FOR EVERYTHING THERE IS A TIME

Marlena Schmool and Geoffrey Alderman

This is a sad but inevitable time. To draw on *Kohelet*,[1] 'there is a time to publish and a time to cease from publishing'. The *Jewish Journal of Sociology (JJS)* was very much a child of its time: 1959 - a time when departments of sociology were being established or extended in British universities and when sociological descriptions and analyses of many types of British community blossomed.[2] The *Journal* was also at the forefront of international developments in the Sociology of Jewry. This had begun to surface as a subfield in the United States with the publication in 1938 of *Jewish Social Studies* and grew from the late1960s following the example set by Marshall Sklare[3].

Inevitably given the exigencies of World War II and its local aftermath, British Jewish sociology took a little longer to emerge. Nevertheless, by the late 1950s, there was a recognised need for an initiative such as the *JJS*. When it first appeared, there were notable works of Anglo-Jewish history but only two volumes that could claim to be social analysis of British Jewry, and one of those was a social history.[4] Indeed, in his 1954 preface to *A Minority in Britain, JJS* founder Maurice Freedman wrote of his hope that the book may have brought 'the possibility of a scientific study of Jewish life in this country closer to realisation'.

The *JJS* was a move in that direction. It was the brainchild of a small but very distinguished group of young (and mainly British) Jewish intellectuals preoccupied with problems of Jewish survival and development in the post-Holocaust world. Together with Maurice Freedman, a London-born anthropologist who had studied at the London School of Economics and who returned there as a lecturer in 1949, were his Cairo-born wife, fellow anthropologist Dr Judith Freedman (née Djamour), and LSE's renowned professor of sociology, Morris Ginsberg.

Encouraged by LSE's director, the economist Sir Sydney Caine, the Freedmans and Ginsberg reacted positively to an invitation from Dr. Aaron Steinberg, head of the cultural department of the World Jewish Congress, to establish an interdisciplinary academic journal devoted to the study of Jewish social relations. So the *JJS* was born. Morris Ginsberg was the first editor until his death in 1970 with Maurice Freedman as first Managing Editor and subsequently Editor until his very untimely death in

1975. From then until she died in December 2009 the *JJS* was maintained by the energy and determination of Judith Freedman. The *JJS* became her memorial to her husband's life and to the work and interests they had shared together. She produced each issue almost single-handedly, insisting until the end – completely undaunted by the advent of the digital age – on the submission by post of two typescript copies of manuscripts that were to be considered for publication.

Peer-reviewed from the outset, the *JJS* rapidly developed a reputation for excellence in the dissemination of high-quality research into, for example, problems of social formation, ethnic identity and demography amongst Jews both of the Diaspora and of Israel. *JJS* was aided here by a cadre of the high calibre international scholars who have constituted an Advisory Board, in various incarnations, throughout the Journal's life. Its international character was strongly recognised in the first two editions which included summaries of all articles in French and Hebrew.

For the *JJS,* 'Sociology' was given the widest possible interpretation, and over the decades the *JJS* has presented original papers and research on virtually every aspect of Jewish social affairs, including historical, philosophical and even economic and theological subjects – as long as they had a broad sociological dimension. It was a truly inter-disciplinary venture of high quality, a model of its kind. The contents of the first volume bear witness to this, covering for example 'The Jewish Trade Union Movement in Israel' by Ferdynand Zweig, 'Synagogal Organization in Anglo-Jewry' by V.D. Lipman and 'Jews as an Indian Caste' by Shifra Strizower. This range of geographic and subject coverage was continued throughout the 55 years of publication. The 2013 edition included articles on Elections to the 19th Knesset, 2013 (Stanley Waterman) and Jewish education in Australia (David Mittelberg) while in 2014 there was a special section on 'the relevance of The Jewish Question in the 21st Century'.

In 1980, when the WJC withdrew its sponsorship of the *Journal* on financial grounds, Judith Freedman established a Research Trust in memory of her late husband, and transferred to the Trust a capital sum that proved large enough to bear the costs of production until now, when the decision to close the *Journal* has been taken. In due course the authors of this paper, sociologist Mrs Marlena Schmool followed later by the historian and political scientist professor Geoffrey Alderman were appointed as Trustees.

When Judith Freedman died in December 2009 the future of the *JJS* seemed in doubt. It had not entered the digital age. It had no website and intending contributors were unable to submit copy electronically. While we recognised that much would have to change if the Journal was to

continue, we were determined that *JJS* should not simply disappear. To allow that would have been to dishonour the many people who had contributed to the *Journal's* success over very many years. We felt that publication should continue for the immediate future if at all possible.

A contract was entered into with the University of Buckingham Press, which took over the administration and annual publication of the *Journal* and gave it a much-needed internet-based presence. The Advisory Board was reconstituted. We ourselves edited the 2010 and 2011 editions. For the 2012 edition Dr Stanley Waterman (professor of geography at the University of Haifa) agreed to act as guest editor, and from 2013 the sociologist Dr Keith Kahn-Harris has been the editor. In 2014 professor David Feldman accepted an invitation to become the third director of the Research Trust that remained in overall charge of the *Journal.*

In taking over the production of the *JJS* we were obliged to recognise that the world of academic journal publication had undergone multiple revolutions over its lifetime – not least the advent of the digital age and the possibility of virtually instantaneous publication of peer-reviewed articles "on-line". This has been accompanied by great changes in the nature of demands made upon academics both by governments and by employing educational institutions. As a result they do not have the time to dedicate to peer-reviewing or book reviews and it has been found increasingly difficult to source high-quality material that the *JJS* might publish. Pre-eminently, the *JJS* has been hampered by not having developed an academic, institutional home from which to build up a network of scholars who could bring forward material from their students and other professional contacts. And although there is a wider appreciation of Jewish sociology than there was in 1959 and despite the development of research within the organised Jewish community[5], Britain has not witnessed the same growth in Jewish Studies departments at universities and colleges as the United States.

Furthermore, since 1975 the Association for the Social Scientific Study of Jewry (ASSJ) has published *Contemporary Jewry,* which covers very much the same disciplines as the *JJS* and has the advantage of being well-rooted in (Jewish) academic life in America. It is important to say here that relations between the two journals have always been cordial but equally it would be unrealistic to ignore the pecking order.

Early in 2015 we Trustees therefore reluctantly came to the conclusion that publication of the *JJS* was no longer viable and decided that it would not be published after 2015. We consider that the objects of the Trust might be realised in other ways – notably the institution of a triennial Maurice Freedman Lecture, the broad content of which will be developed

from the objects of the Trust and the aims of the *JJS*. Further details will be announced in due course.

And so with this volume *JJS* closes. Interestingly, in the course of background research for this review, we discovered that *JJS* has survived approximately as long as did its predecessor *Jewish Social Studies*, which appeared regularly from 1939 to 1988 and a new series of which was established at Stanford University, California, in 1994. Maybe there can be a revival of the *JJS* under future trustees.

Be that as it may, the fact that the a Journal of this nature could be published for more than half a century in Britain in the relatively minor field of Jewish social studies bears witness to the sustained interest and support of many researchers, scholars and other authors for whom such subjects were often ancillary to their professions and/or major areas of expertise. Over the years many people have served as advisors, peer and book reviewers or have provided articles on esoteric subjects. They are too numerous to list here and it would be invidious to single out any individuals. When approached, they gave readily of their scarce time; a volunteer force without which the Journal would not have survived. We close by paying tribute to them and thanking them.

Notes

[1] Ecclesiastes

[2] Among the best known of these are Richard Hoggart, *The Uses of Literacy,* London: Penguin, 1957 and Peter Wilmott and Michael Young, *Family and Kinship in East London*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957.

[3] His initial books include, *Conservative Judaism*, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1955, and as Editor *The Jews; Social Patterns of an American Group*, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958.

[4] Maurice Freedman (ed) *A Minority in Britain,* London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1955, and V.D. Lipman *Social History of the Jews in England* 1850-1950, London: Watts, 1954.

[5] The Statistical and Demographic Research Unit was established by the Board of Deputies of British Jews in 1964, becoming the Community Research Unit (CRU) in 1986 and closing in 2015. In 1965 the Institute of Jewish Affairs (founded in 1941 in New York) moved to London; in 1996 it was re-launched as the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR). JPR has taken over the core work of the CRU.

THE FUTURE OF THE ARCHIVE OF THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY: INTRODUCING THE EUROPEAN JEWISH RESEARCH ARCHIVE

Keith Kahn-Harris

We are pleased to announce that the future of the archive of the Jewish Journal of Sociology has been safeguarded. Back issues up until 2006, which had only been previously available as hard copies, have now been scanned, converted to searchable pdfs and made available for free online through the European Jewish Research Archive (http://archive.jpr.org.uk/)

The European Jewish Research Archive (EJRA) is a project of the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR), funded by the Rothschild Foundation (Hanadiv) Europe. It provides a free-to-use online repository of research and other publications that discuss post-1990 European Jewish life. The hosting of the Jewish Journal of Sociology's archive – which extends long before 1990 and includes items on non-European Jewry - on EJRA represents an exception to its normal inclusion policy.

EJRA was developed by JPR as a response to two limitations in research on contemporary European Jewry. First of all, there is little consciousness of contemporary European Jewry as a coherent research field. Unlike in the US, where research on contemporary Jewish life is well established and institutionalized, research knowledge is scattered amongst disparate researchers and bodies, with no overall coordination. This lack of coherence, together with other issues such as language differences, makes pan-European comparative research difficult and also acts as a barrier to researchers who might be interested in entering this field. The second limitation, which follows on from the first, is that there is no European equivalent of the Berman Jewish Policy Archive (BJPA) in the US. BJPA – which in this and the previous two issues has provided a summary of recent research – is an indispensible clearinghouse for research on contemporary Jewish life. However its European holdings are limited and it does not include non-English language items.

EJRA has therefore been developed to be a European-focused analogue to BJPA. As such, it is possible to search the BJPA archive from

within EJRA and, in due course, vice versa. However, given the very different context within which EJRA is situated, it also serves as a resource for the consolidation and emergence of a research field of contemporary European Jewry, a necessary first step in developing more and better research on European Jewish life.

EJRA is free to access and searchable via a number of fields: author, date, title, country, language etc. Items are also tagged, allowing sophisticated searches. The collection policy is broad: EJRA includes records of research reports, policy papers, books, edited collections, scholarly journal articles, theses and other material. EJRA prioritises items that are published since 1990, dealing with European Jewish life since 1990 (on the basis that European Jewish life changed dramatically around this date with collapse of communism and other developments), but where appropriate it will make exceptions. Where it can be sourced and copyright permissions allow, each item is accompanied by a downloadable pdf. EJRA includes items from nearly 40 countries, defining 'Europe' very broadly, including all former Soviet Union countries and, in some cases, Turkey. At the time of writing, EJRA includes items in 23 languages and, where possible, English translations or titles and abstracts are provided. The archive is recognized in Google Scholar and generates metadata that is recognizable by bibliographic software packages such as Zotero.

The EJRA database is currently being added to, with a substantial backlog of items awaiting entry. JPR invites scholars who have published on contemporary Jewish life to check whether their publications have been included on EJRA and to supply items where they are missing. In particular, JPR is keen to source pdfs where they are missing (hard copies can be scanned where necessary) and where authors and institutions can give copyright permission.

EJRA is actively being developed to ensure that it remains both up to date and robust enough to cope with technological changes and user requirements. 2016 will see a full public launch of the archive, together with the start of a programme of publication of curated collections and specially commissioned subject guides.

For further information, and to search EJRA, visit http://archive.jpr.org.uk/

JEWS IN THE BRITISH ISLES IN 1851: MARRIAGE AND CHILDBEARING

Petra Laidlaw

Abstract

Earlier papers by the author, in Volumes LIII and LV, have drawn on the 1851 Anglo-Jewry Database (AJDB) to analyse the residence, migrations and occupations of Jews living in mid-19th century Britain. The current paper draws further on the database to consider patterns of marriage and childbearing among the same population.

Keywords: Anglo-Jewry 1851, historical demography, prosopography, social history, economic history, marriage, family, fertility, childbearing

Background

General historic background

There were about 31-32,000 Jews living in the British Isles in 1851.[1] Britain had attracted a more or less steadily growing stream of Jewish immigrants since the mid-17th century. They came from a wide range of locations, particularly from Holland and Germany, but most of all, from the late-18th century until the late-19th, from what is now Poland. A significant proportion – perhaps 10 per cent – would move on, in time, to other domiciles overseas. Most, however, stayed and multiplied in the British Isles, with the result that, notwithstanding accelerating inward migration throughout the first half of the 19th century, a steady proportion over that period of around 70 per cent of the adult Jewish population is likely to have been British-born. About three-quarters of them at any one time were living in London. The remainder were widely dispersed across the whole of the British Isles (Laidlaw, 2011: 34-46).

Only a minority of this population was born into affluence. Far more were born into poverty, and would face struggle and privation for much of their lives. With hard work and good fortune many did secure a

reasonably comfortable old age (Laidlaw, 2013: 142-147). The childbearing years, however, would be very tough ones, in material terms, for the majority of the population under review here.

Existing historiography

Studies of marriage and childbearing among the Jewish population in 19th century Britain are in short supply. One important reason is likely to be the general absence of classification by religious faith or ethnic grouping in sources for official social statistics such as censuses and birth and death registers covering this period. Joseph Jacobs' late-19th century statistical survey, which has much to say in other respects – such as occupation, class and anthropometry – about British Jews, is largely silent on this aspect of demography. The classic 20th-century histories (Lipman, Roth and more recently, for example, Alderman, Endelman and Feldman) make little reference to the subject.

There is no lack of high-quality published research, however, on 19th-century marriage and childbearing among the British population at large, not least the work of the highly influential Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure. There have also been useful studies of these topics as they affect continental European, and indeed American, Jewry. They are drawn upon below for comparative purposes, but there are substantial methodological and definitional limits to how far such comparisons may be taken, and what useful inferences can be drawn from them.

The Database

The 1851 Anglo-Jewry Database (AJDB), drawing on the research of some 280 contributors worldwide, carries data on 29,275 Jews who were living in the British Isles in 1851. Details on the background to the project are in Appendix 1.

The people on whom the database has entries are reckoned to represent over 90 per cent of the total Jewish population of the British Isles at that date. The database attempts to track developments throughout the lives of its constituent population: it therefore has data stretching back to the mid-18th century, and forward to the mid-20th. By its nature, however, the richest data relate to the mid-19th century. The data on the early adulthood of people who were already old in 1851 are relatively sparse, as are the data on the late-lives of people who were just young children in this qualifying year.

Moreover, the home-born heavily outnumber the overseas-born in the case of those who were children in 1851, for the simple reason that immigrants migrated predominantly in young adulthood (Laidlaw, 2011: 35-36). This places limitations on the comparisons that can be made across cohorts and between the home-born and immigrant sections of the population. It affects particularly those who would be marrying and bearing children around the 1870s, the period when family limitation was taking root widely among Britain's broader population.

The main data sources underlying the present analysis are, naturally enough, birth and marriage registrations. Because quite a number of the people in the database were born – and in some cases married – well back into the 18th century, before civil registration was introduced,[2] the main source is often synagogue records, though these in turn can be rather patchy before the 19th century.

Allowing for such constraints, the database is in principle well-placed to explore such themes as age at marriage – how it varied over time, whether there are differences between Jewish and non-Jewish patterns, whether there are differences between first-generation immigrants and British-born Jews – along with intermarriage (between Ashkenazim and Sephardim, and Jews and non-Jews), family size, and related themes. Table 1 shows the volume of data available.

Marriage

About 2,000 of the database's population of 29,275 are likely to have died before reaching marriageable age, leaving roughly 27,000 who were potentially marriable. As discussed below, probably something like 10 per cent of them would never marry, so the number that actually did marry is unlikely to be much more than 24,000.

Some data on marriage or cohabitation are available on about two-thirds of this imputed maximum (n = 15,477). In some cases, especially among the older generation on whom no form of marriage registration is known to survive, little may be known beyond the name and birthplace of the spouse/partner,[3] along with their listing in censuses as married or widowed. The actual year of first marriage, or failing that second marriage, is known for about 40 per cent of the likely maximum who married (n = 9,849);[4] and the full dates, which strengthen confidence in the data, are known for four fifths of these (n = 7,987).[5]

It is important to bear in mind that the database does not pretend to offer a structured sample. The proportions of entries on which at least some marriage/cohabitation data are available, however, are such as to

allow reasonably secure analysis, particularly of those born after 1800, on whom the numbers are quite large (Table 1).

Table 1: Proportions of entries with some marriage/cohabitation data available

Birth decade	Age group in 1851	Males			Females		
		All entries (Nos.)	Some marriage data available		All entries (Nos.)	Some marriage data available	
			Nos.	% of all entries		Nos.	% of all entries
1740s	102-11	2	1	50	1	1	100
1750s	92-101	5	3	60	8	8	100
1760s	82-91	78	54	69	68	60	88
1770s	72-81	195	143	73	192	162	84
1780s	62-71	410	346	84	412	363	88
1790s	52-61	804	680	85	752	649	86
1800s	42-51	1,373	1,173	85	1,186	1,038	88
1810s	32-41	1,878	1,493	79	1,725	1,417	82
1820s	22-31	2,505	1,403	56	2,492	1,666	67
1830s	12-21	2,940	935	32	2,991	1,153	39
1840s	2-11	3,741	1,025	27	3,709	1,254	34
1850s	0-1	922	198	21	883	252	29
all decades		**14,853**	**7,454**	**50**	**14,419**	**8,023**	**56**

Age at marriage

The AJDB has a more or less evenly-balanced mix of males to females in all age-groups, with males slightly more numerous than females, as one would expect in a population with significant immigrant origins.[6] Taking all age-groups together, the males' mean age at first marriage was 27.7 years, and the females' was 24.4.[7] Table 2 shows a slight downward drift over the period covered; the figures for those born in the 18th century are mostly too small for reliable inference, but the pattern seems fairly firm among the younger cohorts.

The youngest marriage-age of which we can be certain, from both birth and marriage registrations, is 15, involving a handful of girls, most of them Sephardi.

Table 2: Average age at first marriage by birth cohort

Birth cohort	Males			Females		
	Data available (Nos.)	Average age at first marriage		Data available (Nos.)	Average age at first marriage	
		Mean	Median		Mean	Median
1752-1761	1	32	32	-	-	-
1762-1771	14	33.28	35	15	25.53	26
1772-1781	57	31.54	28	43	25.72	25
1782-1791	143	29.81	28	121	24.20	23
1792-1801	342	28.96	27	242	25.40	23
1802-1811	566	28.66	27	459	25.17	23
1812-1821	870	27.91	27	803	24.45	23
1822-1831	910	26.66	25	1032	24.17	23
1832-1841	827	27.35	27	1028	24.39	23
1842-1851	914	26.94	26	1155	23.89	23
All	**4644**	**27.66**	**26**	**4898**	**24.37**	**23**

*shading denotes cohorts whose numbers are too small for useful inference

A small number appear to have married even younger, but these cases are not fully corroborated. Altogether, some 1 in 15 of database entries with marriage data appear to have married under age 20, the great majority of them women (n = 899/1,073).

The average ages for women do not appear to vary much by location, but men living in London in 1851 (n = 3,650) married on average two years younger than those in the provinces. Their mean age at first marriage was 27.2, whilst for those living outside the capital (n = 1,065), it was 29.2. This may reflect relatively lower earning power, or perhaps the typically more itinerant nature of male occupations away from the metropolis. It must also, to some degree, reflect simple demographics. In the provinces in 1851, males aged 20-30 outnumbered females by about 9:7, so they could be expected to wait longer to marry than their counterparts in London, where the ratio was reversed and females were plentiful (10:11).[8]

Exact comparisons with the wider British population are hard to arrive at, and figures for the population at large are themselves problematic. Wrigley and Schofield (1989: 255) offer estimates from reconstitution studies which yield mean ages at first marriage over the period 1800-49 of 25.3 for men, and 23.4 for women.[9] Allowing for all the uncertainties in the comparison, this suggests that Jews were marrying noticeably later than the rest of the population. The reasons for this are not immediately obvious: there could be a mixture of geographic, economic and cultural factors in play, and possibly some statistical distortion. Some recent studies in continental Europe also find a later age of marriage among Jews than among non-Jews (Lowenstein 1981: 97-99; Goldstein 1981: 122-125); but the 19th-century statistician Joseph Jacobs (1891: 50-53) found the reverse, with Jews marrying on average earlier than non-Jews in various centres of Jewish population in mid-19th century Eastern Europe.[10]

There is a noticeable difference between the home-born and the overseas-born in the age-gaps between spouses. The mean age at marriage of overseas-born men is 28.9, and that of females 23.3, an age gap approaching six years.[11] This gap compares with just under three years among the British-born, where mean ages at marriage are 27.4 and 24.5 respectively. Similarly wide age-gaps are found in Germany and Eastern Europe (Goldstein 1981: 123; Jacobs 1891: 53; Lowenstein 1981: 98; Plakans & Halpern 1981: 27). It could suggest that the wide gap in the case of the overseas-born was mainly cultural in origin – perhaps reflecting a greater propensity to arranged marriages, or a culturally-mediated male preference for younger women. It could also reflect the greater economic strain that the immigrant sub-group laboured under, with the men generally waiting longer than non-immigrants before they could support a family, and their womenfolk coming under parental pressure to marry early. Another factor is likely to be location: adult males in 1851 who were born overseas were much more likely than their British-born counterparts to be living in the provinces, where, as noted above, there was a shortage of Jewish women.[12]

Non-marriage rate

Without comprehensive lifetime data on all cohorts, it is not possible to calculate with certainty the proportion that never married. In particular, there are insufficient data on the younger cohorts. But a reasonable approximation can be gained by looking at those who were aged 35-plus in 1851, that is to say already well above average marriage age.

At that date 17 per cent of the men (n = 708/4,150) and 14 per cent of the women (531/3,802) were unmarried. Mortality would soon take its toll from these numbers, but some of the survivors would eventually marry. Drawing on entries in the database known to have survived beyond the 1850s, we can produce broad estimates of the numbers that never married.[13] They represent 9 per cent of men aged 35-plus in 1851, and 11 per cent of women.

It is impossible, in most cases, to discern the circumstances behind non-marriage. A proportion of the non-marriers will have been homosexual. Some others will have had physical or mental disabilities or ill-health which may have militated against marriage. In other cases, the person concerned (often the eldest daughter) will have been constrained to remain at home to help bring up her younger siblings, and then to look after her parents in old age; a few such cases married in relatively late life once their parents had died. A simple lifestyle choice will rarely have been available other than to the affluent, but there are certainly cases in the database of comfortably-off siblings remaining unmarried and living as one household into old age.

Comparisons with the wider British population are again not straightforward, but Wrigley and Schofield (259-265) estimate that the non-marriage rate in England ranged from about 7 to about 12 per cent for similar age groups to those considered here: the estimated rate for the AJDB population sits comfortably within this range. Comparable data for continental Europe have not been found. Joseph Jacobs (49) presents data suggesting a lower marriage rate among Jews than among non-Jews in later-19th century continental Europe. This appears from more modern studies to have held true in 20th-century Poland (Dobroszycki 1981: 69), but perhaps not in 19th century Bohemia (Vobecká 2013:69-70).

Ashkenazi/Sephardi

Of the 15,477 entries in the database on whom some marriage data are available, specific evidence of faith affiliation is available on about two-thirds (n = 10,011).[14] This gives us some basis for examining rates of Ashkenazi/Sephardi intermarriage and marriage out.

It is commonly believed that there were strong cultural constraints in 19th century Britain against marriage between Ashkenazim and Sephardim. The database indicates that although such marriages were atypical, they were certainly not rare.

Data on faith affiliation in early life indicate that about 8 per cent of the database population may confidently be assumed to have been

Sephardi by birth (n = 2,343).[15] Of the 1,008 on whom data on mid-life faith affiliation are also available, almost 1 in 5 appear to have crossed over to the Ashkenazi fold (n = 197). A large majority of the 197 were Sephardi women marrying Ashkenazi men (n = 171), but Sephardi men married across the divide too.[16] Factors in play in such cases might have included simple familial relationships, business partnerships and suchlike, and of course plain, old-fashioned love.

The reality is, however, likely to be more complex than the bare figures suggest. Some will have been married in an Ashkenazi synagogue because this was all that was available in their locality at the time: it may not imply a lasting change of affiliation or culture. But the inference must surely be drawn that if a sizeable proportion of the Sephardim of this generation were marrying Ashkenazim, quite large numbers from earlier generations probably did so too, with the result that many Jews by this time would have had mixed heritage. In these circumstances, the supposed cultural injunctions may have had little traction. A daughter of a Sephardi father and Ashkenazi mother, for example, though nominally Sephardi, might not have faced great problems if she wanted to marry an Ashkenazi.

Marriage to non-Jews

The AJDB has not collected systematically any data that would indicate how many Jews married proselytes, that is to say converts from (usually) Christianity to Judaism.[17] Other sources however indicate that, in the 19th century, proselyte marriages accounted for about 4 per cent of all marriages in the main London synagogues, with the rate gradually increasing as the century proceeded.[18] Whether the rate was higher or lower in other synagogues doubtless depended to an extent on the attitude of the synagogue authorities, but it might be reasonable to assume a broadly similar rate overall.

The proportion of the AJDB population that went the other way and married out is also hard to pin down, but appears to be small. There are 8,459 entries for whom a more or less specific faith affiliation in mid-life (which usually means at marriage) is recorded in the database, mostly drawn from marriage registrations or newspaper announcements. In just 104 of these cases, a specific church or chapel can be identified. The great majority of these are Anglican, which in some, and perhaps many, cases might reflect a simple default choice on the part of the uncommitted. But there are also marriages in Baptist, Irvingite, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, and Unitarian churches and chapels: these might be thought to indicate, in general, a higher degree of commitment to the

adopted faith. Another 19 are understood to have had a Christian wedding of some unspecified sort – thus 123 in total (Figure 1).

In addition to entries on which specific affiliation data are available, the national civil registration index gives a fairly clear idea of which marriages involved Jewish rites and which did not.[19] 772 additional entries can be identified by this means as having married under Jewish rites, and 235 in accordance with some non-Jewish – civil or religious – form. Of the 235, over 70 per cent were men (n = 167).

Figure 1: sources of marriage-out estimate



Putting the data from all these sources together gives 9,466 entries (about two-thirds of the total in the database on whom any marriage data are available) where the nature of the marriage ceremony can be inferred with some confidence. Only 358 of these appear to have married out. Not all those who were married in church or a registry office, moreover, will have abjured Judaism. Indeed, a few married the same spouse in both a Christian wedding and a Jewish one, presumably in most cases to accommodate the wishes of the two families. Others may have flirted with Christianity at the time of their marriage and returned to the Jewish fold later: there are several cases where the person concerned would later have a Jewish burial, so the degree of disaffiliation may be questioned.

We need also, however, to consider the 1,654 entries in the database where only the partner's given name is known, and no other details offer any direct indication of faith affiliation.[20] About half of the cases (n =

878) concern people born before 1810: most of their marriages would have pre-dated civil registration, and no other marriage documentation has been traced, but there is little doubt from contextual data as to the broadly-Jewish status of the couple.[21] (On the basis set out above, the bride is likely to have been a proselyte in something like a dozen cases.)

Of those born later, some 313 are men whose partners were born abroad (the great majority of the men having themselves been born abroad). Many of them probably did undergo a marriage ceremony. Some appear to have done so before migrating to the British Isles with a young family in tow. Others appear to have married at a later date, possibly to a woman 'back home' betrothed to them by longstanding arrangement: such a marriage would normally be in the bride's home town or village. It would be reasonable to suppose that the majority of these putative marriages (but maybe not all) involved a Jewish ceremony, but registration details are necessarily harder to track down than those in the British Isles.

Finally, there are 463 cases of men with British-born partners on whom no marriage data can be found. Based on their spouses' given names, we can make a rough estimate that about two-thirds of them married or cohabited with Jewish women.[22] The database is unlikely to contain many similarly 'hidden' instances of Jewish *women* marrying out.[23]

Allowing that there may be a degree of sample bias in the data,[24] on these figures the proportion marrying out or cohabiting with non-Jews is unlikely to have been more than about 4 per cent.[25] This is a smaller figure than might be supposed from those narratives, quite common since the 20th century, that portray pre-1880s Anglo-Jewry as abnormally prone to marrying out.[26] Comparable data from continental Europe are hard to come by, but Jacobs (53-54) reported marriage-out rates ranging mostly between 1 and 8 per cent in various centres from the mid-1860s to early 1880s, suggesting that the British rate was not out of line.[27] If, moreover, the figure of 4 per cent suggested above for proselyte marriages holds broadly true, the implication is that there would be little or no net loss to the Jewish population.

Spousal birthplaces

The majority of overseas-born Jews migrated to Britain in young adulthood (Laidlaw 2011: 45-52). Judging by those arriving as adults in the 1830s and '40s, many were already married;[28] others would marry only after they arrived in Britain. Some of the British-born would go in

the opposite direction, marrying and sometimes subsequently living abroad; but the majority of British-born marrying overseas-born spouses married and subsequently lived in Britain.

Table 3 (a): Entries' birthplaces against spouses' birthplaces (nos)

	Birth decade	All entries	Spouse birthplace known		Subject born in British Isles/ spouse in British Isles	Subject born in British Isles/ spouse overseas	Subject born overseas/ spouse in British Isles	Subject born overseas/ spouse overseas
		(nos)	*(nos)*	*(%)*	*(nos)*	*(nos)*	*(nos)*	*(nos)*
Male	1740s	2	0	*0*	0	0	0	0
	1750s	5	1	*20*	0	0	0	1
	1760s	78	32	*41*	11	2	8	11
	1770s	195	92	*47*	60	3	19	10
	1780s	410	276	*67*	181	9	39	47
	1790s	804	597	*74*	353	18	114	112
	1800s	1,373	1,089	*79*	652	34	181	222
	1810s	1,878	1,437	*77*	862	39	261	275
	1820s	2,505	1,217	*49*	753	22	207	235
	1830s	2,940	589	*20*	502	18	47	22
	1840s	3,741	512	*14*	456	27	22	7
	1850s	922	58	*6*	52	6	0	0
	all	**14,853**	**5,900**		**3,882**	**178**	**898**	**942**
Female	1740s	1	1	*100*	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**
	1750s	8	0	*0*	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
	1760s	68	7	*10*	4	1	0	2
	1770s	192	42	*22*	26	3	2	11
	1780s	412	163	*40*	103	29	4	27
	1790s	752	426	*57*	277	62	17	70
	1800s	1,186	839	*71*	523	133	19	164
	1810s	1,725	1,297	*75*	771	233	40	253
	1820s	2,492	1,431	*57*	823	270	24	314
	1830s	2,991	637	*21*	484	92	14	47
	1840s	3,709	599	*16*	514	71	8	6
	1850s	883	100	*11*	88	12	0	0
	all	**14,419**	**5,542**		**3,613**	**907**	**128**	**894**

Table 3 indicates that men born overseas were almost as likely to marry a British bride as one born abroad, whilst men born in Britain were

very unlikely to marry a bride born overseas.[29] This is in notable contrast with the position for women. Not only were those born abroad unlikely to marry British-born men, those born in Britain had a roughly 1-in-5 chance of marrying a man born overseas.

Table 3 (b): Entries' birthplaces against spouses birthplaces (%s)*

	Subject born in British Isles/spouse in British Isles		Subject born in British Isles/spouse overseas		Subject born overseas/ spouse in British Isles		Subject born overseas/ spouse overseas	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1740s	-	0	-	1	-	0	-	0
1750s	0	-	0	-	0	-	1	-
1760s	34	57	6	14	25	0	34	29
1770s	65	62	3	7	21	5	11	26
1780s	66	63	3	18	14	2	17	17
1790s	59	65	3	15	19	4	19	16
1800s	60	62	3	16	17	2	20	20
1810s	60	59	3	18	18	3	19	20
1820s	62	58	2	19	17	2	19	22
1830s	85	76	3	14	8	2	4	7
1840s	89	86	5	12	4	1	1	1
1850s	90	88	10	12	0	0	0	0
all	**66**	**65**	**3**	**16**	**15**	**2**	**16**	**16**

* expressed as %s of entries whose spouse birthplace is known

What might have been driving this difference? One would expect the preferences of women and men to be more closely aligned. It is possible that it signals a greater degree of parental pressure on daughters than sons when it came to selecting marriage partners. This would be consistent with the apparently lower marriage-out rate among women than among men that was noted above.

