EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION TO 2013 VOLUME

It is an honour and a privilege to be the editor of this, the 55th volume of the Jewish Journal of Sociology. Since 1959 the journal has published a wide range of papers and reviews that offer a – broadly conceived - social scientific perspective on contemporary Jewry. This volume is no exception, with six papers that cover a diversity of issues, drawing on a diversity of methodologies and theoretical backgrounds.

Two of the papers deal with what are sometimes seen as 'cutting edge' trends in Jewish life. Michelle Shain and her co-authors investigate the prevalence of American 'Do-It-Yourself' Judaism, defined as 'alternative forms of Jewish engagement that bypass the established infrastructure of American Jewish life.' Based on an analysis of data collected from young adult applicants to Taglit-Birthright Israel trips, the authors show that whilst individualist DIY Judaism may be gaining ground amongst Jewish 'Millenials', those with less of a background or involvement in Jewish community and practice are less likely to be exploring these alternative modes of being Jewish. Shirah Hecht's paper on independent *minyanim* in America also looks at forms of Jewish involvement that are sometimes seen as alternatives to established modes of Jewish community and practice. Hecht defines, explores and differentiates the two 'waves' of minyan formation, the first peaking in the early 1980s and the second building in the 2010s. Drawing on a range of qualitative and quantitative sources and data, the paper identifies the various factors that have contributed to the rise of the independent minyan and analyses their wider relevance as a focus for Jewish practice.

DIY Judaism and independent minyanim have sometimes been seen as powerful ways of 'renewing' Jewish community so as to ensure Jewish continuity amongst new generations of Diaspora Jews. David Mittelberg's paper evaluates related attempts to nurture 'Jewish peoplehood' amongst young Jews in Australia. Drawing on a multivariate secondary analysis of a national survey of Australian Jewry, the paper evaluates the impact of Jewish schooling, informal Jewish education and Israel visits on various dimensions of Jewish peoplehood. Mittelberg finds that while Jewish day schools do enhance some forms of Jewish practice, it is youth movement participation and visits to Israel that do most to enhance Jewish commitment and belonging.

The issue also contains two papers dealing with historical aspects of British Jewry. Benjamin Elton's paper discusses a crucial factor in the distinctive development of British Jewry. Britain's status as an island, close to but not part of the European 'mainland', has had far-reaching consequences on the ways that Jewish life on the island has developed. Elton argues that British Jewry has been 'doubly disadvantaged' through being too close to Europe to be fully independent but too far to play a full part in European Jewish life. Petra Laidlaw's paper builds on an earlier paper published in volume 53 of this journal, exploring the Anglo-Jewish Database of Jews living in Britain in 1851. In the paper for this volume, Laidlaw concentrates on the occupations of the 1851 Jewish population. Just as Elton shows the importance of geography for a full understanding of Jewish history, so Laidlaw shows how statistical analysis can reveal new aspects of Jewish history.

While the other five papers in this volume focus on British, American and Australian Jewry, Liat Kulik's paper looks at how varieties of Jewishness impact on one aspect of life in Israel. Her study examines the impact of secular and ultra-orthodox backgrounds on the experience of stress and distress amongst participants in Israeli gay and lesbian support groups. While it is not entirely surprising that the ultra-orthodox sample suffered more acutely, Kulik's paper offers a valuable psycho-social perspective on one of the far-reaching consequences of this particular form of Jewish life.

This volume also includes book reviews and the 'Chronicle' section. A regular feature of the journal, the Chronicle section has long been a space in which the latest developments in research on Jewish life could be noted and tracked. In this issue, the Chronicle section has been compiled by Professor Steven M Cohen and his team at the Berman Jewish Policy Archive in New York. It offers succinct summaries of the most noteworthy research reports on contemporary Jewry to have been published in 2012. We hope that this collaboration with BJPA will continue in future volumes.

Finally, I would like to draw readers' attention to the call for papers that appears elsewhere in this volume for a special issue for publication in the journal next year on 'The Relevance of the Jewish Question in the 21st Century', to be edited by myself and Ilan Baron of Durham University.

Dr Keith Kahn-Harris

"DIY" JUDAISM: HOW CONTEMPORARY JEWISH YOUNG ADULTS EXPRESS THEIR JEWISH IDENTITY[*]

Michelle Shain, Shira Fishman, Graham Wright, Shahar Hecht, and Leonard Saxe

Abstract

Contemporary American Jewish young adults, like their non-Jewish peers, are believed to eschew traditional religious and communal institutions. The term "Do-It-Yourself" (DIY) Judaism has emerged to characterize alternative forms of Jewish engagement that bypass the established infrastructure of American Jewish life. Little is known about the extent or prevalence of DIY Judaism. The current study uses data collected from a large sample of applicants to Taglit-Birthright Israel (Taglit), which has engaged tens of thousands of young adults from across the spectrum of American Jewish life, to explore both the character of young adults' involvement in Jewish life and the factors associated with involvement. Consistent with the individualistic ethos of the Millennial generation, results indicate that home-based or self-organized ritual practice and small, niche initiatives are popular among Jewish young adults. At the same time, Jewish engagement is strongly predicted by respondents' background and intervening Jewish experiences, such as participation in Taglit. Those with stronger Jewish backgrounds are significantly more likely to celebrate Shabbat and holidays and participate in Jewish-sponsored events. Single young adults with minimal Jewish background remain an especially disconnected segment of the Jewish population, and practices of DIY Judaism have yet to capture this group. It

remains to be seen whether new programs can facilitate their engagement
with Jewish life.

Keywords: Judaism, Identity, Young Adults, Religion, Community,
Individualism

Introduction

The engagement of young adults in Jewish religious and communal life
has become a central concern, and numerous programs have emerged to
bolster Jewish identity and engagement among the next generation of
adults. These initiatives that exist outside the dominant infrastructure of
American Jewish life[1] have been labeled "Do-It-Yourself" (DIY) Judaism.
The common thread linking DIY projects is that they empower
participants, allowing them to define their own Jewish identities and
create their own forms of Jewish expression. Led primarily by young
adults, DIY Judaism is consistent with many of the values espoused by the
Millennial generation—individualism, meaningfulness, authenticity, and
active participation rather than passive consumerism. DIY Judaism exists
on a small scale, often serving niche constituencies and relying on the
expertise of social and cultural entrepreneurs with high levels of Jewish
education and socialization.

Some of the best-known initiatives of DIY Judaism are independent
minyanim and other "emergent" Jewish groups that create prayer
communities outside of conventional synagogue settings.[2] Cohen and
Kelman documented three other initiatives of DIY Judaism: Storahtelling,
a company that promotes Jewish cultural literacy through theatrical
performances, founded in 1998; the now-defunct JDub Records, a Jewish
record label, founded in 2002; and the Salon, a discussion group for
young, culturally savvy Jews in Toronto, Canada, founded in 2003.[3] Other
programs and activities that fall under the umbrella of DIY Judaism
include formal concerts, holiday celebrations, and comic presentations,[4] as
well as informal Jewish book clubs, study groups, and Shabbat meal
programs.[5]

Scholars have described the contours of DIY Judaism. Wertheimer,
for example, distinguishes between the "establishment" sector, which
encompasses longstanding American Jewish institutions such as Jewish
Federations, synagogues, and JCCs, and the "nonestablishment" sector,
which encompasses newer, smaller programs and initiatives, or "start-
ups".[6] This "nonestablishment" sector is analogous to DIY Judaism and
encompasses six categories based on programmatic focus: independent
minyanim, cultural activities, collectives offering Jewish programming,

social action, Israel-oriented programs, and philanthropic efforts.[7] Similarly, Cohen identifies five domains of "'new Jewish organizing'" that exist outside "the 'system'" of American Jewish life: spiritual communities, culture, learning, social justice, and new media.[8] Both Wertheimer and Cohen stress the institutional independence of DIY Judaism and the importance of prayer, culture, and social justice as programmatic foci.

Attempts by Jewish young adults to reinvent and reinvigorate their relationship to Judaism are not new developments; for example, as several have noted, DIY Judaism has features of the havurah movement in the 1970s.[9] Currently, DIY Judaism has captured the attention of the Jewish community, in part because it resonates with other efforts to cultivate the allegiance of Jewish young adults. At the institutional level, Jewish organizations such as Reboot, PresenTense Group, and Slingshot have been founded to support the entry of young innovators into organized Jewish life and the development of new ways for young Jews to relate to the community. DIY Judaism is very much a part of communal discourse, although relatively little is known about the extent to which young adults have embraced it. The current study is designed to advance our understanding of DIY Judaism by providing empirical data about the practices and views of young adults. Survey data from a large sample of Jewish young adults are used to explore the character and prevalence of traditional and DIY forms of Jewish engagement in this population.

Religious Context

DIY Judaism exists within the broader context of declining communal affiliation and social cohesion in the United States. Thus, for example, political scientist Robert Putnam argues that over the last third of the twentieth century, American society experienced a marked decline in political, civic, and religious engagement, as well as workplace connections, informal social connections, altruism, volunteering, and philanthropy.[10] In contrast, sociologist Robert Wuthnow argues that community involvement is not declining but merely adopting a looser and more flexible character in response to changing social realities.[11] Indeed, in a 1991 survey, 40 percent of American adults claimed to be involved in a small group, often religious or spiritual in nature, that provided support and caring for its participants.[12] These groups focused on individual needs, comfort, and success, rather than shared heritage or collective destiny. As such, they attracted people who were disillusioned with large-scale religious institutions and preferred to create their own alternatives.

More recent data indicates that today's young adults eschew formal religious authority and institutions to an even greater degree than their parents. About one quarter of Millenials report having no religious affiliation and consider themselves to be atheists, agnostics, or lacking in a religion. In contrast, only 20 percent of Gen Xers and 13 percent of Baby Boomers were unaffiliated at a comparable point in their lifecycle.[13] Furthermore, across all religious groups, young adults are less likely to attend worship services or join religious organizations than were their parents or grandparents at the same age.[14] Although involvement in religious life increases with age, participation levels among current young adults are not expected to mirror participation levels of previous generations.[15]

Today's young adults are also apt to create a unique set of beliefs rather than accept a top-down religious philosophy.[16] For example, a 2005 survey found that three out of four American Catholics were more likely to "follow my own conscience" on a difficult moral issue than follow the "teachings of Pope Benedict".[17] Typified by Bellah et al.'s anecdote about "Sheilaism," the phenomenon of "make-your-own-religion" still seems an apt descriptor of many young American adults.[18] As captured by Arnett, who refers to the twenty-something developmental stage as emerging adulthood, one of his respondents said, "I don't have any really strong [religious] beliefs because I believe that whatever you feel, it's personal…everybody has their own idea of God".[19] A number of religious innovations have emerged to reach the growing population of religiously unaffiliated individuals in their 20s and 30s. One such innovation is the emerging church movement, which attracts young adults, often in urban areas, through the use of modern technology and a focus on "doing" rather than faith.[20]

These broad trends relating to individualism and declining religious affiliation were mirrored in the American Jewish community in the 1980s and 1990s. Data from the 1970 and 1990 National Jewish Population Surveys (NJPS) show that, although private expressions of Jewish identification remained relatively stable during the last third of the twentieth century, public expressions of Jewish identification—such as synagogue membership, Jewish organizational membership, and attachment to Jewish social networks—declined substantially.[21] Similarly, the 1997 National Survey of American Jews revealed that levels of religiosity were relatively uniform across the age spectrum, but that younger Jews scored lower than older Jews on almost all measures of Jewish ethnicity, including attachment to and affiliation with Jewish institutions.[22] Kosmin, Mayer, and Keysar, using data from NJPS 2000-01

and the American Jewish Identity Survey, found that Jewish "nones" (i.e., participants who have Jewish parents or were brought up in a Jewish home but currently report having "no religion") increased from 15 percent to 21 percent between 1990 and 2001.[23]

Data from the General Social Survey (GSS) support the claim that younger generations are less likely to identify themselves as Jewish[24] and more likely to identify as no religion.[25] Cohen stated that American Judaism has "drawn into the self"[26] and that, on an institutional level, "[b]ars and coffee houses are more inviting to this demographic than synagogues or Jewish community Federation board rooms".[27] Farber and Waxman connected the decline in public expressions of Jewish identification to the adoption of the value structure of postmodern America, which promotes religious individualism and self-autonomy over the interests of the community.[28]

One of the questions driving the present study is whether or not these trends still characterize today's young adults.[29] DIY Judaism seems to run counter to a trend of Jewish disengagement, but some observers have claimed that DIY Judaism is an elite phenomenon, largely attracting Jewish young adults with high levels of Jewish education and childhood Jewish socialization.[30] The present study attempts to capture the current state of Jewish engagement among young adults, including the localized, heterogeneous phenomenon of DIY Judaism, in a large-scale survey. It explores the extent to which Jewish young adults are engaging in Jewish life and, more specifically, the extent to which DIY Judaism manifests itself in their Jewish lives.

Methods

The sample for the current study was drawn from the population of North American applicants to Taglit-Birthright Israel, a program that provides free, ten-day educational trips to Israel for Diaspora Jewish young adults, ages 18 to 26.[31] Taglit applicants represent the diversity of American young adults and include those with virtually no Jewish education to those with day school backgrounds. Prior research on Taglit has demonstrated the program's impact on connection to Israel, family formation, and engagement with the Jewish community, both in the short term and years after the trip.[32] The present analysis does not focus directly on the impact of Taglit. Nevertheless, because it is expected that participation in Taglit will be associated with significantly higher levels of engagement in a variety of forms of Jewish life, analyses designed to understand the factors associated with Jewish engagement will include Taglit participation.

A random sample of 2,870 individuals was drawn from the applicant pool of US and Canadian applicants to Taglit, including both those who participated in the program and those who did not. The survey was conducted in 2010 (January to May) and collected data from a sample of applicants from four trip cohorts (the summer 2007, winter 2007-08, summer 2008, and winter 2008-09 trips). Because the goal of the study was to understand post-college Jewish engagement, only applicants who were 22 or older at the time of the survey are included. The sample was stratified by trip cohort, participant status, and geographic location (with an oversample of the New York metro area). Respondents were offered incentives to complete the survey. The overall response rate was 48.3 percent (AAPOR RR2) with response rates of 55.7 percent for Taglit participants and 41.9 percent for nonparticipants. Design weights were applied to correct for differential probability of selection.[33]

Survey instrument. In addition to basic demographic characteristics, respondents were asked about their experience with Taglit; their religious/Jewish life growing up, including their movement affiliation (e.g., Reform, Conservative), whether and for how many years they attended Jewish day or supplementary school, and their home ritual practices during high school; their attitudes toward Judaism and the Jewish people; and Jewish activities/events in which they had participated over the past year.

Cohen has pointed out the necessity of finding empirical measures "attuned to novelty, innovation, and diversity of Jewish expression".[34] Recognizing that many young adults may be connecting to their Jewish communities in ways that might be difficult to capture in a survey, the current study used open-ended questions designed to capture informal and novel forms of Jewish practice. Respondents were asked a number of open-ended questions, including queries about the most recent Jewish-sponsored event attended and who sponsored it, what they did last Friday night, and whether and with whom they celebrated Hanukkah, Passover, or Purim. Questions about a Jewish-sponsored event were designed to elicit a diverse range of activities that were not familiar to researchers *a priori*. Responses to open-ended questions were coded into categories developed based on the participant-generated responses (see Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 4).

Results

Results are presented in two sections. First, the demographic characteristics and Jewish backgrounds of respondents are summarized, and the creation of a single Jewish background index is also described.

The respondent profile is fairly typical of the current generation of Jewish young adults. Second, the current Jewish engagement of respondents is presented: participation in synagogue and religious services, Jewish events and activities, holiday celebrations, and Shabbat observances. Respondents' overall rates of engagement are low, particularly among those who have weaker Jewish backgrounds and those who are unmarried and childless.

Respondents' Demographic and Jewish Characteristics

Demographic characteristics. The vast majority of respondents lived in the United States, just over six percent lived in Canada, and a very small number lived in other countries. There were an approximately equal number of males and females. Respondents ranged in age from 22 to 29 years old, with a mean age of 25 years. Thirty-nine percent were students: 27 percent were graduate students and 12 percent were undergraduates. Eighty percent of the non-students were working full-time, about 10 percent were working part-time, and the rest were not working. Ninety-three percent of respondents were unmarried and childless. Six percent of respondents were married without children; only one percent of respondents were either married with children or were single parents.

Jewish characteristics. The respondents reflected the diversity within the Jewish community. About one-third of respondents were raised secular/culturally Jewish or "just Jewish" (32 percent), and an additional third were raised Reform (37 percent). The rest were raised Conservative (21 percent), with a small minority raised Orthodox (3 percent), Reconstructionist (1 percent), or "other" (6 percent). One-quarter of the respondents came from intermarried households.

In terms of ritual practices in the household during their high school years, some respondents reported celebrating Hanukkah (94 percent), attending a Passover seder (85 percent), lighting Shabbat candles regularly (33 percent), and keeping kosher (17 percent). These measures of ritual observance were ordered according to level of intensity, from least to greatest: (0) no ritual observance, (1) celebrating Hanukkah only, (2) holding or attending a Passover seder, (3) lighting Shabbat candles regularly, and (4) keeping kosher at home. Respondents were then grouped by the most intense ritual observed by their family. Overall, four percent of families observed no rituals; 10 percent celebrated Hanukkah only, 50 percent attended a Passover seder (and celebrated Hannukkah), 19 percent regularly lit Shabbat candles (as well as celebrating Hanukkah and Passover); and 17 percent kept kosher at home (as well as lighting Shabbat candles and celebrating Hanukkah and Passover).

The majority of respondents (55 percent) received between 100 and 1,000 hours of formal Jewish education in grades 1 through 12,[35] which represents attending supplementary school for one to ten years. Twenty-two percent of respondents received no formal Jewish education in grades 1 through 12, and 23 percent received 1,100 hours or more, which represents attending a Jewish day school for multiple years. Just over 40 percent of respondents attended an overnight Jewish camp or a Jewish educational program.

Jewish background index. A Jewish background scale was created to reflect the intensity of a respondent's Jewish upbringing.[36] The scale included four items: hours of formal Jewish education received in grades 1-12, high school ritual practice, being raised by inmarried parents, and being raised Orthodox.[37] Based on their scale score, respondents were divided into three categories of Jewish background: low, medium, and high. Overall, 30 percent of respondents had low levels of Jewish background, 60 percent had medium levels, and 10 percent had high levels.

Taglit participation. Seventy-two percent of respondents had participated in a Taglit trip between summer 2007 and winter 2008-09.

Jewish Engagement

Synagogue and religious services. Respondents were asked (1) whether they were currently members of a synagogue, temple, minyan, havurah, or other Jewish congregation and (2) how frequently they attended religious services in the past month. These questions capture involvement in both DIY Judaism prayer communities and in more traditional synagogue settings. Overall, only 29 percent of respondents said they were members of a Jewish congregation, and 72 percent said they had not attended services in the past month. A large majority of the sample is therefore uninvolved in either conventional or DIY prayer communities.

Binary logistic regressions were run to understand the factors that contributed to synagogue membership and attendance at Jewish religious services (Table 1). The strongest predictor for both was having a higher Jewish background, such that those with the highest levels of Jewish background were the most likely to belong to a Jewish congregation and to attend religious services. Respondents with children were also more likely than other respondents to belong to a Jewish congregation and to attend religious services, and married respondents without children were more likely to attend religious services. Finally, younger respondents were more likely to report belonging to a Jewish congregation. It is possible that younger respondents still considered themselves members of their

parents' congregations, as they were no more likely than older respondents to attend religious services.

Table 1. Binary Logistic Regression (Odds Ratios) of Belonging to a Jewish Congregation and Religious Service Attendance in the Past Month.

	Belonging to a Jewish congregation	Religious service attendance
Age in years	0.84***	0.95
Female	0.9	0.96
Undergraduate[1]	1.24	1.09
Graduate student[1]	1.04	1.15
Medium Jewish background[2]	1.72**	1.25
High Jewish background[2]	6.04***	6.13***
Taglit participant	1.24	1.31
Married, no children[3]	1.1	1.95*
Has children[3]	5.63*	7.33***
n	1,231	1,237
	$F_{(9,1,207)} = 8.53$***	$F_{(9,1213)} = 9.14$***

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
[1] Reference category: Not student
[2] Reference category: Low Jewish background
[3] Reference category: Unmarried, no children

Table 2. Frequency of Attendance at Events Sponsored by a Jewish Organization in the Past Year (n=1,328).

Never	58%
Once	14%
More than once	28%

Jewish events and activities. The survey asked how often in the past year respondents had gone to any event(s) sponsored by a Jewish organization (other than religious services)—never, once, or more than once. Respondents who had been to one or more events were then asked two open-ended questions: "What was the most recent Jewish-sponsored event you attended (other than religious services)?" and "Who sponsored that event?" The majority of respondents did not attend any events sponsored by a Jewish organization in the past year. Thirteen percent of respondents attended one event, and 28 percent of respondents attended multiple events (see Table 2).

The types of events that respondents reported attending varied widely (Figure 1). The largest percentage were social gatherings such as dances, mixers, or parties (often at bars or other social settings); but lectures and classes, cultural events, such as concerts or plays, and social justice activities, such as charity events or volunteering, were also popular. A small portion of respondents listed Jewish religious services as the event they most recently attended, even though they were instructed to exclude religious services. A substantial percentage of respondents listed activities that could not be easily categorized, either because they were not specific (e.g., "College event") or because they did not fit into another category (e.g., "Yom Ha'atzmaut BBQ Planning Committee").

Figure 1. Most Recent Jewish-Sponsored Event Attended (n=519).

Logistic regression analyses were used to understand the factors that contributed to participation in at least one Jewish-sponsored event in the past year. Holding other factors constant, higher Jewish background and participation in Taglit were both significant, positive predictors of attending events sponsored by Jewish organizations, as was having children (Table 3). Comparing the model of participation in a Jewish-sponsored event to the model of attending religious services, Jewish background and having a family are important predictors of both types of engagement. Taglit participation, however, is only a significant, positive predictor in the model of participation in a Jewish-sponsored event. This

suggests that young adults who are motivated to find a forum for Jewish engagement seek out non-religious venues.

Table 3. Logistic Regression (Odds Ratios) of Participating in a Jewish Activity in the Past Year.

Age in years	0.96
Female	1.03
Undergraduate[1]	1.21
Graduate student[1]	1.01
Medium Jewish background[2]	1.62**
High Jewish background[2]	2.79***
Taglit participant	1.63***
Married, no children[3]	1.18
Has children[3]	2.98*
n	1,210
	$F_{(9,1,186)} = 4.36$***

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$
[1] Reference category: Not student
[2] Reference category: Low Jewish background
[3] Reference category: Unmarried, no children

The variety of sponsoring organizations was even more diverse than the types of activities mentioned (Figure 2). Respondents mentioned a large number and variety of Jewish organizations, from traditional ones such as synagogues, Hillel, and Jewish federations, to Orthodox outreach organizations such as Chabad and Aish HaTorah. No single organization was mentioned by more than 13 percent of respondents, and a plurality of respondents had attended an event sponsored by a Jewish organization that was mentioned by few or no other respondents. Some examples of the "other" organizations mentioned are *Heeb* magazine, the Jewish Law Students Association, AEPi, (a Jewish fraternity) 3G (grandchildren of holocaust survivors) and Hazon, the Jewish environmental organization.

Figure 2. Sponsor of Most Recent Jewish-Sponsored Event Attended (n=519).

Holidays. Holiday celebrations may be a particularly attractive avenue for DIY Judaism because of the diversity of these traditions and the emphasis placed on home celebrations. Respondents were asked open-ended questions about the ways in which they celebrate various holidays, allowing for the capture of any non-traditional holiday observances.

Respondents were asked whether they had done anything to celebrate Hanukkah or Purim and whether they had hosted or attended a Passover seder during the past year. Eighty percent of respondents reported celebrating Hanukkah and 74 percent reported hosting or attending a Passover seder, while only 21 percent reported celebrating Purim. Those who celebrated Hanukkah and Purim were asked in an open-ended question what they did to celebrate the holiday. The most common ways of celebrating Hanukkah were lighting candles (67 percent of celebrants), attending a party, special meal, or get-together (48 percent), exchanging gifts (20 percent), and eating traditional Hanukkah foods like latkes or jelly donuts (13 percent). The most common ways to celebrate Purim were attending parties, carnivals, or Purim spiels (42 percent of celebrants), attending services or hearing a megillah reading (31 percent), eating hamentashen (16 percent), and having a special meal (12 percent). Of

those who attended a Passover seder, 86 percent said they read from a haggadah.

Logistic regression models help explain which factors were associated with celebrating Hanukkah, Purim, and Passover (Table 4). Those with high Jewish backgrounds had a significantly higher likelihood of celebrating each of the holidays when compared to those with low Jewish backgrounds. Those with medium Jewish backgrounds were not significantly different than those with low Jewish backgrounds in regards to celebrating Purim and Hanukkah, but they were more likely to celebrate Passover. Taglit participants were more likely than nonparticipants to celebrate all three holidays. Women were more likely to attend a Passover seder and celebrate Hanukkah. Graduate students were less likely to attend a Passover seder compared to non-students.

Table 4. Logistic Regressions (Odds Ratios) of Celebrating Holidays.

	Hanukkah	Purim	Passover
Age in years	0.96	0.95	0.94
Female	1.54**	1.04	1.49*
Undergraduate[1]	1.06	1.19	0.64
Graduate student[1]	0.71	1.26	0.61**
Medium Jewish background[2]	1.29	1.16	3.24***
High Jewish background[2]	3.12**	6.31***	9.32***
Taglit participant	1.5**	1.59**	1.67***
Married, no children[3]	1.73	1.28	0.54
Has children[3]	0.77	4.3**	1.34
n	1,234	1,229	1,234
	F(9,1,210) = 3.36***	F(9,1,205) = 8.96***	F(9,1,210) = 10.73***

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
[1] Reference category: Not student
[2] Reference category: Low Jewish background
[3] Reference category: Unmarried, no children

Respondents were also asked with whom they celebrated the holidays: were they alone, with family, with Jewish friends, with non-Jewish friends, or with someone else? Responses to this question varied by holiday (Figure 3). For Hanukkah and Passover, most respondents reported being with family (80 percent of all Hanukkah celebrants and 76 percent of all Passover celebrants). Among young adults—a largely unmarried and childless population—"family" likely means the family of origin, pointing to the continuing influence of parents on Jewish young

adults' ritual observance well into their twenties. For Purim, Jewish
friends were the most common co-celebrants (65 percent of all Purim
celebrants).

Figure 3. Holiday Co-Celebrants

Friday night. Shabbat provides multiple opportunities for the
enactment of DIY Judaism. Understanding how Jewish young adults
choose to spend Shabbat may help paint a picture of their broad social
environment and where Judaism fits into their lives as a whole.
Respondents were asked what sorts of activities they had participated in
the Friday night prior to being interviewed. Respondents were asked if
they had participated in any of a number of Shabbat-oriented activities
(lighting candles, having a special meal, or going to services) and then
simply asked if they did anything else. Twenty percent of respondents
reported participating in at least one Shabbat-oriented activity; overall,
Shabbat meals were one of the most popular activities (Figure 4). Other
activities were going out to a bar or club (20 percent) and dinner (17
percent). Some respondents (11 percent) were occupied with their jobs,
classes, or schoolwork.

Figure 4. Last Friday Night's Activities (n=1,387).

Note: Categories are not mutually exclusive.

Table 5. Logistic Regression (Odds Ratios) of Participating in a Shabbat Activity Last Friday Night.

Age in years	0.93
Female	1.12
Undergraduate[1]	1.19
Graduate student[1]	1.32
Medium Jewish background[2]	2.04**
High Jewish background[2]	14.84***
Taglit participant	1.25
Married, no children[3]	1.18
Has children[3]	15.9***
n	1,244
	$F_{(9,1,220)} = 12.53$***

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$
[1] Reference category: Not student
[2] Reference category: Low Jewish background
[3] Reference category: Unmarried, no children

Respondents were also asked who they were with last Friday night: were they alone, with family, with Jewish friends, with non-Jewish friends, or with someone else? Multiple responses were accepted. Most of the respondents (65 percent) reported spending Friday night with friends. Of respondents who reported being with friends, 28 percent reported being with only Jewish friends, 41 percent reported being with non-Jewish friends and 31 percent reported being with both Jewish and non-Jewish friends (Table 6).

Table 6. Religion of Friends with Whom Spent Last Friday Night (n=885).

Jewish	28%
Non-Jewish	41%
Both Jewish and non-Jewish	31%

Note: Includes only those respondents (65 percent) who spent last Friday night with friends.

There was a strong correlation between the type of activity in which a respondent participated and the religion of the friends with whom the respondent spent the evening. Not surpisingly, Shabbat-oriented activities drew a more exclusively Jewish group of friends. Sixty-six percent of those who had a Shabbat meal, lit candles, went to services, or did another Shabbat activity with friends were with Jewish friends only. In contrast, only 15 percent of those who went to a bar or club with friends were with Jewish friends only. Interestingly, 12 percent of those who did a Shabbat activity did so with non-Jewish friends only (Figure 5). Not surprisingly, there is a high correlation between participants' overall proportion of Jewish friends and the religion of the friends with whom they spent last Friday night.[38]

Figure 5. Religion of Friends with Whom Spent Last Friday Night: Selected Activities

Note: Includes only those respondents (65 percent) who spent last Friday night with friends.

Discussion

The present study describes how Jewish young adults engage with Jewish life. The results document the practices of Jewish engagement, and both their frequency and variety, among a large sample of American Jewish young adults. Consistent with trends in the Jewish community and in American society at large, the results of the present study demonstrate the lack of engagement of Jewish young adults in traditional religious institutions, with only a small number belonging to religious congregations or attending religious services. At the same time, despite disengagement with traditional religious institutions, some young adults may be engaging in Jewish life in alternative ways.

Some indicators point to the presence of DIY Judaism, or at least the pervasiveness of the individualist ethos of DIY Judaism, among Jewish young adults. Our respondents reported attending a wide variety of Jewish events, including events with social, educational, and cultural content. Furthermore, they reported attending events sponsored by a wide variety of organizations, including many small, niche organizations. The fact that most young adults participated in self-organized observances of Hanukkah

and Passover—attending a seder, lighting Hanukkah candles, going to a Hannukah party—also points to how self-organized and home-based Jewish activities appeal to this generation. The ability to disentangle what is DIY Judaism done at home and what is merely a home-based ritual is beyond the scope of the current paper, but is an important question for future research on DIY Judaism.

Other indicators, however, suggest that DIY Judaism is not very prevalent. Overall rates of engagement for the current sample were low. For example, fewer than half of the Jewish young adults surveyed attended even one event sponsored by a Jewish organization in the past year, and only 28 percent attended more than one event. Only 20 percent did anything to observe Shabbat on the previous Friday night. In addition, many of the holiday celebrations occurred in the company of family members, which may reflect a mere continuation of parental engagement rather than new engagement of young adults. In addition, the open-ended coding used in the analysis was an attempt to document activities not previously known to the researchers. However, there is little data to support the idea that young adults are engaging in innovative or unique opportunities. Rather, many of the activities of Jewish engagement appeared rather standard, a party or social gathering or a Shabbat dinner.

As expected, current levels of engagement in Jewish life are strongly linked to respondents' childhood Jewish backgrounds and intervening positive Jewish experience (in this case, Taglit). Those with stronger Jewish backgrounds were significantly more likely to celebrate Shabbat and holidays and participate in Jewish-sponsored events. Similarly, a positive experience with Judaism as an adult, such as participation in Taglit, can have a large impact on Jewish engagement. The influence of Jewish background on current Jewish engagement was, however, far stronger than the influence of an adult Jewish experience. At the same time, being a parent rivaled Jewish background as a strong predictor of Jewish engagement.

Disengagement is also prevalent, particularly among single, childless young adults with weak Jewish backgrounds. The current trend of delayed marriage and child-rearing highlights the importance of efforts to engage this sub-population. However, disengagement by young adults is not only a problem for the Jewish community. For example, Wuthnow attributes the current decline in church attendance in the United States almost entirely to the increase in median age at first marriage and at the birth of a first child.[39] Married individuals and those with children attend church at higher rates than unmarried people and people without children; therefore, church attendance among young people has dropped as increasing numbers remain unmarried and childless. Similarly, Jewish organizations

are often geared toward individuals who are married with children,[40] leading single Jewish adults to feel "demographically disenfranchised".[41]

Young adults with limited Jewish knowledge and small numbers of Jewish friends are particularly unengaged and, perhaps, underserved by the organized Jewish community.[42] In the present study, those with weaker Jewish backgrounds and without spouses and children were relatively unlikely to engage in Jewish life. This finding indicates that DIY Judaism has not substantially altered the lives of the majority of Jewish young adults.

It is clear, nevertheless, that intensive Jewish educational experiences, such as Taglit – targeted at those with weaker Jewish backgrounds – have the potential for broad impact on this generation of Jewish young adults. A host of new programs are being developed and funders are increasingly interested in helping young adults cultivate and sustain their engagement in Jewish life. As these programs continue to grow and develop they have the potential to shape the way young adults engage with their Judaism. Research has only begun to understand the extent and impact of such programs for Jewish young adults.

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THE DANCE WITH TRADITION: TWO GENERATIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT MINYAN IN AMERICA

Shirah Weinberg Hecht

Abstract

The paper examines two waves of independent, non-denominational minyan-development activity in the Jewish community in the United States, separated by 30 years (1980's and 2010's). In contrast to common understandings, the current argument identifies the difference between havurah and minyan in the earlier era, and validates the continuity of the independent minyan as a single congregational model between the two eras. With that clarity, the analysis will then trace patterns common to both waves of minyan-founding, related to their founding and the source of their stability and longevity when it is attained. Three frames explain these patterns: the demographic frame which relies on notable internal homogeneity; the revitalization frame, which refers to ongoing tensions and patterns of change in religious organizations in general; and the skills/quality frame, which describes a dynamic specific to the minyanim. This last frame connects to the difference between ascribed and achieved status/identity in Jewish life as a dynamic in Jewish continuity and change, and as the "engine" of Jewish congregationalism. Based on these patterns, the analysis suggests how "the minyan" as an ideal type operates in any given generation and over time. In addition, differentiating the havurah and the minyan suggests how we may understand the role each plays in Jewish belonging, continuity and change. The conclusions refer not only to the founding of independent minyanim in this model, but also suggest dynamics in Jewish congregational and community life in general.

THE DANCE WITH TRADITION: TWO GENERATIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT MINYAN IN AMERICA

If he had smiled why would he have smiled?
To reflect that each one who enters imagines himself to be the first to enter whereas he is always the last term of a preceding series even if the first term of a succeeding one, each imagining himself to be first, last, only and alone, whereas he is neither first nor last nor only nor alone in a series originating and repeated to infinity. (James Joyce, Ulysses)

Introduction

Separated by 30 years, two waves of Jewish religious activity have defined a contemporary American religious congregational form, called the "egalitarian minyan" or "independent minyan." This paper examines these two movements as a single congregational form, the first wave peaking in the 1980's and the second wave commonly identified around the 2010's. The first movement's size and development is interwoven with the larger havurah movement, represented organizationally by the National Havurah Committee. In 2007, the more recent movement, closely connected organizationally with Mechon Hadar, was estimated to include "more than 80 functioning communities" founded in the previous 10 years in the United States and Canada (Cohen *et al.*, 2007, pp. 1-2). As observers and participants note, the minyanim are simultaneously traditional and innovative, vis-à-vis Jewish ritual practice. This analysis shows how tradition combined with innovation describes this religious-organizational form at a communal-structural level also, as the minyanim become a vehicle for participants to continue and to transform Jewish life in each generation.

The independent minyan was perceived as a "new" phenomenon in both eras. However, observers 30 years ago and today have often confused the independent egalitarian minyan of the earlier era with the havurah. In addition, commentators emphasize the innovation of the later minyan movement without connecting it to any prior organizational form, whether havurah or minyan.

In contrast to these understandings, the current argument identifies the difference between havurah and minyan in the earlier era, and validates the continuity of the minyan form between the two eras. With that clarity, the analysis will then trace patterns common to both waves of minyan-founding. Based on this parallel, the analysis suggests how "the minyan" as an ideal type operates in any given generation and over time. In addition, differentiating the havurah and the minyan suggests how we may understand the role each plays in Jewish belonging, continuity and change.

For definitional purposes, havurah and minyan provide different venues for Jewish participation and belonging. The havurah is a flexible participatory structure that brings people together under a Jewish umbrella; diverse activities and open sharing define the form. Liebman succinctly summarizes the havurah's history and sources on its development:

> Havurah is the Hebrew word for "friends." While the idea of a minyan – the group of ten men required for prayer – is as old as Judaism itself, the word havurah came into usage to describe the small groups that some rabbis created within large synagogues (Reisman 1977). In the sixties, havurah was the term chosen by small Jewish countercultural groups committed to participation, creative worship, and the study of Judaism (Neusner 1972). The first, Havurat Shalom, began in Somerville, Massachusetts, in 1968 (Press 1989). (Liebman in Wuthnow, 1994a, p. 305)

In contrast, the independent minyan is defined by a focus on Jewish ritual as the central group activity. A conceptual definition includes: independence from conventional congregations (although the relationships vary), active member participation with rotating lay leadership, women's full participation, and, significantly for the distinction from a havurah, regular Shabbat morning prayer as a primary group activity (Hecht, 1993, p. 110). The earlier overlap between minyan and havurah also helps define the minyan form. With a similar demographic and shared sense of being alternative to conventional synagogues, it is as if someone took the havurah model as a charcoal portrait of group life and darkened the lines of the drawing, to show and play out the traditional structure of Jewish ritual life.

As the distinction is conceptually important, this analysis begins by distinguishing between havurah and minyan. The analysis then describes three notable patterns at the level of group structure and process as frames for understanding the minyan. These patterns, common across the two eras, concern key aspects of minyan development:

- Membership patterns, which describe who joins together to form a minyan
- Religion and change, which addresses the alternative nature of minyanim
- Ritual and group process, which speaks to the traditional nature of minyanim

These three aspects will be described below as the demographic frame, the revitalization frame, and the skills frame. Together, they outline a complex mechanism of minyan participation and group dynamics.

Methods and Data

The research for this analysis included reviewing others' observations as primary material and collecting new data, at two time periods. Reviewing formal and informal observations in the later era confirmed the earlier conceptual definition and patterns, towards this analysis.

To define the minyan phenomenon, initial research included: systematic observation of diverse prayer groups in the Chicago area (1984-1985); review of the 1986 edition of *Genesis 2: Guide to Jewish Boston and New England*; systematic observation of eight groups in the Boston area (1986-1988). This research initially identified four conceptually relevant Boston area minyanim, reduced to three when one dissolved (Hecht, 1993, p. 110). Others' descriptions of congregational groups that might variously be called minyanim or havurot in the earlier period were reviewed as primary materials and included several unpublished academic theses as well as any available published research studies of minyanim as they emerged from the havurah movement (Feinberg, 1978; Foust, 1973; Tickten, 1971; Weissler, 1982; Prell, 1989).[1] Additionally, two unpublished documents which refer back to this period of minyan-founding were also reviewed as primary source material. Written by minyan participants, they include an informal history of the Newton Center Minyan drafted by Richard Israel (Israel, 1989)[2] and a collection of essays in the Library Minyan's unpublished 36th anniversary collection (Berenbaum and Malkus, 2008). For the more recent period of minyan-founding, public observations which are similarly non-academic for the most part were reviewed as primary source material to a great extent (Dreyfus, 2011; Lindsay, 2010; Lurie, 2011; Nathan-Kazis, 2011; Wertheimer, 2010). These materials also include documentation of the more recent wave of minyanim by Kaunfer in his text that both forwards the movement and describes it (Kaunfer, 2010) as well as some social scientific observations of these developments (Belzer, 2009; Cohen *et al.*, 2007; Prell, 2008.)

The analysis is also based on original quantitative and qualitative data collection in both time periods. In the earlier period, I conducted qualitative research on the Boston area groups over a three year period which included interviews with individuals, formal observation of services, and examining the groups' historical and organizational materials. The research also included systematic analysis of six months of

intensive research with one minyan, selected in part for its close connection to the Havurah movement; this data collection included:

- Participant observation at 8 Shabbat services, 5 general meetings, 1 committee meeting, 1 study session, 3 holiday celebrations, including informal conversations with members.
- Formal open-ended interviews of 60-90 minutes with 17 of the 30 to 36 members with a range of backgrounds and participation patterns (6 of 17 men and 11 of 19 women).

Earlier data collection also included an extensive 1989 survey of all members and former members included in lists kept by all the three minyanim. Mailed to 263 individuals, the response rate to the survey was 72 percent.

In the current period, I informally tested a primary argument in this paper by conducting a non-scientific survey, made available to individuals currently associated with minyanim of any founding date. This brief on-line survey was distributed in May 2012 to email distribution lists sponsored by the National Havurah Committee and Mechon Hadar. The contact requested responses from individuals who were founding members of independent or egalitarian minyanim. The on-line survey included questions requesting basic information (optional respondent name; minyan name, founding date and location) and three open-ended questions about motivation, concerns and challenges related to minyan-founding. This reported data includes 23 completed responses received between May 14 and May 23, 2012; the cited data also include Israel's unpublished history shared in response to the survey (Israel, 1989).

The Havurah and the Minyan: Tracing the Historical and Conceptual Difference

In this analysis, "minyan" and "havurah" are historically based forms and ideal types. Their features and a history of their relationship suggest the significance of differentiating them conceptually. In addition, the transition historically from one to the other provides a critical context for understanding the patterns and conclusions drawn from observing the minyan.

Havurah and Minyan

In an essay in Wuthnow's volume on small groups and religion in
America, Liebman describes a somewhat large prayer group called
"Havurah." Although the group "arose independently of the Havurah
movement" (Liebman, 1994, p. 305), Liebman's description of this group
suggests principles and patterns common to the havurah and the first
minyan wave:

> Havurah began in 1978 when about fifteen families – nearly all
> newcomers to Oregon – met in a living room to find a meaningful
> alternative to services and Sunday School at Portland's large synagogues.
> […] Part of a movement of Jewish renewal with one foot in age-old
> Jewish tradition and the other in the sixties, Havurah is a process of
> rediscovering Judaism through learning, prayer, and community.
> (Liebman, 1994, p. 300-301)

Identifying two key havurah principles as "inclusive and
participatory," Liebman cites a member's description of the approach as
"non-judgmental Judaism" (Liebman, 1994, p. 301). The group's
participants have diverse backgrounds, including those "hoping to find a
place after years of post-Bar or Bat Mitzvah absence" and those who
"joined to enter Judaism for the first time" (Liebman, 1994, p. 301).

The havurah movement's combination of tradition with alternative
critique is also definitive:

> In contrast to the description Herberg offers of 1950's religion as 'a kind
> of protection the self throws up against the radical demand of faith'… the
> havurah movement … renewed participatory, informal models of Jewish
> congregation which has [sic] been relegated to history and the
> contemporary Orthodox religious fringe…. [Hecht, 1993, p. 39 citing
> Herberg, 1960, p. 260]

Two Jewish organizational strands flowed from the havurah
movement. Havurot within larger congregations continued to enrich the
denominational "mainstream." In the other strand, alternative groups
emerged which were havurah-like while also transitioning to a minyan
model.

As noted above, outside observers have not commonly distinguished
minyan from havurah in the earlier era. This is understandable given their
overlap and shared countercultural values at the time, including:

an attitude toward organization which opposed hierarchy, elaborate structure and professionalism; concomitant goals of active and broad participation in community and in religious practice; and gender egalitarianism in prayer. Where the two are more closely related, the minyan also shares the havurah's aesthetic of performance and prayer, which emphasizes what is informal, idiosyncratically textured, and responsive over what is formal, standardized or inflexible. (Hecht, 1993, p. vii)

A variety of evidence, however, supports the distinction and its significance. While certainly including social support and other features of group Jewish life, the defining feature of minyan life was regularly holding the complex and demanding Sabbath morning prayer service, which was and remains the minyan's raison d'etre, in contrast to the havurah. As Israel writes of his minyan: "…the only communal activities to which we are jointly committed are Shabbat and holiday services. Everything else is up for grabs, no pressuring allowed" (Israel, 1989, p. 4). The name of one minyan from the earlier era captures the minyan's focus on lay leadership, learning and prayer: known as Lomdim ("learners" in Hebrew), the acronym LMDM was also defined as the Lean Mean Davening Machine. (Hecht, 1993)

The havurah's flexible approach contrasts to the egalitarian minyan's increased focus on prayer. With "havurah" translated loosely as "friendship group," the term itself retains a useful vagueness as far as what the group would become. In contrast, "minyan," is nearly a technical term in its scope, with little room for interpretation. Israel suggests the contrast, explaining why his own minyan in the earlier era rejected both the conventional congregation and the havurah as models:

> [We chose to] refer to ourselves as a Minyan rather than a shul. Shul implies a full service operation and we do not now offer that. We never called ourselves a Havurah for different reasons. To some that suggested a closed club rather than an open worship community. It also sounded a little too Sixties-ish, implying that we sit on cushions on the floor and hum or recite creative prayers by the ocean at sunrise. In truth, we are really a pretty straight and stuffy bunch. (Israel, 1989, p. 4)[3]

Describing the havurah in relation to the synagogue, Hoffman writes: "[it's] members are relatively unconcerned with product. It doesn't matter much to them whether they are studying, socializing or praying, as long as they are all doing it together" (Hoffman, 1980, p. 38). In Hoffman's terms, the minyan was and is more similar to the synagogue as a community of limited liability: "Focused on product, members join the

institution…for a service which in this case is access to shared public worship" (Hecht, 1993, p. 59 citing Hoffman 1980, p. 38).

As early as the 1980's, close observers and participants spoke to the transition occurring from havurah to minyan (Hecht, 1993, p. 52). Strassfeld, an editor of *The Jewish Catalog*, wrote:

> While on the surface, minyanim seem to be closer to the havurah model, they may in reality have little in common with it… Why has there been a trend of late to form minyanim rather than havurot? (Strassfeld, 1980, p. 26-27)

Strassfeld notes the contrast: the havurah's functions "may be many and varied – study, prayer, social action, building a sense of community, etc." while "the minyan is single-focused; that is, unlike havurot, its function is clear – to have services" (Strassfeld, 1980, p. 81).

The transition was not always smooth. As early as 1973 to 1975, Prell wrote of the conflicting desires for intimacy as against prayer in the minyan-as-havurah she studied: "Though many people expressed a wish for more intimacy or more socializing in the group, those needs were never addressed. Those who complained about prayer…were usually taken seriously" (Prell 1989, p. 191).

Notably, prayer as a goal also powerfully structured the minyan as it emerged from the havurah (Hecht, 1993, p. vii) and participants struggled to maintain the values of the open and flexible havurah through the transition (Prell 1989, p. 195). Regarding the resulting predictability of minyan prayer, Green wrote in 1972, "[we] deplore our own lack of such creativity thus far" (Green, 1972a, p. 152). Strassfeld similarly noted, "The pull of tradition has been very powerful" (Strassfeld, 1980, p. 22).

Strassfeld ultimately concludes about the transition:

> Minyanim, then, may have more sociological parallels with havurot than ideological ones; that is, their membership is drawn from a similar type of Jew. With minyanim having given up on the havurot's sense of community and size, and being ambivalent about the latter's principle of self-direction, it could be argued that the two phenomenon [sic] have little in common. Yet, the members of the minyanim see themselves as part of the havurah enterprise. (Strassfeld, 1980, p. 27)

It is out of this mix, that the following describes the members of the Library Minyan:

> Upstairs at Beth Am, amid the leather volumes of Talmud, gathered a Jewish elite. Its members had learned Hebrew and religious Zionism in

the Camp Ramah system, earned ordination as rabbis at the Jewish Theological Seminary, and taught [in the Conservative and Reform seminaries]. They were also, many of them, products of the Jewish counterculture, committed to applying the New Left's ideal of participatory democracy to religious practice. Their models were not the institutional synagogues afflicted, as they saw it, with the edifice complex, but religious communities like the Boston area's Havurat Shalom; their "sacred text," as one historian put it, was the do-it-yourself compendium The Jewish Catalog. They aspired to paradox: being an alternative that was more traditional than the mainstream it was providing an alternative to. By personal choice as much as halakhic command, the minyan's founders conducted 90 percent of their service in Hebrew, and most kept their households shomer Shabbat.[4] (Freedman in Berenbaum and Malkus, 2008, p. 51).

