



AMPLIFYING ANTISEMITISM:

HOW RECOMMENDER ALGORITHMS SERVE HARMFUL CONTENT TO CHILDREN

This research investigates how recommender algorithms on TikTok and Rumble expose UK minors to antisemitic content.

Analysts created ten TikTok profiles representing 15-year-old users with varied political and cultural interests, including neutral interest in the Israel-Palestine conflict, left and right-wing political interest, male lifestyle influencer content, far-right content and two neutral accounts. The profiles were prompted towards relevant topics for each interest through an hour and a half of manual content viewing, followed by content engagement via bespoke bot over 14 days, resulting in over 5,500 recommended videos. Thematic analysis clustered content into ten core themes, revealing pathways from neutral lifestyle content to highly politicised and conspiratorial clusters. Relevant themes were manually reviewed, revealing that harmful content persisted through videos, comments, and TikTok's sticker and sound features, illustrating systemic gaps in safeguarding minors.

On Rumble, analysts collected 4,412 videos from the platform's "Editor's Picks" over six months. Analysts filtered for antisemitism-related keywords and reviewed 259 videos potentially relevant to antisemitism. Findings show Rumble hosts more overt antisemitic content than TikTok, including slurs, Holocaust distortion, and conspiracies about Jewish control. These findings underscore urgent gaps in platform accountability and the need for robust enforcement of the Online Safety Act to protect children from the normalisation and mainstreaming of antisemitic content.

Content warning: The following report includes examples of antisemitic language and hate speech.

KEY FINDINGS

1. Algorithmic amplification can quickly expose minors to antisemitic content

TikTok's recommender systems actively shape pathways where children can encounter antisemitic narratives—even without searching for them.

- ↳ A 15-year-old boy interested in male lifestyle influencers only needed to be on TikTok for an hour before being served antisemitic conspiracy theories.
- ↳ A 15-year-old boy with interest in left-wing politics only needed to spend an hour and a half on TikTok before being served content from Hamas former spokesperson Abu Obeida, or videos glorifying the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

2. TikTok's algorithm escalates content from benign to harmful

Starting from mainstream prompts, accounts were nudged toward content which exposed them to conspiracy theories, Holocaust distortion, and far-right tropes within only a few hours.

- ↳ The most common themes in all videos collected were the Israel-Palestine conflict (22%), culture and lifestyle (19%) and national politics (16%).
- ↳ TikToks about the Israel-Palestine conflict and conspiracy theories were most likely to be antisemitic.
- ↳ Users without an interest in politics were much less likely to be served antisemitic content than those with an interest.
- ↳ Antisemitic content was most prominent in content about the Israel-Palestine conflict and national politics.
- ↳ Antisemitic videos were most quickly recommended to users with left-wing politics, neutral interest in the conflict and male lifestyle influencer content consumers.

3. Interactive features amplify hate

Stickers, sounds, and comment sections on TikTok acted as bridges between potentially benign videos and more overt antisemitic content. Examples include Holocaust memes, neo-Nazi imagery, and far-right codes.

4. Holocaust distortion and denial content has high engagement

Videos contesting the six million death toll and using coded dog whistles like “6 gorillion” averaged tens of thousands of likes and shares before removal, showing strong engagement.

5. The manosphere bleeds into with antisemitism

Accounts prompted toward male lifestyle influencer content were served misogynistic and antisemitic conspiracies, including neo-Nazi codes and glorification of Isla Vista terrorist Elliot Rodger, highlighting cross-pollination between misogyny and antisemitism.

6. Rumble promotes overt antisemitism through its “Editor’s Picks”

Unlike TikTok's gradual escalation, Rumble's ‘Editor’s Picks’ section exposed minors to direct antisemitic slurs, conspiracy myths, and calls to violence from the outset. Its non-account model makes harmful content available to any user, which is surfaced through its algorithm.

7. Conspiracy narratives are persistent across platforms

Both platforms amplified ideas of Jewish greed or influence, Rothschild conspiracies, and false claims alleging Jewish culpability for the 9/11 and October 7 attacks. These narratives adapt to current events and remain resilient online.

8. Platform moderation is patchy and reactive

While some antisemitic videos were removed, harmful stickers and coded sounds often remained. TikTok's automated moderation failed to catch visual hate, and Rumble's livestream features allowed paid antisemitic GIFs to appear prominently.

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INTRODUCTION

Social media platforms have become central to how young people consume information, shaping their identities, worldviews and social development.¹ However, platform design choices which are central to business models—particularly recommender algorithms—pose significant risks when it comes to pushing harmful content to users.² Antisemitic content is not just present online, but amplified through curated ecosystems, optimised for engagement. This amplification creates pathways for minors to encounter and interact with antisemitic material, often without actively seeking it.

Studies show that recommender systems on platforms like TikTok, Instagram, and Facebook prioritise content that drives interaction, inadvertently boosting sensationalist and polarising material, including hate speech and antisemitic tropes.³ TikTok, in particular, has drawn scrutiny for its algorithmic architecture, which rapidly personalises feeds based on minimal engagement signals. ISD’s 2025 analysis demonstrates how TikTok’s search and recommendation functions reproduce societal biases, linking hateful queries to harmful stereotypes across multiple languages.⁴ Similarly, longitudinal research on TikTok documents a dramatic rise in antisemitic usernames and comments, underscoring the platform’s role in normalising such content among younger audiences.⁵

Algorithmic amplification does not operate in isolation. It interacts with cultural trends like meme-based communication, which cloaks antisemitic messages in humour and coded language, making detection and moderation more challenging.⁶ These dynamics create “spirals of hate,” where initial exposure—sometimes accidental—leads to increasingly extreme content recommendations.⁷ Despite moderation efforts, opaque algorithmic systems and limited transparency hinder accountability and effective intervention.

Responding to social media platforms’ failures to effectively moderate the scale of illegal and harmful content seen by young people in the UK, the Online Safety Act (OSA) imposes duties on platforms.⁸ Ofcom’s Codes of Practice compel large social media platforms to take measures to protect children from encountering harmful content – including content which incites hatred or violence – and taking steps to exclude it from recommender systems. Having come into force in July 2025, there remain questions over the ability of these codes to deliver change and protect young people.

This report investigates how – and the extent to which – antisemitic content is served to minors through recommender algorithms. By examining algorithmic design, amplification patterns, and user experience, the research aims to inform child safety and counter-antisemitism policy strategies that protect vulnerable users from online harm.

