Stickers of Hate

Analysis of Antisemitism at the University of Coimbra

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Abstract

This autoethnographic study explores manifestations of antisemitism on a European university campus, focusing on personal experiences as an Israeli Jewish student at the University of Coimbra. Drawing from firsthand observations, documented incidents, and interactions with protesters, administrative officials, and peers, the research highlights how hate-laden stickers, verbal threats, and institutional inaction shape a hostile academic climate. By weaving together personal narrative and scholarly frameworks on hate speech, higher education policies, and antisemitism, the study reveals a troubling dissonance between the university's stated commitment to inclusivity and its inadequate responses to overt acts of discrimination.

Through detailed descriptions of unfolding events—from the initial appearance of incendiary slogans to meetings with administrators—the analysis illuminates how deeply entrenched biases can circumvent legal and procedural safeguards. In reflecting on emotional responses and the complexities of positionality, the autoethnographic lens underscores the human impact of hostile environments and the gaps in institutional support. The findings urge higher education stakeholders to reevaluate their protocols for handling hate speech and discrimination, calling for comprehensive measures that protect vulnerable groups and encourage critical engagement with contentious geopolitical issues. This work ultimately argues that acknowledging and actively combating antisemitism in academic settings is crucial for fostering genuine inclusivity and upholding the values of open, respectful scholarship.

Introduction

Antisemitism has long been a pervasive form of prejudice, adapting to historical and geopolitical contexts to manifest in new and insidious ways. The war that erupted on October 7, 2023 between Israel and Hamas has not only reignited longstanding tensions in the Middle East but has also amplified antisemitic rhetoric and hate speech globally. This surge is evident in physical and digital spaces, where narratives of blame, conspiracy, and demonization have proliferated. Universities, as microcosms of societal dynamics, are not immune to this wave of hostility.

At the University of Coimbra, antisemitic stickers began appearing on campus in the months following the outbreak of the conflict. These stickers, anonymous in their creation but deliberate in their messaging, range from historical antisemitic tropes to explicit calls for political action against Israeli, "Zionist" and Jewish communities. Their placement in high-visibility areas within an academic setting raises pressing questions about their intent, impact, and the cultural environment that allowed their dissemination

The relationship between conflict and antisemitism is well-documented in the literature. Periods of war and political unrest often catalyze an increase in hate speech, particularly against Jewish communities, as observed during previous Middle Eastern conflicts.² Physical media, such as posters and stickers, serve as effective tools of propaganda, weaponizing public spaces to normalize hate and spread divisive ideologies.³ However, the specific intersection of these dynamics within Portuguese academic institutions in modern times remains unexplored.

This study adopts a dual autoethnographic-case study approach to analyze this phenomenon, drawing on the researcher's personal documentation of over 350 antisemitic stickers photographed on campus and discussions with students and faculty. By integrating personal narrative with visual analysis, the research aims to uncover the narratives embedded in these stickers, the sociopolitical forces driving their creation, and their implications for the university community.

Through this lens, the study situates the University of Coimbra within a broader discourse on the resurgence of antisemitism during the ongoing 2023-2024 conflict. It aims to contribute to the understanding of how global events shape localized expressions of hate speech and inform strategies for fostering safer and more inclusive academic environments.

Definitions

In order to be able to discuss about Antisemitism and Zionism, we first have to define those terms.

The most used definition of antisemitism is the one provided by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), and is given as follows: "Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities." This definition called the "working definition of antisemitism" was accepted by the U.S. Department of State and the European Parliament, and includes eleven additional examples of antisemitism. Among those examples are some related to the special status of Israel as a Jewish state:

- "Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.";

- "Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.";
- "Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation."
- "Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis."
- "Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis."
- "Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel."

Those examples were criticized over the years and spawned various new attempts to define antisemitism, such as the Nexus Document (ND) and the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA), none of which are yet internationally recognized or legally binding. Within the ND, one of the given examples of antisemitism is "Characterizing Israel as being part of a sinister world conspiracy of Jewish control of the media, economy, government or other financial, cultural or societal institutions". That embedded example probably stems from countless previous attempts to assert the hypothetical dominance of Jews over the media, among them Nazi-era propaganda and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. For the purposes of this research, the internationally recognized IHRA definition will be used, but the ND and JDA definitions will be periodically consulted as two major contesting frameworks.

The definition of Zionism is somewhat easier to make than that of Antisemitism. While the latter can be hidden and take many forms, making an agreed-upon definition much harder to come by, Zionism can be defined straight from the source, Dr. Nathan Birnbaum, who coined the term that was later incorporated in the first Zionist movement. According to Birnbaum, Zionism is "the national movement for the return of the Jewish people to their homeland and the resumption of Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel." It includes the idea that Jews should have a country for themselves, where they can exercise their right for self determination. During the current war there have been many attempts to reshape and change the definition, sometimes for political motives to the purposes of our paper we'll use the original term coined by the original author.

Researcher context

The researcher is a Jewish-Israeli individual studying at the University of Coimbra both before and during the currently active war. He has firsthand encountered both verbal and physical assault within university grounds based on his Israeli identity. As one of the only Israelis studying at the institution, and one of the only Jews, the researcher has a vastly different perspective and grew in a completely different environment than the majority of his peers. The researcher's unique background may offer key insights into how the situation is perceived among Jews and Israelis—insights that cannot be found elsewhere within the institution—and may form a reasonable basis for an autoethnographic study.

