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EDAH AND 'ETHNIC GROUP' IN ISRAEL

Ernest Krausz

THE aim of this paper is to clarify the concept of *edah* (plural, *edot*) which appears transliterated from the Hebrew in many English-language publications. The term edah is generally used to refer to a sub-division of the Jewish population of Israel, in particular in the context of the division between Oriental and Western Jews. The specific question which arises is whether this concept is synonymous with that of 'ethnic group', as many sociologists, mostly Israeli, have declared or implied.[1] If edah is defined in terms of ethnicity, that will have important consequences for the analysis of Jewish inter-group relations. Such a use raises a further question: what concept and terminology are to be adopted in the case of relations between Jews and non-Jewish groups in Israel — mainly Arab and Druze?

There can be no doubt that the division between Arabs and Jews is an ethnic division. The difficulty is about the exact meaning of the concept of edah and the right term for it in English; for it is this word that has always been used to describe the internal divisions of the Jewish population in Israel. My approach is, therefore, onomasiological,[2] since I start out with the concept of edah and analyse it in relation to the much better known concept of 'ethnic group', with the final aim of determining the most appropriate English-language term for this concept of edah.

The background

In usual parlance, edah means 'community' or 'congregation'[3] and as Ben-Rafael says, 'the very notion of edah . . . belongs to the universe of traditional community concepts'.[4] To understand clearly the current use and meaning of this concept, we must consider briefly its historical roots and the more recent social, political, and administrative processes in the lives of the edot (recent here means the period after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948). The dispersion of Jewish communities in the Middle East and Europe led during the Middle Ages to the development of two distinct culture complexes: the

Ashkenazi and the Sephardi. The former emanated from a centre in northern France and Germany, the latter from Spain and Portugal; and each complex had its own separate community organizations and its own religious and social usages.

The Ashkenazi cultural legacy spread to Poland and Lithuania and to most parts of central and eastern Europe, and eventually to the new Jewish communities outside Europe, such as the United States. The Sephardi culture established itself mainly in the Mediterranean countries, although after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain and Portugal, at the end of the fifteenth century, it also spread to northern Europe, especially Holland and England, and eventually beyond Europe to the Americas. Of course, there was a good deal of Jewish population movement between the areas dominated by these two culture complexes, as a result of which Sephardi and Ashkenazi communities often lived side by side. This was true also of Palestine, where they established distinct sets of institutions, a division which was given clearest expression in the two separate Chief Rabbinates which came into existence early in this century and which have endured until this very day.

Perhaps most important, from the point of view of this paper, is the fact that as a result of the Arab conquest of Spain in 711 C.E., politically and linguistically the Jews of Spain were put in touch with the centre of Jewish life in Babylonia-Iraq (which carried on its own tradition). So, although strictly speaking only the Ladino-speaking communities around the Mediterranean (mainly in Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, as well as in Bulgaria and in Egypt and North Africa) were Sephardi, a link was forged between them and some of the Oriental Jewish communities. Moreover, many of the latter came to identify themselves with the Sephardim, to such an extent that during the British Mandate all non-Ashkenazi 'Oriental' communities in Palestine affiliated themselves with the Sephardi rabbinical authorities.[5] This created a semantic confusion about the term 'Sephardi' and the Jews who came to Israel from Middle Eastern countries and from North Africa, the eastern edot, are therefore now generally referred to as 'Oriental communities'. They occupy mainly a lower and disadvantaged socio-economic position in Israel; and many Sephardi leaders and communities in Europe and America have in recent years championed their cause. It will be right, therefore, when drawing our conclusion as to the modern meaning of edah, to remember the link between the Sephardi and the Oriental Jews, and their separateness from the Ashkenazi communities. However, it must be noted that the Sephardi communities of Ladino-speaking Jews generally kept themselves apart from Arabic-speaking Jews. On the other hand, there occurred over the centuries a certain amount of admixture, especially in Morocco.[6]

The mass immigration immediately after the establishment of the State brought to Israel large distinct Jewish communities, transplanted almost *in toto* from their countries of origin. The largest of the non-European communities were from Morocco, Iraq, and the Yemen. The Moroccans, in common with some other North African and Middle Eastern (especially Egyptian) communities, were partly of Sephardi origin. However, except for some of the Sephardi Jews from Europe, most of those from North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Indian, Bokharan, and Persian Jews, came to occupy the lower end of the socio-economic scale; they developed an economically and politically dependent role (that is, a patron-client relationship) *vis-à-vis* the veteran European Ashkenazim, who were in the great majority until the period of mass immigration and who remained the dominant group. It was in that context that the label of edah was first attached to the Oriental Jews; and the term assumed a social-stratificational connotation. In the subsequent debate concerning the relationship between European and Oriental Jews, the concept of edah came to be applied also to various European communities, especially when the ideal of a melting-down of all the edot into one unified nation and culture was being promoted. In that sense, edah was assuming more of a cultural connotation.

These two connotations (the cultural and the stratificational) expressed facets of the division into edot, a division which was reinforced by the adoption of certain categories for statistical and administrative purposes. Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics states: 'The standard breakdowns used are Asia–Africa, Europe–America, and Israel, with Israel classified according to place of origin: that is, Israel born with parent from Asia–Africa, from Europe–America or from Israel'.[7] Two main criteria were used to arrive at such categories: country or continent of birth; and continent of origin. For instance, in the case of the registration of brides and grooms: 'From 1952 until 1965 the distribution was based on origin: for those born abroad — according to continent of birth, and for those born in Israel —according to the Jewish ethnic group (Edah). Since 1966, the origin of those born in Israel was based on the continent of birth of the father'.[8] As a result, apart from the two major categories of Oriental and Western Jews, there is a third group: the Israel-born. The latter are split into the first generation who, through their fathers, can be identified with one of the two major categories; and the second generation of the Israel-born, or even longer established, who are not so identifiable.

It is interesting to note that during the period 1952–56, in the Tables on marriages, the category Asia–Africa included Greece and Bulgaria; and that over the years, in Tables on immigration, the category Europe included South Africa and Rhodesia.[9] Most of the Jews from Greece and Bulgaria were Ladino speakers while most of those from South

Africa and Rhodesia were Ashkenazim. It seems, therefore, that the division by neat geographical areas was not the only consideration. The Sephardi–Ashkenazi divide still had some influence in deciding in which statistical categories the various communities were to be placed. As to the distinction between Jews and non-Jews, the criterion of religion was used since the 1961 census; the major categories were: Jews, Muslims, Christians, and Druze.[10] However, the citizenship identity document issued by the Ministry of the Interior designates Israeli citizens as Jewish, Arab, Druze, Armenian, Circassian, Samaritan, or Karaite, under the rubric of 'nationality'.[11] In most sociological literature, the major contradistinctions are similarly between Jews, Arabs, and Druze, thus giving prominence to national distinctions. There is also great emphasis on the dominant status of the Jewish segment of the population *vis-à-vis* the non-Jewish minorities.

A review of views

Let us now return to the question of whether the edot are proper ethnic communities in Israel. The writings of most sociologists suggest that usually this assumption is made. Thus, Yochanan Peres states clearly that he uses the term edah as synonymous with ethnic group.[12] He then adopts definitions of American minority groups[13] and decides on three major characteristics: 'an ethnic group is a segment of the wider society, and as such it differs from a nation or a State; an ethnic group is ascriptive . . . and is, therefore, different from a social class, a political party or a profession; belonging to an ethnic group influences the relationship between members of the group and the rest of society'.[14] This wide and flexible definition leads Peres to the analysis of the ethnic structure of Israel, which he regards as being composed of three major ethnic blocks: Ashkenazim (Western Jews); Eastern Edot (Oriental Jews); and the Arabs. His two major criteria are Jewish origin and fusion with modern civilization. The Arabs register negatively on both criteria, while Oriental Jews are negatively identified on the second criterion. Peres stresses the nationality dimension when considering relations between Arabs and Jews; and analyses the relations between Western and Oriental Jews around a separate axis. However, he maintains the concept of ethnicity in his overall analytical framework.[15]

An alternative approach can be to distinguish between ethnic group and edah. Although these can be regarded as allied concepts, they can also be shown to convey different meanings, sufficiently so as to warrant separate conceptualizations. The beginnings of such a distinction are to be found in Ben-Rafael's analysis of ethnicity in Israel. According to him, the Oriental Jewish immigrants who came to Israel underwent two waves of transformation. First, they constituted distinct

minority entities in their native lands. Then upon arrival in Israel, they remained distinct entities, but this time in the sense of edot, namely, sharing the overall national-religious identity, yet appearing distinct because of their particular version of Judaism, which paradoxically derived from their native countries to which they had not fully belonged. Subsequently, facing a dominant group and culture (the European Jews and their modern societal framework), they underwent a process of ethnicization. Ben-Rafael uses for his analysis a definitional framework of 'ethnic group' which emphasizes the following elements: '(1) some primordial attributes such as religion, origin or history, language or "race"; (2) particular sociocultural features; and (3) a consciousness of constituting a group different from others belonging to the same setting'.[16] This distinction, according to him, permits the application of the concept of ethnic group to collectivities which differ widely: for instance, both to groups which aspire to a recognition of collective rights, and to groups which are ready to integrate into society.

It is in view of the wide divergences in types of ethnic group that Ben-Rafael designates the edah as a special type of ethnic group. First, he emphasizes the objective sense in which the edot can be discerned, when Yemenites or Moroccans are encountered in society as ethno-classes. Second, in subjective terms, the edot perceive themselves as having a collective personality and are aware of a collective plight. Third, the Eastern edot (the Oriental Jews), in their encounter with 'others' in society, are more truly recognizable as edot. So far, these features fit well the general definition adopted. However, the other side of the coin suggests some special features. Thus, despite the generally lower-class position of the Eastern edot, Ashkenazi society encourages social mobility with generosity and readily accepts the upwardly mobile into the dominant group. Again, although the edot themselves value their cultural legacy and some continuity of that legacy, which is derived from their past existence in a Muslim or an Iberian country, they aspire to their eventual disappearance as a separate group; and if they still regard themselves as a subdivision of the nation, it is in terms of being 'Jews among Jews', giving their group distinctiveness a temporary character. Furthermore, he adds that there are no signs of a quick 'sub-melting' process of the various edot, such as the Iraqis, Moroccans, Yemenites, etc., within a larger Oriental group, or of Poles, Romanians, Russians, etc., within the Ashkenazi segment. Nevertheless, the central societal value of the total 'fusion of the exiles' is strong, although for Ashkenazi Jews it means acculturation to the modern Western model.

For Ben-Rafael, Israel is without doubt a plural society in the sense that it has a Jewish and Arab population. But within the Jewish population of Israel, the edot are not as clearly seen to conform to the

pluralist model. Thus, Ben-Rafael is forced to admit that 'beyond the emergence of the group as an edah, its lack of self-confidence as well as its belief in its future disappearance account for the fluidity of its boundaries and its weak power of attraction for those who find an alternative to the "ethnic way" '.[17] Nevertheless, he holds on to the view that the edah is a unique type of ethnic group and he does not attempt to provide a separate conceptual basis for the term edah which he uses interchangeably with ethnic group.[18]

There are many other sociologists and anthropologists (whether concerned with political alignments and inter-group conflicts or with cultural differentiation and symbolic interaction) who similarly use the ethnic label to describe and analyse the lives of, and interactions between, Oriental and Western Jews. An example is Eisenstadt's analysis of new political alignments among Oriental Jews and the latter's increased demands for participation in the leadership of a changing Israeli society, resulting in heightened ethnic consciousness and generating a tremendous potential tension.[19] Another instance is Shlomo Deshen's focus on the 'existence of ethnic manifestations that are primarily cultural, and perhaps not relevant at all to problems of conflict and competition'.[20] Deshen refers to the development and growing popularity among Tunisian Jews of the *hillulah*, a traditional memorial celebration of a revered rabbi or of some other personage they wish to honour. He states: 'Such manifestations might . . . be interpreted primarily in terms of strategies to solve problems of identity, belief and culture, and perhaps only secondarily in terms of political strategies'.[21] With the attenuation of traditional culture among Tunisian Jews, in the urban industrial setting of Israel, these celebrations fill needs both at the personal and group level, through the resurgence of communal bonds. As such, they provide a new legitimacy of ethnic activity.[22]

Other sociologists have stressed that notwithstanding modernization and processes of nation-building in Israel, inequalities between immigrants of different countries of origin remain. The new nation-state does not homogenize the various cultures and does not override communal divisions. When analysing this situation, Percy S. Cohen uses ethnicity as his main concept and argues that persisting ethnic inequalities more than any other divisions and inequalities in Israeli society 'question the assertion of Jewish nationhood'. The focus on ethnicity, according to Cohen, results not only from the inequalities experienced by Oriental Jews in Israel, but is 'partly a consequence of the earlier emphasis on the re-socialization of Orientals. The present reaction takes the form of using, as a weapon of retaliation, the very mode of categorization which Orientals believe was imposed upon them: it is now they who persist in reminding some Ashkenazim that they too can be categorized'.[23] Cohen adds:[24]

This perception of social reality, which had apparently been dormant or quiescent for some time, was activated by two sets of circumstances. The first was the arrival in Israel of some later 'newcomers' — the European Jews from the Soviet Union. They seemed to fare very much better than Oriental Jews had fared after reaching Israel; and some seemed, soon after their arrival, to fare better than Oriental Jews who had been in Israel for some years and certainly better than the newcomers from Soviet Georgia, who were looked upon as Orientals.

The second set of circumstances was the movement of Oriental Jews into more skilled occupations, and in some cases into middle-class self-employment, which was accompanied by a movement of Arabs into the occupational spaces vacated by them. These two sets of conditions have, for many Orientals, underscored an aspect of social reality as they have perceived it: namely, that they, the Oriental Jews, have been and perhaps still are the Jewish Arabs of Israel. After all, most Oriental Jews are no less Arab than Ashkenazi Jews are Polish or Russian; and were it not for the difficulty that this would create in forging a national identity, they might well have been called 'Arab Jews'.

Sammy Smooha takes a similar stance in his analysis of conflicts and inequalities, within a pluralist setting, between Oriental and Western Jews. He states: 'Ethnic separation among Jews had begun with their dispersion. Since Jews tend in many ways to resemble Gentiles in countries of their residence, the exiled Jewish people corresponded in large measure to the different nations of the world in whose midst they settled. The territorial dispersal not only produced ethnic diversity, but also produced no problems as long as the Jews were scattered and had very minimal contact with each other. But beginning with the ingathering of the exiles into Palestine, ethnic differences started to generate tensions'.[25]

This sweeping statement by Smooha, and to some extent Cohen's position also, are wide open to serious criticism. First, these scholars understate the basic religious, cultural, and social differences between Jews and Gentiles which persisted for centuries, quite apart from political and other inequalities often culminating in persecutions, factors that produced the well-organized and close-knit ethnic minority communities all over the world, with which millions of Jews identified. To quote Morris Ginsberg: 'In considering particular Jewish communities we must not forget *the essential unity of the Jewish people*. This unity is due not only to the fact that Jews in different parts of the world are aware of each other and have a sense of solidarity, but to the *objective interdependence* of the different communities which does not depend entirely on their own volition' (my italics).[26] Second, while the frequency and strength of the connections between the different Diaspora communities may be matters for debate, few historians and sociologists doubt that the sentiment of a Jewish peoplehood was a significant element.[27] It is precisely because of this common

peoplehood element, linking Jews of various origins in Israel in their own national setting, and linking them also to other Jews in the Diaspora today, that the unqualified use of the concept of ethnicity for Jewish inter-group relations in Israel is inappropriate. That is why a re-examination of the concept of edah is necessary.

In contrast to general usage, some Israeli sociologists have questioned the correctness of applying the concepts of 'ethnicity' and 'ethnic group' to Jewish inter-group relations in Israel. Thus, J. Ben-David rejected the application of the concept of 'ethnic group' to the existing separate Jewish groups which were characterized by cultural self-awareness, because that would over-emphasize the separateness of these entities and ignore the stages of change which they were undergoing — stages which signal their own socio-cultural disintegration and show a clear tendency toward increased identification with the wider Israeli society. According to Ben-David, the various groups are definable as ethnic cultural 'extractions'. There are crises and tensions resulting from the processes of their immigration, absorption, and acculturation; and these in turn affect the wider processes of social change, for example in the spheres of stratification, elite formation, and so on.[28]

I have similarly argued[29] that although processes of differentiation among Jews have been at work, both in the Diaspora and in Israel, and there has been evidence of mutual prejudice between various Jewish groups, the term 'ethnic' is incorrectly applied to such inter-group differentiation. The reasoning is that of the three basic criteria distinguishing ethnic groups — primordial attributes, particular socio-cultural features, and consciousness of kind[30] — the first criterion is in the case of Jews a most complex phenomenon. Primordial attributes are usually taken to be religion, origin or history, and language or race.[31] In order to analyse these elements, one must imagine different layers of primordial bonds affecting the diverse Jewish groups. Undoubtedly, in a basic sense their religion, their deeper origin expressible in terms of a common peoplehood, and certainly the ancient history of the Jews point to a primordiality which is unifying for the different Jewish groups, rather than one which operates as a divider into ethnic groups. The more recent communal life and history, language and culture, emanating from the immediate countries of origin, point, however, to some primordial bonds superimposed on the deeper layers, which are significant and operate to differentiate between the various Jewish groups. But are they significant enough to produce the ethnicization of different Jewish groups in Israel, and can one dismiss the importance of the deeper primordial attachments of all Jews?

As to the specific local historical and cultural development of Diaspora Jews, it must be noted that all these Jews shared parallel historical experiences of dispersion, persecution, and minority status in

their various countries. When the racial factor is considered, in terms of biological or specific genetic characteristics, almost all Jews belong to the same Caucasian category. It is interesting to note here that recent research analysing the genetic characteristics of a large number of Jewish population groups, Oriental and European, has shown that all Jewish populations studied, except Yemenites, are concentrated in the same cluster: they are closer to one another than they are to any of the non-Jewish groups in whose countries they lived. The researchers also state that the differences which were found between the Jewish groups cannot always be explained by admixture with local populations and that other factors such as the effect of convergent adaptive processes must be considered.[32] In one exceptional case, from the point of view of race, there are no clear indications at this early stage whether the Negroid features of the newly-arrived Ethiopian Jews are likely to affect their relations with other Jews in Israel.

The colour visibility, on the other hand, even in the more extreme case of Yemenite Jews, seems to have been of far less significance than have cultural factors in inter-group relations.[33] The cultural factors, differentiating between various Jewish groups, and providing both a meaningful sorting mechanism and familiar identifications for the individual, have not prevented the development of an overarching Israeli civil culture which commands the loyalties of the vast majority of Jews of whatever immediate country of origin they might be. The newly developing Jewish nationalism and the beginnings of an Israeli civil religion[34] are the basic elements of this overarching new order. The civil religion is not perceived as alien by the younger generation, a sizeable proportion of whom have contracted Jewish inter-group marriages.[35] On the contrary, they identify easily with it[36] because it is meaningful both at the practical level of their modern life in Israel and at the historical level of deeper Jewish primordial attachments.

It is true, however, that the other two criteria (particular socio-cultural features and consciousness of kind) are extant in Israel, especially among the immigrant generation and in some of the more segregated areas inhabited by Oriental Jews, such as development towns and deprived urban areas. However, these differences seem to be perceived in stratificational and sub-cultural terms rather than in truly ethnic terms. The question is whether out of such 'structural conditions' ethnic identifications can emerge and persist.[37] My answer for the Israeli Jewish case is in the negative, since it appears that there is no overall desire to perpetuate the separateness of the various Jewish groups, such as the edot, in the way Jews in the Diaspora or Arabs and Druze in Israel express, and act on, such a desire. What we do find is that the more identifiable Jewish Oriental groups wish to eliminate the conditions of relative deprivation and some of the lingering inequalities; and they are pressing for their own versions of Jewish culture to be

accepted on equal terms in the still pluralist setting of Israeli society and in the further development of the overarching Israeli culture. Thus, despite the unifying bonds, Israeli Jewish society is characterized by inter-group differentiation and competition. However, it is inappropriate to designate that in ethnic terms. The alternative is the designation of the various groups as 'sub-cultures', which would enhance the analytical perception of this aspect of the Israeli situation.

In short, the argument of this paper is that the maintenance of 'sub-cultures' is not synonymous with a situation of *ethnic* differentiation, but that the differentiation is embedded deeply enough around the cultural variable alone to suggest that a pluralist situation exists also in Israeli Jewish society. However, the overall unifying bond, present to some extent in most pluralistic societies, is far stronger in that society than it is in an ethnically differentiated situation. Therefore, on this view, the various Jewish communities in the Diaspora are *ethnic groups*, whilst the Jewish groups originating from different countries of the Diaspora, but living now in Israel, are simply *sub-cultural entities*. In the latter case, therefore, we would expect to be moving somewhat faster along the 'acculturation continuum' in the direction of fuller cultural integration, than would be the case among most of the ethnic groups of a country like Britain, or than could be envisaged, even in peaceful circumstances, between Arabs and Jews in Israel where the nationalist element in ethnic identification is strong.

