

Two years after the October 7 attacks: British Jewish views on antisemitism, Israel and Jewish life

Dr Jonathan Boyd

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/ Background

This report is being released two years after the start of the October 7 war between Israel and Hamas. Its purpose is to present data from a survey of British Jews carried out by JPR in June and July 2025 to better understand the impact this traumatic period has had on Jews in Britain in terms of their perceptions and experiences of antisemitism, their feelings of safety, their attitudes towards Israel, their Jewish identity, and how it has affected Jewish community cohesion in the UK.

The period since the 7 October 2023 attacks in southern Israel has been one of profound geopolitical upheaval, for Israel, Palestinians and Jewish communities worldwide. On that day, the Palestinian organisation, *Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya* (the Islamic Resistance Movement), more commonly known as Hamas, launched an unprecedented assault on the country, massacring, mutilating, raping and incinerating over 1,200 people, injuring thousands more, and taking more than 250 hostages. The brutality of the attacks shocked people across the world and triggered a swift and forceful military response from Israel.

In the weeks and months that followed, the Israeli government initiated a large-scale military campaign in Gaza with the stated aims of dismantling Hamas's infrastructure and securing the release of hostages. The war quickly escalated, resulting in significant destruction across Gaza, the killing of many Hamas terrorists, alongside a high civilian death and casualty toll. In this context, the humanitarian situation deteriorated significantly, prompting widespread international concern, condemnation and calls for restraint. Accusations of disproportionate use of force, violations of international law and obstruction of humanitarian aid were levelled against Israel by multiple governments, NGOs and media outlets. At the same time, the Israeli government maintained that its actions were necessary to defend its citizens and eliminate a threat that had demonstrated genocidal intent, and that it goes to all reasonable lengths to avoid civilian casualties and allow in humanitarian aid.

The conflict soon expanded beyond Gaza. Hezbollah intensified rocket attacks from Lebanon, leading to exchanges of fire along Israel's northern border and the evacuation of tens of thousands of Israelis from the area. Houthi forces in Yemen targeted Israeli and Western-linked shipping in the Red Sea, and Iranian-backed militias in Syria and Iraq increased their activity. Iran itself was implicated in supporting these groups, raising fears early on of a broader regional war. Israel responded with targeted strikes across multiple fronts, including high-profile operations in Lebanon and Syria. After Iran's proxies had been significantly degraded, direct hostilities broke out between Israel and Iran in June 2025, involving major Israeli strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities and infrastructure, supported by the US, and hundreds of Iranian ballistic missile and drone attacks on Israel, targeting civilian, military, energy and government sites.

Diplomatically, the war has placed huge strain on Israel's relationships with key allies. While many countries have expressed support for Israel's right to self-defence, including the UK and US, many have increasingly urged far greater protection for civilians and accountability for alleged violations. The United Nations has seen repeated debates over ceasefire resolutions,

many of which have been vetoed or diluted by the US, but a UN commission has recently concluded that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza, a highly controversial accusation vehemently denied by both the Israeli and US governments. The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu and former Minister of Defence, Yoav Gallant, for war crimes; similar warrants were also issued for Hamas leaders, but each of them has subsequently been killed by Israel in the war. Criticism of Israel increased significantly in 2025, particularly following the Israeli government's decision in March to cut off all humanitarian aid with the stated aim of pressuring Hamas to release the hostages, which was widely condemned by NGOs, many international governments and much of the media as a reckless form of collective punishment. Again, the Israeli government denies all such accusations, arguing that UN agencies have been infiltrated by Hamas, who are stealing the aid and selling it at inflated prices to Gazans to help fund its continuing capacity to fight Israel and survive beyond the war.

In September 2025, several Western countries, including the UK and other allies of Israel and the United States, chose to officially recognise a Palestinian State at the UN General Assembly, a move that would have been largely unthinkable two years ago. Those doing so have argued that it will help to keep the possibility of a two-state solution alive; Israel and the US have argued that, at this time, it mainly rewards Hamas, disincentivises it from releasing the remaining Israeli hostages, and encourages it to continue the war.

Media coverage of the conflict has been extensive and polarising. While some outlets – particularly those in Israel – have focused on the trauma and devastation caused by the October 7 attacks and the ongoing threat to Israeli civilians, many others have consistently highlighted the suffering in Gaza and questioned the morality and legality of Israel's military conduct. Accusations of bias, misinformation and antisemitism in reporting – particularly directed at the BBC and other major broadcasters – have become a focal point of concern for parts of the British Jewish population, many of whom feel that Israel has been profoundly misrepresented in public discourse. Other British Jews fervently disagree and have joined the chorus of condemnation of Israel.

In the UK, the war has coincided with a significant rise in antisemitic incidents, including verbal abuse, harassment, vandalism and, to a lesser extent, physical attacks. Jewish schools, synagogues and community centres have tightened security measures, and many Jews report feeling unsafe or excluded in social and professional settings. The war has also prompted intense debates within Jewish communities about Israel's conduct, Zionism and Jewish values, revealing generational and ideological divides that continue to shape communal life.

Two years on, the war remains unresolved, tens of hostages remain in captivity, both dead and alive, and the humanitarian issues in Gaza persist. The geopolitical landscape is volatile, and the emotional, moral and political reverberations of October 7 continue to affect Jews everywhere, including in Britain.

It was in this context that JPR launched its 'Jews in Uncertain Times' survey, a study of the social and political attitudes of British Jews conducted in June and July 2025. The survey was designed to explore a range of issues that have emerged since the October 7 attacks, and measure sentiment among self-identifying Jews, aged 16 or above, living in the UK. It was conducted using the JPR Research Panel – a unique and innovative research mechanism established in 2020, designed to accurately capture the opinions of the UK Jewish population. The Panel currently has close to 11,000 members, comprised of Jewish adults aligned with all

denominational groups and none, living in all parts of the UK, and covering all age bands. This inclusivity is critical to understanding the full spectrum of Jewish opinion in Britain today. Not all Jews are religiously observant or communally-engaged – indeed, many are not – and the attempt here is not to capture the opinion of those most likely to be active in Jewish communal life, but rather that of all people who, when asked in a census or survey, identify as Jewish by religion, ethnicity, or in any other way.

4,822 British Jews participated in the latest study, and the data have been weighted to adjust for the known age, sex, geographical and denominational profile of the Jewish population using a combination of 2021 UK Census data and community administrative data held by JPR. We believe these findings present a broadly accurate representation of British Jewish public opinion at this time. Where possible, we have drawn comparison with data from previous surveys of British Jews conducted by JPR to help assess change over time. All such comparisons in this report have been undertaken using cross-sectional rather than longitudinal data, so sampling effects may compromise accuracy to some degree in such cases, although analysis has shown that the trends described here are real even if the magnitude of the effects may vary slightly. Further methodological details can be found at the end of this report.

/ Summary

The report is divided into three chapters focusing on three main themes, and the key findings include the following:

Antisemitism and insecurity

- Perceptions of antisemitism have intensified: 82% of British Jews now see antisemitism as a “very big” or “fairly big” problem, with 47% saying it is a “very big” problem — up from just 11% in 2012.
- Direct experiences of antisemitism have become more common, especially verbal and online abuse. In calendar year 2024, 32% of Jews reported experiencing at least one antisemitic incident.
- Younger and visibly Jewish individuals are disproportionately affected: 46% of 16–29-year-olds and 53% of Strictly Orthodox Jews experienced an antisemitic incident in 2024.
- Feelings of safety have declined sharply: In 2025, 35% of Jews rated their safety in Britain at the lower end of a 10-point scale (scoring 0-4), compared to just 9% in 2023 before the October 7 attacks.
- ‘Ambient antisemitism’ is rising: indirect experiences (e.g. hostile media coverage, online commentary, microaggressions, etc.) are becoming increasingly common, with 45% experiencing them ‘frequently’ or ‘regularly’ in 2025, compared to 8% before the October 7 attacks.
- Trust in UK institutions is low: only the legal system and parliament score above average; trust in political parties and the BBC is notably poor.

Attitudes towards Israel

- Emotional attachment to Israel has increased: 75% of British Jews feel emotionally attached, with 49% “very attached” (equivalent figures just before the October 7 attacks were 72% and 40%).
- Attachment varies by age and denomination: younger Jews and those unaffiliated with synagogues are less likely to feel attached.
- Supporting Israel as a component of people’s Jewish identity has grown: 45% say it is “very important” to their Jewishness, up from 38% in 2022.
- Charitable giving has shifted: priority for Israel-focused charities rose from 5% in 2022 to 15% in 2025, while support for UK Jewish charities declined.

- Zionist identification remains stable overall (64%), but anti-Zionist identification has risen from 8% in 2022 to 12% in 2025.
- Younger Jews are the most critical of Israel: a quarter (24%) of 20–29-year-olds identify as anti-Zionist, while a further 20% are non-Zionist, and significant minorities appear to be questioning foundational Zionist ideas.
- Criticism of Israel's conduct in Gaza is growing: 52% say the Israeli army has not done enough to protect Palestinian civilians in Gaza (compared to 48% in 2024), and 68% say Israel's government has not done enough to release the hostages (compared to 62% in 2024).

Jewish identity and community cohesion


- Jewish identity remains resilient: strength of Jewish identity, synagogue attendance, and community attachment have remained broadly stable since October 7.
- Increased communal engagement: 32% of Jews report greater involvement in Jewish community life since October 7, compared to 9% who report less.
- Social shifts towards Jewish solidarity: Jews are six times more likely to feel closer to Jewish friends than less close since October 7, and three times more likely to feel less close to non-Jewish friends than closer.
- Internal tensions are rising: 17% of Jews feel not well accepted by the community, mainly due to their views on Israel/Zionism — up from 11% in 2022.
- Generational divides are evident: younger Jews tend to see a broad commitment to social justice as a more important part of their Jewish identity than support for Israel, while older Jews tend to reverse that hierarchy.
- Optimism about the future of Jewish life in the UK is muted: most Jews score below the midpoint on a 0–10 optimism scale.
- Migration to Israel ('aliyah') remains stable and low, but Jews who experience antisemitism or ambient antisemitism are notably more likely to be considering it.

