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CONTENTS

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A TRUST BETRAYED: THE AMERICAN TRUSTEESHIP PROPOSAL FOR PALESTINE IN 1948

Menahem Kaufman

ON 19 March 1948, Warren Austin, who was the United States delegate at the United Nations Security Council, announced that his government would favour a trusteeship for Palestine instead of the partition plan adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 29 November 1947, as a temporary solution to the Palestine problem. The next day, David Ben-Gurion declared: 'We shall not give our consent to any trusteeship plan, be it temporary or permanent, not even for the shortest time'.[1] Austin did not then go into any details of the trusteeship proposal but stressed that it would be a temporary measure which could provide another opportunity in a search for a negotiated peaceful and permanent solution.

The trusteeship proposal had been drafted by the State Department; it consisted of 46 paragraphs and was completed on 22 March 1948 but it was then revised (now numbering 47 paragraphs), and the amended version was ready on 2 April and distributed to selected US embassies and legations in various capitals. A condensed statement of 15 principles was released on 5 April; it was entitled, 'General Principles which Might be Included in a Temporary UN Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine'.[2] The Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee were given copies of the official full working draft on 17 April and the same document was presented at the Security Council meeting of 20 April (convened at the request of the United States).[3]

The purpose of this research paper is to examine the origin and successive transformations of the American Trusteeship Proposal and the later Simplified Trusteeship Proposal, the motives and assumptions which prompted the policy makers to recommend the proposals, the reactions of the parties involved, and the reasons for the failure of the proposals.

Studies on the American trusteeship proposals published so far have dealt mainly with the motives which had prompted the United States government to abandon the partition plan and with the role of

President Truman in the reversal of that policy.[4] Insufficient attention has been given to the details of the proposals and their implications for the political and demographic future of Palestine as a whole and of the Jewish National Home in particular.

Trusteeship plans proposed during and after the Second World War

Proposals for Palestine to be under an international trusteeship were under consideration during and soon after the Second World War. Evan M. Wilson, who for many years was in charge of the Palestine desk at the State Department, disclosed that in 1943 President Roosevelt had proposed the establishment of a trusteeship for Palestine under the supervision of a Committee of Representatives of the Three Faiths — Jewish, Christian, and Muslim.[5] In another working paper, drafted in March 1944 as a basis for discussion between the American State Department and the British Foreign Office, the experts in the State Department's office of Near East and African Affairs came to the conclusion that 'trusteeship exercised by the three religious groups would be a failure',[6] but they did not altogether abandon the idea. It was proposed to leave the central government of Palestine in British hands, and to entrust the local administration to the Jews and Arabs as a preliminary step in preparing 'the people of Palestine' for self-government. Presumably, the intention was to hand over self-government to the Arab Muslim majority while safeguarding some rights of the Jewish minority. No mention was made in the working paper of such problems as immigration quotas and land transfer regulations, although these were discussed by the two sides, and it became clear to the Americans that the Foreign Office opposed partition and accepted in principle the idea of a trusteeship.[7]

William Yale, who had participated in the King-Crane Commission in 1919, prepared in July 1945 for President Truman a revised draft in which he recommended that the future trusteeship of Palestine be given to Britain, and that Britain should be the only governing authority of the principal towns, the Negev, and the undeveloped areas. Regions in which either the Arabs or the Jews were in a majority should be granted communal autonomy. Supervision of immigration quotas should be left to the British trusteeship administration, as well as the land transfer policy throughout the whole country.[8]

Trusteeship as a solution to the problem of Palestine had also been proposed by some of the non-Zionist Jewish organizations since 1943. In that year, the American Jewish Committee put forward a counter-proposal to the Biltmore Programme of 1942 ('that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth . . .'): an international trusteeship administration should be established to safeguard the existing Jewish settlements in Palestine and to grant immigration permits in

accordance with the economic capacity of the country, bearing in mind the fundamental rights of the entire population.[9] A similar policy was favoured by Agudat Yisrael.[10] The State Department saw the American Jewish Committee and Agudat Yisrael as allies who could be helpful in the coming struggle against the 'extremist' demands of the Zionists, and close contacts were therefore maintained with non-Zionist Jewish organizations.[11]

The first skirmish in the international arena over the trusteeship proposal occurred at the San Francisco Conference in the spring of 1945. No discussion of the future of Palestine took place, but the Jewish Agency was determined to ensure that the wording of the chapter on trusteeship in the United Nations Charter should not block the way to the establishment of the Jewish National Home, if and when a trusteeship administration would be appointed for Palestine.[12] The representatives of the Arab states at the UN Assembly demanded the exclusive right for the majority in each area of the Mandatory territory to decide its own political future, but failed to gain their objective. The Western powers, fearing for their interests in other areas of the world should such a resolution be adopted, rejected the Arab proposal. The representative of the United States insisted that all the existing rights should be retained.[13] The Jewish Agency was against a trusteeship administration, but it had to act circumspectly in order not to imperil Jewish rights which had gained international recognition. Eventually, Articles 76 and 80 of the United Nations Charter, safeguarding the rights of all the people in the areas under trusteeship, were approved.[14]

Although the Arab demands were rejected, the Charter failed to provide any constitutional framework for the establishment of a Jewish National Home.[15] However, it did create a basis for safeguarding the people living in the Mandatory areas and for their gradual advancement toward independence. On the other hand, it became clear that a trusteeship regime established on the basis of the Charter would not concern itself with the condition of peoples living outside the Mandated territory, since Article 74 of the Charter required in such circumstances the consent of the Mandatory power as well as of 'the states directly concerned'. Not only Britain but also the Arab states with which negotiations were conducted could have claimed to be 'directly concerned'. An Arab diplomatic offensive in San Francisco was unsuccessful, but the Charter (and specifically its Chapter XII dealing with trusteeship) had no provisions for enlarging and strengthening a Jewish National Home.

The Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry was appointed at the end of 1945 to consider Jewish immigration and the future of Palestine. Its Report, submitted the following year, included the recommendations that immigration certificates be issued immediately for 100,000 Jewish victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, that the United Nations

should take over the trusteeship of Palestine after the end of the British Mandate, and that 'Palestine must ultimately become a state which . . . accords to the inhabitants, as a whole, the fullest measure of self-government'.[16] No timetable for transferring the Mandate to a UN trusteeship was drawn up, nor did the Committee set out any guidelines or principles with regard to the envisaged trusteeship agreement. Recommendations about immigration (after the initial intake of 100,000 Jews) and the land transfer issue were couched in somewhat obscure language, reflecting the conflicting views of the Committee members. As soon as the Report was published, the Jewish Agency demanded that the 100,000 Jews should be allowed to enter Palestine forthwith, but it did not voice publicly its opposition to the political recommendations. On the other hand, the American Jewish Committee and Agudat Yisrael welcomed the trusteeship proposal, which confirmed their own stated objectives.[17] The Arabs rejected the proposal outright.[18] The British were anxious to know more about the trustees — one or two states, or a group of states? How would the trusteeship be endorsed, and which were the 'states directly concerned'?[19]

President Truman welcomed the proposal to admit 100,000 Jewish immigrants, and both he and the State Department regarded with favour the trusteeship recommendations. But after the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry's Report had been filed, and the subsequent Morrison-Grady Cantonization Plan for Palestine (presented in the summer of 1946) had been rejected, the United States had no clear-cut policy[20] apart from a firm decision that no American troops would be despatched to Palestine in order to implement a trusteeship, or indeed any other form of regime;[21] and this resolve was not to be altered.

Before the Palestine problem was brought to the United Nations by the British Government, Ernest Bevin (the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom) had suggested a cantonal solution under British trusteeship for five years. Some elements of his scheme were similar to the later version of the American Trusteeship Proposal — for example, the immediate appointment of a Representative Advisory Council; elections to be held after four years; political independence conditional on a Jewish-Arab agreement; and the transfer of the debate about the future of Palestine to the Trusteeship Council of the UN. The British proposal also recommended that 96,000 Jewish Displaced Persons be admitted into Palestine within the first two years, and that future immigration be dependent on the decision of the British High Commissioner in consultation with the Representative Advisory Council (with an Arab majority). Any differences were to be referred to the Arbitration Committee of the United Nations.[22] Jews should be allowed to acquire land in their own canton. Even Loy Henderson, who

later devised a similar plan, advised the Secretary of State to refrain from any reaction in order to forestall angry opposition from American Jewry to the 'Bevin plan'.[23]

Trusteeship plans at the United Nations deliberations in 1947

When the Palestine issue was put on the agenda of the United Nations in the spring of 1947, the American Administration became increasingly doubtful about the desirability of partition and decided to postpone a decision on the course of future policy and to await the report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP).[24] Some officials of the State Department who opposed partition then worked out a trusteeship plan which leaned heavily in favour of the Arabs. Their proposal was not approved by the Secretary of State, and was not therefore submitted to UNSCOP. But its initiators filed it in the archives and continued to argue that it would be acceptable to the Soviets, the Arabs, and 'the more reasonable and better balanced elements of the Jewish population of the US and other countries'.[25]

Although Secretary of State George Marshall did not change the 'wait and do nothing' policy during the term of UNSCOP's activity, he was in favour of 'the principles enunciated . . . during the war and during the postwar period, including those incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations', an attitude which was interpreted as approving the plan which would lead to majority rule in Palestine.[26] The political entity to be established would become a home for the Arabs and a Jewish National Home in its *spiritual and cultural aspects*; citizenship rights of the Jews were to be safeguarded by a constitution which would also include a section on human rights.[27] The assumption was that Palestine would progress toward independence without any substantial demographic changes taking place. The form of trusteeship (whether one state, a number of states, or the United Nations) to inherit the Mandate would be announced on 1 January 1948. After three years, a democratic government would be established following general elections, and if the minority (that is, the Jews) refused to co-operate, the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations would decide whether to enforce the constitution passed by the majority, or to continue the trusteeship arrangements. Cantonization on an economic and social basis (not religious or national) was also under consideration. If, after a period of eight years, the Palestinian parliament passed such a constitution by a two-thirds majority, and after the UN Trusteeship Council had approved it, Palestine would become an independent state.

As for immigration, 100,000 Jews would be admitted within two years; there would then be a drastic restriction to between 0.5 and one

per cent of the population (9,000 to 18,000 immigrants) per annum, so that the overwhelming Arab majority would not be endangered. It was proposed to abolish the Land Transfer Regulations of 1940, and to enact another set of regulations in order to secure the rights of the landowners and tenant farmers; the effect would be to bar Jews from acquiring land. The expected outcome of the whole plan was the creation of a state, bi-national in name but essentially Arab, and the end of any hope of achieving Jewish sovereignty over even a part of Palestine.

On 31 August 1947, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine published its well-known recommendations. The majority report stated that on 1 September 1949 sovereignty should be granted to two states in Palestine.[28] The minority report favoured the establishment of an independent federal state of Palestine and the Indian representative proposed a trusteeship regime during a three-year transition period but he failed to receive the support of other representatives.[29]

UNSCOP's majority recommendations were widely supported by public opinion in the United States; some non-Zionist bodies which for years had been advocating trusteeship now joined the ranks of those in favour of partition.[30]

Secretary of State Marshall was cautious and reserved in his support for partition; this prompted the opponents of Jewish sovereignty (and in the first place Loy Henderson) to make another attempt at drafting an alternative trusteeship proposal.[31] Marshall himself was ready to adopt trusteeship officially as a switch position if and when the partition recommendation failed to win two thirds of the United Nations Assembly votes.[32] Although Henderson and his colleagues in the office of Near East and African Affairs promised to implement faithfully the policy of the Administration, they were meanwhile working hard to adapt their earlier trusteeship plan to the new situation.[33] In order to allay the fears of those in favour of partition, they stressed that their trusteeship proposal would not prejudice either an eventual partition or a unitary state; but in all their plans they envisaged a demographic status quo which would automatically ensure that such a unitary state would remain Arab. In this way, they intended to promote American economic, cultural, and political interests in the area.[34]

On the assumption, and near certainty, that the United Nations Assembly would reject the partition solution, officials of three divisions of the State Department (Near East and African Affairs, Special Political Affairs, and Dependent Affairs) prepared the switch position. They believed that no difficulty would arise in assigning the trusteeship of Palestine to the United Nations. In their view, a substantial immigration of some 200,000 displaced Jews was not an unattainable

objective; and since any future immigration would depend on the economic capacity of Palestine (to be decided by the trusteeship power), the Arab majority would be maintained even after a period of five years, when the envisaged referendum would be held. As a result of 'counting noses', an Arab state would emerge. The Jewish Agency had been recognized in Article 4 of the British Mandate 'as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and . . . to assist and take part in the development of the country'. The State Department officials attempted to weaken the status of the Jewish Agency by restricting the scope of its activities to the care of immigrant Jewish Displaced Persons, to make sure that it would not be accorded the recognition of a Jewish government in the making. As for the Land Transfer Regulations, their revised plan contained no alterations to the provisions in the earlier trusteeship scheme. They also recommended that the referendum, to be held after five years, should be free 'from pressure of any kind on the part of foreign countries or groups, within or outside Palestine' — apparently a reference to American Jewry and the World Zionist Organization. In this way, the 'nose counting' would attain the desired objective.

However, the vote at the General Assembly of the United Nations on 29 November 1947 was in favour of the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state. Although the United States supported this decision, the State Department kept its alternative plan in its files, ready to be used at a later, more suitable, time.

Trusteeship becomes the official policy of the United States

When Warren Austin, the American delegate to the United Nations, recommended to the Security Council on 19 March 1948 the establishment of a temporary trusteeship for Palestine under the Trusteeship Council of the UN, he stressed that it would be 'without prejudice to the character of the eventual political settlement'. He did not request that the United Nations reverse the decision taken on 29 November 1947 in favour of partition. President Truman had already agreed in February 1948, probably because of the likelihood of a violent military struggle in Palestine, that it would be necessary to have some sort of trusteeship as a stop-gap after the end of the Mandate. But he also gave instructions that 'nothing should be presented to the Security Council that could be interpreted as a recession on our part from the position we took in the General Assembly'.[35] However, the opponents of partition at the State Department saw trusteeship as an abrogation of the November 1947 decision in favour of partition. The Policy Planning Staff had advised

on 19 January that the United States must seek different solutions to the Palestine problem, such as a federal state or a trusteeship.[36]

Samuel Kopper, who maintained liaison with the Arab delegations, G. Wadsworth, the ambassador to Iraq, and R. McClintock together with the permanent staff of the National Security Council, all hinted at the abrogation of the partition plan and its replacement by an alternative policy.[37] Robert Lovett, Marshall's deputy, argued that the General Assembly should decide in favour of trusteeship as a *new proposal*.[38] However, not only at the White House but also at the State Department there were politicians (such as Dean Rusk) who, in February-March 1948, were not entirely opposed to partition; they wished it to be considered as one of the alternatives at the end of the trusteeship period.[39] Even George Marshall, who was not among those in favour of partition, was against the statement 'that Palestine is not yet ready for self-government' in the American latest proposal; he preferred 'until the people of Palestine are ready for self-government they should be placed under the trusteeship system of the United Nations', which left open the possibility of partition at a later date.[40] On 17 March 1948, two days before Warren Austin was to recommend to the Security Council a temporary trusteeship for Palestine, the State Department had decided in principle not to oppose partition: 'Ambassador Austin did not wish to knock partition on the head at this juncture'.[41]

Consensus was evidently achieved. The opponents of partition were reluctant to go too far in contradicting the explicit instructions of the President. At the first stage they had contented themselves with the suspension of the partition plan in order to propose at the next stage the trusteeship scheme, which would effectively prevent a return to any kind of partition. Austin's statement, which was followed by President Truman's declaration on 25 March that he continued to support partition,[42] did not find favour with those opposed to Jewish sovereignty, and made it difficult to convince the Arabs and their supporters of the political candour of the American Administration.[43]

Meanwhile, in March 1948 President Truman and his various advisers agreed that trusteeship must be officially adopted as the policy of the United States government in order to gain time and prevent an outbreak of hostilities in a sensitive region. On 19 March, the United States proposed that a temporary trusteeship be established under the United Nations Trusteeship Council. It had been assumed in 1945–46 that Great Britain as the Mandatory power would take over the role of trustee; but since it had failed to find a solution to the Palestine problem, that was no longer advisable. The only other alternative, that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France jointly assume the responsibilities of trusteeship, was impracticable. Hence, the decision to propose that administrative authority be vested in the U.N.

Trusteeship Council.[44] Moreover, such an arrangement would be in the interest of the Western powers,[45] since the Soviet Union did not at that time participate in the work of the Trusteeship Council.

At his press conference on 25 March, President Truman referred only to those paragraphs in the successive American drafts which stressed the temporary nature of a trusteeship administration and declared that the United States had not ruled out an eventual partition of Palestine. All the other paragraphs in the three main drafts (dated 22 March, 2 and 20 April) differed only in minor details and reflected the policy favoured by Loy Henderson and his colleagues — to create conditions which would lead the United Nations to reject partition.[46]

Warren Austin referred to the section on the trusteeship of Jerusalem in the 29 November 1947 United Nations resolution in order to strengthen his arguments in favour of trusteeship for the whole of Palestine.[47] The April draft proposals contained 47 paragraphs (there were 46 in the March version) and dealt with the system of government and its operation, legislation, internal and external security, foreign relations, the budget, and the sensitive issues of immigration and land transfer. The final draft of the American trusteeship proposal was presented on 20 April 1948 to the First (Political) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. It made no mention of any connection between the Jewish people and Palestine, of the Balfour Declaration, or of the directives in the British Mandate referring to a Jewish National Home.[48] The proposal did not attempt to deal with the national problem of the Jewish people; its declared aim was to bring to an end the conflicts between the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine by encouraging Arab-Jewish co-operation in order to achieve some form of autonomy acceptable to the communities, in accordance with Article 76 of the United Nations Charter.[49] The last paragraph of the American proposal stated that the trusteeship administration should end as soon as the United Nations General Assembly had ratified a plan for self-government agreed on by a majority of the two communities in a referendum. It was not clear from the ambiguous wording whether that would be a majority of each of the two communities or a simple majority of the total population. There was no mention whatever in that final draft of the possibility of establishing two separate governments in a partitioned land.

The State Department's office of Near Eastern and African Affairs had phrased the paragraph on immigration. In the March draft, paragraph 27 recommended 100,000 permits for Displaced Persons, who would be selected by the International Refugee Organization; and as a second stage, a maximum of 25,000 permits per annum would be issued, but only after it was ensured that the country could absorb such a number.[50] This absorption capacity was said later to be dependent on the security conditions, public order, and public morale;[51] the

Governor, sponsored by the United Nations, would be authorized to end immigration whenever the public order was endangered. In the final April draft, the Governor was to decide about potential immigrants after consultations with the representatives of the communities in Palestine — which meant, in effect, that the Arabs would have a say in the matter; and there was no mention of the immigration figures which had appeared in the March draft, apparently for fear of Arab objections. Philip C. Jessup, the American representative on the United Nations Committee, was in favour of maintaining the status quo (in other words, perpetuating the British White Paper immigration quotas), but when objections were raised he proposed monthly immigration quotas for Displaced Persons 'after careful consideration and negotiation'. He added that the United States would prefer to leave the final decision on the matter to the United Nations General Assembly.[52] This was clearly a retreat from the earlier endorsement by Truman about 100,000 immigrants and a complete rejection of the paragraph in the UN November Resolution which called on the 'Mandatory Power . . . to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a sea port and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948'.[53] Moreover, the trusteeship proposal added another recommendation for the protection of small landowners and tenant farmers: a committee of impartial experts would draft laws for the protection of their rights.[54] This meant that the foreign experts might raise further obstacles in the establishment of Jewish settlement in Palestine.