Conclusion

The alternatives presented in this paper can be summed up as follows:

1. One can use the concept of 'ethnicity' to refer to the major division of the Israeli Jewish population into Oriental and Western Jews, or more specifically into edot. According to this usage, edah is synonymous with 'ethnic group', the main justification being the existence of a dominant culture in Israel, which is clearly linked with the dominant European section of the Jewish population, in contradistinction to the Oriental Jewish culture and the subordinate Jewish groups originating in North African and Middle Eastern countries. Thus, the basis of this usage is the 'minus-one' definition of ethnicity, a definition which applies where 'the dominant group insists upon its power to define [the situation, and] members of that group perceive themselves not as ethnic but as setting the standard by which others are to be judged'.[38] In this sense, the term edah, meaning an ethnic group, is properly to be applied only to the Oriental Jewish groups.

2. Alternatively, we could use the adjective 'ethnic' or the prefix 'ethno' to define edot — for example, 'ethnoclasses', 'ethnic extracts', or 'ethno-cultural communities'. 'Ethnoclass' emphasizes the

stratificational nature of the divisions; 'ethnic extract' puts the stress on differentiation based on the country of origin of the immigrants and the temporary nature of such groups in Israel, owing to processes of acculturation and absorption; whilst 'ethno-cultural community' recalls Max Weber's analysis of the emergence and significance of ethnic solidarities in relation to community formation. Weber recognizes the boundary-creating and community-forming powers not only of differences of a physical type or other kinds of appearance, but also of such elements as the common folk-culture, a shared language or dialect, a shared political memory, common religious beliefs, or ties of earlier times based on an old 'cult-community'. It is around such factors that subjective ethnic beliefs and sentiments emerge.[39] In this sense the designation of an edah as an 'ethno-cultural community', on the basis of a complex set of socio-cultural variables, is clearly possible.

3. A third alternative is to limit the use of the concept of 'ethnicity' to cases where primordial attributes are clearly divisive, a situation that does not apply to the Oriental-Western divide between Jews in Israel. One must reiterate that the primordial attachments of both types of Jewish group, Western and Oriental, are basically unifying. This does not deny the differences which have accrued around the various groups over the centuries of Diaspora life — differences which have led to the emergence of a large number of Jewish sub-cultures. Neither can one deny that a process of enculturation, but not of ethnicization, ensued after the arrival in Israel of the first large waves of immigrants, and that prejudices and conflicts developed between the dominant Western and the subordinate Oriental groups in the decades that followed. The policy of imposed adjustment and absorption through modernization was far from crowned with success. However, unlike the case in plural societies where ethnic groups usually have fundamentally conflicting aspirations, in Israel the dividing element is primarily sub-cultural and the process of enculturation can be replaced much more quickly by the process of acculturation. Since the boundaries between sub-cultural entities[40] are less rigid than those between ethnic groups, a clear analytic distinction between the two types of relations must be made. On this view, the edah is a *sub-cultural entity* with certain traditional community characteristics. Accordingly, although the term is more clearly applicable to the Oriental communities, it is not incorrect to apply it also to all the country-of-origin groups, including those from the West. In this sense the term edah coincides, on the whole, with the categories adopted in official statistical publications.

Finally, the burden of this paper is to argue in favour of adopting the third alternative: to define edah as 'a Jewish group characterized by a common sub-culture in Israeli society', elements of the sub-culture being maintained although an integrated culture has become dominant in that society.[41] The relations between sub-cultural groups are not a

variation of, but are quite different from, the type known as inter-ethnic relations.

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NOTES

[1] See, for example, S. N. Eisenstadt, 'Some Comments on the "Ethnic" Problem in Israel', *Israel Social Science Research*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1984, pp. 20–29; Yochanan Peres, *Ethnic Relations in Israel* (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1976, pp. 11, 12, 43; Sammy Smooha, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict*, London, 1978, p. 76.

[2] See Fred W. Riggs, 'Concepts and Terms Relating to Ethnic Processes', paper presented at a Symposium of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences in Vancouver on 23 August 1983.

[3] See *Megido Modern Dictionary: Hebrew-English*, Tel-Aviv, 1967; and R. Alcalay, *The Complete Hebrew-English Dictionary*, Ramat-Gan, 1981.

[4] Eliezer Ben-Rafael, *The Emergence of Ethnicity: Cultural Groups and Social Conflict in Israel*, Westport, Ct., 1982, p. 40.

[5] See *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, Jerusalem, 1971, vol. 3, pp. 719–22; vol. 14, pp. 1164, 1175f.

[6] Ibid., vol. 12, pp. 326–47; vol. 14, p. 1176.

[7] See M. Goldman, ed., *Society in Israel*, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, 1980, p. xxii.

[8] Ibid., p. xxvii.

[9] Ibid., p. xxix. See also Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, Jerusalem, 1954/55, vol. 6, Table 35, p. 29; 1963, vol. 14, Table 14 and fn. 1, p. 79.

[10] *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, op. cit., 1966, vol. 17, p. xxxiii; 1980, vol. 31, Table 11/21, p. 57.

[11] The Hebrew term used is 'leom', which is translated as 'nation', 'people', or 'nationality': see R. Alcalay, op. cit.

[12] Peres, op. cit., p. 11, fn. 1.
[13] Ibid., pp. 11, 12
[14] Ibid., translated from the Hebrew.
[15] Ibid., pp. 42, 43ff.
[16] Ben-Rafael, op. cit., p. 21.
[17] Ibid., p. 228.
[18] Ibid.; see especially Chapters 4 and 12.
[19] Eisenstadt, op. cit.
[20] Shlomo Deshen, 'Political Ethnicity and Cultural Ethnicity in Israel during the 1960s' in Abner Cohen, ed., *Urban Ethnicity*, ASA Monographs, vol. 12, London, 1974, p. 282.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid., pp. 295ff.
[23] Percy S. Cohen, 'Ethnicity, Class, and Political Alignment in Israel', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 25, no. 2, December 1983, p. 127.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Smooha, op. cit. See also Sammy Smooha, 'A Critique of an Updated Establishmentarian Formulation of the Cultural Perspective in the Sociology of Ethnic Relations in Israel' (Hebrew), *Megamot-Behavioural Sciences Quarterly*, vol. 29, no. 1, February 1985, pp. 73–92.
[26] Morris Ginsberg, 'A Review of the European Jewish Communities Today and Some Questions for Tomorrow', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 6, no. 1, June 1964, p. 121.
[27] See Julius Gould, *Jewish Commitment. A Study in London*, London, 1984, p. 7; and Ernest Krausz, 'Concepts and Theoretical Models for Anglo-Jewish Sociology', in Sonia L. Lipman and Vivian D. Lipman, eds., *Jewish Life in Britain 1962–1977*, New York, 1981, pp. 17–25.
[28] See J. Ben-David, 'Ethnic Differences or Social Change?' in S. N. Eisenstadt *et al.*, eds, *Integration and Development in Israel*, Jerusalem, 1970, pp. 368–87; and Akiva W. Deutsch, 'Some Reflections upon the Complexity of the Concept "Ethnicity"', in S. Poll and E. Krausz, eds., *On Ethnic and Religious Diversity in Israel*, Ramat-Gan, 1975, pp. 25–34.
[29] Ernest Krausz, 'The Application of the Concepts of Acculturation and Pluralism to the Study of Sub-Cultures and Ethnic Groups', paper presented at the Israel Sociological Society's annual convention, held at Bar-Ilan University, Winter 1972.
[30] Ibid.
[31] See E. Shils, 'Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 8, no. 2, June 1957, pp. 130–45; Clifford Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution — Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States', in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States*, New York, 1963, pp. 105–19; and Robert H. Jackson, 'Ethnicity', in Giovanni Sartori, ed., *Social Science Concepts*, Beverly Hills, 1984, pp. 205–33.
[32] See E. Kobyliansky *et al.*, 'Jewish Populations of the World: Genetic Likeness and Differences', *Annals of Human Biology*, vol. 9, no. 1, 1982, pp. 1–34.
[33] See Alex Weingrod, 'The State of the Art: A Review and Overview' and Norman Berdichevsky, 'The Persistence of the Yemeni Quarter in an Israeli Town', in Ernest Krausz, ed., *Studies of Israeli Society Volume I. Migration, Ethnicity and Community*, New Brunswick, N.J., 1980, pp. 12, 73–95.

[34] See Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, 'The Dilemma of Reconciling Traditional Culture and Political Needs: Civil Religion in Israel', *Comparative Politics*, vol. 16, no. 1, October 1983, pp. 57–58, 62 f. The authors state (p. 58) that civil religion is 'a highly articulated system of symbols (rituals, myths, special terminology, shrines, heroic figures, etc.) which defines the boundaries and the meaning of a *moral* community'.

[35] Of the total of marrying Jewish couples in Israel in 1980, 20.4 per cent were mixed European and Oriental couples: see *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, op. cit., vol. 33, 1982, Table III 7, p. 86.

[36] See Simon N. Herman, *Jewish Identity*, Beverly Hills, Ca., 1977, pp. 183–91.

[37] See William L. Yancey, Eugene P. Ericksen, and Richard N. Juliani, 'Emergent Ethnicity: A Review and Reformulation', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 41, no. 3, June 1976, pp. 391–403. For a distinction between the 'primordialist' and the 'circumstantialist' aspects of ethnicity, see Gary B. Cohen, 'Ethnic Persistence and Change: Concepts and Models for Historical Research', *Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 65, no. 4, December 1984, pp. 1029–42.

[38] See Michael Banton, *Racial and Ethnic Competition*, Cambridge, 1983, p. 65.

[39] See Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich, and translated by E. Fischoff *et al.*), New York, 1968, pp. 387–93. See also Akiva W. Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 28 ff.

[40] In the case of special characteristics of delinquents or marginal groups in society, the term 'contra-culture' would be appropriate: see Milton J. Yinger, *A Minority Group in American Society*, New York, 1965, p. 122. The term 'sub-culture' can, therefore, be reserved for cases such as the ones discussed here. In this sense 'sub-culture' is a sub-division of a general cultural framework in an inclusive ethnic entity, the sub-division being due either to dispersal among other dominant cultures, as in the case of Diaspora Jews, or to regional or class differences within the same ethnic homeland — examples being northern English or working-class English sub-cultures.

[41] See Abraham Stahl, 'Clarification of Concepts and Aims in Incorporating Jewish-Oriental Culture into the Curriculum', *Megamot-Behavioural Sciences Quarterly* (Hebrew), vol. 28, nos. 2/3, March 1984, p. 397.

FROM ANTI-ZIONISM TO NON-ZIONISM IN ANGLO-JEWRY, 1917–1937

Gideon Shimoni

THERE was something of a paradox in the impact of Zionism upon the Jewish community of Great Britain. On the one hand, the representative communal institutions of Anglo-Jewry were involved more intimately than were those of most other Diaspora communities in activity, both political and practical, on behalf of the development of a Jewish national home in Palestine. That involvement owed much to the circumstance that it was the Jewish community of the Mandatory power in Palestine; but there were historical factors going back far into the nineteenth century, notably the philanthropic activities in Palestine of Sir Moses Montefiore; the influence of a strong strain of Christian religious advocacy of Jewish restoration to Palestine; and the impact of important British diplomatic interests in the Middle East. On the other hand, Zionism raised issues more divisive and enduring than any other in the post-emancipation experience of Anglo-Jewry. Thus, concurrently with their pragmatic co-operation on behalf of the incipient Jewish entity in Palestine, the leadership echelons of Anglo-Jewry engaged in a chronic ideological controversy about the Zionist idea itself. The purpose of the present paper is to trace the development of the non-Zionist position and to examine this interaction between practical and political endeavour and divisive ideological conceptions in Anglo-Jewry from 1917 to 1937.

The mixed reception of Theodor Herzl's political Zionism in Anglo-Jewry and the ensuing ideological controversy which came to a head during the First World War over the intention of the British government to issue a declaration concerning Zionist aspirations in Palestine — the famous Balfour Declaration — has been detailed in a number of historical works.[1] For the purpose of this study, only some salient points need be noted. Herzl's political Zionism postulated that the Jews were an entity possessed of national, and not only religious, attributes and that the 'Jewish problem' ought to be treated as a *national* problem. It diagnosed the Jewish condition, finding it to be one of ever-worsening material and spiritual distress, exacerbated rather than alleviated by civic emancipation. According to Herzl, the core defect of

this condition was the lack of a territorial national home and the solution he envisaged involved the return of Jews to Zion and the ultimate restoration of Zion to the Jews as a national state. Finally, the proposed course of action for achieving that end was to be primarily diplomatic means aimed to secure international support for the envisaged solution while an international organization of Jews was to be established and set out a programme of settlement in Zion.

From the outset, this ideology clashed with the normative world view of highly acculturated Jews in countries where their civic emancipation was an accomplished fact, not least of all in Britain. It shall here be argued that the ideological exposition of the policy of these British non-Zionist Jews was at least as coherent as that of the political Zionists. Although the essentials of their ideology were already well crystallized by the time the Balfour Declaration was issued on 2 November 1917, they did not find explicit expression in an organized body until the founding of the League of British Jews on 14 November 1917.

The League of British Jews

The League of British Jews described itself as an association of British subjects professing the Jewish religion. Its stated objects were:[2]

1. To uphold the status of British subjects professing the Jewish religion.

2. To resist the allegation that Jews constitute a separate Political Nationality.

3. To facilitate the settlement in Palestine of such Jews as may desire to make Palestine their home.

The League was founded by a gathering at New Court, the Rothschilds' offices in the City of London; and the forty-nine members of its Provisional Committee belonged to the elite Anglo-Jewish families of the time. Its strength lay in the wealth, prestige, and influence of its leadership. Lionel de Rothschild was president while Lord Swaythling and Sir Philip Magnus were vice-presidents. However, the League's overall membership was very small; it began with about 400 subscribers and by its own admission never attained more than 1,300. Indeed, it had difficulty expanding its membership owing to the indifference of many of the highly acculturated elite class of Jews to whom it appealed for support.[3] By 1926, it had all but petered out: *The Jewish Chronicle* reported that only six persons attended its annual meeting that year. Although it continued to be listed in *The Jewish Year Book* until as late as 1940, it was virtually defunct after 1930.[4]

Notwithstanding its diminutive size, the League had a formidable ideological impact through the publication of a monthly journal called

Jewish Opinion, the first issue of which appeared in December 1918. After less than two years it was superseded by a weekly of greater scope and duration, *The Jewish Guardian*, edited by Laurie Magnus, which set out to rival the keenly Zionist *The Jewish Chronicle* and *The Jewish World* as the popular news organ of Anglo-Jewry. Although opening its columns to other views and reporting on all aspects of the community, *The Jewish Guardian* was created by the League and faithfully represented the League's views in its editorial comments.[5] There was nothing in the abundant argumentation marshalled by the League of British Jews which had not already been said by the opponents of the Zionist ideology in the period preceding the Balfour Declaration. The only innovation was its presentation in the more systematic and regular manner facilitated by a formal party-like organization with its own newspaper.

A basic tenet of the League was that the Jews were a religious but not a national entity. The argument was not, however, that national attributes had never been a part of Jewish identity, but rather that the Jews had all but shed these during their long Diaspora experience.[6] Moreover — and here lay the fundamental basis of the argument — in acquiring emancipation they had morally undertaken to divest themselves of any residual national attributes. This may be described as the 'contract theory of emancipation', according to which emancipation implied a moral-social contract whereby the Jews were accepted as equal participants in the environing nation on the clear understanding that they undertook to integrate into that nation in all respects barring what European Gentiles described as 'profession of a religion'. Claude Montefiore, president of the Anglo-Jewish Association at the time of the Balfour Declaration and the main progenitor of Liberal Judaism in Britain, averred that when the Jews in England were granted full political rights the main argument was 'that it was only certain religious doctrines and practices which separated them from their Christian fellow-citizens. A Jew, resident in England, was an Englishman of the Jewish faith, just as a Jew whose home was France was a Frenchman of the Jewish faith'.[7] Having been granted emancipation on that premise, Jews who now advanced the Zionist contention that they constituted a nation, and wished to be restored to their own land rather than to be integrated as Englishmen, were guilty of a breach of moral contract. Hence, they not only gave credence to the charge of antisemites that Jews had gained equal civic rights under false pretences, but injured the moral integrity of Jews and therefore tarnished their personal honour. Michael A. Green, the secretary of the League of British Jews, declared: 'The League represents the fundamental principle on which Jews in this and other countries have obtained complete political emancipation. . . . That principle has been the renunciation by Jews of any presumed Jewish nationality in

exchange for the full and equal citizenship of the States in which they dwell'. To now challenge this principle, as the Zionists were doing, was to prejudice the prospect for all Jews who 'would seek a home here and political incorporation with the English nation'.[8]

This notion of an 'emancipation contract' occupied a pivotal role in the ideological clash with Zionism. Since its empirical reference point was a series of specific events in nineteenth-century Britain, the antagonists engaged profusely in rival interpretations of the implications of these events. Each side was able tendentiously to emphasize particular motifs in the nineteenth-century debate because that debate was, objectively speaking, ambiguous as to whether the Jew was to be granted emancipation *because* his actual Jewish identity was considered compatible with citizenship and integration or *on condition* that he modify his Jewish identity to render it compatible.

The Zionist response was provided by Harry Sacher, journalist, lawyer, and one of Weizmann's Manchester circle of disciples. In a pamphlet entitled *Jewish Emancipation: The Contract Myth*, first published in 1917, Sacher argued with considerable cogency that emancipation had been granted to the Jews of Britain at a time when parliament was fully cognisant of the national dimension inherent in Judaism. Hence, if emancipation in England was indeed based upon an implicit contract, it was one which 'set the seal of approval upon Judaism as the national religion of the Jews with all that it implies, while it could not have approved the anti-nationalist form of Judaism, of which it knew nothing'. Turning the tables on the contract theory, Sacher asserted that therefore not the Zionists but rather the disciples of Claude Montefiore's new form of Liberal Judaism were in breach of the emancipation contract.[9]

Defending the contract theory against the counter-arguments of the Zionists, Israel Abrahams (Reader in Rabbinic and Talmudic Literature at Cambridge and, with Claude Montefiore, a progenitor of the Liberal Synagogue) conceded that in the nineteenth-century emancipation debate, 'the opposition was religious more than political' and 'the advocates of tolerance did not found their policy on a denial of the hope, then upheld by the majority of Jews, of an ultimate restoration to Palestine'.[10] However, he argued, this was simply because 'there then existed no such monstrosity as political Zionism' and therefore the opponents of emancipation rested their argument on the charge that Jews could not be accepted as Englishmen because they were international aliens not capable of attachment to any particular country. Abrahams contended, furthermore, that to the extent that advocates of emancipation, like Macaulay, took account of the Jews' hope of restoration to Zion, it was clearly on the grounds of this hope being 'too vaguely assigned to the future for it to be allowed to affect policy in the present'. This, declared Abrahams, was a reply which the

modern Jewish nationalist could not possibly make, adding: 'One cannot but wonder what would have been the fate of Jewish emancipation if its friends, whether Jewish or Christian, had been faced by some of the wilder assertions of national extremists of our day'.[11]

Fundamental to the League's ideology was the belief that emancipation on these principles was a *universally* valid panacea for the contemporary Jewish condition — in Poland and Rumania no less than in the United States, Britain, Germany, or France. In this respect again, the League upheld views which had been formulated earlier, particularly by Lucien Wolf;[12] and it accordingly opposed Jewish demands for 'any recognition of the Jews as a separate political community within the Polish State . . . Polish Jews are by nationality Poles and nothing more and nothing less'.[13] Zionism was therefore a misguided intrusion which imparted credence to antisemitism and reinforced opposition to Jewish emancipation everywhere — not least of all in Britain itself. A leaflet distributed by the League appealed to any British Jew who wished to preserve for his children 'their heritage as Englishmen and their good repute as loyal British subjects' to join the League because his British nationality was 'challenged and endangered' by the misguided declarations of Zionists that he was 'an Alien in the land of his birth'. Citing extracts from statements made by Chaim Weizmann and by the Rev. Dr Moses Gaster (the Haham of the London Sephardi community), the pamphlet asserted that with the Zionists it was 'an official article of faith' that all Jews outside Palestine constitute a homeless political nationality. The British nationality of Jews was already being challenged by the generally antisemitic *Morning Post* and *The New Witness* with statements such as 'the Jews have a double allegiance'; 'it will be better for the Jew in the long run to be distrusted as an alien and respected as a stranger than to be trusted as a citizen and shot as a traitor'; and 'we have repeatedly affirmed . . . our sympathy with the cause of Zionism'.[14]

With regard to the Jewish interest in Palestine, the initial position of the League was exactly as propounded in the notoriously controversial statement on the Palestine question published in *The Times* of 17 May 1917, under the signature of the Conjoint Foreign Committee's co-presidents, David L. Alexander and Claude G. Montefiore. (Alexander was the President of the Board of Deputies and Montefiore was the President of the Ango-Jewish Association. The Conjoint Foreign Committee had been established by the Board and the A.J.A. in 1878 to co-ordinate activities on behalf of Jews outside the United Kingdom.) That position may be summarized as follows. Notions of restoration of Zion to the Jews belonged purely to the realm of Jewish religious eschatology. However, since the Holy Land had 'a profound and undying interest for all Jews', a settlement of Jews in Zion was worthy of Jewish and Gentile support — but that did not imply that Jews

belonged in Zion alone and considered themselves to be homeless aliens everywhere else. Moreover, no special privileges were to be claimed by the Jews of Palestine over and above those equal civic rights claimed by Jews in any other country. In the unlikely eventuality that the Jewish community in Palestine ultimately would come to form the majority of that country, it might conceivably aspire to constitute itself as a nation. However, such a nation would be coextensive only with the Jews of Palestine and would in no sense include Jews living in other countries.[15]

The Leaguers (a term coined by themselves) raised also a number of less important objections to the Zionist enterprise. They did not favour the creation of a *Jewish* university in Palestine: 'It may be a fine thing to found a University there, but it is dangerous to call it a *Jewish* University. . . . A University is a place of learning, where learning should be free, undenominational and open to all'; nor should it be known as the *Hebrew* University (one does not speak of the English University at Oxford) — but as the University of Jerusalem.[16] Likewise, in conformity with the principles of separation of nationality from religion, and that 'a nation should include men of many religions', the name 'Israel' which was being suggested for the newly-organized Palestine was not suitable. It was too intrinsically associated with the Jews: 'The sole course is to employ a name which has only a geographical reference. Such a name is Palestine'.[17]

Apart from these ideological and speculative questions, the operative issue dividing the Leaguers from the Zionists was the interpretation of the Balfour Declaration itself. The League would have preferred a differently worded declaration; one in which the objectionable phrase 'a national home for the Jewish people' would have been replaced with 'a home for Jewish people'.[18] However, the League was far from regarding the Balfour Declaration as an unmitigated disaster. Adopting a realistic view, it expressed appreciation of 'the lofty motives of the British government', and gratification at its recognition of 'the claim of the Jews to a significant place in the reorganisation of the civilised world'. What it set out to attain was not the annulment of the Balfour Declaration but the securing of 'an interpretation consonant with the principles by which Jewish emancipation was won', rather than one 'conforming with the dangerous conceptions of the Jewish nationalists'.[19] One of the League's spokesmen argued that since nationality 'connotes geographical entity, combined with integral political government', there was no comprehensive Jewish nationality for whom Palestine could be a national home. The League was in sympathy with the proposal for the rehabilitation of Palestine but with the proviso that 'the same conditions as prevail elsewhere, must constitute nationality in Palestine'.[20]

In adopting this critical attitude to the Balfour Declaration, the Leaguers did not shrink from taking issue with Gentile political leaders.

