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CONTENTS

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THE JEWS OF QUEBEC: PERCEIVED ANTISEMITISM, SEGREGATION, AND EMIGRATION

Morton Weinfeld

THIS paper considers the relation between the perception of antisemitism and both Jewish communal segregation and the propensity to emigrate, for a sample of Jews in Montreal. Two types of segregation are examined: economic and social.

Studies of multi-ethnic societies, beginning with the classic analysis of plural society by Furnivall,[1] have suggested that inter-group segregation would be greatest for those forms of interaction involving greatest intimacy, and least for those involving lower degrees of intimacy, such as economic activity. This is implicit in the notion of multi-dimensional assimilation[2] and in the idea of social distance as applied to distinct minority groups.[3] While *economic* segregation is generally the result of historic or ongoing patterns of discrimination, often resulting in split labour markets[4] and restricted opportunities,[5] there is evidence which suggests that patterns of *social* segregation, particularly in groups self-consciously opposed to assimilation, may reflect both voluntary and involuntary factors.[6]

The literature on in-group-out-group relations, and specifically the proposition (derived from Simmel),[7] that out-group hostility will be associated with in-group solidarity,[8] leads us to expect that perceived antisemitism would cause Jews to become segregated. LeVine and Campbell[9] have extended the argument to cases of 'perceived threat'. In his classic, *The Ghetto*, Louis Wirth noted that continuing antisemitism was the factor most likely to retard the eventual assimilation of the Jews.[10]

If the outside world is perceived as hostile, Jews might either seek support from other Jews within the community for economic and social purposes, or might consider emigration. Economic and social segregation, or the propensity to emigrate, may vary for many reasons apart from an individual perception of environmental hostility. For example, emigration will be associated with younger age and/or higher educational attainment—older persons find it more difficult to move. For this

reason, I shall try to isolate any unique effects of perceived antisemitism, controlling for other variables.

Perception is important in any study of antisemitism. It has been argued that the 'new antisemitism' is no longer defined by Jews as consisting of specifically anti-Jewish acts, but rather as the absence of concern for, or sympathy with, Jewish interests.[11] For example, political anti-Zionism (or any anti-Israeli position) is often perceived as antisemitism. Thus, it is such a perception of antisemitism which may have consequences and which deserves study, regardless of whether we accept this new definition of antisemitism and regardless of whether specific individuals have suffered from specific acts. Antisemitism is treated here as a subjective social phenomenon.

Historical background

The Jews of Montreal (more than 98 per cent of Quebec Jews live in Montreal) have deep roots. The first congregation was that of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews, whose Synagogue (Shearith Israel) was established in 1768. The community grew slowly; according to Canadian census records, by 1831 there were an estimated 50 Jews residing in Montreal, and by 1881 there were about 1,000. Most of these were of German-Jewish origin. Rapid growth began at the end of the last century, with the influx of immigrants from eastern Europe who were fleeing antisemitism: by 1901, the population had increased to almost 7,000. Immigration (unlike other groups, Jews had very little return migration) and high fertility had led to an almost seven-fold increase by 1921, to 46,000. Since then, the rate of growth has been more modest; according to the 1971 census, 109,480 defined themselves as Jews, by religion, in Montreal. They accounted for about four per cent of the metropolitan population, and roughly 11 per cent of the non-French and nearly 18 per cent of the non-charter (non-English and non-French) ethnic-origin population of the city.

The character of Jewish life in Montreal has been shaped by its waves of immigration; the present community absorbed a relatively large number of post-1945 (Ashkenazi) European immigrants, survivors of the Holocaust. The most recent arrivals have been from North Africa; they have helped to create a large (Sephardi) francophone minority within the Jewish community. These two components of Montreal Jewry make Montreal unique among other Jewish communities in North America, and have produced internal strain[12] not unlike the tensions which arose in the United States between the established German Jews and the immigrants from eastern Europe who came at the turn of the century.

The Jewish population of Montreal has not only grown in size, but has prospered, transforming itself from a largely working-class com-

munity at the beginning of the century to one which is predominantly middle class today, with large numbers of businessmen, managers, professionals, and scientific/technical workers.[13] It has developed a vast network of communal organizations—involving schools, hospitals, welfare, cultural, and recreational associations—thereby achieving a high degree of 'institutional completeness'. That network has developed both as a response to actual antisemitism, and as a carry-over of a tradition of Jewish self-help and corporate autonomy developed earlier in Europe —a tradition which owed much to pre-Emancipation policies restricting Jewish civic, political, and economic rights. This institutional development assumed a dynamic of its own which has maintained it, in Montreal as elsewhere, long after original discriminatory attitudes or restrictions may have abated.[14]

A Jewish 'solitude'[15] was created, to parallel that of the English and the French in Montreal, with a high degree of segregation in economic, social, and residential patterns. While actual or feared antisemitism was a factor, the role of the Jewish religion should not be overlooked. Religious requirements, particularly among the Orthodox —such as the dietary laws, avoidance of travel and work on the Sabbath, and the proscription of intermarriage—would reinforce this isolation.

The Jews, like most other immigrant groups in Quebec, have integrated linguistically into the English-speaking sector of the province. In general, French Quebec was suspicious of its immigrants. While most of this suspicion was no doubt rooted in the fact that immigrants did join the anglophone milieu, another factor may have been a parochial insularity and resulting xenophobia, persisting well into the 1950s.[16] The confessional structure of public education—consisting of Protestant or Catholic schools—led Jewish parents to gravitate to the Protestant system, characterized by less religious zeal and a more modern curriculum. English, moreover, was perceived by the Jewish immigrants, correctly, as the language of entrepreneurial opportunity in the province. It served also to preserve both personal links to relatives and friends who had settled in the United States or in other parts of Canada, and institutional ties to these Jewish communities.

The militant Catholicism of French Canada seemed reminiscent of the ruling Catholic or Russian Orthodox Christian denominations in eastern Europe, which had often been antisemitic. Moreover, in the 1930s and 1940s antisemitism emerged as an accepted component of French Canadian nationalism.[17] It was also found, to be sure, in the English-Protestant community: Jews were excluded from corporate boardrooms in Montreal,[18] and McGill's medical faculty maintained a Jewish quota into the 1950s. Yet the elitist snobbism of the Anglo-Protestants may have seemed a lesser evil; the fear of French Canadian

antisemitism was the fear of the mob, and perhaps subliminally of the pogrom.

Because of the historic association of nationalism with antisemitism, and since the Jews of Montreal are predominantly anglophone and tied to—and identified with—the anglophone community, the recent rise of French nationalism in Quebec Province is viewed with suspicion.[19] Although Jews have historically held attitudes supportive of French language rights and the redress of legitimate grievances,[20] they have opposed, like other anglophones, both the Parti Québécois and separatism/independence in all its versions.

As a result of the history of antisemitism in Quebec, the relatively large number of post-1945 immigrants (many of whom are Holocaust survivors), and the political uncertainty in the province today (though there is no current evidence of antisemitism), we might expect to observe a pronounced degree of perceived antisemitism.

Methodology

Data were gathered from a survey of Jewish household heads in Montreal. The universe was initially conceived as the Jewish 'community' with inclusion to be determined by affiliation (membership) to one of the many Jewish organizations. The sample was constructed by a lengthy procedure of integrating many Jewish organizational membership lists into one master list. Thus, assimilated Jews—those of ancestral Jewish origin who might be included under the census definitions—were excluded from the universe and were not sampled. (The Canadian census identifies Jews both by religion and by ethnic origin. The latter is determined by the reply to the question: 'To what ethnic or cultural group did you or your ancestor (on the male line) belong on coming to this continent?' The census category of Jewish ethnic origin includes 'Protestant Jews' and 'Catholic Jews'—those identifying themselves as Christian by religion but descended from a Jewish ancestor.)

The final master list, which was completed in the summer of 1978, contained approximately 30,000 to 32,500 Jewish households in Montreal (after duplications were removed). This is roughly 85–90 per cent of the 36,100 Jewish households (using the 'religious' definition) in the 1971 census. This high yield reflects the degree of community cohesiveness which exists among Montreal Jews.

From this master list, a random sample of 1,000 households was selected. A pre-tested questionnaire instrument of 332 questions was administered to respondents in a face-to-face interview with the household head, or where this proved impossible, with the next most knowledgeable adult. Questionnaires were available in English and French, and a Yiddish lexicon was provided to avoid language

barriers; only three interviews could not take place for linguistic reasons. Because of the sensitive nature of many of the questions (and in the context of the large numbers of Holocaust survivors among the respondents), only Jewish interviewers were used, in order to maximize rapport and to increase reliability.

Once those who had moved, were recorded at a wrong address, or were not Jewish were eliminated from the list of 1,000, the remaining number of contacts was 937. The interviewing procedure, completed in the autumn of 1978, took approximately 3 months; 657 completed questionnaires were obtained. Thus the response rate was an acceptable 70 per cent.[21]

A profile of the sample and variables

A. Socio-demographic characteristics. The Jews of Montreal are an ageing population: 31 per cent of the respondents were over 65, while the 1976 census data for all Montreal household heads found that 13·5 per cent were over 65. A little over half the respondents were born outside North America: 42 per cent in Europe and 10 per cent in Asia/Africa. Almost one quarter were females, many of these being elderly widows.

The sample is predominantly middle class. More than 31 per cent claim 15 or more years of education, while of those gainfully occupied, 43 per cent are in the 'managers-administrators' census category, and 12 per cent in the 'professional-technical' group. On the other hand, there is substantial variance within the sample: six per cent were unemployed, 12 per cent reported household annual incomes of less than $5,000, and another 14 per cent incomes between $5,000 and $10,000. While the large majority of these low-income households heads are elderly, nine per cent of the respondents under the age of 40 and 13 per cent of those in the 41–64 group reported household incomes under $10,000.

B. Jewish identification of the sample. The denominational identification of the respondents is 41 per cent Orthodox, 35 per cent Conservative, 9 per cent Reform, and the remaining 15 per cent 'none' or 'other'. The respondents do not go regularly to synagogue services: 20 per cent never attend and 33 per cent attend only on the High Holy Days. On the other hand, 80 per cent observe religio-cultural rituals such as fasting on Yom Kippur, abstaining from bread on Passover, and lighting Hanukah candles, while 93 per cent take part in a *seder* on Passover. Under half the total (46 per cent) observe *kashrut* in the home, and 60 per cent light Sabbath candles.

A variety of indicators attest to the strong Jewish identification of the sample. Just over 80 per cent (80·3) have given some Jewish education to their children, and commitment to the intensive Jewish day

school form of education is strongest among the younger respondents. Attitude statements reveal very firm support for Israel, which 60 per cent of the respondents had visited at least once. We find 13 per cent claiming to speak Hebrew and 45 per cent claiming to read it very, or fairly, well; while 59 per cent say they speak Yiddish and 37 per cent that they read it fairly, or very, well.

Almost 80 per cent are at least occasional readers of the Jewish press in Canada, 48 per cent claim membership of at least one voluntary Jewish organization, and 54 per cent state that they have attended at least one lecture or artistic performance sponsored by the Jewish community in the past year. Thus, there appears to be a high degree of participation in Jewish cultural life.

TABLE 1. *Ethnic Distribution of Jewish Economic Activity*

Ethnic category	*Ethnic background of the majority of customers/clients*	*Ethnic background of the majority of the executive management* of the company, institution, or organization*
	%	%
English Canadian	20·0	13·8
French Canadian	21·6	6·5
American	1·1	0·5
Jewish	24·4	69·8
Other Ethnic	7·6	3·3
Other	12·7	2·9
Combination	12·7	3·1
	100·0	100·0
	N=539	N=550

* Includes the self-employed.

C. The segregation of the Jewish community. Table 1 shows the pattern of economic segregation of the sample: the customers/clients of the respondents come from different ethnic groups, as might be expected of Jews working in the professions or in business—although one quarter serve primarily Jewish customers. On the other hand, when we look at the *ownership* or *management* of firms, we find that nearly 70 per cent of the respondents work for Jewish Canadians, 14 per cent for English Canadians, and 6·5 per cent for French Canadians. In other words, the main source of Jewish employment is other Jews. This is confirmed in Table 2C, with 73 per cent of the respondents indicating that some, most, or all their 'business associates' are Jewish.

Patterns of *residential* and *social* segregation are set out in Table 2. The subjective assessments of residential segregation are supported by census data on the spatial distribution of Jews in the Montreal area. While constituting only four per cent of the total Metropolitan population, Jews are concentrated in some areas on the western half of

Montreal: they account for 75 per cent of the population of Cote St. Luc, 61 per cent of that of Hampstead, and for between 13 and 16 per cent of the population of St. Laurent, Town of Mount Royal Outremont, and Westmount.

The large majority (87 per cent) state that all or most of their friends are Jewish and 53 per cent claim that all or most of their neighbours are Jewish. The degree of segregation decreases from the social, to the residential, to the economic spheres. Indices of economic and social segregation are computed for further analysis, and are described in Appendix A. These measures of economic and social segregation are correlated (r=·20).

D. Perceptions of antisemitism. Table 3 gives data on the perception of antisemitism in the province. At one extreme, 12 per cent of the sample state that there is a great deal of antisemitism, while at the

TABLE 2. *Jewish Social, Residential, and Economic Patterns*

	A *Social*	*B* *Residential*	*C* *Economic*
	Among my friends ...	Among people in my neighbourhood ...	Among my business associates ...
None are Jewish	0·2	2·0	6·2
Few are Jewish	1·5	14·5	20·3
Some are Jewish	11·2	30·1	38·5
Most are Jewish	51·1	39·2	23·5
All are Jewish	36·0	14·2	11·5
	100·0 N=652	100·0 N=648	100·0 N=548

other, 15 per cent claim that there is none. Moreover, when comparing Quebec to other parts of Canada, 28 per cent say that there is more antisemitism in Quebec, while 16 per cent believe that there is more elsewhere in Canada. More than one third (34·8 per cent) claim that antisemitism has increased in Quebec over the last five years, while eight per cent think that it has decreased, and 55 per cent say that it has remained constant. Exactly half the sample have had no personal experience of antisemitism, as was the case in Toronto in 1970.[22] Thus, many of those 85 per cent who believe that there is at least a little prejudice against Jews in Quebec (Table 3–1) have themselves not been personally subjected to such prejudice.

There is little consensus on the salience of antisemitism: 58 per cent believe it is a 'problem' in Montreal while 36 per cent do not (Table 3–5). Respondents who had given some thought to leaving Quebec were asked to pick two factors out of many which might cause them to emigrate (open-ended questions); only about five per cent listed antisemitism as either a first or second reason (Table 4–1). When *all*

respondents were asked to rank six specific reasons why some people might leave Quebec, 18 per cent put 'the possibility of antisemitism' in first place and 17 per cent in second place (Table 4–2). The factors selected as most important for both groups are those linked to economic or political considerations.

The two variables in Table 3–1 and 3–5 were combined into an ordinal index of perceived antisemitism (r=·47), which was used in

TABLE 3. *Perceptions of Antisemitism*

1. Do you feel there is prejudice against Jews in Quebec?	Yes, a great deal	12·2
	Yes, some	46·2
	Yes, a bit	26·6
	No, none	15·1
		100·0
		N=624
2. Do you feel there is more prejudice against Jews in Quebec than elsewhere in Canada? Would you say ...	Yes, much more	10·0
	Yes, a bit more	17·6
	The same	56·8
	A little bit less	10·7
	Much less	4·9
		100·0
		N=434
3. Over the last five years, has prejudice against Jews increased, decreased, or remained the same in Quebec?	Increased	34·8
	Decreased	8·4
	Remained the same	54·9
	There is none	1·9
		100·0
		N=473
4. To what extent do you feel that you yourself have been a victim of prejudice because you are Jewish? Would you say	To a great extent	6·3
	More than average	3·0
	Average	26·8
	Less than average	24·0
	Not at all	39·9
		100.0
		N=552
5. 'Antisemitism' is a problem in this city	Strongly agree	18·5
	Agree somewhat	39·7
	Don't know	6·3
	Disagree somewhat	21·7
	Strongly disagree	13·9
		100.0
		N=655

subsequent analyses. (The index of perceived antisemitism ranges from a low of 2 to a high of 9, with a mean of 5·78 and a standard deviation of 1·90.)

E. Propensity to migrate. Respondents were asked to estimate the likelihood that they would still be living in Quebec within five years, under two 'scenarios': a general *status quo*, or a clear-cut referendum majority for Quebec's independence. The results are summarized in Table 5. As can be seen clearly, the declared likelihood of emigration increased dramatically from 14 per cent under the *status quo* to 58 per cent

TABLE 4. *Reasons for leaving Quebec*

1. For those who have considered leaving Quebec.

*Reasons**	*First Choice*	*Second Choice*
Economic conditions	19·3	24·4
Language laws	5·5	10·1
Prejudice against Anglos	2·4	5·0
Antisemitism increasing	5·5	4·2
Family, personal ties	5·2	3·4
Fear of separatism	12·1	5·0
Oppose Quebec government	23·1	14·3
Health, Climate	7·2	10·9
Other	19·7	22·7
	100·0	100·0
* open ended.	N=290	N=119

2. For *all* respondents: Here is a list of reasons why some people would leave Quebec. Which would be most important to you? Which is second in importance?

	First	*Second*
Personal economic situation or job	32·2	14·0
General economic conditions in Quebec	9·4	23·3
Language laws in Quebec	9·5	16·4
General political conditions	22.5	20·5
Friends and relatives living outside Quebec	8·4	8·5
Possibility of antisemitism	18·1	17·3
	100·00	100·0
	N=631	N=614

* open ended.

declaring that they would definitely or probably leave if a referendum were strongly in favour of Quebec independence.

This difference indicates a certain volatility in the commitment of the respondents to remain in Quebec. Other sharp changes in the *status quo* might also lead to a similar, if less dramatic, increase in the propensity to migrate.

The data for both responses in Table 5 were combined to form an index of the propensity to migrate. (The correlation of the two variables was ·61, and the index has a range of a low of 2 and a high of 8, with a mean of 4·60 and a standard deviation of 1·59.)

TABLE 5. *What are the chances of your moving out of Quebec in the next five years. Are you ...*

	'Status quo' assumption	*Referendum strongly supports Quebec independence*
Definitely leaving	3·0	25·3
Probably leaving	10·7	32·7
Probably not leaving	46·0	23·1
Definitely not leaving	40.3	18·9
	100·0	100·0
	N=569	N=562

Analysis

The relation of perceived antisemitism to economic and social segregation was examined, as was the relation of all three to the propensity to emigrate. Additional variables drawn from the survey were introduced as controls in a regression analysis. These were:

1. respondent's age in years;
2. respondent's sex (a dummy variable with Male=1);
3. respondent's education (in ordinal grouped categories of years of education);
4. occupation (measured by the Blishen index);[23]
5. an index of satisfaction (measuring attitudes to the economic and political conditions in the province—see Appendix; and
6. knowledge of French (measured on a five-point ordinal scale ranging from those speaking very well to those speaking not at all).

Inspection of correlations shows that perceived antisemitism is associated moderately with higher economic segregation ($r=\cdot14$) but is uncorrelated with social segregation ($r=\cdot06$). There is also a modest if statistically significant correlation with the propensity to emigrate ($r=\cdot15$).

The regression analysis described in Table 6 confirms these findings. The modest independent effect of perceived antisemitism on *economic* segregation persists with the introduction of other variables as controls (a standardized beta of ·13). Those perceiving antisemitism are more segregated economically within the Jewish community. Perhaps surprisingly, factors such as age, education, or occupation have little effect. This suggests that Jewish economic segregation is not limited to one socio-economic stratum, or to one age group, but is spread randomly throughout the sample.

A different pattern is found with regard to *social* segregation. The regression analysis reveals *no* statistically significant independent effects of perceived antisemitism on social segregation ($b=\cdot06$), but modest effects of age, sex, and education. Respondents who are older, female, and more educated are *less* socially segregated than are other respondents (though the actual degree of segregation may still be high). The finding of a more heterogeneous social integration pattern among more educated respondents parallels findings for Toronto Jews.[24]

The regression equation results in Table 6 show that neither economic nor social segregation is significantly associated with the propensity to emigrate. Thus, Jews who are less segregated either economically or socially are as likely to emigrate as those whose lives are more circumscribed within the Jewish community. Participation in the broader

TABLE 6. *Unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients*

Dependent Variables	*Independent Variables*									
	1 *Ec. seg.*	2 *Age*	3 *Sex*	4 *Educ.*	5 *Occ.*	6 *Gen. sat.*	7 *Perc. Antisem.*	8 *French*	9 *Soc. seg.*	R^2
1. Economic Segregation	—	·29 (·02)	−·13 (−·02)	·92 (·01)	·67 (·05)	−93 (·01)	·14 (·13)*	—·26 (−·17)*	—	·05
2. Social Segregation	—	−·15 (−·10)	·75 (·12)*	−·27 (−·23)*	·49 (·03)	·45 (−·03)	·80 (·06)	−·17 (−·09)	—	·04
3. Propensity to Migrate	·91 (·01)	−·35 (−·35)*	·16 (·04)	−·56 (·00)	·25 (·02)	−·19 (−·18)*	·10 (·12)*	−·74 (−·06)	·50 (·08)	·19*

* Significant at p less than ·05, (standardized betas in parentheses)
N = (395)

society—whether English or French—does not seem to be independently associated with an increased commitment to remain in the province.

Knowledge of French also was uncorrelated with the propensity to emigrate. As seen in Table 6, the dominant factor associated with emigration appears to be age: the younger respondents are more likely to emigrate. The second most important factor, in terms of the magnitude of the effect and the proportion of variance explained, is the index of general satisfaction with economic and political developments in the province. Perceived antisemitism is modestly if significantly associated with the propensity to emigrate ($b = \cdot 12$), though less so than age or general economic and political satisfaction. This confirms the earlier conclusion based on the data in Table 4 which showed that antisemitism appears less important than economic or political factors as a motive for possible emigration.

Conclusion

The data gathered by the research revealed four main trends:

1. There seems to be more social than economic segregation among Jews in Montreal. This is expected from theoretical work on social distance, and multi-dimensional analyses of the assimilation process. However, we find substantial economic segregation, which deserves further study.

2. Perceived antisemitism is only modestly associated with economic segregation, and not at all with social segregation.[25] It is unclear why those respondents perceiving less antisemitism are as socially segregated as those perceiving more. This may be due to the generally high levels of social segregation and to the modest variance. Alternatively, it is possible that those Jews perceiving more antisemitism may seek to minimize risks through greater economic segregation. Thus, the perception of antisemitism may have different effects on economic and social segregation. We can draw no *general* conclusions of support concerning the Simmel-Coser hypothesis on out-group hostility and in-group solidarity. To the extent that perceived antisemitism contributes to the propensity to emigrate, it might even *weaken* the solidarity of the in-group.

3. A propensity for emigration out of Quebec is not associated either with economic or with social segregation. Those segregated in either the general or the Jewish community may find themselves equally integrated into *a* community, and thus equally willing (or unwilling) to emigrate. Ties formed with the Jewish sub-community or with the (English or French) larger community may well be of equal strength and attraction.

4. Perceived antisemitism is associated with greater likelihood of emigration, though it is less important than respondents' age or general

satisfaction with economic and political developments. Jews likely to leave will not do so because of a failure of linguistic adaptation, or primarily because of fears of antisemitism. The threat of Quebec's independence, with the resulting economic and political uncertainties, is more important.

These findings reveal a need for further study of both economic and social segregation within pluralistic contexts. They suggest that integration into either a minority community or a (host) majority community may have similar effects, reducing the likelihood of emigration: strong Jewish attachment to Montreal is in part attachment to the Jewish sub-community of Montreal.

