently he felt sufficiently strong now to attempt this uneasy task. And the very official who gave the green light to the campaign by blaming the Jews for the students' demonstrations, Józef Kępa, switched on the red light. He asserted that the anti-Zionist campaign had got out of hand and turned into a witch-hunt. As the *New York Times* correspondent Jonathan Randal noted, whole paragraphs of the official speech of Kępa could have been taken intact from statements made abroad, which only a little earlier had been branded in the Polish press as Zionist-inspired slanders of Poland. Kępa called for an end to the 'downright filthy defaming of people'.³⁰

The press, and especially the official Communist daily, began shifting from attacks on supposed Zionists in Poland to attacks on Israel. The internal anti-Zionist campaign in the mass media subsided by the end of April, only to be revived temporarily at the time of the Czechoslovak crisis. But the purges of 'Jews' continued unabated. Many were removed from their posts, some with, and more without, public disgrace. In June an ideological justification of the purges of Jews appeared in the serious literary journal *Miesięcznik Literacki*. It was written by Andrzej Werblan, the head of the Education Department of the Party. Under the façade of objective analysis, he pressed the thesis that Jews could seldom make good communists or patriotic Poles: social factors account for it. He concluded his article with a call for the continuation of the purges against 'Jews'. 'The correction of the irregular ethnic composition in the central institutions', he asserted, 'will go a long way to remove the [Jewish] problem from the agenda.'³¹

It seems that, generally speaking, the purges of 'Jews' met with approval in Poland. In addition to the people who profited from it, those with antisemitic leanings or who sympathized with Moczar's 'patriotic' line were especially satisfied. Moreover, Poles devoid of such sentiments hardly felt sorry for the 'Jews' who lost their jobs; the prevalent opinion seemed to be that those entrenched in higher positions were responsible for Poland's economic disaster and it was high time that they gave way to new people.

This climate of opinion made it easier for the government to subdue the liberals in general, not only Jews. Intellectuals and artists were

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particularly singled out in the anti-liberal drive. For example, the Writers' Union, under the threat of tighter controls, was pressured into expelling writers critical of the government (such as Pawel Jasienica, January Grzedzinski, and Stefan Kisielewski).³²

As far as the factional contest is concerned, it is common knowledge that Gomulka came out the winner at the Fifth Party Congress, held in November, 1968. But actually he won the contest earlier, when he made his decision to support the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia with Polish troops. Incidentally, the anti-Jewish campaign had so weakened the liberal forces by then that there was no protest in Poland against the participation in the invasion. At the Party Congress neither Moczar nor Gierek challenged Gomulka for the highest office. He was re-elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. The composition of the ruling Politburo remained largely unchanged. The glaring exception was the removal of the one person of Jewish origin, Eugeniusz Szyr. (For the first time since the Communists came to power in Poland in 1944 the Politburo today includes no person of Jewish origin.) It must be noted that Moczar was not given full membership in the Politburo. He was frozen in the position of alternate member, the post to which he was named in July.

In contrast to the Politburo, the expanded Central Committee shows substantial changes. More than a third of the 81 full members of the previous committee are absent from the expanded 91-man new committee (many of them were victims of the purges). The new men, however, seem to represent a balanced pattern of gains and losses to the three main factions, those of Gomulka, Moczar, and Gierek.³³

Thus, as far as the factions in the ruling elite are concerned, the *status quo ante* the 'campaign against Zionism' has been largely restored, except that the liberals were eliminated. That the drive against the liberals, particularly the intellectuals and artists, would continue was indicated in the speeches of Gomulka at, and the resolutions of, the Congress. It was clear, however, that the 'anti-Zionist' mask of this drive would be dropped. Liberals would be charged from now on with revisionism, not Zionism. It is noteworthy that neither in his opening nor in his final speech to the Congress did Gomulka mention Zionism, although he did deal with the March student protests. He analysed them as the expression of *revisionist* forces which 'spread ideological confusion and political disorientation' and actively undermined the public peace and socialist order (note: revisionist, not Zionist). Because socialism has succeeded in becoming deeply rooted in the Polish masses, he argued, the enemies of socialism did not come out openly against socialism but were using as a mask the slogans of improving socialism, of democratizing socialism.³⁴ The implication for the future is clear: anyone daring to preach improvement of socialism or its democratization would be branded, and treated as, a revisionist.

A special anti-revisionist resolution was passed by the Congress. It singled out the revisionists in art, literature, philosophy, and sociology. In the first two fields, they were accused of imposing the bourgeois model on literature and culture and with encouraging servile attitudes towards the West. The 'revisionists' in philosophy and sociology were charged with the sin of rejecting the principles of Marxism and Leninism. The resolution concluded that 'the struggle against revisionism and other anti-socialist forces remains one of the main tasks of the party'.³⁵

Conclusion

The recent power struggle in Poland, and especially its results, cannot be understood in terms of internal factors alone. Even without direct interference the Soviet Union has played a decisive role. Poland—the country where anti-Russian sentiments are deeply rooted and of long standing—is now bound closer to the Soviet Union than some of the other eastern European states. In the latter, defiance of the Soviet Union is reviving despite the invasion of Czechoslovakia. But Gomulka owes the Soviet leadership a special debt, for it threw the balance in his favour. Poland, the first country in the communist camp to put forward a programme of liberalization, has now no known 'liberals' left in its ruling elite. Under the guise of anti-Zionism the liberal forces have been given what now seems like the final blow. And so in Poland the 'anti-Zionist' campaign accomplished what foreign intervention aimed to achieve in Czechoslovakia.

The 'anti-Zionist' campaign—born in the triangular struggle for power—did not win for its initiator, General Moczar, the top position he aimed for, partly because it was also adopted as a tactic by the two other contenders, Gomulka and Gierek. But it did accomplish the goal shared by all three 'conservative' factions which these men are heading: it sharply reduced the former prominent role played by intellectuals and stifled liberal expression in Poland. It is hard to predict when and under what conditions liberalism will again raise its head in Poland. Some analysts think that when this happens and the establishment attempts to suppress it, there will be no Jews left in Poland to serve as scapegoats.³⁶ But I disagree. Even if there were none left, the ghosts of Jews could be revived to serve as scapegoats. We have seen how in this round 'Zionists' were invented. But more pertinent is the fact that not all Jews, at least as socially defined in Poland, have decided to leave. Actually the ones who have left Poland since the anti-Zionist drive began are mostly intellectuals, artists, and professionals. As a Polish intellectual expressed it to the *New York Times* correspondent in Warsaw: 'The best people in this country are leaving and where is Poland going to find anyone to replace them?'³⁷ Many party activists of Jewish origin—although thrown out of the party, government, and administrative posts—are staying on. As Communists, schooled in political

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intrigue, they understand the political functions of the anti-Zionist campaign. I predict that they will slowly trickle back into middle positions, especially the conservatives among them.³⁸

And so I am doubtful that the 1967-68 'anti-Zionist' campaign represents the final chapter of Polish antisemitism. In Communist Poland the possibility of other anti-Jewish rounds continues to exist. The centuries long antisemitic tradition has left its mark on the Polish psyche, comparable to anti-black racism in the United States. Should antisemitism again be sponsored from above, it would still find many sympathizers and enough potential victims of Jewish descent in the Polish nation. The usefulness of this ancient weapon in the political arena has been proved by the Nazis. And the 'anti-Zionist' campaign in Poland has impressively demonstrated that Marxist ideology need not deter Communists from using antisemitism as a political weapon. All that is needed is another name, a euphemism for antisemitism, to avoid transgressing the ideology.

NOTES

¹ A version of this paper was read at the 1969 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association.

² Stanislaw Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness*, New York, 1963, p. vii.

³ Aleksander Hertz, *Żydzi w Kulturze Polskiej*, Paris, 1961, p. 151.

⁴ Zygmunt Bauman, 'O Frustracji i o Kuglarzach', *Kultura*, December 1968, p. 14.

⁵ Juliusz Burgin, 'Plaga', *Przegląd Kulturalny*, 13 February 1957.

⁶ Samuel L. Sharp, 'Poland: Anti-Semitism as Usual', *Nation*, 15 April 1968, p. 495.

⁷ M. K. Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland*, Cambridge, Mass., 1959, p. 154.

⁸ Paul Lendvai, 'Poland: The Party and the Jews', *Commentary*, September 1968, p. 57.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

¹⁰ Pierre Offenius, 'Wrażenia z Polski', *Kultura*, October 1968, pp. 91-95.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

¹² Samuel L. Sharp, *op. cit.*, p. 496.

¹³ *Trybuna Ludu*, 20 June 1967, p. 1.

¹⁴ Tadeusz Walichnowski, *Izrael a NRF*, Warsaw, 1967; M. Podkowiński, 'Izrael-NRF', *Trybuna Ludu*, 23 January 1968, p. 6.

¹⁵ Zygmunt Bauman, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁶ *Trybuna Ludu*, 12 March 1968, p. 4.

¹⁷ The following senior officials were dismissed: Jan Grudziński, Assistant Secretary of State in the Ministry of Forestry; Jan Górewicz, General Director of the Ministry of Finance; and Frederyk Topolski. See *Trybuna Ludu*, 13 March 1968, p. 1.

¹⁸ *Trybuna Ludu*, 15 March 1968, p. 3.

¹⁹ *Trybuna Ludu*, 20 March 1968, p. 4.

²⁰ From a private document smuggled out of Poland which appeared in 'The Anti-Semitism of Soviet and Polish Communism', *Jews in Eastern Europe*, January 1969, p. 58.

²¹ *Trybuna Ludu*, 7 April 1968, p. 3.

²² As quoted in 'The Anti-Semitism of Soviet and Polish Communism', *op. cit.*, p. 27.

²³ *Trybuna Ludu*, 11 April 1968.

²⁴ Interview, Polish Press Agency, 12 April 1968.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ C. Golebiowski, 'Portrety Wichrzycieli', *Trybuna Ludu*, 17 March 1968, p. 4.

²⁷ *Słowo Ludu*, no. 101, April 1968, p. 3.

²⁸ Zbigniew Lakowski, 'Polityczni Kidnaperzy', *Trybuna Ludu*, 5 April 1968, p. 5.

²⁹ Jonathan Randal, 'Gomulka Praised by Soviet Envoy', *New York Times*, 21 April 1968, p. 9.

³⁰ Jonathan Randal, 'Poland', *New York Times*, Section 4, 21 April 1968, p. 6.

³¹ Quotation from the text reproduced in *Kultura*, 23 June 1968.

³² Jonathan Randal, 'Tight Polish Curb on Writers Urged', *New York Times*, 28 April 1968, p. 21; 'Polish Writers Given a Warning', *New York Times*, 29 April 1968, p. 8.

³³ Jonathan Randal, 'Gomulka Retains Party Leadership', *New York Times*, 7 November 1968, p. 9.

³⁴ *Trybuna Ludu*, 12 November 1968, p. 6; 17 November 1968, p. 3.

³⁵ 'Uchwaly Zjazdu', *Trybuna Ludu*, 21 November 1968, p. 6.

³⁶ Paul Lendvai, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

³⁷ Jonathan Randal, 'A Pole Criticizes Purging of Jews', *New York Times*, 28 September 1968, p. 15.

³⁸ After I wrote this paper, the Polish Government moved to curtail the emigration of Jews. It announced through its official press agency, P.A.P., that at the beginning of September 1969 it would terminate the procedures which enabled Jews to leave Poland upon renouncing Polish citizenship and declaring their wish to emigrate to Israel. See Alvin Shuster, 'Poles to Tighten Jews' Exit Rules', *New York Times*, 11 June 1969, p. 9.

THE EDGWARE SURVEY: FACTORS IN JEWISH IDENTIFICATION

Ernest Krausz

IN 1962-63 I carried out a social survey of Jews in the London suburb of Edgware. In two earlier articles printed in this Journal¹ I dealt with the demographic results and the occupational and class structure of the 382 households (1,290 persons) studied.

In this final report I shall examine rather briefly the main factors contributing to Jewish identification among those interviewed in Edgware. The factors are religious observance and attitudes, kinship ties, sociability patterns, and relations with non-Jews. I shall also give some of the findings concerning the relationships between some of these factors and the key variables of age, occupation and social class, and place of birth.

Religion

A very large battery of questions was administered in order to elicit as much information as possible on the religious factor. For the purposes of this report it will suffice, however, to give merely the basic facts. The most significant figure is the one which shows that 18.1 per cent do not belong to any synagogue. The non-affiliated being deducted, the figures show that 72.2 per cent belong to the Orthodox stream and 9.7 per cent to the Reform/Liberal one. When these figures are compared with respective figures for the parents of respondents, a decline in the strength of the Orthodox group is visible in that 90.8 per cent of the parents were affiliated to Orthodox and 5.0 per cent to Reform/Liberal synagogues.

Probing into the reasons given by respondents for belonging to synagogues, we see that for 42 per cent synagogue affiliation is somehow linked with family life; that is, either they have been brought up to belong to a synagogue, desire to bring up their children as Jews, or merely wish to be buried with other members of the family in a Jewish cemetery.

Synagogue membership in itself does not tell us much about the

closeness of the link between the individual and his synagogue. Synagogue attendance is a much better index and this points to only a tenuous link for the majority of people. Thus only 13.6 per cent attended regularly, that is once a week or more; the large majority (73.9 per cent) attended only occasionally, for example, on festivals; and the rest (12.5 per cent) never attended. Another useful index is that of activity in connexion with the life of the synagogue, for instance taking part in the organization of its cultural, social, or charitable work. The number thus involved at the time of the enquiry was very small: 2.8 per cent said they were very active and another 3.8 per cent that they were active to some extent.

The survey results showed that some religious practices are widely observed but also pointed to certain signs indicating a decline in religious identification. Observance is total as regards circumcision (100 per cent); nine out of ten respondents observe the Passover festival and similar proportions observe the 'shivah' and 'kaddish'; over 90 per cent arrange a 'barmitzvah' ceremony for their children; 97 per cent of the respondents and 94 per cent of their children had a marriage ceremony in a synagogue; 85.6 per cent have Sabbath candles lit in their homes; and over 80 per cent fast on Yom Kippur. On the other hand a slackening has set in as far as the dietary laws are concerned: 78.8 per cent still eat only kasher meat in their homes, but only 57.3 per cent do not ever eat bacon or ham, and even a smaller number, 31.4 per cent, do not eat any kind of non-kasher meat when away from home. Similarly, only just over 30 per cent do not work on the Sabbath, while 11.2 per cent do not travel on that day.

The figures showing a decline in religious affiliation and practices were cross-tabulated against the key variable of age. Thus 60.8 per cent of those not belonging to a synagogue were under the age of 39 but that age group accounted for only 37.4 per cent of the whole sample. In religious behaviour outside the home, the younger age group (20-39) appear less observant than the older age group (40 and over). Occupation as a variable was also tested against the factor of religion. In the group not belonging to synagogues only 10.2 per cent are in the category of employers and managers against 42.2 per cent in the sample as a whole—the younger age composition of the non-affiliated accounting for this difference. On the other hand 21.8 per cent of the non-affiliated are professional people against 15.5 per cent in the whole sample. Considering the surge to the professions among the younger generation, this is not surprising. The proportions in the categories of foremen, skilled, and own-account people are similar. In the categories of non-manual, personal service, and semi-skilled workers the non-synagogue members have 33.2 per cent against only 7.5 per cent in these categories in the whole sample. Again the great number of young people (and widows and divorced persons) among those not belonging to syna-

gogues probably explains this difference. There is also a difference between those who do not belong to a synagogue and the whole sample in respect of social class self-ranking: 55·1 per cent of the whole sample but only 42·0 per cent of the non-affiliated declared themselves as upper middle and middle class; the respective figures for self-ranking as lower middle and working class were 34·9 per cent and 43·4 per cent.

The age structure, marital status, occupational distribution and social class of respondents who do not belong to synagogues suggest that they are generally less well-off younger people who possibly for reasons of the expense involved, or simply because of loss of contact and interest, fail to become members of a synagogue.

The analysis of religious behaviour according to place of birth indicated that those born in western Europe are much less observant than Jews who were born in eastern Europe. However, respondents born in the East End of London displayed a higher degree of religious observance in some spheres than even the eastern European-born respondents. From this point of view the old East End must be regarded as some kind of extension of the Jewish eastern European way of life.

The results of the Edgware survey, some of which have been presented in this article, indicate on the whole that Jewish identification through Judaism is undergoing a weakening process. First, as we saw, a substantial number of respondents are not affiliated to synagogues, and many of them are younger people. Since the synagogue is the central religious institution, it plays a crucial role in the religious identification of the individual. Second, in religious behaviour outside their homes the younger age-group (20-39) seem to be much less observant than the older age-group (40 and over). Third, although many of the practices at home or those connected with the family are in actual fact being maintained, the attitudes expressed by respondents regarding those practices are much less favourable. This applies, for example, to such hitherto well entrenched practices as those of 'shivah' and 'kaddish', or of having the 'mezuzzah' at one's door. Attitudes in these matters may well be indications of future behaviour. Considering the above points, one cannot but conclude that religious identification among Edgware Jews shows weaknesses of a crucial nature. Furthermore, the religious factor has not given rise to secular by-products of a type developing in American suburbs² which could serve as elements in the over-all Jewish identification.

Evidence on American Jewish communities and also on Jews in Britain generally indicates that identification with the Jewish minority persists despite the decline in religious traditions.³ I shall, therefore, look at the situation in Edgware and try to discern factors other than religion, and assess their potency, in the maintenance of ethnocentrism at a time when religious identification in the district is rather weak.

Kinship ties

One index of the closeness of kinship ties is the extent to which parents and married children and unmarried ones away from home, and also other relatives, exchange visits. I gathered some information about the matter. Of those respondents who had parents living, 81.8 per cent had gone to visit them within the month previous to the interview while 71.8 per cent had been visited by their parents during the same period. Again, 89.5 per cent of heads of household were visited by other kinsmen in the month previous to the interview, and 83.5 per cent of heads of household visited some other kinsman during the same period. At the same time one must note that 40 heads of household (that is, 10.5 per cent) had relatives living with them. The interviews have yielded sufficient information to show that in the majority of these cases it was not economic need which led the kinsmen to join the household. Either the older persons involved wished to remain in close daily contact with their children or grandchildren, or the head of the household and/or his wife preferred to have a parent or unmarried sibling under the same roof. The information points, therefore, to a strong link between Jewish heads of household in Edgware and their parents and wider families.

I now turn to the way in which respondents said they bring up their children. What kind of control do they exercise over them? Of the two hundred respondents who had one or more children below the age of 15, only 10 (or 5 per cent) said they were 'very strict', 66.5 per cent that they were 'fairly strict', and 26.5 per cent that they were 'not strict at all'. Of the 88 respondents who had children between the ages of 15 and 21, 72 per cent maintained that their children had more freedom than they themselves had enjoyed at that age.

Further information shows that in fact parents do allow much freedom, particularly as regards choice of friends and places the children frequent. About half, however, apply stricter discipline with regard to the time at which their children come home at night. On the whole, however, control of children does not seem to be very strict. Nevertheless, parents do make sure that their offspring are brought up as Jews by initiation and education: every boy is circumcised and the 'bar-mitzvah' is observed by the vast majority. As regards Hebrew instruction, of the 195 children (both male and female) in the age group 5-14, 62 per cent attended Hebrew classes. This proportion seems low, but as many children at the extremes of the age group often do not attend classes, the actual proportion of those who get some Hebrew instruction is probably a good deal higher. It may also be noted that 38 per cent of the children belonged to Jewish organizations or clubs either at the time of the enquiry or some time in the past.

Parental attitudes to mixing with, and possibly marrying, non-Jews

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is interesting in this context. The survey shows that opposition to children going out with non-Jews is not very great even when parents are facing the possibility of their children marrying non-Jews, a situation that applies to those with children aged over fifteen. In the case of 58.5 per cent of respondents with sons and of 52.7 per cent with daughters there was not very strong opposition to children going out with non-Jews. But as regards actual intermarriage a much smaller number, 28.8 per cent, did not object strongly.

The position so far as intermarriage is concerned is as follows. Of the 147 married children of respondents 16 (or 10.9 per cent) were married to spouses who were not Jewish by birth, but of the same total of married children, 139 (or 94.6 per cent) were married in synagogues. While children have maintained quite well the proportion of synagogue marriages (in fact this was only slightly lower than the 96.7 per cent of synagogue marriages recorded for the parent generation), their proportion of mixed marriages increased substantially. Thus of the 372 respondents who were or had been married only 12 (or 3.2 per cent) said they were married to a non-Jew or to someone who was formerly non-Jewish. It is true that another 3.2 per cent did not wish to answer the question which could be taken to mean, in most cases, a mixed marriage. Even then the mixed marriages among the children are almost twice as numerous. While keeping in mind that many of the non-Jewish partners become proselytised, we must take the increase in the number of mixed marriages as a symptom of the loosening up of the Jewish family and of a general weakening of the ties with the ethnic group.

Sociability patterns

Both formal and informal relations have to be considered here. Leaving aside links in the occupational sphere and with official bodies, an idea of how inward-looking the Jews in Edgware are can be gained from figures about membership of voluntary associations (excluding synagogues). Thus, 35 per cent belonged to a Jewish organization or club at the time of the enquiry and another 40 per cent had belonged at some time in the past. In contrast, only 19 per cent of the respondents were members at the time of the investigation of non-Jewish organizations or clubs. To gauge the degree of involvement respondents were asked how active they were in the Jewish organizations to which they belonged. Of the 135 persons, 24 per cent were 'very active' and 21 per cent were active 'to some extent'. Looking at the sample as a whole (382 respondents) one finds that only 11.8 per cent were actively involved in Jewish organized life other than the synagogue. As for the wives of respondents only 30 per cent were members of Jewish organizations or clubs, and altogether no more than just over 16 per cent were actively involved. It is true that involvement in Jewish organizations and clubs is possible even without actually belonging to them or

taking an active part in their running. Many of the events and activities of these organizations are attended by people who are not even formally members. This applies to public meetings, social events, charitable work, and so on. Interest in organized Jewish life may therefore be greater than the figures suggest.

I now turn to examine the links that respondents have with individuals or informal groups. The main question is who their friends are, particularly, how many have non-Jewish as against Jewish friends. There is the difficulty here of defining the meaning of the word 'friend'. I have, therefore, asked two separate questions: one, regarding people with whom respondents were *on friendly terms*; and another, regarding people whom respondents considered as their *very close friends*. The results show quite clearly that only tiny fractions of respondents numbered mainly non-Jews among their very close friends or among the wider circle of persons with whom they were on friendly terms. There was a small group who claimed they had both Jews and Gentiles as very close friends and a somewhat larger group whose wider circle of friends included some Gentiles. But by far the largest group of all consisted of respondents whose very close friends were almost exclusively Jewish and whose wider circle was mainly Jewish.

The question that poses itself is why Jews in Edgware mix mainly with other Jews. The answer is given at least partly by the fact that more than half of the respondents declared that they felt more at ease in a Jewish group. This was explained mainly in cultural terms, that is, 'having more in common with' other Jews, rather than in terms of negative attitudes on the part of non-Jews, for instance, antisemitism. Edgware Jews maintained that there was very little antisemitism in the district: only 0.8 per cent said they had come across 'a great deal' of antisemitism; 19.6 per cent experienced 'some'; and 78 per cent 'none at all'. But the attitudes of the Jewish respondents were also favourable towards non-Jews. It is interesting that while 29.6 per cent thought that 'Jews like to keep to themselves', only 5.3 per cent thought that 'non-Jews like to keep to themselves'. A large number of respondents, 37.5 per cent, put the responsibility on both Jews and Gentiles alike for keeping apart. But a substantial proportion seemed to recognize that Jews were inward-looking and a very large majority wanted to have more social mixing between Jews and non-Jews.

An analysis of attitudes to intermarriage and to sociability with non-Jews by age and religious identification revealed two important points. First, no clear-cut difference was found between age groups regarding the degree of ethnocentrism evinced. While a somewhat larger proportion of the older group feel more at ease in a Jewish group, a larger proportion of the older than of the younger group advocate more social mixing between Jews and non-Jews. Similarly a larger proportion of the older age group are strongly opposed to their children marrying

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non-Jews and a smaller fraction than among the younger group are not at all opposed to intermarriage. And the trend is similar in the case of attitudes towards sons going out with non-Jewish girls. But the trend is reversed when we look at the attitudes to daughters going out with non-Jewish boys. In other words, in the latter case the younger age group take a stronger line—proportionately more of them are strongly opposed and fewer are not at all opposed to their daughters going out with non-Jewish boys than is the case in the older group.

While there appear to be no clear-cut age-group differences with regard to the ethnocentric factors considered above, these factors do exhibit definite trends when related to religious identification. Thus the orthodox synagogue groups have consistently much higher percentages of respondents strongly opposed to the intermarriage of their children, or the dating of non-Jews by their children, than is the case among respondents who belong to the reform synagogue or who are not members of a synagogue. Similarly, larger proportions of those belonging to the orthodox group feel 'more at ease' in a Jewish group, and smaller proportions advocate more mixing with non-Jews than is the case with respondents in the Reform or 'no synagogue' categories. On the whole it appears that there is a strong link between religious identification and ethnocentric factors such as reliance on the in-group for social mixing and the attempt to prevent intermarriage.

Living in a Jewish milieu

Another ethnocentric factor among Jews is the desire to live with other Jews, in a Jewish district which provides a Jewish environment through such amenities as the synagogue or the shop selling 'kasher' products, and through having Jewish neighbours and meeting other Jews in the street. The question is to what extent was Edgware chosen by respondents because it is a suburb which provides them with such a Jewish milieu. Respondents were asked why they moved to Edgware. The replies were as follows: 58.9 per cent said they moved to Edgware because they liked the suburban environment and general amenities of the district; 5.6 per cent went there because they wanted to live in a Jewish district; 12.2 per cent gave replies which included these two factors; 2.7 per cent moved to the district because a member of their family lived there; and 3.5 per cent moved to Edgware simply because they found a house there. These figures obviously point to the fact that to a large extent the Jews who moved to Edgware did so because they wanted to live in a pleasant area. In fact 64 per cent of all respondents declared that they liked the district 'very much' and 33 per cent that they liked it 'fairly well'. It could further be argued that the attraction of Jews to the district was not mainly due to the fact that they wanted to live with other Jews. When respondents were asked whether they thought that Jewish survival depends on Jews living together in a few

districts, only 24 per cent agreed 'strongly', 25 per cent 'to some extent', and 47 per cent 'disagreed'. Furthermore, 55 per cent expressed the view that if Jews lived together in a few districts relations with Gentiles would worsen; 26 per cent maintained that it would make no difference; and 7 per cent that it would improve such relations.

If the opinions just cited were to be taken as evidence that the factor of a Jewish milieu is not strongly at work amongst Edgware Jews, certain other facts would be difficult to explain. Thus, 65 per cent of all respondents did declare that they felt more 'at home' in a Jewish district. Again, 63 per cent regarded Edgware as a predominantly Jewish area, yet if they were not particularly keen to live in such an area why did they in fact move to it? Should many of the respondents have acted in accordance with their opinions that if Jews lived together in a few districts relations with Gentiles would worsen, and that residence in a Jewish district is not essential to Jewish survival, one would have expected many of them to have moved to predominantly non-Jewish areas. Yet increasing numbers have settled in an area which as many as 63 per cent regard as predominantly Jewish, and in fact have come to live in an area where, by 1963, 40 per cent of the inhabitants were Jews. Moreover, the influx seems to have been extremely strong in recent years—at the time of the survey, 12 per cent of all respondents had lived in Edgware less than two years.

It may be possible to argue that having lived most of their lives in Jewish areas—80 per cent came to Edgware from North-West and North London and from the East End—respondents found it so natural to move to a Jewish district that in giving reasons for moving they mostly left this aspect out of their answers. In other words, in addition to the general amenities of the district attracting them, there were also the almost taken-for-granted factors of the 'Jewish' aspects of Edgware and of the nearness of the district to the very large Jewish population complex of North-West London. And if despite the fact that about half the sample thought that Jewish survival was not enhanced by the existence of Jewish districts and also thought that such concentrations are detrimental to Gentile-Jewish relations they nevertheless lived in the district, this may be further proof of the subtle powers of attraction that 'Jewish' districts still exercise over large numbers of Jews.

The movement of Jews out of central city areas to outer suburbs raises the question of whether in the long run this signifies an important change in the pattern of Jewish settlement. Is this at all a sign of the break-up of the 'ghetto' system? In a study of Jews in an American suburb Kramer and Leventman maintain that among third generation Jews such a change is taking place. They say: 'the suburbs to which the third generation has taken flight not only have fewer inhabitants in general; they have fewer Jews in particular. Jews move to the suburbs for much the same reasons that everyone else does. The move, however,

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changes the social conditions of the minority situation and therefore has special implications for Jews. In search for better housing and bigger backyards, young Jews often discover the added boon of non-Jewish neighbors.⁴ At the same time, however, the authors do say that while the main older area of Jewish settlement in the city they investigated was rapidly losing its Jewish population, one of the suburbs in particular was gaining—it had 28 per cent of the total Jewish population of the city, and the Jews in that particular suburb constituted 13 per cent of the total suburban population. But Kramer and Leventman assert that whilst the third generation wanted a neighbourhood to be Jewish to the extent of making available certain Jewish institutions such as the synagogue or the Hebrew school, they preferred areas populated less thickly with Jews. This may bring about, however, a situation somewhat like the one described by Wirth, namely that because of the similar aims of many Jews the ideal of a less thickly Jewish populated area may not in fact be achieved.⁵ This, indeed, might have happened in Edgware. The attitudes expressed seem to point to less importance being attached to living near other Jews. Yet the earlier Jewish settlers of Edgware selected this suburb which is fairly near to other Jewish areas rather than a suburb further afield, and in the last few years the influx has been very great despite the fact that (or perhaps because) a substantial Jewish community existed in the district.

Two more points have to be made in connexion with the phenomenon of 'the Jewish district'. First, there is some evidence which shows that London Jewry's movements were much influenced by developments in transport facilities in regard to the place of work, that is the industrial and commercial central city areas.⁶ My survey did not delve into this. Second, the survey has also not illuminated the extent to which a self-selection process may have taken place, whereby those who were more eager to live among Jews went to Edgware and other similar areas, while at the same time others wishing to avoid Jewish neighbourhoods went in fact to live in predominantly non-Jewish areas further away from Jewish centres.

Next I consider the attitudes of Edgware Jews to another kind of Jewish milieu—the Jewish national home in Israel. Few of the respondents had any experience of this kind of Jewish milieu: only 16 per cent had been to Israel and most of them had gone only for short periods, for example, on holiday or business. On the other hand, the vast majority were interested in the country to the extent of giving financial support to it: 50 per cent contributed funds for Israel regularly; 41 per cent occasionally; the rest never. And of those who belonged to Jewish associations 25 per cent belonged to Zionist organizations, and in the case of wives of respondents the comparative figure was 53 per cent. But despite the interest exhibited through membership of Zionist groups and contributions to Zionist funds, only a small proportion showed a

positive interest in the possibility of living in a Jewish country. Thus, 22 per cent indicated that they would go to live in Israel if circumstances permitted; 57 per cent would not go under any circumstances; and 21 per cent were undecided. It is probably not surprising that a largely English-born generation of Jews cannot visualize leaving England to settle in Israel. But to the extent that they show an interest in organizations and funds connected with Israel, they are identifying themselves yet again with a Jewish phenomenon.

The Jew in Edgware thus shows a fairly strong interest in Israel and supports the building up of a national home for his ethnic group: he may well do so as a sort of compensation for his slackening interest in religious matters. In this way Israel becomes a strong factor in his Jewish identification. Again he lives in a fairly thickly populated 'Jewish area' while expressing negative attitudes towards such areas. Such attitudes may be indicative of a future trend in which less stress may be put by the Edgware Jew on staying, *ecologically at least*, within his group. But while he lives in Edgware with its large proportion of Jews and with extensive Jewish facilities, the overall Jewish milieu is bound to have a strong positive influence on his identification with his minority group.