Set against the backdrop of the war in Gaza and the wider Middle East, rising antisemitism in the UK, polarised media coverage and global instability, this report is designed to offer a nuanced and data-driven account of how British Jews are navigating what has been a period of profound challenge and uncertainty. At the same time, it offers just a first look at the data, and more detailed analyses of particular issues will be conducted over the coming months. This report is intended to be used by Jewish community leaders and national political figures to better understand Jewish sentiment at this time, and to devise policy to ensure Jews are able to live freely and securely in the UK both in these volatile times and in the future.

1 / Antisemitism and insecurity

There is little question that the great majority of British Jews feel that antisemitism is becoming a growing issue in the UK today. We see this in multiple data sources,¹ not least those shown in Figure 1, which draw on six separate surveys that have been conducted by JPR since 2012, each one aimed in some way at assessing British Jews' perceptions and experiences of antisemitism at the time. In each case, we invited survey respondents to report on the extent to which they believe antisemitism to be a problem in the UK.

Figure 1. Percentage of British Jews saying antisemitism is a 'very big' or 'fairly big' problem in the UK, 2012-2025



Question: *To what extent do you think the following are a problem in the UK?* [Antisemitism]: [Response options: A very big problem; A fairly big problem; Not a very big problem; Not a problem at all; Don't know]. Note that the temporal gaps between the columns shown are inconsistent, and reflect the years for when data is available. Data to the left of the dotted red line pre-date the October 7 attacks; data to the right of it were gathered after it. Sources: 2012: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), n=1,468; 2018: FRA, n=4,731; May 2023: JPR research panel, n=3,754; June 2024: JPR research panel, n=4,676; June 2025: JPR research panel, n=4,822.

The results indicate that the main shift in perception occurred at some point between 2012 and 2018, when the proportion seeing it as a problem rose from 48% to 75%. We hypothesise that the trigger for this change was related to common concerns about the Jeremy Corbyn-led Labour Party (2015-20), which was subsequently found responsible for unlawful harassment and discrimination against Jews in an investigation conducted by the Equalities and Human Rights Commission published in October 2020.² Yet a second significant shift can also be seen in the two most recent, post-October 7 results (2024 and 2025) when compared to earlier figures, where even though the overall proportions defining it as either a 'very big' or a 'fairly big' problem (79% in 2024 and 82% in 2025) are similar to the proportion found in 2021 (82%), the proportions maintaining it is a 'very big' problem are substantively higher than anything seen previously.³ Starkly, more than four times as many British Jews define antisemitism as a 'very big' problem in the UK today than did in 2012.


¹ See: Boyd, J. (2024). [Antisemitism in the aftermath of October 7: What do the data tell us, and what more do we still need to know?](#) London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

² See: EHRC, [Investigation into antisemitism in the Labour Party](#), October 2020.

³ A survey conducted by Survation in November 2023 found that 87% of British Jews felt antisemitism was a problem at that time, and 54% felt it was a 'very big' problem. It is highly likely that feelings peaked at that moment, but due to its small sample size (n=790) and other substantive methodological differences between that study and JPR's, we cannot be confident that these figures are comparable.

Nonetheless, to gain some further perspective on this sentiment, when we situate it among other social, economic and political issues, British Jews are less likely to see antisemitism as a problem than the state of health services or the economy in the UK today (Figure 2). Indeed, only a tiny fraction of British Jews *do not* see these as problems. Equally, British Jews are almost as likely to consider racism in general to be a problem in the UK as they are to see antisemitism to be a problem; indeed, looking at the proportions who describe them as either a ‘very big’ or a ‘fairly big’ problem, a slightly larger proportion is concerned about racism in general than antisemitism in particular.

Figure 2. Proportions of British Jews who feel that various social, political and economic issues are a problem in the UK in 2025 (%)




Question: as shown in note under Figure 1, n=4,822. For legibility reasons, data labels have been removed for those reporting ‘not a problem at all’ or ‘Don’t know’, as the proportions are generally very small.

As we have discussed in previous work, antisemitic incident data generated by police and community bodies only capture a small fraction of all incidents taking place, largely because most incidents are not reported at all, and of those that are, some are reported to agencies other than those holding a mandate to record or publish their figures.⁴ Data from national surveys of Jews help to overcome these shortcomings by inviting a broadly representative sample of Jewish adults to tell us whether they have experienced an antisemitic incident over a given period, irrespective of whether they reported it or not. Figure 3 shows the results for calendar years 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2024. In each case, respondents were asked during the following year shown whether they had experienced an incident in the previous one, between 1 January and 31 December.

⁴ Boyd (2024), op. cit.

Figure 3. Proportions of British Jews who say they personally experienced at least one antisemitic incident during the calendar years 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2024, by incident type (%)



Question: *Thinking specifically about the period from 1st January to 31st December in [calendar year], did you experience any of the following? Please select all that apply.* [A physical antisemitic attack; A verbal antisemitic attack; Antisemitic discrimination at work or other venue or institution; Antisemitic damage to your property; Online antisemitic abuse or harassment directed at you personally; Other type of antisemitic incident(s) directed at you personally; Other; I am unsure if an incident I experienced was antisemitic]; ns=4,152 (2021 data, for 2020); 4,891 (2022 data, for 2021 and 2022); 4,822 (2025 data, for 2024). Note that equivalent incident data for calendar year 2023 was collected in a unique way from the years shown due to the nature and timing of the October 7 attacks in Israel, so we do not have comparable figures.


The proportion of British Jews who said they experienced an incident in 2024 was higher than the other years shown, except for 2021 – also a year during which a major military conflagration between Israel and Hamas occurred in Gaza, albeit of far shorter duration. However, two distinctions between 2021 and 2024 are noteworthy. First, Jews who experienced antisemitism in 2024 were notably more likely to experience *more than one incident* during that year than was the case in 2021, so whilst the overall proportions of Jews affected are almost identical, the number of incidents taking place in 2024 was almost certainly higher, as indicated in administrative data on antisemitic incidents.⁵ Second, we see increases in specific types of antisemitism – notably verbal and online, but also probably in physical violence and direct discrimination.

Of those who had experienced at least one incident in 2024, it was most likely to have taken place online (49%), followed quite closely by in a ‘public space’ (42%) (Figure 4). Social situations, as well as work environments, also feature quite prominently. In considering these data, it is worth bearing in mind that Jews are not necessarily equally likely as one another to experience an antisemitic incident in all of these situations. For example, students or retirees are unlikely to have been in a workplace at any point; older people may not have been online as frequently as younger people; younger people are less likely to have interacted with a medical facility, etc.⁶

⁵ See: Community Security Trust, [Antisemitic Incidents 2024](#).

⁶ To remedy this, much more specific, detailed and bespoke surveys are required, of the type undertaken periodically by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Unfortunately, post-Brexit, the UK is no longer included in these studies, leaving a major vacuum in scientific data collection about the perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in Britain.


Figure 4. Locations of in-person antisemitic incidents (%)



Question: *Where did this/these antisemitic incidents that were directed at you personally in 2024 occur? Please select all that apply.* [In a public space (e.g. in the street, on public transport); At a cultural event (e.g. the arts, theatre, film); At a political event (e.g. a demonstration); At a sports event; At work; Online (e.g. social media); In a social situation (e.g. amongst friends, colleagues); In a medical facility (e.g. GP surgery, hospital, dental surgery), Somewhere else; I can't remember]; n=1,272.

In examining the antisemitic incidents that have taken place most recently, it is important to consider whether certain types of Jews are more or less likely to be victims of these. In the past, data have shown that younger Jews and those most identifiably Jewish – particularly the Strictly Orthodox due to their distinctive dress – are most vulnerable. We see these trends again in the data for calendar year 2024. As Figure 5 shows, there is a clear age gradient where the younger one is, the more likely they are to experience an incident, so much so that close to half of all 16-29-year-olds (46%) said they personally experienced at least one incident during that calendar year. Most of these involved verbal or online harassment, but about 2% of them reported a physical assault of some kind.


Figure 5. Proportions of British Jews experiencing various types of antisemitic incidents in calendar year 2024, by age (%)



Question: As per note under Figure 3, n=1,272.

Looking at the data through a denominational lens, it is the Strictly Orthodox – who commonly wear distinctive Jewish garb at all times – who stand out most prominently (Figure 6). Extraordinarily, over half (53%) reported that they had experienced at least one antisemitic incident in 2024, and as a collective, they were at least twice as likely to experience verbal harassment as any of the other less- or non-orthodox groups shown. As previously stated, this fundamental distinction has long been the case, but it is critical to understand, as it almost inevitably has a bearing on how the most orthodox experience their day-to-day position in British society. As we shall see, their political beliefs about Britain and Israel differ in many respects from more progressive or secular Jews, and in considering that, one should keep in mind these data on antisemitic experiences. Arguably, they reveal something about antisemitism in British society that Jews who are less visibly or openly Jewish are less likely to encounter or fully appreciate.


Figure 6. Proportions of British Jews experiencing various types of antisemitic incidents in calendar year 2024, in total and by denomination (%)



Question: As per note under Figure 3, n=1,272.

What impact is all of this having on Jews in Britain? One of the more striking assessments can be seen in Figure 7, where we present data on how secure Jews feel in the country. We have used a consistent measure over the past few years to assess this, asking respondents to score themselves on a 0-10 scale in response to the statement “I feel safe as a Jew in Britain”, where 0 = the least safe end of the scale, and 10 = the most safe. The data cover four points in time, with two readings from before the October 7 attacks (the 2023 data are from May of that year), and two from after, in mid-2024 and mid-2025. Two findings are worth highlighting. First, there has been a striking increase in feelings of insecurity since October 7. In May 2023, just 9% positioned themselves at the unsafe end of the scale, between scores of 0 and 4. Two years on, that figure had ballooned to 35%, itself an increase on the equivalent 2024 count of 25%. Whilst we only have two data points since the October 7 attacks, the results begin to point to an increasingly deteriorating climate for Jews collectively since that time, at least in terms of how secure they feel. Second, at the same time, it is worth noting that a relatively high proportion of British Jews felt unsafe in 2021 (18%), the same year as the last major conflagration in Gaza, and the situation clearly improved somewhat by the time the data were gathered in 2023 – i.e. after that flare-up had ended, and before the October 7 attacks. Yet one of the questions – and indeed anxieties – of British Jews today is whether their sense of insecurity will dwindle again when the war in Gaza finally ends, as it did after 2021, or whether it will remain or even extend further into the Jewish population in the longer-term as a result of a fundamental change that may have occurred concerning the place of Jews in Britain in the post-October 7 context.