The findings may suggest the need to redefine antisemitism at the micro-sociological level, to conform with the macro-sociological emphasis of the 'new antisemitism'.[26] As we move into the last two decades of the twentieth century, antisemitism in North America has been transformed: it is now related to matters of public policy (which may range from energy policy, to affirmative action, to SALT, to Middle East negotiations) at odds with articulated Jewish interests. As such, it has become externalised, and may not impinge on the daily lives of Jews in the form of the humiliations or of the restrictions common in the past.

Objectively, we know that many of the elements of classic antisemitism either do not exist or have little impact in North America. Jews have complete freedom of worship. In the United States, the Jewish religion enjoys a status as one of the three 'unofficial' state religions; in Quebec, Jewish day schools receive generous per-capita grants from the province to meet the cost of secular studies. Universities support the teaching of Judaica; governmental cultural agencies —particularly in Canada—fund Jewish cultural projects or scholarly research with generous grants.

Perhaps as important, barriers to Jewish opportunity—whether in universities or in boardrooms—have been largely overcome. The Canadian corporate elite, long noted for its conservatism and ethnic exclusivism, has been slowly yet steadily penetrated by Jews.[27] Certainly, Jews are over-represented as members of the middle and upper-middle classes.

Antisemitism thus touches the lives of fewer Jews, yet at the same time most Jews assert that it persists 'out there' as a fixed characteristic of a Gentile society, acting culturally and/or politically.[28] It may be that belief in the omnipresence of antisemitism has become part of the contemporary Jewish belief system. Yet this ideological incorporation may have weakened its power to influence the behaviour and attitudes of individual Jews. As with many ideological values in North America, it may have a 'lip-service' quality, so that while it is acknowledged, other social and demographic factors exercise greater influence.

This paper has been of an exploratory nature.* It has shown that further research is needed on the voluntary dimensions of Jewish social segregation, on the detailed workings of perceived and of actual anti-semitism in the economic life of the Jews, and on their social dealings with non-Jews.

NOTES

[1] J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, Cambridge, Mass., 1964.

[2] Milton Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life*, New York, 1964, chapter 3.

[3] See Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*, New York, 1958, pp. 37–38.

[4] Edna Bonacich, 'A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 37, no. 5, 1972, pp. 31–51.

[5] Norbert F. Wiley, 'The Ethnic Mobility Trap and Stratification Theory', *Social Problems*, vol. XV, no. 2, 1967, pp. 147–59.

[6] See Nathan Kantrowitz, *Ethnic and Racial Segregation in the New York Metropolis*, New York, 1973, chapter 2; and Marshal Sklare, ed., *America's Jews*, New York, 1971, pp. 44–47.

[7] George Simmel, *Conflict*, trans. by Kurt H. Wolff, Glencoe, Illinois, 1955.

[8] Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, New York, 1956, chapter 2.

[9] Robert A. LeVine and Donald T. Campbell, *Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes and Group Behavior* , New York, 1972, p. 41.

[10] Louis Wirth, *The Ghetto*, Chicago, 1928, chapter 13.

[11] Arnold Forster and Benjamin Epstein, *The New Anti-Semitism*, New York, 1974.

[12] Esther Benaim, 'Francophone Jews and the French Fact', *Viewpoints*, Spring 1979, vol. X, no. 1, pp. 11–17.

[13] Harold Waller, *The Governance of the Jewish Community of Montreal*, Philadelphia, 1974, pp. 18–20.

[14] Daniel J. Elazar, *Community and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry*, Philadelphia, 1976, pp. 68–69.

[15] The reference here is to *Two Solitudes* (published in Toronto in 1959), the title of a novel by a Canadian author, Hugh MacLennan, describing the isolated existence of the French and English communities in Montreal.

[16] Freda Hawkins, *Canada and Immigration*, Montreal, 1972, pp. 213–34.

[17] See Lita-Rose Betcherman, *The Swastika and the Maple Leaf*, Toronto, 1975; André Laurendeau, *Witness for Quebec*, Toronto, 1973; Henry Milner and Sheilagh Milner, *The Decolonization of Quebec*, Toronto, 1973, chapter 6; and Stuart E. Rosenberg, *The Jewish Community in Canada*, vol. 1, pp. 194–95.

[18] John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*, Toronto, 1965, pp. 285–90.

[19] See Waller, op. cit., and Morton Weinfeld, 'La Question Juive au Quebec', *Midstream*, vol. XXIII, no. 8, 1977, pp. 20–29.

[20] Coleman Romalis, *The Reaction of the Montreal Jewish Community Toward French Canadian Nationalism and Separation*, M.A. (Sociology) unpublished thesis, McGill University, 1977.

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[21] Apart from assimilated households as defined by the sampling procedure, two other categories of respondents might have been under-represented in the master list, and thus in the sample. The first is the group of young households, consisting of newly-weds or single persons just establishing one independent household. Such persons may become part of the community, but have yet to affiliate formally with its institutions. Special attempts were made to find these households. The second category consists of some ultra-Orthodox Hassidic groups who segregate themselves from the mainstream Jewish community, and would not co-operate with the survey team. Nevertheless, the data collected are representative of the established, mainstream Jewish community of Montreal.

[22] Morton Weinfeld, *Ethnic Identification in Toronto,* Dissertation presented for the Ph.D. degree, Harvard University, 1977.

[23] The Blishen index of socio-economic status combines Canadian census data on the average amount of education and income associated with given occupations, with prestige scores derived from research. For further details see Bernard P. Blishen, 'A Socio-Economic Index for occupations in Canada', in Blishen *et al.*, *Canadian Society, Toronto,* 1968.

[24] Weinfeld, *Ethnic Identification in Toronto,* op. cit.

[25] Of course, one cannot prove the 'null hypothesis' of no statistically significant effects. It is for this reason that I describe the findings on the modest effects of perceived antisemitism as suggestive.

[26] Forster and Epstein, op. cit., chapter 1.

[27] Peter C. Newman, *The Canadian Establishment,* Toronto, 1975, chapter 12.

[28] This discussion on perceived antisemitism as part of a Jewish belief system (and thus with little explanatory power) in no way addresses the question of a latent antisemitism which may, under certain circumstances, emerge and actively impinge on the lives of Jews. Thus, a perception that many or most non-Jews hold antisemitic attitudes (untranslated into actions) may well be accurate.

APPENDIX

A varimax factor analysis of a large set of variables was used to identify component variables of the first two of the following three indices.

1. Index of Social Segregation

Responses to the questions described in Table 2A and B were combined with responses to the question:

—Being Jewish affects my choice of a place to live
- —strongly disagree
- —disagree somewhat
- —don't know
- —agree somewhat
- —disagree somewhat

Thus an ordinal, additive index was created.

The inter-item correlation of the three variables was ·18. The index ranged

in value from a low score of 3 to a high of 15, with high scores indicating high segregation. The mean was 11·09, and the standard deviation was 2·43.

2. Index of Economic Segregation

The responses in Table 2C were combined with the responses to the question:

—I prefer doing business with an establishment that I know is owned by Jews

—strongly disagree
—disagree somewhat
—don't know
—agree somewhat
—strongly agree

The correlation of the two variables was ·14. The ordinal, additive index ranged in value from a low of 2 to a high of 10, with high scores indicating high segregation. The mean was 5·47, and the standard deviation was 2·00.

3. Index of General Satisfaction

The index of General Satisfaction with political and economic conditions is formed by combining responses to the following four questions (each of the questions posed a 4-point response scale):

A. Generally speaking would you say that in Quebec society at present things are going

—very well
—rather well
—not well
—poorly

B. How would you rate the state of the Quebec economy? Is it ...

—very good
—rather good
—poor
—very poor

C. Generally speaking, how do you judge the present provincial government of Quebec? Are you ...

—very satisfied
—rather satisfied
—not too satisfied
—not at all satisfied

D. How do you feel about Bill 101, the French language law adopted last summer by the Quebec government. Are you ...

—strongly in favour
—in favour
—against
—strongly against

The average inter-item correlation of these four variables is ·327. The values were recoded into a six-ranked ordinal index with a mean of 3·8 and a standard deviation of 1·49. High scores indicate high levels of satisfaction.

INNER CITY JEWS IN LEEDS

Nigel Grizzard and Paula Raisman

SINCE the Labour administration's White Paper on *Policy for the Inner Cities*,[1] there has been an upsurge of interest in Britain in the inner areas of large industrial cities. A great deal of the work carried out has looked at the needs of 'ethnic minorities' in these areas; the term is used as a synonym for recent non-white immigrants and their descendants from the New Commonwealth and Pakistan.[2] The Jews, who in many English cities were the first significant ethnic group to settle in the British Isles, are usually considered only in a historical context,[3] perhaps because they are regarded as having undergone a 'successful immigration'.

However, there are still inner city Jews in Britain. In the first half of 1979, we carried out a survey of Jews living in Chapeltown; it was the second Jewish area of settlement in Leeds after the original immigrant quarter, the Leylands.[4] By the mid-1930s, Chapeltown Jewry was at its peak. The Francis Street Synagogue was inaugurated in 1913, the New Synagogue in 1931, and the Louis Street Synagogue in 1933; while in 1937 a further three were opened: the Psalms of David, the Beth Hamedrash, and the Chassidische. It was also in the 1930s that some Leeds Jews started to move to the new residential suburb of Moortown. Its semi-detached homes were more attractive than the terraced houses of Chapeltown to the upwardly mobile.

After the Second World War, the arrival into Chapeltown of non-Jewish eastern European volunteer workers—Poles, Latvians, and Serbs—soon to be followed by West Indians and South Asians in the 1950s, accelerated the Jewish move north to Moortown.

The Jewish population of Chapeltown—which numbered possibly 12,000 out of a total Leeds Jewish population of over 20,000[5] in the 1930s—had fallen dramatically to about 500 by 1979.

By the early 1970s, the Francis Street, the Beth Hamedrash, the Louis Street, and the Psalms of David Synagogues had ceased serving Chapeltown. The Francis Street and the Louis Street Synagogues merged with the New Synagogue, while the Beth Hamedrash and the Psalms of David moved north to Moortown.

Today Chapeltown is the centre of the West Indian, Sikh, and Gentile eastern European communities in Leeds and there are sizeable

numbers of South Asian Moslems and Hindus. It also has a reputation of being the 'vice capital' of West Yorkshire, and is the stamping ground of the 'Yorkshire Ripper'.[6]

In order to carry out a survey, we had to define exactly what constituted the Chapeltown area. The best basis for this definition was found to be an agglomeration of polling districts,[7] and the electoral registers also provided us with a list of all the potential voters.

The area chosen was not homogeneous, although all of it goes under the name of Chapeltown. There are late Victorian and early Edwardian large terraced houses, originally homes of the respectable working and middle classes. Many of these have now been divided into flats, while a fair proportion are Council-owned. The latter—'miscellaneous properties' as they are termed—were bought by Leeds Council gradually since the end of the Second World War, with the aim of offering better rented property in the inner area and in order to facilitate future clearance programmes.

The Council also has many pre-war older properties, most of which are poorly insulated and have no central heating. The new housing in the area consists of two developments of Housing Association flats, and three municipal developments (one of which is a tower block). These were all built in the last fifteen years.

Identifying the Jewish population

Since there was not one single source for locating all the Jewish residents in the chosen area, we decided to use a variety of methods to find as many as possible. The membership lists of the Leeds synagogues and Burial Societies were checked for Chapeltown residents. The Jewish New Year greetings section of the *Leeds Jewish Gazette*[8] was perused, and the electoral rolls were examined for distinctive Jewish names[9] not on our list. As a final check, the Leeds Jewish Welfare Board[10] also examined the electoral rolls for any further households that they knew to contain Jews.

These sources yielded a total of 598 potential Jewish electors in 367 households. From these we drew a sample of every fourth home, or 92 potential households; and we then sent interviewers round to contact their occupants. In 48 of the cases we were successfully able to do so, and in a further 19 the householder was Jewish, but refused to be interviewed. In 20 of the households where the residents had marginal Jewish names, we found them to be non-Jewish: some were eastern Europeans, others West Indians or English. The remaining five households in our sample were empty, the occupants having either moved, entered the Jewish Old-Age Home, or died.

Our actual response rate from the Jewish households was 72 per cent. This was lower than the 80 per cent achieved by Kosmin in Red-

bridge,[11] but is understandable as the Chapeltown area has a high crime rate and many were unwilling to receive a stranger into their home in spite of the fact that we had previously written to them about the survey.

In three of the cases where a household turned out to be non-Jewish, we found a Jewish neighbour whom we interviewed. This gave us a completed total of 51 interviews.

On the basis of our sample returns, we estimate the Jewish population of Chapeltown to be 452 ± 100 people. The total population of the survey area is 20,000, so the Jewish percentage is only 2.3 per cent. What is significant, apart from the smallness of the population, is the elderly age structure the Jews of Chapeltown exhibit. Just over three fifths (61.6 per cent) of our respondents were 65 or older. If we include the 55–64 cohort, then the percentage rises to 83·7. Only 14 persons (16·3 per cent) were under 55, and there was no one under 15; but there may be some children in the Chapeltown Jewish households not in our sample.

TABLE 1. *Age Distribution of Respondents*

Age groups	*Number in sample*	*Frequency*	*Cumulative frequency*
		%	%
15–24	2	2·3	2·3
25–34	3	3·5	5·8
35–44	1	1·2	7·0
45–54	8	9·3	16·3
55–64	19	22·1	38·4
65–74	29	33·7	72·1
75+	24	27·9	100·0

The age profile of the Jewish population in Chapeltown is similar to that of the Jews in Tower Hamlets (Stepney and Whitechapel)—both are weighted towards the elderly. At the other end of the spectrum, there are areas in some suburbs of London and Manchester where the Jewish population consists almost entirely of young people.[12]

Such age-zoning is not a general characteristic of English society, where there are no complete geographic areas (as there are in America) whose population is predominantly in one particular age group.[13]

Household composition

There were 86 persons living in the 51 households of our sample: 48 females and 38 males; 24 of them had never married. If we remove the five single persons under 35 (there were no young marrieds), we are still left with a figure of 19 who had never married and were unlikely to marry. The remaining 62 persons had at some stage in their life been married: there were 17 married couples (thus, in exactly one

third of the households); 26 widows and widowers; and two who had been divorced.

All 86 members of these households were Jewish. We did not find any who were living in part of their home and subletting the rest: there were no resident landlords. Each of the three lodgers was an integral part of the household—that is, ate at the same table.

Single-person households accounted for almost exactly half the total (25 out of 51); 19 had two persons; five had three each; and only two contained four. In one case, the four-person household consisted of brothers and sisters, three of whom were single, and one widowed; and in the other, of two sisters, an unmarried aunt, and a lodger.

Each of the two youngest respondents lived alone. One was a woman student who had a bed-sitter in the area as it was convenient for college, and also for travelling north to Moortown. The other was a man living in a Housing Association flat; his parents lived in the northern suburbs.

Housing

Our respondents lived in various parts of Chapeltown and in various types of housing. There were no 'Jewish pockets', with the possible exception of one street with nine Jewish households.

Thirty of the 51 households were owner-occupied; in 14 cases, the homes were rented from the Council, 11 of these being purpose-built. Only six homes had private landlords: two were furnished and four were unfurnished. Finally, there was one Housing Association flat.

The owner occupiers, without exception, had no outstanding mortgage. This may be a characteristic of poor inner areas, where most of the aged residents have paid off their mortgage.

A recent survey in Bradford[14] showed that the poorest ward (Manningham) had the highest proportion (82 per cent) of owner-occupied unmortgaged homes.

Housing aspirations

About three quarters of our respondents (38) had lived in their homes for more than 20 years, while at the other extreme there was only one who had been in her home for less than two years. All households with two exceptions had the sole use of two basic amenities—a bathroom and an inside lavatory. The two respondents who shared these each lived in a bed-sitter.

There was no case of overcrowding—rather the contrary, with an average of over two rooms per person.[15] This overhousing is not unique to Chapeltown Jews. Research work in Bradford for a Housing Action Area Study[16] showed a similar average occupancy in the case of the

eastern Europeans, who also tended to be in the older or pensionable age groups.

We then asked our heads of household to give some indication of how dissatisfied they were with nine aspects of their homes. Fifteen (31 per cent) complained about the cost of rent and rates; 14 (29 per cent) about the cost of repairs or the difficulty of making the landlord carry out the repairs; 11 (22 per cent) about heating; 10 (20 per cent) about noise and 10 about damp and condensation; 7 (14 per cent) about the number of rooms; four (8 per cent) about the view and four about bathrooms; and only two (4 per cent) about lack of privacy from neighbours.

This yielded an average dissatisfaction level of 17 per cent, which is comparatively low: when similar questions were asked of tenants on the Guardhouse Estate in Keighley as part of the Comprehensive Community Programme,[17] the average dissatisfaction level was 37 per cent. It may be that Chapeltown Jews have comparatively low expectations.

We were surprised by the answers concerning freedom from noise and privacy: our respondents often told us that they would have preferred less silence and that one could have too much privacy. They were obviously lonely and would have liked more contact with their neighbours.

We then asked them whether they had ever thought of moving. We received an affirmative answer from two thirds of our respondents, the majority of whom had thought about moving to Moortown and the adjacent Queenshill Jewish Housing Estate.[18] Only one household was interested in moving to Alwoodley—the prestige Jewish area. Most of those who wanted to move ideally wished for a bungalow or a flat: a small property on one level.

Our respondents' residential preference can be contrasted with that found by Carrier[19] in his survey of Hackney and Tower Hamlets: those at the bottom of the ladder in Tower Hamlets overwhelmingly opted for the prestige suburbs of Hampstead Garden Suburb and Golders Green, while those in Hackney (effectively one rung up the ladder) chose the middle-range suburbs of Southgate and Ilford. The Chapeltown preference for the middle-range area of Moortown and the adjacent Queenshill estate is in the same mould as the Hackney choice: they are attainable goals.

We gave our respondents a choice of 13 reasons for wanting to move. These were assigned a value of 1 for Definitely Yes, 2 for Yes, 3 for Possibly, 4 for No, and 5 for Definitely No. The mean scores were calculated for each reason and they ranged from 2·0 to 4·5.

The strongest positive reason was to move to a nicer area socially (2·0) and this was followed by subsidiary back up reasons: the present area was declining (2·2); to move to a better home (2·5); the present

home was too big (2·7); too much crime and trouble (2·9); and to obtain better Jewish services (2·9).

The reasons which received a negative score were to be nearer the family (3·5); because repairs are needed to the present home (3·5); to retire (3·8); too many immigrants (4·1); present home too small (4·5); and to be nearer work (4·5).

The important reasons for moving were rationalized into moving to a 'nicer area socially', which had the underlying meaning of being with one's own kind of people. When we asked our respondents to give specific reasons for wanting to move—the provision of better Jewish services, or because of the crime rate in Chapeltown, or too many immigrants, or problems with the neighbours—they gave no firm replies. Perhaps we should have simply asked them to say what they most disliked about social conditions in Chapeltown.

Finally, we enquired whether they believed there had been definite obstacles in the way of their moving out of the district. Of the 51 heads of household, 23 replied in the affirmative, citing lack of money, the difficulty of finding a buyer for their home, or family reasons. Some also could not contemplate the upheaval entailed by moving.

Socio-economic profile

The profile has two dimensions. Firstly there is the profile of all those who had ever worked (77 per cent) and secondly, the profile of those gainfully occupied in 1979 (41 per cent).

The diagram shows the difference between those who had retired from work and those currently working. The latter have a higher socio-economic profile than the sample as a whole. The younger respondents tended to be the better off. We found two professional workers—a pharmacist and a translator—who both still lived with their parents; they were unmarried. Another young person ran his own clothing factory. The 20 with no gainful occupation were all women.

Proportion still economically active

	%
1) Professionals, employers, managers	78
2) Other non-manual	70
3) Skilled manual	38
4) Semi-skilled manual	40

The skilled and semi-skilled workers were the older respondents. Half our respondents (49 per cent) had worked in the clothing manufacturing trade, which was the original economic base of the Leeds Jewish community. Among the non-manual workers we found small



businessmen who were self-employed—an agent and a market trader; and there were clerical workers for either the Jewish communal offices still in the Chapeltown area, or the public sector in the centre of Leeds. We did not find any unskilled workers (which is unusual in an inner city area) and there was only one person who was unemployed and seeking work. The level of economic activity was therefore comparatively high, with several people over the age of 65 still at work.

The overall Jewish socio-economic profile was not weighted towards the semi-skilled and unskilled workers as we would normally expect in an inner area. In Hackney, Kosmin and Grizzard[20] found 20 per cent of the Jewish workforce in the unskilled and semi-skilled categories (compared to 32 per cent for the general population). Our Leeds figure of six per cent of the current workforce (and eight per cent of those who ever worked) is very low. One explanation may be that Chapeltown Jews (unlike those in Hackney) had not been at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. Another is that some of the poorest Chapeltown residents had been moved to the Queenshill Estate in the late 1950s, and to other accommodation later, all in the Moortown area, with the help of the Jewish Welfare Board.

Affinity and perceptions of the community

We gave our 51 heads of household six different groups of people and for each group we asked them whether they felt very little, little, neutral, something in common, or a great deal in common with the members of the group.

The six groups and the mean scores were in descending order: Leeds Jews, 3·7; Jews in the local area, 3·6; British people generally, 3·5; Moortown Jews, 3·5; Alwoodley Jews, 3·2; and non-Jews in the local area, 3·0. A value of 3·0 signified neutral and 4·0 something in common.

Thus, respondents did not feel on the whole that they had a great affinity with any group. Only 18 per cent said they had a great deal in common with Leeds Jews—the mother community.

When asked about specific sub-groups—for example Moortown or Alwoodley Jews—, our respondents rated them lower than Leeds Jewry as a whole. For Alwoodley Jews (the most affluent segment), they felt the least affinity of all Jewish sub-groups.

Interestingly, our respondents felt they had least in common with their immediate neighbours. In their replies to the question about affinity with different groups, many looked at people as individuals rather than as a group and said there was both good and bad in any group.

Almost half (45 per cent) felt cut-off from the main body of Leeds Jewry mainly because of the distance from the Jewish areas. We asked whether they felt any stigma about living in Chapeltown; only 20 per cent said they did. However, a further 34 per cent said that although they themselves were content to live in Chapeltown, all their friends and relatives asked them how they could still remain in the district. In some cases it seemed to us that they personally felt the stigma but preferred to attribute that perception to others. As we saw earlier, the evidence from our other questions showed that if they had the choice, our respondents would have moved to a flat or bungalow in Moortown.

The Leeds Jewish community is highly organized with a plethora of communal agencies catering for all tastes, politically and financially; but all the activities are centred in the Moortown and Alwoodley areas. Only one third of our respondents belong to any form of voluntary organization either in the Jewish community or in the wider society.

This low level of involvement in communal life and the lack of any central Jewish social focus in Chapeltown reinforced their isolation from the Jewish community; there is a Jewish day centre on the Queenshill estate where many of their contemporaries spend a large proportion of their time, but those living in Chapeltown find the journey to Moortown tiring and expensive.

Income and social support

It is of limited value to ask direct questions about income in a survey; it also often gives offence to the respondents; and to have any meaning, data on incomes need to be contrasted with expenditure. In order to circumvent this problem. we borrowed a question from the

SSRC *Quality of Life Survey*[21] and asked, 'How much extra money a week, if any, would you need to live free from money worries?' All but one of our respondents willingly answered this question; and since most of them lived on fixed budgets, they were easily able to quantify the difference between surviving and happily managing. Of the 50 heads of household who replied, exactly half (25) said they did not want any extra income; 16 wished to have up to £10 a week extra; five wanted £10–£30; and the remaining four, more than £30.