This research will focus on two platforms identified as particularly relevant to young people; TikTok and Rumble. TikTok is a large social media and short-form video platform particularly popular among young people. It shows users an endless, swipeable feed of short videos—usually full-screen, vertical clips with music, effects, and comments layered on top. Ofcom’s annual report found that TikTok is the most-used single source for news among 12-15 years old news consumers, and is used by nearly half of UK 16-17 year olds.⁹ Rumble is a Canadian-based video-sharing platform which describes itself as a “free speech alternative” to the “Big Tech Giants”, with a stated “mission to protect a free and open internet”.¹⁰ On Rumble, users upload or browse a scrollable feed of mostly horizontal videos, presented in a YouTube-like layout with channels, comments, and recommended content. It is popular among right-wing users, including extremist creators and audiences; previous ISD research has indicated that Rumble plays an important role in the right-wing extremist and conspiracy theorist online milieu.¹¹ A first section of this report explores how antisemitic content is recommended to 10 accounts created to represent UK minors. Secondly, it explores the prevalence and nature of antisemitic content on Rumble’s “Editor’s Picks” section, before concluding with a policy analysis at the intersection of antisemitism and online child safety.

METHODOLOGY

Data collection on TikTok started with the creation of 10 profiles of different political leaning that were then manually trained by researchers. All profiles were created by a UK-based analyst and trained by two analysts. All profiles declared their birthday 1 September 2010, making each account 15 years old at the time of training. Data was collected in September 2025. Between each account training process, analysts logged out of TikTok and deleted the app and all of its data so as to ensure a neutral starting place for the next account.

Profiles were curated to generate a balance across genders and thematic interests. Topic search terms were selected to indicate interests, while retaining little relevance to antisemitism. Accounts indicated their interests by inputting five selected search terms at specific points across the following categories: two accounts neutrally interested in the Israel-Palestine conflict, two mainstream right-wing accounts, two mainstream left-wing accounts, one manosphere-adjacent account, one far-right account and two controls. Table one shows the 10 profiles created and the search terms used to indicate their interests.

Figure 1: The 10 TikTok profiles created for data collection.

Gender	Category	Topic search terms	Account name
Male	Neutral conflict reporting	Israel; Gaza; Palestine; October 7; Hamas	Zackary Brent
Male	Left wing	Trans rights; Just Stop Oil; climate change protests; refugee support	Roberto Dean
Male	Right wing	Free speech UK; anti-woke; illegal immigration; British patriot	Richard Sharp
Male	Manosphere	Red pill; sigma grindset; alpha male; high value man	Lewis Young
Male	Control	n/a	Dan Hadley
Female	Neutral conflict reporting	Israel; Gaza; Palestine; October 7; Hamas	Jenna Clifford
Female	Left wing	Trans rights protect; Just Stop Oil; stop climate change; refugee support	Jennie Hobbs
Female	Right wing	Free speech UK; anti-woke; illegal immigration; British patriot	Collette Calvert
Female	Far right	TJD, ZOG, jewish lobby, rothschilds	Molly Francis
Female	Control	n/a	Ayesha Hunt

The account training process comprised six sessions, each of 15 minutes, as shown in figure two. This process was designed to most effectively imitate organic platform usage, while indicating topics of interest to the algorithm.

Figure 2: The manual account training process for each profile

1. Scroll through For You Page
2. Input relevant search terms, watching the top three videos for each search result
3. Scroll through For You Page
4. Input relevant search terms, watching the top three videos for each search result
5. Scroll through For You Page
6. Scroll through For You Page

In order to establish a baseline, the first session of each account watched content likely to be relevant to a 15-year-old child. This typically included classroom content, videos featuring people of a similar age, videos about GCSEs and skits about parents and teachers. By the end of each first session, the analyst was confident that TikTok had appropriately identified the account as a UK-based child.

At each stage, analysts watched relevant videos to the end and scrolled past irrelevant videos. Analysts also screenshotted and copied links to the most relevant videos to further prompt the algorithm, building a user engagement pattern which may further prompt the algorithm.


This research methodology was designed to replicate platform engagement in a manner which most closely

represents user viewing habits, while facilitating large-scale data collection. However, data collected through automated techniques may not be fully representative of all user experiences.

Data collection

After each account was trained for a total of 1.5 hours, the accounts were transferred to a dedicated Android smartphone for automated data collection. The account information was exported using TikTok's data export tool, that contains the list of all videos that were recommended and watched with the account. An open source TikTok Content Scraper was used to download the videos and collect the metadata, including video description and author information.

Figure 3: Methodological process for data collection on TikTok



Analysts counted the most commonly used key phrases and hashtags in all videos from each account from which a video was collected. From the 50 most used key phrases and hashtags in each account, approximately 10 were selected that best fit the profile that was designed.

ISD analysts built a bespoke bot to automate the training of sock puppet accounts, improving the ability to collect larger datasets and reducing potential analyst exposure to harm.

The 10 most relevant identified words for each account were input into the bot, used as the basis for an automated scrolling phase. TikTok accounts were operated by a bot that monitored the description of each video, comparing it to the set of words. Dependent on similarity, the bot either swiped to the next video or watched the video for at least 60 seconds. This procedure was repeated 15 minutes per account for 14 days totalling over 5,500 watched videos. Afterwards, the videos were downloaded and transcribed using an automated tool.

To conduct thematic analysis, datasets of video transcripts were uploaded to Nomic Atlas, a tool which generates topic theme maps by clustering semantically similar terms. Each cluster was manually verified by a subject matter expert and assigned a sub-theme. Sub-themes were grouped together into 10 central themes, shown in figure four.

Figure 4: Themes of TikTok videos

Theme	Volume of videos
Conspiracy theories	233
Culture & Lifestyle	1278
Iran	273
Israel-Palestine Conflict	1523
Manosphere	389
Migration	1036
National Politics	1070
Psychology	570
Religion	445

Dependent on the identified interests of each account, they contributed to themes in different proportions. Figure five shows thematic data broken down per account. Both the accounts prompted towards neutral interest in the conflict and those interested in broad left-wing politics featured a significant volume of

conflict-related videos. Richard Sharp, whose account focused on right-wing content, mainly watched videos about migration. The majority of psychology and manosphere content was watched by Lewis Young, who was prompted by keywords related to male lifestyle influencers. Both the control accounts, Dan Hadley and Ayesha Hunt, comprised the majority of 'culture and lifestyle' content.

