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ISRAEL'S RIGHT-WING JEWISH PROLETARIAT

Yael Yishai

THE most striking feature of the general elections for the tenth Israeli Knesset, in June 1981, was the dissociation of the workers from the Labour party (the Labour Alignment). Their allegiance to the right-wing Likud confirmed and reinforced what had seemed to be a transitory phase in Israeli politics, the Likud's ascent to power in 1977.

The defection of the proletariat from its 'natural' political affiliation is not a unique Israeli phenomenon. Those voters whom Nordlinger has called 'working-class Tories'[1] can be found in large numbers in several political systems, and especially in Great Britain. In fact, social class has been shown to be the major determinant of political affiliation only in Finland[2] and New Zealand.[3] Two principal reasons have been advanced for the right-wing tendencies of the working class. The first, the affluence hypothesis, which is grounded in psychological motivations, argues that those workers who have subjective middle-class identities will tend to vote for a Conservative party especially when they are dissatisfied with their present conditions.[4] The alternative, sociological, hypothesis focuses on other factors such as age, sex, regional diversity, and ethnicity;[5] these factors are said to erode the link between social class and political affiliation. Israel falls into this latter category, since the political behaviour of its Jewish proletariat is now largely connected with ethnic origin. That proletariat consists more than proportionately of immigrants from Asian and African countries, and their descendants, who since 1977 overwhelmingly support the Likud.

Of course, it is not easy to determine the meaning of 'right-wing';[6] but the Likud advocates free enterprise in the economic and domestic fields and hawkish nationalistic policies in foreign relations. This paper attempts to discover the reasons for the strong attraction which the Likud has for working-class voters, and for the clear rejection of the Labour Alignment. For some years before the 1977 general election, Oriental Jews had expressed feelings of resentment, dissatisfaction, and alienation; and they blamed successive Labour administrations. On the other hand, they saw the Likud as a political party which offered them the possibility of achieving power and influence; it seemed therefore logical and expedient to support the Likud and by so doing to

exact a revenge upon the Labour Alignment. Moreover, right-wing ideologies had a special appeal for Oriental voters. The combination of these factors has led Israeli Jewish workers to form a solid bloc of Likud voters, a development which does not only represent a dramatic change in electoral behaviour, but which might affect the whole structure of Israeli politics.

Working-class Jews in Israel

Israel is one of the more egalitarian democracies.[7] Nevertheless, the country has a disproportionate number of Jews of Afro-Asian origin among those who have the lowest educational achievements, whose occupations yield the lowest income, and who live in the poorest housing conditions. The *Statistical Abstract of Israel* shows that in 1980, 17.5 per cent of the Israel-born children of an immigrant father from Europe or America, but only two per cent of the Israel-born children of an immigrant father from Asia or Africa, had 16 or more years of formal education; while 40.6 per cent of the former, but only 15 per cent of the latter, were among academic, scientific, and professional workers. Moreover, 35.7 per cent of those of Oriental origin, against 15.6 of those of Western origin, were industrial skilled and unskilled workers. As for housing, whereas less than one per cent (0.9) of households of those of Western origin had more than three persons in a room, this was the case for 2.6 per cent of households of the Israel-born of Oriental origin; on the other hand, 29.1 per cent of the former against 15.3 per cent of the latter had under one person per room. Finally, the income index per urban employee's household of those who were themselves born in Asia or Africa was 80.1 against 100 in the case of those born in Europe or America. Moreover, 71.1 per cent of the Jewish population aged 14 and above who had a maximum of four years of schooling were Orientals, although Oriental Jews accounted for only 43.8 per cent of that age group; 81.6 per cent of all those Jews who lived in homes with a housing density of more than three persons per room were Orientals; and 59.7 per cent of all unskilled workers were Orientals, who constituted 42.1 per cent of all Jews gainfully occupied. As for income, Jewish households with a head of household born in Asia or Africa constituted 32.4 per cent of all Jewish households, but accounted for 52.1 per cent of Jewish households in the lowest decile of net income per standard person. In 1980, the proportion of Orientals in the Israeli Jewish population was 44.9 per cent: 19.5 per cent were born in Asia/Africa and 25.4 per cent were born in Israel and had a father born in Asia or Africa.[8]

Voting patterns

The results of the 1973, 1977, and 1981 general elections show a remarkable and consistent shift of the Oriental vote from the left-wing

Labour Alignment to the right-wing Likud. On the other hand, the Western Jews who had deserted the Alignment in 1977, often in favour of the Democratic Movement for Change, returned in 1981 to the Alignment. Asher Arian has noted that while 60 per cent of the Orientals supported the Likud and 30 per cent of them voted for the Alignment in 1981, precisely the reverse was true of Western Jews: 60 per cent of them voted for the Alignment, and 30 per cent for the Likud. In areas of predominantly Oriental settlement (such as Beth She'an, Kiryat Shmona, Ramla, and Rosh Ha'ain), more than half of the electorate voted for the Likud in 1981 — 56.4, 55.7, 51.7, and 57.7 per cent respectively, a notable gain in each case on 1973 and 1977.[9]

It is not the voting patterns alone which lead to the assumption that there is now a right-wing proletariat in Israel. A change in the perception of political parties might have led to a view of the Likud as a party of reform. However, a study of party images has shown that the Likud is perceived in fact as a right-wing party: 77 per cent of respondents saw the Likud as right-wing, while only 28 per cent believed the Alignment to be a party of the Right.[10] The Likud is recognized to have a right-wing ideology both in foreign relations and in domestic economic policy.

Rejection of the Labour Alignment

RESENTMENT. The Labour Party is held responsible by most Oriental Jews for the disadvantages which they have suffered. The mass immigration within the first decade after the establishment of the State of Israel has been widely discussed and documented. The Jewish population more than doubled, from 716,700 in 1948 to 1,810,200 in 1958. [11] Most of the newcomers from Asia and Africa did not have the skills necessary in a rapidly industrializing society, and they were sent to remote development towns or to agricultural settlements. Some of them moved into the larger cities, in areas which became slums. Resentment against their living conditions grew, and some Orientals believed that there was a deliberate policy on the part of the establishment (the Labour party) to take advantage of the poor and the uneducated who could not fight back. Various remedial economic and educational measures which were implemented in order to bridge the 'ethnic gap' were only partly successful.

Resentment persisted, and it is probable that a desire for revenge was an added incentive when working-class voters supported the Likud in 1977. The Likud, if only by virtue of its having been in the opposition in the previous Knesset, could not be held responsible for the correlation between economic deprivation and Oriental origin. But four years later, in 1981, the situation of Oriental Jews had not significantly improved. On the contrary, according to various indices the poor had

become poorer. The average income of a household whose head was an employee of Afro/Asian origin decreased from 82.2 to 81 per cent of the average income of a Western employee's household.[12] And the National Insurance Institute stated that the proportion of households living below the poverty line more than doubled: from 2.8 to 6.6 per cent between 1977 and 1980.[13] Finally, the percentage of households in the lower deciles of income grew from 8 per cent in 1975 to 10.3 per cent in 1980.[14] Nevertheless, working-class voters again supported the Likud in 1981, probably because the Labour Alignment was still seen as the party responsible for instituting and maintaining the ethnic gap.

DISSATISFACTION WITH THE INSTITUTIONS OF LABOUR. Many Oriental Jews view the kibbutzim and the Histadrut (the General Federation of Labour) as institutions affiliated to the Labour party[15] which in practice exploit the workers.

In 1980, the kibbutz population accounted for only 3.6 per cent of the total Jewish population of Israel: 113,977 persons in 246 kibbutzim.[16] The heirs of the legendary pioneers who made the desert bloom and lived under spartan conditions now own more than a third (35.7 per cent) of Israel's cultivated land and produce two thirds of the country's total agricultural exports. The kibbutz movement also has industrial enterprises: in 1977–79, it had 152 regional projects and 377 which were autonomously operated. Of those engaged in the latter ('pure' kibbutz projects), 40.5 per cent are paid employees — that is, not members of a kibbutz; while in the regional enterprises, 80 per cent are paid employees.[17]

Large numbers of kibbutz employees are Oriental residents of development towns. In 1978, 17 per cent of the total Jewish population of Israel lived in 29 development towns,[18] which had been planned as urban centres for the agricultural areas around them. But in many cases these towns have remained small and have not prospered; while in a few cases there are characteristic problems of social malaise, such as a high rate of juvenile delinquency. The contrast between the affluence of the kibbutzim which border on disadvantaged urban areas, and the low standard of living of the Oriental residents who are employed on kibbutz projects, has aroused a great deal of tension and hostility. Kibbutz members are employers, with the status rewards of white-collar and managerial positions; they also reap the profits of their industry. The employees, on the other hand, do not have a direct share in these benefits. By virtue of its ideology, the kibbutz is a closed, in effect almost impenetrable, society with clear boundary lines. Of course, the hiring of labour is not congruent with the principle of equality upon which the kibbutz was founded; but such a deviation has been claimed to be a response to the national need of providing employment for immigrants. Another sharp contrast between the standards of kibbutz members and of their employees is in the field of

education. Kibbutz teachers are well trained, and the schoolchildren have the most advanced equipment for learning — while the educational level in the surrounding development towns is often of a low standard.

The hostility of the development towns to kibbutzim reached its peak during the 1981 general election campaign, when kibbutz members were accused in a campaign advertisement in a local newspaper of being 'bloodthirsty beasts feeding on Kiryat Shmona' (a development town).[19] On the other hand, kibbutzim have claimed that their members are engaged in voluntary work for the benefit of development towns, and that in 1978–79 there were 2,500 of their members engaged in such work in 25 development towns.[20] Far from being grateful, many of the urban residents regard such efforts as an unwelcome intrusion under the guise of philanthropic activities; and they were particularly resentful of the part played by such kibbutz volunteers during the election campaign. Oriental Jews see the co-operative settlements, and the Labour party to which they are affiliated, as symbols of economic exploitation, of the affluent 'first Israel', contrasting with the salaried workers employed in the regional enterprises of the kibbutzim. They therefore did not hesitate to express their frustration and resentment by voting against the Labour Alignment and for the Likud. This hostility did not fade after the general election. In September 1981, the Prime Minister was reported to have referred in a radio interview to members of kibbutzim as 'arrogant millionaires enjoying their swimming pools'.[21] This accusation led to a vociferous public debate, which exacerbated the existing friction and estrangement.

As for the Histadrut, it is naturally identified with the Labour Alignment as well as with the employer class. From a Federation of Labour concerned with national and social ideals, it has become transformed into a giant economic empire, with its own banking concerns as well as heavy industry and the provision of various services. In 1976, the Histadrut accounted for about 27 per cent of Israel's gross national product.[22] It is at the same time a trade union and a manufacturer, and so it must represent the interests of both workers and proprietors, employees and employers. And it is the Oriental Jews who predominate among the workers, while the managers and most senior officials are Ashkenazim — Western Jews. Admittedly, at the lower echelons of power the Histadrut has provided Oriental Jews with a channel of mobility unmatched by any other institution: in 1981, 70.5 per cent of the secretaries of local Workers Councils were of Oriental origin, while their proportion in 1977 had been 62 per cent.[23] However, in 1981 in the top positions of the Histadrut, on its Executive Committee, less than a quarter of the members were Oriental Jews — nine out of 41. Therefore, although the majority of Oriental Jews are members of the Histadrut, many of them

do not see it as an organization which represents their interests. There has recently been an attempt on the part of the Likud to challenge the power of the Labour Alignment in the Histadrut by putting forward as a candidate for the office of Secretary-General the Deputy Prime Minister of Israel, who is of Moroccan origin and who grew up in a development town.

ESTRANGEMENT. Although Oriental Jews overwhelmingly supported the Labour party in the 1950s and 1960s, they did not adhere to the socialist ideals proclaimed by that party; and they were aware that they were a disadvantaged segment of Israeli society. The founding fathers of the Labour movement were mainly immigrants from Poland and Russia who came to settle in Palestine in the 1920s, and their foremost national objective was the establishment of socialism through the creation of a Jewish working class in the land of Zion. Most Oriental Jews, however, had been workers in their lands of origin, but not a working *class*. The concept of a struggle between capitalists and the proletariat as well as the development of historical materialism were totally alien to them. In their native countries, where the Muslim ethos predominated, authority was vested in an absolute ruler and his sovereignty was sanctified by the religious establishment. When they were told of Marxist-Leninist ideas, they rejected them out of hand: they were observant Jews and socialism espoused secularism; socialism advocated equality and the elimination of power structures, while they adhered to a hierarchical order with the family at the kernel but extending to all social domains. Zionist socialism represented a total upheaval, with its promotion of an 'occupational revolution' which would turn Jewish merchants and artisans into farmers and labourers. Oriental Jews respected tradition and considered toiling on the land as inferior work. Their version of Zionism was religious Messianism: coming to settle in Israel would be the fulfilment of ancient prayers and aspirations, not a deliberate rejection of one's past traditions and observances.

Oriental Jews still believe that they are a disadvantaged group. The majority of them (59 per cent), in a poll conducted in October 1981, thought they were a deprived group; but only 27 per cent of Western Israelis believed that Oriental Jews were deprived. Moreover, exactly the same proportion (59 per cent) of the Israel-born children of Oriental immigrants also thought that Oriental Jews were a deprived group in Israel; but only 34 per cent of them believed the deprivation to be intentional and manipulated by the establishment, while 46 per cent of those born in Asia or Africa were of that opinion. When asked whether they thought there would be violent clashes between Orientals and Ashkenazim as a result of the ethnic problems, 24 per cent of those born in Asia or Africa replied in the affirmative, while a slightly smaller proportion (20 per cent) of their Israel-born children were of that

opinion. The immigrants from Europe and America were less pessimistic: only 12 per cent of them thought that there would be violent clashes, while 14 per cent of the Israel-born children of Western immigrants held that belief. As for the Israel-born children of Israel-born fathers (regardless of the country of origin of their grandfathers), 12 per cent of them believed there would be violent confrontations.[24]

In July 1979, two years after the Likud had won the general election of 1977, a public opinion poll enquired, 'Are you satisfied with the government's performance?' Of the respondents born in Asia or Africa, 59 per cent said they were, as did 60 per cent of Israel-born children of Oriental parentage. On the other hand, only 34 per cent of those born in Europe or America, and 39 per cent of the Israel-born of Ashkenazi parentage, were satisfied. Moreover, when asked to compare the achievements of the Likud with those of the Labour Alignment, 61 per cent of the Oriental respondents, but only 34 per cent of the Ashkenazi respondents, thought that on balance the Likud had had more successes than failures when compared with the Alignment.[25]

The Appeal of the Likud

UPWARD MOBILITY. Oriental Jews seem to believe that it is the Likud rather than the Labour Alignment which offers them a channel for rapid political advancement. This belief is not based on hard political facts. In the seventh Knesset (1969–73), the Labour coalition had eight members who were Oriental Jews while the Likud had three; in the eighth Knesset (1973–77), the Labour coalition had 12 and the Likud had six. In the ninth Knesset (1977–81), when the Likud achieved power, the Labour Alignment had eight Oriental MKs and the Likud had seven; and in the tenth Knesset in 1981, with the Likud having retained power, the Labour Alignment still had more Oriental MKs, 12, against the Likud's nine.

On the other hand, while the number of Oriental MKs in the Labour coalition has wavered (from eight to 12, back to eight, then up to 12), the Likud has exhibited a continuous upward trend — from three, to six, to seven, to nine. Moreover, the Likud's Oriental MKs generally enjoy greater popularity than their counterparts in the Labour Alignment do. Here it is important to note that Moroccans constitute the largest segment of Oriental Jews in Israel, and that they are a politically well organized and articulate group. A North African (mainly Moroccan) party was established under the name of Tami, the Movement for Israel's Tradition, and it won three seats in the 1981 Knesset. More than half of the Likud Oriental MKs (five out of nine) are Moroccans, while in the Labour Alignment only one third (four out of 12) are Moroccans. Furthermore, the Likud's Oriental MKs are

seen as genuine representatives of the 'second Israel', who have emerged from development towns and other deprived areas to serve their people. Admittedly, the Labour Alignment can boast that one of its Oriental MKs is the mayor of a development town in the Negev; but in the view of Likud supporters, he and his colleagues have been co-opted by the Ashkenazi élite, who patronize them. Of course, it is not easy to differentiate between a 'genuine' and a 'co-opted' leader, since by the nature of Israeli politics they are both nominated by their political party.[26] Nevertheless, there appears to be a general belief that the Likud offers greater opportunities for promotion. As a result of being in power for three decades, the Labour coalition has the image of a highly institutionalized semi-oligarchic party; while the Likud expanded so rapidly that it had many vacant posts. Oriental Jews were quick to seize the opportunity of filling these posts with vigorous energy, and to point out that they achieved in the Likud positions of power and prestige which had been denied them in the Labour Alignment.

It is worth noting here that since 1969, the proportion of Israeli Jewish voters who were born in Asia or Africa has slightly but steadily declined: 47.8 per cent in 1969, 46.9 per cent in 1973, 45.9 per cent in 1977, and 44.9 per cent in 1980.[27] On the other hand, the proportion of Israel-born voters whose fathers were immigrants from Asia or Africa has increased steadily from 21 per cent in 1969, to 23.2 per cent in 1973, 25 per cent in 1977, and 25.4 per cent in 1980.[28] It is therefore obvious that Oriental Jews are still seriously under-represented in the 1981 Knesset, with 21 Oriental MKs between the two main parties, one each in four small parties (Telem, Hadash, Tehiyah, and the National Religious Party), and three in Tami — that is, 28 out of the total number of 120 Members of the Knesset.

HAWKISH PATRIOTISM. In the all-important matters of national security and foreign policy, the Likud's stance has been generally much more hawkish than that of the Labour Alignment. In its electoral platform, the Likud committed itself to the principle of a Greater Israel and to establishing settlements in the occupied territories. On the other hand, although the Alignment does have some ardent hawks, it is generally far more moderate than the Likud;[29] in its electoral platform, it promised that it would make territorial concessions in return for a lasting peace.

In spite of the Likud's Peace Pact with Egypt, that party still appears to have a popular image of greater intransigence: in a public opinion poll carried out in July 1981, 70 per cent of the respondents said that they thought the Labour Alignment would be willing to surrender some of the occupied territories, while only 30 per cent thought that the Likud might do so.[30] From its advent to power in 1977 until the general election of June 1981, the Likud in fact established 42 settlements on

the West Bank (or Judea and Samaria in the official terminology). A public opinion poll, carried out by the Israel Institute for Applied Social Research in 1979, showed a larger proportion of Oriental-born than of Western-born Jews to be in favour of such settlements: 73 against 56 per cent. Moreover, the Israel-born children of Oriental Jews were almost exactly as hawkish as their parents: 72 per cent of them were in favour of the settlements. Surprisingly perhaps, the Israel-born children of immigrants from Europe and America were more hawkish than their parents: 65 per cent of them were in favour of the settlements. On the other hand, the Israel-born children of Israel-born parents were almost as moderate as the Western immigrants: only 58 per cent of them were in favour of the new settlements.[31]

It also seems that the large majority of Oriental Jews are willing to pay the price, literally, of establishing the new settlements: in 1979, 66 per cent of those born in Asia/Africa, and 77 per cent of the Israel-born of Oriental parentage, stated that they were in favour of giving priority in the national budget to the new settlements. In contrast, just under half of the Western immigrants (49 per cent), and more than half (55 per cent) of their Israel-born children, were of that opinion; and the proportion in the case of the Israel-born children of Israel-born fathers was 57 per cent.[32]

The new settlements have given rise to a great deal of international protest and censure; but the Oriental hawks do not appear chastened by these reactions. What was perhaps unexpected has been the apparent willingness of Oriental Jews to make serious economic sacrifices — for the new settlements are a costly enterprise, requiring large sums of money which would otherwise have been spent on social welfare (of which the Orientals are the main beneficiaries). Poverty in Israel has been said to be the product of a trade-off between guns and butter.[33] It seems that those who are most in need of butter are also those in favour of the acquisition of guns.

One explanation of the hawkish inclination of Oriental Israelis is that although they cling to some of the traditions of their lands of origin, they wish to show that they are patriotic Israelis and strongly hostile to Arab countries. Moreover, they claim to understand well Arab nationalism and politics, and say they have good reason to distrust Arab leaders as peace makers; they insist that Israel's enemies understand only the language of force. At the end of 1979, while nearly two thirds (63 per cent) of Western Jews stated that peace had more advantages than disadvantages, only 41 per cent of Afro/Asian Jews were of that opinion; but exactly 50 per cent of the Israel-born children of both Oriental and Western immigrants, and also 50 per cent of the second generation to have been born in Israel, expressed that belief.[34]

Another explanation for the hawkishness of Oriental Jews is their belief that such an attitude gives them enhanced prestige vis-à-vis other

social groups (including Israeli Arabs), as well as demonstrating their intense patriotism. In this context, it must be remembered that the majority of the total Jewish electorate is against relinquishing the occupied territories — but would agree to returning only a small proportion.[35] Oriental Jews have simply adopted a more extreme position.

In the economic field, it seems irrational for members of the working class to favour a right-wing party such as the Likud. A closer examination of the Likud's 1977 electoral platform, however, reveals that although it advocated free enterprise and other aspects of a laissez-faire policy, it also stressed the importance of combating poverty and gave that goal as much emphasis as that of attaining peace.[36] The Labour Alignment, on the other hand, put the main emphasis on national security and peace; and it was far less committed to the enactment of a wide range of social legislation. The Likud, by challenging the existing social order, was seen as a party of the people and the slogan coined by Mr Begin, 'To Benefit with the People', reinforced the image. Of course, the electorate was aware that campaign promises are rarely fulfilled; but at least the Likud appeared to be moving in the right (as well as right-wing) direction.