We then asked them whether they felt they had lacked any of the basic necessities of life over the past year and what they worried about. In their replies to the latter question, health came first (58 per cent) followed by the political situation (42 per cent), their family (42 per cent), getting old (28 per cent), having debts (12 per cent), money for daily needs (10 per cent), and finally their relations with neighbours (eight per cent).

In answer to the former question they said they had not been able to afford household repairs, clothes, or holidays (14 households or 28 per cent in each case); entertainment (20 per cent); heating (12 per cent); and finally food (only six per cent).

Most of our respondents said that money and debts were not a problem; they prided themselves on not owing a penny. They did not have very high expectations of life and were quite happy with what they possessed. They lived frugally. Very few had been in contact with the Jewish Welfare Board and even fewer with the social services provided by Leeds Council. The main reasons for contacting the Welfare Board were related to the possibilities of obtaining housing on the Queenshill Estate.

They were not interested in consumer durables such as washing machines or cars (most of them were too old to drive). As for central heating, many thought they coped quite adequately with their present system of heating. Two possessions were especially prized, a television set (owned by 46 out of 51 households) and the telephone. The nine households without a telephone wished to have it installed, since it was valued as a lifeline for communicating with their family.

There was negligible use of advice bureaux or counselling services, and only a small percentage had been in contact with the Department of Health and Social Security. The one person who was unemployed was living on his savings; he did not claim unemployment benefit, to which he was entitled, because he was too frightened to get involved with the bureaucracy. He was 64 years old.

The majority of the respondents had gone to a hospital, clinic, or doctor's surgery during the previous year; this is not surprising in view of their age. The other service used in times of crisis was the police. One respondent called the police when his wife died, another householder did so when she had a burst pipe, and a third was contacted by the

police over damage to his shop window. The police were seen in a positive light as a 24-hour agency which could provide help and advice. This attitude is in contrast to that of other residents of inner cities, who often consider the police to be hostile.

Family and friends

The role of the family among Leeds Jews is probably more significant than it is among London Jews, since the latter are spread over a much wider geographical area.

In order to find out how important the family was to our respondents, we asked the 51 heads of household two distinct questions: (1) Who is your closest relative in terms of kinship (outside this household)? (2) Who is your nearest relative in terms of distance from your home? All except one household of two sisters had someone they defined as a relative.

The closest relatives were 27 children, 2 parents (these were of the single young people), and 14 siblings. Only six respondents named a relative who was more distant—a cousin in each case. Two thirds of these relatives (33), lived in the Leeds area; nine were elsewhere in the United Kingdom; and seven (five children and two siblings) were abroad. For 26 of our respondents, there was a relative who lived nearer their home than the relative they considered to be their closest kin.

Frequent contact was maintained in the majority of cases. In the week before our interview, 75 per cent had been in touch with their closest relative and 58 per cent with one who lived near-by. Only three respondents were completely out of touch with their closest kin.

As for close friends, respondents who had someone they called a close friend (70 per cent) generally kept in touch at least once a week. The contact was more likely to be a visit or going to the shops together than a telephone call or a letter.

Those who had no close friends tended to be the poorest and most isolated members of our sample; their lives were almost entirely home-based and their excursions were usually only to the local shops.

Class and politics

Our survey was carried out in the run-up period to the May 1979 General Election. There is obviously much interest in politics during an election period, and the possibility of Mrs. Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister brought forth tirades of abuse from Labour supporters. The response from the Conservative supporters was in a much lower key.

We asked four questions on class and politics: 'How do you define

yourself in class terms?'; 'How interested are you in politics?'; 'Which party will you vote for?' and 'Are there any parties you would never under any circumstances vote for?'

The first question was answered by 49 respondents; over half of them (27) said they were working class; 21 described themselves as middle class; and the remaining one as classless. When we asked about their political affiliations, the working class members were not always Labour supporters nor were those of the middle class all Conservative. In the 1979 election, both the Conservative and the Labour candidates for Leeds North East—the parliamentary constituency covering Chapeltown—were Jews. The Conservative was Sir Keith Joseph and the Labour candidate was Mr. Ron Sedler, a local solicitor. Our respondents in their conversations with us did not seem to be influenced by local issues or ethnic factors. They appeared more concerned about the political platforms of the parties on national issues and to vote for the party of their choice rather than for the candidate. The majority actively followed the national debates; 70 per cent declared they were seriously interested in politics.

We did not find the strong socialism normally expected among poorer elderly Jews: 28 said they would vote for Labour; 20 for the Conservatives; one for the Liberals; one for the Ecology party; and one did not intend to vote.

Finally, when we asked which were the political parties they would never vote for under any circumstances, they replied: Labour (9); Conservative (11); Liberal (20); Communist (50); Socialist Workers (50); and National Front (51).

All our respondents knew what the National Front was, they regarded it as a menace, and not one of them would vote for its candidates. All but one respondent would not vote for the parties of the radical left—the Communist and Socialist Workers parties.

Religion

We were surprised that less than half the homes (21) had a *mezuza* on the front door; some had *mezuzot* only on the inside doors. This may have been because of fear of showing the outside world that their home was Jewish; it is a phenomenon often found among elderly Jews living in inner city areas, as we noted in the course of field research in East London in 1972.

Within the majority of the homes, there was on display a *menorah*, a *kiddush* cup, or some small souvenir brought back by friends or relatives from Israel.

Only four of our 51 heads of household did not belong to a synagogue or burial society. Some of those whose names we had obtained from non-synagogue sources were found to belong to a Leeds Synagogue.

The high level of affiliation is traditional in Leeds, especially since the synagogues offer a 'burial rights only' membership which costs as little as 25 pence a week.

For the majority, religious practice was linked to the observance of the High Holy Days—*Rosh Hashannah* (the New Year), *Yom Kippur* (Day of Atonement), and the Passover. Only two did not observe any of the Holy Days, but 14 (more than a quarter of the total) never went to the synagogue: ten women and four men. It should be remembered that there are two synagogues in Chapeltown.

The marked observance of festivals—especially Rosh Hashannah and the Passover—is linked to the family orientation of our respondents, who often went to have a festival meal with their relatives on those occasions.

Conclusion

The 450 or so Jews in Chapeltown account for an estimated 2·3 per cent of the local population and 2·5 per cent of the Leeds Jewish community of 18,000.[22] We have shown that they are not residentially concentrated in any one part of Chapeltown, and that there is neither a local communal network nor any focal meeting point. Further evidence on the lack of a defined local Jewish community was given by 15 of our respondents who believed that apart from themselves, and one or two relatives and acquaintances, they were the only Jews living in Chapeltown.

Perhaps we should describe Chapeltown Jews as a sub-population rather than a sub-community. They stand in sharp contrast to the Jews of Alwoodley (the prestige suburb north of Moortown) who have the residential concentration, the social interactions, and the informal institutions—such as fund-raising groups—to weld them together into a sub-community within British Jewry.*

NOTES

[1] *Policy for the Inner Cities*, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1977.

[2] The New Commonwealth is defined as all countries of the Commonwealth except Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.

[3] For some previous studies, see B. A. Kosmin and N. Grizzard, *Jews in an Inner London Borough*, Board of Deputies of British Jews, London, 1975; and

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J. W. Carrier 'A Jewish Proletariat' in M. Mindlin and C. Bermant, eds., *Explorations*, London, 1967, pp. 120–40.

[4] For a more detailed account, see Ernest Krausz, *Leeds Jewry*, Cambridge, 1964.

[5] Leeds Jewry is said to have numbered 25,000 in the 1930s: *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, Jerusalem, 1971, vol. XIII, pp. 901–2. We believe this is an overestimate, and the true figure was most probably nearer 20,000.

[6] The Yorkshire Ripper is a psychopath who killed twelve women in the period 1975–79; all but three were prostitutes. Four of the murders were committed in Chapeltown.

[7] Leeds Metropolitan District Council Polling Districts 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55.

[8] The *Leeds Jewish Gazette* has by far the larger circulation of the two Leeds Jewish weeklies. In the Jewish New Year issue of 1978 there were greetings from over 1,000 families.

[9] See Fred Massarik 'The American Jew', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. VIII, no. 2, December 1966, pp. 175–91, for a description of the original method.

[10] We would like to thank Mr. H. Skyte, Director of the Leeds Jewish Welfare Board, for his help.

[11] B. A. Kosmin and D. de Lange, *Community Resources for a Community Survey*, Board of Deputies of British Jews, London, 1979, p. 29.

[12] Unpublished research carried out by the Board of Deputies Research Unit for a study of the geographical distribution of Anglo-Jewry.

[13] See Naomi Levine and Martin Hochbaum, eds., *Poor Jews: An American Awakening*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974, p. 3, where there is a reference to the predominantly elderly Jewish poor in South Beach, Miami Beach, Florida.

[14] National Housing and Dwelling Survey, Department of the Environment Ward Analysis (unpublished), for Bradford Metropolitan District Council, 1979.

[15] Rooms are defined as living rooms and bedrooms. Small kitchens and bathrooms are excluded.

[16] *Woodview Housing Action Area Study*, Bradford Council, Bradford, 1978.

[17] The Comprehensive Community Programme set up in Bradford Metropolitan District in 1978 looked at deprivation in all its forms. The Guardhouse study was a survey of council tenants and their views on a social priority estate in Keighley. The results are as yet unpublished.

[18] The Queenshill Jewish Housing Estate was an experimental project consisting of 200 housing units jointly financed by the Jewish Welfare Board and the Local Authority. The estate has been a success and further housing units have been built on it and in Moortown.

[19] Carrier, op. cit., p. 138.

[20] Kosmin and Grizzard, op. cit., p. 27.

[21] Social Science Research Council, *Quality of Life Survey* (*Urban Britain 1973*), vol. 1, London, 1976.

[22] This is the estimate in the 1979 *Jewish Year Book*. A former President of the Jewish Representative Council of Leeds told us that he believed 16,000 to be a more realistic figure.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN ULTRA-ORTHODOX EDUCATION

Raphael Schneller

THE *Edah HaCharedit* of Jerusalem is an ultra-Orthodox community, founded in 1920. It is concentrated in the Meah Shearim Quarter and its adjacent neighbourhoods. The community is estimated to number 20,000 to 30,000.[1] The members are largely descended from the Ashkenazi *Yishuv Yashan* (the older, pre-Zionist, settlement in Palestine), who came to settle in Jerusalem in the early 1800s. There were four distinct sub-groups, according to country of origin: 1) those from Lithuania and its borders, the *Prushim* (the 'separated');[2] 2) the *Hassidim*, from Poland-Galicia; 3) the comparative newcomers from Hungary, *Kolel Shomrei HaHomot* (the Guardians of the Walls); and 4) the *Ho'd* (Holland-Deutschland), a small but affluent group. The *Ho'd* were later absorbed by the *Prushim*. Nowadays the *Edah* includes a small group of Sephardim. There has been some intermarriage between the various groups, but the first three have retained their distinctiveness.

The community was financially dependent upon the remittances from the Jews in their various countries of origin; this was known as the *halukkah* (distribution) system. Rabbinic leaders from each of the four sub-groups were in charge of distributing the funds.

The supreme religious institution of the Ashkenazi Old *Yishuv* in Palestine was the *Beth Din Tsedek*, the Court of Justice, presided by the foremost rabbinic scholars.

After the First World War, with the establishment of the British Mandate, some members of the *Yishuv Yashan* collaborated with the Jewish Agency (founded by the Zionists), while they retained their traditional patterns of religious life. Others gave up their religious observances and merged with non-religious Zionist newcomers. On the other hand, a minority of the Old Settlement refused to co-operate with the new Jewish national institutional frameworks for both ideological and economic reasons; its members organized themselves formally into a separate entity, the *Edah HaCharedit* (Congregation of the Pious). At first, the *Edah* operated within the political framework of

the *Agudat Israel* Orthodox political party, which was also opposed to secular Zionism and its institutions—including the new establishment of the Chief Rabbinate. In 1945, after *Agudat Israel*'s increasing co-operation with Zionist agencies, the *Edah* severed all its relations with that political party and launched a fierce propaganda campaign against it.

The *Edah* thus became an entirely independent community, opposed not only to the national-social tenets of Zionism, but also after 1948 to the establishment of the State of Israel, which it claims not to recognize. Since the *Edah* believes that the State has no right to exist, it pursues a policy of non co-operation with the national institutions and the Municipality of Jerusalem. Its members therefore take no part in parliamentary elections, and its young men and women refuse to give military service. The men are permanently registered as Talmudic scholars (*Bnei Yeshivot*) and are thus legally exempt from military service. The young women can also be legally exempt on religious grounds. As for services provided by the State or the Municipality, the *Edah* makes use of the water supply, drainage, electricity, garbage collection, the postal services, and public transport.

The community neither recognizes or makes use of religious services offered by outside groups, whether they be those of the Ashkenazi Chief Rabbinate or of the separate rabbinical authority of *Agudat Israel*, the Council of Torah Sages. Its aim is total segregation from the wider society. This distinctiveness is manifested in several striking ways. Yiddish is the language of daily conversation and of instruction. The use of modern Hebrew is forbidden. The members dress in the same style as that of their ancestors in their land of origin and maintain other traditional patterns of personal and social behaviour. They adhere to the motto that 'Whatever is new is forbidden by the Torah', formulated by the *Hatam Sofer*, a leading Hungarian rabbinical authority who wanted to preserve ultra-orthodox eastern European Jewry from the forces of the Jewish Enlightenment.

The various sub-groups of the *Edah* differ among themselves only in small measure in their attire, food, methods of religious learning and praying, and arrangement of living quarters. It is in the manner and degree of their opposition to the State of Israel and its institutions that there are significant differences: the *Prushim* and the *Hassidim* take a comparatively moderate stand, limited to the avoidance of any socio-cultural ties with the State; but a group of several thousand members —primarily of Hungarian origin and including the militant *Hassidim* of Satmar—who call themselves *Neturai Karta* (literally, 'Watchmen of the City'), are extreme zealots. They are sometimes actively provocative and aggressive in their attitude to the State, and occasionally take up a position in matters concerned with both internal politics and foreign policy.

The *Edah* has its own educational system, with separate schools for boys and for girls. Any parents who place their children in other schools cannot retain their membership of the community. The ideal type of man is one who can devote all his time to the study of *Torah*, interpreted in its broadest sense of encompassing the totality of Jewish law and religious thought. Such scholars should be supported by community funds, but economic realities do not make this way of life fully attainable by a large section of men. Consequently, some work as middlemen, small shopkeepers, and craftsmen producing Jewish ritual artifacts such as *tefilin* (phylacteries) and *mezuzot*. Others work as *kashrut* supervisors or in the community's own offices.

Some women earn money by sewing, embroidering, and teaching. Others help their husbands in the shop. But the principal female occupation is to manage the household and bring up the children.

The training and education of the young is clearly crucial for the maintenance and preservation of the established religious and cultural values of the *Edah*. Its schools must socialize the pupils while constantly remaining alert in the face of environmental pressures for change.

The Study

From 1973 to 1976, I was engaged in a study of the *Edah* and was a frequent visitor to the homes of members of the community. I gained access on the strength of the fact that I was an inspector of religious teacher-training institutes. I also stressed that I was eager to learn about authentic, traditional Jewish systems of education. I had interviews and conversation with male and female teachers and many opportunities to observe and discuss household affairs and the upbringing of children.

The aim of my research was to discover whether there had been a change in the *Edah*'s educational system. If there had been any changes, in what spheres did they occur, and how did the community's leaders account for them in view of the fact that they claim they are totally opposed to change? Which elements of the educational system have undergone change, and in what way are they related to external environmental pressure?

Very little reliable data are available to the outside investigator, and there appears to have been no published research on the subject. It was clearly essential to discover how the system of education of the *Edah* had operated in the past. I therefore relied on other sources dealing with the educational system of the nineteenth-century Old *Yishuv*: text-books, rules and regulations, articles in the contemporary press, and other literary sources (including correspondence and announcements).

The school system of today was investigated not merely by examining

the curricula and the textbooks, but by attending classes, by conversations with both pupils and teachers, and by looking at a variety of posters and notices connected with teaching. I also read the writings on education by members of the community and the *Edah*'s periodicals. Finally, I searched government, municipal, and public archives for any documents relating to the *Edah* and to its educational system. I also had extensive interviews with local residents in responsible positions in the past and the present, and with outsiders who had contacts with the groups in economic, administrative, and judicial capacities.

The education of boys

A comparison of the old and the present systems of teaching of male children showed that there had been no significant change since the 1800s. In fact, it seems that not only is the *Edah* following the same methods as those of the Old *Yishuv* in Jerusalem, but that the system has been virtually unchanged since the Middle Ages: it is along the same classic lines as those which prevailed among the Jews of medieval Europe.[3]

The elementary school of today is the *heder*, or the *Talmud Torah*, terms also used in the past; while the *yeshiva* continues to be an establishment for secondary and higher education. The curriculum is based almost exclusively on the study of religious texts. The Pentateuch is the focal subject in the lower forms, and a secondary subject thereafter. Students then move on to the study of the *Mishnah* (the Oral Law) in greater or lesser depth, until finally they reach the stage when they begin studying the Babylonian Talmud. That Talmud is an enormous body of literature and students are expected eventually to devote themselves to the task almost exclusively.

Small boys go to *heder* at the age of three; they have play group activities but are also taught a small number of simple blessings and prayers by rote. Reading skills are acquired at the age of four or five, after which general subjects (such as elementary arithmetic and Yiddish) are taught for only five periods a week, at a time when the pupils are thought to be too tired to be able to concentrate on the most central objective of the school: the study of *Torah*.

The school day is long: classes usually start at 8 a.m. and end at about 5 p.m., with a brief recess for lunch. After dinner, many pupils return to school for further individual study. There are no mid-term vacations other than those for the Jewish Holy Days, in conformity with the pattern which prevailed in eastern European Jewish communities. Schools and *Yeshivot* are closed for three weeks from Yom Kippur to the end of Tishri, and during the whole month of Nissan—so that there are two semesters a year.

The masters in the *Edah*'s schools receive no formal teacher training

whatever; teaching as a profession is passed on from father to son, but senior colleagues advise and supervise the junior staff. This is also the case for the administrative and other personnel.

There are 23 elementary schools for boys; four of them cater for the Sephardim (who are the smallest sub-group). *Etz Hayyim* is the central institution of the *Prushim*; it has more than a thousand pupils in its 11 branches, attended by boys from other sub-groups. The *Hassidim*'s schools are also open to the sons of other sub-groups, but the schools of the *Neturai Karta* are almost exclusively reserved to their own boys.

There are some variations in the style of teaching and choice of subjects or emphasis between the different sub-groups, who follow the tradition of their country of origin. Some schools have courses on the Prophets in addition to those of the Pentateuch; some devote more hours than others to the study of the *Mishnah*, or of the *Halakha* (the codified corpus of Jewish law). There are often some differences in the selection of the Talmudic tractates and in the order of their study, as well as in the manner of studying the texts themselves.

On the other hand, there has been one unifying factor in the *Edah*'s schools since the 1950s. In 1954, one of the teachers at the central *Talmud Torah Etz Hayyim* published a complete series of auxiliary texts for *Torah* study entitled *LaMashmahut* (literally, 'For the Meaning'). The series provides a translation and commentary in Yiddish of each verse of the Pentateuch, as well as detailed explanations of phrases occurring in the verses, summaries, and teaching aides. The series claims on the frontispiece that the manual is 'For teachers—for their work; for pupils—for revisions; for parents—for testing.' The author, H. J. Jacobsen, states that one of his goals is to ensure continuity and uniformity in the teaching of *Torah* from one generation to the other. The manual is used by nearly all the schools and does help to provide uniformity among the various sub-groups in the teaching of the most basic subject.

The education of girls

Before the First World War, the Ashkenazi Old *Yishuv* in Jerusalem had not established any institution for the formal education of girls. From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, foreign philanthropists—mainly Sir Moses Montefiore and the Rothschilds—as well as the Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Ezra Society opened schools for girls. These were not acceptable to the Ashkenazi leaders, with one exception in the case of a pioneering effort in 1854–55, which proved short-lived. The schools established in the later decades of the century catered almost exclusively for Sephardi girls in Jerusalem, while female orphanages existed to rescue young Jewish orphan girls

from falling into the hands of Christian missionaries rather than in order to provide them with formal tuition.

In 1903, a Hebrew kindergarten was opened in Jerusalem, to be followed two years later by a girls' school for the Ashkenazi community, financed by the Ezra Society.[4] But the leaders of the religious segment of the Old *Yishuv* did not recognize the institution as fit for ultra-Orthodox girls, nor would they consider the suggestions made by several prominent personages to establish their own school for girls.[5]

This attitude was entirely in keeping with the policy of the Ashkenazi Old Settlement in Palestine of maintaining in *toto* the integrity of the life patterns of the countries of origin, where the concept of a formal education for Jewish female children was unheard of. A girl stayed at home with her mother, from whom she learnt everything she needed to know, until she married the man of her parents' choice.

In fact, many girls did not stay at home with their mothers either in the old country or in Jerusalem. Married women often had to go out to work—mainly sewing or cleaning—and they entrusted their young daughters to a *rebbitsin* (literally, a rabbi's wife, although the term was loosely used in this context) for supervision during the day. Girls were only given the most elementary tuition to enable them to read Yiddish and classical Hebrew, so that they might follow the text of the few religious books used by women for praying and religious learning. Any other type of systematic tuition in a formal establishment ran counter to the rigidly conservative principles of the ultra-Orthodox Ashkenazim.

All the above notwithstanding, the *Edah* had in 1976 no fewer than ten schools for girls, with a total pupil enrolment of 3,000–4,000. (There are no reliable data, or at least none that were made available.) We must note, however, that these institutions are not called *batay sefer*, the usual term for ordinary schools, but *batay hinuch*, or houses of education or training. Some are for the benefit of girls from a particular sub-group while others are open to all young female members of the *Edah*. The student population varies from a few dozen in some establishments to nearly one thousand in the main institution, known as *Bnot Yerushalayim* (Daughters of Jerusalem).

The first ultra-Orthodox establishment for girls was established in Jerusalem in 1921. Only ten to fifteen girls attended when it first opened; they were instructed by an older girl. The numbers grew, but had not reached a thousand by 1948, when the school had to close during the War of Independence because it was situated in a battle area. It re-opened under the name of *Old Beth Yacov* and had about 200–300 pupils in the 1970s.

Nowadays, the *Edah*'s schools for girls are similar to modern secular teaching institutions: there are several forms or grades, and a different subject is taught every hour until noon. However, there are no afternoon

classes: the girls are expected then to help their mothers with housework. The school is open five days a week, from Sunday to Thursday: the pupils are needed at home on Fridays to help their mothers prepare for the Sabbath. The school session is divided into two semesters as are the boys' *Yeshivot*, with holidays during the months of *Tishri* in the autumn, and *Nissan* in the spring.

While their brothers study the Bible and Talmudic texts in the original Hebrew, the girls in several institutions must use Yiddish translations—some schools even have a Yiddish version of the Bible for the first eight years of elementary education. Yiddish is also the medium of instruction, and the study of foreign languages is forbidden. Girls are not taught the Oral Law in any form.

On the other hand, they study many subjects which are not included in the boys' schools: more extended elementary mathematics; selected aspects of Jewish history (no other history is taught); geography (mainly of the Holy places in Eretz Israel); civics; and in some of the more 'progressive' institutions—like that of the newcomers from the United States (*Bnot Rahel*)—there are classes in elementary science, drawing, music, and dancing. Some schools also give tuition in classical Hebrew and in Hebrew grammar. All the teachers are females.

