



Antisemitism in the Finnish Blue and Black Movement: Ideological Roots and Contemporary Expressions

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Abstract

While far-right organizations often differ in their specific agendas—shaped by the political and geographical contexts in which they operate—antisemitism and anti-Jewish sentiment remain recurring elements across most of them. The Finnish Blue and Black Movement (Fin. *Sinimusta liike*, SML) was initially founded as an organization, later registered as a political party, and subsequently had its party status revoked in April 2024. As of 2025, it is seeking re-registration as a political party. Despite its brief history, SML has provoked public discussion throughout its existence, particularly regarding its ideological foundations. This study aims to situate the Blue and Black Movement within its broader context and examine the antisemitic rhetoric present in the communications of SML and its representatives. The analysis was grounded in Ruth Wodak's approach of defining and identifying antisemitic content through a discourse–historical approach (DHA). The material examined includes public speeches and online textual content—such as social media posts—produced by the Movement and its candidates for the 2023 Finnish parliamentary election and those who were considered as candidates at the 2024 European Parliament elections. The results of the analysis indicate that through a combination of ethnic exclusion, Holocaust distortion, conspiratorial narratives, the Blue and Black Movement articulates a contemporary form of antisemitism that draws on ideological continuities with historical fascist traditions.

Keywords Antisemitism · Far-right · Blue and Black Movement · Finland · Discourse–historical approach

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Introduction

The Finnish Blue and Black Movement (Fin. *Sinimusta liike*, SML) was initially founded as an organization, got the permission to register as a political party in June 2022, and had its party status revoked in April 2024. In early May 2025, however, it collected the necessary signatures for its re-registration as a political party, and in the end of May 2025, it was re-registered. Despite its short history, the Movement has garnered significant public attention, primarily due to the criminal backgrounds of some of its members and its openly fascist ideological stance. However, the anti-semitic rhetoric of its representatives has not yet been thoroughly examined.

Jewish communities and individuals have a long history of facing prejudice in many forms for over two millennia, both in forms of persecution and violence, and lately, in the form of online antisemitic content (Schwarz-Friesel, 2019). Anti-semitism is also present in Finland, as both historical research (see, e.g., Muir and Worthen, 2013; Silvennoinen, 2023) and studies focusing on present times (see, e.g., Illman & Vuola, 2024; Czimbalmos & Pataricza, 2024a, b) indicate. The continuous presence of antisemitism, both historically and in the digital age, has had violent consequences in various contexts.

The deadliest antisemitic attack in the history of the United States occurred during the mass shooting at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh on October 27, 2018. The perpetrator had used the social media platform *Gab* to spread antisemitic messages prior to the attack (McIlroy-Young & Anderson, 2019). Antisemitism has also played a central role in other terrorist attacks targeting minorities, such as the Christchurch Mosque shooting on March 15, 2019 (Every-Palmer et al., 2021), the El Paso shooting on August 3, 2019 (Tinajero et al., 2023) and the Halle synagogue shooting on Yom Kippur, October 9, 2019 (“Halle synagogue attack,” 2020). In each case, the attackers published manifestos referencing antisemitic conspiracy theories such as the “Great Replacement” and “White Genocide,” often using fringe or unmoderated social media platforms. Such antisemitic content has been shown to contribute to increased antisemitic violence and vandalism globally.

While some scholars have argued that antisemitism has become less central to e.g. right-wing populism, and that it was replaced by forms of cultural racism, examples from countries such as Germany and the U.S. indicate that antisemitic ideologies remain active and potent (Roepert, 2022). The Nordic countries are often known for their anti-discrimination policies, gender equality, and democratic institutions. Nevertheless, during recent years, they have witnessed a resurgence of extreme nationalist rhetoric that often includes antisemitic elements, whether overt or coded in conspiratorial language. Far-right antisemitism in the Nordic region is especially relevant today, amid the rise of far-right movements, increasing online hate speech, and polarizing debates on immigration and national identity; trends that can also be observed across Europe. The Finnish far-right is part of broader international networks and reflects global trends. Despite growing concerns over antisemitism in Finland—particularly after the escalation of hostilities following Hamas’ attack on Israeli on October 7, 2023—no scholarly research has yet focused on recent manifestations of antisemitism in the Finnish contemporary far-right.

While the Finnish branch of the Nordic Resistance Movement was banned (Kotonen, 2021: 178), numerous far-right extremist organizations, both officially and unofficially registered, continue to operate in Finland. Within this context, the Blue and Black Movement has received considerable attention both from the media and the public.

The aim of this article is twofold: to introduce the context in which the Blue and Black Movement was established and to address and analyze the antisemitic rhetoric present in the communications of the Movement and its representatives. Historical examples have shown that discussions around race and religion in far-right circles risk fostering radicalization and societal harm. Addressing such discourse within far-right movements is essential, as their tolerance for and endorsement of antisemitism often serves as a prevalent ideological pillar and a potential gateway to broader radicalization. Making early intervention is therefore necessary not only to counter antisemitism itself, but also to mitigate wider threats of authoritarianism and hate-based violence.

To understand and counter the spread and normalization of radical far-right sentiments, it is crucial to document and analyze such phenomena. This article represents an initial step in this process, regarding the Finnish context.

Antisemitism on the Far-Right

Antisemitism is a complex and often contested phenomenon, which is difficult to define in universally accepted terms. While traditionally understood as hostility toward Jews as individuals or as a group, its manifestations vary widely from overt hate speech and violence to more subtle expressions such as conspiracy theories, coded language, or denial of Jewish identity and history, and rhetoric targeting the actions of the State of Israel. While some argue that antisemitism should be seen as a form of racism (e.g., Yuval-Davis, 2023) as scholars of antisemitism point out, antisemitism relies on conspiratorial thinking and its historical adaptability over more than two millennia (see, e.g., Wetzel, 2014; Wodak, 2015; Stögner, 2025), which differentiates it from racism.

Antisemitic stereotypes in right-wing rhetoric may simultaneously portray Jews in contradictory ways: as untrustworthy, rootless, antinational, hyper-intellectual, or even both anticapitalist and exploitative capitalists. This syncretic nature allows antisemitism to combine seemingly paradoxical elements into a cohesive worldview. It may also present in the form of Holocaust denial or “secondary antisemitism”—resentment at being reminded of the Holocaust (Wodak, 2015). At the heart of antisemitic ideologies lies the belief that Jews—or those perceived as Jewish—possess a hidden, intangible form of global power. This framing challenges reductive claims that concerns about antisemitism are merely expressions of “white privilege” or deflections through “Zionist tactics” (Herf, 2023: 189). Yet, explicit antisemitic rhetoric remains more common on the far-right, where it is often a defining ideological feature (Lipstadt, 2021).