Methods

The study includes three main segments:

The first is the personal narrative from the eyes of the researcher. It includes detailed reports and accounts of his own experience, thoughts and emotions, which are the bread and butter of autoethnographic approaches. It also includes interactions with various groups including protesters, faculty, colleagues and the Portuguese authorities. The second segment contains an analysis of stickers found in and around the university campus. Each sticker was photographed, categorized and labeled. The gathering of the stickers occurred at different times, and they were filtered to remove duplicates. Initially, the gathering was not intended for research purposes but for mere documentation; as such, it was not standardized—pictures deviate in quality, and gathering times were not consistent. Due to the constantly shifting nature of the geopolitical situation we are unable to redo the gathering of past data, as it simply does not exist. New stickers are still showing up at the time of writing, but we are unable to standardize them with past stickers. These constraints limit the conclusions that can be drawn regarding the frequency of the stickers, and limit the accuracy of overall city-wide sticker figures. During the majority of the trips that occurred all of the stickers relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were photographed, without skipping any no matter the sentiment or content, meaning that the ratio of sticker types may still be a viable ballpark figure. The trips were at random times of the day and week, offering the advantage of more data, yet less consistency. Overall, the data does accurately offer minimum counts and occurrences, and the majority of the conclusions may remain largely the same, as the purpose of the study is to shed light on this underreported phenomenon more than to quantitatively analyze the figures with extreme accuracy.

The third segment contains reflection on the personal narrative and attempts to combine it with the sticker analysis in order to criticize or approve how accurately the narrative fits reality and the raw data. New conclusions may then be drawn, which will promote better data-backed reflexivity, and hopefully eliminate some of the inherent subjective bias that exists within autoethnographic research.

Personal Narrative

Introduction: The Day Everything Changed

On October 7, 2023, at 6:29 AM, sirens sounded across Israel. Within minutes, we knew that 8,500 rockets had been launched toward Israeli cities—2,500 to 6,500 of them in the first twenty minutes alone. As they rained down on civilian areas, a wave of 6,000 militants from Gaza breached the border at over a hundred different points, murdering anyone they encountered—children, the elderly, men, and women. Some were burnt alive; others were beheaded, and still others taken hostage to the tunnels under Gaza. In a matter of hours, the country erupted into chaos. I remember the immediate fear I felt for friends and family living all across the country. A few of my colleagues lost their lives that day, and the war that broke out quickly became the bloodiest in Israel's history.

From Shock to Division

When the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)—like most armies in wartime—entered Gaza, public opinion splintered. In some corners of both the East and the West, people said the IDF was doing what was necessary. Others claimed Israel was committing genocide. It took barely two days after the largest massacre in Israel's history for some to demand Israel halt the counter-offensive, accusing the country of "war crimes" against Palestinians.

This was not new to me. Being Israeli—and Jewish—I've come to expect such rhetoric. Ever since childhood, when I learned to fear buses because of suicide bombings, I've noticed how quickly any action by Israel triggers immediate calls of 'atrocities' and 'war crimes'. My mother rarely let me take public transportation. She would say, 'Better to be safe than sorry,' and I grew up internalizing that sense of vigilance. Meanwhile, Palestinians under the governance of Hamas in Gaza—considered a resistance organization by some—were not bound by international treaties. Hamas built tunnels under hospitals, hid weapons in UN facilities, mosques, even children's bedrooms, and educated the youth through armed militiamen. They committed heinous crimes that never seemed to stop. After all, the Geneva Conventions require ratification, and terror organizations simply did not get the memo.

Arriving at the University of Coimbra

I came back to Coimbra University in Portugal sometime after the initial outbreak of violence. By November 2023, the campus canteens were filled with students chanting anti-Israel slogans through megaphones. At first, I was too overwhelmed by worrying about friends and family back home to fully register the hostility. Little did I know that just a few months later, I would be on the frontlines of an entirely different type of conflict—this one waged through protests, stickers, and words rather than rockets. I

found it surreal to go from air raid sirens in Israel to strolling by ancient buildings in Coimbra. It is an unexplainably calming feeling, yet one of fear and despair.

First Encounter with a Protester

By December 2023, after attending multiple citywide demonstrations, I approached a protester around my own age. I asked why she was protesting, how she envisioned a geopolitical resolution, and what she thought of the Palestinian situation. She spoke at length about the "genocidal intentions" of the Israeli army and the checkpoints in the West Bank and Gaza.

Yet none of my IDF friends—ordinary people who are software developers, doctors, or cooks—wake up each day plotting to kill Palestinians. For them, entering Gaza was a duty born of necessity, a last resort to protect family, friends, and the hostages taken by Hamas. When I asked her specifically where these checkpoints were located, she insisted they existed in cities like Ramallah, monitoring ordinary civilians. In reality, there are no such checkpoints inside Ramallah¹⁵; Hebron and East Jerusalem are exceptions because they share borders with Israeli settlements. Feeling confused, I asked how she thought Israel should handle the hostage crisis. She immediately wanted to know where I was from. Sensing risk, I answered, "The United States." Her response came swiftly: "Oh, so you support the IOF ['Israeli Occupation Forces'], which means you support killing children. Don't talk to me anymore." I was left speechless. It was the first of many times that I was labeled as a child-killer by a woman I've never met before. Instead of a person seeking dialogue, I realized she saw me as a monster.

Stickers of Hate

Around May 2024, I began noticing a sudden proliferation of stickers across campus and around the city. The first ones I saw were "Jesus was Palestinian," "Cats are cute, Zionists aren't," "Israel is an evil creation," "The chosen people like to kill babies," "Eurovision supports genocide," and "A holocaust doesn't justify another." Almost none of these messages had any semblance of promoting peace or coexistence. Instead, they mocked or vilified Israelis and Jews, suggesting Jews "like killing babies" and accusing us of using our own Holocaust as a twisted justification for another.

As I walked by these stickers, I felt a mix of anger, sadness, and even fear. I struggled to reconcile the university's and Portugal's reputation for tolerance with the hate plastered so openly on its walls.

At the same time, a group set up an encampment outside the Faculty of Letters, chanting for "intifada"—the same violent movement whose suicide bombers threatened my childhood. In another bizarre twist, they yelled at Israel to "keep your hands off Yemen," despite Israel having little to do with that conflict.

One day, a protester who recognized me from my earlier conversation approached, accused me of supporting the killing of babies, and then said my family deserved a "second Holocaust." Horrified, I filed a complaint with the university. Initially, they refused to let me submit it to the Livro de Reclamações (a legally required complaints book), but after I threatened litigation, they scheduled a meeting.