Figure four visualises labelled themes and their constituent sub-themes. Sub-themes focused on key current events, including the Global Sumud Flotilla, the assassination of Charlie Kirk and the Unite the Kingdom rally. Much of the political content centred on political parties; more fringe parties such as Your Party and Reform UK were far more prominent than mainstream ones. While both pro- and anti-Israel content was originally surfaced, the algorithm quickly adjusted political leaning based on watched videos.

EXAMINING USER JOURNEYS

Figure six is cluster visualisation where each dot represents a TikTok video, and colours correspond to thematic categories. The clusters indicate how topics are grouped and interconnected by TikTok's recommender algorithm. The second largest cluster, culture and lifestyle, includes generic content served to minors. This cluster includes the vast majority of videos from the control accounts and the first scrolling session of all other accounts. Its centrality in the topic theme map is indicative of its role as an entry point for all other themes.


The dense cluster in the bottom-right quadrant represents videos about the Israel-Palestine conflict: its size and cohesion indicate significant exposure to posts about the conflict. The topic theme map is broadly split into two halves; the top half includes baseline and popular national content. Two closely related themes – national politics and migration – are intertwined in the top right. The top left of the map shows the proximity between baseline content, motivational videos and manosphere themes.

The bottom half includes a closely related cluster of videos about the conflict, Iran and religion. The navy blue cluster (Israel-Palestine) is the most likely direct source of antisemitic narratives, but its proximity to Religion, Iran, and National Politics creates multiple reinforcement pathways.

The majority of antisemitic content was found in the conspiracy theories theme, which has two major clusters; one within the national politics theme and the other in the Israel-Palestine conflict theme. This indicates that these two themes are the most likely videos from which the recommender algorithm would start surfacing antisemitic content.


Overall, the centrality of Culture & Lifestyle means minors could be algorithmically nudged from neutral content toward extremist narratives through

| **Figure 7:** A topic theme map of TikTok videos recommended to 10 children



Roberto Dean

| **Figure 8:** A topic theme map for videos recommended to Roberto Dean



The Roberto Dean account was trained on mainstream left-wing prompts, including climate justice, LGBTQ+ rights content and support for refugees. In the third session, pro-migrant and anti-racist content was being regularly surfaced. After ten minutes, recommended videos featured Jeremy Corbyn and Novara Media. Pro-Palestine content was organically recommended to the user without any prompting relevant to the Middle East.

In the fourth session, content about ‘Your Party’ was regularly recommended to the user. Additional recommended videos also included some conspiratorial content, including a Candace Owens clip alleging a link between Israel and paedophilia. A number of videos also discussed conversion to Islam.


In the fifth session, the user was recommended videos with Quranic verses and a high volume of pro-Iran content, including speeches by Ayatollah Khomeini and glorification of assassinated IRGC leader Qassem Soleimani.

By the final manual training session, a large amount of Iranian military content was recommended, including weapons parades and pro-Soleimani videos. A number of antisemitic videos were suggested, including multiple references to a Jewish or Zionist lobby, Zionist occupation and the ‘Zionist occupied government’, a term often associated with far-right conspiracy theories. Two videos appeared to show Hamas tunnels in Gaza, overlaid with speeches by former Hamas spokesperson Abu Obeida.

This account shows how a young person with neutral left-wing interests was served biased – and at some points conspiratorial – information about the Israel-Palestine conflict without any prompting towards interest in the conflict.

Lewis Young

| **Figure 9:** A topic theme map for videos recommended to Lewis Young



Lewis Young’s account was prompted to show interest in male lifestyle influencer sub-cultures, which are adjacent to the manosphere. The manosphere is a loosely connected online network, mainly comprised of men, covering a range of topics held together by a form of male supremacism.¹² Very soon after the relevant search terms were inputted, looksmaxxing,¹³ red pill¹⁴ and black pill¹⁵ content was recommended, as well as one video about ropesmaxxing, a trend that often urges users to die by suicide.¹⁶

In the third and fourth training sessions, recommended content transformed from black pill edits to motivational quotes – particularly Machiavelli – and some conspiratorial content, including ideas about ‘taking control’ and the great reset.


By the fifth session, a number of antisemitic conspiracy theories were served, including videos about the alleged power and influence of Rothschilds and Blavatniks. Some far-right codes were used to allege that Jews control the media. Overt far-right videos were served to Young in the sixth session,

including conspiracies that Jews control Hollywood, neo-Nazi codes, the fourteen words¹⁷ and four videos which supported Hitler and either denied or celebrated the Holocaust. One video featured an image of Elliot Roger, a misogynist mass shooter who killed six people in the 2014 Isla Vista attacks.

Starting from manosphere-adjacent prompts, Young's journey through recommended videos evidences how algorithms offer increasingly harmful misogynist content, including terrorist imagery. It further demonstrates the short jump between manosphere and extreme-right online ecosystems.

Molly Francis

| **Figure 10:** A topic theme map for videos recommended to Molly Francis



Molly Francis' account was trained on far-right codewords in order to understand the extent to which overtly extremist content is available on TikTok. The terms searched in the second session returned dogwhistle content, including, for example, the term '271'. This is a coded reference to Holocaust distortion, based on the conspiracy theory that only 271,000 Jews were killed, referencing a supposed Red Cross document from the time. Some far-right search terms were appropriately blocked by platform, including TJD, a code for the term 'Total Jewish Death'. However, the term 'Totally Jolly Day', which is commonly used as a code when the former term is banned, was not blocked, and far-right content was therefore still accessible.

Throughout the following sessions, Francis was recommended a range of antisemitic content, including conspiracies about the Rothschilds, the Jewish lobby, theories about Israel's interests in Charlie Kirk's assassination, and a video featuring

Holocaust denier David Icke. One video included a meme about the terrorist who killed 51 people in two New Zealand mosques in 2019.

The spread-out nature of the topic theme map of Francis' videos shows how antisemitic content is recommended to users with a wide range of interests. However, the majority of content from Francis' account related to religion or the Israel-Palestine conflict, despite no prompting of any keywords related to the conflict. This demonstrates once again the proximity between conflict-related and antisemitic content on TikTok, where the recommender algorithm easily nudges the user between the two themes.

While some overt antisemitic terms were blocked, many remained readily recommended to Francis' account. While attempts have been made by TikTok to remove access to the most harmful content, their picture of online antisemitic codes remains patchy.

THEMATIC ANALYSIS

This section presents the different antisemitic narratives found in the content recommended to all sock puppet accounts used for this study. To do this, analysts reviewed the content under the themes and subthemes visible in the user-journey map above, labelling videos as antisemitic or relevant where applicable and clustering them into different types of narratives. The subsections below are the result of this task, providing deeper, qualitative insight into the narratives served to the accounts of minors on TikTok.


