EDITOR’S NOTE
REFLECTIONS ON BRITISH JEWRY

All articles and book reviews in this, the fifty-third volume of The Jewish Journal of Sociology relate to Anglo-Jewry. While volumes such as this are usually brought together as themed editions, this collection has arisen serendipitously and may be regarded as coming at an important juncture in the annals of the Anglo-Jewish population. It encompasses demography, history, geographical distribution and identity, and touches on communal sectarianism and leadership. The papers employ qualitative and quantitative approaches and balance current demography with historical; an in-depth examination of youth leaders’ attitudes to intra-communal cohesion is counterbalanced by statistical measurement of demographic sub-groups. The books reviewed consider parallel issues and, from different disciplines, highlight Anglo-Jewish causes célèbres of the last two decades. Such consensus on important issues may seem unsurprising within a small, conservative, minority community but is nevertheless remarkable because these events become key, perhaps iconic, markers in the interpretation and analysis of communal development.

There is an important distinction between Jewish population and Jewish community. This affects research design and informs any institution’s mature understanding of reports and data. In today’s world it should be taken for granted that many Jews, however we choose to define them, neither join community membership groups and institutions nor involve themselves in formal communal activity. Indeed, for a large number, informal family occasions may be their only link with Judaism or Jewish life. As both community surveys and official statistics have become more reliable, communal institutions have regularly asked whether this fall-off in affiliation and activity is the outcome of demographic trends such as ageing or out-marriage or even the result of high educational attainment among younger Jewish women. These are recurring questions for social scientists and the responses feed into community policy and custom. The religion question in the 2001 British decennial censuses fuelled this process and the censuses of March 2011 repeated...
the question. Graham’s insightful article shows the wealth of information about population development that came from the original question in 2001 and which points to multiple Jewish identities. Even with caveats about response rates to the question and the definition of ‘Jewish’, the 2011 question will provide comparisons to strengthen our understanding of socio-demographic trends and the accompanying community changes in Anglo-Jewry over the last decade.

Certain changes are approaching at an institutional level, also, although it is too early to define them clearly. In 2012 the United Hebrew Congregations in Britain will decide upon a successor to Chief Rabbi Lord Sacks and the person selected will take up office in 2013. Stephen Pack, newly elected president of the United Synagogue, plans to set up two selection panels, aiming for an agreed appointee by Rosh Hashanah 2012. The Jewish Chronicle launched a campaign on ‘The Future of the Chief Rabbinate’ with a leader stating ‘It is the 21st century, and time to elect our leader’ and articles headlined ‘Time for the Jew in the pew to ask searching questions’ and ‘Who will pick the new Chief Rabbi’. Subsequent readers’ correspondence shows that private dinner-table speculation had moved into the public domain. Unsurprisingly there is some scepticism as to whether anything will indeed change.

These discussions are not confined to United Synagogue members. The interested Jew in the street can come from any sector and, whether or not s/he recognises his authority, can finely gauge the role that a Chief Rabbi plays within British Jewry and have opinions about election procedures, patterns of leadership and the like.

What makes this particular change of incumbent a possible historic turning point rather than a straightforward succession? The Chief Rabbi is spiritual head of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth, which in the UK means the 60 or so constituents of the London-based United Synagogue and over 50 other regional mainstream orthodox congregations. Analyses of British synagogue membership show that he is the constitutional Chief Rabbi of 55 per cent of all synagogue-affiliated households. When Jewish population could more firmly be equated with Jewish community and when that community was more orthodox, the Chief Rabbi was regarded as ex-officio spokesman for all Jews in Britain. For more than 15 years both haredim and Progressives have challenged this position. Haredim have developed discrete links to government and Rabbi Laura Janner-Klausner was recently appointed to act as the Movement for Reform Judaism’s official ‘voice’ on religious issues. On 21 July 2011 the Jewish Chronicle featured an interview with her entitled: ‘Why I’m not the Reform rival to the Chief Rabbi’ where she explained that the United Synagogue should not feel threatened. Notably she speaks from a Reform perspective on the BBC’s daily radio news programme ‘Today’, to which Lord Sacks regularly contributes. Indeed, his Thoughts For The Day are a major source of his...
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national following and of the widespread acceptance among non-Jews that he speaks for the whole Jewish population. How long will it take any successor to come out of this shadow and how will he respond to the increased confidence among other strands in the Jewish spectrum?

The then-Rabbi Dr Jonathan Sacks was welcomed as a harbinger of change and modernisation particularly when he sponsored the 1994 Review Women In The Community. Since then, he has been frequently criticised as ‘looking over his right shoulder’ and mainstream Jewish women lament his lack of action. Will a new Chief Rabbi avoid these pitfalls and develop more cohesion across both community and population? Will he take account of the attitudes and experiences of youth leaders as described by Abramson and draw on them to improve cross-denomination dialogue? In what ways will the changing balance of numbers influence how haredi, mainstream and progressive strands relate to each other? Given the different age-structures of the haredim and non-haredi, will haredi numbers grow so as at least to equal the non-haredi during the next Chief Rabbi’s tenure, with all that may mean in relations with government or for social welfare requirements and provision? And will women come to participate adequately at all levels of orthodox synagogue leadership and thus set an example to the male-biased leaderships of other central and secular communal organisations? Action in response to any of these questions implies communal change.

Laidlaw and Graham present historical and contemporary aspects of demography. Both the historical database and the 2001 census portray established communities. The 1851 Anglo-Jewish Database provides a snapshot of a population that had been in Britain for two centuries prior to the mass immigration of the late 19th century. Jews were then a small minority; at approximately 29,000, they comprised one-tenth of one percent of the England and Wales population. Census statistics for 2001 show a population ten times larger than that of 1851 yet still only half a per cent of the total population. Sporadic studies by individual scholars from the 1890s until the 1960s gave some insight into the social development and growth of twentieth century British Jewry following the pre-World War I influx. Prompted by a conference in 1962, the Board of Deputies of British Jews set up a Statistical and Demographic Research Unit in 1965 which regularly provided indirect estimates of population and undertook identity and local community studies. For some eight years the Unit lobbied the Office for National Statistics (ONS) strongly for the 2001 religion question. With the establishment of the Institute for Jewish Policy Research in 1996 British Jewish research extended further to national, planning-oriented studies.

Communal organisations have commissioned, sought and used social research. As indicated above, since the 1960s there have been community-employed researchers advised by research boards made up of experienced academics. At the timing of writing, this professional
staffing has now been reduced so that there are currently no full-time community researchers although one-off studies are being planned. The annual compilation of basic demographic statistics, which tracked denominational trends, has slowed down and no report has been issued since 2007. While in-house research is clearly not the only model, the community is no longer training any specialist researchers. The appearance of the census religion question may have led to complacency or engendered a sense that the community could rely on government statistics. However, firm statements are now emerging from government to the effect that the 2011 decennial census will be the last. An email circulated by the Office of National Statistics to census users read ‘You may be aware that the UK Statistics Authority has stated that the 2011 Census is likely to be the last of its kind in the UK. The ‘Beyond 2011’ Programme has been established by the Office for National Statistics to take a fresh look at different approaches that will meet future user needs as an alternative to running a Census in 2021’. It explains that this has the potential to change the way socio-demographic statistics are produced for decades to come.

British Jewish communal statistics providers and users must be involved in the planned consultation. Religion is not currently recorded on birth, marriage or death certificates and the number of Jews in national sample surveys is always too small to be of any value. The upshot of this is that Anglo-Jewry could be forced to revert to using statistical methods for which there was no alternative in the pre-digital age but which do not meet the requirements of modern society.

The change in the official approach to the collection and dissemination of core population data should be a wake-up call and taken as an opportunity to ensure that official statistics encompass communal needs. At the same time, the research skills so carefully built up in the last half-century must not be allowed to seep from the community. If they do, British Jewry may find that rather than drawing on evidence it will revert to a very dangerous free-for-all based on poorly informed guesses.

Marlena Schmool
Acting Editor, 2009 to 2011.

NOTES

1 The articles and reviews relate mainly to England and so the term Anglo-Jewry has here been preferred over British Jewry, except where Scotland is also covered.

2 The term used here has been chosen from the many available for inter-group marriage to indicate marriage away from regular Jewish involvement and activity. ‘Intermarriage’ or ‘mixed marriage’ do not have this resonance.
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3 That is in England and Wales, and Scotland. Northern Ireland has regularly included such a question.
4 The Jewish Chronicle, No 7425, 12/8/2011
5 ibid.
6 See for example Alderman, G., An Elected Chief Rabbi? If only in The Jewish Chronicle, Number 7429, 9/11/2011
7 Approximately 70 per cent of Jewish households have synagogue membership. Households vary widely in size and it is difficult to estimate an exact number of people covered by this statistic. For full details see D Graham and D Vulkan, (2010), Synagogue Membership in the United Kingdom in 2010, London JPR [Available on www.bod.org.uk]
8 The Jewish Chronicle, No 7422, 21/07/2011
9 Rabbi Lionel Blue has also done so for decades without any partisan labelling and no suggestion of rivalry has ever been reported.
10 Title of the religion slot in the programme
11 Aleksander, T (2009), Connection, Continuity and Community: British Jewish Women Speak Out (London: Women’s Review Task Force)
12 Except to some extent on the issue of agunot (chained wives)
14 Which became the Community Research Unit in 1986.
15 As protagonists in an ONS Interfaith Census Religion Question Working Group.
16 For example, there are difficulties in finding a project leader for a Jewish Leadership Council-backed study of Women and Leadership in Major Organisations.
17 On 16th September 2011
ENUMERATING BRITAIN’S JEWISH POPULATION: REASSESSING THE 2001 CENSUS IN THE CONTEXT OF ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF INDIRECT ESTIMATES

David Graham

ABSTRACT
The 2001 census count of Britain’s Jewish population is placed in the context of over a century of work estimating this group’s size. It is argued that the published census figure of 267,000 was surprisingly low given the long term trend indicated by this work. Therefore, other data from both the 2001 census and appropriate communal sources are used to derive an adjusted figure of about 301,000. It is argued that this is a more accurate representation of the size of Britain’s Jewish population in 2001. The implications of this figure are that the demographic decline, charted in Britain since the 1960s, appears to have abated with the most likely underlying cause being the rapid demographic growth exhibited by Britain’s haredi (strictly Orthodox) population since the 1970s.

INTRODUCTION
Demographers first attempted to scientifically derive estimates of the size of Britain’s Jewish population in the 1890s by means of complex ‘indirect’ methods because ‘direct’ census data were unavailable. Indeed, more or less every paper published on the topic since then justified the need for such indirect approaches on this basis (Jacobs, 1891; Trachtenberg, 1933:87; Prais & Schmool 1968:5; Haberman et al., 1983:294). However, in 2001 the British census finally included a question on religion which enabled the Jewish population size to be measured directly for the very first time. This long-anticipated event...
produced a Jewish population count that was surprisingly small given previous estimates. It was also statistically problematic since it was based on the only voluntary question in the census. Indeed, it was clear that the census count was, in all likelihood, an understatement (Graham & Waterman, 2005, 2007; Voas, 2007).

That said the 2001 census still proved to be a remarkable resource for the Jewish population, providing it with highly detailed and robust Jewish demographic, geographic, socio-economic and health information (Graham et al., 2007). The 2001 census was therefore bittersweet and ironic from the Jewish demographic point of view. On the one hand it provided a flood of new data but on the other it produced a suspiciously small population estimate. To date there has been no attempt to reconcile the raw census figure empirically with other indicators of the size of Britain’s Jewish population, which in turn, has prevented demographers from assessing the census results in the context of a century or more of indirect population estimates.

This is important because an accurate understanding of the size of the Jewish population is necessary for optimising the distribution of scarce communal resources. Services such as care for the elderly and disadvantaged, Jewish education and security all require an accurate understanding of the functional size of the community. In addition, there is the matter of historical record; we only know how the size of the Jewish population has changed over time because of the efforts of dedicated scholars over the course of the twentieth century to enumerate it. And their data can also be used to try and understand how the population may change in the future.

There is of course no ‘true’ Jewish population size. Like any such indicator, especially those relating to groups primarily defined by their identity, population totals are at best ‘synthetic indicators’ which reflect the ‘permanently provisional’ character of Jewish population estimates (DellaPergola, 2002, 2005; 86, 90). This is because the fluid nature of identity means that boundaries between groups are, in reality, blurred (Alba, 2005). As a result, all estimates are necessarily based on various assumptions and caveats depending on the parameters being set by the demographer. This paper aims to derive a figure most likely to encapsulate the ‘functionally Jewish’ population in Britain in 2001. In other words, to produce an estimate of the total number of people who were likely to have considered themselves Jewish in any way. All the assumptions and caveats used in deriving this figure are described here in detail.

100 YEARS OF INDIRECT ENUMERATION OF BRITAIN’S
JEWISH POPULATION

Since the ‘pioneering’ efforts of Joseph Jacobs in 1891 and Simon Rosenbaum in 1905 (Schmool, 1996:ix–x; Rosenbaum, 1905) demographers
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have relied on what has become known as ‘the death rates method’ for accurately estimating the size of the Jewish population in Britain. In an early justification for this approach Rosenbaum (1905:527) noted, over one hundred years ago, that ‘for statistical purposes [a Jew] is best defined as one who when he dies is buried in a Jewish cemetery.’ This assumption enabled him to derive a population figure by comparing cohort-specific mortality statistics (gathered from the various burial societies, cemeteries and crematoria concerned with the interment of Jews) with those of the general population. By working backwards, a reasonable estimate of the Jewish population could then be derived.\(^2\)

Table 1 summarises the majority of estimates using this approach published over the last 100 years up until the final effort before the 2001 census. Although each study built on and refined earlier approaches, all the authors of these works acknowledge that the figures are, necessarily, ‘rough estimates’ of the population size. As Haberman & Schmool (1995:559) have noted, ‘[p]revious estimates never claimed to cover everyone who might, when asked, identify as a Jew and indeed noted this omission.’\(^3\)

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>‘Best estimates’ of the Jewish population (rounded to nearest 1,000)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>Lipman, 1954:65; Jacobs (1891:11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>Rosenbaum (1905:541,554)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>300,000*</td>
<td>Waterman &amp; Kosmin (1986:21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>300,000*</td>
<td>Salaman (1921)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Trachtenberg (1933:96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Kantorowitsch (1936:377-78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938(^a)</td>
<td>330,000*</td>
<td>Salomon (1938:41-42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-65</td>
<td>410,000</td>
<td>Prais &amp; Schmool (1968:9,19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-83(^b)</td>
<td>330,000*</td>
<td>Waterman &amp; Kosmin (1986:21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-88</td>
<td>308,000</td>
<td>Haberman &amp; Schmool (1995:556)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-93</td>
<td>295,500(^c)</td>
<td>Schmool &amp; Cohen (1998:3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES

\(^*\) These figures were not published with accompanying explanations as to how they were derived.

a) Sidney Salomon’s (1938:41-42) estimate of 330,000 for Britain and 183,000 for London was ‘compiled by estimating the number of births, marriages and deaths’. The London figure is noticeably out of step with earlier and later estimates. b) Waterman & Kosmin’s (1986:21) national figure is sourced to ‘Research Unit statistics’. c) This figure was published without accompanying derivation details, but is based on the death rates method (M Schmool, personal communication, 26 June 2009).
Charting demographic change in this way has made it possible to tell the fascinating story of this population’s evolution and help explain how the current period relates to the past. For example, Table 1 shows the considerable rise in numbers at the dawn of the 20th century due to immigration from Eastern Europe, as well as a second immigrant influx prior to the Second World War, itself followed by a post-war baby-boom that led to the population peaking in size in the 1950s and early 1960s (Lipman, 1990). By this time, however, changing social norms leading to decreased fertility and late marriage, as well as assimilation, were beginning to impact on the population, precipitating a decline of about 1% per year for much of the second half of the twentieth century (Kosmin & Levy, 1985). But as this paper highlights, that demographic contraction appears to have abated and the population has arguably ‘flattened out’. The reasons for this about-turn are discussed in the second half of the paper.

The majority of the figures presented in Table 1 are based on published accounts of their derivation. This is because only by understanding the assumptions and caveats on which figures are based can valid judgments be made about their merits. This also means that some figures have not been included precisely because of the assumptions upon which they are based. By far the most significant omission from Table 1 is the total of 450,000 presented by Hannah Neustatter in 1955 (p73–76) which includes ‘a certain number of Jews who fall within our definition [but] are untraceable. We estimate this section at 15 per cent.’ Since no explanation is provided by Neustatter as to why this ‘untraceable’ group amounted to 15% or, indeed, how knowledge of their existence existed at all, the figure is generally regarded as unreliable by modern scholars (see for example Schmool, 1996:xii). Nevertheless, this unsubstantiated figure was to reappear in the Jewish Year Book annually for a further 25 years and, as a result, has been widely quoted.

By the mid-1990s, it was becoming clear that even the more statistically robust figures based on the death rates method were looking increasingly problematic and likely to be undercounting the Jewish population. For example, Haberman & Schmool concluded that because of considerable social change in the Jewish community it had become appropriate ‘to question the long-standing working assumption of the death-rates [sic] method...’ (1995:559). They noted that changing lifestyles and patterns of Jewish affiliation, especially among younger generations, were resulting in Jews being increasingly less likely to choose a Jewish burial or cremation. ‘These combined trends indicate that direct methods of investigation [i.e. a census] and estimation are required to provide a more accurate picture’. (ibid:560)

It was therefore timely that six years later the 2001 censuses of England and Wales included a religion question for the first time and held out the promise that at long last, a straightforward solution to a
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century of complex, indirect Jewish population estimation had come to an end. The census was much more than simply a new method of enumeration; it was after all counting a very different Jewish population to the one encapsulated by the death rates method (Schmool, 1995:x). Whereas the death rates method only included Jews who, in some small way, identified with the community at the end of their lives, the census recorded anyone who, when asked on 29th April 2001 what their religion was, stated ‘Jewish’. With no other ‘entry requirements’ this self-defined population had the potential to be larger than the one enumerated by the more restrictive death rates approach.

The complex issues surrounding the way in which censuses address subjective topics such as identity have led to considerable academic debate and caused many to question the value of such data. It is therefore important to understand who was being counted in the 2001 census. The fact that 360,000 people reported ‘Jedi’ in the religion question suggests that not everyone took it seriously or felt that its inclusion was unacceptable. No doubt at least some of those ‘Jedis’ were synagogue members who simply objected to the census asking them about their religious identity. It is impossible to know. The census is also clearly not measuring a halachically Jewish population, i.e. Jews as defined by Orthodox Jewish law. As far as the 2001 census was concerned, if a person considered him or herself to be Jewish, for whatever reason, and chose to tick the Jewish box, then he or she was counted as ‘Jewish’. But it should also be noted that in the ten years that have passed since the 2001 census, no evidence has come to light of mass fraud or other sabotage that might have artificially inflated the size of the Jewish population. Therefore, the following reassessment of the 2001 census total for Jews in Britain solely addresses the issue of undercount.

Deriving an Estimate of Britain’s Jewish Population in 2001

When the first ever sets of census data on religion were published in September 2003, they showed that the number of people in Britain who, in 2001, had ticked ‘Jewish’ in response to the religion question, was 266,740 (Table 2). However, this figure was somewhat lower than what would have been expected given the arguably broad definition used by the census and the trend of a century of indirect estimates (Table 1). Schmool & Cohen (1998:5) had used the death rates method to estimate the size of the Jewish population in 1991 deriving a figure of 295,500 persons. Although this total was achieved using indirect methods, the suggestion that the Jewish population had contracted by almost 10% in ten years was suspicious for several reasons. First, as Haberman & Schmool (1995) had noted the 1991 figure was in all likelihood itself an understatement. Second, there was no empirical evidence to suggest
that such a dramatic decline in the size of the Jewish population had occurred due to emigration, assimilation or secularisation in the period. Third, the inclusion of a census question was contentious because many people felt it represented an invasion of privacy and would therefore be deterred from responding, thereby producing an underestimate (Graham and Waterman, 2005). Fourth, being voluntary, the census question produced a higher than average non-response among the general population and it is reasonable to assume that this trend was mirrored among Jews. Fifth, a number of people who described themselves as Jewish elsewhere on the census form (such as in the census’s questions on ethnicity) were not included in the ‘religion’ figure. Sixth, non-response to the religion question in wards noted as having particularly sizable haredi populations was seen to be especially high (Graham and Waterman, 2005:98–99).

Table 2
Raw 2001 census counts for UK Jewish populations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Census count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England and Wales: Jewish by religion</td>
<td>259,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland: Current religion Jewish*</td>
<td>6,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland: Current religion Jewish*</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total UK</td>
<td>266,740</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES
* Refers to all those responding Jewish to a question on current religion or ‘religious affiliation’
Source: Graham et al., 2007:110

Given the evidence of an especially high haredi undercount relative to the rest of the Jewish population (Graham & Waterman, 2005) it is necessary to establish how many haredim were enumerated within the 266,740 census figure and separate out the haredi and non-haredi totals. The difficulty with this is that census data are not available based on Jewish denomination or synagogue affiliation. A second problem relates to there being no clearly defined boundaries separating haredi Jews from other Jews. According to Deutsch (2009:4 note 2) the most common aspect of haredi Judaism that unites haredi Jews but distinguishes them from other Jews is ‘their rejection of the modern idea that the new is better.’ (see also Valins, 2003a:159). One visible consequence of this is a distinctive dress code but, in reality, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to operationalize the term ‘haredi’. And whilst in most cases the differences will be clear enough (in terms of demography, schooling, Jewish practices, as well as appearance), there are inevitably instances where the boundaries between haredim and other orthodox Jews are blurred.
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That said, several surveys and independent studies have shown that haredim tend to live in neighbourhoods with very high Jewish population densities, in a small number of well-defined locales, spatially separated from the majority Jewish population (Gonen, 2005, 2006; Holman & Holman, 2002, 2003; Valins, 2003). Vulkan & Graham (2008) have shown that haredi Jews in Britain live in four main clusters, all of which are in England. Of these, three consist of highly dense Jewish populations that are more or less entirely haredi and are spatially distinct from other Jewish populations. The largest concentration is ‘Stamford Hill’ in North London, located in the north of the London Borough of Hackney and extending into the south of the contiguous London Borough of Haringey. The second largest is ‘Broughton Park’ in Manchester incorporating the north-east of the City of Salford and contiguous areas in the Metropolitan Borough of Bury. The third cluster is ‘Gateshead’ in Tyne and Wear. Although there are certainly some non-haredi Jews living in each of these three clusters, there is little evidence to suggest that the numbers are significant based on an assessment of synagogue membership data for non-haredi communities in these areas (Graham & Vulkan, 2010). For the purposes of this analysis these three clusters are therefore treated as being 100% haredi. Table 3 lists all the wards and Jewish census counts in these ‘haredi-only’ clusters, and shows that 15,775 (haredi) Jews were enumerated there in 2001. Each ward also exhibits exceptionally high proportions of young people suggesting very high birth-rates, another indication that these are predominantly haredi populations.

