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JEWISH CIRCUMCISIONS AND THE DEMOGRAPHY OF BRITISH JEWRY, 1965–82

Barry A. Kosmin and Caren Levy

THERE has been no published study of the national birthrate or of the fertility of Jews in Britain since 1973.[1] This is because the problems associated with reliable and effective data collection, which depended on voluntary returns from all *mohalim* (ritual circumcisers), had proved insuperable obstacles to research in this field in the early 1970s. However, the more recalcitrant *mohalim* are now no longer practising and the annual returns collected by the recognized body of Orthodox *mohalim*, the Initiation Society, have improved in coverage and quality. Moreover, the increased appreciation which the Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and its work have received from the Jewish community has resulted in better co-operation from communal institutions. Therefore, another attempt was made to study the Jewish birthrate.

Data Collection

The Initiation Society's own annual statistical returns for 1982 were made available to the Research Unit by its secretary.[2] These returns covered the years 1974–82 for each of 56 *mohalim* practising in Great Britain. A further eleven, who had ceased to be registered since 1974, were traced and they supplied annual returns direct to the Research Unit. We thus had the returns of a total of 67 *mohalim* who had performed *milot* (recognized ritual circumcisions); some of these are medical practitioners. Their clientele is not confined to members of Orthodox synagogues: the son of any halakhically accepted Jewish mother — whether a member of a Progressive (Reform or Liberal) synagogue or unaffiliated — is also eligible. In recent years, nine *mohalim* have been responsible for about half of the total number of ritual circumcisions; four have each performed more than 100 *milot* a year and five have each accounted for 50 to 100. The vast majority performed on only about 15 occasions annually.

Since we wished to obtain the number of all Jewish male births, we made further enquiries about independent *mohalim* and medical

TABLE I. *Milot and Circumcisions by Area of Residence of Mohel/Medical Doctor*

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
London	1,092	1,136	1,103	1,120	1,188	1,389	1,299	1,437	1,380
NorthWest	247	222	232	261	268	279	293	292	220
Yorkshire	63	71	57	70	59	65	56	49	47
North East	16	22	33	6	6	9	13	9	5
Midlands	38	37	36	22	22	21	23	19	15
Southern counties	23	15	17	23	28	32	35	25	28
Scotland	44	42	31	35	42	35	38	28	38
Wales	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
Total	1,523	1,545	1,509	1,537	1,613	1,830	1,757	1,859	1,736
% Initiation Society	95.4	94.8	95.7	91.8	92.4	91.6	90.0	88.3	89.4
% Provinces	28.3	26.5	26.1	27.1	26.3	24.2	26.1	22.7	20.5

practitioners who are not members of the Initiation Society. We received returns from seven physicians and one *mohel.* Although their clientele was largely drawn from the non-Orthodox section of the Jewish population, they nevertheless covered many who would be halakhically acceptable. These additional circumcisions, both ritual and medical, accounted for some 10 to 11 per cent of total Jewish circumcisions each year.[3] They occurred largely in London — which probably reflects the bias towards non-Orthodox synagogue membership in the capital.[4] Table 1 shows that our coverage beyond the Initiation Society for the most recent period, 1980–82, was greater than that for the middle 1970s.

In the Tables, the sub-totals for circumcisions in London and the provinces are based on the place of residence of the *mohel* or doctor, rather than of the child. Therefore the figures do not represent a true picture of the geographical distribution of Jewish births in Britain, since many *mohalim* are willing to travel long distances to provide their services to isolated Jewish communities and families. Further enquiries led us to believe that very few parents who consider themselves to be Jewish do not have their sons circumcised, and that circumcision is part of a general swing back towards traditional practices among Liberal synagogue members. We also believe that our data cover the vast majority of Jewish male births in Britain, and that the Tables provide a clear indication of the order of magnitude of the numbers and rates of contemporary Jewish births, since male births normally account for just over 51 per cent of all births.

The Annual Totals

Table 1 shows the combined annual totals of *milot* and non-ritual circumcisions for the years 1974–82. Since the quality of the data varies, not too much attention should be paid to annual fluctuations. Yet given the nature of the collection process, the data have a fairly uniform pattern. A large majority of all circumcisions are increasingly performed by persons based in London. However, as can be seen from the last two rows of Table 1, there is a clear relationship between the proportions of Initiation Society *milot* and those of provincial circumcisions, which tend to rise and fall together. This shows that the Initiation Society is stronger outside London and suggests that the returns of their members alone would exaggerate the provincial proportion of Jewish male births.

The overall geographical distribution of the births is in line with what might be expected. We know that in recent years about 27 per cent of synagogue marriages have taken place in the provinces. In addition, we know that London-based *mohalim* travel to perform circumcisions in the provinces and that a greater proportion of the non-Orthodox, and probably of the unaffiliated population, is to be found in London. On the inter-regional level the residential movements of individual *mohalim*, who are often rabbis, is reflected in the sharp annual fluctuations by area which appear in Table 1.

Period Trends in Milot

Table 1 suggests that our success rate in the collection of data on circumcisions outside the auspices of the Initiation Society is not good for the earlier years. This, combined with the fact that the 1960s figures collected by the Research Unit dealt only with Initiation Society *mohalim*, means that for comparative purposes, the Initiation Society returns are the best guide to the changes which have occurred over time. Table 2 compares the Society's *milot* returns for three periods: the quinquennium 1965–69, that of 1975–79 a decade later, and the triennium 1980–82.

If we assume that the socio-religious base of the population served by these *mohalim* has not changed markedly over the period 1965–82,and that they are supplying a service to the same general group of parents, the figures suggest that there was a 20 per cent fall in births between the late 1960s and the late 1970s. It also seems that the number of births has risen in recent years, so that they are now less than 15 per cent down on the late 1960s. Changes in the London-provincial ratio appear to be due to residential migration of circumcisers rather than to short-term structural changes in the Jewish population. It is interesting to note that a decline of about 20 per cent in the total population of British

Jewry, between 1963 and 1977, was suggested by estimates based on our mortality study.[5]

The relationship between *milot* figures and synagogue marriages is important since the vast majority of the parents of these sons must have been married in a synagogue. The 1971 fertility survey by Prais and Schmool found that 80 per cent of boys undergoing *brit milah* came from

TABLE 2. *Initiation Society Milot*

Annual average	London Mohalim	%	Provincial Mohalim	%	Total
1965–69	1,390	74.8	469	25.2	1,859
1975–79	1,093	73.0	405	27.0	1,498
1980–82	1,206	76.0	385	24.0	1,591
% change 1965–69 to 1975–79	−21.4		−13.7		−19.5
% change 1965–69 to 1980–82	−13.2		−18.0		−14.4

synagogue-affiliated households.[6] Table 3 indicates that the correlation between religious circumcisions and synagogue marriages is changing, though explanations of the causes can only be speculative. In 1965–69, the numbers of *milot* and of synagogue marriages were very similar. However, by 1980–82 the decline in synagogue marriages had outrun that in *milot*. A fall of 14.4 per cent in *milot* and a decline of 34.2 per cent in synagogue marriages since 1965–69 can only suggest that there has been a significant increase in the fertility rate of Jewish women or that increasing numbers of *milot* are peformed on boys whose

TABLE 3. *Initiation Society Milot and Synagogue Marriages*

Annual average	Number of Milot	Number of Synagogue Marriages	% Difference between Milot and Synagogue Marriages
1965–69	1859	1830	+1.6
1975–79	1498	1391	+7.7
1980-82	1591	1204	+32.1
% change 1965–69 to 1975–79	−19.5	−24.0	−4.5
% change 1965–69 to 1980–82	−14.4	−34.2	−19.8

parents were not married in a synagogue. The latter is, of course, quite consistent with Initiation Society rules, since the children's *halakhic* status is not affected by either the civil marriage of the parents or the out-marriage of a Jewish mother. The disparity between births and synagogue marriages becomes even more striking when the extra 11 per cent of non-Initiation Society circumcisions is added to the *milot* total, for it has to be remembered that some of these boys' parents may also have married in a synagogue. That would increase the proportionate excess of male births over synagogue marriages among the 'identifying' Jewish population.

Table 4 brings the *milot* and circumcision figures together to produce an estimate of the total numbers of Jewish births for the three periods. The problem of the excess of births over synagogue marriages is clearly evident. There are consistently 2.4 or 2.3 births per synagogue marriage for 1965–70 and 1975–79. This is in line with the Redbridge and other survey findings that there were 2.1 or 2.2 children born to each Jewish married woman.[7] These figures therefore equate well with that reproductive rate, with allowance for a 10 per cent excess of births to cover those who are 'effectively' Jewish, but were not married in a synagogue.

However, the most recent (1980–82) figures show a ratio of 2.9 Jewish births for each synagogue marriage. The causes of the increase of Jewish births and the apparent rise in reproductive rates indicated by the birth ratio are open to discussion. Many possible reasons come

TABLE 4. *Comparative Vital Statistics of British Jews, 1965–82*

	1965–69[8]		1975–79	1980–82	England and Wales 1980–82
Jewish population	405,000	373,000	336,000	330,000	—
Average number of births	3,934[a]		3,200[b]	3,432[c]	—
Births per mille	9.7	10.6	9.5	10.4	12.9
Average number of deaths	4,751		4,874	4,761	-
Deaths per mille	11.7	12.7	14.5	14.4	11.7
Average number of synagogue marriages	1,830		1,391	1,204	—
Marriages per mille	4.5	4.9	4.1	3.6	7.2
Ratio of births to synagogue marriages	2.4		2.3	2.9	—

a. Milot + 9% × 1.942
b. Milot + 10% × 1.942
c. All circumcisions × 1.942

to mind but first it is necessary to dispose of some obvious arguments. The high fertility of the right-wing Orthodox segment could not alone have created the disparity. Although its annual average number of marriages rose from 55 during 1965–69 to 98 for 1975–79, there has been no subsequent increase and the average for 1980–82 was 96 synagogue marriages. Even if we allow for a cumulative effect and a very high fertility rate of 5 children per marriage,[9] these would only account for 0.2 of the 0.6 of a child increase (from 2.3 to 2.9) in the birth–marriage ratio.

Another possible cause is a backlog of births built up by low fertility in the mid-1970s. Only a detailed investigation could discover whether Jewish women have engaged to a significant degree in delayed fertility. That would be a reversal of previous patterns: both the 1971 fertility study and the Redbridge study showed that Jewish mothers were more likely than the general population to concentrate their childbearing years and to have fewer births after 10 years of marriage.[10]

Of course, a much increased rate of civil marriage among identifying *halakhic* Jews could account for part of the increase. Another possibility is that it is a by-product of increasing out-marriage — in which there would be more 'Jewish children' if more than half the Jewish partners, whether men or women, brought up their children as Jews. The first sign of such a trend and prime symbol of such a socio-religious phenomenon would be an increase in 'ritual' circumcisions. Such a situation would be consistent with the sharp decline in the synagogue marriage rate from 4.9 to 3.6 per thousand over the whole period, from 1965–69 to 1980–82 (Table 4).

The increasing number of circumcisions when translated into a total figure for Jewish births gives a rising birthrate for British Jewry. The question which then arises is whether 10.4 births per thousand of the population is a realistic rate. Certainly the Hackney Jewish population in 1971 had a birthrate of 12.4 while that of Redbridge was 10.1 for 1973–79.[11] Of course, the large right-wing Orthodox component in Hackney and the youthful nature of the Redbridge population account for such above-average figures for British Jews, but they do suggest that 10.4 is a possible rate for the early 1980s. Moreover, our population projections suggested that the age structure in Redbridge meant that even given stability of the 1978 fertility rate, the birthrate would still rise to 10.2 by 1983, and to 11.0 by 1988.[12]

Nevertheless, the vital rates in Table 4 indicate that there has been a marked deterioration in the demographic health of British Jewry since the 1960s. The birth and death rates for 1965 showed a net annual loss of two persons per thousand. The annual loss had grown to five per thousand a decade later and still stood at four per thousand in 1982. In real numbers, the average annual natural loss in the Jewish population was 817 for 1965–69, 1,674 for 1975–79, and 1,329 for 1980–82.

The fact that we can produce such figures, even if they are open to some adjustment because of a margin of uncertainty of say 3 to 5 per cent, does demonstrate the value of this survey of Jewish births. It also underlines the crucial need for a further study of the marriage and migration patterns of British Jewry.

NOTES

[1] The two previous studies of the topic were by S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool: 'Statistics of Milah and the Jewish Birth-Rate in Britain', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XII, no. 2, December 1970, pp. 187–93 and 'The Fertility of Jewish Families in Britain, 1971', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 15, no. 2, December 1973, pp. 189–203.

[2] We should like to record our appreciation of Mr Alex Minn's assistance and guidance.

[3] It is interesting to note that Prais and Schmool estimated that nine per cent of circumcisions were performed by men who were not members of the Initiation Society: Prais and Schmool, 'Statistics of Milah', op. cit., p. 189.

[4] In 1983, Progressive synagogue male members accounted for 25.4 per cent of the total in Greater London, but for only 16.3 per cent in the provinces.

[5] S. Haberman, B. A. Kosmin, and C. Levy, 'Mortality Patterns of British Jews 1975–79: Insights and Applications for the Size and Structure of British Jewry', *The Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Part 3, vol. CXLVI, 1983, pp. 294–310.

[6] Prais and Schmool, 'Statistics of Milah', op. cit., p. 191.

[7] See B. A. Kosmin and N. Grizzard, *Jews in an Inner London Borough*, Board of Deputies of British Jews, London, 1979, p. 16; B. A. Kosmin, M. Bauer, and N. Grizzard, *Steel City Jews*, Board of Deputies, London, 1976, p. 16; and B. A. Kosmin, C. Levy, and P. Wigodsky, *The Social Demography of Redbridge Jewry*, Board of Deputies, London, 1979, p. 18.

[8] The two population totals for 1965–69 are based on the middle and lower estimates for the size of British Jewry reported in S.J. Prais and Marlena Schmool, 'The Size and Structure of the Anglo-Jewish Population, 1960–1965', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 10, no. 1, June 1968, pp. 5–34. A retrospective viewpoint based on Haberman, Kosmin, and Levy, 'Mortality Patterns . . .', op. cit., as well as demographic rates in this table indicate that the lower total is more realistic.

[9] This is a contemporary Third World reproductive rate and well above the average of 2.7 children per right-wing Orthodox family in 1971 reported by Prais and Schmool, 'The Fertility . . .', op. cit., p. 200.

[10] Prais and Schmool (ibid.) recorded that the proportion of births occurring after ten years of marriage was 4.5 per cent among Jews compared to 13.3 per cent among the general population of England and Wales. See also Kosmin, Levy, and Wigodsky, op. cit., p. 19.

[11] See Kosmin and Grizzard, op. cit., p. 16, and Kosmin, Levy, and Wigodsky, op. cit., p. 17.

[12] See Kosmin, Levy, and Wigodsky, op. cit., p. 35.

VISITATIONAL DREAMS AND NAMING PRACTICES AMONG MOROCCAN JEWS IN ISRAEL

Henry Abramovitch and Yoram Bilu

MICHAEL HERZFELD recently stated that 'name conferral makes a statement about the recipient's identity.[1] Traditional naming practices therefore may reflect traditional cultural notions concerning the personal and social identities of the parents who confer the names. Migration and other forms of culture change are likely to disrupt traditional values, including the naming system.

This paper deals with changes in naming practice in contemporary Israel and reports on one intriguing mechanism: the visitational dream, which for Jews of Moroccan origin may be a means of preserving their traditional naming practices.

Traditional Ashkenazi naming practice was commemorative and associative in nature. Children were usually given the names of relatives who had died. In their classic *Life is with People*, Zborowski and Herzog stated:[2]

> It is customary to name the baby in honor of someone who is dead, very often a grandparent, sometimes another relative or a distinguished person, perhaps a great rabbi. It need not be a person of the same sex, for names can be masculinized or feminized. Because it is believed that the child will exhibit some of the attributes of his namesake, the name of a weak person or a failure is avoided. A boy is often named for a learned member of the family and as he grows up he will constantly be reminded to become a scholar like that one. He is named for his father only if the father is dead. It is a misfortune not to have someone named for you after you are gone for a namesake is another link with the continuing community.

Only under special circumstances, such as illness or multiple infant deaths, would an alternative name be used. But even in those cases, the names (such as Hayyim — that is, 'life'; or 'Alter' — that is, 'old man', intended to fool the Angel of Death) still had important associative, even magical, connotations.

