THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Published on behalf of Maurice Freedman Research Trust Ltd
by William Heinemann Ltd

VOLUME XXVI : NUMBER 1 : JUNE 1984

CONTENTS

Editor : Judith Freedman

ISSN 0021-6534

OBJECTS AND SPONSORSHIP OF THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

The Jewish Journal of Sociology was sponsored by the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress from its inception in 1959 until the end of 1980. Thereafter, from the first issue of 1981 (volume 23, no. 1), the Journal has been sponsored by Maurice Freedman Research Trust Limited, which is registered as an educational charity and has as its main purposes the encouragement of research in the sociology of the Jews and the publication of The Jewish Journal of Sociology. The objects of the Journal remain as stated in the Editorial of the first issue in 1959:

> 'This Journal has been brought into being in order to provide an international vehicle for serious writing on Jewish social affairs ... Academically we address ourselves not only to sociologists, but to social scientists in general, to historians, to philosophers, and to students of comparative religion. ... We should like to stress both that the Journal is editorially independent and that the opinions expressed by authors are their own responsibility.'

The founding Editor of the *JJS* was Morris Ginsberg, and the founding Managing Editor was Maurice Freedman. Morris Ginsberg, who had been Professor of Sociology at the London School of Economics, died in 1970. Maurice Freedman, who had been Professor of Social Anthropology at the London School of Economics and later at the University of Oxford, succeeded to the title of Editor in 1971, when Dr Judith Freedman (who had been Assistant Editor since 1963) became Managing Editor. Maurice Freedman died in 1975; since then the Journal has been edited by Dr Judith Freedman.

William Heinemann Ltd have acted throughout as publishers on behalf of the sponsors.

Applications for subscriptions and enquiries regarding back numbers should be addressed to:

THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
187 GLOUCESTER PLACE
LONDON NW1 6BU
ENGLAND

TELEPHONE: 01 262 8939

THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Volume XXVI : Number 1 : June 1984

CONTENTS

PUBLISHED TWICE YEARLY, IN JUNE AND DECEMBER
on behalf of Maurice Freedman Research Trust Ltd
by William Heinemann Ltd

(Published by the World Jewish Congress 1959–80)

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION £8.00 (U.S. $18.00) POST FREE
SINGLE COPIES £4.50 (U.S. $10.00)

Applications for subscriptions should be sent to The Jewish Journal of Sociology, 187 Gloucester Place, London NW1 6BU, England

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY W. S. MANEY & SON LTD, LEEDS

BOOKS REVIEWED

NOTICE TO CONTRIBUTORS

Papers submitted to *The Jewish Journal of Sociology* should be addressed to the Editor at *187 Gloucester Place, London NW1 6BU, England.* The papers must be original. They should not have been published previously, or be committed to publication elsewhere, in any language. When a paper has been accepted for publication, the author may not publish it elsewhere in any language, without the written consent of the Editor of the *J.S.S.*

MSS (please send at least two copies) should be typewritten on one side only and double-spaced with ample margins. Pages (including those containing illustrations, diagrams, or tables) should be numbered consecutively. All quotations should be within single inverted commas; quotation marks within quotations should be double inverted commas.

Notes should follow the style of this *Journal* and should be given at the end of the article in numerical sequence according to the order of their citation in the text.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS

A. *Books*
Give author, title, place of publication, year, and page reference. Underline all titles of books.

B. *Articles*
Place titles of articles within single inverted commas. Underline the title of the book or journal in which the article appears.
In the case of a journal, cite numbers of volume and part, and year of publication.

PROOFS. Authors making major revisions in proof will be required to bear the cost. Unless proofs are returned to the Managing Editor promptly, authors' corrections cannot be incorporated.

OFFPRINTS. Each contributor receives thirty free offprints of his article. If there are two or more authors, the thirty offprints are shared between them.

YEMENITE ETHNICITY IN ISRAEL

Herbert S. Lewis

THE expressions *kibuts galuyot* ('ingathering of the exiles') and *mizug galuyot* ('fusion of the exiles') have long been key concepts and watchwords of Israeli society and ideology. Adopted in the early days of the state, they were to guide policies of immigration, immigrant 'absorption', and integration. But in the dialectic of political and social processes, *mizug galuyot* and the policies it fostered have now come under heavy attack from a new generation of writers, as well as from many of those one-time immigrants who were to have been assimilated.

In the past decade it has become commonplace to claim that the Jewish immigrants who came from Asian and African countries (sometimes called 'Oriental Jews' or, just as inaccurately, 'Sephardim') have been robbed of their culture, their traditions, their pride, and their rightful place in Israeli society by the Ashkenazi elite. For example, Henry Toledano says that *mizug galuyot* 'apparently means simply the Ashkenization of the Sephardim'.[1] This is milder than Michael Seltzer who prefers the term 'Aryanization' to refer to the same phenomenon.[2] Nissim Rejwan claims that the result of *mizug galuyot* has been 'deculturation, marginalization, educational and cultural deprivation' of the groups.[3] It is not hard to find more recent formulations of the same idea, such as those in the writings of Sammy Smooha, Sherry Rosen, and Arnold Lewis.[4]

It is quite true that most members of the Ashkenazi establishment were not — and probably still are not — appreciative of or sensitive to the traditions, culture, and social relations of the Asian and African Jews. It is also true that these ways, these traditions, have undergone massive change within Israel. In this paper, however, I attempt to present a picture of one particular ethnic group among the many in Israel's population, and to show how and in what ways its members have maintained for a century a meaningful and distinctive complex set of social relations, activities, and institutions, as well as artistic creativity. By drawing attention to these phenomena I hope to give a more realistic, or more balanced, picture of the range of ethnic variations and options in Israel. The case of the Yemenites is by no

means 'typical'; no single case could be, and the Yemenites are in many respects an exceptional group, with an unusual history. But this study, which is based on participant observation, points to some of the complexities of ethnic change and persistence in Israel and suggests a modified perspective in place of the current accepted wisdom on the subject.[5]

The ideological background

After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the country's Jewish population doubled — from 650,000 to more than 1,340,000 — by the end of 1951. It had tripled by a decade later. The politicians and administrators, planners and workers in housing, education, politics, industry, etc., as well as the armed forces, had to deal with both the physical needs and the social integration of immigrants from more than 50 countries. There was no ambiguity about their attitude and policies. As far as the Jewish portion of Israel's population was concerned, there had to be integration and unity, politically, culturally, and socially. Seeing the Jewish people as one people, the *Knesset* passed 'The Law of Return', which guaranteed the right of all Jews to settle in Israel as full citizens. The government and the various institutional arms of the state aimed in 1948 to settle, educate, and integrate the newcomers without distinction — at least in theory. They expected the immigrants to discard many of the old ways, their '*galut* (Diaspora) mentality' — as the earlier settlers thought they themselves had done. They were building a new Israeli society, a new state with a new culture. Ben-Gurion is said to have exclaimed, 'We have no time for Israel to be a melting pot. It is a pressure cooker'. The idea was clear: one Jewish nation would be formed out of the mass of humanity of differing geographical origins that had suddenly arrived in the reborn Land of Israel.

The pre-State Jewish community had been relatively homogeneous in socio-economic status. But now the mass immigration of people from all over the world, and the varying economic, cultural, and educational backgrounds created considerable differentials in social and economic status and power. In an article in the *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, Aharon Amir states:[6]

> To the extent that the process of assimilation was impeded, inter-community tension developed and was made much more acute by the fact that the distinctions between the communities were largely superimposed on the existing economic and educational stratification: on the whole the Ashkenazim were better educated and more prosperous, while there was a higher proportion of poverty, undereducation and illiteracy among the Sephardim and other oriental communities, particularly the new immigrants from African and Asian countries . . . The alleviation of

intercommunal tension through the 'integration of the exiles' became a major aim of national policy. At the same time, the opinion was widely held that the tension would be alleviated with the disintegration of the communities themselves and the disappearance of communal allegiances, and that as long as the communities themselves continued to exist there would not be a sense of a united people in Israel.

It seemed clear in the early 1950s that the acculturation and assimilation of all Jewish groups was necessary as well as feasible. In 1953, Ben-Gurion wrote:[7]

> Within the state the differences between various kinds of Jews will be obliterated in the course of time, the communities and tribes will sooner or later fuse into one national and cultural unity. Common education, the Hebrew language, universal service in the Israel Defence Forces, the establishment of a common minimum standard of living, the entry of workers from various countries and communities into a single labour federation, mixed marriages between the various tribes, common political action in non-communal parties, and so on, will produce a new type of Jew with the favourable qualities and characteristics of all the tribes of Israel.

With a few exceptions (as in the case of the second President of Israel, Itzhak Ben Zvi), the leaders of the new state had little patience with (or understanding of) the 'traditional' cultures of the newcomers, which seemed to the educated elite to be representative of an earlier age, one which had little place in the modern world. They were particularly concerned about the lack of technical and scientific skills, the poor educational standard, the apparent excessive religiosity and belief in magic, and the patriarchal familism and fatalism which they believed typified the people who came from such places as Yemen, Morocco, Kurdistan, Iran, Libya, and elsewhere in Asia and Africa. It is important to point out that these same leaders did not, at that time, place a positive valuation on *their own* roots: they did not foster the use of the Yiddish language, or greatly value the culture of eastern European Jewry and the life-style which they believed had been forced upon them by the non-Jewish world and the exploitative capitalist system of Europe.

It was part of European Zionist ideology from late in the nineteenth century that the Jewish people were rebuilding themselves as they rebuilt the land. Their view of the future involved a critique of their own past. In addition, the establishment's ideas about the future of 'traditional' African and Asian Jewish cultures and societies were influenced by prevalent social science ideas about the inevitability of 'modernization', and their view of the inevitability of acculturation and assimilation mirrored the social science of the 1940s, and the then current ideas about the American 'melting pot'.

Beyond the ideology and the theories of the largely Ashkenazi establishment, there is a very strong sense, throughout Israel's Jewish

population, that the Jewish people is one people, and that there should *not* be differences among them. One hears the expressions *Am Yisrael 'am ehad*, 'the Jewish people is one people' and *Kol Yisrael haverim*, 'all Israel are comrades', and, although various forms of discrimination do exist, the norm against speaking publicly against any Jewish group is very strong.[8] Until very recently many educated Israelis, including many social scientists, would insist that the education and integration of the past 30 years had, in fact, produced one Israeli Jewish people, without meaningful social and cultural distinctions. They pointed to the rapid and consistent growth in the rate of marriage between Euro-American and Afro-Asian Jews (20.1 per cent in 1978) as further evidence of increasing integration.[9]

Despite the ideology of unity and the assumption that the major institutions of the state should and would work for the acculturation and assimilation of all immigrants, ethnicity was always a reality of life in Israel. There were always ethnically based organizations: mutual aid and burial societies, *landsmannschaft* organizations for those originating from a particular town or region, synagogues and religious associations, cultural organizations, and even daily or weekly newspapers in such languages as Romanian, Hungarian, Judeo-Spanish (Ladino), and German. Furthermore, there were various ethnic political groupings, even in pre-State days. Some groupings were created by members of those groups themselves; others by outsiders who fostered ethnic sections of established parties to satisfy the needs, and attract members, of the ethnic groups. Ethnic leaders were recruited and ethnic interests were played upon for political purposes.[10] Ethnic politics were decried, were looked down upon, but existed and still do.

In addition, there was increasing recognition of the importance of the 'folklore' — the music, arts, and costume of the communities. For the most part, however, the Asian and African traditions were encouraged in the context of ethnic celebrations; rarely were they introduced into wider public occasions, except at festivals which specifically focused on the music and dance of the ethnic communities (*edot*).[11] On the other hand, since the early days of Zionist settlement in Palestine by pioneering youth dissatisfied with the society and culture of European Jewry, artists had searched for new materials to create a new art and 'culture'. Some of these artists turned to the culture of the ethnic communities, especially to the Yemenite traditions.

In summary, official ideology looked to the absorption of immigrants and the creation of a new and modern Israeli population, without ethnic distinctions; the schools, the army, and the political system were meant to foster this development.[12] In practice, however, manifestations of ethnicity were not forbidden and might on occasion be fostered or supported by a variety of institutions and individuals. It is in this

context that the current development of Yemenite ethnicity must be seen.

The Jews of Yemen

There is a legend that Jews first settled in South Arabia at the time of the destruction of the First Temple of Jerusalem (586 B.C.E.), while the earliest historical records indicate that they were in Yemen in the second century of the present era, several hundred years before the advent of Islam. From that time until they began migrating to Israel in the late nineteenth century, they lived among non-Jewish Arab people. Under Islam, they became a *dhimmi* community, protected by the Muslims but separate and inferior in status. They lived throughout Yemen and in parts of the Hadhramaut, in more than 1,000 localities throughout the rural countryside as well as in San'a, Dhamar, and the other larger cities.[13] Only a few engaged in agriculture; the majority were artisans specializing in metalwork (especially silversmithing), carpentry, weaving, and building; a few were shopkeepers, small manufacturers (of candy, for example), and even money changers.

Throughout their history, the Jews of Yemen retained their identity as Jews. Although they were isolated from the rest of world Jewry, and lived in a devout Muslim society, they maintained sufficient communication with Jewish centres in Palestine, Egypt, and Iraq to receive and adopt major Jewish religious works. They retained not only their identity, but also their knowledge of Biblical Hebrew and the full range of practices and customs of Judaism. They were one of the most remote of Jewish communities, and one of the most observant, living in one of the least accessible and least developed states in the world.

Migration to Palestine

The modern history of Jewish Palestine is usually dated from July 1882, when a small group of Russian Jews (the 'Bilu') arrived in Palestine to start a new life and a movement for a Jewish homeland. It is usually forgotten that, by coincidence, about 100 Yemenite families from San'a settled in Jerusalem in 1881 and 1882. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, there had been increased communication between the Jews of Yemen and the rest of world Jewry. By 1880, some Jews of San'a had heard rumours that Lord Rothschild was buying land for Jews to settle in the Land of Israel, while in Yemen itself there was a variety of political and economic troubles. Motivated both by harsh conditions which pushed them, and a messianic Zionism which pulled them, this first group was the forerunner of a series of migrations to Palestine which continued until the State of Israel was established and until virtually all Jews had left Yemen. By 1948, as a result of

intermittent immigration and natural increase, there was a Yemenite population of 30,000 or about 4.6 per cent of the pre-State Jewish population — the largest single non-European Jewish group until 1951.[14] They lived primarily in Jaffa and Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, the towns of Rehovot (especially their own section, called Sha'arayim), Petah Tikva, Rishon LeTsion, Hadera, Zikhron Ya'akov, and a number of smaller rural settlements. A few could be found in a wide range of occupations, but the majority were engaged in agriculture (usually as labourers on the farms of Jewish owners); in the building trades and construction, as tile-setters, stone-cutters, electricians, painters, etc.; as artisans (especially silversmiths); as Torah scribes; and as porters and unskilled workers. Women frequently worked as domestics. There were also teachers, rabbis, yeshiva students, clerks, artists, and musicians among them.

The Yemenites were not the only Jewish immigrants who came to Palestine during this pre-State period, but they were particularly prominent. They were different in many respects, and captured the attention of the Ashkenazim in a number of ways. Their appearance was distinctive: their complexion was darker than that of most other Jews; they wore their own traditional Yemeni dress; and the men had long side-locks (*peyot*). They were seen as hard and law-abiding workers, but as backward and primitive. They were noted for being very observant of religious practices, but this did not arouse the admiration of the secular socialist Jews, while orthodox Western Jews did not look kindly upon the differences between Yemenite and Ashkenazi religious practices. Yemenites were recognized as talented in the arts; their embroidery, silver filigree work, and their music began to have an impact on Jewish arts in Palestine. They were seen, and saw themselves, as a distinctive people, neither Ashkenazim nor Sephardim.

When the State was established in 1948, the Israeli government initiated a programme to bring to Israel the remaining Jews of Yemen. The Imam of Yemen granted his permission and a mass exodus followed. They made their way from every part of the country by every available means, but mostly on foot, to a camp near Aden where, after waiting for some time in transit camps, they were flown directly to Israel. When the airlift (called 'On Wings of Eagles' or 'Operation Magic Carpet') was over in September 1950, virtually all the Jews of Yemen, Aden, and the Hadhramaut (48,818) had arrived in Israel.[15]

Settlement of the Yemenites in Israel

In 1979 there were more than 164,000 people in Israel who were either born in Yemen (52,000) or born in Israel to parents born in Yemen (112,000);[16] they constituted 5.1 per cent of the Jewish population. They are dispersed throughout the country, above all in

the smaller, older cities, middle-sized towns, and in 50 agricultural co-operative villages (*moshavim*), two-thirds of which are ethnically homogeneous. About 15 per cent of the Yemenites live in Tel Aviv (roughly the same proportion as Israeli Jews in general) but the rest are found in these smaller communities. Some 12 per cent live on *moshavim*, and another eight per cent in the all-Yemenite town of Rosh Ha'Ayin. There is a pronounced tendency for Yemenites to cluster in urban and suburban districts which they have made their own.[17] This distribution has several implications for social integration. In *moshavin* and in Rosh Ha'Ayin, it is possible for them to spend much of their lives among fellow Yemenites, even if secondary schooling, army service, non-agricultural work, marketing, and shopping involve varying degrees of contact with non-Yemenites. This is less possible in the towns and urban centres in which 80 per cent of the Yemenites live. Although their clustering in Yemenite residential districts means that they have considerable access to their kin and ethnic brethren for social and community life, they are not isolated in these cities, or even within their neighbourhoods, which usually include non-Yemenites. Moreover, their places of work may be some distance away and their colleagues or customers are likely to be non-Yemenites.

Nowadays, Yemenites are distributed widely throughout the occupational structure of the country, but they tend to be clustered in the areas of agriculture (as independent farmers on the *moshavim*), education, skilled trades (electricians, metal workers, carpenters, mechanics, tile setters, diamond cutters, technicians, silversmiths), building and contracting, organization and bureaucracy (clerks, administrators, bookkeepers and accountants), and in the regular army as commissioned and non-commissioned officers. Increasing numbers of school-leavers are going to university. There are Yemenite lawyers, but few doctors. Engineering is a growing field, as are other technical professions — for example, electronics and metallurgy. Nursing and teaching are preferred occupations for young women. There are also numerous Yemenites in musical, artistic, and religious occupations.

Yemenite identity

It is my impression, on the basis of some years of participant observation and research, that there is still an image of the Yemenite community as it was 30 to 60 years ago — as poor, devout, hard-working, simple people, involved with their folk-heritage. This should be modified to one of an increasingly sophisticated and well-educated people, well organized and proud of their history, arts, and cultural practices and values. These sentiments were not always so universally held, however. For some Yemenites, ethnic identity used to be a stigma. Although they were frequently praised for their arts, their religiosity,

and their willingness to work hard and cheerfully, they were also looked down upon for their supposed 'primitiveness'. Under these circumstances, it was inevitable for many younger people to be embarrassed by the ways of their elders — by their dress, their accent, their attitudes, their lack of modern education, and the contrast they presented with the 'modern Israeli'.

By the mid-1970s, however, it was no longer acceptable to admit these feelings of embarrassment or inferiority. Whatever conscious or unconscious insecurities there may be, the predominant ideology today is one of ethnic pride and assertiveness. Men and women in their late twenties and thirties often declare that they have 'returned' to their ethnic group and to religiosity; they admit that they were wrong about their parents' 'primitiveness' after all. Today's teenagers appear to have few qualms about their origins and are increasingly anxious to participate in specific ethnic activities, especially those involving music and dance. Yemenites may acknowledge that they were simple people when they first returned to the Land of Israel, but they also claim that they then had high standards of morality and piety as well as respect for religious learning. 'We didn't have doctors, and we didn't know engineering', said one nationally prominent Yemenite politician, 'but we knew how to get on without narcotic drugs, and we knew how to teach our children to behave'. There is great stress on the proper education of children in the home, on *derekh erets* (right conduct) in the face of Israel's secularization, delinquency, and the growing drug culture — all of which are current Israeli concerns.

Yemenites are vocal about what they perceive as their values (*arakhim*). Rather in conformity with the stereotype that others hold of them, they see themselves as religious, hard-working, able to cheerfully endure hardship and to be content with little.[18] They are proud of the manner in which they maintained their Judaism in isolation for two millenia, and they are very conscious of their poetic, artistic, and musical traditions and talents. Even those socially mobile individuals who may still harbour ambivalent feelings about their Yemenite identity will usually proclaim their ethnic pride and their allegiance to the group.

Religion, community, and family

The most important institutions in Yemenite communities are the local synagogues, which are well attended on the Sabbath and on the festivals. These synagogues are ethnically homogeneous — for good reasons. Although there is substantial similarity in the prayers and practices of all orthodox Jewish communities, there are significant differences in the pronunciation of Hebrew and in the melodies used for chanting prayers and reading from the Torah which render the services of some groups virtually unintelligible to others. A man who has been

praying for many years (perhaps daily, certainly weekly) according to one prayer tradition, will be severely disconcerted by an unfamiliar service. In addition, Yemenite synagogue practice differs in certain other ways from that of other communities. To cite just a few examples: each Yemenite man is expected to read directly from the Torah himself; boys aged only six or seven years are called up to read from the Torah; and the Onkelos Aramaic translation of the Torah is still read aloud along with the Hebrew. There are many other differences of style and emphasis which account for the fact that their synagogues, and those of some other communities, are distinct and homogeneous. Younger Yemenites who have participated in Ashkenazi and Sephardi services in the religious public schools or in the army generally prefer to return to their own familiar style of worship.

The community is the setting for other activities linked to Judaism and to specific Yemenite practice.[19] Very often on the Sabbath, or when there is an appropriate festival, or the celebration of a wedding, a ritual circumcision, or the donation of a Torah scroll to a synagogue, a group of men (and sometimes younger women) gather at a home, around tables, to eat and drink and sing religious songs from the major Yemenite book of poetry and song, the *diwan*. They might also listen to a layman or a rabbi delivering a moral lesson or sermon. There is a distinct etiquette and form to these gatherings, called *ja'ale*, which have a sacred element, but they sometimes also become quite lively. *Ja'ale* are apparently increasing in popularity among younger people and are of considerable importance for the maintenance of ethnically-based interaction, arts, and values. An important recurrent activity, especially for women and girls, is the party given before weddings when henna is ceremonially put on the hands of the bride and/or groom. Scores of neighbours and kinsmen gather on these occasions; there may be quite a few taking place in a larger community during the popular time for marriage, in late spring, after the Omer period and Shavuoth.[20]

These activities, and the frequent interaction among neighbours who are fellow ethnics (and, frequently, kin as well) form the basis for ethnic awareness and continuity, and provide the setting for the maintenance and development of the music and dance traditions. Beyond the local community, networks of kinsmen and *Landsmann* are maintained throughout the country. People travel to funerals, to visit the bereaved, to attend weddings and henna parties, and sometimes for the duration of the Sabbath or a festival. Important events may bring scores or even hundreds of kinsmen and *Landsmann* from all over Israel.