Disparities in numbers, however, may explain much of the difference. The database population has about 25 British-born females to 22 British-born males (n = 12,503:10,989) – reflecting in part the significant level of young adult male emigration to the Americas, Australia and elsewhere in the first half of the 19th century. This is mirrored in the overseas-born segment of the population, where male immigrants outnumbered female immigrants by 2 to 1 (n = 3,812:1,896). The resulting high rate of marriage on the part of overseas-born males to British-born females is

likely to have assisted their rapid integration into the wider Anglo-Jewish community – an opportunity that looks to have been afforded more rarely to immigrant women.

Separation, divorce and widowhood

Divorce under secular law was difficult, expensive, dishonourable and in consequence very uncommon in 19th century Britain. There were only about 330 divorces for the entire population of England and Wales between 1700 and 1857 (Anderson, 1990: 30-31). Not surprisingly, there are very few entries in the database known to have divorced by this means.[30] Divorce under Jewish law was less fraught, and commoner: between 1805 and 1855, some 347 were authorised by the London Beth Din, whose writ extended across the English-speaking world (Pfeffer 2008: 110-115). No AJDB entries, however, indicate such a divorce, perhaps reflecting its low-key nature.

Separation is likely to have been more common, but it is difficult to get a trace on the frequency with which it occurred. There are 117 entries in the database where a woman is described as married in the 1851 census, but with no husband present; in many cases, she is listed as the head of household. Given the large number of men in the database engaged in trading and mercantile occupations (Laidlaw 2013: 121-122), it is to be expected that many of the absent husbands will simply have been away on business on census night. Others, however, were probably living separately from their wives. Some wives listed as widowed may likewise have been, in reality, separated. It is impossible to put a reliable figure on this. Given, however, the pressures at the time on most homes of low incomes and large numbers of children, it may be expected that most wives would do all they could to keep the main breadwinner at home.

Widowhood would put most parents of young children under severe financial stress, and hardly less so in later life when opportunities for earning a living were reduced and there was little by way of safety net for those living in dire poverty. With male mortality outstripping female at most ages, women were more likely to be left in this position. Table 4 implies that men would generally have a better chance of remarrying. The database shows 622 entries who were known to have married at least twice, 463 of them men. 41 are known to have married at least three times, of whom 39 were men.

The Jewish community ran several almshouses and hospitals for the frail and needy elderly, but they presumably could accommodate only a fraction of the likely demand. The database shows 161 entries living in such accommodation in 1851. What the demand might have been is hard

to estimate, but there are 1,721 entries in the database who were aged 60-plus in 1851. Many would live out their old age with their children or other relations, but many others were living alone.

Table 4: Widows as at 1851 by age cohort and gender

Decade of birth	Males	Females
1740s	1	0
1750s	2	5
1760s	24	42
1770s	59	106
1780s	68	174
1790s	67	183
1800s	60	150
1810s	21	63
1820s	8	30
1830s		2
All	**310**	**755**

Childbearing

Just under 80 per cent of the database entries that are recorded as having married or cohabited are known to have had one or more children (n = 12,256). Some, but not all of the remainder would have been childless, whether for reasons of reproductive pathology, sexual orientation, or personal choice. Others would have had children that have simply not yet been attributed to them in the database, in some cases because of early death, and in others because the children concerned were not living with their parents at relevant moments, like censuses. (Children are quite often identified in the homes of other relatives, such as grandparents, on census night.)

Data on fertility and family size among this population are of interest on several counts. The database spans a period when fertility patterns in Western Europe were changing radically, reflecting a shift from uncontrolled to controlled fertility. The timing varied from country to country, and, within countries, from region to region, by occupation, by class and other variables (Szreter 1996). The database population comprises a mix of couples with quite deep roots in the British Isles and others with recent roots elsewhere, especially in northern and eastern

Europe. Might their respective fertility patterns cast light on issues of culture and assimilation?

Measuring fertility and family size in this population is, however, problematic (see Appendix 2). By drawing on a wide range of sources, the database can lay claim to a reasonably faithful representation, taken in the round. There is, however, an inherent bias towards under-estimation, and all figures presented here must be read as fuzzy rather than precise.

Fertility

In the absence of any national statistics of Jewish births as such, the AJDB may be the best source available. But because of its structure, its sampling becomes thinner as one progresses away from its 1851 anchor date. For this reason, the only reasonably reliable date it offers for measuring fertility is 1851.[31]

Table 5 compares age-specific marital fertility rates for the AJDB population at this single point with those for England and Wales as a whole.[32] The small size of the Jewish sample requires us to be wary of reading too much into a comparison with all-England and Wales numbers. Prima facie, the data suggest both lower overall fertility among the Jewish segment of the population, and a greater rate of reduction. The divergence, in the case of the youngest cohort, must be partly due to the Jewish population's later average age at marriage (see above). The figures for other cohorts could merit further exploration, but without comparable data for births in surrounding decades, there is little more that can be read into the data.

Table 5: Age-specific marital fertility rates (ASMFRs), 1851: AJDB compared with all England and Wales

Birth years	All England & Wales ASMFR*	AJDB 1851 births**	AJDB female population	AJDB ASMFR
1802-1806	0.018	14	498	0.028
1807-1811	0.120	73	549	0.133
1812-1816	0.249	158	640	0.247
1817-1821	0.306	210	728	0.288
1822-1826	0.367	223	711	0.313
1827-1831	0.426	114	433	0.320
Total MFR	**7.43**			**6.31**

* data from Woods (2000: 130) ** see Note xxxii

Family size

It may be more profitable to look directly at family size, that is to say the number of children in a completed family unit, in so far as that can be identified. Here too the AJDB has an inherent bias towards under-estimation, but the estimate can be improved by reference to the interval between the first-born and last-born in each family, assuming these are known accurately. (Interval-based estimates would, however, *overstate* completed family sizes if the fertility-limiting strategy of 'spacing' births were widespread: this is discussed further below.)

Table 6 indicates a mean completed family size of the order of 5.9 to 6.3, if we rely on the unadjusted database figures. The mean in England as a whole is estimated to have ranged between 5.7 and 6.2 for mothers born between 1771 and 1831 (Anderson 1990: 38-43). This could be taken as suggesting that Jewish families were slightly larger on average, notwithstanding their later age at marriage.[33] There may, however, be important differences in data coverage and treatment, for example regarding children dying in infancy. It would be safer to conclude that Jewish families were broadly similar in size to those of the majority community.

Table 6: Mean family size by core birth cohorts*

Birth cohort	No of entries known to have had children	Mean no of children per family	
		from actual nos in database	from interval-based estimates
1802-1821	1,198	6.29	7.49
1822-1841	1,446	5.91	6.88

* count based on mothers and restricted to those tracked post-1851

The table also suggests that the younger cohort were having smaller families than their older counterparts, whichever measure is used. It is possible, but not a foregone conclusion, that this signals a move towards deliberate family limitation. Figure 2 attempts to come at this from a different angle, looking at the variation in family sizes between the same birth cohorts. Here the mean number of children refers to their fathers rather than their mothers. (In a count based on mothers, maternal mortality will tend to understate the numbers of larger families; and by using fathers, any additional children following a remarriage can be included,

which is germane to judging whether any intentionality over family size was in play.) It will be observed that the younger cohort's families are slightly more clustered towards the left. The underlying figures tell us that 4 per cent of fathers in this cohort had 12 or more children, compared with 6 per cent of the older cohort; and that 60 per cent of the younger cohort had six or fewer children, compared with 56 per cent of the older. They are small shifts, but it is possible that they signal a gradual shift towards family limitation.

Figure 2: Distribution of family sizes (actual database nos) by father's birth cohort*



* count based on those tracked post-1851

Family limitation

The trend towards family limitation, which was becoming widespread in Western Europe in the late-19th century, was already under way in some locations several decades earlier, while in others it did not take hold till the 20th (Woods 2000: 111 and *passim*). France shows some of the earliest evidence of what appears to be deliberate limitation, and its Jewish population appear to have mirrored the trend (Hyman 1981: 82-90). Knodel (1974: 137-8) judges that Jews in Prussia, Bavaria and Hesse 'probably started to reduce their fertility at least several decades prior to German unification, and well ahead of the rest of the German population'. In Britain, family limitation becomes noticeable on a large scale in the 1870s, but its onset varies considerably by region, by occupation and other factors (Szreter, *passim*).

The Jewish population of the British Isles in the mid-19th century was quite diverse both in background and in occupations. It was also highly dispersed geographically, albeit with a noticeable concentration in London's East End. It might be imprudent, however, to disaggregate the data in search of underlying fertility patterns, for example by occupation.[34] We confine examination here to broad evidence that might bear on the long-running demographic debate about the relative importance in fertility decline of 'spacing' and 'stopping' behaviour. Did couples, in the later-19th century, on the whole just want fewer/less frequent children, or did they already have in mind a specific, ideal family-size? Spacing is generally considered to be consistent with the former, stopping with the latter. Either way, there was no lack of means, many of them time-honoured, if only partially effective.[35]

Table 7: Mean birth interval by mother's birth cohort*

Mother's birth cohort	Nos of mothers with >1 children	Sum of intervals between known birth years of first and last children	Children total	Mean interval in years between births
1802-1821	1,885	22,438	10,879	2.06
1822-1841	1,520	16,565	8,784	1.89
all (1744-1851)	**4,780**	**53783**	**26,697**	**2.01**

*excluding those known to have remarried

The mean interval between births listed in the AJDB is very close to two years (Table 7). The older of the two cohorts shown here – who married about six months later and had larger families than their younger counterparts – also, counter-intuitively, exhibit a longer interval between births. Some of the difference may be down to statistical effects.[36] It is not impossible, however, that it also indicates a modest level of 'spacing' already being practised on the part of the older cohort, if only in the form of prolonged breastfeeding and/or a habit of relative abstention on the part of the older generation. Prolonged breastfeeding practices have been attributed to Eastern European Jews later in the 19th century (Marks, *passim*), and could have been prevalent among this earlier, more Western-European population too, although direct evidence is lacking. Szreter (392-4) argues that populations given to late marriage and amongst whom

illegitimacy rates are generally low might have carried through into married life a habit of relative abstention which would hold down fertility rates. If this could be said of the English at large in the 19th century, it might also be true of the Jewish section of the population, with their late marriage (see above) and low illegitimacy rates (see on).

If this in turn implies that the younger generation were less given than their elders to spacing, it may be because they were already shifting towards stopping, which tends to involve compressing childbearing into the early years of marriage. Evidence (though certainly not proof) of such a strategy can be found in mothers' ages at last childbirth. Among the general population of England and Wales, women up to the generation born in 1831 were typically aged 39 when they had their last child. At this point, the average age starts dropping off, falling to about 38 for women born in the late-1840s, and then falling further (Anderson 1990: 52). But even the older AJDB cohort appear to have had their last children at an earlier age than these England and Wales averages (Table 8). The sample numbers are small, and comparison may not be very meaningful. Of more interest, however is the apparent drop in average age within the Jewish data, which seems to reinforce the picture that emerged from family sizes.

Table 8: Mothers' mean ages at birth of last child*

Mother's birth cohort	Typical date-range of marriage	No of entries with last child birth-dates	Mean age at birth of last child
1802-1821	1827-1846	1,119	37.8
1822-1841	1846-1865	1,345	36.5

*for mothers born 1802 onwards, restricted to those tracked post-1851 and not listed as dying < age 45

The figures are not implausible. Anderson (1980: 7) quotes a mean age of 40.1 for Europe as a whole before 1800, falling to 33 by the early-20th century. Focussing on Jews, Lowenstein (1981: 99-101) finds mean ages in 19th century Bavaria ranging from 38.8 to 35.8 over much the same period (during which the averages for Catholic Bavarians were one/two years higher). On small samples, Hyman (1981: 82-83) finds the mean ages among Jews in France declining from 38 for those born in the 1790s to 33 for those born in the 1810s.[37]

Against this background, it is tempting to speculate on whether the drop in age in the British figures (assuming it is real) indicates a degree of cultural import – not implausible, given the steady growth of immigration throughout the first half of the 19th century – or whether it was more of an

endogenous phenomenon. Table 9 could suggest that the older overseas-born already had smaller families than the British-born, and that the British-born followed later. But the numbers are small, and the difference may reflect, in large measure, the greater difficulty of tracking the overseas-born throughout the course of their lives.[38]

Table 9: Mean family size by core birth cohorts*

Birth cohort	Birthplace	No of entries known to have had children	Mean no of children per family (actual nos in database)	Mean no of children per family (interval-based estimates)
1802-1821	British Isles	981	6.48	7.71
	Overseas	501	5.56	7.06
	All	**1,482**	**6.17**	**7.49**
1822-1841	British Isles	1,174	5.73	6.65
	Overseas	209	5.66	6.75
	All	**1,440**	**5.72**	**6.67**

* count based on fathers and restricted to those tracked post-1851

Even if, on the whole, the overseas-born did have smaller families, we should not necessarily infer that this arose from deliberate family limitation. It could reflect the hazards of immigrant life: more overcrowded living conditions, for example, resulting in a higher level of infant/early-childhood mortality.[39] Another factor in many cases could be the itinerant nature of the husband's work: frequent separation would of itself increase significantly the spacing between pregnancies (Szreter: 395). It is unclear, then, that the immigrant section of the community was already practising deliberate family limitation, and even less clear whether this would have had much influence on British-born couples' behaviour; but it would be an interesting line for further research.

Extranuptial conception

In his study of the immigrant Jewish population in London's East End in the late-19th century, Schürer finds the immigrants to be more given to a tight nuclear family structure than their neighbours (2000: 103-125). The AJDB does not record family structures as such, but the impression from extensive research through mid-19th century censuses is that earlier

generations of Jews similarly, both in London and elsewhere in the British Isles, lived in close family groupings – typically just the parents and their children, though quite often housing a widowed grandparent or perhaps an unmarried sibling or two. The mid-19th century social documenter, Henry Mayhew, quotes one of his informants as saying that 'the whole, or nearly the whole, of [young Jewish females] reside with parents or friends, and that there is among them far less than the average number of runaways' (1985: 207). With this degree of parental and community oversight, it is to be expected that illegitimacy, as such, would be relatively rare; and this appears to be borne out by the AJDB.

This is not to say, however, that pre- or extra-marital sexual activity among this population was rare. The database cannot, of course, measure this directly, but it can identify those cases where the date of the first child's birth is less than nine months after marriage.[40] Some 10 per cent of first births fall into this category.[41] This is well under the supposed average for the British population at large: in early-19th century England and Wales, over half of all first births were probably conceived outside marriage, albeit the rate was generally lower in the urban settings where most Jews lived (Anderson, 1990: 35-37). The Anglo-Jewish figure is more similar to that found among 19th-century Bavarian Jews, which was 9 per cent (Lowenstein 1981: 107).

In a minority of the AJDB cases, the child is born months, even years, before the marriage; and in a few, several children are born before the parents marry, if they marry at all. Sometimes the explanation may be that the children were the product of an earlier marriage or partnership yet to be identified; in other cases, the parents may have delayed marriage for any of several reasons, such as lack of money, or parental opposition. But the majority of cases look like simple pre-nuptial conceptions that in all probability precipitated the marriage. It is tempting to suppose that such pregnancies gave women a better chance of marrying the man they loved, rather than just the man their family approved. Doubtless this was sometimes what occurred. But there must have been many cases where the woman fell pregnant either through ignorance or through unwanted pressure, so it would be wrong to infer that this device gave many women the man of their choice.

In addition to those who had prenuptial conceptions as identified by marriage date, there are 4,625 entries in the database who are known to have had children, but whose dates of marriage – if they married at all – are unknown. An unknown proportion of these would have been unmarried cohabiting couples. But the great majority of such entries concern older couples, for whom the likeliest explanation is that whatever

documentation once existed is no longer accessible: with an average birth-year for such entries of 1807, most would have married, if they did marry, before the introduction of civil registration in 1837. Illegitimacy, as such, is likely to have been low.

The database has entries on a further 826 couples for whom there is no clear evidence of marriage beyond the statement to that effect in censuses, and who are not recorded as having had children. Again, the proportion who were cohabiting unmarried is unknown, but it would be reasonable to conjecture that any eventual pregnancy would generally trigger marriage.

Conclusions

The Jewish population of mid-19th century Britain represented about one in a thousand of the total British population, and it should not surprise us if mean values for the one differ from mean values for the other. It is important not to read too much into such variance. Some real patterns seem to emerge, however, from this analysis. Jews living in mid-19th century Britain got married a little later, on average, than their counterparts in the population at large, but had broadly similar-sized – if anything, perhaps slightly larger – families. They had a similar non-marriage rate, but a relatively low (but by no means negligible) rate of pre-nuptial conceptions. There are hints in the data that the younger generation may have been beginning actively to limit family size, mirroring what was happening among Jews in France, Germany and perhaps elsewhere in continental Europe at the time; but family limitation was also beginning to take hold among the wider British population, and it is unclear where the main influence on Anglo-Jewish behaviour would have come from.

Intermarriage between Sephardim and Ashkenazim was commoner than is often supposed, and those whose families had been in Britain for several generations are quite likely to have had mixed heritage. Whilst the Anglo-Jewish community as a whole was by many standards very assimilated, marriage-out rates were well within the range found in many other Northern and Central European Jewish populations, and may have been more or less balanced by conversions to the Jewish fold.

Quite high numbers of British-born women married immigrant men, often several years older than themselves, whereas few British-born men married immigrant women. Furthermore, though always in small numbers, men appear to have married out more readily than women. These discrepancies may, to an extent, signal differences in parental pressure and control over their sons and their daughters, but simple demography is likely have played a part too. British-born females, taken

in the round, outnumbered British-born males, presumably reflecting a greater propensity on the part of the males to emigrate;[42] whilst overseas-born males outnumbered overseas-born females, again presumably because of a greater propensity to migrate. The resulting imbalance might be supposed to have given a passport to rapid integration into Anglo-Jewry to a substantial proportion of immigrant males.

The database, rich as it is, throws up many more questions than it answers. But it is under continuing development, and as the coverage becomes more comprehensive it might well cast further light on these and related issues.

APPENDIX 1

THE 1851 ANGLO-JEWRY DATABASE (AJDB)

The AJDB is a 'prosopographical' database, that is to say, one built up from an aggregation of summary biographies on all its entries. Its core purpose is to create a statistical portrait of mid-19th century Anglo-Jewry. It carries details on 29,275 persons and thus covers over 90 per cent of the Jewish population estimated to have been living in the British Isles in 1851.

Each entry lists, wherever possible, the subject's dates of birth, marriage(s) and death; their parents, spouse(s) and children (with birth-years); their place of birth, and of residence at decadal intervals thereafter (up to the 1910s); their occupations at decadal intervals (between 1800 and 1919); their faith affiliations in early-, mid- and late-life; their cause of death and place of burial. On Jewish status, the 1851 AJDB takes a deliberately broad approach, allowing the inclusion of any candidates who were born Jewish, or converted to Judaism, or were likely in their own lifetimes either to have considered themselves, or to have been considered by others, to be Jewish.

Work on the database began in the late-1990s, when the author invited contributions from community historians, genealogists and others. The response was generous. Some contributors had previously transcribed, from censuses, all the data on apparently Jewish households in a given city or cities. Most of the sizeable Jewish communities in mid-19th century Britain had been covered in this way, with the exception of London, whose 1851 census has since been comprehensively researched by the author. Others had researched particular families in depth. Others still had scrutinized particular data sources, such as insurance policies,

charity reports or lunatic asylum records, for Jewish listings. Since 2007, the database has been searchable online, free of charge, by individual name.[43] It has been widely used, prompting in turn an ongoing contribution of valuable additional data from researchers around the world. In total, some 280 contributors have participated in the project to date: their names are listed on the website. The author has however maintained full editorial control throughout, ensuring that all data conform to the definitions and conventions set out on the website.

All entries in the database relate to people who were living in the British Isles in 1851. Most, but not all, appear in the 1851 population census: some died before the census date; others were born after it; and others again, though attested to have been based in the British Isles at the time of the census, for a range of possible reasons cannot be traced in the census itself. The census has no specific significance in the project, except as a valuable and fairly comprehensive source of data.

Nor is the year 1851 of particular significance in project terms. The mid-century population generally is of interest because it has been relatively under-researched. A single year was needed as a means of defining a cohort and minimizing duplicates, and a census-year was obviously preferable. 1851 was preferred as a base-year over, say, 1841 (also a census year) because data sources were richer than those ten years earlier. These sources include the one-off religious census taken in that year;[44] the recent introduction of the *Jewish Chronicle* newspaper; and most importantly the 1851 census itself, which was fuller than its 1841 predecessor and arguably one of the more reliable England and Wales censuses of the 19th century. 1851 was also preferred over 1861, in this case because the target population at the earlier date was that much smaller, and therefore more manageable in a project of this nature.

It is important to appreciate that the data in the database span two centuries: a small proportion of those covered were born in the mid-18th century, while others lived through to the mid-20th century. In principle, the database charts these people's entire lives; and in practice, though data on many entries are fairly sparse, it yields substantial data-sets covering several decades. By definition, however, the data are richest on the 1850s and immediately surrounding decades. Coverage is generally thinner in the outlying decades, as illustrated by the example of residence data in the Table below. Taking both the numbers of entries represented in each decade and the proportions they represent, the database is strongest over the period from the 1790s to the 1880s.

At nearly all ages, males in the database slightly outnumber females, as shown in the graph below. This is to be expected in a population which was always being augmented by migrants from abroad, among whom

young, single males would be predominant. But the population was also being depleted by emigration, particularly of young males.

	Persons with known residence	Those with known residence as % of those in AJDB known to be living*
1760s	140	86
1770s	384	70
1780s	846	61
1790s	1,645	56
1800s	2,890	53
1810s	4,607	51
1820s	7,692	54
1830s	11,779	59
1840s	19.100	69
1850s	29,275	100
1860s	9,758	38
1870s	8,136	37
1880s	6,326	38
1890s	2,117	16
1900s	1,338	16
1910s	673	14

* estimated survivor numbers after 1851



Although the database tracks the later lives of emigrants wherever possible, it is not always easy. Data on the later lives of females tend in consequence to be somewhat richer than on the later lives of males.

As to sources, the national censuses from 1841 to 1911 have been among the most important in compiling the AJDB. Other key general sources include the registration of births, marriages and deaths under the national systems which began in England and Wales in 1837, in Scotland in 1855, and in Ireland in 1864. Jewish sources include the records of the Great, Hambro, New and Bevis Marks synagogues, which go back to the 18th century, becoming more comprehensive in the first half of the 19th. Announcements in Jewish newspapers throughout the second half of the 19th century are particularly germane to the 1851 AJDB population, and have been usefully collated in two printed volumes covering the period 1861-1880 (Berger, 1999 and 2004) and online in relation to the periods up to 1869 and 1880-95 (www.jeffreymaynard.com). Extensive listings of entries relating to Jews in trade directories and the like in the first half of the 19th century are also available online (*ibid*). An index to Jewish names in insurance policies from the mid-18th to mid-19th centuries (www.jewishgen.org/databases/UK/GR_Insurance_Policies/JewishSurnames) has proved a rich resource, especially for occupations, on the early 19th century. All these sources have been extensively trawled in the compilation of the 1851 AJDB and many contributors have drawn on other sources, for example naturalization papers, court records, published biographies and gravestone inscriptions, for data that are also incorporated.

The full database is now available for research applications by registered users of the UK Data Archive (http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=7668&type=Data%20catalogue).

APPENDIX 2

MEASURING FAMILY SIZE

The measurement of family size in this population is problematic on several grounds. Some of these concern the nature of the sources themselves:

Censuses Until the 1911 census (by which date probably well over 90 per cent of the database population would be dead), there was no comprehensive survey in Britain of completed family size. Decennial censuses might or might not document the full family: they would, by definition, miss out most children who died in infancy; and parents with large families in crowded accommodation would often farm out some of their children to stay with relations.

Registrations of births in synagogues or churches This tends to be haphazard, certainly in the 18th century, but remains so after civil registration was introduced in 1837.[45] Some parents, for example, would register the births only of boys. Parents who moved around the country, moreover, might register only a small proportion of their children at any one synagogue.

Civil registration of births Although an invaluable source following its introduction in 1837 (England and Wales), 1856 (Scotland) and 1864 (Ireland), it was not at first compulsory. Compulsory registration was introduced in England and Wales in 1875, and it is thought that before that date up to 15 per cent of births in some parts of the country went unregistered. Registrations, moreover, do not always equate with actual date of birth: for any of several reasons a registration could be delayed for months or even longer.

Birth announcements in newspapers These can make up some of the deficit, but do not become commonplace until the 1870s, and in any case are largely confined to the relatively affluent.

Other constraints arise from the nature of the data collection:

Cohort differences The under-counting that derives from the patchiness of birth records before civil registration is exacerbated by the fact that most of the children of older people in the database (those born before, say, 1800) would have left home by the time that censuses might have been a useful source; many of the children, indeed, would have emigrated. Furthermore, a considerable number of any children they had would have died by 1851, many of them in infancy and early-childhood

Keeping tabs on individuals It can be hard to track an individual throughout the decades of his or her life. Individuals with very common names, like Isaac Isaacs or Rebecca Levy, are always hard to follow through with confidence. Name changes give rise to difficulties too – not so much a woman's change of surname on marriage, which can generally be identified quite easily, as random changes, for example to Anglicise or de-Judaise a name (Levy to Lawson, Moses to Moss, Polack to Pollock and so on), or simply the adoption of informal appellations like John or Jack or Joe for Jacob, Jonas, Joseph and suchlike

Population mobility The database population were often highly mobile: at least 9 per cent of those surviving to the 1860s are estimated to have emigrated to other continents (Laidlaw, pp 46-8, with data since augmented), and others moved a great deal around Britain and Europe. It is often difficult to capture comprehensive data on the marriages and children of people who moved abroad.

Counteracting these shortcomings, many of the entries have been researched in depth by genealogists or social historians employing a wide armoury of sources and techniques to uncover as much information as possible on the individuals concerned. Additional sources such as family prayer books, Wills, naturalisation papers, court records, hospital records and so forth can provide invaluable data to supplement those from standard sources such as censuses and birth registers.

This notwithstanding, the raw data in the database are likely quite frequently to understate completed family sizes. One way of correcting for this, to some degree, is to look not at the listed children for each entry but at the interval between the birth-years of the first and last-born in each family. If, for example, a woman is shown as having had eight children between 1850 and 1872, a possible surmise is that she actually had 12, with four unaccounted for, perhaps having died in infancy. This is not the only possible explanation. She might, for example, simply have had low fertility; she might have been widowed and then re-married; she might have been instructed to avoid childbirth for some years on medical

grounds; or she and her husband might have taken active steps to restrict their family size.

By and large, however, and especially for the older database cohorts, the likeliest explanation in most such cases is that the database under-counts their family size. This being so, an alternative calculation based on the interval between first and final births probably captures a better picture of family size than the raw data. The approach used in this analysis has been to generate an imputed figure, based on an assumed two-year gap between pregnancies, in all cases where the interval is significantly larger than would be expected from the known number of children. The resulting figures obviously do not allow for the other possible explanations of wider-than-predicted birth intervals. Given, however, the inherent under-counting that arises from the nature of the sources and the data collection, it is probably fair to suppose that this degree of inflation of the raw figures goes in the right direction.

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Notes

[1] The expression 'British Isles' covers England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. All were subject to the 19th century censuses, and all had Jewish residents in 1851

[2] in 1837 for England and Wales, 1855 for Scotland and 1864 in Ireland

[3] and not even that in some cases, where all that is known from an extant registration is that the person concerned had been previously married

[4] This figure relates, strictly, to the year of first *known* marriage: most, but not all, sources record whether the person concerned had had a previous marriage. In 181 cases where the year of first marriage is not known, the year of a second or later marriage is known. Second-marriage dates are known for some 622 of the database entries, but this is almost certainly an underestimate. Though divorce was uncommon in the 19th century, relatively high mortality (especially among women of childbearing age) might be expected to have resulted in a higher re-marriage rate than the figures here suggest.

[5] This is because the data usually come from marriage certificates or synagogue records, rather than simply a registry index. Additional data in these sources (such as father's Hebrew name, and/or address and occupation) offer important assurance in the case of people with commonplace names that the data have been correctly matched.

[6] 14,419 females to 14,854 males, a ratio of 49.3:50.7.

[7] Accuracy of age at marriage data depends on accuracy of birth data. The AJDB lists exact birth dates (that is to say, drawn from sources such as birth registers in DDMMYY format) for 960 out of 4,364 marrying males (22%), and 952 out of 4,955 marrying females (19%). In other cases, the age at marriage is computed from year of birth, which in the great majority of cases is drawn from the 1851 census. This has been found – from the checks possible where exact date of date of birth is also known – to be generally very reliable. There is however an intrinsic bias in census-based dates: the 1851 census was taken on 30 March (other censuses on different dates), so although the database treats anyone listed as (say) aged 20 in 1851 as having been born in 1831, something like 75% will actually have been born in 1830. Taking into account the fifth of cases where exact dates are known, the overall average ages for the AJDB population are probably understated by about six months. The distribution of the bias will, however, vary with age group and other variables, so it would be unwise to apply a correction factor across the board.

[8] These figures need to be treated with caution. They refer, for the most part, to people's residence on census night (though if their ordinary residence is different, and known, the database substitutes the ordinary residence). An uncertain proportion of the males listed as resident in the provinces – especially those with travelling occupations – will have been based in London, or at least had roots in London which might have been important when it came to finding a marriage partner. This, along with higher mortality and higher emigration among young adult males than among females, probably goes much of the way to explaining why London females in the 20-30 age-group outnumber their male counterparts by what appears to be quite a large margin (2243 to 2034)

[9] Figures for England and Wales only, and based on reconstitution studies in 26 parishes

[10] Specifically, 'Austria', Moscow, Pesth (ie Budapest), 'Russia' and St Petersburg. Posen/Poznan was cited as an exception to the observation: perhaps significantly, it was

one of the chief sources of Jewish immigration to the British Isles in the first half of the 19th century

[11] The overseas-born represent 18 per cent and 7 per cent respectively of all males and all females whose ages at first marriage are known

[12] 47 per cent of males aged 21-plus who had been born overseas, as compared with 20 per cent of those born in Britain (though see note 8 above). There is a complex interplay here with spousal birthplace, discussed later in the main paper. Roughly half of the men in the database who were born overseas, and on whom spousal birthplace data are available, married women who had also been born overseas: see Table 3. Probably in many cases this simply reflected a preference for a spouse with a similar linguistic and cultural background, along perhaps with some family or community pressure. Against that, marrying a British-born woman would have given a passport to integration which more of the immgrants might have seized had the numbers not been stacked against them.