Meeting the University Officials

Sitting across from university administrators, I felt their primary focus was legal liability mitigation rather than addressing the pervasive hate speech. They told me that threats of a "second Holocaust", calls for "intifada" and claims that "Jews enjoy killing babies" were "just a figure of speech" and that the university provided space for free expression. They claimed they lacked "legal jurisdiction" over the protesters on the faculty's steps, and they doubted anyone would act on these threats because "in Portugal they're not like the French." They also questioned whether these protesters were even students and said that there's nothing they can do.

Each explanation felt like a dismissal, as if my fears were trivial. Picture after picture, the officials stated that hate speech against Israelis, Jews, or "Zionists" was legal, and every incident was dismissed as isolated. When the meeting ended, they offered me psychological help, and suggested to "avoid those parts of campus for my own safety." I remember leaving the meeting with a sense of betrayal, as though my own sense of security was less important than avoiding legal liability. A 91-page report from Columbia University mirrored this experience, noting that Jewish students dealing with antisemitism are often encouraged to simply learn to cope. ¹⁶

Further Confrontations

Later that same day, I confronted the protesters again. They recognized me from when I had filmed their "intifada" chants and scolded me for videotaping, claiming it "made them feel insecure". The stark contrast between their professed concern for their own safety while publicly advocating for violence was perplexing and piqued my curiosity. A sign they hung on a nearby statue claimed Coimbra University "funds Israel with €520m worth of armaments" (a figure considerably higher than the university's total income in 2022¹⁷); yet, when I asked them for specifics, one protester turned to her friend and asked, "Why are we protesting?". Bewildered, I chose to continue the discussion.

We spoke briefly about Hamas—some claimed the group barely existed or was too small to matter—while one individual asserted, "The Jews are also responsible for their own Holocaust because they helped the Nazis in death camps. Now they're doing it again." Others chanted "From the river to the sea," without seeming to know which river they were referring to. It was bizarre. Eventually, I was kicked out of the encampment amid accusations that I supported child-killing.

It stunned me how easily facts and historical nuance were ignored or twisted to fit their narrative. The conversation left me feeling both furious and helpless. I also began to get used to the prevailing sentiment: whenever I supported Israel, regardless of the specific action, I would be instantly accused of advocating for the death of children and subsequently kicked out.

Escalation of Violence and Indifference

By July, the stickers had become more explicitly violent, declaring "Zionists should carry a certificate to prove they're humans," or labeling Israelis as "lice," "parasites," and "bed bugs." People began physically shoving me, flipping me off, and shouting "Free Palestine!" Israeli tourists around the university felt uneasy, especially after the Israeli Embassy issued a Level-2 travel warning advising them not to display Jewish or Israeli symbols publicly.¹⁸

A group of Israeli visitors was even assaulted outside the Faculty of Mathematics. ¹⁹ The embassy wrote directly to the rector of the university, expressing alarm at the growing antisemitic climate. ²⁰ Despite this, in the dormitories, I was told I was a "fake Jew who shouldn't sleep at night," and a professor told me I didn't deserve to sleep after showing a film that seemed to praise the intifada. Repeated attempts to report these incidents to the police were dismissed as "free speech."

I felt my sense of safety eroding day by day. Each slur, each sticker, each shove chipped away at my hope that I could find a respectful, open-minded community in Coimbra

Institutional Dead Ends

Although an attorney advised me that such statements were illegal under Portuguese law, the public prosecutor demanded €120 to investigate, a sum I could not pay. Even filing a police report for physical assault, I learned, costs money.




Figure 1: Emails stating I will cause problems to the university if I pursue litigation

University officials wrote to me, warning I might "cause problems" for the institution if I persisted with the complaints. They disapproved of my refusal to seek psychological help. Over time, I filed about 32 separate complaints against the university, receiving only two identical template responses stating that the university "does not encourage discrimination". Others who filed complaints received the same templated response. I additionally filed two complaints to the Ombudsman of the state of Portugal and Ministry of Education which received no response. The last complaint to the European Union for breaking the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and European Anti-Terror laws has started an inquiry and is currently being investigated.

The Grand Assembly and the Media

At the university's grand assembly, where students decide on major issues, they voted to boycott Israeli academic institutions to "promote peace," ignoring calls to address Hamas or UN-run schools where militants operated. The students seemingly believed peace could be achieved by severing these ties. Five Nobel Peace Prize winners and over a century of conflict negotiations have not resolved the situation, but Coimbra's students apparently concluded that one-sided boycotts were the solution.

I chose to speak up, sharing photos of some of the stickers and describing the harassment I'd faced. I compared the slogans to the antisemitic atmosphere preceding World War II, prompting a journalist in attendance to write an article about my

experiences.²¹ When the media questioned university officials, they minimized the events and falsely claimed I was receiving psychological support.

Reading their denial felt like yet another blow. It painted me as a fragile student being 'handled,' rather than someone calling out a serious issue of hate speech.

Unresolved Tensions

Today, over a year since the initial campus protests, the hateful stickers continue to reappear on university walls. The environment has not improved: Israelis and Jews still feel unsafe, neo-Nazism is gaining traction at the university, local authorities remain largely unresponsive, and the university has done little to counter these messages—choosing to label them as a figure of speech. My own experience has evolved from shock and fear to a kind of resigned vigilance, though I still hope for a day when such open and blatant antisemitism will no longer be met with indifference.




Figure 2: Medical students and others still stand at the Faculty of Letters a year later while sharing neo-Nazi content.

(left) "The satanic and filthy Jews have the capacity to buy everything but they can never buy a human spirit", Coimbra resident saluting to Hitler.

(middle) Hitler was right about Jews

(right) Same protesters sharing that media outside the faculty.

Despite it all, I haven't lost faith in the power of dialogue or the potential for real academic inquiry. Maybe by sharing this narrative, I can illuminate the pervasiveness of antisemitic rhetoric—and remind others that it does real harm to real people.

