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'IF YOU WILL IT, IT IS NO FAIRY TALE': THE FIRST JEWISH UTOPIAS

Miriam Eliav-Feldon

I

MANY scholars who have studied the re-emergence of utopias in the late Renaissance have attempted answers to the perplexing question of their absence from Western literature for almost two millennia after Plato's *Republic*. Similarly, Jewish literature did not include utopias proper until the late nineteenth century and, it seems, for the very same reasons. Utopias proper could not be written until there came into existence the first generations of lay intellectuals. A utopia proper is a literary work describing an ideal imaginary society created on this earth by human powers alone. The utopist, as Ruyer defines him, 'c'est l'homme qui joue à être dieu et non l'homme qui rêve d'un monde divin'[1] — is a man who plays at being a god, not a man who dreams of a divine world. As long as culture was entirely dominated by theology, such a notion was precluded from thought.[2] The utopian propensity, which the Manuels were right, I believe, to describe as perennial and universal,[3] found its satisfaction through other channels: Paradise, city of God, Days of the Messiah, the Millennium — all perfect states of existence but either forfeited through human sin, or other-worldly, or dependent upon divine intervention in the ordinary course of history. And since these ideal states were not man-made, it was not possible for man to imagine what they would be like. 'The eye hath not seen, O Lord, beside thee, what he hath prepared for him that waiteth for him.'[4] The descriptions of a future perfect existence in both Jewish and Christian literature never offered much beyond general slogans about peace, harmony, brotherhood, happiness, etc. The two theologies would brand as sinful hubris any attempt to draw a detailed blueprint for the divine plan of human social salvation.[5]

The earliest literary manifestation of Jewish Messianism can be found in the *Book of Zrubbabel*, composed in the seventh century. In this book, which influenced many later visions of the great redemption, the emphasis was mainly on the apocalyptic stage with very little thought devoted to the order of the world after the appearance of the true

Messiah.[6] Eschatology and Millenarianism, both Christian and Jewish, throughout the Middle Ages, followed the same pattern — namely, imagining in detail the catastrophes that would portend the appearance of the Saviour, but avoiding a commitment to a detailed portrayal of His reign. Furthermore, the great Messianic outburst of the seventeenth century, led by Shabbetai Zevi, left the Jewish consciousness with a deep fear of a 'False Messiah', and the strongest prohibitions on the hastening of the End of Days. That fear was manifested even when the Zionist movement emerged in the nineteenth century, as witnessed in the virulent attacks upon it by the ultra-orthodox, the echoes of which can still be heard in modern-day Israel.

Popular culture, in Medieval Europe, offered another dream of escape from the hardships of reality to a worldly material bliss in the lands of Cockayne. These, however, were dreams of individual, not social, happiness, where all physical needs were satisfied without toil or effort thanks to wonders of nature.[7] Medieval Jewish literature also presented a legendary land where an entire Jewish community, and not only the individual, was free of the predicament of the Jews in the Diaspora, in the popular legends about the ten lost tribes of Israel. This tradition was based primarily on the tales of the ninth-century traveller, Eldad the Danite. In his stories we find a peninsula, beyond the legendary Sambatyon river, where the Sons of Levi lead an idyllic pastoral life, marred by neither crime nor inequality. These tales offered consolation: God had not forsaken His people entirely; somewhere parts of the nation were blessed with a proud and independent existence. Eldad's stories, however, are not a utopia proper: the Sons of Levi had not created this earthly paradise by their own powers but were transported miraculously to an extraordinary land where unclean beasts and reptiles did not dwell, where nature supplied most of their needs, and an unnatural river which rolled torrents of sand and stones protected them from the evil world. There are very few details about social life, organization, and institutions, in this land beyond the Sambatyon. These tales belong, in fact, to the genre of imaginary voyages, so popular in Medieval Europe, which often borders on the utopian genre, and fulfils an escapist-consolatory function. The Christian legends about Prester John were apparently linked to the stories of Eldad the Danite.[8]

For Christian Europe the laicization of the intelligentsia took place during the Renaissance, and then, beginning with More's *Libellus*, the utopian propensity could find expression in secular form: rejecting the *contemptus mundi*, rehabilitating the present as a period not inferior to any other as a possible setting for an ideal society, rehabilitating Man as a creature capable of extricating himself from the vale of tears. For the Jews, this renaissance was to come several centuries later. The physical and mental emergence from the ghetto, in the gradual process

of emancipation, began with the French Revolution. The *Haskalah* (Enlightenment) movement opened the gates to secular learning, and assimilation began to be considered by many as a way of escaping the Jewish predicament. It was the disillusion with emancipation and assimilation, caused by new and virulent forms of antisemitism which did not distinguish between assimilated and non-assimilated Jew, that led to the birth of modern Zionism. The rebellion of the new lay intelligentsia was directed both against the traditional passive waiting for the Messiah and against the false promises of assimilation. Jewish intellectuals, both eastern and western European, trained in the values of secular culture, could be deterred no longer by the prohibitions and fetters of the religious establishment from envisaging a perfect ideal society of Jews created by their own will-power and determination.

The first Jewish utopias began to appear in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, and though they varied considerably in content, they constitute, in form and general aims, a homogenous group. This is a group entirely omitted from the histories and anthologies of Western utopian thought. Only one of them, Theodor Herzl's *Altneuland* (Old–New Land), published in Vienna in 1902, receives brief mention in a few studies.[9] *Altneuland*, indeed, deserves special attention because of the unique position of Herzl as the founder of political Zionism; his vision of the end-product of the movement which he had initiated has had an immense impact. But Herzl was neither the only nor the first Zionist utopist. An impressive array of writers, mostly European Jews, portrayed the ideal society to be established in Zion in the not-too-distant future. Such utopias continued to appear well after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.[10] Historians of Zionism also tend to overlook these literary manifestations of the Jewish aspirations for a perfect society in the land of the Fathers, probably because most of them had little or no influence on Zionist activities. But for the historian of utopias they constitute an interesting case-study and I believe they ought to be rescued from oblivion.[11]

For this paper, I have chosen to examine Theodor Herzl's *Altneuland* together with six Zionist utopias which preceded it. The works written subsequently belong, in many respects, to a different category because the Balfour Declaration, issued by the British government in 1917, had suddenly made the dream about a Jewish homeland in Palestine appear to be coming true, an imminent reality. The group discussed here is of the first known Zionist utopias, written during the genesis of the Zionist movement, when the dream was shared by only a small minority of Jews who were considered by most of their correligionists to be incredible cranks. From the viewpoint of a historian of utopian thought, the interesting question is the relation of these compositions to the general genre of Western utopias — what distinguishes them as a

group on the one hand, and how they conform to the common characteristics of utopias on the other hand. Before the analysis, however, these rather obscure authors and works require an introduction.

1. EDMUND MENACHEM EISLER (1850–1942), a Slovakian Jew who was a coal merchant and insurance agent, had received both a traditional-Jewish and a multi-lingual European education, and published several novels as well as many articles in Jewish journals. He corresponded with Herzl and other Zionist leaders but did not participate in political activities. *Ein Zukunftsbild* (An Image of the Future) was written in 1882 and published anonymously in Vienna in 1885.[12] The immediate circumstances that led him to conceive the utopia were the blood-libel affair in the Hungarian town of Tiszaeszlár in 1882 and the wave of antisemitism in Hungary which followed. The politician responsible for the hate-filled atmosphere against the Jews was one Győzö Istoczy, who in 1878 had suggested to the Budapest parliament that the Jews be transported to Palestine to establish their own state among their 'fellow Semites'.

Eisler's story begins with pogroms in a Jewish community which drive the hero, a young man called Avner, to rebel against the passive submission of his people and to start a campaign to lead the Jews out of Europe to the Promised Land. By petitions and speeches in parliaments, the governments of Europe are persuaded to obtain from the Turkish Sultan a concession over Palestine. Soon, a mass exodus begins to the Holy Land where Avner is elected king, leads his people to victory over hostile neighbours, and creates the prosperous, just, and peace-loving State of Judah. We learn of the institutions and customs of the land by a sample of its constitutional laws which pertain to many aspects of life. The author includes also a prophetic description of the future of Europe, after the departure of the Jews — a prophecy of war and doom, with France conquered by Germany and Russian hordes invading Western Europe. Antisemitism, he concludes, was a poison and a symptom of all the evil forces for which the Jews were but a scape-goat. A copy of Eisler's utopia was found in Herzl's private library and may have had some influence on the composition of his *Altneuland* which was to appear seventeen years later.

2. ELHANAN LEIB LEWINSKY (1857–1910), brought up in the spirit of the *Haskalah* movement, was one of the earlier Zionist leaders in Russia. After the pogroms of 1881, he went on a visit to Palestine and returned an ardent Zionist. Later he became the representative in Russia of the Palestinian 'Carmel' wine company, and was one of the founders of the *Ivriyya* — a movement for the revival of the Hebrew language.

Massa le-Eretz Yisrael bi-Shnat Tat la-Elef ha-Hamishi (A Journey to the land of Israel in the year 5800 [C.E. 2040]) was published in the first issue of the Hebrew periodical *Pardes* in 1892 in Odessa.[13] A newly-

wedded Jewish couple go for their honeymoon to the Land of Israel, which has become a flourishing Jewish society and the spiritual and cultural centre of the entire Jewish nation. There is a long and detailed description of life there, seen through the eyes of the admiring traveller who supplements what he has witnessed with what he reads in the local newspapers and what he finds in the advertisements (a novel source, I believe, in utopian literature, for details of everyday life in the imaginary land).

Lewinsky's utopia was second to Herzl's in its renown among the Zionists, and was often compared favourably with *Altneuland* by Herzl's critics, who preferred Lewinsky's stress on the revival of Hebrew culture.

3. MAX OSTERBERG-VERAKOFF (1865–?), a German journalist and author of plays, children's books, and tourist guides, had a Jewish wife and was perhaps himself of Jewish origin. He published in Stuttgart in 1893 a utopia entitled *Das Reich Judäa im Jahre 6000 (2241 Christlicher Zeitrechnung)* — The Kingdom of Judah in the year 6000 (2241 C.E.).

After the expulsion of Jews from Moscow in 1891, a compassionate American evangelist, William Blackstone, had presented a memorandum to President Harrison urging the restoration of the Land of Israel to the Jews in order to rescue them from persecution in tsarist Russia. Blackstone's petition becomes, in the story, the basis for the initiative taken by the United States to help create the Kingdom of Judah. The book begins with a ceremonial unveiling of a commemorative statue to Blackstone, President Harrison, and his Secretary of State James Blaine. Life in the Jewish state is seen by a German Christian tourist who learns in detail the history of the process of the establishment of the state, the ingathering of the Jewish people within its borders, and the training of the citizens in agriculture and building. The society is patriarchal and very conservative; it is ruled by a king from the house of Montefiore, a council of elders, and a parliament. The priesthood is restored with all its ancient authority and privileges. A long chapter is devoted to a debate in the king's palace about the attitude that should be taken by the Jewish state towards the European governments which in the past had been responsible for the persecution of Jews. Should the Kingdom of Judah establish diplomatic relations with tsarist Russia? Should the house of Rothschild grant the Russian government a loan?

Herzl read this utopia in 1899 and addressed a warm letter to Osterberg-Verakoff, promising to acknowledge this utopian novel in his own work, and expressing wonder that the author had not chosen to join the Zionist movement which, claimed Herzl, was about to realize by political action what Osterberg-Verakoff had envisaged in his imagination.[14]

4. ISAAC FERNHOF, born in Galicia, was a teacher, Hebrew writer, and editor of a small literary Hebrew periodical *Sifrei Sh'ashuim* (Books

of Amusement). In the second issue of that journal he published in 1895 a story, 'Shnei Dimyonot'[15] (Two Visions), which expresses the impact of Herzl's programme in *Der Judenstaat*. A Jew, kicked and humiliated by a Polish fellow-traveller on a train, escapes in his imagination to the State of Israel — an idyllic society of Jews who had regained their independent statehood and their pride.

5. JACQUES BAHAR was the delegate of Algerian Jewry to the first Zionist Congress in Basle in 1897. He wrote several articles expressing anxious concern for the Jewish community in Algeria which was then suffering from a wave of antisemitic violence following the Dreyfus trial in France. His utopia, 'Anti-Goyism in Zion', was first published in the October 1898 issue of the Parisian journal *Siècle*, then translated into German and printed in the Zionist *Die Welt* (no. 6, 1898).[16] The story takes place in Jerusalem in 1997. The state of Zion has become a model to all nations, perfect in all respects and particularly in the absence of any form of discrimination or prejudice. A 'Dreyfus trial' in reverse takes place when a fanatic Gentile-hater is prosecuted and severely punished for his libels and false allegations against non-Jewish citizens of the state.

6. HENRY PEREIRA MENDES (1852–1937), born and educated in England, migrated to America and served for many years as rabbi of the Sephardi congregation in New York. He was one of the founders of the Federation of American Zionists, a prolific writer, and an advocate of enlightened modern orthodoxy. His utopia, *Looking Ahead* (1899),[17] reflects Edward Bellamy's influence only in the title.[18] It is a long (often tedious) analysis of all the evils plaguing civilization: endless wars (an almost prophetic description of the First and Second World Wars and of the development of annihilating weapons), battles between the unions of capitalists and of labourers, a growing gap between rich and poor, secret nihilistic societies constantly terrorizing governments and populations, and crime and immorality everywhere. After the apocalyptic catastrophes comes salvation: a council of pastors of all religions proclaims a 'Solution of Evils', a world constitution intended to restore peace and harmony. This is a document of extraordinary social conservatism in which salvation is dependent mainly on constant moral supervision by a board of pastors. The constitution is immediately adopted by all countries, and the only problem which remains is the rule over the Holy Land. After pleas from all churches, the historical right of the Jews is recognized and a Jewish state is created in Palestine. Jerusalem becomes the City of Peace and its government the arbitrator in all international conflicts. But it is also a perfect society for the Jews who have gathered to live there, and a cultural centre for those who have remained in their native countries. The description of the Jewish state was left to the last few pages of the book, a national within an international utopia. It contains fewer details about everyday life in

Zion than the other works do and in many ways it is a Jewish version of Christian eschatological 'Zionist' utopias in which the restoration of Palestine to the Jews is presented as the crucial step to the millennium.[19] However, Mendes's millennium, although inspired by religious ideals, is a secular dream attained by human powers alone.

7. HERZL began to write *Altneuland*[20] after his visit to Palestine in 1898. It was his last work before his death in 1904 — a Moses who did not live to enter the Promised Land.[21] Although he had read, or at least had known of, all the previous Zionist utopias, his own vision of the future society of the Jews in Palestine is very different from that of the others in many respects: it is more elaborate, more directly influenced by theories of nineteenth-century social thinkers, and less committed to the cultural Hebrew renaissance. It was more oriented to arouse the approval of Gentiles than, as he claimed, simply to raise the spirit of his people by the camp-fire.[22]

The plot begins with a young Viennese lawyer, an assimilated Jew, who, for reasons of unrequited love and general malaise, decides to join a German-American millionaire who had tired of the company of his fellow-men and wished to retire from the world. En route to their blessed isle they visit Palestine and find it a land of desolation. They return there twenty years later (in 1923) to discover to their amazement that it has been turned into a land of milk and honey by the Jews, who had gathered from the four corners of the earth to build with their own hands a New Society.

Der Judenstaat (1895) was Herzl's programme for the process of migration, settlement, and creation of a Jewish state; *Altneuland* was the portrayal of the imaginary outcome.

II

Several reasons justify approaching the Zionist group as a distinct case in the history of utopian literature.[23] First, the concern of these utopias was for an entire nation which has had a very unusual history among the nations of the world. The imaginary ideal society which they depict is intended, first and foremost, to be a solution to the specific predicament of the Jewish people. Utopias, as a rule, are written by intellectuals who desire to abolish injustice, inequality, ignorance, disease, tyranny, war, or human suffering in general. The Zionist utopist also wanted all that, but his primary aim was to save the Jews from persecution, discrimination, and humiliation. The new forms of antisemitism, based on 'scientific' racist ideologies, were seen by many as proof that European society was not willing to absorb or integrate the Jews, even when they shed their own culture and religion. It was the disillusion with the solutions of emancipation and assimilation which led to the determination of some Jewish thinkers to redeem their people

by removing them from Europe and creating for them a national home. In the case of our utopists it was a specific incident of persecution that motivated the escape to an imaginary, ideal, independent state of Jews: pogroms in Russia, expulsion from Moscow, a blood libel, the Dreyfus trial. Antisemitism did not subside with progress and enlightenment, it became more virulent and more inescapable, and as a consequence led to the birth of the Zionist movement in general and of the Zionist utopias in particular. Herzl pointed out this unique nature of the Zionist utopia when referring to Hertzka's project:[24] '*Freeland* is a complicated piece of machinery with many cogs and wheels; but I find in it no proof that it can be set in motion. As against this, my plan calls for the utilization of a driving force that actually exists. What is this force? The distress of the Jews.'[25]

Second, the Zionist utopia is not 'nowhere', it does not describe a non-existing land that could be anywhere on earth, but a very real and very specific corner of this world — *Eretz Yisrael*, the Promised Land from which the Jews were exiled and to which they have traditionally longed to return. 'Next year in Jerusalem' was said by Jews all over the world in their prayers, and it referred to the earthly Jerusalem, the real city that continued to exist throughout the centuries of exile. Indeed, all proposals to settle the Jews in a territory of their own in other parts of the world — Argentina, Africa, Grand Island, Birobidzhan — were never acceptable to the majority of the Jews and did not reach fruition. Therefore, the Zionist utopists had to solve in their imagination some problems quite different from those faced by other utopists: how to gather all the exiles, how to organize an orderly mass migration, and how to acquire a title over the particular territory which, at the time, was part of the Ottoman Empire and populated by Arabs.

Furthermore, this particular nation with its unique history had some very specific social problems. The Zionist utopists expressed the need, felt by many in the Zionist movement, for what they termed 'normalization', that is, reforming the Jews into a normal nation not only by regaining statehood, but also by instituting a normal spectrum of occupations, so that the citizens would become farmers, builders, artisans, labourers, and craftsmen. The return to the land had for them a dual meaning: going back to the homeland and going back to working the land after long centuries of being deprived of access to farming. In all these works we find long passages of eulogy to the Jewish farmer in the imaginary new state: 'Blessed are your tents, King of the field, your life — tiller of the soil';[26] 'Their main power and strength is in agriculture and in the sowing of plants, in which they have achieved great wonders. The Jews are a people of extremes — when they left the land, they left it completely, and when they work it, they do so with their entire soul, as they worship their God with devotion.'[27] Thus, while for the European utopist of the nineteenth century one of the

main problems was how to reconcile an existing agrarian society to the advancement of industry in which, so many believed, lay the true road to progress, for the Jewish utopist the issue was how to turn a nation mainly of pedlars, shopkeepers, innkeepers, and money-lenders into a nation of productive labourers. 'Those who were traders had to make a choice and join either the mechanics' division . . . or else they were dispatched to the depots for agriculturists.'[28]

The ideal of 'normalization' had a cultural facet as well: revival of the old culture which meant, first and foremost, revival of Hebrew as a spoken and living language. This is perhaps the greatest wonder described by the traveller to the imaginary Zion: children prattling in Hebrew, and school lessons, newspapers, theatres, parliamentary debates, lectures on science — all in Hebrew. Only two out of the seven authors actually wrote their utopias in Hebrew (Lewinsky and Fernhof), but for all of them except Herzl the revival of the language was one of the crucial elements in their vision of the Jewish national resurrection. That was indeed a most revolutionary ' utopian' notion in the last decades of the nineteenth century, when Hebrew lay education was in its earliest infancy: Eliezer Ben Yehuda's efforts in Palestine to make Hebrew the sole mother-tongue of his children was then considered to be ridiculously impractical. For the vast majority of Jews, Hebrew was still the 'holy tongue' to be used for religious purposes only.

In this respect, Herzl was an exception among our utopists: 'After all, we cannot converse in Hebrew. Who among us knows enough Hebrew to ask for a railroad ticket in this language?'[29] In *Altneuland* the inhabitants speak a medley of European languages, and cultural life in its towns is a modest replica of *fin-de-siècle* Vienna. On these grounds, Herzl aroused severe criticism among his fellow Zionists who accused him of indifference and lack of commitment to the cultural renaissance.

All these visions, however, including Herzl's, are laden with biblical associations. It was to the Kingdom of David and Solomon, the most glorious period in Jewish national history, that they were harking back. Names of people, places, even of the flora and fauna, are taken from the Old Testament and often carry specific connotations; the Temple is rebuilt in Jerusalem (Lewinsky, Osterberg-Verakoff, Mendes, and Herzl); the population is divided into twelve tribes (Eisler); ancient festivals are revived, such as that of the 15th of the month of Av, when girls all dressed in white go out to dance in the vineyards and the boys chase after them in search of brides (Lewinsky). The basic emotion underlying it all is the wish to erase two thousand years or more of history and to restore a glorious past, a past documented in the Bible and embellished by legends woven during the long years of exile.

However, it is not simply the past restored but rather one combined with all the positive achievements of Western science, technology, and

social and political institutions. It is a unique vision of Western civilization grafted upon a Biblical existence: the Temple lit by electricity, the Holy Land ploughed with tractors and criss-crossed by railways, the Kingdom of David governed by a parliamentary democracy.

Indeed, the attitude of our writers to Europe is extraordinarily ambivalent: on the one hand they wish to turn their backs on it once and for all, but on the other hand they would pack and take with them all the best products of its civilization. To some extent their hearts would be left behind — symbolically expressed in the request of King Avner, Eisler's utopian protagonist, to have a handful of earth from his motherland in Europe put under his head when laid to rest in the Kingdom of Judah.[30] In all these texts we find allusions to the fate of Europe after the departure of the Jews: sometimes it is a tale of disaster — the author seeking psychological relief in imagining the punishment visited upon the persecutor (Eisler, for example); more often it is a story of repentance — Europe redresses the wrongs perpetrated upon the Jews and Israel becomes the model of perfection for all nations, teaching the Gentiles the ways of peace and toleration so that hatred and contempt are turned into respect and admiration.