Yemenite arts in Palestine and Israel

From early in the twentieth century until the 1980s, Yemenite Jews have played a role in the arts of Palestine and Israel which is far out of

proportion to their numbers. As Yehuda Ratzaby and Shalom Staub have pointed out, the Yemenite Jews and their culture offered just what the new artists of Palestine and Israel were looking for: an 'authentically' Jewish tradition, apparently very ancient and rooted in the Middle East and the desert.[21] In their search for materials with which to create a new Jewish, Israeli culture, the musicians, dancers, and artists discovered in their midst a rich tradition of crafts, poetry, music, and dance, rooted in Judaism, and a talented group of creators and performers. If secular socialist administrators and organizers had problems with some aspects of Yemenite behaviour and culture, and some Ashkenazi rabbis and religious teachers were unable to appreciate Yemenite religious tradition, artists, romantics, and those in search of sources for a new and truly Jewish art seized upon and supported the arts of the Yemenites.

In the 1920s Bracha Tsfira, a Jerusalem-born Yemenite, became the 'first national folk singer' of the Palestinian Jewish community, creating and singing music based on Yemenite and other Middle Eastern sources, sometimes with the collaboration of European-born musicians and composers, whom she influenced in turn.[22] Thus began a long and continuing tradition of adapting Yemenite music for the general public. Apparently it was Bracha Tsfira's performances which inspired the Russian-born ballerina Rina Nikova to found and develop the 'Biblical Ballet' (later called 'Yemenite Ballet'), using Yemenite dance movements and motifs. One of Nikova's leading dancers, the Yemenite Rachel Nadav, in turn created some of the early Israeli folk-dances.[23]

When the folk-dance movement began in the early 1940s, a young Yemenite composer, Sara Levi-Tannai, played a central role. She had been educated from an early age as an orphan in institutions and had worked in a kibbutz among Ashkenazim, but she increasingly sought her roots in Yemenite tradition and, together with other young Yemenites, formed folk-dance groups.[24] In 1950 she founded *Inbal*, the first Israeli dance group to come to international prominence; it had support from the Histadrut (the General Federation of Labour), the American–Israel Cultural Foundation, and the Ministry of Education.

Today Yemenite dance movements form an important part of the folk-dance tradition of Israel, and songs based on Yemenite religious poetry and using Yemenite musical themes (perhaps adapted by western-trained composers for western ears) are a vital part of Israeli culture in a way that no other non-European tradition is. Similarly, much of the craft work which is accepted today as 'Israeli' is of Yemenite origin — especially embroidery, basketry, and metal work. Yemenite artisans participated from the outset in the Bezalel School of Arts and Crafts, which was founded in 1906. Today, organizations such as Maskit and WIZO aid in the development and marketing of fashions

and handicrafts and continue to encourage Yemenite and non-Yemenite artists and artisans. Clearly, there have been reciprocal relations between Yemenite and Ashkenazi Jews in the arts, especially in adaptations for stage performances and for a wider, non-Yemenite audience.[25] The reception of Yemenite arts in Palestine and Israel has certainly had a considerable effect on the development of Yemenite pride.

THE ORGANIZATION OF YEMENITE ETHNICITY

A. *Political organization and activity*

Given the ideology of Jewish national unity and integration, it is not surprising that ethnic politics are generally frowned upon. Nevertheless, there have been ethnically-based parties in the past which contested the nationwide elections for the *Knesset*, for representation on the directorate of the Histadrut, and sometimes at local elections. As recently as 1977, a Yemenite party entered a list in the *Knesset* elections. During the days of Ottoman rule and throughout the period of the British Mandate, the various ethnic and religious communities of Palestine had their own organizations and representation recognized by the authorities.[26] As early as the 1880s, the Yemenite immigrants in Jerusalem discovered that their interests would not be looked after satisfactorily by the organization of the Sephardim, who were then the Jewish élite. From the beginning there were disputes about the amount of financial aid which the poor Yemenite immigrants received from the Sephardi charitable organization (*kolel*) — to whose funds the Jews from Yemen had contributed. There have been several Yemenite pressure groups and political parties since the first decades of this century.[27] Although the impetus came from within the Yemenite community, some of these were supported or stimulated by other agencies, such as the political parties, the Histadrut, and the World Zionist Organization, either to try to serve the needs of their Yemenite constituents or to use them in the competition for votes. We must assume that the manipulation was mutually advantageous.

According to Hannah Herzog, an organization of young Yemenites participated in the elections to the first Delegates Assembly in 1911, under the auspices of the early Zionist socialist organization, *Hapoel Hatsair*.[28] A Yemenite list competed in the elections for the directorate of the Histadrut from the 1920s and still does, along with the ideologically-based political parties. In 1923, a general Committee of Yemenites was formed under the auspices of the World Zionist Organization; Herzog states that its aim was to meet the requests of individual Yemenites for aid, but it apparently became a more general political rights organization.[29]

After the establishment of the state, an independent Yemenite party contested the first national elections in 1949. Although Yemenites constituted approximately 8 per cent of the total population, they received only about one per cent of the votes, entitling them to one seat in the *Knesset* (which has a total of 120). In 1951, with 40,000 more Yemenites in the country, the party received 1.2 per cent of the votes cast (7,965) and again won one *Knesset* seat.[30] Never again would any Yemenite party do as well, although Yemenites have remained no lower than 5 per cent of the population.

It is clear that many Yemenites associated their political fortunes with the main parties. Many generally voted Labour, since they are workers and members of the Histadrut; there has long been a connection between the Yemenites and the Labour movement. Others are attracted to the National Religious Party (NRP), not only because of their concern for orthodox Judaism, but because they send their children to religious schools, which are deeply involved with that party. Various links have been forged between the NRP and some Yemenite communities during the past 30 years. Other Yemenites vote for the more 'nationalist' party, Herut/Likud, not only because of current political concerns but because some pre-State Yemenite settlers in the 1940s had joined the forerunner of Herut, the Irgun Zvai Leumi.[31] Finally, since the establishment of the state there has been a certain stigmatization of ethnic politics, which are regarded as destructive separatism, 'betraying the idea of the melting pot, or the integration of the exiles'.[32]

During the 1977 *Knesset* elections, the only *explicitly* ethnic party was the Yemenite party, Bet Yisrael;[33] its list consisted of 43 candidates, from 16 communities around the country, and included six teachers, six clerks, four diamond cutters, four independent businessmen, four lawyers, two jurists, two accountants, an artist, a welder, and a carpenter. (Their occupations were noted on their election posters.) Their platform was spelled out in an issue of the Yemenite monthly *Afikim*.[34] Claiming that there were then more than 200,000 people of Yemenite origin in Israel who not only shared a past but common problems in the present and hopes for the future, they promised to serve both the people and the state of Israel, as well as the Yemenite *edah*. Their primary concerns would be:

1. To work to lessen the social and economic gap between the prosperous and the poor, the Ashkenazim and the immigrants from Afro-Asian countries, and to strive for complete integration, *mizug galuyot*.

2. To work for equal status of Yemenite rabbis with Ashkenazi and Sephardi rabbis. (This is an old and continuing concern of the Yemenite community.)

3. To fight discriminatory practices by government and public institutions.

4. To work for improved access to such benefits as scholarships for study, mortgages, and pensions.

5. To concern themselves, as *Knesset* members, with religion and religious education, and to support education in the values which are derived from Jewish religious tradition and from the Yemenite cultural and spiritual heritage.

6. To safeguard the rights of the Jewish people to the whole of Eretz Yisrael, maintain the unity of Jerusalem and the unity of the Jewish people, and oppose withdrawal from Yehuda and Shomron (the West Bank).

Moreover, they would foster the Yemenite heritage in the schools, through publications and the media. They would seek to establish projects for religious education, education in the Yemenite heritage, and would encourage the development of scholarship funds, conferences, a museum, and a Yemenite Culture House.

In the 1977 general election, there were only 9,505 votes for Bet Yisrael out of the 1,771,726 cast, and the party failed to win a single seat in the *Knesset*.[35] Nor did the other (disguised) ethnic lists fare any better. Clearly, ethnic voting within the Jewish population of Israel is not well supported, and electors make their decisions in terms of other more general values; perhaps they are simply realistic about the chances of success of ethnic parties in competition with the major ones: Labour, the Likud, and the National Religious Party,[36]

B. *Social and cultural ethnicity*

The Yemenite heritage and culture are nowadays flourishing at the local, regional, and national levels. In addition to the celebrations within communities mentioned previously, there are conferences; elaborate shows presenting Yemenite music, costumes, themes, and dance; sabbath 'retreats' devoted to the problems and culture of Yemenite Israelis; and organized celebrations on such (non-solemn) holidays as Hanukkah, Purim, and Lag Ba-Omer. Some of these activities are initiated by local organizers while others are arranged by the leaders of national Yemenite associations. Some are stimulated by the Ministry of Education, local community centres, or schools, while others may be sponsored by the Yemenite section of political organizations. Whatever the stimulus, they depend upon Yemenite traditions, the existence of skilled performers, lecturers, and leaders within the Yemenite community, and an audience, primarily of Yemenites, ready to attend with enthusiasm.

An example of such a programme was an evening of Yemenite music and dance arranged by a group of students at the Technion in Haifa in

1977. The 1,000-seat auditorium was almost filled, with a paying audience not only of students and other young people, but also older persons. The programme featured six different dance groups, each from a different town or *moshav*, and a young male singing duo who are prominent pop recording stars. The performers enacted tales or scenes of life in Yemen, such as the typical *shabbat* activities, often ending with a henna ceremony or a wedding scene which gave them the opportunity to exhibit their drumming, singing, and dancing skills. Although there were only a few themes, there were many variations in costume, melodies, rhythms, and dance styles. After the performance, the audience was invited to partake of Yemenite baked goods and delicacies, and to join in dancing to Yemenite music.

Another popular organized activity, aimed particularly at young and middle-aged couples, involves spending the Sabbath weekend at a hotel or kibbutz resort. (This is quite common in Israel generally.) Those week-ends sponsored by Yemenite organizations for their members typically involve prayer services for the men (on Friday night and Saturday morning), with *ja'ale* sessions and perhaps lectures during *shabbat*, and spare time for private meetings and conversation. They normally wind up with entertainment and Yemenite dancing on Saturday night. Thirty to fifty couples may participate in such a weekend.

The Association for the Cultivation of [Yemenite] Society and Culture in Israel organized a picnic for Independence Day in 1976; it was attended by about 10,000 persons. The small forest on the outskirts of Hadera was filled with the tents of people who came from all over the country. They were of all ages; whole families and large groups from particular communities were represented. A stage was set up with a sound system, and a parade of nationally prominent and lesser-known musicians, entertainers, and politicians performed. People ate, talked, danced, and smoked the *narghila*.

In addition to such activities, associations organize lecture programmes. 'Afikim', an organization dedicated to 'spiritual and social revival, the defence of rights, and *mizug galuyot*', publishes its own periodical devoted to these topics and supports the publication of books about Yemenite culture and history, as well as fiction. There is a growing body of Yemenite writers who devote themselves to their history, Hebrew language usage, and literature. There are also drama workshop groups run by young Yemenites for children and teenagers. They often stress the past history of discrimination and the struggle of the early Yemenite settlers in Palestine.

c. *The role of Yemenite music*

At the centre of many of these activities lies Yemenite music. There are several traditional musical styles that are important within the

community. One genre consists of songs dealing with love, sung in Arabic by women at henna ceremonies. Women also beat drums and dance to these songs. Another traditional style involves men who sing, in Hebrew and Arabic, songs based on the sacred poetry of Yemenite poets, especially Shalom Shabazi, a seventeenth-century writer. A third is the male drumming and singing to accompany male dancing.

Yemenite communities have many members who can sing, drum, and dance in the traditional genres; they teach the young, sometimes in formally organized choruses. But there is another music these days, produced by Yemenite poets, composers, and performers who take the old melodies and the traditional poems and either create wholly new compositions, or modernize the old ones, often orchestrating them in the manner of current Greek popular music. As in earlier periods, Yemenite music is still being adapted for general Israeli tastes and presented through the media and on records. But there are new tendencies. Whereas previously Yemenite music was adapted to conform more to European orchestrations and European-based Israeli folk music, young Yemenite musicians today, sometimes together with other musicians of Middle Eastern origin, are creating a new music utilizing Mediterranean instruments and orchestrations. This new music (available on records and cassettes) is becoming very popular, especially with young people of Asian and African background. There are many popular Yemenite singers, male and female, whose songs the children and teenagers know well and can imitate. They are increasingly in demand, forming ensembles, playing at concerts, and appearing on television and at the events organized by the associations as well as in the new nightclubs which have recently sprung up featuring Yemenite music and entertainment.

Finally, Yemenite dancing is increasingly popular among Yemenite teenagers. As Shalom Staub states; 'Many of these young people are proud of their identity, and their dancing is one way they express their ethnic awareness. It separates them from the other ethnic communities in Israel and binds them together as Yemenites with common roots and a common experience'.[37] Although the most popular dances are very simple, the young are increasingly drawn to more difficult and 'authentic' dances.

Conclusion

Despite the original ideology of Israel's leaders and the optimism regarding complete integration, the realities of the ethnic mosaic in Israel and an awareness of ethnic revivals in the 1960s in Western countries have led to an increasing realization in Israel that ethnic groups need recognition and 'status honour' (to use Max Weber's phrase). In the 1960s, if not earlier, there were debates in the *Knesset* on

the subject of the equality of the ethnic communities, and of the need for mutual respect.[38] At some point the educational establishment realized that it had been a mistake not to give due respect in the schools and in society at large to the traditions of the various *edot*. By 1974 the pendulum had swung, and directives went out to encourage and help to develop an appreciation of those traditions. Funds were appropriated, conferences were arranged, and training sessions organized in an effort to introduce these new elements into the schools and the community centres, formally and informally. However, much of this is quite artificial and forced. There are many ethnic groups, and not all of them are interested in their heritage, at least at present. Nor are all traditions equally adaptable. Therefore, because they are readily available and well known, teachers and administrators turn — again and again — to the Yemenites. They are ready, able, and willing. Jews from Libya or Morocco or Egypt, however, may not feel satisfied that *their* traditions have been represented. Despite the popular use of the term *Edot ha-Mizrach* ('Communities of the East', or 'Orientals'), the cultures and traditions of those various groups are not necessarily similar, and the Yemenite traditions are almost as different from others in Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East as they are from those of the Ashkenzim.

This is not to say that other ethnic groups do not have significant traditions of their own, of which they are proud and which they can develop. One recent immigrant group, the Jews from Soviet Georgia, have well-organized music and dance groups. The Georgians have been supported by the Histadrut, and competing political parties. Tunisians, especially those from the island of Djerba, have a well-developed religious tradition, but it is not readily adaptable for wider consumption and display.[39]

Yemenite traditions are particularly adaptable because they are so distinctly *Jewish*. Except for the women's love songs, Yemenite music and dance are based almost entirely on Jewish religious themes. In contrast, belly dancing, favoured by Moroccans, is clearly *not* religious in intent and does not lend itself to school performances or those organized through the auspices of the Ministry of Religions. Similarly, although there are young Indian Jews with training in Indian classical dance, it can be embarrassing to have them dance to tales of Lord Krishna before an audience of devout Jews. Yemenite arts present no such problems.

Israeli Yemenites are increasing the pace of their upward mobility: they have risen in occupational status, in educational achievement, and in political prominence and influence. Despite all these changes, which involve them with members of Israel's other ethnic groups, a large proportion of Israel's Yemenites continue to participate in very distinctive ethnically-based social relations and activities. Yemenite

culture is undergoing a revival and a creative expansion — contrary both to the older official establishment ideology and to the current critical perceptions of Israeli ethnic integration.[40]

The present condition of Yemenite culture and ethnicity in Israel strongly suggests that the bleak view of *mizug galuyot* as 'Ashkenization' or 'deculturation' needs reconsideration and modification. The reality is much more complex and varied than the critics allow. Although the Yemenites are unusual in the extent to which they have maintained and built upon their ethnic heritage, they are by no means unique. Ethnic communities are found throughout Israel, as are ethnically-based synagogues, organizations, and patterns of social relations. There is increasing evidence of social and cultural as well as political ethnicity.[41] Unfortunately, most social scientists have not paid sufficient attention to these manifestations because they have been working within the framework of the assimilation/acculturation model or the marginalization/deculturation perspective. It is time for a fresh look at the actual (and potential) condition of the many varied cultures and heritages in Israel today.

Acknowledgements

The research on which this paper is based was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation of the United States. I wish to thank Sidney Greenfield, Lisa Gilad, Marcia Lewis, and Arnold Strickon for suggestions and criticism, and Judith Alter for materials on the dance in Israel. Ovadiah Ben-Yosef of the *Aguda* gave me outstanding support and encouragement in 1981–82.

NOTES

[1] Henry Toledano, 'Time to Stir the Melting Pot', in Michael Curtis and Mordecai Chertoff, eds., *Israel: Social Structure and Change*, New Brunswick, NJ, 1973, p. 335.

[2] Michael Seltzer, *The Aryanization of the Jewish State*, New York, 1967.

[3] Nissim Rejwan, 'From Mixing to Participation', *The New Middle East*, May 1971.

[4] Sammy Smooha, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978; Sherry Rosen, 'Intermarriage and the "Blending of Exiles" in Israel', *Research in Race and Ethnic Relations*, vol. 3, 1982, pp. 79–102; Arnold Lewis, 'Phantom Ethnicity: "Oriental Jews" in Israeli Society', to be published in Alex Weingrod, ed., *Studies in Israeli Ethnicity: After the Ingathering*, New York.

[5] This paper is based on research carried out in Israel in 1975–77 and during several subsequent shorter visits. The major field research was centred on a community of approximately 1500 Yemenite Jews within an ethnically

heterogeneous town of 25,000. Information derived from that community was supplemented through involvement in the nationwide networks of its members. By accompanying friends and informants to their kinsmen and *Landsmann* around the country, and going with them to weddings, funerals, ethnic festivals, holiday celebrations, etc., I was able to see Yemenite life and activities throughout the country. Unless noted otherwise, the data in this paper are derived from field observations and the statements of informants.

[6] Aharon Amir, 'Intercommunal Problems', *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, vol. 9, p. 505.

[7] David Ben-Gurion, quoted in J. Isaac, 'Israel — A New Melting Pot?' in W. D. Borrie, ed., *Cultural Integration of Immigrants*, UNESCO, Paris, 1959, p. 266.

[8] Cf. Shlomo Deshen, *Immigrant Voters in Israel: Parties and Congregations in a Local Election Campaign*, Manchester, 1970, p. 215.

[9] See *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, No. 31, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, 1980, p. 83.

[10] See Deshen, op. cit., passim.

[11] For example, the Dalia Folkdance Festivals were occasions when Bukharan, Yemenite, Kurdish, Druze, and Bedouin dances were performed.

[12] See Raphael Patai, *Israel Between East and West*, Philadelphia, 1953, pp. 323–32.

[13] Shlomo D. Goitein, 'Portrait of a Yemenite Weaver's Village', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 17, no. 1, 1955, pp. 3–26.

[14] See, for example, Yosef Tobi, *The Jews of Yemen in the 19th Century* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1976, pp. 118 ff.; and Yehuda Nini, 'Immigration and Assimilation: the Yemenite Jews', *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 21, Fall 1981, pp. 91–98.

[15] Although the airlift is frequently called 'Operation Magic Carpet', many Yemenites today prefer to think of it as 'On Wings of Eagles'. The latter phrase is associated with the line from Exodus 19:4, '. . . I bore you on eagles' wings and brought you unto Myself', while the former is connected with an alien magical tradition. Cf. Nini, op. cit., p. 97.

[16] *Statistical Abstract*, 1980, op. cit., p. 59.

[17] The size of these communities ranges from a few hundred on the *moshavim* to 12,000 in Rosh Ha'Ayin. For more on Yemenite communities, see Herbert S. Lewis, *After the Eagles Landed: Culture and Ethnicity Among the Yemenites of Israel*, forthcoming.

[18] The expression *histapkut b'mu'at*, 'contentment with little', may meet with scorn and sarcasm these days from some Yemenites who have come to see it as a useful rationalization for those in the establishment to *grant* them little. Nevertheless, it has long served to refer to a widely recognized attitude, the willingness and ability to control consumption, to be frugal and thrifty. Even those who resent the implications generally accept the accuracy of the characterization.

[19] For a fuller discussion of community activities see Herbert S. Lewis, 'Ethnicity, Culture and Adaptation Among Yemenites in a Heterogeneous Community', to be published in Weingrod, ed., op. cit.

[20] Henna parties provide employment opportunities for women who are hired to beat drums and sing, and for women who own and rent out the elaborate costumes for the bride and groom.

[21] See Yehuda Ratzaby, '[Yemenite] Settlement in Erez Israel', *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, vol. 16, pp. 755–56; and Shalom Staub, 'An Inquiry into the Nature of Yemenite Jewish Dance', *Essays in Dance Research*, Dance Research Annual, No. IX, 1978.

[22] *Encylopaedia Judaica*, 'Zefira, Brachah', vol. 16, p. 967.

[23] Judith Brin Ingber, 'The Russian Ballerina and the Yemenites', *Israel Dance 1975*, Tel Aviv, February 1976.

[24] Sara Levi-Tannai, quoted in *Shorashim: The Roots of Israeli Folk Dance*, by Judith Brin Ingber, Dance Perspectives, No. 59, New York, 1974.

[25] For example, the choreographer Gurit Kadmon organized a project for the recording of traditional dances of Israeli communities, and she and others have helped groups to preserve and perform these dances. See Ingber, *Shorashim*, op. cit., p. 54.

[26] See Albert M. Hyamson, *Palestine Under the Mandate, 1920–1948*, London, 1950, pp. 38, 104–05.

[27] See Moshe Tsadok, *History and Customs of the Jews in Yemen* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1967, pp. 230–31.

[28] See Hannah Herzog, 'Ethnic Political Identity: The Ethnic Lists to the Delegates Assembly and the Knesset, 1920–1977', in Weingrod, ed., op. cit.

[29] Patai, op. cit., pp. 204–05.

[30] Ibid, p. 204.