Final Thoughts

This personal narrative does more than recount a series of events; it highlights how a world conflict reverberates on university campuses far from the epicenter, sparking hate speech, misinformation, and institutional inertia. As an autoethnographic account, it offers insight into lived experiences and personal reflections, illustrating

how deeply political turmoil can affect even the most ostensibly secure and progressive of academic settings.

Data analysis

Data Preparation

A total of 405 pictures were categorized manually. Upon inspection, I found that relevant graffiti had also been captured and chose to include it in the dataset. Images of other items such as flyers given or simple Palestine flags were removed, as they are either too hard to categorize (with flyers containing a large amount of text) or too simple to be relevant (such as the case of a simple flag on the university buildings). Each image was assigned a unique ID at random and duplicates were removed. In the case where a single image contained multiple stickers, a new ID was assigned for each sticker following a period (.) to identify the sticker (i.e. 'image_id.sticker'). Objective columns of data were then extracted: text within the sticker; image date taken directly from the camera's EXIF; Rough location, validated using camera GPS coordinates; Boolean column stating whether or not the image is a screenshot (as some of the images were social media screenshots of stickers); Boolean column of whether or not an image contained a drawing; Simple drawing description (e.g sticks, flowers, watermelon);

Semi-objective columns were then extracted:

- Boolean whether the image was captured within the university campus. I have found images within Polo I and Polo II, both inside and outside buildings. The area of jurisdiction and what entails "university campus" is hard to distinguish, as some areas are legally defined as public places. A sticker on a building may or may not be legally defined as part of the university. I have chosen to include all images geofenced within 200 meters of the entrance of a university building as "within university campus".
- Boolean column stating whether or not the picture has any Christian elements.
 Some stickers contained references to Jesus or Mary, and as part of the exploration I chose to categorize them accordingly.

Data exploration

Upon exploring the data, several categories appeared relevant. The most relevant categories applicable to the research are whether a sticker is "Antisemitic according to the article's definition" and whether it "may constitute hate speech according to Article 240 [of the Portuguese penal code]". Both of these have legal implications and

a careful examination may confirm or deny the researcher's personal narrative, offering a good opportunity for reflexive insights.

Analyzing whether or not a sticker is anti-semitic is a hard question to solve. Strictly adhering to the original definition of Zionism and the working definition of antisemitism helps lessen the burden but does not solve all cases. Some cases were more clear and cut: "All Zionists are bastards" is very likely anti-semitic according to those definitions. Zionism is the movement that encourages Jews to have a country where they can self-determine. Calling all of those who believe that idea "bastards" may likely be seen as "denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination." Also, as the majority of Jews worldwide are Zionist²², calling the majority of Jews "bastards" within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is "holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel". A Zionist Jew may agree or oppose the Israeli actions taken during the war, but nevertheless he will be classified as a "bastard". He may lean towards the left, center or right, adhere to principles of exclusion or coexistence with the Palestinian population, but will be labeled the same. As that statement may conform to the direct examples given by the working definition and ratified by the EU, that statement is categorized within the research as anti-semitic.

Other cases are harder to categorize, and for those cases a remarks section was added, briefly explaining why the certain given image was classified as anti-semitic. The most common explanation, appearing in 22 images, was "double standards." Applying double standards is anti-semitic according to the working definition. An example for double standards can be seen with the sticker stating "Their arms [bombs], our arms [hug]". Implying that only Israel has bombs, while the Palestinains are hugging, denies the thousands of rockets launched from the Gaza envelope this year alone.²³ It denies the existence of tens of thousands of Palestinian militants who are operating daily within the Gaza envelope, including those who participated in the October 7th massacres, and the active war that ensued for over a year by the time of the research. Unlike the Jews in the Holocaust - which is given as a comparison in many of the stickers - the Palestinians have their own elected government running the Gaza strip and access to heavy weaponry including RPGs, missiles including ground-to-ground and ground-to-air, and over 500 km of tunnels used for offensive and defensive purposes.²⁴ Militants from Gaza have injured thousands of Israeli soldiers and civilians alike, destroyed several tanks and are keeping hostages to this very day.

Categorizing whether or not a sticker is hate-speech according to article 240 of the penal code is also not an easy task. The penal code states that "anyone who founds or establishes an organization or carries out propaganda activities that incite or encourage discrimination, hatred or violence against a person or group of people on the basis of their ethnic-racial origin, national or religious origin, color, nationality, ancestry, territory of origin, religion, language, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression or sexual characteristics, physical or mental disability shall be punished

with imprisonment from one to eight years." Some cases such as "Israelis are the monsters their grandparents warned them about" satisfy this criteria unequivocally, as it directly states that Israelis - a nationality - are monsters. The problem arises when statements against "Zionists" are made. Strictly speaking, Zionism is not within any of the categories mentioned in Article 240. It is protected from discrimination as a political belief, per article 14 of the European Convention on Human rights. Hate speech against Zionism may also constitute hate speech according to the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, defining hate speech against a group based on "other identity factor". Both the former and the latter are not the Portuguese penal code and so cannot be used for literal, strict constructionism-esque, interpretation of the penal code. However, in a large number of cases Zionism was intentionally misused in order to refer to Jews or Israelis as a group. This is where a certain loophole in the penal code is found, and where I, as a researcher, subjectively oppose a literal interpretation of the code. There are three merits from which I draw that conclusion - logical, moral and historical.



Figure 3: Social media post by an author of the stickers

Logically, the law does not account for cases of indirect propaganda. Theoretically, a person can state in court that the word "faggot", although used as a derogatory term for homosexuals, does not strictly refer to that population, therefore any sticker using that term does not count as hate speech by law. The same can be said for many other terms including "nigger" and other abusive nicknames. Recently, cases of "zionist" being used as a derogatory term have risen, and accumulated to the extent that the largest social media platform in the world - Facebook - has decided to ban the term when used in a context similar to the stickers. Meta further stated, explicitly, that "zionists" is being used as a proxy for hate speech against Jews and Israelis. In our particular context within Coimbra University, one of the authors of the stickers has, in fact, purposefully abused that term in what appears to be a deliberate manner. As an example, they have chosen to use an old antisemitic trope that "Jews control the media", crossed the word "Jews" and wrote "Zionists" above it, as shown in figure 3.