Conclusion

In drawing the strands together one can start by postulating that the problem of identification revolves around two possibilities with which a Jewish minority group is faced: on the one hand it can attempt to merge into the wider society by casting off Jewishness; on the other hand it can insist on maintaining its religious or historical traditions and culture. The issue is, however, complicated by the question of whether the wider society is open enough and free enough of prejudices to allow members of the minority group to adopt the former line of action. It appears therefore that there are two aspects to the phenomenon of identification. One is the relationship of the minority with the 'external' world, and the other is the positive forces operating 'internally', inducing group cohesiveness.

These two aspects of identification are not independent of each other. Let us first look at the internal forces working towards differentiation, and then consider the reciprocal influences that these forces and relations with the 'external' world exert on each other. First, the results showed that minority identification in Edgware through the religious factor was weakening in certain respects. Affiliation to synagogues was maintained by over 80 per cent of the sample but their link with synagogal life was tenuous. Again, actual observance of religious rules and customs scored higher than attitudes to such observance, suggesting the possibility of a further weakening in the religious fabric in the future. Finally, the younger generation proved a generally less religious sub-

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group, and there was no evidence of any kind of religious revival even with a secular content, such as has been claimed for American suburbs. But it was also true that on the whole the decline in religiosity was most clearly marked in spheres outside the home and the family.

Ethnocentric factors, however, were found often closely linked with the religious factor. For example, respondents born in eastern Europe or the East End of London were on the whole more religious than those born in western Europe. Being born and brought up in a closely-knit and inward-looking Jewish community, like the East End, or at any rate having parents who have been influenced by such an environment, seems to have been conducive to a greater degree of religious observance.

Another link found was that between religion and intermarriage. In this case the less religious were also less stringent in their attitudes to intermarriage. An interesting pattern was found in that the younger generation, that is the married children of respondents, had a higher proportion of intermarriages than their parents, yet they maintained synagogue marriages at a high level. This suggests that non-Jewish marriage partners usually became converted. The number of mixed marriages found in the sample does not, of course, tell us anything about the *rate* of intermarriage at the time of the enquiry, for this is concealed by earlier intermarriage rates. But although leaders of the community talked about some increase in the number of intermarriages among the younger generation, they maintained that it was when the young left the district that they were more prone to mixing with Gentiles and marrying them. Life in Edgware does not particularly encourage unions between Jews and non-Jews. One can conclude quite confidently that if intermarriage in Anglo-Jewry as a whole has recently increased sharply, as some observers maintain,⁷ the contribution has not been made primarily by the kind of Jewish suburban community that Edgware is.

Although the data show that Edgware respondents have a liberal attitude towards social mixing with non-Jews, both as concerns their children and themselves, in reality there was little such mixing taking place. Information on friendship patterns showed in fact that almost all the close friends and even those with whom respondents were on friendly terms were as a rule Jews. Furthermore, when mixing with non-Jews did take place, it was often circumscribed. The comments of some of the leaders of the Jewish community bring out this point succinctly. One of them, who was a member of a local non-Jewish organization, was well satisfied with the genuine friendship his Gentile friends in the organization displayed towards him. But he objected to the fact that he was regarded by his non-Jewish friends as a kind of *special* person, an ambassador of the Jews. In another case a leading member of the community stated that 'he went out of his way' to have Gentile neighbours in for

tea. Again, this kind of friendship lacks spontaneity and reveals the artificiality in the pattern of mixing between Jew and non-Jew.

The social distance may be induced only to a very small extent by antisemitism, a factor that most respondents thought was not prevalent in Edgware. The different cultural backgrounds of the two groups appears as far more important. This scored highest as a reason given by respondents for feeling more at ease among Jews. Apart from these factors hindering the existence of an unrestricted relationship between Jews and non-Jews, the opportunity for contact is reduced as a result of the large concentration of Jews in the district and particularly in certain parts of it—the proportion of Jews in some streets is much higher than the overall 40 per cent found in Edgware as a whole. Thus although Edgware Jews were more widely dispersed in the general population when at work, and were less traditional when away from their homes, they still maintained a certain degree of religious affiliation and observance, and although in attitudes towards social mixing they seemed to be more outward-looking, in practice the closer relationships with the wider society were very much limited and qualified.

The study of Edgware has produced the kind of evidence which suggests that the Jewish group there has adopted a position of cultural pluralism. Pluralism implies that societies do not always necessarily advance and develop into entities with a uniform way of life. Groups may be found in the same society which, although they accept and contribute to certain general features of the society of which they are part, nevertheless maintain their own identity.⁸ The concept of pluralism enables us to understand why, although the Jewish group studied here was not using or favouring some of the channels of identification, its members were rallying around other means of identification in an effort to maintain their Jewishness. Thus, while they were giving up some religious practices outside the home, they were clinging to others within the family circle. Again, for example, although they advocated more social mixing with non-Jews, they still, out of choice, settled in a Jewish suburb. There is also a reciprocal influence operating between the internal mechanism of identification, such as was discussed above, and the nexus of the minority with the majority. This two-way process further reinforces the tendency towards a pluralistic position. Thus, the cultural distinctiveness of the Jews was at least partly responsible for the social distance found between the minority and the larger society. And social distance in its turn fosters minority identification. Again, although respondents came across little overt antisemitism the strongest organization in the community, excluding synagogues, was the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen whose main task is to defend the community against the possibility of antisemitism;⁹ and of course membership of, and activity in, such an organization heightens identification with the minority.¹⁰

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The survey shows that Jews in Edgware maintain many links through which they identify with the minority. This means that in the same way as middle-class suburban communities of the general population lead lives in certain respects different from working-class communities near city centres,¹¹ so Jews in Edgware have their own social, religious, and ethnic-cultural patterns which distinguish them from non-Jews. Neither social distance, which is a feature of class distinctions as well as of minority-majority relations, nor the distinctive culture patterns of the different segments of society referred to here exclude the possibility of these groups sharing in the common and general aspects of the life of the larger society which they make up. Certainly my study demonstrates that for Edgware Jews in the 1960s to maintain Jewish identification was wholly consistent with leading a modern life in an English suburb; a life that can be regarded as generally integrated into the wider society.

NOTES

¹ 'The Edgware Survey: Demographic Results', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, no. 1, June 1968; and 'The Edgware Survey: Occupation and Social Class', Vol. XI, no. 1, June 1969. I am very grateful for the continuous help and advice given to me by Professor Julius Gould and Professor Maurice Freedman. I am also indebted to Dr. Judith Freedman for a great deal of help in connexion with the publication of this series of articles.

² See S. J. Gould, 'American Jewry—Some Social Trends', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. III, no. 1, June 1961.

³ See M. Sklare, ed., *The Jews*, Glencoe, Ill., 1958; M. Freedman, ed., *A Minority in Britain*, London, 1955; S. J. Gould and S. Esh, eds., *Jewish Life in Modern Britain*, London, 1964.

⁴ J. R. Kramer and S. Leventman, *Children of the Gilded Ghetto*, New Haven, 1961, pp. 17 f.

⁵ L. Wirth, *Community Life and Social Policy*, Chicago, 1956, p. 273.

⁶ See V. D. Lipman, 'The Rise of Jewish Suburbia', in *Transactions*, 1962–1967, Vol. XXI, The Jewish Historical Society of England, 1968.

⁷ For a review and assessment of the situation see Michael Wallach, 'Marrying out', *Jewish Chronicle*, 23 May 1969, p. 7.

⁸ For a discussion of plural societies and a definition of pluralism see J. D. B. Miller and A. Leiserson, in S. J. Gould and W. Kolb, eds., *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences*, London, 1964, pp. 506–8. Some sociologists have distinguished between pluralistic and assimilationist minorities, e.g., L. Wirth, *Community Life and Social Policy*, op. cit., pp. 250 f. See also S. H. Chapman, 'The Spirit of Cultural Pluralism', in H. M. Kallen et al., *Cultural Pluralism and the American Idea*, Philadelphia, 1956, p. 110; R. Glass, 'Insiders-Outsiders: The Position of Minorities' in *Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology*, Vol. III, International Sociological Association, 1964; and John Rex, 'The Plural Society in Sociological Theory', *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, no. 2, June 1959.

⁹ See *Edgware District AJEX Review*, November/December 1960, p. 12.

¹⁰ See, for example, expressions of pride in Jewish groups appearing at parades, etc., *ibid.*, pp. 3, 4.

¹¹ See, for example, M. Young and P. Willmott, *Family and Kinship in East London*, London, 1957, and P. Willmott and M. Young, *Family and Class in a London Suburb*, London, 1960.

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A NOTE ON IDENTIFICATIONAL ASSIMILATION AMONG FORTY JEWS IN MALMÖ

Liva Herz

Introduction

THE relatively large immigration to Sweden in the 1960s has led to a debate there about the situation of minority groups. For obvious reasons interest has been focused on recent immigrant groups, but the debate has to some extent also touched upon the situation of the 'older' groups, such as the Lapps and the Jews. Problems arising in the situation of the minority groups in, and adaptation to, Swedish society have emphasized the need for scientific studies in this field. Such studies have been and are being undertaken, but primarily of the 'new' groups.

As far as I know, the Jewish group in Sweden has not been the subject of any larger scientific studies; however, since Jews have been generally discussed in the minority-group debate, I find it very important to illuminate different aspects of the particular situation and attitudes of the Jews. This is especially so since the Jewish group differs in so many ways from the other minorities in Sweden. Jews have lived in Sweden only since the 1770s, when the first Jew was given the right to settle down in the country without becoming a convert. In the beginning, immigration was relatively slow and steady, consisting mainly of German Jews. The rate later increased, and immigration was concentrated in certain periods as a result of discrimination and pogroms in various countries. The last large group of Jews—about 4,000—came in connexion with the Bernadotte action.¹ Today there are still only about 15,000 Jews living in Sweden.

A relatively large part of Sweden's Jews have lived in the country for a long time and speak Swedish; almost all are now Swedish citizens. This, among other factors, distinguishes them from recently arrived groups such as the Greeks and Yugoslavs; it has also led to the fact that, in certain respects, they have become assimilated into Swedish society. Another distinguishing factor is that the Jews have not come

to Sweden from one country and therefore do not constitute an easily-defined national group with a 'homeland' as do the recently arrived groups. The difficulties in defining 'a Jew' and 'Jewishness' need hardly be stressed.

The fact that most of the Jews in Sweden—as in other countries—have nevertheless kept their religious, cultural, and traditional characteristics, as well as an international solidarity, makes them a group with special characteristics.

I undertook a study within the Jewish community in the city of Malmö.² The research was carried out in the spring of 1968 as part of the requirements for the 'three-point level' at the Department of Sociology at Lund University. The present paper is derived from the full report of the study, *Fyrtio judar i Malmö*.³

The aim of the study

The study focused on what Milton Gordon refers to as 'identificational assimilation'.⁴ It explored the respondents' conceptions of themselves as Jews and/or Swedes, their definitions of the concept of 'Jew', and their explanation of their own being and feeling Jewish. We know from other research, and the point is reinforced here by the respondents' personal conceptions of their Jewishness (that is, what makes them identify themselves with Jews and things Jewish), that the concept of 'identification' is not uni-dimensional. The content of an individual's Jewish identification (including cultural, religious and structural factors), his relation to Zionism, to Israel, and to his host-community and his experience of antisemitism were therefore also treated in the study. This article deals with the respondents' Jewish identification as measured directly by means of their own definitions and explanations of Jewishness and their relationship to it. This in turn is illuminated by structural factors such as the respondents' friendship patterns, attitudes towards intermarriage, and membership in Jewish organizations.

There are about 600 Jews in Malmö, in a total population of 250,000. Jews settled in Malmö in the 1860s. By 1871 there were sixty-two families and a community council was established. However, it was only in 1900 that the first Rabbi was appointed. Malmö's synagogue was inaugurated the following year; the service was (and still is) orthodox. There is no Jewish full-time school in the town, but there is a heder which pupils attend once a week.

Method

The study was conducted among forty members of Malmö's Jewish community, selected by random sampling. They were divided into four sub-groups, consisting of younger (17–25 years old) and older (40 and over) Swedish-born individuals on the one hand, and younger and

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older immigrants on the other. (The former will be referred to as 'younger Swedes' and 'older Swedes' and the latter as 'younger immigrants' and 'older immigrants' although the majority of these are Swedish citizens—only two of the twenty immigrants interviewed were not Swedish.) The younger 'Swedes' are children of Jews born in Sweden. The immigrants have all come to Sweden since 1938, mainly from eastern European countries. There were ten persons in each of the four groups.

The division between older 'Swedes' and older immigrants was made on the assumption that the former have become more assimilated than the latter from the identificational point of view. The division between older and younger Jews was made on the basis of the observation that, regardless of birthplace, the consciousness of their Jewish origin has grown considerably among Jewish youth. It is assumed that they have a strong Jewish identification which would contrast them (the 'young Swedes' and the young immigrants) with the 'older Swedes'. Perhaps one can talk about a kind of 'Jewish revival' in certain respects.

Because of the complex and emotional nature of the issues, unstructured personal interviews based on a so-called interview-guide were made. It was considered to be important to register possible spontaneous reactions and answers from the interviewees, since it can be supposed that most of them are emotionally involved in the issues studied. The interviews were taped. Each one lasted an average of one hour.

IDENTIFICATION

Identification as Jews and/or Swedes

The large Jewish 'ghettos' in Europe constituted a firm religious, cultural, and social basis for the individual Jew; he did not have to question his sense of belonging to the group and his Jewish identity. With the disappearance of the 'ghettos' and the increasing contact with out-groups, identity conflicts as well as a need for a definition of Jewishness have arisen for many Jews. The flood of literature in this field clearly demonstrates this fact.

In Sweden before the Second World War the Jews were relatively few in number and lived scattered throughout the country, with Stockholm as the largest Jewish centre. The community could therefore not constitute as clear a reference group for its members as it had in the countries from which they came. This was all the more the case because the Swedish authorities and public put heavy pressure on the Jewish group by advocating assimilation. The aim was that the Jews should become 'Swedes of Mosaic religion'. A direct consequence of this was the action of the Gothenburg community in hiring a Catholic musician and a clergyman to work out prayers and organ music for the reformed

service in the 1850s. It can therefore be supposed that many of them experienced problems of identity.

Such conflicts and pressures often result in the attempt by a minority group member to identify himself with the majority group and often also to conform to its norms even with regard to his own group. This is often said to have been the case with the old-established Swedish Jewry, and is especially illustrated by the reaction of many Swedish Jews who were not in favour of allowing Jewish refugees to come to Sweden during the Second World War.

The respondents were asked the basic question whether they identified themselves primarily as Jews, as Swedes, or as Swedish Jews. A little over half (22 out of 40) of the whole group answered 'as Jews'; these were seven older immigrants, seven younger immigrants, six younger 'Swedes' and two older 'Swedes'. Most of the older 'Swedes' (80 per cent), on the other hand, identified themselves primarily as Swedes or Swedish Jews, that is, 'Swedes of Mosaic religion'.

We must now turn to the respondents' definitions of the concept of 'Jew'. The question asked implies that the Jews constitute a people just as do the Swedes. That this implication was relevant, was shown in the differences between the sub-groups' definitions of the concept of 'Jew', that is, 'what the Jews are'.

Definitions of the concept of 'Jew'

Eight of the ten older 'Swedes' thought of the Jews as constituting a religious group, whereas all ten of the old immigrants, eight of the young immigrants, and seven young 'Swedes' defined the Jews as being a people with its own religion, or simply as a people. This difference confirms the previous finding: the older 'Swedes' look upon the Jews as constituting only a religious group whose members are primarily Swedes with a Jewish religion. This might be an outcome of the historical background of Swedish Jewry; Jews in the past were few in number and were scattered throughout the country, and external pressures made them feel more Swedish than Jewish. The group lost its function as a factor of identification and distinguished itself from the rest of Sweden's population only in terms of religion. As the historian Hugo Valentin writes in his book *Judarna i Sverige*,⁵ the majority of Swedish Jewry at the end of the nineteenth century experienced Jewishness only as an inherited religion which 'formed only an unimportant detail in its way of life and thinking'. The immigrants and the younger 'Swedes', on the other hand, think of the Jews as a people as well, which implies that they have a stronger Jewish than Swedish identification. For the immigrants this is no doubt true since they have lived in countries with large Jewish centres and a rich Jewish culture. As a result of their experiences, and because they may not feel quite at home in Sweden, it can be supposed that their Jewish identification is strong

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and perhaps has become even stronger since their emigration. Another important factor in this context is that the older immigrants interact socially mainly with one another and less with Swedish-born Jews. This is both a cause and an effect of their identification.

The findings concerning the young 'Swedes' seem interesting when compared with those concerning the old generation. It is likely that for these young Jews factors such as their mixing with young immigrant Jews and periods of residence in Israel are of great importance in their Jewish identification. I did not refer to the Six-Day War, but one young 'Swede' mentioned it spontaneously. He said he felt proud that non-Jews could now see for themselves that the Jews could be good soldiers.

Personal conception of being Jewish

The respondents' definitions of the concept of 'Jew' naturally depend on how they explain their personal conception of being Jewish, that is, what it is primarily that makes them feel Jewish if they do so at all. Rinder talks about Jewish identification as consisting of many subtypes of identification such as 'general, religious, racial, national and cultural feelings of Jewishness'.⁶ These subtypes can to some extent be found in the interviewees' explanations of their feeling Jewish. Two young persons—one 'Swede' and one immigrant—said they did not experience themselves much as Jews: one because of the difficulty of defining what the Jews are and one because of the fact that his overriding feeling was that he was a foreigner in Sweden. The explanations of the others can be grouped into four categories according to reason mentioned: emotional, religious, 'traditional', and 'born a Jew'.

Those who state that 'it is a feeling that makes me experience myself as a Jew' are, for the most part, the same persons who think of themselves primarily as Jews and think of the Jews as a people—that is, immigrants and young 'Swedes'. This emotional identification could thus be compared with Rinder's national identification. Bearing in mind their statement that Jews are primarily Swedes of the Jewish persuasion, we might have expected that the older 'Swedes' would experience themselves as Jews in terms of religion, that is, have a religious identification. This, however, was not the case. Instead, the majority of them said that they felt Jewish because of their habit of keeping certain traditions and because of having been born Jews. Thus, although they conceive of the Jews as constituting a religious group, it is not the religion that is of primary personal importance, but the traditions per se. This is shown by the fact that five of the ten older 'Swedes' observe kashrut as compared with only one old immigrant. (None of the young persons had his or her own household.) The identification of the older 'Swedes' could perhaps be referred to Rinder's cultural identification. In this context, it is significant that the old immigrants generally use the word 'Swedes' for non-Jews while the old 'Swedes' talk about 'Christians'.

This was not the case among the two young groups, who mix socially with one another more than the old ones do.

STRUCTURAL FACTORS

Attitude to intermarriage

Since a person's identification with a group is dependent on his social interaction with its members, questions about intermarriage and social interaction with members of the in-group as against the out-group are relevant here. Many Jews consider intermarriage to be the greatest risk of assimilation. Among Swedish Jews, who are a comparatively small group and live scattered throughout the country, intermarriage has been and is an inevitable problem, and the rate has probably been relatively high. Joachim Prinz in his book *The Dilemma of the Modern Jew*⁷ says that intermarriage is decimating the small Jewish communities in Scandinavia. Since there are no statistics on this matter it is hard to verify his statement.

Of twenty persons who were or had been married in the group interviewed, there was one who was married to a non-Jewish person. When all forty respondents were asked about their attitude to marriage between a Jew and a non-Jew, thirty-four replied that they were not in favour of such a union: twenty-four of them were wholly against it, while the other ten stated that although they were not against intermarriage in principle they nevertheless thought that the disadvantages of such unions outweighed any advantages. The main disadvantages cited were problems created for any children of the couples, irreconcilable outlooks resulting from different backgrounds, and the risk of assimilation.

Among the six persons who were not against intermarriage the main reason mentioned was that isolation is bad and that the important thing in a marriage is that the two persons love each other. It may seem astonishing at first sight that there are no significant differences among the four sub-groups in their replies to this question, that is, the old 'Swedes' are as negative to intermarriage as are the other groups. However, this is understandable in the light of the role of the family in Jewish religion and culture. The family is the centre of religious and cultural life, and strong family solidarity is therefore both fostered and required, even if the home is not religious or does not maintain Jewish traditions.

Friendship patterns

In regard to the degree of social mixing with non-Jews and with Jews the results were somewhat different again. The largest number (17 persons) say that they mix as much with Jews as with non-Jews. Thirteen of the respondents mix primarily with Jews; it is significant that

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not one of the thirteen is an old 'Swede'. Similarly, not one of the eight respondents who mix primarily with non-Jews is an old immigrant. The older 'Swedes' of course, were born and bred in the country, speak Swedish without an accent, and have had many more opportunities of coming into contact with non-Jews. The older immigrants, on the other hand, in many cases came to Sweden as refugees at the same period—a fact which still binds them together; they speak Swedish with a foreign accent and, an important factor, they have all shared unhappy experiences with non-Jews abroad. (Many of these persons believe that their difficulty in coming in contact with non-Jews is not so much that they are Jews as that their accent stamps them as foreigners.) The young immigrants came to Sweden at a very early age and most of them have no foreign accent. Only one of the ten young immigrants interviewed had such an accent.

Among the young there is a tendency for the 'Swedes' to associate more frequently with Jews than do the immigrants, whose circle of friends is mainly mixed. It might be that the young 'Swedes' are in greater need of having Jewish friends in order to maintain or reinforce their Jewish identification, especially if they come from homes that are not so Jewish and therefore supposedly have 'developed' a Jewish identification later in their lives. The young immigrants, on the other hand, have had a more Jewish upbringing and can 'afford' to have non-Jewish friends without threatening their Jewish identification; it may be that they are more secure in their Jewishness. Those with a mixed or mostly non-Jewish circle of friends commented on this by saying that they do not want to isolate themselves; that it is not good for the Jews to be isolated. Those mixing primarily with Jews said that they feel more at home with them, that they have much in common, that they feel a sense of unity, and that it is difficult for others (non-Jews) to understand their way of thinking about various matters. The identificational factor is evident.

Membership in Jewish organizations

The continuing existence of the Jewish group is primarily dependent on the fostering of Jewish culture. This is maintained and developed by the family and by the existence of Jewish clubs and organizations. As was mentioned earlier, Swedish policy (regarding all minority groups) was—and more or less is—directed towards assimilation; the Jews should become 'Swedes of Mosaic religion'. This has naturally hampered the development and natural existence of a Jewish culture and led to difficulties in the case of many for whom Jewishness meant much more than adherence to the Jewish faith.

Within the framework of the Jewish communities in Sweden there are many clubs and organizations—mainly in Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö. In the city of Malmö there are eight different clubs with

about 1,200 members all told. (There are about 1,600 Jews in Malmö and in nearby towns.) Since these clubs and organizations are forums for in-group contact and communication they also constitute an identification-factor. Twenty-seven of the respondents were members of some Jewish club or organization. There is no significant difference on this point between the four sub-groups. The differences appear when the respondents give the reasons for their membership. The majority of the older 'Swedes' said they felt they should support Jewish affairs in order not to allow Jewish culture to disappear and in order to help other Jews, while members of the other three groups mentioned reasons such as the following:

'To meet and get to know Jewish friends.'

'To get to know about Judaism and my background.'

'One feels some kind of unity in the clubs.'

'By being a member one becomes conscious of one's background and origin.'

The last two answers clearly demonstrate the significance of the clubs for the Jewish identification of these individuals, as compared with the first two which reveal a more indirect involvement. The principal reason offered for not being a member of a Jewish organization was lack of time.

Conclusion

The results indicate that the majority of the older 'Swedes' studied conceive of themselves primarily as Swedes or as Swedes of the Jewish religion and explain their perception of their own Jewishness by the fact that they were born Jews and are used to certain traditions. Their circle of friends is mostly mixed or non-Jewish, as they do not want to isolate themselves, and their membership of Jewish clubs and organizations does not seem to be for *direct* personal reasons. Nevertheless, they are not in favour of intermarriage. This negative attitude to intermarriage is also prevalent among the members of the three other sub-groups: the young and old immigrants and the young 'Swedes'. The majority of the members of these three sub-groups identify primarily as Jews, conceive of the Jews as constituting a people with its own religion or simply one people, and experience themselves as Jews in that they have a strong feeling of Jewishness, which could be compared to Rinder's national identification. Their circle of friends is mostly mixed in the case of the younger immigrants and Jewish in the case of the older immigrants and younger 'Swedes'. They have joined Jewish clubs and organizations for direct personal reasons: they wish to maintain their identification with Jewishness.

From the point of view of identification, then, the older 'Swedes' (in the group studied) generally seem to be more assimilated than the older immigrants. As for the young 'Swedes' and the young immigrants, they

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appear to be very conscious of their Jewishness in that they have primarily a national-emotional identification with Jewishness, which can be supposed to encompass a larger part of their whole identity than an identification based on merely being accustomed to certain traditions or being born a Jew.

The attitude of the young 'Swedes' is particularly interesting. Rinder⁸ discusses an idealized model in which 'members of successive generations of ethnic groups may be seen as ranging along a continuum of identification extending from an original ethnic . . . to an identification wholly or predominantly . . . non-ethnic'. My findings in the Malmö sample do not confirm this. When comparing the two Swedish generations we cannot talk about their 'positions' along a continuum but rather in a circle. This leads up to the phenomenon of 'the return to the ghetto'. Wirth noticed a regressive current in the cycle of Jews who met resistance and discrimination when attempting to assimilate.⁹ The younger Swedes would thus be closing the circle, returning to the 'ghetto' in the sense that they have a stronger Jewish (ethnic) identification than the older generation.

Further research is naturally required to validate the generality of these findings. The important question is whether this phenomenon is the result of discrimination, as it has been in the United States according to Wirth. I believe that the existence of the State of Israel cannot be omitted as a factor. Perhaps the phenomenon should be seen in a wider context as part of a general trend among the youth of today to identify with something—to belong to a distinct group.

In order to elicit the factors lying behind the 'revival' among young Swedish Jews, extensive studies are required which would open very interesting and fruitful roads in the discussion not only of Jews, but of minority groups and of today's youth in general.

NOTES

¹ Count Bernadotte was President of the Swedish Red Cross during the Second World War and negotiated with the German authorities the release of Norwegian and Danish citizens held in German concentration camps. Eventually prisoners of other nationalities—mainly Poles—also found a refuge in Sweden. Four thousand refugees remained in Sweden after the War—most of them were Poles.

² Malmö is Sweden's third largest city after Stockholm and Gothenburg. It is an important sea-port at Oresund across from Copenhagen.

³ Unpublished typescript, Lund, 1968; I am grateful to Marga Hirsch for editorial assistance.

⁴ M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life*, New York, 1964.

⁵ H. Valentin, *Judarna i Sverige*, Stockholm, 1964, p. 158.

⁶ I. Rinder, 'Polarities in Jewish Identification', in M. Sklar, ed., *The Jews*, Glencoe, Ill., 1958.

⁷ J. Prinz, *The dilemma of the Modern Jew*, Boston, 1962, p. 179.

⁸ Rinder, op. cit.

⁹ L. Wirth, *The Ghetto*, Chicago, 1928.

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THE KAIFENG JEWISH COMMUNITY: A SUMMARY

Donald Daniel Leslie

THE Chinese inscription of 1663 from the Kaifeng synagogue claims a Chou-time (c. 1122–256 B.C.E.) entry of Judaism into China, but this is best dismissed. So too is the suggestion that the 'ten lost tribes' reached China. The passage from Isaiah 49, 12 'those from the land of Sinim' is now accepted as not referring to China. All pre-Han suggestions are speculative.

An entry during the Han (206 B.C.E. to 221 C.E.), on the other hand, is eminently possible, even though the evidence is slight and mainly circumstantial. The 1512 and 1679 stone inscriptions both mention the Han, and the Jesuit visitors to the community, Gozani in his unpublished letter of 1712, and Domenge in letters of 1723 and 1724, actually name Han Ming Ti (58–76 C.E.). This is reinforced by the likelihood that Jews were active in the overland silk trade from China to Rome. As Boulnois puts it: 'Silk—dyeing—glass—caravans: the combination of these four elements might well lead us to suppose that they took some part in the far-eastern silk trade.' The extrapolation from trading to migration and settlement is not unreasonable.

Our first historical references are by ninth-century Arab writers. Most of the trade from Europe to India and to China from the eighth to the thirteenth centuries was in the hands of Arabs and other Persian speakers. The main route was now by sea from the Persian Gulf around India to Sumatra and Tongking, and as far as Canton, Ch'üan-chou, Hangchow, and other coastal ports of China. Jews were also active in this trade, even though less noted for their seafaring prowess. Ibn Khurdadhbih, c. 844–8, described the routes, by land and by sea, of Jewish merchants, called Radanites, trading from France all the way to China. Taking slaves, furs, brocaded silk (*sic*) eastwards, they returned with spices.

The other basic Arab description of China, by an anonymous Arab traveller in 851, attributed to 'Sulaiman', does not mention Jews. But its continuation by Abu Zaid, towards 916, based partly on a visit by Ibn Wahab, reports the slaughter in 878 of 120,000 Muslims, Jews, Christians, and Magians, in Khānfū by Bānshū. It is accepted that

Bānshū refers to the Chinese rebel Huang-ch'ao, and Pelliot and other modern scholars take Khānfū to be Canton, though there is also a case for Kan-p'u, the port of Hangchow, mentioned by Marco Polo.

Abu Zaid's account is repeated by Mas'udi in 943, and Ibn Khurdadhbih's by Ibn Al-Faqīh in *c.* 902. More in the nature of travellers' tales are reports of Jews visiting China by the tenth-century Persian writer known as Buzurg, by the ninth-century Jew Eldad Ha-Dani, and by the twelfth-century Jew Benjamin of Tudela.

From China itself, we have no direct evidence of a Jewish penetration during the T'ang (618-907). Little importance can be attached to the undoubted Middle Eastern (Semitic and Persian) features of several extant T'ang sculptures, for these are just as likely to be based on Arabs or Armenians as on Jews. More significant is that we can trace the entry to about this time, not only of Islam, but also of Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism, and Nestorianism. As Pelliot puts it: 'At Ningpo, as in all this region of the estuary of the Yangtse, adventurers and merchants from the large Persian junks, people of all races and creeds, Manicheans and Mazdeans, Muslims and Nestorians, bumped into brethren coming by the other route, via Turkestan and Kansu. It would be strange if the Jews were the only ones who remained outside this stream.'

For the Sung (960-1279), we have no reference to Jews in China in extant Sung literature. For the Yüan or Mongol dynasty (1279-1368), we have several. The *Yüan-shih* mentions *chu-hu*, with other minorities, in entries of 1329, 1340, and 1354, the *Yüan-t'ien-chang* in entries of 1280 and 1320. A further non-official source of *c.* 1360 mentions Jewish merchants in the Hangchow sugar board. These isolated remarks are corroborated by Marco Polo in 1286, John of Monte Corvino in *c.* 1300, Andrew of Perugia in 1326, Jean de Marignolli in 1342, and Ibn Battuta in 1346. They mention Jews in Khanbaliq (Peking), Khansa (Hangchow), and probably Zaitun (Ch'üan-chou). The Mongol laws forbade the practice of ritual slaughter of animals by Muslims and Jews, and the marriage of paternal aunts and cousins (this is not the levirate). But Kubilai and his successors gave considerable support to various foreign groups as opposed to the native Chinese. We may suppose that Jewish communities flourished in several Chinese cities at this time.

Nowhere in these early reports is Kaifeng referred to, but it was the Kaifeng Jewish community which alone survived and left valuable records from which almost all our information about the Chinese Jews comes. The main records are stone and other inscriptions in Chinese, the large ones dated 1489, 1512, 1663 (two), 1679; scrolls of the Law, and almost a complete set of prayers in Hebrew; a Chinese-Hebrew Memorial Book of the Dead, closed *c.* 1670. To these should be added the reports of Jesuit and other missionaries from the seventeenth to twentieth centuries.