Antisemitism remains a constitutive element of neo-Nazi and right-wing populist ideologies across Europe, often coexisting with anti-Muslim, homophobic, and antiziganist (anti-Roma) prejudices (Wodak & Richardson, 2013; Wodak, 2015). It is important to point out, however, that some actors on the broader right have adopted instrumentalized pro-Israel or anti-antisemitic stances, especially where this aligns with xenophobic agendas targeting Muslim immigrants (Kahmann, 2017). This tactical appropriation has become especially visible in post-October 7, 2023, rhetoric in various European contexts, including Finland as well, where actors on the political right have taken a vocal stance in support of Israel, while tolerating antisemitic discourse within their parties. However, such positions are largely absent from openly fascist, radical or extreme right movements—such as Finland’s Blue and Black Movement—which reject even this strategic distancing from antisemitism and fascism.

The transformed and flexible nature of antisemitism (Zick & Küpper, 2005) contributes to its longevity. While it remains an ideological component of the European far-right in both overt and covert forms, its expression has evolved over time. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, antisemitism was frequently chimeric, pseudoscientific, and openly xenophobic. Today, it more often manifests through conspiratorial narratives targeting the Jewish individuals referred to as the “Zionists” or “globalists,” who are portrayed as agents of cultural domination and social decay. These narratives are not solely rooted in far-right thought, however. They are also influenced by Soviet-era anti-Zionist propaganda, which continues to shape far-left and far-right antisemitic rhetoric alike (Herf, 2023; Hirsh, 2018; Tabarovsky, 2024).

As a result, contemporary European antisemitism now takes diverse forms—including in Finland and other Nordic countries. These include Holocaust relativization, revivals of the trope of the blood libel, and expressions tied to Israel, such as collectively blaming Jews for the actions of the Israeli state or voicing criticism in clearly antisemitic ways (EU FRA, 2024; Czibalmos & Pataricza, 2024a).

Recent years have seen a documented resurgence of right-wing antisemitism across Europe (Hersh & Royden, 2023), propagated through both online and offline channels. While radical right actors are generally underrepresented on mainstream platforms like X (formerly Twitter) (Kakavand, 2024), their ideological messaging spreads through alternative platforms and in-person mobilization.

As Wodak (2015: 2) notes, far-right actors combine different political imaginaries, evoke idealized nationalist pasts, and emphasize varying themes in everyday politics. This discursive flexibility allows them to repackage antisemitic rhetoric as patriotism, tradition, or cultural protectionism. This way, antisemitism becomes a flexible and recurring tool for the far-right—used to construct and defend ethnonationalist identities.

Research on Far-Right Antisemitism in Finland

In Finland, the historiography of interwar fascist movements and antisemitism has been significantly shaped by the country’s geopolitical position during the Cold

War. After the Second World War, Finland remained outside Western security alliances and under the influence of the Soviet Union. Under these conditions, many facets of Finnish-German cooperation during their joint campaign against the Soviet Union (1941–1944) were left largely unexamined by historians. As a result, a scholarly tendency was to portray antisemitism as a foreign phenomenon—something imported and fundamentally alien to Finnish culture. More often, the presence of antisemitism was downplayed. Even in studies of the interwar far-right, antisemitism was typically framed as a Nazi import, disconnected from domestic ideologies. This approach has contributed to a broader failure to grasp the transnational, entangled nature of fascist movements across Europe and the West. Finnish scholarship has frequently treated native fascist groups as uniquely national phenomena—products of Finland’s specific historical trajectory—rather than as part of a wider continental pattern of far-right radicalism (Bak et al., 2022:17).

Therefore, research on antisemitism in Finland has historically been somewhat limited, partly due to a combination of academic self-censorship and a tendency toward self-preservation, which has constrained critical engagement with Finland’s role in the WWII. As a result, scholarly attention to antisemitism in Finland has been relatively narrow, with early studies primarily focused on the Evangelical Lutheran Church and isolated incidents (Ahonen et al., 2020).

Lately, the previous narrative has increasingly been challenged by a growing body of scholarship addressing Finland’s role in the Holocaust and the country’s historical relationship with fascism (see, e.g., Muir & Worthen, 2013; Silvennoinen, 2015, 2023, 2024; Swanström, 2018, 2025). These works naturally touch upon the question of antisemitism as well. Academic interest explicitly in contemporary antisemitism increased and resulted in several works connected to the subject with regards to, e.g., Jewish perception (see, e.g., Czimbalmos & Pataricza, 2024a, b; Illman & Vuola, 2024). In addition, contemporary fascist organizations such as the Nordic Resistance Movement have received scholarly attention (see, e.g., Kotonen, 2021; Kotonen & Sallamaa, 2023; Sallamaa & Malkki, 2022). Nonetheless, present-day antisemitism within the Finnish far-right remains a so-far rather underexplored area of study.

Data and Methods

The main sources of data for this work were carried out via both ethnographic and netnographic data collection. Some of the information was acquired both through observation at different public events of the Movement, while the main sources of information were various online platforms.

Despite the relatively short history—as discussed later—of the Blue and Black Movement (SML), the party and its leadership have been rather active online when “taking part” in the societal discourse. This activity has also been prevalent on various social media channels, including Youtube, X (former Twitter), and to a limited extent Instagram and even on TikTok. Social media channels tend to provide an environment where radical right as well as populist political parties can

communicate their ideologies. Online media as sites of cultural engagement allow for extremist groups to reach their audiences (e.g., Krämer, 2017; Ahmed & Pisiu, 2020; Askanius, 2021; Schmalenberger & Hübscher, 2022; Kakavand, 2024).

Taking these factors into consideration, the podcasts, public speeches, online textual sources (including the social media posts) of the Blue and Black Movement, and those representing it (e.g., their candidates for the Finnish parliamentary elections of 2023, and those who were considered as candidates for the European Parliament elections in 2024)¹ were studied systematically. Ruth Wodak's approach of defining and identifying antisemitic content (Wodak, 2015) through a discourse historical approach (DHA) (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) was used to analyze the collected data. Due to the limitation of space, the current analysis will focus on the discursive strategy that is reflected on is predication strategies, characterizing social actors (Jews or those identified as Jewish) by assigning them specific traits as well as the topoi, through which these traits are justified.