Crossing a term and using a derogatory analog above it can thus be a way to circumvent any hate speech claims - effectively rendering the law useless. Alternatively, writing "All Jews are Zionists" on a sticker, and then "All Zionists are bastards" below it, would easily circumvent a strict interpretation of the law, as the first sticker does not include hate, while the second does not include a group mentioned in Article 240.

Morally, as the majority of worldwide Jews are Zionists, allowing hate speech against "Zionists" would be practically equivalent to allowing hate speech against the majority of Jews in the world. Quoting UNESCO, "Hate speech not only causes harm at the personal level and can incite violence, it is an attack on inclusion, diversity and human rights. It undermines social cohesion and erodes shared values, setting back peace, stability, sustainable development and the fulfillment of human rights for all."²⁹ The same ideas form the basis for the majority of laws against hate speech, including the Portuguese. ³⁰ As stated earlier in the paper, violence and antisemitic attacks have risen after every Israeli-Palestinian open conflict, including the current one. Also, as stated earlier, propaganda has been used as an effective tool, particularly against Jews, in order to incite violence. Allowing hate speech to affect the majority of Jewish population in Portugal, with all of its inherent risks and implications, is precisely what article 240 was meant to prevent.

Historically, the term Zionist was used as a replacement for the word Jews on multiple occasions in order to avoid perceived backlash, and the conflict itself has plenty of anti-semitism intertwined. Even before the foundation of the country, Arab militias used the term "Itbach Al-Yahud" (Slaughter the Jews) as part of a battle cry against the Jewish population living in Israel. Worldwide antisemitism played a significant role in the founding of the country itself and the ensuing waves of Jewish immigration. 32 The founder of Hamas - the major factor within the current conflict has originally coined the term Khaybar, Khaybar Ya Yehud, jaysh Muḥammad Sawf Ya'ud ("Khaybar, Khaybar, Oh Jews, the army of Muḥammad will return"), and used it during the first intifada to gather the crowds.³³ The 1988 covenant of Hamas included a large amount of antisemitic tropes, presented the Jews as a hidden source of evil on earth, and directly called for all Muslims to kill the Jews.³⁴ Within the covenant, Hamas used the term Zionists and Jews interchangeably. Lately, in 2017, Hamas has chosen to update the covenant, removing the words referring to Jews, and replacing them all with Zionists, keeping many of the original anti-semitic statements. 35 While it still uses "Al Yahud" ("the Jews") in order to rally the troops before attacks, it uses the term Zionist more frequently in text. According to Miller, they do so in order to "demonstrate a softer edge in the eyes of the international community and, presumably, to make Hamas more attractive and fundable". 36 The direct anti-semitism within the original covenant has generated a significant backlash, and by changing the words referring Jews to Zionists, Hamas has garnered more support. In our context, both the local and global shift away from the word "Jews" to the word "Zionists" echoes the same similar sentiment as the one given by Hamas.

Using the word Zionist instead of Jew in order to prevent backlash, is a tactic employed by Hamas and presumably by the authors of the stickers. It can further be noted that some of the authors actively support Hamas, as indicated by drawings containing the typical green headbands and the multiple proclaims of Yahya Sinwar as a hero.

These three reasons affected my decision as a researcher to interpret hate speech against "Zionists" as hate speech according to Article 240.

Further exploration - subjective categories

A few more categories, subjective in nature, have been added while exploring the data - all of them being boolean fields. "Anti Israel sentiment?", "Anti-Zionist sentiment?" accounting for negative sentiments towards the country or the zionist ideology (e.g. "Fuck Israel", "Zionists are bullies"). "Pro-Palestine sentiment? - a positive sentiment towards Palestine or their view of the Palestinian cause (e.g. "Free Palestine", "Gaza my love", "Viva la Resistance"). "Includes insults?" subjective measurements of the use of swear words (e.g. "coward", "fuck", "maniacs"). "Calling for Israel to be destroyed?" (e.g. "Gnomes should exist, Israel shouldn't", "Israel is a fake state from hell"). "Supports Hamas?" (e.g. "Sinwar was a Hero", "Long live the resistance" - sometimes with green headband drawings) "Dehumanization?" where "Zionists" or "Israelis" were treated as sub-human or inhuman beings (e.g. "Know your parasites - dog tick, wood tick, Luna Tick (with flag of Israel)", "Stay hydrated and drink zionist's tears"). While these categories are entirely subjective, they may offer some interesting insights—both about me, as a subject within an autoethnographic research, and about sticker ratios and overall sentiment.

Data results

Out of 405 total images, 46 were taken within the campus. In total, 29% (118/405) were antisemitic according to the article's definition, and 13% (54/405) may constitute hate speech according to Article 240. Of these two groups, 17 were within Coimbra University's campus. Of the total images taken within the campus, 37% (17/46) were either antisemitic, constituted hate speech, or both. 35% (143/405) contain anti-israel sentiment, out of them 23% (33/143) directly call for Israel's destruction. 9% (37/405) were anti-zionist. 24% (97/405) contained insults, with 6 not being anti-zionist, anti-semitic or anti-Israel - e.g. "Imagine being stupid enough to believe genocide is self defense". The majority of the insults (59/97) did not constitute hate speech according to article 240 as they were mostly directed at Israel as a country, not because they did not include hate. Fourteen stickers met the subjective criteria of dehumanizing. Of the 39% (157/405) that contained pro-Palestinian sentiment, 49% (77/157) contained statements endorsing Hamas. In total 20% (83/405) of all stickers directly endorsed Hamas or Yahya Sinwar. 45% (184/405) contained drawing of any kind, and 4 contained christian sentiment.




Figure 4: Chart summarizing the image count per category out of 405 total images.

It is also interesting to note what is absent from the stickers: there were no stickers (0/405) containing the word peace, or the CND peace symbol (\oplus). No stickers were found calling for a two state solution, only stickers endorsing Israel to be destroyed. None of the stickers were found siding with the Israeli side (pro-Israel), and no stickers were found which were anti-Palestinian.