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According to the stone inscriptions, this Kaifeng group arrived during the Sung, probably before 1127, at the then capital, bringing western cloth (some suggest cotton from India, others that they were experts in dyeing cloth). It is still not established whether they came by sea from the Red Sea or Persian Gulf via India, or overland from Persia through Afghanistan and Central Asia. Both routes were open during the T'ang, and also during the Yüan. During the T'ang, the sea route was especially used, but there are already traces of Jews in Dandan Uiliq, Tun-huang, and Ningsia, on the northern overland caravan route. The main argument of Pelliot and Chavannes is that they brought cloth (cotton?) from *T'ien-chu*, usually taken to refer to India. This is countered by the emphasis of the Jesuit visitors on the term *Siyu* (*Hsi-yu*), taken to be Persia, both for the original immigrants and for later emissaries from the west who visited their co-religionists in Kaifeng.

We may try to decide between these two main possibilities by an analysis of the internal peculiarities of their Hebrew writings.

The scrolls of the Law from Kaifeng, now held in various libraries in the west, were probably copied in the seventeenth century from earlier ones of the twelfth to fifteenth centuries. The text is of course highly accurate, but the format and scribal differences may give us some clues as to their provenance. They seem to have some links with oriental scrolls, but nothing has yet been demonstrated. We also possess pointed versions of over 30 sections of the Law, obtained from Kaifeng in 1850 and 1851, copied around 1620 to 1626. I have found a link between the unusual number of verses and some manuscript bibles in the British Museum—unfortunately of unknown provenance. The argument used by Laufer that the Chinese Jews and the Persian Jews divided the Law into 53 sections is weakened by the fact that Maimonides also gave this division.

Unfortunately, no other books of the Bible are now extant, though the Jesuit visitors, in particular Domenge in his letter of 1721 (published in Latin and German by Kögler and von Murr in 1779 and 1805), mention most of the Prophets, and, interestingly, a Hebrew version of (the first two chapters of) the Maccabees, otherwise unknown. It is not clear how much of the Talmud they held, but a single page, autographed by Gozani in 1713, lists most of the titles, implying some knowledge, if not the books themselves, in Kaifeng.

Besides the portions of the Law, a largish collection of prayerbooks was obtained from Kaifeng in 1850 and 1851. These are now held in the library of the Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati. They include some pieces and variants not found elsewhere, but, in the main, they are remarkably like the Yemen ritual, which is known to follow Maimonides (twelfth century). The extant Persian (and Cochín) rituals are quite a long way removed from this. However, we may suppose an

earlier now lost Persian ritual also based on Maimonides. Nevertheless, the possibility arises that our Kaifeng Jews may have stemmed from the Yemen, situated conveniently on the sea routes to India and further. One thing is sure: these Jews were Rabbanites, whose prayers and ceremonies followed Talmudic prescriptions.

The rubrics of these prayers, including a Haggadah, and also colophons to sections of the Law, are mostly in Judaeo-Persian. But this is less significant than appears at first sight. For New Persian was the *lingua franca* of most of the foreign traders in India and the Chinese coast for several hundred years. Similar scraps of Judaeo-Persian in Hebrew script are found in Southern India, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and round the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. According to E. Adler and Norollah, their Persian shows a Bokhara or Khorassan influence. These linguistic arguments, and equally any attempt to analyse the distinctive pointing (i.e. vowels) of the prayers, need to take into account the Chinese influence.

To sum up, it seems legitimate to assume that some Jews, coming via, if not from, India, settled in the Chinese ports, and that some of them spread inland. There can be little doubt that others came in via, if not from, Afghanistan, and spread to Ningsia and Peking. It may be that the former group came with the Arabs during the T'ang, and the latter with the Mongols during the Yüan. But which group got to Kaifeng during the Sung has not yet been settled.

Our main sources for the history of the community are the stone inscriptions, the first still extant dating from 1489. But they tell us little for any time before the Ming (1368-1644). Allowed to settle by a Sung Emperor, they began building a synagogue in 1163, and rebuilt it in 1279, at the beginning of the Yüan. The site of the synagogue was never changed, and we may suppose that a Jewish quarter existed near it.

It is likely that the Chinese attitude to minorities favoured integration whilst hindering to some extent total assimilation. We know that the Muslims had their own leaders responsible for the whole community to the authorities, both in the T'ang and the Yüan, and may suppose a similar arrangement for the less populous Jews. There was no objection to Jewish customs, so long as a minimum of Mongol and, later, Confucian rules were followed. Slowly the original Persian and Hebrew names and titles were replaced by Chinese surnames and translations of titles, a clear sign of integration.

The first known success in Chinese society was in 1421-3, when An San (or An Ch'eng) was given the Chinese surname Chao, and also given a high military rank and post. According to the *Ming-shih-lu*, this promotion was given to the common soldier (*chün-ting*) for informing on the prince then resident in Kaifeng. The Jewish inscriptions gloss over this, calling him a physician (*i-shih*). It is likely that the acceptance of the Kaifeng community into Chinese life stems from this time. How-

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ever, two other Jews at least were equally successful. Kao Nien, a *kung-sheng* (local-level graduate) of *c.* 1430, was appointed district magistrate in Anhwei in *c.* 1440; Ai Chün, a *chü-jen* (provincial-level graduate) of 1447, was appointed 'Sub-director of Studies' in Kiangsu, and 'Annalist' of the local prince of Kaifeng, *c.* 1462. Chin Sheng, great-uncle of Chin Hsüan of Ningsia, who lived about this time, was also a military officer.

Kaifeng was always subject to floods from the Yellow River, and the 1461 flood caused much damage, destroying the synagogue. At about this time, the community obtained two scrolls of the Law from the coastal port Ningpo. By 1489, the synagogue had been rebuilt by Li Jung, Ai Ching, Kao Hung, and others, and the inscription, composed by Chin Chung, set up. In 1512, a further inscription was composed, by Tso T'ang, holder of the *chin-shih* (national-level) degree, probably a non-Jew, of Yangchow. The community was now flourishing and on excellent terms with Chinese officialdom.

In 1605, they first made contact with Christians from Europe, to whom we are largely indebted for preserving their writings, both Hebrew and Chinese. The Jesuit father Matteo Ricci had a remarkable meeting with the Jew Ai, since identified as Ai T'ien, a *chü-jen* of 1573, in Peking in 1605. Ricci's account gives several hints that the community is beginning to weaken. It is almost certain that contact with co-religionists from Western Asia had ceased some years before this. In 1608 approximately, the chief of the synagogue died, and it was suggested that Ricci take the job—on condition that he gave up eating pork!

Ricci mentions a declining community in Hangchow, which formerly had had a synagogue, and Semedo mentions Jews formerly in Nanking. We also have several references to Muslims descended or converted from Jews, in particular in Peking. But within a few years these other communities were no more, and we have no record of the supposed Jewish communities of Ningpo and Peking, Ningsia and Yangchow, cities in which individual Jews named in the 1489 and 1512 inscriptions lived. According to Domenge in 1723, they had not received Jewish emissaries from the west for over 200 years. They were certainly isolated even from other Chinese Jews after the seventeenth century. We may note that the Judaeo-Persian colophons to the Law, dated 1620-6, suggest a poor knowledge of Hebrew at this time, confirmed by the Jesuit visitors.

Just how assimilated they had become after 500 years in Kaifeng is difficult to decide. The Chinese were inclined to look on them as a sect of the more numerous Muslims, whose main centres in China are found in these same cities where Jews are thought to have lived. There was certainly some intermarriage with non-Jews, as demonstrated by the non-Jewish surnames (over one quarter) in the Chinese-Hebrew

Memorial Book of the Dead (though the Jesuit reports are conflicting). The inscriptions show a tendency to emphasize the similarities to and gloss over the distinctions from Confucianism. Seasonal festivals and rites for ancestors were important parts of their practices, though the main Jewish festivals and commandments, including circumcision and the dietary laws, were still followed. The Hebrew prayers cover all the normal festivals, but we have no proof that these were truly understood or even celebrated in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. The inscriptions describe clearly the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement, but the other festivals are less clearly identifiable. Domenge quite specifically names *Simchat Torah* as celebrated on 4 October 1722, which is 23 Tishri, 5483, the 24th day of the Chinese eighth month. It is only in the nineteenth century that we feel sure that the festivals and calendar have gone astray. There was little difficulty in meshing Jewish and Confucian ethics. The 1663 inscription writes that in matters concerning 'capping' (corresponding to *bar-mitzvah*), marriage, deaths, and funerals, the Chinese rites were followed. Nothing alien to a monotheistic Judaism is found in these inscriptions, but the Chinese terms *T'ien*, 'Heaven', and *Tao*, 'The Way', are used, rather than more personalistic terms for God.

Though no love was lost between the Jews and Muslims, non-Chinese customs common to both meant that many of those Jews who finally assimilated were swallowed up by Islam. Even today, there are Chinese Muslims who believe their ancestors were Jewish. The Muslims continued to flourish and increased greatly in numbers, but the Kaifeng Jews probably never numbered more than 300 families, with 1,000-1,500 individuals.

We have little knowledge of any special trades they may have followed. The 1512 inscription mentions degree-holders and serving officials (civil and military), farmers and artisans, traders and shopkeepers. More specifically, in the 1663 inscriptions, we have the names of several successful physicians, notably in the Ai clan, and also of military officers, of the Chao, Chang, Li, and Kao clans. The Chao clan, and to a lesser extent the Kao and other clans, were successful as scholars.

In 1642, once again, there was a great flood in Kaifeng, and the synagogue was destroyed. Most of the scrolls and books were lost, and possibly also the stone inscriptions. But in 1653, the chief rabbi (*chang-chiao*, 'leader of the religion') Li Chen, Chao Ying-ch'eng the *chin-shih*, Chao Ch'eng-chi the military officer, together with members of all seven clans—Ai, Chang, Chao, Chin, Kao, Li, Shih—rebuilt the synagogue on its old site on a grand scale, and collated and copied out the scrolls of the Law (and perhaps the 1489 and 1512 inscriptions). In 1663, they set up a new stone, composed by the Imperial Minister Liu Ch'ang, a non-Jew. This describes the religion in similar terms to

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the earlier inscriptions, and also gives details of the 1642 flood and its aftermath. On the other side, a further inscription describes the contributions of the seven clans and individual members to the rebuilding of the synagogue, and also lists 59 leading members, some within the community, others in Chinese society, followed by 182 other members.

The greatest success in Chinese society, and the proof both of their acceptance and integration, was the 1646 *chin-shih* degree of Chao Ying-ch'eng (1619-c. 1657). Chao Ying-ch'eng reached the rank of Surveillance Vice-Commissioner, serving in Fukien and Hukwang. Several short biographies describe his successes in suppressing the bandits in Fukien. Two short essays he wrote are extant. His father Chao Kuang-yü was honoured with his title and rank. Other Jews who also succeeded in obtaining degrees were his younger brother Chao Ying-tou and Kao Hsüan. The former served as magistrate in Yunnan. Of the many military officers (15-20) of this period, we should mention Chao Ch'eng-chi, major, Chang Mei, major, Chang Shih-ju, major, and the imperial captain Li Yao. The last was in charge of a special Jewish or joint Muslim-Jewish company during the fighting in 1642, according to the *Shou-Pien Jih-Chih*, 'The Diary of the Defence of Kaifeng', written by Li Kuang-t'ien (definitely not a Jew) soon after the fighting. Ai Ying-kuei, his younger brother Ai Ying-chieh, and his son Ai Hsien-sheng, were all official physicians.

Most of these and several others are mentioned in Chinese local histories. However, neither Jews nor the Jewish community are mentioned as such. This is remarkable, since some of the editors of the Kaifeng local histories as well as other local officials are signatories of inscriptions in the synagogue. The Jew Chao Ying-kun was also one of the assistant editors of the 1695 gazetteer of K'ai-feng-fu. It is only in a private description of Kaifeng from c. 1650, the *Ju-meng-lu*, that we read of the synagogue (or mosque) *ch'ing-chen-ssu* or *li-pai-ssu*, of the *T'iao-chin-chiao*, 'the religion that extracts the sinews'. These terms are confirmed by the Jesuit visitors. It is only the last of the three terms which distinguishes them from the Muslims at this time, for the term *Hui-hui* was common to both.

The inscription of 1663 seems to mark the peak of the community's success in Chinese society. It was also about this time that the list of dead in the Memorial Book was closed. In 1679, a special Chao clan inscription was set up, adding little new. In 1704, and in 1721-3, when the Jesuit fathers Gozani, Domenge, and Gaubil visited them, the community was still apparently flourishing, and the synagogue beautiful, as Domenge's fine sketches show. But the seeds of disintegration were also apparent. The knowledge of Hebrew and Judaism was poor, contact had long been lost with other Jewish communities, services and festivals were maintained with difficulty.

The Mongols had encouraged non-Chinese minorities in China.

The Ming, though nationalistic, were nevertheless favourably disposed towards the Muslims, and the Jews no doubt benefited from this. The early years of the Ch'ing (1644-1911) did them no harm, and any decay was due more to their isolation, rather than to any active persecution. But after 1725, the Ch'ing rulers grew increasingly anti-Christian and anti-foreign. This probably hit too at the Jewish element, however well integrated in Kaifeng. In any case, it meant that the Jews were now completely cut off from the Jesuit missionaries, who we may suppose had given them some encouragement after their links with Jewry had been cut off earlier still. The last rabbi died around 1800, and the last small understanding of the Hebrew religious manuscripts was lost at about this time. Services and festivals seem to have lasted a bit longer, with circumcision and the abstinence from pork the last things to go.

It was not until 1850 that further western contact was established. Two Chinese Protestants were sent from Shanghai to rediscover the Kaifeng community. They discovered the synagogue in a state of decay, with no rabbi and no knowledge of Hebrew. The Jews were impoverished, and during this trip and a second one in 1851, the delegates were able to buy most of the surviving scrolls and prayers from the community which had by now little use for them. One of the delegates copied out the inscriptions of 1489 and 1512, which were published in 1851 by Bishop Smith with translations, together with the reports of the two Chinese delegates.

The renewed contact with Christians must have given the Jews some hope of a revival, but at the same time such contact was accompanied by renewed fear, for the Chinese were becoming increasingly anti-foreign. No longer flourishing, the Jews were despised by their neighbours. If there were now any Jewish scholars or officials, they tended to drift away from the community, whose members were mainly small shopkeepers, with some farmers outside the city. They were beginning to quarrel among themselves. This is confirmed by the letter from Kaifeng of 1850, published by Finn in 1872. The only letter received from the community in the nineteenth century, it also describes the festivals celebrated. The calendar is confused, and some festivals seem to be amalgamated.

In 1866, Martin found only a solitary stone on the site of the Synagogue, pulled down and sold by the impoverished Jews. Floods and the ravages of the T'ai-p'ing rebellion (1850-1864) had put the final touches to the decaying community. It was not persecution, not even the undoubted Chinese neglect, that had weakened them, but rather the lack of contact with co-religionists for over 300 years. Jews in Europe and America had made half-hearted attempts to contact them by letters (in 1760, 1794-5, 1815) and abortive missions (of 1842, 1852, 1864). But it was not until 1867 that the first western Jew, J. L. Liebermann, got to Kaifeng. By now there was little hope of revival. No

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Judaism as such remained, probably not even circumcision. From now on, one can hardly talk of a community, though the remnants lasted on for over 50 years. A Jewish Society for the Rescue of the Chinese Jews was active in Shanghai for a few years from 1900, but without avail. Kaifeng Jews came down to Shanghai in 1851, 1864, 1901, 1902, but only the rebuilding of the synagogue in Kaifeng might have helped. When the Anglican Bishop White took over protection of the site and two extant stones in 1912-14, the Jews were still able to approach the local authorities as a group, even though by now they were no longer distinguishable by 'race', culture, or religion.

Visitors in the nineteenth and also in the twentieth century found members of the seven surnames claiming Jewish descent. In 1940, Japanese officials reported that there were still five or six of the clans with a hundred or so members left. Individuals have spread to Peking and Shanghai and further afield, but complete assimilation, largely to Islam, is now a certainty.

The primary sources on the Kaifeng Jews are:

a. The stone and other Chinese inscriptions from the synagogue

The 1489 and 1512 inscriptions are still extant on one stone in Kaifeng, and so is the scratched-over 1679 inscription. The 1663a (obverse) inscription was preserved only by rubbings and copies in Rome and Paris. The 1663b (reverse) inscription was preserved only by copies in Rome and Paris. These rubbings and copies, and others of the 1489 and 1512 inscriptions, were sent to Europe by the Jesuit missionaries in the eighteenth century, in particular by Gozani soon after 1704.

Tobar and Ch'en Yüan published four of these, and White added a reconstruction of the 1679 one. All have overlooked seven pages of the 1663b inscription preserved in Paris. I hope to publish these pages in the near future.

The shorter Chinese inscriptions, mostly dated between 1656 and 1688, are preserved only by copies made by the Jesuits and by the two Protestant delegates.

Tobar and White have given translations of all of these.

b. The Chinese-Hebrew Memorial Book of the Dead

This covers mainly the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, being closed around 1670. It was obtained in 1851, and sent later to Cincinnati. White gives a translation, but see also my article, cited as no. 11 below.

c. The Hebrew Scrolls, Section Books, and prayers, from Kaifeng

Approximately ten scrolls of the Law from Kaifeng are now extant. Six were bought in 1851, and the rest in the second half of the century. They are found in Oxford, Cambridge, London, Vienna, Paris, New York. No one has collated them, though short individual descriptions have been made. Between 30 to 40 sections of the Law in book form are extant, almost all in Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati.

An almost complete set of prayers, including a Haggadah, is preserved, with duplicates, in Cincinnati. They are very close to Maimonides and the Yemen versions. Some of the rubrics are in Judaeo-Persian. Judaeo-Persian colophons to sections of the Law, dated 1620-26, are also found.

For these, see Neubauer, cited as no. 9 below; and my article, cited as no. 13 below, which gives a bibliography.

d. Non-Jewish Chinese sources, in particular the local gazetteers

Local gazetteers do not mention Jews as such, but individual careers can be traced, in particular for Chao Ying-ch'eng. For details, and discoveries by Fang Hao, Ch'en Tseng-hui, and Fang Chaoying (in the *Ming-shih-lu*), see my article, cited as no. 12 below.

The only official mention of Jews is in the Yüan dynasty. See Löwenthal's 1947 article, no. 10 below, for details.

e. Early travellers to China

Of the Arab reports, Ibn Khurdadhbih, c. 844-8, Abu Zaid, c. 916, Ibn Al-Faqih, c. 902, Mas'udi, 943, and later Ibn Battuta, 1346, all mention Jews in China. So do the Europeans Marco Polo, 1286, Monte Corvino, c. 1300, Andrew of Perugia, 1326, de Marignolli, 1342. These support the more doubtful stories of Eldad HaDani, ninth century, Buzurg, tenth century, Benjamin of Tudela, twelfth century.

Reference to most of these can be found by searching Löwenthal's bibliographies, nos. 4 and 5 below; see, e.g., no. 4, p. 200, for Yule's *Cathay and the Way Thither*; p. 155, for Abu Zaid.

f. The reports of the Jesuits

Ricci never visited Kaifeng, but his account of the Jews obtained from the Jew Ai in 1605 is very valuable. The first western eye-witness account is by Gozani in a letter of 1704, published in 1707. A letter of 1712, and a page of 1713, by Gozani, are still unpublished. Six letters by Domenge, from 1721 to 1725, are basic for the books of the Bible held. Two letters, of 1723 and 1725, and other accounts, by Gaubil, are less important. These letters are held in the Archives de la Compagnie de Jésus, Province de Paris. Brotier has given a good précis of them all; and Kögler and von Murr published a translation of Domenge's longest letter of 1721.

g. The reports of nineteenth- and twentieth-century visitors

Of these reports, we should single out those of Bishop Smith in 1851 and Bishop White in 1942 (based on a stay in Kaifeng from 1910 to 1935). References to visits by Martin, 1866, Liebermann, 1867, Schereschewsky, 1867, Mills, 1890, Powell, 1900, Berthelot, 1905, Bainbridge, 1906, Chang Hsiang-wen, 1910, Brown, 1932, Mikami, 1940, Sogabe, 1940, and several others, can be traced in Löwenthal's bibliographies.

For the various letters to and from the community, and for the Shanghai Society for the Rescue of the Chinese Jews, to Löwenthal we may add articles by M. Adler and by E. I. Ezra; and several short articles in the *Jewish Chronicle*, London, 22 June 1900, 4 Jan. 1901, 7 June 1901, 15 August 1902, 22 August 1902.

THE KAIFENG JEWISH COMMUNITY: A SUMMARY

The real basic material is mostly found in the following essential works:

1. Ch'en Yüan, *K'ai-feng Ti-tz'u-lo-yeh Chiao K'ao* (A Study of Judaism in Kaifeng), 1923, Shanghai.
2. William Charles White, *Chinese Jews*, 1966 (2nd edition, from 1942), Toronto.
3. Jérôme Tobar, *Inscriptions juives de K'ai-fong-fou*, 1900, Shanghai.
4. Rudolph Löwenthal, 'The Jews in China: An Annotated Bibliography', *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review* 24 (1940), pp. 113-234.
5. Rudolph Löwenthal, 'The Early Jews in China: A Supplementary Bibliography', *Folklore Studies* 5 (1946), pp. 353-98.
6. George Smith, ed., *The Jews at K'ae-fung-foo*, 1851, Shanghai.
7. Gabriel Brotier, 'Mémoire sur les Juifs établis en Chine', *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses* (1st edition), XXXI (1774), pp. 296-372.
8. C. von Murr, *Versuch einer Geschichte der Juden in Sina*, 1806, Halle.
9. A. Neubauer, 'Jews in China', *The Jewish Quarterly Review* VIII (1895-6), pp. 123-39.
10. R. Löwenthal, 'The Nomenclature of Jews in China', *Monumenta Serica* 12 (1947), pp. 97-126.
11. Daniel Leslie, 'The Chinese-Hebrew Memorial Book of the Jewish Community of K'aifeng', *Abr-Nahrain* 4 (1963-4), pp. 19-49, 5 (1964-5), pp. 1-28, 6 (1965-6), pp. 1-52.
12. D. Leslie, 'The K'aifeng Jew Chao Ying-ch'eng and his Family', *T'oung Pao* 53 (1967), pp. 147-179.
13. D. Leslie, 'The Judaeo-Persian Colophons to the Pentateuch of the K'aifeng Jews', *Abr-Nahrain* 8 (1968-9), pp. 1-35.

Of the many secondary sources, we may mention James Finn, Grosier, Silvestre de Sacy, Laufer, Pelliot, Cordier, A. C. Moule, Chang Hsing-lang, and Hsü Tsung-tse. I have given most of the references in my articles cited above.

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THE RECONSTITUTION OF JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

Daniel J. Elazar

The Jewish Community as a polity

THE study of the Jewish Community¹ as a polity is a proper, if neglected, element in the corpus of Jewish studies and a worthy subject of political and social research in the largest sense.² From one perspective, *Jews* can be fully understood only when they are recognized as members of a covenantal community linked by a shared destiny and a common pattern of communications whose essential community of interest and purpose and whose ability to consent together in matters of common interest have been repeatedly demonstrated. In traditional terms, Judaism itself is essentially a theopolitical phenomenon, a means of seeking salvation by constructing God's polity, the proverbial 'city upon a hill', through which the covenantal community takes on meaning and fulfils its purpose in the scheme of things.³ From a more secular point of view (if such a distinction can be made), nationhood, or its modern variant, peoplehood, has been the motivating force for communal life and creativity throughout the long history of the Jewish People. The power and pervasiveness of this force has certainly been demonstrated in our own time.

From a second perspective, the Jewish Community has the distinction of being the longest-lasting and most widespread 'organization' in the history of the world. Its closest rival to that title is the Catholic Church. Curiously—and perhaps significantly—the two are organized on radically opposed principles. The Catholic Church is built on hierarchical principles from first to last and gains its survival power by their careful and intelligent manipulation.⁴ The Jewish Community is organized on federative, or federal, principles from first to last and enhances its survival power by applying them almost instinctively in changing situations. The contrasting characteristics of these two modes

of organization are intrinsically worthy of political and social investigation. So, too, is the role of the Jewish polity in the development and extension of federal principles, institutions, and processes.⁵

It need hardly be said that a part of recognizing the Jewish Community as a polity is an apprehension of its political uniqueness. The Jewish polity is not a state (though today a state is part of it) nor does it replace the ties of individual Jews to particular states. It is pre-eminently a polity of 'dual citizenship' of a certain kind whose individual members have personal ties, often deep ones, to other polities as well and see no essential contradiction in that.⁶ It is a polity that is far more concerned with the question of autonomy (either overall or internal for limited purposes) than with that of sovereignty and has been so since it rejected the notion that sovereignty could inhere in human beings some 3,200 years ago. It is a polity that combines tribal and territorial features to give it its concrete and continuing base.⁷ Pre-eminently, it is a polity that survives because of the will of its citizens and their active application of that will to carve out an area of autonomous existence in the midst of polities that would absorb or eliminate them.⁸ (As it turns out, this is as true of Israel in its own way as it has been of the diaspora Jewish communities, just as it was true of all the earlier Jewish commonwealths.)

The Jewish polity is a product of a unique blend of kinship and consent. The blend is already reflected in the Biblical account of its origins: a family of tribes that becomes a nation by consenting to the covenant.⁹ (It should be noted that the term 'federal' is derived from the Latin *foedus* meaning covenant.) It continues to be reflected in subsequent Biblical narratives.¹⁰ Post-biblical Jewish history gave the blend new meaning. The fact that Jews were born Jewish put them in a special position to begin with, one which more often than not forced them together for self-protection; yet sufficient opportunities for conversion, assimilation, or the adoption of a posture of simple apathy towards any active effort to maintain Jewish life were almost always available as options. The survival of organized and creative Jewish life, then, can only be understood in the light of the active will of many Jews to function as a community, in itself a form of consent ratified by repeated consensual acts over the millennia.

Beyond the sheer fact of communal survival, consent has remained the essential basis for the shaping of the Jewish polity. Jews in different localities consented (and consent) together to form congregations and communities—the terms are often used synonymously.¹¹ They did (and do) this formally through articles of agreement, charters, covenants, and constitutions. The traditional Sephardi term for such articles of congregational-communal agreement, *askamot* (articles of agreement), conveys this meaning exactly. The local communities were (and are) then tied together by further consensual arrangements, ranging from

RECONSTITUTION OF JEWISH COMMUNITIES

formal federations to the tacit recognition of a particular halachic authority, *shtadlan*, or supra-local body as authoritative.¹² When conditions were propitious, the *de facto* confederation of Jewish communities extended to wherever Jews lived. When this level of political existence was impossible, the binding force of Jewish law served to keep the federal bonds from being severed.

Thus, over the course of many centuries a very distinctive kind of polity has developed as the organized expression of Jewish communal life. While it has undergone many permutations and adaptations, a thread of institutional and ideational continuity has run through the entire course of Jewish political life to give the Jewish People meaningful continuity. The investigation of the thread in all its aspects and its permutations in all theirs are proper subjects for political research.

Jewish communities in the post-war world

The Jewish polity has undergone many changes since its inception somewhere in the Sinai Desert, but none has been more decisive than those which have affected it in the past four centuries.¹³ The inauguration of the modern era, born out of the revolution in science, technology, politics, economics, and religion which caused the western world to take a radical new turn in the mid-seventeenth century (the dates 1646–48 encompass the benchmarks of the transition from the medieval to the modern eras), initiated a process of decorporatization of Jewish communal life that gained momentum for the following two centuries.¹⁴ Jewish corporate autonomy, a feature of diaspora existence in one way or another since the Babylonian exile, never even took hold in the New World, whose Jewish settlements are all products of the modern era. The First World War brought down the last remnants of that kind of autonomy in Europe, where it has been on the wane for two centuries. Only in the Muslim countries did the old forms persist, until the nationalist revolutions of the period after the Second World War eliminated them.

The process of decorporatization—perhaps denationalization is a better term—brought with it efforts to redefine Jewish life in Protestant religious terms in Western Europe and North America and socialist secular ones in Eastern Europe and, somewhat later, in Latin America. In Europe the process was promoted both from within the Jewish community and without by Jews seeking wider economic and social opportunities as individuals and by newly nationalistic regimes seeking to establish the state as the primary force in the life of all residents within its boundaries. In the Americas, it came automatically as individual Jews found themselves in the same position as other migrants to the New World.

Out of decorporatization came new forms of Jewish communal organization on the countrywide and local levels: (1) the *consistoire* of

post-revolutionary France (which spread to the other countries within the French sphere of influence in Europe)—an attempt to create a Jewish 'church' structure parallel to that of the Catholic Church; (2) the nineteenth-century central European *kehilla*, essentially a ritual and social agency chartered and regulated by the secular government as a means of registering all Jews and binding them to some 'religious' grouping; (3) the united congregational pattern of Britain and her overseas settlements whereby Jews voluntarily banded together to create a board of notables ('deputies') to represent Jewish interests to the host country; (4) the radically individualistic organizational pattern of the United States whereby individual Jews banded together locally (and sometimes nationally) to create whatever kind of Jewish association they wished without any kind of supra-local umbrella organization even for external representation; and early in the twentieth century (5) separate communal associations based on the *landsmanshaft* principle which became the basis for voluntary affiliation of the Jewish immigrants to Latin America. The common denominator of all these different forms was their limited scope and increasingly voluntary character.

While these organizational changes were taking shape, a two-pronged demographic shift of great importance began. In the first place,

TABLE 1. *Total Jewish population and its distribution, by continent (in thousands)*

<i>Year Continent</i>	<i>1840 Total %</i>		<i>1900 Total %</i>		<i>1939 Total %</i>		<i>1967 Total %</i>	
Europe (incl. Russia)	3,950	87.8	8,900	80.9	9,500	56.8	4,054	30.0
Asia	300	6.7	510	4.6	1,030	6.2	2,477	18.0
Africa	198	4.4	375	3.4	625	3.7	200	1.5
North America }	50	1.1	1,200	10.9	5,540	33.1	6,822	50.0
South America }								
Australia	2	*	15	0.2	33	0.2	74.5	0.5
Total	4,500	100.0	11,000	100.0	16,728	100.0	13,628	100.0

* less than 0.1 per cent

Sources:

1. Jacob Lestschinsky, *Tfutzot Yisrael ahar haMilhamah*, Tel Aviv, 1958.
2. *American Jewish Year Book*, 1968.

the live birth and survival rate among Jews rose rapidly, causing the number of Jews in the world to soar. In the second, the Jews began to migrate at an accelerating rate to the lands on the western world's great frontier: the western hemisphere, southern Africa, and Australia in particular, but also in smaller numbers to east Asia, thus initiating a shift in the balance of Jewish settlement in the world (see Table 1).¹⁵

Finally, the modern era saw Jewish resettlement of the Land of Israel. The first settlers to come as founders of entirely new settlements began

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to arrive in the seventeenth century and continued regularly thereafter, pioneering new communities of a traditional character within the framework of the Ottoman Empire's *millet* system.¹⁶ They were followed by the Zionist pioneers who, beginning in the last decades of the nineteenth century, created new forms of communal life as part of the last stage in the modern transformation of the Jewish People.¹⁷

The Second World War marked the culmination of all the trends and tendencies of the modern era and the end of the era itself for all mankind. (The dates 1945-48 encompass the benchmark of the transition from the modern to the post-modern eras.) For the Jewish People, the Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel provided the pair of decisive events that marked the crossing of the watershed into the post-modern world. In the process, the entire basis of the Jewish polity was radically changed, the locus of Jewish life shifted, and virtually every organized Jewish community was reconstituted in some way.

Central to the reconstitution was the re-establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Israel. The restoration of an independent Jewish state added a new factor to the Jewish confederacy and created a new focus of Jewish energy and concern precisely at the moment when the older foci had reached the end of their ability to attract a majority of Jews. As the 1967 crisis demonstrated decisively, Israel was not simply another Jewish community in the constellation but the centre of the world for Jews.