The American draft proposals contained detailed recommendations about the establishment of the trusteeship administration and the preparation for autonomy during the trusteeship period. The United Nations Trusteeship Council was to make important decisions about the operation of the trusteeship of Palestine, although every issue was settled in that Council by a simple majority of the representatives of member-nations.[55] The Council would appoint a Governor, who would be empowered to act as an executive and also to legislate by decree when necessary.[56] As soon as was practicable, in preparation for autonomous rule, a government should be formed and it would be responsible to an elected parliament of two houses.[57] Regional elections would ensure the Arabs a permanent and stable majority in the lower house; but in order to limit to some degree the dominance of that majority in state institutions, Jews and Arabs should have equal representation in the upper house (the Senate). The consent of both houses would be necessary for the adoption of any resolution. The Governor or his representative would serve as chairman of the Senate and he would have a casting vote. The safeguarding of Jewish interests was thus rendered dependent to a great extent upon the vote of the

Governor. An Arab Prime Minister, always certain of the support of the Arab majority in the lower house, could thus enforce his policies if he won the acquiesence of the Governor. The British had proposed in the 1930s a similar plan as a preparation for self-rule, with the establishment of a 'Legislative Council', but the Jews had expressed strong opposition.[58]

The details of the trusteeship programme (almost all of which had been drafted by the opponents of partition in the American Administration) were apparently not discussed either with President Truman himself or with his White House staff: there is no available documentation whatever that any discussions of this kind took place. When the President authorized his Secretary of State to present the American trusteeship proposals in the name of the United States to the First (Political) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 20 April 1948, he is unlikely to have known that these proposals constituted an utter reversal of American policy concerning the future of Palestine.

For about a month, the American trusteeship plan remained, officially at least, a secret or classified document. A few days before its official presentation as a working draft, the Security Council and the Arab and Jewish representatives were apprised of the essence of the plan in a paper entitled 'General Principles Which Might Be Included in a Temporary Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine'.[59] Fifteen principles were enumerated, but they concealed more than they revealed. For example, the important issues of immigration and land purchase were dealt with by stating that the Agreement would make specific provisions for immigration and land purchase on a basis to be negotiated in consultation with the representatives of the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine. There is little doubt that the Jewish representatives realized the true significance of these general principles, and that they knew the substance of the complete text of 47 paragraphs before it had been officially communicated to them.[60]

The Trusteeship Plan becomes the focal point of political activity

Since the United States were against the despatch to Palestine of foreign troops, and of American forces in particular, the agreement of all sides to their proposal for trusteeship was a pre-condition for the implementation of their plan. The Americans warned the Arabs that if they rejected trusteeship, their lives and property would be gravely endangered.[61] They told the Jews that they would run the risk of physical annihilation.[62] The Arabs had made it clear from the outset that they would accept trusteeship only if 'substantial authority would remain in the hands of the people of Palestine themselves'.[63] Spokesmen for the United States Administration tried to overcome Arab

distrust; during their meetings with the heads of the Arab delegations to the United Nations, they asserted that President Truman's statement on 25 March, that he had not ruled out partition, did not reflect in fact American operative policy. Henderson reported:[64]

> I fully realized that the Arabs would be suspicious of a slanted trusteeship, and that I felt sure we had nothing of the kind in mind . . . that the terms of the trusteeship agreement would constitute a safeguard, since it would be bound to contain specific provisions concerning the purpose of the trusteeship, the circumstances under which it would be terminated, immigration and so on, and it would be impossible to allow these matters to be dealt with in vague language open to various interpretations as was done in the Mandate. We would, of course, be bound by the terms of the trusteeship agreement.

When the officials of the State Department drafted the proposals, they did their best to keep their promises. However, they did not succeed in alleviating Arab fears, and American diplomats were instructed to issue firm warnings that it was absolutely essential to find a peaceful solution to the Palestine problem. If the Arabs continued to reject trusteeship, a total war would break out; and meanwhile the United States might be prevented from providing the economic and political aid of which the Arabs were very much in need. Saudi Arabia was also warned of the dangers of Communism.[65]

In their contacts with Jewish Agency representatives, the Americans claimed that they were exerting pressure on the Arabs; but they were in fact putting far greater pressure on the Jews.[66] When planning a meeting between Secretary of State George Marshall, Robert Lovett, Moshe Shertok (Sharett), and Eliahu Epstein (Elath), Loy Henderson advised (on 26 March) that the Secretary of State should not recognize Shertok as a representative of international Zionism or of the Jewish Agency, to which the trusteeship proposals would deny any official standing, but only receive him as a representative of the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine). He added: 'However, if Mr Shertok makes a negative response you might wish to caution him of the immense responsibility which he assumes for the welfare of his people before the judgment of history'.[67] But the Jewish representatives managed to change the course of the conversation and concentrated on the British responsibility for the current insecure situation in Palestine, and George Marshall contented himself on that occasion with issuing a warning about the Arabs, who were 'a warlike race and easily inflammable'.[68] In their meetings with Jewish Agency representatives, the Americans sometimes were less threatening in their attempts at persuasion, repeatedly emphasizing that their trusteeship proposal did not rule out eventual partition; its sole aim was to save the country from disaster.[69] Nevertheless, as the end of the Mandate became imminent, and the likelihood of the trusteeship proposals being accepted by the

United Nations General Assembly became more remote, stronger pressure was exerted on the Jewish Agency delegates to agree to the American plan.[70] Marshall himself, on 8 May 1948, sternly warned them about the consequences of engaging in an armed struggle and advised them to postpone the establishment of the Jewish state. Shertok reported: 'If we succeed, well and good. He would be quite happy, he wished us well. But what if we failed? . . . It was our responsibility, and it was for us to face it. We were completely free to take our decision, but he hoped we do so in full realization of the very great risk involved'.[71]

The United States Administration also subjected American Jewry to pressure, especially the non-Zionist organizations. On 13 April 1948, Henderson wrote to Lovett: 'I fear unless we win over Judge Proskauer [the President of the American Jewish Committee] within the next 48 hours, it will be too late'.[72] The American Jewish Committee's reservations about the trusteeship plan[73] had no restraining effect on Loy Henderson, who was also certain that the threat of disaster in Palestine would produce a reversal of the position adopted by Proskauer and his colleagues. Henderson even went so far as to recommend that all the American Jewish leaders be summoned to Washington and to demand of them that they support the policy of the United States 'as developed at the National Security Council'.[74] There were also clear references to 'dual loyalty'. However, Henderson's recommendation that American Jewish leaders be compelled to support the trusteeship proposal was not in fact followed. Meanwhile, Judge Proskauer also adamantly refused his support but, fearing lest American Jewry share the responsibility for a second holocaust in the same generation, he was of some assistance to Dean Rusk at the end of April in his contacts with Jewish Agency representatives. In his appeals to Ben-Gurion and Shertok, Proskauer stressed that agreeing to an armistice was not tantamount to accepting trusteeship,[75] but he failed to convince them and the State Department was also unsuccessful in swaying American Jewry in favour of trusteeship.

There were protracted debates on the American trusteeship proposals in the United Nations First Committee, while a full-scale war in Palestine seemed imminent. It became clear that the United States would not take total military, political, and financial responsibility for the execution of its own plan and the American representatives stated that the General Assembly of the United Nations could alter any provisions of the trusteeship proposals, if necessary.[76] It also became obvious, only ten days after the working draft on trusteeship was laid before the First Committee, that trusteeship would be rejected. While the Palestinian Arabs were opposed to any settlement not awarding them immediate sovereignty and control over the entire country, more sophisticated Arab statesmen viewed trusteeship as a means to further their own ends. The fact that the United States had ceased to support

the implementation of the November 1947 Resolution on partition appeared to them of utmost significance.[77] At the First Committee sessions, they demanded that the following pre-conditions be embodied into the draft trusteeship agreement: a complete halt to Jewish immigration, the establishment of a Senate which would not ensure equal representation for the Jews, and direct legislation by an elected body with an Arab majority. However, it is doubtful whether the Arabs would have even considered a trusteeship administration if they had had any faith in their ability to decide the issue on the battlefield.[78]

On the Jewish side, only Judah L. Magnes and his supporters, together with the American Council for Judaism, favoured trusteeship.[79] The State Department was well aware of the opposition of the Jewish majority, which believed that the United States had betrayed the Jews because of oil interests and the fear of Russian plans of expansion.[80] Members of the American Jewish public spoke out against the breach of faith revealed in the trusteeship plan. Such non-Zionist organizations as B'nai Brith, the Jewish Labor Committee, and even the American Jewish Committee supported the Zionist stand.[81] Speaking before the Security Council of the United Nations, Abba Hillel Silver condemned the American policy reversal as a surrender to threats of violence and warned that it was the first step in the deterioration of the United Nations Organization — a prophecy which some might say has been since fulfilled. He also warned that the Jews of Palestine might well oppose the implementation of the trusteeship plan by force of arms.[82] The Jewish leaders explained their stand to the United States Administration and to the American public by quoting from the last paragraph of Chaim Weizmann's unanswered letter to President Truman that for the Jewish people the choice was 'between statehood and extermination'.[83] They demanded full sovereignty during the discussions with Marshall and his aides,[84] in their reply to the fifteen principles enumerated in the brief American document on trusteeship (a reply which in fact dealt with the proposals contained in the full detailed plan),[85] and in the eloquent speech which Abba Eban delivered before the General Assembly's First Committee.[86] There appears to have been one occasion, however, when in a conversation with Robert Lovett, Chaim Weizmann hinted that a trusteeship arrangement which allowed large-scale Jewish immigration and widespread Jewish settlement in Palestine might form the basis for a solution. This was immediately reported to the White House as a first sign of the success of the persuasion campaign.[87]

The basic claim put forward by the Jewish representatives was that the trusteeship plan constituted an attempt to ignore the existence of a Jewish nation which was entitled to a sovereign state in Palestine, and which indeed had as much right to sovereignty as had the thirteen founding colonies of the United States. That plan not only ignored

historical and ethnic facts characterizing Palestine but also failed to recognize the right to sovereignty which had been internationally granted by the Resolution of 29 November 1947 at the United Nations. As for the American argument that trusteeship would be a temporary arrangement and would not affect the rights of either Jews or Arabs, the Jewish Agency spokesmen pointed out that even a postponment of the implementation of the November Resolution was an infringement of the rights it had granted. When the Australian delegate asked his American colleagues whether they would recognize the rights guaranteed in that Resolution, they evaded answering the question.[88] Abba Eban described the renewed restrictions on Jewish immigration and the freezing of the political situation and of any development of the country as mortal blows.[89] Trusteeship would give the Arabs a new right, that of halting the country's development, after they had employed violence to secure that end. It was clearly in the interest of the Arabs to maintain the status quo, but it was also clearly against the dynamic aspirations of the Jews to do so.[90] One paragraph in the plan stressed the temporary nature of the proposed trusteeship: full self-government would be granted as soon as possible, after the Governor-General had brought about an agreement between Arabs and Jews about a plan of government for Palestine. The Jewish Agency spokesmen pointed out that thirty years' experience had shown that there was little likelihood of achieving such an agreement;[91] and that therefore trusteeship would not be a short-term solution but a new form of Mandate which would last for a considerable period.

The proposed form of trusteeship administration was rejected by the Zionist spokesmen, who explained that the advocated type of democracy with a majority rule was not practicable in a country inhabited by two different peoples lacking common goals and a common vision of the ideals of the state.[92] Moreover, the American proposals would give considerable executive power to a majority which was hostile to the Jewish National Home and which would strive to obstruct the development of that Home in every possible way. The alternative legislative arrangement — by decree of the Governor whenever there was a stalemate in parliament — was ruled out by the Jewish Agency representatives, who were fearful of a return to the conditions of the British Mandate.[93] They argued that the trusteeship provisions of the United Nations Charter were unsuited to the needs of a Jewish National Home. They stressed that there was almost no likelihood of establishing a *sui generis* administration according to the Charter stipulations to further the interests of a people the majority of whom had not yet come to reside in the land. Any government established on such a basis would prepare the existing population for sovereignty and even in the best conditions would view the needs of a (Jewish) minority as of secondary importance; it would certainly be against any measures

which would bring about a change in the country's demographic structure for the benefit of that minority.

The Jewish representatives drew attention to the irresoluble differences about the question of Jewish immigration. The Jews required the right of unlimited immigration for their future state, while the Arabs rejected any arrangement favouring further Jewish immigration. The American trusteeship draft stated that decisions on immigration would be taken by the future parliament soon after its establishment; this meant that the Arabs would then have a voice in the matter. The Jewish spokesmen also rejected the proposal that the Governor of Palestine determine the absorption capacity of the country, claiming that this was not constant and moreover was related to the resources created and exploited by the immigrants themselves; and only a Jewish government would devise and implement policies for absorbing immigrants. They repeatedly warned against the illusion that the trusteeship administration could be effective with a volunteer indigenous police force. Such a force would function adequately only in a sovereign state. If a new external administration were to be instituted, there would then be a need to import a military force from other states; and the Arab countries which were members of the United Nations could propose the requisitioning of their own troops in order to implement trusteeship and by this means would achieve legitimation for their planned invasion.

Perhaps a greater and more real hazard, in the opinion of the Jewish leaders, was that the Americans seemed to be in favour of empowering Great Britain to implement the trusteeship. Secretary of State George Marshall wished to have consultations between the United States and the United Kingdom about the type of trusteeship administration most suitable in the prevailing conditions.[94] Loy Henderson worked diligently to bury past differences with the British and he tried to persuade the United States Administration that American security required the efficient implementation of the trusteeship in collaboration with Great Britain. He went even further, claiming that in order to gain the confidence of Whitehall there should be a firm resolve not to give in to any future pressure and that the Jews should not be allowed to exploit the Palestine issue in American election campaigns. Henderson wanted to involve President Truman in an attempt to persuade the British that they should be involved in the preparation of a trusteeship plan and that they, as the Mandatory power, should present that plan to the United Nations. He submitted to President Truman the draft of a letter to the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee; but the President did not approve of the letter.[95] Truman also rejected suggestions for enforcing trusteeship with the help of foreign troops.[96]

Loy Henderson warned the British that the imminent crisis in Palestine was a cause for great concern and asked in the name of the

United States that British troops should remain in the country after 5 May 1948. The full draft of the American trusteeship plan was still a secret document on 26 March 1948, when Henderson handed it to the British in order to show that they were considered as the closest ally of the United States in the matter of settling the problem of Palestine.[97] But the British were reluctant to support trusteeship and the United States alone would have to take on the task on behalf of the United Nations. Dean Rusk commented on 11 May, four days before the Mandate was due to end: 'Our British friends would like nothing better than to trap us in an arrangement like that. We would take on an excess number of responsibilities or liabilities'.[98] The British had rejected out of hand the request that their troops remain in Palestine after 15 May,[99] and their delegation to the United Nations had shown no special interest in the trusteeship draft which was under consideration.[100] The United Kingdom believed that each side, for its own reasons, would continue to reject trusteeship and it took a neutral stand, explaining (as it had done in the UN Assembly in October and November 1947) that it would not help to implement any plan which was unacceptable to either the Arabs or the Jews.

Nevertheless, the Jewish Agency representatives in London believed that Whitehall actually was in favour of the trusteeship plan because it presented new obstacles in the achievement of Jewish sovereignty.[101] The Mandatory government in Jerusalem meanwhile was warning the Jewish community that if it rejected the proposed trusteeship, it might run the risk of a naval blockade.[102] Abba Eban understood the essence of the British position and, after a conversation with Harold Beeley of the Foreign Office, he noted that the British would certainly maintain a stand of formal neutrality; but they would look forward to an Arab military victory after 15 May, a success which would make the pro-British Arab League the central power in the region and perhaps allow the establishment of a truncated Jewish state within an Arab-controlled federation. Eban concluded that the Foreign Office did not view with favour the trusteeship plan because its implementation might enable the United States to replace Great Britain and to become the dominant power in the Middle East.[103] A few days after the end of the Mandate, Harold Beeley commented to his American colleagues: 'There can be no stabilization of the political situation in Palestine without a period of fighting . . . it will end in some kind of military stalemate which will probably indicate the lines along which a permanent settlement can be found'.[104] The United States and the United Kingdom had seriously disagreed since 1945 about the future of Palestine. Great Britain did not share America's fear that a war in Palestine might lead to a third world war. The British were fully aware that the trusteeship proposal of the Americans constituted a reversal of their pro-Zionist policy, but (with the exception only of Harold Beeley)

they took the view that the Palestine problem would be solved by a quick Arab military victory. A pro-British Arab government would then be established, rather than a trusteeship under the United Nations. The British stand thus greatly contributed to the failure of the American trusteeship proposals.

The Simplified Trusteeship Plan

Only nine days after the United Nations First Committee had started the discussion of trusteeship for Palestine, Warren Austin realized that there was now absolutely no hope that the plan would be approved by the UN General Assembly.[105] It became obvious that although the Americans had not completely abandoned the possibility of establishing trusteeship, they would not take energetic measures at the United Nations in order to ensure the adoption of their 47-paragraph proposal.[106] The Soviet delegate, Andrei Gromyko, rightly noted that the American initiative had petered out.[107] But meanwhile, there were other attempts to deal with the issue at the Special Assembly.[108] On 3 May 1948, Arthur Creech-Jones declared that since trusteeship was strongly opposed by the parties concerned, he now presented in the name of the United Kingdom a plan for setting up a provisional neutral authority under the auspices of the United Nations. That authority should undertake political mediation, provide necessary services to all sides, and in the main assume responsibility for the property of the Mandatory regime.[109] It may be that in putting forward this proposal the British had been motivated by the desire to prevent that property from being taken over by the Jewish state which was about to be declared.[110] The Americans understood that the British were opposed to any significant political decision before 15 May.[111] A paradoxical situation then arose, with Moshe Shertok supporting the British initiative, probably because he believed it to be a suitable way of rejecting the American proposals; the Jews, like the British, were opposed to either trusteeship or a cease-fire. The United Kingdom believed that the Arab armies would be victorious, while the Jews were against any settlement which would prove to be an obstacle in the establishment of the future Jewish state.[112]

The British alternative of a United Nations provisional neutral authority did not find favour with the members of the American delegation to the UN, and they proposed at the beginning of the second week of May (and apparently without explicit instructions from Washington) to the delegations of the United Kingdom and of Canada that they give their consent to a simplified form of trusteeship. Dean Rusk was at the nerve centre of that activity.[113] This latest American plan was based on the trusteeship provisions of the United Nations Charter and also included a number of elements from the British

proposal for a provisional neutral authority.[114] The British and Canadian delegates requested and obtained the addition of a stipulation to the plan, explicitly suspending the operation of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947 on partition. Since the Jews had declared that they were implementing that Resolution, that new stipulation would effectively render illegal the establishment of the State of Israel and its expected recognition by the Soviet Union.