Unlike Ashkenazim, most Sephardim did not restrict themselves to giving their children the names of dead relatives but would also name them in honour of those still living.[3] Thus, a boy was often given his

grandfather's name, even while the latter was still living. The Ashkenazi prohibition on naming children after living relatives was based on the doctrine of *gilgul*, the transmigration of souls, which linked the name and the soul of an individual. As Trachtenberg has observed, the 'desire to bless a child with a richly endowed name was balanced by the fear that the soul of its previous owner would be transplanted into the body of an infant — a fear which stood in the way of naming children after living parents or after any living persons and thus robbing them of their soul and their life'.[4]

However, since Sephardi grandparents or other relatives considered it a special honour to have a child named after them in their lifetime, 'mixed' Sephardi–Ashkenazi marriages provided a natural setting for potential conflict concerning the naming of children of the union. In a survey of American Sephardim of Judeo-Spanish origin,[5] 79 per cent of the respondents who were married to Ashkenazi partners stated that they had named, or intended to name, their children after the living Sephardi grandparents. Sometimes there is a compromise: the child is given the Hebrew name of a living grandparent and an additional different English name. The two names appropriately confer on the child a double if complementary identity, one Jewish (in some cases, Judeo-Spanish) and one English (or rather, American). Such double naming allows for easy identity switching, an English name for normal American mainstream use, with the Hebrew name reserved for ritual occasions.

Ironically, the use of two names (which help to preserve an intact if secondary Jewish identity) is not a mechanism usually employed by the Hebrew-speaking Jews of Israel, who typically bear a single Hebrew name. Although naming conflicts do occur in Israel as elsewhere in 'mixed' Sephardi–Ashkenazi marriages, the main area of discord is between traditional or 'religious' naming patterns and secular naming practices. The clash is not between rival traditions (Sephardi versus Ashkenazi) but is intergenerational: the young against the old.[6]

The dominant trend in the Israeli secular mainstream is not to name the child after relatives, whether living or dead. Rather, young Israeli parents tend to give their children new or made-up names often derived from nature or from peripheral Biblical characters. The latter, because of their often negative connotations, were not formerly used by Jews. Names are also sometimes chosen without reference to their semantic content, but simply on account of their euphony — because they have a pleasing sound.

In order to illustrate this modern trend in Israel, we listed the names of 387 children born in 1970–80 in five non-religious kibbutzim. (We assume that these kibbutz names do not differ significantly from those of the rest of Israel's secular population.) The most popular 29 names were, in that order: Lior; Yael, Asaph; Michal, Noah, Daphna, Rotam,

Tal; Ro'ee, Yaniv, Nadav, Ori, Anat; Roni, Keren, Oren, Zohar, Ofra, Ron, Oded, Elat, Omri, Dana, Omer, Raz, Tamar, Sivan, Aran; and Hagar. There was a virtual absence of the most common traditional Jewish forenames — such as Miriam, Rachel, Solomon, or David. Among all the 387 names, stalwarts of Jewish identity such as 'Moshe' or 'Hayyim' occurred only once. It will be noticed that the majority of the most common names cited above are short and neologistic. Some are derived from nature, such as Daphna (laurel tree), Tal (dew), or Oren (pine-tree) while others are cognates of the Hebrew words for 'light' or 'joy' — such as Lior (a light unto me) or Roni (my joy). Names derived from the Bible are often those of peripheral personalities, such as Yael, Asaph, or Michal; they are not those of the familiar heroes of the Old Testament — Abraham, Isaac, or Jacob. Biblical names such as Omri and Hagar were not traditionally given to Jewish children, since Omri was a great but an immoral king (1 Kings, 16: 16–26) while Hagar was Sarai's maid whom she gave to Abram so that she might bear him children and she bore him Ishmael who would have 'every man's hand against him' (Genesis, 16: 1–12).

Kibbutz parents said that they chose a scriptural name not because of its Biblical connotations but merely because they liked the sound of it. Such a general attitude about naming children represents a break with the former intergenerational pattern and to that extent may reflect an underlying desire on the part of younger Israelis to distance themselves from the traditional value systems of their often immigrant parents. The new names have no moral or religious connotations; they are more like labels which bear no relationship to any facet of the personality.

Since names formerly conveyed important culturally intergenerational significance (via commemoration and association), the naming of a child today may give rise to serious disagreement between its parents and grandparents. However, the older generation is usually helpless in the face of a determined choice by the new parents. Naming may serve as an important symbolic focus for intergenerational conflict, particularly since one of the cultural meanings of a traditional name was precisely generational continuity which the new neologistic trend explicitly rejects.

Against this background of intergenerational and religious/secular conflict over names, the rest of this paper is devoted to the description of a mechanism, among Jews of Moroccan origin, which is used to exert pressure on young Israelis in favour of a traditional choice of name. That mechanism is the visitational dream, which we have described in detail elsewhere.[7]

Visitational dreams of saintly persons (*tsaddikim*) are an important dream genre in Jewish Moroccan culture, reflecting the veneration in which these holy men are held.[8] In form and style, Jewish Moroccan

hagiolatry was clearly influenced by maraboutic practices, the hallmark of Maghrebi Islam,[9] although the reverence for the *tsaddik* is also deeply rooted in classical Judaism.

The Jewish Moroccan saints were charismatic individuals, distinguished by their erudition and piety; and they were believed to possess a special spiritual power with the potentialities of Divine Grace (known in Moroccan Arabic as *Barakah*).[10] That power, which does not fade away after the holy man's death, may be used for the help and benefit of his faithful adherents. The high point in the veneration of each saint was the collective pilgrimage to his shrine on the anniversary of his death — which, in the case of the more renowned saints, developed into a major festival. In personal dire circumstances, there were also individual pilgrimages in Morocco as well as various rituals conducted in the home to honour the *tsaddik*. It is no wonder, therefore, that devotees frequently dream about their holy men. The fact that such dreams are usually associated with the pilgrimage and are often dreamt within the precincts of the saint's shrine make them quite akin to the well-known phenomenon of 'temple sleep' or 'incubation'.[11]

After recovering from the harsh experiences associated with the 'predicaments of homecoming' to Israel in the 1950s and 1960s, Moroccan Jews revived their hagiolatric practices, using various substitutes for the sacred tombs in their native land. The graves of *tsaddikim* (mainly from the Talmudic era) were cherished in the Holy Land as pilgrimage centres since the early Middle Ages. For the Moroccan Jewish immigrants, the most popular site is the tomb of the charismatic Rabbi Shimeon bar Yohai — the alleged author of the mystical Book of Splendour (the Zohar) — at Meiron, near Safed in Upper Galilee. Nowadays, the great majority of those who come to his *hillulah* (memorial celebration) conducted on the thirty-third day after Passover (Lag B'Omer) are of Moroccan extraction. It is the largest annual pilgrimage in Israel, with well over 100,000 devotees each year in the 1980s. On three of these pilgrimages (in 1980, 1981, and 1982), we collected a total of one hundred visitational dreams from pilgrims of Moroccan extraction.

In these dreams the saint usually appears in person, with a shining face and a long beard, in a white *jellaba* (traditional robe or cloak with a hood) while sometimes he comes in some symbolic guise such as a dove, a lion, or a light. It may also happen that a namesake of the saint, usually a relative or a neighbour, represents him. During the initial dream encounter, the saint reveals his identity to the dreamer and orders him or her to stand up. There follows a short exchange of words and then the saint gives some clear or veiled advice to his devotee about the latter's personal difficulties about health, infertility, economic distress, religious issues, or indeed participation in the annual pilgrimage to the saint's shrine. The saint may also give some material object

to the dreamer, as we shall see below. Most of the dreams we collected were related to infertility, but about ten per cent were concerned in varying degrees with the matter of name conferral.

Jewish Moroccan culture views with particular favour the birth of sons and it is no rare occurence for a pregnant woman to have a visitational dream from a saint who reveals to her that the unborn child is a boy. In return, she is expected to name the child in honour of the annunciating *tsaddik* – failing which, some harm might befall the boy. A saint might also appear to inform a pregnant woman that her expected baby is a girl and, as we shall see below, might give a hint about an appropriate name for the infant. According to our data, among Israelis of Moroccan origin, the overwhelming majority of traditional names are given to boys while girls are often named according to the mainstream secular Israeli pattern.

The following tale about a dream dramatically illustrates the intergenerational conflict between a middle-aged woman and her pregnant daughter about the naming of the expected baby:

> My daughter was in her first pregnancy. She was entering her eighth month. One day I said to her, 'Give the [unborn] child the name of my father, your grandfather', and she said, 'Don't think that today's names are like they once were. I want a modern name'. I said, 'Are we not going to continue the tradition [of naming] from grandfather to grandson?'. But she said, 'It's not in fashion'. I replied 'All right, if you don't want to, my other daughters will give [their sons] his name'.
>
> One night I had a dream as my daughter was entering her ninth month. I dreamt that a man appeared to me with a beard, dressed all in white, coming towards me with a grandfather's cane. He looked like the prophet Elijah. Why did he come to me? He said to me. 'Are you Mazal, daughter of Elijah?'. I said, 'Yes'. He said, 'They sent me to be a guest at your place'. I said, 'Welcome. I will honour you, but forgive me, your Honour, that I have not prepared anything special. I must prepare some special food in your Honour. So wait, spend the night here until I am ready to honour you with something finer'.
>
> But he said, 'My daughter, I have come to live here'. And I said, 'Stay please . . . but I have only two rooms. I will build another room for you. Wait and I will ask my husband' [laughter]. He said to me, 'One step at a time. It's not important. I will even stay with your children until you are better off and you will make me my own place. I have to come to you as a permanent guest'.
>
> I said, 'How is it that you will live only with me? Have you no wife? Or children?' He said, 'I finished with them. I have come to live only with you'. I said, 'Welcome. We will receive you as we are'.
>
> Afterwards, he asked me, 'Do you know how I am called?' I said, 'No'. He said, 'They call me David, David, David'.
>
> On the following day, my daughter gave birth. I said to her, 'You don't want the old-fashioned names of the grandparents. God sent King David for you. Call him Dudu, Dotan, David, whatever you like'.

> And so it was. They called him Dani and David. I made the *brit milah* [circumcision] ceremony and the feast of the redemption of the first-born son. All the elders and respectable people were there. It was a grand affair.

As the introductory passage of the dreamer's account reveals, this dream emerged from a controversy over naming between older Moroccan traditional values, represented by the dreamer, and modern Israeli secular values, adopted by her daughter (the mother-to-be). The latter, complying with the modern, 'fashionable' style of naming, refuses to follow tradition and to name her future child after a relative — in this case, the child's great-grandfather, called Elijah. The grandmother's dream serves as a manipulatory device through which the conflict is resolved to the benefit of both parties. It should be noted that King David, like many other Biblical heroes, is venerated as a saint by the traditional segments of Israeli society and his tomb on Mount Zion in Jerusalem is one of the major pilgrimage centres. As a result of his alleged appearance in the grandmother's dream, the newborn is named David. The grandmother fails to realize her preferred choice, but she is satisfied by the fact that her grandchild was granted a traditional name — one which she advocated. The mother (the dreamer's daughter) also has to compromise: she feels obliged to obey the will of the venerated king, mediated by her mother's dream, but she is given a choice of modern Israeli names which are cognates of David. Eventually, the boy is given two names — Dani (a typically modern Israeli name) and David — a combination of the old and the new.

The description of King David closely resembles the typical oneiric appearance of a *tsaddik*, bearded and dressed in white. As in many other visitational dreams, the dreamer is totally ignorant of his identity. That she erroneously identifies him as the prophet Elijah is hardly surprising, given her strong wish to call the newborn after her own father, Elijah. The fact that the *tsaddik* joins the family as a permanent guest (despite the woman's mild protests) is eventually understood as alluding to the arrival of a new member of the family, the grandchild who will bear the venerated name. The dreamer's initial reluctance to welcome the visitor into her house might have reflected a covert ambivalence on her part about the arrival of an extra member of the family. It is hinted that the extra mouth to feed might strain the household's resources and cause overcrowding — special food must be prepared and another room built. Her reluctance might also be related to the subtle sexual nuances that the stranger elicits, enhanced by the absence of her husband and the visitor's announcement that he has 'finished with' his wife and children and has come to live in her home permanently.

The compromise names, Dani and David, correspond to the pattern of double naming, already noted. In the cases where only one traditional Jewish name is given, the bearer and his parents may use a

shortened form or a nickname. Thus, 'Dani' (in the example above) could be short for Daniel while 'Shuki' may be used for Yehoshua (Joshua), 'Kobi' for Ya'akov (Jacob), or 'Tami' for 'Tamar' — all of which have a distinctively modern Israeli sound.

Another locus of potential conflict is the strong cultural preference for males, a trend which is weakening among secular Israelis but is still strong among Moroccan Jews. Visitational dreams — as we noted above — may act as a kind of bargain in which the saint promises the pregnant mother a son in return for which she is obliged to name the child after the saint. The following dream, of a young woman aged 27, is an unusual example of a dream of that type:

> I was sleeping at home in my seventh month. Suddenly I dreamt that our neighbour came down to me and slept with me. The next day I told the dream to a woman neighbour of mine, and she said that it was Rabbi Shimeon bar Yohai, and that I would give birth to a son and call him Shimeon, and so it was. Here is my son at my side [pointing to a small child nearby]. My neighbour is also called Shimeon. He came to me and wished to have [sexual] relations with me [in the dream].

Out of the hundred dreams we collected, that was the only one with an explicit sexual content. Sexual nuances do appear in a few other dreams, but they are never so obvious. On the manifest level, its relevance to the dream genre under study may be doubted. It is indeed the culturally patterned interpretation which sublimates a seemingly unacceptable libidinal desire into a spiritual encounter consistent with the visitational dream type. The interpretation is based on the aforementioned traditional notion that the *tsaddik* may be represented in a dream through a namesake (in this case, a neighbour called Shimeon) and accordingly the newborn is named after the *tsaddik*. It should be noted that in this case the dreamer was a young woman, while the neighbour whom she consulted was substantially older. Beyond resolving the dreamer's sexual conflict, the interpreter serves as a socializing agent for the saint's cult, as she persuades the dreamer to distinguish a saintly message within the framework of her visitational dream.

The dream also illustrates the vital importance of namesakes. The neighbour called Shimeon is identified with Rabbi Shimeon bar Yohai; the newborn is in turn named after the saint, under whose protection the child will remain. The name gives further honour and renown to the saint and his cult and provides concrete evidence of the intimate link between the saint and his devotees.

Another dream was about a culturally unwelcome event, the birth of a daughter:

> My neighbour came to me in my dream and said 'Arise, arise!' [Hebrew, *kum! kum!*]. 'Look here, Rabbi Meir gave you a pot' [Hebrew: *kumkum*]. I said, 'No, I don't want it'. She said, 'Yes, take it. He told me [in my dream]

that you should take it; [he said] to give it to my friend who is sleeping'. When I woke up, I got it into my head that he had given me a present. I became pregnant and gave birth to a girl. The gift of the *kumkum* meant that he gave me a daughter, and I called her Barda because in Moroccan Arabic a pot is called Barda. As I was told, so I did'.

This is an embedded dream, based on a vicarious communication with the *tsaddik*, in this case, Rabbi Meir. The neighbour who appears in the dream acts as an intermediary, delivering to the dreamer Rabbi Meir's message, which she in turn received in her own dream on her neighbour's (our informant) behalf. She addresses the dreamer with the stereotypic command of the *tsaddik* — 'Arise! Arise!' – so prevalent in this type of dream. The command is a clear manifestation of the 'ascending dimension', typical of the saint-adherent relationship. In this case, the appearance of the pot in the dream is presumably determined by the fact that in Hebrew a pot (*kumkum*) and 'Arise!' twice uttered (*Kum! Kum!*) are homonymous. The dreamer realizes that the *tsaddik*'s gift stands for a daughter: in the lexicon of Moroccan folk dream interpretation, the gift of a pot represents a female. (In Western imagery also, a vessel (or a pot or receptacle) is a symbol of the feminine; and modern psychologists have interpreted dreams where a pot or vessel occurs accordingly.[12])

The initial refusal of the dreamer to accept the *tsaddik*'s gift might have reflected her reluctance to give birth to a female baby, given the strong cultural preference for a male child. Later, she was reconciled to becoming the mother of a girl because she believed that her new daughter was, after all, the gift of a venerated saint. As noted above, females are given traditional names less frequently than are boys. 'Barda', although derived from the dream encounter, is nevertheless an Arabic and not a typically Jewish name.[13] Males with their preferred status act as symbols of intergenerational continuity and hence there is greater stress on male names which demonstrate that very continuity.

Conclusion

All three dreams illustrate how a visitational dream may dramatically affect the choice of a child's name. In all three cases, the effect of the dream-derived name is to reassert traditional Jewish–Moroccan values in the face of modern secular trends. The child is named either directly in honour of the revered apparition (David or Shimeon) or only indirectly when the name is derived from the interpretation of the dream (as in the case of Barda). The naming decision, however, ushers the child into a life-long relationship with that dominant symbolic figure of Jewish Moroccan life, the *tsaddik* — whose influence extends even to young secularized Israeli Jews of North African origin.

These 'naming dreams' help to preserve the close relationship between saint and devotee, just as the traditional Ashkenazi practice was to name a child after an esteemed relative or a famous Biblical personality so that by association the child would grow up to resemble the individual after whom he was named.