The Jewry that greeted the new state was no longer an expanding one which was gaining population even in the face of the attrition of intermarriage and assimilation. On the contrary, it was a decimated one (even worse, for decimated means the loss of one in ten; the Jews lost one in three); a Jewry whose very physical survival had been in grave jeopardy and whose rate of loss from defections came close to equalling its birth rate. Moreover, the traditional strongholds of Jewish communal life in Europe (which were also areas with a high Jewish reproduction rate) were those that had been wiped out.

At the end of the 1940s, the centres of Jewish life had shifted decisively away from Europe to Israel and North America. By then, continental Europe as a whole ranked behind Latin America, North Africa, and Great Britain, as a force in Jewish life (see Table 2). In fact, its Jews were almost entirely dependent upon financial and technical assistance from the United States and Israel. Except for those in the Muslim countries that were soon virtually to disappear, the major functioning Jewish communities all had acquired sufficient size to become significant factors on the Jewish scene only within the previous two generations. In effect, the shapers of those communities were still alive, and in many cases still the actual community leaders. The Jewish world had been willy-nilly thrown back to a pioneering stage.

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TABLE 2. *Countrywide Jewish communities in rank order, 1967*

Country	Jewish population ('000s)	Percent. of total Jewish population
1. United States	5,800	78.5
2. U.S.S.R.	2,568	
3. Israel	2,365	
4. France*	535	11.0
5. Argentina	450	
6. United Kingdom	450	
7. Canada	270	5.0
8. Brazil	140	
9. Rumania	110	
10. South Africa	115	
Total	12,803	94.5

* Includes influx of over 300,000 North African Jews in the early 1960s.

TABLE 3. *Post-war changes in continental European Jewish communities*

Country	Post-war situation
Albania	Disappeared as organized community after Communist take-over.
Austria	Reconstructed and reconstituted, substantially different population.
Belgium	Reconstructed and reconstituted, significant new settlement by Eastern European refugees.
Bulgaria	Limited reconstitution after extensive emigration due to Communist take-over.
Czechoslovakia	Partial reconstruction and limited reconstitution under Communist regime.
Denmark	Reconstructed along pre-war lines.
Finland	Reconstituted with additions of refugee population
France	Reconstructed and reconstituted with substantially new population from Eastern Europe; subsequently further reconstituted after North African influx.
Germany (Federal Republic)	Reconstructed and reconstituted with substantially different population including Eastern European refugees and 'Israelis'.
Gibraltar	No significant constitutional change.
Greece	Partially reconstructed and reconstituted around remnant population.
Hungary	Partial reconstruction and limited reconstitution under Communist regime; flight of refugees in 1956.
Italy	Partially reconstructed after formal restoration of pre-war constitution.
Liechtenstein	Jewish community slowly being liquidated through emigration.
Luxembourg	Reconstructed and reconstituted.
Malta	No significant change.
Netherlands	Partially reconstructed and reconstituted with remnant population and addition of some refugees.
Norway	Reconstructed with addition of some refugees.
Poland	Extremely limited reconstitution under Communists with successive emigrations of surviving Jews.
Portugal	Reconstituted to include remnants of wartime influx of refugees.
Rumania	Limited reconstitution under Communist regime, substantial emigration to Israel.
Spain	Gained formal status as community, wartime refugee settlers founded communal institutions.
Sweden	Reconstituted with addition of refugees and abolition of state-required community membership.
Switzerland	Reconstituted to include wartime refugees.
Turkey	Reconstituted after extensive emigration to Israel.
U.S.S.R.	Disappeared as organized community.
Yugoslavia	Reconstructed and reconstituted under Communist regime after substantial emigration to Israel.

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The organization of Jewish community life reflected these shifts and their consequences wherever Jews were found. Thus in the late 1940s and 1950s the reconstruction and the reconstitution of existing communities, and the founding of new ones, were the order of the day throughout the Jewish world. The Jewish communities of continental Europe all underwent periods of reconstruction or reconstitution in response to wartime losses, changes in the formal status of religious communities in their host countries, emigration to Israel, and the introduction of new regimes (Table 3 summarizes these changes). Those of the Muslim countries were transformed in response to the convergence of two factors; the creation of Israel and the anti-colonial revolutions in Asia and Africa. The greater portion of the Jewish population in those countries was transferred to Israel and organized Jewish life virtually came to an end in all of them except Morocco (see Table 4).

TABLE 4. *Post-war changes in Jewish communities in Muslim countries*

Country	Post-war situation
Aden	Entire community emigrated during decolonization.
Afghanistan	Majority of Jews emigrated to Israel leaving small oppressed community behind.
Algeria	Virtually all Jews fled country in wake of French evacuation, moving to France and essentially ending Jewish communal life.
Egypt	Successive oppressions and migrations to Israel after 1948 virtually ended community's existence.
Iran	Community reduced in size by emigration to Israel but continues to function as in past with minor adjustments.
Iraq	Mass migration to Israel reduced community to a tiny oppressed minority.
Lebanon	Community weathered Arab-Israel conflict until 1967; at present in process of self-liquidation through emigration but not to Israel.
Libya	Migration to Israel accelerated after each Arab-Israel crisis; community finally ceased to exist after 1967 war.
Morocco	Slow decline through emigration to Israel accelerated after independence and picked up momentum after 1967 war.
Pakistan	Most of small community emigrated leaving very small group to carry on minimal communal life.
Syria	Oppression after 1948 led to migration of majority to Israel; government pressure increased against remnant after Six-Day War.
Tunisia	Despite official attempts to keep Jews, most emigrated to Israel in successive waves after independence.
Yemen	All but tiny handful left for Israel immediately after establishment of State. No contact with remnant.

The English-speaking Jewries and, to a somewhat lesser extent, those of Latin America, were faced with the more complex task of adapting their organizational structures to three new purposes: to assume responsibilities passed to them as a result of the destruction of European Jewry, to play a major role in assisting Israel, and to accommodate internal changes in communities still in the process of acculturation (see Tables 5 and 6). Moreover, many of the smaller Jewish communities in Asia and Africa were actually founded or given organized form in this period (see Table 7), while others, consisting in the main of transient merchants or refugees, were abandoned. Finally, all but a handful of

the Jewish communities in the contemporary world have had to adjust to the new realities of voluntary choice which, on the one hand, gave Jews greater freedom than ever before in history to identify as Jews or not and, on the other hand, encouraged a wide variety of options for Jewish identification within each community.

TABLE 5. *Post-war changes in major English-speaking Jewish communities*

Country	Post-war adjustments
Australia	Continued influx of refugees enhanced Jewish life and necessitated changes in its organizational structure to encompass widened scope of Jewish activity and more intensely 'Jewish' Jews.
Canada	Pressures of 'Americanization', suburbanization, and general homogenization of Canada lead to weakening of traditional Canadian communal structure and introduction of more American-type 'religious' pluralism.
Ireland	Little significant constitutional change; native-born generation comes to fore.
New Zealand	Continued emigration of younger generation has decreased Jewish population and weakened community structure.
Rhodesia	Concentration of Jews from other countries of Black Africa has increased size and importance of Rhodesian community; separation of Zambia and Rhodesian secession have increased its self-contained character.
South Africa	Changes in the regime and rise of native-born generation within the community shifted emphases of communal institutions and dominant mode of Jewish identification, weakening traditional structure, while encouraging maintenance of high level of communal cohesion.
United Kingdom	Rise of last wave of immigrants and native-born generation challenges communal status quo from both left and right, weakening traditional institutions and strengthening new ones that reflect community's greater diversity.
United States	Destruction of European Jewry transferred world Jewish leadership role decisively to the American Jewish community. This plus rise of new generation and disappearance of immigrant ideologies led to significant organizational changes to meet demands while the community also became more rooted in the general society.

TABLE 6. *Post-war changes in Latin American and Caribbean Jewish communities*

I. Communities entrenching, adjusting, and moving towards greater internal unity:

Argentina	Guatemala
Brazil	Mexico
Chile	Panama
Costa Rica	Uruguay
El Salvador	Venezuela

II. Communities of emigration and decline:

Bolivia	Honduras
Colombia	Nicaragua
Cuba	Paraguay
Dominican Republic	Surinam
Ecuador	
Haiti	

III. Communities undergoing 'Americanization' through expansion of American business and leisure interests in the Caribbean:

Barbados	Jamaica
Curaçao	Trinidad and Tobago

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TABLE 7. *Post-war developments in Asian and African Jewish communities*

I. Communities founded or given new form:

Hong Kong	Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa)
India	Taiwan
Japan	Thailand
Philippines	

II. Communities abandoned or substantially reduced in size:

Angola	Guyana
Burma	Indonesia
China	Malaysia
Congo Republic	Singapore
Cyprus	Uganda
Ethiopia	

III. Communities essentially unaltered:

Kenya
Zambia

An organizational typology of contemporary Jewish communities

According to the World Jewish Congress and the *American Jewish Year Book*, Jews are known to reside in 121 countries, 82 of which have permanent organized communities. At least three and perhaps as many as twelve others are remnant communities where a relative handful of Jews have custody of the few institutions that have survived in the wake of the emigration of the majority of the Jewish population. Fourteen more are transient communities where American or Israeli Jews temporarily stationed in some Asian or African country create such basic Jewish institutions (for instance, religious services, schools) as they need. Only 21 countries with known Jewish residents have no organized Jewish life (see Table 8).¹⁸

Preliminary investigation indicates that it is possible to group the organized Jewish communities into seven major categories based on their structural and cultural differences. All seven had their inception in the modern era and have since taken on more or less new forms in the post-modern world.¹⁹ One of these categories—independent Jewish existence—is *sui generis*, applying only to Israel, which presents special and unique problems as a Jewish community. Here we shall be concerned with the remaining six, those that encompass diaspora Jewry. Table 8 indicates the pattern of Jewish community organization according to the seven major categories and the thirteen sub-categories into which the diaspora communities may be further divided, and tentatively orders the countrywide Jewish communities of the world by them.²⁰

State-recognized communal structures. Jewish communities officially recognized as such in the public law of their host countries (commonly known as *kehillot* or, in German, *Kultusgemeinden*) are distinguished by their very clear-cut formal structure which is itself officially established by special legislation. In both a formal and a real sense, the *kehilla*

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TABLE 8. *Patterns of Jewish Community organization*
(with estimated Jewish population, 1967)

I. Independent—1

Israel (2,365,000)

II. State Recognized Communal Structures ('kehillot')—13

Traditional—3	Modern Countrywide—6	Modern Local—4
Ethiopia (12,000)	Austria (12,000)	Denmark (6,000)
Iran (80,000)	German Federal	Finland (1,550)
Turkey (43,900)	Republic (28,700)	Norway (750)
	Greece (6,500)	Sweden (13,000)
	Italy (35,000)	
	Switzerland (20,000)	
	Yugoslavia ^a (7,000)	

III. State-recognized religious structures ('Consistoire')—5

Belgium (40,500)
Congo (Lubumbashi) (400)
France (535,000)
Luxemburg (1,000)
Netherlands (30,000)

IV. Tacitly recognized community structures (quasi-'kehillot')—24

Territorial federations—3	Communal federations—21
Argentina (450,000)	Bolivia (4,000)
Brazil (140,000)	Chile (35,000)
Colombia (10,000)	Costa Rica (1,500)
	Curaçao (700)
	Dominican Republic (400)
	Ecuador (2,000)
	El Salvador (300)
	Guatemala (1,500)
	Honduras (150)
	Mexico ^b (30,000)
	Monaco (600)
	Nicaragua (200)
	Panama (2,000)
	Paraguay (1,200)
	Peru (4,000)
	Portugal (650)
	Spain (7,000)
	Surinam (500)
	Trinidad and Tobago (400)
	Uruguay (54,000)
	Venezuela (12,000)

V. Entirely voluntary communal structures—22

Representative board—11	American pluralistic—1	Local congregations—10
Australia (69,500)	United States (5,800,000)	Aruba (130)
Canada ^c (270,000)		Barbados (100)
Gibraltar (650)		Hong Kong (200)
India (16,000)		Jamaica (600)
Ireland (5,400)		Japan (1,000)
Kenya (700)		Malta (50)
Rhodesia (5,500)		New Zealand (5,000)
Singapore (600)		Philippines (500)
South Africa (114,800)		Ryukyu Islands (250)
United Kingdom (450,000)		South-West Africa (540)
Zambia (800)		

^a Though in part subject to the conditions of the modern subjugated communities, Yugoslavian Jewry has essentially perpetuated the *kehillah* pattern with formal government recognition.

^b Though Mexico seemingly should be included among the territorial federations of Latin America, its lack of any overall structure in even the strictly formal sense really places it in this category.

^c The Canadian Jewish Congress should be viewed as a Board of Deputies with a North American name.

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VI. Subjugated communities—17

Traditional subjugated^a—9

Afghanistan (800)
Algeria (3,000)
Iraq (2,500)
Lebanon^a (6,000)
Libya (500)
Morocco^a (50,000)
Syria (4,000)
Tunisia^a (10,000)
United Arab Republic (2,500)

Modern subjugated—8

Bulgaria (7,000)^f
Cuba (community council) (2,000)
Czechoslovakia^g (18,000)
German Democratic Republic (1,300)
Hungary^g (80,000)
Poland^h (25,000)
Rumania^g (110,000)
U.S.S.R.ⁱ (2,568,000)

VII. Quasi-communities—17

Remnant Communities—3

Lichtenstein
Pakistan (300)
Yemen (100)

U.S. Outposts—6

Canal Zone
Laos
South Korea
South Vietnam
Taiwan
Thailand

Israeli Outposts—8

Ceylon
Ghana
Liberia
Malagasy Republic
Malawi
Nepal
Nigeria
Sierra Leone

VIII. Inter-national communities—2

Central African Jewish Board of Deputies (Rhodesia and Zambia)
Central American Federation of Jewish Communities (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama)

IX. No organized community life—22

Aden (2)	Cyprus (30)	Sudan
Albania (300)	Fiji Islands	Swaziland
Angola	Guyana	Tanzania
Botswana	Haiti (150)	Uganda
British Honduras	Indonesia (100)	
Burma	Malaysia	
Burundi	Martinique	
Cambodia	Mozambique	
China (100)	Senegal	

Countries with Jews: 121
Permanent communities: 82
Remnant communities: 3
Transient communities: 14
No organized community life: 22

^a All these communities are formally traditional *kehillot* (category II).

^b Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia do not officially restrict Jewish community life, but in fact the communities are closely regulated.

^f Officially, Bulgarian Jewry is organized in a *consistoire* (category III).

^g The extent to which the Jewish communities of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania are actually restricted varies from time to time, but the basic fact of their total dependence upon the decisions of the Communist leadership places them in this category. All are officially organized as modern *kehillot* (category II).

^h Poland is rapidly becoming a remnant community.

ⁱ Strictly speaking, there is no organized Jewish life in the U.S.S.R. apart from a few synagogues open for services.

organizations are the recognized Jewish communities in their countries for both internal and external affairs.

State-recognized communities are essentially survivals from an earlier era. The three *traditional kehillot*—Ethiopia, Iran, and Turkey—acquired their basic communal structures before the modern era, while

the ten *modern kehillot*—all in central Europe or areas influenced by central European culture before the First World War—were granted theirs in the course of nineteenth-century efforts to adapt Jewish communal organization to the new conditions of the Emancipation in countries where the commitment to the structural integration of minority groups into the body politic was of the first importance.

Even these thirteen communities have undergone basic constitutional changes in recent years; the three traditional *kehillot* in response to the modernization movements in their respective host countries and the ten modern ones in the light of the drastic changes wrought by two World Wars. The latter communities have, by and large, lost their power to compel all Jews to be members and must now build their membership on a consensual basis. This usually means that all known Jews are automatically listed on the community's rolls but have the right to opt out if they choose to do so.

Structurally, the *kehilla* communities remain neat and all-embracing. All legitimate institutions or organizations function within their overall framework, except where the state has allowed secessionist groups to exist. The *modern countrywide kehillot* are generally organized along conventional federal lines with either 'national' and 'local' or 'national', 'provincial', and 'local' bodies, each chosen through formal (and usually partisan) elections and linked constitutionally to one another with a relatively clear division of powers. In their *modern local* counterparts, authority remains in the local community, perhaps with some loose confederal relationship uniting the various localities. The greatest source of strength of the state-recognized communities lies in their power to tax or to receive automatically a portion of their members' regular taxes from the authorities.

The state-recognized community, once the basis of Jewish life, is losing ground in size and importance in the Jewish world at the same time as it is losing its compulsory character. All are declining communities, decimated by war, emigration or assimilation and, in many cases, afflicted by serious discrimination as well. According to the 1968 American Jewish Year Book, only 266,400 Jews lived in such communities; 135,900 in traditional ones.²¹ Numerically speaking, this category is the smallest of the basic forms of Jewish communal organization. Moreover, a small but increasing number of Jews may be opting out of community membership (and the taxes that go with it).²²

State-recognized religious structures. A second pattern of community organization that has survived from the nineteenth century is that of the state-recognized religious structure, usually known by its French name, *consistoire*. It, too, has undergone substantial changes since the Second World War and is at present under severe structural and ideological stress. The original *consistoire* was especially a Napoleonic innovation designed to encompass 'Frenchmen of the Jewish faith'

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within a structure that could be held accountable to the French government in the manner in which all groups and institutions must be centralized in France. The *consistoire* pattern spread (with some variations) to those countries within the orbit of French culture in Europe and Africa.

The *consistoire* has a certain legal status as a religious body and its officials are usually supported by government funds, but affiliation with it is entirely voluntary. It is further distinguished from the state-recognized communal structure in two fundamental ways: by its even greater emphasis on the exclusively religious nature of Judaism and its centralized character. The *Gemeinde* idea, for all its development as a response to modernism, implicitly recognized the existence of the extra- or supra-religious components of Jewish life which the *consistoire* idea rather explicitly avoids or rejects.

One consequence of this has been the virtual loss of centrality and the diminution of the scope of the *consistoire* as the keystone of Jewish communal life in the countries using that pattern since the end of the modern era. In effect, it is a casualty of the growing pluralism within the Jewish community. The refugees from eastern and central Europe who became a major—if not the dominant—force in the *consistoire* communities after the Second World War found the *consistoire* pattern with its western emphasis on 'religious' identification not only unfamiliar but positively foreign to them. The growth of secularism among the new generation of Jews made Jewish identification via a state-recognized religious structure increasingly incongruous and—to logical French minds at least—too contradictory to be borne. At the same time, the new extremely Orthodox congregations created by certain of the refugees could not tolerate the laxity of the official 'orthodoxy' of the state-recognized structures. Finally, the rise of Israel generated demands for mobilization of diaspora resources that went beyond the capabilities of the *consistoire* or even of the Alliance Israélite Universelle. In a larger sense, the times themselves conspired against the old system, as committed Jews the world over rediscovered the national-political aspects of Jewish existence.

The decline began when the tasks of communal reconstruction in the aftermath of the war proved too much for the local communities to handle alone. When individual membership dropped and many of the best congregations and organizations simply never affiliated with their countrywide bodies, new countrywide organizations began to emerge particularly in the social, political, and fund-raising fields, to reach those elements which were otherwise not part of the official community. In the process, they began to assume the functions of 'roof' organizations to the extent that their local situation encourages such organizations and within the context of an emerging pluralism in Jewish communal life.

Today the communities with state-recognized religious structures contain 606,900 Jews and are second from the bottom in the ranking of categories. In fact, if France had not received the large migration from North Africa (which stands outside the *consistoire*, by and large), that number would have been fifty per cent smaller. Those communities, too, are losing ground, relatively and absolutely—with the possible exception of a rejuvenated France.²³

Tacitly recognized communal structures. The transplantation of Jews with eastern and central European backgrounds to Latin America (primarily in the twentieth century) has given rise to a third pattern of Jewish communal organization—a replica of the European *kehilla* that does not enjoy the same official status but is tacitly recognized by Jews and non-Jews alike as the organized Jewish community. The central institutions of these communities have a distinct public character but no direct recognition in public law. Characteristically, these communities have emphasized the secular rather than the religious side of Jewish life. Founded in the main by men who considered themselves secularists (regardless of their level of personal religious observance), they were built in the mould of secular diaspora nationalism, a powerful ideology at the time of their creation.

In the last analysis, they function in an environment that provides neither the cultural nor the legal framework for a European-model *kehilla*; and so they must rely entirely on the voluntary attachment of their members.²⁴

The Latin American communities have been relatively successful in their attempt to maintain European patterns primarily because the great social and cultural gap between the Jews and their neighbours aided in giving the Jews a self-image as a special and distinct—indeed superior—group, which, in turn, helped keep them apart in a corporate way as well as individually. This fact has important implications for the character of their community organization. In the first place, while the communities themselves were entirely founded in the modern era, they are located in essentially homogeneous societies whose social structures originated before the beginning of that era.²⁵ Moreover, they themselves were founded by people coming for the most part from still-modernizing societies of a different kind in Europe. As a result, assimilation into the host society was far more difficult than in other countries of migration while, at the same time, the Jewish founders were able to build their institutions upon a far stronger sense of communal self-government than that which prevailed among more emancipated Jews. Thus the community-wide 'roof' organizations they have created have been able to attract and keep virtually every Jewish organization and affiliated Jew within their structures on a formally voluntary basis while gaining informal governmental recognition as the 'address' of the Jewish community.

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The same phenomena also contributed to the dominant pattern of organizing the Jewish immigrants according to their countries of origin. Just as the Jewish immigrants did not assimilate into their host societies, so, too, they did not assimilate among themselves. This was a pattern not uncommon in Jewish history before emancipation when Jews settling in new lands frequently attempted to preserve the special cultural nuances of the lands of their birth.²⁶ In the course of time, these communities loosely confederated with one another to deal with common problems that emerged in their relations with their external environment, essentially those of immigration, antisemitism, and Israel. At the same time each country-of-origin community retained substantial, if not complete, autonomy in internal matters and control over its own institutions.

In three of the larger Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia), the indigenous federal or quasi-federal structures of the countries themselves influenced the Jews to create countrywide confederations based on territorial divisions (officially uniting state or provincial communities which are, in fact, local communities concentrated in the state or provincial capitals). In the other twenty-one, the local federation of the community containing the overwhelming majority of the Jewish population itself became the countrywide unit, usually with the designation 'council of communities'. The community councils of the six central American countries (total Jewish population 5,650) have organized the Federation of Central American Jewish Communities to pool resources and provide common services.

With the revival of open Jewish settlement in the Iberian peninsula Jewish communities similar to the 'council of communities' type took shape in both Spain and Portugal, for many of the same reasons. Similarly, the small Jewish community of Monaco found that same pattern most suitable.

None of the tacitly recognized communal structures has been in existence more than two generations, and the communities themselves originated no more than three or possibly four generations ago. Most of the smaller ones are just now entering their second generation since they were created by the refugees of the 1930s and 1940s. Indeed, all gained substantially as a result of Nazism and the Jews' need to leave Europe before, during, and after the Second World War. Consequently, many, if not most, are still in the process of developing an appropriate and accepted communal character.

The great post-war adjustment that has faced the Latin American communities centres on the emergence of a native-born majority. This new generation has far less attachment to the 'old country' way of life with its emphasis on ideological and country-of-origin ties; hence the whole community structure is less relevant to them. Moreover, some of them are already beginning to assimilate into their own countries of

birth, or at least into the local radical movements, in familiar Jewish ways. For most of them, the *deportivo*, or community recreational centre, often seems the most relevant form of Jewish association.

On the other hand, the host countries, whose aim is the cultural assimilation of all minorities into a common mould, are not particularly receptive to the perpetuation of communities built on a diaspora nationalist ideology. At the same time, they are at least theoretically committed to guaranteeing full freedom of religion for all legitimate groups, thereby pushing Jews towards at least a formal identification in order to maintain their communal identity while conforming to local mores. Both developments are encouraging a trend towards a kind of associational Jewishness in place of the organic pattern of the founding generation.

Not surprisingly, then, the organizational structure that at first reflected, and then came to reinforce, the interests of the founding generation is becoming increasingly obsolete. The elements of a constitutional crisis of the first magnitude are already present in the Latin American communities. To the extent that a communal structure, based on local territorial divisions rather than on the *landsman* principle is emerging in these communities (with its accompanying substructure of associational activities whose participants are drawn in on the basis of common interest rather than of common descent), this constitutional crisis is being overcome.

The tacitly recognized community structures of Latin American Jewry have become important forms of Jewish communal organization in our time with 759,600 Jews living within their framework. While immigration is no longer a factor in their growth, they continue to be growing communities, at least by contemporary Jewish standards. At the same time, they are all located in unstable environments that do not necessarily encourage pluralism. Their attempt to create a unified communal structure on a voluntary basis under such conditions bears close examination.²⁷

Entirely voluntary communal structures. While it is true that all but a handful of the communities mentioned above are, strictly speaking, voluntary in the sense that no Jew is forced by law to join them, in most of them the objective conditions of life in the host countries or among the Jews themselves are sources of great pressure towards affiliation. These pressures are substantially fewer in the group of communities here termed 'entirely voluntary'. While there are variations among them (from South Africa on the one hand to the United States on the other), characteristic of them all is the sense on the part of both the community and the larger society of which it is a part that Jewish attachment is a form of 'religious affiliation' and that an individual's choice of religious affiliation (or whether he wants to affiliate at all) is free, open, and entirely his. Moreover, most of the countries in which these com-

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munities are located present serious possibilities for individual assimilation: an attractive environment which offers great opportunities for Jews (and others) and which is culturally compelling as well, many growing opportunities for intermarriage, and a continually expanding range of serious personal contacts with the non-Jewish world. In fact, regardless of the intensity of their Jewish attachments, the overwhelming majority of the Jews in these countries have culturally assimilated into the wider society's way of life. Thus the associational aspects of Jewish affiliation are far more important than the organic ones, and the community structure is built around associational premises from top to bottom.

The communities themselves have no special status in public law. At most, there is a 'roof' organization which is tacitly accepted as the 'address' of the Jewish community for certain limited purposes and subsidiary institutions which are occasionally accorded government support (along with similar non-Jewish institutions) for specific functions. Nor do the communities have any strong tradition of communal self-government to call upon. All are entirely products of the modern era, hence their founders were either post-emancipation Jews or Jews seeking the benefits of emancipation and desirous of throwing off the burdens of an all-encompassing corporate Jewish life.

The larger communities in this category, at least, were created by successive waves of immigration, the greatest of which arrived in the past ninety years; hence the history of their present communal patterns does not go back more than three or four generations, if that. As is the case in Latin America, their present leaders are sons of immigrants, if not immigrants themselves.

There are three kinds of entirely voluntary communal structure. The eleven communities with *representative boards* are characterized by their umbrella or roof organizations, usually called 'Boards of Deputies' (or some variation thereof) in the British manner.²⁸ These communities are all creations of Anglo-Jewry and are all located in what was once the British Empire. If the typology proposed here were to be considered a continuum, they would be next to the Latin American communities structurally, with their representative boards in most cases formally embracing virtually all the other Jewish institutions and organizations in the community. What makes them different is the cultural content that informs their structure and gives it life. All of them are far more concerned about fitting into the larger societies in which they find themselves than the Latin American Jewries are and, partly as a result of that, all place far more emphasis on the religious character of the Jewish people than on any nationalist theories which, indeed, most formally reject. Having assimilated into pluralistic societies, the Jews in those communities are less prone to accept the 'umbrella' role of their representative Board. Rather, they tend to create other organizations

which, while nominally associated with the Board, are, for all practical purposes, independent of and even equal to it in stature and influence. The Board, in such cases, tends to be pushed in the direction of becoming the ambassador of the Jewish community to the outside world rather than its governing body (which is the role generally conceived for it). This tendency has been accelerated since the Second World War by the 'coming of age' of the last great wave of immigrants and the consequent diminution of the monolithic character of most of the communities. The increase in competing interests, the decline in religious interest, and the growth of assimilatory tendencies have all contributed to this change.

Communities with representative boards are also constructed on federal lines, though less formally so than is the case with the Latin American communities. The combination of the British and Jewish traditions encourages the use of federal principles, especially along associational and territorial lines. At the very least, the Boards become federations of institutions and organizations; and in the federal or quasi-federal countries, they become territorial federations as well.²⁰

The United States, with over half of all the Jews in the Diaspora, stands in a category (as well as a class) by itself, one which may be termed *American pluralistic*. The combination of a very large, fully modern society, established from the first on individualistic principles, pluralistic in the full sense of the word, settled by several significantly different waves of very adventurous Jewish immigrants who shared one common commitment (that of seeking new lives as individuals) was not conducive to the development of sufficient homogeneity to permit the formation of a neat communal structure. Consequently, every effort to create even so much as a single nationwide 'address' for American Jewry has failed.

In the earliest period of Jewish communal life in the United States, the small and relatively homogeneous Jewish population managed to achieve unity at the local level through a system of local congregations not dissimilar to those described in the following pages. The wave of migrants from central Europe that arrived in the nineteenth century put an end to that kind of unity. A larger and more complex American Jewish community then experimented with a representative board. Whether it would have succeeded or not became a moot point when the mass migration from eastern Europe created the largest and most diverse Jewish community in history, scattered over the widest area ever considered as embracing a single countrywide community.³⁰ Even local communities lost whatever features of unity they might have had under the impact of the new migrants. Their own efforts to impose community structures on the European model failed as fully as the earlier efforts to introduce the Anglo-Jewish model.³¹

At the same time, the new immigrants brought with them or

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stimulated by their arrival the beginnings of a system of Jewish communal life more suited to the American environment. Such a system had its origins in the closing years of the nineteenth century but is essentially a twentieth-century development. This is not the place to describe its emergence and evolution. Nevertheless, the basic principles of Jewish communal organization in the United States, as they have evolved, are worth noting.

The organized American Jewish community is entirely built upon an *associational base*. That is to say, not only is there no inescapable compulsion, external or internal, to affiliate with organized Jewry but all connexions with organized Jewish life are based on voluntary association with some particular organization or institution, whether in the form of synagogue membership, contribution to the local Jewish Welfare Fund (which is considered to be an act of joining as well as contributing), or affiliation with a B'nai Brith Lodge or Hadassah chapter. Even such organic entities as the family frequently take on an associational character in American Jewish life; for example, the development and spread of the 'family club', a formal association of kinsmen. Indeed, the usual pattern for affiliated Jews is one of multiple association with memberships in different kinds of association reinforcing one another and creating an interlocking network of Jewish ties that binds the individual more firmly to the community. Without the associational base, there would be no organized Jewish community at all; with it, the Jewish community attains the kind of social—and even a certain legal—status that enables it to fit well into the larger society of which it is a part.

The associational basis of American Jewish life³² is manifested in *a wide variety of local and national organizations designed to suit every Jewish taste*. While these organizations may be confined to specific localities or may reflect specific interests, classes, or types on a strictly supralocal basis, the most successful ones develop both countrywide and local facets. It is no accident that B'nai Brith, a countrywide (now worldwide) federation of multi-state districts and local lodges, and the Hadassah, a countrywide organization that emphasizes the role of its local chapters (which are further divided into almost neighbourhood groups) are the two most successful mass Jewish organizations in the United States. The key to their success is that they provide both an overall purpose attuned to the highest goals of Jewish life and local attachment based on the immediate social needs of the individual Jew in such a way that people can be members for either or both reasons. Sooner or later, all large national Jewish organizations have found that their survival is contingent upon developing some sort of serious local dimension to accommodate the very powerful combination of American and Jewish penchants for organizational arrangements based on federal principles. In both civilizations, mobilization of human resources rests to a substantial degree on promoting the individual's sense of participation.

While certain of its organizations sometimes succeed in developing from the top down, *the institutions of the American Jewish community are essentially local* and, at most, loosely confederated with one another for very limited purposes. The three great synagogue movements—the real custodians of Jewish affiliation in the United States since the end of the Second World War—are excellent cases in point. All three are essentially confederations of highly independent local congregations, linked by relatively vague persuasional ties and a need for certain technical services. The confederations function to provide the requisite emotional reinforcement of those ties and services desired by their member units. As in the case of the great countrywide organizations, it is the combination of countrywide identification based on essentially local considerations and attachments that makes the synagogue movement successful. With the exception of a few institutions of higher education (and, once upon a time, a few specialized hospitals, now non-sectarian) all Jewish social, welfare, and educational institutions are local in name and in fact, some loosely confederated on a supralocal basis and most not.