Discussion

I think the most interesting data point was the absence of the word peace. Supposedly, the student general assembly has taken measures and called upon the academic institution to cut ties with Israeli counterparts in order to promote peace. No sticker showed any peace sentiment, but several did show calls to completely eliminate one of the sides. As calls to eliminate contradict any peace process, it is safe to assume that the authors of the stickers do not wish for peace. Moreover, 49% of the pro-Palestinian stickers contained endorsements or explicit support for Hamas and its late military wing leader Yahya Sinwar, with the former being a designated terror organization and the latter an explicit terrorist according to two distinct European Council rulings. 38

It is highly troubling that stickers containing support for EU-designated terror organizations are attached to, and placed within the vicinity of, university buildings for such a long period. It is also troubling that this is not only the prevailing sentiment on the walls around the city of Coimbra but also the only sentiment that exists within the data, collected over 10 months. It is therefore not only an issue at the university

level, but a city-wide phenomena containing hate, explicit calls for destruction, and support for terrorism against EU rulings. Having the walls of the city painted with sentiment endorsing terrorism, dehumanization and constant hate speech, shows a lack of action by authorities including the municipality and the police, as some of these clearly violate article 240 of the Portuguese penal code, and violate article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, allowing Jews and Israeli nationals to live freely without discrimination on European soil. Acts such as calling terrorist individuals heroes and encouraging armed resistance may further violate Law 52/2003 on Combating Terrorism (Rev. 9 Law 2/2023, 16/01), Article 4 p. 3 which include "whoever, defending, praising, encouraging or appealing to the practice of terrorist offences, by any means distributes or disseminates a message to the public that incites the practice of terrorist offences", and p. 8 which addresses a "reward or commendation" for those committing terror acts. ³⁹

It should, however, be noted that only two of the stickers were found inside university buildings, and neither directly supports terrorism. While they contained the statement "from the river to the sea", a controversial statement that may be seen as calling for the destruction of Israel and banned within some European countries such as Germany, they do not directly contradict Article 240.

The data also contained some controversial flyers that were given in the lines to the canteen, and pictures of individuals who have entered four different canteens on different occasions with a flag and megaphone, chanting anti-Israel statements. That data was not included as part of the analysis as the focus of the research was on the more prevalent stickers and graffiti.

The smaller number of stickers on the university campus compared to the rest of the city probably originates from three main causes: total area (as the total area of the city is significantly larger than the university campus, and the sticker counts are not normalized according to area or density measurements); fewer collection trips - as more collection trips were done at the city center out of convenience, and significantly less were done at the university campus; and an extra careful assessment of the university campus area - stickers that were not clearly located, whether due to the image lacking a visible point of reference or a lack of GPS tagging, were not indicated as part of the university campus. Stickers were found, however, at the entrance of and directly on university buildings in all of the collection trips made to the area. Permanent graffiti is still visible on buildings such as the blue canteen, and stickers can be found on both Polo I and Polo II campuses.



Figure 5: Department of informatics in Polo II. Circled in red - half a dozen stickers attached all across the wall of the department.

The existence of stickers within the Polo II compound, some attached to the entrances of buildings like CISUC (Centre for Informatics and Systems of the University of Coimbra) and DEI (Department of Informatics Engineering), contradicts a claim by university officials that the issue is confined only to the humanities sections of the university. Stickers are found around natural sciences, computer science and engineering faculties. No collection trips were made to Polo III containing the faculties of medicine and economics, as they are located further away from city center. Despite two collection trips made on purpose, no stickers were found on the way between Polo I and Polo II - an aerial distance of roughly 2.5 km - indicating that the stickers are more confined to the city center and the campuses of the university. It may also be a factor of population density or a choice of the authors to place it in higher visibility areas. Stickers were found around the university stadium and its canteens, showing that they are prevalent on both sides of the river dividing the city.

The last data point, showing no pro-Israeli or any critical views at all, may indicate a very grim picture. It may show that no pro-Israelis exist on campus or anyone with a critical view of the sticker sentiments do not publicly announce it using graffiti, stickers or flyers. It may also show however that the freedom of speech is not created equally. Combining the statement from the personal narrative section, where university officials have explicitly directed me to stay away from certain areas of the university for my own safety; the statement from the Israeli embassy warning the university of antisemitic hate crimes within the perimeters; the assault of Israelis outside the faculty of mathematics for showing the Israeli flag; together with the sticker data showing the inability to enter some university buildings nor walk around campus without encountering hate messages based on my nationality or belief, may lead to a conclusion of active discrimination imposed by the university. Researching the law on the subject leads to Article 43 in the Portuguese constitution guaranteeing the freedom to learn and teach; Title II Article 14 in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights guaranteeing the same right to education. Both are bound by Council Directive

2000/78/EC par. 11,12 and the EU CFR Title III Article 21: "Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited." Altogether, the data indicates that whether due to Zionism as a belief or political opinion, Judaism as a religion, or Israeli as a nationality, individuals are unsafe and are explicitly told to stay away from the university—which may act in direct violation of EU law.

Ironically, using the argument of "free speech," the protesters, authors of the stickers, and university officials de facto silence all other viewpoints, preventing all forms of speech contrary to their standing.

Specific sticker analysis

Some stickers and other material shared seem to have drawn on historical antisemitic motives which for us, as Jews, deserve special attention. Figure 3 has already shown one of them, claiming that the Jews (or "Zionists") control 90% of the media. That antisemitic trope is frequently attributed to have started in 1905, with the introduction of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. According to Boym, it then caused some of the bloodiest years and pogroms within Russia. Similar statements of world domination were later employed by the Nazi regime. Figure 6 shows a comparison of the material now and then. Years later, within the 1988 covenant, Hamas used the same sentiment - comparing the Jews and Zionists to an evil world-dominating cult. Direct comparison can also be made to the neo-Nazi content shared by Coimbra students as shown in Figure 2.



