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CONTENTS

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THE INTEGRATION OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN ISRAEL

Judith Bernstein and Aaron Antonovsky

Introduction

ISRAEL'S social structure is strongly influenced by two inseparable historical facts: the extraordinary role of immigration in the country's population growth, and the ethnic and cultural diversity of its immigrants. Hence studies of the social structure of Israel's Jewish population[1] are generally based on analyses of the three major ethnic groups — the native born, immigrants from Europe and America,[2] and immigrants from Asia and Africa — and measure the differential distribution of these groups on a wide range of socio-economic and demographic variables. Special interest has been focused on the Asian–African group, because, as Weller has noted:[3]

> Soon the all too sad truth became evident: one distinguishable segment, those from Asian and African countries, did not succeed. This was not surprising, since most of them came from backward countries. In the early years of the state it was felt that if the parents could not 'make it' then the children would. The extremely high rate of mobility of second generation Jews in America was a striking example. The evidence collected by researchers in recent years has, however, shattered this hope.

Weller's conclusion that the Asian–African group, including the native-born children of these immigrants, 'did not succeed' is interpreted as meaning that this group, compared to the other ethnic groups, has not been able to obtain the rewards deemed desirable by Israeli society — or, in other words, that it is not well integrated into the society.

The main goal of this paper is to assess the integration, in the sense used here, of the Asian–African population by comparing its distribution on such socio-economic indicators as level of education, level of occupation, and income with that of the other ethnic groups. There is no doubt that, as Yuchtman-Yaar and Semyonov have recently put it, 'Oriental Jews are doing significantly worse by almost every criterion of social, economic, and political standing . . .'[4] The crucial issue, we argue, is not the static picture, but rather the dynamics over time. In

other words, our central question is that of the direction of ethnic integration in Israeli society. To what extent has ethnicity *continued* to be a decisive variable shaping the life chances of Israelis? Is the original gap as wide now as it was in the early days of the State, when the Europeans made up the vast majority of the Jewish population and controlled almost all the major resources of society? Even more crucial a question is whether the gap has been transmitted to the second, native-born generation.

Two theoretical orientations have informed studies of these questions. On the one hand, the culture lag or acculturation hypothesis argues that the Asian–African population arrived in a modernizing society from traditional societies. They were highly skilled in many areas, such as commerce and artisanship; their family structure was admirably cohesive and supporting; values of dignity, collective responsibility, and sensitivity to social honour were most important — but these were not the characteristics appropriate to success in a modernizing society. It follows from this approach that over time, as the immigrants (and particularly their children) are exposed to an acculturative process in schools, the army, and so on, they will become more and more integrated.

The alternative hypothesis, which we would call structural, is far more pessimistic, being in the spirit of 'to them that have shall be given'. It suggests that access to rewards is not willingly and easily shared. This does not necessarily mean active, deliberate discrimination. Instead, the 'normal' processes of housing and geographic segregation, poorer schools, stereotyped conceptions — whether 'positive' (as of the Yemenites as 'reliable workers') or 'negative' (as of the Moroccans as 'violent') — combined with the absence of long-range, large-scale programmes planned to combat the consequences of these 'normal' processes, would lead to the perpetuation of ethnic differentiation.

This paper does not presume to provide a definitive test of the hypotheses. Our modest objective is to specify the dimensions of the issue and, largely by using the rich time series data available in the annual *Statistical Abstract* of the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, to provide a base line and framework for more complex research in the area. Before turning to data directly pertinent to the question of ethnic integration, however, it is essential to obtain a picture of the dynamics of population growth and ethnic distribution. Only then can we begin to understand the context of the distribution of socio-economic rewards.

Population data

Israel's Jewish population on the eve of statehood in 1948 was 649,600. By the end of 1978, it was 3,141,200. The Zionist dream of the

'ingathering of the exiles' in the Jewish State is far from fulfilled, but Israel's importance as a numerical centre of world Jewry has grown considerably. Before the Second World War, less than three per cent of world Jewry lived in Palestine; by independence this percentage had nearly doubled; while by the end of 1977, 21.5 per cent of world Jewry lived in Israel (*Statistical Abstract,* 1979, p. 33).[5]

For most nations, population growth is predominantly a product of the excess of births over deaths; but in the case of Israel it has been, of course, primarily a result of Jewish immigration. From statehood to the end of 1978, there was an increase of 2,491,600 Jews; natural population increase accounted for 46 per cent of this total while the net migration balance contributed 54 per cent (1978, p. 31).

The rate of immigration has not been constant: from the eve of statehood to the end of 1951, when Israel's population more than doubled, the migration balance contributed 88 per cent of the population increase (1972, p. 22). Between 1948 and 1971, that balance was responsible for about 60 per cent of the increase. Between 1972 and 1978, 22.9 per cent of the growth was a result of the migration balance and during this period the annual rate of population increase was 2.4 per cent (1979, p. 32). Thus, 'foreign born', rather than 'immigrant' is more and more the appropriate term. For by the end of 1977, of all 'foreign born' residing in Israel, 16 per cent had arrived before statehood, 38 per cent between 1948 and 1954, 25 per cent between 1955 and 1964, and only 21 per cent thereafter (1978, pp. 58–59).

The ethnic distribution of Israel's population is clearly related to patterns of immigration. As can be seen in Table 1, the population at the time of Independence was dominated by Jews whose origins were in Europe. By the end of 1951, after a period of mass immigration, the proportion of immigrants from Asia and Africa nearly tripled (from 10

TABLE 1. *Ethnic groups in the Israeli Jewish population (1948–78) (in percentages)*

	8 Nov. 1948	*31 Dec. 1951*	*22 May 1961*	*19 April 1972*	*31 Dec. 1978*
Population (thousands)	716.7	1,404.4	1,981.7	2,662.0	3,141.2
Born in					
Asia–Africa	9.8	27.6	27.4	24.8	20.4
Europe	54.8	46.9	34.8	27.9	25.4
Israel	35.4	25.5	37.8	47.3	54.2
Father born in					
Asia–Africa			17.4	22.6	25.2
Europe			14.9	16.3	16.5
Israel			5.5	8.4	12.5

Source: Data for 1948 and 1951 from *Statistical Abstract of Israel,* 1975, p. 43; for 1961, 1972, and 1978 from *Statistical Abstract,* 1979, p. 57.

to 28 per cent of the entire population, or 37 per cent of the foreign-born Israelis) and in subsequent years continued to constitute about 45 per cent of the foreign-born.

The major demographic change, however, has been the emergence of the second generation. In the first three years of statehood, the percentage of native-born dropped from 35.4 to 25.5; but the original proportion was restored by 1958. At the 1972 census, it was close to half the entire Jewish population, a mark which it passed by the end of 1975. At the end of 1978, 54 per cent of all Jews had been born in Israel. In sharp contrast to the situation in 1948, nearly half of the second generation are now of Asian–African origin. The composition of the Israeli Jewish population as a whole then, at the end of 1978, was: 12.5 per cent at least second generation Israeli born; 45.6 per cent of Asian–African origin (that is, immigrants from these continents plus their native-born children); and 41.9 per cent of European origin.

One further set of data relevant to this demographic analysis relates to the age structure. Table 2 shows that almost all Israelis aged 65 and over are foreign-born, the great majority having come from Europe. As one moves down the age ladder, the proportion of native-born increases. In the 30–44 age group more than two-thirds were born abroad, most of them in Asia–Africa. The picture is reversed among those aged 20–29, two-thirds of whom are native-born, half of them children of Asian–African fathers. Only five per cent of the children aged up to 14 years were born abroad; of the native-born in this age group, the largest proportion by far is of Asian–African origin (1979, p. 58). These data are reflected in the median age of each ethnic group: 53.4 years for the European-born, 43.3 for the Asian-born, 36.0 for the African-born, and 13.5 for the Israeli-born (1978, p. 58).

TABLE 2. *Age distribution of the Israeli Jewish population by ethnic group (1978) (in percentages)*

Population	*Age* 0–14	15–19	20–29	30–44	45–64	65+	*Total*
Total(thousands)	955.1	260.6	561.0	524.3	546.3	293.8	3,141.2
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Born in							
Asia–Africa	1.2	10.2	20.3	42.8	35.7	23.7	640.6
Europe	4.0	8.6	13.7	28.0	55.0	72.6	797.9
Israel	94.8	81.2	66.0	29.2	9.3	3.7	1,702.7
Father born in							
Asia–Africa	46.3	48.0	32.4	5.8	2.0	1.5	792.9
Europe	19.6	20.7	26.7	18.6	4.5	0.7	517.4
Israel	28.9	12.5	6.9	4.8	2.8	1.5	392.4
% of total population	30.4	8.3	17.9	16.7	17.4	9.3	100.0

Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1979, pp. 58, 60–61.

Given such an age structure, it is clear that the proportion of those of Asian–African origin will continue to grow. Within the immigrant population, they are younger than the European-born, and thus include a larger percentage of women of child-bearing age. Differential reproduction rates — 1.5 for mothers born in Asia–Africa versus 1.32 for European-born mothers (1979, p. 89) — intensify this trend. We noted that among the native-born up to the age of 29 (the current and future child-bearing group), the largest proportion is of Asian–African origin. Thus, even if these women were to have the same reproduction rates as the native-born of European origin, they would be contributing many more children to the total population. As an indication of future trends, we must note that of the 69,287 live births to Jewish mothers in 1978, 28.5 per cent were born to women who immigrated from Asia–Africa and 25 per cent to native-born women, whose fathers were born in Asia–Africa (1979, p. 93). Thus, over half the children born in 1978 were of Asian–African origin.

Israeli-born children of Asian–African origin, in sum, are soon to be the largest ethnic component of Israel's population. Are they more integrated into Israeli society than their immigrant parents? Are they distinguishable, as were their parents, from the other native-born groups by their degree of success in obtaining the rewards offered by the society? It is to these questions that we now turn.

Endogamy

We have defined integration in terms of access to socio-economic rewards, without reference to ethnicity; but there is one set of data which is pertinent to our theme, although it refers to a phenomenon which is not a reward: the pattern of 'intermarriage'. The extent to which men and women from different ethnic groups marry does tell us something about the degree of ethnic insulation in the society. In 1955, after the period of mass immigration, by which time Asian–Africans constituted 46 per cent of all Jewish spouses, 88 per cent of all Jewish marriages were between individuals of the same ethnic group. In subsequent years there was a slow but steady increase in the Asian–African proportion of all Jews marrying (to 57 per cent in 1977) and, in parallel, a decrease in intra-ethnic group marriage, to 80 per cent. It must be noted that in inter-ethnic marriage the brides were more often of Asian–African origin (11.1 per cent) than of European origin (8.8 per cent).

The Bureau of Statistics combines both these sets of data into an 'endogamy index', taking into account the potential number of marriage partners from each ethnic group. An index of 0.50 would indicate that ethnic origin is a totally irrelevant factor in the choice of marriage partner; 1.0 or 0.0 would mean, respectively, that controlling

for the number of available partners from each group, one always or never married a spouse from one's own group. In 1955, the endogamy index was 0.81. Until 1972 it fell steadily, reaching 0.64, and for the following five years it remained at that level. In 1977 it was 0.63 (1979, p. 83).

Education

In contemporary society, formal education is generally regarded as the pathway to material rewards and certainly to prestige. Whatever the opportunities available in commerce or industry, in income terms (an issue to which we shall return), these are usually perceived as — and often are — second best. Formal education provides the prerequisite for social mobility in a technological society.

Israelis are more highly educated than they were a generation ago. In 1961 (no earlier data are available), 55.5 per cent of Jews aged 14 and over had eight or less years of schooling; by 1978, this percentage dropped to 33.4. On the other hand, the percentage with 13 or more years of formal schooling rose in that period from 9.9 to 20.1. There is, as is to be expected, an inverse relationship between age and educational attainment. Data from 1978 show that 14.0 per cent of those aged 14–17 have eight or less years of education; the percentage in the 18–34 age group is 17.0; in the 35–54 group it is 43.4; among those 55 and over, more than half had at most an elementary school education. At the other end of the educational ladder, the percentages of those with higher education (13+ years) are: age 18–34, 27.8; age 35–54, 21.3; age 55–64, 14.2; and age 65 and over, 12.4 (1979, pp. 618–19).

One further datum, particularly germane to our concern, is the number of students enrolled in academic institutions: in 1948–49, it was 1,635; in 1967–68, it had increased to 28,520, and by 1978–79, to 55,790, far outstripping the overall population increase (1979, p. 643). Taking the cohort 20–29 as the most appropriate base group for which data are available, we have calculated[6] the proportion of this age group in academic institutions: in 1948–49, university attendance in Israel was elitist: 1.3 per cent of the age group was enrolled; by 1967–68, a significant social change was in evidence, with the proportion reaching 8.3 per cent. By 1978–79, university attendance was no longer strictly confined to the privileged few: 9.9 per cent of those aged 20 to 29 years were registered in academic institutions (1966, p. 38; 1968, pp. 37, 543; 1979, pp. 54, 643).

We can now, against this background, turn to the relative educational levels of the different ethnic groups. But first a word about the structure of Israeli education. Compulsory education starts with kindergarten at the age of five. From 1948 until 1967 compulsory

primary school covered grades one to eight, that is, to the end of age 13. In 1968 it was extended by a further year. Until then, the ninth grade was part of secondary school, which went up to the twelfth grade, the usual age at graduation being 18. With the extension of compulsory education by one year, what is known in Israel as 'the reform' was introduced: grades 7 to 9, usually coinciding with ages 12 to 14, were separated from primary schools and set up as intermediate schools. This reform was first introduced into development towns and has not yet covered the entire country. In 1979, compulsory education was extended by another year to the end of age 15.

It should be noted that even beyond the age of compulsory education, economic factors *per se* were not of major importance in determining school attendance, since tuition fees have always been linked to family income. All tuition fees in secondary schools were abolished in 1980.

Since almost without exception Israeli children complete at least eight years of schooling, it can be said that the ethnic gap at the level of functional literacy characteristic of Israel a generation ago has largely disappeared.

As late as 1978, 22.7 per cent of Israeli-born children of Asian–African origin aged 14 and over had eight or fewers years of schooling, compared to 6.2 per cent of those of European origin (1979, p. 619). It is clear that, as a result of compulsory education, this ethnic gap will decline fairly rapidly. (Only five years earlier, the respective percentages were 33.2 and 8.3 — 1979, p. 608.) What has happened past the age of compulsory education?

First, it should be noted that the overall proportion of those aged 14–17 enrolled in school has increased considerably. In 1966–67, 62 per cent attended school (1974, p. 625). By 1978–79, 78.5 per cent did so[7] (1979, p. 629). A large majority of them are in secondary or intermediate schools. There is no doubt that a major part of this change

TABLE 3. *Jewish pupils aged 14–17 in post-primary schools* by continent of birth of father (rates per 1,000 of respective group and ratio of Europeans to Asian–Africans) 1966–67 to 1978–79*

Year	Rates		Ratios
	Europeans	*Asian–Africans*	
1966–67	686	379	1.81
1969–70	775	442	1.75
1972–73	782	531	1.47
1976–77	797	637	1.25
1978–79	812	700	1.16

*The enrolment rates over time are not strictly comparable because of the change in school structure during that period.

Source: Data for 1966–67 from *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1968, p. 537; for 1969–70, 1972–73, 1976–77, and 1978–79 from *Statistical Abstract*, 1979, p. 629.

is accounted for by the increasing proportion of pupils of Asian–African origin in post-primary schools: Table 3 shows that while in 1966–67 pupils of European origin aged 14–17 were over-represented by 81 per cent in comparison with those of Asian–African origin, by 1978–79 that percentage has been reduced to 16.

This masks, however, a considerable gap which exists at the older ages. In 1978–79, among pupils aged 17, 35 per cent more of the Europeans than of the Asian–Africans were attending school (1979, p. 629). Moreover, it is important to note that when one breaks down secondary school enrolment into its two major components, general secondary schools — where, in the main, there is an academic orientation — and agricultural and vocational schools — which seldom send their pupils to university —, a clear ethnic gap is apparent. Data from the *Statistical Abstract* volumes show that in 1966–67, European-origin pupils very markedly predominated in academic schools and were slightly over-represented in vocational schools. The latter case was reversed by 1971–72, but the former had increased to almost three to one. Thereafter, the under-representation of Europeans in vocational-agricultural schools increased gradually, while their over-representation in academic schools slowly declined to a ratio of 2.17 to one in 1978–79 (1968, p. 537; 1974, p. 625; 1975, p. 619; 1979, p. 629).

The decade of the seventies, then, has been one of a gradual decline in the disparity between European and Asian–African pupils enrolling in those secondary schools which are the necessary preliminary for university studies. But the ratio remains more than double, even when one disregards those not attending any secondary school. Another way of analysing these data is by considering the internal distribution of each ethnic group in the two types of school. The norm for the Europeans is attendance at an academic high school (62 per cent); for the Asian–Africans, the norm (66 per cent) is attendance at a vocational or agricultural school.

In higher education, we noted above that nearly 10 per cent of those aged 20–29 are at a university or an academic institution; and as is to be expected from the data on over-representation of pupils of European background in academic high schools, Europeans are also considerably over-represented among university students. Our main concern here is with trends over time. Table 4 shows rates per 10,000 population for each ethnic group enrolled in academic institutions. Part A gives the basic rates at four periods of time. Part B shows that each group has increased its rate of enrolment in the decade from 1964–65 to 1974–75. However, there has been a more rapid increase among Asian–Africans than among Europeans: the trend presaged by the secondary school data is also in evidence at the university level. But although there has been some narrowing of the ethnic gap, that gap remains considerable (Part C). While in 1964–65 almost seven times as many Europeans as

Asian–Africans, relative to population size, attended university, ten years later there were still four times as many. Interestingly, the rate of increase of enrolment was more rapid among those born in Asia–Africa than among those born in Israel to fathers born in Asia–Africa. Thus we find that the gap between the former and those born in Europe (3.99 to one) is smaller than the gap between the latter and their European counterparts (4.70 to one). If the cultural hypothesis had been correct, one would have expected the opposite to be the case.

TABLE 4. *Enrolment in academic institutions among Jews aged 20–29* by ethnic origin (per 10,000 in respective group) 1964–65 to 1974–75*

	1964–65	*1969–70*	*1972–73*	*1974–75*
A. Rates per 10,000				
Europe	535	976	932	842
Asia–Africa	79	161	203	211
Israel				
Father born in				
Europe	1074	1262	1380	1405
Asia–Africa	158	246	276	299
B. Changes over time: ratios				
Europe	100	182	174	157
Asia–Africa	100	204	257	267
Israel				
Father born in				
Europe	100	118	128	131
Asia–Africa	100	156	175	189
C. Ratios of enrolment				
Europe: Asia–Africa	6.78:1	6.06:1	4.59:1	3.99:1
Israel-born, father from				
Europe: Asia–Africa	6.80:1	5.13:1	5.00:1	4.70:1

*About 76% of university students in 1974–75 were in this age group.

Source: Data from *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1978, p. 687.

At the time of writing, the latest available data on enrolment rates are for 1974–75. In an attempt to identify subsequent trends, we have made some further calculations (see Table 5) by using somewhat different base figures, which confirm the trends shown in Table 4. The most succinct way of summarizing them is to note the ratio of the ratios in Part B of Table 5. Thus in 1964–65 there were 9.12 times more European-born than Asian–African-born studying at universities (controlling for their proportion in the population): 1.76:0.19. Within the next decade, this ratio declined to 4.07. The same trend is seen among the Israeli-born: from a ratio of 6.31 in 1964–65 to a ratio to 4.87 in 1974–75. Again we see a narrowing of the gap, more rapid among the foreign-born than among the native-born, but a gap which remains considerable.

Since foreign-born Asian–Africans in that age group have rapidly become less numerous than Israeli-born children of Asian–African fathers, this last point is of particular note. It becomes of even greater

significance when we go beyond 1974–75, a step which required the calculations presented in Table 5. In the case of both the less numerous foreign-born, and even more so in the case of the native Asian–Africans, the trend towards a closing of the gap at the university level has, it would seem, been *reversed* in the last four years. The ratio of the ratios between the European-born and those born in Asia–Africa rose to 4.78 (1.56:0.33), controlling for proportions in the population. Among the native-born, the ratio rose to 5.64 (1.81:0.32), identical with that of 1970–71.

TABLE 5. *Proportions of students enrolled in academic institutions and in the total population aged 20–29 by ethnicity, 1964–65 to 1978–79*

	1964–65		*1970–71*		*1974–75*		*1978–79*	
	Pop.	*Univ.*	*Pop.*	*Univ.*	*Pop.*	*Univ.*	*Pop.*	*Univ.*
*A. Percentages**								
Europe	17.1	30.1	19.9	31.4	20.7	25.6	13.7	21.3
Asia–Africa	48.3	9.3	37.2	10.2	28.9	8.8	20.3	6.6
Israel								
Father born in								
Europe	22.9	47.4	26.3	45.0	26.1	48.0	26.7	48.3
Asia–Africa	6.7	2.2	11.5	3.5	18.8	7.1	32.4	10.4
*B. Ratios***								
Europe	1.76		1.58		1.24		1.56	
Asia–Africa	0.19		0.27		0.30		0.33	
Israel								
Father born in								
Europe	2.07		1.71		1.84		1.81	
Asia–Africa	0.33		0.30		0.38		0.32	

*The column percentages do not add up to 100 because third-generation Israelis have been excluded.

**These ratios show the relative under- or over-representation of each ethnic group in enrolment considering its proportion in the population. A ratio of 1.0 would indicate proportional enrolment. The figure 1.76 means that European-born Jews aged 20–29 were over-represented by 76 per cent in universities, considering their proportion of the population.

Source: Data for 1964–65 from *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1966, p. 609;
1970–71 from *Statistical Abstract*, 1972, p. 599;
1974–75 and 1978–79 from *Statistical Abstract*, 1979, p. 647.

In sum, then, we have seen that at the primary school level, integration of Jewish ethnic groups in Israel is complete. A considerable gap remains at the secondary school level, both in terms of school enrolment and even more so in terms of the academic versus vocational-agricultural division. Over time, however, this gap has narrowed considerably. Until 1974–75, the same pattern appeared in university enrolment, particularly among the declining group of foreign-born; but the most recent data suggest a reversal of the trend.

Occupation

In this section we present data on the dynamics of ethnic group distribution in the four major occupational categories of the civilian labour force:

(1) professional, scientific, technical and related workers; (2) administrative, executive, managerial and clerical workers; (3) blue collar workers; and (4) service workers.[8] These categories are composites of two different occupational classifications, one used before 1971 and the other used thereafter; they were chosen in order to determine changes in ethnic group representation over more than one decade. The central limitation imposed by this decision is that each category includes a wide range of occupations, which tends to blur the differential representation of the ethnic groups within any category (for example, the inclusion of executive and clerical workers within the same category).

The data are presented separately for males and females since, as will be seen below, the structure of the female labour force is quite different from that of the male. Table 6 shows the distribution in 1978 by ethnic origin and sex of Jewish gainfully occupied persons. Foreign-born males of European origin are over-represented in the two prestigious occupational categories; they are highly over-represented in the professional occupations, but not so highly in the administrative category. On the other hand, they are highly under-represented in the blue collar and service occupations. The same pattern of ethnic group differentiation holds for the native-born workers. It is worth noting that the ethnic gap is wider between the native-born groups than it is for the foreign-born in all occupations except for those in the administrative category. Thus, for example, at the professional level, while the ratio of European-born workers to the Asian–African-born is 2.4, the ratio of the native-born of European origin to the native-born of Asian–African origin is 3.7. Furthermore, while a higher proportion of Israeli-born of European origin are professional workers than are European-born, the reverse is true of workers of Asian–African origin where the percentage of native-born professionals is slightly lower than that of the foreign-born.

