

Jewish Representative Council of Ireland (JRCI)

Antisemitic Incident Report

Reporting period: 17 July 2025 to 9 January 2026

Published 2/3/2026

Key Findings & Analysis

1. Volume of Reports

A total of **143 antisemitic incidents** were reported to the JRCI reporting mechanism by community members **within 6 months** of introducing it - in a community of around 2,200 people. These include incidents that occurred during and predating the reporting period, and that had never previously been documented anywhere. The incidents are self-reported – they reflect the lived experience of many Irish Jews. No official State mechanism for recording antisemitic incidents in Ireland exists.

2. Most Common Forms of Harm

36% of reported incidents included verbal abuse or slurs. Out of which, **40%** included threats or intimidation.

The top incident categories reported were:

Note: Respondents could choose more than one category, so the sum represents how often a given type of incident was present in reports.

| Incident Type | Number Reported |
|---|-----------------|
| Verbal abuse or slurs | 52 |
| Vandalism or graffiti | 47 |
| Threats or intimidation | 35 |
| Exclusion or discrimination | 29 |
| Direct digital targeting (hate emails & unsolicited messages) | 24 |

These categories reflect **hostility and intimidation**, not criticism or disagreement.

3. Incidents Occur in Everyday Settings

75% of reported incidents occurred in ordinary, everyday environments, including:

| Incident Type | Number Reported | |
|---|-----------------|-----|
| Public spaces | 50 | 35% |
| Educational settings (schools & universities) | 21 | 15% |
| Workplaces | 8 | 6% |
| Healthcare settings | 5 | 3% |
| Retail, hospitality, and other routine services | 13 | 9% |
| Public transport | 4 | 3% |
| Homes and private residential contexts | 6 | 4% |

Antisemitism is not confined to protests, demonstrations, or extremist gatherings. It is experienced where people live, work, study, and access essential services.

When looking at locations by category, the dataset is dominated by incidents occurring in physical settings (75%), with a substantial minority (25%) occurring online through digital targeting.



4. Direct Digital Targeting Is Particularly Threatening

47% (17 incidents) of direct digital targeting incidents included threats or assault language.

This demonstrates that digitally mediated targeting - including hate emails and unsolicited direct messages - is no less serious than physical incidents; it often carries greater levels of intimidation and threat

Note: For methodological clarity, this report excludes social media data, which is currently being collected and analysed separately and will be published in a dedicated digital monitoring report

5. Holocaust distortion and antisemitic conspiracies are not historical - they are contemporary and active

- **25** reports (17%) included Holocaust denial & trivialisation and/or antisemitic conspiracy theories, including classic tropes of Jewish control and manipulation
- Dehumanising and eliminationist language were recorded in both digital and in-person contexts

6. Identity alone is enough to trigger hostility

30% of incidents (43) began as ordinary interactions and then shift to hostile and antisemitic because a Jewish / Israeli identity cue was revealed, including:

- Accent
- Speaking Hebrew in public
- Wearing Jewish symbols
- Being Israeli

This has nothing to do with the person's views or actions, just their identity. This is antisemitism, not policy disagreement.

7. Institutional Response Patterns

Qualitative content in the reports shows recurring patterns where institutional responses contributed to distress, including:

- Refusal to explicitly recognise antisemitism
- Premature case closures
- Reframing of incidents as neutral conflict

In these cases, *how the response was handled* became part of the harm experienced.

8. Under-Reporting & Low Trust in Systems are Likely Substantial

Only **24%** of people reported the incidents to an authority

The data here reflects incidents *people chose to report*. Many community members avoid reporting to the relevant authority due to fear of dismissal, lack of confidence in resolution, or previous negative experience.

According to [The EU Fundamental Rights Agency 2024 survey of Jewish communities around Europe](#), only 11% of victims of antisemitism reported the incident to the police or a Jewish organization. Even for violent antisemitic incidents, only 49% of victims made a report.

According to the [2026 NAPAR report](#), only 10% of racist incidents in Ireland were reported.

This suggests the true scale of antisemitic harm is likely much higher than documented here, consistent with established research on under-reporting of hate crimes.



What This Report Does Not Claim

- It is not a population-representative prevalence study.
- It does not estimate actual incident rates across the whole country.
- It does not draw statistical comparisons with other jurisdictions.

Instead, this dataset exists **because no national mechanism does.**

It offers a **community-generated baseline of lived experience** that previously had no systematic public record in Ireland.

This report documents antisemitism that was serious enough for people to report - despite fear, fatigue, and low expectations of outcome.

Which means:

- It undercounts
- It filters out the most vulnerable
- It reflects only those who still believe documentation matters

Based on this data, international data regarding reporting and our own experience, it is clear that **the real scale of antisemitic incidents in Ireland is far larger than the number of incidents reported here.**

Definitions & Methodology

Scope of the Report

This report summarises antisemitic incidents submitted through the JRCI online reporting form between **17 July 2025 and 9 January 2026**. The form has been available since July 2025; submissions outside this reporting period are not included in the statistical analysis presented here.