Figure 6: Direct comparison of material spread between 2024 Coimbra University students, stickers found within the university campus and 1938 Nazi propaganda

Some stickers request the "Zionists" to walk around with a certificate to prove they're human. Throughout different periods in history, Jews were required to wear or carry a special accessory to differentiate them from the population, and mark them as an outsider. The practice began during the early Muslim conquests in the 7th century, when non-Muslims had to wear a distinctive mark. In the 8th century, the Muslim caliphate ordered Jews to wear a badge shaped like a monkey. By the middle ages, Jews in France, England and Prussia were required to wear a distinctive badge in

different periods and times. Nowadays, the most known badge for Jews is probably the Yellow Badge required by the Nazis. Figure 7 demonstrates how the requirement set by the sticker looks like from a Jewish perspective that was ingrained for over 1200 years.



Figure 7: Comparison of the requirement requested by a sticker in Coimbra in 2024, and the Yellow Badge employed by the Nazis during the Holocaust.

Blood libels accused Jews throughout the centuries of using christian babies' blood in order to bake bread. The claimed ulterior motives and ensuing stories have changed repeatedly. In figure 8 the sticker claims that we, "the chosen people" (a nickname for Jews and Israelites taken from the bible) like to kill babies. It proclaims a false sense of enjoyment, as if Jews truly enjoy killing babies. The usage of the nickname "the chosen people" is probably meant to mock and further escape legal repercussions. On social media, claims are further enhanced to include stealing, raping, and more.



Figure 8: (left) A sticker claiming Jews like to kill babies, found next to the academic services.

(middle) Six stickers, one claiming that Jews are bombing babies. In the background - the Faculty of Chemistry.

(right) Blood libels shared by protesters on social media.

The comparison of Jews to parasites, insects and other subhuman was frequently used in Nazi propaganda. Figure 9 offers a direct comparison.



Figure 9: (left) 2024 Coimbra stickers comparing Israelis to ticks and parasites. (right) 1942 Nazi propaganda in Polish comparing Jews to lice and parasites

More stickers show different types of abuse, some mocking the Israelis - fathers, mothers and children - who lost lives in the October 7th massacre. Other stickers compare all Israelis to the Nazis or tell people to stay away from us.



Figure 10: (top-left) sticker claiming we're all bullies and telling others to stay safe. (top-middle) an individual sitting outside the Faculty of Chemistry, drawing stickers mocking victims of the attacks and telling others to drink their tears.

(top-right) a sticker claiming all Israelis are Nazi monsters.

(bottom-row) "Every Zionist is a danger to all", "Israeli Tourists Fuck Off... Zionists are worse than the Nazis", "Zionists are not welcome" stickers spread around the university.

(bottom-right) "No Jews Wanted" sign in WWII.

In the last part of the discussion section, I have touched on the subject of free speech, and have given an additional hypothesis, that pro-Israeli views may be silenced. No pro-Israel sentiment was found throughout the study and the stickers all but coerce a pro-Palestinian point of view. Figure 11 shows that according to the stickers, there is no legitimacy for other opinions within the academic community of Coimbra. The argument of free speech is paradoxically used once again in favor of those who actively silence free speech. Individuals who have differing opinions will lose their friends, community, and be subject to ridicule, abuse and hatred.



Figure 11: Stickers labeling those with the opposing view as "stupid" and "psychopaths".

Finally, according to the screenshots, stickers spreading hate and containing direct Hamas symbols are sold commercially on the main street of the university campus. The "stick" symbol in figure 12 has appeared in many of the stickers (64/405) that were drawn after Yahya Sinwar's death, where he used a stick to try and take down a drone, and symbolizes his "resistance".







Figure 12: (top-left) stickers containing the green Hamas headband and Yahyah Sinwar's "stick" being shown outside the faculty of Physics.

(top-right) typical Hamas outfit.

(bottom) Anti-Terrorism Law 52/2003 is not enforced. Signs praising Hezbollah, Nasrallah, Hamas and Sinwar, EU designated terror and criminal organizations and individuals, are hung in the streets of Coimbra.

The ones selling the stickers are the same individuals walking around the university campus, with some of the funds supposedly transferred to Palestinian families through crowdfunding sites such as GoFundMe and chuffed. While a commendable effort in principle, these crowdfunding campaigns, in general, help raise millions of dollars for families in Gaza to get smuggled across the Egyptian border, with the black market profiteering from these activities. 44 Unfortunately, GoFundMe has been recently accused by several Palestinian families that the funds never reached their intended target and in other cases the funds completely disappeared. 45




Figure 13: Hate stickers being sold commercially.

Making matters worse, the sticker authors have stated that they support Hamas, Hezbollah, Yahya Sinwar, Nasrallah, and other acts of terror, and are directly promoting them via social media and the aforementioned stickers spread around campus. Some of the groups promoted by students are reportedly responsible for drug trafficking and suicide bombings on European soil. 46 Additional ones like Hamas kidnapped and massacred, among others, dozens of Israeli-Portuguese citizens - an act which the students seem to encourage. 47 I thus cast reasonable doubt on the due diligence taken by the authors to ensure that the funds raised within Coimbra University are not unintentionally used for illicit activities, an outcome that multiple agencies globally warned against. 48 Hamas and PFLP has raised funds using pro-Palestinian advocates within universities precisely that way before, setting up sham charities and crowdfunding campaigns all over Europe, in order to bypass US and EU sanctions. The last of which, Samidoun, has also operated within Spain and Portugal. 49

Reflexivity & Limitations

Throughout this autoethnographic study, I have occupied three intersecting roles: a researcher seeking to document and analyze campus antisemitism, a participant who directly experienced hate speech and microaggressions, and a community member with personal connections to the larger geopolitical conflict. These overlapping identities have influenced both the data gathering process and the subsequent interpretation of findings.

