

Ethnic and Racial Studies

ISSN: 0141-9870 (Print) 1466-4356 (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/rers20

# Antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes in Sweden: patterns of associations, attitudinal profiles, and the role of institutional trust

Liliia Korol & Pieter Bevelander

**To cite this article:** Liliia Korol & Pieter Bevelander (06 Mar 2026): Antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes in Sweden: patterns of associations, attitudinal profiles, and the role of institutional trust, Ethnic and Racial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2026.2635123

**To link to this article:** https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2026.2635123

ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2026.2635123



# Antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes in Sweden: patterns of associations, attitudinal profiles, and the role of institutional trust

Liliia Korol and Pieter Bevelander

Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Malmö University, Malmö, Sweden

**ABSTRACT**

The study examines antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes in Sweden, analyzing their links to prejudicial attitudes, conspiracy beliefs, and institutional trust. Based on a representative survey of 3,507 individuals, the findings reveal that antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes are related, but differ in important ways. Antisemitism is associated with anti-immigrant and sexist attitudes and greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs, but is unrelated to institutional trust. By contrast, anti-Israel attitudes are unrelated to anti-immigrant attitudes and are positively associated with governemnt trust and media confidence. Cluster analyses have identified three profiles: *Neutral Moderates* (low antisemitism and low anti-Israel attitudes), *Critical Engagers* (low antisemitism but moderate anti-Israel attitudes), and *Distrustful Sceptics* (heightened levels of both). These profiles differ in socio-demographic characteristics, prejudicial attitudes, and conspiracy beliefs, with higher institutional trust increasing the likelihood of belonging to *Critical Engagers*. The findings suggest that institutional trust may channel individuals toward stronger anti-Israel attitudes, particularly in Sweden.

**ARTICLE HISTORY**
Received 17 February 2025
Accepted 13 February 2026

**KEYWORDS**
Antisemitism; anti-Israel attitudes; government trust; media confidence; anti-Zionism; prejudice

## Introduction

The relationship between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes has long been a central focus in scholarly debates. A substantial body of research demonstrates that, although not identical, these attitudes are strongly related and frequently overlap (e.g. Allington and Hirsh 2019; Cohen et al. 2009; Wistrich 2010). At the same time, recent empirical evidence suggests that antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes represent two separable facets of a shared underlying disposition (conceptualized as generalized antisemitism), which may have different antecedents and correlates (Allington, Hirsh, and Katz 2022; 2023).

The existing literature argues that antisemitism should not be narrowly viewed as hostility, prejudice, or discrimination toward Jews; rather, in much historical and sociological

**CONTACT** Liliia Korol lilia.korol@mau.se Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Malmö University, 205 06 Malmö, Sweden

analysis, it is conceptualized as a broader worldview – a "certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred", in the wording of the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism – with deep cultural, theological, and conspiracist roots (IHRA 2016; see also Fine and Spencer 2017; Hirsh 2017; Rich 2021). By contrast, anti-Israel attitudes typically involve negative evaluations of the policies or actions of the Israeli state. Yet, the literature also demonstrates that, in some contexts, discourse about Israel can recycle classic antisemitic tropes, making the boundary between the two analytically complex (e.g. Fine and Spencer 2017; Hirsh 2017; Rich 2021; Wistrich 2010).

Our study contributes to the literature by examining antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes in the Swedish context, focusing on how they are related to prejudice toward other groups, conspiracy beliefs, and, in particular, institutional trust. Sweden represents a particularly relevant case given its distinctive political and social environment. Notably, it is one of the few OECD countries that has officially recognized Palestine, underscoring its distinctive stance on Middle East politics (Government of Sweden 2018). At the same time, Sweden has consistently ranked among the countries with the lowest levels of antisemitism in Europe, according to the surveys by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL 2014; 2019) in 2014 and 2019. Moreover, Swedish mainstream media and political discourse have often been more openly critical of Israeli policies than in other Western European countries, reflecting a distinctive institutional framing within the public domain (e.g. Bachner 2010; Söderin, Borgström, and Svensson 2024). Altogether, political and media discourse critical of Israeli policies alongside comparatively low levels of antisemitism provides a distinctive context for examining how antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes relate to prejudice, conspiracy beliefs, and institutional trust.

## Antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes: overlap and divergence

Prior research across national contexts has provided consistent evidence that antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes are strongly related and frequently overlap, particularly in their more extreme forms of expression (e.g. Baum and Nakazawa 2007; Cohen et al. 2009; Kaplan and Small 2006). More recent studies have clarified this relationship by showing that antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes differ in their attitudinal and ideological correlates. For instance, Beattie (2017) found that antisemitism was strongly associated with extreme anti-Israel attitudes, such as delegitimization of Israel or comparisons between Israel and Nazi Germany. Yet, moderate criticisms of Israeli government were only weakly linked to antisemitism and were closely associated with pacifist and human-rights orientations. Importantly, Beattie showed that many respondents with low or moderate anti-Israel attitudes did not endorse antisemitic beliefs, underscoring that criticism of Israel does not necessarily equate to antisemitism. Similarly, Staetsky (2017, 2020) found that individuals holding antisemitic views were more likely to express hostility toward Israel, and anti-Israel attitudes emerged as one of the strongest predictors of antisemitism even after controlling for other social and political factors. At the same time, he demonstrated that many individuals, particularly younger, educated, and left-leaning respondents, expressed anti-Israel views without endorsing antisemitic beliefs, whereas the strongest convergence between the two sets of attitudes was found among Muslim respondents and individuals on the far right.

More recently, Binstok and colleagues (2024) revealed a strong relationship between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, especially in the context of social media discourse, where anti-Israel expressions frequently draw on classic antisemitic tropes such as conspiracy theories about Jewish control and power. At the same time, their analyses demonstrated that many individuals with strong anti-Israel attitudes did not endorse antisemitism and were more likely to be younger, highly educated, politically left-leaning, and more favorable toward immigrants and Muslims. By contrast, individuals who combined strong anti-Israel sentiments with antisemitic beliefs tended to be older, more right-wing, less educated, and more hostile toward other minority groups. Taken together, the findings suggest that antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes are closely related and frequently overlap. At the same time, while antisemitism plays a central role in driving the most extreme forms of anti-Israel hostility, the two sets of attitudes differ in their antecedents and correlates.

Drawing on existing literature, we formulated several expectations using two complementary methodological approaches: (a) analysis of associations between variables and (b) analysis of clusters among respondents. *First*, we examined associations among study variables using regression analyses, which assess how antisemitism, anti-Israel attitudes, prejudice, conspiracy beliefs, and institutional trust are related on average across the sample. By focusing on population-level associations, this approach captures patterns that are typical for the average respondent and assumes linear relationships that apply uniformly across individuals. *Second*, we conducted cluster analysis of individual profiles to examine how antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes are combined within individuals. Rather than assuming the same linear associations for everyone, this approach identifies clusters or profiles of people who combine antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes in distinct ways, capturing both linear and non-linear patterns that may coexist within the population.

Specifically, we expected that antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes would be closely related across the sample as a whole (*Expectation 1a*). Moreover, we expected to identify distinct attitudinal profiles within the Swedish population based on their different combinations of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes (*Expectation 1b*). In particular, we anticipated to identify a profile characterized by moderate-to-high anti-Israel attitudes but low levels of antisemitism. We further expected that this profile would differ from other profiles, especially individuals who display heightened levels of both anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes, who are also likely to be characterized by stronger prejudicial attitudes toward other groups and greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs.

## Are antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes linked to prejudicial attitudes and conspiracy beliefs?

Existing literature suggests that antisemitism is strongly associated with prejudicial orientations toward different groups, including sexism, anti-immigrant sentiments, and other forms of social bias (Zick et al. 2008; Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann 2011). Previous studies have shown that individuals who endorse antisemitic beliefs are also more likely to express hostility toward immigrants, refugees, women, LGBTQ+ people, and other marginalized groups (e.g. Friehs et al. 2022; Heitmeyer et al. 2013; Zick et al. 2008). At the same time, recent research highlights that although antisemitism is

empirically related to other prejudicial attitudes, it cannot be viewed as a component of generalized prejudice rooted in inequality and social dominance. Specifically, Meuleman and colleagues (2019) demonstrated that antisemitism, while correlated with other forms of outgroup hostility, retains substantial group-specific components. Only about one quarter of its variance was explained by a general prejudice factor, with the remainder reflecting unique antecedents such as religious involvement and symbolic threat. This suggests that antisemitism, although related to other prejudicial orientations, has distinct roots.

By contrast, anti-Israel attitudes are less consistently linked to other prejudicial beliefs. While they often overlap with antisemitic attitudes, they can also reflect specific political, ideological, or moral objections to the actions and policies of the Israeli state (Beattie 2017; Kempf 2011, 2015). Prior empirical evidence suggests that individuals who express anti-Israel attitudes do not necessarily harbor prejudices against other marginalized groups, such as immigrants. For instance, in his recent comparative overview of surveys, Bergmann (2021) showed that while xenophobia has a strong effect on antisemitism, it is not significantly related to anti-Israel attitudes. Similarly, Binstok, Gould, and Kaplan (2024) found that individuals who express highly negative views toward Israel but do not exhibit significant signs of antisemitism are much more likely to hold more favorable views of foreigners. The researchers also demonstrated that criticism of Israel increases with holding positive views about how foreigners contribute to society.