Thus, for example, *The Jewish Guardian* criticized Winston Churchill for his article entitled 'Zionism Versus Bolshevism: A Struggle for the Soul of a People' (in the *Illustrated Sunday Herald* of 8 February 1920), in which he concluded that Zionism was the only cure for the Bolshevism of the Russian Jews.[21] Indeed, placed in the awkward position of sometimes having to criticize government policies which the Anglo-Jewish Zionists could patriotically applaud, the League was on the defensive to prove its patriotism. 'To challenge the "patriotism" of the League because of its attitude is at once absurd and insulting', declared *Jewish Opinion*:[22]

> The League is a body of British subjects who claim the right to scrutinise with absolute freedom any act of the Government. It is . . . no proper function of a Government to settle such intricate questions as . . . the precise sense in which there may exist such an entity as 'the Jewish People'. . . . It is the bounden duty of the League to explain to the Government what the true answer to these questions should be . . . to assert that the bond which unites Jews is a bond of religion and not of nationality, that in the national and political sense there *is* no Jewish people and that only in metaphor can the phrase Palestinian homeland be used of Jews whose homelands are as many as the nationalities to which they belong.

The Zionists, not least of all Chaim Weizmann, labelled the exponents of the League's ideology 'assimilationists', implying that they were negating Jewish identity and seeking to dissolve into the majority society while callously ignoring the needs and aspirations of the Jewish masses out of fear lest their own adulterated mode of Jewish identity be jeopardized.[23] The Leaguers protested vigorously against these imputations. As early as 1904, Lucien Wolf had objected to what he described as the etymological distortions of the Zionists. 'They have yet to master the meaning of the word "assimilation" of which they talk and write so glibly', he jibed, 'they have an idea that assimilation and fusion mean the same thing', adding:[24]

> No sensible man dreams of requiring the Jews to fuse with the Christians. . . . All that assimilation means is that the Jews shall become good citizens in the same way as Roman Catholics are good citizens in England and Protestants are good citizens in France. That is, that they shall adopt the social manners and customs, and share in the unsectarian interests, traditions, hopes and ideals of their non-Jewish fellow citizens.

Clearly, the term 'assimilationist' is grossly inadequate as a label for the ideological position of Lucien Wolf and the League of British Jews. The Leaguers may be far more aptly described as emancipationists and integrationists: emancipationists in their programme for the welfare of Jews in every country, integrationists in their programme for fulfilment of the moral contract implicit in emancipation. Indeed, the historian would be best advised in this context to dispense with the misleading

label 'assimilationist' altogether, were it not for the fact that the Leaguers themselves used the term affirmatively. Bearing in mind the precise sense of this contemporary self-definition, the term 'assimilationist' will be retained in the present paper.

Another terminological question which arises is whether 'anti-Zionist' or 'non-Zionist' is the more appropriate description for the Anglo-Jewish assimilationist stance. If any meaning at all is to be attached to this distinction, it is necessary to define 'anti-Zionism' as active opposition to the Zionist Organization and 'non-Zionism' as willingness to desist from active opposition and to enter into some degree of co-operation with the Zionist Organization. Common to both is ideological opposition to Zionism rooted in the question of whether Jews ought to define themselves as a national, or as a purely religious, entity. Admittedly, the lines of division are difficult to draw in reality. On the one hand, the very formation of the League as a party-like organization attests to its initial *anti*-Zionist stance. On the other hand, its active opposition to the Zionist Organization, by means of propaganda and appeals to the government and the public, was tempered from the outset by its declared willingness to assist in practical colonization activities and the development of Jewish institutions in Palestine. Indeed, as noted above, it even showed some willingness to contemplate the eventuality of national self-determination for the Jews in Palestine. The League therefore took a borderline posture which fluctuated somewhat between anti-Zionism and non-Zionism.

From anti-Zionism to non-Zionism

As it happened, the trend of British policy between 1918 and 1923 was marked by retreat from its initial pro-Zionist bias. This in turn facilitated an increasing softening of the League's opposition to Zionism. Indeed, in the League's perception of things, not it but the Zionist Organization was changing, as Zionist dogma gave way to realism. One may trace this development in the columns of *Jewish Opinion* and *The Jewish Guardian*. Already at the end of 1918, the League was finding some expressions of Zionist opinion which it could commend. Thus, when a *Jewish Chronicle* editorial affirmed that in Palestine, as in England, birth in the country or subsequent naturalization would constitute Palestinian nationality, *Jewish Opinion* noted: 'One of the main principles of the League is thus accepted', adding, 'but with this acceptance and proclamation there vanishes any real meaning to the term a "Jewish nationality". The League's principles are clearly making headway'.[25]

After the formation in December 1918 of the Mizrahi Federation in Britain, the League's spokesman, Michael Green, referred to it as an 'influential association of orthodox Jews whose conception of Zionism

is spiritual and with whom, to that extent, the League finds itself in sympathy'.[26] It was, insisted the League, only to political Zionism that it was opposed. 'Anti-Zionism does not exist at all if it is taken to mean opposition to a hopeful future for Palestine', stated *Jewish Opinion* in October 1919. What the League opposed was not 'the creation of a Palestinian State', but the attempt to create a Jewish State.[27]

In March 1920, *The Jewish Guardian* applauded a statement by Leonard Stein (at that time political secretary of the World Zionist Organization) that 'the creation of a Jewish State is not a question of practical politics'; and in August 1920, it went so far as to call on all Jews in Britain to rally in support of the upbuilding of Palestine on these grounds:[28]

> Party differences amongst Jews are in the melting pot. . . . We may all be Zionists today, because Zionism itself has passed out of its theoretic into its practical stage. . . . This change carries with it, in our view, a new duty incumbent on all Jews, and particularly on British Jews, as subjects of the Mandatory Power. They are no longer resisting a claim in excess of expediency or right: they are assisting an experiment which has turned to the good of British and Jewish interests alike . . . and since . . . all Jews will be judged by the success of that experiment, a means of helping England is clearly indicated. To this extent surely we are all Zionists — the more so, because it is fairly clear that the pre-Mandate Zionists are anxious as well as ready to find allies among the mass of their co-religionists. The distinctions which existed should become merged in a common Palestinian policy.

This trend of conciliation with the Zionist enterprise under Weizmann's leadership was finally set on its course by the Churchill White Paper issued in 1922. The gravamen of that new statement of British policy was a reaffirmation of the Balfour promise but in a much depreciated form. While it was firm in insisting that the Jewish people was in Palestine 'as of right and not on sufferance', it rejected the notion that Palestine become 'as Jewish as England is English' and stated: 'When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole but the further development of the existing community'.[29]

The Churchill White Paper was enthusiastically welcomed by the Leaguers. They saw it as a resounding vindication of their own ideological stance over Palestine. *The Jewish Guardian* triumphantly declared that the Zionists' view of the Balfour Declaration had been very heavily defeated and that the Balfour Declaration was at last defined 'in the sense in which it was always understood by the vast majority of Jews in this country'. It stated:[30]

> The talk of a Jewish Palestine is at an end: at an end, too, is the talk of Jews as a nation, and all the unfortunate dualism which has sprung from that mistaken contention. The Jews of Palestine will be nationally as Palestinian

as the Jews of England are English, though Jews in Palestine, like Jews in England, will be there as of right and not on sufferance. The development of a centre of Jewish culture is left to the free influence of the genius loci and of Jewish effort as a whole.

At the same time, the Leaguers were able to welcome the fact that, unlike the Arabs (and the extremist *Jewish Chronicle* as well), the Zionist leadership headed by Weizmann had behaved reasonably in accepting the terms of the Churchill White Paper. In the view of the Leaguers, this at last opened up the prospect of co-operation by all Jews in the practical development of the Yishuv (the Jewish community of Palestine). Indeed, *The Jewish Guardian*, in its elation, went so far as to claim that the Zionists had thus 'moved to the eminently reasonable position adopted by the Conjoint Foreign Committee in 1917'![31] It was this turn of events which allowed some of the leading non-Zionists in Anglo-Jewry to consider Weizmann's initial probings about the creation of a Jewish Agency (as stipulated in clause 4 of the Mandate over Palestine) which would incorporate the broadest possible base of Jewish support, Zionist and non-Zionist, for the development of the national home in Palestine.[32]

The Churchill White Paper was thus a crucial turning point in the development of the non-Zionist position within Britain. The League's unofficial voice, *The Jewish Guardian*, grew steadily more conciliatory; and when, in March 1923, the *Morning Post* attacked what it called the 'fanatical Zionists', it rose to the defence of the 'united front now presented by His Majesty's Government, the Palestine Administration, the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Board of Deputies'. Its editor, Laurie Magnus, declared that he should not now be labelled an anti-Zionist but rather a 'practical Zionist' in contrast to the 'politico-nationalist' Zionists. Robert Waley Cohen summed up the credo of such 'practical Zionism' in an address at a Keren Hayesod dinner in March 1923 (at which *The Jewish Guardian* discerned only 'one or two lapses into the pre-White Paper attitude') when he said: 'British Jews have a double obligation to assist in the restoration of Palestine: (1) as Jews, whom England is helping, and (2) as Englishmen, who are helping the Jews'.[33]

Of all the avowedly non-Zionist personalities in Anglo-Jewry, Robert Waley Cohen was the first to enter into a practical relationship of co-operation with the Zionists. Although he approved of the objects of the League of British Jews, he had declined to join it out of concern lest the League have a disruptive effect on Anglo-Jewry.[34] In mid-1920, Weizmann asked Waley Cohen to become actively involved in the World Zionist Organization's finances, but they failed to see eye to eye on the manner of control which Waley Cohen considered proper for public finances of that sort. Eventually, Waley Cohen agreed to participate in the Economic Board for Palestine established in mid-1921, with

functions limited to the fostering of commercial enterprises without formal connection with the World Zionist Organization. However, he devoted his personal efforts to the funding of his own creation, the Palestine Corporation, which on a commercial basis was to develop many important industrial, agricultural, and financial enterprises in Palestine — ranging from Nesher cement to the King David Hotel and from the Palestine Salt Company to the Levant bonded warehouses in the port of Haifa.

The economic crisis in Palestine in the second half of the 1920s precipitated large-scale unemployment and cuts in the Mandatory government's budget. In these circumstances, the involvement of some of the non-Zionist Jewish magnates in Palestinian economic enterprises became more prominent. In September 1926, the non-Zionist Marquess of Reading, at that time probably the most publicly distinguished Jew in Anglo-Jewry (he had been Lord Chief Justice from 1913 to 1920 and Viceroy of India from 1921 to 1926) became the chairman of the board of directors of the Palestine Electric Corporation, whose creation marked a major step in the industrial development of the country. When the new Zionist Executive elected at the Zionist Congress of August 1927 found it necessary to slash the Zionist budget and launch, in December 1927, a £4,500,000 loan on the London market, the loan was oversubscribed within a few hours of issue. That was a clear indication of the broadening base of support amongst Anglo-Jews of means. Nothing could be more symbolic of the transformation which was taking place than the announcement by Sir Philip Magnus, one of the founding vice-presidents of the League of British Jews, that he had decided to contribute to the Jewish National Fund's Balfour Forest in Palestine.[35]

The Jewish Guardian welcomed the emergence of what it termed a new 'commercial Zionism', the product of 'the gradual but sure transformation of the movement known as Zionism into a series of undertakings of a financial and commercial character for the benefit of Palestine, and incidentally, of the shareholders in the companies which are taking control of that country'. It suggested that, in combining religious and economic principles, the practitioners of this new economic activity were proving to be 'better Zionists than the official Zionists'.[36]

These developments paved the way for the welcome which Anglo-Jewish non-Zionists gave to Chaim Weizmann's offer to incorporate them (and their counterparts in other countries) into an enlarged Jewish Agency. When that proposal was confirmed at the fifteenth Zionist Congress in September 1927, *The Jewish Guardian* hailed it as the birth of a new partnership which 'may mark the beginning of an epoch of united, steady, non-theoretical and business-like Zionist development'.[37]

This conciliation of the non-Zionist position with that of the Zionists had some drawbacks for the Zionist Organization in Britain. It

detracted from whatever ideological elan had animated the Zionists in the period of intense confrontation between the two viewpoints. Thus, in an incisive analysis of Zionism in Britain in mid-1922, the Zionist writer Paul Goodman noted that it was no exaggeration to say that the overwhelming mass of the Jews in Britain had come to sympathize in a general way with the Zionist idea. However, he doubted 'whether from the purely Zionist point of view, the unchecked dilution of the Zionist Organization is the happy consummation to be wished so long as the great majority of English Jews are still at heart non-Nationalist'. Having become 'innocuous and respectable', there was a danger that Zionism would 'lose itself in the sands of philanthropic Palestinism'.[38]

The expanded Jewish Agency in Great Britain

Chaim Weizmann's protracted efforts to mobilize worldwide non-Zionist financial support through the enlargement of the Jewish Agency into a full partnership between Zionists and non-Zionists finally reached fruition in 1929. In no major Jewish community was Weizmann's strategy more acceptable and applicable than it was in Anglo-Jewry. In Poland, he had to contend with the alternative notion of convoking a World Jewish Congress which would subsume both the Zionist programme for Palestine and the struggle for Jewish civil and minority rights in the Diaspora. In the United States, Judge Brandeis and his associates advocated yet another strategy: that the political functions of the World Zionist Organization having been achieved, all Jews who wished to help in the practical development of a Jewish home in Palestine be invited to join the existing organization. Even after the formal enlargement of the Agency in August 1929, serious difficulties were to frustrate all attempts to arrive at a satisfactory formula for non-Zionist representation in Poland, the United States, and in a number of other countries with major Jewish communities, whereas in Britain the matter was easily settled owing to the recognized status of the Board of Deputies of British Jews as the representative institution of Anglo-Jewry.

It was the Board of Deputies which had convened in April 1929 a conference to determine the participation of Anglo-Jewry in the enlarged Jewish Agency. Osmond d'Avigdor Goldsmid, who had been a founding member of the League of British Jews only some twelve years earlier, now presided over the gathering of two hundred delegates from every major Jewish community and institution in Great Britain. Its representative character, he declared, had 'no precedent in the annals of the Anglo-Jewish community'. His opening address summed up the conciliation which had taken place between the non-Zionists and the World Zionist Organization:[39]

> I come to a controversial point which I do not wish to shirk — the question of nationalism. When the Zionist Organization issued their invitation to us to take our share in the enlarged Agency, they made no conditions and asked no questions. Why should I ask any? I am a British citizen of the Jewish faith — proud of both. . . . As an Englishman I feel that so long as the British government holds the Mandate for Palestine, it is our bounden duty to assist in the development of the country. . . . I am content to leave the future destinies of Palestine to the generations that come after us, but to do *now* the work that lies in my hand — to strive for the rebuilding of a centre of culture, happiness and prosperity for our people.

At this founding conference it was decided that Anglo-Jewry be represented on the Jewish Agency by a delegation of non-Zionist members appointed by, and ultimately responsible to, the Board of Deputies, in partnership with Zionist representatives responsible to the Zionist Organization. Moreover, this partnership of representatives duly constituted itself as a permanent conference, meeting once a month under the chairmanship of d'Avigdor Goldsmid. The secretaries of the English Zionist Federation and of the Board of Deputies, Lavy Bakstansky and J. M. Rich respectively, were appointed joint honorary secretaries.

The Keren Hayesod (Palestine Foundation Fund) now became the financial instrument of the Jewish Agency. It was to be governed by non-Zionist and Zionist directors in equal numbers. After examining the possibility of reorganizing the administration of the Keren Hayesod as a separate body wholly independent of the Zionist Federation, it was decided instead, out of considerations of practicality, that the Keren Hayesod's administrative staff remain at the Zionist Federation's premises as before, on payment of an annual rent of £500. Concurrently with this partial relinquishing of Zionist Federation control over the Keren Hayesod, the Board of Deputies formalized its involvement with Zionism by appointing a Palestine Committee.[40]

Owing to this structural framework, the situation of the Jewish Agency in Britain was far more satisfactory than that which obtained in most other countries; and Lauterbach, who headed the Jewish Agency's Organization Department in Jerusalem, commented:[41]

> The best of relations exist between the local Zionists and the circles which are called non-Zionists. . . In England the difference between Zionists and non-Zionists is — for good or bad — not at all as difficult and explicit as in most other countries. . . . From the viewpoint of the Jewish Agency (as well as from that of pure Zionism) would that this situation existed in other countries.

The operative functioning of the Jewish Agency's Anglo-Jewish section was not, however, as satisfactory as its structure. London was already the seat of the Agency's Executive Committee, chosen on a worldwide basis at the biennial meetings of the Jewish Agency

Assembly. Furthermore, that Executive was aided by a local Political Commission, specially appointed to act as an advisory body. Hence, there was neither need nor opportunity for the Conference of British Members of the Jewish Agency to undertake the kind of representations to the British government that the members of the Jewish Agency domiciled in other countries might properly make.[42] The real significance of Anglo-Jewish participation in the enlarged Jewish Agency was, therefore, more symbolic than functional. It demonstrated to the British government and public a degree of Jewish solidarity over the question of Palestine which had hitherto not existed. This became apparent when there was an outbreak of Arab riots and murders of Jews in August 1929, precipitated by a dispute over Jewish religious observances at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. Non-Zionists, no less than Zionists, were outraged by those savage Arab attacks against the Yishuv. Nor were they less indignant at the ensuing recommendations of the Shaw Commission and the John Hope-Simpson report which culminated in the Passfield White Paper of 1930. The gist of that White Paper was that Jewish immigration and land purchases had become prejudicial to those Arab interests which Britain had undertaken to protect and should accordingly be restricted henceforth.

A series of energetic protests and negotiations with Ramsay MacDonald's government ensued. When these appeared to be futile, Chaim Weizmann dramatically announced on 20 October 1930 his resignation from the presidency of both the Jewish Agency and the Zionist Organization. With the acquiescence of the non-Zionists, Lord Melchett, joint chairman of the Council of the Jewish Agency and Felix Warburg, chairman of its Administrative Committee, then also announced their resignations. The ultimate outcome of that crisis was a triumph of Zionist diplomacy and public pressure leading to Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald's virtual retraction of the main points in the White Paper to which the Zionists as well as the non-Zionists objected.

In historical retrospect, however, this impressive demonstration of unity between Zionists and non-Zionists seems to have been only a flash in the pan. The participation of the Anglo-Jewish non-Zionists in the Jewish Agency was based on the assumption that the interpretation of Britain's obligations, as set out in the Churchill White Paper of 1922, had been accepted by the Zionists, especially by Weizmann himself.[43] The enthusiastic demonstration of unity in 1930 had arisen largely because Passfield's White Paper so patently contradicted even the non-Zionists' minimalist interpretation of the Mandatory's obligations towards the development of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. However, the fundamental questions which still ideologically divided non-Zionists from Zionists persisted: the definition of the Jewish entity and the compatibility of the Zionists' aspirations with the kind of

Palestinian society which the assimilationists advocated in order to protect their own rights in their countries of domicile.