Conclusion

The general election of 1981 reaffirmed the support which the Jewish working classes had given to the Likud four years earlier, when they had transferred their allegiance away from the Labour Alignment. Oriental Jews continued to blame the Alignment for the decades of their disadvantaged condition; they showed their enduring resentment by voting again in favour of Labour's opposition, and in that way were able to give expression to their grievances without disrupting the civic order.

Although the Likud in its first term of office did not achieve great improvements for Oriental Jews either in the economic field or in the political, an even greater proportion of them voted for that party in 1981. One probable reason for this paradoxical behaviour was that, unlike the Labour Alignment, the Likud stood for religious observance and against making greater concessions to the Arabs — both attitudes which hold great appeal for Oriental Jews. They could be proud of being observant Jews; they did not have to undergo any transformation; and, while remaining in their development towns or urban neighbourhoods, they could freely express their hostility to their Arab neighbours and their support for those Israeli Jews who became settlers on the West Bank. In that way, they were conforming to the values of the ruling party in Israel and overcoming their sense of alienation; and that was apparently more important than immediate economic

improvement. Another probable reason for supporting the Likud was that it was a party which apparently held greater prospects of political advancement for Oriental Jews.

What of the future? Will the Likud retain its right-wing character or will it become a party of the workers and advocate policies geared to the needs of the proletariat? Will it retain its predominantly Ashkenazi leadership or will it transform itself into a genuine Oriental party? The present alliance between Oriental Jews and the Likud appears fairly durable. However, it may be that the establishment of yesterday (the Labour Alignment) will become the militant opposition of tomorrow and the champion of deprived groups, thus 'normalizing' the political situation by forging a link between a Labour party and the Jewish proletariat of Israel.

NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS

I.I.A.S.R. Israel Institute of Applied Social Research
S.A.I. *Statistical Abstract of Israel*

[1] Eric A. Nordlinger, *The Working Class Tories*, Berkeley, Ca., 1967.

[2] See Pertti Pesonen, *An Election in Finland*, New Haven, Ct., 1968.

[3] Alan D. Robinson, 'Class Voting in New Zealand: A Comment on Alford's Comparison of Class Voting in American Political Systems', in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, New York, 1967, pp. 95–119.

[4] David E. Butler and Donald E. Stokes, *Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice*, New York, 1969, pp. 120–37.

[5] See, for example, Robert A. Dahl, *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, New Haven, Ct., 1966.

[6] John C. Thomas, *The Decline of Ideology in Western Political Parties*, Beverly Hills, Ca., 1975, pp. 46–49.

[7] The Gini index of Inequality for various democratic countries is as follows: Netherlands (1967).45; Japan (1971).42; German Federal Republic (1970).39; U.S.A. (1972).39; Great Britain (1968).34; and Israel (1968–69).38. See Karl W. Deutsch, *Politics and Government*, Boston, 1980, pp. 126–27.

[8] See *S.A.I.*, 1981: for education, p. 608; for occupation, p. 346; for housing density, p. 301; for income, p. 293; and for the percentage of Oriental Jews, p. 56. See also Judith Bernstein and Aaron Antonovsky, 'The Integration of Ethnic Groups in Israel', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 23, no. 1, June 1981, especially pp. 10–20.

[9] See Asher Arian, 'Elections 1981: Competitiveness and Polarization', *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 21 Fall 1981, p. 23. See also Central Bureau of Statistics, *Electoral Results*, for the 1973, 1977, and 1981 Knessets.

[10] Arian, op. cit., p. 7.

[11] *S.A.I.*, 1981, p. 30

[12] *S.A.I.*, 1981, p. 275.

[13] National Insurance Institute, *Annual Survey* (in Hebrew) 1980, p. 146.
[14] For 1975, see *S.A.I.*, 1980, p. 274; and for 1980, *S.A.I.*, 1981, p. 292.
[15] In the 1981 general elections, the Labour Alignment won 88.5 per cent of the votes in all kibbutzim. See *Results of Elections to the Tenth Knesset*, 30.6.81, Central Bureau of Statistics, Special Series No. 680, p. 45.
[16] See *S.A.I.*, 1981, p. 39.
[17] See Moshe Sokolowski, *Haker et Hatnua Hakibbutzit*, Brit Hatnua Hakibbutzit, publication no. 148/80, Tel Aviv, 1980, pp. 9, 14, 16.
[18] Eliyahu Borukhov and Elia Werczberger, 'Factors Affecting the Development of New Towns', *Environment and Planning*, vol. 13, A, 1981, p. 421.
[19] See the report in *Haaretz*, 6 June 1981.
[20] See Sokolowski, op. cit., pp. 7–8.
[21] See *Haaretz*, 28 September 1981. This description of members of kibbutzim was rejected by half the respondents (49.9 per cent) in a public opinion poll: *Haaretz*, 20 November 1981.
[22] See the Histadrut publication, *Netunim Kalkalyim al Chevrat Ha-ovdim be-1976*, October 1977, p. 2.
[23] The information is based on the list of Secretaries provided by the Executive Committee of the Histadrut.
[24] See *Monitin* (Hebrew monthly), no. 38, October 1981, p. 31.
[25] See I.I.A.S.R., publication (S) JK/742/H, July 1979, pp. 13–14.
[26] See Giora Goldberg, 'Democracy and Representation in Israeli Political Parties', in Asher Arian, ed., *The Elections in Israel, 1977*, Jerusalem, 1980, pp. 101–18.
[27] See *S.A.I.*; 1970, p. 46; 1974, pp. 46–47; 1978, p. 57; and 1981, p. 56.
[28] See *S.A.I.*; for 1969: 1970, p. 46; for 1973: 1974, p. 45; for 1977 and 1980: 1981, p. 56.
[29] Avner Yaniv and Fabian Pascal, 'Doves, Hawks and other Birds of Feather. The Distribution of Israeli Parliamentary Opinion on the Future of the Occupied Territories, 1967–1977', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 10, April 1980, pp. 260–67.
[30] Pesach Adi, 'Halikud Vehamaarach Be'enei Habocher', I.I.A.S.R. Newsletter no. 54, July 1981, p. 19.
[31] I.I.A.S.R. publication (S) HL/747H, August 1979, p. 10.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ofira Seliktar, 'The Cost of Vigilance in Israel: Linking the Economic and Social Costs of Defense', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 17, no. 4, 1980, pp. 340–55.
[34] See I.I.A.S.R., IL/756/H, November 1979, p. 16.
[35] Louis Guttman, *The Israel Public, Peace and Territory: The Impact of the Sadat Initiative*, Jerusalem, 1978, Table 1, pp. 8–9.
[36] Yael Yishai, 'Welfare Policy: Party Platforms During the Elections to the Ninth Knesset', *Social Security*, no. 14–15, November 1977, pp. 17–31 (in Hebrew).

PUBLIC PROTESTS AGAINST CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL, 1950–1979

Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig

THE veritable eruption of public protests among western democracies after the Second World War was soon followed by a spate of studies which attempted to analyse the phenomenon. Many of those works were cross-national in character,[1] while others concentrated on specific regions or societies.[2] A wide range of factors were adduced and/or tested as explanatory variables, such as economic indicators[3] and political conditions,[4] as well as aspects of crowd behaviour and personality types.[5]

However, in spite of the growing interest in centre/periphery and federal/state relations, to the best of my knowledge no one has yet considered the public protest issue from the perspective of political geography — the *location* of such events on the one hand, and on the other the *level of political authority* at which protest is directed. Such a study might yield useful results. First, it might indicate the relative political strength (or at least the public's perception of it) of the centre and of the periphery. Indeed, if analysed over a long enough period of time, the data could indicate whether any *change* in the (perceived) relative balance of power had taken place. Second, the morphology of protest events could be determined more accurately to reveal any differences in *intensity*, in *organizational* origin, or in types of *issue* between local and central protests.

The State of Israel provides a perfect setting for such an exploratory inquiry. Its existence for a little more than 30 years offers an extended yet manageable time frame. It is a geographically small country with a national press (there are no serious local daily newspapers), so that reportage of events in large cities, towns, and rural areas is both all-inclusive and homogeneous within each newspaper. The country's citizens are highly politicized: official voter participation in national elections consistently hovers around 80 per cent; in reality, this amounts to a 90 per cent turn-out of those physically able to vote.[6] They have no compunctions about demonstrating their dissatisfaction

on issues large or small. And of perhaps greatest interest, while Israel's constitutional/electoral structure is unitary (proportional representation in state elections with the entire country serving as a single district), various signs of greater regionalization have been in evidence over the past decade or two. Although far from federal in character, Israel seems to be moving in the direction of 'territorial democracy', according to Elazar.[7] To discover whether this trend is reflected in the public's extra-parliamentary activity is one of the central goals of the present study.

Methodology

The source for this study's data is *The Jerusalem Post*, with the Hebrew language daily *Ha-aretz* reviewed randomly for comparative control purposes; virtually no differences were found in their reporting, with regard to both the number of events and internal variables. All forms of public protest were included: indoor and outdoor demonstrations, *politically* oriented strikes, and other miscellaneous forms (office sit-ins, hunger strikes, building squattings, etc.) — as long as a minimum number of ten adults was involved.[8] Jewish protests in the captured territories were included, as were all Arab protests within the pre-1967 borders; Israeli citizenship was the criterion here, but the rare tourist or 'other resident' group protest within these borders was also included.[9]

Each public protest was scored for a number of variables. The relevant categories for this study are:

1. LOCATION

   City. The three major cities: Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, Haifa.

   Town. All other smaller towns and municipalities.

   Rural. Villages, co-operative settlements, collectives, and non-residential areas.

2. LEVEL OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY against which the protest was directed

   Central. Including those institutions run, controlled, or strongly supervised by the Government (for example, Social Security, television, the Electric Corporation, etc.).

   Local.[10]

   Other. Other governments, external organizations (for example, the U.N., foreign embassies).

3. SIZE of the protest

   Small. 10 to 99.

Medium. 100 to 999.

Large. 1,000 to 9,999.

Mass. 10,000+.

4. INTENSITY

Peaceful, disruptive/obstructive, violence against property or people, general riot.

5. DURATION

Up to 3 hours, 3–24 hours, over a day, dispersed by police.

6. ORGANIZATION

Ad hoc, formal pressure group, political party.

7. ISSUE

Political. Defence, settlements, elections.

Economic. Inflation, unemployment, etc.

Religious. Sabbath desecration, autopsies, abortions.

Social. Discrimination, education, housing, etc.

The data were aggregated on an annual basis and then per decade in order to discover possible trends and to compare periods.

Findings and Discussion

As can be seen from Table 1, Israeli public protest frequency rose dramatically from an average of 43 protests per year in the 1960s to an average of 127 in the 1970s. In fact, 1979 was marked by an astounding 241 demonstrations! There are a number of reasons for this, as discussed elsewhere.[11] Briefly, one can enumerate the following few factors as being of some significance: feelings of relative economic deprivation among certain sectors, spiralling inflation, the breakdown of a national consensus on matters pertaining to national security, and the expansion of television audiences. With the exception of television, these social, political, and economic factors are all related to government policy. As the present article attempts to show, there is also a significant institutional/structural element underlying Israel's protest phenomenon.

The first interesting specific finding is the relative geographical consistency of public protest in Israel over the thirty years studied (Table 1). While there are some large year-to-year fluctuations in relative percentage (between the three 'location' categories), there is no outstanding trend over the long term for any of these three loci. In each decade, approximately 70 per cent of all protests occurred in the large

cities, about 20 per cent in the medium-sized towns, and less than 10 per cent in the rural areas. Indeed, the only long-term trend that can be ascertained over the thirty-year period is in the countryside, with a small but relatively steady proportional rise in protest occurring away from the cities and the towns.

TABLE 1. *Location of Protest*

Decade	*Annual Average No.*	*Large Cities Annual Average*		*Towns Annual Average*		*Rural Annual Average*	
		No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
1950s	40.0	28.3	70.8	9.1	22.7	2.6	6.5
1960s	43.1	29.4	68.2	10.5	24.4	3.2	7.4
1970s	126.8	90.4	71.3	23.9	18.8	12.5	9.9

There are probably three reasons for this latter tendency. First, Israeli Arabs (who overwhelmingly live in rural areas) started to mimic Jewish protesters, beginning after the lifting of military government rule in the mid-1960s and gathering force with the increased expropriation of Arab land in the mid-1970s. In the 15 years from 1950 to 1965, there were 27 Arab protests; in the 10 years from 1966 to 1975, there were 23; in the four years from 1976 to 1979 there were 49! Second, after Israel's 1967 conquest of the 'territories', Jewish ultra-nationalists began to unilaterally 'settle' these areas as a means of protesting against government procrastination, resulting in an increase of the number of such events in the rural category.

Various cross-tabulations bear this out. Whereas only 7.7 per cent of all rural protest in the 1950s involved 'political' issues, and 15.6 per cent in the 1960s, by the third decade 'political'-issue protests constituted 45.6 per cent of all such rural events; the respective percentages for the large cities are 15.6, 35.5, and 32.1; and for the towns, 11.0, 20.0, and 21.5. By contrast, 'economic' protests in rural Israel dropped over the three decades from 50 per cent to 28.1 per cent to 6.4 per cent in 1979! Economic protests in all locations declined over the years, but much less steeply as a whole: from 37.8 per cent in the 1950s to 14.0 per cent in the 1970s. In addition, rural protests increased in size through the years: 3.8 per cent to 6.3 per cent to 16.8 per cent of rural protests in the respective decades involved more than a thousand participants; in the towns, the percentages were 6.6, 12.4, and 16.6; the major cities actually registered a 'large'-protest proportional decline in the 1970s from 21.5 to 17.9 per cent. Indeed, the 1970s proportion of rural protest with more than one thousand participants — one out of every six such events — is quite remarkable, since in Israel a rural area by definition has a maximum of only five thousand residents. And

although the general rule is, the larger the protest the shorter its duration, rural protests exhibited a steady rise in length over the three decades — from 34.6 to 43.7 to 58.4 per cent of all such protests lasted for more than three hours. Protests in smaller towns increased in duration only from the 1960s to the 1970s: 34.4 to 51.6 per cent, while demonstrations in the large cities remained short-lived. As for the fourth variable — intensity — no trend unique to a specific area could be found. Protest in Israel has been steadily becoming more peaceful over all three decades in all three locations; by the 1970s, only one out of every ten protests involved any violence.

Another factor which explains the rural trend is the advent of television in 1968 as a 'facilitator' of isolated protests.[12] Without television, many of these demonstrations would hardly impinge upon the nation's consciousness; its increasingly sophisticated use, especially by the ultra-nationalist groups, enabled them to choose a protest venue which would have been worthless (from a public communications stand-point) before 1968. Indeed, while only 17 per cent of all 'rural' protests before 1968 were led by a formal organization (15 per cent interest groups and 2 per cent political parties), with the advent of television in Israel such groups were behind almost half of all the rural protests (45 per cent interest groups and 4 per cent political parties — a proportion of organized protest higher than the percentage of *all* organized protest). This trend towards greater rural protest organization also explains why such protests became increasingly larger and longer: many of them were no longer ad hoc spontaneous eruptions of the local populations, but were exported from the centre to the periphery by organized groups who could rely on their message being transmitted back to the centre.[13]

Nevertheless, the rural trend is still decidedly secondary and should not blur the remarkable consistency of Israeli protest location. Such consistency is all the more remarkable given the city-town-rural population changes which Israel has undergone over the thirty-year period. Table 2 illustrates this clearly.

TABLE 2. *Jewish Population Dispersal: 1950–1978**

	1950		*1965*		*1978*	
	Thousands	%	*Thousands*	%	*Thousands*	%
Cities	585	50.3	789	30.4	850†	23.4
Towns	353	30.4	1338	51.5	2268	62.5
Rural	224	19.3	472	18.1	513	14.1
Total	1162	100.0	2599	100.0	3631	100.0

*Source: *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1950–51*: pp. 8, 9; tables 6 & 7; *1966*: pp. 29, 35; tables B/8 & B/11; *1980*: p. 50; table 11/4. Jewish population only. Non-Jewish figures not available by area.

†Does not include Arabs of East Jerusalem since Arab protests in East Jerusalem were not tallied.

Whereas in 1950 half the total (50.3 per cent) Jewish population of Israel lived in the three large cities — Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem — by 1978 less than a quarter (23.4 per cent) did so. The smaller towns meanwhile more than doubled their relative strength over the same period, from 30.4 to 62.5 per cent. The rural component has been marked by a mild but steady proportional decline. In view of such a massive demographic shift, the consistency of protest locale is anything but a continuation of the status quo. Despite the much larger amount of people who now live in smaller towns, in contrast to 1950, protest still occurs preponderantly in the large cities. This is not a matter of innate conservatism (the demographic shift belies such an evaluation), but rather does tend to reinforce the point made earlier — *Israeli protest has become a highly mobile phenomenon with large numbers of protesters carefully choosing their venue* in order to maximize the impact of their demonstrations. In some cases, as we saw, this involves protest away from 'civilization', while in far more cases it entails being drawn to the political and media magnet of the central cities, especially Jerusalem as the capital and Tel Aviv as the commercial and international communications centre. In short, the data suggest that protest is far from being anomic, mindless, or haphazard; many protesters gravitate to where they believe their demonstrations will be most seen, heard, and/or responded to.

To whom are protests addressed? Table 3 shows that whereas the *location* of Israeli protest has remained constant despite the population shifts, the *level of authority* at which protests are directed has altered considerably. When taking all protests into account (including the irrelevant 'other' category — for example, against foreign governments), we can see that the central government has come under increasing attack over the years — 40 per cent of all protests in the 1950s, 52.9 per cent in the 1960s, 58.3 per cent in the 1970s (and 62.7 per cent for the years after the Yom Kippur War: 1974–79). Concomitantly, the decade of the 1960s was marked by a very sharp drop in protests against local authorities from 50.8 per cent in the 1950s to 30.8 per cent, although no further appreciable decline occurred in the 1970s. Much the same holds true when the 'other' category is eliminated (Table 4).[14]

TABLE 3. *Protests Against Central and Local Authorities*

Decade	*Total Annual Average No.*	*Central Auth. Annual Average No.*	*%*	*Local Auth. Annual Average No.*	*%*	*Other Annual Average No.*	*%*
1950s	40.0	16.0	40.0	20.3	50.8	3.7	9.3
1960s	43.1	22.8	52.9	13.3	30.8	7.0	16.2
1970s	126.8	74.1	58.3	39.5	31.2	13.2	10.4

TABLE 4. *Central and Local Protests*

	Central		*Local*		*Total*
	No.	%	*No.*	%	*No.* (without 'Other')
1950s	160	44.0	203	56.0	363.0
1960s	228	63.2	133	36.8	361.0
1970s	741	65.2	395	34.8	1136.0

We turn now to the central question posed by this study: does the political geography of public protest in Israel support the thesis of 'democratic territorialism', of political decentralization? Is Elazar correct in asserting that: 'Today, the well-nigh inevitable movement toward greater emphasis on territorial democracy is making itself felt at the local level . . .'?[15]

On the face of it, the data here undercut and perhaps even contradict Elazar's argument. If power has shifted to the local authorities, one would then expect the citizens' dissatisfaction to be manifested in greater protest addressed to the local government which now is 'to blame' for local problems. But as has already been shown, quite the reverse has taken place — the relative proportion of protest addressed to local authorities has decreased since the 1950s, and this despite a massive transfer of the population away from the three largest cities, where the central government's offices and institutions make convenient targets.

Yet paradoxically, *such a decrease in protest levelled at local government is a sign of its greater — not lesser — power*. Protest, after all, is a result of systemic dysfunctionality. Lack of protest, conversely, can be taken to mean that the system is working the way it should — or, in the case of reduced protest, that the public is less dissatisfied. If so, the drop in local protest may reflect an increase in local government power and the relatively satisfactory way in which it is being used. Elazar has considered this possibility, and the reasons behind it.

One of the central factors involved here is the process of political differentiation which began in the 1960s and gathered force through the 1970s. This can be seen both on the plane of an informal institutional transfer of power from central to local government, and in the electoral selection by the voters of local candidates and lists which have little connection with the central parties and their politics. Such phenomena manifested themselves in a number of ways.

Institutionally, as Elazar notes, it is 'at the local level that the most innovative developments are taking place and local governments are far more advanced than the government of the state in institutionalizing the new democratic republicanism of Israel'.[16] One of these

innovations is the 'local committee', which originated in the polis-like moshavim and kibbutzim, and has now been extended to unincorporated urban settlements within the more densely populated regional councils — 'the Israeli version of the town meeting principle [projected] in new directions'.[17] A further institutional development, albeit quite recent (1978), is the direct election of the mayor — the *only* direct elections in effect in Israel today at any political level — forging a closer direct link between the local administration and its constituency.[18]

The institutionalization of direct mayoral elections is but the natural continuation of several electoral trends evident over the last two decades. Ticket-splitting between the central and local parties has become an accepted, if not yet dominant, phenomenon — increasing in strength throughout the 1960s and 1970s.[19] This is a mark of the Israeli voters' greater sophistication and concern about local matters, as they vote into office (and keep a close watch on) local officials whose chief concern is the resolution of local problems and whose political future is dependent upon their municipal success, regardless of the vagaries of their central parties' fortunes.