[31] See Percy S. Cohen, 'Alignments and Allegiance in the Community of Shaarayim in Israel', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 4, No. 1, June 1962, p. 23.

[32] Herzog, in Weingrod, ed., op. cit., p. 8.

[33] One party list was heavily Iraqi in origin but did not offer an explicit ethnic appeal. The 'Black Panthers' movement split into three parties, one joining with the New Communists, which is heavily (though not exclusively) Arab. Although the 'Black Panthers' are predominantly Moroccan, their appeal is to the poor and downtrodden in general.

[34] *Afikim*, May 1977, pp. 12–13.

[35] If there were 125,000 or more voters of Yemenite origin, 9505 is not an impressive total, although it was triple what they received in 1973!

[36] See Rael Jean Isaac on the 'failure of ethnic parties'. Isaac, *Party and Politics in Israel*, New York and London, 1981, pp. 189 ff. In the 1981 elections, a party appealing to North African voters, Tami, succeeded in obtaining three seats in the *Knesset*. It remains to be seen whether this is the beginnng of a trend or just a short-lived phenomenon.

[37] Staub, op. cit., pp. 162–63.

[38] See, for example, David Ben-Gurion, *Israel: A Personal History*, translated by N. Meyers and U. Nystar, New York, 1971, pp. 710 ff.

[39] Shlomo Deshen has dealt with these aspects of Southern Tunisian ethnicity; see his 'Political Ethnicity and Cultural Ethnicity in Israel During the 1960s', in Abner Cohen, ed., *Urban Ethnicity*, London, 1974; and 'Ethnic Boundaries and Cultural Paradigms: The Case of Southern Tunisian Immigrants in Israel', *Ethos*, vol. 4, no. 3, 1976.

[40] Elsewhere I have attempted to demonstrate that Yemenites in Israel retain more than just a conscious attachment to traditions and arts. Many are guided in significant ways by a set of Yemenite values and attitudes, and to some

degree look to fellow Yemenites as their 'significant others'. See Lewis, 'Ethnicity, Culture and Adaptation', and *After the Eagles Landed . . .*, op. cit.

[41] Observers sometimes look upon the resurrection of ethnic festivals such as the Kurdish *saharane* and the Moroccan *mimouna* and *hilulot* (pilgrimages to the tombs of revered rabbis) as paradoxical evidence of the very weakening of 'real' ethnicity. Alex Weingrod contends that ethnic distinctiveness, as manifested in such celebrations, 'can become emphasized precisely since they are no longer considered to be dangerous or a threat to social harmony' (Weingrod, 'Recent Trends in Israeli Ethnicity', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 2, No. 1, 1979, p. 60). But it may well be, however, that such celebrations are the beginning of significant 'revivals'.

JEWISH URBAN RESIDENCE IN THE POLISH COMMONWEALTH IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

Gershon David Hundert

THE Jewish quarter has a long history. Philo reported that two of the five 'quarters' of Alexandria in the first half of the first century were predominantly Jewish, and many other Hellenistic cities are known to have had Jewish districts. In the early days of Ashkenazi settlement in Western Europe, there was a Judengasse in Regensburg by 1020, in Köln by about 1070, and in Speyer and Worms before the end of the eleventh century.[1] This was probably in accordance with the practice of the period, when there would be demarcations according to trade, profession, and ethnic group. Ideally in the medieval town, the tanners, the smiths, the Lombards, and the Jews, for example, would each have a street. The reality, to be sure, was more complex. It was not at all uncommon for non-Jews to live in the Judengasse. There is a rabbinic responsum that a mezuzah need not be placed on the gates of the Jewish quarter of Worms because non-Jews also resided there. It is known, to cite one other example of this same phenomenon, that non-Jews lived in the London Jewry.[2]

When, in the late Middle Ages, legislation restricting the Jews to particular quarters was first promulgated, the initiative came not from the Church, as might have been expected, but from secular authorities:[3]

> Except perhaps in . . . Poland, . . . the ecclesiastical authorities rarely took the initiative, but often merely followed the lead of Christian rulers or masses reinforced by the wishes of the Jews themselves.

It is precisely the Polish situation which will be addressed here.

In 1267, a Polish Church synod meeting at Wrocław (Breslau) did indeed decree:[4]

> Jews . . . must not dwell indiscriminately among the Christians but should possess contiguous or adjoining houses in a separate location of each city or village. It should be arranged that the Jewish quarter be divided from the common habitation of the Christians by a fence, a wall or a ditch . . .

Although the concerns of churchmen may have had some influence, it seems likely that a more decisive factor was the settlement of German colonists who populated the towns of Poland in the late medieval period according to the pattern of the traditional socio-topography of the German town. A 'Judengasse' is mentioned in Cracow as early as 1304, and the segregationist pattern also existed in the other large Crown cities such as Poznań and Lwów.[5] During the early modern period, however, the socio-topographic picture became much more complex.[6]

Legislation and regulation

As the fifteenth century ended, the role of the towns in the economic life of the Polish Commonwealth assumed increasing importance while at the same time the Jewish population was growing at an accelerating rate. Christian merchants of the leading cities began to take steps with a view to eliminating or reducing Jewish competition. As early as 1485 the heads of the Jewish community of Cracow, 'freely and without coercion', signed a document stating that they undertook to give up virtually all forms of commercial activity and to restrict themselves almost exclusively to lending money against pledges.[7] Evidently, though, the Jews did not desist from commercial activities and, on the pretext of a fire for which the Jews were blamed, they were expelled from Cracow proper in 1495. Thereafter, they lived in what became an exclusively Jewish section of the suburban town of Kazimierz. Particularly during the sixteenth century, but also during the subsequent two centuries, dozens of towns — including major centres like Lublin, Warsaw, and Wilno (Vilna) — attempted to exclude Jews from residence in their jurisdictions. In the course of the sixteenth century, Polish monarchs gave more than 50 localities the right to exclude Jews, usually referred to as *de non tolerandis Judaeis*.[8]

These edicts should not be understood as expulsions after the West European pattern. As Jacob Goldberg has shown, only in a very few cases did they result in the total exclusion of Jews. In Crown cities, Jews could be excluded only from areas under the city's direct jurisdiction so that frequently they were found living on the holdings of the Starosta (literally, 'elder', a district official appointed by the king), or in the so-called *jurydyki* and *libertacje* (jurisdictional enclaves belonging to noblemen or clergymen).[9] Moreover, in the course of the seventeenth century the enforcement of these privileges of exclusion was often abandoned. An example of the ineffectiveness of such privileges is the case of the town of Piątek. It was owned by the archbishop of Gniezno and Jews were prohibited from residing there. They settled near the town in a gentry-owned village, Pokrzywnica, which became the commercial centre of the town and the site of the weekly market.[10] Many towns which had the right *de non tolerandis Judaeis* made specific

allowance for Jews to be admitted on market and fair days. Such provisions were made, for example, in Toruń, Gdańsk and Wrocław.[11] Other towns, while not excluding Jews entirely, placed limits on the number of dwellings they could inhabit. In many of these cases, also, the restrictions lost their effectiveness in the course of the seventeenth century. In Chęciny, for example, the Jews were ordered in 1588 not to increase the number of homes they owned; in 1597 they were not permitted to erect a synagogue; and in 1602 they were forbidden again to purchase homes in the town or to rent buildings in the market place. Yet the survey (*lustracja*) of 1661 recorded the devout wish of the municipality that the Jews, the majority of whom had left the town because of a recent plague, would soon return. In 1669, the Jews of Chęciny received a royal privilege entitling them to build houses anywhere in the town including the market-place, to have a cemetery, to erect a synagogue, and to trade as they pleased in the town.[12]

As was then the case with radical exclusionary policies, less extreme restrictions regarding where, within the towns, Jews could live, lost much of their force in the seventeenth century. In some towns, for example, attempts had been made not to allow Jews to rent shops or houses in the *rynek* (from the German 'ring' — the street encircling the central market-place), as in the case of Chęciny. Jan Tarnowski forbade Jews to settle in the *rynek* in Tarnopol in 1550; and there were similar prohibitions in Parczew (1569), Łuków (1589), and Zaklików (1602).[13] However, by 1625, despite the prohibition, Jews owned six houses in the *rynek* in Tarnopol while an early seventeenth-century prohibition against Jewish settlement in the *rynek* in Żółkiew was being ignored by 1680. Indeed, there was an identifiable tendency for Jews to settle in the *rynek* of many Polish towns where they lived among the Christians. This was characteristic particularly of smaller towns.[14]

Residential patterns

In Opole (Lubelskie), Bełżyce, and Lubartów, the town records of property transfers reveal that, particularly during the first half of the seventeenth century, Jews and Catholics lived interspersed, frequently in the *rynek*. The earliest Jewish settlers in Kraśnik purchased homes in the *rynek*. An inventory of the town in 1631 showed that Jews lived in 28 houses; nine of these were in the Jewish street where there were three other houses inhabited by Christians, while ten were in the market-place or in Lublin Street where the majority of houses belonged to Christians.

In Opole in 1622, a *kahal* elder bought a home in the *rynek* between two Christian neighbours. The 1688 inventory of the town showed that out of the total of 19 houses owned by Jews, 15 were in the *rynek*, where there was an almost equivalent number of houses (13) owned by non-

Jews. The register of Modliborzyce of 1735 similarly showed that most of the town's Jews lived among Gentiles in the *rynek*. In Kraśnik, the wealthiest Jews lived in a street where most of the residents were non-Jews; and this was also the case in Bełżyce.[15] In Lubartów, most Jews lived in ulica Lubelska, the street connecting the old market-place to the new one.[16]

Salo Baron has remarked, however, that 'Jews residing in Cracow or Grodno, in Brest or Kalisz continued living in the old Ashkenazic way — dwelling in quarters of their own'.[17] This is true of some of the larger cities and even of some of the smaller towns. In Opatów, for example, an inventory carried out in 1721 showed that only six houses out of a total of 110 owned by Jews were outside the Jewish *miasto* ('town') and that not one Christian lived in a Jewish street.[18] The separation of the places of residence of Jews and Christians was enforced both by the town owner and by the *kahal*. Still, it should be pointed out that even in some of the large Crown cities the implementation of the rule of residential segregation was ignored by the *szlachta* (gentry), who permitted Jewish residence in the *jurydyki*. For example, the basic privilege of the Jewish community of Wilno, issued in 1633, strictly limited Jewish residence to a particular district. Twelve years later, 21 Jewish houses were within the designated area and 15 were outside it. Many of these were in *jurydyki*. Still, the 'official' streets were the heart of the Jewish community and the location of its institutions.[19] There was a similar pattern in Lublin where many Jews lived in the numerous *jurydyki* and not in the Jewish town outside the walls. This occurred despite the fact that like the Jewish communities in Poznań and Cracow (Kazimierz), the Jews of Lublin and Wilno had obtained a right tantamount to a provision *de non tolerandis Christianis* in their specific districts. In the case of Wilno the privilege meant that any Christian who acquired a house in the Jewish quarter was forbidden to live in it. He had to rent or re-sell it to Jews. If there was no buyer, the *kahal* was obliged to purchase it. In the case of Lublin, the privilege seems to have been a guarantee of hereditary possession of their homes and real estate in Podzamcze, the area of the Jewish quarter. In Cracow, by contrast, only a small number of Jews lived in *jurydyki*.[20]

There were several factors which determined the socio-topography of Jewish communities in the Polish Commonwealth in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and which were responsible for the changes that occurred. Roughly speaking, during the sixteenth century the principal factor was the competition between burghers and Jews and the attempts of the former to limit Jewish residence. These attempts generally did not meet with success, though at times Jewish residence was indeed temporarily or partially limited. A second factor was the combination of Jewish demographic expansion with the depopulation and agrarianization of the urban Christian inhabitants, a process

which began around 1620. These developments were accelerated by the disastrous events at mid-century (the Chmielnicki revolt and the subsequent Russian and Swedish invasions) and the apparently rather rapid Jewish recovery thereafter. The consequence of these tendencies was the emergence, particularly in the eighteenth century, of the 'Jewish town' where sometimes as much as 40 to 60 per cent of the population was Jewish. Particularly in the south-eastern parts of the country, the magnate town owners encouraged the agrarianization of the Christian population, which consequently tended to gravitate towards the outskirts of the towns.

A special case would be the effect on patterns of residence of the fortified synagogues built mainly during the seventeenth century in these same border regions. They had very thick walls and cannon and rifle sites on the roofs and were built outside the city walls. The Jews' residences in such cases tended to cluster around the synagogue.[21] A final factor was the penetration of the cities by the *szlachta* and the consequent creation of numerous jurisdictional enclaves which, as mentioned, at times served to shelter Jews from exclusionary municipal legislation.[22]

By the third quarter of the eighteenth century, Jews accounted for about half of the urban population of Poland–Lithuania and were the dominant element in many towns. The result seems to have been the further diffusion of the Jewish population within the towns. Recent research by Murray J. Rosman on the Jews in the Sieniawski-Czartoryski holdings reveals the following statistics. In Międzyboż, where in 1730 about 30 per cent of the householders were Jews, 40 per cent of those lived next door to at least one Christian. In Sieniawa in 1734, 57 per cent of the householders were Jews, and 26 per cent of them had at least one Christian neighbour. In Staszów in 1733, almost 16 per cent of the householders were Jews, and 58 per cent of them had at least one Christian neighbour. In Szkłów in 1727, about 20 per cent of the householders were Jews, and at least 44 per cent of them had one or more Christian neighbours.[23] In the older and larger town of Lublin, by contrast, in 1764 Jews lived in eight streets in the Jewish town, and Christians dwelt in only one of those streets.[24] However, these data are as yet insufficient to serve as the basis for generalization about the whole country. Regional differences, in particular, must be investigated further.

During the eighteenth century, magnate town owners sometimes tried to institute separate Jewish and Christian districts in their towns. This occurred, for example, in Opole (Lubelskie) in 1781. Occasionally, residence in new towns was limited exclusively to Jews.[25] These attempts at 'urban planning' were one dimension of the myriad political and economic reforms proposed and occasionally implemented during the last years of the independent Polish Commonwealth.

We do not yet know whether the image of the overcrowded Jewish quarter in Poland is true only of some large and old-established Jewish communities such as that of Poznań. The only possible demographic computations for Jews at that period are based on hearth taxes; these were usually assessed by household, but occasionally by house. There is considerable debate about the average number of Jews in one house in the Polish Commonwealth; but there does seem to have been a marked tendency for them to live in multi-family houses. In Opatów in 1788, 73 per cent of the Jews — but only 29 per cent of the Christians — lived in such houses. In Stryków in 1784, 76 per cent of the Jews lived in houses of four to five rooms while 80 per cent of the Christians lived in houses of two to three rooms. (In a small Polish town, it was extremely rare at that period for a single family to live in more than three rooms.) In Lutomiersk in 1787, 65 per cent of the Jews lived in multi-family houses. In Lublin in 1764, however, Jews lived mainly in single-family dwellings; but this was exceptional.[26] Was this multi-family occupation pattern, if it was in fact characteristic of the Jews, a consequence of legislative restrictions, or a preference on the part of the Jews, or was it perhaps a sign of their impoverishment? These are essential questions which await a diligent researcher. One scholar has suggested that while the houses of Jews tended to be larger and to accommodate more than one household, they also tended to be less well-built. This observation applies to the period roughly 1650–1800, when there was very considerable geographic mobility among Polish Jews.[27] For the earlier period, there is evidence of a tendency to build expensive houses with attention to architectural detail as an expression of high social status.[28]

We do not have sufficient data on the attitude of Polish Jews about their own patterns of settlement, but some information may be gleaned from the enactments of the Jewish communal authorities. The general tendency of a *kahal* was, not surprisingly, to try to maintain the concentration of Jews in Jewish quarters and to forbid the purchase or renting of homes elsewhere in the town. This was both because the physical security of the Jews was best assured through residential concentration and because the authority of a *kahal* would be diminished without such a concentration.[29] There were numerous signs of the diminution of that authority. For example, from the second half of the seventeenth century onward, the *kahal* in Przemyśl had difficulty in collecting communal taxes from the Jews in the town who lived in the *jurydyki*, those jurisdictional enclaves which in other towns protected the Jews from exclusionary municipal legislation.[30]

Conclusion

All the data which have been gathered suggest that patterns of Jewish residence in the cities and towns of the Polish Commonwealth

during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were somewhat diversified. Generally speaking, it is evident that despite opposition from municipal and *kahal* authorities, Jews did not reside exclusively in one particular district or street. Indeed, in many towns there was a pattern of increasing diffusion during the eighteenth century. The extent of this phenomenon must be determined by future research, but meanwhile it is worth considering whether some Jews chose to live further away from a Jewish street or district and in close proximity to Christian residents in the towns of Poland–Lithuania because of a sense of security and self-confidence.*

NOTES

[1] On the development of the residential patterns of Jews, see the voluminous bibliography and insightful comments of Salo W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, Philadelphia, 1952, 1967, vol. I, p. 188; vol. II, pp. 87–96. See also the brief surveys, summaries, and maps in Helmut Veitshans, *Die Judensiedlungen der schwäbischen Reichsstädte und der württemburgischen Landstädte im Mitelalter*, 'Arbeiten zum Historischen Atlas von Südwestdeutschland', fasc. v, vi, Stuttgart, 1970. The standard work on this subject for medieval Germany, however, remains the dissertation by Alexander Pinthus, 'Studien über die bauliche Entwicklung der Judengassen in den deutschen Städten', *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland*, vol. II 1930–31, pp. 101–30, 197–217, 284–300. Cf. Paul Hyams, 'The Jewish Minority in Medieval England, 1066–1290', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 25, nos 3–4, 1974, p. 273.

[2] Moses Isserles, *Responsa* (in Hebrew), Amsterdam, 1711, p. 67b: cited by Majer Balaban, *History of the Jews in Cracow and Kazimierz* (in Polish), vol. I, Cracow, 1931, p. 407. And see H. H. Ben-Sasson, 'The Place of the Community-Town in Jewish History' (in Hebrew), in *The City and the Community* (in Hebrew), Lectures Delivered at the Twelfth Convention of the Historical Society of Israel, Jerusalem, 1967, p. 169.

[3] Baron, op cit., vol. 9, p. 35.

[4] Julius Aronius, *Regesten zur Geschichte der Juden im fränkischen und deutschen Reiche bis zum Jahre 1273*, Berlin, 1887–1902 (reprinted, New York, 1970), no. 704, p. 302.

[5] Non-Jews also lived in the Judengasse in Cracow. Balaban, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 6–7. Crown cities were administered by royal officials and residents had the right of juridical appeal to the king.

[6] For a general view of these problems see Maria Bogucka, 'Die Stadte Polens an der Schwelle zur Neuzeit: Abriss der soziotopographischen Entwicklung', *Die Stadt an der Schwelle zur Neuzeit*, hrsg. von Wilhelm Rausch, Linz/Donau, 1980, pp. 275–91. See also the proceedings of a 1974 symposium on the sociotopography of feudal towns in *Acta Poloniae Historica*, vol. 34, 1976, pp. 5–254.

*A somewhat different version of this paper was presented at a Conference on Jewish Settlement and Community in the Modern Western World, City University of New York, in March 1983.

[7] See Balaban, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 60.

[8] See Mathias Bersohn, *Documents Relating to Jews in Old Poland: Derived from Archival Sources (1388–1782)* (in Polish), Warsaw, 1910, no. 109, p. 79; nos 113, 115, p. 81; no. 160, p. 104; no. 169, p. 108; nos 185, 189, p. 112; no. 545, p. 264. See, also, Jacob Goldberg, 'De Non Tolerandis Judaeis', *Studies in Jewish History Presented to Professor Raphael Mahler*, edited by S. Yeivin, Merhavia, Israel, 1974, p. 39–52.

[9] For cases of Jews living on the holdings of the Starosta, see *Survey of the Voivodship of Sandomierz 1660–1664* (in Polish), Part 1, Cracow, 1971, pp. 4–7; Raphael Mahler, 'On the History of the Jews in Nowy Sącz in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries' (in Polish), *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytut Historyczny* [hereafter *BZIH*], no. 55, 1965, pp. 4–5. For Jews in *jurydyki*, see Jozef Mazurkiewicz, *Juridical Enclaves in Lublin* (in Polish), Wrocław, 1956, pp. 56–57, 99; *Survey of the Voivodship of Lublin 1661* (in Polish), Warsaw, 1962, pp. 127–28; Goldberg, op. cit., p. 43. And see the reference to M. Schorr in Note 30.

[10] Bohdan Baranowski, *Daily Life in a Small Town in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (in Polish), Warsaw, 1975, p. 16.

[11] Majer Balaban, *Jewish History and Literature* (in Polish), vol. 3, Lwów, 1925 (reprinted, Warsaw, 1983), p. 172; Bersohn, op. cit., no. 185, p. 112; no. 214, p. 123; no. 215, p. 124.

[12] Bersohn, op. cit., no. 189, p. 112; no. 205, p. 122; no. 236, p. 132; no. 289, p. 163; *Survey of the Voivodship of Sandomierz 1660–1664*, op. cit., Part 1, pp. 59–61; *Volumina Legum*, vol. 5, St Petersburg, 1860, p. 286. For other, similar, limitations see Bernard Weinryb, *The Jews of Poland*, Philadelphia, 1973, pp. 110–11 (Poznań); *Survey of the Voivodships of Great Poland and Kujawy 1628–1632* (in Polish), Part 1, Wrocław, 1967, p. 161 (Pyzdry), p. 193 (Nakło); Franciszek Błoński, *Five Centuries of the City of Rzeszów* (in Polish), Warsaw, 1958, p. 97; Henryk Rutkowski, 'The Development of Sochaczew from the Thirteenth to the Eighteenth Century' (in Polish), in Henryk Rutkowski, ed., *The History of Sochaczew and the District* (in Polish), Warsaw, 1970, pp. 40, 46; Maurycy Horn, *The Jews of Red Russia in the Sixteenth Century and the First Half of the Seventeenth Century* (in Polish), Warsaw, 1975, p. 47 (Sokal); *Survey of the Voivodship of Sandomierz 1789* (in Polish), Part 2, Wrocław, 1967, p. 81 (Zwoleń); and M. Baliński and T. Lipiński, *Ancient Poland* (in Polish), vol. 2, Warsaw, 1843, p. 435 (Ryczywol).