Antisemitic rhetoric can be overt as well as covert, it may be context-dependent and can be embedded in broader discursive strategies. The context in which certain statements are uttered, the linguistic and rhetorical factors, such as the application of the old antisemitic stereotypes, the discursive strategies, and the framing applied, as well as the genre and historical intertextuality are of special importance when detecting antisemitic language (Wodak, 2015: 97–125; Engel & Wodak, 2013: 73–96). The collected and presented data mainly includes media articles from the website of SML, X posts by its representatives, as well as extracts from speeches and presentations given at public events organized and/or attended by SML, its representatives, and sympathizers from the period of existence until June 2024. The data was collected and selected by the author through following the social media and online channels of the party and its official representatives closely. All materials from Finnish were translated to English by the author. Several SML's members and representatives have been actively engaged in the activities of the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM). This is crucial for understanding the Blue and Black Movement—as demonstrated later. Regarding NRM, however, this article is limited to providing the context of the establishment of SML and its connections to NRM.

The Context: the Establishment of the Blue and Black Movement

The Blue and Black Movement was initially registered as an organization on December 29, 2020, and became an official political party first on June 16, 2022 then on May 28, 2025 again (“Sinimusta Liike merkitty,” 2022; Finnish Patent Registration Office n.d.). This political development did not occur in isolation but was rooted in the broader Finnish far-right landscape, drawing from various ideologically aligned groups. The name and symbols of the party are explicitly inspired by the anti-Communist, fascist Lapua Movement of the 1930s (Koskelainen & Hjelm,

¹ The information about the candidates and their names was derived from the official website of the organization: *SML Eduskuntavaalit 2023*: <https://sinimustaliike.fi/eduskuntavaalit2023/> (accessed 6.6.2024), *SML Eurovaaliehdokkaat*: <https://sinimustaliike.fi/eurovaaliehdokkaat/> (accessed 6.6.2024).

2017; “Etnisesti yhtenäistä Suomea,” 2021; Salojärvi et al., 2023). SML, therefore, has emerged as a reference to historical groups, but also as a convergence point for individuals previously active in several far-right projects and organizations.

Before the establishment of the Blue and Black Movement, the Finnish far-right scene was fragmented, composed of numerous groups operating independently. The so-called “refugee crisis” of 2015–2016 catalyzed the emergence of grassroots movements such as Close the Borders! (Fin. *Rajat kiinni!*), Finland First (Fin. *Suomi Ensín*), Soldiers of Odin, Finland’s People First (Fin. *Suomen Kansa Ensín*), and the Nationalists’ Alliance (Fin. *Kansallismielisten liittouma*). These groups were formed largely in response to what they perceived as the failures of the right-wing Finns Party (Fin. *Perussuomalaiset*), which was part of the governing coalition and, in the far-right’s view, partly responsible for the refugee influx. Following Jussi Halla-aho’s appointment as chairman, the Finns Party regained its position as the dominant right-wing party, attracting a new wave of members after an internal split. At the same time, the Nordic Resistance Movement was banned by Finnish authorities—as indicated earlier.

A pivotal moment in the founding of the Blue and Black Movement was the expulsion of the youth wing of the Finns Party (*PS-Nuoret*). While *PS-Nuoret* had long maintained a more radical stance than the parent party, its increasingly extreme rhetoric and racist statements led to its unprecedented expulsion. The immediate trigger was a tweet posted from the group’s official X (formerly Twitter) account, claiming that non-white individuals could never be considered Finnish (Harju, 2020). One of the organization’s co-chairs, Toni Jalonen—who would later become a leading figure in the Blue and Black Movement—attended the far-right *Etnofutur* conference in Tallinn, Estonia, in 2020, where he publicly identified himself as a fascist (Raitio-aho et al., 2020; Jalonen, 2022). While the exact reasons for the expulsion remain debated, it likely stemmed from the reputational harm *PS-Nuoret* posed to the main party. This is supported by Halla-aho’s statement to the press that the party would form a new youth wing and dissolve the old one (“Finns Party to sack,” 2020). The Blue and Black Movement was formally introduced during the Nationalists’ Alliance camp on October 24, 2020 (“Mikä on Sinimusta Liike,” 2022).

The organization’s choice of colors and symbolism is highly deliberate. Its use of blue and black references the Lapua Movement, a radical nationalist, fascist, anti-Communist, and pro-German political group active in Finland from 1929 to 1932 (Silvennoinen, 2015). The name *Sinimusta liike* (Blue and Black Movement) also directly invokes *Sinimustat* (The Blue and Blacks), a fascist youth organization active between 1930 and 1936. Initially affiliated with the Lapua Movement and later with the Patriotic People’s Movement (Fin. *Isänmaallinen Kansanliike*, IKL), the *Sinimustat* adopted many ideological elements from both Italian fascism and German Nazism (Uola, 1982: 292–313).

Today’s Blue and Black Movement clearly draws from these traditions. Male representatives frequently wear black shirts and dark blue ties in campaign imagery, reminiscent of the Italian Blackshirts (*Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale*), the paramilitary wing of the National Fascist Party. Additionally, the typography used in SML’s election materials strongly resembles *Fraktur*—a blackletter

script associated with Nazi Germany and still used by far-right groups in contemporary Europe to signal ideological alignment (Waldeck, 2018; “Fraktur,” 2020). Building on the aforementioned fascist and Nazi ideologies and symbolism, in 2023, SML further enhanced the symbolic elements of contemporary neo-Nazism. They nominated 88 candidates at the Finnish parliamentary elections (“Sinimusta Liike–Eduskuntavaalit,” 2023). The number 88 is a well-known right extremist numeric symbol. Its usage indicates a commitment to neo-Nazism and it has previously been categorized antisemitic (McGlashan, 2013: 304–305). Eight stands for the eighth letter of the alphabet “H,” 88 standing for “HH:” Heil Hitler. “88” gained popularity by the white supremacist, convicted felon, David Eden Lane’s “88 Precepts,” which “is a collection of maxims extolling a social Darwinian morality that exhorts whites to unashamedly promote their own interests” (Michael, 2009: 51).

Building on this visual and ideological identity, the Movement then turned its attention to attempting to secure official political status within the Finnish political scene. According to Finnish law, a political party must collect at least 5000 supporter signatures to be officially registered (“Puolueen perustaminen,” 2024). The Blue and Black Movement began its signature campaign on May 12, 2021—coinciding with the Day of Finnish Identity. While signature collection had traditionally required physical forms and mail, digital collection became available in 2021. The Movement ultimately gathered 5296 valid signatures within the one-year limit (“Kannattajakorttien loppusaldo,” 2022).

Upon submission of its application, the Ministry of Justice reviewed their party program and required significant amendments before registration could proceed. Specifically, eight of fifty pages were ordered to be removed. These pages included demands for an “ethnic registry of all Finnish citizens,” state-controlled media protected by a “cultural firewall” against subversive “Hollywood propaganda,” and the retroactive reconsideration of all citizenships granted after 1990 (“Sinimusta liike joutui,” 2021). The organization complied with these demands, and the party was officially registered on June 16, 2022. It went on to participate in the 2023 parliamentary elections while simultaneously claiming to oppose the Finnish political system.