Indeed, quite a number of localities have gone so far in this central-local separation that they have voted into office independent local party (non-affiliated) lists. As Elazar notes, 'the more successful ones present themselves as "good government" lists, designed to appeal to the voters on the basis of their ability to improve local programs and services (usually by taking a non-partisan stance vis-à-vis the national parties)'.[20] Not only are comparatively new towns such as Arad being swept by this tide of local non-partisanship,[21] but even Jerusalem's mayor decided to cut the umbilical cord in the 1978 municipal elections, winning a resounding victory over the candidate of the Likud, the party which one year earlier had been triumphant in the general elections.

The very names of these lists aptly illustrate their novel (for Israel) approach to decentralized politics: Nahariyah: 'We Care'; Rishon Le-Zion: 'For Rishon Le-Zion'; and Kiryat Ono: 'Our City'. This is not a matter of parochial chauvinism; allegiance to the State still carries greater weight for the vast majority of Israel's citizens. Rather, it is a matter of more mundane concerns: 'The residents of these communities are oriented toward the separation of local government from the larger political arena, because they perceive local government as a means for providing appropriate services administered efficiently.'[22]

The number of local authorities headed by local list candidates has increased steadily over the last three municipal elections, to the extent that after 1978 such lists ruled over a population sector larger than even that of the Likud (see Table 5)![23] And insofar as the number of local authorities captured by the independent local lists is concerned, the

increase by two thirds, from 12 to 20 per cent, is substantial here as well, albeit not as huge as the population figures. And the extent of such a local take-over is even more widespread than the numbers would indicate, since as a rule numerous local lists win under the aegis of central parties:[24]

> Even where attempts were made to send political veterans into new towns to assume positions of responsibility in the early days of their development, such people were soon overwhelmed by the rise of local leaders who were able to move ahead simply by virtue of their being who they were, vis-à-vis their reference groups, where they were. Ultimately, the parties had to accommodate them and seek to co-opt them, making certain necessary conditions in the process. Not the least of these concessions was an almost total ignoring of ideology in the recruitment of new local leadership.

All these phenomena, then — new local administrative systems, direct mayoral elections, ticket-splitting, independent local lists, and dichotomization of the central parties into two levels of functionaries — point in the same direction. Local government which used to be the political Cinderella of national politics[25] has come into its own, and with the rise of political power has forged closer links with its local constituency. Even this may be understating the case; in many respects it is the local citizens who have taken over their government. They now not only hold their local officials accountable for nitty-gritty performance, but also have involved themselves (through various local councils and committees) in the actual decision-making and governing processes. In short, the local government's 'powers are actually being diffused among an increasingly wide variety of committees, most of which join the elected members of the council with a certain number of private citizens appointed to represent the various local interests, and some of which are entirely citizen bodies.'[26]

TABLE 5. *Distribution of Party Control: 1973 and 1978*

Party	*Total Heads of Local Authorities*		*Total Population*	
	1973 %	*1978* %	*1973*	*1978*
Labour Alignment	61	38	1,560,785	1,217,910
Likud	14	25	741,200	781,350
National Religious Front (Aguda and National Religious Party)	—	3	—	32,320
National Religious Party	4	6	49,900	43,410
Aguda	2	1	85,900	12,600
Democratic Movement for Change	—	1	—	49,700
Unopposed Lists	4	5	1,265	2,168
Local Lists	12	20	147,090	805,910

SOURCE: The Institute of Local Government, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel.

In such a situation — where ideology no longer holds sway, where formerly excluded groups are now recruited or even force themselves into the system, and where political responsiveness is expedited as a result of rulers and ruled understanding and communicating with each other as a matter of course — it is little wonder that political protest against local authorities should decline. The important question which affects such protest is not so much about who wields political power, but whether the power which each authority has is being used in the proper manner. There have been changes in both the structure and the staff of local government in Israel over the last few years to take account of the needs and desires of its electorate; this has led to a reduction of overt extra-systemic political behaviour. On the other hand, the central government has undergone no comparable overhaul (especially on the structural plane), with the result that it has had to face increasing protests directed against it — despite the fact that it has transferred some of its powers to other levels of the administration.

The data with regard to 'level of authority', coupled with 'location', provide graphic evidence of the adaptability of local government — especially the towns and rural areas which have local systems and structures newer than those of the large cities. As can be seen from Table 6, the proportion of rural protests addressed to the local authorities dropped very steeply from an average of 61.5 per cent in the 1950s to an average of 9.6 per cent in the 1970s; there was even a drop in absolute numbers, from 16 to 12. There was also a decline in the smaller towns, but it was more moderate: from 64.8 per cent in the 1950s to 48.3 per cent in the 1970s.

The three large cities, however, show a different pattern — and present serious problems of analysis: while in the 1960s there was a sharp drop in the proportion of protests addressed to the municipalities (from 45 per cent in the 1950s to 23.5 per cent in the 1960s), such protests rose to 29.4 per cent in the 1970s. This suggests that the older cities may not have succeeded during the last decade in improving their local political machinery in order to satisfy their constituents' desires and demands. Nevertheless, in this respect, the cities in the 1970s were still faring better than the small towns: the latter's protests to their local authorities amounted to 48.3 per cent. On the other hand, that proportion was an improvement on the 1960s percentage (54.3), which in turn was an improvement on the 1950s (64.8 per cent) in the small towns. The large cities naturally attract many centrally-addressed protests (in Jerusalem, for example, in front of the Knesset or of the Prime Minister's Office), thereby significantly reducing the relative *proportion* of city 'local' protest. How, then to control for this factor?

One possible way is to compare the difference in relative percentage of city/'local' and town/'local' protest over the three decades. As Table

TABLE 6. *Location/Level of Government Protest: 1950–1979*

	Local		*Central*		*Other*	
	No.	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%
			1950s			
Cities	127	45.0	122	43.3	33	11.7
Towns	59	64.8	28	30.8	4	4.4
Rural Areas	16	61.5	10	38.5	0	0
			1960s			
Cities	69	23.5	162	55.3	62	21.2
Towns	57	54.3	41	39.0	7	6.7
Rural Areas	5	15.6	26	81.3	1	3.1
			1970s			
Cities	266	29.4	516	57.1	122	13.5
Towns	117	48.3	115	47.5	20	4.1
Rural Areas	12	9.6	111	88.8	2	1.6

6 shows, the results for both categories are identical — a decline of 16 per cent from the 1950s to the 1970s (45 to 29.4 per cent for city/'local'; and 64.8 to 48.3 per cent for town/'local') — indicating perhaps that they have been equally successful in institutionally responding to their constituents' formal demands. Yet this 'proportional' comparison is somewhat misleading, since it does not control for population changes within each category. As Table 2 shows, the large cities registered a 45 per cent increase in population between 1950 and 1978, while over the same period the population of the smaller towns increased more than *sixfold*! From this perspective the doubling of city/'local' protests over the three decades (127 to 266) ran somewhat ahead of urban population growth, whereas the doubling of town/'local' protest (59 to 117) was *well behind* its population growth. This suggests that in the final analysis the towns' local administrations, by providing new channels for political communication, did better than their city counterparts in adapting, and responding, to constituents' needs. Nevertheless, the fact remains that as a whole, local government in Israel appears to have been more successful than the central administration.

This is especially so when one considers perhaps the largest single source of protest in Israel over the years — the 'communal' problem. The *Edot Ha-mizrach* (Jews from Arab countries) have felt discriminated against since their mass immigration in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Most of the protests in the 1950s broke out in their 'temporary' camps on issues of work and pay.[27] Two of the most violent demonstrations Israel has ever witnessed were *Edot Ha-mizrach* eruptions: Wadi Salib in 1959,

and the Black Panthers in 1971. Indeed, since 'economic' and 'social' issues account for about 60 per cent of all Israeli protests, and Oriental Jews are to be found quite disproportionately at the lower end of the socio-economic ladder, it is likely that overall this group (now a majority of Israel's Jewish population) is involved in a sizeable portion of the country's protests.[28]

How have Oriental Jews fared on the political plane? At the level of national politics, quite poorly so far. In the 1981 general elections to the tenth Knesset, the Labour Alignment placed 13 *Edot Ha-mizrach* candidates among its top 50 seats (the relatively safe slots), while the Likud (which derives most of its support from Oriental Jews) placed a mere nine in the top 50![29] In the case of local politics, however, the picture is dramatically different: more than half of Israel's local government officials are Jews of Afro-Asian origin, and the numbers are even higher in the newer towns and municipalities.[30] Thus, here is yet another (very significant) factor dampening protest against the local authorities, as the groups with the most reason to feel deprived have attained true representation at least at that level of government. It may even be that the lack of any comparable achievement at the national level is but another factor behind the continuing rise of protest addressed to the central authorities.

Conclusion

The general picture emerging from the Israeli data is one of increasing protest mobility and differentiated focus. The *location* of protests, while apparently remaining stationary (in relative terms) over the years, is in fact quite the opposite when the massive demographic shifts are taken into account. Simply put, huge numbers of Israelis have now settled in smaller towns, but when they feel the need to express their grievances collectively, many return to demonstrate in their original 'nest' — the large cities. Others, post-1948 immigrants who moved from rural *ma'abarot* (transit camps) to these towns, seem to have followed suit.

The data also show that public protests in Israel have been increasingly directed at the *level of authority* of the central government, while local authorities appear to arouse considerably less public discontent. This latter phenomenon is especially important, with real public policy significance.

The message of the Israeli public to its government is clear, and it is at least as old as Burke's comment in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790): 'A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation.' Calls for various forms of systemic change at the central level of government have been made since the mid-1960s, but to little avail. Whereas the reforms and new institutions at the local

level have led to greater governmental adaptability and responsiveness, the lack of any move towards 'territorialism' at the central level has merely led to greater public dissatisfaction with the central governance of the State.[31]

In a December 1981 public opinion poll on political protest, half the respondents (49.7 per cent) chose the answer 'There aren't enough other ways to express oneself to the authorities' in reply to a question on the reason for the high level of public protest.[32] While no distinction was made in the question between the local and central levels of government, one can assume that in the light of the increasing protests made to the central authorities, most respondents had the latter in mind. Altogether, then, the overall evidence points in but one direction: only greater central government responsiveness and institutional change can begin to stem the rising tide of public protest addressed to the central powers-that-be.

Acknowledgements

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NOTES

[1] Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, 'Aggressive Behaviors Within Polities, 1948–1962; A Cross National Study', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. x, no. 3, September 1966, pp. 249–71; Ted R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton, N.J., 1970; Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 2nd edn, New Haven, Ct., 1972; R. J. Rummel, 'Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1946–59', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. x, no. 1, March 1966, pp. 65–73; and Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase, *et al.*, *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*, Beverly Hills, Ca., 1979.

[2] Douglas Bwy, 'Dimensions of Social Conflict in Latin America', in James C. Davies, ed., *When Men Revolt and Why*, New York, 1971, pp. 274–91; Abraham H. Miller *et al.*, 'The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots: An Empirical Test of Progressive Relative Deprivation Theory', *American Political Science Review*, vol. LXXI, no. 3, September 1977, pp. 964–82; Eva Etzioni-Halevy, 'Protest Politics in the Israeli Democracy', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 90, no. 3, Fall 1975, pp. 497–520; and Ann Ruth Wilner, 'Public Protest in Indonesia', in I. K. and R. L. Feierabend and Ted Gurr, eds., *Anger, Violence, and Politics: Theories and Research*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1972, pp. 352–58.

[3] See especially Miller *et al.*, op. cit.; Alexis De Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, Stuart Gilbert trans., Garden City, N.Y., 1955; James C. Davies, 'Toward a Theory of Revolution', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 27, no. 1, February 1962, pp. 5–19; and Mancur Olson, Jr, 'Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force', *Journal of Economic History*, vol. 23, no. 4, December 1963, pp. 529–62.

[4] Robert A. Dahl, *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, New Haven, Ct., 1966; Taylor and Hudson, op. cit.; Michael C. Hudson, 'Political Protest and Power Transfers in Crisis Periods', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 4, no. 3, October 1971, pp. 259–94; and S. Sundaram, *Vote and Violence*, Rajghat, Varanasi, 1974.

[5] Gurr, op. cit.; George Rudé, *The Crowd in History, 1730–1848*, New York, 1964; and Harold D. Lasswell, *Psycho-Pathology and Politics*, New York, 1960.

[6] Since Israel does not allow absentee balloting for overseas citizens, and yet does not remove from the electoral rolls those citizens who have permanently left the country (*yordim* in the Hebrew vernacular, who are believed to constitute approximately 10 per cent of Israel's entire population), voter participation in effect is about 90 per cent. The June 1981 elections had an official rate of 77 per cent, but that relatively low percentage is a result of well over 100,000 Israelis vacationing overseas. Elections in Israel are usually held in the autumn.

[7] Daniel J. Elazar, *Israel: From Ideological to Territorial Democracy*, Jerusalem Institute for Federal Studies, 1978.

[8] The number 10 was chosen for several reasons: anything below that threshold may not have significant public impact; newspapers do not always report instances of such events when only a handful of participants are involved; and ten adults (men) are considered to be a group in Jewish religion: a *minyan*.

[9] The following were *not* included: election rallies and other events which are traditionally part of the formal political process, unless they involved a breach of the peace, violence, etc.; all forms of protest against an employer on the issues of wages, working conditions, etc., *unless* the protest was clearly directed at government economic policy; regular conferences, conventions, etc., which issued protest resolutions as part of their proceedings; and political pressure which did not entail the physical presence of a group of people (for example, telephone and postal campaigns or petitions).

[10] In Israel, it is not at all easy to differentiate between the central political authority and local government since there is some jurisdictional overlap. A good example is education: the central government provides most of the money, while the local authority is in charge of registration, school supplies, etc. In such cases, every effort was made to discover the exact nature of the grievance and where the authority lay for its satisfaction. In the few cases where this was impossible, the 'addressee' was scored 'central government', since it has the ultimate authority in almost every sphere in the final analysis.

[11] See my 'Political Protest and Systemic Stability in Israel: 1960–1979', in Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig and Bernard Susser, eds., *Comparative Jewish Politics: Public Life in Israel and the Diaspora*, Ramat Gan, 1981, pp. 171–210. This initial article also presents a relatively complete methodological and statistical introduction to the Israeli protest phenomenon.

[12] Ted Gurr considers this medium to be part of the 'facilitation' process which enhances feelings of relative deprivation; see his 'Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices', *American Political Science Review*, vol. LXII, no. 4, December 1968, p. 1121. Norman F. Cantor in *The Age of Protest*, London, 1970, p. 326, notes how TV facilitates protest in a direct manner. For the precisely parallel phenomenon in Israel, see Ernie Meyer, 'Parents Can Be Unreasonable At Times', *The Jerusalem Post*, 10 September 1975, p. 2.

[13] The increasing 'ruralization' of Israel protest has become even more marked since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. From 1974 to 1979, rural protests accounted for 12 per cent of all such events, almost double the percentage for the 1950s. Instead of being 'nodal' (a few highly concentrated centres), protest is now 'matrixal' — a greater number of nodes (albeit each relatively smaller) spread throughout the country. This enables the protester to go more easily straight to the site of contention (for example, pollution of the Kinneret, settlement in the administered territories), thereby providing a more interesting visual 'story' for television. Indeed, even the small size of the television screen has an effect, since it enables comparatively small groups to appear formidable — assuming that the news editor wants to make them look so, as is usually the case with the need for 'enhancement' of the news.

[14] Cross-tabulation of the other variables tested in relation to 'level of authority' yield a few noteworthy, if not major, results. Briefly, 'central' protests have become larger: in the 1950s, those with more than 1,000 participants accounted for 14.4 per cent; by the 1970s, the proportion was 21.5 per cent. 'Local' protests of that size grew only from 7.9 to 9.4 per cent in the same period. Moreover, 'central' protests are steadily becoming more organized, that is, they are increasingly initiated by some formal organization — from 38.7 per cent in the 1950s to 57.5 per cent in the 1970s, while 'local' protests exhibited in that respect a reverse trend: from 29.2 per cent in the 1950s to 26.8 per cent in the 1970s. However, 'local' protests have become longer: 35.6 per cent of those in the 1950s lasted more than three hours, while in the 1970s the proportion was 52.9 per cent. On the other hand, the duration of such 'central' protests dropped slightly from 39.4 per cent to 35.2 per cent. Both 'central' and 'local' protests have become more peaceful over the same period, although the former are still more non-violent (from 81.2 to 91.4 per cent) than the latter (78.2 to 82.7 per cent). Finally, 'bread and board' issues (economic and especially social problems) are constituting an ever larger share of locally addressed protest (79.3 per cent in the 1970s compared to 55.5 per cent for centrally addressed protest), while political protest is being increasingly directed at the central authorities (35.8 per cent of all such addressed protests were political in the 1970s, while political protest constituted only 2.5 per cent of all locally addressed protest).

[15] Elazar, *Israel: From Ideological to Territorial Democracy*, op. cit., p. 7.

[16] Ibid., p. 20.

[17] Ibid.

[18] It will be interesting to see in the coming years whether direct mayoral elections will have led to a further reduction in protest to the local authorities. In 1978, a local election year, there was a significant drop in this category (from 30 to a mere 18 per cent), but this may have been due to the heightened

sensitivity of the local administration in an election year; in 1979 there was a return to the 'traditional' proportion of 30 per cent.

[19] See Daniel J. Elazar, 'The Local Elections: Sharpening the Trend Toward Territorial Democracy', in Alan Arian, ed., *The Elections in Israel — 1973*, Jerusalem, 1975, pp. 226-27. Strictly speaking, that was the last campaign in which ticket-splitting was possible. Thereafter, the local elections were held one year after the general elections. There is now increasing pressure to revert to the previous system.

[20] Ibid., p. 227.

[21] Elazar, *From Ideological to Territorial Democracy*, op. cit., p. 21.

[22] Elazar, 'The Local Elections . . .', op. cit., p. 227.

[23] Only the Labour Alignment, with its entrenched local apparatus, governs over more people at the local level; but as Table 5 illustrates, its hold is weakening. From a population standpoint, only the nationally ruling Likud exhibited any other increase, and it was minuscule.

One point should be noted here with regard to the population figures especially. Almost half of the local lists' portion in 1978 can be attributed to Jerusalem, where Mayor Teddy Kollek ran on an independent list, despite his allegiance to the Labour Alignment, of which he continued to be a member. Thus the question of whether Jerusalem's huge population belongs in this 'independent' category is arguable. Nevertheless, even without Jerusalem's population, the increase in this category would be sizeable.

[24] Elazar, *From Ideological to Territorial Democracy*, op. cit., p. 9.

[25] For a trenchant contemporary analysis of the disastrous situation of local government in Israel in the 1950s, see Marver H. Bernstein, *The Politics of Israel*, Princeton, N.J., 1957: in chapter 12, entitled 'The Crisis in Local Government', he noted (p. 289) that 'candidates for local office have rarely been distinguished, and the standard of council members has been low. . . . Most local officials have cared little for local administration. They have neglected their responsibilities, but they have jealously retained their posts'.

[26] Elazar, *From Ideological to Territorial Democracy*, op. cit., p. 21.

[27] In this respect, Elazar is wrong in claiming that 'they had very low expectations regarding government services and even lower expectations regarding their ability to participate in or even influence the shape of government policies'. See his 'Israel's Compound Policy', in Howard R. Penniman, ed., *Israel at the Polls: The Knesset Elections of 1977*, Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 36. Not only do the yearly totals show a relatively high level of protest for these early years, but according to a public opinion poll taken in 1950, only among those who had recently immigrated could a majority be found (52 v. 42 per cent) in support of protest over the issue of unemployment; the overall population was only 37 per cent in favour, 56 per cent against: see *Protest over Unemployment*, The Institute for Applied Social Research, March 1950; the results were also reported in *The Jerusalem Post*, 25 May 1950, p. 2. Thus, the new immigrants clearly hoped that the government would take note of, and remedy, the grievances they voiced in their demonstrations; and therefore believed that they might influence policy.

There may be an additional reason why the percentage of protests against local government was high in the 1950s and decreased thereafter. Most of the new immigrants had quite rudimentary conceptions of political authority and

believed local officials to be the 'government', just as they had done for centuries in the Arab countries in which they had lived. Over the years, as their political sophistication grew in Israel, they saw that real political power lay in the central government and directed their protests to it.

[28] No precise numbers or percentages can be ascertained, since Israeli newspapers tend not to mention the communal origin of the protesters unless it is of direct relevance, as in the case of the Black Panthers. In addition, many protests are 'mixed'. See Elazar, ibid., p. 37, for a discussion of *Edot Ha-mizrach* protests.

[29] This poor representation is one of the reasons why a new communal party, Tami, was established immediately before the elections; it became the first purely communal party since 1951 to win any seats (three) in the Knesset.

[30] See Shevach Weiss, *Ha-shilton Ha-mkomi B'Yisrael* [Local Government in Israel], Tel Aviv, 1972, chapter 10; Elazar, 'Israel's Compound Policy', op. cit., p. 26; and Efraim Torgovnik and Shevach Weiss, 'Local Non-Party Political Organizations in Israel', *Western Political Quarterly*, vol. 25, no. 2, June 1972, pp. 306, 317. This last study looks at the phenomenon of independent local lists from 1950 to 1959; see also pp. 318–20, where the authors point out that personal, ethnic, or community protest finds its formal outlet in Extra Party Alignment groups which can be viewed as a means for structuring and managing conflict.

[31] This general conclusion tends to substantiate Etzioni-Halevy's thesis, albeit in a way quite different from that of her analysis. She concludes: 'It seems that those who perceive this [political] establishment as being responsive, as well as those who perceive it as being unresponsive, can both develop a solid basis for their contentions, since the Israeli establishment has evolved typical patterns of action which include both responsiveness and rigidity.' ('Protest Politics in the Israeli Democracy', in *Political Science Quarterly*, op. cit., p. 519.) She ascribes this duality to the pattern of protest absorption by the authorities — symbolic flexibility and systemic rigidity. However, the present study suggests that such ambivalence is more in the nature of a dichotomy — between local government 'responsiveness' and central government 'unresponsiveness'.