The deterioration of the expanded Jewish Agency

As fate would have it, a combination of unfortunate circumstances was to cripple the expanded Jewish Agency in the first few years of its existence. First, there was the world's economic depression. The urgent need for a mobilization of funds had, after all, been the major motivation for the Zionists' initiative in enlarging the Agency. In the two-year period between 1 April 1925 and 31 March 1927, total Keren Hayesod income from all countries had reached a peak of £1,143,850 (Anglo-Jewry's share being £80,968). Worsening economic conditions had already led to a decline in 1927–29 to £858,078 (Anglo-Jewry's share being £35,783). Far from reversing the trend of decline, the first two years after the enlargement of the Agency (1929–31) saw a further drop to £647,177 while Anglo-Jewry's contribution rose to £47,030; and from 1931 to 1933 the total declined to a disturbing low of £400,072, with Anglo-Jewry's share also declining somewhat to £40,185.[44]

Second, in September 1929, only a few months after the establishment of the enlarged Jewish Agency, there occurred the untimely death of its foremost non-Zionist architect, Louis Marshall; and in 1930, the other major founder, Lord Melchett, died.[45] A further drawback was Weizmann's non-re-election to the presidency of the World Zionist Organization in mid-1931. But the greatest failing of all proved to be the lack of an effective organizational base for the mobilization and representation of the non-Zionists, especially in the United States. Already when the second Council meeting of the Jewish Agency was convened in 1931, the non-Zionists were unable to send their full complement of delegates; while at the third Council meeting in Prague in September 1933, there were only 25 non-Zionists (out of a total attendance of 82)and only one of them, Morris Karpf, was from the United States![46]

Against that background, some Zionist leaders began to agitate in 1933 for a redrawing of the Agency's constitution with a view to revising the principle of parity between Zionists and non-Zionists. The latter resented and resisted that attempt. As it was, they considered themselves to be under-represented owing to the fact that in most countries, not least of all in Britain, the amorphous nature of the non-Zionist constituency as often as not resulted in the election or appointment of known Zionists as members of the non-Zionist delegations to the Agency's Council meetings and to its Executive.

In the British Section of the Jewish Agency, however, relationships between Zionists and non-Zionists remained more harmonious than was the case in the United States. When the question of reorganizing

the Jewish Agency to alter the principle of parity was first raised at a meeting of the British section in March 1933, there was a calm and balanced discussion in which even some of the Zionists (Morris Meyer and Samuel Daiches) expressed opposition to any changes.[47] A committee appointed to consider reorganization proposals, whose members were all Zionists (Israel Feldman, Paul Goodman, Berl Locker, and Lavy Bakstansky) concluded that 'it would not be opportune to proceed to any substantial basic changes in the constitution of the Jewish Agency'.[48] The committee recommended that other countries should emulate British Jewry in finding methods of representation on a communal basis rather than resorting to the selection of prominent individuals. It also proposed that a positive nomenclature be found to replace the negative-sounding term 'non-Zionists' but could not make any definite suggestions.

However, even in Britain the tranquillity of the Jewish Agency's local section began to be disrupted when the energetic and assertive Neville Laski succeeded Osmond d'Avigdor Goldsmid as president of the Board of Deputies in January 1933. In that capacity he became a leading non-Zionist representative in the Jewish Agency, and it was Laski, more than any other leader in Anglo-Jewry, who was henceforth to personify the ongoing but uneasy co-operation between Zionists and non-Zionists in Britain.

Neville Laski was a first-generation Anglo-Jew who had received his education at a grammar school in Manchester, at Clifton College, and then at Oxford. He was called to the Bar in 1914. His father, Nathan Laski, was born in eastern Europe and had become a prominent leader of the Jewish community in Manchester where he had also been associated with Zionism. Neville Laski became a member of the Sephardi congregation after marrying a daughter of the Haham, Moses Gaster, and this brought him into association with members of the elite, patrician families of Anglo-Jewry. At the time of his election to the presidency of the Board of Deputies in 1933, he was only 42 years of age, already a King's Counsel, and regarded by many as a rising star in the Jewish community. The Zionists at first assumed that he viewed their aspirations favourably, for they invited him to join the leadership of the Zionist Federation in England.[49] He declined, but he did soon after attend, as a guest, the 18th World Zionist Congress held in August 1933 in Prague — the first time that a president of the Board of Deputies had been present at such a meeting. However, at the Jewish Agency Council Meeting which followed, it soon became evident that Laski identified whole-heartedly with the non-Zionist section. When some of the Zionists openly argued that the parity principle was unjustified, Laski took an active part in opposing them. An uneasy compromise was reached: no formal constitutional change was made, but only three non-Zionists were placed on the Jewish Agency Executive together

with ten Zionists: the remaining seven places were left theoretically available for the non-Zionists should they choose to fill them. Lack of enthusiasm of the American non-Zionists led to the election of English non-Zionists to the major positions — the second Lord Melchett became chairman of the Jewish Agency's Council while Neville Laski was chosen as co-chairman of its important Administrative Committee. In 1934 he became sole chairman.

While Laski was cautiously diplomatic in his dealings with the Zionist Organization, at heart he had a deep ideological dislike of the political Zionism which the organization embodied. Indeed, in his determination to resist its influence on the British governmental authorities, he was not above using devious methods.[50] He made a secretive approach to the Colonial Office in August 1934, just a few days before leaving for Lucerne to chair a meeting of the Jewish Agency's Administrative Committee. The Assistant Under-Secretary of State in charge of Palestine Affairs, A. Parkinson, recorded the conversation as follows: 'Mr. Laski began by saying this was of course a private talk: that he had come unknown to the Jewish Agency and that in coming at all — he, so to speak, took his life in his hands'. In what was a clear breach of Jewish Agency confidence, Laski proposed, according to Parkinson, not only that he should let him know privately what happened at Lucerne, but that there should also be 'some sort of secret and informal discussion between the Colonial Office and himself and his friends'.[51] Parkinson noted that Laski had come

> with the object of putting to me quite frankly certain doubts which are worrying him and his friends . . . as to the direction of Jewish affairs in connection with Palestine. The whole approach of the Jewish Agency is, they think, wrong, i.e., there should be a readjustment, as it were, which would substitute an economic for a political basis. In other words, as he put it, he and his friends feel that the right people are not in charge.

It is indicative of the strong sense of propriety of the officials at the Colonial Office that they were disinclined to accept Laski's suggestion. The Colonial Secretary, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, wished to maintain 'close contact with men like Laski and Goldsmid', who stood 'for something solid and representative in British Jewry', but the officials showed great reluctance to engage in secret conversations behind the backs of the acknowledged Jewish Agency leaders. Indeed, another Assistant Under-Secretary, J. B. Williams, praised Selig Brodetsky whom Laski had slighted and described as a person of 'non-British origin' and one who thought on 'international lines'. Williams found nothing to fault in 'his international outlook' adding, 'Naturally, any good Zionist wishes to see the Jewish National Home developed as fully as possible'. There is no record to indicate that anything came of this unconventional approach by Laski.

At the international level of Jewish affairs, Neville Laski allied himself closely with the leading American non-Zionists, in particular with Felix Warburg, Cyrus Adler, and Morris Waldman. It was with a view to strengthening links with the Americans that he convened in New York at the end of 1934 the first meeting of the Administrative Committee under his chairmanship. At the next meeting of the Jewish Agency's Council, which took place at Lucerne in 1935, Laski was foremost in resisting the by now adamant demand of the Zionist leaders, mainly David Ben-Gurion, that the fifty-fifty principle of representation be discontinued.

During the gathering at Lucerne, a special conference took place between the leading non-Zionists present (Laski, Karpf, Waldman, Hexter, Simon, and Senator) and some representatives of the Zionist Executive (Ben-Gurion, Brodetsky, and Locker) to thrash out the question of whether the parity principle was to be retained on the Executive.[52] Laski took the view that there was only one acceptable alternative to complete parity: three non-Zionists and three Zionists in Jerusalem, plus two Zionists in London, the latter to be approved by both Zionists and non-Zionists. But Ben-Gurion firmly rejected Laski's proposals; he contended that the original reasons for parity were no longer relevant since the envisaged equal common effort had not materialized. Financially, there had not been anything in any way comparable to what might have been expected: Anglo-Jewry's contribution had made next to no difference notwithstanding the fact that the Jewish Agency had found more co-operation in Britain than it had in other countries. He argued: 'Life changes paper constitutions. Let us not alter the paper but try to find a solution acceptable to everyone, doing justice to both'. He suggested an understanding whereby only three non-Zionists would sit on the Executive of the Jewish Agency irrespective of the number of Zionists in the coalition arrived at by the Zionist Congress.

Taking the lead against Ben-Gurion's position, Laski said that as a lawyer an agreement was sacred to him and he could not acquiesce in breaches of the terms of the original Agency agreement. 'I and my friends want to continue in the partnership', he declared, 'but not as members of a depressed class'. He added that although they were prepared to take up only three places on the Executive, they wished this to be without prejudice to their rights to take up full representation at a later stage. They wanted 'moral parity' rather than numerical parity on the Jewish Agency Executive. Writing during the sessions to Felix Warburg, who was unable to be present, Laski commented: 'The Zionists are on top of the wave, drunk with an amazing draught of self-esteem and sense of power. If a break does not come now, it will come later'. To d'Avigdor Goldsmid, who had also been unable to attend, he wrote that rumour had it that 'Weizmann will not have fifty-fifty at any

price, and will if need be, let the Agency go. A pretty example of a father destroying his child'. He added: 'Whilst I understand their [the Zionists'] point of view, they have no glimmer of appreciation of ours. They want to Gleichshaltung us and have totalitarianism'.[53]

The Zionist leadership reacted to Laski by seeing to his demotion from the position of chairman of the important Administrative Committee to that of co-vice-chairman with Berl Locker. Herbert Speyer was elected chairman. When Warburg afterwards remonstrated with Chaim Weizmann over the tactless slight shown to Laski, Weizmann replied:[54]

> As to the alleged brutal treatment of Laski, I am sure you will not deny me the right to say that I could not work with him because I do not consider him the right man for this position. . . . He has, in my opinion, neither the qualifications nor the training for being the Chairman of the Administrative Committee of the Jewish Agency. I must say this — it is no longer sufficient for a Jewish public leader to be an English K.C. and to have had a Public School education. . . . According to reports I have received, he behaved at the meetings at Lucerne in such a way that no-one seemed to have a good word to say for him.

Although Laski was thus not influential in the international dealings of the Jewish Agency, he carried much weight in the internal politics of Anglo-Jewry, as was evident in the controversy over the World Jewish Congress. The WJC had been founded in 1936 with the blessing of the Zionist Organization and was, from the outset, essentially Zionist in orientation. In effect, it assumed a role complementary to that of the Zionist Organization: the latter purported to be the representative of the Jewish people with regard to Palestine, while the WJC aspired to international recognition as 'the representative body of the Jewish collectivity in matters relating to Jewish life in the Diaspora'.[55] Consequently, the non-Zionists were hostile to the WJC from its inception. The very notion of an international Jewish body — positing that the Jews were a unified national entity, rather than merely co-religionists of various citizenships — was anathema to them. In their eyes, it by far exceeded the dangers of Zionist notions which at least had the saving grace of limiting full Jewish nationhood to the entity in process of formation in Palestine.

Neville Laski vehemently opposed Anglo-Jewish participation in the WJC and assiduously canvassed votes for the Board's rejection of the invitation to join it.[56] He insisted that Anglo-Jewry already possessed in the Joint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association a traditionally recognized and perfectly adequate body for dealing with matters affecting Jews in foreign countries, and that mistaken 'conceptions of the Jewish people as a united national organism' endangered the civic rights of Jews in all countries. To the Foreign Office he presented a memorandum in April

1937 utterly refuting the claim of the World Jewish Congress to be a representative organization and requesting that it be denied entrée to the Foreign Office. 'In fact', he wrote, 'there is no unity nor can there be among Jews of different nationality, who when they meet, simply reflect the views and attitudes of the country of which they are citizens'.[57] A year earlier, he had been successful at the Board of Deputies' debate on the WJC in April 1936: by a majority of twenty-four, the vote went against acceptance of the invitation to join in the founding of the World Jewish Congress.[58]

Another issue on which Laski successfully managed affairs to the advantage of the non-Zionist view was the vexing question of a legislative council in Palestine, as a stage towards self-government. For the Zionist Organization, to permit the formation of a legislative council reflecting the clear Arab majority which prevailed (as it was likely to, unless ingenious alternative devices could be found) would spell disaster for the development of the National Home; but to oppose its formation would place the Zionists in the invidious position of being anti-democratic. For years, this dilemma had plagued the Zionist Organization's policy makers. Only by dint of resourceful tactical manoeuvrings, the indecisiveness of the British authorities, and Arab intransigence, had they managed to delay matters. However, in early 1936 the High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope, renewed with some vigour the plan for a legislative council. This embarrassed the non-Zionists, even more than it did the Zionists. Admittedly, the notion of a legislative council leading to self-government was, *prima facie*, wholly consonant with the former's original conception of the Yishuv as just another Jewish community enjoying no exclusive privileges, in an ultimately Palestinian state. However, since they were now partners with the Zionists in the enlarged Jewish Agency, Neville Laski and his non-Zionist associates were aware of the danger which a legislative assembly posed for the future of the Yishuv. On the other hand, they were alarmed at the 'raging tearing campaign' which the Zionists were about to launch in protest at the imminent establishment of a legislative council by Order in Council.

Laski therefore used all his powers of persuasion to dissuade the Zionists from holding extremist protest meetings throughout the country, and advocated instead a well-disciplined Anglo-Jewish Conference which, while it would resolve against the establishment of a legislative council 'at the present time', would also express a positive willingness to negotiate on the matter with the Colonial Office. In this he was supported not only by leading non-Zionists such as Lionel Cohen and d'Avigdor Goldsmid, but also by Norman Bentwich and Leonard Stein who had long been associated with the Zionist camp and even by Blanche Dugdale (the dedicated 'Gentile Zionist'). With some difficulty, he also managed to restrain an indignant Sir Robert Waley

Cohen from publicly attacking the Zionist attitude in the matter and thereby spoiling the united front presented by the Jewish Agency.[59] Laski wrote to Felix Warburg in New York about the course of action he was following:[60]

> We said that we thought there was [by the English Zionist Federation] a complete misstatement of the position. We had not a good case upon the legislative council . . . a Minister would have an easy task on the Colonial Office Vote in that part of his speech which referred to the creation of the Legislative Council and the Jewish refusal to cooperate. I said — and Stein wholly supported me — that I thought that the Zionists had created a volcanic state of mind, which they were not now in a position to control.

As Laski had advised, the Jewish Agency for Palestine, British Section, convened a special conference of Anglo-Jewry on 19 January 1936; and he put forward his arguments eloquently alongside Selig Brodetsky and other Zionists.[61] As it happened, under the cumulative impact of Weizmann's diplomacy as well as events in Palestine, where the Arabs unleashed a campaign of non-co-operation and rebellion in mid-1936, the plan for a legislative council finally lapsed.[62]

The turning point at which pent-up ideological dissonance began seriously to disrupt co-operation between Zionists and non-Zionists in Britain, as elsewhere, was the partition proposal recommended by the Royal Commission of Inquiry in July 1937. Partition was utterly unacceptable to the non-Zionists. It contradicted their fundamental emancipationist belief that people of different religions and ethnic origins could and should live harmoniously together in the same state; and the immediate prospect of a sovereign Jewish state was alarming —renewing the very fears which had animated anti-Zionism before the Balfour Declaration: fears that antisemitic forces everywhere would exploit the situation to declare the Jews to be aliens, deny or withdraw their civic emancipation, and tell them to go to their own country.

On 19 July 1937, a group of the foremost non-Zionists associated with the Jewish Agency in Britain met at New Court to consider the partition recommendation 'from the standpoint of British Jews who were not Zionists and opposed the "Jewish nation" conception'. Anthony de Rothschild presided and those present included Sir Osmond d'Avigdor Goldsmid, Sir Robert Waley Cohen, Neville Laski, Leonard G. Montefiore, and Otto Schiff. Maurice Hexter from the United States was also present.[63] D'Avigdor Goldsmid and Laski anxiously reported on an interview with Dr Weizmann at which he 'had expressed his gratification at the Report and appeared to be more than willing to accept its recommendations, subject to certain modifications . . .'. Weizmann had also anticipated that at the forthcoming Zionist Congress the resolutions would be so framed as not to express opposition to the partition proposals. The consensus of those present was that what was called for was not partition but renewed negotiations

with influential Arabs — 'even if agreement with the Arabs meant a reduction of immigration, it would be well if partition could be avoided'. While it was felt that a public pronouncement of opposition to partition was undesirable at that moment, it was decided to make informal approaches to the government to see 'if, as appeared probable on good authority, agreement could after all be come to between Jews and Arabs, the Government would for its part be ready to suspend the implementation of the Royal Commissions' proposals'.[64]

At the fifth biennial session of the Jewish Agency Council in Zurich in August 1937, Felix Warburg, leading the American non-Zionist delegation, adopted a strong line even to the point of threatening dissolution of the enlarged Jewish Agency framework. 'The non-Zionists', he protested, 'always understood that the Jewish State idea would not be pursued by the Jewish Agency'. He was implacably opposed to partition and to the creation of a Jewish state and urged that a further attempt be made at serious Arab-Jewish negotiations for a united Palestine before any discussions on partition with the British government were even contemplated. He insisted that a final decision on the matter should properly rest with the Jewish Agency Council, and not with the Zionist Executive, and he was also adamant that the principle of parity representation between Zionists and non-Zionists must be sustained. Neville Laski, Anglo-Jewry's main non-Zionist spokesman, while concurring with Warburg on all essentials, expressed himself with rather more moderation. He guardedly avoided the term 'Jewish State' and pleaded for a gradual development which might ultimately lead to 'the formation of Jewish Palestine as an entity of the British Commonwealth of Nations'. Before that could happen, Palestine would have to continue under British Mandate but with changes providing for increased Jewish immigration and vastly enlarged communal autonomy for both Jews and Arabs.[65]

The Council of the Jewish Agency arrived at a compromise that followed the main lines of the Zionist Congress resolution which had preceded it. It rejected the assertion of the Palestine Royal Commission that the Palestine Mandate had proved unworkable and called for a conference of Jews and Arabs to reach a peaceful settlement in an undivided Palestine under continued British Mandate. At the same time, it empowered the Jewish Agency's Executive to enquire into the precise terms of the British government's 'proposed establishment of a Jewish State'. However, it stipulated that a final decision on any such scheme would rest with the Jewish Agency Council.

On the question of parity of Zionist and non-Zionist representation, a compromise was reached — the non-Zionists would appoint five representatives against seven by the Zionists, but the twelve members would not be regarded as representing either Zionists or non-Zionists. In other words, the principle of parity was officially retained but the

Executive as a whole would have a neutral complexion. In return, the non-Zionists refrained from insisting on numerical parity in practice.

Whereas over the past decade the British non-Zionists had been growing more sympathetic to Weizmann's moderate leadership strategies, they now not only found themselves at loggerheads with him over the partition issue but, ironically, in league with the extremist New Zionist Organization and with the editor of *The Jewish Chronicle*, Ivan Greenberg, who both vigorously opposed partition.[66] In the first instance, the non-Zionists endeavoured to persuade Weizmann that alternatives to partition ought to be considered further. D'Avigdor Goldsmid was convinced that pressure on Weizmann to this end, rather than independent action, was the proper course for the non-Zionists to follow. 'If we sat down with the Arabs and came to an agreement', he submitted to Laski, 'we could not "deliver the goods": Weizmann is the only person who can do so, and, therefore, all possible pressure must be exercised on him and his friends'.[67] What he had in mind was negotiations with accredited representatives of the Arab Higher Committee. On 20 July 1937, he obtained from Weizmann an assurance that 'in spite of the fact that he was himself in favour of the Jewish State, he would loyally proceed with any negotiations, and, though he was of the opinion that a Jewish State would come in time, he was quite prepared now to accept a revised mandate and a united Palestine'. D'Avigdor Goldsmid, in turn, assured Weizmann that if he so acted 'he would have the full support of non-nationalist British Jewry'.[68]

A variety of such negotiations took place at that time[69] but agreement with Arab leaders proved unattainable; and Weizmann settled firmly on acceptance of partition in principle. Indeed, after the Zionist Congress and the Jewish Agency Council meeting of August 1937 endorsed the partition recommendation in principle as a basis for negotiations, Weizmann became increasingly irate at the non-Zionists' persistent manoeuvrings to explore and present alternatives. To one of his aides he wrote:[70]

> I believe Laski is placing himself in a very wrong position. He has voted for the resolution: as to the others — they represent an infinitesimal minority amongst millions and in my opinion they take upon themselves a terrible responsibility. If not for their interference in 1917 before the Balfour Declaration was given we would have had a different Declaration and things might have gone differently. Are they prepared to take responsibility for their step now, upset the march of events, try for peace with the Arabs while they are killing us; perhaps still further limit our immigration? What would the Jews of the world say or think?
>
> I'm ill and cannot enter into an analysis of their ideology, but I do appeal to them to think of the consequences which might follow! They are only a small group of people as against millions of suffering Jews!