Minyan Redux

With a great number of parallels, the more recent minyan movement nonetheless emerged as an alternative, non-denominational form in a very different Jewish and larger American context. In the intervening period, these communities saw the impact of fundamentalism in all religions (Marty and Appleby, 1994) and extensive Jewish assimilation not yet fully seen 30 years before (Fishman, 2004). As a result, when young Jews who might otherwise attend modern Orthodox congregations instead created minyanim, the movement was hailed as unexpected and innovative within the U.S. Jewish community. Young participant-leaders and established scholars, the latter often of the havurah generation, noted the emerging small, localized independent minyanim in the "post-denominational" era, describing the second movement as a distinct, unexpected positive development in the Jewish community making little reference to the egalitarian minyanim of the 1980's (Cohen, 2010; Lindsay, 2010; Prell, 2008; Wertheimer, 2010; Dreyfus, 2011; Cohen *et al.*, 2007; Belzer, 2009; Nathan-Kazis, 2011; Lurie, 2011). Kaunfer, the new movement's spokesperson, specifically distinguishes this later movement from the earlier wave, in part by conflating the havurah with the earlier minyanim (and also thereby implicitly making the distinction between havurah and minyan)[5] (Kaunfer, 2010, p. 71ff, p. 75-77).

Contrary to this reception, however, the minyanim share key features across the eras, suggesting a single congregational model, even if sensibilities and aesthetics differ. Minyanim observed in the 1980's were described as holding regularly scheduled traditional-egalitarian Saturday morning services without any larger organizational affiliation and without

professional religious leadership. (Hecht, 1993, p. 110) Defining features included:

> (1) womens' full and equal participation in religious ritual, contrary to long-standing Jewish practice; (2) traditional religious observance and public practice; (3) minimum organizational hierarchy and bureaucratization (4) broad religious participation, most notably by replacing religious leadership with participatory practice where members rotate through all functional religious roles. (Hecht, 1993, p. 6)

Kaunfer defines the new wave of minyanim in parallel terms. He specifies that "the majority of minyanim hold Shabbat morning services…" (Kaunfer, 2010, p. 63) and defines the groups as:

> organized and led by volunteers, with no paid clergy; no denomination/movement affiliation; founded in the last ten years [ed. note: to distinguish from the havurah movement]; meet at least once a month. (Kaunfer, 2010 p. 61]

Significantly, some features of the havurah also describe the minyan in both eras. Observers in both eras often highlight internal religious diversity, with the minyan as a meeting ground for those who are on the way up, on the way back, and on the way down, regarding religious practice. Observers also present both waves of minyanim as alternatives to the "mainstream" synagogue and the passive, uninvolved Jew. As alternative movements, if we accept the one-time connection between havurah and minyan, each minyan wave also offered a defining publication, which was then critically reviewed in the "mainstream" Jewish press: *The New Jewish Catalog*, harshly reviewed by Marshall Sklare in *Commentary Magazine* in 1974 and *Empowered Judaism*, harshly reviewed by Lurie in *The Jewish Review of Books* in 2011[6] (Sklare, 1974; Lurie, 2011).

The parallels suggest that, despite some aesthetic and cultural-demographic differences,[7] the two movements belong in one congregational type. In addition, identifying this single conceptual category provides analytic leverage for understanding how minyanim emerge and the role "the minyan" plays in ongoing Jewish continuity and change.

The Minyan and American Congregationalism

The minyan and havurah closely parallel general congregational developments in America in the 1980's, fitting well within the literature emerging then. (Ammerman, 1997; Wuthnow, 1993; Wuthnow, 1994a; Wind and Lewis, 1994; Warner, 1994). In 1994, Warner asserted the increasing significance of congregations, observing "In the United States today, we are seeing convergence across religious traditions toward de facto congregationalism" and indicated congregations had "returned to the spotlight" intellectually (Warner, 1994, p. 54).[8]   Attesting to the significance given to these developments as an American pattern, Warner further cites Silver on small groups in American religion, highlighting the sacred nature of congregational relationships. (Warner, 1994 p. 69, fn. 38, citing 61-63 in Silver, 1990, p. 61-63)

What we might consider the conventional congregation "has a sense of corporate identity that endures over time and is often recognized in law" (Ammerman, 1997, p. 6, fn. 5, citing Robert Wuthnow, 1994b: 43-45). As per the minyan, however, Ammerman also notes "the proliferation of religious gatherings that sometimes approximate the congregational form" as "'organized religion' is much more than simply the list of churches and synagogues in the Yellow Pages" (Ammerman, 1997, pp. 6-7).

According to this literature, congregations address contemporary and felt social needs through ritual and community. Members "venture out of privacy into a zone of interactions," (Marty, 1994, p. 150) and religious ritual carries "emotional significance" (Warner, 1994, p. 63). An example from minyan life demonstrates: when a person visits a house of mourning to take part in the group's shared prayer of kaddish, we cannot fully separate the social from the ritualistic.

In Wuthnow's focus on small groups in American religious life in the 1970's to 1980's, the havurah-minyan movement also parallels the "Bible studies, prayer fellowships, house churches, and covenant groups" he notes (Wuthnow, 1993, p. 1). Wuthnow describes the relevant social context of geographical mobility:

> We no longer live in the same neighborhoods all our lives or retain close ties with our kin. The small-group movement has arisen out of the breakdown of these traditional support structures and from our continuing desire for community. (Wuthnow, 1993, on-line paging)

Precisely paralleling the Jewish community, Warner describes alternative religious models:

> The authority of denominational structures is eroding. … At the same time, enormous resources are still required to run these institutions…Religious leaders struggle to raise the necessary cash.
>
> By comparison, small groups cost virtually nothing. They meet in church rooms that stand empty during the week. Or, if those are unavailable, they meet in private homes. They are run by lay leaders, so clergy need not be involved at all…There is no obligation to serve on a church board, help paint the vestibule, run the youth program, or staff the nursery. (Wuthnow, 1994a, p. 349-350)

This literature well contextualizes the minyan's development in the United States. [9] However, even with strong parallels, this analysis extends this established literature further. Much of the analysis above suggests either an historical-cultural perspective, or considers the individual participant's spiritual or psychological needs given their historical situation. In some contrast, the three perspectives outlined below describe minyan development at the level of group structure and process. The analysis moves from patterns that are nearly secular in nature, to processes characterizing religions in general, to a pattern embedded deeply in Jewish life and practice. Detailing patterns of group development observed in the minyan at two points in time, this analysis thereby describes congregations structurally as mechanisms of religious change.

In addition, with the traditional minyan of 10, the congregational model is native to Judaism, as Warner recognizes (Warner, 1994, p. 73). Long-standing sociological definitions reinforce the essential congregational nature of Judaism in general[10] (see Weber, 1922, p. 65 and Christiano, *et al*., 2008, p. 98 on the term "congregational"). This analysis also then extends the literature by highlighting the specific role of religious ritual in the Jewish congregational context.

Demographic Frame: Diversity and Homogeneity in the Minyan

From the evidence, minyanim maximize internal homogeneity demographically, and downplay or actively ignore internal differences in ideology or religious background. This strategy appears to be effective for group development, unity and survival.

In both eras, participants in any given minyan represent the full spectrum of religious knowledge and background (Cohen *et al*., 2007, p. 19; Kaunfer, 2010, p. 64). [11,12] A comment from a member of The Library Minyan describes how those with diverse backgrounds join in the minyanim:

> The Minyan seems to serve as a happy meeting ground for those who want a traditional service, but who are no longer comfortable with the orthodoxy of their parents' homes, and those who come from less observant homes, frequently homes where the family belonged to a conservative synagogue, and are looking for a more traditional religious context. (Spiegel in Berenbaum and Malkus, 2008, p. 96-97).[13]

Less commonly noted, minyanim are otherwise notably homogenous internally in generation, demography and, by extension, culture and lifestyle. The nature of minyan membership, patterned in ways that are not likely to occur by chance, supports the idea that similar others find each other and that minyan boundaries are not based solely on common individual religious goals. Observations earlier (Hecht, 1993) and later (Kaunfer, 2010, p. 65; Cohen et al., 2007, p. 14) indicate that across the movement and within groups, minyan participants are commonly:

- New to a community. Temporarily mobile individuals are less attached to the area's established institutions and share a common experience with others in this situation.[14]
- Younger and somewhat less attached in terms of family networks. Often the founders of new minyanim are single, couples without children or in early marriages with young children.[15]
- Connected to specific common prior Jewish experiences. Members may share a strong formative Jewish experience that may also feel unique to their generation. This would include comparable Jewish camp experiences or common gender-egalitarian experiences.

Supporting these patterns, Israel described his minyan:

> I have recently been hearing talk about the good old days and how the Minyan is no longer a homogeneous group. … We do have some demographic commonalities. We are mostly professional, we tend to have better than average Jewish educations and we have very few members who are Boston area natives. (Israel, 1989, p. 3)

As Israel's comment suggests, minyanim maximize internal homogeneity. In the 1980's, three active prayer groups, all fitting the narrow definition of "egalitarian minyan," met separately within a five-mile radius. Each developed its own religious-organizational patterns and

group personality; they also very nearly represented three different life decades at the upper end: 20's, 30's, and 40-plus. As Table 1 below illustrates, survey data confirmed qualitative observation, that the three groups were largely segregated by demographic and cultural homogeneity; in statistical language, "between-group differences" were greater than "within-group differences." Age differences likely then led to between-group variation in marital status, family stage, income, work and education (Hecht, 1993, p. 118).

Table 1. Demographic Differences among Three Area Minyanim in 1989

Demographic Measure	Minyan A	Minyan B	Minyan C	Total Sample	Significance*	Number of Cases
Mean Age	30	37	40	36	.000	187
Percent Married	46	76	97	78	.000	187
Percent with children	11	77	93	66	.000	189
Maximum N	55	39	95	189		
* Significance measured by appropriate test for the figures, comparison of means or chi-square test of percentages.						

Within each era, minyan founders and participants also share historical and cultural experiences and life cycle stage (Cohen, 2010). The two waves of minyanim itself suggests this pattern, as the later generation broke with conventional congregations and also other minyanim to create religious institutions to suit their shared tastes, goals and needs. While he likely overstates the difference in religious expertise between the two movements' leaders, Kaunfer points in the later generation to increased day school attendance and a new interest among those with Orthodox backgrounds to pray in traditional but egalitarian settings.[16] (Kaunfer, 2010, p. 73) Regarding internal homogeneity, Kaunfer also writes: "Although our ideal vision was a multi-generational community, there was something energizing about a minyan of people mainly in their twenties that was critical to Hadar's founding spirit." (Kaunfer, 2010, p. 19)

Several aspects of a new generation's experience likely drive this pattern. First, as suggested above, each generation shares particular historical and personal experiences. Second, a new generation's members may be motivated to create new institutions in order to assume organizational leadership (Cohen, 2010). Third, generations have partially

synchronized life-stages (school, marriage, and children), shaping common needs and goals.

Family life-stage also intersects with shared prayer and group dynamics. Founders sometimes indicate established congregations are not perceived as child-friendly for the new generation. In addition, minyan histories include repeated stories of "what to do with the children" as an organizational challenge to a minyan originally designed around adult spiritual goals. Israel describes the challenge of integrating children in his somewhat more heterogeneous minyan:

> It was the founders' view that the services were intended for adults…The old ideology of children being rarely seen and not at all heard did not work anymore when you couldn't walk from one side of the room to another without stepping on someone's child. (Kayn yirbu!) … We may or may not be getting nearer to a solution. (Israel, 1989, p. 5)

If the "generational" approach minimizes internal diversity, supporting group cohesion, it appears the minyan manages any remaining heterogeneity through the very process of creating shared prayer. In this regard, the minyan's choice of Saturday morning prayer as its primary goal may be a strategic as well as a religious choice, from the perspective of group-life. Common stories suggest that minyanim in both eras manage internal differences in opinions, politics and ideology largely through reinforcing traditional practice. Noting different interests by members in women's participation and in traditionalism, Israel explains how focusing on prayer allows members to avoid confronting otherwise diverse commitments:

> …from the very beginning people were in the Minyan for very different reasons… But since we needed each other for the Minyan to happen, we opted for a fixed, predictable liturgy with a minimum of innovation (and therefore dissension) and for not intruding into unfriendly ideological space. (Israel 1989, p. 3)

Kaunfer uses strikingly similar terms to describe how his minyan handled an issue, also related women's egalitarianism:[17] "We were not going to become derailed on (legitimate) ideological debates instead of cranking out the core of what was needed – a well-run, vibrant, and egalitarian minyan" (Kaunfer, 2010, p. 31). This evidence suggests the key role religious tradition plays in preserving the group, after shared demography has done its work.

Revitalization Frame: Minyan and New Life for Old Forms

Beyond "who is minyan" we might also ask "why minyan" to pursue the motivation behind minyan development. Jews commonly create new religious congregations when they enter new geographical area, or via congregation splits, or by adding congregations along denominational lines. In contrast, minyan founders often live in large cities and Jewishly-saturated areas, and therefore do not lack established places for prayer. As newcomers, they also would not have pre-existing congregational ties. Therefore, minyanim show a different pattern of congregation-founding: with established congregations and even alternative minyanim available, minyan participants create new venues for prayer.

An explanation for this pattern may be the dynamics all religious organizations experience, generating change over time, as described by O'Dea. Every congregation begins with a desire to found an institution inspired by religious goals. Institutional success, however, places the congregation at risk, as newcomers and later generations do not see its patterns as religiously evocative. The minyan-havurah critique of conventional synagogues demonstrates this process, as does the founding of each minyan. O'Dea's model suggests that, rather than being surprising, minyan-founders inevitably create new places for prayer, with characteristics designed to serve its members' felt spiritual and social-communal needs.

O'Dea outlines challenges and dilemmas that flow from an inherent tension between spontaneous religious response to the sacred and the practical need to create structures that will sustain an individual and a community between moments of inspiration. He writes:

> Since such institutionalization involves the symbolic and organizational embodiment of the experience of the ultimate in less-than-ultimate forms and the concomitant embodiment of the sacred in profane structures, it involves in its very core a basic antinomy that gives rise to severe functional problems for the religious institutions. (O'Dea, 1961, p. 31)

These challenges flow from the ongoing interaction between that which is "spontaneous and creative" and "established and routine forms;" O'Dea concludes: "religion both needs most and suffers most from institutionalization." (O'Dea, 1961, p. 32)

In this model, five dilemmas pose organizational and spiritual/liturgical challenges to socio-religious life:

- *mixed motivation* (transition from charismatic leader)
- *symbolic forms* or objectification/alienation (developing formal and predictable ritual)
- *administrative order* or elaboration/effectiveness (developing organizational structure)
- *delimitation* or concrete definition/substitution of letter for spirit (developing religious rules)
- *power* or conversion/coercion (integrating generation following original insight)

The history of the minyanim, as well as the larger landscape of Jewish congregational and religious life, illustrates these challenges.

The dilemma of mixed motivation suggests individuals are drawn to institutional roles by "prestige, expressing of teaching and leadership abilities, drives for power, aesthetic needs, and the quite prosaic wish for the security of a respectable position in the professional structure of society." (O'Dea, 1961, p. 33) Since these goals contrast with the more disinterested motivation expected from a divinely inspired leader at the original charismatic religious moment, the next generation born into a faith or a congregation may challenge the original leadership, limiting its power. In addition, institutional forms appropriate for solving a problem at one time are not discarded by the leadership when they are no longer apt.

Consistent with these issues, and also with long Jewish tradition, minyanim reject the clerical role as necessary to regular, communal prayer. Participants also express dissatisfaction with ossified and uninspiring "conventional" congregations. Early-era references to "the establishment" and "the edifice complex" suggest a perceived inability to change the pace or nature of congregational services in response to currently felt religious needs. Prell writes of the minyan she observed: "Its members rejected denominations, impressive buildings, and the other imitations of American society and Protestantism" (Prell, 1989 p.16). While perhaps with a different rationale, Kaunfer echoes this criticism. His recipe for "vibrant" Jewish communities explains:

> Most synagogues are built to hold the capacity crowd that comes on the High Holidays…. But what works for a crowd of five hundred is often counter-productive for regular Shabbat services, when synagoguegoers (sic) (and their voices) are dwarfed in the cavernous sanctuaries. Many shuls could improve the chances of having inspiring services if they were willing to let go of the sanctuary as the default location for prayer. (Kaunfer, 2010, pp. 112-113)

Interestingly, even minyan and havurah stories describe the loss of "true commitment" over time. As per Cohen's title, "Conflict in Havurot: Veterans vs. Newcomers" (Cohen, 1979), founders see a loss of faith by the next generation and newcomers offer a mirror critique. One contributor to the anniversary essays for the Library Minyan describes the founding of a new minyan:

> Why were we looking? Many of us attended the Library Minyan but that was well established and many of us newer younger members felt like there was a minyan and then a minyan watching the minyan – that is, an institution that had become impenetrable religiously at some level, due to ossification.[18] (Cohen in Berenbaum and Malkus, 2008 p. 141)

O'Dea's "symbolic dilemma" addresses liturgical vitality:

> The process of objectification, which makes it possible for cult to be a genuine social and communal activity, can proceed so far that symbolic and ritual elements become cut off from the subjective experience of the participants. (O'Dea, 1961, p. 34)

The traditional Jewish distinction between observance and intentionality (*keva* and *kavannah*) summarizes this challenge at the individual level. It is also demonstrated by historical transitions between rationalist and enthusiastic movements, such as Chassidism.

Minyan founders address this dilemma. As Cohen and others document about the current movement, the community seeks to revitalize worship, to reflect new understandings, tempos and needs. Interestingly, the goal may be to "pick up the pace" of prayer in one era, while in another the innovation may be to slow it down; in both cases, the change is promoted to offer greater authenticity and meaning for participants. In his comments on his minyan, Israel offers perspective on the ongoing nature of these dilemmas:

> As the Minyan becomes a conventional and accepted fact rather than a new creation, will it retain that spark of energy which has always been a lot of the fun? (Israel, 1989, p. 6)

Skills Frame: Quality Davening and the Engine of Minyan Life

In both eras, minyan members speak and share a language of "skills," "quality" and "standards." Originally identified as a strong theme in the qualitative research conducted on minyanim in the 1980's (Hecht, 1993),

its repetition suggests a vital engine of minyan life. In each case, "skill" moves the energy each person brings into what becomes an ongoing, functioning group at prayer – and also is perceived as something that can stop a minyan cold when it is not negotiated well.

These quotations from the two eras illustrate the minyan's skills-and-quality dynamic, including its inherent challenge. An observer reports about an early-era minyan:

> Many people also mentioned their satisfaction that the Minyan was the kind of place where, because of its voluntary nature, people could learn new synagogue skills…. Yet, dissatisfaction with the voluntary nature of the service was expressed by several members. One member noted that those leading the service were 'not necessarily the most articulate or the most prepared.' She felt that **the size of the group had led to real problems with 'quality control.'** Thus, there was a very uneven quality to her experiences of prayer, so that "sometimes it was pathetic; sometimes it was elevating." This same person commented that the Minyan 'just sort of runs along. There is no leader, no goals, it's just getting by from week to week.' … Another member similarly complained that **'people lead prayers who don't know how to lead.'** Several members complained specifically about the quality of the Torah commentaries. (Spiegel in Berenbaum and Malkus, 2008, p. 102; bolding added)

Kaunfer offers parallel concerns and language about the new generation of minyanim:

> One of the defining challenges of any lay-led minyan is the following dilemma: how to balance inclusive service leadership with a **quality spiritual experience**. In theory, a lay-led minyan should have no problem with this. Because it is founded on the premise of including a large number of active volunteers, instead of a small number of professionals, in leading the services, the minyan should easily be able to include all the participants in whatever way they hope to contribute. **However, not all lay daveners and Torah readers are blessed with the same skills. Well-meaning and less-competent volunteers can actually detract from the larger mission of creating an inspiring prayer experience.** A minyan must walk a fine line between balancing opportunities for ritual and communal leadership with a focus on inspired and meaningful prayer. (Kaunfer, 2010, p. 35; bolding added)

As these quotes demonstrate, the very meaningfulness of prayer is at stake. In both eras, the "skills/quality/standards" language around prayer and leadership defines the minyan as a group that prays together, with

tradition importantly guiding. This focus sustains a minyan organizationally (like a "God particle"); conversely, deficits here lead to the possible "end" of a minyan and/or of a member's interest.

The May 2012 informal survey supports this analysis. Respondents were asked three open-ended questions about one minyan they had founded, as prompts which did not suggest the hypotheses:

1. When you think of the time when you founded a minyan, how would you describe your own motivations in creating a new religious community?
2. At the time of the minyan's founding, what were the top three concerns you had, in creating the new religious community?
3. If you'd like, please speak also to the challenges you feel the founding members needed to address, in the first years of the minyan.

Table 2 demonstrates the range represented in this dataset, by location and founding date.

Table 2. Minyanim in May 2012 Survey by Region and Founding Year (Frequency)

City	Year of Founding			
	1971-1989	1998-2006	2009-2011	Grand Total
California (L.A., Berkeley)		1	1	2
Mid-Atlantic (DC, MD, Philadelphia)	2	3	2	7
Midwest (Chicago)		1	4	5
Northeast, East Coast, NYC	3	3	2	8
London, United Kingdom	1			1
Toronto, Canada		1		1
Total	6	9	9	24
Note: The N of 24 includes Israel's description of the Newton Center Minyan, provided in response to the survey.				

Combining the questions, respondents provided 70 volunteered, unstructured comments about 23 minyanim. Table 3 shows the recurring themes in these comments by minyan (N=23) and overall (N=70). As the

table shows, while the responses support all three frames, religious skills is a dominant theme:

- Half of the comments referred to the religious aspects of minyan organization and development (83% minyanim, 50% comments)
- As a subset of these comments, one-fourth overall focused narrowly on prayer requirements and maintaining prayer at a high level (57% of minyanim , 27% of comments)

Table 3. Common Themes in Survey Comments in Order of Frequency (Percent)

Theme (Frame)	Percent of Minyanim	Percent of Comments
Religious skills or focus on davening and/or traditional prayer (Skills)	83%	50%
Subset of above: Focus on creating full service, "quality" davening	57%	27%
Demographic issues and shared culture (Demographic)	48%	21%
Alternative to mainstream, revive spirituality (Revitalization)*	43%	26%
Relationship to mainstream with some emphasis on fitting in*	39%	14%
Creating community as a goal	39%	13%
Women's egalitarianism	35%	14%
Combining tradition and innovation as dual goals	30%	11%
Accommodating Orthodoxy or diversity in some way	22%	9%
Total Number (Base for Percentages)	23	70

Note: percentages do not total 100%; comments were coded for multiple themes.

*Comparing two categories of comments that identify the minyan as alternative to the mainstream, there were as many comments concerned with fitting in with the mainstream in some way, as comments concerned with challenging the mainstream; however, all of the former comments were among minyanim founded since 1998, reflecting a less countercultural attitude to the mainstream.

Focusing in on the concept even further, members from around half of the minyanim represented (11 of the 23) speak directly to skills and

quality davening. The following comments illustrate (bolding added for emphasis):

- *Major challenges were finding **competent** prayer leaders and recruiting for succession*
- *We wanted to create a place that combined fully traditional liturgy + egalitarian participation + **vibrant performance** of the liturgy*
- ***High-quality**; lay-led; family friendly*
- *... ensuring **quality** davening.*
- *Would it be **good** davening? ... Would it be self-sustaining?*

The survey comments about skills and quality davening also show continuity across eras. For a middle founding period (1998-2006) and a later one (2009-2011), most of the individual respondents included this theme, and the raw number of skills-theme comments is comparable (respectively: 15 comments from 8 minyanim out of 9 total; 13 comments from 8 minyanim out of 9 total). With fewer cases, minyanim founded earliest (1971-1989) show similar proportions (7 comments from 3 out of 5 minyanim).[19]

The substance of the comments about achieving high quality, lay-led davening also confirm that traditional prayer is a double-edged sword for group development. Traditional prayer vitally structures group activity and offers opportunities for participation. Israel's comment on ideological diversity also indicates this focus helps manage small group dynamics. However, it also poses a challenge, given the necessity for lay leadership. For its participants, active religious participation is both the minyan's reason for existence and its necessary demand. The challenge is expressed in the paired themes: members' desire for "quality davening" and difficulty creating a group large enough to sustain the active lay leadership model. In these respects, skills and quality davening intertwine with a minyan's vital sustainability.

The first two frames suggest that these minyanim flow from the founding members' sociologically patterned desires to congregate with like-minded others and to revive stale worship forms that are not meaningful to them. As such, they are not notably specific to minyanim. In contrast, this third pattern offers a definitive frame for the minyan movement and its specifically Jewish nature, reflecting the central role played by ritual in the minyan's goals and dynamics. While religious skills have been explored in other Jewish congregational research (e.g., Heilman 1980), the analysis above connects Jewish religious skills to the

dynamics of congregational founding, longevity and change. In being definitive of minyanim, it also illustrates how they differ from other Jewish group types, such as the havurah. Finally, this frame suggests how Jewish tradition regenerates, as each generation engages with it on their own terms.

The minyan as described here may be a particularly American phenomenon and each movement may be the product of its specific cultural situation. At the same time, comparing a single phenomenon across two eras which otherwise differ – religiously, politically and economically, and for the American Jewish community in terms of assimilation – provides a unique analytic opportunity. Observing what is common despite the differences potentially identifies a generalizable "mechanism" of religious life. The insight gained may extend to general congregational processes and to Judaism in particular.

The Sukkah of Jewish Continuity and Change

Any given minyan may be more homogenous than the ideal havurah or the synagogue of our imagination. Describing commitment and spirituality in America, in 1985 Bellah proposed the term "lifestyle enclave" to describe groups of individuals who "express their identity through shared patterns of appearance, consumption, and leisure activities." Presumably critically, from a spiritual perspective, the authors suggest "lifestyle is fundamentally segmental and celebrates the narcissism of similarity." (Bellah *et. al*., 1985, p. 72)

In contrast to this assessment, however, this analysis as a whole suggests the minyanim demonstrate the creative potential of some degree of segmented homogeneity and in-group insularity. Given the goal, commonality no doubt facilitates the personal trust required to create and carry forward a religious tradition, particularly in an open, challenging environment for religious practice.

Beyond this, the example of gender egalitarianism suggests that the mechanism of congregational Jewish prayer appears to leverage superficial commonalities and predictable generational turnover to create significant religious change. At the time of the first minyan movement, gender egalitarianism in Jewish prayer was far from accepted in the traditional synagogue, and not even firmly on the radar of the alternative movements. The vague use of "egalitarian" in the phrase "egalitarian minyan," reflected communal ambivalence – did it refer to the lack of hierarchical relationships between leader and led or to women's equal participation? This multivalence may even have allowed early minyanim to sidestep varying attitudes toward women's egalitarianism.[20] However,

over time, gender egalitarianism became not only accepted in the minyan, but part of its key associations and the "standard" in this ritual space. Further, as the mainstream absorbed this change, the alternative become the standard through much of the Jewish community, and continues to evolve even beyond the Conservative-Reform end of the practice continuum.

Interestingly, change in women's status may have been the outcome of both of these waves of minyan founding. Kaunfer suggests this about the earlier era (Kaunfer, 2010 p. 72); in addition, the recent minyanim reportedly draw in those with Orthodox backgrounds, (Kaunfer, 2010; Lurie, 2011)[21] while the previous wave paralleled Conservative Judaism more. This suggests that a key result of minyan-development in both eras – and perhaps impetus, or at least resource – may have been to establish women's participation as the norm, first for Conservative-traditional practice and later for Orthodox-traditional practice. Interestingly, the newer groups are referred to as "independent minyanim," minus the word "egalitarian," presumably given the achieved change in women's religious participation. It is easily conjectured that the minyan accomplished this transition, not as a firebrand movement but more as the flexible mechanism of change.

The incorporation of gender egalitarianism into tradition – appropriate to this generation demographically and experientially – suggests a general dynamic of continuity and change. As every generation re-establishes and re-invents the tradition, "the minyan" – in its most general sense – offers a vehicle for owning and moving the tradition forward. Further, the havurah-to-minyan transition shows how tradition itself supports creating a viable vehicle for change. In the havurah, expressive sharing was ultimately self-limiting; members often found they were "done," after they welcomed everyone to the group and explored their individual paths and feelings. As this occurred, the minyan emerged as a more viable form. To paraphrase Abraham Joshua Heschel, as much as the minyan (once havurah) members preserved tradition by committing to regular prayer, tradition preserved the group by giving it a structure and purpose – enabling it to carry forward both tradition and change.

In this respect, we may compare Jewish congregationalism over time to a sukkah. With minimal formal requirements, and a wide degree of variation, the sukkah is flexible enough to withstand the winds of change for its season. Similarly minyan as a congregational form and as a general Jewish concept has minimal requirements that are nonetheless sufficient both to define ongoing group life and to act as a resource for changing generations and situations. In its structuring role, tradition acts as a powerful cultural resource for successive generations and subgroups

within the full Jewish landscape to create sustainable, tailored settings for group and individual practice. As Jews enter and create their common venues for Jewish participation and meaning-creation, the religious culture evolves over time, from generation to generation (m'dor l'dor), in the ongoing dance with tradition.

The Funnel of Jewish Belonging and Participation

The second conclusion flows from the interplay between two types of energy in Jewish life, as represented by the havurah and the minyan, and, again, the strong role tradition plays in Jewish group life. On one hand, the havurah welcomed all who were hungry, as per the Passover Seder text; Judaism was very nearly the product of who entered the room and what they brought with them. In contrast, the skills frame suggests that in the midst of the spiritual experience, we find a focus on standardized productivity as quantity and quality; "quality" prayer defines the group's success, at a minimal and perhaps a maximal level.

These two models parallel the two sides of Jewish identity, as participation and belonging, which can be summarized by the sociological distinction between ascribed and achieved status.[22] In sociological terms, ascribed identity is defined at birth, with gender as an example; it is held through no action on the individual's part and is considered essentially unchanging. In contrast, an achieved identity results from an individual's actions or accumulated experiences, one example being socio-economic status (SES). Using this distinction, Warner also indicates "the American congregation is …essentially an 'achieved' rather than an 'ascribed'" social grouping (Warner, 1994, p. 63).

Judaism creates a dynamic interaction between these two principles. On one hand, Judaism asserts an ascribed Jewish identity: parentage, whether defined through matrilineal descent or otherwise, determines the fixed status of the individual as "Jew." "Who is a Jew" and the essentialist concept of Jewish identity reflect this (Tenenbaum and Davidman, 2007). On the other side, a Jew may become more learned or more capable in mastering Jewish traditional practice, in essence changing his or her Jewish identity in these terms – ascending the Jewish ritual-knowledge-and-practice equivalent of the SES scale.

In this interpretation, the two principles of ascribed and achieved status are associated with havurah and minyan as ideal types –working in tandem in the Jewish community and Jewish history, to create and re-create the Jewish people and their religious practices. At the organizational level, the havurah works with ascribed status, and the minyan with achieved status. Parallel to a religious "ecological" system"

(Ammerman, 1997, p. 209), havurah and minyan reside in a larger
landscape in which they play different roles in individual Jewish identity
and participation, and in communal continuity and change.

Here, too, we see the "pull of tradition" both in the historical transition
from the flexible havurah to the ritual-focused minyan and in the
dynamics within a given havurah or minyan. As an example of the latter,
we can interpret the once-common practice of sharing only vegetarian
food at a havurah or minyan gathering. The havurah and the minyan are
technically non-judgmental regarding individual religious observance – an
"ascribed status" approach, with no litmus tests or ascending scales. At
the same time, by deciding to share only vegetarian food within the group
as a way to accommodate the accepted diversity, the group accepts a
limitation that honors more traditional observance.

The metaphor for this story is that of the funnel. In the abstract,
Judaism as a whole has a wide end, which welcomes all comers based on
ascribed Jewish status (e.g., as the Lubavitch do in their outreach); and
then ultimately structures participation based on a hierarchy of belonging
and activity that moves towards tradition and the achievement end, rather
than the ascribed end. From the evidence here, including all three frames,
this yin-yang dynamic in Jewish belonging and participation seemingly
allows enough leeway for group members to express themselves through
voluntary belonging – and for the group as a whole to create and re-create
Jewish tradition in each generation.

Conclusion

This analysis traces patterns in minyan formation, with a strong
underlying theme describing how tradition structures and shapes the
outcomes. This occurs at the group level as well as the level of the overall
community, through individual behaviors and choices.

The three patterns examine the minyan at various depths, like the
depths of Jewish text interpretation from "pshat" to "sod." The first
pattern speaks to superficial, secular aspects of belonging: shared
demographic and related characteristics. This key to minyan development
and Jewish ritual participation is nearly divorced from any religious
motivation or activity. The second pattern addresses meaning, insofar as
each generation and group of participants must feel connected to their
religious forms. This perspective places minyan development in the
context of religious organizations in general, as they must be constantly
renewed. The third pattern identifies a core engine of minyan
development, grounded in activity that is Jewish in content and minyan-
specific. The observations demonstrate how the minyan fosters individual

participation, supports group survival, and moves Jewish tradition forward through a process of continuity and change. This last perspective on the minyan also critically distinguishes it from the havurah, suggesting an overarching perspective on Jewish continuity and change that includes them both.

As a whole, the three frames explored here suggest a recipe for building a minyan: minimize demographic and cultural heterogeneity by finding similar others on non-religious factors; capitalize on the inevitable meaningless of older forms; and use tradition for structure and shape, so as to create a shared group-defined activity. The unexpected outcome is that in the process, minyan members have tailored and re-shaped Judaism, even as they have preserved it and as it has preserved the group functioning as a whole.

There is also an aspect of voluntary participation and innovation associated with the havurah and the minyanim in both eras. This contrasts to the myth or reality of traditional constraints or of the "Orthodox" Jew who practices Judaism in close accord to his/her understanding of tradition alone. This might be considered a "limitation" of the study – it is based only on Jews who clearly practice Judaism in what might be considered an open frame. In fact, however, the freedom exhibited here is an opportunity of this set of observations, rather than a limitation.

The observed "context of choice" is likely not unique to our time in history; it may even be part of the deep structure of Jewish life itself. As the independent minyan is independent in many senses – from synagogue, from American denomination, from tradition as frozen – it offers us a window into the very process of Jewish continuity and change. As a result, this analysis addresses the large question: "How does Judaism occur in the context of choice?" Logically extending this argument, I would suggest that this is not the unusual case in Jewish history, but rather the common case. The full change/continuity process occurs at a deep level in Judaism, if we consider Judaism's internal variety at any one time and its evolution over time.

Finally, critics in both eras have perhaps regarded the minyanim as self-indulgent or redundant, competing with synagogues and prayer groups that struggle to survive. This analysis, however, demonstrates that the changeable religious and social needs to which the minyan responds, relevant to this group of individuals in a particular place and time, are as valid as those of Jews creating religious innovations at any time. As gender egalitarianism suggests, shared experiences by generations may not only define a minyan but might also forward religious creativity and history. This analysis suggests that through this congregational process, adherents create a "living" religious tradition in each generation.

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Notes

[1] Prell's published anthropological study is based on her Ph.D. dissertation.

[2] Profound thanks to Sherry Israel for sharing this history.

[3] The reference to the "open" versus "closed" nature of havurah and minyan is beyond the scope of this paper, and yet relevant to the themes explored here. Havurot were technically more open religiously, yet were perceived as socially restricted because of the norms of intimacy and trust; minyanim imposed religious demands and yet, ironically, become more open in practice, due to the agreement on the shared activity – traditional prayer – which lowers the emotional "cost" of including a given individual member.

[4] Source: Samuel Freedman, "Debating the Imahot: Holding the Center" in the unpublished Library Minyan volume, pp. 42-73 (Berenbaum and Malkus, 2008).

[5] Kaunfer engages with differences between the minyan and the havurah, as well as their common distinction from conventional synagogues. He identifies differences in culture, demographics, scale, education, worship style, and goals. Importantly, like others and as noted, Kaunfer does not distinguish between havurah and egalitarian minyan in the earlier era (Kaunfer, 1989, pp. 73-75).

[6] These two texts also suggest the different aesthetic between the two eras. The images on the cover of *The Jewish Catalog* portray prayer and tradition. Collectively they suggest a smooth intersection of tradition and change; they also obfuscate the not-yet-completed gender revolution in Jewish prayer, ambivalence about unacknowledged Jewish sources of authority and leadership, and the as-yet-unsuspected threats to liberal social values of Judaism's own fundamentalist strain. In contrast, Empowered Judaism might be imagined as facing the camera head-on. Rejecting the soft lens suggested by havurah Judaism, the text embraces and celebrates authority: the book incorporates "power" in its title, includes a preface by a leading Jewish American historian of religion, and asserts the value of, for example, rows as against the circle for prayer while definitively rejecting the forgiving flexibility of "Jewish standard time."

[7] In addition to the distinctions Kaunfer identifies, Prell compares the two waves of minyanim (Prell, 2008).

[8] In contrast, Berger's 1969 *The Sacred Canopy* contains no reference to "congregation," as noted in the later literature (Wind and Lewis, 1994, p. 6).

[9] The original study of minyanim cited here (Hecht 1993) was supported by the Congregational History Project at the University of Chicago, which ultimately published the series of essays in *American Congregations: Volume II* (Wind and Lewis, 1994).

[10] Christiano et al. write "the term congregationalism emphasizes the role of the laity within the church (as contrasted to the ordained, set-apart clergy)" (Christiano, *et al.*, 2008, p. 98).

[11] Cohen *et al.* write of the new movement: "While the averages point to [higher] rates of Jewish engagement in these groups, [these communities] attract significant numbers of young adults with weaker Jewish backgrounds and, at least initially, weaker Jewish and religious commitment" [Cohen *et al.*, 2007, p. 19]. That being said, those with more knowledge of Jewish tradition likely become the minyanim's informal leaders.

[12] Kaunfer offers data on minyan attendees, reporting the denominational affiliation of the synagogue in which they grew up: 46 percent Conservative, 20 percent Orthodox, and 18 percent Reform. In addition, he reports that about half "does not claim any denominational affiliation [and] hails from a variety of denominational backgrounds" (Kaunfer, 2010, p. 64).

[13] Source: Fredelle Z. Spiegel, "The Library Minyan at Eighteen: The Dichotomies that Divide and Unite its Members" in the unpublished Library Minyan volume (Berenbaum and Malkus, 2008, pp. 91-116).

[14] Kaunfer connects increased mobility and instability for those in their 20's and 30's with minyan participation. (Kaunfer, 2010, p. 65)

[15] Cohen describes recent minyan participants as "a very youthful clientele, one that hardly affiliates with conventional congregations" (Cohen *et al*., 2007, p. 14); Kaunfer refers to their "lack of institutional affiliation" (Kaunfer, 2010, p. 65).

[16] The participation of those with Orthodox backgrounds may be the one key distinguishing factor between these two movements and may account for the positive reception given to the later wave of minyanim.

[17] The issue concerned inclusion of "imahot" in the Amidah prayer.

[18] Source: Aryeh Cohen's essay, "With all my limbs I praise You: A Short Chronicle of the Shtibl" (Berenbaum and Malkus, 2008, pp. 139-154).

[19] If there is any real difference for the period before 1990, we might hypothesize that these minyanim are more like havurot, with less attachment to articulating the skills/quality frame.

[20] Samuel Freedman's essay in the Library Minyan anniversary collection, "Debating the Imahot: Holding the Center," describes the slow and limited movement toward gender egalitarian liturgical change (Berenbaum and Malkus, 2008, pp. 42-73).

[21] Kaunfer writes: "…the mixing among those with Orthodox backgrounds and those without is very prevalent in the [current] minyanim in a way unthinkable in a previous generation" (Kaunfer, 2010, p. 73). While Lurie suggests the current movement is a Conservative critique of the Conservative movement, she also writes somewhat positively that the new wave of minyanim appeals to the Orthodox, with a right wing that is essentially on the left wing of Orthodoxy (Lurie, 2011).

[22] Sociologists trace this distinction to Talcott Parsons, who cites R. Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York: Appleton, 1936) (Parsons, 1964).

EDUCATION FOR JEWISH PEOPLEHOOD IN AUSTRALIA[*]

Professor David Mittelberg

Abstract

Jewish peoplehood is a multi-dimensional complex construct that cannot be reduced to religious identification alone but is comprised of four distinct dimensions: *collective belonging* or identification with the Jewish people; *Jewish cultural capital* or familiarity with the cultural knowledge, language, customs, and rituals that makes a Jew feel comfortable anywhere in the Jewish world; *Jewish responsibility* or commitment to the welfare of other Jews; and *interpersonal attachment* or personal connection with other Jews.

This paper evaluates the independent impact of Jewish schooling, informal Jewish education, and Israel visits within the non-denominational traditional and secular streams of Australian Jewry via a multivariate secondary analysis of the 18–44-year-old group of respondents in the Australian Gen08 national survey of Australian Jewry (N=2330). It argues that educational intervention is significant, irrespective of what kind of home in which the child is raised. Adopting the paradigm of Jewish peoplehood, we find that while day schools enhance Jewish ritual practice and other cognitive measures—such as

learning Hebrew (Jewish cultural capital), youth movement participation and visits to Israel are the principal drivers of Jewish community activism (interpersonal attachment) and thus Jewish commitment and belonging (Jewish responsibility). Jewish education thus plays an important role in sustaining collective belonging to the Jewish people.

Introduction

The global context of contemporary peoplehood

The world in which we live is characterised by significant social and demographic shifts. From 75 million in 1965, the number of migrants worldwide rose to 120 million in 1990 and to 175 million in 2000. One in every 35 persons worldwide is an international migrant. In 2002, 175 million people lived outside the country in which they were born—56 million in Europe, 50 million in Asia, and 41 million in North America (Waters, Ueda, & Marrow, 2007). The social consequences of such an unprecedented rate of population movement are the increased frequency and legitimacy of homeland/diaspora relationships amongst the peoples of the world. As Anthony Giddens (1991: 16) points out, the globalised world embodies a mode of social organization that separates time and space without the "situatedness of place". People integrate into "lived time" not only through their presence but also frequently via their absence. Globalization produces "a unified and integrated common culture … (where) … we find the most striking examples of the effects of time-space compression, as new means of communication effectively make possible simultaneous transactions which sustain 'deterritorialized cultures'" (Featherstone, 1995: 114–115).

The genesis and persistence of ethnicity traditionally being understood as a residual outcome of migrant national ancestry and religious affiliation, it was predicted that it would dissipate in consequence of generation-time and modernizing secularization. Rather than comprising such linear attrition the contemporary world is not showing signs of the disappearance of ethnicity but rather of multiple personal identities in a pluralised world (Mittelberg, 1999). Identity having been privatised so that it represents the outcome of personal choice, the preservation of this individual decision-making has become the metavalue of postmodern society. Scholars of diaspora Jewry worldwide commonly observe that, like other contemporary diasporans, Jews maintain multiple hybrid identities based on ethnic ancestry and local citizenship, living in multicultural societies that celebrate cultural diversity and multiple identities. What matters most in contemporary Jewish diasporas is the

right to choose one's identity—including the timing at which this choice is made and its intensity and salience at any given time in a person's life-cycle.

This circumstance constitutes not merely a personal situational dilemma but an existential structural paradigm shared by all those who share a cultural diaspora. As Mitchell (1997) posits, diaspora identities are "multifaceted and composed of complexly interwoven strands of ethnicity, religion and ancestry. Diaspora communities have specific geographies and histories, they have multiple loyalties, they move between regions, do not occupy a single cultural space and, perhaps most importantly, operate exterior to state boundaries and their cultural effects" (cited in Coles and Timothy, 2004:7).

Diasporans also possess a relationship with their homeland, however, one they share both with local co-ethnic residents and diasporans elsewhere—i.e., in multi-local communities as well as with ethnic peers in the homeland (imagined or real). This transnational multi-local relationship forms the social scaffold of contemporary transnational peoplehood—i.e., the emerging paradigm of collective belonging experienced by dispersed peoples everywhere. This changing globalised world forms the context within which contemporary Jews must maintain and sustain the vitality of their institutions and the Jewishness of their future. This paper examines the role of Jewish education in sustaining collective belonging to the Jewish people in the Australian diaspora. We assume that this case can also teach us lessons for Jewish and non-Jewish diasporas elsewhere.

Jewish peoplehood

Introduced by Mordechai Kaplan, (Mittelberg, 2011), the term "Jewish peoplehood" attributes Jewish identity to a sense of belonging and connection amongst Jews rather than national, political or religious belief or affiliation: "Judaism … is thus something far more comprehensive than Jewish religion. It includes that nexus of a history, literature, language, social organization, folk sanctions, standards of conduct, social and spiritual ideals, esthetic values, which in their totality form a civilization" (Kaplan, 1967: 178). Just as regarding Judaism as a *civilization* broadened it beyond a religion, the idea of *peoplehood* is intended to avoid contracting it to a State. While each of its constituent components is important in its own right, the peoplehood paradigm cannot be reduced to any one of them alone.

The concept of peoplehood has received increasing attention in social science literature, gaining prominence as an overarching construct for

understanding the dynamic interface between individual and communal Jewish identity. The way in which it intersects with or differs from other similar perspectives on Jewish identity has been far less studied, however, no index yet having been proposed to determine which behavioral or attitudinal indicators can be employed in order to enable its valid measurement. A preliminary attempt to operationalise this paradigm based on survey data from American and Israeli Jewish youth and adults (Mittelberg et al., unpubl. paper) has nonetheless identified four distinct dimensions of Jewish peoplehood: *collective belonging*—identification with the Jewish people; *Jewish cultural capital*—possession of the cultural knowledge, language, customs, and rituals, etc. that make a Jew comfortable anywhere in the Jewish world; *Jewish responsibility*—the commitment to the welfare of other Jews; and *interpersonal attachment*—personal connection with other Jews home and abroad.

Jewish education in Australia

In their comprehensive overview of the history of Jewish education in Australia from 1846 to the present day, Munz and Forgasz (2011) adduce numerous assessments of the day-school movement. These range from its labelling as the "jewel in the crown" of Australian Jewry (Rubinstein and Rubinstein, 1991: 211) whose contribution to the community's unique ethnic vitality and rich sustainability has been invaluable—to a partially successful endeavour that, while fostering Jewish association, commitment to Israel, and knowledge about the Holocaust has struggled to inculcate Judaism and the Hebrew language, many students "feeling disillusioned and negative about their experiences" after completing thirteen years of Jewish schooling (Rutland, 2005: 96).

The authors enumerate the principal challenges facing Jewish day-school enrollment in Australia—such as affordability and demographic changes in the emerging x and y generations of parents and Jewish teacher-training and curriculum-development issues. They also note the pivotal role played by Holocaust memory in Jewish schooling, recognizing both its power and its limitations going forward, together with the importance of the Israel experience and informal education in Australia. The quantitative analysis presented below addresses several of these issues.

A similar review of the Jewish schools and institutions of informal education at the time of the Gen08 national survey is given by Markus et al. (2011). Presenting a descriptive analysis of the enrollment and ideology of day schools, youth movements, and major Israel experience programs in Australia, this study highlights the current challenge of

affordability facing Australian Jewish schools (p. 13), citing response data reflecting this difficulty and the objective continuous rise in school fees. The suggestion that the efficacy of Jewish schooling per se is limited, this issue and its implications form the heart of our present discussion.

The Gen08 Survey

A series of Gen08 reports contain comprehensive and detailed analyses of the rich data collected from 5840 Australian Jews in Melbourne, Sydney, and Perth—some 7% of the eligible population over the age of 18. The Gen08 survey was administered between September 2008 and April 2009. It consisted of 144 questions which included sub questions which was self administered primarily on line but also in print versions The authors report that despite its length, 89% of respondents who began the survey completed it (Markus 2011:218).

Survey respondents were recruited through community lists as well as advertising totaling over 25,000 survey invitees. Representativeness and reliability of the resultant survey sample was validated by crosschecking with the Australian 2006 census with reference to gender, age distribution, country of origin and place of residence, (Markus et al., 2009, 2011; Markus, 2011).

A more detailed presentation of the survey methodology can be found in Markus et al 2009:39-45. This paper is based on the data set of these Australian respondents only. An additional report relates to the impact of day-school education (Graham, 2012).

The survey's principal goal was to investigate the parameters of Jewish identity and community engagement as well as measures of the experience of antisemitism and attachment to Israel of Australian Jews. The survey also considered the role of education and life satisfaction amongst respondents. While the Gen08 survey data does not include any questions directly addressing Jewish peoplehood—as in the national and community surveys implemented in North America or those conducted by the present author—a number of parallel analyses will be offered here based on the secondary analysis of the GEN08 survey data of Australian Jewry.