The fourth haredi cluster differs from the other three in that it is less densely populated and ‘overlaps’ other (non-haredi) Jewish communities. Located in North-west London in the south of the London Borough of Barnet, it therefore requires different statistical treatment and necessitates the use of secondary data sources. Since synagogue membership data are insufficient due to the informal nature of synagogue membership among haredim, an alternative source of data is required. Perhaps the most important source is the local address and telephone directories that each haredi community provides for its residents. These ‘Shomer Shabbos’ directories are published irregularly but contain contact details of the majority of families in each kehilla (haredi community). Households included in the directories are gathered by word of mouth and/or a form in the directory which can be sent to the editors informing them about changes of residence. Such surveillance is possible in these very tight-knit communities (Deutsch, 2009). In this way directory staff are able to keep track fairly well of families moving into and out of the areas. New families are contacted in order to ask their permission to include them in the directory and although some refuse, the majority do not. However, the directories only include the details of those who have chosen to be included and it is not possible to determine definitely how comprehensive each directory is.
Table 3
Wards identified as being predominantly haredi in the 2001 census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Haredi cluster</th>
<th>Ward name</th>
<th>Number Jewish in the census</th>
<th>% of ward aged under 18 (national Jewish average = 19.3%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stamford Hill</td>
<td>Springfield</td>
<td>2,552</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New River</td>
<td>2,346</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lordship</td>
<td>1,949</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cazenove</td>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seven Sisters</td>
<td>1,351</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broughton Park</td>
<td>Kersal</td>
<td>4,025</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Broughton</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gateshead</td>
<td>Bensham</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bede</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saltwell</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ONS 2001 Census Table S149 Standard Table on Sex and Age by Religion, England and Wales

The directories therefore offer an important secondary source of data on haredi numbers and conveniently provide a functional definition of ‘haredi’. In North-west London the directory is called North West Connection. The 2006 edition listed 1,631 haredi households in the area. Using average household size data derived from the census and survey data Vulkan & Graham (2008:15) suggest that there were therefore between 4,012 and 6,769 haredi Jews in north-west London in 2006. They also show clear evidence that the haredi community in general has been growing at a remarkable rate of about 4% per year since the early 1990s (ibid:16). Therefore, depreciating the midpoint of these two figures (5,391) by 4% per year over five years (i.e. to 2001) gives a haredi population size estimate in NW London of 4,431. As Step 1 shows, subtracting these two haredi population totals from the raw census count suggests that 245,401 non-haredi Jews were enumerated in the 2001 census.

Step 1 Subtracting haredim from the raw census count

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Raw 2001 census count of Britain’s Jewish population</th>
<th>266,740</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Jewish population in ‘haredi wards’</td>
<td>15,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of enumerated haredi population in NW London</td>
<td>4,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First estimate for the non-haredi Jewish population enumerated in 2001 census</td>
<td>246,334</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNIQUELY, BECAUSE OF ITS SENSITIVE NATURE, THE RELIGION QUESTION WAS VOLUNTARY IN THE 2001 CENSUS. IT WAS THEREFORE ASSOCIATED WITH A HIGHER THAN AVERAGE LEVEL OF NON-RESPONSE.\textsuperscript{10} IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 7.71\%\textsuperscript{11} OF THE GENERAL POPULATION DID NOT ANSWER THE RELIGION QUESTION. THE QUESTION THEN ARISES AS TO WHAT EXTENT IT CAN BE ASSUMED THAT NON-HAREDI JEWS EXHIBIT THE SAME NON-RESPONSE PROPENSITY? AN INITIAL ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION IS THAT BECAUSE OF A RELATIVELY RECENT HISTORY OF OPPRESSION BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS JEWS MIGHT HAVE BEEN MORE HESITANT THAN MOST ABOUT ANSWERING THE CENSUS’S RELIGION QUESTION. HOWEVER, AS THE CENSUS ITSELF SHOWED, THE MAJORITY (83\%) OF JEWS WERE BORN IN BRITAIN. FURTHER, SURVEY DATA FROM THE INSTITUTE FOR JEWISH POLICY RESEARCH ALSO SUGGEST THAT JEWISH NON-RESPONSE PROBABLY MIRRORED THE GENERAL POPULATION. TWO COMMUNAL SURVEYS ASKED NON-HAREDI JEWISH RESPONDENTS TO REPORT HOW THEY HAD ANSWERED THE CENSUS QUESTION. IN LONDON IN 2002 IT WAS FOUND THAT 7.8% OF RESPONDENTS (N=2,936) REPORTED THAT THEY HAD EITHER CHosen NOT TO ANSWER THE RELIGION QUESTION OR ‘DID NOT FILL IN A CENSUS FORM’.\textsuperscript{12} THE EQUIVALENT PROPORTION FOR LEEDS WAS 8.6% (N=1,417). SINCE THESE RESULTS ARE SIMILAR TO THE 7.7% NON-RESPONSE AMONG THE GENERAL POPULATION THIS CAN BE USED TO ADJUST THE NON-HAREDI TOTAL AS SHOWN IN STEP 2 GIVING AN ADJUSTED FIGURE OF 267,130.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
Non-haredi Jewish population enumerated in 2001 census & 246,534/ \\
Accounts for 7.71\% non-response to the religion question & 0.9229 \\
Second estimate for the non-haredi Jewish population enumerated in 2001 census & = 267,130 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

It should be noted that there is an argument suggesting the census figure should also be adjusted to account for Jews who chose to respond ‘No Religion’ to the religion question. This is based on the assumption that there are multiple dimensions to Jewish identity beyond religion (Lazar et al., 2002; Miller, 1994). For example, people who see their Jewish identity in solely cultural or ethnic terms might not have considered their Jewish identity to be ‘religious’ as such, and may have responded ‘No religion’. Whilst it is likely that such a scenario existed for some people it is more difficult to argue that Jews in general would have responded ‘No Religion’ to a question on religious identity at the same rate as the general population. Unlike the non-response group, people ticking ‘No Religion’ are making a clear statement about their identity – they do not consider themselves to be Jewish (at least by religion). In addition, it is not possible to assess accurately how many people of ‘No Religion’ might have answered Jewish had the question referred to broader aspects of Jewish identity. Thus, in the absence of a satisfactory alternative, Jews
who responded No Religion and did not respond Jewish anywhere else in the census, are not included in this adjustment.

On the other hand, two other groups of Jews appear clearly in the census but not within the confines of the religion question. The first group were in England and Wales and were all those who described themselves as ‘Jewish’ using the write-in option in the census’s question on ethnicity and did not report being Jewish in the religion question. This conscious decision to report Jewish was in spite of the ‘ethnicity’ question listing a set of categories conflating notions of race, skin colour and nationality (‘Black’, ‘White’, ‘Chinese’, ‘Indian’, ‘Pakistani’ etc.). So many different facets of identity were included in this question that it was arguably ambiguous and confusing (Brimicombe, 2007:889; Simpson, 2004:662–63).

The second group of Jews identified in the census, but not recorded in the current religion data, appear in the Scottish census. In Scotland the religion question was presented in two parts; a question about current religion was followed by a question about religion of upbringing. In addition, the question wording also differed; rather than the ‘What is your religion’ wording presented in England and Wales, Scots were presented with ‘What religion, religious denomination or body do you belong to?’, i.e. the Scottish wording was more specifically anchored in notions of affiliation than the wording in England and Wales. Arguably, those who said they had a Jewish upbringing but did not respond to the current religion question should also be included as ‘ethnic Jews’. Therefore, as Table 4 shows, 4,926 Jews were enumerated in the 2001 census in addition to ‘Jews by religion’. It can be debated as to whether the 1,167 ‘ethnic Jews’ who reported a current non-Jewish religion in 2001 should be included in the Jewish population total, but since they do appear in the census as self-identifying Jews in any way (i.e. of mixed identity) they are included in the adjustment. This produces a census total of 272,056 for the non-haredi Jewish population (Step 3).

Table 4
Total number of ‘Jews by ethnicity’ (England and Wales) and ‘Jews by upbringing-only’ (Scotland) enumerated in the 2001 census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England &amp; Wales</td>
<td>Jewish by ethnicity with no religion or non-response</td>
<td>2,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England &amp; Wales</td>
<td>Jewish by ethnicity with non-Jewish religion</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Upbringing Jewish &amp; current: no religion</td>
<td>774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Upbringing Jewish &amp; current: religion not stated</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Upbringing Jewish &amp; current: non-Jewish religion</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,926</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Graham & Waterman, 2007
Finally it is necessary to add back in an adjusted total which accounts for the removal of the census-enumerated haredi population at Step 1. There are various ways in which this can be done but all require estimates to be made of the ‘true’ size of Britain’s haredi population in 2001. One possibility is simply to rely on the level of haredi non-response reported by Graham & Waterman (2005:99), which showed that in Stamford Hill, non-response to the religion question was 16.1% compared with 7.71% in general. In theory this proportion could be used to adjust the entire haredi census count upwards. The estimated number of haredim enumerated in the census (20,206 established in Step 1) would be adjusted to 25,433 on this basis. Although such an adjustment may be sufficient, there is the possibility that many haredi families simply ran out of space on the main household form and did not apply for additional forms or, as some have speculated, they did not complete a census form at all (though this remains pure conjecture). If so, then 16.1% would be an underestimate of the non-response levels among haredim and should not be used to adjust the census figure.

It is therefore necessary to establish the size of the population by indirect means and once again this can be done using the address and telephone directories maintained by the haredi communities themselves. Table 5 provides details of all the haredi household counts from the three directories covering Stamford Hill, Broughton Park and Gateshead (see column 3). To estimate the population size it is necessary to establish the average household size in each of the clusters. A variety of data sources are available including the 2001 census itself but surveys suggest that these figures understate average household size. For example, the census reported that the average size of Jewish households in New River ward in Stamford Hill was 3.21 persons per household (pph), whereas Holman & Holman (2002) have estimated the Stamford Hill figure to be 5.9pph and their (unpublished) study of Broughton Park reveals an average of 6.0pph (Holman & Holman, 2003).

As column 5 in Table 5 shows, this produces three population estimates for the three clusters however, they do not relate to 2001. Therefore, each figure in column 5 has been depreciated by 4% per year (column...
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Table 5
Estimated size of haredi population clusters in Stamford Hill, Broughton Park and Gateshead

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Year directory published</th>
<th>Total number of households counted in directory</th>
<th>Average household size based on survey data</th>
<th>Estimated size of population at year of publication</th>
<th>Depreciating estimated population sizes to 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stamford Hill</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3,174&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.9&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>18,727</td>
<td>14,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broughton Park</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,550&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.0&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>9,390</td>
<td>7,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gateshead</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>366&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.0&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2,196</td>
<td>1,669</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES
Adapted from Vulkan & Graham, 2008:13
a) Number of households in The North London Shomer Shabbos Telephone & Business Directory 2007;
b) Number of households in North Manchester Connections 2006;c) Number of households in Our Kehillah Directory 2008; d) Holman & Holman, 2002; c) Holman & Holman, 2003 (assumes Gateshead is directly comparable); f) It should be noted that these data do not account for the pupils studying at religious seminaries and yeshivot in Gateshead.<sup>19</sup>

6) based on Vulkan & Graham’s (2008:13) calculation of haredi growth rates. By adding in the figure already calculated for the cluster in northwest London (Step 1), an estimate of 28,544 people is derived for the total haredi population in Britain in 2001. This figure enables an estimate to be made of the total extent of the haredi non-response to the religion question. Given that 20,206 haredim are estimated to have been enumerated in the 2001 census (Step 1) total haredi non-response was therefore about 29.2%.

This is the final adjustment to be made to the raw census count and the adjusted size of Britain’s Jewish population in 2001 can now be estimated. Adding the estimated haredi totals for 2001 to the estimate for the non-haredi Jewish population (Step 3) produces a total Jewish population estimate of 300,600 people (Step 4). This figure represents an

Step 4 Adding in haredi Jews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of population including ‘ethnic-only Jews’ excluding haredim</td>
<td>272,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of haredi population in Stamford Hill</td>
<td>+ 14,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of haredi population in Broughton Park</td>
<td>+ 7,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of haredi population in Gateshead</td>
<td>+ 1,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of haredi population in NW London</td>
<td>+ 4,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated total Jewish population in Britain in 2001</td>
<td>= 300,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enumerating Britain’s Jewish Population

estimate of the total number of Jews in Britain in 2001, after adjusting for non-response among mainstream Jews, ‘ethnic’ Jewish census responses and haredi non-response. Thus, the adjustment suggests the raw census total represented an undercount of 12.7% nationally. The figure 300,600 reflects the number of Jews who are likely to have described themselves as Jewish in any way in 2001. Of course, since this is an estimate, it contains a margin of error of perhaps ±3%, but this cannot be ascertained with statistical certainty. Even so, 300,600 represents a more accurate reflection of the ‘true’ size of the Britain’s Jewish population in 2001 than the census figure of 266,740.

Placing the Adjusted Population Estimate in Context

Whilst 300,600 is necessarily an estimate, it is based on empirical evidence and reasoned argument. Clearly, a large number of alternative population totals could also have been derived that would carry similar weight. Nevertheless, a figure needs to be reached if the 2001 census is to be assessed in the context of 100 years of Jewish population estimation. Figure 1 places this estimate in that context and in doing so makes it immediately apparent that the Jewish population decline, which

![Figure 1](image-url)

Jewish population change in Britain from 1900 including the adjusted 2001 census figure*

NOTES

* See Table 1 for sources. Note the bar for the 1920s is inferred using Trachtenberg’s (1933:96) London estimate of 212,000 assuming that the ratio of Jews in London relative to the rest of Britain has always been about two thirds.

^ Figure derived here from the 2001 Census count of 266,740.
commenced around the late 1950s and early 1960s, appears to have flattened out. This is surprising given the fears raised during the 1990s that Diaspora Jews were ‘vanishing’ due to low Jewish birth rates and assimilation (see for example Wasserstein, 1996; Sacks, 1995; Dershowitz, 1997; DellaPergola, 2003).

What might account for the bucking of the downward trend of the 1960s and 1970s? In the absence of evidence for significant Jewish immigration, one possibility is that the decline was ‘softened’ by increased longevity, however, it is difficult to prove this empirically and whilst it may be true the impact would only be temporary as a new equilibrium was reached and the pattern of decline continued. An alternative argument is that the considerable expansion of Jewish day schooling in Britain over the last 20 years (Valins et al, 2001; JLC, 2008) has led directly to a demographic revival. However the impact of Jewish schooling on ‘Jewish continuity’ is by no means clear-cut and it has been argued that such an assumption is flawed once Jewish upbringing is controlled for (Short, 2005; Miller, 2003). A clearer and far more convincing explanation for the flattening out of the Jewish population curve is haredi population growth. As noted above, it has been estimated

Figure 2

Population pyramid showing the total adjusted non-haredi Jewish population in 2001, England and Wales, by gender, (bars sum to 100%)*

NOTES
* This figure does not include data on Scotland, Northern Ireland, or ‘ethnic’ Jews
Source: 2001 Census ONS data table S149

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that the haredi community has been growing at about 4% per year since the early 1990s (Vulkan & Graham, 2008). However, the above calculations suggest that in 2001, haredim only constituted about 9.5% of the national Jewish population in Britain. Could such a relatively small subgroup reverse an entire population trend?

The key to understanding the importance of haredi growth is found not in the overall haredi population proportion but the proportions at younger age cohorts. As was noted in column 4 of Table 3 haredi communities exhibit considerably younger population structures than other Jewish groups (see also Graham et al, 2007). Indeed, Hart et al. (2007:145) estimated that ‘Strictly Orthodox’ Jews accounted for 25% of the total Jewish school-age population in the academic year 2003/4 (see also Valins, 2003a:159). However, since these figures only relate to the school-aged population, it is instructive to see whether the census might shed a comprehensive light on this issue.

Figures 2 and 3 show, respectively, the overall shape of the non-haredi Jewish population and the haredi population using 2001 census data for Jews in England and Wales. The percentage scales of each graph are the same but the (adjusted) size of each population are obviously

![Population pyramid showing the total adjusted haredi population in 2001, England and Wales, by gender, (bars sum to 100%)](image)

**NOTES**

* This figure does not include data on Scotland or Northern Ireland

Source: 2001 Census ONS data table ST49 and haredi community directories
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different. For example, Figure 2 shows that the non-haredi female Jewish population aged 0–4 amounted to 2.25% of the total non-haredi population in 2001. This equated with 5,583 people however, the equivalent proportion in Figure 3 of 6.56% equates to only 1,850 people. The pyramids provide a useful way of examining the internal structure of each population so for example, the slight bulge in the 50–54 cohorts of both figures represents the baby-boom and the ‘off-centred’ 15–19 cohort in Figure 3 is likely to be the result of the outflow of male haredi teenagers to yeshivas abroad and the inflow of foreign female haredi teenagers to seminaries in Gateshead.

It is also clear that the shape of each figure differs dramatically. A far higher proportion of the haredi population is young whereas the reverse is true for the non-haredi population. In order to compare these populations directly Figure 4 shows the proportionate contribution haredim made to each cohort of the total Jewish population in 2001. The graph shows that the haredi proportion increases dramatically; from about 5% for most cohorts above the age of 40 to 23.1% for the 0–4 cohort. In other words, by 2001 almost a quarter of all Jewish children born in Britain was haredi. By contrast haredim contribute just 9.5% of the total Jewish population. Figure 4 also suggests that the haredi population began its demographic ‘take off’ during the 1970s and was increasing its proportion of the Jewish birth cohort by 2.1 percentage points every five years to the end of the century. It remains to be seen if this trend has continued through to the 2011 census which was being conducted at the time of writing.

Figure 4
Estimated proportion of each age cohort that was haredi in 2001
This paper estimates that Britain’s Jewish population numbered about 301,000 in 2001 and not 267,000 as reported by the national census. By implication, the census therefore undercounted this group by 12.7%. Although this adjusted figure is not definitive—no population figure is unchallengeable—it has been derived using a variety of empirical reference points and incorporates a transparent and repeatable approach. Implicit in this revision is the assumption that the census question on religion, being voluntary, meant a certain level of non-response occurred among the Jewish population and that this needed to be taken into account. It also recognised that the census recorded a small number of people as being Jewish outside the confines of the religion question and these ‘Jews by ethnicity’ were also adjusted for. Finally, it was noted that the haredi population was a special case which needed to be treated separately since haredi non-response was far higher (perhaps as high as 29.2%) than in the rest of the Jewish population (estimated to be 7.7%).

By deriving an adjusted population figure of 301,000 it is possible more accurately to contextualize the 2001 census after 100 years of indirect estimates of Britain’s Jewish population. In doing so, it can be seen that the growth and decline of the size of the population over the course of the twentieth century has, as a result of factors such as immigration, natural growth/decline, and assimilation, levelled off. In other words, the Jewish population appears to have turned a demographic corner, ameliorating a downward slide that began in the 1960s and continued into the 1990s. The 2001 census data together with other statistical evidence suggest that this is most likely due to a truly remarkable population explosion within the haredi community over the course of the final three decades of the twentieth century. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the estimate that although haredim made up about 9.5% of the approximately 301,000 Jews in Britain in 2001, at the very youngest cohorts the proportion exceeded 23%.

At the time of writing the 2011 census had only just taken place so it remained to be seen if these trends will be continued into the 21st century. Fortunately, the question wording used in 2001, which asked ‘What is your religion?’, was repeated in 2011. Although there were a couple of minor differences in the question format (i.e., the 2001 category ‘None’ became ‘No religion’ in 2011 and this census also omitted the 2001 instruction to ‘Tick one box only’) these were unlikely to change the way most Jews chose to respond to the religion question thus making direct comparisons possible. It should also be noted that a concerted effort was made within the haredi community to encourage a more complete response, for example, adverts appeared in the Jewish press publicising single-sex drop-in sessions run by the community in association with the England and Wales Office of National Statistics.17
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Therefore, whether or not the trend reversal continues, it will be possible, for the first time, directly to examine change in the Jewish population from one decade to the next. As this paper demonstrates, this too is likely to be a complex exercise. Finally, it is unfortunate to note that 2011 may also mark the last time such a comparison will be possible since the future of the census itself is threatened in Britain (Martin, 2006; Hope, 2010). If the census is eventually abandoned then demographers of the future will have to either return to the death rates method of population estimation or develop new, indirect enumeration techniques in order to continue the work of 100 years of Jewish population estimation in Britain.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful for the comments made by Daniel Vulkan of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and Professor Stanley Waterman of the University of Haifa during the development of this paper. All opinions and any errors are however my own.

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ENUMERATING BRITAIN’S JEWISH POPULATION


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NOTES

1 There are two minor exceptions. First, a religion question has always been asked in Northern Ireland’s census, and second, in 1851 a census of Religious Worship took place in England and Wales but this focused on places of worship rather than worshippers.

2 For a full description of this method and the ways in which it has evolved see Haberman & Schmool, 1995; Haberman et al., 1983; and Prais & Schmool, 1968:7–8

3 See also Prais & Schmool, 1968:7–8.

4 It is not clear that Neustatter was the originator of the 450,000 figure since she refers in her derivation published in 1955 to the Jewish Year Book of 1952 (Neustatter:58) as the original source.

5 450,000 appears in the 1976 edition of the Jewish Year Book (p185) but by 1978 the figure is 410,000 (p158) although this is also a likely overstatement.


7 Jewish authenticity as defined by (Orthodox) halacha states that a person is Jewish either if they have been born to a Jewish woman (who herself is recognised as Jewish by Orthodox criteria) or have converted to Judaism under auspices recognised by Orthodox authorities.

8 See below

9 The term ‘haredi’ (pl. haredim) is used here to refer to orthodox Jews who observe idiosyncratic cultural practices such as dressing in a distinctive way and exhibiting very high birth rates. In this paper, haredi (alternate spelling charedi) is used synonymously with the terms ‘ultra-orthodox’ and ‘strictly orthodox’. Haredi is an umbrella term for a plethora of different Jewish sects. For example, in Britain there is an Ashkenazic group originating from Europe, a Sephardic group originating from Spain and Portugal, and an ‘Oriental’ group originating from North African and Arab countries. Within the main Ashkenazic group a distinction can be made between hasidim and non-hasidim or misnagdim. Amongst
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the misnagdim a distinction is often made between “German” and “Lithuanian” customs. The hasidim themselves are comprised of several sub-sects. All these different groups have developed separate liturgies and customs and resulting cultural identities (Coleman, 2006:9; Valins, 2003a:159).

11 I.e. 4,010,658 people out of 52,041,916 = 7.71%. (ONS 2001 Census Table KS07). Note this proportion was lower in Scotland (5.49%) however, since Scotland accounts for less than 3% of the national Jewish population, 7.71% is applied across Britain.

12 Calculations made by the author.
13 ONS 2001 Census – Table C0645
14 There are two seminaries (for girls) and three yeshivot (for boys) in Gateshead. A majority of the students are foreign or from London and are not permanently resident in Gateshead. There are no publicly available records indicating the size of this transitory student population. Estimates are not included in these figures.
15 This argument was recently put forward by Jonathan Sacks: http://www.jpost.com/JewishWorld/JewishNews/Article.aspx?id=226174
16 Both pyramids were created by identifying ‘haredi wards’ in the 2001 census. Figure 2 presents the Jewish population minus the haredi wards (with an additional adjustment made for haredim in north-west London) and an overall upwards adjustment of 7.7% to account for the assumed national Jewish non-response. Figure 3 shows the remainder haredi population also adjusted upwards but by 29.2%, the proportion by which this paper estimates the haredi community was undercounted in 2001.
17 See for example page 6 and 7 of The Jewish Tribune, 17th March 2011
JEWBS IN THE BRITISH ISLES IN 1851: BIRTHPLACES, RESIDENCE AND MIGRATIONS

PETRA LAIDLAW

ABSTRACT

This paper offers the beginnings of a statistical portrait of the Jewish community living in mid-19th century Britain, before the age of mass immigration later in the century. It draws on the 1851 Anglo-Jewry Database (1851 AJDB) which has been under development over the past decade with the aim of offering an improved quantitative dimension to the existing historiography, and records information on 28,773 individuals. The paper suggests some fine-tuning of overall population estimates for this community; it then examines the range of birthplaces and later residence of the population in scope, along with their migrations both before and after 1851.

