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CONTENTS

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The Jewish Journal of Sociology

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SOME SOCIO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE KIBBUTZ

Hyman Tarlo

Introduction

UTOPIA was an imaginary island, depicted by Sir Thomas More in the sixteenth century as enjoying a perfect social, legal, and political system. It later came to mean, according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, an impossibly ideal scheme, especially for social improvement. This symbolises its etymological origin, the word being equivalent in modern Latin to 'nowhere'. It is not without significance that one of the earliest anthropological studies of collective settlements in Israel was entitled *Kibbutz—Venture in Utopia*[1] and that the word 'Utopia' appears frequently in many publications relating to the kibbutz. In fact, the Library of Congress classification scheme puts works relating to the kibbutz in the same general category as those relating to Utopia: they are both labelled 'HX', which in the Library of Congress scheme stands for 'Socialism, Communism, Anarchism'.

The kibbutz has attracted the attention of anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, biologists, educationalists, political scientists, philosophers, economists, agriculturalists, etc. All this interest has resulted in well over one thousand books and articles in many different languages, for the whole world seems to be fascinated by the subject. Yet Spiro in 1963 considered that kibbutz research was 'in its infancy'[2] and as recently as 1975 the authors of *Women in the Kibbutz* stated that 'there still exists no exhaustive, up-to-date descriptive study of the kibbutz as a social structure'.[3] Though primarily a study of how three generations of kibbutz women have responded to freedom from their traditional roles, that book does present an up-to-date and accurate picture of kibbutz life in general, including an explanation of the fundamental social structure of the kibbutz.

Strangely enough, notwithstanding the many interesting legal aspects of the kibbutz, not a great deal of attention has been paid to its legal framework and in particular very little has been written in English. The first major description and analysis of legal aspects of the kibbutz, by Joshua Weisman, did not appear until 1966.[4] After

years of neglect by the law, the kibbutz was in a state of flux with various proposals for change and for more elaborate regulation. That so little has been published on the topic since 1966 is a reflection of some continued uncertainty in the legal affairs of the kibbutz and the difficulty of legal research, particularly in the light of the failure of attempts to promote specific legislation.

This paper is partially based on personal observation and collection of data obtained from interviews with kibbutz members and kibbutz movement officials, and with many others; but it is far from being a comprehensive presentation. Since there are no official English translations from the Hebrew of the most relevant documents, I have had to rely on the services of a number of voluntary translators—some of them more, and some of them less, expert in the arduous work of converting legal Hebrew into the English language. Inevitably there are gaps, which I found almost impossible to fill. But to all those who helped in any way I owe a debt of gratitude.

Origin of the kibbutz

The term *kevutsa* (literally, a group) was used at the beginning of this century to describe a small commune of pioneers who established an agricultural settlement in Palestine. The first *kevutsa* was founded in Degania in 1909 in the Kinneret Valley by a group who at first worked as employees of the Palestine Land Development Company; they later undertook collective responsibility for the working of the farm. By 1914, there were eleven of these settlements established on land purchased by the Jewish National Fund under the auspices of the Zionist Organisation ; and by the end of 1918 there were twenty-nine.

After the First World War, when greater numbers of pioneering settlers came to Palestine, they established large, self-sufficient, collective agricultural villages, for which the name 'kibbutz' (meaning 'gathering') was used. The first of this type, En Harod, was founded in 1921, and many others followed. Later, the distinction between *kevutsot* and kibbutzim almost disappeared, and both types of settlement combined to establish federations in accordance with their social character or political affiliation.[5] In 1979, there were 252 kibbutzim in Israel, with a total population of about 108,000.[6]

A later form of rural settlement has been the *moshav*, another unique Israeli institution. It is a co-operative (rather than a collective) of smallholders. There are now about 400 *moshavim* with a population of about 140,000.[7] Most of the first members of the *moshavim* had formerly lived in some of the original collective settlements, but sought more independence and individuality.

SOME SOCIO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE KIBBUTZ

Although the kibbutz movement constitutes only a small proportion of the total population of Israel, it made an enormous contribution to the building of the Jewish National Home during the troubled years of the British Mandate (1922–48) and to the building of the State of Israel. It has continued to play a vital role, and members of the movement have been, and are, prominent in all the major organs of the State, including the Defence Forces and the Knesset.

The legal status of the kibbutz

At the time of the foundation of the first kibbutzim (or *kevutsot*, as they then were), Palestine was a province of Turkey, the legal system being that of Ottoman Law. The present legal system of Israel is in part a distinctive mixture of civil law (from the Ottoman Code) and common law (from the British Mandate). There is also the legislation enacted by the Knesset, Israel's Parliament, as well as the decisions of the courts. In addition, matters of personal status are largely governed by religious law (Jewish, Islamic, etc.). Whatever may have been the legal status of the earliest collective settlements in Palestine under Turkish rule, there is no doubt that under the British Mandate the selected status was that of an incorporated co-operative society registered under the *Co-operative Societies Ordinance*, 1933.[8] Notwithstanding attempts to legislate specifically for kibbutzim, that Ordinance continues to govern kibbutzim right up to the present time. It is on the same lines as similar legislation in Britain and in most of the jurisdictions in which Britain once held power or influence.

The Ordinance is designed to cover a wide range of different kinds of co-operative society. Thus, section 4 provides for the registration of 'a society which has as its object the promotion of thrift, self-help and mutual aid among persons with common economic needs so as to bring about better living, better business and better methods of production, or a society established for the purpose of facilitating the operations of such societies'. The registration may be with or without limited liability. By section 21, the registration of a society makes it a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and with power to hold movable and immovable property, to enter into contracts, to institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings, and to do all things necessary for the purposes of its constitution. Section 6 confines individual membership to persons who have attained the age of 18. Every member has, under section 16, one vote only, and that vote may not normally be exercised by proxy. None of these provisions is at variance with the aims and ideals of a kibbutz.

But many of the other provisions of the Ordinance do seem to sit oddly, particularly as to the rights and duties of members. The sections

concerning payments for membership, liability for the obligations of the society, the share or interest of a member in the capital of a society, division of funds by way of bonus or dividend among members, etc., are hardly appropriate in the case of a commune. However, section 55 allows the designated government Minister to exempt, by general or special order, any registered society from any of the provisions of the Ordinance. The Minister may also modify any of the provisions of the Ordinance with regard to their application to a registered society. This allows ample flexibility in the application of the Ordinance. Further, section 8 requires each society to make its own rules, a copy of which has to be filed with the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. On the initiative of the Kibbutz Movement Alliance (a roof organization for all the major federations or 'movements'), the major federations have drafted identical sets of rules for their member kibbutzim to adopt (hereinafter referred to as 'the Kibbutz Rules', or simply 'the Rules').

The federations exercise considerable authority over their members, but in theory at least each kibbutz remains autonomous. Thus while there is assurance that the Rules will be adopted by each member kibbutz, some leeway has had to be given with regard to various matters dealt with in the Rules in order to allow a degree of discretion to each individual kibbutz. Therefore, when permitted additions and particular interpretations of the Rules by the General Assembly of each kibbutz are taken into account, the rule book of any particular kibbutz is on average a more substantial document than the slim pamphlet containing the 125 model rules of the movements.

The kibbutz legally defined

We have noted above the description of the object of a society which may be registered under the *Co-operative Societies Ordinance*, 1933. That description naturally does not contain within it the unique characteristics of a kibbutz, though it may be quite satisfactory for transport or producers' co-operatives or other co-operative societies. It provides an adequate framework, for example, for a *moshav*, but less so for a kibbutz. It is remarkable that during the 32 years since the establishment of Israel there has not been enacted comprehensive legislation dealing specifically with the institution. Its importance would seem to merit such an approach. However, the movements are linked to political parties and the whole issue of what such legislation should include is a sensitive one for all parties.

Weisman drew attention to inconsistencies between the *Co-operative Societies Ordinance* (and the regulations made thereunder) and the kibbutz rules at that time in use. The legal position was to be clarified, not by enacting a comprehensive statute, but by including a special

chapter relating to kibbutzim in the *Co-operative Associations Bill*, 1965, which was drafted as a replacement of the *Co-operative Societies Ordinance*, 1933, and by proposed new rules.[9] That Bill did not become law, nor did a subsequent one in 1971. The 1971 Bill defined 'kibbutz' and 'kibbutz movement', and dealt with the controversial question of the private property of members, the resignation and expulsion of members, and a number of other matters—most of which in general are now dealt with to a greater or lesser extent (though not in the same way as in the Bill) in the current Kibbutz Rules. There is also some control by means of regulations made under the Ordinance. Thus the kibbutz remains, at least for the time being, a co-operative society under a British law, while the Rules are the major means of defining and regulating the unique kibbutz features.

There is in fact now a legal definition of the kibbutz in the *Co-operative Societies (Membership) Regulations*, 1973. This is as follows:

> A society for settlement comprising a separate settlement, the members of which maintain a co-operative society, organised on the basis of communal ownership of property, the aims of which are self-employment, equality and co-operation in all areas of production, consumption and education, and which is classified as a kibbutz by the Registrar.

This definition is almost identical (omitting the final clause) with that in the Kibbutz Rules and more exactly expresses the central concept of the kibbutz.[10]

Establishment and liquidation of a kibbutz

Unlike the collectives and communes of the U.S.S.R. and China, the kibbutz lives and thrives in a capitalist economy and is surrounded by the dynamic free enterprise of the general community around it. On the other hand, there is a strong socialist and co-operative tradition in Israel. The General Federation of Labour (Histadrut) is not only a trade union which organizes some 80 per cent of the country's workers, but has its own affiliated economic enterprises which include kibbutzim, *moshavim*, urban industrial co-operatives and banks. The Histadrut is also the country's largest building and public works contractor. Though Israel is a capitalist country, its public sector accounts for nearly half the gross national product.[11] All this is particularly noteworthy in the case of land ownership. Over 90 per cent of all land in Israel is State-owned, agricultural land being controlled by the Israel Lands Administration. Leases may be granted to settlers for 49 years; this is the case with regard to most kibbutz land, a nominal rent only being payable. There may be a renewal for a further period of 49 years, provided that the land continues to be worked and developed in accordance with the specified terms, which normally require self-labour.

The lease would terminate in the rare event of the liquidation of the kibbutz.[12]

The kibbutz is financed initially by means of various loans from public bodies on favourable terms which would not normally be available to individuals. Assistance is also obtained from the several roof-movements, which arrange working loans, investment aid, economic advice, and marketing and purchasing services.[13] The first kibbutzim were exclusively agricultural (it was part of their ethos), but now most of them manufacture a wide range of products—plastics, furniture, plywood, electronic parts, and precision tools. In most new kibbutzim it is almost essential to have some industry from the very beginning, partly for economic reasons, but also because there is often not sufficient work for all the members in a highly mechanized and efficient agricultural system. Farm produce and manufactured goods are exported in considerable quantities.

Once a kibbutz has been founded, it will normally continue indefinitely. There have been occasions during the various war situations when a settlement has had to be abandoned, but the legal entity continues and in due course the settlers have been restored to their land. It is very seldom indeed that a kibbutz fails and has to be wound up. There is an organization, *Nir*, to which most kibbutzim belong, which is given by the Kibbutz Rules a special role to play in the case of a kibbutz which has fewer than 25 members, and also in the rare event of a failure.

The Rules provide that a kibbutz may not go into liquidation unless a three-fourths majority of all members has so decided and this has been confirmed in writing both by the movement and *Nir*. When a kibbutz is liquidated, each member is entitled to the same rights as in the case of a member who leaves or is expelled,[14] subject to the amounts of money to be granted to the members being approved by the movement and by *Nir*. After payment of all the kibbutz debts and the payments made to members as indicated above, as well as provision being made for the expenses of winding up, all the remaining property and assets of the kibbutz (other than its land) pass to *Nir* to be used by it for the purposes of establishing, developing, and maintaining other similar member societies of the movement. There is an important condition imposed on *Nir* that in receiving these assets it will take upon itself the responsibility to make suitable arrangements for disabled members of the liquidated kibbutz who cannot earn a living, for minor orphans who remained on the kibbutz after the death of a parent-member, and for dependants of a deceased member who were supported by the kibbutz before liquidation.

Rights and duties of members: in general

The Kibbutz Rules lay down that the rights and duties of a member are personal and cannot be transferred to, or undertaken by, any one on his behalf. The member (male or female) must establish his permanent dwelling place in the kibbutz, and he is obliged to offer his full work capacity to the kibbutz (which determines what work he should do), and to observe the guidelines of the kibbutz authorities in everything pertaining to work and work organization. The Rules specifically require the member to act in accordance with the kibbutz way of life and the norms of its society and to accept the authority of the kibbutz with respect to the determination of the maintenance and education of his minor children. He must also be prepared to accept official positions and be active in the administration of the kibbutz and be prepared to be sent by it on postings outside its geographical area—this would include positions in the movement. In all these matters the decisions of the General Assembly are supreme and the member must abide by them. He must act according to the 'national, social, class and movement principles' as they have been expressed or established by decisions of the General Assembly or expressed or established by the movement and adopted by the kibbutz.

The kibbutz undertakes to supply the 'material, social and cultural needs' of its members in accordance with its ability and having regard to the economic needs of the kibbutz itself and its liabilities. Specific mention is made of the principle: 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs'. The needs of the member include the maintenance and education of his minor children and, with the agreement of the kibbutz, even his children living outside the kibbutz.

Freedom of expression is enshrined in the Rules. The kibbutz will not interfere with this freedom. However, this is qualified by the provision that a member must not take part in the establishment or operation of a party or an organized movement within the kibbutz for the advancement or circulation of opinions opposed to the principles of the Movement and its decisions.

The kibbutz members and private property: rules

A fundamental feature of the Israeli form of collective settlement dating from its earliest days is the complete rejection of private property. For a person considering membership of a kibbutz, the thought that he may have to part with all his possessions may well prove a strong deterrent factor. Even as a candidate member, he is obliged by the Rules to hand over to the ownership of the kibbutz all his current earnings, including any pensions received during the period of his candidacy either for himself or for his dependants who have moved from their

previous place of residence to the settlement. His other possessions are dealt with according to such agreement as may be entered into between him and the kibbutz. However, on leaving, in the event of the cancellation (whether by himself or by the kibbutz) of his candidacy, any property which he has deposited under such agreement must be returned immediately to him and the kibbutz must repair or pay compensation for any damage to the property while in its custody, other than depreciation arising from regular use.

Once the candidate has been accepted as a member, he must, by the Rules, transfer all his possessions to the ownership of the kibbutz, while anything already deposited with the kibbutz during his candidacy passes automatically into its ownership. This condition of membership is reinforced by an extensive series of provisions in the Rules. Thus a member is obliged to transfer to the kibbutz, and the kibbutz is entitled to take from the member, the ownership of all his property, present and future. The kibbutz is authorized to take any necessary action for the 'realization' of any property reaching the member either in his own name or on his behalf;[15] in this connection the member is obliged at any time that he is so requested by the kibbutz to give it a power of attorney (general or specific) in such form as it determines.

The injunction against private property is severe enough to warrant a rule precluding the use of all private property, even when it belongs to others, within or outside the bounds of the kibbutz, where it is not in accordance with the norms laid down, though there is an outlet here in that a private possession may be used where an agreement on such use has been reached between the kibbutz and the member. But it is understood that such an agreement would not be allowed to create any considerable gap between that member's living standards and those of his fellow-members, because, even within the norms regulating kibbutz standards, material inequality, resulting in dissension between members, would be caused by the acquisition of, for example, equipment or furniture for which other members might have to wait for a considerable time. Similarly, gifts to members may cause problems. The Rules again state that a member may not receive gifts from outside, deviating from the accepted standards, without the (general or specific) agreement of the kibbutz. Such gifts, if allowed by agreement, are treated in the same way as property granted by the kibbutz for the use of a member: the property (with certain exceptions) remains in its possession, the member being given only the right to use it in accordance with the principles laid down by the kibbutz. There is automatic reversion to the kibbutz on cesser of use by the member.

The Rules even provide that on the death of a member all of his estate is deemed to be left to the kibbutz and only the kibbutz may benefit from his estate. However, some doubt was obviously felt concerning the kibbutz's legal position in seeking to deprive a member of

his rights as a citizen in this respect, for the rule is stated to be subject to its legal validity. Presumably, though, if the provisions already noted had been fully implemented, a member's estate would be of little or of no worth. However, as will be seen, this is not necessarily the case.

The kibbutz member and private property: practice

If one were to be guided by these Draconian Rules alone, one would not unreasonably be led to the conclusion that, apart from some possible minor exceptions, private property of members was rigorously banned, and that the kibbutz took all, fully and finally, to the exclusion of the member and all his family. This, after all, has always been a vital part of the fundamental philosophy and ideology of the movement. But that was all very well in the early days when only a few of those founding or joining a kibbutz had property of any substantial value. Ideology had to be moderated by pragmatism if the kibbutz were to attract and retain members from all walks of life, even those with considerable substance to their names.

The question whether a member's property should be returned to him on his departure from the kibbutz assumed the proportions of a major crisis with regard to the German reparation payments which became payable from the 1950s to thousands of ex-refugee kibbutz members. It was possible for many to retire from the kibbutz and live in comparative comfort on such payments. Many in fact did so, but there were also those who were prepared to hand over the funds to their kibbutzim. On some kibbutzim the resulting large windfalls were used for improvements, such as new or enlarged communal buildings. But some others, obviously feeling the pressure, entered into arrangements that the reparation payments formally yielded to the kibbutz could be kept in part by the member, or would be returned to him if he left the kibbutz. Once the precedent had been set, it was not a much further step for these kibbutzim to act similarly with regard to other forms of property which might come to a member, such as legacies and gifts.

This softening of the strict approach took many years to evolve, and the process continues, but even now it has not been adopted by all kibbutzim. There are differing practices by the various federations and much depends on the political attitude of a particular movement. There are three large federations, and, as might be expected, there is far less tolerance of any maintenance of private property in the most conservatively Marxist of them.

It may be noted that the other two federations (both Labour, one of them fairly relaxed about the private property rules, the other less so) have recently resolved to reunite after a 28-year-old split and that the private property issue was debated at the latter's special

Convention, objections being raised as to the former's 'toleration of members having private property outside their kibbutz'. The issue was to be discussed anew between the two movements before final merger.[16]

These differing practices do not relate to a member's earnings, about which all the movements are united in keeping inviolate the Rules. Thus the small proportion of members who work outside the kibbutz (such as high school and university teachers, politicians, and various professionals) must bring their earnings into the common fund of the kibbutz, from which they in turn receive the expenses incurred in working (and possibly also living) outside the settlement.[17] Rather does the non-enforcement of the Rules have to do with the property a member owns when he joins the kibbutz or which he acquires during his membership. There is a survey of the various practices regarding the use by, and ultimate return to, a member of his property, in Weisman's 1966 article.[18] The practices do not appear to have changed to any extent since then, though the present Kibbutz Rules are prima facie much stricter and more comprehensive in the rejection of private property than were the previous ones.[19] Apparently the proposed new rules referred to by Weisman would have enabled a kibbutz to stipulate that it would return to a member any property which he had transferred to the kibbutz. The several unsuccessful parliamentary Bills also sought to safeguard private property rights and to regulate agreements between the kibbutz and its members.

Private or collective property? The consumer goods issue

In the course of the years, various problems have arisen with regard to certain items of property which have become commonly used in the wider society, but not (or at least not yet) on a family or individual basis in the kibbutz—usually for social and economic reasons. The collectivization of consumption ensures the supply to members by the kibbutz of goods and services within the limits of the prevailing norms. In this respect, the kibbutz has sometimes been likened to an all-embracing social security organization which looks after its charges from cradle to grave. But there has always been the counter-pull of individuality and privacy. It is not so long since kibbutzim were almost rent asunder by members (perhaps only one or two) attempting to use, in their own living quarters, privately provided electric kettles, this being regarded as deviant behaviour.[20] But times changed, and so did the norms; and in those kibbutzim which had a sound economic base members were able eventually to reap the advantages of affluence and technology, the kibbutz providing for them in their own apartments, not only electric kettles, but also kitchenettes, often fitted with small stoves and refrigerators.

We have seen that it is possible for material inequalities to arise by

virtue of the fact that a kibbutz now allows in some cases the use of privately provided equipment. This process has been aided by the annual provision for every member of a personal allowance for the individual purchase of clothes and other items (including furniture in some kibbutzim). But kibbutz standards of living constantly, if slowly, rise, and there is always a member who, perhaps ahead of his time, desires to push the advance along faster. A recent example is that of television. Some members managed to acquire sets, usually as gifts from relatives outside the kibbutz, but this was frowned upon by the General Assemblies as creating inequality and also as tending towards socially divisive conduct. In some kibbutzim, those sets were impounded. But television went the same way as the electric kettle. In accordance with the collectivization principle, including even culture and entertainment, there was usually a television set in the communal club house, but it was soon seen to be illogical (and impracticable) to deny members the right to view in the privacy of apartments. So television sets, it was decided, were to be made available to all members, subject of course to the financial situation of the kibbutz. This allocation could be over a lengthy period, so provision was made for members to elect for the cost of sets to be charged to their personal allowances.

My observation of kibbutz life leads me to the conclusion that the next (and most difficult) consumer goods issue will concern the motor car. Under no circumstances will a kibbutz allow permanent private use of a motor car. A member joining with a car must either dispose of it before he is admitted or transfer it to the kibbutz. Nor may he acquire a private car (for example, by gift) while a member. Most kibbutzim maintain, in addition to various work and service vehicles, a number of passenger cars for the use of members in accordance with guidelines laid down by their General Assemblies. There is always a long waiting list of applicants for the limited number of cars for use on holidays, short recreation leave, or simply to visit friends or relations for a few hours. Mobility is a prized factor of life for those who live in a Western-style society and it is most easily achieved by means of private transport. Members of a kibbutz do not have this kind of mobility and they have increasingly felt its lack, particularly in the case of the younger generation, who are exposed to the wider society during their army service.

The more financially successful a kibbutz is, the more passenger vehicles it can afford to acquire for the communal use of its members in accordance with carefully defined rules. The possibility does exist (though kibbutz secretariats are at pains to deny it) of a kibbutz attaining such wealth that it will be capable of supplying a vehicle for each family. Do not the Kibbutz Rules state that the kibbutz will supply the material, social, and cultural needs of its members in accordance with its ability to do so, bearing in mind at all times the principle 'to

each according to his needs'? A good argument could be made that, if the kibbutz is to develop further, the much-prized need for mobility, especially for those living on still largely rural settlements, will have to be satisfied. However, there are thoughtful movement officials who fear that such mobility may very well destroy the kibbutz.

This is not by any means to suggest that any kibbutz will shortly be able to order hundreds of motor cars. But it does throw light on the great success of the kibbutz in constantly raising its living standards since its foundation in desert, rock, and swamp, its first members living in tents, their only private possession being a toothbrush (literally, for even clothes were communal possessions). Of course kibbutzim even now vary enormously; between the older, well-established and the newer pioneering ones, there is a great gulf. Nevertheless, the following description of an actual kibbutz[21] will give some idea of how some have advanced along the road to material prosperity:

> This socialist town is richer than most, and physically very agreeable. In fact, it is almost luxurious. As the sun falls, sprays of water douse the extravagant flora, and children and parents move along the generous grounds. A visiting British politician once said that the kibbutz was apparently the Israeli social form closest to the landed aristocracy. It is certainly delightful here; the inhabitants lounge on the porches of their comfortable apartments, where each addition to the housing is larger and more comfortable than the last. As for the nurseries, perhaps only Swiss ones are cleaner and better supplied.

The funds of the kibbutz: legal position of members during membership and on departure

That a kibbutz is *sui generis* as a registered co-operative society is well illustrated by the inapplicability to it of those provisions of the *Co-operative Societies Ordinance*, 1933, and the *Co-operative Societies (Membership) Regulations*, 1973, referring to a member's shares in capital and the redemption of shares; for the Kibbutz Rules state that it does not have share capital and a member does not have rights of any sort in its capital. A member does not have to pay any fees, either for joining or for continuance of membership, or to make any payment for the acquisition of an interest. He does not have an 'interest' in the financial sense envisaged by the Ordinance. The Rules provide that the property of the kibbutz may not be divided among its members either during its existence or on its liquidation. Further, the kibbutz does not share its profits with its members in any way whatsoever (otherwise of course than by gradually improving their collective standard of living); all surplus of income over expenditure is added to the separate capital of the kibbutz. The concomitant provision relieves a member from any

personal liability for the debts or obligations of the kibbutz, whether during its existence or on its liquidation.

While a member (or his estate on his death) may have no financial interest or entitlement in the kibbutz, this would not concern him unduly as long as the institution is supplying all his 'material, social and cultural needs'. But if his membership ceases for any reason other than death (as on his resignation, expulsion, or bankruptcy),[22] he may well feel that he is entitled to compensation for the contribution he has made to the economy of the kibbutz. Having received no wages, he can have no savings and, not being an employee, he does not have any employee's rights under the State's labour laws.[23] If he came with property, or acquired (for example, by gift or bequest) property during his membership, and in either case duly transferred it to the kibbutz in accordance with the Rules, it may, depending on its policy or its arrangements with the member, return the property to him on his departure. (It may even have not insisted originally on the transfer of the property to itself.)

Neither the return nor the retention of his private property compensates the departing member for, maybe, very many years of hard work in difficult conditions. But, until recently, if he came without property and acquired none during his membership (as in the vast majority of cases), he was not formally entitled to anything. As Weisman expressed it: 'A member leaves the kibbutz as he entered it—with nothing ... Unless such members join another kibbutz they find themselves with no means whatsoever.'[24] This inequitable situation led to severe criticism of the movement, which prided itself on its idealism and striving for social justice, and, in consequence of this criticism, it became common for the departing member to be granted some compensation—usually clothing, furniture and portable equipment in his personal use, and a small grant of money. The practices varied, though all shared 'one common feature (apart from being *ultra vires* the [then existing] Rules)—the principle that the amount given the departing member in no way represent[ed] his contribution to the Kibbutz assets'.[25]

The present Rules require a person, whose membership has ceased, to vacate any living accommodation which he occupies on sixty days' written notice and provide that he may not claim any compensation or payment except as indicated therein. They validate the practice of giving the departing member the items mentioned above and a sum of money 'to be determined by the Movement and the guidelines adopted by the kibbutz'.

However, the *Co-operative Societies* (*Membership*) *Regulations*, 1973, in effect require the formulation of uniform,[26] specific rules regarding a kibbutz member who resigns or is expelled, and the latter's rights and obligations are now set out in lengthy and precise detail (at least for two of the three major federations) in rules made pursuant to the Regulations.[27] Generally, the 'departure money' (payable in addition to the

personal effects already noted) is calculated according to the member's seniority in the kibbutz, with various extra payments in respect of his children. The rules provide that 'in special circumstances' the kibbutz may pay more than the basic amounts set out therein. There is also introduced the concept of a pension for certain 'departers', provision being made for payment of a monthly pension to them at 65 years for a man and 60 for a woman. These rules, while seemingly not over-generous, are a great step forward in improving and safeguarding the situation of departing members, who would most likely need a period of readjustment to the world outside.

Legal status of the kibbutz member in the general community

A kibbutz member is an ordinary member of the general community and generally he is so treated by the law and the courts of Israel. Thus he is subject to the obligation which falls on all citizens of liability for military service from the age of 18—men for three years and unmarried women for two years (and thereafter reserve duty). He is liable under the criminal law system for such crimes as are committed by him.[28] But his position in civil law raises problems which are not fully resolved and differentiate him from his fellow citizens who are not kibbutz members.

His role as a defendant is obscured by the fact that he does not get paid by the kibbutz, nor in theory does he own any property, though his legal capacity as a citizen to hold and receive property is not impaired. Does the kibbutz's undertaking to supply a member's needs extend to meeting his debts and other liabilities? If it does not do so, a creditor may find himself with a worthless judgment. The Rules now state that a member may not incur debts or other obligations that may bind the kibbutz in any way, but apparently (prior to these Rules) it did sometimes agree to pay, though it was not legally responsible.[29]

His role as a claimant is bedevilled by the fact that the kibbutz takes care of all his basic needs and those of his family living with him. A member, for instance, was held not to be entitled to a State pension payable to an invalid war veteran 'without a livelihood and without income from any source whatsoever'.[30] Can he claim compensation from the negligent party, in a personal injuries case, for medical and other expenses which were in fact borne by the kibbutz? In seeking an affirmative answer, the courts have sometimes been reluctantly forced into tortuous interpretations of the law, though a partial (statutory) solution has been found by allowing in effect the kibbutz itself to claim its expenses from the defendant.[31] It should be observed that a member plaintiff is under an obligation to transfer to the kibbutz any damages he recovers.

Social control in the kibbutz: informal or legal?

The kibbutzim originally were established without any consideration for legal controls of any description. Everything was to be done and decided collectively by informal mutual contact and discussion. In his classic paper, 'Social Factors in the Development of Legal Control: A Case Study of Two Israeli Settlements',[32] R. D. Schwartz noted in 1954 that the kibbutz had no distinct legal institution, whereas the *moshav*, the semi-private property settlement, did. Since public opinion was the sanction for the entire control system in the kibbutz, 'that system must be considered informal rather than legal'.[33] 'Legal control' was defined as 'that which is carried out by specialised functionaries who are socially delegated the task of intra-group control . . .'[34]

Schwartz's research was carried out in 1949–50; a quarter of a century later, his conclusions were reconsidered in A. E. Shapiro's 'Law in the Kibbutz; A Reappraisal',[35] in the *Law and Society Review*, which published a 'Response' by Schwartz.[36] Shapiro pointed out that since 1950 almost all the conditions which facilitated the development of informal controls—whose effectiveness, in Schwartz's view, explained the absence of legal institutions—have changed drastically. Some kibbutzim have reached a considerable size with over a thousand members and a total population of over fifteen hundred. The development of social differentiation and the increased privatization of life in the kibbutz have rendered perfect information doubtful at best and set limits to the interaction of members. Even the communal dining-hall has declined as the social centre of the kibbutz. Yet, according to Shapiro,[37] the change in the conditions facilitating informal control has not resulted in the development of legal controls, at least in Schwartz's sense of the term:

> The Kibbutz still lacks a structurally differentiated court. Sanctions have not changed significantly, nor has there been any drastic alteration in the way they are applied. If the Schwartz thesis may be regarded as grounds for predicting that the decline of informal controls would result in the development of formal controls, through structurally differentiated institutions applying formal sanctions, that prediction remains unfulfilled.

Shapiro also takes issue with Schwartz with regard to the *moshav* and points out that, out of a total of more than 400 *moshavim*, the structurally differentiated court-like 'Judicial Committee' described by Schwartz existed (in 1975) in only four of them.[38]

Schwartz in his 'Response' considered that the data presented by Shapiro showed that the kibbutz had recently moved to some extent away from informal control and towards the establishment and use of external and internal legal controls, and that this tended to confirm his (Schwartz's) original thesis. He cites Shapiro's reporting a growing tendency towards promulgating written rules, whereas the behavioural

norms were earlier known without benefit of a text by all members. Further, as evidence of the growing development of legal control, there was now, according to Shapiro, a tendency for some kibbutzim to permit the partial collection of externally imposed fines from the personal funds of responsible members, and for some members to invoke the police in cases where twenty-five years earlier such intrusions by the police would have been strongly resisted. This again seemed to support his basic hypothesis; and he called for further research on the matter.[39]

The argument, while of some importance sociologically, is not really, it is suggested, a valid dispute. Schwartz and Shapiro have different concepts of legal institutions; they also appear to interpret differently the later data on social control in the kibbutz presented by Shapiro. It is not disputed between them that the General Assembly of the kibbutz has judicial functions, as well as its administrative ones. There are also several important committees which perform those functions, such as the Education and the Housing Committees. But perhaps the greatest evidence of legal control lies in the official Kibbutz Rules (not adverted to by either party), which cover a wide range of social controls and contain within them sufficient formal sanction, even if public opinion within the kibbutz is still perhaps an influence not to be ignored. There are specific provisions dealing with the settlement of disputes and rights of protest on decisions by the kibbutz authorities—a far cry from the informality of earlier days. Behind every rule lurks the possibility of the ultimate sanction: formal expulsion.