The Chart shows the main subjects which are taught in four different schools of the *Edah*, which were established respectively in 1921, 1948, 1964, and 1971, and which were all in operation in the mid 1970s. For purposes of comparison, the curriculum of a school for girls (established in 1930 in Tel Aviv and in 1933 in Jerusalem) run by the very orthodox *Agudat Israel* is also shown in the Chart. The *Edah HaCharedit* has sharply dissociated itself from *Agudat Israel*, as was noted earlier, and strongly disapproves of its programme of studies for girls.

The oldest of the *Edah*'s four schools, *Old Beth Yacov* (founded in 1921), teaches little more than the *rebbitsin* used to do, when a girl was put into her care. At *Bnot Yerushalayim*, established in 1948 when the State of Israel came into being, there is a fuller range of subjects. The Pentateuch and several books of the Bible are taught in Yiddish as Jewish 'history', and Yiddish language studies have been expanded. *Bnot Yerushalayim* is the largest of the *Edah*'s schools and its enrolment of more than one thousand accounts for over a quarter of all the community's female pupils. Its resources have enabled it to prepare and publish many texts and study materials, which have been adopted by other schools.

In all the institutions, the course on Judaism mainly consists in teaching the practical application of religious precepts for women, as well as traditional Jewish tales and beliefs..

Beth Bracha, established by the *Hassidim* in 1964, teaches Hebrew grammar—which enables the girls to communicate more effectively with the outside world—, the study of the Bible in the original Hebrew,

MAIN SUBJECTS OF STUDY IN INSTITUTIONS FOR GIRLS

Under the Auspices of the Edah HaCharedit (The language of instruction is Yiddish)				*Agudat Israel* (Hebrew)
Old Beth Yacov (1921)	*Bnot Yerushalayim* (1948)	*Beth Bracha* (1964)	*Bnot Rahel* (1971)	*New Beth Yacov* (1933)
			Drawing, music, and dancing	Foreign language
		Social studies	Elementary biology and geometry	Elementary biology and geometry
	History and geography (limited)	History and geography (limited)	History and geography (extended)	History and geography (extended)
	Bible as 'history'	Bible in the original text	Bible in the original and commentaries	Bible in the original and commentaries
Yiddish Language (limited)	Yiddish Language (extended)	Yiddish and Hebrew grammar	Classical Hebrew and grammar	Modern Hebrew and grammar
Arithmetic (limited)	Arithmetic	Arithmetic	Arithmetic	Arithmetic
Judaism, ethics, and prayer	Judaism, ethics, and prayer	Judaism, ethics, and prayer	Judaism, ethics, and prayer	Judaism, Jewish philosophy, and prayer

and social studies. The latter are taught in Yiddish translations of modern Hebrew texts. In contrast to *Bnot Yerushalayim*, in *Beth Bracha* the Sephardi pronunciation is used in courses on modern Hebrew and grammar; and excursions are arranged for the girls to visit the holy sites and the environs of Jerusalem.

Bnot Rahel serves primarily the needs of the daughters of *Edah* members who come from English-speaking countries (mainly North

America). The girls are taught elementary biology and geometry—subjects not studied in any of the community's other three schools shown in the Chart. They are also taught in the fourth grade the commentaries on Biblical texts (in much the same way as in state religious schools), as well as classical Hebrew and Hebrew grammar.

It will be noted that the later the year of foundation of the institution, the broader-based is the curriculum. However, both the parents of the girls who go to the ultra-conservative *Old Beth Yacov* school and of those who go to *Bnot Rahel* (with its much wider range of studies) repudiate the State of Israel. The fact that the latter are in favour of a more highly developed curriculum for their daughters does not mean that they have different political attitudes, but simply reflects the aspirations (especially of mothers) to have their girls educated according to the standard which they themselves enjoyed in their country of origin.

Legitimation for the establishment of girls' educational institutions

The *Edah*'s schools seem to run absolutely counter to the community's declared rejection of any innovation. Moreover, as we saw, their classes are not limited to the study of the basic tenets of religion, but have extended in many institutions to more general, secular, fields which are totally excluded from the boys' education.

Documentary evidence and conversations with members of the community reveal some of the reasons for the establishment of female education. The new *Yishuv* had founded school after school for girls, to which *Edah* children were sent in spite of the community leaders' objections. The mothers wanted to provide them with some aspects of a broad general education in formal classes, while it was expected that most of the values of traditional Judaism would be acquired in the home.

Some boys were also attracted by secular schools. Those who defiantly went to those institutions generally left the *Edah*. Most of the boys, however, were mindful of the sacred command to engage without any diversions in the study of *Torah* and Talmud, and could not resist group and parental pressure to go to the schools especially established for training them to become Biblical Scholars. One *Edah* member commented: 'Daughters were not looked after as much as boys'. Nevertheless, the leaders were concerned lest the secular schools' influence on the girls bring about the loss of the group's distinctive identity.

Rabbi Benzion Yadler explains[6] how the community responded to that challenge:

> All the great Torah Sages of Jerusalem came together to share their wisdom and counsels, for the advancement of the Almighty and against the

> evil which is spreading through our streets and our homes. So it was that with their encouragement and support, I founded a house for the education of girls, according to the ways of our forefathers; it is called to this day Ben-Zion Yadler's *heder*.

The pressures for formal female education in the *Edah* grew when the *Mizrahi* (the religious Zionists), and later the anti-Zionist *Agudat Israel*, opened special schools to cater for the daughters of strictly Orthodox families. These institutions taught, in addition to expanded Jewish studies, some general subjects.

The principal leaders of the *Edah* deliberately came to the conclusion that it was better to establish a system of formal education for girls, under full supervision, than to risk losing to the outside world a substantial proportion of future mothers. When the *Edah*'s first school was established in 1921, it taught nothing which had not been previously taught to the girls in the privacy of their own home or of the *rebbitsin*'s home: the regulations of *Old Beth Yacov*—the official name of Yadler's *heder*—state that explicitly.[7] The establishment of a special institution for female pupils was innovation enough at the time.

Later, when some parents exerted pressure to widen the range of subjects, the leaders gave a qualified consent. First, no subject would be included which had been previously banned by the religious authorities of the Old *Yishuv* (such as a foreign language) and the use of Hebrew as a spoken language would continue to be prohibited. Second, there would be no contravention of the religious injunction by leaders (such as Rabbi Diskin at the end of the nineteenth century) forbidding the teaching of *Torah* to women. (Later, this prohibition was amended to refer only to the Oral Law.) In this way, the *Edah*'s *Beth Din Tsedek* found a compromise which was acceptable to parents (whose loyalty was retained) without violating the basic principles of the religious leaders.

A very high degree of watchfulness over the educational contents and methods is maintained, in order to exclude any possible threat to the community's culture and life style from 'alien' study materials. The *Edah*'s leaders contend that they have yielded to pressure in introducing new courses in the girls' curriculum, but that the innovations are firmly within the old framework—they do not constitute a substitution of it. The cohesion and solidarity of the group must be the prime consideration, and desperate circumstances require desperate remedies, so to say. The use of 'tactics of the moment' (*hora'at sha'ah*), a conditional suspension of specific rules in special cases, is legitimate according to Jewish legal precepts.[8]

Conclusion

The leaders of the *Edah HaCharedit* are concerned above all else with preserving the integrity of their religious and cultural heritage. They

have banned the cinema, the television and the radio, and newspapers (including those of the Orthodox *Agudat Israel*). The *Edah* publishes two weeklies, in Yiddish, for the benefit of the members. On the other hand, they allow the use of tape recorders for *Torah* lessons and for sacred chants and music at such occasions as weddings. Thus they do not reject new technological tools which can be of benefit to them.

The community has retained its distinctiveness by judicious yielding to some of the pressures for innovation, while adhering faithfully to its basic religious tenets. Although most of the sub-groups have allowed their girls to acquire some secular knowledge and skills, the schools are run (and closely supervised) within the community; and they teach the pupils old traditional beliefs and practices.

There has been no compromise in what is considered to be the more serious matter of the education of boys: for them, any appreciable time devoted to other than religious study is still held to be time sinfully wasted or *bitul Torah*.*

NOTES

[1] No official statistics are available. There are about 6,000–7,000 boys and 3,000–4,000 girls in the elementary schools.

[2] The term was used in Lithuania to describe a group of Talmudic scholars who left the Mussar movement to devote themselves to the study of the Oral Law. They also 'separated' themselves from their homes in order to pursue their studies.

[3] See Jacob Katz, 'Traditional and Modern Society' (in Hebrew), *Megamot*, vol. 10, 1960, pp. 305–11; and S. Assaf, *Documents on Jewish Education* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1945.

[4] See J. Press, *A Hundred Years of Jerusalem* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1964, p. 110.

[5] Benzion Yadler, *Betoov Yerushalayim* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1964, p. 86.

[6] ibid., p. 91.

[7] ibid., pp. 92–95.

[8] See Maimonides: *The Laws of the Sanhedrin*, ch. 24, paragraph 4, *The Laws of Rebels*, ch. 2, paragraph 4.

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ON POLITICAL STRUCTURES—FOUR MEDIEVAL COMMENTS

Gerald J. Blidstein

PERHAPS the most dramatic clash within the Jewish political tradition is that between the supporters of the monarchic principle and its opponents. Deuteronomy (17:14–20) reluctantly accepts the monarchy, but commands that there be safeguards against the king's drive towards personal power and profligacy. The issue is joined most openly of course in the book of Samuel, where God finally directs the prophet to accede to the popular clamour for a king despite His recognition that Israel's demand is, in effect, a rejection of the Divine Kingship (1 Samuel 8:7–9). Other Biblical texts also hint at the conflict over the idea of monarchy. We ought not be surprised that a God-centred religion with very strong this-worldly interests should discover the need to grapple with this crucial political structure; indeed, one is surprised by the relative ease with which the monarchic element is absorbed. The debate continued down the centuries. Despite the traditional adherence to the Davidic-Messianic ideal, Tannaitic rabbis could disagree as to whether the monarchy was originally mandatory or optional, wise or wicked. Midrashic literature is studded with disagreements on various aspects of the monarchy, fuelled perhaps by differing attitudes towards Rome, towards the Jewish patriarchate, and towards the idea of God's Kingdom. Medieval Jews closed ranks, on the whole, over the desirability of a Jewish king; the institution certainly could not harm the fortunes of this harassed people, and all the nations to whom Jews owed fealty had a monarch. Minority voices were of course heard, but it is their singularity which has ensured their fame. If the medieval Jewish political tradition did foster an on-going discussion, the question of monarchy was not its crux. Modern Jewish thought, on the other hand, has seen a revival of the issue, contemporary with the emergence of modern Jewish nationalism. Martin Buber's treatment of Divine and human kingship, although clothed in the garb of Biblical scholarship, carries definite implications for the political, social, and religious constitution of a Jewish state—as do the views of his opponents.

The legitimacy of a monarchy was not a central issue in medieval

times. But this does not mean to say that the central tradition which accepted a monarchy spoke with one voice—or more significantly, described the *functions* of the monarch, his *role within the total political structure*, in identical terms. Here, I believe, considerable variety is to be found. In fact, the issue of kingly function already exists in Biblical literature; despite the assumption that the king wages war and dispenses justice, the relationship between monarchic justice and that of the village or tribal elders is not at all clear.[1] And needless to say, the question of the judiciary is merely one example among many. As for Talmudic literature, it also leaves the problem pretty much where it found it; indeed it barely raises the issue at all.[2]

The medieval thinkers with whom this paper is concerned did not all address themselves directly to the problem of monarchic function. But they all did make comments from which we may fairly infer, I believe, something about their attitudes towards the role of a king and the roles of other elements in a polity. I shall examine passages found in a book of history, a code of law, a homily, and a philosophical work.

Abraham ibn Daud

Abraham ibn Daud was a mid-twelfth century representative of what Gerson Cohen has called the Andalusian rabbinic courtier class. He was reared 'in ... the world of revelation and the schoolhouse of philosophy', and his literary works, it has been surmised, were 'part of an integrated scheme which we may title "The Defense of Judaism through Reason and History".' The major historical effort is *Sefer HaQabbalah* (*The Book of Tradition*) which is of course a defence of the authenticity of rabbinic tradition but has also been read as a crypto-Messianic treatise and a tract defending the rabbinic courtier class to which ibn Daud belonged and which he believed was destined to lead the Jewish people to its redemption. Such a polemic, Cohen has argued, would be directed primarily against Judah HaLevi, whose philosophical work and eventual departure from Spain for the Promised Land constituted a powerful and appealing rejection of the Spanish rabbinic courtier class and its definitions of 'truth and the good life'.[3]

The Book of Tradition is devoted primarily to Spanish rabbinism and its immediate antecedents, but it begins with Adam and wends its way (actually, it hurtles) through all of Jewish history. The second chapter deals with 'The succession of Teachers in the Days of the Second Temple', a period which interested ibn Daud and about which he composed a separate, if brief, treatise. After presenting Hillel, who 'was of the house of David of the seed of the royal line', ibn Daud discusses the patriarchic Hillelite dynasty and inserts the following description:[4]

> For this was the practice in the days of the Second Temple: the king of the Hasmonean dynasty or of their slaves, the Herodian dynasty, ruled supreme in matters of war and in all affairs of state. However, all matters of law, statutes, and ordinances were executed in accordance with the decision of the patriarch of the house of David and in accordance with the decision of the high priest and the Sanhedrin ... Rabban Gamliel was head of the academy as well as patriarch, and ... his actions were accepted throughout Palestine and throughout the Diaspora of Israel. And neither the King nor anyone else in the world demurred.[5]

The period of the Second Temple was characterized, therefore, by a separation of church and state: the king ruled in affairs of state, and various spiritual authorities directed matters related to religion. Naturally, this brief dichotomization of all life into the political and the spiritual both over-simplifies and (therefore) fails adequately to engage many significant issues. But this fault seems to attend all such theories, no matter to what length they are spun out. Our concern, in any case, is with the elements of the Second Temple structure as ibn Daud describes it, and with the implications this structure holds for the ideal, Biblical, period.

Now High Priest and Sanhedrin are clearly to be placed on the 'spiritual' side of the ledger. The Patriarch is not. He is *not*, ibn Daud informs us, Head of the Sanhedrin, though the same man (for example, Rabban Gamliel) could occupy both offices. The patriarch is, rather, a substitute king, as Cohen points out.[6] Hillel's Davidic lineage is quite significant here, for it seems to legitimate his ability to found a patriarchic dynasty. (Indeed, ibn Daud not only notes Hillel's Davidic ancestry but provides a complete genealogical table extending from Johoiachin, penultimate king of Judah, to R. Judah the Prince, and informs us pointedly that 'all these'—till Hillel, who went to Palestine—'were princes of Israel in Babylonia'.[7]) The Hasmoneans and Herodians could not function fully as monarchs either because they were not prophetically appointed or because they were not Davidides or for some other undisclosed reason.[8] Hence, a 'patriarchate' was founded.

The over-all structure described by ibn Daud does not dovetail with the requirements of rabbinic theory, to which he is usually quite faithful. In rabbinic theory, the Sanhedrin has a decisive voice in questions of war and peace and the king most emphatically does not rule supreme.[9] It is possible, on the other hand, that the king may have a say in matters legal and 'spiritual'. Ibn Daud deliberately rejects all this, by separating the political from the spiritual. But his skewed structure constitutes *a distortion of the ideal Biblical scheme* as he himself understands it. For if this dichotomized, two-headed creature, is the ideal, why create a kingly patriarchate? A patriarchate which, ibn Daud insists, functions on the 'spiritual' side of the ledger?

The existence of a patriarchate that functions in organic relationship

with High Priest and Sanhedrin is, rather, an attempt to constitute a 'shadow' structure that embodies what must have been for ibn Daud the Biblical-rabbinic original. In this ideal, the Sanhedrin would of course have a say in matters of state, and the king would participate (as did the patriarch in ibn Daud's theory!) in matters of law and religion. The historical sources demonstrated to ibn Daud that this was not the situation during the Second Temple, and it is likely that he explained the aberration as a result of non-Davidic kingship; perhaps he found support for his theory in a loose reading of Talmudic texts which barred the non-Davidic king from participating in the Sanhedrin.[10] It is difficult to know whether ibn Daud's semi-monarchic view of the Patriarchate had contemporary overtones in terms of rabbinic claims to social control. In its own terms, the designation of R. Judah the Prince as descendant of Davidic kings (and as simultaneous Head of the Academy) meant that the Mishnah issued by R. Judah was a document proclaimed under both scholarly and monarchic imprint—no mean claim. The genealogy of the Oral Law would then parallel that of the Written Law, which was also proclaimed by a man considered to be King and Head of the Academy—Moses.

From the point of view of political theory, ibn Daud recognizes the existence of differentiated governmental organs, but expects that these will be unified in the ideal (that is, Biblical, Davidic) situation into a single structure in which the various functions will mesh. By noting the dual capacities of the Hillelites, ibn Daud may even suggest that a single individual could hold both offices, though this inference is a most liberal extrapolation from a brief aside. Be this as it may, the tight Second Temple separation of secular and spiritual, King and Sanhedrin, is not an expression of the ideal. On the contrary, the ideal is preserved by the integration of Patriarch alongside Sanhedrin and High Priest—a vestigial reminder of the organic structure which must have been ibn Daud's Messianic dream.

Maimonides

Maimonides's view of the function of a monarch is part and parcel of his political thought as a whole, a subject whose scope and detail warrant a full-scale study. The keystone of the *Code*, after all, is the 'Book of Judges', containing a twenty-six chapter treatment of the Sanhedrin, seven chapters on Rebels, and twelve chapters on Kings and Wars. And then there is the non-halakhic material. Yet Maimonides's attitude towards some specific problems may be studied profitably—even if briefly and in isolation from the rest of his political thought.

He describes the High Sanhedrin and its leadership in these sentences:[11]

> How many regular tribunals are to be set up in Israel? How many members is each to comprise? First there is established a Supreme Court

holding sessions in the sanctuary. This is styled 'the Great Sanhedrin' and consists of seventy-one elders, as it is said: *Gather unto Me seventy men of the elders of Israel* [Num. 11:16], with Moses at their head, as it is said *that they may stand there with thee* [*ibid.*], thus making a tribunal of seventy-one. The one who excels in wisdom is appointed head of the tribunal. He is the presiding officer of the college and is always designated by the Sages as *Naśi*. He occupies the place of Moses, our teacher. The most distinguished of the seventy is next in rank. He is seated to the right of the Naśi and is known as *'Aḥ beṭ din*. The other members are seated with them according to age and standing. The greater the knowledge a member possesses, the closer to the left of the Naśi is the seat assigned to him. They sit in the form of a semicircular threshing floor, so that the *Naśi* and *'Aḥ beṭ din* may see all of them.

These definitions, seemingly simple and self-evident, quietly ignore (or at best minimize) classic Talmudic statements and reject aspects of contemporary Jewish political culture. The crucial assertion, for our purposes, is Maimonides's definition of the *Nasi* (Patriarch) as 'the greatest in wisdom' of the members of the Sanhedrin and their collegiate Head.

Maimonides not only omits all mention of the Davidic ancestry of the *Nasi*, but specifies a requirement that disposes of any dynastic claim to the office: the requirement of *wisdom*. For a system which selects the wisest as its Prince rejects, *ipso facto*, the claim of heredity. (And as Maimonides points out elsewhere, positions of scholarly authority do not pass from father to son but are filled by the most competent candidate at hand.[12]) Hence, the *Nasi* is in fact Head of the Academy; the two terms merely represent Biblical and rabbinic nomenclature for one office, though there may be different shadings to each.[13]

This toppling of the Davidic Patriarch does not come easily—even for a Maimonides. Talmudic norms, Jewish history, and popular culture all spoke against the revision. And Maimonides himself was a firm supporter of Davidic claims to political office in both theory and practice.

Talmudic exegesis of Genesis 43:10 read the verse as a prophetic legitimation of the Babylonian Exilarch and the Palestinian Patriarch, both Davidic (that is, Judahite) scions:[14] '"The sceptre shall not depart from Judah"—this refers to the Exilarchs of Babylon who rule over Israel with sceptre; "and a lawgiver . . ."—this refers to the descendants of Hillel who teach the Torah in public.' Now Maimonides affirms—indeed spells out—the exilarchic claim, basing it on this Talmudic exegesis. But he rejects the second half of the *midrash* with its requirement of a Davidic patriarch.[15] Similarly, he ignores the historical fact—not necessarily normative, of course—that the Davidic Hillelites in fact held the Patriarchate for centuries as a dynastic office. He thus must assume either that these Hillelite patriarchs were the greatest

scholars of their Academies (a fact belied by Talmudic evidence), or that their selection violated Talmudic law.

Whatever the literary and normative dynamics of this revision, its thrust is clear. Maimonides is not opposed to dynastic power *per se*, for he incorporates in his Code provisions for the inheritance of official posts, from the monarchy down.[16] Moreover, he supports the Exilarchate (*not* the Patriarch) as a contemporary substitute for the monarchy, and affirms (in the Commentary to the Mishnah, at least[17]) that this office is to be filled by a Davidide, with popular consent. But he also insists—and his son, R. Abraham, repeats this assertion—that it is totally irrelevant to expect scholarly abilities of the exilarch. This is of course quite consistent with the position we have outlined above. In sum, Maimonides clearly splits the Toraitic function of the Patriarch and the political office of the monarch. The monarch may not become a member of the Sanhedrin; Maimonides presents this as intrinsic to his role, not as a historically-conditioned rabbinic enactment.[18] In a sense, Maimonides here completes a process begun in his Commentary to the *Mishnah*: there he removed the prophetic element from the halakhic process; here he removes the political. One may wish to speak of a separation of powers. Surely this re-definition of the Patriarchate as a position based on wisdom also dovetails with Maimonides's general stress on the intellectual and spiritual components of leadership. Does it also reflect his own struggle against the dynastic claims of the Babylonian gaonate, an institution which he claimed had degenerated precisely because of its blind, selfish, adherence to familial claims?[19] I suspect more is involved.[20]

R. Nissim of Gerona

R. Nissim of Gerona, a fourteenth-century Spanish halakhist, focused on one aspect of the monarchy in his famous Eleventh Homily, and etched the function and method of kingship in stark, indeed brutal (or, perhaps, realistic) terms. A Jewish polity, he argued, rested on two bases: the Sanhedrin and its judicial system, and the monarch and the powers flowing from him. The Sanhedrin enforced the law of the Torah, 'judging the people according to that which is truly just in itself ... according to the laws of the Torah alone, which are just in themselves ... whether or not this completely suited the needs of the society'. According to Torah law, for example, only a murderer who killed in the presence of two witnesses and after being forewarned and having acknowledged such warning, can be executed. This does full justice to the murderer, but it may not meet the needs of a society plagued by violence. Monarchy exists, therefore, to provide a controlled temporary corrective to Torah law and its occasional impracticalities. A king can execute a murderer, for example, if a single witness

convinces him of the man's guilt, irrespectively of forewarning and other procedural requirements, and if the social situation warrants this abuse of pristine Torah law. Now, even the courts can waive such procedural requirements in these situations but, R. Nassim argues, this is merely because 'monarchic' powers devolved upon them when the monarchy *propre* came to an end; the judicial function *per se* does not admit of such exceptional acts. In brief, Torah law represents true justice, which is geared to the rights and duties of the individual, and remains the bailiwick of the Sanhedrin. But Judaism also recognizes a more social morality that legitimately sacrifices such individual rights when the needs of society must be met. Such social morality is encapsulated in an institution recognized by Jewish law itself—the monarchy or its substitutes—and may be enforced temporarily and according to its own code. The waging of war, traditionally associated with the monarchy, is similarly seen as meeting social needs.[21]

R. Nissim's presentation is remarkable on two counts: he offers a sharp differentiation of the roles of monarch and court, and he admits the difficulties attendant on maintaining a social system based totally on standard Talmudic norms, suggesting that the Torah itself allows for the application of a sliding scale of justice relative to social need. I suspect that he is less concerned with the former, theoretical, problem than with the latter; and that what interests him in this latter problem is the need to provide a broad defence for allowing deviations from Talmudic law in the workings of a contemporary Jewish polity. This problem was also recognized by other Spanish contemporaries. R. Solomon ibn Adret had written in a legal responsum that 'if you issue decisions based exclusively on the law as given in the Torah, and rule in questions of torts and such only in accordance with this law, why then society would be destroyed . . .'[22] Fourteenth-century Spain even saw Jewish legists extending the rule that 'the law of the kingdom is law' to include capital cases, so convinced were they of the necessity of effective and strong government.[23] R. Nissim attempts, therefore, to provide the theoretical underpinning for a legitimate non-Talmudic system of social regulation, and he finds that the monarchy exists by virtue of this very need. The monarchy becomes in fact a *type* of institution declared inescapable by the Torah itself; its powers must always be located somewhere within the Jewish social organism.