[13] Elżbieta Horn, 'The Legal and Economic Situation of the Jews in the Towns of the Halicz District at the Turn of the Seventeenth Century' (in Polish), *BZIH*, no. 40, 1961, p. 24; Tomasz Opas, 'The Situation of the Jewish Population in the Private Towns in the Lublin Voivodship in the Eighteenth Century' (in Polish), *BZIH*, no. 67, 1968, p. 9; Melchiorz Buliński, *Monograph on the City of Sandomierz* (in Polish), Warsaw, 1879, pp. 92–93; Janina Morgensztern, 'Abstracts of Entries from the Crown Register Relating to the History of the Jews in Poland, 1588–1632' (in Polish), *BZIH*, no. 51, 1964, no. 56, p. 69; *Survey of the Voivodship of Lublin 1661*, op. cit., p. 57; Mordecai Nadav, 'History of the Community of Pinsk' (in Hebrew), in *Pinsk: A Book of Witness and Memory* (in Hebrew), edited by W. Z. Rabinowitsch, Tel Aviv, 1973, p. 25; and Baron, op. cit., vol. 16, p. 179.

[14] See Nathan Michael Gelber, 'History of the Jews of Żółkiew' (in Hebrew), in *The Żółkiew Book* (in Hebrew), edited by Y. Ben-Shem and N. M. Gelber,

Jerusalem, 1969, column 33; and Solomon Buber, *Sublime City* (in Hebrew), Cracow, 1903, p. 91. See also Maria Stankowa, 'The Decline in the Significance of Lublin' (in Polish), in *The History of Lublin* (in Polish), Lublin, 1965, p. 132. Despite a 1698 prohibition, Jews were living in the *rynek* in Tarnobrzeg by 1705; Cracow, City and Voivodship Archive, Ks. miasta Tarnobrzega, pp. 8, 15.

[15] Lublin, Voivodship Archive, Castrensia Lublinensia Relationes Manifestiones Oblatae, 121/21279. See Gershon Hundert, 'An Advantage to Peculiarity? The Case of the Polish Commonwealth', *Association for Jewish Studies Review*, vol. 6, 1981, pp. 34–35. And see also S. Cynarski, ed., *Raków: Centre of Arianism* (in Polish), Cracow, 1968, pp. 27–28, 46; Jan Pęckowski, *History of the City of Rzeszów* (in Polish), Rzeszów, 1913, pp. 301, 356, 362; N. M. Gelber, *Brody* (in Hebrew), Volume 6 of the series on 'Jewish Metropolises', edited by Y. L. Maimon, Jerusalem, 1955, p. 31; Baranowski, op. cit., p. 113; Władysław Ćwik, 'The Jewish Population in Crown Cities in the Lublin Voivodship in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century' (in Polish), *BZIH*, no. 59, 1966, p. 36; and Baron, op. cit., vol. 16, p. 179.

[16] Zofja Rosciszewska, *Lewartów [Lubartów] in the Years 1543–1643* (in Polish), Lublin, 1932, p. 36.

[17] Op. cit., vol. 16, p. 76.

[18] Hundert, op. cit., pp. 34, 36.

[19] Yisrael Klausner, *History of the Jewish Community in Vilna* (in Hebrew), Wilno, 1938 (reprinted, Jerusalem, 1969), pp. 9, 13, 55.

[20] See Klausner, op. cit., p. 48; Balaban, *History of the Jews in Cracow and Kazimierz*, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 194; M. Balaban, *Die Judenstadt von Lublin*, Berlin, 1919, p. 10; and Bersohn, op. cit., no. 109, p. 79.

[21] Maurycy Horn, *Military Obligations of the Jews in the Polish Commonwealth in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (in Polish), Warsaw, 1978, pp. 53–58; David Dawidowicz, *Art and Artists of the Synagogues of Poland* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1982, pp. 104–22.

[22] Andrzej Wyrobisz, 'The Jewish Population in Tarłów: From the Middle of the Seventeenth Until the End of the Eighteenth Century' (in Polish), *BZIH*, no. 89, 1974, pp. 3–18; and Bogucka, op. cit., p. 276.

[23] See Murray J. Rosman, *The Polish Magnates and the Jews: Jews in the Sieniawski-Czartoryski Territories, 1686–1731*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Jewish Theological Seminary of America, New York, 1982, pp. 80–85. Rosman found that 'Jews were disproportionately represented among the owners of homes and stores on the market place often to the point of being a large majority'.

[24] Raphael Mahler, 'Statistics of Jews in the Lublin Voivodship, 1764–1765' (in Yiddish), *Yunger historiker*, vol. 2, 1929, Table XIX, p. 106.

[25] Ćwik, op. cit., p. 31; Jacob Goldberg, 'Poles and Jews in the 17th and 18th Centuries: Rejection or Acceptance', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, vol. 22, no. 2, 1974, p. 269.

[26] Weinryb, op. cit., p. 310; Ćwik, op. cit., p. 42; Opas, op. cit., p. 11; Wyrobisz, op. cit., p. 7; Baron, op. cit., vol. 16, p. 416; Warsaw, National Archive of Old Acts, Administracja dóbr opatowskich, File I/69, unpaginated; Baranowski, op. cit., p. 86; and Mahler, 'Statistics of Jews in the Lublin Voivodship, 1764–1765', op. cit., p. 106.

[27] Baranowski, op. cit., p. 85.

[28] H. H. Ben-Sasson, *Theory and Practice: The Social Attitudes of Polish Jews at the End of the Middle Ages* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1959, p. 124.

[29] Azriel Nathan Frenk, *Burghers and Jews in Poland* (in Hebrew), Warsaw, 1921, pp. 59–60; Jozef Bursztyn, 'The Jews of Opatów at the Turn of the Eighteenth Century' (in Yiddish), *Bleter far geshikhte*, vol. 13, 1960, p. 122; Buber, op. cit., p. 91; Isaac Levitats, 'The Minute Book of the Dubno Community' (in Yiddish and Hebrew), *Yivo Historishe Shrifin*, vol. 2, 1937, p. 98; Shimon Dubnow, ed., *The Minutes of the Lithuanian Council of Provinces: A Collection of Enactments and Decisions from 1623 Until 1761* (in Hebrew), Berlin, 1925, no. 79, p. 15; and S. W. Baron, *The Jewish Community*, New York, 1942 (reprinted, Westport, Ct, 1973), vol. 2, p. 296.

[30] See Mojżesz Schorr, *The Jews in Przemyśl Until the End of the Eighteenth Century* (in Polish), Lwów, 1903, documents 101, 124, 139. See also Goldberg, 'De Non Tolerandis Judaeis', p. 43.

THE EMIGRATION OF SOVIET GEORGIAN JEWS TO ISRAEL

Yochanan Altman and Gerald Mars

FOR students of migration, the migration of Soviet Georgian Jews to Israel in the last decade raises some intriguing questions. Why was it that Georgian Jews in August 1969 were the first of any group of Soviet Jews to appeal to be allowed to leave their native land? And why was it, as the gates opened and a sizeable migration was allowed in the early seventies, that Georgian Jews departed in such large numbers? Why, indeed, should a higher proportion of Jews have come to Israel from Georgia than from any other Soviet republic? And why was their emigration unusually concentrated in time?[1] A total of about 30,000[2] went to Israel mainly between 1971 and 1974 — amounting to more than half of the entire Jewish population of Georgia at that period.[3]

The usual explanations for Jewish migratory movements do not apply in this case, since Georgian Jews were fleeing neither from antisemitism nor from poverty. Georgia traditionally has had a particularly low level of antisemitism, much lower than elsewhere in the Soviet Union;[4] there had not been any significant upsurge of such activity at the time; and Georgians (including the majority of Jews) enjoyed the highest standard of living in the USSR.[5] Why, then, should those Jews leave a native land which had been a hospitable home for many hundreds of years, one in which they were exceptionally well integrated, to which they were deeply attached,[6] and in which they were economically fairly secure? As we shall show, part of the answer lies in this very involvement of Jews in, and their acceptance by, Georgian society. The other main factor is religious Zionism. Both were, however, dormant elements and became activated only because of specific circumstances at a particular time.

Most of our findings are based on an intimate association over four years with recent migrants from Soviet Georgia in Israel. Through primarily anthropological fieldwork within a bounded community we acquired an insight into the workings of a Jewish Georgian society. We noted typical examples of life histories, case studies, and detailed daily routines. We term this *retrospective reconstruction* and it is a development

of methods which have been employed by earlier social scientists.[7] It required patient participant observation based on a gradual development of rapport and trust which allowed us, in addition to studying the immediate present, to deal with the recent past as well.

In the first instance, we collected data on our migrants in Israel by charting their social relations and identifying their principal social institutions and basic cultural postulates. Typical queries at this stage were: 'How are marriages arranged *here*?' 'How are economic relations organized *here*?' In the second phase, we attempted to reconstruct our understanding of observed social processes retrospectively to Georgia — for example, 'How were marriages arranged over *there*?' and 'How were economic relations organized over *there*?' Attention was constantly paid to establish the differences as well as the similarities between our immigrants and the indigenous people of Georgia. In the third phase, we enquired more specifically about our main interests at the time — the 'second economy' in Georgia.[8] As it so happened, this added an important aspect to the understanding of the massive Jewish migration in the early 1970s.

Most of the fieldwork was carried out by Altman who lived for a period of some sixteen months in Ashkelon among the 5,000 recent arrivals from all parts of Georgia. Mars spent two shorter periods of residence in the same community; he also went to Soviet Georgia where, although not associating specifically with Jews, he widely enquired about their place in Georgian society. Our Ashkelon community of five thousand amounts to about a sixth of the total Georgian migration to Israel. It has a high proportion of people from small Georgian towns; but that does not affect the generalizations outlined in this paper.[9]

Integration, culture, and Georgian nationalism

According to tradition, there have been colonies of Jews in Georgia since the eighth century, and some argue since the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem. There is certainly firm evidence of Jewish settlements at least as far back as the eleventh century, and of an uninterrupted presence since then.[10] In contrast to Tsarist Russia, there were no expulsions and no restricted pales of settlement in Georgia. When Russia annexed Georgia in 1801, it had to recognize the established position of its Jews who then enjoyed a degree of freedom greater than that of Jews living elsewhere in the Russian Empire; and the situation was not much altered after the Red Army marched into Georgia in 1921.

It is important to note that Georgian Jews do not have a distinct language or dialect: their lingua franca is Georgian. They are integrated into the wider society in many other ways. Mark Plisezki, a Soviet ethnographer, observed in 1931:[11]

> Generally speaking, Georgian Jews live the same way as their Gentile neighbours . . . have the same customs, furniture, domestic equipment and dress . . . their wedding ceremonies also are the same, the only differences are a few songs in Hebrew of a religious or ceremonial nature . . . Jews and Georgians have the same names.

Integration, however, is not necessarily total assimilation. Georgian Jews did not achieve (or apparently aspire to) political office; nor did they occupy top professional posts. Fanya Ba'azov, daughter of the leader of Georgia's Zionists, comments in her memoirs on the anti-intellectual purges of the 1930s that politically 'Georgian Jews felt themselves safe, more or less: there were no prominent persons among them, no senior Bolsheviks, nor famous Mensheviks or Trotskyists. There were no prominent party or state officials'.[12]

Jews and Gentiles had friendly relations. Several informants told us that Jews celebrated Christmas, although it was a Christian festival, because it was a special event and 'because Jews and Christians were neighbours'; one recalled that Christians would be honoured guests at the Jewish festival of Purim, and another noted that they would dance with Jews at the festival of Simchat Torah. The principal means of integration, however, was the social institution of 'the network' — one of the central building blocks of Georgian society.[13] Networks, radiating from a core of family members and including friends and 'friends of friends',[14] are not unique to Georgia, of course; but they are of special importance in the specific milieu of Soviet Georgia. A network provides a person with his primary source of aid and security not only in the normal crises of living, but also in the exceptional crises that can occur in a centrally bureaucratized state where arbitrary authority may be imposed at any time. To be able to depend on one's network is a matter of honour for oneself and for one's family and close associates, while to be unable to offer or receive support when it is called upon is conversely a cause of shame that similarly affects the honour of one's significant others. In Georgia, Jews can be found in non-Jewish networks and Georgians in turn are linked to Jewish networks.

In such a network-oriented culture as the Georgian, the importance of the state and of an individual's allegiance to it are seen as secondary to the responsibility one has to one's network. Indeed, in many respects, the state and the network are perceived by both Jewish and non-Jewish Georgians as acting in opposition: the Soviet state is epitomized as abstract, impersonal, intrusive, and bureaucratic whereas networks are equated with 'the way we Georgians do things' — that is, with the personal, the concrete, and the local. It is the institution of the hyper-developed network which lies at the root of Georgian nationalism, a nationalism essentially hostile to the external constraints of a Moscow-based control. And it is this fusion of the

individual, his family, and network that was activated as a 'push' factor when the time became ripe to go to Zion.

Georgia has always been known in the Soviet Union as a hotbed of nationalism.[15] For its inhabitants, anything Georgian became a focus of pride. The growth of Georgian nationalism has been particularly evident since the death of Stalin and his denunciation in the 1950s — to such an extent that Suny has referred to it as a process of 're-nationalization'.[16] When Moscow proposed in 1978 that Russian should take precedence over Georgian as the official language of the Republic, thousands demonstrated in the streets of Tbilisi with such anger that the proposal was abandoned. Moreover, Georgia is the only union republic where the number of Russians fell between the 1959 and 1970 censuses,[17] and in Tbilisi the proportion of natives claiming fluency in Russian slightly dropped between the 1970 and the 1979 censuses.[18] The first society for the protection of historic monuments to be established in the USSR was that for the protection of Georgian historic monuments; and Georgians celebrated the 1,500th anniversary of the foundation of Tbilisi, their capital city, with great pomp.[19] Not the least important, Georgia's flourishing 'second economy' in the 1960s has been assessed as another manifestation of anti-Russian tendencies[20] and Moscow's reluctance to lean too heavily on the corrupt Georgian elite has been interpreted as the result of a fear of arousing further antagonism.[21]

This assertion of, and pride in, a specifically Georgian identity was also manifested by the region's Jews. Indeed, a Georgian emigrant settled in Israel sent a letter of greetings for the New Year which was published in January 1982 in a Georgian monthly:[22]

> I would like to wish, in the name of the Georgian community [in Israel] a happy new year to this paper . . . in particular I would like to wish a happy 1982 to my land of birth, to my magnificent Vani region: to all inhabitants of wonderful Georgia and of Vani, my birthplace. I hope the new year will see you in joy and happiness, my dears. We, in Israel, as compatriots, join you on the eve of the new year . . . with tears of joy. New Year greetings, our mother — who gave us life — Tbilisi. From all Georgians in Israel — we toast you, brothers, to your life.

However, the deep identification with Georgia and an attraction to Georgian symbols did not cloud Jewish identity. Jews and Gentiles alike considered it only natural for Jews to want to return to Zion,[23] where their identity could be displayed at its fullest. The Jews of Georgia, though integrated into Georgian society and culture, were also able to accommodate their Jewishness.[24] What kept them distinct was the dictates of their religion and their Zionism which was derived from it.

Religion and Zionism

As in the case of Jews elsewhere, the two features of religious observance which precluded the assimilation of Georgian Jews were

the dietary laws and the rule of endogamy which forbids a Jewish person to take a non-Jewish spouse in marriage. Jews in Georgia usually abstained from pork, but cooked other foods in much the same way as did their non-Jewish neighbours so that their dietary laws did not greatly set them apart. *Shehita* (ritual slaughter) was regularly provided, but all Jews did not consider it essential. For one thing, kasher meat was much more expensive and, moreover, adherence to kashrut was not needed to maintain a separate identity. Jewish rituals were never practised in secrecy. An informant told us proudly that he would never miss the Yom Kippur service though, because of the distance, he used to have to drive to the synagogue on that holy day. Rabbi Shashunkin in his memoirs recalls that many Jews who used to attend the synagogue regularly on the Sabbath and the holy days were ignorant of basic Jewish laws and even consumed pork.[25]

The principal barrier to assimilation was apparently endogamy. We do not have reliable data on the rate of intermarriage, but our Georgian informants in Israel all asserted that there were few mixed unions. Our detailed enquiries uncovered only two cases. One of the principal reasons for this widespread acceptance of an endogamous norm lay in the tight organization of relatively small-scale, face-to-face communities with numerous kinship bonds and hence social obligations. A situation like this calls for societal control and public pressure to adhere to written and unwritten laws. However, there are indications that the intermarriage rate, though low, was increasing throughout the 1960s.[26] It is also likely that the rate was higher among those Jews who chose to remain in Georgia, who did not wish to emigrate to Israel.[27]

Unlike the case in other republics, the Georgian authorities allowed their Jews freedom of worship. In the 1960s, although only three per cent of the Soviet Union's Jews lived in Georgia, that territory had about half the total number of synagogues in the USSR.[28] The rabbis, known as *khakhamim*,[29] occupied a central role: they were both spiritual and communal leaders. Apart from their religious duties, they administered an informal system of taxation and expenditure; and their judgement was respected in the settlement of disputes — whether of a secular or of a religious nature. For the *khakhamim*, migration to the Holy Land meant the religious return to Zion. There had been an exodus of 500 persons before the First World War and a second group of 20 families had followed in 1926.[30] For most of the years after 1926, no permission was granted to leave the Soviet Union.

The catalyzing events of 1967 and 1972

Two events were to have a decisive effect on the desire of Georgian Jews to emigrate to Israel: the Six-Day War of 1967 and the fall from power of Georgia's First Secretary, Vassily Mzhavanadze, in 1972. The

first was to lead Georgian Jews to identify with the State of Israel and to make strong representations to the authorities to allow them to leave the Soviet Union; the second was to plunge Georgia into turmoil because it disrupted the basis of its personal support networks.

The Six-Day War. The impact of Israel's remarkable victory was felt very strongly in Georgia. Almost every emigrant to whom we spoke about it in Israel stated that that war had had a crucial effect in reinforcing their Jewish identity. For the younger generation in Georgia, it was the first major event to have occurred in Israel which made them particularly proud to be Jewish. The USSR, which broke diplomatic relations with Israel, mobilized opinion against the Jewish State. The effect in Georgia, however, was the reverse of that intended. Since Georgians are traditionally suspicious of Russian policies, they became more attracted to Israel. One of our informants commented:

> We were certain that Israel was only short of being a little America, exactly because it was blackened in the Soviet media. We thought: 'If the Russians put so much effort into this campaign, it is because they are trying to dissociate us from a very good idea'.

There was little factual information available about Israel. An informant told us: 'Until the Six-Day War I knew there was a place in the globe named Israel but I did not know it was a Jewish state'. Another said: 'All I knew about Israel was that there is a Jerusalem, and that it is the focal point of Jewish life. But I really had no idea what Jerusalem was like'. Such ignorance was partly the result of insularity, especially in rural Georgia. Elam tells of the Georgian Jew who was surprised to discover that Israelis did not speak Georgian.[31]

We must also take into account the effect which a victorious Israel had on a society which respects virile fighters and which admired the skill and bravery of those who had defended their threatened land and people. We were told that in those days 'people would greet one another in the street by covering one of their eyes' — a sort of 'Moshe Dayan salute', in imitation of Israel's one-eyed war hero. We were also told that non-Jews in Georgia often expressed admiration for Israel; there was an obvious parallel between their desire to retain their own national identity against the threats of official Soviet ideology and policy and the Zionist aspirations of their Jews who wished to be restored to their Holy Land. That was probably why the Georgian authorities facilitated emigration and allowed Jews to take with them to Israel most of their personal possessions[32] — in marked contrast to what obtained in other regions of the USSR. A report in the London *Times* of 28 September 1971 stated that the Georgian authorities had 'permitted a unique experiment: the creation of a Jewish "public committee" to decide the order of priority in granting exit visas for families wishing to go to Israel'.

The Fall of Mzhavanadze. On 29 September 1972, Vassily Mzhavanadze was replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze, until then Minister of Internal Affairs, after the exposure of what Kaiser has described as 'perhaps the biggest political scandal of modern times'.[33] Mzhavanadze had been the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party; he had ruled Georgia for 19 years, during which corrupt practices had reached unparalleled levels. When Shevardnadze came to power, the tide turned. He was reputed to be honest, tough, and determined to end the state of affairs he had inherited. Mass purges followed, with hundreds dismissed from top-level positions and some 25,000 arrested.[34] For many in Georgia, the future looked bleak as personal support networks collapsed and insecurity prevailed. Jews had particularly good cause to fear these developments. Under Khrushchev, they were the only Georgians to have been executed for economic crimes;[35] and since their traditional occupations were those of pedlars, small traders, and artisans, their stake in the 'second economy' was probably higher and their vulnerability greater than those of the average non-Jewish Georgian. The change of government in 1972 therefore acted as a 'push out' factor, while the Six-Day War had acted as a 'pull in' force; the combination resulted in the highest rate of migration (in proportionate terms) in the shortest time from any Soviet republic.

When the Russians allowed large numbers of Jews to leave, 4,300 Georgians went to Israel in 1971 (amounting to a third of all Soviet Jewish emigration that year), followed by 10,900 in 1972, 7,750 in 1973, and 2,700 in 1974. In the succeeding years, the annual number of Georgians rarely exceeded (and was often less than) one thousand,[36] even though there was no hardening of restrictions throughout the nineteen seventies.

Our explanation for the dramatic change is that after the bitter Yom Kippur War of October 1973, the halo effect of the Six-Day War had faded and the Shevardnadze regime had stabilized. The euphoria and the panic had both declined.

The pattern of migration

There were three leading *khakhamim* among the very first Georgians to reach Isael after the Six-Day War. They clearly believed it to be not only their right, but also their moral duty to issue personal directives to their followers to join them in Israel. And when the latter arrived, they in their turn called upon their kinsmen to emigrate. There were patriarchs, heads of families, among the early followers of the *khakhamim*; and their descendants also came. Georgian Jews have a very strong sense of family obligation and solidarity, especially among patrilineal kindred. Elam states that he was often told: 'We came not

for the sake of Israel, but because our relatives had gone'.[37] One of our informants said that 25 per cent of the Jews in his village had left within six months, adding: 'And then, suddenly, you find that you can't any more go to grandmother or to this or that uncle, as one was used to, on Shabbat. Suddenly . . . it was not the same for me. I could not stand the loneliness'. Another informant said that from his small town of Kulashi, where 90 per cent of the total of its 10,000 inhabitants were Jews, all but a few dozen families had gone to Israel. He himself could not understand why one of his cousins had stayed behind: 'What has he got to do there? All his close family is in Israel. What can possibly be making him stay?' Georgian Jews clearly value the feeling of security and the affection which close family bonds foster; and they are remarkable among all other Soviet immigrants in Israel for their sense of responsibility to their kindred and to their community.[38]

This familial involvement is revealed by the number of immigration requests. The Soviet authorities demand that each prospective migrant produce a request from a relative residing in Israel before considering whether to issue an exit visa. From 1969 to the end of 1971, only some 4,700 Georgian Jews had come to Israel; but they sent to Georgia requests for 40,649 of their relatives to join them. That number represented about two thirds of the total Jewish population of Georgia enumerated in the 1970 Soviet census.[39] Moreover, by the end of the decade, apparently 118 per cent (!) of Georgian Jews had received formal invitations from their kinsmen to settle in Israel, while the average for the whole Jewish population of the USSR was 27.8 per cent.[40] It thus seems likely that nearly all Jews who have remained in Georgia have some close or distant relatives in Israel and that immigrants in Israel see themselves responsible to a wide range of familial connections back in Georgia.