Conspiracy theories about Jewish control

A recurrent antisemitic theme was the typical conspiratorial claim that Jewish people are involved in a global conspiracy for money, power and control. These theories are in alignment with the classical antisemitic belief that Jews, often referred to as “Zionists”, secretly control governments worldwide,

their economies, and other key institutions.¹⁸ Crucially, analysts found evidence of these conspiracies proliferating across the political spectrum, including in far-right, far-left and radicalised conspiracy spaces. One example of this is the use of the phrase “Zionist Occupied Government” or “ZOG” to refer to a perceived Jewish cabal.¹⁹ Overall, conspiratorial content sought to depict Jewish people as a covert, threatening entity purportedly seeking world domination through secret, malicious means.

For example, conspiracies were often framed around the Rothschilds, an influential Jewish banking family that has historically been targeted by antisemitic claims of this type.²⁰ In this regard, examining the feed of the listed sock puppet accounts, analysts were recommended conspiratorial content surrounding the Rothschilds and their global influence, for example claiming that they had orchestrated the events leading to the Balfour Declaration (figure nine).

Figure 11: Conspiratorial content targeting the Rothschild family; a post by Candace Owens promoting ZOG-related narratives; and a video advancing antisemitic, theology-based claims about Israel’s objectives in Gaza.



TikTok also recommended content by Candace Owens, a conservative US influencer known to have shared antisemitic tropes in the past.²¹ The platform surfaced videos by Owens asserting that Jews are in control of notorious social media companies like TikTok, thereby promoting the idea that Jews are in control of global free speech (figure 11).²² TikTok's algorithm also surfaced content from conservative influencer Candace Owens. Content by Owens also alleged links between Israeli state officials and paedophilia, claiming Jeffrey Epstein to have worked for Israel in the past.²³ Although recent claims linking Epstein, Israelis, and paedophilia have recently gained significant traction, these narratives are not new. For years, conspiracy theories have tied²⁴ Jewish communities to fictional paedophile rings in the context of broader Blood Libel tropes²⁵, as well as amplified by QAnon circles.²⁶


Lastly, ISD found false, antisemitic theology-based conspiracies claiming that the actions by the Israeli

government in Gaza are part of a religious, sacrificial ritual looking to force the end of the world by uniting the world against Jews, convinced that only Jews will prevail (figure 11).

Conspiracy theory-related content was often presented as “independent research” by its creators in commentary format. Although said research was provided without mentioning authoritative sources, it still elicited a significant volume of user engagement, with single videos amassing up to 33,500 likes, 1,000 comments, 4,600 shares and 507,000 views.

In reviewing the comment sections of the videos in question, analysts found user responses echoing the conspiracies shared (figure 12) not only in the form of solely text-based comments, but also, visualised with TikTok's sticker function. Herein, analysts underscored concerns that content promoting antisemitic conspiracy theories could be a conduit to even more hateful manifestations of antisemitism, particularly through the use of egregious imagery in the form of stickers.

Figure 12: Examples of stickers posted by users in the comments section of a Candace Owens video.



For example, figure 12 (right) shows the caricature from the antisemitic “Happy Merchant” meme coming out of a Star of David-branded TV while manipulating the watcher’s brain. The “Happy Merchant” caricature is a widely circulated meme in online white-supremacist spaces, portraying a Jewish man with exaggerated, cliché-ridden characteristics rubbing his hands together. Figure 12 (left) is a metaphor showing a convening of Jewish men as the alleged content moderators deciding over social media’s community guidelines.

Further examples include images of a laughing Jew next to the images of modern tragedies such as 9/11 or the assassination of conservative activist Charlie Kirk (figure 13, left), as well as other types of hatefully motivated, conspiratorial imagery claiming Jewish responsibility for global issues (figure 13, right).


Figure 13: Examples of user-generated stickers “memeifying” hateful representations of conspiratorial takes.



9/11 conspiracies: The “Dancing Israelis”

Among the content discovered in the sock puppet training process, analysts found antisemitic, conspiratorial content claiming that Jewish Israeli nationals were responsible for the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States.

Figure 14: Video promoting the “Dancing Israelis” conspiracy theory.



Online, this false flag operation²⁷ theory is often referred to as the “Dancing Israelis”, and is broadly directed at Jewish people or supporters of Zionism depending on its iteration (figure 14).²⁸ Some versions go as far as to claim involvement by Mossad, Israel’s Intelligence Service, or that Israelis had insider knowledge of the attack before it took place.²⁹ This conspiracy theory was found both in far-right ecosystems and in sections of the Palestine solidarity movement such as in figure 14. The alleged proof behind this narrative is based on a video circulated among conspiracy works of “five dancing Israelis” that were purportedly seen celebrating the attack as the Twin Towers fell. According to the conspiracy, these individuals were subsequently arrested but freed shortly after, appearing on Israeli TV only months after the event took place.

Creators behind the antisemitic conspiracies about 9/11 mostly presented their content in the form of “research findings” provided in commentary format. Users shared graphic, “memeified” imagery via TikTok’s sticker functionality on videos’ comment sections. Here, the role of stickers is central to depicting theories in a visually impactful way to other users.

Stickers found included partly AI-generated content showing the burning Twin Towers next to laughing Jews, or the caption “Zionists did it”. Another prominently shared sticker included a 9/11 “infographic” featuring the title “Every single aspect of 9/11 is Jewish”. The sticker displayed the names of the alleged perpetrators, who are pictured with the Star of David on their foreheads, and provided different short-format descriptions of various iterations surrounding this conspiracy.

Figure 15: User reactions to antisemitic 9/11 conspiracies.



One video promoting this narrative was found to reach approximately 1,600 likes, 30 comments and 180 shares over a few weeks, with comments featuring the use of graphic stickers obtaining no more than a dozen likes and often being liked by the creator(s) themselves.

The assassination of Charlie Kirk

TikTok additionally recommended conspiratorial videos implying Israel to be responsible for the death of US conservative activist Charlie Kirk. This narrative falls within a wide historical trend of antisemitic theories centred around the involvement or “hidden hand” of Israelis or Jews in key historical crises, such as 9/11. This theory can be considered another manifestation of antisemitic conspiracy theories seeking to portray Jews as an abstract, secret elite holding unlimited power over governments and businesses to the extent of being able to orchestrate grand scale schemes to preserve power.