What has emerged to unite all these highly independent associations is a number of *overlapping local and supralocal federations* designed for different purposes. The most powerful among them are, respectively, the synagogue confederations and the local federations of Jewish agencies whose own countrywide confederation, the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds (C.J.F.W.F.), like the synagogue confederations, has been growing in strength in the last twenty years. They are the only ones that are able to claim near-universal membership and all-embracing purposes though not even the C.J.F.W.F. has the status of an overall countrywide 'roof' body. Other federative arrangements tend to be limited to single functions and their general organizations rarely have more than a consultative role or power of accreditation (recognition). What is important to note is the consistent use of such arrangements to achieve any kind of unity in the community. One result of this is that power in the community is shared among different loci by consent, and such consent is obtainable only when the ultimate power of the local community is recognized. This *unity on a confederative basis*, which characterizes American Jewry, is very different from unity on a hierarchical one; what emerges in front of the viewer's eye is not a single pyramidal structure, not even one in which the 'bottom' rules the 'top' (as in the case of most of the communities with representative boards), but a three-dimensional matrix consisting of a bundle of institutions and organizations tied together by a criss-crossing of memberships, shared purposes, and common interests, whose roles and powers vary according to situation and issue.

The demands placed upon the American Jewish community beginning in the late 1930s led to a growing recognition of the need to reconstitute the community's organizational structure at least to the

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extent of rationalizing the major inter-institutional relationships and generally tightening the matrix. These efforts at reconstitution received added impetus from the changes in American society as a whole (and the Jews' place in it) after 1945.³³ They signalled the abandonment of earlier chimeral efforts to create a more orthodox organizational pyramid in imitation of foreign patterns which, given the character of American society as a whole, would have been quite out of place.³⁴

Eleven small communities, only one of which (New Zealand) has over 1,000 Jews, are organized primarily as *local congregations*. All but one (Aruba) are offshoots of English and American Jewry and share the characteristics of those Jewries, namely full voluntarism and identification primarily through religious institutions. Their lack of size and the low level of interest of most local Jewish residents keep organized Jewish life within a more or less neat framework that may mask grave weaknesses of morale and commitment. Always weak communities almost by their very nature, they have been affected somewhat less than the larger communities by post-war changes. While the process of assimilation has been hastened, the rise of Israel has given them a previously lacking interest (which they cultivate assiduously), and an anchor.

All told, 22 entirely voluntary communities contain 6,742,650 Jews, or approximately half of the total world Jewish population. For them, the problem of Jewish community organization has taken on a new dimension rooted entirely in the modern and post-modern worlds. In their emphasis on voluntary attachment to the Jewish community, on associational more than on organic ties with Jewish life, and on Jewish self-identification primarily in religious terms, they are in the vanguard of diaspora Jewry today. In this respect, they are, willy-nilly, pointing the direction which communities with older forms of communal organization give every sign of following, for better or for worse. Thus each in its own way is pioneering on the frontiers of Jewish communal existence.

Subjugated communities. In a far different situation are the seventeen Jewish communities that must try to maintain their existence under conditions of subjugation (see Table 8), ranging from open and intense to indirect and subtle. Nine of these communities are located in Arab countries (see Table 8) and are, in effect, the remnants of what were, until the rise of Israel, flourishing traditional *kehillot*. Their present state of subjugation dates from their host countries' attainment of independence or the establishment of Israel, and therefore reflects another kind of post-war reconstitution. The character of the subjugation varies from virtually complete suppression of all communal and private Jewish activities (Iraq) to government appointment of pliable leadership to manage the community's limited affairs (Morocco). In every case, the situation has deteriorated after each Israeli victory and the

number of Jews remaining in the communities has decreased. Since emigration from the larger ones is not impossible, it seems clear that they, too, are fated to disappear or to become no more than very small remnant communities in the near future. In the meantime, communal life proceeds up to the limits of the possible in each of them. This usually means some form of religious life, increasingly limited opportunities to provide children with a Jewish education, and a few limited social services.³⁵

Eight other subjugated communities are located in Communist countries. They, too, are remnant communities—though larger than those in the Arab countries—most of whose earlier residents either died in the Holocaust or emigrated to Israel. At the very least, they are subjugated in the way all potential rivals for the citizens' interest are curbed in totalitarian societies. This is the case in Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania. Jewish communities in the last three actually have a legal status similar to that given their sister communities in other continental European countries and, within the limits imposed upon them, function through state-recognized communal structures. At worst, all possibilities for Jewish communal life are destroyed and the Jews themselves become special victims of a harsh policy directed against them as in the U.S.S.R. and Poland. In any case, whatever organized Jewish life there is, exists on sufferance of the authorities, and the authorities are fully willing to intervene in Jewish affairs in every way as a matter of ideology and policy. With the exception of the U.S.S.R. all these communities became subjugated ones after the Second World War. (Russian Jewry, subjugated since the First World War, lost the last remnants of its organized communal life in the Stalin purges that came in the aftermath of the Second World War.) Most, if not all, have found conditions worsened after each Israeli victory. Because of the great number of Jews in the U.S.S.R. who are unable to leave even if they wish to do so, close to three million Jews (2,900,600 is the current estimate) live in the subjugated communities.³⁶

Quasi-communities. The other three remnant communities, Lichtenstein, Pakistan, and Yemen (whose Jewish populations have virtually all left for other parts), can be categorized with two other groups as quasi-communities, that is to say, Jewries with some attributes of an organized community but with no permanent institutions or settled Jewish population. Most of these quasi-communities are outposts established by Israeli and American Jews in the course of missions given them throughout the post-war world.

Six (see Table 8), all but one in the Far East, are communities established or given organizational form by Jews serving in the American armed forces. The five Far Eastern quasi-communities have existed in that region since an American 'presence' was established

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there after the Second World War.³⁷ They are generally built upon religious facilities provided through the military chaplaincy. American Jewish chaplains and soldiers with religious and communal interests have even managed to mobilize the indigenous Jewish civilian populations wherever any exist and, in some cases (Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan), have been instrumental in transforming quasi-communities into permanent ones. Nevertheless, the survival of the existing quasi-communities appears to depend upon the continued presence of the American Jews.³⁸

Eight of the quasi-communities, two in South Asia and the rest in Africa, have been created by Israelis serving in the host countries on diplomatic, technical, or military assistance missions. They are generally built around the provision of educational facilities for the Israelis' children. Since they are located in countries with virtually no other Jews, they are even more dependent upon transients than are the American outposts. No population figures are available for most of these communities since their numbers are constantly fluctuating, but the total cannot exceed 2,000.

Twenty-two countries (see Table 8) have permanent Jewish residents (several hundred in a few cases) and no organized Jewish community life. In eight, there were once Jews in significant numbers; when the majority departed, organized Jewish life came to an end. The other twelve simply have too few Jews or have attracted people born Jews who do not care about maintaining their Jewish ties. Perhaps 1,500 Jews are scattered throughout these countries.

Community structure in a voluntaristic environment³⁹

Whatever the form of community organization, the primary fact of Jewish communal life today is its voluntary character. While there are some differences from country to country in the degree of actual freedom to be Jewish or not, the virtual disappearance of the remaining legal and even social cultural barriers to individual free choice in all but a handful of countries has made free association the dominant characteristic of Jewish life in the post-modern era. Consequently, the first task of each Jewish community is to learn to deal with the particular local manifestation of this freedom. This task is a major factor in determining the direction of the reconstitution of Jewish life in this generation.

The new voluntarism extends itself into the internal life of the Jewish community as well, generating pluralism even in previously free but relatively homogeneous or monolithic community structures. This pluralism is increased by the breakdown of the traditional reasons for being Jewish and the rise of new incentives for Jewish association. At the same time, the possibilities for organizing a pluralistic Jewish community have also been enhanced by these new incentives and the

post-modern breakdown of the rigid ideologies that divided Jews in the last third of the modern era (mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries). Certainly, the creation of the State of Israel has given the Jewish People a new and compelling focus that enhances virtually all Jews, and whose crucial role as a generator of Jewish ties, regardless of other differences, was decisively demonstrated at the time of the Six-Day War.⁴⁰

Pluralism organized into more or less permanent structural arrangements leads to federalism, and federalism has been the traditional way in which the Jewish People has maintained its unity in the face of the pressures of diversity.⁴¹ It is *one* tradition that is not being abandoned today. The previous sections have outlined the wide variety of federal arrangements that exist at present in the organized Jewish communities of the world. In each case, the Jewish community adapts itself to the environment of the host country so that its own structure reflects local conditions while making possible (as far as possible) the achievement of the main purposes of corporate Jewish life. In virtually every case, the structure that emerges from the adaptation is based on federal principles and uses federal forms.

The pluralistic federalism of the voluntaristic community substantially eliminates the neat pattern of communal organization usually held up as the model by those who concern themselves with rationalizing Jewish community life. Though smaller communities in different cultural settings are not likely to go all the way in the same direction, more and more the seemingly anarchistic American pattern is revealed as the paradigm of their development if not the vision of their future. Certainly the model of a hierarchical organizational structure does not offer an accurate picture of the distribution of powers and responsibilities in any Jewish community today. Even in the more formally structured communities of central Europe and Latin America, the institution that appears to be at the top of the pyramid is really dependent upon, and often manipulated by, the institutions and organizations that would be placed farther down on the structure in any diagrammatic scheme. The local community that 'should' be on the bottom is, in fact, often the real centre of power. For communities like the United States, even the model as modified is useless. Nor is there a central governing agent in most communities that serves as the point at which authority, responsibility, and power converge. Even in the communities ostensibly dominated by a *consistoire*, the erstwhile central body has been shunted aside to become another specialized institution in an oligopoly of such institutions.

What is needed then is a new model of Jewish communal organization that takes present realities and trends into account. As in the case of American Jewry, the structure of the contemporary Jewish community is best understood as a multi-dimensional matrix that takes the form of a

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communications network; a set of interacting institutions which, while preserving their own structural integrity and filling their own functional roles, are informed by shared patterns of culture, activated by a shared system of organizations, and governed by shared leadership cadres. The character of the matrix and its communications network varies from community to community with particularly sharp variations separating the six basic types. In some cases, the network is connected through a common centre which serves as the major (but rarely, if ever, the exclusive) channel for communication. In others, the network forms a matrix without any real centre, with the lines of communication criss-crossing in all directions. In all cases, the boundaries of the community are revealed only when the pattern of the network is uncovered. The pattern itself stands revealed only when both of its components are—namely, its institutions and organizations with their respective roles and the way in which communications are passed between them.

The pattern itself is inevitably a dynamic one. That is to say, there is rarely a fixed division of authority and influence but, rather, one that varies from time to time and usually from issue to issue, with different elements in the matrix taking on different 'loads' at different times and relative to different issues. Since the community is a voluntary one, persuasion rather than compulsion, influence rather than power, are the only tools available for making and executing policies. This, too, works to strengthen its character as a communications network since the character, quality, and relevance of what is communicated and the way in which it is communicated frequently determine the extent of the authority and influence of the parties to the communication.⁴²

Community organization: The key questions

It is within this framework, then, that the problem of Jewish community organization in today's voluntaristic environment must be explored. A number of key questions can be raised in regard to every Jewish community, regardless of its place in the typology presented above. Among those needing investigation, questions of structure and function, affiliation and strength, legitimacy and authority, power and influence, leadership and representativeness, decision-making and conflict, stand out. The remainder of this article suggests some lines of enquiry into these questions and some ways of interpreting the results of the enquiry.

Organizational structure: A subsidiary typology. Within the various countrywide Jewish communities, patterns of organization can be discerned which cut across the structural-cultural typology presented above. These patterns are useful in developing a more precise organizational profile of each community, while aiding in the development of cross-community comparisons.

Institutions and organizations playing at least four kinds of role are to be found in every fully functioning and completely organized countrywide community structure. They are:

1. *Government-like institutions*, whether 'roof' organizations or separate institutions serving discrete functions, that play roles and provide services on all planes (countrywide, local, and, where used, intermediate) which, under other conditions, would be played, provided, or controlled—predominantly or exclusively—by governmental authorities (for instance, external relations, defence, education, social welfare, and public—that is, communal—finance).

2. *Localistic institutions and organizations* that provide a means for attaching people to Jewish life on the basis of their most immediate and personal interests and needs.

3. *General purpose mass-based organizations*, operating countrywide on all planes, that function to (a) articulate community values, attitudes, and policies, (b) provide the energy and motive force for crystallizing the communal consensus that grows out of those values, attitudes and policies, and (c) maintain institutionalized channels of communication between the community's leaders and 'actives' ('cosmopolitans') and the broad base of the affiliated Jewish population ('locals') for dealing with the problems and tasks facing the community in the light of the consensus.⁴³

4. *Special interest organizations* which, by serving specialized interests in the community on all planes, function to mobilize concern and support for the various programmes conducted by the community and to apply pressure for their expansion, modification, and improvement.

The first two of these types are essentially embodied in the institutions which form the structural foundations of the community and the last two essentially in organizations which function to activate the institutional structure and give it life. Institutions of the first type are easily identifiable in most communities. In fact, many of them have already been mentioned, directly or by category, in the preceding pages. The most important localistic institutions are the synagogues which, by their very nature, are geared to be relatively intimate associations of compatible people. Even the very large American synagogues that lose their sense of intimacy remain localistic institutions in this sense, within the overall community context. The most important localistic organizations are family clubs, *landsmánshafte*n, and other similar groups. Organizations in the third category differ widely from community to community. In the United States, B'nai Brith and Hadassah come closest to performing these functions (with a number of smaller countrywide organizations sharing in the task) while in South Africa and much of Latin America the Zionist Federations have assumed that role. The special interest organizations are also identifiable in the various communities.

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It is conceivable that in the smaller countrywide communities, the four kinds of role may be compressed within fewer institutions and be filled incompletely as a consequence. In any case, the functions themselves must be institutionalized somehow in order for an organized community actually to exist. The mapping of the community's organizational structure along the lines of this typology should reveal many of the more permanent channels into which the community's communications network is set and also expose the ways in which the channels are used.

Communal functions. Another important question deserving exploration relates to the functions which the Jewish communities perform. What are they, how are they handled, what set of priorities do they reflect? How well are they carried out? Obviously, the functions of every Jewish community revolve around the fundamental goal of Jewish communal and individual survival, both physical and cultural. In this respect, the Jewish polity is no different from any other. Accordingly, it may be hypothesized that apart from the actual maintenance of the community, the two most important communal functions throughout the Jewish world are defence and education.

Defence, in particular, has taken different forms in this generation. In most Jewish communities, local action against antisemitism has been replaced as the major defence function by efforts to assist the Jews in the subjugated communities and, overwhelmingly, by assistance to Israel. What is hypothesized here is that diaspora Jewry's aid for Israel really must be considered a defence expenditure in the sense that diaspora Jews look upon Israel's survival as vital to their personal security and self-respect and hence are willing to pour out support for it on a scale unprecedented in the annals of Jewish communal life. An analysis of the tone of the campaigns to raise funds for Israel confirms this thesis, while the long-time unwillingness to invest in Israel, that is, to deal with Israel on a business basis, on the part of the same people who give great sums to the cause is revealing.

Education is a more problematic function since it involves and exposes all the ambivalences of contemporary Jewish life; the desire for survival in conflict with the desire for full integration into the general society, or perhaps more accurately, into the new world-wide cosmopolitan culture that is so attractive to the middle and upper classes, particularly the students and intellectuals among them. A study of the educational function in each community will not only lead to an understanding of its content and its place in the community's scheme of things but will also serve as an important means of gaining insight into the community's values and self-image.

Similar insights may be gained, though to a lesser degree, from the examination of the other 'domestic' functions of each community. Simply cataloguing the range of those functions is useful in this regard,

while tracing the expansion or contraction of the range is a good way of assessing changes in the community as a whole, whether in regard to its internal strength, the external pressures upon it, or the nature of its own members' interest in maintaining their communal integrity.

Problems of affiliation. The question of affiliation with the Jewish community is easily disposed of in those countries that still maintain formal registration under government auspices for all those who identify themselves with a 'religious community'. It is more difficult in countries that lack that convenience, for in those countries, not only the fact of affiliation but the form it takes is self-determined. In some cases, membership in a roof organization is the accepted form for the vast majority of Jews. In others, it is necessary to identify the core institutions (for example, synagogues) or organizations (for example, Zionist federations) membership in which is demanded by the local value system for one to be considered a 'good Jew'. In yet other cases, the key to affiliation is contribution to the appropriate community fund. The outer limit of Jewish affiliation probably was reached in the Jews' response to the Six-Day War and perhaps is measurable in those terms.

Intracommunity strength. In order to get a sense of the overall strength of any particular community, some apprehension of the relative strength and influence of the various organizations which serve it must be gained. While it is as yet impossible to construct a formula to measure the relative strength and influence, either generally or in specific situations, certain guidelines can be suggested. (It should be understood that, in the last analysis, strength is a function of the actual exercise of influence that shapes action and consequently, an organization that appears to have strength in the abstract may turn out to be relatively weak in specific situations or in connexion with particular issues.) Organizations in the following categories are considered potentially strong.

1. Organizations membership of which the community deems mandatory for all 'good Jews' (that is, Jews in good standing in the community). Numerical strength is one indication of which organizations have that status.

2. Organizations that furnish a very high proportion of leaders for the community as a whole, whether as a result of democratic choice, for anachronistic reasons, or because they are themselves organizations of elites.

3. Organizations that are called upon to be spokesmen for the community, at least within the fields of their recognized competence.

None of these three categories is individually determinative. The overwhelming majority of Jews in a given community may belong to synagogues yet desire to minimize the community-wide influence of the synagogue movements. Organizations of elites may find their members occupying key positions in the community, but adopting different roles and stances more appropriate to the specific positions they occupy. And

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nothing is quite so obvious as the weakness of a 'recognized spokesman' when the establishment for which he (or it) speaks no longer has the confidence of the community's larger public. Perhaps some 'triangulation' of all three will produce at least a rough guide to the problem of strength.

Legitimacy and authority. Other major aspects of the question of strength are the questions of authority and legitimacy, which took on an entirely new look in the modern era and have undergone further changes in the present generation. Authority in premodern Jewish history was not based on any human or social institution or agency but on the universally accepted Torah which was the ultimate source of legitimacy for the organizational structure of every Jewish community. Even when hierarchical devices were sometimes used to implement the authority of the Torah, the legitimacy of that authority was based on distinctly non-hierarchical principles. Today, of course, the traditional authority of the Torah is no longer universally accepted and the Jewish community has apparently created other forms of authority to substitute for it which, though far weaker and much less visible, nonetheless do function to hold the community together for certain purposes and enable it to achieve common goals. The exploration of the nature and functioning of authority in the contemporary Jewish community and the manner of its legitimation is a matter of first importance. From the evidence available, we can put forward the hypothesis that authority is still not hierarchical in nature but, rather, is connected with (and diffused throughout) the matrix of Jewish organizational life. The identification of authoritative men and institutions in each community and in the Jewish polity as a whole is a matter of uncovering the patterns of deference that have emerged in the various communications networks that make up the organized Jewish world, no doubt the first step in penetrating the contemporary Jewish authority system. The use of the two typologies presented in this paper as they relate to each other should be of help in that task.

Power and Influence. The question of authority, with its connotations of formality and legitimacy, leads naturally to the related question of influence in the community, with its connotations of informal power. A third typology to be applied in the light of what is learned from applying the first two, offers a useful starting point for the exploration of each community's system of power (or influence). Three basic forms of political control can be identified in contemporary Jewish communities: *autocratic*, *oligarchic*, and *polyarchic*.⁴⁴ Under the *autocratic* form, a single individual (for instance, a *shtadlan*) or an organization functioning as a corporate person (for instance, a chief rabbinate) by being decisively involved in every significant community decision, exercises well-nigh complete control over the community. In all likelihood, it is a relatively rare phenomenon in the contemporary Jewish world,

especially in the countrywide communities, surviving, if at all, in small local communities or in certain of the traditional *kehillot*.

Oligarchy is a form of political control in which a substantially closed group of individuals (or interests represented by individuals) enjoys a virtual monopoly of power by keeping decisive control over significant community decisions within its confines. Undoubtedly more prevalent in the Jewish world than autocracy, several forms of oligarchic control are discernible. The simplest involves rule by a *single element* in the community—a small group with the same fundamental interests whose members are closely linked with one another through a network of interlocking relationships that holds power in its hands. To those who stand outside this kind of oligarchy, its rules seems no different from that of an autocracy. However, inside the controlling element itself decision-making is collegial, if only because no individual is in a position to exercise control on his own. The other two forms are more complex. A *multiple-element oligarchy* combines the leaders of a number of different elements in the community in the decision-making group but the group itself remains self-selected and still stands in more or less autocratic relationship to the remainder of the community. Since each element in the coalition has its own sources of power, none can decisively influence community decision-making without the others. At the same time, the more elements represented in the oligarchy, the more open it becomes to various points of view in the community. A multiple-element oligarchy can be broadly based, be quite responsive at least to the articulate publics in the community, and be representative of the great majority (if not all) of its significant elements. In that case it can be considered a *representative oligarchy* or one which, in exercising its decisive influence over community decision-making, gives every legitimate interest a share, albeit a highly structured one, in the process.

Polyarchic systems of political control are those in which no single individual, group, or element nor any exclusive combination of the same is able to monopolize power or be decisively involved in every significant community decision. They are characterized by their relative openness and fluidity, to the extent that power is not only widely diffused but different issues or situations are likely to change the influence of different groups, giving them greater or lesser roles in the decision-making process depending upon their salience. Moreover, the leadership within these groups is more likely to change with some frequency. *Organized polyarchy* can be said to exist where the elements, groups, and individuals active in the community are mobilized in routinized ways and exercise their influence through recognized channels. Since their participation is expected, co-ordination among them is possible on a regular basis. Where power is even more widely diffused and the participants less easily co-ordinated, a *fragmented polyarchy* exists. In a fragmented polyarchy it is difficult for both

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participants and observers alike to determine who has the power potential to achieve their goals. If sufficiently fragmented, a polyarchy may become chaotic but, since *chaotic polyarchy* would signify a community in dissolution, it is a rare phenomenon indeed, and, when it exists, it is ephemeral.

It is not yet possible to classify the Jewish communities of the world according to this typology, given the present limits of our knowledge. At the same time, the existing evidence, fragmentary as it is, leads us to hypothesize that most of the larger countrywide Jewish communities fall somewhere between multiple-element oligarchies and organized polyarchies with the greater number concentrated in the middle, while most of the smaller ones are either multiple-element or single-element oligarchies, perhaps by default. Oligarchy has long been a common pattern of organizing power in Jewish communities, at least since the crystallization of the idea of the Jewish polity as an aristocratic republic during the Second Commonwealth. Ideal aristocratic republics have a way of becoming oligarchies when they fall short of the ideal. At its best, oligarchic control is in itself a decent approximation of the ideal republic within the limits imposed by human nature. In more down-to-earth terms, oligarchies frequently come into existence because there are power vacuums to be filled and there are only a few people interested in filling them. This is particularly true in contemporary Jewish life. Finally, the special nature of the Jewish polity—its core of religious principles and behaviour patterns that must be preserved if the community is to survive meaningfully, its lack of an all-embracing territorial base and the special problem that imposes, its dependence upon a particular kind of dedicated leadership willing to assume grave burdens voluntarily—makes oligarchy a very reasonable solution to its problem of governance. At the same time, the community's necessary reliance upon the consent of its members to survive, the voluntarism that informs that consent, and the same religious tenets that make survival meaningful, demand a degree of democratic participation that under most circumstances has kept oligarchies quite representative.

Apart from the influences indigenous to Jewish civilization itself, particular Jewish communities have always been influenced by the means of organizing power current in their host societies at any given time. In medieval Europe, this meant a strengthening of the hierarchical and autocratic elements in the community. Today this means democratization to a greater or lesser degree. The trend since the Second World War appears to be in that direction, within and relative to the communities' different structural patterns and external environments.

Leadership and representation. If the typology discussed above holds the key to the study of power and influence—and, hence, decision-making—in Jewish communities, it can also be of use in dealing with questions of

leadership and representation. For the Jewish community, as a voluntary polity dependent for its functioning on the free choice of individuals who are willing to do their share to make it function, is indeed ruled by a governing class of a certain kind, composed of those people who choose to make its tasks theirs either as professionals or as volunteers. The character of that governing class both reflects the character of the population it serves and contributes significantly to the shaping of the character of the community itself.

The sheer range of communal functions today requires such a variety of talents to fill its many leadership roles that the kind of simplistic exercises in the description of leadership patterns in the Jewish community frequent in the past have been rendered obsolete. In a system in which a basically complex leadership network is further complicated by the division between professionals and volunteers, special questions arise as to the relationship between leadership and decision-making. Still others involve problems of position and role, recruitment and training, and selection, mobility, and replacement of leaders of both types. The depth of our ignorance about such matters remains extraordinary.

Decision-making and community conflicts. The substantive aspects of the decision-making process in Jewish communities lie outside the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to set out what appear to be some general principles about community decision-making and conflict in the contemporary Jewish world. In the first place, the ideological struggles of the modern era, whether involving emancipation, secularism, socialism, or Zionism, either have vanished or are vanishing from among the concerns of communal decision-makers, surviving only as anachronisms where the communal leadership itself has not changed. They are being replaced by essentially pragmatic concerns revolving round the great central principle of Jewish survival. In the aftermath of the Holocaust and in the turbulence of the contemporary world, the survival question has taken on the most crucial importance in the minds of the vast majority of Jews, whether in the form of concern for the survival of Israel, concern about outbreaks of antisemitism at home and abroad, or concern about preserving communal unity at all costs.

In effect, then, no issue is allowed to emerge as a matter of public controversy if it is felt that such a controversy would threaten the unity of the community. Because of that, open community conflict tends to be confined to marginal matters which are not threatening. 'Extremists' such as the militant Orthodox, idealistic youth, or intellectuals, who challenge the survival consensus by raising 'controversial' issues are disliked and even feared by the great 'respectable' centre that dominates most, if not all, organized Jewish communities. And it is very easy to acquire the label of 'extremist' simply by questioning decisions arrived at through the established patterns of decision-making. By and large,

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these involve a quiet allocation of resources according to the hierarchy of interests of the various community leaders with an emphasis on establishing and preserving an acceptable status quo. Changes or innovations are introduced on an incrementalist basis only so as to raise as little controversy as possible. People working together over a long period of time learn how to satisfy each other's interests in this regard almost intuitively. Those who challenge this pattern and create 'controversy' by doing so are likely to experience rejection even at the hands of those who agree with them in principle. In the end, serious conflicts that may occur within the community are likely to be personal rather than substantive in origin. Perhaps the major exception to this picture is the emerging conflict between the firmly orthodox and the majority of the community over matters of religious law and practice.

The community constitution. Taken together, the structure and functions, means of affiliation and variations in strength, patterns of authority and distribution of influence, forms of leadership, representativeness and decision-making give shape to the constitution which every community creates for itself over time. Not simply—or necessarily—a written frame of government, a constitution in this sense combines the formal ordering of institutions, organizations, and offices with sociologically determined distribution of power and a conception of the good Jewish community that rationalizes the entire social and legal structure and provides the community with its principle of distributive justice.⁴⁵ The identification of this broad constitution and its components takes us beyond the community's organizational 'bundle' per se into the larger questions that make the whole structure meaningful. In the last analysis, it is the first goal of the study of the Jewish community as a polity. This article suggests that the identification of the constitutions of the various countrywide Jewish communities (and their local components) is possible through the application of the typologies and testing of the hypotheses presented in the preceding pages.

Community and polity

So far, the discussion in this paper has been more or less restricted to the matrix of institutions and organizations that form community on the countrywide plane. The Jewish polity as a whole, however, functions on several planes. The federal connexions between local and countrywide communities and between Jewish communities around the world have also undergone important changes, since the Second World War, whose feedback has begun to have a significant effect on the countrywide and local communities involved.

Before the modern era, while there were no formal organizations that functioned on a world-wide basis to unite the various Jewish communities, the common allegiance to halachic Judaism and reliance upon

traditional Jewish law gave all the Jewish People the constitutional unity it needed. During the modern era, this unity was shattered and nothing comparable developed to replace it. By the end of the nineteenth century, all that there was in the way of an organized world-wide Jewish polity was an informal alliance of Jewish 'aristocrats' and their organizations in the Western world who had taken it upon themselves to try to defend Jewish interests and to protect the rights of individual Jews so as to aid in their emancipation.⁴⁶ These inadequate arrangements collapsed during the First World War when the world which encouraged that mode of community action came to an end.

Meanwhile, tentative steps in the direction of a re-organization more appropriate to the twentieth century were beginning to be taken. The World Zionist Organization and its member organizations began to offer more routinized and less elitist means of tying Jews together on a world-wide basis. All together, they began to create an infrastructure for a new Jewish confederacy in the making.

Since the Second World War, the structure of the Jewish Confederacy has been undergoing further adaptation, with the development of a complex of inter-community organizational connexions which may even begin to parallel the four-fold organizational typology delineated above for the countrywide communities, in the near future. This strengthening of the organizational aspects of the world-wide Jewish polity is, partly, a consequence of the changes taking place in its constituent diaspora communities. The other and most crucial factor is the State of Israel. The organizational implications of the existence of the State are just beginning to be felt but the trend is clear: namely, the concentration in Israel of the decision-making organs of the Jewish confederacy and the organizations that serve it and the routing of their decision-making procedures through Jerusalem.⁴⁷ This trend has become particularly noticeable since the Six-Day War, after which the Israeli government began to take very explicit steps to reshape and strengthen the institutions and organizations of World Jewry by tying them closer together to the State. Israel's greater ability, as an independent state, to deal with political matters and its great stake in strengthening the Jewish confederacy throughout the world have led it to assume the role of protector and spokesman of all Jews. It is aided by the fact that it has become the focal point of Jewish identification, the one Jewish phenomenon whose crucial importance is accepted by virtually all Jews and which has the ability to mobilize widespread public effort in what is, after all, still a voluntary polity. The potential development and likely consequences of this new effort to strengthen the Jewish polity's institutional base and communications apparatus need more exploration.

Perhaps paradoxically, at the very moment that free individual choice in the matter of Jewish attachment has reached heights never previously

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attained, there has been a rediscovery of the Jewish polity; that is, of the special political character of the Jewish community. This could only happen in the post-emancipation era, when the struggle of the Jews to escape from the ghetto has come to an end. Its implications for Jewish communal organization are just beginning to be felt.

NOTES

¹ This paper presents the underlying framework, basic questions, and first results of a major effort to explore the reconstituted Jewish communities of the contemporary world as polities within the unique polity that is the Jewish People. The effort is a world-wide 'Study of Jewish Community Organization' sponsored by the Institute of Jewish Affairs of the World Jewish Congress, London, and the Center for the Study of Federalism of Temple University, Philadelphia; it has been under way since September 1962.

² A polity in the sense used here is not necessarily an entity identical with the modern nation-state which, despite its present currency, is but one form of political order. In recent years political research has come to recognize that there are other kinds of politics (or political systems, to use the term preferred among contemporary political scientists) existing alongside the nation-state even today.

David Easton, Gabriel Almond, and Robert A. Dahl, among others have pioneered in broadening the definition of political systems. See, for example, David Easton, *The Political System*, New York, 1953; Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, Princeton, 1960; and Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963. Dahl, for example, defines a political system as 'any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves to a significant extent, power, rule, or authority . . . any collection of real objects that interact in some way with one another can be considered a system . . .' This somewhat inadequate definition serves to demonstrate the new breadth of the definitional framework being used to understand different forms of political order, or different polities. For a good collection of recent thought on this problem, see Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, *Comparative Politics, Notes and Readings*, Homewood, Ill., 1968

(3rd. edn.). Robert J. Pranger offers an important and extremely relevant discussion of the larger questions of political order in *The Eclipse of Citizenship: Power and Participation in Contemporary Politics*, New York, 1968. Benjamin Akzin discusses this entire question in *State and Nation*, London, 1964, a book that rests to a great extent on insights drawn from the Jewish experience.