It has become practically a cliché to say that a utopia is always a mirror-image of the society in which it was written, that is, that its solutions reflect the most acute problems in the environment of the author. Therefore it is not surprising to find that toleration, the reverse of prejudice and discrimination, is one of the major elements in the Zionist utopia. Bahar's *Anti-Goyism* revolves around this theme, and in all the other utopias as well, the many non-Jews (Arabs, foreign merchants, Gentiles who wish to join the perfect society) enjoy equal rights in every respect, and nothing sets them apart from the Jewish citizens except their religious practices. The most famous figure among these is Rashid Bey in *Altneuland*, the learned, European-educated, German-speaking Muslim, who explains to the visitors how the Arabs of Palestine have prospered and benefited from the Jewish settlement and the achievements of the New Society. One cannot but be reminded of the Jew in Bacon's *New Atlantis*, thoroughly assimilated, practically a Christian.[31] The Zionist utopists did not ignore, as a rule, the question of the Arab population in Palestine (approximately 500,000 at the turn of the century), but they believed in all innocence that no problems should arise if the Jewish state would treat Arabs fairly. Only Eisler foresaw a war between Judah and its neighbours, but he too envisaged that hostilities would cease forever after the Jews achieved victory and offered benevolent terms of peace.

The distinguishing features of the Zionist utopias are all, then, consequent upon the unique history of the Jewish nation and the commitment to a specific territory. None the less, they are a branch inseparable from the tree of Western utopianism.

III

All utopias juxtapose evil reality with imagined perfection: Thomas More set the example by dividing his work into Book I, describing the faults of contemporary England, and Book II portraying the ideal life in Utopia. The counterpart example among our texts is Fernhof's 'Two Visions'. But even when not divided so schematically, the comparison between reality and ideal is constantly evoked. The notorious weakness of utopias, however, has always been the vagueness about the passage from reality to ideal, and it is precisely for this fault that the term 'utopian' has acquired its derogatory meaning. In the Zionist utopias, also, the bridge is drawn only in haziest outline and appears to be dangerously unstable. Few of them offer much beyond general statements about a mass exodus of Jews from their countries of residence, a concession over Palestine obtained somehow from the Turkish Sultan by the governments of the world, and the creation of the ideal society almost by a magic wand *ex nihilo*.

Our writers share with all utopists a peculiar combination of optimism and pessimism. They have a remarkable faith in human nature and in the potential powers of mankind to create a harmonious society, to strive for the good and to overcome evil. Utopias proper do not describe unattainable Gardens of Eden, but what is considered to be a *possible* reality. Utopias are written when the possible begins to seem less improbable. In the case of the Zionists, the circumstances which raised such hopes were the result both of specific international developments and of changed attitudes about the Jews: the expansion of European colonialism; the decisions of the Congress of Berlin; the weakness of the Ottoman Empire soon, as many believed, to be dismembered and devoured by the colonial powers; the emergence of national movements among European peoples whose right to an autonomous existence had never been previously recognized; and the voices of philo-semites calling for a just solution to the Jewish question (Disraeli's 'Zionist' novels *David Alroy* and *Tancred*;[32] George Eliot's *Daniel Deronda*; Blackstone's memorandum, etc.). Meanwhile, there were also developments in the Jewish world: the first agricultural settlements in Palestine were founded in the 1880s; and in parallel the voices of Zionists were beginning to be heard, particularly in eastern Europe, far more assiduously. But on the other hand, the road still seemed extremely long and hazardous, perhaps impassable. In the utopias themselves we find references to the insurmountable difficulties: indifference and hostility to the Zionist ideals on the part of the rich and mighty Jews, the fierce antagonism of the religious leadership, the passivity and helplessness of the Jewish masses, and, most of all, the refusal of governments to listen to Jewish appeals for aid. Thus, all our utopists could have ended their works with the words of Thomas More: 'It is easier for me to wish for . . . than to have any hope of seeing

realized.'[33] Symptomatically, Herzl devoted time to the writing of *Altneuland* when most in despair over his political activities: 'I am now industriously working on *Altneuland*. My hopes for practical success have now disintegrated. My life is no novel now. So the novel is my life.'[34]

The reliance on the good will of national rulers, and of the mighty, rather than on mass movements, is another trait typical of utopian visionaries. A resemblance comes to mind between Tommaso Campanella, early in the seventeenth century, presenting his utopian projects (*Civitas Solis*, *Monarchia di Spagna*, *Monarchia del Messia*) to popes, kings, and emperors, and Herzl pleading with every ruler prepared to listen to him, including the Sultan, parliaments, Prime Ministers, dukes, and millionaires, with *Altneuland* in hand presented as the attractive picture of the end-product of all his efforts.

The utopian propensity always grew when new areas were opened to European colonization: Hellenistic utopias were inspired by the conquests of Alexander the Great; the first Christian utopias were written when the New World was discovered to be a vast continent offering opportunities for new social experiments; the immense spaces of North America and the opening up of Africa to white settlement also brought in their wake a spate of utopian writing. The reason is that the building of a utopian society requires virgin soil where the entire new construction can be erected unhindered by the debris of centuries. Palestine, for the Zionists, was exactly such virgin soil, a slate clean of all the national deformities evolved during centuries of exile and dispersal, an almost deserted land where they could build everything from its foundations. 'We founded our New Society, so to speak, without any inherited dead-weight.'[35]

The static, a-historical nature of utopias has been commented upon by many scholars who have studied this genre. The imaginary society is created by a single act of the founders and not through a gradual process, and any future change is prohibited since it could only mean a deviation from perfection. The constitution decreed at the birth of the state is to be eternally valid (Eisler); Herzl's travellers see Palestine in 1903 as a desolate desert and only twenty years later as a fully-mature ideal society.

In sum, these were the utopian weaknesses: no clear road leading to the ideal, oscillation between hope and despair, reliance on the altruistic good will of existing governments, starting with a clean slate, and a disregard for historical evolution. But, though it may seem to be a contradiction in terms, utopists are also extraordinary realists.[36] First, because their imaginary societies are to be products of man alone: utopias proper have no elements of fantasy or science-fiction, nor do they have any kind of divine intervention. To quote Herzl once more: '. . . it was not possible . . . to change the laws of nature, any more than

it was possible to change the nature of man. But it was possible to make use of the forces of nature better than in the old days.'[37] Second, the utopist's realism is manifested in his integrative approach and addiction to detail. As Lewis Mumford put it: 'Utopian thinking was the opposite of one-sidedness, partisanship, partiality, provinciality, specialism. He who practiced the utopian method must view life synoptically and see it as an interrelated whole: not as a random mixture, but as an organic and increasingly organizable union of parts.'[38] These words are as applicable to the Zionist utopias as they are to all other creations of the genre. From the minutest detail of dress, and the most down-to-earth subjects such as public sanitation, to the loftiest issues of government and education; from the care of infants to burial practices; from regulations concerning the rights and duties of the individual citizen to the obligations and responsibilities of the ruler; from arcadian festivities of youth in the vineyards to sophisticated debates in parliament — all are integrated to create a vivid and persuasive 'speaking picture' of a living society. The comprehensive, all-embracing nature of utopias is the reason why their authors often consider them not as mere flights of fancy, but as the most important work of their lives, expressing their entire *Weltanschauung*.

IV

The Zionist utopists, then, were not satisfied simply to transplant the Jews of the Diaspora to the land of Israel, but desired to create there a new and perfect social order. Thus they had to contend with issues which had been the concern of utopias of all times: social justice, economic prosperity, the best form of law and government, health, and education. Within the limits of this paper, it is possible to point out only some of the highlights of Jewish utopias which show them to be a branch of the Western utopian tree, with some peculiar ramifications.

The authors of utopias are rarely skilled in political theory. They tend to rely on the assumptions that the right institutions and proper education would mould good citizens, and that enlightened rulers would have only the interests of the people at heart. Our imaginary societies range from the extremely conservative monarchies of Osterberg-Verakoff and Mendes to Herzl's association of citizens which is not a state but a general organization of co-operatives. In all of them, however, we find many of the elements of a Western parliamentary democracy based on meritocratic principles. In the kingdoms of Eisler, Osterberg-Verakoff, and Mendes, sovereignty is vested in the people, and the powers of the monarchs are curtailed not only by a Council of Elders but also by a parliament; in Herzl's New Society we find most of the institutions of a normal state, including an elected parliament and an elected president, but not an army.

In the sphere of law, our writers generally offer the customary utopian solutions: enlightened judges, simplified codices and processes of law, the accessibility of justice to all, complete absence of (or severe limitations upon) lawyers, and a humane and rehabilitating penal system. On the whole, of course, they expect crime to be minimal since there would be neither poverty nor drunkenness to generate it. In an ideal society, people will not have sorrows to drown; and Jews, adds Lewinsky, were never drunkards, even in hard times. Bahar's utopia, centred around a trial, contains most details about the legal system. Its highest judiciary tribunal is the Great Sanhedrin,[39] and instead of prisons there is a 'penal library' where the transgressor has to carry out research to prove the falsity of the notions that led him to commit his offence.

Economic prosperity, as in all utopias, is attained by the maximum utilization of all available assets: manpower, land, modern technology, and natural resources. The land of Israel had one particular asset of which two of our utopists (Lewinsky and Herzl) were aware: the Dead Sea and its rich mineral deposits. In both these utopias it becomes the centre of industry.[40] Herzl also realized that it had another potential: '. . . the Dead Sea was the lowest point on the earth's surface . . . It was indeed a simple idea to make use of this great difference in levels to generate power' by drawing water in a canal from the Mediterranean and creating a great waterfall.[41]

A further economic advantage would be derived from the location of Palestine at the crossroads of three continents which would make it a centre of international trade. Its climate, scenery, beaches, and spas (Tiberias and the Dead Sea) would be a leading tourist attraction.

As mentioned above, one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Zionist utopias is the agrarian ideal — the full return of the Jews to the land. In most of these texts, the majority of the population is composed of peasants cultivating their own land. The state distributes the land equally among the farmers and prohibits aggregation (Eisler, Fernhof). One method of preventing the amassing of property in the hands of the few is the biblical prescription of the *Yovel* (jubilee): in the fiftieth year all land returns to its original owners (Lewinsky) or to the New Society for redistribution (Herzl). But it appears that only Herzl from among our utopists was versed enough in contemporary affairs and social thought to be fully aware of the complexity of the issues of integrating industry and agriculture, town and village. In *Altneuland*, '. . . near the great cities home industry is the main staff of life, and the farming is only for the artisan-farmer's own needs . . . Then we have villages where the relation between industry and farming is reversed — where farming is the main source of income and industry is only a modest side-line . . .'.[42] The organization of production and consumption in the countryside is entirely based on co-operatives, while in the towns there are, side by side, co-operatives and private enterprises, the

latter owned by those who did not elect to become members of the New Society and restricted only by the regulations prohibiting exploitation of labour. In fact, Herzl's model is a perplexing and interesting case. Obviously, he borrowed ideas eclectically from social thinkers of various schools. His utopia, as mentioned above, does not describe a state but a community or a society organized mainly for the regulation of the economy; the term he uses to describe his system, 'mutualism', is derived directly from the lexicon of the anarchists. He was also influenced by Owen and Bellamy; he paid tribute to them explicitly in *Altneuland* and expressed admiration for the social experiments in Ralahine and Rochdale. Herzl shared the general optimism of the socialist utopists of his day about the success to be achieved by the mechanization of farming and by the application of science to agriculture (see his eulogies to electricity, tractors, etc.).[43] Yet, like Hertzka, he did not by any means desire to abolish private property and private enterprise. He believed his system to be '. . . the middle way between individualism and collectivism . . . the individual is neither ground small between the millstones of capitalism, nor beheaded by the levelling-down process of socialism . . .'.[44] And to this peculiar combination he added biblical motifs.[45]

All our utopists explicitly and vehemently eschewed the label of socialism. Eisler said: 'Judah did not know the socialist monster which ruins both state and family.'[46] Mendes listed the socialists among the dangerous elements from nihilists to Mafiosi.[47] Lewinsky and Osterberg-Verakoff both envisaged a future when America would have adopted Bellamy's socialist system but would not attain through it either social peace or economic success, while the Jewish state, based on rigorous conservative principles, would prosper and flourish. For Osterberg-Verakoff, it seems that the main purpose of his *Das Reich Judäa* was to depict a religious-conservative ideal as an alternative to socialism. Herzl also repudiated the connection between Zionism and socialism, but for undoubtedly political motives. In his meetings and correspondence with the high and the mighty he always tried to impress upon them that Zionism carried no revolutionary overtones; on the contrary, it might even serve to draw young Jews away from the radical movements.[48] Was he unaware of the fact, however, that his own utopia, which in his last years he so often presented as a visiting card, might evoke in the minds of all those eminent politicians and rulers the most 'dangerous' associations of anarchism and radical socialism? And how could he welcome so warmly the ultra-conservative utopia of Osterberg-Verakoff, claiming that it portrayed the end-product of his own political movement? It is probably true that social and economic issues for Herzl were secondary to the main crucial political problem of the creation of a Jewish homeland; nevertheless, these questions remain in need of a fuller answer.

All these utopian societies, whether conservative or radical, are basically welfare states, in the sense that medical care and education for all, as well as assistance to those in need, are entirely the responsibility of the state. This, in fact, is true of practically all Western utopias; but the Zionist utopists claim that all their ideals of social justice are based on biblical tenets dressed up in modern institutional form.[49]

Education has always been a major concern of the Jewish family and community, and thus it comes as no surprise to find a great deal of space devoted to learning and culture. Indeed, our authors and the humanist utopists of the Renaissance faced the same dilemma: on the one hand a utopian society calls for 'useful cogs' for whom academic learning is a luxury, but on the other hand the inclinations of the writer lead him to desire to see the entire population ardently seeking culture. The very learned peasants of Lewinsky's and Bahar's imagination are not significantly different from the utopian creatures in More's work who flock to lectures in Greek before dawn, or Johann Valentin Andreae's artisans in *Christianopolis* (1619) who were required to attain the highest degree of academic training. Education as the main moulding force of the good citizen is one of the basic notions of utopias, yet in the Zionist descriptions of ideal societies there is perhaps a unique flavour to the effusions about the miraculous (imaginary) existence of universities, academies, theatres, concert-halls, libraries, publishing houses, and newspapers — all expressing the renaissance of the Jewish nation and its ancient culture.

Medical care, preventive and remedial, has also been a central issue in Western utopias, particularly in periods of plagues and epidemics. In the utopias of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for instance, *Sanità* was probably the most prominent subject.[50] The Zionist utopists also regarded good health as a basis for a happy society, and stressed that the healthy environment, general prosperity, physical labour, and excellent medical care would turn the sickly, pale, and weak children of the Diaspora into the handsome and robust youth of Zion. They took special pride in a vision of the Land of Israel as an important medical centre serving all its neighbouring countries and attaining the highest levels of scientific research for the benefit of mankind.[51]

Conclusion

A land of justice, plenty, health, enlightenment, tolerance, and happiness — that was the vision which our writers dreamed of and desired to be realized through their peculiar combination of ancient biblical prescriptions and the best achievements of progress of nineteenth-century Europe. They shared the spirit of exuberance which generated such a flood of utopias in the second half of that century and which led Oscar Wilde to proclaim with conviction that 'Progress is the realization of utopias'.[52]

Clearly, then, the early Zionist utopias were part of what may be said to be the last great chapter in Western utopianism and in the stream of the well-known utopists and social reformers of the nineteenth century. However, since at the same time they are the *first* Jewish utopias, they also resemble, particularly in their expression of release from religious shackles upon men's ability to create their own heavens on earth, the group of the first Christian utopias which appeared during the Renaissance. Herzl's motto for *Altneuland*, 'If you will it, it is no fairy tale', no doubt would have pleased Thomas More and all the utopian writers who succeeded him.

NOTES

[1] Raymond Ruyer, *L'Utopie et les Utopies*, Paris, 1950, p. 4.

[2] The only known Western utopias between Plato's *Republic* and Thomas More's *Utopia* are the Hellenistic tales of the third century B.C.E. These have survived mostly in fragmentary form; among them are Iambulus's 'Islands of the Sun' and Euhemerus's 'Panachïa'. Most explanations for the disappearance of the genre relate to the Christian era. The fact that no utopias were produced by Roman culture remains a puzzle.

[3] Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P. Manuel, *Utopian Thought in the Western World*, Cambridge, Ma., 1979, p. 1.

[4] *Sanhedrin*, trans. H. Freedman, London, 1935, vol. II, p. 670; quoted in Manuel and Manuel, op. cit., pp. 40–41.

[5] See Manuel and Manuel, op. cit., part I, ch. 1. See also Michael Higger, *The Jewish Utopia*, Baltimore, 1932 — an attempt to present a composite picture of the Jewish conception of the ideal life drawn from Biblical and Talmudic sources.

[6] B. J, Bamberger, 'A Messianic Document of the 7th Century', *Hebrew Union College Annual*, vol. XV, 1940, pp. 425–31.

[7] For the differentiation between the medieval dreams and the modern utopias, see Alexandre Cioranescu, 'Utopia: Land of Cocaigne and Golden Age', *Diogenes*, no. 75, 1971; and F. Graus, 'Social Utopias in the Middle Ages', *Past and Present*, no. 38, 1967.

[8] For the texts of the stories (in Hebrew), see A. Epstein, *Eldad HaDani, Sippurav ve Hilchotav*, Pressburg, 1891; on Eldad, see A. Neubauer, 'Eldad the Danite', *Jewish Quarterly Review*, vol. III, 1891, pp. 541–51. On the possible connections with the legends about Prester John, see C. E. Nowell, 'The Historical Prester John', *Speculum*, vol. XXVIII, 1953, pp. 435–45.

[9] See Manuel and Manuel, op. cit., p. 761.

[10] A list of Zionist utopias is included in the article on Zionism in *Encylopaedia Judaica*, vol. 16, pp. 1151–52. The most recent Zionist utopia is *Glory in the Land of the Living* by Arie (Lova) Eliav, Tel-Aviv, 1972.

[11] The only scholar who devoted attention to the Zionist utopists as a group was G. Kressel. He wrote several articles about them in Israeli newspapers, as well as two longer essays (in Hebrew): 'Utopiyot Ziyoniyot', in *Maasef*, published by the Hebrew Writers' Association of Israel, Tel-Aviv, 1968,

pp. 465–70; and an epilogue to an anthology of four Zionist utopias, *Hezionei Medina*, ed. Peretz Sandler, Tel-Aviv, 1954, pp. 189–200. This anthology includes the Jewish utopias of Eisler, Lewinsky, Fernhof, and Bahar, discussed below.

[12] Eisler's booklet is reprinted in Hebrew translation in *Hezionei Medina*, op. cit., pp. 27–98, together with an introduction about the author by Sandler, pp. 9–26. Most of the biographical data here are taken from Sandler's introduction.

[13] Lewinsky's tale is reprinted in *Hezionei Medina*, op. cit., pp. 99–152.

[14] The letter was found in the Zionist Archives in Jerusalem and published by N. M. Gellber, 'The State of Judah and the Jews', *Hapoel Hatzair*, no. 26, 1960, pp. 23–24.

[15] Fernhof's story is reprinted in *Hezionei Medina*, op. cit., pp. 176–86.

[16] Bahar's tale is reprinted in Hebrew translation in ibid., pp. 153–76.

[17] Henry Pereira Mendes, *Looking Ahead: Twentieth Century Happenings*, New York, 1899.

[18] Edward Bellamy, an American reformer, published *Looking Backward 2000–1887* in 1888. This was one of the most influential utopias of the nineteenth century. According to Bellamy's vision, monopoly capitalism would evolve peacefully into an egalitarian socialist society. He was attacked by Marxist socialists, who denounced his repudiation of the class struggle; but for Bellamy's many admirers, his utopia represented the typical picture of life under socialism

[19] See below, Note 31.

[20] The quotations from Herzl's utopia are taken from the English translation by Paula Arnold, *Altneuland: Old-New Land*, Haifa, 1960.

[21] Herzl himself knew this to be his fate: see vol. IV, p. 1372, of his *Complete Diaries*, ed. R. Patai, trans. H. Zohn, New York and London, 1960.

[22] Ibid., p. 1356.

[23] G. Kressel, in his epilogue to *Hezionei Medina*, pointed out some of the distinctive traits of the Zionist utopias.

[24] Theodor Hertzka, a Viennese journalist and economist, published in 1890 his plan for a better society: *Freiland: ein soziales Zukunftsbild* (Freeland: A Social Anticipation). It was to be created by white settlers in East Africa.

[25] See Herzl's *Complete Diaries*, op. cit., vol. I, p. 237.

[26] Fernhof, in *Hezionei Medina*, op. cit., p. 184.

[27] Lewinsky, ibid., p. 113.

[28] Mendes, op. cit., 372.

[29] *Complete Diaries*, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 170–71.

[30] Eisler, in *Hezionei Medina*, op. cit., pp. 96–97.

[31] Francis Bacon, *The Advancement of Learning and New Atlantis*, Oxford University Press, London, 1974, pp. 283–84. On the attitude to Jews in early modern Christian utopias, see Miriam Yardeni, 'The Solution of the Jewish Problem in European Utopianism of the 16th–18th Centuries' in B. Oded *et al.*, eds, *Studies in the History of the Jewish People and the Land of Israel*, vol. II, pp. 133–48. This is a publication of the University of Haifa; the articles are in Hebrew, with English abstracts. There were several 'Zionist' Christian utopias based on the eschatological belief that a crucial step towards the Second Coming was the conversion of the Jews to Christianity and their return

to the Land of Israel; the better known among these was Samuel Gott's *Nova Solyma*, published in London in 1648.

[32] Eisler dedicated his *Zukunftsbild* to Disraeli.

[33] Thomas More, *Utopia*, edited by Edward Surtz, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1964, p. 152.

[34] Herzl's *Complete Diaries*, op. cit., vol. III, p. 1071.

[35] *Altneuland*, op. cit., p. 60.

[36] See Manuel and Manuel. op. cit., p. 28. I went so far as to call my book on the Renaissance imaginary societies *Realistic Utopias*, Oxford, 1982.

[37] *Altneuland*, op. cit., p. 176.

[38] Lewis Mumford, *The Story of Utopias*, New York, 1962, pp. 5–6.

[39] The Great Sanhedrin was the supreme Jewish judicial body in Palestine in the Roman period.

[40] Lewinsky, in *Hezionei Medina*, op. cit., pp. 148–50; and Herzl in *Altneuland*, op. cit., pp. 126–27, 178.

[41] *Altneuland*, op. cit., pp. 177–78.

[42] Ibid., p. 93.

[43] On electricity, see *Altneuland*, op. cit., pp. 92, 178; on tractors, p. 155.

[44] Ibid., p. 70.

[45] I know of only one book devoted to Herzl's social thought: Joseph Adler, *The Herzl Paradox: Political, Social and Economic Theories of a Realist*, New York, 1962.

[46] Eisler, in *Hezione Medina*, op. cit., p. 81.

[47] Mendes, op. cit., p. 123. Osterberg-Verakoff also violently denounced socialism in the first page of his utopia.

[48] See, for instance, Herzl's conversation with Prince Bülow, as reported in his *Complete Diaries*, op. cit., vol. II, p. 668.