BACKGROUND

Historical context

Jews are known to have been living in the British Isles since about the time of the Norman Conquest, in 1066. Following mass expulsion in 1290, only very small numbers are thought to have been living in London and one or two other cities until conditions were liberalized under the terms of the Readmission in 1656. The first of the new immigrants were Sephardim from Holland, but they were soon joined by others from Portugal, and by Ashkenazim from both Holland and Germany and then Poland. By the mid-18th century, the Jewish population is thought to have been of the order of 8,000. This number would quadruple by the mid-19th century; then rise to about 300,000 following the greatly accelerated immigration of the late-19th/early-20th centuries.

Compared with many other European countries, Britain in the 19th century presented a relatively benign social and political environment.

to Jews; and with its early industrialization and global empire, it offered enticing economic opportunities. A number of Jews, like Benjamin Disraeli, Moses Montefiore and Nathan Meyer Rothschild, enjoyed dazzling – and inspiring – careers, although the great mass, inevitably, led more humdrum lives, some living in great poverty. The community as a whole, however, seems to have shared in Britain’s growing prosperity over the course of the century, and Britain remained a powerful magnet for immigration from Europe even as migration to the New World gained pace.

Britain’s political and legal system encouraged acculturation. From the time of the Readmission, it had been made clear, more or less consistently, that Jews could not expect special rights and privileges *qua* Jews. Anyone born in Britain was on the same legal footing as anyone else. For this reason, Jewish status is rarely identified in official sources, and the mass of ordinary Jews has tended to melt into the background. This has made it hard to get much solid quantitative purchase on the community’s history, notwithstanding notable efforts from the 18th century onwards. The digitization of records and the concomitant explosion of research by community historians and genealogists have, however, opened up the field.

**THE 1851 DATABASE**

The 1851 AJDB is a ‘prosopographical’ database, that is to say, one built up from an aggregation of summary biographies on everyone included in it. The Database includes details on 28,773 persons and thus covers over 90 per cent of the Jewish population estimated to have been living in the British Isles in 1851. Each entry lists, wherever possible, the subject’s dates of birth, marriage(s) and death; their parents, spouse(s) and children (with birth-years); their place of birth, and of residence at decadal intervals thereafter (up to the 1910s); their occupations at decadal intervals (between 1800 and 1919); their faith affiliations in early-, mid- and late-life; their cause of death and place of burial. On Jewish status, the 1851 AJDB takes a deliberately broad approach, allowing the inclusion of any candidates who were born Jewish, or converted to Judaism, or were likely in their own lifetimes either to have considered themselves, or to have been considered by others, to be Jewish.

Work on the Database began in the late-1990s, when the author invited contributions from community historians, genealogists and others. The response was generous. Some contributors had previously transcribed, from censuses, all the data on apparently Jewish households in a given city or cities. Most of the sizeable Jewish communities in mid-19th century Britain had been covered in this way, with the exception of London, whose 1851 census has since been comprehensively researched by the author. Others had researched particular families in depth. Others
still had scrutinized particular data sources, such as insurance policies, charity reports or lunatic asylum records, for Jewish listings. Since 2007, the Database has been searchable online, free of charge, by individual name. It has been widely used, prompting in turn the contribution of valuable additional data from researchers around the world. In total, over 250 contributors have participated in the project: their names are listed on the website. The author has however maintained full editorial control throughout, ensuring that all data conform to the definitions and conventions set out on the website.

All entries in the Database relate to people who were living in the British Isles in 1851. Most, but not all, appear in the 1851 population census: some died before the census date; others were born after it; and others again, though attested to have been based in the British Isles at the time of the census, for a range of possible reasons cannot be traced in the census itself. The census however has no specific significance in the project, except as a valuable and fairly comprehensive source of data.

Nor is the year 1851 of particular significance in project terms. The mid-century population generally was of interest because it had been relatively under-researched. A single year was needed as a means of defining a cohort and minimizing duplicates, and a census-year was obviously preferable. 1851 was preferred as a base-year over, say, 1841 (also a census year) because data sources were richer than those ten years earlier. These sources include the one-off religious census taken in that year; the recent introduction of the Jewish Chronicle newspaper; and most importantly the 1851 census itself, which was fuller than its 1841 predecessor and arguably one of the more reliable England and Wales censuses of the 19th century. 1851 was also preferred over 1861, in this case because the target population at the earlier date was that much smaller, and therefore more manageable in a project of this nature.

It is important, however, to appreciate that the data in the Database span two centuries: a significant proportion of those covered were born in the mid-19th century, while others lived through to the mid-20th century. In principle, the Database charts these people’s entire lives; and in practice, though data on many entries are fairly sparse, it yields substantial data-sets covering several decades. By definition, however, the data are richest on the 1850s and immediately surrounding decades. Coverage is progressively thinner in the outlying decades (see Appendix Note 1).

Sources

The national censuses from 1841 to 1911 have been key sources in compiling the 1851 AJDB. Other important general sources include the registration of births, marriages and deaths under the national systems which began in England and Wales in 1837, and in Scotland in 1855.
Jewish sources include the records of the Great, Hambro, New and Bevis Marks synagogues, which go back to the eighteenth century, if not earlier, and become more comprehensive in the first half of the nineteenth. Announcements in Jewish newspapers throughout the second half of the nineteenth century are particularly germane to the 1851 AJDB population, and have been usefully collated by name in two printed volumes covering the period 1861–1880 (Berger, 1999 and 2004) and online in relation to the periods up to 1869 and 1880–95 (www.jeffreymaynard.com). Extensive listings of entries relating to Jews in trade directories and the like in the first half of the nineteenth century are also available online (ibid). An unpublished index to Jewish names in insurance policies from about the mid-eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth, compiled by Mr George Rigal, has generously been made available to the author, and has proved a rich resource, especially for occupations, on the early nineteenth century. All these sources were extensively trawled in the compilation of the 1851 AJDB and many contributors drew on other sources, for example naturalization papers, court records, published biographies and gravestone inscriptions, for data that were also incorporated.

**BRITISH JEWISH POPULATION IN 1851**

Estimates of the size of the Jewish population in the mid-nineteenth century have varied quite widely. V D Lipman (1954, p65) suggests that in 1850, ‘there were about 18,000 to 20,000 Jews in London, with about 35,000 in Britain as a whole’, although the different nineteenth century sources he quotes suggested anything from 18,000 to 25,000 in London, and from 27,000 to 40,000 for Britain (1954, p7). Writing more recently, Geoffrey Alderman (1992, p3) concludes ‘We are … probably on safe ground in asserting that the Jewish population – however defined – of the United Kingdom at the time (say) of the Great Exhibition of 1851 numbered around 30 to 35,000 souls. We are on even safer ground in adding that the vast majority of these – perhaps as many as 25,000 and certainly no fewer than 20,000 – lived in London’. The 1851 AJDB gives an opportunity to refine these figures. As noted above, it brings together the results of comprehensive census studies in most of the main centres of Jewish population in mid-nineteenth century Britain, namely Birmingham, Cardiff, Exeter, Falmouth, Glasgow, Hull, Leeds, Manchester, Merthyr Tydfil, North Shields, Oxford, Penzance, Plymouth, Portsmouth, Southampton, Sunderland, Swansea, Truro and of course London. It has also been able to draw on, and with the help of the census in many cases to extend, more partial census studies and non-census studies in centres such as Bristol, Canterbury, Chatham, Cheltenham, Dover, Dublin, Edinburgh, Liverpool, Norwic
Jews in the British Isles in 1851

historians and further leads culled from Jewish newspapers add material on families that might not otherwise have been picked up through census trawls. The author has also undertaken extensive searches of census indexes for Jews residing outside the main centres of population, initiating the search with such prompts as mainly-Jewish names or commonly-Jewish birthplaces such as Poland, and then applying a more demanding set of criteria in order to determine Jewish status with a reasonable degree of confidence.

Liverpool

In most cases, estimates of the sizes of different communities arising from the 1851 AJDB exercise seem broadly to agree with earlier estimates. The one significant exception is Liverpool, a major port on England’s north-western seaboard which had long played an important part in transatlantic trade and had in consequence been a magnet for Jewish traders. The city’s Jewish population in the mid-century was estimated by Lipman (1954, p187) to be of the order of 2,500, and by Alderman (1992, p21) to be of the order of 1,500. The author’s own trawl of the 1851 census for Liverpool, however, has failed to turn up more than about 850 Jewish inhabitants.

Against this, Bill Williams (1985, pp 38–39) suggests that the population of Liverpool was notably larger in the 1820s and 1830s than those of Birmingham or Manchester, standing at around 1,000. Lipman, and to a lesser extent Alderman, appear to have taken the view that Liverpool maintained this demographic lead over its rivals into the 1850s. Philip Ettinger, on the other hand, wrote that when the new synagogue in Hope Place was being planned in the mid-1850s, with accommodation for 800, ‘the move to build a new Synagogue, which when completed would possibly be large enough to accommodate the then entire Jewish population of the City, was causing much alarm to those in authority in Seel Street’. An examination of birth figures would support an 1851 population estimate of 800–900.

If this figure is correct, it appears to imply that in the 1840s and 1850s the Liverpool population was shrinking. This is possible: Liverpool would not be alone in facing a decrease in its Jewish population around this time. It may have been affected particularly by emigration to the New World: this was running high in the 1840s, and Liverpool was a key port of embarkation. It was also the main port of arrival from Ireland, and took in big influxes of destitute migrants from the famine there in the 1840s. This would exert downward pressure on earnings and severe strain on accommodation, which may have served as further encouragement to the city’s Jewish population to move elsewhere, in Britain if not abroad. This is only hypothetical, and perhaps a more convincing explanation is that Liverpool’s population was not as large in earlier
decades as has previously been thought. Only further detailed study can settle the matter.

Population size

The difference of over 1,500 between Lipman’s Liverpool figure and that implied by the 1851 AJDB has an important bearing on the overall size of the Jewish population of the British Isles. As noted above, there is little dispute over the figures for other large centres of population; and little over the much smaller centres whose numbers would anyway make little difference to the overall total. The best estimate from the 1851 AJDB project for the total population of the British Isles is about 31–32,000; but if the higher estimates for Liverpool were to prove correct this figure would need to be revised towards or beyond 33,000.

The working assumption here, however, is that 31–32,000 is nearer the truth, of which about 22,500 were in London. The Database, with its 28,773 entries, represents over 90 per cent of the calculated total. While the Database is not presented as a random sample, at this level of coverage, provided it is treated with caution, it may be considered representative for many analysis purposes. Males make up 50.7 per cent of the Database population, a little higher than their proportion in the overall British population in 1851, which was 48.8 per cent. This is to be expected from a population of immigrant origin, in which young single males will often have migrated alone.

Age

The age-profile of the 1851 AJDB population is set out in Figure 1, and should be born in mind when drawing statistical inferences from the Database. For example, over 7,000 of the entries (24 per cent) are aged 11 or under in 1851, and a significant number of these would not survive the 1850s. Tracking the more long-lived of this youngest cohort to the ends of their lives is more problematical than tracking older cohorts, not least because detailed data are not available from British censuses after 1911. At the other end of the age-range, there are nearly 3,000 people in the Database who were born in the eighteenth century, when those surviving to adulthood would not, on average, expect to live much past their sixties. This suggests that many of this older age group would not live beyond the 1850s, although the Database records the deaths of only about 40 per cent of them. (The Database does include in total some 14 apparent, eventual, centenarians, of whom four were supposedly born in or before 1751. True ages may however have been exaggerated: only two of the 14 can be confirmed as centenarians, one of whom was Sir Moses Montefiore.)
Jews in the British Isles in 1851

Birthplaces

Some 80 per cent of the AJDB population (about 23,000) were born in the British Isles. However, the British-born percentage varies by age group, reflecting in part the information available and the way the AJDB is constructed: 70 per cent British-born probably comes closer to the underlying picture for most age-groups. Among those born before 1770, British births represent 55 per cent of the total: this is unsurprising given the relatively recent foundation of the British community. The British-born proportion then rises to 70 per cent for those born in the 1770s, and remains very close to that level for births in the 1790s through to the 1820s. The increase in numbers by birth decade shown in Figure 1 suggests a steady growth in the native-born population that was paralleled by steadily increasing immigration.

The proportion for those born in the 1780s is slightly outside this trend: some 74 per cent of those born in that decade (n = 810) are British-born. The numbers involved are small, but a reduction in the foreign-born would be consistent with reduced immigration of young adults during the Napoleonic wars. It is of interest that this generation of foreign-born Jews remains under-represented in 1851. It suggests that those who were prevented from migrating to the British Isles in early adulthood were unlikely to do so in middle-age when conditions for migration had improved: family responsibilities and business ties may have played a part here.

The British-born proportion increases sharply for those born from 1830 onwards, i.e. the children and young adults in the Database. This reflects the fact that most potential young-adult immigrants in these
birth cohorts would not yet have reached typical migration age, and were still living abroad. Given that immigration was on the rise, if the Database had been built around those living in Britain in 1861 rather than 1851, the foreign-born proportion among those born in the 1830s would probably have been considerably larger than the 1851 figures suggest.

_British-born_

Not surprisingly in view of the length of settlement and accompanying opportunities for movement around the country, by 1851 the birthplaces of British-born Jews in the Database are highly dispersed.\(^{10}\)

Nevertheless, across all the decades, London birthplaces are predominant: three-quarters of the British-born in the Database were born there (n = 17,531). Furthermore, at least half of these were born in Aldgate, Spitalfields, or Whitechapel,\(^{11}\) the main constituents of the district known in this project as ‘Central East’.\(^{12}\) Of these, the single largest concentration of birthplaces was in Aldgate, the tightly-packed area on the eastern borders of the City of London, where the four main synagogues – Bevis Marks, the Great, the Hambro and the New – were situated.

The remainder of the London births are found mainly in the other Central districts: for much of the pre-1851 period, London did not extend much beyond what is now viewed as its centre. The Central West district accounts for about 9 per cent of the London births (n = 1,535). The Central North district, which is sometimes underplayed in the historiography, accounts for 800 births, outnumbering the Central South which accounts for only 618. Smaller numbers of London births can be found over a wider area, mostly in the Inner districts which arc round the Central ones: Inner East accounts for 560. The Outer districts would hardly be seen as constituents of the metropolis until later in the 19th century, but they were home to a number of satellite communities, in places like Greenwich, Stratford, Tottenham and Woolwich. These were small by London standards, if less so by provincial standards. Between them, the outer districts account for just over 1 per cent of the London-born (n = 228).

As Figure 3 shows, the highest concentrations of birthplaces outside London are in the North West and South West regions. The number born in each of these two regions is about midway between the numbers born in Central West and Central North London, underscoring London’s predominance. About three-quarters of all the births in the North West and South West regions were in just four cities: Liverpool (n = 575), Manchester (n = 384), Plymouth (n = 324) and Bristol (n = 218). With the exception of Manchester, these are all seaports, and major hubs in transatlantic trade; Plymouth was also an important naval base. As such, they had served as magnets for Jewish traders well back into the 18th
Jews in the British Isles in 1851

Figure 2
AJDB grouping of main London residential districts (with area of first settlement in Central East marked by grey circle)

Figure 3
Numbers born in regions outside London, AJDB population
century. Manchester, like Birmingham which was the dominant location in the Central region \((n = 473)\), had relatively newly come to prominence, as one of the manufacturing centres born out of the industrial revolution.

The regions along the Europe-facing east and south coasts of England between them account for about 9 per cent of the British-born AJDB population. Apart from being the entry point for most immigration, the seaboard had great importance for both inland\(^{13}\) and overseas trade, and also for defence, all of which created opportunities for Jews in such traditional 18th/early-19th century occupations as the jewellery trade, clothes dealing and pawnbroking. Chief centres include Sunderland, Hull, Great Yarmouth, Norwich, Ipswich, Canterbury, Chatham, Sheerness, Brighton and Portsmouth, but no particular city dominates to the extent found in the North West and South West regions, suggesting deeper and longer dispersal and penetration.

*Foreign-born*

Just under 20 per cent \((n = 5,611)\) of the 1851 AJDB population are recorded as having been born abroad, plus two at sea. The great majority were born in continental Europe, and the biggest numbers came from Holland, Germany, and Poland.

Those from Holland can be numbered reasonably confidently \((n = 1,099)\), because there are few ambiguities of definition. Germany and Poland, however, present problems because of shifting expressions and shifting borders over the lifetimes of those recorded in the Database. The use, in particular, of the expression ‘Prussia’, unless more specifically defined, presents an important difficulty in estimating the numbers born in Germany and Poland respectively. On allowing for this (see Appendix Note 3), the best estimate is that about 1,400 of the Database population were born in Germany and about 2,300 in Poland. This is an unexpected finding: it is commonly supposed that immigration from Poland was small compared with Germany until the second half of the 19th century, although there is evidence of a significant Polish presence in London from as early as the 18th century.\(^{14}\)

In addition, 184 are recorded as having been born in parts of Eastern Europe other than Poland, namely Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Rumania, Russia and the Ukraine. This may well be an underestimate: some of the 2,300 births attributed above to Poland may in fact relate to more easterly locations. Whilst there is a fair margin of uncertainty in all these figures, it seems clear that in 1851 the numbers of Jews in Britain who had been born in Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe significantly outnumbered the numbers born in Germany. The section on Migrations below examines when the migrants from Eastern Europe might have begun to outnumber those from Germany.
JEWS IN THE BRITISH ISLES IN 1851

A much smaller number of European-born Jews came from a wide range of other locations, including Scandinavia (n = 30); north-western Europe, here covering Belgium, France and Luxembourg (n = 140); Iberia, mostly in this case meaning Gibraltar (n = 60); central Europe, here covering Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Switzerland (n = 63); and the central Mediterranean (n = 43), represented mainly by Italy but also by Greece. A further 260 are recorded as having been born outside Europe: 14 in the Near or Middle East; 43 in Africa (primarily Morocco); 183 in the Americas (primarily the West Indies); 18 in Australasia; and two in South Asia.

RESIDENCE IN 1851

All 28,773 of the Database population were, by definition, living (or based) somewhere in the British Isles in 1851, and three-quarters were living in London. Here the pattern of residence was broadly similar to that in earlier decades described under Birthplaces: the great majority were still living in the Central East district, with the biggest concentration in Aldgate, closely followed by Spitalfields. Both these districts were home to well over 5,000 Jews. Whitechapel, just to the east, would later develop as the dominant Jewish area; in 1851, its Jewish population numbered around 3,000. The Central West district by this date had a Jewish population of approaching 3,000; Central North about 1,400; and Central South about 700.

As London expanded, however, the Inner districts were also beginning to attract a significant Jewish presence. By 1851 there were about 1,700 Jews were living in this belt, which offered better living conditions – less overcrowding, cleaner air, good transport – in many cases within still-easy reach (half-an-hour to an hour’s walk) of the core of the Jewish community in Aldgate. The biggest numbers were in Inner East, particularly at Bethnal Green, Mile End and Stepney, which like Whitechapel would play host to much larger numbers of Jews later in the century. The Inner North district was home to fairly sizeable Jewish populations (100-plus) in Islington and Hackney, as was the Inner West area, particularly in Belgravia, Pimlico and Chelsea.

A small number of Jews, particularly among the wealthy who could afford an out-of-town residence, had been living in the Outer London areas as early as the 18th century. By 1851, many of these locations were developing apace as populous suburbs, and about 500 Jews are to be found in this belt in 1851. The beginnings of settlement are visible in affluent parts of North West London, like Hampstead and Hendon, that would be very much favoured 50 or 100 years later; but, at this date, larger numbers were to be found in places like Brixton, Hammersmith, Holloway, Kingston-upon-Thames, Stockwell and Woolwich where Jewish settlement later declined.
Figure 4
Centres of Jewish population in 1851
Jews in the British Isles in 1851

Some 25 per cent of the adult Jews in London in 1851 were foreign-born. Immigrants from different countries tended to cluster in different areas: Spitalfields, for example, was pre-eminently the destination of immigrants from Holland; Aldgate of immigrants from Poland. However, the foreign-born proportion of the adult Jewish population was lower in London than it was in the rest of the British Isles (Figure 5). Part of the divergence is caused by a net-migration into London of British, but not London-born, Jews, who outstripped London-born Jews living elsewhere in the British Isles at that date.

Additionally, foreign-born Jews were settling disproportionately outside the capital. Foreign immigration was one of the main engines of growth in the newer population centres outside London, notably Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester. Table 1 ranks by size all cities outside London with over 100 Jews in 1851. The shading in column 6 identifies cities where the foreign-born proportion was 30 per cent or more. Manchester, after London the largest recipient of immigrants, drew in large numbers from Germany and accounted for about 1 in 6 of the German-born Jewish population in the British Isles in 1851. Birmingham’s immigrants...
PETRA LAIDLAW

were predominantly from Poland: well over a fifth of its Jewish population in 1851 was Polish-born. Leeds’ Jewish community was much smaller at this date, but here the Polish-born formed an even higher proportion (40 per cent) of the total Jewish population. It is noticeable that nearly all the locations with a high foreign-born proportion in 1851 are the new, industrial cities, as distinct from the old seaports where the immigrants had tended to cluster in earlier times. The older centres not only took in fewer immigrants, but tended also to be the communities losing their native populations, particularly to London, as Table 2 indicates. Shading in column 4 of this table identifies cities which by 1851 had lost 40 per cent or more of the Database population born there. Places like Portsmouth, Bristol, and Chatham were all were losing population to London, and Brighton especially so, though its losses appear to have been more than made up by inflows of British-born Jews from other cities. The cities of Hull, Leeds and Sheffield also show high outflows, at least in proportionate terms, but these are dwarfed by their inflows, particularly of foreign immigrants.

Table 1
Inflows to major regional cities as at 1851

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Born elsewhere in GB and living in city in 1851</th>
<th>Foreign-born living in city in 1851</th>
<th>Total inflow</th>
<th>Inflow as % of 1851 population</th>
<th>Foreign-born as % of 1851 population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>1108</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hull</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plymouth</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portsmouth</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exeter</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swansea</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwich</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeds</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunderland</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brighton</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatham</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Jews in the British Isles in 1851

More detailed analysis of the figures (eg by age cohort, or by migrations to other cities) would doubtless yield a more nuanced and informative picture, but the bare data suggest quite a stark contrast between the dynamism of the newer communities (attracting in migrants and holding on to their native Jewish populations) and the failing vitality of the old centres of population.

At the same time, small numbers of Jews can be found in many lesser communities throughout the British Isles: the Database lists some 130 cities and towns with a Jewish presence in 1851. In some cases, the context makes clear that the people concerned had been living there for many years; in others it is hard to tell whether they are short-stay visitors or longer-term residents, and, accordingly, the true picture on these smaller communities is uncertain. The 1851 snapshot does however suggest quite deep penetration of Jews into ‘middle England’ and the rest of the British Isles, including quite a number of the smaller towns of Wales and Scotland, and the Channel Islands and Isle of Man.

Table 2
Outflows from major regional cities as at 1851

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Born in city living elsewhere in 1851</th>
<th>Born in city living in London</th>
<th>Total outflow as % of those born in city</th>
<th>London residents as % of all outflows</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hull</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plymouth</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portsmouth</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exeter</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swansea</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwich</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeds</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunderland</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brighton</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatham</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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WHEREVER possible, the database records the residence of each individual at decadal intervals from the mid-eighteenth century through to the 1910s. In principle this allows examination of two separate themes: population shifts *en masse*, and the mobility of individuals. However, as the data are sparser for decades after 1851, particular caution is needed in generalizing about the forward patterns: see Appendix Note 1.