[32] I commissioned the poll — conducted by Dr Mina Zemah/DAHAF — in the course of my research. In so far as this specific question is concerned, the respondents were offered six possible answers and were allowed to choose up to three (the average in fact was 2¼). Of the six, this answer received the greatest support (49.7 per cent); the second most popular response (42.2 per cent) was: 'Public protest is one of the few ways of achieving anything'.

THE *ALLIANCE ISRAELITE UNIVERSELLE* AND THE EMANCIPATION OF JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Georges Weill

IN the June 1967 issue of this Journal (vol. IX, no. 1), there was a review article by Elie Kedourie of André Chouraqui's *Cent ans d'histoire: L'Alliance Israélite Universelle et la renaissance juive contemporaine (1860–1960)*. Professor Kedourie commented, at the end of his article, that Chouraqui's

> full account of communal strife in Istanbul and Adrianople, in Jerusalem, Baghdad, and Damascus, throws much welcome light on these communities, whose history in modern times is still largely unknown. The historian who will write it will no doubt find the archives of the *Alliance* one of his most precious sources.

The archives of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* (A.I.U.) were opened to research workers in 1960, and I set out in a specialist publication the system employed in 1958–61 to classify the data;[1] I also expressed the hope that the availability of these archives would stimulate a great deal of research. In fact, over the past twenty years, 141 various studies have resulted, and more than 50 of them have been concerned with the broader aspects of Jewish life in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe (including the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean), in North Africa, and in the Middle East. Scholars have shown the achievements of the *Alliance* since its foundation in 1860, the part it played on the international scene, and its influence on large sections of the Jewish populations of the countries where it fought for the rights of man and where it established its schools.

The *Alliance* was founded by a group of French Jews whom Professor Kedourie has described (p. 93) as being 'liberals in politics and religion'; they 'believed that it was necessary for French Jews, who enjoyed civic and political equality with their Christian compatriots, to take the initiative in defending and advancing Jewish rights everywhere'. The first article of the *Alliance's* statutes stated that its objects

were to work everywhere for the emancipation and the moral progress of the Jews; to provide efficacious aid for those who suffer because of being Jews; and to encourage the publication of works contributing to these ends.

At first, the leaders of the A.I.U. intended to limit themselves to the struggle for the emancipation of Jews living in countries which had not yet granted them civil and political rights. That persistent struggle against injustice practically never ceased, but very soon (in 1862), the *Alliance* decided also to put into effect a system of modern education and to develop a network of schools which, from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf and to the Black Sea, was to have profound repercussions on the social and cultural development of Jewish communities.

In an article published in 1978,[2] I attempted a study of the origins of the intellectual and moral doctrines of the founders of the A.I.U., as revealed by their statements. They strove to achieve a humanism of emancipation; it was a humanism derived from the republican ideology — positivist, liberal, and perhaps free-masonic — of the Jewish bourgeoisie of nineteenth-century France; and it was the inspiration for the political and philanthropic activities of the *Alliance*. That humanism was also largely the inspiration for its educational endeavours, which Professor Kedourie praised in this journal, when he stated that the *Alliance* is best known for 'its justly-renowned educational network . . . the education which these schools provided was remarkably thorough and solid' (p. 97).

Although there were some lapses, some weak points, and perhaps some excesses in the activities of the A.I.U., nevertheless any study of Jewish history in the countries of the Mediterranean basin needs to take into account the role played by the *Alliance* through its teachers and its pupils, and the influence which its moral principles and intellectual discipline had on those Jewish communities for more than a century.

In this paper, I attempt to examine first, the geographical development and institutional framework of the activities of the *Alliance*; second, the main political and ideological problems which affected its educational and humanitarian work, and the consequent progressive westernization of Jewish communities; and third, the use which has been made to date of the archives of the A.I.U., and a brief outline of some of the research work in progress.

I. THE EXTERNAL STRUCTURES OF THE ALLIANCE

1. *Local committees*

The statutes of the A.I.U. catered for the establishment of local committees, consisting of at least ten members, as well as of regional

committees; while the central committee was to be in Paris. The founders wanted their movement to be as widely based as possible, not only for idealistic and somewhat eschatological reasons, but also to stimulate a 'sense of duty towards oppressed Jews' and to provide a broad network of sources of information which would promptly relay the least incident affecting Jewry.

The various humanitarian appeals launched by the *Alliance* had some spectacular success, with increasing numbers of subscribers, members, and committees. Nevertheless, Narcisse Leven, who had closely witnessed that progress over the years, expressed in 1911 only a moderate degree of satisfaction. He was disappointed because several events either delayed or completely prevented the establishment of committees in some countries: in 1870–71, there was the Franco-Prussian war while later there was criticism of the nationalist wing of German Jewry; there were the isolationist tendencies, badly misunderstood, firstly of the Anglo-Jewish Association (established in 1871), secondly of the Austrian Jews who founded the *Israelitischen Allianz zu Wien*, and thirdly of Swiss Jews with their *Kulturverein*. In the United States, the *Alliance* movement developed very slowly, while in Russian Poland it was sharply stopped by the Tsarist government.[3]

In 1862, two years after its foundation, Adolphe Crémieux became the President of the A.I.U. and used all his energy for its success; there was a rapid increase in membership, as well as in the number of committees which were established as a result of Crémieux's appeals in various countries: they spread from France, Italy, Berlin, and the Netherlands to Algeria, England, the Ottoman Empire, Scandinavia, then to central Europe (Hungary and Roumania), and North and South America.

In 1861, the A.I.U. had 850 members; in 1862, 1,112; in 1863, 1,386; in 1864, the total rose to more than double the previous year's membership — 2,878; in 1865, just over a further 1,000 increase resulted in 3,900; in 1866, 4,610; and from 1867 to 1870, there was an annual increase of more than 2,000: 6,826, 9,158, 11,364, and 13,370 in 1870. By 1880, there were 22,443; in 1885, 30,310; but by 1903 the total had settled down to about 30,000, of whom 1,400 were in Paris while in 1914 it was still about 30,000, of whom 1,500 were in Paris. As for local committees, there were 349 in 1880, and their number nearly doubled to 619 by 1914.[4]

The *Bulletins* of the A.I.U. published in detail the payments of subscriptions, gifts, and endowments from the four corners of the globe. Unfortunately, there are too few collated statistics to make it possible to draw up precise geographical balance sheets; to do so would require painstakingly detailed research, for frontiers and place names have changed a great deal meanwhile. We do have, however, a list of the principal local committees which were established by 1880:[5]

A. Western Europe, as was to be expected, had the greatest number: France (including Alsace-Lorraine), 56; Germany, 113; Italy, 20; the Netherlands, 15; Austria-Hungary, 15; Switzerland, 6; Great Britain, 2; and one each in Denmark, Luxemburg, Portugal, and Gibraltar.

B. In the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean, Roumania had a total of 35 local committees, and Bulgaria had 4; Serbia, 2; Crete and Rhodes, one each; while Turkey led with 36, four of which were in Syria/ Palestine and two in Mesopotamia.

C. In Africa, there were in 1880 only a few local committees: 7 in Morocco; Algeria, 5; Egypt, 4; Lybia, 2; and only one in Tunisia.

D. As for the Americas, there were 8 local committees in the United States, and two each in Brasil and Colombia. The Antilles also had two.

By 1913–14, many changes had occurred. First, the A.I.U. did not lose as many committees in Germany as might have been expected after the so-called *Hilfsverein* affair of 1909.[6] Second, the *Bulletins* now simply list in alphabetical order the towns where there are local committees, or regional committees which often cover several countries — so that it is an almost hopeless task to make compilations. Nevertheless, the available data do reveal that there were 31 local committees in the Netherlands, that the central office in Berlin received the subscriptions of 263 localities in Central Europe, and that there were two other regional committees in Germany — one in Cologne, which was the centre for 57 German, Austrian, and Swiss local committees, and one in Nuremberg which was the centre for a further 23. Hungary, through its regional committee in Budapest, was the head office for 32, while in Roumania (where the *Alliance* was active in the defence of freedom against an arbitrary government) there were 46 local committees. In France there were 53, and a further 27 in Alsace-Lorraine; in Italy, 14; 3 each in Belgium and Luxemburg; England, 2; and only one in Denmark. As for North Africa, there were 8 in Morocco, 6 in Algeria, and 2 in Tunisia; while Egypt had 3 and Tripoli one. There were 6 in Palestine, 3 in the Lebanon and Syria; 13 in Turkey, 3 in Greece, 2 in Iran, one in Rhodes, and 3 in Mesopotamia (present-day Iraq). The United States had 9 committees; Nicaragua, 2; Venezuela and Curaçao, one each. There were also committees in China (in Shanghai), in Mauritius, and in Mascara.[7]

The numbers of committees and the social background of their members in the countries of Western Europe and of the Americas must be of interest to historians, but their political importance is not as great as that of the committees of central Europe, the Balkans, or Muslim countries. It was indeed the local committees in those lands which provided reports leading to diplomatic interventions and to the creation of philanthropic institutions such as the provision of social welfare services and after-school care, as well as assistance for mass

emigration. They were sensitive outposts for the *Alliance*, with informants and devoted collaborators at the frontiers of the Russian Empire, in the principalities of the Balkans, and at the heart of Muslim countries. These 'intelligencers' were to be supported, seconded, or replaced by the *Alliance*'s schoolteachers, whose regular reports added to the fund of information of the Central Committee in Paris and made it possible to decide upon the strategy to be employed in particular cases. In whatever country it was deemed necessary to establish (or augment the number of) A.I.U. schools, local notables who were progressive were asked to form special committees (called school committees); these came to constitute confidential sounding boards for the *Alliance* and to give further strength to the solid structure established since 1860.

2. *The establishment of schools*

The schools were born out of a fundamental belief, held by the founders of the *Alliance*, in the French system of education — positivist and secular. That system was to create new elites who would ameliorate the condition of Jews by training them for respectable occupations and stable employment, and giving them the opportunity of becoming honest citizens. Thus, a bourgeois middle class would arise, whose members would be faithful to their ancestral Jewish beliefs as well as to the country which had emancipated them; they would constitute a shield of citizens and patriots, holding in respect the values and principles of the French Revolution.

The network of schools was developed at a spectacular pace in the whole Mediterranean basin, until the First World War. One can distinguish four periods altogether; the first two were in 1862–85 and 1886–1914; the third lasted until the end of the Second World War, and the fourth started after that War. From 1862 until 1885, the year which was the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the *Alliance*, several independent Balkan states had come into being, with large Jewish minorities. In terms of today's geographical frontiers, the network of A.I.U. schools during that first period was spread across nine countries, with 50 schools in 35 different cities and a total of 304 teachers (male and female) and 8,200 pupils. The schools were established in Morocco in 1862, in Iraq and Syria in 1864, in European Turkey and the northern part of present-day Greece in 1867, in the Lebanon and Bulgaria in 1869, in what is now Israel in 1870, in Asia Minor in 1873, and in Tunisia in 1878. In addition, of course, there were the schools in France, including that for training *Alliance* teachers (later to become the A.I.U.'s *Ecole Normale*) which at that period had about 35 male and female students.[8]

In the second period, six more countries acquired *Alliance* schools: Roumania in 1888, Lybia in 1890, Algeria in 1894, Serbian Macedonia (present-day Yugoslavia) in 1895, Egypt in 1896, and Iran in 1898; while the older network was consolidated with more schools. By 1914, the A.I.U. had established 183 schools, with 1,275 teachers and 43,700 pupils in 90 different localities across 15 countries.[9] A French historian of the Ottoman Empire, Paul Dumont, has pointed out that the *Alliance* was outstandingly active in that Empire, which at the time of the Balkan Wars (1911–13) had more than 60 schools in 43 towns — an educational network equal to that of the Empire's Christian schools;[10] in Constantinople alone, it had up to 12 different schools!

In the third period (1914–45), *Alliance* schools were nationalized in various countries, and after the collapse of the Turkish Empire there was a rapid decline in the number of A.I.U. schools in the Balkans between 1925 and 1935. On the other hand, new schools were established in the Middle East, in Iran, and in North Africa, so that between 1930 and 1945 there was a total of about 135 schools catering for some 50,000 pupils.[11]

After the Second World War, the A.I.U.'s educational network was entirely suppressed in most Muslim countries which achieved independence — in Iraq, Egypt, Lybia, Tunisia, and Algeria. According to André Chouraqui, by 1964 there were 93 schools with a total of 30,000 pupils.[12] Although there was a partial reinstatement in Morocco and a renewed vigour in Israel, political instability as well as compulsory nationalization and the exodus of Jewish populations led to a further decline. In 1982, there are *Alliance* schools in only three Muslim countries (Morocco, Syria, and Iran), in Israel, in France, and in an affiliated manner in Spain, Canada, and Venezuela.

In the course of 120 years, from 1862 to 1982, the *Alliance* spread its educational mantle over 16 countries and more than 150 localities. It established 285 schools — 150 for boys, 95 for girls, and 40 mixed schools — with an estimated total of more than 650,000 pupils throughout that period.

3. *Special Schools*

Apart from primary schools, the *Alliance* established a set of special schools: kindergartens or nursery schools, workshops or technical schools, agricultural schools, and rabbinical seminaries. The special schools were founded in capital cities and large towns: in Paris (the *Ecole préparatoire*), in Jerusalem (the *Ecole professionnelle*, founded in 1882), in Salonika, Constantinople, Smyrna, Tunis, Marrakesh, and in Casablanca (a Lycée); there were also special schools in Mikveh-Israel, in Reghaïa (near Algiers), and Djedeida (in Tunisia).[13]

The workshops, or vocational and technical schools were established mainly in the Balkans and in Turkey, but also in North Africa and the Middle East; from 1873 to 1913, they were to be found in 11 countries — Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Lybia, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece — in 35 towns which all had already been provided with primary schools for boys and for girls. There were workshops for male apprentices in 31 towns, and for female apprentices in 21 towns. By 1913, there were nearly 2,000 apprentices in these various workshops and in Jerusalem's *Ecole professionnelle*: 1,260 girls and 650 boys. The boys were trained to become skilled workers in some 40 different crafts, while the girls' choice was much more limited — at first only in the field of sewing and dressmaking, but later they could be trained in secretarial and other office work.[14]

The A.I.U. established also two rabbinical seminaries in Constantinople and in Tunis, as well as four agricultural schools (only one of which, that of Mikveh-Israel, remained viable).

II. THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE A.I.U.'S EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES

The *Alliance* made it possible for younger generations of Jews to enter new skilled trades and professions, for girls to get out of their narrow family circle, and in so doing it introduced into traditional societies an explosive charge which was to have results it could not foresee. Social scientists are now familiar with the problems and psychological conflicts which arise from a sudden transformation of traditional values and practices. When adolescents, in particular, have acquired new modes of thinking and behaviour, together with diversified technical skills, they will resist any attempts at restricting them to an ordinary routine and they will refuse to accept a passive role.[15]

In the market towns of northern Turkey, in the large ports of North Africa, and in the capital cities which were open to European influence, the success of the elite class gave added value to this new culture, which was sometimes tinged with cosmopolitanism. Recent studies on Iraq,[16] Morocco,[17] Greece (Salonika),[18] Tunisia,[19] Egypt,[20] and Roumania,[21] partly based on material from the A.I.U.'s archives, have shown that it was largely as a result of the activities of the *Alliance* that these countries became familiarized with Western culture. On the other hand, we need also to look at the reverse of the medal — the negative consequences of this assimilation which was often accompanied by a loss of religious practice and especially by a complete break with the traditional language (Judeo-Spanish or Judeo-Arabic), as well as with the customs, the folklore, and the sense of being part of one's group of origin.

This estrangement from the old order was not immediately apparent; it occurred gradually over two or three generations and led the *Alliance* to modify its strategy and its teaching. A research group was appointed and it published periodicals for the A.I.U. teachers,[22] while the over-rigid system of appointing and transferring teachers was made more flexible and responsive to the wishes of the local committees. A code of practice was established about the teachers' responsibilities to the Central Committee in Paris as well as to the local communities whose children they taught; and finally, the Central Committee unceasingly promoted a secular morality which it hoped (somewhat naively) would counteract the defects of too rapid an assimilation to Western mercenary values.[23] The A.I.U. also built a network of modern schools, light and airy, which gradually adorned the teeming cities of the Mediterranean and spread from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf.[24]

Meanwhile, other difficulties arose, some of a practical and others of a political nature. The use of the French language as the medium of education was criticized in Germany in the 1880s and led to the *Hilfsverein* affair (referred to earlier); but the Alliance stood firm in its resolve to maintain that system. Narcisse Leven declared in 1911:[25]

> In all those schools, with one exception, the medium of instruction is French. This is not only because our teacher training colleges are in Paris and because most of our teachers have been educated in France; neither is it because — we do need to state it once more — of an exclusive nationalism. But it is because French is the common and commercial language of the Mediterranean basin; this is so truly so, that many foreign schools established in Turkey, for example by German or English associations, are compelled to teach in French, or otherwise run the risk of having no students.
>
> We must add that everywhere the national language is carefully taught; in Turkey especially, the teaching of the Turkish language has been greatly developed since the fortunate evolution of the country.
>
> English is taught in our schools in Egypt and Mesopotamia, as well as in Damascus, Tangiers, Mogador, Smyrna, and Salonika; our excellent collaborators of the Anglo-Jewish Association give us mighty help with their generous assistance.
>
> Italian is taught in Tunisia and in Tripoli, Spanish in the cities of Morocco where that language is spoken by Jews; and finally, German is taught in five schools in Constantinople, and three in Salonika and Bulgaria.

The mediocrity of Hebrew classes also aroused lively controversies; in 1908, three representatives of the Central Committee were sent on a mission of inspection to the Middle East to resolve that provoking problem, which was to arise again on several occasions — in 1920–25 in Palestine,[26] in 1936–39 in Morocco,[27] and in the 1960s in Iran.[28] It had already occurred in 1894–96 in Algeria and in Egypt, and had led to the creation of a network of schools better adapted to local conditions.[29]

Apart from these difficulties, which arose out of the development of new ideologies and morals, there were others which were connected with local political conditions. For example, in Morocco before the French Protectorate, schools were a bulwark against the utter anarchy of the country and the struggle for power of the feudal chiefs against the sultan's authority;[30] in Lybia, the mistrust of the Jewish communities and Italian nationalism made it possible for only one *Alliance* school to be opened;[31] while in Iran, in Macedonia, and on the west coast of Asia Minor, the A.I.U. had to fight the fanaticism of the clergy (Shi'ite or Greek) which was even then fiercely opposed to any form of progress or change. In other Muslim countries (Syria and Iraq), the rise of nationalism provoked incidents which led, from 1948 onwards, to murderous attacks. In eastern Europe, the virulent antisemitism of countries such as Russia and Roumania led to constant migrations, which altered the demography of Jewish communities in the Balkans.[32]

Since 1876, the Alliance, in addition to its diplomatic and educational endeavours, had embarked on a policy of financial support and assistance for the emigration of those populations affected by the Balkan Wars.[33] Then after 1880 and the infamous events at Brody, which started the era of tsarist pogroms, and until after the Second World War, the A.I.U. favoured the emigration to North America of Jews from Russia, Poland, and Roumania; and it took part in the establishment of the Jewish Colonization Association (I.C.A.) and in its agricultural settlements first in the United States, then in Latin America, and finally in Palestine — but with some reservations, about which it has often incurred adverse comment.[34]

The *Alliance* has also been accused of having had secret links with the Quai d'Orsay (the French Foreign Office), to such an extent that these links amounted to the A.I.U. constituting a subsidiary of that Office. However, although it is true that in some cases both had strategies which were complementary and which were implemented by men who believed in the policy of French expansion in the Mediterranean, recent research in diplomatic archives has shown that the *Alliance* had tactical support from the French government only in those cases which were to their mutual advantage. Such a coincidence of interests was far from being total in every circumstance.[35]

On the other hand, there were no reservations in the instructions which the A.I.U. gave to its schoolteachers to defend the freedom of religion and the civil or professional rights of the Jewish minorities, to moderate in cases of local strife, and to take an active part in the (often strained) affairs of the communities to which they had been appointed. Such a task did not prove to be quickly or easily achieved, in view of the differences in outlook and the weight of tradition, so marked in eastern countries.

First, the most common difficulty was the struggle against the upholders of the old style of education. The Alliance eventually

conquered what it called 'obscurantism and prejudices' almost everywhere — in Lybia, Palestine, Egypt, and finally Iran; but it failed in Djerba, in the Yemen, and in Abyssinia.[36]

Second, almost everywhere, the A.I.U. fought against child marriages (where the bride might be only eight or nine years old), against deficient diets, against showy and wasteful extravagances, and against corporal punishment.

Third, the *Alliance* introduced new teaching methods, each adapted to the local population, which favoured experimentalism, rigorous modes of thought, economy and elegance of style, the ability to synthesize, respect for manual and agricultural labour, secular morality, and a sense of civic duty to the ruler or to the local government. The A.I.U. also attempted, but with no apparent success, to fight against the loss of religious belief and of moral values.