The video in figure 16 amassed nearly 200,000 likes and was shared around 19,000 times. It also recorded around 4,000 comments, with some users reacting with hateful stickers alluding to or aestheticising the Holocaust. Furthermore, mainstreamed conspiracies about key events closely bridged to more overt forms of antisemitism, with children exposed to neo-Nazi views in comments sections not just videos. Stickers in the comments included references to gas chambers, depicting Jewish people as bars of soap (figure 17). Other stickers also included an AI-generated image depicting a white woman in a Nazi uniform removing Star of David-shaped biscuits from an oven, a

common metaphor in antisemitic circles online (figure 17, centre). Other imagery featured the figure of Adolf Hitler looking at the horizon, with the sun covered by a swastika (figure 17, right), as well as a picture of Jeffrey Epstein reading “US politicians stand with Israel because I blackmailed them”, alluding to claims of Jewish people being paedophiles.

Figure 16: TikTok video claiming Charlie Kirk would be alive if Israel disappeared.






Figure 17: User reactions to antisemitic 9/11 conspiracies.



Other unrelated content, such as a video on Mossad, saw users sharing stickers featuring AI imagery mocking the death of Charlie Kirk as well as insinuating Mossad involvement in the killing.

Figure 18: AI-generated meme claiming Mossad involvement behind Charlie Kirk's murder



Holocaust distortion and denial

Analysts were also served content distorting and relativising well-established facts from the Holocaust. These kinds of videos mainly contested the official death toll of six million Jews that were killed during this historical period. Herein, content creators made coded references to “six million cookies” or “271k”, thereby seeking to relativise the actual victim count. Recommended videos included captions such as “You’re so sure it was 6 million but you can’t even name 300,000? Curious.” or “How it feels to hang out with bro who also knows it wasn’t 6 million” (figure 19).

Holocaust denial has long been at the crossroads of both conspiratorial and hateful actors, with social media platforms and memes posing a key medium for their dissemination.³⁰ On the conspiratorial side, the 271k reference stems from a death toll figure stated in the Arolsen Archives, which is often referenced by Holocaust deniers.³¹ The document registered 271,000 victims based on death certificates that were recorded from a limited number of concentration camps. Furthermore, it does not list the death toll in its entirety, as it did not account for all death camps nor were death certificates properly documented in many of them. References to “6 million cookies” or “6 gorillion” are used as antisemitic dog whistles looking to discredit facts, diminish the scale of the Holocaust as well as the experiences of Jews during this time.

The Holocaust distortion content in figure 19 averaged considerable engagement at around 31,000 likes, 1,000 comments, and nearly 5,000 shares. This demonstrates the reach of Holocaust denialist narratives in limited time, as the content collected was taken down by the platform between the time of collection and the time of writing.

Furthermore, users commented further references to 271k in textual format, often incorporating coded speech referring to Adolf Hitler as the “Austrian painter”, depicting the Schutzstaffel (SS) as two lightning emojis, or speaking about Jews in a derogatory manner with a juice box emoji.

Far-right content


Additional videos promoted general white supremacist ideas, provided AI voiceovers of speeches by Adolf Hitler, as well as lists with the names of Jewish actors, each next to a Star of David (figure 20).

One video in this category amassed up to around 27,900 likes, 475 comments, 5,450 shares and 188,100 views over a few weeks. Furthermore, analysts observed how TikTok sounds were instrumentalised in the production of antisemitic


content. Videos were combined with the Jewish folk song “Hava Nagila”, which previous research has shown is used by antisemitic users as a dog whistle often being overlooked by platform moderation.³² Other forms of coded language included user

mentions of “the Austrian painter”, which refers to Adolf Hitler due to his past as a painter before rising to power. Far-right content also included blood libel tropes and videos recommending books by far-right philosopher Julia Evola.

| **Figure 19:** Several TikTok examples promoting Holocaust distortion




| **Figure 20:** Far-right content recommended by TikTok.



Bob Vylan’s “Death to the IDF” as a sound: Calls to violence resulting in hateful user responses

The For You feed of sock puppet accounts also featured several videos with Bob Vylan’s “Death to the IDF” as a sound, a tune which was popularised during his performance at the Glastonbury Festival in 2025 and which was highly scrutinised due to its incendiary nature.³³ ISD identified a small subset of videos that used the sound as a dog whistle, similar to the use of “Hava Nagila” detailed above. In this way, content displaying anti-Israel symbols and hateful depictions of the Israeli flag (figure 21) led on to hateful, antisemitic user reactions in the comments.

Figure 21: TikTok videos featuring anti-Israel symbols alongside Bob Vylan’s “Death to the IDF” chants.



Analysts found graphic content featuring Bob Vylan’s “Death to the IDF” track to elicit particularly antisemitic responses in the form of stickers containing hateful imagery. One video amassed around 5,600 likes, 597 comments, 177 shares and 29,700 views. As shown in figure 22, this included various forms of dehumanising depictions of Jewish people. This raises concerns about how anti-Israel statements can be catalysts to large quantities of user-driven, antisemitic hate. It also underscored the importance for platforms to understand potentially harmful sounds in context, as their prominence makes this content available to the accounts of minors on the platform.

Figure 22: Stickers used by users in the commentary section of a TikTok video featuring Bob Vylan’s “Death to the IDF”.



Violence glorification

Beyond content glorifying Adolf Hitler, analysts identified content glorifying Iranian military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Such content, often in the form of GenAI images or videos, included nuclear glorification showing Iranian missile parades or videos glorifying Ali Khamenei or Qassem Soleimani.

Content glorifying Iran was met with users using stickers of imagery praising Ali Khamenei and Iran’s military power, as well as caricatures showing Iran as a hawkish force preying on Israel, with Israel’s depiction as a rat harnessing classic antisemitic imagery (figure 23). Videos in this category averaged considerable engagement, with single videos reaching up to around 80,800 likes, 1,800 comments, 7,700 shares and 1.5 million views.

Additional videos displayed what purportedly seemed to be images from Hamas’ tunnel network in Gaza (figure 24). Furthermore, analysts noted that creators of content glorifying violence recommended by the platform, such as ones showing Hamas’s tunnel network, exploited TikTok’s sound feature by using quotes of former Hamas leader Abu Obeida as a sound. This indicates how, beyond its weaponisation for the use of dog whistles, TikTok sounds are also leveraged for the promotion of terrorist content.

Figure 23: Stickers shared by users under videos glorifying Iran’s leadership and military.