In April 2024, the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland—acting on a request from the Ministry of Justice—revoked the Movement’s official party status. The court ruled that SML’s party program violated basic and human rights, as well as democratic principles (KHO 2024:63). Nonetheless, this was not the end of the Movement’s efforts. After collecting over 5000 new signatures, the organization sought party registration and was marked in the party register in the end of May, 2025. (“Openly fascist,” 2025; Finnish Patent Registration Office, n.d.)

Connections to the Nordic Resistance Movement

The relationship between the Blue and Black Movement (SML) and the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) can be described as closely intertwined—a connection noted in previous research as well (Kotonen, 2021: 190). The NRM, an openly National Socialist and extra-parliamentary organization, was established

in Finland in 2008 as part of a broader Nordic network originating in Sweden. This connection is especially relevant, as the NRM's ideology and antisemitism have been extensively discussed in prior studies (e.g., Haanshuus & Ihlebæk, 2021; Jørgensen, 2019; Löow, 2020; Skiple, 2023; Skjalm, 2020). Central to the NRM's platform are doctrines of National Socialism, overt antisemitism, and the glorification of a unified Nordic identity based on racial and cultural essentialism (Löow, 2020: 226).

Within Finland's fragmented and often contentious far-right scene, the NRM stood out for its strong ideological coherence and openly antisemitic rhetoric. In 2017, following a violent incident at an NRM demonstration that resulted in the death of an individual, Finnish authorities initiated proceedings to ban the organization. The District Court's decision to ban the group was upheld by the Court of Appeals in 2018 and finalized by the Supreme Court in 2020. Among the reasons cited in the ruling were the NRM's glorification of Adolf Hitler, denial of the Holocaust, and its slander of Holocaust survivors as liars (Kotonen & Sallamaa, 2020; KKO 2020:68). Notably, in June 2024, Sebastian Lämsä—a known NRM member—was convicted of attempted murder for stabbing a 12-year-old child with a foreign background. That same year, the United States officially designated the NRM as a terrorist organization (Aholuoto, 2024; Nieminen, 2024).

Throughout most of its existence, the NRM rejected parliamentarism, advocating revolution as the only legitimate path toward a National Socialist Finland and Scandinavia. However, this position began to soften somewhat as legal pressure mounted. In 2018, the group launched a political initiative titled *Kansan Yhtenäisyys* (Eng. "Folk's Unity"), presumably in part to circumvent the impending ban. This shift also mirrored developments in Sweden, where the NRM had contested parliamentary elections in 2018. Following the ban in Finland, the group attempted to continue under the name *Kohti Vapautta!* (Eng. Towards Freedom), but police launched an investigation into this apparent effort to operate under a new identity ("Poliisi epäilee," 2019). Afterward, the NRM ceased attempts to reorganize itself into a formal structure, and activists pursued more decentralized strategies.

The founding of the Blue and Black Movement in 2020 was widely expected to attract former NRM members, as the new organization embraced similar ideological frameworks. Although the precise number of activists who transitioned from the NRM to SML remains unknown—due to SML's policy of withholding membership lists—its chairman, Tuukka Kuru, previously confirmed that approximately 10–15 former NRM activists had joined the party, with around five of them participating as candidates in the 2023 elections ("Lakkautetun uusnatsijärjestön," 2023). Among these were the former NRM leader and another individual previously convicted for vandalizing a synagogue in Turku (Hiltunen & Koutonen, 2020; "Sinimustan liikkeen," 2023). In June 2024, the NRM was officially listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity.

While it is not possible to confirm that the entirety of the NRM's network was absorbed into the Blue and Black Movement, it is evident that they have actively endorsed National Socialist and antisemitic views. Furthermore, SML members frequently attend events and share content from remaining branches of the NRM

on social media, suggesting an ongoing ideological alignment and collaborative relationship between the two movements.

Depictions of Jews and Antisemitic Narratives

Overt expressions or antisemitism, coded antisemitic discourse, and tolerating antisemitic sentiments appear to be a rampant element of the organization's ideological drive, and as the later analysis will showcase, certain members of the Movement are more explicit when facing antisemitic content, while some of them rely on coded conspiratorial comments.

Even without examining the rhetoric used by the Blue and Black Movement's active members, it is evident that they are against combatting antisemitism. This is demonstrated in a statement on their website entitled "The Blue and Black Movement Opposes the EU's Strategy Against Antisemitism" (Fin. *Sinimusta Liike vastustaa EU:n antisemitismin vastaista strategiaa*). In this text ("Sinimusta liike vastustaa," 2021), the Movement draws upon several argumentative topoi to justify both its rejection of the EU strategy and broader political exclusion. These include the topos of threat, in which Jews are portrayed as endangering the Finnish nation; the topos of comparison, where the memory of the Holocaust is delegitimized through comparisons with perceived Finnish suffering; and the topos of excessive power, which accuses Jewish organizations of abusing their influence to shape EU policy. Overall, the statement undermines and delegitimizes international efforts to address antisemitism.

This discursive strategy of reframing or sidestepping the issue of antisemitism is echoed in the public statements of SML's leadership. In an interview with *Kirkko ja Kaupunki* (Eng. *Church and the City*), the magazine of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, the Movement's leader Tuukka Kuru notably avoided directly answering whether the party is antisemitic. Instead, he deflected the question by remarking that Martin Luther would be considered antisemitic and racist by today's standards (Haikala, 2021). Whether Kuru is aware or not is unclear, but Luther's anti-Jewish sentiments are well-documented in academic scholarship (e.g., Kaufmann, 2019; Rudnick, 2017). This rhetorical move reflects a broader pattern within the Movement's discourse: deflecting or relativizing antisemitism rather than confronting it directly.

In the following, several communications of the Movement and its representatives that can be identified as antisemitic will be presented, divided into the different categories of antisemitic sentiment. As Richardson and Wodak have previously pointed out, modern forms of antisemitism tend to mix and fuse religious, racial, and socio-economic forms of antisemitism together (Richardson & Wodak, 2022). These forms can be—and are—often present in antisemitic discourses at the same time, implying that the categories presented in the current text are not necessarily separable from each other.

The Portrayal of Jews as a Danger to White Identity

In far-right thinking, Jews should have never been admitted into society, and in far-right ideology and mentality, Jews are viewed as people pretending to be white (Hersh & Royden, 2023; Spencer, 2024). As Weiss has formulated in this worldview, Jews are “the ultimate betrayers of the white race” (Weiss, 2019: 68). The strategy is employed to exclude Jews from dominant national identities—in the current case, from “Finnishness.”