TABLE 6. *Occupational distribution of the Jewish civilian labour force by ethnic origin and sex (1978) (in percentages)*

	Males				*Females*			
	Foreign-born		*Israeli-born and Father born in*		*Foreign-born*		*Israeli-born and Father born in*	
	Eur.	*As.–Af.*	*Eur.*	*As.–Af.*	*Eur.*	*As.–Af.*	*Eur.*	*As.–Af.*
Professional, scientific, technical and related	21.7	9.0	31.4	8.6	35.4	16.3	49.8	20.0
Administrative, executive, managerial and clerical	23.3	15.3	19.9	13.5	26.5	24.0	34.1	46.0
Blue collar	34.4	50.5	28.2	57.4	11.6	13.4	2.5	11.4
Services	6.4	10.6	3.6	7.0	14.3	36.1	7.4	17.1

Source: *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1979, pp. 348–49.

The data in Table 6 on the ethnic group distribution of females show that for foreign-born women, while the European-born are highly over-represented in the professional occupations, there is practically full ethnic integration in the administrative grades. European-born women are under-represented in the blue collar category and highly under-represented in service occupations. Among the native-born women, those of European origin are highly over-represented in the professional category but they are under-represented in the administrative as well as in the blue collar and service occupations.

When we compare the ratios between native-born with those between foreign-born women, we see a slightly larger ethnic gap in the professional and the administrative categories among the former. However, the native-born of Asian–African origin are over-represented in administrative occupations. The ethnic gap in the blue collar category is far greater for the native-born than for the foreign-born. In the services category, the large under-representation of women of European origin is essentially the same for both the foreign- and the native-born.

In sum then, in 1978, those of European origin, both males and females, were highly over-represented in the most prestigious occupational category, and the ethnic gap for both sexes was larger for the native-born than for the foreign-born. It should be noted, however, that among the native-born of European origin the over-representation of women (2.5) was substantially smaller than that of men (3.7). At the second highest occupational level, while there was a rather small over-representation of males of European origin (both foreign- and native- born), there was no ethnic gap for foreign-born women, and native-born women of Asian–African origin were over-represented. Thus, while the Europeans clearly dominate the most prestigious occupations, ethnicity plays a larger role for males than for females, particularly in the native-born working population.

Let us now turn to an analysis of ethnic group distributions in the labour force over time, focusing on the relationships between the two immigrant groups and between the two native-born groups in order to determine whether, in the light of the ethnic gap seen in 1978, there are indications of a trend towards the integration of Asian–Africans in terms of occupational status.

Table 7 presents data on the occupational distribution of Jewish employed males, by ethnic group, from 1964 to 1978.[9] Whereas in 1964 the European-born workers were over-represented in the professional occupations by nearly three times, compared to immigrants from Asia–Africa, that over-representation was reduced by 1978 to 2.4 times. European immigrants were also considerably over-represented in the administrative occupations in 1964. Over the years, however, the gap became smaller than in the highest occuptional level and showed a

clear sign of closing by 1978. Complementarily, Asian–African-born workers were consistently over-represented in the service and blue collar occupations. But whereas relatively little change occurred over the years with respect to the latter, the gap between European and Asian–African immigrants with respect to service work increased from 1964 to 1975, and then the trend seems to have been reversed by 1978.

TABLE 7. *Ratio of Jewish employed males of European origin to Jewish employed males of Asian–African origin (1964–78)*

Occupation	Foreign-born					Native-born		
	1964	*1968*	*1972*	*1975*	*1978*	*1972*	*1975*	*1978*
Professional, scientific technical and related	2.95	2.79	2.60	2.59	2.41	4.30	3.50	3.65
Administrative, executive, managerial and clerical	2.62	2.10	1.77	1.66	1.52	2.06	2.01	1.47
Blue collar	.74	.78	.72	.73	.68	.48	.47	.49
Services	.71	.57	.53	.47	.60	.44	.64	.51

Source: Data for 1964 from *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1966, p. 314; for 1966, from *Statistical Abstract*, 1969, p. 271; for 1972 from *Statistical Abstract*, 1973, pp. 334–35; for 1975, from *Statistical Abstract*, 1976, pp. 314–15; and for 1978 from *Statistical Abstract*, 1979, pp. 348–49.

Data for the native-born are only available from 1972. Some of the findings are similar: European over-representation in the administrative category, with a trend towards a closing of the gap; and Asian–African over-representation among blue collar and service workers, with little change over time among the former and an uneven picture among the latter. But the data on professionals are most suggestive for our purposes: unlike the steady, albeit slow, closing of the gap among the foreign-born, among the native-born the decline of the ratios from 4.3 in 1972 to 3.5 in 1975 was reversed in 1978 when it increased to 3.65, raising the possibility of a halt in the trend.

Table 8 presents data on the occupational distribution of women, by ethnicity, from 1964 to 1978. Among the foreign-born, while no consistent trend is seen at the professional occupational level, the over-representation of the European-born is greater in each year since 1968 than it was in 1964. A generally linear trend towards a closing of the ethnic gap appears in both the administrative and blue collar categories while a trend towards a widening of the gap in the service occupations seems to have halted in 1978. For native-born women, there is a clear indication of the closing of the ethnic gap in the professional occupations, although it remains substantial. In the administrative category, the native-born of European origin have become increasingly under-represented, while in the blue collar category they are extremely highly under-represented (although a slight closing of the gap is seen in 1978). On the other hand, the under-representation of the native-born women of European origin in

the services category consistently increased over the six years for which data are available.

TABLE 8. *Ratio of Jewish employed females of European origin to Jewish employed females of Asian–African origin (1964–78)*

Occupation	Foreign-born					Native-born		
	1964	*1968*	*1972*	*1975*	*1978*	*1972*	*1975*	*1978*
Professional, scientific, technical and related	1.68	2.24	2.17	1.99	2.17	3.90	3.10	2.49
Administrative, executive, managerial and clerical	1.67	1.71	1.43	1.20	1.10	1.00	.80	.74
Blue collar	.52	.59	.59	.85	.87	.15	.15	.22
Services	.61	.57	.47	.36	.40	.62	.50	.43

Source: Data for 1964 from *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1966, p. 314; for 1966, from *Statistical Abstract*, 1969, p. 271; for 1972, from *Statistical Abstract*, 1973, pp. 334–35; for 1975, from *Statistical Abstract*, 1976, pp. 314–15; and for 1978, from *Statistical Abstract*, 1979, pp. 348–49.

As noted above, and as can be seen in Table 6, there is a marked difference in the distribution of males and females in the various occupations: more women than men are found in the two higher categories. In 1978 (according to the *Statistical Abstract*, 1979, p. 348), 17.4 per cent of males were in the professional category compared with 32.0 per cent of females. However, the predominance of females is a result of their holding the 'lower' positions in each of the two higher categories. For, when the 'professional' category is subdivided into 'scientific and academic workers' and 'other professional, technical and related workers', we find 8.7 per cent of the men and 8.1 per cent of the women in the former and 8.7 per cent of the males and 23.9 per cent of the females in the latter. In the administrative category, males dominate the 'administrative and managers' classification: 6.1 versus 1.1 per cent of females; while in the 'clerical and related' classification the respective percentages are 13.0 versus 29.8. Thus, 62.9 per cent of the female labour force versus 36.5 per cent of the male force were employed in the two higher occupational levels.

The availability of 'female' jobs — teachers, nurses, secretaries — at the upper occupational levels appears to have resulted in a smaller ethnic gap among women than among men. That same smaller ethnic gap in the professional category and the trend towards the over-representation of women of Asian–African origin at the administrative level may point to these women's successful use of existing paths of upward mobility.

Income

Yuchtman and Fishelson have noted that income differentials in Israel, as elsewhere, are in good part a function of differentials in education and occupation, but that in Israel the data point to some

additional effect of ethnicity on income.[10] In 1971, a committee appointed by the Prime Minister summarized its findings as follows:[11]

> In the period under review (1963/64–70), the standard of living of families of Asian and African origin improved relative to the standard of living of all families. This improvement found its expression in higher income levels . . . , in a decline in the proportion of Asian–African immigrants among low-income families, and in an increase in the proportion of these families in the higher income brackets. However, even after the improvement in their relative position during the past decade, the average income per standard equivalent adult among families of Asian–African origin is still only 70% of the overall average for Jewish families.

Income comparisons are notoriously complex, and we are therefore compelled here to limit ourselves to fairly elementary data. None the less, we believe that even brief attention to available sources could shed some useful light.

One set of data for 1975–76 refers to household distribution in deciles of net income per standard person (a concept designed to correct for the number of persons in a household) by ethnicity (1979, pp. 290–91). Asian–African households constituted 32.4 per cent of all Jewish households surveyed. They constituted, however, 67.3 per cent of all Jewish housholds in the lowest income decile and 52.8 per cent in the second lowest decile. On the other hand, they accounted for 5.7 per cent of the households in the highest income decile and 8.9 per cent in the second highest decile (1979, pp. 290–91). Comparison of these data with those based on the same type of survey in 1963–64 and 1968–69[12] shows that while during the 1960s there had been a decline in inequality as measured in this way, by 1975–76 those born in Asia–Africa were as greatly concentrated in the lowest income brackets and as rarely found in the highest brackets as they had been in 1963–64.[13]

The above data refer only to households headed by those born abroad. The only available set of time series data which differentiates among the ethnic groups by place of birth is presented in Table 9, which shows the gross average annual money income per urban employee's family. As can be seen from the ratio column, families headed by persons born in Asia–Africa had in the late sixties about 70 per cent of the income of families headed by persons born in Europe. This proportion rose gradually, reaching 81 per cent in 1977. In contrast, the trend over time for the native-born generation shows that households headed by Israeli-born persons of Asian–African parentage had a family income in 1968 which was 71 per cent of those headed by the Israeli-born of European parentage (75 per cent in 1969). The following years reveal an irregular pattern of decline and rise. In 1977, the most recent year for which data are available, the ratio is .72, that is, what it was at the beginning of the decade.

TABLE 9. *Gross average annual money income per employee's family by continent of birth of head of household, and income ratios (1968–77)* (Income in 1975 prices, IL thousand)

	Foreign-born			*Israeli-born and father born in*		
	Asia–Africa	*Europe*	*Ratio*	*Asia–Africa*	*Europe*	*Ratio*
1968	24.9	35.4	.70	28.8	40.7	.71
1969	26.4	37.3	.71	30.9	41.3	.75
1970	29.9	40.4	.74	31.4	48.0	.65
1971	30.1	40.4	.75	31.0	45.6	.68
1972	31.8	42.8	.74	30.8	48.2	.64
1973	31.7	42.7	.74	36.9	52.0	.71
1974	34.5	44.6	.77	34.9	52.2	.67
1975	36.8	44.8	.82	36.4	51.0	.71
1976	37.7	46.0	.82	35.6	52.5	.68
1977	40.4	49.8	.81	39.3	54.6	.72

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Income of Employees' Families, 1975–1977* (Special Series No. 598), Jerusalem, 1979, p. 7.

It is essential to stress that the meaning of family income is qualified by the number of persons in the household. In 1978, the average numbers per household were by head of household's ethnicity (1979, p. 64):

born in Asia–Africa	4.34
born in Europe	2.69
born in Israel:	
father born in Asia–Africa	3.77
father born in Europe	3.45

Hence the disparity shown in Table 9 is even greater than appears at first sight, particularly among those born abroad.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to provide a partial answer to the question of whether the Asian–African population, particularly the second, native-born generation of Asian–African origin, has become more integrated into Israeli society. The fate of this latter group is of major importance because, as the demographic data indicate, it is clearly becoming the numerically largest segment of Israel's Jewish population; and its sense of under-representation in obtaining the rewards which the wider society has to offer is undoubtedly a major source of tension. Moreover, Israeli society is formally and publicly committed to *mizug galuyot* (the integration of the exiles), as one of its central values. Such a commitment might be seen as consistent with what we have called the cultural lag hypothesis. But this hypothesis requires a continued, manifest increase in integration over time if it is to remain tenable.

We defined integration as success in obtaining the rewards of Israeli society, irrespective of ethnicity. The degree of integration of Asian–African Jews was measured by their distribution, over time, on three socio-economic variables: educational attainment, occupational status, and income.

Since 97 per cent of Jewish Israeli children attend primary school, we can confidently state that no ethnic gap exists at the primary school level. At the post-primary level, we noted a substantial and consistent closing of the gap from 1966 to 1978, although secondary school pupils of European origin are more likely to go to an academically oriented high school, while those of Asian–African origin have been increasingly over-represented in vocational and agricultural secondary establishments. Since the type of high school pupils attend in large part determines whether they will continue their education, it is not surprising that Asian–Africans are highly under-represented at the university level. While the enrolment gap between the Europeans and Asian–Africans has decreased considerably since 1964–65 (the decrease being greater between the two immigrant groups than between the two native-born groups), there is some evidence that after 1975 the gaps between both the immigrant and the native-born groups have widened.

Just as attendance at an academically-oriented secondary school is the main route to university, higher education is the essential channel leading to a prestigious occupation. We have seen that in the highest occupational category, workers of European origin remain greatly over-represented. Two sets of data are of special importance. First, the ethnic gap, in general, is wider for the two native-born groups than it is for the two immigrant groups. Central to this issue is an increase in the under-representation of native-born of Asian–African origin (compared to the native-born of European origin) in 1975–78. Second, in the professional occupations, Israeli-born women of Asian–African origin, unlike their male counterparts, have been consistently upwardly mobile while in the administrative occupations they have become increasingly over-represented by taking advantage of the opportunities open to them.

When we considered the gross money income of urban employees' households, we saw that the income gap between the two immigrant groups narrowed in the 1960s, but that this trend was not apparent in the 1970s. The gap in *per capita* income was wider than that in household income because of the larger household size of the Asian–African immigrant group.

Our last indicator of integration, the endogamy index, showed a slow but steady increase in the rate of ethnic group intermarriage until 1972, after which year the rate stabilized.

On all the socio-demographic measures studied here, the Israeli Jews of European origin were and remain 'more successful' than the Asian–Africans. In general, the ethnic gaps were smaller in 1978 than they had been a decade earlier. However, the hopeful expectation that ethnic group integration would be achieved in one generation has clearly not been borne out by our data, which show that the integration of those of Asian–African origin into Israeli society is far from complete. Moreover, there are some indications that a reversal of the trend towards integration may have set in since 1974–75, especially among the native-born.

Our particular concern in this paper was not the static picture, but the trends over time — so that the relative validity of the culture lag-acculturation versus the structural–'discrimination' hypotheses could be tested. The data show clearly that neither hypothesis alone can account for the trends which have emerged. The process of acculturation, which is assumed to result in the integration of previously deprived social groups, depends in the main on the formal educational establishments of the society. Our evidence is that substantial progress has been made in closing the ethnic gap in primary and secondary schools, a progress which is further reflected at the university level as well as in the occupational and income spheres.

The structural hypothesis, which argues that the social gap is not so easily closed because of intentional (and, in the Israeli case, undoubtedly unintentional) built-in 'discrimination', also finds some support in our data. This is most clearly seen in the increasing over-representation of pupils of Asian–African origin in agricultural and vocational schools, where few of their graduates enter the higher educational institutions; instead, they are 'channelled' into less valued occupations and earn lower salaries.

Two further findings are of the utmost importance in supporting the structural hypothesis. First, we have seen clear suggestions, in the data on endogamy, university enrolment, male occupations, and household income, that the achievements in closing the gaps in earlier years may have come to a halt and in some cases may have been reversed since the early or mid-1970s. Second, and even more fundamental, the concept of 'the generation of the desert' should have led us to expect no substantial integration among those who were born abroad. Real progress would be made by native-born Israelis. The data show quite consistently that precisely the opposite has been the case, with the exception of the occupational achievements of women.

We shall not embark here upon a discussion of the policy implications of these findings. What seems clear, however, is that 'time' is not remotely a solution. Unless a very deliberate, far-sighted, and systematic programme — with explicit goals and interim evaluation — is

adopted in order to counteract the structural trends, a report such as this in a decade or so may well give even more cause for concern.

NOTES

[1] It is obviously of major importance in this context that Israeli Arabs constitute some 16 per cent of the population. In view of the complexity of the issue, however, this paper considers only Jewish ethnic groups.

[2] Though the formal census category is 'Europe–America', the overwhelming majority are from Europe, and this will be the designation used throughout.

[3] Leonard Weller, *Sociology in Israel*, Westport, Conn., 1974, pp. 45–46.

[4] Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar and Moshe Semyonov, 'Ethnic Inequality in Israeli Schools and Sports: An Expectation-States Approach', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 85, no. 3 (November 1979), pp. 576–90.

[5] All data presented in this paper, unless otherwise noted, are taken from the annual volumes of the *Statistical Abstract*. In order to avoid repetitive footnoting, the year and page number which provided the source of the data in each case will be cited in the text.

[6] These calculations are inevitably inexact, given the limitations of the available data. The students include Arabs, while the 20–29 population base is only Jewish. Given the relatively small number of Arab students, this distortion was preferred. Second, the age group includes some three-quarters of the university students; to have used either 20–24 alone, or a larger age span than 20–29, would have introduced an even greater bias. Hence the proportions given in the text are somewhat inaccurate. But the important point is the trend over time.

[7] It should be noted that a few in this age group are at university, others are in formal apprenticeship programmes, and some are in the ultra-orthodox school system not under the direct control of the Ministry of Education. These groups are not included above.

[8] Since their numbers are small and there is relative equality of ethnic group representation, agricultural and shop assistants are omitted in the interest of simplicity.

[9] The ratio is calculated by dividing the percentage of Europeans in the labour force who are employed in a particular occupational category by the percentage of Asian–Africans in the same category. Thus in 1978, 21.7 per cent of European-born workers were in the highest category, compared to 9.0 per cent of Asian–African born — a ratio of 2.41:1.

[10] Ephraim Yuchtman and Gidon Fishelson, 'On the Problem of Inequality in Income Distribution in Israel', *Economic Quarterly* (Hebrew), no. 65–66, June 1970, pp. 3–16.

[11] *Report of the Committee on Income Distribution and Social Inequality*, Tel-Aviv, 1971, pp. 4–5.

[12] Ibid., p. 24.

[13] A very similar picture for 1977 is obtained from a slightly different set of data published in Central Bureau of Statistics, *Income of Employees' Families, 1975–1977* (Special Series No. 598), Jerusalem, 1979, p. 67.

AMERICAN JEWISH LEADERS FROM THE PERIPHERY

Alan S. York

PARK first wrote about the 'marginal man' in 1928, and the term has since been used frequently to describe the American Jew. Both Antonovsky[1] and Glaser[2] in their attempts in the 1950s to refine the concept concluded that the marginal man suffers from ambivalence towards his ethnic identity, an ambivalence which results in conflicting and unsatisfying relationships with both his minority ethnic group and the dominant ethnic group, and so leads to anxiety and psychological insecurity.

Kurt Lewin about a decade earlier had said that there was an increase in Jewish marginality as the ghetto walls crumbled and the Jewish group became less compact, more scattered, and more heterogeneous. Marginality leads to tension, restlessness, and unbalanced behaviour, and may lead eventually to self-hatred as the marginal Jew sees his Jewishness as a barrier to advancement. Such a person, living on the periphery of two groups — the Jewish community and the wider society — suffers frustration and tension as well as aggression which is often turned in against himself or the Jewish community. The most paradoxical step occurs when members of the under-privileged group call upon those people on the periphery who have won some degree of economic or professional success in the general community to lead the group from which they are fleeing. They are courted because they have 'good connections' with the dominant group (or, at least, are potentially able to develop such connections), but the paradox lies in the fact that peripheral members, negatively chauvinistic towards their group, accept the leadership:

> They themselves are usually eager to accept the leading role in the minority, partly as a substitute for gaining status in the majority, partly because such leadership makes it possible for them to have and maintain additional contact with the majority.

Lewin saw the phenomena of self-hatred and of 'the leader from the periphery' as socio-psychological and prophesied their demise when

the minority group (for example American Jewry) would gain full equality of status with the majority group.[3]

Other writers have seen the peripheral leader phenomenon as being purely sociological in nature: the ethnic community serves as a gateway to the general community. Thus, Litt in 1970 described how ethnic politicians capitalize on the ethnic consciousness of their groups and translate it into political power:

> The upwardly mobile men who became ethnic group leaders were quick to see the advantages of the political contacts and the ethnic identifications nurtured by the [ethnic] organizations' existence and activities.

Thus they used their positions as ethnic leaders 'to make an impact upon the general society'.[4] Liebman also was of the opinion that activity and leadership in Jewish associations and organizations act as a spring-board and path of acceptance into the non-Jewish world.[5]

Since Lewin postulated his hypothesis in 1941, several attempts to test it empirically have been made in a variety of American Jewish communities. Sutker in 1950 gave examples of peripheral leaders among the Jews of German origin in Atlanta, and concluded that they were then leaving Jewish leadership behind and climbing socially within the general community.[6] In Lakeville, Ringer saw the Lewinian process among some old-time Jewish inhabitants. Initially, the influx of Jewish families, most of whom were more observant, led to phenomena of self-hatred and aggression against the newcomers. But, as their status rose in the general community, for latent antisemitism was diverted from them to the new arrivals, they found themselves more and more representing the Jewish group within the wider society and playing an ambassadorial role between the two communities.[7]

Segalman has made perhaps the most careful test of the self-hatred and peripheral leadership hypotheses among the Jews of El Paso, Texas, probably a somewhat unrepresentative community, though it may be (as Segalman maintains) a prototype of future small communities. His small sample of leaders in the 1960s included half a dozen each from the executives of the Jewish community centre, B'nai Brith, the Conservative synagogue, and the Reform temple, and another six who were nominated as the 'power elite' for their influence in both the Jewish and general communities. When he tested the leaders and samples of synagogue and temple members and non-members, he found that the organization leaders were generally highest on scales of general and Jewish styles of life and of Jewish identification. However, the 'power elite' showed a mixed score: they were generally low on the scale of Jewish life-style and also that of Jewish identification, but they attended synagogue more frequently, were more active in community service, and gave more money to charity. He concluded that Lewin's

hypothesis was not applicable to the organization leaders, but was to these elite figures, on whom he commented:[8]

> They can't quite leave, and they do stay. . . . Meanwhile, they go through the motions of Jewish leadership activity but with little commitment.

Other empirical studies, not differentiating between types of leaders (Lewin also makes no differentiation), do not generally support the hypothesis. Reissman asked his respondents in New Orleans which item of Jewish education should be emphasized for their children. Those less active in Jewish associations chose social adjustment, but those more active chose religion.[9] The implication is that the latter, from whom the leadership is selected, are more religious in attitude. Gans found in Park Forest that the active members of associations (including the leaders) attended synagogue more frequently than the inactive.[10]

Other writers have attacked marginality, the basis of the hypothesis. Steinberg in 1965 maintained that the years in which Lewin lived in the United States were marked by denominational splits in the Jewish community, but that few renounced their Jewish identity. Since then new forms of Jewish identification have emerged, and the theory of marginality is, in his opinion, fallacious.[11]

Friedman, examining Jewish intellectuals, found no evidence of self-hatred and marginality, and concluded that the intellectual has simply found a non-ethnic substitute for his Jewishness.[12] Mazur, studying American Jewish social scientists at the time of the Six-Day War, found no evidence of the type of suppressed emotionality which a self-hatred hypothesis would imply.[13]

If Jewish leaders are neither marginal nor peripheral, does that mean that they will be more Jewishly and religiously committed? According to Homans, they should be more or less in conformity with the norms of their fellow American Jews: 'the higher the rank of a person within a group, the more nearly his activities conform to the norms of the group'.[14] Krech and his associates stress that the leader must conform with the group's norms ('one of us') and that over-commitment to Jewish values and practices as well as under-commitment may disturb this balance.[15]

The implication is that the American Jewish leader should be neither more peripheral nor more committed Jewishly than the rank and file, and writers taking an overview of Jewish leadership in the United States tend to take this position. Glazer recently pointed out that the leaders do not, for example, generally have a thorough Jewish education, but neither do most American Jews.[16] For Elazar, the lay leaders of American Jews represent 'the more Jewishly committed elements in the mainstream of the American Jewish community'.[17]

They are not particularly observant, but neither are most American Jews.

