

European Jewry – Signals and Noise: Is there a point of negative inflection?

A paradoxical reality with possible negative implications

In the eyes of many American and Israeli Jews, European Jews seem to be on a harsh trajectory. Observing recent negative economic, political and anti-Semitic developments in Europe, many of them question the future thriving of Jewish life on the old continent.

For their part, European Jews, on the whole, enjoy comfortable day-to-day lives, and their representative bodies have not felt the necessity to launch any emergency pan-European or even local strategic thinking process in response to these developments. Since they do not encounter state-sponsored anti-Semitism or barriers to their social and professional fulfillment, they trust their governments to protect them and believe that – provided they lower their Jewish profile – they can comfortably remain in Europe.

At the same time, and this may partially explain the lack of urgency in the behavior of the local Jewish leadership.

In the affluent and protected West Paris and North London suburban Jewish neighborhoods, Jewish life is more vibrant than ever, and every week new families move into them from other communities. Moreover, Vienna's Jewish community is growing (following an influx of Hungarian Jews), Berlin's Jews have launched the *Jewish Voice from Germany* – a publicly-funded quarterly periodical with a circulation of 50,000 – Budapest's Jews have opened an effervescent Israeli Cultural Center, and kosher restaurants, centers for Talmudic studies and Jewish museums open continuously in European capitals. Viewed from Europe, Jewish life is enjoying a renaissance that does not signal any imminent disaster.

Beside this apparent 'business as usual' discourse, it may, however, be possible that Jews are much more pessimistic about the future than they claim. According to a large-scale survey on Jews' experiences and perceptions of anti-Semitism commissioned by the EU's Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), the official results of which will be published in October 2013, Jews all over Europe feel insecure. An EU delegation representative in Israel recently presented basic results and trends that emerge from this survey:

- More than one in four (26%) of Jewish respondents claim to have experienced anti-Semitic harassment at least once in the 12 months preceding the survey, and one in three (34%) had experienced anti-Semitic harassment over the past 5 years. 5% of all Jewish respondents said that their property had been deliberately vandalized because they were Jewish while 7% of respondents had experienced some form of physical attack or threats in the last 5 years.

- In three of the nine nations surveyed (namely Belgium, France and Hungary), between 40 and 50% of respondents said they had considered emigrating from their country of residence because they did not feel safe there.¹

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Henryk Broder, the foremost Jewish journalist in Germany and one of the most widely-read columnists in the general press there declared in a recent interview that if he were younger, he would leave Europe. He is not the only Jew who thinks the future is elsewhere and, indeed, many of the sons and daughters of European Jewry have already left Europe for North America or Israel. Some 200-300 Jewish families of French origin have recently immigrated to Montreal, and at least 120 families to London. On Manhattan's Upper West Side, there are two congregations of French Jews.² 5,000

visitors attended the Jewish Agency's Aliyah Fair in Paris this past May. Beyond the Aliyah of 50,000 French Jews since 1990 (10% of French Jewry), new-immigrant associations claim there are some 20-30,000 additional French Jews who live part of the year in Israel, but for convenience – and in order to avoid Israeli bureaucracy – prefer not to take Israeli citizenship.

We lack reliable sociological surveys to tip the balance to one or the other opinion about this complex and paradoxical reality. But from a prudential policy planning perspective vis-à-vis the State of Israel and world Jewry, our position is that European Jewish life has quite possibly reached a negative inflexion point.

We have been tracing the larger ideological and social currents in Europe: the demise of the multicultural paradigm, the decline of the value of family autonomy and the increasing view of the state as *parens patriae*, economic decline and political turmoil, and the centrality of secularist ideology. For this reason we follow, however cautiously, the pessimistic observers that fear – beyond sporadic anti-Jewish violence already evident in France, Scandinavia, Hungary, Belgium and Holland – a rejection of Jewishness and its subtle political and legal ejection from the public sphere. Such a loss of status may lead organized Jewish communities into a vicious spiral of successive social marginalization (chosen assimilation of the wider community, and self-segregation of the core engaged Jewish community), parochialism, disengagement of quality leadership and ultimately, communal decline.

The following pages explore and analyze recent global, regional and national shifts that may pave the way for the further emergence and development of this process. We identify possible points of intervention and propose activating local and international bodies to confront negative trends.