The material presented by Shapiro in relation to the payment of fines and the calling in of the police[40] is perhaps not wholly relevant to internal control, though he suggests that, within the limits indicated, the sanction mechanism of the general society is used to control the activity of the kibbutz member. But the material is of great interest, not only for its intrinsic value, but also because information of that nature is not easy to discover and Shapiro has been a member for many years of Kibbutz Degania (founded 1909), the mother and father of the entire movement. He has thus been able to draw on his own intimate knowledge, as well as on that of the older settlers. On the matter of fines, it may be noted that the Kibbutz Rules state that, notwithstanding the undertaking that the kibbutz will supply the needs of members, this is not to be taken to mean that it will automatically assume responsibility for a fine imposed on a member for a criminal offence or in any court case or for any damage the member may maliciously cause to the property of the kibbutz. However, the 1971 Bill attempted to force the kibbutz to pay certain fines imposed on members.

With respect to invoking the police, Tiger and Shepher, who have intimate and lengthy knowledge of a considerable number of kibbutzim, maintain that behaviour considered deviant by the kibbutz is dealt

with internally—only the rare incidents of such major misconduct as fraud, larceny, and murder being handed over to the State police. They say that only one murder is known to have been committed within a kibbutz (by a candidate who had spent three months in the community) and only one act of embezzlement.[41] If this is the case, it constitutes a remarkable commentary on the seventy years of growth and development of the kibbutz way of life.

The family in the kibbutz

The family has achieved great importance and status in the kibbutz, which is now very much a family-centred institution. It has higher marriage and birth rates and lower divorce rates than in the non-kibbutz population of Israel. These facts underline the growing strength of the nuclear family in the kibbutz as 'the most important social unit to both the individual and the social structure'.[42] But harm had been caused to the reputation of the kibbutz by the proposition that marriage and the family did not exist in such settlements. There had been damaging legends concerning the abandoning of the nuclear family system, with suggestions of promiscuity, free love, and group marriage, which are not borne out by such genuine personal accounts as are extant. On the contrary, according to Spiro, the philosophy of the first pioneers was characterized by a 'sexual puritanism' which was still (thirty years ago) 'an integral part of kibbutz life'.[43] But it cannot be denied that the kibbutz was for many years hostile to the idea of 'marriage' as such, and formal marriage ceremonies were not looked upon kindly, though when a woman became pregnant, usually the couple legally married.[44] Nowadays, though kibbutz couples live together without marriage, as happens increasingly throughout Western-style countries, in the kibbutz it is much more likely that their affair will culminate in a marriage. This is carried out in accordance with the legal requirements of the State, which in Israel means that there must be a religious ceremony. However, ninety-five per cent of all kibbutzim are secular; most of them are apathetic to religion, some even anti-religious. After the religious rites, the kibbutz carries out its own ceremony, in which the new couple is officially accepted by the kibbutz and a special document written on parchment, somewhat like the official religious marriage contract (the *ketuba*), is given to the couple.[45]

The kibbutz started on an absolutely sexually egalitarian basis; men and women were to be equal in all respects, and women were to be freed from the normal household chores and the rearing of children and thus be made available for work outside the home. The wife was not to be economically dependent on her husband and the children were not to be economically dependent on their parents; they were to be the children of the kibbutz rather than the children of their parents

alone. They were not to live with their parents, but were to be reared and educated separately and collectively, so that the parents were not to have any real responsibility for them.

Despite the moves towards 'familism' and the accompanying (or resulting) sexual polarisation of work patterns, and some anti-collectivistic trends in consumption, it is still true to assert that the principles of sex equality, female emancipation, the collective socialization and education of children, and the abolition of parental authority have not been substantially eroded. Even the current Kibbutz Rules describe one of the aims of the kibbutz as follows:

> To educate and rear the children of members; to nurture them and raise the standard of their education and knowledge; to train them for the continuation of their life in the kibbutz as bearers of the kibbutz destiny; and to be concerned with the training and absorption of them as members of the kibbutz.

Members are bound by the Rules to accept the authority of the kibbutz in all of these matters pertaining to their minor children. Despite some inroads, the children are in the main still housed separately; they are always brought up and educated in their peer age groups under the guidance and control of specialist nurse-educators and teachers. The children literally belong to the entire kibbutz which, in loco parentis, assumes responsibility for their care and education. Nevertheless, on attaining their majority (at age 18), they still have to seek admission to full membership, though this is largely a formality.

Reference has already been made to the provision in the Rules whereby the kibbutz will supply the material, social, and cultural needs for the maintenance and education of the minor children of members (even possibly including children living outside). If a parent-member dies and the surviving parent later wishes to quit, the latter may leave the minor children in the kibbutz until the age of majority, but must meet one-half of the cost of their maintenance (or as the kibbutz may determine). If this liability is not undertaken, the kibbutz is under no obligation to maintain the children, and the departing parent is obliged to remove them. How does this square with the proposition that the children belong to the kibbutz? Presumably the justification in such a case is that the work-force is reduced by the departure of the surviving parent, with disadvantageous consequences for the finances of the kibbutz if the children have to be maintained by it. The requirement that the parent must contribute either labour or money is not so much an indication of the centrality of the nuclear family in the kibbutz society as an application of the harsh realities of the laws of economics. The kibbutz is no longer trying just to make ends meet; it has become a profit-seeking business enterprise which is striving to succeed just as vigorously as any capitalist concern in the surrounding society—if not more so.

It is further provided that, on membership ceasing for any reason, if the spouse (or ex-spouse) of the former member remains, he (or she) is entitled to keep the couple's children on the kibbutz, but without prejudice to the right of the kibbutz to claim from the former member a contribution towards the children's maintenance. It may also demand that the remaining parent claim from the other, either by negotiation or through the courts, participation in the maintenance of the children; any funds so obtained have to be transferred to the kibbutz.

These provisions are an indication of the necessary interaction of the regulatory apparatuses of the kibbutz and the State. The kibbutz is not an autonomous society; it has its own legal structure and the framework of its internal regulatory system of 'legal' rules, but it, and its members, are also subject to the overriding national laws. In the sphere of the family, it is not difficult to envisage a whole host of possible socio-legal problems. One example arises from a court judgment against a member for the maintenance of his spouse (or ex-spouse) and/or the children of the marriage. According to Weisman, he faced imprisonment unless he found funds to enable him to discharge his obligations, and to do that he had to leave the kibbutz and work outside.[46] The 1971 Bill (referred to earlier) attempted to make the kibbutz liable on judgments against a member for maintenance (though not for a member's other debts).[47] But that Bill did not become law. It may be observed that, in Israel, matters relating to the maintenance and custody of children are for the most part governed by religious law, some parts of which have been embodied in State law.[48]

Future development

From both the lawyer's and the social scientist's viewpoints, interest will centre on the inevitable development of a body of law relating specifically to the kibbutz. There are several good reasons why progress in this area has been slow, and also why there is now more awareness of the legal characteristics of the kibbutz[49]—and the legal consequences of those characteristics. These consequences have both external and internal implications. The external ones, such as the liability of the kibbutz or the position of a member as a claimant and as a defendant, have considerable importance for both the kibbutz and the non-kibbutz population. Various family law issues remain to be resolved. Internally, the Kibbutz Rules have a far greater impact on the lives of members than do the rules of most other societies or the articles of association of commercial corporations on their respective members. Whatever the Rules may say about the internal resolution of disputes, it is only a matter of time before the courts assume increasing jurisdiction in cases in which, perhaps, a member's vital interests are at stake. There is also the issue of the authority of the federations over the kibbutzim. Can

the latter remain, even nominally, autonomous? Will the legislature continue to refrain from exercising control over the entire movement? Whatever does occur, legal development and change will have to take account of the unique nature of the kibbutz and of its very special and still important place in Israeli life and society.

NOTES

[1] Melford E. Spiro, Cambridge, Mass., 1956 (new edn., 1963).

[2] ibid., 1963 edn., p. xvi.

[3] Lionel Tiger and Joseph Shepher, *Women in the Kibbutz*, New York, 1976, p. 34.

[4] Joshua Weisman, 'The Kibbutz: Israel's Collective Settlement', *Israel Law Review*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1966.

[5] *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, Jerusalem, 1971, vol. 10, cols. 963–64.

[6] These figures are my own estimates, using a variety of sources.

[7] Again, my own estimates.

[8] As amended in 1937. (There was an earlier Co-operative Societies Ordinance of 1920.) See Weisman, op. cit., pp. 115–116, for an explanation of why the kibbutz did not choose another form of incorporation, e.g. that of a limited company, which would also have given it a separate legal personality.

[9] Weisman, op. cit., pp. 125–26.

[10] The same Regulations also provide a definition of 'kibbutz movement'.

[11] Dan Leon, *The Kibbutz: A New Way of Life*, Oxford, 1969, p. 43.

[12] Apparently the practice, since 1960, is for a newly established kibbutz to be granted merely a licence with the express condition that the land will be vacated upon 25 days' notice: Weisman, op. cit., p. 102.

[13] Similar assistance is available to *moshavim*; there is no evidence of an official bias towards kibbutzim.

[14] This matter is considered *infra*.

[15] 'Property' and 'realization' are very extensively defined in the Rules.

[16] *The Jerusalem Post International Edition*, 24–30 June, 1979, p. 5. It is understood that the merger will take place during 1980.

[17] These outside workers have to take their turn at kitchen, dining-hall, and guard duties in the kibbutz: Tiger and Shepher, op. cit., p. 35.

[18] Op. cit., pp. 112–14.

[19] For the previous rules, see Weisman, op. cit., pp. 117–18.

[20] See respective papers of Richard D. Schwartz and Allan E. Shapiro, referred to *infra*.

[21] Tiger and Shepher, op. cit., p. 87.

[22] *Co-operative Societies (Membership) Regulations*, 1973, reg. 5.

[23] Neither is there a retirement age for a kibbutz member.

[24] Weisman, op. cit., pp. 105, 106.

[25] ibid., p. 106.

[26] However, it is possible in some cases for a kibbutz to draft its own rules.

[27] The present rules were published in the Official Gazette in September 1978, and replace rules of September 1973.

[28] The matter of payment of fines is adverted to *infra*.

[29] Weisman, op. cit., pp. 118–19, where he likens the kibbutz to a protective trust. Another example is that, though membership ceases on bankruptcy, the kibbutz may allow the bankrupt to remain as its 'guest': ibid., p. 130.

[30] ibid., p. 120.

[31] ibid., pp. 120–21, 130–31. It is noted there that under the *Compensation for Personal Injuries Law*, 1964, one who incurs expenses (including maintenance of the injured party and his family) in connection with personal injuries caused to another is entitled to be indemnified by the tortfeasor. It seems that the 1964 Law does not cover non-tort situations; thus in the pension case noted above, the kibbutz must in effect continue to support the invalid member without reimbursement.

[32] *Yale Law Journal*, vol. 63, no. 4, 1954.

[33] ibid., pp. 471–72, 476.

[34] ibid., p. 473.

[35] A. E. Shapiro, *Law & Society Review*, vol. 10, no. 3, 1976.

[36] ibid., p. 439.

[37] ibid., p. 417.

[38] ibid., p. 418.

[39] ibid., pp. 441, 442.

[40] ibid., pp. 428–29.

[41] Tiger and Shepher, op. cit., p. 36.

[42] ibid., pp. 214, 218–25.

[43] Spiro, op. cit., p. 114.

[44] ibid., p. 112. According to Spiro, they married because according to 'the laws of the land ... illegitimate children have no civil rights.' But being born out of wedlock does not in itself make a child illegitimate under Jewish Law (governing the personal status of Jews in Israel); in any event illegitimacy of birth incurs practically no legal or civil disability in Israel.

[45] See description of the dual ceremonies in Tiger and Shepher, op. cit., pp. 211–12. I have been present at a kibbutz wedding and can vouch for the accuracy of the account.

[46] Weisman, op. cit., p. 119.

[47] ibid., p. 130

[48] *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, Jerusalem, 1971, vol. 13, cols. 95–100.

[49] See Weisman, op. cit., pp. 121–25.

SELIG BRODETSKY AND THE ASCENDANCY OF ZIONISM IN ANGLO-JEWRY (1939-1945)

Gideon Shimoni

THE election of Selig Brodetsky to the presidency of the Board of Deputies of British Jews in November 1939 was a remarkable milestone in the modern history of Anglo-Jewry. Heretofore, the lay leadership of Anglo-Jewry had traditionally been almost exclusively in the paternalistic and benevolent hands of what has aptly been described as a 'cousinhood' of eminent and prosperous Anglo-Jews.[1]

Brodetsky, by contrast, was a 'foreign' Jew, born in the townlet of Olviopol in the Russian Pale of Settlement; he had been brought by his parents to London in 1893 at the age of five, and went to school with other eastern European immigrant children in the East End. His emergence to the very forefront of Anglo-Jewry owed much to his leap into the news headlines when he was only twenty: in a prodigious triumph of merit, he won in 1908 the Senior Wranglership, Cambridge's prestigious award in the mathematical tripos.[2] By 1924, he was Professor of Applied Mathematics at Leeds University, and he became active in an array of both Jewish and non-Jewish organizations. The Association of University Teachers elected him president in 1935.

However, Zionism was—from the outset—the cause to which he was most intensely committed. He became a leading figure in the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland, and by 1928 he was a member of the World Zionist Executive and the head of its Political Department in London. It was thus, above all, as a victory for Zionism and as a reflection of its true strength in the Anglo-Jewish community that Brodetsky's election was perceived both in Britain and throughout the Jewish world.[3]

The aim of the present paper is to examine the background to Selig Brodetsky's election, and his role in the events associated with the ascendancy of Zionism within Anglo-Jewry—especially the so-called Zionist 'capture' of the Board of Deputies between 1939 and 1945.

I

Zionists had tried to win over British Jews to their cause long before 1939. 'That there should be agitations in Jewish communities against Zionism has become intolerable', Herzl had declared in his address to the Second Zionist Congress at Basle in 1898, stressing:[4]

> ... the prestige of the community, the means at its disposal ... must not be used to oppose the will of our people ... I think I voice the sentiments of all in proposing to make the conquest of the Jewish communities one of our immediate aims.

British Zionists were certainly eager to fight for their cause, but it was not until June 1917 that they scored a major victory, when the then President of the Board of Deputies, David L. Alexander, was censured for signing an anti-Zionist manifesto without consulting the Board. That manifesto was co-signed by Claude G. Montefiore (the President of the Anglo-Jewish Association), and was issued in the name of the Conjoint Foreign Committee, a body constituted in 1878 by the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association to co-ordinate activities on behalf of Jews in other countries.

The manifesto rejected the demand of Zionist leaders in Britain that 'the Jewish settlements in Palestine shall be recognized as possessing a national character in a political sense'. For the Conjoint Committee, that was 'part and parcel of a wider Zionist theory, which regards all the Jewish communities of the world as constituting one homeless nationality, incapable of complete social and political identification with the nations amongst whom they dwell....' The manifesto vigorously opposed such a theory and asserted:[5]

> Emancipated Jews in this country regard themselves primarily as a religious community, and they have always based their claims to political equality with their fellow citizens of other creeds on this assumption and on its corollary, that they have no separate national aspirations in a political sense ... The establishment of a Jewish nationality in Palestine founded on this theory of Jewish homelessness must have the effect of stamping the Jews as strangers in their native lands.

This statement aroused a storm of Zionist protests and Alexander's action was censured at a plenum of the Board of Deputies—thereby forcing him to resign from the presidency of the Board. His resignation, however, did not represent an unequivocal victory for Zionism: there were 56 votes against Alexander, 51 for him, and six abstained from voting. Furthermore, there is evidence that considerations other than—or additional to—that of Zionism led to the vote of censure. The provincial representatives were dissatisfied with the Board's leaders, as were those who had been elected to represent some new institutions

(such as the Jewish Friendly Societies). In the discussion on the motion of censure, it was evident that the objection of these representatives hinged less on the substantive issue of Zionism than on the failure of the Board's members who were on the Conjoint Foreign Committee to consult the parent body before signing the manifesto.[6]

After the vote of censure, the Zionists were still in a minority on the Board. They had gained what proved to have been only a temporary suspension of the predominantly anti-Zionist Conjoint Foreign Committee. The Board's 'treaty' with the elitist Anglo-Jewish Association was not dissolved and the Conjoint Foreign Committee became two years later the Joint Foreign Committee. The influence of the anti-Zionists on the Board of Deputies remained formidable during the next two decades. The Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland—unlike the Anglo-Jewish Association—did not have its own representatives on the Board: the Zionist members of the Board were deputies for various synagogues and institutions. In the wake of the 1917 vote of censure, some leaders of the Zionist Federation in Britain—among whom were Harry Sacher and Simon Marks—had contemplated the formation of 'a Zionist party with whips' at the Board of Deputies.[7] In 1934, another leading Zionist, Samson Wright, declared in the *Zionist Review*: 'I have long felt and urged that whether the Board is reformed or not we ought to organise a Zionist party to contest the elections openly.' He complained that the Board was not 'truly representative or democratically elected', and that its elections were 'of a farcical nature ... contested mainly on personal issues rather than on matters of principle'.[8]

Nevertheless, in the next few years the number of rank-and-file deputies on the Board who were active Zionists increased steadily, and in January 1938 the Board debated a resolution arising from a report of its Palestine Committee. The resolution stated that the 'Board would welcome a solution for the future of Palestine which will provide for the establishment of a Jewish Dominion within the British Commonwealth of Nations'. That resolution was vigorously opposed by such eminent Jews as Sir Robert Waley Cohen, Sir Osmond d'Avigdor Goldsmid, and Lionel Cohen. Although they welcomed the retention of Palestine within the Commonwealth, they rejected the idea of a Jewish Dominion on the familiar anti-Zionist grounds that it entailed the establishment of a Jewish nationality, would harm the interests of Diaspora Jews, and would reduce the Arabs of Palestine to minority status. In spite of that anti-Zionist opposition, the January 1938 resolution was passed by the Board with an overwhelming majority. The Zionists hailed the event as 'a Zionist victory comparable only with the days of 1917'.[9] But what irked the leaders of the Zionist Federation was precisely the discrepancy between the Zionist sentiments of rank-and-file deputies and the inordinate influence of a minority of anti-Zionist deputies who enjoyed

great public eminence. They complained loudly that 'certain members of the Board ... utilised their influential positions by seeking in private discussions with eminent British statesmen to undermine the Palestine movement, by declaring that a Jewish state in Palestine was "inconsistent with British citizenship" '.[10]

Above all, Zionist dissatisfaction focused on the composition of the Joint Foreign Committee which purported to represent Anglo-Jewry on matters relating to Jewish communities outside the United Kingdom. Since that Committee was chaired jointly by the President of the Board of Deputies and by the President of the Anglo-Jewish Association, it virtually gave equal weight to each of the two constituent bodies. The Zionists considered such a situation to be intolerably undemocratic: the Board was made up of elected representatives while the A.J.A. was a self-appointed body. They also resented the (according to them) inordinate authority which the joint chairmen of the Committee had assumed, when they spoke in the name of the Board and of the A.J.A. without prior consultation with the members of the Board. In 1937, largely under pressure from the Zionists, a Special Committee had been set up to inquire into the Joint Foreign Committee's constitution and functions. It recommended the elimination of the traditional automatic co-chairmanship by the Presidents of the Board of Deputies and of the Anglo-Jewish Association, and proposed instead that the chairmen be elected from the Committee's own members. It also recommended that the members be reduced from 19 to 10, with power to co-opt three additional members. That recommendation was accepted, but owing to the insistence of the Board of Deputies' President (Neville Laski), in alliance with the President of the Anglo-Jewish Association (the influential Leonard G. Montefiore), the situation remained unchanged: the Presidents of the Board and of the A.J.A. continued to be ex officio joint chairmen.[11]

Another source of tension between the Zionists and their opponents was their conflicting positions regarding the World Jewish Congress, British Section. The W.J.C. had been founded in 1936, with the blessing of the Zionist Organization and, from the outset, it was essentially Zionist in orientation. In effect, it assumed a role complementary to that of the Zionist Organization: the latter was internationally recognized as the representative of the Jewish people with regard to Palestine, while the Congress aspired to international recognition as the spokesman of all the Jewish people in the Diaspora.[12]

Consequently, the Anglo-Jewish Association and most of the eminent Anglo-Jews were hostile to the World Jewish Congress from its inception. They had used their considerable influence and prestige to persuade the Board of Deputies of British Jews to vote—by a narrow majority of 24—against participation by the Board in the founding conference of the Congress at Geneva in 1936.[13] The very notion of an

international Jewish body—positing that the Jews were a unified national entity, rather than merely co-religionists of various citizenships—was anathema to most of the members of the Anglo-Jewish elite. The then President of the Board, Neville Laski, had insisted that in the Joint Foreign Committee Anglo-Jewry already possessed a traditionally recognized and perfectly adequate body for dealing with matters affecting Jews in foreign countries. He stressed that Jews of different countries had 'differences of outlook, very largely analogous to the differences of the general communities of which they form a part', and that 'the semblance of internationalism and unified action in the World Jewish Congress has no basis in fact'. It could only add credence to 'the frequent and unfounded charge against Jews by the anti-Semites that there existed an "international Jewry" '.[14]

The refusal of the Board of Deputies to participate in the W.J.C. did not, however, deter the Zionists or the other elements of Anglo-Jewry who believed the Jews to be a nation. Quite independently of the Board, the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland, *Poale Zion* (Workers for Zion), the Mizrahi Federation, as well as various Trade Union groups, Friendly Societies, the Federation of Synagogues, and several other synagogues, decided to create a British Section of the World Jewish Congress.[15] Most of the leading British Zionists were associated with the new body, and Selig Brodetsky was elected one of the honorary vice-presidents of the British Section in February 1939.

On the other hand, Neville Laski (both personally and in his official capacity as President of the Board) went to great pains to obstruct access by the British Section to the United Kingdom's governmental authorities. In January 1937, he made use of his own entrée to the Foreign Office and presented to it a detailed memorandum utterly refuting the claim of the World Jewish Congress to be a representative organization. He was strongly of the opinion that mistaken 'conceptions of the Jewish people as a united national organism' and 'ideas of Jewish nationhood' were a danger to the civic rights of Jews in all countries. Laski therefore requested that in matters concerning the Anglo-Jewish community, entrée to the Foreign Office should be confined solely to the Joint Foreign Committee.[16]

It is unlikely that the Anglo-Jewish Zionists were aware at the time of the extent to which Laski had gone in attempting to influence the Foreign Office's attitude to the W.J.C.; but his publicly aired opposition to the Congress caused great resentment. Although in 1933 he had become the Board's first President to serve as one of the non-Zionists on the enlarged Jewish Agency for Palestine, he was loudly opposed to Zionist aspirations for a sovereign Jewish state. In 1939, he published a book of his essays and speeches, in one of which he had asserted:[17]

> To Western Jewry, as represented by many prominent English and American Jews, the idea of a Jewish State is no less distasteful now than it was

> twenty years ago ... What they want to see in Palestine is a system which will give both to the Jewish population, which is almost a third of the total, and to the Arab population complete political and civil security and self-government in matters that concern each community alone. They want to see in Palestine neither a Jewish nor an Arab State, but a Palestinian State, and they want the Jews of Palestine to count as Palestine citizens (as, in fact they are now), just as the Jews of England are English citizens or the Jews of France French citizens, as in this way the danger both of a 'dual allegiance' and of injustice to the Arabs would be avoided.

Laski's published views aroused the resentment of British Zionist leaders and caused concern at meetings of the Jewish Agency in London.[18] At the Board of Deputies, Rabbi M. L. Perlzweig sharply criticized his book while the *Zionist Review* commented bitingly:[19]

> There is a school of anti-Zionist thought of which the late Claude Montefiore was the most distinguished and conspicuous representative, whose consistent and intellectual integrity evoked a measure of respect from even his bitterest opponents. We knew where he stood, but where does Mr. Laski stand?

A conference of the Federation of Zionist youth held at Manchester in June 1939 went so far as to pass a resolution condemning 'certain utterances of Mr. Neville Laski ... which convey the erroneous impression that any part of the Jewish community would accept minority status in Palestine'.[20]

The driving force of the Anglo-Zionist camp at this point was the Zionist Federation's General Secretary, Lavy Bakstansky. He was born in Slonim, Lithuania, and his family had settled in Palestine when he was a child. He attended the Herzliya Gymnasium in Tel Aviv and went on to study at the London School of Economics, where he became President of the Students' Union. By 1928, he had obtained the degrees of B.Sc. Econ. and Ll.B. He was offered the post of Assistant Secretary of the Zionist Federation in that year and was appointed its General Secretary in 1930. He served the Federation for more than forty years and became the foremost communal 'civil servant' of Anglo-Jewry. He attained a position of extraordinary influence in British Zionist circles by virtue of his powers of persuasion, his organizational genius, and fervent devotion to Zionism. However, he always preferred to operate out of the limelight, and his influence has aptly been described as 'in inverse proportion to his fame'.[21]

Bakstansky believed the Board of Deputies of British Jews to be an important arena for the advancement of Zionism. In 1934, four years after acquiring British citizenship, he had become a member of the Board as deputy for the Lodzer Synagogue—although he was not a religiously observant Jew. His attendance record was among the highest of all deputies and he was very active on the Board's Palestine Com-

mittee. It was largely at Bakstansky's prompting that the Zionist Federation began in the late 1930s to take steps to increase the Zionist presence at the Board, with the ultimate aim of supporting a committed Zionist candidate for the presidency at the next triennial elections.[22] The Zionist leaders' choice fell on Selig Brodetsky, who was already engaged in a great number of public activities—Jewish and non-Jewish. Brodetsky had achieved great distinction and popularity in England, and it was expected that even some of the non-Zionists might support his eventual candidature. He had been elected to the Board as a representative of the United Synagogue in Leeds, and on 15 October 1939, a few weeks after the outbreak of the Second World War, he attended his first Board of Deputies meeting.

Meanwhile, some of the most eminent men of Anglo-Jewry had met at New Court, the offices of the Rothschilds, in order to reorganize the communal leadership in view of the war emergency; and they suggested the formation of some sort of communal directorate to take charge of the conduct of Jewish affairs. Neville Laski was present at that meeting, and he later proposed to the Board of Deputies that it should appoint a committee to co-operate with this directorate. That proposal aroused strong resentment, particularly—though not solely—among the Zionist deputies. The *Zionist Review* saw it as a high-handed attempt to exploit the war crisis by 'shedding democratic forms and assuming the powers of dictatorship'. The Jewish community was not 'the special preserve of our old-established Anglo-Jewish families', it declared, and communal activities were not 'at the disposition of a group of influential gentlemen of social standing'.[23]

During that debate, Selig Brodetsky assumed the mantle of spokesman for the Zionist deputies and he argued that the Board should never allow itself to become subordinate to any other communal body. He proposed, instead, the appointment of a streamlined Executive Committee able to deal with the emergency situation, and that proposal was unanimously adopted at the Board's next plenary meeting, held on 17 December 1939.[24] Those favouring an external communal directorate had continued to press their view at the Board's Law and Parliamentary Committee while it was considering the merits of Brodetsky's proposal before that December meeting. When they remained silent at the plenary meeting, they showed that they had decided to submit to the 'democratic' stand championed by the Zionist deputies.

Brodetsky's victory was not necessarily an accurate gauge of Zionist strength at the Board of Deputies in December 1939, for some of those who voted for his proposals might not have been Zionists. However, Laski announced his resignation from the presidency at that very meeting. The precise motivation for his action—and whether it was in fact connected with the abortive proposal of an external directorate—is difficult to document since no relevant records or personal

correspondence have come to light. Laski declared at the time that he was resigning 'for professional reasons', since the President of the Board now had to meet so many demands on his time and energies that the post required someone able to devote practically all his working hours to it.[25] There had been an enormous expansion of work in the seven years of Laski's presidency: these were the years of Hitler's ascent to power, of a rapid deterioration of many European Jewish communities, and especially of a proliferation of antisemitic manifestations in Great Britain itself. Laski's strenuous duties at the Board inevitably took a heavy toll of his own professional legal practice, and there is no doubt that this consideration played an important part in his decision to resign. On the other hand, there is equally no doubt that he greatly disliked the prospect of his being replaced by an active Zionist.

II

Laski's sudden and unexpected resignation in December 1939 at first took the Zionist deputies by surprise. But they soon made a concerted bid to elect one of their persuasion to the presidency of the Board. Indeed, Lavy Bakstansky attached such importance to that position that he even contemplated persuading Chaim Weizmann to stand for election, if that were the only means of conquering the Board.[26] Brodetsky, of course, was the obvious candidate for the Zionist deputies, but he was engaged in so many activities apart from his University teaching duties at Leeds that he was very hesitant when he was approached. He was then a member of the Zionist Executive as well as of the Jewish Agency Executive and he served on the Executives of the English Zionist Federation, the Maccabi World Union, the Council for German Jewry, and the Order of Ancient Maccabeans. In addition, he took an active interest in a number of non-Jewish bodies such as the League of Nations Union and the Association of University Teachers.

Neville Laski went to great pains to prevent the election of Brodetsky. He tried to persuade Chaim Weizmann and Simon Marks that it was in the best interests of the World Zionist Organization to elect a President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews who was known to be neutral about Zionism. He suggested, at first, that they support the nomination of a man of great distinction who was a non-Zionist but who was known to be moderate in his views as well as fair-minded—Colonel H. L. Nathan.[27] When Weizmann and Marks would not countenance Nathan, Laski urged Anthony de Rothschild to stand for the presidency. Rothschild told Weizmann, who observed very frankly that he could not support a candidate who was opposed to a Jewish state, even if that candidate was a man whom he knew to be a gentleman and fair-minded.[28]

Brodetsky recounts in his memoirs that when he heard that there was

a movement against his nomination on the grounds that it was not politic for a Zionist to preside over the Board, he and his wife Mania decided that he must agree to be nominated.[29] Nevertheless, it is clear that he wavered when he learnt that the prestigious Anthony de Rothschild might also stand—for Bakstansky had to plead most urgently:[30]

> Please cut out any thought of withdrawing your name ... a matter of great principle has now been raised ... I can tell you that I have taken off my coat and gloves too and if only you will stand firm, I am confident of victory ... Please Dr. Brodetsky, I beg of you with all my heart, stand firm ... we will win and that will be an end to all the threats and nonsense which we have had to suffer throughout the Laski regime.

He assured Brodetsky that Anthony de Rothschild would withdraw if he were faced with the determined candidature of the eminent Leeds professor. Bakstansky was also at the same time rallying support for Brodetsky: a confidential circular letter under the Zionist Federation's imprimatur told Zionists throughout Britain that the 'Public Relations Committee of the Zionist Federation, acting in co-operation with the Zionist and democratic members of the Board' had decided 'that the time has come for Professor Brodetsky to be nominated for the presidency of the Board in succession to Laski'. It therefore asked those addressed that they persuade discreetly every member of the Board of Deputies in their particular area to attend the election meeting of the Board and to cast a vote for Brodetsky:[31]

> The time has come for the Board to assert its independence, its right to speak on behalf of the democracy of Anglo-Jewry, to play its part in moulding the destinies of our people, especially at the Peace Conference ... A Jewish Versailles dare not be repeated. We must have a united front and Brodetsky is the only man who can establish it for us through the Board if he is the leader ... we shall stand firm, we shall fight this contest, and once and for all, the Anglo-Jewish democracy will make it clear ... that we are no longer prepared to be governed by a clique from above who have little contact with the masses of Jewry.

Bakstansky was proved right. When they failed to gain Weizmann's support for Anthony de Rothschild and realized the extent of the support for Brodetsky, Neville Laski and the New Court notables gave up the contest, and Anthony de Rothschild withdrew. Brodetsky was the sole candidate at the 17 December 1939 meeting, and he was therefore elected unopposed. For the first time in the Board's history, an eastern European Jew and acknowledged Zionist leader became its President.