Taken together, based on the existing empirical findings, we expected antisemitism to be positively associated with anti-immigrant and sexist attitudes, whereas anti-Israel attitudes would show weaker or no such associations (*Expectation 2a*). In addition, we anticipated that the individual profile characterized by moderate-to-high levels of anti-Israel attitudes but low levels of antisemitism would display lower levels of sexist and anti-immigrant attitudes, compared with individuals with heightened levels of both anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes (*Expectation 2b*).

Conspiracy beliefs provide another important lens, as they often reflect hostile worldviews that attribute hidden control over societal and political events to powerful outgroups (Aaronovitch 2010; Byford 2011; Douglas et al. 2019). Antisemitism has long drawn on conspiracy theories, including myths of Jewish financial control or world domination (Imhoff and Bruder 2014; Kofta and Sedek 2005). For example, recent experimental research (Jolley, Meleady, and Douglas 2020) has shown that exposure to conspiracy theories about Jewish people increases antisemitism and reduces willingness to vote for a Jewish political candidate. Moreover, the study found that such exposure is also linked to prejudice toward several secondary outgroups, including Asians, Arabs, Americans, Irish, and Australians.

At the same time, the relationship between anti-Israel attitudes and conspiracy beliefs may be more nuanced and context-dependent. On the one hand, existing literature suggests that conspiracy theories often portray Israel as a powerful actor that influences global events (Allington, Buarque, and Barker Flores 2021; Allington and Joshi 2020), linking anti-Israel discourse to broader conspiratorial worldviews. Such narratives reinforce hostility toward Israel by framing the state as part of a secretive and controlling elite, echoing the conspiratorial themes that fuel antisemitism. In line with these theoretical arguments, prior empirical research (Allington and Joshi 2020; Kempf 2011, 2015; Kofta, Soral, and Bilewicz 2020) has demonstrated that although antisemitic and anti-

Israel attitudes generally load on two distinct factors, there is one significant overlap: the belief in Jewish world domination or a global Jewish conspiracy. This conspiracy belief serves as a common thread linking certain antisemitic views with anti-Israel narratives.

On the other hand, prior research suggests that anti-Israel attitudes are linked only to specific conspiracy beliefs rather than to conspiratorial thinking more broadly. Specifically, Swami (2012) found that belief in a Jewish conspiracy was associated with anti-Israel attitudes, whereas generic conspiratorial thinking did not emerge as a significant predictor. Similarly, a more recent study by Allington, Hirsh, and Katz (2023) demonstrated that negative attitudes toward the state of Israel and its supporters were most strongly linked to conspiracy beliefs related to government malfeasance. In contrast, antisemitic attitudes were more closely associated with conspiracy beliefs about personal well-being. These findings suggest that conspiracy beliefs relate differently to antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes depending on their content.

Taken together, prior research suggests that antisemitism is strongly linked to conspiratorial worldviews, whereas anti-Israel attitudes show more context-dependent associations. Accordingly, we expected antisemitism to be positively associated with greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs, whereas anti-Israel attitudes would show weaker or more selective associations (*Expectation 3a*). Moreover, we anticipated that the individual profile characterized by moderate-to-high levels of anti-Israel attitudes but low levels of antisemitism would display lower endorsement of conspiracy beliefs, compared to individuals with heightened levels of both anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes (*Expectation 3b*).

## What role does institutional trust have to play?

In understanding the complex relationship between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, it is important to examine broader socio-psychological factors that might shape these attitudes (Jaspal 2023). Among these, institutional trust, encompassing trust in government and confidence in the media, is particularly relevant, as it might influence how individuals form their opinions about Israel and their attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Existing literature suggests that institutional trust plays a pivotal role in shaping individuals' policy preferences by offering a lens through which they can interpret and navigate complex global issues (Hetherington 2004; Jeannet, Heidland, and Ruhs 2023). This trust helps individuals structure their views on specific matters based on broader and more abstract beliefs (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). Specifically, when faced with complex policy matters, individuals tend to rely on cognitive simplification strategies that reduce the time and cognitive effort to form their opinions (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). In these situations, institutional trust acts as a heuristic device, or mental shortcut, allowing individuals to process information more efficiently without extensive fact-finding (Hetherington 2004; Jeannet, Heidland, and Ruhs 2023). Consequently, an individual's level of trust in government institutions influences how they process information and develop their political opinions and policy preferences. Supporting these theoretical arguments, prior empirical research has shown that trust in government was strongly linked to people's attitudes on a range of policy issues, including racial (Hetherington and Globetti 2002), pro-immigration (Macdonald 2021), and foreign (Hetherington and Husser 2012)

policies. Relatedly, a recent study by Agovino, Carillo, and Spagnolo (2022) based on data from the World Values Survey, Wave 5, 2005–2009, for 19 countries has demonstrated that the coverage and negative tone of news attenuate pro-immigration attitudes, albeit only for those with high trust in the media.

Applied to the context of the present study, individuals with high government trust are more likely to align with official governmental positions on Israel and adopt its perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In other words, citizens who trust government tend to accept the government's framing of Israel's role in the conflict. In Sweden, where the government has historically supported Palestinian self-determination and been critical of Israeli policies, individuals with higher institutional trust may be more likely to view Israel as bearing greater responsibility for the conflict. Consequently, they may perceive Israel as less deserving of support compared to Palestinians, who are often portrayed as victims of circumstances beyond their control.

Similarly, high confidence in the media may reinforce alignment with media narratives that reflect the government's critical stance toward Israel. When media coverage emphasizes that Israel's actions are avoidable or within its control, individuals may be more inclined to attribute responsibility for the ongoing conflict to Israel and, therefore, view it as less deserving of sympathy or support. This pattern reflects a broader role of institutional trust, whereby individuals are more likely to accept the judgments of trusted institutions, both government and media, without engaging in deeper cognitive analysis. In such cases, people rely more heavily on simplified heuristics to form their opinions, which can further reinforce the narratives presented by these institutions.

Given the potential role of institutional trust in shaping anti-Israel attitudes, we expected trust in government and confidence in the media to be positively associated with anti-Israel attitudes, but negatively or not significantly associated with antisemitism (*Expectation 4a*). Moreover, we expected that trust in government and confidence in the media would serve as significant predictors of membership in the cluster characterized by moderate-to-high anti-Israel attitudes but low levels of antisemitism (*Expectation 4b*). At the same time, we argue that trust in government and confidence in the media are unlikely to be significant predictors in the cluster with both heightened anti-Israel attitudes and high antisemitism.

## The present study

Building on prior research (e.g. Allington, Hirsh, and Katz 2023; Beattie 2017; Staetsky 2017, 2020), the present study seeks to examine antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes within the Swedish population. We combined two approaches: (a) *analysis of associations between variables* to assess how antisemitism, anti-Israel attitudes, prejudice, conspiracy beliefs, and institutional trust are related on average across the sample; and (b) *analysis of clusters among respondents* to identify distinct attitudinal profiles based on different levels of antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes.

Drawing on prior literature and empirical evidence, we formulated four sets of expectations. *First*, we expected antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes to be closely and positively associated (*Expectation 1a*), and also anticipated to identify distinct attitudinal profiles based on different levels of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes (*Expectation 1b*), most notably a profile characterized by moderate-to-high anti-Israel attitudes but

low antisemitism. *Second*, we expected antisemitism to be positively associated with anti-immigrant and sexist attitudes, whereas anti-Israel attitudes would show weaker or no such associations (*Expectation 2a*). We further anticipated that the profile characterized by moderate-to-high levels of anti-Israel attitudes but low levels of antisemitism would display lower levels of sexist and anti-immigrant attitudes, compared to the profile with heightened levels of both anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes (*Expectation 2b*). *Third*, we expected antisemitism to be positively associated with conspiracy beliefs, while anti-Israel attitudes would show weaker and more selective associations (*Expectation 3a*). We also anticipated that the profile characterized by moderate-to-high levels of anti-Israel attitudes but low levels of antisemitism would display lower endorsement of conspiracy beliefs compared to the profile in which both anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes are heightened (*Expectation 3b*). *Finally*, we expected institutional trust to play a differentiating role: trust in government and confidence in the media would be positively associated with anti-Israel attitudes but negatively or not significantly associated with antisemitism (*Expectation 4a*). Moreover, we anticipated the institutional trust to be a significant predictor of membership in the profile characterized by moderate-to-high levels of anti-Israel attitudes but low levels of antisemitism (*Expectation 4b*), as these individuals may be more likely to align with government and media narratives regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

## Method

### *Procedure and participants*

The data for this study were drawn from a nationally representative survey on antisemitic attitudes in Sweden, coordinated by the Living History Forum (Bachner and Bevelander 2021) and administered by Novus in late summer 2020. The survey targeted individuals aged 18–79 and employed a stratified random sample drawn from the Novus Sweden Panel, which is demographically representative in terms of gender, age, and region. To ensure sufficient representation of foreign-born individuals, respondents born outside Europe were oversampled using both the Novus panel and a quality-assured partner panel (Norstat). Data were collected between August 26 and September 7, 2020, yielding 3,507 completed responses. The overall response rate was 61 per cent, and the data were weighted to reflect the population distribution by geographical origin. The survey received approval from the Ethics Review Authority. Our final analytic sample consisted of 3,507 individuals, with 49.7 per cent being female. Most participants were born in Sweden (82.9 per cent) and had completed tertiary education (56.2 per cent), and the majority reported a monthly income between 10,000 and 49,999 SEK.