The operative elements of the simplified plan consisted of only twelve paragraphs — disputed issues such as Jewish immigration, land ownership and transfer, and the development of autonomous rule being entirely ignored. The Security Council resolutions calling for a cease-fire were to be implemented before the projected temporary administration was established. The United Nations High Commissioner would be empowered to recruit local forces for security purposes. (The title of High Commissioner rather than Governor-General emphasized the continuity of the regime after 15 May.) No specific defensive arrangements were outlined in order to repel any external aggression. The Security Council was to deal with emergencies. It was proposed that this temporary administration come to an end on the first day of January 1950. The object of that simplified plan was to gain time (during which it might be possible to reach an agreed settlement), rather than to have it publicly recognized that both the United Nations and the United States had hopelessly failed to find a solution to the problem of Palestine. It seems that the initiators of the plan were either very naïve or were not kept properly informed in New York of the realities of the situation on the spot. They expressed their readiness to consider favourably some of the demands of the United Kingdom delegation to the UN, but they were told that the British Foreign Office had rejected the plan.[115]

The cease-fire, which was a pre-condition for the success of the emergency proposal, never came into effect. As a result, even before the members of the American delegation in New York could secure Washington's approval, their most recent version of trusteeship had also failed. George Marshall then had no other choice but to instruct his delegation to propose on 12 May the appointment of a United Nations mediator. He abandoned the plan to set up an alternative to the Mandatory regime, but in his proposal for a mediator he included some elements from the Simplified Trusteeship draft.[116] The United Nations would have to adopt a new resolution in order to nullify that of 29 November 1947 on partition. But Marshall told Austin not to refer to the matter in the American proposal for the appointment of a mediator, but simply to request that the UN General Assembly discharge its Palestine Commission from further exercise of its responsibilities in implementing the Resolution on partition. In fact, that Commission

had ceased to carry out the functions assigned to it by the General Assembly because the British had declared on 31 January 1948 that they would not permit it to enter Palestine before 15 May 1948.

On 13 May, Philip Jessup was instructed 'to vote No on any amendment which would seek further to reduce the effect of the Resolution of November 29'.[117] Signs of the second reversal of the Truman Administration's Palestine policy were already in evidence. When Jessup recommended to the UN the appointment of a mediator, he stated that the American trusteeship proposals had not been accepted because the parties concerned had failed to reach agreement and because there was no military force to implement trusteeship.[118] The United Nations General Assembly on 14 May 1948 ratified the decision to appoint a mediator by 31 votes to seven,[119] and on 20 May Count Folke Bernadotte was appointed. He attempted to revive several of the trusteeship proposals, especially those concerning Jewish immigration, and on 28 June he submitted a plan for setting up a 'union' of an Arab state and a Jewish state, with a Central Council which would decide, within two years, on the dimensions of immigration into the Jewish state. In case of disagreement between Jews and Arabs in that Council, the United Nations Economic and Social Committee would be empowered to rule on the economic absorption capacity of the State of Israel,[120] thus encroaching on the newly-proclaimed state's sovereign right to determine its own policy on this issue. Count Bernadotte's suggestions were similar in spirit to the American trusteeship draft proposal (paragraph 29),[121] but the American delegates at the United Nations did not support them. They stated that it would be advisable for Israel voluntarily to limit immigration according to the state's own economic capacity for absorbing newcomers.[122]

Conclusion

From March until the middle of May 1948, the setting up of a trusteeship administration was the policy of all sections of the American government, despite a lack of unanimity on common motives and goals. The sponsors of the plan — the heads of the Near Eastern and African Affairs office (NEA) in the State Department, led by Loy Henderson, the Middle East experts on the diplomatic staff, George Kennan and the Policy Planning Staff (for the Middle East), the Senior staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as some of the senior personnel in the Defense Department and in the armed services — were opposed in principle to the creation of a Jewish state. They were against its establishment either in all of Palestine or in only part of it, and that position was reflected in the trusteeship draft proposals, which were largely drawn up by NEA officials. For them, trusteeship would be a

transitory stage leading to a unitary Arab state in which the Jewish minority would enjoy some religious and cultural freedom, but in which the Jewish National Home would not have any independent political force. They believed that such a state of affairs would best serve the strategic interests of the United States.

President Truman and some of his advisers did not view matters from a perspective similar to that of Henderson, Kennan, and others. (George Marshall did not define his stand openly, although he apparently agreed with most of the opinions of his NEA aides.) Nevertheless, the President did indeed authorize the reversal of America's Palestine policy, because he saw trusteeship as a way out of a politically complex situation, and as a means of preventing a dangerous and bloody war in the Middle East while East-West relations were frigid. When Truman and most of the members of the United States delegation to the United Nations had supported the partition of Palestine in November 1947, they had assumed that no large foreign military contingents would be necessary to bring about the division of the country into two states. However, the violent Arab reaction to the partition Resolution and the stand adopted by Great Britain as the Mandatory power convinced Truman and his aides that a substantial military force would have to be despatched to Palestine if partition was to be enforced.

President Truman was absolutely determined that no American troops should be sent to Palestine, but he feared that the despatch of troops from other countries would open the way to Russian penetration of the Middle East. He therefore authorized the draft proposals for a temporary trusteeship, which he believed would be able to solve (at least partially) the problem of the Jewish state within the framework of an accepted partition plan at a later stage. Michael Cohen has correctly concluded that the trusteeship proposal 'was not the product of some sudden, secretly-planned coup':[123] all branches of the Truman Administration were in favour of it, although there was some disagreement about the details of the plan. The President himself was apparently not shown the complete text of the March 1948 American trusteeship proposal, and he announced at a White House press conference on 25 March 1948 that he continued to support partition.[124]

Zvi Ganin has convincingly shown that the aim of the State Department officials who drew up the trusteeship proposals was to prevent the establishment of a Jewish sovereign state at almost any cost and not to allow any significant strengthening of the Jewish community in Palestine in order to ensure that there would be no Jewish majority in the country able to determine its own future.[125] That aim, however, cannot be attributed to President Truman himself. When it became evident that a considerable military force would be required to implement either trusteeship or partition and, moreover, when there

soon was a virtual materialization of partition without the presence of foreign troops, President Truman decided to execute another reversal of America's Palestine policy and to recognize the provisional government of the new state of Israel. The opponents of Jewish sovereignty in the American Administration had been defeated mainly by the unswerving determination of the Jewish Yishuv and of the Zionist leaders and by the heroic victories of the Jewish fighting forces.

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NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS

FRUS *Foreign Relations of the United States*
GAOR (United Nations) *General Assembly Official Records*
ISA Israel State Archives
NA National Archives (of the United States)
PDD *Political and Diplomatic Documents* [of Israel] *1947–1948*
SSSMC Second Special Session, Main Committees (of the United Nations General Assembly)

[1] For Austin's declaration, see *Security Council Official Records*, 1948, Nos 36–51, p. 157. For David Ben-Gurion's statement, see his *B'hillahem Yisrael* (*Israel at War*), Tel-Aviv, 1951, p. 75.

[2] For the draft dated 22 March 1948 see NA 501 BB Palestine 3–2248; for the draft of 2 April 1948 see *FRUS* 1948 v/II, pp. 778–79; and for the fifteen General Principles of 5 April, ibid., pp. 802–03.

[3] See *GAOR*, Second Special Session, Annex, pp. 12–31.

[4] See Michael J. Cohen, 'Truman and the State Department: The Palestine Trusteeship Proposal, March 1948', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. XLIII, no. 2, Spring 1981; Zvi Ganin, *Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 1945–1948*, New York and London, 1979; Kenneth R. Bain, *The March to Zion*, London, 1979; Evan M. Wilson, *Decision on Palestine*, Stanford, Ca., 1979; Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman*, New York, 1973; *FRUS* 1948 v/II, pp. 744–46 and pp. 748–49 (Editorial Notes); Clark Clifford, 'Factors Influencing President Truman's Decision to Support Partition and Recognize the State of Israel', lecture delivered on 28 December 1976 in Washington DC, to the American Historical Association and the American Jewish Historical Society, p. 21; and M. Kaufman, 'The Non-Zionists in the United States: Their Reaction to the Change in the American Administration's Policy in March 1948' (Hebrew), *Bitfutsot Ha-Golah*, nos. 81–82, Summer 1977, pp. 151–68.

[5] Wilson, op. cit., p. 46.

[6] *FRUS* 1944, v, p. 594.

[7] Wilson, op. cit., p. 46

[8] *Proposed Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine*, 28 July 1945, NA 867 N.01/7–2845.

[9] See 'Statement of Views, January 31, 1943', *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 45, Philadelphia, 1944, pp. 608–10 and John Slawson to Wallace Murray, 20 December 1943, NA 867 N.01/2079.

[10] Rabbi P. M. Teitz to Dean Acheson, 19 June 1946, NA 867 N.01/6–1946.

[11] Yale, who drafted the 1945 trusteeship proposal, wrote two days after his plan was presented: 'The A.J.C. will take an active interest in the terms of the trusteeship agreement for Palestine. Its support of them will be essential . . . [in the event of a debate in Congress] if the terms do not meet Zionist demands'. To Merriam from Yale, 30 July 1945, NA 867 N.01/7–3045.

[12] Eliahu Elath, *Zionism at the U.N. A Diary of the First Days*, Philadelphia, 1976.

[13] Ibid., pp. 8, 171, and 174.

[14] *Everyman's United Nations*, Eighth Edition, New York, 1968; Charter of the U.N., pp. 568–69.

[15] J. R. [Jacob Robinson], 'The Essence of Trusteeship According to the Charter of the U.N.', 1948, ISA 93.3/14/95.

[16] *Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry Regarding the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine*, London, 1946. See also Wilson, op. cit., p. 70.

[17] Joseph Proskauer and Jacob Blaustein to Dean Acheson, 10 June 1946, NA 867 N.01/6–1946 and Rabbi Teitz's letter (Note 10 above).

[18] Pinkerton to the Secretary of State, 2 and 27 May 1946, *FRUS* 1946, VII, pp. 590–91 and 615; and Wadsworth to the Secretary of State, 19 June 1946, ibid., p. 630.

[19] Attlee to Truman, 27 May 1946, ibid., pp. 612–15.

[20] Henderson to Acheson, 21 October 1946, NA 501 BB Palestine 10/2146.

[21] 'Memo on Matters re Palestine Before the London Conference', 9 July 1946, *FRUS* 1946, VII, p. 644.

[22] UNSCOP 1947, *U.N.O. Second Session, General Assembly*, Supplement 11, p. 40; Villard to Marshall, 18 February 1947, NA 867 N.01/2–1847; and Marshall to Bevin, 17 February 1947, ibid.

[23] Henderson to Acheson, 10 February 1947, *FRUS* 1947, V, pp. 1038–39.

[24] Gallman to Marshall, 19 February 1947, ibid., p. 1053; Acheson to Henderson, 15 February 1947, ibid., pp. 1045–49; and Secretary of State to Certain [20] Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 13 June 1947, ibid., p. 1103, and to Austin, 13 June 1947, ibid., pp. 1104–05.

[25] Robert McClintock to Dean Rusk, 21 May 1947, NA 501 BB Palestine 5–2142; and Austin to Marshall, 22 May 1947, *FRUS* 1947, V, pp. 1086–88.

[26] Marshall to Austin, 13 June 1947, ibid., p. 1104.

[27] See Note 25 above and memo prepared in the Department of State, 4 June 1947, *FRUS* 1947, V, pp. 1096–1101.

[28] *U.N.O. Second Session, General Assembly*, Supplement 11; *FRUS* 1947, V (Editorial Note), p. 1143.

[29] Dr Schwardron to Lurie, 25 March 1948, p. 2, ISA 93.03/14/95.

[30] Excerpts from the sixth meeting of the US delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly, 15 September 1947, *FRUS* 1947, V, p. 1147. About Agudat Yisrael's agreement, see Sharett's speech, Protocol of the Jewish Agency's Session in New York, 17 September 1947, p. 33, Central

Zionist Archives Z5/59 and the Report of the Palestine Committee Session of the American Jewish Committee, 10 September 1947, AJC Archives, Box I/3.

[31] See the summary of Marshall's statement to the Assembly on 17 September 1947, *FRUS* 1947, V, p. 1157; Hildring to Johnson, 24 September 1947, ibid., pp. 1162–63; and Henderson to Marshall, 'Certain Considerations Against Advocacy by the US of the Majority Plan', 22 September 1947, *FRUS* 1947, V, pp. 1153–59. See also Zvi Ganin, op. cit., p. 12.

[32] Knox to Johnson, 3 October 1947, *FRUS* 1947, V, p. 1174.

[33] Henderson to Marshall, 22 September 1947, NA 501 BB Palestine 9–2247.

[34] McClintock to Merriam, Mattison, and McCown, 'Draft Paper on a Possible 5-year Trusteeship of Palestine', 13 November 1947, NA Rusk McClintock File.

[35] The Department of State to President Truman, 21 February 1948, *FRUS* 1947, V/II, pp. 637–40 and Truman to the Secretary of State, 22 February 1948, ibid., p. 645.

[36] Ibid., p. 524.

[37] Ibid., pp. 565, 598, and 628. See also Draft Report Prepared by the Staff of the National Security Council, 17 February 1948, ibid., pp. 631–32.

[38] McClintock to Rusk, 28 February 1948, ibid., p. 664.

[39] Memo from Rusk to Lovett, 3 February 1948, ibid., p. 588.

[40] See the Department of State to President Truman, 21 February 1948, ibid., p. 640 and Marshall to Austin, 5 March 1948, ibid., p. 681.

[41] McClintock, Memo of Telephone Conversation, 17 March 1948, ibid., pp. 729–30.

[42] Transcript of White House Press and Radio News Conference, 25 March 1948, NA Rusk McClintock File.

[43] For Harold Beeley's explanation of the Arab stand on 21 March 1948, see *FRUS* 1948, V/II, p. 767, footnote 4. See also Z. Khan, *GAOR*, SSSMC, vol. II, p. 18 and Henderson's Memo of Conversation (with C. Malik), 26 March 1948, *FRUS* 1948, V/II, pp. 764–65.

[44] Regarding the hesitation about choosing trustees, see to Rusk from Green, 20 February 1948, NA Rusk McClintock File; from the American Delegation in New York to the Secretary of State, 24 March 1948, NA 501 BB Palestine 3–2348; and to US delegate Austin from Gerig, 23 March 1948, ibid., 3–2248. For the various drafts regarding possible trusteeships, see McClintock to Lovett, 8 March 1948, *FRUS* 1948, V/II, p. 697.

[45] About the connection between the trusteeship plan and the struggle between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, see for Rusk from John Ross, 24 March 1948, NA 501 BB Palestine 3–2348.

[46] For the draft of 22 March 1948, see NA 501 BB Palestine 3–2248; and for the draft of 2 April 1948, see *FRUS* 1948, V/II, pp. 778–96. For the 20 April draft as presented to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, see *GAOR*, Second Special Session, Annex, pp. 12–31. The paragraphs relating to the temporary nature of the trusteeship do not appear in the draft of 22 March.

[47] See *GAOR*, SSSMC, p. 8.

[48] Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 17 April 1948, ISA 93.01/218/14.

[49] Article 76 of the United Nations Charter states (a version adopted after a bitter debate in 1945): 'To promote . . . progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular

circumstances of each territory and its peoples, and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned . . '. Paragraph 4 of the American trusteeship draft proposed: ' . . . form of self-government which will be acceptable to both communities'; that would not grant the Jewish *people* any status in determining the fate of the country.

[50] To US Delegation (Austin) from Division of Dependent Affairs (Gerig), 23 March 1948, NA 501 BB Palestine 3–2248.

[51] *GAOR*, SSSMC, p. 179.

[52] Ibid., pp. 179–80.

[53] UN Resolution 181 II, *FRUS* 1948, V/II, p. 1711.

[54] *GAOR*, SSSMC, p. 182.

[55] See p. 13 of the J.R. [Jacob Robinson] memorandum cited in Note 15 above.

[56] Paragraphs 3 and 7 in the March 22 draft and paragraphs 3, 11, 13, and 15 in the April 2 draft. See *GAOR*, SSSMC, p. 8 and Gerig to Austin, 23 March 1948, NA 501 BB Palestine 3–2248.

[57] Ibid., and see paragraphs 10, 19, and 20 in the April drafts.

[58] See *The New Judaea* (published in London), vol. XII, no. 3, December 1935, pp. 1 and 35–37.

[59] *FRUS* 1948, V/II, pp. 802–03.

[60] For the Jewish reply to the fifteen principles, see Abba Eban to J. C. Ross (a member of the United States delegation to the UN), 12 April 1948 and 'Appendix Observations of General Principles Regarding Temporary Trusteeship for Palestine Formulated by the US' (April 1948), *PDD*, pp. 606–21.

[61] See memo of conversation between Asad Al Faqih, of Saudi Arabia, and Henderson and Merriam, 26 April 1948, *FRUS* 1948, V/II, p. 859.

[62] Henderson to Marshall, 24 March 1948, NA 501 BB Palestine 3–2448.

[63] S. K. C. Kopper (the State Department's liaison official with the Arab delegations to the UN) to Austin, 21 February 1948, *FRUS* 1948, V/II, pp. 643–44.

[64] Memo of conversation between Henderson, Merriam, and Dr Malik (the head of the Lebanese delegation), ibid., pp. 764–65.

[65] Henderson advised in a memorandum dated 22 April 1948: 'These appeals should be of a friendly but stern nature', NA 867 N.01/4–2248. For the instructions given to American ambassadors in the Arab states, see Marshall to Tuck (Cairo), with copies to Baghdad, Beirut, and Jedda in NA 501 BB Palestine 4–2848. See also telegram from Acting Secretary Lovett to embassy in Baghdad, 22 April 1948, ibid., 4–2248, reprinted in *FRUS* 1948, V/II, p. 85.

[66] For the conversation between Lovett and Z. Fahi on 12 April 1948, see *PDD*, p. 643. On 26 March, Henderson warned Epstein that if trusteeship was rejected, 'the Jews there will be massacred': Epstein to the members of the Jewish Agency Executive, 29 March 1948, ibid., p. 529.

[67] See 'Suggested Outline of Conversation' with Shertok and Epstein, 26 March 1948, NA Rusk McClintock File.

[68] Memo of Conversation between Marshall, Lovett, Shertok, and Epstein on 26 March 1948, NA 867 N.01/3–2648 and *PDD*, pp. 509–21.

[69] Conversation between Shertok, Lovett, and Rusk on 9 April 1948, *PDD*, p. 595; conversation between Shertok and Rusk also on 9 April, ibid., p. 597; and conversation between Fahi and Lovett on 16 April, ibid., p. 643.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Report of conversation between Shertok, Epstein, Marshall, Lovett, and Rusk on 8 May 1948, ibid., p. 769.