Conclusion

We began this paper by posing some intriguing questions. Why, we asked, should so many Georgian Jews have migrated to Israel in the early seventies when they were neither openly persecuted nor particularly poor? And why was their migration unusually concentrated at a particular period? We have shown that the preconditions for a mass migration were set in the network-based and personalized nature of Georgian culture; in the degree of integration of Georgia's Jews within this culture and with the resultant mutuality of a shared anti-Soviet orientation. Against this background we must set the linked presence of Jewishness and of Zionism. The first served to retain the Jews as a distinctive entity, despite their considerable integration; while the second pointed them towards Jerusalem and Israel. Both were centred about the *khakhamim*.

The scene was then set for a mass migration but it took, in addition, the coincidental effect of two events to activate the process. The first, the Six-Day War of 1967, highlighted Jewish consciousness; provided a new awareness of the State of Israel; obtained the support of the Georgian populace and of local officialdom; and acted as a 'pull' factor. The second event was the fall of Mzhavanadze in 1972, which upset existing social relationships based on networks, increased uncertainty, and made Jews feel particularly vulnerable in the massive anti-corruption drive that followed the change of government. It provided the 'push' factor.

At the time, in the early 1970s, external as well as internal pressures encouraged the Soviet government to release a few old (and apparently unimportant) religious leaders — the *khakhamim* — who, following their religious Zionist ideals, left for Israel. In fact, these men were to become the spearhead of a Georgian chain of emigration by calling to Israel their followers who, in their turn, summoned their various kinsmen, so that what began as a trickle became a flood.

We have little reliable and detailed data about the Jews who have remained in Georgia, but we understand that they consist largely of those who do not observe Jewish religious precepts, although they may not have married Gentiles in deference to their parents' wishes. It may be that members of the younger generation will marry non-Jews and that if social conditions in Georgia continue to allow them to live undisturbed, most of them will not seek to emigrate to Israel. On the other hand, it may well be that a sharp decrease in the availability of foodstuffs and a shortage of consumer goods,[41] as well as a hardening of the anti-corruption line,[42] will lead to a new exodus of Jews from Georgia if the Soviet government were again to allow its Jews to emigrate.

NOTES

[1] This paper presents part of the findings from a wider joint study funded by the United Kingdom Nuffield Foundation: 'A Study of the Hidden Economy in Soviet Georgia'. The grant was awarded to Gerald Mars and Yochanan Altman was appointed research fellow.

[2] Official Israeli statistics indicate a total of only 25,560 arrivals from Soviet Georgia until March 1980; see Joseph Litvak, Avraham Yehoshafat, and Nunu Magor, *Georgian, Bukhara and Kavkaz Jews — Aliyah Potential Towards the 1980s* (Hebrew), Ministry of Aliyah Absorption, Jerusalem 1981, Tables 21 and 27. But there were also Georgian Jews who came from other Soviet republics. Altshuler states that 10 to 15 per cent of Georgian Jews lived outside Georgia according to official Soviet censuses from the 1950s onwards; he estimates them to have numbered between 5,000 and 7,500 before the beginning of emigration: Mordechai Altshuler, *The Jewish Community in the Soviet Union Nowadays* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1980, p. 254.

[3] We refer here to the indigenous Jews who, according to Altshuler, numbered about 50,000 before the beginning of emigration. In addition, there were several thousand Ashkenazi Jews who came after the Second World War to live in Georgia (mainly in Tbilisi, the capital of the republic); by the early 1970s, there were some 13,000 Ashkenazi Jews in Tbilisi: Altshuler, op. cit., pp. 254, 255.

[4] See Nathan Elyashvili, *Georgian Jews in Georgia and Eretz-Israel* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1975; and Mordekhai Neishtat, *The Jews of Georgia* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1970. For a fuller discussion, see Yochanan Altman, *A Reconstruction Using Anthropological Methods of the Second Economy of Soviet Georgia*, unpublished PhD Dissertation, Middlesex Polytechnic, Middlesex 1983, chapter 3.

[5] See Gerald Mars and Yochanan Altman, 'The Cultural Bases of Soviet Georgia's Second Economy', *Soviet Studies*, vol. xxxv, no. 4, October 1983, pp. 546–60.

[6] There is a wide consensus among writers on Georgian Jewry about that. See, for instance, Elyashvili, op. cit.; Neishtat, op. cit.; Itzhak Ben Zvi, *Exiled Israel* (Hebrew), 3rd edn, Ministry of Defence Publishing House, Tel Aviv, 1963, pp. 89–95; Ben Ami, *Between the Hammer and the Sickle* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1965, pp. 159–68; and Y. Elam, *Georgian Immigrants in Israel: Anthropological Observations* (Hebrew), Papers in Sociology, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1980.

[7] For example, in the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System (see Alex Inkeles and Raimond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society*, New York, 1959) and in the Columbia University Research in Contemporary Cultures (see Margaret Mead and Rhoda Métraux, eds, *The Study of Culture at a Distance*, Chicago, 1953).

[8] For further details on the methodology, see Altman, op. cit., chapter 2.

[9] It was the policy of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption to direct the better educated and the members of the liberal professions to the larger cities, while the less educated and those with manual or no declared occupations, as well as small-scale traders, were sent to the provincial towns. Hence, our sample is less indicative of Jewish Georgian academics and members of the liberal professions whose representation among the arrivals is low anyway — about 20 per cent of the total (see Altman, op. cit., pp. 3–12).

[10] See, for instance, Elyashvili, op. cit., pp. 20–30; Neishtat, op. cit., pp. 15–18; and Ben Zvi, op. cit., p. 90.

[11] Mark Plisezki, *Religion and Customs of the Georgian Jews* (Russian), Moscow, 1931, p. 36.

[12] Fanya Ba'azov *The Lepers* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1979, p. 8.

[13] See Gerald Mars and Yochanan Altman, 'Feasts and Drinking in a Soviet Society', in Mary Douglas, ed., *The Anthropology of Drinking*, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming; and Mars and Altman 'The Cultural Bases . . .', op. cit.

[14] See Jeremy Boissevain, *Friends of Friends*, Oxford, 1978.

[15] See, for instance, Robert Parsons, 'National Integration in Soviet Georgia', *Soviet Studies*, vol. xxxiv, no. 4, October 1982, pp. 547–69; C. J. Peters, 'The Georgians', in *The Ukrainians and the Georgians*, Minority Rights Group, Report no. 50, London, 1981; and Mark Kipnis, 'The Georgian National Movement: Problems and Trends', *Crossroads*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1978, pp. 193–215.

[16] Ronald Grigor Suny, *Soviet Georgia in the Seventies*, Kennan Institute Occasional Paper no. 64, The Wilson Center, Washington, DC, 1979, p. 1.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Parsons, op. cit., p. 556, quoting Radio Liberty report 396/81.
[19] According to informants who attended the celebrations.
[20] Peter Wiles, *Anti-Systemic Behaviour in the Soviet Economy* (German), Bundesinstitut fuer Ostwissenschaftliche und Internazionale Studien, Bonn, 1980.
[21] Suny, op. cit., p. 4.
[22] *Samshoblo* (Georgian Compatriot Monthly), no. 57, January 1982.
[23] Native Georgians account for only 70 per cent of Georgia's population. Georgia contains two Autonomous Soviet Socialist republics, the Abkhaz and the Adjarian, as well as one Autonomous Region — the South Ossetian.
[24] When asked whether the publishing of his letter expressing great affection and longing for Georgia might not hinder Jewish readers from emigrating, the writer replied, 'But why? It only suggests that we here in Israel don't stop loving Georgia just because we left. The same as while there we did not stop from longing for Israel. If at all, this letter will only facilitate emigration because those who stayed behind will see that we do not repudiate our motherland and here in Israel we can express our sympathy for Georgia without fear'.
[25] Rabbi Nahum Shmaryahu Shashunkin (Rabbi of Batum), *My Memoirs* (Hebrew), edited by N. Z. Gotlieb, Jerusalem, 1980.
[26] See Mordechai Neishtat, 'Georgian Jewry in the Soviet Regime', in Ya'akov Zur, ed., *The Disapora: Eastern Europe* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1976, p. 139.
[27] Many of those who have remained in Georgia live in the capital, Tbilisi, where the rate of intermarriage is much higher than elsewhere — not untypical of a large city with a cosmopolitan tradition.
[28] See L. Schreider, *The Last Exodus*, Washington, 1979, chapter 7.
[29] Literally, the term means 'wise men'. It is the usual term for rabbis and spiritual leaders among Sephardi and Oriental Jews.
[30] See Elyashvili, op. cit., pp. 82–88.
[31] See Elam, op. cit., p. 9.
[32] Ibid., pp. 1–11.
[33] See Robert Kaiser, *Russia: The People and the Power*, New York, 1976, p. 110.
[34] See Peters, op. cit.
[35] See Schreider, op. cit.
[36] See Litvak *et al.*, Tables 21 and 27, quoting official Israeli statistics.
[37] See Elam, op. cit., p. 8.
[38] See, for instance, Altman, op. cit., accounts ii and iii in chapter 8 and Elam, op. cit., in particular pp. 52–76.
[39] See Litvak *et al.*, op. cit., tables 27 and 29.
[40] Ibid., table 29.
[41] Recent arrivals from Georgia tell of rationed meats, eggs, sugar and butter and of soaring black market prices.
[42] As seems to have been the trend under Andropov. See, for instance, Joseph Berliner, 'Managing the USSR Economy', *Problems of Communism*, January–February 1983, pp. 40–56.

A NOTE ON THE GEORGIAN JEWS OF TBILISI

Shirley Kolack

THERE has been a Jewish presence in Georgia for more than a thousand years. According to an official Russian handbook on nationalities in Georgia, published in 1980, there are some 28,000 Jews in Georgia and 15,000 live in Tbilisi, the capital of the Republic. I was repeatedly told that Georgia has no history of pogroms. There is certainly an atmosphere of religious pluralism; Orthodox, Armenian, Roman Catholic and other churches dot the landscape and are well attended. Unlike their correligionists in other Soviet Republics, Georgian Jews can freely and openly practise their religion.

In the spring of 1983, while I was a visiting professor in the Sociology Department of Tbilisi State University, I prepared a questionnaire on nationality identification. My colleagues assisted me in obtaining 50 respondents who included professionals as well as white-collar and blue-collar workers. There were 15 Jews among those I interviewed. I also visited many Jewish families in their flats, attended synagogue services on several occasions, interviewed Jews informally, and generally engaged in participant observation.

The questionnaire consisted of 65 questions, some of which were open-ended. It was prepared in English, Georgian, and Russian; those respondents who knew English (about half of the Jews did so) answered in English. Many of the questions were pre-coded, forced choice, thus only requiring the affixing of a number to the selected response. Overall, the data revealed that in spite of Marxist ideology which promotes the fusing of the many different ethnic groups in the Soviet Union, nationality identification in Georgia is still alive and well. Most parents send their children to Georgian schools where they learn Russian as a second language. In the late 1970s, Georgians vigorously and successfully protested against a proposed constitutional change that would have made Russian instead of Georgian the official language of their Republic. In reply to a question about citizenship, my respondents stated that Georgia was their motherland and the Soviet Union their country.

There is now some degree of official toleration of nationality identification if it is of a non-religious nature — as in the arts, the dance,

and the theatre. However, this poses a special problem for Jews because for them culture and religion are intricately intertwined. Unlike the case of other ethnic groups in the Soviet Union, for Jews there is no national identity without the tie to historic Judaism; during their long presence in Georgia, most of them remained orthodox in the practice of their religion. It is only in recent years that some of them have sloughed off their religious ties and identify as secular Jews only. Yiddish culture is artificially stimulated by the authorities.[1] While I was in Tbilisi, a Yiddish folk and dance group gave widely heralded performances. But Georgian Jews consider Georgian (not Yiddish or Hebrew) to be their mother tongue. Thus, the question I asked of all ethnic groups — about speaking a native language — had little meaning for Jews. My colleagues who helped me to design the questionnaire stared blankly at me when I pointed out that the national language of Jews could be Hebrew as well as (or instead of) Yiddish, and that Hebrew was the official language of Israel.

Traditionally, Jews were merchants and tradesmen. Nowadays, they are well represented in the professions: they are physicians, scientists, engineers, economists, and teachers. Still others, fewer in number, are factory managers and skilled workers. I was told that there were not many lawyers. The Jews I interviewed included college students majoring in physics and chemistry, a factory manager, an engineer, a mathematician, an English teacher, a secretary, a book-keeper, and a television repairman. The educational level of young Georgian Jews is high in the case of both men and women, whether they are religiously observant or not. Substantial numbers are college graduates.[2] As is the norm for Soviet society in general, most Jewish women work outside the home; but some of the older orthodox married women do not.

Although religious and secular Jews alike stated that their overall relations with non-Jews were good, there were disquieting notes. Apparently Jews are now kept out of the more senior positions in government and industry; they are told by their superiors that they are not eligible for further promotion because they might decide to emigrate to Israel. A young engineer, a recent graduate from the Polytechnic Institute, confided in me that he was denied a position for which he was qualified when it was noted that his surname was Jewish. He was told coldly, 'You can't have this job, because after we train you, what if you depart for Israel?'. When I asked if he could not appeal against that decision, he just shrugged his shoulders as if to say that it would be impossible or fruitless to do so.

There are some very poor Jews as well as some who are quite well-to-do. As I sat at his Passover table laden with all kinds of delicacies, a Jewish factory manager told me of his puzzlement at recently receiving a food parcel from an American Jewish agency. His eyes roved over the room filled with richly carved furniture and he commented, 'I really did not know what to do with it'.

GEORGIAN JEWS OF TBILISI

Of all the Jews in the Soviet Union, those from Georgia are said to be the most religiously observant.[3] They also have a sense of community and strong ties to old traditions. They have religious ceremonies for circumcision, Bar Mitzvah, marriage, and burial. Boys preparing for their Bar Mitzvah learn some Hebrew but the Torah portion is chanted mostly in Georgian. There are no religious schools; all children attend Georgian or Russian schools. Hebrew is taught at Tbilisi State University but the courses are strictly for non-Jews who will use it probably in government service.

The handsome red-brick synagogue is well kept; my non-Jewish academic colleagues, who eagerly escorted me, pointed out the beautiful crystal chandeliers and the ornate, highly polished, woodwork. Services are well attended; there are two large sanctuaries for worship, with balconies provided for women. Large portions of the Sabbath service are conducted in Georgian, not in Hebrew. There were some old tattered Hebrew prayer books in use as well as several new ones which I was told were gifts from Western countries. There is a Rabbi but it will not be easy to replace him: apparently no rabbis are being trained in the Soviet Union, or so I was told. The synagogue serves as both a house of prayer and a social centre. There are no official Jewish charities or communal organizations. Unofficially, however, the synagogue is the social services agency for the Jewish community. Before and after the religious services there is much activity in the surrounding courtyard. In preparation for the Passover, poultry was ritually slaughtered and matzot were baked in the synagogue grounds. I noticed that non-Jews (including my university colleagues) ate matzot during Passover week; they told me that their Jewish friends or neighbours had given them the matzot because they knew that they liked eating them.

Most of the orthodox Jews reside in the areas near the synagogue; this enhances its role as a community centre. Secular Jews, however, live scattered throughout the city. Among both groups, as among all Georgians generally, the age of first marriage is in the late teens or early twenties and some marry while still at college. There is a tendency for girls from orthodox families to be married at a younger age. The traditional custom for Georgians, including Jews, is for newly-married couples to live in the household of the groom's parents. Some orthodox Jewish households were quite large and included several married sons with their wives and children; but this arrangement is dying out, as is the practice of cousin marriage.

Most secular Jews, in reply to questions about intermarriage, stated that nationality is of no importance if there is love between the partners and they share common interests. On the other hand, all the religious Jews whom I met were without exception emphatically against intermarriage. The children of a mixed marriage can choose to take the

nationality of either parent when they reach the age of sixteen years and have to acquire an internal passport, on which the bearer's nationality is stamped. Georgians find it difficult to believe that American passports make no mention of religion; even several university teachers expressed doubts until I showed them my passport to convince them. When talking about intermarriage, a young Jewish woman told me that she had fallen in love with a non-Jewish Georgian when she was a 19-year-old student; but she had to bow to family pressure and marry a young Jew selected by her parents, much against her wishes. A middle-aged teacher told me that he had married a Jewish woman only to please his mother, for he was in love then with a non-Jewish Georgian; but when his younger brother later married out, their mother did not raise objections. It is still customary among both secular and religious Jews in Georgia for parents to exert control over their children throughout life.

A large proportion of the most religious and less educated Jews have gone to Israel. Many went as a result of a chain reaction: one member of a family emigrated and the rest followed. I was told that the authorities regard Georgian Jews, especially those who are religiously observant, as expendable.[4] Some of the people I met have relatives in Israel and occasionally receive letters from them; and several non-Jewish Georgians also told me that they sometimes hear from their friends in Israel. One teacher had actually gone to visit his relatives in Israel and returned; but I did not hear of any cases of persons who had emigrated and then regretted their decision and returned to Georgia. The official anti-Israel propaganda has influenced some Jews. A young television repairman who invited me to his flat to meet his family told me that he had been visited by a 'Zionist' from Israel and that he was worried about the possible consequences of that visit. An engineer expressed his disquiet at the alleged Nazi-like behaviour of the Israeli army in the Lebanese refugee camps; he also stated that Georgian Jews in Israel are treated in the same way as 'Negroes' are in the United States. I went with my Tbilisi University guide to a Leningrad museum where I saw mounted displays of the barbarism of the Nazi concentration camps and when I voiced the hope that the terror of systematic mass murder would never be repeated, my colleague commented, 'Well, look at what the Israelis have done in the Lebanon!'.

Unlike other Soviet ethnic groups, Jews do not have any territory to which they cling. There is the Siberian autonomous region allocated to Jews, Birobidzhan, but under one per cent of the country's total Jewish population chose to live there.[5] An official government pamphlet, *Jews in the U.S.S.R.*, published in 1982, states that most Jews would find the isolation of Birobidzhan unsuitable to their life-style; they prefer to live in the larger cities.[6] All the Georgian Jews I interviewed said that they would not go to live in any other Soviet Republic, even if there were

better job opportunities. I met a Jewish couple — both of them are mathematicians — who had recently moved with their young son to Tbilisi from the Ukraine; it had taken them several years to obtain their present posts and home but they believed that their considerable efforts had been worth while. They found the atmosphere in Georgia to be much less oppressive and they exclaimed that it was 'like a breath of fresh air — Georgians love their Jews!'.

In spite of this positive attitude, it is clear that the ability to sustain binding religious ties to Judaism may become more tenuous. I came to know some Jews who are members of the Communist Party and whose overriding desire is to be successful in Soviet society as it now exists. They consider themselves to be part of an elite group and none of them professed belief in God or in any religious ideals. I formed the impression that they would have ceased formally to be Jews if it were easier to have one's nationality officially altered. Most of the secular Jews I interviewed said that they were Jews only because a nationality label is required for their internal passport. A few observed that they adhere to some religious traditions only in order to please their aged parents. A young woman, a secretary, could think of no religious traditions worth keeping while a student, a Physics major, said that he saw no reason why he should identify with other Jews. A teacher of English told me that in Tbilisi he is known as a Jew but when he goes to Moscow he is called a Georgian; he deplored his marginal status and commented, 'I do not know who I am!'.

For the present, the orthodox sector of the Jewish community of Tbilisi maintains its religious traditions and practices. A tolerant atmosphere prevails, reinforced by Georgians and by other ethnic groups who oppose any attempts to homogenize the population. However, there is a continuing process of Russification and some cultural assimilation inevitably occurs as the values and ideology of the Soviet state are internalized as the result of the educational system and of the influence of the mass media. If there will be further substantial numbers of religious Jews emigrating to Israel and an accelerated pace of acculturation and intermarriage among the secular Jews who remain, the survival of Judaism in Georgia will be jeopardized.

NOTES

[1] The official booklet, *Jews in the U.S.S.R.*, by Avtandil Rukhadze (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1982) states in the chapter on 'Cultural Development' (pp. 38–44) that Yiddish classics are widely published and that in Birobidzhan there are Yiddish newspapers and radio programmes in Yiddish. See also Paul A. Lucey, 'Religious Institutions and Practices in the Soviet Union', *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol 38, no. 5, May 1982, p. 31.

[2] See Rukhadze, op. cit., p. 48. See also Zvi Gitelman, 'The Jewish Question in the USSR Since 1964' in George W. Simmonds, ed., *Nationalities in the USSR and in Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin*, Detroit, 1977, p. 325.

[3] See Lucey, op. cit., pp. 34–35.

[4] See Gitelman, op. cit., pp. 326–27. He notes that Georgia's Jews are among those who are less integrated into Russian culture; they have closer links with traditional Judaism and a hierarchical family structure. Soviet policy has therefore been to allow Jews from the peripheries to emigrate while making it much more difficult for those from the Russian heartland to leave the country. Thus, while Georgian Jews constituted only three per cent of the Jews of the USSR, they accounted for 27 per cent of the emigrants.

[5] See Rockey L Rockett, *Ethnic Nationalities in the Soviet Union*, New York, 1981, p. 53.

[6] Rukhadze, op. cit., p. 33. Gitelman, op. cit., p. 325, states that 98 per cent of Soviet Jews are classified as urban dwellers.

JEWS IN BRITISH SOCIETY

Israel Finestein

(Review Article)

HAROLD POLLINS and Geoffrey Alderman have each made an important contribution to the study of Anglo-Jewish history by attempting, respectively, a comprehensive study of Anglo-Jewish economic history and of the role of the Jewish community in British politics.*

Dr Pollins examines the role of Jews in the British economy since the seventeenth century, after presenting a sketch of the medieval period. He enquires into the economic proclivities of Jews, the causes and effects of those inclinations and tendencies, and their interactions with Jewish public relations. It is the sweep over three centuries which gives the volume its distinguishing character.