Figure 7. Proportions of British Jews feeling 'safe as a Jew in Britain', 2021, 2023 (May), 2024, 2025 (%) (0=feel unsafe; 10=feel safe)




Question: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement by selecting a number between 0 and 10, where 0 is 'Strongly disagree' and 10 is 'Strongly agree': I feel safe as a Jewish person living in the UK. All data from the JPR Research Panel, Ns=4,152 (2021); 3,767 (2023); 4,641 (2024); 4,822 (2025). Data above the dotted red line pre-date the October 7 attacks, data below the line reflect sentiment after them.

/ Ambient antisemitism

These rising measures of insecurity prompted us to explore a phenomenon we have identified in our post-October 7 work on antisemitism, both in the UK and abroad, that we have termed '*ambient antisemitism*.' Typically, antisemitism, like other forms of racial discrimination or hate crime, is measured through 'incidents' – encounters and experiences that people have that are directed at them personally. These include physical assaults, verbal attacks and other forms of harassment, vandalism and discrimination, as shown in the data previously. However, antisemitism, again like other forms of racism, can manifest itself in more subtle and indirect ways, through microaggressions or social norms that whilst not directed at any individual, can nonetheless create a sense among Jews that they are being collectively blamed, neglected, criticised, or indeed excluded in some way from 'the community of the good.'

As a result, in our most recent surveys, we have invited respondents to report on whether they have had any experiences that they considered to be antisemitic that were *not* directed at them personally, for example, seeing antisemitic graffiti, posters, online comments or images, media reports, etc., that affected them emotionally in some way. The results, shown in Figure 8, suggest that this is becoming a more common experience for British Jews. Invited to comment in our mid-2024 survey, respondents told us that these types of experiences were relatively uncommon prior to the October 7 attacks – just 8% said they had experienced them regularly or frequently in that period. However, they reported that they had become much more common afterwards during two periods offered in the questionnaire: in 2023 after the October 7 attacks, and in 2024 up to the point when the data were gathered that year (June/July). The most recent figures suggest that these experiences have remained similarly common since then. One should be a little cautious interpreting the trend data because the length of the time periods being referenced in each instance differ from one another, but it is nonetheless reasonable to conclude that far more British Jews are having these types of experiences on a 'frequent' or 'regular' basis since the October 7 attacks than before them. This points clearly to a perceived change in the wider social, cultural and political climate that many Jews find unsettling. Whether or not it is technically antisemitic is somewhat moot – indeed, many such experiences would likely not be formally classified as such by the police – yet it is clear from these data that they often feel unnerving, destabilising and hostile to a sizable proportion of British Jews.

Figure 8. Frequency of British Jews experiencing ‘ambient antisemitism’ in four different time periods (%)




Question: *Thinking more generally, have you had any experiences in [period] that you considered to be antisemitic that were not directed at you personally (for example, seeing antisemitic graffiti, posters, online comments or images, media reports, etc?)* [Response options as shown on chart]. Ns=4,676 (calendar year 2023, pre-Oct 7; calendar year 2023, post-Oct 7; 2024, up to June/July); 4,822 (2025, past twelve months up to June/July). Data above the dotted red line pre-date the October 7 attacks, data below the line reflect experiences after them.

When we start to explore the content and context of these experiences, we find, as with direct antisemitic incidents, that they are most commonly happening online. 60% of British Jews report reading or hearing antisemitic comments on the internet either “frequently” or “often” over the twelve months prior to the survey, and only 6% report “never” doing so (Figure 9). Over half (54%) further point to frequently or often reading or hearing “media reports that criticise Israel in a way you feel is antisemitic.” While there is certainly a subjective element to this (the media reports they are thinking about may or may not be antisemitic), the fact that only 16% of British Jews say they “never” read or hear such reports suggests that perceptions – at the very least – of how Israel is being portrayed in media sources commonly *feels* antisemitic to many. More in-depth research is required to fully interpret this (as is the case regarding the findings about antisemitism online or with regard to “statements from British public figures”), but it is worth noting that there has been particularly widespread criticism by the mainstream British Jewish leadership and Jewish media about media reporting, particularly with regard to the BBC, the publically funded broadcaster.⁷ From an empirical perspective, more work is needed to determine the extent to which content that is critical of Israel crosses the line into antisemitism; our main study of the topic demonstrated that anti-Jewish and anti-Israel sentiment certainly correlates, but the issue has become considerably more fraught and complex since the October 7 attacks.⁸ This is perhaps partly captured by the finding that over a third of British Jews (35%) report hearing claims frequently or often “that the Holocaust has been exaggerated” – a suggestion, perhaps, that some of the discourse about and around Jews has become particularly extreme and offensive in the current context.

⁷ See, for examples: ‘[UK Jewish leaders unite to condemn BBC over ‘institutional hostility’ to Israel](#),’ *The Jewish Chronicle*, 30 September 2024; ‘[BBC and Guardian fail to correct flawed Israel genocide story](#),’ *The Jewish Chronicle*, 12 September 2025. An extensive report on the BBC’s coverage of the war was also issued: Asserson, T. (2024). *The Asserson Report: The Israel-Hamas war and the BBC*, available at: [asserson-report.pdf](#), which alleged over 1,500 breaches of its editorial guidelines between October 2023 and February 2024. External media indicated that the BBC had questioned the methodology employed in the study but said it would “carefully consider” the findings, stressing that it aimed for “due impartiality” rather than a “balance of sympathy.”

⁸ See: Staetsky, D. (2017). [Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain. A study of attitudes towards Jews and Israel](#). London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

Figure 9. Proportions of British Jews who have heard or read antisemitic ideas in public discourse at different levels of frequency in the past 12 months (% , 2025)




Question: *In the past 12 months, how often, if at all, have you read or heard any of the following?* [Response options as shown on chart]; n=4,822.

All of this may well be affecting levels of trust among British Jews in Britain's major institutions. Unfortunately, we do not have equivalent benchmark data from before the October 7 attacks, but the assessments we have from 2024 and 2025 are not particularly encouraging.⁹ On a scale of 0-10, scores of below 5 suggest a below average level of trust, and scores above that suggest an above average level (Figure 10). Of the institutions measured, only the legal system and parliament receive above average scores, with little to differentiate the results from 2024 and 2025. None of the political parties investigated reached this threshold, but whereas we found notably higher levels of trust in the Labour Party than the Conservative Party in 2024 (on the eve of the General Election that year), by 2025, the traditional three main parties all scored poorly and similarly. That said, levels of trust in the new, steadfastly nationalist party, Reform UK, are notably lower, scoring just 1.9 on the scale. Returning to the issue of the media, trust levels in the BBC appear to have fallen very slightly over the past year, from 3.8 to 3.6, likely reflecting quite common concerns among British Jews about the corporation's characterisation of Israel in its coverage of the war in Gaza.

⁹ That said, a more subjective assessment, using a different sampling method, was made by Survation in a November 2023 survey supported by the Jewish Leadership Council under advice from JPR, when British Jewish respondents were invited to reflect back on the levels of trust they had in various different institutions in the twelve months prior to the October 7 attacks. They found that the police (5.9), the Labour Party (4.3) and particularly the Conservative Party (5.6) received notably higher scores at that time compared to ones we found in 2025, whereas the BBC received the identical score (3.6).

Figure 10. Levels of trust of different British institutions and political parties, 2024 and 2025



Question: *On a scale from 0 to 10, how much do you personally trust each of the following UK institutions/systems where 0 means you do not trust them at all, and 10 means you trust them completely?* Note that the scale is truncated in the chart to make the results easier to see; n=4,822.

In brief, looking in general at the data presented in this chapter, we see a rather stark picture of rising antisemitism and increasing insecurity among Jews in Britain since the October 7 attacks. British Jews are not only experiencing more direct incidents — particularly verbal and online abuse — but are also increasingly affected by what we have termed ‘ambient antisemitism’: more subtle, indirect, yet emotionally impactful experiences that contribute to a growing sense of exclusion and unease. Younger Jews and those most visibly Jewish are disproportionately affected, although concerns have deepened to varying degrees across the population.

This unsettling climate is not only shaping how Jews feel about their place in British society, but also, as we shall see in the third chapter of this report, how they relate to one another and to their Jewish identities. It is prompting some to withdraw from communal life, even as most appear to be seeking greater solidarity and connection. However, first, it is important to consider the extent to which it may have a bearing on how British Jews think and feel about Israel — a country that, for many, represents either a source of pride or a point of growing moral and ideological tension or shame, or indeed both.


In the next chapter we explore attitudes towards Israel among British Jews, how they view some of the many moral and political issues that have arisen during the war, and the extent to which these are affecting their fundamental relationship with the country. Over 70% of British Jews have close family or friends living in Israel, so the issues are deeply personal for many, and the day-to-day realities of the war often feel very close. Israel is rarely seen by Jews simply as a country 3,500 kilometres away from the UK; particularly since October 7, it lives continually for many in their hearts, minds and very sense of self.

2 / Attitudes towards Israel

Anecdotally, many British Jews sense that something fundamental has changed in the relationship they have with Israel over the two years since the October 7 attacks. The brutality of the attacks, the ways in which the Israeli government has prosecuted the war and the rise in antisemitism in the UK are all commonly assumed to have significantly shifted this component of British Jewish identity. But is this true?