[13] The calculation goes as follows:

			Males	Females
All married and unmarried born <1817	a	total aged 35+ in 1851	4,150	3,802
	b	deaths from 20% mortality in 1850s	830	760
	c	estimated survivors to 1860s (b-a)	3,320	3,042
	d	survivors tracked in AJDB	1,882	1,554
	e	grossing-up factor (c/d)	1.76	1.96
Unmarried born <1817	f	unmarried in 1851	708	531
	g	deaths from 20% mortality in 1850s (assume predominantly old, so no late marriers)	142	106
	h	estimated survivors to 1860s (f-g)	566	425
	i	survivors tracked in AJDB and remaining unmarried	134	167
	j	tracked unmarried survivors grossed up to estimated survivor total (i x e)	236	327
	k	never married (g+j)	378	433
	l	never married % of all 1851 population (l/a)	9.1	11.3

[14] This should not be taken as implying that there is much doubt about the broad Jewish status of the remainder – only that specific data is absent on their synagogue affiliation. Other considerations like family naming patterns, announcements in the Jewish press and suchlike permit a high degree of confidence as to Jewish status in many cases where synagogue data are lacking

[15] Data generally drawn from synagogue birth records, or, in the absence of those, inferred from family names and/or birth in countries like Italy, Gibraltar, Morocco and Turkey. In addition, an uplift of 7 per cent has been applied to bring in those with common family names like Cohen, Levy, and Solomons, which are not clearly suggestive of either

Sephardi or Ashkenazi origins: this is the proportion which such names represent in the indexes of Bevis Marks birth and death registrations. Some further uplift would be in order to reflect the fact that a proportion of Jews from northern European countries, most notably Holland, had Sephardi origins, although this is often not clear from their names (eg Van Den Bergh, which could be derived from Delmonte). The figure in the main text assumes, *faute de mieux*, that the Sephardi proportion among the Dutch-born Jews in Britain was in line with the proportion among non-Dutch in Britain. See also discussion in Whitehill (1973: 4-5), which lends support to a figure of this magnitude

[16] Whitehill (1973: 5) suggests that the rate of mixed Sephardi/Ashkenazi marriages might have been quite a bit higher than the figures here suggest, with about 42 per cent of Sephardi men marrying Ashkenazi brides over the period 1838-70. His figures are based, however, on surnames rather than more detailed data, and an assumption that people with names like Cohen, Levy and Solomon would have been Ashkenazi, which he acknowledges may give rise to error. Whichever estimate is truer, the judgment can hold good that 'Marriages between Sephardi men and Ashkenazi women were far more frequent in the Victorian age than is generally supposed' (ibid)

[17] Just two dozen are so listed, but this is probably a large underestimate

[18] The figures available are as follows:

Synagogue	Date range	Proselyte marriages (nos)	Total marriages (nos)	Proselyte proportion (%)	Source
Bevis Marks	1841-1901	64	1212	5	Whitehill (1973: 6)
Great	1791-1859	123	4301	3	Courtesy of Angela Shire (www.synagoguescribes.com)
Hambro	1791-1837	13	263	5	
New	1819-32	10	230	4	New Synagogue Duplicate Ketubah Book (transcription by Bernard Susser)

[19] This may be inferred from online BMD indexes, like www.freebmd.org.uk. These display results grouped together by volume and page reference, which means marriage data supplied by a single registrar or institution. If we take as an example a search against the name 'Edward Nathan', in 1846 we find one man by that name in a group of marriages in Stepney whose other members are Mary Brown, Jane Chalmers, Elizabeth Clayson, James Furze, Jane Maslin, John Porter and John Stewart – one of the women here presumably being his bride. None of the names except his look Jewish. By comparison, in 1851 we find an 'Edward Nathan' marriage in London City alongside Dinah Abrahams, Rachel Cohen, Lewin Crawcour, John Davis, Sophia Isaacs, Daniel Myers and Maria Samuel. We might reasonably conclude, without any more specific information, that the Edward Nathan marrying in 1846 married out (if indeed he was Jewish), whilst the one who married in 1851 stayed within the fold

[20] In a further 588 cases, only the *surname* of the spouse is known. The great majority are widowed women, or women whose husband was absent on census night, but whose married surname and other details (like children's given names and other contextual data) generally leave little doubt as to their Jewish status

[21] Extensive, but not comprehensive, marriage records have survived for some but not all of the main synagogues in 18th and early-19th century Britain. A quarter of this generation, in any case, were born abroad, and married partners who were also born abroad (n = 250): if they were *married* abroad too, there is little prospect of tracking down their marriage record other than by dedicated genealogical research. It must be recognised also that, for people – men especially – reaching marriageable age in Britain in the 18th century, finding a spouse from within the still relatively small Jewish population would not always have been easy. Some married converts (see note 18), but even those whose spouses did not formally convert would not necessarily forego Jewish culture in the home and beyond. Suffice to say, there is little doubt about the Jewish status of older generations in the database, even though explicit Jewish marriage data may be lacking. Family naming patterns and other contextual data can be very telling, and corroboration can often be found in people's *children's* Jewish marriages

[22] At least a quarter of the 463 have fairly Jewish-sounding forenames (Bloomer, Deborah, Esther, Hannah, Jael, Leah, Rachel, Rayner, Rebecca, Welcome, Zillah &c). In the remaining 350-odd cases, the partners mostly have names like Caroline, Catherine, Clara, Elizabeth, Fanny, Jane, Louise, Phoebe, and Sarah, which could as easily be Jewish as not. The absence of a matching marriage record might indicate a Jewish couple cohabiting (or indeed who were married, but under different names) or a mixed Jewish/non-Jewish couple. We assume here that half of the 350 were non-mixed Jewish couples

[23] Jewish women who married out before 1851 are unlikely to feature in the database except where they have been picked up through family research by one of its contributors, and there are several such cases. Those marrying out after 1851 are included in the civil registration and church-marriage figures in the body of this paper, and represent 28 per cent of the marrying out total. There are likely to be some others, not thus far identified, who married out after 1851 but whose marriage data can be traced, if at all, only by in-depth family research. Their numbers are probably small. If we were to apply the 28:72 ratio from civil registration data to the 463 men whose partners' identities cannot be traced, and assume a similar 50:50 division between those marrying Jews and those marrying non-Jews, we would have 68 women marring out in thus-far untraced marriages. But the absence of numbers of this order from the numerator is likely to make minimal difference to the estimated marriage-out rate, given their absence also from the denominator

[24] Of the 270-plus contributors of data to the database, a significant proportion are genealogists researching their own, Jewish families. Some may not have followed through on collateral ancestors who left the fold with the same assiduity as they applied to those who stayed within: this would lead to exogamy being under-reported to at least a small degree. The search through marriage announcements in Jewish newspapers, but not on the whole in non-Jewish ones, may also have created some bias (at least among the more affluent sections of the community that announced marriages in newspapers).

[25] (X + Y + Z)/15,447, where X refers to 123 marriages in Christian ceremonies, Y to 235 marriages identified from the civil registration index as non-Jewish, and Z to a notional 50% of the 350-odd partnerships with women whose forenames were not obviously Jewish. The denominator refers to all the entries in the database on whom any marriage data are available

[26] See eg Endelman (1990: 104-8). Further, indirect evidence that the Jewish population in Britain at this time remained at least broadly observant of Jewish traditions comes from an analysis of nuptial seasonality. The database shows evidence of a clear dip

in marriages in April, September and October, that is to say around Pesach, the High Holy Days and Sukkot – a very different pattern from that among non-Jews in England (Wrigley & Schofield, 1989: 300)

[27] The locations quoted are Algeria, Bavaria, Berlin, Pesth (ie Budapest), Prague, 'Prussia' (presumably excluding Berlin) and Vienna. Berlin was shown as having a much higher marriage-out rate than the rest, with 8 per cent of Jewish men and 5 per cent of Jewish women reported as marrying out. The basis of calculation of all these figures is however uncertain (in particular, it is unclear whether Jacobs' figures measure the stock – as do the AJDB calculations above – or the flow), and they are probably in some cases shaky, so direct comparison cannot be made with the AJDB figures. Vobecká (2013: 66-69) explains some of the difficulties of measuring the heterogamy rate in jurisdictions where marriage regulation was based on canon law

[28] or at least in a partnership. In the great majority of such cases, no details are to hand of the marriage in the home country. It is probably safe to assume that most were indeed married. There were doubtless some cases, though, where couples, freed from the constraints of the community they were leaving, simply paired up without a ceremony

[29] 'Overseas' in this context might just mean continental Europe (typically France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, and especially Poland) but could also indicate the West Indies, the USA or Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere across the globe. By the mid-19th century, trans-oceanic travel was by no means exceptional: a significant proportion of the Anglo-Jewry Database population themselves emigrated to new continents (Laidlaw 2011, pp 46-8). The large majority, however, of entries (or entries' spouses) listed as born overseas were born in continental Europe

[30] Status is uncertain in several cases, but the number recorded is unlikely to be more than about 35 out of the 15,477 known marriages/partnerships spanning the late-18th to early-20th centuries.

[31] The census for 1851 – from which a high proportion of the data have been captured – picks up births only in the first three months of that year. Table 5 therefore uses the annual mean of listed births in 1850 and 1851 as a proxy for comparison with the age-specific marital fertility rates for the population of England and Wales at large. If the raw count of births in 1851 is understated because of the census date, the raw count of births in 1850 will be overstated for the same reason, and the mean should give a reasonable approximation to the actual figure

[32] A time series should, in principle, be more telling than a single year's snapshot. But until the AJDB has comprehensive data on most of its entries across all decades of their lives, it would be hard to estimate adequately the relevant married female population at different dates. Any fertility data that could be produced in this way would, moreover, be of limited interest. They would tell us about shifts in fertility patterns among the AJDB population *per se*, but would give only a partial picture of fertility rates among the Jewish population as a whole at the given date. This is because of the large volumes of Jewish immigration throughout the 19th century. Time series applied to small populations undergoing considerable flux, as this one was, are inevitably more problematic than those applied to large (eg national) and more stable populations

[33] For a notional maximum, studies of benchmark fertility among the Hutterites (an isolated group known for their exceptionally high fertility rates) indicate a median of about 10 children per woman, along with a median age at marriage of 21 (Larsen and Vaupel, 1993: 84)

[34] Occupational data on the fathers with the largest families are slanted noticeably towards the professional and managerial end of the scale, but the numbers are probably too small to be very meaningful

[35] for example, prolonged breastfeeding, coitus interruptus, non-coital sex, sheaths and sponges, varying degrees of abstinence, and abortion.

[36] for example, rounding error arising from birth-dates derived from age at last birthday expressed in whole years: in 19th century censuses, there was an observably more casual approach to reporting adults' as distinct from children's ages. The difference could also be due in part to missing data on stillbirths and infant/early-childhood deaths, which would be more frequent among the older generation. The database does however include, in the children field, data on any known stillbirths and perinatal/infant deaths.

[37] The family sizes of French Jews were accordingly much smaller too: the average for women born between 1801 and 1806 who survived to age 45 was 3.52 (Hyman 82)

[38] for example, because of name-changes, but also because some, at least, would not develop much attachment to their new home before they migrated further afield. The overseas-born are under-represented in the database's post-1851 data: although they constitute 19 per cent of the total database population, they constitute only 14 per cent of those whose later lives have been tracked. This makes it more likely that their post-1851 children are under-recorded, in addition perhaps in some cases to children born before they migrated to Britain and who did not migrate with them

[39] The deflating effect this would have on their average family sizes, however, should be broadly countered by the use of interval-based estimates, as in Table 9

[40] These fall into three main categories: those where the precise date (DDMMYY) of marriage and first birth are known; those where only the broad dates are known (eg, marriage in the first quarter of the year, childbirth in the second quarter); and those where other contextual data suggest an extranuptial conception is likely, though uncertain. Most cases in the database fall into the first two groups

[41] 798 out of 7,643 entries whose marriage dates are known and who are known to have had children

[42] The rate of emigration after 1851 among the AJDB population, mostly going to Australia, New Zealand, the Americas and South Africa, was high, particularly among the British-born (Laidlaw 2011: 46-49)

[43] http://www.jewishgen.org/jcr-uk/1851/introduction.htm

[44] National Archives, class HO 129, summary Jewish data from which are reproduced in Lipman (1954: Appendix). This one-off census does not give information relating to named individuals, but is a useful guide to the sizes of different communities.

[45] At the same time, synagogue records quite often contain valuable records of stillbirths and perinatal deaths

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY AND ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA UNDER THE APARTHEID REGIME – 1961-1967

Itzhak Mualem

Abstract

The discussion of a diaspora's influence of a sovereign state's foreign policy provides a new perspective on the nature of international relations. Foreign policy in this context is analysed in this paper through various theoretical approaches. First, the Realist approach, examining inter-state relations between Israel and South Africa and the black continent states; The second approach, the Neoliberal approach, examining the processes of cooperation in social and economic areas; The third approach, the State-Diaspora model, examining the impact of the Jewish context on relations between Israel and South Africa. The diaspora phenomenon is universal. However, this case is unique due to the influence of the Jewish Diaspora over Israel's foreign policy. This unique discussion leads to the existence of a complex Israeli-Jewish foreign policy.

Keywords

Political realism, neoliberalism, diaspora, foreign policy, apartheid, Jewish community

Preface

Relations between Israel and South Africa were characterised from the start as amicable, apart from the period of 1961-1967, in which relations deteriorated. This was caused by Israel's support for the United Nation's resolutions in 1961 and 1962 condemning the racial apartheid regime and the imposition of sanctions on South Africa. Israel's objective in adopting this policy was to promote its interests in the international arena, while gaining political assistance from the African states. Israel's change of policy resulted in an immediate change in the approach of the South

African Republic towards its Jewish population. This conflict had repercussions on the Zionist-Jewish agenda of the Israeli government, since such activity in the diplomatic arena was directly related to the issue of the status and welfare of the Jews of South Africa.

The study's objective is therefore the analysis of Israel's policy, as the State of the Jewish people,[1] regarding points of conflict on its South African agenda during this period.[2] On one hand, Israel's policy was to support the new states of Black Africa, both for idealistic and realist motives.[3] The Israeli government expected these states to support its policy in the international arena pertaining to a resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict. On the other hand stood the Jewish interest, which entailed concern for the Jews' welfare and their status in South Africa.[4] The question posed is: to what extent and how does an ethno-national diaspora influence the policy of the country of origin? In this case study, would the State of Israel, the country of origin of the Jewish people, striving to achieve its political objectives, sacrifice the vital interests of the South African Jewish community, and risk it becoming a distressed community? Would Israel's preference lie in enlisting this Diaspora's support over the necessity to assist this community, which could suffer politically and economically in consequence to Israel's policy in Africa?[5]

The analysis of Israel's national objectives will be made in reference to the three components in the triangular relationship between Israel, the Jewish community of South Africa, and the South African government. The first is Israeli-South African relations at their lowest peak, 1961-1967. The second component is a product of the first, the influence of Israeli-South African relations on the relations between the Jewish community and Israel, the country of origin, and between this community and its country of settlement, South Africa. The third component, which dominated and influenced the first two, was the relations between Israel and the new African states.[6]

This study, therefore, examines the nature of this policy, according to which on the one hand there is a need to realize state goals through cooperation with the Jewish community, and on the other hand, the need to realize the goals of the Jewish community in South Africa. The aim of this case study is to examine the extent of influence of the Jewish dimension over Israeli foreign policy. This paper will therefore present a theoretical examination, while emphasizing the influence of non-state factors –such as the diaspora –on shaping the foreign policy of the sovereign state. The discussion of these issues necessitates, at this stage, the presentation of a theoretical framework and background information as the basis of research.

Theoretical Framework

The definition of the State of Israel as the State of the Jewish people has repercussions for Israel's foreign policy. It can therefore be said that it is the foreign policy of a state influenced by the existence of an external Jewish diaspora and not the foreign policy of a geographically-defined nation-state. In the framework of this discussion, the Jewish case is unique since the existence of a Jewish diaspora is not due to economic, professional, or political considerations. The Jewish diaspora is unique in terms of the components of its temporal, geographic, ethnic, cultural and historical aspects.[7] Moreover, its uniqueness lies also in the structure and system of ties existing between the parts of the Jewish people over centuries of Jewish history since the Temple destruction until the establishment of the State of Israel.[8] The establishment of Israel changed the nature of these ties and the power relations between the various Jewish communities in the diaspora. Therefore, the national interest of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people is unique, comprising of the political goals of the State and the goals of the Jewish communities in the diaspora.[9] This national interest pattern expresses the sense of joint destiny and the unique structure of the State of Israel, which permeates beyond its sovereign borders.[10]

This foreign policy is thus both complex and unique in the international arena. The theoretical analysis of this case study applies eclectic theoretical approaches, using as a theoretical starting point that of political realism.[11] This approach facilitates the understanding of international processes originating in initiatives by sovereign states acting rationally in the international arena. However, due to the uniqueness of the Israeli-Jewish case, we will also be assisted by the world politics approach [12] and the state-diaspora model.[13]

Political Realism places an emphasis on the existence of the sovereign state and its activity as a dominant entity in an anarchic international arena.[14] The aim of the states operating in this arena is to secure their continued existence as sovereign and independent political entities. Therefore, according to political realism, the basis for existence of the sovereign state is its constant struggle for survival as a political unit, and its constant power struggle in the international arena.[15]

The state's survival depends on the extent of its success in the race to enhance its power and abilities in the international arena. States in general strive to enhance their abilities, particularly so in the military area. Their ability to improve their military capabilities significantly contributes to their continued survival as sovereign states in the anarchically-defined

international arena. The constant drive for empowerment creates a reality of an ongoing conflict among states. Therefore, a basic premise in political realism is that states do not cooperate with each other. Such cooperation can exist only when it will contribute to the enhancement of the state's status and its continued survival.[16]

In the political reality in which the State of Israel operates, as the State of the Jewish people, Israel's foreign policy cannot be examined merely according to the tools of political realism, due to the singularity of the Israeli case, which reaches beyond the theoretical framework of the sovereign national state. The existence of a Jewish diaspora requires the application of a more extensive and complex approach in the analysis of Israeli foreign policy. Therefore the neo-liberal approach of world politics is applied here, as it deals with the influence of non-state political actors.[17] According to this approach, international relations are not based on the existence of sovereign states only, but on additional, non-governmental factors that are influential in their own spheres of action. Analysis of foreign policy according to this approach places an emphasis on cooperation expressed in dialogue, negotiation and bargaining on common issues between governmental and non-governmental units. The world politics approach permits a wide spectrum of ties between states and non-state entities. One such relationship is the connection between a state and its nationals residing outside its borders. The nature of this connection can be examined by using the state-diaspora model.

The approach of state-diaspora relations deals with ties between the sovereign state and its members living in various diaspora communities.[18] Country of origin-country of settlement relations impact on the status and future of the diaspora communities. The country of origin operates in favour of its diaspora community, which could have repercussions on country of origin-country of settlement relations. The diaspora itself, as a political entity, could also influence country of origin-country of settlement relations.[19] Thus, this approach is suitable for examining the relations between Israel and South Africa as well as that of Israel and the Jewish community against the backdrop of the Apartheid regime during this period.

Israeli foreign policy will be analysed here using political realism tools as well as tools presented by other approaches, the world politics approach and the state-diaspora model. This study examines whether Israeli foreign policy was based on political realism or whether its foreign policy constituted in fact a Jewish foreign policy during this period.

The Jewish Community in South Africa: Between Conflict and Cooperation

The history of the South African Jewish community is intertwined to a great degree with the historical processes of the establishment of the South African Republic, and as result is evidence of the Jews' integration in this country. This is the background from which arose the diplomatic crisis between Israel and South Africa, and its impact on the Jewish community. Gideon Shimoni, in his comprehensive study[20] on the Jewish community and the Zionist Movement in South Africa, presents an extensive history of the Jews' integration in this part of the world, since the beginning of colonisation. Shimoni focuses on a number of important stages in the development of the South African Republic, which began with the first wave of Dutch settlers who arrived at the southernmost point of the African continent in 1652 as employees of the Dutch East India Company.[21]

The British wave of immigration brought with it Jewish immigrants from Britain and Germany who arrived in two immigration waves, 1882-1912 and during the 1930s.[22] These immigration waves influenced Jewish life, not only culturally and organisationally, but also economically and politically. The first community was founded in 1841 in Cape Town, and in 1910, when South Africa became independent, most of the Jewish institutions were already functioning.[23] Nevertheless, the biggest and most significant immigration wave arrived in this area at the end of the 19th century, with the immigration of Jews from Lithuania, following the discovery of gold and diamond deposits.[24]

These new immigrants entered the ranks of the Jewish community leadership and a process of cultural and social merging commenced between the community's two sectors – the British-German and the Lithuanian-East European sectors. Each contributed its unique characteristics to the creation of a new Jewish community in South Africa.[25] The height of this merging process was in the 1940s, during the Second World War. The activities of two central Jewish organisations were already prominent by this period: The Zionist Federation, established in 1896 as a Lovers of Zion association, and the Jewish Board of Deputies, established in 1903. These organisations, which led the community, were involved to a great degree in the dispute that erupted at a later period between the Jewish community and the State of Israel following the Israeli policy on the Apartheid regime.

In 1962, seven members of Parliament were from the South African Jewish community. Many Jews worked for their living in jobs associated

with a low economic status, such as taxi drivers and shop keepers. Many other Jews enjoyed a high economic status, employed as lawyers, company managers and doctors. Yet, they all led comfortable lives.[26] This was due to the positive political and social climate towards the Jews, which enabled them to lead a life of comfort and prosperity, despite the underlying racist policy towards this community.

Israel's support for the UN proposal condemning South Africa and the imposition of sanctions in the years 1961 and 1962 placed the Jewish community in a difficult situation. It unearthed hidden antisemitic tendencies, which were upheld by many in South Africa. The roots of this hatred were set in the first days of the Jewish community in the country.[27] One of the events that left their mark were clauses in the 1864 Transvaal Republic's Constitution, according to which Jews were not granted the right to vote and were restricted in the areas of education and civil rights. This phenomenon appeared also in the first elections held in 1910, among parties that ran for election supporting this anti-Semitic trend.[28]

Within this ambivalent system of relations the growth of pro-Nazi and antisemitic forces was facilitated. The various organizations gained power and status within South African society in the 1920s and 1930s.[29] In this era the antisemitic political and cultural organizations were rejuvenated, such as for example, the German Nazi Party Club, established already in 1932, the South African National Democratic Party, the People's Movement and the Deutsche Bund, a pro-Nazi cultural organisation, and the 'shirt' organisations, which provided the organisational frameworks for the implementing an ideology based on the white man's supremacy in South Africa. Within the 'shirt' organizations the 'Greyshirt' organisation was the most prominent.[30] The chauvinistic Louis T. Weichardt, who espoused a struggle against all non-Afrikaaner foreigners including the Jews established this organization in 1933. He backed Hitler's regime and policy but emphasized his loyalty to white South Africa. Many of this organization's members had a major share of South Africa's leadership, such as Prime Minister F. Verwoerd who led South Africa in the late 1950s and 1960s, during the crisis of relations between Israel and South Africa. Verwoerd was a chauvinistic, fanatic, and racist leader.[31] In April 1960, a report reached Israel's Foreign Ministry from its legation in South Africa, describing Verwoerd as a racist who developed the theory of white racial supremacy. During his term as prime minister, a period of cruel oppression against non-whites was launched, and racial separation laws were passed.[32]

The political system of South Africa was comprised also of liberal proponents, such as Jan Christian Smuts among the leaders of the liberal

wing. These leaders belonged to the bible-loving Christians, who identified with the Jewish people and with its sufferings. Additionally, the head of the antisemitic national party, Daniel Malan, brought about a serious change in the attitude of his party to Jews in 1948, when it rose to power in South Africa. He conducted a policy of appeasement between the ruling National party and the Jewish community and indeed this policy succeeded in removing the subject of the Jews from the South African political agenda in the 1950s and early 1960s.[33]

In short, the relationship between the Jewish community and South African society at large was motivated by feelings of sympathy and a wish for cooperation with the Jews and with Israel. Liberal South Africans perceived the State of Israel as the fulfilment of the Bible's prophecies.[34] Yet, this relationship with the local Jewish community was also influenced by the existence of antisemitic and racist components in South African culture, as was expressed in South Africa's immigration policy and in the operation of pro-Nazi organisations within its borders.

The South African Jewish Community in the Wake of Changes in Israeli Foreign Policy: October 1961-November 1962

In March 1960, violent incidents broke out between the South African government and black Africans, which resulted in the death of 80 people in the town of Sharpeville.[35] This incident exacerbated the already-difficult situation in which the Jewish community found itself: it increased the inter-racial and inter-religious political tensions, which brought to the surface several questions regarding the continued Jewish existence as a minority in this country, which was becoming progressively more isolated, sensitive and vulnerable due to the approach towards South Africa in the international arena. The racist climate and domestic policy continued throughout 1960 and was expressed towards the Jews in the beginning of 1961.[36] Antisemitic decisions were passed that year against Jews, for example, the cancellation of the Hebrew language as an examination language in school Matriculation and in university entrance exams, and the cancellation of Jews' recruitment orders to serve in the army. This climate even had detrimental effects on the Jews' position within Parliament, such as the incitement campaign launched against Alec Gorshel from Cape Town,[37] a Jewish Parliamentary representative of the opposition United Party.[38]

This negative climate towards the Jews of South Africa further escalated until it reached a peak in October 1961, when Israel voted for the UN proposal to condemn the Apartheid regime in South Africa. The

South African Foreign Minister, Eric Louw, in his address at the UN General Assembly,[39] defended his government's Apartheid policy. This position was attacked by the representatives of the African states, headed by Liberia, who demanded that Louw's speech be struck from the record. The UN General Assembly succeeded in passing a majority vote, with Israel's support, to censure the South African policy expressed in this speech.[40] For South Africa, Israel's support of this resolution was a stinging insult to its own policy towards Israel. South Africa was shocked by Israel's step, since, besides Israel and Holland, no Western state voted in favour of the resolution, merely abstained. Consequently, Louw accused Israel of hostility and ingratitude,[41] claiming that any South African with a religious or racial-ethnic connection with Israel must disassociate himself from the hostile and ungrateful actions of the Israeli Mission to the UN.[42]

In response, all the Jewish organisations in South Africa presented a unified front, viewing Israel's step as mistaken and justifying the South African government's indignation. An even harsher tone was sounded by the South African Zionist Revisionists in their newspaper, the *Jewish Herald*.[43] The Jewish Board of Deputies,[44] the second Jewish organisation in size and influence in South Africa, also published its reservations and critique of Israel's policies in the national paper the *Star*. This unified front stemmed from the organizations' perceived need to preserve the Jews' relations with the regime, despite the existence of opposition to apartheid by the liberal Jews.

In the wake of the events following Louw's speech in the UN, a meeting was convened between representatives of the Zionist Federation, the Jewish Board of Deputies and representatives of the Israeli Legation in Johannesburg. The Jewish organisations proposed the publication of an article in support of the South African government in the Zionist newspaper the *Zionist Record* in which they would voice their 'disappointment from Israel's vote on the UN resolution, which impinges on the principle of freedom of speech'.[45] They proposed adding a demand that action will be taken to foil any drastic steps that might be implemented by the South African government against the Zionist Movement and the Jews in general. The Head of the Israeli Mission to Pretoria, Simcha Pratt, objected to this move, protesting against any presentation of reservations against the policy of the Israeli government. 'Official reservations on this case,' said Pratt, 'would constitute a change, and would serve as a dangerous precedent regarding statements by local Jewry on Israel's vote against South Africa,'

Israeli foreign policy in this context is characterised as state-based. In this case, clear preference was given to the state interest, in view of Israel's expectation for a long-lasting policy in the international arena, supported by the African states in the international institutions, and the expectation of a change in future to the structure of the South African regime. Therefore, Israeli foreign policymakers acted as they did, despite the detrimental effect on the welfare of the Jews of South Africa and the subordination of the Jewish organisations in South Africa to this policy.

In the beginning of November 1961, fears grew of a worsening of the crisis between Israel and South Africa, following information that Israel would support the imposing of sanctions on South Africa and the annulment of its mandate over South-West Africa.

Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Michael Comay, warned Foreign Ministry Assistant Director General Kidron of the dangers the Jewish community in South Africa would face:

> If we are facing a crisis in Israeli-South African relations, the community itself will be in the complex position of 'dual loyalty'. We must inform them in advance of our considerations, where possible, instead of having them caught by surprise. Let us therefore brief Pratt on conducting an exchange of words with the local leadership on the subject.[46]

Indeed, Pratt attempted to communicate with the community's leadership, predominantly the leadership of the two prominent Jewish organisations – the Zionist Federation and the Jewish Board of Deputies – without much success. The government's political and social pressure on the community was great, and could not facilitate the dialogue between Pratt and the local leadership, particularly regarding the Jewish Board of Deputies, which saw itself as representative and mouthpiece of the entire South African Jewry. In contrast, the Zionist Federation leaders refrained from voicing their criticism and displeasure with Israel's policy in this case.[47] In the opinion of the heads of the Jewish Board of Deputies, Israel should have abstained on the UN vote, rather than actively supporting the condemnation. Pratt's words fell on deaf ears when he tried to justify Israel's policy as beneficial to Israel's vital interests directly and the Jewish community indirectly.[48] In continuation to the community's statement that it wished to live in comfort and ease, Pratt claimed that in such a reality, the uncertain future also created antagonism on the part of the community towards the Israeli policy, due to fear of damage to Jews' property.[49] Nevertheless, Pratt did state that the policy set in Jerusalem should be continued, despite the harm that could be inflicted on the Jewish community. Besides the social-political and economic damage, the most

significant damage for the community was the restrictions imposed upon it in transferring fundraising contributions for Israel. The inability to transfer the funds constituted a serious blow to the continued political and cultural activity of South African Jewry, since the severing of the link between the Jewish diaspora community and its country of origin signified, according to the South African Zionist leadership, an essential hit to the continued identity of the community as Jewish and Zionist, whose very existence was derived from this connection.

Imposition of Restrictions on the Transfer of Funds to Israel

Following Israel's support of the UN resolution, the government of Pretoria decided to hold up the transfer of money allocated for Israel, which was collected by the South African Zionists. In past years, the South African government permitted the bi-annual transfer of millions of Rands of money and goods to Israel. However, it now forbade the Zionist leadership to transfer these monies to Israel.

The purpose of these restrictions and prohibitions was to harm Israel economically.[50] However, more than it did so, it inflicted a direct and painful blow to the connection between the Jewish community and Israel. Disrupting these ties, which were one of the channels for tightening relations between this diaspora and Israel, could have caused political and spiritual damage to the community by decreasing Jewish political activity and by diminishing its ties with Israel.

The state of Israel, on its part, did not give up on the funds, and tried to get the Jewish community in South Africa to persuade the government of Pretoria to transfer the money after all.[51] The Zionist Federation acted jointly with the Jewish Board of Deputies to change the policy of the South African government on this matter, since the Jewish community perceived itself as the main injured party in the political dispute between Israel and South Africa, as described by Edel Horowitz, Chair of the Zionist Federation at his meeting with Dr. Donges, South African Minister of the Interior (in January 1962).

Horowitz, in his report on the meeting to the Federation leadership stated that this issue constituted one of the most severe blows to the Zionist Movement in South Africa since its foundation 60 years earlier (1896).[52] This increased their uncertainty regarding the future of the Zionist activity in South Africa, fears of the collapse of the Zionist Movement's institutions in the country. Consequently, the leaders of the Zionist Federation and the Jewish Board of Deputies petitioned jointly to the Minister of Interior for a change in policy.

In a joint meeting, the Minister of Interior stated that as a past supporter of the Zionist endeavour, he understood the importance of transferring the contributions,[53] but that reality changed after Israel's 'slap in the face' to South Africa, and therefore his government could not act according to *status quo ante*, as this might lead to anti-Semitic reactions, which the government of South Africa could not allow. In order to bring about a change, he urged the leaders of the prominent Jewish organisations to take up their case with the government of Israel. The minister claimed that the 'door was not locked' and a change in policy was possible should Israel act differently.

The Jewish community was therefore compelled to put up with Israel's unilateral policy. Although the State of Israel was the one directly hit, the situation did have an indirect influence on the continuation of Jewish Zionism in South Africa. This study shows that in this case, the diaspora-related economic factor had no influence on the Israeli government, which preferred the creation of diplomatic ties with developing countries in Africa to potential harm to the welfare of the Jews of South Africa.

Israeli-South African Relations: November 1962-August 1967

The State of Israel saw in the creation of deep and extensive ties with the new African states a strategic means for the resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict. When the Israeli government decided to support the UN sanctions on South Africa, Israeli foreign policy in this period (November 1962) was decidedly anti-South African. During this period, Israel was at the peak of its honeymoon relations with the new African states. This was expressed by the considerable foreign aid provided by Israel to states in West Africa, as Ghana, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, as well as states south and east of the Sahara, as Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and the Central African Republic.[54] The political changes occurring at the time in the international arena, particularly the process of decolonisation, influenced Israel to raise the Middle Eastern issue on the international agenda, and brought about Israel's readiness to reach dialogue with the Arab states without prior conditions. The Israeli government saw the UN institutions as the arena for influencing the Arab states, via resolutions made, to open up diplomatic channels for peace negotiations, with the aim of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel's policymakers realised that the General Assembly convened in November 1962 was the arena in which they should endeavour to take advantage of the expansion of relations with the African states, following the enhanced de-colonisation process-taking place at the time.

