

Antisemitic Attitudes and Anti-Jewish Crime in the United Kingdom: Longitudinal Trends, Demographic Predictors, and Policy Implications

Daniel Allington

Abstract

Recent terror attacks against Jewish targets in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in the diaspora have been motivated by hostility to Israel and (for the most part) carried out by Muslim members of migrant communities, often with links to Islamist organizations. In this, such attacks follow trends in anti-Jewish incidents more broadly. An explanation for this pattern may be found in evidence (a) that antisemitic attitudes are low in the United Kingdom and culturally similar countries, but much higher in parts of the Muslim world from which large numbers have migrated to the United Kingdom, and (b) that extremists exploit the Israel-Hamas conflict in order to radicalize Muslims in particular.

This article presents two empirical studies. The first, which aggregates official UK police statistics for the eight-year period ending March 2025, finds absolute numbers of religiously aggravated crimes targeting perceived Jews to have roughly tripled, appearing to track developments in the Israel-Hamas conflict (notably doubling after October 7, 2023). The second, which analyzes attitudinal data collected from the general British population between December 2020 and September 2025 ($n = 11394$), finds proportions of individuals with elevated levels of “old” (Judeophobic) and “new” (antizionist) antisemitic attitudes to be almost perfectly correlated from one year to the next, roughly doubling after the Hamas-led atrocities of October 7, 2023, with this rise having occurred disproportionately among the young (especially with regard to “old” antisemitic attitudes, which barely changed among individuals of median age and above). Multiple demographic predictors are identified with regard to “old” and “new” antisemitic attitudes, identity as Muslim emerging as by far the strongest in respect of both. Christians of all denominations are found to be particularly unlikely to hold elevated levels of antisemitic attitudes in relation to Israel and its supporters, while Christians of mainstream denominations are found to be no more nor less susceptible to elevated levels of classic antisemitic belief than people of no religion (although Christians of small minority denominations were found to be more likely to hold such attitudes). These findings have important policy implications, both for government and for the Jewish community itself.

Keywords: Antisemitism, antizionism, hate crime, Islamism, Jihadism, migration, Muslims, terrorism

INTRODUCTION



2025 was the year in which a long-anticipated, long-dreaded event came to pass. On the

morning of October 2—the first morning of Yom Kippur—the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Manchester became unwilling host to the United Kingdom’s first lethal terror attack on a Jewish place of worship.

Once upon a time, it might have seemed safe to assume that such an attack could come only from right-wing extremist members of the country's historical ethnic and religious majority community, i.e., white British people of Christian faith. But this was almost exactly two years after the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, carried out by a coalition of Palestinian militants and civilians which crossed the border between Gaza and Israel on October 7, 2023, under the leadership of the Qatari-funded Iranian proxy militia, Hamas: an Islamist group dedicated to the killing of Jews.¹ So it should have come as no surprise that an era of comparative Anglo-Jewish safety would come to an end with an attack, not from white British Christians inspired by neo-Nazism, Christian Nationalism, or White Nationalism, but from a different ethnic, religious, and ideological quarter entirely.

Jihad al-Shamie was the Syrian-born, UK-resident son of a doctor who had praised the perpetrators of the October 7, 2023, atrocities as "Allah's men on earth."² During his rampage—which resulted in death or serious injury for three members of the congregation (one of whom was accidentally hit by a police bullet)—al-Shamie explicitly pledged allegiance to Islamic State³ and shouted, "this is what they get for killing our children,"⁴ thus identifying his murderous actions as retribution for the death of Palestinians in Gaza. His own death was guaranteed by the fake suicide belt that he wore, the presence of which obliged police responders to take his life.

Like the Hamas-led incursion that the terrorist's father had celebrated, albeit on a much smaller scale, the Heaton Park synagogue attack resulted in loss of life. The same was thankfully not true of the terror plot hatched by Tunisian-born Walid Saadaoui together with the Syrian-born Kuwaiti national Amar Hussein.⁵ These two Islamic State supporters were convicted on December 23 the same year in connection with a planned mass casualty attack on Jewish community targets in the same city, in

preparation for which they had attempted to procure smuggled automatic weapons and ammunition.⁶ Both men were said to have a "visceral dislike" of Jews,⁷ with the October 7, 2023, atrocities having inspired Saadaoui—who once prayed not to be caught until he had "br[oken his] thirst with Jewish, Christians [sic], and their [sic] proxies' blood"—to begin preparing an attack, and with Hussein describing UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer as "[a] terrorist that kills our children and gives Israel weapons [to] kill our children."⁸

As Saadaoui's reference to Christian blood should remind the readers of this article, it is not always Jews who become the immediate victims of antisemitic crime. Eight days after the October 7, 2023, pogrom, Ahmed Ali Alid—a Moroccan citizen who had entered the United Kingdom illegally and applied for asylum—murdered an elderly non-Jewish man, also attempting to murder a fellow asylum seeker who had converted to Christianity.⁹ Following his arrest, Alid told police that "he wanted to kill [his two victims] because of the conflict in Gaza and so that Palestine would be free from 'Zionists,'" further clarifying that "he would have killed many more people if he had been able to, because so many innocents were being killed in Gaza."¹⁰ One might also draw a parallel with the case of Ali Harbi Ali, a British-born Islamic State supporter of Somali heritage, who killed British MP Sir David Amess the previous year, in part because of the latter's support for airstrikes against Islamic State targets in Syria and in part because of his membership of the parliamentary group Conservative Friends of Israel.¹¹

Recent attacks such as the above have also occurred elsewhere in the world. Elias Rodriguez, a Chicago-born US citizen with a background in left-wing politics,¹² appears to have made a call to "bring the war home," justifying "armed action" and arguing that "the perpetrators and abettors [of genocide] have forfeited their humanity," before allegedly opening fire on attendees at a reception at the Capital Jewish

Museum in Washington, D.C., on May 21, 2025, shouting “Free Palestine,” and subsequently declaring that he “did it for Palestine” and “did it for Gaza.”¹³ Mohamed Soliman, the Egyptian asylum seeker who attacked a Colorado rally for Israeli hostages in Gaza with firebombs and a makeshift flamethrower on June 1, 2025, yelling “Free Palestine” and later telling investigators that he wanted to “kill all Zionist people,” is reported to have expressed support for the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁴ The terrorists who are alleged to have carried out the December 14, 2025 massacre of fifteen Jews attending a Hanukkah party at Bondi Beach, i.e., Indian-born Sajid Akram and his Australian-born son Naveed Akram,¹⁵ appear to have expressed allegiance to Islamic State, and explained the motivation for their attack through condemnation of “Zionists.”¹⁶ On March 12, 2026, as this article neared completion, Lebanese-born Ayman Mohamad Ghazali, the brother of a Hezbollah commander and a US citizen since 2015, carried out a vehicle ramming attack on the Temple Israel synagogue in Detroit, his car laden with explosives, but thankfully killed no one before dying by his own hand.¹⁷

There are three fundamental points to observe about these attacks, whether consummated or frustrated. The first is that all but one of the perpetrators were both Muslims and either migrants or members of migrant communities, and that the exception had a background, not in right-wing but in left-wing politics. The second is that all but one of the Muslim perpetrators either were directly connected to or had expressed support for formal Islamist organizations, either during or prior to their crimes. The third is that, in every single case but that of Ghazali (who said nothing about his motives), the attackers (or would-be attackers) explicitly indicated in their own words that they were motivated not by traditional Western prejudices against Jews, but by hostility to Israel and its “Zionist” citizens and supporters. In this third respect, the more outspoken perpetrators follow Hamas’s turn towards official public expression

of hostility towards “Zionism,” rather than Jews¹⁸—a turn which did not, of course, preclude that organization from killing hundreds of Jewish civilians on October 7, 2023,—and indeed adopt the framing of its original founding document, which drew heavily on European antisemitic sources and openly fulminated against “warmongering Jews,” yet referred to “world Zionism” where earlier Islamists had identified their enemy as “world Jewry.”¹⁹

These trends show no sign of abating. While this article was under review, several arson attacks on Jewish targets in London were claimed by a new Islamist organization known as Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia,²⁰ with named suspects Hamza Iqbal and Rehan Khan, both identified as British nationals, being arrested alongside an unnamed dual British-Pakistani national in connection with the most devastating attack, which destroyed several ambulances belonging to a Jewish charity.²¹ During the same period, details were released of an attack on the Israeli embassy in London which had been thwarted on April 28, 2025, with the arrest of Abdullah Albadri: a Kuwaiti asylum seeker who had illegally entered the United Kingdom by small boat.²² Armed with knives and wearing a Palestinian keffiyeh, Albadri was carrying a handwritten note with the words “I will not go back on my decision to go in the cause of Allah, to come out for His sake and to stand up to the enemies in order to support the religion of Allah Almighty,” and was heard to declare that “they need to stop” the “war on children.”²³ Then, while the manuscript of this article was being copyedited following peer review, Essa Suleiman—a British citizen born in Somalia—was arrested and charged with the public stabbing of two visibly Jewish men in one of the most famously Jewish areas of London, which prompted the UK government to raise the country’s terror threat level to “severe.”²⁴ Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia again claimed responsibility:

Zionists were targeted by our lone wolves in the Golders Green area of London. The heroic act

left two Zionists critically wounded and on the brink of death . . .

Historically, the Jews are the killers of Jesus Christ, and today, the Zionists are the killers of innocent women and children.

We call upon all free people in the world, especially Muslims, to carry out qualitative operations in defense of humanity, occupied Palestine, al-Aqsa Mosque, and the prisoners. Furthermore, anyone who is able to kill Zionists should not hesitate.²⁵

In this context, it may be noted that a majority of the 3700 antisemitic incidents logged by the UK Community Security Trust in 2025 and the 3556 antisemitic incidents logged by the same organization the previous year “referenced, or were linked to, Israel, Palestine, the Hamas terror attack, or the subsequent war,”²⁶ with 1766 incidents in 2025 “in which the offender demonstrated outright antizionist motivation that went beyond more superficial discourse about the region or the conflict, alongside explicitly anti-Jewish comments or abuse aimed at unsuspecting Jewish people.”²⁷ That is, there is clear evidence for the role of narratives about Israel in motivating and justifying hostile targeting of Jews in the United Kingdom, both above and below the terror threshold.