Dr Alderman's book is a study of the political leanings and voting patterns of Jews in Britain since the seventeenth century. It was only in 1835 that professing Jews were allowed by law to vote. Formerly, voters were required by law to swear at the polls a Christian oath. There were some instances before that date when returning officers turned a blind eye to Jews exercising the franchise without taking that oath, just as there were a few cases of Jews holding municipal office without offence to their religious consciences before the Jewish Municipal Relief Act of 1845. There was a striking contrast between the extensive social and economic emancipation of the Jews in England and the civil restrictions placed upon them before their political emancipation in 1858, when at last a Jew could take his seat in the House of Commons without having to make a declaration 'on the true faith of a Christian'.

Harold Pollins is Senior Tutor in Industrial Relations at Ruskin College, Oxford. His first published work relating to his current theme was his valuable paper on 'The Jews' Role in the Early British Railways' (*Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 15, no. 1, 1953) while his latest study in Jewish social history (before the present volume) was his equally original monograph on the Jewish Working Men's Club and

* Harold Pollins, *Economic History of the Jews in England*, 339 pp., The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, Associated University Presses, London and Toronto, 1982, £20.

Geoffrey Alderman, *The Jewish Community in British Politics*, xiii + 218 pp., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983, £17.50.

Institute which appeared in 1981 and was reviewed in this Journal (vol. 23, no. 2, December 1981). His close attention to all aspects of the Jewish social and economic spectrum at each phase of Anglo-Jewish history is amply evidenced in the mass of well-ordered data in this book.

One might question whether there is such a subject as the economic history of the Jews in England. The international trading connections of the Sephardi merchants in the seventeenth century differed widely from the peddling by Ashkenazi dealers in the eighteenth century. They reflected not only different epochs but also sharply contrasting types of community; and they in turn had little in common with the Jewish financiers or with the merchant adventurers of the nineteenth century, or with the Jewish proletariat around the turn of this century, or with the modern great Jewish entrepreneurs and retail distribution outlets. Dr Pollins states: 'The history of any minority must embrace, as well as its own internal development, the influence of the external world and the interaction between them' (p. 236). However, Jews through the ages exhibited talents and qualities which were distinctive and prominent. Related to that theme is the much-debated issue concerning the role of the Jews and of Judaism in the growth and even in the inception of capitalism.

Dr Pollins asserts that 'whatever may have been in the minds of the Jews, their actions — and in particular their occupations — were primarily a result of their conditions of life' (p. 237). No one would reasonably deny the inter-connection between the conditions and pressures of life on the one hand and such phenomena, on the other hand, as Jewish concentrations in certain trades. But these influences may be only part of the story, and not necessarily the major part. To many Gentiles, each Jewish occupational category — the shippers, the bankers, the hawkers, the merchants, the artisans working long hours, the workshop employer, the adventurous retailer — was representative of Jewish talent and of the specifically Jewish element in society. Whether what was held to be distinctive was an exceptionally sharp acquisitiveness, or the effect of thrift and sobriety, or a keen intellect, the fact was that — whatever the nature of external influences and at whatever level of the social and economic structure the Jews were observed — such distinctiveness clearly heightened for both Jews and Gentiles the sense of Jewish separateness.

There have been numerous theories about the direct and indirect factors which have spurred Jews to achieve success or to strive to achieve. In the June 1977 issue of this Journal (vol. 19, no. 1), Dr Eva Etzioni-Halevi and Dr Zvi Halevy contributed an article entitled 'The "Jewish Ethic" and the "Spirit of Achievement"' which reviewed many of these theories. The rich assembly of data in Harold Pollins's book is a quarry for testing such theories in the British setting.

A common feature found throughout the many generations covered in this volume is the involvement of Jews in the development of new and successive forms of economic activity. Joint stock banking, the railways, gas lighting and improved urban amenities, insurance, the mass production of garments, mail order distribution, and property-potential maximization do not exhaust the list of Jewish entrepreneurial innovation and/or expansion. The opportunities seized or created by Jews reflected public needs or sprang out of historical processes. The undoubted fact that Jews responded with vigour and success led some who had no taste for such innovations to link the Jews with disruption and sometimes with an alleged tribal-like programme of insidious and radical change. When William Cobbett inveighed in the early part of the nineteenth century against the spread of the new towns, the growth of paper money, and the migration from the countryside, he constantly attributed to Jewish capital a large share of the responsibility for what he regarded as the deplorable transformation of an older England. A century later, opponents of Jewish immigration gave the greatest prominence to the contention that the aliens competed with Englishmen for jobs and housing and that they were ready to work for longer hours and if necessary at lower rates of pay.

In the chapter entitled 'The Immigrant Trades, 1880–1914', the author refers to a series of distinguishing characteristics. Two elements are of particular interest. The first is that the immigrant trades — Jewish-owned and with a Jewish labour force — sometimes introduced new products or specialized in a particular segment of an industry; he cites as an example of the latter the manufacture of ladies' jackets and mantles which had previously been imported from Germany and which was to become a Jewish trade.

Second, he observes: 'Small-scale workshops were flexible and did not require investment' and adds that 'since it was not at all difficult to set up as a master in industries of this kind . . . it was not uncommon for workers to set up as small masters' (p. 148). Although the great majority of immigrants remained employees, they were often more ambitious than the Gentiles among whom they lived in the East End of London. This was also true of the areas of expanding Jewish residence in the provinces. He has reservations about Beatrice Webb's well-known suggestion that for the immigrants, 'manual work was the bottom rung of a ladder which they ascended as quickly as they could into the world of trade and finance' (p. 150). But it is clear from his account that specialization, innovativeness, ambition, and upward mobility were distinguishing features both of the newcomers and of their descendants.

Harold Pollins acknowledges the legitimacy of the contention — associated principally with Max Weber — that in the economic field, attitudes have an important influence on behaviour. It is, he adds, 'the

converse of the marxist view that religion is part of the superstructure which is economically determined' (p. 237). Clearly, both views are simplistic and the author obviously believes that a balance must be drawn. He briefly discusses this subject in his last chapter but I think that he gives somewhat less weight than is their due to intrinsically Jewish ideas and habits of mind.

Max Weber in his celebrated study (*The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*) analysed the concepts of divine grace, individual responsibility, reward and punishment, and traditional family loyalty. These concepts have Judaic origins. It was not only among the Protestants that individualism was an important factor in the development of the industrial and commercial revolutions. The profoundly interesting study by Dr Pollins seems to me to support the argument that there is a natural affinity between the Judaic spirit and economic individualism. There is also a comparable affinity between the Judaic spirit and the doctrines of political liberty and social responsibility. This brings us back to Dr Alderman's book; there are many bridges between the subject-matters of these two volumes.

Dr Alderman is a Lecturer in Politics at the Royal Holloway College in the University of London. His *British Elections: Myth and Reality*, published in 1978, examined the differences between the conventional generalizations about shifts in British electoral behaviour and the more chequered reality. He seems to have a deep distaste for anything connected with what used to be called 'the Whig interpretation of history' — the belief in the ultimate triumph of liberal philosophies, the certainty of progress, the inevitable vindication of good sense, and the essential rationality of human beings. It tended to see constitutional balances as the natural and desirable result of wise and beneficent precedent following upon equally wise and beneficent precedent. Any breaks in such a glorious sequence were seen essentially as aberrations. In such an outlook, ideas were endowed with creative momentum. On the other hand, the 'Tory interpretation of history' dwelt on clashes of interests and ideas were less seriously considered as determinants of change; the component parts of institutions were more worthy of study than were the ideals which they were said to enshrine.

In order to understand Dr Alderman's historical approach and the vigour and evident pleasure with which he seeks to disillusion the convinced and to provoke the committed, it is necessary to bear in mind his apparent attachment to the historicism of Namier and Butterfield rather than to that of Macaulay and Trevelyan. Such an attachment in a historian is perfectly consistent with left-wing politics.

When Dr Alderman states (on p. 14) that during and after the struggle for Jewish emancipation 'myths developed about the friends and foes in the contest, the quarters from which the Jews received most help, and hence to which they were supposed to be most beholden . . .',

the reader may reasonably ask (even on the basis of the author's own account) whether there was anything mythical about the central belief that it was the Whigs and the Liberals with their Radical allies who championed the Jewish cause and the Tories who opposed it. Admittedly, there were exceptions: Professor Goldwin Smith was a prominent Liberal but was antipathetic to Jewish aspirations, while Bentinck followed his friend Disraeli's lead in the face of the persistent opposition of the mass of his fellow-Tories in Parliament. Some leading Anglican prelates, contrary to the general body of Anglican clerical opinion, were emancipationists. Moreover, as Dr Alderman emphasizes, some Jews voted for Tory candidates in parliamentary elections. There was certainly not a clear-cut line of division between the parties on the Jewish issue just as all the Jews did not vote the same way.

It was the Conservative government of the pragmatic Sir Robert Peel which finally put through the measure that in 1845 opened municipal office to Jews and it was the Conservative government of Lord Derby which opened the House of Commons to them in 1858. The 1858 legislation was enacted out of weariness and anxiety over the deadlock between the two Houses of Parliament about the Jewish issue. The preponderantly Tory House of Lords had regularly opposed the relevant Bills but the Commons had equally regularly (with the virtual unanimity of the Whigs and the Liberals and with the support of some Tories) passed them. There was a deep Jewish sense of affinity with the Liberals, whose political philosophy and programme were conducive to what came later to be called the plural society.

It is part of Dr Alderman's thesis that there was and is a Jewish vote. This is linked with his other thesis that Jews, like others, tend to vote according to their own interests. Thus, apart from those individual Jews who voted Tory because the Tory candidate was in favour of Jewish emancipation, other Jews might also vote Tory because they had come to feel sympathy with the traditions of Toryism or because their social and economic status inclined them towards the voting fashions of their milieu. It is consistent with both these theses that upon the success of the emancipation campaign the distribution of Jewish votes would be yet more varied. When Jews voted for Liberals or Tories, or later for Labour Party candidates, they did so as Englishmen. It was no less consistent with the above principles that Jews around the end of the century would tend to vote for the Liberal Party, having regard to the Conservative Party's restrictive immigration policies. Of course, there were some restrictionist Liberals, some 'open-door' Tories, and a number of prominent Jewish Tories, but the broad pattern was clear.

Dr Alderman concludes that 'Jewish voters in Britain have always been capable of independent political behaviour, sometimes in marked

contrast to national or regional trends' (p. 171). Emancipation, immigration, antisemitism, and Zionism have at successive times provided ample incentives for specifically Jewish responses to party political candidatures at election times. He treats the phenomenon of the specifically Jewish response, especially when organized, as evidence that Jewish voters are far from being 'totally assimilated within British political culture' (p. 171). But such a response might well be regarded, on the contrary, as evidence of their far-reaching degree of assimilation within British political culture, since special interests and concerns are wholly compatible with integration and assimilation in the sense in which the term is used by Dr Alderman. Indeed, he asserts: 'Far from being a contradiction of the emancipation won over a hundred years ago, the continued existence of a Jewish vote in this country is, surely, emancipation's natural corollary' (pp. 171–72).

What has attracted a certain amount of adverse comment is his attribution to that vote of sufficient electoral power to decide the outcome of an election in some areas. It is difficult to find in the evidence which he has assembled anything more than that on sensitive Jewish issues, Jewish citizens tend to react as Jews, that the political parties are not at all taken by surprise thereby, and that Jews are not the only people in society who react when their own group relations or interests are the subject of contentious public debate. On the other hand, it may well be that in the special circumstances of a by-election, or in a particular set of circumstances in a particular constituency, the votes cast by Jews could make a difference.

Jews in politics of whatever party are inclined to advocate with gusto policies of social amelioration. It is as though they have an extra dimension of social conscience. This may spring from a Jewish tradition of compassion and/or a sense of community concern. It may be related to the importance which they attach to a cohesive society and to the greater stability of the Jewish position within such a society. Comparative newcomers have a heightened perception of social needs in the interplay of politics. I do not think that it would be far-fetched to say that there may be a common peculiarly Jewish element in Disraeli's social reformism, in the anti-bourgeois sentiments of Aaron Lieberman, and in the parliamentary socialism of Harold Laski. Jews have a multi-faceted interest in social justice, however controversial may sometimes be the courses recommended by some of them for its pursuit. But that is another matter.

The subject matter of each of these books is largely historical, but each volume is also of considerable contemporary interest. The reason is that each author has explored topics which are as alive today as ever, however different present circumstances may be. Those topics relate to the role of Jews in society, the nature of their integration, and the

character of their distinctive qualities. Both scholars have amassed a wealth of bibliographical material. They have demonstrated from their different viewpoints the individualism, vulnerability, and assimilation of the Jew, while at the same time delineating his aspiration for public involvement, his powers of assertiveness and self-protection, and his essential ineradicable distinctiveness.

BOOK REVIEWS

JANET AVIAD, *Return to Judaism. Religious Renewal in Israel*, xiii + 194 pp., The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983, £16.00.

In the preface to her book on *baalei teshuvah* ('those who repent and return'), previously secular Jews who have adopted ultra-orthodox Judaism, Janet Aviad states that she attempted 'to penetrate beneath the level of external behavior to the change of ideas and attitudes, which is the core of the process and that most difficult to observe'. She also focuses on the institutional framework, the yeshivot of *baalei teshuvah* in Jerusalem, and the wider socio-cultural context.

Aviad has achieved a fair level of success in her endeavour to be 'intellectually objective and humanly sympathetic'. She presents a finely drawn and sensitively written portrait that weaves together an attempt to understand the motivations and perspectives of the *baalei teshuvah* with the observations and analysis of the outsider. Possibly in response to a deep concern with the problems of an outsider's 'understanding', the emphasis is on the phenomenology of *teshuvah* rather than on the testing or application of sociological models and theories. It is clear that the author is familiar with the general literature on religious conversion, but this gets only brief mention and there is no systematic comparison of the *teshuvah* process with 'conversion careers' in other religious contexts. This is a pity since Aviad addresses questions that are typically asked in social scientific studies of conversion: why do some people rather than others join religious movements, and why are they recruited to a particular religious movement rather than to any of the others?

In addressing the first question, she notes that a common disposition of all three groups of *baalei teshuvah* (Jewish Americans, Israelis of European origin, and Israelis of Asian or African origin) was their rejection of western culture which they criticized as empty, corrupt, degenerate, and directionless. They were seekers, searching for a compelling knowledge and way of life that would provide meaning and contentment. Aviad acknowledges that the pattern of motivation, the rejection and seeking, cannot be distinguished from that of other alienated youth who, in America at least, have been able to choose from a number of counter-cultural options. What distinguishes the *baalei teshuvah* is the direction they took to seek salvation and to resolve their discontent.

Ultra-orthodox Judaism has several points in common with other religious movements: in its uncompromising stance and utter rejection of western culture it appeals to those who seek total change, in its encompassing way of life it appeals to those who desire a basic reordering of their lives, and in its demand for consistency it appeals to those who seek absolute certainty. Aviad's answer to why *baalei teshuvah* chose this particular path of total change, reordering, and certainty is largely in terms of their Jewish consciousness. The particular choice is not entirely a 'happenstance' because there is a sense of discovering the true nature of the Jewishness that was already present in the individual; there is a feeling of return to a heritage in which the individual recovers his 'essence' and true past. Aviad writes that the theme of 'homecoming', 'returning to the fold', is the most distinctive Jewish component of the *teshuvah* process and sets it off from other forms of conversion. It may be argued that the theme of return is not quite as distinctive as she suggests; 'restorative movements' are found in many cultures and some Christian sects desire to return to the 'uncorrupted' religion of the first Christians. However, as she notes, *baalei teshuvah* do not have to travel far back to rejoin the past; for many, it is a return to the religious culture of their grandparents or great-grandparents. And it is also a return to a religious culture which has had a continuous existence in the ultra-orthodox community.

It is, then, the pull of 'roots', the 'compelling power' of the encounter with Judaism, which leads Aviad to address the second question: why this particular path? The question, however, remains unanswered. Not all Jewish seekers chose ultra-orthodox Judaism. Some joined Jews for Jesus, Hare Krishna, or one of the many other cults. These options may be less available in Israel than they are in western countries, but about two-thirds of the *baalei teshuvah* in Jerusalem are from the United States and Europe and there is an increasing concern in Israel about the appeal and 'dangers' of the cults for Israeli youth. It may be that the *baalei teshuvah* begin with a Jewish consciousness and background stronger than that of the Jewish converts to other movements, and comparative studies of different paths might be useful here. Aviad's largely phenomenological approach might also be fruitfully supplemented by a systematic attempt to reconstruct the social networks of the *baalei teshuvah* before they joined their yeshivot.

In addressing the reasons for *teshuvah*, the author provides explanations mainly in terms of dispositions, and the evidence for these dispositions is taken from what the *baalei teshuvah* told her. Quotations from their statements show that many of them are highly articulate individuals who are able to stand outside their situation and make acute observations on such matters as the continuing tension between their secular past and their present lives. Nevertheless, there is perhaps too heavy a reliance on the motives related by the *baalei teshuvah*

themselves. One does not have to take the radical view that dispositions reported post-hoc explain nothing about action, but one might question more the congruence between action and stated motives of the actors. The section on the yeshivot reinforces this point. Aviad sees the teachers' emphasis on withdrawal from secular society and the alienness of western culture to Judaism as in alignment with the predispositions of the *baalei teshuvah*, but we do not know how far the reports by *baalei teshuvah* of their former dispositions are coloured by their resocialization within the yeshivot.

In her discussion of the wider socio-economic background, the author makes a number of pertinent points: the costs of modernity to the Jewish people, the positive response of the Israeli public to the *baalei teshuvah*, the decline in the appeal of secular ideologies in the west and in Israel, and the revival of traditional religion in many parts of the world. One might wish to have more here on the extent that the Israeli context is similar to, and differs from, other social contexts of neo-traditionalism, but this is only to say that Aviad's most interesting study stimulates further reflection, questioning, and analyses.

STEPHEN SHAROT

JOSEPH BUCKMAN, *Immigrants and the Class Struggle. The Jewish Immigrant in Leeds, 1880–1914*, xii + 183 pp., Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1983, £17.50.

There must be a warm welcome for any serious work about the history of Jewish immigrants in their major cities of settlement. Leeds is one such city and deserves special note because it had very few members of the older Anglo-Jewish stock when the eastern European immigrants arrived. The Leeds Jewish community was constituted almost entirely by these immigrants and their descendants.

A reader who takes seriously the sub-title of Dr Buckman's book will be surprised to find that there is nothing about the arrival and settlement of Jewish immigrants in Leeds, their work outside of the clothing industry, their religious, social, and cultural life, or the upbringing of the next generation. The author is interested in one subject only. He is determined to fit the Jewish worker into the class struggle and to ally him with the Gentile worker against their class enemy — the employer, whether Jewish or Gentile. He scornfully dismisses any conception of collective interest or solidarity as Jews, terming it 'metaphysical'. What passionately engages him, to the exclusion of any other aspect of Leeds Jewish immigrant history, is his vision of oppressed Jewish workers labouring long hours in filthy workshops and uniting in their heroic labour struggle. Their strikes are described with the impartiality of a strike placard.

No one will deny that at times workers and employers were at one another's throats, but can that be the whole story in Leeds? In fact, for all his research, Dr Buckman's history of immigrant Jewish unionism in Leeds is incomplete. Jewish workers organized friendly societies and in 1899 they founded a long-lived Jewish Workers' Burial and Trading Society which combined cemetery rights with a kasher meat store. Such activities smack of religion and Jewish communal attachment, qualities not in harmony with the demands of the class struggle. Perhaps that is why the author does not mention them. His ideological blinkers obstruct his view again when he mentions 'Jewish workers, adhering, for the most part, unwaveringly to the class view that Britain ought to be kept open to immigrant workers . . .' (p. 46). Thus he disregards a very appreciable portion of the British working class which did not desire at all that Britain be kept open. Presumably they were afflicted with false consciousness of their class interest. The Jewish workers, that sentence concludes, 'found themselves in the same posture as their masters, if for different reasons'. No doubt the Jewish masters wanted the flow of cheap labour to continue. We are also to suppose that the Jewish workers' reason for supporting free immigration lay in their sophisticated internationalist awareness of the brotherhood of proletarians under capitalism, regardless of country. Or might we set aside all this obfuscation and simply suggest that masters and workers, as eastern European Jews, wanted their families and other eastern European Jews to be able to enter Great Britain? The Jewish workers who opposed the continuation of free immigration —and Dr Buckman's sentence (which includes the words 'for the most part') implies their existence — belonged to the shrinking native Jewish working class. But so obvious a proposition does not square with the class struggle and internationalism; and the 'metaphysics' of Jewish group interest is not mentioned in the book.

Dr Buckman smites hip and thigh several scholarly predecessors who see Leeds Jewish immigrants in a light different from his. One of them is the present reviewer, whose work, *The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870–1914* (2nd edn, London, 1973), briefly discusses Leeds. In focusing on London I may have done so partly at the expense of the provinces. But Dr Buckman is annoyed for another reason — that I considered sweating in Leeds less oppressive than in London because Leeds workshops were somewhat larger than London's. I added the comment that Leeds workshops were usually dirty, and a report published in *The Lancet* in 1888 provided evidence. Buckman observes that even trade unionists spoke very little about the physical condition of Leeds Jewish workshops and he can hardly explain this relative silence. May one suggest that conditions outside the bedroom workshops had become tolerable? Just the same, he rains reproof on me in no less than nine places; and in one of them he even refers to 'Gartner and

his school', a distinction I did not know about. My disciples seem to be two other scholars who have also drawn Buckman's wrath.

Immigrants and the Class Struggle contains a good deal of valuable information within its self-imposed limits. Jewish trade unionism is extensively presented, especially in its connections with the Leeds labour movement. The economic analyses excerpted from the writings of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin are inferior to the work of later authorities, but Dr Buckman has his strong preferences. One does not know what to make of Appendix I, which consists of nine graphs of the sales and profits of four Leeds wholesale clothing manufacturers; these graphs remain stark unexplained lines.

Had Dr Buckman recognized Jewish immigrant workers and masters as more than pawns in the class struggle and paid fair attention to other aspects of their life and work, he would have written a richer and better balanced book.

LLOYD P. GARTNER

REUVEN P. BULKA, ed., *Dimensions of Orthodox Judaism*, xvii + 471 pp., Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1983, $25.00.