[49] See , in *Hezionei Medina*, op. cit.: Lewinsky, pp. 137, 139; Bahar, p. 173; and Fernhof, p. 183.

[50] See the first chapter of my *Realistic Utopias*, op. cit.

[51] See, for example, the Steineck Institute in Herzl's *Altneuland*, op. cit., pp. 124–30.

[52] Oscar Wilde, 'The Soul of Man Under Socialism', in *The Works of Oscar Wilde*, New York, 1909, vol. VIII, p. 148.

HASSIDIC JEWS AND QUEBEC POLITICS

William Shaffir

OUTSIDERS often regard ethnic communities as homogeneous entities, but they are usually characterized by differentiation along religious, linguistic, demographic, and/or political lines. Sub-groups may also respond differently to those political events in the larger society which threaten to alter their life-style.

This paper examines the reactions of two of Montreal's larger Hassidic groups — the Lubavitcher and the Tasher — to the changing political climate in the Province of Quebec. I argue that their reactions to recent changes in the Quebec government have differed dramatically from those of the organized Jewish community because of their distinctive life-style and social organization. While focusing particularly on their accommodation to Bill 101 — the Charter of the French language — making French the official language of the Province, I attempt to detail those features which have helped to shape the Hassidim's reactions to political changes in the wider society.

The data for this paper were gathered mainly during the Spring of 1982, by means of participant observation and of informal interviews with Lubavitcher and Tasher Hassidim. In total, seventeen interviews were tape recorded — eleven with Lubavitcher and the remainder with Tasher. In addition, considerable time was spent in the Lubavitcher and Tasher Yeshivot, chatting informally about the political situation in Quebec.

Montreal Jewry and Quebec nationalism

Language is an intensely political matter in Canada, perhaps especially so in the Montreal area.[1] Overall, the Province of Quebec is about 80 per cent Francophone, but the majority of its Anglophones live in Montreal, a city of some two millions. Virtually all of Quebec's Jews live in Montreal, whose population has included Jews for more than two hundred years. The fastest influx of immigrants occurred in the first two decades of this century, but a sizeable proportion came after the Second World War. According to the 1971 census, Jews in

Montreal numbered 109,480, and the generally accepted figure for 1978 was 115,000.[2] Over the years, like most other immigrant groups in Quebec, they have oriented themselves toward the city's Anglophone community. When they came to Canada, they looked on Quebec as part of North America, where the language was English. Moreover, within the socio-political reality of Quebec until at least the 1960s, 'English was the language of entrepreneurial opportunity, and was essential for advancement in business and the professions'.[3] It also served as a link with friends and relatives who had settled in other parts of Canada and the United States and with Jewish institutions in those communities. For these reasons, in part, the Jews of Montreal became a basically Anglophone group, although a fairly high percentage — 44 per cent in 1971 — also knew French.[4]

However, Montreal Jews were not much assimilated into the city's traditional English-speaking Protestant elite; rather, they developed a highly organized community of their own. The modern Jewish community of Montreal can claim a high degree of 'institutional completeness'[5] and has organizations of long standing which cater for the economic, social, cultural, and religious needs of its members. Among them is an elaborate day-school system: the fifteen elementary schools and seven high schools, which run the gamut from ultra-Orthodox to non-religious, enrol some 38 per cent of Jewish school-age children.[6]

Two socio-political facts in Quebec undoubtedly account for this remarkably large percentage of pupils in Jewish day schools, amongst the highest in North America.[7] One is the confessional nature of all the province's public education. Schools are either Catholic — and largely Francophone, or Protestant — and almost entirely Anglophone. Since 1903 non-Catholic children, whether Protestant or Jewish, had been directed to Protestant schools, where the language of education was English. Of equal importance to the present situation is the position about private schools taken by the provincial government which, under the Canadian constitution, has total authority in education. Since 1968, the province has given per capita operating grants to private schools; the criteria are accreditation of the secular curriculum and operation 'in the public interest', a phrase which, since the early 1970s, has been interpreted as meaning increased teaching of French and/or the use of it as the language of instruction. These grants are substantial: in 1976–77, Jewish day schools received more than $800 for each pupil and the total subsidy covered the major portion of the cost of secular studies in most of these schools.

The story of the rise of Francophone power in Quebec has been told many times. Suffice it to say here that what is often called French nationalism has been simmering since the day after the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, surfacing frequently in such a variety of forms that

language has always been of immense socio-political importance — actual and symbolic — in most areas of life in Quebec. Its most recent emergence can be traced to the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, which began to undermine the Anglophones' near-exclusive hold on economic life. The dramatic turning point occurred in 1976, when the Parti Québécois — a political party formally committed to Quebec's separation from Canada — came into power. Although the French had, by this time, made real progress economically, socially, and politically, the PQ's stunning electoral victory surprised most Anglophones.

The mainstream Jewish community was particularly unnerved. Almost all its members were staunch federalists and feared the prospect of an independent Quebec. Many were concerned about the personal and economic implications of separation. Given the 'Jewish sense of history',[8] many were also 'wary about the way in which nationalist movements can accentuate minority status',[9] and became apprehensive about their marginality, their economic well-being, a possible eruption of antisemitism, and even physical safety. These fears were, at least, based on uncertainties about the future. More immediate problems were raised by the new government's language legislation. Bill 101, the Charter of the French Language, was enacted in 1977 and was designed to ensure the primacy of French, a policy summed up in the word *francization*. It specifies what language(s) may be used — generally requiring French — in many areas of life, from the work place to street signs.

Fears of *francization* have already driven away from Quebec large numbers of Anglophones, Jews amongst them.[10] The exodus of Jews has not only depleted Montreal Jewry but also altered its demographic structure. At the time of the 1971 census, before the wave of out-migration began, the Montreal Jewish community already had disproportionately more older and fewer younger persons than did Quebec society as a whole. It is usually young adults who tend to migrate and leave behind an ageing population, unable to maintain the full complement of institutions to meet its members' needs adequately.

For the Jews who have chosen to stay in Montreal, particularly for the organized community, the cost of *francization* in their day schools is of great immediate concern. Although many members of the PQ are opposed in principle to subsidizing private schools, the PQ government, soon after its election, indicated its willingness to continue the former government's liberal funding policy if those schools moved toward making French the almost exclusive language of instruction in the secular curriculum. With few exceptions, French had never been the primary secular language in Montreal's Jewish day schools, although they had increased instruction in French from three hours per week in 1971 to eight hours per week in the 1976–77 session. In negotiations for the 1977–78 school year, however, the new government

made the virtual elimination of English studies a pre-condition for the grants. When the organized Jewish community voiced its strong opposition to this demand, the authorities settled for eleven hours of French instruction in 1977–78 and the scheduling of a further hour a week in each succeeding year until 1980–81, when there would be a total of fourteen hours of instruction in French.[11]

Another problem for the Jewish day schools is the clause of Bill 101 which restricts general access to the English-language schools to children qualified in one of two ways: (1) if the pupil or an older sibling was enrolled in an English-language school in Quebec in the 1976–77 session, or (2) if one of the parents had received his or her primary education in English anywhere, and was domiciled in Quebec before 26 August 1977. Many Montreal Jewish children qualify under these criteria, but many others do not — for example, the children of post-war immigrants or of Jews who came to Montreal from other provinces after August 1977.

Montreal's Hassidic Jews

The Hassidim are ultra-religious Jews who live within a framework of their own centuries-old beliefs and traditions and who observe Orthodox law so meticulously that they are set apart from most other Orthodox Jews. Even their appearance is distinctive: the men bearded in black suits or long black coats with black hats over side curls and the women in high-necked, loose fitting dresses, often of unfashionable length, with kerchiefs or traditional wigs covering their hair.[12] They are dedicated to living uncontaminated by contact with modern society except in accord with the demands of the work place and the state. They do not, for the most part, own radio or television sets nor do they frequent cinemas or theatres. They pursue religious studies zealously, but shun the universities and carefully co-ordinate and control the secular subjects taught in their schools in order to ensure that there will be no conflict with the pupils' religious upbringing. They dress and pray as their forefathers did in the eighteenth century, and they reject Western secular society which they believe to be degenerate — as evidenced by the prevalence of marital breakdown, crime, illegal drugs, lust, and greed for material possessions. This misguided style of living, they argue, only leads to unhappiness. Since Jews who have become assimilated to their host society have usually estranged themselves from their Torah heritage, it is essential for Hassidim to live apart from secular influences.

The Hassidim are not, however, a uniform group; there are a number of communities, each organized according to the teachings of a particular *rebbe* (a charismatic religious leader). Thus although the Hassidim are united in their very strict observance and interpretation

of Jewish law, they differ in details of attitude, customs, and beliefs. There are now in Montreal seven Hassidic communities; the largest are those of Belz, Lubavitch, Satmar, and Tash.

The Lubavitch community of Montreal dates back to 1941, with the arrival of nine students who were refugees from the Polish Lubavitcher Yeshiva near Warsaw. In 1942 and 1943, some fifteen young men of German and Austrian origin, who were interned in Quebec as prisoners of war and subsequently released, joined the group. During the next few years, the community grew through a steady birth rate and by attracting individuals of a non-Lubavitch background. The next important influx occurred in 1947, with the arrival of a small group of Lubavitcher of Russian origin, followed by a steady stream of other Lubavitch migrants between 1950 and 1953. The community today largely consists of persons of European origin who came to Montreal shortly after the Second World War; there is also a sizeable number of individuals who have joined as a result of the Lubavitch proselytizing zeal among the Ashkenazim and the Sephardim of Montreal, while a few American Lubavitcher came to the city because they found congenial employment.

In contrast, the Tasher community consists mainly of individuals of Tasher background who came to Canada from Hungary and Poland after the Second World War. Whereas a majority of second-generation Lubavitcher — that is, children of immigrants — have left Montreal for less densely populated Jewish centres to pursue the Lubavitch ideal of disseminating *Yiddishkayt* (Jewish values and learning), their counterpart in Tash have remained in their community primarily because of its relative isolation from the outside world. In fact, a number of the Tasher *rebbe*'s followers in New York have come to Quebec both to be near him and because of the community's ideal geographic setting.

Both Hassidic groups in Montreal derive much financial support from the contributions of their followers and sympathizers, as well as from appeals to Jews in the wider community. The occupational breakdown in the two communities differs. Approximately half of the Lubavitcher pursue religious-oriented work (teachers, ritual slaughterers, kashrut supervisors), while only one third of the Tasher are engaged in similar occupations. On the other hand, while 33 per cent of Tasher married men study in the *koillel* (advanced Talmudic seminary) for which they receive study grants, the comparable figure in Lubavitch is only five per cent. About 50 per cent of the Lubavitcher and 33 per cent of the Tasher are involved in business — mainly in printing, plastics, and silk screening.[13]

Both *rebbeim* (plural of *rebbe*) are immigrants. The Lubavitch *rebbe* came to the United States from Russia in 1941, while the Tasher *rebbe* left Europe for Montreal in 1951. The Lubavitcher *rebbe* did not study at a particular yeshiva but was exposed, instead, to a number of

religious scholars who served as tutors. He was also a student of mathematics and science at the Sorbonne in Paris and trained in electrical engineering. The Tasher *rebbe* is believed to be a direct descendant of the Maharal of Prague, and studied at the yeshiva in Kalev, Hungary.

Although all Hassidim attach great importance to preventing assimilation by insulating their members from the secular influences of the host culture, the Lubavitcher and the Tasher are at opposite ends of a continuum in terms of their contacts with the mainstream Jewish community. The Lubavitcher have organized a series of highly visible institutions, events, and activities aimed at intensifying other Jews' identification with, and commitment to, Orthodox Judaism. In fact, they are renowned for their eagerness to initiate contacts with all segments of less observant Jews in order to attract them to Orthodox Judaism. By contrast, the Tasher fear that contacts with unobservant Jews would endanger the stability of their distinctive life-style. Since 1964, they have lived outside Montreal in Ste-Thérese (a rural community approximately 18 miles north of the city), where they have their own yeshiva. Such isolation, they believe, increases their ability to repel untoward influences; it also provides a quiet environment conducive to the intensive study of Torah.

The Lubavitch and Tash communities are of roughly equal size, each numbering about 120 households. Their respective growth patterns reflect their involvement with, and relationship to, the larger Jewish community. The Lubavitcher have only a moderately high birth rate and have added to their numbers largely by taking into their midst *baalei tshuvah* (newly orthodox Jews). The Tasher, on the other hand, have grown because of a high birth rate and because a number of Hassidic families from Montreal and New York have been attracted by the Tasher *rebbe* and the life-style possibilities of the community's rural setting. Moreover, the Tasher *rebbe* has a considerable following among Jews who are not Hassidic but look to him for advice on many subjects, including finances, marriage, and medical problems.

The Hassidim's adaptation to change in Quebec

Both the Lubavitcher and Tasher must take account of the changing political reality in Quebec. Despite their efforts to minimize the impact of secular influences and restrict the range of contacts with unobservant Jews, the Hassidim cannot remain totally impervious to their surroundings. Events in the host society cannot always be ignored and their consequences cannot be entirely avoided. The reaction of both groups has been to turn to their *rebbe* for guidance and to take the minimum possible notice of provincial politics; while in the matter of the language legislation as it affects their respective day schools, they have taken opposite stands.

The Rebbe's Guidance. The *rebbe* occupies a unique position in the Hassidic community.[14] He is in every way the leader of his flock and that fact is central in the organization of the group and the dynamics of change within it. His followers turn to him for advice not merely on spiritual and ethical problems but also on a wide range of practical matters. His opinion is asked about taking a new job, moving to another city, planning an overseas trip, or even consulting a doctor. And, because he is believed to be a *tsaddik* (righteous person) possessing special qualities of insight, the Hassidim turn to him 'in the uncertain areas of life rather than in the clearly defined domain of the law'.[15]

The Lubavitcher as well as the Tasher have relied on their *rebbe*'s assessment of the political situation in Quebec and have acted on his advice. The following comments by three Lubavitcher are revealing:

> The *rebbe* said to stay here. Ya, the *rebbe* took that fear away. And I'll tell you honestly, to say that people weren't afraid? I mean humans are humans . . . . Look, people thought that the sun is not going to shine the next day if they [the PQ] won the election. But the *rebbe* said, 'Buy houses'.

> Prior to the election . . . I know of an individual here . . . and he had a business opportunity to buy some real estate. He went and asked the *rebbe* if he should buy . . . And the *rebbe* encouraged him to buy . . . Now this is an indication from the *rebbe* himself that he feels that separation is not in the immediate future . . . If the *rebbe* definitely felt that it's another Germany . . . the *rebbe* has enough foresight to avoid such a thing.

> And, of course, we have a *rebbe*. And the *rebbe* reassured everybody that what they [the PQ] had in mind had nothing to do with Jews *per se*.

It is noteworthy that every Lubavitcher with whom I spoke about the position of Jews in Quebec spontaneously told me of the *rebbe*'s 'declaration' to his followers in Montreal. The declaration had not taken the form of a written or public statement of the *rebbe*'s position on the matter. Yet the community, through word-of-mouth reports, came to a clear conclusion that the *rebbe* did not believe the political situation warranted any special attention or anxiety. At a time when many mainstream Jews either left the Province of Quebec or considered leaving, not a single Lubavitcher was said to have moved away from Montreal. Rather, there was a stress on the Lubavitch philosophy of disseminating *Yiddishkayt* and on continuing to serve and sustain Montreal Jewry in its hour of need.

The Tasher *rebbe*'s counsel was sought not only by the members of his group, but also by his non-Hassidic admirers and he was asked to evaluate the political situation. He, like the Lubavitcher *rebbe*, was unequivocal in his view that the effects of the changes on the Jews were more illusory than real, as the following comments reveal:

> Needless to say, people were frightened and anxious. They just didn't know what to do. Stay? Leave? But the *rebbe* has always been politically aware . . .

> He told people, 'Don't worry'. There were some people who had bought houses and were willing to lose their deposits and he told them not to be foolish.
>
> . . . all the Jews in Montreal were scared stiff out of their lives and wanted to run away. So the *rebbe* called them together and said, 'Don't worry, everything is going to be okay'. So they said, 'It's all right for you, *rebbe*, with your little community up there, but we own homes and businesses'. So the *rebbe* said, 'I'm going to show you. We [the Tasher community] are going to build'. And off he went to the Feds [Federal Government] and the Feds agreed to give him a loan and he built 78 houses.

Interestingly, although both Hassidic communities received the same basic message, it is the Tasher *rebbe*'s views that seem to have been conveyed more actively to outside audiences. With the exception of a handful of administrators, the residents of Tash are largely unfamiliar with, and uninterested in, the political situation in Quebec. Since the community has separated itself from the outside world to the point of banning English- and French-language newspapers as well as strongly frowning upon those printed in Yiddish or Hebrew, and forbidding radio and television, little need exists for the *rebbe* to analyse the political situation for the benefit of his immediate followers. But Tasher administrators have mounted a campaign to convince their sympathizers in the wider Jewish community — for instance, business people who regularly seek the *rebbe*'s advice — that the situation in Quebec does not warrant such a drastic response as emigration. Simultaneously, they have sought to impress Quebec government officials with the influence that the *rebbe* wields among Montreal and even Canadian Jews, emphasizing that he has been supportive of PQ aspirations. In return for such support, the Tasher attempt to extract special considerations from the provincial government. Thus, for example, a significant portion of the dwellings in the Tasher community have qualified as public housing entitling the Tasher to subsidies; and the Tasher claim that the PQ government might support the community's request to be declared a separate municipality, with all the rights and privileges of such a status.[16]

Separation from the Mainstream. While many Diaspora Jews pursue a life-style of 'acculturation without assimilation',[17] the Hassidim have voluntarily removed themselves from the mainstream. Since they believe that life must be lived within the boundaries of the Torah, it is not surprising that they view trends in the wider society as either harmful or irrelevant to their chosen path. For both the Tasher and the Lubavitcher, living in Quebec has no special significance: it is a place just like any other. Quebec, they point out, is *golus* (*galut*, exile). A Lubavitch woman stated:

> First of all, for me, Quebec is a place in *golus*, like any other place, and I don't look on it as a permanent home. I never did.

And a Tasher man explained:

> We believe there's such a thing as *golus*. We appreciate that we're not in our homeland here. Not even when we're there [in Israel].[18]

A Lubavitch man was of the same opinion:

> Face it, we're all in exile. We're all in *golus*. We're just waiting for Moshiach [the Messiah], so we could wait for him in Quebec, we could wait for him in Ontario.

Precisely because their stake in Quebec's future is so limited, the Hassidim see as matters of minor consequence political changes which arouse anxiety in the larger Jewish community. The *francization* of Quebec society — a very grave matter for the mainstream Jews of the province — causes them little concern. A Lubavitcher summed up the prevailing attitude:

> One of the biggest concerns for Jews is speaking French, that their children will have to be educated in French, that Quebec will truly be a French society. For us it doesn't make a difference. We are mostly interested in spreading *Yiddishkayt*. For us it's no different if we spread *Yiddishkayt* in English or in French . . . And really, what difference does it really make if the Yeshiva teaches secular subjects in French? At first it's a shock, but it's not so important and so you adjust.

A Tasher echoed that view:

> Do you think people are upset about the new law converting to metric?[19] Why? Because they're used to the other measure, and it's the same thing about French. My children, what's the difference what language they're going to pick up?

The Hassidim claim that the fact that English, instead of French, was adopted by Jews as a language of communication was a 'mistake of history':

> So when our forefathers came here the majority was English-speaking. So now because the modern Jew chose to give up Jewish [Yiddish], chose to become modernized and follow the general public, so they follow English, they put all their communications in English. So when Bill 101 . . . starts to attack English, the Jews feel they're attacked. But they're not attacking the Jews . . . They should feel they're attacking a thing that happened by a mistake of history. We picked up English more than French. Now the French are trying to correct the situation. The main thing I'm trying to say is there's nothing more about the English than the French. They're all *goyim* [Gentiles], and they don't like us.

Mainstream Montreal Jewry seems to have developed an enhanced sense of marginality and alienation in the new Quebec, with the *francization* of public life; some fear a possible erosion of civil liberties, and believe that Jews may be relegated to the position of second-class citizens with restricted opportunities. For the Lubavitcher and Tasher

Hassidim, such concerns are of relatively minor importance. What is of paramount importance to them is that they have the freedom to follow their religious practices and to maintain their traditional life-style. So far, they foresee no difficulty in doing so. A Lubavitcher commented:

> It depends what your aspirations are. If I was considering that my kids would have to go into the mainstream of things . . . maybe I'd think differently.

Reaction to francization. As has been said above, Hassidic communities believe that secular education threatens their traditional values; and in order to avert its potentially harmful influence, they run their own schools where secular classes are closely supervised to ensure that the pupils will find no conflict with the content of their religious studies.[20] Both the Lubavitch and Tash schools are open five days a week, but Lubavitch pupils attend classes from Monday to Friday while Tash pupils attend from Sunday to Thursday.

The Lubavitcher and the Tasher have reacted to *francization* in quite different ways. Lubavitcher elementary schools — a *yeshiva* for boys and *Bays Rivkah* for girls — are accredited by the provincial government and have an enrolment of approximately 200 each. They have secular curricula which closely follow the Ministry of Education's guidelines and they employ teachers who have the necessary professional qualifications. Since the pupils of both schools may sit for examinations approved by the Ministry of Education, they must study the full range of secular subjects available in the public elementary and high schools. However, the secular curriculum in the Lubavitch schools is so designed that while remaining within the Ministry's latitudes, books judged offensive to an Orthodox upbringing are excluded, and particular topics conflicting with the tenets of Orthodox Judaism are presented from a Torah perspective. For example, books for the English literature course which explicitly deal with the theme of sexuality are not selected; and while courses in biology and chemistry are taught, the topic of evolution is a sensitive area to be discussed with utmost caution. A school official said: 'Evolution, if it is mentioned, or if it has to be, is right away told from the point of view of the Torah . . .'. In both Lubavitch schools, French is the language of instruction for secular studies.

Since the Lubavitcher aim to disseminate *Yiddishkayt* amongst all Jews of Montreal, enrolment in their two schools is not restricted to children of Lubavitch families or even to those from an Orthodox background. In fact, many pupils come from homes in which Jewish practices are only minimally observed. It is probably this desire to attract the non-Orthodox which has led the Lubavitch to organize an accredited secular programme, over and above the important financial consideration of government subsidies.