This strategy, as well as the ideas behind it, has been prevalent in the communications of the representatives of the Movement (e.g., Lähtimäki, 2024a; Mourujärvi, 2024a, b). “That is most likely a Jew pretending to be white, in order to spread anti-white propaganda.”—posted Taika Mourujärvi, a candidate of the 2023 parliamentary elections on X on March 29, 2024 (Mourujärvi, 2024b, Fig. 1.). The X post accumulates the core of chimeric antisemitism portraying Jews as deceptive outsiders who pretend to be white, echoing classic antisemitic conspiracy theories, relying on the topos of racial essentialism, framing Jews as a danger to white identity.

The perceived differences between Jews and non-Jews—and thus, the perceived reasons for the “un-Finnishness” of Jewish individuals—have also been spelled out in a presentation in 2019 by Tuukka Kuru (Suunta, 2019), in which he provides his listeners with an explanation on who are to be considered Finnish. This “lecture” is an example of how far-right populism incorporates antisemitic (and other xenophobic) ideas in its narrative, to create an imagined collectivity, from which Jewish (and other) subjects are excluded based on their genetic ancestry. In building this narrative, anational Jews serve as the clearly identifiable enemies of the nation. Kuru presents his arguments in a seemingly elaborate manner, presenting information derived both from scientific research and nonscientific sources, drawing conclusions such as “Finnish Jews are not Finnish.” In his explanation, the genetic origins of Jewish individuals are different from those who migrated to the territory of Finland thousands of years ago. In his interpretation of what this research indicates is that Swedish-speaking Finns, Finnish Tatars—among other groups—are not to be considered Finnish either. This type of communication has been discussed previously by scholars, dissecting the strategy of softening the up-front rhetoric that one could accuse of being, e.g., antisemitism, incitement, or hate speech by toning down symbols that are associated with traditional fascism (Wodak, 2015). With



Fig. 1 Mourujärvi's X post (Mourujärvi, 2024b)

this statement, Kuru draws on the topos of belonging and recontextualizes national histories by claiming that Finnishness and Jewishness are mutually exclusive. He positions Jews as foreign to the Finnish state. At the same time, he is engaging in what Krzyzanowski and Ledin (2017) call as “borderline discourse.” In these borderline cases, unmitigated racism is fused with “civil, quasi-academic and politically correct language” (Krzyzanowski, 2020: 505). In 2022, the organization started a citizens’ initiative (Fi. *kansalaisaloite*) to initiate the criminalization of disparagement of Finnishness (Kansalaisaloite.fi, 2022). On their website, they state that the “duty” of the Finnish legal system is to “not to protect the special rights of population groups that do not belong to our [their] nation.” From their perspective, “influential minority groups” such as Jews or Muslims enjoy extended protection in Finnish society. At the beginning of the text, the position on neither Jewish nor Muslim individuals belonging to the Finnish nation—according to them—is outlined (“Sinimusta liike kannattaa,” 2022). This approach has also been present among the representatives of the party in their individual communications (see, e.g. Lähtimäki, 2023). This ethno-nationalist idea expressed on many different channels thus is commonly understood as antisemitic, as it excludes the possibility of Jewish individuals being part of the Finnish nation; in fact, as demonstrated later, they are portrayed as a threat to national identity, embedding the topos of threat in the communication.

Kuru’s in a tweet in the autumn of 2020 reacted to a discussion about the legality of circumcision, saying “Actually, criminalizing Judaism sounds quite good!” (“Fascist party leader,” 2023). “Humor” has not been his only approach to share antisemitic sentiments on X (form. Twitter)—as indicated later. SML representatives also use sarcasm, memes, and cartoonish language to spread antisemitic messages under the guise of humor or irony—a tactic documented in broader studies of far-right communication (Wodak, 2015). Posts by representatives such as Mikko Lähtimäki and Aleksi Veikkola illustrate this method (Lähtimäki, 2024b, c; Veikkola, n.d.). However, these attempts at concealment often fail, as the underlying antisemitic content remains evident.

In one case in a tweet on Kuru asked his audience about whether the “atrophy” of the Jewish community would sound good (Kuru, 2024b). This was not the first time that the elimination of the Jewish people was suggested by the party’s representatives: Eero Molkoselkä, another candidate of the party in response to a tweet chain about the assault of MP Ben Zyskowitz, wrote: “Our racism is the deepest kind. The Jews are one nation which will be deported in blue and black Finland.” Kuru’s response to the tweet was that “it [the deportation of Jews] would not be a complete impossibility from the point of view of our [SML’s] politics” (Mantsinen, 2023). The logic is straightforward: Jews pose a threat, against which the “nation” must be defended. Neutralizing and eliminating the threat is therefore justified by the topos of threat, serving as a gateway to explicit antisemitic communication. Such explicit communication is demonstrated by another post on X of the previously mentioned Toni Jalonen, who also ran as a candidate of the Movement in the 2023 parliamentary election. In the spring of 2024, Jalonen, while responding to MP Atte Kaleva’s post in which he stated, that antisemitism is to be condemned (Kaleva, 2024). Kaleva, has been active in the discussions related to the war between Israel and Hamas. In his response to this post, Jalonen stated that “One nation cannot be

universally placed above all others, but it must also be possible to criticize it [this nation]. So, antisemitism from both the left and the right is ok.” (Jalonen, 2024a).

Any attempt to normalize overt or covert antisemitism, or to frame it as a legitimate form of political critique or free expression, serves not only to legitimize the prejudice but becomes an antisemitic act in itself.

Holocaust Distortion

Connected to the ideologies of Nazism and neo-Nazism is the distortion and denial of the Holocaust, which are forms of antisemitism among representatives of the extremist-right, as well as radical Islamist ideologies (Bauer, 2020). References to Holocaust denial and distortion can also be detected in the communications of SML’s representatives.

Holocaust denial and distortion are closely connected to each other, but are different (Bauer, 2020: 209). Holocaust denial may often only happen when those who express such statements are being accused. Holocaust distortion, as a rhetorical tactic that warps the known record of the Holocaust for deliberately political purposes—may it be intentional or unintentional (Parnell & Stuckey, 2023: 129). Notably, the degree of distortion may range: Holocaust distortion does not completely deny that the Holocaust took place. It may, however, rewrite the narrative of the annihilation of European Jewry, often by minimizing the role of the aggressors or the harm they have done. Trivialization of the Holocaust and its comparison with other genocides have previously been pointed out as antisemitic by scholarly work (e.g., Gerstenfeld, 2007a, b; Lipstadt, 1994). Currently, Holocaust denial and distortion are not criminalized in Finland—while a law to criminalize them is under preparation.