Recent Developments

Against the background of demographic shifts, including the mass migration of non-European populations to Europe, the recent attempt to restrict rights to normative Jewish practice there could be viewed as the latest juridical/political aspect of a larger identity backlash against multi-cultural policies. While apparently directed mainly against Muslims, this new and vigorous opposition to particularist religious practices also profoundly affects the status of Judaism and may, in the long term, pose a serious challenge to the future thriving of organized Jewish communities in Europe.

Even if each discrete restriction on traditional Jewish life appears to be anchored in universal values and in the interests of general societal good, their cumulative effect does not bode well. They include:

- The attempt to ban circumcision in Germany (so-called 'intactivist' movement has also pushed for a ban in Denmark, Austria, the United Kingdom, and other European countries) – *resting on children's rights and medical claims*;
- The attempt to ban ritual slaughter (*Shechita*, along with *Halal*) in Holland and France, which

is already proscribed in Poland, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, and Iceland – *resting on animal rights claims*;

- The abolition of eternal cemeteries (in Switzerland and Belgium) – *resting on environmental claims*;
- The rejection of requests to accommodate conflicts with the Jewish calendar in scheduling public examinations (in France and Switzerland) – *resting on a claim of church/state separation*;³
- The rejection of requests by Shabbat observant Jews for non-electric entry access in private condominiums (in France) – *resting on security claims*;⁴
- The reconsideration of traditional public funding of Jewish cultural institutions (in France and other countries) – *resting on equity claims*;
- The increasing state interference in the internal operation of Jewish day schools (all over Europe) – *resting on ethnic non-discrimination claims*.

The larger identity backlash against multi-cultural policies is directed mainly against Muslims

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The Circumcision Affair: a Case Study

The circumcision affair in Germany that began with a ruling in a Cologne court, made public on June 26, 2012 and ended – temporarily – in the Bundestag on December 10, 2012, illustrates how a single ruling of a local court could potentially drastically destabilize the Jewish continuity in Europe. Questioning the preconceptions of the debate's

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different stakeholders, JPPI, in August 2012, issued a comprehensive policy paper presenting some analytical questions, policy dilemmas, and communal implications associated with the attempt, and proposing directions for local, pan-European, international and Israeli policy responses.⁵

Anti-circumcision advocates deny they are motivated by anti-Semitic or anti-Islamic feelings. The issue, they say, is children's rights. One survey, taken last year, found that 60% of Germans consider it genital mutilation, and most German medical groups, including the German Pediatric Association, condemns male circumcision as bodily injury without health benefits. In contrast, the American Academy of Pediatrics delivered the following statement:

“After a comprehensive review of the scientific evidence, the American Academy of Pediatrics found that the

benefits of newborn male circumcision outweigh the risks, but the benefits are not great enough to recommend universal circumcision.”

The AAP policy statement, published in August 2012, says the final decision should “still be left to parents to make in the context of their religious, ethical and cultural beliefs.”

It seems that Germans have cultural predispositions to consider “infringement of bodily integrity” of an infant to be worse than negating its parents' right to freedom of religion. This may be questioned theoretically, but practically this kind of attitude makes Jews feel uncomfortable in Germany.

From a policy planning perspective, it is of interest to observe the organized Jewish response to this affair:

- Europe's main Orthodox rabbinical body urged Jews in Germany to uphold the commandment to circumcise newborn sons regardless of the Cologne court's ruling. Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt, president of the Conference of European Rabbis, called the court decision “one of the gravest attacks on Jewish life in the post-Holocaust world.” Stephan Kramer, secretary general of the Zentralrat (Central Council of Jews in Germany), said, “the *brit* [*mila*] is fundamental for our religion. If this is put into legal jeopardy, then we have to reconsider whether we can stay in Germany or not.”
- Israel's Ashkenazi chief rabbi travelled to Berlin and, after meeting different parties without coordination with the local Jewish leadership, intervened in a way that was

perceived by local Jews as highly intrusive and counterproductive. The German ambassador in Israel was summoned to the Knesset to explain his country's policy and various Israeli politicians denounced the anti-Semitic dimension of the ruling.⁶