The secular programmes in the two Tasher schools — a *yeshiva* for boys and *Bays Tzirl* for girls, each with approximately 110 pupils — are narrowly defined and do not comply with the requirements of the provincial authorities. The Boys are instructed in French and English in reading, writing, and arithmetic for approximately two hours on weekday afternoons by teachers who more often than not lack the qualifications recognized by the government. The objective is to teach the boys to become proficient at writing a business letter and to enable them to communicate with the surrounding Francophone population. The secular classes for girls are more flexibly organized, and the emphasis is mainly on home economics; the natural sciences are not taught, but there is some instruction in geography and history. The languages of instruction for secular studies are French and English, but all notices on the bulletin board are in Yiddish.[21] The girls are engaged in secular studies every school day for about three and a half hours. This is almost double the time devoted by the boys to these subjects because the Tasher believe that a broad secular education is not only unnecessary but inadvisable for boys, since it would divert their attention from their religious studies.

The Tasher have refused to accept *francization* in their schools. They are convinced that education, whether religious or secular, is too important a matter to be dictated, or controlled, by outsiders. They have long refused any school subsidies from the government because they do not wish to comply with the obligations entailed. They claim that their views on this subject have been clearly transmitted to government officials:

> We're not going to fool anybody that our language of communication is French [in fact, it is Yiddish, not English]. We told that to the government, and the government appreciated that. We have made it clear to the government: 'My dear friend, we are Jews. We live as Jews. We will die as Jews. If you tell us we cannot continue our education the way we want it . . . then we have news for you. Either we're going to leave Quebec or we're going to go into shelters like in Russia, in basements.'

Perhaps because of Tash's small size and geographic isolation, perhaps because of apprehensiveness lest their *rebbe* discourage Jewish investment in Quebec, it seems that the government has not exerted any pressure on the community to bring its secular curricula into conformity with the Ministry of Education's guidelines. A Tasher explined:

> The government of Quebec has told us openly. Like I was in Quebec City in the Minister's office and I spoke to his deputy and he told us, 'We don't know that you exist. Don't bother us and we wont' bother you'.

The Lubavitch community's attitude differed dramatically from that of the Tasher. Before the enactment of Bill 101, the Lubavitch schools were accredited and received government subsidies, and they wished to

continue to do so. This necessitated, however, not only the continuation of an accredited programme but also a change to French as the language of instruction, since schools classified as English-language institutions could admit only those students who met Bill 101's quite stringent qualifications. Jewish pupils who did not qualify for enrolment in an English school might have to be turned away. The Lubavitcher therefore decided to increase French instruction to seventeen hours a week, in order to qualify their schools as French-language institutions eligible to admit all applicants.

Conclusion

While mainstream Montreal Jewry viewed with apprehension Quebec's *francization* laws, with several thousands leaving the province, the Lubavitcher and Tasher Hassidim appear to have reacted with calm. The members of these two groups have the utmost trust in the judgement of their respective *rebbe* and believed that they could remain in Montreal without needing to make any drastic alteration to their life-style.

The Lubavitcher showed some flexibility in the matter of increasing the hours of French studies in exchange for securing not only the continuance of govenment subsidies but also the freedom to admit any pupil they wished to enrol. At the other extreme, the Tasher Hassidim resolutely refused to allow *francization* in their schools and apparently have done so with impunity.

The essential difference in this context between mainstream Montreal Jewry and the two Hassidic groups is that the former feared alienation from the wider society because it might lead to discrimination, while the latter had always sought to be insulated from secular society and could continue to preserve their separateness under the guidance and protection of their religious leaders .

Acknowledgements

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NOTES

[1] The material in this section is largely derived from Harold M. Waller, 'Montreal Jews Face the Challenge of Quebec Nationalism', *Analysis*, no. 65, September 1978, pp. 1–12; Harold M. Waller and Morton Weinfeld, 'The Jews of Quebec and "Le Fait Français"' in Morton Weinfeld, William Shaffir and Irwin Cotler, eds, *The Canadian Jewish Mosaic*, Toronto, 1981, pp. 415–39. For additional material relating to the dilemma of Quebec Jewry, see Ruth R.

Wisse and Irwin Cotler, 'Quebec's Jews: Caught in the Middle', *Commentary*, vol. LXIV, no. 3, September 1977, pp. 55–59; and Morton Weinfeld, 'The Jews of Quebec: Perceived Antisemitism, Segregation, and Emigration', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXII, no. 1, June 1980, pp. 5–19.

[2] See Waller, op. cit., p. 2.

[3] See Waller and Weinfeld, op. cit., p. 417.

[4] According to the 1971 Canadian census, only the Italians equalled the Jews' bilingualism rate. It is very likely that the latter's relatively high percentage was bolstered by Sephardi Jews who, in 1971, accounted for approximately 10 per cent of Montreal Jewry, and whose primary language of communication is French.

[5] See Raymond Breton, 'Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. LXX, no. 2, September 1964, pp. 193–205.

[6] See Yaacov Glickman, 'Jewish Education: Success or Failure?', in Morton Weinfeld *et al.*, eds, op. cit., p. 123.

[7] Ibid.

[8] See Waller and Weinfeld, op. cit., p. 422.

[9] Ibid.

[10] It is impossible to give the exact numbers of Jews who have left the Province of Quebec, since such figures are unavailable. The figures mentioned in Jewish circles, based on 'guestimates', range from as many as 20,000 to as few as 8,000. According to the 1981 Canadian census, the Jewish population of Quebec, by religion, is 102,000 — down 8,000 from the 1971 total. It is important to realize that this drop may be attributed to causes other than the political climate. However, Jewish educators and community leaders are greatly concerned about the numbers of Jews who have left Montreal.

[11] It must be emphasized that the figure of 14 hours of French instruction per week applies only to Jewish day schools at the elementary level, and is based on an arrangement negotiated with the Provincial Government for funding purposes. The corresponding figure for Jewish high schools is a minimum of 250 minutes of French per week. English elementary schools, assured of government funding, are required to provide a weekly minimum of three hours of instruction in French.

[12] In fact, it is usually possible to identify the men of each Hassidic group by their particular garb. In the case of Tash, in addition to wearing a beard, virtually all males dress in a *kaftan*, or long black overcoat and grow long earlocks; married males wear a *shtreimel* (a round fur hat) on the Sabbath and on Holy days. The Lubavitcher, on the other hand, have adapted their dress to western customs. They wear hats of different colours with the brim turned down, and they typically dress in dark coloured suits though many wear a long black coat on Holy days. They are bearded, but their earlocks are very short and tucked behind their ears. It is more difficult to detect differences in the appearance of the females.

[13] As the Lubavitch community includes a number of newcomers who acquired their professional training before joining the group, some members of the Lubavitcher of Montreal are also to be found in the liberal professions.

[14] For a discussion of the role and influence of the Hassidic *rebbe*, see Jerome Mintz, *Legends of the Hasidim*, Chicago, 1968; Israel Rubin, *Satmar: An Island In*

The City, Chicago, 1972; and William Shaffir, *Life In A Religious Community: The Lubavitcher Chassidim In Montreal*, Montreal, 1974.

[15] See Mintz, op. cit., p. 89.

[16] For a journalistic account of this situation, see 'A Strange Bid for Autonomy', *Maclean's*, November 1979.

[17] Erich Rosenthal, 'Acculturation Without Assimilation: the Jewish Community of Chicago, Illinois', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. LXVI, no. 3, November 1960, pp. 275–88.

[18] Those Orthodox Jews who do not recognize Israel as the Jewish homeland subscribe to the belief that the Jewish State will be established in the Land of Israel after the arrival of the Messiah. For a discussion of the Satmarer Hassidim's view on this matter, see Rubin, op. cit., pp. 50–55.

[19] The reference here is to Canada's new metrication law requiring that all weights and measures be expressed in metric units.

[20] See Rubin, op. cit., pp. 137–56; and William Shaffir, 'The Organization of Secular Education in a Chassidic Jewish Community', *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, vol. VIII, 1, 1976, pp. 38–51.

[21] In both the Lubavitch and Tash Schools, Yiddish is the medium of instruction for religious subjects. However, Yiddish is not taught as a language, as is the case in some of Montreal's Jewish day and afternoon schools.

ETHNICITY, CLASS, AND POLITICAL ALIGNMENT IN ISRAEL

Percy S. Cohen

I

THERE is, in Israeli society, a political situation in which support for the Right and ultra-Right comes disproportionately from Oriental Jews, while support for the Labour Alignment and the parties of the ultra-Left comes disproportionately from the Ashkenazim (European Jews). Orientals now say that they support the Right because the Labour establishment managed the polity and the economy throughout those decades during which Orientals were the objects of discrimination and, worse still, suffered an assault on their culture and therefore on their identity and self-esteem; while some elitist and anti-populist Ashkenazim complain that those Orientals who might previously have supported a political culture promoting and maintaining a tolerant, liberal society have now given that support to a political culture of populism and chauvinism which also encourages increasing intolerance of, and contempt for, the rights of Arabs.

While some of the more extreme views of Orientals lead them to attribute their past misfortunes and present discontents to the Ashkenazim of the Labour Alignment (appearing to overlook the fact that those leaders of the Right whom they most admire, Mr Begin and General Sharon, are no less Ashkenazi for earning their support), some of the more 'objective' views of the Ashkenazi elite lead them to question the degree and extent of discrimination which Orientals are said to suffer. At the same time, some Orientals treat the whole matter as simply political — for them, the Ashkenazim, as such, are not to blame — while some Ashkenazim attribute the political movement of the Orientals to the abandonment of the old ideals of egalitarian socialism.

There are social scientists who have, for some time, considered this divide to be one of the most important aspects of Israeli society and one of its most serious social problems. Others, however, have doubted until recently whether there was such a serious ethnic divide at all. However, in a less urgent tone, Yael Yishai has (in a recent article in this Journal)[1] formulated and confirmed the hypothesis that the shift in political allegiance of large numbers of working-class Orientals is

related to the resentment which they have increasingly felt against the Ashkenazi Labour establishment so that they vote, vengefully, against the very party which claims to represent their class interests. Commendably, Yishai adopts a cross-national perspective in emphasizing the general point that many working-class voters in parliamentary democracies are not simple, class-conscious robots — any more than their middle-class counterparts are. They are capable not only of failing to vote for the party which claims to represent them, but of voting against it or even for parties whose interests are, according to social democratic ideology, contrary to their own. One should also note that the parties to which members of the working class switch their votes, or for which some of them consistently vote, are parties which commonly seek to present a national rather than a purely class image.[2]

Yishai's excellent analysis of the social conditions — such as differentials in income, occupation, housing, and educational achievement — within which certain ideas, perceptions, and feelings have influenced Oriental voters in their steady drift, over the years, towards the Right, can scarcely be faulted. However, in her understandable enthusiasm to broaden the perspective of her sociological analysis she has overlooked the possibility that an enquiry into the political orientations of those Separdi and Oriental Jews who were either born in Palestine or who immigrated well before the establishment of the Jewish State might have predicted the likelihood of such a development. And this assertion, by this writer, is not yet another irritating example of a sociologist's claim to forecast the future with the benefit of hindsight. For it is well known that Sephardi and Yemini Jews were well represented among the supporters of Irgun Zvai Leuni (IZL) and that they were, later, equally well represented among the supporters of Herut. Commenting on this in this Journal in 1962,[3] I wrote:

> In retrospect, it is not surprising that this oganization [IZL] received considerable support, both moral and active, from the Oriental Jewish communities in Palestine. Support . . . served a number of functions, particularly for the younger generation: it provided a means of identifying with . . . the wider society; it simultaneously provided an avenue for expressing hostility to the leadership of the Yishuv on the part of a group which strongly resented its inferior status . . .; it furnished a means of dramatically affirming nationalist aspirations on the part of those who were . . . ambivalent in their attitude to the Yishuv.

I said further:[4]

> Their partial failure to achieve full acceptance is linked with the low social status of the group to which they belong; they therefore rebel not only against their own group membership, but against the authority of the wider society. This dual rebellion is adequately expressed in support for at least one of the right-wing parties (Heruth) whose ideology of extreme nationalism and opposition to the labour movement is aimed at every discontented

> and frustrated group in the society . . . it might be suggested that *this indicates a possible future trend.*

This is not a claim to have predicted the inevitable. Yet, until recently, some Israeli social scientists have found it difficult to accept even a non-conspirational emphasis on the latent (and, sometimes, manifest) sources of resentment on the part of Oriental Jews and on the awareness of negative stereotypes applied to them.

II

The sub-title of a recent book by Eliezer Ben-Rafael on ethnicity in Israel does include the word 'conflict'.[5] So one expects that this Israeli sociologist has come to terms with what appears to be an ethnic antagonism which has become endemic to the social system of Israel; though one also expects the author to attend to the proposition that not all inter-ethnic relations are antagonistic nor are all social antagonisms inter-ethnic. He does, indeed, attend to both matters. In fact, the following statements — albeit made more than halfway through the book — are directly pertinent to any attempt to place the ethnic problem in perspective:[6]

> Thus, among all social cleavages dividing Israeli society, that opposing Ashkenazi to Oriental groups is seen as one of the most acute . . . or the most acute. . . . This cleavage, at least as far as the 'others' are concerned, is detailed by our informants in reference to all the major points of social interaction.

The author is not, however, presenting his observations on the relative importance of different antagonisms in Israeli society. His interpretation of the social perceptions of Oriental Jews is based on the opinions of approximately 300 respondents — half of whom were Yemeni and the other half, Moroccan — given in answer to his questions about ethnicity and conflict. His data confirm the proposition that substantial numbers of Orientals are, at least, disposed to experience their relations with Ashkenazim in terms of a divide. What the data do not reveal is that Oriental Jews are manifestly or latently antagonistic to Ashkenazim. Nor do we know to what extent their social perception is complemented by that of Ashkenazim.

Ben-Rafael's principal aim is to identify the nature of ethnicity in Israeli society. In doing that, he suggests that ethnicity is commonly a lower-class phenomenon.

It may indeed be true that when one is upwardly mobile one is more free to disengage, to a greater or lesser extent, from the ethnic ties which were part of one's lower status. But this does not imply acceptance by those whom one wishes to join. In some cases, 'mobiles' seek out others

very much like themselves and all of them retain downward ethnic ties by bestowing patronage in return for acknowledgement of their rank and for gratitude. Israeli Arabs who are upwardly mobile may well find that the range of their contacts with Jews is widened in a few areas of social life but not at all in others; while Israeli Jews who are upwardly mobile may find far more social space in which to expand relations with Jews who are not of the same ethnic origin and who may not even be of the same broader ethnic category. The evidence cited by Ben-Rafael is that of respondents who are 'mobiles' and who put less emphasis on ethnicity than do 'non-mobiles'. But what 'mobiles' say of themselves should be checked against what they do, if it is to be cited as anything but attitudinal.

Ben-Rafael also makes great use of the data gathered by the Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel. These data show that the average household income of an Oriental family is about 80 per cent of the national average (and 66 per cent for Arabs). However, owing to ethnic differences in family size, the differentials per capita are considerably greater (and even more so for Arabs). The data on marriage are more complex. They show a gradual increase, over time, of marriages between the two major Jewish ethnic categories, where there is a greater probability that the marriage is between an Ashkenazi male and an Oriental female — a predictable pattern in terms of the ethnic status ranking. But Oriental males increase their chances of exogamy if they are 'mobiles'. The result is that the lower classes remain fairly solidly Oriental while the higher classes become more mixed. Furthermore, if the net reproduction rate of the Oriental lower classes continues to be higher than that of the Ashkenazim (other than of the most Orthodox of the latter), it will require a fairly high rate of upward mobility to prevent a further consolidation of the lower ethnic-class.

Ben-Rafael has, in using his own data and those of the Bureau of Statistics, written an extremely perceptive and invaluable book on certain aspects of Israeli society; and the volume also reveals his own considerable skills and powers of observation and interpretation. He examines the implicit values and other assumptions of the political elites and of their agents and links this examination to a subtle and thorough account of the structure of elite domination and to the processes which have characterized Israel as an immigrant and post-immigrant society. He assesses a number of well-worn beliefs — such as the integrating effect of the army — and explains their weaknesses. While finding little evidence in support of a conspirational explanation of the Israeli ethnic divide, Ben-Rafael does not underestimate the role of paternalism and patronage. In short, while he does not specifically focus on forms of conflict and antagonism, he provides an admirable account of the context within which to locate them.

III

Some facts can be accepted, for present purposes, as beyond further questioning: that ethnicity is a significant aspect of Israeli society; that it has most significance among lower-class Orientals; that Orientals are over-represented in lower and Ashkenazim in higher status occupations and at corresponding income levels; that the significant correlation between social class and ethnic category is commonly recognized in Israel as 'the social gap'; that many Orientals who are aware of this consider it to be a consequence of public policies and of discriminatory practices in different areas of social life; that middle-class Orientals — especially those who are self-employed — have long tended to vote for the Right and have been, in particular, supporters of the Herut party while those of the working class have, over the years, moved steadily in the direction of the Right; and that this lower-class movement is to be explained largely in terms of a growing expression of resentment against the Labour establishment which is held responsible for the association between social class and ethnic category.

However, several important questions still remain unanswered. How did this ethnic-class formation come to be? Why did the movement to the Right occur when it did and not earlier? Why does Oriental antagonism to Ashkenazim in general not extend to the Ashkenazi leaders of the Right?

There are three main answers given by sociologists to the first question. The first attributes inequality to the cultural 'backwardness' of the Oriental immigrants which affected their ability to compete with Ashkenazi immigrants for higher status occupations at the outset or for greater social mobility later on. The principal marks of 'backwardness' were: differences in levels of secular education and in later educational performance; differences in familiarity with the social and cultural practices of a modern society; possibly, differences in cognitive and conative characteristics resulting from differences in upbringing; and, finally, differences in attitudes to family planning so that a greater number of children in Oriental families would not only affect educational performance, motivation, etc., but would also make for a lower per capita income and a greater dependence on social services.

The second explanation retains some elements from the first but places much more emphasis on the fact that, since the Zionist movement and the pioneering settlement of Palestine were almost entirely the work of Ashkenazim and since it was the Ashkenazim who came to dominate the polity and the economy, one or both of the following consequences were likely: that Ashkenazi immigrants would more easily find their way to the appropriate decision-makers and centres of patronage; and that the holders of power at almost all levels would either consciously, unconsciously, or tacitly discriminate in

favour of Ashkenazim and/or make decisions regarding employment, settlement, and housing in terms of their own versions of Oriental cultural 'backwardness'.

The third approach, which is more recent, involves a 'radical critique' of the first.[7] Its most important contribution is the incontestable assertion that the mass immigration which occurred after 1948 was not so much 'absorbed' into an existing social framework as let loose upon it — thereby transforming the society in a number of important respects. In particular, the 'radical critique' emphasizes the fact that the true 'modernization' of Israel was made possible by the manpower provided by the Oriental immigrants who arrived after the foundation of the state. In short, it was not so much a case of the Oriental immigrants who, because of their cultural inadequacies, were absorbed into the lower social class but, rather, that mass immigration created a new lower class and modified the existing class structure in other ways.

As for the assumption that the Orientals were less familiar than the Ashkenazim with modern society, it is flawed in a number of respects: the society which existed before mass immigration was, by the standards of the capitalist world, not very 'modern'; nor, for that matter, were most of the eastern European societies from which most of the Ashkenazi immigrants came; the societies in which some of the Oriental immigrants had lived were hardly more 'backward' than all of these others; while all of them were 'peripheral' to the main centres of modernity. Consequently, what made it more difficult for the Oriental immigrants was not so much the unfamiliarity of the cultural terrain but, rather, the structure of power in which they were made dependent. In short, the Oriental immigrants were brought to Israel so that they would constitute the urban and rural proletariat of a developing society. When pressed to explain the emergence of inequality, the proponents of the 'radical critique' have to acknowledge that the Ashkenazim were in positions of power to bring immigrants to Israel and to settle them in farming villages or development towns because it was they who had created the Jewish homeland.

Whatever the merits and weaknesses of the different approaches, one is left with one set of factors which explains the initial inequality of status between immigrants and veterans; another which explains the advantages which enabled Ashkenazi immigrants to compete more favourably in the emerging occupational structure and in securing better housing; and a third set which explains how Oriental Jews were likely to be over-represented in the lower classes until such time as their own entry into more favourable occupational positions and conditions of life was accompanied by the entry of Arabs into positions vacated by Oriental Jews. The existence of a preponderantly Oriental upper working class is then explained in terms of these three sets of factors.

However, a version of Israeli history which, with the wisdom of hindsight, attributes the development of Israeli society to some kind of hegemonic planning is implausible. One does not doubt that the encouragement of immigration is, at all times, a product of a number of reasons and that in the past promoting economic development was one of the dominant reasons. Nor is it fanciful to suggest that decisions made about certain immigrants — for example, their location in development towns and their receipt of some types of aid and not others — were based on the assumption that these immigrants were sufficiently dependent to be manageable. Certainly, it appears to Oriental immigrants that they were perceived as dependent and, therefore, as manageable and that they were used in ways in which immigrants from Europe were less likely to be used; and their way of perceiving social reality clearly influences the 'radical' account of the structuring of the ethnic divide. But that perception may be, in part, erroneous.

What is not disputed is that Oriental immigrants were perceived in certain ways; nor is it disputed that the perceptions which others had of them influenced their own self-perceptions and, possibly, the likelihood that they could compete equally with others for goods, services, status, and power. What is being suggested is that given the initial circumstances of immigration and given also the advantage of ethnic origin in a variety of types of social interaction, much of the consequent difference in achievement in terms of income and housing can be explained in terms of the somewhat greater facility with which Ashkenazim could manage by virtue of being more like those in positions of power, of being better placed to establish and to use networks which provided access to preferred positions, and also by virtue of having smaller families to look after.

Thus, the aggregate effects of a number of intended and unintended consequences of many social actions and interactions occurring within a particular set of constraining conditions may give the final appearance of the implementation of an overall plan governed by a particular mental 'set' of which ethnic perception is a part. But it does not follow that such a plan existed or that, if it had existed, its implementation would have provided quite the same results which are now to be observed.

An ethnic divide in Israeli society exists; or, to put it in another way, certain social realities are selected, emphasized, and perceived as a divide or as a 'gap'. This perception has doubtless sharpened, as Yochanan Peres has argued, as differences in income levels and between ethnic categories, as such, have been reduced;[8] and also as varieties of Israeli popular culture, not necessarily reflecting broad ethnic differences, have emerged. But there is another reason for the salience of the ethnic divide: it is that, over time, the other divisions in

Israeli society have come increasingly to strengthen it. Twenty years ago those other divisions tended, more than they do now, to cut across those of ethnic difference. There were still obvious contrasts between 'veterans' and 'newcomers'; and some of the veterans who were privileged — politically and, even more so, materially — were not Ashkenazim.