On October 8, one day after Hamas’ attack on Israel—Kuru posted on X, comparing contemporary political issues with the Holocaust, and trivializing its significance: “Relatively harsh statements about the Palestinians came from the mouth of the same group that thinks the Holocaust is an exceptional event in the history of mankind, for which all Europeans should feel guilty.” (Kuru, 2023b).

The sentence implicitly contrasts concern for the Holocaust with criticism of Israeli policy toward Palestinians, a rhetorical move that risks undermining Jewish historical suffering to score political points. Such “criticism” delegitimizes Holocaust remembrance and promotes resentment toward Jewish communities or institutions associated with that memory. In this way, the sentence reflects a form of antisemitism, even if it does not cross into explicit hate speech.

Later, when Jussi Halla-aho of the Finns Party—who previously referred to the Holocaust with the Finnish term “holo-hölinä,” (Eng. *holohoax*) (Suntinen, 2023)—stated when running at the presidential election of 2024 that “Every phenomenon, idea, religion should be criticized freely”—as tweeted on the Finns Party’s official X channel. The same day, Tuukka Kuru retweeted the party’s X post (Kuru, 2024a), and asked the question “Except the Holocaust?”—indicating his stance on whether the Holocaust is a debatable matter or not. Kuru’s response signals what Wodak

(2015) calls the macro-strategy of relativization: the comment raises the discussion about the Holocaust to a general level, reframing the specific antisemitic incidents that took place during the Holocaust.

These X posts are connected to Finnish political events of the spring of 2023: Petteri Orpo's government fell under heavy public criticism due to the fact that several of its current members—including ministers in his government—have been accused of spreading and supporting racist and antisemitic ideologies (“Finland to criminalise,” 2023). Proceeding this, the government initiated the development of equality, anti-racism, and antidiscrimination measures, which would also include the criminalization of Holocaust denial and distortion, as well as exploring the possibility of whether symbols of Nazism and communism would be possible (Valtioneuvosto, 2023). The official stance of SML on the criminalization of Holocaust denial in line with Kuru's insinuations, as follows:

“At the center of historical interpretation are reflections on whether something was unique or significant. When 80 years have already passed since the Holocaust, interpretations that do not consider it a unique or significant part of world history naturally start to become more common. Those who have built their own identity, politics or the story of their own ethnic group from the special position of the Holocaust are increasingly forced to silence opposing interpretations of history.” (“Holokaustia ei tule,” 2023)

By suggesting that interpretations which no longer view the Holocaust as unique or significant are naturally becoming more common, the text—similarly to Kuru's previously mentioned X post (Kuru, 2024a)—engages in Holocaust relativization via using classic antisemitic tropes of Jews exploiting victimhood and implying that Holocaust remembrance is an act of censorship, not education.

Kuru, however, has not been the only person affiliated with and supporting SML who expressed such remarks about the Holocaust. Eero Molkoselkä, candidate of the party in an X post stated “Israel has certainly found its Final Solution” (Fin. “Israel kyllä on löytänyt sen lopullisen ratkaisunsa”) (Molkoselkä, 2024). The phrase “Final Solution” is a direct and universally recognized reference to the Nazi regime's plan to exterminate the Jewish people during the Holocaust. By applying this term to Israel, the tweet draws a comparison between the State of Israel and the genocidal actions of Nazi Germany that led to the extermination of six million Jews. The rhetoric distorts the memory of the Holocaust, dehumanizes Israeli Jews, and promotes a narrative of moral equivalence between victims of genocide and their descendants, drawing on the topos of historical analogy. The statement weaponizes the Holocaust to demonize a state closely tied to Jewish identity. As such, it is a prime example of how predication and topoi interact in antisemitic discourse to construct moral inversions and justify hostility toward Jews or the Jewish state. Similarly to the above quoted X posts, this text also diminishes and downplays the historical significance of the Holocaust, its atrocities and the suffering of its victims in the name of free speech, by indicating that “opposing interpretations of history” in this case would be possible.

Conspiratory Thinking

At the root of antisemitic ideologies lies the belief that Jews are hidden forces of manipulation and power in global politics, economic, cultural, and social systems and—according to Karl Popper who coined and explained the term “conspiracy theory of society” also large catastrophes, like war—of the world (Popper, 2006; Popper & Gombrich, 2020). These ideas may attach themselves to Jews as individuals or communities, to Zionism as an ideology, or to the State of Israel as a geopolitical entity. These narratives offer simplistic explanations for complex social changes, often targeting Jewish people as the cause of globalization, multiculturalism, or national decline (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Rensmann, 2011; Lipstadt, 2019).

Conspiracy theories can be defined as “attempts to explain the ultimate cause of an event (usually one that is political or social) as a secret plot by a covert alliance of influential individuals and organizations, rather than as an over activity of natural occurrence” (Douglas & Sutton, 2008: 211). Some researchers view conspiracies as phenomena that allow people to come to terms with their powerlessness, or as means for less powerful individuals to imagine themselves in a position of being in possession of secret information (Douglas & Sutton, 2008: 211).

Conspiratory allegations towards and about Jews have been present in anti-Jewish sentiments throughout history, while they shifted and changed over time: from accusations of killing Jesus to those of ritual murder, to Jews spreading certain diseases—including leprosy and then later, Covid-19—and of Jews taking over the world economy and finances, or “ruling the world.” Conspiracies respond to the disruptions caused by economic and cultural globalization by framing them as the result of a conspiracy involving unaccountable globalist elites and the immigrants and cultural minorities they are said to support, guide, and finance (see, e.g., Rensmann, 2011; Roepert, 2022; Richardson & Wodak, 2022). Negative attitudes towards diversity, globalization, and migration thus lead to the scapegoating of the Jews (Lipstadt, 2019; Weiss, 2019). The antisemitic tropes applied in both ends of the political spectrum seem to share the vocabulary of Soviet antizionist antisemitism on the far-left and the far-right alike. It has previously been shown that the word “Zionist” is often used as a synonym for the word “Jew” in antisemitic attacks on world Jewry. This term has generally become a main code word for Jews in antisemitic discourses, blurring the boundaries between overt and covert antisemitism—helping in avoiding legal prosecution (Rensmann, 2011).

Propagating ideas about Jewish entities wielding disproportionate power over global affairs have been especially present in the communications of the party when talking about the “Jewish world order” (Lähtimäki, 2023), to the European Union as an entity that opens the path to “Jewish hybrid influencing” (Eurovaaliohjelman, 2024), and of other conspiracies of similar nature (see, e.g., Hokkanen, 2023; Kuru, 2023a, 2024c). In March 2023, Lauri Hokkanen—who previously referred to SML as a “fascist party” that wishes to “normalize fascism” (“Lauri Hokkasen puhe,” 2023) responded to an X post of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) with the following post: “When someone talks about warmongers, communists, globalists, or



Fig. 2 Hokkanen's X post (Hokkanen, 2023)

those who hate the country they live in, the Jew gets nervous.'Are they talking about me?' Clatter & yelp." (Hokkanen, 2023; Fig. 2).