**Internal Migration**

As indicated earlier, the settlement pattern for Jews in London in 1851 was quite similar to that obtaining in earlier decades, save only for the growth of the Central West district and the beginnings of outward migration to the suburbs. By the 1880s, however, these shifts are more marked (Figure 6). The Inner West, with areas like Bayswater, Maida Vale, Notting Hill and Paddington, attracted the wealthier sections of the community; the Inner North, particularly around Islington and Dalston, was favoured by the moderately prosperous. The Inner East, now primarily represented by Mile End, offered decent housing that appears often to have served as ‘starter homes’ for younger families before they expanded and moved north and west.

Much of this change simply mirrors wider changes in London’s social geography, with its burgeoning suburban development. It also suggests the more open society and better economic opportunities that Britain offered compared with many of the countries from which immigrants
were now increasingly coming. The marked move out of the East End by earlier immigrants not only helped to create room for the newcomers in a still distinctively Jewish milieu, it also presented possible trajectories for their own lives. It is striking that the foreign-born in London’s population of 1851 seem just as likely as the British-born to be living in the more affluent parts by the 1880s.

On the other hand, the Database indicates that numbers of the 1851 population remained in the same area, sometimes in the same street or house, all their lives. About 1 in 6 of those born in Aldgate and living there in 1851 were still there in the 1880s. The reasons for their staying are not known but we might surmise from the wider context that on the whole they did so more out of choice than otherwise.

Population movements within and between the Regions are more marked than those in London. By 1851, as previously noted, the old seaboard centres of Jewish population were already losing ground to the newer industrial cities. Those shifts had been accentuated and consolidated by the 1880s, with the Central region – primarily Birmingham – showing the greatest gain, and the North West region apparently slipping back. As ever, however, the data need to be read with care. The 1851 AJDB population was, by the 1880s, an ageing population. Any who had been alive as early as the 1800s would now be elderly and in retirement, often living either with grown-up children (in whatever locations attracted that younger generation), or in retirement locations like the south coast. Those who had been children in 1851 were now in mid-life, shifting to wherever work opportunities, marriage, or other circumstances took them. Significant numbers had emigrated abroad, as discussed below. An analysis by birth cohort would doubtless highlight these differences, but the overall message is clear – that the 1851 AJDB population en masse participated in sizeable inter-regional shifts within Britain, if not further afield, between the 1850s and 1880s.

Immigration pre-1851

Some of the foreign-born in the Database would have arrived as children; many would first have entered the country as young adults; and others would have settled only later in life, perhaps joining children already in the British Isles. Reasonably firm arrival dates are available for only about 1 in 20 of the foreign-born, but it is possible to estimate at least the decade of arrival of the rest with tolerable confidence (see Appendix Note 4). This in turn offers some tentative insight into overall immigration flows.

The overall numbers likely to have arrived in Britain before the end of the Napoleonic Wars and surviving to 1851 are very small. There are only about 500 in the Database, but those suggest that the numbers of Polish immigrants were similar to those from Holland and Germany as
PETRA LAIDLAW

far back as the late-eighteenth century. In the 1810s and 1820s, immigration from Poland appears to have accelerated relative to Holland and Germany, and to have taken off sharply in the 1830s and 1840s. In the 1830s and 1840s immigration from other East European countries also began to grow, albeit from a much lower base. Flow-patterns from particular areas between the 1850s and 1880s are uncertain but the ADJB suggests that if the numbers arriving from Eastern Europe continued to increase as they had been doing, they would already form a significant mass in Britain before the major immigration flow of the 1880s to 1900s. This would suggest a migration chain which, over the next three decades, might have influenced those immigrants from Eastern Europe who chose to migrate to Britain rather than to other destinations. \(^{18}\)

Migrations from other regions of origin are not without interest, though their numbers are much smaller. Chief among the lesser sources are France, Gibraltar, Morocco and the West Indies. These had been sources of immigration from the eighteenth century, and their numbers too started to accelerate in the 1820s and 1830s, doubtless reflecting external conditions like the ending of the Napoleonic Wars and the change in the Caribbean economies following the abolition of slavery. \(^{19}\)

**Emigration post-1851**

The Database indicates that at least several hundred, and probably more, of the 1851 population, wherever born, subsequently lived overseas. A number of them moved or returned to continental Europe. The Database contains examples of women who left Britain for continental Europe following marriage, and of men who left to pursue their careers there. Some newer immigrants may have returned to their homelands if things did not work out in Britain as they had expected, or if family circumstances at home required their return. Some long-settled immigrants may have returned to their birthplaces later in life, as their preferred place for retirement and eventual burial. All such cases are hard to trace, and it is therefore impossible to estimate their number reliably. \(^{20}\)

There is more extensive evidence of migrations to the Americas, Australasia, South Africa and other non-European destinations. About 10,800 Database entries contain information on residence in one or more of the decades after 1851: this represents about 42 per cent of those estimated to be still alive after the 1850s. Some 7 per cent of this subgroup are listed as living in the USA, Canada, the Caribbean, Central or South America, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Singapore, India or South Africa in at least one of the decades after 1851. \(^{21}\) Easily the most favoured destination was Australia (figure 7). This predominance is slightly surprising. Emigration studies relating to the British population as a whole (Jewish and non-Jewish) in the 19th century suggest that
the USA was a more common destination (Baines, 1985, Table 3.3). It is possible that the result here is due to bias in the available data. More contributors to the Database have submitted data on emigrants to Australia than on emigrants to the USA, and this finding could reflect an imbalance of contributions rather than the true balance of destinations.

Another possible explanation is that emigration destinations varied significantly by decade, and that the apparently low figures for the USA are due to the timing of the 1851 snapshot. Taking the British population as a whole, Australia seems to have outpaced the USA as a destination during the period 1853–60, but only rarely thereafter (ibid). Anecdotal evidence submitted in the course of the Database project suggests that significant numbers of Jews emigrated from the British Isles to California for the gold rush in the 1840s: only a few early-returnees actually feature in the 1851 AJDB. By the 1850s, gold rush fever had moved on from California to Australia. Occupational data on 1851 AJDB emigrants suggests that many of those moving to Australia did so to work, if not in mining then in supporting occupations, like running bars and lodging houses, clothing shops and lending/deposit agencies. Taking a long view, we might conclude that the more mobile Jews were just following wherever new opportunities were opening up: some of those in the Database criss-crossed the globe extensively over their lifetimes. The apparent favouring of Australia over the USA may thus be a short-term rather than an enduring effect.

It is important to be aware that we cannot tell how many of those who moved overseas were actually emigrating, in the sense of moving away

![Figure 7](image_url)  
**Figure 7**  
AJDB individuals living in main overseas destinations, 1860s–1890s
with the intention of starting a new life with no expectation of returning (other than for visits). Some may have planned only to work abroad for a few years. The Database indicates that of the 436 who were living overseas in the 1860s, 30 were apparently living in the British Isles again as early as the 1870s. Similar numbers are found a decade later. The data are too thin for safe generalization, but it is probably reasonable to assume that the overall return rate would be quite a bit higher than suggested by this limited analysis.

Whatever their long-term intentions, the 1851 AJDB population seem to have taken advantage of the opportunities offered by the British Empire. This would be understandable especially among the British-born segment of the population. Moving to another English-speaking country, with cultural similarities to the country they were leaving, would present relatively little challenge to them. In their propensity to emigrate, they may well have mirrored Britons at large, who were migrating between continents in considerable numbers throughout the 19th century (Baines, 1985, Appendices 2-5), though further study would be required to make a proper comparison.

For those born in continental Europe, a further major migration after the initial journey to the British Isles could have been more daunting. It is not surprising, therefore, to find the foreign-born under-represented in the emigrant data: they account for 78 (one per cent) of the 774 found outside Europe after 1851. The numbers here are small, and the nature of the data collection for the 1851 AJDB may have created other distortions, but a low propensity to re-emigrate appears to be backed up by data on the lifetime mobility of the individuals making up the Database population.

**Individual geographic mobility**

Database information on people’s residence across decades makes possible some estimate of their individual mobility. As noted earlier, some moved very little through the course of their lives; some moved extensively within the British Isles; about a fifth of the Database population made at least one long-distance move, simply in migrating to the British Isles; and after 1851, significant numbers would move further afield.

Some measure of these movements is given in Table 3. Here an estimate of each individual’s lifetime migration has been made, using standard ‘as the crow flies’ distances between all changes in residence to which the Database attests (see Appendix, Note 5). The higher distances travelled by the foreign-born section of the population before 1851 are only to be expected, but it is striking how much less mobile the foreign-born appear to be thereafter. As noted in the previous section, cultural factors may have made inter-continental emigration after 1851 more challenging for the foreign-born than for the British-born population.
Jews in the British Isles in 1851

Table 3
Average migration distances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average pre-1851 migrations (kms)</th>
<th>Average post-1851 migrations (kms)</th>
<th>Average lifetime migrations (kms)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British-born</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>1,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>2,180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The analysis above is designed to show some of the ways in which a prosopographical database can cast new light on the history of a population. A price has to be paid for defining the target population by a more or less arbitrary date criterion, but the advantage is that it yields a rich and relatively manageable data-set. Provided it is interpreted judiciously, it affords a degree of quantitative insight that has hitherto been lacking, and gives due attention to the lives of the broad mass of the population, which can all too easily be underplayed in non-quantitative historiography. The current analysis suggests further inquiry, especially on immigration and emigration flows. Further analysis is planned on other themes covered by the Database, such as occupations, fertility and mortality.

The author acknowledges the great debt owed to the large number of people who have contributed to the Database. They are too numerous to name here, but are listed on the Database website (www.jgsgb.org.uk/contributors). The author would be pleased to hear from readers who might like to contribute to further analysis: email to 1851@jgsgb.org.uk.

APPENDIX: NOTES ON UNDERLYING DATA

1. Data coverage by decade

The Table below shows that data on place of residence for the 1851 AJDB population in any given decade become progressively thinner as one moves away from 1851. Of those in the Database who were already alive in earlier decades, the percentage with known residence in each of the decades up to the 1780s is high, but the absolute numbers are small. From the 1790s to the 1810s, the numbers are higher, but the percentage drops (if never below 50 per cent). The data relating to the 1820s–1840s are increasingly solid in both absolute and percentage terms.

After 1851, however, the numbers of known residences drop off quite rapidly, because it is harder to trace people’s movements forwards than backwards. Moreover, years of death are known for only 23 per cent of the Database population so, in order to gain some idea of the level of data coverage in any given decade, broad decadal mortality estimates need to be applied to each decadal birth cohort. For each birth cohort
 Known residence of the Database population by decade
(figures in bold based on estimated mortality)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Persons with known residence</th>
<th>Those with known residence as % of those living</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1760s</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1770s</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1780s</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1790s</td>
<td>1,594</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800s</td>
<td>2,887</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1810s</td>
<td>4,488</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820s</td>
<td>7,458</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830s</td>
<td>11,476</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840s</td>
<td>18,545</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850s</td>
<td>28,773</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860s</td>
<td>8,126</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870s</td>
<td>6,371</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880s</td>
<td>5,101</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890s</td>
<td>1,657</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900s</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

up to and including the 1830s, known deaths in any given decade from the 1850s onwards have been grossed up in line with the proportion of known deaths to the total cohort size to give an estimated total mortality in that decade. In the case of those born between 1840 and 1851, estimates of infant and childhood mortality in the 1850s and 1860s have been made using standard British mortality figures, then applying the same grossing-up procedure for later decades as was used for the older birth cohorts.

2. Age-related data

Exact (or more or less exact) dates of birth, from synagogue records, birth certificates and the like, are available for just under 14 per cent of the Database total. These match ages reported in the 1851 census with reassuring frequency, leading to the conclusion that the census is generally reliable in this regard. Age as reported in that census is therefore the default source where no more convincing source is available. The 30 March census date in 1851 – and similar intra-year dates for the other censuses – introduces, however, a systemic underestimation of ages by a year in about two-thirds of those cases where, as in this project, the year of birth is taken simply as census-year less reported age. This is of minor consequence in most analyses, but needs to be kept well in mind in others, for example if looking at teenage marriages. Other biases (for example, understatement of age by unmarried women at the older end
of ‘marriageable age’, and the tendency of informants to overstate the ages at death of the very elderly), along with occasional confusions on the part of census enumerators mean that, in sum, the age-related data in the 1851 AJDB should be seen as broadly reliable rather than exact.

3. Residence locations

In the nineteenth century the names used for any given location can vary quite widely according to the source and date: ‘Mile End’ and ‘Whitechapel’ are particularly fluid terms, but there is ambiguity around many more. As part of the 1851 AJDB project, the author adopted a set of standard naming conventions and, in the case of London, took them down to street level, developing a street gazetteer as look-up table to ensure consistent usage as far as possible.

For locations abroad, the convention in the 1851 Database and throughout this analysis has been to use modern city names wherever possible (thus Gdansk rather than Danzig), and to place them within their modern borders (thus Gdansk is in Poland rather than Prussia). Where the sources indicate an actual town or city, and one with a fairly distinctive name, it can usually be located with some assurance (allowing always that the sources themselves sometimes render birthplaces inaccurately). Some city names, however, are subject to more uncertainty: ‘Kempen’ might mean ‘Kempen in Posen’, which is modern-day Kepno in Poland; or it might mean Kempen in Westphalia. Sometimes the census will give a clue which may or may not be reliable: ‘Kempen, Prussia’ may well be Kepno, whereas ‘Kempen, Germany’ may be Kempen in Westphalia, though the expressions ‘Germany’ and ‘Prussia’ appear often to be used rather loosely.

Frequently the available sources give no better indication of the subject’s birthplace than ‘Galicia’ (which could be either Poland or the Ukraine), or ‘Silesia’ (which is likely to be Poland, but could be the Czech Republic or Germany), or – much the commonest – ‘Prussia’. This makes for considerable uncertainty when it comes to measuring the relative contributions of the areas occupied by present-day Germany and present-day Poland to the 1851 AJDB population. The approach adopted in counting births in ‘Prussia’ has been to distribute the unspecified/Prussia births between Germany and Poland pro rata to the specified/Prussia birthplaces (eg Berlin, Brandenburg, Bydgoszcz/Bromberg, Gdansk/Danzig, Kalisz, Leszno/Lissa, and Poznan/Posen). This produces 75 German-Prussia births to 352 Polish-Prussia births. If the same ratio is applied to the 895 unspecified-Prussia births and the sub-totals redistributed to Germany and Poland (‘the Prussia adjustment’), births in Germany rise to 1,377, and the Poland figure becomes 2,308. The predominance of Poland over Germany is not particularly sensitive to the ratio adopted for the Prussia adjustment. If, instead of
distributing the 895 ‘Prussia’ births between Germany and Poland on the roughly 1:5 ratio suggested by city-specific Prussian births, they were distributed on a more arbitrary (and scarcely credible) 1:1 ratio, German births would still be only 1,668, and Polish births would be 2,018. The Polish figure of 2,308 carries further uncertainty because some of those whose birthplace is rendered in the available sources as ‘Poland’ are likely actually to have come from Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania or the Ukraine (as also with some whose birthplace was given as ‘Russia’). Sometimes, as with Prussia, a place-name will settle the location more precisely, but with more easterly birthplaces this appears to happen less frequently, perhaps because of transcription problems. This makes it impractical to redistribute ‘Polish’ births to other Eastern European countries by an equivalent to the Prussia adjustment. Suffice it to say that the adjusted total of 2,308 births in Poland is probably slightly overstated, and the total of 184 for other East European births is probably somewhat understated.

4. Immigration

In about five per cent of cases, the date of arrival in Britain of the foreign-born in the Database is known with some precision (for example from shipping returns or naturalization papers), or at least to within two or three years (inferred, for example, from the recorded birthplaces of children). In about 48 per cent of cases, the date of arrival can be estimated to within about ten years, because the last trace on them abroad and the first trace on them in the British Isles are separated by 20 years or fewer. In the remainder of cases, the last trace abroad and the first trace in the British Isles are separated by more than 20 years. If however, for the sake of a broad picture, one allows that the bulk of immigrants in this third group would arrive as young adults, a rough estimate of arrival date can be attained for this group by positing arrival at age 20. This will give seriously wrong estimates in that minority of cases where the person concerned arrived either as a child or as a more mature adult.

By and large, however, these might be supposed to balance each other out, and such cases are probably well outnumbered by those who arrived between the ages of about 15 and 25, for whom the ‘year of birth plus 20’ formula will give a reasonable approximation. These assumptions inform the estimates of arrival by decade from the main countries of origin that underlie the discussion of inward migration pre-1851 in the main paper.

5. Mobility estimates

The distance figures in Table 3 must be seen as very broad-brush. The Database records only one place of residence per decade and so intra-decadal moves are not picked up, though for some people they were
extensive. In other cases, the residence data for any given decade are vague, for example ‘London’ or ‘Prussia’. Standardized rules have been applied in these cases, so for example the distance from ‘Prussia’ to London is taken to be the distance from Poznan to London (930 kms) unless more specific information is available.

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**NOTES**

1 A useful summary of early sources is in Lipman (1954, pp 6–9)

2 www.jgsgb.org.uk/1851-database

3 National Archives, class HO 129, summary Jewish data from which are reproduced in Lipman (1954, Appendix). This one-off census does not give information relating to named individuals, but is a useful guide to the sizes of different communities.

4 For example studies of synagogue records or trade directories

5 For example because of their very ordinary British names

6 Ettinger, P (1930), quoted in private correspondence with the author by Arnold Lewis, community archivist for Liverpool

7 These appear under-reported in the data quoted by Lipman (1954, p 187), but can be revised by reference to the 1851 AJDB.

8 There is some uncertainty about many people’s ages: see Appendix Note 2

9 The figures cannot be absolutely precise: there are 165 entries for whom a birthplace has not been traced, and others whose birthplace is recorded inconsistently in different sources.

10 The large number of locations in which Jews are found in this period, both in and outside London, creates a need for standardization and aggregation (illustrated by Figures 2 and 4): see Appendix Note 3.

11 Forming part of what is now popularly known as The East End

12 The true proportion of London births attributable to the Central East district is likely to be well over half. The birthplaces of nearly 3,700 Database
Jews in the British Isles in 1851

entries are listed only as ‘Middlesex’ or ‘London’, but a high proportion of these would be from Central East. If distributed \textit{pro rata}, the Central East total comes to 12,319, or some 70 per cent of London births.

Before the railways, sea routes were often the main means of transport between inland destinations.

For example, from the mid/late 18th century, a number of synagogues in London were labelled as ‘Polish’. Writing in the mid-19th century, Picciotto (reprinted 1956, p 218) says that the increase in the Jewish population ‘during the eighteenth century was mainly confined to the Jews of German and Polish descent’.

The author’s trawl of London in the 1851 census has identified about 1,000 Jews, mostly in the Central East district, who have not yet been added to the Database. This suggests that the best estimate for the total population of the Central East district in 1851 is about 15,000. The extra numbers are included in the total London population estimate of 22,500 referred to in the main paper.

The figures for the foreign-born proportions of the population need to be treated with some caution for cities which have not been the subject of a comprehensive census trawl, namely Bristol, Norwich, Dublin, Brighton, Sheffield and Chatham.

It may need to be stressed that Figure 6 relates only to the Database population, that is to say those living in the British Isles in 1851. It tells nothing about the residence of post-1851 immigrants, so it carries no implication of any decline in the Jewish population of the Central East district at that early date: it remained the pre-eminent centre of Britain’s Jewish population for several decades afterwards.

On chain migration generally, see Baines (1985, chapter 2)

See Faber (1998). Only small numbers of the Jews listed there as owning slaves appear in the 1851 AJDB.

Baines (1985, pp 28–29) suggests in a discussion of later-19th century emigration generally that ‘between a quarter and a third of all emigrants from Europe before the First World War seem to have returned’ although he adds that the return rate was likely to have been less for the Irish and for Jews. If a hypothetical 20 per cent of those Jews in the Database who appear to have arrived in the British Isles between the 1820s and 1840s returned to their homeland after 1851, they alone would account for about 1,000 of the nearly 15,000 in the Database who are likely to have survived the 1850s but whose whereabouts after that decade is not known.

The number for the 1860s alone is 436, or about 16 per 1,000 of those not known already to have died. The figure looks high. Baines (1985, Appendix 4) estimates the overall emigration rate for England and Wales to be 2.4 per 1,000 over the period 1853–60, although, within that national figure, the rate from London (where of course most Jews were living) was considerably higher than from most rural counties. The basis of calculation of the two figures is very different, so they are not closely comparable, but closer analysis, for example by age group, might be able to identify if the Jewish section of the population exhibited an above-average or below-average propensity to emigrate.

See Note 20

Taken as the average of distances recorded over the number of Database entries for whom post-1851 residence in at least one decade is known
PETRA LAIDLAW

24 The birthplaces in the 1851 census alone yield extensive residence information relating to past decades, but information about later decades must be sought from later censuses or other sources. Name changes (eg among women marrying, or immigrants anglicizing their names), and the prevalence of some common names, can make it hard to trace people forwards, although the involvement in the project of large numbers of genealogists has been invaluable in reducing these problems.

25 These draw on Woods (2000, chapter 7), and Hinde (2003, chapter 12)

26 As the data on immigration during the Napoleonic period, discussed under Birthplaces in the main paper, suggest would be plausible

27 Modified by the Prussia adjustment described in Appendix Note 2.
THE PLURALITY OF PLURALISM: YOUTH MOVEMENTS AND THE COMMUNAL DISCOURSE OF JEWISH DIVERSITY

Sarah Abramson

ABSTRACT

This article examines the ways in which British Jewish youth movements support, denounce and struggle with the concept of Jewish pluralism and how these actions mimic or diverge from wider communal debates. I argue that these young leaders often consider their approaches to intra-Jewish diversity to be more nuanced than the two dominant (and polarised) communal positions on pluralism. I conclude that youth movements provide an important space for engaging with notions of pluralism in more controversial and significant ways than can be seen in wider British Jewish debates on the issue, but these movements devise educational agendas that are still constrained by a fear of transgressing against the increasingly controversial concept of a singular ‘authentic’ Judaism.

WHAT IS [JEWISH] PLURALISM?

According to the philosopher David Archard, “[t]he starting point for any discussion of pluralism is a recognition that we inhabit a world of difference” (1996, p. 1). Pluralism is a basic tenet of (post) modern Western existence; existing alongside a plurality of other types of people is now often understood as a given fact. As a result, academic sociological literature tends to analyse attempts to live with pluralism (integration, assimilation and cohesion studies) rather than analyses of pluralism as a theoretical concept (ibid).

Yet the sociology of religion, or sociology about religious groups, requires a more careful consideration of pluralism as a theoretical category.
of analysis. For religious people, pluralism is sometimes construed as fundamentally at odds with the basis of their religious belief, since belief itself is firmly rooted in an infallible dedication to a singular truth about God, life and the way to approach life in the spirit of God (Seul 1999). A pluralistic approach to religious traditions is interpreted as accepting multiple paths to truth. Since this pluralism is antithetical to the assertion of a singular truth, Orthodox religious belief often necessitates the rejection of pluralism.

Judaism is a religion rife with internal disputes about religious belief (Aviv and Shner 2005), as well as having conflicting ideas about how best to exist in a pluralistic society with a pluralism of religions. Worldwide Jewry is a conglomeration of different approaches to Judaism, separated by physical miles and metaphorical distance in belief. In order to maintain a bounded community that can be separated from other systems of belief, world-wide Jewry must, to some extent, recognize multiple expressions of Judaism. Yet *intra*-Jewish plurality has often proved harder for Jews to accept than learning how to coexist in the Diaspora with expressions of other religions (*inter*-plurality).