- American Jewry didn't stay idle and, as part of the effort, a bipartisan group of 20 U.S. members of Congress sent a protest letter to the German ambassador in the United States.⁷
- Following Jewish and Muslim protests, both local and international, Chancellor Angela Merkel was quoted as saying in a closed meeting of her Christian Democrats (CDU): "I do not want Germany to be the only country in the world where Jews cannot practice their rituals. Otherwise we will become a laughingstock." Some people took Merkel's statement to indicate that she was more concerned with Germany's image than with the effect of the ruling on Germany's Jews.
- Following the personal and decisive involvement of Chancellor Merkel, the Bundestag adopted legislation legalizing circumcision on December 10, 2012. But while the circumcision crisis was belatedly resolved by a government still acting out of traditional guilt and feeling of responsibility to the Jews, the attitudes prevailing among the younger generation of German politicians suggest that the Merkel government may be the last to feel a special relationship with Israel and the Jews. More disturbingly, if before the Bundestag decision, the rate of Germans who opposed circumcision was 45%, this

number reached 75% following the vote.

- The case continued snowballing internationally.⁸ According to a survey published on March 2013, about 45% of Britons favor banning Jewish ritual slaughter and 38% favor banning non-medical circumcision.⁹

As a matter of policy planning, and as the attempts to regulate Jewish rituals gain momentum, **it is worthwhile considering whether the approaches and methodologies currently employed by Jewish communities – winning short-term votes and attaining back-door agreements but not always engaging on the wider shifts in public opinion – will protect Jewish practices over the long term.**

Do these assaults on the foundations of Jewish life reveal attitudes of "Jewish rejection"? For Joshua Hammer, an American reporter of Jewish descent based in Berlin, "the court judgment and ensuing anti-circumcision backlash reinforced the notion that many Germans regard Jews – and Muslims – as outsiders, clinging to backward, unsavory rituals and beliefs."¹⁰ German Muslims, many of whom already feel like second-class citizens there, were also incensed. Ali Demir, chairman of the Islamic Religious Community, said that the ruling would make it more difficult for Muslims to assimilate into German life.

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Mega-Trends and Deep Cultural Causes

Though probably not intentional, this marginalization phenomena are the result of a series of interconnected demographic, political, sociological, cultural, and economic developments that affect all of Europe and have particular fallout on European Jewish communities.

1. Economic decline, political turmoil, anti-Semitism

First and foremost, the old continent is in bad economic and political shape

First and foremost, the old continent is in bad economic and political shape. Populist and far-right parties have emerged as the third-strongest – sometimes second – political actors in several countries, and anti-Semitic discourse spreads accordingly. As a result of budget cuts, but also of pressure to

provide similar assistance to other minorities, the traditionally high level of public funding of Jewish institutions has declined. Studying European history, Fernand Braudel (1902-1985) found that as a general rule every major anti-Jewish persecution in Europe was preceded, accompanied or followed by a severe economic crisis.¹¹ Indeed, anti-Semitic incidents in Europe increased by more than 30% in 2012. In France, anti-Semitic incidents increased by 58% in 2012, with a staggering 96 violent attacks.

The rate accelerated rapidly after the lethal attack in Toulouse on March 19, 2012 by a French-born Jihadist of Algerian descent. Anti-Jewish hostility has different faces. Whereas in countries like France and Sweden anti-Semitism is fueled by Muslim elements and rationalized as a response to Israeli policy in the territories, in Greece and Hungary it draws on calls for ethnic purity and nationalism.

There is indeed sporadic anti-Jewish violence in France, Scandinavia, Belgium, Germany, Ukraine, and Holland. In Hungary, public anti-Semitic rhetoric has up-surged to a degree not seen in Europe after the Second World War and is accompanied by anti-Jewish vandalism and sporadic violence, which had been directed against the chief rabbi himself.

Beyond violence that hurts specifically recognizable Jews, political anti-Semitism – the main threat to Jewish continuity – is, unfortunately, gathering force. Popular parties often affiliated with the reactionary extreme-right, which espouses nationalism, anti-Muslim xenophobia and sometimes anti-Semitism, are taking hold in major political arenas. This is already the case with the neo-Nazi parties in Greece, Latvia, Austria, Ukraine, and Hungary. And the Italian popular comedian, Beppe Grillo, leader of the Five Star Movement (MoVimento 5 Stelle), uses anti-Semitic rhetoric.