For the information of the potential reader of this fascinating collection of very readable essays (most of them previously published in scholarly journals and newspapers), linked by the editor's splendid introductions and comments, it is necessary to add to the title 'in the United States'. In the early decades of this century, Orthodox Judaism in the USA was moribund or was, at least, so seen to be by observers who predicted its speedy demise. The forecast was premature. Far from Orthodoxy vanishing from the scene, it has now acquired, largely owing to the immigration from Europe after the Second World War, an undreamed-of confidence. It has also become highly articulate, as evidenced both by these essays and by the comprehensive bibliography appended to the book. The style of American works of this genre is not entirely absent but we have been mercifully spared from the statement that Orthodoxy is now in a meaningful, growth-movement situation.

Orthodoxy in the United States is certainly not monolithic. The book describes adequately the various groupings, all influenced to a greater or lesser extent by the American experience but so varied that in more than one essay the question of definition is raised. How does a Jew in America have to structure his life-style (the jargon is infectious) in order to qualify as Orthodox? Leaving aside the nominally Orthodox, those who simply prefer to belong to an Orthodox synagogue because they feel at home there or because they like the Rabbi, there are, in the main, three Orthodox groups: the Yeshiva 'world' (influenced by the Lithuanian-type Yeshiva); the Hassidim; and the Modern Orthodox,

whose acknowedged head is the famous Rabbi J. B. Soloveitchik of Boston. The relationship between these groups is not always harmonious — name-calling of laxity and heresy from the right and of intolerance and extremism from the left being much in evidence. It is a refreshing feature of the book that these tensions are not glossed over. On the contrary, there is a good deal of agonising over this matter and over other problems which Orthodoxy faces, such as co-operation with the non-Orthodox community and with non-Jews; the legitimacy of dissent within Orthodoxy; whether Orthodoxy lives up to its high standards in the ethical sphere; new roles for Orthodox women in religious life; and whether secular learning is to be seen as of value in itself rather than simply as a means of earning a living. Attention is drawn to the fact that Orthodoxy is now strongly middle-class with the new problems this has created.

The emphasis throughout is on the sociological aspects. There are only a few, almost casual, references to the philosophy of Orthodoxy. There are occasional remarks about revelation and the Torah as the very word of God; about the Halakhah as the ultimate criterion; and about the Torah personality, the *Gadol be-Yisrael*, in his capacity of a virtually infallible guide because of the divine charisma with which he is invested. But it would have been more challenging if these and similar theological topics had been discussed in greater detail. It is only a lack of theological sensitivity that can permit a Rabbi, while defending the surely untraditional view that a *Gadol be-Yisrael* is not elected but given a kind of divine stamp of approval in a mystical way, to write (p. 334) 'Many know but few are chosen', an adaptation, of course, of 'many are called, but few are chosen' in Matthew 22. 14 (!). Nevertheless, the book can be warmly recommended as a clear account of Orthodoxy come of age in an environment previously seen as hostile to its survival.

LOUIS JACOBS

DAN CASPI, ABRAHAM DISKIN, and EMANUEL GUTMANN, eds., *The Roots of Begin's Success. The 1981 Israeli Elections*, 297 pp., Croom Helm, London, 1984, £16.95.

It is now virtually commonplace to introduce studies of Israeli political life by reference to the upheaval that resulted from the elections of 1977. It was not, as the editors in their preface to this latest collection of essays state, merely a matter of a coalitional realignment. There occurred a genuine and substantial shift of power arising from deep-rooted long-term trends rather than an episodic swing from one party to another.

Among the many legacies of the upheaval of 1977 is the volume of literature on the elections of 1981. In 1977, few people had been aware

of the dramatic process of change which had taken place in Israeli society. The effects of the huge increase in the country's population since the founding of the State were too little appreciated, as was the change in the ethnic balance of the Jewish population from Ashkenazi to Oriental predominance. Too little attention had been paid to the decline of the old kibbutz-derived, collectivist ideology which had characterized the Yishuv in pre-State days and which had continued for a decade or so after the State had been established. While there was growing awareness of the grievances of the under-privileged Oriental Jewish community and especially the attitudes of its youth, the Labour establishment was too set in its ways, too concerned with its internal conflicts and rivalries, and too concerned to preserve its privileges to respond in a positive and meaningful way to the rising aspirations and expectations of the new generation. Like so many post-revolutionary societies, Israel had become extremely conservative.

The many years of Labour dominance had lulled the Party and its supporters, along with the majority of academic observers, into the belief that the long-term stability of the political system was assured. It was often remarked that governments in Britain frequently changed, but policies were rarely affected. In Israel, on the other hand, the government never changed, but its policies frequently did so.

The immediate explanations of the 1977 election result, with a few notable exceptions, bordered on the trivial. People had become bored with so many years of Labour rule, it was argued, and wanted a change for its own sake. Labour was paying the price of a series of scandals culminating in the resignation of Prime Minister Rabin shortly before the election was held. There was dissatisfaction with the state of the economy and concern for national security when shortcomings were revealed by the debacle of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Indeed, some felt that if those who were absent from the polls in the 1973 elections (because of their military service) had been able to cast their votes at that time, the change would have occurred there and then, in the immediate aftermath of the war. Others were convinced that the 1973 election results were proof of Labour's invulnerability to electoral defeat, even in the wake of a perceived national disaster.

Six months before the 1981 elections, Labour appeared to be well ahead of the Likud in the opinion polls — seemingly justifying the view that the latter's performance in the 1977 elections was little more than a flash in the pan. Indeed, as public opinion changed and the Likud won a second term in office, some still insisted on attributing its success to a combination of the charismatic appeal of Mr Begin and the 'election economics' of Finance Minister Yoram Aridor. It was not that these factors played no part in ensuring the Likud victory, but that they served only to conceal the profound socio-economic changes in the nature and character of Israeli society. All this means, and the authors

of the essays in this book make no bones about it, that Israel has acquired a new dominant party or bloc with a stable basis of support rooted in ethnicity, age, and religious observance. What had been, until 1977, a dominant one-party or one-bloc system has subsequently become a dominant two-party or two-bloc system, but with an increasing tendency for the new to prevail over the older grouping.

The eleven chapters in this collection seek to place the 1981 elections within such a framework of understanding and they do so in the best tradition of Israeli political and wider social science. They suggest, with the backing of some clear and original survey findings, that the sharp differentiation in the ethnic vote between the two major parties is intensifying and that this will apparently ensure the Likud's holding on to power for a long period of time. There is a discussion, by Menachem Friedman, of the dramatic drop in electoral support for the National Religious Party and an analysis of the trend in Arab voting by Jacob M. Landau. There is also a suggestion that the changes in Israeli political life are so deep that they affect core values such as Israel's security concept. The preventive war conception of the Labour bloc has gradually been replaced, Yoram Peri argues, by the concept of war as an instrument for attaining national objectives as conceived by the Likud government.

Altogether, this is a most interesting, instructive and erudite collection of essays making a major contribution to the literature of political sociology. Any criticism must be reserved for the book's title and dust cover. Contrary to what the contents set out, most successfully, to show, they emphasise the importance of Mr Begin in the recent electoral history of Israel. But the book is not at all about Begin's success. Rather, it reveals that change was and is inevitable regardless of any particular personalities. Mr. Begin happened to be leading the Likud when a possibly inevitable process of political evolution was reaching its fulfilment. He may even have been responsible for the Likud inheriting the mantle of government when the voters began to desert Labour in sufficient numbers so that it could no longer rule. But Mr. Begin was not responsible for the changes in Israeli society. He had little to do with those, although he had a leading role in the political history of the Likud, which is a different story altogether. It is a story which ought to be told, but the book under review is a sociological text, which profiles the changing political map of the Jewish State.

DAVID CAPITANCHIK

DOMINIQUE SCHNAPPER, *Jewish Identities in France. An Analysis of Contemporary French Jewry*, liii + 181 pp., The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983, £20.00.

Dominique Schnapper chose to investigate Jewish identities in France by conducting in-depth interviews with small samples in a number of

communities. She constructed a typology of three ideal type identities: practising Jews who observe in various degrees the religious precepts of Judaism; militant Jews, most of whom are involved in political activities related to the State of Israel; and assimilated Jews who maintain an attenuated Jewish identity. The bulk of the book is made up of three long chapters in which each of the identities is described in its various manifestations and illustrated by copious quotations from the interviews.

Plurality within each type of identity is emphasized. Practising Jews are divided by distinctions such as 'traditional' and 'newly practicing', native French-born and transplanted (mainly from North Africa), and high and low 'cultural level'. The main division among the militant Jews is between the pro-Israel activists, whom Schnapper sees as the most vital and widespread sector of French Jewry, and the small proportion of anti-Israel radicals. Two types of assimilationists are distinguished. The first, the neo-assimilationists, rarely demonstrate any religious or political indication of their identity, but they nevertheless have a sense of a shared fate with the Jewish people. The second, the merchants, are conditioned largely by their occupations; their levels of religious observance and participation in Jewish organizations are low but most of their social contacts outside work are with other Jews.

The author examines the differences among the types and sub-types with respect to such issues as their consciousness of antisemitism, intention to migrate to Israel, and the proportions of Jewish and non-Jewish friends. This occasionally provides some interesting, and possibly unexpected, findings. For example, the degree of social interaction with Gentiles at the friendship level was greater in the case of traditional practising Jews than it was in the case of the anti-Israel militants and the assimilated merchants. However, most of the differences among the types, such as those between the native French Ashkenazim and the transplanted Jews from North Africa, are simply described with little attempt to analyse or explain the patterns within a general conceptual framework.

The most interesting of the three chapters on the major types of identity is the one on assimilationists. Schnapper is able to draw on some excellent historical works in order to show the change from the old type of assimilationist, who regarded antisemitism as a survival from a previous age and sought a total absorption into French secular culture, to the contemporary, mainly post-1967, assimilationist who has an acute sense of antisemitism and emphasizes a Jewish identity even though it has little cultural or political content. The historical dimension in that chapter would have been welcome also in the other chapters, especially the one on practising Jews.

In the conclusion, Schnapper presents an interesting commentary on the 'return to Judaism' and on other movements which aim to recover

cultural identities. She argues that in the advanced stages of industrialization it is not the working class but the bourgeoisie, especially the 'intellectual' bourgeoisie of professionals and teachers, who are most likely to preserve and revive particularistic traditional practices and beliefs. After the dissolution of the traditional community and the decline of the legitimacy of behaviour based solely on custom, cultural traditions can still be revived by an intellectual and scholarly approach of the 'cultivated' classes.

Jewish Identities in France contains some interesting material and some pertinent comments, but on the whole it is a disappointing book. The author claims to have followed Weber's ideal type methodology, and she justifies her small sample and absence of statistical analysis by stating that her aim is a qualitative analysis and interpretation of the multifaceted character of Jewish identities. It is not clear to me why she believes that statistical analysis of a large sample would necessarily vitiate her aim of emphasizing different forms of identity or why she opposes ideal types to factor analysis; ideal types can provide the bases for the construction of scales and quantitative as well as qualitative comparisons of empirical cases. The ideal type methodology is not fully exploited; cases are used only to illustrate the ideal types, and there are no cases presented that cut across or represent combinations of the types. Finally, even if we accept that the methodology is the most appropriate one, there is no justification for almost entirely ignoring the considerable analytical and empirical works on Jewish identity which have been conducted in the United States and Israel by such scholars as Marshall Sklare and Simon Herman.

STEPHEN SHAROT

STEPHEN SHAROT, *Messianism, Mysticism, and Magic. A Sociological Analysis of Jewish Religious Movements*, ix + 306 pp., The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1982, £17.50.

The aim of this book is ambitious and innovative: to analyse with the help of sociological tools the Jewish messianic and mystical movements of the last two millennia. The sociological perspective is directed at folk religion rather than at talmudic or kabbalistic texts. The author stresses that bringing to light the social determinants at work in the religious process does not in any way lead to reductionist or unilateral interpretations.

Dr Sharot proceeds most systematically and at first presents a battery of concepts which will serve as the framework for his analysis. Thus he classifies messianic and mystical movements as hypernomian when they stress faithfulness to the Law and to a measure of asceticism, and as antinomian when they break with customary norms and taboos. Such classificatory categories are certainly useful, but they can

sometimes be too rigid: the Hassidim would be considered antinomian by their adversaries, but on the other hand are they not hypernomian, being strictly faithful to the Law in spite of their liking for their dances?

After three preliminary chapters, the author examines the messianic movements of the first millennium; but the available data are inadequate and any sociological analysis of that period is hampered by the paucity of historical evidence. However, from the time of the Crusades onwards, more material is available. Italy and Spain were fruitful sites for 'living Messiahs'. In Sicily, Abraham Aboulafia (who was a native of Spain) announced that redemption would come in the year 1290. In 1295, there were two Messianic prophets in Spain: in Avila and in Ayllon. Some historians believe that persecutions stimulated this movement, but neither of the two towns had been affected by Jewish persecutions at the time. On the other hand, their Jewish populations were aware of anti-Jewish sentiments which existed before the Inquisition and the Jewish community of each town was small in number and not prosperous.

Messianism in Italy at the beginning of the sixteenth century poses several questions. Admittedly, there were Spanish Jewish exiles who had fled the persecutions; but in the Renaissance, Jews were well tolerated in Italy. There appear to have been more general factors at work. When Charles VIII of France invaded Italy, there were already millenarian tendencies in the country, notably in Florence which had been affected by the preachings of Savanarola. According to Dr Sharot, Jewish millenarianism in Italy arose as a result of both the presence of the Spanish exiles and the general climate. He attempts to explain why the Ashkenazim, who had been subjected to grave persecutions in the previous centuries, did not have messianic movements. It was, according to him, because (a) they were more religiously observant than were the Sephardim and (b) the latter had risen to positions of authority among the ruling classes to a degree unknown to the Ashkenazim and their downfall had therefore affected them very deeply.

I find the author's reflections on the Marranos more stimulating. Many *conversos* were involved in Catholic mystical movements — for example, the Illuminists. Those who left Spain and then returned to the Jewish faith were impregnated by mysticism and/or a profound messianism; this took the place of adherence to Jewish prescriptions and rituals which had lapsed in the course of their Marrano tribulations. Again, there does not appear to have been a direct link with Jewish messianic phenomena.

However, these considerations are only the introduction to the core of Dr Sharot's book: Sabbatianism, Frankism, and Hassidism. Where Shabbetai Tsevi is concerned, Sharot re-examines some of Gershom Scholem's hypotheses. He doubts whether kabbalistic ideas played a

major role in the development of Sabbatianism, and believes that the movement was much more the result of a sense of insecurity which affected all the social classes of a 'pariah nation' whose economic functions were impaired by the advent of a modern capitalist economy. Such difficulties were encountered in Amsterdam, Salonica, and Livorno, where Jews nevertheless enjoyed great freedom. But Dr Sharot points to another factor which Scholem might have somewhat underestimated: the presence of Marranos who were more likely than others to respond to millenerian movements, as we saw earlier. Moreover, from the end of the sixteenth century, the change in economic structure particularly affected the Sephardim (and the former Marranos among them) in the Ottoman Empire. And it was indeed in that Empire that Shabbetai Tsevi was to intoxicate the Jewish communities in the middle of the seventeenth century.

There are fewer original suggestions in the chapter on Frankism and on the beginnings of Hassidism. The author rightly points out that both movements, and particularly Hassidism, were to develop in regions where Jews were less urbanised and where their communities were at a low ebb, especially economically, after the Ukrainian massacres of the seventeenth century. The Hassidism of Besht is at first that of the magician-thaumaturge; it is a popular religion suited to depressed socio-cultural conditions.

The author presents a typology of 'dynastic' successions. These vary and often give rise to conflicts, as when each of two sons claims to be his father's heir. Each *rebbe* and his faithful also have particular traditions, and he stresses that such variety helps in the success of Hassidism, since it offers a choice to the followers of the movement. For modern Poland, Dr Sharot indicates the role played by Hassidic leaders in the constitution of Agudat Israel in Independent Poland; but he fails to point out the ultra-conservative character of that religious party, which often allied itself to the most reactionary forces of Poland. There is a chapter on the secularisation of millenarianism which deals with Reform Judaism, with the revolutionaries inside and outside Judaism, and with Zionism. He does not say that these are secularized millenarianisms, but that messianic hopes and vestiges exist in the background of such movements — even when, as in the case of Reform Judaism, they are a counterpoint. This leads him to the study of a specifically religious Zionism, that of the Mizrachi, and of the Israeli expansionist party, Gush Emunim, whose ideology was bred in the yeshivot of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook and of his son, Rabbi Zvi Kook. However, a serious discussion of the religious factor in Gush Emunim seems to me to give too much stress to what is in fact an ideological camouflage for geo-political aspirations.

This book may not entirely fulfil its ambitions, but it does provide a set of useful and interesting sociological hypotheses about a subject

which has until now been the preserve of historians of religion, historians who are rarely aware of the perspectives of the social sciences. It is a stimulating contribution to the scholarly study of Jewish mysticism and messianism. It also has a comprehensive and up-to-date bibliography as well as a full index.

JACQUES GUTWIRTH

CHRONICLE

According to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, the population of Israel, excluding the occupied territories, was 4,140,000 at the end of 1983. There were 3,430,000 Jews and 710,000 non Jews; the population increased by 1.9 per cent over the previous year's total.

*

Last January, preliminary figures were issued for the 1981 Census of Population of the Republic of Ireland; they showed that the number of Jews in the country had dropped from 2,633 in 1971 to 2,128 in 1981. The Jewish population reached its peak in 1946, with a total of 3,907, but it has steadily declined since. The Irish census return forms give the option of declaring one's religion, stating that one has 'no religion', or leaving the entry on religion blank.

*

The National Institute of Statistics of Brazil, a government institution, states that 91,795 Brazilians gave their religion as Jewish in the September 1980 national census. The majority, 44,569, live in Sao Paulo; 29,157 in Rio de Janeiro; 8,330 in Rio Grande do Sul; 2,408 in Parana; 1,656 in Minas Gerais; 1,276 in Pernambuco; 899 in Para; and 625 in Brazilia. But Jewish communal leaders are said to have pointed out that provisional statistics published in June 1982, and based on the same census data, stated that 118,991 Brazilians declared that their religion was Jewish. These leaders are also of the opinion that several thousand Jews did not return themselves as being of the Jewish religion.

*

The Minister of Tourism of Israel is reported to have stated last January that the number of tourists who came to Israel in 1983, some 1,166,000, showed an increase of 17 per cent over the previous year. There was a record number from the United States, 350,000 or about a third (32 per cent) more than in 1982. There were 580,000 visitors from Europe; 40,000 crossed from Egypt, but only 3,000 of them were residents of Egypt; 4,300 came from Japan and 2,000 from South Korea.

*

The number of Soviet Jews allowed to emigrate in 1983, 1,315, was the lowest since 1970. In 1979, it was 51,303; in 1980, 21,471; and in 1982, 2,692. In December 1983, 97 Jews left the Soviet Union; less than a third of them, 31, went to Israel while the rest chose other destinations. In January 1984, 88 Soviet Jews emigrated and a quarter of them, 22, went to Israel; but in

February 1984, more than half of those who left the Soviet Union, 49 out of 90, chose to go to Israel.

*

The Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds sponspored a survey by social scientists of Soviet Jewish immigrants in the United States. They found that 60 per cent of the males and 34 per cent of the females had secured paid employment within six months of their arrival; and that within a year, this was so in the case of 78 per cent of the males and 56 per cent of the females. The majority of both male and female immigrants were in professional or white-collar occupations or skilled crafts and the large majority (84.5 per cent) said they were 'very satisfied' or 'somewhat satisfied' with their jobs. They considered that their present housing and standard of living were higher than had been the case in the USSR, but claimed that they preferred the cultural and social life of the Soviet Union. In reply to questions about friendship, the majority said that nearly all their friends were Jewish, largely fellow Soviet Jewish immigrants.

As for religious observance, only 16 per cent described themselves as 'fairly' or 'very' religious, 36 per cent said that they were not at all religious, and the large majority do not observe the Sabbath or the dietary laws. On the other hand, most of the respondents said that they light Hanukkah candles and avoid eating bread during Passover.

Only 14 per cent would encourage their children to settle in Israel; 45 per cent would not influence them either way; 29 per cent would discourage and 11 per cent would 'actively discourage' their children to do so. But the large majority, 86 per cent, would encourage their child to marry a Jew.

*

Hellenic House, an educational centre built on the Mount Scopus site of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, was opened last March. It is the gift of the Salonika Jewish community in memory of Greek Jewish students who were murdered in Nazi concentration camps. The Greek government was officially represented at the inauguration ceremony.

It was reported last April that the Prime Minister of Greece had accepted an invitation to be present on 29 April at a ceremony at the Athens Jewish cemetery in memory of the Greek Jews who perished in Nazi concentration camps during the Second World War; 67,150 were killed. It is the first time that a Greek government leader has agreed to be present at this Jewish ceremony.

*

The Winter 1983–84 issue of *News from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem* states that there are more than 16,000 students in the University's seven faculties, 11 schools, and Pre-Academic Centre; about a third of them are graduate students working for a Master's or a Doctoral degree. There are a further 14,000 in special and extension courses and similar programmes.

The Faculty of Agriculture has 1,700 students. Last year, it awarded 320 Bachelor of Agricultural Sciences degrees, 14 Bachelor degrees in Nutritional

and Domestic Sciences, 65 Master's degrees, and 10 doctorates as well as 24 high school teacher certificates and 13 extension officer certificates. A new centre for agricultural biotechnology, established with the aid of a West German foundation, will engage in improving plant varieties and in creating new varieties through the use of both conventional and advanced genetic techniques.

The School of Nutritional and Domestic Sciences at the Faculty of Agriculture in Rehovot is Israel's only institution to provide a university-level education in this area of studies; it had 88 undergraduate and 13 graduate students in 1983–84. A new Centre for Food Sciences and a new Chair in Agricultural Botany have been established. At the ceremony inaugurating the Centre, the Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture stated that the Centre would concentrate on 'the development and introduction of new crops and new varieties of existing crops, improvement of livestock, other aspects of animal sciences, finding more effective utilization of agricultural products in industrial processing, improving the taste, shelf life and nutritional value of fresh produce, training food services management personnel especially for the tourism industry, stimulation of food exports through improved production, packaging and shipping, developing new sources of food bearing in mind the world food problem, and various areas of food biochemistry and technology.'

The Hebrew University's Marine Biology Laboratory at Eilat engages in teaching and research in the spheres of chemical and biological oceanography, marine microbiology, and fish pathology and parasitology. It also has a miniature research submarine capable of submerging to 200 metres as well as an underwater habitat for carrying out long-term experiments in the depths of the sea. The study of marine agriculture has been transferred to a special institute of the Israel Oceanographic and Limnologic Research Society.