However, Israel's Mission to the UN, headed by Foreign Minister Golda Meir, was compelled to change its plans, rendering all their efforts futile. Short-term geo-strategic objectives were the ones that ultimately tipped the scales. It was the American demand by President John Kennedy that Israel refrain from proposing a resolution to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict by peaceful means,[55] following the request at the UN of several moderate Muslim states that the Israeli Mission refrained from raising the issue. Indeed, President Kennedy informed Golda Meir unequivocally at a meeting between them that the US was requested by the Muslim states to vote against such a proposal. Although the US President could not see himself voting against a call for an Arab-Israeli peace, he was informed that should the US vote in favour of such a resolution, all the Arab states would automatically take the side of the Soviet Union and place a counter vote to the US position, whatever the subject. Consequently, the US President made Israel remove the issue from the agenda, and hinted that this relinquishment would be recompensed with US military foreign aid to Israel.[56]

Despite this, the Israeli government continued with the political line it set on October 1961. On November 6, 1962, Israel supported the resolution of the Afro-Asian bloc to impose sanctions on South Africa.[57] Israel's Mission to the UN voted for the sanctions but did not support the Ghanaian and Indian proposal to ban South Africa from the UN or to impose unprecedented sanctions that would bring about its collapse.[58] Israel refrained from supporting resolutions whose aim was to harm South Africa *per se*, but rather, to support sanctions that would influence the South African government to abolish its Apartheid policy. In this context, Gideon Shimoni adds that the State of Israel refrained from supporting the Ghanaian and Indian proposals so as not to inflict harm on the local Jewish community, which would suffer as result of an overall and extensive blow to South Africa.[59] From Israel's point of view, this would constitute an unnecessary injury to the Jews' welfare in the diaspora.

Israel's support of the UN resolution resulted in a major crisis among whites in South Africa, and reactions towards the Jewish community were not long in coming, as described below. Prime Minister Verwoerd focused specifically on Israel's vote over those of the other states.[60] He perceived the Jewish community as a victim of the situation caused by the Israeli government, and demanded it expressed its loyalty to South Africa in order to put an end to the discomfort experienced by this community.

Israel's support of the sanctions against South Africa and the comments by Prime Minister Verwoerd raised the anxiety level of South African Jewish leadership, which feared accusations and even physical violence. The leaders of the Zionist Federation and the Jewish Board of

Deputies convened several urgent meetings to discuss their response to the new reality, following the Israeli policy. There was immense external pressure, particularly on the Board of Deputies, as representative of the entire Jewish community, to announce its response to Israel's support of the UN sanctions. The Board's chair, Teddy Schneider, pronounced in a press release the discomfort felt among the South African Jews at the situation and emphasised their loyalty to South Africa, and that they are not responsible for the policy of Israel.[61]

On November 11, 1962, an emergency conference was convened jointly by the Zionist Federation and the Board of Deputies to which Simcha Pratt was invited. This all-Jewish conference raised the problem facing the community. The two organisations felt ambivalence towards the problem created. On the one hand they expressed disappointment on Israel's vote against South Africa, and on the other, they expressed resentment towards the South African's government supporters, who tended to perceive the Jews as responsible for Israel's actions.

Following Israel's support of sanctions, relations between Israel and South Africa deteriorated, to a greater extent than during the period following Israel's previous vote at the UN, in October 1961. These culminated in the recall of the Israeli Head of Mission to Jerusalem without providing a replacement, in September 1963. Yet, surprisingly, the pressure on the part of the South African government towards the local Jews was not as direct and menacing as previously. Rather, it was expressed more moderately, while placing greater significance on the issue of double loyalty, which compelled the local Jewish leaders to issue clear statements regarding their discomfort and disappointment with Israel's policy.

This relationship continued for several years, with indirect implications for the Jewish community in a number of areas. Three areas are discussed here; those which had an effect on the relationships between the three actors (Israel, South Africa and the Jewish community), and Israel's relations vis a vis the African states, until the outbreak of the Six-Day War in 1967. These are: Israeli-South African trade relations; the attempt to stop El Al flights to South Africa; and antisemitic activity.

Israeli-South African Trade Relations

The bilateral trade relations between the two countries took a hit following Israel's support of the UN resolution to impose sanctions, with Israel limiting its trade volume with South Africa. This topic occasionally made headlines, such as with the question of supplying Uzi submachine guns to South Africa,[62] fish imports[63] and other products.[64] Discussion of

this issue requires the examination of Israel's conduct in a comparative context with such cases such as Israel's continued economic ties with France against the backdrop of the question of the future of the Jews in Algiers,[65] or the problematic economic ties with Argentina during the 1970s and 1980s. In the present case, the Israeli government restricted its economic ties with South Africa,[66] while in the other two cases the Israeli government continued with its existing policy, despite the fact that an existential threat lay over the entire Jewish community, in the case of Algiers, or over part of the community, as in Argentina.[67]

Israel acted in the present case according to the same general format but under different guidelines. Israel set its policy in this context according to its objectives regarding the target state. In contrast to the other two cases, here Israel set its eyes on two targets, the African states, on which the Israeli Foreign Ministry focused, and South Africa. Israel's support of the sanctions, for the advancement of its national-economic objectives in Africa, caused the change in relations, to the detriment of the Jewish community. The Jewish community was in constant fear of harsh economic steps taken against them.

Israel's foreign policy in the African context had altruistic, economic and political objectives that constituted the basis for the relations with the African states. The government of Israel had no expectations of profiting from its investments in Africa in the short-term in view of the poor situation of these countries, both economically and from a humanitarian perspective. Therefore, Israel's expectations were pretty low at this stage, and were summed by its expectation to gain a political dividend in the international arena, in the framework of the international institutions and organisations.

However, in practice, not only did Israel not benefit from its policy in Africa in the political arena, it became unpopular in several countries. At this stage, the lack of sympathy for Israel among the new states derived from their economic and political situation. Despite the assistance provided by Israel, they preferred the more extensive economic assistance and significant support of those Arab states who offered it, within international frameworks which enhanced the status of the new states in the international arena. Verwoerd even accused Israel of causing Egypt to act in opposition to South African policy due to Egypt's ties with Israel. In this arena, a number of incidents occurred in which Nasser attempted to place hurdles before Israeli policy, for example, his successful endeavour to pass an anti-Israeli resolution at the Casablanca Bloc Conference in the early 1960s, denouncing Israel 'as an instrument in the service of imperialism', which was detrimental to Israeli relations with African states.[68]

Thus, examination of Israel's overall foreign relations in this context shows that Israel was unsuccessful in its endeavours to advance its economic and political objectives in Africa, despite having greatly restricting its economic ties with South Africa as a means of realising this objective.[69] Therefore, Israel's political adventure in Africa can be viewed as a failure, both from the Israeli and Jewish national interest. Israel suffered to a certain extent from the unrealised potential of political and economic ties with the new African states, from the blow to its status vis a vis the Republic of South Africa, and from the blow to the status of the Jews of South Africa, socially and politically.

The attempt to stop El Al flights to South Africa

During the first months of 1963, the Israeli foreign office formed a plan to cancel the EL AL flights to South Africa, as part of the sanctions imposed on that country. The leaders of the South African Jews opposed this plan from the start. For example, Maisels,[70] a Jewish judge and one of the community's leaders, met with foreign minister Golda Meir and conveyed to her that the Jews of South Africa would prefer Israel not to rush to be the first of the states represented in South Africa to impose sanctions upon the country. To this, Meir responded that the Foreign Office had reached a decision to act at the earliest opportunity, and that suggestions have been made to await a final decision by the government.[71] At a meeting with the foreign minister, in August 1963, Gideon Rafael, the director general, expressed his fears of the repercussions to Israel should it not act prior to the UN General Assembly of October 18, 1963. Indeed, Meir's decision had operational aspects, as she presented at the meeting:

> EL Al cannot fly to South Africa without a stopover either in Nairobi or in Dar-es-Salaam. Kenya will receive independence on 12 December. We assume that Kenya, after becoming independent, will not permit a stopover of aircrafts travelling to South Africa. There is also a security risk, perhaps from Egypt, in landing in Kenya prior to 12 December…[72]

According to the formulation of the plan, flights to South Africa were scheduled to cease on 5 December, and not 12 December, according to Harry Horowitz. He claims that in the meeting held between Golda Meir and the representatives of the Zionist Federation, she informed them that halting the flights a week early would show the African states that Israel stood behind its international commitments. The Jewish delegation claimed on their part that 'Such a step would bring the Jews to

desperation, since EL Al flights were their bridge to Israel'.[73] Golda Meir responded by saying that Israel would not change its policy as due to its history and ethics, Israel must adopt a moral stand on apartheid. Israel would have severed its ties entirely with the country had it not been for the sizable Jewish community in South Africa.[74] Regarding the necessity of the flights, Golda Meir recommended that the Jews immigrate to Israel as a solution, [75] showing clearly that Israel's top priority was the national political interest. Meir used the moral universalistic claim as a cover for the realisation of particular political objectives.

In practice, the idea of halting EL AL flights to South Africa was not realised. Israel decided not to act upon its decision, which would only harm South African Jewry, while having no benefit in the African arena. Furthermore, no demand of this kind was made by the African states, who understood the situation.

Antisemitic Activity

The situation of South African Jews deteriorated in the wake of events above-mentioned, both materially and in terms of their public confidence. Antisemitic activities spread. This phenomenon had its roots in the political culture of extreme groups in South Africa, who now took advantage of the situation to increase their activities against Jewish entities in the country. For example, the antisemitic activities of esoteric organisations of Raymond Rudman, John Schoeman,[76] and Tacura,[77] who maintained ties with organisations outside South Africa, such as the Klu-Klux-Klan in the US, and with others.

The antisemitic activities had moral-spiritual and physical targets. In the moral-spiritual area, progressively more aggressive antisemitic newspaper reports published in the South African press accused the Jews of a lack of loyalty to the South African regime. Physical expressions of antisemitism continued the line taken by these organisations prior to the Israeli change of policy towards south Africa, for example the bombing of the Great Synagogue in Johannesburg in January 1961, and the destruction of a monument in the Jewish cemetery in Johannesburg in June 1962[78] in the wake of the Eichmann trial.[79] Incidents such as these were repeated in Pretoria in September 1965,[80] and in April 1966 – on the anniversary of Hitler's birthday – when two synagogues were damaged in Johannesburg. The significance of these incidences for the Jewish community was far greater than the actual damage and pain inflicted, as can be seen in documents of the Foreign Ministry and the Jewish Agency,

as no physical harm was actually inflicted, neither significant nor widespread harm to Jewish property. [81]

The apprehensions of the Jewish population in South Africa from anticipated (rather than actual) harm rising from antisemitic activity in this country were shared by Zionists and non-Zionists alike. In an inter-regional conference of the Jewish Board of Deputies in October 1963, a clear statement was made that 'while the Jews' status in this country has clearly deteriorated, it has yet to express itself in a tangible and public manner.'[82] A similar atmosphere was felt in the 28th bi-annual convention of the Zionist Federation in South Africa, which gave voice to apprehensive and disgruntled opinions, that the change wrought following the Israeli foreign policy towards South Africa was harmful to the Jews, and that contrary to any other nation, the Jews' hands were tied, due to their unique sensitivity and their greater vulnerability.[83] Some compared the atmosphere in the convention to the atmosphere felt by Central European Jews in the summer of 1939.

At the Jewish Agency board meeting of June 1963, Chair A. Pinkus spoke of his impressions from his visit to South Africa.[84] He recounted how the South African government manipulated the Jewish community into a no-way-out situation, following the events derived from the change in relations between the two countries. The South African government did not declaratively encourage antisemitic activity but it did force the Jews to openly take a stand in support of the Apartheid regime. From a realist perspective for Israel, this was the price it expected the Jewish community to pay in its support.

Conclusion: Jewish-Israeli Foreign Policy

This study focused on the triangle of relations, at the centre of which stood the State of Israel. One side of this complex relationship was the Israel-South African bilateral relations, and its focus – Israel's foreign policy regarding the racial segregation policy enacted in Africa. Regarding the second side - the relations between Israel and the new African states – this study dealt with the essence and objectives of the relationship. Regarding the third side, the study examined how the changes in the two arenas above affected the relationship between the State of Israel and the South African Jewish community.

The State of Israel acted to achieve its political objectives in the international arena on the African continent while attempting to enlist the African states to its diplomatic-political struggle to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict within the international institutions. However, at the same time Israel also endeavoured to look after the interests of the Jewish

community while striving to minimise and prevent harm to its status and welfare. This policy, which was supposedly expressed in two separate channels – the state and the diaspora – is a unique foreign policy because Israel, as the state of the Jewish people, cannot separate its political objectives and those of the Jews in the diaspora.

The State of Israel has a commitment towards Jewish communities outside Israel. The situation in which it exists and operates makes it difficult for it to act 'normally', as a sovereign state protecting its vital interests on the one hand and on the other, a state protecting interests beyond its geographical borders. Therefore, Israel implements a foreign policy that is based on the principles of political realism on the one hand, and on the other hand on the principles of world politics and the state-diaspora model. This study demonstrates that Israel's foreign policy in this case was, therefore, an Israeli-Jewish foreign policy.

Notes

[1] See discussion on the definition and essence of the State of Israel as the State of the Jewish people as reflected in the law of Return, the Law of Citizenship and the legal status of the Jewish Agency for Israel, in Amnon Rubenstein, *Judicial Law of the State of Israel* [Hebrew], Vol. 1 (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Shoken, 2005), pp. 319-413. See also the Zionist definition of the Jewish State in Amnon Rubinstein, *To Be a* Free Nation (Jerusalem: Shoken, *1977*) [Hebrew], p. 196; Amnon Rubenstein & Alexander Ya'akobson, *Israel and the Family of Nations* (Tel Aviv and Jerusalem: Shoken, 2003) [Hebrew], pp. 257-268; See reference to the definition of "the State of the Jews" in Yehezkel Dror, *Refounding Zionism* (Jerusalem: Hasifriya Hatziyonit – Mossad Bialik, 1997) [Hebrew], pp. 127-129. See legal discussion on the issue of Israel as the State of the Jews or the Jewish State in the article by Claude Klein, "A Jewish State or State for the Jews", *The Jerusalem Quarterly* (Spring 1978), pp. 37-47; Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 56-71; Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (London: Oxford University press, 1972), pp. 229-250.

[2] Charles (Yeshayahu) Liebman, "Conflicting Interests in Israeli-Diaspora Relations", *Gesher* (January 1976), vol. 22, no. 1-2 [Hebrew], p. 60; See also, David Vital, *The Future of the Jews* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 29-63; Daniel J. Elazar, *People and State*, (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1989); See in his essay, "Land, State Diaspora in the History of Jewish Polity", *Jewish Political Studies Review*, Vol. 3 No. 1-2 (Spring 1991), pp. 3-31.

[3] For expansion on this subject, see, Yitzhak Mualem, *The Jewish Dimension in Israeli Foreign Policy: Between Political Realism and Goals of the Jewish People* (Ph.D. diss., Bar-Ilan University, 1999) [Hebrew].

[4] See extensive discussion on issue of State-Diaspora relations in, Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), *The Modern Diasporas in International Politics* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1986); James Cliford, "Diaspora", *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1994), pp. 302-338; On common characteristics of all diasporas see, Robin Cohen, "Diasporas and the nation-state from victims to challengers", *International Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 3 (1996), p. 515. Additional reference on the issue of Diaspora see in, Richard Marienstras, "On Notion of Diaspora", in Gerard Chaliand (ed.), *Minority Peoples In the Age of Nations States* (London: Pluto Press, 1989), pp.119-125; Yossi Shain and Martin Sherman, "Dynamics of disintegration: Diaspora, secession and the paradox of nation-states", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1998), pp.321-346. For a similar state of relations comprised of three factors namely the mother country, the host country and the community see: Natan Aridan, *Britain, Israel and Anglo Jewry 1949-97* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004).

[5] See work by Gabriel Sheffer on the Jewish Diaspora: Gabriel Sheffer, "The Jewish Diaspora at a Crossroads", *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1990), pp. 31-44; Gabriel Sheffer, "From Israeli Hegemony to Autonomy of Diaspora", *Gesher*, Vol. 42 (132) (1995-96) [Hebrew], pp. 81-87; See also his article: "Towards Re-examination of Israeli-Diaspora Relations", *Gesher*, Vol. 44 (137) (1998) [Hebrew], pp. 23-31. See also, Charles S. Liebman, *Pressure Without Sanction* (London: Associated University Press, 1977); Charles S. Liebman and Steven Cohen, *Two Worlds of Judaism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). See also historical-philosophical analysis by Shimon Ravidovitz on the mutual interdependence between the State of Israel and the Diaspora in *Babel and Jerusalem,* Vol. 2 (London: Ararat, 1957) [Hebrew], pp. 724-769; See also article by Charles Liebman, "Elements and Symbols in the Politics of Israel-Diaspora Relations," Kivunim, No. 16 (August 1982) [Hebrew], pp. 127-135.

[6] Naomi Hazan, "The *Fallacies of Pragmatism*: Israel's Policy Towards South Africa, 1974-1983", in Benyamin Neuberger (ed.), *War and Peacemaking* (Tel Aviv: Open University, 1992) [Hebrew], pp. 291-328; Interview with Simcha Pratt, Head of Israeli Mission in Pretoria in the 1960s, 9 January 1996; Benyamin Neuberger, "From Idealism to Pragmatism - Israel and the Third World 1948-1992", in *War and Peacemaking*, p. 497; *Meron Medzini*, *The* Proud *Jewess* (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1990) [Hebrew], p. 279; Golda Meir, My Life (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1975) [Hebrew], 231.

[7] John. A. Armstrong, "Mobilized Proletarian Diasporas, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 70, No. 2 (1976), pp. 393-408; Anthony. D. Smith, "Zionism and Diaspora Nationalism", *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 2, No.2 (Winter 1995), pp. 1-12; Daniel Elazar, "The Jewish People As The Classic Diaspora: A Political Analysis", in Gabriel Sheffer (ed), *Modern Diasporas in International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986). pp. 212-257;

David Biale, *Power and Powerlessness in Jewish History* (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), pp. 34-57; Ruth Wisse, *Jews and Power* (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), pp. 171-184.

[8] Robin Cohen, "Diasporas and nation-state: from victims to challengers", *International Affairs*, Vol.72, No.3 (1996), pp. 507-520; Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 21-36.

[9] See comment by Gabriel Sheffer on the uniqueness of the Jewish diaspora in Gabriel Sheffer & Hadas Roth-Toledano, *Who Leads? On Israeli-Diaspora Relations* (Jerusalem: Van Leer Jerusalem Institute/Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House, 2006) [Hebrew], pp. 304-306; Gabriel Sheffer, "Israel and the Jewish Diaspora from a worldwide comparative perspective", in Naomi Zabar, Gideon Shimoni and Nurit Hemo (eds.), *Jewish Peoplehood* (Tel Aviv: Diaspora Museum, 2009) [Hebrew], pp. 142-164; Gabriel Sheffer, "Is the Jewish Diaspora Unique", *Gesher*, Vol. 42, No. 142 (2000) [Hebrew], pp. 23-37; See also, Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge ,2008)., pp.106-114.

[10] Daniel Elazar, "Israel-American Jewry Relations in the Context of the Global Jewish Political Community," *Kivunim* [Hebrew], no. 3 (Spring 1973), pp. 93-116. See in this context also Charles Liebman, Charles Liebman, *Pressure Without Sanctions* (New-Jersey: Fairleigh Dicknson University Press, 1977).

[11] Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). Michael Smith, *Realism Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Louisiana: Louisiana University Press, 1986); Benjamin Frankel (ed.), *Roots of Realism* (London-Portland: Frank Cass, 1996).

[12] Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); James N. Rosenau, *The Study of Global Politics* (New York: Nicolas Publishing Company, 1980); Shmuel Sandler, "Towards a Theory of Global Politics (Statecraft) and Foreign Policy" in Moshe Hellinger (ed.) *Jewish Tradition Throughout Generations: A Memorial Volume for Daniel Elazar*. [Hebrew] (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 2010), pp. 407 -433.

[13] John A. Armstrong, "Mobilized Proletarian Diaspora," *American Politics Science Review*, Vol. 70, No. 2 (January 1976), pp. 393-408; Gabriel Sheffer, *At Home Abroad: Diaspora Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Yossi Shain and Ahron Barth, "Diaspora and International Relations Theory," *International Organization,* Vol. 57 (Summer 2003), pp. 449-479.

[14] From a theoretical perspective, emphasis should be placed on the theoretical contribution of the Neorealistic approach. See, Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979); Richard W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Politics," in Keohane Robert (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1986), pp.205-225; Joseph N. Grieco, "Anarchy and Limits of

Cooperation: A Realist Critique of Newest Liberal Institutionalism", *International Organization,* Vol. 38, No. 3 (August 1984), pp. 485-507; Robert Keohane, "Neo-realism and Study of World Politics", in Robert Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, pp. 1-26.

[15] John Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Thomas Walker and Jaffery Morton, "Reassessing the 'Power of Power Politics' Thesis: Is Realism Still Dominant?", *International Studies Review,* Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 2005), pp. 341-356.

[16] Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 1 (1997), pp. 50-66; Ann-Marie Slaughter, "The Real New World Order", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 5(1997), pp.183-197.

[17] Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics", *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 80 (1986), pp. 1151-1170; Joseph Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism", *World Politics*, Vol. 40, No.2 (January 1988), pp.235-251.

[18] Gabriel Sheffer, "From Israeli Hegemony to Autonomy of Diaspora", pp. 81-87; Sheffer, "Towards Re-examination of Israeli-Diaspora Relations"; and Gabriel Sheffer & Hadas Roth-Toledano, *Who Leads? On Israeli-Diaspora Relations* (Jerusalem: Van Leer Jerusalem Institute/Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House, 2006) [Hebrew]. Robin Cohen, "Diaspora and the nation-state from victim to challengers", *International Affairs,* Vol. 71 (1996), pp. 507-520.

[19] Milton J. Esman, "Diasporas and International Relations," in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), *Modern Diasporas In International Politics* (New York: St. Martin Press ,1986), pp. 333-349; Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, "Diaspora and International Relations Theory".

[20] Gideon Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism: The Jewish Community and Zionist Movement in South African Society 1910-1948* (Ph.D. diss., Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1974).

[21] Louis Herrman, "Cape Jewry before 1870", in: Gustav Saron and Louis Hotz (eds), *The Jews in South Africa: A History* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 1; Rita E. Hauser, "Israel, South Africa and the West", *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 1979), p. 75.

[22] Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism*, pp. 13-30.

[23] Shimoni, op. cit., p. 24.

[24] Marcus Arkin, "South Africa, Its Jews, and the Israel Connection", *South Africa International*, vol. 8, No. 12 (October 1977), p. 86; see also: Eric Rosenthal, "On the Diamond Fields", in: Gustav Saron and Louis Hotz (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 105-120.

[25] Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism*, p. 29.

[26] Henry Katzew, "Jews in the Land of Apartheid", *Midstream*, vol. 8, No. 4 (December 1969), pp. 65-66; Tzippi Hoffman and Alen Ficher, *The Jews of South Africa: What Future?* (Johannesburg: Southern African Book,1988); Cyril Harris*, For Heaven's Sake* (London: Vallentin Mitchell, 2001).

[27] Shimoni, *op. cit.*, p. 47; Gideon Shimoni, *Community and Conscience: The Jews in Apartheid South Africa* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2003), p 6.

[28] Shimoni, *op. cit*., p. 65; Milton Shain, *The Roots of Antisemitism in South Africa* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994), pp. 49-78; Gustav Saron, "Boers, Uitelnder Jews," in Gustav Saron and Louis Hotz (eds) *The Jews in South Africa* (Cape Town, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.185; Milton Shain, *The Roots of Antisemitism in South Africa* (Charlottsvill and London: University Press of Virginia, 1994), p. 20.

[29] See expansion in Shimoni, *op. cit*., pp. 160-185. Patrick J. Furlong, *Between Crown and Swastika* (Hanover and London: Wesleyan Press, 1991), pp.70-96. Gideon Shimol, *Jews and Zionism: The South Africa Experience 1910-1967* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1980) pp. 109-124. Gideon Shimoni, "Zionism in South Africa: in Alon Gal (ed.) *Zionism by Its Regions* vol. 3 (Jerusalem: The Zalman Shazar Center, Ben-Gurion Research Institute for the Study of Israel & Zionism and Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 2010) [Hebrew] pp. 327-368

[30] Furlong, *Between Crown and Swastika*, pp. 16-20. See also, Richard Mendelson and Milton Shain, *The Jews in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2008), pp. 105-133. Gideon Shimoni, *Community and Conscience – The Jews in Apartheid South Africa* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2003), pp. 13-14.

[31] Furlong, *Between Crown and Swastika*, pp. 22-25.

[32] See report on South Africa by Yitzhak Bavli, former envoy to Pretoria, to S. Bentzur, Foreign Office Assistant Director General, from 1 April 1960, file no. 14/3300 – Southern Africa, political relations, diaries, Israel State Archives [Hebrew]; Tamar Golan, *Black-White, White-Black* (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1986) [Hebrew], pp. 141-147.

[33] See, Gideon Shimoni, "The Jewish Community within the Apartheid Society of South Africa", in Shimon Herman and Gideon Shimoni (eds.), *The Path of the Jewish Community and the Zionist Movement in South Africa Society 1910-1948* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University –Institute of Contemporary Jewry,1973), pp. 11-28; Gideon Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism: The Jewish Community and Zionist Movement in South African Society 1910-1948* (Ph.D. diss., Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1974), pp. 327-356; Mendelson and Shain, *The Jews in South Africa*, pp. 134-171. Furlong, *Between Crown and Swastika*, p. 237. James Barber, *South Africa in The Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1999), pp.134-139. Robert Ross, *A Concise History of South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.114. Sasha Polakow-Suransky, *The Unspoken Alliance* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010). p. 20.

[34] Alon Liel, *Black Justice - The South African Upheaval* (Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1999) [Hebrew]; Ephraim Inbar, *Outcast Countries in the World Community* (Denver: University of Denver,1985); Deon Geldenhuys, *Isolated*

States: A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[35] "The Crisis in South Africa", *Monthly Review* (April 1960) [Hebrew], pp. 12-14.

[36] See report by Yaakov Doron, Consul to Johannesburg, to Foreign Office Director, Haim Yechiel, 16 January 1960, Israel State Archives, file no, 17/3300 – South Africa – Jews.

[37] See letter by Matityahu Sharon from Israeli legation in Cape Town to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 6 March 1961. See also, Gideon Shimoni, *Community and Conscience – The Jews in Apartheid South Africa*: University Press of New England, 2003).

[38] See on this issue, Gustav Sharon, "Israel and South Africa", *Gesher*, Vol. 7, no. 4 (1962) [Hebrew], pp. 13-27; During this period, three incidents occurred in Parliament, on a Jewish-related issue, one of which regarded the Jewish background of delegate Alec Gorshel. Israel State Archives, file no. 9/3517 Foreign Office – Southern Africa - Jews. Most South African Jews supported the National Party headed by Prime Minister Verwoerd. See, Alon Liel, *Black Justice - The South African Upheaval*, p. 65.

[39] See remarks of South African foreign minister in the General Assembly, October 1961, Israel State Archives, file no. 16/3300.

[40] See resolutions and votes on this issue from 13 November 1961, *Ibid.*

[41] Gideon Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism: The South Africa Experience 1910-1967* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 308.

[42] Henry Katzew, *op. cit.,* p. 74.

[43] *Ibid.*

[44] See Israel State Archives, file no. 16/3300; See also in this file a support telegram of this organisation in the South African government, sent to South African Foreign Minister.

[45] Telegram from 20 January 1961, sent from Johannesburg to Jerusalem, Israel States Archives, file no. 16/3300.

[46] Letter from Michael Comay from Permanent Mission of Israel to the UN to the Foreign Office, 1 November 1961 – Israel State Archives, file no. 16/3300 – material on condemning South Africa.

[47] Gideon Shimoni ,*op cit*, pp. 308-309.

[48] See Q & A pamphlet published by the Zionist Federation following this incident. Israel State Archives, file no. 16/3300 – material condemning South Africa.

[49] See letter by General Consul Y. Doron to envoy in Pretoria, Simcha Pratt, in which he reports the financial repercussions to Jews in the region of Johannesburg following the Israeli support for UN sanctions on South Africa, Israel State Archives, 17/3300 – South Africa – Jews; for discussion of threats of antisemitic acts against Jews, see Gideon Shimoni ,*op cit*, p. 319.

[50] Gideon Shimoni, *op cit*, p. 317. See also correspondence on this issue by Simcha Pratt to the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, 19 December 1961, Israel State Archive, file no. 28/3350 – South Africa – Magbit Appeal; and letter by

Pratt to Aryeh Levavi, Assistant Director General, 7 December 1961, Israel State Archive, file no. 12/3300 – South Africa – Jews.

[51] Letter by Simcha Pratt to Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, Israel State Archives, 28/3300 – Southern Africa – Appeal; Edgar Berenstein, "South African Jewish Community", *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 65 (1964), p. 344.

[52] Gideon Shimoni, *op cit*, p. 318.

[53] *Ibid,* p. 319.

[54] Nathan Grossman, "Examination of the Concept 'Developing Countries' from Israel's International Relations Perspective", M.A. Thesis (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 1973)[Hebrew], p. 128. Polakow-Suransky, *The Unspoken Alliance,* pp. 27-29.

[55] H.S. Aynor, "Israel Versus Apartheid at the United Nations", *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations,* Vol 8, No. 1 (March 1986), p. 40.

[56] *Meron Medzini*, *op. cit*., p. 282.

[57] See details in pamphlet by Zionist Federation, note 42 above.

[58] See remarks by Levi Eshkol on the issue, claiming that the State of Israel had no interest in the total excommunication and isolation of South Africa, Knesset Protocols, vol. 38, 23 October 1963, pp. 50-53.

[59] Gideon Shimoni ,*op cit*, pp. 330-331.

[60] *Ibid*, p. 331.

[61] *Ibid*, p. 334. See reference to this issue in correspondence between legation in Pretoria to Director of British Commonwealth Dept., 12 November 1962, Israel State Archives, file no. 1/351, Southern Africa. Polakow-Suransky, *The Unspoken Alliance*, p. 31.

[62] See letter by Matityahu Sharon from Israeli legation in Pretoria to S. Arad, Cape Town to Director of British Commonwealth Dept., 5 March 1963, Israel State Archives, file no. 2/130, Africa.

[63] See letter by Nitzan Hadas to Azriel Harel in Pretoria, 28 October 1963, Israel State Archives, file no. 1/103, Africa.

[64] On trade ties, see letter by Yaakov Doron to S. Ronen, 1 September 1963, *op. cit.* Polakow-Suransky, *The Unspoken Alliance*, pp. 39-47. Bilateral trade ties deteriorated significantly, expressed particularly in the drop in imports to Israel. In 1960, Israel imported 11 million dollars' worth of goods. (Statistical Abstract of Israel 1961, no. 12, p. 331) and dropped to 5.5 million dollars in 1962 (Statistical Abstract of Israel 1965, no. 16, p. 259; In 1965 the trade volume was 4.4 million dollars (Statistical Abstract of Israel 1967, no. 18, p. 220). Regarding export, the changes were marginal: in 1960, the export volume of Israel to South Africa was 3.4 million dollars (Statistical Abstract of Israel 1961, *op. cit*.) and in 1966 export dropped to 2.3 million dollars (Statistical Abstract of Israel 1967, *op. cit.*).

[65] In relation to the Jews of Argentina, see publication by Efraim Zadoff, "Israel's commitment to the Jews in the Diaspora in times of crisis – the case of Argentina, 1976-1983", *Bitachon Leumi* [Hebrew], nos. 2-3 (September 2003), p. 4-59; Bishara Bahbah, "Israel's Military Relationship with Ecuador and

Argentina", *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, Vol. 15, (1980), pp. 76-101. On Algerian Jews see Mualem, *The Jewish Dimension in Israeli Foreign Policy,* op. cit., pp. 51-85.