2. Tolerance threshold and reaction against cultural transformation

Multiculturalism in Europe started in Great Britain in the mid-1960s. Governments (especially in Great Britain, Germany, and Scandinavia) attempted

to facilitate integration of new ethnic groups by incorporating their modes of cultural/religious difference into national society. However, since the early years of this century, and certainly since the terrorist attacks of September 2001 in the United States and July 2005 in London, multiculturalism has faced mounting criticism and has gradually been sidelined by a new 'post-multiculturalism' considerably more hostile to certain practices associated with ethnic minorities and immigrants.¹²

As long as Jewish ritual slaughter and circumcision were carried out on a very small scale, they were not regarded as a public policy issue worthy of attention, and were tolerated under special arrangements. The scaling-up of these practices as a result of the growing Muslim presence in several European countries now seems to require official regulation. Opposition to these practices, as of now, seems to be directed not toward Jews in particular, but rather toward Muslim populations. Islam is in the process of becoming a major component of the European cultural landscape, with an increasing number of Muslims holding leading public and private positions. As a reaction to this demographic shift, popular voices advocate a return to 'European core values' while nationalist and Christian parties gain substantial political influence. Muslims are not going to return to their countries of origin, so they are asked to adopt a low profile, adapt to the European ethos, and to privatize their ethnic and religious practices. The ban against minarets in Switzerland, which was supported by 57.5% at the polls, and the *burqa* ban in France can be seen as expressions of this assimilationist political determination.

3. The European secularist ideology

From its early colonial days when English and German settlers came in search of religious freedom, America has been profoundly influenced by religion. That influence continues in American culture, social life, and politics. According to a 2009 Gallup survey, 65% of Americans said that religion plays an important role in their lives, compared to 13% in France, 25% in Italy, and 34% in Germany.¹³ Consequently, the culture of the United States is very different from that of Europe. In America, with the importance in its history of dissenting Protestantism, freedom of religion is conceived of in terms of the family lifestyle and bringing up one's children in accordance with one's beliefs. In Europe, however, religion came to be seen as negative and ever since the Enlightenment and the French Revolution the aim of liberty in regard to religion is to break free from the controlling Church.¹⁴ Thus, if personal and family religious freedom is fundamental to America's value system, it is much less so in Europe. What is central is personal dignity, including the dignity of children.

As a reaction to this demographic shift, popular voices advocate a return to 'European core values' while nationalist and Christian parties gain substantial influence

Analyzing recent conflicts between European liberal ideals and Semitic religious practices may help identify trends and anticipate potential developments. The conclusions of Professor Cecile Laborde, who conducted a comparison

between contemporary Anglo-American and French political theory, is worth mentioning here. Observing the intellectual debate around the 2004 ban on religious symbols in French public schools (a ban aimed at stemming the increased prevalence of Muslim head scarves and that incidentally also encompassed Jewish *kippot* and Catholic crucifixes), she claims that opponents of religious practice justified their positions based on three key French republican ideals: (1) **individual autonomy**,

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to argue that women must be emancipated from oppressive forms of religious beliefs; (2) **secular equality**, to suggest that a religion-free public sphere is the best way to show respect to all citizens regardless of their religion; (3) **national cohesion**, to denounce religious signs as conspicuous symbols of divisiveness and of insufficient integration of minorities into the national community.¹⁵

If Laborde is correct, the opposition to religious dress, rituals, and practices is not an incidental conflict between the value of religious freedom and the bodily integrity of children or the rights of animals that can be resolved by conciliation. **Instead, these rituals will be increasingly perceived as threats to the national ethos and to its core values of Equality (secular neutrality in the public sphere), Liberty (individual autonomy and emancipation) and Fraternity**

(civic loyalty to the community of citizens), especially as conceived in the French political tradition. According to the French conception of the Social Contract (Rousseau), one gives all of one's powers and rights to the *volonté générale* and one receives back civic rights, not natural rights. In the predominant political philosophy in America, that of John Locke and Jefferson, in contrast, one retains one's natural rights and only gives the state the power to protect them. In response to the massive influx of Muslims, the state's secularist attitude has been strengthened in France as cultural patrimony.