After his election, Brodetsky took pains to dispel the fears aroused by the New Court circle at the prospect of a Zionist President. He asserted, to the applause of the Zionist deputies, that he remained as committed

to Zionism as ever; and then he observed: 'But as a Zionist, I realize that there are other Jews who have other views about Jewish problems and I consider it the primary function of anybody who directs the activities of an organization like the Board of Deputies to conduct its affairs with due regard to the views of all sections of the Board.' He assured the deputies that they would find 'that it was possible for a convinced Zionist to be just as impartial and objective and fair in the conduct of the affairs of a mixed body as a convinced non-Zionist or a convinced anti-Zionist'.[32]

Brodetsky also attempted to secure Anthony de Rothschild's co-operation. He told him that he intended the Board of Deputies to be representative of every section of Anglo-Jewry, and not subservient to any extraneous organization, and he asked him to agree to be co-opted to the Executive of the Board. Rothschild accepted the invitation, but requested that another leading non-Zionist, Lionel Cohen, be also co-opted.[33]

In the period of intensive wartime activity which followed, controversy over the presidency of the Board abated. Brodetsky co-operated with the non-Zionist deputies as well as with Leonard Stein, who was the other co-Chairman of the Joint Foreign Committee. Stein was a Zionist of long standing: from 1920 to 1929 he had served as Political Secretary of the World Zionist Organization, and from 1929 to 1939 as honorary legal adviser to the expanded Jewish Agency in whose creation he had taken an active part. However, during the 1930s his minimalist conception of Zionist aims and demands had brought him closer to the views of non-Zionists like Neville Laski and Robert Waley Cohen, a fact which facilitated his election to the presidency of the Anglo-Jewish Association in 1939. Although Brodetsky differed profoundly from Stein in his conception of Zionism, he at least had Stein's support in opposing Britain's White Paper policy of 1939. In this atmosphere of co-operation, when the Board of Deputies' regular triennial election fell due in May 1940, Brodetsky was re-elected as President, unopposed and without any of the behind-the-scenes contriving which had accompanied his initial election.

Nevertheless, whenever there was a discussion of post-war policy during the dark years of the Second World War, the old differences were revived as soon as Jewish statehood in Palestine was debated. In September 1941 Brodetsky arranged a meeting with Chaim Weizmann and the New Court circle to discuss Palestine, but no agreement could be reached. Anthony de Rothschild and his friends reaffirmed that they were 'unalterably opposed to the establishment of a Jewish state'.[34] Indeed, the differences between Brodetsky (and others of eastern European origin) and the New Court circle went deeper than disagreements on lines of policy to be adopted concerning Palestine. There was a fundamental clash in their respective self-images as Jews.

This conflict can perhaps best be illustrated in the exchange of letters between Brodetsky and Anthony de Rothschild at the end of 1940. It was occasioned by a report of a fervently Zionist speech by Brodetsky in which he had said that Zionists refused to accept 'the policy of assimilation' because it represented 'a capitulation on the part of the Jewish people, an abandonment of its sense of history, its tradition and its national dignity'. Taking Brodetsky to task on the grounds that as President of the Board of Deputies he could not divest himself of 'representative responsibility in the public utterances he made', Rothschild contended that this rejection of assimilation not only created 'an absolutely erroneous impression of the feelings of the Anglo-Jewish community but also invited a most damaging resentment in the mind of any Englishman who reads them and accepts them as representative'. Contending that in the view of 'the great body of English Jews, assimilation to English life' was the foremost 'civil ideal', he accused Brodetsky of speaking as if all Anglo-Jews supported the notion that the Jews have 'nationalistic aspirations which are the reverse of our conception of British citizenship'. He said Brodetsky was giving the impression 'that the Anglo-Jewish community should be regarded as some kind of national unit forming part of another nation', an idea 'most dangerous for the future of Jews of this country as well as of every other'. To the formal charge that his speech was improper, Brodetsky replied that those who had elected him President of the Board had done so in the full knowledge that he was a Zionist; he would never have accepted nomination if it had meant that he was not to be free to express his opinions and was to be subjected to a control from which his predecessors in the presidency were free. On the substantive point at issue, Brodetsky countered that the idea 'that Jews should be good citizens and should be identified in their aims and in their secular life with fellow-citizens of other creeds' was not at issue. The problem was that the assimilationists rejected 'the idea of a regenerated Jewish nation in Palestine'. Consequently, assimilation as a policy meant 'the disappearance of the Jews as a distinct people and of their role as a distinctive force in civilisation'.[35]

Another occasion when tensions arose was in October 1942, when the anti-Zionist Louis Gluckstein, M.P., clashed with the Zionists on the Board. At a meeting of the Junior Membership Group of the West London Reform Synagogue in June 1942, Gluckstein announced that he intended to place his own views and those of his friends concerning the future of Palestine before members of the British Government. This led Bakstansky to enter into a sharp exchange of letters with Gluckstein. At a Board of Deputies meeting on 19 October 1942, the Palestine Committee—prompted by Bakstansky—issued a report reproving such an 'unauthorized representation to the Government'. Gluckstein retorted that this was an attempt to stifle freedom of speech. After an

acrimonious debate, the Palestine Committee's Report embodying that reprimand was approved—much to Gluckstein's chagrin.[36]

Meanwhile, Brodetsky was being subjected to the high-handed criticism of his senior Vice-President, Sir Robert Waley Cohen, who was a powerful figure in Anglo-Jewry by virtue of his contacts with the British Government and his established prestige in Anglo-Jewry. He also headed the council of the United Synagogue. Sir Robert was contemptuous of the Zionist deputies on the Board, referring to them as 'the mob'. Matters came to a head when he made somewhat insulting personal attacks on Lavy Bakstansky at a meeting of the Board's Executive on 9 November 1942. Brodetsky found it necessary to upbraid Sir Robert for having 'on several occasions both privately and at meetings of the Executive, spoken with considerable contempt of the Board', and he told him bluntly: 'I feel that you must make up your mind whether you wish to work with Jewish democracy even if the views of the democracy do not always agree with yours, or whether your desire is to force through your views by pressure which has nothing to do with fair discussion.' Sir Robert retorted with characteristic haughtiness that such a rebuke was 'rather an impertinence', and he challenged the very propriety of Bakstansky's membership of the Board and of its Executive: 'I do not know anything and I am afraid I care less, about Mr. Bakstansky's personality, but I do feel that it is most unfortunate that a whole time paid secretary of a political organisation in the community should be allowed by that organisation to sit on the Board.... I think the precedent of the Civil Servants is the only sound one.'[37]

III

As far as the British Zionists were concerned, the persistence of these conflicts within Anglo-Jewry which continued even after Selig Brodetsky's election proved that that election had not fully ensured the establishment of a 'Jewish democracy'. Meanwhile, the World Zionist Organization had become sharply militant. An Extraordinary Zionist Conference held at the Biltmore Hotel in New York in May 1942 had not only vehemently denounced Britain's 1939 White Paper, but also boldly declared itself for the post-war establishment of Palestine as a 'Jewish Commonwealth'. It demanded that full powers to achieve this aim be transferred from the British Mandatory power to the Jewish Agency for Palestine, which was 'to direct and regulate immigration into Palestine'. The Zionists wanted to have far more control over the development of Palestine. Britain would retain its sovereignty over the country, but only until such time as a Jewish majority had been established. This new militancy sharpened the ideological differences between Zionists and non-Zionists and provoked the opposition of the

influential American Jewish Committee (which was a non-Zionist organization).[38]

The Biltmore Declaration alarmed British non-Zionists no less than it had done the American Jewish Committee. Not only did it revive the spectre of a sovereign Jewish state which, to their minds, would undermine the emancipated status of Jews in all lands of the Diaspora, but it also threw down the gauntlet at their own British Government. The Zionist Federation's leaders (including Brodetsky) therefore now considered it essential not to give the Jewish 'Grand Dukes' the opportunity to obstruct the crucial thrust towards Jewish statehood. The collective voice of British Jewry must be made to speak unequivocally in favour of a Jewish state.[39] Zionist resources had to be mobilized not merely to re-elect Brodetsky to the presidency of the Board, but also to ensure that he had a clear majority of reliable supporters on the plenum of the Board and on its Executive. Furthermore, the Joint Foreign Committee had to be dissolved and replaced by another such committee answerable solely to the Board of Deputies.

Accordingly, with the approach of the Board's triennial elections in June 1943, the Zionist Federation was adeptly led by Bakstansky to strive even more actively than it had in 1939 to 'Zionize' the composition of the Board. The *Zionist Review* meanwhile had launched a vigorous ideological campaign directed at the same end, and its editor, S. Levenberg, published a series of incisive articles—in one of which he demanded the 'elimination of anachronisms in the structure of the Board', such as its agreement with the Anglo-Jewish Association. He declared: 'It is our democratic right to see to it that opponents of our national revival should have no hold on British Jewry.'[40] Two factors made Bakstansky's efforts easier: 1) the constitution of the Board did not require that candidates for election reside in the area of the constituent body they represented; and 2) the Zionist Federation's Central Synagogue Council had long actively promoted the cause of Zionism in its synagogues. By 1943, there were 55 synagogues (as well as 25 Friendly Societies) affiliated as 'subsidiary bodies' to the Zionist Federation.[41]

Bakstansky convened meetings of the Zionist group on the Board and kept in close touch with leading Zionists in the provinces and in London, assiduously canvassing for votes. Synagogue congregations which had never bothered to apply for representation on the Board, or which had allowed their representation to fall into desuetude, were now asked persistently to rectify the situation and to attend the plenary sessions on 4 July, when there would be elections for the Executive of the Board, and on 25 July—when the members of committees would be appointed.[42]

The Board's official report for 1943 noted that there was 'an extraordinary increase in the number of Deputies elected and the number of constituencies which obtained representation for the new session ... an

increase of 148 Deputies and 47 constituencies as compared with the end of the previous session'.[43] Admittedly, they were not all accretions to the Zionist group on the Board, for they included three Liberal synagogues and also the New Zionist Organization which, notwithstanding its militant Zionism, was strongly opposed to the Zionist Federation's strategy at the Board of Deputies.[44] However, there can be little doubt that the majority of the new constituents were represented by persons whose election had been prompted or manœuvred by the Zionist group. They included, for example, the representatives of four Glasgow congregations, all of whom could be relied upon by the Zionist caucus. A. L. Easterman, the political secretary of the World Jewish Congress, and a devoted Zionist, was one of these representatives; Rebecca Sieff, the prominent Zionist Women's leader, was another.[45] There were also deputies for synagogues which had followed Bakstansky's urgent advice to renew their representation on the Board in time for the momentous July elections.[46]

On 4 July 1943, 339 deputies attended the new session of the Board (out of a total of 420 elected); a *Jewish Chronicle* reporter noted that the gathering was the largest in the history of the Board of Deputies.[47] It was a foregone conclusion that Brodetsky would be returned unopposed. The matter of the dissolution of the Joint Foreign Committee was not, as soon became evident in the voting; it was moved by Aaron Wright (brother of Samson Wright) who submitted that 'there was no logical or rational case for renewing the treaty'. He claimed that it had never functioned well and reminded the other deputies that in 1917 the Conjoint Foreign Committee had helped in the 'desperate attempt to strangle the Balfour Declaration'. However, he conceded that the Anglo-Jewish Association's representatives on the Board of Deputies included men with much experience of foreign affairs and that their services were of value to the community. He added that those who opposed the continued existence of the joint committee would nevertheless do their utmost to elect such experienced A.J.A. members to a new Foreign Affairs Committee of the Board—'but they would be elected as members of the Board and responsible to the Board and not as representatives of a semi-philanthropic organisation ... The Board, and through it the Anglo-Jewish community which it represented, must be master in its own household.' The President of the A.J.A., Leonard Stein, vainly defended the Joint Foreign Committee, stressing its importance 'when all sorts of grave issues were hanging in the balance', and reminding the deputies that there were 'those who were closely watching them and not always with very friendly eyes'. 'Extremely damaging' inferences would be drawn and the interests of Anglo-Jewry and its ability to act representatively would be gravely impaired.[48]

Neville Laski, who had just been elected honorary member of the Board, deplored 'the campaign which the Secretary of the English

Zionist Federation had conducted through the country'. When the motion was put to the vote, by means of a division into separate lobbies, 148 were in favour of renewing the agreement while 154 were against; there were 37 abstentions. Thus, by a bare majority of six, was that 65-year long partnership dramatically terminated.[49]

That the overwhelming majority of deputies was favourably disposed to Zionism can hardly be in doubt. However, the meagre majority in favour of dissolving the Joint Foreign Committee attests to the fact that not all these deputies were willing to be 'whipped' by the caucus. Moreover, the results of the election of honorary officers (conducted at the same meeting) show that the caucus was unable to mobilize the full complement of deputies well disposed to Zionism. The caucus had hoped to see Samson Wright and Barnett Janner as Vice-Presidents and Isaac Landau as Treasurer; but only Wright was successful while Israel Feldman was elected to one of the vice-presidencies and Gordon Liverman was appointed Treasurer. Neither Feldman nor Liverman was favoured by the Zionist caucus.[50] The latter now proceeded with even greater fervour to wage a campaign for the election to the membership of the Board's various committees, which was to take place on 25 July. On that day the Zionists were victorious: of the seven members on the Board's Executive, four of those elected were members of the Zionist caucus; of the 15 on its new Foreign Affairs Committee, seven were closely connected with the caucus and a further three could be relied upon to support a Zionist approach; and of the 16 elected to the Palestine Committee, all but one were known Zionists—and 12 of them were connected with the caucus.[51]

These events aroused a great deal of acrimonious controversy in the Jewish community. The *Jewish Chronicle* editor, Ivan Greenberg, who was a Revisionist Zionist, somewhat paradoxically attacked Bakstansky and his circle. Under a sensationalist headline, 'The Deputies Captured', he sharply criticized the 'caucus triumph against strong opposition' when the Joint Foreign Committee was dissolved:[52]

> The evidence of careful organisation on the part of Mr. Bakstansky's caucus was plain. The caucus members sat mostly together with Mr. Bakstansky on the front bench as leader and when the motion on the Joint Foreign Committee came up, the indefatigable Mr. Bakstansky had a requisition for a ballot duly signed by thirty members ready to hand in. This vote was taken by separating into opposite lobbies and the caucus supporters were adroitly shepherded in the way they should go. A 'whip' had been sent round beforehand to each Deputy making plain the line of voting and the persons to vote into office as decided by the caucus.

The *Zionist Review* sprang to the defence of the Zionists on the Board and declared that their triumph was a 'Zionist victory for democracy'. Levenberg quoted Winston Churchill's observation that 'democratic assemblies do not act on unanimity. They act by majorities', and

commented: 'We called upon the democratic elements in the community to take an active part in the elections. We encouraged contests between various candidates. We openly stated our programme and asked for support. Was there anything wrong in that?'[53]

Non-Zionists also challenged the legality of some of the congregational elections of the deputies. Leo Elton of the United Synagogue charged at a meeting of the Board that there had been constitutional irregularities in the election of Professor Samson Wright by the Spitalfields Great Congregation, while Major Louis Gluckstein (who represented the Liberal Congregation) unsuccessfully pressed a motion disapproving of 'the attempt made by the Public Relations Committee of the Zionist Federation ... secretly to induce certain members of the Board to support the block election of its candidates'. Bakstansky replied to these charges, to the accompaniment of cries of 'Shame', 'Scandal!' and 'Cheap' from the non-Zionists. He stoutly defended the propriety of using a 'whip' as a way of 'providing like-minded deputies with guidance and advice on matters of voting without compelling anyone to accept them'. He stated that Zionists stood 'for a certain policy which they had declared from the housetops', and in such critical times they certainly wished 'to see the committees at the Board proclaim that policy'.[54]

Selig Brodetsky was profoundly upset by this bitter controversy. The militancy of his fellow Zionists went against the grain of his essentially moderate temperament. The letters he exchanged with Bakstansky show that the latter was constantly prodding him. Brodetsky, ever mindful of his overall responsibility as President of the Board, aimed to be as objective and impartial as possible. Bakstansky, on the other hand, saw no impropriety in using the official letterhead of the Zionist Federation when he wrote on caucus matters: he claimed he was speaking in the name of 'the democracy of the Jewish people in this country'. He was 'not in favour of any action of camouflage such as having meetings not at Great Russell Street' or avoiding written propaganda. 'Nobody will be deceived by such tactics and it is better to be open and emphatic about our objectives and strategy', he declared. He told Brodetsky that the friends of Zionism had to be 'cultivated and persuaded and they will resent it if their loyalty is taken for granted', and added, 'The other side is very anxious to intimidate us into a quiet campaign, or no campaign, as their strength lies in secrecy and our power is democracy and public opinion.'[55]

In his memoirs, Brodetsky was discreet about these events, only hinting at the severe tensions which developed between him and Bakstansky over the Zionist 'capture' of the Board.[56] He had never been in favour of abolishing the Joint Foreign Committee, but considered it to be 'a matter upon which a compromise solution should be found rather than precipitate a situation in which the Anglo-Jewish Association

would form its own Foreign Affairs Department'. He thought it imperative that 'the community shall not be split into bodies struggling with one another'. He proposed a compromise: the A.J.A.'s representation on the Joint Foreign Committee would be limited to only about three out of a total of about twenty members of the Committee and the President of the Board would be its sole chairman.[57] Before the critical meeting of 4 July 1943, he wrote to Bakstansky, 'As you know I have all along repudiated the idea of what is called "capturing" the Board', and he observed:[58]

> The strength of the opinion of British Jewry on any Jewish issue, and particularly on what is most vital to both of us, namely the Jewish future in Palestine, will largely depend upon the extent to which one can say that this opinion is the result of free and open discussion at the Representative Institution of the Community. I believe that the decision of the community will be most powerful if we have those who oppose our view inside the Board.

Brodetsky therefore considered it particularly important that Sir Robert Waley Cohen be re-elected as Vice-President: 'I believe that a person who occupies Sir Robert's position is best within and not without the decision of our problem', he argued. Indeed, having gained the agreement of Leonard Montefiore and Leonard Stein to submit his proposed solution to the council of the Anglo-Jewish Association, Brodetsky leapfrogged over the uncompromising Bakstansky and entreated the influential Simon Marks to persuade the Zionist caucus that the compromise he advocated was advisable.[59]

As we know, Brodetsky failed in his attempt to restrain the Zionist militants, who succeeded in dissolving the Joint Foreign Committee in July 1943. The acrimonious aftermath of this event all too well confirmed Brodetsky's fears. 'I told them a considerable time before the meeting of July 4th that it would be a mistake to push through the dissolution of the agreement with the A.J.A.', he wrote. 'Even I did not see how serious the mistake would be, and it is indeed vastly more serious than I ever thought.' He was deeply pained, in particular, by the bitingly critical attitude of the widely-read *Jewish Chronicle*. Its condemnations were detrimental to the public image of his presidency of the Board as well as to the Board's status in the eyes of the authorities, and he asked its editor, Ivan Greenberg: 'What I would like to know is what is your object.' He reasoned: 'The Board has been elected . . . and will function for the next three years. Do you want the Government and other authorities to reach the conclusion that there is no such thing as a Jewish institution to whom they should listen about Jewish affairs?'[60] Greenberg replied:[61]

> I think that any people who see, as we believe we do, the grave perils into which Zionism has been rushed, merely for the sake of getting a 'schtich' [Yiddish: dig] at the sort of people we don't like . . . any such people, I say,

who held their peace, and pretended all was well, would be guilty of the deepest treachery to Zionism. I am just appalled at the frivolous indifference to the fate of Zionism which has been shown by those responsible for the whole of the 'capturing of the Board' activity. Either they must be politically stone-blind or else they must be like a child when it tries to mend a watch, loses its temper and bashes it with a hammer.

In an effort to minimize the damage already caused, Brodetsky attempted to neutralize the dissolution decision. One compromise solution which he contemplated was that the President of the A.J.A. be offered the vice-presidency of the Board's new Foreign Committee. He warned Bakstansky that a 'Zionist "isolationism" within the Board will, on the one hand, largely destroy the status of the Board as representing the community, and on the other hand, will do much harm to the Zionist movement as such.' He added:[62]

I believe that the Board cannot possibly serve the community if it is not above all suspicion in regard to its representative character ... No-one can conceive the danger to the status of the community if at any moment those who are making representations on behalf of the Board may be faced with the allegation that they are not in fact representing the community at all. I would ask you, my dear Bakstansky, to look the future in the face and to see the chaos into which we are being pushed. There are times when men have to admit to themselves and, if necessary, publicly, that they have committed mistakes, and do all that is necessary in order to correct them.

However, Bakstansky and his associates were determined to 'contest to the bitter end' any relapse into compromises which they feared would restore the former inordinate controlling influence to the Jewish 'Grand Dukes': 'The supreme consideration must be the fate of the Jewish people in the future, especially in Palestine and the Peace Conference or peace discussions which will play such a large part in determining our fate.' Commenting caustically on Brodetsky's acceptance of Lord Bearsted's invitation to a private gathering at which the situation was to be informally discussed, Bakstansky wrote to him: 'We stand firmly for the policy of a Jewish State or Jewish Commonwealth, to which Bearsted, Rothschild and L. Cohen are adamantly opposed and no private dinner parties will help'.[63] A few weeks earlier, in September 1943, he had written to Brodetsky:[64]

We shall be no party to any plan which is calculated, or which would in effect undo the decision of July 4th ... You will, therefore, appreciate that to us this is a matter of grave principles ... We have not undertaken our campaign of opposition to the Joint Foreign Committee by accident, or merely on the caprice of any individual. It was the result of years of study and experience and accumulated bitterness at a system which was neither democratic nor effective.

Brodetsky, by October 1943, was on the verge of handing in his resignation as President of the Board. He submitted a written statement

to 'the Zionist group' in which he stated that the situation had become intolerable. 'I would be much happier doing any useful mathematical or Zionist work than wasting my time as I am doing at the present moment, and carrying the public responsibility for what I consider to be disastrous to the whole community and to Zionism in particular.' He demanded 'as matters of confidence' that the Zionist Federation should officially renounce interference with the Board's functioning; that the Zionist group at the Board should meet only for matters which dealt directly with Palestine 'because it is a fallacy to suppose that Zionist loyalty involves the acceptance of views on other matters in the community'; that steps should be taken to deal with the alleged illegalities of elections; and finally, that co-options to the Board's committees should be proposed 'to bring in deputies who represent other views'.[65] In his reply, Bakstansky expressed astonishment that Brodetsky 'should seek to define Zionism and Zionist ideology in such a narrow manner' He stressed:[66]

> At bottom, every one of us must ask himself whether when his own judgement is in conflict with the views of almost every Zionist leader in the country—he would not do well to submit to the collective wisdom of those with whom he invariably co-operates and of the very people who have made your presidency possible—on which occasion you did choose to accept their verdict. When you gratuitously attack the leaders of the Zionist group as having done the greatest harm to this country—you must realise that only the future historian will be able to decide whether your suggestion is warranted or whether the harm was occasioned by the vacillations of a leadership which from the word go set out to destroy the decision of July 4th and thereby confuse the community and the Zionists at the same time.

Brodetsky was constrained from resigning by his deep sense of responsibility to those who had elected him and by his concern lest the Zionist cause be publicly discredited. As he himself admitted, to resign and to explain publicly the fundamental differences between him and his fellow Zionists or, alternatively, to take these matters to the Board and ask for a majority against them, would be 'undesirable and calamitous'. He added, '... and this is why I am doing everything I can in order to avoid such a catastrophe'. Brodetsky therefore chose not to resign and deferred—albeit reluctantly—to the Zionist pressure against reinstating the former privileged position of the Anglo-Jewish Association on the Foreign Committee.[67] But he persisted in his negotiations with the A.J.A. with the aim of reaching some degree of understanding and co-ordination in order to ensure that there would be no rival and contradictory approaches to the British Government on vital matters concerning Palestine and the catastrophic plight of European Jewry.

IV

Selig Brodetsky became entangled in yet another area of dissonance in the Anglo-Jewish community—the relationship between the Board of Deputities and the British Section of the World Jewish Congress. As we saw earlier, the Board (under Neville Laski's presidency) had adopted an antagonistic stance *vis-à-vis* the W.J.C. Brodetsky, on the other hand, had not only been associated as a Zionist with the founding of its British Section in 1936, but had continued to be one of its vice-presidents while he presided over the Board. That placed him in an awkward position. He did not—like his predecessor Laski—clash with the W.J.C. on any substantive issue, but he also held that the principle of the Board's primacy as the representative organ of British Jewry was very much at stake. Far more was involved than the old antagonism between 'assimilationist' Anglo-Jewish notables and the Zionists who were almost exclusively of eastern European origin. There was an objective clash of interests—such as the matter of representations to the British Government concerning the Jewish aliens and refugees in the United Kingdom. In one sense, that was the internal affair of British Jewry, and hence the preserve of the Board. Yet in another sense, it was inextricable from general questions concerning Jewish aliens and refugees throughout the globe—and therefore also the legitimate concern of the World Jewish Congress.

Brodetsky had assumed that when he became President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the British Section of the W.J.C. would tacitly bow to his authority in all major spheres of representation. However, in an exchange of letters over this matter in 1941, Lavy Bakstansky declared '... no such understanding, explicit or tacit, was ever mentioned in our discussions prior to the presidential election'. He said that the only understanding was that the Zionists would not press again for the affiliation of the Board with the World Jewish Congress. He stated, 'The Board of Deputies cannot have it both ways', explaining: 'It cannot, on the one hand, refuse to be affiliated with the World Jewish Congress and, on the other hand, expect the Congress to suspend its activities in England.' He stressed that, as a Zionist, he '... should decline to have anything to do with measures which would weaken the British Section of the World Jewish Congress'.[68]

If Brodetsky made no attempt—either before or after the dissolution of the Joint Foreign Committee in 1943—to ask for a reversal of the decision of the Board of Deputies in 1936 not to join the World Jewish Congress, his reason was less the storm of protest which he knew it would certainly have aroused from the non-Zionists on the Board, than the emphatic personal conviction he had formed against such a curtailment of the Board's traditional representative role. He explained:[69]

> I am against the handing over of any functions of the Anglo-Jewish community to some other body, because it would be disastrous to Jewish interests if the British Government, or Parliament, or British public life obtained the impression that the opinions of British Jews were given by a body sitting in New York or anywhere else outside this country ... The World Jewish Congress therefore can have no right to carry out acts in this country in any sphere which may be interpreted as being on behalf of Anglo-Jewry ... On the other hand, I think that we should recognise the British Section as the representative in Great Britain of the Executive of the World Jewish Congress which functions in America, so that the World Jewish Congress may have in the British Section the means of easy approach to governments that are conveniently spoken to in this country ...

However, in practice, Brodetsky experienced great difficulty in establishing such a division of spheres. The W.J.C. leader, Stephen Wise, wrote from New York, objecting that if 'the Congress is to be excluded not only from the internal affairs of Anglo-Jewry [to which Wise was agreeable] but also, in any effective sense, from what you call "foreign affairs", it looks very much as though what you are asking us to do is to urge the British Section to drop any kind of significant activity'. Wise was also aware of the delicacy of the situation created, somewhat paradoxically, by the very fact of the Zionist Brodetsky's election:[70]

> The rest of the difficulty is of course the refusal of the Board to join the Congress. So long as there was open hostility, there was no real problem. The Board having refused to work with us, we were entitled, if we could obtain the moral authority to do so, to work by ourselves. It is your election which has changed the situation. In strict logic, we ought to urge you to seek to solve the problem by pressing the Board to reverse its previous negative decision, which was after all arrived at by a very small majority. But we recognize the difficulty of your situation and have done nothing to embarrass you by urging such a course upon you. It is, however, quite impossible for us to accept the view that the Board is not only entitled to stand aloof from the only effort to organize the Jewish people on a democratic basis in defence of its rights in the Diaspora, but has at the same time the moral right to demand that, in attempting to organize the Jewish people, the Congress must do no work in Great Britain.

The correspondence between the Board and the W.J.C. reflects recurrent friction and a chronic failure to maintain a *modus vivendi* or even to formulate exact terms of agreement. The British Section of the W.J.C.—headed by a team of talented and devoted leaders who included not only Rabbi Perlzweig and Noah Barou, but also the dynamic Labour Party M.P., S. S. Silverman, the outstanding political journalist A. L. Easterman, and even some members of the most highly connected Anglo-Jewish families (notably the Marchioness of Reading)—energetically went about its political work on behalf of devastated European Jewry. The British Section frequently trod on the

Board's toes—and *vice versa*. Only after nearly three years of tortuous negotiations and correspondence did the two bodies finally reach an agreement in March 1944.[71] Even then the compact was far from unequivocal and conclusive. On the one hand, it provided for regular exchanges of information between the Board's Foreign Affairs Committee and the European Division of the W.J.C., and it stated that 'the Board of Deputies is recognised by the European Division of the World Jewish Congress as the representative body of British Jewry, authorised as such to make representations on behalf of the Jewish community in the United Kingdom in regard to both internal and foreign affairs'. On the other hand, it affirmed that in the final analysis 'each body should retain its freedom of action'. Consequently, even after the 1944 agreement, there was continuing dissension.[72]

Ideologically, the World Jewish Congress represented a considerable accretion of strength to Anglo-Jewish Zionists in Britain. Functionally, the Congress clashed repeatedly even with the 'Zionized' Board of Deputies and impeded Brodetsky's endeavour to attain a unified representative voice for British Jewry on all foreign affairs matters of Jewish concern.

V

When the leaders of the Zionist Federation of Britain were debating such crucial issues as a post-war settlement of the Palestine issue, they did not believe that it would be enough for them to achieve in the community of British Jews a massive Zionist consensus. That community must not only be in favour of Zionism, it was essential for it to be seen to be so. Brodetsky and Bakstansky were fully agreed about the importance of incontrovertibly demonstrating to the Government officials in charge of the Foreign Office and of the Colonial Office that the overwhelming majority of British Jewry gave their unconditional support to the official policies of the World Zionist Organization. But they differed on the means to be employed. While Brodetsky believed it necessary to have conciliatory relations with non-Zionists on the Board, Bakstansky and his associates held that an uncompromising Zionist hegemony was necessary.

The question now to be considered, in retrospect, is whether the 'capture' of the Board of Deputies of British Jews had the effect intended by the Zionists. The latter certainly gained a great victory when the Board issued in November 1944 its major 'Statement on Post-War Policy', the text of which had been formulated by its Palestine Committee. It closely followed the wording of the Biltmore Resolution which the World Zionist Organization had issued in May 1942. The statement stressed that 'future policy in regard to Palestine must clearly begin with the abrogation of the White Paper', and urged that 'Palestine

be designated to become, after an agreed period of transitional government, a Jewish State or Commonwealth', which might find a place within the British Commonwealth of Nations. It asked[73] that

> during the transitional period, before the full establishment of the Jewish State or Commonwealth, the Jewish Agency, recognised under the Mandate as the authorised representative of the Jewish people in relation to Palestine, be vested with authority to direct and regulate immigration into Palestine ... and to utilise the uncultivated and unoccupied lands for Jewish colonisation and for the benefit of the country as a whole.

The minority of anti-Zionists on the Board strongly opposed this statement. Their leading spokesmen, Louis Gluckstein and Basil Henriques, advocated an amendment which would eliminate all mention of the words 'State' or 'Commonwealth'. Gluckstein argued that the proposers of the statement 'were descending into a narrow nationalism just at the moment when the rest of the world was turning its mind to a greater ideal in internationalism'. Basil Henriques declared that to him 'the word "Jew" meant religion and nothing but religion'. He warned that 'if for the sake of evading persecution Jews were to lock themselves up into a ghetto State, they were not fulfilling the prophetic message of their ancestors'. But when put to the vote the amendment removing all mention of the words 'State' or 'Commonwealth' was roundly defeated by 159 to 18 votes. When the document as a whole was put to the vote, it was accepted by 85 for and 20 against.[74]

However, Brodetsky's reservations about the wisdom of dissolving the Joint Foreign Committee were borne out by later events: the Anglo-Jewish Association did not capitulate. Having rejected Brodetsky's sincere but constrained efforts to reach a new compromise, the Association duly set up its own independent General Purposes and Foreign Committee under the chairmanship of Leonard Stein. In October 1943 Stein wrote to the Foreign Office to inform it of the new position and to express his trust 'that the Secretary of State may be willing to extend the same facilities for placing their views before him as have been accorded to them in the past'.[75] The Foreign Office acceded to this request and in the years which followed it received a number of delegations and statements of policy from the leaders of the A.J.A., who included Neville Laski, the former President of the Board of Deputies, as well as Leonard Stein and Sir Robert Waley Cohen.