However, there exists in Britain, as in many other countries, an established academic and political infrastructure for the minimization and downplaying of antisemitism that does not originate on the extreme right.²⁸ A team of three scholar-activists at the Birkbeck Institute for the Study of Antisemitism—including the institute’s director and co-director—responded to the Manchester synagogue attack by publishing an article in the left-wing magazine, *Prospect*.²⁹ The article, which appeared less than three weeks after the attack itself, cast doubt on Community Security Trust figures showing record numbers of antisemitic incidents for the first half of the year,³⁰ argued that Jewish concerns over antisemitism may not reflect real-world events as they were likely to have been “fuelled by encounters

on social media,” and complained that the “widespread attempt to draw a straight line between the reported rise in antisemitic incidents and the attack at the Heaton Park synagogue . . . mistakenly conflates the reality of everyday antisemitism,” which the Birkbeck scholar-activists argue to be a minor and diminishing problem, “with what happened in Manchester.”³¹ The article continues as follows:

There is another way of looking at antisemitism . . . which gives very different results. Social scientists and polling companies survey the British population’s attitudes to Jewish people. Far from showing an unrelenting wave of hate, this data indicates that antisemitism in Britain has been in steady decline over the last decade. Polls undertaken by YouGov suggest a striking shift in attitudes to Jewish people. For example, in 2015 the organisation reported that 25 per cent of respondents believed that Jews “chase money more than other people” whereas in early September this year that figure had dropped to 14 per cent. Similarly, the earlier survey found that 17 per cent of respondents believed that “Jewish people have too much power in the media” but this year the same question elicited a positive response from 13 per cent of those surveyed.

All of this leaves us with a puzzle. Jewish perceptions depict an antisemitism rising steeply, and many Jews are fearful. This is corroborated (and likely reinforced) by trends in recorded incidents. Meanwhile, research on attitudes suggests that antisemitism is in decline.³²

This is—of course—cherry-picking. Arbitrarily selecting two items for comparison across two surveys a decade apart (while ignoring the nine carried out in the intervening period) is obviously unprincipled, and strongly suggestive of motivated reasoning—especially when the batteries from which the questionnaire items were drawn were designed for analysis in the aggregate. However, while the authors avoid

naming the social scientists involved or citing their work, choosing instead to identify only the opinion research company which collected the data, it is worth noting that one of those social scientists has indeed published an analysis which appears to show a slight fall in “classic” antisemitic attitudes—that is to say, traditional European prejudices with regard to Jews identified as such—across the British electorate for the period 2015–2020.³³ There is thus more evidence than one might at first assume for the idea of declining antisemitic attitudes within the general British population, which is indeed suggestive of a contradiction between an apparent increase in the victimization of Jews and an apparent fall in the general prevalence of the attitudes that one might suppose to motivate such victimization. For the Birkbeck scholar-activists, the contradiction appears to be at least partly resolved through the imputation of exaggeration when it comes to the victimization of Jews (a rhetorical move which they had made before).³⁴ However, such a contradiction would be open to another potential explanation—and one which involves no implication that Jews are confused about their victimization, or have been crying wolf.

Writing nearly a decade ago with regard to the situation in France, Günther Jikeli notes that, “[a]t first sight, a perplexing discrepancy exists between the sharp rise in antisemitic incidents and antisemitic violence since 2000, and representative attitude surveys that do not show a drastic rise in antisemitic attitudes.”³⁵ Writing more recently, but with regard to the same approximate period, Robert Brym similarly notes that “[a]ttitudinal data . . . suggest that the percentage of Canadians with negative attitudes toward Jews . . . declin[ed] from the 1980s until 2019,” but that, “[i]n contrast . . . , most behavioural data indicate a rise in antisemitic incidents in Canada over the past four decades, with an especially dramatic jump in reported antisemitic incidents and hate crimes since the early 2000s.”³⁶ Both Jikeli and Brym essentially

propose the same explanation: that the empirical victimization of Jews that occurs in societies like those of France and Canada today does not really emerge from what the Birkbeck scholar-activists call “a reservoir of racialised beliefs about Jewish people . . . [that] are embedded in [the] common culture” of the nation,³⁷ being instead largely the preserve of “small fractions of the [national] population,”³⁸ and indeed having a wellspring outside Europe, not only in the sense that “heightened tension and violence in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict trigger antisemitic acts” through a mechanism by which “[t]he demonisation of Israel becomes a demonisation of all Jews and lowers the threshold for acting upon negative attitudes toward Jews,”³⁹ but also in the sense that—as Jikeli observes in an article published six years later—“all antisemitic perpetrators in 21st century Europe who killed Jews for being Jewish were Muslim and made some reference to Muslim extremist ideology.”⁴⁰

The remainder of this article will attempt to establish whether Jikeli’s analysis of the situation in France, echoed in Brym’s analysis of the situation in Canada, might also apply to the United Kingdom: firstly, through a literature review which takes other national contexts into consideration but focuses on the United Kingdom in particular; secondly, through aggregation of eight years of official crime statistics for England and Wales (these collectively forming the part of the United Kingdom in which most British Jews are resident; see Appendix); and thirdly, through inferential analysis of a very large UK-wide attitudinal survey dataset spanning a six-year period.

All data and analytic code employed in the empirical studies were made available to peer reviewers, and have now been published on an open access basis in the Open Science Framework repository.⁴¹

LITERATURE REVIEW

According to the conventional antiracist view, where “antisemitism has . . . been turned into a concrete programme of political violence . . .

it is situated within a web of hatreds,” including “anti-Black racism, Islamophobia, hatred of migrants, misogyny, homophobia, [and] hatred of transpeople,” across which “[t]he commonality . . . is white nationalism.”⁴² However, there is abundant evidence that this form of political violence exists alongside a form of terrorism which is specific to Jews—and which has, indeed, eclipsed it, becoming the predominant terror threat now faced by Jews in the West. That is, while the extreme right-wing tradition of white nationalist political violence targets Jews alongside members of other minority groups, often imagining Jews at the heart of an elaborately fantasized conspiracy,⁴³ it now appears to be overshadowed by a different tradition of anti-Jewish violence, which is offered up as vengeance for perceived wrongs done to Palestinians, and which is typically (but not exclusively) carried out by members or informal supporters of Islamist groups.

That Muslims might be disproportionately represented among the perpetrators of Islamist terrorism—and also of Islamist-inspired criminality which falls below the terror threshold—would be expected for the obvious reason that people of their faith form the primary constituency to which Islamists aim to appeal, just as people of historically European phenotypes form the primary constituency to which white nationalists aim to appeal. But the question of why such activity should be directed against Jewish targets needs explanation. It has been observed that the Muslim Brotherhood has, since its earliest days, “frame[d] jihad for Palestine as a pan-Islamic religious duty,” with Yusuf al-Qaradawi—for many years, its spiritual leader—presenting such jihad—especially as waged by Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood—as “a cause so fundamental that participation becomes a test of authentic spiritual identity” for Muslims.⁴⁴ A British former Islamist has explained the religio-political

importance of anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish themes as follows:

There . . . [are] quotations that [Islamists] would use, like “If you give away a handspan of Islamic land, you’ll get the same amount in hellfire”, they use all these justifications . . . [to the effect that] it was up to the Muslims to have defended that land, and it was their duty to have done so, and they neglected their duty to protect the land from the Zionists. . . . And so . . . from there sprouts a whole load of other arguments and issues and justifications to fight against the State of Israel, and then the blurred lines of, well, the State of Israel is a Jewish state. . . . [T]here’s a lot of justification of fighting the State of Israel . . . from Islamic scripture, of . . . encourag[ing] people to fight for what is theirs. . . .

. . . [There are] Muslims around the world [who feel] that this is a place that belonged to them . . . and [that] for it to be taken away and for it to be put into the hands of what they call “the Jews” is completely unacceptable.⁴⁵

Given this ideological background, it is perhaps unsurprising that analysis of data collected from a sample of British Muslims in 2015 should have found a clear statistical link between antisemitic attitudes and support for multiple expressions of Islamist extremism,⁴⁶ such that (for example) a one standard deviation rise in antisemitic attitudes was associated with over seven times greater odds of sympathy for Islamic State.⁴⁷ The representative of a Jewish communal organization argues as follows:

[War between Israel and Hamas is] used as an excuse to express . . . hatred [of Jews] and [Islamist] ideology more openly, and it’s also used as a recruiting [tool]. . . . [So w]hat we seem to see is Islamist organisations working hard between . . . rounds of fighting [between Israel and Hamas] . . . and then really surging

their activities during [phases of armed] conflict, so . . . they are constantly active, they constantly use the conflict as a means of propagating their ideology and of claiming that there is a crisis all of the time, and then, when . . . fighting is active, then they surge their activities and start gathering out on the street.