This survey of the literature shows a mixed picture. On the one hand, community studies support Lewin's hypothesis of marginal leaders of American Jewry. On the other hand, the theoretical basis of the hypothesis has been attacked by some, while others have suggested alternative reasons for a similar phenomenon; and data from further community studies do not support the hypothesis. In the middle, two recent surveys of American Jewish leadership in general (neither based on quantifiable data) suggest that the leaders' Jewish identification will be very similar to that of the rank and file. What do the findings of a national survey of American Jews in 1970–71 show?

Data source

The data presented below are from the National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS), a national survey of the United States Jewish population conducted from the early spring of 1970 to the end of 1971 for the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds. The sample yielded 5,790 household interviews at a 79 per cent response rate. For the purpose of the survey, a Jew was defined as a person who reported himself or herself as Jewish or, failing this, as a person who had at least one Jewish parent. The sample design had to take into account the fact that American Jewry constitutes only a small percentage of the total American population, that a sizeable proportion do not live in neighbourhoods with high concentrations of Jewish residents, and that many are not listed on readily available communal lists. The final design was a complex, multi-stage, two-phase, disproportionately stratified, cluster sample.[18] When a sampled household was found to contain a Jewish resident, basic information about the family was obtained and, using the Kish technique,[19] one adult Jewish respondent was then selected for more detailed questioning from among all the Jewish adults in the household. At this survey phase there was additional sub-sampling within the New York area, and so interviews with 4,305 adult Jewish respondents from this final sampling stage provided the national data reported here.

Variable definition and measurement

The variables employed in this paper can be summarized as follows: (1) *Jewish denominational identification and synagogue membership*. Respondents were classified into three categories on the basis of their expressed denominational identification: Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform. Those who did not identify with a denomination, or said they were 'just

Jewish', were classified as having no denominational identification. In addition, respondents were asked whether they were members of a synagogue.

(2) *Jewish identification indices.* A set of items indicative of various aspects of religious and ethnic identification were used to create indices of dimensions of Jewish identification.[20] In brief, these indices are:

a. Childhood home Jewish background: the Jewish aspects of respondents' childhood homes, covering items such as parental religious involvement, home Holy Day celebrations, and the extent of the respondents' parents' activity in Jewish organizations.

b. Jewish education: the type and amount during childhood and adolescence.

c. Religious practice: respondents' observance of the Sabbath, Passover, Hanuka, Yom Kippur, and the dietary laws (*kashrut*), and present synagogue attendance.

d. Jewish ideology: extent to which being Jewish and retaining Jewish values are felt to be desirable and intrinsically worthwhile.

e. Ethnic community involvement: the extent to which a respondent's primary group behaviour (dating, courtship, friends, family life, social life) has been confined to Jews.

f. Jewish socialization of children: degree of respondents' past, present and intended efforts to socialize their children into Jewish life.

g. Concern for world Jewry: attitudes towards Israel and degree of concern over the fate of Jews in difficult circumstances in the rest of the world.

(3) *Jewish organizational participation.* The extent of membership, attendance, activity, and fund-raising in and for Jewish voluntary associations.

(4) *Jewish communal leadership,* measured in four ways:

a. Officers: officers in any Jewish voluntary association.

b. Community organization members: members of those Jewish associations whose main objective is community service — for example, health, welfare, education, culture, community relations.

c. Elite organization members: members of those Jewish organizations classified as 'elite' within the community by virtue of their exclusivity, their high status or their members' high status — such as synagogue boards, charity boards, American Jewish Committee, Jewish country clubs, Federation boards.

d. 'Philanthropists': respondents who had a high family income and also gave a large amount to charity of any sort.[21]

(5) *General community organizational involvement.* The extent of membership, attendance, and fund-raising in and for non-Jewish voluntary associations.

(6) *Socio-economic characteristics.* These include the respondent's general education, the occupation of the head of the household, the total

family income in the year before the survey, and the total amount contributed to charity in that year.

(7) *Biosocial characteristics.* These include the respondent's sex, his generation in the United States (foreign-born, both parents foreign-born, one parent foreign-born, both parents born in the United States), and a life-cycle index. The latter grouped the respondents into ten categories ranging from unmarried young respondents, through married couples with young or adolescent children, couples whose children had left home, to elderly respondents living alone.

Data analysis

The data from the NJPS were analysed according to the OSIRIS multivariate analysis programme.[22] Its three basic components, called automatic interaction detection (AID), multiple classification analysis (MCA), and multivariate nominal scale analysis (MNA) were used to create regression equations.

Both MCA and MNA are variations of dummy variable multiple regression procedures. They assume an additive model but need no assumption of linearity. The chief advantage of these programmes is that the independent (predictor) variables can be ordinal or nominal. While MCA requires an interval or pseudo-interval scale for the dependent variable, MNA can work with a nominal or ordinal dependent variable. The four Jewish leadership dependent variables, all of which are nominal, were analysed using MNA. Both the MCA and MNA programmes give beta measures, which depict the ability of the predictor variable to explain changes in the dependent variable after adjusting for the effects of all the other predictor variables.

MCA and MNA assume that there are no interactions among the variables, and so the AID programme was used first to check that. No meaningful interactions were found, and it may be assumed that any interactions that were not detected by the AID analysis have very limited impacts, if any at all, and may be ignored.

The several MNA equations were arrayed by a path analysis approach. This means that variables were introduced into the various equations from the most basic to the most dependent ones. In doing this, time ordering was of considerable importance. Thus the various independent variables have been organized into biosocial, Jewish background, present socio-economic characteristics, denominational preference, current religious practice, Jewish identification, and Jewish organizational participation. This ordering indicates that, in the model, Jewish background variables enter equations before current religious practice which, in turn, appears before variables of Jewish organizational participation.[23]

Findings

TABLE 1. *MNA Beta and Multiple Correlation Values for the Communal Leadership Model, NJPS, 1971*

Predictor Variables \ *Dependent Variables*		*Jewish Association Officers*	*Jewish Community Organization Members*	*Jewish Elite Organization Members*	*Philanthropists*
Bio-Social	Sex	−.01	−.18	.02	.01
	U.S. Gen.	.04	.03	.01	.05
	Life Cycle	.05	.08	.06	.11
Jewish background	J. Home Backg.	.04	.10	.04	−.02
	J. Educ.	.01	.05	.04	.03
	Father's J. Orgs	.02	.02	.02	.03
	Mother's J. Orgs	.02	.08	.03	.03
Socio-Economic	Inc.	.03	.09	.05	—
	Charity	.06	.14	.18	—
	Educ.	.02	.09	.07	.11
	Occ.	.07	.08	.15	.16
Denom.		.02	−.06	−.08	−.05
Religious	Sabbath Obs.	.02	.05	.02	.00
Practice	Passover Obs.	.02	.00	.03	.02
	Hanuka Obs.	.01	.00	.04	.04
	Kashrut Obs.	.00	.09	−.05	−.04
	Yom K. Obs.	.01	.01	.01	.03
	Syn Att.	.02	.11	.10	.07
	Syn Memb.	.00	.01	.05	.03
Jewish	J. Ideol	.03	.08	.02	.04
Identification	Ethnic Comm.	.01	.04	.04	.00
	J. Socn Children	.02	.02	−.03	−.05
	World Jewry	.01	.08	.05	.06
Jewish Org.	J. Ass. Memb.	.07	—	—	.36
Participation	J. Ass. Att.	.13	—	—	.24
	J. Ass. Act.	.49	—	—	.05
	J. Fund Raising	.09	.13	.07	.08
J. Leadership	Officers		.11	.08	.01
	J. Comm. Orgs			—	.01
	J. Elite Orgs				.12
Squared Mult. Corr.		.38	.24	.17	.20

Negative Sign means: women more than men, foreign-born more than 3rd generation, Reform more than Orthodox, low category more than high category.

Predictors are omitted from equations in which the dependent variable has been built up from those predictors.

Table 1 introduces the model for leadership in the Jewish community. The predictor variables appear, in the order just mentioned, in the vertical array (rows), while the four dependent variables are in the horizontal array (columns). The figures given in the Table are beta coefficients derived from MNA calculations. The squared multiple correlation (that is, the amount of variance explained by the total equation including all the predictor variables together) appears in the final data row. Then each table column represents the beta coefficients

of one dummy variable multiple regression equation with the indicated dependent variable, predictor variables, and the resultant multiple correlation. For example, the first equation of the Table has office-holding in Jewish voluntary associations as the dependent variable. The predictor variables are, from top to bottom, sex, number of generations in the United States, family life-cycle, etc., up to activity in fund-raising for Jewish organizations. The beta coefficient between office-holding in Jewish associations and sex is −.01, while between office-holding in Jewish associations and activity in fund-raising for Jewish organizations it is .09. That equation's squared multiple correlation coefficient is .38. The remainder of the Table can be read in the same way.

In line with current use of the OSIRIS programme, a beta value of .09 (or −.09) or less will be considered as showing a weak effect of that predictor variable on the dependent variable, a beta value of between .10 and .19 as moderate, and of .20 (or −.20) and over as strong. Thus in each equation, that is in each column of the Table, the betas doubly underlined indicate the predictors that have a powerful effect on leadership in the American Jewish community, those singly underlined indicate a moderate effect, and the remainder have only a weak effect.[24]

Strong or moderate *negative* beta values (−.10 or more) in the rows of religious practice and Jewish identification would support the Lewinian hypothesis. Strong or moderate *positive* beta values (.10 or more) in the same rows would be *prima facie* evidence of refutation of the hypothesis. Weak beta values (.09 or −.09 or less) in these rows (and, indeed, in other rows too) would point to a lack of differentiation between American Jewish leaders and their rank and file.

The Table shows that leadership in the Jewish community is most strongly associated with participation in Jewish voluntary associations, while few of the other predictors reach even moderate levels. Charity donation, occupational status, and synagogue attendance show some effect on at least two of the dependent variables; the predictors of biosocial status, Jewish background, denomination, private religious practice, and Jewish identification have virtually no effect. Jewish leaders participate more than non-leaders in Jewish organizations, they tend to give more to charity, to have higher occupational status, and to attend synagogue more frequently, but they are neither marginal in their Jewish practice and identification nor exceptional: they are as observant and as identifying as the average American Jew. The Lewinian hypothesis is clearly not supported, nor is the other which sees the leaders as more observant and more identifying than the rank and file.

Although it is not apparent from the Table, the alternative hypothesis of Litt and Liebman — that leadership in Jewish associations leads to activity in the general community — is also not supported

by the NJPS data. When the four Jewish leadership variables of Table 1 were used as predictors in an MCA run in which the dependent variable was a composite index of general organizational activity, the beta coefficients were respectively .02, −.01, .01 and .03. Clearly, Jewish leadership has no effect on participation in organizations in the general community.

Discussion

The national data do not support the Lewinian hypothesis of peripheral leaders. Four possible explanations may be put forward.

First, it may be argued that the NJPS data do not identify leaders in the sense used by Lewin and other writers. Those who are called leaders include between eight and eighteen per cent of the population, and they include leaders and activists at the most local level as well as national leaders of American Jewry. Indeed, it is unlikely that many, or any, of the members of the Conference of Presidents of Major American-Jewish Organizations fell into the NJPS sample. However, Lewin did not differentiate between types of leaders, and one might have expected to have found some effects of peripherality even in such a widely drawn sample. No effects whatsoever are apparent.

A second obvious explanation is that Lewin's hypothesis, based upon an impressionistic view of the American Jewish community in the early 1940s, was never correct — as Steinberg, Friedman, and Mazur state or imply. If this is the case, how can the findings of Sutker, Ringer, and Segalman be explained? All three used survey techniques and varying degrees of statistical sophistication in three very different communities, yet they all found phenomena consistent with Lewin's hypothesis.

A third explanation may lie in the view that times have changed and that what may have been true of American Jews in the early 1940s no longer applies today. Lewin stated clearly that his thesis applied to minority groups which were oppressed in some way, and suggested that equality of status would lead to the demise of the peripheral leader phenomenon. Today, it may be argued, the Jews of the United States have achieved such a group status that peripheral leaders are no longer necessary. Alternatively, it may be that today it is no longer necessary for a Jew who wishes to be active in the wider American society to be peripheral in his Jewishness; it may be to his advantage to be 'a proud Jew' and a practising Jew, and it seems clear that it will not be to his disadvantage to practise at least the public 'church-like' elements of his religion (such as synagogue attendance) or to show his commitment to Jewishness. Thus synagogue attendance may reflect conformity with American norms of public worship rather than show religious commitment.[25] Moreover, the NJPS data show no evidence that participation

in general associations is marked by lower Jewish identification or religious practice,[26] and much evidence of the strong association between participation in Jewish and in general organizations.[27]

Finally, Sutker and Reissman's researches suggest another explanation which may reconcile the Lewinian hypothesis and the NJPS data. Sutker found that once the Jewish leader had been accepted by the wider society's leadership, he retained his status in the general community even if his ethnic base eroded. He concluded that the general community in Atlanta was scarcely aware of the circulation and changes within the Jewish lay leadership (particularly of the eclipse of the German elite and the rise of the East European elite), and thus many of the Jews who were chosen to represent their community, as it were, in fact no longer led Jewish organizations.[28] Reissman, writing about another Southern community, New Orleans, found a similar phenomenon.[29] Alternatively, as Segalman has shown, the peripheral leaders, influential in both the Jewish and the general communities, seldom held formal leadership positions in the Jewish community.[30] They may have been examples of the Sutker–Reissman type leaders, or they may have been Jews who had risen to eminence in the wider society without ever holding formal positions of authority or leadership within the Jewish community. Whether they were lapsed leaders or those who avoided formal Jewish leadership positions, they were the only candidates who could possibly be considered peripheral leaders. Even so, the previous explanations and the evidence of the NJPS data raise doubts as to their peripherality in Jewish commitment and religiosity. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the NJPS shows no evidence of leaders from the periphery and that about thirty years after Lewin's analysis, the phenomenon no longer exists among the Jews of the United States of America.

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NOTES

[1] Aaron Antonovsky, 'Toward a Refinement of the "Marginal Man" Concept'. *Social Forces*, vol. XXXV (October 1956), pp. 57–62.

[2] Daniel Glaser, 'Dynamics of Ethnic Identification'. *American Sociological Review*, vol. XXIII (February 1958), pp. 31–35.

[3] Kurt Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts*. New York, 1948, p. 196. See also pp. 148–58, 186–200.

[4] Edgar Litt, *Beyond Pluralism: Ethnic Politics in America*. Glenview, Ill., 1970, p. 43. See also pp. 27, 42–45.

[5] Charles S. Liebman, 'American Jewry: Identity and Affiliation', in David Sidorsky, ed., *The Future of the Jewish Community in America*. American Jewish Committee, New York, 1973, p. 132.

[6] Solomon Sutker, 'The Jews of Atlanta: Their Social Structure and Leadership Patterns', unpublished Ph.D. thesis in the Department of Sociology at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1950, pp. 339, 344–50.

[7] Benjamin B. Ringer, *The Edge of Friendliness: A Study of Jewish-Gentile Relations*. New York, 1967, pp. 74–88.

[8] Ralph Segalman, 'A Test of the Lewinian Hypothesis on Self-Hatred Among the Jews', unpublished Ph.D. thesis in the Department of Education at the University of New York, 1966, p. 330. See also pp. 304–6, 326–30.

[9] Leonard Reissman, 'The New Orleans Jewish Community', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. IV (June 1962), pp. 113–17.

[10] Herbert J. Gans, 'The Origin and Growth of a Jewish Community in the Suburbs: A Study of the Jews of Park Forest', in Marshall Sklare, ed., *The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group*, New York, 1958, p. 222.

[11] Stephen Steinberg, 'The Anatomy of Jewish Identification'. *Review of Religious Research*, vol. VII (Fall 1965), pp. 2–3.

[12] Norman L. Friedman, 'The Problem of the "Runaway Jewish Intellectuals"', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. XXXI (January 1969), pp. 13–19.

[13] Allan Mazur, 'Jewish Social Scientists: Apathy: Reactions to the Six Day War', paper delivered at the American Sociological Association Meeting in New Orleans, 1972.

[14] George C. Homans, *The Human Group*, London, 1951, p. 141.

[15] David Krech *et al*, *Individual in Society: A Textbook of Social Psychology*. New York, 1962, pp. 438–42.

[16] Nathan Glazer, 'American Jewish Leadership', *Contemporary Jewry*, vol. III (Spring/Summer 1977), p. 11.

[17] Daniel J. Elazar, *Community and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry*, Philadelphia, 1976, p. 285. See also pp. 275–76.

[18] For more details of the sample, its response characteristics, and generalized sampling errors, see Bernard Lazerwitz, *The Sample Design of the National Jewish Population Survey*, Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, New York, 1973; and his *Sampling Errors and Statistical Inference for the National Jewish Population Survey*, Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, New York, 1974; 'An Approach to the Components and Consequences of Jewish Identification'. *Contemporary Jewry*, vol. IV (Spring/Summer 1978), pp. 3–8.

[19] Leslie Kish, 'A Procedure for Objective Respondent Selection within the Household', *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, vol. XLIV (September 1949), pp. 380–87.

[20] See Bernard Lazerwitz, 'Religious Identification and its Ethnic Correlates', *Social Forces*, vol. LII (December 1973), pp. 205–10.

[21] 9% of the sample are Officers, 18% Community Organization Members, 8% Elite Organization Members, and 9% are Philanthropists.

[22] See Judith Rattenbury and Neal Van Eck, *OSIRIS: Architecture and Design*, Ann Arbor, Mich., Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1973.

[23] For a rationalization and testing of this order, see Lazerwitz, 'Religious Identification and its Ethnic Correlates', loc. cit.

[24] Also in line with general use of OSIRIS, there is no testing for statistical significance. There is an elaborate procedure for this, but it is almost never used for two main reasons. Firstly, the strength of the betas and the squared multiple correlation indicate the amount of variance explained, and it has been shown that coefficients of .20 and more are usually significant. Secondly, the size of this sample (and OSIRIS is chiefly used for large samples) would probably guarantee statistical significance for almost all results.

[25] N. J. Demerath III, *Social Class in American Protestantism*, Chicago, 1965, pp. 4, 11–15; Rodney Stark, *The Economics of Piety: Social Class and Religious Commitment*, University of California Survey Research Center, Berkeley, 1966 (?), p. 10.

[26] With memberships of general associations, high attendance at meetings of general associations, fund-raising in the general community, and membership of general 'communal' associations as dependent variables, and with the eleven predictors of religious practice and Jewish indentification, the four equations show only 14 out of 44 beta values that are negative (all weak), while 30 of the beta values are zero or positive (one is moderate, the others are weak).

[27] On the equation in which general association membership is the dependent variable, attendance at Jewish associations shows a .25 beta value. On the equation of high attendance at general association meetings, the beta values for Jewish association membership and Jewish association attendance are respectively .46 and .41. General community fund-raising and Jewish community fund-raising have a .32 association, and membership of general 'communal' associations shows .20 and .29 beta values for Jewish association membership and Jewish association attendance respectively. See Alan S. York, 'Voluntary Associations and Communal Leadership of the Jews of the United States of America', unpublished Ph.D. thesis in the Department of Sociology, Bar-Ilan University, 1979, p. 125.

[28] Sutker, op. cit., pp. 350–57.

[29] Reissman, op. cit., p. 118.

[30] Segalman, loc. cit.

URBAN HISTORY AND THE PATTERN OF PROVINCIAL JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND

Lloyd P. Gartner

A CENTURY ago, Baron L. Benas of Liverpool admitted to feeling a little troubled because there was 'something very unromantic in the origin of most of our Anglo-Jewish communities'. They were not 'founded by martyrs, exiles, and those who had bled for their faith'. Wandering pedlars, who could not provide a substitute for refugee Marranos, only implanted 'a kind of monotony in the early history of our English provincial communities'. London had its Marranos even from the time of Henry VIII, but in the Provinces, alas, 'first comes a substratum of Germans and Poles, who pioneer the way into town as hawkers, pedlars, or watchmakers' — humdrum beginnings. German and Polish Jews had in fact 'bled for their faith' centuries before Benas wrote. Their fate was massacre and dreary suffering, rather than the Shakespearian tragedy of Spanish Jewry's downfall. Benas observed that the early Germans and Poles settled down in the Provincial towns and raised families. 'A superior stratum of newcomers' arrived somewhat later.[1]

However, Manchester, not distant from his native Liverpool, did not exactly fit the scheme: 'A motley crowd of Jews of divergent trade interests and religious opinions congregate in Manchester from all parts of the world. But, wonder of wonders, the mystic word "Jew" unites them as if by some invisible bond. . .'.[2]

Actually, Benas was mainly describing how the Jewish communities originated in the large industrial cities of the Midlands and the North. As he readily admitted, London Jewry boasted earlier and much different beginnings. His account of 1877, with its fanciful trimmings, contains enough of close observation and hard facts to merit a contemporary, more earthbound, look. It seems possible to suggest distinct stages of Provincial Anglo-Jewry's communal development during the early Victorian era and then, somewhat hypothetically, to

attempt to link these economic and social developments with religious and communal trends.

One founder of a Provincial community may first be allowed to speak for himself. In 1900, London-born John Jacobs, dwelling at the age of eighty-four in the Joel Emanuel Almshouses in London, recalled his boyhood in Sheffield. During the 1820s his was the sole Jewish family in Sheffield, but a *shohet* was their boarder. They had regular Sabbath services, because 'on Friday Mother always told us to look out for Jewish travellers, and bring them home, so that we were never without Minyan'.[3] Old Jacobs's genial account does not fully square with other information, since his was evidently not the sole Jewish family resident in Sheffield during the 1820s. However, there seems little doubt that peddling underlies the founding of that community.[4]

During Sheffield's pre-railway years, until 1845, six coaches journeyed daily thence to London, and would stop at the Bull Inn, Aldgate, close by the Jewish streets of London. In 1828, from Exeter to London by mail coach took nineteen and a half hours.[5] Still earlier, Birmingham, already the home of some Jewish craftsmen and shopkeepers, was 'the centre or head-quarters of many pedlars . . . they came to replenish their stocks, and hither too they gathered at the great festivals of Passover and Rosh Hashanah' to be with other Jews.[6]

One is reminded of Henri Pirenne's famous construct of the origins of medieval towns: wandering merchants find shelter for the winter within castle walls, or just outside them. The shelter becomes a base, and ultimately a permanent home, more merchants settle there, and a recognizable town emerges which demands privileges from the lord of the castle. Just as it has undergone much correction for medieval history, the Pirenne thesis's usefulness as analogy for Anglo-Jewish provincial history requires modification. To Birmingham came Jewish pedlars for supplies and Jewish fellowship. A single hospitable Jewish family, which probably derived income from doing it, encouraged Jewish pedlars to make their way to Sheffield after a hard week of tramping the countryside. Would not some of them have in time wearied of lengthy, bone-rattling coach trips back to London, and settled down in Sheffield and in Birmingham?[7]

The beginnings recalled by John Jacobs are applicable to other towns, but not to all of them. Twenty years after the Sheffield *shohet* supplied the city's two or three Jewish families with ritually slaughtered meat and poultry, there were still only ten to twenty Jewish families in Leeds, by then the seventh largest city in England. There was 'great difficulty' in Leeds to form a *minyan* during the early 1860s. The provincial growth of Leeds Jewry was due entirely to Russian and Polish immigrants after 1870, most of them working in the clothing industry.[8] Leeds's late start did not prevent its becoming second in size among Provincial communities by 1900.