Finally, perhaps the greatest achievement of the A.I.U. was the emancipation of Jewish women — at least until they married. That emancipation was the theme of the first pronouncements of the leaders of the *Alliance*, particularly Crémieux. His relentless efforts led to the establishment of schools and workshops for girls, the training of young female teachers who were sent to Paris for the purpose, and the constant reminders to the staff about the education of girls. Paul Dumont has shown the social consequences, practical and moral, which female education entailed in Salonika; and all those who have considered the evolution of Jewish women in the Middle East agree that the credit is largely due to the activities of the *Alliance* in the countries of the Mediterranean where it introduced 'modern' education.[37]

Moreover, that process of education went hand in hand with an appreciation of the local communities expressed in a veritable wealth of statistical data. The reports which the teachers sent to Paris amply reward patient scrutiny; they give an almost complete picture of the evolution of Jewish communities, of their daily life, and of the progress towards emancipation as well as the inroads of assimilation. It is worth referring once again to the excellent paper by Paul Dumont on the contents of the archives of the *Alliance* and to summarize briefly here its methodological section; although that paper was centred on the Ottoman Empire, the analysis of the data could be carried out in the same manner in most other cases when sorting out the reports and communications sent from A.I.U. schools; this is now being done, for example, about the Jews of Tetouan.[38]

1. *Educational matters*: study of classical authors, courses of teaching for various subject matters, moral principles to be stressed, modern languages, and the intellectual and professional training of young boys and girls as well as its effect on their social and cultural future.

2. *Local demographic data*: population estimates, migratory movements and trends, and refugees.

3. *Socio-professional profile of communities:* lists of pupils' names, social categories, structures of the working, middle, and well-to-do classes, etc.

4. *Ethnographic data*: local customs and folklore, specific diseases, 'superstitions', and funeral and other rites.

5. *Crisis situations*: natural disasters (floods, earthquakes, droughts), epidemics, fires, and their social consequences.

6. *Inter-communal relations*: either with other minority groups (Greeks, Armenians), or with Muslims or Christians, or even between rival Jewish communities.

So far, there have been only comparatively few good pieces of research based on the archives of the *Alliance*. In spite of an only too common belief held in some university circles, it is only a trained research worker, who already has a knowledge of modern Jewish history, of the history of the A.I.U., and of the bibliography of the subject, who will fully benefit from a study of the files of the *Alliance*. While those who were well prepared have achieved real success, others who were not have resoundingly failed.

III. THE ARCHIVES OF THE A.I.U. AND RESEARCH IN JEWISH HISTORY

1. *1960–81*

There have been 141 different research workers who made use of the Alliance's archives in Paris, consulting 1,430 bundles (which contained more than one million documents). To that must be added about one hundred searches for the A.I.U. administration and for replies to requests received by post; these involved about 300 bundles. From 1960 to 1968, 20 to 70 bundles were consulted each year; but the annual average then rose steadily, and now amounts to 130.

Most of the 141 research workers were graduate students working for a Master's degree or for a doctorate. A great deal of their research does not get printed; but some articles have appeared and, less frequently, some monographs. On the other hand, the *Alliance* Library does not, as should be the case, receive automatically copies of books or offprints of articles derived from its archives; nor are Journals systematically examined to discover such publications.

2. *Preliminary balance sheet*

A. First place among successful works of research must be assigned to those dealing with the history of French Jewry in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Most of the recent studies in that subject made use

of the archives of the *Alliance*, and it is unfortunate that they could not benefit as much as would have been possible if important papers had not been lost during the Second World War — minutes of the Central Committee, records of financial accounts, and correspondence for 1936–40. The list of these studies includes Michael Graetz's thesis (sadly, not yet available in English) on the moral and intellectual climate of French Jewry at the beginning of the nineteenth century; Phyllis Cohen Albert on the Consistoires; David Cohen's two volumes on French elites in the Second Empire as well as Jonathan Helphand's thesis on the Jews of France during that period. There has been the now classical study by Michael Marrus on the Dreyfus Affair, followed by the works of Paula Hyman, Nancy Green, Danielle Delmaire, and Laurent Bensaid, and the article by Roger Kohn.[39]

B. The A.I.U's archives have also proved to be of some value to historians of central and eastern Europe. To the articles by Paul Dumont and the book by Carol Iancu on Roumanian Jews, already referred to, must be added Fritz Stern's work on German finance in the nineteenth century and Jacob Toury's book on the emancipation of German Jews, Jacques Thobie's article on France and the Ottoman Empire, Pawel Korzec's book on Polish Jews and his article on the Vatican and Jewish organizations in the First World War, E. Feldman's paper on the *Alliance* in Roumania in 1867, and Willy Bok's article on the Jews of Belgium.[40] Others have been engaged on research on Jewish students in Roumania (Marcel Schneider), on the Jews of Vienna in the last two decades of the nineteenth century (Robert Wistrich), and on the white slave traffic of Jewish women in central Europe from 1850 to 1914 (Edward Bristow).

C. There has been renewed interest in research on North African Jews, which had experienced a lull for about a decade. Apart from the studies (cited in Note 17, below) by Laskier, Schroeter, Cohen, and Bensimon-Donath, and the article by Claude Hagege (Note 19), there have been on Algerian Jews the thesis by Joan Roland, the vivid and impassioned book by the late lamented Henri Chemouilli, and the works of Richard Ayoun. Other authors on North African Jews include Simon Schwartzfuchs, Jacques Taïeb, Lucette Valensi and Abraham Udovitch, and Sarah Leibovici;[41] there are also theses in course of preparation by Albert Maarek and by Yaron Tsur on the Jews of Tunisia.

D. Material on Zionism and the foundation of the State of Israel is of course available in many countries; but the archives of the *Alliance* on that subject have not been much used so far, perhaps because such use would require first a good knowledge of the A.I.U.'s own history and dealings with the Turkish, British, and French governments.

After several false starts, which had suffered from an inadequate methodology, research workers have recently been stimulated to study

the once large Jewish communities of those Mediterranean countries which benefited from the activities of the *Alliance*. They now embark more boldly on studies connected with the establishment of the State of Israel and the part (modest but effective) played by the A.I.U. in the development of that country's educational, intellectual, and agricultural fields. There is no longer a mental block about a militant Zionist ideology, which today has less harsh undertones.

To numerous well known works on the subject, must be added the article and the thesis by Catherine Levigne-Nicault on Zionism and French politics,[42] and another thesis on which Jean-Marie Delmaire is engaged, dealing with the contribution of the A.I.U. to the renaissance of the Hebrew language. Others are working on the first Jewish settlements in Palestine, on the activities of the *Alliance* in Jerusalem, and on a biography of Charles Netter, who founded the agricultural school of Mikveh-Israel.

E. Finally, several graduate students are working on theses concerned with the Spanish Jews of Istanbul, antisemitism in Algeria, the westernization of Jewish communities in the Ottoman Empire, the *Alliance* schools in Iran, and the Jews of Yezd (in Iran) in the twentieth century. There are also other works in progress, and we must hope that these researches, some of which are ambitious, will throw fresh light on the modern history of these Jewish communities.

3. *The archives of the Alliance and contemporary historiography*

This brief sketch of recent research based on the A.I.U.'s archives has dealt only with the main trends, and clearly does not cover all the resultant publications. There are many lacunae in large sectors of the historiography of the subject. The history of the *Alliance*, and that of the many Jewish communities in Muslim lands and in Central Asia as well as in central and eastern Europe, has still to be written. The hope that Professor Kedourie and I myself had expressed (when we had not yet met) has not so far been fulfilled. Is it because there is an insufficiency of determined research workers? Or a lack of knowledge of the problem or of the appropriate methodology? These questions have no easy answers.

The scholar of today who is concerned with the many facets of the history of the relations between eastern and western countries must have the ability to interpret the great multitude of available data. A study of the repercussions of the activities of the *Alliance* must not be limited to mere conflicts of opinion by those who espouse different theories. It is not simply a matter for apologetics or for disparagement, but for a realistic appreciation of the facts; and these facts can be understood only with the help of available documents and perhaps also oral evidence.

If the *Alliance* had been content merely to observe Jewish communities and to protect or defend them, matters might be easier; but the A.I.U. took an active part in the institutional and cultural development of these communities, it altered the course of their political history, and if affected the direction of their evolution. These are facts which today's research workers must not underestimate if they are to achieve some measure of success in their studies of the history of Jewish communities in modern times.[43]

NOTES

[1] See Georges Weill, 'Les archives de l'A.I.U. antérieures à 1940' in *Archives Juives*, vol. II, no. 2, 1965–66, pp. 6–10. See also the fairly extensive bibliography on the *Alliance* in André Chouraqui's *Cent ans d'histoire: L'Alliance Israélite Universelle et la renaissance juive contemporaine (1860–1960)*, Paris, 1965, pp. 515–20. This study does not supersede the account by Narcisse Leven, *Cinquante ans d'histoire: L'Alliance Israélite Universelle (1860–1910)*, 2 vols., Paris, 1911–20. Leven gives a chronological and detailed record of the ideology of the founders of the A.I.U. and of their conceptions of human relations. There will be other references below to more recent publications concerning the *Alliance*, from the point of view of contemporary historiography.

[2] See Georges Weill, 'Emancipation et humanisme, le discours idéologique de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle au XIX[e] siècle', in *Les Nouveaux Cahiers* (henceforth, *N.C.*), no. 52, Spring 1978, pp. 1–20.

[3] Leven, op. cit., pp. 70–74.

[4] See Leven, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 70–74. See also the A.I.U.'s brochure, *Vingt-cinquième anniversaire de la fondation de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle*, Paris, 1885, 16 pp.; *Assemblée Générale . . .*, op. cit., p. 39; and the A.I.U.'s, *Liste des adhérents de Paris arrêtée le 1[er] juin 1903*, Paris, 1903, 47 pp.

[5] See Chouraqui, op. cit., pp. 429–32, for a list of local committees established from 1861 to 1880.

[6] The *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden*, founded in 1901, was at first supported by the *Alliance*. Later, however, relations deteriorated in the circumstances of European political strife and pan-Germanic aspirations. There was a complete break in 1911, after an acrimonious argument about the teaching of the German language: see the A.I.U. Report, *Alliance Israélite Universelle, Assemblée Générale du 17 décembre 1911*, Paris, 1911, 58pp.

[7] See the A.I.U.'s *Bulletin annuel*, 1913, pp. 215–54.

[8] See the A.I.U.'s *Bulletin annuel*, 1909, pp. 108–09; Moïse Nahon, *L'Alliance Israélite Universelle, 1860–1910*, Algiers, 1910, pp. 18–19; *Vingt-cinquième anniversaire . . .* op. cit., pp. 110–11; the A.I.U.'s *Bulletin annuel*, 1913, pp. 122–27 and its monthly *Paix et Droit*, 1931–39; Albert Confino, *L'action de l'Alliance Israélite en Perse*, Algiers, 1941, p. 171; and Chouraqui, op. cit., pp. 498–506.

[9] See the data on schools in *Assemblée Générale . . .*, op. cit., pp. 53–58; Nahon, op. cit., pp. 20–24; and the A.I.U.'S *Bulletin annuel*, 1913, pp. 128–58.

[10] See Paul Dumont, 'Une source pour l'étude des communautés juives de Turquie, les archives de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle', in *Journal Asiatique*, vol. 247, 1979, pp. 101–35. This article gives one of the best analyses of the

contents of the A.I.U. archives and of the social achievements of the *Alliance* in the Ottoman Empire.

[11] See Confino, op. cit., p. 171; and S. Szajkowski, *Jewish Education in France (1789–1939)*, New York, 1980, p. 41. For the schools established until 1940, see also the data in Paul Silbermann, *An Investigation of the Schools Operated by the Alliance Israélite Universelle from 1862 to 1940*, Ph.D. thesis at New York University, 1973; a copy is available in the library of the *Alliance* (ms. 628). Unfortunately, this thesis has not yet been published; it gives an excellent synthesis of the education provided in the schools of the *Alliance*.

[12] Chouraqui, op. cit., pp. 498–506.

[13] On the foundation of the agricultural school of Mikveh-Israel, see Georges Weill, 'Charles Netter ou les oranges de Jaffa', in *N.C.*, no. 21, June 1970, pp. 2–37. We know little about the Djedeida school, which was established in 1895 and which had to close after 1915, apart from a reference to it in J. Bigart, *L'Alliance Israélite, son action éducative*, Paris, 1900, pp. 36–37, and the annual reports published in the *Bulletins* until 1913. There are practically no data on Reghaïa, to which reference is made in the reports on Djedeida, or on the farm on the outskirts of Smyrna. The rabbinical seminaries of Constantinople (1898–1914) and of Tunis (1907–14) are mentioned in the annual reports. As for the 'école preparatoire' of Paris and that of Versailles, established in 1867 and 1872 respectively, see A. H. Navon, *Les 70 ans de l'Ecole normale israélite orientale*, Paris, 1936; see also Gérard Israel and Georges Weill, 'Centenaire de l'Ecole Normale Israélite Orientale', in *Revue Encyclopédique juive*, no. 27, 1972, pp. 809–12.

[14] The brochure entitled *Vingt-cinquième anniversaire . . .*, op. cit., pp. 81–84 and 109–111, gives a first list of the workshops; and the *Bulletins* give detailed statistical data for boys' workshops while the information on girls' workshops is less precise. See also Rabbiner Frank, *Die Culturarbeit der Alliance Israélite Universelle*, Cologne, 1911 pp. 18–21, *Tabellen der Schulen nach Laendern*.

[15] See Gérard Klein's Preface in *Michel Jeury, Anthologie réunie et présentée par Gérard Klein*, Presse-Pocket, Paris, 1982, pp. 37–38.

[16] See Eliyahu Cohen, *L'influence intellectuelle et sociale des écoles de l'A.I.U. sur les Israélites d'Irak*, unpublished University of Paris thesis, 1962; a typescript copy is available at the library of the *Alliance*.

[17] Michael M. Laskier, *The Jewish Communities of Morocco and the Alliance Israélite Universelle (1860–1956)*, Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Los Angeles, 1979; to be published by State University of New York Press; Laskier, 'Aspects of Change and Modernization: the Jewish Communities of Morocco's bled' in Michel Abitbol, ed., *Communautés juives des marges sahariennes du Maghreb*, Jerusalem, 1982, pp. 329–64; and also in Abitbol, ed., Daniel Schroeter, 'The Jews of Essaouira (Mogador)' pp. 365–90. See also Doris Bensimon-Donath, *Evolution du judaïsme marocain sous le protectorat français (1912–1956)*, Paris, 1968. Finally, David Cohen, 'Le processus d'occidentalisation de la communauté juive de Casablanca (1890–1940)', contribution to the colloquium held at Sénanque in May 1982 on *Les relations intercommunautaires juives en Méditerranée et en Europe Occidentale (XV^e–XX^e siècle)*, to be published for the University of Provence.

[18] Paul Dumont, 'La structure sociale de la communauté juive de Salonique à la fin du XIX^e siècle', in *Revue Historique*, vol. 243, no. 2, 1980, pp. 351–93.

[19] Claude Hagege, *Les juifs de Tunisie et la colonisation française*, thesis, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, 1973; and Hagege, 'La communauté juive de Tunisie à la veille du protectorat français', in *Le Mouvement Social*, no. 110, January–March 1980.

[20] Jacob M. Landau, *Jews in Nineteenth-Century Egypt*, New York, 1969; and Landau, 'Manuscript Materials on the Teaching of Hebrew in the Egyptian schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle', in *Doron: Hebraic Studies. Essays in Honor of Professor Abraham I. Katsh*, New York, 1965, pp. 26–36.

[21] The paradoxical situation in Roumania, where the Alliance had only one school but where it exercised a great influence, has been studied by Carol Iancu in his *Les Juifs en Roumanie (1866–1919)*, Aix-en-Provence, 1978.

[22] The *Revue des Ecoles* (1901–04), and later the *Bulletin des Ecoles* (1910–14). From the 1920s onward, the schools were asked to subscribe to the periodicals of public education in France.

[23] See the A.I.U.'s *Instruction générale pour les professeurs*, Paris, 1903, which returned to the subject of the 1896 circulars on the teaching of moral values.

[24] The *Alliance* used almost all the funds of the Crémieux and of the Hirsch foundations — about two million gold francs — to build the infrastructure of its schools.

[25] See *Assemblée Générale . . .*, op. cit., p. 14.

[26] See Lucien Lazare, 'L'Alliance Israélite Universelle en Palestine à l'époque de la Révolution des Jeunes Turcs et la mission en Orient du 29 octobre 1908 au 19 janvier 1909', in *Revue des Etudes Juives*, vol. 138, 1979, pp. 307–35. It is worth noting here that for a long time the teaching of the Hebrew language was left to the local rabbis, whose training was often inadequate. On the other hand, many of the *Alliance*'s Hebrew teachers became renowned Hebraists: Nissim Béhar, David Yellin, and Eliezer Ben Yehuda (now acknowledged as having founded modern Hebrew), Yomtov Semach, Abraham Elmaleh, etc. Hebrew replaced French as the medium of teaching in Mikveh-Israel in 1925.

[27] That was the mission of Chief Rabbi Maurice Liber; his famous report was recently found among the private papers of Georges Leven (which were given to the *Alliance* by his grandson, Hubert Leven, in 1981). That report led to the establishment of the 'Ecole normale hébraïque' of Casablanca in 1946 by the vice-chairman (now President) of the A.I.U., Jules Braunschvig.

[28] Otsar Ha-Torah, an Orthodox network of elementary schools financed by American Jews, collaborated in the teaching of Hebrew in the A.I.U.'s schools in Iran.

[29] In Algeria, the decline in religious observance led the *Alliance* to establish Talmud Torah classes in Algiers, Oran, and Constantine. In Egypt, where well-to-do Jews sent their children to Christian missionary schools, the A.I.U. opened schools in prosperous districts of Cairo and Alexandria: see Narcisse Leven's speech, published in the A.I.U. Report, *Assemblée Générale du 29 Avril 1903*, Paris, 1903, pp. 47–49.

[30] The unsettled conditions in Morocco were stressed in the annual reports until 1911.

[31] See Mme Simone Backchine-Dumont's contribution, 'Les relations entre les communautés juives italiennes et libyennes', at the Sénanque colloquium mentioned above (Note 17).

[32] See Leven, op. cit., passim; Chouraqui, op. cit., passim; and the A.I.U.'s annual *Bulletins*.

[33] See the A.I.U. publication, *Réunion en faveur des Israélites de l'Orient tenue à Paris en décembre 1876*, Paris, 1877.

[34] The history of the Koenigsberg committee, which organized emigration, has yet to be fully written. The same is true of the history of the I.C.A., whose archives were transferred to Tel Aviv in 1980. On some episodes of the A.I.U.'s fight for Russian Jews, see Georges Weill, 'Histoire d'une infamie', in *N.C.*, no. 11, autumn 1967, pp. 6–28.

[35] See Michel Abitbol's contribution, 'La rencontre du Judaïsme de France avec les Juifs d'Afrique du Nord (1830–1912): analyse d'un discours', at the Sénanque colloquium mentioned above (Note 17).

[36] There were never any schools in Djerba or in Ethiopia. As for the Yemen, after Yomtov Semach's mission in 1910, the A.I.U. was ready to open a school in Sanaa, but the First World War intervened; see Georges Weill, 'Le Juif des Sables' in *N.C.*, no. 13–14, Spring/Summer 1968, pp. 8–22.

[37] See Paul Dumont.'La structure sociale . . .', op. cit., pp. 362–63; and his 'La condition juive en Turquie à la fin du XIX[e] siècle', in *N.C.*, no. 57, Summer 1979, pp. 25–38.

[38] See Paul Dumont, 'Une source pour l'étude . . .', op. cit., pp. 103 ff. Mme Sarah Leibovici has gathered material from school archives for the publication of several studies on the Jews of Tetouan in the nineteenth century.

[39] Michael Graetz, *Changes in the Consciousness of French Jewry from the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century to 1860* (in Hebrew), Ph.D. thesis, University of Jerusalem, 1972; Phyllis Cohen Albert, *The Modernization of French Jewry: Consistory and Community in the Nineteenth Century*, Hanover, New Hampshire, 1977; David Cohen, *La promotion des Juifs en France à l'époque du Second Empire*, 2 vols., Aix-en-Provence, 1980; Jonathan Helphand, *The Jews in France (1848–1870)*, Ph.D. thesis, University of New York, 1971; Michael Marrus, *The Politics of Assimilation. A Study of the French Jewish Community at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair*, London, 1971 (translated into French, *Les Juifs de France à l'époque de l'affaire Dreyfus. L'assimilation à l'épreuve*, Paris, 1972); Paula Hyman, *The Jews in post-Dreyfus France (1906–1939)*, New York, 1975; Nancy Green, *Class Struggle in the Pletzel: Jewish Immigrant Workers in Paris, 1881–1914*, Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1980; Danielle Delmaire, *L'antisémitisme de "la Croix du Nord" (1898–1899)*, thesis at the University of Lille, 1980; Laurent Bensaid, *Les Juifs de France de 1914 à 1930*, thesis at the University of Paris, 1981; and Roger Kohn, 'La communauté juive pendant le procès Zola', in *N.C.*, no. 57, Summer 1979, pp. 7–18.

[40] Fritz Stern, *Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire*, New York, 1977; and on German Jews see also Jacob Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland (1847–1871)*, Dusseldorf, 1977. Jacques Thobie, 'Les intérêts français dans l'empire ottoman au début du XX[e] siècle' in *Revue Historique*, fasc. 478, April–June 1966, pp. 381–96; Pawel Korzec, *Juifs en Pologne*, Paris, 1980, and Korzec, 'Les relations entre le Vatican et les organisations juives pendant la première guerre mondiale', in *Revue d'Histoire moderne et contemporaine*, vol. 20, 1973, pp. 301–33; E. Feldman, 'Les contacts entre l'Alliance Israélite Universelle et le secrétaire du Prince de Roumanie en 1867', in *Michael* (annual publication of Tel Aviv University),

vol. IV, 1976; and Willy Bok, 'Vie juive et communauté, une esquisse de leur histoire au vingtième siècle', in *La Grande Synagogue de Bruxelles. Contributions à l'histoire des Juifs de Bruxelles*, published by Communauté Israélite de Bruxelles, Brussels, 1978, pp. 151–68.