There was a considerable conflict of interests between the orthodox and the secularists over, for example, public transport on the Sabbath. The matter was of concern to newcomers, especially the young (regardless of ethnic origin or descent), and a large proportion of them aligned themselves with the secularists, as did the majority of all veterans. And, of course, there were class differences — even acknowledging the real differences between 'fractions' of the working class — which cut across those of ethnicity and, what is more, across other divisions to a much greater extent than is now the case. In short, to the extent that recently the different divisions tend to overlap and, what is more important, are experienced as overlapping, they also tend to strengthen the perception of a divide in Israeli society which focuses, diacritically, on ethnic origin or descent.

It does so for two reasons. The first is that one of the ideal values of Israeli society is the 'ingathering of the exiles' for the creation of a Jewish state. The image of such a single nation is not marred by inequalities of income or power which, provided they are not excessive, are after all signs of normality. It is, however, marred by ethnic inequalities which, of their very nature, call into question the assertion of Jewish nationhood. That there should be greater inequality between Jews and Arabs than there is among Jews is of little consequence — though Jewish unity in Israel is not dependent upon Arab-Jewish inequality but might, indeed, be dependent on a pluralist-segmentary divide between the two 'nations'. It is of little consequence because the presence of large numbers of lower-class Arabs in Israeli society is no balm to the resentment of Oriental Jews though it may, in fact, be an added irritant in these particular circumstances. This brings us to the second reason.

To begin with, why are some Jews referred to as Orientals? In Hebrew, the term is *Edot Hamizrach* which, roughly, means 'ethnic groups of the East'. The most obvious answer is that while, clearly, they are not Ashkenazim they are also not all Sephardim: the Jews of Yemeni, Iraqi, Kurdish, Bokharan, Iranian, and Indian origin are clearly not the descendants of the one-time Jews of Spain and Portugal. The term 'Oriental' would, then, emphasize an origin in the Middle or Near East, including North Africa, or some other part of Asia. It should not usually embrace those Sephardim whose culture is clearly European and whose language is Ladino; but it would embrace almost all those North African Jews — that is, the overwhelming majority of

Israeli Orientals — who are thought of as being, or as having been, Arabic rather Ladino speakers among themselves. (Some of the Arabic speakers claim that only a few generations ago they were Ladino speakers.)

But this is more than a matter of mere geography and language. For, although the Hebrew term may not *seem* to carry the same associations as the English word 'Oriental' it has, in fact, done so. The term as used by Europeans, including Jews, usually implies 'backwardness' among other things. While all newcomers to Israel, especially those who were part of the mass immigration of the decade following the foundation of the state, were treated as Diaspora Jews who needed to be taught to be Israelis, Orientals were treated more paternalistically and more patronizingly than the others. They were certainly thought to be in greater need of re-socialization and were perceived as culturally inferior. Many of these immigrants tell of their having been literally disinfected on arrival. Whether some were or were not is less to the point than whether some still retain the feeling of having undergone a 'ritual of degradation'.

Thus, the focus on ethnicity is partly a consequence of the earlier emphasis on the re-socialization of Orientals. The present reaction takes the form of using, as a weapon of retaliation, the very mode of categorization which Orientals believe was imposed upon them: it is now they who persist in reminding some Ashkenazim that they too can be categorized.

This perception of social reality, which had apparently been dormant or quiescent for some time, was activated by two sets of circumstances. The first was the arrival in Israel of some later 'newcomers' — the European Jews from the Soviet Union. They seemed to fare very much better than Oriental Jews had fared after reaching Israel; and some seemed, soon after their arrival, to fare better than Oriental Jews who had been in Israel for some years and certainly better than the newcomers from Soviet Georgia, who were looked upon as Orientals.

The second set of circumstances was the movement of Oriental Jews into more skilled occupations, and in some cases into middle-class self-employment, which was accompanied by a movement of Arabs into the occupational spaces vacated by them. These two sets of conditions have, for many Orientals, underscored an aspect of social reality as they have perceived it: namely, that they, the Oriental Jews, have been and perhaps still are the Jewish Arabs of Israel. After all, most Oriental Jews are no less Arab than Ashkenazi Jews are Polish or Russian; and were it not for the difficulty that this would create in forging a national identity, they might well have been called 'Arab Jews'. However, Arabs, apart from being perceived as threatening 'strangers', are also for the most part perceived as 'backward' and of low social status.

All these conditions tend to strengthen the Orientals' determination to distance themselves from the Arabs. It is notable that when Orientals are angered by the concern which some Ashkenazim seem to show for the Arabs of the West Bank by demonstrating against Jewish settlement in that area, they accuse those Ashkenazim of planning to rob Oriental Jews of their present occupations and greater prosperity by demoting them to the occupations of Arabs.[9] The 'logic' of the accusation is as follows: some Ashkenazim wish to return Judea and Samaria to the Arabs (or, even worse, give it outright to the Palestinians); in that case, the latter will cease to be the migrant 'underclass' labourers of the Ashkenazim; and if that happens, Oriental Jews will have to do the work no longer done by Arabs. Perhaps the Orientals do not understand that their own entry into new occupations resulted in the employment of Arabs in their place or, even, that in some cases new jobs were created in response to the availability of cheaper Arab labour. But whether or not they do understand this process, their resort to this accusation is a symbolic statement about themselves in relation to Arabs and in relation to those Ashkenazim who, in their view of the social world, perceive Oriental Jews as rather like Arabs.

If Orientals wish to distance themselves from Arabs, one way is to show how emphatically they are part of the Jewish nation and how strongly they identify with the Jewish State. They therefore offer unswerving solidarity to those Ashkenazim who wish to unite the nation.[10] We now have one explanation of why, despite the fact that the principal leaders of Herut are Ashkenazim, the Oriental Jews have come increasingly to identify with them. Those leaders, who had long been powerless, are utterly steadfast in their determination not to compromise on the concept of a Complete Israel — just as they appear to have been steadfast in their determination, even in their dealings with great powers, to show Israel as strong and unbending in its concern for the security of the state.

How, then, does one explain the timing of the shift of the Oriental Jews to the Right? As far as middle-class Orientals are concerned (at least those members of the middle class who did not benefit directly from the patronage of the Labour establishment), they have long supported Herut. But the movement to the Right of large numbers of the Oriental working class occurred more recently, despite the fact that the social conditions which underlie this political alignment were of long duration. Apart from the factors already mentioned, there was the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and its aftermath. Many Israelis came to believe that the Labour Alignment had failed to ensure military readiness and has shown weakness when apportioning blame for the state of unpreparedness; but they also admired the bravery and strength of those who had distinguished themselves during the war,

such as General Sharon whom they acclaimed as 'King of Israel' both during and after the war. The perceived weakness of the Labour Alignment was, for many Israelis, but especially for the Orientals, a sufficient reason to vote for other parties as a demonstration of protest. But for Orientals the protest had been long simmering and, as we have seen, could be best expressed in support for Herut as led by Mr Begin. It should be added that for all Israelis the military unpreparedness was traumatic; but for Orientals it undermined the last elements of trust which they had placed in the so-called party of their class.

The first electoral victory of the Right, in 1977, had a 'demonstration effect' for Orientals: the labour movement, associated with the power to manage everything pertaining to public life, had shown itself to be neither immovable nor invincible; and its power was not a necessary part of the taken-for-granted social world. Given this 'demonstration effect' and the presence of two charismatic leaders on the Right (Mr Begin and General Sharon), it is not surprising that the majority of the support for the Right in the general election of 1981 came from Oriental Jews.

I stated in this Journal more than twenty years ago — at a time when workers' parties seemed to be as permanent a feature of Israel as the Social Democratic Party was of Sweden — that potential Oriental Jewish support for Herut was rooted in certain social conditions and that if those conditions were to persist, that support might grow. A social scientist with no trust in historicist prophecies could not have said more than that.

NOTES

[1] Yael Yishai, 'Israel's Right-Wing Jewish Proletariat', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 24, no. 2, December 1982, pp. 87–98.

[2] Like Likud or, more specifically Herut, the Conservative Party in Britain and the Christian Democrats in West Germany emphasize patriotism and national interest and, therefore, present themselves as national rather than as class parties.

[3] Percy S. Cohen, 'Alignments and Allegiances in the Community of Shaarayim in Israel', *JJS*, vol. 4, no. 1, June 1962, p. 20.

[4] Ibid., p. 30. The italics have been inserted now.

[5] Eliezer Ben-Rafael, *The Emergence of Ethnicity: Cultural Groups and Social Conflict in Israel*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Ct., and London, 1982.

[6] Ibid., p. 146.

[7] See Deborah Bernstein, 'Immigrants and Society — a Critical View of the Dominant School of Israeli Sociology', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 31, no. 2, June 1980, pp. 246–64; and Deborah Bernstein and Shlomo Swirsky, 'The Rapid Economic Development of Israel and the Emergence of the Ethnic Division of Labour', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 33, no. 1, March 1982, pp. 64–85.

[8] This important hypothesis, to which the summary given here does not do justice, was put forward by Yochanan Peres in a paper presented at a conference on Israeli ethnicity held at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in June 1980.

[9] For confirmation of this view, see the remarkable article by Amos Oz, 'Fury and Insult', in *The New York Review of Books*, vol. 30, no. 17, 10 November 1983, pp. 51–56

[10] Ibid.

JEWISH DIVORCE LAW AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

Norman Solomon

Review Article

IN 1981, the fourth volume of *The Jewish Law Annual** appeared, affording an English-speaking public, for the first time, a clear and authoritative presentation of the main issues in Jewish divorce law and of the problems arising from the attempt to operate this system within the restraints imposed by a dominant western law system. As well as historical analysis, the volume considers the practical consequences, especially for those living in Britain, the United States, and Israel, of the refusal of the rabbinic courts to 'dissolve' marriages or to countenance divorce without the husband's formal authorization. What types of coercion are available within the different legal systems, and which would be acceptable in terms of Jewish law? Is any remedy available to the *agunah* — the 'chained' woman who cannot remarry so long as her husband refuses her a *get*?[1]

It is deeply to be regretted that despite its timely appearance this volume remains virtually unknown to British lawyers. The victims of their ignorance are the many women who, on account of poor legal advice, have not taken advantage of the procedures which exist within the legal system of the United Kingdom to ensure that within the terms of their civil divorce their husbands would provide them with a *get* and so enable them to enter into another religious marriage. The present writer is personally acquainted with the problem of the Jewish lawyer whose antipathy to Jewish legal procedure (of which he is in any case woefully ignorant) outweighs his commitment to his client's interest; if she does dare to ask whether he can ensure that she receives a *get*, he airily dismisses her enquiry with some disparaging remark about 'mediaeval superstition' or the like. The Anglo-Jewish Divorce Project currently being conducted by the West-Central Jewish Community Development Centre has highlighted ignorance of Jewish law, not least by the legal profession, as a cause of much needless distress.

* Bernard S. Jackson, ed., *The Jewish Law Annual. Volume Four*, vii + 332 pp., published under the auspices of the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists and the Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies by E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1981, 108 guilders.

The practising divorce lawyer who advises Jewish clients should turn at once to M. D. A. Freeman's succinct chapter on 'Jews and the Law of Divorce in England'.[2] Freeman has numerous suggestions as to how a *get* might be compelled by an English court, and one hopes that these possiblities will be explored. To date, however, the only method actually adopted by the courts has been that of oblique compulsion established in *Brett* v. *Brett*[3] in 1969, where the court used a maintenace order to pressurise a recalcitrant husband to grant his wife a *get*. Freeman thinks that an English court would be unlikely to emulate the procedure used in some United States courts of ordering the specific performance of the *ketubah*(written marriage contract); he is probably right, though it is hard to see why it should be more difficult for an English court to overcome its scruples in regard to the unusual nature of the *ketubah* contract than for a United States court to come to terms with the First Amendment. At any rate, from the practical point of view it is important that solicitors should be familiar with *Brett* v. *Brett* and its consequences. From the London Beth Din or the Jewish Marriage Council they can, moreover, obtain up-to-date lists of court orders with respect to *gittin*, and with this information should be well armed to safeguard the interests of their female clients.

Let us turn now from the solicitor's office to consider more deeply the provisions of Jewish law with regard to divorce, and in particular the problem of the recalcitrant husband. *The Jewish Law Annual*, in 1979, set a competition for young authors on the theme 'The Wife Refused a *Get*: Towards a Solution', and in this volume Mark Washofsky's winning entry is published. Both Mark Washofsky, a graduate student at Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, and the sponsors of the competition are to be congratulated on the production of this excellent essay, certainly the best English introduction of which I am aware to the intricacies of Jewish divorce law and the numerous traditional attempts made to alleviate the condition of the woman who becomes an *agunah* through her husband's refusal to grant a *get*. The roots of the problem, claims Washofsky, lie within biblical law (temper this to 'biblical law as interpreted by the rabbis' — it is not entirely clear that a woman in early biblical times could not one-sidedly terminate her marriage).[4] The rabbis inferred from Deuteronomy 24. 1 that the husband's consent was an absolute prerequisite for divorce. This legal requirement conflicted with the generally humane attitude of the rabbis to women and with their concern for justice and fairness. Hence several remedies were in the course of time introduced to alleviate the *agunah*'s predicament — for instance, the decision to accept the testimony of a single witness as to her husband's death, or the use of coercion to compel the husband to grant a *get*. Washofsky distinguishes between 'solutions' to the *agunah* problem and 'inducements'. The former are suggested means of terminating a marriage without the

husband's consent; the latter are ways of ensuring his consent. Whereas the proposed 'solutions' are halakhically problematic, the 'inducements', halakhically more acceptable, do not solve the *moral* dilemma arising from the husband's ability, in principle, to inflict a cruel fate upon his innocent wife.

There are three types of 'solution'. Basing themselves on a ruling of Israel of Brunn (1400–1480), Eliezer Berkovitz[5] and others have urged 'conditional' marriages, where the marriage itself would be invalidated retrospectively if some condition (for example, to grant a *get*) were not complied with. The Conservative Rabbinical Assembly in the United States wanted to adopt a second approach, worked out by Louis Epstein,[6] following Rabbi Ben-Zion Alkalai of Algiers' 1912 proposal, whereby the husband, at the time of marriage, would make arrangements for the couple's divorce in appropriate circumstances.[7] The third type of solution reverts to the mishnaic procedure, attributed to Rabban Gamaliel the Elder,[8] of *hafka'at kiddushin*, annulment of marriage (betrothal). This last, the oldest and most radical of the procedures, amounts to granting the court power to annul marriages. So far, none of these procedures has been accepted for general use by the leading orthodox halakhic authorities, and their adoption would inevitably cause a serious rift, involving restraints on intermarriage, between the different groups of Jews. (See below the discussion of the Bleich and Novak proposals which are presented in this volume of *The Jewish Law Annual.*)

'Inducements' are less contentious halakhically, though not free from both halakhic and practical problems. Saul Lieberman's recommendation, adopted in 1948 by the Conservative Rabbinical Assembly, was for the insertion in the *ketubah* of a clause whereby bride and groom would be bound to accept the adjudication of the Assembly's Beth Din were they to encounter marital difficulties. If, for instance, the husband in such circumstances refused to grant a *get* the Assembly's Beth Din would impose terms of compensation which could then be enforced by American civil courts. However, not all American courts have been ready to intervene on this basis. Moreover, three halakhic objections have been raised: (*i*) the original commitment is vague (*asmakhta*); (*ii*) even if the civil courts were to enforce it, this might be regarded by Jewish law as illegal compulsion; and (*iii*) the procedure verges on 'conditional marriage', which is morally as well as halakhically open to objection. This said, 'inducement' of one sort or another is widely used even by orthodox Batei Din. Inducements range from the threat of imprisonment which the recalcitrant husband faces in Israel (no limits are placed by Jewish law on the coercive power of a Jewish court with regard to divorce) to the enforcement of maintenance orders by the civil courts, which most halakhic authorities would regard as legitimate compulsion where the granting of a *get* had been ordered by a Beth Din.

Washofsky, rightly in my view, argues strongly for 'solutions' rather than 'inducements', though he is well aware that a 'solution' not acceptable to the orthodox would result in the 'strict' authorities forbidding 'all intermarriage with Jews living in communities where the disputed reforms are in force, an action which would seriously impair the unity of world Jewry' (p. 157). His own hope for a 'solution' lies in the process he refers to as 'an essential *re-definition* of those fundamental principles which lie at the heart and base of the system of Jewish family law' (p. 159). He sees a model for this process in the attempt of the orthodox rabbi Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg (1885–1956) to re-define the concept of *zikkui ha-get*[9] (writing a *get* on behalf of someone who has not expressed his consent but of whom the court declares that it is to his advantage to issue the *get*) and devotes the latter part of his essay to a careful analysis of Weinberg's extension, or redefinition, of the rabbinic rule of *zakin le'adam shelo befanav*[10] — acting on a person's behalf without his consent on the basis that such action is to his advantage. Washofsky is convinced that it would be possible to re-define fundamental concepts of Jewish law in such a way as to *solve* definitively the problem of the recalcitrant husband. I would agree that this is possible, and even the right way to set about things. The real problem, however, is not that the *halakha* is inherently inflexible, for indeed it possesses great flexibility. The problem is not so much halakhic at all as *political*. It is not *can* the rabbis develop, or re-define, *halakha* in such a way as to solve the *agunah* problem, but *will* they? The bounds are set not by the logic of *halakha* (the rabbis of the Mishnah, as we saw above, actually *annulled* marriages where they saw fit) but by the nervousness of its practitioners, none of whom can dare to apply a 'solution' for fear that his colleagues will reject it and force him into a sectarian situation which would simply exacerbate the problem while helping no one. Central to this is the problem of authority in Jewish law; no one can *impose* a solution, and the consensus by which orthodoxy today maintains its identity is so fragile as not to admit of radical changes.

Is there, then, any possibility of change *within* the orthodox framework? J. David Bleich, who is Professor of Talmud at Yeshivah University in New York as well as Professor of Law at its Benjamin R. Cardozo School of Law, thinks that there is, and he proposes a remedy — still what Washofsky would call an 'inducement' — which he feels is sufficiently strongly grounded in *halakha* to commend itself to the orthodox. Bleich utilizes the institution of *tosefet mezonot*, of inserting in the *ketubah* a clause guaranteeing the bride maintenance beyond the statutory minimum set by the rabbis. Such a provision is well-attested by both law and custom, and is sufficiently definite in its nature to escape the charge of being *asmakhta*, an ill-defined contract. The daily sum stipulated should be significantly higher than any alimony award

likely to be made by a civil court. The husband could only be released from this obligation if and when the marriage was terminated in accordance with Jewish law, and would thus be induced by the hope of escaping the hefty maintenance provision to grant the *get*. Bleich considers in meticulous detail the formulation of this provision in the *ketubah* and sees the now rarely used *Tenaim Aharonim* (Final Articles of Engagement) document as a model of unquestionable authority (once again it is the problem of *authority* which lies at the heart of things). It remains to be seen whether Bleich's suggestion (*a*) meets with the approval of his orthodox colleagues, (*b*) is implemented by them, and (*c*) proves to be enforceable in the American courts. Certainly there is no indication that English courts would at present be ready to take into consideration provisions incorporated in the *ketubah*.

David Novak, like Washofsky, sees 'solution' as the aim — solution, moreover, within the terms of Jewish law, not by the invocation of civil authority. Novak gives a perceptive analysis of the annulment of marriage in Jewish law, and explores the possibility of using this in lieu of divorce to solve *agunah* problems. He sums up the present situation in Jewish law as enabling 'a lawless person, the husband, to use a specific law to reject the authority of the Law in general and to fulfill his avaricious or sadistic designs against his wife' (p. 192). He acknowledges a debt to his late teacher, the talmudist and philosopher Samuel Atlas (d. 1977), for emphasizing the essentially social nature of the institution of marriage as conceived in the Talmud. Any individual freedom, argues Novak — such as in this case the freedom to divorce one's wife or not — is not a right prior to the Law but, rather, a personal prerogative which is allowed by the Law when it is consistent with the purposes of the Law (see p. 190). In several cases where a marriage was improperly though validly initiated we find rabbis, even in the Middle Ages, annulling it; the Talmud has instances of annulment even where the marriage was not improperly initiated. Novak cogently argues that annulment is the proper mode of operation today, for 'without the practical power to annul such marriages the law is in effect encouraging immoral blackmail and vengeance' (p. 206). Novak is ready to endorse the annulment procedure despite the fact that he knows it will not command universal consent. To him, a moral evil at the heart of *halakha* and contrary to its true intentions cannot be countenanced even in the interest of maintaining communal unity.

In the contrast between Bleich and Novak we see the difference in the Orthodox and Conservative approaches to *halakha*. *Both* groups regard the *halakha* as of the essence of Torah and as binding upon all Jews. Both groups regard themselves as firmly in the tradition of the rabbis. The Orthodox, however, though recognising the demands of morality and compassion and indeed seeing them as principles of Torah, are reluctant to invoke them to develop given rules in ways not clearly

stated by earlier rabbis; the Conservatives are ready to accept responsibility for development along what they perceive as philosophically justifiable paths of interpretation. Clearly, the issue between them is one of *authority* rather than of law or morality.

In recent years, English divorce law has moved further and further away from involving itself in marriage. Of course, it still regulates the *consequences* of marriage and divorce by a variety of administrative procedures. Since the 1969 Divorce Reform Act, however, it can hardly be said to regulate divorce itself, for divorce is now available, subject to the lapse of an appropriate period of time, on demand. There are of course many important consequences which flow from a legally enacted marriage and which are not applicable to a couple merely 'living together', but even here there is a noticeable tendency to granting rights to those who have not been through the formalities. It seems to be the case that marriage and divorce are coming to be regarded as in themselves personal matters, their consequences rather than they themselves being the area of operation of the law. There are well-known social reasons for this development, but one of its consequences is that lawyers in England today have to be much more sensitive to the purely personal aspects of marriage and divorce. The religious affiliation, if any, of the parties, becomes important, and thus it is that so many important cases recently have hinged on the cognizance to be taken by the law of, for instance, Hindu and Muslim, as well as Jewish, marriage and divorce regulations; it is a reflection of the pluralistic and doctrinally uncommitted nature of our society, and of the consequent recognition that the law should interfere as little as possible with the right of the individual to follow his or her own preferences in regard to the establishment or discontinuance of the marriage relationship. Paradoxically, now that the law itself is not determined by the dominant religion of the country, it has become more rather than less important to have regard to the religious commitment, if any, of the matrimonial pair themselves. Not that the law itself is interested in the religion of the parties — as a matter of principle, it is *not* interested. But precisely *because* it is not interested, precisely *because* it leaves it to the parties to choose or reject any religious beliefs they wish, it has to recognize that parties *do* in fact choose beliefs, and marry or divorce in accordance with those beliefs. I would argue that, subject to such measures as are necessary to protect basic rights of the individual, the task of the law is not to make or break marriages, but to *register* them as having taken place or as having been dissolved, and to *regulate* the consequences. Historically, it is likely that this was for a time the case with regard to Jewish marriages in this country. There were probably not many Jewish divorces in nineteenth-century England; it would seem, however, that prior to the 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act the Jewish ecclesiastical authorities themselves exercised

the power of granting divorce on the grounds established by Jewish law. This is most reasonable. A couple who, at the time of their marriage, commit themselves to a particular type of jurisdiction by virtue of their choice of religious ceremony should be understood as committed to the same jurisdiction in the case of divorce, subject to (*a*) regulation of the *consequences* of that divorce by the dominant jurisdiction and (*b*) provision for appeal to the dominant jurisdiction in the case of manifest inequity. Jewish law undoubtedly has its problems, as in the case of the recalcitrant husband. Much of the difficulty is, however, only apparent, and stems not from Jewish law itself but from the rabbis' lack of power to put the law into effect. Many of these difficulties, not least that of the recalcitrant husband, could be mitigated if religious divorce were accorded a status similar to that of religious marriage.