Looking first at people's fundamental levels of emotional attachment to Israel, it seems that there has been a noteworthy increase in this sentiment across the Jewish population as a whole, that has been sustained over the two years since the attacks. We have measured this consistently over the past five years, and whilst the proportions saying they feel either 'very' or 'somewhat' attached have consistently sat in the 72-78% range, falling to the lower end in mid-2023 in the midst of the judicial reform legislation pursued by the Netanyahu government at that time, they climbed to their highest point in mid-2024, the first measurement after the October 7 attacks (Figure 11) and have broadly remained there since. The latest (2025) reading shows that three-quarters (75%) of British Jews feel emotionally attached to Israel today, and half (49%) feel 'very attached'. It is worth reiterating that this sentiment was in a state of decline in the years immediately preceding the attacks, so the increase in emotional attachment after October 7 is probably even more pronounced than it first appears: the decline has not only stopped, but reversed.


Figure 11. Levels of emotional attachment to Israel among British Jews, 2021-25 (%)



Question: *In general, how emotionally attached are you to Israel?* [Response options as shown]; n=4,822. Note that the data for 2023 were gathered in May and June of that year, prior to the October 7 attacks – data above the dotted red line pre-date the October 7 attacks, data below the line reflect sentiment after them.

That stated, levels of attachment are found to differ somewhat, particularly by age and denomination (Figure 12). Today, younger people (those aged 16-29) are notably less likely to feel emotionally attached than their elders, and there is also something of a denominational gradient, with members of orthodox synagogues more likely to feel attached than those belonging to progressive ones, and, in turn, those who do not belong to a synagogue at all.


Figure 12. Levels of emotional attachment to Israel among British Jews, by sex, age and denomination, 2025 (%)



Question: as reported under Figure 11, n=4,822.

Whilst the approach to assessing change over time shown in Figure 11 is arguably the most robust way of measuring it, we were also keen to understand the extent to which respondents *perceive* any changes they may have felt regarding their degree of emotional attachment. Invited to report whether they felt they had become more or less emotionally attached to Israel since October 7, 2023, almost half (48%) said they felt more attached (25% 'much more' and 23% 'somewhat more'), whilst under a quarter (23%) said they felt less attached (15% 'much less' and 8% 'somewhat less') (Figure 13). Whilst this type of assessment lacks the consistency of measure shown in Figure 11, it nonetheless reinforces it, suggesting that about twice as many British Jews sense that they have moved emotionally closer to Israel than further away as a result of all that has occurred over the past two years.


Figure 13. Self-assessed changes in emotional attachment to Israel since October 7, 2023 (2025, %)



Question: *Thinking about your attachment to Israel today compared to how you felt before the October 7 attacks, would you say you have become:* [Much more attached to Israel; Somewhat more attached to Israel; About the same; Somewhat less attached to Israel; Much less attached to Israel; Not sure; Not applicable – I have never felt any attachment to Israel]. Proportions reported exclude 6% of respondents who either selected 'Not applicable' or 'Not sure'. 30% reported no change in their emotional attachment; n=4,822.

There are other ways to make an assessment. One of the many methods social scientists use to understand the nature of contemporary Jewish identity is by investigating the extent to which Jews regard various aspects of Jewishness as important to them. When we examine our data, we find that there has been a change in the proportion of British Jews who say that 'supporting Israel' is 'very important' to how they see themselves as Jews, rising from 38% in 2022 to 45% in 2025 (Figure 14). At the same time, there is evidence of a slight decline in this regard since 2024 (from 48% down to 45%). Yet it is striking that other components of Jewish identity do not show the same degree of volatility: other components measured, such as 'Combating antisemitism', 'Feeling part of the Jewish People', 'Supporting social justice causes' and 'Donating funds to charity' have been notably more stable over the period shown. In brief, overall, we again see a shift towards Israel since October 7, and indeed a very specific one that is not reflected in other dimensions of Jewish identity.

Figure 14. Importance of various components of Jewishness to British Jews, 2022, 2024 and 2025 (%)




Question: *How important or unimportant are each of the following to how you see yourself as a Jewish person?* [Response options: Very important; Fairly important; Fairly unimportant; Very unimportant; Don't know]. Proportions shown reflect those who responded 'very important'. Ns=4,891 (2022); 4,641 (2024); 4,822 (2025). Note that temporal gaps between columns are inconsistent and data shown in orange pre-date the October 7 attacks; data shown in both shades of blue were gathered after them.

We see a similar dynamic when exploring respondents' charitable giving priorities. Jewish communities have long grappled with the extent to which their charitable donations to Jewish organisations should prioritise the needs of the communities in which they live versus needs overseas, particularly those in Israel. Looking at data from 2022, 2024 and 2025, we can see clear evidence of a shift away from local Jewish community needs (falling from 43% to 35%) and towards those in Israel (rising from 5% to 15%) (Figure 15). In many respects, this is to be expected – the needs in Israel post-October 7 have both emotionally and financially overwhelmed those closer to home. Issues such as trauma and psychosocial support for victims of the terror attacks and their families, financial support for families forced to relocate due to the war or whose homes have been damaged or destroyed by the bombing campaigns of Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iran, and educational support for displaced children, have all become major issues for Israel-focused charities. At the same time, it is distinctly possible this is coming at a cost to local Jewish charities. While more work is required to measure this, we can see signs here that the emotional pull of Israel may be affecting the extent to which British Jews are focused on Jewish charitable causes at home. This is most likely a simple shift in emphasis towards Israel rather than away from Jewish communal life in

Britain, but further research is required to substantiate this. Interestingly, we do not see a particular drop-off in support for general charities – levels there remain fairly stable over the period shown – but we do see a small increase in support for aid for the poor in overseas countries other than Israel – a turn, among some it seems, towards more universal global concerns and needs.

Figure 15. British Jewish charitable giving priorities, 2022, 2024, and 2025 (%)




Question: *Regardless of whether you have made any charitable donations recently or not, which if the following, if any, do you give the highest priority?* Response options as shown on chart. Ns=4,891 (2022); 4,641 (2024); 4,822 (2025). Note that temporal gaps between columns are inconsistent and data shown in orange pre-date the October 7 attacks; data shown in both shades of blue were gathered after them.

Putting together these various approaches to understanding how attachments to Israel have evolved, the British Jewish population, taken as a whole, has become somewhat more attached to Israel over the two years since October 7, at least in terms of their fundamental and foundational links to the country. Yet whilst this reflects the majority, we also see subgroups displaying other sentiments. In exploring this further, it is worth looking at the extent to which British Jews see themselves as Zionists.

Most Jews do self-identify as Zionists, and the proportion – at just below the two-thirds mark – has been highly consistent over the period shown in Figure 16, from 2022 to 2025. Whilst that constitutes a drop from 2010 (when the proportion was 72%),¹⁰ the recent overarching picture is fairly stable – the most volatility is among those who are unsure. This uncertainty is highly likely to have been influenced by the nature of the October 7 attacks and the manner in which the Israeli government has prosecuted the war in Gaza. However, it is also likely affected by the deliberate and concerted effort by Israel’s enemies and strongest critics to delegitimise the very idea of Zionism itself over many years, and particularly since October 7, rendering it rather more challenging for some Jews – perhaps particularly the young – to associate with it.

¹⁰ See: Graham, D. and Boyd J. (2010). [Committed, concerned and conciliatory: The attitudes of Jews in Britain towards Israel](#). London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.


Figure 16. Proportions of British Jews who identify as Zionist, non-Zionist or anti-Zionist, 2022, 2024, 2025 (%)



Questions: *Although there are different opinions about what the term Zionism means, in general, do you consider yourself to be a Zionist?* [Response options: Yes; No; Don't know]. If 'No' or 'Don't know': *You said you do not consider yourself to be a Zionist or do not know if you are. Which of the following is closest to your position?* [Response options: I am an anti-Zionist; I am a non-Zionist; I am not sure what Zionism means; Don't know; Other, please specify]. 'Ns=4,891 (2022); 4,641 (2024); 4,822 (2025). Note that temporal gaps between columns are inconsistent and data shown in orange pre-date the October 7 attacks; data shown in both shades of blue were gathered after them.

Indeed, it is noteworthy that the only category that shows a clear direction of travel over the three years shown is 'anti-Zionist', rising from 8% in 2022 to 12% in 2025. Whilst it is important to understand that both these proportions and changes over time are small, might we be seeing the beginning of a trend in the British Jewish population? Strikingly, we can see in the 2025 data that young people are much more likely to identify as anti-Zionists than their elders – indeed, almost a quarter of those aged in their 20s do so, more than three times as many as those in their 50s and 60s (Figure 17). Looking more closely, the main distinction appears to lie between those aged over and under 40 – born before and after the mid-1980s. Identification as an 'anti-Zionist' is much more common among the two youngest age bands shown – those in their 20s and 30s – than any of the older groups. However, it is in the youngest cohort that we see the greatest division. Today, in the current context, under half of them identify as Zionists.


Figure 17. Proportions of British Jews who identify as Zionist, non-Zionist or anti-Zionist, by age (2025, %)



Note: n=4,822. Proportions among those aged 16-19 and 90+ not shown due to small sample sizes.

Examining the trends within different age bands over the past few years, we can see evidence of an increasing tendency to identify as anti-Zionist among almost all age bands, even though the proportions among those aged 40 and above remain small – around the one in ten mark or lower (Figure 18). Yet the most potent shifts again can be seen in the youngest age bands – those aged under 40 – where the proportions of ‘anti-Zionists’ have climbed most substantially.

Figure 18. Proportions of British Jews who identify as anti-Zionist, by age, 2022, 2024 and 2025 comparison (%)




Ns=4,891 (2022); 4,641 (2024); 4,822 (2025). Proportions among those aged 16-19 and 90+ not shown due to small sample sizes. Note that temporal gaps between columns are inconsistent and data shown in orange pre-date the October 7 attacks; data shown in both shades of blue were gathered after them.

Intriguingly, the major shift in sentiment among the youngest age bands appears to have taken place more since mid-2024 than in the first year after the October 7 attacks. The differences shown between 2022 and 2024 are notably smaller than between 2024 and 2025, suggesting, perhaps, that the type of foundational identification with Israel embodied in Zionist self-identification has been affected more by developments in the war in its second year than its first. It has been during the latter period that some of the harshest condemnation of the Israeli government has been heard – notably in relation to issues around humanitarian aid and accompanying claims of famine and genocide. Yet a critical question about any growing trend among Jews to identify as anti-Zionist, or indeed *not* to identify as Zionist, concerns whether that reflects a foundational erosion in some of the core beliefs of Zionism among British Jews, or whether it is informed by something else: most notably, a time-bound critique of the current Israeli government that could change under a different administration.