The question of what such a new secondary analysis of the same data can contribute has a threefold answer aim:

a) It draws on the paradigm of Jewish peoplehood rather than Jewish identity;
b) It employs a multivariate analysis rather than a multiple series of cross-tabulated item responses, important or rich as the latter may be;

c) It focuses on half the national sample, aged 18–44—following, in part, Markus in sections of the Gen08 reports and his 2011 study.
The primary goal is to engage with the published findings in order to offer additional directions for analysis and policy.

Jewish education and Jewish peoplehood belonging

Does Jewish education in fact make a difference to the sense of Jewish belonging amongst Australian Jews? The reports published to date not only present significant findings but also raise serious and important questions in this regard. I concur with the opinion given in the overview cited above: "Examination of survey data utilising a range of different methodologies establishes that *identity formation is best understood in terms of a number of inter-related factors*. The five key factors are: a young person's home environment; school attended; form of Judaism/ synagogue affiliation; youth group involvement; and experience of Israel. The findings show that *the more consistent and integrated these factors, the stronger one's Jewish identity*" (Markus et al., 2011: 3 [original italics]). This statement is immediately followed, however, by the assertion that: "In isolation, individual factors such as schooling or a visit to Israel will generally have *limited impact*. It is the extent of coherence or synergy between the five key factors that provides the strongest basis for Jewish continuity" (ibid; italics added).

This paper seeks to establish whether the impact of these factors is indeed "limited": under what conditions do these limitations obtain and what is their relative weight upon various Jewish-identity and behavioural outcomes? Crucially, it endeavours to identify the characteristics of the various synergistic constellations within different sectors of Australian Jewry. In my opinion, while the synergistic argument may be appropriate, it favours home religiosity—understood as a denominational hierarchy with Orthodox at top and secular at bottom—over the independent role of Jewish schooling and Israel visits. In so doing, it emasculates the role of educational interventions, confounding the independent role of these educational variables with the differential synergies (pl.)—that are indeed mediated by different home background (s.).

While the Gen08 reports demonstrate the undeniable power of home upbringing as a predictor of the type and intensity of Jewishness likely to characterise the next generation, its analysts suggest that Jewish schooling only has limited power in predicting the ultimate outcome of Jewish identity. One report (Graham, 2012) even warns Jewish parents not to overestimate the anticipated impact of their investment in day-school education. I respectfully take issue with this argument on logical,

methodological, and sociological grounds alike. I shall explain why in relation to the published data provided in the reports themselves.

The excellent introductory chapter of the second Gen08 report (Markus et al., 2011) portrays cross-generational stability in religious practice in each of the five sectors of Australian Jewry—Ultra-Orthodox, Modern Orthodox, Conservative/Progressive, traditional, and secular. School selection is predictably stable: the schools children attend being chosen by their parents, respondents generally reported that they picked the school whose ethos most closely corresponded to their home religiosity and ideology (Markus et al., 2011: 6). The question of the relative impact of each of these frameworks within each sector nevertheless remains, not being adducible from the data under review.

With respect to the respondents' religious stability, the authors state that approximately half of those between the ages of 18–34—and particularly amongst the traditional and secular—reported that their religiosity had not changed "in recent years" (Table 0.5, page 8).

The majority of respondents also reported their current level of religiosity to be commensurate with that of their home: 67% of those raised as secular reported themselves to be secular, 56% traditional-background reported themselves to be traditional, and 61% Modern Orthodox reported themselves to be Modern Orthodox (see Table 0.6, p. 9). Irrespective of self-definition, the religiosity of the majority of all adult respondents thus remained similar to what it had been in an earlier period.

The fact that we are unable to ascertain what would have happened had the parents *not* sent their children to a Jewish school or to manipulate the variables of the respondents' home presents us with a logical problem. More significantly—as we will see below—a unitary paradigm of religiosity is applied to the whole spectrum of Australian Jewry, it not even being clear whether this is a correct measuring tool. The important issue is the relative impact of the different educational interventions *within* each Jewish sector. Within this framework, home background and religiosity become, at least to some degree, a constant.

The question is, of course, *what precisely is impacted*? Does the report ask the relevant theoretical question regarding Jewish continuity? The dilemma is clearly acknowledged by the authors in their discussion of two possible inferences from their own findings (pp. 8–10). The first suggests that, in light of the powerful Jewish nature of the Orthodox home, the goal perhaps should be to make all Australian Jews Orthodox. Clearly, this is not happening. Nor is it evident that such an outcome is desirable. This constitutes a discussion in its own right.

The second relates to the fact that, the desired consequences of the first inference remaining an unrealistic goal, the best alternative is to

promote the development of the "patterns of consistency" characteristic of Orthodox Judaism within non-Orthodox Judaism (p. 10). The authors adduce numerous frequently-heard explanations relating to the characteristics of modernity and youth culture in order to explain the threat to Jewish continuity posed by the lack of "certainty of Jewish faith and deep knowledge of Jewish heritage, the values and knowledge which provide answers for the ever present question, 'why is it important to maintain a Jewish life?'" amongst the non-Orthodox (p. 10).

In my view, Jewish belonging cannot be reduced to the issue of Jewish faith alone. Adopting this measurement narrows the range of anticipated Jewish outcomes and restricts the complex elements of Jewish life to a single criterion. In other words, the unidimensional faith paradigm fails to acknowledge the complexity of Jewish identity and contemporary Jewish life. This fact has significant methodological consequences. Determining Jewish continuity and social cohesion as an outcome of ritual practice, the loss of these within large sectors of Australian Jewry—whose sense of belonging to the Jewish community and people derives from dimensions of Jewish life beyond faith-based ritual practice—is then lamented.

The authors are clearly well aware of the problematic, as attested by the various bivariate analyses they offer. They also acknowledge that "other ways" to ensure Jewish continuity exist, contrasting religious Judaism with cultural Judaism, for example (p. 53). They nonetheless appear to privilege religious Judaism—certainly empirically and by implication perhaps also ideologically—by arguing that the path to strong Jewish identification in today's world is "most likely to occur within a religious context" (p. 4).

The present study seeks to review the Gen08 data via an alternative theoretical lens and utilizing different methodological tools in order to offer a divergent vista of the Jewish future of Australian Jewry that takes into account the drawbacks of adopting the faith-based paradigm as the principal tool of measurement. Utilizing the Jewish peoplehood paradigm frees us from having to choose between these two and enables the search for a more inclusive path. It may also address some of the methodological issues that, in my opinion, detract from the most important contribution the GEN08 reports make to both policy and Jewish social science.

While arguing that "home environment is the key to successful transmission of Jewish identity" (p. 14) is a valid truism, what implications does this statement bear? Although we cannot easily change the home environment, we can impact the younger generation outside it. If our concern is to develop a Jewish education and community policy,

confining ourselves to home background might be a valid exercise. It fails to offer us any tools to achieve the overarching goal, however.

Most importantly, the view that religious identification predicts Jewish belonging is also virtually a tautology or circular argument: when "Jewish belonging" is defined in religious terms, the two items become analogous. Although the Jewish day school is said to serve as a more powerful determiner for those coming from a religious home, is this because of the home or the school? These factors must be isolated and distinguished from one another.

This author concurring wholeheartedly with the assertion that acknowledged impact of visiting Israel cannot be assessed in isolation (p. 14), this item will be assessed in conjunction with the measures of formal and informal education, as well as the respondent's religiosity.

The GEN08 analysis of the impact of Jewish schooling on Australian adults (pp. 57–63) was restricted to respondents between the age of 18 and 34, the schools being ranked on a hierarchy of Jewish worldview from the most Orthodox to the least. It is thus unsurprising that the distribution of Orthodox values corresponds to the school pattern: we would not expect to find Orthodox ritual practice patterns amongst non-Orthodox schools or adults. Here, too, we shall thus assess the impact of Jewish schooling, informal Jewish education, and Israel visits within two ideological streams of Australian Jewry in an attempt to address the complex issue of Jewish continuity in Australia via a multivariate analysis, holding the home background of each individual as a constant. While we shall examine Jewish religious practice, we shall also include two additional measures— "identification and connection with the Jewish people" and "Jewish community engagement"—in order to assess the impact of each educational intervention on the intensity of belonging to the Jewish people.

In a separate report, David Graham (2012: 2) explicitly asks: "What is the contribution of Australian Jewish day schools to Jewish identity outcomes in Australia?" Following an in-depth multivariate analysis of 18–34-year-old Australian Jews, he concludes that Jewish day schools do not "by themselves" instill a strong Jewish identity (p. 10). Despite addressing this question, the present author acknowledges that it has no single answer. Since no school acts "by itself", the synergy referred to at the outset remains key, requiring consideration of the particular sector of Australian Jewry being referred to and identification of the specific dependant variable being impacted.

With respect to the independent influence of Israel visits, lead Gen08 researcher Andrew Markus (Markus, 2011) not only contends that the claims for the educational impact of Taglit birthright may be overstated in

North America but also that the program is less relevant for Australia than it is for American Jewry. The subject of Taglit deserves more serious attention. While I personally do not share the GEN08 authors' critique of the American social science literature on Taglit, I do maintain that policy issues must be considered. If Taglit Australia is differentially targeted in order to reach the population most in need of it, its impact may very well serve the goals of Jewish people building to which all aspire.

The present paper also acknowledging that variance in Jewish identity outcomes is not to be explained by Israel visits alone but "…is to be understood in terms of a set of inter related factors" (Markus, 2011: 213), it adopts this as a starting point, introducing an alternative theoretical prism and methodology to that employed in the Gen08 reports in order to provide systematic evidence for this view.

Finally, inquiring into the exclusive impact of Jewish education may be as misleading as arguing for the overwhelming impact of the Jewish home. The question that must be asked is a much broader one: how do the home and the school, together with informal agencies of Jewish education, impact diverse dimensions of Jewish belonging? Despite its more cumbersome and somewhat overwhelming nature, I hope that this formulation will enable a more nuanced conversation and thereby deepen our understanding of the ways in which the different agencies of Jewish education impact the various dimensions of Jewish Peoplehood.

Methodology

In order to comprehend the complex construct of Jewish peoplehood and analyse the relative impact of different variables on peoplehood outcomes, a number of multivariate statistical tools were employed.

The dependent variables were constructed through factor analysis. Included in the factor analysis were only variables which met the condition of being quasi interval likert scale, while none were dichotomous. All variables were recoded so that the response scheme would be in the same direction where 1 is lowest level. Since a number of variables had a different response scale, where the highest score may have been 4, 5 or six, all variables have been converted to Z scores before conducting factor analysis. The factor analysis was utilized in order to reduce the large number of GEN08 survey items to a smaller number of basic factors. The theoretically-driven analysis was directed towards isolating the components of Jewish peoplehood: the correlation matrix between the survey items having been calculated, the extracted factors were then rotated. The outcome is number of factors whose component variables closely correlate with each other but not with items in other

groups or factors. This generates the dependent variables described in Tables 2 and 3 below that serve as the components of "Jewish peoplehood belonging" we are seeking to explain.

With the dependent variables in hand, we are then able to identify which variables drawn from the GEN08 survey can serve as predictors or explanations for the frequency of these factors. This is achieved by the utilization of sequential multiple regression and logistic regression analysis where appropriate. Multiple regression analysis reveals the way in which a number of independent variables operate in isolation to impact a given dependent variable. Any kind of variable may be used for the independent variables—categorical or continuous, etc.—the regression equation providing us with the total variance in the dependent variable that has been explained and the proportion that remains unexplained.

Finally, we employed logistic regression with respect to the dependent variable: "Do you consider yourself as a Zionist", only logistic regression being valid in the case of a dichotomous dependent variable such as this. Logistic regression is also more flexible in rejecting the assumption that an independent variable must be "normally distributed, linearly related or of equal variance within each group" (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007: 437). Nor does it presuppose that the belonging to one of only two outcomes available here is ordered in any direction.

Together, these two forms of multivariate analysis determine that which a series of bivariate analyses cannot—namely, an investigation of the isolated impact of the independent variables, as well as their combined impact on dependent variables.

Findings

Exploratory factor analysis

We conducted a principal-component exploratory factor analysis on 20 items measuring attitudes towards Judaism and Israel across the entire sample of survey participants (N=5840). The principal-component varimax rotation analysis identified 5 factors producing an eigenvalue above 1, which together explain 57% of the items' variance. The resulting factor solution identified five distinct components of Jewish peoplehood. The factor loadings for each of these items are presented in Table 1.

To verify that the scales were internally consistent, a reliability analysis was conducted on all five measures across the whole GEN08 sample. In the first three cases, the scales had Cronbach alphas of 0.67 or higher, suggesting an acceptable level of internal consistency within each

Table 1: The structure of factor analysis (after Varimax rotation) of Jewish identity items[1]—including means, standard deviations, and factor loadings (N=2330)

#	Variable	Mean (SD)	1	2	3	4	5
1	If one of your children said they were going to marry a non-Jew, how would you feel about it? (Q48A) 1= Very pleased	4.08 (0.98)	0.793				
2	When you hear about intermarriage in the community, how do you feel? (Q47New) 1= very pleased	3.79 (0.94)	0.758				
3	Would you like, or have liked, your children to bring up their children as Jews? (Q49R) 1= Prefer them not to bring up their children as Jews	3.50 (0.64)	0.735				
4	How important is it to have a Jewish circle of friends? (Q41R) 1= Not important at all	4.26 (0.92)	0.669				
5	Thinking of your close friends, how many of them ... are Jewish? (Q38_1New) 1= None	3.42 (1.06)	0.623				
6	How important is being Jewish in your life today? (Q25R) 1= Not at all important	3.54 (0.68)	0.492				
7	Sense of centrality of being Jewish in my life? (Q83R) 1= It is of no importance to me	4.04 (0.77)	0.437				
8	How connected do you feel to Jewish communal life? (Q92R) 1= Not at all	3.68 (1.18)		0.732			
9	On issues that are important to you, do you feel that you are able to have a say in the Jewish community?(Q94R) 1= Never	2.90 (1.08)		0.713			
10	Acceptance in the Jewish community (Q81_7R)	4.13 (0.90)		0.700			

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[1] All items meet the criteria for quasi-interval scale definition. All items converted to Z scores prior Factor Analysis.

#	Variable	Mean (SD)	1	2	3	4	5
	1= Very Dissatisfied						
11	How often do you attend organized Jewish functions (other than religious events), whether social, cultural, educational or other? (Q85) 1= Never			0.584			
12	Thinking about the synagogue that you attend most often, do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "I feel comfortable and at home in this congregation"? (Q29R) 1= Strongly disagree	3.89 (1.15)		0.476			
13	When you attend synagogue, what proportion of the service do you feel you know how to participate in? (Q30R) 1= None of the service	2.74 (0.97)			0.827		
14	When Hebrew is being read in the synagogue, how much do you understand? (Q31R) 1= I cannot read the Hebrew alphabet at all	2.68 (1.08)			0.696		
15	How do you usually observe Friday night Sabbath at home? (Q34) 1= Do not observe any rituals	2.41 (0.80)			0.644		
16	How often, if ever, do you fast over Yom Kippur? (Q36R) 1= Never	3.09 (1.20)			0.486		
17	To what extent do you keep up with current events which involve Israel? (Q52R) 1= Not at all	2.88 (0.82)				0.774	
18	When international events put Israel in danger, which one of the following best describes how you feel? (Q54) 1= I do not feel any different about it than I would if another important foreign country were in the same sort of danger	2.94 (0.70)				0.679	
19	How serious would you say anti-Semitism is in Australia today? (Q69R) 1= Not a serious problem at	2.39 (0.70)				0.850	

#	Variable	Mean (SD)	1	2	3	4	5
	all						
20	Do you feel anti-Semitism is worse, about the same or less than it was five years ago? (Q70R) 1= Much worse	3.37 (0.67)				0.817	
	Eigenvalue		3.496	2.410	2,338	1.560	1.476
	R^2		17.482%	12.049%	11.692%	7.798%	7.379%

scale. These measures alone were chosen as the dependent variables for the multivariate analysis (Table 2).

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables: Jewish identity indexes—means and standard deviations, ages 18–44

	Factor	Cronbach alpha
1	**Identification and connection with the Jewish people**	0.855
2	**Jewish community engagement**	0.669
3	**Jewish ritual observance**	0.744
4	**Attachment to Israel**	0.600
5	**Concerned by anti-Semitism in Australia**	0.578

Table 3 presents the means and standard deviation scores of these three indices for the entire survey population of respondents between the ages of 18 and 44 (N=2330). The indices were computed as averages of the following survey items.

Identification and Connection with the Jewish People: Mean of seven variables:- Raising children as Jews, Important to have Jewish friends, Importance of Jewish life today, Importance of being Jewish, Attitude to out-marriage of your children, Attitude to out-marriage in community, How many close friends are Jewish.

Jewish Ritual Practice: Mean of five variables:- Degree of comfort in prayer in synagogue, Degree of understanding Hebrew in Synagogue, Fasting on Yom Kippur, feeling comfortable in congregation, Frequency of home observance of Friday night Sabbath.

Jewish Community Engagement: Mean of four variables:- Degree of connection to Jewish community life, Degree of influence in Jewish

community, Satisfaction with degree of acceptance in Jewish community, frequency of attendance at organised Jewish functions.

Interestingly, the highest score is on the index of "identification and connection with the Jewish people", the lowest on the index of "Jewish ritual observance", "Jewish community engagement" lying between them. This finding raises serious questions regarding to the best method of measuring Jewish belonging and the relative weight of Jewish religion in this analysis.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables: Jewish identity indexes—means and standard deviations, ages 18–44

Index	Mean (SD)	N
Identification and connection with the Jewish people	3.78 (0.68)	2305
Jewish ritual observance	2.91 (0.81)	2299
Jewish community engagement	3.38 (0.83)	2297

This paper seeks to explore the sense of Jewish belonging amongst young Jewish Australians who self-identify as traditional or secular by deliberately proscribing the conventional analyses that includes all religious denominations. Unsurprisingly, these analyses indicate that the more Orthodox a home, the stronger the sense of Jewish belonging, being based on a conceptual paradigm constructed upon a hierarchic model that is over-determined by religion. Moreover, in accentuating home upbringing, they neutralize the intervention impact of school and informal education on adult attitudes, due to the close and intimate correlation between parental doctrinal orthodoxy and the choice to invest—in terms of both discretionary income and discretionary family time—in expensive Jewish education.

Henceforth, we shall focus on these non-denominational respondents. Table 4 presents the mean and standard deviation of the three measures of Jewish belonging we have identified for traditional and secular respondents aged between 18 and 44 (N=1330)—51% of the entire cohort. Here, too, the same consistent pattern reported above of the primacy of "identification with Jewish people" is evident. Unsurprisingly, the lowest dimension for both traditional and secular respondents is "Jewish ritual observance". A t-test analysis was also conducted in order to determine whether any differences obtained between the two groups. While the score of the traditional respondents was statistically significantly higher than

that of the secular respondents on all three measures, both groups exhibited the same paradigmatic pattern.

Table 4: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables: Jewish identity indexes—means and standard deviations, ages 18–44: Secular/traditional comparison

Index	Mean (SD)		T-test
	Secular	**Traditional**	
Identification and connection with the Jewish people	3.26 (0.70)	3.93 (0.48)	19.69***
Jewish ritual observance	2.22 (0.83)	2.90 (0.54)	17.24***
Jewish community engagement	2.88 (0.87)	3.49 (0.69)	13.91***
N	627	703	1330

Table 5 introduces a fourth dependent variable, much discussed both in the general Australian Jewish press and the official GEN08 reports, with great justification. This single item question is "self-identification as a Zionist". It should be noted that most American Jewish social-science surveys would not anticipate the very high community-wide scores reported by Gen08 (see Markus et al., 2011; Markus, 2011: 206). What is remarkable is the high affirmative score of both groups: 62% of the traditional respondents and 87% of the secular respondents. The former score is more than double that of the comparable American Jewish scores measured in 1989 (cf. Markus, 2011: 206).

Table 5: Self Definition Zionist,[2] ages 18–44: All groups and secular/traditional comparison

Variable	Frequency (%)		
	Secular	**Traditional**	**All**
Do you regard yourself as a Zionist? (yes)	62.3%	87.1%	80%
N	628	703	2306

What can we adduce regarding the background of these young Australian traditional and secular Jews? Table 6 reveals several demographic characteristics. Firstly, combined, these two groups

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[2] The table reports the percentage of respondents who answered "yes".

comprise 58% of the entire 18–44-age cohort. This suggests that these groups warrant closer research and community attention.

Table 6: Demographic variables frequencies, ages 18–44: All groups and secular/traditional comparison

Variable		Frequency (%)		
		Secular	**Traditional**	**All**
Visiting Israel (yes)		61.9%	85.9%	87%
Country of origin	Australia	54%	59.3%	60.8%
	FSU	12.2%	5.8%	6.3%
	Europe	4.4%	3.5%	4.7%
	South Africa	8.4%	24.1%	17.3%
	USA	2.1%	1%	2.3%
	Israel	18.8%	6.4%	8.6%
		100%	**100%**	**100%**
Religiosity	Ultra-Orthodox	——	——	5.7%
	Modern Orthodox			21.6%
	Conservative/ Progressive			15.0%
	Traditional			30.5%
	Secular			27.2%
				100%
Age group	18–24	33.9%	20.2%	29.6%
	25–34	35.0%	43.3%	36.9%
	35–44	31.1%	36.6%	33.5%
		100%	**100%**	**100%**
N		628	703	2306

Secondly, with respect to national ancestry, in comparison with the overall age cohort the secular respondents contained a higher percentage of Jews from the former Soviet Union (12% vs. 6% overall) and Israelis (19% vs. 9% overall). The traditional group, on the other hand, contained a higher percentage of South African Jews (24% vs. 17%). The secular respondents also appeared to be younger than the traditional respondents—and the total age cohort. This may reflect the data collection patterns. Finally, while the secular respondents had visited Israel on far fewer occasions than other groups, they still recorded an extraordinarily high rate—one consistent with the Gen08 reports cited above and double the national average in the United States.

In regard to the frequency of Jewish formal and informal education in both groups in comparison with the total cohort, Table 7 presents a series of compound indices constructed in an effort to assess the aggregate exposure of the respondents to various forms of Jewish education. Here again, traditional Jews clearly exhibit a higher exposure to Jewish

education than secular Jews. The disparity is not always as great as might be predicted, however, secular not being synonymous with detachment or lack of engagement. Thus, for example, over two thirds of young secular adults reported some form of exposure to informal Jewish education, just over half having a degree of day-school education. At the same time, a high 37% had no exposure whatever to any informal education, 29% not having any day-school education. Instead, in the final aggregate general index of Jewish education, close to a quarter of secular Jews had no informal or formal Jewish education. 43% had exposure to both and 10% exposure to day school only. Over half of this group thus possessed a considerable measure of Jewish education. We shall return to this theme below.

Table 7: Jewish education variables frequencies, ages 18–44: Comparison of all respondents with secular and traditional

Variable	Values	Frequency (%)		
		Secular	Traditional	All
Informal Jewish education attendance (yes)	———	67.2%	83.5%	78.9%
Full-time Jewish education attendance (yes)	———	52.5%	65.6%	45.7%
Part-time Jewish education attendance (yes)	———	34.9%	42.5%	60.1%
Index of informal Jewish education	None	37.3%	21.1%	26.2%
	Jewish sports club only	39.2%	45.7%	43.0%
	Jewish youth-movement camp only	23.1%	33.3%	30.8%
Index of formal Jewish education	None	29.3%	13.4%	16.8%
	Part-time Jewish education only	18.2%	21.1%	39.9%
	Full-time Jewish education only	35.8%	44.1%	37.6%
	Both part-time and full-time education	16.7%	21.5%	22.6%
General index of Jewish education	None	23.2%	8.5%	13.3%
	Informal education only	24.2%	25.9%	26.6%
	Day-school education only	9.6%	8.0%	7.8%
	Both informal and day-school education	43.0%	57.6%	52.3%
N		628	703	2306

Although the GEN08 data set addresses the question of the cognitive outcomes of all these forms of Jewish education, it has now become clear that the attitudinal and affective outcomes can also be anticipated—at least partially due to the high degree of year-round Jewish peer group association available through Jewish sports clubs and youth movements, subsequently bolstered by annual camps and Israel educational experiences. In a small-scale ethnographic study of four Melbourne Jewish day schools, Ben Moshe and Mittelberg (2012) have illustrated the degree to which cooperation between the informal and formal has become intimate. We can thus now speak in terms of the synergetic impact of day-school and youth-movement education on their alumni.

This data points to the need to target young secular Australian Jews—who are relatively unexposed to either informal or formal Jewish education and at risk of disengagement from the Jewish community. This goal of engaging the unengaged has already been recognized worldwide, serving as the major impetus for the foundation of the Taglit Birthright Israel programme. The programme's structure has been set out in detail in Saxe and Chazan (2008), Saxe et al. (2011) also having published a fine and rich series of research reports not only concerning the programme's direct educational impact on the participants but also its impact on patterns of Jewish marriage across an entire generation of millennials (aged 28 and younger) in North America.

Given the richness of Jewish educational experiences available to Australian Jewish youth, it has been queried whether an Australian Taglit programme is in fact necessary. The answer to this question is complex and certainly not an unequivocal yes or no, depending greatly on the identity of the participants. Issues demanding attention include: Who benefits from Taglit Australia? Who needs it most? Are these groups the same in practical terms? A partial answer is suggested in Tables 8a and 8b, which demonstrate that, amongst those between 18 and 24, those who are Ultra- or Modern Orthodox had visited Israel the most, the secular having visited the least. In fact, 30% of the secular had never been to Israel—in comparison with 14% amongst the former. With respect to reported participation in Taglit *only*, the ratio of secular and Modern Orthodox is similar—7% and 5% respectively—the Ultra-Orthodox demonstrating a high 11%. Although hard to determine, this is probably a quirk of the low number of actual participants of this group in the survey.

In light of the acknowledged Jewish richness of the Orthodox home and school attested to above, the egalitarian distribution of places on Taglit—whether by accident or design—appears to be an unwelcome policy outcome. The community would be far better served in the long term if a more powerful Taglit outreach existed in the sector of 30%

secular who have never been to Israel prior to the age of 24 than the current allocation of Taglit places/subsidies might suggest. Amongst those between 25 and 34 we see—through no fault of any provider—the probable effect of "missing the boat"—a full 41% of these secular Australian Jews never having visited Israel. This sector makes up 20% of the entire 25–34-age cohort and ought not to be ignored. Many are still unmarried and as yet not settled in their family ways. If Gen08 can reach them, so can the education providers.

Table 8a: Israel experience by religiosity, ages 18–24

	Ultra-Orthodox	Modern Orthodox	Conservative/ Progressive	Traditional	Secular	All
Taglit only	11%	5%	4%	4%	7%	5%
Taglit + plus longer programmes	22%	14%	10%	18%	15%	15%
All other programmes not Taglit	53%	68%	65%	61%	48%	60%
Never been to Israel	14%	13%	21%	17%	30%	20%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	36	184	72	128	151	571
Total %	6%	32%	13%	22%	27%	100%

Table 8b: Israel experience by religiosity, ages 25–34

	Ultra-Orthodox	Modern Orthodox	Conservative/ Progressive	Traditional	Secular	All
Taglit only	5%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%
Taglit + plus longer programmes	7%	4%	3%	3%	1%	3%
All other programmes not Taglit	69%	74%	64%	74%	56%	69%
Never been to Israel	19%	20%	31%	21%	41%	26%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	58	140	88	267	135	688
Total %	8%	20%	13%	39%	20%	100%

Jewish peoplehood education
Multivariate analysis

In what ways do educational interventions impact this complex construct of Jewish peoplehood or its constituent components? To answer this question, we employed a series of linear regression models, the following three of the five factors adduced above serving as dependent variables:

Factor 1: Identification and connection with the Jewish people.
Factor 2: Jewish community engagement.
Factor 3: Jewish ritual observance.

A fourth dependent variable comprised the single item question: Do you consider yourself as a Zionist?

The following items were used as independent variables in the analyses: the background variables of Jewish Religious identification and age , two measures of formal Jewish schooling, one measure of informal Jewish education as well as the additional informal education measure of Israel visits. In view of the fact that Australia in general and the Jewish community in particular, have a significant migrant intake, the analysis was controlled for local born compared to foreign born.

Results

Table 9 presents the three linear regression models applied to all the participants aged between 18 and 44 (N= 2099). While the same independent variables are included in each model, their impact is assessed with regard to each different dependent variable. In line with the findings reported by Markus et al (2011), religiosity of the home is positively correlated with identification and connection with the Jewish people, the implication being that that the Ultra- and Modern Orthodox contribute more to this variable than do the traditional and secular. In addition, the findings from the equation predicting impact on identification and connection with the Jewish people indicate that visiting Israel, informal Jewish education, and formal day-school education all also make an independent positive contribution to the impact. Foreign-born Australian Jews are also slightly more likely to predict this variable than those born in Australia. Finally, participation in supplementary education is *negatively* linked to this dependent variable.

Looking more closely at table 9, in the first pair of regressions predicting the relative impact of variables in the model (Beta's), on the dependent variable identification with the Jewish people, we find that the beta value of Religiosity is a high 0.48 which drops slightly to 0.46 when Israel visits is added in second regression model, formal Jewish full time education is 0.15 dropping to 0.12 when Israel visits is added, Informal Jewish education is 0.15 dropping to 0.12 when Israel Visits is added.

Table 9: Coefficients of sequential linear regression models predicting "identification with the Jewish people", "Jewish ritual observance", and "Jewish community engagement" amongst participants aged 18–44

	Identification with the Jewish people		Jewish ritual observance		Jewish community engagement	
Age	(b) 0.004*	0.003	0.000	-0.001	-0.007**	-0.008***
	(S.E) (0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
	(β) 0.048	0.037	-0.003	-0.011	-0.069	-0.082
Religiosity[3]	0.260***	0.248***	0.368***	0.359***	0.204***	0.189***
	(0.010)	(0.01)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	0.013
	0.478	0.457	0.573	0.558	0.313	0.289
Origin (0=other, 1 = Australian)	-0.083**	-0.073**	-0.073*	-0.066*	0.003	0.016
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.037)
	-0.059	-0.052	-0.044	-0.039	0.002	0.009
Informal Jewish education (0=None, 1 = yes)	0.261***	0.209***	0.172***	0.130***	0.294***	0.226***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.044)
	0.149	0.119	0.083	0.063	0.139	0.107
Formal Jewish full- time education (0=None, 1 = yes)	0.205***	0.165***	0.250***	0.218***	0.114**	0.061
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.041)
	0.146	0.117	0.151	0.131	0.068	0.036

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[3] The values are: 1 = Secular till 5 = Orthodox

	Identification with the Jewish people		Jewish ritual observance		Jewish community engagement	
Formal Jewish part- time education (0=None, 1 = yes)	-0.079** (0.027) -0.059	-.079** (0.026) -0.058	0.127*** (0.030) 0.079	0.127*** (0.029) 0.079	0.012 (0.035) 0.008	0.013 (0.035) 0.008
Visiting Israel (0=Never, (1 = yes)	-----	0.373*** (0.038) 0.185	-----	0.304*** (0.042) 0.127	-----	0.497*** (0.05) 0.205
Constant	2.762	2.557	1.687	1.521	2.790	2.519
R²	28.9%	32.1%	38.6%	40.2%	14.6%	18.5%
F	141.599***	141.125***	219.514***	200.366***	59.571***	67.781***
F change		98.629***		52.832***		100.072***
N	2099		2098		2094	

*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

These patterns persist for the other two dependent variables in table 9. Most interestingly, *part time* formal Jewish education, is negatively correlated with identification with the Jewish people (-.06) but positively correlated with Jewish religious practice (0.08), while bearing no significant correlation with Jewish community engagement at all. It would appear that the narrow focus of curriculum and limited exposure to students, results in Sunday school pupils having engagement in synagogue but hardly with the local Jewish community or the worldwide Jewish people.

These data support the frequently-reported finding that while religious identification is an important predictor of identification with the Jewish people it does not constitute the sole factor. This regression strongly corroborates the claim that Israel visits, day-school education, and informal education all add independently to the model's explanation strength—a 32% variance explanation (a considerable percentage in social-science terms). It is important to stress that in each model two sets of regressions were run in what is termed sequential linear regression analysis where in the first model Israel visits is *excluded* and only in the second model is it included. This procedure is followed in tables 9 10, 11 and 12. What this tells us is the striking finding that while in addition to

the obvious impact of the home background, formal and informal Jewish education make an important *additional* contribution to explanation of the variance in the dependent variable. Moreover, over and above these schooling variables, the Israel visit adds further additional explanation of variance which is demonstrated not only by the additional value of R sq (3%), but also the high statistical significance of F change, in this and each and every subsequent model.

With respect to the second equation, religious identification predicts even more strongly Jewish ritual practice. Yet here too, the other educational interventions, schooling and Israel visits—with the exception of part-time supplementary education—also contribute to the outcome, the equation providing an almost 40% total-variance explanation.

The third model—presented in Table 9 —relates to the impact of these variables on Jewish community engagement. The findings indicate that the role of religiosity is diminished although still important, the weight of visiting Israel increasing markedly in comparison with the previous two equations adding 6% of RSQ. In relation to the other variables, age appears to make a difference on the one hand—i.e., older respondents are more engaged—while national origin and participation in supplementary education lose all significance on the other. A critical finding is that informal Jewish education has more impact on Jewish community engagement than day-school education. Indeed, when Israel Visits is added to the equation, day school education loses significance altogether in deference to the former and informal Jewish education, as well as the background variable of religiosity. These findings illustrate the importance of such informal education and Israel visits for the sustainability of the Jewish community. This equation generates a 19% variance explanation.

Table 10 gives the results for a repetition of the same exercise with all three regression models, this time amongst traditional respondents aged between 18 and 44 exclusively. It must be understood here that the very selection of a particular subsector weakens the power of many variables— not to speak of the actual equation—a great deal of variance being eliminated simply by virtue of the fact that the group under study is homogeneous. However the importance of this analysis lies in the fact that it indicates for example, the need to enhance Jewish education of secular respondents while recognizing the power of informal Jewish education and Israel visits to impact on the Jewishness of this group.

We can nonetheless ask: what overall patterns arise out of the three regression analyses in Table 10? The first indicates that visiting Israel is a powerful predictor of all dependent variables, most prominently of "Jewish community engagement". Indeed, only age and Israel visits are

significant predictors of Jewish community engagement amongst younger traditional Australian Jews. Two other independent variables—not being born in Australia and attending Jewish day school—both serve as predictors of Jewish ritual observance in addition to visiting Israel. Informal Jewish education has no impact on any of the three dependent variables amongst the traditional respondents.

Table 10: Coefficients of sequential linear regression models predicting "identification with the Jewish people", "Jewish ritual observance", and "Jewish community engagement" amongst *traditional* **participants aged 18–44**

	Identification with the Jewish people		Jewish ritual observance		Jewish community engagement	
Age	0.001	0.001	-0.004	-0.004	-0.009*	-.009**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
	0.019	0.019	-0.060	-0.059	-0.100	-0.099
Origin (0=other, 1 = Australian)	-0.092*	-0.099*	-0.160***	-0.168***	-0.027	-0.041
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.061)	(0.059)
	-0.092	-0.098	-0.145	-0.153	-0.019	-0.029
Informal Jewish education(0=None, 1 = Yes)	0.054	0.051	0.031	0.026	0.093	0.085
	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.076)	(0.073)
	0.040	0.038	0.021	0.018	0.049	0.045
Formal Jewish full-time education (0=None, 1 = yes)	0.079	0.073	0.140**	0.132*	0.083	0.071
	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.069)	(0.067)
	0.075	0.070	0.122	0.116	0.057	0.049
Formal Jewish part-time education (0=None, 1 = yes)	-0.053	-0.050	0.030	0.034	-0.020	-0.014
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.055)
	-0.054	-0.051	0.028	0.032	-0.015	-0.010
Visiting Israel (0=Never, 1 = yes)	-----	0.251***	-----	0.338***	-----	0.577***
		(0.069)		0.074		(0.094)
		0.141		0.174		0.233
Constant	3.876	3.653	3.002	2.702	3.697	3.185
R²	1.4%	3.3%	2.6%	5.6%	2%	7.4%
F	1.788	3.738***	3.473**	6.426***	2.687*	8.700***
F change	-----	13.317***	-----	20.667***		38.000***
N	658		658		658	

*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

With respect to the analysis of the secular respondents only (see Table 11), a quite different pattern emerges. Firstly, the most important variable by far, to significantly predict all three dependent variables—including "Jewish ritual observance"—is informal Jewish education. Visiting Israel also predicts all three dependent variables. The primary impact of day-school education on this group of respondents is upon "Jewish ritual

observance", followed by "identification with the Jewish people", but it has no impact on "Jewish community engagement". In these analyses, Israel visits and informal education make the larger and more significant difference. Of particular interest is the fact that, amongst the secular group, part-time Jewish schooling impacts the degree of Jewish religious practice. It is of note that visiting Israel makes a powerful contribution to identification with the Jewish people for secular respondents as well as a smaller but still significant contribution to their degree of Jewish community engagement.

Table 11: Coefficients of sequential linear regression models predicting "identification with the Jewish people", "Jewish ritual observance" and "Jewish community engagement" amongst *secular* participants aged 18–44

	Identification with the Jewish people		Jewish ritual observance		Jewish community engagement	
Age	-0.005 (0.004) -0.059	-0.006 (0.004) -0.070	-0.010* (0.004) -0.095	-0.010* (0.004) -0.103	-0.016*** (0.005) -0.148	-0.017*** (0.005) -0.157
Origin (0=other, 1 = Australian))	-0.033 (0.069) -0.022	-0.009 (0.068) -0.006	-0.052 (0.077) -0.031	-0.034 (0.077) -0.020	0.040 (0.083) 0.022	0.063 (0.083) 0.035
Informal Jewish Education (0=None, 1 = yes)	0.423*** (0.075) 0.261	0.360*** (0.075) 0.222	0.328*** (0.084) 0.178	0.280*** (0.085) 0.151	0.536*** (0.091) 0.270	0.477*** (0.092) 0.240
Formal Jewish full- time education (0=None, 1 = yes)	0.187** (0.071) 0.128	0.142* (0.071) 0.097	0.375*** (0.080) 0.226	0.341*** (0.080) 0.205	0.143 (0.086) 0.080	0.101 (0.086) 0.056
Formal Jewish part- time education (0=None, 1 = yes)	-0.108 (0.065) -0.074	-0.116 (0.064) -0.080	0.228** (0.073) 0.138	0.222** (0.073) 0.134	0.031 (0.079) 0.017	0.024 (0.078) 0.018
Visiting Israel (0=Never, (1 = yes)	-----	0.313*** (0.064) 0.080	-----	0.241** (0.083) 0.125	-----	0.294*** (0.089) 0.142
Constant	3.029	3.198	1.964	1.849	2.860	2.722
R²	9.8%	13.8%	13.3%	14.8 %	12.9%	14.8%
F	11.919***	13.337***	15.346***	14.392***	14.695***	10.844***
F change		18.356***		8.472**		14.296***
N	506		505		502	

*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

The GEN08 survey includes in this cohort a relatively small group of respondents (N=325) who self-identified as Conservative or Progressive. While the discussion has not included this group thus far due to size, we conducted the same three regressions on this group (see Table 12). In common with their secular peers, visiting Israel impacts "identification with the Jewish people", "Jewish ritual observance", and "Jewish communal engagement". As with the secular group, a positive impact obtains between supplementary Jewish education and Jewish religious practice, — day-school education and foreign ancestry producing no variance at all.

Table 12: Coefficients of sequential linear regression models predicting "identification with the Jewish people", "Jewish ritual observance", and "Jewish community engagement" amongst *Conservative/Progressive* participants aged 18–44

	Identification with the Jewish people		Jewish ritual observance		Jewish community engagement	
Age	0.005 (0.004) 0.073	0.004 (0.004) 0.060	-0.002 (0.005) -0.029	-0.003 (0.005) -0.038	-0.016** (0.006) -0.170	-.017** (0.005) -0.182
Origin(0=other, 1 = Australian)	-0.015 (0.065) -0.013	-0.019 (0.064) -0.016	-0.022 (0.081) -0.015	-0.025 (0.080) -0.018	0.062 (0.107) 0.088	0.056 (0.096) 0.033
Informal Jewish education (0=None, 1 = yes)	0.168* (0.072) 0.133	0.108 (0.072) 0.085	0.113 (0.089) 0.072	0.061 (0.091) 0.039	0.165 (0.107) 0.088	0.082 (0.108) 0.044
Formal Jewish full- time education (0=None, 1 = yes)	0.119 (0.065) 0.114	0.086 (0.065) 0.082	0.095 (0.081) 0.073	0.067 (0.081) 0.051	-0.003 (0.097) -0.002	-0.049 (0.096) -0.031
Formal Jewish part- time education ((0=None, 1 = yes)	0.050 (0.066) (0.046)	0.059 (0.074) 0.054	0.273*** (0.081) 0.200	0.280*** (0.081) 0.205	0.149 (0.098) 0.091	0.161 (0.096) 0.099
Visiting Israel (0=Never, (1 = yes)	-----	0.286*** (0.068) 0.217	-----	0.241** (0.092) 0.147		0.390*** (0.110) 0.199
Constant	3.169	3.025	2.751	2.630	3.592	3.397
R²	3.4%	7.8%	4.6%	6.6%	4.9%	8.6%
F	2.260*	4.457***	3.105**	3.770***	3.286**	4.948***
F change		14.950***		6.809**		12.654***
N	325		325		324	

*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

With respect to collective Jewish belonging, we analysed the issue of Zionist self-identification. This question most closely approximates an inquiry regarding Jewish peoplehood in the survey:

Do you regard yourself as a Zionist? By "Zionist" we mean that you feel connected to the Jewish people, Jewish history, culture, and beliefs, the Hebrew language, and the Jewish homeland, Israel.

Table 13: Coefficients of logistic regression models, predicting the probability of "Do you consider yourself as a Zionist?"[4] aged 18–44: Total sample compared with traditional and secular combined and traditional and secular respondents separately.

	All	Traditional and Secular	Traditional	Secular
Age	(b) 0.017*	0.018	-0.002	0.006
	(S.E) (0.008)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.013)
	(Exp. B) 1.018	1.019	0.998	1.006
Visiting Israel (0=Never, 1 = yes)	1.326***	1.689***	1.502***	1.524**
	(0.145)	(0.180)	(0.313)	(0.239)
	3.765	5.413	4.491	4.591
Religiosity[5]	-0.444***			
	(0.052)	----------	----------	---------
	1.559			
Origin ((0=other, 1 = Australian)	-0.009	-0.029	-0.194	0.225
	(0.130)	(0.163)	(0.274)	(0.219)
	0.991	0.971	0.824	1.252
Informal Jewish education (0=None, 1 = yes)	0.351*	0.413*	0.274	0.229
	(0.146)	(0.180)	(0.316)	(0.241)
	1.420	1.511	1.315	1.258
Formal Jewish full-time education (0=None, 1 = yes)	0.428**	0.585***	0.522	0.426
	(0.142)	(0.173)	(0.298)	(0.227)
	1.534	1.796	1.686	1.531
Formal Jewish part-time education (0=None, 1 = yes)	0.074	0.050	-0.010	0.020
	(0.126)	(0.156)	(0.257)	(0.210)
	1.077	1.051	0.991	1.020
Constant	-1.854	-1.564	0.200	-1.607
Cox & Snell R Square	**10.7%**	**10.9%**	**4%**	**12%**
Nagelkerke R Square	**16.8%**	**16.1%**	**7.3%**	**16.2%**
-2 Log Likelihood	2133.899***	1195.747***	491.205***	623.978***
N	2099	1164	658	506

*$p<0.05$ **$p<0.01$ ***$p<0.001$

Notably, this definition does not call for any affirmation of religious practice beyond the broad term "beliefs". Since this variable is a

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[4] Do you consider yourself as a Zionist: No = 0, Yes = 1
[5] The values are: 1 = Secular till 5 = Orthodox

dichotomous yes/no response question, we employed a logistic regression model, valid for this type of analysis. The results are presented in Table 13. The independent variables remain precisely the same as in the previous analyses. The analysis of the entire 18–44-age cohort (N=2099) also exhibits the same pattern reported previously—namely, the powerful impact of visiting Israel and both informal and formal education, in addition to the respondent's religiosity. When looking at only the traditional and secular groups combined, these two schooling variables retain their significance though the day school is more powerful, in addition to visiting Israel. However, when looking separately at each of the two subgroups—traditional and secular—we find that the *only* powerful educational variable predicting Zionist self-definition is visiting Israel, this is particularly powerful in the case of secular respondents where the RSQ ranges from 12% to 16%.. It should be noted that while Israeli-born Australian Jews were excluded from the overall multivariate analysis, 90% of former Israelis affirmed that they are Zionist as compared with the overall 80% in the age cohort. Amongst FSU respondents, the rate was only 67%.

Discussion

These findings indicate that Jewish peoplehood is a multi-dimensional complex construct that cannot be reduced to religious identification alone. In addition, Jewish peoplehood itself is impacted differentially by the independent variables of Jewish schooling, informal education, and Israel visits. While Jewish religiosity is a common impact denominator on Jewish belonging, it is not the sole factor, the other variables adduced above also playing a role.

Based on the Gen08 data set, we can identify three separate dimensions of Jewish belonging, each of which are impacted in divergent ways by different forms of Jewish education. This impact also varies for the various categories of Australian Jews. Jewish peoplehood is thus a pluralistic paradigm inclusive of different types of Jews that allows us to comprehend how the entire Jewish people can be culturally sustained. This goal calls for a more nuanced construct of Jewish belonging that is grounded in—but not over determined by—Jewish religion.

The multivariate analysis suggests that the various forms of Jewish education available in Australia today carry differentially independent weights for different types of Australian Jews.

This is particularly pertinent to the specific educational needs of secular Jews for whom we have demonstrated here that informal Jewish education and visits to Israel serve as primary agencies of Jewish

education and Jewish belonging. While these forms of Jewish education are frequently complementary and mutually reinforcing, they cannot be reduced into one another nor to the home or the degree of doctrinal orthodoxy of the household.

Visiting Israel is of crucial importance across all sectors of Australian Jewry, playing a particularly critical role in guaranteeing "Jewish community engagement" amongst all young adult Australian Jews— particularly amongst the secular or non-religious. Its contribution is *independent*, precisely because it is partially independent of parental choice of Jewish home, Jewish schooling or its absence

Sadly, it would appear that part-time supplementary Jewish education consistently fails to enhance other forms of Jewish education, frequently being negatively correlated with the dependent variable components of Jewish belonging. The notable exception is Jewish ritual observance amongst secular and Conservative/Progressive Jews. This finding calls for a renewed critical review of this educational framework, especially when it too often constitutes the only type of Jewish education to which significant sectors of young Australian Jews are exposed.

The strategic universal importance of visiting Israel for augmenting the sense of Jewish belonging—long recognized in Australia—is now eminently clear for the rapidly growing sector of young Australians self-identified as *secular*. This suggests that a proactive policy needs to be implemented in order to enhance the penetration of Taglit into this sector—perhaps even at the expense of other richly-served sectors of the Australian Jewish community. While this course is possibly already being pursued, the Gen 08 data cannot determine this fact. Clearly, however, much remains to be done before this sector is brought to parity with their peers in the 18–24 age cohort.

Jewish education in Australia

Most critically, this paper argues that that educational intervention has a direct impact on the degree of belonging to the Jewish people *independently of home religious background*, whether religious, traditional, or secular. These findings are consistent with earlier research of the author (Mittelberg 1988, 1994 1999, 2007, and Lev Ari and Mittelberg 2008) as well as the recent research by the Cohen Center on Taglit Birthright Israel (Saxe et al 2011). Why then do the primary authors of the Gen 08 reports down play the role of day school education and Israel visits in Jewish identity formation? (Graham 2012). It seems to me to be an outcome of the restricted operationalisation of what Judaism and Jewish belonging amounts to, discussed above. Judaism as Jews live it

rather than as Rabbis preach it, is not best understood nor exhausted by a denominational hierarchy of doctrinal orthodoxy but as a civilization that encompasses a pluralistic spectrum of Jewish commitment and multiple modes of attachment and belonging, beyond the synagogue which may be revered, but hardly attended.

With respect to the fourfold paradigm of Jewish peoplehood offered above, the findings indicate that, while day schools do indeed serve as drivers towards enhanced Jewish ritual practice and probably other cognitive measures, such as learning Hebrew (Jewish cultural capital), youth-movement participation and visits to Israel are the principal drivers of Jewish community activism (interpersonal attachment) and ultimately Jewish commitment and belonging (Jewish responsibility).