Purpose

The report supports monitoring, service planning, and informed engagement with public authorities and partners. It is not a police or court-verified crime dataset.

Source of Data

Incidents were recorded through the JRCI reporting form, which is publicly accessible. While most submissions were entered directly by individuals, some were recorded by JRCI staff acting as intermediaries, based on information received through direct contact, email, or follow-up conversations.

Definition of an Incident

For the purposes of this report, an “incident” refers to any experience of antisemitism reported through the form. This may include harassment, discrimination, threats or intimidation, vandalism or graffiti, online abuse, or other antisemitic behaviour.

Categorisation

Where incidents are classified by location or type, these categories reflect how the complainants selected them at the time of submission. Multiple categories may apply to a single incident.

Verification & Interpretation

Incidents are not independently investigated or adjudicated. Findings represent reported experiences.

This report provides a baseline of documented incidents - it does not measure the full scale of antisemitism in Ireland. As with all reporting mechanisms, under-reporting is expected. Reporting levels are influenced by awareness of the form, confidence in reporting pathways, and individual decisions about whether to come forward.

Confidentiality

Personal contact details are stored separately from analytical outputs and are not reproduced in this report. Individuals and organisations are not named. Illustrative examples are paraphrased or redacted to prevent identification.

Extended Details

Volume and timing of incidents


The JRCI incident reporting form was launched in July 2025; therefore, all incidents in this dataset were reported after that date. Some submissions refer to incidents that occurred prior to July 2025 and were reported retrospectively. This analysis includes 143 reports where incident date was provided and could be parsed to at least year-level precision.

This report does not describe trends over time – we cannot interpret this report as indicating as evidence of increases or decreases in antisemitic incidents across years.

Where incidents occurred

Incidents by Location Type


n=143



Across the reporting period (n = 143), incidents were most commonly reported in Public Space settings (50), followed by Direct Digital Targeting (36) and School/University settings (18).

Overall, this distribution suggests that a substantial portion of reported incidents (60%) occur in high-visibility contexts (public spaces and direct digital targeting), alongside a meaningful minority (17.5%) occurring within institutional settings (education and workplaces).


When looking at locations by category, the dataset is dominated by incidents occurring in physical settings (75%), with a substantial minority (25%) occurring online through digital targeting.



What happened (incident typology)

This section summarises the reported types of antisemitism captured in the incident form. Complainants can select more than one type for a single incident, so totals across categories will exceed the number of submitted incidents.

The figures below should therefore be read as “how often a given type was present in reports” rather than a distribution where categories sum to 100%.



The most commonly reported incidents involved **verbal abuse or slurs (52 reports)**, followed closely by **vandalism or graffiti (47)** and **threats or intimidation (35)**.

Reports also frequently cited **exclusion or discrimination (29)** and **direct digital harassment (24)**. Less frequently reported but still significant were incidents involving **antisemitic conspiracy theories (21)**, **Holocaust denial or trivialisation (10)**, **hate email (8)**, and **physical assault (3)**.

Taken together, the findings indicate antisemitic incidents in Ireland are primarily characterised by:

- Direct interpersonal hostility
- Property-related damage
- Intimidating or threatening behaviour

While digital and ideological forms of antisemitism appear less often, they represent a consistent and material component of reported experiences.

Overlapping of top 5 reported antisemitism types

n = 143

| Type | Digital harassment | Exclusion or discrimination | Threats or intimidation | Vandalism or graffiti | Verbal abuse or slurs |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Digital harassment | 24 | 2 | 14 | 0 | 8 |
| Exclusion or discrimination | 2 | 29 | 7 | 1 | 13 |
| Threats or intimidation | 14 | 7 | 35 | 4 | 21 |
| Vandalism or graffiti | 0 | 1 | 4 | 47 | 6 |
| Verbal abuse or slurs | 8 | 13 | 21 | 6 | 52 |

In the graph above, the diagonal figures represent the total number of reports within each of the main categories.


Off-diagonal figures show how often other forms of antisemitic behaviour were reported **within the same incident**. These patterns reveal that:

- Verbal abuse frequently coincides with threats or intimidation
- Digital harassment commonly accompanies threatening behaviour

This suggests that intimidation rarely occurs in isolation and is often part of broader hostile conduct. Co-occurrence patterns should be interpreted with care. They reflect how individuals experienced and categorised incidents, rather than legal or investigative determinations

Severity in verbal abuse or slurs type


n=52/143



The graph above shows the severity of the verbal abuse incidents, where out of 52 incidents identified as Verbal Abuse or Slurs, 40% (21 incidents) included threats and assault language.

