

THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Published on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

VOLUME XXI: NUMBER 2: DECEMBER 1979

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The Democratization of a Community: French
Jewry and the Fonds Social Juif Unifié

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On the History of Sociology (Review Article)

Howard Brotz

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The Jewish Journal of Sociology

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PUBLISHED TWICE YEARLY

on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

Annual Subscription £3.00 (U.S. \$7.50) *post free*

Single Copies £1.75 (\$4.00)

**Applications for subscriptions should be addressed to the Managing
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THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF A COMMUNITY: FRENCH JEWRY AND THE *FONDS SOCIAL JUIF UNIFIE*

Ilan Greilsammer

THE problem of the relationship between Judaism and democracy has been much debated. As Daniel Elazar has noted, many writers have tried to show that Judaism and democracy (variously defined) are cut from the same cloth'.¹ They disregarded those elements of Jewish religious thought which may be of an oligarchic or even autocratic nature. For example, Louis Finkelstein wrote in 1945:²

Despite this ability to adjust itself to the exigencies of any form of temporal government, Judaism, like other faiths derived from the Prophets, has always upheld the principles of the Fatherhood of God and the dignity and Worth of Man as the child and the creature of God; and its ideals are more consistent with those of democracy than any other system of government.

On the other hand, other studies have tried to reappraise the relationship between Judaism and democracy.³

It is not surprising that the great majority of Jewish organizations in the Diaspora are governed according to oligarchic principles, by small groups of prominent citizens. The latter are probably the only ones who have the time and the material means necessary to attend to the administration of the community; they are often the most well-known Jews in the host Gentile society, and therefore perhaps the best suited to politically represent their respective communities before the authorities; since they often are the largest contributors to the Jewish Appeal, they seek to ensure a proper utilization of the funds;⁴ and they enjoy the respect of the majority of their fellow Jews.⁵

The case of the Jewish community and its institutions in France is a good illustration of the *pouvoir des notables*, where the factors listed above have been reinforced by a number of others specific to the French context:

(1) The organizational system established by Napoleon (the Consistoires) aimed explicitly at assigning the conduct of the Jewish

community to prominent members of the bourgeoisie who were loyal to the central authority.⁶

(2) Within the community, some 'great families'—such as the Rothschilds⁷—have always been very active, through filial loyalty, in Jewish organizations and Jewish concerns.

(3) As a result, on the one hand, of the separation of church and state (in 1905), and the rapid assimilation of French Jewry on the other, the financial assets of the community were significantly reduced. There is a generally low level of contributions, as compared to those in neighbouring communities such as Belgium and Switzerland, with a consequent increase in the social and political influence of several large donor families.

(4) Most social and demographic studies on French Jewry comment on the remarkable economic and social improvement of that population. Doris Bensimon notes the high percentage of Jews who are higher executives, or in the professions.⁸ French Jews saw that they had more and more in common with their leaders and therefore had no real cause to challenge them.

This model of *gouvernement par les notables* was called into question⁹ and undermined by a process of democratization in the course of the last decade, a process which ultimately resulted in a replacement of the previous system by what appears to be a classical parliamentary administration. What led to this change? How did it develop? What were its results? This paper attempts to answer these questions.

I. The process of democratization

It must be made clear at the outset that I am concerned here with only one of the institutions of the French community: the *Fonds Social Juif Unifié* (FSJU). Nevertheless, I believe that we can speak of the 'democratization of the community' since the *Fonds* has truly become the central organization of French Jewry; its role and functions have steadily broadened over the last 25 years. It distributes the funds collected by the *Appel Juif Unifié* and allocated to the community,¹⁰ it makes the important choices and lays down the major orientations, and in effect determines the development of the various sectors of French Jewry. Only three fields are outside its sphere of activity: that of religious worship, administered by the Consistoires and the Orthodox and Reform organizations; the Zionist domain, run by the Jewish Agency and by the small Zionist Movement of France; and political representation, which is effected by a federative organization, the *Conseil Représentatif des Juifs de France* (CRIF). However, the *Fonds Social Juif Unifié* tends to extend even into these three fields, since it subsidizes the religious schools and takes an active part in all the activities of 'identification'

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with Israel and in the political demonstrations of the CRIF. In short, to use the terminology suggested by Daniel J. Elazar, the *Fonds Social* is at the same time a 'government-like institution' and a 'general-purpose mass-based organization'.¹¹

Until several years ago, the management of the FSJU corresponded quite closely to an oligarchic-type model. The people who directed it and, through it, the community, enjoyed various kinds of authority—authority of confidence, authority of identification, authority of legitimacy, and authority of sanction;¹² they were few in number and owed their power essentially to their position as 'notables' of the community. Socially, they all belonged to a limited number of socio-professional categories: industry, commerce, banking, and the academic world.

Theoretically, the statutes of the FSJU provided for a representative system of government, with a General Assembly, a National Council, study commissions, etc. But these institutions had fallen into disuse, and the management of the *Fonds Social* was in practice entirely in the hands of its *Conseil Exécutif*.

Again, it is true that this Executive Council could boast that it was not autocratic since it did appoint, for example, qualified advisers and independent scholars. However, such 'democratic' procedures did not have any noticeable effect on what was in practice (if not in theory) an oligarchic administration.

The process of democratization which was initiated in the late 1960s had both immediate and remote causes. The central factor was undoubtedly the demographic change which occurred within the community with the arrival of approximately 120,000 repatriates from Algeria (1961–62),¹³ and of the refugees from North Africa in general. Whereas the community had previously been relatively homogeneous (French Jewry was largely like its leaders, Ashkenazi and bourgeois), the gap between the 'new community' and its administrators soon became very wide. The repatriates followed the Sephardi ritual, they belonged in many cases to the middle or even lower social strata (minor civil servants, employees, small traders), they had their own orientations in communal and welfare matters and, most importantly, their Judaism was more militant and dynamic.

This crisis of identification with the existing institutions did not immediately manifest itself, and it was in fact not openly or blatantly expressed. For several years, indeed, the newcomers did not challenge the structure and leadership of the Jewish organizations in France,¹⁴ and they were even quite well integrated. Nevertheless, this rift between the 'new community' and the older leadership was one of the deep-rooted causes of the process of democratization.

In 1967, a few years after this immigration of North African Jews, there came the shock of the Six-Day War, the reawakening of the

community (in a large measure prompted by the young repatriates), and the confrontation with a fundamentally changed political climate. The new Gaullist policy aroused the opposition of almost the entire Jewish community, leading to the adoption of a militant attitude, which was foreign to the habits and modes of action of its leaders.¹⁵

However, it was above all the *événements* of May 1968 which came into play: the students, as well as other strata of the French population, demanded greater 'participation'. These events, which occurred in the host society—the national environment of the Jewish community, had a most important effect.¹⁶ As Moshe Davis has noted, 'What is striking is the fact that the multi-patterned communal structures . . . take form to a large extent from the socio-political organization of the respective societies in which they function'.¹⁷ During the May 1968 riots, the premises of the FSJU and of the Paris Consistoire were also 'occupied'. (Oddly, the occupation of the Consistoire was organized by a small group of young orthodox Jews who demanded the discontinuance of the use of the organ in the Synagogue de la Victoire on religious grounds.) While these sit-ins and demonstrations had few immediate consequences, they marked a clear climate of contestation.

In 1969, a group of young Jewish graduates of the 'Grandes Ecoles' (the Ecole Polytechnique, the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, and others), belonging to what is considered the technocratic élite of the French political and economic system, vigorously demanded a place in the management of the FSJU. That movement, which aroused considerable interest in the Jewish press and even in *Le Monde*, called itself *Point 1970*. These young technocrats challenged the community decisions which they considered arbitrary; they aimed to rationalize the functioning of the community. The FSJU leaders reacted strongly and defeated the young technocrats; and *Point 1970* ceased to exist. It was only three years later, in the wake of a new crisis, that a democratic reform was successful.

In 1972, the FSJU decided to set up, in the heart of the Latin Quarter of Paris, a gigantic and multi-functional centre. The decision was no doubt well-meant, but very strong criticisms were expressed on all sides against the decision-making process within the *Fonds*, especially as the sums involved were so huge that they would have tied up the budget and the future activities of the whole Jewish community for several years. A movement—stimulated by former members of *Point 1970*, academics, youth movement leaders, administrators of the *Fonds*, and some of the FSJU leaders themselves—set out to compel the FSJU to reform its 1966 constitution according to democratic principles. After long preparatory work, the new constitution was adopted on 1st November 1972.¹⁸

The principal innovations dealt with the membership and institutions of the *Fonds*:

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(a) In its 1966 constitution, the FSJU had—in addition to its active members, associate members, and honorary members—‘corresponding members’ (international organizations). In the new constitution, this last category was eliminated. While the old constitution limited the status of active member to those who had contributed to its fund-raising drives for three consecutive years, the new constitution conferred this status on anyone over 18 years of age who joined the FSJU by paying a very small membership fee (five francs). This provision was obviously the key element of the reform. As for the associate members, they had included various organizations concerned only with social, cultural, and educational matters. The new constitution opened membership in the FSJU to *any* Jewish association, regardless of its character (even if purely ‘political’). Finally, although the new constitution did not go so far as to abolish the category of honorary members (people who had rendered important services to the community), it granted them only a consultative voice in its *Conseil National*.

(b) According to the articles of 1966, the FSJU had several agencies, some of which found themselves in competition with one another since their respective fields were ill-defined: the General Assembly, the National Council, the Executive Council, the Action and Fund-Raising Committees, the study commissions, etc. After 1972, the FSJU was to consist of three governing institutions: the *Conseil National*, a kind of ‘Jewish parliament’, which is a sovereign organ; the *Comité Directeur*, which must follow the community policy as defined by the *Conseil National*; and the *Bureau Exécutif*, a kind of cabinet to which the *Comité Directeur* delegates authority and which administers the community. The emphasis is thus placed on the *Conseil National*, which consists of 120 delegates elected for six years from among the active members and 40 delegates elected from among the associate members. In order to be eligible, it is sufficient to have been a member of the FSJU for two years. The members of the ‘parliament’ can be re-elected. The elections are conducted by a single round uninominal ballot, on the basis of a geographic division into regional districts. The Council meets at least once a month.

We find, then, that the articles of 1972, drawn up by well-known jurists, virtually copied all the institutions and statutes of classical parliamentarianism. The *Comité Directeur* has 30 members elected for four years by the *Conseil National*, by a secret uninominal ballot. Its members may be re-elected once, but—and thus perpetual ‘government by the notables’ is avoided—they are eligible for re-election to a third term only four years after the end of their second mandate. The *Bureau Exécutif* consists of seven members: five are elected by the *Comité Directeur* from among its members, while the other two are the secretary-general and the treasurer of the FSJU.

In conclusion, and to confine ourselves to the *formal* plane, this was

a radical reform (even though provisions were made for a certain number of transitional measures—articles 20–25 of the new constitution). The directors of the *Fonds* themselves presented the change in the following manner:¹⁹

The FSJU, since it represents the Community as a whole, was best suited to do away with a policy of closed doors, which is no longer practical. Its leaders had the courage to take the lead in an undertaking prompted by young academics who took it upon themselves to propose a radical reform . . . A radical reform, a calculated risk, for the present leaders will have to stand before the Jewish electorate, a first step in the direction of a Jewish parliament . . . Either we will be left on the sidelines and disappear, or we will form this living, democratic and strong Community which the new generations demand and which Israel needs.

II. *The results of the reform*

The different organizations of French Jewry and the Jewish press (mainly *L'Arche*, *Tribune Juive—Hebdo*, *Information Juive*, and *Les Nouveaux Cahiers*) greeted the reform of the *Fonds Social* with great satisfaction.²⁰ Such diverse organizations as the *Consistoire Central* and the Zionist Movement of France called upon their members to join 'en masse' the FSJU, to stand for election, and to vote in the coming elections. An extensive membership campaign was conducted in 1973–74.

(a) *The membership.* If one takes into consideration the extent of the campaign which was conducted and its great financial cost, the results were quite modest.²¹ The FSJU in effect registered only 16,341 members (for a community estimated to number 525,000–700,000),²² distributed as follows:

Paris	6,332
Paris suburbs	3,739
Provinces	6,270
	<hr/>
	16,341

The greater metropolitan Paris area accounted for 10,071 members, or nearly two-thirds of those Jews who can be considered 'activist' or 'involved'. Two provincial regions—Provence Languedoc and Rhone Alpes—accounted for more than half of the total provincial membership of 6,270:

Provence Languedoc	2,029
Rhone Alpes	1,465
	<hr/>
	3,494

In two other provincial regions, the membership was negligible: 165 in the North of the country and 88 in the West.

These figures reflect the distribution of those Jews who are most con-

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cerned about Jewish affairs and probably most willing to spring to the defence of Jewish causes in France today.

The first deputies were dissatisfied with the results of the campaign. They therefore decided that, at the next partial election to the National Council (in November 1978), the right to vote would be granted to all members who had contributed financially to the FSJU during 1977-78.²³ Consequently, the number of 'registered voters' more than doubled in 1978. There were 38,702, distributed as follows:

Paris	15,654
Paris suburbs	8,509
Provinces	14,539
	38,702

(b) *The candidates.* The following analysis is based on the 1978 elections, since the 1975 data were very sketchy. Moreover, the percentages indicated below provide only an approximate indication of the situation, since they are computed on the basis of very small overall figures;²⁴ and, even in 1978, the candidates often provided incomplete information about themselves, sometimes neglecting to mention their age or their occupation.

With regard to a most important factor—that of how many Sephardim stood for election—the study can only be onomastic, and therefore partial and largely inadequate.²⁵ It appears that, in 1978, the proportion of Sephardim among the candidates was 40 per cent in Paris; 75 per cent in the suburbs of Paris; and 60 per cent in the provinces. These figures seem to indicate that the reform succeeded in attracting a considerable fringe of the North African refugees, some of whom had undoubtedly long aspired to more active participation in Jewish affairs.

As for female involvement, Paris had the highest percentage of women candidates (21.3 per cent), while there were only 10.6 per cent in the Paris suburbs and 14.1 per cent in the provinces. There seems to be a fairly clear correlation here with the proportion of Sephardi candidates in each zone: the more Sephardi candidates in a given district, the fewer women candidates, and vice versa.

An analysis of the candidates' gainful occupations²⁶ shows that about 15 per cent were in the liberal professions (particularly medicine and law): 15.5 per cent in Paris; 15.1 per cent in the capital's suburbs; and 14 per cent in the provinces. These proportions seem to reflect the occupational distribution of French Jewry. According to Doris Bensimon, 20 per cent of the Jewish inhabitants of Paris and its suburbs are senior executives or in the liberal professions.²⁷

Table 1 shows that the proportion of teachers was exactly the same in Paris and in the capital's suburbs—10.6 per cent—while in the provinces it was only 6.4 per cent.

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On the other hand, executives constituted 18·1 per cent of the candidates in the Paris suburbs (the largest single group), 11·4 per cent in inner Paris, and only 7·6 per cent in the provinces.

Intermediate and minor-grade civil servants account for 7·5 per cent of those in the Paris suburbs—where Jews of North African origin are known to be numerous—but only half that proportion in the provinces; and they are almost non-existent in Paris.

There was a much higher proportion of businessmen in the provinces (15·3 per cent) than in the Paris suburbs (6 per cent) or in inner Paris (4 per cent). Paris and the provinces did not have a single candidate who was a skilled workman or a labourer, while the Paris suburbs had

TABLE 1. *Gainful occupations of 1978 candidates (in percentages)*

	<i>Paris</i>	<i>Paris suburbs</i>	<i>Provinces</i>
Employees of Jewish Organizations	8·1	1·7	0
Liberal professions	15·5	15·1	14·0
Other professionals (e.g., engineers, interpreters)	6·5	4·5	7·0
Executives	11·4	18·1	7·6
Lycée and university teachers	10·6	10·6	6·4
Senior civil servants	1·6	0	0
Intermediate and minor grade civil servants	0·8	7·5	3·8
Businessmen	4·0	6·0	15·3
Manufacturers and bankers	8·1	1·5	5·1
Employees	4·0	1·5	3·8
Skilled workers and labourers	0	4·5	0
Students	0·8	3·3	6·4
Retired	15·5	3·0	8·9
No data	13·1	22·7	21·7
	100	100	100

4·5 per cent in that category. On the other hand, these suburbs had only a tiny proportion who were manufacturers or bankers, while inner Paris had 8·1 per cent and the provinces 5·1 per cent.

Candidates who had retired from active employment were most numerous in Paris (15·5 per cent), and least so in its suburbs (3 per cent). Finally, there was a remarkably low percentage of students in Paris (0·8) and its suburbs (3·3), while the provinces had 6·4 per cent.²⁸

Some candidates did not state their age; the percentage of those who failed to do so was 27·4 in the Paris suburbs, but only 3·8 in inner Paris; while in the provinces it was 18·3 (see table 2).

Just over half the total of Paris candidates (51 per cent) were 50 years

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of age or older, while only 15 per cent of those in the capital's suburbs, and 28 per cent of those in the provinces, were in that age group.

Ten per cent of the candidates in the provinces were under the age of thirty; while in both Paris and its suburbs that age group accounted for just under 5 per cent of the total. On the other hand, no candidate in the Paris suburbs was older than 69, while in the inner metropolitan area 10 per cent were aged between 70 and 79 and a further 3.2 per cent were 80 and over. (It will be remembered that 15 per cent of the Paris candidates were retired.²⁹) The largest single group of candidates in all three regions was in the age range 40-49.

Therefore, while the democratization campaign seems to have succeeded in arousing the desire of the Sephardim to participate in the management of community affairs, it does not appear to have significantly stimulated the women, the young, and the 'underprivileged

TABLE 2. *Age composition of 1978 candidates*
(in percentages)

<i>Age group</i>	<i>Paris</i>	<i>Paris suburbs</i>	<i>Provinces</i>
Under 30	4.9	4.5	10.2
30-39	17.2	22.7	19.2
40-49	23.1	30.3	24.3
50-59	14.7	10.6	15.3
60-69	23.1	4.5	3.8
70-79	10.0	0	8.9
80 and over	3.2	0	0
No data	3.8	27.4	18.3
	100	100	100

classes' (workers,³⁰ employees, minor civil servants, etc.) of French Jewry to offer themselves as candidates.