### *Measures*

#### *Antisemitism*

Antisemitic attitudes were assessed using an eight-item scale that captures both traditional antisemitic beliefs and attitudes related to the Holocaust. The scale assessed perceptions of Jewish power and influence as well as beliefs that blame Jews for historical and contemporary events. **Traditional antisemitism** included items that reflect

stereotypes about Jewish power and control over global affairs (e.g. "The Jews have great influence over the media"; "The Jews have great influence over the world economy"; "The Jews control U.S. foreign policy"). **Holocaust-related antisemitism** included statements that deny, distort, or exploit the Holocaust, reflecting a more specific and historically anchored form of antisemitism. Sample items included: "The Jews believe they are the only ones who have suffered in history"; "The Jews exploit the Nazis' Jewish extermination (Holocaust) in economic matters"; and "The persecution and hatred of the Jews is partly the Jews' own fault". Participants were asked to respond on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). The scale demonstrated good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .891).

### *Anti-Israel attitudes*

Anti-Israel attitudes were measured using a scale designed to capture participants' sentiments and opinions toward the state of Israel. This scale included items that addressed various political, social, and cultural criticisms of Israel. Participants were asked to respond on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Sample items included: "Which of the parties do you most sympathize with in the conflict between Israel and Palestine?"; "Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories is unacceptable" (reversed item); and "Israel's treatment of the Palestinians is reminiscent of the Nazis' treatment". This scale demonstrated good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .807).

### *Prejudicial attitudes*

Prejudicial attitudes were assessed using scales measuring anti-immigrant attitudes and sexist attitudes, with higher scores indicating stronger prejudice.

***Anti-immigrant attitudes.*** Anti-immigrant attitudes were assessed using a scale assessing negative evaluations of immigrants and immigration policies, particularly concerning societal integration and cultural values. Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Sample items included: "Many immigrants have come to Sweden and worked their way up in society"; "It's about some not trying hard enough. About immigrants"; and "Immigrants who live here teach their children other values and abilities". The scale demonstrated good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .856).

***Sexist attitudes.*** Sexist attitudes were measured using a scale that captured traditional and discriminatory views about gender roles and sensitivity to sexism. Responses were recorded on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Sample items included: "Women are too easily offended"; "Most women interpret innocent comments as sexism"; and "Men are too easily offended". The scale demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .624).

### *Conspiracy beliefs*

Conspiracy beliefs were assessed using three items designed to measure endorsement of common conspiracy theories involving Jewish influence and control. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they believed that there was any truth in the following

statements: "Jews control immigration to Sweden and other European countries"; "Financier George Soros secretly controls much of what happens in the world"; and "The terrorist group Islamic State was created by Israel to divide its enemies". Responses were recorded on a three-category response scale: *I believe there is something in it*, *I do not believe there is anything in it*, and *Don't know*. For analysis, responses were recoded into a binary variable (1 = endorsement, 0 = rejection; "don't know" treated as missing). An index was created by averaging the three items, with higher values indicating greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs. The items showed moderate internal consistency (Cronbach's α = .578), demonstrating its reliability in measuring these attitudes.

### *Government trust*

Government trust was measured with a single item asking respondents to rate their trust in the government on a 5-point scale (1 = *low confidence*, 5 = *high confidence*). Higher scores indicated greater trust in the Swedish government. Single-item measures of political trust have been shown to demonstrate adequate validity and reliability (Allington, Buarque, and Barker Flores 2021; Bergkvist and Rossiter 2007; Karić and Međedović 2021).

### *Media confidence*

Confidence in the media was assessed using two items measuring confidence in the news reporting of Swedish Television (SVT) and Swedish Radio (SR). Responses were recorded on a 5-point Likert scale, with higher scores indicating greater confidence in media accuracy and fairness. The scale demonstrated excellent internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .932).

### *Social distance*

Social distance was measured by asking participants how comfortable they would feel in various social situations involving Jews. Participants were presented with scenarios such as having a Jewish neighbor, coworker, or family member by marriage and rated their comfort level on a 5-point Likert scale, with higher scores indicating a greater sense of social distance. The scale demonstrated good reliability in this study (Cronbach's alpha = .879).

## Data analysis

We used a two-step methodological strategy that combined analyses of associations between variables with analyses of clusters among respondents. First, we examined population-level associations by computing Pearson correlations and conducting hierarchical multiple regressions with antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes as dependent variables. Socio-demographic variables (gender, age, education, and country of birth) were entered in Step 1, followed by social distance (Step 2), prejudicial attitudes (anti-immigrant and sexist) and conspiracy beliefs (Step 3), and institutional trust, including trust in government and confidence in the media, at Step 4.

Second, we identified attitudinal profiles based on joint levels of antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, using a two-step clustering procedure (Hair et al. 2010). First, mean scores on the antisemitism and anti-Israel attitude scales were standardized and entered into a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward's linkage method and squared Euclidean distances

to determine the optimal number of clusters (Hair et al. 2010). The cluster solution was evaluated based on inspection of the dendrogram, explained variance, and the conceptual coherence of the resulting groups. Second, this solution was refined using k-means clustering, which reallocates individuals to minimize within-cluster variance and maximize between-cluster differences.

Additionally, to assess differences between the identified clusters in antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes, we conducted a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA), followed by post-hoc tests. To examine differences in prejudicial attitudes and conspiracy beliefs across clusters, we conducted Multivariate Analysis of Covariance (MANCOVA), controlling for age, gender, education, and country of birth. Finally, predictors of cluster membership were examined using multinomial logistic regression, including trust in government and confidence in the media as key predictors, with age, gender, education, country of birth, and social distance included as control variables. All analyses were conducted using SPSS version 29.0.2.0.

## Results

### *Descriptive statistics and preliminary analyses*

We first examined the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for all study and socio-demographic variables (see Table 1). As can be seen from the table, respondents reported low social distance toward Jews, indicating generally positive feelings toward having Jews as neighbors, colleagues, or family members by marriage ($M = 1.202$, $SD = .596$). Likewise, the average level of antisemitic beliefs was relatively low ($M = 2.087$, $SD = .791$), falling below the scale midpoint. By contrast, anti-Israel attitudes were somewhat more prevalent ($M = 2.457$, $SD = .715$), yet still below the scale midpoint, suggesting that while criticism of Israel is more common than antisemitism, it is not strongly endorsed on average.

Concerning prejudicial attitudes, the analysis showed moderate anti-immigrant attitudes ($M = 2.957$, $SD = 1.173$) and somewhat lower sexist attitudes ($M = 2.550$, SD = .939). In addition, the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs was low overall, with respondents endorsing only a small proportion of the conspiracy statements on average (M = .078, SD = .204). Regarding institutional trust, respondents expressed moderate trust in government ($M = 3.000$, $SD = 1.254$) and higher confidence in the media ($M = 3.853$, $SD = 1.105$).

Correlational analyses also revealed some interesting preliminary insights. As expected, antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes were positively correlated (r = .492, $p < .001$), indicating that the two sets of attitudes are closely related. At the same time, antisemitism was also positively associated with greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs (r = .497, $p < .001$), greater social distance (r = .425, $p < .001$), as well as higher anti-immigrant (r = .459, $p < .001$) and sexist attitudes (r = .429, $p < .001$). In addition, antisemitism correlated negatively with trust in government (r = −.263, $p < .001$) and confidence in the media (r = −.304, $p < .001$).