Severity of type by Channel

Digital Targeting n = 36; In-Person = 104



This chart uses a very basic way to flag possible escalation. It simply separates reports into two groups:

- Incidents that included **threats or intimidation and/or physical assault**
- Incidents that did **not** include those elements

This is **not** a formal or validated severity scale. It doesn't measure overall harm or impact. It is only a practical way to distinguish incidents that involved explicit threats or assault from those that did not. When we look at how incidents were reported:

- **47% of direct digital targeting reports (36 cases)** included threats or assault language
- **18% of in-person reports (19 cases)** included threats or assault language

This does **not** mean digital targeting incidents are more severe overall.

It simply means that, in this dataset and using this limited definition, explicit threats or intimidation appeared more often in digital direct targeting reports than in in-person reports.

Who was targeted

Just over half of all reports - **56% (80 incidents)** - involved antisemitic behaviour directed at organisations.

The remaining **44% (63 incidents)** involved individuals:

- **31% (44 incidents)** targeted the person submitting the report
- **13% (19 incidents)** targeted another individual

These figures should be interpreted with care.

Differences between organisational and individual targets may reflect both the nature of the incidents and how people choose to report them.

For example, individuals may be more likely to submit a report when:

- They are personally affected
- The incident impacts a wider group
- The incident takes place in a formal or organisational setting where reporting feels more possible or meaningful

In other words, reporting patterns may reflect behaviour as well as experience.

Witnesses and evidence

This section summarises the extent to which incidents were reported as having witnesses and whether supporting evidence (e.g., photos/screenshots) was available, as this has direct implications for triage and follow-up.

75% (107) of incidents were reported as not having witnesses.

This suggests that a substantial share of reports may rely primarily on the individual’s account, particularly for incidents occurring in transient public settings or digital contexts where bystanders may not be identifiable or available for follow-up. This means a larger share of reports relies on individual’s account alone, particularly where incidents are transient or digital.

In contrast, 55% (79) of incidents reported evidence available.



This pattern is consistent with a reporting environment where many incidents leave a record (e.g., screenshots of online abuse, emails, or photographs of graffiti/vandalism), even when no independent witnesses are present. This suggests evidence is often available in documentary form (e.g., screenshots/photos).

Taken together, these findings suggest that follow-up pathways should assume that witness corroboration will often be limited, but that documentary evidence may be available in a meaningful proportion of cases, and should be handled in a consistent, privacy-preserving way.

Reporting and escalation

Of all the incidents reported to the JRCI, only 24% (34) reported them directly to authorities as well.

Details on *to whom* people reported, include identifiable organisations & roles, employer, school, Gardaí, venue/security, online platform



Qualitative themes and illustrative vignettes

Themes below summarise patterns in the narrative descriptions. These themes reflect self-reported experiences and the level of detail provided varies substantially across reports. They are best interpreted as a structured picture of patterns within submissions received, not as a representative estimate of antisemitism prevalence nationally.

Theme 1: Boundary violations in “neutral” settings (work, education, healthcare, routine services)

Description: Many reports describe antisemitism intruding into settings where neutrality and professionalism are expected—workplaces, schools/universities, healthcare, public transport, hospitality, and everyday services. The harm often comes from the mismatch between the setting and the behaviour, leaving targets feeling exposed and unsupported.

- **Vignette A:** In a healthcare setting, a patient reported fear of speaking up due to dependence on care, following remarks attributed to staff that the patient experienced as antisemitic.
- **Vignette B:** A person had to stop wearing their star of David to work due to constant abuse & antisemitic comments

Theme 2: Ambient hostility and “background hate” in public space (stickers, posters, graffiti, signage)

Description: Several narratives describe a cumulative hostile environment created by repeated visible messaging—stickers, graffiti, posters, and signs—rather than a single direct confrontation. The reported impact is often hypervigilance, avoidance, and a sense that hostility is normalised in shared spaces.

- **Vignette A:** A poster displayed above the entry door to a local bar stating, ‘ALL ZIONISTS ARE BARRED FROM The XXX pub’.
- **Vignette B:** A row of Graffiti of swastikas and the writing ‘Jew Rat’ all over a public road.

Theme 3: Antisemitic tropes and dehumanising content (conspiracy, Holocaust references, exterminationist language)

Description: Across both online and in-person incidents, some narratives feature explicit antisemitic tropes—conspiratorial claims (control of banks/media/tech), Holocaust references/inversion, and dehumanising or eliminationist language. Where these appear, the semantic content is central to the harm and was often described alongside heightened fear/anxiety.

- **Vignette A:** A message exchange included classic conspiracy framing about Jewish control and escalated into degrading and threatening language.
- **Vignette B:** During an argument at school, a young Jewish person received images of swastikas and was told that “the classroom will turn into a modern-day gas chamber”.