Why is this so? Young Australian Jews exercise choice in reinventing different forms of Jewish belonging as old forms wax and wane. Their multiple identities place variant emphases on synagogue, community involvement, and attachment to Israel, as well as increased commitment to local community and citizenship. In our global world, declining religiosity does not necessarily correlate with declining attachment to the symbolic homeland and vice versa and Jewish education has important outcomes for sustaining collective belonging to the Jewish people.

As indicated, inter alia, by Ben Moshe and Mittelberg the most likely factor capable of sustaining the Australian Jewish community and the Jewish people worldwide in the generations to come is the synergetic collaboration of various forms of Jewish education in Australia and the more universal distribution of an educational tour to Israel.

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IN THE ISLANDS OF THE SEA: GEOGRAPHY IN THE RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE JEWS OF BRITAIN

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Abstract

Britain's Jewish community has experienced a unique religious history. This can only be explained by several factors, but one of those is Britain's unusual geographical circumstances. It is a long, narrow island just a few miles off the coast of North Western Europe. It has long enjoyed intimate connections to the European mainland without ever being quite part of it. In the case of Anglo-Jewry this has led to a double disadvantage. It was neither part of the vigorous intellectual mainstream nor was it so detached that it was forced to rely on its own resources. Instead it was left semi-dependent, which inhibited exciting local religious developments. This seems to have been the case in both the medieval period, between Jewish settlement in the 1060s and expulsion in 1290, and again since the return of an open Jewish community in the seventeenth century.

The location of London in the South East of Britain fostered a particular relationship between the capital and the provinces. Regional communities could establish their own religious identities, leading to friction as central authorities attempted to assert control. The leaders of London Jewry were also involved with overseas communities. Britain was a maritime power and developed a maritime empire. Communities in the British style, with all its idiosyncrasies, were planted around the world. This article analyses these impacts of geography on British Jewish religious life, and places them in a theoretical context using scholarship on the role of its island status in moulding British history.

Introduction

Britain's outstanding physical attribute is that it is an island.[1] England, Scotland, Wales, Ireland and the smaller land masses nearby are known as the 'British Isles' and even the attempt by John Pocock to drain the nomenclature of Anglo-centricity merely introduced the equally island-based phrase 'Atlantic Archipelago'.[2] It has never been otherwise. Jewish and non-Jewish sources alike were interested in Britain as an island. The first fact Tacitus tells us about Britain in his biography of Agricola, who was Governor of Britain and Tacitus' father-in-law, is that it is 'the largest of the islands known to the Romans'.[3] In his elegy for the Jews who died in the mass suicide in York in 1190 R. Menahem ben Yaakov quoted Isaiah 24:15 to identify Britain as 'the islands of the sea'.

The British internalised their island. It became as much a cultural or ideological attitude as a physical fact.[4] As the sociologist and geographer Alex Law has argued, Britain became a 'mental island' in which the inhabitants defined themselves and their relationship with the rest of the world and its population though their status as island dwellers. As Law writes, unlike land borders, 'in their physicality, visibility and regularity, sea borders accentuate and colour the imagined political, military and cultural tension between the defensive and offensive functions inscribed in the boundary'.[5] In *Richard II*, Shakespeare delights in island imagery: ''this precious stone set in the silver sea".[6] From the seventeenth century the English, and then the British, adopted the Roman symbol of Britannia, sitting amidst the waves, trident in hand. *Rule Britannia* from Thomas Arne's 1740 masque *Alfred*, using words by James Thomson, refers to Britain rising 'from out the azure main', a 'blessed isle' with a 'happy coast'. The idea of Britons as 'an island race' grew stronger in the nineteenth century, reaching its apogee in the writings of Winston Churchill and Arthur Bryant, and continues today.

What was the impact of Britain as a physical and mental island? Paul Vidal de la Blache and later Fernand Braudel and the *Annales* school, analysed the powerful role of geography as a long term cause, above the 'dust of events'.[7] As Braudel wrote, 'behind all of human history there is this actor – an actor who promptly transforms himself, who is always adroit, who always presses himself forward and who is often decisive in

his intervention. What shall we call him? Space? The word says too little. The earth? An equivocal name. Let us say the geographical milieu'.[8] The historical consequences of British geography, including Britain as a physical and mental island, have been the subject of consistent interest by scholars. I want to look at one aspect which has not yet been examined systematically: the role of geography in the religious life of British Jews, both medieval and modern.

Before we proceed further, two notes about methodology. First, the purpose of this article is not to bring to light new data, but rather to analyse facts which are already know in a new and, I hope, enlightening way. Secondly, it is impossible to perform a complete analysis on every aspect of Jewish religious life in Britain and how it relates to British geography in the space available here. I have therefore touched on a selection of themes, with the hope that this will spark further conversation.

I want to suggest that although the effects of geography were refracted through different political, economic, social and cultural factors, religious life in both medieval and modern British Jewry developed in response to its geographical context. This is not a complete explanation of the development of religious life in British Jewry, but it is part of the explanation. I will argue that in the medieval period, as an island twenty two miles off the coast of Northern France, Britain was both too near and too far from longer-established and stronger communities for British Jewry to develop its own religious identity and independent institutions and resources. In the modern period, some of this dependence remained, but concurrently, Britain's development as a maritime power ruling an empire, planted the particular form of British Judaism around the world, so that a religious culture that developed in response to specific local circumstances became an international phenomenon. Within Britain, the religious life of provincial communities developed in a way that reflected the geographical fact of a long, narrow country, with the capital located in the South East, far from many of the places it aspired to control.

Too Near and Too Far

The first impact of Britain's geographical position as an island on the periphery of Europe was that Jews came to Britain relatively late and as a transplanted outpost of established communities. Although small numbers of Jews may have settled under Roman rule, no permanent Jewish population appeared in Britain of its own accord.[9] Jews arrived in Germany in the fourth century, spread to France around the year 1000 but had proceeded no further by the time Duke William of Normandy

conquered England in 1066 and invited Jews from Rouen to settle in his new kingdom. Moving to a land previously entirely without Jews made the new community highly dependent on the Crown with long term consequences.[10] As Anglo-Jewry was not a free-standing community but merely an out-of-the-way corner of French Jewry, it never grew to any great size in the medieval period. At its height in 1200, there were probably only between 4,000 and 5,000 Jews in England, compared to up to 125,000 Jews in France.[11]

If this was the result of being distant, Anglo-Jewry also felt the effects of proximity. English Jews remained culturally attached to the French community because they were too near and too small to be anything else. In the first decades of their settlement Jews regularly went backwards and forwards between London and Rouen, and just as England was merely one province of the Norman Empire, so its Jews were part of a single French community. English Jews maintained frequent contact with the mainland, sustaining a shared identity.[12] English Jews spoke French. When French Jews mourned the Blois Massacre in 1171, English Jews joined them, for example by observing fasts. [13] When the community of York disappeared in the wake of Christian violence, elegies were written in France.[14]. When a synod of French rabbis convened in 1170 to enact communal *takkanot* (decrees), they invited colleagues from England.[15]

The close connections between the Jews of England and France only began to weaken in 1204 when King John of England lost his Norman possessions and travel between England and France became more difficult. Yet as late as 1242 Muriel, whose husband David of Oxford was attempting to divorce her against her will, appealed to the *bet din* (rabbinical court) of Paris to adjudicate. She was keen to involve the French authorities because they had accepted the decree attributed to Rabbenu Gershom, the leading Northern European authority around the year 1000, which prohibited the divorce of a woman against her will.[16] English rabbis, somewhat removed from European developments by the mid thirteenth century, had not accepted the injunction. Yet it is apparent that almost two hundred years after they first arrived the Jews of England still looked to French Jewry as the seat of authority. It is true that some distinctively English customs did emerge.[17] By the end of the thirteenth century the English *get* (bill of divorce) was slightly different from that used in France, and there were some minor variations in the liturgy.[18] Nevertheless, by the end of the medieval period of Anglo-Jewish history the English community had not firmly established itself as a separate entity, which is one reason why after the expulsion of 1290 English Jews did not maintain their identity and simply merged back into the French branch of Ashkenaz.

Scholarship

As a secondary community, Anglo-Jewry failed to produce or attract first rank scholars, and this reinforced its subordinate status. The small Jewish population could not generate or support scholars on a large scale and the great Jewish authorities of Northern France were too close for the community to need talmudists and halakhists of great stature on the ground. Commonplace questions could be answered locally by someone competent but not exceptional. More complex inquiries could be answered within a week by communicating with Troyes, Ramperupt, Corbeil or elsewhere. The religious leaders of London Jewry in the twelfth century left barely a trace on rabbinic literature.[19] Physical proximity inhibited intellectual independence and vitality.

The growth of indigenous scholarship was impeded further by the perfectly reasonable personal considerations of established or promising scholars on the Continent. They could choose to study with one of the great scholars of the age in Northern France, or they could remove themselves from the centre of Jewish intellectual life to travel to England. They had no interest in depriving themselves of the opportunities on their doorstep, and so they stayed at home. So, as well as being too near to be culturally independent, it was also too far to be fully part of the intellectual milieu. England's situation in the twelfth century was similar to France in the eleventh, when French Jews, including Rashi, went back to their ancestral communities in Germany to study.[20] By the time French Jewry began to suffer major persecutions in the middle of the thirteenth century, Anglo-Jewry was already in decline, and was in no position to provide a new centre for Jewish intellectual life.[21]

There were two brief and partial exceptions to this pattern, which both arose when the usual geographical factors were not active. The only place in England with a concentration of serious Jewish scholars in the twelfth century was York. There were at least four significant rabbis in York in the last quarter of the twelfth century.[22] They were imported by the small but wealthy Jewish community, which was established to provide finance in the North of England. Just as it was inconvenient for people in the North who wanted to borrow money to deal with financiers in London, it was also difficult for York's Jews to have to rely on religious rulings from London, which was two hundred miles away and even more difficult to consult with Northern France. It therefore needed an indigenous scholarly community, which persisted until York Jewry was destroyed in 1190.[23]

The other exception was late thirteenth century London, just before the expulsion of 1290. R. Elijah Menaham of London (1220-1284) was

the leader of Anglo-Jewry as it reached its final crisis. Rapacious taxation and religious persecution isolated England from foreign communities, whose Jews were naturally disinclined to travel or settle in England. At this point London Jews finally had to rely on their own intellectual resources. R. Elijah Menahem filled that need, as a *posek* (jurist) and commentator. He may have been the editor of the *Tosafot* on *Rosh Hashanah* and his and his contemporaries' original work was collected into the *Tosafot Hakhmei Anglia*. This is not a work of primary importance in rabbinic literature, but was the most impressive Jewish scholarship to emerge from the whole period of medieval Anglo-Jewry.[24]

Regional Communities and Religious Leniency

We have dealt thus far primarily with London Jewry. The Jews' great dependence on the Crown encouraged them to remain in London, but the death of Henry I in 1135 precipitated a civil war between his daughter Matilda and his nephew, Stephen. The ensuing disturbances promoted the spread of Jews around England. Substantial communities arose in regional centres, including Oxford, Norwich and Lincoln, but even they were too small to support a full range of religious institutions. When in 1177 Jews were allowed to be buried outside London, the Jews of Lincoln used the York cemetery because they lacked the resources to maintain their own.[25]

English Jews came to rely on certain halakhic leniencies because they lacked the facilities of larger and better connected communities. Unlike many French Jews who were stringent, English Jews ate bread and drank beer and cider made by non-Jews. English Jews did not drink wine made by non-Jews and therefore had to procure wine from the continent. They obtained the agreement of Rabbenu Tam for it to be imported under one seal, rather than two, which presumably eased transit. This imported wine was scarce and expensive, so instead of drinking the prescribed quantity (a 'cheekful') usually required after making *Kiddush*, English Jews would just sip a little.[26] There was a disagreement among English rabbinical authorities regarding milk produced without Jewish supervision. R. Benjamin of Cambridge, who was a student of Rabbenu Tam, adopted the Northern French opinion and ruled that such milk was forbidden even if the farmer had no non-kosher animals. R. Joseph of Lincoln disagreed, and responding to the exigencies of the English situation held that as non-kosher animals were not milked in England, unsupervised milk could be drunk.[27]

Accusations of Ritual Murder and Mass Suicide

Until the spread of Jews out of London, most English Christians knew Jews only as the targets of anti-Jewish polemics preached in church, or represented in mystery plays, telling Biblical stories and acted out by local guilds. In the story of the death of Jesus the Jews inevitable received an unsympathetic portrayal. The arrival of real Jews in dozens of settlements around the country must have come as a profound religious shock to their inhabitants. These provincial Jews were not only new in town, they were also distant from the royal protection available in London. It may not be incidental that the first accusation of Jewish ritual murder took place in a provincial community just after the Jews arrived, in the case of William of Norwich in 1144.[28] The story of William began a trend across Christendom as ritual murder accusations and blood libels spread around Europe. In England alone there were three more such accusations in the twelfth century, all outside London: Harold of Gloucester in 1168, Robert of Bury St Edmund's in 1181 and Adam of Bristol in 1183.[29]

The best known example of anti-Jewish violence in medieval England also had a provincial setting. The events in York in 1190 sprang from resentment at the Jews' financial power, but it only ended as bloodily as it did because of York's distance from London. When disturbances broke in London out at Richard I's coronation banquet in 1189 they were swiftly brought under control by the King's men. With only a local sheriff and garrison in York and without the King's personal intervention, the violence in York went unchecked and most of the community committed suicide in Clifford's Tower rather than face the mob. Even though a financial community reassembled fairly soon afterwards, this destruction ended York as a centre of Jewish learning.[30]

Expulsion

After the Jews' enemies killed the survivors of Clifford's Tower they burned the debt records. The Crown taxed money-lending and in response Richard I instituted a system of holding the Jews' records in secure locations and set up the Exchequer of the Jews to administer Jewish affairs.[31] English monarchs enjoyed the best knowledge of Jewish financial dealings of any ruler in Europe. This allowed for much more efficient taxation, which by the 1250s was overwhelming and ruined the Jews.[32] Around 10% of the Jewish population converted, and others turned to crime, especially coin clipping.[33] Some English Jews consulted the Maharam (R. Meir ben Barukh) of Rothenberg, the leading authority

of his day in Northern Europe about whether they were bound by an oath not to clip coins if they had made mental reservations. He replied that they were not permitted to clip coins even if they had not made an oath.[34] When the Jews had been drained dry they were no longer useful to the Crown and when it was politically expedient Edward I expelled them. On an island this was not difficult to effect. In the summer of 1290 Jews were accompanied to the coast, put on ships and sent to the Continent. There is no evidence of crypto-Jewish life immediately following the expulsion. Jewish life ended completely and at once.

Geography: A Continuing Factor?

We have seen in the medieval period the ways in which the peculiarities of British geography affected Jewish religious life. Our question now, is whether a case for the impact of geography can be made for the modern period. One might think otherwise. Perhaps improved communications effectively obliterated the challenges that geography presented, and which shaped life, including religious life, in different locales. If geography did continue to wield an influence, we can expect that it did so in different ways, as the factors with which it interacted inevitably changed between the medieval and modern periods. Yet, if as Braudel argued, the impact of geography on history is both deep and long lasting, we will also find continuity. In the modern period, though the British lost their necessary insularity, their island-grown culture perpetuated a distinction and semi-detachment from the Continent even after it could have been overcome physically.

Resettlement

Jews came to England from the 1490s, fleeing the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal, but it took 150 years for an open community to be re-established. It is relatively easy to control the border of an island. Fledgling Jewish communities were broken up in 1542 and again in 1609.[35] Another community assembled in the 1630s and survived until the time was right for formal recognition. The security of the community depended initially on an oral promise of protection and toleration given by Oliver Cromwell in 1656. In addition to his general sympathy for toleration, Cromwell had a particular interest in the Jews, motivated by religio-geographical considerations. He shared the common Puritan belief that it was the task of Christians to hasten the Millennium and bring the Second Coming. That could only happen when the Jews were scattered

throughout the world, including to its furthest corner, the British Isles.[36] As Cromwell told the Barebones Parliament in July 1653, 'as some think, God will bring the Jews home to their station [the Land of Israel] from the isles of the sea'.[37] An Amsterdam rabbi, Manasseh ben Israel, shared Cromwell's view about the need for Jews to be spread across the whole world, although he expected it to bring about the Messiah's first coming, not his second. He petitioned Cromwell to readmit Jews on that basis, although he also made an economic case, which appealed to Cromwell the pragmatist.[38] Nevertheless, Manasseh and Cromwell had a common religious interest in the Jews returning to England, which related directly to its geographical location.

Religious Tepidity

Jewish religious life in Britain in the modern period stands out for its tepidity. The dominant pattern has been an affiliation to traditional institutions, today labelled 'Orthodox', without high levels of learning or personal observance. For example, in 1961 61% of British Jews belonged to a synagogue, and 85% of those belonged to an Orthodox synagogue. Yet in Edgware in 1963 69% would eat non-kosher food outside the house, 89% would ride on the Sabbath and 20% ate on the Day of Atonement.[39] This attitude began with the first Jews of the Resettlement. For crypto-Jews looking to escape persecution and make a living, London was extremely attractive because of its geographical position. Jewish merchants were keen to establish a base in this important port city with access to major trade routes. Miriam Bodian and others have argued that mercantile interests probably took priority over religious feelings for the Jews who came to London. By 1650 there were cities where they could practice their religion more freely, including Hamburg, Amsterdam and Antwerp. Jews who came to London did so because of its trading opportunities, even though Jewish religious life was less open and developed.[40]

This had a long term effect on the religious nature of the community. Crypto-Judaism was a complex phenomenon, and the re-emergence of crypto-Jews into open Jewish life was complicated wherever it took place, but in London there was particular resistance to the adoption of full rabbinic Judaism.[41] There were Jews, including synagogue goers, who attended to business publicly on the Sabbath.[42] Others went to the theatre on the Sabbath, and carried their money to pay for a ticket.[43] An area of particular resistance was circumcision, even among prominent members of the community.[44] In an extreme case of rejection of rabbinic Judaism, a member of the Francia family stood up in the synagogue in 1665 and

announced 'gentlemen, all this is suited either to very great fools or very wise men'. He took off his *tallit* (prayer shawl), threw down his prayer book and walked out.[45]

The religious leadership's objective of returning Jews to full observance was especially difficult because London was a community on the periphery of the Jewish world, which kept the population low. In 1700 there were fewer than 1,000 Jews in London and almost none on the rest of the island. The community was too small for the leadership lightly to exclude potential members, even if they refused to comply with communal norms. Other communities, for example Amsterdam, eventually came to ignore marginal members and turned them into outsiders.[46] By contrast, the religious and lay leadership in London retained links with non-conforming members.[47] This was not only for religious or cultural reasons. The Sephardim of mercantile London were practical. The *Mahamad* (executive) once declared that it permitted dealings with marginal Jews 'so as not to disturb commerce'.[48]

This meant that deviant modes of thought, in particular hostility towards the Oral Law and Rabbinic legislation remained a presence and continued to exert an influence even after the community was relatively settled. Jacob Sasportas, *Hakham* (rabbi) 1664-5, complained bitterly about the religious attitudes of his congregants and the lack of discipline imposed by the lay leadership. He campaigned with a passion against the uncircumcised and others who did not conform.[49] Solomon Ayllon (*Hakham* 1689-1700) made the same complaints over twenty five years later.[50] They did not last long in office. Other *Hakhamim* chose a quieter life and a longer career, and adopted a more pragmatic stance, which reinforced heterodoxy.[51]

Liberal Society

An important factor in shaping Jewish religious life in England, as Todd Endelman has argued, is the effect on the Jews of the surrounding liberal society.[52] By the eighteenth century London was both the capital of an entire island and a major port. It had the mixed population of a capital and the culture of a port city. Like its other inhabitants, London's Jews responded to this culture; its cosmopolitan, transient and unregulated atmosphere promoted personal autonomy.[53] Conversion to Anglicanism was a reliable route to complete acceptance, and it became very attractive, and eighteenth century defections among the elite were widespread.[54] The only countervailing factor was that gentile society was relatively open even to those who remained Jews, but the result of this attitude was that

while the wealthy might remain Jews officially, they quickly began to adopt the mores of non-Jews of the same economic stratum, and the abandonment of Judaism was slowed but not halted.

Within the Jewish population, as a relatively new community, geographically removed from the mainstream of Jewish life, London lacked the powerful socially adhesive forces that characterised European Jewry. This was true of Ashkenazim as well as Sephardim. In the first decade of the eighteenth century, when most Ashkenazi Jews were immigrants and carried the culture of their European origins, the *herem* (excommunication) still worked in London as a tool of communal discipline. When Marcus Moses questioned the validity of a divorce granted by R. Aaron Hart in 1706 and was placed in *herem* he found that no one in the Ashkenazi community would trade with him. However, by the middle of the century its power had dissipated under the effect of local conditions. Just fifty years later the *herem* had become meaningless, and was lifted.[55] On the Continent by contrast, rabbis exerted a powerful measure of control until the end of the eighteenth century, that is at least fifty years after it had evaporated in London.

Scholarly Vacuum

Religious apathy discouraged leading scholars from joining the community. A lack of long-term and strong scholarly leadership promoted a generally ill-educated and religiously lax Jewish population.[56] A respectable scholar, Hart Lyon left the rabbinate of the Great Synagogue in 1763 after only seven years because he was so frustrated with the low religious standards and absence of Torah learning.[57] In this the Polish-German Jews of London were different to the Polish-German Jews of Germany itself. When Lyon went to his new post in Halberstadt his new community provided him with a *yeshivah* with twelve students.[58] Lyon's successors were equally miserable in London.[59] David Tevele Schiff told his brother 'the *Shulhan Arukh Orakh Hayyim* [the Sabbath and prayer] is forgotten here, and nearly also the *Yoreh Deah* [*kashrut*]…I have no pupils and not even anyone to whom I could speak on Talmudic subjects'.[60]

London Jewry was caught in a vicious cycle. Poor intellectual resources at home forced it to look abroad for rabbinic leadership, but the uncongenial prospect of a life in London deterred the best scholars, leaving the second rate, which reinforced and perpetuated the problem. The community was willing to tolerate the mediocre and there was little support for efforts to tackle the situation. In the mid nineteenth century when Nathan Adler wanted Jews' College to incorporate a traditional *bet*

midrash two generally supportive communal financiers, Nathan Mayer Rothschild and Moses Montefiore withheld funding until the plan for the College was modified and it became a ministerial training college without rabbinical pretensions.[61] No rabbis were ordained by the mainstream Orthodox community until the end of the nineteenth century, and even then in tiny numbers.[62] This persisted even as Britain and London became the centre of the richest and most powerful empire in the world. There was a massive increase in the Jewish population in the nineteenth century, by its end there were over a quarter of a million Jews in England, yet there was still no *yeshivah* and one small and chronically underfunded rabbinical seminary.

To this day the Sephardim have never been led by a British born *hakham* or communal rabbi. Of the ten rabbis of the Ashkenazi Great Synagogue and their successors, the Chief Rabbis, only three were born in England. In the recent process to find a successor to Jonathan Sacks, many foreign candidates were considered, and the appointee, Ephraim Mirvis was born in South Africa and educated in Israel. The total number of members of the *battei din* of both communities comes to a mere handful, and even they were educated outside Britain. This situation shows no sign of changing. At the beginning of the twenty first century Jews' College ceased to ordain rabbis, although there is now a part-time course sponsored by the Sephardim.

A paucity of first rank scholars in England led to a reliance on foreign authorities to settle difficult disputes. In the first decade of the eighteenth century, the Hakham Tsevi in Altona was consulted twice by the Sephardim. A third approach was made by Ashkenazim who were facing a breakaway congregation.[63] In the 1890s, when the recent and pious immigrants of *Machzike Hadath* clashed with Chief Rabbi Hermann Adler, each side procured the support of European authorities. R. Yisrael Meir Kagan (the *Hafets Hayim*) in Radin, Poland sided with the immigrants and R. Yitshak Elhanan Spektor of Kovno with the Chief Rabbi.[64] Most recently, in 2004, when Jonathan Sacks' book *Dignity of Difference* sparked controversy, the final condemnation which led to the issue of a second, amended edition came not from a British rabbi, but R. Yosef Shalom Eliyashiv in Jerusalem.

Provincial Dependence

Until the end of the nineteenth century religious conditions in the provinces were even worse than London. In the eighteenth century pedlars started working the British countryside and after a while, groups of these pedlars consolidated into communities.[65] Synagogues were founded in

places with barely any Jewish facilities and were led by overworked, poorly paid and only basically educated religious functionaries.[66] These communities were forced to look to London for religious guidance on any significant issue, and the Rabbi of the Great Synagogue perforce became the Chief Rabbi of the whole country. As the *Voice of Jacob* newspaper wrote when Rabbi Solomon Hirschell of the Great Synagogue died in 1842, 'the provincial and colonial synagogues…have found reference and subordination indispensable in *shehita*, marriages, divorces etc., etc., and hence, not from design or system, but from inevitable necessity, the late Rabbi was recognized as the spiritual head of most Jews claiming British origins'.[67]

Though British Jewry's religious centralism stems from the needs of dispersed communities in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it took on a life of its own. The centre attempted to squash any attempt at religious independence in the provinces. Nathan Adler consolidated his hegemony in 1847 by issuing *Laws and Regulations for all the Synagogues in the British Empire*. This document not only instructed congregations on how to conduct their services, but also established his supremacy, both by virtue of his issuing the *Laws and Regulations* and through rules codified within them.[68] When the distinguished scholar Solomon Schiller-Szinessy tried to set himself up as the religious authority of Manchester, Nathan Adler exerted all his influence to bring his provincial rival to heel.[69] To this day, the London Beth Din enjoys certain prerogatives over conversions and marriages denied to regional communities.

Provincial Independence

In the mid nineteenth century British Jewish religious culture seemed solidly established, but upheaval came when a completely different Jewish culture arrived from Eastern Europe. Immigrants from Russia came in large numbers to Britain because it was the nearest free country. By 1911 there were almost a quarter of a million Jewish immigrants.[70] Many were not religious, and some were anti-religious, but there were enough of those committed to observance to make an impact. They improved the standards of *kashrut* and established more committed congregations in London and in the great regional cities of Glasgow, Liverpool, Leeds, Manchester, and major towns such as Sunderland, Hull and Sheffield. In London, close to the centres of entrenched communal power the informal congregations, *minyanim* and *hevrot* of the immigrants, even *Machzike Hadath*, were successfully corralled by the establishment into the

Federation of Synagogues, with Lord Rothschild and the Chief Rabbi at its head.[71] It took the most ideological and determined German Jews in North London to resist.[72]

By contrast, in the provinces the immigrants were more able to maintain their independence. New Eastern European style *kehillot* (congregations) were established. The eighteenth century provincial communities needed London, but in the nineteenth century, London found it difficult to impose its will when communities wanted to be independent. This was crucial for Russian Jews in the provinces, who were able to break free from the prevailing religiously and intellectually apathetic atmosphere. They imported traditional *rabbanim*, including Rabbis Hillman in Glasgow, Daiches in Leeds and Yoffe in Manchester. Provincial traditionalists managed to establish a traditional *yeshivah* of world standing, again away from the capital, when R. Dovid Dryan founded the Gateshead Yeshiva in the North East of England in 1929.[73] Gateshead was the most militant of provincial communities, and successfully resisted all attempted by the Chief Rabbinate to establish control.[74] Until the large scale movement of Hungarian Jews to London after 1956, traditional European Judaism in England, was primarily, and not incidentally, largely a provincial affair.[75] Even after, the *yeshivot* of Manchester and Gateshead remained stronger than any similar institutions in London.

Imperial Judaism

In 1707 England and Scotland united and in 1800 Ireland joined the Union. The new United Kingdom began its phase as the world's greatest maritime power. Colonies were planted far away, and British men and women filled them, placing pockets of Britishness across the globe. Small, English-speaking Jewish communities with few religious resources sprang up all over the world. It was natural that they looked to London, for even though its rabbis were not the greatest in the world, they were certainly the greatest who spoke English.

The British model of Judaism, with all its peculiarities and limitations, was planted around the world. Even after independence, major synagogues in the United States looked to London, whether it was the Ashkenazi Bnai Jeshurun to the Great Synagogue or the Sephardi Shearith Israel to Bevis Marks.[76] Today's legacy in the Commonwealth, of strong affiliation to official Orthodoxy without a high degree of personal observance can be doubly traced back to Britain's island nature: it derives from the type of Judaism and the type of empire Britain's geography helped to create.

We see here the development of a curious situation. Britain was considerably weaker in Jewish terms than Europe and was dependent on Europe for elite religious personnel. Yet, because of Britain's status as a maritime-imperial power, she created many other communities in her image.

Modern Jewish Thought

Physical distance from the centres of traditional rabbinic culture placed Britain on the scholarly periphery, and the same was true when new Jewish intellectual currents began to flow. Although David Ruderman has documented a number of figures in England associated with the European *Haskalah*, they were unusual individuals. They had generally received their education in Germany and were not part of a British movement.[77] The wider Enlightenment (a complex and variegated phenomenon) developed differently in Europe and in Britain. Furthermore, British universities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were much less impressive intellectual institutions than the great Continental centres, especially in the humanities. The same was true in the Jewish sphere, and the nearest Anglo-Jewry came to a *Haskalah* was a Jewish version of the specifically scientific British Enlightenment. At its most radical, Deist ideas current among the elite filtered into the Jewish community. They were adopted by the physician and scientist Jacob de Castro Sarmeto.[78] Other Jews looked to the scientific Christian Enlightenment of Robert Boyle, Samuel Clarke and Isaac Newton. They retained a belief in an imminent God who governed the Universe through scientific laws, even though those laws were reliable and apparently independent.[79] Distance from its source meant that the *Haskalah* in its German form barely touched Britain.

As with the *Haskalah* so with *Wissenschaft des Judentums*. The academic study of Judaism developed by Leopold Zunz, Zachariah Frankel, Abraham Geiger and others in Germany gained only a weak foothold in Britain, despite some efforts to make it otherwise. As well as being a ministerial seminary, Jews' College was intended to be a centre of *Wissenschaft*. There were scholars of standing on its faculty, especially Adolph Büchler (Principal 1906-1939). Yet, it was never comparable to the great seminaries in either the Old or New Worlds. The paucity of funding and the demand for a rapid output of competent ministers rather than the nurturing of profound scholars precluded anything more.[80] The best scholars the College produced went abroad to more lively institutions. Jacob Mann joined Hebrew Union College and Ben Zion Halper went to Dropsie College. Jewish Studies remains an

underdeveloped academic discipline in Britain. There are departments and courses in Britain but on a far smaller scale than in Israel and the United States. The difference cannot be ascribed entirely to the size of the communities; even per capita Britain is far weaker. The very success of the Limmud, the educational conference that takes places every Christmas in the English Midlands and attracts 2,500 participants, may be due to the fact that despite its short comings it remains the most exciting Jewish intellectual event in Britain by far.[81]

Denominations

Distance from Continental intellectual currents had affected the development of denominations in Britain. The radical ritual reforms introduced by Israel Jacobson at the Hamburg Temple and the *Wissenschaft*-based brand of Reform developed by Geiger more or less passed Britain by. Instead, a uniquely British expression of Reform emerged in the 1840s which did not seek to modernise Rabbinic Judaism, but to reject it. British Reformers led by David Wolf Marks rejected the binding authority of the Oral Law and rabbinic legislation under the influence of bibliocentric English Protestantism.[82] English Jews, drawing upon a long tradition of scepticism to the Oral Law, seeking acceptance in wider society internalized these critiques, and some began to express them in debates within the Jewish community. Marks openly espoused a theology which rejected rabbinic innovations and therefore answered Protestant critic.[83] In January 1842, at the consecration of the congregation's new synagogue Marks declared, 'we must (as our conviction urges us) solemnly deny, that a belief in the divinity of the traditions contained in the Mishnah, and the Jerusalem and Babylonian Talmuds, is of equal obligation to the Israelite with the faith in the divinity of the Law of Moses.[84] So was born another example of the religious eccentricity of British Jewry: a Reform movement quite different to that in Europe, which verged on the neo-Karaite.[85]

Only in the twentieth century did European and American Reform come to London. This happened first through the Liberal Jewish Synagogue under the ideological direction of Claude Montefiore, who studied in Berlin, and imported Israel Mattuck, a graduate of the Hebrew Union College to be the congregation's first rabbi.[86] Shortly before and after the Second World War German refugee rabbis such as Ignaz Maybaum and Albert Friedlander joined and turned the British Reform movement to a European model. The recent leadership of the non-Orthodox movements contains many rabbis either from or trained in

America, including Rabbis Mark Winer (Reform) and Chaim Weiner (Masorti).

Comparisons

Some of what can be said of Jewish religious life in London can be said of other European capitals. By the end of the nineteenth century Paris, Vienna, Rome, Budapest and St Petersburg had large and wealthy Jewish populations, but they were not home to the most committed Jewish communities. Some of these cities were ports, and therefore arguably operated under the same geographical influences, but others were not. It is true that capitals whether ports or not have a cosmopolitan quality which dissolves religious tradition, nevertheless, European capitals generally were stronger Jewish religious centres than London. For example, Berlin became a hub of Jewish scholarship after it became the imperial capital. It is striking that today Berlin has a more vibrant rabbinical school than London. The seminaries in Vienna and Budapest founded in the nineteenth century were not of the standard of Frankel's institution in (provincial) Breslau but were more impressive than Jews' College in London. Italian Jewry supplied scholars for the Sephardi diaspora; David Nieto and Benjamin Artom both came from Italy to London to serve as *Hakham* and Sabato Morais went to Philadelphia. In Europe, even if there was not strength in a nation's capital, it could often be found elsewhere in a Jewish community. In France, the *yeshivah* in Metz was turned into a national rabbinical seminary to supply French Jewry. London and Britain still appear to be a special case. London had neither strong religious or intellectual life itself, nor did it foster such life elsewhere in the community. We must therefore look for other causes to explain London's peculiarity. Politics, culture and social factors played a part, but room should be left for geography.

Conclusion

No set of historical outcomes can be traced to a single cause, and an ingenious historian can make a case for the importance for just about any factor.[87] Yet geography, Braudel's 'adroit actor', seems to have played a role in the religious lives of British Jews. For all the improvements in transport and communications, some physical facts present for medieval

Anglo-Jewry were also present in the modern period. More importantly, the British did not wish to dissolve the distinctiveness from Europe and maritime prowess which they attributed to their island status. They therefore augmented their physical island with a mental island, serving the same function. As Scott has written, 'insularity had always been a geopolitical rather than a geographical claim. Geography informed, but culture completed the work'.[88]

The largest community in British Jewry in both the early and later periods, that of London, was both too near to and too far from stronger centres to develop its own religious resources and mostly attracted second rank religious figures. Judaism developed differently in Britain because of its distance from the great European centres of Jewish life, and later because Britain's interest was directed towards its empire. In what at first appears a paradox, only in more isolated provincial communities, whether York in the twelfth century or Gateshead in the twenty first, could a vibrant and independent Jewish intellectual life be established. Britain's isolation also led to dependence.

British Jewry has always had to look to Europe and then to America for guidance and personnel. It was strikingly different to foreign communities, but also relied upon them. In the case of Jewish religious history, then, Alex Law's thesis requires some revision. Britain's sea borders did not make Anglo-Jewry more independent, but rather the opposite. Britain as an island close to the coast of Europe tied British Jewry to foreign communities in a way we might not have expected, just as a particular form of Judaism developed within the sea border. [89] This was the case in both the early and the later community, making geography an important and a continuing factor.

Notes

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[3] Tacitus, Agricola, 1:10.

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[6] William Shakespeare, Richard II 2:1.

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[15] Jacobs, J. The Jews of Angevin England. London: David Nutt 1893 pp 47-48

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[23] Dobson, R.B. The Jews of Medieval York and the Massacre of 1190. Borthwick Papers, no. 45. York: St. Anthony's Press 1974.

[24] Roth, C. Elijah of London *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England* 15, 1939-45 p 55; Sofer, A. (ed.) Tosafot Hakhmei Anglia. Jerusalem 1968.

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[64] For a full, if partisan, account, see Homa, B. A Fortress in Anglo-Jewry. London: Shapiro Vallentine 1953 pp 9-52.

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[68] Adler, N.M. Laws and Regulations for all the Synagogues in the British Empire. London 1847.

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[75] Bermant, C. Troubled Eden. London: Vallentine Mitchell 1969 pp 221-222.

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Jews from London, but from Brazil, but in Hyamson's phrase, became a foster-child of Bevis Marks.

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[82] McCaul, A. The Old Paths: A Comparison of the Principles and Doctrines of Modern Judaism with the Religion of Moses and the Prophets. London: London Society's House 1847 quoted in Singer, S. Jewish Religious Thought in Early Victorian London. *AJS Review* 10:2, Autumn 1985 p 204.

[83] Kershen A.J. and Romain, J.A. Tradition and Change. London: Vallentine Mitchell 1995 pp 3-30.

[84] Marks, D.W. Sermons. London: R. Groombridge and Sons 1851 p 7.

[85] Singer referred to the English Reform movement as neo-Karaite. That is not quite accurate, because the Karaites rejected rabbinic law, Marks argued instead that although it was not binding, it should be retained when it was edifying.

[86] Edgar, L.I. Some Memories of my Ministry. London: Liberal Jewish Synagogue 1985 p 6.

[87] For example, hemophilia and the end of the Romanov dynasty, or A.J.P. Taylor's explanation of the outbreak of the First World War.

[88] Scott, J. When the Waves Ruled Britannia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011 p 172

[89] A similar argument can be made for other aspects of cultural history. Eighteenth and nineteenth century British musical life relied on foreign imports: Handel, Halle, Costa etc. British musicians were trained abroad, e.g. Sullivan.

JEWS IN THE BRITISH ISLES IN 1851: OCCUPATIONS

Petra Laidlaw

Abstract

An earlier paper, in Volume LIII, drew on the 1851 Anglo-Jewry Database (AJDB) to analyse the residence and migrations of Jews living in mid-19th century Britain. The current paper draws further on this source to analyse the population's occupations from a number of angles in 1851 and other decades, using the standard Booth-Armstrong industrial classification and a custom-designed supplementary taxonomy.

Background

General historic background

There were about 31-32,000 Jews living in the British Isles in 1851.[1] The British Isles had attracted a more or less steadily growing stream of Jewish immigrants since the mid-17th century. They came from a wide range of locations, particularly from Holland and Germany, but most of all, from the late-18th century until the late-19th, from what is now Poland. Some would move on, in time, to other domiciles, especially in the Americas and Australasia; but most stayed, and over time a good number prospered, in the British Isles. By the mid-19th century, in consequence, about 70 per cent of the adult Jewish population was British-born, and relatively settled economically. About three-quarters were living in London, with the remainder widely dispersed: among the old seaports which had attracted migrants in the 18th century; in the newer industrial cities which now exercised a much greater pull; and in smaller

market towns across the whole of the British Isles (Laidlaw, 2011, pp 34-46).

The mid-century Jewish population was generally quite well integrated in the wider community, of which they represented roughly one per 1,000. The contemporary social commentator, Henry Mayhew (p 137), spoke of the Jews as one of the 'nations' making up the United Kingdom in the same way as he spoke of the English, the Irish, the Scots and the Welsh. Their position in the economy was, however, atypical. In the mid-century, a large proportion of the wider population remained engaged in primary sector occupations, especially agriculture and mining, where Jews were found only very rarely. By contrast, the proportion of the Jewish community working in the tertiary (trade and service) sector was much greater than that of the population at large. The representation of Jews in secondary (manufacturing) sector occupations did, in broad terms, mirror quite closely that of the wider population; but they were disproportionately involved in making consumer goods, rather than industrial infrastructure. To some extent, these divergences reflected simple geography. London, where the majority of Jews were living, offered much more occupational variety, and readier access to consumer markets, than the rural areas and smaller towns and cities where many of the wider population found their work. But other factors, such as cultural traditions, social connections and supply-chain opportunities, may be assumed to have played some part.

Existing historiography

The occupations of the Jewish population in the mid-19th century have already been studied quite extensively. The current study offers only a footnote to the key texts, among the foremost of which are Lipman (1954) and Pollins (1982). Both draw on an impressive range of statistical data, though neither would lay claim to comprehensively grounded quantitative analysis.

Others, especially Wrigley (1972, 2004) and Armstrong (1972), provide the seminal quantitative works on the wider population's occupations. These have much to offer by way of methodology and comparative data, but little that bears directly on the Jewish community. This reflects, *inter alia*, the fact that official sources for occupational data in the 19th century, such as the decennial censuses, almost never state people's faith affiliations or ethnic backgrounds. One notable exception is marriage registrations, which have been used to good effect by some commentators, including Pollins (1982) and Godley (2001); but this source suffers unavoidably from a bias towards early-career occupations.

(By its nature, the 1851 Anglo-Jewry Database (AJDB), on which this paper draws, records occupations across the full age-range.)

Another source of highly relevant data is Henry Mayhew, who chronicled the lives and work of the London poor at precisely the time with which the AJDB is chiefly concerned. His detailed descriptions of various trades in which Jews happen to have been involved add an invaluable qualitative dimension (Mayhew 1985, and Thompson and Yeo, 2009).

The 1851 Anglo-Jewry Database

The AJDB is a prosopographical database containing data on 28,799 individuals, or about 90 per cent of the estimated target population.[2] The general background to the project and the sources used were described in my previous paper in this journal. (Laidlaw, 2011, pp 30-32).

The database records the occupations in 1851 of 91 per cent (n = 8,278) of adult[3] male entries, equating to the occupations of about 83 per cent of all Jewish adult males in the British Isles at the time. Female occupations, which are widely regarded as under-recorded in 19th century censuses, are available for 1851 on 38 per cent (n = 3,311) of adult female entries. The database also records the 1851 occupations of 38 per cent of children aged 14 or under (n = 4,166), the great majority, but by no means all, being schoolchildren. A small proportion of young adults – 205 out of 3,399 aged 15-20 in 1851 – are also recorded as schoolchildren or students.

As the earlier paper stressed, the AJDB population is neither random nor structured; but, given its size, it can be taken as reasonably representative for most purposes. In the context of occupations, the difference between the proportions of male and female entries might appear problematic, but the problem is likely to be more apparent than real. The female shortfall relates mostly to married women, who, unless their occupations were separately stated, are likely very often to have worked – if domestic circumstances allowed – in the same businesses as their husbands. The occupations of single and widowed women are more extensively recorded: see Table 7 below. In the analysis that follows, therefore, unless otherwise stated, no distinction is made by gender. The undifferentiated occupational data account for about two-thirds of the 1851 adult total, allowing fairly robust inferences to be drawn about the Jewish population as a whole.

The chief source for 1851 occupations is the census for that year. The best data now available are the returns compiled by the census

enumerators, recruited locally to distribute forms to individual households, collect them, then transfer the data, having edited them according to guidelines, for onward transmission to the centre.[4] Quite often their editing would jettison what would now be regarded as valuable detail: an expression like 'dealer in sponges, horsehair, brass fittings and dairy products', for example, might be simplified into 'general dealer'. To compensate, the AJDB has mined a wide range of further sources, like trade directories, marriage certificates, insurance policies, court records and wills, substituting the specific for the general wherever possible.

The database also records, wherever known, the occupations of the same people in surrounding decades.[5] The occupational data become progressively thinner in earlier decades, in part because of the age structure of the database population, but also because there is little relevant census information before 1841. Other sources (trade directories, insurance policies &c) quite often fill the gaps, but they have a bias towards the more affluent and/or more self-advertising sectors of the population. Sources for decades beyond 1851 are generally more broadly-based, but can sometimes be hard to match reliably with the individuals in the Database (Laidlaw, 2011, p.49). The inter-decadal comparisons that can be made as the Database currently stands are therefore somewhat limited in scope.

Occupational classification

Notwithstanding the census enumerators' recension, the number of occupational expressions used in their returns remained very large: for the database population alone, there are several thousand. For statistical analysis, the data have to be aggregated further.

This is no straightforward matter. Different definitions and classification systems were developed by the Registrar General for each decennial census. These reflected shifting purposes of analysis – for example, to explore the relationship between materials worked with and mortality – and often embodied concepts, like social rank, which are of limited interest today (Wrigley, 2004, pp. 129-203). Inter-decadal comparisons were fraught until the social reformer, Charles Booth, working in the closing decades of the 19th century, designed a taxonomy for all the censuses from 1801 to 1881. The system was modified but otherwise substantially validated in the 1970s by W A Armstrong (2004), and the resulting Booth-Armstrong Industrial Classification is probably now the most widely used in British social and economic historical studies. It has its own shortcomings, however, when applied to the Jewish

section of the population. In covering adequately the full range of occupations of the British population as a whole, it does not differentiate as much as one might wish in fields in which Jews tended to specialise. It offers much more nuance in manufacturing occupations, for example, than in those classed as dealing.

Underlying all these difficulties is the necessity of choosing a classification system fit for the purpose in hand. In this instance, we wish to get some idea of how the Jewish community compared with the wider population, but also to explore in rather more detail the occupational structure of the Jewish community itself. The solution here has been to use the Booth-Armstrong system for broad comparative analyses, and to custom-build a supplementary system, the AJDB system, for exploring the Jewish profile in more depth. The AJDB system is a four-way taxonomy, classifying by *product* (eg clothing, jewellery, commercial finance: see Appendix), by *activity* (eg 'manufacturing', 'selling', 'providing a service'); by *position in labour market* (eg 'in training', 'self-employed', 'employer'); and by *skill level* (eg 'skilled manual', 'professional'). A violin-maker, for example, will be classed as a manufacturer, a sheet-music dealer as a seller, and a pianist as the provider of a service – the first of them skilled, the second semi-skilled and the third professional – but they will all be grouped together under the Performing Arts. In principle, this approach should allow a more fine-tuned measurement of the Jewish presence in various trades.

It is important, however, to recognise the limitations imposed by the sources. Taking the hypothetical example used earlier of a 'dealer in sponges, horsehair, brass fittings and dairy products' who is recorded in the census simply as a 'general dealer', the Database will normally have classified him as unskilled, the default classification for 'general dealers'. But the person in question may in reality have been at the apex of a substantial dealing and warehousing empire, so meriting at least re-classification as managerial rather than unskilled. Where such cases have come to light from supplementary sources, they have been re-coded.[6] But there are probably further instances, so far unidentified. In other cases, unfamiliar 19th century expressions (like 'drug dealer', 'attends sales', 'hooker', and 'professional pedestrian') can throw the unwary modern reader. For all these reasons, it needs to be borne in mind that all the categories, and all the data deriving from them, are unavoidably fuzzy-edged.

Occupations in 1851

Industrial sectors

Table 1 shows how the broad disposition of Jews across industrial sectors in 1851 compares with that of the British Isles population at large.

Table 1
All listed active occupations, 1851, Booth-Armstrong classification

	Adult (15+) AJDB population		All British Isles population*	
	Numbers ('000s)	% of occupied adult AJDB population	Numbers ('000s)	% of occupied British Isles population
Agriculture and fishing	0.027	0.2	1,776.5	21.9
Mining	0	-	335.2	4.1
Building	0.197	1.8	460.7	5.7
Manufacture	4.789	44.0	2,754.8	33.9
Transport	0.136	1.3	345.3	4.3
Dealing	4.415	40.6	546.7	6.7
Industrial service	0.168	1.5	376.6	4.6
Public service and Professional	0.670	6.2	399.7	4.9
Domestic service	0.469	4.3	1,121.2	13.8
Total	**10.871**		**8,116.7**	

*source: Armstrong, Appendix D

The figures need to be read with circumspection. Much depends on the classification and coverage. For example, Wrigley (2004, pp 166-169) uses a different system which yields 46 per cent as the proportion of the 1851 English (as distinct from British Isles) population involved in secondary sector occupations – essentially building and manufacturing – rather than the 40 per cent implied by Booth-Armstrong.[7] Whilst the proportion of the AJDB population in secondary sector occupations comes out at 45/46 per cent under either system, its relation to the wider population is clearly somewhat elastic. It is safe only to say that the Jewish involvement in the secondary sector was broadly in line with that of the wider population. The Jewish population's representation *within* the manufacturing sector, however, was clearly out of line with that of the general population, as indicated in Table 2.