(c) *The system of voting.* Candidates can form lists or tickets reflecting their common views on community affairs and on Israel, but they are not obliged to do so. Most candidates opted for the former, but a few decided to stand independently. In turn, the voters must elect a certain number of deputies, but they are in no way obliged to vote for a whole list: they may split their vote, by crossing some of the names on a list, or by adding to it the names of other candidates. Finally, the candidate who obtains the highest number of votes is elected.

Both in 1975 and in 1978, we find in Paris four major lists or tickets (four different trends): (1) a 'central' list including most of the leading personalities in the community who, while essentially in favour of the development and reinforcement of the institutions of French Jewry, also declared their loyalty to Israel;³¹ (2) a list made up of former members

of the youth movements and of people who, while more or less well-known, were not included for personal reasons on the first list; (3) a list representing mainly North African Jews; and (4) a 'leftist' list (including intellectuals of the Bernard Lazare group,³² former communists, and people connected with *Hashomer Hatsair*). A comparison of the ideological platforms of these different lists of candidates does not reveal any significant differences. On the contrary, there is a relative uniformity concerning both important issues: the future of French Jewry and the State of Israel.

Ostensibly democratic, this voting system could not give entirely satisfactory results, at least in Paris. For although, in theory, it is possible to split a list of candidates, the average Jewish elector tends to cast his vote for a particular list as a whole (especially as the candidates are unfamiliar to him). Thus, in Paris, the results in 1978 were exactly the same as in 1975: almost all those elected were from a single list, that of the 'central' trend, consisting of the best-known figures and personalities of Paris Jewry. The new candidates who appeared on other lists or who stood for election independently had in fact no chance of being elected: in 1975, all those who were elected belonged to the 'central' trend entitled *Am Ehad* (One People) and in 1978 all those elected (except one³³) belonged to the same ticket, renamed *Ahavat Israel* (Love of Israel).³⁴ This system may well discourage new candidates from standing in future elections.

(d) *The vote.* In 1975, 6,670 persons participated in the elections, or 40.8 per cent of the 16,341 registered voters. Thus, there were clearly two levels of participation: the act of membership, and the act of voting. In 1978, 7,821 persons voted, or 20.2 per cent of the 38,702 registered voters. If we assume that almost all those who voted in 1975 voted again in 1978, there was an increase of roughly one thousand voters (+17 per cent). As regards voter participation, important differences can be noted from one electoral zone to another. The general tendency seems to be that the more registered voters there are in a particular zone, the smaller the relative turnout.

	1975		1978	
	Registered Voters	Voter Turnout (%)	Registered Voters	Voter Turnout (%)
Paris	6,332	33.7	15,654	19.3
Paris suburbs	3,739	43.1	8,509	22.5
Provinces	6,270	48.1	14,539	19.7

This statement is confirmed most clearly in the different electoral districts in the provinces. Thus, in 1978, the average turnout in those provincial districts with the largest number of potential voters (400 to

2,147) was only 17.3 per cent, while the turnout in those districts with less than 400 registered voters was 26 per cent.

Another interesting correlation is that between the percentage of votes cast in each district and the percentage of 'blank' or 'disqualified' votes.³⁵ The greater the number of votes, the fewer blank and disqualified votes, and vice versa. Thus, in the two suburban districts with the largest voter turnout—Val d'Oise 3è (33.6 per cent) and Val-de-Marne 4è (31 per cent) only 2.4 per cent and 2 per cent of the votes, respectively, were either blank or disqualified. Conversely, the two districts where the turnout was the smallest—Val-de-Marne 2è (16.5 per cent) and Seine Saint-Denis 1è (17.2 per cent)—were also those where the proportion of blank and disqualified votes was the largest: 7.4 and 7.9 per cent. We find the same correlation in the provinces, where the districts with the highest voter turnout were Bretagne-Vallée de la Loire 1è (36 per cent, with 2.3 per cent blank or disqualified votes) and Est 1-1è (28 per cent with 6.4 per cent blank or disqualified votes); while those with low voter turnout were, for example, Est 1-2è (12.6 per cent, with 19.6 per cent blank or disqualified) and Nice-Côte d'Azur 1è (12.6 per cent, with 20 per cent blank or disqualified votes).

(e) *The elected deputies.* A detailed analysis of the 1978 results reveals that the French Jewish electorate chose its representatives in a somewhat cautious or conservative manner. The positive trend towards diversification to be seen among the candidates was not reflected by the deputies who were elected. Admittedly, the percentage of Sephardim who were returned was about the same as that among the candidates (though it should be recalled that these data are incomplete). In the provinces, the proportion was exactly the same: 60 per cent. In the Paris suburbs, it was practically the same: 75 per cent of the candidates were Sephardim, as were 73 per cent of those elected; while in Paris the proportions were 40 per cent of the candidates and 33 per cent of the elected.

When we examine the data on female candidates, we see that 17.3 per cent of the deputies elected in the Paris suburbs were women, although only 10.6 per cent of the candidates in that area were female. On the other hand, 14.2 per cent of those elected by Paris voters were women, while the latter accounted for 21.3 per cent of the candidates. In the provinces, the contrast was striking: 14.1 per cent of the candidates were women, but only 3.3 per cent of the elected deputies were female. It is worth noting that women had been much more successful in the 1975 election, when they had constituted 30 per cent of the deputies returned in the Paris area and 8 per cent of those in the provinces.

With respect to age, significant differences appear. In Paris, there was a clear trend towards seniority: not a single candidate under 30 was elected, while 42.8 per cent of the deputies were 50 or older. In

effect, practically none of the young members of the *Ahavat Israel* list were elected.

The situation was somewhat different in the provinces, where 28.5 per cent of those elected were under 40 (of whom 7.1 per cent were under 30). However, 21.3 per cent of those elected were 50 or older (of whom 3.5 per cent were over 70). The Paris suburbs showed a marked preference for the younger age groups, reflecting the composition of the Jewish population in that area: 43.3 per cent of those elected were under 40 (8.6 per cent under 30) and only 8.6 per cent were 50 or older (with none over 60). It should be added that all these returns correspond with surprising accuracy to what is known of the age distribution of French Jewry.³⁶

Conclusion

It is too early to pass judgment on the success or failure of the democratization of the *Fonds Social Juif Unifié*. Some phenomena, such as the high rate of abstention and the relatively low number of young people and of women elected, clearly merit fuller consideration. However, we must bear in mind that so far there have been only two elections (one of which was only a partial election). Meanwhile, it is worth noting three aspects of the process of that reform.

First, there is no doubt that the changes which took place within the community were to a great extent related to the events which occurred in France during May–June 1968, and to the general anti-authoritarian revolt which became manifest in the society at large as well as in individual groups. The French context is also reflected in the central role of the ‘technocratic élites’, which can undoubtedly be attributed in part to the immense prestige enjoyed by the graduates of the *Grandes Ecoles* among all sectors of the population. Several of the most brilliant Jewish technocrats played a role in the organization of the reform (for example, the socialist economist Jacques Attali). A final reflection of the French context was that the reform failed to affiliate the young extreme leftists through the ‘new community’. Unlike the case in America, where some groups of young radicals remain strongly concerned with their Judaism and with *klal Israel*, the French Jewish radicals are in general totally uninterested in any form of Jewish community life or organization. (It is true that the French radicals are immeasurably more to the left of the political spectrum than are the American.³⁷)

Second, what seems characteristic of any attempted process of change within a Jewish institution is the striking permanence of the structures of authority and influence. Jewish ‘notables’ possess what can truly be described as ‘paternal authority’. And if the community is, to cite Peter Medding’s expression, a ‘family’ or a ‘family of families’,³⁸

it is to be expected that the authority of these family heads will remain dominant, in other words that the electorate of the newly democratized community will continue to re-elect their 'notables', old and new. Thus, as we saw, almost all the outgoing delegates of 1975 were re-elected in 1978. In fact, since the leaders are not remunerated for the considerable time they devote to their duties, it is quite probable that, despite all attempts at diversification through democratic elections, the leaders will continue to be largely recruited from among those who have a measure of financial independence.

Finally, there were elements characteristic of any institutional transformation, when it is affected by other important kinds of change in the wider society. If the Napoleonic era, with its principles of hierarchy, centralism, authority, faith in the 'notables', conformism, and the omnipotence of Paris, was favourable to the establishment of such institutions as the Consistoires, we can understand how the post-war period, and especially the post-1968 period, with its themes of autonomy, regionalism, emancipation, and participation encouraged the change which was achieved in the 1970s. An institutional transformation is also often related to a change in the existing social and economic structures. In the case of Jewish institutions in France, there was a direct link between the advent of the reform and the preceding arrival of thousands of refugees with a social and occupational structure clearly different from that of the indigenous Jewish population.

NOTES

¹ Daniel J. Elazar, 'American Political Theory and the Political Notions of American Jews. Convergences and Contradictions', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. IX, no. 1 (June 1967), p. 22, note 6.

² Louis Finkelstein, *The Religions of Democracy*, New York, 1945, p. 8; see also Milton Konvitz, 'Judaism and the Democratic Ideal', in Louis Finkelstein, ed., *The Jews: Their History, Culture and Religion*, New York, 1949, vol. 2, pp. 1430-1451.

³ See, for example, Harold Fisch, *Jerusalem and Albion. The Hebraic Factor in Seventeenth Century Literature*, New York, 1964; Robert Gordis, *The Root and the Branch, Judaism and the Free Society*, Chicago, 1962; Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism. A Study of its Origins and Background*, New York, 1944, chap. II.

⁴ See Yohanan Manor and Gabriel Sheffer, 'L'United Jewish Appeal ou la métamorphose du don', *Revue Française de Sociologie*, vol. XVIII, no. 1 (1977), pp. 3-24.

⁵ Charles S. Liebman has extensively dealt with the question of the *basis* of the community leaders' authority in 'Dimensions of Authority in the Contemporary Jewish Community', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XII, no. 1 (June 1970), pp. 29-38; and in 'Sources of Authority in the Contemporary Jewish Community', *Jewish Digest*, no. 17 (November 1971), pp. 1-7.

⁶ See Simon Schwarzfuchs, *Les Juifs de France*, Paris, 1975; and Bernhard Blumenkranz, ed., *Histoire des Juifs en France*, Toulouse, 1972.

⁷ Nowadays, the five most active members of the Rothschild family in France are: Guy (President of the FSJU), Alain (President of the *Consistoire Central* and of the *Conseil Représentatif des Juifs de France*), David (Treasurer of the FSJU), Elie (leader of the fund-raising campaign), and Edmond (investments and economic assistance in Israel). For an analysis of the dominant position of the Rothschild family in French Jewish affairs, see Yohanan Manor, 'Réflexions sur le Judaïsme français', *Dispersion et Unité*, no. 8 (1978), pp. 184-185.

⁸ See Doris Bensimon, 'Socio-demographic Aspects of French Jewry', *European Judaism*, no. 1 (1978), pp. 12-16. The same author notes:

French Jewry succeeded in normalizing its economic status during the first two or three years following the liberation ... Among both Ashkenazim and Sephardim, rapid and important changes in social status took place. Artisans from Eastern Europe or North Africa abandoned their traditional occupations in the second, if not the first generation in order to find jobs in modern industry ... through which a rapid rise on the social scale was possible ... Social advancement was rapid among North African Jews who were French Nationals, as racial barriers that had seriously handicapped their advancement under colonial rule did not exist in France. Their settlement there opened new prospects for them, and many made their way in the liberal professions, commerce and industry. (*Encyclopaedia Judaica*, vol. 7, p. 37.)

⁹ See, for example, Patrick Girard, 'Mourir pour les notables', *Les Nouveaux Cahiers*, no. 8 (34), (autumn 1973), pp. 3-10.

¹⁰ The fund-raising is carried out by the *Appel Unifié Juif de France* (AUJF); the Jewish Agency administers the funds allocated to Israel, while the FSJU administers those allocated to the French community.

¹¹ Daniel J. Elazar, 'The Institutional Life of American Jewry', *Midstream*, vol. 17, no. 6 (June-July 1971), p. 35.

¹² See Charles S. Liebman, 'Dimensions of Authority...', op. cit., pp. 32-35.

¹³ See Doris Bensimon, *L'intégration des Juifs nord-africains en France*, Paris, 1971, p. 2, note 3.

¹⁴ The case was clearly different from that of the immigrants from eastern and central Europe who began to arrive at the end of the nineteenth century and established their own networks and community organizations in France, separate from those of the indigenous Jewish population.

¹⁵ See Alain Greilsammer, 'Jews of France, From Neutrality to Involvement', *Forum* (Jerusalem), no. 28-29 (Winter 1978), pp. 130-146. See also the interviews of Raymond Aron, Albert Memmi, Edgard Morin, and others in 'La guerre des six-jours a-t-elle modifié la conscience juive en France?', *L'Arche*, no. 133, March-April 1968, pp. 35-40.

¹⁶ On the repercussions of the May-June 1968 events in the community, see 'La contestation dans la communauté juive', in a special issue of *Les Nouveaux Cahiers*, no. 4 (16), Winter 1968-69, pp. 4-44.

¹⁷ Moshe Davis, *Jewish Communities in World Perspective*, New York, 1964, p. 9.

¹⁸ That constitution was slightly amended by the *Conseil National* of the FSJU on 1st November 1976.

¹⁹ French original:

Le FSJU, étant donné qu'il représente la communauté dans son ensemble, était le mieux à même de mettre fin à une politique de huis clos qui n'est plus praticable. Ses dirigeants ont eu le courage de prendre la tête d'un mouvement suscité par de jeunes universitaires, qui ont pris sur eux de proposer une réforme radicale... Une réforme radicale, un risque calculé, car les dirigeants actuels auront à se présenter devant l'électorat juif, un premier pas sur la voie d'un parlement juif...

Ou bien nous resterons de côté et nous disparaîtrons, ou bien nous formerons cette communauté vivante, démocratique et forte que les nouvelles générations demandent et dont Israël a besoin.

²⁰ A detailed study of the community's four major journals reveals a rare unanimity in the enthusiasm for the reform. On the attitudes of the principal organizations, see the dossier published by the FSJU, *Réforme des structures du Fonds Social Juif Unifié: Positions des organisations juives*, Paris, 1974.

²¹ See the brochure: FSJU, *Résultats des élections au Conseil National, Scrutin du 26.1.75*, Paris, 1975.

²² The numerical size of the Jewish population of France has recently been the subject of an interesting controversy. A team from SOFRES (an important French polling institute) under the direction of Emeric Deutsch estimated that the Jewish population of France was about 700,000 in 1976: see *Bulletin Quotidien d'Information, Agence Télégraphique Juive*, no. 1527, 11 February 1977. This figure and the methods used in establishing it were strongly challenged by Sergio Della Pergola (of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem) and Doris Bensimon, who have suggested a much lower figure: see their 'Enquêtes socio-démographiques sur les Juifs de France', *Dispersion et Unité*, no. 18, 1978, pp. 190-212.

²³ New statutes voted by the *Conseil National* on 1st November 1976.

²⁴ There were 122 candidates in Paris, 66 in the Paris suburbs, and 93 in the provinces.

²⁵ Since this was one of the first occasions on which the North African Jews could really make their presence and participation felt, it was important to know the origin of the candidates. As no document mentioned their place of birth, we had to utilize the onomastic criterion. However, apart from the fact that many names are common to both Ashkenazim and Sephardim (such as Cohen or Levy), it is impossible to distinguish, among the Sephardim themselves, between those who were repatriates or recent refugees and those, for example, who originated from Salonika or who had long been integrated into French society.

²⁶ As can be seen in Table 1, a marked percentage of candidates omitted to state their occupation.

²⁷ Doris Bensimon, 'Socio-demographic Aspects of French Jewry', op. cit. On the other hand, Emeric Deutsch estimates the percentage of French Jews in the *professions libérales* or who are *cadres d'entreprises* (executives) at 16 per cent (op. cit., p. 2).

²⁸ The very low 5 francs fee should not have prevented the participation

or candidature of students. The lack of interest of the Jewish students had no financial basis.

²⁹ See Table 1 above.

³⁰ It should be noted here that one of the 'revelations' of the survey conducted by SOFRES under Emeric Deutsch's direction was that 22 per cent of the French Jewish population was composed of 'workers' (10 per cent skilled, 8 per cent semi-skilled or unskilled, and 4 per cent domestic staff).

³¹ Among the candidates on this list, we find a very broad sample of nearly all the trends in the community: Diasporists, Zionists, Orthodox, members of the Progressive Judaism movement, etc.

³² This group, which was named after a French Jewish writer (1865–1903), consists essentially of left-wing Zionist intellectuals who identify themselves with the Mapam party's orientations. It favours a democratized and secular Jewish community and publishes a monthly journal, *Les Cahiers Bernard Lazare*.

³³ This was Serge Klarsfeld, who is famous for his role in the pursuit of former Nazis. He was a member of the 'outsider' list of candidates, named *Atidenou* (Our Future). *Atidenou* had 21 men and women who challenged the list headed by Guy de Rothschild.

³⁴ The results were slightly different in the Paris suburbs and in the provinces, where the competition was more open: the independent candidates were more successful, and the few lists did not play an important role.

³⁵ It has been a French electoral practice to lump the blank and disqualified votes together. This practice is particularly open to criticism in the case of electing representatives to Jewish organizations, since the blank vote and the disqualified vote represent completely different attitudes: in the case being examined here, a blank vote may, for example, signify a lack of confidence in the candidates, the platforms of the lists, or the general structure of the organized community, while invalid votes include 'those ballot papers which have more names than there are seats in the constituency, or which have a name that does not figure among the list of candidates for that constituency'.

³⁶ Della Pergola and Bensimon have pointed out the differences between the distribution of the Jewish population by age in inner Paris and in the Paris suburbs; they note a clear ageing in Paris, in contrast with the 'youthful' character of the suburbs. In Paris, for example, the average age of the Jews is about 41, in contrast to 30 in the suburbs. See 'Enquêtes socio-démographiques ...', op. cit., pp. 200–201.