The data shown in Figure 19 go some way to supporting the former hypothesis. As can be seen, there is a clear age gradient on two statements designed to test belief in foundational ideas underpinning Zionism – ‘Israel is the ancestral homeland of the Jewish People’ (Panel A) and ‘I support Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish State’ (Panel B) – both of which garner very high levels of agreement across the British Jewish population as a whole at around the 80% mark. However, while the oldest age band bucks the trend, there is declining agreement with both statements as we move down the age bands. Importantly, that gradient is more pronounced on the latter statement – support for Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish State – than the former one, suggesting that the historical claim is rather more resonant with younger people than the contemporary one, and that a significant minority among them may be questioning in some way the very idea of modern Jewish statehood. We have seen more evidence of this in a recent JPR paper examining data on support for the two-state solution,

where as many as 43% of 16-29-year-olds either strongly agreed or tended to agree that ‘a shared bi-national Israeli-Palestinian state is the only way to achieve peace,’ compared to 48% who disagreed.¹¹ This doesn’t necessarily indicate support among them for that idea – it may rather reflect disillusionment with existing realities – but it does again suggest that younger people are thinking about Zionism rather differently today from their elders. Only time will tell whether this is an age effect or a generational one (i.e. whether young people will become more like their elders over time, or whether their generation’s perspective will remain with them as they age), but it is evident that, at this time, significant proportions of young British Jews are struggling with their relationship with Israel and Zionism, or indeed feeling wholly alienated by them, in the midst of the current harsh and unforgiving war.

Figure 19. Proportions of British Jews who agree with two foundational statements about Zionism, total and by age (2025, %)




Question: *To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about Israel?* [Statements as shown on charts]. [Response options: Strongly agree; Tend to agree; Tend to disagree; Strongly disagree; No opinion; Don't know]; n=4,822.

At the time of writing, 48 Israeli hostages are still being held by Hamas in Gaza, only twenty of whom are still believed to be alive. A clear majority of British Jews (68%) feels that “Israel’s government has not done enough to release the hostages” (Figure 20, Panel A), and a smaller proportion, though still a majority (51%), believes that “The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) has not done enough to protect Palestinian civilians in Gaza” (Panel B). However, again, looking at the data in terms of age, we see evidence that younger Jews tend to be more critical than their elders on these issues. 16-29-year-olds are more likely than their elders to feel that Israel’s government has not done enough to release the hostages (Panel A), and that the IDF has not done enough to protect Palestinian civilians in Gaza (Panel B). Similarly, we see harsher judgement from the young on whether “The IDF has operated within the bounds of humanitarian law” (Panel C) and whether “Israel’s government is justified in withholding humanitarian aid from Gaza” (Panel D).

¹¹ Boyd, J. (2025). *Is the two-state solution dead? Exploring the attitudes of Jews in the UK*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research. Note that the statement testing bi-nationalism was not asked in direct opposition to other possible solutions; close to one-in-five British Jews who agreed to some degree with the bi-national contention also agreed with a statement supporting the two-state solution.


Figure 20. Proportions of British Jews who agree with four statements about how the Israeli government and military have handled issues concerning the war in Gaza, totals and by age (2025, %)



Question: *To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about Israel?* [Statements as shown on charts]. [Response options: Strongly agree; Tend to agree; Tend to disagree; Strongly disagree; No opinion; Don't know]; n=4,822.

More generally, we can see that there has been an overall shift towards more critical sentiment across the Jewish population as a whole over the course of the past year. As Figure 21 shows, the proportions expressing more critical views on some of the most pressing issues around the war – notably whether the Israeli government has done enough to release the hostages and whether the IDF has done enough to protect Palestinian civilians – have increased since we last measured them in mid-2024. And whilst we should recollect the earlier data showing that there has an increase in emotional attachment to Israel among the British Jewish population as a whole, we also see evidence that the war is taking a toll. Where 28% agreed in mid-2024 with the statement “The way Israel has conducted the war in Gaza has weakened my attachment to Israel”, that proportion had climbed to 40% by mid-2025. It remains a minority position across the population as a whole, but the rise is striking, nonetheless.

Figure 21. Change in British Jewish attitudes to issues concerning the war in Gaza, 2024 vs 2025 (%)



Question: *To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about Israel?* [Statements as shown on charts]. [Response options: Strongly agree; Tend to agree; Tend to disagree; Strongly disagree; No opinion; Don't know]. Ns=4,641 (2024); 4,822 (2025).


However, more striking is the difference in responses to the similar statement, “The way Israel has conducted the war in Gaza clashes with my Jewish values.” 40% of British Jews agreed with that contention in 2024 (24% strongly) with 51% disagreeing (33% strongly). By mid-2025, agreement with it had risen to 51% (33% strongly), with 42% disagreeing (27% strongly). Embedded within this statement is a tremendous sense of pain, confusion and disorientation for British Jews – a feeling of dissonance among a growing number that the Israel they have loved, admired and indeed needed as a key component of their Jewishness is acting counter to what they understand their Jewishness to be. Objectively speaking, they may or may not be right – many of those disagreeing would argue that Israel has no choice in fighting the war as it has given the nature and tactics of the implacable, vicious enemy – but the statement is not designed to make an objective assessment. It rather speaks to how British Jews are experiencing the war in relation to their Jewishness, a topic we explore in more depth in the next chapter.

3 / Jewish life

With so much turmoil both around antisemitism and insecurity in Britain and the challenges of navigating the political, moral and emotional dimensions of the October 7 attacks and the war, one might assume that the Jewish identities of British Jews would be in a parallel state of flux and uncertainty. Is this the case?

Viewed in simple terms at a population level, it appears *not* to be. On the contrary, many of the most basic measures of Jewishness and Jewish identity reveal a remarkable degree of stability over the recent period, with the readings from immediately before the October 7 attacks strikingly similar to those after it. One such example can be seen in Figure 22, where respondents were invited to score the strength of their Jewish identity on a scale running from 0 (low) to 10 (high). The results shown, for data gathered in late 2022, mid-2024 and mid-2025, are extraordinarily consistent: whilst it is possible that there has been a very slight increase among those placing themselves at the lower end of the scale in the most recent results, the overwhelming impression is one of no meaningful change. The mean scores for the population as a whole reinforce this: 8.3 in 2022; 8.2 in both 2024 and 2025. If there has been any kind of change over the period shown, it is too negligible to detect in this way.

Figure 22. Strength of Jewish identity over time (10=high; 0=low)




Question: *Please position yourself on a scale ranging from 0 to 10 according to the strength of your Jewish identity, where 0 means 'very low strength' and 10 means 'very high strength'.* Ns=4,891 (2022); 4,641 (2024); 4,822 (2025). Data above the dotted red line pre-date the October 7 attacks, data below the line are from after them.

Data on synagogue engagement largely reinforce this impression. Reactions to the October 7 attacks or the war in Gaza might reasonably have been expected to affect synagogue life positively or negatively. Some may have responded by increasing the regularity of their own synagogue attendance in pursuit of community support, reassurance or solidarity, or indeed in search of spiritual meaning at a time of such moral complexity and emotional strain. Certainly, as we shall see, there is evidence of many Jews gravitating towards Jewish friends since October 7, and attending synagogue could be one way of doing that. On the other hand, others may have reacted differently, turning away from organised Jewish religious life because of their critical views on Israel and the way the war was being prosecuted. We saw earlier that about half of all Jews agreed to some extent with the statement “the way Israel has conducted the war in Gaza clashes with my Jewish values,” and one might hypothesise that this feeling could prompt a reduction in their synagogue engagement. Alternatively, concern about antisemitism could fuel such a reduction too – some may feel that synagogues

themselves could be targeted for terrorism in the current context, so, for security reasons, it would be best to stay away. Certainly, many synagogues around the world, as well as in the UK, have been directly targeted for attack since the October 7 attacks and have increased security accordingly.¹²

Yet overall patterns of attendance indicate that very little has changed. In the period prior to 7 October, 42% attended monthly or more often, exactly the same proportion as in 2024 and only slightly higher than the most recent figure (40%) (Figure 23). Statistically, it is difficult to conclude anything has fundamentally shifted here. Moreover, even if a small change has occurred, it may have nothing to do with the war or antisemitism; it could equally be accounted for by a wider secularising tendency among Jews in general. Thus, at this stage, we conclude that synagogue engagement levels are broadly stable or declining very slightly.

Figure 23. Frequency of synagogue attendance among British Jews, 2022, 2024 and 2025 (%)




Question: *In the past 12 months, how often have you participated in a synagogue service, whether in person and/or online?* [Response options as shown on chart]. Ns=4,891 (2022); 4,641 (2024); 4,822 (2025). Data above the dotted red line pre-date the October 7 attacks, data below the line are from after them.

Similarly, people's feelings of attachment to their local Jewish community remain steady too. We have data over a slightly longer and more consistent period in this regard, and in general, the results are similar year-on-year. In each year measured, about a third reports feeling 'strongly attached' and just under 30% report feeling 'moderately attached.' However, there is one exception, in 2024. It seems likely that attachment levels to community strengthened at that time, in the first few months following the October 7 attacks, when the proportion reporting 'strongly attached' climbed from around a third to almost 40%, before settling back at the level it was at previously by 2025. Whilst the 2024 shift is not dramatic, it seems likely that this is evidence of an increased need among some for the type of solidarity a local Jewish community might offer at such a time.

¹² These include the burning down of the El Hamma synagogue in Tunisia (October 2023); a Molotov cocktail attack on the Kahal Adass Jisroel synagogue in Berlin (October 2023); a Molotov cocktail attack on the Nożyk Synagogue in Warsaw, Poland (May 2024); an arson attack at the Rouen synagogue in France (May 2024); an arson attack on the East Melbourne Hebrew Congregation in Australia (July 2025) subsequently found to be linked to Iranian coordination; and the smearing of faeces on four synagogues in north London (September 2025).