Anti-Israel attitudes displayed a somewhat different pattern. Although anti-Israel attitudes were positively associated with higher social distance (r = .306, $p < .001$) and greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs (r = .255, $p < .001$), the strength of these relationships

**Table 1.** Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the study variables.

| | Variable | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Gender [a] | – | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | Age | −.029 [−.062, .004] | – | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3 | Education | .091*** [.058, .124] | .017 [−.016, .050] | – | | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | Birth [b] | −.012 [−.045, .021] | −.048** [−.081, −.015] | .093*** [.060, .125] | – | | | | | | | | |
| 5 | Social Distance | −.066*** [−.100, −.033] | .055** [.021, .088] | −.137*** [−.170, −.104] | .082*** [.048, .115] | – | | | | | | | |
| 6 | Anti-Immigrant Attitudes | −.207*** [−.239, −.175] | .214*** [.182, .246] | −.213*** [−.244, −.180] | .034* [.000, .067] | .234*** [.202, .266] | – | | | | | | |
| 7 | Sexist Attitudes | −.155*** [−.188, −.122] | .103*** [.069, .136] | −.236*** [−.267, −.203] | .030 [−.004, .063] | .232*** [.199, .264] | .520*** [.495, .545] | – | | | | | |
| 8 | Conspiracy Beliefs | −.079*** [−.117, −.040] | .011 [−.028, .050] | −.159*** [−.197, −.121] | .145*** [.106, .183] | .409*** [.376, .441] | .299*** [.263, .334] | .271*** [.234, .307] | – | | | | |
| 9 | Trust in Government | .169*** [.136, .201] | −.065*** [−.098, −.032] | .122*** [.089, .154] | .028 [−.005, .061] | −.140*** [−.173, −.107] | −.515*** [−.539, −.490] | −.320*** [−.350, −.289] | −.277*** [−.312, −.241] | – | | | |
| 10 | Confidence in Media | .181*** [.148, .213] | −.024 [−.058, .009] | .103*** [.070, .136] | −.076*** [−.109, −.043] | −.156*** [−.188, −.123] | −.480*** [−.506, −.454] | −.311*** [−.342, −.280] | −.353*** [−.386, −.318] | .636*** [.615, .655] | – | | |
| 11 | Antisemitism | −.139*** [−.172, −.107] | .151*** [.118, .183] | −.162*** [−.194, −.129] | .215*** [.183, .246] | .425*** [.397, .452] | .459*** [.432, .485] | .429*** [.401, .456] | .497*** [.467, .525] | −.263*** [−.293, −.232] | −.304*** [−.334, −.274] | – | |
| 12 | Anti-Israel Attitudes | .073*** [.040, .106] | .024 [−.009, .057] | −.109*** [−.141, −.076] | .093*** [.060, .126] | .306*** [.275, .336] | .060*** [.026, .093] | .156*** [.123, .189] | .255*** [.218, .291] | .067*** [.034, .100] | .077*** [.044, .110] | .492*** [.467, .517] | – |
| | M (*SD*) | – – | 48.61 *16.468* | 2.498 *.623* | – – | 1.202 *.596* | 2.957 *1.173* | 2.550 *.939* | .078 *.204* | 3.000 *1.254* | 3.853 *1.105* | 2.087 *.791* | 2.457 *.715* |

Note. [a] Gender coded as 1 = male, 2 = female; [b] Birth coded as 1 = born in Sweden, 2 = foreign-born.
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

was weaker than that observed for antisemitism. Likewise, the associations with anti-immigrant (r = .060, $p < .001$) and sexist attitudes (r = .156, $p < .001$) were notably weaker than the corresponding correlations for antisemitism. Importantly, anti-Israel attitudes correlated positively with trust in government (r = .067, $p < .001$) and confidence in the media (r = .077, $p < .001$). Together, these findings suggest that antisemitism is more strongly related to conspiratorial thinking, prejudice, and institutional distrust, whereas anti-Israel attitudes are more weakly associated with conspiracy beliefs and prejudicial attitudes, and relate positively to institutional trust.

## *Regression analyses*

We next conducted hierarchical regression analyses (see Table 2). As shown in Table 2, after adjusting for socio-demographic variables and social distance, antisemitism was most strongly related to greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs (β = .277, $p < .001$) as well as prejudicial attitudes, including higher anti-immigrant (β = .206, $p < .001$) and sexist attitudes (β = .142, $p < .001$). Yet, neither trust in government (β = .020, $p = .354$) nor confidence in the media (β = −.008, $p = .695$) was significantly associated with antisemitism, indicating that institutional trust was not related to antisemitic attitudes once other factors were taken into account.

For anti-Israel attitudes, a somewhat different pattern emerged. Specifically, conspiracy beliefs (β = .209, $p < .001$) and sexist attitudes (β = .109, $p < .001$) were significant positive predictors, whereas anti-immigrant attitudes were no longer related to anti-Israel attitudes (β = −.018, $p = .474$). Crucially, institutional trust was significantly related to anti-Israel attitudes: higher trust in government (β = .098, $p < .001$) and greater confidence in the media (β = .196, $p < .001$) were both positively related to stronger anti-Israel attitudes.

Taken together, these results indicate that antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, while strongly related, are linked to different sets of determinants. Antisemitism was more closely linked to anti-immigrant attitudes and greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs, whereas anti-Israel attitudes were unrelated to anti-immigrant views and were instead positively associated with institutional trust. While regression analyses provide insights into average associations between the study variables, they do not capture whether different subgroups of individuals combine these attitudes in distinct ways. This motivated us to use cluster analysis to identify potential attitudinal profiles.

## *Individual profiles on anti-Israel attitudes and antisemitism*

Inspection of the hierarchical clustering dendrogram indicated a clear three-cluster solution, marked by a substantial increase in fusion distance before the final merger. The three-cluster solution explained more variance in antisemitism (61.34 per cent) and anti-Israel attitudes (63.21 per cent) than a two-cluster solution (57.09 per cent and 40.28 per cent, respectively), and was therefore retained. We refined the cluster solution using k-means clustering with initial centroids from the hierarchical analysis. This approach delineated three distinct groups based on our two key dimensions entered into the analysis (see Figure 1). This three-cluster solution consisted of *Neutral Moderates* (n = 1182, 33.7 per cent), comprising individuals reporting the lowest levels of anti-Israel

**Table 2.** Hierarchical regressions with antisemitism and anti-israel attitudes as dependent variables.

| Dependent variable | Antisemitism | | | | | Anti-Israel Attitudes | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *B* | *β* | *t* | *p* | *95% CI B* | *B* | *β* | *t* | *p* | *95% CI B* |
| **Step 1: Demographics** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Gender | −.230 | −.146 | − 7.577 | <.001 | [−.290, −.171] | .081 | .055 | 2.719 | .007 | [.023, .139] |
| Age | .009 | .193 | 10.015 | <.001 | [.007, .011] | .001 | .017 | .861 | .389 | [−.001, .003] |
| Education | −.206 | −.156 | − 8.002 | <.001 | [−.256, −.155] | −.118 | −.096 | − 4.686 | <.001 | [−.167, −.069] |
| Birth | .463 | .206 | 10.729 | <.001 | [.378, .547] | .238 | .114 | 5.634 | <.001 | [.155, .321] |
| **Step 2: + Social distance** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Gender | −.188 | −.120 | − 6.853 | <.001 | [−.242, −.134] | .110 | .075 | 3.883 | <.001 | [.055, .166] |
| Age | .008 | .168 | 9.632 | <.001 | [.006, .010] | 0.000 | −.001 | −.075 | .940 | [−.002, .002] |
| Education | −.135 | −.102 | − 5.767 | <.001 | [−.181, −.089] | −.069 | −.056 | − 2.837 | .005 | [−.116, −.021] |
| Birth | .366 | .163 | 9.352 | <.001 | [.289, .443] | .170 | .082 | 4.216 | <.001 | [.091, .250] |
| Social distance | .574 | .412 | 23.461 | <.001 | [.526, .622] | .400 | .310 | 15.838 | <.001 | [.351, .450] |
| **Step 3: + Attitudes** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Gender | −.075 | −.048 | − 3.016 | .003 | [−.123, −.026] | .091 | .062 | 3.161 | .002 | [.034, .147] |
| Age | .005 | .109 | 6.935 | <.001 | [.004, .007] | .001 | .019 | .996 | .319 | [−.001, .003] |
| Education | −.017 | −.013 | −.820 | .413 | [−.059, .024] | −.054 | −.044 | − 2.222 | .026 | [−.102, −.006] |
| Birth | .277 | .123 | 7.993 | <.001 | [.209, .345] | .134 | .065 | 3.358 | <.001 | [.056, .213] |
| Social distance | .335 | .240 | 14.176 | <.001 | [.288, .381] | .334 | .259 | 12.256 | <.001 | [.281, .388] |
| Anti-immigrant attitudes | .130 | .200 | 10.622 | <.001 | [.106, .154] | −.092 | −.152 | −6.483 | <.001 | [− .120, −.064] |
| Sexist attitudes | .118 | .141 | 7.777 | <.001 | [.088, .147] | .071 | .092 | 4.070 | <.001 | [.037, .105] |
| Conspiracy beliefs | 1.067 | .276 | 15.830 | <.001 | [.935, 1.199] | .560 | .156 | 7.186 | <.001 | [.407, .712] |
| **Step 4: + Institutional trust** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Gender | −.076 | −.048 | −3.043 | .002 | [−.124, −.027] | .067 | .046 | 2.386 | .017 | [.012, .122] |
| Age | .005 | .109 | 6.912 | <.001 | [.004, .007] | .000 | .006 | .315 | .753 | [−.001, .002] |
| Education | −.017 | −.013 | −.827 | .408 | [−.059, .024] | −.050 | −.041 | −2.095 | .036 | [−.096, −.003] |
| Birth | .274 | .122 | 7.867 | <.001 | [.206, .342] | .136 | .065 | 3.466 | <.001 | [.059, .213] |
| Social distance | .335 | .240 | 14.178 | <.001 | [.289, .381] | .329 | .255 | 12.404 | <.001 | [.277, .382] |
| Anti-immigrant attitudes | .134 | .206 | 9.685 | <.001 | [.107, .161] | −.011 | −.018 | −.717 | .474 | [−.042, .019] |
| Sexist attitudes | .118 | .142 | 7.790 | <.001 | [.088, .148] | .084 | .109 | 4.956 | <.001 | [.051, .118] |
| Conspiracy beliefs | 1.069 | .277 | 15.479 | <.001 | [.934, 1.205] | .749 | .209 | 9.644 | <.001 | [.597, .901] |
| Government trust | .012 | .020 | .926 | .354 | [−.014, .038] | .056 | .098 | 3.720 | <.001 | [.026, .085] |
| Media confidence | −.006 | −.008 | −.392 | .695 | [−.034, .023] | .123 | .196 | 7.486 | <.001 | [.091, .155] |
| Model fit | Adj. $R^2$ = .447; F(10, 2394) = 195.249*** | | | | | Adj. $R^2$ = .188; F(10, 2394) = 56.595*** | | | | |

Note. Gender coded 1 = male, 2 = female; birth coded 1 = Sweden, 2 = foreign-born. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.