What it basically means is that . . . when there is [armed] conflict, [Islamist antisemitism] suddenly shoots up and then . . . after [that,] . . . expressions of the ideology come back down again . . . but never to the previous level, so you end up with this sort of ratcheting up where each [armed] conflict sees a surge and then a new normal which is worse than before.⁴⁸

In the United Kingdom, Community Security Trust figures show a gradual rise in antisemitic incidents from 501 in 2015 to 911 in 2019, followed by a four-year plateau interrupted by a spike of 1371 in 2021;⁴⁹ the year of the brief but deadly escalation in the Israel-Hamas conflict remembered on one side as the Unity Intifada and on the other as Operation Guardian of the Walls. This plateau ends with a meteoric rise to 2019 incidents in 2024—the first complete calendar year following the atrocities led by Hamas under the name of the Al-Aqsa Flood and the beginning of the retaliatory war waged by Israel under the name of Operation Swords of Iron—and a record-breaking 1521 incidents in the first half of 2025 alone, as the latter war continued.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, surveys conducted by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research show the proportion of British Jews disagreeing with the statement “I feel safe as a Jewish person living in the United Kingdom” falling from 18% in May 2021—the month of the aforementioned escalation—to 9% in May 2023, then rising to 25% in May 2024—just over half a year into the aforementioned war—and further climbing to 35% in May 2025 as the war continued.⁵¹

These figures, which rise and fall in tandem, collectively present exactly the sort of pattern described by the communal representative

quoted above. And they may also be compared with figures from overseas. For example, in the United States, antisemitic hate crimes rose by 63% from 2022 to 2023, and the proportion of Jews reporting declining feelings of safety rose by 73.8% from 2019 to 2024.⁵² As to the possible reasons for this, an analysis of national survey data found that attitudes towards Jews in the United States became less positive from 2020 to 2024,⁵³ with by far the most precipitous fall taking place among Muslims.⁵⁴ This is precisely the sort of thing that one might expect to find if negative attitudes to Jews were motivated by a desire for revenge against Israel, and especially if such desire were encouraged by Islamists in addressing a target audience composed, in the first instance, of Muslims. (Although considerably smaller, the second greatest fall was among Black respondents,⁵⁵ which may perhaps be related to the radical anti-Israeli turn taken by some prominent African American cultural figures, such as Ta-Nehisi Coates.)⁵⁶

Although underacknowledged on a political level, the idea that the greatest threat to European Jewish security might be located within diasporic Muslim communities is not new. As long ago as 2006, a report from the US Department of State Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism raised concern that, while not confined to Muslims, Israel-focused antisemitism is “common throughout the Middle East and in Muslim communities in Europe,”⁵⁷ and in France “appears to be the generator of most antisemitic incidents, as evidenced by the clear spike in antisemitic incidents whenever conflict in the Middle East flares up,” with “evidence of a shift away from extreme right-wing perpetrators of physical attacks on Jews and Jewish property towards young Muslim males.”⁵⁸ Five years later, Manfred Gerstenfeld argued that mass immigration from (to employ his chosen turn of phrase) “Muslim countries where antisemitism is widely promoted” had been, from a European Jewish perspective, the single most important development of the preceding half-century, with consequences that

were “almost entirely adverse,” both with regard to “the disproportionately large number of antisemitic incidents caused by immigrants from these countries” and with regard to “the more extreme nature of some of [those incidents].”⁵⁹

One study based on data collected in 2014 and 2024 for the Anti-Defamation League (for more on which, see below) found the proportion of individuals with highly antisemitic attitudes to have increased between these dates in forty-eight of ninety-six countries, while falling in just fourteen.⁶⁰ With regard to the ten European countries which were also surveyed in 2023, the same study found that the proportion of such individuals increased from 2023 to 2024 in six of them (massively so, in the case of Russia), while falling in just three.⁶¹ The same study notes that some of these changes were slight.⁶² However, this was inevitable, given that the comparison was made on the basis of arithmetic differences rather than ratios, and that the starting percentages were in most of these (European) cases low.

An official European Union monitoring project noted that, in Germany, the Israel-Hamas conflict popularly remembered as the Second Intifada motivated both Islamists and the extreme right wing to antisemitic action, also observing that the same event was associated with an exceptionally high level of antisemitic agitation in the Swedish city of Malmö, where the Muslim population was higher than that of the other major cities in the country and where antisemitic attitudes appeared to be more common among Muslims than in the general population.⁶³ An early twenty-first-century study of antisemitic incidents across the then fifteen member states of the European Union found that “Physical attacks on Jews and the desecration and destruction of synagogues were acts often committed by young Muslim[s] . . . [often] either during or after pro-Palestinian demonstrations,”⁶⁴ while a more recent survey of Jews in Europe found that 30% of those who had experienced antisemitic harassment identified the perpetrator as “someone with an extremist Muslim view” (as

compared to 21% identifying him or her as “someone with a left-wing political view” and only 13% identifying him or her as “someone with a right-wing political view,”⁶⁵) and a subsequent survey of young European Jews found that, of those who had experienced antisemitic violence, 59% identified the perpetrator as Muslim.⁶⁶ A poll of a large, representative sample of UK Jews conducted by a leading opinion research company found 60.8% to fear Islamists more than neo-Nazis, and just 15.9% of Jews to fear neo-Nazis more than Islamists.⁶⁷

These findings may be set in context of a number of studies which suggest higher levels of antisemitism among Muslims than among members of other groups. A 2006 Pew Global Attitudes poll found between 65% and 98% of the population of the majority-Muslim nations, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, and Jordan (listed here from low to high), to report having an unfavorable view of Jews, also finding stark differences in this regard between Muslim and non-Muslim residents of West European nations—the greatest discrepancy being found in the United Kingdom, where 47% of Muslims, but just 7% of the general public, reported the same.⁶⁸ (When it came to more pronounced levels of hostility, the ratio was even greater, with 3% of the general British population, but 33% of British Muslims, admitting to a “very unfavourable” view of Jews.)⁶⁹ A 2008 survey of six European nations, conducted by the Berlin Social Research Centre, found agreement with the statement “The Jews cannot be trusted” to run at around 10% among Christians, but 28–64% of Muslims, depending on country,⁷⁰ while a 2015 ADL survey found that, across six European nations, 21% of all respondents, but 59% of Muslim respondents, agreed with six or more of eleven antisemitic stereotypes.⁷¹ Reviewing a range of international studies just over a decade ago, Günther Jikeli found that “[a]ntisemitic attitudes in many Muslim-majority countries are high, including in those countries where the majority of European Muslims, or their parents, originate,”⁷² and that,

across Europe, “the level of antisemitic attitudes is significantly higher among Muslims than among non-Muslims.”⁷³ In a 2024 Canadian survey, 81% of respondents in general, but only 44% of Muslim respondents, disagreed with boycotts of Jewish businesses in Canada as a means of expressing opposition to Israeli government policy.⁷⁴

Levels and types of religiosity have in some cases been found to play an important role. For example, an online survey conducted among residents of Iran found Muslim religious identity to be strongly correlated both with anti-Israeli attitudes ($r = .52$) and (to an even greater extent) with anti-Jewish attitudes ($r = .77$),⁷⁵ while findings of a number of studies suggest that “[t]he level of antisemitism [among European Muslims] rises with the level of religiosity and with fundamentalist interpretations of Islam.”⁷⁶ In particular, the aforementioned Berlin Social Research Centre study found that, among “very religious” Muslims, distrust of Jews ran at more than 70% of those who described themselves as “fundamentalist,” but less than 30% of those who did not.⁷⁷

When it comes to recent UK-specific studies, a 2020 survey found more British Muslims to agree than disagree that Jews have too much control over each of (a) the global media, (b) the global banking system, (c) the global arms industry, (d) global political leadership, and (e) the global entertainment industry, with this trend being strongest among Muslims at least half of whose friends are Muslim, and with agreement being strongest among those with the greatest frequency of mosque attendance.⁷⁸ This would support Matthias Küntzel’s view that “Islamic antisemitism thrives above all where European Muslims live in parallel societies.”⁷⁹ That particular study did not include a comparison sample of non-Muslims, but a 2026 follow-up with differently worded questions (published as this article was being copyedited) found great contrasts between proportions within a sample of 1006 British Muslims and within a sample of 1025

members of the general population (which also included Muslims): members of the Muslim-only sample were 2.29–2.83 times more likely to consider Jews to have too much power over the parliament, the banking system, the media, the pharmaceutical industry, the legal system, the weapons manufacturing industry, and the entertainment and music industry, from lowest to highest.⁸⁰ (Interestingly, while examination of the topline summary for the underlying data does not suggest a clear relationship between concern over Jewish power and frequency of mosque attendance, it *does* suggest a relationship between the latter and support for terrorist organizations, with positive feelings towards Hamas reported by just 7–12% of those who never attend, or who attend only once or twice per year, but by 34–35% of those who attend once or more per week.)⁸¹

The most detailed study so far of the relationship between antisemitism and religion in the United Kingdom has been L. Daniel Staetsky’s 2016 survey of 4005 UK-resident adults, including 995 Muslims.⁸² This found 28% of UK residents with no religion, and between 24% and 32% of members of various Christian denominations, but 56% of Muslims, to hold at least one “classic” antisemitic view.⁸³ Predictors of antizionist views were not explored. However, Staetsky’s analysis found that—after holding antizionist views—the strongest predictors of classic antisemitic views were being born outside the United Kingdom and being Muslim.⁸⁴

That each of the latter two predictors survives statistical control for the other suggests both that second-generation British Muslims might be less likely to hold antisemitic attitudes than their parents, and that non-Muslim migrants might be more likely to hold antisemitic attitudes than non-Muslims of British origin. In this context, it is worth noting that there have been many surveys of attitudes towards Jews in one of the largest sources of migration towards the United Kingdom, i.e., the European Union. As one review of such studies notes, comparative studies have tended to find that levels of antisemitism

are higher in East European than in West European countries.⁸⁵ For example, from 1992 to 2011, a succession of surveys in Poland found rising agreement that Jews have too much power and influence in the country, as well as rising belief in the myth that more ethnic Poles than Jews were murdered during the Second World War,⁸⁶ with one 2010 survey finding nearly 20% agreement with the statement that “Although the Holocaust was a great tragedy, one good thing about it is that there are no more Jews living currently in Poland.”⁸⁷ In Romania, a pair of early twenty-first-century surveys found 27–36% of Romanian respondents agreeing with statements such as “Jews exaggerate the persecutions they were subjected to in order to obtain advantages” and “The suffering of the Jewish people is God’s punishment.”⁸⁸ In some countries, such as Slovakia, levels of antisemitism appeared to subside following the fall of communism,⁸⁹ while in others, such as Hungary, they appeared to increase.⁹⁰

A reading of the available literature thus raises the possibility that antisemitic attitudes may have been imported into the United Kingdom through migratory flows not only from countries within which Islam is the dominant religion, but also from countries within which it is not. Indeed, it is hard to see how things could be otherwise: an under-acknowledged implication of the findings of the 2025 ADL Global 100 Index (which was based on international survey data collected the previous year) is that the proportion of strongly antisemitic individuals in Britain is so low, in global terms, that immigration from almost anywhere outside of Canada, the United States, and Western Europe (more specifically, its historically Protestant constituent nations, plus France with its longstanding and deeply embedded tradition of secularism) would be liable to raise it.⁹¹ In this connection, attention must be drawn to the fact that individuals born or having heritage in Eastern European countries with substantial antisemitic traditions now constitute a notable element within the United Kingdom’s ethnic mix, with—for

example—an estimated 682000 Polish-born, 329000 Romanian-born, 142000 Lithuanian-born, and 116000 Hungarian-born UK residents as of the period running from July 2020 to June 2021,⁹² and with the 2025 ADL Global 100 Index suggesting the proportion of residents of those countries with elevated levels of classic antisemitic attitudes to be (respectively) 3.33, 3.58, 3.00, and 3.00 times higher than in the United Kingdom.⁹³ Of course, these figures are dwarfed by those from many Muslim-majority nations, especially in the Middle East and North Africa. To take the most extreme examples: both in Kuwait and in the West Bank and Gaza, the proportion of residents with such attitudes was found to be 8.08 times higher than in the United Kingdom. In the subcontinent, proportions of individuals with elevated levels of antisemitic attitudes appear more moderate, with ADL figures suggesting that those in majority-Muslim Bangladesh were only marginally higher than those in historically Orthodox Christian Greece, i.e., about 4.33 times those in the United Kingdom, while those in India, with its substantial Muslim minority, were about the same as those in Catholic Poland. All this is to say that Jews whose forebears left relatively high-antisemitism environments for the relatively low-antisemitism environment of the United Kingdom may now be finding that—thanks to subsequent waves of immigration—the latter is increasingly coming to resemble the countries from which their ancestors fled.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Having established the above points through literature review, this article will attempt to answer the following questions with regard to the United Kingdom.