In particular, Orthodox Jews have difficulties reconciling different approaches to Judaism as expressions of the same religion as their own. For many Orthodox Jews, Judaism is the embodiment of a singular truth that cannot be negotiated, even in the face of (post) modernity. Conversely, most non-Orthodox Jewish denominations stress that Jewish continuity depends on the cultivation of a sense of commonality which can be preserved and transported across physical distance and metaphorical chasms of belief and thus has room for the accommodation of different Judaisms.

Progressive Jews have accused Orthodox Jews of “imposing on the past a single mould [that] not only ignores the complexity of past Jewish experience but facilitates denial of the spiritual fragmentation which characterizes modernity” (Kimelman 1987, p. 143). Many Progressive Jews believe that Orthodoxy has been consumed by a “nostalgic yearning for a uniform past” that never existed (ibid). It is this tension, between pulls from the past or towards the future, which fuels debates about pluralism within the British Jewish community. Consequently, debates about pluralism form an important component of dialogue about the continuity and survival of a British Jewish community in the future: how to make sure there are British Jews, and what these Jews should look and act like.

**ORIGINS OF THE CONTEMPORARY BRITISH JEWISH PLURALISM DEBATE**

The contemporary Anglo-Jewish debate about pluralism may have begun with the official founding of the first Reform congregation in the
THE PLURALITY OF PLURALISM

UK on the 15th of April 1840. As might be expected, the founding of a Reform synagogue prompted a plethora of articles and letters on the subject in the *Jewish Chronicle*. As a Mr. J. Cohen wrote in a letter to the *JC* on the 5th of July 1844 (p. 18):

Reform is at the end; and we desire, though scarcely entering the career, at once to have its extremity! Not so: men, as well as nations, require prudent and progressive initiations. If we take the torch, let it not be to destroy, but to light the road for new generations... Yes, doubtless, there is something to reform. But let us be careful, lest the desire to disembarass our worship of the too stringent bonds of the past, lead us to reject all, without distinction or discrimination.

Placed between the ancient order of things, and that which is thought to be introduced, I say to those who hold with blind obstinacy to minutiae which have only the merit of antiquity—"Your time is past": And to those too pressing reforms, whose intentions, perhaps good at the foundation appear dangerous to us in the present day—"Your time will not arrive till you have accomplished the sublime duty of giving instruction to your fellow men." In the meantime, consider, that with trifling modifications, Judaism may still be the most majestic of religions, the most impressive of worships.

Arguments over the acceptability of intra-Jewish diversity continue today, albeit in a different guise. Few people today would dispute the existence of Reform Judaism, but many Orthodox Jews would question its legitimacy as an ‘authentic’ expression of the religion. For example, in his book *One People? Tradition, Modernity, and Jewish Unity*, Chief Rabbi Lord Sacks outlines his argument against pluralism. Pluralism, in Sacks’ estimation, “rests on the dethronement of tradition” (1993, p. 140) because it “asserts that there is no single authoritative definition of Judaism... [pluralism maintains that] there are many valid interpretations, none of which excludes or necessarily includes the other” (p. 142).

Yet while the Chief Rabbi’s Orthodoxy cannot accommodate pluralism, it can support attempts at ‘inclusivism’. The concept of inclusivity is the farthest Judaism can stretch, according to Lord Sacks:

Orthodox Jews, if they are inclusive, will see such willingness as a culturally conditioned error [rather than heresy]. Inclusivism involves a refusal to accept the self-evaluation of the outside tradition...attaching no significance to Liberal ‘Jews’ description of their own actions and intentions allows Orthodoxy to include individual Jews within the halachic community while excluding their ideologies (1993, p. 152).

Inclusivism seemingly warrants ethical objectivism, or the strongly held belief that there is one only correct set of moral beliefs (Bunting 1996, p. 73). The Chief Rabbi continues: “there is an authoritative set of beliefs that constitute the Jewish faith...Denial...is...an error. But—and this is the crux of inclusivism—it is an excusable error, not to be attributed
to defiance or rebellion. Inclusivism preserves Orthodoxy while not excluding the non-Orthodox from the covenantal community” (1993, p. 142). For Chief Rabbi Sacks, inclusivism is an enabling concept, as it allows Orthodox Jews to regard friends and family members who have defected from Orthodoxy as Jews, but as Jews who are under the sway of modernity and practicing a false Judaism.

The Chief Rabbi’s position on pluralism is strongly contrasted by the unified position of many other major denominations in the UK, as expressed by the late Rabbi John D. Rayner CBE in a Jewish Chronicle article entitled ‘Progressive Call for Unity with Integrity’ (14 April 1997, p. 28). For Rabbi Rayner, intra-Jewish diversity (pluralism) was an established fact of life. For him, one of the most important issues facing British Jewry could be summarised with the question: “how, in spite of this diversity, to maintain communal unity where it exists, and to create it where it does not” (ibid). Unity was not a choice for British Jewry, according to Rayner. Instead, unity in spite of the fact of pluralism was mandatory for Jewish survival.

However, Rayner stressed that unity must not be confused with “majoritism”, or the “fiction that the Establishment—the Chief Rabbinate and the United Synagogue, by virtue of representing the majority, may ride roughshod over the rights of dissident minorities, or buy them a few crumbs with tolerance” (ibid); Rayner’s Jewish unity did not require Jewish uniformity. Rabbi Rayner took issue with the Chief Rabbi’s willingness to embrace pluralism outside of Judaism while refusing to accept the authentic expression of Judaism in ways that diverge from Orthodoxy. Rayner wrote: “[i]n other words, Rabbi Sacks is prepared to say to non-Jews ‘you don’t have to be Jewish.’ But he is not prepared to say to Jews ‘You don’t have to be Orthodox’”. For non-Orthodox Jews, the Chief Rabbi’s longstanding respect and support of other religions is in sharp contrast to his unwillingness to accept the authenticity of non-Orthodox Jewish traditions.

Rabbi Rayner recognised the Chief Rabbi’s deep commitment to his role and his religious mandates yet was also deeply insulted by the Chief Rabbi’s unwillingness to accord him the same respect. Rayner wrote: “as a matter of fact, my objections to Orthodox Judaism are every bit as principled as Orthodox objections to progressive Judaism” (ibid). Rayner remained loyal to his Jewish past, but did not believe that this loyalty mandated him to reproduce the Judaism of the past for a present that, according to Rayner, is fundamentally incompatible with Orthodox Judaism. It is this tension, summarised by the positions of Rabbi’s Rayner and Sacks, that provides an overview for the debate about pluralism at a communal level in the UK. Yet younger members of the community do not necessarily recreate the same debate and positions when discussing pluralism amongst themselves.
Rayner’s statement on pluralism specifies education as a fundamental tool for creating a cohesive, pluralist British Jewish society. Indeed, sociologists widely agree that formalised education is a vital way of creating and maintaining social norms: “[t]he values, norms, and customs of schools are used to identify certain activities as important, and they help to define social status by according greater prestige to students who participate in valued activities” (Schneider 2000, p. 371). Schools are places where “knowledge and meaning are explicitly constructed” (Quinn 2004; Bidwell 2000) and for this reason “educational institutions should themselves be problematised and subjected to critical scrutiny” (Youdell 2006a, p. 57). Both students and teachers constitute (and are constituted by) discourses of authenticity that are operating in wider society (Hey 2006), today often emphasising choice and individualism as a fundamental human right.

Yet while students are being taught to value their individuality and freedom of choice (Allard 2004), they are simultaneously subjected to on-going attempts to teach them what knowledge or behaviour is within the bounds of acceptable studenthood (Ali et al. 2004); as Epstein claims, “Foucault’s description of the panopticon [Foucault, 1977], as a prison in which the prisoner can always be seen by the warder but cannot be sure when he [sic] is under observation and therefore modifies his own behaviour, could equally be a description of any classroom” (1999, p. 28). By choosing certain social activities and by establishing rules about what constitutes acceptable student behaviour and what does not, teachers are able to manage (control) the boundaries of normalcy by imparting their own understandings of what is normal and what is not to their students.

Choice is presented as an inalienable right accorded to citizens in a democracy, yet students in formal educational spaces are only allowed to choose from a range of available discourses; choice is limited to the options presented as authentic and acceptable for a student to make (Epstein and Johnson 1998; Youdell 2006a, 2006b). Therefore, although individuality is constructed as a core value in contemporary education, students who make choices that are outside the range of acceptable student-subject positions are often subjected to immediate control by a teacher or the schooling system to ensure that they are brought back within the recognised purview of authentic student behaviour (Gordon 2006).

However, within Jewish youth movements (as spaces for informal education), the limits to authentic choices can be more readily communicated than within formal education. While formal education consists of both a taught curriculum (maths, science, English)
and a hidden curriculum (values that are considered important to the school, culture and/or the teacher), youth movements are able to make some of the ‘hidden curriculum’ known, since their entire (and overt) purpose is to impart specific moral values. This values education, based on specific cultural, moral or religious principles, is much more open and transparent (although by no means completely so) in youth movements than the education found even within Jewish faith schools, which are also open about their agendas of teaching young people to be good Jews.

Even as there is a growing amount of literature on formal faith education, there continues to be an obvious lack of empirical research on the informal education conducted within faith-based youth movements. The British Jewish community has never restricted its understanding of education solely to the domain of the formal classroom (Kadish 1997) and voluntary organisations have always been an important part of the British Jewish community, as well as of British society more generally. Yet most research on Jewish education in the UK is based on the implicit assumption that learning to be Jewish takes place in schools or at home, a binary that ignores the significant in between location of the British Jewish youth movements.

**INFORMAL EDUCATION AND JEWISH IDENTIFICATION**

*Taking informal education seriously in academic research*

There is strong evidence to suggest that informal Jewish education plays a vital role in the struggle for British Jewish continuity. A 1997 Institute for Jewish Policy Research report entitled *The Social Attitudes of Unmarried Young Jews in Contemporary Britain* found that: “[i]t is likely that Jewish education is more indicative of parental attitudes and Jewish identity while youth [club or movement] attendance demonstrates an individual expression of their own identity and social preferences” (Goldberg and Kosmin 1997, p. 2). Cohen and Berkovitz have argued that a model for effective Jewish education in the future must include at least two or three forms of informal Jewish education for young people in order to strongly enhance Jewish identifications amongst the next generation (2004, p.18).

Many young British Jews participate in some form of youth movement and past research has found that this involvement is a strong predictor of future (adult) affiliation and feelings of belonging within the Jewish community.

Of a sample of young, unmarried Jews surveyed by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR), those ‘closest’ to Judaism were much more likely to have attended a youth club or organisation than were those who did not identify as closely with Judaism. While many people who were classified as ‘halfway’ (somewhat close, somewhat distant to
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Judaism) had often had a formal Jewish education, they, as well as those people who were not ‘close’ to Judaism, were less likely to have attended a Jewish youth club. The report concludes that informal education is a stronger predictor of future Jewish involvement than is participation in formal Jewish education.

Other research has confirmed this theory; on 25 May 2007, the Jewish Chronicle published an article entitled ‘Youth Group Involvement is Key’ (p. 8), describing research undertaken in the United States in which 793 graduates of an American Jewish cross-denominational youth movement were surveyed. This research found that only nine percent had married non-Jews (which is one fifth of the estimated figure for United States Jewry as a whole). He also found that fifty-three percent of the non-Orthodox general public married ‘in’, but that the figure rose dramatically to eighty percent for those with informal Jewish experiences in their youth. The JC article about these findings argued that “through a wide range of activities, [young people in youth movements] develop a sense of individual and collective Jewish identity and an attachment to Israel. They also form social bonds that are retained. This combination makes them far more likely to marry a Jewish partner” (Jeffray 2007, p.5). It is thus of vital importance that the informal educational sector is included in the discussions and debates about communal continuity and, by extension, pluralism and the negotiation of Jewish difference.

![Figure 1](image.png)

Formal Jewish education and youth group attendance by social network group

Source: (Goldberg and Kosmin 1997, p. 11)
Virtually all British Jewish youth movements are peer-led; mazkirim (chairs of movements) are both male and female, usually between the ages of twenty-two and twenty-four. They are elected by chanichim (movement members) to act as full time, paid chair-people for one or two years. Mazkirim are almost always long-term members of the organisation and have usually participated in every training programme offered by the movement—from summer camps to leadership training courses; from Europe Holocaust education tours to year-long study abroad programmes in Israel. They are deeply committed to their organisations, and (as I found during my interviews with them) are self-reflexive about their own relationship with Judaism and the organisation they represent. These young leaders work diligently to promote a certain understanding of what it means to be Jewish that will appeal to as many young people as possible, while also striving to differentiate their movement from all others.

In his 1975 historical overview of Jewish youth movements in Great Britain, Bunt wrote that most people in the British Jewish community think that “…the Jewish youth worker is little more than an entertainer; others say that child-minder is an even better description. [The youth leader’s] claim to be an educator is seldom ever heard, let alone taken seriously, by the Jewish man in the street” (1975, p. 6). Youth movement leaders, like teachers in formal education, are in positions of power relative to the members of the organisation (Delpit 2001; Youdell 2006a, 2006b) and “[t]here is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives” (Foucault 1981: 94–95). British Jewish youth movements have an agenda and it is the obligation of movement madrichim⁴ to foster a strong sense of Jewish identity in their members. Movement leaders are charged with ensuring that individual members affiliate with their leaders’ own movement; therefore they need to ensure that young people feel comfortable within the movement. Simultaneously however, leaders have also been tasked with safeguarding Jewish continuity by ensuring that young Jews learn to identify with (the movement’s brand of) Judaism at a relatively young age since identification with Judaism is believed to be the antidote to intermarriage and therefore to the demographic decline being experienced by some parts of British Jewry.

Although leaders of youth movements are often compared to teachers, they are also generally engaged in more interactive learning processes than are possible within the confines of formalised schooling; informal education is predicated on more holistic approaches to teaching and learning which include the possibility for a reciprocal relationship of learning between leaders and members of the organisation (Kahane 1997; Batsleer 2008). Fine and Sandstrom argue that a leader is obligated
to interact with those they are leading in an almost exclusively positive manner, but that this emphasis on positive interaction does not diminish the “legitimate authority” leaders have in relation to those being led (1988, p. 15).

Jewish youth movements “teach members of the group how to perform religious, cultural and other activities that the group has defined as worthwhile” (Barack Fishman 2007, p. 216; Halter 2000). Informal education has been described as an effective way of inspiring young people to prioritise their Jewish identifications; rather than indoctrination through lectures and desk-based activities, movements use stimulating activities in order to teach young people to identify seemingly of their own accord with certain values (Kahane 1997). Many movements are (to a greater or lesser extent) aligned with traditional frameworks of Judaism, but as I found during my interviews, even leaders of these movements express a growing desire to deliver informal education that transcends (and sometimes transgresses against) the boundaries of Judaism as defined by synagogual or denominational authorities.

**YOUTH MOVEMENTS AND ANTI-PLURALISM**

From a community-wide vantage point, anti-pluralism sentiments are expressed primarily by the modern Orthodox. Yet distrust of pluralism is widespread throughout the ‘youth movement world’. Ironically, denominationally aligned movements (Liberal, Reform, and Masorti) are some of the fiercest critics of a pluralist ideology, even though their parent denominations are some of its strongest supporters (as evidenced by Rayner’s Call for Unity).

All mazkirim of denominationally aligned youth movements interviewed were adamantly opposed to pluralism, although with varying degrees of commitment and clarity. Reba, the mazkira for the reform youth movement Gluke, believed that her movement’s greatest strength is its ability to create a safe space for the expression of Reform Judaism in both its cultural and religious manifestations. She felt strongly that being aligned to a particular denomination allows Gluke to delve deeply into contentious issues, since the movement is openly aligned with Reform views and practices. Pluralist organisations, according to Reba, do not have this ability. Reba believed that pluralist organisations do not usually engage much with religious issues, since religion is too contentious in such an environment:

Um I think the thing... We work better, because we, erm. We can promote Reform Judaism and we want our chanichim to learn how to be good and secure in Reform Judaism.

Reba went on to say that pluralist youth movements try to do too much and, in the end, do very little, whereas movements with a specific
denominational allegiance are freer to promote a very specific understanding of Judaism and thus facilitate stronger Jewish identities in their members. Reba spoke with only one slight hesitation, nervous of criticizing other movements while strongly asserting her own movement’s ability to educate more comprehensively than some other movements. Gideon, the mazkir of a Masorti youth movement, agreed with Reba; he claimed that Masorti Jews are only ever entirely free to express their particular expression of Judaism in an exclusively Masorti environment. For Gideon, pluralist youth movements always defer to standards of Orthodox practice in order to maximize the number of people able to join the movement. In response to my question: “Is creating a trans-denominational space in the youth movement world achievable?”, Gideon responded:

I don’t know, if you talk about a pluralist movement...I...yeah, I don’t think that works, because everyone just goes to the Orthodox service, and they’re not pluralist, because the service is Orthodox. All the pluralist movements are really Orthodox, but you can do a Masorti service in the corner, on, on the side. I mean, like, this is a funny example, but a true story. We had a kid come to Hadar after he had gotten fed up with pluralist movements. Like, the movement he was in didn’t respond to his challenges erm, uh—he challenged that it was really pluralist. Like, he asked if he could have some cheese on his burger and he was told no, and then he said to them, to the madrichim, why not? It’s pluralist and having cheese is therefore equally valid.

He continued:

In the pluralist movements...in them, it is always best to offend [makes quotes] ‘more progressive’ people...because progressive people can keep kosher, or, uh, they can not keep kosher, but they don’t have to not. So there’s always that thing. So I don’t believe a pluralist movement works, I’ve not seen any pluralist movement where I think, yeah, this is pluralist.

Pluralist organisations’ deference to Orthodoxy was reiterated by both the other denominational mazkirim I interviewed, and was acknowledged to be a problem by eleven other movement leaders. Sam, the leader of (as he described it) an “admittedly pluralist” youth movement Herut admitted:

...it is completely impossible to create a trans-denominational environment. Yeah, it is definitely something we, we wrestle with. Like, on camps and stuff, we, we—make sure the lights are off in rooms on Shabbat up to modern Orthodox standards, because, because we have 16 kids sharing a room on camp, and we, well, we...can’t split by denomination, since that would be segregation. But no one could sleep with the lights on. It, yeah, it definitely exists this understanding that if you are going to offend anyone it is best not to offend the Orthodox. There is definitely an understanding, like, that there is something ‘stronger’ about Orthodoxy than the others (I disagree, just for
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the record). It creates a hierarchical shape…rather than lateral. That is why the lights go off.

Sam spoke delicately about the issue of pluralism and Orthodoxy; he wanted me to know this issue is something the movement “wrestles with” and that he personally did not believe that there is something “stronger” about Orthodox Judaism than other forms. However, Sam also used such phrases as keeping life on camps “up to modern Orthodox standards”. He acknowledged that Judaism is often seen as “hierarchical” and, although he claimed to disagree, it is a hierarchy he was not prepared to challenge on behalf of his movement. Sam spoke with a particularly regretful tone and seemed to recognize deference to Orthodoxy as a problem for a movement open to non-Orthodox Jews, but in the process of this recognition, believed himself to have absolved his movement of any responsibility to challenge it as the status-quo and the default position even of cross-communal movements.

Sam avoided more controversial examples of his movement’s deference to Orthodoxy by choosing to illustrate his point with an example about sleeping with lights on over Shabbat. Sam could have chosen examples that prove much more troublesome for Liberal, Reform, and/or Masorti members than keeping the lights on; more controversial examples would have dealt with playing music on Shabbat (a key part of Liberal and Reform services, but forbidden by Masorti and Orthodoxy), allowing women to read from the Torah, and mixed gendered seating (fundamental to Liberal, Reform, and some Masorti, forbidden by Orthodoxy).

Sam’s admission of his movement’s impulse to Orthodoxy also echoed Stuart Charme’s previous findings in a study of young Jews in the United States. Charme describes this impulse towards Orthodoxy as the commonplace recognition (even by non-Orthodox members of the community) that there is something more ‘authentic’ about Orthodox Jewry than liberal or progressive versions. He claims that “[a]uthenticity of a Jew is often identified as adherence to authentic Judaism, and is ultimately defined by a particular understanding of the concept of tradition that is accepted as normative and authoritative”; Charme argues that defining a version of Judaism as authentic is entirely dependent upon “accepting the authority of those who determine its authenticity”— or believing that those who claim a version of Judaism is more authentic than others have some moral authority to make such a judgement (Charme 2000, p. 138).

Anna, the mazkira for Liberal Judaism’s youth movement Chaim, claimed that her organisation, as a denominationally aligned youth movement, was much better prepared to cater for the needs of their members, as it is purposefully and unashamedly positioned far outside the boundaries of authenticity as defined by the Orthodox Establishment. She said:
we don’t, um, we don’t have to pretend or fake anything, or offend anyone. We are clear about what we believe in, and kids come because they know what to expect of us and, like, what we would expect of them. In that way, our kids are never put in situations that are offensive to them or their sense of Judaism.

For Anna and the other leaders of the denominationally aligned movements, the superficial surface-level pluralism some of the youth movements did not make them more appealing than denominational ones—indeed, often quite the opposite.

For leaders such as Anna, the success of their movements was largely built upon the fact that they exist to provide a safe space for the practice and development of an ethos that mirrors the Judaism of their parent denominations. When I asked Reba whether being aligned to Reform Judaism was help or hindrance to her movement, she replied with ease:

Definitely a help. Our—we’re focused on Reform Judaism so our—we educate about it. We want our leaders and our chanichim to be engaged with it and it’s much easier to, um, educate them about Reform Judaism when we are in a space when, like, the only Judaism being practiced is reform. Whereas in pluralist movements, they’re trying to educate about all different streams of Judaism and more often that not the members of the movement are one stream of Judaism. And their education, I know, like, on Reform Judaism for example it is very poor a lot of the time and they don’t actually have any reform madrichim so it’s usually people who might care but, eh, they might not be reform themselves so might not actually have any special experience of it.

In Reba’s estimation, pluralist movements can be dangerous for members who might not have strong affiliations with their own religious or cultural backgrounds, as they might feel pressure to conform to a Judaism which they would not otherwise. Gideon concurred:

[i]f some Masorti kids go to a pluralist youth movement and expect to get a, uh, a good Masorti informal education, well, they just aren’t going to get it. And they might, then, end up just going along with what the movement does, like going to Orthodox services and getting used to that. It just isn’t ideal.

These denominationally aligned movements had a self-selecting demographic pool; members came to their organisation because they belong to the parent denomination and are therefore previously familiar with the movement’s ethos. Yet movements that attract a denominationally diverse membership also did not have easy time defining their own position on the issue of pluralism.

SARAH ABRAMSON
Two of the eleven youth movements included in my research considered themselves to be cross-communal but explicitly anti-pluralism. Noah, the mazkir of one such movement, was asked if his movement, Dor, could be considered pluralist:

_Noah_: we reject pluralism.
_SA_: you reject the idea of pluralism? Or just the word pluralism?
_Noah_: We don’t use that word at all.
_SA_: why n-
_Noah_: it semantics and it goes back to the way we like to talk about everything. Pluralism is the acceptance of a plural environment. That there is—no one truth. That’s nonsense, especially in a large number of fractions of Judaism. It you’re an Orthodox Jew, it’s torah mishamayim, you can’t accept the Reform idea, because as far as you’re concerned it is wrong. We use cross-communalism and tolerance is the word we like to use, you have to accept other peoples’ right to be wrong...you are well within your rights to think someone else is wrong, but have the discussion, talk about it. And accept, not accept...deal with the fact that they are there. You don’t agree with them, you don’t think they are right, you may even think they’re fundamentally wrong and are a, a heathen, but they’re still there and you have to deal with that in a Dor world.