**Figure 1.** Profiles of Attitudes toward Israel and Antisemitism Based on Z-scores.

attitudes and antisemitism; *Critical Engagers* (n = 1342, 38.3 per cent), comprising individuals characterized by moderate anti-Israel attitudes but low antisemitism; and *Distrustful Sceptics* (n = 983, 28 per cent), comprising individuals reporting the highest levels of anti-Israel attitudes and antisemitism. Although *Distrustful Sceptics* scored highest on these measures, it is important to note that their levels reflect the upper range of these attitudes within the sample rather than indicate extreme attitudes.

To ascertain significant differences among these clusters regarding their anti-Israel and antisemitic views, a MANOVA was conducted with these dimensions as dependent variables. The results revealed a pronounced divergence across the clusters, as evidenced by a multivariate F-test, $F(4, 7006) = 2124.067$, $p < 0.001$, with a partial eta squared ($\eta_p^2$) of .548, indicating a strong effect size. Subsequent post-hoc analyses verified distinct mean differences among all clusters concerning both measured attitudes, as detailed in Table 3. Even though *Distrustful Sceptics* had the highest mean scores on antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, these scores remained within the moderate range when viewed on a 5-point scale. The findings robustly demonstrate that each group exhibits unique profiles in terms of their anti-Israel and antisemitic orientations.

## Socio-demographic characteristics of attitudinal profiles

The different individual profiles were compared across various socio-demographic characteristics, including gender, education, age, and personal income. A multivariate F-test

**Table 3.** Means and differences across profiles of antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes.

| Grouping variable | Neutral Moderates (N = 1182) | Critical Engagers (N = 1342) | Distrustful Sceptics (N = 983) | $F$ (2, 3504) | $\eta_p^2$ | Observed power |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Antisemitism | 1.606[a] | 1.906[b] | 2.959[c] | 2533.529*** | .591 | 1.000 |
| Anti-Israel attitudes | 1.698[a] | 2.662[b] | 3.091[c] | 3009.236*** | .632 | 1.000 |

Note. ***$p < 0.001$.
[a,b,c]The different superscripts indicate significant mean differences across the groups using the SNK post-hoc test. Multivariate F-test, $F(4, 7006) = 2124.067$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta_p^2 = .548$.

revealed overall differences between the three clusters, $F$ (8, 6082) = 28.141, $p < 0.001$, $\eta_p^2$ = .036. Post-hoc comparisons between the clusters indicated that there were significantly more women among *Critical Engagers* compared to *Neutral Moderates* and *Distrustful Sceptics*, $F$ (2, 3044) = 29.380, $p < 0.001$, $\eta_p^2$ = .019. Furthermore, *Distrustful Sceptics* were characterized by a significantly lower education level, $F$ (2, 3044) = 42.121, $p < 0.001$, $\eta_p^2$ = .027, an older average age, $F$ (2, 3044) = 39.347, $p < 0.001$, $\eta_p^2$ = .025, and also reported lower personal income, $F$ (2, 3044) = 8.256, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2$ = .005, as compared with the other two groups.

Additionally, chi-square tests revealed significant differences in party affiliation across the three clusters, $\chi^2$ (30, N = 3487) = 278.543, $p < 0.001$. Specifically, 21.5 per cent of *Distrustful Sceptics* supported the Sweden Democrats, which was significantly higher compared with 13.1 per cent among *Neutral Moderates* and 7.3 per cent among *Critical Engagers*. Conversely, Social Democrats received the most support among *Critical Engagers*, with 24.5 per cent, followed closely by *Distrustful Sceptics* at 25.2 per cent, and 16.2 per cent among *Neutral Moderates*. The Left Party and Green Party also found their strongest support among *Critical Engagers*, with 14.1 per cent and 8.4 per cent, respectively, compared to lower support in the other two clusters.

Finally, significant differences across the three clusters were found regarding country of birth, $\chi^2$ (6, N = 3507) = 103.218, $p < .001$. While the majority of individuals among *Neutral Moderates* and *Critical Engagers* were born in Sweden (87.7 per cent and 88.9 per cent, respectively), *Distrustful Sceptics* had a noticeably lower percentage of individuals born in Sweden (77.6 per cent). Moreover, *Distrustful Sceptics* stood out with a significantly higher percentage of individuals born in other parts of the world (25.4 per cent) compared with *Neutral Moderates* (12.3 per cent) and *Critical Engagers* (11.1 per cent).

## *Cluster variations in prejudicial attitudes and conspiracy beliefs*

To examine differences among individual profiles concerning prejudicial attitudes and conspiracy beliefs, we conducted a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA). In this analysis, age, gender, education, and country of birth were entered as control variables (see Table 4). The results suggested that there were significant group differences in prejudicial attitudes and conspiracy beliefs, $F$ (6, 4858) = 78.996, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2$ = .089.

An examination of the univariate and post-hoc comparisons clearly delineated the specific differences across the clusters. Notably, *Distrustful Sceptics* consistently reported the highest levels of both anti-immigrant and sexist attitudes, significantly higher than both *Neutral Moderates* and *Critical Engagers*. Among the latter two groups, *Neutral Moderates* reported slightly higher levels of anti-immigrant attitudes than *Critical Engagers*,

**Table 4.** Cluster variations in prejudicial attitudes and conspiracy beliefs.

| | Neutral Moderates | Critical Engagers | Distrustful Sceptics | $F$ (2, 2431) | $\eta_p^2$ | Observed power |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anti-immigrant attitudes | 2.752[a] | 2.557[b] | 3.579[c] | 88.290*** | .068 | 1.000 |
| Sexist attitudes | 2.333[a] | 2.393[b] | 2.999[c] | 67.022*** | .052 | 1.000 |
| Conspiracy beliefs | .034[a] | .041[a] | .237[b] | 178.742*** | .128 | 1.000 |

Note. ***$p < .001$. Data presented in each cell are standardized means.
[a,b,c]The different superscripts indicate significant mean differences across the groups using LSD post-hoc tests.

whereas *Critical Engagers* reported slightly higher levels of sexist attitudes than *Neutral Moderates*, with both differences reaching statistical significance.

Concerning conspiracy beliefs, *Distrustful Sceptics* were significantly more likely to endorse conspiracy beliefs than both *Neutral Moderates* and *Critical Engagers*. In contrast, *Neutral Moderates* and *Critical Engagers* did not differ significantly from one another and both displayed comparatively low levels of endorsement of conspiracy beliefs. Taken together, *Distrustful Sceptics* showed the highest levels of anti-immigrant and sexist attitudes as well as endorsement of conspiracy beliefs, compared to the other two profiles. Although *Neutral Moderates* and *Critical Engagers* differed significantly from one another on prejudicial attitudes (but not conspiracy beliefs), both profiles reported lower levels than *Distrustful Sceptics*.

## Multinomial logistic regression analysis

To further understand the factors related to cluster membership across groups, we conducted a multinomial logistic regression analysis. The analysis incorporated government trust and confidence in the media as key predictors, with age, gender, education, country of birth, and social distance included as control variables. The multinomial logistic regression model provided a good fit for the data, as indicated by the significant improvement in model fit over the intercept-only model ($\chi^2 = 740.180$, $df = 14$, $p < 0.001$). The multinomial logistic regression model revealed several significant predictors of cluster membership, offering insights into the distinct characteristics of each group (see Table 5).