[72] See NA 867 N.01/4–1348.

[73] See *The Committee Reporter*, vol. v, no. 4, pp. 1 and 4.

[74] To Lovett from Henderson, 22 April 1948, NA 867 N.01/4–2248.

[75] Proskauer to Shertok on 27 April 1948 and to Ben-Gurion on 30 April 1948, *PDD*, pp. 684–86 and 705–06.

[76] Lovett to Forrestal and Forrestal to Lovett, 23 April 1948, *FRUS* 1948, v/II, pp. 851–52; Memo by Henderson, 26 April 1948, ibid., pp. 859–60. For Austin's speech, see *GAOR*, SSSMC, p. 8, and for the debate on the immigration issue see ibid., p. 180.

[77] *GAOR*, SSSMC, p. 180.

[78] Concerning disagreement among the Arabs, see unsigned memorandum, 21 April 1948, ISA 93.03/14/95.

[79] Memo of Conversation between Magnes, Austin, and John Ross on 23 April 1948, NA Rusk McClintock File.

[80] Robert B. Macatee (US Consul in Jerusalem) to Marshall on 22 March and 30 April 1948, NA 501 BB Palestine, 3–2248 and 4–3048.

[81] See M. Kaufman, *Non-Zionists in American Jewry* (Hebrew, multilith), Jerusalem, 1978, pp. 581 ff.

[82] See report of Silver's speech in *PDD*, pp. 475–78.

[83] For Weizmann's letter, dated 9 April 1948, see ibid., pp. 588–90.

[84] Shertok-Epstein-Marshall-Lovett, 26 March 1948, ibid., pp. 509 ff.; Shertok-Lovett-Rusk, 9 April, ibid., pp. 591 ff.; Shertok-Rusk also on 9 April, ibid., pp. 596 ff.; and Shertok-Epstein-Marshall-Rusk-Lovett, 8 May 1948, ibid., pp. 757 ff.

[85] Eban to Ross, 12 April 1948, enclosing an Appendix entitled 'The Jewish Agency for Palestine: Observations on General Principles Regarding a Temporary Trusteeship for Palestine Formulated by the United States (April 5, 1948)', ibid., pp. 608–21. Concerning the fact that details of the plan were known to the Jewish Agency before they were published, see memorandum (apparently written by Jacob Robinson on 21 April 1948) in ISA 93.03/14/95.

[86] *GAOR*, SSSMC, pp. 192–97.

[87] Austin to the Secretary of State, 15 April 1948, and footnote 2, *FRUS* 1948, v/II, pp. 823–34.

[88] *GAOR*, SSSMC, pp. 172 and 174.

[89] Ibid., p. 9.

[90] See the Shertok-Rusk-Lovett conversation of 9 April, *PPD*, pp. 591 ff.

[91] Eban at the First Committee, *GAOR*, SSSMC, pp. 194–95. For the plan as presented to the First Committee, see ibid., Annex, pp. 12–32.

[92] Comments on paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 of the 'General Principles Regarding a Temporary Trusteeship for Palestine', *PDD*, p. 617.

[93] See *GAOR*, SSSMC, pp. 195–96.

[94] The Secretary of State to the Embassy of the United Kingdom, 26 March 1948, *FRUS* 1948, v/II, p. 766.

[95] See *FRUS* 1948, v/II, pp. 771–73 (27–29/3/48).

[96] See the transcript of the remarks by Dean Rusk in telephone conversations with Philip Jessup and John Ross, 11 May 1948, ibid., p. 966.

[97] Henderson to Lovett, 27 March 1948, ibid., pp. 767–69.

[98] See the transcript cited in Note 96 above, pp. 966 and 969.

[99] See telegrams from the US Ambassador in London (Gallman) to the Secretary of State on 22 and 23 March 1948, NA 501 BB Palestine 3–2248 and 3–2748. See also Cadogan's statement to the First Committee, *GAOR*, SSSMC, p. 248.

[100] Statement by Colonial Secretary Creech-Jones, *GAOR*, SSSMC, pp. 185–86.

[101] U. Heydt (Uriel Heid) to Shertok, 24 March 1948, *PDD*, p. 49.

[102] Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 27 March 1948, ibid., p. 525.

[103] Eban to Berl Locker, 20 April 1948, ibid., pp. 658–60.

[104] For the statement by Harold Beeley, see Austin to Marshall, 21 May 1948, *FRUS* 1948, V/II, pp. 1025–26.

[105] Austin to Marshall, 1 May 1948, ibid., p. 880.

[106] The Shertok-Epstein-Marshall-Lovett-Rusk conversation of 8 May 1948 (see Note 71 above). See also, about Lovett's stand on 9 May that it was too late to implement trusteeship, the memo of a telephone conversation in *FRUS* 1948, V/II, p. 942. Arthur Creech-Jones (the United Kingdom's Colonial Secretary) told Shertok that he had ruled out trusteeship altogether: see Shertok to Reuben Zaslany (Reuben Shiloah), 1 May 1948, *PDD*, p. 715.

[107] *GAOR*, Second Special Plenary Session, p. 38.

[108] Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 29 April 1948, *PDD*, p. 697. For the comments of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency on the US Department of State's cease-fire draft agreement, 4 May 1948, see ibid, p. 723. See also the Jewish Agency in the US to the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, 7 May 1948, ibid., p. 747.

[109] *GAOR*, SSSMC, pp. 209–10.

[110] For the *FRUS* editorial explanation of the British initiative, see Editorial Notes, *FRUS* 1948, V/II, p. 912.

[111] Memo by C. Clifford, 8 May 1948, ibid., p. 935.

[112] Shertok's stand in his conversation with the senior officials of the State Department: see Note 71 above; and his views as expressed in the National Administration (*Minhelet Ha'am*) session of 12 May 1948: *PPD*, p. 762 (Note 7).

[113] See the Clifford memorandum (Note 111 above) and Austin to Marshall, 8 May 1948, *FRUS* 1948, V/II, pp. 936–40. For the plan, see ibid., pp. 942–44; and for Austin's comments on the plan, 9 May 1948, ibid., pp. 946–53.

[114] For the elements of the British proposal in paragraphs 4 and 7 of the American plan, see *FRUS* 1948, V/II, p. 943.

[115] For the instructions Harold Beeley received from London, see Austin to Marshall, 11 May 1948, ibid., pp. 970–71.

[116] These elements were the provision of common services for the entire population of the country, mediation to reach a final agreement, and a request for co-operation with the Cease-fire Commission according to the Security Council Resolution of 23 April 1948: *FRUS* 1948, V/II, pp. 943 and 979.

[117] See Memo for the Files by R. McClintock, 13 May 1948, ibid., p. 984.

[118] *GAOR*, SSSMC, p. 245.

[119] *GAOR*, Second Special Plenary Session, p. 45, and Annex, pp. 44 and 45.

[120] See 'Text of Suggestions Presented by Count Bernadotte at Rhodes to the Two Parties on June 28, 1948', *FRUS* 1948, V/II, p. 1153.
[121] Ibid., p. 788.
[122] Jessup to Secretary of State, 30 June 1948, ibid., p. 1162.
[123] Cohen, op. cit., p. 167.
[124] See Note 42 above.
[125] See Ganin, op. cit., p. 169.

THE RECRUITMENT OF *BAALEI TSHUVAH* IN A JERUSALEM YESHIVA

William Shaffir

SOCIAL scientists in the last decade have shown great interest in fundamentalist groups, and particularly in the fact that these groups attract recruits who might have been thought to be too sophisticated to find strict religious practice congenial. Sociologists have examined the origin of such groups and their recruitment tactics,[1] the individual characteristics of the converts,[2] and the social conditions which are favourable to the emergence of potential recruits.[3]

Much of this research has been concerned with various sects of Christianity and of eastern religions. However, there has also been a growing parallel Jewish phenomenon in recent years: that of *baalei tshuvah* — repenters or returners to Orthodox Judaism. They are Jewish men and women who become attracted to the idea of transforming their secular way of life into a mode of living based on the precepts of the Torah; it is a transformation which is akin to conversion.[4]

My concern in this paper is to describe the process of recruitment and socialization in a yeshiva in Jerusalem (here simply called 'the Jerusalem yeshiva') which aims primarily to attract college-educated men and to persuade them to commit themselves to a life of Orthodox Jewish observance.[5]

I spent seven months in the Jerusalem yeshiva, from October 1979 to April 1980, and participated in the full range of the students' activities — attending classes, taking meals with them, and engaging in informal conversations and discussions. I also conducted (and recorded) open-ended interviews with 50 students and with six of the eight English-speaking rabbis who were their teachers. Finally, I examined the yeshiva's literature; the texts are printed in English as well as in Hebrew.

The Jerusalem yeshiva was established in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City in August 1974, largely with funds from private sources; it is one of approximately ten yeshivot for male *baalei tshuvah* in Jerusalem. It includes a Bays Medresh (place of prayer and study), dormitory facilities, administrative offices, and a dining area, all of which are housed in buildings which were erected after the Six-Day War of 1967.

A sign above the entrance, in English, reads: 'If you have been to Israel but have not been to yeshiva, you have not been to Israel'. The main study area is a large rectangular room, with plain desks and chairs which are used for prayer as well as for study. Two of the walls are lined with Hebrew religious texts and a variety of English books about Judaism. On many of the desks are books and pamphlets specifically written in English for newcomers. The room is bare of all decorations and has a spartan appearance.

Unlike the case at traditional yeshivot, there is no obligatory form of dress. The rabbis and most of the senior students are bearded, and are usually to be seen in dark suits, white shirts, hats, and dark shoes; but many of the young men in the first weeks and months of their attendance wear jeans, casual shirts, pullovers, and sandals or sneakers. Those who decide to stay for a longer period, however, follow the religious requirements and put on a *talis kotn* (a fringed undershirt), a hat or skullcap, and grow a beard.

In 1979–80, the Jerusalem yeshiva had approximately seventy-five students, ranging in age from eighteen to thirty, but most of them were in their early to middle twenties and were university-educated Americans; there were also some young men from England, Canada, and South Africa. The teaching staff consisted of eight rabbis, six of whom were raised and educated in the United States and received their rabbinic ordination from American yeshivot. The two remaining rabbis were Israeli, but spoke English fluently. The head of the yeshiva was American-born and had been mainly responsible for establishing since 1966 three yeshivot for *baalei tshuvah* before he founded 'the Jerusalem yeshiva'. The single students were housed in apartments adjacent to the yeshiva, which the latter had bought and converted into dormitory and classroom facilities. The rabbis were all married and, together with their families, lived in the city's Orthodox neighbourhoods. The yeshiva had no provision for married accommodation, and its few married students lived in apartments which they had privately acquired.

Admission to the yeshiva is not contingent upon the payment of fees. On arrival, the newcomer is offered free board and lodging. Although there is a fee schedule (roughly comparable to tuition fees at a middle-ranking American university), few students pay full tuition. The yeshiva receives per capita grants from the Government, but also relies on private donations.

The curriculum

The medium of instruction is English, since the majority of students are unfamiliar with Hebrew. A short introductory programme lasts three months, with courses on the Chumash (Pentateuch), the

Commandments, the divine authorship of the Torah, Jewish law and prayers, and a specially designed class entitled 'The Forty-eight Ways to Wisdom'; there is also an introductory class on Jewish history. This programme is regarded as a prerequisite for the more intensive four-year course of study which will follow.

The first year is divided into two programmes. During the first six months, the curriculum includes courses on the Mishna (an introduction to the concepts of the Oral Law), Halakha I (a class on Jewish Law in which the daily observances are taught), Chumash I (a survey course designed to cover the general scope of the entire Pentateuch), Hebrew Ulpan (instruction in Hebrew grammar and conversation), and Mussar (a course emphasizing different aspects of ethical conduct). The second six-month programme is mainly a continuation of the preceding six months, but at a more advanced level and with the addition of an introductory course on the Rambam (Maimonides) and the Gemara (commentary on the Talmud).

The curriculum in the second and third years consists of increasingly advanced courses on various areas of Jewish Law and includes classes on Gemara, Halakha, Mishna, Rambam, Mussar, and Tanach (the Old Testament). In the fourth year, the study of Gemara is continued and there is a re-examination of 'The Forty-eight Ways to Wisdom' and of the 'Proofs of Torah from Sinai'. The format of the curriculum is modelled after the university system of teaching, a format with which the students are familiar. At the end of the four years, the student is examined by Orthodox rabbis who may confer on him *smicha* (rabbinic ordination). Only a few young men complete the four-year course; in 1979–80, the overwhelming majority of students were in the first year of the programme.

Formal teaching starts at 9 a.m. and ends at 10 p.m., with breaks for meals. However, a beginner need not commit himself to regular attendance at all classes, although most of them in fact do so. Students therefore have little time for leisure activities. While they are not expressly forbidden to attend concerts, or the theatre or cinema, the allocation of time for such entertainment is discouraged; time is a precious commodity which must be wisely apportioned and is best used for the study of Torah. There are no television or radio sets in the yeshiva. A few students rise at 6 a.m. and jog or do calisthenics; it is not unusual for others to start the day at 7 a.m. with preparations for the morning prayer and to end it at 11 p.m. with a review of the day's studies and the preparation of assignments for the following day's classes.

The students sleep four or five to a room and take their meals with the rabbis in the same dining room. The two groups are clearly distinguishable, however, since the rabbis are seated together at a separate table.

The senior rabbis of the Jerusalem yeshiva are convinced that young people in the present secular climate can become attracted by a life-style based on the Torah. Like the dean of another yeshiva for *baalei tshuvah*,[6] they believe that young Jews are dissatisfied with western secular ideals and that there is 'a rejection of many old cherished American values . . . Young people . . . began to call attention to the inconsistencies they were being offered, and this has evolved into a search for alternatives. A small but growing number discovered the Torah alternative'.

The Jerusalem yeshiva hopes to attract students who will remain for several years, participating in an on-going transformation experience. It is important to understand, however, its voluntary, relatively unstructured nature. Enquirers come and go; so do students. Despite the organization of the formal curriculum into distinct time periods, an individual may come to, or leave, the yeshiva whenever he chooses to do so.

'What are you living for?'

The Jerusalem yeshiva does not have an elaborate system for acquiring recruits. However, it does recruit actively, mainly by persuading young men who have come on a visit intended to last only a few hours to remain for a few days, then three months, then longer still. Usually, the visitors are tourists. Some of them may have been interested in religious thought and practice and might even have experimented with sects of Christianity or with eastern cults; but few had intended to engage in a study of Orthodox Judaism, let alone to follow its religious observances. Most of the visitors are brought by men whom Goldberg has called 'teshuva solicitors';[7] they are dedicated to the task of finding potential *baalei tshuvah* and they seek recruits for several yeshivot concerned with 'repenters'. One particular such 'solicitor' was identified by many of the students as the man who had approached them and then brought them to the Jerusalem yeshiva. He apparently makes an assessment of each individual and then selects the yeshiva which would suit him best. Some students from the Jerusalem yeshiva also regularly seek out potential newcomers in areas of the city frequented by young tourists; they strike up conversations with them, and invite them to the yeshiva; but these students have not been able to attract many *baalei tshuvah*. It must be noted here that the Jerusalem yeshiva does not systematically deploy its students as recruiters.

Whether a visitor is brought in by a specialist 'solicitor' or by a resident student, he can depend on an immediately warm reception. He is then drawn into a lively discussion and every effort is made to convince him that he should stay on. One senior student explained:

> In the short amount of time that you are going to deal with him, you are going to . . . show him that to spend a little time here is a better opportunity

> than what he is doing now. . . . You have to get hold of a guy . . . whatever it takes with all honest means. It is like a salesman, he knows he has to make a sale. . . . You open up with casual small talk. Find out where he is from, where he is going, and what his obligations are; his Jewish background, how old he is, why he is travelling, what he is looking for. . . . You have to reach the nobler motives of the person.

In the initial encounter, the newcomer is asked about his future plans and about how he intends to achieve them. He is also asked about his belief in God and about his views on the meaning of life. Then a central question is put to him, 'What are you living for?' One student who had been at the yeshiva for eighteen months remarked: 'The first day I was here, they gave me the workover: the good old yeshiva line, "What are you living for?"' The visitor often discovers that the student body includes young men whose backgrounds and recent histories resemble his own, and they use all their persuasive powers to convince him that it is in his own best interests to joing them:

> We can show you how to be happy, what pleasure is. A lot of people say you can't teach it. What if I was to say I could turn your watch into solid gold. What would you say? You would say, 'Go ahead and try it'. So give us a chance. Check it out. If it does work, you will go home raving about it.

Some students are more gifted in persuasive and argumentative skills, and it is to one of those that a new visitor is first introduced since it is important to capture at once the interest of a would-be recruit. But the most convincing and able persuader is acknowledged to be the head of the yeshiva, Rav (Rabbi) Noach. Almost all the students who met him at their first visit said that he had been singularly successful in making them decide to remain in the yeshiva. One of the students recounted his own experience:

> Rav Noach said, 'Are you living to eat, or are you eating to live?' I said, '. . . No, I am not living to eat. There must be more to life than eating. I must be eating to live'. He said, 'That's right. You are eating to live. If so, what are you living for?' . . . He was bringing up questions like this. The last thing on my mind was to become a religious Jew. . . . One is not afraid to answer his questions because he puts them in a non-charging way.

After a newcomer has agreed to stay, for however short a period, other students engage him in casual conversation and speak of their belief in the values taught at the yeshiva; they may not be as sophisticated or refined in their arguments as are the rabbis and senior students, but their sincerity is beyond doubt. The visitor, however, is not always immediately converted; indeed, some go away after a few hours, while others attend a few classes and then leave.

Only a small minority of those who are initially attracted decide to stay, and then usually for an unspecified period of time in the first place. Some later agree to remain for three months to take the shortened

beginner's course, especially if they are convinced by the replies they receive to their questions about the claims of the yeshiva. In such discussions, the newcomer is often at a disadvantage, because the rabbis and senior students are past masters in debates on religion while he is usually less well-equipped.

Making it make sense to stay

The newcomer who agrees to remain for three months has a structured curriculum to introduce him to Jewish laws and traditions; he is taught by sympathetic tutors in a friendly atmosphere which encourages him to consider changing his life-style permanently. The Jerusalem yeshiva believes, however, that only logical arguments will be effective in ensuring a conversion. One of the rabbis explained:

> You know, the majority of our students are either university-educated or are completing their university training. It's difficult to convince them to change if your arguments aren't persuasive. But overpowering the individual with logic in your first or second discussion with him won't necessarily do the trick. Success isn't achieved so quickly. No . . . he has to come to the realization that . . . what we are asking of him makes sense.

Another rabbi commented:

> There is no way to force anyone to stay. . . . It is just a matter of convincing arguments that the person cannot answer back. . . . Usually people that leave, sneak out sort of, they know they don't have a good reason for going. They can't answer back the logical arguments. In the middle of the night, without telling anybody, because he knows his logical arguments are invalid, he'll leave.