1. How have rates of anti-Jewish crime changed over time?
2. How has the proportion of individuals with elevated levels of antisemitic attitudes changed over time?

3. What are the demographic predictors of elevated levels of antisemitic attitudes?

RQ1 is investigated through descriptive analysis of official police totals for hate crimes targeting perceived Jews (Study I). RQ2 and RQ3 are answered through inferential analysis of data which were collected from the general UK population in a series of surveys carried out by the UK opinion research company YouGov from 2020 to 2025 (Study II).

STUDY I: AGGRAVATED OFFENCES TARGETING PERCEIVED JEWS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 2017–2025

Dataset

In order to answer RQ1, this study focuses on the UK legal category of “aggravated” offences, i.e., offences motivated by, or accompanied by expressions of hostility towards, the intended victim’s perceived possession of a legally protected characteristic, such as membership of a racial or religious group. Since the year ending March 2018, the UK government has published yearly totals for such offences broken down by the perceived characteristic in question,⁹⁴ with monthly totals also being available from April 2023 to March 2025.⁹⁵

Analytic Methodology

Analysis proceeds through examination of these official figures with regard to religiously aggravated offences targeting perceived Jews, with offences targeting perceived Muslims and Christians also provided as context. The analysis is descriptive rather than inferential. Indeed, inferential tools such as confidence intervals and significance tests would be neither necessary nor valid in relation to such a dataset, because the statistics in question relate not to a sample, but to the whole population of recorded offences. The analysis relates to England and Wales only,

because equivalent statistics are not available for Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, only a very small proportion of the United Kingdom’s Jewish population is resident outside England and Wales (see Appendix), which means that Scotland and Northern Ireland will have offered relatively few opportunities for offending against Jewish targets. Scrutiny of this dataset thus provides a very direct means by which to assess the changing threat level facing UK Jews, using information logged by official sources in relation to legal criteria which apply equally to Jews and non-Jews.

Findings

Figure 1 visualizes total numbers of offences aggravated by hostility towards members of the Jewish faith group for all available years, alongside total numbers of offences aggravated by hostility towards Christians and Muslims, which are provided for comparison. On the basis of this chart, a number of observations may be made.

Firstly, numbers of offences aggravated by hostility towards Muslims are more frequent than offences aggravated by hostility towards Jews—but not so much more frequent as one might expect, given that the population of Muslims in the country is 14.26 times larger. Indeed, offences aggravated by hostility towards Jews accounted for 28.2% of all religiously aggravated offences in 2024–2025, and 31.7% of all religiously aggravated offences the previous year—which is a remarkable proportion of religious hate crimes to be directed at a group that at the time of the last census comprised only 4.3% of what might be called the minority religious population (that is, the population of UK residents who follow a religion other than Christianity).

Secondly, numbers of offences aggravated by hostility towards members of all three religious groups rise throughout the period, but not by equivalent amounts. If we compare the last two years to the first two years of the period April




FIGURE 1. Police-recorded anti-Jewish, anti-Muslim, and anti-Christian hate crimes, April 2017–March 2025 (yearly totals).

2017 to March 2025, hate crimes targeted against perceived Christians (a population which is *declining* in size) rise by 50.7%, while hate crimes targeted against perceived Muslims (a population which is *growing* in size) rise by just 28.5%. (Indeed, this may even indicate a fall relative to the size of the Muslim population, which grew by 44.4% from 2011 to 2021, and thus might be expected to have grown by about 35.6% between April 2017 and March 2025.) However, hate crimes targeted against perceived Jews rise by an astonishing 208.1%.

What does this tripling of the aggravated crime rate mean for Jewish safety? It is an important question to ask, because—as the first section of this article has shown—there are many voices strongly dedicated to the minimization

and trivialization of threats to Jewish safety. For example, one left-wing writer dismisses Home Office statistics showing a rise in anti-Jewish crime for the year 2023–2024 on the grounds that “it seems likely that many of these incidents represent police spotting banners they deem antisemitic, rather than threats to individual Jews.”⁹⁶ In fact, Home Office figures reveal that, in 2023–2024 and 2024–2025, 10% of hate crimes targeting perceived Jews involved the crime of assault. With regard to Muslims—the only other group for which such proportions were published—the proportion also remained roughly constant, ranging from 17% to 18% of hate crimes targeting perceived Muslims. This would imply 616 instances of religiously aggravated assault against people perceived to be

Jewish—or 2.27 assaults per 1000 Jews in England and Wales according to 2021 census figures—for the two reporting years running from April 2023 to March 2025, as compared to 1463 instances of religiously aggravated assault against people perceived to be Muslim—or 0.38 assaults per 1000 Muslims in England and Wales according to the same census—throughout the same period. That is, in England and Wales for the period in question, the rate of religiously aggravated assault against individuals targeted on the basis of perceived identity as Jews was 6.00 times higher (relative to the size of the Jewish population) than the rate of religiously aggravated assault against individuals targeted on the basis of perceived identity as Muslims (relative to the size of the Muslim population, which is growing and is therefore likely to have been *underestimated* for the period 2023–2025,

leading to a probable overstatement of the rate of assault per 1000 individuals).

This strongly suggests that Jewish perceptions of declining safety are not alarmist but an accurate reflection of reality. Indeed, it suggests that, even if the terror threat is taken out of consideration, the security of the Anglo-Jewish community is in a parlous and deteriorating state.

We may also gain some idea of motivations from examination of yearly totals, which spike in 2021–2022 (the year of the Unity Intifada and Operation Guardian of the Walls), and 2023–2024 (the year of the Al-Aqsa Flood and the beginning of Operation Swords of Iron).

The point becomes clearer when we look at Figure 2, which visualizes monthly totals for hate crimes targeting Jews. As may be seen, these totals spike in October 2023—the month of the Hamas-led atrocities which led to Israel's




FIGURE 2. Police-recorded anti-Jewish hate crimes, April 2023–March 2025 (monthly totals).

military response and partial re-occupation of Gaza—before gradually declining back to a level somewhat higher than before, such that the number of hate crimes targeting Jews in England and Wales from April 2024 to March 2025 was 93% higher than the mean level from April 2019 to March 2023.

Discussion

It is now possible to answer this article's first research question: rates of anti-Jewish crime in the United Kingdom have approximately tripled over the course of the last eight years. Glib dismissals of such crime as low-level, inconsequential, or likely reflective of police over-sensitivity, may confidently be set aside: on the basis of official police statistics for England and Wales, Jews are likely to fall victim to religiously aggravated assault at a far higher rate than Muslims (the only other group for which it is possible to draw a comparison). This in turn implies that—contrary to implications made by some authors quoted in the introduction—neither Community Security Trust reporting, nor polling of threat perception within the United Kingdom's Jewish population (such as that carried out by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research), can be assumed to have exaggerated the problems faced by UK Jewish communities.

The yearly and monthly totals visualized above are clearly suggestive of motive. If criminal victimization of Jews bubbled up (so to speak) from a reservoir of traditional European prejudices against Jews, there would be no reason to expect it to spike following a flare-up in the Israel-Hamas conflict. If, on the other hand, it is driven by something closely connected to that conflict, such as the desire to be revenged upon local Jews for the (real or purported) actions of the distant Jewish state of Israel, then such spikes are exactly what one would expect to see. The question of who might be carrying out such crimes cannot be answered with official data, as statistics on

perpetrator identity are not collected by UK police forces. However, they provide additional context for high-profile offences whose perpetrators are known—such as those discussed in this article's introduction.

In many such cases, the motivations of those perpetrators have been made absolutely clear—as this article has shown—and align closely with the interpretation presented here, i.e., that people with an anti-Israeli axe to grind tend to strike out at whichever Jews are available. Further insight may be provided by the attitudinal data analyzed in the following study. For now, it may simply be observed that official crime statistics exactly match the pattern of “ratcheting up” described by the above-quoted Jewish communal organization representative, who attributed rising UK antisemitism to exploitation of the Israel-Hamas conflict by Islamists.

STUDY II: PREDICTORS OF ELEVATED ANTISEMITIC ATTITUDES AMONG UK RESIDENTS, 2020–2025

Dataset

In order to answer RQ2 and RQ3, a unique dataset was produced by collating six separate survey datasets collected online on December 16–17, 2020; December 19–20, 2021; December 22–23, 2022; December 8–11, 2023; August 2–5, 2024; and September 1–2, 2025, by YouGov, a member of the British Polling Council, with funding from Campaign against Antisemitism. Respondents to these surveys were presented with items from the Generalized Antisemitism scale, which contains two subscales: one measuring Judeophobic Antisemitism, i.e., traditional European anti-Jewish attitudes, and one measuring Antizionist Antisemitism, i.e., extreme anti-Israeli attitudes closely resembling traditional European anti-Jewish prejudices (see Table 1). This scale is notable both for its extensively referenced demonstration of face validity⁹⁷ and for its

TABLE 1. Questionnaire items, Generalized Antisemitism scale items

Judeophobic Antisemitism (JpAs)	
Jewish people can be trusted just as much as other British people in business	*
Jewish people are just as loyal to [nation] as other British people	*
I am just as open to having Jewish friends as I am to having friends from other sections of British society	*
Compared to other groups, Jewish people have too much power in the media	
Jewish people talk about the Holocaust just to further their political agenda	
Jewish people chase money more than other people do	
Antizionist Antisemitism (Antizionist Antisemitism)	
I am comfortable spending time with people who openly support Israel	*
Israel has a right to exist as a homeland for the Jewish people	*
Israel is right to defend itself against those who want to destroy it	*
Israel and its supporters are a bad influence on our democracy	
Israel can get away with anything because its supporters control the media	
Israel treats the Palestinians like the Nazis treated the Jews	

* Reverse-coded

psychometric validation.⁹⁸ A further advantage is its balance of positively and negatively keyed items.