Figure 24: TikTok videos glorifying Iran (left, middle), and showing Hamas’s tunnel network (right).




The Manosphere-antisemitism overlap

Antisemitic narratives from content discussed in this section (e.g., 9/11 & ZOG conspiracies, far-right content) were recommended to the sock puppet that consumed content adjacent to the manosphere. Among edits of Elliot Rodger, “blackpill” or “looksmaxxing” content, sock puppets encountered antisemitic conspiracies in their feeds as well as the comment sections of manosphere videos. Whereas past research has highlighted overlaps between

antisemitism and misogyny, there is limited research on antisemitic manifestations in manosphere environments.³⁴

Analysts found users reacting to manosphere content in the form of stickers, aestheticising Hitler as a “high tier normie” (htn) or “chadlite” and depicting so-called “Chads” as being part of the Aryan race next to hateful, antisemitic imagery (figure 25). The use of antisemitic coded language was also prominent, with mentions of 271k and the use of the juice box and double lightning emojis.

Figure 25: Antisemitic commentary visualised by stickers on manosphere videos.



Assessment of platform limitations and particularities

The narratives explored in this section show how harmful content is available to minors on TikTok, with the platform recommending antisemitic conspiratorial content, creators that distort well-established facts about the Holocaust, harmful conspiracy theories and videos glorifying Iran.

During the research process, analysts noted how a limited subset of videos flagged for antisemitic content were swiftly taken down by the platform. It is likely that the swiftness of removal can be attributed to automated content moderation procedures programmed to review specific antisemitism-adjacent keywords (e.g., Rothschild, 271k, etc.). However, this type of content was still readily available to minors

through recommender algorithms, and moderation coverage remained patchy. Stickers featuring hateful, antisemitic imagery or coded language in response to content flagged as antisemitic were rarely taken down unless the post was entirely removed by the platform.

The hateful weaponisation of stickers and use of specific sounds as dog whistles demonstrates how the promotion of conspiracy theories facilitates the spread of more overt forms of antisemitism, inciting hateful conduct and the use of antisemitic imagery and symbols. The widespread availability of hateful stickers and specific sounds signals a concerning gap in the enforcement of TikTok's own Safety Controls. Ultimately, this enables the proliferation and snowballing of hateful antisemitic rhetoric on the platform as well as minor's unfiltered exposure to such content.

METHODOLOGY

Rumble operates a non-account model, where any user can interact with all content without any need to sign up. A minor is therefore recommended the same content on the Rumble homepage as an adult. Therefore, in order to collect data on videos served to minors, analysts took a different approach to TikTok, choosing instead to focus on the ‘Editor’s Picks’ section of the homepage, which recommends videos to the user. While there are multiple recommendation sections on Rumble, including the homepage, the editor’s picks are titled “absolute real best of Rumble.com”. In the past researchers have noted that the editor’s picks sometimes promoted Russian state-sponsored media and posts that promote conspiracy theories.³⁵

Analysts collected the editor’s picks over a six-month period from January 23 to July 22 2025. In total, 4,412 videos from 712 channels were recommended. Some channels were favoured by the Editor over others: videos from only 10 channels (1.4% of the channels) comprised 18% of recommended videos. These channels included conservative figures and content closely related to male lifestyle influencers.


Figure 26 shows the process of data collection. Given the volume and length of videos, sometimes several hours long, an automated approach was chosen to assist in the surfacing of content potentially relevant to antisemitism.

To start, analysts filtered the descriptions of videos using a list of keywords likely to be relevant to antisemitism. The list of 203 keywords was built using ethnography and existing lists from other recent research on antisemitism. After filtering by title, 254 videos were selected for further analysis.

Videos were downloaded using the yt-dlp tool and transcribed using openAI’s whisper. Videos ranged in length from a few minutes to a number of hours: transcriptions totaled over 14,000 pages. To generate a more meaningful and relevant dataset, analysts used a large language model (gemma3:12b-it-qat) to analyse the transcriptions for potential relevance to antisemitism. Out of the 254 video transcripts, the LLM identified 163 conversational snippets over 17 distinct videos as potentially relevant to antisemitic discourse. To ensure accuracy and incorporation of context, the clips were manually reviewed for relevance.

Overall, antisemitic narratives and insults were most prevalent in videos discussing the relationship between the United States and the state of Israel. This claim is not inherently antisemitic, but was discussed in Rumble videos in antisemitic ways through claims of a global Jewish conspiracy. Themes revolved around antisemitic claims that agents of the Israeli government secretly influence US politics or that those aligned with politics of the Israeli government have supposedly too much power within US politics. Another frequently discussed topic was a debate about free speech and the US administration’s crack down on Palestinian activists.

| **Figure 26:** Data collection process for Rumble



THEMATIC ANALYSIS

Compared to TikTok's short format content, Rumble's often hour-long videos provided deeper insight into the content of interest. Herein, analysts found more overt, direct instances of antisemitism and generally hateful content than on TikTok. This is consistent with existing findings detailing Rumble's self-acclaimed 'free speech' approach to content moderation, resulting in fringe content creators using it as their platform of choice.³⁶

Streamers were observed to not shy away from openly using egregious slurs and tropes against Jews. Consequently, analysts found creators to share incendiary takes with their real-time viewers in a more unfiltered and direct manner, often eliciting amplified hateful responses from their viewers.

A core set of antisemitic themes corresponded with those found on TikTok, such as conspiracies about Jewish control and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and the use of hateful slurs and tropes. Here, analysts identified additional narratives of relevance, ranging from newer iterations of conspiratorial myths to the use of more explicit slurs and more niche tropes, such as the so-called 'Khazar myth'. This analysis will discuss the themes additionally present on Rumble compared to TikTok.

Jewish control conspiracies: The Israel lobby and George Soros conspiracies

As for TikTok, content flagged as antisemitic on Rumble included conspiracies about Jewish control. Narratives claimed the so-called 'Israel lobby', or more concretely, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), to have control over the US government. This rhetoric went as far as to assert that Donald Trump becoming US President is 'part of an Israeli OP'.

Other versions of these conspiracies were centred around Jewish philanthropist George Soros. Conspiracy theories often frame Soros as an evil puppet master trying to destabilise the American government and other key institutions through his charitable causes. They also spread malinformation falsely affirming him to have been a Nazi, to have orchestrated the COVID-19 pandemic and the Black Lives Matter protests, as well as different instances of unrest and electoral fraud.³⁷

In particular, quotes flagged by analysts saw streamers affirm Soros to allegedly be behind illegal immigration to Europe and the US with the aim of destabilising the West (figure 27). This quote originated from an account with 227,000 followers on a video with over 262,000 views and around 3,500 likes. Another video with 101,000 views and over 1,000 likes from a channel with 114,000 followers also asserted that Soros was responsible for destroying the US justice system with USAID funding (figure 27).