NOTES

[1] Michael Herzfeld, 'When Exceptions Define the Rules: Greek Baptismal Names and the Negotiation of Identity', *Journal of Anthropological Research*, vol. 38, no. 3, 1982, p. 288.

[2] Mark Zborowski and Elizabeth Herzog, *Life is with People: The Culture of the Shtetl*, New York, 1952, p. 321.

[3] See, for example, H. J. Zimmels, *Ashkenazim and Sephardim: Their Relations, Differences and Problems as Reflected in the Rabbinical Responsa*, London, 1975, p. 165; and Abraham Chill, *The Minhagim: The Customs and Ceremonies of Judaism, Their Origin and Rationale*, New York, 1979, pp. 291–307.

[4] Joshua Trachtenberg, *Jewish Magic and Superstition*, New York, 1970, p. 78.

[5] Marc D. Angel, 'Sephardic–Ashkenazic Intermarriage', *Sh'ma: A Journal of Jewish Responsibility*, vol. 14, no. 2, January 1984, p. 45. See also Marc D. Angel, 'The Sephardim in the United States: An Exploratory Study', *American Jewish Year Book 1973*, vol. 74, p. 125.

[6] See, for example, Sammy Smooha, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict*, London, 1978 and S. N. Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society*, London, 1967, p. 415.

[7] See Yoram Bilu and Henry Abramovitch, 'In Search of the Saddiq: Visitational Dreams Among Moroccan Jews Living in Israel', *Psychiatry*, vol. 48, no. 1, February 1985.

[8] See, for example, Issachar Ben-Ami, *Folk Veneration of Saints Among Moroccan Jews*, Jerusalem, 1984 and Norman A. Stillman, 'Saddiq and Marabout in Morocco' in Issachar Ben-Ami, ed., *The Sephardi and Oriental Jewish Heritage*, Jerusalem, 1982.

[9] See, for example, D. F. Eickleman, *Moroccan Islam*, Austin, Texas, 1976.

[10] See P. Rabinow, *Symbolic Domination: Cultural Form and Historical Change in Morocco*, Chicago, 1975.

[11] See, for example, E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley, 1951, especially chapter IV, 'Dream-Pattern and Culture Pattern', pp. 110–16.

[12] See Sigmund Freud, *Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis* (trans. James Strachey), Pelican Freud Library, vol. 1, London, 1974, p. 189; Carl Jung, *Symbols of Transformation* (trans. R. F. C. Hull), Princeton, 1976, p. 203; and T. Chetwynd, *Dictionary for Dreamers*, London, 1974, p. 128.

[13] In everyday usage, 'Barda' is probably pronounced 'Varda', a fairly common girl's name in Israel, which is the Hebrew for 'Rose'. *Wardah* is the Arabic word for a rose.

A NOTE ON THE MIGRATION OF JEWS FROM DUBLIN

Stanley Waterman

MIGRATION usually alters the demographic structure of a population. For example, the immigration of households with young children into a community will cause the median age of that community to drop, whereas their emigration will raise the median age of the population remaining. Most populations are subject to varying intensities of migration streams in both directions, which affect their size and demographic structure. The smaller the group, the greater will be the change caused by a given migration. As a side effect, there may also be ensuing changes in leadership patterns and in the planning of schools, hospitals, and welfare services.

This Note deals with the migration of Jews from Dublin between approximately 1930 and 1980. The small Dublin Jewish community, similar in ethnic origins and in organization to other Jewish provincial communities in the British Isles, has stood apart from the predominantly Catholic population. It is only in the past two decades that a substantial number of Jews have become active in the mainstream of Irish political and cultural life, among them three members of the current Dáil (Lower House), one from each major party. It has traditionally been an Orthodox tightly-knit community. Despite its small size (2,128 Jews for the Republic of Ireland as a whole according to the 1981 Census), it maintained in 1980 five synagogues (including one Progressive), a Jewish day school, two kasher butchers, a Home for the Aged, and several charitable societies. Its main cultural and social ties have been with the British communities, but in recent decades family links have been established with Israel and North America. Israel has also supplied teachers and youth leaders.

There is a Jewish Representative Council of Ireland, a General Board of Shechita of Eire, a Jewish Board of Guardians, and a Zionist Council of Ireland. There are several Women's International Zionist Organization (WIZO) groups, an office of the Jewish National Fund, and a branch of the Child Resettlement Fund: Emunah (concerned with under-privileged children in Israel). Dublin also has a group of Friends of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

The present Chief Rabbi of Great Britain and the British Commonwealth had been Chief Rabbi of the Jewish Communities in Ireland from 1949 to 1958 and last March he inducted Ireland's fifth Chief Rabbi in the Adelaide Road Synagogue of Dublin in the presence of the President and the Prime Minister of Ireland, of the Leader of the Opposition, and of the Lord Mayor of Dublin.

Dublin Jewry in its modern form dates from the end of the nineteenth century, when there was an influx of migrants from Lithuania.[1] At the 1881 Census, there were 394 Jews in the counties which now constitute the Republic of Ireland; most of them, 89.3 per cent, were in the Dublin area. (Throughout the last hundred years, the very large majority of Irish Jews have lived in Dublin and its environs.) As a result mainly of the Lithuanian immigration, there were 1,502 Jews in 1891, 2,724 in 1901, and 3,802 in 1911. The next Census, in 1926, recorded a slight decrease to 3,686 followed by slight increases to 3,749 in 1936 and 3,908 in 1946. Thereafter, the Jewish population of Ireland declined steadily to 3,255 in 1961, 2,633 in 1971, and 2,128 in 1981.

Clearly, many of the descendants of the early immigrants left Ireland to settle elsewhere, but it is not possible to discover the exact number who did so in recent decades.

Data source

In October 1980, 150 households were randomly selected from a communal mailing list (drawn up in April of that year) of all known identifying Jews in Dublin in 712 households. They were asked to cooperate in a survey of Dublin Jewry and were assured of complete confidentiality. Twelve households refused to take part in the enquiry. A further 12 were randomly selected but two of them refused to cooperate. When the survey was conducted in November 1980 and the 148 households were visited, nine were either out of town or otherwise unavailable during the survey period, five had moved out of Dublin, two persons (each living in single-person households) had died, and two others were in hospital.

The 130 households to which the questionnaire was administered had a total of 361 individuals. There were 29 persons living alone, nearly all of whom were widows or spinsters over the age of sixty. Another 45 households consisted of two persons, mostly married couples without children. The remaining 56 households were constituted as follows: 15 with three members, 16 with four members, 21 with five members, and four with six or more members. The average household size was 2.8 persons.[2] The 200 respondents in the survey were the heads of the 130 households and (where there were married couples) their spouses.

In the case of married couples, each spouse was separately questioned. Every respondent was asked about any children or siblings who had formerly emigrated from Dublin and were now living abroad. Information was required about the destination, year of emigration, and occupation in 1980.

An approximate picture of the emigrants has been built up on the basis of this information. However, the data are somewhat deficient. First, the source is not the emigrant but a sibling or a parent who was still in Dublin in 1980, so that those who had emigrated and had no such close kinsmen in Dublin were not accounted for. Second, although the aim was to discover the number of emigrants who were still alive in 1980 (the original intention was to compare the emigrants with the remaining community), some confusion may have arisen when the respondents were interviewed in that they may have included members of their family who had emigrated from Dublin but who had since died.

The 200 respondents reported 221 cases of emigration — 117 males, and 104 females; 21 per cent of these left Dublin before the 1950s, 29 per cent during the 1950s, 22 per cent in the 1960s, and 28 per cent in the 1970s. This may seem to indicate a greater proportion of emigrants in recent years but we must bear in mind that it may also reflect that there were very few respondents still in Dublin in 1980 to report on cases of earlier migration.

Destinations

Over the period as a whole, from about 1930 to 1980, the United Kingdom was the destination of slightly more than half the number of emigrants, 119 out of 221. London was the choice of 67, followed by Manchester with 13, while the remaining 39 went to Leeds, Glasgow, Liverpool, Sheffield, Bristol, and Brighton. It is not surprising that more Dublin Jews emigrated to the UK rather than to any other land. Not only was it the nearest country in geographical terms, but there was no language barrier and no restrictions on immigration. Moreover, they could easily pay visits to Ireland and/or be joined by their kinsmen. A total of 44 went to North America: 26 to the United States and 18 to Canada. Not a single emigrant was reported to have gone to Palestine before the 1940s, but three went in the 1940s, 16 went to Israel in the 1950s, five in the 1960s, and 18 in the 1970s — a total of 42. Although some went to kibbutzim and moshavim, most of them settled in urban areas. A further 16 went to other various destinations: four to Australia, three to South Africa, two to the Netherlands, and one each to France, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Austria, the Bahamas, and Costa Rica.

Occupations

About a third of the total number of emigrants (75 out of 221) were housewives with no reported gainful occupation; 42 went to the United Kingdom, 17 to Israel, eight to the United States, six to Canada, and the remaining two to South Africa and Australia.

After housewives, physicians (35) constituted the largest single occupational category and together with five dentists and three nurses, accounted for 19.5 per cent of all emigrants during the entire period. Ten medical doctors went to London, nine elsewhere in the United Kingdom, six to the United States, five to Canada, two to Israel, two to South Africa, and one to Australia. Other professionals included university lecturers and schoolteachers, painters, and sculptors. Their destinations in general resembled those of the rest of the migrating population.

There were 13 secretaries, all women. No secretary was reported to have emigrated before 1951, but in the three decades from 1951 to 1980, six went to London, three elsewhere in the United Kingdom, and one each to Israel, the USA, the Netherlands, and Australia.

The total of businessmen who emigrated was very close to that of medical doctors, 32. Of these, 14 went to the United Kingdom, eight to the United States, five to Israel, two each to Canada and Australia, and one to Switzerland.

Only five per cent of the 221 emigrants (11) had retired when they left Dublin. This is not surprising since it is usually the younger and more active members of a community who emigrate in normal circumstances — that is, when there is no war, persecution, or famine.

Conclusion

Much of the early growth of the Irish Jewish population was the result of immigration and much of its recent decline (from 3,255 in 1961 to 2,128 in 1981) was the result of emigration. In many cases, children of those who came with the major influx at the beginning of this century received their education and professional training in Dublin then left the country before rearing their own children.

Two reasons in particular can be highlighted for the continual stream of emigration. There was a limited choice of suitable marriage partners in the local community, which was of restricted size. While this factor also brought an inflow of partners from abroad, especially from the United Kingdom, it led to the emigration of many more. Second, there was a comparatively high proportion of members of the medical, dental, legal, and academic professions. Some of them believed that their opportunities for professional advancement were limited because they belonged to a minority group in a developing country while others who sought positions outside the realm of private

practice had to leave their native land in order to achieve their aim. The level of education of Dublin Jews is very high. In 1980, 62 per cent of the heads of household who were under 45 years of age had gone to university and the remaining 38 per cent to secondary and technical schools.

It is impossible to discover the total number of Dublin Jews who left Ireland in the course of the last fifty years, partly owing to the method by which the data were collected. But if we do no more than project directly from the 200 informants interviewed, then at least 1,200 Jews left since 1930. In addition, we know from our 1980 survey that many migrated with their entire households and left behind no potential respondents. Furthermore, there were those known emigrants who were no longer alive at the time of the interviews and were therefore not included in the questionnaires.

Dublin Jews, apart from those who went to Israel, migrated like Irish Gentiles mainly to countries in the English-speaking world. They have been subject to the same immigration restrictions as the general Irish population and the majority went to the United Kingdom. One main difference between the two groups is that while labourers make up the bulk of the general Irish migrant stream,[3] they are non-existent among the Jews who left Dublin.

Additional factors contributing to the decline in the number of Irish Jews are a low birth rate, ageing, and cases of out-marriage into the host community in recent years. Of the 130 heads of household interviewed in 1980, exactly half (65) were aged 60 and over while only 34 (just over a quarter) were under 45. Further evidence of the decline, if needed, is reflected in the fact that since 1961 four synagogues and one of the two Jewish day schools have closed, and kasher meat shops have been reduced from seven to two. Under the circumstances, it is truly remarkable that Dublin in 1985 still has four functioning synagogues[4] and a wide range of communal activities.

NOTES

[1] See L. Hyman, *The Jews of Ireland*, London, 1971, and Stanley Waterman, 'Changing Residential Patterns of the Dublin Jewish Community', *Irish Geography*, vol. 14, 1981, pp. 41–50.

[2] See Stanley Waterman, 'Neighbourhood, Community and Residential Change Decisions in the Dublin Jewish Community', *Irish Geography*, vol. 16, 1983, pp. 55–68.

[3] J. G. Hughes and B. M. Walsh, 'Migration Flows Between Ireland, the U.K. and the Rest of the World', *European Demographic Information Bulletin*, vol. 7, 1975, pp. 125–49.

[4] One of the five synagogues which functioned in 1980 now seems about to close: it held no Rosh Hashanah or Yom Kippur services in the autumn of 1984.

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL

David B. Capitanchik

(*Review Article*)

IN A recent article,[1] the editor of the Israeli daily newspaper *Ha-Aretz*, Gershom Schocken, states that the founders of Zionism, whether in eastern Europe or elsewhere, were guided by liberal or socialist ideas. According to him, Zionism was, *inter alia*, and perhaps first and foremost, a rebellion against the Jewish religion and the religious and social establishment within Jewish society. Zionist leaders, such as Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, viewed religion with indifference, if not animosity.

Schocken had previously observed, in an earlier article in *Ha-Aretz*, that in the past the religious leaders of the Irish, of the Italians, and of the Jews had generally opposed their respective peoples' nationalist aspirations, seeing in those aspirations the pernicious influence of nineteenth-century secular liberalism. However, once each nationalist movement had succeeded in establishing a unified independent state, its religious institutions quickly adapted to the changed circumstances and made every effort to re-establish their hegemony over the new polity. Those efforts were in turn largely successful, although in the case of Israel it is tempting to believe that their achievements were more limited. This is because the number of Knesset seats held by the religious parties is smaller in 1985 than it was at any time before the assumption of power by the Likud in 1977. But, paradoxically, the political importance of Israel's 'religious camp' does seem to have increased as its numerical strength has declined. Indeed, those who have always favoured a secular liberal state are now apprehensive lest Israel evolve into a theocracy.

What is usually referred to as the 'religious camp' is far from united. It emerged from the last Israeli General Election in 1984 split not only along the traditional lines of degrees of orthodoxy and commitment to Zionism, but also along ethnic lines between Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews. Like their counterparts in the secular parties, prominent Sephardi figures in the 'religious camp', frustrated in their ambition to reach the highest positions within the existing frameworks, have created new parties based on the support of their followers from their

own 'ethnic' communities. This was first seen in the success of the Tami party (The Movement for a Traditional Israel) in breaking away from the National Religious Party in the 1981 elections. Tami represents Orthodox Sephardi Jews of mainly Moroccan origin. It won three seats in the Knesset in 1981, but was left with only one after last year's poll. Tami lost about two-fifths of its 1981 vote mostly, or so it seems, to the new Sephardi Torah Observance Party (Shas).[2]

Shas is led by the hitherto virtually unknown Rabbi Yitzhak Peretz, but was evidently inspired and guided by the former Sephardi Chief Rabbi, Ovadia Yosef. Shas won 3.1 per cent of the poll in 1984 and its 63,605 votes were enough to give the new party four seats in the Knesset. Its relative success, however, did not represent any noticeable increase in the vote for the 'religious camp' as a whole. With 13 seats overall, its number remained exactly the same as after the 1981 elections. In addition to the two seats gained from Tami, Shas seems to have taken its other two mandates from the erstwhile anti-Zionist Agudat Israel Party from which the new party emerged. The ultra-orthodox Aguda won only 1.7 per cent of the poll in 1984, compared with 3.7 per cent in the previous general election, and it now has only two seats in the Knesset.

Nevertheless, argues Schocken, the idea of the modern, secular, liberal state in Israel is now challenged by a minority of militant religious Jews who are organised in relatively effective political bodies. Their aim is to turn Israel into a theocracy, involving the substitution of the Sanhedrin for the Knesset as the country's supreme authority. Schocken acknowledges that in parliamentary terms, the religious minority has little more than 10 per cent of Knesset seats. However, he maintains, it is usually able to bring powerful pressure to bear, especially within the coalition, so as to realise its goals. This has been one of the major consequences of the transformation of the Israeli polity from one dominated by a single major party (Labour) into a dominant two-party system (the Labour Alignment and the Likud). The two major parties are so finely balanced that minor coalition partners can play off one against the other in achieving legislative sanction for their values and goals.

For at least two decades following the establishment of the State, the gulf between Israel's Orthodox minority and secular majority was bridged by an agreement to observe a status quo in religious affairs. Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, and Rabbi Yehuda Fishman (Maimon) agreed that rules regarding the observance of the Sabbath before the establishment of the State would continue to be observed thereafter. This meant permitting buses to operate on Saturday in Haifa, but not in Tel-Aviv or Jerusalem. Cinemas would be closed, but the radio would be allowed to continue broadcasting. The old Ottoman law which provided for communal jurisdiction over

family law and which precluded civil marriage in Israel was retained. The National Religious Party in Labour-dominated coalition governments was assured the Ministry of the Interior portfolio, and the Orthodox had the right to exercise supervision over which person was permitted to be recognized as a Jew.