On the non-Zionist side, Sir Robert Waley Cohen had long been equally irate. He believed that Laski was far too timid in resisting the Zionists. Already in November 1936 Sir Robert had rebuked him for allowing himself 'to be in fact and in action led by the nose by the Zionists'.[71] In February 1937 he told Laski that he doubted whether it was worth maintaining 'a so called United Front for a [Zionist] policy which we all feel to be unsound'. The time had come 'when Warburg and the rest of us should make it clear to Weizmann that unless he will agree to consultation, we must publicly express our dissent from the Zionist position and express in our own language the Jewish attitude towards the Palestinian problem'. Yet in the same breath Waley Cohen added a noteworthy comment which admirably captures the essence of the commitment which the Anglo-Jewish non-Zionists had by now made to the idea of a Jewish National Home: 'We realise that the Jewish flag is nailed to the mast of Palestine and that whatever happens therefore will carry credit or discredit to the Jews for generations to come'.[72]

The partition controversy of 1937, because it dealt with the imminent prospect of a Jewish state, marked the turning point in the fate of the enlarged Jewish Agency. Thereafter, the strategy of the Zionist political leadership, especially that of David Ben-Gurion, was dominated by the thrust towards sovereign Jewish statehood. The non-Zionists in Britain, as in the United States, still had grave reservations about the desirability of a Jewish state. However, their opposition was overridden by the Zionists who allowed the enlarged Jewish Agency to atrophy. Moreover, in Britain, the Zionists determined to gain hegemony over the representative institution of Anglo-Jewry — the Board of Deputies of British Jews. The non-Zionists' response to these developments until 1948 will be the subject of a second article to be published in this Journal.

Acknowledgements

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NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS

AJA	Anglo-Jewish Archives, Mocatta Library, London
BD	Archives of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, London
CZA	Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem

JC *The Jewish Chronicle*, London (weekly)
JG *The Jewish Guardian*, London (weekly)
JO *Jewish Opinion*, London (monthly)
PRO Public Record Office, Kew, London
ZR *The Zionist Review*, London

[1] See, for example, Leonard Stein, *The Balfour Declaration*, London, 1961; Isaiah Friedman, *The Question of Palestine, 1914–1918*, London, 1973; and Stuart A. Cohen, *English Zionists and British Jews*, Princeton, 1982.

[2] Undated circular in BD E3/208.

[3] See report by M. A. Green and J. Gluckstein (1919) in BD E3/208.

[4] *JC*, 28 April 1926, p. 15. Even in earlier years only a few tens of members had attended the annual general meetings. Until 1919, *The Jewish Year Book* gave its office address at 38 Fitzroy Square and listed its honorary officers and organizing secretary. In 1930 it ceased to have its own office and its address was given as c/o Messrs N. M. Rothschild and Sons, New Court. In 1936 the position of secretary was no longer mentioned and in 1940 only the chairman of the trustees, Lionel de Rothschild, was mentioned.

[5] The first issue of *The Jewish Guardian* appeared on 3 October 1919 while *Jewish Opinion* was still being published, and it ceased publication in 1931. Although the League claimed that it had 'no part whatever in the control of the newcomer', (*JO*, October 1919), there is clear evidence in BD E3/208 that *The Jewish Guardian* was founded to propagate the League's ideological viewpoint.

[6] See, for example, Claude Montefiore, 'Nation or Religious Community?', *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England*, vol. 4, 1903, pp. 1–15. References to this paper were repeatedly made by non-Zionists in later years. Montefiore had asked whether the Jews were '*still* a nation professing a particular religion which is professed by no other nation . . .' (my italics).

[7] See 'Zionism', by an Englishman of the Jewish Faith, *The Fortnightly Review*, November 1916, pp. 819–26. The author was Claude Montefiore.

[8] Michael A. Green, 'The Claims of the League of British Jews' (Address to the Liberal Jewish Synagogue, 11 May 1919), *Supplement to JO*, June 1919, pp. 1, 2.

[9] See Harry Sacher, *Jewish Emancipation: The Contract Myth*, published by the English Zionist Federation, London, 1917.

[10] Israel Abrahams, 'Nationalism and Emancipation in England', *JO*, August 1919, pp. 5, 6.

[11] This line of argument involving a conjectural foray into the past appears repeatedly in the argumentation offered by the Leaguers. For instance, *JO* stated: 'It is perfectly obvious to any clear minded observer that if the struggle for emancipation had to be fought now for the first time in England, a favourable issue would be far from secure. For that deplorable fact we have to thank the follies and fallacies of the "Jewish Nationalists"'. *JO*, June 1919, p. 4.

[12] See Lucien Wolf, 'The Zionist Peril', *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, vol. 17, October 1904, pp. 1–25: 'With regard to emancipation and assimilation, my first reason for refusing to acquiesce in the Zionist contention in regard to Russia is that that Empire is not exempt from the law of political progress by which the whole of the Western World is governed' (p. 14); and 'the chances of

emancipation are by no means desperate and the capacity of the Russian Jew for assimilation is in no way inferior to that of his Western co-religionists' (p. 18).

[13] See *JO*, August 1919, p. 4.

[14] Undated printed leaflet entitled *The League of British Jews: The Need for the League*, BD E3/208. The quotations were respectively from *The Morning Post*, 10 July 1917, and *The New Witness*, 12 July and 11 October 1917.

[15] This summary draws upon the 'Statement on the Palestine Question' published in *The Times* of 17 May 1917 and on many similar statements published by the League of British Jews. See BD C11/12/54 and AJA 37/6/1b/3.

[16] See *JO*, December 1918, p. 8. On objections to a Jewish university, see also Claude G. Montefiore, 'The Dangers of Zionism', *JC*, 13 December 1918.

[17] *JO*, December 1918, p. 4.

[18] See the exchange of correspondence between Lionel de Rothschild, President of the League, and Louis Marshall, President of the American Jewish Committee, June and July 1918, published in *JO*, December 1918, p. 2. Of course, what the League would have most liked was the kind of declaration suggested by Claude Montefiore when he was one of the eight Jews consulted by the British government before the issue of the Balfour Declaration: 'H.M. Government is anxious that free and unimpeded Jewish immigration into Palestine should be established. It views with favour unrestricted Jewish Colonization in that country. It will do its best to facilitate such immigration and colonization. It will also seek to secure such municipal and local autonomy for the Jews as may be possible and as the circumstances of the case may demand; it being clearly understood. . . .': Copy of letter from C. Montefiore to M. Hankey, Secretary of the War Cabinet, 12 October 1917, AJA 37/6/1b/3.

[19] See *JO*, December 1918, p. 4.

[20] See *JO*, February 1919, p. 8.

[21] *JG*, 13 February 1920, p. 1: 'We venture seriously to deprecate this fresh instance of the bad and growing practice of responsible ministers of the Crown lending their names to sensational articles on important matters of public policy'. See similar criticism of a speech by Lord Balfour, *JG*, 8 October 1920, p. 1.

[22] *JO*, December 1918, p. 4.

[23] Chaim Weizmann repeatedly ascribed these concerns and intentions to those 'assimilated cosmopolitan Jews, mostly belonging to the *Haute* finance, who have lost contact with the development of Jewish life and ideas'. See Weizmann to Arthur J. Balfour, 3 October 1917, in Leonard Stein, ed., *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, Series A, vol. 7, London, 1975, pp. 521, 522; and Weizmann to M. Hankey, 15 October 1917, ibid., pp. 533, 534.

[24] See Lucien Wolf, 'The Zionist Peril', *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, October 1904, p. 9.

[25] *JO*, December 1918, p. 4.

[26] See M. A. Green, 'The Claims of the League of British Jews', op. cit.

[27] *JO*, October 1919, p. 2, stated 'Palestine must not be governed as a Christian or as a Jewish or as a Moslem State, but as a State where all races and religions have an absolutely equal position'.

[28] *JG*, 5 March 1920, p. 1 and 6 August 1920, p. 1.
[29] *British Parliamentary Papers*, Command 1700, June 1922, pp. 17–21.
[30] *JG*, 7 July 1922, p. 3.
[31] *JG*, 21 July 1922, p. 10.
[32] After August 1922, *The Jewish Guardian*'s editorial comments are replete with conciliatory and complimentary utterances about Weizmann's leadership of Zionism. See, for example, *JG*, 2 March 1923, and 30 March 1923.
[33] *JG*, 30 March 1923, p. 1; 4 May 1923, p. 3; and 30 March 1923, p. 3.
[34] See Robert Henriques, *Sir Robert Waley Cohen 1877–1952*, London, 1966, p. 269.
[35] See *JG*, 23 December 1927, p. 8.
[36] See *JG*, 8 October 1926, p. 1 and 15 October 1926, p. 1.
[37] *JG*, 23 September 1927, p. 4.
[38] See Paul Goodman, 'The E.Z.F. at the Crossroads', *ZR*, vol. 6, nos. 3–4, July–August 1922, p. 27. Much the same lament was repeated a few years later, in June 1925, in a similar analysis by Phineas Horowitz. He recalled that in the early days, the Zionist movement drew its strength 'from the enthusiasm born of the struggle against the virile opposition. . . . Today, of that opposition there remained but a passive and incoherent remnant'. See P. Horowitz, 'The Future Organization of the E.Z.F.', *ZR*, June 1925, p. 15.
[39] See *The New Judaea*, vol. 5, no. 8, April 1929, for the protocol of the conference.
[40] See 'Report on Schemes Suggested for Securing the Financial Support of British Non-Zionists for the Jewish Agency' by L. Bakstansky and J. M. Rich, 22 November 1929; and 'Conference of British Members of the Jewish Agency for Palestine: Report of the Organising Committee, 12 December 1929', CZA, Z4/20214. The Board of Deputies' Palestine Committee consisted of the Board's president, vice-presidents, treasurer, and sixteen other deputies, together with such representatives of the Anglo-Jewish community on the Jewish Agency as were not already members of the Palestine Committee.
[41] CZA, Lauterbach to Senator, 6 July 1936, [in German] S29/62.
[42] 'Memorandum on the Political Functions of the Conference of British Members of the Jewish Agency for Palestine', by L. Bakstansky and J. M. Rich, 31 December 1929, CZA, Z4/20214.
[43] Cyrus Adler, who chaired the second meeting of the Jewish Agency Council in July 1931, quoted directly from the White Paper of 1922: see Ben Halpern, *The Idea of the Jewish State*, 2nd edn., Cambridge, Mass., 1969, pp. 203, 204.
[44] The Keren Hayesod figures are taken from *Report of the Executives of the Zionist Organisation and of the Jewish Agency for Palestine Submitted to the 20th Zionist Congress and the 5th Session of the Council of the Jewish Agency*, August 1937, p. 274. The British Keren Hayesod figures are from *Report of the Executive of the Zionist Organisation Submitted to the 16th Zionist Congress at Zurich*, July 1929, p. 139 and *Report of the Executive of the Zionist Organisation Submitted to the 17th Zionist Congress at Prague*, August 1933, p. 101.
[45] Lord Melchett of Landford (Alfred Moritz Mond), the industrialist and former cabinet minister, had become an enthusiastic convert to Zionism after the Balfour Declaration. See Hector Bolitho, *Alfred Mond*, London, 1933, p. 359.
[46] In the first Executive of the Jewish Agency in 1930 there were only four non-Zionists: Dr Morris Hexter (the only American), Dr Werner Senator

(who was in fact a moderate Zionist) Isaac B. Berkson (who was also a Zionist, although non-party), and Dr Bernard Kahn. See Menahem Kaufman, *Non-Zionists in America and the Struggle for Jewish Statehood* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1984, pp. 21, 22.

[47] See Minutes of the Jewish Agency for Palestine (British Section), 7 March 1933, CZA, Z4/10002.

[48] See 'Report of Committee to Reconsider Proposals Relating to the Reorganisation of the Jewish Agency', 19 June 1933, in CZA, Z4/20214a.

[49] Paul Goodman (for Honorary Officers of the Zionist Federation) to N. Laski, 27 January 1933 and Laski to Goodman, 7 February 1933, BD E1/111. See also the favourable article on Neville Laski in the 'Communal Personalities' column, *ZR*, January 1935, p. 166.

[50] Even Laski's non-Zionist colleagues had cause to criticize his behaviour. For instance, Leo Simon, a prominent European non-Zionist, objected strongly to Laski being given the chairmanship of the Jewish Agency's Administrative Committee, on the grounds that he was untrustworthy and had 'on two occasions . . . shamelessly broken the pledge he had given me to stand for a certain policy. . . . I am personally convinced that he will always subordinate the general interest to his own': Leo Simon to W. Senator, 10 May 1935, CZA, S29/62.

[51] See PRO, CO 733/266, file 37542.

[52] Laski's detailed notes on the conference, held on 15 August 1935 at the Lucernehof, are in BD E3/75.

[53] N. Laski to F. Warburg, 23 August 1935 and to d'Avigdor Goldsmid, 22 August 1935, BD E3/75.

[54] Weizmann to F. Warburg, 24 January 1936, in Yemima Rosenthal, ed., *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, Series A, vol. 17, Jerusalem, 1979, p. 159.

[55] See A. Leon Kubowitzki, *Unity in Dispersion. A History of the World Jewish Congress*, World Jewish Congress, New York, 1948, pp. 70–71.

[56] For example, Laski wrote to Bertram Benas, a deputy of the Board from Liverpool: 'I want you not only to attend yourself but to see the other Liverpool members and get them to attend and vote against participation. . . . Every vote counts . . . I happen to know that the opposition are making the most strenuous efforts to snatch a victory': Laski to B. Benas, 12 April 1936, BD B5/2/9.

[57] Neville Laski to Sir R. Vansittart, 4 April 1937, PRO, FO 371/20825.

[58] BD Minute Books, 28, p. 96, Meeting on 26 April 1936: 81 voted to accept the invitation, 105 to decline.

[59] See Laski to R. Waley Cohen, 15 January 1936, BD E3/210. Waley Cohen was of the opinion that the Jewish Agency ought to agree to the establishment of a legislative council.

[60] Laski to F. Warburg, 13 January 1936, BD E3/210.

[61] At the conference, the gravamen of Laski's objections to the current Colonial Office plan was that it contradicted two principles to which the Mandate was legally and morally bound. The first, as stated in article 2 of the Mandate, was: 'The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home . . .'. The second principle was stated in Ramsay MacDonald's 1931 letter to Weizmann that His Majesty's

Government recognized that the undertaking by the Mandate was 'to the Jewish people and not only to the Jewish population in Palestine'. See 'Speeches Delivered at the Special Conference of Anglo-Jewry', 19 January 1936, BD E3/210.

[62] See Norman Rose, *The Gentile Zionists*, London, 1973, pp. 41–69.

[63] See 'Meeting at New Court, 4 p.m. Monday 19th July 1917', BD E3/237.

[64] What the non-Zionists contemplated was along the lines of Norman Bentwich's memorandum, 'Suggested Basis for Negotiations between Jewish and Arab Representatives with a View to Finding an Alternative Settlement to Partition in Palestine, 14 July 1937' (BD E3/237). His proposals included termination of the Mandate in five years, and the creation of an autonomous undivided Palestine government (including Transjordan) in treaty with Great Britain, with Jews and Arabs equally represented on a central basis. He also recommended, however, a limitation of Jewish immigration for five years 'by some relation to the existing population and the difference between the natural increase of the Arabs over the natural increase of the Jews'.

[65] See the summary of the Fifth Jewish Agency Council Session in *The New Judaea*, August/September 1937, pp. 232 ff and 'Text of Speech by Neville Laski', 18 August 1937, in BD E3/237; and Brotman's report of the proceedings in E3/268.

[66] Benjamin Akzin, Chairman of the Presidency of the New Zionist Organization, met Laski with a view to co-operation in their common opposition to partition. See 'Note of interview with Professor Akzin', 1 June 1937, BD E3/236.

[67] d'Avigdor Goldsmid to Laski, 29 July 1937, BD E3/237.

[68] See Memorandum of Interview with Dr Weizmann, 20 July 1937, by d'Avigdor Goldsmid, BD E3/237.

[69] This was a period of intensive discussions between various Arab and Jewish personalities mainly on the common basis of opposition to partition. On the Jewish side they were conducted by Judah Magnes, Albert Hyamson, and Haim Kalvarisky; and also by Moshe Shertok of the Jewish Agency. See Yehoyada Haim, *Abandonment of Illusions: Zionist Political Attitudes Towards Palestinian Arab Nationalism 1936–1939*, Boulder, Colorado, 1983, pp. 100–11.

[70] See Weizmann to Arthur Lourie, 20 November 1936, in Aaron Klieman, ed., *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, Series A, vol. 18, Jerusalem, 1979, pp. 246, 247.

[71] See R. Waley Cohen to N. Laski, 24 November 1936, BD E3/234.

[72] See Waley Cohen to N. Laski, 8 February 1937, BD E3/235.

RECENT TRENDS IN ANGLO-JEWISH MARRIAGES

Barry A. Kosmin and Stanley Waterman

IN an article published in the June 1967 issue of this Journal, 'Statistics of Jewish Marriages in Great Britain: 1901–1965', S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool noted that there had been a substantial decline in the rate of synagogue marriages. Since such a rate is based on an estimate of the total Jewish population and such an estimate could be subject to serious error, they decided 'to examine the change in the absolute number of marriages between . . . 1935 and 1965. Even the most sceptical would agree that the Jewish population of this country has been augmented by a number of immigrations since 1935; yet the number of synagogue marriages has fallen from 2,638 in that year to 1,765 in 1965, that is, by 33 per cent.'[1]

In the June 1970 issue of this Journal, the same authors published a follow-up study on synagogue marriages in Great Britain in 1966–68. They concluded that although there had been a sharp increase in marriages in 1966–68 there was 'nothing to indicate any reversal of the longer-term trend of a declining rate of synagogue marriages'.[2] This paper considers developments until the early 1980s.

In 1914, synagogue marriages constituted 1 per cent of all religious marriages in England and Wales, while the Anglo-Jewish community was estimated to number around 280,000, approximately 0.8 per cent of the total population.[3] The disproportionately high rate of synagogue marriages reflected the young age structure and the traditional religious outlook of the largely immigrant Jewish population at that period. That rate was maintained until about 1950, when a decline occurred, bringing down the proportion of synagogue marriages to only 0.6 per cent of all religious marriages in England and Wales by 1961. In the 'swinging sixties', as rapid secularization became evident in British society, the number of synagogue marriages remained fairly steady while the number of Gentile religious weddings declined. By 1971, synagogue marriages, by simply maintaining their absolute figures, had come to constitute 0.9 per cent of all religious weddings in England and Wales.[4]

In the following decade, however, the effects of a delayed reaction became apparent and there was greatly increased secularization in the Anglo-Jewish community so that by 1981 synagogue weddings

accounted for only 0.6 per cent of the (much reduced) total of all religious marriages in the country[5] (see Figure 1).

FIGURE 1. *Marriage trends 1961–84*



The Statistical and Demographic Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews was established in 1965 and one of its first tasks was to gather systematic data on Jewish marriages. It has since collected statistics annually from communal religious bodies. The Office of the Chief Rabbi is the central source for the vast majority of Jewish marriages which are performed under Central Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox auspices. The Research Unit also collects data from other Independent Central Orthodox synagogues as well as from the Sephardi, Reform, and Liberal synagogues of England, Wales, and Scotland (Great Britain).

The Registrar General for England and Wales published statistics of religious marriages (including synagogue weddings) at five-yearly intervals from 1844 until 1934. The Second World War caused an interruption in the pattern and official statistics on religious marriages became available again from 1952 onwards. The 1952 figures showed that a substantial decline had occurred during the 18-year period in which statistics were not published, with synagogue marriages falling from 2,233 in 1934 to 1,876 in 1952.

There is some discrepancy between the Research Unit's Jewish marriage statistics and those for England and Wales published by the Registrar General. This is because the Registrar General's figures

cover those marriages which are solemnized only in a synagogue and consequently recorded by the statutory synagogue Marriage Secretary or local Registrar as being 'according to the usages of the Jews'. If there is a civil marriage at a Register Office which precedes a synagogue ceremony, the religious wedding cannot be recorded as a Jewish marriage by the Registrar General since he wishes to avoid double-counting in his statistics. Prais and Schmool stated that over a period of several decades the annual average of those unrecorded or 'unreported' Jewish marriages constituted about 10 per cent of the total.[6]

The Research Unit's statistics of synagogue marriages have always included Scotland but it was only from 1977 onwards that it became feasible to distinguish the Scottish synagogue returns from the total so that there could be a strict basis for comparison when dealing with the Registrar General's figures for England and Wales.

In returns to the Board of Deputies, all reporting communal bodies are asked to subdivide their marriage returns into 'marriages reported to the Registrar General' and 'unreported (religious-rites-only)' ceremonies. Discrepancies occur because in their reports to the Board of Deputies there is a tendency by synagogues to exaggerate slightly their annual returns to the Registrar General and correspondingly to understate their religious-rites-only figures, as shown in Table 1. The only year in which this discrepancy exceeded two per cent was 1979. The number of 'religious-rites-only' ceremonies in returns to the Board of Deputies is always larger among the non-Orthodox synagogue groupings.