Theme 4: Discrimination and exclusion (social, professional, and service access)

Description: Another pattern involves exclusion from services, opportunities, or social participation following disclosure (or perception) of Jewish/Israeli identity. Some accounts describe quiet withdrawal by others (sudden coldness, being dropped from opportunities), while others describe explicit exclusionary statements.

- **Vignette A:** After October 7th, a professional relationship severely deteriorated and shifted into hostile remarks and practical obstruction that affected business and reputation.
- **Vignette B:** A family described gradual social exclusion (e.g., community distancing and changes in children’s inclusion), which accumulated into a full sense of insecurity.

Theme 5: Identity cues as the trigger (visibility, accent, “where are you from?”)

Description: A recurring pattern is incidents that begin as ordinary interactions and then shift once a Jewish or Israeli identity cue becomes visible or known (e.g., language, accent, nationality, Jewish symbols). In these cases, the escalation is less about the person’s views or actions and more about perceived identity.

- **Vignette A:** A service interaction ended abruptly when the provider asked about the target’s accent/nationality and refused service after hearing they were originally from Israel, even though they are Irish citizens.
- **Vignette B:** Taxi driver found out the passenger is originally from Israel and asked them to leave mid-way, while cursing & shouting abuse at them.

Theme 6: Institutional response as part of the incident (minimisation, closure, unclear accountability)

Description: In some reports, the core issue is not only what happened, but how an institution responded - closing complaints, avoiding naming antisemitism, treating it as “private,” or offering generic reassurance without concrete action. These accounts often include frustration about unclear pathways for escalation and inconsistent thresholds for intervention.

- **Vignette A:** An individual described filing a complaint about intimidation through an official channel and receiving a generic response, followed by closure of the case without resolution.
- **Vignette B:** In an educational setting, reported antisemitic symbols/behaviours were addressed only indirectly (e.g., “hate in general”), leaving the person feeling the specific issue was minimised/ignored.

Theme 7: Escalation and coordination, especially Digital (doxing, campaigns, persistent targeting)

Description: A smaller subset of reports described incidents involving coordinated targeting, amplification across platforms, and exposure of personal or workplace identifiers. These cases are characterised by sustained risk elevation (fear, safety planning, changes to routine/work), not just distressing content.

- **Vignette:** A digital campaign targeted an individual because of their Israeli background, and shared workplace-linked personal details, prompting the person to change routines and avoid attending their workplace in person due to safety concerns.

Executive summary

This report documents 143 antisemitic incidents experienced by members of the Irish Jewish community and reported between July 2025 and January 2026.

It was not commissioned by the State, nor produced as part of a national research programme. It exists because Ireland currently lacks a comprehensive, trusted, and responsive national system for recording antisemitism in a consistent and transparent way. In that absence, the Jewish Representative Council of Ireland (JRCI) introduced a community reporting mechanism in mid-2025.

What emerged once reporting became possible was not an isolated series of events, but a pattern. The 143 incidents recorded here reflect antisemitic harm experienced across everyday settings - public spaces, workplaces, educational institutions, healthcare environments, routine services, and direct digital communications. The most commonly reported forms were verbal abuse, vandalism, threats and intimidation, exclusion or discrimination, Holocaust distortion, and antisemitic conspiracy narratives.

A significant subset involved direct digital targeting, including hate emails, private messages, and direct threats sent to identifiable individuals or organisations. Within this dataset, digital direct targeting reports were more likely to contain explicit threats than incidents occurring in physical settings. Intimidation rarely appeared in isolation; it frequently accompanied other forms of hostility.

In 30% of incidents, identity cues alone - accent, language, nationality, or visible Jewish symbols - were often sufficient to trigger hostility.

This report does not claim to measure national prevalence or present verified crime statistics. It provides a structured record of lived experience based on voluntary submissions. The figures should be understood as a floor, not a ceiling.

Many individuals do not report incidents due to fear of repercussions, low expectations of response, or prior experiences of minimisation, delay, or reluctance to explicitly recognise antisemitism. In some cases, institutional responses were described as compounding the distress associated with the original incident.

Taken together, these findings indicate that antisemitism in Ireland is neither abstract nor confined to extremist margins. It is experienced in ordinary environments.

A central conclusion of this report is structural. In many EU countries, the documentation and monitoring of antisemitism is a defined public responsibility. In Ireland, that responsibility has effectively fallen to a small minority community. That displacement is not sustainable and does not align with principles of equal protection, accountability, and democratic inclusion.

This report establishes a baseline. It documents what became visible when reporting became possible. The question now is whether this evidence will lead to clearer recognition, improved national recording mechanisms, and consistent institutional response - or whether the burden of documenting antisemitism will continue to rest primarily with the community experiencing it.