As mentioned above, one of the classes for beginners is entitled 'The Forty-eight Ways to Wisdom'; the students were unanimous in asserting that the manner in which Rav Noach taught that course was the main reason for which they had stayed on. One of them explained:

> This class is really basic. Have you attended any of Rav Noach's classes? More than any other class, this one sets the pace. This is the one that really makes you think — actually this one and the Proofs class. The thing about this class is that everything is presented so logically. You are constantly challenged to point out where the arguments don't make sense. Many times people will stay for three months just to complete this class.

As for the course on 'Proofs of the Divine Authorship of the Torah', a senior student said:

> There really isn't much of a problem in getting people to agree there's a God. Most have no difficulty with this idea — they will believe in a higher power, whether they call this God or not. For many people, the real difficulty is accepting the idea of Torah from Sinai — that the Torah was

written by God. If this can be proved to them, then it logically follows that the commandments must be observed because they are God's commandments.

One of the arguments used is that the

> Jews themselves are described constantly in the Torah as a stubborn, 'stiff-necked' people, hard to please. . . . A people so mistrustful are not very different from the Jews today, and could not have been convinced without some overwhelming experience.[8]

A student explained:

> The proofs have been organized very carefully. A lot of the guys figure that they'll be able to refute the arguments — after all, what do rabbis know . . . ? They [the newcomers] have studied philosophy, religion. . . . First of all they realize that they're up against some very bright and sophisticated teachers. Second, and this is what they find even more confusing, the arguments seem to make sense. Many of the guys here tried challenging them, but then realized they [the arguments] might be right. For sure, they're convincing enough not to dismiss them.

The next step is to convince the student that Divine Providence has guided him to the Jerusalem yeshiva. One of the rabbis said in reply to a student's query:

> What do you think? Do you think you're here by chance? Think about the things that had to happen, according to a particular sequence, for you to have made it here. Really, does it make sense to believe that this is due to luck or chance? No. You are here because God wanted you here. This is an opportunity that *Ha-Shem* [God] is offering you. It's now up to you to take advantage of it.

Once the student has accepted that he is at the yeshiva by Divine Providence he starts to alter his secular frame of reference and to acquire instead a religious one. But the yeshiva does not demand that he sever extra-group ties, as so many radical sectarian movements do.[9] On the other hand, the activities at the yeshiva consume most of his waking hours. When he is not attending classes or studying, he is in the company of other students engaging in informal conversation during which the subject of religion is the main topic. One student observed:

> It's really quite remarkable. Wherever you turn someone is talking about religion or something that is connected. At lunch, for example, someone raises a point brought up in class. Or someone else tells about a conversation he had with someone to get them to come to the yeshiva. No one talks about baseball, or if someone talks about sports, it'll be directed to a conversation about religion.

Both formally and informally, the message conveyed to the student is that his decision to remain in the yeshiva is a reasonable one. And this approach often succeeds, as two students explained:

> Before I knew it, they proved to me there was a God with logical proofs. There is none of this belief or faith . . . at least in this yeshiva. Everything is 'think'. . . . If you show us a hole in the proof, you can walk away. But if you can't . . . you have to accept it.

> I would take the proofs and try to find holes in them. . . . And I couldn't do it. They were just too logical. . . . I would go to people on the street and ask them to try to find a hole in it, and they couldn't. . . . I was really freaking out and I started realizing that it made sense. They proved it to you. . . . And so I started becoming a *mitzvah* [commandment] observer, praying three times a day, studying Torah for nineteen hours a day.

Social scientists have shown that friendship and a sense of community play an important part in the recruitment-commitment process.[10] Newcomers are attracted not only by the logical arguments but also by the sense of community which prevails in the Jerusalem yeshiva and by its communal rituals. Both the administrators and the long-term students are aware of that appeal and they help to create a receptive and warm environment for the new recruit, who apart from being provided with free board and lodging soon discovers that those around him take a special interest in his personal situation. They are not only prepared to listen to his concerns, and to answer his questions about Judaism, but are also willing to speak about their own reactions. He sees that they do sincerely care about him and about all the other members of the yeshiva:

> The thing about this place is that it's genuine. People here are interested in you and that comes across right from the start. . . . I have been involved in a number of religious groups. The affection showered on you in those groups was contrived. It's not like that here. People here care about you in a real and sincere way. Part of the reason why I stay, and I've spoken with others about it, is because I like being in an environment with people who care about other Jews and are genuinely interested in helping them.

The newcomer first establishes inter-personal ties with those with whom he shares a room, but later the bonds of friendship widen, as he spends virtually all the hours of the day with others at classes, at meals, and during prayers, and becomes committed to a new set of social relationships.

The students claim that by participating actively in the religious observances, they come to appreciate the tenets of Orthodox Judaism and they attain emotional fulfilment. One of them said:

> Look, people stay for different reasons. For me, and I think others the emotional and spiritual highs are worth an awful lot. You feel a certain excitement as the *Shabbess* [Sabbath] approaches. Everyone can't help but feel this, it is in the air. That feeling is worth everything. You experience the importance of Torah Judaism, you're a part of Jewish history. You feel good about it. You feel fulfilled.

Arousing and relieving anxiety

The fact that a newcomer accepts the validity of the yeshiva's teachings does not necessarily allay his doubts about his ability to undergo the transformation from a secular to a religious style of living. He realizes from the outset that a commitment to Orthodox Judaism involves specific obligations including, for example, praying three times a day, and observing strictly the laws of kashrut and the Sabbath. A *baal tshuvah* also has to acquire a new philosophy. A student who hesitated to do so explained:

> I would have to drop a lot of ideals that I had and start new ideals. What is the number one thought for a religious person? God. Before it wasn't God. . . . You have to change life to a certain extent. I don't know if I want it, the religious way of life. . . . I want to know more about Judaism, I want to be more Jewish, but do I want to go all the way. . . ? That's scary.

A new recruit is subjected not only to such personal anxieties but also to external pressure. Some newcomers believe that the rabbis instigate such a pressure, soon after a recruit arrives, in order to encourage the young man to stay on at the yeshiva and to discourage others from leaving. One of the students said: 'The first two weeks one goes through all the hell, all the questions and answers, and not so subtle pressures. . . . I am sure you have heard the line, 'What are you living for? . . .'

When it is noticed that a student is uneasy at the prospect of remaining at the yeshiva and is contemplating leaving, direct pressure is exerted by other students and by rabbis to persuade him to stay:

> The pressure is not very subtle anymore. There is direct pressure. As someone who has been around, you're supposed to know the stuff and the logic behind the yeshiva, so they don't use subtle pressure. . . . They use more direct pressure: 'Don't go. What are you going to America for? You know it is hell there. You know it is a rat race there'.

However, as a rabbi claimed: 'There is more direct pressure from other students than there is from the teachers. The teachers are more low key'. The majority of students agreed that that was the case. One of them said:

> The most direct arguments for staying come from the guys, not the rabbis. What you have here is peer pressure. At times it's very subtle. . . . Sometimes it's direct. . . .

Another student stated:

> The pressure to conform basically comes from one's peers. There are certain people who set the pace — either they study more, or perform more of the commandments. In general, they seem to be involved. You sometimes feel a pressure to be more like them. No one really forces you — it is self-imposed.

However, the students who exert the pressure are not themselves always reconciled to their new mode of living. Many had to give up

ambitions which had meant a great deal to them; and in the case of most recruits, their parents and friends had reacted far from enthusiastically on learning about their decision to join the ranks of the *baalei tshuvah* at the Jerusalem yeshiva. They may have lingering doubts. When they use the arguments which had persuaded them in order to banish the doubts of the more recent newcomers, they seek self-reassurance to reinforce their own convictions.[11] One such student was aware of this when he said:

> To get people to stay, many people do it just to reaffirm their own convictions that it is right to stay here. The yeshiva doesn't say you are responsible for getting people to stay here. . . . Getting back to the students themselves, they kind of ask you why you are going back. Some of them are trying to get you to stay, and they are also going over in their own minds why they are staying or why they are leaving — comparing notes.

The yeshiva's task of attracting a newcomer is greatly complicated by the latter's fear that the required changes will be too dramatic. The rabbis are aware that a student's fear of, and resistance to, perceived change is the central stumbling block, the main reason for deciding to leave, for staying for only a very short time, or simply for refusing to enter at all. A rabbi explained:

> They like it and they are running because they are afraid they will have to change. It makes sense to them, it appeals to them emotionally, only there is this fear there . . . that they will have to change and with that change will be a tremendous change in their lives. They are afraid that it is going to affect their relationships with their parents, their friends. It is like a new life.

Another rabbi was of the same opinion:

> There is another aspect of fear, fear he might stay. If he changes his lifestyle, then it is going to be very difficult to cope with it back home, [in terms of] how he relates to his parents, his girl friends, and his own personal way of life.

Thus, the yeshiva has had to face the problem that its goal is to induce change in the individual but that fear of change is a major drawback for a majority of students. The solution to this problem has been to allow the newcomer to change at the pace which is most comfortable for him. Each student determines when he feels prepared to assume specific responsibilities: a new recruit may be slow to adopt the more conventional style of dress, or to attend prayers regularly, but he is not rebuked. A student confessed candidly:

> I was just waiting for someone to pressure me . . . and that would have been my ticket to leave. I was looking for a reason to check out. I couldn't because the arguments were logical. But I was looking for an excuse, because I was afraid of what staying in the yeshiva would mean as far as a lot of things were concerned.

The rabbis realize that forcing the pace of change is likely to heighten a student's anxiety and to be a contributory factor in his decision to leave. A rabbi explained:

> For a person who spends a few days here, thinking about staying, the problem must be overwhelming. Is he going to be able to make the change? Does he even want to change? It would just not serve our purpose if we insisted that this person begin to change immediately.

An important consideration influencing the yeshiva's approach is its leaders' view that an individual is unlikely to adopt behavioural change permanently unless it is meaningful to him. Thus the rabbis do not seek instant emotional conversion, because they are aware that the convert may just as quickly revert to his old mode of life. A rabbi commented:

> There isn't any point to insisting that someone must perform a *mitzvah* before he is ready. A person has to want to do it and then they will do it on a regular basis. If you force them, pressure them, they might do it but are likely to stop. If they understand why a *mitzvah* should be observed, and accept it, then the chances are better that they'll continue the practice after they leave here.

The student, then, must be carefully nurtured. An appropriate balance must be struck between providing him with information about the laws of Judaism and encouraging him to abide by its practices, between creating an environment from which a religious life-style flows naturally and imposing on him specific modes of behaviour. The teachers believe that the newcomer's movement towards Orthodox Judaism is mainly influenced by his earlier background. A rabbi observed:

> People come here and they are in certain stages. . . . There are people that come here . . . that have really made the decision to contact their spiritual roots and nature, but they have been involved in other pursuits, like Christianity, and the eastern religions, and they are not open to experience the Torah system. . . . they are also afraid to take the jump into Torah to see how it compares and differs. There are certain people that can and do. Some people come here without the idea of jumping and jump, and some people come with the idea of jumping and don't jump. Some people have jumped . . . into different things, and they are ready to jump again. And some people have jumped into different things and they can't jump anymore. . . .

The rabbis show the road to Orthodox Judaism and its attractions, and they watch with keen interest and especially with tolerance the steps and the stumbles taken along that road; they hope that those who stray from the path will allow themselves to be guided gently back. A new student may decide to observe only some of the Torah's commandments, and to do so only sporadically, or he may observe none of them; and this is acceptable provided that there is no doubt

about the sincerity of his attempt to engage in the serious study of a Torah-based Judaism. One accepted measure of sincerity is regular class attendance. A rabbi explained:

> Basically, one way to tell how serious a person is, is whether he attends class. If he consistently misses class, then we'll put an end to his stay here. He may not *daven* [pray], he may sleep instead. Okay, he hasn't reached the point where he wants to *daven*. The same may be true for *Tefillin* [phylacteries]. But there is no excuse not to attend class.

General demeanour is also believed to provide clues to a student's sincerity, according to one of the rabbis:

> You can tell whether the person is serious nor not. Does he get up in the morning? Does he come to class? You can also tell by the person's attitude, by the questons he asks, whether he listens, what he is reading. Also, who does he talk to?

In practice, however, the latitude given to the newcomers at the Jerusalem yeshiva is not as wide as the rabbis claim it to be. Admittedly, a new recruit is not presented with a timetable outlining the sequence of his passage into Orthodox Judaism, and he does not have to adhere strictly to a schedule; but he is surrounded by peers who do so, and these peers are far less tolerant. A student remarked:

> The pressure to change is there. It comes mainly from the students. The rabbis mainly leave you alone. . . . They can do this because this work is carried out by students. I am not saying this is the plan. It's just the way it is.

The result of allowing newcomers to believe that they control the pace of their socialization is that they gradually become intensely committed to the strict observance of the Torah. Ideally, from the yeshiva's standpoint, those who have graduated after completing the programme will embark upon a career of actively pursuing the yeshiva's goal — seeking out unobservant Jews and encouraging them to become *baalei tshuvah*. As for others, who leave the yeshiva to return to a career which was temporarily interrupted by the study of Torah, it is hoped that the time they spent in Jerusalem will have strengthened their Jewish identity and impressed upon them the importance of organizing their life-style around the tenets of Orthodox Judaism.

Conclusion

There has been a great deal of concern, especially in the United States, about several non-Jewish sects and cults which have attracted young Jews and converted them.[12]

The leaders of the Jerusalem yeshiva are aware that many educated secular Jews are restless and in search of a satisfying faith. The fact that they are in Israel on a visit shows that they at least have some interest in the land of the Jews. The rabbis at the yeshiva appeal to both the

intellect and the emotions, arouse the potential recruit's curiosity, promise to satisfy it, and surround him with friendliness and consideration. They 'prove' to the young man the validity of the precepts of the Torah and eventually transform him into a convinced and observant Orthodox Jew. They fail to influence permanently many of their transient visitors but, in their opinion, even a comparatively small measure of success with young men who might otherwise have abandoned Judaism justifies their efforts.

It would have been interesting to gather systematic data about the recruits who became disenchanted and could not be persuaded to stay on at the Jerusalem yeshiva. Certainly, the stages in the process of disaffection deserve to be examined as carefully as those resulting in increased involvement; but to do so would have been extremely difficult, since those who left usually did so suddenly and secretly.[13]

Acknowledgements

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NOTES

[1] See, for example, R. Davis and J. T. Richardson, 'The Organization and Functioning of the Children of God', *Sociological Analysis*, vol. 37, no. 4, 1976, pp. 321–39; D. Gordon, 'The Jesus People: An Identity Synthesis', *Urban Life and Culture*, vol. 3, no. 2, July 1974, pp. 159–78; John Lofland, *Doomsday Cult: A Study of Conversion, Proselytization and Maintenance of Faith*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966; J. T. Richardson and M. Stewart, 'Conversion Process Models and the Jesus Movement' in J. T. Richardson, ed., *Conversion Careers: In and Out of the New Religions*, Beverly Hills, Ca., 1977, pp. 24–42; William Shaffir, *Life in a Religious Community: The Lubavitcher Chassidim in Montreal*, Montreal, 1974; and J. F. Zygmunt, *Jehovah's Witnesses: A Study of Symbolic and Structural Elements in the Development and Institutionalization of a Sectarian Movement*, doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1967.

[2] See, for example, W. R. Catton, 'What Kind of People Does a Religious Cult Attract?', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 22, no. 5, October 1957, pp. 551–66; and L. Festinger, H. W. Riecken, and S. Schachter, *When Prophecy Fails*, Minneapolis, 1956.

[3] See C. Y. Glock and R. N. Bellah, eds., *The New Religious Consciousness*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976; M. I. Harrison, 'Sources of Recruitment to Catholic Pentacostalism', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, vol. 13, no. 1, March 1974, pp. 49–64; M. McGuire, 'Toward a Sociological Interpretation of the "Catholic Pentacostal" Movement', *Review of Religious Research*, vol. 16, no. 2, Winter 1975, pp. 94–104; and H. Mol, *Identity and the Sacred*, Oxford, 1976.

[4] R. Travisano, 'Alternation and Conversion as Qualitatively Different Transformations' in G. P. Stone and H. A. Farberman, eds., *Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction*, Waltham, Ma., 1970, pp. 594–606.

[5] See H. S. Becker, 'Notes on the Concept of Commitment', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 66, no. 1, July 1960, pp. 32–40 and R. Kanter, *Commitment and Community*, Cambridge, Ma., 1972.

[6] See N. Schiller, 'Studying Talmud — the Means and the End', *The Jewish Observer*, vol. 14, no. 9, June 1980, p. 13.

[7] See Hillel Goldberg, 'The Teshuva Solicitors', *The Jewish Observer*, vol. 14, no. 9, June 1980, pp. 10–12.

[8] Some other 'proofs' are that the prophecies contained in the Torah predict exactly the history of the Jewish people; that the moral principles enunciated in the Torah have become the goal of humanity; and that the world is hard to understand as anything but a purposeful creation.

[9] See, for example, E. Bittner, 'Radicalism and the Organization of Radical Movements', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 28, no. 6, December 1963, pp. 928–40, and W. Kornhauser, 'Social Bases of Political Commitment: A Study of Liberals and Radicals' in A. Rose, ed., *Human Behavior and Social Processes*, Boston, 1962, pp. 321–29. David Glanz and Michael I. Harrison in an insightful paper, 'Varieties of Identity Transformation: The Case of Newly Orthodox Jews', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 20, no. 2, December 1978, distinguish between four types of identity transformation among newly orthodox Jews.

[10] See M. I. Harrison, 'Preparation for Life in the Spirit: The Process of Initial Commitment to a Religious Movement', *Urban Life and Culture*, vol. 2, no. 4, January 1974, pp. 387–414; and R. Kanter, *Commitment and Community*, Cambridge, Ma., 1972.

[11] See W. Shaffir, 'Witnessing as Identity Consolidation: The Case of the Lubavitcher Chassidim' in H. Mol, ed., *Identity and Religion: International Cross-Cultural Approaches*, Beverly Hills, Ca., 1978, pp. 39–51.

[12] See Jacques Gutwirth, 'Jews Among Evangelists in Los Angeles', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 24, no. 1, June 1982, pp. 39–55.

[13] Compare Gutwirth, ibid., pp. 51–52: 'Sometimes, a resident of a house church 'escapes' during the night, without warning. It seems that many are called, but not all stay the course'.

MEYER FORTES

1906–1983

MEYER FORTES was born in Britstown, of Jewish parents who had emigrated from the Crimea. He was the eldest of a large sibling group, and the first-born was a topic he frequently returned to in his writing. The family moved a number of times, eventually to the outskirts of Cape Town. They were poor and his father found it difficult to meet his school fees. Moses Anafu, son of a Tallensi who had befriended Meyer when he worked in the field in Northern Ghana, recalls asking him in Cambridge about his (Meyer's) childhood and Meyer telling him how, at one point in his childhood, he had had to rise very early in the morning to milk his father's cow before going to school — an experience of common ground which seemed to his Tallensi listener perhaps to help explain the sympathy and percipience which Meyer brought to his study of Tallensi life.