³⁷ For the gulf which separates the American Jewish radicals from the French Jewish radicals (*membres de l'extrême-gauche*) concerning their relationship with the Jewish community (opposition to the community structures in the U.S.A. in contrast to a rejection of the community as a whole in France), see Jack Nusan Porter and Peter Dreier, eds., *Jewish Radicalism*, New York, 1973, for the former; and Annie Kriegel, 'Judaïsme et gauchisme', in *Communismes au miroir français*, Paris, 1974, pp. 219–225 for the latter.

³⁸ Peter Y. Medding, 'A Contemporary Paradox, Israel and Jewish Peoplehood', *Forum* (Jerusalem), no. 1 (1977), pp. 5–6.

CHELTENHAM JEWS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Michael A. Shepherd

WHY did Cheltenham's Jewish community fail to prosper in the nineteenth century? That it was one of a group of provincial Jewish centres in decline in the later nineteenth century is established,¹ but there has been no satisfactory explanation for that decay. An examination of Cheltenham's 'failure' may help to emancipate historians from historiographical traditions (both Whig and Marxist), whereby the causes of success and the origins of the present monopolize their curiosity. Even the scholarly Cecil Roth, who was chiefly concerned in his *Rise of Provincial Jewry* to give 'considerable space' to the lost and decayed communities,² assumed that the decay was best explained by the failure of the towns in which these communities resided to grow demographically or economically.³ The economic hypothesis is inappropriate for Cheltenham, which prospered in the late nineteenth century.⁴ The demographic hypothesis is only partially applicable: Cheltenham grew fastest in the early nineteenth century, as did its Jewish community; but, as we shall see, the decline of Cheltenham's Jewry predated the decline of Cheltenham's general population, which began in the 1880s.⁵ Along with demography, we must take into account the psychological aspects of Jewish existence in a small town, identified for the twentieth century by Peter Rose.⁶ It will be argued here that, if Cheltenham Jews enjoyed in their synagogue a reasonable focus for community life, they suffered from apathetic membership, weak leadership, and an unfavourable image.

The synagogue

The first Jewish congregation in Cheltenham met regularly in St. George's Place, not 'in 1830 or soon after', as local historians believe,⁷ but from 1823.⁸ Although individual Jews resided in Cheltenham, or passed through it, at least as early as 1800,⁹ a Jewish community emerged only in the 1820s, with the mushrooming of the middle-class suburb of Pittville, whose inhabitants' needs they served. William Cobbett, who disliked both Cheltenham and Jews, complained that the

whole town was full of them in 1823: 'The place really seems to be sinking very fast.'¹⁰

Both Cheltenham and its Jewish community survived Cobbett's strictures. The synagogue remained in St. George's Place, though it moved to a larger purpose-built site in 1837, 'opposite the Cheltenham Infant School Room'. The foundation stone was laid on 25 July 1837, and the edifice was consecrated in May 1839:¹¹

On Tuesday last the members of the Jewish persuasion assembled at 4 o'clock to consecrate the new synagogue . . . Mr. Abrahams, of the Gloucester synagogue, officiated as reader and the psalms were chanted by Mr. Lewis Isaacs of Cheltenham, and assistants. The reader, followed by Mr. Davis, the president, and Messrs. Isaacs, Samuels and Plaite, carrying the rolls of the Pentateuch, walked in procession seven times round the synagogue, chanting a psalm during each circuit, after which they deposited the rolls in the ark. . . . The synagogue was erected by Mr. Hastings, and the plans were drawn by Mr. Knight, both of this town. The exterior is plain, but the interior is elegantly fitted up with the ark, the body of which is imitation jasper, and the pediment is supported by elegant Corinthian columns, the capitals and bases of which, together with the vases above the pediments, are chastely gilded, and the doors are hid by a rich Indian curtain, the reading desk is painted in imitation of bird's-eye maple. The synagogue is furnished with two brass chandeliers, eight large candlesticks, besides small sconces, which were filled with wax candles. Besides this there are two frames upon the wall, one containing a prayer in English for her Majesty Queen Victoria, and the other a prayer in Hebrew repeated on the days [*sic*] of Atonement. The dome is one of the principal ornaments of the place, and is finished in a superior manner with cornice and fretwork.

Most of these architectural niceties can still be seen in the synagogue today. The internal fixtures were doubtless grander than the Cheltenham community could afford: they were taken from the New Synagogue in Leadenhall Street in 1838, when the latter was dismantled.

Despite the publicity given to the new synagogue in Cheltenham, it was still possible for a local gazetteer to imagine that the home in Andover Terrace of the man acting as Rabbi (the 'Rev.' Joshua Levi, who taught Hebrew from there to augment his salary) was 'the premises of the Jews' synagogue'.¹² The exterior of the synagogue building was infrequently repaired (in 1866 and 1873, the latter occasion on the direction of the Cheltenham Improvement Commissioners); but the interior was extensively redecorated in 1850, 1863, 1865 (when gas-light was introduced), and again in 1874. The community tended to prefer to spend on extending its burial ground rather than on maintaining the synagogue.

The size of the community

The number of Jews living in Cheltenham remained small even in the period of communal expansion to 1871. Whereas Glasgow, whose

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synagogue was also established in 1823, had acquired a Jewish community of 1,000 souls in 1879, Cheltenham Jewry never expanded significantly beyond the level reached in the 1840s. Between 1823 and 1845, a total of 40 householders joined the congregation as 'members'—that is, active participants in the community with full voting privileges. One quarter had already ceased to pay their dues by 1845 and three-quarters joined after the synagogue was opened in 1839. Although the membership was unstable, at least in the early years all but three families resided in Cheltenham.

This local constituency for the congregation probably peaked in the late 1840s. A total of 75 Jews was estimated (by the United Synagogue) to live in Cheltenham in 1846 and in 1850.¹³ After 1850, there appears to have been a steady decline in the numbers of Jewish residents, according to the Census Schedules for 1851, 1861, and 1871. United Synagogue statistics suggest an early fall in membership after 1845: in 1845 there were eighteen seatholders, and in 1852 only fifteen.¹⁴

In the five years from 1846 to 1851, there were no new members and some of the old ones fell away, notably Lewis Dight, the Cheltenham printer who had produced the first rule-book of the congregation. In 1843, Dight led a secession of 'the majority of the members' of the congregation over an obscure quarrel with the then warden, which does not appear to have been completely patched up. Dight and the others, who failed to pay their three shillings a week as 'members', technically became merely 'seatholders', liable to pay one shilling; but in practice they withdrew entirely from the community rather than bear their loss of status.

Cheltenham's Jewish records, alas, do not as a rule record deaths or resignations of members. The evidence suggests that, while the number of Jews in Cheltenham stagnated, the congregation continued to expand after 1850, but at a progressively slower rate. In the decade of the 1850s, twenty-two new members joined, and eleven more in the 1860s. Two thirds of these new members, however, were non-resident, paying for the privilege of a Jewish burial and *kasher* meat supplies, but living in such places as Gloucester and Hereford. The synagogue officials belatedly took cognisance of their unhealthy membership level and sought desperate remedies. However, they looked for money rather than active members. In 1865 they wrote to the baronet Sir Francis Goldsmid, claiming that as one of his country homes was 'in our neighbourhood', he ought to contribute to the congregation's funds. Sir Francis consented to give what he called a 'donation', and then gave much larger sums to the local hospital and infirmary, presumably to snub his co-religionists. The synagogue proved even less successful in its other initiatives. In 1868, the congregation tried to increase its funds by elevating Richard J. Moses (of 172 High Street) and his brother, from seatholders to members, without asking them. Moses expressed

surprise and ironic gratitude, and insisted that they would continue to pay the lower subscription.¹⁵ As R. J. Moses was the Treasurer (and Auditor!) of the congregation in the early 1870s, there was little incentive for others to pay the higher fee.

The synagogue's non-resident membership increasingly outnumbered its residents. In the 1870s only six new members joined, all absentees. The later absentees were less likely to live in towns like Gloucester and Stroud, than in more remote places like Liverpool and Norwich. They were no longer interested in *kasher* meat but merely in the right to burial in a Jewish cemetery. In this they were simply following the example of Montague Alex, the former secretary and president, who had moved to Southampton by 1873.

In the 1880s, under the presidency of S. Goldberg, a concerted effort was made to recruit new blood locally, and eight residents of Cheltenham joined along with six new absentee members. The 1890s opened misleadingly vigorously with a fresh recruitment campaign in 1892, which produced five new members, all local inhabitants. But religious immigrants from the influx of Russian Jews who flocked to England at the end of the century seem to have avoided Cheltenham. No more members joined after 1892, when the synagogue possessed but three male members, all of them recently admitted and lacking roots in Cheltenham. For synagogue services, they depended in the 1890s on Jewish schoolboys attending Cheltenham College. Finally, the synagogue had to close.

The Jewish Board of Deputies in London, which recorded four Jewish residents in Cheltenham in 1901 despite the closure of the synagogue, was forced to accept in 1903 that the community was extinct.¹⁶ None of the last surviving members—N. Schnurman, a teacher; J. Hart, who owned the Fleece Hotel; and E. Feldman—attempted to revive the synagogue. It was resuscitated between 1939 and 1945 by Orthodox immigrants. Soon after the war, Dr. A. Goldfoot devised a new constitution. As most of the synagogue's assets had been swallowed up in legal costs during a dispute in 1899–1901, over a legacy to the synagogue, the new community owed nothing but the synagogue building to its Victorian predecessors.

What of the seatholders, as distinct from the members? According to the Board of Deputies' records, there were fifteen seatholders in 1852, nineteen in 1860, eighteen in 1870, thirteen in 1880, and seven in 1890. This story of slow decline is not hard to explain. Seatholders' fees of a shilling a week, or £2. 12s. 6d. (*sic*) per annum, were far higher than the £2 a year which Bristol synagogue charged its seatholders in the 1850s. Montague Alex, dentist and president of the congregation, complained (with some exaggeration) to the Chief Rabbi in 1853 that Bristol's recruitments threatened to make his 'very small congregation . . . become extinct'. In 1852, Cheltenham tried to raise the fee for seat-

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holders, which provided the occasion for some to resign. The synagogue did not try the stratagem again, but appears to have attempted to cut the costs of its *kasher* meat service. At any rate, seatholders frequently complained of Cheltenham's failure to deliver *kasher* meat of a reasonable quality, the item which they believed they were paying for, since they rarely used their seat-entitlement. In 1854, their meat supplier was found to have been embezzling the congregation, and non-pious Jews had an extra pretext for failing to preserve their minimal attachment to Jewish rituals and observances.

The only other indication of the size of the Jewish community in Cheltenham, and therefore of the synagogue's potential constituency, lies in the incidence of Jewish names in Cheltenham's Census schedules. In 1841, there were at least twenty Jews in Cheltenham who paid nothing to the congregation—not only pedlars and hawkers residing in hotels, but also the tailor Samuel Bloom and his family, the dentist Joseph Levason and his family, and the broker Abraham Mocatta and his family, householders all apparently not keen to advertise their Jewish identity. By 1871, there were no Jewish travellers, nor many non-religious persons of Jewish nomenclature recorded. Indeed, there were hardly any Jews living within walking distance of the synagogue, except the long-standing wardens Samuel Steinberg, the pawnbroker, and Hirtz Karo the jeweller. The impression conveyed by the fiscal records, of a community which had moved away, is re-echoed in the Census schedules.

The image of the congregation

Despite the stimulus of two visits by the Chief Rabbi, in 1836 and 1871,¹⁷ public events contrived to give the impression of a community at odds with itself. When the leading congregant of the 1850s and 1860s, Montague Alex, married off his daughter in 1867, he chose to snub the community by holding the ceremony as well as the celebration in the Masonic Hall instead of the synagogue.¹⁸

Cheltenham Jews grew more concerned to assimilate than to perpetuate their identity. They stipulated that no Rabbi should be appointed who had a beard, and preferred even their poultry-butcher to be English-born. The qualifications required were so high and the duties expected of their minister so extensive that Cheltenham Jews had a succession of temporary and disgruntled aspirant-clergymen to hold the congregation together. P. Phillips was the longest-lasting incumbent, resigning in 1874 after eight years. He was a London-born son of a Spitalfields ostrich-feather 'manufacturer'. Educated at Jews' College, he claimed the title 'Reverend' because he had previously taken temporary jobs as cantor in Bristol and Sheerness. He was unmarried and was expected to teach Hebrew classes gratuitously as well as to act as

cantor, poultry-butcher, and minister, for £60 per annum. In 1872, Phillips dared to ask for a rise, to no avail: 'I should not have written on this subject knowing you have lost some good members, whose loss I keenly felt, only my private resources are exhausted.' Meanwhile, the synagogue's assets (cottages for which rent was collected) were run like a private company, with the balance sheet in the 1860s frequently recording the distribution of fresh 'shares' to a caucus of eight or nine names, among whom the offices of President, Warden, and Secretary rotated.

The failure of leadership extended well beyond the scope of religious functions. The Jewish community's members were most prone to spring to its defence in its early years, especially in the heyday of the Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews, a society which baptised two Jews in Cheltenham in 1838¹⁹ and two more in 1843.²⁰ Thus, in 1838 a Cheltenham Jew appealed in *The Cheltenham Free Press*²¹ for equal rights for his co-religionists, and in 1845 Cheltenham Jews followed many other Jewish congregations in petitioning Parliament for Jewish emancipation. This campaigning spirit petered out, and no reply was made to subsequent hostile characterizations of Jews that appeared in the local press.²² The last defence occurred in 1868 when the local Liberal candidate at the hustings let drop an anti-Jewish remark. The synagogue leaders met him 'as a deputation from the Jewish electors' and elicited an assurance that he meant no ill towards this congregation 'so universally respected and well spoken of, so respectable and so influential'.²³ But he lost the election and his retraction never reached the press.

Lastly, the Jews' image in Cheltenham remained unpopular in part because of the failure of that provincial community to diversify its occupational range, as other Jewish communities were doing in the nineteenth century. Cheltenham Jewry was unique in that it had more pawnbrokers in 1871 than in 1841. In 1838-45,²⁴ the town's Jews could be found practising as opticians, shoemakers, furriers, booksellers, watchmakers, wheelchair-makers, drapers, and fancy goods warehousemen. By 1871, the pawnbrokers predominated, though they were not as geographically concentrated along the High Street as in the early days.²⁵ This contraction of the job spectrum reinforced both the age-old association of Jews with pawnbroking and the myth that Jews would always be as they had been. Without the usual ration of 'professionals', Cheltenham Jews lacked a sufficient sense of community to support each other's diversifying initiatives, or leave any traces of communal life behind them. The paradox of a languishing community in the midst of prospering late Victorian Cheltenham may never be satisfactorily explained.

However, the available evidence tallies remarkably closely with the assumptions of Jewish Victorians about why some provincial congrega-

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tions decayed. They distinguished between the major and the minor urban communities on the grounds not of a town's size or prosperity, but of the status of its immigrants. A Jew, discussing the waves of successively more respectable immigrants establishing themselves in Liverpool, Birmingham, or Manchester, reflected:²⁶

... there is a kind of monotony in the early history of our English provincial communities. First there comes a substratum of poor Germans or Poles, who pioneer the way into a town as hawkers, pedlars, or watchmakers; then commences the struggle for livelihood and the desire to educate their offspring in the religious faith of their ancestors; and lastly, there arrives a superior stratum of newcomers, who help to fertilize the soil that has been cleared and prepared by the original humble settlers.

By contrast, the smaller provincial communities were reputed for their indifference towards religious education and their lack of a sense of communal responsibility, epitomized by the low wages awarded to Hebrew teachers. In a letter to the London weekly, *The Jewish Record*, a school teacher complained²⁷ that these smaller

... provincial congregations of Great Britain are composed mainly of our foreign brethren from Poland and Russia, men who driven from their native land and from their childhood's associations should by reason of a common calamity be supposed to cling the more tenaciously to each other. Unfortunately, this is not the case. There is no amity, and no unity, and consequently no combined effort to obtain a teacher for their children.

Cheltenham lacked both a 'sequence of progressively' respectable immigrants and an interest in Hebrew education. Its Jewish community was generally ignored by the Jewish press. However, a correspondent, writing in *The Jewish Record*²⁸ on the occasion of the visit of the Chief Rabbi to the town in 1871, noted that Cheltenham Jews deviated from their usual practice (of keeping their place of business open late on Fridays) by closing in time for the beginning of the Sabbath in order to greet him. He commented: 'They seem to show more respect for Dr. Adler than for the Almighty.'

NOTES

¹ V. D. Lipman, *Social History of the Jews in England 1850-1950*, London, 1954, p. 66. Unless other references are given, the sources for this paper are the Cheltenham Jewish Archives, saved from destruction by Dr. A. Goldfoot, and deposited on loan in Gloucester County Record Office.

² Cecil Roth, *The Rise of Provincial Jewry*, London, 1950, p. 26. Dr. S. Blake and Dr. Aubrey Newman kindly commented on an earlier draft of this article.

³ Roth, *ibid.*, pp. 24, 26.

⁴ Gwen Hart, *A History of Cheltenham*, Leicester, 1965, p. 364.

⁵ Figures for Cheltenham's general population are taken from the decennial Census reports for England and Wales, 1831-1901. See also J. Patmore, 'The Spa Towns of Britain', in R. Beckinsale and J. Houston, eds., *Urbanization and its Problems*, Oxford, 1968, pp. 47-69.

⁶ Peter I. Rose, with the assistance of Liv O. Pertzoff, *Strangers in their Midst: Small-Town Jews and their Neighbors*, New York, 1977.

⁷ Cheltenham Spa Campaign, *St. George's Place*, Cheltenham, 1978, p. 29.

⁸ J. Goding, *Norman's History of Cheltenham*, London, 1863, p. 472.

⁹ Roth, op. cit., p. 51.

¹⁰ Quoted in S. Pakenham, *Cheltenham*, London, 1971, p. 97.

¹¹ *Cheltenham Free Press*, 18 May 1839. The land was purchased by Isaiah Alex and five other Jews resident in Cheltenham and Stroud in 1834 (Gloucester County Record Office D2025 Box 95).