[66] See Israel State Archives, file no. 13/3516 – Foreign Office – Southern Africa – political relations - Israeli-African non-governmental level relations; This trend repeats itself in 1965, as expressed in letter by Azriel Harel, Pretoria, to Director of British Commonwealth Dept., 4 August 1965, and in letter by A.P. Haran from the economic department of the Foreign Ministry to the deputy minister of Israel to the *European Office of the United Nations, 1 February 1965, Israel State Archives, file no. 16/3516; See also reference to this issue in reports published in the Jewish Revisionist weekly of South Africa, The Jewish Herald*: "Israel Fashion Exports for S.A.", 27.10.1964, p. 1; "Major S.A.-Israel Tourists Exchange Plan", 23.11.1965, p. 1; "New Israel Start On S.A.", 13.7.1965, p.1.

[67] Yitzhak Mualem, "Between a Jewish and Israeli Foreign Policy: the Algerian Exodus 1958-1962," in Moshe Orfali, Ephraim Hazan (eds.) *Between Tradition And Progress: Leadership and Cultural Processes in North African Jewry* (Jerusalem: Bialik Press, 2005)[in Hebrew], pp. 296-314; Yitzhak Mualem, "Between a Jewish and Israeli Foreign Policy: Israel-Argentina relations and the issue of Jewish disappeared persons and detainees under the Military Junta 1976-1983," *Jewish Political Studies Review*, Vol. 16, No. 1-2 (Spring 2004), pp. 51-79.

[68] Dan Avni Segera, *The Black Continent* (Tel Aviv: Am Hasefer, 1967) [Hebrew], p. 208; See also approach of the State of Ghana, brought in correspondence by M. Bitan, Israeli Ambassador to Monrobia, with Department of Africa in Israeli Foreign Office, 16 May 1961, see, *The Labour Movement's Contribution to Implementation of Israel's Foreign Ties in Asia and Africa* (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Hebrew University and the *Lavon* Institute for the *Research* of the Jewish *Labour Movement, 1989) [Hebrew], p. 135. Aryeh Oded, Africa and Israel (Jerusalem: Magnes – Hebrew University, 2011)(Hebrew), pp. 3-14;* Benyamin Neuberger*,* Africa and International Relations *(Raanana: Open University, 2011)(Hebrew), pp. 129-137.*

[69] Interview with Simcha Pratt. 19.1.1.1996

[70] Naomi Hazan, "Israel's Position in Africa due to the Changes on the Continent", *Monthly Review* [Hebrew], no. 2 (February 1962), pp. 21-22.

[71] See letter of general consul in Johannesburg to Director of British Commonwealth Dept. on issue of sanctions against South Africa, 16 July 1963, Israel State Archives, no. 1/351 – Southern Africa.

[72] Stenographic report of meeting at the Chambers of Foreign Minister Golda Meir, 15 August 1963, on South Africa. Israel State Archives, no. 28/4390 – Foreign Office.

[73] Author's interview with *Harry Horowitz, 26 March 1996.*

[74] See letter by Nitzan Hadas to Azriel Harel in Pretoria (who replaced Head of Mission Simcha Pratt), 6 November 1963, 28 October 1963, Israel State Archives, file no. 6/3388 – Southern Africa – World Jewry.

[75] *Meron Medzini*, *op. cit*., p. 282.

[76] Edgar Berenstein, "South African Jewish Community", *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 62, (1961), pp. 366-367.

[77] See on this issue Israel State Archives, file no. 6/3388 – Southern Africa – South African Jewry. See also discussion on foreign activity and influence in coordinating and intensifying antisemitic activity in South Africa, in report sent to Consul Dov Sinai from Judith Nisiyahu, 5 March 1964, Israel State Archives, file no. 9/3517 – Foreign Office. See also, Milton Shain, *The Roots of Antisemitism in South Africa*.

[78] Edgar Berenstein, "South African Jewish Community", *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 64 (1963), pp. 418-419.

[79] See antisemitic responses in South Africa to the Eichmann trial: Edgar Berenstein, "South African Jewish Community", *American Jewish Year Book,* Vol. 63 (1962), p. 459.

[80] See letter by Azriel Garel to Director of British Commonwealth Dept. from 14 September 1965, on the issue of the desecration of the cemetery in Pretoria, in which 12 tombstones were desecrated and were sprayed with "Hang Jews and Communists; Hang Ben Gurion; Down with all Jews" in red paint. Israel State Archive, file 3517 – Southern Africa – Jews; see also letter of General Consul in Johannesburg to Mr. Dvir from Israeli Secret Service (Mossad) from 20 April 1966 in which he reports the painting of a swastika and a slogan "Heil Hitler" discovered in one of the large synagogues in Johannesburg. Israel State Archive, file 6/3993.Edgar Berenstein, "South African Jewish Community", *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 66 (1965), pp. 490-492; Edgar Berenstein, "South African Jewish Community", *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 68 (1967), pp. 454-455.

[81] See report on these activities in: Gideon Shimoni, *op cit,* p. 339; "South African Jewish Community", *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 63 (1962), p. 459.

[82] See protocol from Jewish Agency board meeting, convened in Jerusalem in 24 June 1963, Central Zionist Archive, 216/559.

[83] See letter of General Consul in Johannesburg to Director of British Commonwealth Dept. from 6 September 1963. Israel State Archive, file 351/1.

[84] See n. 74.

IDEOLOGY AND EVENTS IN ISRAELI HUMAN LANDSCAPES: REVISITED[i]

Stanley Waterman

Background

Over 40 years ago, not long after I had arrived in Israel, Donald Meinig, an eminent American historical and cultural geographer, presented a lecture in the Department of Geography at the University of Haifa. In his presentation, Meinig sketched three symbolic landscapes, which he portrayed as models of American community.[ii]

These landscapes, he explained, were part of the iconography of nationhood, part of a shared set of ideas and memories and feelings that bind people together. However, he observed that whereas the existence of such landscapes seemed clear, they were no more than images; what is more, they were fraught with nuances and different expressions which appear at various levels of social consciousness. In doing this, Meinig was using an approach adopted by the historian Daniel Boorstin in his three-volume classic *The Americans*, in which he sketched the social history of the American experience in 163 chapters contained within 31 sections, almost all of which can be read as stand-alone pieces.[iii]

Even though Meinig identified other symbolic American landscapes, the three he chose to elaborate on were the New England village, Main Street of Middle America and California Suburbia. His rationalization for this choice was that, with reference to idealized communities for family life, these three were the most influential at the national level. In addition, though each was based on an actual landscape of a particular region, all derived from national experience. Each of these idealized landscapes had been simplified, beautified, and widely advertised, becoming in the process a commonly understood symbol, contributing to the shaping of the American scene over wider areas.

Meinig was a scholar of stature with an awe-inspiring reputation and he had an absorbing lecturing style. I was a young man at the start of my academic career and his presentation was pretty persuasive. Put very simply, I had been captivated and won over, so much so that I thought that his idea of symbolic landscapes could easily be applied to the Israeli scene. More than this, I thought it should be.

For me, the timing of this event could not have been more apt. Prior to my arrival, I had steeped myself in literature about Israel and even though

the corpus of material had been almost entirely in English, I thought I understood some things. Eighteen months after arriving as a new immigrant, it was beginning to seem to me that there was a considerable gap between the Israel I thought I had come to know and the one I was experiencing. This jarred. Increasingly, the Israel based on what I had read from the literature both of academic articles published by my erstwhile colleagues in social sciences (especially geography and planning) and the serious pseudo-academic material published by quangos such as the Jewish Agency or the Jewish National Fund, seemed to be highly idealized. (And sometimes it was difficult to ascertain who were the real academics and who the quasi-scholars!)

So, after some thought, I decided to adopt Meinig's model. I had no qualms about using it — after all, they say that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. I gave some thought to what would comprise my idealized Israeli landscapes and set out to describe and explain three elements of the contemporary (1974) Israeli landscape that appeared to me to have achieved mythical proportions. Popularization of idealized images had constructed a caricature of Israeli culture and society and its human landscapes. Israelis were parodied as being a group of paramilitary pioneering immigrants, simultaneously engaged in protecting the borders from enemies whilst reclaiming desert wastes, all in a spirit of an egalitarian and ascetic socialism. Even so, one had to admit that this caricature contained some real-life elements.

I started to write the article some time in 1974. Although at just over 4,000 words without the footnotes, it's a short piece, it took me over a year to complete. I was conscious of the fact that I needed to choose my words very carefully and to say a lot in as few words as possible — which I later learned is part of the art of writing articles. Initially, I had not thought out the conclusions; this was the hardest part of all because I discovered that what I wanted to say wasn't strictly geography — or at least geography as most people seemed to understand it in the mid-1970s.

There wasn't all that much to make use of; the roles of perception and subjectivity in appreciating the environment were not yet widespread among geographers. We need to be aware of this when reviewing something written four decades ago. At the time, there was the 1947 AAG presidential address by John K. Wright on imagination in geography[iv] and David Lowenthal's wonderful pioneering paper on experience and imagination in geography, which had appeared in 1961 almost 20 years before its time.[v]

There was also Wreford Watson's little piece on myth in American landscapes[vi] and Yi- Fu Tuan's *Topophilia,*[vii] which had appeared around the time as I was writing this paper so I was able to use both. Both

Relph's *Place and Placelessness*[viii] and the essays edited by Lowenthal and Martyn Bowden[ix] came out while I was waiting to hear if my article would be published but I didn't read them until it had been accepted for publication. And Peirce Lewis's brilliant essay on landscapes[x] was only published in the book in which the published version of Meinig's seminar paper appeared, in 1979 and although Grady Clay had been publishing for years, he was beneath my horizon.[xi] I had also read Roland Barthes' essays on myths[xii], but because in 1975 nobody had suggested to me that they might be relevant to a geographer, I wasn't quite sure what to make of them.

In Israeli geography, divided among quantitative positivists, applied geographers, and historical geographers, there was nobody I knew at the time with whom I could discuss my ideas. Anyway, I was a new immigrant and as Israeli geography has always been less friendly to outsiders than most other disciplines, I was very much working in the dark and on my own.

The article took nearly two and a half years to find an outlet and was published about four years after I wrote it. This was partly because referees were lax and there was a one-year wait for a decision from each of the first two journals I sent it to and partly because (in retrospect, naïvely) I didn't want to change a single word of what I'd written.[xiii] It was eventually published in *Geography*, a journal published by The Geographical Association, the professional association of British secondary school geography teachers.[xiv] This was not perhaps the most prestigious of outlets but a good journal nonetheless. And although I knew that some people would read it (and they did!) I have little doubt that the vast majority of my Israeli peers never saw it and had they come across it at the time, they might not have then quite grasped what I was trying to say.

What follows is the entire original article, followed by a short discussion of the changes in the intervening four decades.

Ideology and Events in Israeli Human Landscapes, by Stanley Waterman, first published in

Geography *Vol. 64, Part 3. July 1979, pp. 171—81*

Abstract

As a consequence of the role played by agricultural pioneering in peripheral areas of Jewish settlement in Israel prior to 1948, a mythical landscape has evolved in which small development towns and collective villages transform a desert environment. In reality, the majority of the population lives in the three metropolitan areas of Tel-Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem, the collective village is no longer dominant numerically nor is it a Pioneering agricultural settlement and the call to make the desert bloom no longer serves as a rallying cry for Israeli society. Because of the ethnocentric beliefs in the uniqueness of Israel's achievements and destiny, the reality has been slow in gaining recognition both within Israel and outside, with negative consequences for Israel's development.

"… Now, more than ever before, we need a strong and devoted pioneering force. The desert area of our land is calling us and the destruction of our people is crying out to us. ... The tasks that lie ahead will require pioneering efforts the likes of which we have never known, for we must conquer and fructify the waste-places (in the mountains of Galilee, the plains of the Negev, the valley of the Jordan, the sand dunes of the sea- shore, the mountains of Judea) and we must prepare for new immigrants." [1]

Introduction

The Zionist settlement in Israel during the past century has brought about remarkable changes in the landscape, probably the most drastic to have taken place in the long history of the region. This is particularly true of the last 30 years since the foundation of the State of Israel. Moreover, many of these changes and the processes that brought them about have been documented so that it should be possible to build up a detailed picture of what has taken place.[2] So important has the past been in guiding the emerging Israeli society that the most common framework for presenting Israeli culture, society and human environments is a variant of a model developed early in the history of the State as a goal for the development of Israel. This presents a basic image of an agrarian, pioneering Israel.

Since 1948, three major processes have been changing Israeli society, all of which have been presented in an idealized manner. Immigration, which yielded a population different from, unsuited to the promotion and ignorant of the ideals of the majority of the preceding period, is most often presented simply as an "ingathering of exiles". Urbanization and industrialization, which gave rise to factors opposed to the ideals of the rural- based agrarian elite of the pre-State period, have been treated respectively as a continuation of pioneering and hardly at all.[3]

These images of Israeli society and its expression on the landscape result from the passage of information through filters, many of which were designed to project or transmit such idealized images to specific populations. Some filters, such as government publications and news media, overtly project distorted images; others, such as social science literature, are more subtle and intangible, often the result of unsuspected personal bias based on individual human experience or beliefs.[4]

Popularization of ideal images has constructed a caricature of Israeli culture, society and landscapes in which Israelis are drawn as a group of paramilitary pioneering immigrant people, simultaneously engaged in protecting its borders whilst reclaiming desert wastes in an egalitarian spirit of ascetic socialism.[5] Three landscape elements are contained in this caricature, each reflecting an aspect of the goals for Israeli development set at the beginning of statehood. The beliefs emanating from these can be crudely, but explicitly stated as follows:

(1) Population dispersal has succeeded and large populations reside in peripheral regions. Inhabitants of agricultural border settlements and peripheral development towns are pioneers.
(2) The *kibbutz* (collective) is the most important form of rural settlement.
(3) Seventy years of pioneering have "made the desert bloom" into an irrigated paradise.

This paper seeks to examine some of the inaccuracies contained in these beliefs.

Population Dispersal

Israel is a highly urbanized, metropolitan, country. In 1978, over 85 per cent of the population of Israel (90 per cent of the Jews) lived in urban places.[6] This situation will probably intensify as most immigrants settle in towns, rural to urban migration continues and rural settlements officially change their status on reaching specific size and as their functions

change.[7] There is nothing inherently surprising about the fact that Israel is one of the world's most highly urbanized countries. However, Israeli ideology and settlement policies since the beginning of the century have been decidedly anti-urban. Manual labour, a pioneering spirit and a "return to the soil" through agriculture, the traditional ideology of Labour Zionism, have formed the motor for the driving forces of society.[8]

In 1948, Israel had a "typically colonial" settlement system, overweighted towards large urban centres.[9] Forty-nine per cent of the population lived in the cities of Tel-Aviv, Haifa or Jerusalem, which together accounted for 58 per cent of the Jewish population. There were several smaller towns, only one of which had over 20 000 inhabitants, with over 500 rural settlements at the bottom of the hierarchy. To normalize the system by inserting settlements intermediate in size between the major cities and the smaller settlements, the policy of population dispersal was initiated. Other factors were also involved in the promotion of this policy. There was the pragmatic necessity of checking the expected large-scale urban growth in the Tel-Aviv area which contains excellent agricultural land and in much of which, in contrast to the rest of Israel, land is privately owned and thus liable to speculation.[10]

Additional demands for instituting the population dispersal policy arose from the needs of security, politics and ideology. Israel had to protect its border areas, indicate its readiness to settle areas under its sovereignty and to continue to promote pioneering.[11] The "New Towns Programme" formed the means by which this strategy was to be carried out. Planned urban centres, especially in the arid South and non-Jewish North, were to absorb the new immigrants thereby dispersing the population and providing services for established and newly founded rural settlements.[12] Ideologically, it was hoped that the New Towns would possess and retain a pioneering spirit, which would provide new immigrants with motivation and prove capable of drawing established Israelis from the large cities which were anathema to the ideology of Labour Zionism.[13] Geographically, this directed emphasis from the core to the periphery of the settled area.

The literature generally suggests that these policies have been successful. Data are usually presented in support of this view. By the late 1970s, New Town population exceeded half a million (approximately 17 per cent of Israel's population). On the other hand, the combined population of the cities of Tel-Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem was about 950,000, some 26 per cent of the total population and a proportion approximately half of that of 1948 (Table).

But the statistics are misleading. The greatest absolute growth has taken place around the major cities, especially Tel-Aviv. By 1978, four

cities in the Tel-Aviv region each had a larger population than Beersheba, by far the largest development town; four others were larger than the second development town, Ashdod (Fig. 1).

The combined population of the three major urban areas is between 1.7 and 2.2 millions (depending on Metropolitan definitions).[14] This is double the population of the combined central cities and proportionally seems to represent little change from 1948 (Table) but, in fact, it marks a deterioration, since then because of the amalgamation of small, relatively isolated settlements into an integrated urban system. This process in the Tel-Aviv area and to a lesser extent in Haifa (parallelled by the politically motivated push to develop a reunited Jerusalem as Israel's capital) has been the opposite of the centre points of planning objectives, representing a strengthening of the core (Fig. 2).

Table

POPULATION OF METROPOLITAN AREAS IN 1948 AND 1977 IN THOUSANDS
(Metropolitan areas defined by 1977 figures)

	Year	
	1948	1977
Total population of Israel	873	3653
Total Metropolitan population	582	2201
Tel-Aviv	381	1420
Inner ring	331	1030
Outer ring	50	390
Haifa	117	405
Inner ring	102	254
Outer ring	15	151
Jerusalem	84	376
Metropolitan population as percentage of total population	66	60

Tel-Aviv
Inner ring: Tel-Aviv, Ramat-Gan, Holon, Bat Yam, Petah Tiqva, Bnei Braq, Givatayyim, Herzliyya, Qiryat Ono
Outer ring: Rishon-le-Zion, Rehovot, Ramat HaSharon, Raanana, Ramle, Lod, Natanya, Kfar Saba
Haifa
Inner ring: Haifa, Nesher, Tirat HaCarmel
Outer ring: Qiryat Bialik, Qiryat Yam, Qiryat Motzkin, Qiryat Ata, Qiryat Tivon, Acre

SOURCE: *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, vol. 29, 1978, p. 29.



Fig. 1.—Israel—location map.



Fig. 2.—Israel—population in centres of 5000 or more, 1948 and 1972.

In this light, the effect of the New Towns on national population distribution is not as it seemed at first. Though the New Towns help in facilitating population dispersal as demanded by national plans, the overall effect has been to stem the relative numerical growth of the metropolitan areas. That this has been the major, though not inconsiderable, achievement of the population dispersal policy and the New Towns Programme has been admitted.[15]

Most of the inhabitants of the New Towns are immigrants drawn from the Sephardic and Oriental communities and occupy a lower social and economic rank than the general population. As a result of the gap between "core" and "periphery", population turnover has been high and might have been higher had the potential migrants sufficient funds to utilize in their choice of residence.[16] Lack of urban amenities sufficient to retain or attract large numbers, a result of the Zionist bias against the city, and proximity to larger cities, reflecting Israel's small size and efficient transportation system, has also contributed to the relatively poor success rate of many New Towns.[17]

Moreover, Israeli governments have been unwilling or unable to control urban developments in the central Coastal Plain, even tracts of state- controlled land having been released for urban improvements. Perhaps because the Labour governments that ruled Israel until 1977 did not appreciate or care about the dangers of uncontrolled metropolitan growth or were reluctant to encroach upon alien territory, it is not surprising that little positive was done to prevent large-scale urban developments in that region.[18]

Because of the attention bestowed on the New Towns and the predisposition against the city, problems in the large cities have suffered a benign neglect on the part of the government.[19] In this respect, Jerusalem suffers less than Tel-Aviv or Haifa because of historical and political interests, a single local authority and a tradition of town planning inherited from the British Mandate. This has led to a situation in which large urban areas, especially Tel-Aviv and its region, have grown constantly, attracting additional population.[20] Industry and services have been an integral part of this growth.[21] Problems arising from metropolitan expansion, such as co-operation in local government, integrated planning of services, social problems and the human effects of industrial growth have only begun to be considered serious and pressing, although they have existed for many years.[22]

Rural development

As Israel is not a country of small towns, neither is it one of *kibbutzim*. These collective villages, implying both idealistic lifestyle and efficient use of resources, have attracted much attention, especially in the West.[23]

During the 1930s and 1940s, the kibbutz played an important role as a border settlement, actively expanding the Jewish ecumene and defending those areas already settled (Fig. 3).[24] Kibbutzim provided a disproportionately large share of Labour Movement leaders. This trend continued into the next generation and provided Israel with two

generations of political leaders with all the advantages for increase of reputation that this brings.[25] The kibbutzim represented a microcosm of Jewish society in Palestine and were treated with reverence and awe, their idealism and asceticism providing goals towards which other elements of the population aspired but could not attain.[26]



Fig. 3.—Israel—kibbutzim (collective villages) and moshavim (co-operative villages), 1909–47.

To some degree what was true of the kibbutzim 30 years ago is appropriate today. They provide leaders in politics, the army and other sectors beyond their numbers. However, their share of the population has fallen by two-thirds from 9 per cent in the late 1940s.[27] More significant, however, are the changes in Israeli lifestyles since then. Living standards have risen as the economy developed and within this milieu the structure of the kibbutz has not remained static. No longer a rural border outpost

with an agricultural way of life, the kibbutz economy has industrialized and the spartan and unique way of life has been ameliorated.[28]

As a pioneer rural settlement, the kibbutz has largely been replaced by the *moshav* (cooperative smallholders' village), a settlement type almost as old as the kibbutz.[29] The moshav is essentially a co-operative agricultural society governed by regulations designed to control certain activities such as co-operative marketing, purchasing of heavy equipment and collectively working certain privately held lands.[30] Its growth curve rose sharply when, with intensive land settlement programmes of new immigrants who had little agricultural experience or ideological motivation, the collective lifestyle was less useful to their absorption on the land than the moshav, based on the family farm.[31] Although the pre-1948 moshavim comprise the wealthiest single group of agricultural settlements, the moshavim are faced with a more pressing set of development problems than the kibbutzim in the attempt to raise rural living standards. Much of the effort on the moshav· has gone into making good, efficient farmers of what one anthropologist termed "reluctant pioneers".[32]

On the whole, the social and economic structure of the kibbutz permits change and innovation more readily than does the moshav, essentially involving a shift of members from one job to another. Outside the kibbutz, introduction of rural industry has been restricted to a few industrially based co-operatives, as the need to retain the family farm has hampered such progress in the moshavim. Moreover, relaxation of formerly strict rulings on the non-hiring of external labour has resulted in an increase in agricultural output on the moshav whereas on the kibbutz it has been used to develop industry to a point where, on a majority of the kibbutzim, returns from industrial production are greater than from agriculture.[33]

Compounding the problems of the moshavim is the relatively lower place they have occupied traditionally in the Israeli power structure as compared with the kibbutzim, although the situation is changing. In the past, the kibbutzim exploited their position to extract concessions from the authorities. For instance, water allocations, calculated on the basis of worked farm units in the village, are distributed on the moshav according to the number of family farms; on the kibbutz, the unit is two adult members whether employed in agriculture or not.[34] Without diminishing the role played by the kibbutz in Israel's development or its position in Israel today, many resemble towns more than they do other villages in terms of economic structure and type of employment of their inhabitants.[35] Furthermore, several kibbutzim have changed their lifestyle from a collective one to resemble the *moshav-shitufi* (collective moshav), an

increasingly popular settlement type, in which economic enterprises are collective but social life is family based.[36]

A re-evaluation of the term "pioneer" in the Israeli context is called for by these changes. Given the problems of the moshav, those associated with its search for a place in a changing situation are perhaps closer to that ideal than the majority of the kibbutzim, which exude an air of self-satisfaction, a function of past pioneering spirit and present prosperity. What was a young, revolutionary, progressive settlement in the past seems not to match the businesslike, establishment-oriented conservative settlements that are the reality of the 1970s, though there is considerable reluctance in Israel to recognize this.[37]

Conquest of the desert

The desert in Israel is the Negev, which occupies over half of the area of the State (1949 borders). Most of this region is unpopulated. However, the dimensions of the region have changed. Sixty years ago, the Negev included areas that today are close to the outer fringes of the Tel-Aviv Metropolitan Area; development of the Lakhish region east of Ashqelon over 20 years ago was once thought of as opening up the Northern Negev rather than as a classical example of regional development in Southern Israel as is the case today.

Contrary to popular belief, the desert has not all been conquered, nor for that matter has most of settled Israel been won from the desert. In the story of "making the desert bloom", promotion has once more been active. Though conquest of the wilderness and reclamation of desert land evoke images of ascetic pioneers labouring in a strange and harsh environment, most land reclamation in Palestine was of long neglected wastes of swamps and coastal sand dunes rather than of any Sahara-like deserts.[38] The appeal of the story lies in the connotations of idealism and efficiency.

Like other pioneer areas, the importance of the Negev has been romanticized and exaggerated, in keeping With its status as a development symbol. Like the kibbutz and development town, exploitation of the Negev is tied up with agriculture and rural development. These have encountered problems of which the main are lack of water, isolation and substitution by other pioneer zones. Settlement of the Negev was connected closely with exploitation of water resources from the Jordan River and transfer outside its basin.[39] However, even 10 years ago, most of Israel's known water resources were already in use, thus inhibiting further agricultural expansion on a large scale in water-deficient areas.[40] Instead of a wider geographical diffusion of agriculture, emphasis is placed on more economic and efficient use of resources in those areas

where the greatest returns might be expected and in intense specialization of crops, mainly for export.

Though much land has been brought into productive use, the desert remains as a psychological and physical barrier to the realization of the Zionist vision of populating the whole country. During the first 20 years of statehood, the Negev occupied a place in the national consciousness similar to that of the nineteenth-century American West or the Scandinavian Northlands. A peripheral pioneering area is almost essential to a healthy national growth and development.[41] Developing the desert and making it a paradise still presents older Israelis with a goal capable of raising excitement, being a cornerstone of the philosophy of a former Israeli leader towards building a better Israel.[42]

Part of the attraction of the Negev in the 1950s and 1960s was as a "last frontier". However, the "last frontier" in Israel has proved elusive, so that the place of the Negev as the premier frontier zone in the 1970s has been taken by other regions such as the Golan Heights, Judea and Samaria or the Jordan Valley. While perhaps physically less forbidding than the Negev, these have provided greater emotional attraction and satisfaction, opening up new Jewish frontier areas. Similarly, the policy of "judaizing Galilee", meaning the increase of Jewish settlement in Northern Israel, appears in recent years to have provided a greater national challenge than more desert settlements.

Nevertheless, the Negev is experiencing economic development though of a kind not originally envisaged. Because most of Israel's mineral resources are there (the chemical industries associated with the Dead Sea, the phosphates and copper ores), their exploitation is being pursued, given the vagaries of world markets. Two cities, Beersheba and Dimona, have succeeded as industrial centres and Eilat has based its development on its port facilities and tourism. Moreover, peace with Egypt will, if fully realized, provide the Negev with an additional function as supply-base for a large part of Israel's army. Stationing of families and provision of services should stimulate further the economy of the region to a level unknown before. Thus, instead of developing as a pioneering agricultural region on the fringe of the Jewish ecumene, the Negev is likely to achieve its success as an industrialized region and urbanized area, something of an enigma to the founding fathers of the country, the Zionist leaders and idealists of an earlier generation.[43]

Conclusions

Uniqueness, whether expressed by biblical and historical associations or by the Zionist settlement and the creation of the State, has been the

principal factor to have attracted interest in Israel.[44] This attraction to the unique has tended to blur the sharpness of the realities of human settlement in contemporary Israel. At any scale our conception of the world around us is partly objective and partly subjective. The subjective part, structured by our experience, imagination and fantasies, is kept in check by the objective part, the real world. Moreover, we are increasingly aware of the role of the subjective in helping us shape our images of the real world and hence the real world itself.[45] The part of imagination and imagery in creating known landscapes was pointed out over 30 years ago by J. K. Wright.[46]

Even scientific writing is not free from subjective influences though the scientific method reduces the influence of subjectivity through systematic methods of observations and measurement of phenomena and processes.[47] Decisions must be taken on the problem to be investigated, how to portray it, the scale of study, the choice of analytical tools.[48] Intuition, as always must play its part in scholarly pursuits. Yet Wright indicated that objectivity and subjectivity are not antithetical and argued for "realistic subjectivity" and "intuitive imagination" as legitimate tools for converting *terrae incognitae* into *terrae cognitae.*[49]

In Israel, those writing about the transformation of landscape and environment, as with other aspects of society and culture, have mostly used alternative forms, termed by Wright "illusory subjectivity" and "promotional imagination" which are recognized as the building blocks of myth. Myth is subjective imagining dominated by partiality and self-interests, Mythology is theorized as a collective accord with the world not as it is but as it wants to be.[50] Ethnocentrism has played an important role in the continuance of uniqueness as a factor in the expression of Israel's human geography, the illusion of superiority and centrality probably being necessary to the sustenance of culture and the prosperity of small nations.[51] Thus, ethnocentrism gives rise to national myths, providing an idealized version of what the nation consists of or should be.

The population dispersal policy, the collective village and the development of the desert have all been seen as singular Israeli efforts and achievements, as ethnocentric attempts of a small nation to succeed against tremendous odds. To a point, the national myths arising from such ethnocentrism serve to strengthen culture, providing society with an ideal towards which to aspire. But although Lowenthal noted that the past is cherished as a collective guide to behaviour and that the general consensus changes slowly, he also pointed to the transience of the shared world view and the ability of each generation to find new facts and concepts to interpret it.[52] Slow alteration in the general consensus leads to changes in the perceived world being out of phase with those in the real

world. In Israel's case, this problem is compounded, as history and circumstances have provided society with a powerful and long-lasting frame of reference for collective experience and collective goals. Thus, the likely result of shattering illusions by a rude encounter with reality is the decline of culture.[53] The Israeli meeting with reality has been abrupt and the nation inadequately prepared to accept it. Three generations of Labour Zionist ideology, ethnocentric uniqueness and the myth of a pioneering, rural society successfully metamorphosing into a pluralistic, pioneering society based on small urban centres and guided by similar ideals is at considerable odds with the metropolitan society that does exist.

Finding the facts and concepts to tackle the new realities in Israel has been difficult, involving a dilemma of reinterpreting national goals, directions and priorities.[54] Replacing the illusory subjectivity and promotional imagination of the mythmaker with the realistic subjectivity and intuitive imagination desirable for understanding the nature of a situation and for seeking ways to change it raises many awkward questions. If the problems that Israel shares with other nations are stressed over its own unique problems and if its unique history is mitigated, what will make Israel different — a "light unto the nations"? And what is left to appeal to the nation itself as an overall national ideal? Is the myth so strong as to prevent recognition in a proper manner of the cultural, social and geographical realities?

Such are the dilemmas facing Israel on entering its fourth decade of statehood. They are not simply rhetorical or polemical but are being posed by individuals capable of influencing the nature of decisions that will be taken during the coming decade and after. Some issues are being confronted directly. Problems such as slum clearance, social and environmental planning, regional government in metropolitan areas, planning for the minority sector, are being investigated. There is a recognition that frontier areas other than the desert have problems, less romantic but of a more pressing nature, if Israeli dreams are to be realized.[55] In the short run, much of this is due to little more than the pressure of events forcing recognition upon those most closely associated with them. In the longer term, it is the result of an ability to question myths and to take a more detached view of the events that have taken, and are taking, place.

Older scholars in Israel grew up in or immigrated to the country during the most active period of nation-building and state-building. Many of them gave part, if not all, of their energies to these processes. Moreover, many non-academics, even more intimately involved in the various settlement and development programmes, contributed heavily to the literature during the first 30 years. Consequently, the literature,

including geographical writing, has unwittingly perpetuated national myths and been lax to change them. As a result, scientific, official and popular literature reflected these biases. Relatively recent is the involvement of individuals not active in the early stages of nation-building in changing perspectives on the problems of Israeli society and culture. As their subjectivity is of a different kind from that of their predecessors, it yet remains to be seen whether the myths that they will create will once more close the gap between the ideal and the reality.