Figures 27: Rumble videos promoting antisemitic conspiracies centered around George Soros.



The Khazar myth and the denial of Ashkenazi Jews

Among videos referencing the theme of Jewish control, analysts identified quotes about what content creators referred to as the 'Khazarian mafia' (figure 28). This term is rooted in the so-called 'Khazar myth', an antisemitic conspiracy theory that asserts, with limited and outdated evidence from the medieval ages, that Ashkenazi Jews were descendants from the Khazars, a semi nomadic Turkic people native to the empire of Khazaria who converted to Judaism in the 8th century.³⁸ Antisemitic actors leverage this background to deny Ashkenazi Jews of their Jewish heritage due to their alleged Khazar background, frequently referring to them as 'fake Jews'.

Figure 28: A content creator on Rumble with 340,000 followers sharing rhetoric referencing the Khazar myth on a video with 210,000 views and over 4,000 likes.




Such actors also describe Ashkenazi Jews as a 'Khazar elite' which secretly orchestrates key global events. For example, past research by ISD found this theory to be instrumentalised by QAnon, sovereigntist, right-wing extremist and pro-Kremlin propagandist groups on Telegram in conversations about the Russian invasion of Ukraine.³⁹ Here, the Khazar myth was weaponised to justify Russia's invasion, framing Ukraine as a 'Khazarian project' led by a 'Khazarian elite' composed of Ukrainian Nazis that sought to incite a war against Russia to further their plans of global domination.⁴⁰ Different ramifications of this theory also link the Khazar myth to elements of the Rothschild conspiracy and the blood libel myth.⁴¹

From 9/11 to October 7: The adaptability of antisemitic conspiracies

9/11 conspiracies also surfaced among the videos recommended by Rumble's editor's picks. Similar to TikTok, analysts found antisemitic quotes stating that "Mossad wired the tower on 9/11" or statements accusing Jewish people of playing the victim card during times of need "like they did for 9/11" (figure 29).


Within conspiratorial conversations, analysts identified a more recent theory in line with antisemitic rhetoric around the September 11, 2001 attacks; namely assertions framing Israel to be behind the October 7 attacks against Israel. This was highlighted by previous research by ISD into the mis- and disinformation and conspiracy theories around October 7.⁴² This finding underscores the resilience of such claims online, as well as their rapid dissemination across platforms.

Figure 29: Content creator asserting the Mossad helped wire the towers during 9/11.



Streamers did not dispute that Hamas perpetrated the attacks, but claimed Hamas to have been created by Mossad (figure 29). This was shared on a video with nearly 81,000 views and 300 likes, on an account with 46,000 followers. On the other hand, content creators asserted that Hamas did not have the military capabilities to perpetrate an attack on the scale of October 7, thereby implying the IDF committed the attack (figure 30). This claim was shared by an account of just under 88,000 followers and featured on a video with nearly 120,000 shares and 650 likes. Such themes diminish the suffering of Israelis during October 7 and polarise discussions around the attacks by sowing distrust.

Figure 30: Streamer implying the IDF to have been responsible for the October 7 attacks on Israel.



On Rumble, conspiracies falsely holding Jews and Israelis accountable for these key global events equally elicited hateful responses by viewers. Such claims included clear statements inciting to violence and dehumanising remarks against Jews (figure 31).

Figure 31: Viewer comments inciting violence and spreading slurs and tropes against Jews.



Slurs and tropes

Further content recommended by Rumble's editor's picks saw streamers use antisemitic slurs and tropes. Examples included the use of "J people" when referring to Jews, the utilisation of "Chosen people" as a dog whistle, or cliché-ridden depictions of Jews as greedy and avaricious. Additionally, analysts spotted dehumanising remarks that were often rooted in the antisemitic trope affirming that Jews were collectively accountable for the death of Jesus, a misconception also termed as the 'deicide myth'.⁴³ Quotes flagged by analysts as severely antisemitic in conversations about the Israel-Palestine conflict or US politics falsely asserted that the goal of Jews is to summon the Antichrist, called for the 'repentance of Jews', or described Israelis as an apocalyptic cult. These claims often overlapped with conspiracies of Jewish control, with streamers making coded references to Jews running the media or referring to Judaism as an 'ethno-supremacist ideology' with an 'Us versus them mentality'.


Assessment of platform limitations and particularities

Rumble's failure to incorporate age control by not requiring user registration poses a significant gap in the protection of minors, making antisemitic content easily available to underaged users. Additionally, Rumble's 'free speech' approach to content moderation, as well as the overall difficulty of moderating antisemitic remarks in live, often hour-long videos, enables the proliferation of such statements on its platform.

Analysts' findings further underscore this issue, revealing unmoderated comments that reinforced and escalated antisemitic sentiment. This was particularly evident in recordings of past livestreams that remain available as regular videos on Rumble, where viewer comments posted during the live broadcast are permanently displayed on screen and are not subject to the moderation applied to standard comment sections.

Analysts also observed that during live streams, viewers can send paid donations that display a message and accompanying GIF prominently at the centre of the broadcast, a feature they found was being exploited by some users to circulate antisemitic tropes alongside explicitly antisemitic imagery, including GIFs such as the "Happy Merchant" meme (figure 32)

Figure 32: Use of the antisemitic "Happy Merchant meme" by viewers during a stream.



CONCLUSIONS

This research demonstrates that recommender algorithms on TikTok and Rumble actively shape minors' exposure to antisemitic content, often without explicit intent from the user. Across both platforms, user journeys reveal how neutral or mainstream interests can serve as entry points into ecosystems where harmful narratives proliferate. On TikTok, benign themes such as lifestyle and motivational content sit at the centre of recommendation chains, yet are closely connected to clusters on geopolitics, religion, and conspiracy theories. These pathways enable a gradual escalation from general interest to highly politicised and antisemitic material, including Holocaust distortion, conspiracies about control, and far-right tropes. Rumble, by contrast, exposes minors to overt antisemitism from the outset, with its non-account model and "Editor's Picks" section amplifying long-form videos rife with slurs, Khazar myths, and calls to violence.