¹² *The Cheltenham Annuaire for 1860*, Cheltenham, 1860, p. xi. A similar mistake was made by F. Westley, whose *New Guide to Cheltenham* (Cheltenham, 1867) noted 'a Jewish Synagogue in St. James' Square' (p. 31). St. James' Square was just off St. George's Place, where the synagogue 'from its retired situation is not seen to advantage': George Rowe, *Illustrated Cheltenham Guide*, Cheltenham, 1845, p. 96.

¹³ Lipman, op. cit., p. 186; statistics of Chief Rabbi's Questionnaire of 1846 cited in Jewish Historical Society of England, *Provincial Jewry in Victorian Britain*, Conference of July 1975.

¹⁴ Lipman, op. cit., p. 186. The contemporary distinction in Victorian congregations between 'seatholders' and 'members' is described in Bill Williams, *The Making of Manchester Jewry 1740-1875*, Manchester, 1976, p. 54.

¹⁵ Richard Moses was a pawnbroker. He suffered an extensive robbery in 1858. Neither culprits nor property were ever found; see Goding, op. cit., p. 622. Samuel Moses, his brother, was also a High Street pawnbroker. In 1866 he discovered that his assistant, a local lad named Tom Piff, had been systematically embezzling him: *Cheltenham Times and Musical Record*, 19 January 1867.

¹⁶ Jewish Historical Society of England, *Provincial Jewry in Victorian Britain*, op. cit., Proceedings, sub. Cheltenham.

¹⁷ cf. Alfred Miles, *History of Cheltenham and District* (manuscript in Cheltenham Local History Library, 1927), vol. 6, p. 180.

¹⁸ *Cheltenham Times and Musical Record*, 6 July 1867. The Freemasons did not provide a ladder for Jews to climb into English gentlemanly status: Montague Alex was the only Jewish member of the Cheltenham Freemasons; he belonged to the junior lodge, which also accepted the occasional fishmonger and tobacconist. He is recorded as a Freemason, both in 1868, when Knight the architect was a fellow-member, and in 1873, when he had retired to 77 Marland Place, Southampton. See Gloucester County Record Office QRM 1/1-2.

¹⁹ *Cheltenham Chronicle*, 19 April 1838.

²⁰ Goding, op. cit., p. 561.

²¹ *Cheltenham Free Press*, 18 August 1838.

²² *Gloucestershire Chronicle*, 18 July 1857; and *Cheltenham Working Men's College Magazine*, 1885, p. 191. For the general climate of opinion in late nineteenth-century England, see Colin Holmes, *Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876-1939*, London, 1979, chapter 1.

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²³ Letter in Cheltenham Jewish Archives.

²⁴ Henry Davies, ed., *Cheltenham Annuaire for 1837*, Cheltenham, 1838; 1841 Census (Public Record Office); and Cheltenham Jewish Archives.

²⁵ 1871 Census (Public Record Office).

²⁶ *The Jewish World*, 10 August 1877.

²⁷ *The Jewish Record*, 14 August 1868.

²⁸ *ibid.*, 14 July 1871.

WHY NORTH AMERICANS MIGRATE TO ISRAEL

Gerald S. Berman

THIS paper addresses itself to the question of why North Americans migrate to Israel. There has never been a large migration of Americans and Canadians to Israel—indeed their number has been almost negligible in relation to the size of the Jewish population in the United States and Canada.¹ This is not all that surprising. Historically, international migration has been from the less to the more developed countries—so that the movement of Americans and Canadians to Israel seems to be traditionally in the wrong direction. However, several thousands do arrive each year, and one wonders why these few North American Jews out of so many decide to migrate.

The question of *why* people migrate, as Taylor has pointed out, is not so easily distinguishable from the question of *who* migrates.² One can discover why some people have moved from one place to another either by asking them, or by observing in which characteristics they differ significantly from those who do not migrate. These are the two principal approaches which have been useful in research in international migration; but each method has its limitations. On the one hand, explaining behaviour in terms of objective characteristics neglects the person's own 'definition of the situation'. On the other hand, to rely only on the migrant's personal account of reasons for choosing to settle in a new country raises the possibility of rationalization.

In this paper the question of why North Americans migrate to Israel is approached from both perspectives: by the selectivity of the migrants (how they differ from those who stay at home), and by motives (the reasons they give for their decision to migrate). Several data sources, including the findings of two studies which I conducted, are used to investigate this question. I shall also examine trends over time to determine whether motivations for migration have changed. In addition, some attention will be given to the classical distinction between 'push' and 'pull' factors of migration. In the context of the studies considered here, I will attempt to show whether North American immigrants feel more 'pulled' towards Israel or more 'pushed' to leave their country of origin.³

Previous studies

The first major study of North Americans in Israel was by Antonovsky and Katz.⁴ In late 1966, they interviewed 1,649 Americans and Canadians between the ages of 22 and 65 who had migrated to Israel by March 1966. In order to obtain a longitudinal picture, they divided their sample into three groups according to time of arrival in Israel: those who came (1) before the establishment of the State in 1948; (2) between 1948 and 1956; and finally, (3) between 1957 and 1966.⁵

In that study, the decision to migrate was examined by way of the two approaches mentioned above: *who* were these North American immigrants, and *why*, in their own words, did they move?

As to the first question, Antonovsky and Katz found a group distinguished clearly by its strong commitment to Jewishness. Unusually high proportions of their respondents had a strong Jewish educational background, had come from Orthodox families, from families who were extremely observant of traditions, and from homes which had maintained a definite atmosphere of Jewishness.⁶ They commented: 'This was a population, which on the eve of migration to Israel, was in a good part rooted in its Jewish identity.'⁷

Zionist organizational affiliation was also evident among these migrants, although it had considerably declined by the last period. Whereas more than three quarters of the pre-1948 immigrants were members of a Zionist organization in their last year in America, only 47 per cent of the 1957-66 group were Zionist-affiliated.⁸ This trend accords with the data on motives (referred to below), which show a diminishing importance of Zionist reasons for migration over time.

These then are selective attributes, which according to Taylor's scheme could offer clues as to why North Americans settle in Israel. It could be inferred, that is, that a good many of the North American migrants were attracted to Israel because it was the one country in which their Jewishness might be expressed.

Antonovsky and Katz then turned to the more direct approach and asked their North American respondents why in fact they decided to migrate.⁹ For the entire sample, two types of reason—Jewishness and Zionism—were more or less equally prominent, far outweighing the other types. Antonovsky and Katz point out that although the two types of motive were closely related empirically (those who gave a Zionist reason for immigrating were likely to mention a Jewish-type reason as well, and vice versa), they are nonetheless distinctively different. Zionist motives refer to an ideological orientation which considers migration to Israel as a social movement—a group solution to the survival of the Jewish people; building a Jewish homeland is the central concern. By contrast, Jewishness refers to a more individual, subjective orientation: 'a personal wish to live a certain kind of life in a certain place'.¹⁰

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Differences in time were also noted. A consistent decline in the importance of Zionist motives occurred over the three periods of immigration (see Table 1). Almost half the pre-State immigrants referred to an aspect of Zionism as the most important reason for coming to Israel, whereas this was the case for 32 per cent of the 1948-56 group and for only 16 per cent of those who arrived in 1957-66. Jewish-religious reasons, on the other hand, not only maintained their stability but gained slightly over time. By the last period (1957-66), they had emerged as the single most important motive for *aliyah*, acting thus as a major 'pull' for North Americans who came to Israel during those years.¹¹

Goldscheider, analysing registration data (collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel) on immigrants who arrived in 1969-70, came to conclusions more or less similar to those of the above study.

TABLE 1. *Most important type of reason for migration to Israel by period of immigration in Antonovsky and Katz sample (in percentages)**

Type of reason	Period of immigration			Total
	Pre-1948	1948-56	1957-66	
Zionism	48	32	16	29
Jewishness-religious	22	29	30	28
Other, miscellaneous	30	39	54	43
TOTALS: per cent	100	100	100	100
(number)	(312)	(666)	(671)	(1,649)

*Data are adapted from Aaron Antonovsky and Abraham David Katz, *From the Golden to the Promised Land*, Jerusalem, 1979, Table IV-1, p. 51.

These data on immigrant characteristics revealed, on the one hand, an extremely high level of Jewish background, education, and identity. On the other hand, Zionist organizational activity was not a prominent feature among the American immigrants: only half of them (50.7 per cent) had been members of a Zionist organization before their migration, and only 20.9 per cent defined themselves as very active members.¹² Goldscheider comments that although ideological factors still motivate migration to Israel, it is an ideology which 'seems much less "Zionist" in the narrow, formal sense and much more "religious" in its broadest, sociological meaning'.¹³ His data revealed a growing importance of the religious and Jewishness factors. As Antonovsky and Katz have suggested, this is no doubt concurrent with a growing legitimacy of overt Jewish and religious expression in America in general, and not inconsequentially, they add, among young third-generation American Jews.¹⁴

Data from a more recent study by Tabory and Lazerwitz again

pointed to the importance of Jewishness and religious reasons for immigration.¹⁵ A sample of American academics who came to Israel between 1967 and 1973 were interviewed in the first months of 1975. That investigation clearly showed that Israel was receiving a very high proportion of American Orthodox Jews. Moreover, the most common type of reason given for migrating was the chance to enjoy a fuller Jewish and religious life in a Jewish society. The authors' conclusion, based both on selective characteristics and on the answers given by American immigrants, was that 'were it not for Israel being a Jewish society, many of them would probably not have left the United States'.¹⁶ They added, however (disagreeing with interpretations offered in the other studies), that the American migration is to a large extent the result of 'push' factors—a feeling of uneasiness in a foreign, predominantly Christian American culture that *pushed* them to come to Israel.¹⁷

Data from 1976 and 1977 studies

Two studies which I recently conducted examined further the reasons given by North Americans for their migration to Israel. In the first—carried out in the summer and autumn of 1976—there were 292 American and Canadian men and women, 21 years of age and older, who had come to Israel between January 1970 and January 1975.¹⁸ The sample was drawn in a systematic representative manner from lists maintained on all immigrants by the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption.

The second set of data was derived from a study of 145 North Americans, aged 20 and over, who had all come to Israel in 1976.¹⁹ Most of them, interviewed in the autumn of 1977, were still living in absorption centres and immigrant hostels. Both samples appeared to be fairly representative of the population of Americans and Canadians who had migrated in those years. A number of characteristics of the sample respondents—such as age distribution, marital and occupational status, and region of last residence in North America—were compared with equivalent characteristics available in the files of the population from which they were drawn and found to be similar.

Selective characteristics. As in the studies already referred to in this paper, the North Americans in these two samples are characterized by a definite Jewish-religion selectivity. An examination of their demographic and social attributes shows that it is this dimension which seems to distinguish them most of all. The data on a number of indicators of this Jewish-religious character are shown in Table 2.

A strong Jewish background is clearly evident. About one-half of the respondents in both samples report that their childhood homes were religious or very religious. In addition, both groups (and particularly the earlier one) show a fairly intensive background of Jewish education.

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TABLE 2. *Distribution of Jewish-religious characteristics among two samples
(in percentages)*

Characteristic	<i>Time of migration</i>	
	1970-74	1976
Religiousness of parental home		
Very religious	13	12
Religious	40	37
Not very religious	30	34
Not at all religious	16	17
	TOTALS: per cent	
	99	100
	(288)*	(139)
Jewish education		
Full-time day school	32	21
Afternoon Hebrew and Sunday school	23	39
Afternoon Hebrew school only	23	13
Sunday or Saturday school only	9	13
Other	3	1
No Jewish education	10	14
	TOTALS: per cent	
	100	101
	(284)	(143)
Median no. of years of Jewish education	8.0	6.3
Feeling of being Jewish in		
North America		
Strong feeling (1-2) †	81	80
Medium feeling (3-5)	14	17
Little or no feeling (6-7)	5	3
	TOTALS: per cent	
	100	100
	(287)	(140)
Religious self-identification		
Very religious	14	17
Religious	35	24
Not very religious	28	42
Not at all religious	23	18
	TOTALS: per cent	
	100	101
	(288)	(139)
Institutional self-identification		
Orthodox	37	25
Conservative	31	42
Reform	10	18
Other	22	15
	TOTALS: per cent	
	100	100
	(286)	(139)

* Totals vary owing to missing data.

† Seven response categories were provided, from 'strong feeling of being Jewish' (1) to 'no feeling of being Jewish' (7).

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TABLE 2—*contd.*

<i>Characteristic</i>	<i>Time of migration</i>	
	<i>1970-74</i>	<i>1976</i>
Synagogue attendance		
Once a week or more frequently	36	29
Several times a month	7	18
Only on Holy Days	20	29
Rarely or never	36	24
TOTALS: per cent	99	100
(number)	(292)	(136)

Almost nine out of ten respondents in both samples had some type of Jewish education, and almost one-third in the earlier group and one-fifth in the later group had attended a full-time Hebrew day school at one time. The median number of years of Jewish education was 8.0 for the 1970-74 migration and 6.3 for the 1976 group.

Consistent with these background characteristics is the strong Jewish feeling expressed by most respondents in both samples. The extent of religious self-identification is also substantial. In both groups, half the respondents said that they were either religious or very religious, and two-thirds identified themselves as either Orthodox or Conservative. In the earlier sample, as many as one in three defined himself or herself as Orthodox. The last item in Table 2 shows that 43 per cent of the 1970-74 sample, and 47 per cent of the 1976 sample, had attended synagogue at least several times a month before their migration, while 36 per cent of the earlier group, and 29 per cent of the later, had attended services at least once a week.

A complete picture of the distribution of religious characteristics of the Jewish population in North America is not available, but it is safe to conclude from a few scattered sources that North American immigrants in Israel have a greater than average Jewish-religious dimension. For instance, whereas 11 per cent of the Jewish population in the United States are estimated to be Orthodox,²⁰ 37 per cent of Goldscheider's 1969-70 sample,²¹ and 37 and 25 per cent of the respondents in my two samples defined themselves as Orthodox. North Americans who migrate to Israel are therefore quite likely to have done so for Jewish-religious purposes.

Reasons for migration. In an open-ended question, respondents were asked to give three reasons, in order of importance, for their migration to Israel (see Table 3).

As in the case of Antonovsky and Katz's data, motives linked to Zionism and Jewishness constitute the major 'pull' for these North Americans. Together they account for 69 per cent of the 1970-74 group, and

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TABLE 3. *Most important type of reason for migration to Israel among two samples (in percentages)*

<i>Type of reason</i>	<i>Time of migration</i>	
	1970-74	1976
Zionism	38	42
Jewishness-religious	31	18
Attraction to life in Israel	19	18
Family reasons	5	6
Dissatisfaction with life in North America	4	6
Personal reasons	3	10
TOTALS: per cent (number)	100 (273)	100 (140)

* The question asked was open-ended. The following are the types of responses, taken verbatim, according to the motive type by which they were coded:

Zionism: identification as a Zionist; return to a Jewish homeland; contribute to the building of Israel; 'coming home', Israel is where a Jew should live; to live in one's own country; solution to the Jewish problem.

Jewish-religious: to lead a fuller Jewish, religious, or spiritual life; to live among other Jews; Israel offers the opportunity of full expression as a Jew; for children to be raised in a Jewish environment; etc.

Attraction to life in Israel: reasons other than Jewish or Zionist attractions, such as a more personal society, sense of community, less hectic pace, opportunity to contribute, interesting place to live, beautiful land, climate, job opportunity, etc.

Family reasons: better place to raise children; other members of family wanted to come; Israeli spouse; children in Israel; etc.

Dissatisfaction with life in North America: crime; unsafe streets; antisemitism; dissatisfaction with political or cultural life; not want to live in the Diaspora; dissatisfaction with Jewish life; lack of job opportunity; etc.

Personal reasons: adventure; new start in life; to seek self-fulfilment or purpose in life; etc.

60 per cent of the 1976 sample. But in contrast to Antonovsky and Katz (see Table 1), a time trend of decreasing Zionism and increasing Jewish-religious reasons does not obtain. Indeed, Zionist motives appear to be slightly stronger in the later group but the difference is not statistically significant. In any case, both types of motive still predominate, with the majority giving a Jewish or Zionist-type reason for this decision to immigrate.

This selective pattern of both Jewish-religious characteristics and Jewish and Zionist motives is *not* associated with a Zionist organizational background: Table 4 shows that only a little over a third of

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TABLE 4. *Zionist organizational affiliation among two samples (in percentages)*

<i>Affiliation</i>	<i>Time of migration</i>	
	<i>1970-74</i>	<i>1976</i>
Member, active or fairly active	28	23
Member, not very or not at all active	11	12
Not a member	61	65
TOTALS: per cent (number)	100 (287)	100 (138)

the respondents were members of a Zionist organization in North America, and only about a quarter were active members. (It will be recalled that among the 1969-70 American immigrants studies by Goldscheider, only half of them belonged to a Zionist organization and only one fifth were very active members.)

Table 5 compares Zionist activity with several indicators of Jewish-religious identification among the 1976 respondents. It shows that the Zionists are more likely than the non-Zionists to have come from observant homes, to be more observant themselves, to have attended synagogue frequently, and to have had seven or more years of Jewish education. In addition, a higher proportion of Zionist than of non-Zionist members gave Jewish-religious reasons for their migration.

TABLE 5. *Percentage scoring high on measures of Jewish-religious identification, by Zionist organizational membership (1976 sample)*

<i>Jewish-religious characteristics</i>	<i>Zionist organization</i>		
	<i>Member</i>	<i>Non-member</i>	<i>Total</i>
Parental home observant*	62	44	50
Total number†	(45)	(96)	(141)
Attended synagogue‡	77	36	49
Total number	(45)	(95)	(140)
7 or more years of Jewish education	64	38	46
Total number	(45)	(95)	(140)
Respondent observant*	49	36	40
Total number	(45)	(96)	(141)
Jewish-religious reason given for migration	26	13	17
Total number	(42)	(94)	(136)

* Observant = those who answered 'very observant' or 'observant'.

† N in each case represents the total number of respondents in each membership category; i.e. base N on which percentages are computed.