Brodetsky exerted himself greatly to reach some kind of understanding with the A.J.A. which might avoid 'the scandal of dual representations to the Government'. The files of the Board of Deputies contain an extensive correspondence and records of many meetings between representatives of the two bodies. Finally, in March 1944 an agreement was reached about a regular exchange of information; it made prior consultations obligatory before any approach to the Government on

major matters concerning post-war policies.[76] Nevertheless, later differences between the two bodies over policy on the future of Palestine proved insurmountable. In conformity with their agreement, the Board consulted the A.J.A. before presenting its major 'Statement on Post-War Policy' to the Foreign Office. But Stein told Brodetsky that even 'speaking as a Zionist of many years standing', he was quite unable to recommend that the A.J.A. endorse the Board's Statement. 'If I were asked what I wanted, without being obliged to explain how I proposed to attain it', he frankly explained, 'I should personally say (putting it very generally) that the Palestine I should like to see is a Palestine with a predominantly Jewish population enjoying self-government within, or under the protection of the British Empire.'[77]

Stein's opposition to the Board's Statement was moderate. Sir Robert Waley Cohen, on the other hand, bluntly advocated that 'the Jews should give up their demand for a "Jewish State" and satisfy themselves with being members—with the fullest citizens' rights—of a "Palestine State" '. 'The Arabs on their side', he added, 'must agree to free immigration of Jews to the maximum extent which the country can support, this maximum to be decided by a body independent of the Government of the day, consisting of Jews and Arabs in equal numbers with an independent English chairman.'[78]

The Anglo-Jewish Association not only refused to endorse the Board's Statement on Post-War Policy but decided to formulate a 'Memorandum on Palestine' of its own. It agreed with the Board that the 1939 White Paper must be revoked: 'We feel that it is not possible to reconcile this measure with any fair interpretation of the Mandate.' It explained: 'Any adequate conception of a Jewish National Home in Palestine must imply the maximum Jewish immigration into the country and ... without facilities for acquiring land under reasonable economic conditions large-scale immigration will be impracticable.' However, the Association implicitly rejected Jewish statehood, but proposed instead[79] that after the war the Government of Palestine should be so conducted

> as to further the development of the Jewish National Home in an undivided Palestine, facilitate and expedite the immigration and settlement of Jews desirous of making their homes in that country ... create conditions conducive to the attainment by Palestine of the status of a self-governing territory, with a constitution designed to meet the special needs of the country, within or in close association with the British Commonwealth and Empire.

The Zionists denounced the A.J.A.'s Memorandum and conducted a vigorous campaign against submitting it to the Government in order to avoid giving the public impression that 'the Jews are divided on the Jewish State'. Addressing a Zionist Conference in Manchester in October 1944, Lavy Bakstansky condemned the Memorandum as

'clearly an act in opposition to the one policy which represents the wish of our people'. He exclaimed, 'Remember Edwin Montagu! Remember the letter to *The Times* in 1917!' He reminded his audience that the Anglo-Jewish Association was a self-appointed body and said: 'The Stamford Hill Zionist Society alone has as many members as you command. What right have you to rush to His Majesty's Government speaking on behalf of your Association and pretending to be a representative body, with a memorandum which may prejudice the fate of our people?' He warned:[80]

> Jewish history will never forgive you. Your fathers in 1917 did not succeed in killing the Balfour Declaration, but they may have helped in whittling down its original terms and it is not unreasonable to argue that, had the original Declaration been allowed to prevail, many hundreds of thousands of Jews who have since perished at the hands of Hitler, would have been proud citizens of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine.

Leonard Stein took offence at Bakstansky's abusive reprimands and complained bitterly about them to Selig Brodetsky, claiming that he himself was as much of a Zionist as he had ever been.[81] However, the A.J.A.'s intention of stating publicly that its members were against the Board of Deputies' appeal to the British Government had deeply perturbed even the moderate Brodetsky. He therefore replied to Stein that while the language of Zionist attacks against the A.J.A. was not the one he himself would have employed, he could not help but note the similarity of the present situation to that of 1917. He urged Stein not to put the A.J.A.'s case to the Foreign Office, pointing out that it 'would not only create a violent eruption and schism in the community, but would defeat the ends of the many like yourself in the Anglo-Jewish Association who wish to see the Jews securely established in their own homeland'.[82] Nevertheless, in January 1945 the A.J.A. submitted its Memorandum to the Foreign Office. It also entered into closer co-operation with its parallel American Jewish organization—the American Jewish Committee.

The Board of Deputies and the A.J.A. were to clash again in 1946, when the Zionists had decided to accept the proposal of partitioning Palestine and the Board had endorsed that decision, while the A.J.A. persisted in advocating 'the gradual development of self-governing institutions and the eventual emergence of a substantially autonomous Palestine associated with the British Commonwealth'.[83] Indeed, by April 1947, the rift between the two bodies had gone so far that the Council of the A.J.A. decided to withdraw its representation on the Board of Deputies.[84]

Meanwhile, a peripheral but vocal body of anti-Zionists had emerged in reaction to the Zionist 'capture' of the Board. The Jewish Fellowship—led by such prominent anti-Zionists as Basil Henriques, Louis

Gluckstein, and Brunel Cohen—declared that the Board of Deputies had 'ceased to be a representative body of all types and denominations of British Jews and has become what is elegantly described in the Jewish press as a Zionist caucus'. The Fellowship rejected the claim that the Jews were a political-national group, and it dedicated itself to upholding 'the principle that the Jews are a religious community, the members of which are united by their religion, a common tradition and history and have a distinctive contribution to make to civilisation'. Although the Fellowship did urge the British Government to permit more Jewish immigration into Palestine than the White Paper had recommended, it stressed that its attitude was 'fundamentally different from political nationalism'; it looked upon Palestine purely 'as the Holy Land, as a Jewish religious and cultural centre', and desired only 'to help the Jews who need a place of refuge to settle there'. It was strongly opposed to the notion of a Jewish state under any circumstances. Indeed, in 1946 it told the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry that even assuming 99 per cent of the inhabitants of Palestine were Jews, 'the Fellowship would still say that there is no ground for forming a Jewish state', since it would place the Diaspora Jew in 'an impossible position in relation to his fellow non-Jewish citizen ... it would lay the ground for another outbreak of anti-Semitism'.[85]

VI

How did the Foreign Office react to the conflicting representations it received from the various bodies of British Jews? The relevant documents now released by the Public Record Office lead me to the conclusion that the multiplicity of Jewish approaches from organizations purporting to have Jewish representative status of one sort or another largely neutralized the impact of the Board of Deputies' 'Zionization'. On matters relating to Jewish refugees, Jewish aliens in Britain, and the rescue of Jewish victims from Nazi-occupied Europe, there was—as we have seen—considerable overlapping between the Board of Deputies and the British Section of the World Jewish Congress. Moreover, various other representations, at times overlapping and at times complementary, reached the Foreign Office from the ultra-Orthodox *Agudas Yisroel* and from the Emergency Council of the Chief Rabbi.[86]

On matters concerning the future of Palestine, the Executive of the Jewish Agency in London (of which Selig Brodetsky was a member) remained for the Foreign Office the recognized authoritative spokesman. Furthermore, after the dissolution of the Joint Foreign Committee in July 1943, the Jewish Agency could certainly claim that its policies enjoyed the unequivocal support of the Board of Deputies of British Jews—the representative body of British Jewry which was recognized as such by the British Government. However, in fact, the authority of

the Board in the eyes of officials in the Foreign Office could not but be questioned as a result of the conflicting representations of the Anglo-Jewish Association's prestigious spokesmen.

It is perfectly obvious from Foreign Office records that that Office was kept extremely well informed on matters concerning the Jewish community in Britain—primarily through Harold Beeley, its expert on Jewish affairs at its Research and Press Section at Balliol College, Oxford. In a memorandum circulated to Foreign Office personnel in August 1943, Beeley gave an accurate and perceptive description of the formation of the Zionist caucus (headed by Bakstansky) and of the 'capture' of the Board of Deputies. Beeley himself was most certainly not favourably disposed to Zionist aspirations. Nevertheless, his reports were remarkably objective and he discerningly recognized that, quite apart from the machinations of the caucus, there was, in fact, a high consensus of support for Zionism among British Jews. He noted that the bone of contention between the Board and the A.J.A. was 'not one of Zionism versus anti-Zionism', and that 'the majority of the Anglo-Jewish Association, and certainly of the opposition to the caucus on the Board of Deputies are sympathetic to the Zionist cause'. He added: 'They do not, however, in all circumstances follow the lead of the Zionist headquarters in Great Russell Street [the Jewish Agency] even on issues relating to Palestine. Still less are they willing to do so on the great variety of non-Palestinian questions with which the representative bodies of the Anglo-Jewish community are concerned.' Beeley's conclusions in August 1943 concerning the implications of the situation for the British Government were:[87]

(1) that the policy of the Board of Deputies of British Jews will be directed by the leaders of the Zionist Organisation in this country; and
(2) that views on the future of the Jews in foreign countries, notably on the continent of Europe and in Palestine, will be put before H.M.G. by two distinct bodies with different outlooks—the one elected by a wide constituency but controlled in the last resort by an international organisation with a single objective, the other representing a small upper class of assimilated British Jews.

Thus briefed, the members of the Foreign Office who had to deal with Anglo-Jewish representations could hardly have attached overwhelming importance to the views of the Board of Deputies, which could always be conveniently counterbalanced by the conflicting views of the Anglo-Jewish Association. It may therefore be that the 'capture' of the Board by the Zionists made little difference and even was counter-productive in some respects. One official, I. L. Henderson, indeed made the following marginal comment: 'The trend of Jewish organisation in this country appears to be towards the loss of its British character and the assumption of an international one ... the influence of Eastern

European Jews here as elsewhere is growing (a thoroughly bad sign).' A. W. G. Randall, an important counsellor at the Foreign Office and formerly head of the Refugee Department, commented on Beeley's memorandum: 'We should obviously not go back on any understandings we have given to the British Board of Deputies but in future we should bear in mind that Zionist aims will tend to dominate the British Board.' He added that an independent source had let him know that Dr. Brodetsky himself deplored recent developments but had so far 'been unable to withstand his more energetic colleagues'.[88]

The approaches which the small Jewish Fellowship made to the Foreign Office somewhat weakened again the Board's claim that it was the acknowledged and undisputed representative of the Jewish community of Britain. Although that Office was well aware that the Fellowship was a peripheral group within an overwhelmingly pro-Zionist community, the anti-Zionist representations it made enabled Beeley to comment: 'It is true that nearly all Zionists are Jews, but many Jews are not Zionists.'[89]

It is more difficult to gauge the effect of the approaches made by the World Jewish Congress to the Foreign Office. The W.J.C.'s stand on Zionist aspirations was largely in harmony with that of the 'Zionized' Board of Deputies. However, it appears—if one is to go by the available Foreign Office records—that Brodetsky was right in his opinion that the Zionist cause was best served if the Board of Deputies maintained its prerogative of speaking for British Jewry. In British Government official circles, the British Section of the W.J.C. did not enjoy a status equivalent to that of the Board or of the Anglo-Jewish Association. A major memorandum on 'The World Jewish Congress and Jewish Nationalism' prepared by Harold Beeley in January 1944 concluded that 'any recognition of the World Jewish Congress as representing "the Jewish People" would meet with vehement protests from other Jewish organisations and would not in fact simplify the treatment of Jewish problems'. Beeley pointed out that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association were the proper channels of communication for all foreign affairs not directly within the sphere of the Jewish Agency, and he recommended that the best interest of His Majesty's Government would be served by avoiding taking account of the Congress.[90] He explained[91] that the W.J.C.'s claims were based on two assertions:

(a) that the Jews in all parts of the world form a single people;
(b) that the World Jewish Congress represents this national entity. The former assertion is disputed by large numbers of Jews, who recognise its dangerous implications. The latter is received in representative Anglo-Jewish circles with either indignation or derision and in fact the leaders of the Congress have never received a mandate to represent 'World Jewry' or submitted themselves to election by any part of it.

The Refugee Department of the Foreign Office deemed 'that a Jew is a Jew by race and religion but that, so far as nationality is concerned, he is not a member of any supra-national body but a citizen of some individual state, e.g. Hungary, Germany, the U.K., or (on the same footing as the previous three) Palestine'. On the other hand, Paul Mason (who was the head of the Refugee Department in 1944-45) commented in November 1944 that he included the W.J.C. among those bodies which belonged 'to what we regard as the "respectable" Jewish organisations'; but he added: '... so far as the Refugee Department is concerned, we look if I may so put it, with rather special benevolence upon the two bodies of the British Jews [the Board and the A.J.A.] since we regard them, apart from their intrinsic merits, as a useful offset to the claims of the World Jewish Congress'.[92]

Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether even the representations of the Board—whether it was Zionized or not—in fact had a substantial influence on British policy or practice concerning Palestine. The Foreign Office took account of the Board's expressed views, but its officials could conveniently also take account of those of the A.J.A. and even of the Jewish Fellowship, and thus claim not to be inconsiderate of Jewish opinion in the country.

Bernard Wasserstein has incisively shown that even in the case of the tragic plight of Jewish refugees from Europe (a matter which found British Jewry far less divided than that of Palestine), the Jewish organizations proved powerless to effect any significant departure from the guiding principles of British policy, namely—no retreat from the immigration provisions of the Palestine White Paper; no admission to Britain of refugees from Nazi Europe; and no entry to the British colonies for significant numbers.[93] It is therefore not surprising that British Jewry could not significantly influence government policy on the intractable question of Palestine.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, the most significant impact of Selig Brodetsky's presidency of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the attendant Zionist 'capture' of that Board was upon the Jewish community of Britain rather than upon that country's Government. The Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland showed in those momentous years that it was capable of mobilizing its organizational resources, and its considerable influence among rank-and-file Jews, in order to override the influence of the established Jewish 'Grand Dukes' and other assimilated Anglo-Jews who had traditionally represented the community *vis-à-vis* the British Government. Although the Zionist Federation did not officially usurp the role of the Board, in effect it became the most dynamic and powerful force in the organized life of British Jews. It also

helped to transform and invigorate the Board, which may be said to have undergone an unwritten constitutional change. Its new mode of functioning has aptly been described as 'the group system', based upon an informal but real division between the governing 'Zionist Progressive Group' and the opposing 'Independent Group'—'a phenomenon as near to a party system as the procedure, functions and history of a purely voluntary body such as the Board allowed'.[94]

Above all, however, the cumulative effect of the 'Zionization' of the Board of Deputies (and the energetic activities of the World Jewish Congress) was to generate an overwhelmingly Zionist consensus among the Jews of Britain for the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. That consensus gave great support to the leaders of World Zionism in the few critical years after the Second World War; the clash (sometimes violent) between the forces of the British Mandate and the Jews of Palestine failed to undermine the Zionist stand of the Jewish community in the United Kingdom.

Selig Brodetsky himself was never entirely in control of these communal developments—as we have seen. However, it was he above all other British Jews who epitomized the dramatic ascendancy of Zionism in the Jewish community of Great Britain.

NOTES

Abbreviations:

AJ	Anglo-Jewish Archives, Mocatta Library, London
BD	The Board of Deputies of British Jews Archives, London
CZA	The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem
JC	*Jewish Chronicle*
PRO	Public Record Office, Kew, London
WJC	World Jewish Congress (British Section) Archives, London
ZR	*Zionist Review*

[1] See Chaim Bermant, *The Cousinhood: The Anglo-Jewish Gentry*, London, 1971.

[2] In 1908, Brodetsky was bracketed Senior Wrangler with one other student, when he was awarded a first-class degree. At the Jews' Free School he had already acquired the reputation of a child prodigy, having won at the age of nine a scholarship to the Central Foundation School in Cowper St. He was the first pupil of the Jews' Free School to have achieved the distinction of Senior Wrangler, and the second Jew to have done so, at Cambridge University—where he had gone on a scholarship.

[3] A large number of newspaper cuttings (in the AJ's and the CZA's holdings of Brodetsky's papers) show that Brodetsky's election in 1939 to the presidency

of the Board was widely regarded by World Jewry as an achievement for Zionism. In America, *The New Palestine* of 22 December 1939, p. 4, headlined the event as 'A Zionist Victory'. See also *ZR*, 18 January 1940, p. 1, and E. Broido, 'A Zionist President for Anglo-Jewry' in the Hebrew newspaper, *Davar*, of 2 January 1940.

[4] *Stenographische Protokoll des II Zionisten-Kongresses*, Vienna, 1898, p. 5.

[5] *The Times*, 24 May 1917; Conjoint Foreign Committee, 'Statement on the Palestine Question', 17 May 1917; AJ, 37/6/1b/3.

[6] See Stuart A. Cohen, 'The Conquest of a Community? The Zionists and the Board of Deputies in 1917', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XIX, no. 2, Dec. 1977.

[7] ibid.

[8] *ZR*, June 1934, p. 53.

[9] There were 179 Deputies present, and the resolution was passed with only seven dissenting votes. See *ZR*, January 1938, pp. 11, 12; also BD Minute Book 29, p. 198; and *JC*, 21 January 1938.

[10] *ZR*, 23 November 1939, p. 8.

[11] BD Minute Book 29, pp. 120 ff, meetings of 12 April and 26 July 1937. The renewed Joint Foreign Committee consisted of the two Presidents, two nominees of the A.J.A., six members of the Board of Deputies, and three co-options approved by two-thirds of the Committee. The Board was a widely representative organization, whose members were chosen (in 1937) by 215 London, provincial, and colonial synagogues and by 15 other communal institutions—one of which was the A.J.A. (with eight deputies). See BD Minute Book 29, pp. 138 ff, List of Constituencies, 1 July 1937. In contrast, the Anglo-Jewish Association consisted of individual members who had to be approved by its Council and who paid individual subscriptions. In 1937, the Association had only 448 members in the whole of the United Kingdom—see *A.J.A. Sixty-Sixth Annual Report 1937*, pp. 37 ff.

[12] See L. Zelmanovits, *Origins and Development of the World Jewish Congress*, London, 1943.

[13] BD Minute Book 28, p. 96; also correspondence in BD, C 11/10/2. There were 81 who voted to accept the invitation, and 105 to refuse it. The Board's President, Neville Laski, took the lead of those against participation in the W.J.C.

[14] Memorandum on the World Jewish Congress, 6 January 1937, BD, C 11/10/2.

[15] See *World Jewish Congress (British Section): Facts*, London, 1943, p. 9.

[16] Memorandum on the W.J.C. (see note 14 above) PRO, F.O. 371/20825; Neville Laski to Sir R. Vansittart, 4 March 1937, ibid. Laski wrote, *inter alia*, 'In fact there is no unity nor can there be, among Jews of different nationality, who when they meet, simply reflect the views and attitudes of the country of which they are citizens.'

[17] Neville Laski, *Jewish Rights and Jewish Wrongs*, London, 1939, pp. 149-150. See also Laski's valedictory address, BD Minute Book 32, p. 146.

[18] Meetings of 20 and 24 April 1939, and 17 November 1939, CZA, Z4/302/23.

[19] *ZR*, 27 April 1939, p. 6.

[20] Resolutions of the Fifth Annual Federation of the Zionist Youth

Conference, Manchester, 2–4 June 1939, *The Young Zionist*, July–August 1939, p. 25.

[21] See Maurice Samuelson, 'The loneliness of Lavy Bakstansky: An appreciation of a Jewish leader', *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, 22 January 1971.

[22] No direct documentary evidence is available, owing to gaps in the records. I have relied on statements made to me in the course of conversations I had with several individuals who were actively associated with Bakstansky and Brodetsky.

[23] *ZR*, 7 December 1939, p. 3; 9 November 1939, p. 3; and 16 November 1939, p. 4.

[24] BD Minute Book 30, pp. 147 ff, meetings of 19 November and 17 December 1939.

[25] ibid., meeting of 17 December 1939.

[26] Bakstansky to Brodetsky, 7 December 1939, CZA, A82, has a handwritten postcript stating, 'Please remember your promise to me: no withdrawal except if Weizmann will stand.'

[27] Colonel H. L. Nathan had first become a deputy at the Board in 1925 and had twice stood unsuccessfully as candidate for the presidency. He had been for many years a member of Parliament, first in the Liberal Party and then in the Labour Party. He was made a peer in 1940 and in the post-war Labour governments he was to be appointed, successively, Under-Secretary of State for War, and Minister of Aviation.

[28] Confidential circular letter, 8 December 1939; Bakstansky to Brodetsky, 8 December 1939; CZA, A82/9/4.

[29] Selig Brodetsky, *Memoirs: From Ghetto to Israel*, London, 1960, p. 194.

[30] Bakstansky to Brodetsky, 8 December 1939, CZA, A82/9/4.

[31] Confidential circular letter, 8 December 1939, ibid.

[32] BD Minute Book 30, p. 158, meeting of 17 December 1939; also *JC*, 22 December 1939.

[33] Selig Brodetsky, op. cit., p. 195; see also *The Functions, Machinery and Problems of the Board of Deputies: Address by Prof. Selig Brodetsky*, 21 January 1940.

[34] Selig Brodetsky, Ms. of *Memoirs*, p. 342. (I am indebted to Selig Brodetsky's son, the late Paul Brodetsky, for giving me access to this Ms., upon which the published *Memoirs* were based.) Brodetsky states rather vaguely: 'In mid 1940 I persuaded Weizmann to arrange a discussion between Zionists and non-Zionists . . .' However, this meeting actually took place on 9 September 1941: see *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, vol. XX, Series A, edited by M. J. Cohen, Jerusalem, 1979, pp. 201, 204, 257–60.

[35] Anthony de Rothschild to Brodetsky, 16 December 1940 and 12 February 1941; Brodetsky to Rothschild, 16 January 1941; AJ, Brodetsky papers.

[36] BD Minute Book 32, pp. 17–26. See also the exchange of letters between Bakstansky and Gluckstein, 11–30 June 1942 in AJ, 110/8.

[37] Brodetsky to Waley Cohen, 16 November 1942 and Waley Cohen to Brodetsky, 19 November 1942, BD, B 5/2/2.

[38] On the significance of the Biltmore Programme and the reaction of non-Zionists, see Ben Halpern, *The Idea of the Jewish State*, Cambridge, Mass., 1969, pp. 39–40; and Melvyn Urofsky, *We Are One: American Jewry and Israel*, New York, 1978, pp. 19–30.

[39] The opposition of the A.J.A. to a Jewish state 'in the form asked for by the Biltmore resolution of 1942' found expression in several of its major policy statements during this period; see Leonard Stein's retrospective survey, 'Anglo-Jewry and Palestine', *The Jewish Monthly*, July 1950, p. 4. In contrast, the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland enthusiastically rallied behind the Biltmore Programme, stating, '... it is clear that there is no difference between the terms "Commonwealth" and "State" in point of the measure of authority and self-determination which they denote'. See *Speakers Notes no. 2: The Jewish State Idea in Zionism*, Zionist Federation, Dept. of Education and Propaganda, December 1943, p. 9.

[40] See S. Levenberg's articles in the *Zionist Review* of 16 April, 4 June, 18 June, and 9 July 1943.

[41] See the 43rd Annual Report of the Zionist Federation, London, 1943, p. 5.

[42] There is evidence of Bakstansky's intensive canvassing activities in the Zionist Federation's correspondence files: in his letters to Norman Jacobs, the Hon. Secretary of the Zionist Central Council of Manchester and Salford, he said, '... inquire immediately into the names of the candidates who will be elected to the Board by the various Synagogues and Friendly Societies ... Should you find that the opponents are suggested please try to persuade the synagogues to elect one of our supporters ... I am enclosing a list of your present representatives against whose names we have indicated by a cross those who are not so desirable.' 7 April–30 June 1943 in CZA, F13 721.

[43] *Board of Deputies of British Jews, Annual Report 1943*, p. 17.

[44] The newly represented Liberal synagogues were the New Liberal, the South London Liberal, and the Brighton and Hove Liberal. As a rule, the Liberal synagogues were represented by non-Zionists. As for the New Zionist Organization, it denied that 'Zionism was in danger from domination by the Jewish archdukes' and condemned the 'efforts at disruption, acrimonious and ill-advised campaigns ... for ensuring for the Old Zionists a complete control of the Deputies'. See the editorial in *The Jewish Standard* of 2 and 9 July 1943.

[45] The four Glasgow constituencies were Giffnock and Newlands, Netherlee and Stamperland, the Jewish Institute, and the Representative Council.

[46] Examples in London are Canning Town (H. Bagel), Chevra Shass (J. Laitner and A. Dolland), Ezras Chaim (Rev. A. Baum and N. Kosky), Hoxton and Shoreditch (S. S. Perry), Dollis Hill and Gladstone Park (J. M. Ladsky and J. L. Singer), Kehal Yisroel (M. Rabinowitz), Stepney Orthodox (J. Cohen, S. Ellenberg, and C. Tennenhaus), and Wellington Road (M. Gorowitz and E. Stekel). Another indication of the effect of the caucus may be found in the increase of representation taken up by some congregations—for example, the Lubiner and Lomzer sent three representatives while it had only one before July 1943, and one—moreover—who had never attended a single meeting. The same was true of the provinces: there is the reappearance for Leeds of the Chassidishe (S. S. Levin) and the Herzl Moser (A. Weizman), and the increase of Leeds United (Brodetsky's own constituency) from three to five representatives. In Manchester there was renewed representation by the Austrian (Dr. H. Lurie), Prestwich (N. Berkeley), Sellel and Psalms (N. M. Jacobs, one of Bakstansky's closest collaborators in caucus matters), United (J. M. Hyman and S. Glicher), and Central which increased its representation from two to

three—one of whom was S. Levenberg, the Poale Zion leader and editor of the *Zionist Review*.

[47] *JC*, 9 July 1943. Also BD Minute Book 32, pp. 90 ff, meeting of 4 July 1943. Lists of the deputies returned for the Board's sessions beginning in July 1937, July 1940, and July 1943, may be found in the Board's Annual Reports for those years in BD Minute Books 29 (pp. 138 ff), 31 (pp. 2 ff), and 32 (pp. 86 ff). These show the composition of the Board before and after the July 1943 elections. I was unsuccessful in my search in the Zionist Federation records for any list of caucus-sponsored deputies such as might facilitate an exact reckoning of the strength of the Zionist groups at the critical Board election meetings of 4 and 25 July 1943. However, on the basis of a number of sources (identification of deputies' allegiance by interviewees who had served on the Board in 1943; identification of synagogue constituents also affiliated to the Zionist Federation; and deputies identified as Zionists on lists which I found in WJC, Box 77), it may reasonably be estimated that more than half the 420 deputies elected to the Board in July 1943 had some form of Zionist allegiance which rendered them amenable to pressure from the caucus. They could be relied upon to vote for Brodetsky as President. However, as both Bakstansky's relevant correspondence and the actual voting results show, they would not all accept 'guidance' from the caucus on the matter of the dissolution of the Joint Foreign Committee. As for the Anglo-Jewish Association, it had only eight direct representatives on the Board. Another 29 of its Council members (including Neville Laski) sat on the Board as representatives of other constituent bodies, while a few dozen more deputies were subscribing members of the A.J.A. and some of these were also members of Zionist organizations.

[48] BD Minute Book 32, pp. 90 ff. See also Leonard Stein's presidential address in *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Anglo-Jewish Association*, 2 June 1943, p. 3. Stein argued: 'Looked at in the abstract and without reference to realities, the arrangement may seem to some minds illogical. The same can be said of certain features of the British constitution. But, like the British constitution, the Joint Foreign Committee has one great merit—it works; and the lesson of experience is that it works, on the whole, to the general advantage of the community.'

[49] BD Minute Book 32, ibid.

[50] The *Zionist Review* admitted as much: 'The vote for the non-renewal would have been larger had not a few Zionists thought that their duty lay in defying the decision of the Zionist Federation's Public Relations Committee.' *ZR*, 9 July 1943, p. 1.

[51] BD Minute Book 32, pp. 90 ff, Voting Paper Results 25 July 1943. These three committees were the most important from the Zionist point of view. Of the 18 members on the Law, Parliamentary and General Purposes Committee, only five were 'caucus' Zionists, while another six were more loosely associated with Zionism. Of nine on the Defence Committee, four were 'caucus' Zionists and one was loosely associated with Zionism. Of eight on the Finance Committee, two were 'caucus' Zionists and another two were more loosely associated with Zionism. I have arrived at these figures on the basis of Bakstansky's correspondence files and with the help of interviewees who were associated with the caucus, especially Dr. S. Levenberg and Mr. B. Cherrick.

[52] *JC*, 9 July 1943.

[53] See especially the pamphlet, *The Deputies Controversy: Constructive Work or Disruption?*, Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland, 1943 (reprinted from *ZR*, 24 September 1943).

[54] *JC*, 30 July 1943; BD Minute Book 32, pp. 102–22, 17 September 1943. The Chairman of the Law and Parliamentary Committee, Dr. Epstein, reported after 'very searching enquiries into the Spitalfields matter' that if they approached it 'from a strictly legal point of view ... there were irregularities, but if they took the human side, they would see that those irregularities did not matter.' When Elton's motion that Professor Samson Wright's election be declared invalid was put to the vote, it was defeated by 95 to 12. (Of the approximately 280 deputies present, 50 abstained while the others had left owing to the lateness of the hour.)

[55] Bakstansky to Brodetsky, 28 April 1943, AJ, Brodetsky Papers.

[56] See Selig Brodetsky's *Memoirs*, op. cit., pp. 228, 229. In the pre-edited Ms. of these memoirs, Brodetsky was a little more explicit, although there also he chose to be discreet, noting only (p. 388) that he regarded it as 'foolish for the Zionists to trumpet the fact that they were out to capture the Board', and that his 'Zionist friends made a mistake in being in too great a hurry'.

[57] The composition of the Joint Foreign Committee had undergone change since the 1937 reform referred to above. From 10 (plus up to three co-options), it was increased in November 1939 'for the duration of the war' to 14 (plus up to three co-options). The enlarged Committee consisted of the Presidents of the Board and of the A.J.A. (as joint chairmen), nine representatives of the Board, three of the A.J.A., and up to three co-options. Brodetsky was now proposing a much larger Committee, with an overwhelming majority of Board representatives but no increase in those of the A.J.A.

[58] Brodetsky to Bakstansky, 23 June 1943; similarly, Brodetsky to Moss, 23 June 1943; AJ, Brodetsky Papers.

[59] Brodetsky to Simon Marks, 30 June 1943; ibid.

[60] 'Statement by S. Brodetsky' attached to letter dated 8 October 1943; Brodetsky to Greenberg, June or July (exact date obscure) 1943; ibid. Also Brodetsky *Ms.*, p. 388.

[61] Greenberg to Brodetsky, 13 July 1943. Other associates, who could not rightly be called anti-Zionists, also pressed Brodetsky to repudiate the militants. One of them was D. I. Sandelson of Leeds, who referred to the 'beastly caucus people': Sandelson to Brodetsky, 10 August 1943. AJ, Brodetsky Papers.

[62] Brodetsky to Bakstansky, 23 September 1943; ibid.

[63] Bakstansky to Brodetsky, 6 October and 30 November 1943; this irritated even the moderate Brodetsky sufficiently for him to retort: 'I am getting a little tired of being told by you over and over again that I am in danger of falling away from Zionist orthodoxy' (Brodetsky to Bakstansky, 1 December 1943); ibid.

[64] Bakstansky to Brodetsky, 15 September 1943, ibid.

[65] 'Statement by S. Brodetsky', see Note 60 above; ibid.

[66] Bakstansky to Brodetsky, 11 October 1943; ibid.

[67] 'Statement by S. Brodetsky', ibid. At the same time, Brodetsky's own feelers and proposals—that the President of the A.J.A. agree to become Vice-Chairman of the Board's Foreign Affairs Committee—were rejected by the A.J.A. See *A.J.A. Executive Committee Report*, November 1943, p. 142.

[68] Copy of Bakstansky's letter to Brodetsky, 26 July 1941; AJ, 37/6/5/43. Bakstansky was writing from New York, where he was temporarily working with the United Palestine Appeal and where he was also in close touch with Stephen Wise and other leaders of the W.J.C.