The post is an example of inferred self-recognition, suggesting that Jews feel accused not due to being described with antisemitic topoi, but because the insinuations about them—according to the author of the post—are true.

A further example of using such references in non-online environments is the *Suomi Herää!* (Eng. *Wake-up Finland!*) march in 2023, attended by individuals linked to the SML and other far-right groups, such as Soldiers of Odin. The march is already known for its participants attending while showcasing Nazi and extreme right symbols in 2022—which was already pointed out by the Finnish press (Happonen et al., 2022). Speakers referenced “Ashkenazi Jewish oligarchs,” the “Great Replacement,” and individuals with “strange hats” (an apparent reference to *kippot*), all of which drew applause from the not especially large audience. These narratives follow classic antisemitic patterns of depicting Jews as orchestrating demographic change through immigration—a core component of the “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory (Ekman, 2022; Herf, 2023). Believers of the “theory” think that there is an intentional effort, led by Jews, to promote mass non-white immigration, interracial marriage, and other efforts that would lead to the extinction of whites (Ekman, 2022). The Great Replacement is not a recent conspiracy theory. It originates in Nazi Germany, where the concept of *Umwolknung* first referred to the assimilation of the German people (the Volk) to forget about their culture and heritage. “Umwolknung” has reemerged as a conspiratorial narrative in contemporary far-right discourse, suggesting that the “white European populations” are being intentionally replaced—via the deeds of Jewish actors. This conspiracy was famously promoted at the 2017 “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville when white supremacists chanted, “Jews will not replace us” (Herf, 2023: 175). In Finland, it is actively promoted by the representatives of SML (see, e.g., Kuru, 2023a; Mourujärvi 2023a, b) as well.

A later text, from 2024 “In Blue and Black Finland Women's Day is Not Celebrated” (Fin. *Sinimustassa Suomessa ei juhlita naistenpäivää*) in addition to the dehumanizing rhetoric, the women whom the article is written about (Theresa Malkiel, Clara Zetkin, and Rosa Luxemburg) are presented with classic antisemitic tropes, referring to them as foreign, disloyal and destructive agents of chaos. The text argues that Jewish women weakened Western civilization,

reviving ideas of racial betrayal and referring to tools of Nazi propaganda (“Sinimusta Suomessa ei juhli” 2024). The narratives feature conspiratorial tropes of Jewish subversion, manipulation, and cultural control. A similar narrative is presented at another article written about the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) (“ADL ulos,” 2024). The text claims that the ADL is operating to advance Jewish and Israeli interests, while applying global influence and limiting free speech, the media, and the laws. In addition, the text links Jewish religious advocacy to a broader scope of manipulation, when mentioning the Finnish reference, the Jewish Community of Helsinki saying that “ADL even congratulated the Jewish Community of Helsinki for their work in preserving the legality of kosher slaughter.” The text frames the work of ADL as the proof of global manipulation, in which Jewish institutions impose foreign values onto national cultures, reinforcing the idea of Jewish dominance. In this realm, it is not particularly surprising that the statements lead to conspiratorial incitement.

These repeated conspiracies essentially serve to unify and mobilize the base of those who believe them by offering simplistic explanations for complex societal and economic issues, simply by identifying a common enemy (the Jews). Similar ideas have also been repeated at the *Awakening III* “conference” in April 2024—where various international speakers discussed them in their presentations. The conference was broadcast on the X of the rightist podcast/talk show Monokulttuuri FM (Monokulttuuri FM, n.d.), whose X feed is also infiltrated by antisemitic and conspiracist posts. The event was attended by members of SML, such as Kuru himself, and has been reposted by other representatives on X (see, e.g., Ojala, 2024).

Israel-Related Antisemitism

Perhaps somewhat unsurprisingly, Israel-related antisemitism has also been rather frequent within the communications of SML, already before 7 October 2023. Such antisemitism was present in various articles on SML’s website, attributing various conspiracies, predicating the pattern in which Israel is not only depicted as the powerful, manipulative other, but also as a state that is in direct opposition to Finnish interests. Already in early 2022, the Movement was demanding sanctioning Israel (“Sinimusta Liike vaatii,” 2022). The text lists various criticisms towards the policies of the Israeli government, referring to the settlements, or the treatment of the Palestinians. The text, however, strategically conflates Israel with Jews, referring to “Jewish communities” and the “Jewish people.” This strategy instrumentalizes the conflict in Israel-Palestine to normalize antisemitic rhetoric. Following the terrorist organization Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, far-right extremist movements around the world appeared to exploit the ensuing war to normalize xenophobic, antisemitic, and anti-Muslim rhetoric.

One week after the attack, they published a text “Jewish Supremacy is the Common Enemy of All” (Fin. *Juutalainen ylivalta on kaikkien yhteinen vihollinen*). It begins by portraying Israel’s response as an example of weakness and hypocrisy. As previously indicated, antisemitism on the far-right often draws selectively from

broad political discourses, manipulating them to reinforce conspiratorial narratives. In this case, the piece implies that Israel, depicted as the true aggressor, manipulates global sympathy through false narratives of Jewish suffering while downplaying or ignoring Palestinian casualties. The Hamas attack is described as a form of “legitimate resistance.”

The article uses phrases such as “the ruthless expansion of Jewish power” (Fin. *juutalaisvallan häikäilemätöntä laajentumista*), “manipulation attempts” (Fin. *manipulointiyritykset*), and “Jewish supremacy” (Fin. *juutalainen ylivalta*) to frame Jews and Israel as manipulative, dishonest, and power-hungry. It further claims that Jews conceal their true racial identity and position them as enemies of white Europeans. The piece ends with a sarcastic suggestion that Jews should apply the same diversity principles they allegedly promote in Europe by opening Israel’s borders to Muslim refugees (“Juutalainen ylivalta,” 2023). Ironically, the Movement condemns instrumentalization when it comes from those whom they disagree with. As such, they condemn the Hungarian governing party’s Fidesz’ adoption of a pro-Israeli stance:

“Today, Orbán often uses rhetoric typical of the radical right because it enjoys broad support in Hungarian society. At the same time, Fidesz has built a strong alliance with the Israeli Likud party (its sister party), which serves as a political shield when Fidesz is accused of being far-right. Hungary is a prime example of a country where the words and actions of pseudo-patriotic rulers do not align—making genuine nationalist politics difficult.” (“Unkarin kansallismielinen,” 2023).