‡ Those who attended synagogue twice a month or more frequently in North America before their migration to Israel.

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Conclusion

Thus, although the Zionist dimension continues to play an important role in the motivational structure of North Americans who migrate to Israel, the Zionism of the 1970s is different from that of the pre-State days. The Zionism of today which motivates migration seems less formal or organizational, but more idealistic and religious. In spite of the clear Jewishness selectivity of recent North American migrants in Israel, it is not that a Jewish-religiosity has replaced Zionism, but that the two types of motive seem to have converged, resulting in a kind of Jewish-religio-Zionist ideology. As Goldscheider has noted, one major type of migrant from North America is to be found among those 'in search of Jewishness and Judaism who see Israeli society as a rich, natural environment for the expression of their own Jewish identity and that of their children'.²²

NOTES

¹ Until 1967, no more than 1,500 to 2,000 North Americans per year migrated to Israel. Figures vary considerably depending on the statistical sources, estimation procedures, and definitions of immigrant status. The first few years after the Six-Day War in 1967 saw a marked rise in North American immigration, reaching a peak of 8,122 in 1971. Since then, however, the number of North Americans coming to Israel has dropped steadily, returning more or less to the pre-1967 figures. See the following publications by the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption: *Immigration to Israel, 1948-1972, Part 1. Annual Data*, Special Series No. 416; *Absorption of North American Immigrants*, 1974; and 'Selected Data on North American Immigrants', unpublished data collected from Ministry files, 1976. See also Calvin Goldscheider, 'American Aliya. Sociological and Demographic Perspectives', in Marshall Sklare, ed., *The Jew in American Society*, New York, 1974, pp. 335-384.

² R. C. Taylor, 'Migration and Motivation: A Study of Determinants and Types', in J. A. Jackson, ed., *Migration*, London, 1969, pp. 99-133.

³ The difficulty of conceptually separating 'push' and 'pull' motives for migration has been acknowledged in the literature. Motives can reflect both 'push' and 'pull' elements. For example, if poor job opportunities in the country of origin were a reason to move, then better opportunities in the new country would likely be a correlate. See Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, *The Language of Social Research*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1955, p. 388; and R. C. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 99-100.

⁴ Aaron Antonovsky and Abraham David Katz, *From the Golden to the Promised Land*, Jerusalem, 1979.

⁵ It should be noted, however, that the majority (about 70 per cent) of Americans and Canadians in Israel migrated after 1967. See Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, op. cit., 1974, Table 4, pp. 20-25; and the Ministry's 1976 data referred to in Note 1 above.

- ⁶ Antonovsky and Katz, op. cit., pp. 43-47.
- ⁷ *ibid.*, p. 45.
- ⁸ *ibid.*, p. 39.
- ⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 49-67.
- ¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 52. See also the Note to Table 3 above.
- ¹¹ *ibid.*, pp. 55-58.
- ¹² Goldscheider, op. cit., pp. 374-377.
- ¹³ *ibid.*, p. 375.
- ¹⁴ Antonovsky and Katz, op. cit., p. 58.
- ¹⁵ Ephraim Tabory and Bernard Lazerwitz, 'Motivation for Migration: A Comparative Study of American and Soviet Academic Immigrants to Israel', *Ethnicity*, vol. 4, no. 2 (June 1977), pp. 91-102.
- ¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 100.
- ¹⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 94-95.
- ¹⁸ The study was supported by funds from the Center for the Absorption of Scientists, Office of the Prime Minister, State of Israel.
- ¹⁹ The Department of Immigration and Absorption of the Jewish Agency of Israel and the Department of Planning and Research of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption gave financial assistance for this research.
- ²⁰ Bernard Lazerwitz, Mimeographed Paper on United States National Jewish Population Survey, 1975. Other data from the National Jewish Population Study (1970) show only 8.4 per cent of Jewish household heads and 7.3 per cent of individuals aged 13 and over characterized as Orthodox-affiliated. See Fred Massarik, 'Affiliation and Nonaffiliation in the United States Jewish Community: A Reconceptualization', *American Jewish Yearbook*, vol. LXXVIII (1978), pp. 262-274 at p. 264. For additional descriptive data regarding Jewish and religious characteristics, see Gerald Engel, 'Comparison Between Americans Living in Israel and Those Who Returned to America: Part 1, American Background', *The Journal of Psychology*, vol. LXXIV (March 1970), pp. 195-204; Marshall Sklare, *America's Jews*, New York, 1971, pp. 103-135, 155-179; Charles Liebman, *The Ambivalent American Jew: Politics, Religion, and Family in American Jewish Life*, Philadelphia, 1973.
- ²¹ Goldscheider, op. cit., p. 380.
- ²² *ibid.*, p. 384.

BEN-GURION'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION

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THE negative attitude of Israeli leaders towards Communism in general, and the Soviet Union in particular, is by now firmly established: the Western orientation of Israel and her economic, military, and political dependence on the United States are salient facts and the only question is that of extent. It is also not difficult to understand why Israel is in the Western camp, in view of the anti-Zionist policy of the U.S.S.R. and its consistent support of the Arab side. The decision-making process which accompanied Israel's shift from non-alignment to support for the West during the Korean crisis and its aftermath has been thoroughly analysed by Michael Brecher.¹ A relevant factor, however, which has not been examined carefully to date, is the attitude of Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, towards the Soviet Union. His negative perception of the Soviet Union probably influenced Israel's pro-Western orientation.

Objective political and strategic factors in the decision-making process are clearly important, but it is likely that policies are influenced by the personal attitudes of the decision-makers.² This latter variable is particularly significant in the light of the fact that Israel's shift towards the West preceded Russia's penetration into the Middle East and support of the Arab cause. Moreover, the general tendency of the new states—which achieved their independence after the Second World War—to adopt a neutral stand in the East-West conflict, and the self-proclaimed non-alignment policy of Israel in the early years give this variable further importance.

There are several reasons for selecting David Ben-Gurion as the subject of the present study. First, there is no doubt today that he had a profound impact on Israel's foreign policy when he was Prime Minister—an impact which transcended his period in office and left its imprint on the way of thinking of his heirs. Second, Ben-Gurion was the central decision-maker during the critical years before the foundation of the State and in the first period of independence, when regional orientations and frameworks were firmly established. Third, Ben-Gurion has left a multitude of statements and writings, containing

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concise references to the Soviet Union, throughout the long period of his public life. They provide material for analysing his general value system and worldview.³

In this paper, I quote only from his published works. (The archives at Sde Boker are a fruitful source for future research.) I shall analyse, first, the various specific elements of Ben-Gurion's attitude towards the Soviet Union; and second, the relationship between these elements, his value system, and his conceptual framework of the Jewish people. The present study is limited in two ways. It does not attempt to measure the precise extent to which Ben-Gurion's feelings and beliefs concerning the Soviet Union influenced his foreign policy; it assumes only that his attitude had some impact. Its other limitation is that the period under review does not go beyond the early years of the establishment of the State of Israel; for it is assumed that after the Soviet Union's penetration into the Middle East, when it sided unreservedly with the Arab camp in the mid-1950s, Israel had no choice of global orientation.

A. ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION

Ben-Gurion's critical comments on the Soviet Union were expressed over a long period of time, when he was active in public life as a leader of the *Yishuv* (the Jewish settlement in Palestine before the establishment of the State) and later as Prime Minister of Israel. There are essentially two criteria according to which he judged the Bolsheviks. The first was a general one—the social philosophy and behaviour of the regime and of its leaders. The second, which was probably the dominant one, was an evaluation of the regime and of its representatives from the Jewish perspective—namely, its relation to Jews, Zionism, and the State of Israel. These two strands are sometimes interwoven and sometimes separate. For the sake of clarity, however, I shall consider five different elements which together compose his frame of reference regarding the Soviet Union.

1. *The Soviet regime*

Ben-Gurion's attitude towards the Soviet regime was expressed at several levels. His conception of government was classically Western: the state and political ideology must be designed to serve the individual and not vice versa. The individual has interests, rights, functions, and desires which are not always congruent with those of the state. The state is a partner and an ally and not, as Communist ideology views it, 'a total instrument to impose communism'.⁴ The Soviet government is a totalitarian regime which interferes in all aspects of life through the state machinery according to the line adopted by the party, and especially by its leader. A totalitarian regime must therefore be rejected

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not merely because it is harmful to the interests of the State of Israel and essentially contrary to the nature and tradition of the Jewish people, but also *per se*.⁵

But the objection to the Soviet regime on the philosophical level transcends the socio-political framework. Ben-Gurion despised the philosophy and the various interpretations of Marxism, arguing that in effect there is no objective Marxism. In a speech delivered in 1941, entitled 'A Political Debate with *Ha-Shomer Ha-Tsair*' (*Ha-Shomer Ha-Tsair* was the Marxist faction of the Zionist Labour camp), he emphasized the fact that there are various interpretations of Marxism, such as those of Kautsky, Trotsky, and Stalin, and that each thesis is regarded by the others as anti-Marxist. The Bolsheviki have always demanded that other Socialist parties accept their 'scientific truth', while this truth varies according to the prevailing power struggle within the Soviet Union. He declared:⁶

Whoever controls the G.P.U. or the Gestapo has the power to decide that the theory of relativity is a contra-revolutionary theory, and whoever thinks differently is executed . . . We do not wish to disqualify this or that interpretation but we insist on freedom of the spirit, that a person should be free to explain the events of nature and history according to the best of his knowledge. . . . freedom of the spirit I shall not sell out even for a union with *Ha-Shomer Ha-Tsair*, because spiritual freedom is the totality of a human being.

Ben-Gurion notes that although Communist terminology now calls a totalitarian government 'a popular democracy' rather than a dictatorship, it will not succeed in misleading the free world:⁷

Thirty years ago people were more genuine: then they called a dictatorship—dictatorship, and the supporters of that system had the courage and intellectual integrity to advocate the denial of freedom . . . and the imposition of the minority will on the majority, for ideological reasons. In our days they call a dictatorship a popular democracy, and a puppet government they call genuine independence.

He distinguishes between government by force and government through the conviction and free choice of the majority—'. . . the difference between a dictatorship and a democracy, between the coercive rule of the minority and an elected rule of the majority'.⁸ The direct result of the former system is the loss of all personal rights. 'In the Soviet Union the government rests on tyranny—terror unprecedented in world history,' declared Ben-Gurion, ending his denunciation indignantly:⁹

. . . and this regime which destroyed, shattered and uprooted all of human dignity, all the worker's rights, all of human freedom, and is sustained by terror and a secret police calls itself government of the workers or Soviet Union or a Socialist republic . . .

Finally, he notes that the tyranny of the Soviet regime is expressed also in the international field: under the cover of peace and brotherhood among nations, it pursues an imperialistic expansionism which exceeds even that of the Tsars.¹⁰ And within Russia it implemented a Russification campaign which even the Tsars did not dare to pursue. The menace of such a regime in the international system lies in its desire to force its despotism on other peoples. In this respect, there is no difference between the Bolsheviks and the Nazi and Fascist regimes 'which do not harm merely the residents and the nations that are subordinate to this despotic rule. The opponents of totalitarianism may also be hurt by this regime.'¹¹

2. *Soviet leadership—Stalin*

Whereas Ben-Gurion's attitude towards Bolshevism is clearly negative, his references to Russia's leaders are mixed; we can distinguish here between Lenin and Trotsky on the one hand, and Stalin on the other. For Lenin, power was a means; for Stalin, power became a goal in itself, and thus the party chiefs and Lenin's friends were executed, and instead of a social revolution the old policy of the Russian Tsars was resumed.¹²

Ben Gurion's perception of Lenin and Trotsky was influenced by a visit to the Soviet Union in 1923. In a letter written in December 1923, his evaluation of Lenin was mixed: disapproval, admiration, and sorrow. Lenin's fate symbolized for Ben-Gurion the destiny of Communist Russia. This man, who was ready to sacrifice everything for the final goal, 'the man of iron will who would not spare human life, or the blood of infants and that of the innocent for the sake of the Revolution, was overpowered and collapsed. A malignant disease that he inherited from his parents, an incurable illness smashed this giant.'¹³ Communist Russia, in this respect, resembles Lenin; she, too, inherited an evil ailment. On several occasions he also mentions Trotsky's popularity among the masses, noting that his picture hung side by side with that of Lenin.¹⁴ His view of Stalin, in contrast, is totally negative. While Ben-Gurion does not exonerate Lenin from blame, since it was he who planted the first seeds of distortion by abolishing democracy, thus preparing the road for despotism, it was Stalin who implemented the policy, 'powerfully, with stubbornness, cruelty, and without any conscience'.¹⁵ Stalin is for Ben-Gurion the symbol of negation and pollution. For him, Stalin belongs to the same category as that of the ancient despots—the Russian Tsars—or the modern tyrants—Mussolini and Hitler. Just as some internal national achievements could not exonerate Hitler and Mussolini, Stalin's success in the development of heavy industry cannot compensate for the atrocities committed under his rule, nor affect our opinion of his overall performance.¹⁶

3. *International Communism*

To a great extent, Ben-Gurion's references to the Soviet Union are linked to his relations with the Marxist parties in the *Yishuv* or the State; in many cases they were part of a general attack on the pro-Moscow parties in Israel. He used the latter's loyalty as the point of departure for a discussion of the question of Israel's political and ideological orientation. He perceived International Communism as an instrument for Russia's aspirations of world hegemony, and the Israel Communist parties as Moscow's agents in the accomplishment of this goal in Palestine.

The confrontation between Ben-Gurion and the Internationalist left, which perceived the Communist revolution in Russia as a solution for the Jewish people, started at an early stage in his life and preceded his encounter with the Bolsheviks. As early as 1904-5, he fought against the penetration of the ideas and influence of the Bund into his town, Plonsk.¹⁷ His visit to Soviet Russia in 1923 only strengthened his hatred of the *Yeusectia* (the Hebrew section of the Russian Communist Party); he believed those Jews to represent the most extreme wing in the fight against Zionism and Jewish culture.¹⁸ His hostility towards Jewish Communists was strengthened following the struggle of the Labour Zionists of the *Yishuv* for *Avoda Ivrit* (Jewish labour). The Communist Party of Palestine (P.K.P.), with the assistance of other leftist sections in the Zionist movement—*Poalei Tsion Smol* (Leftist Zionist Workers)—objected to the campaign of other socialists to employ Jewish workers even if they had to pay them more. This campaign was in accordance with the transformation of the Jews from traders to labourers and peasants. In 1932, Ben-Gurion was nominated to serve as prosecutor in a suit by the Histradut (the Federation of Trade Unions) against the Communists. In this trial, he accused them of antisemitism, cooperation with the Mufti's followers, and of being the agents of the Comintern. In addition, he charged them with distributing material which called upon the Arabs to use force in their struggle against the Zionists.¹⁹

At the time of the *Meoraot* (the Palestinian Arab uprising of 1936-39, in which many Jews and Arabs were killed), Ben-Gurion accused the Communist International of supporting the Mufti's terrorism. At that time he argued that the support given to the Arabs came not only from the P.K.P. but also from the Comintern: 'It would be blindness or moral and intellectual cowardice to ignore the revolting fact that "revolutionary socialism" à la Moscow has established a united front with the Mufti, the effendis and the Arab bandit gangs to destroy the Jewish entity and terminate the Jewish people's hopes for redemption.'²⁰ The demand of the leftists, following the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact in 1939, that the *Yishuv* should remain neutral in the Second World War, and

the changes which occurred in these circles, substituting the concept of 'popular democracy' for the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', were additional indicators for Ben-Gurion that these parties were subordinate to the Kremlin.²¹ Even after the 1947 Soviet vote in the United Nations in favour of a Jewish State and diplomatic recognition of Israel, he continued to see *Maki* (the Israeli Communist Party) as a dangerous element. In an address delivered in 1949, entitled 'Problems of our Independence', he cited the actions of the left in the 1930s, arguing that the behaviour of *Mapam* (a labour Zionist party with a Moscow orientation) and *Maki* was a continuation of the actions of the *Yeusectia* and an indication of the subordination of these parties to Moscow and to external forces hostile to the State and to the Jewish people.²²

The debate with the representatives of International Communism, according to Ben-Gurion, did not concern socialism or communism in Israel, but was much more substantial and profound. The issue at stake was whether Israel should be an independent Jewish state or subordinated to the interests of a totalitarian power with global imperialistic ambitions.²³ The U.S.S.R. is to be despised not only because of its totalitarian nature but also because it founded an international movement with which it attempts to subjugate the world.²⁴

Since the foundation of the Catholic Church in Rome and the establishment of the universal rule of the Popes—there has not arisen a force in the world that demanded for itself global and absolute authority like that which the leaders of the Bolshevik party demand. . . . There is no doubt that the heads of the ruling party believe that what is good for their country is also good for other countries and that their country is bringing redemption to the world. . . .

4. *The attitude of the U.S.S.R. to Judaism and Zionism*

Russia's treatment of its Jews and of Zionism had a major and perhaps a dominant effect on Ben-Gurion's general attitude towards the Soviet Union. The isolation of Soviet Jewry from the rest of the Jewish people after the Bolshevik revolution was regarded by Ben-Gurion as a disaster. The severity of this development is expressed in two themes which recur on several occasions. The first theme is that of the terrible loss suffered by the Jewish people in 1917. In order to comprehend the implications of this disaster, the Jewish people had only to ask itself what would have happened had the Russian Revolution taken place in 1880. Had that been the case, Zionism would have been deprived of the waves of immigration of the early twentieth century, of the institutions and the Hebrew literature contributed by eastern European Jewry, and 'all the leaders who headed the Zionist movement for forty years . . . and all the creativity of Russian Jewish emigrants in all the countries'.²⁵ The other theme is the equation of the fate of Russian

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Jewry with the Holocaust. The Jewish people went through two holocausts in one generation: one took place in Russia after the First World War, and the other during the Second World War.²⁶

Ben-Gurion perceived the isolation of Russian Jewry as an integral part of the anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist policies of the Soviet Union. However, his perception of Russia's attitude towards Judaism was not as totally negative during the earlier period as it was to become later.