The earliest Provincial communities may well have been founded by pedlars, many of whom are encountered only later on by the historian when they have become shopkeepers. Yet in Newcastle upon Tyne, the earliest identifiable Jews, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, were independent artisans as well as sedentary merchants.[9]

By the latter half of the nineteenth century, already an age of trains and a retail network, country pedlars had lost their communal, as well as economic, significance. The first arrivals in Jewish communities in Benas's day were no longer likely to be pedlars. For example, during the 1860s, a small Jewish community was founded in Coventry, evidently by men who came to work in the city's then flourishing watchmaking trade. That trade, and with it Coventry Jewry, began to decline about twenty years later.[10] In Stroud, it was a large wholesale clothing firm which attracted Jewish workers to the town during the 1870s, but only one Jew remained by 1914.[11]

The brothers Lazareck, after years in the Australian goldfields, came in about 1857 to the small town of Aldershot, where a large Army base was springing up. Two other Jewish families arrived with them. Joseph Lazareck became a successful businessman and local notable, but when he died in 1900 the civilian Jewish population of Aldershot numbered no more than 50 persons.[12]

After 1880, most of the vast increase in the Anglo-Jewish population was contained within the largest cities, but new communities did also arise. H. Reuben Davidson reported in 1900 that he had lived in Barrow in Furness nine years, 'and there are only half-a-dozen Jews as yet settled here', who had come during the preceding three years. 'As soon as four more Jews settle here, we intend having a congregation and to engage a Shochet'.[13] As he walked in a street of Dudley, Henry A. Phillips wrote, he was stopped and asked whether he was a Jew. His 'yes' elicited the request to help make a *minyan*. 'No one would credit that such a thing is possible in a town with a population standing at nearly 60,000 . . .'. There were then said to be twelve Jewish families in Dudley, but it did not develop further.[14] The very issue of the *Jewish Chronicle* which reported this brought word from Brynmawr, one of 'the smaller congregations which have of late sprung up in South Wales', that a younger generation was growing up and plans were being made for a proper synagogue to replace the room in a house which was then being used for worship.[15] Seven men founded the Blackpool congregation in 1898, and in 1900, when there were fourteen members, they consecrated a synagogue.[16]

The Reading Jewish community was probably the only one whose growth was directly encouraged by the London Jewish elite. The Reading Jews, the first of whom came there in 1887, had been East End immigrant workmen. The development of Reading Jewish communal life, it was hoped, would draw Jews thither and decrease East End

congestion. It did not happen that way, but leaders of native Jewry contributed to build the Reading synagogue and assisted that community with its other needs.[17] A small Jewish settlement of tailors, artisans, and shopkeepers rose in Blackburn near Manchester at the turn of the twentieth century, but without external assistance.[18]

The latter half of the nineteenth century was a period of major Provincial expansion. For 1851, Dr Lipman has counted 33 functioning congregations in 30 English towns, two in Wales, and four more in the rest of the United Kingdom.[19] In 1900, 49 places reported holding High Holiday services.[20] The *Jewish Year Book* of 1902 identified 84 places of Jewish settlement in the United Kingdom.

Brave starts, however, do not assure flourishing communal futures, and Jewish communities, like cities and nations, do decline. Lamented a correspondent from Newcastle to the *Jewish Chronicle* in 1880: 'It is painful to see how many of these old Houses of God have decayed or are decaying; Bedford, Ipswich and Colchester are gone; Norwich, Exeter, and Falmouth are almost things of the past. Here in the North, the commercial genius of our nation had more scope . . .'[21] What the last sentence hinted at was stated in realistic terms years later by the Reverend A. A. Green: 'A great deal has yet to be written of the decline and fall of once considerable congregations like Falmouth in the West, and Ipswich in the East. The fact, too, that this synagogal decay has gone on upon the fringe of these islands — on the extreme West and extreme East — and that, side by side, the rise of great industrial centres in the North and the Midlands has created great Jewish congregations in these parts, suggests useful consideration of the sources of synagogal decline and the inevitable relationship between commercial and communal conditions.'[22]

A Defunct Synagogues Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews reported in 1914 on synagogues which 'appear to have ceased to exist', and included Bath, Bedford, Boston, Ipswich, Jersey, King's Lynn, Penzance, Rhyl, Sheerness, and Stroud.[23] The rise of Provincial Jewry in the Midlands and the North as well as in Scotland, and its decline in the South-West, along the Channel coast, and in East Anglia, thus involved an extensive demographic shift which was accomplished around the middle of the nineteenth century. Devonshire's general population was by then in stagnation, and it and the other areas just mentioned lost nearly all their Jewish population.[24] We are not certain where these Jews went. Benas's description of early Liverpool Jewry as people who had come there in order to embark for America but instead remained does seem exaggerated, and probably refers to a somewhat earlier period. Yet as a native of the great port city, Benas may well have known of such cases. Emigration to America was indeed extensive, and some even braved the voyage to Australia. A 'large number' of Jewish immigrants who were rural pedlars are

reported to have gone to America at mid-century, but none of this is really hard fact. On the other hand, general migration within England was mostly short-range, to the nearest large town.[25]

Altogether, most of the Jews who left the declining areas settled elsewhere in England and Scotland. Thus, Manchester in 1851 counted 501 native-born (and 591 foreign-born) Jews, of whom 298 were born elsewhere in England.[26] In the same year, Birmingham Jewry's total of 204 males and 296 females native-born (of respective totals of 304 and 359) includes 38 males and 55 females who had come from the declining towns.[27] It is unusual and significant that a count of Glasgow Jewry in 1831 found 47 Jews, of whom 21 were native-born; and no less then ten of these had come from the distant Kentish seacoast town of Sheerness.[28] One may reasonably infer the occurence of a chain, or a group, migration. By 1900, only a dim remembrance remained of 'the little known, but important body of native English Jews of the middle class who had come from little Provincial towns'.[29]

The first Provincial Anglo-Jewish communities existed for about one hundred years, until the opening of the Victorian era, and were scattered mainly among the seaport and market towns of Devon, Cornwall, Kent, and East Anglia. Bristol, then the second city in the kingdom, was an important centre,[30] while around 1800 neither Liverpool nor Manchester as yet had more Jews than many of the little towns. Apart from numerous pedlars operating out of the small sedentary communities, the first Provincial settlements also had small merchant craftsmen like watchmakers and silversmiths. These occupations took them deep into rural, traditional, Christian England, where, however, they had little but business relations. Their mode of life was Jewish, with little admixture from the society in which they earned their income.

Susser's findings in the case of Plymouth poignantly illustrate some social and cultural characteristics. The Jews in that town clung to Yiddish, and there were some who could write only in the Hebrew script. Thus a will of 1808, by a shopkeeper who had lived for at least twenty years in Exeter, is in Yiddish. The Plymouth synagogue kept its minutes in Yiddish until 1834, although by then the majority of its members were native-born. Admittedly, keeping minutes in Yiddish may have been merely the habit of a veteran secretary, but what he wrote had to be understood by the members.[31]

Their synagogues had an informal, clubable atmosphere, seasoned with open quarrels, suiting men who did business with equally rough and ready informality, and who had no Christian religious models at the back of their mind. The preservation unchanged of Judaism as they knew it was their goal, not its change or adaptation. What happened in the case of the socially ambitious or educated to whom the local religious regime was objectionable, may be suggested by the 14 known

conversions of Jews to Christianity between 1730 and 1830; none are known after that date.[32]

During the 1840s what we may call the second wave of Provincial Anglo-Jewry emerged in the great Midlands cities. There were already long-established Jewish communities in Liverpool, Manchester, and Birmingham: Liverpool Jews had a synagogue by 1775, Birmingham's second was opened in 1820, and the third house of worship in Manchester was dedicated in 1826. However, it was only after 1840 that these cities far surpassed the old communities.[33]

Conspicuous among the new Provincial Jews were educated Germans who came from the rapidly increasing ranks of assimilated, Germanized Jews. They helped to open central and eastern Europe to British industrial production, and their success, besides of course enriching them, enlarged such industries as Nottingham lace and Bradford woollens.[34] They set up commercial firms in Manchester, Liverpool, and elsewhere, where they joined sons of earlier Provincial Jews who seem to have moved there. Jewish fidelity among the German immigrants was often weak; their defections in the small Jewish community of Nottingham, for example, were comparatively numerous. Louis Heymann, a civic leader who also once served as mayor, as well as some others, abandoned Judaism and joined the social and business leaders of the town who worshipped at the Unitarian Church.[35] On the other hand, Jacob Weinberg (who had come from Hamburg to Nottingham in 1850) was meticulously observant, shutting his firm of Simon, May and Co. on the Sabbath and on Jewish festivals. Weinberg left the local congregation and kept a more Orthodox *minyan* of his own.[36] German Jews were living in Bradford many years before they established their own Reform congregation, which went its quiet way almost isolated from Anglo-Jewry. Sons of these Jews, such as Alfred Zimmern and William Rothenstein, left the Jewish community. Manchester Jewry also lost many of the new German settlers. They 'held themselves completely aloof from all *congregational* matters as distinct from *educational* . . .'.[37] Moreover, they 'did not adhere strictly to the rites nor eventually to the doctrines of our holy faith', and as a result 'it is not so much wondered at that many adherents were lost to Judaism . . . many secessions to Christianity took place, and there are not a few wealthy [mercantile] houses' bearing their names.[38]

Membership in the English commercial classes, then at the summit of their world supremacy, was easily acquired, and apostasy in favour of the Dissenting churches and middle-class respectability was not at all unthinkable.[39] Williams's work has shown that the departure from Judaism of these significant elements slowed considerably once a form of Judaism existed which they found compatible with their cultural status and social ambitions. A minister with a general education,

English (and for some, German) sermons set in a decorous service within a pleasing synagogue edifice, epitomized their wishes. Reform was not essential to most of them. There were also middle-class Jews who returned to the synagogue once its forms became more attractive.[40]

The new Provincial Jewry as it regrouped and grew larger from the 1840s was insistent on acquiring equal franchise in their synagogues and communities. This was the main reason why mid-nineteenth-century English synagogues knew serious strife. Later accounts mention this as casually as possible, preferring to muffle it under a blanket of Jewish affability. But strife is instructive to the historian. If the pleasure which is often taken in synagogue factions and quarrels may interest a psychologist, the historian may find that irate words and bellicose acts illuminate deep divergences and important social cleavages. Let us therefore take these synagogue conflicts as seriously as their participants once did, if for different reasons. We know of conflicts in what were then becoming the three main Provincial communities, Manchester, Liverpool, and Birmingham. As early as 1828, the Birmingham congregation sought to deal with a decidedly new and unsettling phenomenon, Jews who kept their businesses open on the Sabbath, by a definitely traditional means: denying them the honour of being called to the Torah reading (*aliyot*). Isaac L. Goldsmid mediated a settlement. However, it was synagogue government which remained a dangerous constant irritant, and the issue came to focus not on the subject of Reform Judaism but on that of free (that is, unrestricted, full-fledged) members. This was an English version of the long-established right of Continental communities to accept or reject candidates for permanent residence (*hezkat ha-yishuv, hezkat ha-kahal*), and to charge those who were accepted a usually substantial fee for the economic and welfare rights they would receive.[41] In England, where of course no community could exclude anyone from a town or compel him to leave it, this right was confined to the synagogue, which might grant or withhold free membership. Free members monopolized power: only they could elect or be elected, assess financial contributions, levy fees, and distribute honours. Clauses 6, 7, and 14 (out of 263!), with the Hebrew words printed in Hebrew script, of the *Laws and Regulations of the Brighton Synagogue 5585*[42] provide an example of the system in operation:

> 6. A *ba'al bayit* (a privileged member) is one who has paid and continues to pay *hezkat ha-kehillah*, and is entitled to the accustomed rights and privileges of the Synagogue.
>
> 7. A *toshav* is one who is not a privileged member, but occupies a seat in the synagogue.
>
> 14. Members who have been one year *ba'aley batim* not in arrears, and occupying a seat in the synagogue, whether married, widowers, or

> bachelors, are eligible to be qualified to attend the meetings of this congregation, and to become ever after members of the *kahal*, by a resolution to that effect being carried at a quarterly meeting by a decided majority of the members present . . .

For this elevation a member had to pay two guineas (Clause 93).

The 'Laws of the Exeter Congregation of Jews' in their 1833 version[43] resembled the Brighton rules. Sons and sons-in-law of members were readily admitted to free member status, but newcomers first had to be paying seat-holders for three years, and then could 'only be elected by the Annual Meeting and must be proposed at a Quarterly Meeting previous'. When the little community of Canterbury faced the necessity of building a new synagogue in 1844, it decided to abolish privileged membership: 'for the future there is to be no distinction whatever'. Their new synagogue was dedicated four years later. In 1869, however, 14 'privileged members' are named, and 'they only at the present time have any voice or vote in Congregational matters or business'.[44] Probably the leaders were not reneging on an inconvenient commitment, but found it expedient to make everyone in their dwindling body a 'privileged member'.[45]

In Brighton, the youthful immigrant Hermann Landau (1844-1921) led a revolt by the disfranchised members during the late 1860s. When they refused to pay their synagogue bills, the 'three or four English Jews' who ruled the synagogue gave up, and equal franchise was soon obtained.[46]

Little communities whose heyday had passed by the mid-nineteenth century had to dismantle their structure of privilege in order to survive. New members were too few and too much needed to be denied equality with old settlers. However, in the rapidly growing Midlands cities, where there were frequent new arrivals, the old settlers thought they could hold tight to their privileges in the assurance that new members would join anyhow, in a subordinate status. This obduracy of the free members led instead to communal explosions.

The Jewish communal struggle is in many ways a miniature of the nineteenth-century British conflict and ultimate accommodation between vested privilege and the new wealth. Some of the Jewish new men sensed this, and their awareness lent the struggle a liberal fervour. After the passage of the Reform Bill of 1832, during the age of Peel and Cobden, when reform, Chartism, and the anti-Corn Law agitation became the great issues in English politics, the Jewish communities in the Provinces were bound to find their own old regime sharply challenged. Who challenged it? Those who did were the new generation of consciously English Jews, following with concern Jewish emancipation's Parliamentary progress, proud to belong to England's commercial classes who dominated world trade. Confident in the

rational, systematic, punctual conduct of their affairs and of their very lives, imbued with the virtues of the successful businessman, they wanted Jewish communal and religious institutions to possess the same virtues. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Birmingham congregation was embattled during the 1850s, as free members levied assessments based upon their private estimate of members' incomes. Appeals from the assessments they imposed brought personal affairs to public scrutiny. It was a practice with deep historic roots, but utterly opposed to nineteenth-century England's economic ethos of impersonal, private financial relationship.[47]

A forceful statement of the opposition case comes from Liverpool. There the free members of the only synagogue had raised the fee for admission to their limited ranks to a prohibitive £27 5s. by 1838, and levied charges at will. Barnet L. Joseph, a prosperous jeweller, addressed a meeting which demanded liberal changes:[48]

> Now, what is the situation? Why, that being a majority in numbers, contributing to the funds of the Congregation, by forced and voluntary payments, a greater part, having neither voice in the Senate, where the Laws are made that we are expected to obey, vote in the election of Officers, whom we are taught to look up to with respect, both as temporal and religious heads of the Congregation, and also as they have constituted themselves judges in any dispute that may arise between the Israelites in Liverpool.

Joseph attacked the free members' claim that having built the synagogue, it was their exclusive property, to govern as they saw fit;

> . . . there is a total want of representation to which the seat-holder is clearly entitled . . . I consider that the 'election of officers' should be in the hands of those who ought to be the best judges of the competency and fitness of men who are to rule over them. I further consider that all members should have a control over the funds which they contribute to raise . . .

In justification, Joseph appealed to the far-reaching political changes in contemporary England:

> The day we live in — the things that have passed around us for the last ten years — the constitution of the country — the municipal government of this town — the nature of every public and private society, show that the power of the few over the many is passing away, and that every man in possession of a stake in society is entitled by himself or his representatives to a stake in its management.

As a 'slave member' assailing the free members, Joseph by no means sought to abolish these categories. Bill Williams notes:[49]

> The distinction between Free Members and seat-holders was to remain, but the latter were to be given additional powers, including the right to participate in the enactment of laws and the regulation of taxes. The constitution was to be amended to facilitate the acquisition of Free

> Membership at a 'moderate fixed sum' by men of 'good character' who had resided in Liverpool for three years or more . . .

Joseph's arguments paralleled those which advocated the Reform Bill of 1832, and the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835; radical democratic Chartism, which was raising its head in Lancashire, found no place in Joseph's thinking. The refusal of the free member oligarchy to accept any of these demands led to a split and to the founding of Hope Place Synagogue.

It is likely that the older free members found these new English-educated middle-class men brusque, cocksure, and demanding. Benas described them as 'the younger Jewish men and women who felt themselves English, and their sympathies and their tastes went entirely with the land of their birth'. Some were hostile to the Judaism of their parents, and would 'not pause to consider that it was less the religion of their fathers than their German and Polish habits and errors of diction that required to be improved'. Those of them who emigrated to the Colonies returned there 'like the Vandals of old' to Judaism. Against Liverpool Jewry's old-line stalwarts stood those 'who disliked everything Jewish, and merely remained in its fold by reason of it being the only circle in which they could rise to any importance'. A third element, Benas reported sympathetically, desired moderate, conservative change. 'They were not only Jews by faith, but they took pains to identify themselves with the Jewish cause generally', especially with the charity reform in which their community preceded London.[50] Perhaps it was owing to the moderate yet vigorous religious leadership which Liverpool Jewry enjoyed during its troubled 1840s, and the persuasive influence of the monthly *Cup of Salvation* which appeared in 1846–47, that the Reform movement failed to emerge. The Old Hebrew Congregation modified its membership policies, and recouped the losses of the Hope Place secession, 'by the influx into town of gentlemen holding important and influential positions in the mercantile world, [which] gave a very superior tone to the elder synagogue'.[51] These prosperous members enabled it to erect in 1874 the Princes Road Synagogue, the most impressive synagogue of nineteenth-century England, and they brought to Jewish communal affairs 'method, a discipline, a certain business-like air', thanks to their involvement in 'local matters not immediately concerning their own sect'.[52]

The Birmingham Jewish community's time of trouble came after the Reverend Morris J. Raphall left for America in 1849. Open rebellion erupted against five free members who held autocratic control, and a second congregation began to function in 1853 which soon enrolled 90 members to the old congregation's 120. Compromise and reunion came about two or three years later when a new synagogue had to be built, and the power monopoly of the free members ended. In 1864, there

were 98 free members, who attained that status merely be paying at the upper level of graded annual fees. Their powers were limited.[53] In Benas's judgement, Birmingham Jews had less education and fewer rich men than Liverpool, but there was rather 'a very large class of men well-to-do, fairly educated, and possessed of sound shrewd sense', capable of conducting communal affairs.[54]

The tale of conflict, division, and reunion in Manchester has been lavishly narrated and brilliantly analysed by Bill Williams. In that city, 'a closely knit suburban plutocracy' had control of affairs, although there were actually 38 free members to 44 seat-holders. A group of discontented seat-holders petitioned in 1844 for easier access to free member status, and for increased rights for the seat-holders themselves. They are characterized as 'a fair occupational cross-section of the new petite bourgeoisie. Sharp, ambitious, competitive, self-made men', they established a new congregation when their petition was rejected. Only their leader, David Hesse, a wealthy shirt manufacturer of German rabbinical stock, was ideologically articulate, in terms similar to those of Barnet L. Joseph. When a modern German preacher, Dr Solomon Schiller-Szinessy, was engaged by the older synagogue in 1850, the two congregations reunited on terms very similar to those requested in the petition and proceeded to erect a fine new synagogue.[55] Only after this controversy was settled did Reform Judaism emerge in Manchester. To be sure, nowhere had the issue been religious change, much less Reform Judaism, but rather communal governance and external style. Victorian Orthodoxy and Victorian Reform in fact did not differ much outwardly. The Manchester Congregation of British Jews, established in 1856, was Reform Judaism at its mildest. Its chronicler merely asserts that 'the congregation wished to worship decorously, intelligibly, and to the accompaniment of a choir and organ'.[56]

Stormy times in Manchester's Great Synagogue were not at an end, because its highly Anglicized element found itself repeatedly outnumbered after 1869 by relative newcomers to the congregation, of Russian and Polish origin, and established their own South Manchester Synagogue.[57] Perhaps this tension between newly middle-class Russian and Polish immigrants and entrenched Anglicized Jews, many of them earlier immigrants and one-time rebels against a still earlier oligarchy, foreshadows the third stage of Provincial Anglo-Jewry which was to emerge about twenty years later. At any rate, Benas found Manchester in 1877 a sad story. Its 7,000 to 8,000 Jews were 'a disunited, segregated mass', and their 'immense influence, wealth, and station' as individuals failed to give the impression of a community.[58] When the century closed, two Manchester ministers lamented 'the want of a powerful man who would be able at all times to represent Jewish interests not only outside the community but would at the same

time command a strong controlling influence within the community'.[59]

Notwithstanding these exceptions and others elsewhere, the second era of Provincial Anglo-Jewry was solidly established by 1860. English in culture or trying to become so, Orthodox in religion if rather more in the synagogue than at home, these Provincial communities had their centres in the Midlands cities. The synagogues underwent stormy disputes as their politics were remodelled to fit the general political conception of their times: rights in proportion to the size of voluntary annual subscriptions. The religious authority of the unswervingly Orthodox Chief Rabbi was accepted, and effective institutions for charity and education were founded. Much of the structure built then remains to the present day.

Jewish Community History and Urban History

It is valuable to see wherever possible the historic emergence of a Jewish community. Much is also to be learned about the reasons why Jewish communities flourished in a particular area or did not flourish elsewhere. Here we have run the social phenomena alongside the religious and have seen that they illuminate one another. We may take a further example from the synagogue, the most historic and representative of Jewish institutions. It is recognized that even the hundreds of synagogues which use identical liturgies and profess the same beliefs are otherwise extremely different. The difference will lie not only in the outward design but also in the manner of receiving a new face, or in the atmosphere of solemn restraint or lively discourse with God and with the man on the same bench. Nor are the differences only on the surface. The salience or the interpretation of common beliefs will differ, such as Messianic redemption as professed, say, in Whitechapel and in Hampstead around 1900. These provide clues to matters of interest to historians and social scientists: just who are the people attending that synagogue? How do they earn their living? How much money do they have and how long do they have it? How far back in England do they reach and where did they or their forebears come from? How much education and Jewish learning do they possess? In practically every synagogue worthy of the name, these are subjects for sage discussion.[60] That is, the key to understanding the milieu, the setting, of a synagogue is to know all about its people. So it is with a Jewish club, a Jewish school, and with those who give to, or receive from, a Jewish charity. Always, to know an institution or a community requires knowing the people who constitute it. Certainly the synagogue rifts of mid-nineteenth-century Provincial Jewry would hardly seem different from quarrels practically anywhere, if attention were not given to their social bearings; then they become meaningful indeed.

While it may readily be agreed that Jewish institutions are best studied from the outside as well as the inside, there is another aspect where disagreement is likelier. A great many Jews maintain minimal ties with the Jewish community, with little if any Jewish social communication. Sometimes important persons in commerce or politics or cultural life, they have chosen to be on the outer margin of the Jewish community, and in their personal mode of life and belief, and in what they do with their time and money, they show little if any Jewish connexion. They are Jews in name. What place if any shall they have in the Jewish history of their town? I believe that in order to grasp the place of Jews in an urban society we are obliged to take in all Jews. The Jews form a distinct group, although of course not the only distinct group, within urban society. As long as Jews live in an emancipated society, they will also take part as individuals in its affairs; however, to what extent and with what relationship to Jewish communal affairs? This varies not only from person to person, but — in the United States — from community to community. One supposes it will prove to be the case also in England.

My conviction may emerge from this discussion, that the best approach to local Jewish history is what may be called the social-communal,[61] or what has been called the 'socio-cultural': 'The city is looked upon as a decisive contribution to the history of civilization: first as a network of economic services and human relations; secondly as a meeting place between the community and the individual. Therefore urban studies should bring to light the interaction between material conditions and psychological, environment and social values, town layout and town life.' To understand the structure of the Jewish community and its inner communications we must know the social and cultural 'profile' of those who belong, and the intensity of their connexion with it. All we learn about the Jewish community will in turn explain a great deal about those who are involved in it. Thus the internal conflicts discussed above are apt to inform us about much more than personal dislikes and institutional rivalries and halakhic disputes.