³ The close connexions between the theological and the political are made manifest in Jewish literature beginning with the Bible. In our time, Martin Buber has been the foremost expositor of those connexions. See, in particular, his *Kingship of God*, trans. Richard Scheimann, New York, 1967. See also, Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, New York, 1944, ch. 2; and Harold Fisch, *Jerusalem and Albion*, New York, 1964.

⁴ See, for example, Edwin Samuel, 'The Administration of the Catholic Church', in *Public Administration in Israel and Abroad 1966*, Jerusalem, 1967, one of the few such studies available.

⁵ A few historians and social scientists have taken note of the covenant community as a distinct socio-political phenomenon from this perspective. Margaret Mead, for example, suggests that the Jewish polity and other covenant communities deserve special exploration; see her Introduction to Mark Zborowski and Elizabeth Herzog, *Life is with People*, New York, 1952. For an eloquent evocation of the spirit and character of the covenant community, see Page Smith, *As a City Upon a Hill*, New York, 1967.

⁶ Pranger, op. cit., following the Bible and Aristotle, among others, provides a very useful discussion of citizenship as the creation of official identity, itself a culturally-created necessity for every man that enables men to become fully human. The necessity for citizenship has become universal (p. 10): 'In the language of psychology, citizenship supplies an

integral segment of one's "identity pattern", something taken as second nature.' It is essentially in this sense that the concept is used here. See also Akzin, op. cit. Very relevant to the Jewish situation is D. F. Aberle *et al.*, 'The Functional Prerequisites of a Society', *Ethics*, vol. LX, no. 2, January 1950, pp. 100-10.

⁷ This is not to imply that Jews have not always desired an independent territorial state. Indeed they have, but they have desired it only as a means to a larger end and not as an end in itself.

⁸ Pranger, op. cit., following Sheldon S. Wolin in *Politics and Vision*, Boston, 1960, defines this phenomenon as the carving out of political space, space 'shaped by a dualist structure of tangible objects and subjective perceptions which arranges a system of shared political meanings among citizens and also establishes these meanings in hierarchies of valued priorities'. Pranger continues, 'Around a nation are drawn a number of physical and non-physical boundaries within which citizens feel at home, outside of which they are foreigners. Such a space is molded by objective factors such as geographical frontiers, an economic system, a legal system, a common political language . . . , and by special governmental institutions called offices. But one also discovers certain subjective perceptions and expectations that members share about correct political action, expectations drawn from the members' own individual needs and values and from the social symbolism attributed to boundaries, economics, language, and governments. These symbolic perceptions may not find common agreement throughout a nation. Nevertheless, there are often common relationships between more specialized perceptions which entitle an observer to speak of a "pattern" for even the heterogeneous political life of a Switzerland or an India. . . . In every political situation, no matter how transient, one can locate such patterns of civic expectations.' Pranger defines this as the political culture of a 'national state' but with a few modifications it is useful in defining the political space and culture of the Jewish polity. Thus, for example, this concept being related to the study of Jewish political life, the tangible objects are the patterns of community organization and activity while the subjective perceptions relate

to the questions of individual identity and involvement. See also, Center for the Study of Federalism, *Political Culture Working Kit, No. 1*, Philadelphia, 1969.

⁹ The Biblical understanding of the covenant as a consensual, theopolitical act is discussed by R. A. F. MacKenzie, S.J., in *Faith and History in the Old Testament*, New York, 1963; see ch. 3, 'Israel's Covenant with God'.

¹⁰ The record of the re-affirmation of the covenant in the Bible is easily discernible in the text itself. Buber, op. cit., deals with this in his textual exegesis. See also the studies of Avraham Malamud, G. E. Mendensall, Hayim Tadmor, and others collected in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., *Covenant and Commonwealth: Readings in the Political Life and Thought of Ancient Israel* (unpublished typescript available at the Center for the Study of Federalism, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa.).

¹¹ Leo Baeck discusses this phenomenon in *This People Israel*, Philadelphia, 1965. See also Daniel J. Elazar, 'The Quest for Community: Selections from the Literature of Jewish Public Affairs, 1965-1966', *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 68, New York and Philadelphia, 1967.

¹² See, for example, Louis Finkelstein, *Jewish Self-Government in the Middle Ages*, 2nd. edn., New York, 1964; and H. H. Ben-Sasson, *Perakim beToldot haYehudim beYamei haBaynayim* (Chapters in the History of the Jews in the Middle Ages), Tel Aviv, 1969.

¹³ Howard M. Sachar's *The Course of Modern Jewish History*, New York, 1958, is a good comprehensive source of the history of Jewish life in this period. The changes themselves are discussed by Jacob Katz in *Tradition and Crisis*, New York, 1965, and Michael A. Meyer, *The Origins of the Modern Jew: Jewish Identity and European Culture in Germany 1794-1824*, Detroit, 1967. See also Louis Finkelstein, ed., *The Jews: Their History, Culture and Religion*, Philadelphia, 1960, 3rd. edn., 2 volumes, and Salo W. Baron, 'The Modern Age' in Leo W. Schwarz, ed., *Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People*, New York, 1956, pp. 315-484.

¹⁴ For a brief exposition of this definition of the modern era, particularly as it applies to the United States, see Daniel J. Elazar, *Cities of the Prairie*, New York, 1969, Introduction and Appendix; and, by the same author, *Toward a Generational Theory of American Politics*, Philadelphia, 1969. The writer has discussed this

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periodization of Jewish history in 'A Constitutional View of Jewish History', *Judaism*, vol. 10, no. 3 (Summer 1961), pp. 256-64.

¹⁵ Jacob Lestschinsky, *Tfutzot Yisrael Ahar haMilhamah* (The Dispersions of Israel after the War), Tel Aviv, 1958, and Aryeh Tartakower, *HaHevrah haYehudit* (Jewish Society), Tel Aviv, 1957-59.

¹⁶ Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, *Toldot Eretz-Yisrael baTekufah haOtomanit* (History of the Land of Israel in the Ottoman Period), Jerusalem, 1955, and Robert Shereshevsky, Avraham Katz, Yisrael Kolatt, and Hayim Barkai, *Meah Shanah ve'ed 20* (One Hundred Years and Another 20), Jerusalem, 1968.

¹⁷ It should be noted that most, if not all, of the first colonies were founded by covenants or articles of agreement, thus continuing the classic Jewish pattern.

¹⁸ Institute of Jewish Affairs, *The Jewish Communities of the World*, 2nd. rev. edn., and *idem*, typescript, 3rd. rev. edn., London, 1968. Information on all the various types of communities may be found in these publications; the earlier volumes of the A.J.Y.B.; and the files of the Study of Jewish Community Organizations (hereafter cited as S.J.C.O.) which concentrate on more ephemeral materials (e.g., newspaper clippings and magazine articles) as well as on systematic interview and statistical data. Geoffrey Wigoder's regular column in *The Jerusalem Post*, 'The Jewish Scene', is an excellent source of information on the most current trends in Jewish communal life around the world and, since he surveys the current literature, a bibliographic source as well. For further bibliographic information see the bi-monthly publication of the Blaustein Library of the American Jewish Committee, *Recent Additions to the Library*, the monthly *Library Bulletin* of the United Hebrew Schools of Detroit, and Daniel J. Elazar's biennial review articles on the literature of Jewish public affairs in A.J.Y.B., 'The Quest for Community', 1967, and 'The Rediscovery of Polity', 1969.

¹⁹ I am indebted to Dr. Stephen J. Roth, Director of the Institute of Jewish Affairs, for guiding my thinking along the lines that led to this typology and first suggesting some of the categories.

²⁰ One of the first tasks of the staff of the Study of Jewish Community Organization Project was to attempt to create a

standard terminology that could be used with minimum confusion in several languages, particularly Hebrew and English. This paper uses the terminology put forward thus far as adequate to achieve that goal. Three basic planes of Jewish communal organization can be identified:

1. *countrywide communities*—embracing the Jewish population of an identifiable (usually independent) country;
2. *provincial or intermediate communities*—embracing the Jewish population of a state, *Land*, canton, or province in a federal or quasi-federal country or some less-than-countrywide regional arrangement developed by the Jewish population itself;
3. *local communities*—embracing the Jewish population of a particular locality (city, metropolitan area, township, or the like) identifiable as a *local* entity and so considered by its inhabitants.

In addition, there exist some *multi-country communities* (see Table 8) where the Jewish population of several countries have federated their countrywide communities to create a more viable entity for certain purposes. Finally there are *world-wide organizations* such as the World Zionist Organization and the World Jewish Congress which unite Jewish communities for some purposes but are not, in themselves, communities but, rather, part of an organizationally nebulous world-wide Jewish Community.

It is to be noted that the words 'national' and 'state' have purposely not been used in this terminology because of their great ambiguity. Particularly in Hebrew, *leumi* (national) refers to the world-wide Jewish Community of the organizations and institutions that serve the entire Jewish People (for example, the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund) while 'state' refers to the State of Israel. Hence any usage of those terms in a generic way to describe countrywide or intermediate Jewish communities in the Diaspora would undoubtedly add to already substantial problems of cross-linguistic communication.

²¹ A.J.Y.B., vol. 69, pp. 543-49. All population figures in this paper are drawn from this source unless otherwise indicated.

²² For more information on the state-recognized communities, see Centre

national des hautes études juives de l'Institut de Sociologie de l'Université libre de Bruxelles and the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, *La vie juive dans l'Europe contemporaine*, Brussels, 1965; and Paul Glikson and Shlomo Ketko, eds., *Jewish Communal Service: Preliminary Survey of Jewish Communal Organizations and Services Throughout the World*, International Conference for Jewish Communal Service, Jerusalem, 1967.

²³ For more information on the state-recognized religious structures, see *La vie juive* . . . , op. cit., and Glikson and Ketko, op. cit. Preliminary reports on the Belgian and Dutch Jewish communities have been prepared by Adina Weiss and Miriam Mundstock, respectively, for the S.J.C.O.

²⁴ An excellent starting point for understanding Latin American Jewry is Moshe Davis, 'Centres of Jewry in the Western Hemisphere: A Comparative Approach', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. V, no. 1, June 1963, pp. 4-26. For documentation of the European origins of the Latin American *kehilla* see Federation of Jewish Communities in Argentina, *Jewish Community of Buenos Aires*, Buenos Aires, 1968, pp. 5 ff.

²⁵ While the Latin American countries are 'lands of migration', they are not products of the modern era because they acquired their pre-modern social forms as Spanish and Portuguese colonies a century before it began and retained them virtually intact until the nineteenth century.

²⁶ Note, for example, the situation that prevailed in Jerusalem under the Ottoman Empire; cf. Ben-Zvi, op. cit.

²⁷ For more information on the tacitly recognized community structures, see *Jewish Community of Buenos Aires*, op. cit.; Natan Lerner, 'The Jewish Communal Life in Latin America' in Glikson and Ketko, op. cit.; and *Judios in el Uruguay 1932-1957*, Montevideo, 1957. A preliminary report on the Brazilian Jewish community has been prepared by Miriam Mundstock for the S.J.C.O.

²⁸ The exceptions are the Canadian Jewish Congress, the Jewish Representative Council of Ireland, and the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (where the individual states have their own Boards of Deputies and use that designation).

²⁹ For some information on the communities with representative boards see

Julius Gould and Shaul Esh, eds., *Jewish Life in Modern Britain*, London, 1964; Gustav Saron and Louis Hotz, eds., *The Jews in South Africa*, London, 1955; Glikson and Ketko, op. cit.; Davis, op. cit.; P. Y. Medding, *From Assimilation to Group Survival: A Political and Sociological Study of an Australian Jewish Community*, Melbourne, 1968; Edgar Bernstein, 'A Bird's-Eye View of South African Jewry Today', *South African Jewry 1967-68*, Johannesburg, 1968; and 'A Salute to Canada on her Centennial Year and to the Canadian Jewish Community', special issue of the *Jewish Digest*, May 1967. A preliminary report on the South African Jewish community has been prepared by Steven E. Aschheim for the S.J.C.O.

³⁰ While the Czarist Russian empire was technically larger, the Jews were confined to a few widely separated areas within it and did not consider their brethren in other areas as being within the same country.

³¹ For more information on the history of the American Jewish community, see Anita Libman Lebeson, *Pilgrim People*, New York, 1954. No comprehensive scholarly history of American Jewry exists, though data for such a history have accumulated in the scholarly journals of American Jewish history, particularly *American Jewish Archives* published by the Hebrew Union College and *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* published by the American Jewish Historical Society. Regional Jewish historical journals are published by Jewish historical societies in Southern California, Maryland, Michigan, and Rhode Island.

³² Among the best sources of information on the contemporary American Jewish community are Nathan Glazer, *American Judaism*, Chicago, 1957; Ben Halpern, *The American Jew: A Zionist Analysis*, New York, 1956; and Marshall Sklare, ed., *The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group*, Glencoe, Ill., 1958. See also Davis, op. cit.; Daniel J. Elazar, 'The Emerging Organic Community', in Mordecai M. Kaplan and Daniel J. Elazar, *The Organic Jewish Community*, New York, 1967; Oscar Janowsky, ed., *The American Jew*, Philadelphia, 1964; Joseph L. Blau et al., *The Characteristics of American Jews*, New York, 1965; Robert Morris and Michael Freund, eds., *Trends and Issues in Jewish Social Welfare in the United States, 1899-1952*, Philadelphia,

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1966; and C. Bezalel Sherman, *The Jew within American Society*, Detroit, 1960.

³³ See Daniel J. Elazar, *Federalism and the Community*, Pittsburgh, 1968, and 'American Political Ideas and the Political Notions of American Jews: Convergences and Contradictions', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, June 1967, vol. IX, no. 1.

³⁴ For more information on these communities, see Glikson and Ketko, op. cit., and L. M. Goldman, *History of Jews in New Zealand*, Wellington, 1959.

³⁵ For more information on the Jewish communities in the Arab countries, see E. Resner, *Eternal Stranger—The Plight of the Modern Jew from Bagdad to Casablanca*, New York, 1951, and André Chouraqui, *Between East and West, The History of the Jews in North Africa*, Philadelphia, 1968. Geoffrey Wigoder's previously cited column is perhaps the best published source of current material on these virtually inaccessible communities.

³⁶ For more information on the Jewish communities in the Communist countries, see Ari Ben-Ami, *Between Hammer and Sickle*, Philadelphia, 1967; *Yahadut Brit HaMoatzot* (Soviet Jewry), Tel Aviv, n.d.; Everett Gendler, 'Holy Days in Habana', *Conservative Judaism*, Winter 1969, pp. 15-24; Elizabeth Eppler, 'Organized Decline', *European Judaism*, Summer 1968, vol. 3, no. 1; and *The Jewish Communities of Eastern Europe: A First Hand Report by a Study Mission of the American Jewish Congress*, New York, 1967.

³⁷ French Indochina (the present-day Laos, Cambodia, and the Viet Nams) had 1,500 Jewish residents before the French evacuation, many of whom left while the others made no effort to perpetuate communal life. Hence the present forms of organized life are all new phenomena, brought in by the Americans.

³⁸ Little systematic information is available about these quasi-communities. Journalists' reports, personal accounts written by chaplains, and the like make up the bulk of the published materials available. Wigoder's column in *The Jerusalem Post* is the major point of departure for uncovering what exists.

³⁹ 'Structure' in the sense used here should be understood as the patterning of interactions between institutions, organizations, and groups as well as the patterning of the institutions, organizations, and

groups themselves. In this sense, we are concerned with these both as entities and as role players in the system. See Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action*, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, for an elaboration of the concepts of role and the patterned interaction of roles.

⁴⁰ A comprehensive view of the impact of the Six-Day War can be found in the section on 'The Arab-Israel War of 1967', *American Jewish Year Book 1968*, vol. 69, New York and Philadelphia, 1968, pp. 115-32.

⁴¹ For an elaboration of the relationship between pluralism and federalism, see Daniel J. Elazar, 'Federalism', in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, New York, 1968.

⁴² Johannes Althusius presents a comprehensive discussion of the political system as a communications system that deals in detail with the ideas advanced here and which has the virtue of being the first systematic presentation of this theory. His *Politica methodice digesta*, first published in 1603, is available in a modern edition edited with an extensive introduction by Carl J. Friedrich, Cambridge, Mass., 1932.

⁴³ The 'cosmopolitan'-'local' division is of potentially great significance in understanding the dynamics of Jewish community organization, useful in explaining the relationships of people to institutions and organizations, institutions and organizations to one another, and the patterns of leadership in the community. For an introduction to the literature on this concept, see Robert K. Merton, 'Patterns of Influence: Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials' in his *Social Theory and Social Structure*, 2nd. edn., Glencoe, Ill., 1957, and Daniel J. Elazar and Douglas St. Angelo, '"Cosmopolitans" and "Locals" in Contemporary Community Politics', *Proceedings of the Minnesota Academy of Science*, XXXI, 2, 1964, pp. 171-78.

⁴⁴ The terms are used in the most neutral sense implied by their Greek roots. For a more extensive treatment of the typology in a different but analogous setting, see Daniel J. Elazar, *Cities of the Prairie*, op. cit., ch. 5.

⁴⁵ Norton Long discusses this 'constitutions' approach to the study of politics in 'Aristotle and the Study of Local Government', *Social Research*, vol. 24, no. 3, Autumn 1957, pp. 287-310, a

modern adaptation of Aristotelian principles for the study of comparative government.

⁴⁶ Men such as Moses Montefiore, Adolphe Crémieux, the Rothschilds and, later, Oscar Strauss, and organizations such as the Alliance Israélite Universelle. For an excellent case study describing how this alliance functioned, see Lloyd P. Gartner, 'Roumania, America and World Jewry: Consul Peixolto in Bucharest, 1870-1876', *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, vol. LVIII, no. 1, September 1968.

⁴⁷ This is not to say that any major centralization of power is taking place in the Jewish polity. The creation of a headquarters—or perhaps a seat of 'government'—is not the same as creating a centre. What it does mean is that a new force is being created that can serve as an initiator and leader in the Jewish world while at the same time offering a meeting ground for all segments of the Jewish confederacy where the crucial polity-wide decisions will be made.

ON THE CIVILIZING PROCESS

M. C. Albrow

(Review Article)

NINETEEN-THIRTY-NINE was scarcely an auspicious year for any book to be published, and certainly not for a two-volume work examining the growth of civilization. Perhaps the 1969 re-issue of Norbert Elias's *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation** is a sign of a revived confidence in the future. We are bound to hope fervently that the auguries are better than for the first edition, and that confidence is sustained long enough to enable this book to receive its just attention. It says little for the social sciences today, or at least for their impact on publics and publishers, if the imputation here is correct, and an issue such as the growth of civilization is at the mercy of the moods induced by the vagaries of political fortune. It suggests that we do not have the historical and comparative perspective to detach ourselves from our immediate and personal fates, and thirty years of obscurity for a book which exemplifies historical perspective on the grandest scale does seem to substantiate this suspicion. Political disillusionment generates a distrust of the major interpretative concepts of Western society which is out of all proportion to their analytical importance. The sophistication of early European thought on social development makes the recently burgeoning literature on 'modernity' and 'under-development' crude and jejune by comparison, but it is only political vicissitudes which have led to the neglect of the former tradition and the popularity of the latter.

Über den Prozess der Zivilisation represents a continuation of the concern for understanding the development of Western society which characterized the work of Comte, Marx, Max and Alfred Weber, and Karl Mannheim. It makes a worthy new chapter to add to that tradition. Yet how many sociologists know of this book, even by reputation? In spite of the important role the author has played for many years in the teaching of sociology at the University of Leicester, his *magnum opus* has been accorded negligible attention and, if it has infiltrated the British intellectual consciousness at all, it is only through the writing of two representatives of the tradition of gentleman scholar, Harold Nicolson

* Francke Verlag, Bern und München, pp. 334, 492. Swiss Fr. 78.

and Patrick Gordon Walker. Nicolson's *Good Behaviour* (1955), a polished piece of amateur sociology, employs Elias as a source, and there is a story that Nicolson went several shades paler when he was once introduced to the author, whose presence in England he little suspected. Gordon Walker cites Elias as an authority on no fewer than 155 occasions in his idiosyncratic *Restatement of Liberty* (1951). But the citadels of academic sociology are not stormed with this kind of book.

Elias's conception is grand; the hostile critic might say grandiose. He sets himself the task of showing how certain standards of interpersonal conduct prevalent in twentieth-century Western societies have been generated by a process of social structural change, the origins of which are lost to investigation, but which in any case encompasses the last thousand years. His laboratory is, therefore, the major part of Western history and his theme is nothing less than the nature of man. The execution is correspondingly and appropriately monumental. The first volume is divided into two chapters. The first, and much the shorter of the two, 'Zur Soziogenese der Begriffe "Zivilisation" and "Kultur"', examines the nuances of two related ideas from the standpoint of the sociology of knowledge. Elias finds the idea of civilization a resultant of the close affiliation between the French court and intellectual circles. It referred to the polish, style, and manners which distinguished the behaviour of the elite from the lower orders. In Germany, on the other hand, the social rift between middle-class intellectuals and court life led to an antithesis being drawn between civilization and culture, the latter referring to the deeper qualities of national life which the middle class assumed they embodied in contrast to the superficiality of court civilization. Elias considers both the French and German ideas of civilization to be direct successors of the idea of *civilité*, popularized more than by any other means by Erasmus's manual of good behaviour, *De civilitate morum puerilium* (1530), which was published in more than 130 editions.

The second chapter, 'Über die Zivilisation als eine spezifische Veränderung des menschlichen Verhaltens', considers the nature and significance of the prescriptions for behaviour in Erasmus's treatise and a variety of similar manuals through to the nineteenth century. Elias devotes over two hundred pages to examining table manners, attitudes to spitting, sneezing, excretion, nakedness, and sexual relations. With avid and fascinating concern for detail, he shows how knives and forks supplant the common bowl into which diners thrust their hands, how the handkerchief obviated the blowing of mucus to the floor, how nakedness became shameful, how strangers ceased to share the bedroom. He interprets all these changes as part of an on-going process of civilization, each marking an increase in the degree of control which men are expected to exercise over their emotions and the expression of their impulses. The dominant fears of the individual cease to be con-

cerned with violence from others and instead are focused on the dangers of breaking these codes of behaviour. The growth of the sense of shame is the major indication of this heightened self control. Freud, and especially *Civilization and its Discontents* (1929), is an obvious influence, but Elias has effected some vital transformations. The superego becomes the product of relatively recent historical development, and the whole array of psychoanalytical concepts is correspondingly historicized. The process of civilization is a continuing one, incomplete, but with definite direction. Moreover, it occasions for Elias none of the gloom which pervades Freud's analysis.

The second volume attempts to identify the social forces which make for the growth of self-discipline. The third chapter, 'Zur Soziogenese der abendländischen Zivilisation', takes us back to the feudal period and examines the outcome of conflict between warlords, where mutual relations were determined by strength alone. Elias detects a gradual process of monopolization of power, where the warlords who gained most supporters overcame their opponents, where larger social units proved more powerful than smaller. But as the warlord grew in strength, so the social unit focused on him became more complex and functional differentiation took place so that its members were subjected to the constraints of tasks and duties. The subjugated warriors, deprived of the possibility of satisfying their desires through violence, were forced to please their new master and to fit the task demands of an increasingly complex organization. The warrior was transformed into the courtier. As one among many executing the tasks of the lord the courtier was bound to co-operate with his peers. Moreover, in order to justify his position in society, it was important to maintain a form of behaviour which distinguished him from the lower orders. This is the context in which the treatises on manners by Erasmus and many others were written.

But although the process of civilization obtained its main impetus from courtly circles, it had repercussions on the rest of society. Those who wished to rise socially had to adapt themselves to the manners of the upper strata. The bourgeoisie attempted to ape the higher orders, but there was an additional factor which encouraged them to adopt elaborate forms of self-discipline. They were involved in economic activity which required this quality. In fact, the pacification which created courtly life also provided the conditions for regular economic activity. In sum, Elias is arguing that we must see the growth of the modern state and the development of modern standards of inter-personal behaviour as directly linked processes. Such a perspective sees pre-revolutionary monarchies not, as so often with liberal historiography, interludes or even regressions on the road to democracy, but as important stages in the process of civilization. Ideological or constitutional differences between pre- and post-revolutionary regimes fade into insignificance

beside the similarities in their structure and methods of governing. The discontinuities of political history are supplanted by a theory which finds a consistent underlying trend in areas of life the historian rarely deems worthy of attention.

Elias concludes by drawing together the many threads of his thesis into a summarizing conclusion, 'Entwurf zu einer Theorie der Zivilisation'. He is particularly concerned to ward off one possible misunderstanding, that he has been describing the 'growth of reason'. Civilization is not the product of human wisdom, rather the reverse. 'The way in which men are obliged to live together changes; hence their behaviour changes, hence their consciousness and the whole management of their impulses (*Triebhaushalt*) change' (II, p. 377). In consequence, the history of ideas cannot be understood except in relation to changes in the structure of inter-personal relations. Elias makes a plea for the psychologizing of historiography and for historicizing psychology, but, in effect, he is asking that both history and psychology should become sociological in a more radical sense than most modern sociologists have the stomach for. Its nearest anticipation and most eloquent expression is in the work of the early Marx, for whom 'the real nature of man is the totality of social relations' and that nature is the product of human history. But, whereas Marx allowed his early insights to be dominated by the idea of the social relations of production, Elias takes up the great suppressed theme of the Marxists and treats the factor of power as having prime importance.

The strategy of research Elias is advocating certainly has close affinities with Marxist views of the unity of historical and scientific method. This in itself will guarantee a difficult passage for this book. But it is probably the radical implications this method has for the special social sciences which will prove the greater obstacle to its acceptance. These products of intellectual specialization thrive on the fragmentation of knowledge and a strict determination not to recognize the historical contingency of their own propositions. Historical perspective relativizes their scientific truths and raises daunting inter-disciplinary problems. For Elias is not calling upon history as written by the modern professional historian, himself a victim of absurd degrees of specialization, but upon an historical sociology concerned to classify and determine the directions of change in societies. This is historicism, but without iron laws, unmoved movers, or basic causes. The perspective is evolutionary because societies have evolved, and changes in human relationships have not been random and directionless. This book is important, therefore, not simply for its theme, but also as an exemplar of a special view of the purposes and methods of social science.

The test of any perspective on society is the number of interesting, new, and true propositions which it elicits. I believe that the idea that twentieth-century standards of personal behaviour stem from the

power structure and structural differentiation of society to be interesting and fresh even thirty years after its first publication. As to its truth, let us recognize immediately that a vast series of questions are raised which admit of no easy answer and which could justifiably occupy the lifetimes of a team of scholars. In a consideration of just a few of these problems it may well appear that sufficient doubt is thrown upon the validity of Elias's thesis to warrant its rejection. But doubts as to its validity must fade into insignificance when we admit the intrinsic interest of the questions which are raised by Elias's own problem-setting and are a testimony to its value. It is in this spirit that the following issues are discussed.

Most of Elias's evidence for a systematic change in the behaviour of Western man is drawn from a particular type of literary source. He considers books on etiquette, justifiably, more as an expression of than an influence on prevalent behaviour patterns. But this is indicative of his attitude not simply to these sources, but to the whole topic of the relationship between ideas and social action. We may divide writers on this theme into analytic and synthetic schools. The former see ideas and action as logically related, the latter detect causal relations between them. Elias is firmly in the former camp. An intermediate position, that sometimes ideas and action are intrinsically, at other times extrinsically, related is rarely espoused. As a result major categories of data tend to be neglected. In Elias's case we look in vain for any consideration of the influence of major religious ideas on behaviour. Now religious dogma is particularly well suited to being considered as a factor acting on social relations from without. Its exponents make up a differentiated and exclusive group, yet they often seem to be in the forefront of significant social conflicts. Literature from this quarter was very well suited to Max Weber's purpose in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904) of showing that ideas could be a potent factor in social change. But Elias has nothing to say about the differences between the Christian churches and sects in their attitudes to standards of interpersonal behaviour. His is a completely secular interpretation of Western history, and refreshing for that fact, but can it be possible to neglect what has both popularly and sociologically been considered to be a major regulating influence on behaviour? A history of the growth of self-control which does not examine Puritanism is like *Hamlet* without the Prince, and what an ironic affront to the Puritan that the life of the courtier should be considered archetypical for modern self-discipline. It is not easy to reconcile this with the following, not unusual description of the court of Louis XV: 'General society leaves an impression of vulgar decadence. The abuses in the faster set are *peculiarly modern* [this writer's italics] . . . Decadence was far from delicate, for the best society was often drunk. Everyone strove to be amusing, and, to judge

from the rage for tediously indecent chansons, usually failed' (*Cambridge Modern History*, VI, 1909, p. 165). Elias may be able to account for this kind of discrepancy with his theory, but undoubtedly his stress on the unilinearity of civilization has led him to neglect discussion of such apparent discontinuities and paradoxes in its development, an issue to which we shall have to return.

Another facet of Elias's rejection of ideas as an influence on behaviour is his scant regard for the importance of the modern concept of hygiene. He sees it as a late starter, providing a subsequent rationalization for practices which had long been prevalent. But this is to under-estimate the importance of qualitative changes in behaviour induced by the spread of scientific ideas. Indeed in modern society we can see a direct conflict between the demands of social intercourse and the ideas which come to us from that outside source known as 'the scientists'. It is a conflict which can afflict the individual severely, as anyone who tries to give up smoking will testify. For evolutionary sociologists of an earlier period this emergence of scientific ideas as a controlling factor in behaviour was of supreme developmental significance. Hobhouse, who had many of the same purposes as Elias in his *Morals in Evolution*, argued that the rise of organizing intelligence would transform society in unprecedented ways. In the language of modern systems analysis, he was simply discussing morphogenesis, or the emergence of new types of self-regulating system. This is the guise in which evolutionary ideas are bound to be popular again soon, but Elias's approach to the relation of ideas and society precludes viewing them as proceeding in any other way than perfectly in step with each other. The dramatic impact of medical, psychological, and social science on our behaviour in the last century is consequently minimized.

Elias's repeated stress that one cannot view rules of behaviour as expressions of human reasoning leads him to avoid probing deeply into the reasons the moralists offered for their prescriptions for conduct. The only reason he discerns is the repeated invocation of courtliness or civilized behaviour. But this leaves a research problem open. Why should one form of behaviour rather than another have been thought to be 'civil'? Are the possibilities limitless or is there a definite range of behaviour which must be limited by rules and falls within the concept of civilization? What is the anatomy of rules for civilized conduct? It would be wrong to suggest that Elias is not aware of this issue, but what he does do is to adopt a stand which suggests that he believes its solution is unimportant to his task. 'The emotional structure of the human being is a single unit (*ein Ganzes*)' (I, p. 263). The various names we give to our needs and drives, sex, hunger, aggression, imply that we are dealing with distinct phenomena when, in fact, they are merely aspects of a unitary emotional structure expressed in different forms. Now, although this position can be justified at length, it raises a number of problems

for Elias's thesis. For, if the human drives are so amorphous and unclassifiable, it is difficult to envisage how anyone is going to be able to assess the degree of their restraint. Are we simply to count the number of rules governing behaviour of all kinds (scarcely feasible), or do we attempt to assess the extent to which each rule represses emotion? If the latter, we must face the probability that a single rule in respect of monogamy may have more importance than the sum total of rules in respect of etiquette at the table. Thus, when we consider Elias's evidence, we are bound to ask whether he is justified in making so much of table manners as opposed to, say, sumptuary regulation and fashion, or whether sexual relations do not deserve more space than the rest of the evidence put together.