4. Refusal of Jewish particularism

If, in America, young Jews of the current generation have gently integrated their Jewishness into their multifaceted identity, in Europe Jews still live according to the binary identity that characterized previous generations of American Jews. Like the grandparents of today's American Jews, even the European Jews who have very little in the way of Jewish ethnic capital, who knew little or nothing of Jewish languages, written texts, and cultural expressions, have a sense of being viscerally, even tribally linked – positively or negatively – to their Jewish ancestry. Even if young European Jews do not experience any impediment to their educational, occupational, or social mobility, their Jewishness is a key element of their identity – and Jewish belonging is never a trivial issue. In practical terms, Jews are faced with an impossible choice: they are subliminally asked to assimilate, but the environment emphasizes primordial

ethnic differences between non-Jews and Jews and does not allow them to do so easily.

Built following centuries of bloody ethno-religious and national conflicts, the founding ethos of the European Union is that strong ethno-religious and national identities are better avoided. Jewish particularism is regarded with suspicion. Nicolas Sarkozy's successor as leader of the UMP liberal party and current French opposition leader, Jean-François Copé, whose mother is of Jewish Algerian descent and whose father is of Jewish Romanian ancestry, illustrates this pressure to disengage from 'assigned' Jewishness in order to make one's way to national political leadership. He felt the need to declare, "[his] community of reference is not the Jewish one but the French one." Whereas Judaism as a culture is sometimes praised and celebrated, the ethnic, collective, and communitarian dimensions of Jewishness are repudiated. All over Europe, Jews are increasingly encouraged to privatize their identity and avoid emphasizing their Jewishness. This has already been the rule for the last two hundred years, but with the demographic shifts and the massive influx of Muslim populations, this expectation of 'voluntary amnesia' is becoming mandatory in the public sphere.

Given this wider context, we do not yet know whether the Jews are what we could call 'collateral damage' of a backlash aimed against the increasing Muslim presence, or the victims of a European nationalistic resurgence that specifically targets Jews as well as Muslims.

Implications for Jewish Communal Life

We started this chapter by presenting two perspectives, one optimistic and one pessimistic, regarding maintaining a Jewish way of life in Europe. In the light of the broad social and cultural context we discussed, we can perhaps understand this reality in all of its complexity and present both perspectives as two sides of the same coin. Indeed, it seems that in the wake of the developments described above, the Jewish communities have become polarized. On one side, a small minority, which includes the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox, lives a vibrant Jewish life and has become more committed and connected to its Jewishness. At the same time there is another group that seeks integration into the space of national and public life. This group attempts to lower its Jewish profile and to detach itself, culturally and socially from Jewish institutions. As a result, Jewish communities have become weakened and are becoming less and less capable of engaging in future-oriented strategic thinking.

All over Europe but especially in the United Kingdom and France, which are home to 80% of Western Europe's Jews, we find the expression of this polarization. In order to avoid friction with

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their environment, Jews take various steps – **the more practicing Jews relocate in self-segregated neighborhoods, the more idealistic ones make Aliyah, and the most ambitious ones quit Europe for more promising horizons.**

This state of affairs sends two important messages to world Jewry. First, that the European Jewish leadership may not be sufficiently professionally equipped to organize itself on the Pan-European plane and deal with the huge challenges it is

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confronting. Second, based on the high motivation to emigrate, Israeli policy makers and American communal leaders could find in this problematic situation a window of opportunity for Aliyah of a well-qualified population.

Recommendations: Challenges and Possible Jewish Responses

Emigration challenges: Will the Jews leave Europe?

Benefiting from relatively high social, professional, and economic personal status, most European Jews will in all likelihood remain in Europe. However, we observe two phenomena:

1. **Internal migration to stronger communities.**

As mentioned earlier, families prefer to relocate to neighborhoods in which their children can attend schools along with sufficient numbers of other Jewish children, and preferably with a low Muslim presence. Moving is never easy and if people decide to relocate, this certainly indicates a discomfort.