Jesse, the field worker for the Alizah youth movement, was also more comfortable with the term cross-communal than pluralist. When asked why, he responded:

When I think of, the idea of pluralism...erm it’s...it’s not people coming together. I, well, it is people coming together but it’s people going in the same direction. It’s about...and...maybe this is a very naive way of looking at it, but it’s about, people doing something together but not necessarily, er, in the same direction...erm...it’s kind of...we...we don’t discourage, but if someone really wanted to do a traditional, erm, morning prayer or something then they can go and do it, but really we want to encourage everybody, we are openly doing the same thing together as a group, which together they need to find what’s right for them all as individuals and together but moving in the same direction as in, we’re –we’re not only gonna come together and, to do this, but, we wanna come together, create something that all of us can do, and move together in the same direction, in openness.

Jesse was strategic with his word choice; he took his time, thinking out-loud about exactly what he wanted to communicate about pluralism. Through a careful choice of descriptors and qualifiers, Jesse equated pluralism with a system of “separate but equal-ness”—a system that he did not think achieved the goals which Alizah sets out for itself. Instead, he preferred to label the movement as cross-communal because it signifies more of a sense of togetherness. For Jesse, cross-communal means asking people to negotiate their differences and arrive at a compromise that is comfortable for all participants.
CROSS-COMMUNALISM AND SHABBAT

Dor youth movement had produced its own siddur, specifically developed to represent the movement’s cross-communal stance. The prayer book opened up so as to show two pages at a time, with two distinct sections on each page: an explanation section, an English translation section (page one), and a Hebrew section and transliteration section (page two).

The introduction to the prayer book read: “While Dor believes that the service is similar enough to allow us to pray together, we also feel that to truly cater for everyone we need a siddur that sets out clearly where we act together and where there are differences in the prayers, even if the leader chooses to follow one particular tradition”.

For Dor, its cross-communalist nature mandated equal space for four different approaches to prayer: a humanist-Jewish approach of thoughts and explanations; an English translation for those who do not speak Hebrew; a modern Orthodox version of Shabbat services; and a transliterated section for those people who want to follow the Hebrew service but might not be quick enough Hebrew readers to follow along without transliteration.

However, this prayer book was noticeably missing religious services (in Hebrew) that were equitable with more liberal traditions. Indeed, this prayer book was only cross-communal in that it includes one section for people interested in explanations for the prayers, and three sections for those interested in following the modern Orthodox standard service, in English, Hebrew or transliterated Hebrew. While there were four sections to the siddur, there were really only two distinct options for praying—namely Orthodox and non-religious.

After I pressed Noah for the specifics of how the prayers were led out loud, Noah admitted that the modern Orthodox section of the prayer book was the one that was usually recited by a service leader. This decision is significant, since it relegated non-Orthodox expressions of Judaism to the position of ‘other’. Dor’s cross-communal nature mandated that all members attend one service together, but in doing so, the movement required non-Orthodox members to practice their own variety of Judaism silently (in their heads). Dor also, Noah admitted, usually asked male and female members to sit separately, as again, Reform members can sit separately but Orthodox members cannot. Yet as a basic tenet of Reform and Liberal Judaism, this sex-specific seating is a rebuttal of a primary part of their expressions of faith and allows Orthodoxy to remain the undisputed norm of publicly displayed religious expression. Just as Kimelman maintains, it seemed that the cross communalism mazkirim spoke eloquently about came to a “screeching halt” in practice (2002).

As discussed in reference to the wider community, many Jews intellectually accept a plurality of beliefs, but still require the manifestation
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Psalm 99

EXPLANATION: This psalm discusses what will happen in a messianic age, and celebrates God’s faithfulness.

QUESTION: Why is Shabbat traditionally compared to the messianic age? Does the comparison mean anything to us?

COMMENT: Recite the Psalms in a very low voice. Cry out quietly, saying the words with all your strength. This is the meaning of the verse “All my bones shall say, ‘God, who is like You?’” (Psalm 35:10). A cry that results from complete attachment [to God] is absolutely silent. — Chasidic teaching

Psalm 29

EXPLANATION: This psalm describes God’s power over nature, showing that all forces are the voice of God. Orthodox and Masorti communities stand up because it contains God’s name so many times. In the psalm the great thunderstorm is followed by calm, perhaps symbolizing that the weekly struggle in the world of achievement is at an end and that we can rest.

THOUGHT: A person is like the “ladder standing on the ground, with its top in the heavens” (Genesis 28:12). One can do worldly, physical things here on earth, but “its top is in heaven,” since he mediates on lofty concepts — attributed to the Baal Shem Tov (founder of Chasidism)

THOUGHT: In the Kabbalah, Shabbat symbolizes the union of the male and female metaphysical properties that provide the foundation of the universe. — Rabbi Wurtzburger

THOUGHT: Work is a symbol of conflict and disharmony; rest is an expression of dignity, peace, and freedom. — Einich Fromm (psychologist)

Figure 2
Dor Prayerbook

Psalm 99

The Eternal rules, let the nations tremble. He judges the chambers, let the earth shake. 1
The Eternal is great in Zion, high above all peoples. 2
They shall praise Your name, great and awesome, holy is God. 3
God is a strong ruler who loves justice. It is You who established honesty, justice and righteousness. It is You who formed them in Jacob. 4
Exalt the Eternal our God, bow down before God’s footstool, holy is God. 5
Moses and Aaron were among His priests, and Samuel among those who called on His name. They called to the Eternal who answered them. 6
In a pillar of cloud God spoke to them. They kept His teaching and the law. He gave them. Eternal our God, You answered them. To Them You were a forgiving God, though You punished their wrongdoing. 7
Exalt the Eternal our God, bow down before God’s holy mountain. For holy is the Eternal our God. 8

Psalm 29

Orthodox and Masorti communities stand

A psalm of David. Praise God, children of the angels. Praise God’s glory and might. Praise God, Honoring His name. Worship God in the beauty of holiness. The voice of the Eternal echoes over the waters, the God of glory thunders, the Eternal is exuding over the mighty waters. The voice of God breaks cedars. He has shaken the cedars of Lebanon. They begin to leap about, Lebanon like a calf and Sirion like a young ox. The voice of the Eternal splits the lightning shaft, the voice of the Eternal whirls the deserts, the voice of the Eternal whirls the desert of Kadesh.

The voice of God makes the wild deer run, it strips the forest bare — while in His temple all cry “Glory!” God saw the flood at the food. He is exalted, sovereign forever. The Eternal will give strength to His people, the Eternal will bless His people with peace.

Psalm 99

Adoni malach yig’yu amin, yeshiv’ k’tivim, tanat be’etem. 1
Adonai ki on gadoth, yam ha’shalom, ki ha’am. 2
Yodu shinchar gadoth, v’bora, kadoth ha. 3
V’kisti mishpat sheviv, a’ta kidevish, mishpat. 4
Adoni ki on gadoth, yam ha’shalom, ki ha’am. 5
Ki ha’am, ki utz’mah, ki utz’tzim, ki utz’mah. 6
Ki ha’am, ki utz’mah, ki utz’tzim, ki utz’mah. 7
Ki ha’am, ki utz’mah, ki utz’tzim, ki utz’mah. 8

Psalm 29

Orthodox and Masorti communities stand

Adoni malach yig’yu amin, yeshiv’ k’tivim, tanat be’etem. 1
Adonai ki on gadoth, yam ha’shalom, ki ha’am. 2
Yodu shinchar gadoth, v’bora, kadoth ha. 3
V’kisti mishpat sheviv, a’ta kidevish, mishpat. 4
Adoni ki on gadoth, yam ha’shalom, ki ha’am. 5
Ki ha’am, ki utz’mah, ki utz’tzim, ki utz’mah. 6
Ki ha’am, ki utz’mah, ki utz’tzim, ki utz’mah. 7
Ki ha’am, ki utz’mah, ki utz’tzim, ki utz’mah. 8

Psalm 99

EXPLANATION: This psalm discusses what will happen in a messianic age, and celebrates God’s faithfulness.

QUESTION: Why is Shabbat traditionally compared to the messianic age? Does the comparison mean anything to us?

COMMENT: Recite the Psalms in a very low voice. Cry out quietly, saying the words with all your strength. This is the meaning of the verse “All my bones shall say, ‘God, who is like You?’” (Psalm 35:10). A cry that results from complete attachment [to God] is absolutely silent. — Chasidic teaching

Psalm 29

EXPLANATION: This psalm describes God’s power over nature, showing that all forces are the voice of God. Orthodox and Masorti communities stand up because it contains God’s name so many times. In the psalm the great thunderstorm is followed by calm, perhaps symbolizing that the weekly struggle in the world of achievement is at an end and that we can rest.

THOUGHT: A person is like the “ladder standing on the ground, with its top in the heavens” (Genesis 28:12). One can do worldly, physical things here on earth, but “its top is in heaven,” since he mediates on lofty concepts — attributed to the Baal Shem Tov (founder of Chasidism)

THOUGHT: In the Kabbalah, Shabbat symbolizes the union of the male and female metaphysical properties that provide the foundation of the universe. — Rabbi Wurtzburger

THOUGHT: Work is a symbol of conflict and disharmony; rest is an expression of dignity, peace, and freedom. — Einich Fromm (psychologist)
of these beliefs (the religious practices) to uphold a singular (traditionally authentic) understanding of Judaism as Orthodox. Most youth movements welcome disagreement as an intellectual exercise and claim to be spaces welcoming of a diverse expression of Jewish belief. However, these same movements require uniformity in religious practice as the basis of movement cohesiveness, thereby undermining their own intellectual acceptance of cross-communalism with their enactment of restrictive and Orthodox practices. Indeed, I found that even ‘fully pluralist’ movements struggle to enact pluralism in a way that is equally as respectful to Progressive Jews.

**FULLY PLURALIST**

Only two of the movement leaders I interviewed comfortably identified their movements as pluralist. *Herut* considered itself to be pluralist, and yet the movement was cognisant of the fact that it was, according to the *mazkir* Sam, “completely impossible to create a trans-denominational environment”. For *Herut*, a pluralist environment was entirely reliant on tolerance and separation of denominational beliefs when necessary. As Sam said:

> let’s take Shabbat as an example. The way I see it, there are four alternatives: modern Orthodox, Reform, hybrid, and alternative...tolerance is key, but, um, so is having spaces for everyone to practice their different beliefs and not feel threatened.

Sam considered pluralism to be achieved when differing beliefs were treated equally, even if they were treated differently or separately from one another.

Jared, the *mazkir* of *Ehud*, agreed that his movement is pluralist, but approached the issue differently. He said:

> our version and our take on pluralism...it’s a lot to us, it should be a lot more than it is, but theoretically it’s a fair bit.

SA: in what ways?

**Jared**: we view pluralism as an opportunity for people from different religious backgrounds, upbringings, and beliefs to come together, and, and unite our differences and learn more about each other though being in that cross communal environment...part of pluralism is, it is about sharing our discomfort, there’s all these different approaches to it. And for us, pluralism is about making people, like...making them question their own Jewish identity, whether it was to change it, whether it was to strengthen it, whatever it might be, just to um get people to question.

SA: interesting-

**Jared**: our take, we believe, that pluralism doesn’t need to be boxy. So like, we want people to have formed their own opinions through a-political, non-partisan, informal education, where we give them as broad an opinion as possible, like as broad an education as possible on a particular topic, both sided. Then they can take that information, and like form their own opinion, and then go do something about it together.
The Plurality of Pluralism

For Jared, pluralism requires a basic acceptance of the legitimacy of a range of opinions and positions. Jared’s movement purposefully presented arguments from across the Jewish denominational spectrum, and crucially tried not to specify which way of thinking was the correct (or authentically Jewish) way of thinking even within the movement.

In *Ehud*, pluralism was based on a togetherness that requires a negotiation of difference. Similar to arguments in favour of pluralism from the more liberal communities of British Jewry, Jared believed that a system based on the separation of denominational thinking was fundamentally flawed. For Jared, pluralism could not be achieved if there was separation between people within a movement; movements that were pluralist in their membership approval process, but supportive of separation within the movement, could never really uphold pluralism to its highest standards. He said:

> those semi pluralist movements, like, their take is, we’ll take everybody, we’re all different and we all believe different things, and so Orthodox people go and have an Orthodox service, Reform, Masorti, and it’s, well, I don’t want to make it sound like I’m putting them down or whatever, but it’s a boxy way, like I said before, a boxy way of…you categorise people put them in there are you get them to do a service of whatever, but its boxy…we don’t do that.

Like *Alizah*, the *Ehud* experience necessitated togetherness at the expense of strict religious observance according to an individual’s own tradition. Pluralism, for Jared, had to avoid the “boxy fake togetherness”, as forced in movements that perpetuate separate but equal space, especially during Shabbat. Pluralism meant being together no matter how uncomfortable.

Notably, my interviewees were exceptionally careful to make clear that they respect and admire other Jewish youth movements—they just happen to prefer their ‘brand’ of movement. *Madrichim* were also keen to offer cross-movement support, in recognition of their shared aim of securing Jewish continuity, albeit through different means. This cross-movement support was evidence of a fundamental difference between this younger generation and the battle over pluralism and continuity being waged in the pages of the *JC*. Whereas the *JC* articles are predominantly in one of two camps, for pluralism or against it, these youth movement leaders employed much more fluid interpretations of the concept and demonstrated an openness and support of other interpretations.

**Fully Pluralist and Shabbat**

The introduction to the *Ehud siddur* was entitled: ‘What is a Pluralist Bencher?’ The authors wrote:
We asked ourselves at the start [of writing the prayerbook] how it would be possible for a group of diverse Jews to sit together and bench together, while not everyone follows the same text, and not everyone believes in the prayer. The answer, we believe, lies in these pages. Every word said by every major movement is found here, and for those who don’t believe in the liturgy, there is some poetry, prose or philosophy, relevant to the theme of each blessing.

This prayerbook was built on a similar foundation to Dor’s cross-communal prayer book. However, this bencher was used to guide one cohesive service led by someone well trained in pluralist praying, according to the movement madrich Jared. He said:

a good pluralist prayer leader will be someone who, who makes you share your discomfort, there’s these different approaches to Judaism that can all be expressed together.

The differences between religious traditions were clear; cultural/humanist Judaism was delineated in bordered boxes; transliteration of the exact Hebrew was in italics; and the parts which were different for various denominations were highlighted in grey, with footnotes to explain. The service was not based on a modern Orthodox version, with other prayers given as an alternative. Instead, Liberal and Reform liturgy and prayers had been effectively integrated into one service that will be familiar and/ or comfortable for most participants; all aspects were explained for those who are not familiar with various components of the service.

I pressed Jared, as I had done Noah, about whether this pluralist ethos was practiced beyond a written discourse; I asked: “Is the service conducted out-loud based on a modern Orthodox one?” Jared, unlike Noah, said no: “Just because real pluralism is extremely difficult does not mean we shouldn’t try to the best of our abilities”. While he recognised that Ehud did not attract “the super religious”, he also claimed that anyone who wanted to learn how to lead a service, regardless of belief or background, was more than supported in doing so, even at the expense of pushing the boundaries of legitimacy in some peoples’ minds.

Yet even under this model, some form of communal prayer is required; opting-out of Friday night and Saturday morning services was not an option for members. Religious belief is not forced upon anyone, but attendance at religious services was mandatory during Ehud gatherings (meaning that some form of ritualised, communal performance of Judaism is considered fundamental to any type of Jewishness).

At the end of the siddur, there was a small box which read: “Whether one believes in the religious value of the rituals or not, no one can deny that the Jewish Friday night is part of the essence of Jewish culture”. The spirit of Friday night, whatever that may mean to individuals, was identified as the one common strand throughout Jewdasms and can be emphasised in a pluralistic setting. For Ehud, pluralism necessitated
refraining from insisting on any amount of belief/non-belief beyond the basic difference between Shabbat and the rest of the week.

**CONCLUSION**

In 1998, Harry Freedman, the then-Director of the Masorti Movement in the UK, wrote an opinion piece entitled *Judaism’s Need to Respond to Change* saying:

[at] a time when Jewish institutions across the world are working hard to encourage young people to remain within the Jewish community, and to adopt a Jewish lifestyle, such dissension and strife [as evident within British Jewry] are counter-productive...we need to create an environment in which differences of outlook are tolerated. Recognising that fellow Jews may hold different views does not in any way undermine the convictions of one’s own ideology. Mutual respect is the key to co-existence, as is an awareness that the modern world is necessarily pluralist. The clear message from many of today’s young people is that the sooner a post-denominational age dawns, the better. It is not always easy to respond to the pace of change in the world
around us. But Judaism has always been a synthesis of modern ideas and traditional values...The faster the world changes the more we need to hold on to our key values, which include tolerance, intellectual openness, and respect for the whole of Creation (22 May 1998, p. 26).

Freedman’s assertion that younger people are anxiously awaiting a ‘post denominational age’ summarises the sentiments of many of my interviewees. Yet Freedman writes as someone heavily influenced by the secular discourse of multiculturalism and diversity. He stresses the need for ‘tolerance’ and ‘respect’, key tropes that were being introduced in 1998 by the newly elected Labour government in an effort to help Britain come to terms with its increasing diversity (Worley 2005). However, for many modern Orthodox British Jews, the modern agenda of choice and equality of positions—the understanding that there is not a right or wrong authenticity—is fundamentally at odds with the very core of religious belief. Although few modern Orthodox Jews would deny the existence of denominational Jewry, many would firmly denounce the authenticity of denominationalism, since all deviations from Orthodoxy are often regarded as perversions of authentic Judaism.

Pluralism is a contentious issue within British Jewry, and debates about the topic can and do engender deeply felt animosity, fear, and protectiveness. Whereas the wider community is polarised between pro-inclusivism and pro-pluralism, the younger generations are beginning to grapple with pluralism in (often) more complex and nuanced manners. Within British Jewish youth movements, this impasse between plurality and Orthodoxy is not unbridgeable. While movements often defer to Orthodoxy in practice, many have begun to realize that a “total commitment to a vision of truth need not necessitate the belief that the truth is exhausted by the vision” (Kimelman 1987, p. 138), or that a plurality of opinions on what constitutes Jewish truth need not necessarily lead to paralysis. Many movements attract a wide variety of Jews, and although a movement promotes a particular ethos of Jewish truth, there are some attempts to make space for other opinions to sit alongside, and not be eclipsed by, the historically more powerful Orthodox claims of authenticity, as evidenced particularly by Ehud’s approach to pluralism as an uncomfortable investigation of Jewish difference.

Jewish youth movements recognize that they represent a possibility for a collective moment of interception – interception between formal education and values transmitted in families, interception between the binary opinions of Orthodox and Progressive communal opinions on pluralism, and interception between an individualised Judaism based on personal belief and a Judaism which is supported and negotiated by the wider community. Although youth movements are shaped and somewhat constrained by wider communal expectations, as demonstrated here in relation to pluralism, they are not entirely determined by
THE PLURALITY OF PLURALISM

them—and it is this point which makes their inclusion in research about Jewish education and continuity in the UK so important. Indeed, the study of young people in youth movements introduces new discourses about innovative performances of Judaism to discussions about Jewish continuity. Hey writes:

The idea of performativity of identity as simultaneously asserted and ‘under threat’ in relations to its (ethnographic) others creates conceptual-empirical space for elaborating how, and under what conditions, subjects can come to cite themselves in recognised as well as unpredictable ways (Hey 2006, p. 452, italics added).

Youth movements enable young people to learn to ‘do’ Judaism in ways that are simultaneously recognisable but also unpredictable. This Judaism as a verb, the act of ‘doing’ Judaism, is a way of redefining the noun ‘Jew’ to include broader and more fluid understanding of what it means to ‘act’, ‘talk’ and ‘be’ Jewish. Further explorations of doing Judaism in informal education contexts will prove an invaluable component of sociological research on the British Jewish community in the future.

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THE PLURALITY OF PLURALISM


NOTES

1 The unease over the Chief Rabbi’s excellent inter-faith record, and his continued reluctance to engage with Liberal Jews, continues to enrage many people. For example, a letter to the editor of the Jewish Chronicle by Mr. Neil Levitt on 26 October 2007 was entitled: ‘Chief’s Hypocrisy?’ Levitt, a member of the public, echoed Rabbi Rayner’s sentiments from a full ten years earlier when he wrote: “Whilst…[the Chief Rabbi] is happy to attend at Westminster Abbey and St. Paul’s and no doubt has visited the Mosque and Temple near his residence, he steadfastly refuses to set foot in a Liberal or Reform Synagogue” (p. 34).

2 There is research on informal education in other contexts, and some theoretical writing on the importance of informal education, most notably Coffield’s The Necessity of Informal Learning (2000), designed to introduce informal learning as a topic in need of more theoretical explanation, but there is still a dearth of empirical research on informal education in faith-based youth movements, particularly Jewish ones.

3 The study used a scale of identification with Judaism, with ‘closest’ referring to those young adults who were actively involved in Jewish life and had mostly Jewish friends. ‘Distant’ refers to those young adults who had little or no involvement in Jewish communal life and had mostly non-Jewish friends. Additionally, the report found that involvement in informal education was a better predictor of future communal involvement than was formal education. Over 70% of the distant people had experiences of Jewish formal education.

4 Madrichim is the term for youth leaders more generally, as opposed to mazkirim which refers to the movement chair-people specifically.

5 The chart below sets out the movements and leaders discussed in this article:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement</th>
<th>Interviewee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gluke: Reform Zionist Jewish Movement</td>
<td>Reba; 24 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chain: Liberal Jewish Zionist Youth Movement</td>
<td>Anna; 22 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadar: Zionist Masorti Youth Movement (egalitarian)</td>
<td>Gideon; 23 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herut: Zionist movement open to all denominations</td>
<td>Sam; 24 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehud: Zionist youth movement open to all denominations, mostly for those students over the age of 16.</td>
<td>Jared; 24 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dor: Zionist, pluralist youth movement</td>
<td>Noah; 24 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alizah: socialist, Zionist youth movement</td>
<td>Jesse; 24 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABG: inclusivist youth movement</td>
<td>Jeremy, 28 years old</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SARAH ABRAMSON

6 All youth leader and organisation names have been changed.
7 I often found that leaders initially hesitated to criticize other movements, because there is an underlying appreciation for a general youth movement culture that often is forced to band together for the purposes of fund raising or even demonstrating why the education they undertake is important at all. However after the initial hesitation, most leaders consistently compared their own movement to others (in order to demonstrate why their movement was better), even when comparison was not particularly warranted. The impulse to compare was particularly strong when movement leaders’ understood their position as a defensive one—defending their way of doing things in relation to other movements, as with pluralism, cross communalism or denominationalism.
8 The particular challenge Shabbat represents to pluralism is discussed at the end of this article.
9 Only one movement leader described his movement as inclusivist. Jeremy, the chief executive of ABG originally had no trouble defining his movement as pluralist; in our first meeting, held during October 2006, Jeremy defined ABG as “a pluralist Jewish youth organization, open to all boys and girls who call themselves Jews”. However, during our final wrap-up meeting eighteen months after I first approached him, he was eager to re-evaluate his position:

You know, Sarah. Um, you know how you are calling us pluralist? I know I said that, but I have been doing a lot of thinking lately just on that. I really don’t think we should really describe ourselves like that, since, [ahem] we really are more like a Modern Orthodox movement, but we accept everyone and are inclusive of everyone. But, you know, you have seen it—once we are in a movement setting, we are modern Orthodox.