User pathways into antisemitic content were exacerbated by a number of platform dynamics. Algorithmic amplification surfaced antisemitic content for minors even when they did not enter search terms relevant to antisemitism. Interactive features such as stickers and comment sections acted as bridges to more overt forms of antisemitism on TikTok, particularly on topics such as the Israel-Palestine conflict and the assassination of Charlie Kirk.

These findings raise critical questions for the enforcement of the Online Safety Act and whether current platform responses have met the established requirements. Effective enforcement will require platforms to move beyond reactive takedowns toward systemic interventions: algorithmic transparency, proactive and more informed detection of visual and coded hate, and stricter enforcement of policies relating to use of interactive features. Without these measures, recommender systems will continue to serve as vectors for antisemitic harm, undermining the OSA's core objective of safeguarding children online and further contributing to the normalisation of a culture of antisemitism among young people in the UK.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Treat algorithmic amplification of antisemitism and other hateful content as a distinct aspect of regulated harms.

Ofcom should clarify in guidance and codes that algorithmic amplification of antisemitic and hateful content (as abusive or hateful Priority Content) constitutes a distinct aspect of regulated harms under both illegal content duties and children's safety duties. Platforms should be required to demonstrate in risk assessments and compliance evidence how recommender systems prevent repeated serving of such content to users (including children), beyond content removal measures, building on existing obligations to test recommender changes for illegal content impact (Illegal Content Code, p.42) and to configure systems for safer outcomes in child feeds (Children's Code, PCU E2, p.48).

2. Mandate risk assessments that explicitly account for "passive exposure" pathways.

Building on existing requirements in Ofcom's Children's Risk Assessment Guidance (pp. 40-47) and the Children's Register of Risks, platforms should be required to include passive exposure pathways (where users encounter harmful content such as hate speech, antisemitic tropes, or extremist material without actively searching for it) in their risk assessments, especially for hate content amplified by recommender systems. This recognises that platforms often function as push services, where harm occurs even in the absence of user intent, particularly affecting younger users. Platforms should demonstrate how users who do not actively seek such material are protected from being drawn into harmful content loops.

3. Clarify and strengthen application of child safety duties to antisemitic and hateful content.

Ofcom should clarify in guidance (e.g., Guidance on Content Harmful to Children, Section 6 on Abuse and Hate Content) that antisemitic content constitutes a significant child safety risk as Priority Content (abusive or hateful), including normalisation and repetition even without explicit incitement to violence. Platforms should be required to apply the strongest available safeguards under the Children's Codes and demonstrate effective implementation against contextual/coded antisemitism, as reflected in the Children's Register of Risks.

4. Require platforms to address engagement-driven escalation in recommender systems.

This is particularly important in crisis moments – such as armed conflicts in the Middle East, acts of terrorism (including the 7 October atrocities, where Ofcom highlighted the role of online platforms in spreading harmful material⁴⁴), or episodes of public disorder (e.g., the misinformation-fuelled riots after the 2024 Southport murders⁴⁵) – when platforms' engagement-optimised algorithms can rapidly escalate exposure to antisemitic tropes, conspiracy theories, or calls for violence. Our research highlights a structural problem: systems optimised for engagement can intensify exposure to antisemitism, even when individual items are later removed. Ofcom should require platforms to explain how engagement-based recommendation systems avoid escalating users toward more extreme content, in line with existing testing obligations for recommender systems (Illegal Content Code) and safer algorithm configuration (Children's Code). Ofcom could also introduce expectations that platforms intervene where patterns of hate amplification and escalation are detected.

5. Improve public transparency around recommender systems and hate content handling.

Ofcom should require greater public transparency on recommender systems' handling of hate content, including for parents and users, such as through accessible summaries in transparency reports or dedicated disclosures. This should extend beyond moderation to include promotion, sequencing, and algorithmic design, building on existing obligations for categorised services and annual Ofcom summaries of risk assessments.

6. Ensure enforcement does not rely solely on content removal.

Our research indicates that antisemitic content continues to reach users even when moderation exists, pointing to structural rather than isolated failures. Ofcom should make clear that compliance cannot be demonstrated solely through content removal statistics. It should regularly assess whether platforms are addressing systemic drivers of antisemitic amplification, including recommender design, distinguishing between children's safety codes (prevention-focused) and illegal content codes (removal-focused where applicable).

7. Incorporate antisemitism expertise into regulatory oversight.





Our research shows that antisemitism frequently manifests in forms that require contextual understanding, not simple keyword detection, especially as antisemitism constantly mutates into different forms and new, often coded, manifestations – as demonstrated by low detection rates in AI classifiers for antisemitic deepfakes and imagery.⁴⁶ Ofcom should ensure access to specialist antisemitism expertise when evaluating platform risk assessments and mitigation strategies. It should also encourage platforms to demonstrate how they detect and address coded and contextual antisemitism, not only explicit slurs.

Endnotes

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- 12 Sid Venkataramakrishnan and Tim Squirell, 'The "Manosphere"', Institute for Strategic Dialogue, n.d., <https://www.isdglobal.org/explainers/the-manosphere-explainer/>.
- 13 A term referring to improving physical appearance which originated among incels.
- 14 A term used in the manosphere signifying acceptance of anti-feminist views.
- 15 A term used by incels to refer to their belief that there is no way out of being an incel.
- 16 Sid Venkataramakrishnan and Tim Squirell, 'The "Manosphere"'
- 17 'Fourteen words' is a reference to a popular white supremacist slogan – which is 14 words long – promoting the idea that the white race will go extinct without extreme action.
- 18 Antisemitism Policy Trust, Conspiracy Theories: A Guide for Members of Parliament and Candidates (2024), <https://antisemitism.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Conspiracy-Theory-Guide.pdf>.
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```
..._mod.use_x = True
..._mod.use_y = False
..._mod.use_z = False
operation == "MIRROR_X":
..._mod.use_x = True
..._mod.use_y = False
..._mod.use_z = False
operation == "MIRROR_Y":
..._mod.use_x = False
..._mod.use_y = True
..._mod.use_z = False
operation == "MIRROR_Z":
..._mod.use_x = False
..._mod.use_y = False
..._mod.use_z = True
...
selection at the end -add
..._ob.select= 1
..._ob.select=1
context.scene.objects.active
("Selected" + str(modifier
..._ob.select = 0
bpy.context.selected_ob
data.objects[one.name].se
int("please select exactly
OPERATOR
BLOCK 01
types.One
X mirror to the selected
mirror_x"
```

Contact APT

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