The demise of the old single-party dominated politics and the emergence of the new dominant two-party system have been accompanied by a decline in the National Religious Party. With only four seats in the Knesset, it has been reduced to a shadow of its former glory, and the last few years have seen the rise of more aggressive, fundamentalist religious politics. The post-1948 understanding between the secularists and Orthodox politicians is a thing of the past. They face each other now with two very different conceptions of Israeli society: one, the modern Western liberal state based on high technology, with a universalist culture; the other, the theocratic state governed by rabbinic law (the halakha).

Schocken's view of the relationship between religion and politics in Israel is widespread among those who still subscribe to the values and ideology that prevailed in Israel during the first 29 years of its existence, until 1977. As is only to be expected, it is a view which is strongly challenged from within the religious community. Indeed, a very different analysis is to be found in a collection of essays published in 1984 by Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya of Bar-Ilan University.[3] Seen from the perspective of the Orthodox community, the complex interrelationship between religion and politics in Israel does not inevitably lead to divisiveness. That it should seem to, the authors say, is largely a Western view which regards the introduction of religious issues into the political arena as leading inevitably to conflict. Democratic politics are, by their very nature, believed to be based upon bargaining and compromise. Thus in the West it is commonly assumed that they cannot deal effectively with ultimate issues over which compromise is difficult, if not impossible. Hence the strict separation of state and religion in the United States. Moreover, the argument goes, those who regard the secular libertarian society as desirable insist that in matters of religion, as is the case in all issues of conscience, the Government ought to remain strictly neutral so as to safeguard individual liberty. The entry of religion into the political arena is also seen as having the effect of corrupting the religious establishment which can easily succumb to the temptations of political power and the attainment of religious goals through coercion rather than moral persuasion.

Liebman and Don-Yehiya agree that the mixing of religion and politics does have unfortunate consequences for both the stability of the political system and the integrity of religion. But they argue also that there are certain benefits to be gained for both particularly where, as in

the case of Israel, the mix is inevitable. Too many studies, they argue, focus upon the political controversies that arise from religious issues. True, religion has divided Israeli society. However, the studies overlook the integrative function of religion and the extent to which it provides a vehicle for socialization and political legitimation.

Liebman and Don-Yehiya attempt to substantiate these claims in the essays which together make up their book. It is not an easy task and frequently their arguments, though undoubtedly sincere, verge on the disingenuous. They reject all arguments in favour of religious legislation that are couched in secular terms. They would not support the usual explanations in favour of the continued prohibition on civil marriage and divorce — namely, on the grounds that otherwise there would be created a category of Jews with whom the Orthodox could not marry and national unity would thereby be undermined. They reject also the contention that the absence of religious laws would alienate Diaspora Jews who, until recently, were believed to be more orthodox than the majority of Israelis. They even dismiss the notion that the religious laws are of moral-social significance (for example, the justification of the Sabbath-rest laws on grounds of social welfare). Instead, they insist that the impetus for religious legislation stems in good part from an authentic national-religious impulse.

Here we reach the nub of the issue which presents a profound moral and political dilemma for Schocken and those who share his views about the nature of the Israeli polity and its relationship to religion. In the past, the reasons for religious legislation were largely defensive: the religious political parties saw it as their main responsibility to use whatever political leverage they might possess in order to prevent the erosion of religious institutions by secular encroachment. As Liebman and Don-Yehiya point out, Agudat Israel avoided involvement with government altogether, preferring to confine its activities exclusively to defending its own particularistic interests. One of its principal aims was to secure the exemption from military service of Yeshiva students and of Orthodox girls; and another was that religious Jews could lawfully refuse to allow autopsies to be carried out on the bodies of their relatives. In particular, there was concern to preserve the autonomy of religious institutions and to ensure the provision of separate religious educational facilities from nursery school to university.

The situation has changed dramatically in recent years, largely, according to Liebman and Don-Yehiya, because religious voters feel increasingly secure that their basic interests are protected. They can now involve themselves in issues that affect all Israelis, rather than confine their attention to their own particular concerns. It was the rise to power of the Likud under the premiership of Menahem Begin which provided the main stimulus for this development and which was related largely to the changing Israeli demographic structure. Approximately

55 per cent of Israel's Jews are now of Sephardi origin and their political impact has been felt in recent years in their strong support for the Likud. Indeed, ethnic affiliation has become the main determinant of party choice for the majority of voters. In 1984, about three-quarters of the Likud's supporters were Sephardi (or of Oriental origin) and three-quarters of Labour voters were Ashkenazi. Significantly, about 80 per cent of those who voted for the left-of-centre Citizens Rights and Shinui parties were of Ashkenazi origin.

A number of reasons have been advanced for the increasing support for the Likud among Sephardi Jews,[4] who incidentally include the more disadvantaged and underprivileged members of Israeli Jewish society. It is something of a paradox that these should support a block which favours free-market right-of-centre economic policies and includes in its ranks the rump of Israel's Liberal Party, which nowadays represents the country's business interests. However, this is often accounted for by the rejection by Sephardim of the secular ideology of parties such as the Labour Alignment. The more traditional Sephardim tend to regard the collectivism of Labour as inimical to their conception of social structure and family life. Moreover, they have a different idea of the state and a view of the justification and goals of the State of Israel which is different from that of the Ashkenazim. Whereas secular middle-class Israelis of European origin tend, on the whole, to see Israel as a modern, liberal, Western-style democracy, for many Sephardim the *raison d'être* of the Jewish State is religion and tradition. The Likud, especially under Begin's leadership, was able to exploit this latter conception to its advantage.

In the light of these arguments, Liebman and Don-Yehiya are right. Perceptions of Judaism among Sephardim (although clearly not among all Israelis) have undergone something of a transformation: they have come to regard Judaism as a political expression of national identity as well as a religion. Such a transformation was inevitable for two reasons, one of which Liebman and Don-Yehiya cover extensively in their book. For Sephardi Jews, they claim, neither traditional Zionism nor the liberal, Western idea of the state is particularly meaningful. Religion, therefore, both fulfils an integrative function and provides meaningful national symbols which serve to bind them to the polity. And, possibly more doubtfully, it reinforces national integration because the Jewish identity of even secular Israelis cannot be divorced from religion.

Furthermore, it has been argued,[5] for underprivileged and disadvantaged Israelis, the merging and consequent mutual reinforcement of national and religious identities serves another function. Increasingly since 1967, Israeli Arabs (to say nothing of the many thousands from the Occupied Territories) have constituted an important element in the Israeli economy. In the ideology and platforms of all but the most extreme right-wing factions in Israeli political life, Israel's Arab

population is entitled to full and equal citizenship, along with Jews. Migrant workers from the Territories now perform many of the more menial, unskilled jobs which were previously the preserve of unskilled Oriental Jews. The effect has been to raise the latter's self-image and it has indeed meant that they are no longer at the bottom of the country's socio-economic structure.

However, if Arabs can be full and free citizens of Israel and are to enjoy equal civil rights with Jews, what differentiates Jews from Arabs? The answer is membership of the Jewish people and Israeli patriotism. Those who hold such beliefs would support a combination of Herut and the religious parties; and some of them, at least, would also be in favour of the extremist politics of Kach and Gush Emunim.

In the final analysis, however, the differences between the views of Gershom Schocken and of Liebman and Don-Yehiya are not as great as might seem from what has been said so far. The latter conclude their book with a chapter on 'Religious Extremism in Israel' in which they agree that parties such as the Aguda deny basic maxims of democratic politics. For the extreme religious parties, they say, politics is an instrument to achieve goals, not a forum for choosing appropriate goals:[6]

> When decisions arrived at by democratic processes have been judged as contrary to religious convictions (drafting women in the case of Agudat Israel or limiting Jewish settlement on the West Bank in the case of Gush Emunim), both groups have defended violation of the law — not as a mechanism like civil disobedience, whose purpose is to point out the inequity of the law, but because man-made law has to give way to divine law.

Schocken and others, such as Professor Uriel Tal of Tel-Aviv University, have expressed the gravest concern for the future of the Israeli polity precisely because they fear that extremist views are gaining strength. Even though it is not yet reflected in electoral terms, they do believe that the combination of parties, such as the Aguda, Shas, Morasha, and Kach, all of whom are represented in the Knesset and among whom there are potential coalition partners, does present a real threat to Israel's democratic order. So, they say, does the heavily politicised Chief Rabbinate.[7]

With all of this, Liebman and Don-Yehiya agree, but they seek to draw a distinction between the extremists and the National Religious Party. For a number of reasons, which they list in their final paragraphs, they do not believe that the NRP constitutes a danger to the democratic character of the Israeli polity. It is worth quoting them on this issue:[8]

> With all due respect to the religious integrity of the NRP, we think it is fair to note that they are not quite as committed to 'religion' [as the Aguda] because they are also committed to other aspects of life in the material and

cultural realms. This means they are less single-minded, less zealous, and less close-minded. It may handicap them politically in their intraparty or intra-religious camp struggles, but it does make them more suitable partners in a stable political system.

Liebman and Don-Yehiya have written a most interesting, thought-provoking book. It is the kind of work which must enhance the reputation of social science in general and political science in particular. It makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the role and function of religion in Israeli political life. There remains one drawback to their thesis, however, and that is that the moderate National Religious Party, insofar as it still exists, has shifted to the right under a new generation of leaders, whose sympathies lie more with the values of Gush Emunim. Those who have always cherished the ideal of a secular, liberal, democratic Israel must, for the time being, share Schocken's apprehension.

NOTES

[1] Gershom Schocken, 'Jews, Arabs and the Halacha', *From the Rostrum*, No. 73, January 1985, The Moshe Sharett Institute, Tel-Aviv.

[2] For the data on the Israeli general elections of 1981 and 1984, see David B. Capitanchik, 'A Guide to the Israeli General Election 1984', *Research Report No. 8*, July 1984, and 'The Israeli General Election 1984. An Analysis of the Results and the Campaign', *Research Report No. 9*, September 1984, Institute of Jewish Affairs, London.

[3] Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Religion and Politics in Israel*, xi+148 pp., Bloomington, 1984, Indiana University Press, $17.50.

[4] See, for example, Aliza Wallach, 'Is There a Clear Distinction Between the Sephardi Vote and the Ashkenazi Vote?' (Hebrew), *Davar*, 27 July 1984.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Liebman and Don-Yehiya, op. cit., p. 135.

[7] See Uriel Tal, 'The Dangers of Political Messiansim', *The Jewish Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (117), 1985, pp. 3–4. It is an excellent example of the pessimism that prevails among many of the members of Israel's liberal intelligentsia over this issue.

[8] Liebman and Don-Yehiya, op. cit., p. 137.

BOOK REVIEWS

JOHN D. BREWER, *Mosley's Men. The British Union of Fascists in the West Midlands*, xii + 159 pp., Gower Publishing Company, Aldershot, 1984, £13.50.

The definitive history of Fascism in Britain has yet to be written. Benewick's survey in *Political Violence and Public Order* (later entitled *The Fascist Movement in Britain*) and Skidelsky's biography of Oswald Mosley remain essential starting points, but before a full-scale history can be written many smaller gaps need to be filled. The charismatic leader of the British Union of Fascists has captured attention but the lives of officials and of the men and women who marched in the ranks have been ignored. Moreover, there is a need for local studies of Fascism.

John Brewer's volume, *Mosley's Men*, attempts to recover the history of Fascism in the West Midlands, concentrating on the BUF and the later Union Movement. 'Who were the Fascists?', Brewer asks, noting that membership is 'the most problematic aspect of the BUF' and grappling with this on the basis of fifteen oral interviews. 'What did they do?' is his second question, which takes him into a consideration of everyday political life. These are important themes which most existing studies have neglected. In this respect Brewer has made a real contribution to our deeper knowledge of the BUF and his study of 'agrarian Fascism' in his chapter on 'Farming and Fascism in Evesham' marks a new departure. But, overall, his work does not possess the pioneer quality that he claims for it. Stuart Rawnsley's Ph.D. thesis, *Fascism and Fascists in Britain in the 1930s. A Case Study of Fascism in the North of England*, completed in 1981 at Bradford University and now awaiting publication, tackles both issues at the centre of Brewer's book and does so intelligently and with a greater range of material. Most historians of British Fascism are familiar with Rawnsley's research and it is surprising that Brewer does not refer to it.

Readers particularly interested in the question of Fascism and antisemitism, the theme of chapter 7, will discover little that is new. Antisemitism did not assume the intensity in Birmingham that it did in London's East End and, as a result, Brewer's analysis operates at a more general level than in other parts of the book. The results of this are not always satisfactory. One might argue with his position on the essence of antisemitism (p. 106) and question the general validity of his stress on numbers (pp. 106–07). Furthermore, his discussion of the Union Movement's campaign in Handsworth in 1966 also carries some

dubious emphases. Apart from re-affirming the importance of numbers in generating hostility, without asking why the Irish who were the largest immigrant minority in Britain in the 1960s were relatively immune from attack, Brewer's analysis of Labour's response to New Commonwealth immigration at that time is misleading and contradictory.

Mosley's Men, therefore, is like the curate's egg: it is good in parts. The typographical quality is similar. Dr Robert Forgan appears throughout in the guise of Robert Frogan and the Ku-Klux-Klan is rendered consistently as the Klu Klux Klan. Finally, there are a number of assorted and striking errors in the bibliography.

COLIN HOLMES

STEVE COHEN, *That's Funny, You Don't Look Anti-Semitic: An Anti-Racist Analysis of Left Anti-Semitism*, 103 pp., published and distributed by Beyond the Pale Collective (Box No. 6, 59 Cookridge Street, Leeds LS2 3AW, England), 1984, £2.00 or $4.00.

From its earliest formulations by the Utopians to the present day, Socialism has had insurmountable problems with Jews and Judaism. Notwithstanding the disproportionately large number of Jews who have theorized, advocated, fought and been martyred for Socialism, these two systems of thought, these two modes of human salvation, have been and remain incompatible. Just as Christianity once it had achieved supremacy throughout Europe visualized its greatest theological triumph in the conversion of the Jews as proof of its divine authenticity, so Socialism seeks the dissolution of Judaism, the disappearance of the Jews, as a vindication of the scientism of Marx's predictions. Just as the early Jewish founders of Christianity yearned for total submission to their doctrines from all Jews to dispel the possibility or alleviate the pains of betrayal, so did many of the leading lights of Socialism who were of Jewish origin cajole, berate, and condemn the Jews who would not and will not acknowledge the world historical mission of the new faith.

The conflict between Socialism and the Jews is aggravated by a number of intervening factors, not the least of which is the moral idealism which they share in the search for social justice. Nevertheless, many Socialists were antisemitic before they were Socialist and they sought to incorporate traditional prejudices into their eschatology. The Jews of Western Europe were among the first beneficiaries of a capitalist order, which freed them from the caprice of Christian toleration and created exciting possibilities for their rationalist tradition. Precisely because Socialism and Judaism are intellectually and practically incompatible in the dictatorial universalism of the former against the realist particularism of the latter, they have fought and

continue to do battle with each other over secondary issues. Their central positions cannot be resolved. Broadly speaking, the Socialist position is that all antisemitism must be eschewed, subject only to an absolute acceptance by all Jews of a total repudiation of a Jewish identity, the complete assimilation of 'the Jewish masses' into an international and hopefully revolutionary proletariat. The Jewish response is either an outright rejection of Socialism or, from those who are attracted to it but committed to their Jewishness, a plea for compromise, an offer to negotiate a final outcome. Moses Hess offered a religious Socialism for a reconstituted Jewish nation, Simon Dubnow suggested a 'cultural autonomy' for Jews, the Bundists of eastern Europe wanted to be a 'nationality' within a nation, and Ber Borochov propounded a theory of a Marxist-Zionist synthesis. The largest number of Jews who were sympathetic to Socialist aspirations preferred the evolutionary approach of an Eduard Bernstein, who left the critical issues between the two protagonists to the vagaries of an historical process.

These options competed with each other for socialist and Jewish attention, but Hitler's Fascism and Stalin's Communism obliterated most of them. However, Zionism survived, and if Jews deserted the ranks of evolutionary Socialism, it was not because they had lost faith in the evolutionary process, but because they had lost faith in the ability of Socialism to generate and replicate the comfortable and reassuring pluralism of latter-day capitalist societies. While in the Middle Ages the Talmud was declared the true enemy of Christianity because it was correctly perceived to be the primary instrument of Jewish survival, so Zionism today has been identified as a formidable obstacle to Jewish dissolution. It has become the object of a fierce hostility for Socialists, many of whom have drawn on the energies and experience of endemic antisemitism to pursue their quarry. And once again, just as in the Middle ages the most ferocious attacks on the Jews and their Talmud were led by Jewish converts to Christianity, so today many of the leading campaigners against Zion are of Jewish origin. Revolutionary Socialism has retained its power to attract alienated young Jews into its ranks, where they either become more revolutionary than Socialism, or are entrapped in that divide of incompatibility which will surface in any thinking Jew sooner or later.