Figure 24. Feelings of attachment to one's local Jewish community among British Jews, 2020-2025 (%)




Question: *How attached do you currently feel to your local Jewish community?* [Response options as shown on chart].
 Ns=6,984 (2020); 4,152 (2021); 4,891 (2022); 4,641 (2024); 4,822 (2025). Data above the dotted red line pre-date the October 7 attacks, data below the line are from after them.

This need for solidarity can also be seen in some of the data we hold on friendship patterns. One of the issues discussed in Jewish circles since October 7 has been about how social and public discourse about Israel has affected Jewish people's relationships with close colleagues and friends. Indeed, clinical psychologists have started to explore the issue, writing in one case about the phenomenon of 'traumatic invalidation' among Jews since October 7, with evidence from Jewish clients that "rather than being met with compassion and care [from friends and colleagues], many were instead met with a stunning mix of silence, blaming, excluding, and even outright denying the atrocities of October 7 along with any emotional pain stemming from them."¹³ Whilst we cannot say how widespread this type of experience has been (although our measures of 'ambient antisemitism' in Figure 8 possibly provide an indication), we do find that British Jews are more than six times as likely to say that they have felt more close to Jewish friends than less close (37% vs. 6%) since October 7, and three times as likely to say they feel less close to non-Jewish friends than more close to them (8% vs. 24%) (Figure 25, Panel A). This suggests an inward social turn among British Jews towards fellow Jews and away from non-Jews, indicating a desire or need for Jewish solidarity and connectivity over this period. It may also be suggestive of wider social environments feeling uncomfortable, exclusionary or hostile to Jews, in a way that is damaging existing Jewish/non-Jewish relationships. It is noteworthy, for example, that 56% of British Jews agreed with the statement "I try to avoid talking about Israel with non-Jewish friends" (not shown graphically), although without benchmark data on this issue from before the October 7 attacks (which does not exist), we cannot say whether or not this sentiment has increased.

Examining the friendship data by age, we see little differentiation across the four bands shown, with the exception of the oldest group which, despite the same fundamental pattern, appears to be experiencing rather less change than younger groups (Figure 25, Panels B & C).

¹³ See: Bar-Halpern, M. and Wolfman, J. (2025). 'Traumatic invalidation in the Jewish community after October 7', *Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment*, pp.1-28. doi: 10.1080/10911359.2025.2503441.


Figure 25. How close do you feel to your friends today compared to before October 7? – overall and by age (2025, %)



Questions: *Thinking about your [Jewish/non-Jewish] friends and how close you feel to them today compared to how close you felt to them before the October 7 attacks in Israel, would you say you have become:* [Response options: Much closer to them; Somewhat closer; About the same; Somewhat less close; Much less close to them; Not sure; Not applicable – I do not have any [Jewish/non-Jewish] friends]; n=4,822.

In what may be an echo of these social shifts – and notwithstanding the broad stability shown above around the strength of people’s Jewish identities, attachments to Jewish community and engagement in synagogue life – about a third of British Jews say that they have become more involved in Jewish community life since October 7, compared to one in ten who report that they have become less involved (Figure 26). This ‘community life’ measure is deliberately broad – it could refer to a specific synagogue community, but equally it could be understood by respondents to refer to Jewish community life more generally – involvement in other parts of formal or informal Jewish social or organisational activities. The findings suggest that overall, Jews are about three times as likely to feel their involvement in Jewish communal life has increased than decreased, suggesting that, overall, the October 7 attacks and the subsequent war may have resulted thus far in a net increase in involvement. This does not differ dramatically by age, although there is a little more polarisation among younger people than older ones, but we would expect to see this pattern under normal circumstances – it is not necessarily a unique result of this particular period.

Figure 26. Proportions of British Jews feeling more or less involved in local Jewish community life since October 7, totals and by age, 2025 (%)



Question: *Comparing your level of involvement in Jewish community life in the UK before the October 7 attacks in Israel and your level of involvement now, would you say you have become:* [Response options: Much more involved; Somewhat more involved; About the same; Somewhat less involved; Much less involved; Not sure; Not applicable – I have never been involved]; n=4,822.


Whilst it should be clear that the overarching picture shows a remarkably high degree of resilience among most British Jews in terms of the strength of their Jewishness, and clear shifts towards community solidarity and involvement, this is not the case for every Jewish person. As can be seen in Figure 26, a small minority (9%) feels distanced from community life, rising to 15% among the youngest cohort aged 16-29. In Figure 25 we also saw that similar proportions feel *less* close to Jewish friends (6%) or *more* close to non-Jewish friends (8%). While there are multiple reasons why these shifts may be occurring, one of the more obvious hypotheses is that these individuals' perceptions or experiences of Jewish social and communal life since October 7 is leaving them feeling Jewishly distanced in some way, and that they are turning away from it as a result.

There is a small denominational dimension to this. Fewer than 1% of Strictly Orthodox Jews and under 4% of mainstream Orthodox Jews say they feel less involved in Jewish community life since October 7, whereas the proportions of progressive and unaffiliated Jews are higher (10% and 11% respectively; not shown graphically). There is also evidence of a relationship between this sentiment and people's connections to Israel – those feeling 'very emotionally attached' to Israel are notably less likely to feel less involved in Jewish community life (3%) than those who are 'not at all emotionally attached' (20%; not shown graphically).

To explore this further, we invited respondents to tell us how accepted they feel by the Jewish community, broadly understood. A strong majority said they *do* feel accepted – either 'very well' (42%) or 'quite well' (32%). Yet we found that a minority (17%) said either 'not very well accepted' (15%) or 'not accepted at all' (2%) (Figure 27).¹⁴ Examining these 17%, we again find denominational and Israel-related patterns – about a third of the unaffiliated do not feel accepted compared to just 3% of the Strictly Orthodox, and 60% of self-identifying anti-Zionists feel this, compared to just 6% of Zionists. There is also an age dimension to the phenomenon that is worth considering, with young adults notably less likely to feel accepted than older people, although again, this is a familiar pattern – we would expect to see it under normal circumstances.

¹⁴ A further 9% reported 'don't know' or 'prefer not to say'.

Figure 27. Proportions of British Jews reporting feeling either 'not very well accepted' or 'not accepted at all' by the Jewish community, by age, denomination and identification with Zionism, 2025 (%)




Question: *However, you define it, in general, how accepted do you feel by the Jewish community? Do you feel you are:* [Response options: Very well accepted; Quite well accepted; Not very well accepted; Not accepted at all; Don't know; Prefer not to say]; n=576.

We invited the 17% of respondents who said they do not feel accepted to tell us why. There are multiple reasons why this could be the case, not necessarily related to October 7 or the war in Gaza – connected, for example, to other issues such as their gender, sexuality or Jewish status. As Figure 28 shows, people reported all of these, alongside others. Yet the dominant reason by some distance was their views on Israel/Zionism. It is worth noting that we explored this phenomenon in 2022 in the JPR National Jewish Identity Survey as well, at which time 11% of respondents said they felt 'not at all accepted' or 'not very well accepted' by the community (compared to 17% today), and of these, 40% cited their views on Israel/Zionism as the reason (compared with 75% today).¹⁵ Evidently, dynamics within the community have been rather more fraught in the post-October 7 context, with notably more Jews feeling marginalised or excluded as a result of how they are processing or expressing their opinions on Israel, Zionism and the evolving situation in Gaza and the wider Middle East.

¹⁵ In parallel, feelings of acceptance have also shifted. 74% of British said they feel accepted by the Jewish community in 2025 (42% very well accepted; 32% quite well accepted). In 2022, the equivalent proportions were 80% overall, 49% very well and 31% quite well.


Figure 28. Reasons why 17% of British Jews do not feel accepted by the Jewish community, 2025 (%)



Question: *You said you do not feel accepted in some way by the Jewish community. Is this because of your:* [Response options as shown on chart. 'Other/Don't know' could include: None of these; Don't know; Prefer not to say; Other reasons – please specify). n=576.

While these data only relate to the minority (17%) who do not feel accepted in some way by the wider Jewish community, they nonetheless reflect a charged atmosphere in some community circles around developments in Israel and Gaza since October 7. Despite the apparent stability we see around the more fundamental measures of Jewish identity – which reveals something about its resilience under strain – the consistent distinctions we observe by denomination and age help to expose some of tensions that have arisen as British Jews grapple with the issues surrounding the war in Gaza. Beyond the broader experience of rising antisemitism in Britain and daily news about the war in Gaza, both of which set the context, the deeper moral issues are also being played *within* some Jewish communities, organisations and synagogues, as individuals grapple with their Jewish identities and commitments in this volatile context. Those at the more political or religious extremes of the community tend to be somewhat less exposed to such tensions, as their Jewish social environments and networks are typically more unified in their opinions, whether staunchly supportive or staunchly critical of Israel's actions. But those closer to the mainstream centre (particularly including the engaged and/or affiliated progressives and the left-leaning parts of modern orthodoxy) are more likely to be part of sub-communities, organisations or synagogues that are rather more divided in their opinions, and the process of navigating their differences has been very unsettling for many of them. Importantly, their fundamental underlying sense of their own Jewishness is largely unaffected, but anecdotally at least, some appear to be questioning whether they still belong in the communities or organisations they may have been part of for many years. At the heart of this issue is a question about which Jewish values should have primacy – a commitment to the particular needs of the Jewish People as a whole, which include a strong sense of support for the Jewish State, or a commitment to wider universal values and the role Jews ought to play in pursuing justice for all, including the Palestinians. Both of these ideas have strong roots in Jewish thought (indeed, one of the most well-known maxims of Hillel, one of the Talmud's most famous rabbis, is: "If I am not for myself, who will be for me? But if I am only for myself, what am I?), yet Jews of different denominations commonly lean one way or the other. Figure 29 (Panel A) helps to illustrate this: whereas those belonging to mainstream orthodox synagogues are more likely to say that 'supporting Israel' is 'very important' to their own Jewish identities than 'supporting social justice causes', those belonging to progressive synagogues tend to prioritise them the other way around.