Table 2: All manufacturing occupations, 1851, Booth-Armstrong classification

	Adult (15+) AJDB population		All British Isles population**	
	Numbers ('000s)	% of AJDB population in manufacturing occupations	Numbers ('000s)	% of British Isles population in manufacturing occupations
Machinery	0.002	0.0	62.3	2.3
Tools &c	0.083	1.7	37.8	1.4
Shipbuilding	0.003	0.1	26.8	1.0
Iron and steel	0.006	0.1	222.0	8.1
Copper, tin, lead &c	0.042	0.9	63.2	2.3
Gold, silver and jewellery	**0.071**	**1.5**	**8.0**	**0.3**
Earthenware &c	0.043	0.9	46.5	1.7
Coal and gas	0.001	0.0	8.8	0.3
Chemical	0.004	0.1	9.3	0.3
Furs and leather	**0.218**	**4.6**	**26.1**	**0.9**
Glue, tallow &c	0.005	0.1	6.9	0.3
Hair &c	**0.106**	**2.2**	**18.0**	**0.7**
Wood workers	0.035	0.7	76.9	2.8
Furniture	0.126	2.6	51.8	1.9
Carriage and harness	0.009	0.2	60.4	2.2
Paper	0.017	0.4	17.7	0.6
Floorcloth and waterproof	0.016	0.3	4.2	0.2
Woollens	0.007	0.1	257.9	9.4
Cotton and silk	0.040	0.8	529.3	19.2
Flax, hemp &c	0.016	0.3	50.9	1.8
Lace	0.087	1.8	68.5	2.5
Dyeing	0.016	0.3	27.9	1.0
Dress	**2.563**	**53.5**	**855.3**	**31.0**
Sundries connected with dress	**0.141**	**2.9**	**13.4**	**0.5**
Food preparation	0.008	0.2	35.4	1.3
Baking	0.106	2.2	64.0	2.3
Drink preparation	0.006	0.1	27.5	1.0
Smoking	**0.575**	**12.0**	**6.4**	**0.2**
Watches, instruments and toys	**0.326**	**6.8**	**24.8**	**0.9**
Printing and bookbinding	0.080	1.7	34.2	1.2
Unspecified	0.031	0.6	12.6	0.5
Total	4.789		2754.8	

shading indicates Jewish over-representation: see footnote viii

**source: Armstrong, Appendix D

Shading indicates those categories in which Jews appear substantially over-represented. They will come as little surprise to anyone familiar with this community (with the possible exception of the category labelled 'hair &c': this includes occupations like feather dressing and quill pen making in which Jews were quite prominent).

Although the Jewish population was disproportionately involved in 'dress' – which accounted for over half of all Jews in manufacturing occupations, as against under a third of the UK population as a whole – they were hardly significant numerically (less than 3,000 out of a UK total of 855,000). Even in the East End of London, the Jews were by no means dominant in clothing manufacture, certainly as measured by numbers employed: the non-Jewish English and Irish were also heavily involved.[8] It would be wrong therefore to see 'clothes' as a quintessentially Jewish occupation. It was, if anything, a quintessentially British occupation in the mid-19th century.

The Jews in manufacturing occupations were, in essence, supplying consumer-facing parts of the economy, rather than industrial infrastructure. There are probably many reasons for this. The consumer market, highly varied and adaptable, may have been easier for outsiders to penetrate than traditional craft trades. It is likely also to be linked to the Jews' concentration in London, which was the centre not only of surging domestic demand, but of trade with the growing markets of the British Empire and beyond (Daunton, pp 369-380; Thompson and Yeo, p 211).

Jews were much more prominent than the population at large in 'dealing' occupations (Table 1), here covering everything from street hawkers through retailers to import-export merchants. They account for about 40 per cent of AJDB active adult occupations, six times as many as in the population at large.

Table 3 unpacks the headline figures. Well over half of the *wider* British population in dealing occupations are seen to have been involved – probably mostly as retailers – in food, drink and what would now be called the hospitality sector. There were also quite sizeable numbers in the dress sector – hardly surprising given its size – and in coal, which again is hardly surprising given its ubiquity as an energy source. But otherwise the wider community was relatively thinly involved in dealing occupations. The Jews appear, by contrast, to have been spread more evenly, though particularly present in those consumer sectors where they were also prominent in manufacturing (clothing, tobacco, furniture and household utensils and ornaments). Their strong showing in the general dealing category may be testimony to a commercial versatility in which the wider population was less practised.

Table 3: All dealing occupations, 1851, Booth-Armstrong classification

	Adult (15+) AJDB population		All British Isles population*	
	Numbers ('000s)	% of AJDB population in dealing occupations	Numbers ('000s)	% of British Isles population in dealing occupations
Coals	0	0.0	23.7	4.3
Raw materials	0.013	0.3	16.2	3.0
Clothing materials	0.089	2.0	2.0	0.4
Dress	0.456	10.3	53.3	9.7
Food	0.514	11.6	196.6	36.0
Tobacco	0.090	2.0	2.0	0.4
Wines, spirits and hotels	0.043	1.0	85.8	15.7
Lodging and coffee houses	0.068	1.5	22.5	4.1
Furniture	0.244	5.5	7.0	1.3
Stationery and publications	0.086	2.0	14.3	2.6
Household utensils and ornaments	0.610	13.8	18.4	3.4
General dealers	1.690	38.3	69.4	12.7
Unspecified	0.512	11.6	35.5	6.5
Total	**4.415**		**546.7**	

*source: Armstrong, Appendix D

Products and activities

The distinction between manufacturing and dealing is not always clear-cut, however, especially in the case of items – like watches, jewellery, and to some extent clothes – that might be made and sold by the same person on the same premises. Partly for this reason, the Booth-Armstrong classification sometimes conflates dealing with manufacturing occupations.

Figure 1: numbers of adult (15+) entries, all activities except students, by AJDB product groups (see Appendix), 1851

It will be clear, however, from a comparison of Tables 2 and 3 that the manufacturing and dealing categories in Booth-Armstrong do not line up directly with one another. This may not hinder interpretation significantly where the wider population are concerned, given that most were probably engaged in either one or the other, but rarely both. It may, though, cloud understanding of Jewish occupations. The AJDB's supplementary classification system is designed to allow all manufacturing, dealing and service trades to be either brigaded together (as in Figure 1) or examined separately within individual product groups.

Figure 1 confirms the predominance of the garment sector, which in 1851 accounted for a third of all AJDB occupied adults. Almost 60 per cent of them were engaged in clothing proper (Figure 2).

Only a very small proportion appear to have been involved in the specialist clothing business, as military outfitters, masquerade tailors and so forth. The great majority describe themselves simply as tailors, dressmakers, seamstresses or clothes dealers. We may infer from the detailed description that Henry Mayhew gives of the work of tailors and dressmakers in the late 1840s, particularly those in the East End of London, that most of them would be engaged in an irregular flow of routine piecework, making ready-to-wear (or 'slop') clothing, often in dismal workshops or overcrowded homes, rather than working as skilled

and autonomous artisans in the made-to-measure trade (Thompson and Yeo, pp 116-80).[9]

Figure 2: numbers of adult (15+) AJDB entries, all activities, in garments occupations (see Appendix), 1851

The *dealers* in clothing were much smaller in number than the manual workers (n = 282). The old clothes dealer is often represented as the archetypal early-19th century poor Jew, but the AJDB data suggest that things had already shifted considerably by the mid-century. With real wages rising across the economy, the trade in second-hand clothing was giving way to demand for cheap, mass-manufactured new clothing, and the Jews were already taking their place alongside other members of London's burgeoning sweatshop proletariat. Many of those classed here as dealers in clothing are likely to have been middlemen, farming out orders for garments to be made up for the big merchant-houses.

Headwear accounted for another 14 per cent of the garment sector. The majority (n = 376) were making caps or parts of caps (eg cutting or stitching the peak), rather than the more fashionable hats. Again, Mayhew is helpful here in distinguishing the two: caps were low-skill, the best hats high-skill (*ibid*, and pp 440-50). The numbers of Londoners overall

making caps was quite small, so this would appear to be a market in which Jews were particularly prominent.[10] Over half of them (n = 218) were foreign-born, two-thirds of them in Poland, of which a further two-thirds were aged 30 or under: it seems to have been substantially a starter-trade for the young new immigrant.

Figure 1 indicates that the most populous sector after garments (apart from the 'miscellaneous/unknown' sector with all its general dealers) is 'personal requisites'. This accounted for some 15 per cent of adult Jewish employment. The heading includes the manufacture and sale of bags, clocks and watches, gloves, parasols and umbrellas, purses, wallets and toys –the non-essentials which were increasingly in demand in the growing consumer economy. Much the biggest sub-categories, however, were tobacco (n = 762) and jewellery (n = 572).

There are important differences between the two. As in cap-making, jewellery was characteristically a first-generation immigrant trade: 59 per cent of jewellers were immigrants, compared with the overall adult average in the database of 30 per cent. Again, a high proportion was from Poland. But jewellery was typically a provincial trade, and slanted towards the older generation.[11] This reflects the historic tendency of 18th and early-19th century immigrants dispersing to the seaports to set up in small shop trades like jewellery and pawnbroking. That generation was still active in 1851.

By contrast, cigar-making was the province mainly of younger people, home- and foreign-born alike, and largely London-based. It was one in which community leaders had, for some years, taken steps to create apprenticeships to get unskilled young people off the streets and away from the temptations of crime (Lipman, pp 30-31; Pollins, pp 120-22). The database suggests that the cigar trade gave young people a start in life, a trade they could fall back on, rather than one in which they would necessarily stay throughout their lives. The retail tobacconists trade – to which some, but probably only a minority, of cigar-makers would gravitate – was different. It had, in 1851, a profile more akin to the jewellery business, being in the hands of older people, disproportionately foreign-born, and much more dispersed around the country. [12]

Another sector involving mostly younger workers was construction. This accounts for much smaller numbers – some 257 – mostly as glaziers and painters. The great majority were foreign-born, again particularly from Poland. The census suggests that several groups of young men aged about 15-25, lodging together with one or two older colleagues, were operating as mobile work-gangs, travelling to wherever the work could be found. In 1851, there were notable clusters in and around Birmingham,

Merthyr Tydfil and Newcastle Upon Tyne. Besides the manual workers in this sector, the AJDB lists a dozen professionals (architects, civil engineers and surveyors).

The arts, entertainment and sport sector, though small, merits mention. The Anglo-Jewish population that preceded the late-19th century immigration has sometimes been caricatured by later generations as stolidly business-minded to the point of philistinism. The numbers in the AJDB who were involved in the arts in 1851, whether as performers, makers[13] or dealers, were small, with performers representing just over half of the total, mostly in music and the literary and visual arts. But, judging by the Booth-Armstrong classification, they were punching above their weight: for a population constituting 0.1 per cent of the British Isles total, they were over-represented in this sector by a factor of four (Table 4).

By contrast, the AJDB population was under-represented in the transport sector (0.04 per cent). Most were working either on road transport (there were already quite a number of Jewish cab drivers in London) or in shipping-related trades. It is perhaps surprising that so few appear to have been involved in one of the biggest growth industries of the mid-19th century, the railways. The AJDB attests to a small handful of railway staff, proprietors, and investors,[14] along with one heroic inventor, Joseph d'Aguilar Samuda, who patented the briefly exciting, but soon doomed, atmospheric railway. Why Jewish involvement was so low at this date might merit further study.

The other smaller sectors attest to a rich range of occupations: in hospitality (for example, as lodging-house keepers, publicans and brothel keepers[15]); in education, science and technology (as school teachers principally, but also as university academics); in finance, insurance and investment (as bill brokers, stockbrokers and bullion dealers, but primarily as pawnbrokers); in the food and drink trade; in health and hygiene (primarily as surgeons, physicians, nurses, dentists and opticians); and as horticulturists, army officers, iron founders, oyster dealers, poets, barmen, civil servants, chiropodists, gas fitters, telegraph agents, ship-breakers, cow keepers, wine porters, and much else besides. Just under 1,000 are listed in the available sources simply as 'general dealers', so cannot be categorised by sector: they make up a large part of the 'miscellaneous/unknown' category in Figure 1.

Table 4: AJDB population (all ages) in arts occupations in 1851 as % of all UK, Booth-Armstrong classification

	All British Isles* ('000s)	AJDB ('000s)	AJDB as % of all British Isles
Painters	5.4	0.015	0.3
Engravers (artists)	4.9	0.026	0.5
Other visual arts (photographers, figure makers, animal and bird preservers, naturalists)	2.8	0.004	0.1
Musicians (not teachers)	6.1	0.044	0.7
Actors	1.9	0.002	0.1
Art, Music and Theatre service	1.4	-	-
Others (performers, showmen, billiards, cricket and other games service)	2.9	0.005	0.2
Authors, editors, journalists &c	1.5	0.025	1.7
TOTAL	**26.9**	**0.121**	**0.4**

*source: Armstrong, Appendix D

Skill levels

It is hard to tell from sources like the census at what level of skill most individuals were likely to be operating. Perceptions of the skill levels associated with different occupations would in any case shift over time, particularly in the 19th century with its advances in mechanisation and production-line manufacture. Was a 'tailor' a fully-skilled artisan, or a semi-skilled piece-worker? Early in the 19th century, he was probably a skilled and autonomous artisan. By the mid-19th century, he was more likely to be a de-skilled piece-worker in a workshop. By the late 19th century, he would probably be working on small, repetitive tasks in a factory production line.

It is hard, furthermore, to tell whether a self-described 'master tailor' was indeed a fully-skilled artisan, or just a semi-skilled middleman (or 'sweater') passing jobs on to a team of low-skilled workers. The data rely on people's self-description, and usage is not consistent. Contemporary sources like Mayhew, however, offer some grounding: cap-makers in the mid-century would probably be semi-skilled, hatters skilled. Someone heading up a team of half-a-dozen workers would probably do a lot of

manual work himself, whilst someone running a team of 20 would probably spend more of his time managing (buying in the materials, distributing and collecting the work, checking quality, dispatching to wholesalers, and so on).

Acknowledging all these difficulties, an attempt has been made in Table 5 to give a broad sense of the skill profile of the AJDB population. This relies on informed guesses as to the education and/or vocational training that would probably be required for entry to particular occupations.[16]

Table 5: Skills distribution of the AJDB adult population, 1851

Category	Assumed training requirement	Example occupations	Nos	% of all listed adult occupations
unskilled and semi-skilled	possibly some elementary schooling (unskilled) and possibly a short apprenticeship (semi-skilled)	*manual*: cap-maker, dressmaker, dyer, glazier, laundress, pen-cutter, umbrella-maker	8,484	75
		non-manual: clothes dealer, hawker, publican, pawnbroker, railway clerk, shopkeeper		
skilled	Skilled extended apprenticeship (manual) or some post-elementary education (non-manual)	*manual*: cabinet maker, printer, scientific instrument maker, silversmith, watchmaker	1,866	16
		non-manual: artist, interpreter, newspaper reporter, teacher		
managerial, entrepreneurial and professional	for non-entrepreneurial occupations, usually professional qualifications or university	colonial banker, dentist, engineer, newspaper publisher, physician, rabbi, solicitor, stockbroker, wholesale shoe manufacturer and warehouseman	592	5
inactive, independent or indeterminate	n/a	fundholder, invalid, lunatic, pensioner, refugee	428	4
TOTAL			**11,370**	

The number in the first row splits roughly a third unskilled, two-thirds semi-skilled, but the boundaries are too often uncertain to merit separate lines. General dealers, hawkers and costermongers represent the largest unskilled group (n = 1,244), and general domestic servants account for much of the rest (n =374), followed by small numbers of agricultural

workers, general labourers, sailors, porters, messengers and the like. Clothing and allied workers along with cigar makers (n = 2,536) make up a large part of the semi-skilled manual group. In the semi-skilled non-manual group, the majority are shopkeepers and shop assistants, travellers or specialised dealers. Predictably, a substantial proportion of these – some 20 per cent (n = 604) – were engaged in the garment trades, but, as noted earlier, Jews in trading occupations covered a wide range of other product groups.

The skilled group is made up predominantly of skilled manual workers, especially jewellers, watchmakers and the like, and is very largely represented by men. The non-manual minority are much more evenly split between men and women: their numbers are more or less even in teaching, and women make up a third of those in the arts.

Labour market

The occupational data offer some clues, if not fully reliable, as to people's position in the labour market. The census form given to householders in 1851 asked them to state (for each person in the household) if they were employers, and if so how many they employed. Not everyone is likely to have responded accurately: some will have overlooked the question, whilst others, for a variety of reasons, may not have stated the true position.[17] Not all of those who would have regarded themselves as 'retired' are so described in their census returns. It is perhaps even harder to measure the balance between the active workforce and the unemployed. Much piece-work, for example, was subject to large seasonal fluctuations (Thompson and Yeo, p 191-92 and passim). Some of those who were out of work would so describe themselves, whilst others would simply list the trade they had followed previously. The data in Table 6 need therefore to be read as indicative rather than precise.

The high proportion of self-employed/sole traders nevertheless stands out: it is due mainly to the large number of dealers, agents and shopkeepers. It is not easy to arrive at comparable figures for the British working population as a whole in 1851, but taking the 'dealing' line in Table 1 as a proxy, the national figure is likely to have been much lower – perhaps between 5 and 10 per cent.[18]

Table 6: Labour market distribution of the adult AJDB population*

Category	Example occupations	Numbers	% of all listed adult occupations
in apprenticeships	apprentice lithographer, articled clerk, pupil teacher	151	1
self-employed/sole trader	fruiterer, general dealer, optician, Navy agent, professor of languages, solicitor, upholsterer	5,013	44
in contracted employment (waged, salaried or piece-worker)	buttonhole maker, dock labourer, domestic servant mercantile clerk	5,104	45
employer	Birmingham warehouseman, boot manufacturer, coalmine proprietor, clothier warehouse, school proprietor, wholesale jeweller	397	3
inactive	unemployed, retired, supported by family	206	2
independent	annuitant, investment income, rents from property	366	3
under care or restraint	convict, invalid, lunatic, patient	29	<1
not known	attends sales, chess player, interpreter's wife, Polish refugee	104	1
TOTAL		**11,370**	

* excluding students

A quarter of those listed as employers were involved in clothing manufacture (n = 101). Of these, 58 recorded in the census the numbers they employed. The majority employed less than 10 (Figure 3). At least another six clothing employers were operating on a significantly larger scale. Three were employing between 20 and 50, and one quoted 130 – already large figures for a sector that was mainly based in small workshops rather than factories at this date. The two largest – E Moses and the firm of Hyam Hyam – were calling on much bigger numbers, albeit many of their workers would have been under contract to middlemen rather than direct employees.[19]

Figure 3: numbers of AJDB employers in garments manufacturing with <21 employees, 1851

Not all of those classed in Table 6 as independent would have been economically inactive. Some of those living off rental income, for instance, may have devoted much time and effort to property management. Unmarried daughters in wealthy families, excluded from the labour market by social convention, would often throw themselves into some absorbing activity, typically charitable or literary in nature. At a best guess, there are some 300 occupational entries that suggest a largely leisured existence ('annuitant', 'fundholder', 'holder of railway stock', 'lady' and suchlike).[20]

How big was the AJDB's social and economic élite? The managerial, entrepreneurial and professional group in Table 5 taken together with the leisured group identified here represent roughly 7 per cent of the 1851 population.[21] This is about half the size of Joseph Jacobs' estimate for a broadly equivalent group thirty years later (Lipman, pp 75-77).[22] The implied progression, however, is plausible. As set out below, the AJDB

population appear, in the round, to have made significant gains in the second half of the 19th century.

At the other end of the scale, the database lists a small number of people under care or restraint. Ten are hospital patients, three are 'lunatics', and two 'idiots', though the number suffering from mental disabilities was probably larger than the recorded examples suggest. In addition, 16 – amounting to 0.13 per cent of the adult Jewish population – were in prison for various offences. This appears to be about half the national rate,[23] but the Jewish figures are too small to read much into the comparison. The most that can probably be said is that by the mid-century the Jewish community appears to have shaken off the propensity to crime that marked them out in earlier decades, even if – thanks to the likes of Charles Dickens – the reputation lingered on.

Age differentials

The database suggests some substantial differences between the occupational profiles of different age cohorts in 1851. Figure 4 appears to suggest, for example, that the younger generation were much more concentrated in a few sectors (notably garments and personal requisites) than their older peers. By contrast, the construction/housing/hospitality sector appears to be skewed towards older age groups: this demands some disaggregation. The sector includes both the glaziers and plumbers, who tended to be quite young, and the likes of pub landlords, who tended to be older.

Further study would be needed to disentangle durable generational differences from the natural cycle of career progression. For example, it will be seen in the discussion below of 1820s occupations that the proportion of the Jewish population working in the garments sector was probably substantially smaller in the 1820s than it had become by the 1850s. But clothing (along with cigar-making, as already discussed) was one of the trades in which community leaders encouraged apprenticeships. It may therefore have had something of the character of a starter occupation, a trade that young people tended to drift into before they found a more permanent footing elsewhere.[24] The evidence from occupations in the 1880s (see below) suggests that any apparent narrowing of range for the younger generation was more of an age-related phenomenon than an indication that this cohort were caught by a lasting shift towards proletarian occupations, or a narrowing of opportunities.

Figure 4: percentage of age cohort by AJDB product group, 1851

Regional differences

Three-quarters of the AJDB population in 1851 were living in London. Most of them were still in the area of first settlement on the eastern fringes of the City (in Aldgate, Spitalfields and neighbouring areas, the 'East End'). But dispersal around the metropolis, dating well back into the 18th

century, was by now gathering pace, and accounted for about a quarter of Jewish Londoners (Laidlaw, 2011, pp 39-41). Sizeable Jewish populations were to be found in affluent districts like Bloomsbury, Marylebone and Piccadilly, although in these areas, just as in the poorer areas of the East End, the rich would often be living more or less cheek-by-jowl with the poor.[25]

As in most old cities, different quarters were associated with different trades. In London, upmarket tailoring was associated with the West End, particularly around the Strand; cheap clothes manufacture was concentrated particularly in Aldgate; and clothes dealing was centred in Spitalfields, home of the Petticoat Lane clothing market. The distribution of Jewish clothing workers between these areas probably mirrored that of the wider population. Spitalfields also had a high proportion of London's Jewish cigar-makers, which may have reflected the Dutch origins of many of its inhabitants (Laidlaw, 2011, p 41). Aldgate was home to approaching half of all London's Jewish food traders, among them bakers, butchers, confectioners, fishmongers, and fruiterers.[26]A range of factors would be in play here, among them the adjacency of the main London synagogues around which kosher butchers and bakers would naturally cluster, and also of the Duke's Place fruit market.

Outside London, the AJDB population was dispersed throughout the British Isles, with about half of the total in Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool, Plymouth, Hull and Portsmouth. The characters of these communities were quite distinctive in terms of the origins of their populations, the length of settlement, and the external factors that drove the local economies (Laidlaw, 2011, pp 42-43), and the occupational profiles vary from city to city.

In Manchester, predictably, over a third of the recorded adult occupations in 1851 were in the garments industry (n = 170), with a higher ratio of dealers to makers, and a higher proportion involved in the textiles trade, than seen elsewhere. But there are surprisingly few Manchester Jews involved in the finance, insurance and investment sector, which is better represented in nearby Liverpool. Only a low proportion of Liverpool's population, by contrast, were involved in the garments business (n = 42). But they made a much stronger showing than most other communities in personal requisites, particularly watch-making (n = 79). Few Jews in Birmingham were directly involved with 'Birmingham goods' – small metal goods like nails and screws, tools and locks – but an unusually high proportion of the Jewish community were pawnbrokers, perhaps reflecting the very rapid expansion that the city was undergoing in the mid-19th century. Hull, with its high levels of recent immigration

from Eastern Europe, had a relatively large proportion of jewellers: as explored below, jewellers often had Eastern European origins. These broad pointers apart, however, the numbers in the regional communities are too small to allow meaningful inference outside the context of more in-depth study.[27]

Women

As already noted, female occupations appear under-reported in the census and other sources relied on in this project. Few women, except those in affluent families or the incapacitated, would have been without work, formal or otherwise. But, particularly among married women, it was common to leave the occupation line in censuses blank (Table 7).

Table 7
1851 occupational data coverage, AJDB women, by marital status

Age in 1851	Single			Married			Widowed		
	Total Numbers	of which, occupation recorded		Total Numbers	of which, occupation recorded		total Numbers	of which, occupation recorded	
		Numbers	%		Numbers	%		Numbers	%
15-24	2302	1185	51	495	108	22	3	2	67
25-34	715	414	58	1417	269	19	37	28	76
35-44	249	132	53	1183	235	20	70	55	79
45-54	126	67	53	774	192	25	122	96	79
55-64	74	56	76	440	125	28	147	104	71
65-plus	67	37	55	244	90	37	216	104	48
all ages	3533	1891	54	4553	1019	22	595	389	65

This requires careful interpretation. It seems probable that many of the wives of craftsmen and retailers, for example, would have participated in their husbands' businesses, even if no occupation was shown against their names. There is evidence from sources like the censuses and insurance policies that widows quite often took over their deceased husbands' businesses, suggesting that they already had some grounding. In the case of manual workers, the evidence of Mayhew (Thompson and Yeo, passim) suggests that whole households would often be working together in the home to produce mass-market garments, even though the census might record only the head of household's occupation. Anderson (pp 199-

202) makes the further point that many married women would earn income for the household by catering for lodgers: certainly many of the households in the AJDB contained one or more lodgers.[28] A blank in the occupation column, in other words, does not mean that the woman was not in work.

Against this, Table 6 suggests a credible age-related pattern: before children were born, married women tended to be in paid work; when their children were young, they had to stop non-domestic work; when some of their children were old enough to look after the younger ones, they would take up paid work again. Anderson (p 203) argues, albeit from examining a very different population, that the 1851 census gives a fairer reflection of married women's occupations than is sometimes supposed. It seems quite possible that, taken in the round, the AJDB would corroborate this conclusion.

As to the work that women were doing, Figure 5 suggests that they were for the most part concentrated into a smaller range of occupations than men: the great majority were seamstresses, dressmakers and milliners, hawkers and general dealers, or domestic servants. In some smaller trades, like artificial flowers, carpet-bags, feathers and umbrellas and parasols, the manufacturing side of the business was almost wholly in women's hands: the men in these trades tended either to be managers or dealers. The more educated women, if they worked at all, were mostly found in teaching or the arts. Only two are found in the professions, one as a chemist and the other as a dentist; both are widows who have presumably carried on their husbands' businesses. As already noted, however, there is likely to be a hidden number of women working alongside their husbands in a much wider range of businesses.

This probably includes most of those listed as 'wives' (as in 'fishmonger's wife' 'tobacconist's wife', 'furniture dealer's wife', and so on); and it might reasonably be inferred, too, that many women with no occupation against their names were substantially involved in their husbands' work. An outstanding but surely not lone example is Harriet Samuel née Wolf, who turned round her in-laws' ailing watch-making business into what was to become one of Britain's biggest jewellery chains.[29]

Figure 5: gender differentiation by AJDB product group (1851)[30]

Foreign-born

About 30 per cent of the database population's adults in 1851 were foreign-born (Laidlaw, 2011, p 35), and the database indicates some differences in their occupations compared with those born in the British Isles. The home-born were, predictably, much more likely than the foreign born to be found in the professions (particularly in justice and law enforcement and in audit, accountancy and book-keeping), and also in the property business. But they were also over-represented compared with the foreign-born in sectors like the feather trade, fishmongery, and road transport (mostly as cab-drivers or proprietors or as coach builders). Whether this was the result mainly of informal traditions and networking, or whether there were more significant barriers against immigrant penetration, is beyond the scope of this study.

The immigrant population, for their part, were much more likely than the home-born to be found in fields like footwear and hosiery, headwear, jewellery and construction (particularly glazing and plumbing) as already described above. The over-representation applied particularly to those from Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe, accounting for almost a quarter of their known occupations (n = 554 out of 2,375). Those from Western Europe appear to have been more similar to the home-born population in their occupational profiles: little more than a tenth of those born in France, Holland and Germany with known occupations are found

in these trades (n = 249 out 2,139). A complex tangle of social, cultural and commercial factors is likely to have been in play here.

The foreign-born were also heavily dominant in religious ministry, where 65 out of a total of 77 were foreign-born. This reflects, in large part, the preference for bringing in rabbis from central and eastern Europe, where the most highly-respected rabbinical schools were to be found: 71 per cent of the foreign-born came from these parts. The religious ministry category also includes, however, 11 foreign-born Jews who converted to Christianity and became church ministers or missionaries.[31]

Sephardim

The AJDB records, wherever known, people's faith affiliations in early-life, mid-life and late-life, usually inferred from birth, marriage and death records. Data from at least one of these points are available on just under 40 per cent (n = 11,241) of the database population. Supplementing this as necessary with birthplace and name information, it is estimated that some 6 per cent (n = 746) of adults with known 1851 occupations were Sephardi.[32]

The occupational profile of this group is different from that of the majority. In the case of clothes-making and dealing, which accounts for such a high proportion of Jewish occupations in 1851, the Sephardi community appears (at 3.9 per cent of the AJDB total) substantially under-represented. The reasons for this are unclear. By contrast, they appear over-represented in, for example, the food and drinks business (especially confectionery, baking and non-alcoholic drinks), in pharmaceuticals, and in the feather trade. The numbers in each case are small, so it is difficult to judge how much of this is down to chance, rather than commercial considerations such as supply lines; or down to cultural traditions like those that produced the pastries which Mayhew (p 99) says were so highly prized in London; or simply down to family networks.[33]

Children

School attendance was not compulsory in 1851, but provision was widespread, and it is likely that at this date most children in Britain received some degree of elementary education, even if in many cases it was only sporadic or of short duration (Coleman, pp 402-10). There were, by this time, several Jewish day schools in London, catering for perhaps 3,000 pupils, along with some smaller Jewish establishments in major centres of population like Birmingham and Manchester (Black, 1998, p 76; Williams, 1985, pp 96-97). The affluent had the additional option of

several Jewish boarding schools located around the country; and there were also some charitable boarding establishments for Jewish orphans. Children who could not get into a Jewish school had the option of attending local non-Jewish schools. Others could be educated at home.

The database contains entries on 7,559 children aged between 4 and 14 in 1851. Of these, almost half (n = 3,484) are recorded as being school pupils at the time of the census, of whom 8 per cent (n = 290) were in boarding schools. Most of the remainder – in London and the other big cities, at least – are likely to have gone to the Jewish day schools already referred to. It should not, however, be inferred that the 3,622 children who were not listed as scholars in the 1851 census never attended school: most probably did, at some point in the course of their childhoods, even if they were not so described in the census.

Table 8
Children listed as scholars as proportion of age group, 1851 census

Age		Male		Female	
		All London, general population	All AJDB	All London, general population	All AJDB
0-4	Total in age group ('000s)	146	2.1	147	2.0
	Scholars ('000s)	12	0.2	12	0.2
	Scholars(%)	8.6	10.6	8.2	9.9
5-9	Total in age group ('000s)	121	1.8	122	1.8
	Scholars ('000s)	68	0.9	63	0.8
	Scholars (%)	56.0	52.3	51.7	46.3
10-14	Total in age group ('000s)	107	1.6	109	1.7
	Scholars ('000s)	50	0.8	48	0.7
	Scholars (%)	46.3	50.6	44.0	42.8

Source of all-London data: Coleman (1972, Table 9)

Coleman (1972, pp 402-9) suggests, in a study of the broader population's attendance rates, that school attendance was generally lower in the cities, and particularly London, than elsewhere in the country. Taking his London figures as a reasonable benchmark for the AJDB population as a whole,[34] Jewish participation seems higher than the wider population's in the early years, but then appears to drop off, relatively speaking, in the 5-9 age-group (Table 8). More Jewish boys appear to stay

on for 10-14 schooling than among the wider population, but girls' participation remains lower than for Londoners generally.

Economic factors probably loom large. With a high proportion of the Jewish population in very poorly paid manual occupations, it should be no surprise to find sizeable numbers of their children put out to work. But the rate of child labour among the Jewish population actually seems lower than in the wider community (Table 9). It appears particularly low, moreover, when compared with the wider population of Bethnal Green – a deprived London district contiguous, and probably quite similar, to the main centres of Jewish population – which Coleman has studied in some detail.

The main sector in which AJDB working children were involved was, predictably, the garment industry. This accounts for over 40 per cent of working children, the bulk of them as tailors, dressmakers and cap-makers.

Table 9: Children aged 10-14 in work, 1851 census

	Male			Female		
	All London, general population	Bethnal Green, general population	All AJDB	All London, general population	Bethnal Green, general population	All AJDB
Total in age group ('000s)	107	1.0	**1.6**	109	0.9	**1.7**
In work ('000s)	26	0.3	**0.2**	15	0.2	**0.2**
In work (%)	23.9	33	**15.7**	13.4	21.1	**11.2**

Source of all-London and Bethnal Green data: Coleman (1972, Table 9)

Another quarter was making personal requisites, particularly cigars and umbrellas. About an eighth were working as errand boys, and the rest were scattered among a range of occupations, including domestic service, construction (mainly glazing), the food industry and the performing arts.

Occupations in surrounding decades

Besides 1851, the Database records, wherever available, people's occupations in each of the surrounding decades of the 19th century. The data in the outlying decades, especially the early ones, are relatively thin, for reasons already described, but the coverage in more central and later decades is better. This allows at least some tentative comparisons across the decades, and also permits a degree of longitudinal analysis.

1820s

There are 196 entries in the AJDB that list occupations in the 1820s. Only about a third of the AJDB population who would be adults at this date were already living in Britain (n = 1,891); and data on the occupations of the foreign-born before emigration are virtually non-existent. Moreover, all but three of the recorded occupations are of males.[35] Narrowing the denominator to reflect these limitations, the occupations logged for the 1820s represent a fairly respectable 20% of the adult male AJDB population already living in Britain. The absolute numbers are however small, and some source bias is inevitable, so it would be unwise to place a great deal of weight on comparisons with the data for 1851. It is nevertheless of interest to see the split across product groups from this sample (Figure 6).

What stands out here is the much stronger showing of personal requisites (here referring mainly to jewellery and silversmithing), and the relatively weaker showing of garments, than is found later on. Unlike in 1851, moreover, the majority of those involved in the garments business were selling rather than making, typically describing themselves as 'slopsellers', that is to say sellers of used clothing.

There must be an element here of source bias: poorly-paid manual workers are unlikely to have taken out insurance policies, or paid for entries in trade directories, or made wills. But it is also very likely that proportionately fewer Jews were involved in clothing manufacture at this date. Mayhew comments on a major shift between the early and middle decades of the century (Thompson and Yeo, pp 181-191 and passim). In the earlier decades, he says, it consisted largely of skilled tailoring, from which the man of the house could generally support his entire family. The majority of the population, however, could never afford to buy from a tailor: they would rely on used clothing, many going around in rags. This meant there was much work to be had from clothes dealing. But by the mid-century, cheap, ready-to-wear clothing had started to be turned out for the mass market. Often this involved the whole family as an

industrial unit, maybe producing only parts of clothing (sleeves, buttonholes, and so on) rather than finished garments, and often under contract to a middleman or 'sweater'. The market for second-hand clothes was presumably beginning to wane as a result. It is probably therefore safe to infer that, in the 1820s, those Jews who were working in the clothing industry were mostly either skilled tailors or dealers, and that, as Figure 6 implies, the sector was less dominant numerically for Jews than it later became.


Figure 6: occupations in the 1820s by product category

1880s

By the 1880s, something like 12,000 of the database population would have died.[36] Of the remainder, most who had been children in 1851 would now be married, and – in the case of women – would be using a different surname. A significant proportion of the database population, moreover, would have emigrated (Laidlaw, 2011, pp 46-48). It can be hard, in consequence, to trace survivors through the remainder of their lives, and the database records the occupations in the 1880s of only about 16 per

cent (n = 2,668) of the estimated total, most but not all of them still living in the British Isles.[37]

By definition, by 1881 we should expect to see fewer people in occupations associated with the young, and more in those associated with older people, than in 1851. In accordance with the pattern in Table 7, female occupations are particularly thinly represented for this reason (n = 532). Recorded male occupations amount to a more respectable 25 per cent (n = 2,136) of the estimated surviving male population, and the analysis that follows is therefore confined to males.[38]


Figure 7: sectoral split of male occupations, 1851 and 1881

Underlying the 1880s data will be, not just life-cycle shifts, but shifts reflecting structural change in the wider economy: the move from home- and workshop-based manufacturing to production-line factory work, for example. Both factors might of course combine: older people who had been able to make the most of a booming economy would enjoy greater prosperity in later life than would be possible in a flatter economy. These various factors are hard to disentangle. Figure 7 suggests some significant shifts, but the figures need to be read with caution. For example, the apparent shift away from the garment industry may reflect new cohorts of Jewish immigrants (not represented in the database) undercutting the 'Anglo' population who had taken the work in less competitive times.[39]

Table 10: Percentages in occupational sectors, 1851 and 1881, by birth cohort (males only)

	1807-16 birth cohort		1827-36 birth cohort	
	% of male occupations in 1851 (*mid-career*)	% of male occupations in 1881 (*late-career*)	% of male occupations in 1851 (*early-career*)	% of male occupations in 1881 (*mid-career*)
Construction, Housing and Hospitality	4.1	3.7	3.9	5.9
Arts, Entertainment and Sport	1.6	1.7	1.6	4.2
Garments	26.3	14.9	26.3	15.2
Education, Science and Technology	2.1	2.9	1.0	1.1
Finance, Insurance and Investment	2.5	4.1	1.8	8.6
Food and drink	7.5	7.4	6.6	10.1
Health and Hygiene	3.3	2.1	1.9	3.1
Household goods and services	7.6	4.5	5.3	9.7
Metals (miscellaneous products)	0.9	0.4	0.8	1.8
Personal requisites	14.3	11.6	24.7	9.7
Printing, publishing and stationery	3.1	2.9	2.6	2.4
Public and community services	3.6	5.8	1.2	6.4
Transport and distribution	1.6	2.1	1.6	1.5
Miscellaneous/unknown	21.5	36.0	20.6	20.4

There is likely also to be some source bias in the apparent growth in the Finance, Insurance and Investment sector (where banking, stockbroking and suchlike were gaining ground on the traditional pawnbroking); in the Miscellaneous sector (covering the likes of Brazil, West Indies and East Indies merchants) and in Public and Community Services (where the main growth was in entry to the legal profession and political services).

There will be age-related effects too, some to do with life-cycle stages, some generational. Table 10 compares the shifts in occupations of two

male cohorts: those born in 1807-16, who would be in mid-career in 1851 (n = 1,543), and late-career by 1881 (n = 242); and those born in 1827-36, who would be in early-career in 1851 (n = 2,247), and mid-career in 1881 (n = 455).[40] Some shifts stand out. For example, the substantial move away from personal requisites amongst the younger cohort is mainly driven by a big drop-off, as they got older, in cigar-making: this appears to confirm its status as a starter-trade for the young. Both the younger and the older cohorts show a notable shift towards the financial sector, but it is more marked in the younger cohort: almost 9 per cent of them were engaged in this sector in mid-life, compared with under 3 per cent of the older cohort when they were in mid-life. This is likely to reflect changes in the wider economy as much as circumstances specific to this population.

Table 11 looks at the shift in skills-status for the same two cohorts of males as in Table 10. Allowing always for the uncertainties of the data, it does appear to suggest significant upward mobility, with a quarter of the younger cohort in managerial, entrepreneurial or professional positions by the time they were in mid-career, compared with just one in ten of their older counterparts. The figures in the round are consistent with Jacobs' estimate of 14 per cent in the professional and merchant group in 1882 (Lipman, pp 75-77).

Table 11
Skills-status split, 1851 and 1881, by birth cohort (males only)

	1807-17 birth cohort		1827-36 birth cohort	
	% of male occupations in 1851	% of male occupations in 1881	% of male occupations in 1851	% of male occupations in 1881
inactive/indeterminate	0.6	7.8	1.6	3.3
managerial, entrepreneurial and professional	9.6	21.4	3.9	24.6
skilled	19.6	13.6	17.5	12.9
unskilled and semi-skilled	70.2	57.2	77.0	59.2

Longitudinal sweep: career progression

The figures presented so far have tracked shifts only at the population level, rather than the occupational progression of individuals, which in

principle would be very much more telling. The database is designed to afford longitudinal analysis, although the current availability of occupational data on decades surrounding 1851 restricts the scope. About one in eight database entries (n = 3,628) show occupations in at least one decade other than the 1850s; and about 6 per cent in at least two (n = 1,589).

At the extreme, there are just 24 people in the database whose occupations are listed in the 1820s, the 1850s and the 1880s. They are almost all professional people, including such notables as Joseph Levy-Lawson (proprietor of the Daily Telegraph), Moses Hyam of the clothing empire, the composer Charles Kensington Salaman, the mathematician James Joseph Sylvester, and Benjamin Disraeli, one of two Jewish prime ministers in the database.[41] Notwithstanding their considerable biographical interest, the data on this group have little to tell us at a statistical level.


Figure 8: skills progression of individuals with adult occupations in 1851 and occupations known in 1881

There are, however, 1,169 entries with adult occupations in 1851 for whom occupations are recorded in 1881; about a third of them also show occupations in the intervening decades. The data could be explored in various ways. Here we look, in the most general terms, at progression up the skills ladder (Figure 8), building on the picture already drawn in the previous section.

Much turns here on the way individual occupational descriptors have been coded and, with only small numbers, a few mis-allocations can affect the overall picture. The data do however suggest that something of the order of a quarter of 1851's unskilled and semi-skilled workers had risen up the scale 30 years later. Examples include a pedlar in 1851 who by 1881 was a bill broker, a shop assistant who ended up as a wholesale jeweller, and a glazier who ended up as a cloth merchant: it is fairly clear from their addresses how much they had moved up in the world.[42]

A similar proportion of 1851's skilled workers appear also to have moved up the ladder by 1881. Examples here include a spectacle maker who ended up as a knighted alderman and magistrate; a jeweller and pawnbroker who ended up a ship-owner; a hawker in 1841/watchmaker in 1851 who progressed to being a wholesale jeweller; a cap-peak maker who in 1851 was employing 5 hands, and by 1881 was employing 40; and a governess who became a school principal. Again, addresses bear out the suggested progression.

Not surprisingly, both the skilled and the managerial, entrepreneurial and professional groups appear to have had some casualties – people who slipped back into semi-skilled or unskilled work (perhaps reflecting the wider changes in demand for traditional skills). Examples here include a cabinet maker who slid down to hawking, a paper-stainer who ended as a charwoman, and a schoolmaster who became a sexton. The individual stories – whether external misfortune or something in their own character was in play – are unfortunately not known.

In most cases of apparent movement down the scale, however, what appears to be happening is more a shift from the keen manual demands of craft-work to the physically gentler demands of commerce, possibly because of declining eyesight or dexterity: the harness-maker who ends up as a fishmonger, for example, the bookbinder who becomes a meat inspector, the shoemaker who becomes a lodging house keeper, or the brass-founder who becomes a licensed victualler. Such shifts should probably be interpreted, not as downward mobility, but as fairly normal developments across life-cycles.

Concluding remarks

The analysis offered here demonstrates the contribution that prosopographical databases can make to social and economic research. The AJDB project is able to demonstrate, with numbers, that the great majority of the Jewish population in mid-19th century Britain were in low-earning occupations. It also suggests that, by the time of the mass immigration that began in the 1880s, a fair proportion of them (perhaps a quarter of the unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled) had seen an improvement in their circumstances. This rather undermines the stereotype reputedly held by the newcomers in the age of mass immigration, that the pre-existing Anglo-Jewish population was staid and bourgeois. Comfortable though many of them may have been by the late-century, most would have started their working lives in circumstances of considerable privation. The implicit message they held out to the newcomers was that those who started at the bottom and worked hard had a fair chance of improving their lot, to an extent probably unthinkable for most in the Old Country. The pattern may not have been so different from the pattern in store for the newcomers themselves, who may have had more in common with their 'Anglo' forerunners than they supposed.

APPENDIX

OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION

As indicated above under Occupational Classification, the standard Booth-Armstrong system, though useful for comparing Jewish occupational patterns with those of the British population at large, does not seem well-suited to detailed analysis of Jewish occupations. In terms simply of industrial sectors, the occupational profile of Jews in mid-19th century Britain was very different from that of the population at large. Booth-Armstrong is not, moreover, designed to assist with the other interrogations this paper has addressed, such as skill levels. As part of the project, therefore, the author designed a custom-made classification to reflect as soundly as possible the underlying raw data. It has four components: product categories; skill levels; labour market position; and activity types, generating a four-part code for each entry, made up as follows.

Skills status
leisured
managerial
professional
semi-skilled manual
semi-skilled non-manual
skilled manual
skilled non-manual
unskilled
inactive
indeterminate

Labour market position
in education
in apprenticeships/vocational
training
self-employed/sole trader

contracted employment
employer
economically inactive
income from investments,
property &c
under care or restraint
not known

Activity
producing raw materials
manufacturing
selling a product
providing a service
in education
not clear
no activity

Products

CONSTRUCTION, HOUSING AND HOSPITALITY
01   construction
02   hospitality
03   property

ARTS, ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORT
04   performing arts
05   literary arts
06   sport
07   visual arts

GARMENTS
08   feathers
09   footwear and hosiery
10   furs and skin
11   clothing – general
12   clothing – specialist
13   haberdashery
14   headwear
15   textiles

EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
16   academic research
17   education
18   science and technology

FINANCE, INSURANCE AND INVESTMENT
19   audit, accountancy and book-keeping
20   commercial finance and investment
21   insurance
22   personal finance
23   retail money services

FOOD AND DRINK
24   alcoholic drinks
25   bakery products and confectionery
26   fish
27   fruit and vegetables
28   meat and dairy
29   miscellaneous grocery
30   non-alcoholic

HEALTH AND HYGIENE
31   chiropody
32   dentistry
33   medical care and surgery
34   optical services
35   personal grooming and hygiene
36   pharmaceutical supplies
37   veterinary services

HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND SERVICES AND IRONMONGERY
38   domestic service
39   floristry
40   fuel and lighting
41   furniture
42   household decoration
43   ironmongery and tools
44   soft furnishings
45   tableware

METALS (MISCELLANEOUS PRODUCTS)
46   non-precious metals
47   precious metals (gold merchant, silver dealer)

PERSONAL REQUISITES
48   accessories
49   jewellery
50   timepieces
51   tobacco
52   toys

PRINTING, PUBLISHING AND STATIONERY
53   general publishing
54   newspaper publishing
55   printing
56   paper supplies and miscellaneous stationery
57   writing materials

PUBLIC AND COMMUNITY SERVICES
58   burial services
59   community service
60   government service
61   justice and law enforcement
62   military service and general military supplies
63   religious ministry
64   political activity/
65   ritual services

TRANSPORT AND DISTRIBUTION
66   marine and waterway transport and distribution
67   packaging
68   *rail transport*
69   road construction and maintenance
70   road transport

MISCELLANEOUS/UNKNOWN
71   miscellaneous
72   unknown

NO PRODUCT: EDUCATION AS INPUT
00 schoolchildren (scholar, pupil, at home, student)

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Notes

[1] The expression 'British Isles' covers England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. All were subject to the 19th century censuses, and all had Jewish residents in 1851.

[2] The AJDB project has been running for over ten years. It is a prosopographical database – that is to say, one made up of summary biographical data on all the people it contains – drawing on data from a wide range of sources and a large number of contributors. The qualifying criterion for inclusion in the database is that the person needs to have been 'Jewish' (on a liberal definition) and resident somewhere in the British Isles at some point during the course of 1851. Some of the entries were old people in 1851, and their biographical data stretch back to the middle of the 18th century. Some were just babies, and the biographical data on those who were blessed with long lives stretches to the middle of the twentieth century. Details of the database are at http://www.jewishgen.org/jcr-uk/1851/introduction.htm.

[3] Here defined as those aged 15-plus, using birth-years as recorded in the database.

[4] The individual household schedules were not seen as worth keeping once the data had been transmitted to the Registrar General, and almost all were destroyed, to the lasting frustration of later researchers.

[5] The database convention is to record occupations in, or as close as possible to, the decade-plus-one date (eg 1841, 1851, 1861) used for UK censuses. Where no decade-plus-one data are available, but sources relating to other years in the decade yield relevant data, the source closest to decade-plus-one (eg 1842 rather than 1846) is the one used.

[6] Quite a large number of entries in the database indicate involvement in two or more different industrial sectors, for example, 'gold and silversmith, dealer in gold and silver lace, tailor, sword cutler, hatter, glover and hosier' and 'Hackney carriage proprietor, victualler and dealer in paintings'. (It seems likely that quite often this would reflect a clutch of inherited businesses in which the person concerned may or may not have had much involvement.) Several entries, similarly, indicate a range of different activity types (for example 'lace merchant and manufacturer and alderman' and 'sealing wax maker and preacher'), and several others indicate a range of different labour market statuses (for example, 'patent medicine vendor and fund holder'). In all such cases, the occupational codings are compounded to reflect the full range, but for analytical purposes only the first-named element is counted. This follows common convention is census studies, and reflects the instruction to householders on the census form to list multiple occupations 'in the order of their importance'.