Historians of the Jews have to be clear about what it is considered their business to study within each place Jews settled. Shall we be concerned mainly with the Jewish institutions, the synagogues, schools, philanthropies, and other associations and what they did? Shall we concentrate on prominent individuals or families, those in whom we may see the embodiment of the hopes of Jewish emancipation? Will it be the Jewish historians' interest to regard the Jews, a distinct group, as the object of a group biography covering every possible aspect of their lives? These questions require, in their turn, some clarity about what a community is, and about what its relation is to urban history.

Urban history is a species of local history. Local history deals with any *locus*, any place, including a village or some particular area of the countryside. In the case of urban history the area studied is a city, which is not easy to define: Manchester was governed until 1838 as a medieval borough, while London was not governed at all as London before 1888. Today, the problem of delimiting American cities with the suburbs which lie across their formal boundaries is well known, and this problem now exists in many large cities of the Western world. In fixing the true boundaries of an urban area we do have the help of the census experts, with their 'conurbations' in the United Kingdom and 'standard metropolitan statistical areas' in the United States. The historian of urban Jewish communities in America must also bear in mind that today there are practically no Jews dwelling within the boundaries of Cleveland, Newark, Detroit, or Washington; nearly all are in the suburbs, and the process is far advanced in quite a few other cities. Most urban historians, however, take their city dwellers where they find them, that is, in places which possess the characteristics of urban society, however defined. Formal boundaries are kept more or less in mental footnotes, since the historians' interests differ from those of the political scientists who are much concerned with government jurisdictions.

Reading recent urban historiography, conversing with urban historians, and scrutinizing some published shop talk[62] provides some sense of the concerns of urban historians. They are extremely interested in social classes, which they must labour to define and identify, and in social groups, and in changes taking place within the composition of these groups. Governing elites are also examined from that perspective. Very characteristic of urban history today is the attention being given to those at the bottom or near it. Urban historians are now conspicuously occupied with the physical basis of city life, the houses and streets, railways and schools, roads and sewers. Quite a few show fine historic and aesthetic sensitivity to the architecture and topography and to the very mood of city life. Urban historians are not economic historians, so that what interests them about urban economic activity is its connexion with the lives of the people who are involved in it, between factories and workshops and those who live under the smokestacks or sleep in the rooms where they work. Local government commands attention, particularly its record in comprehending and coping with the problems of the city's life. All in all, urban historiography is directed inward, dealing with the city unto itself.[63]

Urban society and the Jewish community within urban society: these two must be kept analytically distinct. Until about the First World War, immigrant Jews in English cities were conspicuous in neighbourhoods which were generally close to the centre of town: they had their own language, modes of dress, special occupations, and

religious ways. Many Jews who were not immigrants continued to live in these districts. Some of this concentration persisted until about the Second World War. In our day, however, we have to speak of a group bearing little outward distinctiveness and blending quite readily with the urban general population. The Jews specialize economically, but in so highly urbanized and industrialized a land as Great Britain this is not very conspicuous, except perhaps when one of their specialities falls upon evil days. What generally distinguishes the Jews, therefore, is that on the one hand they participate extensively in the nation's economic, political, and cultural life while on the other they retain social separateness and maintain substantial independent, voluntary-supported institutions of their own.

It is not law but a feeling, a sense of relationship, that led to the foundation and the continued maintenance of these institutions which outwardly express the existence of a Jewish community. Institutions themselves, and their activities, are not identical with the Jewish community. Baron Benas spoke long ago of 'the mystic word "Jew" [which] unites them as if by some "invisible bond". . .'. Slightly demystified — I wonder whether it can ever be utterly demystified —, the bond is an effective network of social communication. A society, however, including an urban society, is formed by working together and the consequent exchange of goods and services. Obviously it is possible to belong to several communities: the Jewish, that of neighbours in a street, of musicians, of the old boys of a school. But one's community par excellence is that with which social communication is the most wide-ranging and intensive. The history of a community is in the first place the history of the people who by conscious, or sometimes semi-conscious, choice compose it and who exchange quantities of what social scientists call 'information'. The history of a community is also the history of the tangible institutions which are the focus of much of this social communication. In Victorian England every Jew belonged to the urban society in which he dwelled and earned his living. The extent to which he shared in Jewish social communication decided in how great a measure he was also in the Jewish community. Some Jews reduced or virtually eliminated such communication, and presently ceased formally to be Jews.

There are other problems in Jewish local history in which what is called the new social history can do valuable work, for example in defining and analysing Jewish social strata, where possible in comparison with other groups within the urban society. The lower, generally inarticulate, classes might also be profitably studied in Jewish communities, especially since Jews of the lower or of any class are rarely inarticulate and sources can be found. To trace Jewish families through several generations in one city appears to me a likely way of adequately answering perennial questions about the Jewish birth rate, social and

geographic mobility, marriage and intermarriage, and the continuity of Jewish identity in general. Yet it remains my own conviction that of ways to write the history of a local Jewish community, the method of playing in constantly intersecting lines the social and economic with the communal and religious aspects is the best when a single choice is to be made.[64]

These distinctions and definitions may assist us to comprehend the Provincial Jewish scene in Victorian England. Nothing would be more interesting than two well-wrought histories of one Jewish community, each written from a different approach. Yet in the present condition of Jewish local history we had better forego this luxury in favour of one well-wrought history per community.

NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS

JC *Jewish Chronicle*
JW *Jewish World*
TJHSE Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England.

[1] *JW*, 10 August 1877; On Benas, see Sefton D. Temkin, *Bertram B. Benas: The Life and Times of a Jewish Victorian*, a Memorial lecture given on 7 June 1978, Albany, New York, 1978, pp. 2–10.

[2] *JW*, 7 September 1877; on Manchester, see Bill Williams, *The Making of Manchester Jewry 1740–1875*, Manchester, 1976, the foremost work on a Provincial Jewish subject and one of the best Jewish local histories yet written. Further volumes may be expected.

[3] *JC*, 24 July 1900.

[4] Kenneth Lunn, 'The Sheffield Jewish Community in the 19th Century' pp. 2–4, in *Provincial Jewry in Victorian Britain: Papers for a conference at University College, London convened by the Jewish Historical Society of England, prepared by Dr. Aubrey Newman 6 July 1975*. This is an extremely valuable repertoire of data and papers assembled for that occasion; each item is separately paginated. All copies were distributed among the participants at the conference, and it is to be hoped that the compilation will be reprinted and made available in permanent form. The present paper appears in that collection in a rudimentary state.

[5] Ibid.; H. J. Dyos and D. H. Aldcroft, *British Transport: An Economic Survey from the Seventeenth Century to the Twentieth*, Leicester, 1969, pp. 126, 212; and W. G. Hoskins, *Devon* (1954; repr. Newton Abbot, 1972), p. 151.

[6] *JW*, 22 June 1877. Pedlars of 'Brummagem goods' circulated throughout the country. Lloyd P. Gartner, *The Jewish Immigrant in England 1870–1914*, 2nd edn., London, 1973, pp. 178–79; Harry Levine, *A Short History of the Birmingham Hebrew Congregation* (Birmingham? 1956?), p. 12.

[7] There were twelve Jewish families in Sheffield in 1851, when they sought to establish a permanent synagogue: letter in *JC*, 13 June 1851.

[8] See House of Lords, 'Report on the Sweating System, Third Report, 24 May 1889 . . .' (*Sessional Papers*, 1889, XIII), Min. 30826–7, 30834–8 (Abraham Cohen) and 30865–70 (the Rev. Moses Abrahams). See also V. D. Lipman, *Social History of the Jews in England 1850–1950*, London, 1953, p. 24; Ernest Krausz, *Leeds Jewry: Its History and*

Social Structure, Cambridge, 1964, pp. 1–4; and A. S. Diamond, 'A Sketch of Leeds Jewry in the 19th Century', in *Provincial Jewry. . . . Papers*, op. cit.

[9] G. D. Guttentag, 'The Beginnings of the Newcastle Jewish Community', *TJHSE*, vol. xxv, 1977, pp. 4–6.

[10] 'Old Coventry Jewry', *JC*, 5 June 1936; and Harry Levine, *The Jews of Coventry*, Coventry, 1970, pp. 2–3, 19, 40–41, 55 (citing *Coventry Standard*, 29 May 1889).

[11] M. Malinski — the solitary Jew — to J. M. Rich, Board of Deputies, 21 May 1930, in Board of Deputies Archives, B4/ST32.

[12] *JC*, 25 May 1900; and Malcolm Slowe, 'The Foundation of Aldershot Synagogue' in *Provincial Jewry . . . Papers . . .*, op. cit.

[13] *JC*, 7 September 1900.

[14] *JC*, 27 July 1900.

[15] *JC*, 27 July 1900.

[16] *JC*, 18 May 1900.

[17] *JC*, 23 March and 2 November 1900; 25 January, and 1 February 1901.

[18] Edmund Conway, 'Blackburn', in *Provincial Jewry . . . Papers . . .*, op. cit.

[19] V. D. Lipman, 'A Survey of Anglo-Jewry in 1851', *TJHSE*, vol. xvii, 1953, pp. 186–88. Manchester, Liverpool, and Newcastle each had two congregations.

[20] *JC*, 28 September, 5 and 12 October 1900.

[21] *JC*, 13 August 1880, p. 5.

[22] *JC*, 16 March 1900.

[23] Board of Deputies Archives, C1/5. On Penzance, see Cecil Roth, 'The Decline and Fall of an Anglo-Jewish Community', *JC* Supplements Nos. 148 (May 1933) and 149 (June 1933), bound with issues of 2 June and 7 July 1933; Gartner, op.cit., pp. 148–49. Others could have been added to their list.

[24] See Cecil Roth, *The Rise of Provincial Jewry*, London, 1950, on most of these towns, usefully supplemented by Alex M. Jacob, 'The Jews of Falmouth — 1740–1860', *TJHSE*, vol. xvii, 1953, esp. p. 69; W. G. Hoskins, op.cit., pp. 69, 120–22; V. D. Lipman, in 'A Survey of Anglo-Jewry in 1851', loc. cit., p. 187, observes that this date is on the edge of an Anglo-Jewish demographic transformation.

[25] Arthur Redford, *Labour Migration in England 1800–1850*, 2nd edn, edited by W. H. Chaloner, New York, 1968, esp. pp. vii–viii; H. A. Shannon, 'Migration and the Growth of London 1841–1891', *Economic History Review*, vol. v, no. 2, April 1935, pp. 79–86. Jacob Neusner's data show the prominent place of Jews from the South-West among Anglo-Jewish emigrants to the United States: see his 'Anglo-Jewry and the Development of American Jewish Life, 1775–1850', *TJHSE*, vol. xviii, 1958, pp. 231–42; and Anthony P. Joseph, 'Jewry of South-West England and some of its Australian Connections', *TJHSE*, vol. xxiv, 1975, pp. 24–37.

[26] Williams, op. cit., p. 176.

[27] Birmingham Jewish Local History Study Group, 'A Portrait of Birmingham Jewry in 1851', *Provincial Jewry . . . Papers . . .*, op. cit., pp. 15–16.

[28] Cited in A. Levy, 'The Origins of Scottish Jewry', *TJHSE*, vol. xix, 1960, p. 155.

[29] Obituary of Mrs Sampson Samuel, who 'was born [in 1824] at Leigh, near Rochford, in Essex (her father's name being Lazarus, with relatives named Levy, who were brewers, at Rochester) . . .', *JC*, 30 March 1900.

[30] J. Abelson, 'Some Reminiscences of Bristol Jewry', *JC*, 5 April 1907; and Eric Mendoza, 'The Jews of Bristol: The Story of the Jews of England in Miniature', *Jewish Monthly*, September 1951, pp. 325–33.

[31] Bernard Susser, 'Social Acclimatization by Jews in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Devon', in Roger Burt, ed., *Industry and Society in the South-West*, University of Exeter, 1970, pp. 51–69.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Williams, op. cit., pp. 6, 12–17, 48–50; Conrad Gill, *History of Birmingham*, vol. 1: *Manor and Borough to 1865*, London, 1952, pp. 78, 143; William Hutton, *The History of*

Birmingham, Birmingham, 1835, p. 121 (on this book, see Gill, op. cit., p. 11); and Richard Brooke, *Liverpool as it was During the Last Quarter of the Eighteenth Century, 1775 to 1800*, Liverpool, 1835, pp. 60–61, 525.

[34] Asa Briggs, *Victorian Cities*, New York, 1965, pp. 151–52, where the references to Germans mean Jews; A. R. Rollin, 'The Jewish Contribution to the British Textile Industry: "Builders of Bradford"', *TJHSE*, vol. XVII, 1953, pp. 45–51; and Roy A. Church, *Economic and Social Change in a Midland Town: Victorian Nottingham 1815-1900*, London, 1966, pp. 76, 77, 167–68, 182.

[35] Church, op. cit., pp. 76–77, 167–68.

[36] *JC*, 23 March 1900.

[37] *JW*, 2 November 1877.

[38] The two sections, both written by Baron L. Benas, are from *JW*, 7 September and 2 November 1877. The firms mentioned are Sam Mendel & Co., Silas Schwabe & Co., Steinthal & Co., Alderman F. P. Willert, Cllr P. Goldschmidt, H. J. Leppoc J.P., and Leo Schuster & Co.

[39] On Nonconformist social backgrounds, see K. S. Inglis, *Churches and the Working Classes in Victorian England*, London, 1963, pp. 62–118, esp. pp. 100–15 on Congregationalists; Geoffrey Best, *Mid-Victorian Britain 1851–1875*, paperback edition, New York, 1972, pp. 185–97; and G. Kitson Clark, *The Making of Victorian England*, Cambridge, Mass., 1962, pp. 160–67.

[40] Williams, op. cit., pp. 82–85, 93–95, 191–97, 257–63.

[41] Salo Wittmayer Baron, *The Jewish Community: Its History and Structure to the American Revolution*, 3 vols, Philadelphia, 1942, vol. II, pp. 2–17; Bernard D. Weinryb, 'Texts and Studies in the Communal History of Polish Jewry', *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, vol. XIX, 1950, pp. 32–36; and Jacob Katz, *Massoret u-Mashber*, Jerusalem, 1958, pp. 130–33.

[42] Brighton, 1825; photocopy at Mocatta Library, University College, London.

[43] In Anglo-Jewish Archives, Mocatta Library, University College, London, mark AJ/168.

[44] Canterbury communal notebook, loc. cit.

[45] Returns to the Board of Deputies for 1870 listed 13 seat-holders: 'Canterbury' in *Provincial Jewry . . . Papers . . .*, op. cit.

[46] Landau was a lifelong champion of eastern European Jews in England, so that his obituary (*JC*, 2 September 1921), the sole source for this episode, might be likely to interpret it as an instance of English versus foreign membership. However, it appears likelier that what occured in Brighton was a more customary case of free members, perhaps mostly English, under attack by seat-holders, perhaps mostly foreign.

[47] Levine, . . . *Birmingham* . . ., op. cit., pp. 3, 8; *JW*, 13 July 1877; S. Y. Prais, 'The Development of Birmingham Jewry', *Jewish Monthly*, February 1949, pp. 670–73. A suggestive comparison may be drawn from David E. H. Mole, 'Challenge to the Church: Birmingham, 1815–1865', in H. J. Dyos and Michael Wolff, *The Victorian City: Images and Realities*, 2 vols, London, 1973, vol. II, pp. 815–36.

[48] B. L. Joseph, *Address to the Seat-holders of the Liverpool Congregation*, Liverpool, 1838, quoted in Philip Ettinger, *'Hope Place' in Liverpool Jewry*, Liverpool, 1930, pp. 25–28, and Williams, op. cit., p. 133; no copy of the pamphlet was available.

[49] Williams, op. cit., p. 134; cf. V. D. Lipman, 'Synagogal Organization in Anglo-Jewry', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. I, no. 1, April 1959, pp. 80–90.

[50] *JW*, 24 August 1877.

[51] *JW*, 17 August 1877.

[52] *JW*, 31 August 1877.

[53] Levine, . . . *Birmingham* . . ., op. cit., pp. 3, 8; Prais, op.cit., pp. 670–73.

[54] *JW*, 15 June 1877.

[55] Williams, op. cit., pp. 80, 134, 138, 189–90, 299.

[56] P. Selvin Goldberg, *The Manchester Congregation of British Jews 1857–1957*, s.l., s.d., p. 13; Williams, op. cit., chapter 10; and Raphael Loewe, 'Solomon Marcus Schiller-Szinessy, 1820–1890', *TJHSE*, vol. XII, 1968, pp. 148–89.

[57] Williams, op. cit, pp. 298–319.

[58] *JW*, 2 November 1877.

[59] The Rev. J. H. Valentine and the (Reform) Rev. L. M. Simmons agreed on this point: *JC*, 23 March 1900.

[60] Perhaps it will be granted me to develop fully the theory that Jewish sociology's roots lie in synagogue conversation.

[61] For what follows, cf. the six ideologies of urban historiography enumerated by François Bedarida in H. J. Dyos, ed., *The Study of Urban History*, London, 1968, pp. 58–59.

[62] For example, Dyos, op. cit.; Oscar Handlin and John Burchard, eds., *The Historian and the City*, Cambridge, Mass., 1963.

[63] These qualities are exemplified in Dyos and Wolff's (op. cit.) splended, massive collection.

[64] These points are developed a little more fully in the 'Author's Introduction' to my *History of the Jews of Cleveland*, Cleveland, Ohio, 1978.

MARX AND JUDAISM

Werner J. Dannhauser

(Review Article)

I

JULIUS CARLEBACH is to be commended for wrestling with a most significant topic,* a subject which not only engages theoretical curiosity but involves the most urgent practical considerations.[1] Any study of any critique of Judaism ought to command wide attention, and not only among Jews. After all, Judaism is the parent religion of both Christianity and Islam; thus criticism of it may hold the promise of a new insight into the perennial tension between faith and reason. The fact of Judaism's priority in time could serve to make the confrontation more fundamental. The fact that Judaism is unique (for example, it is easier to cease being an Episcopalian than to cease being a Jew; Judaism is linked inextricably to a specific location in space like the Holy Land) need not be an obstacle. On the contrary, a good critique could enhance the understanding of ethnicity, human group cohesion, and kindred matters of universal import.

One's initial reaction to a *radical* critique ought to be simple: all the better. Judaism has been a puzzle to mankind, including mankind's Jews, at least since the events at Mount Sinai, and an investigation that is radical in the sense of attempting to get to the root of the matter might yield an especially rich harvest.

All such confrontations admittedly border on the trivial, in view of the unique circumstance that the critic is Karl Marx, the patron saint of communist theory as well as practice, and one of the leading figures in the attempt to abolish the difference between theory and practice. The fact that Marx was himself a Jew at birth is in some ways the least interesting aspect of his uniqueness for present purposes. ('The Jewishness of Marx' is quite adequately discussed by Carlebach in a chapter so entitled, pp. 310–30.) Suffice it here to say that he was

* Julius Carlebach, *Karl Marx and the Radical Critique of Judaism*, xi + 466 pp., Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978, £8.00.

converted to Christianity at the age of six, and that Jews have been inordinately praised as well as blamed for Marx's descent from Jewish parents — they themselves have been inordinately proud as well as ashamed.

What is more worthy of attention is the whole notion of 'critique'. Today, that word has assumed such popularity that it is virtually meaningless. It has even been barbarized into a verb. But the word has a noble ancestry — think of Kant's three great 'critiques'. It is an over-simplification — but not wholly a distortion — to understand the word critique as inseparable, at least in Kant's case, from the notion of limits. Kant was trying to establish the outermost reaches of pure reason, practical reason, and judgement.

Even when one understands critique in these terms, it at once poses a problem to Judaism. All sane men, including the most pious of Jews, would agree that to the extent that it is institutionalized, to the extent that it is what one now calls an organized religion, Judaism can be the sinful vessel for the word of God. Nevertheless, the Torah, which *is* the word of God — the Law — constitutes the core of Judaism. To what extent can one then think of the limits of Judaism without diminishing it? What does the Torah fail to contain? One reads in the Talmud that 'everything is in it',[2] but how can the all-inclusive accommodate a study of its limitations? On the other hand, does not intellectual probity demand that one attempt precisely such an accommodation?

The radicalization of the concept of critique complicates matters further. Leaving aside Hegel for the moment, we find that in Marx a critique always entails a measure of destruction. As Marcuse was later to remark, a critique involves an application of the 'power of negative thinking'.[3] The object of any critique does not survive the critique in its original form. It is subjected to an *Aufhebung* involving elevation, transcendence — and abolition. Can Judaism exist without understanding itself as the absolute, final truth, the rock on which any attempt at *Aufhebung* must founder? But can the intransigence which is the glory of human thought settle for anything less than an attempt at *Aufhebung* that appears most difficult?

In the case of Marxism, these poignant dilemmas, these touching collisions between irresistible forces and immovable objects, shift from the plane of theory to the plane of practice. Marx despised pure theorizing: 'The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it.'[4] That famous statement ought never to be understood as a simple condemnation. Aware of the charms of philosophy and philosophizing, Marx came to think that those charms were radically incomplete unless philosophy itself were subjected to an *Aufhebung*. Marxism, in its self-understanding, is that *Aufhebung*. The radical critique of Judaism, to be worthy of the name, must have tangible effects in what we call the real world.

One would have to be exceptionally bold or exceptionally foolish to deny that Marx not only interpreted the world but changed it. His stance *vis-à-vis* Judaism certainly resulted in more than some utterances that gave Jews pause to think. Marx gave birth to Marxism — which changed Judaism's mode of existence in the world in ways which are not simply exhausted by its effects on individual Jews. Marx's theory had an impact on the Jewish way of life, and we need, in turn, a theoretical understanding of that impact, so that any contribution to that field deserves welcome attention, and the most serious consideration.

II

Unfortunately, Carlebach's contribution is rather depressingly modest, although the bulk of the book certainly appears impressive. But even the most sympathetic reader is likely to be left with a deep sense of disappointment. He will have ploughed not only through 369 pages of text but also no less than 67 pages of notes — and found that he has only worked his way through a seemingly exhaustive and most certainly exhausting collection of important material which has not been shaped into a genuine whole or fully coherent book. He will be led to wonder how — and especially why — Carlebach sowed so much and reaped so little.

The volume's greatest merit is that the materials it brings together stimulate thought. On the other hand, Carlebach seems deliberately to shy away from the deepest and, therefore, most exciting problems his topic raises. In part the fault may lie in his having been heavily influenced by Karl Mannheim: one who is indebted to the founder of the modern sociology of knowledge is probably bound to adopt the 'pedestrian approach' to which Carlebach disarmingly admits. What is more, the clash between the sociologist's striving for objectivity and Carlebach's 'subjective attitude' as a 'committed Jew' (pp. 4–5) has had negative consequences as regards both form and substance. The style scarcely ever rises above blandness and the content becomes nothing more than an addendum to the *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, the Science of Judaism, after the latter has lost the bloom of youth and resigned itself, as Scholem has remarked, to giving Judaism a decent funeral — by way of a historical petrification of it.

The author's scholarship is imposing, but there are some lapses. He describes the Prussian Edict of Emancipation as 'almost complete civil emancipation' (p. 23) without giving information about what it lacked, or what led to it. What were the intentions or political conceptions of Stein and Hardenberg? He does not seem to know that Jacob Katz has shown that the Hep Hep riots were not the work of students and he is unsuccessful in depicting the deterioration of the Jewish position in Germany after Napoleon had vanished from the scene because he does

not dwell on the real focal points of the 'action' — namely 'reaction' in Frankfurt and Hamburg. But the major fault of the book is assuredly its skewed emphasis.

It is a well known fact that Marx's 'On the Jewish Question' constitutes the core of his 'Radical Critique of Judaism'. In a book as massive as Carlebach's, many good reasons might be advanced for taking 148 pages, as he does, to reach that central text. The stage must be set; a reader must be carefully prepared before he can really understand 'On the Jewish Question' which is, after all, a response — but also much more — to a polemic by Bruno Bauer.

Dr Carlebach performs a genuine service to students of Marx's text in summarizing adequately the work by Bauer that triggered Marx's sharp remarks. It is one of those writings which has slipped into that oblivion for which it seemed predestined, and Dr Carlebach saves one the trouble of trying to obtain it.