NOTES

[1] D. Ben-Gurion, "The imperatives of the Jewish revolution", in A. Hertzberg (ed.), *The Zionist Idea*, Atheneum, New York, 1971 pp. 617-8.

[2] For examples of the geographical changes see Y. Ben-Arieh, *The Central Jordan Valley*, Magnes Press, Jerusalem, 1968; D. Nir, *La Vallée de Beth-Chéane*, Armand Colin, Paris, 1968; Y. Karmon, "The drainage of the Huleh Swamps", *Geographical Review*, vol. 50, 1960, pp. 168—93. For more general topics, see S.N. Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1967; H. Halperin. *Changing Patterns in Israeli Agriculture*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1957; E. Spiegel, *Neue Städte/New Towns in Israel*, Karl Kramer, Stuttgart, 1966; R. Weitz and A. Rokach, *Agricultural Development—Planning and Implementation*, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1968; D. Willner, *Nationbuilding and Community in Israel*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1969. See also *Atlas of Israel*, English Edition, Ministry of Labour, Jerusalem, 1970, especially Section VIII.

[3] See D. Lowenthal, "The place of the past in the American landscape", in D. Lowenthal and M.J. Bowden (eds.), *Geographies of the Mind*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1976, p. 107.

[4] Much of the literature on changes in the Israeli scene has been written by decision makers and not by independent observers. See S. Reichman and R. Gerson, "Uniqueness and generality in Israeli geography", in D.H.K. Amiran and Y. Ben-Arieh (eds.), *Geography in Israel*, I.G.U. National Committee, Jerusalem, 1976, pp. 24—35. The Israeli government and bodies such as the Jewish Agency, the Jewish National Fund and the World Zionist Organization keep up a steady flow of information.

[5] See, for instance, T. Prittie, *Israel—Miracle in the Desert*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1967; E. Samuel, *Structure of Society in Israel*, Random House, New York, 1968; J. Scofield, "Israel—land of promise", *National Geographical Magazine*, vol. 126, 1965, pp. 395—434.

[6] *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, vol. 29, 1978, Table ii/9, p. 41.

[7] A. Sofer and Y. Bar-Gal, "Urban elements in non-Jewish villages in the north of Israel", in D. H. K. Amiran and Ben-Arieh, *op. cit.*, pp. 275—96.

[8] E. Cohen, *The City in the Zionist Ideology*, Institute of Urban and

Regional Studies, Jerusalem, 1971. Labour Zionism was the major trend in the Zionist Movement.

[9] E. Brutzkus, *Physical Planning in Israel*, privately published, Jerusalem, 1964, p. 15.

[10] A.S. Shachar, "Israel's development towns: Evolution of a national urbanization policy", *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, vol. 28, I 97 I, p. 364; Atlas if Israel, Hebrew Edition. Ministry of Labour, Jerusalem, 1956—60, Map 6/XI; E. Brutzkus, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[11] A.S. Shachar, *op. cit.*

[12] A. Sharon, "Planning in Israel", *Town Planning Review*, vol. 23, 1952, pp. 66—82; E. Brutzkus, *op. cit.*; E. Spiegel, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

[13] E. Cohen, *op. cit.*; E. A. Altman and B. R. Rosenbaum, "Principles of planning and Zionist ideology", *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, vol. 29, 1973, pp. 316—25.

[14] S. Reichman, "On the determination of the unit of enquiry in geography", *Studies in the Geography of Israel*, vol. 8, 1972, pp. 91—100 (in Hebrew).

[15] D.H.K. Amiran and A. Shachar, *Development Towns in Israel*, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, p. 10; E. A. Altman and B. R. Rosenbaum, *op. cit.*; R. Sarly, "Failure of the new towns", *Built Environment*, vol. 3, 1974, pp. 612—6.

[16] A. Berler, *New Towns in Israel*, Israel Universities' Press, Jerusalem, 1970, pp. 175—6.

[17] *Ibid*., pp. 167—8; J. Ash, "The progress of new towns in Israel", *Town Planning Review*, vol. 45, 1974, pp. 387—400; A. Kirschenbaum and Y. Comay, "Dynamics of population attraction to new towns: the case of Israel", *Socio-Economic Planning Sciences*, vol. 7, 1973, pp. 687—96; Y. Don and H. Hovav, "The measurement of population mobility—a case study of an Israeli development town", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. 20, 1971, pp. 703—21.

[18] The private landowners of the Coastal Plain, were, for the most part, in political opposition to the Labour Zionists.

[19] See E. Isaac, "A deteriorating urban core: ideology and economics in the landscape of Tel-Aviv", *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, vol. 52, 1961, pp. 113—6.

[20] See D.H.K. Amiran and A. Shachar, "The towns of Israel", *Geographical Review*, vol. 51, 1961, pp. 348—69·

[21] S. Reichman, "On the validity of the spatial distribution plans of Israel's population", *City and Region*, vol. 1, 1973, pp. 26—43 (in Hebrew).

[22] For instance, the *Israel Today* booklet series, Jewish Agency, Jerusalem, 1958—75, designed to inform the general reader outside Israel on Israeli society did not deal with urban problems as such, but continued to reprint booklets on Immigrant Absorption, the Kibbutz, the Negev, the Moshav and Soil Reclamation every few years.

[23] M.E. Spiro, Kibbutz, *Venture in Utopia*, Schocken, New York, 1955; B. Bettelheim, *Children of the Dream*, Macmillan, New York, 1969; H.F. Infield, *Co-operative Living in Palestine*, Kegan Paul, London, 1946.

[24] U. Paran, "Kibbutzim in Israel: Their development and distribution",

Jerusalem Studies in Geography, vol. 1, 1970, pp. 1—36.

[25] D. Avni-Segre, *Israel—A Society in Transition*, Oxford University Press, London, 1971. He notes that the "kibbutz became quite naturally an aristocracy of ideals" (p. 75) and "the kibbutz was in fact, a little state run by an elite drawn from an already select Zionist society" (p. 74)'

[26] *Ibid*., p. 78.

[27] E. Kanovsky, *The Economy of the Israeli Kibbutz*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1966, pp. 19—20. In 1948, 49 per cent of the Jewish rural population was in collectives.

[28] D. Horowitz, *The Economics of Israel*, Pergamon, Oxford, 1967, Chapter 3; E. Kanovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 58—67; A. Antonovsky and A. Arian, *Hopes and Fears of Israelis*, Academic Press, Jerusalem, 1972, Chapter 8; "Industry on the kibbutz", *Israel Economist*, July 1976, pp. 32—3; J. Darom, "The industrialization of the kibbutz", *Midstream*, December 1968, pp. 13—23.

[29] G.H. Blake, "The origins and evolution of Israel's moshav", *Kulturgeografi*, vol. 109, 1969, pp. 293—310; *idem*, "The emergence of the Moshav Ovdim in Palestine, 1882—1921", *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, vol. 64, 1973, pp. 169—80.

[30] D. Weintraub, M. Lissak and Y. Azmon, *Moshava, Kibbutz, Moshav*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1970; Y. Don, "Adaptation of co-operatives to economic changes: the Israeli experience", *Journal of Farm Economics*, vol. 49, 1967, pp. 119—30; E. Baldwin, *Differentiation and Co-operation in an Israeli veteran moshav*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1972.

[31] D. Weintraub *et al.*, *Immigration and Social Change*, Humanities Press, New York, 1971, pp. 1—22.

[32] A. Weingrod, *Reluctant Pioneers*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1966.

[33] E. Kanovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 62—7; E. Baldwin, *op. cit.*; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, vol. 25, 1974, Table xiii/41. p. 409.

[34] See S. Pohoryles and A. L. Szeskin, *F.A.O. Research in Contemporary Changes in Agrarian Structure: Case Study Israel*, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, 1973, Chapters 3 and 4.

[35] *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, vol. 29, 1978, Table xii/l4, pp·358—9.

[36] Y. Bar-Gal, "The moshav shitufi — a chapter in social geography", *Horizons in Geography*, vol. 1, 1975, pp. 71—80 (in Hebrew); Y. Talmon-Garber and Z. Stup, "Secular asceticism; Patterns of ideological change", in S.N. Eisenstadt, R. Bar-Yosef and C. Adler (eds.), *Integration and Development in Israel*, Israel Universities' Press, Jerusalem, 1970, pp. 469—504; E. Kanovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-44.

[37] See E. Marx, "Anthropological studies in a centralized state, the Bernstein Research Project in Israel", *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 17, 1975, pp. 131—50; E. Cohen, "Paradox of the kibbutz", *Built Environment*, vol. 3, 1974, pp. 617—20.

[38] W. C. Lowdermilk, "The reclamation of a man-made desert". *Scientific American*, vol. 202 (3), 1961, pp. 66 ff; R. Halliday, *The Skills to Make the Desert Bloom*, Anglo-Israel Association, London, 1964.

[39] M. A. Garbell, "The Jordan Valley plan", *Scientific American*, vol. 212

(3), 1965, pp. 23—31.

[40] A. Rokach, "Land and water", in J. Ben-David (ed.), *Agricultural Planning and Village Community in Israel*, UNESCO, Paris, 1964, pp. 13—22; N. Raphaeli, "Israel's water economy", *Land Economics*, vol. 41, 1965, pp. 361—4.

[41] I. Bowman, *Limits of Land Settlement*, Council of Foreign Relations, New York, 1937, p. 1.

[42] A. Avi-Hai, "David Ben-Gurion's political philosophy", *Encyclopedia Judaica Yearbook 1973*, pp. 88—98; and "Ben-Gurion speaks", *Encvclopedia Judaica Yearbook 1974*, pp. 123—36; D. Avni-Segre, *op. cit.*, pp. 149—50.

[43] Reichman, *op. cit.* (1973), points out the specific success of population dispersal in the South because of localized resources such as minerals and ports. See also D.H.K. Amiran, "Environmental constraints and opportunities for development", in D.H.K. Amiran and Y. Ben-Arieh, *op. cit.*, pp. 9—23.

[44] For an elaboration, D. Ben-Gurion, *Israel, A Personal History*, Sabra Books, New York, 1971, pp. xvii—xxii.

[45] J.W. Watson, "Image geography; The myth of America in the American scene", *Advancement of Science*, vol. 27, 1970, pp. 71—9.

[46] J.K. Wright, "*Terrae incognita*—the place of the imagination in geography", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*. vol. 37, 1947, pp. 1—15.

[47] A. Kaplan. *The Conduct of Inquiry*, Chandler, Scranton. 1964. p. 387; I. Scheffler, *Science and Subjectivity*. Bobbs Merrill, Indianapolis, 1967, chapter 1.

[48] D.W. Harvey, *Explanation in Geography*, Arnold, London. 1969, pp. 55—61; Chapter 19; A. Buttimer, *Values in Geography*, Association of American Geographers, Washington. 1974.

[49] J.K. Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

[50] R. Barthes. *Mythologies*, Paladin, London, 1973, pp. l09—59.

[51] Y-F. Tuan, *Topophilia*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs. 1974, p. 31.

[52] D. Lowenthal. "Geography, experience and imagination: towards a geographical epistemology", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, vol. 51. 1961, pp. 241—60.

[53] Y.-F. Tuan. *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[54] E.A. Altman and B.R. Rosenbaum. *op. cit.*

[55] See D. Soën (ed.), *Urban Renewal: An Interdisciplinary Symposium and Social Problems in Urban Renewal*, IPD Tel-Aviv, 1968—9 (mimeographed): I. Kimhi, "Poverty zones in Jerusalem", *Studies in the Geography of Israel*, vol. 8. 1972, pp. 65—90 (in Hebrew); A. Gonen, "The suburban mosaic in Israel". in D.H.K. Amiran and Y. Ben-Arieh (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 163—86, especially for works in progress; E. Torgovnik. "Urban political integration in Israel", *Urban Affairs Quarterly*. vol. 1 I, 1976, pp. 469—88; A. Sofer and Y. Bar-Gal. *op. cit.* The most useful collection of statements on the present state of Israeli society is M. Curtis and M. Chertoff (eds.), *lsrael: Social Structure and Change*, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 1973.

Discussion

On reading this paper again after an interval of many years, several thoughts and questions come to mind. What was I thinking of when I decided to use the term 'landscape' and how did I go about selecting these three symbolic landscapes 40 years ago? Were these symbolic landscapes representative at the time? If they were, was I just lucky and if they weren't, what might have made better choices? In other words, did I get things more or less right? Were they just symbolic or were they really iconic? How much was my reading of the Israeli landscape and my explanations for how this reflected Israeli society coloured by my Diaspora background — beliefs, images, prejudices or, more likely, ignorance? What iconic landscapes might an Israeli-born or Israeli-trained geographer have presented had s/he thought of posing such a question?

Of course, it is tricky to answer these questions; it is difficult to provide satisfactory or meaningful responses. In fact, it's probably impossible as hindsight is such a powerful modifying filter that it interferes with every effort to provide reasonable explanations. So much has changed. Yet bearing in mind that the paper was completed in 1975 and the voters rejected the Labour Party in 1977, I might not have been that far off track. Of course, the whole premise on which I based the article might have been grossly flawed. Given that I concluded that the world of the pioneering ascetic socialist living on the periphery had become a myth, it strikes me now that it may very well have been a myth long before that if, indeed, it had ever really existed.

First, there are differences to the self. Though I am the same person, with the same name and the identity number I had in 1975, I am different. In 1975, when I completed the paper, I had been in Israel for less than three years and was not yet an Israeli citizen. In 2015 I have lived in Israel for over four decades; I had an active academic career, raised a family, served in the army, and paid a lot of taxes. There was then, as there is now, the vexed question asked by myself and by others about myself as to whether I am an 'Insider' or an 'Outsider'. I think that in 1975 there is little doubt: I was looking at Israel from the perspective of an outsider even though formally I was on the inside. By 2015, this as somewhat of a moot point; I think my insideness is, to use Ted Relph's terminology, empathetic. Yet observing events from a vantage point 40 years on and with the value of retrospection, to think that I might have been able to finger iconic landscapes and try to explain why the imagined landscape reflected something wrong with Israeli society required more than a little *chutzpah*.

Second, since 1975, human geography has gone through several paradigmatic shifts. The romance with logical positivism and the accompanying quantitative methodologies was already beginning to wane by the mid-1970s. A new concern with the subjective was beginning to emerge, expressed in such topics as mental maps and environmental perception. Then, towards the end of the 1980s, heavily influenced by several [then] young British geographers, the so-called cultural shift in geography began to have an impact on the way we looked at things. This occurred at about the same time as other geographers had joined in the love-fest of postmodernism, rejecting rigid genre distinctions, favouring reflexivity and ambiguity, and celebrating the idea of fragmentation and incoherence. And, as a consequence of the universal changes in human geography, Israeli geography was towed along in their wake, allowing new issues to be addressed and in ways that differed from what had previously passed as acceptable practice.

Third, it is difficult to visualize the landscape as it was four decades ago even though it has been heavily documented. There are of course numerous novels, short stories, songs and poems; there are countless articles in newspapers and magazines; there are radio and TV documentaries; there are as many photographs and films. For a start, the population, then just under 3 millions, was less than half of today's. Even the most cursory observation reveals that the construction of houses, industrial plants, office buildings, and the growth in transportation and ancillary infrastructure has altered the landscape quite radically over four decades.

In essence, the Zionist project was a futuristic scheme with a pair of contradictory messages. On the one hand, the socialists wanted to demonstrate that although they were Jews, they could accomplish things in a way that was different to how Jews were expected to: thus socialism and asceticism in preference to capitalism and hedonism, agriculture and pioneering on the rural periphery rather than trade, commerce and comfort in the urban centre. It was bundled with a clear message to Diaspora Jews that the old ways — the traditional life of Jews in the *shtetls* and ghettos and the new lifestyles of the New World — had corrupted the Jewish people. This was the dominant message until the voters ejected the socialists in 1977, setting the national tone and agenda and controlling the dissemination of much of the information about Zionist activity. The mantra revolved around *difference*. To other Jews, their message was: 'Jews should be different and this is how it is possible.' However, to the gentile world, the message was subtler, the implication being that Jews *could* be different. The transmutation of Jews begged innovation and experiment. It was an example to the rest of the world of what could be

accomplished with effort, an ideal towards which the rest of the world could aspire — in Zionist jargon, Jews could become 'a light unto the Nations'.

However, although the socialist Zionists called the tune for more than half a century, they never went unchallenged. Curiously, the principal socialist institutions—political parties, settlement movements, agricultural cooperatives, and many of their intellectuals—were based in Tel Aviv. The socialists played it down even if they could not ignore it totally. Despite this, Tel Aviv was outside the socialist loop because it embodied almost everything that socialist Zionism wished to change. It was a city; it was the hub of Jewish settlement in Palestine; and politicians and intellectuals who did not buy into the socialist brand of Zionism controlled it.

Tel Aviv was indeed the other focus of the Zionist venture. In retrospect, the city and the metropolis that has mushroomed around it has been more of a long-term success than the socialist institutions. Its allure differed from the appeal of socialist Zionism. The city grew by dint of private initiative and investment; the iconic drawing of lots for plots in *Ahuzat Bayit* had been a private initiative.

In essence, Tel Aviv appealed to Jews by asking them why they needed to make their mark in the gentile cities of North America or Central and Western Europe when they could come to Palestine and make it as Jews in a Jewish environment. They could participate in the rebirth of the Jewish people in a home-made Jewish city; what is more, they did not have to break their backs as socialist pioneers working the land to do this. Tel Aviv stressed a new brand of secular Jewishness. It was, as Maoz Azaryahu (2006) has so colourfully explained, the first *Hebrew* city. Right from the start it had pretensions of playing in major leagues when it was no more than a greenhorn; it aimed to be a Jewish New York, Paris, or London (maybe all three together) on the eastern Mediterranean littoral. Expressed differently, from the 1920s when it was hardly more than a small town, Tel Aviv believed it was a World City — spiritually, if not physically.[xv]

Israel underwent a fundamental shift from the early 1980s as it gradually lost its illusory patina of ascetic socialism born in Europe (perhaps it was a delusional gloss), replacing it with a free market approach to prosperity rooted in North America, a form of capitalist hedonism. In consequence of this and other lifestyle-related factors, the gap between the better off and the less fortunate in Israeli society has widened substantially. The explanations for this are complex and as well as encompassing the usual economic, social and political reasons, they also encompass cultural ones.

Tel Aviv's time came when the efficacy of the socialist model had run its course. By the 1980s, Israel was well on the way to abandoning the European mentality on which it was founded and adopting a variant of the American, which included individualism, free markets, free movement. But the message was substantially different to what had preceded it. Whereas the socialists placed the emphasis on being different from both Diaspora Jews and from gentiles, the message that Tel Aviv transmitted was *similarity*. To the Jews, it was: 'you can to the same thing here, only in a more fulfilling manner' whereas to the gentiles, it was: 'we can be the same as you, in our way, and as good as you, if not better.'

Not that the socialists gave up without a fight. With their penchant for frontier pioneering, they were quick to find the new edge of settlement on the Golan Heights. And when messianic nationalism took off after the Six-Day War, and pressed for Jewish settlement in the West Bank (Judaea and Samaria) and Gaza, Labour-led governments supported them; they were ideologically incapable of refusing. And when right-wing governments, which encouraged such settlement for nationalist motives rather than pioneering ones, followed them, settlements were created throughout the length and breadth of what were to become — to the rest of the world at any rate — the Occupied [Palestinian] Territories, with all the political baggage that this has entailed over the past almost half century.

The Americanization of Israel legitimized the metamorphosis of Tel Aviv[xvi] (and other cities in central Israel that lacked Tel Aviv's iconic cladding) into the Dan Region metropolis. High-rise apartment and office buildings sprang up like mushrooms after the rain; suburbanization flowered with the blossoming of small tract houses in the towns and cities around Tel Aviv; industrial parks based on footloose hi-tech industries heralded the arrival of Israel, but especially the metropolis, as part of the integrated, globalized world that had come to be by the 1990s. The emergence of the service sector is also apparent to even a casual onlooker and economic, social and cultural factors, all of which underlie and impact on the landscape have been transformed, too. Just look at the expansion of the tourism sector and the quantity and quality of restaurants.

Of course, there was infrastructural change to accommodate and integrate the whole. The Ayalon Freeway runs through the metropolis from north to south and does its best to facilitate movement. The ambitious Trans-Israel Highway—also a private initiative—has been partially completed to link the periphery with the centre. An extended and improved railway system puts Haifa under an hour and Beersheva less than 90 minutes from Tel Aviv, respectively—40 times a day in the case of Haifa. The train allows people to live an easy 60 km commute away

from their place of work in the Dan Region, pulling places within this radius ever more into the ambit of Tel Aviv. Some believe that this is to Israel's detriment. Even the iconic kibbutz has adapted to suit the times. Whereas even by the mid-1970s most kibbutzim had some industry, 40 years on, most not only have sophisticated industry but have been privatized, providing their quasi-rural residents—as well as those in many moshav dwellers—with the ultimate in exurban environments.

Conclusion

So, was I both impudent and imprudent 40 years ago? And if I or someone else were to write a paper set in 2015 rather than 1974 and in a similar vein, what might the likely outcome be? What might constitute symbolic or iconic landscapes now? Could three such landscapes be found based on a reading of the literature in geography and adjacent disciplines? And if so, what would they say about Israeli society and culture?

But before attempting to devise an answer, let me say a little more about my choice of symbolic landscapes in 1974. For reasons already noted—self, the state of the discipline and apparent state of both country and inhabitants—the choice of new towns, kibbutz and desert was based as much on ignorance as on knowledge. For instance, when I used the term landscape I was probably thinking of a visual landscape (it's hard to remember exactly). I was aware of landscape from the work of Carl Sauer and the Berkeley School, had been an aficionado of W.G. Hoskins' work on English landscapes and was becoming aware of the work of J.B. Jackson.[xvii] And although I understood that 'landscape' was an important concept for others—architects, painters or photographers, for instance—I was oblivious both to the complexities associated with the term[xviii] and the underlying intricate involvement of society and culture in both the production and interpretation of landscapes. By the end of the lengthy process of writing and re-writing that short paper in 1974/75, I was beginning to appreciate this. It took several years more to become more fully aware.

Because of these intellectual lacunae, I was oblivious to such landscape symbolism in memorials to resistance or to the fallen, or monuments to heroism such as *Yad va-Shem* or *Tel Hai*. For that matter, I also paid no heed to Arab landscapes, or to religious or biblical components. Although they were quite visible, there for all to see and with an unhidden symbolism, I never considered them. I suppose I didn't regard them as *iconic* enough and, in retrospect, without fully appreciating it that was what I was really about at the time.

For the reasons already intimated—changes to self, developments in the discipline and modifications to both the country and its inhabitants—finding iconic landscapes is undeniably more difficult now than then. Human geography is more diffuse with the geographers more individualist, less concerned with singing from the same hymn-sheet. The issues they write about—borders and boundaries, water and the environment, metropolitan growth and transportation, social issues such as segregation, cultural issues such as memorial space—may deal primarily with Israel but are usually placed in a much broader and generalized framework than before. The Israel/Palestine issue, including the relations between Israel and a future Palestinian state are often placed within a comparative framework, too. Even the approach to historical geography, that most Zionist of sub-disciplines, has opened up to critical approaches. The bottom line is that if indeed there are any iconic landscapes, they would illustrate less how Israel *differs* from other places, drawing attention to its shared *similarities* with other countries. But once more, perhaps I might be entirely wrong and we may have returned to an alternative unique view of Israel.

From the literature, it seems as if the only currently discernible iconic landscapes relate to Tel Aviv and 'the Occupation.' The former is related to the fact that Israel is very much a part of the globalized world in which we live and the Tel Aviv metropolis contains the epitome landscapes of that relationship. Moreover, much has been written and published about landscapes of resistance, the settlements and the visible barrier that separates Israeli and Palestinian territories and people. The Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the traffic arrangements facilitating movement between these settlements and impeding passage between Palestinian ones, and the wall and fence that constitute the 'Separation Barrier' are currently attractive topics, especially among so-called 'progressive' and 'liberal' (read: post-Zionist and anti-Zionist) circles. This purportedly illustrates Israel's emergence as a unique state in the negative sense, a worthy successor to *Apartheid* South Africa. Although this attracts much attention from non-Israeli social scientists and polemicists, several Israelis have jumped on this international bandwagon, too. For a small and vocal group of Israeli geographers this is just one of the outward expressions of a highly inequitable, unjust and undemocratic society organized by and for an 'ethnocracy' of mainly secular Ashkenazim, which discriminates relentlessly against all the country's minorities—Arabs, *Mizrahim* and *Haredim*—in housing, education and employment opportunities.[xix]

Like their precursors of four and five decades ago, these socially and politically conscious intellectuals and academics are sure that they have

captured the 'truth' and as they attempt to right the wrongs they perceive by drawing attention to Israel's ills, playing on the sentiments of the world, they draw yet another caricature of Israeli landscapes, society and culture. It appears that in the past 40 years we have come full circle — from those who attempted to portray Israel as different and unique by stressing those elements they regarded as presenting Israel at its most positive to once more illustrating Israel as different and unique, but this time by emphasizing the negative.

Yet, truth is elusive. In the words of William Cronon, the American environmental historian, discussing the ways historians have interpreted the American West:

> Like all historians we configure the events of the past into causal sequences—stories—that order and simplify those events to give them new meanings… When we choose a plot to order our environmental histories, we give them a unity that neither nature nor the past possesses so clearly. In so doing we move well beyond nature into the intensely human realm of value.[xx]

Cronon claimed that whatever the overt purpose of a particular story 'it cannot avoid a covert exercise of power; it inevitably sanctions some stories while silencing others' (1349—50) and that the various stories have hidden agendas that influence what the narrative includes and what it excludes (1352). And to quote Cronon again: 'it remains possible to narrate the same evidence in radically different ways or indeed to selectively seek evidence that will lead to a pre-determined conclusion' (1376).

There is truly nothing new under the sun.

Notes

[i] I acknowledge helpful comments from Maoz Azaryahu, Yoram Bar-Gal, Orna Blumen, Fred Boal, Vivien Waterman and John Western on drafts of this paper. I am particularly grateful to Fred for directing me to the article by Cronon and to Orna for drawing my attention to the book by Wylie. I am grateful to the Editor of *Geography* and The Geographical Association for permitting me to reprint the original article here.

[ii] Donald Meinig, 1979 "Symbolic landscapes — Some idealizations of American Communities". In D.W. Meinig (ed.) The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes. (New York: Oxford University Press),164—92

[iii] Daniel J. Boorstin, 1958 — 1973. The Americans. 3 volumes. (New York: Random House)

[iv] John K. Wright, "*Terrae incognitae* — the place of the imagination in geography", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 37, 1947, pp. 1—15.

[v] David Lowenthal, 1961, "Geography, experience and imagination: towards a geographical epistemology", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 51, 241—60.

[vi] J. Wreford Watson, 1970, "Image geography: the myth of America in the American scene", *Advancement of Science*, 27, 71—79.

[vii] Yi-Fu Tuan, 1974, *Topophilia*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.

[viii] Edward C. Relph, 1976, *Place and Placelessness*. London: Pion.

[ix] David Lowenthal and Martyn J. Bowden (eds.), 1976, *Geographies of the Mind*, Oxford University Press, New York.

[x] Peirce F. Lewis, 1979, Axioms for Reading the Landscape. Some Guides to the American Scene. In D.W. Meinig (ed.) *The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes.* Oxford University Press, New York, 11-32

[xi] Grady Clay, 1973, *Close-Up: How to read the American City*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

[xii] Roland Barthes, 1973, *Mythologies*. Paladin, London.

[xiii] I had a difference of opinion with the then editor of the journal over using the word 'boosterism', which Boorstin had used for the enthusiastic promotion of social artifacts in 19th century American society and landscape. She claimed that it was not an English word but it existed in American English and exactly described the way Israel was selling itself. I lost, the editor using her prerogative and replacing it with the sterile word 'promotion'.

[xiv] Stanley Waterman, 1979, Ideology and events in Israeli human landscapes. *Geography* 64, 171—81

[xv] Maoz Azaryahu , 2006, *Tel Aviv: Mythography of a City*. (Syracuse University Press)

[xvi] Arnon Soffer and Evgenia Bystrov, 2006, *Tel Aviv State: A threat to Israel*. (Haifa: Reuven Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy, University of Haifa).

[xvii] See C. O. Sauer, 1925; 1963, The morphology of landscape. In C.O. Sauer, *Land and Life*. (Berkeley: University of California Press); W.G. Hoskins, 1954, *The Making of the English Landscape* (Harmondsworth: Penguin); J.B. Jackson, 1997, *Landscape in Sight: Looking at America* (New Haven: Yale University Press).

[xviii] John Wylie, 2007, *Landscape.* (Abingdon: Routledge); see also Grady Clay, 1994, *Real Places: An unconventional guide to America's generic landscape.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) and Simon Schama, 1995, *Landscape and Memory* (London: Harper Collins).

[xix] Oren Yiftachel, 2006, *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palesti*ne (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press,)

[xx] William Cronon, 1992, A place for stories: nature, history and narrative. *Journal of American History*, 78 (4), 1347-1376.

Research note

ARE JEWS MORE POLARISED IN THEIR SOCIAL ATTITUDES THAN NON-JEWS? EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE 1995 JPR STUDY

Stephen H Miller

Numerous studies have reported differences between the attitudes of Jews and non-Jews toward a range of social phenomena.[1] This note addresses a more fundamental issue, namely whether Jews - in accordance with Jewish folklore, religious narratives and the tropes of Jewish humour - are more divergent in their attitudes and more likely to hold strong views across a wide variety of issues.

To address this question empirically it is necessary to compare the distributions of opinion of Jewish and non-Jewish groups on attitudes that allow the respondent to choose between moderate or more extreme positions. It is then possible to test the hypothesis that Jews – in this case British Jews - are prone to adopt stronger and/or more divergent positions than non-Jews.

The 1995 Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) study of 2167 British Jews provides a unique opportunity to make such a comparison because the survey incorporated questionnaire items taken from the national British Social Attitudes Study (BSA).[2] Thus it is possible to compare the pattern of responses of a large sample of Jews and non-Jews to exactly the same social attitude items, and to examine the extent to which Jews, in comparison with non-Jews, adopt more extreme positions on those attitudes.

Subsequent JPR surveys have not included questionnaire items matched to those included in the BSA study (and nor has any other British Jewish community survey) so this issue can only be investigated for British Jews using relatively old data. However, unlike mean scores on an attitude scale, which will obviously change through time, a finding that one group shows more diversity in its views than another group is less likely to be time dependent; this is because such comparisons reflect group differences in cognitive style rather than specific views on a

substantive issue. Cognitive style is known to be an enduring and consistent feature of human performance.[3]

Findings

Most of the questionnaire items in the BSA survey invite respondents to express their opinions by selecting a position on a five-point Likert scale. For example, in response to the statement "Many people who get social security don't deserve any help" each respondent may select any one of the following options:-

Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree nor disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Typically, the 'strongly agree' and 'strongly disagree' options attract the smallest numbers of responses. However, a population with strong or highly divergent attitudes would be expected to gravitate towards the extremes of the scale.

Chart 1 shows the distribution of responses of the national BSA sample (1995) and those of the JPR sample to a statement on social welfare payments. Although the median scores on the 5-point attitude scale are almost identical (at 3.46 and 3.45 respectively), there are about 10% fewer Jewish respondents in the central categories, and a corresponding increase in the proportion of Jews in the 'strongly agree' and 'strongly disagree' categories. Indeed Jews are roughly twice as likely as non-Jews to strongly disagree with the statement on social security (15% vs 9%), and to strongly agree with it (7% vs 3%).

CHART 1: Many people who get social security don't deserve any help



This single example is not sufficient to validate the central hypothesis. However, Table 1 below extends the analysis to fourteen relatively controversial items that allow a direct comparison between the BSA and JPR data. In all but one of these cases, the Jewish respondents exhibit a wider spread of attitudes (i.e. a higher variance) than their non-Jewish counterparts.