[7] Wrigley's system is designed for a different purpose from Booth-Armstrong's, namely to track shifts in the overall structure of demand in the economy, as distinct from measuring the sizes of different industrial sectors.

[8] It is perhaps surprising, when so many were involved in the manufacture of clothing, that so few Jews were involved in the manufacture of textiles, even in Manchester. The reasons for this are beyond the scope of the present study, but are likely to include both cultural and geographical factors: much textile production there was located in satellite towns, each specialising in particular processes

[9] Mayhew indicates that, in 1848, whilst a skilled male tailor working in the West End might earn an average per week of £1 2s (Thompson and Yeo, p 191), his counterpart in the East End might earn only 5s (*ibid*, p 206), and a female slopworker or shirtmaker in the East End 2s per week for an 18-hour day (*ibid*, p 170). Of the 1,645 adults in the AJDB listed as engaged (other than as employers) in general clothing manufacture in 1851, 32 were males based in London's West End, 511 were males based in the East End, and 619 were females based in the East End. The great majority, in other words, were in the very low-earning East End trade.

[10] The 1851 Population Tables (www.histpop.org.uk) give figures only for female cap-makers: the total in London was 1,277, of whom 110 were aged under 15. The AJDB records 184 female cap-makers in London in 1851, of whom 29

were under 15. The Jewish component thus accounted for about 13 per cent of the adult total, and 26 per cent of the children. There were also 130 male Jewish cap-makers in London, but for some reason the Population Tables do not list cap-making separately among male trades, so their proportion of all cap-makers cannot be estimated. Mayhew (Thompson and Yeo, p 163) gives interesting data from the published statistics on the 1841 census, but it is not clear how far they are comparable with those for 1851.

[11] The mean year of birth of those in jewellery trades in 1851 was 1811, compared with 1826 for all adult occupations.

[12] The mean year of birth of those listed as cigar-makers in 1851 was 1829, and that of tobacconists was 1816. 25 per cent of cigar-makers were foreign-born (roughly average at this date for people of that age), and 95 per cent based in London, whereas 41 per cent of tobacconists were foreign born (above average for people of that age), and only 48 per cent based in London.

[13] This group includes the likes of carvers and gilders, engravers, picture restorers, tambour workers, and violin makers.

[14] Though probably several others listed in the database as living on investment income held railway stocks, even after the railway bubble burst in the late-1840s.

[15] Six people in the database are recorded as brothel keepers. None, however, are recorded as prostitutes. Professional prostitutes living in brothels are rarely identified by a real name or other data that would indicate Jewish status. Some of those in the AJDB who are listed with other occupations may have had to resort to prostitution, at least occasionally, to make ends meet: Mayhew states that it was very hard for East End seamstresses, for example, to survive on normal pay rates unless they had other means of support (Thompson and Yeo, pp 147-49 and 167-78). Most seamstresses in the AJDB, however, appear to be living in family groups, which would make them less vulnerable; and Mayhew suggests elsewhere that the Jews in the East End were less given to vice than many of their neighbours (Mayhew, p 207). Whatever the underlying number is, it is likely to be quite small.

[16] Most of the adult population in 1851 – certainly those brought up in Britain – will have had at least a few years of elementary education, though their attendance may have been sporadic: it was not made compulsory until the 1870s. Apprenticeships of varying lengths offered the normal route into skilled, and some semi-skilled, manual occupations. For most white-collar occupations, like teachers, solicitors' clerks &c, even architects, secondary schooling to age 16 was normally all that was required. University education was the privilege of only a tiny minority, and in England it was geared more to a liberal education than to professional training. Surmised education and training levels can only therefore serve as a very loose indicator of skill levels.

[17] There is little that can be done here other than to take the workforce data at face value, although in some cases it has been possible to supplement the census data with information from other sources.

[18] The figures in Table 1 and those in Table 6 overlap but are not conterminous. Those in Table 1 relate to all dealing occupations, so would include (for example) employed shop assistants and commercial travellers. Those in Table 6 relate to all the self-employed, which would include most people in professional occupations as well as those in dealing.

[19] The exact size of Elias Moses' workforce at this time is hard to come by. He was one of the pioneers of outsourced – or 'sweated' – labour, and the number of direct employees was probably relatively small. The intermediaries on whom he relied would draw in work from countless small workshops and homes, by no means all of them Jewish. Lipman (p 28) quotes a contemporary source as saying that Hyams employed some 6,000 hands. Here, probably only a minority, if any, were Jewish. The business was based in Colchester, Essex, which did not have a large Jewish population. Brown (p 128) says 'At Colchester in 1844 between 1000 and 1500 of their employees took work out for as many more. Many piecemakers were farmers' womenfolk, and certainly others were Colchester garrison wives.'

[20] It is probable that some of the adults for whom no occupation is recorded in 1851 were also members of the leisured class, but taking the 739 adult men in the AJDB for whom no 1851 occupation is recorded, available occupational data for surrounding decades do not suggest that many should be counted as leisured.

[21] The proportion of children in boarding schools in 1851 (see section on Children), which was about 8 per cent – including some poor children in orphan schools – lends some corroboration to this figure.

[22] Jacobs, however, was counting only London residents, which would tend to inflate the figure, and was using quite different sources (numbers of West End synagogue seat-holders plus entries in residential and commercial directories)

[23] The 1851 census recorded 23,768 prisoners out of a total England and Wales population of 8,781,225.

[24] Another factor to bear in mind when looking at Figure 4 is the low reporting of married women's occupations (typically those in the middle columns) compared with single women's (typically right-hand columns) and widows' (typically those on the left): see section on Women.

[25] In the more affluent districts of London in 1851, the database lists 170 adult Jews classed as professional, managerial or leisured, and 211 in semi-skilled or unskilled occupations. In the East End, there were predictably many more in semi-skilled and unskilled occupations (n = 4,970), but also a sizeable number classed as professional, managerial or leisured (n = 201). The East End still boasted many large, elegant merchant houses, as well as mean and overcrowded tenements.

[26] n = 257, out of a London total of 604.

[27] Such as Williams (1985) and Hyman (1972).

[28] About 1,000 of the Database entries are noted as being in lodgings in the 1851 census, mostly but not solely in Jewish households.

[29] No occupation is listed against her name in the 1851 census, but she didn't actually marry into the Samuel family, and their business, until the following

year. The general point nevertheless holds: married women might often have been a major force in their husband's businesses, even if official records are silent on their involvement.

[30] The numbers underlying Figure 5 are as follows:

	males	females
Arts, Entertainment and Sport	123	28
Construction, Housing and Hospitality	322	66
Education, Science and Technology	127	105
Finance. Insurance and Investment	196	24
Food and drink	574	118
Garments	2094	1447
Health and Hygiene	221	60
Household goods and services	507	488
Metals (miscellaneous products)	61	1
Personal requisites	1410	207
Printing, publishing and stationery	234	38
Public and community services	220	15
Transport and distribution	141	15
Miscellaneous/unknown	1947	581
Total	8177	3193

[31] Nathan Davis, Ridley Haim Herschell, and Moses Margoliouth are cases in point (Rubinstein, Jolles and Rubinstein, pp 204-5, 420 and 644; ODNB) There was proselytising activity to greet new arrivals from the moment they arrived at the docks, as the case of Margoliouth testifies. Some might have been already open to conversion before they left home, while others were perhaps first tempted by the charitable welcome. At all events, they must have been a valuable catch for those organisations involved in missionary activity among the Jewish community.

[32] Most but not all the remainder will have been Ashkenazi, but there are likely to be some Sephardim among them whose affiliation is unclear. Note also that many people in this population switched allegiance at some point in their lifetime, or were offspring of mixed Ashkenazi/Sephardi marriages, so it is unwise to suppose a clear distinction. The occupational data do, however, suggest that distinctive cultural/social/commercial ties were at work.

[33] For example, the Andrade Da Costa and Botibol families seem to have been heavily involved in the feather trade, very possibly with relations overseas arranging the supply.

[34] About three-quarters of the AJDB population were living in London in 1851, and the majority of the remainder were in other big cities (Laidlaw, 2011, p 39).

[35] The three females are: a navy agent and women's clothes dealer; a brothel keeper; and a dealer in iron and rags.

[36] The database collects data on both date and cause of death, though for a variety of reasons the information is far from complete: date of death is known for nearly a quarter of the AJDB population, but cause of death for only about 3 per cent (n = 908). With fuller data, the database would allow an analysis of

mortality against occupations. But it is doubtful that it would produce meaningful results, not least because it is hard to disentangle broader environmental from occupational factors (Woods, pp 203-246).

[37] The database does record include, wherever possible, the occupations of emigrants in their new lands, but these data are currently quite thin.

[38] It needs to be borne in mind that the data must contain a degree of bias: the more successful tend to be more visible (leaving more verifiable trails in sources like newspaper announcements, trade directories and suchlike), and therefore more trackable than the less successful.

[39] Feldman (pp 162-65) offers some interesting comparative data on the occupations of new immigrant generations in the East End of London in the closing years of the century.

[40] The number in 1881 of those born 1807-16 looks small, but represents about 33 per cent of estimated male survivors. (The males in this cohort numbered 1,635 in 1851. By 1881, about 900 of them would have died, leaving 735 survivors.) Males in the cohort born 1827-36 numbered 2,760 in 1851. About 710 would have died by 1881, leaving around 2,050 survivors, of whom the 455 on whom 1881 occupations are recorded represent about 22 per cent.

[41] The other was Julius Vogel (1835-99), who was born and died in London but was twice Prime Minister of New Zealand in the 1870s.

[42] Addresses are never a certain pointer to a person's economic status, because (as indicated in Note 25), any given neighbourhood is likely to contain a mixture of more or less rich and more or less poor people. In the cases here, however, the combination of address *and* occupation probably gives a fairly reliable guide. For example, the pedlar who became a bill broker, Samuel Lewis, was living in Grosvenor Square, Mayfair in 1881, and in later life became a noted philanthropist; the glazier who ended up a cloth merchant, Ellis Harfeld, was living in St George's Square, Regent's Park in 1881; the cap-peak employer whose business expanded between 1851 and 1881 moved from the fairly mean Crispin Street in Spitalfields to the distinctly more salubrious Grosvenor Avenue in Highbury.

INTERNALIZED HOMOPHOBIA AND DISTRESS AMONG PARTICIPANTS IN SUPPORT GROUPS FOR HOMOSEXUALS: SECULAR VERSUS ULTRA-ORTHODOX PARTICIPANTS

Liat Kulik

Abstract

The study compared internalized homophobia and distress among 135 participants in gay and lesbian support groups in Israel, by extent of religiosity (secular vs. ultra-Orthodox) and gender. Another goal of the study was to examine whether the contribution of personal resources (self-esteem and self-differentiation) and environmental resources (emotional support) to explaining distress differed for secular versus ultra-Orthodox participants, and for men versus women. As expected, religiosity contributed most significantly to explaining distress. Several differences were found between men and women with regard to the outcome variable and the explanatory variables, irrespective of religiosity. Notably, distress and levels of internalized homophobia were lower for women than for men, although levels of emotional support were higher for women.

Keywords: Support groups for homosexuals, ultra-Orthodox Jews, self-esteem, internalized homophobia, self-differentiation

Introduction

Notwithstanding the changes that have taken place in attitudes toward homosexuality in contemporary societies, the prevalence of heterosexism, sexism, and racism has exposed gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals to daily stress (DiPlacido, 1998). This is especially true of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals who also belong to religious and ethnic minorities. In an attempt

to cope with social and personal pressures that arise as a result of their different sexual orientation, some gays, lesbians, and bisexuals join support groups that provide them with guidance, assistance, and support in the process of establishing their sexual identity (Slusher, Mayer, & Dunkle, 1996). In Israel, which is known as a society that combines traditional and modern values, support groups for gays, lesbians and bisexuals have existed for a long time in secular communities. Recently, at the initiative of homosexual organizations, support groups have been established for sexual minorities in ultra-Orthodox communities as well. The main purpose of these groups is to provide an appropriate social response to those who wish to remain religiously observant while also freely expressing a non-heterosexual orientation. In most of these groups, there is a professional team that provides psychological support in the complex process commonly known as "coming out of the closet".

The study focused mainly on examining differences in levels of distress and the variables that explain distress among participants in support groups for gays, lesbians and bisexuals in two social and religious contexts: secular society, and ultra-Orthodox society. Some of the participants in the support groups had already formed a homosexual or bisexual identity. Others were still in the initial stages of forming their sexual identity, and expressed a "confused sexual identity" – either unconsciously, or out of a conscious desire to deny or conceal their sexual orientation. Hence, participants in these support groups – mainly those who are ultra-Orthodox, and especially those who are married – often continue to define themselves as heterosexual. Because all of the participants in this study were affiliated with gays and lesbian support groups (even if not all of them shared a homosexual or bisexual identity), they will be referred to in this article as "participants in support groups for gays, lesbians and bisexuals".

Based on a broad ecological approach, various researchers have emphasized the impact of the social environment on shaping the experience of daily stress generated by the values, norms, and taboos that prevail in the individual's surroundings. In that connection, Pearlin (1999) emphasized the importance of existing social arrangements in preventing the adverse effects of stress situations. Regarding the impact of social context on shaping the experience of distress and patterns of coping, a recent study conducted in Israel (Kulik, 2010) revealed that a traditional or modern environment has a decisive impact not only on the individual's experience of daily stress, but also on the use of available resources and on the exchange of those resources for effective coping strategies: secular Jewish women who live in a liberal environment were more successful in using the resources at their disposal to reduce distress than were Arab

women, who belong to a traditional, patriarchal society. This suggests that a traditional environment can cause individuals to delay the exchange of resources for effective coping strategies.

Regarding the homo-lesbian population, communities that condemn homosexual behavior can exacerbate the stress that these individuals already encounter because of their sexual orientation. That kind of social environment can restrict their life opportunities as a result of forced social isolation, limited access to resources, threat of punishment, etc. (Bowleg, Craig, & Burkholder, 2004). It has also been suggested that homosexuals may compartmentalize their sexual and religious identities in order to deal with the antagonistic relationship between them (Yip, 2004). The notion of compartmentalization has also been identified as a strategy for managing multiple identities (Roccas & Brewer, 2002).

The ultra-Orthodox community in Israel, known as *Haredim*, is characterized by strict adherence to religious law. In Israel, *Haredim* comprise about 6.5% of the total population, and are characterized by regional isolation and homogeneity. As such, they maintain a separate lifestyle, and make a concerted effort to prevent exposure to mainstream society. Many ultra-Orthodox men view religious study as a career, and do not serve in the army or participate in the labor force. Members of that community also tend to marry at a young age and have large families (Gurevich & Cohen-Kastro, 2004).

In that context, ultra-Orthodox homosexuals and lesbians are likely to experience intense emotional distress, which derives from their multiple minority identities as members of the ultra-Orthodox community in Israeli society, and as members of the homosexual minority in a majority heterosexual population. Moreover, their experience of daily stress is especially intense because their lifestyle contradicts the norms and values of the *Haredi* community – especially the strong familistic orientation and the harsh prohibitions against homosexuality in Jewish religious law. According to Jewish law, a person who engages in homosexual relations is viewed not only as a sinner, but also as a person who goes against nature. The prohibition against two men having sexual relations is found in the Torah: "Do not lie with a man as one lies with a woman: it is an abomination" (Leviticus, 18:22). According to the Orthodox interpretation of Jewish oral law, a person who violates this prohibition in the presence of witnesses must be sentenced to death. Regarding the prohibition against homosexual relations between women, in the following passage of the Bible it is written: "You shall not do as they do in the land of Egypt" (Leviticus, 18:3). In the Orthodox interpretation of Jewish oral law, sexual relations between women are not considered as serious as male

homosexuality. Notably, a woman who has engaged in lesbian relations will not be prohibited to her husband.

Notwithstanding the firm prohibition against homo-lesbianism in Jewish law, which is strictly followed by Orthodox Jews, in recent years there have been calls to change the religious Jewish approach to homosexuality. These calls for change are the result of social and scientific developments which have led to increased tolerance of differences. In light of these developments, which include social legitimation of homosexuality by a few religious leaders in the Orthodox community, attitudes toward the gay and lesbian community and homosexual behavior need to be re-examined.

Against this background, and based on Pearlin's (1999) theoretical approach, which emphasizes the impact of social context on coping with stress, the present study examined differences in the contribution of coping resources among ultra-Orthodox versus secular participants in support groups for gays, lesbians and bisexuals in processes of coping with the stress evoked by deviating from the norm. More specifically, one of the main questions examined in the study was whether coping resources contribute to explaining distress to the same extent among secular participants as they do among ultra-Orthodox participants in those support groups, or whether the ultra-Orthodox social context, which is characterized by strong negative attitudes toward gay and lesbian behavior, prevents those resources from enhancing well-being, even when those resources exist?

Coping Resources

Coping resources are personality attributes, personal characteristics, and environmental variables help individuals cope with stress situations (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). In that connection, researchers in the field have distinguished between personal and environmental resources.

Personal resources. The personal resources examined in the study were self-esteem and self-differentiation. **Self-esteem** is defined as the extent to which individuals have high or low regard for various aspects of themselves (Schmitt & Allik, 2005). Even though there can be temporary changes in people's levels of self-esteem, it appears that in most measures, that resource is considered to be a stable trait. Thus, people with high self-esteem usually tend to be happier, healthier, more creative, and more successful than those with low self-esteem. (Smith & Mackie, 1995). It can also be reasonably assumed that people with high self-esteem will not yield easily to social pressure to engage in conformist behavior.

Self-differentiation is defined as the ability to distinguish between thought and emotion. People with high levels of self-differentiation can experience intense, spontaneous feelings. Nonetheless, they can simultaneously show restraint, think rationally, and resist their impulses (Bowen, 1978). People with high levels of self-differentiation can solve interpersonal conflicts easily and amicably. Researchers have also argued that self-differentiation develops as a result of relating the closeness of relationships among family members, and is dependent on the ability of family members to experience enjoyable interaction while showing understanding and mutual trust (Anderson & Sabatelli, 1992). Thus, families with high levels of self-differentiation tend to encourage individualism, autonomy, and self-expression. It can be assumed that these characteristics are not prevalent in ultra-Orthodox families, which maintain a rigid structure and hierarchy of relations between family members and roles in the family, based on gender and age.

Environmental resources: emotional support. The environmental resource examined in this study was informal social support, as reflected in emotional support. Researchers have emphasized that of various types of social support, emotional support contributes most to the individual's well-being (Thoits, 1985). Emotional support enables individuals to establish structure and order in their socio-cultural environment (Church & Looner, 1998). It facilitates coping with daily stress, by creating an atmosphere of acceptance (Heller, Swindle & Dusenbury, 1986), and serves as a buffer against tension and anxiety, and promotes adjustment (Dubow, Tisak, Cavsey, Hryskho, & Reid, 1992). Moreover, emotional support strengthens the individual's sense of belonging, and enhances self-esteem (Papini & Roggman, 1992), and it is related to internal locus of control as well as to active social involvement (Chubb& Fertman, 1992).

Internalized homophobia. Besides examining differences in levels of personal and environmental resources among secular versus ultra-Orthodox participants in support groups for gays, lesbians and bisexuals, we also examined the participants' attitudes toward homosexual behavior, as reflected in internalized homophobia. Moreover, beyond the consequences of actual deviation from the mainstream sexual orientation, these attitudes themselves may intensify distress reactions among gays and lesbians. Internalized homophobia is defined as hostility toward homosexuality and toward the self (Mayfield, 2001). These attitudes are characteristic of sexual minorities and they have been associated with low levels of coping resources (such as low self-esteem), as well as with symptoms of depression, alcoholism, psychosomatic complaints, and demoralization (Chung & Szymanski, 2006). Thus, beyond those direct negative effects on the individual's well-being, it was hypothesized that

internalized homophobia would also correlate indirectly with distress as a mediating variable. That is, it was hypothesized that coping resources would correlate negatively with levels of internalized homophobia, and that internalized homophobia will correlate positively with distress (see the research model, Figure 1).


Figure 1: The Research Model: Relationships between Resources, Internalized Homophobia, and Distress

Research Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical and empirical literature presented above, the following research hypotheses were put forth:

Differences between the Outcome Variable and Explanatory Variables, by Religiosity

1. Internalized homophobia and distress will be higher among ultra-Orthodox participants in support groups for homosexuals than among their secular counterparts.
2. There will be an interaction between the participants' religiosity and gender. That is, ultra-Orthodox men will have higher levels of internalized homophobia and distress than will ultra-Orthodox women.
3. Levels of personal resources (self-esteem and self differentiation) and environmental resources (emotional support) will be higher among secular participants than among their ultra-Orthodox counterparts.

Correlations between the Explanatory Variables and Outcome Variable

4. Resources will correlate negatively with levels of internalized homophobia and distress. That is, the more resources the participants have, the lower their levels of internalized homophobia and distress will be.
5. The correlations between resources and distress will be higher among secular participants than among the ultra-Orthodox participants.
6. Internalized homophobia will mediate between resources and distress.

Besides testing the specific research hypotheses, we examined the overall contribution of the research variables (age, personal resources, emotional support, and internalized homophobia) to explaining the experience of distress.

Method

Participants

The research sample included 135 men and women in support groups for gays, lesbians and bisexuals. The support groups for ultra-Orthodox gays, lesbians and bisexuals were conducted far from their community in order to avoid exposure of their sexual orientation. Because the aim of the study was to compare individuals at the extreme ends of the religiosity scale (secular versus ultra-Orthodox), the sampling method was purposive, and we collected data only from groups that are directed specifically toward the secular or ultra-Orthodox population. In addition to the purposive sampling of the groups, six participants who did not meet the sampling criteria, i.e., who defined themselves as traditional or religious (and not as secular or ultra Orthodox) were eliminated from the data analysis.

Following these sampling procedures, the distribution of participants in the study by religiosity was as follows: 75 participants (55%) defined themselves as secular, and 60 (45%) defined themselves as ultra-Orthodox. As for the distribution by gender, 73 participants (54.8%) were men, and 62 (45.2%) were women. Sexual identity was determined according to self-definitions, which were based on the following direct question: "What lifestyle defines your present sexual orientation?". The choice of responses was: 1 (*heterosexual*); 2 (*homosexual*); and 3 (*bisexual*). Substantial differences were found between ultra-Orthodox and secular participants with regard to definitions of their sexual orientation. Among the secular participants, none defined themselves as

heterosexual, 80% defined themselves as homosexual, and 20% defined themselves as bisexual. Among the ultra-Orthodox participants, in contrast, the distribution of heterosexual, homosexual, and bisexual participants according to the self-definitions was 27.6%, 39.7%, and 32.8%, respectively.

Based on the two main sampling criteria, i.e., religiosity and gender, the distribution of the participants was as follows: secular men – 43 (32%); ultra-Orthodox men – 30 (22%); secular women – 31 (23%); and ultra-Orthodox women – 31 (23%).

With regard to background characteristics, the distribution of the sample was as follows: Level of education – 40.5% of the participants had up to 12 years of schooling without a matriculation certificate; 27.3% had a high school diploma with a matriculation certificate; 15.9% had non-academic post-secondary education; and 16.4% had an academic education. Age – participants ranged from 18 to 58 years of age (M=30, SD=9.4). As for marital status, significant differences were found between the secular and ultra-Orthodox participants: About 90% of the ultra-Orthodox men were married, whereas only about 10% of the secular men were married. Of the women, 20% of the secular participants and 30% of the ultra-Orthodox participants. were married.

Instruments

The research instrument consisted of several questionnaires:

Background questionnaire. This questionnaire contained background data on the following variables: gender, marital status, sexual orientation, religiosity, age, and education.

Measure of Distress. Distress was examined on the basis of the questionnaire developed by Cohen, Kamark, and Mermelstein (1983). The questionnaire contained 14 items, which examined the individual's emotional state during the month preceding the study (e.g., "during the last month, to what extent did you get angry because of events that were beyond your control?"). Responses were based on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 (*often*) to 5 (*never*). One overall score was derived by computing the mean of the items in the questionnaire. The higher the score, the higher the participant's level of stress. The Cronbach's alpha reliability of the questionnaire used in this study was .88.

Internalized homonegativity inventory. The questionnaire was developed by Mayfield (2001), and consisted of 27 items that measure responses to homosexuality (e.g., "I think homosexuality harms the social order"). Responses were based on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (*very*

strongly disagree) to 7 (*very strongly agree*). Questionnaires were distributed in accordance with the participant's gender. For example, questionnaires with the item "I believe that sexual relations between men are immoral" were distributed to males, and questionnaires with the item "I believe that sexual relations between women are immoral" were distributed to women. One score was derived by computing the mean of the items in the questionnaire.

The higher the score, the higher the participant's levels of internalized homophobia. The Cronbach's alpha reliability of the questionnaire used in this study was .90.

Rosenberg self-esteem scale. The questionnaire was developed by Rosenberg (1965), and consisted of 10 items that measure self-esteem (e.g., "I feel I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others"). Responses were based on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). One score was derived for each participant by computing the mean of the items in the questionnaire. The higher the score, the higher the participant's self-esteem. The Cronbach's alpha reliability of the questionnaire used in this study was .88.

Self-differentiation scale. The 14-item questionnaire was developed by Haber (1993), and measured two dimensions of self-differentiation: emotional maturity, and emotional dependency. Responses were based on a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 4 (*strongly agree*). One score was derived by computing the mean of the items in the questionnaire. The higher the score, the higher the participant's level of self-differentiation. The Cronbach's scale reliability of the questionnaire used in this study was .87.

Emotional support. The original scale for perceived social support was developed by Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet, and Farley (1988), and contained 24 items. In the present study, we used a shortened version of the scale developed by Blumenthal, Burg, Barefoot, Williams, Haney, and Zimet (1987), which consisted of 12 items that examined emotional support (e.g., "I have a close person with whom I can share sorrow and joy"). Responses were based on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (*doesn't reflect my feelings at all*) to 7 (*reflects my feelings to a great extent*). One score was derived by computing the mean of the items in the scale. A high score indicated that the participant felt a high level of emotional and social support. The Cronbach's alpha reliability of the questionnaire used in this study was .88.

Data Collection

Data for the study were collected from support groups for Jewish gays, lesbians and bisexuals throughout the country. Questionnaires were distributed to the participants at the beginning of group sessions. In most cases, the group organizer or a contact person from the group who served as a liaison with the researchers distributed the questionnaires. The researchers clarified to the participants that the data were collected solely for the purpose of the study, and assured them of confidentiality and anonymity. The time allotted for completion of the questionnaires was about 10 minutes, and the response rate was about 80%.

Results

Differences in the Research Variables, by Religiosity and by Participants' Gender (Hypotheses 1-3)

To examine whether participants differed in the research variables by religiosity (secular versus ultra-Orthodox) and by gender, two-way ANOVAs were conducted (religiosity x gender) for distress, internalized homophobia, and resources. The following are the results of those analyses:

Distress. A main effect was found for religiosity as well as for gender. Regarding the effect of religiosity, the ultra-Orthodox participants expressed higher levels of distress than did the secular participants: $F(3, 131)=32.79$, $p<.001$. Regarding the effect of gender, men were found to express higher levels of distress than women: $F(3, 131)=4.54$, $p<.05$ (see Table 1)

Internalized homophobia. Religiosity had a significant effect on internalized homophobia: $F(3, 131)=68.55$, $p<.001$. That is, the ultra-Orthodox participants had higher levels of internalized homophobia than did the secular participants (see Table 1). However, the analysis revealed no significant differences in internalized homophobia by the participants' gender.

Resources

Self-esteem. Analysis of variance revealed that religiosity had a significant effect on self-esteem: $F(3, 131)=20.20$, $p<.001$, but the effect of gender was not significant. That is, the secular participants had higher

levels of self-esteem than did the ultra-Orthodox participants, but no differences were found between men and women (see Table 1).

Self-differentiation. Religiosity was found to have a significant effect on self-differentiation: $F(3, 131)=68.15$, $p<.001$, but the effect of gender was not significant, as shown in Table 1. That is, the secular participants showed a greater tendency toward self-differentiation than did the ultra-Orthodox participants. Notably, for all of the variables mentioned above (distress, internalized homophobia, self-esteem, and self-differentiation), no significant interaction was found between religiosity and gender. This finding indicates that there were differences in the above-mentioned research variables above by religiosity, irrespective of the participants' gender.

Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations and F Values of the Main Research Variables – Religiosity and Gender

Measures	Religiosity					
	Secular		Ultra-Orthodox			
	M	SD	M	SD	F(1, 135)	Eta²
Internalized homophobia	1.95	.71	3.38	1.24	68.50***	.34
Distress	2.37	.70	3.08	.54	32.82***	.20
Self-esteem	6.22	.84	5.28	.81	20.20***	.13
Self-differentiation	3.13	.37	2.54	.48	68.15***	.33
Emotional support	5.83	1.10	4.16	1.37	72.72***	.35
	Gender					
	Men		Women			
Measures	M	SD	M	SD	F(1, 135)	Eta²
Internalized homophobia	2.56	1.10	2.63	1.36	07.	.00
Distress	2.54	.70	2.83	.71	4.50*	.03
Self-esteem	5.83	.93	5.92	76.	1.40	.01
Self-differentiation	2.83	.53	2.93	.51	.47	.05
Emotional support	4.85	1.60	5.44	1.30	14.95**	.10

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001

Emotional support. Emotional support was significantly affected by religiosity, as well as by gender: $F(3, 131)=72.72$, $p<.001$; and $F(3, 131)=14.15$, $p<.001$, respectively. That is, the secular participants received more emotional support than did the ultra-Orthodox participants, and women received more emotional support than did men (see Table 1).

In addition, a significant interaction was found between religiosity and gender. Whereas both the secular and ultra-Orthodox women had higher levels of emotional support than men, the gaps between men and women were much greater among the ultra-Orthodox participants (M=3.47, SD=.98; and M=4.82, SD=1.38) than among the secular participants (M=5.76, SD=1.24; and M=5.92, SD=.88 for men and women, respectively).

Correlations between the Research Variables (Hypotheses 4, 5)

Distress and internalized homophobia correlated negatively with personal resources as well as with the environmental resource (see Table 2). The higher the participants' levels of self-esteem, self-differentiation, and emotional support, the lower their levels of distress and internalized homophobia. Levels of distress also correlated positively with internalized homophobia. The higher the participants' levels of perceived stress, the higher their levels of internalized homophobia. As for the participants' age, the older the participants were, the less emotional support they received.

Table 2: Pearson's Correlations between the Research Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Age						
2. Distress	.02					
3. Self-esteem	-.16	-.56***				
4. Internalized homophobia	.15	.52***	-.57***			
5. Self-differentiation	.12	-.57***	-.58***	-.73***		
6. Emotional support	-.30**	-.56***	.54***	-.69***	.57***	

$**p < .01 \ ***p < .001$

The Overall Contribution of the Independent Variable to Explaining Level of distress (Hypothesis 6)

Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to examine the overall contribution of the independent research variables to explaining distress. Using the same regression, we examined Hypothesis 6, which posited that the correlation between resources and distress is mediated by internalized homophobia.

In the first step, the background variables age, gender (women coded as 0, men coded as 1), and religiosity (secular coded as 0, ultra-Orthodox

coded as 1) were entered in order to partial out their effect on the variables that were entered in the subsequent steps of the regression. In the second step, personal resources (self-esteem and self-differentiation) were entered; in the third step, the environmental resource (emotional support) was entered; and in the fourth step, internalized homophobia was entered. Internalized homophobia was added after the other variables had been entered in order to examine whether it mediates between resources and distress. In the fifth step, the interactions between resources and gender was added, as well as the interactions between resources and religiosity. This approach was adopted in order to examine whether the contribution of personal and environmental resources to explaining distress differed for men versus women, and for secular versus ultra-Orthodox participants.

On the whole, the independent variables explained 48% of the variance in distress (see Table 3). The background variables that were entered in the first step of the regression equation combined to explain 23% of the variance in distress. However, of the three background variables examined in the study, only two of them – religiosity and gender – contributed significantly to explaining the variance in that variable, whereas the contribution of age was not significant. Comparison of the size of the Beta coefficients reveals that the contribution of religiosity to explaining distress was greater than that of gender. Personal resources, which were entered in the second step of the regression, explained an additional 24% of the variance, over and above the variance explained by the background variables. The directions of the Beta coefficients indicate that the higher the participants' levels of self-differentiation and self-esteem, the lower their levels of distress were. In the second step, when personal resources were entered into the regression equation, the contribution of gender remained significant, but the contribution of religiosity was no longer significant. This finding may indicate that personal resources mediated between religiosity and distress. That is, religiosity affected the amount of personal resources available to the participants, and the amount of those resources in turn affected distress. In the third step, the environmental resource (emotional support), and in the fourth step internalized homophobia did not significantly explain the variance, over and above the variance that was explained by the variables in the previous steps. Hence, contrary to expectations, internalized homophobia did not mediate between resources and distress. Rather, personal resources contributed directly to explaining that variable. As for internalized homophobia, after partialing out the impact of the variables entered in previous steps, its impact on distress was no longer significant, as revealed in the correlations presented above (see Table 2). Moreover, the interactions between personal and environmental resources and

religiosity, as well as the interactions between those resources and the participants' gender did not contribute significantly to explaining distress. Hence, the contribution of the personal and environmental resources to explaining distress did not differ for secular and ultra-Orthodox participants, nor did it differ for men and women.

Discussion

Before discussing the research findings and their theoretical and empirical implications, it is important to note that even though most of the participants defined their lifestyle as non-heterosexual, it cannot be argued that the sample represented the overall gay and lesbian and bisexual population in Israel. Rather, the characteristic shared in common by the participants in the study was the sense of stress generated by being different from the mainstream society, a feeling reflected in the very act of joining support groups.

The research findings highlight the impact of the sociocultural environment on shaping feelings of stress among participants in support groups for non-heterosexual men and women. Notably, of the research variables examined in the study (background variables, personal resources, and environmental resources), religiosity contributed most significantly to explaining distress and internalized homophobia. Moreover, the ultra-Orthodox participants were found to have higher levels of internalized homophobia and distress than their secular counterparts (supporting Hypothesis 1).

However, contrary to expectations, among the ultra-Orthodox participants levels of internalized homophobia and distress were not higher among men than among women (failing to support Hypothesis 2). Evidently, the strong familial orientation of Israeli society in general and the ultra-Orthodox community in particular, as well as the religious and normative prohibition against homosexual relations, which contradict the Jewish religious commandment "to be fruitful and multiply" blur the differences between ultra-Orthodox men and women with regard to levels of distress and internalized homophobia. Consistent with the research hypothesis, religiosity not only had a direct effect on the outcome variable in this study, but it also had an indirect effect. That is, levels of personal and environmental resources possessed by the participants (which were related to distress and internalized homophobia), correlated with religiosity. Among the ultra-Orthodox participants, most of the personal and environmental resources were lower than among the secular participants (supporting Hypothesis 3). Evidently, their sense of social deviance and otherness, and the rejection of homosexuality in ultra-

Orthodox society diminished the personal resources at their disposal. Accordingly, as expected, self-differentiation was lower among the ultra-Orthodox than among the secular participants – irrespective of gender. The explanation for the differences between the two groups in levels of self-differentiation relates to the combination of the characteristics of ultra-Orthodox families and the implications of homosexuality in that social context.

Table 3: Hierarchical Regression Analyses to Explain Distress

Predictors	β	B	SE.B	R^2	ΔR^2	F
Step 1						
Gender	.16*	.09	24.	23.***	.23***	13.82***
Religiosity	.44***	.45	.64			
Age	.01	01.	00.			
Step 2						
Gender	23**	.18	33.	47.***	.24***	24.89***
Religiosity	.11	60.	16			
Age	.06	05.	00.			
Self-differentiation	-.33***	-06	46.			
Self-esteem	-.35***	-.09	28.			
Step 3						
Gender	.22**	.32	32.	47.***	.00	17.62***
Religiosity	.14	07.	21.			
Age	-.04	14.	00.			
Self-differentiation	-.37***	-.72	52.			
Self-esteem	-.35**	09-.	28.			
Emotional support	-.06	-.25	03.			
Step 4						
Gender	.20**	.35	30.	48.***	01.	15.90***
Religiosity	.12	42.	17.			
Age	.03	00.	00.			
Self-differentiation	-.32**	-.60	45.			
Self-esteem	-.33***	-.26	26.			
Emotional support	-.11	-.29	05.			
Internalized homophobia	-.16	-.30	09.			

$**p < .01, ***p < .001$

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The strict rules that govern relationships between family members and roles in the family in the ultra-Orthodox community leave children with less room for freedom and less personal space. It can be reasonably assumed that the restrictions on personal freedom in the family of origin are enforced all the more for individuals with homosexual tendencies in ultra-Orthodox society, and that efforts will be made to maintain a distance from relatives in order to avoid revealing the secret.

As expected, level of resources correlated negatively with internalized homophobia and distress (supporting Hypothesis 4). The participants with high levels of resources developed less negative attitudes toward homosexuality, and reported lower levels of distress. As mentioned at the beginning of the Discussion, despite the considerable differences between the secular and ultra-Orthodox participants in the main research variables, religiosity did not affect the correlation between resources and distress. That is, the contribution of personal and environmental resources to explaining the outcome variable remained the same, irrespective of the participants' religiosity (failing to support Hypothesis 5). Moreover, the contribution of personal resources to explaining the outcome variable was not different for men and women. In addition, internalized homophobia did not mediate the contribution of resources to explaining the outcome variable (failing to support Hypothesis 6). That is, the personal and environmental resources examined in the study have a direct effect on distress, which was not mediated by internalized homophobia. Moreover, the contribution of internalized homophobia to explaining distress was not significant after the contribution of personal and environmental resources was partialed out. On the whole, the findings indicate that when the participants had high levels of personal and environmental resources, their levels of internalized homophobia declined – although internalized homophobia in itself did not contribute to explaining distress. Rather, personal resources were the main variables that affected feelings of distress among the participants in support groups for gays, lesbians and bisexuals. This finding suggests that when individuals have high levels of resources, then internalized homophobia will not necessarily detract from their well-being.

The comparison of participants by gender yielded noteworthy findings. In general, there were differences as well as similarities between men and women in the research variables, and these trends were maintained irrespective of religiosity. Regarding personal resources, i.e., self-esteem and self-differentiation, no gender differences were found among participants in support groups for gays, lesbians and bisexuals. The similarities between men and women in self-esteem contradict the results of comparative studies conducted among the population at large (Kling,

Hyde, Showers, & Buswell, 1999), but they are consistent with the results of studies that focused on the gay and lesbian population (Hershberger & D'Augelli, 1995). As a minority group with a stigmatized sexual orientation, gays and lesbians in the world have been forced to contend with common existential problems. Hence, it is possible that they develop similar levels of self-esteem, and that gender differences in self-esteem, which exist among the heterosexual population, have become blurred among gays, lesbians and bisexuals.

In contrast to the findings regarding personal resources, there were significant gender differences in the environmental resource, i.e., levels of emotional support among the participants in the study, which were also found among men and women in the population at large (Barbee et al., 1993). Notably, men and women are socialized differently, regardless of sexual orientation. Because men are socialized to emphasize autonomy, achievement, and mastery, they tend to refrain from seeking help. In contrast, because women are socialized to emphasize caring and expressiveness, they show a greater tendency to provide emotional support and are also more likely to seek assistance from their social networks in solving personal problems. Moreover, the findings indicate that gender differences in levels of emotional support were greater for the ultra-Orthodox participants than for the secular participants. Apparently, the strict religious prohibition against male homosexuality makes it more difficult for ultra-Orthodox men to receive emotional support. In order to keep their secret hidden, they also tend to request less emotional support. This explanation is supported by the finding regarding the participants' self-definitions of their sexual orientation. All of the secular participants reported a non-heterosexual identity, whereas a substantial percentage of the ultra-Orthodox participants still defined themselves as heterosexuals.

In sum, one conclusion that can be drawn from the research findings is that the participants' socio-cultural environment affected various measures relating to personal well-being, as reflected in distress, levels of resources, and levels of internalized homophobia. However, socio-cultural environment was not found to affect the exchange of resources for well-being, as evidenced in the similarities in the set of variables that explained distress among the ultra-Orthodox and secular participants. Therefore, it can be argued that even though the secular participants had more resources at their disposal and lower levels of internalized homophobia, there was no difference between the two groups of participants with regard to the contribution of resources and internalized homophobia to mitigating stress.

Even though no significant differences were found between secular and ultra-Orthodox participants in the impact of resources and internalized

homophobia on the experience of distress, the findings do not provide a basis for concluding that the impact of social context is insignificant. Hence, there is a need to further examine the complex relationships between resources and different measures of well-being in various social contexts. Thus, the attempt to enhance insight into social conditions that facilitate or inhibit the effective use of resources for enhancing well-being is a challenge for researchers who focus on traditional communities in the process of modernization.

To conclude, some limitations of the study need to be mentioned. Owing to the correlative research design, there is no way of determining the causal relationship between the explanatory variables and the outcome variable (distress). Hence, there is a need to conduct longitudinal studies that will initially examine the explanatory variables, and then examine the outcome variable after a period of time among the same sample of participants. Another limitation relates to the inclusion of homosexuals and bisexuals in the statistical analysis in the same group due to the small number of bisexual participants in the study. In future studies, these two populations should be considered as separate groups.

Practical Recommendations

Owing to the large number of stressors faced by ultra-Orthodox participants, therapists who treat that population should not adopt a uniform, stereotyped approach in providing professional help and counseling to participants in support groups. Rather, an attempt should be made to identify the specific source of stress for each individual participant and consider the community context that each participant comes from. For example, the married ultra-Orthodox participants in the support groups, who continued to conceal their secrets, had perceptions that were different from those of unmarried ultra-Orthodox participants who have already revealed their sexual orientation. Therapists should also be aware of the intense stress experienced by individuals belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, besides the stress that results from having a sexual orientation that deviates from the mainstream – especially when the values and norms of one identity conflict with those of the other. Moreover, ultra-Orthodox professionals should be trained to deal with the problem, because they are familiar with the norms of the ultra-Orthodox community, and understand the distress that can arise among homosexuals in that context.

The significant contribution of self-differentiation to mitigating the experience of distress among homosexuals, as reflected in the findings of the present study, is also noteworthy. In light of that finding, therapists

who conduct groups for parents of children with homosexual tendencies should highlight the importance of opening channels of communication between children and parents as an essential condition for developing self-differentiation. Finally, given the relatively low levels of emotional support available to ultra-Orthodox men in the support groups, counselors should encourage men to seek emotional support from sources that they feel secure and comfortable with, and should highlight the advantages of such support.

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THE ELECTIONS TO THE 19th KNESSET, 2013: SOME THOUGHTS

Stanley Waterman

Prologue

In mid-October 2012 a general election for the 19th Knesset was called for January 22 2013 and was expected to result in radical change to the political landscape. *Kadima*, the party founded in late 2005 by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and which had won the largest number of seats in the election of February 2009, had virtually disintegrated. Ehud Barak, the Defence Minister and another ex-Prime Minister, had announced his departure from politics. In November 2012, Naftali Bennett, a 40-year old former businessman, organized a coup of the moribund National Religious Party, forcing it into alliance with another small right-wing party and forming *HaBayit HaYehudi* (The Jewish Home) and campaigned to annex substantial parts of the West Bank to Israel (Bennett 2013). The final ingredient in this political cocktail was *Yesh Atid* (There is a Future), founded by Yair Lapid, a former TV chat-show host, actor, playwright and author, virulently opposed to ultra-orthodox political parties, as was his father, a former Minister of Justice.

Just days after the election date had been fixed, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Lieberman announced that their respective parties, *Likud* and *Yisrael Beitenu* (Israel is our Home), would present a combined list, rationalizing that as the differences between the parties were slight, a joint list would obviate the need to choose between them, raising the probability that the list would receive most votes, thereby enabling them to form the next coalition. Lieberman also wished to bring what had been a Russian immigrant party into the mainstream.

Candidate lists had to be submitted by December 6 2012. Consequently, up to that date, rumours abounded as to which parties and individuals would actually contest the election. Much of the speculation concerned whether two politicians, former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and former Foreign Minister and Opposition Leader Tzipi Livni would run. On November 27, Livni announced the formation of a new party,

HaTnuah (The Movement); Olmert, still embroiled in legal proceedings, declined the challenge.

Some parties held democratic primaries to choose and rank their candidates; others used less overt procedures. *HaBayit HaYehudi*, *Likud*, Labour and *Meretz*, a small left-wing party, held primaries; as far as can be ascertained, the lists for *Yisrael Beitenu*, *Yesh Atid* and *HaTnuah* were formulated by their respective party leaders. The *Haredi* (ultra-Orthodox) candidates were appointed by their respective Torah Elders and Torah Sages.

Although *Likud* and *Yisrael Beitenu* presented a joint list (Netanyahu and Lieberman repeatedly stated that their parties were not amalgamating) the candidates for each party were chosen by different methods and they agreed the number and ranking of the candidates for each in what was then regarded as "realistic" positions—perhaps as far as 45 on the joint list. The *Likud* primaries were held shortly after Israel's eight-day "Pillar of Defence" operation in Gaza. This directly influenced the outcome, producing a candidate list far to the Right of that expected and preferred by Prime Minister Netanyahu. Labour's primaries were held in the shadow of the 2011 street demonstrations over the cost of living and resulted in a list more appealing to the Left-wing than the Centre.

Despite the Likud/Beitenu alliance, early polls indicated a fall in support for the right wing. This pressurized the "Centre" parties — Labour, *Yesh Atid* and *HaTnuah* — into announcing that they would follow the example of the right-wing parties by also presenting a joint list. Some felt that such a list could offer itself to the electorate as an alternative to Likud/Beitenu and perhaps receive enough seats to form a government. In the event, each of the three party leaders chose to run independently, egos trumping apparent logic.

The Campaign

The campaign began in earnest with the submission of the party lists. It was generally low-key, with television advertising only kicking in during the last fortnight (see Kenig & Atmor 2013). Advertising messages were relayed primarily by placards and posters along the streets, on buildings and buses. Subtle changes in advertising were observed during the life of the campaign. For instance, *Shas*, the Sephardi Haredi party, a member of almost every coalition since 1984 began its bus-advertising campaign with a slogan claiming to represent the interests of the poor from within a Netanyahu-led government; oddly for a party running independently, the poster was adorned with a large portrait of the Prime Minister. When, halfway through the campaign, it dawned on Shas that it might not be in

the ensuing government, the slogan remained but Netanyahu's face was replaced by that of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, the movement's "spiritual leader".

The electorate was polled constantly during the course of the campaign. Between October 28 2012 and January 18 2013, 59 polls were conducted and their results published — one each 1.4 days (Saltan 2013). This non-stop publication of polls influenced many voters. All the polls showed a decline in support for *Likud/Beitenu* from a high of 42 seats in late October to 32 just four days before polling. Although two polls by right-wing newspapers, *Yisrael HaYom* (owned by Netanyahu supporter Sheldon Adelson and distributed free on the streets) and *Ma'ariv* showed a surge for Likud in the final days, these were exceptions—and wrong. However, the surveys also showed steady loss of support for Labour, from 24 seats early on to between 15 and 17 towards the end of the campaign.

The polls also indicated unchanging support for the main Haredi and the three major Arab parties, all parties with "loyal" voters. They also indicated a rise in support for the small but ideologically pure left-wing *Meretz* from three seats to around six at the end of the campaign. According to these surveys, the "official" Centre parties, *HaTnuah* and *Yesh Atid* were undergoing mixed fortunes, with a slight rise recorded for the former and a drop for the latter. They all also showed the remarkable rehabilitation of the National Religious Party in its new guise under the guidance of Bennett. Though almost all the party's front-runners were religious and from West Bank settlements and espoused an uncompromising stand on settlement and annexation, the PR message of the party was a desire to transmogrify into one in which religious and secular could function together. The media bought into this story and Bennett, unabashedly displaying his macho commando and successful business past, became the campaign's blue-eyed boy, culminating in a full-length article in *The New Yorker* on January 21 2013. *HaBayit HaYehudi*'s positive showing in the polls continued despite several *faux pas* and stories of "bad blood" between Bennett, the Prime Minister and the latter's wife when Bennett had been Director of Netanyahu's bureau some years before. Beginning the campaign on between five and eight seats, the surveys suggested they might receive as many as 15.

In addition to the public opinion polls and the information or disinformation they emplaced in the voters' minds, one enterprising website associated with Israel's Channel Two Television channel offered voters a short questionnaire of just over 20 questions divided into Economic/Social, International/Political and Secular/Religious issues to

help identify the party closest to their views amongst the quagmire that is Israeli electoral politics (Channel Two, 2013).