The Movement’s homepage is not the only platform where Israel-related antisemitism is expressed. At the 2023 *Suomi Herää* event, for instance, Werner Toivonen—a recurring speaker at Blue and Black Movement-affiliated events and author of the book *National Socialism—The Environmental Protection Ideology* (Fin. *Kansallissosialismi – Luonnonsuojeluvaate*)—delivered a speech that further exemplified such discourse. Through nomination and predication strategies, Toivonen framed Israel as a “criminal state,” whose “head is in the distant desert,” yet whose invasive “tentacles reach all the way here to the North.” In this construction, “the North” symbolically represents the in-group of “white Finns,” while Jews and Zionists are cast as the threatening out-group. Particularly alarming is Toivonen’s declaration: “There is only one remedy left for Zionism and that is the merciless sword!” (“Werner Toivosen puhe,” 2023). This explicit incitement to violence equates Zionism with the Jewish people as a whole, thereby encouraging violent actions and perpetuating deeply rooted antisemitic tropes.

Such rhetoric is echoed in the Movement’s formal communications. In a statement (“Sinimusta Liike vaatii,” 2024), published on its website, the Movement demands recognition of a Palestinian state—not out of support for Palestinian rights, but as part of an anti-immigration agenda rooted in conspiratorial thinking. The statement reads:

“The continuation of the war will inevitably lead to a great wave of migration; displaced Palestinians will move to Europe in masses, and due to our loose

immigration policy, we will let them in. This is also what Israel wants, because then the Palestinians would no longer be their problem. Our party naturally wants to minimize immigration to Finland, therefore, a quick end to the war is also in our interest.” (“Sinimusta Liike vaatii,” 2024)

This passage illustrates how the Movement instrumentalizes the war to stoke nationalist sentiment, presenting migration as a geopolitical threat allegedly orchestrated by Israel. Such framing not only simplifies a complex international conflict but also aligns it with the Movement’s ideological goals while reinforcing antisemitic conspiracies.

This strategic exploitation of the Israel-Palestine conflict is also evident in other communications. During the Eurovision Song Contest 2024, protests against Israel’s participation erupted in Malmö, Sweden, with antisemitic slogans and threats directed at the Israeli contestant and Jewish individuals. In response, Toni Jalonen posted on X that “as a Nazi”—in his own words—he would vote for Israel’s Eurovision act (Jalonen, 2024b, c). His posts about voting during the Contest were not gestures of solidarity but calculated moves grounded in accelerationism: a far-right strategy aimed at intensifying societal division and instability (Walther & McCoy, 2021).

Accelerationism often appears in conspiracy-driven contexts, particularly those claiming white Europeans are under threat due to immigration and multiculturalism. Jalonen explicitly framed his message as an effort to escalate the conflict and chaos in Malmö. This demonstrates the manipulative and inflammatory approaches embraced by some representatives of SML.

Conclusions

Drawing on Ruth Wodak’s approach of defining and identifying antisemitic content (Wodak, 2015) through a discourse historical approach (DHA) (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) this contribution analyzed and showcased a range of materials—including public speeches, social media posts, and statements—produced by the Blue and Black Movement and its representatives between 2020 and June 2024, focusing on the antisemitic rhetoric embedded in the communications of the Movement and its representatives.

Despite its short history, SML exhibits ideological continuity with historical fascist and National Socialist traditions in its rhetoric about Jews and Jewish identity. The Movement’s close affiliations with the Nordic Resistance Movement further reinforce its political alignment and increase its potential for radicalization and political violence. As this analysis points out, antisemitism is not a marginal element within the Blue and Black Movement. In their communication, Jews are not only named as a group but also are assigned stereotypical traits through which antisemitism and antisemitic sentiments are legitimized.

Previous research (e.g., Engel & Wodak, 2013; Wodak, 2015) has noted that antisemitic rhetoric can be both overt and covert, often context-dependent, and embedded within broader discursive strategies. It can present itself through conspiratorial

views and presenting Jews as though they pretended to be white (Weiss, 2019), as scapegoats, through old antisemitic stereotypes, Holocaust denial, distortion, or trivialization (see, e.g., Engel & Wodak, 2013; Wodak, 2015) or when referring to actions of the State of Israel (see, e.g., Herf, 2023; Hirsh, 2018; Lipstadt, 2019)—often at the same time. Such representations of antisemitic sentiments can also be observed in the communication of SML. The use of traditional antisemitic stereotypes, specific framing techniques, and historical intertextual references in the discourse of the Movement proves that language is employed to assign stereotypical traits to Jewish individuals and groups. The Movement operationalizes antisemitism across various discursive registers, from overt to more covert allusions and even academicized pseudoscience. Its representatives deploy antisemitic topoi to delegitimize Jewish identity, reinterpret history, and frame Jewish individuals and institutions as existential threats to the Finnish nation.

The evidence presented in this analysis demonstrates that antisemitism is not a marginal or incidental feature of the Blue and Black Movement's discourse—it is a central ideological pillar that manifests across their rhetoric, symbolism, and (political) actions. The analysis identified a recurring pattern of antisemitic discourse expressed through ethnic exclusion, Holocaust distortion, and trivialization, intertwined with conspiratorial narratives. From pseudo-scientific definitions of national identity, through calling for the “atrophy” of Jews, to Holocaust distortion to conspiracy theories about Jewish global control, the Movement systematically recycles antisemitic tropes in both overt and coded forms. This rhetoric is not only consistent with fascist traditions but also is strategically adapted to contemporary media environments, as well as fitted for contemporary discussions related to, e.g., questions concerning the State of Israel.

These narratives are mobilized not only to marginalize Jewish communities but also to legitimize broader far-right objectives, including ethnic nationalism, historical revisionism, and societal polarization. The normalization of such rhetoric by SML representatives, particularly in connection with current political and geopolitical events, highlights the urgent need for critical inquiry.

These examples show that the Movement is rearticulating historical antisemitism to fit modern political agendas. This carries the potential of dangerous consequences for democratic values and minority rights. While other forms of antisemitism seem to emerge and become increasingly prevalent in Finnish society in all ends of the political spectrum, the longevity of far-right antisemitism should not be overlooked. Increase in antisemitic sentiments, especially in the form of conspiracies, may lead to loss of trust in scientific experts, media, politicians, and governmental authorities—undermining the legitimacy of certain institutions, leading to polarization and radicalization. It is, therefore, important to carry out further scientific research on the various factors that may potentially contribute to this polarization, to defend democratic societies and their citizens.

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Declarations

Ethics approval The research was carried out according to the ethical guidelines of the Finnish National Board on Research Integrity, as well as the guidelines of the Research Integrity Advisers and the Board for Research Ethics at Åbo Akademi University.

Conflict of interest The author declares no competing interests.

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