The mere fact that Ben-Gurion emigrated from eastern Europe indicates that he never believed it possible to find a solution for the Jewish people within the framework of the anticipated social revolution in Europe. He believed that antisemitism would not disappear even in a revolutionary society. While this belief was strengthened during his visit to Russia in 1923, he nevertheless made no direct accusation against the Soviet regime at that time; on the contrary, that regime was in his view the only protection for the Jews against pogroms.²⁷ In 1929, however, he discerned a deliberate anti-Jewish policy on the part of the Soviet government, comparable to that of the Spanish Inquisition.²⁸ In 1950, he argued that the anti-Jewish campaign in the Soviet Union was a deliberate plan which stood in contrast to the comparative tolerance of other cultures:²⁹

Only one entity in the Soviet Union, the Jewish entity, was in effect condemned to national and spiritual annihilation . . . the most ancient culture among the nations of the Soviet Union was robbed of its historic inheritance . . . silence and decimation and national bereavement were decreed upon a Jewish community that numbers millions, a community that for generations led the national creativity of its people.

In 1953, he proclaimed openly that this Soviet policy was motivated by anti-Jewish feelings, and that the treatment and persecution of Jews could be compared to the Nazi campaign. In both cases—the Nazi and the Bolshevik—he objected to the use of the term 'antisemitism' since both regimes co-operated with the Mufti, also a Semite. What motivated both was their hatred of Jews, and the result was warfare against the people of Israel and the State of Israel.³⁰

In Ben-Gurion's statements on Soviet attitudes towards Zionism, several gradations can be discerned. The recognition of Soviet hostility towards Zionism was present already in 1923, but at that time Ben-Gurion placed the blame primarily on the *Yevsectia*. By 1937, he included the Communist International and the Soviet government. 'The fastidious distinction made by *Ha-Shomer Ha-Tsair* between the Comintern and Soviet Russia,' he asserted, 'ignores a basic fact, that in both the Comintern and Soviet Russia there is one and only one ruler who directs everything and is responsible for everything: the Russian Communist party.'³¹ At that time, however, he still explained Russia's behaviour as resulting from the weakness of the Zionist movement. After

the Soviet Union became an ally of the Western powers in 1941, he speculated that the Russians might also change their attitude towards Zionism.³² A similar theme can be traced following the Gromyko speech and the Soviet vote in the United Nations in 1947.³³ Subsequently, however, his interpretation of Soviet policy changed. In 1953, he argued that Soviet policy was fundamentally and permanently anti-Zionist. That policy, according to Ben-Gurion, had begun with the coming to power of the Bolsheviks, was continued in the 1930s when they supported the Mufti, and reached its climax during the Doctors and Prague trials. The 1947 vote in the U.N. did not indicate a basic change in Soviet policy but was rather a tactical change designed to accomplish the expulsion of Britain from the Middle East.³⁴ Thus, he reached the conclusion that Israel could not assume a change in Soviet policy because 'the Stalinist regime in its essence and its historical aspirations, aspirations of imperialism and Russian chauvinism *par excellence*, cannot be reconciled with the existence of a Jewish people having the right to self-determination'.³⁵ On this occasion he also asserted that it was impossible to differentiate between anti-Judaism and anti-Zionism, as the *Ha-Shomer Ha-Tsair* had tried to interpret the Soviet Union's policy through the thesis of 'tragic contradiction';³⁶ For Ben-Gurion, the Jewish people plus Zionism equalled the State of Israel; the three were interdependent and inseparable.³⁷

5. *The Soviet Union vis-à-vis the West*

Finally, in order to round out the picture, we must compare Ben-Gurion's attitude towards the Soviet Union with his attitude towards the Western world in general and the United States in particular. Such a comparison was drawn by Israel's first Prime Minister himself on the basis of three criteria: Israel's ability to influence the various regimes; the Jewish community in each regime; and a general comparison between the people of America and of Russia.

What seems to be crucial in Ben-Gurion's evaluation is Israel's ability to influence governments through public opinion. This factor was already salient in his political conception during the 1930s, when the debate regarding the international orientation of Zionism began. On several occasions, Ben-Gurion explained that one of the cardinal factors which influenced his Anglo-centric orientation was the fact that it was possible to influence the British government through public opinion.³⁸ 'Where there is no freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of the press, freedom of communication . . . there is no potential for Zionism policy.'³⁹ With the foundation of the State and the exacerbation of relations between totalitarian and free societies, this factor was given even more emphasis. In an address to the Knesset in 1951, he divided the countries of the world into three groups: countries which did not estab-

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lish relations with Israel, countries with which relations were restricted solely to the government, and 'countries where we maintain relations with both their government and their people'. The difference between the second and the third group, from Israel's perspective, is very significant. While in totalitarian states interaction is restricted to the formal channels, in free states it is possible to turn to the press, to speak to the elected representatives, and to appeal to the people. 'Is it necessary to explain the importance of access to a free public opinion?' he asked; and added, 'In these countries the government is based on persuasion, public debate is permitted and natural, and criticism is free . . . and ultimately public opinion determines the attitude of the government.'⁴⁰

Ben-Gurion also evaluated both the United States and the Soviet Union from the Jewish point of view. On many occasions he pointed out that the two largest Jewish communities in the world happened to be in Russia and America, a reality which required Israel to maintain good relations with both. But, with time, this line of thinking was slowly phased out and increasing emphasis was placed on American Jewry. During the early 1940s Ben-Gurion saw the value and importance of American Jews, although he did not then trust them; he saw them as 'Marranos' (those converts in Spain and Portugal who practised Judaism in secret during the time of the Inquisition) because of their apprehensions in identifying openly with the Jewish people and Zionism.⁴¹ With the establishment of the State, his attitude changed and he expected them to make important contributions to the building of the Jewish State. The main reason for this was that 'since the United States is a free democratic country, American Jewry is able to contribute to, and participate in, the development and fortification of Israel'.⁴² It was not that American Jews were better than Soviet Jews: 'Take away from the American people its freedom and American Jewry will also be paralysed. Jewish freedom is possible only in a free environment.'⁴³

In addition, Ben-Gurion had much more respect and sympathy for the Americans than for the Russians, as a nation—although he did sometimes criticize the former. His respect for the American people originated at a rather early stage in his political activity. In 1915, he spoke of the difficulties, the sacrifices, the struggle and pioneering spirit of the first settlers who were responsible for America's richness, prosperity, and ability to absorb immigrants from all over the world.⁴⁴ In a speech at the convention of his party in August 1950, he chose to compare the two countries by citing de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, in which the author draws a comparison between Russia and America. De Tocqueville analyses the different ways in which the Russian and the American each advances his country's power. While the American fights against the hazards of nature, the Russian fights against people. The American struggles against the desert with a plough and relies on free enterprise; the Russian, in contrast, fights against

civilization with a sword and his government is centralistic. 'The main tool of the American is freedom, of Russia—subordination.' And Ben-Gurion summarized: 'It is possible to disagree with one or another definition . . . , but it is impossible not to appreciate the penetrating vision of this French analyst.'⁴⁵

In 1951, in an address on Israel's foreign policy, he again compared the two regimes, openly attacking various aspects of Communism while praising the United States. The most important factor, according to Ben-Gurion, is that the aid given by the American government to Israel is a result of the sympathy of the American people, 'and only if we know how to maintain friendly and trustful relations between us and the American people shall we be able to count, more or less, on the assistance of the American government'.⁴⁶

In 1953, he contrasted East and West. He argued that it would be misleading to state that the world is divided into blocs; there is only one bloc which is united by being subordinated in all respects to a superior rule and dogma—Communism, to which all the Communist branches scattered throughout the globe belong. The rest of the world he saw as a heterogenous body not subject to any superior or central authority—and that was the camp to which Israel belonged.⁴⁷

B. BEN-GURION'S VALUE SYSTEM AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE

1. Value System

A value system can be defined as 'an individual's over-all life aspiration (what he really wants to achieve) which on the one hand gives direction to his behaviour and on the other hand is a frame of reference by which the worth of stimulus objects may be judged'.⁴⁸ What was Ben-Gurion's life aspiration which directed his behaviour and influenced his judgment on various issues?

In the introduction to his book, *From a Class to a Nation*, he wrote (the italics are mine):⁴⁹

The history of the world and of our people has been marked by hard and bitter trials, and the author has not remained insulated from all the changes and transformations; his life experience has expanded and his perception of certain events has changed, but the *central ideas that guided the life of the author* since he started to comprehend, . . . , even before he immigrated to Palestine in 1906 . . . have not altered. A full and complete redemption for the Jewish people, *a national and social redemption*, Jewish and human, and for that purpose—*ingathering of the exiles* and transformation of the national structure from a people which depends on others to *a working people which returns to the origins of nature* and life and to its historical tradition, and creates through its manual and spiritual labour its ways and values—these were the poles of the author's thought and life. . . .

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Ben-Gurion's central ideal, according to his own testimony, can be defined as a social and physical revolution of Jewish life. This revolution implied the ingathering of the Jewish people to its old-new homeland, the transformation of its life style, and the striking of roots in the soil of its homeland. In Zionist terminology, this was expressed as *Aliya* (immigration), *Avoda Ivrit* (Jewish labour), and *Hityashvut* (settlement).

The first goal was defined as the transfer of the Jews from the Diaspora to the Promised Land—he sometimes called it *Aliya*, and sometimes *Kibbutz Galuyot* (the ingathering of exiles). Immigration is more pragmatic, while ingathering of exiles is more idealistic and poetic; but they are similar in significance. The second goal is the transformation of a people detached from the land to one dedicated to the cultivation of the soil. The struggle for 'Jewish labour' in Palestine was not only an economic necessity but also an integral part of the Zionist revolution. Later, after the struggle for 'Jewish labour' had succeeded, the emphasis was placed on the settlement and development of the land and on making the desert bloom. The third goal is security, a goal which Ben-Gurion recognized from the moment he came to Palestine but which became even more important with the establishment of the State. He was aware of the interdependence between immigration, Jewish labour, and security for the settlers.⁵⁰ But he saw the ingathering of the exiles as the ultimate and most sacred value of Zionism. In 1937, in an address to the *Histadrut* Council, he argued:⁵¹

And if we had been offered a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan on one condition, that immigration be limited to one and a half million Jews—and one and a half million Jews would be sufficient to constitute a Jewish majority on both sides of the Jordan, and thus establish a Jewish state—we would have had to reject this offer if we were to remain loyal to the Jewish people and its need for redemption. . . . the real and true essence of Zionism is the redemption of all the Jews who desire and are able to be redeemed in the land of Israel. . . .

On several occasions, even after the founding of the State, Ben-Gurion asserted that immigration takes precedence over even such central values as the security and development of the State. 'But neither security nor development of the land are the essence of the State, they are merely necessary conditions for the final goal', he declared at the Ein Harod convention in 1950, adding, 'The ingathering of the exiles is the *raison d'être* of Israel . . . this is the origin of our heroism in war; this is the motive and spirit of our creativity and development . . . all our accomplishments in the three generations and the last two wonderful years are but preparation for the ultimate goal—the ingathering of the exiles'.⁵² And on another occasion he declared:⁵³

The War of Liberation and the Declaration of Independence were both preparation for the ultimate goal of Jewish history—the ingathering of the

exiles. Our security depends primarily on the ingathering of the exiles. . . . Only the ingathering will build the country. . . . In the ingathering of exiles lie all our historical hopes, and the status of Israel in the world depends on it.

Such feelings and beliefs regarding immigration undoubtedly influenced Ben-Gurion's attitude towards the Soviet Union; the fact that this great power did not permit its three million Jews to leave affected him very deeply. The contribution of Russian Jewry to the Jewish settlement in Palestine, and its great potential, only strengthened his negative feelings towards the Soviet Union. Not only did the Soviet government adversely affect immigration by imprisoning its Jews behind the Iron Curtain, but it also harmed Israel's security and settlement needs.

Moreover, the Soviet Union and International Communism challenged another of Ben-Gurion's central values—Jewish labour. He saw the struggle for Jewish labour as both a social and a national value. 'The workers' struggle in the country was not and will not be a struggle of class interests only,' he claimed. The Hebrew worker did not draw his power only 'from his class orientation and his social vision but also from his national mission, which he took upon himself with conviction and willingly, convinced that behind his labour and struggle stands the historic need of a nation fighting for its existence and awaiting redemption'.⁵⁴ Further, Jewish labour would revolutionize both the people and the land and would bind them together:⁵⁵

A homeland is not given or taken as a gift, is not built through rights or political treaties, is not bought by gold and is not conquered by force, but is built through the sweat of labour. . . . If a people has the right to say, This is my country, my homeland—it is only because the people created its land. . . . The land of Israel will be ours not when the Turks or the British or the next peace conference will so decide . . . but when we the Jews will build it.

On another occasion, he went even further: 'If there is something that encompasses one of the fundamental principles of Zionism it is Hebrew labour. . . . This is Zionism in a nutshell. The land of Israel without Hebrew labour is like the land of Israel without Jews.'⁵⁶

The militant opposition of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party in Palestine against the ideal of Hebrew labour undoubtedly strengthened Ben-Gurion's negative feelings towards the U.S.S.R. He never forgave it or the local Communist parties for their stand against Zionism.

2. *Conceptual framework*

Ben-Gurion's conception of the Jewish people had two central dimensions—continuity and unity. The first element is an outgrowth of his philosophic interpretation of Jewish history. The second is a belief

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in the Jewish people as an organic entity in which the various components are interrelated.

In an historic address delivered before the high command of the armed forces in 1950, entitled 'Uniqueness and Destiny',⁵⁷ Ben-Gurion asserted that the Jewish people was unique in that, since its creation, it had denied the superiority of physical power and believed in a messianic vision in which the rule of force would vanish. As a result of this belief, Judaism was involved throughout its history in a political, military, and ideological struggle against other nations and cultures which were superior to it both physically and at times also in some areas of science and the liberal arts. Nevertheless, despite this inferiority, the Jewish people as a collective had succeeded in preserving its uniqueness, and while these other cultures have disappeared, the Jews have endured. The secret of this ability to survive, according to Ben-Gurion, lay in the Jewish people's spiritual superiority and its immunity from the influence of universalistic cultures. Against this background, Ben-Gurion interpreted Jewish history as a continuing struggle against universalistic and assimilating cultures, beginning with Babylonia and Egypt, followed by Persia and Hellenism, Christianity and Islam, and finally European Emancipation. At the present stage in its history, Judaism is again involved in a physical and ideological struggle against a culture with universalistic aspirations—Russian Communism. Moreover, throughout this cultural and spiritual struggle there have been factions within the Jewish people which were influenced by, and demanded that the Jews be integrated into, foreign cultures. Thus, the contemporary pro-Moscow groups fulfil the same function as the false prophets during the First Temple period, the Hellenists during the Second Temple period, the Jews who followed Jesus, and the liberals during the era of Emancipation. In short, in Ben-Gurion's conceptual framework, the contemporary external and internal struggle against Communism is an integral part of the history and destiny of the Jewish people.

The Jew, in this conception, is not only part of a unique historical process but is also part of a whole, and therefore carries responsibilities towards all the Jews in every part of the world. Ben-Gurion perceived every Jew, wherever he may live, as an organic part of the Jewish people. Although the Jews had ceased for a long time to be a territorial nation, they never ceased being a nation bound together by spiritual, cultural, and traditional ties. This conception, which appeared as early as 1926,⁵⁸ did not change in later years, and in 1953 was expressed in a declaration that, 'There is a mutual destiny common to all the Jews of the world whether they want it or not'.⁵⁹ Every Jew anywhere is therefore responsible for the destiny of the Jewish people. After the establishment of the State of Israel, this responsibility was translated into a mutual responsibility between the Jewish State and the Diaspora.

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The Jews of the world are responsible for the State, and the State must concern itself with the fate of Jews anywhere in the world.⁶⁰

The principle of collective responsibility, according to Ben-Gurion, must guide Israel's foreign policy. 'The State of Israel, whose security, development and growth depend on the co-operation of world Jewry, cannot be indifferent to a state that denies or places limitations on this freedom.' And at the end of that speech, delivered before the high command of the Israeli army in March 1953, he concluded:⁶¹

The linkage of the State to Diaspora Jewry determines and conditions its relations with other countries and governments. Ensuring the freedom of Diaspora Jewry to participate in building and maintaining the security of the State, and in preserving the unity of the Jewish people and the Hebrew culture . . . is the supreme goal of Israel's foreign policy in our generation.

When Ben-Gurion spoke these sentences, he must have had in mind the Soviet Union and its attitude towards the Jewish people.

CONCLUSION

Ben-Gurion expressed clearly and sharply his attitude towards Communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular. In analysing the various interrelated aspects of this attitude, I have tried to demonstrate the intensity of his negative feelings and beliefs.

There was an inherent clash between the ideology and policies of Soviet Russia and the ideals and aspirations of Judaism and Zionism as they were defined and conceptualized by David Ben-Gurion during the pre-State period and the early years of independence. His hostility to the Bolshevik regime influenced his political judgment, but further exploration is required to determine the precise impact on various aspects of Israel's foreign policy of its first Prime Minister's attitude to the Soviet Union.

NOTES

¹ Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy*, New Haven, Conn., 1975, ch. 4.

² Concerning the importance of images in decision-making, see for instance Kenneth Boulding, 'National Images and International Systems', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. III, no. 2 (June 1959), pp. 120-121.

³ Cf. the selection of John Foster Dulles as a case study in Ole R. Holsti, 'The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study', in James Roseneau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, New York, 1969, p. 545.

⁴ David Ben-Gurion, *Chazon Vaderekh (Vision and Road)*, 5 vols., Tel Aviv, 1957, vol. 3, p. 43.