Researcher perspective

In many ways, I am an insider to the phenomena described. I experienced firsthand the hostility expressed through antisemitic stickers, verbal threats, and protests within the university environment. This intimate involvement enriched the study by granting me direct access to events, conversations, and emotions that might remain hidden to an external observer. It allowed me to recognize subtle cues—such as specific language, references to cultural symbols, and social dynamics—often overlooked by people who are outside the Jewish or Israeli community.

Multiple examples may come to mind. Searching for the meaning of the word "intifada" for instance, shows uprising or rebellion. The majority of participants shouting it on campus have never been through the intifada. The professor on campus encouraging the "intifada" did not have to ride buses while dozens were exploding in the vicinity. They do not understand the effects and toll suicide bombings take on a daily basis. For them, as they claim, it is just an uprising; for me, it is a constant state of fear for over 4 years, where I as a child may be targeted simply because I'm Jewish and live on the other side of the border.

However, being an insider also carries the risk of confirmation bias: a tendency to interpret hostile or ambiguous messages as antisemitic, given my heightened sensitivity. While I believe I'm generally less susceptible to that issue, as I tend to think critically and verify my own accords as part of my personality traits, I have attempted to mitigate this further by triangulating my experiences with documentary evidence (e.g., photographs, eyewitness accounts) and by drawing on external sources such as human rights reports, news articles, and legal statutes.

Emotional engagement as a participant

My emotional engagement with the events is both a strength and a potential limitation. Writing about antisemitic harassment has, at times, evoked intense feelings of anger and frustration. These emotions can prompt greater depth in the data—fostering a richer account of lived experiences—but they can also render objectivity more challenging.

I took two steps in order to reduce the emotional bias. First, I frequently asked for the opinions of others. Peer reviews of this research helps offset emotional bias. I have also utilized LLMs such as ChatGPT in order to try and get a different perspective by positioning the LLM as a reviewer. Second, I took breaks quite often. If I felt too engaged, I took a break while writing in order to reflect on my emotions. That offered the opportunity to return in a more calm and rational manner, sometimes rewriting the areas that I found problematic.

The inclusion of these emotional responses within the personal narrative underscores the reality of enduring constant hostility in one's academic environment. It follows the autoethnographic principle that the researcher's emotional world is itself valid data. That way I may provide a fuller, more authentic account of the lived experience of campus antisemitism.

A note on nationality

This tension between global narratives and local experiences has demanded careful introspection. I acknowledge that some readers may view my background—an Israeli Jewish individual—as a source of bias, potentially discounting my interpretations as partial or self-serving. However, by integrating transparent self-reflection and systematically documenting evidence, I aim to ensure that my analysis remains rigorous.

University officials' refusal to handle antisemitism complaints for example was echoed in a large number of academic communities around the world.⁵¹ Documenting cases and comparing them to global phenomena allows me to further tackle obstacles visible only to me, individually and locally, as an Israeli.

Furthermore, I was not in any position of privilege. On the contrary, while in the global conversation Israel is frequently portrayed as powerful, I found myself in a distinctly vulnerable position within the university context. I navigated administrative resistance, social ostracism, and recurring hate speech that undermined any perceived privilege.

Broader insights

Reflecting on my personal story in light of the data I gathered, I see this narrative not simply as an individual account of antisemitism, but rather a story within a larger scope of institutional dynamics, historical biases and socio-political tensions.

My account aligns with many others, some shared earlier, yet brings the first documented perspective I have found within Portugal in general and Coimbra University in particular.

A major goal of this research was to raise awareness about: antisemitic discourse, disinformation, potential law violations, institutional inaction, and the feelings of a minority group within the Portuguese academic space. The sticker analysis eventually verified, validated and exposed the problem at hand. While conducting the research I was constantly worried that I might be wrong, but the data is hard to ignore. Having this additional data - backed account can help validate the feelings of so many others around the world suffering the same hatred I have encountered on a daily basis. It is my hope that by documenting both my subjective experiences and the steps I have taken to critically reflect on them, this dual autoethnographic - case study work will resonate with scholars, policy-makers, and peers who share a vision for safer, more inclusive academic spaces.

Conclusion

The experiences documented in this autoethnographic study reveal the complexities of addressing antisemitism in academic settings, where institutional policies and cultural attitudes often collide. As seen through the events at the University of Coimbra, the presence of hate-filled stickers, verbal assaults, and administrative inertia underscores how systemic and deeply rooted such bias can be. Despite repeated efforts to bring these incidents to light—through official complaints, engagement with the media, and direct conversations with both protesters and university officials—meaningful change remained elusive.

These findings align with existing research on campus antisemitism and hate speech, highlighting the frequent disconnect between institutional rhetoric on inclusivity and the lived reality of those targeted. The narratives of dismissive or downplayed reactions from authorities illustrate the challenges in seeking redress, including legal, procedural, and cultural barriers. Nonetheless, by situating these personal stories within broader historical and contemporary frameworks, this work underscores that

antisemitism is not merely an isolated or outdated prejudice, but one that continues to adapt and manifest in new contexts.

Furthermore, the reflexivity section demonstrates how personal identity and emotional engagement can both deepen and complicate research. By acknowledging my intertwined roles as a participant, observer, and advocate, I have endeavored to offer an honest reflection of the toll such hostility exacts on one's academic and personal life. An autoethnographic lens not only heightens our understanding of antisemitism but also illuminates the multifaceted ways individuals respond to—and resist—intimidation.

Ultimately, this account calls for a re-examination of institutional policies and pedagogical practices aimed at safeguarding all students. Whether through enhanced reporting mechanisms, open dialogues, or greater transparency in governance, universities bear responsibility for fostering truly inclusive environments. In sharing this personal narrative, I hope to spark renewed urgency in confronting antisemitism on campus and beyond, urging stakeholders across the academic spectrum to move from acknowledgment to tangible, lasting change.

Disclaimers

The author of the paper has used LLMs for grammatical and stylistic advice. LLMs were also used as described in the Reflexivity section to advise or act as a more neutral "reviewer" and to attempt to reduce inherent autoethnographic emotional bias. None of the data or findings were generated, in particular personal narrative accounts, sticker data or analysis.

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