10 This section discusses movements who have open admissions —movements which do not require adherence to a particular denomination of Judaism (or any denomination). In practice, membership is often drawn from a particular part of the community (due to reputation or friends wanting to attend with friends), but the movements’ ethos’s all make clear that they are open to anyone who self identifies as Jewish.
11 The sacredness of teachings from the Torah.
12 Prayerbook.
13 See Appendix four for Ehud’s Tips for Pluralist Programming, which interestingly focus particularly on gender equality as a fundamental part of pluralism (the exact issue that is seen as a primary reason why Orthodoxy cannot accept pluralism).
14 Bench refers to saying grace after meals.
15 Ehud was the only movement that offered a short course for members and leaders interested in leading pluralist prayer or activities more generally.
THE JEWS OF BOSTON, LINCOLNSHIRE: ADDENDUM

HAROLD POLLINS

In Volume LII 2010, some important information was omitted from The Jews of Boston, Lincolnshire, paragraph 3 page 57. That paragraph should be replaced by the following:

Cecil Roth ended his book on provincial Jewry at about 1840 although with some references to later events and people. He referred to one man who lived there in the 18th century, about 1779-80, and to Mary Myers who was born in the town in 1799. Otherwise he wrote particularly of Henry Lewis Leo, born c1800 in London, who married Mary Myers in Boston in 1822. One person he missed was Sarah Moses, born in Boston in about 1818, daughter of Bedford-born Emanuel, a watch maker, who travelled greatly, three children being born in Ipswich and one in London. Sarah married Swansea-resident John Moses Moses (also born in Bedford) as his second wife in 1852 and settled in Swansea. But more important is the fact that there was apparently a synagogue in Boston, at least as early as 1812. A local newspaper reported a wedding which took place on 29 January 1812 ‘at the Jewish Synagogue in Boston’, between Mr Levy, a Silversmith in the High Street and Miss Levy of Bargate, Boston.¹ A synagogue, even if it had been only a room in a dwelling-house, presupposes a number of resident Jews; but their names are unknown. One wonders who conducted the marriage ceremony.

There is no doubt that soon after that, and at least by the 1840s, the community ceased to exist. The Chief Rabbi’s survey of 1845 did not mention Boston, nor did the Religious Census of 1851.² When the new congregation was formed in the early 1890s the Jewish Chronicle (JC) said, fairly accurately, that this was after ‘a lapse of nearly a century’.³ Confirmation, perhaps, of the absence of a community is the fact that when two Boston residents were married in the town in 1857 the ceremony was carried out by Rev. L. Goldberg of the Nottingham Hebrew Congregation. The celebrants were Rosina Leo, the youngest daughter


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of Henry Lewis Leo, and Benjamin Abrahams, and it took place in her father’s house in Red Lion Street, Boston.\textsuperscript{4}

Rosina Leo had been born in Hull in about 1830 but her two sisters, Abigail and Elizabeth, were born in Boston in about 1826 and 1828 respectively; they remained unmarried. Roth said that ‘the Leo family’ were ‘traditionally quill-pen manufacturers, and at the same time cigar and sweet-merchants’. In the 1841 Census Leo is described as a ‘quill dresser’, in 1851 as a general shopkeeper, and in 1861 as a tobacconist. He died just before the 1871 Census but his widow then became the tobacconist, in the few months before she died.\textsuperscript{5}

There were many items about Boston in the \textit{JC} from its beginnings in 1841 but apart from a report of 1848 describing a public meeting in favour of the Bill to allow Jews to sit in Parliament, they were almost entirely about the Leo family. They consisted largely of their contributions to various Jewish charities, sometimes noting that the money had been collected from Christian friends.\textsuperscript{6}

\textbf{NOTES}


\textsuperscript{3} \textit{JC}, 8 July 1892, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{ibid.}, 27 February 1857, p. 913. Also \textit{Lincoln Mercury}, 27 February 1857 (from Pat Pomeroy). I take it that the wedding was carried out by a Nottingham officiant, and was thus registered in that town, because there was no Jewish Secretary for Marriages in Boston. Rosina was probably named after her grandmother, Rosina Myers (called Rosina Lyons in Roth’s book, p. 34), who died in Boston in 1847; \textit{JC}, 31 December 1847, p. 379.

\textsuperscript{5} Strangely, the notice of his death on 10th March 1871 describes him as ‘MRCP, of Bevis Marks, London’. Roth (page 33) notes that his father was ‘Dr. Lewis Leo of Bevis Marks’. It is likely that the death notice was garbled and was meant to read that he was the son of Dr Leo. The death notice is reprinted from the \textit{JC} in Doreen Berger, \textit{The Jewish Victorian: Genealogical Information from the Jewish Newspapers 1871–1880}.


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BOOK REVIEWS


When I first saw the title of this new book, I hoped to find some fresh insights into the major controversies of the past two decades, such as the Hugo Gryn affair, the Stanmore Accords, the rise of Islamist extremism, the JFS court case, the creation of the Jewish Leadership Council or the increasingly fractured debates over Israel. Whilst this book touches on such issues, it provides a largely sociological approach to the major changes that have impinged upon the community during this period. Whilst the authors are clearly embedded in sociological research, and provide an admirable analysis of much of the recent research on British Jewry, they would be the first to admit that research has rarely translated into policy and action. Many of the community’s leaders claim to know what needs to be done, without the need for research studies to underpin their policies.

The main thesis of the authors is that the last twenty years mark a change from a strategy of security to one of insecurity. These are strange phrases to use, since they appear to bear the opposite of their conventional meanings. Thus the strategy of security reflects a community that felt insecure in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Holocaust and the birth of Israel, leading to an approach where it was felt necessary to stress the loyalty of British Jews and refrain from raising one’s head too high above the parapet or displaying one’s religious affiliations in public. By contrast, over the last twenty years the community has shown a growing self-confidence and a more self-critical approach, reflected in a willingness to express in public dangers and controversies affecting the community. The authors recognise that whereas Jewish life in Britain has probably never been so vibrant (despite the so-called “strategy of insecurity”), so the community has become more open about the problems it faces and more willing to press for its rights and its place at the multicultural table. Fears by communal leaders that the community would disappear through assimilation are said to have strengthened the arguments for this shift in strategies.


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BOOK REVIEWS

While there is some truth in this analysis, it exaggerates the contrast between the two so-called strategies—and are these changes really strategies at all, in the sense of planned and accepted shifts reflecting a consensus among those affected? The book fails to explain in what sense such strategies really existed and by whom they were formulated.

There was certainly a sense in which the community by the 1990’s was suffering, in Voltaire’s phrase, from “an excess of zeal” (although here “zeal” would be an acronym for Zionism, Exogamy, Assimilation and Low birth-rate: all factors leading to a reducing Jewish population). To counter this, the authors give pride of place to the role of the Chief Rabbi, who came to office in 1991 pledged to introduce a “Decade of Renewal”. Jonathan Sacks certainly proved an inspiration to the centre-of-the-road orthodoxy which acknowledges his authority, and stimulated debates over Jewish education—or at least education for Jewish children. New schools burgeoned during this period, many attracting state funding and demonstrating academic excellence. As the main engine for communal renewal, the Chief Rabbi set up a new organisation named Jewish Continuity, and the book provides a detailed account of its rise and fall, including some insightful comments from its one and only chief executive Clive Lawton. One might well ask what it was that should be continued. Given the problems the Chief Rabbi was seeking to address, use of the word “continuity” was probably the last description to adopt: continuity of the ignorant, boring, uncultured community of the post-war years? In harking back to a golden age of knowledgeable committed communities (probably unknown in Britain), maybe “Jewish Renaissance” or “Revival” might have been a more apt title. The new organisation created expectations that could never be fulfilled, particularly in its relations with the non-orthodox sections of the community which it was supposed to support. The resulting conflicts underlined the impossibility of a single organisation satisfying a plurality of competing visions, while others waited on the sidelines to engulf an organisation doomed to failure.

Despite the collapse of Jewish Continuity, the period has seen the adoption of many initiatives, although how far they have changed the community is more open to question. The Chief Rabbi’s diagnosis in “Will We Have Jewish Grandchildren?”, which in 1994 set out his vision for the community, centred upon ways of building orthodox Jewish families, which were seen as the basic building block for continuity. It is therefore an irony that Jewish schools came to be seen as the panacea for the issue of Jewish continuity. The Chief Rabbi’s approach to education, and that of the funders who provided seed-corn for the spate of new schools, was an assumption that Jewish schools would ipso facto produce more committed Jewish families. There is very little evidence to bear out this claim. A 1988 survey of British Jewish students suggested that home life and family are greater predictors of Jewish identity and commitment than attendance at a Jewish school. As the authors wryly
BOOK REVIEWS

comment, the expansion of Jewish day schools has been driven by faith rather than strategic planning. It is another irony that, despite successive reviews, the place of women within Jewish institutions has changed little, whilst many of the initiatives that have developed in the cultural sphere (Limmud, the Jewish Film Festival, Jewish Music Institute, Jewish Book Week) have been grassroots initiatives, and it may be no coincidence that each of those named is currently led by a woman. And despite the mushrooming of interfaith activities, relations between the different denominations within the community remain as fraught as ever.

The decade of renewal has demonstrated a growing openness and assertiveness on the part of the community. By the mid-1990s it was possible to argue that Jewish identity would no longer be maintained by reaction to traditional anti-Semitism or by Zionist fervour; so what would be the key factor keeping people Jewish, if not education and a revival in religious observance? Unfortunately, the answer quickly became apparent. After Ariel Sharon’s ill-fated walk on the Temple Mount and the Second Intifada, we were back in more familiar territory with the renewal of anti-Semitism and attacks on Israel. The community showed an increasing sense of insecurity as Jews became the targets for a growing hatred of Israel, which soon became regarded by the Arab world and their Western apologists as the cause of all the problems in the world. War in Iraq? Instigated by Israel. 9/11? A Jewish conspiracy. Banking crisis? Blame the Jews. Little distinction was made between Israel and Jews, as the so-called new anti-Semitism revitalised the traditional tropes of the past centuries and applied them to Israel. Anti-Semitism has proved an ever-mutating virus. Its recent manifestations exemplify how those urging the destruction of the only Jewish state in the world regularly blur the distinction between Jews and Israel. The authors provide a useful exposition of the arguments over whether there is a new anti-Semitism and the claim that such anti-Semitism comes about largely through the failure of communal institutions to condemn the policies of successive Israeli governments towards the Palestinians. Meanwhile those Jewish voices who want to express their criticisms of Israel have come under increasing attack from mainstream organisations concerned to maintain solidarity with Israel. The past few years have thus demonstrated good grounds for reasserting the more traditional approach of “security”, although once the genie of anti-Semitism has been released from the bottle terms such as “security” or “insecurity” cease to have much relevance.

In the context of British society, Jews have always been marginal in numbers—nowadays less than 0.5 per cent of the UK population. We do not know whether the number of Jews in Britain is continuing to decline; even the national census can only count those willing to describe their religion as Jewish. Whether numbers matter is an entire separate debate, although it may well affect the significance which the outside
world, including government, attaches to the views of the community. Jews and their leaders may be listened to with respect, but it would be folly to imagine that they carry much influence over government policy. The change from a monocultural to a multicultural Britain was driven by the non-Jewish ethnic and religious communities. Jews were caught up in this, and were offered seats at the growing number of tables created during the 1990’s. In my role at the Board of Deputies, I spent a growing proportion of my time responding to government interfaith initiatives, including the Inner Cities Religious Council (set up by the Tories in the early 1990’s), the Lambeth group that spent years planning the religious component for the Millennium in 2000, and the Home Office group creating Holocaust Memorial Day. Whilst many faith leaders, including Chief Rabbi Sacks, have cast doubt on the key premise of multiculturalism, namely that all cultures are of equal value and have as much to offer our society, it was still necessary to be part of the process, if only to avoid decisions that might have bypassed or damaged the community. For similar reasons, Jews had at times to show solidarity with other faith or ethnic groups even on matters where the community had little to gain, for example on immigration and asylum and on religious equality laws. None of these aspects are touched on by Kahn-Harris and Gidley.

It is a pity that in discussion with communal leaders, the authors have consulted no more than nineteen named individuals (including only one woman): many informed sources have been ignored. Maybe that is why they ignored Jo Wagerman’s election as the first woman President of the Board of Deputies in 2000, whilst many women have chaired the provincial representative councils, which do not even get a mention in the book, despite their invaluable role in bringing the range of community groups together in all the largest Jewish centres.

We have now a community which is probably more educated, creative, vibrant and diverse than at any time. As the authors note in their conclusion, this vibrancy has come about against a growing concern about anti-Semitism, whilst many of the deep-seated anachronisms, divisions and weaknesses within the community remain unreformed. But then the recent renewal has been directed at the “content” of the community and its institutions rather than at the community’s organisational structure. The position of so-called “marginal Jews” remains a subject of debate. In a free society, the right to choose means that there will always be some people who do not wish to preserve their heritage or associate with other Jews. How far any programme of Jewish continuity or revival can impinge upon them is an open question.

In a climate of insecurity there will be many who seek to return to an idealised notion of the traditional family, safe neighbourhoods and shared values. The reality is that a community can never turn back the clock. It is vital to recognise the condition of insecurity and devise ways
of venturing into the unknown, living creatively with risk and developing a shared recognition of the challenges we face. This is the message with which the authors close this book, calling for a dialogical community, in which a polyphony of contending voices can generate creative solutions to the challenges of being a minority community in multicultural Britain.

In discussing the origins of the continuity debate, the authors quote Simon Rawidowicz’s aphorism that “Jews are the ever-dying people”, in the sense of their intense historic preoccupation with survival over centuries of persecution, massacres and genocide. But the very fact of Jewish survival would make it more accurate to describe Jews as “the ever-living people”. After overcoming so many physical threats to our existence, there can be little doubt of our ability to survive as a people. Survival in itself presupposes adaptability: that is what Jews have always done, and the past two decades have been no different. For Jews, the times are always turbulent. As long as there is life on earth, somewhere there will be Jews who claim that the dimming of the sun and the extinction of life are just another anti-Semitic plot.

**Neville Nagler**

Director General, Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1991–2005


Dr Meir Persoff has had a distinguished career as a journalist on the Jewish Chronicle, and his knowledge of the Anglo-Jewish community is unrivalled. Since moving to Jerusalem he has produced two excellent books: his biography of Chief Rabbi Lord Jakobovits¹ and his monumental history, “Faith against Reason”,² of relations between the Chief Rabbinate and the progressive movements. Both these works would have given us reason to expect that his latest offering would follow the same pattern and be to the same standard. As before the work is meticulously annotated, and each statement is referenced – indeed the footnotes merit careful study on their own account. It is the purpose and argument of this volume that I find disappointing. This is a one-sided, peevish recital of complaints and failures, and frankly unworthy of its author.

The Chief Rabbinate of England, unlike every other Chief Rabbinate anywhere in Jewish history, evolved organically from the pre-eminence of the Rabbis of the Great Synagogue in London, particularly Rabbi David Tevele Schiff (1765–1791). This was recognised by the custom of Chief Rabbis, up to and including Israel Brodie (1948–1965) spending Yom Kippur in the Great Synagogue or its post-bombing ghost, long
after the community and its leaders had moved their homes from the City and the East End of London.

Persoff seems to think that Jonathan Sacks could and should have acted independently of his Beth Din, but no Chief Rabbi has been able to do that since Nathan Marcus Adler (1845–1890) and his son Hermann Marcus Adler (1891–1911), not even Immanuel Jakobovits (1967–1991) who in rabbinical terms was the strongest of them all. As Dr Benjamin Elton has shown, the process of appointing very Orthodox Dayanim and enabling the Beth Din to act independently began under Nathan Marcus Adler with the appointment of Dayan Jacob Reinowitz in 1879, and the very rigid and right-wing attitude of the London Beth Din was merely reinforced with the appointment of Dayan Yechezkel Abramsky in 1936. It would be disastrous for the Jews in Britain if the inability of foreign rabbinates to understand the particular dynamics of Anglo Jewry were to lead to the community’s classification as non-orthodox. It is for that reason that the universal acceptance of the Court of the Chief Rabbi as being fully and unquestionably Orthodox is essential for the preservation of the Orthodox status of decisions taken by the Beth Din in the Chief Rabbi’s name.

Persoff totally ignores this major dynamic in the Anglo-Jewish community and instead has listed in full detail what he regards as Jonathan Sacks’ failure to establish religious inclusivism. His main authorities for claiming that this failure is central to an evaluation of the Sacks’ Chief Rabbinate are the views of two people, namely Lord Stanley Kalms, who has held many leadership positions in both Jewish and general organisations and whose relationship with Sacks has (to say the least) been on-and-off and Professor Geoffrey Alderman, whose antipathy towards the Chief Rabbinate and the United Synagogue is set out in detail in his Modern British Jewry. Persoff’s book runs to over 300 pages, and there is no attempt either to admit that there is another point of view or to list any successes.

And yet one is entitled to ask how far the raison d’être of the Chief Rabbinate, which is appointed by and funded by the Centrist Orthodox community, is to accommodate the wishes of the non-Orthodox. Clearly the author believes that this should be a major preoccupation of the Chief Rabbi, an unrealistic expectation at any time and especially at the present. Moreover, the book gives no indication of the achievements of this Chief Rabbinate, of the growth of Jewish Education, of the growth of Jewish consciousness, of the pre-eminence given to the moral leadership shown by Jonathan Sacks to the entire country.

Indeed in some senses this book is no more than an estimation of Jonathan Sacks’ performance against the expectations of Stanley Kalms, in which he has been found wanting. I suspect that the rest of Anglo Jewry does not take such a blinkered and simplistic point of view.
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Persoff makes great play of the fact that he was given access to Stanley Kalms’ files of correspondence, and these are very revealing. Kalms’ letter to Lord Jakobovits in which he asserts “you will have to accept that we are a double act and that one without the other would be less than half” is quite breath-taking, especially as it was followed, the next year, by Kalms’ dramatic and unexpected resignation from all his communal offices. More revealing is Persoff’s reliance on Kalms’ views as the touchstone of Anglo Jewish truth. Kalms’ relationship with Jonathan Sacks has gone through a number of cycles and on at least two occasions Kalms called for Sacks’ resignation. Midway between those two occasions, in 2001, Kalms contributed an article to the Jewish Chronicle, a personal view of Jonathan Sacks’ first 10 years. Persoff describes this as “a headmaster’s report, so to speak” which reveals his whole attitude towards the views of this one man, and his abrogation of any sense of disinterested analysis.

After Kalms’ first call for Sacks’ resignation, there were numerous criticisms voiced in the Jewish Chronicle. Perhaps the most telling is the comment of Michael Gross who pointed out that “success in retailing does not bring with it theological competence. Sir Stanley should stick to what he understands and leave the Chief Rabbi to provide the spiritual leadership, which he is clearly better qualified to do.”

Today the Chief Rabbinate of England holds higher prestige and authority within British society than it has ever held, but there is not one word of acknowledgement of this beyond the comment in Alderman’s foreword that Jonathan Sacks “is – now – virtually untouchable”. This remark on page xiii caused your reviewer to wonder about the real point of the following 300 pages. No Chief Rabbinate from the time of Aaron Hart (1702–1752) onward has been a tale of unbroken success, and every Chief Rabbi has to take account of both the community as it is and the constituency that he represents. Have there been failures in the present Chief Rabbinate? Undoubtedly so. Central to them has been Sacks’ failure to maintain the point of view of his own constituency while kowtowing to the extreme right-wing who have respect neither for him nor for his office and his continuing deference, as a broadly-educated 21st Century polymath, to those who define themselves by the narrowness of their approach. The absence of the United Synagogue from Limmud, most of whose attendees come from centrist modern orthodoxy is a serious and glaring example of this failure. There are times when the religious establishment of the United Synagogue seem more anxious to maintain the views of those who don’t support them than the views of those who do.

Anglo Jewry is a very strange community, with a theoretical Orthodox adherence of around 70% and an orthodox practice rate in single figures, similar to the Church of England. This is perhaps why the Jewish community developed an ecclesiastical head to parallel the Archbishop of Canterbury, and indeed there are interesting similarities between the present incumbents of the two offices.
Persoff ignores the central tragedy of Jewish status in the 21st-century, which is the growing non-recognition of one group – what Sacks has called “the adjectival Jew” – by another. The situation of the German communities before the Second World War, where all Beth Din matters were left to be administered by the Orthodox Beth Din serving the entire community, seems to have been a far better system than the internecine warfare of Anglo Jewry. My late father-in-law, Dayan Michael Fisher who was Rav Rashi of the Federation of Synagogues, once told me that he had reached an agreement with the late Rabbi Sidney Brichto, Director of the (then) Union of Liberal and Progressive Synagogues, for the Federation to process Jewish divorces for the Liberal Synagogues; whether this ever happened in practice I do not know – and if not, why not.

Persoff devotes a whole chapter in considerable detail to the recent case involving JFS, the major London Jewish secondary school. The trial turned around the question of whether the selection of Jewish pupils in accordance with halachah was a matter of religion and therefore permitted, or of race and therefore illegal. At the base was the thorny problem of conversion and Jewish status, which bedevils Jewish relations all over the world. Indeed the reluctance of diaspora Batei Din to recognise Israeli conversions is a scandal that needs addressing, as much by the lay leadership as by the Rabbis.

The intervention of the courts in the JFS case, involving them in religion in a way that had never previously been regarded as within their influence and jurisdiction, was widely regarded with dismay and unease. Rabbi Tony Bayfield, then Chief Executive of the Movement for Reform Judaism, while viewing the school’s admission policy as “excessively narrow and restrictive” pointed out that this was “an internal matter for the Jewish community. We would not want the law of the land to question the right of the Office of the Chief Rabbi to define Jewish identity the way that it does”.

Lord Justice Sedley, the Jewish Judge in the Court of Appeal bench (one knows very little of his Jewish involvements) would have none of this and went where 350 years of his predecessors had refrained from going. Such intervention reflects, so I understand, an on-going debate within the judiciary. One school of thought believes that judges should only deal with legal matters that are brought before them, while the other school believes that judges have the right to boldly interfere in everything, whether it is their business or not. Attendance at United Synagogue schools now depends upon synagogue attendance, and Persoff ignores the interesting twist that the outcome of the JFS debacle is that Certificates of Religious Practice from non-orthodox rabbis are now accepted by Orthodox schools under the Chief Rabbinate, precisely the inclusivism that he advocates in this book.

Some of Persoff’s phraseology is a little strange. I was fascinated on page 133 to find that when President of the United Synagogue I had a
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“spokesman” who on reference to the footnote turned out to be Jonathan Lew, then Chief Executive of the United Synagogue. Some statements are inaccurate. In the description of the negotiations for the Stanmore Accords, Persoff records that I would have nothing to do with the negotiations, but in practice after the first few months the late Lionel Swift and I dealt with all the negotiations on behalf of the United Synagogue. The Stanmore Accords were, after all, the document of the lay leadership, not that of the Chief Rabbinate or the Beth Din; it is important to maintain the distinction.

Persoff’s quixotic and unrealistic deduction from his criticisms of Jonathan Sacks is to suggest the abolition of the Chief Rabbinate, an argument which he himself has shown to have been around since at least 1845. During that time the office has grown in stature and significance, so that it now amounts almost to one of the Great Offices of State. English society is not conditioned to a multiplicity of religious leaders, and the Jewish community needs one spokesman who will articulate Jewish views in a non-controversial manner.