Such a proposal may seem radical to some. In effect, what it does is to remove the last vestiges of Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act of 1753 which provided, for the first time, that no marriages other than those publicly solemnized in the Church of England should be recognized as valid. Lord Hardwicke's Act, contentious even in its own time as an attempt to rob Roman Catholics and Dissenters of the right to celebrate their own marriages, has of course been whittled away in the course of the last two centuries so that we are close to the pre-1753 situation where common law marriage was a valid form; that is, where marriage — as apart from its *consequences* — was not normally within the range of statutory law. But this is a perfectly natural development in a society in which the Church of England can in no way claim a monopoly of marriage regulation. It is similar to the situation in those overseas territories, such as India, where in imperial times the regulation of marriage — and in Muslim areas, divorce — was within the local religious jurisdiction.

It is interesting to note that talmudic law treats marriage and divorce as private arrangements not requiring the specific sanction of an authorised rabbi, though of course subject to procedures and limitations imposed by rabbinic law. There were many Jewish Lord Hardwickes[11] in the Middle Ages who attempted to invalidate marriages contracted without the specific approval of the local rabbi or worthies, notwithstanding their clear validity in talmudic law. Their rulings might even be cited (many will dispute this) as a precedent for the dissolution by a Beth Din of a validly contracted marriage.

An important point overlooked when proposals are made for enforcement of the performance of a *get* is the status of coercion in rabbinic law. Basically, coercion is acceptable when exerted on behalf of a validly constituted Beth Din, but not when exerted on behalf of a non-Jewish court unless that court is urging compliance with a ruling of the Beth Din. If the English courts were to accept the jurisdiction of the

Beth Din in Jewish divorces all coercive action to secure compliance would clearly be acceptable in terms of Jewish law, even though actually carried out by officers of the state. But I very much doubt whether such a proposal as that of Eleanor Platt Q.C.[12] would meet this requirement. Miss Platt suggests 'an agreement under seal between bride and groom that in the event of a decree absolute in the civil Court, if the husband then refused to give a Get or the wife refused to receive one, the injured party would be liable to be paid liquidated damages . . . by the other for breach of that contract.' Miss Platt thinks such an arrangement would be enforceable by an English civil Court. It does not seem to me clear that a *get*, if enforced in such a manner, would be valid in Jewish law. Perhaps this difficulty could be overcome by specifying in the original agreement that the *get* is to be given if and as directed by the Beth Din (one foresees problems as to the identity of 'the Beth Din'). Miss Platt notes, by way of precedent, that 'the failure to provide a dowry in accordance with the marriage contract has been upheld in the English civil law as breach of contract in relation to a polygamous Mohammedan marriage'.[13]

Not only the practising lawyer but equally the historian of law and society will learn much from the volume under review. Rabbinic law is set in perspective in relation to (*a*) its historical antecedents both in the Bible and in the ancient Near East (Lipinski, Zakovitch, Piatelli); (*b*) its contemporary setting, as reflected in the New Testament (Lövestam) and the Roman Empire (Rabello); and (*c*) the wife's right to divorce in Muslim and Hindu law (David Pearl, J. Duncan M. Derrett). Mordechai Friedman, utilizing material from the Cairo Geniza, has some interesting observations on divorce on the wife's demand in the Gaonic period and late medieval Egypt, and Shmuel Shilo writes on the treatment by the *rishonim* (rabbis of the twelfth to fifteenth centuries) of impotence as a ground for divorce.

The volume is highly recommended to all who wish to gain an insight into Jewish law at a point at which it has maximum impact on the lives of twentieth-century Jews. For practising divorce lawyers in any country where there are substantial numbers of Jews, it is compulsory reading.

NOTES

[1] A *get* is a bill of divorcement. An *agunah* is also a woman whose husband's death is strongly suspected but not proved to the satisfaction of the Beth Din and who cannot remarry; or a childless widow whose deceased husband's brother cannot be reached so that he may ritually release her (or who refuses to release her) and who cannot remarry until he does so.

[2] Pp. 276–88. On pp. 250–71, Bernard J. Meislin writes on the 'Pursuit of the Wife's Right to a "Get" in United States and Canadian Courts'. In this latter

connection, the reader should also pay special attention to the text of the judgment of Justice of the Supreme Court Gerald S. Held in the important case of *Stern* v. *Stern*. Freeman thinks that an English court, unlike Judge Held, would not compel a *get* by ordering the specific performance of a *ketubah*. See my remarks below on Eleanor Platt Q.C.'s proposal and the precedent she offers (*Shahnaz* v. *Rizwan* [1965] 1 Queen's Bench 390). Freeman, at any rate, does not think that *Shahnaz* v. *Rizwan* would be sufficient basis for action on the basis of a *ketubah* — but Platt's proposal involves using an agreement separate from the *ketubah* and would certainly be worth testing in court.

[3] [1969] *All England Review*, p. 1007.

[4] Yair Zakovitch suggests (p. 46), but with little supporting evidence, that in some biblical periods, at least, a wife had 'certain rights to divorce her husband when her basic needs are not supplied or when she is deserted . . .'. I can find not the slightest indication, in the texts he cites, that a wife was able *to issue a bill of divorcement* to her husband. Indeed, throughout most of the biblical period and for the majority of people, things were certainly not as well regulated and documented as Deuteronomy might have wished.

[5] Eliezer Berkowitz, *Tenai Benisuin Uv'Get*, Mosad Harav Kook, Jerusalem, 1967.

[6] Louis Epstein, *Lish'elat Ha-Agunot*, New York, 1940.

[7] In Malay Muslim marriages, the husband usually utters a formula (which is duly registered in the marriage certificate as a *ta'alik* clause) by which he binds himself that his wife will be divorced if he fails to maintain her for a specified period of time, usually three months. If she can satisfy a kathi or a Muslim court that he has not maintained her, the divorce is registered with or without the husband's consent, since he has already pronounced a conditional divorce formula (a *ta'alik*) at the time of the marriage. See Chapter 2 on *Ta'alik* in Judith Djamour, *The Muslim Matrimoniai Court in Singapore*, London, 1966, pp. 38–76.

[8] Mark Washofsky (p. 150, n. 34) cites *Mishnah Gittin* 4:1,2. The Mishnah does not state the principle of *hafka'at kiddushin*. This is given in R. Gamaliel's rationale in *B. Gittin* 33a in a pericope which I would hesitate to date earlier than the fourth century. However, there is no doubt that the principle is widely accepted in the Talmud. It was certainly regarded by the later authorities as authoritative, though they hotly disputed the range of its application.

[9] J. J. Weinberg, *Seridei Esh* (Responsa), vol. 3, Mosad Harav Kook, Jerusalem, 1969.

[10] Cf. *Mishnah Eruvin* 7:11 and, for its application to divorce law, *Shulchan Aruch Even Ha-Ezer* 140.

[11] Joseph Colon (1420–1480), in a very colourful responsum (*Maharik* — Responsum no. 84) directed against Moses Capsali of Constantinople, ridicules the very notion that a marriage can be invalidated on the grounds that it contravened a local *herem* or *takkana*. But it is clear that Capsali thought otherwise.

[12] She has published her suggestion in *New London Forum* (the Journal of the New London Synagogue), vol. 1, no. 2, September 1983.

[13] This (she cites no reference) is presumably her summary of *Shahnaz* v. *Rizwan*. See Note 2 above for Freeman's comment on the case.

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BOOK REVIEWS

KEVIN AVRUCH, *American Immigrants in Israel. Social Identities and Change*, x + 243 pp., University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1981, £15.40.

At first sight, this is an impressive study. Avruch pursues an argument and never gets sidetracked or beset by doubts. He examines the changing ethnic identities of American Jews who emigrate to Israel. He assumes that the quest for a satisfactory ethnic identity motivates some American Jews to emigrate to Israel and shows the difficulties they encounter when they seek to establish secure identities. They strive to become traditional Jews and to leave American modernity behind; but in Israel they find that they have become ambassadors of American technology and efficiency. The author states that he conducted fieldwork in Israel between December 1975 and March 1977, but that 'participant observation . . . was not a major method of research' and that the core of the research consisted of intensive 'interviews with nineteen immigrant families. . . . The total time spent with each family ranged from three to twelve hours' (pp. 8–9). He also administered a questionnaire to one hundred immigrants.

On careful consideration, one discovers that Avruch's analysis is based mainly on the immigrants' attitudes about themselves and about Israel. We learn little else about their activities in their new country and about their environment. Their attitudinal statements are accepted unquestioningly and treated as observed reality. For instance, two immigrants tell of their encounters with Israeli bureaucracy and how they used 'personal influence' (*protektsia*) to arrange their affairs (pp. 139–41) and Avruch comments that these 'individuals have adpated — with considerable insight — to certain deviations from bureaucratic norms. Rules, they have realized, are not necessarily applied on universalistic principles: in the bureaucrat-client relationship, role specifity . . . is not necessarily maintained, and neither is affective neutrality' (p. 141). Avruch thus accepts the factuality of the immigrants' tales and immediately goes on to denounce Israeli bureaucracy as deviant. Not for a moment does he seem to consider that the 'facts' are highly selected and could have been made up to support the accounts. He might also have noted that similar 'deviations from bureaucratic norms' have been reported from many parts of the world, including the United States — as Peter M. Blau showed in *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (1963).

One immigrant who runs an automatic towel service reported that he 'started when Jerusalem was like a little village. . . . There were no public health laws — well, a few left over from the British — but no one gave a damn. You never used a public bathroom, even in the best hotels' (p. 183). This man apparently came to Israel about 1970 and not in 1948, as one might have thought. The 'facts' cited go unchallenged and the author praises that immigrant as an entrepreneur who 'invented a product or service that did not exist in Israel before' and who 'educated' Israelis to need the service (p. 184). One must hope that the mayor of Jerusalem will not sue for libel.

The book contains interesting general discussions on Zionism, the State of Israel and immigration, the demography of American immigrants, and the institutional treatment of new immigrants (chapters 2, 3, and 4). The problems of official Israeli emissaries in America are vividly portrayed: they complain that they cannot persuade desirable potential immigrants to settle in Israel, while they must try to dissuade others who are unlikely to adapt successfully. Part of the fifth chapter deals with the motivation for migration to Israel and the data the author relies on are statistical surveys conducted in Israel over the years by various researchers and his own interviews. That information was of course collected after the American immigrants came to Israel, often many years later; and it may reflect little about their motivation and much about their situation at the time of the inquiry. Avruch does not appear to be aware of the methodological difficulty and he finds it striking that the reasons given by the immigrants 'for leaving the U.S. are cast in terms of objective social dilemmas . . . while the reasons for going to Israel are cast in terms of subjective personal dilemmas . . .' (p. 93). The past has become generalized and objectivized, but it turns out to be the obverse of the Israeli situation and, therefore, a statement about the present and not about the American past. Thus, when a second-generation American who settled in Israel in 1971 (that is, several years before the interview) says, 'I never felt any attachment to America' (p. 97), it may only mean that she wishes to stress her present attachment to Israel.

His limited field data do not provide Avruch with a sufficient basis to develop 'grounded' theory. Instead, he combines and manipulates a few well-established sociological categories, such as the traditional-modern dichotomy, absorption of immigrants, primordial identity, status and contract, expressive and instrumental behaviour, and Parsonian pattern variables. Many of these concepts have been discussed at length in the literature, and some have been discredited. Here, they are accepted uncritically, on the basis of authorities like Weber, Parsons, and Eisenstadt. On several occasions, the author uses as many sociological terms as possible in a single paragraph. For example, 'A person who invests in an ethnic identity and maximizes the

investment, contextualizing the identity in a particular image of society, has traditionalized his social identity in an expressive mode. He has made certain ties, loyalties and values primary or ultimate ones' (p. 154). Such sociological jargon is unlikely to lead to new insights.

There are also some unfortunate errors in the rendering of Hebrew words and phrases — for example, *kol yehudim 'am ahad* (p. 119), *'ain bayah* (p. 140), and *dati oleh* (p. 178) for *'oleh dati*.

EMANUEL MARX

RACHEL ERTEL, *Le Shtetl. La bourgade juive de Pologne de la tradition à la modernité*, 323 pp., Payot, Paris, 1982, 110 francs.

We must rejoice at the publication of this important book about Jewish life in Poland. There are very few works on the subject in the French language, as can be seen in Rachel Ertel's bibliography — only a bare handful, and those have appeared only quite recently. She has followed the example of some French and American authors of theses (so far unpublished) and brought to light the merit of an original genre: the *yizkerbiher*, books of memoirs and testimonials.

That style of publication started in 1943 in New York and so far there have been about 400 works, mostly in Yiddish, and mostly (85 per cent) about Poland. They are collections of articles and of written reminiscences by members of *landsmanshaften* — associations of former residents of a particular town or region. (Such a book, on the Jews of Wuerttemberg, was reviewed in the June 1983 issue of this Journal: vol. 25, no. 1). Usually, an editor assembles the material and organizes it in what has now become a classic manner, with a section on the early origins of the particular community followed by another on the period starting at the end of the nineteenth century and ending with the First World War. The third part of the book deals with the inter-war period, with chapters on traditional institutions (such as synagogues, *hevrot*, religious schools, etc.), on secular developments (such as political parties, lay education, and youth movements), on outstanding personalities (rabbis, philanthropists, writers), and on ordinary people. The last part deals with the period of the genocide.

At first, most social scientists looked upon these works with condescension if not with scorn; but they are now beginning to appreciate the importance of the data they contain. Admittedly, the reminiscences are written by amateurs and often exhibit naïvety and provincialism; but nevertheless, they are valuable as a rich historical and ethnographic mine since the tragedy of the genocide has obliterated other sources. Sometimes, the descriptions may be distorted; but the authors usually strive for accuracy, since they know that they will be read and commented upon by their old compatriots. Moreover, the

texts make revelations about facts which might have previously been kept secret for reasons of security.

Rachel Ertel has based her study on the Polish *shtetl* on three areas: Zetl, Belhatov, and Santz. Belhatov was the subject of a thesis (unpublished) by Régine Azria. The areas were chosen because of their geo-political diversity, especially until Polish independence. Zetl (Yiddish for Zdzieciol) was in Byelorussia, in the Jewish Pale of Settlement of the tsarist empire; Belhatov was situated in 'Congress Poland', an almost autonomous region in the nineteenth century; while Santz (Saç) in Galicia was until 1918 under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. These three small towns also had other points of differentiation in their demography and social structure.

The author in her introductory chapter stresses the great difficulties in defining a *shtetl* (p. 16). The word means literally a small town or large village, and indeed the three areas she has chosen vary greatly. In 1926, Zetl had only 4,600 inhabitants, of whom 75 per cent were Jews; Belhatov in 1931 had 10,851 residents, half of whom were Jews; and in 1931 Santz had more Jews than were to be found in the two other areas together — 9,084. On the other hand, the Jews of Santz constituted only about 30 per cent of the total population of 30,928; Santz was clearly a town of some importance.

Linguistically, the word *shtetl* is simply the diminutive of *shtot* or town (p. 16); but the author sees it from the 'emic' point of view of the anthropologist and says that this diminutive in Yiddish has overtones of neighbourliness, tenderness, and familiarity. A *shtetl* is not simply an area where one lives with fellow residents; it has a peculiar socio-economic structure, a network of individual and collective relationships, and a special mode of living. It is, in every sense, 'un espace juif' (p. 16).

She is aware that before 1940, 40 per cent of Warsaw's population was Jewish and that there were great numbers of Jews in large cities such as Lodz, Lublin, and Cracow; but these Jews had been recent immigrants from a *shtetl*, and they had been moulded for several generations within the confines of the *shtetl*. On the other hand, can one consider the *shtetl* without taking into account the great importance of the demographic and socio-cultural aspects of Polish Jewry in the large cities? S. Bronsztejn, in 'The Jewish Population of Poland in 1931' (published in this Journal in vol. 6, no. 1, 1964) showed in great detail that in 1931, one quarter of the 3,113,933 Jews of Poland lived in five large cities: Warsaw, Lodz, Wilno, Cracow, and Lwow, and that two thirds lived in towns of more than 20,000 inhabitants. This urban concentration had started well before 1931. By the end of the nineteenth century, the *shtetl* was losing its vitality and indeed its mode of life, as described by Rachel Ertel, was largely influenced by events in the greater conurbations. This uneasy line of demarcation in the

principal theme of the book is probably why the author has found it necessary to give us a very detailed history of Polish Jewry from its origins until Polish independence, extending over 60 pages in the second chapter alone, before she embarks on her study of Zetl, Belhatov, and Santz. Then again in the sixth chapter, she takes 38 pages to describe the critical position of the Jews in independent Poland.

Of course, a proper historical perspective is important (and here only published sources are used), but one of such detail is achieved at the expense of the main purpose of the book — a study of the *shtetl*. There is also a chapter entitled 'L'irruption des idéologies', dealing with the *Haskalah* (the Enlightenment), Zionism, and political movements, which is of the same general character. There is thus a constant criss-crossing between the themes of the *shtetl* and of the totality of Polish Jewry. It would have been perhaps more useful to have had both more specific case studies and deeper and more imaginative sociological analyses. In the three case studies she presents, she does give us a detailed picture of economic practices, of the role of religious institutions, of trade unions, and of the topography — what she calls the 'espace juif' — in the three towns. Nevertheless, I was not able to gather what made for the unity of the 'group' — a very imprecise term which she uses to characterize the local Jewish population. The term *judaïcité*, which Albert Memmi favours, would have been more apt.

She tells us that the 'group' survives because of its observance of kashrut, but that surely is attaching too much importance to a secondary variable. She also asserts that the family is the primordial basis of Jewish culture, 'a fortress which alone can guarantee survival' (p. 126) and that the interrelationship between family and group is one of the foundations of Jewish culture in eastern Europe. But how can she take no account of the theses of Max Weber and others about the relationship between religion (or ethical beliefs) and type of family organization within the context of the economic practices of capitalism? She does describe and analyse economic activities: in Zetl, there are small shopkeepers and artisans; in Belhatov, there are mainly sub-contractors for the textile industry of Lodz; and in Santz, the Jews are mainly small dealers and shopkeepers. Thus, there is a variety of occupations, but within the specific areas of light industry, crafts, and small trade; and from the Middle Ages until the nineteenth century, the *shtetl*'s economy was in sharp contrast with that of the general society, which was largely a rural peasant economy. The author is aware of that fact, but apparently fails to realize its significance for the mode of existence of the *shtetl*.

This having been said, there is no doubt that the book has many merits. The author's observations are keen and the descriptions of Jewish life in each *shtetl* are vivid and utterly convincing. So also are the

descriptions of the militant secular left-wing Jews (Communists, Bundists, etc.) in opposition to the conservatism of religious Jews. These militants had retained the fervour and the dedication as well as the intolerance and self-confidence of their centuries-old traditional Jewish upbringing. The lively and friendly Jewish associations in the political, cultural, trade-union, and sporting fields of the twentieth century sprang from the tradition of *hevrot* or religious brotherhoods and of the guilds of artisans and traders. Rachel Ertel also shows how the present century's Jewish passion for literature and a broad secular culture arose from the old traditional values of the merit of learning — although, of course, both the style and the content of the new culture often sharply differed from traditional Jewish culture.

This book is therefore an important contribution to the history, sociology, and ethnography of Polish Jewry. Surprisingly, the author's field is English and American literature; and that is all the more reason to congratulate her for having produced this pioneer study. It is regrettable that there is no index; but there are several maps and a very valuable bibliography.

JACQUES GUTWIRTH

HYAM MACCOBY, ed. and trans., *Judaism on Trial. Jewish-Christian Disputations in the Middle Ages*, 245 pp., The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, Associated University Presses, London and Toronto, 1982. £15.00.

The Harvard philosopher Robert Nozick writes that when the Messiah comes, he will be asked if this is his first coming or his second. Nozick strongly advises him not to answer the question. Advice well-justified in the light of the present study.

Into what category of verbal exchange do we fit the encounters between Judaism and Christianity in the Middle Ages? Dialogue is the last word one would choose, implying an openness on both sides conspicuous by its absence. Disputation is the most commonly chosen, conveying both the formality of the staged proceedings and something of the aggressive passion with which they were attended. Hyam Maccoby, in his translation and analysis of three of the disputations, has preferred to describe them as 'Judaism on Trial'. It is a description both accurate and ironic, inviting us to share in full measure the bewilderment of the Jewish defendants: accused of obstinacy in rejecting Christian truth, and caught between the equally unpleasant alternatives of accepting the charge or of proving it by contesting it.

Medieval Christianity knew where to locate the Jews of the past and the Jews of the future. Those of the Biblical past looked forward to their redeemer; those of the future would accept him. What to do in the meanwhile, with the Jews who refused to acknowledge that redemption

had been at hand for more than a millennium? The disputations give us pointed insight into the extent to which the question irritated the Church. Did the Jews not possess and cherish the very texts which Christian tradition read as precise indications of itself? How could they read and fail to understand?

The answer, of course, lay in the fact that Judaism possessed a quite different interpretative tradition, in the lively, argumentative, and often seemingly irreverent literature of the Talmud and Midrashim. As Maccoby points out, it was ultimately the Talmud that was on trial. A post-Christian Judaism could not exist, let alone create a flourishing religious culture. Talmudic Judaism must either be proved to be non-existent, an outrageous sign of life after the obituary had already been written; or to be an extended work of cover-up in which the rabbis alternated between admission of Christianity and concealment of the admission. The debates make chilling reading. What was at stake was the right of a people to its own self-understanding. The rabbis who were called on to defend the Jewish stance were effectively deprived of a language in which to do so. The result was a classic and fated series of non-encounters.