Steve Cohen, the author of the little volume under review, belongs to this latter category. Eager and fervent in his desire to bring about the great Socialist nirvana, he is Jewish enough to want that compromise which so many of his predecessors have fought for to no avail. In his determination to find the reasons for that failure, and largely unaware of the long struggle that is now part of history, he has confined his analysis to the United Kingdom and the present century. Puzzled by the hostility he has to face, even though he is willing to join his

comrades in rejecting and condemning Zionism, he has discovered a stratum of antisemitism which has clearly shaken him. We are offered here a scathing polemic which, for all its confusion and mixed history, presents a serious indictment of much in British Socialist thought which he attacks as genuinely antisemitic because it is built around the twin pillars of classical antisemitism — the theories of Jewish world domination and of collective guilt. He also argues strongly that 'assimilationism' is part of an antisemitic syndrome. Cohen is surely right in assuming that an enforced assimilation is not different from more traditional methods of eliminating Jews — conversion, expulsion, and extermination. His case is strongly argued and he draws widely, though somewhat haphazardly, on views and opinions ranging from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Kautsky to the most recent vilifiers of Jewish aspirations in Socialist ranks.

The sincerity and passion of this *cri de cœur* are patently obvious, but our author is pleading for a lost cause. Those guilty of antisemitism will ignore him, not least because modern-day antisemitism has refined itself by denying that it exists. If Vienna's antisemitic Lord Mayor, Karl Lueger, could declare, 'I decide who is a Jew', present-day antisemites have arrogated to themselves the right to decide who is antisemitic. Those who are sympathetic to Cohen's desire to preserve his Jewish identity will also reject his plea for compromise because they will see in his dilemma a confirmation of the incompatibility of Judaism and Socialism as belief systems.

Cohen's book is presented in a cosy Jewish guise. Apart from the humorous title, there is on the fly-leaf the question, 'Why is this book different from all other books?', patterned on the Haggadah of Passover, followed by four replies. Two of the replies are that in all other books we are told to assimilate or go to Israel, but in this book we need not do either; and that in all other books we can be either Jewish or Left but in this book we can be both. The cover of the book has a drawing of a seven-branched candelabrum on which lights burn alternately over a hammer and sickle and a shield of David. It seems unlikely that our author is aware of the implicit irony in his revolutionary symbolism. As a symbol, that candelabrum represents the Temple of Jerusalem and its religious rituals — which he does not consider binding. As an emblem, the candelabrum signifies the State of Israel which is antithetical to his Socialist convictions.

JULIUS CARLEBACH

STEVEN M. COHEN, *American Modernity and Jewish Identity*, Foreword by Charles E. Silberman, xvi + 210 pp., Tavistock Publications, London and New York, 1983, £4.95 (paperback).

This comparatively short but solid book, based on replies to several questionnaires, deals with the evolution of Jewish identity in the

United States. Steven Cohen examines the varied and complex parameters of that identity among the several million American Jews. Many of them are 'the fourth generation', the great-grandchildren of those immigrants who arrived with the great migratory waves at the turn of the present century. The large majority, of whatever generation, have tried to become integrated into the host society; and in so doing, the scope and the intensity of their religious observance were reduced. However, integration-modernization 'provoked the innovation of new modes of Jewish practice, identity and institutional life. The analysis essentially seeks to understand the link between integration and reduction/innovation in Jewish life' (p. 37).

Conservative Judaism, the dominant movement in the United States, allows an attenuation of the strict rules of orthodox Judaism; but the author shows that American Jews, whatever their denomination, adhere to rituals which are 'family events' such as the Passover *seder* and the lighting of Hanukah candles — they tend to favour religious practices which are child- centred.

One of the most interesting chapters is that entitled 'Mobility and Community'. There have been profound changes affecting Jewish identity with the move from New York's Lower East Side to the cities of the Sunbelt such as Phoenix and Houston, so that those who are 'residentially mobile are less communally affiliated than the residentially stable' (p. 100). These internal migrants are usually younger than average, have fewer children, are less religiously observant, and constitute a self-selected group — as indeed was the case of their forebears who left Europe to settle in America. Religous affiliation is a group and a 'localistic' phenomenon. Mobility disrupts and it is usually only after an average of five years in their new place of residence that mobile Jews feel the need to join a congregation. (This, of course, does not apply to the orthodox minority when its members abandon traditional neighbourhoods to settle elsewhere.) Some of the cities which have become new centres of Jewish settlement — such as Denver, Colorado, one of the areas where a questionnaire was administered — are 'under-institutionalized': they lack basic Jewish requirements, such as a kosher butcher. And the newcomers who have left their parents and grandparents in Boston or New York are somewhat freed from the pressure of traditional observances.

American Jews, like others of the middle classes, nowadays marry at a later age or even remain unmarried. Marriages with a non- Jewish spouse are increasingly frequent, according to all observers, but there are no reliable statistics about this crucial matter. Cohen also describes 'alternative households': unmarried persons, mixed couples, and couples without children who have created sub-cultures, specific communities, and 'counter-norms to support and legitimate their once deviant status' (p. 127). This is the growing milieu where gay

synagogues were established and where there are also *havurot*. However, only a small proportion of alternative households engage in these forms of marginal Judaism; the majority have become detached from Jewish traditional practices.

The author comments that the political liberalism of Jews was not only a legitimate reaction to social inequalities and prejudices but also a form of integration into modern society. He analyses in detail the support for Israel — which cannot properly be called Zionism since the vast majority of American Jews, although quick to rise to the defence of Israel, have no intention of leaving the United States and feel that their future is secure in American society. In fact, liberalism and a pro-Israeli stance 'express the long-standing twin social goals of integration and survival' (p. 155). He concludes that 'the balance sheet, then, on the impact of modernity upon Jewish identification points neither in the direction of rapid assimilation, nor toward sustained and assured group continuity' (p. 175). 'The impact is clearly complex and does not submit to sweeping generalization' (p. 177); and Steven Cohen believes that intensive fieldwork studies would give us a better understanding of the various factors affecting Jewish identity in America.

But I wonder whether sociological studies of a minority group can effectively succeed in predicting the future trends of that minority, which is also dependent upon the fate of the entire United States. Nevertheless, the author has ably demonstrated that a survey based on the analysis of responses to questionnaires can yield new insights and make a valuable contribution to our knowledge of American Jewry.

JACQUES GUTWIRTH

DANIEL J. ELAZAR with PETER MEDDING, *Jewish Communities in Frontier Societies: Argentina, Australia and South Africa*, ix + 357 pp., Holmes and Meier, New York and London, 1983, $44.50.

Frontier societies, as described by Elazar and Medding, are comparatively late phenomena in the modern era. They are distinctive in that they have had vast territories, far from the centre of European civilization, to be explored and settled. They have also had an urban-industrial frontier characterized by evolving urban centres — which developed new technology and created new wealth — that eventually made the agricultural hinterland dependent on them.

The majority of the Jews who came to settle in these three countries (Argentina, Australia, and South Africa) arrived at the end of the nineteenth century or at the beginning of the present one. Where they immigrated when the host society was still in its formative (or frontier) stage, they were more fully integrated into it; but the reverse was the case when they landed at a later period of the country's development

—they remained to a great extent outsiders. Thus, the Jews of Australia were amongst the founders of the new society and have been involved in every subsequent wave of immigration so that they were able to become comparatively well integrated into the life of the wider society.

In Argentina, on the other hand, the great wave of Jewish migrants came fairly late in the country's development, when no proper frontier persisted and where in addition there was a strong Catholic identity. Consequently, they have remained somewhat isolated from the host society. In South Africa, there were few Jews under Dutch colonial rule but they later came in large numbers to the Cape Colony and to several areas of Afrikaner settlement in the interior. Owing to this and because of the multi-national character of South Africa, Jews were accepted as individuals but they also remained separate as a group.

The frontier character of the three countries influenced the development of their respective Jewish institutions. The large majority of the members of the Jewish communities came from Europe and at first they tried to maintain their old familiar patterns, largely in order to avoid assimilation. Later, however, Australian and South African Jews grew less rigid in their adherence to the old ways and became better adapted to their new environment. In Argentina, however, a notable bifurcation occurred. The Sephardi settlers managed to create an institutional framework which was well received by their Hispanic host society. But the eastern European Jews wanted to preserve the structure of their native eastern European *kehilla* and to transplant it into an environment to which it was not suited. In the process, they failed to develop effective communal organizations with the result that the entire communal enterprise was on the verge of collapse. This, in turn, led to an alienation of subsequent generations from both Argentinian society and from Jewishness. They are far more estranged than are the Jews of Australia or of South Africa. They also suffer the greatest antisemitism and their internal value system is being eroded to the extent that 'they have little left to pass on to their children and their way of life stands to become extinct the day before yesterday' (p. 113).

While there are some features that are distinctive to each and to all the three frontier Jewish communities, there are also characteristics which they share with other Diaspora settlements. Traditionally, Jews have established communal organizations which combined religious, social, political, and legal functions. With Jewish emancipation in Europe, these associations lost their juridical status; their political dimensions were attenuated or abolished while their religious and ethnic dimensions were emphasized instead. The Jews themselves were generally in favour of these developments as part of their efforts to become intergrated into the societies in which they lived. Eventually, however, especially after the Second World War, they reverted to the building of political institutions. In part, this was a result of the

ascendance of Zionism after the establishment of the state of Israel. For Zionism sought not only to re-establish a Jewish state in Israel but also to restore to the Jewish people its national and political dimension. The new state has come to occupy an increasingly central place in communal life in the Diaspora; and in each of the three countries which are examined in the book under review the Jews have developed a range of institutions covering all areas of Jewish social and political life — with varying degrees of success.

These communal organizations in each country are seen by the authors as grouping themselves *de facto* around five major functions or spheres of activity: 1) religious-congregational; 2) educational cultural; 3) community (that is, external) relations; 4) communal welfare; and 5) Israel-overseas. In order to analyse these spheres of activity, Elazar and Medding have devised a conceptual framework whose major elements are 'games' and 'complexes'. Games are defined as public activities while complexes are the interests directed to, and the organizations surrounding, the game which stands at the centre. There is an indefinite number of games within any Jewish community, but all are based in some way on the five functional spheres or 'basic games' mentioned above. The content and boundaries of each game tend to shift. Also, it is 'possible for operational purposes to decide that a certain activity is a game itself, or to treat it as a part of a larger game' (p. 56).

Initially, this conceptual framework seems promising. However, it may not have sufficient analytical power for although it is presented in the early part of the book, it is not subsequently used for the concrete analysis of the three Jewish communities. It thus remains a framework which is artificially annexed to a very informative and interesting but basically descriptive rather than analytical account of these communities.

There are interesting data about leadership structures. Governance in any contemporary Jewish community, we are told, is not the result of a highly integrated decision-making structure but rather of a loosely knit network of decision makers whose roles and spheres of activity are often specialized as well as overlapping and shifting. However, there are differences in this respect amongst the communities under study. In Argentina, the power structure is fragmented into different organizations. South Africa, on the other hand, is a clear example of structured power in the hands of country-wide institutions which co-ordinate and control the activities of local organizations; communication lines between leaders are comparatively uncomplicated and conflict is thereby reduced. Australia, in turn, is characterized by a pattern of functional representation ensuring that the top organizations include leaders of the major functional activities; there are few leadership seekers and elections are rarely contested, so that the transmission of

leadership is by co-optation within narrow, known circles. In South Africa, leaders are drawn mainly from professional ranks, with a notable proportion of lawyers; but as greater emphasis is put on fund raising and associated activities, business people and industrialists are becoming more important in the leadership structure. In Australia, the narrow composition of the leadership derives from its voluntary and honorary nature: without salaried offices, there is little possibility for those without ample means to rise to the positions of communal leaders.

Unfortunately, we are told very little about the structure and composition of Jewish leadership in Argentina. As for the socio-economic background, Jews came too late to Argentina for the acquisition of large-scale landed estates, they have been excluded from the most senior ranks of the armed forces, and they obviously cannot remain Jews and become allied to the Catholic church — so that they are gainfully occupied in various businesses and in some of the liberal professions. Many have prospered. 'Latin American culture, however, places a low value on money-oriented activities which, as such, are considered undignified, so the Jews' very success only confirms their marginality' (p. 62). South African Jews have experienced rapid upward mobility but only a few of them have penetrated the top, key positions in the economy. In general, they are a very affluent middle-class community, with a high proportion of members engaged in industry, in business, and in the liberal professions.

Detailed and precise information on socio-economic background, however, is given only about Australian Jewry. At the time of the 1971 Australian census, 42 per cent of Australian Jewish males were in professional and managerial occupations (compared to 15 per cent of males in the general population); and 14.8 per cent of Australian- and British-born Jews were engaged in the practice of law or medicine (compared to 2.8 per cent of foreign-born Jews and 0.5 per cent of the general population). Nevertheless, about three per cent of Australian Jewish families lived in poverty and required the assistance provided by Jewish welfare agencies.

Although the authors give few details about the socio-economic situation of Argentinian Jewry, they present an interesting and convincing picture of the most serious problem besetting the community. Many Jews, especially those of the younger generation, have abandoned their Jewish heritage yet are unwilling or unable to assimilate into the wider society. This is at least in part because of the virulent antisemitism which has distinguished Argentina from many other countries of the New World. Argentinians are generally insecure about their own national identity and as a result are especially hostile to marginal groups in their midst; and the Jews have been amongst the main sufferers. Their attachment to Israel was interpreted as disloyalty

to Argentina while skilful propaganda by the Arab League and by Nazi and neo-Nazi groups fanned the existent antisemitic feelings. Although Argentinian Jews have been preoccupied with combating that antisemitism, they have often underrated its dimensions and seriousness. In the mid-1970s, when the military used terror in order to fight terrorists and many left-wing Jews disappeared without trace, the community became seriously alarmed. Today, however, in spite of the fact that they are attacked by both the extreme right and the extreme left and that they are virtually 'threatened with extinction by the impoverished masses and by the powerful establishment of church, military, and aristocracy' (p. 113), Argentinian Jews nevertheless deny that antisemitism is a serious threat to their well-being. 'They have become accustomed to living atop a volcano while assuming that occasional rumblings and gaseous extrusions will prevent violent eruptions' (p. 132). They have been accused of not caring about what happens to the country, except as it affects their bank accounts. One may well wonder, in the circumstances of such virulent antisemitism, why the Jews of Argentina have not left the country *en masse*. Does material wealth provide them with rose-coloured spectacles?

EVA ETZIONI-HALEVY

MENAHEM KAUFMAN, *Non-Zionists in America and the Struggle for Jewish Statehood* (Hebrew), xxiii + 413 pp., Hasifriya Haziyonit, Jerusalem, 1984, n.p.

American Jewry played a decisive role in the political (and financial) struggle for the creation of the state of Israel. In that struggle, the American Zionist movement, under the forceful and energetic leadership of Abba Hillel Silver, led the successful campaign that mobilized the pressure and public opinion necessary to overcome the opposition of the State Department and the Pentagon to Jewish statehood. However, although there was widespread support for Silver's activist tactics and a swelling of Zionist ranks in the 1940s, the common perception of a united American Jewry has no basis in reality. Indeed, American Jewry has never been a homogeneous or united community, speaking on any issue with one voice. America's Zionists have always had to compete in the public arena with other major and minor Jewish organizations, whose claim to represent the true interests of American Jewry was no less forceful and unyielding. Among those organizations, the most important ones were those of the so-called non-Zionists:

Non-Zionism is an esoteric and abstruse concept, almost incomprehensible to Israeli university students, who are usually familiar with only two categories: Zionism and anti-Zionism. Whereas anti-Zionism denotes active opposition to the Zionist idea, non-Zionism is more

elusive: it entails no less active opposition to Zionism as a political ideology (which aimed at the eventual creation of a Jewish state) while simultaneously being willing to support the resettlement work conducted by the Zionist movement in Palestine.

Which were the non-Zionist organizations? Kaufman has classified them into four groupings: 1) politically active national organizations such as the American Jewish Committee (AJC), and the Jewish Labor Committee; 2) apolitical national organizations such as B'nai B'rith; 3) religious organizations, foremost among them Agudat Israel; and 4) communal organizations — local welfare federations, in charge of fund raising for the United Jewish Appeal.

Non-Zionism as an ideological position was thus maintained by large segments of American Jewry. But this picture is somewhat misleading, since in the political struggle for Jewish statehood, in the corridors of power in Washington, only one organization counted: the American Jewish Committee. That small but affluent and influential body oscillated throughout its long and distinguished history between anti-Zionism and non-Zionism, almost always fearful of the dual loyalty accusation.