[69] 'Professor Brodetsky on the World Jewish Congress', speech at Glasgow, 28 April 1941; BD, B5/2/5.

[70] Stephen Wise to Brodetsky, 7 July 1941; WJC, Box 77 (Relations with Board of Deputies 1940–44); also BD, B5/2/1.

[71] See especially, 'Meeting between Representatives of the Board of Deputies and the World Jewish Congress to Discuss Proposals for an Understanding', 18 October 1943; WJC, Box 77. Also BD, C11/10/4–6 and BD Minute Book 32, p. 191, 'The Deputies Agreement with the W.J.C.'

[72] Correspondence between Brotman and Easterman, especially 30 May to 9 June 1944; BD, C 11/10/5.

[73] *Statement on Post-War Policy and Policy on Palestine for Submission to the Colonial and Foreign Office*, Board of Deputies of British Jews, November 1944.

[74] BD Minute Book 32, pp. 251 ff, 'Meeting of 5 November 1944'.

[75] Leonard Stein to the Foreign Office, 29 October 1943, and F.O. reply, 6 November 1943; PRO, F.O. 371/36741.

[76] See especially, 'Meeting of Representatives of Board of Deputies Foreign Affairs Committee and Anglo-Jewish Association General Purposes and Foreign Committee', 29 November 1943, BD, C11/1/7; BD Minute Book 32, pp. 142–96 and *JC*, 24 March 1944.

[77] Stein to Brodetsky, 8 June 1944; and Stein to A. de Rothschild, 11 August 1943. Leonard Stein Papers, Box 113, Bodleian, Oxford.

[78] Waley Cohen to Alexander (copy), 4 July 1944, ibid.

[79] *Anglo-Jewish Association Memorandum on Palestine*, London, 1944; AJ, 95/69. That memorandum was approved by the Annual General Meeting of the A.J.A. on 2 November 1944, and by a special General Meeting on 7 December 1944.

[80] *ZR*, 3 November 1944, p. 7.

[81] Stein to Brodetsky, 29 October 1944; Leonard Stein Papers, Box 113, Bodleian.

[82] Brodetsky to Stein, 30 October 1944, and further correspondence; ibid.

[83] See Leonard Stein's speech, 'Anglo-Jewry and Israel', delivered at the A.J.A. Conference in Birmingham on 11 June 1950; AJ, 95/69. See also *Anglo-Jewish Association Memorandum for Submission to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry*; it was approved by the A.J.A. Council on 22 January 1946.

[84] See especially Temkin to Brotman, 24 April 1947; BD, C 11/1/7. These difficulties were overcome only after the creation of the State of Israel.

[85] These quotations are from the Minutes of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (mimeographed), 30 January 1946. The Minutes include the Fellowship's memorandum and oral evidence; AJ, 95/69. See also the Fellowship's *A Challenge to All Jews*, London, n.d.

[86] For a full discussion of these overlapping representations, see Meir Sompolinsky, 'The Anglo-Jewish Leadership, the British Government and the Holocaust', unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Bar Ilan University, 1977 (in Hebrew), *passim*, but especially pp. 13–33.

[87] Memorandum from Harold Beeley, 20 August 1943; PRO, F.O. 371/

36741. Beeley consistently held that in the final analysis the A.J.A.'s position on the future of Palestine was not far removed from that of the World Zionist Organization. For example, on the A.J.A.'s controversial 1944 Memorandum on Palestine, Beeley commented: 'The Zionists are expressing more indignation than would seem to be called for ... True there is no mention of a Jewish state but what else could flow from "expediting" immigration and creating conditions conducive to "self-government"?' See F.O. 371/40138.

[88] For Henderson's and Randall's comments, see F.O. 371/36741. Randall's informant was Harry Goodman, the leader of *Agudas Yisroel* in Britain and a member of both the Board of Deputies and the A.J.A. PRO, F.O. 371/40138.

[89] Beeley's marginal comment on a communication from the Jewish Fellowship dated 11 December 1946; PRO, F.O. 371/52503.

[90] See PRO, F.O. 371/42773.

[91] Memorandum from Harold Beeley, 11 November 1944; PRO, F.O. 371/42893.

[92] Marginal comments by Mason, ibid.

[93] See Bernard Wasserstein, *Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945*, Oxford, 1979, p. 38.

[94] See Israel Finestein, 'The Group System at the Board' in *Concord* (the Forum of the Jewish Defence Committee), no. 10, June 1949, for a perceptive and well-informed discussion of this system. See also the critical evaluation of the Board's group system by Gordon Liverman, who was Treasurer of the Board during that period, in *JC*, 26 December 1947, p. 21.

A POPULATION POLICY FOR ISRAEL?

Roberto Bachi

Review Article

I

THIS article has evolved out of the kind invitation of *The Jewish Journal of Sociology* to review *The Population of Israel* by Dov Friedlander and Calvin Goldscheider.*

The book deals mainly with only one aspect of the demography of Israel: population policies. This is a complex and important field, which has not yet been studied to a sufficient extent and depth. However, I doubt whether the present volume satisfactory fills this lacuna or contributes practical advice to policy makers for the following main reasons:

1. Only two aspects of population policies are analysed: those concerned with immigration and with natality.

With respect to immigration policies, it seems to me that some of the main conclusions are at variance with the results of the detailed analysis, as I will show in the next section.

As for natality policies, the authors present a systematic demonstration of their thesis that the pronatal policies proposed in Israel in 1966 were futile. That thesis is based on a chain of arguments which cannot but impress uninformed and uncritical readers. However, patient checking of their data and of the conclusions drawn from them reveals weaknesses and internal contradictions which, in my opinion, invalidate their main thesis (as will be seen below, in Section III).

2. The neglect of other aspects of population policies is regrettable, since these may also directly or indirectly influence population growth and structure.[1] For instance:

(*i*) The analysis of effects of migratory movements on population growth should not be based only on the study of immigration: obviously, 'losses' due to emigration should be also considered. Emigration from

* Dov Friedlander and Calvin Goldscheider, *The Population of Israel*, xxiii + 240 pp., Columbia University Press, New York, 1979, $21.90.

Israel is a complex and sensitive issue; its relative size and characteristics have greatly altered in the course of time: in most periods it has been largely a 'backflow' movement of recent immigrants, while in other periods (as in recent years), those who left the country included considerable proportions of young people born in Israel. Policies designed to discourage emigration and to encourage the return of Israelis who have settled abroad deserve serious analysis.[2]

(*ii*) Health policies have had an enormous influence on reducing mortality and thus modifying population development and structure of both Jews and non-Jews in Palestine during the British Mandate, in Israel during the first years of independence, and in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza after the Six-Day War.

(*iii*) Finally, policies connected with rural settlement, urban development, the establishment of new towns, etc., have had important demographic effects.

The book under review is divided into three parts: the 'background to population growth and policy in Palestine and Israel'; 'population policy: trends and patterns'; and the 'evaluation and implications of population growth and policy'.

There are two chapters in the first part. One is on 'Zionism and population', but regrettably, neither substantiating evidence nor indication of periods is given in regard to 'Zionist ideologies' which 'differed on key demographic issues such as (1) the pace of Immigration . . .; (2) population composition . . .; and (3) eventual population size . . .' (p. 9). The second chapter is on 'demographic background', and is followed by a collection of detailed tables (pp. 30–50), many of which are not utilized in the text.

In this review article I shall concentrate mainly on problems of natality policies, since I believe these to be of particular importance for the future of the Jewish people.

II

Part Two of *The Population of Israel* consists of three chapters; 'Immigration Policies and Patterns in Palestine', 'Immigration Policies and Patterns in Israel', and 'Natality Policies: Trends and Patterns'. The history of immigration during the last period of Ottoman rule, the British Mandate, and the first thirty years of Israeli independence is well known and the literature on it is enormous. Nevertheless, it may be perfectly justifiable to retell this history as background for the scientific analysis of aspects which have not yet been sufficiently clarified. It seems to me that the authors have selected as main foci of interest the following ones, which are certainly of considerable importance:

(*a*) disentangling from other 'components' or factors of immigration

(pp. 84–85) 'immigration policies'[3] and evaluating their success or failure;

(*b*) learning from past experience in order to formulate desirable future policies; and

(*c*) evaluating whether Jewish immigration to Palestine and Israel is mainly similar to, or dissimilar from, other large migratory movements.

(*a*) *Evaluation of past immigration policies.* In order to help in the evaluation of policies, the authors suggest a model of components of immigration and their inter-relationships (pp. 84–85). The model is based on the idea that given the intensity of the Zionist ideological factor, 'immigration volume and characteristics' are governed by 'conditions of Jewish communities, immigration policies, means of implementing policies, and conditions in Israel'. In framing this model, the authors make little use of the existing literature on immigration models in general and on factors of immigration to Israel in particular; they could have built a more complete model, and perhaps been able to connect the model to an empirical analysis of the enormous material available in Israel on immigration. Such an analysis might also have enabled them to achieve their goal of a systematic comparison with other international migrations.

It is to be regretted that the statistical analysis of immigration conducted on pp. 53–117 and judgements passed on the success or failure of immigration policies are mainly based on the consideration of absolute numbers of immigrants in each period. Whether a migratory flux is 'small' or 'large' cannot be judged from its absolute size. That size is to be compared (*i*) to the size of the population of origin (Jewish population in each Diaspora region) and/or (*ii*) to the size of the population in the country of immigration (the Jewish population in the Land of Israel at that period). To grasp the importance of this point let us consider two examples:

(*i*) Rates are available in the literature on immigration to Israel per 1,000 Jews in each Diaspora region in each period since 1919. These rates measure the 'propensity to immigrate' of the Jews of each region. This propensity is merely mentioned by the authors (p. 84) although one would have expected them to consider it in some detail. Even a most cursory examination of these rates reveals very interesting features in regard to differentials of immigration propensities between regions and between periods. For instance, during the Mandate and independence decades, the propensity to emigrate from Asia, eastern Europe, Africa, the Balkans, and Central Europe was much greater than from other regions of the Diaspora.[4] The basic reason for the continuous decline in immigration to Israel, which through short-range ups and downs has been dominant after the end of the mass immigration of 1948–51, is simply the progressive exhaustion of the Jewish population of these regions in which 42 per cent of the Diaspora lived

in 1930, 20 per cent after the Holocaust, and only some 2.5 per cent now.

Having failed to show clearly this to have been the reason for a long-term decline, the authors over-emphasize, in my opinion, the self-limiting effect of large immigration (pp. 98–104, 116–17) owing to 'socioeconomic conditions that would rapidly follow . . . a high volume of immigration'.

(*ii*) They give as the main example of a large immigration the mass immigration of 1948–51. However, the rates of immigration per 1,000 Jewish inhabitants of the Land of Israel, quoted in Table 2.6 of their book, show that very high rates were attained not only in 1948–51 but also in 1924–25 and 1933–35. The effects of these great waves were quite varied: the largely middle-class eastern European immigration of 1924–25 caused in the short run an economic crisis; the second wave, which brought professional skills and large capital funds, determined an economic boom and an enormous strengthening of the Jewish *Yishuv*: in the 1948–51 immigration, the newcomers of European origin had fewer economic difficulties and absorption problems than did those of Afro-Asian origin. It is therefore inadvisable to make generalizations based on a consideration of immigration volume only. The effects of immigration surely vary according to many factors not directly related to the numbers involved—such as the age and sex structure of the newcomers, their educational level, their skills, and the capital they bring or which is provided by World Jewry for their absorption.

It is evident that an evaluation of immigration effects and of immigration policies is a very difficult undertaking. It seems to me that the authors would have succeeded better if they had utilized the very large statistical material available in Israel on the economic, social, and cultural absorption of immigrants and of their children, and on the extent of backflow of the various immigration waves, and the results of extensive and in-depth analyses carried out by sociologists and economists on the conditions of the immigrants in Israel as well as on the effects of immigration on the country's social, economic, and political conditions.

(*b*) *Desirable future immigration policies.* In their concluding chapter, the authors stress that policies for encouraging immigration are the most practical way to achieve a further growth of Israel's Jewish population. It is well known that in the long run the main sources for future immigration can be only Western countries[5] and the USSR. With regard to attempts to encourage Western immigration, Friedlander and Goldscheider are very pessimistic: 'Most of these attempts were largely unsuccessful until conditions in Israel improved considerably' (p. 117). The improvement took place in the short period between the Six-Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Since they maintain that a 'very high correlation exists between the volume of Western

emigration to Israel and economic indices' (p. 117), it would follow that the only way in which Israel may stimulate Western immigration is to improve its own socio-economic conditions. But how realistic is it to expect Israel to be able to become economically almost as attractive as, say, North America or Western Europe?

However, the problem of whether, and how, to encourage Russian and Western immigration should not have been treated only cursorily. Much might have been learnt from the material collected and scientific analysis carried out in the past fifteen years or so, on topics such as the following: the large differentials in the propensity to emigrate to Israel from different Western countries; the effects of actual policies on immigration propensity; the differentials between streams of Jews from the USSR directed towards Israel and towards other countries and the effects of policies over the two streams; and the presumed effects of policies aimed at immigrant absorption and the prevention of the re-emigration of Jews from Western countries and the USSR.

(*c*) *Comparison between Jewish immigration to Palestine and Israel and other large migratory movements.* The authors say in the concluding paragraph of their second chapter on immigration policies and patterns: 'Immigration to Israel, despite the unique forces of nationalism, Zionism, ideology, and policy has responded in remarkably similar ways to socioeconomic "pushes" and 'pulls" that have played the key roles in general processes of immigration to countries around the world' (p. 117).

This is a sweeping statement. It would take too long to show that it cannot be justified on the basis of the analysis of the data in other parts of the book. Suffice it to say that for the purpose of international comparisons, it would surely have been important to consider also migrations which have occurred as a result of political (and not only socio-economic) factors.

III

Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to natality policy: chapter 5 gives a historical sketch of pronatal views developed in Palestine[6] and Israel, and summarizes a Report submitted in 1966 to the Government of Israel by an *ad hoc* committee on problems of natality. Chapter 6 is a critical evaluation of this Report, which reproduces with little change a paper published by Friedlander in 1974.[7]

Very little space is devoted to the actual implementation of demographic policies in Israel during 1968–78 (pp. 137–40); and no space at all is given to the analysis of actual changes in fertility which took place in Israel in that period.

It may be noted that the Natality Report[8] was prepared at the request of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who became worried in the early

1960s both by the general demographic problems of Israel and by the socio-economic problems of underprivileged large families. The Report was written in the political and economically difficult years which preceded the Six-Day War. The summary Report[9] was approved by the Government presided by Mr. Eshkol in 1967, and some steps for its implementation were taken in a radically transformed Israel after that war. One of them was the establishment of a Demographic Centre attached to the Prime Minister's Office and later transferred to the Ministry of Labour and Welfare. Under the governments of Mrs. Golda Meir and of Mr. Rabin, considerable emphasis was given to welfare policies for underprivileged large families. However, most of these activities were developed by agencies other than the Demographic Centre.

The reprinting in the book under review of the criticism published by Professor Friedlander in 1974 of a Report prepared fifteen years ago under very different circumstances, and implemented only to a very limited extent, might not deserve here any further comment.

Nevertheless, having been engaged in the last few months in some new research on demographic policies for Israel, I have read again very carefully both the original 1974 paper by Friedlander and the corresponding chapters of the present book of which he is joint author. Since demographic policies are important for Israel, I give briefly my considered comments on the main points he raised:

(*a*) the Natality Committee failed to examine fully fertility trends;

(*b*) it aimed at a fertility level which is unattainable;

(*c*) even if high fertility levels were achieved, they would fall short of the alleged aims of demographic policy; and finally

(*d*) if it is intended to increase substantially the population of Israel, the only effective means is by fostering immigration.

(*a*) *Alleged use of insufficient data on which to base the proposed policies.* 'Failure to examine fertility trends more fully' is given both in the 1974 Friedlander paper (pp. 71–73) and in the book under review (pp. 144–46) as one of the reasons for the supposed failure of the Natality Report to frame acceptable policies.

It is well known that there are many ways of measuring fertility (the average number of children per woman), and that each of these has its particular advantages and limitations. The Committee used critically a wealth of material, published and unpublished, obtained from (i) current fertility rates for the Mandate and independence periods; (ii) retrospective detailed tables of the 1961 census on marriage and fertility; and (iii) special sample inquiries on fertility, family planning, and knowledge and practice of contraception.

However, Friedlander criticizes the Committee for not having utilized fertility data for cohorts of women (classified by year of birth or year of marriage). In fact, it was only several years after the preparation of the Report that these data became available.

A POPULATION POLICY FOR ISRAEL?

On p. 146 of the book under review, the following cohort data are quoted with the conclusion that 'at the time that the Natality Committee was discussing the decline of fertility among Europeans, fertility was actually increasing':

Average number of children per European-born Jewish woman
Marriage cohorts

	1920–34	*1935–44*	*1944–54*	*1955–59*
Immigrated before 1948	2·2	2·2	2·5	
Immigrated after 1948	2·3	2·0	2·1	2·4

The implication of this comment is clearly that the Committee was unduly alarmist.

In fact, the Committee did not base its recommendations on changing trends but on low fertility levels of European-born women. Among the many data available to the Committee, the following average current fertility rates may be compared to the cohort fertility rates mentioned above.

Average number of children per Jewish woman

	1954–57	*1958–60*	*1961–64*
Born in Europe	2·64	2·39	2·42
Born in Israel	2·83	2·76	2·73

If the data quoted by Friedlander and Goldscheider have any meaning at all for the issue discussed, they certainly confirm that the fertility of married European-born women was low around the time of the preparation of the Natality Report. Unfortunately, the authors have apparently lumped together European-born women who married in Israel and those who married abroad, so that their data cannot be considered to be a clear-cut picture of fertility in Israel.

The last remark does not apply to the following averages of children per Jewish woman born in Israel and aged 45,[10] obtained by a study of cohorts, and quoted by Friedlander in his 1974 paper (p. 73).

Average number of children per woman in the cohort born around:

1915	*1920*	*1925*	*1930*	*1935*	*1940*	*1945*	*1950*
3·66	3·32	2·94	2·82	2·76	2·84	2·70	2·60

Also these data are similar to those employed by the Natality Committee (see above). If they had been available to the members of the Committee, they would certainly not have changed the conclusion of the Report (p. 14) that 'the fertility of women born in Israel—the importance of whom will increase in the course of time—tends to become more similar to that of the women born in Europe'.

Both the Friedlander 1974 paper (pp. 79–83) and the present book

(pp. 155–59) indicate that the policy suggested by the Natality Committee assumed 'indefinite continuation of the high fertility levels among Israeli Arabs'. This policy thus 'ignored the powerful forces of social and economic change as well as processes of modernization and demographic change that have occurred elsewhere' (p. 158).

The Natality Report in fact took a very different stand. Noting that Christians in Israel were already effectively controlling fertility and that Muslims were beginning to do so—in areas of urban residence, with increasing years of education, when women were gainfully employed, and when there were contacts with the Jews—,the Report concluded (p. 19): 'The Committee is of the opinion that in the long run also the non-Jewish population of Israel will enter into the stage of fertility control. However, it is difficult to forecast the time and speed of this development.'[11]

(*b*) *The alleged aim of raising Jewish fertility to an average of 4.5 children per family.* A section of the Friedlander paper (pp. 70–71) is devoted to criticism of the Natality Report for having 'omitted demographic targets' (in term of an average number of children per family) and this criticism is repeated in the present book (pp. 143–44), although the authors had previously quoted (on p. 138) a statement made by the first director of the Demographic Centre in 1968: 'We might decide on five or four children per family as the optimum average.'

Taking this as a sort of indication of a desired national target, the authors try to examine whether this target can be attained through a natality policy. They note (p. 147) that first- and second-generation European Jews have about three children and then reason as follows: 'Let us assume, therefore, that as many as 50 per cent of families might be willing to increase the number of their children in response to incentives. In order to achieve a national average family size of 4.5 children (the number mentioned as optimum by the Demographic Center), an average increase of about three children would be necessary for those families "willing" to increase their fertility.' In other words, such families would need to have six children on an average, a target which they proceed to demonstrate as unattainable.

This is an unnecessary exercise, since the Natality Committee and later the Demographic Centre certainly did not advocate a policy aiming at the return to families with a large number of children. The Natality Report stressed that a couple must have full freedom to have the number of children they desire; it noted the different attitudes of the religious and the non-Orthodox in the population, and was against setting general targets of family size; it also examined the socio-economic problems often facing familes with large numbers of children, and recommended that family planning methods be made available to couples who wished to acquire this knowledge, so as to encourage responsible parenthood.

In order to show that pronatal policies cannot substantially affect fertility levels, the three following examples were given in the Friedlander paper and are repeated in the present book:

(*i*) An 'example of a situation in which pronatal efforts did not seem to affect fertility in a major way can be drawn from the kibbutz community in Israel' (p. 149). The 'demonstration' of this statement is based on a cursory analysis of current fertility rates in kibbutzim for a few years between 1960 and 1972. A more extensive and deeper analysis would have led to the opposite conclusion. Let us accept Friedlander's standpoint that kibbutzim adopted during the independence period pronatal attitudes and policies. Since the kibbutz population has consistently been largely of European origin, it is of interest to compare kibbutz fertility with that of other European groups. Such a comparison shows that while during the Mandate kibbutz fertility was the lowest among all European groups, in the last decades it has become the highest.[12] Moreover, while in the early forties kibbutz fertility was well below reproduction level, it has had during the entire independence period much higher levels.

(*ii*) The authors note that the general experience of pronatal policies in other countries is that 'long-term increments in family size seem to be insignificant or nonexistent' (p. 148). The only bibliographical reference for this statement is a paper published in 1968, which is not relevant in regard to population policies. The authors seem to be unaware of the enormous literature[13] which has been devoted in the past decade or so to the problems of the decrease of fertility in the developed countries, its socio-economic and political consequences, and various types of policies developed to sustain fertility and the analysis of their effects.

In order to give an idea of the wide scope of these policies, it is sufficient to indicate that an enquiry conducted by the United Nations[14] in 1976 found that 36 countries with a total population of 550 million had policies for increasing fertility or for avoiding its decrease.

It would be impossible to attempt to summarize here the lessons that can be learnt from the wide experience which has accumulated so far in the field of pronatal policies. I wish only to mention a few very general points. First, no simple, ready-made remedy seems to exist which may bring fertility within a given period to a given predetermined level (that is, to a 'target' of the type suggested by the authors). However, in many countries a wide battery of policies—economic, psychological, and social—have been put in action in order to try to give support to families and to sustain fertility. Many of the methods proposed in the 1970s in various countries are similar to those proposed in the early 1960s in the Israeli Natality Report. Second, in some eastern European countries policies have been developed which limit to some extent the former almost complete freedom of abortion. The authors

quote the examples of Romania, which reintroduced a system of controls on abortions in 1966. This was followed by a great increase in births. 'If fertility remained at these high levels it would be a very encouraging case in support of the policy to restrict abortions so as to increase fertility levels in Israel. However birth rates in Romania began to drop again after September 1967 . . ., . . . a sharp decline of almost 50 per cent followed. . . . Hence, to date, there is no evidence anywhere, the Romanian example included, demonstrating conclusively that a *sustained* increase in fertility has been achieved as a result of regulations restricting the performance of abortions' (pp. 151, 154-55).

Whilst this conclusion was based on the superficial perusal of the Romanian birth rates for a few years, a thorough statistical analysis recently carried out by B. Berelson concluded that Romanian policy 'had a large effect on increasing fertility within its first decade to the order of one-third and on the designated target. It doubled the rate of the natural increase and accounted for half of Romania's population increase during those years.' 'In short . . . Romania has enjoyed one of the world's major successes in such efforts'.[15]

Third, at the end of their chapter on the critical evaluation of natality policy, the authors state that 'a substantial increase in long-term fertility among the Jewish population is not likely to result from policies recommended by the Natality Committee. . . . It is difficult to support a pronatal policy that has an almost zero probability of attaining its fertility targets . . .' (p. 159).

Strangely enough, they completely neglected to examine fertility changes which actually took place in Israel in the brief period in which pronatal policies have been implemented, albeit to a very limited extent. Briefly, these major changes (in 1968-78) were as follows: there has been a welcome 'convergence' of fertility among the various groups of the Jewish population, with a reduction of the proportion of the underprivileged very large families of Afro-Asian origin;[16] a slow but progressive reduction of Muslim fertility;[17] and an increase in the fertility of Jews of European origin (first and second generation in Israel). Commenting upon this, in a paper published in 1978 in *Population Studies*,[18] Friedlander and Goldscheider say: 'The direction in fertility trends of the Jewish population of Israel in the past decade is clearly towards an increase. Moreover this change toward higher fertility contrasts with fertility experienced in most, if not all, presently developed countries, where fertility has declined considerably in recent years.' The authors try to explain this increase by referring to the economic improvement which occurred after 1968 and '*insurance effect*'. They suppose that 'Israel's almost constant flow of casualties during two and a half decades has increased the willingness of many parents to allocate more resources, compared to other developed countries, toward raising a large family'. This might account also for the fact that 'Israeli families

. . . desire a family size which is almost one child larger than in other developed countries'.

It is very difficult to identify the causes of fertility changes without a systematic analysis. However, it seems to me that 'insurance effect' may have been only a small contributory factor. Apart from economic changes, there might be many other factors, such as the formation of new socio-demographic norms which became fashionable among young families both in the wake of the greater optimism induced by the success of the Six-Day War and by the greater concern shown by public opinion for the nation's demographic problems. It may also be that measures taken both for demographic reasons and for reasons of social welfare and social justice were contributory factors. In fact, during this period children's allowances were much increased, housing for newly-married couples was largely subsidized, some support was given to families requiring larger living quarters in order to have an additional child, the provision of day nurseries of various types was considerably extended; and much more attention was given to the problems of working mothers. A somewhat wider provision of family planning services, and family welfare agencies, may also have had some effect on the 'convergence' of fertility.

Since all those measures were the direct or indirect result of demographic policies implemented to a modest degree after 1968, we may say at least that there is no evidence that Israel's natality policy had failed.

(*c*) *The alleged futility of the proposed natality policy.* According to the authors, even if the policies proposed by the Natality Committee did not have inherent weaknesses, they could not reach their main goals. Among the goals quoted, let us single out for discussion the following two:

(*i*) *Proportion of Israel's population in the Middle East.* The authors note that in the Middle East there are about 33 Arabs to every Israeli. They comment: 'Even a considerable increase in fertility in Israel . . . that might be attempted through pronatal policies would reduce this ratio only slightly to 32.1 by the year 2010' (p.191). In fact, pronatal policies aimed at altering substantially the proportions of Israeli Jews and of Arabs in the Middle East were certainly not considered in the framing of demographic policies in Israel.[19]

However, the question might be considered from a different angle. If full peace is not achieved in the Middle East, Israel's ability to survive is dependent—among other factors—upon its military strength. This requires, among other things, a sufficient number of citizens of military age. Within certain limits, the larger the number of young persons, the smaller the burden each of them has to carry. According to the authors' calculations (p. 212), the Jewish population of Israel in 2010 may vary between 3·8 million (in case of no immigration and low fertility) and

6·9 million (in case of high immigration and high fertility). It is certainly a matter of vital importance for Israel to aim at least at an intermediate figure between these two extremes.

(*ii*) *Israel and the Diaspora population.* The authors ask (p. 193): 'What contribution can population policies and patterns in Israel make toward the Jewish population of the world?' They calculate as follows: 'Projecting current growth rates of the Jewish population outside of Israel and Israel's growth rate based on the medium fertility assumption yields an estimated 17·5 million Jews in the world in 1990 and 21·8 million in 2010,' and add that 'the fertility of Jews in Israel has but a marginal effect on population growth rates of world Jewry'.

Their assumption of the future growth of Diaspora Jewry is in direct contradiction to the results of research carried out in the last two decades,[20] which predict a decline rather than an increase: Diaspora Jews have very low fertility, a rapidly aging population, considerable losses arising from intermarriage and assimilation, and therefore natality rates which are lower than mortality rates. The Jews of Israel are today the only important segment of world Jewry to have a natural increase instead of a natural decline. Detailed projections of the world's Jewish population recently prepared by U.O. Schmelz[21] show that the level of fertility of Israeli Jews is likely to have a very significant effect on the demographic future of World Jewry.

(*d*) *Fostering immigration is preferable to a pronatal policy.* The authors claim to have 'demonstrated that none of the population problems defined by Israel's Natality Committee as the basis for pronatal policy recommendations can be solved or reduced substantially by increasing fertility. In all cases, immigration is a much more decisive means of dealing with these problems, at least in the next several decades' (pp. 207–208). This suggestion is well in line with the following statement by Dr. Friedlander in his 1974 paper (p. 94): 'population policy suggested . . . is the diversion of efforts and means currently invested or intended to be invested in a pronatal policy toward the task of increasing Jewish immigration to Israel . . .: high immigration can achieve a non deteriorating balance between Jews and Arabs in Israel or in the Middle East . . . Since most migrations have a high proportion in the relatively young-adult age groups, a high immigration volume is likely to contribute in the short run toward an increase in the labour force. . . . Even from the point of view of world Jewry more immigration seems to make a more important contribution compared with marginally higher fertility rates in Israel.'

The above suggestions seem to be based on many misjudgements:

(*i*) Considerable investments have been made by the Jewish Agency and the Israeli Government for the encouragement and absorption of immigrants, while there has been only a small expenditure for the immediate implementation of pronatal policies. Diverting funds

from the latter to add to the resources of the former is not a realistic proposition.

(*ii*) The policy of encouraging immigration has been, and still remains, one of the basic tenets of Israel and of the Zionist movement, and it will probably be pursued in the future with a large measure of national consensus. However, in view of what the authors themselves say about the limited results achieved in recent years by all agencies concerned with the promotion of immigration, it is difficult to see how a substantial improvement could be obtained in the near future.

(*iii*) There is no justification for considering the demographic problems of Israel only in the short term. The tremendous efforts and expense which went into rebuilding Israel were not aimed at an ephemeral creation. An Israeli society with a fertility rate, say, considerably under reproduction level—as in many Western countries and among Diaspora Jews today—would in the long run endanger basic national aspirations. Even if Israel's population were to be replenished by immigration, the result would be a continuous weakening of the Diaspora, without in the long run strengthening Israel.

Chapter 7 of the book under review, on 'Implications of past population policies', is largely based on a paper by Friedlander on 'mass immigration and population dynamics in Israel', published in the November 1975 issue of *Demography*. It is practically an exercise in population projections which compares the actual Jewish population in 1972 with the hypothetical size and structure of that population, if (1) there had been no immigration during 1948–72 or if (2) the volume of immigration was distributed equally between 1948 and 1972 (pp. 163–64). No reason is given for the selection of 1972. The main results of these calculations are obvious: (1) without immigration the size of the Jewish population would have been much smaller; (2) if immigration had been evenly spread, the resulting population would have been at first much smaller than the actual one while at the end of the period the difference would not have been large.

Calculation (1) is used, among other applications, to show (p. 170) that if immigration had been zero between the establishment of the State of Israel and 1972, the percentage of Jews would have declined from 80.5 in 1947 to 65.4 in 1972 in Israel and to 38 per cent in Israel and the Administered Territories together (p. 172). However, one can question whether under the hypothesis of no immigration, a state of Israel with a Jewish population of 756,000 in 1957 and 846,000 in 1967 (p. 170) could have survived and won the 1956 Sinai campaign and the 1967 Six-Day War.

The second calculation (if immigration had been evenly spread in 1948–72) implies the hypothesis that people in refugee camps in Europe or Jews in the Yemen or in Iraq would have remained there for more than two decades in order to come to Israel in yearly equal instalments.

To be fair, a Note on p. 234 indicates that one of these calculations is 'clearly a statistical exercise that has no real sociopolitical significance, except to demonstrate in dramatic and extreme form one powerful long-term implication of the volume of mass migration to Israel'. However, while it is doubtful whether this exercise was necessary, it is to be noted that in the analysis of population projections for 1948–72 in Chapter 7 and in those for 1970–2010 in Chapter 8, the effects of mass migration are often presented as effects of 'immigration policies'. Such policies are thus shown to have been very successful.