Hyam Maccoby has produced a superb work of committed scholarship. At the heart of the book are his translations of the three disputations of which we have reasonably detailed records: the Paris Disputation of 1240, the Barcelona Disputation of 1263, and the Tortosa Disputation of 1413–14. The translations are first-rate and the accompanying notes full of interest. They are prefaced by a long introduction and analysis, in which the author sets the debates in their historical context, outlines the territory they cover, and evaluates the arguments, rescuing them from archaism by a vigorous modern umpiring of the contests.

It is at this that Maccoby excels. Clearly a man who loves an argument, he leads us through the twists and turns of the confrontations, sighing at a self-contradiction, appreciating a decisive rejoinder, lamenting a missed opportunity. His commentary, beautifully written, perceptive and urbane, deals with each disputation almost as if it were a passage drawn from the Talmud itself. His hero of the encounters is Nahmanides, spokesman at Barcelona, not least for the self-evident intellectual pleasure he was able to derive from a fraught situation. In his footnotes Maccoby indulges in equally playful speculation, reconstructing a lost sermon of R. Zerahia Halevi, providing a new provenance for two items of medical terminology, and supplying some deft textual emendation.

What of the disputations themselves? Pride of place is given, rightly, to the Barcelona encounter, the only one in which some real measure of debate ensued. The Paris Disputation which preceded it was, by comparison, a two-dimensional affair, animated chiefly by the fervour

which the Christian accuser, Nicholas Donin — a converted Jew of Karaite tendency — put into his attacks on the Talmud. The Jewish spokesman, Rabbi Yehiel ben Joseph, answered the charges of anti-Christian content simply enough: the persons referred to in the various passages seeming to refer to Jesus were not in fact the Jesus of Christianity ('Not every Louis is King of France'); nor were the idolaters referred to in Jewish law to be taken to include Christians, nor indeed any contemporary non-Jews. He failed to convince his opponents — the Christian record comments: 'Believe him who will, he lied'. The passages were duly ordered to be censored.

Maccoby partially defends him from the charge of disingenuousness. Almost none of the Talmudic stories of rebellious disciples referred originally to the Jesus of Christianity; but they had acquired this association, perhaps by the time of the redaction of the Talmud and certainly in later folk-literature. The laws of idolaters were sometimes applied to Christians, sometimes not, depending on an implicit perception of their moral standing. Where Jews were treated with a measure of civilized toleration by their non-Jewish neighbours, they were quick to reciprocate. But in Yehiel's time, Maccoby comments, there was 'little to contradict the idea that Christians . . . were congenital shedders of blood and uncivilised people, against whom a Jew should be on his guard' (p. 33). The very fluidity which Judaism had preserved in the interpretation of the controversial sections kept the debate at some distance from the issues.

The other charges — that the Talmud contained blasphemies against God, and foolish or obscene passages — show in retrospect a sad lack of insight into the expressive forms which rabbinic theology took. Amongst the 'confessions' elicited by Donin's outrage was the admission that 'God exerts himself to teach children every day' (p. 166). Maccoby correctly points out that the very passages which aroused anger as blasphemies were those which depicted a suffering God — a central concept in Christianity itself. The Christian tradition preserved itself, at least in its Nicene form, from attributing emotion to God the Father by transferring it to an incarnate God — a move which R. Yehiel wisely refrained from pointing out might be considered a greater unintelligibility.

The defensive character of the Paris Disputation is altogether absent from that of Barcelona. Here the debate glitters with the repartees of Nahmanides, reluctant though he had been at the outset to take part, and despite his attempt halfway through to have it discontinued. The Christian rulers of Spain still preserved some of the tolerance they had shown in the previous two centuries, anxious to secure Jewish support while the Moors were a power. King James of Aragon, who acted as chairman during the proceedings, took a relatively even-handed part, evidently enjoying the cut-and-thrust of the argument. Nahmanides's

account ends with a description of the sermon preached by the King in the Barcelona synagogue, and with his own daring rejoinder: 'The words of our lord the King are noble, exalted and honoured. . . . But I will not give his words the praise of saying that they are true' (p. 143). The moment and the man were right; Nahmanides speaks with a self-confidence not to be recaptured by later protagonists. Maccoby states that it was 'the greatest confrontation between Christianity and Judaism in the Middle Ages' (p. 12).

The Christian case had by now moved on. Instead of an attack on the Talmud, the case at Barcelona was that the early rabbinic literature itself contained evidence of the truth of Christianity. This was an altogether more subtle approach to the task of winning Jewish converts, encouraged by Raymund de Penaforte and assisted by defecting Jews such as Pablo Christiani, who was to become the main Christian speaker in the disputation.

Nahmanides's first response is blunt: if the sages did, as the other side contends, believe in Jesus, why did they remain Jews? When confronted with Aggadic passages which seem to suggest that the Messiah was born and lived at the time of the sages, he is equally dismissive: 'I do not believe in this Aggadah' (p. 110). Again, Maccoby is very much to the point in explaining the difficulty Christian interlocutors had in getting to grips with the Aggadah as evidence for a theological position. Always they would be confronted with what seemed to them to be evasions: the passage was not authoritative, or it was not to be taken literally. Nahmanides often pursues both lines at once: I do not agree with it; but were I to, let me point out that it refutes you. The issue is ultimately about what is important to the two religious traditions. In Judaism it is the laws of conduct: here the arguments of the Talmud require an authoritative resolution. In Christianity it was theological belief: hence the incredulity that Judaism might leave such matters open-ended.

Nahmanides patiently explains that the Aggadah consists of 'sermons' and stories. 'If anyone wants to believe in it, well and good, but if someone does not believe in it, there is no harm' (p. 115). Passages in the early rabbinic literature describing the birth of the Messiah at the time of the destruction of the Temple, or his appearance in Rome to one of the rabbis, were to be rejected as non-authoritative or as carrying a figurative meaning. For good measure he throws in the alternative possibility, that they are literal, that the Messiah does indeed exist, but has merely not come yet. He may, he adds jokingly, be waiting now at the gates of Toledo. This was, perhaps, an unfortunate argumentative move for it was taken up by the disputants a century and a half later at Tortosa, where the idea that the Messiah was alive, still waiting his call, and more than a thousand years old, was greeted with incredulity, hardly undeserved.

On the Messianic idea itself, Nahmanides is at pains to explain that it is 'not fundamental to our religion'. He says to King James, in a bold stroke of flattery and paradox, 'Why, you are worth more to me than the Messiah!' His contribution at this point is powerful and systematic. Judaism does not need a Messiah to redeem man from Original Sin. 'My soul is no closer to the soul of Adam than to the soul of Pharaoh, and my soul will not enter Gehenna because of the sin of Pharaoh' (p. 118). Instead it expects from the Messianic Age a return of the people from exile, and a restored rule of justice. How can a Jew believe that the Messiah has come when 'from the days of Jesus until now, the whole world has been full of violence and plundering' (p. 121)? The Jewish Messianic expectation is verifiable. The difference between then and now will be self-evident. By contrast, complains Nahmanides, the Christian claims are either beyond verification, or simply beyond belief. Like many other Jewish theologians, he found the doctrine of the Trinity to be absurd stated one way, and in another, trivial. What cannot be known — or as we should now say, stated consistently — cannot be believed (p. 146).

The document is a classic of its kind, a statement of differences that still commands attention. By contrast, the Tortosa disputation is of interest not for what was said, but for the palpable atmosphere of fear and intimidation, caught in one way in Solomon ibn Verga's graphic account, and inferrable in another from the icily disdainful Christian record. By the time it took place, massacres had already been perpetrated against the Jews of Spain and, under the influence of Vincent Ferrer, the law had reduced them to pariah status. After prolonged browbeating — the disputation lasted for twenty-one months — the Jewish participants gradually retreated to the defence of ignorance and pleas for toleration.

Ibn Verga's fragmentary history has some marvellous touches. Finding themselves, at the first session, brought before a massive crowd of dignitaries, the Jewish delegates are terrified and hold on to one reassuring legal certainty: 'And our heart melted and became water; nevertheless we made the blessing, "Blessed is He who has apportioned some of his glory to flesh and blood"' (p. 170). There is a moment of truth when one of the Jewish participants explains why the Messiah will come when his people, rather than the world, is worthy: 'One does not say that a Redeemer will come except for those who dwell in exile. For those who dwell in security — what need have they of a Redeemer?' (p. 174). The remark draws no response. Occasional shafts of criticism at the methods of their opponents draw only anger and abuse. The rabbis are, with a few defiant exceptions, intimidated into increasingly cautious positions. It is a disturbing narrative.

Judaism on Trial is a work full of interest to those already familiar with the material it contains, and compelling reading for those who are not.

Maccoby has done a fine job in recapturing the intellectual and social drama of the confrontations. It is difficult not to feel shaken at the progressive defeat of argument by imperialism; difficult also not to feel that there is contemporary relevance in the plea, implicit in Maccoby's analysis, that Christianity might come to terms with the living phenomenon of post-Biblical Judaism. 'Christians,' he writes of the Paris meeting, 'were prepared to tolerate Judaism only as long as it remained fixated in pre-Christian Judaism; i.e., if it remained as a fossilised witness to the kind of Judaism which Jesus came to supersede' (p. 24). As a timely reminder of what dialogue is not, he points us discreetly to what it might be. Altogether an impressive addition to the already outstanding Littman Library of Jewish Civilization.

JONATHAN SACKS

SIMON D. MESSING, *The Story of the Falashas. "Black Jews" of Ethiopia*, 134 pp., Balshon Printing & Offset Co., Brooklyn, N.Y. 1982, distributed by Dr Simon D. Messing, 58 Shepard's Knoll Drive, Hamden, Ct., U.S.A., $7.50.

It is a strange paradox that the branch of the Jewish people which is the most neglected, the most isolated, and the most in need of assistance is the very segment which has had the greatest difficulty in being acknowledged as a member of *Klal Israel*, the brotherhood of Jewry. The only comparable example was the community of Chinese Jews in Kaifeng Fu; but their numbers were never more than minute and today, thanks to their neglect by Western Jewry, they are extinct.

The case of the Ethiopian Jews, the Falashas, is unique. Other ethnically distinct communities like the Bene Israel of Bombay or the Jews of Cochin, or the Yemeni and Berber Jews, were all admitted into membership, though in some cases only after a struggle. Even 'heretical' Jews like the Samaritans and Karaites were accepted. Only the Falashas were consistently cold-shouldered until a decade ago.

Gandhi once declared that civilization is to be judged by its treatment of minorities. Measured by that yardstick, our record leaves a good deal to be desired. There is room here for serious sociological research, for little attention has been paid to the underlying causes of our failure. Compare the tremendous effort which has been put into the attempt to save Soviet Jewry and then ask whether the Falasha leader's *cri de cœur* has not a good deal of validity: 'If our skin would be only a little lighter, I am sure World Jewry would take a greater interest.'

We cannot plead ignorance. The pathetic condition of the Ethiopian Jews as a depressed minority in the midst of a semi-hostile and fairly primitive society was known in the West since the early decades of the nineteenth century, when the community numbered about a quarter of a million souls. Attention was drawn to their plight by the Jewish

scholars Filosseno Luzzatto and Joseph Halévy and the highly respected Rabbi Hildesheimer of Eisenstadt. Leading communal organizations in Europe and the United States were alerted but no help came until Jacques Faitlovitch, a pupil of Halévy at the Sorbonne, determined to make practical help for the Falashas his life's work. He set about his task with devotion, courage, and intelligence and brought to the Falashas a considerable measure of assistance, especially in the field of education. He also raised their morale by showing them that they were not the only Jews left in the world, and that they had co-religionists who cared about their welfare. But he worked virtually single-handed and, although he secured the nominal support of 44 leading European and American rabbis in 1906, he failed to enlist the active co-operation of major institutions such as the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* of Paris or the Anglo-Jewish Association of London. These organizations had the capability of bringing assistance on a substantial scale, as they did in other countries, especially in the Muslim world, and even as near to Ethiopia as Aden where the A.J.A. was responsible for a good Jewish school.

Why, then, were the unfortunate Falashas neglected for so long by World Jewry? Was it a simple matter of colour prejudice, or was it the influence of misguided racial and religious ideas which affected both scholars and rabbis?

There is also a fruitful field for historical investigation. If my thesis that Judaism reached Abyssinia from the Jewish settlement at Elephantine, on the ancient Egyptian-Nubian border, is accepted (*pace* Professor Ullendorff), then we must find out much more than we know at present about the incidence of the Jewish religion in ancient times in the intermediate area known variously as Kush, Meroë and Ethiopia. The study of the Falashas opens chapters of Jewish history which, like the Falashas themselves, have been strangely neglected.

In the field of comparative religion, also, there are unexplored possibilities which deserve attention. To what extent, for instance, does the Falasha form of Judaism — which is based on a literal interpretation of the Torah without benefit of Halakhic interpretation of which the Ethiopian Jews were ignorant — resemble the pre-Talmudic rite practised in the pre-Christian diaspora? In what measure was Ethiopian Christianity — which shows more Judaic traits than almost any other branch of the faith — influenced by the form of Judaism which was already widespread before the conversion of the Axumite Empire in the mid-fourth century? What can we learn from the numerous references to Kush and Ethiopia in the Old and New Testaments following the realization that a pocket of practising Jews apparently existed in the Meroitic kingdom before the turn of the era? It would be interesting to know how it was that the writings of Josephus came to be fairly widely distributed in medieval Ethiopia. More work also needs to

be done on the story of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba which plays such a central role in Ethiopian and Falasha history and legend. Is it reasonable to associate the Queen with the Ethiopian ambassadors who, as suggested in Chapter 18 of the Book of Isaiah, visited King Hezekiah of Judah?

The history of the Falashas is a remarkable saga of survival against the greatest odds. It is a tribute to the strength of the Jewish religion that they were able to withstand both physical and intellectual opposition, isolated in the heart of Africa with hostile Christian and Muslim neighbours, lacking the Talmudic fence around the Law and ignorant of Hebrew. During the last century and a half the Falashas also had to resist the blandishments of European Protestant missionaries sent especially to convert them.

In *The Story of the Falashas, 'Black Jews' of Ethiopia*, Dr Simon Messing, an American Jewish university teacher, has written a short description of the tribe which, unfortunately, scarcely fulfils the promise of its title. Dr Messing gives us some useful information about the way of life of the Falashas in their remote villages in the Ethiopian highlands; the data were gathered during his seven years of research as an anthropologist in the field, ending in 1967. But he has not revisited the country since the revolution of 1974 which has had a profound effect.

The historical introduction is far too sketchy and is marred by many errors of fact. To mention but a few: the Abyssinian rulers did not adopt Christianity in the sixth century but in the fourth; the Sephardi Chief Rabbi of Israel accepted the Falashas as Jews in 1973, not 1972; James Bruce travelled in Ethiopia in 1769 and 1770, not 1768–73; and the young Falasha whom Halévy befriended did not die before he could be brought to Europe but after the *Alliance Israélite* sent him back to Cairo from Paris.

The author is on far firmer ground when he is describing the religion, customs, and living conditions of the Falashas as he saw them. However, it must be pointed out that the term *kayla* (p. 98) is not an 'offensive word' for a Jew but was used by the Falashas themselves; and it is of Agau origin, not Tigrinyan. An interesting section of the book concerns the author's personal recollections of Jacques Faitlovitch, the great exponent of the Falasha cause, as well as of Tamrat Emanuel and other Falasha leaders. The illustrations are a useful addition and the extensive bibliography contains much valuable information but surprisingly does not cite Max Wurmbrand's important contribution to Falasha studies or his excellent article in Volume 6 of the *Encyclopaedia Judaica*.

Despite some errors of commission and omission, Simon Messing has made a modest, if somewhat belated, contribution to a subject which, notwithstanding a slowly growing literature, continues to suffer from a lack of reliable material. His book, unlike much which has been

written on the subject, is mercifully free from polemic. He might, nevertheless, have laid more emphasis on the longing of the Falashas to return to the Land of Israel, since it is one of the principal factors which has ensured their survival.

DAVID KESSLER

YORAM PERI, *Between Battles and Ballots. Israeli Military in Politics*, viii + 344 pp., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, £19.50.

The disturbing conclusion of this revealing study of civil-military relations in Israel is that the prospect of so-called military democracy cannot be ruled out. By military democracy, the author means a pattern of politics in which the civil establishment bears only a formal constitutional responsibility, while the armed forces assume a central role as of right. Such a pattern of politics, if held out as a demon to be exorcized by devotion to democracy, might seem out of keeping with conventional wisdom about Israel where, despite the persistent centrality of security, the armed forces are depicted as an apolitical entity subject to the full control of elected civilian political superiors. Dr Peri challenges this conventional wisdom with great effect through a meticulous examination of the experience of civil-military relations since before the foundation of the state of Israel. Indeed, as an example of just how the traditional boundary between civil and military spheres has been breached, the reader is presented with the spectacle in 1980 of the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Rafael Eitan, admonishing the entire cabinet with the comment 'You had better get control over the civilian economy, before starting to criticize the defence establishment' (p. 266).

Although the centrality of security and the attendant requirement to sustain a nation-at-arms has made permeable the boundary between civilian and military spheres of competence, Dr Peri argues that the abiding predicament of Israel is not a sufficient explanation to account for what he regards as a process of political degeneration. A great measure of criticism is reserved for Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, who is depicted as applying double standards in insisting that the armed forces should be subordinate to civilian control, while at the same time exercising that control in the interests of his dominant political party, Mapai. Ben-Gurion's behaviour was influenced by the defection of Ahdut Haavoda from Mapai in 1944, which then provided the majority of senior Haganah commanders. Peri points out that 'Ben Gurion's "depoliticization of the army" was designed to neutralize the influence of other parties and so consolidate the loyalty of the military command to the ruling party' (p. 64). Moreover, Ben-Gurion's failure to institutionalize means of state control because of the priority of party

advantage is deemed to have made such control ineffective, and thus opened up from the outset a breach in the boundary wall between civilian and military responsibility. Politicization of the military sphere was reinforced by the succession struggle within Mapai, while a countervailing militarization of politics was stimulated by the prelude to the Six-Day War of June 1967, the role of the army in the occupied territories, and the propensity of senior officers to seek a second career in politics. The author explains with care this process of military intrusion concurrently with the inability of elected politicians to exercise full control over military initiatives. It is in this context that Dr Peri maintains that the Lavon Affair was not an aberration but the logical consequence of an initial failure to impose a system of institutional control. With the advent of the Begin government in 1977, the tolerated involvement of senior military commanders in the political process reached a new peak with the Chief of Staff no longer a civil servant subordinate to a minister but a political equal, while the Israel Defence Forces became increasingly an object of popular contention. Dr Peri argues strongly that initial shortcomings in institution building paved the way for what he regards as a deplorable state of affairs. Institutions, of course, are what men make of them and while Dr Peri has written an important and possibly influential book, there is no certainty that an ideally conceived institutional structure would have resisted the play of those political forces which are so well depicted in this volume.

MICHAEL LEIFER

M. C. N. SALBSTEIN, *The Emancipation of the Jews in Britain. The Question of the Admission of the Jews to Parliament, 1828–1860*, 266 pp., The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, Associated University Presses, London, 1982, £15.00.

The political emancipation of the Jews in Great Britain, in contrast to the case of other European Jewries, was unconnected with revolutions. Instead, it has to be understood in terms of the debates in Victorian England about the meaning of a Christian state, a matter over which there was sharp disagreement. If it was accepted that Great Britain was a Christian state, then the debate over Jewish emancipation narrowed to the right of Jews to sit in Parliament as lawmakers for Christian Britons. For Jews held other rights, and already voted and held municipal office. Their right to economic freedom, to acquire and bequeath all manner of property, to have recourse to the courts, and to practise Judaism openly, were long established. Opponents of Jewish political emancipation actually emphasized how strongly they supported Jewish civil rights, in contrast to the impropriety they saw in letting Jews make laws for Christians. As to the Jews themselves, the

acquisition of a place in Parliament was symbolic. Once the first Jewish M.P. was at last seated in 1858, it made no difference in the actual social and economic status of the Jews, least of all in the case of that M.P. himself, Lionel Rothschild.

Jewish political emancipation followed long after that of the Protestant Dissenters and the Catholics, and constituted part of the long process of breaking the Church of England's political monopoly. It stood high in the Liberal programme, while an increasing number of Conservatives also lent their support. The thirty years' effort to secure the admission of Jews to the seats to which constituencies had elected them lacked qualities of desperation and bitterness, and was characterized instead by elegant parliamentary manoeuvres and polite public debate. Once achieved, Jewish emancipation was never curtailed, nor did an opposition remain encamped in permanent hostility to it. No price for their emancipation was asked of the Jews in Great Britain. No one instructed them to become British and how they were to do so; the Jews themselves fervently wanted to be British and found their way to that estate unaided.

The time is ripe for a new history of the movement for Jewish political emancipation in England, and that is the purpose of Dr Salbstein's book. The author sticks to his subject somewhat narrowly, saying almost nothing about Jewish emancipation at the municipal level or about the entry of Jews in public life generally. No comparisons are attempted with Jewish emancipation in other countries. Dr Salbstein concentrates expertly upon the parliamentary duels of the 1840s and the 1850s, with admiring attention to the aggressive methods of the banker and communal leader David Salomons; and he puts to use the papers of political leaders of the period. He is so intent on these matters that it seems to me that he makes too little of the indifference with which the British viewed the entire issue.

While he is an able analyst of parliamentary affairs, Dr Salbstein's grasp of the Jewish community's working is much less in evidence. The fact that Rabbi (?) Joseph Crooll, that strange isolated Cambridge character, was given to writing pamphlets which opponents of emancipation found it gratifying to quote from, does not make him representative of anyone but himself. To consider Crooll the 'counterpart in England' (pp. 78–79) of his contemporary R. Moses Sofer, the powerful Orthodox leader and scholar of Central Europe, is absurd. And sixty years after Gershom Scholem began his epoch-making career in the study of Kabbalah, it is strange to read a scholar writing of 'cabbalistic mumbo-jumbo' (p. 80).

Instead of discussing Crooll, it would have served Salbstein's purpose much better to look deeper into the none too fervent view of emancipation held by Chief Rabbi Nathan Adler (who was himself Chief Rabbi of Hanover before coming to England, and not the son of

one, and whose son Hermann was not yet Delegate Chief Rabbi in 1870). The analysis of Anglo-Jewish opinion is inferior to that in I. Finestein's 'Anglo-Jewish Opinion During the Struggle for Emancipation (1828–1858)' (*Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England*, vol. xx, 1958, pp. 113–44) and does not add anything to the material he published. The manuscript and printed sources Dr Salbstein employs for parliamentary affairs are rich indeed, but the presentation of mid-nineteenth century Anglo-Jewry rests on little more than the well-used books of John Mills, J. H. Stallard, and Henry Mayhew. We remain ill-informed about the ordinary Jew's attitude to Jewish representation in Parliament. After all, the Reform Bill of 1832 did not give most of them the vote; so why should it be assumed that they cared much about having a Jewish M.P.?