The non-Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox worlds have frequently attacked Jonathan Sacks’ actions and rulings insofar as they relate to the internal affairs of the Anglo-Jewish community. No section of the community, from the extreme right to the extreme left, has attacked his speeches and articles commenting on the moral condition and direction of the British nation as a whole. All are happy to bask in the reflected glory of the Chief Rabbinate.

It is difficult to see the logic of criticising Sacks for failure to dance to the non-orthodox tune, when he is neither appointed by them, nor paid by them, nor does he claim to represent them in religious matters. As an Orthodox Chief Rabbi, Jonathan Sacks is bound by halachah. An attack on him for adhering to the principles and practices that he is elected to represent is in fact an attack on the Chief Rabbi for doing precisely what he is appointed to do.

Moreover it is naive in the extreme to assume that the Orthodox world would allow any vacuum created by the absence of an Orthodox Chief Rabbi to be filled by non-Orthodox rabbis. As the late Chaim Bermant pointed out, the result of the resignation of a Chief Rabbi, or the failure to appoint his successor, would be that the London Beth Din would step forward joyfully to fill the gap and relations between mainstream orthodoxy and the progressive movements would totally cease. Anglo Jewry would no longer be a community but a loose confederation of warring tribes with the haredim in the numerical ascendancy.

Relations between Orthodox and Reform Judaism have been generally productive – respect rather than recognition – and similarly with Masorti, although Liberal Judaism tends to be less of a consensus player. It is however totally wrong to blame the failure to produce closer relations exclusively on the orthodox side. Respect is a two-way street and
my personal experience has been that relationships with Reform are usually pleasant with a mutual understanding of each other’s positions, similarly with Masorti. However dealings with Liberal Judaism can be confrontational and prickly from their side, and I may not be alone in this perception. One small provincial community, which joined Liberal Judaism and then regretted it because “it had gone in too low for the religious desires of its members”, was afraid to apply to the Movement for Reform Judaism because of the inevitable reaction from their previous sponsors.

Persoff calls for the “disestablishment” of the Chief Rabbinate (not that it was ever established) and “the elevation of an alternative figure as the recognised leader of a pluralistic Anglo Jewry” but this would require a nonorthodox Rabbi to be sensitive to the views of the majority of nominally Orthodox British Jews.10

By failing to acknowledge the Chief Rabbi’s successes and by concentrating only on those areas where he has failed to achieve his aims, Dr Persoff forfeits the right to claim that this book is a dispassionate and disinterested probe into Jonathan Sacks’ Chief Rabbinate. It grew from an earlier and shorter version which formed part of Dr Persoff’s submission for a PhD for which Dr Alderman was his supervisor. However this was not included when the submission was published as “Faith against Reason” The missing chapter has now been expanded into the present volume and Professor Alderman describes it as the yardstick against which all future writings on Jonathan Sacks will have to be measured. Your reviewer profoundly disagrees. In writing this book, Dr Persoff has taken a number of his hobby-horses, which he seems to share with Professor Alderman, for a vigorous gallop; they would have been better left in their stable.

Elkan D. Levy
President, United Synagogue 1996–99
Director of the Office for Small Communities 2004–2010

NOTES

2 London: Vallentine Mitchell (2009)
5 Kalms to Jakobovits 30 September 1988, quoted Persoff p27
6 The Jewish Chronicle, 9th February 1996, quoted Persoff p156
7 An agreement signed in 1998 by the United Synagogue and the Masorti, Reform and Liberal movements regulating relations between them. The text is set out in full on Persoff pp138–141
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8 See, for example, Chief Rabbi Lord Sacks’ Op-Ed “The 9/11 attacks are linked to a wider moral malaise, including the loss of authority, integrity, and family unity.” The Times, 8th September 2011
9 “Sacking Sacks will give bigots bigger say” The Jewish Chronicle 2nd February 1996, quoted in Persoff p158
10 The recent appointment of Baroness Rabbi Julia Neuberger as Rabbi of the West London Synagogue, the flagship of the Reform movement, may well lead to friction between Orthodox and Progressives. Her admission – in a recent feature interview in The Times that although she requires her synagogue to be Kosher she herself does not keep a kosher home, has to my knowledge upset many Reform Jews, who look upon this appointment with deep misgivings. Julia Neuberger is no stranger to publicity, and her pronouncements on Jewish and Israeli matters in the House of Lords and in the British press may well show up the short-sightedness of Persoff’s complaints and suggestions.


This book, by an eminent Canadian scholar working at the University of Kent, is about religious and racial representations in law, specifically about Jews and Jewishness. It is, an important monograph, and it should appeal to a wide range of professional disciplines as well as to the lay person. The final two chapters concentrate on the recent JFS case. Herman points out that this is the only reported action ever won by a Jewish claimant under the U.K.’s Race Relations Act 1976. Ironically, it was brought against a Jewish school and in effect against the Chief Rabbi. The Supreme Court, as is well-known, found the matrilineal test employed for entrance to the school to be a ‘racial’ one, and thus contrary to English equality law. Herman is more interested in the reasoning than the conclusion. She points out that the judges indulge in clumsy racial description. One can but laugh at Baroness Hale’s assertion that you can’t be both Jewish and Italian (what was Primo Levi?), and wonder what Lord Mance, himself a Jew, meant when he wrote that a ‘Cohen’ and an ‘English woman’ are two different species. Herman focuses on the Court’s racializing discourse.

The book is about more than the JFS case. It consists in a series of essays showing the part played by racial and religious understandings in legal decision-making. One of the most interesting chapters (chapter 5) offers a history of the term ‘holocaust’ in the range of English legal cases over the course of the last 100 years, and considers how ‘the Holocaust’ circulated in judicial discourse once that phrase proliferated. There is an interesting discussion of the legal case involving the ship we know as the ‘Exodus’. In this judgment Jenkins, J. describes those aboard as ‘illegal immigrants’, rather than ‘displaced Jews’ (which their counsel dubbed them). His judgment makes no reference to the extermination of Jews:
it is rather an exemplar of legal formalism which shows total indifference to the mass killings that was the background to the case. In other cases of the period, ‘holocaust’ refers to a disaster: there is no reference to ‘the Holocaust’ to signify the mass killings of Jewish Europeans by the German state. Not until 1976 (in Oppenheimer v. Cattermole) was ‘the Holocaust’ referred to by name in an English decision. The reference to the 6 million is found in Lord Salmon’s speech in the House of Lords: and, of course, he was the only Jewish judge in the House of Lords at that time. By 1987 the Holocaust of the Jews appears as ‘stock footage’ in an entirely unrelated case about criminal duress. This reference was made by Lord Hailsham. Other references appear in cases in the late 1990s, again from the pens of Jewish judges! By 2000 in the Irving v. Penguin Books case, we get a 200 page judgment all about the Holocaust, but that is not surprising as it centres on Holocaust ‘denial’. This is not a crime in the U.K.: Herman does not investigate why, which is, I think, a pity.

An earlier chapter (chapter 4) explores themes of Christianity, ‘race’ and orientalising processes by considering judicial representations of Jews and Jewishness in child welfare cases. There is also a discussion in this chapter of some cases involving Muslim, Jain and Sikh children – the only chapter in the book which transcends the Jewish context. Perhaps the most interesting part of this chapter, especially for readers of this journal, is the discussion of a ‘Muslim’ case, Re J, because it grapples with judicial attitudes to male circumcision. J had a Christian mother, and a Turkish Muslim father. The dispute centred on whether the father’s wish that his 7-year-old son be circumcised should prevail over his mother’s insistence that it should not. The mother and father both had parental responsibility for J. In the judgments the father’s Muslimness becomes solely associated with his Turkish origins, ‘an eastern Islamic world outside England’s Christian borders’. Herman remarks perceptively: ‘What the judges, and many academic commentators fail to grapple with is that the rejection of male circumcision, draped as it is in the language of medical and psychological health, is as much a normative ethnic-religious choice as is the act of circumcision itself’. The debate is played out against a background of power – a nation state with an established Christian church and participation in the long European history of anti-Islamic and anti-Jewish thinking characterised by its denunciation of circumcision. This chapter also considered the cases of the Down Syndrome girl from an orthodox Jewish background destined to be brought up by Catholic foster parents (Re P), and that of Jonathan Bradley (Re B), the child of an Arab father and English Catholic mother, adopted by practising Jews who failed to have his adoption overturned. In the discussion of each of these cases the argument and language of the judges is perceptively deconstructed.

The book avoids discussing the ‘get’ case law. Herman says they don’t lend themselves to the analysis pursued in the book. This is probably
right, but is it right to omit any discussion as to why this might be so? Criminal law cases are also not the subject of any of the chapters: Herman reasons they are too easy a target. Again, I think this is a pity: a dissection of the so-called ‘Guinness’ cases, in particular the sentences, would make for interesting reading and would support the overall thesis of the book – indeed, it might add new nuances.

These are minor quibbles. So is my noting of several silly slips. Lord Rodger’s name is consistently spelt wrongly, she is not too sure what to call Lord Denning (and she is usually wrong!), Poulter is renamed Stephen (he was Sebastian), Jane Rendall appears as ‘Randall’ and many more. More seriously there is nothing in the book about Israel today and its impact, if there is some, on how Jews are perceived. The relationship between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism in this is politely veiled. There is, of course, no discussion of international law – a book remains to be written on how international organisations stigmatise Israel when other countries with worse human rights records emerge unscathed. There are investigations still to pursue, but Herman has done her job, and done it well. This is an excellent, insightful monograph, which merits a wide audience and not just one of lawyers, or of Jews.

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NOTES

1 R (on the application of E) v. Governing Body of JFS [2009] 4 All E.R. 375 (Court of Appeal); (2010) 1 All E.R. 319 (Supreme Court)
2 Herman does not discuss Jordan v. Burgoyne [1963] 2 WLR1045, which Jews might claim as a success. The case emanates from Colin Jordan’s ‘Trafalgar Square’ speech that ‘Hitler Was Right’, which not surprisingly caused a breach of the peace.
3 See now the Equality Act 2010
4 [1976] AC 249
6 [2001] All E.R. (D) 257. It is worth observing that Holocaust deniers seem to accept that gypsies, Communists, the mentally ill and homosexuals were exterminated by the Nazis.
7 [2000] 1FLR 571
8 [2000] Fam. 15
9 [1995] 2 FLR 1
10 A series of related British criminal cases in the 1980s, involving allegations of share-trading fraud. The principal defendants were wealthy Jewish businessmen.
11 As I wrote this, the rants of John Galliano unravelled. See The Guardian March 2, 2011, Section 2 and now on the trial see The Guardian, 23 June 2011. It will be interesting to see what a French court makes of his anti-Semitic outbursts.
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*AJR Information* is the monthly journal of the Association of Jewish Refugees, a publication which first appeared in 1946, the Association itself having been established five years earlier. This journal has faithfully chronicled the lives and times, preoccupations, thoughts and feelings of those Jews – refugees from central European Nazism – who sought and were granted refuge in the United Kingdom between *circa* 1933 and 1939. One such was the Viennese businessman Arthur Grünfeld. His son, the British academic Dr Anthony Grenville (note the change of surname) has combed the pages of *AJR Information* to produce a very readable account of this refugee experience, but – principally – as reflected in its pages. It is, in other words, a sympathetic history, but economical with the truth in certain crucial respects.

Between the advent of a Nazi government in Germany in January 1933 and the outbreak of war in September 1939 some 60,000 or so mainly German, Austrian and Czech Jews found refuge in the UK. Of these around 40,000 (Dr Grenville puts the figure somewhat higher, at 50,000) settled permanently in Great Britain. Their welcome could have been much warmer than it was. Until 1938 the authority to make decisions as to which individual Jewish refugees from Nazism might be permitted to enter the UK was, for all practical purposes, in the hands of the Anglo-German banker Otto Schiff, who had received the OBE for his work on behalf of Belgian refugees during the Great War. Schiff was one of the four signatories of a remarkable pledge, given to the British government in April 1933, that effected to guarantee that no refugee from Germany, admitted (exceptionally) without proof of financial independence, would become “a charge to the state.” Instead, their entire maintenance was to be paid for by British Jewry.

In practice this meant that German (and later Austrian) refugees were admitted and refused admission on Schiff’s say-so. The Home Office trusted Schiff because his prejudices were their prejudices, and these were chiefly (at least until 1938) that those admitted should preferably be under 45 years of age, should preferably come from professional middle-class backgrounds, and should preferably be of a disposition tending towards willing assimilation into British society.

Dr Grenville has remarkably little to say about Schiff; there are but two brief compassionate mentions of him in the book. Yet the backbone (so to speak) of the *AJR* was composed of Schiff protégés. Neither does Dr Grenville have much to say about the religious affirmations of the refugees – in particular the orthodox Jews who were brought to England (and Scotland) mainly through the efforts of groups and individuals who
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worked outside (and to some extent in spite of) the best efforts of Schiff and his entourage. Nor does he examine in as much detail as he might the prejudice that was visited upon the refugees from Jewish as well as non-Jewish quarters in their country of adoption. He does, it is true, examine in some detail the events surrounding the so-called ‘Hampstead Petition’ presented to Parliament in the autumn of 1945, demanding that “aliens” then resident in the borough be moved into army or prisoner-of-war camps prior to their deportation. But he might have said much more than he does on the subject of prejudice from fellow Jews – for instance the well-documented refusal of the Hendon United Synagogue to permit refugees to arrange for a sermon to be preached to them in German (May 1940), because the Hendon Board of Management did not wish “to encourage gatherings of German people” – even though they were Jews!

The strengths of this book lie in its examination of German and Austrian refugees as social and cultural phenomena. Exhausted and in shock, these exiles, whilst of course immeasurably grateful to their host country, grieved for the societies they had been forced to abandon, and did their best to recreate and preserve – in what was for them a foreign land – the way of life to which they had been accustomed – the cuisine, the love of art and of classical music and literature, above all, perhaps, the shops and cafés: a secular but at the same time unmistakeably Jewish outlook that native Anglo-Jewish communities had largely lacked hitherto.

To a considerable extent the German and Austrian arrivals in Britain tended to marry either fellow German or Austrian Jews, or non-Jews. And Dr Grenville is surely right when he points out that these “Continental Britons” assimilated much more easily – and readily – into British society than into British-Jewish society, dominated as it then was by the children of the Polish and Russian emigrants whom German Jewry had so vocally denounced and denigrated a mere half-century before.

This would be a pleasing irony were it not also so deeply laden with tragedy.

Professor Geoffrey Alderman
Michael Gross Professor of Politics & Contemporary History, University of Buckingham


Zionism – the movement advocating the right of the Jews to national self-determination – has always been controversial within the modern Jewish world. In its early days the political Zionism of Herzl and his associates was challenged both by Jewish secularists (who feared for their
newly-emancipated status) and from within the camp of orthodoxy by those who descried Herzl’s presumption in attempting to bring about (it was argued) that which only the Almighty could bring about, and only in a time and manner of His choosing.

In the United Kingdom Chief Rabbi Hermann Adler denounced the first Zionist Congress (1897) as an “egregious blunder” and enthusiastically contributed to *Or Layesharim* (“Light Unto The Righteous”), a collection of anti-Zionist articles written by leading mainly eastern European rabbis and published in Warsaw in 1900. Twelve years later there took place in Kattowitz (Upper Silesia) the inaugural conference of *Agudas Yisroel*, the orthodox anti-Zionist answer to the Mizrachi movement. Jewish secularists did their best to torpedo the Balfour Declaration (1917) and members of *Neturei Karta* (which had split from *Agudas Yisroel* in the 1930s) lay down in front of Israeli tanks during Israel’s war of independence.

I make these points because none of them are made in Dr David Landy’s study of opposition to Israel from within the Jewish diaspora. His book lacks any historical dimension, and whilst one might be tempted to excuse this omission on the grounds that what he presents is, after all, a work of sociology (or, as he puts it, “public sociology”) [p. 4], and whilst one must also note that he excuses his failure to address contemporary orthodox anti-Zionism on the grounds that others have covered this particular terrain, and that, in any case, contacts between “such anti-secular groups” and “the worldly social movement” in which he is interested are “limited, often non-existent” [p.16], it would nonetheless have benefited him (to say nothing of his readers) if this historical dimension had at least been acknowledged. Besides which, within the crowds demonstrating against Israel (say in London, or New York) Jewish secularists of the broad left and Jewish sectarians of the rejectionist right are not infrequently to be found practically adjacent to each other. Divided on almost every other issue (such as gay rights, feminism, democracy, freedom of speech) they are united by only two things: their Jewishness and their aversion to the Jewish state.

So there is nothing new about this aversion, which Dr Landy would appear to share since he is by his own admission “active in the Palestine Solidarity Movement” [p.ii]. Nonetheless this is an important book. Its focus is on the range of Jewish (or mainly Jewish) Israel-critical secular movements that have for the most part emerged over the last decade or so. Its author asks some pointed questions about them. Why have they been formed? Why do Jews identify with them? What have they achieved? And in order to answer these questions Dr Landy has examined a great deal of literature (both hard-copy and web-based) and has conducted interviews with fellow participants.

The answers themselves are intriguing. Jewish participation in the ill-fated Gaza Flotilla of 2010 was apparently rooted less in a realistic
determination to run Israel’s blockade (which Dr Landy might have admitted is being enforced in strict conformity with customary international law as set out in the so-called San Remo Manual of 1994) than to advertise a certain admittedly idiosyncratic Jewish identity. “As a story,” Dr Landy correctly points out, “it pushes Palestinians to the margins and centres the struggle for Jewish identity” (p. 3).

Or take the “boycott” movement. In Dr Landy’s considered opinion (with which I happen to agree), “activists don’t seriously believe that their specific actions will stop Israeli goods reaching the market, but rather that through constituting themselves as worthy social actors able to exert pressure on suppliers of Israeli goods they can achieve their end” (p. 152) – which would appear to be largely symbolic. Dr Landy is honest and courageous enough to admit that Jewish support for boycott activities is, in part, “a purist affectation unconnected with trying to achieve real change.” “Among British interviewees,” he reveals, “it was precisely those more institutionally involved with Israel-critical Jewish groups … that were most dismissive of the boycott” (p. 159).

So what is actually going on here? “Most interviewees considered themselves outside the community, yet nevertheless saw themselves as Jewish, with many participating in Jewish events” (p. 140). In the immediate post-Holocaust period it is arguable that Zionism replaced Judaism as the core belief uniting British Jews. For many (not all) Israel-critical Jews, who have to a greater or lesser extent turned against this secular Zionism in which they were brought up, identification with an Israel-critical movement (however nebulous) thus provides, now, an alternative Jewish identity – one, moreover, which actually echoes and reaches back to the unashamed cultural cosmopolitanism that was a jewel in the crown of the European diaspora in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Dr Landy (an Irish-Jewish academic) bravely points out, in this connection, that there has been criticism of his own Palestine Solidarity Movement from Palestinians, who ask “whether its purpose is simply to make liberal diaspora Jews feel better about themselves – identity construction rather than genuine solidarity” (p.18). Dr. Landy seems to feel (letter in the Jewish Chronicle, 29 July 2011) that the answer is no. I fear, however, that – on the basis of his own research as set out in this volume – the answer has to be a resounding yes.

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In Population Studies, 65:2 (Routledge, 2011), Laura Staetsky writes on *The role of smoking in the explanation of the Israeli Jewish pattern of sex differentials in mortality.*

She examines patterns in the years 1951–53, 1973–75 and 1995–97 and finds the difference in life expectancy between women and men among Israeli Jews is very low relative to the difference in other developed countries, noting that the reasons for this are not fully understood. The paper explores the contribution of smoking to the observed patterns of sex-specific mortality among Israeli Jews, and to the sex difference in mortality exhibited by this population. The results show that the mortality of Israeli Jewish men is low owing to the relatively weak impact of smoking-related mortality, and that this also contributes to an explanation of the small sex difference. The result is explained by the high level of health-protective behaviour of Israeli Jewish men, including a low intensity of smoking (though not a low prevalence). The findings could have implications for some debates on the determinants of divergences and convergences in mortality, and research into the relationship between mortality and the Mediterranean diet.

Data for the comparator populations used in the study came from the World Health Organization’s Statistical Information System which provides statistics on deaths by age, sex, and cause, and base-population estimates in a corresponding format. Data on deaths for Israeli Jews in the 1950s and 1970s came from the same source, and for the 1990s from a data file specially requested from the Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel. Base-population estimates for Israeli Jews in the 1950s and 1970s were taken from the annual Statistical Abstracts of Israel and for the 1990s were from a data file specially requested from the Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel.

Link to full article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2011.571280
Volume 15, 2010 of the Papers of the Sociological Institute for Community Studies at Bar-Ilan University is titled *From State Socialism to State Judaism: ‘Russian’ Immigrants in Israel and their Attitudes towards Religion*, and written by Larissa Remennick and Anna Prashizky; they were both born in Russia and immigrated to Israel in 1991.

They report on the findings of a research project that examined attitudes and behaviours relating to religion among 1990s Soviet immigrants in Israel. The study included a national sample survey of 507 Russian-speaking immigrants and a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews with 50 informants representing different positions on a secular-religious scale. The report looks at identity and religion among Jews in the Late Soviet and Post-Soviet Period, Attitudes towards Judaism and Organised Religion among Russian-Jewish Immigrants and Current Religious Beliefs and Practices among Russian Israelis.

Website: http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/so/Sociology_papers/Sociologypapers.htm

In 2009 in London, Rosalind Preston convened a group to revisit the issues of the 1994 Review of Women in the Jewish Community, which she had spearheaded. This was in response to widespread communal interest about the outcomes of that Review. The new group reported its findings in *Connection, Continuity and Community: British Jewish Women Speak Out*. The report illustrates a perceived gulf between women’s achievements and aspirations in secular life and their Jewish communal and spiritual experience. It pinpoints high calibre Jewish education as the key to the future, recognising that if British Jewish women are not now empowered by learning and understanding they will not be able to inspire their daughters and their sons. Above all the respondents identified the need to rethink the assumptions about how community is defined and how women may connect with it.

The full report is available on www.bod.org.uk/publications

On 3rd October 2011 the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (London) published *Home and away: Jewish journeys towards independence – Key findings from the 2011 National Jewish Student Survey* by David Graham and Jonathan Boyd. This reported the results of a British survey carried out in February and March 2011.

The sample contained 925 valid responses from Jewish students covering 95 different institutions; 43 students also took part in focus groups. A parallel study among the general student population elicited 761 valid
responses. Topics covered in the study are: Jewish upbringing and Jewish
journeys; university life; accommodation and finance; Jewish beliefs and
behaviours including ethnic and religious attitudes and ethical Jewish
behaviour; Jewish social life including relationships and attitudes to
intermarriage; attitudes towards Israel and Israel-related experiences
on campus; experiences of antisemitism and views on Britain’s Jewish
community.

The full report is available on http://www.jpr.org.uk/publications as are
the following reports that the Institute published in 2011.

*Jewish life in Hungary: Achievements, challenges and
priorities since the collapse of communism.*
Authors: Andras Kovacs and Aletta Forras-Biro

*Jewish life in Poland: Achievements, challenges and priorities
since the collapse of communism*
Author: Konstanty Gebert

These two projects were designed to assess the development of Jewish
communities in East-Central Europe since the collapse of communism,
as well as the challenges they face going forward and were conducted
by local scholars.

*Key trends in the British Jewish Community: A review of data
on poverty, the elderly and children*
Authors: Sarah Abramson, David Graham, Jonathan Boyd

This study provides an overview of existing reliable demographic data
related to three issues within the British Jewish community: poverty
(including indigence and distress), the elderly (including care, welfare
and support) and children (including care, welfare and support and
education)