As a child Meyer was used to English, Afrikaans, and Yiddish, an exposure to linguistic and cultural diversity which was a good preparation for an anthropologist. He came to anthropology by a roundabout route. He read English and Psychology at the University of Cape Town and in 1927 was awarded a scholarship to come to London for postgraduate work in psychology. Morris Ginsberg was his academic mentor and, later, Charles Spearman. The subject of his research was to devise a non-verbal test of intelligence for inter-racial use. He completed his Ph.D. thesis, although his research ended in scepticism about the possibility of a wholly culture-free and socially neutral test of intelligence. During this period of research Morris Ginsberg had also introduced him to Dr Emanuel Miller, director of the East London Child Guidance Clinic which had just been set up under the auspices of the Jewish Health Organization. Here he was engaged as educational psychologist to study juvenile delinquency and maladjustment. At that time the slump was severe and mass unemployment prevailed in the East End. Inevitably, economic and social factors in the background of juvenile crime loomed large.

Emanuel Miller was interested in family structure, in the relations between parents and children and their impact on character and personality formation. Some of these themes appeared later in Meyer Fortes's anthropological work, especially in his analyses of

inter-personal kinship, the relations between successive generations, and the developmental pattern of changes in family relationships. He was introduced to psychoanalysis at the Clinic and through contact with J. C. Flugel and later, C. G. Seligman. Freudian theory influenced his thought. It was not obvious, as he made little direct reference to it in his anthropological writing at first; indeed, he said he started his fieldwork in a spirit of scepticism about psychological explanations of custom and social organization.

He first met Malinowski at Flugel's home in 1931 and it led to an invitation to participate informally in Malinowski's seminar at the London School of Economics. Discussion in the seminar sometimes bore directly, he found, on problems he was dealing with in his psychological researches. He was well acquainted with the criminological literature of the time, but to think of crime in sociological terms as infraction of culturally defined norms and values was a new idea. There was as well the catalytic virtuosity of Malinowski and the stimulus of the remarkable group of postgraduate students and teachers who gathered for the seminar. Debate was vigorous and free. It was during this time that he got to know Evans-Pritchard.

In 1932, Meyer Fortes was appointed to one of the Fellowships for field research in Africa funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and the International African Institute. He spent the year 1932–33 in preparation at the LSE with the rest of the team who had been recruited. It was a year of eager discussion, mutual criticism, and cheerful speculation. Fortes chose to work in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast (Ghana) on the advice of R. S. Rattray, the expert then on the peoples of the Gold Coast. Fortes went for a month to Berlin in search of training in the languages of the Gold Coast from Professor D. Westermann. The month was April 1933 and the experience was frustrating and rather frightening as the Nazis were seizing full control of Germany. In December 1933, he sailed with his wife (Sonia, née Donen, who died in 1956) for West Africa.

The Tallensi, the people he was to work with, had been under colonial rule for just over two decades when the Forteses arrived. The rule had been established only after Tale resistance was overcome by force. The Tallensi had been punished, some sent into exile, and they were suspicious of white people. Yet Meyer Fortes came to be accepted with a degree of intimacy which Moses Anafu has beautifully described: 'My father', he writes, 'was by no means alone in his admiration for Fortes. When I came to consciousness, he was already a legendary figure among the Tallensi and their neighbours. They knew his name was Dr Fortes; but for them, however, he was, and remained to the end, Solmiin Taleng: 'the white Tallensi' . . . The acceptance was as real as it was complete and many a Tallensi elder came to look upon him almost as a son. Ondeso, the father of the present Tongrana (Chief

of Tongo), was one of those elders who took Meyer as one of his own. In 1970, Meyer visited Taleland and when he was about to take leave of the Tongrana, the latter rose from his dais and invited Meyer to follow him. He took him into a room where he kept the bulk of his religious *sacra* and squatting in front of his long dead father's Yin (Shrine) solemnly apprised him of the presence of his old friend Meyer Fortes, and asked for his blessings on him. As Meyer later told me, he found the gesture particularly moving as he knew only too well that it was the kind of treatment extended to only the closest of kinsmen'.

The experience of that fieldwork in 1934–35, and again in 1936–37, stayed fresh in all Fortes's later work. His writing is characterized by the detail and sensitivity of his observations of Tallensi family life. The descriptions are never sparse or perfunctory; he was able to probe each point not with just one apt illustration but more often with many to show the variety and nuances to be observed in their actual conduct; and the effect was an absorbing ethnographic record which carried great conviction. As Professor Goody has noted, his examination of the bonds and conflicts, the ties and cleavages, of inter-personal kinship among the Tallensi set a standard in the analysis of these relationships which no anthropologist has emulated.

He respected the discipline of fieldwork. He set himself the highest standards. Ethnographic facts were meaningless unless examined in the light of theory. The monograph should be the study of a problem —that is, an investigation of a hypothesis — as well as the record of field data. 'Description', he wrote, 'cannot yield generalisations; we can arrive at generalisations only by way of analysis'. The fruitfulness of the functionalist method he had learnt from Malinowski lay in looking for significance in ethnographic observations. He preferred to examine a case in depth so as to derive general principles from it rather than to derive the general principles from a more cursory study of many cases. He would choose the ethnographic cases not to represent the whole gamut of human societies but for the clarity with which they exhibited the principles to be demonstrated. This was the method he used in his major treatise, *Kinship and the Social Order* (1969), the expanded version of the first Lewis Henry Morgan lectures. This method, using paradigmatic cases, he referred to as 'Mendelian' in contrast to the taxonomically oriented 'Darwinian' method of comparative research. The method was in keeping with his conviction that between theory and field investigation there was continual feedback and stimulation. Social anthropology was an empirical discipline in which the data of field observation must be used to explore, if not to test, the validity of explanatory hypotheses. Fieldwork was for him the *sine qua non* for making new discoveries. He rejected the fashion of mounting scepticism towards ethnographic facts: 'pontifications on the impossibility of "objectivity" in our researches' were no use.

He would read or listen to other people's ethnographic accounts with alert attention; he was a shrewd judge of their quality, sometimes an amused listener. Unlike some anthropologists who, with age and fame, move away from their observations aspiring to fly higher into theory and forget the field, Meyer Fortes constantly turned back to his field notes. He spoke of the fieldwork he must still write up and of his sense of time running short. He felt, I think, responsible for putting it on record. This feeling grew also from his respect for the Tallensi people, his wish to give a full account of their thought and conduct, their morality and social structure, as he had known it. The anthropologist who studies a society that no one else has studied bears a responsibility for recording it.

In his profound short book, *Oedipus and Job in West African Religion*, he sets Tallensi thought to illuminate the book of Job and the story of Oedipus. Oedipus and Job represent two fundamental principles of religious thought and custom, the notion of Fate or Destiny in Oedipus, the principle of Supernatural Justice in Job. He showed that these religious and ethical conceptions existed also in West African religious systems. He examined the notion of Destiny among the Tallensi, putting it in the context of their beliefs about the spiritual elements constituting a human being, and their cult of the ancestors. The ancestors punish and reward the living, intervening justly in the life of the individual and of society. His analysis uncovered the roots of these beliefs in the family system, and the passage of the individual from childish dependence to adult independence — the latter, however, an independence conditional on following social rules and subject to their constraints. The internal domain of the family, where children are reared, is bound to the external domain of political society, where they eventually run their life-course; we see why parenthood, on the one hand, and the sovereignty of society, on the other, are invested with sacredness. The worship of ancestors is a projection on the mystical plane of the tangle of attachments, tensions, and submerged antagonisms that bind parents and children to one another. The Tallensi stress filial piety towards the dead parents more strongly than towards the living. While he is alive, a persons's father has a direct jural and ritual authority over him; when he dies, the father becomes the paramount sanction of moral conduct for him. The focal field of kinship is also the focal field of moral experience; and the psychological and social factors that generate it are symbolically projected in religious beliefs.

The influence of Freud, as well as Durkheim, speaks clearly here. In later papers, Fortes went on to develop and refine his analysis of these relations between generations, Tallensi morality, and filial piety. These papers show his fine psychological insight, his concern for the actor. He believed that the human actor was sometimes at risk of being subordinated to theoretical analysis of the contents, patterns, and

products of his actions. He stressed that we should keep in mind the question of how the actor himself came to adopt the norms of social relationships in his society, how he came to accept its cultural values as his own. The actor has to know for self-guidance and to show for others that he is a member of a particular locality or division of society. Fortes analysed totemic beliefs and taboo usages in this light, seeing them as morally binding codes for knowing and showing who and what a person is. No doubt his own experience of Jewishness sharpened his insight into taboo and its moral force. He could not neglect the way taboo can bind someone in daily life to feel his identity in relation to other people and to society at large.

Many anthropologists will think first of Meyer's great contributions to the analysis of social structure, in particular to the work he did on descent and descent group structure. Parts of the technical vocabulary in this field (corporate lineage, contraposition, complementary opposition, filiation, politico-jural domain, consanguineal) serve almost as cues to evoke his memory, so strongly was he associated with using them to develop the analysis of social structure. This was the distinctive achievement of British anthropology after the war. With Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard at Oxford, Meyer Fortes was exponent and advocate of the fundamental distinction between the analytic frame of 'society' and that of 'culture'. His work in this mode shows the influence of Sir Henry Maine, the jurist, and of Fustel de Coulanges on the family in ancient Greece and Rome, as well as that of Radcliffe-Brown, to whom Meyer remained loyal. His writings are marked by striving for precision (certainly he sometimes achieved the rebarbative and elaborate nicety of legal writing) and also by his ability to see structure, to distinguish configurations of rules and norms, the patterning of institutions and their interrelationships. As to seeing structure, he remarked that before he turned to anthropology, he had once had to translate a ponderous German work on Gestalt theory. He found the experience instructive for it brought him to grips with the ideas of structure and configuration as properties of wholes or ensembles which could determine, and reciprocally be determined by, the roles and the significance of their constituent parts.

First as Reader at Oxford (1946–50), then as William Wyse Professor at Cambridge (1950–73), he had great influence on social anthropology in Britain and abroad. He built up a strong department in Cambridge that attracted postgraduate research students from many places. The effects of his teaching and writing are widespread in the anthropological world. As teacher and colleague, he set a moral example by the evident sincerity and deep feeling he put into his work. He did not take part in academic argument for the sake of shining or of coming off best in a debate, but because some problem engaged his interest. He conveyed a strong sense of his concern to get at the truth.

He was not mean-spirited in his remarks about others. Though loyal to colleagues and generous to the memory of his teachers, he was clear on what he disagreed with in their work. He had a quick sense of what was significant when he listened to someone's paper or ideas. He would light on what he saw as the important point, sometimes bringing the issue suddenly into focus. Or his remark might have a cryptic quality whose meaning only later sprang to life.

In 1960, he married Dr Doris Mayer. She had trained as a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, and he revisited the Tallensi with her. Together they wrote a study of mental illness among the Tallensi which documented the effects of cultural and social change on the prevalence of mental illness, especially in respect of schizophrenia. On his retirement from the Chair in 1973, he continued to write, bringing out, among others, some papers which developed the analysis of *Oedipus and Job*. He travelled in the United States and Australia, lecturing with vigour and enjoyment, also at times noting with amusement the feeling that his audience came to see him as they might some prehistoric creature, or an ancestor. But he derived great pleasure from debate and discussion with students. He was modest about himself. When he looked back on his career, he spoke of himself as a journeyman anthropologist, meaning by this, 'one who, having served his apprenticeship to a handycraft or trade, is qualified to work at it for day's wages . . . skill and technique are directed strictly to the job in hand in the light of whatever good ideas happen to be appropriate to his task. . . . It is as a journeyman in this spirit that I have always approached my vocation as an anthropologist'. To others he gave inspiration by the example of his vocation and his craft and his own fine vision of anthropology. He was made a Fellow of the British Academy in 1967.

Meyer Fortes joined the Advisory Board of this Journal in 1976 and gave much assistance in evaluating papers submitted for publication. He also contributed book reviews.

GILBERT LEWIS

PAUL GLIKSON

1921–1983

PAUL GLIKSON died suddenly on 5 January 1983, in Jerusalem. He was the Editorial Secretary of *The Jewish Journal of Sociology* from its inception in 1959 until 1963, when he left England and joined the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

He was born in Warsaw, into an old-established Polish Jewish family. His father was a committed Zionist who actively supported Jewish educational and cultural activities. Paul went to a Jewish high school, Gymnasia Hinukh, where he acquired a good knowledge of Hebrew; he had completed his secondary school education when the Germans invaded Poland. The family escaped from the country in 1940 and by a circuitous underground route went overland across Europe to Turkey, then to Syria, the Lebanon, and finally reached Palestine. Paul enlisted in General Anders' Free Polish Army and served as interpreter in Egypt, Iraq, Iran, and Italy and was in the battle of Monte Cassino with the invading Allied forces.

At the end of the war, he studied economics in Italy and later at the London School of Economics and Political Science, where he specialized in statistics. He then took up a post with the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress, which was headed by Dr Aaron Steinberg. When it was decided to launch *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Paul took an active part in all the preliminary discussions and correspondence and was generally of great assistance to the first Managing Editor, Maurice Freedman. He translated items from the Hebrew press and compiled the 'Chronicle' for every issue of the *JJS* until the end of 1963. He dealt not only with editorial matters but also with subscriptions.

At the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Paul Glikson was a senior member of the staff of the Division for Jewish Demography and Statistics. He was concerned with various aspects of the historical and modern demography of the Jews throughout the world; and with his working knowledge of several languages, he accomplished the exacting task of monitoring current research and publications in this field. He helped in the compilation and editing of a series of studies and bibliographies on Jewish demography. Indeed, within months of joining the Institute he was one of the compilers of a list of selected

publications on the demography of the Jews up to 1963, which appeared in *Betfutzot Ha-Golah* (vol. VI, nos 3/4, 1964). He was one of the editors of the volumes of *Papers in Jewish Demography*, published after the demographic sessions of the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth World Congresses of Jewish Studies held in Jerusalem in 1969, 1973, 1977, and 1981. He was also one of the editors of three volumes issued jointly by the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of Jerusalem and the Institute of Jewish Affairs of London: *Jewish Population Studies, 1961–1968* (published in 1970); *Studies in Jewish Demography: Survey for 1969–1971* (published in 1975); and *Studies in Jewish Demography: Survey for 1972–1980*. His annotated bibliography listed 288 items in the first volume, 319 in the second, and 599 in the third volume (published this year). He had finished correcting the proofs of this last volume immediately before his untimely death.

He took an active part in the preparation and publication of other volumes in the Jewish Population Studies series issued by the Institute of Contemporary Jewry; there were 13 altogether (including those listed above), and a further two bearing his name as co-editor are to appear in 1983. Paul Glikson had an abiding interest in the demographic evolution of the Jews of Poland, his native country. He ceaselessly searched historical and literary texts for data on Polish Jews and tried to keep abreast of new publications. In 1973, he presented at the Sixth World Congress of Jewish Studies a paper entitled 'Jewish Population in the Polish People's Republic, 1944–1972'; it was published in the relevant volume of *Papers in Jewish Demography*. A few weeks before his death, he finished a complete bibliography of the Polish Jewish press from its beginnings in 1820 until 1980. He had also planned to compile a systematic documentation on the demographic history of the Jews in Poland, a task for which he was eminently fitted, but very sadly did not live to accomplish it.

Paul Glikson carried a great deal of the burden of organizing a considerable number of Conferences and professional meetings on the demography of the Jews, both in Israel and abroad. He was the Honorary Treasurer of the International Association for Jewish Demography and Statistics.

He did not confine his activities to those of his specialist field. He contributed a select bibliography of Jacob Lestschinsky's works in the June 1967 issue of this Journal (vol. IX, no. 1), listing items published in English, French, German, Polish, Rumanian, Russian, Hebrew, and Yiddish. One of the merits of that bibliography was that it listed articles in learned journals which had not appeared in earlier bibliographies of Lestschinsky.

Paul Glikson maintained a far-flung network of professional correspondence with other scholars and with various institutions throughout the world. He was interested in philosophy and in comparative

religion; and he became increasingly drawn to studies of Chinese civilization and acquired an impressive personal collection of books on the subject. Indeed, he spent much of his time when visiting London scouring bookshops and his many friends in that city often saw him happily laden with new acquisitions.

Paul was the kindest and most unobtrusively generous of friends. If he read an article in Polish or Hebrew which he believed deserved to be brought to the attention of a wider English-reading audience, he would offer to translate the paper and submit it on behalf of the author; but he would usually refuse payment for the many days of work involved. During his visits to England he found time, even when he himself was in poor health, to visit aged and infirm former colleagues as well as the widows of his old friends.

He married Yvonne Perry in 1964; she had been a colleague at the World Jewish Congress office in London. She gave him constant support in all his activities throughout their married life and nursed him devotedly during his periods of ill health.

ZIONISM AND ANGLO-JEWISH POLITICS

V. D. Lipman

(Review Article)

PROFESSOR Cohen's book* is an admirable example of a new approach to historiography (Dr Gideon Shimoni is another exponent of it), which treats modern Anglo-Jewish communal politics seriously. The scholarly scrutiny and detailed assessment of unsuccessful resolutions moved at meetings of the Board of Deputies by self-important individuals may provide wry amusement for those readers old enough to remember some at least of the personalities of the first quarter of the twentieth century. But, if a historian is trying objectively to chart movements of opinion within the Anglo-Jewish community, the degree of support accorded to a proposition within what has long purported to be the community's representative body is a reasonable criterion to use. In circumstances where public opinion polls are not available, it would be hard to suggest a better one; and to provide an objective account of Anglo-Jewish opinion on Zionism between 1895 and 1920 is what Professor Cohen has successfully set out to do. Indeed, he has done better: by living up to his sub-title ('The Communal Politics of Anglo-Jewry'), he has shown how far the ideological positions of Zionism, non-Zionism, and anti-Zionism have to be viewed within the framework of the struggle to advance personal ambitions, or to express group resentments, which form the stuff of Anglo-Jewish politics.

As a result, we get an overall picture of Anglo-Jewish communal politics in the period. In a sense, in examining the role of Zionism within Anglo-Jewish domestic politics, we are looking at a sideshow. The main event affecting world Jewish history which occurred in Britain during this period was the issue of the Balfour Declaration in 1917. Whatever view one takes of the reason for the War Cabinet approving this step, it is unlikely to be that the British Government wanted to conciliate the English Zionist Federation or that it would

* Stuart A. Cohen, *English Zionists and British Jews: The Communal Politics of Anglo-Jewry, 1895–1920*, xv + 349 pp., Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1982, £24.30.

have been unduly influenced by evidence of the strength of anti-Zionism in Anglo-Jewish politics. Anyone reading the War Cabinet papers (including the Cabinet Secretariat file on Zionism) in relation to Edwin Montagu's three broadsides against the proposed declaration, or the consultation of Anglo-Jewish notables on the proposed text, can see that such matters of state were not conducted on a straw poll of Anglo-Jewish communal leadership.

But Herzl set the Zionists of each country the task of 'capturing the community' as a road to broader political achievement and the fact that the accomplishment of this was not a crucial factor in the achievement of the Balfour Declaration does not detract from the importance of Professor Cohen's book, which is of pioneer distinction in Anglo-Jewish historiography for its use of sources. The range of archival material consulted is impressive and the presentation of items found telling. Particularly striking is the amount of material drawn from archives in Israel and the United States. The Anglo-Jewish historian is already grateful to Professor Cohen for the detailed survey (modestly described as an interim report) on 'Sources in Israel for the Study of Anglo-Jewish History' in volume 27 (1978–80) of the *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England*; and this book brilliantly demonstrates how such archives should be used.