Figure 29. Proportions saying ‘supporting Israel’ and ‘supporting social justice causes’ are ‘very important’ to their sense of Jewish identity, by denomination and age, 2025 (%)



Question: *How important or unimportant are each of the following to how you see yourself as a Jewish person?*
 [Response options: Supporting Israel; Supporting social justice causes¹⁶]; n=4,822.

The data in Panel B of Figure 29 add a further dimension to this dynamic by showing the same issue by age. As can be seen, the youngest age band (16-29-year-olds) is notably more likely to prioritise social justice over Israel, whereas the oldest two groups tend to lean in the other direction. This age dynamic hints at some of the tensions happening within some Jewish families, between generations, particularly when parents and their young adult children differ strongly on how they interpret and understand current events. To some degree, this has long been the case – in general, younger people tend to be more left-leaning than older people – but with the situation so fraught, it is not only within communities where these tensions are being played out, but within families too, and indeed, within individuals themselves. It is striking, for example, that 28% of all British Jews agreed with the statement “I try to avoid talking about Israel with family members,” and that this sentiment is more common among young adults than their elders (not shown graphically). Whilst 60% of the population as a whole disagreed with the contention, the 28% are pointing to a challenging and upsetting dynamic within their families – a sense that this topic, which is so important to many Jews’ sense of self, is too toxic to bring up even among their nearest and dearest.

/ Faith in the future


Yet in considering all of this, one should recall that surrounding these struggles within Jewish life is a broader question about Jewish people’s sense of security in Britain. The data discussed in the opening chapter show how these dynamics about Israel within the Jewish community are taking place in the wider context of rising concern about antisemitism at home. And when antisemitism rises, it is perhaps inevitable that Jews will begin to question whether or not they – and indeed Jewish life as a whole – have a future in the UK. Jewish history almost dictates that Jews ask themselves this question; part of the ongoing trauma of the Holocaust for some relates to those who didn’t escape from Germany, or Europe more broadly, in time. Indeed, the often-unstated question on many Jews’ lips concerns how they will *know* it is time to flee; what conditions would indicate that level of precariousness?

¹⁶ Note that the question invited responses on multiple other dimensions of Jewishness too.

It is rather striking that antisemitism experts have yet to establish a broad set of measurable variables to genuinely help answer this question, but in the absence of that, we can use our data to understand more about how Jews are feeling, and indeed, what they are doing in this regard. First, notwithstanding the significant decline in feelings of safety in the UK (see Figure 7) it is somewhat reassuring to see that 85% of British Jews report that they are “able to practise Judaism freely” in the UK (59% strongly agree), and only 8% disagree (not shown graphically). This is a strong indication that, in general terms, little is occurring in the UK to curb their ability to live Jewish lives; freedom of religion itself remains largely secure. That said, Jewish community experts and scholars of antisemitism have regularly noted that synagogues and Jewish schools have security outside them as standard in the UK (and in most other Diaspora communities), indicating that whilst the freedom to practise Judaism is clearly protected by the State, the community feels less than fully secure in being able to do so.¹⁷ Moreover, close to half of all British Jews (46%) agreed with the statement “there are events and places I don’t go because of antisemitism” (18% strongly), whilst 37% disagreed (27% strongly; not shown graphically). Agreement is notably common among the Strictly Orthodox, those who feel most emotionally attached to Israel, those on the right-wing of British politics (i.e. those likely to vote Conservative or Reform), and those most likely to define antisemitism as ‘a very big problem’ in the UK. Clearly, many feel that Jews are not fully safe in certain contexts in Britain.

Given this sentiment, we were eager to establish a benchmark against which to measure Jews’ sense of optimism or pessimism about the future of Jewish life in the UK. We do not have historical data on this, but it is instructive to examine which subgroups within the Jewish population are feeling more or less optimistic in this regard. The orthodox feel less optimistic than average, as do those on the political right; by contrast, members of Progressive synagogues and Labour and Green voters feel most optimistic. Yet overall, the results are not particularly encouraging – the mid-point is 5.0, and the Jewish population as a whole, along with most subgroups within it, locate themselves on the more pessimistic side of it.

Figure 30. British Jews’ feelings about the future of Jewish life in the UK; mean scores, and by age, denomination and political leaning, 2025 (0=very pessimistic; 10=very optimistic)




Question: *Thinking about the next 10 years, how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel about the prospects of each of the following? Use the 0 to 10 scale to answer, where 0 means very pessimistic and 10 means very optimistic. [The future of Jewish life in Britain]; n=4,822.*

¹⁷ See, for example, Dave Rich, ‘[As British Jews celebrate the High Holy Days, security measures reflects the reality of antisemitism at record levels](#)’, LBC, 2 October 2024.

Given this, are there any indicators of Jews leaving the country? Data on this are rather sparse, not least because countries tend not to gather migration data by religion, but the State of Israel records immigration data from multiple countries on a monthly basis, and Israel is known to be the most common destination for Jews migrating from the UK. Examining these data over time, there is no sign of any kind of recent spike in migration rates from the UK (shown in red in Figure 31) – on the contrary, the picture is remarkably stable over the past quarter century. The situation is similar in some other European countries – for example, Germany and the Netherlands – but is rather different in France, particularly in the mid-2010s, a period which saw several murderous Islamist attacks on Jewish and wider targets in the country. Similar incidents in the UK could prompt a similar reaction (and just as this report was about to be published, news was emerging of a deadly antisemitic attack on a synagogue in Manchester on 2 October 2025 – Yom Kippur) although in general migration rates tend to track unemployment levels rather better than antisemitism indicators; economic downturns are typically the most reliable predictor of migration.¹⁸

Figure 31. Number of Jews migrating to Israel per annum from France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, per 1,000 in each national Jewish population, 2000-2024.




Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.

Nevertheless, our most recent data do suggest that British Jews are somewhat more likely to be considering moving to Israel in the coming five years than they were before the October 7 attacks. Using a 0-10 scale, where 0=low likelihood and 10=high likelihood, we can see that 10% of all British Jews scored at the more likely end of the scale (6-10) when we asked the question in late 2022, whereas that proportion climbed to 14% in our mid-2024 assessment. It has remained at that level since then, although comparing the overarching pictures from 2024 and 2025, there appears to be a slight reduction in likelihood overall over the past year. Of course, a desire to move to Israel could be motivated by pull factors towards Israel (e.g. a strong sense of Zionist sentiment, a feeling that Jewish life may be more complete and fulfilling there, etc.), or push factors away from the UK (e.g. that life is becoming more difficult

¹⁸ Data from the first half of 2025 indicate that migration levels to Israel may be marginally higher in 2025 than average, but nonetheless well within the range that would be considered normal.

economically, that the UK is becoming less accommodating towards Jews, etc.), but it is worth noting that those who reported experiencing an antisemitic incident in 2024 were three times as likely to score 10 on the scale (very high likelihood) than those who did not. The same is the case for those who said they had experienced ambient antisemitism frequently or regularly, compared to those who had not done so at all, or had only encountered it rarely. Similarly, those most pessimistic about the future of Jewish life in the UK (scoring 0-3 on that scale) were about six times as likely to score 10 on the migration to Israel scale (i.e. high likelihood), as those who were optimistic (scoring 7-10 on the scale) about it.

Figure 32. Likelihood of British Jews moving permanently to Israel ('making aliyah') in the coming five years, 2022, 2024 and 2025 (10=high likelihood; 0=low likelihood)



Question: *How likely, if at all, is it that you will live permanently in Israel ('make aliyah' or return there) in the next five years, where 0 is 'Extremely unlikely' and 10 is 'Extremely likely'?* Note. Proportions may not sum to 100 due to rounding. Ns=4,891 (2022); 4,641 (2024); 4,822 (2025). Data above the dotted red line pre-date the October 7 attacks, data below the line are from after them.

In seeking to summarise the key findings in this chapter, the data suggest that, overall, British Jewish identity remains fundamentally resilient, despite the profound challenges posed by rising antisemitism and the war in Gaza. Core indicators – such as strength of Jewish identity, synagogue attendance, and attachment to local Jewish communities – have remained remarkably stable over the past two years. Indeed, if anything, some measures show signs of increased engagement, with many Jews reporting closer relationships with Jewish friends and greater involvement in communal life since October 7; in others, we may see very slight declines in engagement levels, but any such shifts appear small overall.

Yet whilst this is certainly the dominant picture, this resilience coexists with increased internal tensions. A small but notable minority of Jews – particularly younger, unaffiliated and those identifying as anti-Zionists – report feeling less accepted by the community, often due to their views on Israel and Zionism. These dynamics are playing out not only in communal spaces but also generationally and within families and personal relationships, as Jews navigate competing ideas about Jewishness: one rooted in particularism and solidarity with Israel, and another grounded in universalism and social justice.

/ Reflections on the findings

Two years on from the 7 October 2023 attacks, the data presented in this report reveal a striking contrast about how Jewish life has, and has not, been affected by this profoundly disruptive and challenging period. On the one hand, the findings reveal a community grappling with rising antisemitism, shifting emotional and ideological relationships with Israel, and complex internal dynamics around identity, belonging and core moral issues. Yet, on the other, Jewish life goes on, and as we have revealed empirically, Jewish identity stands resolute, despite the sometimes febrile atmosphere surrounding it. Fundamentally, we see in the data a deeply resilient community, continuing to live full Jewish lives despite living through the most volatile and unsettling period most have ever known.

Nevertheless, the most troubling theme throughout the data is the intensification of perceived and experienced antisemitism. While concern about antisemitism has been high since at least 2018, the post-October 7 period has seen a marked rise in the proportion of British Jews who define it as a “very big problem.” This is not merely a matter of perception: the data on personal experiences of antisemitic incidents — particularly verbal and online harassment — confirm that the problem is widespread and has grown. Younger Jews and those most visibly Jewish, especially the Strictly Orthodox, are disproportionately affected, suggesting that antisemitism in Britain is not only increasing but that it stratifies along lines of age, visibility and religious observance.