2. **International relocation.** European Jews are fervent Zionists and Israel has the potential to become the relocation destination for many. Unfortunately, as shown in JPPI's 2011-2012 Annual Assessment,¹⁶ **there is as yet no Israeli political determination to set up appropriate structures to ease the professional and educational integration of new immigrants from non-Russian speaking European countries.** Solutions that have been proposed to improve Israeli capabilities in this field fall into four categories:

1. Removing bureaucratic barriers, such as those involved in gaining recognition of foreign degrees and professional licenses, and a reexamination of the military enlistment regulations (for instance, making the compulsory military draft law more flexible) by setting up an inter-ministerial committee/national authority charged under a cabinet mandate.

2. Significantly improving the absorption system in Israel. Creating plans for selected cities, towns and communities to ensure they include all absorption services – *ulpanim*, children's education,

community activity, and employment. The plan should be implemented by specially trained project staff in cities with high concentrations of *olim*.

3. Renewing and expanding 'community Aliyah' projects, including a proactive system of attracting *Olim*. This also includes an effort to remove bureaucratic barriers associated with small and middle size businesses setting-up and relocation.
4. Establishing an operational body that integrates the experience of 'community Aliyah' projects and the lessons learned from attracting and absorbing North American *Olim* – that can provide a comprehensive solution to those from Western Europe, and especially from France, who seek to move to Israel.

Organizational challenges: Possible action bodies

The European Jewish Communities: Confronted with new trans-European developments, European Jewries, which have traditionally been autonomous and separate, should investigate the creation of a new, Pan-European coordinating body to deal with the current situation. Such a body should include both religious representatives and community leaders in the common effort to preserve fundamental elements of Jewish belonging.¹⁷

Israeli and American participation in such a pan-European body – perhaps as observers – should not be excluded, since the face of European Jewry also has many implications for the Jewish world at

large, even though it is the Europeans who are, at the moment, on the front line. One direction to be investigated for an effective executive body could take the form of a sextet including four Europeans (a leading rabbi, a leading jurist, a communal leader, and one politician of Jewish descent), with one American representative and one Israeli government official as observers.

World Jewry and Israel: It is important to distinguish between actions taken by the Jewish people as a whole, with American Jewry's involvement, and exclusive Israeli intervention in this matter, as they could stem from different considerations and interests. Herein lies one of the sensitivities of the issue: while the vibrancy of European Jewish communities will be impacted by the future of Europe and its attitude toward Muslims, Jews, and Israel, it is also very likely that – in the case of unfavorable conditions – the most engaged of the 1.3 million European Jews will relocate to more hospitable environments. In this context, Israel and North America Jewries may have conflicting interests.

As such, the appropriate role of American and international Jewish secular and religious organizations is clear: they have to support, as they are used to doing, local Jewish organizations to defend and present in the best professional

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manner their legal, medical, rabbinical, and historical arguments to judicial and political decision-makers in Europe. International Jewish leaders have to be careful to coordinate with local community leaders, and discreetly demonstrate to public authorities that local Jews are not alone in this fight.

Regarding possible intervention by the State of Israel, things are even more delicate: it can certainly be seen as a foreign state's interference in

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another country's affairs and this may place local Jewish leadership in an uncomfortable position. Although discreet diplomatic interventions by Israeli embassies are often useful, a public intervention by the Israeli government in the local media is a delicate issue that may exacerbate charges of dual loyalty leveled at European Jews

and should be considered with caution.

Conclusion

The campaigns to restrict Jewish rites we are observing today seem to be part of a wider cultural mega-trend that is not disconnected from the political, economic, and demographic European identity crisis. It is worthwhile considering whether current approaches and strategies utilized by Jewish communities – of winning short-term votes and attaining back-door agreements, but not always engaging with wider developments in public opinion – can protect Jewish practices over the long-term. There is no certainty that answers and institutions that have been effective in the past will adequately fit tomorrow's challenges.

There is a need to assess existing national and trans-European communal mechanisms and to launch an innovative process to develop a bold vision to meet future developments as they emerge. As numbers and political influence diminish within some European Jewish communities, coordination with non-European Jewish actors could be considered in order to elaborate a global coordination mechanism and propose a comprehensive and professional response.