With regard to Jewish fertility, it is supposed that it may vary at the end of the projection period between a minimum of 2 children per woman to a maximum of 3 for women born in Israel, 3·2 for those born in Europe,[22] and 3·8 for those born in Africa and Asia. Table 8B (p. 212) shows that under the hypothesis of higher fertility, the population in 2010 may be 21–24 per cent[23] larger than the total under the hypothesis of low fertility.

One might surmise that fertility is likely to be low if there is no implementation of a pronatal policy, while if such a policy is implemented fertility will rise. At least, that would be one way to assess the effectiveness of pronatal policies. The authors, however, do not consider this possibility, which would be at variance with the main thesis of their book.

Conclusion

Recent detailed projections of the world's Jewish population show that if present demographic trends are maintained, a steep numerical decline and a further rapid aging of the Diaspora population can be expected. If present levels of fertility of Jews in Israel will be maintained in the future, their natural increase may in a rather considerable measure compensate for demographic losses of the Diaspora. However, if fertility in Israel will decline, this may lead to a steep decrease of the world's Jewish population. Today this possibility cannot be ruled out. It is true that Israeli Jews are still rather familistic, that their tendency to marry is still strong, and that their fertility is higher than in the Diaspora and in the majority of developed countries. However, there have been some indications in the past few years that these trends are weakening.[24]

Population policies aim at correcting undesirable demographic developments. If the future survival of the Jewish people and the strengthening of the State of Israel are seen as desirable ends, then policies must be carefully designed to ensure that the Jewish population of Israel may reach a size and a structure which would help to attain these objectives. Such policies must be directed at supporting the institution of marriage and the stability of the family and at promoting fertility and responsible parenthood. At the same time, there must be a continuing evaluation

of existing policies directed at encouraging immigration, discouraging emigration, improving immigration absorption, and maintaining ties with the 'Israeli Diaspora' and stimulating those who have left Israel to return to the country. There is clearly room for improvement in the design and implementation of these policies.

As for pronatal policies, it is important to create a general environment and a psychological climate favourable to family development and welfare: assistance must be given to couples who wish to have more children but are deterred by practical problems. Policies concerned with labour, housing, welfare, and health must be framed by taking into full account the demographic goals. In particular, in view of the large increase of the female labour force, better provisions should be made for assisting working mothers: more creches and day nurseries; flexible working hours to allow for housekeeping and maternal duties; and provision for women to re-enter the labour force if they wish to do so, after a limited or an extended period of looking after their children at home. Some of these pro-natal policies still require careful study and systematic research, while others may be difficult to finance adequately since Israel's budget is severely strained by many other urgent needs. Nevertheless, the demographic problem is important and cannot be neglected. In the long run, it is the very survival of the Jewish people which may be at stake. All who have this survival at heart—in Israel as well as in the Diaspora—must be made fully aware of that fact.

NOTES

[1] On these aspects, see (among other sources) chapters 9, 13 and 18 of my book on *The Population of Israel*, published in 1977 by the Hebrew University (Institute of Contemporary Jewry), the Demographic Centre of the Government of Israel, and the International Committee for Cooperation in Demographic Research (Jerusalem and Paris).

[2] The population formed by Jewish emigrants from Israel and their descendants was very roughly evaluated in 1975 at some 371,000. See p. 126 of my *The Population of Israel*, op. cit.

[3] Immigration policies are said to 'refer to laws, regulations and policy declarations that focus on the goals of immigration' (p. 84). This appears to be a narrow definition. For instance, political and educational activities of the Zionist Organization and other Jewish bodies among the youth and the public at large, or information on Israel distributed in the Diaspora communities are part and parcel of immigration policies and of their means of implementation: their degree of efficacy or inefficacy can greatly affect both the volume and the specific characteristics of the immigration.

[4] For an analysis of immigration propensity, see my *The Population of Israel*, op.cit., pp. 81-95.

[5] Such as the U.S.A., Canada, Latin America, western, central, and northern Europe, South Africa, and Oceania.

[6] This is based largely on an analysis of newspapers, public debates in Parliament, and a few publications which appeared on the subject. The fact that a public campaign for raising Jewish fertility in the 1940s was conducted by a Committee on problems of natality, established by the Vaad Leumi (the National Council of the Jewish Community of Palestine) is not indicated in Chapter Five. This campaign preceded the 'baby boom': it cannot be ruled out that it may have had some contributory effect on the boom. See R. Bachi, 'Outline of the demography of the Jewish Population in Palestine', in *Proceedings of the International Statistical Congress*, International Statistical Institute, vol. III, part B, Washington 1947, p. 627; and R. Bachi, 'La population juive de l'Etat d'Israël' in *Population*, July-September 1952, pp. 440-41.

[7] 'Population Policy in Israel', in B. Berelson, ed., *Population Policy in Developed Countries*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1974.

[8] I think that it is my duty to the readers of *The Jewish Journal of Sociology* to indicate that I was the Chairman of the Natality Committee. This may have involuntarily determined some bias in my analysis of the authors' sharp judgment of the Committee's work and proposals, but I sincerely hope that it is not the case.

[9] The only part of the report which was actually finalized appeared in a small stencilled volume in Hebrew, under the title: *Report of the Committee for the Natality Problems*, Vol. 1. *Summary of findings and proposals*, submitted to the Prime Minister, Jerusalem, 1966. It was planned that at a later stage other volumes might follow as appendices to the Summary Report. They should have incorporated at least part of the material prepared by, or for, the Committee on topics such as: family planning and birth control; conditions of children in large families; children allowances, etc. (see pp. 3-4 of the Report). However, under the completely changed conditions after the Six-Day War, this plan was not implemented.

It may be noted too that in later years the literature on underprivileged large families increased considerably.

[10] Fertility of cohorts after 1930 has been obtained by Friedlander through projection. See his 'Population Policy in Israel', op. cit., p. 73.

[11] Apparently Friedlander did not pay attention to these considerations. Both in the 1974 paper (pp. 79-80) and in the book under review (p. 156), the Committee is criticized for having used the findings of the 1961 Census showing that Muslim women aged 45-49 had 8·2 children on an average. It is claimed that this 'is not very revealing since these data relate to the fertility experience of women who have long since completed their childbearing'. Since in the 1950s and early 1960s only a small minority of Muslim women used to control fertility, this statement is clearly incorrect. In any event it is of interest to compare the average of 8·2 children per woman quoted in the Committee's Report with the fertility cohort averages for Muslim women after 20 years of marriage: see Friedlander, Eisenbach, and Goldscheider's 'Modernization Patterns and Fertility Change: The Arab Population of Israel and the Israel Administered Territories' in *Population Studies*, July 1979. Taking, in brief, a weighted average between rural and urban sectors, it is found that the fertility was: in marriage cohorts of 1945-49: 8·18; 1950-54: 8·44; 1955-59: 8·42. These averages even exceed the average of 8·2 quoted by the Committee. It may be added that fertility of incomplete marriage cohorts in the rural Muslim sector

quoted in *Population Studies* show a continuous rise from cohorts married in 1945-49 to those of 1960-64.

[12] For kibbutz low fertility in the Mandate period, see R. Bachi, *Marriage and fertility in the various sections of the Jewish population of Palestine* (in Hebrew), The Jewish Agency, Jerusalem, 1944, pp. 164-69. For the evolution in the independence period, see my *The Population of Israel*, op. cit., pp. 217-21.

[13] The number of meaningful books and papers on these topics probably exceeds 100. It would therefore be impossible to list them here.

[14] *World Population Trends and Policies—1977 Monitoring Report* Vol II, *Population Policies*, United Nations publication, New York, 1979.

[15] B. Berelson, 'Romania's 1966 Anti-Abortion Decree: The Demographic Experience of the First Decade', *Population Studies*, July 1979, pp. 205 and 209-22.

[16] D. Friedlander and C. Goldscheider, 'Immigration, Social Change and Cohort Fertility in Israel', *Population Studies*, July 1978, p. 313.

[17] See Friedlander, Eisenbach and Goldscheider, op.cit., pp. 239-54.

[18] See the paper quoted in Note 16, p. 314.

[19] See the Natality Committee Report, p. 25.

[20] Much of this research has been carried out by the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University (see the series of volumes on *Jewish Population Studies*). Summaries of the demographic characteristics of Diaspora Jewry are given in the two following publications by R. Bachi: *Population Trends of World Jewry*, vol. 9; and *The Demographic Crisis of Diaspora Jewry* (Background Paper for The President of Israel's Continuing Seminar on World Jewry and the State of Israel), Jerusalem, 1979.

[21] The projections have been calculated at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry at the request of the Prime Minister's Office and are being prepared for publication. *Inter alia*, they show that the population of Diaspora Jewry is already below 10 million. If present demographic trends will persist, this total may decrease to some 8 million by the end of the century. Under several hypotheses, which cannot be discussed here, world Jewry (including Israel) may decrease from about 13 million now to 12,345,000 in 2025, if fertility in Israel will not decline under the level of three children per woman; and to 10,857,000, if fertility in Israel will gradually decline to 2·1 children per woman.

[22] It is not clear why, in contrast to available evidence, it is supposed that the Israeli-born (of all origins lumped together) have lower fertility than the European-born.

[23] These percentages refer respectively to the population in 2010 under the hypothesis of an annual immigration of 40,000 or of 0.

[24] There has recently been a decline in nuptiality; an increase in the proportions of young people living together without contracting marriage and in the proportion of illegitimate children; an older age at marriage; an increased rate of divorce; etc. Although these trends are much weaker than in Western countries (and presumably weaker than in most Diaspora Jewish communities), they may indicate trends which in other countries have been accompanied by a further decrease in fertility. For some of these occurrences, see a paper in preparation by O. U. Schmelz on 'Recent Changes in the Vital Statistics of the Jewish Population of Israel' (in Hebrew), Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem.

Rejoinder to Roberto Bachi's Article on *The Population of Israel* by Dov Friedlander and Calvin Goldscheider

Professor Bachi's review article is a rambling polemic rather than a review of our book. It is a polemic which deals only with selected parts of our analysis and contains a series of misunderstandings and errors based on a superficial and often careless reading of our text. It is informed by an implicit ideological bias which distorts the issues involved in evaluating population policy in Israel. To answer fully would require an essay of equal or greater length, but fortunately that is not necessary.

The analysis and detailed critique of the position Bachi has taken in his review article are dealt with in our book, which is available for the interested reader to evaluate objectively. His arguments and 'evidence' are basically no different from those he presented as chairman of the Israel Natality Committee of the early 1960's and in other papers he wrote earlier and subsequently. Since we devoted a chapter to a critical evaluation of Israel's natality policy, we need not detail here the arguments found in that chapter of our book. If those arguments put forward by Bachi had been merely theoretical and concerned with a particular period, they would not have been of great general interest. Unfortunately, they have been, and continue to be, part of a general orientation which may influence the policy of the government of Israel and which may have societal costs. The analysis we presented in detail in our book points unmistakably to the conclusion that the pro-natal suggestions have had, and will have, little impact on population processes in Israel.

In order to move beyond the ideological issues which guide Bachi's review article and to convey the thrust of our analysis, it is necessary here to give a brief outline of our objectives in *The Population of Israel*— to examine systematically the relationships between population growth and policies in Palestine and Israel and to unravel the social, political, and economic determinants, as well as the consequences and implications of these inter-relationships. Population processes have been integral features of the dynamic changes which have characterized the country over the last several decades. Indeed, one of the dominant themes in the socio-political evolution of Israeli society has been the relative size and growth of Jewish and Arab populations and the issues related to immigration and natality patterns. Moreover, populating Palestine and Israel has been one of the main goals of Zionist nationalism and a focus of its policies and programmes. The open door immigration policy formulated when Israel was established has been one of the clearest expressions of Zionism. This policy, in combination with socio-political and economic processes, resulted in the mass migration of 1949–51, a migration unprecedented in modern demographic history.

In turn, this mass migration has been, and continues to be, the dominant factor shaping Israeli society.

A full understanding of these population processes and of their implications is therefore an essential first step for an analysis of the evolution and continuity of Israel as a viable state in the Middle East. The changing Arab-Jewish and Arab-Israeli conflicts, on the one hand, and the changing socio-economic and socio-ethnic structure of Israeli society on the other, are to a large extent consequences of population patterns and policies. Of no less significance are the short and long term implications of population policies for the changing structure of Israeli society—implications that are likely to continue into the twenty-first century. Although the focus of our book was on the unique aspects of those policies and patterns, we argued that Israel provides a fascinating case study of the relationship between population processes and policies which may have broader implications.

In general, previous studies of population processes in Palestine and Israel were often characterized by ideological and political biases, implicitly or explicitly. We—as Israelis, demographers, and social scientists—tried to focus on analytic issues which seemed to us of central importance; and we carefully avoided entering into the ideological and political polemics which have so often clouded the analysis of population policy and change in Israel. Indeed, we avoided the temptation to write an encyclopedic account of Israel's population evolution precisely because we wanted to focus on social scientific analytic issues rather than to present a descriptive overview of statistics published by the government's Central Bureau of Statistics. We were concerned with some population issues—for example, those associated with health policies, population redistribution within Israel, and emigration—only in so far as they were related to national growth and policies.

The thrust of Bachi's critical comments is on our analysis of immigration patterns and policies and, more specifically, on our evaluation of natality policies in Israel. In his criticism of our immigration analysis, he calls for a 'more complete model' of immigration (unspecified), without indicating what is wrong with the model we presented. His main criticism is directed at our use of absolute numbers of immigrants rather than rates and to our emphasis on mass immigration in 1948-51. But, first, we did analyse clearly rates and volume of immigration throughout our text and in our tables; and if Bachi had read carefully our third and fourth chapters, he would have taken note of that.

Second, we compared at some length the immigration rates and volume of immigration in the periods 1924-26 and 1933-36, and we analysed the demographic and sociopolitical implications of those migration waves. We also dealt extensively with the overwhelming and continuing impact of the almost 700,000 immigrants between 1948 and 1951, and discussed in great detail the rates, volume, characteristics,

determinants, and consequences of that mass immigration as well as its short and long term implications. But to focus solely on the rate—as Bachi suggests—and miss the point about the impact of the volume and the characteristics of mass immigration would have been an error of major proportions.

Third, to argue—as Bachi does—that 'the basic reason for the continuous decline in immigration to Israel ... after the end of the mass immigration of 1948–51, is simply the progressive exhaustion of the Jewish population' outside Israel ignores (*a*) the enormous fluctuations in the rate and volume of immigration from North African countries that demand explanation beyond the depletion of North African Jewry; and (*b*) the fluctuations in the volume and rate of Western immigration to Israel. While some part of the decline from specific countries may be accounted for by the decline of their Jewish population (and we did specifically note this where it is appropriate), the major explanation lies elsewhere.

While Bachi finds our conclusion regarding the factors influencing immigration to Israel too 'sweeping' (although it would take him 'too long to show that it cannot be justified'), a careful reading of the two chapters we devote to that analysis would have shown him precisely how immigration to Israel has responded in ways remarkably similar to the socio-economic and political 'pushes' and 'pulls' of other international migrations round the world. And this has been so despite the unique forces of Zionist ideology and policy. It is indicative of the ideological and political issues involved that an analysis of the relationship between immigration policies and patterns in Israel within a social scientific demographic context has been presented for the first time in our book.

In dealing here with Bachi's comments on our evaluation of natality policy, we are essentially making a rejoinder to Bachi's rejoinder of the critical evaluation in our book of Bachi's policy recommendations. Let us just illustrate by two examples how he has presented a distorted and biased review of what we wrote in order to defend his ideological position.

First, he quotes from our discussion of kibbutz fertility and our conclusion that 'pronatal efforts did not seem to affect fertility in a major way'. He goes on to suggest that 'a more extensive and deeper analysis would have led to the opposite conclusion'. However, he omits to note that in the next two pages of our book (pp. 149–50) and in a large table (pp. 152–53), we show in detail the increase in kibbutz fertility. We said that it was difficult to make a full assessment of the change in kibbutz fertility without a cohort analysis and we concluded (p. 150) that 'current fertility measures show definite increases starting in the 1960s'. We did not of course say that there had been no fertility increase in the kibbutz, but only that the increase had been slight

and certainly did not indicate a return to the days of large family size.

Second, when we dealt with Romania, we certainly did not state that there had been no change in the birth rates of that country as a result of its restrictions on abortion. Indeed, we presented detailed evidence (Table 6.3, p. 154)—and not a 'superficial perusal'—showing the increase and the *subsequent decline* in current fertility rates in Romania. What we did state (and what Berelson also noted in his article cited by Bachi) was that 'to date, there is no evidence anywhere, the Romanian example included, demonstrating conclusively that a *sustained* increase in fertility has been achieved as a result of regulations restricting the performance of abortions' (pp. 154–55). Furthermore, we pointed out clearly (p. 155) that restrictions on induced abortions in Israel may result in small or short run fertility increases. But these would not affect the problems cited by Bachi's Natality Committee which were the justification for the policy recommendations. Finally, to achieve an increase in fertility through increased 'unwanted births' (that is, by reducing the number of abortions) seems very costly in social and family terms—not to mention the moral issues involved. Since abortions are clearly linked in Israel to socio-economic and ethnic sub-groups, a policy which restricts abortions would reinforce ethnic stratification and discrimination. That, we argue, is a means of achieving higher fertility which is not acceptable in a democratic society.

Bachi makes numerous other points which are in our view misleading and distorting—not only of what we wrote but of what we criticized. Here are some examples:

1. Bachi argues that his recommendations on fertility policy were based on the 'low levels' of fertility in Israel and not on 'changing trends'. Clearly, however, policy recommendations which are made without an analysis of trends have little justification.

2. We have evaluated Israel's population policy in terms of some inferred target. Unfortunately, natality policy in that country has always been vague and targetless; and as long as it remains vague it can never be evaluated. This is doubly true when no use is made of the analytic-empirical tools in order to evaluate or measure the degree to which the trends are moving in the policy direction. Bachi confuses period and cohort indicators of fertility, and therefore cannot separate tempo and timing from changes in family size.

3. To conclude, as Bachi does, that it is 'certainly a matter of vital importance' to increase the size of the Jewish population in Israel may be ideologically valid; but it is not necessarily beneficial socially, economically, or politically.

4. The limited policies advocated by Bachi, if implemented, would hardly have much effect on fertility rates of the Jewish population of Israel. He concludes that even his own limited suggestions require

careful study and systematic research, while others cannot be financed in the present economic situation of the country. It follows that if in the next few years there is an increase in fertility, the policies will have been successful; but if fertility declines or if it does not show any change, he could argue that it is because his policies have not been implemented fully. Heads, he wins; tails, we lose.

5. Bachi's pro-natalism suggestions, particularly for the Jews of European origin, raise an important issue which is becoming more and more salient in Israel—are pro-natal policies to be implemented for the State's Muslim population, or only for the Jews? For the Jews of Asian-African origin as well as for those of European origin? If yes, it hardly makes sense to encourage high fertility among all the sub-populations. If no, are selective policies justifiable in a democratic society? Selective pro-natalism is no less controversial than other policies which favour some ethnic-national groups over others. For a Jewish state not to be super-sensitive in the matter of such selective policies is untenable.

6. To frame Israeli population policy in the Catholic context of 'responsible parenthood', as does Bachi, is an irony for the Jewish State of Israel and requires no further comment from us.

We could go on refuting Bachi's other polemical criticisms, but that would contribute little to the discussion of population policy in Israel. His alarmism, misunderstandings, and ideological biases would—as in the past—narrow that discussion. We attempted in our book to go beyond the parochial and to raise the level of the discussion by presenting an analysis which focused on social scientific issues. As we said above, the task we set ourselves was particularly difficult since those are very sensitive ideological issues.

For those who start with the assumption that every additional Jew in Israel is a national or religious imperative (a *mitsvah*), and that the survival of the Jewish people is at stake, all efforts must be made to increase the Jewish population by whatever means, at whatever cost. Classical Zionism emphasized immigration while Bachi over the last several decades has strongly advocated pro-natalism. We may or may not share such an ideological bias as individuals—but as social scientists, we cannot allow it to guide our analysis and evaluation. Let those who plead on religious, ideological, or secular-Zionist grounds for more Jews in Israel—through immigration and fertility policies—continue their holy missions. But let no one be deluded that these ideological commitments can be justified by objective socio-demographic analysis. And let no one assume that policy and ideological pronouncements are related in simple ways to the reality of population processes and trends. When our ideological blinkers are removed, we are able to evaluate more clearly the issues involved. Our argument was, and continues to be, that it is incumbent upon us to question the assumptions underlying policies, to evaluate critically their efficacy, and to search out the

relative costs and benefits of alternative investments. Unfortunately, these have not been the guidelines of other demographers proposing or examining population policies in Israel. Until we move beyond ideological platitudes to analyse the relationships between population policies and processes, we shall remain in the parochial confines of our biases, persisting in the belief that these processes can easily be manipulated by policy pronouncements.

The analysis of population policies and patterns in Israel presented in our book argues strongly for the central importance of population factors in the continuing evaluation of Israeli society. It is precisely because of the importance we attach to demographic processes that we set out to critically evaluate the weaknesses of past Israeli population policies. We noted in the final paragraph of our book that Israel, like most other developed countries, does not currently have a comprehensive population-welfare policy, and we commented:

> However, such policy considerations are of more critical importance for Israel than other countries, since human resources have such an important role in Israel's security and political problems and in the socioeconomic issues facing Israeli society.

It would be indeed unfortunate if a new population policy failed to consider systematically the issues we have raised and analysed. And even more unfortunate and costly if the errors and weaknesses of the population policies proposed in the 1960's were to be repeated in the 1980's.

Professor Bachi comments:

I agree with Professors Friedlander and Goldscheider about the importance for Israel of the study of population policies. That is precisely why I gave much thought to the arguments in their book—which I did not read in a 'superficial and often careless' manner. Had I found their arguments persuasive, I would have accepted them unhesitatingly. As this was not the case, I believed it to be my duty to go into some detail when setting out the reasons why I disagreed with the authors.

Since they remain convinced that their analysis 'points unmistakably to the conclusion' they have reached, there is no point in continuing our discussion and abusing the kind hospitality of this Journal. I wish only to suggest to the authors, who are my friends and colleagues, that their use of such terms as 'rambling polemics', 'errors', 'ideological biases', 'distorted', 'parochial', etc., in refuting my arguments does not contribute to the objective analysis of the important and complex issues involved.

THE JEWS OF BORO PARK

Erich Rosenthal

Review Article

THE provocative title of this book* is misleading, as are many of the statements which evaluate the past 50 years of sociological research into local Jewish communities in the industrial cities of the northern states of America.

Boro Park is a residential neighbourhood in the Borough of Brooklyn. Before the consolidation of the Greater City of New York in 1896, it was a residential area of the city of Brooklyn. Boro Park never was a suburb. A genuine suburb in the United States is a small geographic area, governed by a small local administration and endowed with a deep sense of citizen participation in local affairs and without local transport. Boro Park never had these attributes. Is Boro Park a *shtetl*? To judge the whole by the part: as one who has observed Jewish neighbourhoods in American cities for over four decades, the strongest impression I had from a walk along 13th Avenue on a Sunday afternoon was that of *déja vu*: a shopping street in a Jewish immigrant area like Roosevelt Road in Chicago in the 1930s. Of course, there are some differences: hassidim and Pizza Parlors were totally absent from Roosevelt Road and yarmulkas (skull caps) were much less evident.

Boro Park, like many other urban areas, so far has experienced two types of 'succession'—to use a term favoured by the Chicago school of sociology. The first succession was the out-migration of Gentile residents and the influx of Jews. The second was, and is, the outflow of the original Jewish families and the influx of new groups of Jews, among whom were a very large number of post war immigrants. That second wave, which in everyday parlance I call the 'Albany Park' syndrome—after a Jewish community in the north-western part of Chicago—proceeds as follows. Aggressive, upwardly mobile Jewish families leave an older area of settlement and move into a non-Jewish neighbourhood. Typically, they organize themselves in a Reform congregation and build a Reform temple. As soon as it becomes known that this new neighbourhood offers little resistance to Jewish residents, other, more

* Egon MAYER, *From Suburb to Shtetl. The Jews of Boro Park*. Temple University Press, Philadelphia, Pa., 1979. $17.50.

traditional, families move in and establish a Conservative congregation. As soon as the 'pioneers' realize that the new neighbourhood is becoming more 'ghetto'-like, they leave to settle elsewhere and are replaced by less acculturated, less assimilated, and less prosperous families. This influx is accompanied by the appearance of Orthodox Synagogues or Shuls. At the same time the 'organized Jewish community' (that is the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies) establishes needed social services in the form of community centres, family and child care agencies, and clinics.

Finally, when the neighbourhood no longer attracts Jewish families, a third wave of succession occurs: other ethnic and racial groups move into the vacant housing. Typically, during the past 60 years, the black population has taken over former Jewish neighbourhoods in northern industrial cities. From Dr. Mayer's own description, it is clear that Boro Park has basically followed that pattern. It comes, therefore, as a shock to find that in the introductory chapter he feels compelled to prove that Boro Park developed differently. At the same time, he goes to great lengths to depreciate 50 years of social research into Jewish community life in the United States. The proper and scientific approach would have been to determine the extent to which the established pattern was still operating. There would have been plenty of room to describe, and account for, recent changes.

The major changes which have occurred since the Second World War can be summarized as follows: shorter life-span for Jewish neighbourhoods, a more favourable climate for the Orthodox way of life, and government-financed aid programmes at the local level.

With the onset of the Second World War, the immigration of Blacks from the South and of Hispanics from Puerto Rico and other parts of the Americas has been so heavy that residential areas in the inner parts of cities have been turned over to them. Since Jewish groups have always been interested in settling in ever better residential areas, they have offered no resistance to the newcomers, especially in rented housing, but have moved away. As a result, the life-span of Jewish neighbourhoods has been sharply reduced. Boro Park at present houses many Jewish families who were displaced from adjacent areas. Will they eventually leave Boro Park? Quite likely. Mayer found in his research that in the early 1970's the adult children of the Boro Park residents did not settle in sufficient numbers within the area and he thinks it quite probable that other ethnic or racial groups will take over the district. It is my belief that the future third wave of succession will be in keeping with the traditional fate of Jewish neighbourhoods in northern industrial cities.

'It is difficult to be a Jew.' Before the Second World War it was moreover twice as difficult to be an Orthodox Jew in a modern industrial society. This is no longer the case. Changes in the work week and

advances in technology have eased the burden of Orthodox prescriptions and proscriptions: as it has shrunk from six days to five and a half, then to five, and as some unions and businesses are aiming for a four-day week, Sabbath observers should encounter ever fewer obstacles. Electric timers and electronic devices regulate lights, cookers, and passenger lifts. Of even greater significance for easing the Orthodox way of life are advances in food technology. I became aware of this for the first time at the end of the Second World War when the director of the Hillel Foundation at the University of Iowa kept a month's supply of kasher meat in his freezer. That a kasher way of life presents few obstacles in the modern world is best symbolized by the kasher food packages available on 'all airlines' according to one caterer. If a family should decide to return to Orthodoxy, they can do so in less than 24 hours by buying a kasher frozen chicken, some tins, paper plates, and plastic cutlery.

The changes in the work week and the advances in food technology go far to explain how easy it has been to 'revive' Orthodox Jewish life in the United States. The Orthodox Jews who came to the U.S.A. after 1933 found little difficulty in maintaining their way of life. If, in addition, they were under the influence of the Frankfurt rabbi S. R. Hirsch, they had a pattern to follow. Revival then is the wrong word. If such favourable conditions had obtained during the era of mass immigration several decades earlier, the Orthodox way of life might well have endured.

Dr. Mayer every so often pointedly asserts that Boro Park must be considered a middle-class community. That assertion cannot go unchallenged. First of all, if Boro Park is at present the most prominent settlement of Orthodox Jews on the East Coast, one should expect to find several social class levels there. During that recent visit to Boro Park on a Sunday afternoon, my companion and I were repeatedly approached by panhandlers, tin cup in hand. One such beggar came into a shoe shop asking for a hand-out. I was quite amazed that the saleswoman was prepared for it: quickly, she fished a coin out of her pocket and handed it to him. Clearly, the *schnorrer* (beggar) has a right to *tsedaka* (alms) in this community. Dr. Mayer reports that the Office of Economic Opportunity gave a grant of nearly $200,000 'to render service to the Jewish poor in Brooklyn and New York City'. Since when are middle-class people subsidized by the Office of Economic Opportunity?

During the same visit I saw a young Hassidic couple with four children, the eldest of whom was about four years old. This fertility is not consistent with the one that prevails among the non-Hassidic Jewish population, who have an average of 1·8 or 1·9 children per family. Nor is it consonant with middle-class fertility among American Gentiles. As a matter of fact, all social classes in the United States ideally wish to

have no more than two children.[1] Thus Hassidic fertility must be considered a sectarian attribute such as that of the Hutterites in the north-western United States and Canada.

Dr. Mayer reports that Boro Park receives financial aid from federal and state authorities for breakfast and lunch programmes, bus transport, etc. Since such programmes are also found in a community like Great Neck (which is generally believed to be affluent), one cannot determine the class levels of a local community without calculating the *per capita* or per student subsidy. Dr. Mayer does not provide such data for Boro Park.

He states (p. 130) that earlier waves of Jewish immigration did not avail themselves of governmental subsidies:

> Where earlier generations of immigrants and their children proudly eschewed anything resembling the public dole, the postwar immigrants and their descendants see societal resources as equally available to all segments of the population: to Orthodox Jews as well as blacks.

He should be reminded of two facts: (1) governmental subsidies did not come into full bloom before the official 'war on poverty' in the 1960's, and (2) these subsidies should not, and are not, considered 'dole' or welfare payments. They are a recognition of the lop-sided tax structure. Since the federal income tax takes such a large bite, little is left for state and local tax revenues and federal subsidies, in particular, are an attempt to correct that imbalance.

The social processes which govern the life of Boro Park can be summarized by the concepts of compartmentalization and federalism. The former refers to the adaptation of two different sets of behaviour patterns, the orthodox religious code side by side with a secular code for the successful pursuit of a secular occupation. The major instrumentality is the *yeshiva*, a school devoted in Boro Park to religious as well as to secular education. Since the *yeshiva* must meet the standards of state educational authorities, secular studies are taken seriously. Such an approach is directly derived from the inventor of Modern Orthodoxy, Rabbi Samson R. Hirsch, leader of the Frankfurt/Main *Austrittsorthodoxie*. Rabbi Joseph Elias, one of Rabbi Hirsch's followers from Frankfurt, has interpreted the formula *Torah Im Derekh Erets* as '... *pursuit of general knowledge in the service of Torah*.... In effect, this means that some very definite control must be exercised over the General Studies Department' (p. 117). It appears that in spite of a different environment (the U.S.A.) and the various regional origins of Boro Park's Jews, Rabbi Hirsch's formula—developed over a hundred years ago—is still the only viable method of persevering in the Orthodox way of life in the modern industrial world.

In North Lawndale, a Chicago community with nearly 100,000 Jews in the 1930's, Orthodox synagogue life was organized by region of

European origin: a Russian *shul*, a Hungarian *shul*, a Rumanian *shul*, etc. When that population left the area shortly after the Second World War, its regional organization was abandoned in the new neighbourhoods in favour of synagogues intended to serve the inhabitants of a given local area. Mayer describes in detail how a similar process of 'federalism' is taking place within Boro Park. The major agency, again, is the *yeshiva* which teaches Jewish law to young people and enables them to identify those prescriptions and proscriptions which are 'only' traditional local customs and which can therefore be disregarded without fear of stepping beyond the limits of Orthodoxy. This 'federalism' is creating greater conformity and compatibility between European variants, and while doing so it weakens family tradition and authority. Modern Orthodoxy, then, can be defined as a religious way of life dominated by an educational institution which is both religious and secular.

Boro Park will continue to experience change. Should Dr. Mayer decide to pursue his research in the same fields, it is to be hoped he will give his readers a report in which there is a proper balance between description and analysis.

NOTE

[1] Erich Rosenthal, 'The Jewish Population of the United States: A Demographic and Sociological Analysis', in Bernard Martin, ed., *Movements and Issues in American Judaism*, Westport, Conn., 1978, pp. 51–55. Sergio Della Pergola, 'Patterns of American Jewish Fertility', *Demography*, vol. 17, no. 3 (August 1980), pp. 261–73. Maurice J. Moore, *Perspectives on American Fertility*; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports: Special Studies: Series P-23, No. 70, Washington, D.C., July 1978.