This pattern is not unique to the UK. Comparative data from multiple other countries show similar trends, particularly in the wake of the October 7 attacks. Antisemitic incident data from a wide range of countries since the attacks show this clearly, and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) surveys have found that Jews across Europe feel increasingly insecure, with many reporting high levels of antisemitic harassment and a lack of trust in public institutions. One of the issues British politicians and legislators should be conscious of is that spikes in serious antisemitic violence can prompt significant increases in Jewish emigration to Israel, as was seen in France, for example, in the mid-2010s. While the UK has not seen any kind of Jewish emigratory surge under the current conditions, the data suggest that the migration question has become slightly more active among British Jews over the past two years, particularly among those who have experienced antisemitism or feel pessimistic about the future of Jewish life in Britain. This should not be misinterpreted as indicative of a forthcoming ‘exodus’ — that is highly improbable — but the shift in sentiment could certainly prompt increased levels of migration should the community experience the types of murderous attacks seen in other parts of Europe in recent years.

The British Jewish experience is also shaped by a broader social and political context. The concept of “ambient antisemitism” — indirect, non-personal experiences that nonetheless contribute to a sense of exclusion or hostility — has emerged as a critical lens through which to understand contemporary Jewish insecurity. These experiences, often encountered online, in media representations of Israel, or simply in day-to-day social situations, are difficult to quantify but are felt by many. They reflect a cultural climate in which many Jews increasingly feel that their identities, values and affiliations are being questioned or marginalised. This phenomenon is not easily captured by traditional incident-based metrics, but it is essential to understanding the emotional and psychological toll of the current moment.

The data also reveal a complex and evolving relationship between British Jews and Israel. Contrary to what some might expect, the overall levels of emotional attachment to Israel remain stable, and in some cases have intensified. However, attachment to the country is becoming more contested, particularly among younger Jews. The rise in anti-Zionist identification among those aged under 40 — especially those in their 20s — suggests a growing

generational divide that may have longer-term implications. While older Jews tend to view Zionism as a foundational component of their Jewish identity, younger Jews are more likely to question its relevance or moral legitimacy, especially in light of how the Israeli government has prosecuted the war in Gaza.

This tension is not merely political; it is also philosophical. At its core lies a struggle between two contrasting visions of Jewish identity: one rooted in particularism — the defence of Jewish peoplehood, sovereignty and communal solidarity — and another grounded in universalism — the pursuit of justice, equality and human rights. Both have deep roots in Jewish thought and tradition, and both are reflected in the data. Progressive Jews and younger respondents are more likely to prioritise social justice over support for Israel as key components of their Jewishness, while mainstream Orthodox and older Jews tend to reverse that hierarchy. These differences are not just ideological; they are lived and felt, shaping how individuals relate to their communities, families and broader society.

The internal dynamics of the British Jewish community are also undergoing subtle but significant changes. Among the vast majority of British Jews, core measures of Jewish identity — such as strength of identification, synagogue attendance, and communal attachment — remain remarkably stable. Nevertheless, there are signs of increased polarisation with a small but growing minority of Jews struggling to find their place in the community especially when their views on Israel or Zionism contrast with the mainstream. This is most pronounced among unaffiliated and anti-Zionist Jews.

At the same time, there are signs of increased communal engagement and solidarity. Many Jews report feeling closer to Jewish friends and more involved in Jewish communal life since October 7. This suggests that, in times of crisis, Jewish identity can serve as a critical source of strength and cohesion. The data point to an overall 'gravitational pull' towards Jewish spaces and relationships, even as some individuals feel pushed away. This dynamic of inclusion and exclusion appears to be a growing issue among the broader challenges facing the British Jewish community today.

Looking ahead, the future of Jewish life in Britain feels somewhat uncertain to many. The overall mood might best be characterised as 'cautious pessimism' – on our optimism/pessimism scale, most Jews locate themselves on the slightly pessimistic side of the centre line rather than closer to its deeply pessimistic end. This is not necessarily a prediction of decline, but rather a reflection of the anxieties and complexities of the current moment. The ability to practise Judaism freely remains firmly intact, but many Jews feel worried in other ways — avoiding certain places or conversations due to fear of antisemitism or social isolation, ostracism or hostility.

In sum, while the overall picture of Jewish life in Britain looks remarkably robust, significant challenges undoubtedly lie ahead. In responding to these, British Jews — and the institutions that serve them — will need to navigate a delicate balance. They have to continue to advocate for security and inclusion, both within the Jewish community and in wider society, while also fostering spaces for honest dialogue and moral reflection. The tensions around Israel, Zionism and key moral questions may soften as and when the war ends, but they are unlikely to disappear. Managing them will require empathy, openness and a commitment to understanding.

Ultimately, perhaps the strongest signal emerging from the data is the strength and resilience of the Jewish population at a time when Israel, their Jewishness, and their place in Britain feel more contested than most have ever previously experienced. For the majority, their Jewish identities remain as strong as ever, and their attachments to Israel even more embedded and intense. The October 7 attacks have reminded them how important Israel is to them, and the

multitude of military and political threats the country has faced have only reinforced this. Yet the ways in which the war in Gaza has been fought by the Israel government and military, and the manner in which it has been reported, is having a significant impact on a sizeable and growing minority, prompting them to have to rethink their Jewishness and their relationship with Israel in ways that feel profoundly unsettling. Only time will tell whether the trends discussed in this paper continue along the lines shown or change course – much depends on how national leaders in Britain, Israel and around the world, as well as Jewish community leaders here, navigate their way through the turbulent waters of the contemporary era.

/ Methodological notes

The 2025 JPR Jews in Uncertain Times Survey was conducted using the JPR Jewish Population Research Panel, our core research mechanism for exploring the attitudes and experiences of Jews in the UK on a variety of issues. The panel contains close to 11,000 individuals who are UK residents aged 16 or above who self-identify as Jewish and have agreed to be recontacted for JPR research purposes. These individuals have been carefully recruited and retained over several years to ensure that all parts of the self-identifying adult Jewish population are included, across gender, all age bands, geographical areas, denominational groups and affiliations. Particular efforts have been made to include the hardest-to-reach parts of the Jewish population, notably young adults, the most Orthodox, and those least likely to be affiliated with the organised Jewish community. All panel members have completed a sign-up survey to assess their eligibility and have shared their email address to gain access to JPR questionnaires.

The 2025 data presented here (wave 7 of the JPR Research Panel) are based on 4,822 individuals who participated in our most recent survey, which was conducted between 8 June and 20 July 2025. Respondents completed the questionnaire online, by computer, smartphone or tablet, and in a handful of cases, by telephone. The questionnaire was developed by JPR, drawing on a range of existing surveys, and was programmed in-house using Forsta software. The survey data were cleaned and weighted to adjust for the age, sex and geographical distribution of the Jewish population based on the 2021 Census, and on information about Jewish denomination based on a combination of administrative and JPR survey data. Statistical analysis was carried out using IBM SPSS Version 30.0.

All survey data presented here for years 2020 onwards also come from the JPR Research Panel. JPR has run a full survey of the Jewish population in each calendar year since 2020, using the same fundamental method outlined above. The 2020 survey (wave 1) was conducted between July 9-31 (n=6,984) – a detailed methodological report can be found [here](#); the 2021 survey (wave 2) took place between 23 July and 1 September (n=4,152); the 2022 survey (wave 3 – the National Jewish Identity Survey) ran between 16 November and 23 December (n=4,891) – a more detailed methodological summary can be found at the end of [this report](#); the 2023 survey (wave 4) took place between 16 April and 31 May (n=3,767); and fieldwork for the 2024 survey (wave 6) took place between 14 June and 14 July (n=4,641).

There are a number of ways that response rates to a panel survey and its constituent waves can be presented, and a detailed account is needed to give a full understanding. This is not possible here, but a few statistics may give a sense of the level of engagement of survey participants. If we take as the base (or denominator) all panel members who have completed at least one JPR survey and who were issued an email invitation to take part in the 2025 wave (including those who registered for the panel at this wave), approximately 44% completed the survey, 12% started the survey but did not complete it, and 44% did not start the survey. Of those who responded to the survey, approaching 45% registered at the inaugural wave in 2020, a further 4% registered at the second survey in 2021, 15% registered at the third survey in 2022 (a major survey on Jewish identity), and an additional 4%, 5% and 7% at the fourth (2023), fifth (early 2024) and sixth (mid-2024) waves. Approaching 20% of those who responded to the 2025 survey registered at this wave. To give a sense of the potential for further analysis of changing attitudes, there are many wave 7 (2025) participants who also took part in wave 1 (almost exactly 2,000), wave 3 (over 2,500) and wave 6 (almost 2,900). A number of longitudinal weights have been calculated to support analysis of different combinations of waves.

This report also includes references to data from 2012 and 2018. These surveys were conducted by a joint JPR/Ipsos team working under the auspices of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), following a competitive tender process. The surveys, conducted among Jews living in multiple EU Member States, were actively promoted by a carefully-selected range of Jewish community organisations to build convenience samples aimed at ensuring that all parts of the self-identifying adult Jewish population were included, across all age bands, geographical areas, denominational groups and affiliations. Snowballing methods through peer referrals were used to extend both survey's reach into the unaffiliated parts of the Jewish population, and the data were subsequently cleaned and weighted to adjust for the age, sex and geographical distribution of the Jewish population based on the 2011 Census and on synagogue membership data held by JPR. Fieldwork for the 2012 survey was conducted between 3 September and 3 October (n=1,468) – a more detailed methodology can be found in [this report](#); the 2018 survey ran between May and June (n=4,731) – a more detailed methodology can be found in [this report](#).

Note that all comparisons across different surveys in this report have been made using cross-sectional data rather than analysing a consistent sample of those who participated in every wave, so differences in the composition of the samples at each wave may affect the results. Sensitivity analyses have been carried out on previous studies and have shown that any such differences tend to be very small, so we are confident that the changes shown over time are broadly accurate.

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/ About the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR)

The Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) is a London-based research organisation, consultancy and think-tank. It aims to advance the prospects of Jewish communities in the United Kingdom and across Europe by conducting research and informing policy development in dialogue with those best placed to positively influence Jewish life. Web: www.jpr.org.uk.

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