Although the polls had spotted the general trends (waning support for the traditionally dominant parties), a resurgence in the fortunes of the National Religious Party and *Meretz*, constancy in backing for the Haredim and the Arabs, and the re-emergence of support for Centre parties, none of the polls spotted the one event that made all the difference to the structure of the coalition that finally emerged. Although it was forecast that Y*esh Atid* would do well, the extent of its success was missed; instead of the projected 10—12 seats, it won 19. Whether this was due to flawed polling or that voters made their decision at the last minute is, in the short run, moot and essentially irrelevant.

iii) Average of Polls published on January 18 2103 conducted during the week before the election (Saltan, 2013)

Party	Poll Average	Actual seats won	Over-estimate (+) Under-estimate (-)
Likud Beitenu	35	31	+4
Labour	18	15	+3
HaBayit HaYehudi	15	12	+3
Yesh Atid	12	19	-7
Shas	11	11	0
HaTenuah	7	6	+1
Yahadut HaTorah	6	7	-1
Meretz	6	6	0
Hadash	4	4	0
Ra'am/Ta'al	3	4	-1
Balad	3	3	0
Kadima	0	2	-2

The Election

Thirty-two parties competed for the 120 seats on election day, January 22 2013. Of these, 12 passed the 2% threshold needed for entry (a minimum of two Knesset seats). Following publication of the official results a week later, the President held formal consultations with representatives of all parties and the task of forming a coalition was entrusted to Netanyahu, as leader of the list that received most votes. Following six weeks of contacts, conjecture and negotiation, a coalition was formed, comprising *Likud/Beteinu, Yesh Atid, HaBayit HaYehudi* and *HaTnuah*. With 68 seats, it had an ostensibly comfortable majority of 16.

There were 5,656,705 registered voters and 3,833,646 votes cast of which 40,904 (just under 1.1%) were invalid. The participation rate was thus 67.8%. The real participation rate was actually higher, as except for diplomats and merchant sailors Israel has no postal or absentee voting and it is estimated that at any given time, at least 10% of registered voters are abroad (Ynet 2013). Furthermore, about 269,000 voters voted for parties that failed to pass the 2% threshold. Thus in addition to the disqualified votes, wasted votes amounted to 8% of votes cast.

Table 2

Number of eligible voters	Number of votes	Voting percentage	Valid votes	Disqualified votes
5,656,705	3,833,646	67.8%	3,792,742	40,904

Coalition Formation

Preceding the election there had been rampant speculation as to the shape of the government emerging after the election, so much so that while chairing a television debate on the weekend before polling day, Ayala Hasson, one of Israel's most respected political commentators interrupted several "experts" with the prescient comment that all conjectures were unwarranted until actual numbers were known.

During the coalition negotiations, a temporary and unscripted pact emerged between the two big gainers in the election, Lapid of *Yesh Atid* and Bennett of *HaBayit HaYehudi*. With little in common other than that they were political novices who had done better than the polls had suggested and whose Knesset members owed their election almost entirely to their respective leaders, they fought—for entirely different reasons—to exclude Haredi parties from the new government.

In contrast to the previous government and by recent Israeli standards, the new coalition was relatively compact, comprising 22 ministers with responsibility for 30 ministries. Including the Prime Minister, 12 (54.5%) of these were from *Likud/Beitenu*, which also controlled 19 (63.3%) of the ministries. In addition, eight Deputy Ministers were appointed, five from *Likud*. In all, Likud/Beitenu, the party which had suffered the largest setback, thus did particularly well in the distribution of portfolios — even if many of these were considered junior government positions.

The previous government had been marked by profligacy of ministries and ministers. In addition to three Vice Prime Ministers (only one of which had a "real" job—the other two were "senior" Ministers without Portfolio) and four Deputy Prime Ministers, there were four Ministers

without Portfolio and nine Deputy Ministers. Ironically, there was a Ministry (and Minister) for the Improvement of Government Services, which was jettisoned in the government formed in March 2013, as was the Ministry of Economic Strategy and the Ministry for Minorities. On the other hand, a new Ministry of International Relations was created although at the time of writing (September 2013), there is no full-time Minister of Foreign Affairs, as Netanyahu awaits the outcome of Lieberman's corruption trial.

Table 3: Parties elected to the 19th Knesset, 2013. Coalition — *Opposition*

List	Valid votes	Valid votes (%)	Seats	Ministries	Ministers	Deputy Ministers
Likud/Yisrael Beitenu	**885,163**	**23.3%**	**31**	19	12	5
Yesh Atid	**543,458**	**14.3%**	**19**	5	5	1
Israel Labor Party	432,118	11.4%	15			
Habayit Hayehudi	**345,985**	**9.1%**	**12**	4	3	2
Shas	331,868	8.8%	11			
Yahadut HaTorah	195,892	5.2%	7			
HaTnuah	**189,167**	**5.0%**	**6**	2	2	0
Meretz	172,403	4.6%	6			
United Arab List	138,450	3.7%	4			
Hadash	113,439	3.0%	4			
Balad	97,030	2.6%	3			
Kadima	78,974	2.1%	2			
Parties receiving <2% of votes	268,795	7.1%	0			
TOTAL	3,792,742	100.0%	120			

Conclusion

The elections to the 19th Knesset were conducted using the same highly proportional electoral system that Israel has used in each of the 18 previous elections since 1948 and even prior to the establishment of the state. This system was deemed appropriate during the British Mandate to ensure the representation of as wide a spectrum possible of political views from within the *Yishuv* (the Jewish community of pre-State Palestine) in dealing with the colonial power. Changing the electoral system has never been an issue of great concern for Israel's lawmakers with the

consequence that the country has an electoral system that met the needs of a small confessional community during a colonial period.

In the mid-1970s, some politicians perceived a need for electoral reform but although preliminary bills were introduced in the Knesset they never advanced to committee stage and nothing practical followed (Waterman 1980; Waterman & Zefadia 1992). Most politicians could see no good reason to tinker with, let alone reform, a system they were used to and understood how to manipulate — and in this sense Israel is little different to most other democracies.

Technically, Israel operates a "Closed List" system in which the order of the candidates on a list is pre-determined and unalterable, with seats allocated in strict proportion to the number of votes each party receives and candidates elected in the order in which their names appear on the list.[1] Voters can only choose a list and cannot express any preference among candidates. Closed List systems, especially where there is a single nation-wide constituency, are thus party-based systems and offer more or less full proportionality (Hix *et al.*, 2010, Chapter 5). In Israel there is also the proviso that they must pass the 2% (originally 1%) threshold, which prevents single-member factions.

This system usually produces a plethora of parties, making coalition formation a drawn-out exercise with many possible combinations. And because it favours parties over candidates and the candidates' position on the list determines the likelihood of their election, there is a propensity among members elected to represent primarily the narrow interests of the party that placed them high enough on the list to be elected. They do not represent the electorate as individuals and are not answerable to any specific body of voters such as those of a constituency or electoral district. In other words, there is a dearth of personal accountability.

The coalition agreement of March 15 2013, established that the Government would introduce a bill during the first session of the Knesset to invoke changes the system of government, to take effect from the next election (Knesset, 2013). Included in this were the size and composition of the government (no more than 18 ministers and four deputy ministers and no ministers without portfolio). The Knesset could overturn this only with a special majority of 70 Knesset members. Moreover, all no-confidence votes would need to be constructive votes, i.e., have an alternative government in hand at the time of the vote. However, this agreement only called for raising the threshold for election to the Knesset

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[1] Israel is one of only five countries in which the whole country is a single constituency. (The others are Moldova, The Netherlands, Slovakia, and Ukraine.) (Hix et al., 2010, 60)

from the current 2% to 4%, effectively determining that the smallest factions would consist of either four or five members. True to its word, a preliminary reading of this bill was introduced into the Knesset and approved on May 8 2013 (Lis, 2013)

However, the bill was controversial and labelled by some (including the recently deposed Knesset Speaker, Reuven Rivlin) as "undemocratic" and by the Leader of the Opposition Shelli Yacimovich as "dictatorial". Although most of the venom was directed at the clause dealing with constructive no-confidence motions, there was also vocal opposition to raising the threshold. The main criticism in this regard was that it was likely to increase the proportion of wasted votes by virtue of the fact that several smaller parties might not obtain sufficient votes to pass.

However, it is not at all clear that this negative scenario could be the only scenario of such a change. Indeed, a positive effect might bring about the drawing up of joint lists specifically to pass the threshold, (i.e., create mini-coalitions *prior* to the election), thereby clarifying the parties' intentions before the vote and making the voters' decisions that much easier.

Notwithstanding such worthy aims, none of this constitutes a radical reform of the electoral system. Not a word has been uttered about the possibility of change to a constituency-based system or making geographical constituencies at least a part of the Israel's electoral make-up. Given the economic and social changes that have occurred in Israel over the past three decades, such as liberalization of the economy, privatization and the expansion of individual initiatives and advance of particularized responses and responsibilities at the expense of cooperative and group reactions, this is somewhat surprising. It would certainly clarify the outcome of elections more rapidly and make the country's elected representatives more directly answerable to the electorate. Despite the dire warnings about the loss of proportionality, stable electoral systems that make use of electoral districts and maintain more than a modicum of proportionality are not difficult to design (vide Ireland) (see Hix *et al*., Chapter 5; Paddison, 1976).

Perhaps politicians are just all conservatives when it comes to moving their own political goalposts.

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BOOK REVIEWS

ANTHONY CLAVANE, *Does your rabbi know you're here? The story of English Football's Forgotten Tribe*, xxxiv + 270 pp. Quercus, London, ISBN: 9780857388124, 2012, £17.99p (hardback) [also available in paperback and eBook editions]

DAVID DEE, *Sport and British Jewry: Integration, ethnicity and anti-Semitism 1890-1970*, xiv + 258 pp, Manchester University Press, Manchester & New York, ISBN: 9780719087608, 2013, £65 (hardback)

Immigrant communities seek to legitimate themselves in the eyes of the host society in which they dwell in one or more of a number of ways. They may acquire wealth – because money has a habit of commanding instant attention. They may enter the learned professions – because such entry earns respect (however grudging) from important host elites. They may achieve prominence in the world of entertainment – because this, in turn, brings them admiration and esteem, particularly from within the lower social strata. For much the same reason, they may enter the ranks of the criminal classes. And/or they may achieve prominence and its concomitant accolades in the world of sport.

Jewish diasporas in western societies have at one time or another chosen all five paths to legitimation: wealth; the professions; entertainment; crime; and sport. But in terms of their historiographies some of these paths remain un- or at least under-explored. This is admittedly not true of American Jewry, but it is certainly true of British Jewry. There are now a number of studies of wealthy British-Jewish landed and commercial elites – notably within Harold Pollins' *Economic History of the Jews in England* (1982) and, most recently, Derek Taylor's *Jewish Contribution to the British Economy* (2013). There are a number of studies of Jews in the British learned professions (such as the law and medicine), though much work remains to be done. A recent issue of the *Journal of European Popular Culture* (volume 3 (2), October 2012) was devoted entirely to Jews in British cinema history, and there is a growing library of biographies and autobiographies of Anglo-Jewish show-business personalities. However, the Anglo-Jewish contribution to crime remains largely unexplored. Until recently the same could be said of the relationship between Jews and British sport. But in his monograph *Sport*

and British Jewry Dr David Dee has made an admirable start in filling this gap.

Dr Dee chooses as his point of departure the great migration of Jews from eastern Europe to the British Isles at the end of the 19th century. For the wealthy Cousinhood that then directed the affairs of British Jewry this influx presented multiple problems. Many of the immigrants were despatched on to the Americas. Some were bribed to return whence they had come. Those that stayed (around 120,000) had to be anglicised as quickly as possible. One way of achieving this was to get the Yiddish-speaking youngsters to immerse themselves in sporting activities: cricket (obviously), but also football, athletics and boxing. To this end a network of clubs was established – catering mainly for Jewish working boys (girls came later): in London the Brady Street Club (endowed by the Rothschilds in 1896); the West Central Jewish Working Lads' Club (founded by the Montefiore and Mocatta families two years later); the Victoria Jews Lads' Club (whose inauguration, in 1901, was assisted by volunteers from Clifton College, Bristol, the only public - i.e. private - school to have had a Jewish 'house').

Such initiatives were designed to achieve multiple ends. They certainly helped acculturate Jewish youngsters to the norms of British society. In so doing they assisted also in dispelling the myth that Jews were averse to (and indeed incapable of) physical exertion. In both respects their success is beyond doubt – no more so than in the case of boxing (which had in fact spawned a catalogue of Anglo-Jewish star performers since the 18th century) and athletics. And here we encounter one of the supreme ironies of the entire exercise: it was, if anything, too successful. Participation in sport certainly ironed out the ghetto bend. But it also drew youngsters away from their Jewish roots. The multiple strictures of Sabbath observance, synagogue attendance and observance of the dietary laws gave way to the delights of the football pitch, the boxing ring and the athletics track. Nothing illustrated this more dramatically than the career of Harold Abrahams (1899-1978), the Anglo-Jewish sprinter whose gold medal victory in the 100 metres at the 1924 Paris Olympics was famously celebrated – and infamously misrepresented – in the 1981 film *Chariots of Fire*. The truth is that Abrahams saw athletics as the way out of Jewish and into English society: he converted to Roman Catholicism, married out of the faith and was given a Christian burial.

"Sport," Dr Dee concludes, "was a powerful factor in decreasing the 'Jewishness' of immigrant children and grandchildren and in lessening concern for aspects of Jewish religion, community and ethnicity." So it was. Fascist campaigns against British Jews in the 1930s shamelessly exploited stereotypes of Jews as "others" – not really British – and these

campaigns happily extended into sporting milieux, in which (it was alleged) Jewish participation brought unwelcome professionalism – and a preoccupation with money - where the amateur should have been king, and undesirable commercialization where cash-flows ought to have had no place. These campaigns, and the prejudices that informed them, survived the Holocaust more or less intact: witness the wholesale exclusion of Jews from British golf clubs well into the 1960s and the unabashed discrimination, within the world of tennis, suffered by the Jewish tennis star Angela Buxton, who in 1956 won the women's doubles title at both the French Championships and Wimbledon, each with her black American tennis partner Althea Gibson.

But nowhere is this prejudice more in evidence than in the dressing rooms and playing fields of English football. And nowhere, perhaps, has this prejudice been fought with greater tenacity and with more success. In *Does your rabbi know you're here?* the Jewish sports journalist Anthony Clavane tells the story of Jewish involvement in English football from the beginning of the 20th century. He reminds us that the Lithuanian-born footballer (and cricketer) Louis Buchalter [later Bookman], the son of a rabbi, achieved prominence playing for Bradford City before the first world war, that he was chosen to play for Ireland (his adopted country) in 1914, and that Harry Morris, "Swindon Town's legendary goalscorer" in the interwar period, was in fact "a Brady boy." But it was in the post-war era that the Jewish love-affair with English football reached maturity, both on the field and in the boardroom – a coming-of-age symbolised by the appointment of David (Lord) Triesman as the first independent chairman of the (English) Football Association in 2008.

Clavane's is less a work of scholarship than a personal odyssey. Scholars will not find the book an easy or a comfortable read; it presupposes a knowledge of the basics of football and of the football universe that not all its readers (this reviewer included) will readily possess. That said, its pages are replete with earthy pen-portraits and warm, well-penned anecdotes of some of the great Jewish names in the English footballing world: the Leyton Orient chairman Harry Zussman, the Tottenham Hotspur "superfan" Morris Keston, and Mark Lazarus, the brilliant "winger" who scored the winning goal for Queen's Park Rangers in the 1967 Football League cup final – to say nothing of the entry of Israeli Jews and Russo-Jewish entrepreneurs onto the English soccer stage in more recent decades. Clavane is also right to remind us that there was – and still is – a seamier side to the game, and that this side too has had its Jewish players.

In one sense Clavane's monograph ought to be regarded as a primary rather than a secondary source. The potted history of British Jewry that he

offers in his Introduction is out of place and contains some basic errors (the Jewish Naturalisation Act of 1753 did *not* "grant the community English citizenship," and to call Lionel de Rothschild "the first official Jewish MP" is to mis-represent his campaign to take his parliamentary seat as a professing Jew). On the other hand, Anthony Clavane commendably confronts the Jewish contribution to sports (or at least football) *management* in Britain in a way that seems to elude David Dee, who somehow manages to tell the story of Jewish involvement in British sport without once mentioning Sir Arthur Gold (1917-2002), a motor retailer by profession, who was honorary secretary of the British Amateur Athletics Board 1965-72, chairman of the British Olympic Association 1988-92 and an uncompromising opponent of professionalization in sport and of the use of performance-enhancing drugs.[1]

But these are not major criticisms. In their very different ways both Dee and Clavane have made very original contributions to our understanding of the interface between British Jewry, British sports, and the British sporting instinct. They are both, therefore, seminal works.

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[1] Curiously, Gold is given a passing mention in Dr Dee's De Montfort University PhD thesis, upon which one assumes the book is based: see D. G. Dee, 'Jews and British Sport: Integration, Ethnicity and Anti-Semitism, c1880-c1960,' PhD thesis, De Montfort University (Leicester), p.126, note 194.

BOOK REVIEW

TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, *Kosher: Private Regulation in the Age of Industrial Food,* 232 pp Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-0 674072 93 0 £29.95 Hardcover

"Kosher food is big business" writes Timothy D. Lytton in *Kosher: Private Regulation in the Age of Industrial Food* (p. 7). The kosher food market generates about $12 billion a year in retail sales, but only about 8 percent of kosher food consumers are religiously observant Jews that follow the dietary laws. For a host of reasons, whether based on fact, myth or faith, many other Americans purposely buy kosher foods because they are kosher. But, alas, in this age of industrial food production where the canned, boxed, bottled, wrapped processed food is prepared out of the consumers' sight, how does one know if the food or drink is kosher or *treif* (non-kosher)?

Lytton acknowledges the greater challenges and higher costs of the supervision of *kashrut* (kosher dietary regulations) in the slaughtering and food service industries. He focuses, however, on the evolution in the United States of modern private kosher certification agencies in industrial food production. He writes that they "transformed kosher supervision in America from a tool of fraud and corruption into a model of nongovernmental industrial regulation" (p. 3).

The kosher certifying agencies serve an important function by mitigating a potential "market failure" due to asymmetric information. While food producing companies know the ingredients and production process of their product, and hence can know whether it is kosher, it is too costly for any individual consumer to obtain independently the correct information. The certifying agencies bridge this asymmetric information gap.

The largest certifying agency by far is the Orthodox Union, recognized by its OU symbol (Ⓤ). It and the next four largest are referred to as the Big Five. Together they are responsible for about 80 percent of the kosher certification in the U.S.

In an earlier era, before the development over the past century of industrial food production, most Jews lived in the Jewish communities that were largely self-governing. Each community would employ the local *shochet* (ritual slaughterer) for poultry and beef (fish, fruits and vegetables did not require special treatment). The community would supervise his

training and the exacting specifications as to the slaughtering and selling of meat from permissible animals. Corruption and fraud might arise because profits would be greater if *treif* meat (e.g., meat that did not satisfy the exacting slaughtering requirements) could be sold as kosher. Regulations were introduced and enforced by the community.

With the growth of larger Jewish communities, and the anonymity that followed, especially in America, this system broke down. Moreover, food production and consumption patterns changed with the development of industrial food production and the growth of the food service industry (i.e., restaurants and caterers).

There are three primary actors in this story: consumers who want to purchase kosher food, producers who want to increase their profits through greater sales, and the kosher certifying agencies. Given the large production runs, the mechanization of production, recipes strictly followed to assure uniformity of the product, and modern record-keeping, the cost of kosher supervision in industrial production is relatively low in absolute terms, and extremely low on a per unit basis. Many companies have found that the per unit extra cost (price increase to consumer) is small compared to the additional sales to the market for kosher food. And, for some products, the shift from *treif* to kosher ingredients (e.g., from lard to vegetable shortening) made it possible to obtain certification (e.g., Oreo cookies).

The certification process is not simple. In modern industrial food production there is a "supply chain", where many ingredients from different suppliers, including food products, coloring, preservatives, emulsifiers, other additives, packaging and production processes are all brought together in the final product. Yet, each of these items, at each stage in the production process, must pass muster for the final product to be kosher. Producers of the intermediate products can differ in their certifying agency. If an agency is found to have erred in its certification, all of the products down the supply chain are tainted. This gives certifying agencies, if not also the food producers, an incentive to know what is happening at earlier stages in the supply chain.

Certifying agencies need to maintain a reputation for exacting and reliable standards to obtain and keep clients. If their standards are too low other agencies would not accept their *hecksher* (certification) further down the supply chain. If their standards are too high, or the fees they charge are too high, the food company can change certifying agencies. These factors tend to keep the Big Five major agencies, and numerous smaller ones, at a roughly similar standard of Orthodox interpretation of *kashrut*, and their charges competitive.

As a result of supply chain production, downstream certifiers depend on the reputation for integrity and efficacy of the upstream certifiers. Upstream certifiers of necessity depend on the acceptance of their *hecksher* by those downstream. And, the value of an agency *hecksher* ultimately depends on the acceptance by consumers.

Consumers play an active role. Many follow the newsletters and other media about supervising agencies and kosher products. They share this information with others with similar concerns. The rapid spread of information among consumers has beneficial disciplinary effects in the kosher marketplace. Reputational effects are therefore essential in the kosher certification market.

Lytton emphasizes that these various competitive pressures reduce fraud and corruption. He also emphasizes that the participants in the kosher certification industry typically have a strong sense of religious obligation and that this too tends to promote honesty. Presumably the kosher certifiers earlier in the 20th century also had a strong sense of religious obligation, even though fraud and corruption were rife. This suggests that the change in institutional arrangements, rather than a change in moral fervor, changed behavior.

It is curious that several short appendices were not included in the body of the text. One is on the Orthodox Union (OU) domination of the certification of kosher meat. Lytton claims that OU maintains the dominant position by refusing to certify food service operations and retail stores that carry meat that is not OU certified. It is surprising that this dominance has not attracted anti-trust attention.

The OU has also adopted what it calls a "higher" standard of *kashrut* for beef, referred to as "*glatt* kosher". This pertains to the presence of lesions on a cow's lungs. In spite of his attempts at providing explanations, Lytton is not convincing as to why this more costly standard has come to dominate in the kosher beef market, or why the "*glatt* kosher" designation has spread beyond beef.

"Kosher" is well-written and very informative about kosher certification in the U.S., and the comparison with alternative mechanisms for certifying food products. He discusses the pros and cons of the private kosher certification industry as a model for private certification of food safety, and of ethical food business practices. Yet, especially given that it is a short book, I was disappointed that it lacked a discussion of kosher supervision in Israel where there is not the separation of religion and government as in the U.S. Moreover, is the US unique among diaspora countries? How is kosher certification handled elsewhere, or have other countries followed the U.S. model?

After reading "Kosher" I now find that I not only check for a *hecksher*, but also whose *hecksher* – is it OU, OK, Star-K, Kol-K, CRC, or one of the smaller certifiers?

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BOOK REVIEWS

MEIR PERSOFF *Hats in the Ring, Choosing Britain's Chief Rabbis from Adler to Sacks*, 360 pp., Academic Studies Press Boston ISBN: 978 1 6181 1177 7, 2013, £54.95 (hardback)

Every twenty five years or so since the appointment of Nathan Marcus Adler in 1845, British Jews have selected a Chief Rabbi. Officially the choice is made by representatives of the United Hebrew Congregations, first of the Empire, and then the Commonwealth, who comprise all the synagogues accepting the Chief Rabbi's authority. In practice the major London synagogues have always wielded the greatest influence and after they formed the United Synagogue in 1870, power moved decisively into the hands of the sitting President. That was how Hermann Adler was chosen in 1891, Joseph Hertz in 1913, Israel Brodie in 1948, Immanuel Jakobovits in 1967 and Jonathan Sacks in 1991. Ephraim Mirvis was chosen at the end of the seventh and most recent process, which is a story which remains to be told. The first six selections have now been thoroughly documented by Meir Persoff in *Hats in the Ring*.

Persoff gives a blow by blow account of the twists and turns on each occasion. He has undertaken a prodigious amount of research and he has given his readers a tremendous wealth of information which will be of lasting value to students of Anglo-Jewish religious history. Persoff is a talented writer, and the interested general reader will find this book readable and entertaining. However, the data that Persoff assembled could have been more efficiently sifted. As in his earlier books on the Chief Rabbinate (this is his fourth), Persoff gives us very long extracts from primary sources, including the complete texts of each Chief Rabbi's induction sermon. It is unclear that we need all 23 items in the list of procedures for electing a Chief Rabbi in 1843, including 'that the cordial thanks of this meeting be given to Isaac Cohen Esq., for his very able and impartial conduct in the Chair'. We also do not need to know that a proposal to abandon the age limit of 50 for candidates in 1966 was lost by 52 votes to 46 after a recount. This is the level of detail the historian works with, not generally what they present unprocessed to their readers, at least not without some explanation of its significance. This is symptomatic of a book that is heavy on narrative but light on analysis.

Persoff tends not to interrogate his evidence to illuminate larger themes in Anglo-Jewish history and the development of one of its central

institutions. Why were all the candidates to succeed Solomon Hirschell in 1842-5 so different from their predecessor? What happened between 1891, when there was a possibility that the Reform synagogue would be involved in the election, and 1991 when they vocally distanced themselves from the office of Chief Rabbi? Did the elaborate negotiations between the United Synagogue and their poor relations in the Federation of Synagogues come to nothing in both 1948 and 1967 due to short term factors and the impact of personalities, or for fundamental structural reasons? Were the differences between them really religious, or were they social and cultural? What was the impact of the changing nature of the lay leadership, from the non-observant Robert Waley Cohen in 1948 to the much more traditional Isaac Wolfson in 1967? What does it say about British rabbinical education that the bulk of candidates for the Chief Rabbinate have always been foreign? It is a sign of an attempt to look broadly for the best talent or a failure to foster it at home?

Regretfully, Persoff does not dig deeply into the reasons for each successful candidature. We read a great deal about what the leading characters said, wrote and did, but their accounts are not critically examined to reveal the matrix of forces at work in determining outcomes, such as the voice of the Jewish press. For example, the election of Hertz requires explanation. He was in competition with Moses Hyamson, a dayan (judge) of the London Beth Din and acting Chief Rabbi, and with Bernard Drachman, a senior New York rabbi and sometime Dean of the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York. In 1906 Hertz had failed even to be appointed Minister of the New West End Synagogue, yet seven years later he was Chief Rabbi. The *Jewish Chronicle* waged a determined campaign against Hyamson, favouring whichever candidate looked likely to beat him. Hyamson was unpopular in some sections of the East End, as Persoff mentions, but it is unlikely that this was the *Chronicle*'s major concern. It initially backed Drachman, who claimed in his memoirs that he was a great hit when he came to Britain to show himself to the community. Yet he also described how he alienated the immigrants by refusing to speak to them in Yiddish and the Anglo-Jewish clergy by displaying his distrust of their *kashrut*. Once Drachman had destroyed his own chances, the *Chronicle* alighted on Hertz, and he was fortunate to be the front runner when Lord Rothschild ran out of patience and summarily chose a winner.

It may be that analysis is not Persoff's primary interest. An unfortunate element in *Hats in the Ring* is the amount of gossip. Of course the personal element is important in understanding historical events, but Persoff tends not to point to any wider significance. We see rabbis and lay leaders fighting like rats in a sack, attacking each other in the most

pointed and personal terms during the course of each contest, but we are not given a wider analytical framework to understand the relevance of the personal politics. This becomes especially apparent when Persoff turns to Jonathan Sacks. Do we need to read the bitter correspondence between Lord Jakobovits and Stanley Kalms, in which they lacerate each other and Jonathan Sacks in the process? Persoff has already spent an entire book, *Another Way, Another Time: Religious Inclusivism and the Sacks Chief Rabbinate* (Academic Press: Boston 2010) lambasting Jonathan Sacks. Persoff's earlier book *Faith Against Reason: Religious Reform and the British Chief Rabbinate* (Vallentine Mitchell: London 2008) was designed to show that the Chief Rabbinate was and is an essentially obnoxious institution. That campaign continues in this work, and may be the real argument of a work that seems to lack a thesis.

All this is not to deny that Persoff has placed a great deal of important new information before us, and no one who wishes to understand the development of the office of Chief Rabbi and the lay and rabbinic figures who guided its fortunes will be able to ignore it. Persoff and I have debated these questions in our respective publications, and will no doubt continue to do so. However, this particular book remains essentially a gathering of raw material, another file in the case for the abolition of the Chief Rabbinate; the real work of historical analysis remains to be done.

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BOOK REVIEWS

JONATHAN B KRASNER, *The Benderly Boys and American Jewish Education,* 512 pp., Brandeis University Press, Brandeis, ISBN: 9781584659839, 2011, $39.95 (paperback)

In every generation, Jewish education has a distinct and specific focus. In recent decades, in both the United States and in Britain, the focus has been on the Jewish day school system. There has been a remarkable shift away from supplementary education to full time Jewish education, and we can relate that shift to political, environmental, educational and communal agendas.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the needs of the Jewish community were quite different. The mass immigration of Eastern European Jews from the 1880s until the start of the First World War into both the United States and Britain caused a fundamental question for those new immigrants: how to live in two worlds at once, how to be both citizens of their new adopted country and Jewish, how to be both part of wider society and distinct from it.

In both the United States and Britain, the question was the same, but Samson Benderly's journey had taken him from Safed, in then Palestine, to Baltimore in the United States in 1898, and so it is on the United States that his story is focussed. Originally in the States to pursue his Medical studies, Benderly soon realised that his passion was for Jewish Education. Benderly was preoccupied with a dual school system - a new system of Jewish education built on principles underlying the life of all American Jews. For the rest of his life, Benderly sought to modernise Jewish education by professionalising the field, creating an immigrant-based supplementary school model and by pushing community responsibility for Jewish education. Benderly trained teachers, principal and bureau leaders and it is these young men who became known as the "Benderly Boys". There were "Benderly girls" too, and Krasner's book should be read together with the 2010 book "*The Women Who Reconstructed American Jewish Education, 1910–1965*" (Brandeis). Edited by Carol Ingall, it comprises portraits of influential female Jewish educators, including a chapter on the Benderly girls.

Jonathan Krasner has written what must be seen as the definitive biography of one of the most important figures in American Jewish Education. His volume is a substantial and compelling story of Benderly's

vast contribution to the Jewish education landscape in the United States. Krasner traces how Benderly shifted the Jewish education emphasis from heritage and content transmission to enculturation and social environment adjustment. The book tells the stories behind the creation of both institutions and curriculum, of both Federations and Camps. Krasner has coined the term: the "Benderly Revolution" and he sympathetically and rigorously chronicles that revolution through the four hundred pages of this book. Events and people are described and analysed in depth, and the book draws the reader in from the very first – the absorbing story of Temima Gezari, one of the first immigrants to be touched by the Benderly revolution – through to the final days of Benderly's life in 1944.

Benderly's philosophy and methods were creative and ambitious, and Krasner shows how his strategies made concessions to both the voluntary nature of religious education in the United States and to the realities of family life. His emphasis on flexibility, experimenting with everything from a three day a week to a two hour a week programme, valued family needs and priorities.

But Benderly's efforts did not stop at organisational principles and curriculum. His establishment of teachers' colleges and a professional journal were huge achievements and quite literally changed the face of Jewish education in the States. Krasner chronicles Benderly's achievements with warmth and certainly celebrates him as a pioneer of modern Jewish education. But he does recognise the failings of the Benderly revolution, and arrives at a mixed conclusion. Benderly's scheme of modernization, professionalization, and standardization did not produce the educated American Jews that he and his "boys" tried to develop. Nevertheless, without their efforts Krasner acknowledges that Jewish American immigrants would have been challenged to have safeguarded Jewish continuity.

With enormous energy, Benderly's main purpose was to organise, modernise and Americanise Jewish education. His role models, friends and colleagues were icons of twentieth century Jewish history: Judah Magnes, Henrietta Szold, Barnett Brickner, Solomon Schechter, Jacob Schiff, and Mordecai Kaplan. Benderly stood with the great and the good of his time.

And this is where, as a British Jew, I am puzzled. Jewish education academics and practitioners in Britain know of Henrietta Szold and they have read about Mordechai Kaplan. Virtually nobody has ever heard of Samson Benderly. How can this giant of Jewish Education, a man of such vision and drive that he revolutionised half a century of Jewish education in the United States, be so virtually unknown outside of the States? Krasner's biography should somehow find its way to the UK (and

beyond). It should be required reading for both students of Jewish education and students of history and sociology. Not only is it a fascinating exploration related to a specific environment, but the issues facing American Jewry at the start of the twentieth century are very relevant to the situation that existed in the UK at that time.

By the 1960s, the era of the Benderly boys was over. The formulation of the purpose of Jewish education had shifted again, from adjustment to survival, and Jewish education was elevated to a communal priority, with the main aim being to stem the assimilationist drift in an open society. The emphasis on supplementary education was being replaced by a growth and belief in the need for Jewish day schools. But for a half a century or more Benderly and his boys were the dominant force in American Jewish education. The system wide revolution directed by Samson Benderly and his protégés touched hundreds of thousands of lives. Jonathan Krasner has contributed a seminal work to the library of the history and sociology of Jewish education. It should be read and discussed by all those who are invested not just in the past, but in the future.

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BOOK REVIEWS

MINNY E. MOCK-DEGEN, *The Dynamics of becoming Orthodox;*
Dutch Jewish women returning to Judaism and how their mothers felt
about, 313 pp., Amphora Books, Amsterdam, ISBN: 9789064460661
(paperback).

Mock-Degen's study offers a variety of excellent observations, but leaves
a number of intriguing questions unanswered because of the chosen
theoretical perspective: Glaser and Strauss' grounded theory. In 1919
sociologist and philosopher Max Weber proclaimed the world's
disenchantment as the task of science. Fifty years later the era of big
narratives – Christianity, Socialism – and "big theories" was felt to be
over. In lieu of starting from abstract and alienating theoretical thought,
research was to focus on the description of lived reality. Practice came to
be studied as local practice – a term coined by anthropologist Clifford
Geertz. According to Flick (2002), Habermas was the first to recognise a
different tradition in qualitative research, related to names like Goffman
and Garfinkel. Based on the new principle of openness, which came to be
known as naturalistic sociology, it was assumed that the object would
present itself. Cultural anthropologists, opposing themselves to positivistic
research, "just selected their tribe, learned the language, and kept a field
diary. The hope was that somehow meaning would emerge by itself"
(Silverman, 1997). In the 1960s, this belief was supported by Glaser and
Strauss' grounded theory: "The apparently a-theoretical position of some
ethnographers itself derives from a theory: just hanging out, with the aim
of faithfully representing the subject's world. [It was] a myth, called
naturalism" (Silverman, 1997).

In grounded theory, preference is given to field study as against
theoretical assumptions, which are to be discovered. It implies that the
researcher should suspend a-priori theoretical knowledge. In Mock-
Degen's study the inductive perspective is neither anti-theoretical nor a-
theoretical. On the contrary, reference is made to various theories on for
example mother-daughter relationships, coping with religious
transformation and potential stress, and the Shoah. The principle research
questions are: "How do returnee women and their mothers perceive and
interpret the return to Orthodox Judaism? In what way has the return to
Orthodox Judaism impacted their intergenerational relationships? How
did the Dutch Jewish women participating in this research become

involved in Orthodox Judaism and construct a religious lifestyle they felt comfortable with?" The dissertation offers a rich view on the dynamic process the interviewees went through, their caveats and ambivalences, and the impact of choosing a kosher lifestyle on their relationships with friends and relatives while safeguarding *shalom bajit*. The author argues that from this study emerges an overarching analytic narrative: the respondents saw Orthodox Judaism as a way of giving meaning to being Jewish. From an analytical perspective, the final conclusion could have been more informative. The analytic statements made throughout the book correspond to the grounded theory approach. As a result, theory-building remains rather fragmentary and leaves a variety of pressing questions open.

The aim of the study was to explore how the return to Orthodox Judaism is experienced, perceived and interpreted by the returnees and their mothers. How did the daughters' religious change affect intergenerational relations? There are indications of four patterns of becoming observant: the peer group pattern (orthodox Zionist youth movement *Bné Akiwa*), the partner prompted-pattern (involvement with religious practice unfolded as a consequence of meeting an observant partner), the wanting-to-connect pattern (a desire for contact with other Jews), and the by-chance pattern.

In contradistinction to American returnees, many of whom went through a period of political activism and spiritual experimentation before discovering Orthodox Judaism, *ba'alot teshuvah* in the Netherlands did not abandon the "corrupt" Western world. They found their way back to Judaism more or less silently. A fascinating and puzzling question was why educated, secular women would be attracted to Orthodox Judaism with its traditional gender roles and considered feminism selfish, individualistic, and career-orientated. Becoming Orthodox was not a protest against or even a response to feminism. The returnees were not rebels, with or without a cause, but meaning-seekers who became observant as a natural consequence of being part of the overlapping micro-systems at the Jewish school and the Orthodox youth organisation *Bné Akiva*. "Their increasing observance came gradually, and developed as they acquired more knowledge, internalising and committing themselves to the behavioural norms and values of an orthodox Jewish life" (2009:221).

The interviewees were attracted to Orthodox Judaism because "it provided a code of apparently authentic pre-established meaning" (2009:222). Their return to Judaism was not a personal reinterpretation of disparate religious notions, nor did they set out to assert their right to *bricolage*. Their new lifestyle "offered an alternative to the permissive

adolescent sub-culture which emerged in Dutch society in the 1960s" (2009:223) and to the superficial social groups their parents associated with: "They found that this did not offer a profound sense of being Jewish" (2009:223). Returning to Judaism offered an opportunity to give a positive turn to being Jewish. They came to view their life as a historical link in a chain of Jewish generations, and more specifically a contribution to the continuation of Judaism after the Shoah. The Shoah provided a frame of reference for raising a large family. The Shoah and what Hirsch terms post-memory[1] have continued to impact the lives of survivors and their children. Yet neither the returnees nor their mothers saw the Shoah as a reason for returning to Orthodox Judaism. So, what motivated them? Did it boil down to youngsters seeking whatever beliefs and practices they could identify with?

While elaborating on the presentation of the data, three issues in particular crossed my mind: the vitality of ethnicity, Jewish women and feminism, and the historical context at the time of the interviewees' return to Judaism.

The *ba'al teshuva* movement originated in the 1960s and 1970s when Western students rallied against the war in Vietnam, smoked pot to deliberately upset their materialistic parents, attended chaotic Rolling Stones concerts, climbed the barricades of academic institutions, and left the Church since God was dead and church-goers were hypocrites. American returnees were anti-establishment and in search of a more authentic, spiritual Judaism, frequently stimulated by a desire for Kabbalistic knowledge. In France, *Juifs de Retour* opted for a radical, comprehensive style of Judaism in juxtaposition to the French mentality viewing religion as a private matter. Dutch Jewry considered Judaism an "afgelopen chassene" (the wedding was over), especially since the working-class had been almost completely wiped out in the Shoah. Yet, in this era of scepticism, democratisation and secularisation, there was an increasing emphasis on religious observance in *Bné Akiva* circles with adolescents attracted to strict, ultra and middle-of-the-road Orthodoxy. Interestingly, the author observes a trend toward increasing religious observance in Dutch Liberal Judaism as well. It raises the question as to whether the *teshuva* movement is an idiosyncratic, i.e. typically orthodox phenomenon. In my observation, quite a few progressive *ba'alei teshuvah* were encouraged to return to their Jewish roots by their non-Jewish spouses.

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[1] Post-memory: quasi memory experience of those who grow up dominated by narratives that preceded their birth, shaped by traumatic events than can be neither understood nor recreated.

Studies of ethnicity demonstrate that we were dealing, in the 1960s and 1970s, with second and third generation minorities becoming "Polish" or "Chinese" again. Some Dutch Jews who were active and leading members of leftist organisations became consciously aware of their Jewishness as a result of their involvement in immigrant emancipation programs. They envied the Turks and the Moroccans for their presumed clear cultural and religious identities. Many became Jewish again via the solidarity bypass. The question which interests me is, why the Dutch returnees in this study were indifferent or immune to the counter-culture which so obviously affected their American counterparts.

The author contrasts traditional Jewish gender roles with feminist views or more accurately with radical and ideological feminism. My question would be: Who is defining feminism? Is there one single authoritative concept or are there more feminisms? The interviewees rejected the sweeping individualism and selfishness of second-wave feminists. Meanwhile, the Dutch Jewish women's organisation Deborah was campaigning for women's right to be elected to community boards! The secular women's movement in the Netherlands proclaimed itself egalitarian. In reality it was ruled by self-proclaimed leaders, some of whom advocated lesbian love as the alternative to male chauvinism. In terms of Jewish and for that matter Christian, Islamic and Humanistic basic values, it might be worthwhile to problemetize the subjectivism, relativism and continuous search for meaning of the non-affiliated, and redefine feminism from a religious and philosophical perspective.

The book concludes with a number of suggested questions for further research, such as: How do men became observant and why would they perceive their return differently? My suggestion would be to build on this open-minded and impressive study to construct a comprehensive theory of the *ba'al teshuva* movement. One of my questions would address, why being and staying Jewish is an inevitable as well as deliberate choice.

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Literature consulted
Flick, Uwe. *An Introduction to Qualitative Research*; London: SAGE, 2002.
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BOOK REVIEWS

YOEL COHEN *God, Jews and the Media: Religion and Israel's Media*,
   272 pp., Routledge, London and New York, ISBN: 9780415475037,
   2012. $135 (hardback)

*Normally, the head of Israel's broadcasting authority would see the Chief
Rabbi only on key dates such as when the latter was invited to appear on
television at the Jewish New Year. So when a somewhat nervous, if not
frantic, Chief Rabbi called the authority head at his home at the end of the
Sabbath, it was clear something unusual had occurred.*

*   The Chief Rabbi related that during his sleep on the Holy Sabbath he
had had a vision from Almighty God, in which God told the learned rabbi
that He wished to speak to the Jewish people, indeed to mankind, through
an interview on Israel Television. (preface, ix)*

With this anecdote, Yoel Cohen begins the present monograph, which
seeks to explore "the interplay of media and religion in the Israeli Jewish
context." (11) In his opening pages, Cohen chronicles the reactions of
Israeli Jews of various streams to God's proposed appearance, and the
preparations for the big event by Israel's broadcasting authority—then the
resulting embarrassment for Israel Television and the Chief Rabbinate
when, in the presence of the Chief Rabbi, the Minister of Religious
Affairs and representatives of all the faiths in the Holy Land, God fails to
appear to answer the studio interviewer's questions. The chief rabbi and
broadcasting authority appear to be hopelessly naïve in agreeing to the
interview, and God himself capricious, justifying the religious doubt of
Israel's secular population (xi); predictably, the story ends with the
resignation of the broadcasting chief.

   As s/he had probably suspected, the reader learns four pages later that
this anecdote is entirely the fruit of the author's imagination.
Nevertheless, rather than "illustrat[ing] nevertheless how mass media and
Jewish religious identity intertwine today" as Cohen suggests (xii), this
anecdote—one of relatively few in-depth case studies presented in the
book—serves to raise questions about why a scholar who seeks to further
the understanding of Jewish religious identity in the mass media age
should choose to open his book with an anecdote so seemingly
unsympathetic to those it portrays. Unfortunately, for the present reader
these reservations were only deepened by the body of the book, which

while interesting in its subject matter, is problematic in both presentation and critical engagement.

Seeking to rectify an absence of engagement with religion in the academic literature concerning media in Israel, the thirteen chapters of Cohen's book encompass a wide-ranging approach to this subject area, summarizing a range of Jewish legal opinions pertinent to modern media, and discussing the reporting of "religion" in the mainstream Israeli media, non-mainstream Jewish media including strictly Orthodox and diaspora Jewish newspapers, and ideology in reporting religious news in Israel. Most of the research cited here is quantitative, based on surveys and questionnaires undertaken by the author, including a two-month survey of the coverage of religion in various Israeli religious and secular media (49), combined with figures compiled by other individuals and institutions, and material cited from Israeli newspapers. While this information does paint a variegated portrait of media practices pertaining to religion in Israel and the Jewish diaspora, highlighting episodes ranging from rabbi scandals in the mainstream Israeli press to the foundation of independent ultra-Orthodox magazines, a number of problems detract seriously from the overall value of this volume.

First, Cohen never adequately interrogates the terms in which he presents his research. Whilst the diversity of contemporary Jewish belief and practice is acknowledged throughout the book, "Judaism" is frequently constructed as a monolithic entity, with little attention to the texture of religious opinion presented, which ranges from biblical citations to the opinions of major and lesser known rabbinic figures. Much of this material appears to be cited secondhand, with virtually no references to the sources of the religious opinions cited; sweeping statements about the "endless Hegelian-type struggle between loyalty to Judaism and to the modern world of science" among modern Orthodox Jews (96) or about the role of Israel in constructing diaspora Jewish identity (186) are problematic and need more serious critical engagement.

Second, more information is needed about the research methodologies employed by the author. For example, Cohen discusses his survey of the coverage of "religion" in the Israeli news media at length – but without specifying what, in hs eyes, constituted a "religion" story. While he excluded theological exegesis, it is unclear, for example, whether he included general political material in which religious Knesset parties were involved. Similarly, while Cohen rates each piece of this news coverage on a scale of 1 to 5 (negative to positive) and thereby asserts that "the media did not strengthen stereotypes and were inclined to be neutral" (125), he gives no examples or explanation of his rating system, without which it is difficult to read much into the detailed statistics he presents.

Third, while much information is presented in this volume, beyond a general statement that the subject matter is worthy of interest, there is little sense of sustained argument or analysis. It is unclear what this book is trying to say, or what Cohen sought to find when examining the impact of "media" and "Judaism" on each other. Too frequently, opportunities for serious analysis are skated over in favour of broad-brushed assertion. "Judaism" is uncritically assumed to be in a conflictual relationship with "modernity", represented by the (secular) media; the ways in which media might contribute to the construction of religious meaning are not adequately explored, "virtual communities" (184) are left untheorised, and while Cohen observes that "there are certain theological differences between Judaism's and Christianity's perceptions of mass media and their social role – which make the Israeli model a contrasting case (sic) from the US model," (12) the nature and impact of such theological differences are not explored—not to mention other problematic assumptions implicit in this sentence. In place of substantial engagement with scholarly debate, the reader is too frequently left with clichés: "The search for God has become an Internet surf of spiritual discovery" (4), or unsubstantiated statements: "News media play opposite roles for religious communities and for the secular Israeli population." (118)

Finally, this volume would have benefited from much tighter editing. The English syntax is often problematic, Israeli Hebrew terminology has slipped into the English, and a number of sentences are either difficult to parse or do not make sense. Typos are frequent: for example, the name of the Haredi newspaper Yated Neeman appears several times as 'Yetad' (eg. 79), and the religious feminist organization Kolech becomes 'Kollek' (60).

In the past couple of decades, abundant scholarly work has theorized the construction of religious subjectivities and alternative modernities, the creation of communities via the internet, and the creative harnessing of technologies and new media by religious communities; likewise, a wide body of research has critically analysed Jewish subjectivities and identity formation. While the subject matter presented here is certainly worthy of interest, it is difficult to justify both the absence of critical analysis here, and Cohen's choice not to engage with the wider scholarly debates in which the material he presents is situated. A wider frame of reference and more secure theorizing would have turned this volume into a valuable contribution to the scholarly bookshelf. As it stands, however, the serious shortcomings of this book leave the academic reader disappointed.

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The Year

in Social Research
on Jews & Jewish Life:

2012

Introduction

In cooperation with the Jewish Journal of Sociology, our good friends in the UK, we are pleased to present this review of the year of Jewish social research: 2012. Included are the 68 pieces of empirical research (both quantitative and qualitative) that appeared in the 2012 calendar year and that also are included in the Berman Jewish Policy Archive @ NYU Wagner.

While most of these pieces of research derive from the United States, we also include research conducted in the UK, Israel, the Former Soviet Union, Sweden, and elsewhere. The wide breadth of research embraces public opinion research, evaluation research, basic research, policy analyses, institutional reports, Ph.D. dissertations, Master's theses, and Jewish population studies (including the New York study that I do commend to your attention).

In reviewing the full sweep of these studies, I was struck not only by the prodigious thought and creativity that went into producing this impressive literature, but also the diversity of topics, approaches, and researchers. Using terminology drawn from the Michelin travel guides, the list is definitely worth a stop, many of the abstracts are worth a detour, and I'm sure you'll find some of the full studies worth a trip.