Thus it is no accident that modern defences of the halakhic legitimacy of the non-traditional legislation passed by the Israeli parliament (in civil matters), turn to R. Nissim's Eleventh Homily, for in it they find a classical halakhist's description of law in functional pragmatic terms, and his assertion that the power to create and enforce such law (though as a temporary measure only!) must always be found within the community.[24]

R. Nissim probably saw himself as working out of the Maimonidean

understanding of monarchy. His major 'Talmudic' proof of the extraordinary powers of the king—from which he derives the very purpose of monarchy— is the fact that the king's justice waives procedural requirements demanded by the courts. But this asserton is found *only in Maimonides*, who in fact expands upon it considerably. The Talmud itself speaks of the extraordinary powers of *courts*, which it does not (contrary to R. Nissim) derive from the monarchic function.[25] Other Maimonidean stresses can also be noted.[26] But it is likely that Maimonides integrated his assertions on the powers and responsibilities of a king within a broader theory of the differing sources of law.

Judah HaLevi

Judah HaLevi is usually considered the advocate of Jewish nationalism among the classic philosophers. We ought not to be misled into thinking, however, that he is eager to laud all institutions associated with Jewish peoplehood. To be specific: HaLevi's nationalism does not grant the king—so central a figure in medieval nationalism and so beloved a figure for nostalgic traditionalists—a very elevated role. Consider the following paragraph:[27]

> Al Khazari: Rabbi, thy symbolization was excellent, but the head and its senses, as well as the anointing oil were left unconsidered.
>
> The Rabbi: Quite so. The root of all knowledge was deposited in the Ark which took the place of the heart, viz. the Ten Commandments, and its branch is the Torah on its side, as it is said: 'Put it in the side of the ark of the covenant of the Lord your God' [Deut. xxxi.26]. From there went forth a twofold knowledge, firstly, the scriptural knowledge, whose bearers were the priests; secondly, the prophetic knowledge which was in the hands of the prophets. Both classes were, so to to speak, the people's watchful advisers, who compiled the chronicles. They, therefore, represent the head of the people.

Prophets and priests—these are the head of the nation; and its heart is the Ark in which the Ten Commandments rest. I am not concerned with establishing a lucid reading of the various claims entered here. What is evident, though, is the glaring omission of the monarch. The monarch is absent not only because he is omitted. Rather, HaLevi chose to ignore the king in precisely that literary context where the political theorists of his time would have automatically considered him. Muslim political theory habitually identified the king as 'heart' of his people.[28] This usage was known to Maimonides, it was known to HaLevi himself, and it circulated in popular adages. But here, the king is not the heart—the Torah is.[29] HaLevi similarly interpreted Deuteronomy 33:5 ('There was a king in Jeshurun . . .') as referring to the regal status of the Torah.[30]

What is the source of this devaluation of the political? Ben-Sasson[31]

implies that it is related to HaLevi's enthusiasm for the over-riding virtue of humility, his disparagement of worldly power and success—and kings are expected to win. I would rather suspect that HaLevi's relegation of the monarchy to a peripheral role derives from his view of Jewish history. For HaLevi, it is true, history is the prime channel of national revelation; and kings make history. But HaLevi also believes that the Jewish people, by virtue of their unique relationship to the Divine, have a unique history, one not governed completely by the normal processes of historical causality. Kingship is significant in a system geared to these normal processes of history, and the very adoption by Israel of the monarchy from foreign sources ('That we may be like all the nations'—Samuel 8:20) was a point probably not lost on HaLevi. The significant, causal, factors for Jewish history, on the other hand, were nearness to God or alienation from Him. And these factors are embodied in prophet and priest, the custodians of a religious nationalism.

Conclusion

All the problems discussed in this paper have been studied within the Jewish tradition. Indeed, none of the concepts which have emerged are unknown to that tradition, none are alien to its basic structure or early literary sources. The various institutions—king, priest, prophet, exilarch, patriarch, court—are all products of early Jewish history, and the Bible and the Talmud are clearly aware of (and sometimes specify) their differentiated roles and the problems of their conflict or cohesion. The tradition also knows the distinction between the political and the spiritual, however much Biblical and rabbinic Judaism believe in the imperative of an organic synthesis between these two realms.

Yet the fact remains that our Jewish theorists lived and wrote in a cultural context which had a profound interest in precisely the issues we have noted. Both Christianity and Islam passionately discussed—and perhaps magnified—the competing claims of the political and the spiritual realms. Were Jewish theorists awakened to the implications—as well as the problems—of their tradition by the extensive debates raging, often with great public resonance, in their sister communities? The conflict between *regnum* and *sacerdotium*, and the need to balance these two realms according to the theory of one camp or the other, were international concerns of the first order.[32] Do the dualisms of ibn Daud and R. Nissim reflect this fact? The rule of the calif—the power vested in the sovereign to violate the ideal law of the *shari'ah* in its rigorous requirements concerning witnesses to a crime, for example—was an issue discussed and resolved in Islam before the time of Maimonides.[33] Hence we might ponder to what degree the Jewish discussion must be read as part of the characteristic Christian and

Muslim medieval debate over the proper governance of society, and to what degree it was sharpened (if not shaped) by this debate, even as it developed the points of view most appropriate to its own spiritual resources.*

NOTES

[1] See Roland de Vaux, *Ancient Israel*, New York, 1961, pp. 150 ff.

[2] See Zacharias Frankel, *Die gerichtliche Beweis*, Berlin, 1846, pp. 41–42.

[3] Gerson Cohen, *The Book of Tradition by Abraham ibn Daud*, Philadelphia, 1967, pp. xxiv, xxxii, 296 ff, 301 ff. All further citations of *The Book of Tradition* are from Cohen's translation.

[4] ibid., pp. 25–25.

[5] Cf. Cohen, op. cit., p. 24, n. 151 and p. 116, n. 145. In its own terms, *The Book of Tradition* seemingly asserts here the superiority of the Patriarch over the Babylonian exilarch (who, I believe, does not appear in that book at all). In the Talmud (Sanhedrin 5a) exilarchic priority is the rule, but attempts to achieve a Palestine-oriented version are known: see Chaim Taubes, ed., *Ozar HaGa'onim, Sanhedrin*, Jerusalem, 1966, pp. 28–30; and Aaron Greenbaum, ed., *Commentary of R. Samuel b. Hofni to the Torah* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1979, p. 355, n. 177. See also M. Klein, 'Ibn Daud as Historian' (in Hebrew), *HaZofe LeHochmat Israel*, vol. V, 1921, p. 97.

[6] Cohen, op. cit., p. 25, n. 131.

[7] ibid., pp. 8, 150, 209–10.

[8] Ibn Daud takes the Hasmonean monarchy quite seriously in his *Dibray Malkay Bayyit Sheni* (*History of the Kings of the Second Temple*), Mantua, 1514. The Hasmonean kings are called 'kings of grace' and 'kings of faith' (49b). The divisive warfare between Aristobolus and Hyrcannus is likened to the activities of Jeroboam in sundering Israel and Judah (ibid.), and Alexander Jannaens is called 'God's anointed' by Pharisaic sages (35b)—none of which is present in ibn Daud's major source, *Josippon*. The summary given of Herod's (!) life is also much more positive than the parallel in *Josippon* (43b). Indeed the very title of the work betokens the legitimacy of these monarchs in ibn Daud's eyes: cf. Cohen, op. cit., p. xxxv, n. 88. See also ibid., pp. 170–71, 230 ff; and H. H. Ben-Sasson, 'The Jewish People in the Eyes of Twelfth-Century Authors' (in Hebrew), *Peraqim* II, ed. S. Rosenthal, Jerusalem, 1971, pp. 166–67.

[9] Cohen, op. cit., p. 116, n. 129.

[10] Sanhedrin 18b–19b. Cf. n. below.

[11] *H. Sanhedrin* I, 3 (trans. A. Herschman).

[12] *Responsa*, ed. J. Blau, Jerusalem, 1958, I, pp. 191–99, no. 111; III, p. 139, no. 462.

[13] Ibn Daud speaks of R. Simeon ben Gamliel as *Nasi Israel* (*Dibray* ..., op. cit., 49a) = Patriarch *of Israel*, as distinct from *Rosh*—that is, 'Head'—of the Academy. But for Maimonides the *Nasi* is chief of the Sanhedrin, not of

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the Jewish people. Cf. also Maimonides's *Sefer HaMitzvot*, Negative Commands, 316.

[14] Sanhedrin 5a.

[15] *H. Sanhedrin*, 4, 14. The Davidic ancestry of the exilarch is explicit in the *Commentary to the Mishnah, Bekhorot* 4, 4. In the *Code* Maimonides avoids an explicit commitment; Judah here may mean the Jewish people. But the Talmudic reference to 'the sons of Hillel' is absent in both instances, though Maimonides clearly accepts the teaching role of the Patriarch as central to his identity (a sore point for ibn Daud, who reverses both the logic and the law of the Talmudic pericope: see note 5 above). This Talmudic reference is also absent in the *responsum* of his son R. Abraham on these questions, a *responsum* that lays bare the contemporary significance of the issue: *Responsa of R. Abraham ben HaRambam*, ed. Solomon Goitein, Jerusalem, 1938, no. 4, pp. 19ff. R. Abraham repeats and buttresses his father's position: Exilarch is parallel to king; *Nasi*=Head of the Academy 'who may or may not be a Hillelite', as is demonstrated by the existence of a non-Davidic *Nasi* (R. Elazar b. Azaryah; but see *The Book of Tradition*, op. cit., p. 27 lines 25–26 and Cohen's notes *ad loc*; *Bene Bathyra*). Other rabbinic—but not Talmudic—traditions on Genesis 49:10 do exist, indicating the subject is an old crux: cf. Moshe Beer, *The Babylonian Exilarchate* (in Hebrew), Ramat Gan, 1970, pp. 33ff.

[16] *H. Melakhim* 1, 7.

[17] Cf. note 15 above.

[18] *H. Sanhedrin* 2, 4–5.

[19] Cf. H. H. Ben-Sasson, 'Maimonides, The Intellectual as Leader' (in Hebrew), in *HaIshiyut VeHaRuah*, a collection of papers published by the Historical Society of Israel, Jerusalem, 1954, pp. 93–107.

[20] The manifold issues involved in Maimonides's political thought warrant a full-scale study, on which I am engaged.

[21] R. Nissim of Gerona, *Derashot HaRan*, ed. Leon Feldman, Jerusalem, 1974, pp. 189–92.

[22] Cited by R. Joseph Karo, *Bet Yosef to Hoshen Mishpat*, chapter 2. This is not an isolated ruling; see, for example, Kaufmann (note 23 below), p. 235.

[23] R. Solomon ibn Adret: cf. his *responsum* in David Kaufmann, 'Jewish Informers in the Middle Ages', *Jewish Quarterly Review* (O.S.), vol. VIII, 1896, pp. 228ff; (attributed to) R. Nissim to Sanhedrin 27b, 46a. The often cited comment of R. Moses of Hallawah to *Pesahim* 25a is not really germane; he merely asserts the *certainty* of monarchic punishment—not its legitimacy. For a discussion as to whether Maimonides granted such powers to a Gentile monarch, cf. Samuel Shiloh, *Dina DeMalkhuta Dina*, Jerusalem, 1975, pp. 270–72. It ought to be noted that R. Meir of Rothenberg supports ibn Adret's position by agreeing that informers ought to be handed over for punishment, but he is silent on ibn Adret's second point, that the Gentile king is generally authorized to administer capital punishment to Jews (Kaufmann, op. cit.). In general, discussion of whether *dina de-malkhuta* operates in religious matters, as well as fiscal, ought to consider the issue of punishment which, in Jewish law, operates on the 'religious' (*issura*) level.

[24] Cf. Menahem Elon, *HaMishpat HaIvri*, Jerusalem, 1975, I, 42–45.

[25] *H. Rozeah* 2, 4–5; *H. Melakhim* 3. 10; Sanhedrin 46a. Other, aggadic,

materials are not adequate sources for these rulings. Already Abarbanel objected to R. Nissim's reversed use of these sources in his commentary to Deut. 17:8–13.

[26] Nachmanidean influences are also at work.

[27] *Kuzari* II, 28 (trans. H. Hirschfeld).

[28] For Alfarabi, see Lawrence V. Berman, *Ibn Bajjah and Maimonides* (in Hebrew), Ph.D. thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1959; for Al-Ghazzali, see H. K. Sherwani, *Studies in Muslim Political Thought*, reprinted Philadelphia, 1977, pp. 152–53. This usage is common in the neo-Platonic tradition.

[29] *Moreh* I, 72 and perhaps *H. Melakhim* 3, 6; *Kuzari* IV, 25; *Midrash Hagadol, Genesis*, ed. Mordechai Margaliot, p. 330 (to Genesis 20:9). The Sanhedrin as the heart of Israel is found in *Midrash Eichach Rabbati, Petihta*, 16.

[30] As cited in Ibn Ezra's comment to that verse. It ought not to be thought, incidentally, that Halevi rejects the monarchy; on the contrary, the king is a powerful symbol in his poems and other passages in *Kuzari* testify to the king's important role (cf. II, 68; III, 31, 41; IV, 3; and especially III, 73 and I, 83).

[31] Ben-Sasson, 'The Jewish People....', op. cit., pp. 161–64, 194.

[32] Cf. a similar suggestion with regard to R. Eliezer of Beaugency in Ben-Sasson, ibid., p. 214. Thus see R. Menahem Me'iri, *Bet HaBehirah*, Sanhedrin (ed. A. Schreiber), Jerusalem, 1965, p. 58.

[33] See Norman N. Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law*, Edinburgh, 1964, pp. 132–33

BRITAIN AND THE JEWS OF EUROPE

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Review Article

SINCE the publication of E. H. Carr's significant Trevelyan Lectures on historiography we have become increasingly conscious of the dictum that before we know history we should know the historian.[1] No historian works in a vacuum and his or her role in the making of history is crucial. It is relevant, therefore, to point out at the beginning that Bernard Wasserstein's *Britain and the Jews of Europe* is written at the invitation of the Institute of Jewish Affairs, which together with Oxford University Press has also acted as publisher.[2] The result is a book which is clearly sympathetic to Jewish interests and aspirations.

But what is its theme? In answer to this and to set it in context, one might begin by referring to another, earlier book, A. J. Sherman's *Island Refuge. Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich 1933–39*, which was published in 1973.[3] In the course of this assessment of British policy towards refugees from Hitlerite persecution, it was argued that there were no simple answers and no obvious or rapid solutions to the problem. The civil servants who were entrusted with it had to balance the tradition of political asylum, which had deep roots in British culture, with the tension which might result from a sudden influx of aliens. In the calm waters of Victorian society, amidst a self-confident capitalism, an assured welcome could await alien refugees.[4] But as this confidence diminished in Britain at the beginning of the twentieth century and particularly after the world crisis and depression which cast its shadow over all the leading capitalist countries after 1929, reactions were more hesitant. In the 1930s unemployment was rife among professional as well as working-class groups and in such circumstances the influx of refugees produced a sensitive situation for civil servants and governments to handle. Under continuing pressure concessions were made which allowed for the admission of refugees and, taken as a whole, Britain's record towards those fleeing from the Third Reich was far more generous than that of many other countries.[5] Sherman's account of these developments ends in 1939; it is at this point that *Britain and*

the Jews of Europe picks up the story and proceeds to move the analysis forward to the war years.[6] Taken together, therefore, Sherman and Wasserstein provide a comprehensive analysis of British responses to the Jewish refugee problem and the Jewish fate in Europe generated by the policies of Nazi Germany.

In pursuit of this theme Wasserstein spreads himself over nine chapters, in the course of which he presents the following argument. As the restrictions on Jewish life in Germany mounted after the assumption of power by the National Socialists in 1933 and particularly after *Kristallnacht* on 9–10 November 1938, those Jews who could leave did not need much encouragement to depart from Germany, provided they could find a home elsewhere. For its part the German Government was anxious to cleanse Germany of its Jews and was quite prepared to export what it regarded as a major social problem. Indeed, from the autumn of 1938 it resorted to physical extrusion as a means of getting rid of Jews. As a result of such pressures one third of the Jews living within the expanded borders of the Reich—amounting to 360,000–370,000 altogether—had emigrated by 1939. Of these, 50,000 came to Britain, to what Sigmund Freud, one of the emigrants, called 'this strange country'.[7] But whenever an attempt was made to dispatch large numbers beyond the borders of the Reich every conceivable tactic was employed by the British Government to prevent the refugees becoming its responsibility. Hence its reluctance to admit them into the mandated territory of Palestine, Britain, or the Empire. Furthermore, those Jews who did manage to find a new home in Britain, as well as some long-standing German and Austrian residents, were subjected to a policy of internment which was introduced by the British Government in May 1940. Everyone from that part of the world was suspect. Consequently, in the course of the summer, the Government began to engage in the deportation of German and Austrian aliens.

Soon afterwards, events began to move in a different direction. After 1941 expulsion ceased to be a feature of German policy towards the Jews and with that decision taken, attempts were made to seal the escape routes. Even so, Jews tried to get away and, as before, the refugees found Britain unresponsive to their situation. Other countries also displayed little interest; for example, the Bermuda Conference of April 1943—'ten agreeable days of discussion' as one Foreign Office official described it[8]—revealed that the Americans were also lacking in dynamic resolution. Against this background it is hardly surprising to learn that the British reacted suspiciously to the proposals emanating from Hungary in 1944, which involved the freeing of some Jews who had previously been locked in occupied Europe. In line with this view, that Jewish sectional interests should not have a high priority, Whitehall fought a sturdy battle against the proposal for a Jewish Army. Furthermore, little support was given to Jewish resistance groups and

mandarins within the Foreign Office opposed the proposal to bomb Auschwitz.

Such in outline is the drift of events. Against this background certain matters call for extended discussion and we might note, first of all, that in presenting his account of developments Wasserstein has his own portrait gallery of heroes and villains and that prominent among the former is Churchill. It is stressed that he opposed the May 1939 White Paper which restricted Jewish immigration into Palestine, he consistently welcomed the initiative to form a Jewish Army to aid the Allied war effort, and the proposal to bomb Auschwitz enlisted his 'rapid and clear-cut support'.[9] In total, it is argued that Churchill's attitude towards the Jews was characterized by sympathy and compassion, but the effectiveness of his intervention was repeatedly blunted by the actions of his subordinates.[10] Many reviewers have been attracted to this portrait and have redrawn it in their own work. But this image does not tell everything. The internment of aliens, including Jewish refugees, was introduced as one of the first actions of Churchill's cabinet and the Prime Minister remained a leading advocate of the policy.[11] It also has to be recognized that Churchill was the instigator of the policy involving the deportation of refugees which began in June 1940.[12] And he was clearly concerned that such action should not be delayed. Hence his minute to the Cabinet Secretary on 3 June 1941 in which he wrote:[13]

> Has anything been done about shipping 20,000 internees to Newfoundland or St. Helena? Is this one of the matters that the Lord President has in hand? If so, would you please ask him about it. I should like to get them on the high seas as soon as possible, but I suppose considerable arrangements have to be made at the other end. Is it all going forward?

There is something almost indecent in this anxiety. In the light of this, we should be wary of the unqualified claim that Churchill's attitude towards the refugees was one of 'consistent sympathy',[14] that he always had 'the Jewish question close to his heart'[15] and that his stance was, in an unqualified sense, 'pro-Jewish'.[16] Indeed, Wasserstein does not fully tease out Churchill's attitudes towards Jews. His conversion to an interest in the issue of Jewish immigration, shown by his opposition to the legislation drafted against alien immigration in 1904–05—he virtually killed the 1904 Bill in its committee stage—was laced with a strong dash of political self interest. It is no accident that it occurred at a time when, through his connection with the Laski family, he had become Liberal parliamentary candidate for North West Manchester.[17] Furthermore, his acceptance of the idea of a Jewish conspiracy which was present in his article in the *Illustrated Sunday Herald* in 1920, which he later refused The Britons Publishing Company the right to reprint, is a further indication of his complex and changing attitudes towards Jews.[18]

If we are intent on seeking those whose hands were clean in their dealing with the Jewish Question we should be better advised to turn attention to R. T. E. Latham, who was a Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, a Barrister of Lincoln's Inn, and a temporary clerk in the Refugee Section of the Foreign Office General Department between 1939 and 1941. His record on the matters under consideration was second to none. By way of illustrating this, it might be noticed that early in 1940 the Colonial Office asked for the help of the Foreign Office in a deterrent measure. It had become known that a party of at least a thousand Jewish refugees—fleeing down the Danube—had found themselves blocked by ice on the river, as a result of which they were forced to remain at Kladovo in Yugoslavia. Here they were reported to be in dire straits and it was known that they had appealed to the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for aid. The Colonial Office suggested that some means should be found to prevent assistance reaching the refugees on the grounds that this would be tantamount to helping illegal immigrants towards Palestine. The suggestion was rejected by the Foreign Office, where, in a minute, Latham commented:[19]

> This time the C.O. is really carrying too far its policy of calling upon other Departments to do its dirty work ... American public opinion would protest against our inhumanity: 'You won't help these people yourselves; and now you won't let us help them'. In the spirit though not in the letter, American public opinion would be right. Such action on our part would savour of real malice against the refugees, more worthy of our enemies than of us.

Latham also condemned the 'pathetic policy of interning all male enemy aliens',[20] and in a memorandum compiled in the summer of 1940 wrote of a 'loss of faith' among German and Austrian refugees in Britain 'in all values, worse in its way than the demoralisation caused by German concentration camps, with which I am acquainted'.[21] Latham was particularly damning of MI5 when he accused them of 'lack of experience, lack of political judgement, stupidity and poor organization'.[22] But even Latham did not feel able in December 1940 to press for the admission of Jews from Luxembourg into Britain or the Empire. They were 'covered by the Home Office prejudice ... against people from enemy occupied territory'. It is also significant that Latham proceeded to state: 'Furthermore, these particular refugees, pitiable as is their plight, are hardly war-refugees in the sense that they are in danger because they have fought against the Germans, but simply racial refugees'.[23]

But men such as Latham and Oliver Harvey, also of the Foreign Office, are exceptional figures in the drama.[24] For the most part those concerned with policy were quite unsympathetic to the Jewish case.