TABLE 1. *Synagogue Marriages in England and Wales, 1977–82*

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
1. Total synagogue marriages according to Board of Deputies	1346	1250	1261	1192	1146	1075
2. Registrar General's returns	1209	1122	1096	1059	1041	982
3. Unreported to Registrar General (religious-rites only)	137	128	165	133	105	93
4. Religious-rites ceremonies in returns to the Board of Deputies*	130	120	127	123	86	75
5. Unreported to Registrar General as % of total marriages	10.2	10.2	13.1	11.1	9.2	8.7

* Reflects the discrepancy between claimed 'unreported marriages' to the Board of Deputies and Registrar General's returns.

Figure 2 records the general trend in synagogue marriages over the past two decades, indexed to 1961. The four curves show similar

features with a general drop within a relatively narrow band. The decline is sharpest for the Central Orthodox. The ultra-Orthodox and the Sephardim are not included in the graph; the former account on average annually for under eight per cent of all synagogue marriages, and the latter for between two and three per cent.

FIGURE 2. *Trends in synagogue marriages 1961–84*



There is no clear-cut distinction between the ultra-Orthodox and the Central Orthodox; both groups submit marriage authorizations through the office of the Chief Rabbi. The tendency in recent years for some highly-committed Orthodox young people to identify with the ultra-Orthodox must have contributed directly to the decline of Central Orthodox marriages.

The problem of the unreported cases (that is, religious-rites-only weddings not included in the Registrar General's returns) is largely confined to Reform and Liberal marriages, which annually constitute about a quarter of all synagogue marriages. These tend to occur in small suburban and provincial synagogues. The most likely explanation is conversion to Judaism. Conversion is less rigid among the Reform and Liberal authorities. Thus, the probable process suggested by our data involves marriage in a civil ceremony, followed at a later date by a non-Orthodox 'religious-rites-only' ceremony. The Reform and Liberal synagogues also cater for persons who have an impediment to marriage under Orthodox Jewish law (halakha).[7] Overcoming such an impediment is a laborious and time-consuming procedure so that

couples often contract a civil marriage, followed by a non-Orthodox religious ceremony. As for the 'unreported' marriages amongst the Orthodox, some of them occur as a result of a civil ceremony abroad which is followed by a religious ceremony in Great Britain.

According to statistics published by the Registrar General, only about a quarter of all unions in England and Wales between 1914 and 1950 were civil marriages. By 1978, that proportion had more than doubled, with 53 per cent of all marriages taking place in Register Offices. One of the main causes of the secularization of weddings was the increasing rate of divorce. By 1978, divorced persons constituted 20 per cent of all those marrying; and in 1978, only 65 per cent of all marriages were between bachelors and spinsters, whereas in 1961 the proportion had been 85 per cent. As both Roman Catholic and Church of England clergy will not normally consent to officiate at the remarriage of a divorced person, the proportion of all religious marriages conducted under their auspices fell in the 1970s, while that of marriages in Nonconformist churches rose.[8]

In contrast, a religious divorce in Jewish law entitles one to be remarried in a synagogue — the main exception being that a Kohen (a male member of the priestly caste) cannot marry a divorced woman. In theory, therefore, the increased rate of divorce should not have the same consequences for Jews that it does for Anglicans and Roman Catholics. In practice, however, it may well be that in cases where a woman is divorced in civil law but has been unable to obtain easily a religious divorce (a *get* or bill of divorcement), she will remarry in a Register Office, even if her second husband is Jewish. (If she does obtain a *get* later, she may go through a 'religious-rites-only' ceremony which will then be unreported to the Registrar-General.)

The fact that marriage has become less popular in England and Wales is, of course, reflected in the recent rapid rise of rates of illegitimate births. However, it must be noted that the rate of decline in Jewish marriages in the period 1971–82 exceeded the rates of both the fall in all religious marriages in the 1960s and the fall in all first marriages in the early 1970s.[9]

In the wider society, there has been an increasing number of marriages where at least one spouse is a divorced person. The Office of Population Censuses and Surveys' special tabulations for selected years during the 1970s clearly show that the very large majority of synagogue marriages were between bachelors and spinsters (see Table 2). Moreover, the percentage of divorcees among those marrying in a synagogue was less than half the percentage of divorcees remarrying in the general population of England and Wales (see Table 3). This could be because divorced Jewish persons who remarry tend on the whole to decide on a civil ceremony even if there is no impediment to their marriage in a synagogue.

Of course, not all those who remarry are divorcees. Data recorded by the Registrar General show that on average during the 1970s, 6 per cent of Jewish persons marrying in a synagogue were widowed and 8 per cent were divorcees.

TABLE 2. *Percentage of Marriage Ceremonies which were First Marriages for Both Partners (England and Wales)*

	All marriages	All religious marriages	Synagogue marriages reported to Registrar General
1974	70.7	91.2	83.6
1975	69.6	90.2	81.6
1978	65.3	88.5	82.4

Source: OPCS Special Tabulations

TABLE 3. *Percentage of Divorcees among Persons marrying (England and Wales)*

	All marriages	Synagogue marriages reported to Registrar General
1974	16.4	6.3
1975	17.3	7.3
1978	21.0	7.0
1979	21.2	9.4

Source: OPCS Special Tabulations

According to the Registrar General, divorcees are not only a rising proportion of all persons marrying, but there has also been an increase in the numbers and proportions of marriages where both partners were divorcees. In 1974 and 1975, such marriages accounted for 8 per cent of all unions; and in 1978, the parallel figure was 10 per cent. On the other hand, synagogue marriages where both partners were divorcees were 2 per cent in 1974, 3 per cent in 1975, and only 1.7 per cent in 1978. Again, it may well be that when two Jewish divorcees decide to remarry, they will do so only at a Register Office. It must also be remembered that the Registrar General's figures cover only about 90 per cent of synagogue marriages, as the remaining 10 per cent go unrecorded by his officials.

Table 4 shows that Jewish brides were younger than brides remarrying in Register Offices and in Nonconformist churches in 1978, but that Jewish bridegrooms were older than their male counterparts in civil and Nonconformist remarriages. However, it must be borne in mind that we do not know what percentage of those divorced persons who remarry by civil rites are Jewish. It may well be that older divorced Jewish women prefer to remarry in a Register Office. It must also be stressed that synagogue marriage statistics deal with spouses both of whom are Jewish and that we do have some evidence that Jewish divorcees who enter into a subsequent marriage are more likely then to choose a Gentile spouse, whom they marry in a civil ceremony.[10]

TABLE 4. *Median Age at Marriage of Persons Divorced Before Current Marriage Ceremony*

		Civil	Nonconformist	Synagogue
Brides	1975	32.8	31.5	32.6
	1978	32.9	31.0	30.9
Bridegrooms	1975	36.7	32.1	37.2
	1978	36.4	32.0	38.8

Source: J. Haskey, 'Trends in Marriages: Church, Chapel and Civil Ceremonies', *Popoulation Trends*, vol. 18, Winter 1980, pp. 19–24.

What we do know is that in synagogue marriages there is a lower proportion of cases where both bride and groom had been previously divorced than obtains in civil or Nonconformist unions. We also know from recent surveys of the Jewish population that the majority of women seeking a *get* are in the younger age groups; this is not surprising, of course, since younger divorcees are more likely to wish to remarry and to wish to have children whose Jewish status is indisputable in halakha.[11]

The complications caused by unreported ceremonies and the two legal systems with regard to divorce create partial data which lead the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys to suggest that the Jews have very normal patterns with regard to median age at marriage (Table 5). However, the lack of difference between the median ages of Jews and of the general population in Table 5 merely reflects an older median age at first marriage among Jews since the synagogue marriage returns do not include large numbers of divorcees, as is the case nationally;[12] and it is usual for those entering into a subsequent marriage to be older than those marrying for the first time.

TABLE 5. *Median Age at Marriage*

	Synagogue marriages	All marriages in England and Wales (religious and civil)
Brides		
1975	23.6	23.2
1978	24.0	23.9
Bridegrooms		
1975	26.0	25.7
1978	26.6	26.5

Source: as for Table 4.

Several surveys carried out since 1975 have shown that, on average, for every 100 civil divorces granted to Jewish couples, there are only 50 bills of divorcement (*gittin*) registered by Jewish religious authorities.[13] Undoubtedly, this accounts for the fact that the percentage of divorcees remarrying in a synagogue is under half the proportion of all divorcees remarrying in England and Wales (see Table 3). It seems likely, therefore, that there were some civil marriages in the 1970s in which both bride and groom were halakhically Jewish and which need to be added to the statistics of synagogue marriages to arrive at the total number of unions between members of Anglo-Jewry.[14]

Nevertheless, there is little doubt that in recent years there has been an overall decline in Jewish marriages. This continuing decline should be a source of grave concern to the community. The number of persons involved in synagogue marriages is little more than half the number expected on the basis of births recorded for the Jewish population in the 1950s and 1960s.[15] We do not know precisely why this is so, but relevant factors include civil marriage between Jews, out-marriage with Gentiles, net emigration of young persons, apostasy, and non-marriage or 'alternative life-styles'. In the two latter cases, the increasing tendency of provincial Jews to settle in London, the most secularized city in the country, may well be an additional factor.

There is also little doubt that synagogue-affiliated Jews have been deserting mainstream Orthodox Judaism in recent decades. In the years between the two World Wars, the Central Orthodox clergy officiated at 97 per cent of all synagogue marriages; but by 1982, that proportion had fallen to under 68 per cent of all unions solemnized in a synagogue. Moreover, the total in that year was less than half of the annual average in the inter-war years. This indicates that there has been greater religious pluralism alongside numerical depletion.

However, the low number of synagogue marriages has stabilized in the early 1980s and it may well be that the rapid secularization of the previous decade has now lost much of its momentum.

NOTES

[1] S. J. Prais and M. Schmool, 'Statistics of Jewish Marriages in Great Britain, 1901–1965', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 9, no. 1, June 1967 (pp. 149–74), p. 152.

[2] S. J. Prais and M. Schmool 'Synagogue Marriages in Great Britain, 1966–8, *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 12, no. 1. June 1970 (pp. 21–28), p. 27.

[3] Based upon V. D. Lipman, *Social History of the Jews in England: 1850–1950*, London, 1954, p. 160; S. Rosenbaum, 'A contribution to the study of vital and other statistics of the Jews in the United Kingdom', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, vol. 68, 1905, pp. 526–56; and H. L. Trachtenberg, 'Estimate of the Jewish Population of London in 1929', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, vol. 96, 1933, pp. 87–98.

[4] See J. Haskey, 'Trends in Marriages: Church, Chapel and Civil Ceremonies', *Population Trends*, vol. 18, Winter 1980, pp. 19–24 and Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS hereafter), Monitor FM2 83/2, *Marriages 1981*.

[5] In England and Wales in 1971, religious ceremonies numbered 237,636; the corresponding figure for 1981 was 179,469: ibid. The sources for Jewish marriages are the Annual Reports of the Statistical and Demographic Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews.

[6] Prais and Schmool, 'Statistics of Jewish Marriages', op. cit., pp. 151–52.

[7] Such persons include childless widows in certain specific conditions, abandoned wives, and male members of the priestly cast (*Kohanim*) who are forbidden to marry a divorcee, a convert, or a Jewess whose father is a Gentile or unknown.

[8] See Haskey, op. cit.

[9] See OPCS Monitor FM2 83/2, *Marriages 1981*, op. cit.

[10] See Barry A. Kosmin, *Divorce in Anglo-Jewry 1970–1980: an Investigation*, London, West Central, 1982, p. 25.

[11] See Barry A. Kosmin ed., *The Anglo-Jewish Divorce Project: Papers for the 1983 Working Conference*, London, West Central, 1983, p. 10.

[12] OPCS Special Tabulations for the Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews (unpublished).

[13] See Kosmin, *The Anglo-Jewish Divorce Project*, op. cit., p. 10.

[14] See Barry A. Kosmin and Caren Levy, 'Jewish Circumcisions and the Demography of British Jewry, 1965–82', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 27, no. 1, June 1985, pp. 5–11.

[15] Ibid.

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BOOK REVIEWS

JUDITH E. ENDELMAN, *The Jewish Community of Indianapolis: 1849 to the Present*, xi + 303 pp., The Modern Jewish Experience Series (Paula Hyman and Deborah Dash Moore, eds), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1985, $17.50.

A correspondent of *Ha-Melitz* noted in 1884 that the Jewish community of Indianapolis was 'divided into two camps — the Orthodox and the Reform. The Orthodox are Russian and Polish Jews who are strictly orthodox and live, crowded and impoverished, in a small street in the southern part of the city. . . . The Reform Jews live . . . in ivory towers in the northern part of the city, in the wealthy section inhabited by the aristocracy'; and he saw 'for the first time people of twenty and twenty-five who could not pray in Hebrew'. He concluded that there was 'no hope for Judaism in the next generation in this city' (p. 57). Thus, we find in the comments of a contemporary observer the stereotypes beloved of a later age. Judith Endelman's book tells what really happened and explains why the correspondent of *Ha-Melitz* was a poor prophet.

Formally, this is a study of a German-Jewish settlement in the mid-nineteenth century, of eastern European Jewish immigration later, of the relationship between the two groups, and the ultimate emergence of a united community. The Jewish population of Indianapolis in most of the period under review constituted between one and two per cent of the total population of the city and never rose above 2.5 per cent, when Jews numbered about 11,000 souls. It is thus possible to follow, for example, the fortunes of all the individual congregations — about ten — without becoming overwhelmed by a mass of names of organizations. The author writes with enviable lucidity and is good at not missing the wood for the trees. She is well aware that the Jewish experience in Indianapolis was not necessarily typical and points to the ways it differs from major communities like those of New York. One feature of Indianapolis was the relative importance of a significant Sephardi immigrant group, originally from Monastir in Macedonia. Individuals are normally brought into the story to illustrate general points and there is not the individually interesting but collectively wearisome mass of short biographies so often found in books of this kind.

Jewish settlement in Indianapolis began in the 1840s — about a generation after the founding of the city — with German-Jewish pedlars who, after acquiring sufficient prosperity to establish

businesses, mainly in retail clothing, prospered and founded in 1858 the Indianapolis Hebrew Congregation. They then speedily adopted Reform Judaism and their congregation became that of the Jewish elite of the city. The eastern European immigrants began to come in the 1880s and the author documents the work of the Industrial Removal Office (IRO) which collaborated with the local chapter of B'nai B'rith in organizing the settlement of the newcomers. The central office of the IRO paid part of the cost of a local organizer and 10 dollars for a single man and 25 dollars for a family relocated — calculated to provide a month's rent and two weeks' groceries in the 1880s. Unlike the earlier German-Jewish immigrants who were usually pedlars and then became traders or manufacturers, the typical eastern European immigrants were artisans or garment workers; and this was so even in Indianapolis, where there was not a well-developed garment industry.

The way in which Indianapolis Jews, like most western Jewish communities, moved outwards, normally along a single line, is illustrated by the story of one lady. She lived throughout her long life in houses in Meridian Street, an arterial north-south thoroughfare. Born in 1873 to immigrants from Lithuania and Prussia, she spent her early years over her parents' dry goods store on the 'south side', which was the Jewish immigrant quarter. As the family prospered and acquired a small department store, she moved to North Meridian in 1888; when it became one of the leading families in the community, she moved 11, then seven, and finally 14 blocks to the house where she died in 1965 'in one of the city's finest neighborhoods'. In the 1920s, the Jewish community became increasingly middle-class and the familiar process whereby an employee acquired his own business may have been even faster in a smaller city than it was in a metropolis because there was less Jewish competition. It seems that only about 250 refugees from Central Europe came to Indianapolis in the 1930s.

The surrounding environment of the community was overwhelmingly white, native-born and Protestant, and reputedly not favourable to ethnic and cultural diversity. However, Indianapolis Jews, though subject to some antisemitism, especially in the 1920s, seem to have suffered less than did other American Jews; they were adept at becoming acculturated. This book is good at describing the trends of the post-1920s era and at relating them to the general developments in American Jewry. It recounts the fight of the children of the eastern European immigrants to secure their share in the control of the communal institutions in the 1930s and the 1940s.

The 1920s were a period of change in the objectives of institutions. At first, 'Jewish institutions viewed one another as competitors rather than as partners, and the size and grandeur of their respective buildings stood as symbols of their status and accomplishments . . . an edifice complex. A luxurious new building, rather than the programs that

went on inside, demonstrated the success of an organization' (p. 206). Later, increasing affluence brought change in the operation of communal bodies. The Jewish Welfare Federation changed from 'benevolence' to servicing the contributory organizations. By 1949, the Jewish social services were giving relief to less than 10 per cent of the families visited and it was largely the middle class who required help for their social or emotional problems. That meant that welfare organizations could charge fees for their services on a sliding scale.

By the 1950s, the return to religion as a means of Jewish identification had begun to bring an increase in synagogue membership; secular organizations declined and the Jewish left nearly disappeared. The author believes that church membership by the Gentile middle class was at least partly responsible for increased synagogue affiliation as an imitative process. But by the 1970s a move to the right in religious observance was observable, although suburban dispersal results in the persistence of riding to synagogue on the Sabbath and on Festivals even in nominally orthodox congregations. The author presents a perceptive picture of Jewish communal life in the 1970s and draws attention to the tendency to look to conversions of Gentile marriage partners as a means of limiting the numerical loss due to intermarriage.

Finally, the book deals with the increasing influence of Israel on communal life, not least on communal fund-raising. There are illuminating statistics on changes in the volume of fund-raising and its distribution between local and overseas causes, in response to stimuli like the Six-Day War of 1967; and the influence of fund-raising on the communal power structure is analysed. Altogether, this study tells us much that we might have wished to know about Indianapolis Jewry and, perhaps even more usefully, much about American Jewish life in the last hundred years and indeed about Western Jewry generally.

V. D. LIPMAN

LILY GARDNER FELDMAN, *The Special Relationship Between West Germany and Israel*, xix + 330 pp., George Allen & Unwin, Boston, London and Sydney, 1984. £25.00

For two countries to have a 'special relationship' is not unusual and need not call for an innovatory approach in the study of international relations, but the relationship between West Germany and Israel is not merely special, it is unique. Unique because it has to accommodate simultaneously the history of an extraordinarily creative and productive relationship between Germans and Jews, which enriched German social and cultural life out of all proportion to the number of Jews who actually lived in Germany, while it stimulated Jewish communal life to achieve a level of modernity which was unequalled in any other land. Yet Germany was also, and at the same time, the

foremost advocate and disseminator of political antisemitism. The relationship is also unique because it has to come to terms with the knowledge that, in the wake of the military campaigns of the Second World War, Germany conquered and brutally annihilated a third of the world's Jewish population; and, again, because there appears to have been, in the first two decades after 1945, an unspoken but unswerving assumption in the world at large that Germany could not and would not be accepted in the community of nations until and unless it had assumed full moral responsibility for the excesses of the National-Socialist era and had recompensed and made its peace with the Jewish people, now represented by the modern state of Israel.

To establish any relationship whatever between Germany and Israel was not merely difficult and problematic: it appeared at first to be impossible. For Germany, slowly recovering and rebuilding after the war, it was an overwhelming obligation in that it called for a voluntary assumption of collective guilt and direct responsibility for Nazi crimes. In Israel, populated as it was by wholly alienated former German Jews and, more significantly, by the remnants of eastern European Jewry, the very suggestion of any kind of relationship with Germany unleashed emotions and feelings which exceeded anything experienced in the young state before or since. If a special relationship was nevertheless established, this was due largely to the maturity, wisdom, and foresight of Konrad Adenauer, the Chancellor of West Germany, and David Ben-Gurion, Israel's Prime Minister.

All this is depicted in sharp and concise detail by Professor Feldman, who has also attempted to set this complex and controversial relationship into a theoretical framework of international relations. Indeed, she has attempted to create a theory of special relationships on the basis of her extensive and finely marshalled data. Her greatest handicap would seem to be the unpredictable nature of future developments. The historical complexities which she has vividly described continue to be matched by existing and continuing complexities, of present and likely future events. Thus, the very success of the restitution programme appears to have generated a sense of weariness in West Germany, in the face of continuing demands. The Holocaust itself is becoming a focal interest for generations no longer inhibited by the constraints of personal involvement on either side. The foreign policy of West Germany is frequently and increasingly strained by her expressed desire to balance her special relationship with Israel with her political determination to maintain a credible and acceptable position in the Arab world. We might reasonably expect her relationship with East Germany to be progressively normalised, but East Germany has opted for an openly and consistently hostile approach to the Jewish state. The dangers and possibilities in future developments are endless and here we can only hope that, in due course, Professor Feldman will write an

equally absorbing and instructive second volume in the difficult saga of West German-Israeli relations.

JULIUS CARLEBACH

CALVIN GOLDSCHEIDER and ALAN S. ZUCKERMAN, *The Transformation of the Jews*, xii + 279 pp., University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1984, £22.95 or $28.75.

The authors, a demographer and a political scientist respectively, propose to present the modern history of the Jews in terms of 'the master theme of contemporary social science'. That theme is 'the social, political, and economic transformations associated with modernization' (p. 4). In their view, every change the Jews have undergone during the past two centuries represents some aspect of their modernization and they all add up to a transformation. Professors Goldscheider and Zuckerman hardly trouble with chronology, nor do they define clearly the time span they are covering. They do provide a parable of modernization from one of Rabbi Nahman of Bratzlav's tales, which tells of a gigantic windstorm that turns the world 'upside down'. That Hassidic rabbi's recent biographer, Professor Arthur Green, has suggested that this was the contemporary 'Napoleonic wind' shaking Europe. The present authors undertake an almost limitless expansion of Green's interpretation to include the gamut of modernization. Since the windstorm is a recurring leitmotiv in this book, it may as well be observed that other authoritative expositors of Rabbi Nahman of Bratzlav, J. G. Weiss and M. Piekarz, nowhere find a Napoleonic wind, much less a windstorm of modernization, when they comment on that tale.