The Faculty of Medicine has 1,230 students in its five schools and some 2,000 medical doctors have enrolled in its Institute of Post-Graduate Medical Education. The Hadassah Medical School has 515 students in its six-year programme of training; 88 of these are freshmen. The School of Pharmacy has 285 students, a quarter of whom are freshmen; 247 are registered for a Bachelor's degree, 18 for a Master's, and 20 for Doctorates. It is now possible for undergraduates to specialize in community pharmacy, clinical and hospital pharmacy, or industrial and research pharmacy.

The Hadassah School of Dental Medicine has 337 students, including 48 in their first year who were selected out of several hundred applicants. Some 60 students are being trained as dental hygenists or dental assistants. The Hadassah School of Nursing has 242 students; the majority, 172, are in Jerusalem while 70 are in the School's branch at Assaf Harofeh Medical Centre. A course in computer studies has been introduced as well as a clinical course in geriatrics and gerontology. The Hadassah School of Occupational Therapy has 115 students, 32 of whom are in their first year. In their second and third years, students undergo clinical training to acquire professional experience and to become acquainted with the various areas of care and treatment. There are 20 students registered for a special studies course leading to a Bachelor's degree.

The School of Public Health and Community Medicine has 59 students enrolled for a Master of Public Health degree; they are doctors, nurses, social

workers, and graduates of other health-oriented disciplines. The School also has a special international course in English for students from developing countries; 20 have registered for the 1983–84 academic year.

The Faculty of Social Sciences has 3,300 students. There was a record number of applicants for the 1983–84 session: 5,500, of whom 900 were accepted. There are altogether 2,100 undergraduates; of the 1,200 graduate students, 950 are registered for a Master's degree and 250 for a Doctorate.

The School of Social Work has about 550 students, of whom 350 are undergraduates. There are Master's degrees in Social Welfare Administration, in Social Welfare Research, and in Supervision of Social Welfare Practitioners; 110 graduates are engaged in these courses. There are also students with Bachelor degrees in other disciplines who are following a shortened programme for a Bachelor of Social Work degree. Those with a Bachelor's degree in Sociology, Psychology, or Behavioural Sciences can register for a special programme leading to a Master of Social Work degree. The School also trains graduates for senior positions as Community Centre Directors and as Day Care Centre Directors.

The Faculty of Law has 620 students; 490 are undergraduates while 30 are working for a Master's degree and a further 30 for a Doctorate. In addition, there are 70 graduates in the Faculty's Institute of Criminology who are registered for a Master's. A new programme has been devised about the European Community, dealing with aspects of law in European countries.

The Institute of Asian and African Studies has a new Centre for Islamic Research in addition to its Department of the History of Muslim Countries and to its Department of Islamic Civilization. It is also offering a new programme in Korean Studies and courses in classical and in spoken Japanese.

The Institute of Languages, Literature, and Art has a Department of Romance Philology which is offering for the first time the option of a subsidiary subject in Judeo-Spanish language and literature to undergraduates. One of the courses is on the inter-relationship between Judeo-Spanish and Spanish literature in the Middle Ages; for more advanced students there are courses on Ladino translations from the Scriptures and on the Judeo-Spanish press of the Ottoman Empire. Judeo-Italian is also taught, but only at the M.A. level.

The School of Education has some 900 students; 120 of them are working for a Master's degree. A further 550, an increase of 100 over the previous year, are following the teacher training programme while about 800 practising teachers have been enrolled in various in-service courses. There is a new programme for training in vocational education.

The Centre for Pre-Academic Studies aims 'to bring capable young people who in the past lacked proper academic opportunities, up to the level where they can study in the University's various Faculties'. Numbers have been steadily rising, from 354 in 1979–80 to 600 in 1983–84.

The Graduate School of Library and Archives Studies has some 100 students registered for a Master of Library Science degree or a Diploma. There are also in-service study programmes for about 100 librarians, archivists, and scientists from various institutions; one of the courses deals with On-Line Retrieval of Information from Computerized Storage. A new Unit for the Promotion of Reading aims to create reading motivation and to develop

reading habits among both children and adults by non-formal methods of teaching.

The Faculty of Science has some 2,500 students registered for a B.Sc. degree; half of them are freshmen. There are 500 who are working for a Master's and a further 500 for a Doctorate. The Faculty has also admitted 100 outstanding high school leavers who combine their studies with compulsory military service; another 100 are enrolled in various refresher courses.

The Graduate School of Applied Science and Technology trains science graduates for work in Israeli industry and institutes of applied research and development. It has 90 students enrolled for a Master's degree and 40 for a Doctorate. There are a further seven post-doctoral students who are undergoing retraining in the technology of applied industrial research. The Institute of Chemistry has a new analytic laboratory designed to provide services for industry.

The Autumn 1983 issue of *News from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem* states that a Research Centre for Molecular Dynamics has been established in the Givat Ram Science Campus. There is also a new Centre for the Normal and Psychopathological Development of the Child and Adolescent. A Chair in Property Law and a Chair in Family Medicine have been inaugurated.

*

According to *Bar-Ilan University News* (vol. 28, no. 1, 1983), the University has a total of 11,130 students, 15 per cent of whom are engaged in graduate studies. The Faculty of Social Sciences leads with 58 per cent of the total number of students, followed by the Faculties of Jewish Studies with 16 per cent, of Natural Sciences with 10 per cent, of Humanities with 9 per cent, of General Studies with 4 per cent, and finally the Law Faculty with the remaining 3 per cent. The students are from 65 countries and a third of them are Oriental Jews.

Bar-Ilan University now has a Chair in Yiddish Language and Literature; it is 'Israel's first academic chair to utilize Yiddish as the language of instruction'.

*

The January 1984 issue of *MEMO* (*Middle East and Mediterranean Outlook*) states that a Centre for the Revival and Development of the Arab Heritage has been established in Taibeh, in Northern Israel, under the chairmanship of a Palestinian Arab. It will have a public library, a research centre, a folklore section, and an educational bureau.

*

The March 1984 issue of *Les Cahiers de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle* states that in the academic year 1982–83 the AIU had 13,660 pupils in 37 schools and colleges in eight countries. There were 546 pupils in three schools in France; 2,341 in six schools in Iran; 5,689 in seven schools in Israel; 1,653 in 11 schools in Morocco; and 528 in one school in Syria. Apart from these 28 educational establishments, the *Alliance* has nine affiliated schools: one in Belgium with 544

pupils, six in Canada with a total of 2,095 pupils, and two in Spain with a total of 264 pupils.

*

The Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews published last December a booklet by Barry A. Kosmin and Caren Levy entitled *Synagogue Membership in the United Kingdom 1983*. There are 328 congregations in the United Kingdom, with a total of 78,899 male and 30,527 independent female members in 295 synagogue buildings. The authors state: 'In Orthodox synagogues married women are not counted as members unless they themselves join and pay an individual subscription, whereas in progressive Synagogues (Reform and Liberal) women and men have equal membership. . . .' (p. 2).

As far as male membership is concerned, the Central Orthodox group accounted for 70.5 per cent of the total, with 55,606 members in 221 congregations; the Reform, for 15.2 per cent with 12,030 members in 36 congregations; the Liberals, for 7.2 per cent with 5,661 members in 23 congregations; the Right-wing Orthodox, for 4.4 per cent with 3,482 members in 35 congregations; and the Sephardim, for 2.7 per cent with 2,120 members in 13 congregations.

The overwhelming majority of congregations (308 out of 328) are in England. Scotland has 12 (9 in Glasgow and one each in Aberdeen, Dundee, and Edinburgh) with a total of 4,206 members; Wales has 5 (one each in Bangor, Cardiff, Llandudno, Newport, and Swansea) with a total of 837 members; Northern Ireland's only congregation is in Belfast, with 312 members; Jersey's is in St. Helier, with 82 members; and the Isle of Man's congregation is in Douglas, with 30 members.

Greater London has more than half of the total number of congregations in England: 162. The majority (97) are Central Orthodox, followed by 29 Right-wing Orthodox, 15 Reform, 13 Liberal, and 8 Sephardi; and the total number of male members is 53,359. The Provinces of the United Kingdom have 166 congregations and again the majorityof these (124) are Central Orthodox. The Reform are in second place with 21, followed by the Liberal with 10, the Right-wing Orthodox with 6, and the Sephardi with 5. The total number of male members of provincial congregations is 25,540.

The number of Jewish religious congregations in the United Kingdom is in decline: there were 368 in 1970, 351 in 1977, and 328 in 1983. The number of synagogue buildings has also declined from 345 in 1970, to 315 in 1977, and 295 in 1983, as a result of the closure or amalgamation of synagogues.

The authors state that 'whereas male synagogue membership has declined by 4.9% since 1977, the total number of household memberships has only declined by 1.8%. The concept of family membership of synagogues and the failure to differentiate between the sexes as regards membership has been a noticeable feature of returns from synagogues in recent years even among Orthodox congregations. This possibly reflects the trend towards increasing female membership in all synagogue groups. Social and demographic changes in the Jewish communities have led to a growing number of independent female memberships in line with the general growth in the number of widows,

single parents, spinsters, and women who have married-out but wish to maintain their ties with Judaism.'

*

The fourth British seminar on Judeo-Spanish Studies was held last March in a hall of residence of Glasgow University; it was convened by the Professor of Hispanic Studies. The participants included a lecturer in Romance philology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a professor who has established a programme of Judaic Studies in the University of Connecticut, and a contributor from the University of Birmingham.

*

The Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies was founded in 1972 as a Centre associated with Oxford University; it is also an Associated Centre of St Cross College, Oxford. Modern Hebrew is taught at three levels — elementary, intermediate, and advanced. The Centre's principal aim 'is the encouragement of study and research not only in Hebrew language and literature but also in the various fields of Jewish history and culture. . . . The Centre is also interested in religion, law, philosophy, and Jewish sociology, as well as in Yiddish studies'.

The Report of the Centre for the academic year 1982–83 states that in addition to its classes and lectures there were seminars on Life and Letters in Contemporary Israel, Modern Jewish History and Society, and Problems of Jewish History and Literature. There was also a Summer Programme in Yiddish Language and Literature in August 1983, with 50 students from 11 countries; one of them was a Japanese professor from the University of Tokyo.

The Second International Conference on Research in Yiddish Language and Literature was held in Oxford in July 1983; it was sponsored jointly by the Oxford Centre, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Columbia University of New York, McGill University of Montreal, Hebrew Union College, and the Max Weinreich Center for Advanced Jewish Studies, YIVO Institute for Jewish Research.

*

Oxford University now has a one-year postgraduate course leading to a degree of Master of Studies (M. St.). Two of the subjects are Jewish Studies in the Graeco-Roman Period and Modern Jewish Studies; the latter course will be taught mainly by the academic staff of the Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies.

*

A report by the National Insurance Institute of Israel, published last January, states that half a million Israelis (including 100,000 children) are living below the poverty line; they account for one eighth of the population. A particular cause for concern is that 220,000 of them are members of households with at least one wage earner, which shows the extent to which pay has been eroded by the country's soaring inflation. The remaining 280,000 are

pensioners and welfare recipients entirely dependent on National Insurance payments.

*

According to a Haifa University survey, the average life expectancy of a male resident of a kibbutz is 74.7 years compared to 71 years for a man living in a city. A woman living in a kibbutz has an average life expectancy of 78.9 years compared to 75 years for one living in a city.

*

It was reported last March that the Centre for Information and Documentation on Israel (CIDI) at The Hague carried out a survey of antisemitic incidents in Holland in 1983. The survey was modelled on the annual reports of similar incidents in the United States by B'nai B'rith's Anti-Defamation League (ADL). The CIDI survey lists 60 cases of antisemitism in Holland during 1983; these include the publication of five antisemitic books, the distribution on ten occasions of antisemitic banners, badges, and stickers, and four anti-Jewish meetings. It also notes that there has been a sharp increase of antisemitic slogans at football matches.

The ADL European Foundation in Paris and Holland's CIDI collaborate to combat prejudice and discrimination.

*

WIZO (Women's International Zionist Organization) has inaugurated two more day care centres in Israel to cater for children from disadvantaged families or whose mothers go out to work. One is in Afula and will look after 90 young children; the other is in Ramat Alon, a suburb of Jerusalem, and will accommodate 130 children aged six months to four years. WIZO's Child Welfare Department in Israel is responsible for the care of 13,150 pre-school children in 204 institutions.

A WIZO youth centre and music centre has been established in Tiberias. WIZO runs 80 youth clubs in Israel, mainly in underprivileged areas, in collaboration with the Department of Education and various municipalities.

*

The January 1984 issue of *On Board*, the newsletter of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, reported that there are some 25,000 Jews in Chile. The capital, Santiago, has six synagogues and members of the Government 'regularly attend the High Holyday services as a sign of respect for the Jewish community'.

*

Immigrants, Minorities and Race Relations, by Victor F. Gilbert and Darshan Singh Tatla, was published last March by Mansell (6 All Saints Street, London N1 9RL). It is a bibliography of theses and dissertations presented at British and Irish universities from 1900 to 1981. The Preface states: 'The

material is divided into two main sections: General and Theoretical Studies, arranged by subject; and National and Regional Studies, arranged geographically and further subdivided by subject where necessary. . . . Each entry contains the following information: author, title of the thesis, degree awarded, the university . . . , and the year in which the degree was awarded.'

In Part I there is a section entitled 'Jews: General and Comparative Studies', listing 29 titles; another section on race, minorities, and literature includes a sub-section on 'Jews and Literature' which lists 25 titles. Part II has a section on the Midle East which includes a sub-section on relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine and in Israel, listing 48 titles. There are also references to theses and dissertations on Jews in various countries, from Austria to Yemen. Under the heading of Great Britain, there is a section on specific community studies of immigrants and minorities and a sub-section on the Jewish community and antisemitism lists 28 titles. Finally, there is a detailed subject index as well as an index of authors.

*

The first volume of the *Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual* appeared last April. Those wishing to contribute to future volumes are invited to submit papers to the Managing Editor, *Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual*, 9760 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90035, USA. Papers for Volume III must be received by 15 April 1985. The *Annual* 'is designed to be the first serial publication in the United States focusing on the scholarly study of the Holocaust'. The range of subjects to be covered includes Nazi Germany and the Final Solution (1933–45); European Jewry during the Second World War; refugees, rescue, and Displaced Persons; immigration; and modern antisemitism.

*

The Institute of Jewish Affairs (11 Hertford Street, London W1Y 7DX) regularly publishes Research Reports. Recent reports include the following titles: 'Spotlight on the Liberty Lobby: an aspect of American antisemitism'; 'Nazi war criminals: the search and the legal process continue'; 'The West German elections, March 1983. Features of Jewish interest'; 'Eight Soviet Jews appeal for the creation of an Anti-Zionist Committee'; 'The anti-foreigner campaign in Germany'; 'Legal aspects of the Israeli incursion into Lebanon and the Middle East conflict'; 'Interfaith dialogue in Israel. A survey of the current position'; 'Anti-Jewish attitudes in the Arabic media, 1975–1981'; 'Jews, Arabs and antisemites in Latin America'; 'The Second World Conference on Racism'; 'The International Conference on the Question of Palestine'; 'Uni-national and mixed marriages in the USSR: further statistical data on Soviet Jewry'; 'The PLO revolt in the Arab media'; 'Politics and Morality: Chancellor Kohl's Visit to Israel. A survey of German press reactions'; 'The Druze: *enfants terribles* of the Middle East?'; and '*Pravda* equates Zionism with Fascism'.

*

The Judaica Collector is an illustrated quarterly sponsored by the Jewish National Fund for Great Britain and Ireland. It covers the world of Jewish ceremonial objects, artefacts, stamps, coins, books, posters, postcards, etc. The annual subscription is £6.00 and a sample copy is obtainable at £1.00 from *The Judaica Collector*, Harold Poster House, Kingsbury Circle, London NW9 9SP.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Abercrombie, Nicholas, Stephen Hill, and Bryan S. Turner, *The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology*, 267 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1984, paperback, £3.50 (Allen Lane hardback, £10.95).

Bernstein, Philip, *To Dwell in Unity. The Jewish Federation Movement in America Since 1960*, xv + 394 pp., The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1983, $19.95.

Brewer, John D., *Mosley's Men. The British Union of Fascists in the West Midlands*, xii + 159 pp., Gower Publishing Co., Croft Road, Aldershot, 1984, £13.50.

Cohen, Steven M., *American Modernity and Jewish Identity*, Foreword by Charles E. Silberman, xvi + 210 pp., Tavistock Publications, London, 1983, paperback, £4.95.

Elazar, Daniel J. with Peter Medding, *Jewish Communities in Frontier Societies: Argentina, Australia, and South Africa*, x + 357 pp., Holmes & Meier, New York and London, 1983, $44.50.

Francis, Doris, *Will You Still Need Me, Will You Still Feed Me, When I'm 84?*, xiii + 252 pp., Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1984, $18.50.

Gilbert, Victor F. and Darshan Singh Tatla, *Immigrants, Minorities and Race Relations. A bibliography of theses and dissertations presented at British and Irish universities, 1900–1981*, with an introductory essay by Colin Homes, xxxiii + 153 pp., Mansell Publishing, 6 All Saints Street, London N1 9RL, 1984, £13.50.

Gould, Julius, *Jewish Commitment. A Study in London*, x + 113 pp., Institute of Jewish Affairs, 11 Hertford Street, London, W1Y 7DX, 1984, £6.00.

Heilman, Samuel C., *The People of the Book. Drama, Fellowship, and Religion*, x + 337 pp., University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1983, $22.50.

Kahn, Paul, ed., *Proceedings of the Associations of Orthodox Jewish Scientists*, vol. 7, Behavioral Sciences and Mental Health, 229 pp., Sepher-Hermon Press, New York, 1984, paperback, $12.95.

Kateb, George, *Hannah Arendt. Politics, Conscience, Evil*, xiii + 204 pp., Rowan & Allanheld, 81 Adams Drive, Totowa, NJ, 1983, $24.95.

Kosmin, Barry A. and Caren Levy, *Synagogue Membership in the United Kingdom 1983*, 39 pp., Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, Woburn House, Upper Woburn Place, London, WC1H 0EP, 1983, paperback, £1.00.

Liebman, Charles S. and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Religion and Politics in Israel*, xi + 148 pp., Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1984, $17.50.

Linzer, Norman, *The Jewish Family. Authority and Tradition in Modern Perspective*, 217 pp., Human Sciences Press, New York, 1984, $24.95 (paperback, $14.95).

Piette, Christine, *Les Juifs de Paris (1808-1840). La marche vers l'assimilation*, no. 28 of Les cahiers d'histoire de l'Université Laval, 211 pp., Les Presses de l'Université Laval, Québec, 1983, $8.50; also available from Editions ESKA, 30, rue de Domrémy, 75013 Paris, France.

Schmelz, U. O., Paul Glikson, and S. Della Pergola, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1981, Proceedings of the Demographic Sessions Held at the Eighth World Congress of Jewish Studies in Jerusalem, August 1981*, Jewish Population Studies no. 16, 457 pp., Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in conjunction with the World Union of Jewish Studies and the Association for Jewish Demography and Statistics, Jerusalem, 1983, n.p.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

ALTMAN, Yochanan; Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Occupational and Community Research, Middlesex Polytechnic. Chief publications: co-author, 'The cultural Bases of Soviet Georgia's Second Economy', *Soviet Studies*, vol. 35, no. 4, October 1983; and co-author, 'Feasts and Drinking in a Soviet Society' in Mary Douglas, ed., *The Anthropology of Drinking*, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

FINESTEIN, Israel; Q.C., M.A. Crown Court Judge; Vice-President, Jewish Historical Society of England. Chief publications: 'The New Community: 1880–1918' in V. D. Lipman, ed., *Three Centuries of Anglo-Jewish History*, 1961; 'An Aspect of the Jews and English Marriage Law During the Emancipation: The Prohibited Degrees', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 7, no. 1, June 1965; 'Jewish Immigration in British Party Politics', in Jewish Historical Society of England, *Migration and Settlement*, 1971; 'Anglo-Jewry Since 1933', *The Jewish Quarterly*, vol. 30, no. 4, 1983; and editor of James Picciotto's *Sketches of Anglo-Jewish History*, 1956, reissued 1984.

HUNDERT Gershon David; Ph.D. Assistant Professor, Department of History and Jewish Studies Program, McGill University. Chief publications: 'An Advantage to Peculiarity? The Case of the Polish Commonwealth', *Association for Jewish Studies Review*, vol. 6, 1981; 'Jews, Money and Society in the Seventeenth-Century Polish Commonwealth', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 43, no. 3–4, Summer-Fall 1981; 'Reflections on the "Whig" Interpretation of Jewish History' in H. Joseph *et al.*, eds, *Truth and Compassion: Essays in Memory of Rabbi Solomon Frank*, 1983; 'On the Jews in Poland-Lituania During the Seventeenth Century: Some Comparative Perspectives', *Revue des études juives*, vol. 43, no. 2, 1983; and with Gershon Bacon, *The Jews in Poland and Russia: Bibliographical Essays*, 1984.

KOLACK, Shirley, Ph.D. Professor of Sociology, University of Lowell. Chief publications: 'Iberian Jewish Communities. A Letter from Spain', *Midstream*, March 1970; 'A Course in Ethnic Studies', *Teaching Sociology*, October 1975; 'The Ambiguous Status of the Jews of Mexico', *Conservative Judaism*, Fall-Winter 1976–77; 'Beer-Sheva: Israel's Melting Pot. Myth or Reality?', *Midstream*, May 1979; and 'Teaching with Engineers and Scientists: What Role for Sociologists?' *The Humanist Sociologist*, December 1980.

LEWIS, Herbert S.; Ph.D. Professor of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin. Chief publications: *A Galla Monarchy*, 1965; 'The Origins of the Galla and Somali', *Journal of African History*, vol. 7, no. 1, 1966; *Leaders and Followers: Some Anthropological Perspectives*, 1974; 'European Ethnicity in Wisconsin', *Ethnicity*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1978; 'Warfare and the Origin of the State' in M. Claessen and P. Skalnik, eds, *The Study of the State*, 1981.

MARS, Gerald; Ph.D. Reader in Occupational and Community Research and Head of the Centre for Occupational and Community Research,

Middlesex Polytechnic. Chief publications: *Cheats at Work: An Anthropology of Workplace Crime*, 1982; co-author, 'How a Soviet Economy Really Works: The Case of Soviet Georgia' in M. Clarke, ed., *The Sociology of Corruption*, 1983; and co-author, *The World of Waiters*, 1984.