And it is the bureaucrats who draw most of the fire from Wasserstein. In this sense, he is adding to a mounting volume of criticism against officials who have had to deal with the problem of foreign nationals who came under British control as a result of the war. One is reminded of the comments appearing in Nicholas Bethell's book, *The Last Secret*[25] and Nikolai Tolstoy's *Victims of Yalta*.[26] There is another link, too, with these analyses. Neither Bethell nor Tolstoy was allowed to consult all the official files on the repatriation of Russians after the Second World War and Wasserstein has also been restricted in his own work. By the 1958 Public Records Act, as amended in 1967, it is possible for the Government to close sensitive material under sections 3 and 5 of the Act for more than the usual 30 years. As a result, Wasserstein has been denied access to some Foreign Office documents. In the case of this particular department, files are either open or closed. Ministers, civil servants, and official historians are the only people who have access to such closed material, some of which might never be made public. As for the Home Office, one of the other departments most involved in the story, some files were also closed but thanks to the privileged access system which that particular department operates—whereby closed material can be made exceptionally available—Wasserstein was able to read through a certain number of such files, although this concession came too late to be reflected in his book.[27] However, the evidence which is generally available is in itself revealing. In Wasserstein's own words: 'The generous impulses of a small number of officials and politicians stand out from the documents mainly by virtue of their isolation amidst an ocean of bureaucratic indifference and lack of concern. The overall record leaves a profoundly saddening impression.'[28] It is such individuals, 'men with large desks and small consciences', as they have been described elsewhere,[29] who have been placed in the 'dock' and condemned by the actions and reflections which they themselves diligently recorded.

There are two particular incidents which need to be noticed in this connection. The first involved the refugee ship, the *Struma*. In December 1941, 769 Roumanian Jews, with tickets to Palestine but without Palestine immigration certificates, left Roumania in the *Struma* which was flying the Panamanian flag. In February 1942 the ship exploded off Istanbul, with the loss of all but one of those on board.[30] The root cause of the disaster was the German terror. The Roumanian Government which had persecuted those on board and then refused to take them back into the country also bore some responsibility, as did the Turkish Government which in all its dealings displayed little concern for what happened to the passengers. But we need to go beyond this point and consider, in addition, the role of the Colonial Office and the Government of Palestine. A communication by the British Ambassador in Ankara to the refugees, suggesting that those who managed

to gain illegal entry to Palestine might receive humane treatment, led to a blast from the Colonial Office on his 'absurdly misjudged humanitarian sentiments'; indeed, Lord Moyne, the Colonial Secretary, found it 'difficult to write with moderation' about such behaviour.[31] As for the Government of Palestine, Sir Harold MacMichael, the High Commissioner, took an active personal interest in the matter and played a crucial role in pressing the view that there could be no admittance to Palestine. All told, although the immigration restrictions on entry into the mandated territory were modified temporarily in the wake of the disaster, the incident proved to be a running sore in relations between the British and the Zionists and versions of the tragedy provided part of the ideological justification for the terrorist movements which emerged among the *Yishuv* in the later years of the war.[32]

The second major incident which revealed the power of the Civil Service concerned the proposal to bomb the extermination camp at Auschwitz. The prospect was raised by the Jewish Agency at a meeting with the Foreign Office in the summer of 1944. It was accepted that the direct effect of bombing might not be great but it was suggested that it would have a significant moral, political, and psychological impact.[33] The plan secured the support of Eden and Churchill almost at once and the former was soon in touch with the Secretary of State for Air. The reply from the latter, which came after a week, was cautious on practical grounds and it was also believed that the Americans might be unwilling to help.[34] From that point the matter was not pursued with any sense of urgency by Foreign Office officials, but on 13 August the Air Ministry requested topographic data of camps and installations in the Birkenau area. The response of the Foreign Office to this was to suggest to the Jewish Agency that in view of the reported halt to deportations from Hungary (which had been one of the reasons why the original request for action had been made) the Zionists might wish to withdraw their request for the raid. The Zionists replied that the reasons for bombing remained valid and they also secured plans and descriptions of the Auschwitz and Treblinka camps. At this point the Foreign Office blocked developments. The plans and descriptions were not forwarded to the Air Ministry: they were consigned to the Foreign Office files.[35] Following this, a minute was prepared for the Secretary of State which outlined the history of the scheme and stressed that the deportations of Jews from Hungary had been halted. The minute suggested that in the circumstances—that is, the apparent cessation of the deportations but most of all because of the great technical difficulties involved—it might be considered advisable to inform the Secretary of State for Air that the scheme should not be pursued. The minute made no reference to the Air Ministry's request for topographic data, nor to the fact that the data had been received and withheld by the Foreign Office. As Wasserstein says: 'The result

was a striking testimony to the ability of the British civil service to overturn ministerial decisions: although it had secured the explicit backing of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, the scheme was rejected'.[36] Auschwitz *could* have been bombed: on 13 September 1944 the Americans attacked the I. G. Farben industrial complex adjacent to the camp from bases in Italy.[37] It also turns out that although the Foreign Office was correct in its claim that the despatch of Jews from Hungary to Auschwitz had stopped in July 1944, deportations were in fact continuing from other areas. It is unclear, however, how much hard evidence the Foreign Office had on this.[38]

In discussing the proposal to bomb Auschwitz, one reviewer has commented that Wasserstein has overlooked two facts. First of all, the issue arose at a time when the Allied strategic bomber forces had been largely diverted from attacks on Germany and eastern Europe in order to achieve a concentrated bombardment of the roads and railways in France and to support the Allied invasion in Normandy. Secondly, it was noted that the headquarters of General Eisenhower had command of strategic air force operations in the summer of 1944 and therefore ultimate approval for the raid was dependent on this source. In a full and rounded discussion of the proposal these avenues would need to be explored. However, neither detracts from the essential point being made here about the obstructive role of the Foreign Office.[39]

It needs to be mentioned at this point, however, that whereas many reviewers of the book have referred to the machinations of the Civil Service, and lumped together departmental reactions to the fate of European Jewry, the situation reveals a deeper complexity than this. A close examination of the evidence highlights the fact that on a number of occasions there were serious differences of opinion between departments. For instance, when the Colonial Office proposed in February 1940 the forfeiture of ships carrying illegal immigrants to Palestine and fines and imprisonment on the owner, agent, or master of such vessels, as well as on the immigrant passengers, this was criticized by a legal adviser of the Foreign Office, as 'rather a pathetic commentary on the Palestine authorities and particularly on the judicial authorities'.[40] Tensions also occurred between the Foreign Office and the Home Office over the issue of internment, as when Sir Robert Vansittart, Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Foreign Office, criticized the Home Office for having interned only males: 'This is just silly,' he commented. 'The females are often quite as dangerous; sometimes more dangerous. Experience in Holland showed that.'[41] Soon afterwards by contrast, we have already noted that R. T. E. Latham of the Foreign Office was critical of MI5 and the Home Office because their internment policy had been pushed too far and Latham's indictment claimed considerable support in the Foreign Office.[42] In general, however, even if there are dangers in lumping all policy makers together,

civil servants and Ministers displayed an unsympathetic reaction to the fate of the Jews and we might now try to explain why there was a reluctance to take refugees, why the internment and deportation of aliens became official policy during the war, and why Jews received little specific help in the fight against Germany.

First of all, attitudes towards the entry of refugees into Palestine were influenced by the 1939 White Paper, issued a few months before the outbreak of the War, which, *inter alia*, laid down that between 1939 and 1945 only 75,000 Jewish immigrants would be admitted to Palestine. From that point onwards there was a fierce determination in the Colonial Office to keep immigration under strict control. After all, it was argued, Britain needed to take account of more than just Jewish interests in the Middle East. The strategic and economic value of the area to Britain meant that on a wider view Arab interests also had to be considered.[43] This approach, which marked a new departure in British policy, was defensible from a national point of view. But it did not justify the niggardly administration of the policy adopted towards Jewish refugees which developed after 1939, as a result of which the numbers actually allowed to enter Palestine fell below the limits set by the White Paper.[44]

But it was not simply entry into Palestine which was at issue. Contrary to what has been claimed by John Marlowe and Christopher Sykes, Zionists were prepared to accept settlement in places other than Palestine and co-operated with the British Government to this end.[45] The fact that Britain did not absorb more refugees is roundly and rightly condemned and gives substance to the charge of bureaucratic myopia which has been levelled at Britain's treatment of the refugee problem. 'Given a modicum of political will, places [could have] been found for many hundreds of thousands.'[46] Or, as another reviewer has written, Wasserstein's case does not rest on the rights and wrongs of Middle East policy, 'it is with the British resistance to accepting Jewish refugees anywhere in the Empire and especially in Britain itself that the gravamen lies'.[47] But when the prospect was raised of the entry of refugees into Britain or the Empire it was met by a counter argument which turned upon the scale of possible future movement. A fear of the flood was frequently exploited. In other words, great emphasis was placed upon the numbers of refugees who might be drawn towards British territory if any leniency were shown. The rationalization is of course quite familiar. At the time of the great Jewish immigration from Russia, anxiety was expressed about the country being swamped by newcomers. Hence the appearance of imagery such as 'invasion' and 'flood' in the vocabulary of those who suffered, in Charles Booth's words, from 'visions of Oriental hordes of barbarians, streaming in like Huns and Vandals'.[48] Similar views were also expressed in the early 1930s, when the refugees from Hitlerite persecution began to arrive;

hence the *Daily Mail* could emphasize that once it was known that there was a sanctuary in Britain, 'the floodgates would be opened and we should be inundated by thousands seeking a home'.[49] It was this kind of fear which was invoked again between 1939 and 1945. Such emphases are not, of course, exclusive to debates over a Jewish presence. Contemporary immigration policy in Britain is justified on similar grounds, and critics of an immigrant presence have argued that 'the issue ... of numbers' is crucial to the whole debate.[50]

As for the policies of internment and deportation which affected Jewish aliens in Britain who had fled from the Reich, these have to be set against the background of xenophobia and national paranoia occasioned by the war. If Wordsworth and Coleridge walked the countryside at night during the Revolutionary Wars, they were French spies. In the Great War, possession of a dachshund could result in its owner being equated with a German spy and men of eminence from a German background were pressurized to prostrate themselves before the British public and write 'loyalty letters' to *The Times*. Hence we should not be surprised that 'a group of C.I.D. men walked into Hampstead Public Library at 1.30 p.m. on 13 July [1940] and asked all Germans and Austrians to leave with them'. The 'bizarre episodes' and 'absurdities' which Wasserstein notes between 1939 and 1945 possess a more general currency.[51]

As regards the limited involvement and help in issues of specific Jewish concern during the war, the other major theme of the book, this has to be related primarily to the British Government's resolve that, within the context of the total war effort, aid to the Jews of Europe was regarded as a low priority which had to give way to 'inexorable strategic realities'.[52] In other words, there was a clash of priorities between Jews and the British Government. And official British policy could be pursued with rigour since 'The support of the Jews for the Allied cause could be taken for granted and therefore required no additional stimulation from the British Government'; or as one perceptive Foreign Office minute expressed it in 1941, 'When it comes to the point, the Jews will never hamper us to put the Germans on the throne'.[53] It would be difficult to disagree with the British Government's view that the major priority in the war was to crush Germany. But the pursuit of this did not necessarily mean that Jews could not have been given more assistance. One can understand that the training of a Jewish Army, including recruits from Palestine, might be viewed with caution by the Colonial Office. After all, such personnel might after the war turn their guns on British troops in the Middle East. But did it make sense, within the context of the war aims, to neglect Jewish resistance movements?[54] And if it were possible to bomb the Farben complex at Auschwitz, did not the request to attack the extermination camp deserve a more attentive hearing? The problem was that such

issues—pursuit of the war, attentiveness to Jewish interests—were usually regarded in Whitehall in either/or terms.

But, even after these emphases, there is still a missing link in this attempt to explain policy and I believe that to round off any analysis of the developments we have been considering, we need to take account of the cultural antipathy towards Jews which was present in British society. Wasserstein is correct in his refusal to regard antisemitism alone as the force behind British policy but, in making this point, he runs the risk of underplaying its significance.[55] Antisemitism comes in various guises, of course, and there is clear evidence that in the form of a cultural antipathy towards Jews such hostility was at work in the circumstances we have been describing.[56] An awareness that this sentiment existed in Britain lay behind the tension displayed by Anglo-Jewish agencies. Hence the Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Board of Deputies could express strong concern during the war at what he described as 'the thoughtless behaviour of so many of them [the refugees] in areas where they are concentrated namely Golders Green, Hampstead, North London etc.' Furthermore, it was from similar motives that the policy of dispersal of the refugees was undertaken by Jewish organizations.[57] Such sentiments and behaviour constituted an echo of the Board's activity at the time of the great immigration from Russia when an emphasis was placed upon Jews remaining in eastern Europe or, if they must come to this country, on their becoming Englishmen as soon as possible.[58] We are also reminded of the pre-war responses to the refugees from Nazi Germany when, among other things, they were provided by the Board with copies of *While you are in England. Helpful Information and Guidance for Every Refugee*, which gave advice on practical matters and provided the newcomers with a code of conduct which, it was hoped, would help to reduce their 'visibility'.[59] But, if we return to the war years, it was not only the Jewish community which worried about the possible tension which an influx of Jews might trigger off. Herbert Morrison, the Home Secretary, also displayed anxiety on this score and some of this was almost certainly related to Morrison's view that antisemitism could easily be sparked off unless Jews were 'super correct' in their conduct—a special obligation which Morrison thought they should bear.[60] And confirmation that Jews were indeed regarded as a special class of immigrant is shown by the evidence that it *was* possible in the summer of 1940, when it was regarded as inopportune to admit further Jewish refugees, to consider the possibility of admitting 300,000 Dutch and Belgians.[61]

As for the proposals put forward to help Jews in occupied Europe, these had to contend with a strain of antisemitism in the Foreign Office.[62] Jews could expect little sympathy, for instance, from the Secretary of State. Anthony Eden could murmur in the ear of Oliver Harvey, 'I prefer Arabs to Jews' and in stronger terms Harvey, Eden's

private secretary, could record: 'Unfortunately A.E. is immovable on the subject of Palestine. *He loves Arabs and hates Jews*' [my emphasis].[63] Furthermore, A. R. Dew, head of the Southern Department of the Foreign Office, could comment on suggestions by the Board of Deputies, urging measures to help Jews in Hungary and Roumania: 'In my opinion, a disproportionate amount of the time of this office is wasted in dealing with these wailing Jews.'[64] In similar vein, in a discussion of propaganda matters, A. Walker could refer dismissively to the 'air for the Jew String'.[65] There was a fundamental antipathy towards Jews underlying these remarks and it was a sentiment which could not only support the reluctance to help Jews in occupied Europe but could also allow an official to comment, without apparent concern, 'I shouldn't be much surprised if there was a good bit of antisemitism in the British army.'[66]

Of course there are those whose horizons are limited by the world of high politics who have been prepared to dismiss the presence of antisemitism in British society and to consign it to a lunatic fringe. And there are those who have built on this and referred to an acceptable level of antisemitism in Britain, on the assumption that there are cranks in every society and that they are without influence.[67] But, in fact, antisemitism, in an amorphous, unco-ordinated form, has always been generously present in Britain and, if it has for the most part remained a private rather than a public matter in the world of high politics, it is because the interests of Jews and the state have been seen to hang together, without conflict.[68] Where this was not regarded as the case—as in certain incidents with which Wasserstein is concerned—private views could underwrite government policy, even if the major dynamic came from a perceived clash of interests which would have existed in the absence of such sentiments. It is of course open to speculation whether officials would have condemned themselves out of their own pens if, at the time, they had not believed that their comments were to be shielded from the public gaze for 50 years.

I suggested at the beginning that Wasserstein does not hold a neutral position. He is, in the words of one critic, 'frankly partisan' although 'trying his utmost to be fair'.[69] There is, indeed, hardly a neutral position on the issues which he describes and the historian who wrote to please everyone would satisfy nobody. There are also those who claim that there is little that is new in the analysis even though he has 'brought all the facts together in a way which revives agonised memories'.[70] But this is too mean and grudging. A careful reading of the book does cast doubt on some previous interpretations and condemns others. And no-one has combed the archives with greater diligence.[71] It is more fitting to describe *Britain and the Jews of Europe* as a 'melancholy, moving and generally excellent book',[72] diligently researched and written with passion beneath its surface calm. It is a

worthy successor to Sherman—it is indeed a more rounded book—and the Vietnamese refugees, who were very much in the public mind when Wasserstein's book was published,[73] will be fortunate if they find a chronicler of similar quality.

NOTES

[1] E. H. Carr, *What is History?*, London, 1961.

[2] Bernard Wasserstein, *Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939–1945*, x+389 pp., Oxford, 1979, £7.95.

[3] A. J. Sherman, *Island Refuge: Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich 1933–1939*, London, 1973.

[4] See the recent study by Bernard Porter, *The Refugee Question in Mid-Victorian Politics*, Cambridge, 1979, chapter 7.

[5] Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 7.

[6] For a wider perspective, see Malcolm J. Proudfoot, *European Refugees: 1939–1951*, London, 1957; Arthur D. Morse, *Why Six Million Died*, New York, 1968; and Henry L. Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust 1938–1945*, New Brunswick, N.J., 1970.

[7] See E. L. Freud, ed., *The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Arnold Zweig*, London, 1970, p. 164.

[8] Noted in Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 201.

[9] ibid., p. 311.

[10] ibid., p. 345.

[11] ibid., p. 87.

[12] ibid., p. 96. See also the letter in the *New Statesman*, 31 August 1979, on Churchill's attitudes towards the refugees.

[13] Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 96.

[14] As suggested in a review of Wasserstein, in *The Spectator* (Hamilton, Ontario), 8 August 1979.

[15] David Pryce Jones in the *New Statesman*, 24 August 1979.

[16] *The Scotsman*, 26 July 1979.

[17] John A. Garrard, *The English and Immigration. A Comparative Study of the Jewish Influx 1880–1910*, London, 1971, p. 122.

[18] See Winston S. Churchill, 'Zionism versus Bolshevism. A struggle for the Soul of the Jewish People', *Illustrated Sunday Herald*, 8 February 1920. Correspondence relating to the prospect of reprinting the article is in the archives of The Britons. For a general introduction to Churchill's attitudes towards Jews, see Oscar K. Rabinowicz, *Winston Churchill on Jewish Problems*, Westport, Conn., 1974.

[19] Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 58.

[20] ibid., p. 95.

[21] ibid., p. 102.

[22] ibid., p. 103.

[23] ibid., p. 109.

[24] For Harvey's views, see ibid., pp. 117, 147–48. Latham was an Australian, the son of a High Court judge; he was killed in action in 1943—shot down off Norway. See in *The Times* of 24 October 1978 the article by Peter Hennessy on the internment of enemy aliens during the Second World War.

[25] Nicholas Bethell, *The Last Secret*, London, 1974.
[26] Nikolai Tolstoy, *Victims of Yalta*, London, 1977.
[27] Personal information from Bernard Wasserstein.
[28] Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 345.
[29] *New Society*, 23 August 1979.
[30] Wasserstein, op. cit., pp. 143–53, covers the incident. See also the *Sunday Times* colour magazine, 9 March 1980; Nicholas Bethell has traced the *Struma*'s sole survivor and interviewed him.
[31] Quoted in Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 145.
[32] ibid., pp. 154 ff.
[33] ibid., p. 310.
[34] ibid., p. 312.
[35] ibid., pp. 313–16.
[36] ibid., p. 316.
[37] ibid., p. 318.
[38] ibid., p. 319. Wasserstein implies that the Foreign Office was aware that deportations were still taking place, but he presents no evidence in support of this.
[39] Points made by Telford Taylor in his review in the *New York Times Book Review*, 7 October 1979.
[40] Quoted in Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 59.
[41] Quoted in ibid., p. 88.
[42] See above p. 62.
[43] See the heavy emphasis on this in T. R. Fyvel's review in the *Jewish Chronicle*, 27 July 1979. For comment additional to Wasserstein on the situation in Palestine see Nicholas Bethell, *The Palestine Triangle*, London, 1979. Financial inducements were also used to obtain Arab sympathy. See Peter Hennessy's article, 'Lawrence's secret Arabian "slush fund"', in *The Times*, 11 February 1980, based on Treasury files which, after 50 years, have just been released in the Public Record Office.
[44] Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 349, notes that by the end of the war the quota of 75,000 immigrants allowed for in the 1939 White Paper had not been reached. For additional comment see Zara Steiner in the *Financial Times*, 4 August 1979 and David Pryce Jones in the *New Statesman*, 24 August 1979.
[45] The alleged insistence on Palestine appears in John Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate*, London, 1959, and Christopher Sykes, *Cross-Roads to Israel*, London, 1965. For evidence on Zionist acceptance of other areas, see Wasserstein, op. cit., pp. 65, 73, 346–47.
[46] Nicholas Bethell in the *Sunday Telegraph*, 29 July 1979.
[47] David Pryce Jones in the *New Statesman*, 24 August 1979.
[48] Quoted by Victor Kiernan in Colin Holmes, ed., *Immigrants and Minorities in British Society*, London, 1978, p. 53.
[49] Quoted in Sherman, op. cit., p. 94.
[50] See Bill Smithies and Peter Fiddick, *Enoch Powell on Immigration*, London, 1969, p. 68. For a more general discussion on the influence of numbers on policy see Gary P. Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies. The French and British Experience 1945–1975*, Princeton, N.J., 1979.
[51] Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 91. One wishes that in his survey of the Home Front (chapter 3) Wasserstein had drawn more parallels with the situation in

the First World War. On this see Colin Holmes, *Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876–1939*, London, 1979, chapter 8.

[52] Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 352.

[53] ibid.

[54] ibid., p. 349, notes the lack of assistance afforded to Jewish resistance groups. In this connection Wasserstein remarks on the difference between British responses to the uprising in the Warsaw ghetto in 1943 and the general rising in the city in the following year (p. 355). And this is emphasized in the *Jewish Echo*, 27 July 1979. But elsewhere in his book (p. 305) Wasserstein reveals that in 1943 major technical problems stood in the way of granting assistance to the ghetto fighters. For more recent comment on the relations between Special Operations Executive (SOE) and Jewish resistance groups, see David Stafford, *Britain and European Resistance 1940–1945*, London, 1980, pp. 179–81.

[55] Wasserstein, op. cit., pp. 351–52.

[56] *The Guardian*, 2 August 1979, touches on this but does not develop the point.

[57] All from Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 92.

[58] The best study remains Lloyd P. Gartner, *The Jewish Immigrant in England 1870–1914* London, 1960.

[59] Holmes, *Anti-semitism* ..., op. cit., p. 202.

[60] See Wasserstein, op. cit., pp. 115–16. For more information on Morrison's views see Colin Holmes, 'East End Anti-Semitism, 1936', *Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History*, no. 32, Spring 1976, pp. 26–33.

[61] Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 132.

[62] Gisela Lebzelter, *Political Anti-Semitism in England 1919–1939*, London, 1979, p. 177, suggests that the Foreign Office discriminated against Jews in its recruitment policy. If true, this in itself is significant.

[63] Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 34.

[64] ibid., p. 351.

[65] ibid., p. 297. Zara Steiner in the *Financial Times*, 4 August 1979, regards Walker as a humane voice in the debate.

[66] Wasserstein, op. cit., p. 93.

[67] See John Vincent's review of four books on antisemitism (including Wasserstein's) in *The Times Higher Education Supplement*, 16 November 1979. His review was headed: 'An acceptable level of Anti-semitism'.

[68] See Holmes, *Anti-Semitism* ..., op. cit., chapters 7, 12, 13, and 14.

[69] *The Scotsman*, 24 July 1979.