And, of course, your comments and additional contributions are invited. Should we have missed any research published in 2012, please do send it along.

Happy reading, happy thinking,

Prof. Steven M. Cohen
Director, Berman Jewish Policy Archive @ NYU Wagner
Research Professor, Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion

Please note: *all publications listed here, and their full bibliographic information, are available via* **bjpa.org***, by following the links provided with each listing.*

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JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

About the Jewish Journal of Sociology

The Jewish Journal of Sociology was sponsored by the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress from its inception in 1959 until the end of 1980. Thereafter, from the first issue of 1981 (volume 23, no. 1), the Journal has been sponsored by Maurice Freedman Research Trust Limited, which is registered as an educational charity by the Charity Commission of England and Wales (no. 326077). It has as its main purpose the encouragement of research in the sociology of the Jews and the publication of The Jewish Journal of Sociology. The objects of the Journal remain as stated in the Editorial of the first issue in 1959:

> *'This Journal has been brought into being in order to provide an international vehicle for serious writing on Jewish social affairs. Academically we address ourselves not only to sociologists, but to social scientists in general, to historians, to philosophers, and to students of comparative religion.*
>
> *We should like to stress both that the Journal is editorially independent and that the opinions expressed by authors are their own responsibility.'*

The founding Editor of the *JJSoc* was Morris Ginsberg, and the founding Managing Editor was Maurice Freedman. Morris Ginsberg, who had been Professor of Sociology at the London School of Economics, died in 1970. Maurice Freedman, who had been Professor of Social Anthropology at The London School of Economics and later at the University of Oxford, succeeded to the title of Editor in 1971, when Dr. Judith Freedman (who had been Assistant Editor since 1963) became Managing Editor. Maurice Freedman died in1975; from then until her death in December 2009 the Journal was edited by Dr. Judith Freedman. The 2010 and 2011 volumes were edited by Marlena Schmool and Geoffrey Alderman and the 2012 volume by Stanley Waterman. Keith Kahn-Harris is the current editor.

About the Berman Jewish Policy Archive

The Berman Jewish Policy Archive (BJPA) at NYU's Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service is the central electronic address for Jewish communal policy. BJPA offers a vast collection of policy-relevant research and analysis on Jewish life to the public, free of charge, with holdings spanning from 1900 until today, at **bjpa.org**.

BJPA's powerful search functionality allows students, researchers, educators, professionals, and others to access the most relevant content with ease. Prominent within the archive is the entire collection of two journals: The Journal of Jewish Communal Service and Sh'ma: a Journal of Jewish Ideas. Many documents from the American Jewish Committee (AJC) are also archived, including materials from the American Jewish Year Book. BJPA hosts large collections of material by Charles Liebman (*z"l*), Daniel Elazar (*z"l*), and Leonard Fein (*shlita*).

BJPA produces monthly Reader's Guides on topics such as Environmental Issues, Synagogues & Kehillot, Jewish Politics, the major Jewish denominations, and much more. Sign up for our mailing list at **bjpa.org**, and register for a free user account. Registration is *not required* to use the archive, but registered users can create a "Bookshelf" of BJPA materials to be saved and shared, or to gather bibliographical information easily. Registered users can also save customized search preferences, and upload documents for submission to the archive.

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American Jewish Committee (AJC)

2012 AJC Survey of American Jewish Opinion

AJC's annual survey shows that President Obama would win a majority of the Jewish vote in a contest against Gov. Mitt Romney. Probed for the first time is the link between religious activity (based on frequency of synagogue attendance) and voting behavior. Among the 14 percent of American Jews who attend religious services one or more times per week, 52 percent would vote for Obama and 34 percent for Romney; 67 percent of those who never attend religious services – 31 percent of respondents – would vote for Obama, while 21 percent would vote for Romney.

American Jewish Committee (AJC)

Colloquium Report: Are Young Committed American Jews Distancing From Israel?

A report of the proceedings of an American Jewish Committee (AJC) colloquium on December 15, 2011, entitled "Are Young Committed American Jews Distancing From Israel?" This marked the second in a series of colloquia addressing Ihe question of distancing from Israel among younger American Jews. Also included is a front page article on the colloquium thal appeared in the New York Jewish Week as well as a background paper prepared for advance reading by colloquium participants .

Bikkurim, Wellspring Consulting

From First Fruits to Abundant Harvest: Maximizing the Potential of Innovative Jewish Start-Ups

Currently, the Jewish community offers very little support specifically geared toward post-start-up needs, nor are those needs broadly understood by funders, capacity builders, and even by the organizations themselves. This study focuses on those start-up and post-startup organizations, few in number but strong in transformative potential, that are poised to make a significant contribution to the Jewish community. It calls attention to the severe drop-off in communal support that occurs as start-ups grow into the post-start-up stage, when both budgets and potential for impact are greater.

Board of Deputies of British Jews

Inspiring Women Leaders: Advancing Gender Equality in Jewish Communal Life - The Report of the Jewish Leadership Council's Commission on Women in Jewish Leadership

The following report has taken the community forward in recognizing the need for and the benefits of gender equality. Jewish charitable organizations have very few women in leadership roles despite exceptionally high levels of achievement and education among women in the Jewish community. The report focuses on lay and professional leadership roles in Jewish communal organizations and recommends ways of advancing more women to senior paid and voluntary roles in the community.

Dahaf Institute, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA) **http://bit.ly/11gQHsW**

Views of the Israeli Public on Israeli Security and Resolution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

This survey scrutinizes trends in the Israeli public's positions on foreign policy and defense and the effects of these positions on intentions about voting for the 19th Knesset, based on representative-sample responses of the adult population of Israel (N=500). 76% of Israelis (83% of Jews) believe that a withdrawal to the 1967 lines and a division of Jerusalem would not bring about an end of the conflict. 61% of the Jewish population believes that defensible borders are more important than peace for assuring Israel's security (up from 49% in 2005). 78% of Jews indicated they would change their vote if the party they intended to support indicated that it was prepared to relinquish sovereignty in east Jerusalem. 59% of Jews said the same about the Jordan Valley.

Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA) **http://bit.ly/11gQNRn**

Israeli Settlements, American Pressure, and Peace

President Obama apparently believed that pressuring Israel to halt construction of homes in Jewish neighborhoods in parts of Jerusalem formerly controlled by Jordan would advance peace. In reality, the opposite ensued. No major party in Israel, and no significant part of the Jewish public, is willing to count the Jewish neighborhoods that fall within the juridical boundaries of Jerusalem as "settlements" to be "frozen." From the Israeli point of view, Obama violated an Executive Agreement that Sharon had negotiated with President Bush. Stalled peace negotiations in the Obama years cannot be blamed on Netanyahu's policies of accelerating settlement construction.

Reut Institute **http://bit.ly/11gQS7I**

The Israeli Diaspora as a Catalyst for Jewish Peoplehood: An Emerging Opportunity Within the Changing Relationship Between Israel and the Jewish World

This report offers a conceptual framework for understanding the place and potential role of the Israeli Diaspora within the changing paradigm between Israel and the Jewish world. While the 'old relationship' between Israel and world Jewry was based upon an unwritten covenant grounded in classical Zionism, the emerging paradigm is shaped by partnership and mutuality, with the notion of Jewish Peoplehood taking center stage. This changing dynamic presents an opportunity for the Jewish people.

Synagogue 3000 **http://bit.ly/11gQWV2**

Reform and Conservative Congregations: Different Strengths, Different Challenges

U.S. Jewish congregational life is showing signs of stagnation, with few young adults, many older members and more than adequate sanctuary space, according to a new survey of Jewish congregational life. The survey, which included responses from leaders in 1,215 synagogues, offers the most comprehensive view of Reform and Conservative movement congregations to date. Conducted by sociologist Steven M. Cohen for the Synagogue Studies Institute of Synagogue 3000, the survey is part of the larger Faith Communities Today (FACT), a national data set of American religious congregations.

Abrams, Samuel. Cohen, Steven M. | *Workmen's Circle / Arbeter Ring*

Workmen's Circle / Arbeter Ring 2012 American Jews' Political Values Survey

Jewish voters prefer President Obama to Mitt Romney two to one. The issues driving the Jewish vote according to this survey are economic justice, including regulating financial institutions, support for progressive taxation, and the argument that government should do more to help the needy. American Jews today are pointedly more liberal than the overall population, especially on economic issues traditionally considered social justice concerns. Significantly, neither attachment to Israel nor confidence in Israelis vs. Palestinians as peace seeking strongly factor into Jews' presidential vote decision.

Ackerman, Matthew. Bernstein, David. Fuld, Avi. Savage, Sean. Shaubi, Eli. Young, Todd. | *The David Project*

A Burning Campus? Rethinking Israel Advocacy at America's Universities and Colleges

There has not to date been an attempt to conceptualize the campus specific situation for Israel in the United States or craft an overarching strategy for how to deal with it. Based on significant research (including surveys of students, campus professionals, and faculty), this document intends is to fill this gap in order to assist the leadership and staff of the pro-Israel campus network and the wider Jewish community in developing a set of generally agreed upon principles. The heart of campus strategy should be identification and engagement with key influencers on a given campus, with the goal of moving them a realistic distance toward Israel.

Almog, Doron. Amidror, Yaakov. Dayan, Uzi. Eiland, Giora. Harari, Shalom. Tirza, Danny. Vardi, Rephael. Wegman, Yehuda. Yadlin, Amos. | *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA).*

What Israel Has Learned about Security: Nine IDF Officers Discuss Israel's Security Challenges

Topics covered in this volume include Israel's experience in counterinsurgency warfare, the effectiveness of security barriers, predicting the rise of Hamas, lessons of the Second Lebanon War of 2006, and the possibility of security arrangements for Israel in the Golan Heights.

Arian, Asher. Keissar-Sugarmen, Ayala. | *AVI CHAI Israel Foundation*

A Portrait of Israeli Jews: Beliefs, Observance, and Values of Israeli Jews, 2009

The Guttman Center for Surveys of the Israel Democracy Institute was commissioned by AVI CHAI– Israel to conduct a survey of the Jewish profile of Israeli society, with regard to religiosity, belief, values, and tradition and practices. The survey also related to Jewish Israelis' attitudes toward religion, the state, and public life, relations between different sectors of Israeli Jewish society, and relations between Israeli Jews and Diaspora Jewry. This survey, along with tow others, present a unique continuum of Jewish religiosity and tradition in Israel.

Avineri, Netta Rose.

Heritage Language Socialization Practices in Secular Yiddish Educational Contexts: The Creation of a Metalinguistic Community

This UCLA dissertation develops a theoretical and empirical framework for the model of metalinguistic community, a community of positioned social actors engaged primarily in discourse about language and cultural symbols tied to language. *Metalinguistic community* provides a novel practice-based framework for diverse participants who experience a strong connection to a language and its speakers but may lack familiarity with them due to historical, personal, and/or communal circumstances. As a case study of metalinguistic community, this dissertation provides an in-depth ethnographic analysis of contemporary secular engagement with Yiddish language and culture in the United States.

Baker, Alan. Bell, Abraham. Blum, Yehuda Z.. Gold, Dore. Helmreich, Jeffrey. Lapidoth, Ruth. Rothenberg, Laurence E.. Sabel, Robbie. Sharon, Avinoam. | *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA)*

Israel's Legal Case: A Guidebook

This volume by recognized experts from Israel and abroad outlines Israel's legal case on key issues of international law. As questions are raised over the legitimacy and morality of Israel's actions, the authors in this volume see Israel's actions as firmly rooted in international law. These scholars present well-reasoned responses to the charges of "occupation," "apartheid," and "colonialism." They also discuss the legal status of Israeli settlements, the West Bank security fence, and Israel's borders.

Bard, Mitchell. Dawson, Jeff. | *American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise*

Israel and the Campus: The Real Story

Some have argued that there is a well-funded and organized network promoting the delegitimization of Israel on college campuses. This report presents evidence to the contrary. Two groups are responsible for most of the anti-Israel activity: the Muslim Students Association (MSA) and Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP). Unlike pro-Israel groups, most anti-Israel groups are student-led with little or no professional assistance. Rather than weaken the relationship between U.S. colleges and Israel, the boycott, divestment, sanctions (BDS) movement, has largely backfired. The most serious problem on campus is not from student activities, but from faculty.

Bell, Abraham. Cohen, Amichai. Fletcher, George P. Halevi, Jonathan D. Horovitz, Sigall. Kemp, Richard. Lapidoth, Ruth. Limon, Gil. Schondorf, Roy S.. Sharvit-Baruch, Pnina. Steinberg, Gerald M. | *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA)*

Israel's Right to Self-Defense: International Law and Gaza

A review of Israel's consideration of questions of international law when forced to go to war, with a particular focus on the Gaza war of 2008-2009. It concludes that existing international law permits a nation to act in self-defense, and that Israel gives more thought to upholding the laws of war during its military operations than any other nation in history.

Be'er, Shmuel. Brodsky, Jenny. Korazim, Malka. Nir, Shiri. Resnizky, Shirli. | *Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute*

http://bit.ly/15fYcHb

[Daycare Centers for the Elderly - Patterns of Utilization, Contributions and Programmatic Directions](http://bit.ly/15fYcHb)

Daycare centers are one of the central services for elderly with disabilities in the community. There are now 172 centers in Israel serving 15,500 elders living in the community. The centers provide socio-cultural activities, personal care and rehabilitation services, all under one roof. This study included three components: 1) a census of the centers and their clients; 2) interviews with long-term care beneficiaries attending the centers and their family caregivers; 3) interviews with beneficiaries not attending the centers and their family caregivers.

Billig, Shelley H.. Brown, Stephany. Fredericks, Linda. Jaramillo, Dawn. Meyer, Stephen. | *Repair the World, RMC Research*

http://bit.ly/15fYfmx

[Teaching to the Moment: A Study of Immersive Jewish Service-Learning Educators](http://bit.ly/15fYfmx)

The purpose of this study is to identify the capacities and practices that enable JSL (Jewish service-learning) educators to be effective. To that end, the study is intended to explore the ways in which IJSL (immersive Jewish service-learning) educators from all walks of Jewish life and various associations think about their practice, the approaches and tools they use to implement programs, the factors they believe are associated with effective IJSL pedagogy, how they were trained and the professional development that they believe would strengthen their effectiveness as IJSL educators. This report provides an analysis of the results of cognitive interviews conducted with 11 representatives of the field and an online survey completed by 110 respondents.

Binstock, Michael. | *The Board of Deputies of British Jews*

[Simon Marks Jewish Primary School Inspection Report](http://bit.ly/15fYAWc) — http://bit.ly/15fYAWc

[King David Primary School Inspection Report](http://bit.ly/15fYC0v) — http://bit.ly/15fYC0v

[Menorah Primary School Inspection Report](http://bit.ly/15fYG06) — http://bit.ly/15fYG06

[Pardes House Primary School Inspection Report](http://bit.ly/15fYH45) — http://bit.ly/15fYH45

These inspections looked in detail at the following: (1) the quality of leadership and management, (2) the quality of the curriculum, (3) the quality of learning, teaching and assessment, (4) the quality of provision and outcomes for all groups of pupils, and (5) the impact of the schools' actions to bring about improvement.

Bleckman, Dina. Magidin de Kramer, Raquel. Nursahedov, Begli. Saxe, Leonard. Tighe, Elizabeth. | *Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies*

Hardship And Needs Of Elderly Hesed Clients: An Analysis Of Clients Served By Hesed Service Centers In Russia & Ukraine

The Former Soviet Union is home today for many Jews in poor communities. Throughout the FSU, the JDC has supported the development of Hesed welfare and Jewish community centers to provide services to Jews in need and to support the renewal of Jewish life. This report reviews the current economic, health, and social conditions of these elderly Jews in need in the FSU and to compares their circumstances to their counterparts in western countries such as the United States.

Boyd, Jonathan. Graham, David. Vulkan, Daniel. | *Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR)*

2011 Census Results (England and Wales): Initial Insights About the UK Jewish Population

An initial examination of 2011 UK Census data from England in Wales reveals a Jewish population of 2284,000 in England and Wales. London and its immediately adjacent areas account for 65.3% of the total Jewish population. This population has remained static over the ten year period. However this belies a far more complex picture due to high birth rates among the Orthodox (especially the *haredim*), but also low birth rates and ageing in the rest of the population, as well as a degree of assimilation.

Chesir-Teran, Daniel. Kopelowitz, Ezra. | Schusterman Family Foundation, Research Success Technologies

Next Generation Advocacy: A Study of Young Israel Advocates

This study--the first of its kind--gathered the views of almost 4,000 young Israel advocates in an effort to gain a better understanding of what compels young people to become involved in Israel advocacy, to become leaders in this area and to maintain their involvement during high school, college and beyond. The research explored: 1) the factors that lead teens and young adults to engage in Israel advocacy, 2) the role that organizations play in their involvement, and 3) the influence of mentors in supporting advocates' commitment over time.

Cohen, Steven M. | *Workmen's Circle / Arbeter Ring*

Jewishly Engaged & Congregationally Unaffiliated: The Holy Grail of Jewish Engagement Efforts

Jews who are engaged as Jews but unaffiliated with Jewish congregational life constitute about a third of congregationally unaffiliated non-Orthodox American Jews, and a sixth of all Jews, and comprise about one million Jewish individuals. Compared with other non-Orthodox Jews, they are more frequently: younger adults, living in the West, non-married, non-parents, intermarried, and lower income. Many see religion as important in their lives, even as many are cultural Jews, and most define themselves as spiritual. They are far more Israel-engaged than the unaffiliated. Politically, most are liberals, with strong commitments to economic justice.

Cohen, Steven M. Hoffman, Lawrence A. Ament, Jonathon. Miller, Ron. | **http://bit.ly/15fYTjX**

Berman Jewish Policy Archive @ NYU Wagner (BJPA), North American Jewish Data Bank, Synagogue 3000 (S3K)

Conservative & Reform Congregations in the United States: The FACT-Synagogue 3000 Survey, 2010

This report includes the full survey data from the Faith Communities Today (FACT) Synagogue Survey, 2010. This survey informed the previous report, *Reform and Conservative Congregations: Different Strengths, Different Challenges*. Contrary to the impression that denomination no longer matters, this research underscores the many ways in which Conservative and Reform congregations differ. The report confirms that U.S. Jewish congregational life is showing signs of stagnation, with few young adults, many older members and more than adequate sanctuary space. The survey, which included responses from leaders in 1,215 synagogues, offers the most comprehensive view of Reform and Conservative movement congregations to date.

Cohen, Steven M. Miller, Ron. Ukeles, Jacob B. | *UJA-Federation of NY*   **http://bit.ly/15fYUUW**

Jewish Community Study of New York: 2011 - Comprehensive Report

Key findings include: **Growth:** There are more Jews in the New York area today: 1.54 million in 2011, up from 1.41 million in 2002. In New York City, the Jewish population is back to more than 1 million. **Poverty:** There are more than half a million Jews living in poor or near-poor households, a significant increase in the last 10 years. **Diversity:** There are large numbers of Orthodox Jews and Russian-speaking Jews, as well as other significant segments that include Israelis, Syrians, and, counted for the first time, biracial, Hispanic, and nonwhite Jewish households, and LGBT Jewish households. **Engagement:** Jews in the New York area continue to be engaged in Jewish life in a wide variety of ways, but fewer Jews in the New York area are engaged on some important measures — and the two ends of the engagement continuum are expanding; there are more Orthodox Jews, and more nondenominational Jews and Jews with no religion. **Intermarriage:** Half of the non- Orthodox couples wed between 2006 and 2011 are intermarried. On Jewish engagement, intermarried respondents significantly trail the in-married. **Philanthropy:** Since 2002, Jewish philanthropy has eroded modestly, while community needs have expanded.

Cox, Daniel. Jones, Robert P. | *Public Religion Research Institute*   **http://bit.ly/15fZ0Mj**

Chosen for What? Jewish Values in 2012: Findings from the 2012 Jewish Values Survey

This survey of 1,004 American Jews is the most comprehensive, representative national study of its kind conducted by a non-Jewish research organization. The survey takes a broad look at how Jewish values, experiences and identity are shaping political beliefs and behavior and influencing social action in the Jewish community and beyond. The survey finds that more than eight-in-ten American Jews say that pursuing justice and caring for the widow and the orphan are somewhat or very important values that inform their political beliefs and activities. More than seven-in-ten say that tikkun olam and welcoming the stranger are important values. A majority say that seeing every person as made in the image of God is an important influence on their political beliefs and activities. Strong majorities of American Jews also cite the experience of the Holocaust, having opportunities for economic success in America, and the immigrant experience as important in shaping their political beliefs and activities. The survey also finds President Barack Obama with the same level of support (62%) among American Jewish voters as during a comparable point in the 2008 race.

BJPA Berman Jewish Policy Archive NYUWagner — **JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY**

Dayan, Uzi. | *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA)*

Israel's National Security Considerations in Its Approach to the Peace Process

The architects of Israel's national security doctrine from Yigal Allon to Moshe Dayan to Yitzhak Rabin found compelling reasons to insist that it must not return to the vulnerable 1967 lines, which only appeared to invite aggression and imperil Israel's future rather than set the stage for peace. These Israeli leaders sought new boundaries that would allow Israel to defend itself, by itself. Israel must never allow the West Bank to become a launchpad for rocket attacks on Israeli cities, which is what happened in the Gaza Strip after the 2005 pullout. Israeli security requirements in the West Bank are based in part on preventing that kind of outcome. The Israeli experience with an international presence has been poor. UNIFIL in Lebanon has not lived up to Israeli expectations in preventing the rearmament of Hizbullah since the 2006 Second Lebanon War. Likewise, EU monitors abandoned their positions at the Rafah crossing in 2006 when challenged by local insurgents from Gaza.

Deeter, Anne. | *AVI CHAI Foundation*

Online Learning State of the Field Survey: Summary Findings Report

The AVI CHAI Foundation, in October 2010, began work on a new initiative: online/blended learning. To that end, the Foundation established a two-fold motivation and goal: 1) to improve the quality of education by increasing individualized instruction and enabling students to develop skills and ways of thinking needed in the 21st century; and 2) to bring down the cost of education. Furthermore, AVI CHAI's work to promote the adoption of online learning by day schools is three-pronged: 1) supporting the adoption of online courses at established Jewish day schools; 2) supporting entrepreneurs who are willing to experiment with the model of a day school in service of both educational and cost-saving goals via the incorporation of online learning (and other 21st century learning ideals); and 3) to stimulate the development of Judaic studies offerings online at both the middle and high school levels. In order to gain a better understanding of the status of the field in regard to online learning, the Foundation launched an initiative in the fall of 2011 to gather information about the depth and breadth of online course offerings throughout Jewish day schools in North America. This summary findings report describes the methodology and summary findings discovered through this initial state of the field survey research effort.

Deitcher, Howard. Held, Daniel. Mattenson, Pearl. Pomson, Alex. | *AVI CHAI Foundation*

Engineering Enduring Change: Learning What it Will Take to Transform Day School Israel Education from a Study of BASIS--The Bay Area Schools Israel Synergy Initiative

BASIS--the Bay Area Schools Israel Synergy initiative--has been an ambitious initiative to intensify Israel education in eleven Jewish day schools with a combined enrollment of more than 2,000 students. This report studies the BASIS initiative so as to learn what might lead to enduring change elsewhere in the field of day school Israel education and in any Jewish communal effort to produce systemic and sustained change across multiple educational institutions.

Fishman, Shira. Hecht, Shahar. Sasson, Theodore. Saxe, Leonard. Shain, Michelle. Wright, Graham. | *Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies (CMJS)*

The Impact of Taglit-Birthright Israel: 2012 Update

This study is based on data from a survey of a sample of individuals who applied to Taglit-Birthright Israel between 2001 and 2006. Interviews, both telephone and web, were conducted with nearly 2,000 respondents. The sample of applicants includes both participants and nonparticipants. The present study represents the third wave of data collection in a broad longitudinal study aimed at understanding young adults' Jewish trajectories and assessing the long-term impact of Taglit. The first two waves of the study (conducted in 2009 and 2010) showed strong effects of Taglit participation, and the current analysis, with a sample that is more Jewishly diverse and includes older individuals who are more likely to be married, increases confidence in the previous findings. The findings focus on respondents who were not raised Orthodox, and the analysis compares responses of Taglit participants to a comparison group of individuals who applied to the program but did not participate. At the time of application/trip, there were few systematic differences between participants and nonparticipants. Overall, the results indicate that, despite the increasing time lag since the Taglit experience, there is substantial evidence of the program's positive impact on a broad range of measures having to do with an individual's Jewish identity, relationship to Israel, and connection to the Jewish people.

Fleisch, Eric. Sasson, Theodore. | *Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies (CMJS)*

The New Philanthropy: American Jewish Giving to Israeli Organizations

In recent years, scholars of the American Jewish community have noted declining contributions to the federations and declining transfers by federations to overseas causes including Israel. Some observers have expressed concern that this pattern indicates distancing from Israel. Over the past two decades, as donations through the federation framework have declined, there has been a concomitant increase in the number of Israeli organizations directly reaching out to American Jewish donors. Some scholars have estimated that the increase in donations to these independent entities has offset the decline in federation giving. However, to date, no systematic research has tested this hypothesis. This is the first research of its kind to provide a comprehensive account (within the limits of the available data) of American Jewish giving in Israel. Our study draws on U.S. Internal Revenue Service documents to describe the sum and distribution of American Jewish donations to causes in Israel and to provide a partial account of historical trends.

Gaynor, Adam. | *The Curriculum Initiative (TCI)*

Through the Prism: Reflections on The Curriculum Initiative (1994-2011)

This report was written at a critical point in TCI's trajectory as it recently dismantled its national infrastructure, and its local programs were absorbed by existing institutions. The report chronicles the history and growth trajectory of the organization through the years. TCI's educational methods of reaching students, as well as the organizational infrastructure, shifted as the program grew. Building on over a decade of work with the highly unaffiliated Jewish teen population in non-Jewish spaces, TCI pioneered an educational methodology that has broad implications for many other organizations.

Fleishman, Joel. | *Duke Sanford School of Public Policy*

Some Strategies Beginning to Pay Off ...And Promising Hints of Others, Like Early Glimpses of the Dawn: Year Four Report on the Concluding Years of the AVI CHAI Foundation

This is the fourth in a series of reports on how The AVI CHAI Foundation goes about putting its full endowment to use and completing its grantmaking by the end of this decade. The AVI CHAI Foundation pursues its mission in slightly different ways in the three regions of the world where it operates. In Israel, the Foundation concentrates on fostering Jewish learning, culture, debate, community, and leadership, in part by helping to fuel a movement widely known as Jewish Renewal. In North America, it focuses on Jewish day school education and overnight summer camping. In the former Soviet Union, its emphasis is on engaging unaffiliated Jews and revitalizing Jewish life, education, and culture after decades of Soviet-era suppression. In each of the three regions, AVI CHAI's approach to these challenges has been shaped partly by the different prospects for recruiting long-term funders to carry on after it closes. In North America, the effort to recruit new donors will call for opening channels of conversation with people who may as yet be only marginally involved in the field. In Israel, AVI CHAI's hope of securing a future for its projects and grantees calls for cultivating not only the fundraising capacity of the individual organizations and the commitment of their direct contributors, but more broadly, the culture of philanthropy for Jewish Renewal in Israel. In the former Soviet Union, yet another strategy is required, a hybrid of those in North America and Israel. A strategy for strengthening and sustaining the Foundation's grantees therefore has to be custom-tailored to each field and area of interest.

Gold, Dore. | *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA)*

U.S. Policy toward Israel in the Peace Process: Negating the 1967 Lines and Supporting Defensible Borders

The high-profile dispute in May 2011 between President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the question of whether the 1967 lines should serve as the basis for future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations caused many observers to ask what exactly had been traditional U.S. policy in this regard. What emerges in the following analysis is that since 1967, U.S. administrations have not called on Israel to pull back to the 1967 lines, and have even asserted that Israel has a right to "defensible borders" instead.

Greene, Amanda. | *HUC-JIR Thesis*

Teaching Israel in Reform Congregational Schools

It is no surprise that the subject of Israel has been on the agenda of Reform Jewish Educators. While Israel trips have been successful in strengthening Jewish identity as well as connecting Jews to Israel, the majority of North American Jews in these Reform synagogues are not going to Israel. Thus it is essential that Israel be brought into the lives of those Jews through other avenues. This Capstone explores the following two questions: (1) what is being taught about Israel and (2) how is it being taught in Reform Congregations across North America, to pinpoint areas in which Israel Education can, and should, be improved. This small study makes it difficult to draw any decisive conclusions. But what can be gathered from this study is that the field of Israel education is growing. Israel remains an important priority for both scholars and educators in the field of Jewish education.

Guskin, Leah. | *HUC-JIR Thesis*

We Have an Announcement: Communicating Organizational Change in the Nonprofit Sector

Change in any organization requires a great deal of planning and strategy in order to be successful. Unfortunately many nonprofit organizations are struggling to effectively communicate these changes to their employees. This poor communication has led to ineffective, and sometimes damaging, change. This paper addresses what nonprofit organizations are currently doing to communicate change with their employees, how effective their current efforts are, and how these nonprofits can be more successful at communicating change effectively and efficiently. Data was collected from three Jewish nonprofits in the United States that have recently gone through large, organization-wide changes. Two methods were used; interviews and surveys. Through interviews with top management in each organization, data about commutation planning and message creation was collected. Through surveys of each organization's employee base, data about reception of the messages and perception of the change was collected. The end result of this study is a set of best practices for communicating change with nonprofit employees.

Hakman, Inbal. Rosner, Shmuel. | *Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI)*

The Challenge of Peoplehood: Strengthening the Attachment of Young American Jews to Israel in the Time of the Distancing Discourse

The claim that young American Jews are distancing themselves from Israel is rapidly becoming a major preoccupation of those in charge of cultivating the Jewish People. This paper shows that the claim of distancing is not supported by the data currently available and argues that the conversation about distancing, as such, defeats the very purpose of those who engage in it: to enhance the attachment of the American Jewish community to Israel. The relationship between the two largest Jewish communities, Israel and North America, is complex. Both communities are undergoing a process of change, carrying both risks of genuine distancing in the future as well as opportunities for building new models of partnership between the two communities. But parsing the relationship between the two communities along a binary model of distance versus closeness fails to capture its complexity. Moreover, the distancing discourse tends to exacerbate negative trends and thus risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Instead, there is a need to promote the long-term programs that would bring the world's two largest Jewish communities even closer together. This paper analyzes the conflicting hypotheses concerning distancing, identifies the weak links in the research to date, and surveys the different aims served by the distancing discourse. It then reviews the salient features of the changing relationship between the Jewish communities of Israel and North America and proposes guidelines in response to the new relationship pattern between them.

Horowitz, Bethamie. | *The iCenter*

Defining Israel Education

In recent years there has been an upsurge in organizational activity on the American Jewish scene regarding Israel. The present inquiry, commissioned by the iCenter to support its own planning efforts, was designed to sharpen and clarify the special role of a *Jewish educational enterprise directed at learners in the years between kindergarten and the end of high school*. The findings draw on interviews with 21 experts about American Jewish and Israel education and ethnographic observations of the field and of the iCenter in 2010 and 2011, plus additional historical research about the development of the field.

Kay, Avi. | *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA)*   **http://bit.ly/15fZr9A**

[From Altneuland to the New Promised Land: A Study of the Evolution and Americanization of the Israeli Economy](http://bit.ly/15fZr9A)

Israel is often seen as an economic miracle. An examination of the evolution of the Israeli economy from the prestate period until today allows a glimpse into both the initial underlying values of the Israeli economy as well as the dramatic crises, developments, and events that have shaped contemporary Israeli society. From a primarily agricultural-based, semisocialistic economy, Israel has emerged as one of the fastest-growing economies in the world and a leader both in high-tech and in income inequality. This work surveys the history of the Israeli economy and suggests possible future directions it may take.

Katz, Elad. Lachman-Messer, Didi. | *Yad Hanadiv*   **http://bit.ly/15fZpyh**

[A Social Capital Market for Israel: Report of the Working Group for Social Investment](http://bit.ly/15fZpyh)

This report examines the field of social investment that has emerged in a number of countries, particularly in the UK and the US in recent years, and offers recommendations and ways to develop this field in Israel. Among the recommendations: establishing social investment funds; investing public funds in projects with social significance that yield economic returns; creating incentives for investment in social fields; and adopting an approach that encourages social-business corporations.

Katz, Esther. Korazim, Malka. | *Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute*   **http://bit.ly/15fZsKG**

[The Paideia European-Jewish Leadership Program: Graduate Views of Program Contributions and Impacts](http://bit.ly/15fZsKG)

Paideia was created with the mandate of working for the rebuilding of Jewish life and culture in Europe, and educating for active minority citizenship. After several years of activity, Paideia decided to conduct an evaluation study to provide a systematic overview of the program's contributions and achievements, and identify unmet needs. The evaluation comprised a follow-up study of all graduates from 2002-2009. This report presents the findings of that study. The study findings showed that graduates view the Paideia program as very successful and feel that it contributed to them to a great extent. It was found that all graduates continue to be involved in Jewish activities in their countries of residence.

King, Elenna. | *HUC-JIR Thesis*   **http://bit.ly/15fZwtD**

[Empowerment and Internal Struggle: An Exploration of the Women's Tefillah Group Movement in Los Angeles](http://bit.ly/15fZwtD)

On the heels of religious feminism of the 1970's, women's tefillah groups have been creating safe and empowering spaces for Orthodox women to take on more participatory roles within Jewish ritual practice for the last few decades. This movement has grown within several Modern Orthodox communities, the majority of which are on the east coast and only one group in California, located in Los Angeles. Using ethnographic observations and in-depth interviews, this thesis explores a new area of research within this topic, focusing on the presence of women's tefillah groups on the west coast.

BJPA Berman Jewish Policy Archive NYUWagner

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Kosmin, Barry A. | *JDC International Centre for Community Development*   http://bit.ly/15fZy4N

Second Survey of European Jewish Leaders and Opinion Formers, 2011

The Second Survey of European Jewish Leaders and Opinion Formers presents the results of an online survey administered to 328 respondents in 32 countries. Conducted every three years using the same format, the survey seeks to identify trends and their evolution in time. The survey asked Jewish leaders and opinion formers a range of questions, seeking their views on the major challenges and issues concerning European Jewish communities in 2011 and their expectations for how their community's situation would evolve over the next 5-10 years.

Khokhlov, Igor. | *HUC-JIR Thesis*   http://bit.ly/15fZvGm

Startups that Stop: Lessons for the Jewish Nonprofit World

The American Jewish nonprofit world has enjoyed significant growth in the field of Jewish Social Entrepreneurship. While many Jewish Startups have been successful; there are a few that had to stop their operations after relatively short periods of time. This thesis is a close examination of initially successful Jewish startups that had to cease operations after a 3-5 year period. Information for this thesis was solicited from the principals of four major Jewish incubators and four startups, as well as several other lay and professional leaders in the Jewish community. Mixed methods of analysis were used: professional and lay leaders were interviewed using a unified protocol; cyber ethnography helped to collect and analyze scattered data on the web.

Lebovits, Jessica. | *HUC-JIR Thesis*   http://bit.ly/15fZzWD

JTeens of the iGeneration

This research project investigates how teenagers and young adults access the news and, more specifically news regarding the Middle East and Israel. The project supposes that social and news media play a role in how they interact with the news. The research also examines how social and news media portray the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and thus, the information the teenagers and young adults receive. The research findings will be used to inform a tenth grade Jewish Religious School confirmation curriculum, which will teach the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the use of online media sources.

Levin, Rachel. | *HUC-JIR Thesis*   http://bit.ly/15fZD8x

The Experience of Absorption Among Jewish Immigrant Populations in Israel: Ethiopian, Former Soviet Union, and North American Communities

This thesis explores the absorption and integration processes of three Jewish immigrant populations in Israel: Ethiopian, Former Soviet Union (FSU), and North American. Through an analysis of scholarly literature and a new collection of immigrant narratives, it attempts to capture both the communal and individual experience of immigration and integration. The research surveys the similarities and differences of each community in relation to history, traditions, culture, and customs, and explores the ways in which all of these factors have impacted the immigration process. It also examines the impacts of Israel's policy on immigration—a policy that transitioned in the 1990s from an assimilationist stance to one of cultural pluralism.

Lipton-Schwartz, Matthew. | *HUC-JIR Thesis*

Five Alternatives to the Federation Philanthropic Model

The Federation's central coordination and planning model is over a century old. This research examines five agencies, which have developed alternatives to the Federation umbrella model: Jewish Family Service, the result of Federations pushing agencies to be self-supporting, independent entities; Jewish Home for the Aging, which has reserved the philanthropic model for endowments and major capital expenditures; Zimmer Children's Museum, was founded independently and moved into the Federation building; Beit T'Shuvah, where the clients and their families become the funders; and National Council of Jewish Women, which has abandoned the philanthropic model and turned to retail.

Ludwig, Erik. Weinberg, Aryeh K. | *Institute for Jewish and Community Research*

Following the Money: A Look at Jewish Foundation Giving

This report presents selected findings from a forthcoming study of Jewish foundations and their impact on Jewish and non-Jewish charitable organizations. It focuses on Jewish foundation giving to Jewish causes in America and abroad. The report finds that Jewish foundations are making their mark on the Jewish philanthropic world. They help to fund the vast network of Jewish communal institutions, while also acting as catalysts for innovative programming and upstart organizations meeting the diverse needs of the Jewish community. The increasing role of foundations is not uniquely a Jewish trend. From 1999 to 2009 the number of grantmaking foundations in America has increased in total number from 50, 201 to 76, 545, an increase of over 50%. Nearly 10, 000 foundations have made grants to Jewish causes and of the 100 largest private foundations, 16 were founded by a Jewish donor.

Means, Makenzie. | *HUC-JIR Thesis*

A Study of the Usefulness of Jewish History Knowledge in Jewish Communal Professions

Little research exists on Jewish communal professionals' level of Jewish history knowledge and its importance to their jobs. This thesis aims to fill that scholarly gap through interviews with program directors from eight Jewish professional Master's programs, an examination of the history course offerings for each of the programs, and a survey that measured self-selected Jewish communal professionals' knowledge of Jewish history and how valuable it is to their careers. Survey respondents demonstrated an average level of Jewish history knowledge, with greater than fifty percent "passing" the quiz. Though program directors and respondents asserted that modern Jewish history, American Jewish history, and the history of Israel were the most important elements of Jewish history for communal professionals, quiz takers did not answer questions related to those fields correctly at a higher rate than questions on other aspects of Jewish history. It was also expected that respondents with a certificate or master's degree from a Jewish professional program would have a greater level of Jewish history knowledge and perceive that knowledge to be more valuable to them, but this only held true for respondents with a degree or certificate in Jewish nonprofit management. The sole discrepancy among communal professionals in terms of their levels of Jewish history knowledge and the perceived value of that knowledge was between CEOs and development professionals.

Mellman, Mark S. Strauss, Aaron. Wald, Kenneth D. | *Solomon Project*

Jewish American Voting Behavior 1972-2008: Just the Facts

This extensive analysis of exit poll data yields several key conclusions about the voting behavior of American Jews:

- From 1972 through 1988, Republican candidates for president attracted between 31% and 37% of the Jewish vote. From 1992 through 2008, the GOP share of the Jewish vote dropped to between 15% and 23%.
- In 2008, Barack Obama captured 74% of the total Jewish vote, which translates into 76% of the two-party vote.
- Jewish voters remain much more Democratic than the rest of the electorate.
- Jews have given even higher levels of support to Democratic congressional candidates.
- A majority of Jewish voters identify themselves as Democrats, and these numbers have proved remarkably stable over time.
- A large plurality of Jewish voters identifies as liberals, and these numbers too have been relatively stable over time.

Nijim-Ektelat, Fida. Sorek, Yoa. | *Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute*

Expanding Adoption Opportunities For Children At Risk

Israel's Department of Adoption Services, Division for Personal and Social Services at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services, in partnership with Ashalim, initiated a program which aims to increase adoption opportunities for children at risk who are unable to grow up in their birth families, and to improve adoption support services in Israel. The Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute was asked to provide research to support the initiative. This report presents the first stage of the study, that consists of (a) a review of the literature about the adoption of children at risk, options for expanding adoption, and adoption support services and (b) interviews conducted with senior decision-makers at the Ministry of Social Affairs, professionals at NGOs in the areas of foster care and family court judges. The review presents findings about how current Israeli policy and regulations may lead to an overly protracted process before a child can be adopted and placed in a permanent home. Findings about the implementation of three policy options for improving the process and expanding possibilities for adoption are presented: --Open adoption, whereby some contact is maintained with the birth family - in contrast to the strict confidentiality currently imposed --Adoption by a foster family --Concurrent planning, whereby, for one year, work is done to rehabilitate the birth parents in parallel with preparations for adoption so that at the end of that period, a permanent solution is achieved for the child.

Noble, Steven J. | *Jewish Communal Service Association of North America (JCSA), Noble Consulting Associates*

Effective CEO Transitioning/Leadership Sustainability in North American Jewish Nonprofit Organizations: A Research Study of 440 CEO's

This report explores the nature and causes of a major challenge faced by countless North American Jewish nonprofits: effective succession planning for CEO transitioning and organizational leadership sustainability. It concludes by proposing ten practical recommendations to address this challenge. A survey was administered to 440 CEOs in the Jewish nonprofit world to explore these transition challenges. One major finding is that the vast majority of Jewish nonprofits do not have an "in-place" emergency back-up plan to address the situation of an unforeseen event in which the CEO exits very abruptly.

Reid Weiner, Justus. | *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA)*

http://bit.ly/15fZQbP

Targeted Killings and Double Standards

TKs (targeted killings) have been subjected to significant scrutiny by several human rights groups in a manner that has both contributed to the lack of a genuine, honest, public debate surrounding the issue, and created an atmosphere in which different countries' TK policies are subject to different standards of evaluation and critique. This monograph looks closely at the work of both Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International (AI), with respect to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and several Western armies (the U.S., the U.K., the Netherlands, Canada and Australia) that have implemented TK policies since November 2000 (collectively labeled "Western TKs"). A product of a year and a half of detailed research, the monograph identifies substantial and systemic failings in the work of HRW and AI.

Rosen, Steven J. | *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA)*

http://bit.ly/15fZS3I

Israeli Settlements, American Pressure, and Peace

The settlement issue was often at the heart of U.S.-Israeli differences during the Obama administration. However, the crisis that erupted between the two countries appeared to be completely unnecessary. A settlement freeze had never been a precondition for negotiations when the 1993 Oslo Agreements were originally signed. Israeli-Palestinian negotiations continued with no settlement freeze under successive Israeli governments as well. When the Netanyahu government actually agreed to a ten-month moratorium on settlement construction, its importance was discounted by the Palestinian side, which only came to negotiate with Israel in the last month of the moratorium. Settlements turned out to be a far less important issue for determining the course of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

Rubin-Schlansky, Hannah. | *HUC-JIR Thesis*

http://bit.ly/15fZUsf

An Exploration of Israel Education in URJ Summer Camps

This study examines how Israel Education is integrated into the curriculum of Jewish summer camps based on interviews of individuals in six URJ summer camps. Each was asked a series of questions probing their camps' curricular development and how they implement Israel Education throughout the summer. All of the camps integrate Israel into their curricula in some way. Some camps segregate Israel into its own learning activity, and others integrate pieces of Israel Education into many daily activities.

Sheskin, Ira M.

http://bit.ly/15fZTEw

The Jewish Vote

This is the slide presentation accompanying Prof. Ira M. Sheskin's presentation in June 2012 (updated in October 2012) to the American Jewish Press Association's annual conference. It covers:

- Size and Geographic Distribution of the US Jewish Population and Implications for the Jewish Vote
- A Few Key Demographic Indicators
- Political Party
- Political Views
- Voter Registration
- Politically Active
- Obama's Policies: Impact on Jewish Vote?

Sheskin, Ira M. | *Jewish Federations of North America (JFNA),North American Jewish Data Bank*

Comparisons of Jewish Communities: A Compendium of Tables and Bar Charts

This compendium is a single source of tables and bar charts designed to provide a comparative context for understanding American Jewish communities. It is intended for local Jewish communities seeking to compare themselves to others, as well as for researchers, teachers and students of North American Jewry.

Tolts, Mark.

Yiddish in the Former Soviet Union since 1959: A Statistical-Demographic Analysis

This paper is based mainly on the results of the post-war Soviet censuses concerning respondents' native language and second language. The statistical data on Yiddish were studied for the former union republics of the USSR and their capitals.

Trajtenberg, Manuel. | *Israel Prime Minister's Office*

Trajtenberg Report: Creating a More Just Israeli Society

This is an English translation of the official summary of the Trajtenberg Report. This report came out of the Trajtenberg committee, which was appointed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in August 2011 in order to examine and propose solutions to Israel's socioeconomic problems. It was established following the 2011 Israeli housing protests.

Trexler, Lauren. | *HUC-JIR Thesis*

Why Join?: An Examination of Membership in National Council of Jewish Women/Los Angeles and Hadassah Southern California

This thesis examines reasons why women join membership organizations like National Council of Jewish Women/Los Angeles (NCJW/LA) and Hadassah Southern California (HSC). To understand members' attraction to these organizations, 17 interviews were conducted with professional staff and lay leaders. Observational data was also collected at events sponsored by NCJW/LA and HSC.

Tyzzer, LuAnne. | *HUC-JIR Thesis*

Jewish Philanthropy: A Family Affair?

The goal of this paper is to better understand how the value of *tzedakah* is transmitted between parents and children. The paper looks at how parents of religious school children in an LA Reform congregation understood *tzedakah* when they were growing up; how they experience *tzedakah* as adults with children of their own; how they give; where they give; and to what degree they involve their children in their giving. The results of this study are intended to inform a family education curriculum on the subject of *tzedakah*.

Verbit, Mervin F. | *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA)*

http://bit.ly/15g042S

American Jews--More Right than Left on the Peace Process

The best data on the positions of American Jews on the peace process show that they are more on the "right" side of the political spectrum than is often claimed regarding such issues as the two-state solution, basic Arab goals, the future status of Jerusalem, and the settlements, and this pattern has been consistent over the last decade. Moreover, the more attached American Jews feel to Israel and the more importance they attribute to their Jewishness, the more likely they are to take positions on the right.

Vulkan, Daniel. | *Board of Deputies of British Jews*

http://bit.ly/15g1JFF

Britain's Jewish Community Statistics 2010

This report is the latest in a series covering data relating to births, marriages, divorces and deaths in the British Jewish community. These data are collected on behalf of the whole community and this survey is the only one which regularly collects such data. Participants of this survey are those who have associated themselves with the Jewish community through a formal Jewish act, i.e. circumcision, marriage in a synagogue, or Jewish burial or cremation.

Weinberg, Aryeh K. | *Institute for Jewish and Community Research*

http://bit.ly/15g1MBc

Facing the Charge of Racism: New Research on Jewish Student Identity

Accusations of racism have become a staple of anti-Israel protest on campus and, for Jewish students, these charges can negatively impact their college experience and raise important questions about their Jewish identity. The irony of the racism accusation is that young Jews are firmly committed to the global world in which they live. They embrace a world with permeable boundaries and multiple identities that celebrate and validate diversity, as do most young Americans. It should come as no surprise that Jewish students are committed to an expansive and inclusive vision of the world. Many are raised in homes that reflect the changing demographics of the 21st century. Nearly half (45%) of Jewish college students arrived on campus having been raised in a family with some level of diversity. The most effective defense against charges of racism is to embrace and celebrate the full spectrum of Jewish identity.

Weinberg, Aryeh K. | *Institute for Jewish and Community Research*

http://bit.ly/15g1NVY

Penetrating the Campus: Understanding How Anti-Western Biases Relate to Anti-Semitism and Anti-Israelism

Anti-Semitism and anti-Israelism on campus often uses the language of resistance against Western power and is embedded within a loosely defined set of ideologies that include anti-Americanism, opposition to free markets and distrust of business. In this framework, Israel is viewed as an extension of Western neo-colonialism and Jews as the epitome of the oppressive powerful elite. Previously unacceptable anti-Jewish sentiment is then repackaged in a more palatable form. This research provides an exploratory look at the relationship between critical views of the West and negative views of Jews and Israel. The findings presented in this report reveal consistent and significant differences that shed light on the relationship between existing criticisms of America, capitalism and business, and rising anti-Israel and anti-Semitic views. Conclusions are based on data from an IJCR national survey of over 1400 college students fielded in 2010-2011.

http://bjpa.org

http://jewishjournalofsociology.org/index.php/jjs