The resulting dataset included a total of 11622 observations. Participants were randomly selected from a large recruited panel within quotas for age, education, gender, region, social grade (a specifically British measure of occupational class, conventionally used throughout the opinion research industry), political attention, and voting history. Although this approach to sampling has been specifically calibrated to produce accurate indicators of future voting behavior, it is not guaranteed to produce representativeness on demographic variables such as ethnicity and religious affiliation. Thus, the observations for each annual sample in the dataset were re-weighted to match the general population on age, gender, ethnicity, and religious group. Weighting was done on the basis of population percentages derived from the 2021 census of England and Wales, the 2021 census of Northern Ireland, and the 2022 census of Scotland (see Appendix).

Analytic Methodology

The overall analytic approach adopted in this study consisted of (a) visualizing proportions of individuals with elevated levels of antisemitic attitudes, and (b) modelling the likelihood of a given individual harboring elevated levels of antisemitic attitudes. Both for visualization and modelling purposes, ethnic and religious group, age, gender, household income, highest educational qualification, and date of data collection were treated as independent variables. For ease of interpretation, all of these variables but religious and ethnic group were dichotomized throughout, with the exception that annual samples were treated separately when visualizing changes of proportions of individuals within the UK-resident population as a whole and when calculating population-level correlations between proportions of individuals with elevated levels of “old” and “new” antisemitic attitudes. For purposes of visualization, 95% confidence intervals were calculated using the modified Wilson method proposed by Lawrence Brown and colleagues.⁹⁹ In order to clarify the longitudinal

visualizations, the Wald method was additionally used to calculate a 95% confidence interval for the ratio between proportions of individuals in the general population with elevated levels of antisemitic attitudes, before and after October 7, 2023.

For modelling purposes, logit models were fitted, again with 95% confidence intervals. Except with regard to date of data collection (see below), modelling was done without interaction terms: that is to say, coefficients were estimated on the simplifying assumption that the effects of ethnicity, religion, and other demographic variables will have been independent of one another. This assumption is not entirely realistic, but was considered necessary in order to avoid overfitting, as even a dataset as large as this one will have included very few observations at the intersections of certain pairs of categories. For example, the dataset included only sixty-six South Asian respondents of no religion, and only fifteen who identified as Christian.

Possessing an elevated level of antisemitic attitudes was defined in terms of providing potentially antisemitic responses (i.e., agreement with positively keyed items or disagreement with reverse-coded items) to *more than half* of the six items on either of the Generalized Antisemitism scale's two subscales. This approach has the advantage of providing readily interpretable statistics, i.e., percentages and odds, with regard, not to antisemitic attitudes in the abstract, but to individuals in whom such attitudes pass a given threshold and as such can be regarded as elevated: a matter of clear relevance where *threats to the Jewish population* are concerned. For the sake of model interpretability, all predictor variables were either categorical or recoded as such, with participant age and household income being dichotomized at the median and with the multiple dates of data collection being collapsed into two distinct eras, i.e., that preceding and that following the October 7, 2023, pogrom.

The two subscales of the Generalized Antisemitism scale were treated separately for

purposes both of visualization and of modelling. That is, individuals with elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitism (JpAs), i.e., traditional European prejudiced and paranoid attitudes expressed towards Jews identified as Jews, were fully distinguished from individuals with elevated levels of Antizionist Antisemitism (AzAs), i.e., substantially similar and genealogically related prejudiced and paranoid attitudes expressed towards Israel and its supporters. Decades of empirical studies have reliably replicated the finding of moderate positive correlation between attitudes to Jews and attitudes to Israel on the level of the individual personality, whether as a core finding or as a finding incidental to the main investigation.¹⁰⁰ However, by treating these traits as distinct and reporting findings separately for each of them, this article provides complete transparency with regard to the research questions which it was designed to answer.

Sample Demographics

Respondents were placed in one or other of four ethnic groupings, through recoding of YouGov's standard self-identification categories. White respondents constituted the majority, with 10204 such being categorized as British (including those identifying as white and as either British, English, Scottish, Welsh, or Northern Irish), and with the remaining 478 white respondents (including those identifying as Irish and those identifying as Gypsy or Irish Traveler as well as the much larger numbers specifying that they belonged to "any other white background," many of whom are likely to have been born in Eastern Europe) being collected together into a single category. Of those who did not identify as white, the largest group was comprised of the 223 respondents identifying as Indian, Pakistani, or Bangladeshi, all of whom were collectively classified as South Asian. Respondents self-identifying with other categories were treated as a single category. This included African and Afro-Caribbean ethnicities,

as well as Chinese respondents, and those selecting YouGov's "any other Asian background" category (which was used by only fifty-eight respondents and thus can have included at most only tiny numbers of South Asian respondents with heritage from outside the three South Asian nations identified by name, for example, Sri Lankans and Nepalis). Within this category, the largest contingent was made up by 221 respondents of mixed or multiple ethnicity.

The dataset contained responses collected from sixty-six individuals identifying as Jewish, who were removed from the dataset for all analytic purposes. It may be observed that, among the sixty-six individuals who identified as Jewish and were for that reason discounted from the analysis, none displayed what is defined here as an elevated level of Judeophobic Antisemitism, and just one—a seventy-year-old female surveyed in 2020—displayed what is defined here as an elevated level of Antizionist Antisemitism.

Once this was done, religion was collapsed into six categories, with 6695 respondents stating that they had no religion, and with the bulk of the remainder identifying with one of the major churches in the United Kingdom: here, adherents of the Episcopalian and Presbyterian churches were grouped together, as these Protestant groupings include the national churches of both England and Scotland and can thus be taken to represent an "established" religious sensibility. Roman Catholics formed the next-largest group, and were likewise treated as a category by themselves. Christians of all other denominations, amongst whom the majority was comprised by 268 Baptists and Methodists and 141 Evangelicals, were treated as a single group. Muslims made up the next largest religious group within the dataset, with all other respondents being placed in a single group. (Note that, for weighting purposes, Christians were treated as a single group. This was necessary because different Christian denominations were not distinguished in all national census questionnaires.)

With the small number of Jews taken out of consideration (see above), 11622 observations remained. For descriptive statistics, see Table 2, which presents percentages and (in parentheses) absolute numbers of respondents for various levels of the categorical variables used for analysis, together with mean and standard deviation for age. The reason for the fall in absolute numbers between the unweighted and weighted datasets is that 228 respondents provided insufficient demographic information for weighting. Once such individuals were excluded, 11394 data points were available for analysis. It will be noted that there was over-representation of women, white British people, and people of no religion, and consequent under-representation of a number of minority demographic groups. The small number of observations for some such groups within the dataset—including Muslims—is reflected in wider confidence intervals with regard to findings vis-à-vis the particular groups in question.

Visualization of Longitudinal Trends and Relationship between "Old" and "New" Antisemitic Attitudes

Figure 3 suggests that the trend implied by the already-noted finding of a slight fall in the proportion of UK-resident adults with elevated levels of Judeophobic antisemitism—that is, traditional European prejudices about Jews—in 2015–2020¹⁰¹ may have continued into 2021, remaining stable for another year, while the proportion of individuals with elevated levels of antizionist antisemitism—that is, essentially similar prejudices expressed in relation to Israel and its supporters rather than in relation to Jews identified as Jews—appears to have remained stable throughout the first three years. However, everything changes following the Hamas-led atrocities of October 7, 2023, and the subsequent military campaign which Israel launched in response. In *every* sample collected from 2023 to 2025, the proportion of individuals with elevated levels of *each* form of antisemitism was

higher than it had been in *every* sample collected from 2020 to 2022. Moreover, there were steep rises not only between 2022 and 2023, but between 2023 and 2024. From 2024 to 2025, proportions remained roughly stable, with a slight fall with regard to Judeophobic antisemitism and a slight rise with regard to antizionist antisemitism, but with substantial overlap between the 95% confidence intervals in both cases. Overall, the proportion of members of the sample exhibiting elevated levels of Judeophobic antisemitism roughly doubled after October 7, 2023, providing 95% confidence that the proportion of members of the general population harboring the same increased by 1.53–2.32 times, while the proportion of members of the sample exhibiting elevated levels of antizionist antisemitism also roughly doubled, providing 95% confidence that the proportion of members of the general population harbouring the same increased by 1.80–2.25 times.

It may be noted that two charts plotted in Figure 3 follow very similar shapes—especially so in 2021–2024. That is, while proportions of individuals with what are here defined as elevated levels of Judeophobic antisemitism are substantially smaller than proportions of individuals with what are here defined as elevated levels of antizionist antisemitism, changes to these proportions run approximately in parallel. Indeed, the product-moment correlation between the proportion of individuals with elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitism and the proportion of individuals with elevated levels of Antizionist Antisemitism, from one year to the next, is close to perfect ($r = .93$).

What this means is that, throughout the period covered by the dataset, the relationship between the proportion of individuals holding elevated levels of each form of antisemitic attitudes is virtually linear, with a 4.0 percentage point rise in the proportion of individuals with elevated levels of Antizionist Antisemitism corresponding to a 1.0 percentage point rise in the mean proportion of individuals with elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitism. This may

be seen in Figure 4, which plots these proportions against one another for each year in which data were collected. Although wholly unexpected and thus unrelated to any research question, the finding of such strong linearity in the relationship between the two is an important empirical observation that shall be returned to below.