[70] *Jewish Chronicle*, 27 July 1979.

[71] See Vincent's remarks in *The Times Higher Education Supplement*, 16 November 1979.

[72] Telford Taylor in the *New York Times Book Review*, 7 October 1979.

[73] See the article by Wasserstein in the *Jewish Chronicle*, 3 August 1979, for his assessment of the differences in the circumstances of the contemporary Vietnamese refugees and the Jewish refugees of 1939–45.

BOOK REVIEWS

EVA ETZIONI-HALEVY, *Political Manipulation and Administrative Power: A Comparative Study*, x+218 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979, £8.95.

Eva Etzioni-Halevy is concerned with the role of tangible pay-offs in elections and administrative agencies. To what extent do elections, government jobs, and public services depend on favours rendered outside the formal rules? What features of a society produce inclinations towards the use of tangible rewards in politics and government? In other words, why are some democracies more than others governed by patronage? Etzioni-Halevy seeks to answer this question by comparing Great Britain, Australia, the United States, and Israel in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The author draws her theoretical cues from many sources. She contrasts theories of social dominance based on economic class with those based on political elites. Her references range from the intellectual classics of the nineteenth century to contemporary political scientists like James Scott and Arnold Heidenheimer. Central to her analysis is the distinction between material and symbolic inducements. To her, symbolic inducements are the legitimate stuff of ideology and party platform. Material inducements may be legitimate in democratic politics if they are of 'macro' character and are offered to collectivities. The problem for democracies lies in the 'micro-material inducements'—money, jobs, and other favours—which are offered to individuals in exchange for political support.

The author considers several factors which may incline polities to micro-material inducements. Scott's work is one important point of departure, suggesting the importance of poverty, a lack of strong ideological commitments, or social disorganization owing to heavy immigration. Heidenheimer is another point of departure, in suggesting that electoral patronage reflects the development of legislatures and political parties before the development of a strong civil service.

Secondary materials provide the wherewithal for Etzioni-Halevy's analysis. They lead her to reject interpretations of patronage based on the dominance of economic class, as well as those of Scott and Heidenheimer. For her, the values of political elites—especially those in public administration—are most important in explaining the use of patronage.

She also demonstrates—often implicitly—the importance of each country's particular national experience for the rise or fall of micro-material inducements.

Country-by-country chapters on patronage in elections and government offices are thorough and useful descriptions of the present and the relevant historical stages in each setting. She describes electoral politics and government in Great Britain and Australia as once substantially affected by patronage, but now largely free of it. The United States remains a mixed case, with patronage important in some settings but largely absent from others. Of her four cases, Israel shows the greatest use of patronage in recent years.

The chapters on Israel are the liveliest and seem to be the best informed by the author's intimate knowledge. They also serve most often to challenge the theses of Scott and Heidenheimer—that patronage comes where the population weakly holds to ideology, or where the electoral system predated a strong bureaucracy. Unfortunately, the story of Israel stops just at the point where things become most interesting for the analysis—when for the first time, in 1977, a new coalition of parties gets control of the state and its material rewards.

Etzioni-Halevy's analysis is persuasive, but it is not without problems. Most striking is the author's lack of concern for principles of probability in comparative analysis. With only four national cases, she can do little more than raise questions about the utility of general theses, or suggest the prospect of new theory. Too often she implies much more—that she has disproven the work of other authors and put her own on a superior footing. Her sample is hardly up to such claims. The nearly exclusive reliance on secondary sources presents further problems. For some important issues, she relies on old textbooks written for undergraduate courses in political science. Chapter 22 of Ferguson and McHenry's *The American Federal Government* (1950 edition), for example, is not an impressive source for the important points which rest upon it in Etzioni-Halevy's chapter on administrative power in the United States (her pp. 137, 139).

There is a lack of precision here and there. On p. 139 she states that Senator Moynihan 'refused to go along' with President Carter on a patronage issue. From what she writes, this reviewer cannot understand what new powers that phrase attributes to a member of the Senate. In the same chapter, the author variously separates and mixes reports about patronage at national, state, and local levels of the United States so that it is difficult to keep the pictures clear. At one point 'the Nixon administration', and at another point 'a presidential election year', are used as time references for events which may have occurred largely in state and local government arenas (pp. 140–41).

The most useful sections of the book are the chapters which describe and explain patronage in the elections and administrations of four

countries. These chapters also present some difficulties for the author's theoretical analysis. Most important to her, apparently, is the discovery of general patterns to explain the use of patronage. Most convincing, however, are her reports of peculiar events and combinations of events in each country's history which explain the appearance or decline of patronage.

IRA SHARKANSKY

BERNARD S. JACKSON, ed., *The Jewish Law Annual. Volume Two*, ix+ 270 pp. E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1979, 84 guilders. Published under the auspices of the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists and the Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies.

It is as well to recall the aims of this publication, as stated by its editor in the first volume: 'to promote research in Jewish Civil Law, to foster interest in the Jewish legal system amongst comparative lawyers and secularly-trained Jewish lawyers; and to provide a medium for communication between lawyers and students of halakha, and between Israel and the Diaspora'. The present volume, the bulk of which consists of a symposium on Codification and Restatement, serves these aims admirably; one only hopes that it will achieve the large readership it deserves, and in particular that the numerous 'secularly-trained' Jewish lawyers in the English-speaking world will seize this magnificent opportunity to become acquainted with Jewish law as a living force.

This is not to suggest that *The Jewish Law Annual* is in any sense an introductory work—on the contrary, it comprises specialized studies on a high academic level, and Dr Jackson is to be congratulated on the variety of expertise he has been able to call upon from such a distinguished panel of scholars from all parts of the world.

M. Chigier, in the opening study, provides a history of attempts to codify Jewish Law, from the Mishnah onwards, and concludes that none of these attempts—not even the Mishnah itself, or the great codes of Maimonides and Caro—really succeeded in imposing on Jewish Law the unity and finality one might expect from a code. Since Jewish Law is based on a revealed text, Chigier argues, only interpretation, and not novel legislation, is possible. But this need itself creates flexibility, for the constant textual study it demands conflicts with the dogmatic finality characteristic of a code. For the integration of Jewish Law within the law system of Israel it is not codification which is necessary or possible, but the extension of a freely-developing rabbinic jurisdiction in civil matters. But for such an extension to be possible restatements of Talmudic Law in terms applicable to the modern situation are necessary, and young rabbis must receive the sort of specialized halakhic training which will enable them to handle contemporary

situations competently. Chigier describes how both the publication of the restatements and the training of experts are undertaken at the Harry Fischel Institute for Talmudic Research, of which he is a distinguished member. The most useful part of his article is the excellent account of recent attempts to codify and restate Jewish Law.

Ze'ev Falk opens a short series of purely historical studies with an assessment of codificatory elements in the second century BCE Temple Scroll, recently published (in Hebrew) by Professor Yadin. Samuel Hoenig, following in the footsteps of Abraham Weiss, examines the structure of the *Halakhot Gedolot* (a ninth century collection of Jewish Law) without, however, discovering any overall formal plan. Professor Passamaneck contributes a useful research tool in the form of an index to the responsa underlying decisions of the *Hoshen Mishpat*—the section of *Shulkhan Aruch* dealing with Civil and Criminal Law.

The next few articles are of contemporary relevance, relating the problems of codification of Jewish Law to the special conditions of Israel today. Nahum Rakover, who is Advisor on Jewish Law to the Israel Ministry of Justice, describes the work of the Ministry's Department of Jewish Law. Israeli statutes explicitly indebted to Rabbinic Law include, apart from matters of personal status, the Agency Law (1965), the Bailees Law (1967) and the Restoration of Lost Property Law (1973); and it is likely that the laws on privacy and copyright will be revised in accordance with the recommendations, heavily influenced by Jewish Law, of the committee appointed for that purpose by the Ministry of Justice. The Advisor on Jewish Law participates on a regular basis in the legislative process of the Knesset. Rakover appends to his articles a list of his *Research on Jewish Law* Series (some of which are reviewed elsewhere in the *Jewish Law Annual*); these excellent studies, available from the Ministry of Justice, are instructive attempts to restate specific issues of Jewish Law in a manner that will facilitate their adoption or absorption in a modern legal code.

D. B. Sinclair and Menachem Slae describe the Jerusalem and Bar-Ilan attempts to index and thus render more easily accessible the vast store of legal and historical material in the responsa literature. Whereas at Jerusalem legal concepts are indexed, at Bar Ilan a computerized and highly comprehensive word-index is in the process of compilation, with due recognition of the different needs of the halakhic scholar and the lawyer.

Daniel Friedmann, Professor of Law at Tel Aviv University, examines trends towards codification in Israeli, rather than Jewish, Law. At the inception of the State there was no unitary law-system in operation, but 'layers' of legislation including Ottoman and British elements. (It is interesting to note that Israel thus became the only State to have recourse to the *mejelle*, Turkey herself having abrogated it in 1926 in favour of the Swiss Code!) This was obviously unsatisfactory both prac-

tically and ideologically. It was not felt practical at the time to adopt Jewish Law without modification; nor was it ideologically acceptable to adopt *in toto* any existing Western system. A pragmatic approach was therefore adopted, and since 1965 sixteen statutes have been enacted in the field of Civil Law, drawing as appropriate on Jewish as well as European sources; but this limited codification does not exclude recourse to pre-existing law, and is certainly not designed to inhibit creative interpretation by the judiciary—Friedmann indeed regards case-law rather than legislation as the most important achievement of the Israeli legal system, and finds the greatest value of such codification as has taken place in the elimination of inappropriate remnants of earlier, mainly Ottoman, legislation rather than in the creation of positive law.

The next section of the *Annual* is devoted to comparative law material on the subject of codification and restatement. John G. Fleming assesses the American 'Restatements' as a realistic alternative to a definitive legislative code. B. Beinart considers the special problems of codification and restatement in 'mixed jurisdictions'—that is, those, as in Israel, in which a civilian system of law has been overlaid by elements of English Common Law. He concludes that there is no haste for full codification, and that various 'sentiments', including national and religious ones, should be allowed a role in the fashioning of legal development, though legislators should not fear unduly the incorporation of foreign matter also. Like Friedmann, his view is strongly pragmatic.

The attempts of the Islamic States in recent times to establish their legal systems on the basis of the *Shari'a* are rich in examples both of the pitfalls and of the successes that can be expected in utilizing the *halakha* in the development of Israeli Law. David Pearl's concise account of Codification in Islamic Law, despite its wide compass, is sensitive to the issues involved, and also to the flexibility that Muslim jurists have shown in some countries in their approach to the different *Shari'a* traditions. *Halakha* has an inbuilt flexibility much greater than that of the *Shari'a*, and this should ease its adoption whether in whole or part.

M. D. A. Freeman analyses the concept of codification, concluding that codification, in the sense of an authoritative and comprehensive system in which all problems are solved, is an unattainable ideal, the quest for which springs from the desire for certainty, the desire to be ruled by clear laws rather than by the arbitrary exercise of human discretion.

Bernard Jackson, bringing the threads together in his 'personal summation', indicates the objectives of codification in the Jewish/Israeli context, the preparatory work necessary before codification can be undertaken, and the techniques to be used—for example, should the codification or restatement be whole or partial, presented dogmatically

or with commentary, eclectic or comprehensive in its use of sources, case- or principle-based? Dr. Jackson obviously desires such a codification of Jewish/Israeli Law, and he rightly insists that it should not inhibit future development of the law, but would assist immensely in its technical development, accessibility, and application.

The remainder of the *Jewish Law Annual* is a Chronicle. Current responsa, decisions of *Batei Din*, and recent rabbinic literature are reviewed, and a useful section contains reports of three recent Israeli High Court judgments in which traditional Jewish Law was invoked. Malcolm Shaw has contributed a note on the 'Certainty of Trusts and the Definition of a Jew' in English Law, with particular respect to the way in which trusts in partial restraint in marriage are affected by Race Relations legislation; other notes relate to recent cases of special Jewish interest in Europe and America.

The volume is well produced, accurately printed, and contains more Hebrew text than its predecessor. The price of 84 guilders seems more reasonable this year than last, and a substantial reduction is available to members of the International Association of Jewish Lawyers. One can look forward with confident expectation to next year's volume, on Unjust Enrichment, as well as to the supplementary volumes on *Modern Research in Jewish Law* and *Jewish Law in Legal History and the Modern World*, which may well be in print by the time this review appears.

NORMAN SOLOMON

ELIE KEDOURIE, ed., *The Jewish World. Revelation, Prophecy and History*, 328 pp., Thames and Hudson, London, 1979, £15.00.

The Jewish World is a superbly produced volume. Although it has no fewer than 436 illustrations (of which 125 are in colour) and '301 photographs, drawings and maps', it is not merely a coffee-table ornament. The editor is that rare type of scholar, one who can write lucidly and elegantly. In his short Introduction he notes recurrent themes in the history of the Jewish people. First, exile; Abraham is ordered to leave his land for another, where his descendants will be afflicted. Then came the Covenant between the Lord and the children of Israel, who are warned that if they do not follow all His commandments, they will suffer grievously and will be scattered 'from the one end of the earth even unto the other' (Deut. 28:64).

Another theme is that of the separateness of the Jewish people who, while neighbouring nations believed in the divinity of their monarchs, were exhorted to have reverence only for the Lord of Israel. When they nevertheless insist that Samuel give them a king so that they 'also may be like other nations', they are told again and again that kings can

rule unwisely and oppress their subjects. Throughout the Diaspora, the various scattered communities were taught the Written and the Oral Torah by their rabbis, who for centuries reminded them that they were the people chosen of God. And they remained apart.

There are six sections in this volume. The first is entitled 'A People and a Book', with a chapter on pre-Exilic Jewry by H. W. F. Saggs and one on the Bible by Hyam Maccoby. The second is on 'The Making of Jewry', with contributions by Zvi Yavetz on the Jews and the great powers of the ancient world, by Jacob Neusner on the Talmud, and by Amnon Shiloah on the ritual and music of the synagogue. The third part deals with the Jews under Christianity and Islam; Haim Beinart writes on the Jews in Spain, A. Grossman on those in Byzantium and medieval Europe, and S. D. Goitein and Amnon Cohen on the Jews under Islam. The fourth section is entitled 'The Inner World' and deals with Jewish philosophy (Arthur Hyman), Jewish mysticism (Zwi Werblowsky), and the Enlightenment (S. Ettinger). The fifth is on tradition and change; there is a chapter on Jewish literature (which should have been entitled 'Hebrew Literature') in which Ezra Spicehandler writes on fiction and T. Carmi on poetry. The next two chapters are by Lionel Kochan on European Jewry in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and by Oscar Handlin on American Jewry. The final section is entitled 'The Modern World: Constraint and Options'; Arthur Hertzberg writes on Judaism and modernity and David Vital on Zionism and Israel.

The contributions are scholarly; they inform the general reader in the style of very good introductory lectures. This is not surprising, since all the authors are teachers at various institutions in Israel (nine are associated with the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and two are at Tel Aviv University), Great Britain, and the United States. When the subject is a phase of Jewish history, or the Jews of Spain or of the United States, the writer probably does not have as many difficulties as when the field is that of Jewish philosophy or Jewish mysticism. What is remarkable is the skill with which Professor Hyman and Professor Werblowsky impart some of their knowledge in a few pages. The former tells us that Jewish philosophers were concerned with purely philosophic issues (such as categories of logic and the existence of God) as well as with purely Jewish issues (such as the prophecy of Moses and the conception of the Messiah). He then summarizes the doctrines of Philo, of medieval Jewish philosophers under the impact of Islam—Saadya Gaon, ibn Gabirol, ibn Pakuda, Yehuda ha-Levi, ibn Daud, and others—and dwells on Maimonides and his critics. In the last section of his article, on the Enlightenment and modernity, he explains that Jewish philosophers had to rethink some of their theological beliefs and briefly describes the principles of Moses Mendelssohn, Nachman Krochmal, Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, and Martin Buber.

(One wonders, incidentally, why so many of the later Jewish philosophers flourished in Germany.)

Zwi Werblowsky distinguishes between prophet and mystic, and observes that 'one of the curious paradoxes of mysticism is that, in spite of the quest or actual experience of reality that is said to be "ineffable", "unutterable" and "unspeakable", many mystics have left an immense body of writings' (p. 218). He unravels the concepts of the Kabbalah and explains that while a Christian or a Sufi mystic seeks *union* with God, the Jewish mystic seeks *communion*. The author then analyses Isaac Luria's kabbalistic 'mythology' and asserts that Lurianism is essentially a Messianic mysticism. This leads him smoothly on to Sabbatai Zevi, on whom he does not dwell—rightly referring the reader to Scholem's 'magisterial' work. Finally, he deals briefly with Hassidism—which in its earlier period made use of kabbalistic terminology—and deplores many of its later trends, 'the foolish superstitions that become part of every mass movement, the development of hereditary "dynasties" ... combined with a degenerate but presumptuous theory of "mediation"' (p. 223).

There are magnificent illustrations and prints, some of which the publishers assure us have never before been reproduced, and the captions are clear and informative. This is a volume to which one wants to return again and again.

J. FREEDMAN

WILLIAM E. MITCHELL, *Mishpokhe: A Study of New York City Jewish Family Clubs*, New Babylon: Studies in the Social Sciences, no. 30, 262 pp., Mouton Publishers, distributed by Walter de Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1978, DM37.

One of the many interesting aspects of the Museum of the Diaspora in Tel Aviv is to be found in the entrance—the long list of family and territorial associations which have contributed to the establishment of that museum's collections. The existence of such groups, and their distribution, is in itself part of the history of World Jewry.

Jews from eastern Europe formed these associations when they came to North America, but those who settled in other Western countries do not seem to have done so to any extent. There is certainly little evidence in Great Britain of this type of family association; the territorial *chevras* and benefit societies which appear fleetingly among the institutions of London's East End or of Manchester seem to have had little permanency. And yet they are vigorous in New York City and, to quote Dr. Mitchell, 'may be found in any big American city where Eastern European Jews settled in large numbers'.

Those who know the extended Jewish family (either from the inside

or the outside) will not be surprised to find that its members come together—or break apart—for the slightest of reasons. The traditional Jewish occasions for celebration and sorrow always bring a momentary resumption or remembrance of such ties. What is of great interest is the way in which Dr. Mitchell has demonstrated the creation of formally constituted groups to perpetuate these relationships. His work, over a period of nearly twenty years, has demonstrated the development of these groups, which originated in the early part of this century as an attempt to maintain the ties which helped the members of a family to come out of Russia, and which then a generation later worked to keep the cousins in contact with each other. This latter category of cousins had a significant element—the exclusion of the older immigrant generations.

Dr. Mitchell is to be congratulated on the lively presentation of a most striking phenomenon. The evidence he adduces—formal constitutions, official minutes of meetings, complicated financial records, club newsletters, and of course family genealogies—develops into an analysis of a strong manifestation of 'the family' and shows that it is still alive and kicking in this new form.

There is one question to which he does not appear to have addressed himself: why did that pattern develop in America but not, for example, in Great Britain? This variety of family group, either in its earlier or its later form, is obviously a reaction of the eastern Europeans to their American environment, and it would be of great value indeed to discover why their 'English' cousins—those who did not manage to cross the Atlantic—felt no need to establish such associations, and why family clubs came into being and endured on the East Side of New York and not in the East End of London.

AUBREY NEWMAN

ROLAND ROBERTSON, *Meaning and Change. Explorations in the Cultural Sociology of Modern Societies*, v+284 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1978, £8.85.

It is impossible to describe a book so rich, varied, and multi-layered as this. Professor Robertson is the peritus of the sociology of religion, observing the practitioners of that discipline as they take counsel together, and setting their activities in a wider context. His work is characteristically tertiary sociology, sociology for sociologists, sociology about sociologists, sociology about the relationship between sociologizing and the cultural environments in which the discipline operates.

This kind of work requires a wide perspective, both in engaging the kinds of sociological work current in the various enclaves of discussion (including the enclave of the mainstream) and in drawing upon the

rich thematic web of the classical sociologists. Such a wide perspective is undoubtedly present in everything which Professor Robertson writes. He refers, makes fresh comparisons, categorizes, distinguishes and sets local tendencies in a wide complicated landscape. He also brings relatively neglected parts of that landscape into view—for example, the 'civilizational' studies of Nelson, the work of Simmel on culture.

His concern is with the way classical sociology can illuminate the contemporary world, owing to the fact that it emerged on the brink of our modern set of problems. Like the classical sociologists he takes religion as a primary focus, but not as a domain shut off and neutered, one specialism among others. He wishes to set religion in relation to culture at large and the fragility of culture. That means a wide humanistic stance, embracing philosophy and history. He refers to it as a standpoint which insists on the salience of concern with life as well as with society, concern with the role of ideas and symbols and the transmission of historicity. The book is a sequence of 'monographic stabs' clustering around cultural authority and the increase in individuation.

Part One has, perhaps, a largely Weberian concern, beginning with 'Sociology and Socio-cultural Change', continuing with 'Weber, Religion and Modern Sociology' and 'Inner-Worldly Mysticism: Before and After Weber'. The next two chapters take up the problem of 'Civil Religion', in which Robertson begins to work out a typology of Individual/Society relationships based on France, the U.S.A., Germany, and England, and the problem of Conversion, which concludes with a powerful set of 'Dimensions of Conversion Processes'. The final chapters are by way of more particular pleas. They touch on the need to probe below the surface of belief in specific 'religious entities' and to compare the ways sociologists think with the ways 'ordinary mortals' think. In Britain for example it would be useful to deploy an in-depth ethnomethodological approach, as well as to set that off against historical trajectories and the broad historical profile of the society. The final essay on 'Biases in the Analysis of Secularization' includes a discussion of the options which exist in the relationship of sociology to religion. Robertson concludes that the confrontation with secularization brings the sociology of religion back to its former centrality in the discipline as a whole. That also is the effect of these concentrated monographs which are about central questions and conducted in a genuinely critical manner.

DAVID MARTIN

MELFORD E. SPIRO, *Gender and Culture: Kibbutz Women Revisited*, A volume in a series based on the Howard Eikenberry Jensen Lectures on Sociology and Social Action, xi+116 pp., Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1979, $9.75.

This short book is the third of Professor Spiro's kibbutz trilogy. In the first two (*Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia*, 1955, and *Children of the Kibbutz*, 1958), he pioneered the scientific investigation of the kibbutz and made the challenging peculiarities of its social system familiar to social scientists.

The present volume focuses on the sexual division of labour in the kibbutz. Spiro returned in 1975 to Kiryat Yedidim after twenty-five years, to find that the dramatic changes which had occurred in the intervening period made his earlier studies appear like historical documents. The young children whom he had studied with his wife were now fully mature adults living in an environment which had become remarkably transformed not only in technological but in social and psychological aspects.

He did not settle for a mere description of the profound changes which had taken place. He analyses them with an open mind, admits his earlier errors in his interpretation of the roles of kibbutz women, and in his concluding chapter (p. 106) he says that his findings forced upon him 'a kind of Copernican revolution' in his own thinking:

> As a cultural determinist, my aim in studying personality development in Kiryat Yedidim in 1951 was to observe the influence of culture on human nature or, more accurately, to discover how a new culture produces a new human nature. In 1975 I found (against my own intentions) that I was observing the influence of human nature on culture; alternatively, I was observing the resurgence of the old culture (in modern garb) as a function of those elements in human nature that the new culture was unable to change.

One must admire Spiro's intellectual integrity and his readiness to re-assess his theories openly; so many social scientists obstinately cling to their conclusions, refusing to alter them in spite of convincing contrary evidence.