This is, of course, a meagre point. However, the wind called modernization blows through *The Transformation of the Jews* all the time and like the hot wind that blows ceaselessly down the Arava through Eilat, it does not refresh but instead disturbs. Nothing escapes the 'master theme'. Thus, the great differences between eastern and western Jewry, which became conspicuous especially from the late eighteenth century onwards, are readily written down to different rates of modernization. Modernization is inevitable; it changes whatever it touches; it leads to transformation. The present reviewer was led to wonder what in our understanding of modern Jewish history is thereby illuminated. If modernization reaches everywhere and explains everything, does it really explain anything?

One comes upon the essentially sociological chapters on American Jewry with some degree of surprise. The United States, without a feudal or hierarchical or absolutist past, is the first new nation in Martin Lipset's term. The modernization of Jewish immigrants had begun before they arrived in America and proceeded there with such

speed that the history of American Jewry is not one of modernization but of post-modernization. On the other hand, there are some perceptive chapters on Israeli society, while the Jews of Latin America, Oriental countries, South Africa, Australia, Holland, Italy, and Great Britain are scarcely mentioned. *The Transformation of the Jews* assembles a great deal of mainly economic and demographic information. It is emphatically determinist, since it argues that nothing could hold back or effectively resist modernization. The authors insist that modernization does not undermine or dissolve ethnicity but indeed may restructure and enhance it.

The authors also suggest that the special distinction of Lithuania in Talmudic studies arose because of extensive factory work by women coupled with a high rate of male unemployment. But the 'alternative opportunities in jobs and education for men' (p. 107) which were not available in that country were hardly more abundant in Galicia, whose level of Talmudic learning the authors believe was low, while Hungary had both famous yeshivot and a degree of prosperity within its pre-1914 boundaries. Moreover, the authors nowhere attend to the fascinating relation between Hassidism and modernization despite their use of Rabbi Nahman's Hassidic tale of the gigantic windstorm.

In Goldscheider and Zuckerman's view, Zionism and Jewish socialism became significant only when assimilated Jewish student revolutionaries returned to Judaism after finding themselves rejected by the general revolutionary movement. While there was such a phenomenon, it was on a small scale and a great many Jews remained within the Russian revolutionary movement. Certainly, the return of the prodigal students did not precipitate either Zionism or Jewish socialism. In general, the authors practically dismiss the role of intellectuals and of ideologies as a force for change.

The Transformation of the Jews virtually omits the cultural and intellectual history of the Jews. Primary sources are little used while the secondary works cited are almost all in English and often outdated or inferior. A social-scientific study of the development of modern Jewry is much to be desired but sadly I do not think that the present effort is the book we have waited for.

LLOYD P. GARTNER

ERNEST KRAUSZ and DAVID GLANZ, eds, *Politics and Society in Israel* (Studies of Israeli Society, vol. III), x + 453 pp., Transaction Books, New Brunswick and Oxford, 1985, paperback, n.p.

This volume is meant to serve as more than a reader in the political sociology of Israel. It is part of a series whose underlying objective, according to the Preface, is 'to provide a review process of sociological research in the field, and to generate discussion, reassessment, and

further research'. The majority of the contributions were previously published in international scholarly journals; and the principal criteria for selection were '(1) that the subject should be of considerable interest both for Israeli society and for social science, and (2) that a critical mass of literature on the topic be available, to provide a comprehensive view of "the state of the art", and to facilitate a better understanding of Israeli society.' The book deals with the secular and political changes which have taken place in Israeli society during the last decade; but there is no analysis of the most recent (1984) Knesset election.

If the reader is handed a neat, pre-packaged set of criteria by which to judge the book, he is also immediately stimulated by two arresting criticisms. One is contained in the brief Introduction by Karl Deutsch and the other in a following original essay by Professor Yonathan Shapiro. The first criticism is that just as the aspirations of Israel's Arab population, both within the country proper and in the occupied territories, are overshadowed and discounted in the light of Israel's perceived security needs, so the ideas and arguments of Arab academics and political activists are largely ignored within the covers of this book — the exception being Sammy Smooha's article, 'Existing and Alternative Policy Towards the Arabs in Israel'. It is indeed of some significance that nothing written by a social scientist of Arab background was considered worthy of inclusion in this collection. Or is it the case that we are to expect a further volume on Israel's minorities?

The second criticism focuses upon the functionalist bias of the participating sociologists. Whereas functionalist analysis is no longer in favour in Western Europe and North America, Shapiro argues, Israeli sociologists seem reluctant to drop this approach with its emphasis on integration, balance, and ultimate social consensus. Professor Shapiro's explanation for this is interesting in itself, if it is also highly contentious. To see Israel as a stratified society divided by class, with consequent disparities of power between groups, is to challenge the claim to pluralism and openness, the very core beliefs of Israeli politics. It is not evidence of intellectual stagnation but rather an innate loyalty to a society whose very existence is problematic and to a generation of 'founding fathers', some of whom still survive and all of whom still command respect. Thus there has been a tendency to shun the practice of critical analysis current among social scientists in other democratic countries.

From the outset, then, the 'state of the art' is found wanting. At best, its practitioners stand accused of being blinkered; at worst, Israeli research in political sociology suffers from an aridity, self-imposed by sociologists evidently suffering from the age-old Jewish reluctance to offer self-critical hostages to a malign fortune.

Shapiro's essay, 'Political Sociology in Israel: A Critical View', asserts that to the cultural and historical differences that had existed

between immigrants from Asian and Afrian countries and those of European origin, has been added a class distinction which is rejected by Israeli sociologists, just as it is not accepted by their American colleagues. This is because a class analysis would oblige them to deal with conflict and change rather than stability and consensus. And yet, as Shapiro himself states, relations between Ashkenazim and Sephardim were a central subject of sociological research in Israel after the establishment of the State and in recent years it has assumed an important place in Israeli political sociology, as is evident in the volume under review.

More than one contributor refers to the 'political upheaval' (the *mahapach*) of 1977. The ousting from power of the Labour Alignment in that year, and the re-election of the Likud in 1981, resulted from a variety of factors, the most important of which was the massive shift of the Sephardi Jewish vote to the Likud. Seeking to understand and explain the decline in Labour's fortunes and the rise in those of the right-wing nationalist opposition required a radical reappraisal of the nature of Israeli society, the dominant belief system, and the relations between different social strata.

Contrary to Shapiro's assertion, a class analysis would prove no more adequate for understanding political behaviour in Israel than it does in Europe and North America, except marginally in countries like Britain where class only matters because little else divides the electorate. As described in the valuable contributions of Yael Yishai, Erik Cohen, and Shmuel Eisenstadt in this book, social class is at best only one facet, and a not very significant one at that, of the complex structure of the evolving Israeli society. Indeed, the issues that are discussed in the chapters of this volume are possibly more profound and conceivably more threatening for the future stability and cohesion of Israeli society. They do not suggest any reluctance on the part of Israeli political sociologists to subject their society to critical analysis.

Apart from the contributions by Deutsch, Shapiro, and Eisenstadt, there are no original essays in this volume, but as a review of the 'state of the art' of Israeli political sociology, this is an excellent work that should be included in any library. It remains only to ask whether it succeeds in its secondary purpose in being of broader interest in social science. Essentially, this collection constitutes a social history of Israel as written by social scientists rather than traditional historians. As such, it serves as an exemplary exercise which might be emulated on a more systematic basis elsewhere in the world. The authors are to be congratulated for their contributions and the editors deserve the highest praise for their choice.

DAVID CAPITANCHIK

NATHAN ROTENSTREICH, *Jews and German Philosophy: The Polemics of Emancipation*, viii + 266 pp., Schocken Books, New York, 1984, $21.95.

Nathan Rotenstreich is well-known for his numerous publications on modern German philosophy, notably on Kant and Hegel, and for his views on the impact of German philosophy on Jewish thought, from Moses Mendelssohn to Franz Rosenzweig. In this book, he returns to themes which, in one way or another, have occupied him in books such as *The Recurring Pattern: Studies in Anti-Judaism in Modern Thought* (1963) and *Jewish Philosophy in Modern Times* (1968). Starting from a premise that religion was one manifestation of human creativity which commanded the attention of the great systematic philosophers interested in science, moral behaviour, and aesthetic activities, it follows that any comprehensive scheme, like those of Kant and Hegel, must take issue with Judaism — not least because Judaism is, at best, an independent alternative system, or, at the very least, a challenge to the Christian tradition. The question which this raises relates not only to the 'objective' content of the Judaic religion, but also to the way it was perceived in the German-Christian tradition, which determined or influenced the context within which German philosophers perceived it. And that context included a considerable amount of explicit and quite unphilosophical hostility.

The problem for Jewish philosophers of the modern era was the reverse of this. From Mendelssohn to Rosenzweig they had to come to terms with intellectual positions which might be attractive in themselves, but which carried inevitable associations of anti-Judaic and antisemitic arguments. By focusing on the century-long debate on Jewish suitability for emancipation and a philosophical acceptability of the Judaic tradition, as a formally recognized constituent part of a great German tradition, Rotenstreich also points to the ways in which those who were unable to fully comprehend complex philosophical systems nevertheless abstracted anti-Jewish sentiments from the great philosophers — as, for example, in the case of Nietzsche.

While Rotenstreich is always stimulating, certain basic questions remain. Here we can mention only two. It is argued (p. vii) that 'major systems of German philosophy were preoccupied . . . with Judaism'. The first question would have to be, what Judaism? Was it a preoccupation based on a systematic study of the Judaic tradition, as advocated by Max Weber, who recognized the problem of taking issue with an intellectual system which was largely inaccessible to most German scholars, or was it a preoccupation with Judaism which had been mediated in its essentials by a hostile Christianity? The second question is one of interpretation. Rotenstreich explains the preoccupation of German philosophers with Judaism as a consequence of 'the social and political position of Jews in the German political order'.

It could be argued with equal force that the preoccupation with Jews was, in nineteenth-century Germany, the result of an excessive and rigorous censorship of political discussion, except where it was concerned with Jews. There, freedom of expression was such that almost any argument could be put forward without fear of consequences. It could be argued that this factor accounts, in part at least, for the disproportionate amount of attention which Jews and Judaism attracted in intellectual and political circles, given that the Jews represented a tiny minority and that a knowledge of, and influence exercised by, Judaism were virtually non-existent. The over-representation of debates about Jews might also be seen as a considerable contributing factor in the persistence and strength of anti-Jewish feeling.

JULIUS CARLEBACH

GEOFFREY WIGODER, ed., *Contemporary Jewry. Studies in Honor of Moshe Davis*, 269 pp. in English and 162 pp. in Hebrew, The Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 1984, n.p.

Professor Moshe Davis of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem has been one of the great inspirers and innovators in the field of contemporary Jewish studies in our time. It was owing to his energy and vision that the Institute of Contemporary Jewry was founded at the Hebrew University and it was on his initiative that the Study Circle on World Jewry, under the auspices of the President of Israel, was established. More recently, he inaugurated the American-Holy Land Project followed by his latest major undertaking — the International Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization. Throughout his distinguished academic career, Professor Davis has always emphasized the need for partnership with the Diaspora, the importance of developing in Jewish scholarship what he calls (in an interview with Geoffrey Wigoder) 'bifocal' vision — that is, the ability to observe the Jewish world as a totality, from without and within (p. 17).

This is well reflected in Geoffrey Wigoder's collection of essays in honour of Moshe Davis, partly in English and partly in Hebrew. They are a fitting tribute by his colleagues to the wide-ranging interests of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry. The topics range from studies of the 'making' of American Jewry in the nineteenth century and essays on pioneers of Christian ecumenism in the United States to statistical studies of Italian Jewry and of the progress of new immigrants to Israel in learning Hebrew; from theoretical considerations on various philosophical and sociolological approaches, to the area of contemporary Jewry, to case-studies of individuals as different as the revolutionary

Zionist Ber Borochov or the Arab nationalist, George Antonius; from a fascinating comparative analysis of the Jews of the Soviet Union and Poland to a number of more specialized articles by such renowned Holocaust scholars as Yehuda Bauer, Israel Gutman, and Haim Avni. All the articles in this collection are well worth reading and a number of them are very important contributions to contemporary Jewish scholarship. The volume as a whole can certainly be said to have avoided most of the well-known dangers of fragmentation and lack of any guiding theme, that so often plague the Festschrift genre, and to do justice to the vision of the man who is honoured.

It is not possible in the space of a short review to comment on every essay. This reader especially enjoyed the articles by Lloyd P. Gartner, Mordechai Altshuler and Ezra Mendelssohn, Jonathan Frankel, Emil Fackenheim, and Menahem Kaufman. Professor Gartner writes authoritatively on 'Contemporary Historians of New York Jewry', focusing on the literature of the past twenty years. Altshuler and Mendelssohn demonstrate the value of a comparative perspective in looking at the changes that Polish and Soviet Jewry underwent between the two World Wars under regimes that could not have been more different. Whereas Polish Jews followed the classic model of an eastern European Jewish community, the Jews of the Soviet Union began to approximate to the Jewish pattern in more industrialized states. Polish Jews had a much wider field of action as a group but their individual possibilities of advancement were very limited; while in the U.S.S.R., the situation in the 1920s and 1930s was exactly the reverse.

Another valuable study is that by Jonathan Frankel of the ideological path traced by Ber Borokhov during the revolution of 1905–06. Frankel succeeds in providing a remarkably clear account of the metamorphosis in Borokhov's thought from voluntarism to Marxist determinism, from the avant-gardist *chalutziut* of Ussishkin's *Zionei Zion* to the orthodox proletarian Zionism of the Jewish Social Democratic Labour Party. Beyond the discussion of Borokhov, there is much to be learned here about the impact of the 1905 Russian Revolution on the various Jewish socialist parties, including the Bund and the Socialist Territorialists.

The article by Menahem Kaufman, 'George Antonius and the United States', deals with the little-known but extremely interesting first contacts between Palestinian Arabs and America. The author demonstrates the importance of Antonius as a pioneer in the field of Palestinian Arab nationalist *hasbara* in the United States during the 1930s, as a result of his Western education and diplomatic skills as well as of the degree to which his views on Palestine coincided with those of influential State Department officials. Kaufman's article in the Hebrew section is followed by a number of well-researched case-studies relating to the Holocaust (by Haim Avni, Michel Abitbol, and Dov Levin) and

by the important methodological reflections of Yehuda Bauer and Israel Gutman.

Perhaps most important of all in terms of Moshe Davis's life-work is the essay by Emil L. Fackenheim entitled 'The Study of Contemporary Jewry: Its Place in the Academic World. Six Theses'. Fackenheim focuses on the tension between 'objective' scholarship and Jewish commitment, showing that they are not so far apart as appears at first sight. He argues that contemporary Jewish history is both legitimate and indispensable; and he stresses that the Holocaust and the fact of Israel make this study both necessary and possible. He forcefully argues that the 'emancipation of Jewish studies within the academic world is also, and at the same time, the self-emancipation from anti-Jewish bias of the academic world' (p. 252). The times when Jews and Judaism could be reduced by Western scholarship to a few footnotes in European history are over. As Fackenheim points out, this has a great deal to do with the existence of Israel and the recognition that there is a creative interplay between university goals of scholarship and 'Jewish group goals of identification and commitment' (p. 257). No doubt some scholars and academics, Jews as well as non-Jews, will quarrel with these challenging words. But they seem to this reviewer to perfectly exemplify that vital commitment to the Jewish *future* which has been the hallmark of Professor Moshe Davis's crucial energizing contribution in placing the study of *contemporary* Jewry on the scholarly map.

ROBERT WISTRICH

IRVING M. ZEITLIN, *Ancient Judaism. Biblical Criticism from Max Weber to the Present*, xiii + 314 pp., Polity Press, Cambridge, 1984, £22.50.

Irving Zeitlin, a Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto, is intrigued by Max Weber's insight that in ancient Judaism are to be found the roots of Western rationalism. Here we find the beginning of liberation from polytheism, mysticism, magic, and gnosis. The Mosaic covenant constitutes a rational relationship between a people and God: obedience in return for Divine protection. Both sides of the covenant are worldly in their reference, ethical in their relationship. As a result, in Weber's words, ancient Israel was 'free of magic and all forms of irrational quest for salvation; it was inwardly worlds apart from the paths of salvation offered by Asiatic religions'. Hence its singular contribution to the eventual rise of science, technology, and capitalism.

Judaism's singularity must be seen in contrast to the polytheistic environment of the ancient Near East. Polytheism is more than the belief in many gods. It characteristically involves belief in an impersonal force to which the gods themselves are subject; the gods conflict with one another and with this force; man, through magic, may

learn to manipulate the force and hence influence or control the gods. From these beliefs arise mythology and magic. Sumerian, Akkadian, ancient Egyptian, and Canaanite culture all conform to this type.

By contrast, Israelite religion recognizes no power above God. There is little evidence in the Pentateuch of Canaanite influence; such borrowings as exist come from Mesopotamia. But the material is radically recast. The flood becomes not 'a rash and arbitrary act but the work of an ethical God' (p. 26); the sacrificial cult is no longer a magical instrumentality but an expression of gratitude; prayer supplants coercive formulae of invocation; God's 'specific sphere of action is human history' (p. 28) and the locus of religion accordingly shifts from nature to society. The folly and hubris of trying to control the divine will is a motif of the Bible, well expressed in Balaam's lament: 'How shall I curse, whom God hath not cursed?' (Numbers 23:8).

Thus, Zeitlin's summary of Weber's comparative sociology of ancient religion. But from the second chapter onwards he is concerned with another question, namely, how and especially when did ethical monotheism arise in Israel? The scholarly consensus in Weber's time, and still influential sixty years later, is that monotheism emerged relatively late in Israel's history. Its beginnings came with the period of classical prophecy around the eighth century B.C.E., but it did not take popular root until after the destruction and exile, during the period of the return prior to the rebuilding of the Temple. Hitherto Israel had been polytheistic, practising a syncretic religion of Canaanite origins.

Zeitlin's methodological axiom is that 'one ought not to reject any statement in Scripture which is not inherently impossible, nor contradicted by a more reliable source' (p. 43). His task is thus a point-by-point rebuttal of earlier Biblical-critical orthodoxy and a reaffirmation of the essential historicity of the Scriptural narratives. Monotheism did indeed originate with Moses. The patriarchs were polytheists, Zeitlin concedes, but following a suggestion of A. G. Alt's he contends that they believed in gods who watched over particular persons rather than places. This belief was characteristic of a sojourner, a person who moves from place to place and whose deity moves with him as he goes. The severing of the link between God and a particular locale prepared the ground for a transcendent monotheism.

There is a view, associated with von Rad, Alt, and Noth that the exodus is a fiction, as is the story of the conquest of the land by Joshua. Instead, the land was settled gradually by disparate tribes who eventually formed themselves into an amphictyony, a federation brought together for cultic purposes. Zeitlin regards this as altogether fanciful: there is no evidence of any central sanctuary during that period. He defends the main claims of the Biblical text and suggests that in Egypt, the Israelites begin to perceive God as 'the conscious and universal presence in history who saves' (p. 83). The Israelites in Egypt

had preserved their ancestral religion, and already celebrated the Passover prior to the exodus. This may have been due to the sharp antagonism between Egyptians and Semites, which preserved the Israelites apart and bred a *ressentiment* which 'inverts the ethic of the privileged and teaches that oppression is an injustice caused by the sinfulness of the privileged' (p. 94).

The ethic of the decalogue and covenant clearly reflects this process: a substitution of humility for hubris, the creation of a sense of solidarity and peoplehood, the rejection of an elite through a covenant with the entire population. Assigning a late date for the decalogue cannot account for its particular concerns. The Alt-Noth dismissal of Joshua's conquest of the land is also rejected. Zeitlin argues that the amphictyony theory is unsubstantiated and inherently implausible. He cites W. F. Albright's archaeological evidence — the destruction of cities in the thirteenth century B.C.E. — in support of the Joshua narrative of settlement by military conquest, but concedes to the critics that the archaeological evidence alone is indecisive.

He therefore adopts Yehezkiel Kaufmann's approach which is to see that though the books of Joshua and Judges contain schematic and legendary material which is unhistorical, they nonetheless provide fragmentary evidence from which a historical picture may be reconstructed. Joshua preserves 'historically authentic traditions concerning Israel's wars of conquest' (p. 139); the miraculous or legendary character of some of the narratives is 'not an artificial or later superimposition of the religious upon the real. The integration of the two elements in the tradition reflects their fusion in the life and minds of the Israelites' (p. 137). Canaanite culture left no significant impact on the Israelities, who borrowed neither its military technology (chariot warfare) nor its political organization (the city-state). This too argues for the Biblical picture of a relationship of war between the two, rather than the Alt-Noth theory of slow and gradual assimilation. Zeitlin concludes that the traditional-historical and form-critical schools use methods which 'are highly subjective and . . . tend to obliterate the factual materials contained in the narratives' (p. 146).