The initial question which Professor Cohen asks is why the apparently overwhelming success of Herzl's meetings with Anglo-Jewish leaders, on his lightning visits in 1895 and 1896, proved to have little lasting effects on those individuals by the time the English Zionist Federation, the instrument for capturing the Anglo-Jewish community, was founded in 1899. The answer is that the success was more apparent than real. The very dynamism of Herzl's character and approach, the imprecision on the detailed implementation of the programme, and the natural tendency of his hosts to give a polite reception to a distinguished-looking foreign visitor tended to obscure the tenuousness of bankable assurances, especially when those interviewed by Herzl had time to think over the wider implications of his initiative.

There were too many ideological divides between Herzlian Zionism and Anglo-Jewish leadership of all kinds. First, there was the fundamental distinction between Zionism and Love of Zion. Under the latter head can be grouped at least four strands in Jewish thought and history: an age-long devotion to the Land of Israel and the hope of ultimate return explicit in Jewish prayer and religious tradition; the renaissance of Hebrew as a literary language from the end of the eighteenth century (although it had never ceased to be a language of scholarly correspondence or in some cases of vernacular use); the philanthropic motive of finding new homes and establishing agricultural settlements as a means of 'normalizing' Jewish occupations; and

the political institutions associated with the eschatological concept of the Messianic restoration of Israel to its land. Yet Herzlian Zionism with its programme of the international recognition of a national home for the Jewish people, was not indissolubly tied to any of these propositions. Most of its leaders were not traditional religious Jews, praying daily for the return to Zion and the Messianic restoration of Israel and its institutions. Herz himself, in *The Jewish State*, ridiculed the idea of Hebrew as the language of the new state ('Who amongst us has a sufficient acquaintance to ask for a railway ticket in that language . . . ? Every man can preserve the language in which his thoughts are at home . . . The language which proves itself to be of greatest utility . . . will be adopted as our national tongue'); and the East Africa proposal demonstrated that for its supporters what mattered was the state rather than the Land.

One can, in the light of this, see why Dr Hermann Adler (popularly remembered in this connexion for his description of Zionism as 'an egregious blunder'), who had been to Palestine as a pilgrim in 1885 and regarded himself as a true Lover of Zion, declared that 'every believing and conforming Israelite must be a Zionist', but that Herzlian Zionism was not really Zionism at all but used the name for something different, which, Adler thought, ought to be called 'political, secular or Basle Congress Zionism'. To support the Chovevei Zion (Lovers of Zion) provided a focus for enthusiasm but meant no ideological commitment incompatible with previously held religious, political, or social positions, as Herzl's Zionism did.

Another aspect of the religious divide was the question of the relationship of a politically motivated return to Zion (especially if led by non-observant Jews) to the religious concept of the Messianic restoration of Israel to its Land. Anglo-Jewry was only marginally involved in the massive debate in which European orthodoxy was engaged on the religious acceptability of Zionism, but Professor Cohen gives a relevant summary of it, and indicates how such religious luminaries of the traditional European stamp as there were in Britain might make different pronouncements at different times on the *kashrut* of the English Zionist Federation (EZF). The Mizrachi movement, which did unequivocally support political Zionism, did not form a Federation in Great Britain until 1918, and even then remained separate from, and gave only conditional support to, the EZF; and this again weakened the impact of Zionism as a united political movement on Anglo-Jewry before 1917.

A third religious aspect — at least as fundamental for the Jewish leadership and to some extent the middle class — was the theology of the Jewish mission to spread Jewish ideals to the Gentiles, which then characterized Reform and the recently formed Liberal Judaism. As expounded by its contemporary Anglo-Jewish theologians, Claude

Montefiore and Israel Abrahams, it involved the abandonment of the national return to Zion and the acceptance that Diaspora was divinely ordained, since how else could Jews set an example to non-Jews except by living in the countries where the latter did? This theory was interlinked with the concept of Judaism as a religion (though hardly as traditional rabbinic thought envisaged it), and in no way a nationality. Admittedly this outlook would not preclude the existence of Jewish communities in the Holy Land, or even the promotion of some Jewish settlement there on philanthropic grounds. But this philanthropic motive was to a considerable extent diverted into the efforts of the Jewish Territorial Organization (ITO), flamboyantly promoted by Israel Zangwill, for this very purpose of finding new homes for oppressed Jews; indeed, the very urgency of the need, as persecution increased, strengthened the arguments for settlement in countries which could be plausibly, or even implausibly, represented as offering the provision of a haven more quickly than in Ottoman-administered Palestine. The ideological acceptability of such solutions was reinforced if presented as staging posts on the way back to Zion; and, after all, even Zionists had seriously considered East Africa.

But probably the most serious obstacle was the view taken by those who had campaigned for Jewish civil rights of the Zionist assertion that Jews constituted a political nationality and were therefore entitled to a homeland or state of their own. It was not merely the fear of a charge of dual loyalties, although many prominent Anglo-Jews (especially if, like Edwin Montagu, they had political ambitions in British public life) did feel that Zionism threatened their own credibility. It was felt perhaps most sincerely by Lucien Wolf, who devoted much of his life to campaigning for civil rights for Jews in Europe, that Zionism as a political theory would make legitimate the denial of equal rights to Diaspora Jewry, without guaranteeing an alternative solution. Even if Palestine could be constituted as a Jewish state, could it accommodate all who might be denied, or lose, equal rights in the Diaspora if antisemites were able to persuade the governments of the world to treat their Jews as foreigners?

It was not surprising therefore that the small band who inaugurated the EZF at a dinner at the Trocadero Restaurant on 22 January 1899 found massive obstacles in achieving the task of 'capturing the community'. Mainly middle-class business or professional men, they were no doubt idealists, although Professor Cohen indicates that some at least were impelled by that urge to shine in communal politics which has provided so much of the impetus of Anglo-Jewish organizations. Apart from Sir Francis Montefiore, the EZF could not attract (at least until Weizmann took over) the interest of the communal aristocracy. The immigrant proletariat was not much help: its members were either attracted by other ideologies or more concerned in earning or bettering

their living. The Zionists' main asset was Leopold Greenberg's control of the *Jewish Chronicle* from 1907 (although it was then not the sole organ of the Anglo-Jewish community). Their tendency to quarrel with each other, which led in 1909 to a virtual schism between the EZF and a Gaster-inspired group working through the Order of Ancient Maccabeans, did not enhance their communal image. In so far as they could hope to 'capture the community', it could only be by trying to gain votes and influence in the Board of Deputies by allying themselves with other groups discontented with the current leadership: particularly those who believed that the provinces were not getting a fair deal or who, as groups or individuals, felt they were not being allowed a status appropriate to their importance by what they considered a communal oligarchy, self-appointed and limited to a few, often inter-related, families. In an article in the December 1977 issue of this *Journal*, Professor Cohen identified these dissatisfied groups and personalities; and, by analyzing the votes cast on 17 June 1917 by the Board of Deputies condemning the Conjoint Foreign Committee's publication in *The Times* of an anti-Zionist manifesto showed how even the 56 to 51 majority could not have been achieved if the Zionists had not been supported by elements objecting to the way in which the decision to issue the manifesto had been taken, rather than to its contents. This argument is supported by the fact that, in spite of the prestige given to Zionism by the issue of the Balfour Declaration and the considerable increase in the EZF membership, the Joint Foreign Committee with the Anglo-Jewish Association was reconstituted under a barely changed name and the Board's leadership did not substantially alter its political stance in relation to Zionism in the years immediately following 1917.

Had the June 1917 vote at the Board gone the other way, it would have been awkward for the Government and embarrassing for the Zionists, but I do not believe it would have changed the course of history. Edwin Montagu, in his second paper circulated to the Cabinet on 14 September 1917 (GT 2191), discussed the June vote at length and made the same point as Professor Cohen: 'This vote of censure obviously enlisted the support not only of Zionists but also of those who felt the force of the criticism that the Joint Committee in issuing it [the letter] on its own responsibility exceeded its rights as a mere executive committee of two parent organizations which should have been consulted before a large declaration of policy was given to the world'; and he concluded that 'the issue of Zionism was mingled with the questions arising out of an injudicious use of delegated power' (PRO CAB 21/58).

But the War Cabinet was unimpressed, any more than it was by the anti-Zionist views expressed by Claude Montefiore, Philip Magnus, and Leonard Cohen: the whole exercise of consultation of representative Jewish leaders was carried out to satisfy the requirement that the War Cabinet should be made aware of the anti-Zionist case.

That this case was argued eloquently and sincerely is brought out by Professor Cohen. It is a tribute to the objectivity of a professor at an Orthodox-inspired university in Israel that he demonstrates that arguments based on anti-Zionist political philosophy and Liberal Jewish theology were presented with more cogency, and had been more thoroughly thought through, than those presented by their opponents; and that the Zionist case was often polemical, shallowly or superficially thought out, and evaded rather than answered questions about how the existing inhabitants of Palestine would be affected or what might be the effect on Jews in Arab lands of the implementation of Zionist policies. Professor Cohen also seems to acquit the anti-Zionists of the charge that they were unduly motivated by considerations of mere convenience: that they did not want to give up their comfortable homes and status in Britain was the charge often brought against anti-Zionists by Zionists. Professor Cohen accepts that the anti-Zionists were genuinely moved by what they conceived to be the true interests of the Jewish people, with themselves as an integral part of that people. Yet the present reviewer is haunted by a quotation from an undated letter by Claude Montefiore, now in American Jewish Archives, cited by Professor Steven Bayme in his article on Montefiore in *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England* (vol. 27, p. 767): 'I cannot tell you the anxiety the Zionists cause me. Sometimes I get so sick . . . that I feel tempted to chuck all Jewish work and retire . . . and live exclusively as an ordinary Englishman among my *English* neighbours — my own *people* as I call them'.

Professor Cohen's book may be thought to deal with the part played by organizations and people on the periphery of world Jewish history. What it does provide is a methodological exemplar to Anglo-Jewish historians on how to write their own history (although I hope they will not follow the practice of identifying the first and second Lords Rothschild by calling them 'Lord Nathaniel Rothschild' and 'Lord Walter Rothschild', since they were peers and not the younger sons of a duke or marquess).

BOOK REVIEWS

EMIL L. FACKENHEIM, *To Mend the World: Foundations of Future Jewish Thought*, xii + 362 pp., Schocken Books, New York, 1982, $12.95.

In addition to his general place in contemporary Jewish philosophy, Professor Fackenheim is well known as one of the foremost Holocaust theologians. He has taught that the Holocaust demands that a new commandment be added to the 613 of tradition. This is that Hitler must not be allowed to have the last word. In the book under review, Fackenheim seeks to describe how the foundations might be laid for the building of Jewish life in the future. Of the three parts of Jewish theology — God, the Torah, and Israel — his stress is on the last of these, Israel for him being the Jewish people as a whole but with the land and people of the State of Israel at the centre. He is not afraid of Jewish particularism, seeing this as at least as important as universalism. He is neither so arrogant nor so foolish as to imagine that anything more than a tentative sketch can be provided; his Introduction concludes with the saying of Rabbi Tarfon: 'It is not thy duty to complete the work but neither art thou free to desist from it'.

Basically, Fackenheim relies in his attempt at reconstruction on four philosophers, two Jewish, the other two non-Jewish. These are Spinoza, Rosenzweig, Hegel, and Heidegger. The choice of these four becomes less odd when this difficult book is studied carefully and the progression of its argument closely followed. It is emphatically not a work that can easily be summarized but its thrust and boldness can perhaps be grasped by these remarks at the end of the book (p. 330): 'A generation ago, an unprecedented attempt was made to make an end to Jews, and some in this generation regret that it failed of complete success. However, whether or not the world today realizes it, it cannot do without Jews — the accidental remnant that, heir to the holy ones, is itself bidden to be holy. Neither, in our time, can God Himself'.

LOUIS JACOBS

SONIA L. LIPMAN and VIVIAN D. LIPMAN, eds., *Jewish Life in Britain 1962–1977, Papers and Proceedings of a Conference Held at Hillel House, London on 13 March 1977 by the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Institute of Jewish Affairs*, xvii + 203 pp., K. G. Saur Publishing, New York and Munich, 1981, DM. 74.

The first Conference on Jewish life in modern Britain was held in London in 1962; its papers and proceedings were edited by Julius

Gould and the late Shaul Esh and published in 1964 under the title, *Jewish Life in Modern Britain*. A second Conference was held in 1977, in order 'to review the changes that had taken place in the Anglo-Jewish community in the intervening 15 years' (p. ix). There were five sessions. The first opened with a paper by S. J. Prais, who between 1965 and 1972 inspired and directed a great deal of original research on the size and structure of the Anglo-Jewish population, while he was honorary consultant of the Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews. Professor Prais was ably assisted by Mrs Marlena Schmool, and this Journal published nine of their articles between 1967 and 1975. At the 1962 Conference, his contribution was entitled, 'Statistical Research: Needs and Prospects'. Fifteen years later, his subject was, 'Polarization or Decline? A Discussion of Some Statistical Findings on the Community'. He examined, among other things, estimates of the size of the Anglo-Jewish population, the decline in the number of synagogue marriages, the low birth rate, and the provisions for Jewish education in schools. He also made practical recommendations for future research.

Professor Ernest Krausz's paper is on 'Concepts and Theoretical Models for Anglo-Jewish Sociology'. His key concepts are ethnocentrism, acculturation, and assimilation; and he also considers the methods used by American social scientists in their studies of Jewish identification.

The second session centred on the challenge of secularization. The Chief Rabbi, Dr I. Jakobovits (now Sir Immanuel), analysed religious and secular trends in Anglo-Jewry since 1962. He claimed that the community had a 'predilection for stability and aversion to change, whether by revolution or innovation' (p. 35). He believed that the most positive development in recent years has been the phenomenal growth of Jewish day schools and institutions of higher learning. On the other hand, he deplored the rising Jewish divorce rate, which posed a grave threat to the stability of the Jewish home; it was as serious a challenge to Jewish continuity and the preservation of Jewish values as was the decline in religious observance and identification. He also regretted that Jewish scholars and intellectuals were not among the leaders of the community.

Rabbi Dr Marmur dealt with various aspects of secularism, and noted that whereas Christians make a distinction between the religious and the secular, 'Judaism knows only the distinction between holy and profane; the profane is the not yet holy, and it is for us to sanctify it' (p. 50). The realm of the profane is thus challenging in the truest sense of the word. Dr Marmur (who is a Reform rabbi) claims that contemporary Progressive Judaism has tried to respond to that challenge. 'A modern Jewish theology can neither uncritically affirm the secular city nor totally deny its validity; instead, it must seek to

integrate it into Judaism, sanctify it, and thus remove its secularity' (p. 55). Mr P. Feingold, in considering the counter-attack on secularization, rejoiced that increasing numbers of young Jews were being attracted to seminaries and yeshivot, and were discovering their Jewish heritage.

The third session of the Conference was devoted to historical and local studies. Dr Aubrey Newman, in his paper on 'Recent Research in Anglo-Jewish History', reported on studies of provincial communities. He also noted that Anglo-Jewish history can now be studied in several British universities and described the activities and achievements of the Jewish Historical Society of England. Dr Barry Kosmin, the Director of the Research Unit of the Board of Deputies, stressed the importance of the local perspective in studying contemporary British Jewry and related some of the difficulties which the Research Unit and social scientists had encountered when they tried to secure the co-operation of some Jewish organizations and synagogues. Bill Wiliams deplored the fact that there were very few local historical studies and that local archives (for example, minute books of synagogues) are not always preserved. He also stressed that 'the history of a local Jewish community makes complete sense only when it is set against the wider society of which it is a part. The true disease of local Jewish history is its introversion' (p. 97).

The fourth session was concerned with Jewish education. The late Jacob Braude, to whose memory the present volume is dedicated, reported on the present state of Jewish education in Great Britain. The total number of children in Jewish day schools had nearly trebled in 23 years, and the increase would have been even greater if there had been enough schools of that type in London.

Professor F. Jacobs and Mrs Vivien Prais presented a paper on 'Developments in the Law on State-Aided Schools for Religious Minorities'. The Education Act of 1944 recommended that ' . . . so far as is compatible with the provision of efficient instruction and training and the avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure pupils are to be educated in accordance with the wishes of their parents'. This has meant that denominational schools have been largely supported by public grants. In recent years, however, there has been a surplus of general school places and the government decided not to provide state aid for denominational schools in areas where there is a general surplus, on the grounds that there must be an 'avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure'. When the United Kingdom ratified the Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, it made a reservation in Article 2 about the right of parents to have their children educated in conformity with their own religious convictions: this would be 'only so far as it is compatible with . . . the avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure' (p. 138).

Rabbi Michael Rosin, in 'The Jewish Student Scene', spoke from his own experience as a full-time Chaplain to the northern region of the Union of Jewish Students. In 1977, out of an estimated 8,000 Jewish students in universities and polytechnic institutes, only about 2,500 were members of Jewish students' societies. There were 74 such societies, varying in size from 200 'to 10 or less'. One of the difficulties in organizing an active Jewish society was that those joining universities usually came from less committed Jewish homes. There was an alarming increase of virulent Arab anti-Zionist propaganda; it jolted many Jewish students out of their false sense of security and led them to organize pro-Israel meetings.

In the fifth and last session, Mr Geoffrey Paul spoke of the value of controversy in communal life, Dr S. Levenberg gave an outline of 'The Development of Anglo-Jewry, 1962–1977', and Professor Julius Gould's contribution was entitled 'Grandchildren of the Ghetto'. Professor Gould noted that although in Britain the descendants of the ghetto were now largely members of the middle class, there were still sizable groups of Jews who were manual and semi-skilled workers (for example, in the London borough of Hackney), and there were also pockets of deprivation. The Jewish family was facing strains, with an increasing rate of divorce and of intermarriage. Leadership of the highest order was required for the Jewish community, as it became 'more educated, geographically dispersed, and more divided and/or indifferent on religious matters' (p. 185).

In a Postscript, Dr V. D. Lipman admirably summarizes, and comments on, some of the main contributions and discussions which took place after the presentation of the papers. He praises the achievements of the Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, which was set up after the 1962 Conference to provide a systematic collection of data on the community, and which has carried out local studies in Sheffield, Hackney, and Redbridge. He ends by asserting that there can be no doubt that the material assembled in this volume has increased the capacity for self-analysis of the Anglo-Jewish community probably beyond what has been contributed in any single volume so far. That is probably true, but it is certainly true that there are pitifully few scholarly studies of Anglo-Jewry.

The volume is very well edited and has a glossary of Hebrew and Yiddish words and an Index. However, it is odd that a book on Jewish life in Britain, whose contributors and editors write in British English, should have American spelling. Could no British publisher be found to have the volume printed as it was originally written and to see that it was readily available in British bookshops?