Today, Europe itself is at an inflection point and we do not yet know whether it will become more open to religious diversity or more closed to it. The Jewish people must be prepared for all possible eventualities.

Notes

1. Communication of Ms. Sandra de Waele, First Counsellor, Head of Political and Press Section of the European Union delegation in Israel, at the 4th International Conference of the Global Forum for Combating Anti-Semitism (28-30 May 2013) in Jerusalem. Several surveys on anti-Semitic attitudes have been launched in the past, but this one, conducted by the London-based *Institute for Jewish Policy Research* and carried out in nine European countries is unique because it measured anti-Semitism as perceived by Jews themselves.
2. See, for example, Molinari, Maurizio, "Manhattan terra promessa degli ebrei in fuga da Parigi", *La Stampa*, March 13, 2013.
3. Such an exceptional arrangement that is working satisfactorily can be seen in Italy's "Concordato" with the Jewish Community, which grants Jews the right to abstain from working and/or going to school and/or taking exams on Saturday and Jewish holidays, while requiring universities and public offices to refrain from setting exams and other obligations during Jewish festivals. See Sacerdoti, Georgio, *L'Intesa tra Stato e Unione delle Comunita' Ebraiche del 1987 e la sua attuazione*. <http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/USRI/confessioni/doc/sacerdoti.pdf>
4. For a discussion of the human rights dimension of the legal precedents that limit Jewish daily life of observant Jews in France, including restrictions regarding mezuzot, sukkot and intercoms, see Amar, Jacques, "Laïcité 2005 : zones d'ombre et droits de l'individu, l'exclusion rampante des juifs pratiquants," *Controverses*, n° 1, March 2006, p. 176-193. <http://www.controverses.fr/articles/numero1/amar1.htm>. This ban is a step up: traditionally, the secularization process in Europe was accompanied by a separation between private space, in which religion expression is allowed, and public space, in which religious expression should be avoided.
5. Maimon, Dov and Nadia Ellis, "The Circumcision Crisis: Challenges for European and World Jewry," JPPI, August 2012.
6. From a Jewish people perspective, the Israeli politicians' reactions can be perceived as counterproductive. See Ellis, Nadia and Dov Maimon, "Israel, don't capsiz the Jewish people's boat", *Times of Israel*, September 10, 2012.
7. <http://waxman.house.gov/sites/waxman.house.gov/files/documents/UploadedFiles/Letter%20on%20Circumcision%20in%20Germany%202012.08.08.pdf>
8. For a presentation of the diverse national legislation regarding circumcision, see the comprehensive Australian report: *Non-Therapeutic Male Circumcision*, Tasmania Law Reform Institute, August 2012. <http://www.law.utas.edu.au/reform/documents/CircumcisionFinal.pdf>
9. "Poll: 45% of Britons favor banning shechitah," *Jewish Press*, March 30, 2013.
10. Hammer, Joshua, "Anti-Semitism and Germany's Movement Against Circumcision," *The Atlantic*, January, 7, 2013.
11. Braudel, Fernand, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the age of Phillip II*, Vol. II, Trans. Sian Reynolds, Suffolk 1982, p. 820 quoted by in Wald, Shalom Salomon, *Rise and Decline of Civilizations, Lessons for the Jewish People*, Academic Studies Press, 2013 (Hebrew trans. Yediot Books, 2013).
12. See Christopher McCrudden, Multiculturalism, Freedom of Religion, Equality, and the British Constitution: the JFS case considered (2011) *International Journal of Constitutional Law*.

13. www.gallup.com/poll/114022/state-states-importance-religion.aspx; www.pewforum.org/Christian/Catholic/During-Benedicts-Papacy-Religious-Observance-Among-Catholics-in-Europe-Remained-Low-but-Stable.aspx
14. See David Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization* (Oxford 1978).
15. Laborde, Cecile, State Paternalism and Religious Dress Code (August 21, 2011). *International Journal of Constitutional Law* (I-CON) Vol. 10, No. 2, 398-410. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1913771>
16. JPPI 2011-2012 Annual Assessment, pp. 207-209.
17. For a comprehensive presentation of the challenges confronting European Jewries and possible intervention policies, see Maimon, Dov, *Background: European Jewry in 2030*, JPPI, 2010, p. 63-100.