He follows Kaufmann, too, in maintaining that Baal worship which made its appearance with Jezebel, wife of Ahab, was 'a foreign import, restricted to the court circle and without roots among the people' (p. 192). The evidence is that the numbers involved were very small, that the Baal culture did not diffuse itself among the people, and that there was no merging of it and indigenous Israelite religion. Jehu's subsequent purge of the cult in the northern kingdom was thus relatively simple; in the southern kingdom pagan importations made several sporadic appearances before their final elimination by Josiah.

Accordingly Zeitlin rejects the notion, first propounded by Julius Wellhausen, that monotheism begins with Amos and the period of

classical prophecy. There is no hint, in Amos or elsewhere, that the prophets saw themselves as religious innovators. What is new in their work is the war against exploitation, immorality, and social injustice, as against the primary Pentateuchal enemy, idolatry. This accorded with the social changes of their time: the emergence of new class divisions of court officials, ministers, and professional military officers: a landed aristocracy and an 'urban patriciate'. The prophet was not primarily an oracle concerned with 'foretelling', he was rather 'a critic whose mission it was to warn the people away from their wrongdoings so that his prophecies should not come to pass' (p. 217). The many discrepancies between things foretold in the prophetic books and subsequent historical reality, testify both to the relative unimportance of the oracular function and to the fact that the prophetic books were not subsequently reworked with the hindsight of a later editor.

Likewise, Zeitlin holds as untenable the view shared by Weber that only in exile did monotheism become the prevalent faith of the people, shocked into fidelity by the sudden confirmation of the prophets' words of doom. His view, by contrast, is that the prophets of exile could not have struck a responsive chord had they not been appealing to a pre-existing, indeed ancient, faith. Their genius lay in applying it to the new situation and rescuing a message of hope out of despair. What is more, 'in the era of the destruction and the exile, it is *not* the prophetic, but rather the popular-priestly doctrine that dominates life and literature' (p. 267). The great innovation of the exile lay in the field of practice rather than belief, namely in the development of the synagogue, a form of worship freed from the sacrificial cult, from a particular locale and the priestly office.

In short, Zeitlin's *Ancient Judaism* is not so much an exercise in sociology nor a re-examination of Weber's methods and conclusions. It is rather a critique of certain dominant views of Biblical scholarship, and an argument for the acceptance of the Biblical narrative in its broad historical outlines, much influenced by the work of Kaufmann. Monotheism was not a late development in the history of ancient Israel, nor can any simple evolutionary view be given of the slow emergence of a distinctive Israelite faith from Canaanite origins. The linking of this study to the name of Weber seems somewhat tangential. Other than sharing the scholarly orthodoxy of his time, the most Zeitlin has to say of Weber is that he may have found its views congenial because of his own interest in the role of elite strata in the sociology of religion. This 'prompts him to exaggerate the contribution of the prophets and to denigrate that of the priests' and falsely to suppose that popular religion 'remained steeped in polytheism or, at best, in syncretic beliefs and practices' (p. 282).

As a survey, then, of Biblical criticism in the last sixty years — specifically of the Biblical text as historically referential — this is a

useful if derivative work. On the key questions, however, of why monotheism emerged, when, and in the form it did, with Moses in the wilderness, and why it maintained such a tenacious hold on the religious imagination of a people, Zeitlin's analysis is disappointing.

JONATHAN SACKS

CHRONICLE

Only 11,298 immigrants came to settle in Israel in 1985, the lowest figure for any one year since the establishment of the State in May 1948. In 1984 there were 19,230, of whom about 8,000 were Ethiopian Jews. The 1985 total includes about 2,000 Ethiopian Jews who came with the tail end of Operation Moses.

In 1985, 1,139 Jews were allowed to emigrate from the Soviet Union but only 348 chose to settle in Israel. In the first three months of 1986, a total of 210 Jews left the USSR: 79 in January, 84 in February, and only 47 in March.

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Israel received 1.45 million visitors in 1985, 16 per cent more than in the previous year. This total does not include cruise-liner passengers who spent only one or two days in the country. Israel is also becoming increasingly popular as a venue for conventions: in 1985, about 75,000 persons came to attend international meetings.

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Last autumn, 150 scholars from universities and institutes in Western countries and in East Germany participated in a four-day symposium on the persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1939. The symposium was held at the Leo Baeck Institute in West Berlin and the President of West Germany was one of the guests of honour. The West German Chancellor delivered the opening address in the course of which he is reported to have stated that 'while Germans became guilty individually, they are atoning collectively' for Nazi crimes.

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Educationalists from 13 Western countries attended a seminar in Paris last March on 'The Jewish People and Eretz Israel'.

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The fifth annual international congress of the Weizmann Institute of Science was held in Madrid and Barcelona last autumn. The Spanish Minister for Education and Science attended the ceremony.

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The December 1985 issue of *Jewish Affairs*, a publication of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, includes an article by Allie A. Dubb on the

South African Jewish population based on the final count of the 1980 census. In that year, 117,963 Jews were returned; they constituted 2.6 per cent of the white population and 0.5 per cent of the total population. At the previous census in 1970, there were 118,200 Jews: 3.1 per cent of the whites and 0.6 per cent of the total population. In 1980, 'some 2,000 Israelis by birth or citizenship were enumerated'. The majority of Jews (79.1 per cent) were born in South Africa and 93 per cent had South African citizenship; 4 per cent were born in the United Kingdom, 2.1 per cent were born in Germany, 9.3 per cent came from other European countries, 1.7 per cent were born in Israel, and 1.7 per cent also were born in Zimbabwe (formerly, Rhodesia). Of the 4 per cent from the United Kingdom, 2.4 per cent retained their nationality of birth.

Almost all Jews (98.8 per cent) live in urban areas while 87.9 per cent of all whites do so. The large majority of Jews, 80 per cent, were returned in Johannesburg and Cape Town. South African Jews are an ageing population. In 1980, 28.5 per cent were under the age of 20 years compared to 36.5 per cent of all whites and 17.1 per cent were 65 and over compared to 8.1 per cent of all whites.

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The December 1985 Report of the International Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization states: 'The Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá, Colombia, is now conducting three courses on Jewish subjects . . .. A course on Jewish Thought is given in the Department of Religious Sciences; an annual seminar on Introduction to Judaism is given in the framework of the Education Department; an annual seminar on Jewish Theology is conducted . . . within the Faculty of Theology'.

At the University of Chile, the Centro de Estudios de Cultura Judaica 'supervises academic research and publications in the field of Jewish culture. It developed a series of courses covering diverse aspects of Jewish life. They include the study of Hebrew language at all levels, Bible, Hebrew Literature, Yiddish Literature, Jewish Thought, History of the Jews in Latin America, the Middle East Conflict, and Art and Religion'.

'The first issue of *Rashi*, a newsletter of the New Zealand Association for the Study of Jewish Civilization, has appeared. Among the items carried by the newsletter are reports on the summer lecture series conducted by the University of Waikato in Hamilton and a seminar run by the Centre for Continuing Education at the same university on the topic of Jewish–Christian Dialogue; a preliminary survey of courses on Jewish Studies at New Zealand universities and an announcement on the conference organized by the New Zealand Association for the Study of Religion at the University of Otago in Dunedin, last August, with a special section devoted to Judaism.'

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The Autumn 1985 issue of *Tel Aviv University News* states that several new Chairs have been established at the University: in Computer Systems Engineering, in Biomedical Ethics, in the History and Philosophy of Science, and in the History of Books. In addition, 'Tel Aviv University has established

a chair for visiting professors endowed by the City of Frankfurt, and aimed at strengthening academic and cultural ties between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Frankfurt Chair for Visiting Professors . . . will encourage binational cooperation in various fields of science, through reciprocal visits of leading scientists, joint research projects, public lectures, research seminars, and consultation on research and teaching'. Frankfurt and Tel Aviv have been linked since 1980 by 'a "twin cities" pact which has encouraged tourism, study tours by specialists, and many other cultural activities. . . . Frankfurt's mayor . . . is an honorary fellow of the University and serves on the Executive of The Friends of TAU in Germany'.

Two new graduate programmes in the field of health are being offered by Tel Aviv University in the academic year 1985–86: a Master in Occupational Health and a Master in Health Systems Management. Both are said to be 'unique in Israel'.

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The Summer 1985 issue of *News from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem*, received in London at the end of last November, reports the inauguration of several Chairs, two of which are in the University's School of Dental Medicine — a Chair in Periodontal Research and a Chair for Visiting Professors in Dental Research. Another four Chairs are in Public Health, in Sports Medicine, in Psychopharmacology, and in Comparative Education.

A new Centre for Research in Computer Science was established at the University with the help of a grant from the Minerva Society of the West German Ministry of Research and Technology. The first scientific activity of the new Centre was a workshop which involved participants from Israel and West Germany.

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The Autumn/Winter 1985 issue of *News from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem*, received in London last April, states that a 'Center for the Research of Zionism and the Yishuv has been established at the University. The new center is a joint project of the Faculties of Humanities and Social Sciences and will involve inter-disciplinary and inter-departmental activity in all areas connected with the history of Zionism and the Yishuv (the pre-state Jewish community) in Eretz Israel, beginning with the 19th century'.

In the academic year 1985–86 the Faculty of Humanities, the largest in the University, had some 5,000 students: the Faculty of Science had 4,200 registered for the B.Sc. degree; the Faculty of Social Science had 3,700; the Faculty of Medicine's five schools (Medicine, Pharmacy, Nursing, Occupational Therapy, and Public Health) had a total of 1,660 and there was the same number in the Faculty of Agriculture; the School of Social Work had 550 students; the Faculty of Dental Medicine had 360; and the Graduate School of Library and Archive Studies had 55.

Medical personnel and social workers from several countries, including Hungary and Poland, attended the International Congress on Adolescent Health and Medicine in Jerusalem, sponsored by the Student Health Service

of the Hebrew University and the Hadassah Medical Organization. Suicide was one of the subjects under discussion and two American participants reported that 'the rate of adolescent suicide has tripled in the U.S. in the past generation and is considered to be of "epidemic proportions"'. The director of the Student Health Service at the Hebrew University noted in contrast that 'the rate of suicide among Israeli students is quite low — an average of one suicide in two years. Though the pressures on the Israeli students are certainly not less than in other countries, the Israeli student is generally older than his counterpart elsewhere (due to compulsory military service), and he is probably more self-confident and mature than other students'.

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The September 1985 issue of *Bar-Ilan University News* states that in the academic year 1984–85, there were 'close to 7,000 students studying for a B.A. degree, 1,500 students studying for a M.A. degree and 300 students in the Doctoral program'. In addition, there were 2,500 enrolled in non-academic courses. More than half of the undergraduates, 55 per cent, were in the Faculty of Social Sciences, 15 per cent in Jewish Studies, 10 per cent in Natural Sciences, 8 per cent in the Humanities and another 8 per cent in General Studies, and the remaining 4 per cent in the Faculty of Law.

At the end of the academic year, the university conferred 1,013 Bachelor degrees, 161 Masters, and 20 doctorates. It also awarded 158 teacher certificates and 53 diplomas for courses which included librarianship and translation.

The February 1986 issue of *Bar-Ilan News* states that in the academic year 1985–86, 7,982 students were registered for an academic degree: 6,233 for a Bachelor degree, 1,469 for Masters, and 280 for doctorates. The teaching staff consisted of 94 full professors, 115 associate professors, 236 senior lecturers, 178 lecturers, 139 instructors, and 97 assistants.

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The Winter 1985 issue of the *Bulletin* of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev reports the inauguration of four chairs — in Holocaust Studies, in Clinical Pharmacology, in Applied Sciences, and for the Prevention of Cardiovascular Diseases — and of a Centre for Holocaust and Redemption Studies.

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The February 1986 issue of *Les Cahiers de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle* states that in the academic year 1984–85 there were 15,240 pupils in 39 schools established by, or affiliated to, the *Alliance* in nine countries. This represents a slight increase over 1983–84, when the total was 15,072. Israel had the largest number of pupils, 6,890, in nine schools followed by Canada with 2,838 in eight schools, Iran with 2,072 in five schools, Morocco with 1,429 in nine schools, France with 578 in three schools, Belgium with 554 in one school, Syria with 452 in one school, Spain with 279 in two schools, and the Netherlands with 148 in one school.

Only 607 pupils out of the total of 2,072 in Iran were Jewish: 354 in Teheran (293 boys and 61 girls); 149 in Kermanshah (75 girls and 74 boys); 67 boys in Ispahan; and 37 boys in Yezd. The *Alliance* in Morocco had six schools in Casablance and one each in Fez, Meknes, and Marrakesh. Its only school in Syria was in Damascus; it had in 1984–85 354 girls and 98 boys, who were given religious instruction for eight hours a week and who were taught French for six hours a week.

The Belgian school is in Brussels; all eight Canadian schools are in Montreal; the three schools in France are in Paris and in a suburb of Paris; those in Israel are in Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, Haifa, Mikveh-Israel, Nayariya, and Sderoth; the two schools in Spain are in Madrid and in Barcelona; and the Netherlands school is in Amsterdam.

In 1984-85, the *Alliance* made 60 student loans totalling 153,850 francs. Some of the earlier student loans are being gradually repaid.

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The Twelfth Meeting of the International Catholic-Jewish Liaison Committee took place at the end of last October in Rome. The Committee is composed of the International Jewish Committee on Interreligious Consultations (IJCIC) and of representatives of the Holy See's Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews. The members of the IJCIC represent the World Jewish Congress, the Synagogue Council of America, the American Jewish Committee, the Israel Jewish Council for Interreligious Consultations, and B'nai B'rith.

At the end of the meeting, a joint press release was issued, stating that 'The International Catholic-Jewish Liaison Committee committed itself to a programme of action for the immediate future. The six points of the programme are:

1 to disseminate and explain the achievements of the past two decades in our two communities;

2 to undertake an effort to overcome the residues of indifference, resistance and suspicion that may still prevail in some section of our communities;

3 to work together in combating tendencies towards religious extremism and fanaticism;

4 to promote conceptual clarifications and theological reflection in both communities and to create appropriate forums acceptable to both sides, in which this reflection can be deepened;

5 to foster co-operation and common action for justice and peace;

6 to undertake a joint study of the historical events and theological implications of the extermination of the Jews of Europe during the Second World War (frequently called the Holocaust or, in Hebrew, *Shoah*).

A steering committee will be established to work out the details of this programme'.

The press release stated that the meeting 'was timed to coincide with the twentieth anniversary of the Second Vatican Council's Declaration on the "Relationship between the Church and the Jewish People", *Nostra Aetate*, . . . promulgated on 28 October 1965 by Pope Paul VI together with the 2,221 Council Fathers. The International Liaison Committee was founded in 1970

as a means of implementing the Council's call for the institution of ongoing dialogue between the Church and the Jewish people after centuries of mistrust and often tragic conflict. The Pope . . . reaffirmed the Church's commitment to *Nostra Aetate* and the uniqueness of the sacred "link" between the Church and the Jewish people . . .'.

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A survey carried out by the Christian-Jewish Friendship Association in Italy revealed that more than half (57 per cent) of the Roman Catholics interviewed had antisemitic attitudes: 23 per cent regarded the Jews as rich and as usurers or unscrupulous merchants; 13 per cent said that the Jews rejected dialogue with other faiths; 11 per cent believed they had killed Jesus; eight per cent said that Jews were a world-wide financial and political power; and two per cent believed that they were accursed by God.

As for *Nostra Aetate*, the 1965 Ecumenical Council's declaration on the Catholic Church's relationship with the Jewish People, the survey found that about two thirds of the priests and nuns interviewed, 78 per cent of students, and 97 per cent of teachers had never heard of *Nostra Aetate*.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Ashtor, Eliyahu, *The Jews of Moslem Spain*, vol. 3, translated from the Hebrew by Aaron Klein and Jenny Machlowitz Klein, iv + 310 pp., The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1984, $19.95.

Bernstein, *The Renaissance of the Torah Jew*, xix + 412 pp., Ktav Publishing House, Hoboken, NJ, 1985, $20.00.

Cohen, Stuart A. and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Conflict and Consensus in Jewish Political Life*, 218 pp., Bar-Ilan University Press, Ramat Gan, 1986, n.p.

Davis, Moshe, *Sir Moses Montefiore: American Jewry's Ideal*, Inaugural Lecture on the American Jewish Experience, 30 pp., The American Jewish Archives in Israel, Jerusalem, 1985, n.p.

Goldscheider, Calvin, *Jewish Continuity and Change: Emerging Patterns in America*, xvii + 195 pp., Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1986, $24.95.

Green, Nancy, *The Pletzl of Paris. Jewish Immigrant Workers in the Belle Epoque*, ix + 270 pp., Holmes & Meier, New York and London, 1986, n.p.

Halkin, Abraham and David Hartman, *Crisis and Leadership: Epistles of Maimonides*, x + 292 pp., The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1985, $15.95.

Hasan-Rokem, Galit and Alan Dundes, eds, *The Wandering Jew: Essays in the Interpretation of a Christian Legend*, ix + 278 pp., Indiana University Press, 1986, $27.50.

Hurd, Geoffrey *et al.*, *Human Societies. An Introduction to Sociology*, revised edition, x + 259 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1986, paperback, £7.95 (hardback, £20.00).

Israeli, Raphael, *Peace in in the Eye of the Beholder*, xxiii + 389 pp., Mouton Publishers, Berlin, New York, and Amsterdam, 1985, DM105.

Mahler, Raphael, *Hasidism and the Jewish Enlightenment. Their Confrontation in Galicia and Poland in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century*, translated from the Yiddish by Eugene Orenstein and from the Hebrew by Jenny Machlowitz Klein, xvii + 411 pp., The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1985, $29.95.

Medding, Peter Y., ed., *Studies in Contemporary Jewry, Volume 2*, xvii + 425 pp., published for the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem by Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1986, $25.00.

Sarna, Nahum M., *Exploring Exodus: The Heritage of Biblical Israel*, xii + 277 pp., Schocken Books, New York, 1986, $17.95.

Sicher, Efraim, *Beyond Marginality: Anglo-Jewish Literature After the Holocaust*, xv + 235 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, 1985, $34.50 (paperback, $10.95).

Tabory, Mala and Charles S. Liebman, *Jewish International Activity: An Annotated Bibliography*, iii + 241 pp., The Argov Center of Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 1985, n.p.

Taylor, Simon, *Prelude to Genocide. Nazi Ideology and the Struggle for Power*, xii + 228 pp., Duckworth, London, 1985, n.p.

Wilson, H. T., *Political Management. Redefining the Public Sphere*, x + 316 pp., Walter de Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1985, DM98 or US $34.95.

Wistrich, Robert, *Hitler's Apocalypse: Jews and the Nazi Legacy*, viii + 309 pp., Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1985, £18.95.

Zipperstein, Steven J., *The Jews of Odessa: A Cultural History, 1794–1881*, xvi + 212 pp., Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1985, $32.50.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

KOSMIN Barry A.; D.Phil. Director of Research of the Council of Jewish Federations and Director of the North American Jewish Data Bank at the Graduate School of the City University of New York. Formerly Director of the Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews. Chief publications: *Majuta: A History of the Jewish Community in Zimbabwe*, 1980; *Community Resources for a Community Survey*, 1980; *The Social Demography of Redbridge Jewry*, 1980; *Divorce in Anglo-Jewry 1970–1980: An Investigation*, 1982; and co-author, *Jews in an Inner London Borough*, 1975.

KRAUSZ, Ernest; Ph.D. Rector and Professor of Sociology, Bar-Ilan University. Formerly Reader at the City University, London. Chief publications: *Sociology in Britain*, 1969; *Ethnic Minorities in Britain*, 1971; editor of *Studies of Israeli Society*, publication series of the Israel Sociological Society (vol. 1, 1980; vol. 2, 1983; vol. 3, 1985); 'In Defence of Methodological Collectivism' in Otto Neumaier, ed., *Mind, Language and Society*, 1984; and 'The Principle of Causality and its Application to Social Phenomena' in *Methodology and Science*, vol. 18, no. 3, 1985.

SHIMONI, Gideon; Ph.D. Senior Lecturer and incumbent of the Shlomo Argov Chair in Israel–Diaspora Relations at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Chief publications: *Gandhi, Satyagraha and the Jews*, 1977; *Jews and Zionism: The South African Experience 1910–1967*, 1980; 'Ideological Perspectives' in Moshe Davis, ed., *Zionism in Transition*, 1980; 'Selig Brodetsky and the Ascendancy of Zionism in Anglo-Jewry (1939–1945)' in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 22, no. 2, 1980; and 'Poale Zion: A Zionist Transplant in Britain' in Peter Y. Medding, ed., *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 2, 1986.

WATERMAN, Stanley; Ph.D. Senior Lecturer in Geography, University of Haifa. Chief publications: 'Ideology and Events in Israeli Human Landscapes', *Geography*, vol. 64, 1979; 'Neighbourhood, Community and Residential Change Decisions in the Dublin Jewish Community' in *Irish Geography*, vol. 16, 1983; 'Not Just Milk and Honey, Now a Way of Life: Israeli Human Geography Since the Six Day War' in *Progress in Human Geography*, vol. 9, 1985; 'Partitioned States' in *Political Geography Quarterly*, vol. 5, 1986; and co-author, 'Mapping an Unenumerated Population: Jews in London, 1984' in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 10, 1986 (forthcoming).

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