Breaking the dataset down by demographic variables, as in Figures 5–10, shows that the proportion of individuals with elevated levels of both forms of antisemitic attitudes increased after October 7, 2023, in almost every group. It also reveals lower rates of both forms of antisemitism among white British respondents, as compared to members of other ethnic groups, as well as hugely elevated rates of both forms of antisemitism among Muslims, as compared to every other religious group. Some groups (such as Muslims) are much more sparsely represented than others in the dataset (such as irreligious people, and Episcopalians and Presbyterians), their estimated percentages being subject to greater statistical uncertainty that is reflected in wider confidence intervals. However, this does little to undermine the impression (available also from earlier studies cited in the literature review above) of a particular association between antisemitism and claimed identity as Muslim: especially with regard to the two largest religious groups (i.e., people of no religion, and members of the Christian denominations encompassing the established churches of England and Scotland), the confidence intervals are not even close. Before October 7, 2023, there is overlap between the lower end of the confidence interval for Muslims and the upper end of the confidence interval for a number of other small religious groups with regard to Judeophobic Antisemitism, but, after October 7, 2023, these overlaps disappear, and, with regard to Antizionist Antisemitism, no such overlap appears at any point.

On the basis of the data analyzed here, it would be difficult to make a judgement as to whether post-October 7, 2023, increases are

proportional across ethnic and religious groups: arithmetic differences for the larger ethnic and religious groups are small, as are samples for the ethnic and religious groups with the largest arithmetic differences, which means that, in each case, the confidence interval for the ratio would be very wide. However, rises were clearly much more slight in individuals over forty-eight years old than in individuals aged eighteen to forty-seven—especially with regard to Judeophobic Antisemitism, where the change among older individuals was negligible, suggesting that, across society, growth in antisemitism may have been predominantly among the young. For this reason, an interaction term between respondent age and date of data collection was included in each of the logit models.

Statistical Models

As discussed above, logit models were fitted to the dataset, with elevated levels of each form of antisemitism being treated as a separate outcome variable. For model coefficients, expressed in the form of adjusted odds ratios, see Table 3 and Figures 11–12.

These models provide support for the view that the rise in “old” or Judeophobic Antisemitic attitudes since October 7, 2023, has been virtually confined to the young: no association whatsoever was found between date of data collection and likelihood of holding elevated levels of such attitudes, and only a very slight (and entirely non-significant) association was found between youth and the same, but a very strong association was found for the interaction between the two, with sub-median age in the post-October 7, 2023 era being associated with an approximate tripling of the odds of holding such attitudes, providing 95% confidence that the odds increased by 1.86–5.40 times for people under forty-eight years of age in the general population. This combines with what appear to be greatly increased odds of holding elevated levels of “new” antisemitic attitudes, although those are slightly harder to interpret, because they also

rose among older respondents, albeit to a lesser degree: the relevant model provides 95% confidence that the odds of elevated Antizionist Antisemitic attitudes rose by 1.31–2.22 times overall, and by a further 1.69–3.37 times for the young.

As well as quantifying the increase in antisemitic attitudes since October 7, 2023, these models also suggest that by far the strongest predictor of “new” and “old” antisemitic attitudes is being Muslim, which was found to be associated with hugely increased odds of holding elevated levels of *both*. Indeed, they provide 95% confidence that the odds of a given individual’s holding elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitic attitudes are 9.64–24.89 times higher if he or she is Muslim than if he or she has no religion, with the odds being 7.41–14.45 times higher if attention is switched to Antizionist Antisemitism. By contrast, all forms of Christianity were found to be associated with *reduced* odds of holding elevated levels of Antizionist Antisemitic attitudes, with (for example) 95% confidence that those odds are 1.71–2.68 times lower for Episcopalians and Presbyterians than for people of no religion, while only the smaller Christian denominations were associated with increased odds of elevated Judeophobic Antisemitism (with 95% confidence that those are 1.56–3.58 times higher for members of non-Episcopalian, non-Presbyterian, non-Catholic churches than for people of no religion).

Male gender was associated with substantially increased odds of Judeophobic Antisemitism (with 95% confidence that these are 2.34–3.99 times higher for males than for females), but unchanged odds of Antizionist Antisemitism, while education to degree level was found to be associated with 1.21–2.08 times lower odds of elevated Judeophobic Antisemitism, but 1.09–1.51 times higher odds of elevated Antizionist Antisemitism (again, at a 95% level of statistical confidence). Interestingly, membership of a white ethnic group originating outside Britain was associated

TABLE 2. Descriptive demographic statistics

Age				Gender		Ethnicity				Religion						
	n	M	SD	Female	Male	White: British	White: other	South Asian	Other ethnicity	None	Episc./ Presb.	Catholic	Other Christian	Muslim	Other religion	
2020	Unweighted	1636	52.59	16.63	59.0 (965)	41.0 (671)	91.6 (1491)	3.7 (61)	1.8 (29)	2.8 (46)	54.0 (884)	27.4 (449)	7.5 (123)	6.8 (111)	1.4 (23)	2.8 (46)
	Weighted	1627	48.28	17.45	51.6 (962)	48.4 (665)	74.7 (1491)	8.2 (61)	6.4 (29)	10.7 (46)	40.0 (883)	28.6 (447)	12.2 (122)	9.0 (108)	6.4 (22)	3.8 (45)
2021	Unweighted	1633	50.73	16.59	52.2 (853)	47.8 (780)	90.3 (1451)	4.4 (70)	1.9 (30)	3.5 (56)	55.8 (911)	25.8 (421)	7.3 (119)	5.3 (86)	1.8 (29)	4.1 (67)
	Weighted	1607	48.36	17.58	51.6 (845)	48.4 (762)	74.9 (1451)	8.3 (70)	6.4 (30)	10.4 (56)	39.9 (900)	30.2 (413)	11.2 (118)	8.3 (83)	6.4 (29)	4.0 (64)
2022	Unweighted	1697	50.02	16.47	55.2 (936)	44.8 (761)	87.9 (1473)	5.3 (88)	2.7 (45)	4.1 (69)	58.1 (986)	24.4 (414)	7.2 (123)	5.1 (86)	1.5 (26)	3.7 (62)
	Weighted	1675	48.36	17.46	51.6 (929)	48.4 (746)	74.8 (1473)	8.1 (88)	6.4 (45)	10.7 (69)	40.0 (975)	30.6 (411)	11.0 (123)	8.1 (85)	6.4 (21)	3.9 (60)
2023	Unweighted	2000	50.14	17.34	53.9 (1079)	46.1 (921)	86.8 (1715)	4.1 (80)	2.6 (52)	6.5 (128)	57.4 (1148)	23.5 (470)	8.1 (161)	5.6 (111)	2.0 (39)	3.5 (71)
	Weighted	1975	48.68	17.72	51.6 (1068)	48.4 (907)	74.6 (1715)	8.3 (80)	6.4 (52)	10.7 (128)	39.9 (1136)	28.8 (466)	12.6 (159)	8.2 (110)	6.4 (37)	4.1 (67)
2024	Unweighted	2537	51.60	17.19	54.0 (1371)	46.0 (1166)	90.9 (2222)	3.7 (91)	1.1 (28)	4.3 (104)	59.1 (1499)	24.3 (616)	7.3 (186)	4.7 (118)	1.0 (26)	3.6 (92)
	Weighted	2445	48.89	17.84	51.7 (1323)	48.3 (1122)	74.9 (2222)	8.2 (91)	6.4 (28)	10.6 (104)	39.9 (1445)	29.4 (592)	12.7 (182)	7.5 (116)	6.3 (22)	4.2 (88)
2025	Unweighted	2119	52.04	17.04	55.2 (1169)	44.8 (950)	89.7 (1852)	4.3 (88)	1.9 (39)	4.2 (86)	59.8 (1267)	23.1 (489)	7.4 (157)	5.4 (115)	1.2 (25)	3.1 (66)
	Weighted	2065	48.67	17.81	51.6 (1142)	48.4 (923)	74.7 (1852)	8.2 (88)	6.4 (39)	10.7 (86)	39.9 (1238)	28.4 (478)	12.0 (151)	9.2 (111)	6.4 (22)	4.1 (65)

with 95% confidence of 1.32–2.85 times higher odds of elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitism and 1.12–1.89 times higher odds of elevated levels of Antizionist Antisemitism.

Adjusted odds ratios for non-Abrahamic religion and for South Asian ethnicity need to be interpreted in the light of an appreciation of the intersections between religious and ethnic identity. The odds ratios approximately cancel out, with the result that a South Asian Sikh or Hindu would be estimated to have about the same odds of elevated antisemitic attitudes as a White British person of no religion, while the odds of a UK-resident Muslim of South Asian origin would be estimated to be lower than those for UK-resident Muslims of ethnic origin elsewhere in the world. An implication of the model as it stands is that a South Asian Christian or atheist would be exceptionally unlikely to hold antisemitic attitudes, but this should not be taken too seriously: as noted above, there were vanishingly few respondents at these intersections of ethnic and religious categorization.

These observations should serve as a reminder that the coefficients of a logit model are multiplicative. The meaning of the models presented here may thus be clarified by comparing the implied probability of holding elevated levels of antisemitic attitudes for individuals possessing various combinations of demographic characteristics. Exact percentages are quoted only in order to illustrate the idea of multiplicative odds, and should not be taken at face value. (For this reason, confidence intervals are ignored, and the estimated model coefficients are taken at face value.)

On the basis of the model, it would be estimated that a male, 18–47 years old, educated to below degree level, and living in a household with a combined income of under £35000 would have a roughly 6.8–8.2% probability of harboring elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitic attitudes in the post-October 7, 2023, era if he were of white British ethnicity and either had no religion or belonged to one of the mainstream Christian

denominations (i.e., Episcopalianism, Presbyterianism, and Catholicism), or if he were of South Asian ethnicity and hewed to a non-Abrahamic faith such as Hinduism or Sikhism, but would have a 14.2% probability of the same if he were of a non-British white ethnic group and hewed to the Catholic faith, a 25.6% probability if he were of a non-British white ethnic group and adhered to a minority Christian church, a 34.7% probability if he were of South Asian ethnicity and of Muslim faith, and a 46.7% probability if he were of Muslim faith and belonged to a non-white ethnic group originating outside the Subcontinent (for example, in Africa or the Middle East). By contrast, he would be estimated to have an 8.1–9.0% probability of harboring elevated levels of Antizionist Antisemitic attitudes if he were of white British ethnicity and belonged to any Christian denomination, as compared to an 11.4–12.6% probability if he were Christian but associated with a non-British white ethnic group, a 16.2% probability if he were of white British ethnicity and held no religion, a 21.4% probability if he were of South Asian ethnicity and a non-Abrahamic religion, and a 66.7–74.5% probability if he were Muslim (with the probability being at the lower end of this range for a South Asian Muslim and at the upper end for a Muslim of other non-white heritage).