The history of relations between Zionists and non-Zionists (and particularly with the AJC) is a long one, marked by ups and downs. It culminated in 1929 with Chaim Weizmann's historic achievement of establishing the Enlarged Jewish Agency. That achievement, however, was overshadowed by the world economic depression, by the rise of Nazism and antisemitism, and most importantly, by the publication of the White Paper of 1939 and the outbreak of the Second World War. Those last two cataclysmic events demonstrated to the leaders of the World Zionist Movement, Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, the vital importance of American Jewry — first, as the sole remaining source of financial and political support for the survival of the Yishuv in face of the Nazi onslaught; second, as a critically important ally in the political struggle aiming at abrogation of the White Paper; and third and most controversially, as the major support for the Biltmore Program which called for Palestine to 'be established as a Jewish Commonwealth'. The implementation of those Zionist aims, the two leaders had recognized, required the establishment of an alliance with the non-Zionists — thus creating a united American Jewish front that would back Zionist demands in dealing with the State Department and the White House.

The first half of the book under review is devoted to a detailed description and analysis of the failure of all Zionist attempts at creating a united Jewish front. The central object of those attempts was, of course, the American Jewish Committee. Kaufman therefore wisely chose to concentrate on that body, paying special attention to its dominant figure, Judge Joseph M. Proskauer, who in January 1943, as

the leader of its anti-Zionist wing, became president of the organization. Indeed, Proskauer emerges throughout the book as a most intriguing figure.

With the end of the Second World War, a completely new situation arose. America emerged as a global power, while the Holocaust, the illegal immigration, and the armed struggle had created a new reality in Palestine. Moreover, the Holocaust had awakened in the Zionists a tremendous sense of urgency bordering on desperation. Non-Zionists had also to shift their focus from the abstruse ideological disputes about the nature of Jewish existence in the Diaspora and to face the actual consequences of the Second World War and their effect in Europe, in Palestine, and in the United States.

The second half of the book unfolds in detail the major role played by the non-Zionists (mainly the AJC) in the crucial years between 1945 and 1948. The plight of the survivors of the Holocaust, the Displaced Persons, was heart-rending. Nevertheless, the doors of America remained closed — as did those of Palestine. The fate of the DPs and their resettlement in the latter country were dependent on the abrogation of the 1939 White Paper. These two problems were intertwined, as Proskauer had to admit in his testimony before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in January 1946. At that stage, he was still opposed to the conception of a Jewish state — even in a partitioned Palestine. But a few months later, in the summer of 1946, he crossed the Rubicon: at the urging of his former bête noire, Nahum Goldmann, he abandoned his lifelong opposition and agreed to support Goldmann's Partition Plan. It was indeed a historic shift of position for the president of the American Jewish Committee and for his organization (although there were some dissenting members) to join the American Jewish consensus for the creation of a Jewish state.

The most interesting and stimulating section of the book is surely to be found in Chapters VI–VIII, which reveal in detail the role played by the non-Zionists in the campaign for the United Nations' approval of the Partition Plan and the political struggle for the implementation of Partition during the first months of 1948 which culminated in President Truman's dramatic recognition of the new Jewish state. Relying on a wealth of archival material in the United States and in Israel, Kaufman has succeeded in coherently organizing his complicated data, following step by step the intricate moves and counter-moves of the major protagonists: the Jewish Agency, the State Department, the White House, and in particular the elusive figure of Proskauer who emerged in 1947–48 as the unofficial liaison officer between the Jewish Agency and the senior echelons of the State Department. Unfortunately, there is no written record of many of Proskauer's behind-the-scenes manoeuvres in Washington so that historians of that crucial period are forever deprived of a full understanding of his role.

We must also be grateful to the author for the important data in the Appendices. They include 15 selected documents, starting with the 'Cos Cob Formula' of June 1942 drafted by Ben-Gurion and accepted by Maurice Wertheim (the then president of the AJC) and followed by subsequent position papers of the AJC, Agudat Israel, the Jewish Labor Committee, B'nai B'rith, and the Reform Movement. Several State Department documents (in Appendices 5, 10, and 12) merit special attention; they were not published in *Foreign Relations of the United States* and they have here been saved from oblivion by Kaufman. They reveal the persistent attempts by senior officials at the State Department to secure the support of the American Jewish Committee for their policies.

However, it is a matter for regret that the author did not end his book with a short concluding chapter, sharpening the focus of the main issues and summarizing the very real dilemmas which Zionist ideology had posed for important sections of American Jewry. As it is, the reader coming to the last page of the text is left somewhat in the air.

Nevertheless, the volume is a solid study of a vital but somewhat neglected subject. Now, the Hebrew reader (and it is to be hoped, the English reader at a future date) who takes for granted the support of American Jewry for Israel can better grasp how complex and difficult was the metamorphosis which some significant segments of American Jewry underwent in relation to the idea of a Jewish state.

ZVI GANIN

BRYAN S. TURNER, *Religion and Social Theory. A Materialist Perspective*, vii + 264 pp., Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1983, £15.00 (paperback £5.95).

When reviewing a book as wide-ranging as this, one has to choose between a detailed discussion of issues raised on almost every page or a general characterization of contents, thrust, and style. I choose the latter.

The book begins with a rather sidelong glance at the question of 'other religions' which is taken up within the perspective provided by 'orientalism' and how the difference between Christianity and Islam may be variously expressed. There follows a treatment of religion as 'social cement', based on several nineteenth-century thinkers and on Durkheim, concluding with sections on nationalism and 'civil religion'. Then comes a chapter on religion as 'opium', which relies in particular on Engels and rejects interpretations emphasizing themes like alienation and fetishism.

With Chapter 4, we move to the Weberian contrast between 'virtuoso' and mass religion. This is treated as a form of exchange and discussed in relation to Hassidism, Islam, and Christianity. Chapter 5

considers religion as social control, notably the control of the body, and of 'bodies of men'. This runs from the Middle Ages up to the 'regulative panopticism' [*sic*] and private narcissism of modern times. I find Chapter 6 somewhat puzzling, since it is headed 'Feudalism and Religion' but includes a discussion of secularization attempting to reconcile my views with those of Bryan Wilson, before veering back to family strategies in feudal society and penance as a form of social control. Chapter 7 is a rather fragmentary account of religion and global politics. The volume concludes with sex and death.

The author told me a while ago that I would not like the book. I confess I find it disappointing, given the learning evident in it and the exploration of certain topics, like sex, death, and the 'body' usually left out in the sociology of religion. But what is good in this book has mostly already been given to us in distinguished and often illuminating work published by Professor Turner on Islam, on Confession, on the control of the body, and on *The Dominant Ideology Thesis* (with N. Abercrombie and S. Hill). The last-named in particular is here extensively cannibalized; and *disjecta membra* from the other works, plus some seasonings and fillings thrown in, do not make a book.

Some of the fillings are in themselves very interesting — for example, the use of Ullmann. Others, such as the section based on the psychologist Bakan, are really most unimpressive. In any case, the unwary reader needs to have the kind of viewpoint on the Old Testament put forward by Bakan placed in perspective and assessed for its plausibility in the context of serious Old Testament study. Too often we are simply informed that 'it has been argued'. Furthermore, discussions which exist in their own right are wrenched from their context and severely pulled about to do service in helping along a chapter in getting from A to B.

Professor Turner describes his position as materialist and it is undoubtedly worthwhile having a book based on such presuppositions. He rejects the way Durkheim and Marx treat ideology — rather convincingly, I think — to ground his own analysis in the material body, the body politic, and the body of Christ. It is also good to have a book giving proper space to Nietzsche and emphasizing the thematic contents exposed by Foucault.

This volume complements other studies in the sociology of religion and widens our horizons. It is a pity that its criticisms of what has been done in that discipline are unfair, particularly when, for example, the kind of analysis of morality and impersonal bureaucracy provided by Bryan Wilson is pursued at length without mentioning him. It is also pretty odd to attack the sociologists of religion for not worrying about inflated obscurantists like Althusser and Poulantzas. The complaint about ignoring Braudel is much better founded, though he is very hard to 'extract' or deploy. Perhaps Professor Turner's book should be

treated as a series of pointers, back to important contributions already made and, one hopes, to others still latent in the text.

DAVID MARTIN

CHAIM I. WAXMAN, *America's Jews in Transition*, xxv + 272 pp., Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1983, $24.95 (paperback $9.95).

Professor Waxman tells us that he has written this book in order to test straight-line theories of American ethnicity. These theories hold that ethnic group identity must inevitably diminish to zero in a straight line — that is, without regression — in the course of a few generations. The theorists avoid committing themselves to the number of generations needed to reach zero. Most of them appear to agree that the stages of diminution will follow those outlined by Milton Gordon in *Assimilation in American Life* (1964) and in later works: cultural assimilation first and then 'structural assimilation' during which the organizations maintaining separate group identity shrivel away. In the first half of this century, things may have seemed to be going in that direction for American Jews. In the years following the Second World War, however, straight-line theory began to appear questionable; and by now, in the mid-1980s, it is full of holes and patches. But straight-line theory has added a political overtone: many on the Left allege that ethnic identity is merely a reactionary resistance to class, and to Black, demands for social justice.

However, straight-line theory is not only the argument — and in some cases, the wishful thinking — of some sociologists. It was also the despondent conviction of many Jewish survivalists, who found the assimilation of the Jews so thorough that they saw no hope for Jewish continuity. As American Jews lost nearly all traces of their Jewish cultural heritage, only a very small proportion could be expected to remain really Jewish. That was the conviction expressed in 1947 by Simon Halkin in his *Ha-Yehudim veha-Yahadut be-America* (Jews and Judaism in America). The anxiety which used to focus on cultural assimilation is now focused mainly on intermarriage and the declining birth-rate.

Professor Waxman begins with about a hundred pages of potted American Jewish history, until 1965. The second and better half of his book analyses developments since then, which have 'dramatically restructured both the nature of American Jewish self-consciousness and the relationship between American Jewry and American society' (pp. xvii–xviii). Sociologists failed to predict any of those developments and he himself is careful about predictions. He becomes fairly definite only in foreseeing the decline of Conservative Judaism.

Waxman treats the past, from the onset of mass immigration in 1881, in terms of generations. American Jewish history becomes a succession

of fixed age cohorts, starting with late nineteenth-century eastern European immigrants; and each generation's presumed social and psychic characteristics dominate a historic period. But Jacob H. Schiff came as a youthful immigrant from Germany no earlier than 1865, while Louis Marshall's father arrived only three or four years before his son's birth in 1856. Where are such powerful, Americanized leaders to be placed, and indeed all the generations before 1880? And what of the adolescent immigrant of the late 1930s who became acculturated enough to function as US Secretary of State? One can readily produce several examples to show that generational cohorts cannot be made identical with historic periods — at least not until the methods of conception elaborated in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* are put into operation. There is no doubt about the central importance of eastern European immigration, but American Jewish history cannot be pressed into the mould of fixed generations while disregarding structural continuities and phenomena which are simply not generational. Waxman locates in the bosom of the 'fourth generation' the consciousness that the Holocaust defines Jewish identity; but a great deal of observation suggests that this consciousness exists no less strongly among that generation's contemporaries, the 'second generation' children of Holocaust survivors.

When the author turns to developments since 1965, he treats with discernment the intertwined, much-discussed themes of Black–Jewish relations, the New Left and the Jews, and the impact of the Six-Day War of 1967. Israel's safety and Holocaust consciousness became central symbols of Jewish identity then and explicitly pluralist social doctrines encouraged Jewish interests to be openly declared and aggressively pursued. There are interesting, well-informed pages about the Orthodox revival of the past quarter-century. Waxman notes that the refusal of the ultra-Orthodox to discuss family matters with any outsider makes it probable that their very high birth-rate — five to eight children is quite usual — has not been adequately reckoned in the compilation of current Jewish demographic estimates (pp. 168–69).

Contemporary hazy, ill-defined American liberalism has not been abandoned *en masse* by Jews in favour of conservative Republicanism but American Jews are not the liberal stalwarts of past decades. It seems unlikely that they will resume the liberal fervour they exhibited from the Roosevelt era until the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. American politics change, and so do Jewish attitudes. Professor Waxman expands, as have numerous social scientists, on the social and ideological sources of Jewish liberalism.

Other chapters on American Jewry since 1965 examine communal leadership from a viewpoint sympathetic to the rebellious mood of the late 1960s. In dealing with religious life, the Reform movement is almost omitted while the future of the Conservatives looks almost as

bleak as did forty years ago that of the now triumphant Orthodox. The discussion of economics, migration, and even antisemitism, the staples of earlier American Jewish sociology, seems tame or perfunctory. The author displays great knowledge and insight about inner communal affairs but his frequent learned references to aspects of Jewish tradition are more hortatory than illuminating. He has obviously read widely and observed extensively, but at too many points he presents an exposition of what other sociologists have written without apparently reaching any incisive conclusion of his own. For example, one would like to know what in his opinion makes American Jewry a community at all.

These reservations apart, *America's Jews in Transition* is clearly written, carefully indexed, and includes an extensive bibliography. It is an informative, well-disciplined, noteworthy contribution to the perennial discussion about the foremost Diaspora community.

LLOYD P. GARTNER

JULIUS GOULD, *Jewish Commitment. A Study in London*, x + 113 pp., Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, 1984, £6.00.

Many Jews who are aware of being Jewish are, nowadays, also aware that there are different forms and degrees of Jewish commitment. For example, there are, at one extreme, most devout orthodox Jews who can be supposed to have a strong commitment to Judaism but who also have a strong commitment to anti-Zionism; and at the other extreme, there are, or used to be, others with a strong commitment to Zionism coupled with hostility to religious orthodoxy. Most Jews (outside the Soviet Union — since we know, after all, very little about most Soviet Jews) are at neither of those extremes.

But to answer the question, 'Where then are they?' is no simple matter. For there can be relatively active forms of liberal Judaism and relatively inactive forms of orthodox synagogue affiliation; and both can be associated with varying degrees and styles of pro-Zionist commitment. There are even, to this day, non-religious Jews who hold that their moral commitments — to universalist socialism, for example — are of a Jewish nature; and they may combine this seemingly paradoxical mixture of universalism and particularism with support for Israel and opposition to Zionist ideology.

Professor Gould is concerned with the very complexities which surround any discussion of Jewish commitment. His research was carried out among a sample of 217 London Jews who were interviewed between 1969 and 1970. All had children aged five to 21 years; over 70 per cent were aged between 35 and 54; 80 per cent were synagogue affiliated; almost two-thirds were Orthodox; and only 26 out of the 217

were women. The author does not pretend to have had anything like a representative sample of London Jews of whom, we are told, only 60 per cent were then synagogue-affiliated (as opposed to 80 per cent in the sample); and it is also safe to assume that in 1969–70 more than 12 per cent of London Jewish adults were women. However, since the investigators chose to include only a small proportion of women and to exclude the unmarried (and, therefore, all those too young to be married) it cannot matter much whether the synagogue-affiliated were over-represented. For the value of the study does not lie in any attempt to relate the facts to any ideas concerning Jews in Britain — that attempt is not made. Nor does the author claim to provide an ethnography of London Jews. He does purport to show, as precisely as possible, how some Jews see their Jewishness; and he has, in pursuing that goal, constructed a device known as an Overall Jewishness Index (which might, in principle, be applicable to the further study of Jews and other minorities).

Most of the book is a presentation, in statistical form, of data obtained from the responses of all members of the sample to a large number of very specific questions requiring fairly precise answers. But the last section of the book presents ten profiles which are intended to bring alive some of the respondents' own accounts of their Jewishness. However, their statements, with one or two exceptions, make rather dull reading.

Some of the statistical material is bunched into five categories — ritual, education, intermarriage, Israel, and friendship — each of which is used as an index of Jewishness; the respondents are then ranked high, medium, or low, on each of the indices. Next, the five indices are combined to form a composite Overall Jewishness Index. On the basis of that index, three categories emerge: A with high, B with medium, and C with low scores of Jewish commitment. Finally, some comparisons are made between 57 respondents who have very high scores (a category now called A1) and the 55 who are in category C. This is done by relating commitment category to age, occupation, place of birth, cultural practices, and to a variety of attitudes, self-perceptions, etc.

In some cases there are clear correlations which might tell us something about differences in degrees of commitment — for example, that A1 individuals are more likely than C individuals to remember that their parents had emphasized the importance of being Jewish. In other cases, however, there are no clear correlations. But even when there are, the author is somewhat coy about telling us what they might mean. Nor is any attempt made to summarize and to discuss what readers might be expected to have learned from the correlations (other than that they should not be too hasty in reading too much into them and that the whole matter is rather complex).

In some places, the author's modesty seems extreme — as when he states that there are 'clear grounds' for 'suspecting' that those with synagogue affiliation are more likely than those who are not so affiliated to want a Jewish education for their children. Are clear grounds not sufficient to move from suspicion to assertion? Apparently not, since 'in such matters cause and effect are very hard to disentangle'. Indeed, both synagogue affiliation and attitudes to Jewish education might be the joint effects of a different cause: for example, those whose parents have given them a Jewish education may follow into their parents' footsteps because it is expected of them to do so and will belong to a synagogue and see in turn that their own children receive a Jewish education — thus ensuring the survival of Judaism.