JACOB TALMON, 1916–1980

Extract from an address delivered by Professor Ephraim E. Urbach (in Hebrew) at Jacob Talmon's funeral in Jerusalem on 17 June 1980.

A great deal will be said and written in appreciation of Jacob Talmon, who has been recognized and honoured as one of the outstanding historians of our generation by cultural and academic circles and institutions throughout the world.

Jacob Talmon was a man of both intellect and heart, a penetrating thinker of sensitivity and discernment. His historical analyses were concerned not so much with establishing the chain of cause and effect as with revealing the universally operative forces whose interaction imparted specific characteristics to the major events of the modern era. His natural inclinations led him to concentrate more on philosophical and psychological than on social and economic factors.

Talmon the historian was inseparable from Talmon the committed Jew and Zionist, and he saw Judaism and Zionism in a universal perspective. In turn, he could not see the history of mankind in isolation from the fate and experience of his own people. The saying in Numbers (23:9) that the Jewish people 'shall dwell alone, and shall not be reckoned among the nations' was for him a diminishment of their significance and the lessening of a vision. The basis of their uniqueness was to be found in the perpetual tension caused by a determined will to preserve their Jewish identity and beliefs despite all those who wished to blur or obliterate them and in their equally determined identification with universalist ethics. Judaism had made an undeniable contribution to the formulation and expression of these ethics. He believed that one of the main concerns of the State of Israel should have been an awareness of the problems created by that tension and of the need to grapple with them until a proper balance was achieved. His anxiety over the difficulties facing the country and the choices open to it caused him many unquiet days and sleepless nights.

He feared the dangers of self-righteousness, of violence which breeds violence, and of extremism which breeds extremism. He was a historian who specialized in the study of national and radical ideologies and of wars and revolutions. He warned against drawing dogmatic conclusions

and against a one-sided reading of the past; over-reliance on the lessons of history was a source of danger and it could also have a paralysing effect. He would only point out the alternatives, in both their positive and negative aspects, so that the chances of success and the risks involved might be assessed. However, he recognized that the history of the Jews and of other nations showed the importance of a sense of proportion and of restraint. One had to distinguish those dreams and ideals which could be realized from those which could not, and in order to do so one must have sensitivity and an awareness of contemporary trends.

Jacob Talmon was not one of those historians who, when uncovering the forces of destructiveness, of violence and hypocrisy—even in ideological movements—became utterly cynical or gave way to defeatism. He was of the opinion that such historians, even of the stature of Jacob Burckhardt, had become infected by the very evils they tried to describe and explain. He himself never despaired. He wrote: 'I believe that notwithstanding all the vexations and entanglements caused by emergency and inescapable necessity ... Israel will one day be spiritually effective in the world' (*The Unique and the Universal*, London, 1965, p. 90).

BOOK REVIEWS

HENRI DESROCHE, *The Sociology of Hope*, vii + 209 pp., translated from the French by Carol Martin-Sperry, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Boston and Henley, 1979, £8.95.

This is a book in English, but not an English book. The style is resolutely anti Anglo-Saxon and the translation a kind of transliteration. When I first read it in French, I was impressed by the dialectic legerdemain, but now I re-read it in English some of the inner spiritual dynamic has somehow disappeared—a reflection, alas, on my poor French. The dazzling haze and cloud-topped towers, the cumulative dialectic, have mostly vanished into thin air. It is rather like the morning after the night before, when the brilliant summae of the midnight inspiration are revealed as just the ancient theses and antitheses piled up in the same old way.

Such a comparison is appropriate because the book is about dreams. It is the anatomy of the dream poised in the air, like the Indian rope, suggesting unsuspected powers and potencies. It is also a kind of generalized, schematized history of the dream as it passes through cycle after cycle, from the Fathers to the English Civil War, covering the mutations in America, in the Slavonic world, and in the French Revolution. In such a panorama the third world is also reviewed: Latin America, Africa, Islam, the South Seas.

Then M. Desroche goes on to examine the structure of the myth itself, realized in micro- and macro-social forms, with all the various scenarios depicting the expected stages, signs, and theophanies. What is perhaps most valuable in this is a complicated chart of the collusions and conflicts between religions, revolutions, messianisms, and ideologies. And all this required (in M. Desroche's words) that we remove ourselves 'from a sociology whose entire ambition is reduced, according to consecrated formulae, to finding the non-theological factors of theological phenomena'. Instead we need 'to co-ordinate the famous determination of the infrastructure'. After all men of God make gods of men, and vice versa, and thereby men become men and gods become gods.

In a sense such paradoxes, breeding on each other, convey the strength and weakness of the book. Like hope itself it points forward with a kind of excited hint of more to come, but as to what the vision is there remains a kind of dark bewilderment and uncertainty.

DAVID MARTIN

MAURICE FREEDMAN, *The Study of Chinese Society, Essays by Maurice Freedman Selected and Introduced by G. William Skinner*, xxiv+491 pp., Stanford Univ. Press, Stanford, Ca., $28·50.

This book of twenty-four essays comprises almost the complete sinological oeuvre of Maurice Freedman, apart from book-length monographs.

Part One contains four essays on the Chinese in South East Asia while Part Two concentrates on the Chinese in Singapore. Part Three presents three papers on Hong Kong and the New Territories and in Part Five there are four overviews concerned with sociology in China, the relationship of social science to sinological studies, and the general rationale of a focus on China. The core of the book is to be found in Part Four: eight essays on the religious and kinship patterns of traditional China.

The excellent Introduction by Professor Skinner first sets this work in the context of Maurice Freedman's career as researcher, and successively teacher and Professor of Anthropology at the London School of Economics and at Oxford. He then pays particular attention to those areas where Freedman's contribution was of particular scholarly significance: family and marriage, lineage and ancestor worship, and religion. So far as concerns the relationship between intellectual production and scholarly career, Skinner points out that Maurice Freedman came to graduate anthropology at the L.S.E. with an interest in race relations and that he was attracted by what he himself regarded as the rather partial analogy between the Overseas Chinese and the Jews. His doctoral research, later to be *Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore* (1957), was conducted in 1949–50, during which period his wife Judith was engaged on her own doctoral research on the Malay family in Singapore. Altogether five of the essays in this book are concerned with Chinese society in Singapore; they are on immigrants and their associations; kinship and marriage in early Singapore; Colonial law and its effect on Chinese society; Chinese family law; and (with Marjorie Topley) on religion and social realignment.

In due course, Freedman's interest came to include the Overseas Chinese as a whole; the essays which relate to them include a consideration of the variable economic success they achieved according to the economic history of the different parts of China from which they came, an analysis of the way nationalism sharpened up the plural nature of Malay society, and a sceptical examination of the idea that the Overseas Chinese provided a way station in the persistent southward expansion of China.

Freedman later concentrated on gathering material (largely by way of armchair anthropology) for his *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China* (1958). But a short period of fieldwork in the New Territories of

Hong Kong convinced him that direct access could be obtained there to at least a version of traditional Chinese society; and the three essays on the New Territories are on geomancy, on shifts of local power, and on emigration. During this period of his research, he published *Chinese Lineage and Society* (1966) and the several essays which Professor Skinner has selected for Part Four—on models of the Chinese domestic family, the family in China, Chinese marriage, ritual aspects of kinship and marriage, ancestor worship, lineage and the political order, and on the sociological study of Chinese religion.

The last part of this collection has no particular provenance in time, but reflects Maurice Freedman's well-known interest in the condition of his subject and his passion for its intellectual history, especially as revealed by J. J. M. de Groot and Marcel Granet.

It is of course impossible, even were this reviewer competent, to provide here a critical assessment complementing that of Professor Skinner and dealing with the researches which inspired Maurice Freedman's work, and the standing of those hypotheses in relation to which others measured their own work. All that can be done is to note the qualities which inform his monographs and essays, qualities which were both intellectual and personal. First, it should be said that he was a craftsman who used whatever scale or method was necessary to the task in hand—micro or macro, the library or the field, the diachronic or the synchronic. He had a sense of the whole picture in historic perspective. And he brought to his Chinese studies a mind appropriately civilized in every sense of the word. His essays have about them a clarity and an easy command of structure. They are courteous and exact with a characteristic punctilio. In none of Freedman's work is there any grandiosity or straining after theory. Everything is appropriate, and the theory is simply that required for the issues involved. There is also an almost feminine subtlety, as in the essay on marriage rites; and a nice sense of humour as in those on geomancy.

Maurice Freedman placed himself in a line of predecessors and successors, helping the latter to understand the former, and courteously commenting on the work of his compeers. The seminar which he ran at the L.S.E. in conjunction with Professors Isaac Schapera and Donald MacRae was a paradigm of his work and of the inspiration he provided for younger scholars—kindly, authoritative, and dedicated with precise and passionate intelligence to the tasks in hand.

DAVID MARTIN

LLOYD P. GARTNER, *History of the Jews of Cleveland*, xvii + 385 pp., Vol. VII in the Moreshet Series edited by Moshe Davis, joint publication of The Western Reserve Historical Society and the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1978, $15·00.

At a recent meeting of the American Jewish Historical Society in New York City, discussion turned to the issue of local history. Was this form a valid scholarly genre? Should it be encouraged and supported? Few of the participants doubted the contributions which local historical research could make, nor did they question the value of such local sources as newspapers, municipal record books, manuscript and published census materials, and neighbourhood surveys. Nor did anyone suppose that broadly-based national histories could be written if the narrow local studies were unavailable. The issue was resolved on the side of the angels: whether history is local, national, or biographical is not important; but what is important is that it be rigorously conceived, perceptively researched, sharply defined, clearly organized, articulately presented, and judiciously argued.

Unfortunately, few 'local' histories have lived up to these standards; those which have concerned themselves with local communities have been heavily subsidized and locally sponsored efforts cast in an excessively parochial mould. Often, they have been primarily concerned with celebrating rather than with studying. Instead of enhancing our understanding of historical process or alternatively providing a well-etched integrated community portrait, these works have listed, catalogued, recorded, and praised—all with little discernment and insight. In what we may call the old local history, the whole was manifestly less than the parts.

In recent years, however, historians have been awakened by a new interest in social history; and while using both traditional and less conventional sources and methodologies, they have produced excellent local histories—mature, penetrating, and with an eye towards the broader view. Examples of such outstanding local histories are Anthony Wallace's *Rockdale*, John Demos's *The Puritan Commonwealth*, Stephan Thernstrom's *Poverty and Progress*, Moses Rischin's *The Promised City*, and Irving Howe's *The World of Our Fathers*.

Lloyd Gartner's study of Cleveland Jewry is burdened by some of the shortcomings of the old local history, but it also shows some of the rigour and wider awareness of the new. His research is solid. He is clearly conscious of the need to integrate the history of Cleveland's Jews into that of the rest of the city, and with the larger American scene. And he attempts to understand the community as something more than just individuals and institutions, as something with an élan of its own. But the emphasis on small, unrelated discrete facts which are not pulled together defeats his efforts. Instead of a living community we confront

lists, data, and undigested research. The spark of life that the historian adds to the relating of facts by interpreting them and placing them into a larger context is absent.

Above all, there are those lists which so typify the old local history: lists of synagogues meet lists of organizations which give rise to lists of Hebrew Schools, charities, and clubs. There are lists of prominent individuals, merchants and peddlers, rabbis and writers, and so forth. For Clevelanders looking for familiar names, streets, and organizations, these lists may hold some interest; but few others will much care. Altogether, the author's assembling of facts represents more a chronicle than a history.

The information is loosely hung on the conventional frame: German immigration, economic success, Reform Judaism, relations with the larger community, the arrival of the eastern Europeans, etc. The information is there, but it is not filtered through the historical imagination. One searches in vain for deeper questions. What did it mean to be Jewish in Cleveland? What moved Cleveland Jewry toward Reform? What were the dynamics of changing Jewish religiosity within the broader structure of American social development? How did Jews in Cleveland deal with the Depression—beyond its obvious impact on charity disbursements? Did they, like ethnic groups in other American cities, try to grab disproportionate control of federal relief projects in order to help their own? Were they exposed to the rabid antisemitism of that era as were Jews in New York and Boston? And what of the Holocaust, the definitive crisis of modern World Jewry—how did Cleveland Jews respond?

In the end, too many such questions are left unanswered, indeed unasked. As a result, this study remains merely suggestive and useful rather than absorbing and satisfying.

THOMAS KESSNER

PAULA HYMAN, *From Dreyfus to Vichy: The Remaking of French Jewry, 1906–1939*, xiii + 338 pp., Columbia University Press, New York, 1979, $21.90.

Over a decade has passed since the publication of Arthur Hertzberg's *The French Enlightment and the Jews*, which started the new wave of Franco-Jewish studies in the English language. True, the highly prolific Zosa Szajkowski (1911–78) had been writing for many years, but his studies, for all their weighty documentation, did not stand at the interpretive level which could lay out avenues for research. Hertzberg's boldness and skill were of a different order. He insisted on the French Enlightenment less as the source of emancipation than of modern secular antisemitism, and of pressures for total Jewish conformity to national

cultures as the price of emancipation. Few scholars have gone all the way with Hertzberg, but the sceptical questions have been put by scholars who are not French.

The valuable recent collection, *Les Juifs et la Révolution Française* (edited by B. Blumenkranz and A. Soboul, Paris, 1973) suggests that sceptical questions concerning Jewish emancipation in France and its later history are not being pressed—at least not yet. Questioning from outside sources, however, has a long pedigree, reaching back to Ahad Ha-Am's famous 'Slavery within Freedom' of 1891, which derided the passionate homage to *la patrie* offered by supposedly emancipated French Jews. He found it self-conscious and self-abasing. Michael R. Marrus, *The Politics of Assimilation: A study of the French Jewish Community at the time of the Dreyfus Affair* (Oxford, 1971) is not written in Ahad Ha-Am's tone, but it clearly contrasts the harshness of the challenge to French Jewry with the flaccidity of the Jewish response. The same may be said of the scrutiny of Paris Jewry during the 1930s by David H. Weinberg, *A Community on Trial* (Chicago, 1977). Other books may also be cited if this were a bibliographic survey, but the book under review by Paula Hyman, who teaches Jewish history at Columbia University, is the broadest in scope and may well be the best of them all.

From Dreyfus to Vichy (not a felicitous title, regrettably, since it moves from a name to a place, each of which is symbolic without clearly harmonizing or contrasting) displays a clear chronological division. Between 1906 and 1914, optimistic confidence saturated French Jewry. Dreyfus had been exonerated, and the hostile power of the Roman Catholic Church reduced by the separation of Church and State. Jews could feel themselves restored to unquestioned Frenchness. Immigrants from eastern Europe, not yet very numerous, were firmly led by the omnipotent communal engine, the Consistoire, in the spirit of monolithic Gallicization. There was no place in the official Jewish community's scheme of things for secularism or ethnicism, or even for a pluralist conception which would accommodate a variety of Jewish expressions.

The patriotic 'sacred union' within French Jewry during the First World War was practically terminated by the opposition of the Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Central Consistory both to Zionism and to minority rights for eastern European Jewry. However, there was not yet a well-established body of eastern Eoropean immigrants which would strongly object. They were to arrive in force during the 1920s and 1930s, as access to the United States was virtually cut off. They established the typical institutions of the immigrant world—little synagogues, *landsmanshaftn*, radical trade unions, Yiddish press and books, and a mélange of other associations. Their sensibility as Jews differed from that of the natives, as their Jewish reactions to the world about them were more salient and direct. The Yiddish culture which flowered in New York around 1900 did likewise in Paris two decades later, but

as Dr. Hyman observes, under much more difficult conditions. More menacing than the total lack of sympathy and understanding on the part of the official Jewish community was the economic stagnation and advancing xenophobia which replaced pre-war economic buoyancy and liberalism. As the external situation worsened, the immigrants became more fervently leftist, while the bewildered native community could only repeat its everlasting fidelity to French democratic principles, try to appease or refute the antisemites, and urge upon the immigrants decorous behaviour as Frenchmen. There were faltering attempts at immigrant-native collaboration in the Paris Consistoire during the 1930s, but tension between the two sides failed to attain synthesis or resolution before 1939.

Dr. Hyman's book is gracefully written, based on broad and intensive research and commands the French and Jewish dimensions with assurance. The essence of *From Dreyfus to Vichy* is communal and cultural history, with due attention to the social dimensions of the community. I tend to think, however, that the book would have benefited from somewhat fuller economic and demographic data, and from hearing a little more distinctly the voice of the average French Jew.

A few bibliographic suggestions may be noted: Charles Rappaport's memoirs appeared in Yiddish in *YIVO Historishe Shrifin*, III (Vilna and Paris, 1939); the Yiddish intellectuals of Paris produced two numbers of a remarkable journal, *Oifn Shaydeveg*, in April and August 1939, as their world crumbled; the historian Marc Bloch wrote some penetrating comments on antisemitism when he was kept from the headship of the Ecole Normale Supérieure, which appeared in the *Annales d'histoire sociale* of 1946 (pp. 29-30); responsa literature concerning immigrants is to be found in the respona of R. Shalom Mordecai Shwadron (Maharsham), I, 3, 42; III, 164; VI, 63, 79, 80, 81; VII, 156; R. Naftali Zvi Judah, *Meshiv Davar*, I, 45, 56; II, 42, 49.

From Dreyfus to Vichy is an important work on twentieth-century French Jewry which will assuredly open out avenues for future research.

LLOYD P. GARTNER

MARION A. KAPLAN, *The Jewish Feminist Movement in Germany. The Campaigns of the Jüdischer Frauenbund 1904–1938*, Contributions in Women's Studies, No. 8, 229 pp., Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., and London, 1979, $17.50.

Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century the Jews of Germany made great strides in social and economic adaptation. Their life-styles and aspirations were, broadly speaking, essentially middle class and, in spite of persistent and openly expressed antisemitism, both racial and economic, they saw themselves and their destinies—totally

and often enough passionately—committed to the German fatherland. This applied equally to men and women, even though the intensely status-conscious Germany retained, revered, and perpetuated an inflexible conception of the absolute seniority of the male, a sentiment derived from the Christian tradition (cf. *Corinthians* 11:3 and *Ephesians* 5:22), reaffirmed in German idealist philosophy, and subsequently embodied in the law of the land. (cf. *The Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch* para. 1354: 'Dem Manne steht die Entscheidung in allen das gemeinschaftliche Eheliche betreffenden Angelegenheiten an': 'The husband has the final decision in all matters concerning the spouses'.) For Jewish women this represented something of a dilemma, since the Jewish tradition, though not altogether dissimilar from Teutonic patriarchalism, was nevertheless more sensitive to the complexity of the problem, and at least ambivalent, where the German ethos was adamant.

On other social issues, German and Jewish perceptions were less divided. Middle-class women, increasingly secure economically and conscious of the growing disparity of access to basic provisions, were moved to intervene by developing social services which sought to alleviate the pains and deprivations of the less fortunate elements in society, while creating acceptable outlets for the unused skills and energies of an able but senselessly idle workforce. At the same time they recognised and publicised the growing need for access to independent occupations for a steadily increasing number of women who, with or without husbands, had to find a place in the ranks of wage and salary earners. If the Gentile and the Jewish women of Germany had similar goals, they tended to approach them by different routes. Most Jewish women began initially to involve themselves in broader social issues through communally based Frauenvereine, in which traditional Jewish norms inspired them to organise support for sick, handicapped, and destitute women and to provide training for girls who would have to rely on whatever skills they could acquire to maintain themselves. These women's associations began to express muted but unmistakably feminist aspirations as early as the 1870s. In 1904, Bertha Pappenheim, a dynamic and forceful Jewish feminist, established the Jüdischer Frauenbund, in which the localised, parochial groups were drawn together into a single, influential movement, which played an important part in the final evolution of German Jewry, until the movement—like all too many of its members—was abruptly eliminated.

To Marion Kaplan belongs the credit for making the first systematic attempt to record the history of that movement. In view of the complexity of such an undertaking and of difficulties likely to be encountered in unravelling the manifold strands of overlapping German-Jewish ramifications, there appear to be three possible ways in which such a task might have been approached. It could have been presented as a factual history of a vigorous and profoundly important social move-

ment, or as a series of selected biographical studies of leading figures in the movement. It could also have been recorded at a level at which, in this reviewer's opinion, women have contributed most significantly and at which they tend to be most neglected even by their most dedicated protagonists—namely, as a history of ideas, in which the debates, published works, and private archives of the pre-eminent thinkers of the movement could be tested against the social and intellectual climate of their time. In the event, although Kaplan has used elements of all three approaches, she has done so in a somewhat cursory fashion, and examined the women, their activities, and achievements against a conception of feminism which owes more to recent American liberationist radicalism than to the social reality of an emerging Jewish feminism. Not surprisingly, judged by such standards, neither the Gentile nor the Jewish German women come out too well and the result is a disappointing, sad, and at times unfair exercise which, for all the prodigious effort that has gone into its preparation, seeks to do more for contemporary feminists in the United States than for their formidable European predecessors.

Jewish women in Germany are described as 'oppressed', 'powerless', 'treated like children' and being denied responsible roles. Their feminism is presented as 'a strange amalgam of internalized patriarchal values and women-oriented concerns'. Male domination and an unswerving hostility of men towards women is taken for granted, and Judaism fares badly, albeit on very slender and often enough carelessly inaccurate evidence. Factual errors aside (a *Mitzvah* is not a blessing; prayer is not a 'male monopoly': in fact it was introduced in Judaism by a woman, Hannah (I Samuel 1) and there is a whole literature of *Techinoth*—prayers by and for women; the quotation (p.149) from Sotah 21b is not a quotation); statements to the effect that in an orthodox Jewish marriage a woman becomes 'a man's possession' are so fundamentally wrong that they must render an account of a 'campaign' against such a view meaningless. The author is, of course, entitled to her opinions and to choose her approach to a problem, just as a reviewer must raise questions when stated objectives have not been met. An historical account suffers when prescription is mixed with description, that is to say, when an observer injects his or her assumptions to analyse perceptions which belong to different periods and different social contexts. Thus, an assertion that 'because the Frauenbund confined its feminist demands to areas it could combine with social work, it neglected more far-reaching women's issues, for example, women's situation within the nuclear family or sex-role stereotypes' not only criticizes Jewish women in early twentieth-century Germany for not sharing the focal concern of some American women of the 1970s, it also obscures the possibility that these are precisely the issues which Jewish women had identified, though not of course in the terminology of later

years. It also precludes serious consideration of how the women in question came to perceive—and become involved in—what appeared to them to be the real issues of their time.

It seems that the author has deprived herself of a unique opportunity to explore one of the most interesting and significant questions arising from the activities and concepts of German-Jewish women. While we are offered a long, detailed chapter on 'Prostitution, Morality Crusades and Feminism', there is no systematic analysis of *why* women chose to become involved in social work, and what, apart from purely humanitarian considerations, they hoped to achieve through the creation of a new and ultimately very influential profession. This would appear to be the more important issue. The campaigns against the white slave traffic and prostitution, and for the protection of girls, were spread across the whole of Europe; were initiated by Josephine Butler, an English Gentile, long before Bertha Pappenheim became involved; and owed their vigour and general relevance as much to the sexual adventures of the British Army in India as to the unhappy fates of some of the victims of an exceptionally large Jewish migration of that time. The involvement of the Frauenbund in this issue was inevitable, but had broader roots and enjoyed much greater male support than did purely feminist demands. The predominance in social work, on the other hand, has all the ingredients of a more substantial and controversial issue. Just as the reversion to traditional female roles in present-day kibbutzim *may* be an attempt by women to assert their identity and achieve a power-base in kibbutz society by elevating their reproductive function to the level of the generally more highly esteemed and male-centred productive role, so Jewish—and, indeed, Gentile—German women may have opted to subvert the rigid, formal power structure of their society, by extending their accepted and narrowly defined domestic roles to gain a foothold in the political arena. (Kaplan offers a telling quotation from an unpublished source: 'those who serve really control'.) In this way a more meaningful picture of the Frauenbund might have emerged, even if serious consideration of such a view would, in the end, have been rejected by the author. Again, the casual and at times contemptuous dismissal of some of the leading feminists of the period (Helen Lange as an 'idealist-romantic' and with Gertrud Bäumer as 'proper bourgeois ladies'), as well as the bare references to key figures (some fifteen of the better known women receive no more than a half-line mention on two pages) does not do justice to creative and imaginative personalities whose stature and achievements deserve more sympathetic consideration.

It is presumably the assumptions and methods of analysis chosen by the author, rather than ill-will or deliberate bias, which have led her to a final chapter which strains credulity by its proposition that 'the JFB appropriated and propagated the negative images of Jewish women

which were shared by Jewish men and antisemites alike'. Even more improbable is her assertion that 'Members of the Frauenbund, both as Jews and as women, demonstrated the self-hatred characteristic of oppressed minorities'. A modern historian need not feel empathy with her subject, but ought to present far more convincing evidence—if that is indeed available—to reach such extreme, and to some perhaps even hurtful, conclusions.

JULIUS CARLEBACH

NADAV SAFRAN, *Israel—the Embattled Ally*, ix + 632 pp., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1978, £12·95.

This is a monumental work. It constitutes a *magnum opus*, not only because of its size but because of the breadth of the canvas it seeks to cover—'the shaping of American-Israeli relations and the creation and transformation of Israel through three decades of Middle East crises and wars'. It is in fact two books in one. The first part is devoted to a consideration of the domestic scene—Israel's political, economic, social, and even religious structure, as seen by Safran—and is intended to provide a backdrop to the other half of the work. The second, and larger, part deals with Israel's foreign relations and its ties with the United States.

Upon opening the book one is immediately struck by the absence of the normal accoutrements of scholarly studies such as citations, documentation, direct quotation, and footnotes. The only exception is the presence of a bibliography. Perhaps the author felt that, given the contemporary focus of his study, the usual scholarly paraphernalia were not in fact called for or even appropriate. To take several illustrations: On p. 489 Safran states that Prime Minister Golda Meir, during the course of the Yom Kippur War, wrote a letter to President Nixon 'in which Israel hinted that unless American arms started to flow immediately, it might find itself compelled to resort to nuclear weapons'. It is doubtful whether Safran ever saw any such letter. But in any case, it is not the sort of document which could be quoted directly or for which one could ask, or expect, a citation. Then again, on p. 586, he states that in 1970, while Secretary of State Rogers was attempting to work out a ceasefire between Egypt and Israel in the War of Attrition (after the Russians had stationed forces in Egypt), President Nixon 'gave secret encouragement to Israel while publicly supporting the Rogers Initiative'. This is an extraordinary assertion—that the President of the United States was covertly undermining his own Secretary of State's diplomatic initiative. But again, it is pointless to expect documented evidence for this kind of statement. At the same time, however, the

author should not be surprised if readers indulge in a healthy amount of skepticism in evaluating the accuracy of such statements.

What saves this book from being a mere exercise in journalism (of the genre of Edward Sheehan's *The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger: A Secret History of American Diplomacy in the Middle East*) is the sophisticated and incisive analysis which characterizes the work. In a masterly and convincing manner, Safran highlights the salient features of each period surveyed and depicts the clash of interests and forces which shaped the American–Israeli nexus. The author is at his best in describing the military conflicts and in analysing their implications for the subsequent course of diplomacy. Since, unfortunately, the three decades of the Arab–Israeli conflict dealt with by the author were so heavily studded with military engagements, the interplay of war and diplomacy in the Middle East and its effect on the American–Israeli tie provide the dominant motif of this elaborate study.

Summed up in one sentence, the thesis of this work is that American–Israeli relations over the years have very much been a coeffcient of the Cold War. This is not to say that the 'special' relationship between Israel and the United States is merely a product of the Cold War; in fact, American sympathy and support for the Zionist cause antedates by decades Soviet–American rivalry. Nor should the influence of the Holocaust in stirring the American conscience be underestimated. That dark and cruel chapter in the history of mankind has had a profound effect on the American people; it has aroused them to actively endorse a solution for the age-old problem of Jewish homelessness through the restoration of the Jewish nation to its ancient homeland in sovereign independence. Other sentiments, such as a sense of kinship with a young, vibrant, and pioneering state and sympathy for an isolated and beleaguered fellow democracy surrounded by a sea of Middle East totalitarian states, have also played their part; they have reinforced the spiritual and cultural ties between the two countries and have promoted a sense of concern for the future of the Jewish state.

But these factors, Safran maintains, are marginal to the American–Israeli equation. While they may have deepened the affinity between the two peoples, they could not and did not determine the shape of official American policy towards Israel. Moreover, they cannot explain the rise and fall, the ebb and flow, in the relationship between Jerusalem and Washington since 1948. As Safran puts it, these elements comprise America's *moral* interest in Israel and have remained more or less constant. However, fluctuations have occurred primarily in America's perception of what Safran labels its *real* interest in relation to Israel. Herein, according to him, lies the key to the oscillations in the American–Israeli connection. The *real* interests are those political-strategic concerns of the United States in the Middle East and embrace, most importantly, the oil factor.

In meeting the Soviet threat to America's *real* interests in the Middle East, the United States has tended to regard Israel at times as a liability and at times as an asset. On the one hand, when the Soviets successfully manipulated the Arab-Israeli conflict (as distinct from inter-Arab disputes) for the purpose of establishing a bridgehead and of extending their influence in the Middle East, Washington tended to view Israel as somewhat of a liability or a handicap. On the other hand, Israel has also served to check Soviet penetration and domination, and thus willy-nilly to shore up western-oriented Arab states and to that extent it has been considered by the United States as a distinct asset and, at times, as a virtual ally. This was pre-eminently the case in June 1967 when Nasser, with active Russian incitement, threatened to gain control of the entire Middle East and was prevented from doing so by Israel's lightning victory in the Six-Day War. Similarly, in September 1970, Israel frustrated a Syrian drive to dominate Jordan when the latter was engaged in subduing the El Fatah guerrillas who, in the wake of their hijacking of four airliners to Jordan, were well on the way to taking over that country. Israel's threat to intervene stopped the Syrian advance in its tracks, and American policymakers were more than pleased that Israel was also able to forestall a pro-Soviet takeover of the region.

Safran depicts four distinct periods in the American-Israeli relationship: 1948–57; 1957–67; 1967–73; and 1973 to the Second Interim Agreement of September 1975.

The first period, 1948–57, was marked by American efforts to establish a security network in the Middle East. The United States sought to entice Arab states to permit the establishment of military bases in their territories. Thus America's moral interest in Israel diverged from its *real* interests, and the outcome was a considerable strain in relations. Even when Israel felt threatened by Egyptian moves, such as the famous 1955 Czech arms deal, the United States did not desist from appeasing Nasser and did nothing to bolster Israel's defences and thus assuage its concern. America's failure to appreciate the depth of Israeli anxiety in the face of Nasserite bellicosity prompted Israel to embark (with British and French collaboration) on the 1956 Sinai campaign. The result was a major crisis between Washington and Jerusalem, which persisted even in the aftermath of that conflict as a result of American pressures upon Israel to withdraw before any scheme for ensuring Israeli security was agreed upon. Washington entertained the hope that by compelling an Israeli evacuation of Sinai it would earn Nasser's eternal gratitude and hence his co-operation in keeping the area free of Russian influence. Eisenhower's administration was quickly disabused of this assumption when Nasser, in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal, speedily reverted to his pro-Soviet line. Henceforth, Washington endeavoured to stabilize the Middle East not in conjunction with, but despite, Nasser. American policy was now directed at containing Nasserite adventurism, and Israel

assumed a significant role in this endeavour. As a result, there developed a greater affinity between America's moral commitments and its real interests. Israel's value as a stabilizing factor in the Middle East came to the fore in that period and reached a climax in the events of the Six-Day War.

The period after the Six-Day War (1967–73) was characterized by maximal harmony between the United States and Israel. U.S. policy-makers recognized that their pressure on Israel to withdraw from Sinai in 1957 had been precipitate and counter-productive and had, in fact, set the stage for a new round of fighting. This time, the Lyndon Johnson Administration resolved, an Israeli withdrawal would be called for only in the context of a final peace settlement. U.S.–Israeli relations, therefore, reached a stage of unprecedented accord, and Washington tended more and more to regard Israel as a virtual (though unwritten) ally.