Specifically, for *Critical Engagers*, gender emerged as a significant factor, with females being more likely to belong to this cluster compared with the reference group (*Neutral Moderates*) (OR = 1.569, 95% CI = 1.332–1.848, $p < 0.001$). Educational attainment was inversely related to membership in this cluster, indicating that individuals with higher

**Table 5.** Multinomial logistic regression results comparing critical engagers and distrustful sceptics with neutral moderates.

| | *B* | *SE* | *Wald* $\chi^2$ | *df* | *p* | *OR* | *95% CI for OR* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Critical Engagers** | | | | | | | |
| Intercept | −1.998 | 0.359 | 30.983 | 1 | <.001 | - | - |
| Gender | 0.450 | 0.083 | 29.125 | 1 | <.001 | 1.569 | [1.332, 1.848] |
| Education | −0.190 | 0.071 | 7.144 | 1 | .008 | 0.827 | [0.719, 0.951] |
| Birth | −0.061 | 0.129 | 0.228 | 1 | .633 | 0.940 | [0.731, 1.210] |
| Age | 0.001 | 0.003 | 0.051 | 1 | .822 | 1.001 | [0.996, 1.006] |
| Social Distance | 0.640 | 0.160 | 16.055 | 1 | <.001 | 1.897 | [1.387, 2.594] |
| Trust in Government | 0.111 | 0.043 | 6.606 | 1 | .010 | 1.117 | [1.027, 1.216] |
| Confidence in Media | 0.235 | 0.051 | 20.970 | 1 | <.001 | 1.265 | [1.144, 1.399] |
| **Distrustful Sceptics** | | | | | | | |
| Intercept | −2.917 | 0.376 | 60.214 | 1 | <.001 | - | - |
| Gender | 0.126 | 0.100 | 1.595 | 1 | .207 | 1.134 | [0.933, 1.378] |
| Education | −0.484 | 0.080 | 36.204 | 1 | <.001 | 0.616 | [0.526, 0.722] |
| Birth | 0.944 | 0.130 | 52.881 | 1 | <.001 | 2.569 | [1.992, 3.314] |
| Age | 0.018 | 0.003 | 36.978 | 1 | <.001 | 1.018 | [1.012, 1.024] |
| Social Distance | 1.714 | 0.148 | 133.353 | 1 | <.001 | 5.549 | [4.148, 7.421] |
| Trust in Government | −0.082 | 0.050 | 2.677 | 1 | .102 | 0.922 | [0.836, 1.016] |
| Confidence in Media | −0.046 | 0.054 | 0.715 | 1 | .398 | 0.955 | [0.858, 1.063] |

Note. *B:* unstandardized regression coefficient; *SE:* standard error of the coefficient; *Wald* $\chi^2$: Wald chi-square statistic; *df:* degrees of freedom; *p:* probability value (significance level); *OR*: Odds Ratio (Exp(B)); 95% CI for OR: 95% confidence interval for the Odds Ratio; reference categories: male and born inside the reference country.

levels of education were less likely to be *Critical Engagers* (OR = 0.827, 95% CI = 0.719–0.951, $p = 0.008$). Social distance significantly increased the likelihood of being a *Critical Engager* (OR = 1.897, 95% CI = 1.387–2.594, $p < 0.001$), suggesting that individuals who feel more socially distant from Jews are more likely to align with this group. Importantly, trust in government was positively associated with membership in this cluster (OR = 1.117, 95% CI = 1.027–1.216, $p = 0.010$), as was confidence in the media (OR = 1.265, 95% CI = 1.144–1.399, $p < 0.001$).

For *Distrustful Sceptics*, the analysis identified several distinct characteristics. Higher education significantly reduced the likelihood of being in this cluster (OR = 0.616, 95% CI = 0.526–0.722, $p < 0.001$), while being born outside the reference country substantially increased the odds of membership (OR = 2.569, 95% CI = 1.992–3.314, $p < 0.001$). Age was another significant factor, with older individuals being more likely to belong to this cluster (OR = 1.018, 95% CI = 1.012–1.024, $p < 0.001$). Trust in government did not emerge as a significant predictor for this group ($p = 0.102$), nor did confidence in the media ($p = 0.398$). However, social distance was a strong predictor, with higher levels dramatically increasing the likelihood of being a distrustful sceptic (OR = 5.549, 95% CI = 4.148–7.421, $p < 0.001$).

Overall, the multinomial logistic regression analysis indicates that trust in government and confidence in the media increase the likelihood of an individual belonging to the *Critical Engagers* group, suggesting that their attitudes may be shaped by these institutional trust factors.

## Discussion

The present study examined the relationship between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes in Sweden using a two-step methodological strategy. We first applied analyses of associations between the study variables to assess how these attitudes relate to prejudicial orientations, conspiracy beliefs, and institutional trust across the population on average. We then complemented these findings with analyses of clusters among respondents to explore whether these associations combine into distinct attitudinal profiles.

Consistent with our expectations (*Expectation 1a*), antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes were strongly associated, supporting prior research showing that these attitudes are closely related and frequently overlap (e.g. Beattie 2017; Binstok, Gould, and Kaplan 2024; Staetsky 2017, 2020). As anticipated (*Expectation 2a*), antisemitism was positively associated with anti-immigrant and sexist attitudes, echoing prior findings that antisemitism frequently co-occurs with other prejudicial orientations (Heitmeyer et al. 2013; Zick et al. 2008). Anti-Israel attitudes, by contrast, were not related to anti-immigrant attitudes and were associated with sexist attitudes to a lesser extent than antisemitism, providing partial support for our expectations.

Furthermore, in line with our expectations (*Expectation 3a*), antisemitism was positively linked to greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs, consistent with evidence that antisemitism is frequently fueled by conspiratorial worldviews (Imhoff and Bruder 2014; Jolley, Meleady, and Douglas 2020). At the same time, anti-Israel attitudes showed a weaker association with endorsement of conspiracy beliefs, as compared to antisemitism. Importantly, the regression analyses showed this association became more pronounced when institutional trust was added into the model. These findings suggest that conspiracy

beliefs are more closely linked to antisemitism, while their relationship with anti-Israel attitudes is more selective and dependent on the institutional context.

Finally, consistent with our expectations (*Expectation 4a*), antisemitism was unrelated to institutional trust, including trust in government and confidence in the media, when other socio-demographic and attitudinal factors were taken into account. By contrast, anti-Israel attitudes were positively related to trust in government and confidence in the media. This pattern suggests that in Sweden, where government and media narratives have often been critical of Israel, higher institutional trust is associated with stronger anti-Israel attitudes.

Taken together, our findings suggest that antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, although significantly correlated, are linked to different sets of antecedents. Antisemitism is associated with higher prejudicial orientations toward other groups and greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs and is unrelated to institutional trust when other factors are taken into account. By contrast, anti-Israel attitudes are unrelated to anti-immigrant attitudes and are positively associated with higher trust in government and confidence in the media.

The cluster analyses provided additional insights into how individuals combine antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes in different ways. Specifically, in line with our expectations (*Expectation 1b*), we identified a profile of individuals characterized by moderate anti-Israel attitudes but low levels of antisemitism. This group, termed *Critical Engagers*, aligns with prior research (Beattie 2017; Binstok, Gould, and Kaplan 2024; Staetsky 2017, 2020) showing that individuals may express criticism of Israeli policies without endorsing antisemitic beliefs. These findings support the argument that, even though both sets of attitudes are closely related, anti-Israel attitudes, particularly at moderate levels, do not always go hand in hand with antisemitic beliefs and may instead reflect political, ideological, or humanitarian concerns. More broadly, the cluster-based approach highlights the complex relationship between these attitudes and the importance of examining distinct attitudinal profiles rather than focusing only on average associations.

We also identified the *Distrustful Sceptics* group, characterized by the highest levels of anti-Israel attitudes and antisemitism compared to the other groups. Importantly, these elevated levels do not reach the threshold of extreme attitudes and remain moderate within our measurement scales. This finding highlights the need to recognize relative differences within the Swedish population: while *Distrustful Sceptics* display more negative views toward Jews and Israel than *Neutral Moderates* or *Critical Engagers*, these attitudes should not be misinterpreted as indicative of extreme hostility.

Consistent with our expectations (*Expectations 2b and 3b*), *Critical Engagers* displayed lower endorsement of conspiracy beliefs as well as lower levels of both anti-immigrant and sexist attitudes than *Distrustful Sceptics*. At the same time, differences between *Critical Engagers* and *Neutral Moderates*, although statistically significant for prejudicial attitudes, were less pronounced, indicating that their distinctiveness is most evident in contrast to *Distrustful Sceptics*. These findings suggest that individuals who hold moderate anti-Israel attitudes but low levels of antisemitism are less likely to harbor broader prejudicial attitudes and conspiracy beliefs than those whose anti-Israel attitudes co-occur with antisemitic views.

Crucially, the cluster-based analyses (*Expectation 4b*) demonstrated that *Critical Engagers* were distinguished from other profiles by higher levels of institutional trust. In line

with prior research (Hetherington and Globetti 2002; Hetherington and Husser 2012; Jeannet, Heidland, and Ruhs 2023), greater institutional trust was associated with more mainstream critiques of Israel, reflecting the influence of governmental positions and media narratives on public opinion. In Sweden, where governmental and mainstream media discourse have generally been critical of Israeli policies, individuals who trust these institutions are more likely to align with such narratives, adopting stronger anti-Israel attitudes without simultaneously endorsing antisemitic views.

At the same time, this pattern could not be fully captured by regression analyses alone. While the regression models showed that trust in government and confidence in the media were positively related to stronger anti-Israel attitudes on average, the cluster analysis clarified that this relationship was specific to a particular subgroup – individuals characterized by moderate anti-Israel attitudes but low antisemitism. This underscores that institutional trust can channel individuals toward anti-Israel attitudes without having a comparable influence on antisemitism, highlighting the added value of combining analyses of associations between the variables with analyses of attitudinal profiles.