JUDITH FREEDMAN

TIMOTHY OELMAN, ed. and translator, *Marrano Poets of the Seventeenth Century. An Anthology of the Poetry of João Pinto Delgado, Antonio Enríquez Gómez, and Miguel de Barrios*, 296 pp., The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, Associated University Presses, London and Toronto, 1982, £15.

The publication of a work which presents the phenomenon of 'Marrano literature' to the English-speaking reader for the first time is warmly to be welcomed. The fate of the Marranos, the forcibly baptised New Christians of Spain and Portugal, some of whom persisted over many generations in adhering to crypto-Jewish belief and practice in the face of danger and repression, has long fascinated the general Jewish reader and specialist in hispanic scholarship alike. The world of the Marranos is replete with drama and not infrequently with real heroism under the shadow of the Inquisition and the tyranny of a relentless majority. In general, it also savours strongly of ambivalence, doubt, and occasional betrayal from within.

Timothy Oelman, the presenter and translator of this well-chosen anthology, is certainly right when he claims that while historians have assembled an increasingly detailed picture of the Marrano phenomenon as an episode in social history, little attempt has yet been made to evaluate the Marrano mentality or assess its impact on thought and literature. This present anthology, comprising a selection in both Spanish and English translation from three of the most distinguished Marrano poets, João Pinto Delgado, Antonio Enríquez Gómez, and Miguel de Barrios, is envisaged as a contribution towards the latter task. It is a great pity therefore that the presenter has kept what he himself has to say to the barest minimum, preferring to devote nearly the whole of his space to the poems themselves. He ought to have provided far more explanation of the context and subject matter. The editor's Introduction is helpful as far as it goes but comprising as it does only twenty-five pages, it is much too short to fulfill its function. The reader's curiosity is undoubtedly whetted, only to be left largely unsatisfied.

Apart from the main introduction, each of the three poets receives another two pages or so of individual attention including biographical data. But again this is altogether inadequate. João Pinto Delgado (*c.* 1585–1653) is judged to be the most accomplished of the three. We are told that he spent most of his first forty years in Portugal, joining his parents at Rouen in around 1625, and that his main collection of poems was published at Rouen, in 1627. From a few terse sentences, we glean that the poet envisaged the Inquisition as 'God's instrument for bringing the Marranos back to Judaism by awakening them to their racial and religious origins'. In his poems *Queen Esther* (a theme of abiding interest to the Marranos) and *Ruth*, Pinto Delgado displays a certain familiarity with Rabbinic sources. All very fascinating but in

view of the considerable amount that has been written about this author by I. S. Revah and other scholars, unaccountably brief.

Miguel (Daniel Levi) de Barrios (1635–1701), born at Montilla, in Andalusia, and a wanderer who lived in Leghorn, the Caribbean, Brussels, and Amsterdam, is another writer of whom a good deal is known. He is given a page and a half of individual treatment which sadly misses the opportunity to discuss patterns of literary taste and thought among the Sephardi community of golden-age Holland.

All considered, one cannot be otherwise than appreciative of this offering, but it is disappointing that we are not treated to more.

JONATHAN I. ISRAEL

CHAIM RAPHAEL, *The Springs of Jewish Life*, v + 288 pp., Basic Books, New York, 1982, $16.50.

When David Hume asked a man, who was reading philosophy for the first time, how he was getting on with his studies, the man replied: 'I am persevering but cheerfulness keeps breaking in'. Chaim Raphael, impatient with what Salo Baron calls the lachrymose view of Jewish history, seeks to describe why it has been and still is a joy to be Jewish. He even considered calling his book *A Cheerful Look at Jewish History* but changed his mind because a deeper question has to asked: What is the source of this Jewish courage and the Jewish will to live forged in antiquity and kept alive today? The answer is explored in this lively interpretation of the whole of Jewish history with the author's uncanny skill for mining the quarries of scholarship and presenting the gold he finds there for the enjoyment and education of the non-specialist. His aim is to take in Jewish history 'in a way that can be sad without self-pity, involved without megalomania, proud — that is the hardest part — without vainglory' (p. 5). He believes that 'the story is far too long, too full of contradictions, too varied in tone to be summarized as expressing some set purpose either of God or man'.

It would be grossly unfair to fault an impressionistic work for being too categorical in areas where there is controversy or for the occasional generalization. It is precisely to the author's broad sweep that the book owes its charm. Nevertheless, it is perhaps worth pointing out one or two statements open to question. There is, when dealing with the Rabbinic period, a tendency to relegate odd tales and sayings to the realm of folklore. This is not always the case. When, for instance, the Talmud tells of the rabbi who by the utterance of a magic word filled a whole field with cucumbers, this is not, in the context, a mere fanciful legend (p. 77) but part of an Halakhic discussion on the right of the rabbis to practise magic for the purpose of teaching their disciples the ways of the magicians so that, as judges, they can decide on cases of

magic coming before them. We may consider it to be a legend but the rabbis themselves took it as sober fact.

The impression is given (pp. 176–77) that, from the third century, there was a one-way flow of scholars from Palestine to Babylon and that the Babylonian Talmud consists only of the discussions of the Babylonian teachers. In fact, there was a two-way traffic, at least the same number of scholars emigrating from Babylon to Palestine, and the Babylonian Talmud consists of the discussions of the Palestinian teachers as well as the Babylonian — just as the Palestinian Talmud contains the discussions of some of the Babylonians. In other words, how the Talmud came to be is an extremely complicated problem, still awaiting its solution, and Chaim Raphael is right to call it 'a mysterious work'. It can hardly be said (p. 242) that the opposition of the Vilna Gaon to Hassidism was because he urged the importance of rational study and responsible judgement, foreshadowing the gap in approach between the rational and the mystical. The Vilna Gaon himself was a Kabbalist. Among other reasons, he opposed Hassidism on theological grounds, concerning divine providence and immanence and the respective roles of Torah study and prayer in the religious life. A man who in his early youth thought of creating a golem and who went from his home in voluntary exile in order to share the pain of the *Shekhinah* cannot fairly be described as a rationalist even in a limited sense.

Other readers will no doubt be stimulated to take up other points with the author but from the tenor of this book and from what one knows of Chaim Raphael, he will be hugely pleased that his work has promoted further debate.

LOUIS JACOBS

WALTER STRAUSS, ed., *Signs of Life: Jews from Wuerttemberg — Reports for the Period after 1933 in Letters and Descriptions*, xvii + 389 pp, Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1982, $25.00.

The Organization of Jews from Wuerttemberg was founded in New York in 1939 and is apparently the only Landsmannschaft in the United States to survive into the 1980s. Whether this is due to the dynamic leadership of Walter Strauss, the editor and inspiration of the volume under review, or to some other social or historical characteristic of this group of refugees from Nazi Germany, remains unclear. The bond that unites them has withstood the test of time. In September 1979, Strauss sent a request to all the members of the organization, asking for details of 'background in the old country (sic) . . . the kinds of persecution they had encountered . . . and life experiences in the new country' (p. xi). Some six hundred letters went out to several countries and about five hundred replies were received by June 1981, ranging from cryptic four-line notices to substantial biographical essays.

Included are famous names like Albert Einstein and Max Horkheimer, well-known names like Karl Adler and Otto Hirsch, and a host of less well-known and unknown persons — men and women, artisans and professionals, sophisticated émigrés and simple countryfolk, though the more famous and now deceased are briefly and proudly described or remembered by those who knew them. For all its uneven presentation of data, and classically refugee-style American English, the book is moving and delightful, a veritable mine of information, of entertainment, and of pathos.

For the sociologist there is important source material, albeit in totally disjointed form, on the essential middle-classness of German Jews, the *drang* for education, the distribution of occupations in urban and rural Germany, and the impact of new environments on changes in occupational structures. There is a great deal of thought-provoking material on changing religious attitudes and the nature of Jewishness, on the reasons for migrating again, for example, from Israel to the United States, on the position of women and family structure, on the size of families, age distributions, and deaths. Perhaps, one day, someone will organize all that data and attempt to explain, and comment upon, the extraordinary toughness and resilience of Jewish refugees from Germany. It would not be an easy task, not least because the validity of the data would be difficult to test and what is offered in the way of supporting evidence or references is often somewhat unusual for the professional researcher. This is not to be construed as a criticism. How can one feel anything but genuine pleasure when reading such a sentence (p. 22): 'The Germans also made a film about him which his sister saw on TV but cannot remember the name of'?

JULIUS CARLEBACH

CHRONICLE

According to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, the population of the State by the end of 1982 exceeded four million: 4,055,000, of whom 3,366,300 (or 83 per cent) were Jewish. There was an increase of 67,500 (1.7 per cent) over the 1981 total; the 67,500 include about 20,000 non-Jews of whom 12,000 are Druse living on the Golan Heights, which Israel annexed in December 1981.

*

The emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union has dropped very sharply from 51,303 in 1979, 21,741 in 1980, 9,447 in 1981, to 2,692 in 1982.

*

In 1982, 1,256 Jews from Great Britain and Ireland settled in Israel; this is the highest number since 1948 and includes temporary residents in Israel who changed their status to that of olim.

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There were 62,100 Jews in Australia at the time of the 1981 Census: 30,000 in Victoria, 25,200 in New South Wales, 3,200 in Western Australia, 1,100 in South Australia, 2,000 in Queensland, 400 in Canberra, 100 in Tasmania, and 100 in the Northern Territory. In the Australian Census, the question about religion is optional; 11.8 per cent of householders did not state their religion and a further 10 per cent declared that they had 'no religion'.

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The Winter 1982–83 issue of *News from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem* states that the academic year opened with some 16,000 students in the University's four campuses (Mount Scopus, Givat Ram, Ein Karem, and Rehovot). Nearly a third of the total, about 5,000, are engaged in postgraduate studies. There are in addition some 14,000 who are taking part in external and continuing education programmes and in refresher courses.

The Faculty of Agriculture has about 1,750 undergraduate and postgraduate students; at the end of the 1981–82 session, it awarded a record number of degrees: 305 Bachelors of Science, 9 Masters of Science, 9 Doctorates, and 30 Teaching Certificates.

The University's Hadassah Medical School has some 500 students in its six-year course of studies; these include 85 in their first year. There are a further 50 who are registered for a Master's degree in Medical Sciences, 37 for the same degree in microbiology, and 100 for a Doctorate. The School of Public Health and Community Medicine has 55 students working for a Master in Public Health degree, while the School of Occupational Therapy has an enrolment of 122.

The School of Pharmacy has 288 registered students — 250 for a Bachelor's degree, 17 for a Master's, and 21 for a Doctorate. The School of Nursing has 215 who are working for a Bachelor's degree in Nursing Sciences, including 15 who are registered nurses; it is planning a programme for an exchange of staff and students with universities in Great Britain, South Africa, and the United States. The Faculty of Dental Medicine has 330 students, of whom 60 are being trained as dental hygienists and dental assistants.

The Faculty of Law has an enrolment of 640, including 70 in its Institute of Criminology. It has a library of 250,000 volumes and 750 periodicals, and intends to expand its criminology collection.

The School of Education has 900 students registered for degree courses and a further 450 in the Teachers' Training programme; there are also 800 practising teachers in various in-service courses. The School has acquired a computer laboratory and the Centre for Cognitive Science and Education will promote the use of computers in educational research.

The Faculty of Social Sciences had a record 5,200 applicants, from whom some 800 were selected, for a course of studies leading to a Bachelor's degree. The total of undergraduates is about 2,000, while 950 are working for a Master's degree and 250 for a Doctorate. The Paul Baerwald School of Social Work has more than 500 students in a wide range of programmes. A four-trimester course has been introduced to provide basic skills for graduates in sociology, psychology, and the behavioural sciences who wish to register for a Master's degree in social work.

More than a thousand Hebrew University students have undertaken to take part in community and social activities in disadvantaged neighbourhoods of Jerusalem and in the student-to-child tutoring programme which has proved highly successful.

The Faculty of Humanities has about 4,500 students; there were more than 3,700 applicants for the 1982–83 session, but only about half of them (1,780) were accepted. The Graduate School has a new Master of Arts programme in History, Philosophy, and Sociology of the Sciences, in co-operation with the Faculty of Social Sciences and the Faculty of Science.

The Graduate School of Library and Archive Studies has an enrolment of 225; a further 150 librarians, archivists, and information specialists have registered for continuing education courses. A new course in the history of Judaica collections is now being offered. There is also a new computer laboratory which will make it possible to plan information retrieval and automatic indexing and to create data banks.

A Centre for Industrial Research and Development has been established; it is a joint project of the Hebrew University and the Office of the Chief Scientist in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Its purposes are 'to create a reservoir of scientific knowhow for industrial technologies; to execute research and development projects for Israeli industry at various levels (development of products and processes, development of scientific analysis and testing methods, supportive research feasibility studies, and the like)'.

*

Twenty-one French-speaking theologians, priests, and nuns from Haiti and from Africa (Benin, Cameroon, Mauritius, Ruanda, Senegal, Togo, and

Zaire) took part in a two-month seminar on 'Biblical Tradition and Community Development' at the Hebrew University's Martin Buber Centre for Adult and Continuing Education. So far, more than 100 French- and English-speaking participants have attended these seminars. They have also visited settlements of diverse social and community backgrounds, so that they could envisage how Israeli settlements might be adapted to their own national needs.

*

The Hadassah School of Public Health and Community Medicine of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem conferred Master of Public Health degrees to students from 16 countries. The graduates in the international programme included 14 physicians, five nurses, a veterinarian, and an expert in occupational health. They came from Australia, Bolivia, Burma, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, India, Kenya, Lesotho, Nepal, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay. A total of 175 students (mainly from developing countries) have been awarded MPH degrees in the last 20 years, after completing the international programme's courses.

*

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem has announced the establishment of the Gershom Scholem Centre for the Study of Jewish Mysticism. The Centre will promote teaching, research, and publications and will organize seminars, symposia, and conferences. It will also have a Gershom Scholem Chair in Kabbala and Jewish Mysticism.

*

An Institute of Assyriology has been established at Bar-Ilan University. Its programme of studies will include courses in Sumerian literature and in Mesopotamian and Jewish Law.

*

The International Sephardi Education Foundation was established in New York six years ago, mainly by Jews originating from Syria and the Lebanon. It helps Sephardi students to pursue academic studies at Israeli universities and by 1982 it had awarded 450 scholarships (totalling about US $150,000) at Bar-Ilan University alone. The foundation also has a special programme for private tuition.

*

The Central Zionist Archives of the World Zionist Organization submitted last year to the Thirtieth Zionist Congress a 'Report of Activities: September 1977–July 1982'. The Archives now occupy 5,000 metres of shelving. Among recent acquisitions are the files of 'Magen', the Society for the Aid of Persecuted Zionists in Soviet Russia, from 1929 to 1972; the files of the Association of Zionist Activists in Rumania, 1921–77; and the files of the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association, 1883–1957, which contain valuable data on the history of the settlements of the First Aliyah. The Archives

have also acquired documents and files relating to the history of Zionism in Canada, Hungary, Poland, South Africa, and the United States; and files of two Zionist student organizations in Vienna (1888–1977 and 1908–35) and one in Budapest (1919–45).

*

It was reported last December that the Greater New York area has 197 Jewish day schools with a total enrolment of about 60,000. The large majority of the pupils (75 per cent) are from Orthodox families; 10 per cent are from Conservative and two per cent from Reform families; and a surprising 13 per cent from non-observant households. The students include 4,000 children of Russian immigrants, 2,500 Israelis, and 500 Iranian Jews.

*

The November 1982 isue of *Les Cahiers de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle* states that in the academic session 1981–82 the AIU had 37 educational establishments in eight countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Iran, Israel, Morocco, Spain, and Syria) with a total enrolment of 13,890 pupils. This represented a slight increase over the previous year's total of 13,627.

The schools in Belgium, Canada, and Spain are affiliated to the *Alliance*; there were 553 pupils in one school in Brussels, 2,106 in five schools in Montreal, while one in Madrid had 140 and the Sephardi College in Barcelona had 113.

The country with the largest number of AIU students was Israel, with a total of 5,474 in seven establishments: three in Jerusalem, one in Tel-Aviv, two in Haifa, and one in Holon (the Agricultural School of Mikveh Israel). One of the Jerusalem schools is for deaf and dumb children and it had three classes for Arab pupils.

Iran had seven AIU schools in 1981–82, with a total of 2,603 pupils: four schools in Teheran with 1,679 pupils, of whom only 588 were Jewish; and three in the provinces (Ispahan, Kermanshah, and Yezd) with 924 pupils, of whom 372 were Jewish.

Morocco had 11 *Alliance* establishments with a total enrolment of 1,734 pupils: six in Casablanca, and one each in Agadir, Fez, Marrakesh, Meknes, and Tangiers.

Syria had one *Alliance* school, in Damascus, with 534 pupils: 412 girls and 122 boys.

Finally, France had three AIU establishments, with a total of 563 students: 155 in its Lycée, 175 in its College, and 233 in the Ecole Normale Israélite Orientale in Paris.

*

WIZO Review, published by the Women's International Zionist Organisation, states in its November 1982–January 1983 issue that WIZO runs 203 institutions for 12,273 children in Israel: day care centres, kindergartens, and toddlers' homes. Its high schools have a total enrolment of 4,444, of whom 1,615 are boarding pupils.

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CHRONICLE

A Liberal Jewish community has been established in Antwerp and has been granted official recognition in the Belgian State Gazette. The community has about 40 families.

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The Federation of Jewish Communities in Romania has sent 305 Torah scrolls and about 9,000 books on Talmudic studies to Israel. Since the law forbids the export of old books, special permission had to be requested by the country's Chief Rabbi and it was granted by the President of Romania.

*

The International Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization was established in 1980 in Jerusalem, under the aegis of the Office of the President of Israel. One of its activities was to organize in Jerusalem in the summer of 1982 Continuing Workshops in the fields of Contemporary Jewry and Modern Hebrew, with the participation of 60 teachers from nine countries. The second sessions of these two workshops are scheduled for the summer of 1983, when there will also be two other workshops on the themes of Sephardi History and Culture and of Jewish Political Studies.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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LIPMAN, V.D., CVO, D.Phil. Honorary Research Fellow, University College London and Vice-President, Jewish Historical Society of England. Chief publications: *Social History of the Jews in England 1850–1950*, 1954; *A Century of Social Service: The Jewish Board of Guardians*, 1959; editor, *Three Centuries of Anglo-Jewish History*, 1961; *The Jews of Mediaeval Norwich*, 1967; and co-editor (with Sonia L. Lipman), *Jewish Life in Britain 1962–1977*, 1981.

SHAFFIR, William; Ph.D. Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, McMaster University. Chief publications: *Life in a Religious Community: The Lubavitcher Chassidim in Montreal*, 1974; co-editor, *Fieldwork Experience: Qualitative Approaches to Social Research*, 1980; co-editor, *The Canadian Jewish Mosaic*, 1981; co-author, 'The Professionalization of Medical Students: Developing Competence and a Cloak of Competence', *Symbolic Interaction*, vol. 1, no. 1, Fall 1977; and 'Ritual Evaluation of Competence: The Hidden Curriculum of Professionalization in an Innovative Medical School Program', *Work and Occupations*, vol. 9, no. 2, May 1982.