This issue is so important for Elias because the determination of the directionality of change must depend on being able to ascertain differing degrees of self-control and hence the relative significance of different categories of rules. For example, if sexual relations were allocated a more important place in Elias's account, his theory would be confronted with some very discrepant facts. He is compelled to admit that everyone claims to detect a relaxation in standards of self-control in sexual relations. The naked body is exhibited in a way which would have shocked the Victorians. But Elias has an ingenious explanation. 'Only in a society in which a high degree of propriety is taken for granted, and in which women, as well as men, are absolutely sure that strong self-discipline and strict etiquette hold every single person in bounds can sporting and bathing customs develop, of such freedom as compared with previous periods' (I, p. 257). Unfortunately social change has transformed the special pleading of 1939 into the romantic whimsy of 1969. For many, permissiveness and freedom in sexual relations is a mark of advancing civilization. We have the advantage of hindsight now, but even in 1939 it must have been difficult for Elias to argue as he does that the discussion of sex was subject to more and more restriction. This seems an extraordinary judgement for someone who owes so much to Freud. Even if he is unable to envisage Freud and his followers having wider social impact, at least, by his own method of analysis, they should be the mouthpieces of structural change in society.

Are we, in Elias's terms, experiencing a decline in civilization? It ought to be clear that, hitherto, neither in this account of his thesis, nor in the subsequent discussion of the problems it raises, have we found this possibility excluded. It is simply a matter of fact that men have become more civilized. It could equally be a matter of fact that men are becoming less civilized as the twentieth century proceeds. But, although Elias's theory is ostensibly falsifiable for the past and not necessarily applicable for the future, he undoubtedly does not wish it to be an easy victim for the kind of criticism the last paragraph has implied. He does, therefore, ultimately introduce a criterion for judging the

relative importance of different forms of self-control which makes such apparent regressions as that in sexual relations unimportant to his general theory. On his final page he says, 'Men will only have a greater right to say that they are civilized when the structure of inter-personal relations is built in such a way, when the co-operative work of human beings, which is the basis of individual existence, so functions that for everyone who works in this richly articulated chain of common tasks there is at least the possibility of finding this equilibrium.' 'This equilibrium' is a harmony between social demands and individual needs. In other words, the absolute increase of self-control is not the criterion for the growth of civilization, but, rather, only that which is functionally necessary for society. The introduction of the idea of functional necessity is as important to Elias's theory as is the concept of normal and pathological states of society to Durkheim's. But one must doubt whether Elias sees its full significance. If we can determine what is and is not functional self-control it is indeed possible that we will be able to show that the restrictions governing sexual relations in the nineteenth century were unnecessary exercises in self-restraint, and, therefore, that the modern relaxation in this sphere is compatible with civilization. However, *a fortiori*, Elias's whole thesis must now be subject to re-examination since we must apply the criterion of functional necessity to every rule of etiquette he adduces as evidence of advancing civilization. Once again he is forced to consider the relative contribution different rules make to the on-going process.

This argument serves to highlight a peculiar feature of Elias's concern with the concept of civilization. In the tradition of the sociology of knowledge he examines its emergence and changes in nuance. But this analysis stops essentially with the eighteenth century and he accepts the concept as he finds it at that time. But he is not prepared to evaluate it as a scientific concept. He neglects the army of scholars who have employed a concept of civilization and the proliferation of meanings which have arisen in social scientific and philosophical discussions since the nineteenth century. He avoids defending his concept against competing interpretations of the nature of modern man. The sociology of knowledge cannot provide the canons for social scientific concept formation. The fact that a concept has arisen and been influential does not confer upon it any scientific worth. That must be established in other ways.

Perhaps the most important consequence of Elias's acceptance of an eighteenth-century concept of civilization is his almost total neglect of anthropological literature. The intellectual climate which generated this concept was self-assuredly ethnocentric. Civilization, the manners and morals of Europeans, were contrasted with savagery and barbarism, the manners and morals of the rest of the world. Elias's linkage of European political history with the growth of self-control means that he

cannot free himself from this perspective, even though it had already been exorcised from modern anthropology. He seems to share what Firth has called 'the popular notion that primitive peoples lack all the gentler forms of social intercourse'. Yet repression, the sense of shame, and elaborate social etiquette were extensively documented in the work of Malinowski, Mead, and others well before 1939.

Elias's account of spitting is especially revealing as being one of those occasions when he does make explicit reference to non-European societies. Even today, he says, Europeans will find their confidence in the superior 'progress' of their civilization reinforced when they see frequent spitting in the East or Africa. But, he notes, of course many primitive societies do restrict spitting. Are they then civilized? No, because these prohibitions are backed by taboos, by the fear of outside forces, and not by an inner discipline (I, pp. 212-18). Thus, if other societies do not share the rules of behaviour of the European they are primitive, but if they do the rules cannot have the same significance. Two comments suffice. The belief that 'primitive' morals and manners are based solely on taboos rather than on factors of social approval, ideas of 'goodness', and a sense of shame is erroneous. Secondly, Elias underestimates the extent to which the sanctions of legal retribution, social disgrace, and superstition uphold the Western conscience. Indeed the dichotomy he makes between external and internal pressures on the individual is altogether too sharp, and at variance with his own concept of society.

The evidence of anthropology poses difficult problems for Elias. For one thing, it suggests that he should seek the differentiating characteristics of the West in areas we have argued he distrusts, science and the rationalization of life. For another, it casts doubt on the association of political centralization with self-control. When we consider this linkage a large area of ambiguity is revealed. Elias places great emphasis on the withdrawal from the individual of the possibility of using force to achieve his own ends. But it is hard to see how this in itself makes for conscience formation. Aggression against others is not manifested solely through physical force, and centralized empires are frequently run by self-seeking, intolerant, ruthless bureaucrats. Elias notes differences of degree between different Western societies. In the case of Prussia, political centralization involved heavy reliance on a police force, and an authoritarian state meant that individuals were less able to develop self-discipline. His comments here seem apt, but, if centralization can have a dual significance for the generation of self-control, much of his account of political history must be seen as inconclusive until the factors which determine the character of the regime are specified. Of possible determinants, the division of labour within the economy has an important subsidiary place in Elias's theory, and it may well have to be elevated to take pride of place. But if this were to happen, Marx would provide an uncomfortably close anticipation of much of Elias's theory. In effect,

Elias has given us two books, one on the development of morals, the other on political history. Each would amount to a considerable achievement for a scholar of normal ambition, but only their articulation into a theory of far-reaching significance is enough to satisfy Elias.

What all the preceding issues indicate is the extent to which the author has outstripped the capacity of the individual scholar, and, indeed, the resources of whole disciplines. A venture of this vast scope requires a tradition of psychological historiography which still does not exist. The phenomenology of rules and the concepts of conscience, self-control, shame, guilt, fear, punishment all need considerable elaboration. At every point Elias comes up against lacunae in the treatment of concepts and data which are fundamental to his endeavour. He is a pioneer and he has to cultivate self-sufficiency. It is hardly surprising if this sometimes results in an isolation from intellectual resources which are obviously at hand.

Elias is well aware that he is pioneering. He says so in a substantial introduction written especially for this edition. This is particularly valuable for the explicit way in which he pinpoints the significance he attaches to his own work. He considers it to have fundamental implications for sociological theory and he launches a spirited attack on the major orthodoxy of the present time. Wasting no time with lesser figures he accuses Talcott Parsons of failing to understand the nature of social development. He argues that the pattern variables preclude the satisfactory treatment of emergent social factors and impoverish the vocabulary of sociology. Social change for Parsons is a disturbance between the normal steady states of society. In his own book, on the other hand, he views change as endemic and his method is designed to do justice to this fact.

Elias has chosen his opponent and therefore the standards against which he wishes his book to be judged. We are to view it as an exemplar of a new sociological method. Now, when we compare the output of Parsons and his followers with this single treatise such claims may seem disproportionately large. But they are justified, since this book is a more important empirical study than any which have issued from Parsonianism. There are indeed profound implications for sociological method in Elias's work, and it is clear that his and Parsons's objectives and strategy are poles apart. However, what must regretfully be admitted is that its conceptual and theoretical underpinning seems scarcely to have begun. The new introduction adds little to the original text. The method is still compelling at the intuitive level only. Parsons has been incalculably more articulate, and therefore persuasive, in explaining his strategy than Elias. Let us hope that this will soon be rectified.

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DORIS BENSIMON-DONATH, *Evolution du Judaïsme marocain sous le Protectorat français 1912-1956*, 149 pp., Mouton & Co., Paris, The Hague, 1968, 30F.

This is a modest but very useful book. As the author remarks, it has no pretensions to being a history of Jewish communities in Morocco during the French Protectorate (1912-1956). It merely offers a rough sociological summary, based on available documentation of the transformation of the Jewish communities in Morocco during the relevant period.

The story could perhaps be summed up under the phrase 'from Diversity to Disappearance'. At the beginning of the French Colonial period in Morocco at the start of this century, there was not one Jewish community in Morocco, but a variety of extremely different *communities*: the Jews of Morocco differed among themselves even more than the Muslims of that country. The spectrum ranging from a citizen of a coastal town and a beneficiary of protection of a foreign power, to a Berber-speaking Jewish cobbler settled in the midst of a dissident Berber tribe, was even greater than the distance between a Muslim bourgeois of Fez and a Berber tribesman.

The internal division within the Jewish urban population between the prestigious descendants of refugees from Spain and the rest, seems to have survived more sharply than did the similar distinction within the Muslim community. The author tells us that the family law of these two groupings remained distinct until 1947! Both of these groupings of course looked down on the Berber-speaking communities of the tribal lands. The author invokes the customary sources concerning the latter group of communities, and repeats the unusual statement that whereas the protector of the Jews in the governed area was the Sultan, the Jews of the dissident tribal areas each had an individual Muslim 'Lord' (*Sid*). This raises an interesting question: how could this system work in areas where there were no permanent chieftaincies, where no lords were available? Jewish communities were after all also found in the territories of those Berber tribes in which chieftaincies were elective and annual. This could mean that those, admittedly rather small, communities were under the protection of tribal units as a whole, under the supervision of the *office* of the chief rather than its individual temporary occupant, or it could mean that they had individual protectors who, however, did not combine this position with other political functions. The literature used does not seem to answer this interesting question, or even raise it.

The profound diversification of communities certainly persisted until the political impact of France in this century. Recent historical scholarship has tended to stress the extent to which external economic impact was quite powerful throughout the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, political and social changes came more slowly. The author does not discuss this in depth,

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though she comments on the extent to which the migration from the small Jewish communities towards the towns preceded the arrival of the French.

The main factors making for the demolition and near-disappearance of the Jewish community after 1956 are of course obvious. The consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict for the Jewish minority in an independent Arab state are only one factor. But the other important factors are sociologically more interesting. One of them of course is the remarkable impact of Western education on the Jewish communities—an impact incomparably greater and speedier than that which was made on the Muslim community. After an initial, almost token resistance by the forces of traditionalism, an education in the French language made an effective conquest of the youth of the communities. Another factor is that the Jewish economic role in traditional Morocco was tied to a certain balance of power, a stalemate in effect, between the various Muslim social forces: and that balance has been destroyed by the more effective modern state. The author's final chapter asks a question: emancipation or uprooting? There is no reason to suppose that these are incompatible.

ERNEST GELLNER

ALEXANDER M. DUSHKIN, *Jewish Education in the Diaspora—The Problems of Teachers and Teaching* (Hebrew), 96 pp., The Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Sprinsak Division, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 1968, n.p.

A study circle on Diaspora Jewry has been meeting in Israel at intervals for a number of years. This book records a discussion on Jewish Education in the Diaspora that was held at the residence of the President of Israel.

The ground was prepared by Mr. Alexander Dushkin who in 1964 sent a questionnaire round the countries of the Diaspora asking for information on the supply of and the demand for teachers, the difficulties experienced in enlisting them, their training and their provenance, and for information on local plans for improving the situation. The information gathered is presented as an important appendix to the book under review.

Mr. Dushkin himself opened the discussion and from his remarks and from the appendix one learns that there are estimated to be 1,800,000 Jewish children of school age (5-17 years) outside Russia and its satellites in the Diaspora, that 45 per cent have some form of Jewish schooling at any one time, that they require 25,000 teachers, and that 2,000 teachers have to be replaced every year. In the U.S.A., where 1,200 new teachers are required every year, only half of that number, including a mere 120 from accredited training colleges, have some form of training. The other half are recruited from any material that presents itself. That states the problem starkly enough.

About 3,000 Israeli teachers work in the Diaspora. A minority are trained teachers (*shlihim*), many are students, some are Israelis who have settled abroad (*yoredim*).

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To cope with this problem Mr. Dushkin suggests the establishment of three funds. One fund, an 'equalization' fund, is to enable Jewish teachers to have conditions of service equivalent to those enjoyed by secular teachers. One fund is to train teachers. One fund is to foster research and to support publications.

It is interesting that a similar fund, of the same order of magnitude, was suggested by the Commission of Enquiry set up by the Chief Rabbi to report on Jewish education in London.

Twelve outstanding educators took part in the discussion that followed Mr. Dushkin's paper. Much of the discussion centred on the problems involved in sending teachers from Israel. Ernst Simon among others pleaded that such teachers even if they stayed longer than the usual two-year spell of duty should not be classed pejoratively as *yoredim* (emotionally almost equivalent to *deserters*) and that they should be thought of as fulfilling a legitimate and laudable role in the foreign service of the State.

The value of the two-year spell of duty was questioned. The reviewer finds himself agreeing with this criticism. An Israeli teacher often spends most of his first year acclimatizing himself and part of his second year preparing to leave.

Warnings were uttered by some of the participants. If the Israeli teacher stays long enough to become part of the local community he is no longer an Israeli teacher. His impact is diminished. Israel cannot spare enough teachers. Diaspora education must in the end be built on local resources, and ways must be found of inspiring Diaspora youth to undertake training for Jewish education as a kind of *halutsiut* in the lands of their birth. Training for work in one country would not necessarily be valid for another country. Teachers seconded from Israel should be trained for the purpose before they leave and their training should be supplemented by in-service courses in the lands where they are working.

A serious difficulty was raised by Y. Harkavy. When an Israeli teacher comes to work in a Diaspora school, the headmaster looks upon him as one of the staff employed by him. The teacher must adapt himself to the ways of the school. That seems self-evident, but, in adapting himself to local conditions, will not the Israeli teacher lose just those qualities that make him a desirable teacher? Mr. Harkavy wants the good Israeli teacher to be not merely a good teacher but a good Israeli emissary.

The discussion ranged widely and aired and illuminated more problems than it solved. Perhaps above all the discussion showed that education is not a mechanical problem amenable to mechanical treatment but a social problem, and that all who take part in it, educators and educated alike, change and develop by virtue of their involvement in the process.

HAROLD LEVY

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GOLDSTEIN, SIDNEY and GOLDSCHIEDER, CALVIN, eds., *Jewish Americans: Three Generations in a Jewish Community*, xvii + 274 pp., Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1968, n.p.

Jewish Americans must be added to the small shelf of indispensable works on the social characteristics of American Jews. While the book is the first in a series devoted to the major American ethnic groups, it is basically a detailed, knowledgeable, and theoretically sophisticated report of a demographic, social, and religious survey of the Jewish population of Providence, Rhode Island, made in 1962. The book as a whole is introduced by a chapter which summarizes theoretical discussion and empirical findings on such key issues as the degree of assimilation and acculturation of the American Jewish community, and the role of the third generation in maintaining Jewish identity and the Jewish population. Each section of the report is introduced by brief but informed accounts of the present state of research in each of the areas reviewed, and thus the book serves not only as a survey of a single American Jewish community, but because of the invaluable general discussions which precede each chapter, it also serves as a general introduction to and summary of the main issues in the sociology of American Jews.

To summarize the findings briefly. The Jewish community of Providence numbers about 20,000, in a metropolitan area of three-quarters of a million. Only 17 per cent of this population is now foreign-born—the rest is roughly split between second generation and third generation. There are thus sufficient numbers in the third generation to analyse the effect of this degree of distance from immigrant origins. The group has shared in the recent massive move to suburbia—30 per cent of the Jewish population lives in the suburbs, but, perhaps betraying the indelible Jewish urban character, this is a smaller proportion than for the metropolitan area as a whole.

The Jews of Providence are very well educated—34 per cent of the males are college graduates, as against 8.6 per cent of all Providence males. In the third generation, the proportion of college graduates among Jewish males rises to 43 per cent. Fifty-three per cent of the males are self-employed, compared with 11 per cent of the total population. Sixty-one per cent of the Jewish males are occupationally professionals and managers and proprietors, compared with 20 per cent of all males in Providence. A smaller number of Jews are divorced, widowed, and separated. All this confirms other studies that reveal the high educational and occupational position of Jews, and the greater strength of the Jewish family.

On the disputed question of fertility, it turns out that Jews once again show a lower fertility. A substantial decline from the first to the second generation has been followed by a smaller recovery in the third generation. Within the overall pattern of lower fertility, Jews show the same patterns to be found in the rest of the population—an inverse relationship between socio-economic status and fertility.

On the even more controversial question of intermarriage, Goldstein and Goldscheider's material shows a low rate of intermarriage, which is rising slightly—98.8 per cent of the first generation, 94.4 per cent of the second, and 93.4 per cent of the third generation married Jews. Among the younger intermarried, two-thirds of the spouses are converted. Those who attended

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only high school show the highest rate of intermarriage (6.3 per cent). Those who attended college show the lowest rate—1.3 per cent. Those who attended graduate school show a rise to 4.7 per cent.

On Jewish religious affiliation, the study also shows interesting results, confirming a theory not perhaps of a third-generation *return*, but certainly of a third-generation *plateau* in the presumed decline of Jewish identity, affiliation, and religious practice, and it shows further a remarkable homogenization of practice in the third generation, even if at a relatively low level. Thus, there is no drop in synagogue affiliation with generation—there is of course a drop in the proportion affiliated with Orthodox synagogues, a rise in those affiliated with Conservative and Reform synagogues. There is a drop in synagogue attendance—quite in contrast to high and rising attendance in the third generations of Catholics and Protestants. But there is a rise by generation in the observance of the Passover Seder and the lighting of Chanukah candles—these seem to be becoming the minimal but increasingly widespread marks of the observance of Judaism. There is a remarkable increase in the number receiving some Jewish education—only 1.5 per cent of the third generation between 25 and 44 received no Jewish education.

Goldstein and Goldscheider conclude: 'The data, as a whole, reveal the strengthening of some areas of religiosity (Jewish education), stability in other areas (synagogue membership, affiliating with one of the three religious divisions, observance of Chanukah and Passover), and declines in other areas (Orthodoxy, Kashruth . . .) . . . There has . . . been an over-all development of new forms of Jewish identity and expression, with an emphasis on those aspects that are congruent with Americanization.'

The findings are similar to those of Marshall Sklare in his *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier*. Perhaps more surprising, they are similar to the general position taken in books now fifteen years old, on the basis of much less solid empirical information, in Will Herberg's *Protestant, Catholic, Jew* and in my *American Judaism*. Our research on American Judaism must now proceed, I feel, to more difficult questions, beyond the specifying of the socio-economic position of Jews and the character of their Jewish identity. We have not known really how to put these questions—and we still do not. But they deal with the issue of the place of the Jews, this exceptional group, in American life—a place that is now coming to public consciousness as it is challenged by the rise of new demands by Black Americans; and with the meaning of Jewish identity, which is now challenged by the rise of an intense radicalism among Jewish youth.

NATHAN GLAZER

GÜNTER KEHRER, *Religionssoziologie*, 158 pp., Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 1968, DM.360.

This is a pocket book introduction to the sociology of religion. Its format is of a kind more usually associated with bus timetables, but that should not

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lead one to underestimate the product or the task involved in writing an introductory text of this length. Judicious planning and selection of material are essential. Dr. Kehrer chooses to spend one third of his scant allocation of space in outlining the development of the sociology of religion. In the remaining eighty pages he examines the social structure of religious groups and considers the functional relationships of religion to stratification, politics, the economy, the family, conflict, and change.

Kehrer is scholarly and methodical in his approach but he will tax the enthusiasm of even the most ardent reader of pocket books on bus journeys. The total effect is as synthetic as the most jejune of American introductory texts. Indeed if we compare this book with its nearest equivalent in scope and length, Elizabeth K. Nottingham's *Religion and Society*, 1954, we may be surprised to find that the American author exhibits far more of the virtues usually associated with European sociology. She has a better sense for the historical context of religious ideas and understands the importance of examining religion in different types of society. Kehrer's strong point is the use of ethnographic material but this is often indiscriminately employed.

The author avoids discussion of the more fascinating and controversial issues in the sociology of religion. There is no discussion of the influence of social structure on religious dogma, nor of how religious explanations satisfy individuals. Certainly he avoids giving offence to believers and non-believers alike, but this is not the same thing as objectivity, which may be highly disturbing. In Britain, Bryan Wilson and David Martin have shown that it is not necessary to avoid controversy when presenting the sociology of religion to a wider public. On the contrary, to do so is to sell the discipline short and to deny the reader his due.

M. C. ALBROW

SEYMOUR M. LIPSET, *Revolution and Counterrevolution, Change and Persistence in Social Structures*, 466 pp., Heinemann, London, 63s.

Professor Lipset's book is composed of various essays written in recent years that deal in a substantive or theoretical way with the problems of analysing from an historical-structural perspective the character of changing societies and politics. The title of the collection refers to the chapter on the American Revolution, and the non-revolution which has formed the constitutional and value framework of Canadian politics. It is a neat title for the whole, but it is somewhat misleading, for the causes and circumstances of revolutions and counter-revolutions are not part of the volume, and it is at least arguable that the character of Canadian politics is no more of a 'counter-revolution' than the failure of Chartism, the absence of a Jacksonian revolution in Britain, and the extension of the franchise were counter-revolutionary in British politics.

As an historically minded sociologist Lipset in this volume, as elsewhere in his writings, gives good value. In Part I, he explores the uses to which sociological techniques may be put for the illumination and testing of historical explanations—what, and how, the sociologist may contribute, to give

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a more accurate interpretation of past events, or more precisely, to the explanation of the motives of men and to the specific values and aspirations that moved them to political action. The historian is concerned to attain chronological accuracy, to evaluate, through correspondence and public addresses and character studies why public persons acted as they did. The good sociologist is aware of all that the historian has done, but his own interest is to explain the significance of particular thoughts or actions of men (or groups), in and for the society in which they lived. He is interested in reform movements, the political leanings of religious sects, the reasons why political programmes or theories prosper in some countries yet languish in others, why the wealthy, in some countries, put their money to work while in others they post it off to Zurich or use it to purchase the burdens of high social status. Traditional values, status aspirations, differing types of high education, may be some parts of the explanation, and by cross-reference to analogous experience elsewhere a key factor may be highlighted for particular societies. What the sociologist contributes therefore is (in addition to e.g. the statistical examination of past voting figures, wealth distribution, membership of churches etc.) a set of hypotheses, an assembly of equipment, which may go some way (but usually not all the way) to explain voting patterns, religious preferences, or the phenomenon of entrepreneurial activity. There need be no demarcation disputes between historians and sociologists here. Professor Hofstadter (an historian) in the *Age of Reform* has produced the most persuasive explanation to date of American 'Progressivism' by examining and explaining it as the political outcome of the status anxiety of W.A.S.P.s faced by the dual threat to their social importance presented by corrupt big business and lower class (and corrupt) hegemony in city politics. And your reviewer (and no doubt many other students) learnt more about the value make-up of the Republican party from Professor Gusfield's study—*Symbolic Crusade*—of the temperance issue in American politics than from any number of historians' accounts of the origins and fortunes of the G.O.P.

Part II of Lipset's collection, 'Value Differences in American Perspective', deals with U.S. and Canadian origins and values. Part III covers 'Social Stratification and Politics' and contains important material on 'Class, Politics and Religion in Modern Society'. Part IV, 'Political Cleavages in Comparative Perspective', contains chap. 7 on the Modernization of Contemporary European Politics. Part V, 'Continuities in Scholarship', is three essays on pioneers of comparative analysis: Harriet Martineau, Moisei Ostrogorski, and Robert Michels.

'The Modernization of Contemporary European Politics' is written against a background of assertion about the 'End of Ideology'. It is an important contribution not merely because it can be considered in the light of the (unexpected) continuation of Social Democratic rule in Sweden, the gradual growth of the S.P.D. vote in Western Germany, the events in France of May 1968, and the forthcoming Butler and Stokes volume on British voting, but because it poses—but does not answer—the question of what is meant by ideology in the modern European context. The simple 'End of Ideology' message was that, with the spread in Europe of the affluence of modern industrialized economies, crude contrasts of wealth and squalor were disappearing, and that 'working class' parties, whose emotions, propaganda,

and programmes were harnessed to exploit politically and then to remedy gross inequalities would run out of the ammunition so far freely supplied by the exploiting capitalist system; having taken part in a historic process, the parties would lose the support of the now 'middle class' worker. It seemed a distinct possibility, and evidence for it was supplied by the gradual abandonment of ideologically 'left' programmes by the S.P.D., the British Labour Party, and by, for example, the increasing and successful involvement of the Italian Communist Party in ordinary municipal politics and administration. But it was never crystal-clear (and to many it was unacceptable) that the Social Democratic parties would or should become Kennedy-type Democratic parties. The picture was further obscured by fascination with the Kennedy style. In France, Germany, and Britain, John F. Kennedy was much more than the youngish man who narrowly won the 1960 Presidential election. But it was the style that was seductive. The content of Kennedyism (if discoverable) was not easily translated into European slogans and programmes.

Part of the 'End of Ideology' thesis was based on the important premise that not only would European and American workers experience ever rising standards of living, but that with arrangements such as *Mitbestimmung*, representation on boards of nationalized industries, joint consultation machinery, the working class would exercise power, receive the respect, and have the responsibilities which heretofore had been the prerogatives of the managerial bourgeoisie; *and* that they would receive the higher education appropriate to these positions. The evidence in Europe today is (with the exception that in the U.K. university students of working class origin are now a significant part of the student population) that most of these status expectations for the workers have not been realized. It is of course probable in many cases that the workers do not want the new statuses, though the recent election in Germany showed that concern about educational chances far out-ranked e.g. reunification as an 'issue'.

As Professor Lipset shows, the allegiance of working-class voters to traditional working-class parties has increased and not diminished. That these parties' ideologies have changed is not in doubt. But why should the affluent worker who is familiar with (as perhaps was his father and grandfather) the image of the Labour Party or the S.P.D. change his vote to Conservative or C.D.U. because some academic theorists say that there are no longer 'objective' grounds for his traditional political preference?—to put the matter baldly. 'Conservative socialism' (or liberal communism) has become the ideology of the working-class parties in affluent Western Europe; and this is the 'end of ideology' only to those who define ideology (as they have an historical right to!) as some total concept embracing explanation and prescription, the past, present, and future, history, morals, politics, economics, philosophy, and religion. Social Democracy is an ideology still, perhaps in the sense that British Conservatism can be disassembled and reassembled to provide a view of the past, present, and future, the *is* and the *ought* of political and spiritual man.

One of the problems of cross-polity comparison is the selection of values and attitudes for comparison, which, when delineated and translated into the words of the English (or any other) language do not distort the meaning

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or significance of that value in its own cultural setting. Broad general comparisons are the usual result and in these Professor Lipset is not guilty of distortion. Reporting (p. 229) on the aspirations of European youth, with respect to high-status occupations, the author indicates that in France the strongest preference seemed to be for careers in the French civil service, while in Britain and Italy the preference was for high-status professional occupations. This is not just an interesting and useful finding; it raises the whole question of comparison, for the French civil service, at the higher levels, is not only 'high status', influential, highly honoured etc.; it has, for a very long time, set the *professional* standards for those professional persons *not* employed by the state, for lawyers, scientists, accountants, engineers—and by example as much as by regulation. When higher civil servants set professional standards, have the highest national status, and are coveted by the private sector because of these attributes, the real differences between the objectives of aspirations (which, I think, is what is implied by Lipset) between France and Italy and the U.K. become far less significant.

R. H. PEAR

P. Y. MEDDING, *From Assimilation to Group Survival, A Political and Sociological Study of an Australian Jewish Community*, xxii + 309 pp., Introduction by Marshall Sklare, F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne 1968, \$A.6.00.

Mr. Medding has provided us with a welcome contribution to Jewish sociological studies. In a work which raises a wide variety of issues and which employs, if a little eclectically, an interesting variety of techniques—documentary, survey, and interview—he has provided a coherent account of some of the more significant features of Melbourne Jewish society in the 1960s. Melbourne Jewry has thus found in Mr. Medding both investigator and publicist who, by effectively showing that the situation in Melbourne is *sui generis* and no mere replica of British or American patterns, has provided some very relevant data for the comparative study of Western Jewry, and of immigration in general.

The three main aspects of Mr. Medding's study—the historical, the survey, and the present political sociology—share a common preoccupation: the relationship between locally supported definitions of Judaism and interpretations of Jewish identity, on the one hand, and the political leadership of Melbourne Jewry and its relation to Australian society on the other. Medding's account centres upon the manner in which the present situation emerged as the result of a protracted struggle over communal leadership, wherein the rise of new internal leadership institutions and personnel promoted new (that is, not exclusively religious) bases of Jewish identification which in turn have reinforced the leaders' positions by their implications for the relation of Jewry, through its institutional leadership, to the Australian political community.

Mr. Medding is a sociologist who appreciates the importance of history,

and he has made clear the extent to which contemporary Melbourne Jewry is a product of its immediate past, or rather of the rejection in the course of a forty year struggle for communal supremacy of a more remote past which for the new leadership was disadvantageous and inappropriate. The historical part of Mr. Medding's book does not pretend to be a full social history. It is an account of how a single fact, the arrival in the 1920s and 1930s of some 20,000 immigrants (mainly from Eastern Europe), overthrew the ascendancy of the old Australian Jewish families: by raising a whole new range of problems, and by expressing the demand for the organizational means whereby they themselves could solve those problems independent of 'aristocratic' control and paternalism, the migrants radically transformed the nature of Melbourne Jewry both by revitalizing religious life and by providing other focal points of Jewish identification. The many aspects of this transformation—economic, demographic, ideological, and organizational—all of which centred upon the leadership contest, are summarized in the title of the book; for the story the author relates, and with which he strongly identifies in the telling, is of the victory of the newly arrived 'ethnic survivalists', with their European notions of a diverse yet co-ordinated pattern of organizationally-centred Jewish life, over the old ascendancy of the colonial Jewish families who, as gentlemen of the Jewish faith, subscribed to a rather 'Anglican' Judaism of worship and charity, sustained by a positive ideology of social assimilation and undermined by the attendant attrition of rampant intermarriage. At first resented as an embarrassing intrusion—their strong Jewish commitments and heavy accents as well as their swelling numbers clearly threatening the adjustment which the old families had made to Australian society by restricting the context and impact of their religious peculiarity—the newcomers were gradually able to assert their influence and impose their values by establishing a network of associations and leadership positions which, co-ordinated in the Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies, became fully effective in 1961. The triumph of the newcomers and their success in establishing an associational network of leadership in the place of the family-based patronage and synagogal control of the old elite both reflected and accentuated the many other changes that were taking place: among them, a decline in intermarriage; the growth of Zionism; the development of a well-supported system of Jewish day-schools; the intensification of religious life (to even Hassidic extremes); and a determined campaign for the survival of Yiddish.

Mr. Medding's account of these changes is clear, but his enthusiastic approval for the changes he recounts at times blinds his perception of some important issues. His own analysis goes very little further than do the newcomers' denunciations of the 'old patrician ruling oligarchy', and while his delineation of the ethos of the patricians is interesting something more than just stereotype is needed. Mr. Medding's attempt to adopt that perilous stance which seeks to straddle detachment and involvement has led him to over-identify, but it is a virtue of his book to have pointed up, albeit by default, the need for a clear study of the old-family network: the basis of their wealth and status, their relations of kinship and marriage, and the manner in which they exercised their control through the synagogues and charitable institutions.