This finding supports the view that institutional trust functions as a heuristic in the formation of public opinions (Rudolph 2017), particularly on complex issues such as the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. Individuals with higher levels of institutional trust may rely more heavily on cues provided by government and media (Korol and Bevelander 2021; Korol et al. 2023), which direct their attention toward prevailing institutional narratives. This highlights the influential role of governmental and media framing in shaping public attitudes (Korol and Bevelander 2023). In this way, *Critical Engagers* – guided by institutional trust – tend to adopt positions that align with dominant institutional narratives, expressing criticism of Israeli policies without extending into antisemitic and broadly hostile worldviews.

At the same time, it is important to situate these findings within a broader European context. In Sweden, where both government and mainstream media discourse have often been critical of Israeli policies, higher institutional trust was associated with stronger anti-Israel attitudes, suggesting that trust may orient individuals toward prevailing institutional narratives. This pattern, however, contrasts with contexts such as Germany and the United Kingdom, where governments and mainstream media have historically been more supportive of Israel. In those settings, anti-Israel attitudes are more often expressed by oppositional groups, and institutional trust is therefore likely to predict *lower* anti-Israel attitudes, while distrust of institutions may fuel sharper criticism of Israel. Supporting these arguments, recent research among a representative sample of UK residents has shown that conspiracy beliefs related to government malfeasance are positively associated with anti-Israel attitudes (Allington, Hirsh, and Katz 2023).

Taken together, the findings of the present study suggest that the relationship between institutional trust and anti-Israel attitudes is highly context-dependent. In contexts where institutional discourse adopts a critical stance toward Israel, higher trust may amplify critical attitudes by aligning individuals with dominant governmental and media framing. By contrast, in contexts where institutions are supportive of Israel, anti-Israel attitudes may be more closely tied to distrust and conspiratorial narratives. Sweden is not unique in having mainstream discourse critical of Israeli policies: other European countries, such as Ireland, Spain, Norway, and Belgium, display similar patterns.

In these contexts, institutional trust may play a role similar to Sweden, shaping anti-Israel attitudes via orienting individuals toward prevailing institutional narratives. Future cross-national research is needed to systematically examine how national political and media environments shape the interplay between institutional trust, conspiratorial beliefs, and anti-Israel attitudes.

## Limitations and future directions

While the present study offers valuable insights into antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes within the Swedish population, as well as their attitudinal correlates and antecedents, several limitations should be noted.

First, the cross-sectional design limits the ability to infer causal relationships between antisemitic attitudes, anti-Israel sentiments, and their antecedents, including institutional trust. Longitudinal research is needed to examine how these attitudes develop over time and respond to political, media, and societal changes, and to provide stronger evidence for underlying causal mechanisms. Second, reliance on self-report measures may introduce social desirability and mono-method bias, particularly given the sensitivity of topics such as antisemitism and institutional trust. Although self-reported data are commonly used in attitudinal research, future studies could address this by incorporating implicit attitude measures or behavioral data.

Third, while the regression analyses estimate average associations, the cluster analysis used to identify individual profiles is exploratory and reflects statistical groupings rather than naturally existing categories. Replication in future surveys is needed to assess the robustness of these profiles, and both approaches should be interpreted with caution. Fourth, the study relied on a single-item measure for government trust, which may not fully capture its complexity. Although prior research (Bergkvist and Rossiter 2007; Citrin and Stoker 2018) indicates that single-item measures can be valid and reliable, future studies would benefit from multi-item scales to provide a more nuanced understanding of how trust in government relates to antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes.

Fifth, the study used survey instruments developed for the national data collection rather than established validated scales to measure antisemitism, anti-Israel attitudes, and conspiracy beliefs (Bachner and Bevelander 2021). While these measures were designed to capture contemporary expressions relevant to the Swedish context, reliance on validated scales would improve comparability across studies and facilitate replication. Future research should therefore combine established instruments with context-specific items to balance cross-study comparability with sensitivity to evolving discourses.

Finally, the focus on Sweden raises questions of generalizability. Sweden's combination of low antisemitism and mainstream institutional criticism of Israel provides a distinctive context, but the role of institutional trust may differ in other national settings. In countries such as Germany and the UK, where mainstream discourse has historically been more supportive of Israel, institutional trust may be associated with weaker rather than stronger anti-Israel attitudes. By contrast, countries like Ireland, Spain, or Belgium, where institutional narratives have been more critical of Israel, may resemble Sweden more closely. Future cross-national comparative research is therefore essential to test the context-dependence of these findings and to assess whether similar patterns emerge across different environments.

## Conclusion

The findings demonstrate that antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes in Sweden are closely related, yet differ in their associations with other attitudinal and socio-political factors. Antisemitism is linked to prejudicial orientations and conspiratorial worldviews, whereas anti-Israel attitudes are unrelated to anti-immigrant attitudes and are positively associated with institutional trust. Beyond these average associations, the cluster analyses add nuance by identifying a group of *Critical Engagers* who combine moderate anti-Israel attitudes with low levels of antisemitism. This finding supports existing evidence that criticism of Israel can be expressed without accompanying antisemitic beliefs, even though the two attitudes are closely related and may reflect different expressions of a shared underlying disposition. In Sweden, this individual profile appears to be shaped by higher institutional trust, suggesting that alignment with prevailing governmental and media discourse can channel critical views of Israel without activating antisemitic attitudes. More broadly, these results illustrate how antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes may manifest in different ways depending on political, institutional, and discursive contexts, empathizing the value of examining distinct attitudinal profiles rather than relying solely on average associations. Taken together, this study contributes to the field by moving beyond demonstrations of overlap between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, and by identifying specific factors – most notably institutional trust – that help explain why individuals may be inclined toward one set of attitudes rather than the other.

## Author contributions

CRediT: **Liliia Korol:** Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition, Investigation, Methodology, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing; **Pieter Bevelander:** Data curation, Funding acquisition, Project administration, Supervision, Writing – review & editing.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

## Funding

This study resulted from the research supported by the grants from the Swedish Research Council (dnr 2023-01482) and the Swedish Knowledge Foundation [grant number 20220101]. The study was made possible by access to data collected by the Living History Forum with the aim to describe the prevalence of antisemitic attitudes in Sweden.

## Ethical approval

The study used anonymized third-party survey data provided by the Living History Forum. The Swedish Ethics Review Authority determined that the project did not require ethical review under the Ethical Review Act, as it involved no intervention and no processing of sensitive personal data. The dataset was provided in fully anonymized form, and permission to use the data for research purposes was obtained from the data owner. No identifiable personal information was accessed, and informed consent was obtained by the data owner at the time of data collection.

## Data availability statement

The data generated and/or analyzed during the current study are not publicly available.

## ORCID

*Liliia Korol* http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6434-0982
*Pieter Bevelander* http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7001-4526

## References

Aaronovitch, D. 2010. *Voodoo Histories: The Role of the Conspiracy Theory in Shaping Modern History*. New York, NY: Riverhead Books.

Anti-Defamation League (ADL). 2014. *ADL Global 100: An Index of Anti-Semitism*. Anti-Defamation League. https://global100.adl.org/.

Anti-Defamation League (ADL). 2019 https://global100.adl.org

Agovino, M., M. Carillo, and N. Spagnolo. 2022. "Effect of Media News on Radicalization of Attitudes to Immigration." *Journal of Economics, Race, and Policy* 5:318–340. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41996-021-00091-4.

Allington, D., B. L. Buarque, and D. Barker Flores. 2021. "Antisemitic Conspiracy Fantasy in the age of Digital Media: Three 'Conspiracy Theorists' and Their YouTube Audiences." *Language and Literature: International Journal of Stylistics* 30 (1): 78–102. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963947020971997.

Allington, D., and D. Hirsh. 2019. "The AzAs (Antizionist Antisemitism) Scale: Measuring Antisemitism as Expressed in Relation to Israel and Its Supporters." *Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism* 2 (2): 43–52. https://doi.org/10.26613/jca/2.2.32.

Allington, D., D. Hirsh, and L. Katz. 2022. "The Generalised Antisemitism (GeAs) Scale: A Questionnaire Instrument for Measuring Antisemitism as Expressed in Relation Both to Jews and to Israel." *Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism* 5 (1): 37–48. https://doi.org/10.26613/jca/5.1.99.

Allington, D., D. Hirsh, and L. Katz. 2023. "Antisemitism Is Predicted by Anti-hierarchical Aggression, Totalitarianism, and Belief in Malevolent Global Conspiracies." *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications* 10:155. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-023-01624-y.

Allington, D., and T. Joshi. 2020. "'What Others Dare Not Say': An Antisemitic Conspiracy Fantasy and Its YouTube Audience." *Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism* 3 (1): 35–54. https://doi.org/10.26613/jca/3.1.42.

Bachner, H. 2010. "Political Cultures of Denial? Antisemitism in Sweden and Scandinavia." In *Politics and Resentment: Antisemitism and Counter-cosmopolitanism in the European Union*, edited by L. Rensmann and J. H. Schoeps, 329–362. Brill.