Unfortunately, the preparation for Marx's seminal work is inadequate. Too little attention is devoted to the Enlightenment in general, a period teeming with writers who combined plans for the Emancipation of Jews with an active dislike of Jews. Moreover, Dr Carlebach unaccountably relegates Hegel to some four unsatisfactory pages, when Hegel might well be understood to represent the *Aufhebung* of the Enlightenment, as well as the bridge between the latter and Marx.

Rather oddly, by page 184 Dr Carlebach is done with Marx himself. The rest is not silence but an immense cataloguing of a great number of responses to Marx along with some questionably useful parts which discuss various aspects of the problems Marx has raised, while more than 90 pages on 'Marx and the Sociologists' show Dr Carlebach's complete familiarity with the history of sociology. The author has fallen between the two stools of minute historical details and adequate attention to the broad sweep of the story, and has thus failed to do justice to either or both. Nevertheless, this reviewer is grateful to Dr Carlebach, not only for the immensity of his labours and the earnestness of his purpose, but for the stimulation his work has given. The following sketchy observations on the radical critique of Judaism owe a good deal to him, as will all future exercises of this kind.

III

The radical critique of Judaism can without undue facetiousness be traced back, in one of its forms, to God, Who more than once refers to Jews as a 'stiff-necked' people.[5] The Almighty frequently voices His displeasure at the ways of those He has chosen. For example, speaking through Amos,[6] He thunders:

> I hate, I despise your feasts,
> And I will take no delight in your solemn assemblies.

If this is the way their own God spoke to Jews, who could completely blame non-Jews for looking at them askance? Tacitus, who cannot be said to have lacked the most astute powers of observation, commented on the Jews:[7]

> . . . this race detested by the gods . . . [Their customs] which are at once perverse and disgusting, owe their strength to their very badness . . . [They] regard the rest of mankind with all the hatred of enemies . . . they are singularly prone to lust . . . [The] Jewish religion is tasteless and mean.

Clearly what came to be called antisemitism — though only late in the nineteenth century — has a long history. The dislike of Jews antedates Christianity and can be said to be coeval with the existence of the Jews. The possibility of *some* kind of 'radical critique' of Judaism has existed throughout history. To say so is not to belittle the role of Christianity in affecting the destiny of Jews, nor to deny that Marx's radical critique of Judaism is essentially a post-Christian phenomenon.

Christianity added a new charge to the imposing arsenal of accusations that had fuelled the hatred of Jews before its advent. From then on, the Jews could, in addition to everything else, be held responsible for the murder of God. Anybody doubting the strength and staying power of this calumny should study the history of the Vatican's attempt to deal with the problem of 'Jewish deicide' in our very own time.

Can anything at all be said on behalf of those millions who thought of Jews as God-killers throughout history? Unfortunately, yes. In their twisted way, they were acknowledging that there was something very special about the Jews, and Jews have always made this assertion. Their insistence that they were the Chosen People might be utter foolishness to pagans, but it was *bound* to constitute a stumbling block to Christians. This is not to say that the claim to be the chosen people causes antisemitism. Antisemites need no reason for their spleen. They can always find or invent a cause for hating Jews. They can hate Jews when the latter are not physically present. Nevertheless, the historical problem has never been primarily that Jews thought they were chosen — it is a rare group that does not in one way or another think itself better than all others — but that the rest of mankind believed that the Jews were chosen, a belief almost always coupled with resentment.

At best, Christianity viewed Judaism as a curiosity which caused anxiety. The benign form of that reaction is reflected in the line of verse 'How odd of God to choose the Jews'. The theological form assumes the contention that the mysterious survival of the Jews amounts to a proof of God's existence. Thinkers of the stature of Pascal could argue in that way.

At worst, the suspicion Jews engendered for being so obstinately and perennially different resulted in consequences far worse than quizzical

rejection or debatable theological propositions. The best one can say for organized Christianity is that it organized no Final Solution for the Jewish problem, leaving that for God to bring about in His own good time. On the other hand, life for the Jews during the centuries of the dominance of Christianity in the West often enough had the quality of a nightmare. Even today, Jews see no romance in the history of the Crusades, only the memory of massacres of helpless people, while the splendours of Christian Spain pale before the iniquities of the Inquisition.

The Jews also tend to have a different perspective of the history of European thought during the era of Christian hegemony. One example will bring us up to the century dominated by Marx. John Locke was once regarded as 'America's philosopher' and the leading champion of freedom under law, but he is today seen more often as capitalism's philosopher and one of the first to attempt a justification of man's exploitation of man. Jews, of course, read as well as other people and usually in the same way, seeing therefore the same things in Locke; but they are especially sensitive, perhaps, to his *Letter on Toleration*. Locke may have built a system on the low but solid ground of self-interest; he may have encouraged a political society devoted more to commerce than to virtue; but the anti-theological bent of his thought surely worked against the ability of Christian countries to inflict pain — and worse than pain — on their Jews.

IV

The connection between Locke and Marx is not as tenuous as might appear at first sight. We must necessarily deal in sweeping generalizations, but it makes sense to understand John Locke as one of the Titans of the Enlightenment, the Enlightenment as the prelude to the French Revolution, and Marx as the man who understood his task to be the completion of the work of the French Revolution. The latter, according to Marxism, after all represents the penultimate revolution, the precursor to the 'final conflict'.

As a group, Jews do not share the reservations conservatives harbour to this day about the French Revolution. To put it in the crude and inadequate — but necessary — language of self-interest: the French Revolution did more good than harm to the Jews. Similarly, Jews as a group do not view Napoleon with the ambivalence that informs views of him to this very day: Napoleon was, by and large, a benefactor of the Jews.

A different perspective helps to illuminate this thesis. The distinction between the Right and the Left dates from the seating arrangements of the post-Revolutionary French National Assembly, in which the more radical factions sat on the Left. That distinction still retains its

meaning, albeit in attenuated form. To be on the Left means to favour the French Revolution and its legacy; to be on the Right means to oppose it.

Putting the matter more starkly, one comes to see that in 1789, and not only in 1789, the Jews had an elective affinity with the Left, one they were prone to recognize in their speeches as well as their deeds. That elective affinity goes a long way in explaining the post-revolutionary alliance between Jews and European radicalism. From the Jewish point of view, the dawning nineteenth century promised great things to those inside the ghetto. Their discontent had already found vivid expression in the seventeenth century: the success of Sabbatai Sevi proved as much.[8] For many Jews, the glitter of the 'outside world', with its economic riches and cultural adornments, was impossible to resist. But the Right stood for denial of access to that strange and brave new world. It stood for the gates around Berlin through which no Jew was allowed to pass; it stood for the continued dominance of Christianity, and therefore for a continuation of the Christian hostility to Judaism and the Jews.

While the Right thus clung obstinately to the feudal particularism of the past, the Left stood for the universalism of the future. The Left promised the brotherhood of all men. It advocated the abolition of all outmoded and cruel distinctions and aimed at a future of prosperous, friendly peace. The Jew, as an individual, could not help but be attracted to the Left, even though the success of the Left meant the end of the Jews as a distinct people.

In some important ways the feeling was reciprocated and — leaving aside for the moment the very early appearance of Left-wing antisemitism — the Left could not help but be attracted to the Jews. After all, the Left meant to represent the whole of Europe and indeed the world. Wishing to embrace mankind as a whole, it inevitably saw the Jews as a paradigmatic case for its cause. The Jews were an excellent symbol of past injustice, perhaps the finest one possible. After all, the Revolution represented the triumph of the Enlightenment, and Enlightenment meant relief from the Kingdom of Darkness, and the Kingdom of Darkness was Christianity, and the Jews were the most long-suffering victims of Christianity's injustices. The Jews epitomized the essence of exclusion; the denial of humanity to the Jews was the archetypical denial of the universality of man, the most potent of all possible affronts to the spirit of reason.

However, the relationship between the Jews and the Left was never all sunshine and light; the alliance was an uneasy one from the very beginning, for reasons which are not far to seek. The entrance ticket to the European scene (Heine's way of putting it) carried a price: the Jewishness of the Jew. It must be admitted that the Left was not alone in making this demand: even before the Revolution, Lessing, to cite a

prominent example, had hoped and worked for a world in which there would be neither Christians nor Jews. Lessing cannot be said to belong to the Left, which goes to show that one did not *have* to be on the Left to hope that the Jewish problem would go away because Jews would stop beings Jews. But the Right never cared for the Jews at all and the Centre could at least opt for a liberal state that defused the religious problem by allowing many sects to flourish and by viewing Judaism as one sect among many. Moreover, the Centre retained a traditional permissiveness towards a divergence between universalist theory and particularist practice.

The Left laboured mightily to abolish any gap between theory and practice, especially when Marx came to dominate it. The word 'praxis' is too often merely a chic way 'parlor pinks' spell 'practice', but it does carry with it a potent meaning: a closing of the gap, hitherto thought inevitable and perhaps even salutary, between what the mind could think and what existed in reality. The Left, to be sure, existed before Marx and his thought dominated it, but even in its earliest days it was utterly dogmatic and fanatical in insisting on the conformity of what is to what ought to be. In other words, it always insisted that the price for the Jew's becoming a member of common humanity be paid in hard cash. (It ought to go without saying that, in the early days, the Left's lack of power enhanced its intellectual purity.)

German Jews were prominent among those willing, or even eager, to pay the price asked of them.[9] In connection with this present discussion, the process of payment is most fittingly personified in the transformation of a certain Heschel, the son of Meir, who had been the chief rabbi of Trier, Germany's most ancient city. Heschel became not only a lawyer, a Kantian, and a Protestant, but Heinrich Marx, the father of Karl, who was also made to pay the price — conversion to Christianity at the tender age of six.

The German Jews formed the vanguard of those who were asked to change their ways and who did so. The request came with varying degrees of politeness or rudeness but always amounted to the same thing: in return for partaking of the grandeur of universality, the Jews were asked or forced to abandon their particularity — their Jewishness. That came to much more than removing their skullcaps so as to appear more European. It involved, as it were, their abandonment of the Torah as well, their removal of the yoke of the Law, a yoke that they had hitherto likened to grace itself and now came to see as an impediment to the good life.

That is the story with which Dr Carlebach deals, and the details he adds to it command our gratitude. The story includes a goodly share of villains and heroes, with the former unfortunately outnumbering the latter, with horrific consequence. The story focuses on the Left's invention of the Jewish Question or Problem. Before the 1820s there

was, in most senses of the term, no Jewish Question; the term *Judenfrage* had not yet entered the German vocabulary. There was no problem because there was no thought of a solution. Both Jews and the Christians who surrounded them thought that the troubled situation would last until God, in His own good time, acted. The Left changed the troubled situation into a problem with the clear supposition that a solution was at hand. Marx was later to declare that mankind poses for itself *only* such tasks as it can solve.

The Left, then, in a way invented the Jewish problem and set about to solve it by stripping Jews of their Jewishness. When the procedure succeeded, it rendered the Jew naked unto his enemies. When it failed, the Left itself turned against the Jews — for their stiff-neckedness, as it were. The Jews persisted in remaining Jews and even in claiming their rights. When it has suited the Left's purpose, it has periodically embraced nationalism, usually renaming it 'national liberation', but in the event the Left has never forgiven the Jews for their temerity in founding what other peoples already had: a state.

V

I have argued that the story of modernity's attempt to deal with a Jewish problem which was, to a considerable extent, of its own making includes a number of villains. The first of these was Hegel, great philosopher though he undoubtedly was. Hegel was a decent man as well as a great thinker and his personal behaviour towards Jews and Judaism compares most favourably with that of most other philosophers.[10] What is more, in this respect he puts his immediate predecessor, Kant, to shame. But we must distinguish between Hegel's deeds and his expressed thoughts, according the utmost priority to the latter. Clearly the most important thing about a thinker is his thinking. In Hegel's case one can go even somewhat further and declare that thinking to have imperatives of its own, a kind of independence from the man who thinks it, from the mere vessel containing it. That may or may not be a correct way of looking at things, but it comes close to Hegel's self-understanding. In any event, Hegel's philosophy deserves more than the four pages Carlebach devotes to it.

It is tempting to generalize and state that Hegel transformed the whole arena of speculation about Jews from an arcane dispute between Judaism and Christianity to a dispute between Judaism and History, a quarrel that was simultaneously more metaphysical and more urgent. In a way, Hegel invented history: the term 'philosophy of history' did not come into the use it enjoys today until Hegel. The Greeks obviously had superb histories and the Bible is, among other things, a history of the Jews. But history had a different, and a lesser, status before Hegel: if there were to be solutions to man's problems they were not to be found

in history, for the historical realm was the realm of chance and human limitations. Only with Hegel did history proper become a dimension of meaning; he imbued history with metaphysical orderliness.

According to Hegel, things came into being and ceased to be neither by chance nor by the will of God, but rather because of the result of that dialectical necessity which Hegel called the unfolding of reason in history. Historical change might, to be sure, appear to even the most intelligent observer as a sequence of meaningless and frequently disastrous occurrences. But the nonsensical was merely the mask of a higher meaning, just as the apparently sovereign passions were in the service of reason's rule: the historical process was stage-managed by the cunning of reason.

Thus did the concept of progress pass from the realm of hope — in Judaism progress at its deepest level is merely hope and prayer for the coming of the Messiah — to the realm of demonstrable necessity. That necessity, moreover, pointed to a self-defined and finite end. In practical terms this meant that history could be understood as an ascent; what came later excelled what had been before. Hegel's scheme was nothing if not benign, positing as it did history's gradual unfurling of human goodness, but the stiff-necked persistence of the Jews severely tested that scheme's benevolence.

The Jews were different. There were still Greeks but they did not practice the Olympian religion nor did they declare that all thought after Plato and Aristotle amounted to an abomination. There were still Persians, yet Zoroastrianism was well on the way to being of merely antiquarian interest. Greeks, Persians, and other groups continued to exist but their historical principles had been transcended, and *they knew that*. Not so the Jews, who not only continued to exist but continued to affirm the truth of their ancient principle; they lived by it and not infrequently died for it. Either they had not been transcended in the sense of having been absorbed by history, or at the very least they did not *know* they had been transcended. Even if they had been transcended without ever becoming aware of it, they posed a difficult problem. The process of *Aufhebung* included an awareness of what had taken place; history included a steady growth in reason's historical self-consciousness. Could the wonderful march of *Aufhebung* after *Aufhebung* possibly have failed to include the Jews?

Hegel's system was simply unable to accommodate the existence of the Jews, who stubbornly survived when they had no business to do so. As a result, Judaism clashed so sharply with his view of the world that the old antagonism between it and Christianity paled by comparison. During most of its hegemony, after all, Christianity had been able to endure the existence of Jews. At worst, it viewed their misery as a justified punishment for their sins. A few Jews might be converted; the rest could live on Christian mercy. The 'conversion of the Jews', which

Marvell equated with an unthinkably long time away, would signal the Second Coming; but only a few fanatics, usually denounced by the proper authorities, would seek to hasten the Second Coming by perpetrating violence on the Jews. Only with Hegel did the very existence, or *mere* existence of Jews, encounter a metaphysical–historical challenge.

Even a cursory glance at Hegel's *Philosophy of History* reveals the difficulties with which he had to wrestle in fitting Judaism into his grand scheme. In fact, a glance at the table of contents of the book's abridged English version reveals most of what we need to show for our present purposes. For the sake of sweepingly retelling the history of the world as it moves onward and upward from East to West, from China to the twin peaks in Hegel himself and Napoleon, for that sake Judaism becomes a part of the history of the Oriental world, sandwiched in between 'Syria' and 'Egypt'. Hegel knew as well as anybody else that Jesus was born of the Jews, but the first Christian appears in a section entitled 'Christianity', a sub-section of the volume entitled 'The Roman World'. In this instance, Hegel abolishes historical continuity as much as possible. On the one hand, Judaism appears as a mere fossil of the East; it was so characterized by the most famous of British epigoni of Hegel in the philosophy of history, Arnold Toynbee. On the other hand, it appears as a mere prelude to *the* world-historical religion — Christianity, which constitutes the *Aufhebung* of Judaism. In Hegel's scheme, only Judaism receives and needs two separate treatments.[11]

One could say that with Hegel the history and existence of Judaism became — in one further sense — a philosophical question for the first time. *The Philosophy of Right* was Hegel's last book. In it he argued once more, and with what he took to be incontrovertible finality, that the end of history had arrived. Time would go on, to be sure, and things would happen, but the era of fundamental changes was over, now that all was right with the world. 'What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational': he disdained to talk about what ought to be, because what is coincides with what ought to be.[12]

Now a perfected, or at least completed world, is for Hegel a world of universals, with the bourgeois family constituting the only admissible particularity. Hegel's system — and the world it purports to reflect in thought — leaves no room for any group claiming distinct corporate status. In other words, Hegel's benign world has no room for Judaism or the Jewish community, or even the Jew himself apart from the lonely particularity of his family. After the final *Aufhebung*, Jews and Judaism are an anomaly bound for extinction.

VI

Before leaving Hegel, we must emphasize once more the fundamentally benign way in which he conceived what he was proposing and

what would happen. The world-historical process would integrate Jews into European society, the best of all possible societies. The world stood ready to liberate the Jew, conferring inestimable benefits on him. A churlish person could, of course, consider this embrace of the Jews to be a process of liquidation, but would have to admit that what was to be liquidated was an archaic and outmoded way of life, not individual Jews. The Jews would merely be denied something history had exposed as inconsequential, their Jewishness; they would exchange patent irrationality for true freedom.

Bearing in mind the above qualifications, one can dare to call the post-Hegelian discussion of Judaism a disputation about the proper procedures of benign liquidation. In this review article, the discussion centres on those who acknowledge the influence Hegel had upon them, and even more specifically on those men of the Left called Left-wing, or Young Hegelians. Marx definitely began as a member of that group, though dispute surrounds both the later direction of his thought and its final destination. Only a fool would simply deride the claim that Marx was the greatest of the sons of Hegel.

Dr Carlebach's discussion of the followers of Hegel greatly excels his treatment of Hegel. Indeed, his book quite properly centres on the combat between Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx on the Jewish Question. Bruno Bauer is one of the many interesting intellectual figures of the nineteenth century who are today remembered mainly because Marx engaged them polemically. He was a faithful friend of the young Marx but in this respect he can scarcely claim uniqueness. A long list of arguments with former friends and allies characterizes Marx's collected works.

In 1843, Bauer wrote on 'The Jewish Question' generally and in the following year on 'The Capacity of Today's Jews and Christians to Become Free'.[13] He adopted a relatively simple position: universality was the final aim of the state. It followed as the night the day that the characteristic which made a Jew a Jew precluded universality. Impartial in his intolerance, Bauer held that as a matter of fact religion as such rendered universality impossible. Christianity, on the other hand, differed from the common run of religions: other religions outraged reason with their parochialism but Christianity rather peculiarly contained the principle of universality within itself. It must be acknowledged that Bauer knew the basic texts of Christianity and could, in fact, qualify as an expert on the Gospels. He was therefore able to employ the skill at dialectical finesse he shared with other young Hegelians and announce that the practices of Christianity — such as the Sunday Sabbath — could become the basis of a secular state. A state of this kind would be able to include Jews, who need only make concessions Bauer regarded as inconsequential. It went without saying that they would have to cease observing their own Sabbath lest that

interfere with their duties of citizenship. But in ceasing and desisting from absurd ways (read Judaism), the Jews lost nothing at all. One could not speak of losses when the abandonment of foolish rites led to the acquisition of common humanity.

Marx was appalled by Bruno Bauer's proposals, but those who give him credit for this must first come to terms with the basis of his divergence from Bauer. He rejected the latter's ideas not because they went too far but because they did not go far enough; he found the proposals too *modest.* Marx fearlessly reached the conclusion that the emancipation of Jews depended on the emancipation of mankind from Judaism. We may well tend to shrink away from that conclusion in horror, but we must try to understand it before we reject it.

VII

Why would a sane man of high intelligence and unquestioned devotion to the relief of man's estate (in Bacon's sense) desire the emancipation of mankind from Judaism? In Marx's case, the answer is of the kind that is easy to overlook by virtue of its startling simplicity. Marx was for communism and against capitalism. The final enemy in the final conflict was the bourgeoisie, and the Jews were the paradigm of the bourgeoisie. Because of Judaism, the Jews reduced everything, including God, to the level of practical need. Their interests were exclusively material and money was their God. For Marx, Judaism was more dangerous in his own time than it had been for ages past. The existence of the Jews and their religion made possible the renaissance of the bourgeois spirit after it had lain dormant for some 2,000 years. A life informed by Judaism was tantamount to a life of bourgeois deformation. The Jewish obsession with practical things necessitated the radical exclusion of spiritual concerns; the Jew was the embodiment of man's alienated condition under capitalism; Judaism was the very essence of capitalism.

Because matters stood that way, the true emancipation of the Jews could never be effected by any merely political act or social withering away of barriers or kindred half-hearted measures. What, then, was to be done? The Jewish spirit as such had to be rooted out and extirpated. Marx's war against capitalism began as a war against the Jews. It ought to go without saying that Marx was not a racist: Judaism was never understood by him as either genetically transmitted or communicable in some Lamarckian manner. It was not only quite possible for Jews to divest themselves of their Judaism but it was also quite necessary. To say that capitalism precluded the peace and well-being of Europe was for Marx tantamount to saying that Europe could enjoy

neither peace nor the greatness for which it seemed destined while Jews held fast to their Judaism.

Some will dismiss this Marxist analysis — or at least the present attempt to articulate it as fairly as possible — because it appears to be patently ludicrous. Nevertheless, it merits serious consideration. Nobody scoffs at what is widely proclaimed to be one of modern sociology's masterpieces, Max Weber's 'The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism', and it can be argued that On the Jewish Question represents the young Marx's attempt to write 'The Jewish Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism'. Marx was not the only man to suggest that something in Jews 'took to' business and commerce and that they were indeed quite good at operating within a free market system. For a time, such statements incurred charges of prejudice, but today we are 'beyond the melting pot', to borrow Glazer and Moynihan's phrase; one is once more 'permitted' to think in terms of group characteristics without being accused of bigotry. Nor need one be a Marxist to see a correlation between Jews and free enterprise; some of our present-day neo-conservative thinkers argue along surprisingly similar lines.

Marx's speculations on the relationship between Judaism and capitalism, then, deserve a notable place in a whole genre of socio-political investigation. However, while Weber cannot seriously be accused of anti-Protestantism, and while no charge of prejudice against either Jews or capitalism can be convincingly laid against neo-conservatism, Marx by contrast can justly be accused of being anti-Jewish, though it is always possible to argue that his 'personal views' are irrelevant.

Marx's manner of expressing himself almost alone suffices to condemn him. The style is coarse enough to bear comparison with later diatribes about Jews produced by the psychopathic Julius Streicher in *Der Stürmer*. It is also repulsive enough so that translators, who are properly sympathetic to Marx — a thinker of Marx's significance surely deserves sympathetic translators — have consciously or unconsciously tended to soften his fulminations about the greed of Jews and their habit of 'jewing' others.[14]

Marx's antisemitism cannot be claimed to have a central position in his opus — but neither should it be lightly dismissed, since some have seen in Marx the continuation of the highest Jewish tradition. There is something to be said for such a claim, which means that there is also something to be said against it. Admittedly, Marx worked ceaselessly to realize a Utopia; and it is true that Utopianism is not unrelated to Jewish Messianism — which may have been born with the destruction of the Second Temple or may already be inherent in the Genesis account of Creation. Admittedly, Marx cried out for social justice, as did the ancient prophets of Israel. But the contrast between the crude language of Marx and the exalted language of Amos is only the outer

manifestation of an even deeper difference. Marx was not a great Jewish prophet; indeed he never thought of himself as one, entertaining instead comparison with Greek figures like Prometheus.

The question of Marx's antisemitism has a real — even if limited — interest. Scholarly integrity dictates that Marx be rescued from his slavish admirers as well as from his thoughtless detractors. The limits of the relevance of the problem of Marx's antisemitism become apparent the moment one realizes that it is quite possible at one and the same time to be a bad Jew and a good philosopher — witness Spinoza.