[41] Joan Roland, *The Alliance Israélite Universelle and French Policy in North Africa (1860–1918)*, Ph.D. thesis, University of Columbia, 1970, available in microfilm and xerox; Henri Chemouilli, *Une Diaspora méconnue: les Juifs d'Algérie*, Paris, 1976; Richard Ayoun, *Mahir Charleville*, Master's dissertation, University of Paris, 1973, and Richard Ayoun in collaboration with Bernard Cohen, *Les Juifs d'Algérie*, Paris, 1982. Simon Schwartzfuchs, 'Le Judaïsme algérien et le Consistoire Central', contribution at the 1982 Sénanque Colloquium mentioned above (Note 17). Jacques Taïeb, 'Les Israélites de Tunisie', in *N.C.*, no. 42, autumn 1975, pp. 3–21 and no. 45, Summer 1976, pp. 70–72; and Taïeb, *La Tunisie des premiers temps coloniaux*, Tunis, 1978. Lucette Valensi and Abraham Udovitch, 'Communautés juives en pays d'Islam', in *Annales*, no. 35, 1980, pp. 764–83. Sarah Leibovici, 'Tétouan: une communauté éclatée', in *N.C.*, no. 59, Winter 1979–80, pp. 11–22 and 'Le temps des retrouvailles', in *N.C.*, no. 62, Autumn 1980, pp. 32–38; and forthcoming, a book on the history of the Jewish community of Tetouan.

[42] Catherine Levigne, 'Le "Quai" et les débuts du sionisme', in *N.C.*, no. 50, Autumn 1977, pp. 50–55; and Catherine Levigne-Nicault, *La politique française à l'égard du sionisme (1896–1939)*, thesis at the University of Paris, 1979.

[43] This article is an abridged version of a paper I contributed to the Colloquium on Jewish communities held at Sénanque in May 1982. The translation from the French is by Judith Freedman.

THE PROPHECY AND POLITICS OF RUSSIAN JEWS 1862–1917

Lloyd P. Gartner

(Review Article)

THE Jewish ideologies of the left once had the power to inspire or to dismay and anger, but today's historian has the opportunity to scrutinize them dispassionately and fully. The ideologists, who interpreted and evaluated Jewish existence and proclaimed what had to be done to alter and remedy it, constituted a pressure group of forceful claimants to power, which they in many instances achieved. The Jewish social structure and conditions of life which shaped their consciousness no longer exist, and their ideologies, as systems of belief and prescriptions for action, no longer function. Constituent ideas, however, like still useful parts of an outworn engine, may be extracted in order to become components of another ideological engine, one which may move in quite a different direction.

Out of the motifs of the *Haskalah*, the Jews of western Europe built their Enlightenment ideology. It fitted into nineteenth-century liberalism and served well the cause of Jewish emancipation and integration within the host society. As a fighting faith, its climax came in 1848, and it continued to bloom during the 1860s and 1870s. But even then the socialist Jewish nationalism of Moses Hess in his *Rome and Jerusalem* could be heard by the very few who cared to listen. That book, published in 1862, provides the chronological starting point of Jonathan Frankel's study,* since it was not only Zionism which Hess foretold but also the main direction of subsequent Jewish politics and ideologies in eastern Europe.

Practically all the eastern European Jewish ideologies from the mid-nineteenth century until the end of the First World War were of the left, and the evocative words in the title of Professor Frankel's notable book — 'Prophecy', 'Politics', 'Socialism', and 'Nationalism'

*Jonathan Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism, and the Russian Jews, 1862–1917*, xxii + 686 pp., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, £30.00.

— suggest how potent these ideologies were to become among the Jewish masses in the Pale of Settlement. Many of the ideologists sprang from general leftist (equated in Tsarist Russia with 'revolutionary') movements, and they brought with them scorn for liberalism and the bourgeoisie. Considering how weak were both liberalism and the bourgeoisie in eastern European Jewry, this attitude was easy to assume. The new ideologies were also militantly secularist, although a few of their advocates showed some sentimental fondness for their religious upbringing and a grudging tolerance about the Orthodoxy of the masses. One of their fundamental conceptions was that the Jews were a people ruled like every other nation by discernible and analysable laws of history which accurately foretold their future.

The Jews of Russia and Galicia increased about fivefold during the nineteenth century — with the result that their median age was slightly under twenty in the census year of 1897. This demographic picture probably encouraged the spread of comprehensive ideologies, which gain their converts typically among the young. Most Jews also were so disastrously poor that they were nearly always hungry. There is nowadays a complete reversal: Jews nearly everywhere have an aging population and their material standard of living has improved so greatly that *Judennot*, Jewish neediness, has virtually disappeared as a force shaping Jewish ideologies.

The subject of Professor Frankel's massive, penetrating study is the Jewish ideologies of the left in Russia and their intimate relation with the birth and diffusion of Jewish politics, which proposed to solve the problems of the Jews by means of secular political action. From the starting point of 1862, when Hess's book was published, we are led through the beginning of Jewish politics in Russia in 1881–82, to culmination in 1917 — when the two Russian revolutions, the Balfour Declaration, and the American Jewish Congress showed the full development internationally of Jewish politics. Russia, Palestine, and the United States are the arenas Frankel scrutinizes.

Prophecy and Politics contains detailed intellectual portraits of five men, each of whom in his way synthesized socialism with Jewish nationalism: Moses Hess, Aaron Lieberman, Nachman Syrkin, Chaim Zhitlovsky, and Ber Borochov. Interwoven with these portraits are three historical chapters on revolutionary episodes, when ideologies acted clearly as historical forces. Of these, the first occurred during 1881–82, when an intelligentsia of newly committed young Russian Jews suddenly emerged during the pogroms and practically forced itself upon the weak, bewildered St Petersburg Jewish leaders. At that dramatic time, when hostility to the Jews became a fixed star in the Tsarist political constellation, mass emigration, a Jewish revolutionary movement, and Zionism (called at first *Hibbat Zion*) all became permanent features of eastern European Jewish life. Frankel provides a

brilliant narrative and analysis of this much-studied episode, when Jewish politics sprang to life and new aspirants from the intelligentsia challenged the established bourgeois leaders. His focus then turns to the complex ideological history of the Jewish revolutionary labour movement, out of which the Bund was founded in 1897. He notes that its historiography has been revised in recent years, to take account of the varieties of the Jewish labour movement outside its Vilna, and Russian, cradle. The important transition within the early movement, as now appears, was less that from Russian to Yiddish agitation, than from cultivating a select group of worker revolutionists to mass agitation among the entire Jewish proletariat. The young members of that intelligentsia turned homeward to the Jews, while seeking to retain their standing within the Russian revolutionary movement. Quite as much as internal developments, external forces also made these leaders 'Jewish'. The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party of Plekhanov and Lenin refused to recognize the Bund as the sole, autonomous representative of the Jewish workers, while the Polish revolutionary movement's demand that the Jewish movement in Russian Poland be Polish, not Russian, encouraged it to be simply Jewish. In his important book, *The Emergence of the Jewish Labour Movement in Russia* (in Hebrew; Tel Aviv, 1981), Professor Moshe Mishkinsky carries the revision further, seeing the revolutionary labour movement as essentially Jewish and national from its beginning.

Hardly had the Bund left the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, when the revolution of 1905 burst. For a few ecstatic months the young men and women of the Bund practically directed the local Jewish communities, whose traditional leaders were tossed aside by the revolutionary tide. The crushing of the revolution and of Jewish politics in Russia drove the revolutionary intelligentsia in two main directions, Palestine and the United States, and Frankel's study follows them. Of those who went to Palestine, the few who remained became the Second Aliyah of fame and folklore. They arrived during the Yishuv's economic doldrums, and they brought from Russia fixed ideas concerning the necessity of developing capitalism and a Jewish proletariat. The young ideologist-pioneers detested the Yishuv as they found it, and clashed repeatedly with its social and religious way of life. They were divided among themselves into the Borochovian Marxist *Poale Zion* and the somewhat more pragmatic and Hebraist *Hapoel Hatsair*. But capital did not flow into Palestine and the proletariat remained largely Arab, not Jewish. The outlook was discouraging, especially to young men and women who were emotionally and intellectually highly strung. Change came only around 1910, when the ideas brought from Russia were modified to allow co-operative agricultural settlement. With that step, controversial as it was then, the Second Aliyah began on the high but rocky

road to the economic and political control of the Yishuv which it was to gain in the 1930s.

While the members of the Second Aliyah thus decided to build their own sector of the economy rather than attempt to infiltrate that of others, their former revolutionary comrades, now in America, underwent the experience of leading an effective trade union movement. As socialists, however, they enjoyed little political success. But their voice was heard louder than anyone else's in the Jewish immigrant world, and their Yiddish cultural activity was impressive. Then during the First World War, the popular movement for an American Jewish Congress to express the will of the Jewish masses at the future Peace Conference virtually compelled the Jewish revolutionaries — if it was not already hyperbolic to call them that — to function, however squeamishly, as Jews within the Jewish community in opposing the Congress movement, often in alliance with the German Jewish capitalist patricians. With almost surgical precision, Frankel analyses in detail the manœuvres of middle-class Zionists, *Poale* Zionists, the patricians, and anti-Zionist Jewish socialists over what was, even in the short run, merely the election of delegates to an assembly which would meet perhaps twice. The immigrant Russian Jewish intelligentsia found itself pushed to the wall. Since its mass following perceived the issue as one of saving Jews and providing for their future, the leaders' abhorrence of national solutions and class collaboration had to be laid aside. (Frankel has published an even fuller analysis of that episode in the *Yivo Annual of Jewish Social Science*, vol. XVI, 1976, pp. 202–341.)

Prophecy and Politics is a study of majestic dimensions. To its approximately 380,000 words of text, which are interspersed with some nice contemporary photographs and cartoons, are added an abundant apparatus, a multi-lingual bibliography, and a thorough index. The technical work has been fastidious. What with its author shifting from country to country and from narrative to the analysis of ideological systems, the book is inevitably somewhat loose-jointed. However, Frankel never lets us lose sight of the thread — the rise of socialist nationalist Jewish ideologies in Russian Jewry and their relation to the intelligentsia who formulated them and led the movements which their creeds inspired. Summaries and transitional statements come periodically to the reader's aid. The book is clearly written and consistently argued and shows a scope as well as depth of learning which make it a most important and useful work.

Can one rightly use the term 'prophecy' for the Jewish politics of the left as practised in several lands? The ideologists' passion and faith came not from God but from their understanding of history. That understanding was faulty and over-confident, but it allowed them to shape much of the history of their time and after. It was not prophecy, but there was a great deal of fulfilment.

BOOK REVIEWS

DAVID DAUBE, *Ancient Jewish Law, Three Inaugural Lectures,* xii + 129 pp., E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1981, 48 guilders.

These lectures on Jewish law were given by Professor Daube at the invitation of the University of Judaism in Los Angeles to inaugurate the Norman and Sadie Lee Program in Jewish and Western Civilization. They are a most apt model of the kind of study which the Lee Program would like to foster. Proceeding from the mature mind of one of the most eminent of international lawyers (Daube is Emeritus Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford and currently Professor and Director of Roman and Hebrew Law Collections at Berkeley, California), they illustrate superbly the richness of understanding which accrues from examining biblical and talmudic law as dynamic systems within the context of a developing western — and in its earlier stages middle eastern — civilization. The written lectures, one must presume, have been somewhat expanded from the original, spoken version; they are also embellished with some excursus in which Professor Daube has incorporated material from notes he has accumulated over the years.

The first lecture is entitled 'Conversion to Judaism and Early Christianity', and in it Daube traces the development of Jewish conversion procedure. In the pre-Exilic period, he maintains, a man became Jewish by circumcision; a woman's description simply followed that of her father or husband. During the Exile, however, the minority status of Jews led to the introduction of 'baptism' for both males and females, signifying entry not only into the Abrahamic convenant (the Jewish *nation*) but into the Sinaitic one (the religious covenant). 'Rebirth', as symbolized by baptism, was an attractive possibility in the first century as now; Christians took advantage of this and, by relinquishing the circumcision requirement, were able to encourage mass conversions. Daube speculates on the other consequences of the 'rebirth' idea found in Judaism and early Christianity — the dissolution of previous ties, such as those of marriage or of family relationships, leading to much misunderstanding in the ancient world. In tracing the later evolution of rabbinic law on proselytization, Daube shows himself curiously unaware of the research already done in this field by such men as W. G. Braude and B. J. Bamberger, and indeed of recent trends in rabbinic scholarship; but his speculations, even when almost certainly wrong (for instance, his assertion that the 'main phases of the baptismal instruction recommended in the Talmud date

from the pre-Christian period' (p. 18)), are often more illuminating than the meticulous but unimaginative scholarship of others.

The second lecture carries the title 'Error and Ignorance as Excuses in Crime'. Ignorance as to circumstances is first used to exempt a criminal from punishment, according to Daube, in the Middle Assyrian Laws (second half of the second millenium BCE); in the field of religious taboos, however, it proved much more difficult to exculpate a transgressor. Daube sees it as a remarkable achievement of the Book of Numbers (one which the much later Septuagint and Vulgate could not keep up with) that, under the single heading of *sheghagha*, it subsumes 'various instances of accidental homicide, i.e. homicide not from error or ignorance but, say, where you aim a stone at a bird and it hits a person . . . henceforth, throughout the legal system, the word may denote any absence of evil intent as a basis for relief'. However, though the law came to recognize misinformation, whether as to fact or as to law, as a possible basis for relief from punishment, the situation with regard to the 'absence of deeper understanding' has always been and still is problematic. 'My people are destroyed for being without knowledge', proclaims Hosea — meaning, not that they are ignorant of circumstances or law, but that, as we might put it, 'they don't know any better', they suffer moral blindness. Does this suffice to free them from *legal*, as opposed to *moral*, responsibility for their actions? Psychoanalysis has been used in modern times to justify the mitigation of penal sentences; Daube traces back at least to Plato this tendency to modify judicial response in tune with the moral apperceptions of the offender. In Jewish and Jewish-Christian documents, however, he maintains that such arguments are used to invalidate accusations only 'before heaven', not under human law or ethics. 'In this life', he observes (p. 69), 'however flawed our intellect and emotions, we are responsible for our conduct towards our fellow-beings.'

The third lecture, 'The Form is the Message', is a masterly survey of the forms in which laws have been expressed and the significance of those forms. It owes nothing, notwithstanding the title, to Marshall McLuhan, but builds on the foundations laid down by Daube himself since as early as 1932, in particular in his paper on 'Forms of Roman Legislation' (1956). In a central section of the lecture he examines the three forms: (a) you shall (not), (b) you have heard, but I say . . . , and (c) one does (not). The first of these is characteristic of the Old Testament (though it is only one of the many forms utilized there), and is conspicuously absent not only from the New Testament but also from the Talmud, other than in quotations. It conveys the highest absolute authority, and permits neither casuistry nor the specification of penalties; the Ten Commandments are largely cast in this form, though the fifth ('Honour thy father . . .'), discussed at length by Daube, has what he calls the 'Wisdom' form. 'You have heard, but I say . . .' is

known through the Sermon on the Mount, and Daube has rabbinic analogies; it represents 'a fresh impulse on the one hand, a faithful acceptance of the traditional framework on the other' (p. 92). The third form is normal in Talmudic legislation, for example, 'One does not sell pagans bears or lions or anything dangerous' (Mishna Avoda Zara 1:7), rather than 'Do not sell . . .'. Revelation has ceased, 'the framework of right living is complete' (p. 80), the formulation 'constitutes a painstaking working out of the way of life an élite will pursue on the basis of the hallowed documents' (p. 92); it is not unlike society defining its mores by 'One wears a jacket for dinner' rather than 'You must wear . . .'.

With respect to the volume as a whole, it could well be said that 'the form is the message'. For, despite the length of the printed version, the chapters really are 'lectures'; they are Daube *talking* to us, and no summary of their content can convey the warmth, geniality, and human understanding which spring from every page. One finds Daube amongst the Samaritans (p. 7), Daube embarrassedly asking a prim female Scot librarian for a copy of the Kama Sutra (p. 116), Daube counselling his friend the late C. H. Dodd to complete his Life of Jesus instead of getting involved with the New English Bible (Dodd actually got both finished — p. 91). Daube himself writes (p. 119): 'Where I go wrong is in transferring what belongs in a live show to the printed page'. In a man with less breadth of scholarship and less amiable disposition, or one who did not know how to discipline his thoughts, this would be a fault; in Daube's case we can enjoy his easy mastery, his apt anecdotes, his constant and illuminating 'loose ends' which stimulate us to further thought and research.

I read this book with enormous pleasure. Specialists in any of the many fields it traverses will dispute points here and there, but I shall be surprised if anyone with a real love of learning will come away otherwise than refreshed, enriched, and invigorated.

NORMAN SOLOMON

RAPHAEL SAMUEL, *East End Underworld: Chapters in the Life of Arthur Harding*, xii + 366 pp., History Workshop Series, General Editor Raphael Samuel, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Boston, 1981, £11.50 (paperback, £6.95).

In the early 1960s, Raphael Samuel was engaged for a time on a study which eventually emerged after its completion and substantial reworking as 'Adolescent Boys of East London' by Peter Wilmott. Samuel abandoned his own work on the project at an early stage, dissatisfied because, as he put it at the time, the faces did not fit what he had written. This touchstone, that the 'facts' must fit the 'faces', and that if

they do not then we can be sure the facts are wrong, is somewhat rare in the annals of sociology. It testified to Samuel's conviction that both sociology and history, as commonly practised, somehow failed to achieve what should have been their purpose: the depiction and analysis of culture, community, and biography as they are lived.

Ten years later, Samuel was somewhat notorious for suffering from what one don referred to as 'folie d'incomplétude', an apparent compulsion to initiate ambitious projects which were never finished. Even in Oxford, it seems, true originality is meant to deliver the goods within a decade. However, by this time the lines of his achievement were becoming discernible. The History Workshop had been launched at Oxford's Ruskin College, and its annual meetings were the major stimulus to what has come to be called 'history from below' — the recovery from what E. P. Thompson has termed 'the enormous condescension of posterity' of at least some of the annals of working-class history. The pioneering series of History Workshop Pamphlets has now become the basis for a series edited and partly written by Samuel, of which this volume is the fifth. In short, by 1981, the feeling that history and sociology were at odds with human experience had found substantial expression in the development of oral history as a method of extending and deepening their range and sensitivity of recall.

In this book, several of Samuel's projects come to fruition: the use of oral history, the strength of his attachment to the East End of London, his own residence in what was once the heart of the Jewish East End, and his fascination with its working practices, one strand of which was crime. In Arthur Harding he has found an uncannily appropriate life, memory, and voice whereby these and other themes are articulated with an immediacy and resonance rarely, if ever, attained by the use of the methods of oral history. How those methods were employed and elaborated, how the interplay between 'author' and 'subject' was sustained and developed over several years, and how Samuel himself makes more developed analytical use of the wealth of material he has elicited, are questions reserved for a future companion volume. Hence, any review of the present book must be limited to what has been recalled, rather than to the processes whereby such recall has been accomplished and presented.

Arthur Harding could well have served as the original for 'Dicky Perrott', the tragic hero of Arthur Morrison's *A Child of the Jago*, published in 1896 when Arthur Harding would have been about 10 years old. The Nichol, a network of street, alleys, and courts in the heart of Hoxton, 'bore an evil reputation and was regarded by the working-class people of Bethnal Green as so disreputable that they avoided contact with the people who lived' there (p. 1). It was the archetypal 'dreadful enclosure', and Morrison's fictionalized account

of it as the Jago helped to perpetuate the view that the only source of alleviation from its miseries and squalor flowed from the struggles of the local vicar, Father Jay (who, as Father Sturt in the novel, cradles the dying Dicky in his arms but fails to elicit the name of his killer). The reality was naturally more complex and less sensational. Though the miseries and squalor were real enough, the Church served mainly as an extra source of occasional food and clothing, provided the recipients were 'deserving'. Charity still functioned as a form of control: 'You earned your ticket for your breakfast by going to Sunday School . . . If you missed Sunday School there would be no breakfast for a week' (p. 26). The small change of compliance was easily negotiated but the gulf between the givers and the receivers of alms was unbridgeable. The poor were then even shorter of options than now: casual or sweated labour, charity or crime. Petty thieving, especially from the slow-moving vans around the markets and stations, was part of Arthur's criminal apprenticeship. At the age of 15, he received 12 months' hard labour for stealing a bale of rags. From Wormwood Scrubs and a subsequent pioneering spell in the newly established Borstal system, he returned to Hoxton in 1904 'fitter, stronger, taller . . . something of a hero' (p. 74). His brief education at Barnardo's, his attempt to join the army, and his stretches 'inside' made him a more resourceful leader.

From 1904 until his two long sentences in Parkhurst (1911–16) and Dartmoor (1917–22), Arthur Harding enjoyed something of a heyday as a versatile East End villain. Pickpocketing, forgery, fraud, club and race-course protection were his main lines, and his detailed accounts of underworld life centre on that period, though his involvement and reputation tailed off only after his marriage in the mid-1920s. After the 1920s, his livelihood was dealing, and he acquired a shop in Brick Lane to serve as an outlet for clothing and jewellery bought in sweeps around the outer suburbs. He moved from Bethnal Green to Leyton in 1932. With a wife and three children, he broke contact with the underworld after being 'leant on' for money and forced to resort to the police for protection. After a few years of honest dealing, the police left him alone in turn. During the Second World War, he worked with the 'ghost' squad, who were set up to deal covertly with war-time rackets. After the war, he resumed his dealing until his shop was demolished in the mid-1950s.