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- ⁵ *ibid.*, p. 46.
- ⁶ David Ben-Gurion, *Vikuach Medini im Ha-Shomer Ha-Tsair (A Political Debate with Ha-Shomer Ha-Tsair)*, Tel Aviv, 1941, pp. 5-7.
- ⁷ Ben-Gurion, *Chazon Vaderekh*, op. cit., vol. 1, 3rd edn., Tel Aviv, 1962, p. 25.
- ⁸ *ibid.*, p. 98.
- ⁹ Saba Shel Yariv, *Al Ha-Communism Veba-Tsiyonut Shel Ha-Shomer Ha-Tsair (On the Communism and Zionism of Ha-Shomer Ha-Tsair)*, Tel Aviv, 1953, p. 102. Saba Shel Yariv was a pseudonym used by Ben-Gurion when he attacked the Soviet Union and *Ha-Shomer Ha-Tsair* in a series of articles which were later collected in book form under that name. Yariv was the name of his grandchild, and the pseudonym means 'Grandfather of Yariv'.
- ¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 101.
- ¹¹ *ibid.*, p. 112.
- ¹² *ibid.*, p. 128.
- ¹³ David Ben-Gurion, *Zikhronot (Memoirs)*, 2 vols., Tel Aviv, 1971, vol. 1, p. 268.
- ¹⁴ See, for instance, Ben-Gurion, *Chazon Vaderekh*, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 131 and p. 180; and *Zikhronot*, op. cit., p. 259.
- ¹⁵ S. S. Yariv, *Al Ha-Communism...*, op. cit., p. 128.
- ¹⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 112-118.
- ¹⁷ *Zikhronot*, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 13.
- ¹⁸ *ibid.*, p. 245.
- ¹⁹ David Ben-Gurion, *Mishmarot (Guards)*, Tel Aviv, 1935, pp. 123-127. See also *Zikhronot*, op. cit., pp. 501-511.
- ²⁰ David Ben-Gurion, *Bama'aracha (In the Battle)*, Tel Aviv, 4 vols., first printed in 1950; sixth edn., 1957, vol. 1, p. 198.
- ²¹ The criticism regarding neutralism appears in *Vikuach Medini...*, op. cit., p. 6. Concerning the conceptual changes, see David Ben-Gurion, *Behilachem Israel (Israel at War)*, Tel Aviv, 1951, p. 328.
- ²² *Chazon Vaderekh*, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 298-306.
- ²³ *ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 23.
- ²⁴ *ibid.*
- ²⁵ *ibid.*, p. 22. See also Ben-Gurion, *Bama'aracha*, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 240-241, and vol. 4, pp. 198, 209.
- ²⁶ See, for instance, *Chazon Vaderekh*, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 197; see also David Ben-Gurion, *Medinat Yisrael Hamechudeshet (The Renewed State of Israel)*, Tel Aviv, 1969, p. 16.
- ²⁷ *Zikhronot*, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 269.
- ²⁸ Ben-Gurion, *Mishmarot*, op. cit., p. 36.
- ²⁹ *Chazon Vaderekh*, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 21-22. See also *Bama'aracha*, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 199.
- ³⁰ Yariv, *Al Ha-Communism...*, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
- ³¹ *Bama'aracha*, vol. 1, pp. 199-201.
- ³² *ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 102. See also David Ben-Gurion, *Shlichut Vaderekh (Mission and Road)*, Tel Aviv, 1942, p. 13.
- ³³ *Bama'aracha*, op. cit., vol. 5, pp. 172-174.
- ³⁴ *Al Ha-Communism...*, op. cit., p. 59.
- ³⁵ *ibid.*, p. 62.

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- ³⁶ *ibid.*, p. 61.
³⁷ *ibid.*, p. 59.
³⁸ *Bama'aracha*, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 82-83, and vol. 2, pp. 42-44. See also *Shlichut Vaderekh*, op. cit., p. 14.
³⁹ *Bama'aracha*, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 72.
⁴⁰ *Chazon Vaderekh*, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 242-243.
⁴¹ *Bama'aracha*, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 261; vol. 3, pp. 213-215; and vol. 4, p. 111.
⁴² *Chazon Vaderekh*, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 249-250.
⁴³ *ibid.*, p. 250.
⁴⁴ David Ben-Gurion, *Mema'amad Le' Am (From a Class to a Nation)*, Tel Aviv, 1955, p. 5.
⁴⁵ *Chazon Vaderekh*, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 246-247.
⁴⁶ *ibid.*, vol. 3, pp. 250, 289.
⁴⁷ *ibid.*, vol. 4, pp. 199-200.
⁴⁸ Joseph B. Cooper and James L. McGough, 'Attitudes and Related Concepts', in Marie Jahoda and Nell Warren, eds., *Attitudes*, London, 1966, pp. 30-31.
⁴⁹ *Mema'amad Le' Am*, op. cit., p. 9.
⁵⁰ *Chazon Vaderekh*, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 8-9.
⁵¹ *Bama'aracha*, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 53-54.
⁵² *Chazon Vaderekh*, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 20-21.
⁵³ *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 292-293.
⁵⁴ *Mishmarot*, op. cit., pp. 119-120.
⁵⁵ *Mema'amad Le' Am*, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
⁵⁶ *Zikhronot*, op. cit., p. 512.
⁵⁷ See *Chazon Vaderekh*, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 7-47.
⁵⁸ David Ben-Gurion, *Anachnu Vescheneinu (We and Our Neighbours)*, Tel Aviv, 1931, p. 115.
⁵⁹ *Chazon Vaderekh*, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 230.
⁶⁰ *ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 24; vol. 3, pp. 249-250; and vol. 5, p. 40.
⁶¹ *ibid.*, vol. 4, pp. 205-206.

ON THE HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY

Howard Brotz

(Review Article)

SOME preliminary remarks are essential for understanding the place of Bottomore and Nisbet's book* in the contemporary intellectual scene.

The late Talcott Parsons, in the introduction to his *The Structure of Social Action*, made it a point to emphasize that his study was concerned with the development not of sociological 'theories' but rather of *theory*. Indeed, he regarded the shift from the plural to the singular as the key to understanding his book. In a spirit akin to—though not identical with—that of Comte's *Positive Philosophy*, Parsons contended that the thought of some first pre-scientific then scientific students of man and society pointed towards a convergence upon a single intellectual goal: a unified theory of the subject matter which self-evidently excluded the possibility of permanently co-existing alternatives or 'theories'. He regarded the argument of his book as the demonstration of this convergence. Having asserted the point, he then dropped any further interest in what could now be seen as the 'pre-history' of the convergence—the careful study of which, one must note, could keep alive the idea of alternatives—to turn to the 'construction' of the unified theory. He was not alone in this enterprise. An important precedent lay at hand in the classificatory framework of concepts worked out by Max Weber in his *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. And there have been contemporaries of Parsons working along similar lines in political science and social psychology. But one is bound to note that he devoted himself to his aims with an intransigence unequalled by his contemporaries; and he had, for a time, a considerable influence in defining the character of post-war sociology.

I believe that today the impulse behind this project is a spent force. The young people now going into graduate work in sociology are repelled by it, rightly or wrongly, as lacking in vitality. They also see

* Tom Bottomore and Robert Nisbet, eds., vi+717 pp., *A History of Sociological Analysis*, Heinemann, London, 1979, £12.50 (paperback, £5.00).

in it, rightly or wrongly, an uncritical apologia for capitalism. Parsons, to be sure, was aware of such critics, whom he forthrightly confronted, and whom for a time he managed to silence if not convince by a reasonably responsive elaboration of his understanding of the demands of a scientifically theoretical sociology. Today—indeed for the past ten years—it has no longer been possible to do this. Sociology, while by no means simply ‘radicalized’, has become open to all sorts of new interests—such as Marxism, phenomenology, ethnomethodology—which ten and certainly twenty years ago were either marginal or unarticulated.

Unfortunately this revolt against the ‘establishment’ has opened the door to the most widespread auto-didacticism. To the extent that theory came to mean ‘theory construction’, the scholarly study of texts from the ‘pre-history’, having lost their rationale, dried up. And for reasons discussed below, they were not well taught in the pre-war period either. The result is that the number of teachers in sociology departments who could guide students in the careful study of the texts superseded by the *nuova scienza* became fewer and fewer. Auto-didacticism necessarily emerged. This in turn means that while ‘philosophy’ may well have returned to sociology after its period of exile, it did so, however, as a mass-like phenomenon.

What so clearly shows the mass level of this new ferment is its eclecticism which thoughtlessly combines selected pieces of what are really opposed positions. But could a serious person be a Marxist and an existentialist and a value-free positivist? Could a person who knew what he was doing combine, without distorting the position of each, the thought of Husserl and Max Weber—whose positions on the status of the pre-scientific or common-sense or ‘life-world’ as the ground and necessary beginning of science were diametrically opposed?

There is no doubt that *A History of Sociological Analysis* shows—and intentionally—that sociology has turned something of a corner. To begin with, one must note that this is a collective work (which claims, curiously, to be inspired by a non-collective work, namely, Schumpeter’s *History of Economic Analysis*), with seventeen chapters by different contributors, including both editors. The first six chapters deal with precursors and founders such as Durkheim, Weber, and Toennies, from a contemporary vantage point. The others are concerned with themes, issues, and approaches which are to be found in contemporary sociology: positivism, American trends, functionalism, theories of social action, exchange theory, interactionism, phenomenology, structuralism, social stratification, and power and authority. The last essay, by James Coleman, is on sociological analysis and social policy. The selection of topics is therefore quite comprehensive. However, the book is not a critical history, in Nietzsche’s sense, of sociology. What it is, is an exposition of the varieties of sociological analysis, prevalent today (mainly in the United States), some of which manifest a reawakening

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of interest in their own 'pre-history' and in kindred currents that burst the bounds of positivist theory construction. Indeed, it is in making clear the precise scope of the book that one can see its distinctive contribution, which is to provide thoughtful self-assessments of different positions by people who hold or have held them.

The first sentence of the chapter on functionalism by Wilbert Moore (p. 321) is an honest recognition of the present situation: 'It would almost appear that functionalism has become an embarrassment in contemporary theoretical sociology.' Nothing could be more indicative of the changed outlook in sociology. On a more practical level, the book is also useful in providing information about current issues. The debate about positivism which took place principally between Habermas and Popper is not well enough known in North America; and the chapter by Anthony Giddens on positivism and its critics usefully directs the reader's attention to it.

There is, one must point out, a certain amount of misinformation here and there where careful study of a text from the 'pre-history' is essential. Note 10 of Robert Bierstedt's chapter on 'Sociological Thought in the Eighteenth Century' states that 'Locke, champion of toleration, declined to extend it to atheists, Unitarians, Jews, and Catholics' (p. 34). But Locke, in his *Letter on Toleration*,¹ explicitly asserts:

But those whose doctrine is peaceable, and whose manners are pure and blameless, should be on equal terms with their fellow-citizens. And if others are allowed assemblies . . . , [they] should with equal right be allowed to Remonstrants, Anti-remonstrants, Lutherans, Anabaptists, or Socinians. Indeed, . . . neither Pagan nor Mahometan nor Jew should be excluded from the commonwealth because of his religion.

Of a more serious nature is that misinterpretation of Hobbes which one encounters in this volume and which has had such a formative influence in shaping sociological theory in the recent past. I refer to the view, first propounded by Parsons in *The Structure of Social Action*, and followed here by Wilbert Moore in his essay on functionalism, that Hobbes was concerned with the 'problem of order', that is, with *how* order is maintained in human society. In fact, Hobbes's *own* problem was not at all such a technical police question. It was rather the question of what is the best regime or form of government according to nature, a question which he inherited from the tradition begun by Plato and Aristotle. Hobbes, to be sure, in answering this question, like Machiavelli before him, broke with the tradition as being 'unrealistic'. But what difference does all this make? What purpose is served by mentioning such details? If contemporary sociologists want to see Hobbes as the first 'technician of order', whether he regarded himself as such or not, what harm is done by recasting his teaching

into a perspective that was not his own? Here I believe that one is in for something of a surprise.

The prevalent opinion in sociology today, which Moore articulates, of Hobbes's place in the development of sociological theory is that Hobbes overestimated the role of coercion and underestimated the role of 'common values' as the basis of social order. The discovery of the importance of the latter factor was then seen to be the work of sociologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who reacted against the atomism fostered by utilitarianism. That such a development in social thought took place, and with good reason, is not at issue. What is alone at issue is the interpretation of this development as the unfolding of a value-free, technical theory, an interpretation in which the correct (or incorrect) understanding of Hobbes plays a decisive role.

Now if one confronts Hobbes with the figure *he* explicitly repudiated, namely, Aristotle, one is immediately struck by Hobbes's view of Aristotle as a fomenter of 'sedition', a mischief-maker, who in propounding the teaching that tyranny was a defective regime gave good reasons to the quarrelsome and factious to project themselves as mock-heroic tyrannicides. We may leave on one side the question of whether this interpretation of Aristotle does not in fact distort the overall moderation of his teaching. But one can still ask whether this interpretation, which is intended to ridicule any opposition to tyranny, does not really mean a policy of 'peace at any price'. Hobbes, far from being embarrassed by such a question, would have replied 'obviously and with good reason': any alternative to the peace conferred by the existence of *any* established government would be for the worse, as far as the self-preservation of the individual is concerned.

This reply, however, is not a 'technical' judgment. It is a moral-political one, concerned at root with the question of whether life under a tyranny—at least under certain conditions—is worth living and thus, by implication, with the question of whether a fully human being can be such and remain obsessed with mere self-preservation.

What is then so strange about the whole discussion of Hobbes in the sociological theory of the past generation is to realize, as soon as the massive moral-political issue is made clear, that the technical question has been based on a factual error about Hobbes. For he, far from underestimating the importance of common values, was more than any other political philosopher (ancient or modern) obsessed with the political importance of opinions, doctrines, or what would now be called 'common values'. As is evident from his fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth natural laws, Hobbes laid the groundwork in modern society for the type of person known—not inaccurately—as the 'team worker', the 'good guy who doesn't rock the boat', the 'organization man', the

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'over-socialized man'.² It evidently matters whether one understands a thinker correctly as he understood himself.³ By careful attention to Hobbes's own thought, furthermore, one could establish the correct relationship between it and later developments. Why did some thinkers in the twentieth century begin to make a disjunction between public-spiritedness and rationality? Is this disjunction part of Hobbes's own teaching? Or is it not a misinterpretation of it based on a post-Kantian rejection of utilitarianism as an equation of 'rationality' and 'self-interest'? One cannot begin to disentangle the problems with which Max Weber wrestled until one has accurately clarified Hobbes's doctrine.

Notwithstanding such weaknesses in some of the contributions, *A History of Sociological Analysis* as a whole provides invaluable data about the current state of sociology, data which are a basic prerequisite for a critical history of the discipline.

As we know, sociological theory before the period of 'theory construction' was a history of social thought that was in fact a residue of Comte's philosophy of history. This can be seen not merely in the general idea of progress which was presupposed or postulated, but in the specific idea of progress as a movement from lore to science.⁴ By virtue of the presuppositions of this history, any thinkers in the past could be, and were, seen as 'precursors', including those who may have thought about and rejected the possibility of a social science modelled upon the natural sciences. What counted, however, was not what they said from their point of view and in the context of their integral standpoint but, rather, what they 'contributed' from the point of view of the present. That this could lead to distortion of what people actually thought is indicated by the remarks above about Hobbes. But this distortion was virtually guaranteed by the casual approach to earlier texts. If Marx used the word 'class', he was a sociologist. If Rousseau used the word 'social', he was a sociologist. If Thomas Aquinas used the word 'marriage', he was a sociologist. Along these lines the whole significance of the historically innovative character of positivism disappears, as well as the distinction between lore and science. It would seem either that scientific sociology began with the first man who uttered the word 'group' or else that everything is still lore. This is only the surface of the intellectual problems posed by this decayed philosophy of history which—certainly in the United States—shaped much of pre-war sociological theory.

These problems, nonetheless, played a role in the self-discrediting of this understanding of theory. But to begin with the most obvious observation, one notes that the sociology departments, while committed to paying lip service to the methodological professions of positivism, were pursuing varieties of research into contemporary society. Yet the 'history of sociological theory' courses then taught were totally

irrelevant to these pursuits. In fact, the theory courses were maintained as a kind of high-brow cultural ornamentation. In the university where I studied, the professor teaching the theory courses would have been appalled if a student had asked him to supervise a dissertation on an earlier thinker. In fact, he would have declined to do so, on the grounds that one would merely be repeating other people's words about what 'they saw'. His injunction was, 'Go out and have a look for yourself'. In view of the poor quality of what would have emerged from a dissertation on historical theory—for which no real training existed—I think his advice was sound.

In such an intellectual setting, however, it was only a matter of time before someone would say something like the following: 'If sociology has moved (or is moving) from lore to science, who needs to know the lore? Does an engineer begin his studies by re-inventing the digging stick?' Such a pithy critique, which proved to be quite devastating, defines in a nutshell the entire thrust of the late Talcott Parsons's project. And the common sense in this stance cannot be underestimated. In fact, its plausibility explains why he was so easily able to dethrone the decayed philosophy of history. After all, he was only radicalizing in intellectual respects what was the prevalent norm in sociology, but to which its theory only paid lip service. It propagated the view that positive science was the highest form of knowledge, yet it would not liberate itself from its wholly unscientific and wholly unjustifiable fascination with the 'lore'. In *fundamental* respects, there seemed to be complete agreement between the premises of the new theory construction and the decayed Comteanism it dethroned. There were, to be sure, many people who disliked the direction in which American sociology began to move after the war. The late C. Wright Mills, for example, saw with perfect clarity that 'theory construction' was a semantic exercise consisting of the translation of banalities into obscurities. But unless one were prepared to make such an evaluation on the grounds of something like Husserl's critique of science and his correlative restoration of the status of common sense,⁵ the temptation would arise to see in theory construction the workings of a 'plot' to justify the status quo. Mills, and his followers more so, seemed unable to resist this temptation, which was as wide of the mark because untrue as it was guilty of the very fallacy of which he accused the functionalists—namely, seeing a covert harmony among all the interests in the society. But on the basis of such a supposition, it would be impossible to account for the fact that human beings, acting within the bounds set by the interests of scientific inquiry, can be either wrong or confused, not because they are lackeys of the powers but because they are overwhelmed by fashionable ideas which they have not thought through for themselves. Indeed, the sociological opinion that all scientific interests are covertly determined by, or are in the service of, political

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powers leaves the proponents of that opinion wide open to the question, 'To which powers are *they* beholden for their pay-off?'