Dr Salbstein offers some interesting suggestions, like his almost convincing interpretation of the protean Disraeli as a 'Marrano Englishman'. He also argues that as the British began to glorify the mercantile virtues, they also began to look with more favour upon the Jews, merchants par excellence. This, and nearly everything the author says, is expressed in a remarkably ramified, obscure, and ponderous style, with innumerable complexities of tenses, needless modifiers, and qualifying clauses. An extreme but not quite untypical example opens Chapter xi (p. 201):

> The gentile response to Jewish claims could not but be partly determined by the image which the Jewish minority conveyed to the gentile majority and this chapter therefore turns aside — albeit briefly — from tracing the development of the political campaign so as to enquire to what extent the characteristics borne by, or imputed to, the Jewish community were seen to resemble those of the gentile population, that resemblance taking the form of reciprocation of whatever opportunities for integration had been afforded to the Jews by the middle decades of the century.

Dr Salbstein is a learned scholar, but it is very regrettable that he has not made the effort to be a fluent, communicative one.

LLOYD P. GARTNER

WILLIAM TOLL, *The Making of an Ethnic Middle Class: Portland Jewry Over Four Generations*, xii + 242 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 1982, $39.50 (paperback $12.95).

In 1978 Lloyd P. Gartner, the doyen of American Jewish community studies, said in the Introduction to his *A History of the Jews of Cleveland* that it 'should be possible to apply the recently elaborated quantitative techniques to the history of Jews in a given locality'. That same year saw the publication of Steven Hertzberg's *Strangers Within the Gate City: The Jews of Atlanta 1845–1915*, and in 1979 Marc Lee Raphael's *Jews and Judaism in a Midwestern Community: Columbus, Ohio, 1840–1975* appeared.

William Toll reviewed the output of such studies in 'The "New Social History" and Recent Jewish Historical Writing' in *American Jewish History* (vol. 69, no. 3, 1980).

Toll has now published his analysis of Portland Jewry, which will stand, at least for the time being, as the culmination of applied quantitative methodology in Jewish community studies. In the new social and urban history, quantification is most often used to determine the changing structure of the ethnic community within the larger urban social framework. Early community studies had assumed an assimilative process in which religious and secular institutions, family, and labour facilitated the entry of succeeding generations into a non-ethnic society. The new social history reversed this 'ghetto model' and focused instead on the roles of family, church, and work-place in maintaining ethnic and socio-cultural values. Toll accepts this reversal and sets out 'to examine the relationship between cultural continuity and social change' (p. 4) in the shaping of Portland Jewry as a modern middle class. In five tightly written chapters he follows the Jewish community of Portland, Oregon, from its early social structure in the 1860s to its mid-twentieth century character as an entrenched middle class and a politicized ethnic group.

Throughout, Toll stresses the role of the family and of voluntary associations, in particular the B'nai B'rith lodges. In his choice of these two elements lie both his methodological and conceptual strength and weakness. The chapter on the family, significantly entitled 'Jewish Women and Social Modernization', is undoubtedly the best in the book. Until now, Jewish community studies have largely ignored the role of the family and particularly of women in 'creating new social forms and initiating civic action to confront the consequences of lengthy migration and urban dislocations' (p. 192). Toll convincingly argues that within a generation in their new surroundings, successive waves of female migrants married at an older age, had fewer children, and participated actively in setting the ethnic community's social and political agenda. Women were largely responsible for solving the severe social problems that arose during the first disruptive stages of settlement as well as during the Depression. American Jewish historiography has usually either ignored the role of women or treated the subject with a clear feminist bias at the expense of historical objectivity. Toll's finely balanced and methodologically faultless analysis should be a model for historians.

In addition to the family or the larger kinship networks, voluntary association fulfilled an important, often crucial, role in the process of cultural continuity and social mobility. In nineteenth-century America, these organizations were a regulating force within the body politic and maintained social and civic order. Throughout the book, the author uses the registers of such associations, in particular of B'nai

B'rith, to analyse the social, economic, and geographic mobility of Portland Jewry. In line with the methods of the new urban history, he uses occupational designations to study two interrelated factors: the changing structure of the ethnic community and the individual occupational change as an index of mobility. Occupations are usually classified according to a scheme which divides them into several categories, thus forming a status hierarchy. Such a scheme should include by necessity a representative sample of the total population to avoid statistical deviation and to make the data valid for the whole community. Furthermore, the data thus collected should enable the reader not only to understand the community in question but also to check and rework the data presented in the research.

Toll fails on all counts. Indeed, he states in an Appendix (p. 197) that no effort 'has been made to create statistically precise samples of the Portland population as a whole in given years. Instead, I have gathered data on complete sub-populations, like head of households residing on specific streets, or relied on data from other studies for comparative purposes.' Nowhere in this book does he give his criteria for occupational categorization; and in his Table 1 (p. 16) there is a dairyman who has a category all to himself.

Since neither significance tests nor a methodological appendix explaining categorization are provided, the serious reader must turn to Toll's earlier writings on Portland Jews to determine the value of his statistics — 'American Jewish Families: The Occupational Basis of Adaptability in Portland, Oregon', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 19, no. 1, June 1977 and 'Fraternalism and Community Structure on the Urban Frontier: The Jews of Portland, Oregon — A Case Study', *Pacific Historical Review*, vol. 47, no. 3, 1978. But if he does so, he will find large discrepancies between the Tables in these two articles and those in the book under the review.

In the book, nearly half of the B'nai B'rith members (14 out of 31, or 45.2 per cent) were 'owners' in 1885 (p. 27), but in his 1978 article 'owners' in that same year accounted for under a third of the total (nine out of 30, or 30 per cent); while there were five 'employees' and 'agents' in the book but eight in the article. Again, in his 1977 paper in this Journal, 166 out of 961 B'nai B'rith members, or 17.3 per cent, were in service occupations in 1920 (p. 36), while in the present book there were 43 out of a total of 964, or 4.5 per cent (p. 146), in that year.

It is, of course, perfectly possible that after the publication of his articles, William Toll discovered new data which he incorporated in his book; but if so, a 50 per cent variation in the numbers of 'owners' as a result of the new data and of a change of classification throws serious doubt on his system of classification and on the value of the statistics which he presents.

Even within the book under review there are inconsistencies: Table 23 (p. 140) shows that 26 per cent of new members of the Council of Jewish Women left Portland between 1921 and 1930, while the text on that same page states: 'By 1930, 81% remained in the city'; and in 1920 B'nai B'rith had 957 members ten years of age and older (p. 145) but by the next page that same population had grown to 964. It is also irritating to find the names of Thernstrom, Chudacoff, and Yans McLaughlin, leading scholars of urban history, misspelt on the very first page of the book as well as in the Notes.

In his article on 'The "New Social History" and Recent Jewish Historical Writing', Toll stated (p. 325):

> Armed with statistical methods to conduct better comparative research, the most recent students of Jewish communities are able to recreate patterns of occupational and residential mobility, family organization, major intergenerational shifts, and the changing class position of Jews.

In the present book, William Toll has done all that and more. He has recreated the development of a Jewish community by using sources hitherto largely neglected. In doing so, he has contributed a great deal to our understanding of urban history in general and of Jewish community history in particular. The more is the pity that he has left so many chinks in his armour of statistical methodology.

ROBERT COHEN

CHRONICLE

In *Studies in Jewish Demography. Survey for 1972–1980* (edited by U. O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. J. Gould and published for the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Institute of Jewish Affairs of London by Ktav Publishing House in 1983), Dr Schmelz writes on the 'Evolution and Projection of World Jewish Population'.

He estimates that at the end of 1980, the total population of the Diaspora was 9,745,000; and since Israel's Jews than numbered 3,283,000, the total for World Jewry was just over 13 million — 13,028,000. According to these estimates, there were at the end of 1980 in the United States of America 5,690,000 Jews; in Canada, 308,000; in Argentina, 242,000; in Brazil, 110,000; and in other Latin American countries, 252,000; so that the total for the whole American continent was 6,492,000.

Europe had almost 3 million Jews (2,969,000), with more than half that number (1,700,000) in the USSR and 148,000 in other areas of Eastern Europe. There were 1,121,000 Jews in Western Europe, with the largest number in France (535,000) followed by Great Britain (390,000), and a further 196,000 in various others countries.

The total of Diaspora Jews in Asia was only 45,000 (excluding the Asian territories of the USSR and Turkey), while South Africa had 108,000 out of a total of 165,000 Jews in the African continent. Finally, there were 74,000 in Oceania.

This volume also includes a 'Selected Bibliography 1972–1980', which was compiled by the late Paul Glikson; his Introduction states that it 'contains a fairly comprehensive selection of books, papers and reports which appeared between 1972 and 1980 on the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of Jewish populations in Israel and the Diaspora, and on the methodology of demographic research on the Jews.' Some 600 annotated items are listed; they were published in a multitude of languages: Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Hebrew, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Serbo-Croat, Spanish, Swedish, Ukrainian, and Yiddish.

*

The Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews reported last July on synagogue marriages and on Jewish burials and cremations in Great Britain in 1982. There were 1,110 marriages in that year; there had been 1,180 in 1981 and 1,222 in 1980. In 1982, the majority took place in the Central Orthodox sector: 750 or 67.5 per cent; the Reform accounted for 175 (15.8 per cent), the Right-wing Orthodox for 100 (9 per cent), the Liberals for 55 (5 per cent), and the Sephardim for 30 (2.7 per cent).

In 1980, 75 per cent of all synagogue marriages took place in London and 25 per cent in the provinces; in 1981, 73 per cent in London and 27 per cent in the provinces; and in 1982, 72 per cent in London and 28 per cent in the provinces.

In 1982, the total number of burials and cremations was 4,846 — higher than in 1981 (4,654) and in 1980 (4,656) and than the five-year average for 1977–1981 (4,751). There was no change, however, in the geographical distribution: in 1980, 1981, and 1982, 66 per cent of burials and cremations took place in London and 34 per cent in the provinces.

*

The August–September 1983 issue of *Britain and Israel* states that there is in Israel a 'closer coordination between industry and institutes of higher education than exists anywhere in the world. One figure is illustrative: 3 out of every 1,000 Israelis are engaged in research, against 2.5 in the USA, 2.4 in Japan and 1.7 in Switzerland'. More than 500 firms in Israel are engaged in research and development; in 1977, there were 200. In 1982, productivity per worker in science-based industries was about three times that in other industries.

*

A Chair in Theoretical Physics has been established at Tel-Aviv University with the aid of the French Friends of the University. A Jewish businessman from England has sponsored a Chair in Jewish Unity at Bar-Ilan University. An Institute for the study of underground and resistance movements has been established at Bar-Ilan University.

*

The 1982 *Annual* of the Social, Cultural, and Educational Organization of the Jews in the People's Republic of Bulgaria includes the following articles, printed in English: 'George Dimitrov in the Memoirs of his Contemporaries — Bulgarian Jews' by Israel Mayer (pp. 41–60); 'The Old Jewish Municipality in Vidin' by Philip Dimitrov (pp. 115–43); 'Speculations with the History of the Bulgarian Jews' by Ivan Ilchev (pp. 297–302); and 'German Documents on the Policy of Deportation of the Bulgarian Jews and its Failure' by David Cohen and Ljuben Zlatarov (pp. 303–20).

*

The Director-General of the United Israel Appeal (UIA) of Canada is reported to have stated of Jewish fund-raising for Israel that 'the highest per capita country in the world is Canada'. In 1982, Canadian Jewry gave more than 40 million dolloars to the UIA, apart from donations to various Israeli educational and social welfare institutions. The UIA of Canada's largest expenditure that year was on youth services, with an allocation of $20 million to maintain children from broken homes and immigrant orphans. The second largest amount, more than $6 million, was spent in hostels and absorption centres for immigrants. Subsidized housing for single immigrants has also been provided, with 50 applicants for every available apartment.

The UIA of Canada also awards scholarships at institutes of higher learning and yeshivot, assists needy and aged immigrants, and runs community and day-care centres. Canadian Jews have taken an active interest in Project Renewal: Yeroham has been adopted by Montreal, Or Yehuda by Ontario and Atlantic Canada, Jaffa Dalet by Western Canada, and Beit Dagon by

Toronto. Youth leaders come from Canada to these areas of Israel to organize summer camps and Canadian visitors come to see the community they have adopted.

*

The Central British Fund for World Jewish Relief distributed about £450,000 in the 12 months from 1 July 1982 to the end of June 1983 to help Jews in need. The largest single allocation, £105,000, was granted to the United Kingdom Jewish Refugees Committee. Romanian Jews received £35,000 for home care and socio-medical centres, while about £29,000 went to aid aged Jews in Hungary and to pay for the running expenses of day centres. Other sums were sent to France (to supply aids for the handicapped), Israel, Morocco, Poland, Tunisia, and British Commonwealth countries.

The Central British Fund, which was established in 1933, co-operates with the American Joint Distribution Committee in many projects and with the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) in resettling refugees in various regions of the British Commonwealth.

*

The International Jewish Committee on Interreligious Consultations (IJCIC) and the Lutheran World Federation met in Stockholm last July and considered the subject of 'Luther, Lutheranism, and the Jews'; 1983 marks the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther's birth. The IJCIC is the joint agency of the World Jewish Congress, the Synagogue Council of America, the American Jewish Committee, the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League, and the Jewish Council in Israel for Interreligious Consultations. The Lutheran participants issued a statement in which they declared: 'We Lutherans take our name and much of our understanding of Christianity from Martin Luther. But we cannot accept or condone the violent verbal attacks that the Reformer made against the Jews. . . . The sins of Luther's anti-Jewish remarks, the violence of his attacks on the Jews, must be acknowledged with deep distress. And all occasions for similar sin in the present or the future must be removed from our Churches'.

*

It was reported last August that 40.3 per cent of Israel's Jewish prisoners aged 18 to 25 are illiterate, although they hold Education Ministry certificates showing that they completed eight years of elementary schooling. The Prison Authority has therefore established this year seven education centres in various prisons. These centres are to be provided with modern pedagogigal equipment and will employ retired teachers.

*

The Summer 1983 issue of *News from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem* states that a Centre for Bible Studies has been established in its Institute of Jewish Studies. A group of Friends of the Hebrew University in Canada, the United States, and Mexico have endowed a Chair in Social Work; its first incumbent is the new Director of the Paul Baerwald School of Social Work. A Chair in Human Behaviour Genetics has been inaugurated in the Centre for Human

Genetics. A Chair in Clinical Microbiology has been established in the Hadassah-Hebrew University Medical Centre; the first holder of this Chair delivered an inaugural lecture and noted that 10 per cent of patients in Israel and elsewhere suffer from infectious diseases and that the University's Department of Clinical Microbiology aimed to achieve 'same-day reporting' in its laboratory diagnoses and to make advances in the control of hospital infections.

The University awarded this year certificates to twelve students, all ordained priests enrolled at the Pontifical Biblical Institute in Rome, who have completed an eight-month programme in Hebrew and Latin at the University's Rothberg School for Overseas Students. They came from ten countries: Australia, India, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, the United States, and Yugoslavia. The programme, which is now an integral part of the Pontifical Biblical Institute's four-year curriculum, was started by the University in 1976. After the presentation of the certificates, two students (from Poland and the Philippines) spoke in Hebrew about the benefit they had derived from their studies in Jerusalem.

*

The Second International Scholars Colloquium on America-Holy Land Studies took place last summer in Jerusalem. It was sponsored by the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the American Jewish Historical Society, and the National Archives and Records Service; and it was concerned with 'Themes and Sources in the Archives of the United States, Great Britain, Turkey and Israel'.

*

Two universities in Brazil now have courses in Hebrew language and Jewish culture, as a result of co-operation between the Jerusalem-based International Centre for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization and the Brazilian Universities' Association for Jewish Culture.

*

A report published last August states that the proportion of women elected to hold office in Israel's local councils has decreased from 4 per cent in 1950 to 2 per cent at the present time. In 1959, there were 34 women out of a total of 1,008 councillors; in 1969, there were 35 out of 1,081; and after the 1978 elections there were 41 out of 2,000 (2 per cent). Moreover, no woman in Israel serves as a local council chairman, mayor, or deputy mayor.

*

Last July, a Conservative congregation in New York engaged a woman as its minister. The first woman rabbi to head a Conservative synagogue was appointed to a Philadelphia congregation in August 1979. It was announced last October that the Jewish Theological Seminary of New York decided by 34 votes to eight to admit women to its rabbinical school for ordination as rabbis to head Conservative congregations.

At an ordination service last July, the Leo Baeck College of London awarded a rabbinical diploma to a woman; she was the fifth woman to be ordained at the College.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Aschheim, Steven, E., *Brothers and Strangers. The East European Jew in German and German Jewish Consciousness, 1800–1923*, xiv + 331 pp., University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1982, $25.00.

Aviad, Janet, *Return to Judaism. Religious Revival in Israel*, xiii + 194 pp., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983, £16.00.

Buckman, Joseph, *Immigrants and the Class Struggle. The Jewish Immigrant in Leeds 1880–1914*, xii + 283 pp., Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1983, £17.50.

Bulka, Reuven, P., ed., *Dimensions of Orthodox Judaism*, xvii + 471 pp., Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1983, $25.00.

Caspi, Dan, Abraham Diskin, and Emanuel Guttman, eds., *The Roots of Begin's Success. The 1981 Israeli Elections*, 297 pp., Croom Helm, Beckenham, Kent, 1983, £16.95.

Chejne, Anwar G., *Islam and the West: The Moriscos. A Cultural and Social History*, ix + 248 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 1983, $44.50 (paperback, $16.95).

Elazar, Daniel, J., *Kinship and Consent. The Jewish Political Tradition and its Contemporary Uses*, xv + 397 pp., published for the Center for Jewish Community Studies, Jerusalem, by University Press of America, Washington, D.C., 1983, $24.75 (paperback, $13.75).

Eppler, Elizabeth E., ed., *International Bibliography of Jewish Affairs, 1976–1977. A Selectively Annotated List of Books and Articles Published in the Diaspora*, xiii + 402 pp., published for the Institute of Jewish Affairs in association with the World Jewish Congress by Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1983, and supplied in Great Britain by Bowker Publishing Co., Erasmus House, Epping, Essex, £31.75.

Glikson, Paul, *Preliminary Inventory of the Jewish Daily and Periodical Press Published in the Polish Language 1823–1982*, xv + 69 pp., Institute of Jewish Studies, Centre for Research on Polish Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1983, n.p.

Greengross, Wendy, *Jewish and Homosexual*, 50 pp., published by The Reform Synagogues of Great Britain, The Manor House Centre for Judaism, 80 East End Road, London N3 2SY, 1983, £1.50.

Kosmin, Barry, A. and Caren Levy, *Jewish Identity in an Anglo-Jewish Community. The Findings of the 1978 Redbridge Jewish Survey*, 45 pp., published by the Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, Woburn House, Upper Woburn Place, London WC1H 0EP, 1983, £2.00.

Marinbach, Bernard, *Galveston: Ellis Island of the West*, xx + 240 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 1983, $49.50 (paperback, $14.95).

Mendelsohn, Ezra, *The Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars*, xvi + 300 pp., Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1983, $27.50 in North America and £19.25 in the United Kingdom.

Schmelz, U. O., P. Glikson, and S. J. Gould, eds., *Studies in Jewish Demography. Survey for 1972–1980*, xi + 304 pp., published for the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, by Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1983, n.p.

Schnapper, Dominique, *Jewish Identities in France. An Analysis of Contemporary French Jewry*, Foreword by Edward Shils, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, liii + 181 pp., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983, £20.00.

Stanislawski, Michael, *Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews. The Transformation of Jewish Society in Russia 1825–1855*, xvi + 246 pp., The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1983, $18.95.

Steinberg, Aaron, *History as Experience. Aspects of Historical Thought — Universal and Jewish. Selected Essays and Studies*, Introduction by Gerhart M. Riegner and Uriel Tal, vii + 486 pp., published under the auspices of the World Jewish Congress by Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1983, $37.50 or £25.00.

West-Central Jewish Community Development Centre, *The Anglo-Jewish Divorce Project. Papers for the 1983 Working Conference*, 52 pp., West Central, 20a Hand Court, London WC1V 6JF, 1983, £2.00.

Working Party of the Reform Synagogues of Great Britain, *The Jewish Family Today and Tomorrow. Social change, its effects on the family and the implications for Jewish life*, vi + 23 pp.; and *Remember the Sabbath Day . . . Guidelines for the celebration and observance of Shabbat*, vi + 20 pp., published by the Reform Synagogues of Great Britain, the Manor House Centre for Judaism, 80 East End Road, London N3 2SY, 1983, £1.25 each (including postage).

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

COHEN, Percy S.; Ph.D. Professor of Sociology, University of London (London School of Economics and Political Science). Chief publications: *Modern Social Theory*, 1968; *Jewish Radicals and Radical Jews*, 1980; co-editor, *Politics in Leadership: A Comparative Perspective*, 1979; 'Student Revolt and Generational Conflict: Phantasy and Reality', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 13, no. 2, December 1971; and 'Is Positivism Dead?', *Sociological Review*, vol. 28, no. 1, February 1980.

ELIAV-FELDON, Miriam; D.Phil. Lecturer on early modern European history, Tel-Aviv University. Author of *Realistic Utopias: The Ideal Imaginary Societies of the Renaissance, 1516–1630*, 1982.

SHAFFIR, William; Ph.D. Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, McMaster University, Chief publications: *Life in a Religious Community: The Lubavitcher Chassidim in Montreal*, 1974; co-editor, *Fieldwork Experience: Qualitative Approaches to Social Research*, 1980; co-editor, *The Canadian Jewish Mosaic*, 1981; co-author, 'The Professionalization of Medical Students: Developing Competence and a Cloak of Competence', *Symbolic Interaction*, vol. 1, no. 1, Fall 1977; and 'Ritual Evaluation of Competence: The Hidden Curriculum of Professionalization in an Innovative Medical School Program', *Work and Occupations*, vol. 9, no. 2, May 1982.

SOLOMON, Rabbi Norman; Ph.D. Director, European Centre for the Study of Judaism and Jewish-Christian Relations, Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham. Chief publications: 'Definition and Classification in the Works of the Lithuanian Halakhists', *Dine Israel*, vol. 6, 1975; 'Martin Buber and Orthodox Judaism', *European Judaism*, vol. 12, no. 2, Winter 1978; 'Hilluq vahaqira', *Midor Dor*, vol. 1, 1979 (Hebrew); 'Division and Reconciliation', the 1980 St Paul's Lecture, London Diocesan Council; and 'Concepts of *Zeh Neheneh* in the Analytic School', *The Jewish Law Annual*, vol. 3, 1980.

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