It is extraordinarily difficult to know how much credence to give to his account of his life and times. This problem has only partially to do with the necessarily devious stratagems associated with crime. Emotion recollected in tranquility is a snare for more people than poets. Most of what Arthur has to say 'rings true', dangerous as it is to rely upon such a criterion. Paradoxically, the densest and most authentic-sounding passages relate to his childhood and adolescence. Here the descriptions tally with the bleaker and more astringent memoirs of

Jaspers' *A Hoxton Childhood*. Samuel, assisted by John Mason, has cross-checked and amplified hundreds of references to court appearances, criminal associates, locations, and personal references — the great bulk of which suggests a high degree of accuracy on Arthur's part. If doubts persist, it is partly because the narrative thins out rather drastically towards his period of going 'straight', and such episodes as that connected with the 'ghost' squad need far more detail if they are to sound more than self-glorifying tall stories. Moreover, there are several passages which pile on largely secondary detail while the meaning of what went on remains obscure. The need for some sort of commentary is especially strong in the chapter on vendettas. A bewildering array of feuds, fights, and struggles over what was presumably territory are recounted, but no real sense emerges of what was going on backstage. These are the kinds of issue I hope Samuel will address in his next volume, which will also contain more passages from Arthur's life. Perhaps Samuel cannot answer the difficult question of how far *his* own Jewish background led Arthur to over-emphasize his sympathies for Jewish, and 'half Jewish', rivals and accomplices, and play down his involvement with Mosleyism. One bonus, however, is the rich coverage of the Jewish underworld before the First World War and in the inter-war period.

That said, what has been achieved? The answer has to be: more than one would have imagined possible. What was virtually unknown terrain, apart from a few rather unfocused memoirs, and decidedly all too focused and slanted police biographies (cited with much derision by Arthur, mostly justifiably) is now staked out. Huge gaps exist, but at least there is a frame to those gaps. The East End may now be but a shadow of its former state, with its population shrunk by more than half from before the War, the complex family networks dispersed, and those who remain pitted against high-rise flats and the decay of docking and other traditional industries. But it is not yet a burnt-out case, and its tumultuous history is most aptly pieced together by such means as those employed here. And much that is recorded has strong continuity with the present: the coexistence of strong labourism with a conservatism that breeds ethnocentrism and bully-boy fascism; a simultaneous sympathy for, and opposition to, ethnic immigrant groups; extensive police-criminal collusion despite strong enmity; and a fierce pull to stay in the area combined with a clear determination to leave it.

The story is especially rich on the 'Jago' from the inside, with its reminder that even in the depths most families had some links with, and aspirations for, respectability. The extent and the character of collusion between criminals and police are convincingly spelt out, particularly in the context of illegal street betting. Without such collusion, it is not only difficult to understand how gambling could have been pursued on so large a scale, it is also significant that — apart

from pay-offs — the police gained an easier path to acceptance in the rougher working-class areas through the tacit connivance of key underworld figures such as Arthur. For example, in the wake of the anarchist shootings of 1911, a commonplace fight over gambling in a street-market turned into a panic-ridden stampede, with costly claims for damages against the police being made by stall-holders. Arthur and friends took up a police entreaty to 'say it was an ordinary crowd, and the stampede had started by people losing their tempers and pushing against each other . . . The police came out of it with flying colours. . . . After a few weeks, things went back to normal' (p. 178).

Such antinomies are characteristic of East End life, and Arthur's account is studded with them. They consist of a simultaneous striving for, and aversion to, one or other of such polarities as: 'roughness' versus respectability; excitement versus a 'quiet life'; sympathy for minority groups (Jews, West Indians, anarchists) versus ethnocentric hostility (working with Mosley); and solidarity (not 'grassing') versus survival ('grassing' when crime gets too close to home). It is because of, not despite, the contradictions that this book is so profuse a source of understanding not simply crime, nor poverty, nor the East End (any one of which would be achievement enough), but how people make sense of their lives. The illustrations show that Samuel was right to 'trust' the faces.

DAVID DOWNES

SHEILA SAUNDERS, *A Study of Domestic Violence: Battered Women in Israel*, 22 pp, Anglo-Israel Association, 9 Bentinck Street, London, W1M 5RP, 1982, 75p. plus p. & p.

The author was awarded a Wyndham Deedes Travel Scholarship in 1980 and spent two months in Israel. At the time of her study, there were only two refuges (in Haifa and Herzlia) for battered women and their children, and a third was to be opened in Jerusalem. The Haifa *miklat* (shelter) was established in November 1977 with the financial help of an anonymous donor. A flat was rented in a residential area by five active feminists who were concerned with 'women's problems'. When the tenancy agreement expired a year later, only the tenacity of the organizers and of the battered women themselves who occupied the upper floors of another building won them government help to acquire the premises. Apparently, this was achieved by alerting 'the entire Israeli media to interview them and hear their story . . . and a lot of favourable publicity was gained' (p. 8). (In this context, see the reference to the importance of the media in the article on public protest in Israel in the present issue of this Journal.)

The majority of those in the Haifa refuge are Jewish, but there are also some Arab women (both Christian and Muslim). They are expected to remain in the shelter for a maximum of three months, but if

they can find nowhere else to go they are allowed to stay longer. The Haifa *miklat* also provides a counselling service for women who are exposed to physical violence but who do not need accommodation.

The Herzlia shelter was founded by a local resident who was horrified when she read the report of a man who had killed his wife in 1977 and had pleaded in court: 'I never thought she would die . . . she was used to being beaten by me.' The then mayor of Herzlia was approached; he agreed that his municipality would pay the rent for a shelter and would provide for preliminary expenses, and in April 1978 the *miklat* was opened. Some months later, the Ministry of Welfare made grants for a social worker and two other part-time workers to be employed, while fund-raising activities supplied the extra income needed. All the residents help in turn with domestic chores.

In both the Haifa and the Herzlia shelters, the women are encouraged to take part in discussions among themselves as well as with counsellors. Sadly, there are occasions when they 'sometimes resort to using violence against each other, they know no other way of relating or working through their frustrations. What happens in these situations is that other women challenge the use of violence, forcing the aggressor to look at her own behaviour' (p. 10).

The author interviewed ten women in the Haifa refuge and tells us that they answered individually and collectively all the questions in the questionnaire (which is reproduced at the end of her short pamphlet). It would have been interesting for readers to learn something about the country of birth and the occupation of the husbands, whether these men had seen their own mothers being beaten by their fathers, and whether the women's own kin had offered any support — points which are raised in the questionnaire. She does say that in the Herzlia *miklat* one young woman told her that her husband did not think it wrong to beat her, since his father had beaten his mother.

The Haifa women stated that their children were also beaten, sometimes seriously enough to require hospital treatment. Two of the ten residents said that the men had beaten them before they were married. All of them had left their husbands at least once before, but had returned to them. All of them said that they had endured severe and regular beatings, and some were engaged in divorce proceedings. They were all grateful to have found a shelter where they and their children were physically safe and where they also received emotional comfort. One woman, a Russian-born concert pianist, said that now she could laugh, now she never cried, she danced and sang to entertain the others; and another said that she used to shout all the time but now she was calmer.

The author concludes her brief study by stressing the importance of using all the provisions of the law in order to protect the victims of violence, and cites the case of a woman from the Herzlia *miklat* who was

murdered by her husband while he was out on bail; the judge had rejected the police request that he be remanded in custody. Finally, it may come as a surprise to many that in Israel a man can be found criminally guilty of raping his own wife, and that there were at least two such convictions, one in September 1980 in Jerusalem and another in May 1981 in Haifa.

J. FREEDMAN

M. WEINFELD, W. SHAFFIR, and I. COTLER, eds., *The Canadian Jewish Mosaic*, viii + 511 pp., John Wiley & Sons, Rexdale, Ontario, 1981, $27.95.

The editors of this book undertook an ambitious task, and an Introduction and twenty-one contributions give a varied and often original view of Canadian Jewry. The reader will be grateful for the diversity of the approaches. The first part of the volume is historical; the second deals with social and political institutions; the third is entitled 'Beyond the Mainstream' and includes essays on the poor, the old, and on Chassidic communities in Montreal; the fourth is on culture and ideology; and the last considers 'Challenges for the Future'. Unfortunately, all the contributions are not written by specialists in the subject, and are too often of an anecdotal nature. Nevertheless, they do present numerous data on matters which are not well known or which have not been available so far in published form.

Shaffir and Weinfeld in their Introduction consider a major question which recurs throughout the collection of essays which follow. Are Canadian Jews, who numbered less than 300,000 in 1971 (that is, less than the total of Jews in the city of Los Angeles alone), truly distinguishable from the Jews of the United States? There are certainly some differences. First, their concentration, since two-thirds of them live in Montreal and Toronto. Second, they are 'more Jewish' because a higher proportion of them than of United States Jews speak Yiddish (50,000 said in 1971 that Yiddish was their mother tongue); they are more orthodox, since 40 per cent of all Canadian Jews who are members of a synagogue belong to the Orthodox movement, while only 15 per cent (against 30 per cent of American Jews) are members of Reform synagogues. On average, Canadian Jews are also nearer (in terms of generations in North America) to their European origins; in 1971, 40 per cent of them were born outside Canada. But differences are also to be found in more important aspects. The Jewish community of Montreal, numbering about 100,000, lives in a city with a francophone majority, in the midst of the problems which Quebec nationalism has raised in recent years; and Canada, unlike the United States, is a land where ethnicity (for example, bilingualism) has always been largely accepted. One should also note that there were in Montreal in the early 1970s some 11,000 North African-born Jews,

francophones, about whom Jean-Claude Lasry writes in 'A Francophone Diaspora in Quebec'.

Two of the studies in the historical section deserve particular attention, because they reveal facts which have been largely obscured in earlier works. Irving Abella and Harold E. Troper, in '"The Line Must Be Drawn Somewhere": Canada and Jewish Refugees, 1933–39', show that during that period the Canadian government which was then led by Mackenzie King did its best to restrict the immigration of Jewish refugees; it admitted only about 4,000 while Great Britain took in 85,000 and 'even penurious Mexico and Colombia had each accepted about 20,000' (p. 51). The Canadian government had alleged economic exigency, but had also been influenced by pressure from the extreme right, especially in Quebec. Gerald E. Dirks, in 'The Canadian Rescue Effort: The Few Who Cared', tells of the struggle which both Jews and non-Jews waged against that policy.

In the second part of the volume, there is a good study by Leo Davids of the Jewish family; he shows that it has become child-centred, while the reproduction rate is low; and that as far as shifts and problems are concerned, there are few differences between Jewish families in Canada and in the United States. There is a contrast, however, in the field of Jewish education, which flourishes much more in Canada; Yaacov Glickman, in 'Jewish Education: Success or Failure?', believes that this is so largely because of the autonomous religious and linguistic structures of Canada.

In the third part of this collection, Jim Torczyner deals with a subject which has so far been neglected, 'To Be Poor and Jewish in Canada', a neglect which is surprising since in 1971 one sixth of Montreal's Jews (about 17,000 of them) 'were poor according to contemporary government definitions' (p. 179). He points out that in Montreal in 1978 'roughly ten cents of every fund-drive dollar went to support the essential needs of the Jewish poor' and goes on to ask (p. 185): 'Who decides — and on what basis — that money should be spent on scholarships for camps, schools, and the YMHAs rather than on essential relief?' He also notes that approximately 60 per cent of the funds collected go to Israel.

It is not only in the final section entitled 'Challenges for the Future' that the question of survival of the Jewish community in Canada predominates. This constant preoccupation is evident in many of the other contributions; it is a valid concern, but it also has an unfortunate effect, an excessive scientific ethnocentrism which obscures comparative perspectives. Thus, Morton Weinfeld in 'Intermarriage: Agony and Adaptation' tells us that it is mainly Catholics with whom Jews intermarry, in Quebec, but he does not touch upon the possibility that other religious or ethnic groups also might be facing and studying the problems of intermarriage.

Harold M. Waller and Morton Weinfeld's 'The Jews of Quebec and "Le Fait Français"' is a well-balanced analysis, except for their stress on the fact that the ruling Parti Québécois (P.Q.) has socialist policies while Jews generally prefer to practise free enterprise, and the implication that one of the consequences of the P.Q.'s victory has been a decline in the value of the Canadian dollar! They also point out that the P.Q. has a pro-Arab wing and that the language problem presents considerable difficulties since in 1971, 93 per cent of Montreal-born Jews said they spoke English at home. One could have wished for a more even-handed approach here. After all, Harold Waller's interesting essay on 'Power in the Jewish Community', in the second part of the volume, showed how some Jewish financiers and industrialists constitute an establishment which controls communal institutions, and that these men are nearly all English-speaking and are linked both to the United States establishment and to the English-speaking Canadian establishment. Indeed, one Canadian Jewish industrialist, who is an important communal leader, threatened on the eve of the victory of the Parti Québécois to transfer all his corporate holdings out of Quebec if the P.Q. should win the election.

However, even if some of the contributions may be criticized for a lack of rigour, *The Canadian Jewish Mosaic* is a most useful addition to our knowledge of Canadian Jews.

JACQUES GUTWIRTH

S. J. WOOLF, ed., *Fascism in Europe*, vi + 408 pp., Methuen, London and New York, 1981, £11.50 (paperback, £5.95).

It is something of a treat to be presented with the opportunity to review the second edition of a book that one praised when it first appeared. Has it survived the test of time? What changes have been made and to what effect? My second impressions like the first are favourable.

The first edition, published in 1960, was based on a series of lectures and seminars held at Reading University. If the need was obvious, the enterprise was nevertheless daring. There were individual studies of twelve countries; in this way movements and regimes could be included. Stuart Woolf, the editor, refrained from imposing a framework upon the contributors. Instead he outlined a basis for comparison, Hugh Trevor-Roper provided an overview, and there was a concluding essay on contemporary fascist movements by Christopher Seton-Watson. The strength of the book rested upon what was brought together in one volume and upon the quality of the individual contributions.

The present edition includes six new country-based essays; those on Italy, France, and Britain are by the original contributors while Paul Preston has replaced Hugh Thomas on Spain. Studies of Belgium and

Denmark are new to this edition but Portugal has been dropped. The general essays by Woolf and Seton-Watson have been revised, as has the contribution on Poland.

The basic test of a new edition is the editor's own contribution. Woolf draws attention to the complexities of fascism: its nationalistic and particularistic character in contrast to its international claims; the development of fascism as a bulwark against socialism in industrialized countries and the emergence of fascist movements in economically backward ones; despite the centrality of the *Führenprinzip*, fascism was unable to produce outstanding leaders in many countries; fascist ideology stressed modernity while its rituals were rooted in the past; and the fascist movements drew their strength from the petty bourgeoisie but fascist regimes turned to the industrialists and landowners for support. The point is that while generalizations are possible, explanations are bound to national peculiarities.

This does not mean that comparisons are unhelpful and Woolf suggests three distinctions: between fascism in western Europe and fascism in central and eastern Europe; between fascist movements and fascist regimes; and in the changes in the nature of fascism from the 1920s to the end of the Second World War. It is in maintaining the first distinction that the most difficulties are encountered — not least owing to the complexities cited. Woolf has extended his discussion, sharpening the original distinction which now stands as 'between the core of industrialized countries and most other states of Europe economically dependent on the West and with relatively "traditional" social structures'.

It is not surprising given this approach that the emphasis is on the development and performance of singular fascisms. Perhaps the most consciously comparative contribution is Andreski's study of Poland. Nor is it surprising that it is Woolf who takes explicit account of the methodological implications of his comparative distinctions for his essay on Italy. The first is the need for a dual perspective on the development of Italian fascism. Italian fascism emergent served in many respects as a model. Italian fascism matured was displaced as a model; the changes in the status among European fascisms and European states had consequences in turn for its own development. Second, interpretations of Italian fascism have tended to focus on either movement or regime, and particularly the former until relatively recently. Woolf reasons that although the contrast between claims and achievements is greater for Italian fascism than for German Nazism, the continuity between movement and regime argues against any simplified separation.

Woolf's essay is informed by the prodigious amount of research that has been carried out on Italian fascism since the book first appeared. For example, he discusses the debate about the origins of the Italian

crisis upon which the fascists capitalized. Or more specifically, whether the First World War was a manifestation of the structural weaknesses in Italian society or a disjuncture in the course of Italian political and economic development. Woolf comes down on the side which emphasizes the impact of the war. In negative terms, the pre-war weaknesses were not peculiar to Italy and if the ingredients for a fascist ideology were available they were without a catalyst. It is necessary to take into account the polarizing effects of the war and the creation of political consciousness. This is not meant to imply that the fascists were merely spectators, for if the war created the conditions the fascists had the means to exploit them.

One of the strengths of Woolf's original essay was the attention that he devoted to the fascists in power. The years 1925 to 1932 were singled out as the period of the rise and decline of the attempt to fashion an authoritarian state. The present discussion has been extended to include the struggles between the 'intransigent' and 'revisionist' wings of the party between October 1922 and January 1925 and to take account of the consequences of the world economic crises on the corporate state and on the party.

The last few years have also seen the growth of a considerable amount of research and a rigorous debate on the nature of Francoism. Hugh Thomas viewed the Franco regime as a military one. Others have described the regime as authoritarian rather than fascist, or argue that only the Falange properly qualifies. According to Paul Preston, however, these interpretations detract from the need to examine the fascist characteristics of other groups and of the regime itself. One consequence is to virtually relegate fascism to a period of about one year. A second consequence is to exorcise atrocities committed in the course of the civil war and its aftermath. Preston compares Spain with fascist Italy, noting the differences. But these are outweighed by the resemblances — particularly the economic, social, and political circumstances of the two regimes. Since fascism was also a response to crises, most of the Preston analysis is devoted to the nature and development of Spanish capitalism. The result is a brisk but stimulating and valuable essay.

For me, the most interesting new essay is Robert Skidelsky's contribution on Great Britain. There was no account of the British Union of Fascists in the original collection. Instead, Sir Oswald Mosley's political and intellectual development up to 1932 was traced by Skidelsky in detail and with skill. The approach made sense at the time, in that British fascism was identified with Mosley and the BUF was his movement and in that Skidelsky's own work was only that far advanced. It did, however, stand apart from the other essays. Now with a full-length and inevitably controversial biography of Mosley behind him (and presumably out of his system), Skidelsky has contributed a

balanced and reflective analytical account. He does of course deal once again with Mosley's 'mission' and also provides a summary of the history of the BUF as well as a discussion of the roles of violence and antisemitism. The failure of the BUF is credited to its own tactical mistakes, the nature of the British political system, the character of the social structure, and the economic and international circumstances.

Tactically, according to Skidelsky, the BUF had to bear the responsibility for violence and public disorder. Three points are considered in reference to the political system: the lack of political ideas contributing to fascism; the efficiency and competency of the parliamentary system; and its legitimacy. In regard to the social structure, no important social group was excluded from the political system, thus creating what Skidelsky describes as the 'social basis of the successful MacDonald–Baldwin politics of accommodation and decency'. Finally, Mosley's predicted economic crises failed to materialize.

If I have dwelled upon the BUF, it is not only because Skidelsky's analysis now appears more in accord with my own. It is also because I think that this short essay is better value than the biography.

The extent to which fascism in Europe between the two World Wars was a response to crises opens up speculation about neo-fascism. Trevor-Roper concludes his essay on the note that the essential conditions of fascism are absent. These are an economic crisis, the threat of proletarian revolution, and 'the unifying patronage of a dominant industrial power'. This stands in need of revision not only because he is wrong on the first count but because his explanation of the second may well be fascinating. Fortunately Christopher Seton-Watson, whose brief is fascism in contemporary Europe, is not so complacent. In the first edition he attributed the lack of success of neo-fascist movements to rising affluence, the American provision against communist aggression and subversion, and stable and effective government. Conditions have changed, but despite an economic crisis fascist movements are not posing a threat comparable to that of their predecessors. In part, the most severe effects of economic decline and uncertainty are ameliorated by a welfare state. And an element of political crisis is also necessary for fascism to prosper. According to Seton-Watson, there are three possibly interrelated antidotes: political stability, strong administration, and an effective conservative party. Given the attempts to dismantle welfare states and the warnings of social scientists about ungovernability, governmental overload, and the disabling consequences of adversary politics, the explanation loses some of its plausibility. Indeed, Seton-Watson concludes that a conjuncture of certain conditions could promote a fascist resurgence. Meanwhile if, like the BUF, the neo-fascists do not pose a threat to the state, they do threaten groups and individuals.

ROBERT BENEWICK

CORRESPONDENCE

Israel Finestein, who was a member of the Board of Deputies of British Jews from 1945 to 1972, makes the following comments:

Historians of Anglo-Jewry will be grateful to Dr Gideon Shimoni and Dr Stuart Cohen for their pioneering researches concerning Selig Brodetsky and the 'ascendancy of Zionism' among British Jews during the period 1939–45. Dr Shimoni's article in this Journal (vol. 22, no. 2, December 1980) and that of Dr Cohen (vol. 24, no. 1, June 1982) raised important questions about Brodetsky's role and evoked certain impressions of the man and the nature of his influence.