Was Marx a good philosopher? In the present context we can afford to evade that question by stating the obvious. Marx was an *important* philosopher who did as much as any man, and perhaps more, to fashion the climate of modernity. It is when one comes to see the peculiarly anti-Jewish tenor of modernity as such, that one recognizes the deepest significance of a meditation on the theme of 'Marx and Judaism'. We need to know more, much more than we do, about the topic. We must know whether, or rather to what extent, modernity's anti-Jewishness constitutes nothing less than part of its essence.

Dr Carlebach knows more at first hand than any man should of one aspect of modern antisemitism. His moving dedication of his volume states:

To My Parents
Chief Rabbi Dr Joseph Zvi Carlebach and Charlotte Carlebach, née Preuss
They lived as Jews . . .
Loved Judaism . . .
And died because they were Jews . . .
in a concentration camp outside Riga
26 March 1942 — 8 Nissan 5702

Dr Carlebach's parents and millions of other Jews — thousands of Jewish Communists among them — died not because of the way modernity had taken as a direct result of Marx's attempt to change the world Hegel had interpreted. The Left has enough to answer for before the bar of history — the highest court according to its own view — for us to smear it with any excessive moral similarities with the Right. The core of Nazism consisted of its Satanic resolve to destroy the Jews, and it had hardly any other core. It would take an idiot to say the same thing of the Left; indeed, Bebel, a leading man of the Left, was to characterize antisemitism as the socialism of the idiots.

In fact, the Left could afford to, and did, enter into convenient support of Jews and Judaism when it suited its own interest. The U.S.S.R. backed the creation of the State of Israel; arms from Czechoslovakia helped it to survive, and Gromyko himself once referred to Zionism as the national liberation movement of the Jews. That was long ago, before the correctly understood class interest of the wretched of the earth demanded that Zionism be branded as racism

and Israelis be compared to Nazis, but it nevertheless held true once upon a time. One must go even further back and remember that the Left attracted many Jews in this century mainly because it, and only it, seemed fully aware of the Right's deadly threat. Historians will note the ironic turn-about: in the nineteenth century, many a man joined the Right because it and only it seemed prepared to take arms against the Left's deadly threat. Since the French Revolution, the Right and the Left have not only fought each other; they have fuelled one another's energies, and more than once have temporarily agreed both in theory and practice as to the perfidy of the Centre.

The Right is not the subject of this discussion; it has been introduced to explain two rather obvious aspects of the Jewish plight in modernity. First, both the Christian and post-Christian Right have had only a negative appeal for the Jews, tending to push them to the Left. Second, since politics and life in general have tended to become polarized in modernity, the latter as such has left Jews precious little room for political manoeuvring — and even little room in which to flourish.

VIII

Reflecting upon 'Marx and Judaism' has led to posing a simple question: is the Left anti-Jewish at its core? Simple questions are frequently difficult to answer, but even posing them correctly can mark an advance over previous murkiness, and that particular question was not all that easy to ask before the lessons of our time taught us to do it. Antisemitism used to be thought of as a Christian phenomenon, but the Left was anti-Christian. In its post-Christian manifestation antisemitism became the speciality of the Nazis, and many men and women of the Left laid down their lives in the fight against Nazism. Again, the enemies of the Jews were on the Right and Jews could be forgiven for reasoning like everyone else that the enemies of their enemies were their friends.

Since 1945 the major threat to human liberty, dignity, and decency has not come from the Right. It is probably safe to assume that the evils of the Right represent a perennial danger, but they have not held centre stage since Germany's defeat in the Second World War. For some years it even seemed that Hitler had disgraced antisemitism forever. Statesmen could not say nasty things about the Jews; it was politically damaging to engage in anything but laudatory generalizations about them. It was probably De Gaulle who first began to speak censoriously of Jews again (*un peuple d'élite, dominateur*). However, De Gaulle was not typical of anything but himself, and only by an extraordinary feat of imagination could he be said to belong to the Left.

But De Gaulle marked a new beginning. Israel steadily lost support in the family of nations, as the United Nations Organization was wont

to call itself. The Third World saw greater hope for 'genuine freedom' by looking towards Moscow rather than Washington. The Soviet Union both artificially and naturally revived antisemitism; Stalin had certainly not succeeded in totally discrediting it. Israel might be the only country in the world — certainly in the Middle East — blessed with not one but two Communist parties, but the Communist world learned yet another lesson from the grandest of all teachers, history: the Arabs represented progress. The Communist world split between the U.S.S.R. and China but both sides kept agreeing that Israel was fundamentally and irremediably reactionary.

Things also took a turn for the worse in the United Sates. In New York City during the 1960s, black antisemitism came to flourish in some quarters and even to claim immunity from criticism because of the historical wrongs inflicted on the Blacks. More than one Black leader discovered that a nasty remark about Jews no longer jeopardized his ambition or career. Everywhere, American young radicals of all colours discovered that for some reason or other Jews were not 'really' a minority. The quota system in the universities, euphemistically called affirmative action, saw Jews as enemies of justice and progress.

Examples of the above kind could be multiplied with depressing ease but they all point in the same direction: today anti-Jewishness is a speciality of the Left. Indeed, in the United States a small industry of intellectual explanation has sprouted to deal with a new phenomenon: since Senator McCarthy, the major attempts to shift the country to the Right have lacked a significant antisemitic component. No such charges could be aimed at Senator Goldwater, and President Reagan remains a staunch ally of Israel.

It cannot be denied that nowadays most of the anti-Jewish sentiment, in the United States as well as in other countries, comes from the Left. There are, of course, many honourable men on the Left (non-Jews as well as Jews) who deplore this situation and suffer from it. All of them must — and do — agonize over the situation. The Soviet Union's antisemitism is a legacy from Czarist days and has nothing to do with Marxism — but what about Chinese hostility to Israel? It is often said that one can oppose Israel without opposing Jews or Judaism. However, while it is not true that all opponents of Israel are opponents of Judaism, it can hardly be asserted that all opponents of Judaism are not opponents of Israel.

The common thread of the various apologies for the antisemitism of the Left is simple enough to state: Left-wing antisemitism represents an infantile disorder, as it were, of the Left; it is accidental, peripheral, ephemeral — a historical aberration. In most cases such an explanation can easily be accepted. However, the Left has no good reason to advance it, and compelling reasons for rejecting it.

The intellectual fountain-head of the Left, it must not be forgotten, is Marx. According to Marxism many things may be in flux, but history is the fixed point for evaluating the flux. History may zig and zag a tiny bit but it *cannot err*. It is un-Marxist to say that a Communist movement has betrayed history, since Communist movements move strictly according to history. History is the final bar of judgement from which there is no appeal. And history has consigned Judaism to its dustbin.

This interpretation of Marx is more deterministic than many of his admirers would allow it to be. But it is defensible — although this is not the place to defend it. What must be noted here is that ever since its Marxist inception, the modern Left has at best been only tactically in favour of Judaism; strategically and in the long run it has always been against it. Even non-deterministic Marxists would have to say, 'And that, comrade, is no accident'.

The Left must view Judaism with hostility, not by way of an accident but because of its essence. The leading Jewish figures in the pantheon of the Left — Rosa Luxemburg would be a good example — have always known as much. The Left works for, and expects, a universal classless society. Jews and Judaism have ever embodied the scandal of particularity.

The seeds of this analysis are buried in Dr Carlebach's book. He seems to suggest that the apparent alliance between Jews and the Left, which collapsed in 1967 with the Six-Day War, never amounted to more than a sustaining illusion, and he is surely right. He also suggests that modernity's pervasive anti-Jewishness is the necessary outcome of modern philosophy and its alarming success in translating theory into practice. He is probably right about that as well.

It is important — and especially important to Jews — to tell the story of the illusory quality of the Jewish alliance with the Left. But what can Jews do? The stench of Auschwitz alone suffices to make even the thought of a Jewish alliance with the Right a blasphemy. There remains the Centre, also known as liberal democracy, and *it* is the place where Jews belong. The Centre permits them to grapple with life *as* Jews, to keep faith with a spiritual Jerusalem that is neither Right nor Left but above both. Only in the Centre can Jews remain the heirs, albeit the corrupted heirs, of the legacy they received on Mount Sinai.

But what if the Centre is a point with no extension in space, so that one must decide to be either a Left Centrist or a Right Centrist? The story Dr Carlebach tells begins when all Centrists were somehow to the Left, when a political society granting Jews emancipation was radical. The Jews had to *lean* to the Left at least. Today many should perhaps lean ever so slightly to the Right, if only to redress the historical balance. This is a tentative suggestion. But basically tentativeness about all political programmes is very much in harmony with Jewishness and Judaism. Jews should know as well as anybody else,

and perhaps better than anybody else, that human or political solutions are always tentative. Marx notwithstanding, mankind often sets itself only such tasks as it cannot solve.

NOTES

[1] I am deeply indebted to my former student and present friend, Professor George Friedman. He helped me greatly during all the stages of the preparation of this review article; I could not have written it without him; and he came as close to being a co-author as is possible without actually being one.

[2] *Pirke Abot,* translated by Judah Goldin as *The Wisdom of the Fathers,* New York, 1975, p. 142.

[3] Herbert Marcuse, *Negations,* Boston, 1968, p. 208.

[4] See Lewis S. Feuer, ed., *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy,* New York, 1959, p. 245. The quotation is from Marx's 'Theses on Feuerbach'.

[5] *Exodus* 32:9 and *Deuteronomy* 9:6, among other places.

[6] *Amos* 5:21.

[7] *History* 5.2–5.7.

[8] This is one of the many things to be learned from Gershom Scholem's *Sabbatai Sevi: The Mystical Messiah,* Princeton, N.J., 1973, a volume which is indispensable for understanding modern Jewish history.

[9] On this point, see especially Gershom Scholem, *On Jews and Judaism in Crisis,* New York, 1975, pp. 71–92.

[10] See Shlomo Avineri, 'A Note on Hegel's View on Jewish Emancipation', *Jewish Social Studies,* vol. 25, no. 1, 1963, pp. 145–51.

[11] G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History,* translated by J. Sibree, New York, 1956, pp. xv–xvi, 195, 318. The German original follows the same order.

[12] *Philosophy of Right,* translated by L. M. Knox, London, 1952, p. 10; also 'Preface', *passim.* Cf. *The Philosophy of History,* op. cit., pp. 103, 342. The most convincing demonstration of this point is to be found in A. Kojeve, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel,* New York, 1969.

[13] For a good summary discussion of Bauer, see Carlebach, pp. 125–47.

[14] In addition to Carlebach, see especially Edmund Silberner, whose 1949 article on the subject 'Was Marx an anti-Semite?' (*Historica Judaica II,* vol. 1, 1949, pp. 3–52) remains unsurpassed; and Arnold Künzli, *Karl Marx: Eine Psychobiographie,* which treats the matter under discussion at great length, but unfortunately manifests all the vices and few of the virtues of psycho-biography. The best discussion of the translations and mistranslations of Marx can be found in Walter Kaufmann, *Without Guilt and Justice,* New York, 1973, pp. 167–70. Kaufmann demolishes the attempts to defend Marx against antisemitism made by Erich Fromm in *Marx's Concept of Man,* New York, 1961.

BOOK REVIEWS

TODD M. ENDELMAN, *The Jews of Georgian England 1714–1830: Tradition and Change in a Liberal Society*, xiv+370 pp., The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1979, $14.50.

Dr Endelman of Indiana University has brought together in a highly readable and well-marshalled form the results of a wide study of primary and secondary sources. He deals with a period of increasing interest to historians of Anglo-Jewry. On both sides of the Atlantic, students of Jewish history have become increasingly aware of the modernity of many of the issues debated within Anglo-Jewry in the nineteenth century — and indeed earlier.

The author has much to say about 'philo-semitism'. It is not of course the equivalent of the absence of antisemitism. It is a doctrinal, and sometimes eschatological, conception of the role of the Jews in the story of mankind and in the history and future of Christendom. It was often associated with proselytizing efforts and with Christian-based Restorationist ideas. Dr Endelman refers to the inter-relations between Christian hopes of converting Jews and philo-semitic support for Jewish emancipation. Some Jews looked upon that link with anxiety, as they did upon the 'Zionistic' ideas advanced by Gentiles. He refers to Melvin Scult's unpublished 1968 dissertation (Brandeis University) on *The Conversion of the Jews and the Origins of Jewish Emancipation in England.* That author's important work on *Millenial Expectations and Jewish Liberties: A Study of the Efforts to Convert the Jews in Britain up to the mid-19th Century* (1978), which Dr Endelman later reviewed, appeared too late for reference in the present book, as did also Harvey Meirovich's instructive paper on 'Ashkenazi Reactions to the Conversionists 1800–1850' in Vol. 26 of the *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England* (1979).

In discussing the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts in 1828, the author refers to the crucial clause inserted in the new legislation which required the declaration of loyalty to include the words 'upon the faith of a Christian'. He adds that it is 'uncertain whether the clause was directed explicitly against the Jews. It may have been intended primarily for Deists and Benthamites, although its supporters were well aware that it left the Jews worse off than before' (pp. 45–46). I believe that the clause was in fact directed specifically at the Jews. The Duke of Wellington suggested a non-denominational deistic reference which would probably at that stage not have been offensive to any

conscience. But the House of Lords decided upon the episcopally promoted language, which was finally adopted. Furthermore, had the target been the exclusion of deists and suspected atheists, there would not have been any discernible reason why Lord Holland's attempt to provide for the Jews should have been rejected. Indeed, Lord Derby — who led the Tory Party — told the House of Lords on 10 July 1857 that the clause had been put in with the deliberate intention of excluding Jews. He was in a good position to know; in the early 1830s, he had supported Grant's failed Bills to remove the 1828 clause, which would have largely equated the Jews with the Protestant Dissenters and (after the Emancipation Act of 1829) the Roman Catholics.

Opposition to the Jewish case was not a matter of antisemitism. To the leading Jews, their case accorded with the advancing libertarianism of the day, and seemed a postulate of the intellectual and scientific revolutions of which the new century was heir. Above all, they saw themselves as one of the elements in the body of Nonconformists, as the Dissenters were soon to be called. The legislation of 1828–29 was regarded by them as depriving their opponents of the central ground of their opposition. In 1831, in the fifth 'letter' of his *Arguments*, Francis Goldsmid stressed that Jews should now be placed on an equal footing with 'other Dissenters', for otherwise it might be implied that they were 'a dishonoured and degraded caste'. To many of the succeeding generation of Jews, the notion that their community was but part and parcel of the Nonconformists was the centre-piece of their public relations. Goldsmid noted in his *Arguments* that the Jewish proposals seemed to their most experienced advocates to have so few elements 'that seemed likely to alarm . . . the staunchest opposer of change in the laws of England' that 'any very serious opposition . . . was . . . regarded as an impossibility'. That optimism was ill-founded, in spite of the extensive social emancipation of the Jews.

I do not think Dr Endelman has paid sufficent attention to the true nature of the opposition. Jewish political emancipation was interrelated with many other facets of national life and public controversy. With the advance of the Dissenters, there evolved a series of movements directed against the privileges of the Church of England in public life and especially at the Universities. The upholders of the old order saw Jewish emancipation as a further effort to weaken old-established authority, as subversive of a system already heavily assailed, and — ironically — as likely to encourage a freer approach to Scripture and render scepticism and secularism respectable. Jewish protests against such a view of their campaign failed to reassure the critics, quite apart from the further complicating topics of Jewish nationality and Messianism.

It is worthy of mention that the emphasis upon the Jews constituting part of the Nonconformist body tended to sharpen the differences

between those Jews, like Sir Moses Montefiore, who were content with piecemeal reform, and those, led by the Goldsmids, who pressed for immediate equality with the Dissenters. English Jews of Sephardi origin were less combative than their more recently arrived (in terms of settlement as a community) Ashkenazi brethren. They retained keener recollections of the Naturalization Act of 1753 and the anti-Jewish polemical outburst which it provoked; and some of them were concerned lest Jews of talent might take advantage of a sudden broadening of public opportunities to the jeopardy of their religious observances and to the detriment of the community's cohesion.

Perhaps the most interesting chapters are the fourth, 'Gentlemen Jews: the Acculturation of the Anglo-Jewish Middle Class', and the ninth, 'Jewish Citizens in a Liberal State'. The trends set in the period with which the author is concerned sprang from sources and influences which have had long-term effects upon the institutional and social life of British Jewry. Styles of conducting communal affairs, developed in the eighteenth century, became deep-rooted. The failure to endow higher Jewish learning, a certain minimalist approach to Jewish education, the ultimate control of the religious by the lay leaders, the practice of caring for the poor within the community as a matter of public relations as well as of religion and philanthropy, the emphasis on sound administration in the main charitable and religious institutions — the origins of all this and much else lie deep in Anglo-Jewish history. English patterns and English pragmatism had an enduring influence upon successive waves of immigrants and their descendants, especially as they moved into the Jewish middle classes.

The author's pen portraits of aristocrats and hawkers, and the mixture of social history and ideological analysis, will inform and give pleasure. The book is an important contribution to the historiography of Anglo-Jewry.

ISRAEL FINESTEIN

JACOB HABERMAN, *Maimonides and Aquinas. A Contemporary Appraisal*, xx+289 pp., Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1979, $17.50.

The place for a proper review of this book is, of course, a philosophical or theological journal. Sociologists will mainly be interested in the fact that there are still writers and readers, and consequently also publishers, who find Maimonides and Aquinas sufficiently 'relevant' to make them the subject of a contemporary appraisal. Even unphilosophical sociologists are aware that both men were great, or even among the greatest, philosopher-theologians; and Dr Haberman, though not a sociologist, is clearly aware of the specific social and historical locus of his two subjects. They were medieval thinkers, trying to reconcile faith (that is, revelation-based religion) and reason within the modes of

thought provided by the western philosophical-religious tradition — which means Plato and Aristotle, as mediated by Arab-Muslim philosophers. One must bear in mind that both Maimonides and Aquinas, in spite of their being 'Aristotelians', began to 'platonize' at crucial points in their theology.

Since Haberman's study is a contemporary and highly personal appraisal, the reader sometimes gets the impression that there really are three great philosopher-theologians: Maimonides, Aquinas, and Haberman. Lest this sound unkind, let me hasten to add that the book is well-written, extremely readable, and exhibits considerable erudition which, together with a certain charming frankness, goes a long way towards reconciling the reader with the author's occasionally implicit arrogance. One hopes that Dr Haberman also agrees that few historians of Jewish philosophy possessed the learning, the breadth, and the depth (as well as the capacity for 'contemporary appraisal') of the late Professor Julius Guttman; the reference to his discussion of Maimonides as 'acidulous' is itself rather acidulous.

Witness to the author's intellectual strength are the six chapters of text (pp. 1–81) and the 'Conclusion and Evaluation' of the seventh chapter (pp. 85–117). Witness to his ability to cast his net wide are the five Appendices (pp. 149–75) which include a stimulating excursus on historians of medieval Jewish philosophy, on Kant (here one misses a reference to Nathan Rotenstreich's illuminating discussion on the subject in his *The Recurrent Pattern*, published in 1963), and on S. R. Hirsch. Witness to his erudition are the near hundred pages of Notes (pp. 177–271).

A very special feature is Chapter 8, an 'Epilogue' devoted to Herbert Loewe: 'An Unorthodox Defense of Orthodoxy'. Loewe, a scholar remembered with reverence and affection by all those — Jews and Christians — who studied with him at Oxford and Cambridge, has never been made the subject of a systematic analysis of his (unsystematic and implicit) underlying conceptions of the nature of Judaism. To be the first to do so is to the author's credit, though one may be surprised to find Herbert Loewe in the company of Maimonides and Aquinas, and to find him praised and extolled when much of Haberman's criticism of the two great medieval theologians would apply *a fortiori* to Loewe (due account being taken of the very different nature of the concepts of both 'faith' and 'reason' in the twentieth century). Or does the author perhaps merely wish to hint obliquely at his conviction that unsystematic thinking is more congenial to Judaism? Anyway, one is pleased to find an orthodox Jewish theologian displaying such thorough knowledge of Christian thought and treating it with such seriousness and respect. But he avoids the word 'Christ', speaking instead of the 'Founder of Christianity' — an eminently Christian, theological expression but one which, historically, is

patently either meaningless or wrong. For the Christian faith, Jesus is the Founder of Christianity; for the unbelieving historian, Jesus is the sectarian teacher who became the corner-stone around which others built what was subsequently to become Christianity.

R. J. ZWI WERBLOWSKY

BERNARD S. JACKSON, ed., *The Jewish Law Annual, Supplement One. Modern Research in Jewish Law*, vii+157 pp., published under the auspices of the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists and the Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies by E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1980, 56 guilders.

This Supplement is far more exciting than one has a right to expect a work on such an abstract and technical subject to be, and the knowledgeable reader will find it hard to put down once he has got to the point where battle has been joined by the main protagonists.

It falls to Shalom Albeck to 'raise the standard'. The principle of research into Jewish Law, he says, is 'to investigate the legal decisions and the single *halakhot* which determine what is right in human conduct in various circumstances in order to find out what is common to all these legal decisions and to infer from it the general principle by which we may conclude what will be right in human conduct in the future'. In a brief but erudite review of the halakhic laws of Tort, Contracts and property, Albeck illustrates his technique of abstracting unchangeable general principles from the mass of detail revealed by historical research.

Enter Izhak Englard, and the challenges are hurled, against *mishpat ivri* as an expression of Jewish national renaissance, against confusions in understanding the relationship between history and dogmatics in research on Jewish Law, against Gulak, against Elon, and against Albeck. Research into Jewish Law, Englard maintains, must (*a*) look at it in its totality, not sundering 'religious' from 'non-religious' elements, (*b*) be objective, not slanted towards some ulterior purpose, such as the introduction of Jewish Law into the legislature of the State of Israel, (*c*) not confuse historical with dogmatic research, and (*d*) present the legal institutions of Jewish law in a systematic way. Englard hotly rejects Albeck's contention that there are immutable general principles of law from which detailed *halakhot* are derived in changing social and historical circumstances.

Hard on the heels of his professorial colleagues follows Menahem Elon, Justice of the Supreme Court of Israel — and, in addition, author of perhaps the finest scholarly presentation of Jewish law to date, his three-volume *Mishpat Ivri* (Magnes Press, Jerusalem, 1973). Elon,

though as temperate as Englard is aggressive, gives as good as — I am inclined to say better than — he has received. Himself a staunch advocate of *mishpat ivri* and its judicious and selective introduction into the law of the State, he reminds Englard that it is indeed well precedented in rabbinic thought to bring different approaches to bear in different areas of law, such as *issur* and *mamon*. He expresses particular resentment at Englard's suggestion that research undertaken to facilitate the absorption of *mishpat ivri* into the law of the State is lacking in objectivity because 'value-laden', and retorts that it is not 'in the humanities and the social and legal sciences possible to conceive pure objective scientific research without some degree of value-judgment deriving from the *Weltanschauung* of the scholar'.

But perhaps the most intense conflict (it is a long-standing one) between Englard and Elon concerns the whole idea of the introduction of Jewish Law into the State legislature. Englard, though he is from a personal religious point of view committed to *halakha*, strongly opposes its incorporation in whole or in part into the State legislature; he maintains that all that could be achieved by this would be the secularization of *halakha*. For *halakha* is only meaningful in its totality, and its essence is a religious one, which requires that its judges be accredited in accordance with its own terms — a judicial decision can *only* be halakhic, even when made in accordance with halakhic rules, if made by a judge who is himself recognized by the *halakha*. Elon, as his life's work has shown, disagrees.

In the next article, Baruch Shiber defends Albeck against Englard's attack. The special aspect of legal philosophy which comes to the fore here is, as I see it, a conflict between natural law and positivism, Shiber for Albeck maintaining that the *halakha* is to be identified and universal, and Englard maintaining that such abstractions are not part of the positive law of the *halakha* nor a legitimate construction from it.