These distributions are based on large sample sizes (2900+ in the BSA study and 2000+ in the JPR study) and the differences in spread (the F ratio[4]) are statistically significant in 11 of the 14 cases – and in only one case is the expected outcome in the reverse direction from that predicted. The finding of greater variance in the JPR responses over the 14 items taken as a whole is highly significant statistically (Mean F ratio = 1.23, SE of Mean = 0.045, $p < 0.0001$).

Competing explanations

These findings support the hypothesis that Jews are more divergent in their social attitudes than their non-Jewish counterparts. There are, however, at least two alternative classes of explanation for the results that need to be considered:

1) Socio-demographic: The JPR and BSA samples differ significantly with respect to (i) age and (ii) academic achievement. With regard to age, the JPR sample is somewhat more aged than the general population. However, since older respondents are *less* prone to extreme attitudes than younger ones,[5] this confounding factor cannot explain the greater spread of opinions in the JPR sample.

Table 1

Attitude statement	Spread (variance) JPR	Spread (variance) BSA	F ratio (JPR/BSA)	P value
Many people who get social security don't deserve any help	1.38	1.06	1.29	0.1%
In this area most people could find a job if they really wanted to	1.26	1.19	1.06	-
Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another	1.28	1.13	1.13	1%
If welfare benefits weren't so generous people would learn to stand on their own two feet	1.58	1.19	1.32	0.1%
Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards	1.47	1.17	1.26	0.1%
Formal exams are the best way of judging the ability of pupils in schools	1.38	1.1	1.24	0.1%
Schools should teach children to obey authority	0.95	0.69	1.37	0.1%
Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values	0.99	0.90	1.10	5%
People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences	1.06	0.69	1.55	0.1%
The law should be obeyed even if a particular law is wrong	1.16	1.05	1.11	5%
For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence	2.38	1.71	1.40	0.1%
A man's job is to earn the money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family	1.33	1.31	1.02	-
A job is all right but what most women really want is a home and children	1.22	1.27	0.96	R
Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nations wealth	1.07	0.80	1.40	0.1%

With regard to academic achievement, in keeping with Census data for the period,[6] the JPR sample contains a much higher proportion of graduates than the BSA sample (32% vs 10%). Since the variance of graduates' attitudes is about 8% higher than that of non-graduates (in the JPR sample), the larger proportion of graduates in the JPR sample could explain the differences in variance between the two samples. However, making the crude, but plausible assumption that the BSA sample has a 'graduate effect' of similar magnitude to that found in the JPR sample, the higher proportion of Jewish graduates could only account for about a 2% difference in the variance of Jewish and non-Jewish attitudes (ie [0.32 – 0.1] x 8%) assuming additivity of variances in the relevant

subpopulations. The data in Table 1 show a mean increase in variance of 23% making it very unlikely that that the differences in exposure to higher education could account for more than a small fraction of the increased divergence of Jewish attitudes.

2) Language norms: A second and more subtle explanation is that the greater use of the extremes of the attitude scale by Jewish respondents may reflect a superficial difference in the way Jews label their opinions; i.e. that they have a greater propensity for using the more extreme labels (e.g. strongly agree/disagree) to describe the same level of conviction as would be represented by the terms agree/disagree by non-Jews. On this model, Jews could be characterised as having a lower threshold for using polarised language, rather than being more diverse in the intensity of their attitudes and beliefs.

This 'language norms' hypothesis was tested empirically by comparing the variance of JPR and BSA attitudes on questionnaire items that were judged by a panel of five observers to involve 'less controversial moral, political or social issues than the items in Table 1' (e.g. judgements of how much more or less government spending should be devoted to particular areas of the economy). If the more divergent opinions of Jews were due simply to their tendency to use unequivocal language, then they would be expected to show more divergence than non-Jews both on controversial and on neutral items. However, if the increased divergence reflects real differences in conviction, then the greater variability should diminish or disappear when Jews are compared with non-Jews on more neutral items. For the eight items allocated to the 'neutral set', there was in fact no significant difference between the variances of the JPR and BSA responses. (Mean F ratio = 1.02, SE of Mean = 0.055, $p > 0.1$).

This leads to the conclusion, having excluded the most obvious confounding factors, that at least in the JPR and BSA samples Jews are significantly more polarised in their views than non-Jews.

It is not clear why this should be so. Indeed, it has not been the fashion in Jewish social research to examine attitudinal or psychological differences between Jews and non-Jews, still less to consider possible explanations for such differences.[7]

There is a class of explanations that connects Jewish firmness in matters of judgement and opinion to the process of cultural transmission; in essence, Jewish patterns of child rearing, socialisation and education are assumed to encourage the development of analytical thinking and the formation of unequivocal views. This is something that could be usefully examined both in relation to the current issue and as a means of

understanding the processes by which Jewish identity is transmitted across generations.

In addition to environmental explanations, there is a great deal of evidence to show that individual differences in cognition, personality and behaviour can be explained by genetic factors; behavioural geneticists are agreed that variations in characteristics like intelligence and assertiveness reflect the interaction of genetic and environmental causative factors.[8] If genetics is a factor in the higher levels of conviction of Jews than non-Jews then the intriguing question is how the Jewish gene pool came to select for these particular aspects of cognitive style? There are at least two possible classes of explanation (not mutually exclusive): the first is that over successive periods of persecution, pogrom and hostile attack, there was survival value in having the capacity to construe situations in stark terms and to take firm and decisive action. Thus by the normal processes of behavioural evolution, the surviving Jewish population would have the genetic correlates of decisiveness and firmness selectively reinforced.

The second possibility is that in periods of relative peace and harmony, Jews with more compliant and flexible personalities would be able to assimilate more easily into the host society. Given this tendency, the gene pool of the sub-population which remained Jewish would, by default, shift in the direction of firm-mindedness (Hypothesis A). However, it is possible to argue precisely the opposite case: Formidable social and emotional pressures may be brought to bear on those choosing non-Jewish partners or disassociating from the Jewish community in other ways - so those who cease to identify as Jews may be expected to possess the highest levels of intellectual conviction and determination (Hypothesis B).

Hypotheses A and B have interesting and contradictory implications. They lead respectively to the prediction that the divergence of Jewish opinions will intensify further through time (A) or gradually atrophy (B). Using the JPR data it is possible to test whether Jews who have married out, or whose lifestyle can be characterised as tending towards assimilation, are more (or less) extreme than other Jews in their social attitudes. Using the set of attitude items listed in Table 1 extended with a set of four similar items, outmarried Jews do exhibit more divergent attitudes than those who marry Jews or remain single, in accordance with Hypothesis B. (Mean F ratio = 1.12, SE of Mean = 0.022, $p < 0.01\%$).

If replicated in other studies, the conclusion to be drawn is that, in parallel with the process of assimilation, there is likely to be a net loss of individuals from the organised community who possess relatively diverse social attitudes. Over a number of generations, if these trends are reliable

and continue, the residual Jewish population which is currently characterised as having strong and divergent opinions, may come to lose that feature.

Notes

[1] For example: 'Jews, Non-Jews, And Attitudes Toward Reproductive Technologies', Judith N. Lasker and Dawn Murray, *Contemporary Jewry* Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 80-97; *Social and political attitudes of British Jews: Some Key findings of the JPR Survey* (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 1996). S. H. Miller, M. Schmool and A. Lerman

[2] I am grateful to the late Professor Sir Roger Jowell for permission to use items from the SCPR study of British Social Attitudes (1993 and 1994) in the JPR study.

[3] Ausubel, D.P., Novak, J.D. & Hanesian, H. (Eds.) (1968) *Educational Psychology: A Cognitive View* (New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston).

[4] The F ratio is defined as the variance in one sample (in this case JPR) divided by the variance in another sample (in this case BSA). On average the F ratio will be 1 if the two samples show similar variations in attitude, but it will rise above 1 to the extent that the JPR respondents show a wider spread of opinions.

[5] Older respondents (>60 years) have, on average, about 10% less variance than younger respondents on the 14 items in Table 1.

[6] *Jews in Britain: A snapshot from the 2001 Census*; David Graham, Marlena Schmool, Stanley Waterman, 2007

[7] A notable exception is: *The Chosen People: A Study of Jewish Intelligence and Achievement.* Washington, Richard Lynn, Summit Publishers, 2011.

[8] See, for example, Robert Plomin et al, *Behavioral Genetics in the Postgenomic Era* (Washington, DC: APA Books, 2003).

ON PREJUDICE[1]

Morris Ginsberg

The following essay by the founding editor appeared in the first issue of the Jewish Journal of Sociology. We reprint it here in part as a tribute to Ginsberg's contribution, and in part because it is an essay that deserves revisiting. While it is very much of its time – 1959, less than a decade and a half after the holocaust, before the success of the American civil rights movement and while commonwealth immigration to the UK was still in process – it remains an exemplary piece of clear yet profound thinking. It also demonstrates how 'Jewish' issues can and should be at the heart of an engagement with wider issues in the social sciences.

The word prejudice is derived from the Latin Prae-judicium signifying a legal decision based on previous judgements or precedents. The etymology, however, is not very helpful in defining the present meaning. The term now has a derogatory implication, which obviously the legal term did not have, suggesting that there is something wrong or false about the judgement, and in any case, prejudgement is not sufficient to define prejudice. Many prejudices are not based on previous judgements and not all judgements so based are prejudices.

An examination of the ways in which the term prejudice is now commonly employed suggests that it may be provisionally defined to include (a) prejudgements (Vomrteile) or opinions and beliefs formed without examination or consideration and accepted uncritically when doubt or criticism might reasonably be expected; (b) beliefs or opinions influenced by logically irrelevant impulses, feelings, emotions, sentiments or complexes; (c) attitudes favourable or unfavourable towards persons or things formed prior to or not based on experience or knowledge of their qualities. Generally prejudice has a negative implication, being employed more frequently to describe unfavourable than favourable attitudes. 'Prepossession', on the other hand, which has a somewhat similar meaning, is used more positively to describe a favourable impression. It remains to be added that prejudice covers not only beliefs and attitudes but also the behaviour influenced by beliefs and attitudes.

In order to understand the nature of prejudice it is helpful to consider first the psychology of 'certitude', that is, the state of feeling certain. This is a psychological term indicating a state of mind and is to be distinguished from 'certainty' which is best used as a logical term

indicating that the grounds for a belief or judgement are logically adequate. We may feel certain of something which logically is false or at any rate without sufficient grounds. In current language we use several words to indicate degrees of certitude. We distinguish, for example, between knowledge, belief and opinion. I should not say that I believe, but that I know that I had porridge this morning or that two and two make four. 'Opinion', again, is used in reference to assertions which fall short of the assurance we have in knowledge or belief. 'It is my opinion that so and so is the case' means that I have some but not very full grounds for thinking that so and so is the case. The assent we give to opinions is milder, more open to doubt than that which we give to our beliefs. Opinion thus seems to be intermediate between knowing and doubting.

What then is this state of feeling certain and what are its conditions? The older psychologists, dominated by associationist theories, tended to explain certitude as the result of indissoluble associations. We believe two ideas to be necessarily linked if in the past they have occurred in contiguity or in immediate succession. Modern psychologists, though agreeing that invariable association is one ground of certitude, argue that it will account neither for the certitude of simple perceptions nor for the confidence we feel about axioms.

If dazzled by the sun I say 'It is light' the psychological necessity accompanying this assertion, though it is confined to a single instance is more absolute and immediate than that which is present when I say 'Unsupported bodies fall', a proposition which I and my ancestors before me have verified innumerable times and never known to fail.[2]

Similarly the degree of conviction with which I believe that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other is far greater than that which accompanies my belief that unsupported bodies will fall, despite the fact that the number of times in which I have actually experienced the connexion is far greater in the latter than in the former case. In both simple perception and the apprehension of objects or relations of a higher order, the conviction of certainty is immediate or intuitive and, as it would seem, psychologically irreducible.

Perhaps the most general thing we can say about the state of certitude is that in some sense our mental processes arc constrained or restricted. When we are convinced we are, so to say, overcome, compelled. I am convinced means I am forced to assent. This is most obvious in direct perception. If in broad daylight I open my eyes it is not in my power to decide whether I shall see or not. I am bound to see. Similarly we have only limited command over our organic sensations. I cannot get rid of a toothache by not attending to it. The certitude thus arising is of a primitive kind. We hardly ever think of questioning it.

Apart from direct perception, I may be equally certain about recent memory. I have no doubt at all about what I had for breakfast this morning; though if asked to give proof of the accuracy of my recollection I might be involved in difficulties because memory is notoriously fallible. Nevertheless, psychologically, immediate or recent memory has the directness of perception. In both cases the flow of my activity is restricted, my mental processes are determined for me. Wherever there is a similar restriction there is belief. In imaginative work, in writing a novel for example, you might think that you can shape what happens as you choose. But in so far as you do this you have no belief in the reality of the characters. If you believe in their reality you cannot make them do things which are not in keeping with their nature.

Following this line of thought, we may draw up a scale beginning with free fantasy such as you have in day dreaming, when the flow of your ideas is unrestricted and anything may come into your head, to imaginative construction where you have a good deal of freedom, but are still limited by the nature of your characters as you have conceived them, to the definite constraint which you experience in direct perception, in recent memory, in logical thought or in practical activity when the means chosen must be such as are in fact likely to achieve the ends desired. We can in this way classify mental processes according to the degree or kind of restrictions imposed on the mind. It will be noticed that dreaming differs from free fantasy in this respect. In the latter objects can be moulded by your desires. In dreaming, on the other hand, the objects will resist your efforts and you may even struggle against them. This is why you believe in the reality of the objects while you are dreaming.

We must distinguish between implicit and explicit certitude. Normally when we take the trouble to say 'we are certain' we refer to statements which we might have doubted or which we had previously to ascertain or verify. In such cases the certainty is explicit. A great many of our beliefs are implicitly certain. We had no reason for doubting them. In fact what we call common sense or common knowledge consists of such implicit beliefs and they mostly remain unchallenged. Doubt arises when the conditions leave us freedom of choice, and we make some effort to find something which will help us to decide in favour of one of the alternatives. There is no virtue in doubting for doubting sake. 'The ignorant man', Renouvier tells us, 'doubts little and the fool does not doubt at all.'

The opposite to the tendency to doubt is credulity, that is readiness to believe without sufficient reasons. Of this, as we all know, there is any amount. For suspension of judgement a good deal of self control is needed and active doubt requires sustained effort. It is easier to escape from the

discomfort of uncertainty by stifling doubt and turning attention away from anything that might encourage it. Credulity is obviously an important factor in prejudice, as it is also of superstition. Superstition is a word difficult to define. In common use it means false beliefs concerning supernatural powers. There is often an implication that these beliefs are not only false but socially injurious, encouraging obscurantism and leading to cruelty. But this is disputed and what is injurious in certain circumstances may not be so in others[4].

Another concept which has here to be considered is faith[5]. This is also difficult to define. It is commonly distinguished alike from knowledge and belief. In knowledge and belief we are constrained in varying degree by what is directly before us in perception or memory or the force of logical proof. In faith we venture beyond what is thus known to what is ideally possible. The stimulus to faith is often dissatisfaction with the world as we know it. But it is not mere dissatisfaction. At its best it is an adventure into the unknown and, though not knowledge, it is often a forerunner of knowledge and sometimes of knowledge otherwise unattainable. The relation between reasoned knowledge and faith is a well worn theme and this is not the place for a detailed discussion. The rationalist will not close his mind to the suggestions of faith. He will realize that in the sense of anticipation of and experimentation with what is ideally possible faith is an element not only in religion and morality, but also in theoretical and practical knowledge. But he will be on his guard against giving assent to conclusions to which we are prompted by feeling or desire alone, and against the dogmatic spirit which, not satisfied with believing, cannot rest until others believe as well.

Closely linked with the dogmatic spirit is fanaticism. Considering the havoc worked by fanaticism it is odd that psychologists have paid so little attention to it. It has generally been treated in connexion with the psychology of religion but, of course, fanaticism is by no means confined to religion. From the point of view of our present discussion it may be defined as an intensified form of the feeling of certitude. We can, I think, distinguish various types of fanatics. There is first the assertive or aggressive type. He is the sort of person who, filled with the sense of his mission, broods ascetically over his ideas and so establishes habits which make it impossible for him to consider or tolerate any beliefs that would tend to shake them. Such a person is often paranoid and feeling himself to be persecuted, persecutes others. He is the persecuted persecutor. Obsessed by his ideas normal standards of con- duct fail, and in support of his intense convictions he can indulge in the most terrible cruelties.

There is a second type into which the first passes by gradations. This is the type of person who is at bottom weak and unstable and not at all

really certain. He has doubts which he dare not face. He will not admit that he is doubtful and to see others doubting infuriates him. He thus hunts his own doubts in others. He cannot believe so long as others doubt. Fearful and over-anxious he seeks reassurance in exaggerated self-assertion. His weakness issues in destructive and cruel acts as terrible as those of the first type.

There is a third type which originates in excessive loyalty. Fanatics of this sort are people in whom loyalty is carried to an extreme. They tend to glorify their hero and their cause and to idealize their own devotion. They show their sensitiveness by intense jealousy for the honour of the object of their devotion. They will go to any length to avenge any doubt, slight or affront to their god, hero or cause. 'Crusades have been preached and massacres instigated for no other reason than a fancied slight upon the God.[6]'.

The fanatic generally is jealous of his own importance, the dupe of his excited vanity, though often the intensity of his certitude is an exaggerated defence against his own doubt and anxiety. I have distinguished different types, but they have much in common and in their outward behaviour they may be very similar.

We must now try to define a little more precisely what is to be included under prejudice In so far as the word relates to opinions and beliefs, it will be seen that not all wrong opinions and beliefs are prejudices. Errors arising through ignorance of relevant facts or through fallacious methods of reasoning are not necessarily due to prejudice. In so far as the term is applied to attitudes again, it is easily seen that liking or disliking by itself does not amount to prejudice. If I like sugar and you do not I should not think of describing the fact by saying that I have a prejudice for, and you a prejudice against, sugar.

It would seem that what distinguishes prejudice is either the influence on our thinking of preformed judgements and the readiness to apply them to new cases without examination, when such examination might reasonably be expected; or else the influence on our thinking of logically irrelevant impulses, sentiments and complexes. The two modes of influence are closely connected. For feelings or desires may lead us to accept preformed judgements which in a cool hour we might be ready to doubt or at any rate hesitate to act upon. On the other hand, preformed judgements may induce feelings in us which otherwise we should not have experienced, as for example when we are unfavourably disposed towards individuals in advance of any experience of them merely because we know they are Negroes, Jews, Turks.

In analysing the conditions of certitude, it will be recalled, I have adopted the view that certitude involves the restriction or control of our thinking by conditions *which* are, so to say, forced upon us. This is most easily seen in the case of direct perception or in logical thought when we are carried away by the force of the evidence. Control of this sort may be called objective. But there is also control or restriction by subjective factors, as when our thinking is affected by our desires, passions or complexes. In the theoretical analysis of prejudice, we are concerned mainly with the way in which these subjective factors operate in generating prejudices and in making them readily acceptable once formed.

We may consider first the influence of preformed judgements. It is clear that prejudgement is normal and inevitable. We cannot be expected to start *de novo* every time we form a judgement. Indeed we could not do so, for we cannot proceed at all without the stock of ideas, categories, classifications, which we inherit in the very language we use. In what way then do preformed judgements encourage prejudice? I think the answer is to be found in two directions. In the first place, accepted beliefs and attitudes harden into habits and ingrained predilections and offer strong and often bitter resistance to change or the challenge of new experiences. This resistance is due partly to sheer inertia, partly to fear of the new, partly to vested interests and partly to group loyalty. It is only too easy to give examples. Some of the greatest discoveries, of the utmost importance to mankind, were denounced and opposed by contemporary authorities. Examples from the history of biology and medicine are Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood, the germ theory of disease, and more recently the teaching of psycho-analysis. Theological predilections have often hindered men otherwise open-minded and impartial from appreciating new advances in science. Legal reforms have rarely been initiated by lawyers and generally have had to overcome their apathy or active opposition.

In the second place, accepted beliefs contain not only the truths of experience systematized in common sense and science, but also the errors of misinterpreted experience, untested generalizations, and corrupted testimony and traditions. In so far as these erroneous beliefs were originally due to prejudgements and the influence of emotions they may be considered as causes of present prejudices. A great many prejudices are rooted in past prejudices. This is especially marked in the case of race prejudice, in which traditionally transmitted antipathies often provide the central core round which there gather other supporting antipathies constituting together an emotional system difficult to eradicate.

I come next to the influence of desires, feelings, and the systems formed of them. It is often said that we believe what we want to believe. This is true only in a certain sense. We cannot believe anything just by willing it. What happens is that when we want anything with a certain intensity our attention tends to be concentrated on those things which fit in with our desires and away from anything that does not: In this way every desire gathers around it beliefs favourable to it and diverts attention from conflicting beliefs. The strength of desires may easily blind us to the fact that they cannot all be realized, or that they are incompatible with each other. The range of knowledge at our command is here of great importance. A wide knowledge of the possibilities that are open and of the probable consequences of action may awaken conflicting desires and so make for hesitation or deliberation. In estimating consequences the strength of our regard for others may play a part. The weaker our interest in them the less is desire likely to be inhibited by its consequences to them and the less check on our beliefs tending to strengthen our desire.

Perhaps a more important factor in the formation of prejudices than specific desires are the more general dispositions described as 'interests'. Desires change with changes in the situation, but behind them are larger and more enduring needs seeking satisfaction in comprehensive ends such as health, home, family life, profession, etc., and forming the basis of the temporary purposes in the pursuit of which we are engaged from day to day. These 'interests' gather around them systems of beliefs congruent with them and repel beliefs not favouring them. As a source of prejudice group interests are specially important. For groups have common interests which may be opposed, or appear to be opposed, to the interests of other groups. These interests affect the beliefs and opinions of the members of the group and colour their general outlook. Irrational factors here come into play. When group interests clash there is a strong tendency for beliefs to arise in each group attributing qualities to the other justifying the conflict. This is most obvious in war, but is easily discerned everywhere when groups of any size come into contact. Prejudices thus arising may be slight, fluid and transferable. But if they are sanctioned by social usages they may strike deep roots and issue in discriminatory treatment or even segregation, which then in turn strengthen the prejudices. Racial and ethnic prejudices afford numerous examples.

Passing now from the emotional background of prejudice to the cognitive structure of prejudiced beliefs, we may without any pretence to completeness enumerate the following features. These can be seen most easily perhaps in the case of racial or ethnic prejudice. Firstly, there is uncritical *generalization.* This results in the attribution to all members of a group qualities in fact only observed in a few. Secondly, there is

specification, or selective emphasis, that is the tendency to con- sider certain qualities as specially characteristic of a group which are in fact to be found equally commonly in other groups, e.g. when Jews are said to be ostentatious or pushful. Thirdly, there is *omission* that is the tendency to overlook desirable qualities in the group which is disliked or when they are too obvious to be denied to dismiss them as 'untypical'. Fourthly, there is *discrimination,* that is the tendency to condemn acts of one group which would be condoned or not noticed or even praised when committed by others, for example, when similar acts are considered as sharp practice in one case but regarded as showing business acumen in the other; or when Jews are condemned as 'money-minded' in a country where competition and the striving for money are considered proper and normal for everybody.

Other factors of importance are reliance on hear-say, suggestibility, self-deception, conscious and unconscious, sophistication and rationalization. Once the prejudiced beliefs are built up they tend to arouse emotions or passions similar to those which originally gave rise to them and thus to sustain or intensify them. They then impose themselves on the individual and become coercive and intolerant. The mass of beliefs thus engendered tends to be supported by other beliefs; for people like to think they have reasons for what they believe. In this way systems of belief are built up which are highly resistant and blind to doubt or criticism. The strength of prejudices like that of dogmas lies not in the reasoning on which they are based but in the mass of feelings behind them. Hence they do not yield easily to reasoning or even to persuasion.

To test this general analysis I propose to consider the case of racial or ethnic prejudice. This has been extensively studied by sociologists and psychologists and some general conclusions are beginning to emerge.

Prejudice, as we have seen, is ultimately to be traced to the influence on our beliefs of impulses or feelings. In the case of inter-group prejudices the central element seems to be the very deeply rooted and probably very ancient fear or dislike of the stranger. This fear normally leads to avoidance tempered by curiosity, but when groups of any size are thrown together the dislike does not disappear but tends to generate beliefs in justification and to be embodied in customs or modes of behaviour keeping the groups at a distance. Comparative study shows that the intensity of intergroup prejudice varies with the strength and persistence of this feeling of strangeness. Hence the importance of 'visible' criteria demarcating the groups and making them readily identifiable. The distinguishing marks may be physical, as in the case of the Negro in American society, or mainly cultural, for example, persistent patterns of behaviour or outward appearance, as in the case of the Jews in eastern

Europe. The fundamental problem is to find out under what conditions the feeling of 'strangeness' or 'alienage' persists and under what conditions it yields to the forces making for social assimilation.

Given the element of alienage other sources of rivalry or conflict tend to take a group alignment. Thus, for example, economic rivalry between Jews and non-Jews would cause no more bitterness than normal business competition between individuals, if the Jew were not regarded as a stranger. The study of antisemitism thus centres largely round the problem why the Jew has in the eyes of many remained a stranger even in countries where he has been settled for a thousand years. In the case of the American Negro the question is why it is that despite the adoption of typically American behaviour patterns and the fact that they have been longer resident in America than most white groups the barriers that perpetuate the minority status of Negroes persist. It would seem that the answer to such questions has to be sought in the history of the relations between the groups involved. Closely associated with economic interests is the sense of social status and prestige. In many cases it becomes difficult to distinguish between race prejudice and class prejudice. The distinction between class and caste is of great importance in this connexion. Where caste-like distinctions prevail improvement in social standing or differentiation based on skill or training does not take an individual out of his group. On the other hand, in class societies vertical mobility is possible and individuals can rise in the social scale. This distinction has important consequences. In 'caste' societies group consciousness may be normally passive or quiescent, but in certain circumstances it may be intensified as, for example, when improvement in general standing can only be achieved through raising the status of the group as a whole. In class societies, on the other hand, there may be no need for united group action and consequently no intense group consciousness. This may account to some extent for the difference in the intensity of race consciousness as such in the United States of America, where caste distinctions survive, and, for example, Brazil which has a class society. In Brazil class distinctions are closely associated with colour, but do not completely determine them. Wealth and education count. There is a Brazilian proverb, we are told, which says that a rich Negro is a white man and a poor white a Negro. No one would say this in the United States.' The influence of changing class relations on antisemitism has not, as far as I know, been studied adequately. The rise of Jews in the social scale, especially when they move from country to country, tends to disturb class alignments. Hence the frequent charges of vulgarity, social climbing and the like, and the tendency in some countries to exclude Jews from the social amenities of the 'upper middle class', e.g.

clubs or residential areas, and to set obstacles to the admission of Jews to occupations in which social status is a dominating factor. That there is a connexion between ethnic prejudice and class prejudice is strongly suggested by various studies of antisemitism in America and elsewhere[8].

In an earlier discussion of antisemitism[9] I suggested that it was necessary to distinguish different degrees of intensity in the feeling of antagonism or hostility and that the difference of degree may almost amount to a difference of kind. Studies of other ethnic antagonisms show, I think, that this distinction is of more general applicability. Group prejudices may be relatively mild, not founded in personal experience, but reflecting rather the attitude widely prevalent in a particular circle or group against other groups. The more intense kind of prejudice, on the other hand, depends more on the character structure of the individual. In this connexion psychoanalytic theories have made important contributions to the study of prejudice. They have shown that group prejudice may provide an outlet for inner tensions and anxieties and an object for displaced aggression, and they have accordingly given us various pictures of the types of person likely to be prejudiced. Theories of this sort may help to account for the peculiar intensity of group prejudice in particular individuals, but are of lesser importance in dealing with group prejudice in general or with the various forms in which it occurs among different peoples or at different periods[10].

There can be no doubt that ethnic prejudices differ greatly in range and intensity. The relations between White, Negro and Indian in the United States differ from those prevailing in Brazil. Inside the United States students of race relations distinguish various lines of demarcation. There is, first, the caste line proper which relegates all 'coloured' peoples including Negroes, Chinese, Hindus, Japanese, Koreans, Filipinos, American Indians, Mexicans and some other Latin Americans to a lower caste. There is, next, what is described as a deep fissure line separating the Jews from the rest of the people. There are, thirdly, minor fissure lines detaching various other foreign born, e.g. Poles, Czechs, Greeks, various Slays, Italians and some others. In respect of all these there are variations in the intensity of discrimination and presumably in the underlying attitudes for different parts of the country and no doubt for different periods of time. From the sociological point of view the important problem is to disentangle the conditions with which these variations are associated. A number of factors suggest themselves as *prima fade* likely to play a part. There is, firstly, the size of the groups in contact. 'Lest they multiply' is the cry already raised against the Israelites in ancient Egypt[11]. Where the dominant group is in a minority, as are now the Whites in

South Africa, they are likely to fear submergence. Next, the sex ratio, especially in the early stages of settlement, may seriously affect subsequent attitudes. For example, in Brazil the Portuguese colonists did not at first bring their women with them (unlike the Anglo-Saxon migrants who emigrated with their families), and this favoured miscegenation. Thirdly, differences of attitude are affected by the extent of local concentration. Where migrants are concentrated in particular areas they tend to maintain their traditional patterns of living and thus to keep alive the sense of their difference from others. Where migrants are widely dispersed they are likely to come to terms more easily with the native population. This may act in different ways. When they are a conquering or in other ways a dominant group conscious of their superiority dispersal will incline them to seek for a certain solidarity, even though it may be of the condescending or paternalistic type. On the other hand, if the incoming groups feel weak they will tend, if widely dispersed, to abandon the struggle to survive as a distinct entity and to succumb to the forces of assimilation. Fourthly, occupational differentiation and the skill shown by the incoming groups to adapt themselves to new economic conditions strongly affect the attitude of the population to the minorities in their midst. Group prejudice seems to vary directly with the extent of competition for economic advantage or advance in social status. The operation of all these and other factors depends largely on the initial difference in cultural level, patterns of living and other factors giving rise to a sense of difference or strangeness. Given this strangeness, the forces making for conflict come to be associated with groups as such and to generate group prejudices, needed to rationalize discrimination and perhaps, on the other side, to provide energy in the fight against discrimination.

It remains to be added that the factors making for group prejudice often operate in a circular manner. Thus in the ease of the Jews the inner tendency towards isolation encouraged a policy of discrimination and discrimination in turn made for further isolation. Similarly, as has been argued at length by Myrdal in the U.S.A. White prejudice causes discrimination against Negroes and keeps down their standard of living, and the low standards in turn stimulate antipathy and further discrimination[12]. Professor Maclver has described in more detail how the conditions produced by discrimination tend to sustain it. The group with greater power deprives the other group of the opportunities to social and economic advance. The upper group is thus strengthened in the sense of its own superiority. This in turn is reinforced by the factual evidence of inferiority that accompanies the lack of opportunity and the habits of subservience resulting from a policy of discrimination. In this way self-

perpetuating complexes of conditions making for prejudice are created and sustained[12].

Comparative study strongly confirms the view indicated above that although inter-group prejudice is found in one form or another in all societies of any size it is highly changeable in intensity and direction. This has been brought out very clearly by the highly detailed and elaborate studies that American investigators have devoted to the problem of the status of the Negro in American society. The results are strongly confirmed by studies of race consciousness in areas where it is less intense and where the changes which it has undergone have followed a different course, as, for example, in Brazil. Historians have traced in detail the social and economic conditions which shaped Negro-White relations in the South and in the North after the emancipation from slavery. Equally detailed studies have been made of the impact of the two world wars on the status of the Negro. Urbanization and northward migration have produced profound changes in the occupational structure of the Negroes, have brought into being a differentiated Negro middle class and enormously strengthened the power of Negro organizations to exert legal and political pressure against continuing discrimination. The social and economic changes due to the Second World War and perhaps also, the increasing use made in communist propaganda of the theme of racial tensions, have deepened the awareness of Americans of what has been called the American dilemma—the conflict between the persistent attitude to Negroes and the professed democratic ideals of American society. A new climate of opinion is thus being generated, greatly helped by the scientific work of sociologists and psychologists, more favourable to changes in the status of minorities and to a lessening of the intensity of prejudice against them.