If this book is addressed only to Jews and, moreover, only to those Jews who, in any case, know all about these matters, then perhaps no elaboration or discussion of this kind is necessary. But if it is addressed only to such a narrow public, then other questions arise concerning the presentation of the research material and the relative lack of comment from the author who invites the reader 'to observe, for himself or herself...'.

PERCY S. COHEN

MARSHA L. ROZENBLIT, *The Jews of Vienna, 1867–1914: Assimilation and Identity* (SUNY Studies in Modern Jewish History, Paula Hyman and Deborah Dash Moore, eds), xvii + 284 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, 1983, $39.50.

To bring to mind Jews in Vienna is to evoke by now hackneyed images of Freud, Mahler, Schnitzler, and others who exemplified the restless search into human emotion and states of consciousness which Vienna and especially its Jewish artists signify in contemporary culture. Marsha L. Rozenblit, however, dispenses with that Vienna and with the Vienna of pomp and glitter. She briskly leads us instead to the concrete realities of Viennese Jewry quite in the manner of historians of local Jewish communities in English-speaking countries. Jewish population, immigration, economic activity, social mobility, and stratification constitute the substance of Dr Rozenblit's work until she turns to matters of ideology and communal politics. Readers who are acquainted with the history of a good many lack-lustre American Jewish communities may feel methodologically more at home in Dr Rozenblit's Vienna than do those who recall Viennese Jewry through its particular cultural prism. At any rate, the hard data about the heyday of Viennese Jewish history between 1867 and 1914 are amassed and presented in an original, forthright fashion.

Viennese Jewry, which numbered no more than 4,000 in 1848, multiplied (mainly by immigration, as did Vienna itself) to 175,000 by

1910. The Jewish immigrants arrived, more or less in chronological sequence, from Bohemia and Moravia, Hungary, and Galicia. The Galicians, who came chiefly after 1880 and constituted the main group of orthodox un-Germanized poor Jews, were the butt of complaint and ridicule by other Jews.

Coming to the great city meant occupational change, and the author shows that the most typical of these changes was from pedlar or very minor tradesman to white-collar worker. However, some did become solid merchants. Upward Jewish mobility was extensive but it was not at the rate achieved by immigrant Jews in the United States. Neither was Viennese education intended as an avenue to mobility, although the astonishing proportion of Jewish youth in the gymnasia suggests that the Jews were using it for that purpose. One of Dr Rozenblit's main points is that Viennese Jews assimilated to German culture as a group in Jewish neighbourhoods. However, in order to assimilate totally conversion was required, and Vienna had the highest Jewish conversion rate in Europe. Dr Rozenblit provides extremely interesting data gathered from baptismal records in Viennese churches favoured by Jews who desired to convert. The social and age strata of the converts changed over the decades and it is notable that a small proportion returned to Judaism after a few years as Christians.

The communal basis of Viennese Jewry was the *Israelitische Kultusgemeinde*; it was supported by a tax that Jews were required to pay unless they opted to be *konfessionslos* (without religion). The *Kultusgemeinde* provided religious, charitable, and educational services, and it was controlled by assimilated Jewish bourgeois who adhered to Habsburg patriotism and liberal emancipationism. But the season for their ideology was passing, and their control came under challenge from Zionists and other Jewish nationalists. Although the latter met with little electoral success in the *Kultusgemeinde* before 1914, they injected into Jewish public life a more emphatic assertion of Jewish culture and commitment.

'Assimilation and Identity', Dr Rozenblit's theme, would seem to require fuller attention to the legal status of the Jewish community, as well as to that of Jews individually. History in its traditional sense of a flow of events is likewise almost absent. We do not learn much about the insecure position of the Jews among Vienna's religious and national groups.

Dr Rozenblit has built her book, originally a Columbia University dissertation, upon a rich variety of sources. The most important are the Austrian census sources and the archives of the *Israelitische Kultusgemeinde*. The latter yielded not only communal but also socio-economic data. The press and literary sources are also used well. The influence of American sociology is evident, especially in the discussion of social mobility and residential patterns. All this may disconcert or

even dismay devotees of the vibrant Vienna of cultural glory. Dr Rozenblit's Viennese Jewry vibrates not so much with cultural glory as with shifting social strata, the endeavours of hundreds of Jewish organizations, and conflicts over Jewish identity.

LLOYD P. GARTNER

CLAUDINE VEGH, *I Didn't Say Goodbye (Je ne lui ai pas dit au revoir)*, translated by Ros Schwartz, Postface by Bruno Bettelheim, 179 pp., Caliban Books, 25 Nassington Road, London, NW3, 1984, £7.95 (paperback, £3.95).

Claudine Vegh, a psychiatrist, relates in this book the harrowing reminiscences of seventeen men and women in France who lost one or both parents, deported and killed in Nazi concentration camps. They were all separated from their families when they were young children, aged three to thirteen years. The author herself was luckier than those she interviewed in that she was looked after by a childless Gentile couple who cherished and protected her devotedly. When France was liberated, she was reunited with her mother but never fully recovered from the loss of her beloved father.

In her Introduction, she says that she 'chose to interview people who have all the appearances of being unquestionably integrated, both socially and professionally, people about whom it is said: "They have every reason to be happy"'. All those she approached agreed to talk about their experiences in the war years, with the single exception of a psychotherapist who had lost both parents in the death camps. Each interview lasted about two hours, we are told, but the accounts published in this book vary in length.

Some of the parents were immigrants from eastern Europe and spoke Yiddish at home while others were French-born. One of the latter had fought in the French army in the First World War and his daughter recalls seeing him stitching his war decorations around the yellow star which Jews were forced to sew on to their clothes. Jewish children also had to wear the star and several of them report that they were tormented and beaten by other pupils while their schoolteachers looked on without intervening.

Some of the men and women are profoundly disturbed by the knowledge that their fathers died because they had sacrificed themselves for their families. They could have escaped in several cases, but they had been warned that if they failed to report to the police severe sanctions would be taken against their wives and children; and more than three decades later, these children feel an intolerable burden of guilt. One of them said that he twice went back with his wife and daughters to the farm in the Dordogne where he had last lived with his

parents and his brothers and sisters, before all except him were deported; he commented bitterly that it was well known that 'a criminal always returns to the scene of the crime' and insisted, 'Yes, I said criminal, it's odd . . . but after all, they're dead and I'm alive'.

Many of those interviewed say that they are not observant Jews and some indeed go further and declare that they are atheists — but have retained a firm Jewish identity. That clearly puzzles them, as the following statements reveal: 'My wife is Jewish, I don't think I could have felt happy with someone who wasn't Jewish. . . . I hope my daughter will marry a Jewish boy. And yet I am an atheist, I no longer believe in anything. I have never been to Israel. Deep down I'm afraid of being disappointed. I have studied the history of the Jewish people. Forever beginning again: persecution, humiliation, flight in order to survive and, above all, to ensure the survival of the children'; 'I am neither practising nor a believer. [but for me] to marry a non-Jew would be unthinkable . . . and I hope it will be the same for my daughters. . . . It would be too cruel, wouldn't it, all that . . . for nothing?'; 'I'm not religious, I can't believe in God, . . . I insisted however on my son's having his *Bar mitzvah*. Try and explain that! That way it seemed that . . . my parents, my brother hadn't "died for nothing". Because if they died for nothing, I no longer understand why I am alive'.

Claudine Vegh herself is another case in point, for she tells us in her Introduction: 'It is very difficult to be a Jew; to insist on remaining one, when one is, as I am, neither practising nor even a believer, may seem aberrant. But to refuse one's Jewishness would somehow be unbearable. The fact that my two children decided of their own accord to have a *Bar Mitzvah* eased a wound deep inside me. I do not really know in what way'. And one of her respondents is also perplexed about his Jewish identity: 'You know, I'm not glad to be Jewish, not at all. As an anti-religious atheist, Judaism exasperates me. . . . the idea that my father died because he was a Jew has stayed with me: so how do you expect me to feel happy being a Jew? Once, I had a very strange reaction: I've never been to Israel, but when the six-day war broke out, I wanted to enlist as a volunteer. You'll never guess why: in Israel they have planted a tree for each deportee; I had to go and defend my father's tree, it was as though his life was going to be taken from him a second time, or his grave violated; I don't know how to explain what I felt, but I wanted to scream, to scream endlessly'.

Those so tragically orphaned in their childhood bitterly resent being told by their Gentile compatriots, 'You Jews, you're different!'. As one of them, now a medical doctor, told the author: 'But worst of all is when they add "Deep down you don't really consider yourselves French". . . . but whose fault is that? . . . I have never forgotten that the police officers who came to get us were French police officers, that my teachers

did not once try to shield me from the taunts of the other children, not to mention actively defend me'. A truly ominous note is sounded by one of those who fear that their own fateful history could repeat itself: 'I hope that my children will continue to be Jewish, whatever happens. For my part, I have no illusions; what took place can happen again. We are only entitled to a respite, a reprieve . . .'.

In his Postface, Bruno Bettelheim analyses the reactions of the respondents and writes perceptively and compassionately about bereavement and mourning. He notes that it is difficult for young children to mourn their parents, 'particularly when they could not participate in ritual ceremonies, and when there are no physical remains to which they can attach their mourning. . . . no corpse to be buried, no grave to be visited'. That reminded me of a friend, a university teacher in America, born in Czechoslovakia, who alone with his brother had survived the slaughter in Nazi death camps of three generations of his family. His brother had settled in Italy, where he died in 1961. My friend, when given the news, immediately decided to fly to Rome because, he told me, although he could not easily afford the return air fare, he 'wanted to have the luxury of attending the funeral' of at least one member of his family. *I Didn't Say Goodbye* can help us to understand the significance of such a luxury for the children of those who were deported and deliberately murdered only because they were Jews.

J. FREEDMAN

SOVIET JEWISH AFFAIRS

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BOOKS RECEIVED

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

1 March-31 August 1984

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CHRONICLE

On 31 December 1984, the population of Israel, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights but excluding the West Bank and Gaza, totalled 4,235,000: 3,500,000 Jews and 735,000 non-Jews. During 1984, the number of Jews increased by 66,000 (1.9 per cent) over the previous year while the number of non-Jews rose by 20,000 (2.8 per cent).

*

Only 896 Jews were allowed to leave the Soviet Union in 1984 — the lowest annual emigration figure since 1971. In the first four months of 1985, a total of 413 Jews emigrated: 61 in January; 88 in February; 98 in March; and 166 in April. The majority of these Soviet Jews came from Moscow. Only 148 went to Israel while 265 chose other destinations.

*

Israel's Minister for Immigrant Absorption was reported to have stated last February that in 1984 immigration from North America dropped by 24 per cent over the previous year, from South America by 33 per cent, and from Europe by 31 per cent. About 300,000 Israelis are believed to have established a permanent residence abroad.

*

The Ministry of Tourism of Israel stated that there were 1,259,000 foreign visitors in 1984 — an eight per cent increase over the previous year. The large majority, 936,000, came by air. There were 164,000 cruise passengers — a 32 per cent increase. About half of the tourists came from Europe. West Germany led the European league with 133,767, a 20 per cent increase; it was followed by Great Britain with 131,300 (seven per cent up on 1983) and France with 125,000 (a two per cent decline). American visitors totalled 404,000 — a 14 per cent increase.

There are 165 international conferences scheduled to be held in Israel in 1985.

*

An article in the January 1985 issue of *Jewish Affairs*, a publication of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, states that according to the 1980 Census Report, there were 119,220 Jews in South Africa in that year — against 114,501 in 1960 and 117,990 in 1970. They are increasingly concentrated in the major metropolitan urban areas. In 1960, 59,205 or 51.7 per cent lived in

Johannesburg; in 1970, 63,190 or 53.6 per cent; and in 1980, 68,060 or 57 per cent. Just under 20 per cent (19.8 per cent) of the country's Jews were returned in Cape Town in 1960 — 22,716; 21.7 per cent in 1970 (25,650); and 24 per cent in 1980 (28,600). In 1960, 4.7 per cent (5,353) lived in Durban; in 1970, 5.1 per cent (5,990); and in 1980, 5.4 per cent (6,420). Pretoria had 3.1 per cent (3,533) in 1960; 3.2 per cent in 1970 (3,750); and 3.9 per cent (4,600) in 1980. Thus, these four cities accounted for 90,807 Jews (79.3 per cent of the total) in 1960; 98,580 (83.5 per cent) in 1970; and 107,680 (90.3 per cent) in 1980.

The proportion of the Jewish population in Port Elizabeth has altered only slightly: 2.6 per cent (2,972) in 1960; 2.4 per cent (2,820) in 1970; and again 2.4 per cent (2,840) in 1980. On the other hand, there has been a sharp decline in Bloemfontein and in East London. The former had 1,219 Jews in 1960 (1.1 per cent of the total); 1,200 in 1970 (one per cent); and only 500 (0.4 per cent) in 1980. East London had 0.9 per cent (1,023) in 1960; 0.7 per cent (800) in 1970; and 0.3 per cent (420) in 1980.

Thus, in 1980 a total of 111,440 Jews (93.5 per cent) lived in these seven cities, while the remaining 7,780 (6.5 per cent) were elsewhere in South Africa. In 1960, 16.1 per cent of all South African Jews lived outside the seven major cities.

*

The Winter 1985 issue of *Tel Aviv University News* states that a new two-year Bachelor of Arts programme has been established at the University in co-operation with the Senior Officers Police Academy. Twenty-four superintendents and chief inspectors have been enrolled for the new degree in the academic year 1984–85. 'This is the first time . . . that a recognized academic degree is being offered by an Israeli university, specifically for police officers.'

The three-year Community Involvement Programme of Tel Aviv University 'in which students meet with the aged, underprivileged and handicapped, has two aims: to provide students with a chance to combine theoretical and practical work in their fields and to offer companionship and assistance to those in need'. Another programme, 'Perah', 'encourages university students throughout Israel to help children from low-income areas with family, school and environmental problems. Students participating in this program have 60 per cent of their tuition fees paid by the Ministry of Education'. Within the framework of the Community Involvement Programme 'and with the help of the Association for Planning and Development of Services for the Aged in Israel, an experimental field studies project for psychology students was initiated at homes and institutions for the aged'. The Psychology Department of Tel Aviv University claims that it is the first in Israel to provide practical work in that area.

*

Tel Aviv University and the University of Frankfurt have entered into a co-operation agreement. After the signing of the agreement, the Lord Mayor of Frankfurt received an Honorary Fellowship of the University.

*

The First Asian-Jewish Colloquium was held in 1984 in Singapore on the subject of 'Cultural Interaction — Old and New: Old Societies, New States'. The Colloquium was sponsored by the Asia Pacific Jewish Association and organized by the President of that Association and the Rector of Tel Aviv University. It attracted scholars from Australia, China, India, Israel, Japan, Korea, Nepal, the Philippines, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, and the United States of America. The Rector of Tel Aviv University 'invited Asian scholars of various fields of interest to discuss a subject common both to Israel and the Asian countries — the problem of building a new nation on the infrastructure of an ancient culture'.

After the Colloquium, three Israeli participants gave lectures at the National University of Singapore.

It was decided to hold a second meeting in 1986, either in Hong Kong or in Japan.

*

The School of Language and Literature of Tel Aviv University has launched a new series of books in the Arabic language 'featuring translations of contemporary Israeli authors as well as studies of various aspects of Jewish culture'. It is hoped that the books will be distributed commercially in Egypt, where some 1,000 students are majoring in Hebrew language and literature at Egyptian universities. The head of the School is the general editor of the new series and he commented: 'Very little Hebrew literature has been available in Arabic and almost nothing scholarly exists on Jewish or Israeli culture. Almost everything available in Arabic is unsympathetic if not hostile. This series will contribute to a balanced view of Israel and the Jews'.

*

The Winter 1984–85 issue of *News from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem* states that some 17,000 students are enrolled in the University's seven faculties, 11 schools, and Pre-Academic Centre. About 6,500 are studying science, medicine, dentistry, and agriculture; 2,000 of them are engaged in graduate work. 'In the other fields (humanities, social sciences, law, education, social work, etc.) the total enrollment is about 9,000, of whom 3,500 are graduate students.' The school for Overseas Students has about 1,000 students and the Centre for Pre-Academic Studies has 400.

The Golda Meir Fellowship Fund of the Hebrew University awarded its first fellowships last December, on the sixth anniversary of the former Prime Minister's death. The 27 recipients were three senior scholars, five post-doctoral students, nine Ph.D. candidates, and ten Master's degree students. They originate from Canada, England, France, Israel, Morocco, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and the United States of America.