Moreover, the issues on which the leadership struggle was first fought out in the 1930s—British policy in Palestine and Australian immigration policy—were not purely internal ones, and Mr. Medding, preoccupied with the internal struggle for representative communal institutions, seems to miss the analytical importance of the external aspects which became increasingly important in the subsequent leadership crises which in the post-war period centred upon the questions of German migration, Communism, and the resultant labyrinthine intermeshing of Board of Deputies and Labour Party politics. In this perspective, Mr. Medding's account of leadership among Melbourne Jewry can be made to sustain a quite different interpretation: that the development of a network of organizations centralized in the Board has not produced a 'broad-based democratic structure' (whatever that may mean), but (in the context of the bloc voting and organizational dominance of the Board), merely the organizational means whereby those who overthrew the 'patrician oligarchy' themselves were able in turn to pre-empt the right to control, by their relation to power and influence in the Australian political community, large areas of communal life.

The suggestion of such an alternative interpretation indicates what may be the main shortcoming of Mr. Medding's work. His account of Melbourne Jewry is tied into the theory of social and cultural pluralism, and this, for all its documented provenance, is a political ideology rather than a conceptual framework for sociological analysis. The author's adherence to this orientation, together with the unrealistic view it entails of Australian society and with the associated insistence that Melbourne Jewry constitutes a 'community', again evidences the perils of investigator-involvement, for Mr. Medding's theory proves in crucial respects to be not a sociological analysis but an academically dressed-up version of the 'public relations' ideology (well analysed by the author himself) that the new leaders themselves would happily acknowledge as their own.

A review which critically concentrates on the major theoretical features of a book cannot attempt to do justice to the mass of empirical data presented, and in this regard Mr. Medding's book is both wealthy and suggestive of further lines of research. His combination of analysis of census returns together with the results of his own sample survey—though it is not clear from what universe he derived his sample—contains much that is of interest, including the intriguing statistic that while 64.2 per cent of Melbourne Jewry perceive discrimination, yet 56.9 per cent claim that they are unequivocally accepted. Nevertheless, Mr. Medding's book remains a thorough and absorbing account of a situation which continues to change, and one which both local leaders and those interested in comparative studies will refer to as a base for analysing further changes: in view of Mr. Medding's expressed concern about the alienation of the educated youth, more involved with Vietnam than with the Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies, it is noteworthy that an analysis of subsequent census returns, recently reported in this *Journal*, suggests that the tide of ethnic revival may again be ebbing, and that as the proportion of local-born Jews again increases so too does the wastage by intermarriage. Once again, the future of immigrant institutions lies in the hands of the immigrants' children.

CLIVE S. KESSLER

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ALEXANDER MITSCHERLICH, *Society without the Father, A Contribution to Social Psychology*, xi + 329 pp., Tavistock Publications, London, 1969, 60s.

Professor Mitscherlich's *Society without the Father* is an ambitious book. His three most quoted references are Freud, Nietzsche, and David Riesman, and the first two are demanding ego-ideals indeed. The third, Riesman, is an American sociologist who is known for his sweeping but compelling analysis of the American character as he views it moving from 'inner-direction' to 'other-direction', from responding to a fixed inner moral code to responding to the demands of others in increasingly complex situations. Like Riesman, and in a similar vein, Professor Mitscherlich attempts an analysis of the way in which modern society is changing and its impact on man's psychology. His main thesis is that modern man must cope with the loss of the father both in the primary sense, in his diminished role within the family, and in the secondary sense of the breakdown of a fixed and powerful authority in all aspects of social life. The individuals of the mass society react with 'regressive adaptation', a widespread weakness in personality development. He goes on to remind us, and here he is at his most persuasive, that under certain circumstances these same passive 'other-directed' individuals may allow aggressive tendencies of the most primitive kind to well up into mob action of which the Nazi movement has provided the most salient recent example.

To combat these twin dangers of passive obedience and unbridled aggression, Professor Mitscherlich puts his faith in a strengthening of the individual ego. It sometimes seems to the reader as though he were being addressed, over the head of society at large, as a somewhat recalcitrant psychoanalytic patient, that he is being told in effect to pull up his socks. This prescription is sometimes put back one step: parents are exhorted to bring up their children differently so that *they* will have stronger egos. Or a revolution in education is called for which is never spelled out but referred to in terms which echo progressive educators of fifty years ago. Existing social institutions are seen as almost wholly inimical to the process of ego strengthening, almost never as capable of contributing to the individual's intellectual, moral, or social development.

The most antagonistic forces are at work in the social field in which each of us moves. On the one hand are the residues of a paternalism which is becoming increasingly void of content and is no longer able to provide guidance in the real decisions that have to be made, and on the other the rules of a society of the 'band of brothers' type that have hardly developed beyond the rudimentary stage and therefore do not yet provide binding and compelling patterns of behaviour. . . . The dice will fall not just for today but for a present that will determine the future.

In the shadow of the mushroom cloud, one cannot object to the apocalyptic tone. Nor can one really criticize the lack of a reasoned programme for what to do about the underlying problems of our society. The book must stand or fall upon the validity of Professor Mitscherlich's description of modern social trends and his reasoning concerning their implications for the individual in relation to his society, and society in relation to the individuals out of which it is composed. Here, despite the considerable literature which is synthesized

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by Professor Mitscherlich, the book seems to this reader to suffer from a lack of the 'middle-level' type of analysis. There is a well-developed description of modern psychoanalytic views about the structure and development of the individual personality. On the other hand, there are many references to social and political institutions seen from a global perspective, as in the quotation above. But the aim embodied in the sub-title of the book is 'a contribution to social psychology' and it is just here, in the nexus where the individual interacts with social forces, that Professor Mitscherlich does least justice to his subject. It is true that he devotes a chapter to *roles* and another to *prejudice*, both useful concepts for social psychological analysis. But the discussion of role is marred by the inability to give due weight to the *positive* functions of role, to the intimate connexion between the individual's multiple roles and his individuality. His chapter on prejudice suffers from a like tendency to look upon prejudice as a thing apart: the interconnexion between prejudice, attitude, and value is not explored in the context of a modern social psychology of attitudes.

Professor Mitscherlich calls for greater social knowledge and insight to aid the individual ego in its beleaguered position, but he greatly underestimates the degree to which modern empirical social science has already travelled toward that enlightenment which he holds out wistfully as an impossible Utopia.

Studying a teacher, a professor, minister, or industrialist at work with his group is regarded as a grossly improper idea, not as a project that might be helpful to society.

I do not know the situation in Germany but, in Great Britain and America, substantial sums are being paid out every year by government, industry, and private foundations to support just such studies. Or again:

If it were possible, with the aid of a more subtle understanding of the different types of obedience, to make observations of the most varied fields—if it were possible, for instance, to study the relationship between the progress made by children at school and the behaviour pattern of their families, or similarly to study how much elbow room is really available in reaching judicial decisions, or how much freedom of judgment the character structure . . . of members of a cabinet allows them in arriving at government decisions—we should reach a new dimension of understanding of the social reality of which history is made.

The 'different types of obedience' in all their ramifications (usually referred to as aspects of *conformity*) have become one of the major topics of psychological research; the detailed tracing of the inter-relations between school and home have likewise generated a sizable research literature. I am less familiar with the other two topics suggested, but I would be most surprised if they had not been explored by some of those avid research psychologists and sociologists who have recently invaded the domains of both law and government. This research is, of course, of variable quality, and one cannot as yet claim 'a new dimension of understanding'. But one can hardly agree that these questions have escaped notice from social science; rather it is this type of research which has escaped the notice of Professor Mitscherlich.

More surprising, perhaps, is Professor Mitscherlich's almost unrelieved pessimism in the face of certain hopeful and progressive steps which have been

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taken by various governments in the past few years. For example, can anyone familiar with the recent legislation and judicial implementation of the civil rights of the American Negro really agree with such statements as the following?

... jurisprudence has contributed and still contributes little to the integration of a new society but a great deal to its state of disintegration and confusion. . . . It no longer possesses the creative power of making explicit the social sense of justice, putting it into words, and instead of searching for the fundamental rights and wrongs of the case at issue, administers a fictitious justice dictated by prevalent ideologies and propositions regarded as self-evident.

Many of us share with Professor Mitscherlich the problem of reconciling a hope for increased freedom and individuality with the conservative estimate of human nature and society bequeathed to us from the paternalistic 'inner-directed' perspective of his great mentor Freud. But with Professor Mitscherlich even more than with Freud, one is so often made conscious of the Puritan anti-consumption anti-emotion bias underlying his personal value system. Thus he approves of electricity as a convenience available to everyone and looks forward to 'a technical Elysium in which the technical cathexis [of such things as cars, carpets, one's residential neighbourhood, etc.] . . . will have been so reduced that all products of industry will provide a similarly unnoticed background'. This may spell Elysium to Professor Mitscherlich, but I can think of other words for it! Again, emotion and affect are always portrayed as dangerous and negative; 'the less our affects succeed in evading the ego and thus directly influencing our actions, the greater our self-knowledge'. And since self-knowledge is the highest good, so much for spontaneity and freedom in the life of the emotions! His insistence on a tight rein at all times gives his strictures on child-rearing a most unrealistic tinge: serious negative consequences for the child are predicted if parents subject their children to their 'irritable moods'; they must give their children a 'constancy of affective approach' with no rationalizing or deviations from this course, for 'we know for certain that no abruptly or carelessly or casually taken affective decision is without consequences, perhaps permanent consequences'. One begins to side with the philistines in reflecting that children, luckily, must be a good deal tougher than Professor Mitscherlich thinks.

Finally, one is left with the question of Professor Mitscherlich's main thesis. There are many families without fathers, and for some social groups this constitutes a major problem. But is it a problem for our society in general in the sense which Professor Mitscherlich means?

The increase in specialization had led to fatherlessness in the first degree; to the loss of the physical presence of the working father . . . Fatherlessness of the second degree dissolves the personal element in power relationships; one is aware of authority as ever, but it cannot be visualized. The fatherless (and increasingly also motherless) child grows into an adult with no visible master, exercises anonymous functions, and is guided by anonymous functions. What his senses are aware of is individuals similar to himself in huge number.

The paragraph touches off a kind of resonance, and one cannot deny that the author possesses an authentic and deeply felt sensitivity to certain features of the malaise of our times. But there is another side. One looks at the

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modern fathers one knows, in many ways so much more accessible to their children than fathers of any preceding generation, and one wonders. The 'experiment' which Professor Mitscherlich repeatedly calls for in the pages of his book—towards more child-centred, more psychologically aware methods of child rearing and education—is already in effect in a sizable number of homes and schools throughout the modern world. The effects of this social revolution are still in question, and many people remain doubtful. But to write as though such social forms were not yet invented is once again to do society an injustice, on a scale altogether more serious than withholding due credit for the achievements of social science research. For if Professor Mitscherlich is right, the creative forces in our society need all the recognition and support which we can give.

ELAINE GRAHAM SOFER

CARLTON C. QUALEY, ed., *Thorstein Veblen The Carleton College Veblen Seminar Essays*, ix + 170 pp., Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1968, 54s.

In 1966 Carleton College decided to celebrate its centenary by holding a seminar on its best known alumnus Thorstein Veblen, of the class of 1880. The centre of the seminar's concern was Veblen as a social critic, more particularly his relevance to the American present. Six scholars participated in the seminar, and this book is a symposium of their contributions.

There is a helpful introduction by Carlton Qualey which attempts to assess the credit and loss account of Veblen's social prophecy: the importance of his insight into the role of the machine process, his moralistic objection to the 'unreal' pecuniary culture and the artificial world of salesmanship, his anticipation of the managerial revolution and his overemphasis—in contemporary terms—on 'industrial sabotage' (restriction for profit), and on a conspicuous consumption confined to a small leisure class.

Qualey ends on an uncertain note about the stark choice Veblen offered between a socialized state and a perpetual war economy. Professor Friday is less uncertain: in his view the Welfare State as a third option has so far achieved less impact than the war economy. His is the gloomiest of the essays: he seems to agree with Veblen that the capitalist economy stagnates rather than staggering from crisis to crisis, accepts the thesis that war and conspicuous waste absorb more of the 'slack' than does welfare, and stresses the view fundamental to Veblen that the root of the trouble is inequality.

Joseph Dorfman delineates the university context within which Veblen was a conspicuous irritant and underlines the help and stimulation he received from conservative minded academics. He shows Veblen's relation to the contemporary debate over the interpretation of social evolution, the Spencerian view being that selection was the natural mode of social advance, whereas Lester Ward and Veblen saw evolution as including the amelioration of selection by human intelligence, which was itself also part of nature. Veblen also found interesting the use of anthropology in Spencer, and utilized

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Boas's work on the Kwakiutl as analogous to his own concept of 'conspicuous waste'. Another point emerging from Dorfman is Veblen's early interest in the popular radicalism of Edward Bellamy and Henry George.

Thomas Cochran's essay on business in Veblen's heyday (1890-1910) is a notably succinct summary of the major trends in one of the most fascinating and crucial phases of American history. He describes the end of the self-sufficient rural economy and the diminishing overall role of agriculture, the growth of gentlemen's agreements, trusts, and monopolies and the expanding powers of investment banking and insurance. Yet he regards this period as the peak of this expansion and emphasizes that the new elite of corporate managers were well-educated, technically expert, and even to some extent socially responsible. As Veblen prophesied, they ended the transitional style of capitalism—but they did not end capitalism as such.

The group on which Veblen eventually pinned messianic hopes was the engineers, on account of their devotion to real production and technological improvement rather than to paper transactions and restrictive practices, their 'instinct of workmanship', and their 'idle curiosity'. David Noble develops Veblen's implicit theology by showing how the engineers were his key stratum, ontologically superior by virtue of their roots in 'nature'. The Puritan revolution of the seventeenth century was a false dawn of peace, science, productivity, and brotherhood, which made it all the more difficult to recognize in the profane chaos and the 'artificial' pecuniary culture of later capitalism the dragon lying across the path of humanity. The capitalist elite has taken over the warring habits and status adornments of feudalism: if the engineers, the holy men of industrialism, did not accept their religious responsibility to recover true sacred harmony then mankind might lose its last chance to live in the organic unity and peace of 'hereditary savage human nature'.

Altogether this is an excellent series of essays, illuminating Veblen from every angle, and a worthy conclusion to Carleton College's first hundred years. There is also a bibliography of Veblen's writings.

DAVID MARTIN

STEIN, LEONARD, ed., in collaboration with YOGEV, GEDALIA, *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, English edn., Series A; Letters, Volume I, Summer 1885-October 29th, 1902, xlii + 447 pp., Oxford University Press, London, 1968, 63s. -

For those concerned with the history of Zionism and with the atmosphere in which were built up the plans and personalities of its beginnings, a series of letters so complete from one of the chief actors is invaluable. Weizmann is especially concerned in these letters with three aspects of the movement, with the formation of a 'democratic faction' within it, which would get practical activities dealt with, with an organization for youth, to develop progressive ideas, and with the establishment of a Jewish university. In the first two he failed to achieve any results; the third took a long time of gestation. In the

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letters the issues are dealt with, now formally, now informally, now in terms of projects, now of personalities. The earlier part reflects his friendship and gradual exasperation with the erratic Leo Motzkin, the second part his growing and deepening love for Vera Khatzman who was to make him such a perfect wife and who survived him for some years. The introduction by Stein is masterly, the editing and translating are admirably done. We leave Weizmann still at Geneva University, and Vera Khatzman a medical student at the same university. They were not married till 1906. In the Zionist Organization we can see his growing importance, but leadership, even of a 'faction', comes later. The second volume will be eagerly awaited.

JAMES PARKES

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The Hebrew University of Jerusalem has had a record student registration for the academic year 1969-70. The total enrolment is 15,320, 1,700 more than in the previous session. About half of the increase is made up by foreign students, who now account for 3,200 compared with 2,400 in 1968-69. Two years ago foreign students at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem constituted 11 per cent of the total enrolment; this year they represent 20 per cent. On the other hand, Arab students from East Jerusalem and the West Bank numbered 22 last session and this session there are only 15. The President of the University explained at a Press Conference that Arab students were handicapped by the fact that they had not followed an Israeli curriculum in the secondary schools; he added that he hoped their number would increase in the future. However, the total number of Israeli Arabs (that is, from all parts of Israel) has increased from 150 to 155. The increase would have been greater were it not for the fact that many Arab students who would have gone to the Jerusalem University have now registered at Haifa University. The President of the Hebrew University also stated that a new department of Chinese Studies has been established in Jerusalem, and that a School of Home Economics has been opened on the Rehovot Campus.

The Rector of the Hebrew University announced that there were 90 places this year for first year students of the Medical Faculty; there had been 10 applicants for each place. He added that there had recently been a great pressure on places for Biology degrees. Until recently the Physics Department had had the greatest number of applications. The Rector expressed the opinion that the change was probably due 'to recent basic biological discoveries'.

For the first time in 22 years, lectures were given on the Mount Scopus Campus of the Hebrew University: they were attended by 850 students of the Law Faculty. The Faculty is the first of the University's departments to move to Mount Scopus. It is hoped that within five years 13,000 to 14,000 students will be enrolled in various departments of the University on Mount Scopus. There were classes held there for six months in the last academic session but these classes were not part of the University's formal curriculum. About 500 students have been trained there to prepare them for University entrance.

It has been announced that in September 1970 the Hebrew University will start a European Training Project for Jewish educators at its Jerusalem Centre for Jewish Education in the Diaspora. The Project will offer comprehensive courses of study in Jewish Education leading to the B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees. Scholarships will be available for suitable candidates, who will be required to serve for four years in their home communities after completing their studies. Applications for the courses should be addressed

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to the Joint Distribution Committee, Geneva, or to the Centre for Jewish Education in the Diaspora at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

*

The Institute of Contemporary Jewry at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, is drawing up an inventory of current studies in the field of Contemporary Jewry which are being carried out throughout the world. This project will encompass ongoing research in the various disciplines for the post First World War period. It will include both Masters' theses and Doctoral dissertations in progress as well as theses and dissertations which have been completed since 1967 but have not yet been published.

It is the intention in the first instance to publish a preliminary register. The inventory will be expanded and published on a regular basis in the proposed World Jewish Year Book which is being planned by the Institute of Contemporary Jewry.

The Institute requests anyone with students carrying out research in this field to send the relevant information (when a questionnaire will be forwarded immediately).

*

Israel's Ministerial Committee on Science and Technology, which is headed by the Deputy Prime Minister, decided last November to establish a University at Beersheba. The new University will incorporate several institutions already established in the Negev region; the largest of these is the Institute for Higher Learning at Beersheba.

*

The President of the Technion in Haifa announced that there had been a record number of students enrolled in the 1969-70 academic session: 4,400 undergraduates (compared with 4,100 last year) and 1,850 graduates. He told a press conference last October that the Government matches pound for pound research projects commissioned by industry. The Technion's Research and Development Foundation had carried out research to the value of IL12m. in the last academic year—a rise of 50 per cent on the previous year's figure. He added that new departments had been established this year; they included a department of Applied Mathematics, an Engineering Materials department, and a Medical Engineering department.

*

Over 16,000 immigrants, an increase of 40 per cent over 1968, arrived in Israel during the first half of this year. 1,000 former Israelis are included in this figure. Immigration from Europe increased threefold, and immigration increased by 40 per cent from the United States and Latin American countries. There was a decrease, however, in the number of immigrants from Asian and African countries. 35 per cent of the new Olim were below 19 years old, a similar percentage were between 20 and 39, but only 9 per cent were over 60 years of age.

The expected figure for the whole of 1969 was 37,000 immigrants to Israel.

*

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Over 1,000 British citizens settled in Israel in the first 8 months of 1961, that is, an increase of more than 30 per cent. Nearly 50 per cent of this year's immigrants to Israel were in the 18 to 29 age group. 170 professional people, mostly teachers and medical personnel, immigrated—a larger proportion than previously. There were more single women than men among the Olim in 1969.

It was hoped that the figure of 1,500 would be reached for this year.

*

It was reported by the Central Bureau of Statistics (Jerusalem) last October that in 1968, 2,647 temporary residents and tourists settled permanently in Israel; the number included 90 non-Jews. From the foundation of the State of Israel until the end of 1968, 30,641 tourists and temporary residents have settled in the country; among them were 1,369 Gentiles. In recent years there has been a marked increase in the numbers who decided to settle in Israel: until 1961 the annual average was about 1,000; in 1962 there were 1,900; while from 1963 to 1968 inclusive the annual average rose to 2,400.

About three-quarters of the total number of these immigrants have come from Europe and the Americas—mainly from English-speaking countries. About 85 per cent of last year's settlers are urban residents.

*

The Eighth World Congress of the Israel Medical Association will meet in Jerusalem on 18 May 1970. The main subjects in the official programme are

- (a) The Jewish contribution to medicine throughout the ages, and
- (b) The achievements of medicine in Israel and medical services during the Israel-Arab wars of 1948, 1956, and 1967.

*

It was announced in Haifa last November that President Shazar had sworn in the first Druze magistrate to be appointed since the end of Ottoman rule in the Holy Land. He is a lawyer, and has been appointed to the Acre court.

*

The Federation of Jewish Communities in Yugoslavia celebrated last October the fiftieth anniversary of its foundation. The community now numbers about 6,500 souls; before the outbreak of the Second World War there were some 75,000 Jews in Yugoslavia.

During the Jubilee celebration the Belgrade Jewish historical museum inaugurated its new premises. A memorial volume covering the fifty-year-old history of the Federation has been published this year. Representatives from many European Jewish communities attended the celebrations for the Jubilee of Yugoslav Jewry.

*

The Novosti Press Agency has published details of a study entitled 'Soviet Jews as they are'. The Agency said that 'about 100 synagogues' are functioning

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in the Soviet Union and that a Yeshiva is attached to the main synagogue in Moscow where Rabbis and ritual slaughterers are trained.

According to the Study, there are large numbers of Jews in the main Soviet cities: 240,000 in Moscow; 170,000 in Leningrad; 154,000 in Kiev; 39,000 in Minsk; 17,000 in Vilna; 43,000 in Kishinev; 31,000 in Riga; 17,400 in Tiflis; 72,430 in the Dnepropetrovsk region; 84,000 in Kharkov; 42,000 in Vinnitsa; 30,000 in Lvov; 40,000 in Chernovitsi; 120,000 in Odessa; 43,000 in Gomel; and 28,000 in Mogilev.

A very large number of Jews sought refuge in Uzbekistan during the war; 100,000 still live in the region now.

*

The Association of Sephardi Congregations, at a conference held in London last November, decided to take steps to establish its own permanent Beth Din. The conference was attended by representatives of Sephardi congregations in London and Manchester and by the president of the Sephardi Hebrew Congregation in Rhodesia.

*

The head of the Overseas Department of the Central Jewish Federation of Welfare Funds has been establishing contact with Jewish communities in Latin America. In October 1969 the Information Service of the European Council of Jewish Community Services reported in its bulletin, *Exchange Information Service*, No. 7, that the Jewish community in Cuba now numbers fewer than 2,000 people. In 1961 Cuba had about 6,500 Jewish inhabitants. The present community has a very high percentage of aged and handicapped persons. Most of the young and able-bodied members have emigrated.

*

It was announced from Sydney early in December that, after the conference organized by the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, a Federation of Jewish Communities of South-East Asia and the Far East was set up—the executive of the Federation to be composed of communal representatives from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and India. The new Federation is to be a regional associate of the World Jewish Congress, and will seek co-operation between the various communities in the fields of religion, culture, youth, education, welfare, and in matters connected with Israel.

*

The Research Report for 1967–68 of the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, Jerusalem, published in 1969, gives details of, *inter alia*, various research projects carried out in connexion with the Six-Day War. It lists research in progress 1967–68 under the following heads: methodological advances; medical sociology and social psychology; genetics; education; culture and social structure; and public opinion. The Report refers to various other activities of the Institute and provides a list of publications.

*

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A 15,000 volume library which belonged to the late Oskar K. Rabinowicz (and which was started by his father, Yehuda Arich Rabinowicz) will soon be moved from New York to the library of the Hebrew University. It is said to be one of the world's most important collections on Zionism and Jewish history.

*

The Association of French Jewish students held a colloquium in Strasbourg from 30th October to 2nd November 1969; the colloquium was held under the auspices of the World Jewish Congress and the Jewish Agency. About two hundred students from various cities of France participated; they invited guest speakers.

The central theme of the colloquium was Jewish youth, Israel, and Revolution.

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A new study centre has just been inaugurated in Grenoble, under the auspices of the Ecole supérieure talmudique of Aix-les-Bains, *Chachmey Tsofot*. It is reported that the aim of the centre is to provide courses specially aimed at Jewish youth; these courses will include a study of the Bible and biblical commentary, of Halachah, Mishnah, Gemara, and Jewish ethics.

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Argentina has about 475,000 Jews, of whom 100,000 are Sephardim. About three quarters of the total Jewish population (350,000) live in Greater Buenos Aires.

The *Jewish Chronicle* in its issue of 19th September 1969 reported that the Chief Rabbi of Argentina had stated that there was not a single Rabbi anywhere in Argentina outside Buenos Aires. There are about 140 communities in the country ranging in size from 20 to 3,000 families. The Chief Rabbi is also reported to have stated that there has been a great decline in the Jewish population of the provinces. He was speaking at a meeting in Cordoba of the communal council of Argentina. He cited, as an example of the decline, the fact that many Jewish families are not registered with the community, and that in one particular town 22 of the 52 households which were on the register were mixed-marriage households. In another town, where it is known there are about 100 Jewish children, only 25 attended local Jewish schools. The Chief Rabbi added that assimilation was rampant in many of the scattered communities of the country.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

- Arberry, A. J., general ed., *Religion in the Middle East, Three Religions in Concord and Conflict*, 2 vols., vol. I: xii + 595 pp., vol. II: xi + 850 pp., Cambridge Univ. Press, London, 1969, £7.
- Borowitz, Eugene B., *How Can a Jew Speak of Faith Today?*, 221 pp., The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1969, \$6.00.
- Cohen, Hayyim J., *Hape'ilut hatsionit be'Iraq*, 275 pp., Hasifria Hatsionit, Jerusalem, 1969, n.p.
- Daton, James Allen, *Soka Gakkai, Builders of the Third Civilization, American and Japanese Members*, xiv + 171 pp., Univ. of Washington Press, London, 1969, 75s. 6d.
- Department of Education and Science, *Youth and Community Work in the 70s*, proposals by the Youth Service Development Council, viii + 175 pp., Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1969, 15s.
- Harris, Hugh, *English Words of Hebrew Origin*, 12 pp., Society for Jewish Study, London, 1969, n.p.
- Institute of Criminology, *Proceedings of the Symposium on Amnesty in Israel (Jerusalem 13/14 May 1968)* (Hebrew and English), xxiv + 58 pp., Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1968, n.p.
- Institute of Criminology, Faculty of Law in co-operation with the Israel National Committee for Human Rights Year, *Symposium on War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and Statutory Limitations*, 39 pp., The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1968, n.p.
- Katz, Israel and Silver, Harold, eds., *The University and Social Welfare*, papers delivered at the Colloquium held in Jerusalem, April 1967, xi + 251 pp., publication of the Paul Baerwald School of Social Work, Magnes Press of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1969, 50s.
- Krausz, Ernest, *Sociology in Britain, A survey of research*, vii + 222 pp., B. T. Batsford Ltd., London, 1969, 42s.
- Mead, Margaret, Dobzhansky, Theodosius; Toback, Ethel; and Light, Robert E., eds., *Science and the Concept of Race*, x + 177 pp., Columbia Univ. Press, London, 1969, 22s. 6d. paperback.
- Moskowitz, Moses, *The Politics and Dynamics of Human Rights*, xii + 283 pp., Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1968, \$7.50.
- Nettl, J. P., *Rosa Luxemburg* (abridged edition) xviii + 557 pp., Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1969, 25s.
- Northern, Helen, *Social Work with Groups*, x + 270 pp., Columbia Univ. Press, London, 1969, 67s. 6d.
- Osipov, G. V. ed., *Town, Country and People*, viii + 260 pp., Tavistock Publications, London, 1969, 55s.
- Reid, William J. and Shyne, Ann W., *Brief and Extended Casework*, xiii + 270 pp., Columbia Univ. Press, London, 1969, 67s. 6d.
- Ross, Aileen D., *Student Unrest in India, A Comparative Approach*, xiv + 301 pp., McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, London, 1969, 112s. 6d.
- Rowe, Eric, *Modern Politics, An Introduction to Behaviour and Institutions*, xii + 116 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1969; cloth edition, 16s., paperback, 8s.
- Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, *Statistical Yearbook of the Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality 1968*, Research and Statistics Department, n.p.
- Warner, Aaron W.; Morse, Dean; and Cooney, Thomas E., eds., *The Environment of Change*, xvii + 186 pp., Columbia Univ. Press, London, 1969, 67s. 6d.
- Yivo Institute for Jewish Research, *Yivo Annual of Jewish Social Science, Volume XIV*, 288 pp., New York, 1969, n.p.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

- ALBROW, Martin; B.A., Senior Lecturer in Sociology, University College, Cardiff. Chief publications: 'The Influence of Accommodation on 64 Reading University Students', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. xvii No. 4, 1966; 'The Study of Organizations: Objectivity or Bias', *Penguin Social Sciences Survey* 1968; *Bureaucracy* (forthcoming). His current research is on Max Weber and the idea of rationality in social science.
- ELAZAR, Daniel J.; M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Federalism, Temple University, Philadelphia. Chief publications: *The Defeat of Metropolitan Integration in Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee*, Chicago, 1961; *The American Partnership*, Chicago, 1962; *American Federalism: A View from the States*, New York, 1966; *Federalism and the Community*, Pittsburgh, 1968; *Cities of the Prairie*, New York, 1969; *Toward a Generational Theory of American Politics*, Philadelphia, 1969.
- GLAZER, Nathan; A.M., Ph.D., Professor of Education and Social Structure, Harvard University. Formerly Professor of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley. Chief publications: *The Lonely Crowd* (with David Riesman and Reuel Denney), New Haven, Conn., 1950; *Faces in the Crowd* (with David Riesman), New Haven, 1952; *American Judaism*, Chicago, 1957; *Studies in Housing and Minority Groups* (co-editor with Davis McEntire), Berkeley, 1960; *The Social Basis of American Communism*, New York, 1961; *Beyond the Melting Pot* (with Daniel P. Moynihan), Cambridge, Mass., 1963. Currently engaged in work on urban social policy.
- HELLER, Celia Stopnicka; M.A., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Sociology, Hunter College of the City University of New York; formerly Lecturer at Vassar College and at the University of Cartagena, Colombia. Her publications include 'Social Stratification of the Jewish Community of a Small Polish Town', *American Journal of Sociology*, July 1953; 'The Jews of Barranquilla—a community in South America', *Jewish Social Studies*, October 1956; 'The Attitudes of Negroes Toward Jews', *Social Forces*, March 1965; *Mexican American Youth*, New York, 1966; *Structured Social Inequality*, New York, 1969. Currently working on a book about the Jewish Community in Poland 1917-39, and engaged in research on the sociological approach to genocide.
- HERZ, Liva; Phil. cand., Assistant in the Department of Sociology, University of Lund. Currently engaged in research work for the degree of doctor of sociology.
- KRAUSZ, Ernest; M.Sc. (Econ.), Ph.D., Lecturer in Sociology, The City University London. Held Nuffield Foundation Sociological Research Scholarship at the London School of Economics, 1961-1964. Chief publications: *Leeds Jewry: Its History and Social Structure*, 1964; 'Occupation and Social Advancement in Anglo-Jewry', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. IV, no. 1, 1962; contributor to J. Gould and S. Esh

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LESLIE, Donald Daniel; B.Sc., M.Litt., D. de l'Université (Paris), Fellow, Far Eastern History, Australian National University; formerly Research Fellow, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Chief publications: 'Contribution to a New Translation of the Lun Heng', *T'oung Pao*, 44, 1956; with A. Porath, *The Sayings of Confucius* (Hebrew), Bialik Institute, Jerusalem, 1960; *Confucius*, Paris, 1962; with J. Davidson, *Catalogues of Chinese Local Gazetteers*, Canberra, 1967. Currently working on Chinese Jews; ways of thinking of Ancient Chinese philosophers; and on a Chinese bibliography.