In his first chapter, Spiro considers the concept of sexual equality. He distinguishes between the 'identity' meaning—according to which females must engage in occupations which are exactly the same as those of males—and the 'equivalent' meaning, according to which people are considered equal even when engaged in different activities so long as the latter are assessed as being of equivalent value. He shows that earlier kibbutz ideology favoured the 'identity' criterion; and since the kibbutzniks were cultural relativists, they believed that with the sheer force of their powerful ideology they would be able to dispense with sex as a criterion for the division of labour.

In 1975, he found that a counter-revolution had taken place: there was a polar sexual division of labour; the nuclear family had become a unit of central importance; and marriage was a religious ceremony contracted with great rejoicing and publicity. Spiro readily admits that others had already noted these changes and cites *Women in the Kibbutz* by Lionel Tiger and Joseph Shepher; but it is only fair to add that our book was published in 1975 and that by the time it reached Spiro, his fieldwork was almost completed.

The author distinguishes between the socio-cultural and the psycho-cultural determinants of the counter-revolution. He carefully subdivides these groups of determinants in order to cover the whole cognitive map of possible causative factors. He then carefully analyses—and rejects—each of them, since he doubts that they can be primary determinants. He re-analyses his own 1950–51 data concerning child behaviour, in order to show that the 'seeds' of the counter-revolution were present then in those children, before the effects of any cultural influences. He then reaches the conclusion that the primary and decisive determinants of the counter-revolution are the 'sex differences in precultural motivational dispositions' (p. 96). These differences can be of three types: 1) biological needs that are genetically inherited devices; 2) psycho-social needs; and 3) psycho-biological needs. He comments (p. 101):

> Although the latter two types are experientially acquired, they are no less panhuman than those genetically inherited because the experiences by which they are acquired are dependent either on certain invariant characteristics of the human organism or on those characteristics of human society that are invariant. Since the invariant characteristics of human society (biparental families, group living, socialization systems, and the like) are institutional solutions to adaptive requirements of human beings (the satisfaction of early dependency needs, for example) which they share by virtue of their constituting a common biological species, these needs too are indirectly 'psycho-biological'. From this perspective, then, those precultural needs that are experientially acquired are no less a part of 'human nature' than those that are genetically inherited. In the present stage, at least, of human biological and social evolution, both are invariant characteristics of human personality and both constitute panhuman bases for human behaviour.

Is this subdivision really needed? I doubt it. If one does not limit biological needs to such phenomena as sweating and shivering in which the hypothalamus in the brain activates the glands and muscles, then almost every genetically inherited disposition has to be triggered 'experientially'. Thus, nobody would doubt that our ability to use language is genetically inherited; but in order to activate it, we have to hear human speech. In my *Incest: a Biosocial View* (in press, as I write), I argue that the disposition to be imprinted against one's cross-sex sib-

ling has to be triggered by some environmental and social events. The fact is that almost all genetically inherited human behavioural dispositions (and very many of the animal, as well) can be activated under specific but typical circumstances and most of them can be called experiential. Thus, Spiro is fundamentally correct in his conclusions, although he could have stated them more simply.

This book not only rounds off Spiro's valuable contribution to kibbutz studies, but will be indispensable in the teaching of, and research into, family and sex differences.

JOSEPH SHEPHER

YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science, Volume XVII, v+289 pp. YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, New York, 1978, $15.00.

Again the YIVO Institute presents its valuable Annual, which appears more or less biennially, containing here studies of eastern European Jewry and its emigrant offshoots in America, France, and Israel. Unintentionally, the theme of Volume XVII is chronological, since the focus of the historical studies lies between 1900 and 1914, with individual studies reaching backward as well as forward about thirty years. Even Dan Miron's splendid 'Bouncing Back: Destruction and Recovery in Sholem Aleykhem's *Motl Peyse dem khazns*' (pp. 119–84) concerns itself with the odyssey of eastern European Jewry westward during this period, as narrated by the cantor's young orphan son.

The articles vary widely in quality as well as in length. I am far from expert in Yiddish, but Miron's study seems to be a sensitive and quite delightful analysis of Sholem Aleichem's masterpiece. The Israeli author finds the Yiddish master employing a young child as his narrator, who neither grows older nor often speaks in child's language, in order to emphasize the decay and demise of the old life. Motl is little affected even by his father's illness and death, or by the break-up of his home in Russia. His joy is in freedom and constant movement which is bathed in the constant summer of Sholem Aleichem's novel. Unlike many mature emigrants, Motl is delighted with the bustle and rush of America.

Diane Roskies's 'Alphabet Instruction in the East European Heder: Some Comparative and Historical Notes' (pp. 21–53) skilfully combines literary sources, oral recollections, and folklore to portray *heder* instruction. Enjoyable while yet critical, the study benefits in its depth from the author's knowledge of comparative educational history, which she tactfully puts to use.

In an article previously published in Yiddish, to which a '1977 Postscript' is added, Beatrice Silverman-Weinreich works 'Towards a Structural Analysis of Yiddish Proverbs' (pp. 1–20). She sidesteps the

rewarding but problematical 'genetic' study of Yiddish proverbs, is highly sceptical of a 'Jewish philosophy of life' which is to be derived from them, and prefers a 'third, safer approach ...: *the study of the formal structure*—the "morphology" as it were—of Yiddish proverbs and of the poetic taste that has shaped them' (p. 4). To an inexpert reader, the results are impressive.

This triad of Yiddish studies is truly notable. Another triad, of American Jewish studies, is less so.

The late Zosa Szajkowski's 'The Impact of the Russian Revolution of 1905 on American Jewish Life' (pp. 54–118), despite some careful editing, is really regrettable. Szajkowski does not clarify what 'impact' means, although he seems to have in mind something less rigorous than 'results' or 'effects'. Just the same, the result has been merely to toss in almost anything that happened in American Jewry as late as 1912 about which something turned up in one of the archives Szajkowski examined. There is almost no attention to secondary literature, and hardly any distinctions are made among the respective weights of personalities and organizations. The American Jewish Committee and the Galveston Movement both 'failed' because they were so accused in some contemporary newspaper accounts the author happened to read; that settles the matter. All the abundant material is helpless before such primitive interpretation.

On the other hand, Stuart E. Knee draws extensively on the plentiful sources in 'From Controversy to Conversion: Liberal Judaism in America and the Zionist Movement, 1917–1941' (pp. 260–89), but he hardly quotes from them. Altogether, the study is rather bland, and one misses the cut and thrust of argument. The author does not seem to catch on to the paradoxical position of the Brandeis Zionists after 1921. He does carefully relate changing viewpoints in Reform Judaism to developments in Palestine and the Zionist movement. But how was Rabbi David Philipson, *aetat* 56 in 1918, the 'dean of American Reform' and still 'heir apparent' to Isaac M. Wise, then dead eighteen years?

The last American study, Steven Hertzberg's 'Making It in Atlanta: Economic Mobility in a Southern Jewish Community, 1870–1911' (pp. 185–217), represents nicely the new urban quantitative history. The author, who has recently published a history of the Jews in that city until 1915, has worked through unpublished census material and presents valuable statistical data concerning the economic rise of the Jews in Atlanta—their jobs, income, and wealth as they changed over the decades. Not everyone rose, but most did, as Hertzberg clearly shows.

Altogether admirable is Paula E. Hyman's latest contribution to French Jewish history, 'From Paternalism to Cooptation: The French Jewish Consistory and the Immigrants, 1906–1939' (pp. 217–37). She sees French monolithic culture and nationality being pressed on eastern

European immigrants by anxious native Jews. Finally setting aside coercion from above, the none too flourishing Paris Consistory was persuaded during the 1930's to co-opt gingerly a few Jews from immigrant stock. The eastern Europeans were unimpressed, especially because the native Jewish bodies were flirting with right-wing, nativist organizations in the hope of appeasing them. Then the war came.

Finally, there is a stimulating Israeli contribution by Abraham Cordova and Hanna Herzog, 'The Cultural Endeavor of the Labor Movement in Palestine: A Study of the Relationship Between Intelligentsia and Intellectuals' (pp. 238–59). They first distinguish between 'intellectuals'—who include men of ideas or knowledge, generally of extensive education—and 'intelligentsia', less formally educated and recruited usually from youth within a culture being transformed or disintegrating. The Palestine Jewish labour movement, led by an intelligentsia, was satisfied to allow its cultural concerns to lag far behind its political, economic, and organizational interests. Little was done to foster cultural careers, but the effort was made instead to recruit for the service of the movement intellectual careers which had already developed. The labour leadership expected to dominate such intellectuals, and the latter wanted to lead the labour movement. Both sides failed, and their relations remained guarded. This iconoclastic research matches the newer Israeli outlook in political sociology associated with Professor Yonathan Shapiro of Tel-Aviv University.

This is a fine, well-edited volume, with a rich and varied fare for serious readers of modern Jewish studies. As far as one can tell without having seen the original texts, it is also well translated; but the use of contractions like 'didn't' and 'won't' appear inappropriate in their contexts.

LLOYD P. GARTNER

CHRONICLE

The population of Israel totalled 3,830,000 at the end of 1979: 3,212,000 Jews and 618,000 non-Jews. This represented an increase of 93,000 over the 1978 population: 72,000 Jews and 21,000 non-Jews; the former increased by 2·3 per cent while the latter grew by 3·6 per cent. There were 37,000 new Jewish immigrants in 1979 (accounting for more than half of the year's increase); there had been 26,400 in 1978.

The State's population grew by 901,000 in the decade just ended: 706,000 Jews and 195,000 non-Jews; of the former, 471,000 were by natural increase (excess of births over deaths) and 235,000 by net immigration.

*

The Soviet Jewry Research Bureau of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry announced in New York last January that 1979 was a record year, with 51,300 persons arriving in Vienna with Israeli entry visas. However, only one third—17,200—proceeded to Israel while the other two thirds preferred to settle in other countries, primarily in North America. The earlier highest annual total of Soviet Jews to leave the U.S.S.R. had been in 1973, when 34,733 emigrated.

*

There was a record emigration from the United Kingdom of 1,547 Jews who went to settle in Israel in 1979.

Two-thirds—1,028—were under the age of 30 and only 170 were over 50. There were 275 families (904 adults and children) and 643 single individuals more than half of whom (353) were females.

Apart from 139 students, there were 89 clerks and secretaries, 73 lecturers and teachers, 39 para-medical professionals, 31 company directors, 20 businessmen, 19 accountants and auditors, 16 salesmen, 13 solicitors, 12 engineers, 9 doctors, and others in a wide variety of occupations.

In addition to the 1979 total of 1,547 British emigrants, there were 105 United Kingdom citizens who had gone to Israel as tourists and who changed their status to settlers in 1979. In 1978, 1,330 British Jews went on aliya.

*

The German Federal Minister for Research and Technology was in Israel last March as a guest of the Israeli Ministry for Energy. West Germany and Israel are conducting more than eighty joint research projects; after the United States, Israel is West Germany's most important partner in research activities. Greater emphasis is to be given to research in solar energy and in new technology for developing countries.

The German Minister visited the Weizmann Institute, where he announced the founding of the Albert Einstein Centre for Theoretical Physics, which his

Ministry will support with an annual grant of about one and a half million Marks. The centre will also organize interdisciplinary workshops.

*

An Institute of Jewish Studies—the first of its kind in West Germany—has been established at Heidelberg University. It will train rabbis and religious teachers and is open to non-Jews. Several of the latter have enrolled.

The Institute is sponsored by the Central Council of Jews in Germany and is supported by the West German Federal and State Governments.

*

The West German Government has allocated funds to endow two new chairs at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem: a chair of mathematics at that University's Einstein Institute and a chair of modern German history.

The Institute of German Culture in Tel Aviv will also receive a substantial grant.

*

The November 1979 issue of *News & Views*—a publication of the World Jewish Congress—has a report on the Jewish population of Brazil, which is said to number about 150,000. The largest communities are in Sao Paulo (75,000), Rio de Janeiro (55,000), Porto Allegre (8,000), Belo Horizonte (2,000), and Recife (1,800), while smaller settlements are to be found in Salvador, Belem, Manaos, and Brasilia. The largest cities have both Sephardi and Ashkenazi synagogues; and there are Jewish newspapers in both Yiddish and Portuguese.

The central representative body of Brazilian Jewry is the Confederacao Israelita do Brazil, founded in 1951; it is a member of the World Jewish Congress. There are about 5,500 children in Sao Paulo Jewish schools, about 4,500 in those of Rio de Janeiro, and approximately 1,500 in Porto Allegre. There is also a Centre for Jewish Studies, with courses in modern, medieval, and ancient Jewish history. The Centre is fully recognized by the University of Sao Paulo.

*

The January 1980 issue of *News and Views* has a report on Romanian Jews, who number about 35,000. A United States Congressional delegation visited Romania last January and the members were given a list of 1,184 names of Romanian Jews whose applications for emigration had been approved in 1979. Most of them (988) had already left the country and the rest were 'liquidating their personal affairs, and would follow in two to three months'. In 1978, 1,134 Jews were allowed to leave Romania.

At Hannukah, ten members of the United Jewish Appeal of America had visited Romania and accompanied that country's Chief Rabbi on his visits to various Jewish communities. The Chief Rabbi is reported to have expressed his gratitude to the Romanian government for the 'complete religious and cultural freedom enjoyed by the Jews of Romania, and for the right of *aliyah* given to every Jew who wants to be united with his family in Israel'.

*

CHRONICLE

The Federation of Yugoslav Jewish Communities, an affiliate of the World Jewish Congress, celebrated last December the sixtieth anniversary of its establishment and the centenary of the Baruch Brothers Choir.

The Lord Mayor of Belgrade gave a reception in the city's assembly rooms in honour of the Choir.

*

Last March, the first Soviet rabbinical student to be ordained for more than thirty years received his diploma at the Jewish Theological Seminary in Budapest. The rabbi of Moscow and the chairman (lay leader) of the Moscow Jewish religious community attended the ceremony. The seminary—the only one of its kind in eastern Europe—has 16 students: 12 from Hungary, three from the U.S.S.R., and one from Czechoslovakia.

It is expected that the new Soviet graduate will be appointed to the Leningrad congregation, which has been without a rabbi for many years.

*

It was announced in New York last February that the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee has reached an agreement with the Hungarian Government to expand its welfare services for Hungary's Jews, and to do so under its own banner. The Committee's funds had been previously channelled through Hungarian governmental agencies. There are about 100,000 Jews in the country, 80,000 of whom live in Budapest. They are an ageing community.

*

Last November, an official delegation of Moroccan Jewish leaders presented a request for the affiliation of the Moroccan Jewish Community to the World Jewish Congress. The Executive of the Congress, at its meeting in Chicago, unanimously approved the application. There are 20,000 Jews in Morocco and the W.J.C. recorded 'its appreciative recognition of the protection of King Hassan II and his late father, King Mohammed V, of the religious, cultural, and political rights of Moroccan Jews and the recent support by King Hassan II of the desire of Moroccan Jews to become an integral part of the Jewish community'.

The Hebrew Congregation of St. Thomas, in the Virgin Islands, has also recently become affiliated to the W.J.C. The Jewish community is reported to number about 375 and there are in addition an estimated 100 other Jews who are not registered members of the Congregation.

*

The Fifth World Congress for Rural Sociology will be held in Mexico City on 7–12 August 1980, under the sponsorship of the International Rural Sociological Association and the Latin American Rural Sociological Association. The general theme will be 'Agrarian Problems, Peasants, and Development' and the official languages will be Spanish, English, and French.

*

CHRONICLE

The Dutch Committee for the History of the Jews in the Netherlands, under the auspices of the Royal Academy of Arts and Sciences, will hold a symposium on Dutch Jewish History in Amsterdam on 1–3 September 1980. This will coincide with the centenary of the Bibliotheca Rosenthaliana.

For details about the symposium, please write to the Secretary of the Committee, c/o Jewish Historical Museum of Amsterdam, Waaggebouw, Nieuwmarkt, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Adler, Ruth, *Women of the Shtetl—Through the Eyes of Y. L. Peretz*, 144 pp., Fairleigh Dickinson Univ. Press, Cranbury, New Jersey, and Associated Univ. Presses, London, 1980, $14.00 or £7.00.

Baechler, Jean, *Suicides*, translated from the French by Barry Cooper, xxiii+474 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1979, £17.50.

Bulgarian Academy of Sciences—Institute of Sociology Bulgarian Sociological Association, *Contemporary Sociology in Bulgaria. Selected Studies*, 460 pp., Publishing House of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, 1978, $15.

Dehergne, Joseph, S. J. and Donald Daniel Leslie, *Juifs de Chine à travers la correspondance inédite des jésuites du dix-huitième siècle*, Bibliotheca Instituti Historici S.I. Vol. XLI, xvii+271 pp., Institutum Historicum S.I., Rome, and Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1980, Lire 15,000 or 80 French francs.

Dontchev, Stefan, *The Social System and the Industrial Solution* (in Bulgarian), 168 pp., Publishing House of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, 1979, n.p.

D'Souza, Frances, *The Refugee Dilemma: International Recognition and Acceptance*, Report No. 43, 20 pp., Minority Rights Group, 36 Craven Street, London WC2N 5NG, 1980, 75p.

Eidelberg, Paul, *Sadat's Strategy*, 159 pp., Dawn Books, Dollard des Ormeaux, Quebec, 1979, $3,50.

Hazan, Haim, *The Limbo People. A Study of the Constitution of the Time Universe Among the Aged*, vii+199 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Boston, and Henley, 1980, £10.50.

Hyman, Paula, *From Dreyfus to Vichy. The Remaking of French Jewry, 1906–1939*, xiii+338 pp., Columbia University Press, New York, 1979, $21.90.

Kaplan, Marion A., *The Jewish Feminist Movement in Germany. The Campaigns of the Jüdischer Frauenbund, 1904–1938*, Contributions in Women's Studies, Number 8, xi+229 pp., Greenwood Press, Westport, Ct., and London, 1979, $17.50.

Kosmin, Barry A., Caren Levy, and Peter Wigodsky, *The Social Demography of Redbridge Jewry*, 36 pp., Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, London, 1979, £1.

Levy, Emanuel, *The Habima—Israel's National Theater, 1917–1977. A Study of Cultural Nationalism*, xxi+346 pp., Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1979, $28.10.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, ed., *The Third Century. America as a Post-Industrial Society*, vi+471 pp., Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, 1979, $14.95.

Martin, David, *The Breaking of the Image. A Sociology of Christian Theory and Practice*, xi+211 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980, £8.95.

Mayer, Egon, *From Suburb to Shtetl. The Jews of Boro Park*, xi+196 pp., Temple Univ. Press, Philadelphia, 1979, $15.00.

Merchav, Peretz, *Linkssocialismus in Europa zwischen den Weltkriegen. Materialien zur Arbeiter Bewegung*, No. 14, xxvi+129 pp., Ludwig Boltzmann Institut für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, Europaverlag, Vienna, 1979, 98 schillings.

Musgrove, Frank, *School and the Social Order*, vi+204 pp., John Wiley, Chichester, New York, Brisbane, and Toronto, 1979, £10.75.

Nikiprowetzky, Valentin, ed., *De l'antijudaïsme antique à l'antisémitisme contemporain*, Avant-Propos de Léon Poliakov, 292 pp., Presses Universitaires de Lille, Villeneuve-d'Ascq, n.p.

Payne, Christopher J. and Keith J. White, eds., *Caring for Deprived Children. International Case Studies of Residential Settings*, 271 pp., Croom Helm, in association with the Residential Care Association, London, 1979, £9.95.

Petev, Todor, *On the Sociology of Mass Communications. Problems of System Approach* (in Bulgarian), 150 pp., Publishing House of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, 1979, n.p.

Roumani, Maurice M., *From Immigrant to Citizen. The Contribution of the Army to National Integration in Israel: the Case of Oriental Jews*, v+163 pp., Foundation for the Study of Plural Societies, The Hague, 1979, n.p.

Smith, Michael Peter, *The City and Social Theory*, xv+315 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980, £12 (paperback, £3.95).

Stack, John F., Jr., *International Conflict in an American City: Boston's Irish, Italians, and Jews, 1935–1944*. Contributions in Political Science No. 26, xiv+181 pp., Greenwood Press, Westport, Ct. and London, 1979, £13.95.

Stillman, Norman A., *The Jews of Arab Lands. A History and Source Book*, xxx+473 pp., The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1979, $14.95.

Sutton, Joseph A. D., *Magic Carpet: Aleppo-in-Flatbush. The Story of a Unique Ethnic Jewish Community*, xiii+304 pp., Thayer-Jacoby, New York, 1979, $19.95.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

BLIDSTEIN, Gerald J., Ph.D. Associate Professor of History of Jewish Thought, Ben Gurion University of the Negev. Chief publications: *Honor Thy Father and Mother: Filial Responsibility in Jewish Law and Ethics*, New York, 1975; and 'A Note on the Function of "The Law of the Kingdom is Law" in the Medieval Jewish Community', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XV, no. 2, December 1973. Currently engaged in the study of political thought in Maimonidean law.

GRIZZARD, Nigel; BSc. Policy and Research Liaison Officer, Policy Unit, Bradford Metropolitan District Council. Formerly Research Officer for the Board of Deputies of British Jews. Chief publications: with B. A. Kosmin, *Jews in an Inner London Borough*, London, 1975; 'Local Authorities and the Black Community', *Corporate Planning Journal*, Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham, vol. 6, no. 2, 1979; 'Immigrant/Ethnic Minority Statistics' in E. M. Davies, ed., *Research and Intelligence Papers delivered at the Annual Conference 1979*, Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham, 1979.

HOLMES, Colin; M.A. Senior Lecturer in Economic and Social History, University of Sheffield. Chief publications: with S. Pollard, *Documents of European Economic History*, 3 volumes London, 1968–73; 'New Light on the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion"', *Patterns of Prejudice*, vol. 11, November–December 1977; editor, *Immigrants and Minorities in British Society*, London, 1978; *Anti-semitism in British Society 1876–1939*, London 1979; 'Anti-Semitism and the BUF' in K. J. Lunn and R. C. Thurlow, eds., *British Fascism*, London 1980. Currently engaged in research on immigration into Britain since 1870.

RAISMAN, Paula; B.A. Specialist Careers Officer for the Unemployed, Bradford Metropolitan District Council. Formerly Administrator for Government Programmes to help the young unemployed.

SCHNELLER, Raphael; Ph.D. Senior Lecturer, School of Education, Bar-Ilan University. Chief Publications (all in Hebrew): 'Some Pedagogical Problems in Modern Science Teaching', *Studies in Teaching in Secondary Schools*, University of Tel Aviv, vol. 6, 1972; *Faith and Science Confrontation in the Religious School*, Ramat Gan, 1974; 'The Growth and Development of Girls' Education in the Edah Hacharedit of Jerusalem' in Y. Gilat and E. Stern, eds., *Michtam Le-David, Rabbi D. Ochs Memorial Volume*, Ramat Gan, 1978; 'The Social Meaning of TV Viewing Patterns by Israeli Youth', *Studies in Education*, University of Haifa, vol. 23, 1979; 'Religious Youth in Israel as TV Consumers', *Israeli Journal of Psychology and Counselling in Education*, vol. 13, 1980. Currently engaged in a study of the mass media and the socialization of religious youth in Israel.

WEINFELD, Morton; Ph.D. Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology, McGill University. Chief publications: 'A Note on Comparing Canadian

and American Jewry', *Journal of Ethnic Studies*, Spring 1977; 'La Question Juive au Quebec', *Midstream*, October 1977; with S. Lieberman, 'Demographic Trends and Jewish Survival', *Midstream*, November 1978. Currently engaged in editing a volume on Canadian Jewry.

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