Strangely, after the internicine strife of these four orthodox scholars, Haim Cohn's 'secularist view' of the methodology of Jewish Law brings an air of repose and content. Without in any way belittling the contribution of religious values and religious scholars to the continuing development of Jewish Law, Cohn reviews it as a primarily cultural phenomenon, and would encourage research along these lines.

The volume is completed with a review by the editor, Professor Jackson, of the theoretical issues involved in the preceding discussions. With customary clarity and sound judgement, Jackson first assesses the positions of the disputants against the background of general jurisprudence, then isolates what he perceives as the fundamental issues. His final pages are the most tantalizing part of the book, for he only too briefly hints at a structuralist approach to the problems raised. I look forward to seeing this worked out at greater length in relation to Jewish Law, as Jackson has indeed already done in general law.

It should be mentioned that of the six studies in the volume, four — those by Albeck, Englard, Elon, and Shiber — have previously appeared in Hebrew versions. Professor Jackson has rendered a great service to the English-reading world of law by providing an opportunity for a wider audience to come to grips with the lively and creative debate sparked off anew by Englard's paper in 1976.

NORMAN SOLOMON

DAVID SIDORSKY, ed., in collaboration with Sidney Liskofsky and Jerome J. Shestack, *Essays on Human Rights. Contemporary Issues and Jewish Perspectives*, xlv+359 pp., The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1979, $12.00.

This thoughtful book belongs to that large class of contemporary products that might be called conferential; comprising twenty-one essays by as many contributors, it owes its unity to the idea behind an international colloquium on Judaism and human rights held a few years ago at McGill University. Its coherence is assisted by the senior editor's long introduction summarizing, and to some extent integrating, the chapters as well as parts of the discussion that took place at the conference.

About a third of the essays are concerned with human rights in an international context, with special reference to the United Nations, while another third consider human rights in national contexts (with special reference to the Soviet Union, Iraq, and Israel). The last third deal with the history of human rights in Jewish thought and experience; there are three chapters on classical sources and five on modern movements. Of the authors, all but one (Daniel P. Moynihan) appear to be Jewish, at least on their parents' side; the majority of them reside in the United States.

As several of the contributors point out, Jews have had a long engagement with the subject-matter of human rights in varied connections, not always entirely compatible. Since long before the Hebrew Bible took its present form they have written, interpreted, debated, administered, and suffered under some of the earliest relevant texts; they have adapted their law to the diverse and changing conditions of two millennia of life in the Diaspora. They have contributed more than their share of ideas to the development of ethical precept and legal enactment in the Gentile communities where they have lived in partial emancipation for a few centuries; they have numbered more than their share of victims of violations of human rights; and lately, as founders and citizens of a new state in an old homeland, they have attracted more than their share of attention as putative defendants. There are perceptive essays here — which do not

pretend to comprehensiveness — on the treatment of inequality, other races, and women in Biblical times (H. Ch. Brichto) and the Middle Ages (S. D. Goitein); on rabbinical treatment of fair hearing and confrontation, escape of captives and slaves (David Daube). The historical essays make their points more succinctly, with surer (perhaps easier) command of cases and context, than do the contemporary studies. If the record seems suspiciously clean, that may be explained not by the author's benevolence but by gaps in the data or, as Goitein suggests, by the Jews' historic political weakness.

In the past three centuries, as contributors note from different perspectives, Jewish attitudes towards human rights have been ramified by divisive and contradictory impulses. One main dimension may be summed up by the polar terms 'universal/particular'; another, by 'collective/individual'. The first contrasts rights that inhere in all mankind and rights that are to be claimed by a particular segment of mankind with its own revelation, sacred obligations, and history. The other is concerned with the question whether the proper subject and claimant of human rights, or some of them, is the individual human being or is a collective to which the individual belongs. Modern or modernizing Jewish democratic liberalism, especially in Western Europe and America, has tended to emphasize on the one hand the universal as against the particular; and on the other, the individual as distinct from, and more to be protected than, the collective. Since the Second World War, the Holocaust, and the formation of the State of Israel, many have moved paradoxically both from universal toward particular and from individual toward collective. Some Jews believe or hope that there is no insoluble conflict along either dimension, but in practice one observes tensions between (for example) those in and out of the Soviet Union who concentrate on the general human-rights movement there (usually, universalist and individual) and those who concentrate on Jewish emigration (usually, particularist and collective). Two emigré contributors, Pavel Litvinov and Michael Meerson-Aksenov, seek to reconcile the tensions. Even for emigrants from the Soviet Union, the fork in the road at Vienna (on to Israel, or on to the Atlantic Diaspora?) can be seen as a practical literal instance of the same divergence.

In the chapters devoted to contemporary issues, much of the attention is concentrated on work at the United Nations and other international organizations, on the relationship between economic and social rights and civil and political rights, or on the intersection between the fora and the norms. Several contributors inveigh against the wounds inflicted on the concepts and practice of human rights by the coalition of states in the overlapping groups of the Soviet camp, the 'Third World', and the Arab countries. In the book's most thorough review of United Nations actions, Sidney Liskofsky notes that the

Third World has shown at least a declaratory preference for the value of equality over that of freedom. (He might have quoted the observation, made by Amnon Rubinstein and others, to the effect that those who act on that preference usually lose freedom without achieving equality.) None of the essays goes very far into the supposed conflict between emphasis on economic and social rights and emphasis on civil and political rights; Litvinov maintains that priority for the former would destroy the essence of human rights, but he is opposed also to the reverse priority apparently because he believes that rights in the two categories are interdependent and perhaps that they are indivisible. Liskofsky, Sidorsky, Walter Laqueur, Leonard Garment, and other contributors trace sadly the work of re-definition that is being undertaken in U.N. committees and other bodies to relativize human rights in favour of notions — themselves defined tendentiously — of national sovereignty and the redistribution of resources.

The essays on the United Nations, on human rights in the Soviet Union, and on human-rights practices in and by Israel furnish numerous instances of the double standard that is applied widely today. Colonialism from overseas is decried while colonialism over adjacent or incorporated lands is ignored (save always for South Africa); minor weaknesses in Israel are exaggerated by critics who ignore major violations elsewhere in the Middle East; the Soviet Union passes over its earlier support of one movement for national liberation in Palestine in order to cut a braver figure as present champion of another; Israel's ties with South Africa are attacked by people who ignore the much closer ties of many other nations. Jerome Shestack discerns a different, and older, aspect of the application of standards: reviewing Israel's actions in — what cannot now even be named without partisanship — Gaza and the West Bank, or the occupied territories, or the administered territories, or Judaea and Samaria, he notes that 'throughout the ages Jews have been held accountable for actions which departed from Jewish values — and that, perhaps, is the key to Jewish survival'.

The attentive reader will find much matter for reflection but not very much ground for hope. Some authors take comfort from such progress as has been made, and lay stress on the improvement in communications and reporting that makes violations of human rights known so fast so far to so many. Some, while viewing with alarm, are nonetheless cheered by the growing number of Viewers with Alarm. President Carter's proclamation of emphasis on progress in human rights as one goal of United States foreign policy is welcomed by several contributors, who accept the proviso that other goals must sometimes take precedence.

In one of the longest of the perspectives, the late Jacob Talmon recommends that the peoples liberate themselves from the prison-

house of history. This adjuration, coming near the end of an essay on antisemitism, seems to be addressed directly to Gentiles, but one wonders whether it is meant also for Jews. Was Talmon recommending that Jews relinquish their long attachment to the concrete significant symbols upheld by the orthodox, symbols whose unifying power is celebrated in another essay by Halpern? May we go further and read Talmon as speculating that Jewry cannot turn aside historic destructive antisemitism except by ideological self-liquidation? That might indeed assure the sacrifice of the particular but not purchase therewith the triumph of the desired universal.

LEON LIPSON

JOHN F. STACK JR., *International Conflict in an American City: Boston's Irish, Italians, and Jews, 1935–1944*, with an Introduction by Andrew M. Greeley, xiv+181 pp., Greenwood Press, Westport, Ct., and London, 1979, £13.95.

John Stack has written a wholly admirable book on a narrow topic in American ethnic history, the conflict in Boston in 1935–44, but he approaches this subject with such breadth, insight, and intelligence that his treatment throws light on other conflicts in Boston and other cities, and in other decades. While nothing in the book of this most professional historian is pointed to the ethnic conflict of the 1970s in Boston (a town almost as well known for anti-black prejudice as Selma, Alabama), inevitably, like all good history, it gives a new perspective on events of a third of a century after the period of which he writes.

One object of this book, expressed in its title, is to emphasize the role of international events on ethnic groups far from the scene of these events, and the backflow of influences from the local scene onto international events. This was the decade of the rise of Hitler, of the Italo-Ethiopian war, of Britain's efforts to limit Jewish immigration into Palestine, of the Second World War and the alliance with Russia. In an Irish, Italian, and Jewish city, these had to have consequences for the relations between the ethnic groups; and they did. The impact of international events was modulated by the distinctive history of Boston, and in Stack's analysis what was most distinctive was the political monopoly the Irish had established in Boston, combined with their sense of permanent grievance. Their political dominance had been won in conflict with the 'Brahmins', the Protestant elite of English origin who had controlled Boston and made it the most genteel and cultured city in the United States; and the Brahmins, while losing all power in Boston, retained it in the State capital and kept Irish power in the city within strict bounds. In addition, despite their political success, the Boston Irish saw a second major element in the city, the

eastern European Jews, surpassing them economically. The third major ethnic group, the Italians, could lay claim to neither political nor economic effectiveness. And the Depression had hit both the Irish and the Italians harder than it did the Jews, the latter now moving into white-collar occupations and already well established as business proprietors.

In this setting, one may well ask why the most intense conflict was between Irish and Jews, climaxing in a wave of antisemitic acts of violence and vandalism during the Second World War, while the United States was engaged in the struggle against Hitler. Stack analyses the development of these tensions. Father Coughlin, the populist radio priest who turned into a fierce antisemite, found a strong resonance in Irish Boston. Attacking plutocrats, Communists, Jews, and the New Deal, he appealed to Irish grievances against a political élite — whether Brahmin or New Deal — that had established relations with Russia, seemed unconcerned with Mexican oppression of the Catholic Church, supported the loyalists in the Spanish Civil War, and annoyingly paid more attention to the Nazi persecution of Jews than to the Mexican and Soviet persecution of priests. The Irish had ghettoized themselves — politically, economically, educationally, culturally — and within this ghetto they saw and felt only grievances, even if others saw their political power. Their automatic support of the Democratic party declined in the course of time: Roosevelt was for them too friendly with Russia, too worried about helping England against Germany, and in any case culturally related to the Brahmin élite they despised. Thus, as Jews clung more and more closely to Roosevelt, the Irish disengaged from him. And the Italians joined them. Mussolini had given them something to be proud about in the victory over Ethiopia (an event which had its own repercussions in a brief wave of anti-black epithets in the Italian press). Roosevelt reminded them of anti-Italian stereotypes with his 'stab-in-the-back' speech, after Mussolini's entry into the war.

Stack's interpretation of the Irish during these years is based on their ghettoized condition, in part self-imposed, and a consequent 'defensiveness and rancor'. Thus, even when it was clear that the silence of an Irish Catholic cardinal and an Irish Catholic mayor was at the least not discouraging attacks by Irish youths on Jews, Irish leadership still refused to acknowledge any responsibility, denied the incidents, and attacked protesting Jews with the argument that Jews could not be victims of prejudice and discrimination — only the Irish could.

The Jews come off very well in Stack's account: 'A commitment to democratic values and ideals was one of the principal contributions that Boston's Jews made to the Hub and American life during the 1940s. Despite heightened tensions in the closing years of the 1930s, the leaders of Boston's Jewish community refused to reject liberal ideals

. . . In their vigorous opposition to anti-Semitism, . . . Boston's Jews frequently clashed with Irish and Italians. But these manifestations of ethnic conflict did not resemble the hysterical Irish anti-subversive witch-hunts or the frenzied Italian pro-fascist demonstrations' (pp. 109, 111). One is tempted to ask what else the Jews could have done, but the activities in recent years of Rabbi Kahane suggest that the Jews could indeed have resorted to similarly violent protests.

Stack is hard on the Boston Irish, and in his Introduction Andrew Greeley points to some mitigating considerations. Since the 1940s, the Jews have completely left Boston, as they have other American central cities, for the suburbs. The Irish remain in control of the city — but still, as we see from their reactions to Boston school desegregation, with a sense of grievance and victimization, shared by the Italians. Both today's desegregations and yesterday's international policies are seen as the impositions of Brahmins and Jews and liberals, still lying in wait outside the city, and exerting their will. And so we see outraged bursts of violence by the Irish against Boston's newest ethnic group, the blacks. A lot of the Irish of course have joined the Brahmins and the Jews in the suburban migration (including the school-desegregating Judge Arthur Garrity himself, whom the inner-city Irish see as their chief tormentor), but for those left behind it still seems to be the case that their political dominance has not brought with it the economic rewards and the social esteem they might have expected from it. This sense of victimization certainly helps explain the angry and nasty outbursts of the past few years. Stack's account of the conflicts of the 1930s gives one a better appreciation of the sources of this sense of victimization, and its persisting influence. It also may help explain why the inner-city Irish have received so little sympathy in their struggles with desegregation from Boston's suburban, highly educated, and prosperous Jewish communities.

NATHAN GLAZER

CHRONICLE

The November 1980 issue of *Jewish Cultural News*, a publication of the World Jewish Congress, gives some data on the teaching of Hebrew in France:

> Hebrew is taught in about 40 government schools as a foreign language and in 1980 . . . 2,750 pupils are studying Hebrew in high schools. In 1969 a Hebrew Studies Department was opened in Paris University and in 1977 the first students received diplomas as teachers of Hebrew. . . . About 1,200 students are studying in the Hebrew Language Institute at the Sorbonne . . . , and there is also a special correspondence course held there. . . . instruction is also given in Hebrew, Yiddish, Ladino and Judeo-Arabic and the study of these languages is recognized as an integral part of the degree courses.

*

The thirteenth Cairo International Book Fair took place earlier this year, 29 January — 9 February. Twenty Israeli publishing houses were represented; they are reported to have sold about 1,500 books in Arabic, Hebrew, and English. Hebrew grammars and dictionaries were particularly popular and were completely sold out, while university librarians, teachers, and students bought works of classic and modern Hebrew literature.

The visitors to the Fair showed particular interest in the section of the Israeli stand devoted to four publishers who specialize in Arabic books.

*

The November-December 1980 issue of the *WIZO Review*, a publication of the Women's International Zionist Organization, reports that WIZO in Israel looks after 11,170 children in 143 day care centres, 12 kindergartens, 11 toddlers' homes, and seven absorption centres. WIZO has established 28 new youth centres since 1977, bringing the total number to 75; they are in development towns, remote settlements, and the poorer neighbourhoods of Israel's large cities.

There are 180 WIZO women's centres and clubs throughout Israel, including several for Arab and Druze women; and 84 Golden Age clubs for the elderly, which provide a variety of activities for the members.

*

A study conducted by Israel's National Insurance Institute claims that the proportion of households whose income is below the poverty line (set at one fifth of the national average) rose from 2.8 per cent in 1977 to 3.8 per cent in 1979. This is a marked reversal of the trend in the decade up to 1977, when there was a continuing decrease in the inequality of income distribution in Israel.

*

Last March, 1,249 Soviet Jewish emigrants arrived in Vienna; 178 went to Israel while 1,071 asked to go to other destinations. This represents a drop-out rate of 85 per cent; the average in 1979 and 1980 was 65 per cent.

Last February, Israel's total number of new immigrants was only 857, the smallest monthly figure since the 1967 Six-Day War.

*

Israel received 1,430 immigrants from France in 1980; this was a decline over the previous year's 1,700 but an increase over the 1978 total of 1,335. A Jewish Agency spokesman is reported to have stated in Paris last March that the decline in 1980 was due partly to Israel's housing shortage and partly to reports in the French press on the country's difficult conditions; but an encouraging aspect of the 1980 emigration was that the new settlers were mainly young couples and that there was also a substantial number of students — about 300. The first two months of 1981 had shown an increase over the same period last year.

A total of about 30,000 French Jews have settled in France since the Six-Day War of 1967; they represent a very small percentage of the Jewish community of France, estimated at 700,000.

*

In 1980, more than one million tourists came to Israel — 1,175,800, an increase of 3 per cent over the previous year. Those from the United States accounted for 284,700, a drop of 5 per cent. Visitors from West Germany headed the European league with 157,400, followed by the United Kingdom's 140,838 (up 8 per cent). The largest increase over 1979 was from Cyprus: 78 per cent more Cypriots came in 1980; next were Egypt and the Sudan with a 50 per cent increase, Portugal with 35 per cent, Italy with 21 per cent, and Mexico with 19 per cent. About a quarter of the tourists who came to Israel by air were charter flight passengers.

*

The African Ecumenical Centre of Jerusalem was inaugurated last August by the Archbishop of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in Jerusalem; this is the city's first all-African biblical institute. The Jerusalem Congress on Black Africa and the Bible, held in 1972, had shown the participants the rewards of studying the Bible in its geographical and historical contexts; and at the end of that Congress two committees had been set up, one in Africa and one in Jerusalem, to work for the establishment of a biblical Institute for the African clergy.

It was later decided that such an institute should be part of an African Ecumenical Centre in Jerusalem, which would welcome African pilgrims as well as all Africans living and studying in the Holy Land. At the inauguration ceremony, attended by bishops, clergymen, students, and pilgrims from Africa, the Cardinal Archbishop of Kampala said that he spoke in the name of all the Church leaders in Africa when he thanked those whose dedicated efforts had brought about the establishment of the Centre

*

The secretary-general of the Central Board of Hungarian Jews visited London earlier this year and is reported to have said that there are about 100,000 Jews in Hungary. Budapest has 30 synagogues and prayer halls, and the Jewish Museum was famous for its library of 20,000 books, some of which are unique. Hungarian Jews were free to teach their children whatever they wished, and young people in the community played an active part in Hungarian Jewish life. Baby boys were circumcised at the rate of about two or three a week and a young man was sent out from Hungary to train as a *mohel* in England because the present *mohel* is ageing.

Many services are provided for poor and aged Jews by the Hungarian government and the Jewish community; and a central kitchen in Budapest provides 800 kasher meals a day through 11 depots.

*

An International Conference on One Hundred years of Zionism will be held on 21–24 December 1981 at the Institute for Zionist Research of Tel-Aviv University. The Conference will be opened by the President of Israel.

The Institute states: 'Lectures and panel-discussions will deal with topics under three major headings: the Zionist idea, the Zionist movement, and one hundred years of Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel. At the time of the Conference, the Museum of the Diaspora (Beth Hatefutsot) will open its exhibition . . . "One Hundred years of Aliya and Settlement"'.

Further information may be obtained from the Institute for Zionist Research, Tel-Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Israel.

*

The sixteenth meeting of the International Conference for the Sociology of Religion will be held at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland, from 29 August to 3 September 1981. The general theme of the Conference will be 'Religion, Values, and Daily Life'.

There will be Reports from research groups in Argentina, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Southern Ireland, Spain, and the United States of America; and about 80 papers will be presented at the Conference.

A detailed programme and registration forms may be obtained from the C.I.S.R. Secretariat, 20 Avenue d'Ivry, Tour Tokyo, Apt. 2281, F75645, Paris Cedex 13, France

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A postscript gives some indication of how Israeli political society might develop in future. £6.50

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This book, the first study of Lewis Namier's political life, relates his growing awareness of the potency of modern nationalism, tainted by anti-semitism, and his initial contact with the Zionist movement, during the years from the ratification of the mandate until the establishment of the state of Israel. It tells of his relationships with his colleagues and political opponents, in particular with Chaim Weizmann, to whom he was adviser and confidant.
£9.95

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Cohen, David, *La promotion des Juifs en France à l'époque du Second Empire (1852–1870)*, xix+869 pp. (in two vols.), Université de Provence, Aix-en-Provence, 1980, n.p. Distributed by Librairie Honoré Champion, 7, Quai Malaquais, 75006 Paris.

Etzioni-Halevy, Eva, *Social Change. The Advent and Maturation of Modern Society*, xiv+304 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Boston, and Henley, 1981, £10.95 (paperback, £5.95).

Frechof, Solomon B., *New Reform Responsa*, x+282 pp., The Hebrew Union College Press, 1980, $12.50. Distributed by Ktav Publishing House, New York.

Bernard S. Jackson, ed., *The Jewish Law Annual. Volume III*, vii+257 pp., E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1980, 84 guilders.

Jones, Catherine, *Immigration and Social Policy*, ix+291 pp., Tavistock Publications (first published in 1977), London, 1980, paperback edition £4.75.

Jospe, Raphael and Fishman, Samuel Z., eds., *Go and Study. Essays and Studies in Honor of Alfred Jospe*, xii+396 pp., B'nai Brith Hillel Foundations, Washington, D.C., 1980; distributed by Ktav Publishing House, New York, $29.50.

Mahfouz, Naguib, *Children of Gebelawi*, translated from the Arabic by Philip Stewart, ix+355 pp., Heinemann, London, 1981, £3.75 (paperback).

Moore, Deborah Dash, *At Home in America. Second Generation New York Jews*, xiii+303 pp., Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1981, $20.70.

Porter, Jack Nusan, ed., *The Sociology of American Jews: A Critical Anthology*, 2nd rev. edn., xxxii+298 pp., University Press of America, Washington, D.C., 1980, $11.50 (paperback).

Samuel, Raphael, *East End Underworld. Chapters in the Life of Arthur Harding*, xi+355 pp., History Workshop Series, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Boston, and Henley, 1981, £11.50 (paperback, £6.95).

Scherer, Ross P., ed., *American Denominational Organization. A Sociological View*, viii+378 pp., William Carey Library, Pasadena, Ca., 1980, $14.95. (paperback).

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

ANTONOVSKY, Aaron; Ph.D., Kunin-Lunenfeld Professor of Medical Sociology and Chairman, Department of the Sociology of Health, Faculty of Health Sciences, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva. Chief publications: *Social Functions of Medical Practice* (with J. T. Shuval and A. M. Davies), 1970; *Hopes and Fears of Israelis: Consensus in a New Society* (with A. Arian), 1972; *From the Golden to the Promised Land* (with A. D. Katz), 1979; *Health, Stress and Coping: New Perspectives on Mental and Physical Well-Being*, 1979; *A Time to Reap: The Middle Age of Women in Five Israeli Subcultures* (with N. Datan and B. Maoz), 1981.

BERNSTEIN, Judith; M.A., Teaching and Research Assistant, Department of the Sociology of Health, Faculty of Health Sciences, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva. Chief publications: 'Social Class and Infant Mortality' in *Social Science and Medicine*, 1977 (with A. Antonovsky); 'Interviewing and Selection of Medical Students' in *Programmed Learning and Education Technology*, 1979 (with O. Anson and A. Antonovsky).

DANNHAUSER, Werner J.; Ph.D. Professor of Government, Cornell University. Author of *Nietzsche's View of Socrates* and editor and co-translator of Gershom Sholem, *On Jews and Judaism in Crisis: Selected Essays*. Currently working on a re-assessment of Marx and Marxism.

GARTNER, Lloyd, P.; Ph.D. Professor of Modern Jewish History, Tel-Aviv University. Chief Publications: co-author, *History of the Jews of Milwaukee*, 1963, and *History of the Jews of Los Angeles*, 1970; *The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870–1914*, 2nd edn., 1973; *History of the Jews of Cleveland*, 1978.

YORK, Alan S.; Ph.D. Lecturer in the School of Social Work, Bar-Ilan University. Chief publications: 'Voluntary Associations in a "Difficult" Housing Estate' in *Community Development Journal*, vol. XI, 1976; 'Leaders of Voluntary Associations in a "Difficult" Housing Estate' in *International Review of Community Development*, vol. 37–38, Summer 1977; 'A Course for Volunteer Organizers' in Shimon E. Spiro, ed., *Issues and Explorations in Social Work Education*, 1978; in Hebrew, 'Reflections on Community work with the Poor' in *Hevra ve-Revaha* (Society and Welfare), vol. 2, March 1979. Currently engaged in research on the use of para-professionals in community work in Israel.

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