The Yom Kippur War of 1973 opened up a new phase in the relationship, according to Safran. The see-saw nature of the conflict in its early phases and the resultant Israeli dependence on American military aid, gave the United States significant leverage to bring about a settlement. In the view of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the makings of a quid pro quo existed in Israel's hold on Arab territories: the latter could be 'traded' for a peace settlement. That policy led to the step-by-step approach and the conclusion of various interim agreements during 1974 and 1975. In a real sense, this American approach set the stage for the ultimate Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. What is no less significant is that this policy succeeded in consolidating Egypt's detachment from the Soviet Union and its alignment with the West. The United States was gaining in Egypt a major new ally in the Middle East, and one, moreover, which did not suffer from the disabilities of Israel *vis-à-vis* the Arab world.

It is here that one could wish that Safran had elaborated more on the factors which prompted Sadat to abandon the Russian connection and to develop a new positive tie with Washington. From all indications, this decision represented a crucial turning point in the Arab–Israeli conflict. The stage was thereby set for all the subsequent developments leading up to Camp David and its aftermath. Moreover, Sadat's new turn bears significantly on the American–Israeli relationship and, therefore, would seem to warrant special attention and analysis. Elsewhere I have suggested that Sadat's disenchantment with the Russians, although it began as early as July 1972 with the expulsion of Soviet forces from Egypt, reached its apogée in the critical events of 24–25 October 1973. It was then, it will be recalled, that the Russians threatened to intervene directly in the Yom Kippur War and were dissuaded from doing so, inter alia, by America's decision to place its armed forces (including those equipped with nuclear weapons) on alert. This Ameri-

can response, it is suggested, preserved Egypt's independence by freeing it of the Russian bear hug. In a real sense, therefore, America's action shielded Egypt, more than it saved Israel, from a Russian threat. And the outcome of that episode was Sadat's dramatic turn to Washington, reflected in Kissinger's tête-à-tête with Sadat early in November 1973, and the consequent renewal of diplomatic relations between Cairo and Washington. Regardless of any particular interpretation which one may give to those events, it is a pity that Safran did not focus more attention on their seminal character and analyse their implications for the Washington–Jerusalem tie.

It may be thought that Safran's cut-off date (June 1977) caused his book to be somewhat outdated by the time it was in print. Such momentous events as Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, the Camp David Agreements of September 1978, and the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty of March 1979 are, of course, not touched upon and their impact on the American–Israeli relationship not assessed. It may be supposed, therefore, that Safran's book has little to teach us about the latest stage of American–Israeli relations and still less to reveal about the future course which these relations are likely to take. This, however, is not the case. Safran's central thesis that the relative balancing of America's real and moral interests in the Middle East at any critical moment is what determines Washington's attitude towards Israel, remains valid. It applies no less today than it had applied in the earlier period. Indeed, the recent developments surrounding the peace process should be examined and assessed in the light of the Safran formula on American–Israeli relations. In particular, to what extent will the emergence of Egypt as a bulwark against Soviet penetration of the Middle East affect American reliance on Israel as a Cold War ally? For the first time the United States is gaining a powerful Arab ally in the heartland of the Middle East, and some adjustment in the Washington–Jerusalem connection will be inevitable. Israeli policymakers, assuredly, will continue to hope that, despite Washington's ties to both Cairo and Jerusalem, the United States will not become 'neutralized' in the context of the Arab–Israeli dispute, which, even after the conclusion of the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty, is by no means settled. If Egypt has indeed committed itself to withdrawing from the belligerent Arab front, Israel may no longer be as 'embattled' as it previously was. The key question, however, is whether Israel will continue to be regarded by Washington as an effective American 'ally' in the Middle East notwithstanding Egypt's reorientation in the global competition between the powers.

SHLOMO SLONIM

STEVEN P. SEGAL AND URI AVIRAM, *The Mentally Ill in Community-Based Sheltered Care. A Study of Community Care and Social Integration*, xiv + 337 pp., John Wiley & Sons, New York, Chichester, Brisbane, and Toronto, 1979, £14.05.

In 1955 California's state mental hospitals had a resident population of 37,000, and a further thousand were cared for in the community in some sort of sheltered care. Less than twenty years later the hospital population had decreased to 7,000 while the number in sheltered care facilities had risen to 12,500. This dramatic change does not apparently reflect a decrease in mental illness, since the number of first admissions to the state hospitals has actually increased. Segal and Aviram discuss the many reasons for the Californian and United States decline in long-term hospitalization, a decline which has also occurred in other countries and which is usually attributed to the advent of psychotropic medication. It is the authors' contention, however, that in the United States—and especially in California—changes in policy and administration have played an even more important role and that these in turn were brought about by changes in the attitude to the mentally ill. The introductory discussion of the history of mental health reform in the United States is among the most interesting and readable sections of this book. The authors studied 499 persons, a sample of the 12,430 former state mental hospitals patients aged 18–65 who were in sheltered care in September 1973.

The shift from hospital to community care is based on the idea that the aim of treatment should be to re-integrate the patient into the community and that hospitalization, especially long-term hospitalization, leads to the opposite results—to institutionalization. The study had three specific goals:

'(1) To provide demographic data on released patients living in sheltered care; (2) to generate a measure of the level of their social integration; and most importantly (3) to identify factors facilitating or hindering social integration.'

The first goal is straightforward. In the sample—chosen according to accepted techniques which are carefully described—46 per cent are 50 years or older (compared with 25 per cent for the general population of California), while the sex distribution shows an equal division between men and women. On the other hand, the women on average are considerably older than the men. Their marital staus is markedly different from that of the general population; 79 per cent of Californians between 18 and 65 are married and only 18 per cent have never been married; of the sheltered care population, five per cent are married and only 40 per cent have ever been married. A very small proportion of the group—15 per cent—are gainfully occupied; it would have been interesting to know how many of them had been in the labour force

before they became mental patients, but it seems that the matter of past employment was not investigated—a surprising omission. Socio-economically, they are downwardly mobile (that is, their fathers were in a higher category) and are over-represented in the unskilled worker category, but no figures are given. All those in the sample had been in California state mental hospitals: the older ones usually for more than two years continuously, and the younger ones for shorter periods (but likely to have had several short terms in hospital). The Overall and Gorham Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (with which I am not familiar) was used to determine the extent of psychopathology. By the standards of this test, the interviewers found 16 per cent of their sample severely disturbed, and 56 per cent mildly disturbed—while 28 per cent showed no overt psychological disturbance whatever. If we assume that the test is reliable, and the interviewers capable, what are these 28 per cent doing in sheltered care? For some unexplained reason, this significant question is not considered by the authors.

The further goals of the study were to generate a measure of the level of their social integration and to identify factors facilitating or hindering it. Social integration is divided into 'internal integration' and 'external integration'. Internal integration is assessed according to the extent to which the individual ex-patient (generally referred to as a 'resident') participated in the life of the particular unit (generally referred to as a 'facility'). External integration, on the other hand, is assessed by the extent to which the resident participated in the life of the larger community (as defined by R. Warren in *The Community in America*, 1963). Scales were devised to measure the degree of participation in the facility and in the community. The principal yardstick was based on a structured interview conducted by a social worker, who not only interviewed the residents but also those who ran the facilities (referred to as 'operators').

The third goal must, of course, depend on the accuracy of the information obtained from the second. My impression is that the questionnaires were adequate but pedestrian and that the sophistication of their methodological techniques was not matched by an equivalent understanding of the patients they were studying. Let me give one striking example. In determining the extent of external integration, one of the sub-scales was called 'friendship, access and participation'; this akward phrase referred to the extent of interaction between the residents and their acquaintances and close friends. One of the findings was that for a large percentage there was more 'access and participation' with acquaintances than with close friends, and this is interpreted as showing that for some disturbed people contact is easier with casual than with close friends. When looking at the questionnaire on which this finding was based, I see that residents were asked how often they were likely to visit or get together with an acquaintance and how often with a close

friend. What was not asked was, 'Do you have a close friend?' Any experienced worker in this field knows that one of the characteristics of long-term patients is their social isolation; few of them have close friends, while some have never had any real experience of friendship. To ask them how often they visit a close friend, and how often an acquaintance, is like asking a group of people, most of whom are only children, how close they were to their brothers and sisters and to their acqaintances and then generalizing about the reasons for the low incidence of sibling interaction.

Another problem with this book is the awkwardness and lack of clarity of much, although not all, of the writing. Indeed, it is so uneven that one cannot help but conclude that one of the authors writes far more fluently and precisely than the other. There is an irritating use of jargon—long words are used when short, simple terms would have been more comprehensible as well as more correct; people 'articulate' or 'verbalize' rather than speak; they never reach out towards others but are continually showing 'greater or lesser social outreach'. Workers for civil liberties are referred to as 'libertarians'. Sometimes, imprecisions and circumlocutions render the arguments difficult to follow and inevitably lead the informed reader to question some of the findings. For example, one of the chapters examines the part played by particular communities in helping or hindering the residents' participation and integration. The authors list four characteristics of any given community which are crucial, in one way or another, for such integration. They are:

1. Response of neighbours,
2. Rural-urban location of the facility,
3. Complaints from neighbours, and
4. Distance from the facility.

Apart from the fact that (3) is part of (1), can any of the four criteria be considered to be characteristics of a community? However, this book—in spite of the sloppiness of the writing, and sometimes of the argument, is full of valuable if rather depressing information. Some of it is made lively and poignant when it reports the sayings of the residents or the spontaneous reactions of the interviewers.

Although the whole point of emptying out California's hospitals and of placing former patients in community care was to help those men and women to get back into the community, it seems that most of them have simply been moved from a large institution to a smaller one in much the same way as orphans are nowadays placed with a few others in a home with 'houseparents' rather than kept in the large impersonal orphanages of former years. They are still orphans. The majority of the residents apparently prefer these smaller facilities, but the overall picture of life in them is not a salutary one. Most of the patients have not had any say in choosing the facility, and many have not even visited it

before they find themselves 'posted' to it. The 'Halfway House' is the type of residence which gets the most publicity and which is most geared to therapy and to self help—but only three per cent of the sheltered care population are in halfway houses, while 14 per cent are in private families. The remaining 83 per cent live in what are called 'board and care homes', which vary from small to very large and are typically situated in ghetto neighbourhoods of large cities. When such 'homes' are in residential neighbourhoods, the local inhabitants often go to the courts to obtain an order against the 'operators' who run them. The operators seem to have little or no training; they are generally well-meaning but for them this kind of position is a step up the social and economic ladder. They tend to treat the residents like children, even opening their mail and then presenting them with the welfare cheques (out of which operators are paid) for signature. They are in charge of the medications and see to it that the daily dose is taken. More than three quarters of the residents are on psychotropic drugs and—although medical and sometimes psychiatric consultation is said to be available—patients tend to be kept on the same dosage prescribed for them when they left hospital.

More than half the sample studied never or rarely 'interact in community groups' or use community facilities; they do not, on their own initiative, contact family or friends. A mere 10 per cent regularly use community facilities—and then only when it is arranged by the operator. I think it important to note here that I believe that the great majority of patients in British mental hospitals have more contact with the outside world than do most of the residents in California's community facilities.

I am less optimistic than the authors, who think that identification of the factors which help or hinder social integration is likely to lead to a great deal of improvement. There does, however, appear to be some hope for the future as a result of the activities of the Civil Rights Movement—which is discussed in the penultimate chapter. It seems that in the last few years, the mentally ill have become a new minority group for whom there are interested and articulate defenders. One cannot deny that social change may be very quickly precipitated in the United States. But whether it can lead in this particular case to a more therapeutic and more autonomous way of life is open to question. There are two major forces against such reform: the residents themselves are scattered, individually isolated, and chemically tranquillized; and the operators are private entrepreneurs who would be working against their own interests if they succeeded in returning their residents to the wider society.

This study has been only partially successful in its declared aim of measuring social integration or discovering the factors which help or hinder this integration. Its value, in my opinion, lies in its social

documentation and in its description of what happened—as well as what has not happened—in the process of transferring a particularly disadvantaged group out of mental hospitals into the community.

DORIS Y. MAYER

WILLIAM SHACK and PERSY S. COHEN, eds. *Politics and Leadership: A Comparative Perspective*, xiv + 296 pp., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, £10.

Isaac Schapera is one of the most distinguished—if not the most distinguished—of the authorities on the ethnology, anthropology and social history of the African peoples of South Africa. As the splendid bibliography of all his published works at the end of this book shows, his first piece of scholarly research was published in 1923, when he was eighteen. His latest paper appeared in 1978 when he was seventy-four, marking fifty-five years of continual scholarly productivity. *Politics in Leadership* is a collection of essays contributed by some of his former colleagues and students to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of his arrival at the London School of Economics as a graduate student.

As a co-editor of an earlier *festschrift* dedicated to Schapera (*Studies in African Social Anthropology*, 1975), I want to offer a special welcome to the present volume. And as an early convert to the study of comparative politics he pioneered, I also want to applaud the choice of the central theme for this collection. None more fitting as a tribute to him could have been found. It was planned, we are told, to consider aspects of matters dealt with in his *Government and Politics in Tribal Societies*, and a better qualified team for this undertaking could hardly have been assembled.

The book begins with an introduction by Percy Cohen which expertly elicits the main arguments advanced in the papers that follow. Stimulated by his comments, I began with James Woodburn's paper on 'Minimal Politics' among the Hadza of Tanzania. It is, to my mind, the volume's most interesting contribution to comparative political theory. Recent field-work has shown hunting and gathering peoples to have a very comfortable subsistence level. But how they maintain law and order internally and defend themselves against outside enemies is still obscure. Orthodox opinion is that political organization in such societies is wholly coterminous with their kinship organization. But Woodburn demonstrates that the Hadza do not recognize kinship connections or obligations beyond first-degree kin and affines, hence there is no basis for a kinship polity. Their 'minimal politics' are limited to a combination of violent self-help, flight, ritually sanctioned opposition of the sexes, incest taboos, and rules about food sharing. I foresee lively discussion of the Woodburn 'model', which seems to contradict emphatically the accepted views.

Equally instructive, but from a very different point of view, is Ernest Gellner's assessment of the Soviet anthropologist L. E. Kubbel's book on the mediaevel West African states of Ghana and Mali. This is one of a series of penetrating studies in which Gellner has been presenting contemporary Soviet anthropological theory and research to anglophone students. From the perspective of some of Schapera's generalizations, he examines, in contrast, Kubbel's analysis of the supposed development of these societies through the canonical marxist stages to eventual state formation. Kubbel's studied objectivity within the limits of his strict marxist guidelines leads to the inference that, contrary to marxist dogma, state formation preceded rather than followed class formation. Gellner's scrupulously fair evaluation of the argument makes clear the importance of Soviet work in this field—controversial though it must remain for 'Westerners'.

Stephen Morris, turning to a different aspect of Schapera's work, describes the demise of formerly aristocratic leadership among the Melanau. It is an absorbing story of the transformation of a social and economic order as a result of intrusive—mainly Chinese—traders bringing in new productive technology and commercial methods and thus exacerbating the impoverishment and political dependency of the native population.

Leadership in politics is more conspicuously at the centre of the remaining papers. Ioan Lewis's fascinating account of the vicissitudes of marxist political leadership in Somalia has much wider implications. The same pattern of a quasi-dynastic, educated, committed, very personal leadership, using all available means, from media technology to international diplomacy, to put across the rhetoric of socialist nationalism in opposition to tribalism, is common among the new nations of Africa. And the likelihood of this challenge confronting the new Zimbabwe is readily inferrable from Hugh Ashton's paper. This admirable survey, by a master of the data, sets out stage by stage the development of the administrative structure of Matabeleland from pre-colonial days to the present time. What strikes one is the tenacity of the traditional values attached to chiefship in the face of policy changes and, more significantly, the spread of modern education, radical economic change, and contemporary political movements.

Such tenacity of traditional forms of political leadership behind apparently revolutionary changes resulting from far-reaching westernization is also exemplified among the South-Eastern Nigerians dicussed by G.I. Jones. In this area traditional leadership was an achieved status depending on entrepreneurship, wealth, intelligence or prowess in war. The triumph of Christianity, education, commerce, modern politics, migration to cities, and modern communications has resulted in a shift to a form of collective leadership by associations of elite members of each local community. But the model of achieved status persists.

With Professor La Fontaine and Drs. Roberts and Comaroff the emphasis is on the sources and efficacy of authority vested in high political office. Professor La Fontaine, writing about the Bagisu, takes up a long-standing theoretical question much stressed by Schapera. She examines, step by step, the interconnections between the political and juridical definitions of land as an economic asset and territory as a determinant of political boundary and identity, linking this with lineage and headship as the basis of the legitimacy of the political order.

Roberts and Comaroff also go back to a favourite topic of Schapera's, the inheritance of property among the Kgatla and the efforts of chiefs to change the customary rules. The cases they analyse lead to a novel conclusion. They interpret the marginal superiority still accorded the inheritance rights of an eldest son as signifying not economic provision ensuring support for younger siblings but legitimacy of succession to father's status—which explains the resistance to attemps by chiefs to change the rules. Further evidence will be awaited with interest.

The papers by Sir Raymond Firth and William Shack are appropriately bracketted together under the rubric of *Sacred and Secular Leadership*. Firth poses the problem of how it is that the traditionally 'sacred' Tikopia chiefship has persisted into the modern era of Christianity, literacy, and general westernization as a 'secular' office. No longer sacred, it is still regarded reverentially as the symbolic focus of Tikopian unity and identity. To explain this, he examines the Tikopia concept of *tapu* in the context of both Polynesian usage and the development of theory since Durkheim. He thus elicits the positive 'image-enhancing aspect of *tapu*' in relation to the chiefship, as opposed to its negative, prohibitive aspects in other situations. The transition to the modern pattern of secular authority backed by Christianity is elucidated with classical precision.

Finally, Dr. Shack considers an African variant of the configuration. His synopsis of Gurage political development from before the Ethiopian conquest of 1889 until the present time depicts an institutional complex very reminiscent, as he notes, of the Bemba. Military, political, and theocratic elements were traditionally—and remain—intertwined in this system. Sacred and secular components of political authority were—and remain—vested in mutually exclusive offices tied to social groups that are correspondingly distinct but united in inseparable interdependence ensured by powerful religious sanctions. Changing fortunes of both internecine and external warfare, modernization, and bureaucratization, have totally transformed the original secular chiefship. But the supremacy of the 'sacerdotal leaders' has never been undermined. Dr. Shack explains why, by linking this state of affairs with Gurage cosmological beliefs, notably their conception of their national divinity, the Free Spirit.

A *festschrift*, even one built around a single broad theme, inevitably

reflects the diverse interests and points of view of its contributors. All-embracing generalizations are not expected to emerge. What is striking about this *festschrift* is how one feature of political leadership stands out in all the papers. It seems that in one guise or another, traditional forms of leadership have considerable tenacity and adaptability in the face of often drastic social and economic changes. Here lies a problem that recurs throughout Schapera's Tswana studies. It calls for much further research.

MEYER FORTES

CHRONICLE

The Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel announced last September, on the eve of the Jewish New Year, that the country's population then stood at 3,885,000—an increase of 82,000 (2·5 per cent) over the previous year's total. The Jewish population accounted for 61,000 of the 82,000; there had been a natural increase (excess of births over deaths) of 45,000 and a net immigration total of 16,000. Although 28,000 immigrants had come to settle (including 6,000 Jews who had returned to Israel after an absence of more than one year) in the course of the year, 12,000 had left the country.

The rate of increase of both Jews and non-Jews had declined: from 2·3 to 1·9 for Jews and 3·6 to 3·4 for non-Jews. The growth of the latter (21,000 persons) was entirely through natural increase.

*

The Foundations of Law bill became law last July, when the Knesset approved its second and third readings by a vote of 48 to 15. Henceforth, whenever the courts note a lacuna in legislation or judicial precedent, their decision shall be guided by 'the principles of freedom, justice, honesty and peace of the Jewish heritage'. Until now, the courts had been required in such cases (under Article 46 of the King's Order in Council, dating from the Mandate period) to rule in accordance with English law.

The chairman of the Law Committee of the Knesset is reported to have commented that 23 July 1980, when the bill passed into law, was 'a great day for Israeli law', and to have added that he himself would have preferred the words 'the principles of Jewish law' to 'the Jewish heritage'.

*

All Israeli Rabbinical Court judgements have been added to the data bank of the computer used by Bar Ilan University in its 12-year-old *Responsa* Project. Some of the responsa date back to the seventh century. The data bank holds more than thirty thousand individual questions and answers. There were more than 600 inquiries received in 1979 from Israel and abroad and the Director of the Project stated that the 36-million word computer has the ability to print out full unabridged *responsa* texts when a triggering 'key-word' is punched out.

Yeshiva University in New York operates a sister-system.

*

There has been a sharp drop in immigration to Israel in the first ten months of 1980, compared with the same period in 1979: 18,869 against 31,666. The number of Russian newcomers in that period, 7,160, is less than half the total for January-October 1979—14,654; the Soviet authorities have granted fewer exit visas and many more Soviet Jews decided on reaching Vienna that they would not settle in Israel.

The Jewish Agency is reported to have stated last November that owing to the decrease in immigration, absorption centres are less crowded; some are being converted to provide permanent housing for immigrants. New centres would be opened if necessary, should there be a future surge of Diaspora Jews coming to settle in Israel.

*

The Jews' Temporary Shelter in London (which provides accommodation for those en route to other countries) has received an influx of Middle Eastern Jews in 1980. At the Shelter's annual meeting in December, it was announced that in the eight months from April to November 250 persons were housed for 6,188 nights; during the same period in 1979 the total had been 3,000 nights.

There has also been a substantial increase in the duration of the stay at the Shelter until the residents leave for a more permanent home: some have stayed for between one and nine months after being referred to the Shelter by the Jewish Welfare Board, the Central British Fund-World Jewish Relief, or the Home Office. A special tribute was paid to the sympathetic attitude of the Home Office when dealing with the cases.

*

The August 1980 issue of *Jewish Cultural News*, a publication of the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress, has a report on Jewish education in South Africa:

'Fifteen thousand Jewish children, some two-thirds of those of school age, are studying at schools run by the South African Board of Jewish Education. Thus South Africa has the highest percentage of children receiving a Jewish education outside Israel.

'The largest schools are . . . in Johannesburg and in Cape Town. Other sizeable day schools are to be found in Durban, Pretoria and Benoni . . .

'The University of South Africa in Pretoria, a correspondence university, offers a course in Judaica. This course is divided into two main subjects: Jewish history and Jewish culture. The Jewish History curriculum covers the history of the Jewish people from biblical times to the present era and lays special emphasis on the political, socio-economic, and religious conditions that prevailed in Jewish communities throughout the world. A section on the history of South African Jewry since the sixteenth century (*sic*) is included in the course. In the field of Jewish culture a study is made of the nature and development of Jewish law, Hebrew literature, the Kabbalah and Jewish philosophy.'

*

The Young Adult Division of the World Zionist Organization has opened a centre for Jewish studies in Madrid. It also runs centres in Malaga, in Southern Spain, and in Tangier for young adults and youth leaders.

*

The Board of Trustees of the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture met in Amsterdam last July and approved the distribution of U.S. $1,585,000 to various programmes. Grants were allocated to nearly 200 projects in the area

of Jewish research and publication, Jewish studies at colleges and universities, and the documentation and commemoration of the Holocaust. A similar number of grants was given for doctoral scholarships and fellowships, for the training of future Judaic and post-rabbinic scholars, and for Jewish educationists, research specialists, writers, and artists.

The Board of Trustees also approved grants to teachers and communal workers for service in isolated or culturally deprived Jewish communities, particularly those which had been affected by the Holocaust.

The Foundation was established in 1965, with headquarters in New York.

*

The Society for Danish Jewish History has been established in Copenhagen. No such organization has existed in Denmark, although the first wave of Jewish immigration came to the country in the sixteenth century. They were Sephardi Jews from Holland, who were followed in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by German and eastern European Jews. The board of directors of the Society includes the vice-president and chief librarian of the Danish parliament. The address of the Society for Danish Jewish History is Stefansgade 51B, 52200N Copenhagen, Denmark.

*

Jewish communities in Asia have established their own association, the Asia Pacific Jewish Association (A.P.J.A.). They held a conference in Hong Kong, attended by representatives of the Jewish communities of Australia, India, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan. The base of the Association will be in Australia, under the aegis of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry.

*

The Technion awarded last June more than 300 degrees, which included doctorates in science and in medicine and Masters of science. Nine women were among the 54 new doctors of science and engineering and a further nine women among the 49 medical doctors. Of the 207 Masters of science graduates, 41 were women.

Bar Ilan University has conferred this year 33 Ph. D. degrees, 101 Masters, 1,043 Bachelor degrees, and 162 diplomas in education, translation, and librarianship.

*

Brooklyn College of the City University of New York has established a Master of Arts degree in Judaic Studies, which will have three main areas of instruction and research: Biblical, Second Commonwealth, and Talmudic Studies; Medieval Studies; and Modern Judaic Studies. Of the 30 credits required, 12 may be taken in Israel through an arrangement with the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv and Bar Ilan universities.

*

The Whitworth Art Gallery of the University of Manchester held an exhibition in October–December 1980 of Jewish Art Treasures from the collections of the State Museum in Prague.

The exhibition was seen by more than 38,000 visitors, many of whom came in coachloads from London and other cities of the United Kingdom. The Jewish art treasures from Prague had never previously been seen in the West; the Whitworth Art Gallery exhibited silver and metal work—which included jewelled crowns, breastplates and finials used to decorate the scrolls of the Torah, candelabra, etc; synagogue textiles—elaborate pelmets and curtains for the Ark and velvet mantles for the Torah embroidered in gold and silver; eighteenth-century paintings, miniature portraits, glass, ceramics, and silver utensils from the Prague *Hevra Kadisha* (Burial Brotherhood); and original drawings made in the concentration camp at Terezin by adult artists as well as some of the 15,000 children in that camp between 1942 and 1944.

The collections of the State Jewish Museum in Prague are the greatest holding of Judaica in the world, according to the Director of the Whitworth Art Gallery, who went to Prague in 1972 and again in 1978 to negotiate an exchange of exhibitions between the United Kingdom and Czechoslovakia. As a result, an exhibition of 'The Pre-Raphaelites and Related Artists'—drawn entirely from the Whitworth Art Gallery—was shown in Bratislava and in Prague some months before the Whitworth Art Gallery exhibited nearly three hundred items from the State Jewish Museum in Prague. The Gallery has published a superb illustrated catalogue of the Exhibition, with a Dedication stating:

> The history of the Jews in Prague and in Bohemia begins in the Middle Ages. In the course of a thousand years, monuments of significance and objects of great artistic and cultural value have been made for particular Jewish communities within the regions of Bohemia and Moravia, and these are now in the care of the State Jewish Museum in Prague. Its collections originated in those of the pre-war Prague Jewish Museum but they were greatly enlarged as a result of the tragedy of World War II when most Jewish communities in Bohemia and Moravia became victims of the Nazi racial persecution.
>
> This exhibition, which displays representative examples from that collection, is dedicated to the memory of those who lost their lives.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Beer, William R., *The Unexpected Rebellion. Ethnic Activism in Contemporary France*, xxxii + 150 pp., New York Univ. Press, New York and London, 1980, $24.00.

Bell, Daniel, *Sociological Journeys Essays 1960-1980*, xxiv + 370 pp., Heinemann, London, 1980. £12.50.

Bykovsky, Lev, *Solomon I. Goldelman: A Portrait of a Politician and Educator (1885-1974). A Chapter in Ukrainian Jewish Relations*, edited by Lubomyr R. Wynar, 98 pp., Ukrainian Historical Association, New York, Toronto, and Munich, 1980, n.p.

Cohen, Percy S., *Jewish Radicals and Radical Jews*, xviii + 224 pp., published for the Institute of Jewish Affairs by Academic Press, London, 1980, £10.80 or $25.00.

Davis, Moshe, ed., *Zionism in Transition*, xv + 377 pp., The Herzl Press, New York, 1980, n.p.

Eber, Irene, *Voices From Afar: Modern Chinese Writers On Oppressed Peoples and Their Literature*, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, No. 38, xxiv + 162 pp., Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1980, n.p.

Edwards, Richard, *Contested Terrain. The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century*, ix + 261 pp., Heinemann, London, 1980, £4.50.

Elkin, Judith Laikin, *Jews of the Latin American Republics*, xv + 298 pp., The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1980, $17.00.

Franck, Issac, ed., *Biochemical Ethics in Perspective of Jewish Teaching and Tradition. Proceedings of an American Conference (November 13, 1977)*, ii + 60 pp., College of Jewish Studies of Greater Washington, 1980, $2·50.

Ginzberg, Eli, *Yehudei Amerikah: Kehilah Hofshit Be-Hithavutah* (American Jews: The Building of a Voluntary Community), 208 pp., published for the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the American Jewish Historical Society by Schocken Publishing House, Tel Aviv, 1980, n.p.

Irving, R. E. M., *The Flemings and Walloons of Belgium*, Report No. 46, 16 pp, Minority Rights Group, 36 Craven Street, London WC3N 5NG, London, 1980, 75p.

Kren, George M., and Leon Rappoport, *The Holocaust and the Crisis of Human Behavior*, v + 176 pp., Holmes and Meier, New York and London, 1980, £8.95.

Levine, Aaron, *Free Enterprise and Jewish Law. Aspects of Jewish Business Ethics*, xiii + 224 pp., The Library of Jewish Law and Ethics, Ktav Publishing House and Yeshiva Univ. Press, New York, 1980, $17·50.

McLean, Scilla, ed., *Female Circumcision, Excision and Infibulation*, Report No. 47,

20 pp., Minority Rights Group, 36 Craven Street, London WC2N 5NG, 1980. £1·20.

Marx, Emanuel, ed., *A Composite Portrait of Israel*, vii + 290 pp., Academic Press, London and New York, 1980, £12·80 or $29·50.

Pollak, Michael, *Mandarins, Jews, and Missionaries. The Jewish Experience in the Chinese Empire*, xviii + 436 pp., The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1980, $14·95.

Shimoni, Gideon, *Jews and Zionism: The South African Experience 1910–1967*, xii + 428 pp., Oxford Univ. Press, Cape Town, 1980, £12·00.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

BACHI, Roberto; Ph.D. Emeritus Professor of statistics and demography, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Government Statistician of the State of Israel 1948–1971. Chief publications: *La mobilità della popolazione all'interno delle grandi città europeè*, Rome, 1933; *L'evoluzione demografica degli Ebrei Italiani dal 1600 al 1937*, Florence, 1938; *Graphical Rational Patterns. A New Approach to graphical Presentation of Statistics*, Jerusalem, 1968; *Population Trends of World Jewry*, Jerusalem, 1968; and *The Population of Israel*, Jerusalem and Paris, 1977. Currently engaged in research on geostatistical and graphical-statistical methods and on the demography of Diaspora Jewry.

ROSENTHAL, Erich; Ph.D. Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Queens College of the City University of New York. Chief publications: 'Acculturation Without Assimilation? The Jewish Community of Chicago, Illinois', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 66, November 1960; 'This was North Lawndale: The Transplantation of a Jewish Community in Chigo, Illinois', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 22, April 1960; 'Studies of Jewish Intermarriage in the United States', *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 64, 1963; 'Jewish Intermarriage in Indiana', *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 68, 1967; and 'Jewish Populations in General Decennial Population Censuses, 1955–61: a Bibliography' in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 11, no. 1, June 1969.

SHIMONI, Gideon; Ph.D. Lecturer at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Chief publications: *Gandhi, Satyagraha and the Jews*, Jerusalem Papers on Peace, 1977; 'Jan Christian Smuts and Zionism', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 39, no. 4, 1977; *Jews and Zionism: The South African Experience 1910–1967*, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1980; and 'Ideological Perspectives' in Moshe Davis, ed., *Zionism in Transition*, New York, 1980.

TARLO, Hyman; M.A., Ll.B. Professor of Law at the University of Queensland and President of the Australian and New Zealand Union for Progressive Judaism. His publications have been mainly in the fields of law and legal education. Currently engaged in environment law and other contemporary legal problems.

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