There are differences of opinion about the extent and the depth of the changes that arc occurring. Writing in 1948 Professor Maclver thought it quite possible that discrimination might be decreasing in some directions and growing stronger in others. It is sad to relate that in his opinion what he calls the deep fissure line dividing Jews from others was at that time holding firm, the more so in view of the more encouraging evidence of better relations in other areas[14]. In all cases the problem is to account for the sense of difference, strangeness or distance which is felt in varying degrees towards minorities and which prevents them from participating fully and on equal terms in the life of the communities in which they live. I have dwelt at some length on the problem of ethnic prejudices because of its great importance at the present time and because it throws some light on the relation between psychological and socio- logical modes of explanation. Whilst the analysis of its cognitive and emotional structure

is essential to an understanding of prejudice, such analysis will not of itself account for the collective aspects of prejudiced behaviour or for the changes which it undergoes under different social and economic conditions. The tendencies towards uncritical generalization and the emotional sources of irrationality are always with us. What has to be explained is the form which they take when embodied in particular beliefs and directed to certain objects and not others. We need to discover the conditions which make for the wide prevalence of certain beliefs and give them a coercive character and which, on the other hand, bring about a general change in the climate of opinion in which even long established prejudices tend to wither away. Problems of this sort cannot be fruitfully explored without considering the demographic, economic and cultural conditions. It is thus clear that both the psychological and sociological modes of approach are legitimate and necessary. From the practical or tactical point of view, however, it may well be that the analysis of social conditions may have prior or stronger claims. It is easier to change conditions than to alter feelings and attitudes, especially if these have deep roots in the unconscious mind. This is not to minimize the importance of psychological inquiry or of education. Obviously everything should be done that can be done to reveal the irrationality of prejudices and to dissipate the myths that justify them. But such efforts are more likely to succeed if accompanied by outward changes in the conditions conducive to prejudice. Thus, for example, in the case of group prejudice, it is better tactics to attack discrimination directly, e.g. by efforts to raise the standard of living and to remove inequalities, than to try to change the feelings or attitudes associated with discrimination. No doubt, however, different types of prejudice have to be attacked in different ways. Dr. Edward Glover in a study of War Sadism and Pacifism gave it as his view that the first effective step towards abolishing war must be a complete investigation of the nature of the sadistic impulses and of the defence mechanisms tending to keep us unaware of their strength: It seems that the researches required would have to be very prolonged and be planned on 100 to 1000 years' basis. A psychoanalyst writing in 1100 or 1200 might have been equally pessimistic of the possibility of abolishing private wars and establishing a unified system of public justice in Britain. But arguments of priority in these matters are unreal. Social changes are, as we have seen, frequently circular in their operation. When the circles are vicious it is sensible to try to break them by a simultaneous and concerted attack at different points.

Notes

[1] The third Jacques Cohen Memorial Lecture, delivered under the auspices of the Central Jewish Lecture Committee (Board of Deputies of British Jews) on June 12, 1958, at Friends' House, London.

[2] James Ward, *Psychological Principles,* p. 349.

[3] James Ward, *Psychological Principles,* p.357.

[4] Carveth Read, *Origin of Superstition.*

[5] *cf.* F. R. Tennant, *The Nature of Belief.*

[6] William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience,* p. 342.

[7] cf. 'Race Relations in Brazil', by Roger Bastide, *International Social Science Bulletin,* vol. ix, No. 4, 1957, p. 496.

[8] cf. R. M. Maclver, *The More Perfect Union,* p. 33.

[9] *Reason and Unreason in Society,* chap. X.

[10] For a balanced account see Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice,* chap. 31.

[11] *Exodus* i. 10.

[12] C. Myrdal, *An American Dilemma,* chap. III.

[13] cf. *The More Perfect Union, chap. IV.*

[14] cf. *The More Perfect Union,* p.46

CHRONICLE

BJPA Berman Jewish Policy Archive

In cooperation with the Jewish Journal of Sociology, our good friends in the UK, we are pleased to present this review of the year of Jewish social research in 2014. Included are 49 pieces of empirical research (both quantitative and qualitative) that appeared in the 2014 calendar year and are included in the Berman Jewish Policy Archive @ NYU Wagner.

Of course, your comments and additional contributions are invited. Should we have missed any research published in 2014, please do send it along.

Prof. Steven M. Cohen Director, Berman Jewish Policy Archive @ NYU Wagner Research Professor, Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion

Demography

World Jewish Population, 2014
Sergio DellaPergola | American Jewish Year Book 2014

The world's Jewish population is estimated at 14,212,800 at the beginning of 2014. This is an increase of 93,400 (0.66%) over the revised 2013 estimate. The core Jewish population estimate for the United States is approximately 5,700,000, second to the Israel estimate of 6,013,200.



World total population and Jewish population, core defintion, 1945-2014

Jewish Population in the United States, 2014
Ira Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky | American Jewish Year Book 2014

The authors review (carefully) a number of recent estimates of the United States Jewish population. They estimate that the U.S. population is probably between 6.6 and 6.7 million.

Jews in the United Kingdom in 2013: Preliminary findings from the National Jewish Community Survey
David Graham, L. D. Staetsky, Jonathan Boyd | JPR

The 2013 National Jewish Community Survey is a national survey of the UK Jewish community conducted in June and July 2013. It contains

data on 3,736 Jewish people and their households. It covers several themes, notably Jewish practice, belief and belonging, intermarriage, Jewish education, and charitable giving.

Highlights: Demographic Survey of American Jewish College Students 2014
Ariela Keysar, Barry A. Kosmin | Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut

The national online Demographic Survey of American College Students interviewed 1,157 self-identified Jewish students in March-April, 2014.

Jewish Community Study of New York: 2011--Special Study on Nonwhite, Hispanic, and Multiracial Jewish Households
UJA-Federation of New York

This special study (part of a larger series of reports from the Jewish Community Study of New York: 2011) focuses on households that included one or more members who are Hispanic, black, Asian, Native American, biracial, or of mixed races.

Jewish Community Study of New York: 2011--Special Study on Jewish Households with LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, or Transgender) Individuals
UJA-Federation of New York

This special study (part of a larger series of reports from the Jewish Community Study of New York: 2011) focuses on households that included one or more members who self-identify at LGBT.

The Jewish Population of Australia: Key Findings from the 2011 Census
David Graham | Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation (ACJC) at Monash University, Jewish Communal Appeal (JCA) Australia

The 2011 Census of Australia was conducted in August 2011. This produced a rich dataset on Australia's Jewish population. Australia's total Jewish population in 2011 was estimated to be 112,000 people.

The Jewish Population of New South Wales: Key Findings from the 2011 Census
David Graham | Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation (ACJC) at Monash University, Jewish Communal Appeal (JCA) Australia

There were 45,718 Jewish people in New South Wales (NSW) in 2011, or 6 Jews per 1,000 people. The state has the second largest Jewish population in Australia.

The Jewish Population of Victoria: Key Findings from the 2011 Census
Andrew Markus | Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation (ACJC) at Monash University, Jewish Communal Appeal (JCA) Australia

The Jewish population of Victoria continues to experience strong growth. The core Jewish population of Victoria is an estimated 51,955 persons, an increase of 6.3% since 2006.

2014 Greater Seattle Jewish Community Study
Matthew Boxer, Janet Krasner Aronson, Matthew A. Brown, Leonard Saxe CMJS / SSRI, Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle.

The Greater Seattle Jewish community is composed of 63,400 Jewish individuals who live in 33,700 households. The 2014 Jewish population is 70% larger than the 2000-2001 estimate of 37,180 Jewish individuals. Much of the growth has come from newcomers to the community.

What is to be Done? Policy Responses to the Shrinking Jewish Middle
Steven M. Cohen | BJPA

A shrinkage is on the way of what may be termed the "Jewish Middle," those located in the central region of the Jewish identity spectrum, roughly encompassed by those affirming a Jewish denominational identity other than Orthodoxy. The number of middle-aged non-Orthodox Jews who are engaged in Jewish life is poised to drop sharply in the next 20-40 years.

The Pew Survey Reanalyzed: More Bad News, but a Glimmer of Hope
Jack Wertheimer, Steven M. Cohen | Mosaic

Contrary to claims that the Pew report merely substantiates what we have long known, it actually offers powerful evidence to refute some of the most cherished myths of American Jewish life.

A Portrait of Jewish Columbus
Jewish Federation of Columbus, Wexner Foundation

An estimated 25,500 Jewish persons live in 14,200 Jewish households in the Columbus area. The Jewish community of Columbus is relatively young.

The Sky Is Falling! The Sky Is Falling! A reanalysis of last year's important Pew Study contradicts persistent alarmism about 'vanishing' American Jewry
Leonard Saxe | Tablet

The current state of American Jewry is neither as dire as some suggest, nor is it unequivocally positive. On the one hand, the anticipated demise of non-Orthodox American Judaism has not occurred, and there are many positive developments regarding Jewish attitudes and behaviors among the large majority of Jews who describe themselves as non-Orthodox. On the other hand, as predicted, Jews are a smaller proportion of the American population and there are growing numbers of non-Jewish individuals of Jewish background.

Identity & Continuity

"Once in a while kosher, once in a while Shabbat:" A Study on the Identities, Perceptions, and Practices of Children of Mixed Marriages in Germany
Julia Bernstein | JDC International Centre for Community Development

"My Jewish Part: Being a Part of Judaism of Keeping Judaism Apart?" The transmission of Judaism among children of mixed marriages residing in the Paris metropolitan area
Julia David | JDC International Centre for Community Development

Jewish Feelings, Jewish Practice? Children of Jewish Intermarriage in the Netherlands
Barbara Tanenbaum, Riki Kooyman | JDC International Centre for Community Development

Choosing Each Other: Exogamy in the Jewish Community of Buenos Aires
Ezequiel Erdei | JDC International Centre for Community Development

Strengthening Jewish Identity: What Works? An Analysis of Jewish Students in the UK
David Graham | JPR

A nationwide study of the identities of Jewish students in the UK.

Generations & Re-Generation: Engagement and Fidelity in 21st Century American Jewish Life
David M. Elcott, Stuart Himmelfarb | B3/The Jewish Boomer Platform

In the spring of 2013, B3 surveyed more than 12,500 engaged American Jews, exploring the demographics, beliefs, activities, and behaviors of those who have some degree of affiliation with a Jewish institution (members, donors, and/or email subscribers). They placed special emphasis on generational issues.

Social & Political Studies

ADL Global 100: An Index of Anti-Semitism
Anti-Defamation League (ADL)



The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) Global 100 Index surveyed adults worldwide to assess the level and intensity of anti-Jewish sentiment across the globe.

Jewish and Democratic: Perspectives from World Jewry
Shmuel Rosner, Inbal Hackman | JPPI

This report is based on direct study of the views of Jewish groups with a significant connection to Israel. This was accomplished by initiating some 40 discussion groups and seminars with the participation of engaged Jewish community members around the world, through questionnaire responses, and analysis of research on the full spectrum opinions on the subject.

Annual Assessment--The Jewish People: Situation and Dynamics
JPPI

JPPI's Annual Assessment seeks to create a baseline for establishing the status and well-being of different Jewish communities around the world.

The Exceptional Case? Perceptions and Experiences of Antisemitism Among Jews in the United Kingdom
L. D. Staetsky, Jonathan Boyd | JPR

Based on data commissioned by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and gathered and analysed by JPR's academic team, this is the first in a series of reports looking at the perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in different EU Member States. This report, focusing on Jews in the UK, demonstrates that Jews feel more secure in the UK than elsewhere, but that Orthodox Jews are measurably more anxious about, and susceptible to antisemitic incidents, than non-Orthodox Jews.

U.S. Jewish Young Adults React to the Gaza Conflict: A Survey of Birthright Israel Applicants
Michelle Shain, Shahar Hecht, Leonard Saxe | CMJS

A survey of c. 1,800 American Taglit-Birthright Israel applicants—both participants and nonparticipants—assessing reactions of Jewish young adults to the summer 2014 conflict between Israel and Hamas.

Jewish life in Ukraine
Darina Privalko | JPR

Part of a four-part series funded by the Rothschild Foundation (Hanadiv) Europe that looks at Jewish life in east-central Europe since the collapse of communism.

Organizations & Philanthropy

Leadership Pipelines Initiative: Cultivating the Next Generation of Leaders for Jewish Nonprofits
Libbie Landles-Cobb, Susan Wolf Ditkoff | Bridgespan Group, Leadership Pipelines Initiative

The authors interviewed more than 160 leaders: Jewish and non-Jewish, for-profit and nonprofit, lay and professional, current and emerging, funder and direct service, expert and academic.

Connected to Give: Synagogues and Movements
Steven M. Cohen, J. Shawn Landres Jumpstart

The fourth report in the *Connected to Give* series of publications based on nationally representative surveys, focus groups, and field research involving more than 5,000 Americans, this report explores charitable giving by American Jews who are members of Jewish congregations and/or identify with a religious movement, with a special focus on Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform affiliates.



Connected to Give: Community Circles
Evelyn Dean-Olmsted, Sarah Bunin Benor, Jim Gerstein | Jumpstart

The fifth report in the *Connected to Give* series, this report outlines the demographics of giving circle participation and, through interviews with participants in African American, Asian American/Pacific Islander, Hispanic/Latino, Jewish, LGBT, women's, and Millennial-generation giving circles, examines how people explore and express shared identities through collaborative giving.

Connected to Give: Risk & Relevance
Jim Gerstein, J. Shawn Landres, Joshua Avedon | Jumpstart

The sixth report in the *Connected to Give* series, this report looks towards the future by exploring donors' expectations regarding the organizations they support. The report finds that those most deeply connected to faith traditions are less in-group-focused than donors with

looser ties. Moreover, donors who are the most connected to their faith traditions are not just more likely to give, but do so with a sense of openness, experimentation, and risk tolerance.

Education

Spreading and Sustaining Innovation in Congregational Education: Accomplishments and Lessons Learned
Experiment in Congregational Education, Jewish Education Project

Beginning in 2009, the Jewish Education Project and the Experiment in Congregational Education set out to engage in a five-year strategy to create a positive and measurable difference in the educational experience of children and families in congregational education programs. Findings from the study of these efforts have critical implications for the work of Jewish education in New York and beyond.

Hearts and Minds: Israel in North American Jewish Day Schools
Alex Pomson, Jack Wertheimer, Hagit Hacohen-Wolf AVI CHAI Foundation, Rosov Consulting

Through a survey of 95 North American Jewish day schools, site visits to over a dozen of the schools, and observations of school trips to Israel, the research team gathered qualitative data about how and when material about Israel is taught.

2012-13 Israel Studies Report and Directory
Annette Koren, Eric Fleisch | CMJS

The 2012-13 Directory of Israel Studies builds on the work of previous directories through inclusion of course enrollment data and identification of faculty. A key change is the recognition and addition of upper-level Hebrew language courses as Israel-focused.

A Census of Jewish Day Schools in the United States: 2013-2014
Marvin Schick | AVI CHAI Foundation

There were 861 day schools in 2013-14, significantly above the 802 schools reported in the previous census. In 1998-99, the number was 676. More than half of this increase is in the Yeshiva World sector.

Intergenerational Challenges in Australian Jewish School Education
Zehavit Gross, Suzanne Rutland

This paper investigates the intergenerational changes that have occurred in Australian Jewish day schools and the challenges these pose for religious and Jewish education. Using a grounded theory approach according to the constant comparative method, data from three sources (interviews, observations and documents) were analyzed, thus enabling triangulation. Findings show that there is an incongruity between what the adult community defines as the central components of Jewish and religious identity which are more particularistic, and the perspectives of Jewish youth which are more universalistic.

The Chicken and the Egg: Connections Between Hebrew Language Teaching, Curriculum and Identity in Jewish Day Schools in Australia
Zehavit Gross, Suzanne Rutland

This paper investigates the role and place of Hebrew within the Australian Jewish day schools' curriculum and analyzes the cultural factors, which contribute to the challenges Hebrew teachers face. Its findings show that there is a need to locate Modern Hebrew more centrally within the schools' organizational structure. If the Hebrew language is central to Jewish identity, then it is important to integrate it across the school curriculum, and not treat it as a separate subject area, in addition to upgrading teaching and learning methodologies and professional development. An integrative, interdisciplinary approach would change the power allocation within the school, and thus strengthen Jewish identity through more effective language acquisition.

Combatting Racial Prejudice in the School Playground: An Australian Case Study
Zehavit Gross, Suzanne Rutland

This paper analyzes the problem of racial bullying in contemporary Australian government schools by investigating Jewish children as a case study. The study is interdisciplinary, and employs a qualitative approach through semi-structural interviews conducted in Sydney and Melbourne with all the major stakeholders: students, teachers, principals, parents and Jewish communal leaders. The classical anti-Jewish stereotypes are perpetuated in the school playground, transmitted by children from one generation to the next. This finding provides an additional perspective to

the general literature, which argues that stereotypes are acquired primarily through home, churches, and the media, but neglects the role of the playground.

Program Evaluations

Assessing the Teen Israel Experience: A Focus on In-Marriage, Raising Children Jewish and Jewish Engagement -- Comparing Teen Israel Trip Alumni with Birthright Israel Alumni and Young Adults from the Pew Survey
Steven M. Cohen, Ezra Kopelowitz | Research Success Technologies

A study of alumni, age 18-39, of the Youth to Israel Adventure (Y2I), assessing the the impact of Y2I upon adult Jewish engagement, as compared with similar demographics among Birthright alumni and young Jews in the Pew study.

DeLeT Graduates' Perceptions of the Program and their Preparedness for Teaching: An Evaluation Report
Eran Tamir, Nili Pearlmutter | Brandeis

This report is a part of a longitudinal survey of the DeLeT program, which was established in 2002 in response to three decades of expansion in non-orthodox Jewish day schools. It focuses on how DeLeT graduates from both programs perceive their preparedness for day school teaching, as well as how they perceive the DeLeT faculty and the programs' strengths and weaknesses.

Jewish Futures Project--The Impact of Taglit-Birthright Israel: Marriage and Family
Leonard Saxe, Michelle Shain, Shahar Hecht, Graham Wright, Micha Rieser, Theodore Sasson | CMJS

This report examines Taglit-Birthright Israel's long-term impact on participants with a special focus on their decisions about marriage and children. The findings are derived from data collected in 2013 for the fourth wave of the "Jewish Futures Project" (JFP), a panel study of individuals who applied to Taglit between 2001 and 2006. Interviews, both telephone and web, were conducted with over 2,000 respondents. The analysis compares Taglit participants to those who applied to the program but did not participate.

The Jewish Resource Specialist Program: Year 3 Evaluation Findings
Ellen Irie, Naomi Orensten, Isaac Agree | Informing Change

This report presents the final cumulative evaluation findings for the Jewish Resource Specialist Program (JRS) over the three years of the JRS pilot, including key achievements and challenges.

New Jewish Specialty Camps: From Idea to Reality -- Foundation for Jewish Camp Specialty Camps Incubator Evaluation Report
Foundation for Jewish Camp (FJC), Jim Joseph Foundation

The Foundation for Jewish Camp (FJC) launched the Specialty Camps Incubator (Incubator) to support the creation and development of five new Jewish specialty camps. A key purpose of establishing the new specialty camps was to attract Jewish teens who were not attending other Jewish camps.

Making an Impact: Learning from the Kavana Cooperative's Model
Lori Smith, Rachel Nussbaum, Steven M. Cohen | Kavana Cooperative

The Kavana Cooperative is a pluralistic, non-denominational, cooperative Jewish community influenced by Seattle's start-up culture, specifically designed to meet the needs of 21st century Jews.

Understanding the Israel Fellows Program: Program Theory and Implementation Challenges
Fern Chertok, Annette Koren | CMJS

Concern regarding support for Israel on North American campuses led to the development of the Israel Fellows Program (IFP). The IFP brings Israeli young adults to American college campuses to work on Israel education, advocacy, and engagement.

Seeds of Opportunity: A National Study of Immersive Jewish Outdoor, Food, and Environmental Education (JOFEE)
Hazon, Informing Change

This study examines key components of numerous aspects of Jewish Outdoor, Food, and Environmental Education (JOFEE).

Evaluation of the Jim Joseph Foundation Education Initiative: Year 3 Report
Mark Schneider, Yael Kidron, Jesse Levin, David Blumenthal, Alexandra Brawley American Institutes for Research (AIR)

The Jim Joseph Foundation's Education Initiative funds the development, operational costs, and scholarships for 18 degree, certificate, and leadership programs at HUC-JIR, JTS, and YU. AIR is conducting an ongoing, five-year, independent evaluation of the Jim Joseph Foundation's Education Initiative.

The Summer Institute for Israel Studies: The First Decade and Looking Ahead
Annette Koren, Eric Fleisch | Schusterman Center ,for Israel Studies

Summer 2014 marked the beginning of the second decade of the Summer Institute for Israel Studies (SIIS). This report attempts to capture fellows' experience in 2014 and summarizes the first decade of SIIS influence on the academy. Including summer 2014, the program has prepared 226 fellows from around the world to teach about Israel. Of the 205 fellows in the first decade, 172 have taught a total of more than 600 courses about Israel to at least 18,000 students.

Looking Back, Looking Forward: Year 3 of the Evaluation of the Boston-Haifa Connection Jewish Identity and Education School Pilot
Fern Chertok, David Mittelberg, Dinah Laron, Ellie Aitan | CMJS,Oranim Academic College

The Jewish Identity and Education School Pilot (JIESP) developed by the Boston Haifa Committee is an example of the emerging peoplehood education paradigm which seeks to build reciprocal lines of connection between Israeli and American students, educators, and schools. This report describes the findings of formative and summative research on Year 3 of the project.

Building a Community of Jewish Teens: A Model Documentation of the North Shore Teen Initiative
North Shore Teen Initiative

This report documents the evolution of the North Shore Teen Initiative (NSTI), a pilot project in the North Shore of Boston to increase Jewish teen engagement.

CHRONICLE 1959

P. Glikson

The following is the Chronicle section printed in the first edition of the Jewish Journal of Sociology in 1959. It makes fascinating and often sobering reading. It is a snapshot of a time when the Jewish world was in a state of flux and when social scientists were trying to track a variety of demographic changes: the revival of post-war European Jewish communities, immigration to Israel, the disappearance of some Middle Eastern Jewish communities.

The Annual Report for 1957 published by the Executive of the Dutch Ashkenazi Community states that there are only 18,18 Jews left in Holland who are members of various congregations of the Sephardi community. In Amsterdam the number of those who have joined Ashkenazi congregations totals 10,500, compared with 100,000 prior to the war. At The Hague there are 2,400 Jews, compared with 16,000 before the war; Rotterdam has 700, compared with nearly 12,000 before the war, and Utrecht 430. Holland's Jewish population now totals in all about 23,000.

*

A survey published by the World Jewish Congress shows that 75 per cent, of the world's Jewish population is located in three countries: the United States (5,200,000); Soviet Russia (2,000,000); and Israel (1,760,000). More than half, 5,987,000, live on the American continent, 3,214,000 in Europe, 1,959,000 in Asia, 603,000 in Africa, and 64,000 in Australasia.

Figures for some of the other major centres are:

Algeria 130,000
Argentina 400,000
Brazil 110,000
Canada 241,000
France 250,000
Great Britain 450,000
Morocco 200,000
Rumania 200,000

Union of S. Africa 110,000

*

Only 4-5,000 Jews remain in Iraq, out of a community which numbered, over 120,000 before the outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities. Most of the Iraqi Jews emigrated to Israel between 1950 and 1951. The Jewish community in the Lebanon today numbers 10,000, half of whom are refugees from Syria.

*

The World Congress of Jewish Teachers, sponsored by the Jewish Agency, opened in Jerusalem in July 1958. 3,000 teachers participated, including some 200 from abroad. The Congress decided to establish a World Union of Hebrew Teachers. The low status of Hebrew teachers and the profession's poor attraction for young people had resulted in a serious shortage of Hebrew instructors, stated Dr. Shim Pollack, President of the American Hebrew Teachers' Association.

*

The increasingly sympathetic attitude of Latin-American countries towards Jewish migration is one of the most encouraging developments in the continued search for places of resettlement for Jewish refugees and uprooted persons, stated James P. Rice, Director of the United H.I.A.S., at the Fifth Annual Conference of this organization, held in Paris in October, 1958. It was also stated that Australia is now the leading country for Jewish re-settlement outside Israel. 'Here are at present some 15,000 persons registered with H.I.A.S. The total of new immigrants to Israel for the first six months of 1958 was 8,600. The figures increased towards the end of the year, and in September alone 3,500 people arrived in Israel. It is expected that 15,000 people will arrive from Eastern Europe as compared with 3,400 who arrived in the first half of the year.

*

The Israel Ministry of the Interior has appointed a special committee to study the reasons motivating Jewish emigration from Israel and to suggest a possible way of removing them. In the past ten years about 63,000 emigrated officially, but it is estimated that several thousand more who left as tourists have not returned to Israel but settled abroad. In view

of the fact that almost 1,000,000 immigrants arrived during the same period, this represents about 7-8 per cent. of the immigration, which is much lower than is customary in countries of mass immigration. However, it is felt that in the special circumstances under which the *aliya* is being carried out, this is much too high a percentage.

The Committee will request all applicants for emigration visas to indicate reasons for wanting to leave the country and will undertake to keep the information in the strictest confidence.

*

The pre-war Czech Jewish population was about 360,000. After the war 23,000 of the survivors emigrated to Israel, many thousands to other countries, and about 20,000 remained in Czechoslovakia. 8,000 live in Bohemia, 2,000 in Moravia, and 10,000 in Slovakia. Half of the Jewish population resides in Prague (4,500), Bratislava (3,000), Kosice (1,000), and Brno (700), the remainder being scattered in tiny communities throughout the country. There are two main community organizations, the Prague-centred Community Council of Bohemia and Moravia and the Bratislava- based Organization of the Community Councils of Slovakia. Each small community, however, conducts its own religious and cultural affairs. The overall supervision is carried out by the Ministry of Education and Culture. There is a shortage of religious functionaries and very meagre religious education is given.

*

The official Soviet-Rumanian Year Book for 1957 contains data on the Rumanian Jewish population as at February 21 1956, according to which 144,236 people gave their colloquial tongue as Yiddish.

In fact, reliable estimates give the figure of 240,000 as the Jewish population of Rumania, but since Jews are under no compulsion to declare their religion, many of them, it is believed, prefer to declare themselves to be of Rumanian or Hungarian nationality.

Below are the statistical data of those who declared themselves as Jews and as Yiddish-speaking in the various zones of Rumania, according to the 1956 census:

Place	No. of Jews	Yiddish-speaking
Bucharest (Town)	43,492	4,463
Bucharest (District)	167	16

Bacau	11,892	2,560
Baia Marc	7,469	3,613
Cluj	8,282	2,397
Constanza	978	309
Craiova	565	72
Galatz	7,223	738
Hunedeara	2,223	490
Yassi	16,677	5,624
Oradia	5,144	879
Pitesti	208	43
Ploesti	1,636	195
Brasow (Stalintown)	3,934	624
Suceawa	18,658	10,518
Timisoara	12,784	1,204
Hungarian Autonomous Region	2,904	520
Total	144,236	34,265

In view of the census that is due to be held in the Soviet Union this year, some figures received of the estimated Jewish population should be of interest. According to these, the numbers of Jews in the various Soviet republics are as follows:

Russia — 1,250,000; Ukraine — 1,000,000; Byelorussia — 150,000; Uzbekistan — 100,000; Georgia — 100,000; Moldavia — 100,000; Azerbaijan — 80,000; Kazakhstan — 80,000; Latvia — 50,000; Lithuania — 50,000; Kirghizia — 15,000; Estonia — 10,000; Armenia —5,000; Tadzhikistan — 5,000; Turkmenistan — 5,000. The total, therefore, is 3,000,000.

Population by cities gives Moscow an estimated half-million Jews; Leningrad, between 200,000 and 250,000; Kiev and Odessa, 180,000 to 200,000 each; Tiflis in the Georgian Republic, 50,000; Kharkov and Tashkent, 70,000 each. Eleven cities have Jewish populations between 30,000 and 50,000; eleven between 15,000 and 30,000; thirteen over 10,000; the rest of the Jewish population being distributed widely in small towns throughout the U.S.S.R.

*

Membership of Jewish communities in Switzerland has increased by fourteen per cent., from 3,534 to 4,029, during the ten years between 1946 and 196, and numbered 4,130 at the end of 1957. This transpires from a detailed Annual Report of the Union of Jewish Communities in Switzerland. Jewish Communities now exist in 25 localities, as against 13 when the Union was founded in 1904. Leading Jewish communities now are Zurich (1,749 members), Basle (851), and Geneva (357). Five communities have a membership of over 100; the remaining list communal membership of between 3 and100.

*

According to an inquiry conducted under the direction of S. Zulicki, President of the Union of Jewish Students in Switzerland, 880 among the 16,500 students enrolled in 13 Swiss universities are Jews.

The survey sponsored by the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress, and based on a sample analysis of questionnaires sent in by nearly 200 of the 88o Jewish students, shows that only 23 per cent. of the Jewish students have their pre-university education in Switzerland. 55 per cent. gave their mother tongue as English, 17 per cent, as German, 14 per cent, as Herew, 7 per cent. as French. 18 per cent of the students are Swiss born; 45 per cent, were born in the U.S. and 3 per cent. in Israel.

*

The Hebrew daily *Davar* has published interesting figures on the use of Hebrew and other languages in Israel. According to these figures, in 1948, when the State of Israel was founded, Hebrew was the spoken language of 75 per cent, of the population. The increase in immigration during the years following the establishment of the State reduced the percentage to about 6o. In 1950, when the immigrants were taking root in the country, the percentage rose to about 62, and this upward trend is continuing.

Of the other languages, Arabic rose to second place in 1954, with about 12 per cent., owing to the large number of immigrants from North Africa. Yiddish follows with 10 per cent., Rumanian with 2.8 per cent., German with 2.4 per cent., Ladino with 2.2 per cent., Bulgarian with 1.7 per cent., Persian with 1.5 per cent., Hungarian with 1.2 per cent., and Polish with 1 per cent.

*

A characteristic feature of Jewish education in Great Britain, as in the U.S.A. and other countries, is the increase in the number of Jewish Day Schools, particularly since the end of the Second World War.

Early in 1958 about 4,000 children attended the Day Schools in London, and approximately 2,200 in the provinces. These figures also include the pupils of the kindergartens attached to the Day Schools. Altogether about 12 per cent. of the Jewish children of school age in London attend Jewish Day Schools. The percentage in cities like Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, and Gateshead is considerably higher. In all the schools the percentage of children of former refugees is particularly high.

Following is a breakdown of the number of Day Schools, pupils, and teachers:

London		
Primary Schools	10	Pupils 2,838
Teachers		118 full-time
		30 part-time
Secondary	5	Pupils 1,052
Teachers		51 full-time
		27 part-time
Manchester		
(1 Secondary)	6	Pupils 1,276
Teachers		50 full-time
		17 part-time
Liverpool		
Primary	2	Pupils 461
Teachers		18 full-time
		6 part-time
Leeds		
Primary	1	Pupils 85
Teachers		4 full-time
		3 part-time
Birmingham		
Primary	1	Pupils 240
Teachers		7 full-time
		2 part-time
Gateshead		
Primary	1	Pupils 71
Teachers		2 full-time
		6 part-time

As for Ireland, the figures on the two Day Schools in Dublin have been made public by the Chief Rabbi of Ireland, Dr. Immanuel Jacobovits. These institutions comprise a kindergarten, a primary and a secondary school, with a total enrolment of approximately 230 and a staff of 7 Hebrew teachers. According to Dr. Jacobovits, about 40 per cent. of the Jewish children of school age in Dublin are enrolled in these two Day Schools. The primary school is subsidized, by the State, as are the kindergarten and secondary school, though to a lesser extent.

*

3,000 children receive education in Jewish schools in Mexico. Most of the schools are secular and children study Yiddish as well as Hebrew. In Ashkenazi religious and Sephardi schools only Hebrew is taught. Eight per cent. of Jewish students in Mexico learn Hebrew, a percentage which is the highest outside Israel