Bachner, H., and P. Bevelander. 2021. "Antisemitism i Sverige : En jämförelse av attityder och föreställningar 2005 och 2020." Forum för levande historia: https://www.levandehistoria.se/english/learn-and-teach/summary-of-the-study-antisemitism-in-sweden.

Baum, S. K., and M. Nakazawa. 2007. "Anti-Semitism versus Anti-israeli Sentiment." *Journal of Religion & Society* 9:1–8.

Beattie, P. 2017. "Anti-Semitism and Opposition to Israeli Government Policies: The Roles of Prejudice and Information." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40 (15): 2749–2767. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2016.1260751.

Bergkvist, L., and J. R. Rossiter. 2007. "The Predictive Validity of Multiple-Item versus Single-Item Measures of the Same Constructs." *Journal of Marketing Research* 44 (2): 175–184. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.44.2.175.

Bergmann, W. 2021. "Antisemitic and Anti-Israel Attitudes – How are They Linked? A Comparative Overview of Surveys." HL Senteret: Senter for studier av Holocaust og livssynsminoriteter. https://archive.jpr.org.uk/object-3703.

Binstok, N., E. D. Gould, and T. Kaplan. 2024. "Policies or Prejudices? An Analysis of Antisemitic and Anti-Israel Views on Social Media and Social Surveys." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 22 (5): 2329–2373. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae013.

Byford, J. 2011. *Conspiracy Theories: A Critical Introduction*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Citrin, J., and L. Stoker. 2018. "Political Trust in a Cynical age." *Annual Review of Political Science* 21:49–70. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050316-092550.

Cohen, F., L. Jussim, K. D. Harber, and G. Bhasin. 2009. "Modern Anti-Semitism and Anti-Israeli Attitudes." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 97 (2): 290–306. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015338.

Douglas, K. M., J. E. Uscinski, R. M. Sutton, A. Cichocka, T. Nefes, C. S. Ang, and F. Deravi. 2019. "Understanding Conspiracy Theories." *Political Psychology* 40 (S1): 3–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12568.

Fine, R., and P. Spencer. 2017. *Antisemitism and the Left: On the Return of the Jewish Question*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Friehs, M.-T., J. Masselmann, M. Trautner, P. F. Kotzur, and P. Schmidt. 2022. "Unobserved Heterogeneity between Individuals in Group-Focused Enmity." *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 16:1–17. https://doi.org/10.11576/ijcv-5266.

Government of Sweden. 2018. "The Situation in the Middle East, Including the Palestinian Question." https://www.government.se/statements/2018/02/the-situation-in-the-middle-east-including-the-palestinian-question/.

Hair, J. F., W. C. Black, B. J. Babin, R. E. Anderson, and R. L. Tatham. 2010. *Multivariate Data Analysis*. 7th ed.. New York: Prentice Hall.

Heitmeyer, W., A. Zick, B. Küpper, and A. Klein. 2013. "Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit in Deutschland: Ergebnisse aus zehn Jahren empirischer Forschung." In *Deutsche Zustände*, Vol. 10, edited by W. Heitmeyer, 13–68. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Hetherington, M. J. 2004. *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hetherington, M. J., and S. Globetti. 2002. "Political Trust and Racial Policy Preferences." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (2): 253–275. https://doi.org/10.2307/3088375.

Hetherington, M. J., and J. A. Husser. 2012. "How Trust Matters: The Changing Political Relevance of Political Trust." *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (2): 312–325. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00548.x.

Hirsh, D. 2017. *Contemporary Left Antisemitism*. London: Routledge.

Hurwitz, J., and M. Peffley. 1987. "How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model." *American Political Science Review* 81 (4): 1099–1120. https://doi.org/10.2307/1962580.

Imhoff, R., and M. Bruder. 2014. "Speaking (Un–)Truth to Power: Conspiracy Mentality as a Generalised Political Attitude." *European Journal of Personality* 28 (1): 25–43. https://doi.org/10.1002/per.1930.

International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. 2016. "Working Definition of Antisemitism." https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitions-charters/working-definition-antisemitism.

Jaspal, R. 2023. "The Social Psychology of Contemporary Antisemitism." *Israel Affairs* 29 (1): 31–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2023.2166203.

Jeannet, A. M., T. Heidland, and M. Ruhs. 2023. "A Need for Control? Political Trust and Public Preferences for Asylum and Refugee Policy." *European Political Science Review* 15 (3): 427–443. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773923000012.

Jolley, D., R. Meleady, and K. M. Douglas. 2020. "Exposure to Intergroup Conspiracy Theories Promotes Prejudice Which Spreads across Groups." *British Journal of Psychology* 111 (1): 17–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12385.

Kaplan, E. H., and C. A. Small. 2006. "Anti-israel Sentiment Predicts Antisemitism in Europe." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (4): 548–561. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002706289184.

Karić, T., and J. Međedović. 2021. "The Effect of Ego-Resiliency and COVID-19-Related Stress on Mental Health among the Japanese Population." *Personality and Individual Differences* 175:110702. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2021.110702.

Kempf, W. 2011. "Mental Models of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." *Journal for the Study of Anti-semitism* 3:507–554.

Kempf, W. 2015. "Anti-Semitism and Criticism of Israel: Methodology and Results of the ASCI Survey." *Conflict & Communication Online* 14 (1). https://cco.regener-online.de/2015_1/pdf/kempf2015.pdf.

Kofta, M., and G. Sedek. 2005. "Conspiracy Stereotypes of Jews during Systemic Transformation in Poland." *International Journal of Sociology* 35:40–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207659.2005.11043142.

Kofta, M., W. Soral, and M. Bilewicz. 2020. "What Breeds Conspiracy Antisemitism? The Role of Political Uncontrollability and Uncertainty in the Belief in Jewish Conspiracy." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 118 (5): 900–918. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000183.

Korol, L., and P. Bevelander. 2021. "Does Young Adults' Life Satisfaction Promote Tolerance towards Immigrants? The Role of Political Satisfaction and Social Trust." *Current Psychology* 42:5599–5610. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-021-01923-0.

Korol, L., and P. Bevelander. 2023. "The Power of Positive Thinking: How Positive Opinions of Refugees' Impact on the Host Society Generate Positive Behavioural Intentions." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 36 (1): 22–45. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feac065.

Korol, L., A. W. Fietzer, P. Bevelander, and I. Pasichnyk. 2023. "Are Immigrants Scapegoats? The Reciprocal Relationships between Subjective Well-Being, Political Distrust, and Anti-immigrant Attitudes in Young Adulthood." *Psychological Reports* 126 (3): 1392–1415. https://doi.org/10.1177/00332941211065951.

Lau, R. R., and D. P. Redlawsk. 2001. "Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making." *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (4): 951–971. https://doi.org/10.2307/2669334.

Macdonald, D. 2021. "Political Trust and Support for Immigration in the American Mass Public." *British Journal of Political Science* 51 (4): 1402–1420. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000668.

Meuleman, B., K. Abts, K. Slootmaeckers, and C. Meeusen. 2019. "Differentiated Threat and the Genesis of Prejudice: Group-Specific Antecedents of Homonegativity, Islamophobia, Anti-Semitism, and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 82 (4): 611–635. https://doi.org/10.1177/0190272519875640.

Rich, D. 2021. *Everyday Hate: How Antisemitism Is Built into Our World—and How You Can Change It*. London: Biteback Publishing.

Rudolph, T. J. 2017. "Political Trust as a Heuristic." In S. Zmerli, & T. van der Meer (Eds.), *Handbook on political trust* (pp. 197–211). Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782545118.00023.

Söderin, E., Borgström, A., & Svensson, J. (2024, September 16). "Unik analys: Så partiska är svenska medier om Gazakriget." Dagens ETC. https://www.etc.se/story/unik-analys-saa-partiska-aer-svenska-medier-om-gaza-kriget

Staetsky, L. D. 2017. *Antisemitism in Contemporary Great Britain: A Study of Attitudes towards Jews and Israel*. Institute for Jewish Policy Research. https://www.jpr.org.uk/reports/antisemitism-contemporary-great-britain.

Staetsky, L. D. 2020. "The Left, the Right, Christians, Muslims and Detractors of Israel: Who Is Antisemitic in Great Britain in the Early 21st Century?" *Contemporary Jewry* 40 (2): 259–292. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45299129.

Swami, V. 2012. "Social Psychological Origins of Conspiracy Theories: The Case of the Jewish Conspiracy Theory in Malaysia." *Frontiers in Psychology* 3:280. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00280.

Wistrich, R. S. 2010. *A Lethal Obsession: Anti-semitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad*. New York, NY: Random House.

Zick, A., B. Küpper, and A. Hövermann. 2011. *Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination: A European Report*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2018626

Zick, A., C. Wolf, B. Küpper, E. Davidov, P. Schmidt, and W. Heitmeyer. 2008. "The Syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity: The Interrelation of Prejudices Tested with Multiple Cross-Sectional and Panel Data." *Journal of Social Issues* 64 (2): 363–383. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00566.x.