By temperament and conviction, Brodestsky shared Chaim Weizmann's pragmatic approach to politics. The perils of his time gave him a heightened sense both of the urgency with which the practical work of Zionism should be pursued and of the need to be seen to sustain the fruits of emancipation. His training and associations gave him a profound respect for English institutions and for Jewish institutions founded on English models. His birth and upbringing disinclined him to seek entry into any of the magic circles from which communal leaders tended to emerge in his generation. In his combination of qualities and instincts, he was a man apart from many of the principal protagonists in the communal scene — in both the Zionist and the non-Zionist camps.

There is always an inherent difficulty in assessing the respective proportions of influence exercised by any public figure and by the events in which he participated. In the case of Brodetsky, the difficulty is the greater because inevitably his efforts to keep within what he regarded as proper bounds Lavy Bakstansky's 'Group' at the Board were made largely behind the scenes. In many contentious debates at the Board, Brodetsky as a political Zionist found himself in agreement with the leaders of the 'Group'. This put him on the defensive. The result was that those who shared the outlook of the Anglo-Jewish Association or the approach of Agudas Israel sometimes relegated him to the rank of an ambivalent politician or saw him as a weak and malleable President. He was also placed under considerable strain. As chairman of the Board, he was lack-lustre. His platform talents, impressive elsewhere, achieved little there.

Brodetsky's impact on Zionism in England cannot be measured only by reference to the post-1939 period. Nor did your learned contributors suggest any such limitation. One has to consider the entire nature of his previous public career. He was an unprecedented figure in the community's history, a kind of folk personality among wide sections of Anglo-Jewry, especially in the provinces. His innumerable addresses to Jewish audiences up and down the land were on his part a deliberate educational course for the community in Zionist thought and formulation. His youthful spectacular academic achievements, his professorship at an early age as well as his early prominence in the World Zionist Organization, his foreign birth and Yiddish banter, and his natural approachability made him the first popular hero on a national scale in

Anglo-Jewry. No other local Zionist attained anything like the effect on Jewish public opinion which he exercised in the 1920s and 1930s. For many, he gave to simple enthusiasms the respectability of academic standing. His special status came ultimately from shared elemental sources, with their spring in eastern European Jewish life.

His personal career greatly encouraged the belief that outspoken political Zionism was no fetter to professional advancement. It is not easy today to appreciate the significance of this in the context of communal life fifty and sixty years ago. Brodetsky was well aware of the importance of his example in this connection. The effect of it generally, and in individual cases, was a notable element in the growth of Zionism in England, particularly of the General Zionist and undoctrinal variety which he made his own.

He was always sensitive to the criticisms ceaselessly levelled at him for holding at one and the same time the office of President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and that of head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency in London. His retention of the latter position made him all the more anxious to maintain the visibly representative character of the Board. He was acutely conscious of the desirability that the Board be deemed by all to speak to the British Government for Anglo-Jewry and that it should not be associated in the public mind with other, or any sectional, interests. He regarded the suggestion that he should cease to hold one office or the other as implying that an English Jew could not properly be a Zionist, a notion which he wholly rejected. In his public speeches, however, he generally took care to state in which capacity he spoke; but his critics held such caution to be ineffective.

If he was at one with the 'Group' on the Biltmore Programme, he was at odds with its leaders over the price which he thought the Board paid for the methods they had adopted — methods which encouraged the image of outside influences. He believed that if the Board addressed the Government with a Zionist voice, then the fact that in its counsels were men of differing schools of thought would strengthen its effect, especially if those men belonged to the main tradition of earlier Jewish public relations. He regarded the withdrawal of some prominent representatives of that tradition, following the dissolution of the Conjoint Committee in 1943, as a weakening of the Board, although a significant number of that body of opinion remained.

Bakstansky thought that Brodetsky was naive in this respect, since those who were opposed to pressing for the Biltmore Programme and were aggrieved about Zionist dominance at the Board would in any event maintain their vocal criticism; Brodetsky's sensitivity, if given full effect, was likely to blur the Board's expressions of policy. Bakstansky had no wish to cause men of the old school to leave the Board, provided he could be sure that the Board's Zionist policy would be publicly stated. He did not share the particular respect felt by Brodetsky (connected with many personal and communal factors) for the *savoir faire* and for the *noblesse oblige* attitudes of the old families. I believe that Brodetsky thought that the upbuilding of the Yishuv, the advocacy of substantial Jewish imigration in Palestine, and the retention of the British connection could at that time provide the basis for a wide measure of agreement between the various principal bodies of opinion inside and outside the Board, without a rejection by any of them of eventual statehood as a goal. The two men were consequently in a state of mutual exasperation.

CHRONICLE

Last September, at the Jewish New Year, the population of Israel stood at just over four million: 4,038,000 — 3,354,000 Jews and 684,000 non-Jews (including 100,000 East Jerusalem Arabs, but not those on the West Bank and in the Gaza strip). The total population increased over the previous year by 45,000 Jews and 18,000 non-Jews, representing growth rates respectively of 1.4 per cent and 2.8 per cent. An estimated 17,000 residents left the country and some 13,000 new immigrants arrived.

*

The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of Israel has a bureau in New York which seeks to attract Israeli professionals resident in North America by providing them with details of employment opportunities in Israel. In 1981, 1,121 persons used the services of the bureau to return to Israel, 104 fewer than in 1980. However, with the worsening economic situation in the United States and Canada, more Israelis have been considering going back home. At the end of 1981, the bureau had a computerized file with detailed data about 2,432 persons and partial information about a further 1,300.

A growing number of employers in Israel in the field of computers and electronics and in science-based industries have also been using the bureau's services. A large proportion of the 2,432 registered applicants hold Ph.D. degrees and more than half have lived out of Israel for more than seven years. The bureau arranges meetings between the candidates and prospective employers visiting North America; it also provides standing loans to candidates to pay for 50 per cent of travel expenses to Israel for job-seeking pilot trips and if the candidate returns to settle in Israel, the loan becomes a grant. About 80 per cent of those who took advantage of the loan did in fact resettle in Israel. More than half of those who returned in 1981 had been resident abroad for less than four years.

*

The Minister of Tourism of Israel stated last July that there were 55,000–60,000 workers in the tourist industry in 1981. In that year, 'tourists stayed an average of 22 nights in Israel, putting the country in third place in world statistics, after Australia and India.' Jerusalem accommodated the largest number, with two million bed nights; Tel Aviv, 1.7 million; Eilat, 710,000; and Netanya, 690,000 bed nights. There are now 305 tourist hotels, which provide 25,800 rooms.

In 1981, 308,000 visitors came from North America, a six per cent drop on the number in 1980. On the other hand, there was a slight increase in the number of European tourists, who totalled 719,000. Germany led with 160,000, an increase of two per cent over 1980 when it also headed the list;

France came in second place, with 149,000 (an increase of seven per cent); while British tourists followed with 146,000 (a four per cent increase).

Tourism has been for many years Israel's prime source of foreign currency. Direct income from visitors in 1981 totalled about £543 million; for the population as a whole, this represents a per capita income of £140.

The Ministry of Tourism is now making special efforts to promote domestic tourism, with the slogan 'This year, we'll tour Israel'. Various resorts are offering holidays at reduced prices, and it is hoped that by taking vacations at these resorts rather than abroad, Israelis would not only enjoy a cheaper holiday but would also save their country much needed foreign currency.

*

The chairman of the Aliya and Absorption Committee of the Knesset was in England last July. He stated that British Jews are among the best immigrants in Israel: only 10 per cent of them returned to their native country within two years following their emigration, while 40 per cent of immigrants from the United States did so within that period.

*

The Youth Department of the World Zionist Organization has arranged holidays in Israel during this past summer for some 6,000 young people from nine countries; they range in age from 15 to the early twenties. According to a report in *The Jerusalem Post* of 26 August 1982, 'the aim of the holidays is to strengthen Jewish culture throughout the Diaspora and ultimately to promote immigration to Israel'. There were about 150 different holidays, in the course of which the young visitors not only toured the country or stayed in kibbutzim but also took part in seminars.

The co-ordinator of these organized holidays asserted: 'Our educational programmes are playing a vital role in strengthening the Jewish community abroad.' Arrangements have been made for other groups of young people to come in the winter to Israel under this scheme.

*

The Summer 1982 issue of *Les Cahiers de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle, Paix et Droit* has a report on the allocation of scholarships and loans to students. The A.I.U.'s Commission des Bourses et Prêts d'études supérieures gave loans to 62 young men and women during the academic year 1981–82 to enable them to pursue their university studies. The total amount was provided from the income of various Foundations established under the auspices of the A.I.U. and of the American Friends of the *Alliance*.

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At Bar-Ilan University, last June, students were awarded 1,200 Bachelor's degrees, 250 Master's degrees, and 25 doctorates; 75 received diplomas in teaching, translation, and library science.

Two new chairs have been established in the Faculty of Agriculture of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; one is in soil and water sciences and the other is a chair in agricultural entomology. The University also has a new chair in humanistic studies, in the Faculty of Humanities, and the first incumbent is a professor in the Department of English literature.

*

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem announced last April the creation of a Centre for the Study of Antisemitism; it will carry out research into the roots and history of antisemitism and will also make comparative studies of contemporary antisemitism. The founding committee of the Centre is chaired by the head of the Holocaust Studies Section of the University's Institute of Contemporary Studies and includes professors of Jewish History, Political Science, Psychiatry, and International Relations. The Centre hopes to co-operate with other institutions of higher learning both in Israel and abroad.

*

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem established in 1980 a Teaching Centre of the Heritage of Sephardi and Oriental Jews. Students who wish to specialize in this field are offered graduate and undergraduate courses in Ladino (Judeo-Spanish), History of the Jewish People, History of Muslim Countries, Jewish Thought, Jewish Folklore, Hebrew Language and Literature, Arabic Language and Literature, Italian Language and Literature, Iranian Studies, Musicology, and Art History.

According to the April 1982 issue of *Jewish Cultural News*, a publication of the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress, 'there are 62 MA and Ph.D. dissertations being written on topics directly related to the heritage of Oriental and Sephardi Jews'.

*

Christian News From Israel, a quarterly published by the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Israel, announced (in vol. 27, no. 4, 1982) the inauguration of the Jerusalem Institute for Research and the Promotion of Interreligious Relations. The founder and director of the Institute stated that its goals were 'the dissemination of information on Judaism among the religious communities in the country and among Christian pilgrims and visitors from abroad, and the holding of interreligious encounters between Christian and Orthodox Jewish leaders, based on mutual tolerance and respect'.

*

The 1981 *Annual* of the Social, Cultural, and Educational Association of the Jews in the People's Republic of Bulgaria includes the following articles, printed in English: 'Thirteen Centuries Since the Foundation of the Bulgarian State and the Bulgarian Jews' by David Cohen (pp. 57–71); 'Information about the Jews in the Principate of Bulgaria in the Bulgarian Diary of Irecheck', for the years 1879–1884, by Rusi Rusev (pp. 73–78); 'Information about the Plagues in the Balkans, XV–XIX Centuries, According to Jewish Sources' by Nikolai Tsvjatkov (pp. 79–84); and 'Data Concerning the

Demographic Situation of the Bulgarian Jews (1887–1940)' by Astruc Kalev (pp. 85–96).

There is also a series of Sephardi anecdotes collected by Isak Moscona; they are printed in Djudezmo (the Judeo-Spanish spoken by Bulgarian Jews) and in English translation (pp. 97–122).

*

The Chief Rabbi of Romania is reported to have stated in Washington last August that there are about 32,000 Jews left in Romania, more than half of whom are over the age of sixty and too old to leave the country. Some 372,000 Romanian Jews emigrated to Israel in the three decades following the establishment of the State. In 1980, 667 were allowed to leave; in 1981, 394: and 1,204 in the first seven months of 1982.

The Chief Rabbi said that the Romanian government opposes emigration, but has made an exception in the case of Jews because of the suffering they underwent during the Holocaust.

*

The Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), a world-wide Jewish migration agency, published its Annual Report for 1981 last July. In 1981, HIAS helped 12, 859 refugees to find new homes; of these, 6,720 were Soviet Jews and 3,909 were non-Jews (mainly from Asia). The agency has offices in 47 countries and spent eleven and a half million dollars in that year; the sum included grants from the American Government which covered the total costs of helping to resettle non-Jewish refugees and partially covered the cost of helping Jewish migrants.

*

The Jerusalem International Convention of Hungarian Jews is organizing a meeting in Jerusalem in April 1984. According to *The Jerusalem Post* of 30 July 1982, it 'aims at highlighting the contribution of Hungarian Jews in all fields, and preserving and transmitting to future generations the 1,000-year heritage of Hungarian Jewry. It will include workshops and discussions as well as tours of kibbutzim founded by Hungarian immigrants'.

*

The Poswohl synagogue in central Johannesburg was declared a national monument in December 1981. According to the August 1982 issue of *Jewish Affairs*, the monthly publication of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, the synagogue was built in the Byzantine style by immigrants from Poswohl in Lithuania after the First World War; it was consecrated by the Chief Rabbi of South Africa in 1922. The synagogue had a regular attendance until the end of the Second World War, but after Jewish migration to the suburbs, services were held only on High Holy days. The building, which had fallen into disrepair, has now been restored with very great care; it is the only synagogue in South Africa to have been officially declared a national monument.

The July 1982 issue of *Jewish Affairs* notes: 'A five per cent sample of the 1980 census, all that is available at present, shows that there are just over 119,000 Jews in South Africa — a slight increase over the 1970 census statistic figure of over 118,000'.

*

It was reported last June that the Brazilian Institute of Statistics published preliminary official census figures which give 118,991 as the total number of Jews in the country. The large majority, 72,530, live in Sao Paulo.

*

There were 200 delegates from 15 countries at the Conference which the World Council for Yiddish and Jewish Culture held in Montreal last May. A special fund was set up to provide educational aids for teaching Yiddish in schools and it was decided to establish another fund for the publication of works of Jewish writers.

*

A collection of New Zealand Jewish archives has been established under the auspices of the Wellington unit of B'nai Brith. The Community Centre in Wellington will have the care and custody of Jewish archival material and artefacts connected with New Zealand Jews.

*

The Institute of Jewish Affairs (11 Hertford Street, London W1Y 7DX, England) regularly publishes Research Reports. The 1982 Reports include the following titles: 'Poland's Jewish Policies Under Martial Law'; 'The Institute for Historical Review: 'Revisionists' Who Whitewash Nazism'; 'Jewish Students in Moscow and the U.S.S.R.'; 'Arab Propaganda in France'; 'Britain and Israel: the Carrington Era and After'; 'The Lebanese War in the Arab Media'; 'German Emigration from the Soviet Union'; and 'Arab Dollars and American Universities'.

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BETSY GIDWITZ on **Soviet Jewish Resettlement in the US—** *Studies of the Third Wave: Recent Migration of Soviet Jews to the United States* by Dan N. Jacobs and Ellen Frankel Paul (eds.)

S. LEVENBERG on **A Memorial to the Past—** *Zionism in Poland: The Formative Years* by Ezra Mendelsohn

BOOKS RECEIVED

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BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Ben-Rafael, Eliezer, *The Emergence of Ethnicity. Cultural Groups and Social Conflict in Israel*, xvii + 258 pp., Contributions in Ethnic Studies, no. 7, Greenwood Press, Westport, Ct. and London, 1982, n.p.

Charny, Israel W. in collaboration with Chanan Rapaport, *How Can We Commit the Unthinkable? Genocide: The Human Cancer*, Foreword by Elie Wiesel, xviii + 430 pp., Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1982, £16.25.

Cohen. Stuart A., *English Zionists and British Jews. The Communal Politics of Anglo-Jewry, 1895–1920*, xv + 349 pp., Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1982, £24.30.

Deshen, Shlomo and Walter P. Zenner, eds., *Jewish Societies in the Middle East. Community, Culture and Authority*, vi + 320 pp., University Press of America, Washington, D.C., 1982, n.p.

Elazar, Daniel J., *Judea, Samaria, and Gaza: Views on the Present and Future*, xii + 222 pp., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. and London, 1982, n.p.

Handelman, Susan A., *The Slayers of Moses: The Emergence of Rabbinic Interpretation in Modern Literary Theory*, xxi + 267 pp., S.U.N.Y. Series on Modern Jewish Literature and Culture, State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 1982, $39.00 (paperback, $12.95).

Hollowell, Peter, ed., *Property and Social Relations*, viii + 209 pp., Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1982, £8.50 (paperback).

Jaffe, Eliezer David, *Child Welfare in Israel*, xii + 319 pp., Praeger Special Studies in Social Welfare, Praeger, New York, 1982, $25.95.

Maccoby, Hyam ed. and trans., *Judaism on Trial. Jewish-Christian Disputations in the Middle Ages*, 245 pp., The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, Associated University Presses, London and Toronto, 1982, £15.00.

Mark, Ber, *Des voix dans la nuit. La Résistance juive à Auschwitz-Birkenau*, 362 pp., translated and adapted from the Yiddish by Esther and Joseph Fridman and Liliane Princet, first published as *Megillat Auschwitz*, Plon, Paris, 1982, n.p.

Markovits, Andrei S. and Frank E. Sysyn, eds., *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism. Essays on Austrian Galicia*, ix + 343 pp., distributed by Harvard University Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, Cambridge, Ma., 1982, £6.70 (paperback).

Oelman, Timothy, ed. and trans., *Marrano Poets of the Seventeenth Century. An Anthology of the Poetry of João Pinto Delgado, Antonio Enríquez Gómez, and Miguel de Barrios*, 296 pp., The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, Associated University Presses, Toronto and London, 1982, £15.00.

Porter, Jack Nusan, ed., *Genocide and Human Rights: A Global Anthology*, iv + 352 pp., University Press of America, Washington, D.C., 1982, $22.75 (paperback, $12.75).

Porter, Jack Nusan, ed., *Jewish Partisans: A Documentary of Jewish Resistance in the Soviet Union During World War II*, vol. 1, xvii + 292 pp., University Press of America, Washington, D.C., 1982, $23.50 (paperback, $12.25); vol. 2, with the assistance of Yehuda Merin, xiii + 296 pp., $22.75 (paperback, $12.25).

Salbstein, M. C. N., *The Emancipation of the Jews in Britain. The Question of the Admission of the Jews to Parliament, 1828–1860*, 266 pp., The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, Associated University Presses, London and Toronto, 1982, £15.00.

Shokeid, Moshe and Shlomo Deshen, *Distant Relations. Ethnicity and Politics Among Arabs and North African Jews in Israel*, xi + 179 pp., Praeger Special Studies, J. F. Bergin Publishers, South Hadley, Ma., 1982, $24.95.

Silver, Daniel Jeremy, *Images of Moses*, xv + 335 pp., Basic Books, New York, 1982, $16.95.

Simms, Norman, ed., *Oral and Traditional Literatures*, 101 pp., Outrigger Publishers, P.O. Box 13049, Hamilton, New Zealand, 1982, £5.00.

Slavin, Stephen L. and Mary A. Pradt, *The Einstein Syndrome: Corporate Anti-Semitism in America Today*, vii + 185 pp., University Press of America, Washington, D.C., 1982, $20.50 (paperback, $9.50).

Strauss, Walter, ed., *Signs of Life: Jews from Wuerttemberg. Reports for the Period After 1933 in Letters and Descriptions*, xxv + 389 pp., Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1982, $25.00.

Toll, William, *The Making of an Ethnic Middle Class: Portland Jewry Over Four Generations*, xii + 242 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 1982, $39.50 (paperback, $12.95).

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

GARTNER, Lloyd P.; Ph.D. Professor of Modern Jewish History, Tel Aviv University. Chief publications: co-author, *History of the Jews of Milwaukee*, 1963, and *History of the Jews of Los Angeles*, 1970; *The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870–1914*, 2nd edn., 1973; *History of the Jews of Cleveland*, 1978; and 'Urban History and the Pattern of Provincial Jewish Settlement in Victorian England' in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 23, no. 1, June 1981.

LEHMAN-WILZIG, Sam N.; Ph.D. Lecturer in Political Studies and Associate Director of the School of Mass Communications, Bar-Ilan University, Chief publications: 'Public Protest and Systemic Stability in Israel: 1960–1979' in Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig and Bernard Susser, eds., *Comparative Jewish Politics: Public Life in Israel and the Diaspora*, 1981; 'The Israeli Protester: Attitudes, Participation, Trends, and Prospects' in a forthcoming issue of *The Jerusalem Quarterly*; and 'Thunder Before the Storm: Pre-Election Agitation and Post-Election Turmoil' in Asher Arian, ed., *The Elections in Israel — 1981*, forthcoming.

WEILL, Georges; Archiviste Paléographe. Director of the Services d'Archives des Hauts-de-Seine and Conservateur de la Bibliothèque et des Archives de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle. Chief publications: *Catalogue des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle*, Manuscrits Judaica, vol. 1, 1979; 'L'intendant d'Alsace et la centralisation de la Nation juive' in *Dix-Huitième Siècle*, vol. 13, 1980; 'Les Juifs d'Alsace: cent ans d'historiographie' in *Revue des Etudes Juives*, vol. 139, 1980; *The Admissibility of Microforms as Evidence*, 1980 (UNESCO publication, also published in French and Spanish); and with Véronique Magnol, *Jardins et Paysages des Hauts-de-Seine*, 1982.

YISHAI, Yael; Ph.D. Senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Haifa. Chief publications: *Factionalism in the Labour Party: Siah Bet in Mapai* (in Hebrew), 1978; 'Abortion in Israeli Politics', *Policy Studies Journal*, vol. 7, Winter 1978; 'Health Policy and Religion: Conflict and Accommodation in Israeli Politics' in *Journal of Health Policy, Politics and Law*, vol. 5, Fall 1980; 'Factionalism in Israeli Parties' in *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, vol. 20, Summer 1981; and 'Challenge Groups in Israeli Politics' in *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 35, Autumn 1981.

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