*

A Conference of the International Union of Physiological Sciences was held in Jerusalem under the auspices of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the

Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, and the Israel Society of Physiology and Pharmacology. Some 600 scientists attended the Conference; they came from 27 countries, including Bulgaria, Brazil, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Australia, and New Zealand.

*

Israeli and Mexican agricultural scientists attended a symposium on the problems of arid lands in Mexico City last October. Later that month there was a Conference in Mexico City of the Friends of the Hebrew University from North, Central, and South America; the President of Mexico was the guest of honour and main speaker at the inauguration of the Conference.

*

The autumn 1984 issue of *Les nouveaux cahiers*, a quarterly journal published under the auspices of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, is devoted to Jewish education. One of the articles deals with Jewish day schools in France which are fee-paying and subsidized by the state.

In the academic year 1983–84, there were 10,083 pupils in some 50 Jewish kindergartens and elementary and secondary schools. More than two thirds of the pupils (7,163) were in Paris and its suburbs while the remaining 2,920 lived in the provinces — mainly in Strasbourg, Marseilles, Nice, and Toulouse.

In addition, ORT had a total of eight establishments with a total of 2,975 students: 1,668 in Paris and its environs and 1,307 in the provinces.

*

The March 1985 issue of *Les Cahiers de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle* states that in the academic year 1983–84 there were 15,072 pupils in 39 schools established by, or affiliated to, the *Alliance* in various countries. Israel had the largest number of pupils, 5,629, in six schools in Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, Haifa, and Mikveh-Israel: 2,846 girls and 2,783 boys. One of the Jerusalem schools is for the deaf and dumb and had 83 pupils (55 boys and 28 girls), some of whom are Arabs. A seventh establishment is the Institut d'Etudes Supérieures Humanistes Juives Kerem, in Jerusalem, which had a total of 121 students. In addition, there were two other establishments affiliated to the *Alliance*; one in Nahariya with 682 pupils and the other in Sderot with 200 students.

Iran had 2,178 pupils in five schools in Teheran, Ispahan, Kermanshah, and Yezd but only 660 are Jewish — 451 in Teheran, 36 in Ispahan, 140 in Kermanshah, and 33 in Yezd. Morocco had 1,553 pupils in Casablanca, Fez, Meknes, Marrakesh, and Tangiers. Syria had a primary school in Damascus with 474 pupils — 400 girls and 74 boys. There is a secondary school in Damascus for Jewish pupils which is sponsored 'by another Jewish organization'.

The *Alliance* had three establishments in France with a total of 554 pupils: 285 boys and 269 girls. In Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and Spain, there are schools affiliated to the *Alliance*. Belgium had one school in Brussels

with 538 pupils; Canada had seven schools (all in Montreal) with a total of 2,691 pupils; the Netherlands had one school in Amsterdam with 150 pupils; and Spain had two schools: one in Madrid with 160 pupils and one in Barcelona with 102.

*

A Portugal-Israel Association of Friendship and Culture has been established in Lisbon. Its president is a Jewish professor who is a member of the National Assembly and a senior official in the Ministry of Education of Portugal. The new association hopes to build a library devoted to the Jews of Portugal and to assemble a central archive. It also plans to arrange for an exchange of students between Portugal and Israel.

A Portugal-Israel association was first established in Oporto in 1978 and it was followed in 1979 by another in the northern town of Guarda.

*

The Auschwitz Foundation established a library and documentation centre in Brussels last January. The centre is open to the public and it will provide special facilities for research workers and teachers. There are photographs and other archival materials about the Nazi death camps during the Second World War. The president of the International Auschwitz Committee is reported to have stated at a press conference that systematic documentation was unfortunately necessary to counter denials of the Holocaust made by so-called 'revisionist' historians.

*

Manchester's Jewish Museum, which was opened last year, inaugurated last April a permanent exhibition representing many aspects of Jewish life in the city's history.

*

La Rassegna Mensile de Israel, a periodical publication of the Unione delle Comunità Israelitiche Italiane (Lungotevere Sanzio 9, 00153 Rome, Italy), has issued three numbers entitled 'La Cultura Sefardita'. They contain articles in Italian, French, English, and Judeo-Spanish on Sephardi Jews. The first volume has papers on Sephardim in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Amsterdam, and North Africa.

The second volume deals with Jews in the Middle Ages in Spain; their literary and religious writings and their music in Morocco; the reaction of Sephardi Jews to the Inquisition and to antisemitism; the varieties of Judeo-Spanish; and Jewish philosophy and jurisprudence with articles on Bahya Ibn Pakuda, Maimonides, Menasseh ben Israel, and Baruch Spinoza.

The third volume has papers on Spanish liturgy in Italy; on the culinary practices of Algerian Jews in the twentieth century; on traditional Sephardi ballads; on Sephardi humour; on Moses Almosino; and on novels by North African Jews published in Paris in the 1970s and 1980s.

*

The January–April 1984 issue of *La Rassegna Mensile* (received in London in March 1985) contains an article in French on the Jewish community of Florence. According to that article, Florence has some 1,300 Jews; 70 per cent of them were born in Florence, 12 per cent came to the city before the Second World War, and the remaining 18 per cent came after that war. The 'newcomers' consist of Ashkenazi Jews from other European countries who settled in Florence immediately after the war and of Sephardi Jews mainly from Libya who came when they were expelled from that country, in 1967.

The chief gainful occupations of Florentine Jews are, in that order, business and commerce, the civil service (mainly as schoolteachers), and the liberal professions.

There is a Jewish kindergarten, an elementary school, and a 'scuola media' for Jewish pupils aged between 10 and 14 years. Almost all Jewish children attend these schools. Only six per cent of the city's Jews said that they did not wish to give their children a Jewish education.

Apart from a Jewish club, which attracts some 150 Israeli students in Florence, there is a Jewish drama group, a Jewish choir, and branches of WIZO (Women's International Zionist Organization), Bnei Akiva, and Maccabi. There is also a Jewish Home for the Aged.

When questioned about emigration to Israel, 41 per cent said that they were in favour of Zionism but that they themselves did not intend settling in Israel; 30 per cent were unequivocally against Zionism — 23 per cent stating that 'nowadays it made no sense for an Italian Jew' and seven per cent giving 'ideological' reasons for rejecting Zionism; 17 per cent said that they were 'ready to go to Israel' but did not specify when they would go; and the remaining 12 per cent said that they 'would have liked' to emigrate to Israel but because of family obligations, state of health, etc., they could not do so.

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The April 1985 issue of *On Board*, the Newsletter of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, gave details of the exhibition arranged under the auspices of the Board to celebrate its 225th anniversary. The Exhibition was entitled 'Achievement: British Jewry' and covered a 'wide range of subjects . . . in original drawings and paintings, press cuttings, photographs, books and printed matter'. The full text of the first minutes of the London Committee of Deputies of British Jews, written in Portuguese and dated 19 November 1760, was on display.

*

The President of India inaugurated the centenary celebrations of Bombay's Knesseth Eliahu Synagogue last spring and toured an Exhibition of Judaica. He lit the menorah and praised the Jewish community of India which 'has made notable contributions to the country's business and industry, civil services and armed forces, and in the spheres of art and education'. A message was read from India's Prime Minister, who also praised the Jewish community, stating that the 'smallness of its numbers has not been a constraint, and members of the community have achieved prominence in many fields of activity'.

*

The Jewish community of Denmark celebrated last December the 300th anniversary of the opening of the first synagogue in Copenhagen, in December 1684. There was a concert attended by the Queen of Denmark and her Consort, an exhibition entitled 'Traditions in Jewish Homes Through 300 Years', and a display of Jewish art in Denmark in the last three centuries.

*

It was reported last October that the municipal council of Thessaloniki (Salonika) has decided to name a city square 'Jewish Martyrs' Square'. The city had a flourishing community of 56,000 Jews before the Second World War but only 1,950 survived the Nazi occupation and deportations to death camps. There are now about 1,000 Jewish residents, who plan to erect a memorial in the square.

*

The November 1984 Report of the International Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization states that there are now 824 colleges and universities in various countries 'which have Jewish Studies departments or accredited courses on Jewish subjects in general disciplines'.

In France, 'more than 1,000 students are enrolled in Hebrew courses at the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales . . . The French Ministry of Education has decided to establish a chair in Ladino and Judesmo. Two professional conferences are planned . . ., on Sephardic culture and on Medicine in Jewish Ethics'.

In the United Kingdom, the establishment 'of a British Committee of the International Center was formally announced at a conference of university teachers of Jewish subjects which took place in London . . . A series of plans concerning future activities are being considered by the British group, . . . concentrating on the strengthening of Jewish Studies programs in British universities, facilitating academic exchanges and the improvement of communications within the field'.

In Australia, a Chair in Semitic Studies at the University of Melbourne and courses in Semitic Studies at the University of Sydney were established several decades ago. 'More recently, courses in contemporary Jewish history have been introduced at the University of Western Australia, dealing mainly with the Middle East. At the University of New South Wales, Judaic Studies have developed in three areas — German Studies, history and sociology. Another recent development is the teaching of modern Hebrew in the Oriental Studies program at the Australian National University in Canberra. A degree in Jewish Studies is available at Victoria College in Melbourne. . . . Another recent development at this level has been at the Sydney College of Advanced Education, which provides teacher training programs into which a Jewish Studies strand has now been introduced.

'Since the mid-70s, interest at the university and college level has steadily increased, and the Jewish community has taken steps to develop policy-making and financial support at a national level through the Australian Co-ordinating Committee for Tertiary Jewish Studies. This committee was

established in 1982. . . . It has established close connections with the Jewish day schools in regard to teacher training.'

In Brazil, a University Association for Jewish Culture was founded in 1982, when Jewish Studies were taught only at the University of Sao Paulo. As a result of the new Association's activities, courses in Jewish Civilization were introduced in three other universities in 1983.

In Uruguay, in July 1984, 'an agreement was signed establishing a Chair for Hebrew Language and Culture within the framework of the Department of Classical Philology of the Faculty of Humanities of the State University of Uruguay. . . . The initial courses to be offered will be in Hebrew Language, Jewish History and Bible'.

In South Africa, a National Committee for Tertiary Jewish Studies was established in April 1984. It planned to introduce 'courses in Jewish Civilization in the University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg), which has an enrollment of about 4,000 Jewish students . . . The Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies attached to the University of Cape Town continues to arrange special courses for undergraduates and for the general public, given by visiting lecturers . . . At the University of South Africa (Pretoria) some eighty undergraduates are currently enrolled in Judaica courses, while there are also students in this field at honours, masters, and doctorate level'.

In 1984, one of the Continuing Workshops on University Teaching of Jewish Civilization 'focused on preparing curricula for university teaching of social and cultural history of Sephardic and Oriental Jewry, the definition of that Jewry being geographic-cultural and not communal or ethnic. The geographic units included are: Western Europe and North America, North Africa, Turkey and the Balkans, and the Middle East. A general framework was formulated for the following periods: Middle Ages, 16th–18th Centuries, 19th and 20th Centuries. . . . Participants in the workshop represented the following universities: Université de la Sorbonne (France); Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Everyman's University, Haifa University and the Hebrew University (Israel); Pontifical University of Comillas (Spain); and Princeton University (United States)'.

Another workshop of the International Center for University Teacher of Jewish Civilization, on Jewish Political Studies, is organized in co-operation with the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. The teachers who participated in that workshop came from McGill University of Canada; Université Paul Valéry of France; Bar-Ilan University, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, and Everyman's University of Israel; and Baltimore Hebrew College, City University of New York, Gratz College, the Jewish Theological Seminary, and the University of Louisville of the United States.

The November 1984 Report of the International Center also states that a first 'Continental Conference on University Teaching of Jewish Civilization took place in Buenos Aires, 8–10 June 1984. It was attended by university teachers and community leaders from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. . . . The Conference was held under the aegis of the Institute for Israel-Argentina Cultural Relations . . . Within the framework of the conference, foundations were laid for committees to develop Jewish Studies in Argentina and Chile, along the lines of the Associaçao Universitaria

de Cultura Judaica in Sao Paulo. Similar organization was reported in Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela'.

*

Last November, the first Jewish high school in Vienna since the Second World War was inaugurated by the President of Austria. The school has 150 pupils, many of them the children of Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The Foriegn Minister of Austria, who was formerly the Lord Mayor of Vienna, attended the ceremony and is reported to have commented that, in view of a recent survey by a professor of sociology at Vienna University which revealed an alarming persistence of antisemitism in the country, it was necessary to make Austrians realize that 'Vienna as it is now would not exist without the contribution of Viennese Jewry to culture, to science, to architecture . . . to show the Viennese that so many things they are proud of are, in reality, a result of the impact of the Jews of Vienna'. (Details about that survey of Austrian attitudes to Jews were given in the 'Chronicle' of the last issue of this Journal, vol. 26, no. 2, December 1984, pp. 169–70.)

There was a festival of films on Jewish themes, and an exhibition of photographs, videos, and religious items illustrating the former life and the persecution of European Jewry. There was also a symposium, held under the auspices of the Institute of Jewish Affairs, of intellectuals from many countries on Jews in the Habsburg monarchy.

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The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith European Foundation, the Federation of French Jewish Societies, the Sephardi Federation of France, and the Independent Association of Jewish Veteran Deportees and Internees co-sponsored an exhibition, which opened in Paris last November, entitled 'Forty Year After — French Jews After Nazism'. There were also seminars, debates, films, and a sale on books on antisemitism in France, the Jewish Resistance, neo-Nazism, and the denial that the Holocaust took place.

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The Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the American Jewish Historical Society have presented to the White House Library in Washington a set of historic source materials concerning America's relationship with the Holy Land. The ceremony took place at the White House last March. The First International Scholars Colloquium on America-Holy Land Studies was held in 1975; the Second Colloquium in 1983; and a third is planned for 1987. The Studies are a joint undertaking of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry and of the American Jewish Historical Society.

*

The Second International Congress for the Study of Sephardi and Oriental Culture was held in Jerusalem last January. It was attended by some 200

scholars from Israel, Western Europe, and North and Latin America. The Congress was sponsored by the Institute for Research into the Sephardi and Oriental Jewish Heritage (established by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem), the World Sephardi Federation, and the Council of the Sephardi and Oriental Communities of Jerusalem.

*

An International Colloquium was held last April at the University of Toulouse-Le Mirail on 'Jews as Perceived by Others' ('Les Juifs dans le regard de l'autre'). There were contributions on Jews in the Middle Ages in France and in Muslim society; on Jews in France during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; on Jews as perceived by their slaves in New Spain; on Jews during the Second World War; on Jews in North Africa; and on Jews as perceived by a group of Italian students. The contributors came from Canadian, French, Israeli, and Italian universities.

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A poll carried out by the French Institute of Public Opinion last spring revealed that only six per cent of Frenchmen said that they felt 'antipathy' towards Jews; but 17 per cent believe that a Frenchman of Jewish origin is not as French as a Gentile Frenchman. Antisemitism is strongest among those aged 65 and over and among those under 25. It is also more clearly marked among the working classes, especially among agricultural workers.

About 25 per cent of those who voted for the extreme Right-wing National Front Party are openly antisemitic.

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The twelfth Jerusalem International Book Fair was held last May. About a thousand publishers from 40 countries displayed their wares in more than two miles of stands. There were exhibits from some 20 publishers at the Egyptian stand.

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The Institute of Jewish Affairs (11 Hertford Street, London W1Y 7DX) regularly publishes Research Reports. Recent Reports include the following titles: 'The Lebanon war and Western news media'; 'The rise of the Front National in France'; 'The reaction against immigrants in France'; 'Jewish issues in the American presidential election, 1984'; 'American Jewish voters and the Democratic tradition. An analysis of the Jewish vote in the 1984 presidential election'; 'Fulfilling a restricted role: the Soviet Anti-Zionist Committee'; 'The U.N. Resolution equating Zionism with racism: genesis and repercussions'; and 'The myth of Zionist-Nazi collaboration: some sources of Soviet propaganda'.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Blum, Jakub and Vera Rich, *The Image of the Jew in Soviet Literature. The Post-Stalin Period*, vii + 276 pp., published for the Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, by Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1984, n.p.

Cohen, Esther, *No Charge for Looking*, vi + 180 pp., Shocken Books, New York, 1984, $13.50.

Cohen, Stanley, *Visions of Social Control. Crime, Punishment and Classification*, x + 325 pp., Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985, £25.00 (£8.95, paperback).

Coser, Lewis A., *Refugee Scholars in America: Their Impact and Their Experiences*, xviii + 351 pp., Yale University Press, New Haven, Ct and London (13 Bedford Square, London WC1B 3JF), 1984, £25.00.

Elazar, Daniel J. and Stuart A. Cohen, *The Jewish Polity: Jewish Political Organization from Biblical Times to the Present*, xiii + 303 pp., Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1985, $27.50.

Endelman, Judith E., *The Jewish Community of Indianapolis, 1849 to the Present* (The Modern Jewish Experience Series, Paula Hyman and Deborah Dash Moore, eds), xi + 303 pp., Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1984, $17.50.

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