Female gender reduces the estimated probability of elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitic attitudes by 2.90 times, while leaving the estimated probability of elevated levels of Antizionist Antisemitic attitudes about the same; on the other hand, median or greater age decreases the probability of elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitism by 2.48 times, while decreasing the estimated probability of elevated levels of Antizionist Antisemitic attitudes by 1.75 times. As for degree-level education, it reduces an individual's estimated probability of holding elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitic attitudes by 1.54 times, while




FIGURE 3. Proportions of individuals with elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitism and Antizionist Antisemitism, by year (95% CI).




FIGURE 4. Proportion of individuals with elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitism by proportion of individuals with elevated levels of Antizionist Antisemitism.




FIGURE 5. Proportion of individuals with elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitism across ethnic categories, by date of data collection (95% CI).




FIGURE 6. Proportion of individuals with elevated levels of Antizionist Antisemitism across ethnic categories, by date of data collection (95% CI).




FIGURE 7. Proportion of individuals with elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitism across religious categories, by date of data collection (95% CI).

increasing an individual's estimated probability of holding elevated levels of Antizionist Antisemitic attitudes by 1.23 times. Thus, a white British member of the Church of England or the Church of Scotland, aged forty-eight or more, would be predicted to have a 0.6–1.0% probability of elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitism (depending on level of education) if female, and a 1.9–2.9% probability of the same (again, depending on level of education) if male, as compared to a 4.6–6.1% probability of

elevated levels of Antizionist Antisemitism (again, depending on level of education, with gender making little difference).

Date of observation makes a great difference to these estimated probabilities. Before October 7, 2023, the estimated probability of an 18–47-year-old's being found to hold elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitic attitudes would be 2.89 times lower (probabilities for older individuals would be unchanged), while the estimated probability of elevated levels of




FIGURE 8. Proportion of individuals with elevated levels of Antizionist Antisemitism across religious categories, by date of data collection (95% CI).

Antizionist Antisemitic attitudes would be 3.55 times lower for an individual aged 18–47, and 1.63 times lower for someone older.

Discussion

The remaining research questions may now be answered. The proportion of individuals with elevated levels of antisemitic attitudes has

roughly doubled, although the increase has been much greater among the young than among the old (amongst whom ‘old’ antisemitic attitudes do not appear to have increased at all). The likelihood of elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitism is increased by male gender, membership of a Christian denomination other than Episcopalianism, Presbyterianism, and Catholicism, and not having been educated to




FIGURE 9. Proportion of individuals with elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitism across miscellaneous demographic categories, by date of data collection (95% CI).




FIGURE 10. Proportion of individuals with elevated levels of Antizionist Antisemitism across miscellaneous demographic categories, by date of data collection (95% CI).

degree level. The likelihood of elevated levels of Antizionist Antisemitism is reduced by membership of any Christian denomination at all, but increased by education to degree level. Elevated levels of *both* forms of antisemitism are predicted by youth, self-identification as white but *not* as British, English, Scottish, Welsh, or Northern Irish, and—above all—by self-identification as Muslim. Despite the relatively small number of Muslims in the sample ($n = 153$), the discrepancy between proportions of Muslims and non-Muslims with elevated levels of *both* types of antisemitic attitudes is large enough to provide confidence that Muslims in the wider population are much more likely to hold such attitudes than members of other religious groups, even after controls for other demographic characteristics have been applied.

The finding that the prevalence of elevated levels of antisemitic attitudes should be lower among South Asian Muslims than among Muslims of other ethnicities, lower among white respondents who identify as British than among those who do not, and about the same for South Asian non-Muslims as for white British people of no religion, are all consistent with expectations that would be formed from global surveys of antisemitic attitudes, given the assumption that migrant communities will tend to carry social attitudes with them (see the literature review above).

The finding that the rise in Judeophobic Antisemitic attitudes should have occurred among the young rather than among the old was unexpected, as was the finding of a very strong linear relationship between the proportion of individuals with elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitic attitudes and the proportion of individuals with elevated levels of Antizionist Antisemitic attitudes from one year to the next. The former finding is of grave concern, because it suggests that antisemitism is not dying out, but being generationally renewed, while the latter is particularly notable in context of the repeat finding (highlighted, again, in the literature review) of highly significant but substantially

weaker correlation between such attitudes on the level of the individual personality. Given that individuals harboring what are here treated as elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitism are so much rarer than individuals harboring what are here treated as elevated levels of Antizionist Antisemitism, it is inevitable that the majority of individuals harboring the latter will not harbor the former—hence the established finding of modest correlation on the individual level. But, with the proportion of individuals harboring the former rising so reliably and predictably with the proportion of individuals harboring the latter, it would seem perverse to treat the two as anything other than a single phenomenon, from a social or political (as opposed to merely psychological) point of view.

The use of a relatively high threshold for antisemitic attitudes, with visualizations and models focusing on individuals with multiple antisemitic beliefs, has likely resulted in more dramatic findings with regard to demographic predictors than would have followed from the adoption of a lower threshold, such as the harboring of one or more antisemitic beliefs. For example, when taking the dataset as a whole, the ratio between the 67.9% majority of Muslims with *at least one* potentially antisemitic attitude on the Judeophobic Antisemitism scale and the 20.3% minority of people of no religion (or for that matter the effectively identical 19.9% minority of Episcopalians and Presbyterians) with the same is clearly much less extreme than the ratio between the 19.6% minority of Muslims with four or more such and the 2.1% minority of people of no religion (or the still smaller 1.6% minority of Episcopalians and Presbyterians) with the same. And the same applies to antizionist forms of antisemitism: to lower the bar from four potentially antisemitic answers to one on the Antizionist Antisemitism scale would be to move from the large ratio between the 63.1% majority of Muslims and the 10.4% minority of people of no religion (or the far smaller 4.0% minority of Episcopalians and Presbyterians) to the much closer ratio between




FIGURE 11. Adjusted odds ratios for predictors of elevated Judeophobic Antisemitism (95% CI).




FIGURE 12. Adjusted odds ratios for predictors of elevated Antisemitism (95% CI).

TABLE 3. Adjusted odds ratios for elevated levels of Judeophobic and antizionist Antisemitism (95% CI)

	JpAs				AzAs			
	AOR				AOR			
	Est.	Low	High	p	Est.	Low	High	p
Era								
Post 7 Oct. 2023	0.96	0.65	1.43	.837	1.70	1.31	2.22	<.001
Ethnicity								
White: other	1.96	1.32	2.85	.001	1.46	1.12	1.89	.005
South Asian	0.47	0.28	0.78	.004	1.28	0.90	1.81	.159
Other ethnicity	0.77	0.49	1.18	.245	1.25	0.96	1.61	.086
Religion								
Episc./Presb.	1.05	0.73	1.51	.786	0.47	0.37	0.59	<.001
Catholic	1.15	0.72	1.78	.537	0.46	0.34	0.60	<.001
Other Christian	2.39	1.56	3.58	<.001	0.51	0.36	0.70	<.001
Muslim	15.46	9.64	24.89	<.001	10.31	7.41	14.45	<.001
Other religion	2.60	1.42	4.50	.001	1.10	0.74	1.58	.633
Other demographics								
Age < 48	0.82	0.52	1.28	.380	0.79	0.59	1.07	.132
Male	3.04	2.34	3.99	<.001	0.95	0.82	1.11	.507
H. inc. < £35k	1.02	0.79	1.30	.903	0.98	0.83	1.15	.787
Degree	0.63	0.48	0.82	.001	1.28	1.09	1.51	.002
Interaction								
Post 7 Oct. 2023 x Age < 48	3.16	1.86	5.40	<.001	2.38	1.69	3.37	<.001

the overwhelming 84.5% majority of Muslims and the substantial 44.7% minority of people of no religion (or the less substantial 34.2% minority of Episcopalians and Presbyterians). The use of a high threshold is, however, consistent with the overall thrust of this paper, as it would seem likely that attacks on Jewish targets are more likely to be attempted by very antisemitic than by slightly antisemitic individuals.

CONCLUSION

The data analyzed above suggest that rates of antisemitic crime have roughly tripled over the past eight years, and that the proportion of

people harboring elevated antisemitic attitudes has roughly doubled over the past six years. While there is evidence that the proportion of people with elevated levels of traditional Judeophobic antisemitic attitudes was in gradual decline in 2015–2020, and this article’s analysis suggests that this decline may have continued for a certain time afterward, such attitudes appear to have made a comeback since the Hamas-led atrocities of October 7, 2023, in parallel with a dramatic rise, not only in the proportion of people with elevated levels of newer antizionist antisemitic attitudes, but also in absolute numbers of aggravated criminal offences targeting perceived Jews. Given the

well-established finding of *moderate* correlation between anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli expressions of antisemitism on the level of the individual personality, the finding of *near perfect* correlation between proportions of individuals with elevated levels of Judeophobic Antisemitism and Antizionist Antisemitism from one year to the next was unexpected, and is strongly suggestive of a common driver for both. In view of observations made in the literature review, as well as the apparent relationship, not only with antisemitic attitudes, but also with anti-Jewish crime rates, the most obvious candidate must be ideological exploitation of Iran's decades-long proxy war with Israel—reductively known to the world as the Israel-Palestine conflict (and often ahistorically and one-sidedly framed as “the occupation” or, more fancifully, “the genocide”).¹⁰²

A further finding is that the prevalence of traditional Judeophobic antisemitic attitudes is low among members of the historically dominant ethnic group, i.e., white British people, as well as among members of the historically dominant religious group, i.e., members of mainstream Christian denominations, and that the prevalence of antizionist antisemitic attitudes is lower among Christians of all denominations than it is among members of any other non-Jewish religious group (including people of no religion). This means that the prevalence of *both* types of antisemitic attitudes is found to be higher within certain minority groups: in particular, white people with external national origins (many of whom are likely to hail from Eastern Europe), members of non-mainstream Christian denominations, and (to a still greater extent) Muslims (especially from outside the subcontinent). The finding that proportions of individuals with elevated levels of antisemitic attitudes would appear to be much greater within the Muslim population than within the Christian and non-religious populations—a finding which survives controls for non-religious demographic variables, and which is sufficiently pronounced to leave very little room for statistical doubt

despite the small number of Muslims in the sample—replicates findings of earlier studies covered in the literature review, and should thus be considered robust. It provides important context for the evident tendency of anti-Jewish terror attacks both in the UK and in the wider West to originate within Muslim populations with external ethnic origins, as well as for the repeat finding that Jews now perceive Islamist extremists to be a greater threat than right-wing extremists.

When combined with the existing literature on the international distribution of antisemitism, this article's attitudinal findings lend support to the intuitive idea that, when populations migrate, they will tend to carry their attitudes with them. This is an idea which may have wide implications—including for the safety of other groups beside Jews—and should thus be tested further, ideally in a manner which takes more account of diversity within such populations. For example, as this article's literature review has found, there is evidence that levels of antisemitism among Muslims may vary with intensity and type of religiosity, which were not measured for the datasets analyzed here, and would have been difficult to draw conclusions from even had they been measured, without a much larger number of observations.

The attitudinal study is also notable for its unexpected finding that both “old” and “new” types of antisemitic attitudes—that is, antisemitic attitudes expressed in relation to Jews identified as Jews and antisemitic attitudes expressed in relation to Israel and its supporters—are now more prevalent among younger UK residents, and that growth in the older kind since October 7, 2023, appears to have been *almost exclusively* among the young. This finding may perhaps be explained with regard to generational preferences with regard to information source. That is to say, it is (for example) consistent with the conjecture that antisemitic attitudes might be transmitted through online media, and that younger people's opinions are more decisively shaped by such media. However, no data were collected that

could serve to test such a hypothesis (for example, through the use of preferred information source as a control), and this should be regarded as another important area for future investigation.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In its initial observations with regard to the perpetrators of high-profile terror incidents, their ideological affiliations, and their stated motivations, in its literature review highlighting well-established but politically under-acknowledged patterns, in its analysis of religiously aggravated crime rates, and in its identification of demographic predictors of antisemitic attitudes, this article provides ample evidence to support policy. In view of the evidence assembled, the urgency of action must surely be impossible to deny.

The findings of the attitudinal research presented here would clearly imply that attempts to oppose the dissemination of antisemitic narratives should focus especially on Muslims and the young. Moreover, this study provides clear evidence as to the narratives most urgently in need of challenge, both in its unexpected finding of a very strong linear relationship between Judeophobic and antizionist forms of antisemitism on a social level (with both on the rise since October 7, 2023), and its finding that religiously aggravated crime against perceived Jews should—like antisemitic incidents more generally—so closely track developments in the decades-long Israel-Hamas war. Together with qualitative evidence that it is to narratives about Israel that terrorists typically appeal when justifying attacks on Jews in the diaspora, and that similar narratives play a role in most sub-terrorist targeting of British Jews, this finding highlights the futility of attempts to protect diasporic Jews while failing to engage with extremist discourse on Israel and its supporters. (It may be that the UK political elite is at last awakening to this reality. The cross-party parliamentary committee responsible for scrutinizing and directing the

activity of the country's interior ministry recently identified "anti-Israel extremism" as one of four forms of extremism linked to rising numbers of incidents, and named what it called "the Israel-Hamas conflict" as a key driver of extremism in the UK today.)¹⁰³

If nothing is done, the long-term prospects for the United Kingdom's Jewish community would seem bleak. Regardless of how it is to be explained, the finding of a rise in the proportion of young people with elevated antisemitic attitudes is very concerning. In itself, it suggests that the prevalence of such attitudes—and therefore perhaps also the rate of anti-Jewish crime—is likely to increase as older, more antisemitism-resistant generations die off. But that is not the only way in which this study suggests that demographics may serve—over time—to make the United Kingdom a less hospitable environment for its Jewish minority. The ethnic and religious groups identified here as resistant to antisemitism appear to be in long-term decline (slow in the ethnic case, rapid in the religious case), while the demographic group most strongly associated with elevated levels of antisemitism, i.e., Muslims, appears to be growing rapidly.

While the number of residents of England and Wales identifying as white and as British, English, Welsh, Scottish, or Northern Irish fell by only 1.7% from 2011 to 2021, this was in a context of overall population growth, with the non-British white population rising by 41.3% and the non-white population rising by 38.5%.¹⁰⁴ As for the Christian population, it plummeted by 17.4% while the Muslim population soared by 30.8%.¹⁰⁵ This would suggest an overall worsening of the attitudinal weather facing British Jews over the next few years, as rates of birth and migration jointly shift the demographic balance away from Christians and towards Muslims, while the proportion of members of the general population identifying as White British continues to fall, and—across all sub-populations—younger generations replace older ones. With higher levels of

education apparently serving only to shift the balance from Judeophobic Antisemitism towards Antizionist Antisemitism (which, on the evidence of terrorists' expressed motivations, would be very far from being possible to consider as an improvement), it is hard to see the problem fixing itself.

In the day-to-day experience of UK-based Jews, the effects of these demographic trends are likely to be exacerbated by the geographical distribution of the Jewish population. Compared to the Jews of England and Wales, the Jews of Scotland and Northern Ireland constitute very small minorities indeed (see Appendix). Moreover, even in England and Wales, Jews are virtually absent from many regions. The Institute for Jewish Policy Research finds that 53.6% of English and Welsh Jews are resident in London:¹⁰⁶ a city 41% of whose residents are believed to have been born outside the United Kingdom,¹⁰⁷ and whose 15.0% Muslim minority was more than a third the size of its 40.7% Christian minority in 2021.¹⁰⁸ Away from London, the two largest local authorities in England and Wales by Jewish population are both in Greater Manchester¹⁰⁹: site of the recent anti-Jewish terror offences discussed in this article's introduction, and home to a population 31% of which was born outside the United Kingdom,¹¹⁰ with a Muslim minority that has recently been estimated at 22.3%, i.e. nearly two-thirds the size of the city's 36.2% Christian minority.¹¹¹ What this means is that the majority of British Jews live in parts of the United Kingdom with unusually low proportions of White British people and Christians, and unusually high proportions of Muslims—which is to say, in what are likely to be unusually hostile environments as compared to the United Kingdom as a whole. Internal migration away from demographically unfavorable locations within the United Kingdom might perhaps be considered as a way to mitigate the danger. However, unless it were done *en masse*—as in the unrelated migration of Haredi Jews from Inner London to Canvey Island in the coastal county

of Essex¹¹²—such relocation would inevitably involve dispersal, and thus come at considerable cost to communal life.

However, hope glimmers in this study's finding that, outside certain minority groups, proportions of individuals in the United Kingdom with elevated antisemitic attitudes remain low—which suggests that counter-antisemitic policy might be popular across the country as a whole. Moreover, the finding that UK-based Christians should be so resistant to antisemitic ideation, not only when expressed in relation to Jews identified as Jews, but also when expressed in relation to Israel and its supporters, should surely be seen as cause for celebration: even if Christians are currently in numerical decline, they remain the United Kingdom's largest group of religious believers, and as such might potentially provide an important ally in efforts to secure the future of Anglo-Jewry.

TECHNICAL NOTE

All calculations were carried out in R v. 4.3.1,¹¹³ with visualizations generated using ggplot2 v. 4.0.1,¹¹⁴ and with knitr v. 1.47 and kableExtra v. 1.4.0¹¹⁵ employed for table formatting. The implementation of the modified Wilson method used for confidence intervals of proportions was drawn from DescTools v. 0.99.60,¹¹⁶ while the implementation of the Wald method used for confidence intervals for risk ratios was drawn from epitools v. 0.5–10.1.¹¹⁷ Demographic weights were calculated using autumn v. 0.1.¹¹⁸

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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the usual word limit, and to King's College London and Dr Steven Baum for jointly covering this article's open access fee.

APPENDIX: POPULATION ESTIMATES

Ethnic population sizes for England and Wales and for Scotland were taken directly from official census figures released in 2022 and 2024, which provided “British,” “English,” “Scottish,” “Welsh,” “Northern Irish,” and “Irish” subcategories of “white” as an ethnic category.¹¹⁹ In the census for Northern Ireland, however, these were treated as subcategories of “other,” rather than of “white.” In consequence, ethnic populations had to be estimated on the basis of the ethnicity bulletin and main statistics release for Northern Ireland¹²⁰ combined with information on national identity drawn from a briefing subsequently published by the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland.¹²¹ (The assumption that proportions of white residents

of Northern Ireland identifying as British, Irish, etc. will be the same as the proportions of all residents of the same country identifying in the same way is relatively reasonable, given that 96.6% of Northern Irish residents were identified as white.) Population sizes for faith groups in England and Wales were taken from the relevant official report,¹²² as were those for Scotland,¹²³ while those for Northern Ireland were drawn from the official release of data tables for that country.¹²⁴ All of these figures were combined to derive population sizes for ethnic and religious groups across the entire United Kingdom, which are not officially provided thanks to the division of statistical responsibilities: see Tables 4–5.

Note that percentages reported here and used for weighting purposes *exclude* those for whom no answer was given in relation to census questions on ethnicity and religion. Thus, they may differ from percentages reported in official statistical reports.

TABLE 4. Ethnic groups by country

Ethnicity	England & Wales	Scotland	Northern Ireland	UK
White: British	74.4	87.1	49.9	74.8
White: other	7.3	5.8	46.6	8.3
South Asian	6.9	2.4	0.6	6.3
Other ethnicity	11.4	4.7	2.8	10.6

TABLE 5. Religious groups by country

Religion	England & Wales	Scotland	Northern Ireland	UK
None	39.6	51.1	17.6	39.7
Christian	49.1	38.8	81.0	49.4
Muslim	6.9	2.2	0.6	6.4
Jewish	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.4
Other religion	3.9	7.8	0.8	4.1

ENDNOTES

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