But more significant, perhaps, than even the above is the fact that unless one confronted the premises of the *nuova scienza* with a theoretical understanding of the proper method for the study of man as opposed to rocks, one could not adequately defend the valuable research which was—and still is—being done by making clear the actual grounds of that inquiry. Why, in this connection, did the 'Chicago tradition' of Robert Park and his pupils lose its pre-eminence in American sociology? The usual answer is that it was too 'empirical' and not 'theoretical' and, hence, became 'trivial'.⁶ The implication is that by being explicitly guided by constructed 'theory', 'empirical' research—leaving on one side a discussion of what the word empirical really means—would cease to be trivial. The implication of this in turn is that there can be no non-trivial observation so long as it finds its place in some 'theoretical scheme', an implication—I should add—which simply launched the semantic exercise.

Now, it is hardly surprising that the Chicago tradition gave rise to graduate dissertations which were not simply trivial, but dull and stupid to boot. In this respect, it is no different from any other academic tradition which by its very nature brings together students of unequal intelligence. If, however, one looks squarely at the most interesting books which emanated from that school, such as, to mention only two, E. Franklin Frazier's *Negro Family in the United States* and Myrdal's *American Dilemma*, one sees that they were far from trivial. Admittedly, they were not at all 'scientific' in the positivistic understanding of a value-free social science. But they were scientific in the pre-positivistic usage of this term (akin to the German *Wissenschaft*) in that they sought to give accurate accounts which rose above the obvious and banal. They certainly were not guided in any way by 'constructed theory'. And what is equally decisive is that they were not guided by the decayed Comteanism floating around the sociology departments either. In fact, these inquiries were guided by educated common sense, which made it possible to distinguish the genuinely significant from the genuinely trivial. And the same is true of those books written since the post-war hegemony of theory construction which stand up because they give an interesting account. Such would be Riesman's *Lonely Crowd*, Glazer and Moynihan's *Beyond the Melting Pot*, and Lipset's *Union Democracy*. Indeed, there has not been one interesting account that has been dependent in a primary respect upon theory construction. This must necessarily be the case if observations are of interest not for what they tell about the world but for how they illustrate a conceptual scheme. The true meaning of theory, which literally means 'beholding', becomes altogether inverted by what is in fact desiccated neo-Kantianism. Theoretical reflection becomes concerned not with talking

about the world but with talking about itself, which opens the way to an infinite regress. A science which 'constructs' the universe by means of mathematical physics may succeed in sending people to the moon. In the social sciences, it doesn't 'work'.

The Chicago tradition was also said to be a-political and, hence, overly 'micro-sociological'. That is, it did not embrace such conceptions as the 'system'. This is partly true or partly false. To begin with, a work such as Everett Hughes's *French Canada in Transition*—which was written long before the separatist movement in Quebec captured the provincial government—was not 'a-political' because it was aware of the resentments then at work and of their significance. And, of course, there was no methodological obstacle in any element of the Chicago tradition to studying the character of life under different political regimes, had students wanted to extend their interests in that direction. All the books mentioned earlier were explicitly aware of the significance of legal and political change.

As for the overly 'micro-sociological' character of this sociology, that is a more complicated point. Certainly, any study of a sub-political group which was totally abstracted from its political context would lead to absurdities—as can be seen from studies of people in extreme situations, like concentration camps. One could hardly begin even to think about what life must be like in such situations without differentiating them from, let us say, resort hotels. To be sure, most sociological research is done, for politically understandable reasons, not in societies where there are concentration camps but rather in permissive societies where one can be indifferent to, or even unaware of, the political context. It then becomes a delicate matter on the part of the observer of that society how far and in what way he wants to relate the public and the private realms. Think only of Tocqueville's discussion of the impact of political equality upon the family, where the connection between the two realms was his explicit concern. But it would be alien to what he explicitly says to construe such a discussion as a requirement that everything be narrowly reduced to the political, narrowly understood. One can talk about religion or about *mœurs* from other points of view than their affinity with democracy. What is decisive is that the impingement of the political context be reflected in the study of sub-political groups even in cases where it is apparently suspended so as to understand the significance of that suspension. But such considerations depend upon the finesse of the student.

The fundamental weakness of the Chicago tradition is that, while unopposed by any serious criticism, it failed to clarify the grounds of the best work it was doing. Had it done so, it would, to begin with, have jettisoned the decayed or dead Comteanism to which it gave lip service. It would have then replaced that theory by live theoretical reflection about man and society that could pull a student out of

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himself and his complacency with his opinions towards a discussion of fundamental questions. And the rudiments of such live theory were present in the tradition. When it was then attacked for being 'unscientific', it was overwhelmed. This left a void which the 'theory constructors', to do them justice, tried to fill by their understanding of 'theoretical significance'. But since 'significance' so understood runs away from fundamental questions by dismissing them as 'normative' even more so than did the Chicago tradition, the void created by this dead theory became larger. It was only a matter of time until it began to be filled by ideology, a residue of the philosophy of history, though hardly the Comtean version of it. Ideology at least could talk to students about the good society. On the other hand, it strangled at birth a basic curiosity about the world by answering any question before it was asked.

If the dialectic between the decayed Comteans and the theory constructors has thus sunk into the morass of ideology, one might well reopen that dialectic at the point where it began. That point, it will be recalled, was the question, 'If sociology has moved from lore to science . . .?' The *if* is the heart of the matter. One can then question two things. The first is the novelty of so-called 'post-positivism'. When one scratches beneath its surface, is it still not as much a prisoner of the idea of inevitable scientific-technological progress as positivism was—hence, in the decisive respect, still positivism? The second, correlatively, is the primitive quality of what was so casually dismissed by positivism as 'lore' or common sense.

NOTES

¹ John Locke, *A Letter on Toleration*, ed. R. Klibansky and J. W. Gough, Oxford, 1968, pp. 143f.

² Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive or the Citizen*, ed. S. P. Lamprecht, New York, 1949, pp. 48, 50.

³ Alan Dawe in his essay on 'Theories of Social Action', which immediately follows Moore's contribution, deals at length with Hobbes and with the problem of order as 'the' central problem of sociology. But he nowhere in his essay confronts Hobbes with Aristotle, as Hobbes himself did.

⁴ A popularized treatise, written by Harry Elmer Barnes and Howard Becker, published in New York in 1938, was in fact entitled *Social Thought from Lore to Science*.

⁵ See Aron Gurwitsch, 'Galilean Physics in the Light of Husserl's Phenomenology', in Thomas Luckmann, ed., *Phenomenology and Sociology*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1978, pp. 71–89.

⁶ See, in the volume under review, p. 318 in L. A. Coser's 'American Trends' and p. 486 in B. M. Fisher and A. L. Strauss's contribution on 'Interactionism'.

BOOK REVIEWS

COMMUNAUTÉ ISRAËLITE DE BRUXELLES, ed., *La Grande Synagogue de Bruxelles. Contributions à l'histoire des Juifs de Bruxelles 1878-1978*, 172 pp., Communauté Israélite de Bruxelles, 2, Rue Joseph Dupont, Brussels, 1978, 380 Belgian Francs.

This is a handsomely illustrated volume, commemorating the centenary of Brussels' Great Synagogue. It was inaugurated in September 1878 in the presence of senior officials from the Ministries of Justice and of the Interior, and of the president of the *Commission Royale des Monuments*. In 1874, the *Commission* had rejected the synagogue's earlier plan on the grounds that the proposed building was too much like a Catholic Church and lacked any element—structural or decorative—which would have reflected the oriental origin or the 'haute antiquité de la religion hébraïque', or any trace 'de ce qui nous reste de l'architecture israélite . . .' p. 82).

The first article is by the President of the Consistoire, who writes about eminent Belgian Jews in the nineteenth century. Apart from bankers, there were army generals, members of Parliament, university teachers, and an ambassador.

Willy Bok, the Director of the *Centre National des Hautes Etudes Juives* of Brussels, makes three contributions to the present volume. He writes on the evolution of the Jewish population of Belgium in the nineteenth century; on Brussels' Jewish primary school (1817 to 1879); and on Belgian Jewry in the twentieth century. The 1846 Census of Belgium recorded a total of 1,336 Jews, of whom 524 lived in Brussels and 345 in Antwerp. By the end of the century, Antwerp Jewry numbered 6,400 while that of Brussels amounted to 5,600. After the First World War, thousands of Jews came—mainly from Poland—to settle in Belgium; and from 1933 onwards, it was the turn of the German Jews. By the spring of 1934, Belgium had given refuge to several thousand German Jews. Bok notes that in a parliamentary debate, in May 1934, the Minister of Justice—Paul-Emile Janson, who was to perish in Buchenwald in 1944—stated that he had given instructions to the effect that people had to be admitted 'sans demander ni papiers ni justification. Nous devons commencer par recevoir . . . et nous verrons après' (p. 159).

By 1939, there were about 12,000 refugees from Nazism who were

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being assisted by various Jewish organizations. When the army was mobilized, recruiting centres for foreign Jewish volunteers were opened in several cities and in October 1939 a Jewish delegation handed the Minister of Defence a list of 8,321 men who wished to enlist.

Brussels Jewry has a long and honourable tradition of assistance to the needy. Thomas Gergely relates that its oldest charitable institution, the *Société de Bienfaisance*, was established in 1833 to cater for the poor, the sick, and the infirm, and to provide Jewish burial for the destitute. In 1852, the *Société des secours efficaces* was established, to assist traders by providing interest-free loans; its founders were not kindly bankers but a group of Jewish ladies of Brussels. It was the latter also who created the *Société des mères israélites*—‘plus spécifiquement féminine’, as Gergely notes—to give practical and medical assistance to young married Jewish mothers in need; and to establish an orphanage for girls.

Other benevolent institutions were an old age home and an association to give dowries to needy Jewish girls who were not less than twenty years old and of a ‘moralité exemplaire’. A *Comité des Apprentis* was established to provide alternatives to the old occupation of peddling. The committee selected young pupils who were given special training in a trade or profession, at the expense—and under the supervision—of the Committee. Another association took upon itself the duty of distributing clothing to young recipients of Jewish charity, and in 1880 it merged with the *Comité des Apprentis*. The twentieth century saw the establishment of several other charitable organizations catering for both indigenous Brussels Jews and for new immigrants.

Rabbi Marc Kahlenberg, in the Introduction, quotes a statement made in 1856 by the President of the *Consistoire Central*: ‘Nulle part la charité n’est mieux rendue que chez nous’ (p. 21). He observes that Belgian Jewry today might well make the same comment.

The last of the many excellent illustrations in the volume is that of a special stamp issued by the Belgian Post Office in December 1978 to commemorate the centenary of the Grande Synagogue.

J. FREEDMAN

SIMON N. HERMAN, *Jewish Identity: A Social Psychological Perspective*, with a foreword by Herman C. Kelman, 263 pp., Sage Publications, Beverly Hills and London, 1977, £8.50 (paperback, £4.25).

The analysis of Jewish identity is central to understanding the nature of modern Jewish life. Those who have studied contemporary Jewish communities cannot avoid dealing with issues of Jewish identity, nor can policy makers or shapers ignore the importance of such issues in the future survival and vitality of these communities. Yet there have

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been few serious, systematic studies of the nature of Jewish identity and few attempts to clarify the theoretical complexities associated with the concept. Fewer still are studies that are both theoretically cogent and follow through with empirical testing, while comparative studies are almost non-existent.

Simon Herman's book is a major effort to come to grips with the basic issues associated with Jewish identity from a systematic social-psychological perspective. It is a unique contribution to the field, for it attempts to place the study of Jewish identity within a holistic conceptual framework, to face issues of ideology (social and personal) squarely and forthrightly, to provide empirical tests and illustrations of the general theory, to propose policies for strengthening Jewish identity which are grounded in theory and empirical evidence, and to focus on the social-psychological dynamics of that identity, historically and comparatively. It is a difficult task indeed, and while there are specific theoretical and empirical limitations to the analysis, the book as a whole is an important, penetrating, and stimulating contribution to the subject. Future theoretical and empirical work will have to begin with the groundwork prepared by Simon Herman.

Jewish identity is difficult to conceptualize and operationalize for research purposes, and Herman's attempt is orderly and systematic. He shows both the complexities of studying the subject and the path through these complexities. Interwoven with a social-psychological analysis of Jewish identity, there is a personal statement. Consciously disregarding the value-free ideology (or myth) of the social sciences, Herman tells us not only what Jewish identity is but what it should be; not only how the Holocaust relates to Jewish identity, but how it should affect the identity of Jews; not only the nature of immigration to Israel (*Aliya*) and how it relates to Jewish identity but how to encourage it, and what policies are more likely to be successful.

The interweaving of values, ideology, and careful research is an attempt to bridge a gap between the Jewish ideologists and the social scientists. Undoubtedly, some ideologists will find Herman's ideology problematic and his social science irrelevant. Some social scientists will find his social science limited and his ideology an irritating intrusion. Both ideologists and social scientists will learn a great deal, however, from the clarity of his arguments and the comprehensiveness of his scope. The refreshing candour with which he exposes his Jewish survivalist biases is a much needed corrective to the implicit (yet ever-present) assimilationist biases of much of social science research on the Jews.

The book is divided into four parts. The first presents a general theoretical overview, placing the study of Jewish identity in the broad social-psychological perspective associated with the field theory of Kurt Lewin—Herman's former teacher. The general orientation proceeds

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from 'a view of the Jewish people as a continually changing organism to be studied as a totality in historical and in comparative perspective and in the setting of the majority cultures in which the larger part of this people is located' (pp. 20-21). In discussing the nature of ethnic identity, Herman distinguishes between Jewish identification—'the process by which the individual comes to see himself as part of the Jewish group and the form the act of identification takes'—and Jewish identity, 'what being Jewish means . . . what kind of Jew and what kind of Jewishness develop in the majority culture'. The distinction is an important one but there is too much of an overlap between the concepts and, in the analysis, Jewish identification and Jewish identity are interwoven without analytic separation.

Throughout this section and in subsequent chapters, Herman argues for the view that Jewish identity contains both religious and national elements. The peculiarity of Jewish identity emerges from the fact that 'Judaism is not just a religious creed analogous to Christianity. It is a religious civilization of one particular nation, it resides in the Jewish people and reflects its history. And the Jewish people is what it is because of this religious civilization' (p. 36). Simon Herman's theory is influenced by Mordecai Kaplan's theology-sociology as much as it is by Kurt Lewin.

In examining the criteria for Jewish identity, the author spells out the basis of Jewish group membership. This includes a shared sense of belonging (alignment over time and space) and a differentiation from other groups (marking-off). The content of the identity is discussed on three levels: cognitive, affective, and behavioural.

From this theoretical basis, Herman moves on to discuss constancies and variations in Jewish identity. He gives a brief historical sketch and some comparative data on Jewish students from the United States, South Africa, France, Argentina, and the Soviet Union. The discussion whets the appetite and clearly needs expansion; it is limited to students studying in Israel. Generally, it is through comparisons—historical and cross-cultural—that we can begin to analyse the dynamics of Jewish identity and move beyond static, local descriptions. Much more research needs to be organized and analysed before we can understand changes over time and national variations.

The second part of the book focuses on contemporary expressions of Jewish identity. Particular attention is paid to the profound and continuing impact of the Holocaust and to the role of the Eichmann trial, the Six-Day War, and the Yom Kippur War in reactivating that memory. The attitudes of Israeli youth to the Holocaust in the 1960s and in the 1970s are compared, as are the reaction of Jews in the United States, the Soviet Union, and South Africa.

Herman devotes a chapter to analysing the differences between Zionism and pro-Israelism, and in the process reinterprets and clarifies

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the specific meaning of Zionism. Zionism, he argues, is more than a positive attitude towards Israel and more than *Aliya*; it represents an 'all-encompassing approach to the problems of the Jewish people'. He discusses the elements of his Zionist ideology which he sees as providing 'purposeful direction in the complex, changing situations which face a Jewish people located in a world in turmoil'.

The strong relationship between Jewish identity and the decision to settle in Israel is reviewed in Chapter 8 and the implications of his analysis for *Aliya* policy are spelled out. While he does not present a comprehensive policy or programme, he does make important suggestions. It is not clear how his arguments differ from general policy-programmes suggested by others or how successful *Aliya* policy could be in the conditions now prevailing in Israel and in Western countries. Nevertheless, his attempt to base *Aliya* policies on evidence gathered by social scientists seems to be in the right direction.

The third part deals with a series of empirical studies on high school students in Israel undertaken in 1965 and 1974, and on foreign students studying in Israel in the early 1970s. The Israeli sample does not represent a cross-section of Israeli adolescents (there is a strong selectivity factor in remaining in high school), nor do foreign students represent Jews outside Israel (again, there is a strong selectivity bias with respect to those studying in Israel). Herman recognizes these limitations and the empirical evidence should be viewed as illustrative. Nevertheless, there are many penetrating observations which he makes on the basis of these data. More rigorous testing on representative samples is clearly called for.

His discussion of Jewish identity among Israeli high school students reveals the overall importance of religious observance in the determination of that identity. The attachment to the Jewish people is stronger among religious students, there is a much greater measure of Jewish content in their lives, they feel closer to Jews everywhere, and in general they 'represent the hard Jewish core of Israeli society'. This is perhaps not a surprising finding, but it is one which raises serious questions for secular Zionists in Israel and in the Diaspora and poses important policy considerations for the educational system.

In comparing the results of his 1965 and 1974 studies, Herman notes that 'on the questions concerning feelings about Jewishness and Israeli-ness, a considerable measure of stability is observable across the period' (p. 199). This is surprising, in view of the changes generated by the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War. Nevertheless, the time period may perhaps be too long and change may be difficult to measure with two cross-sectional samples. A longitudinal research design is needed to deal more fully with issues of change.

In general, Herman plays down and minimizes the ethnic factor in Jewish identity differences in Israel. He argues, for example, that such

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differences between the Ashkenazi and Oriental sectors are 'becoming less marked in members of the younger generation who move through a unified educational system and share the army training experience' (p. 172). There is some doubt whether the educational system and the military experience have such a clear assimilatory effect on Israelis of different ethnic backgrounds; the issues of ethnic differentiation in Israel are much more complex. His empirical evidence does not (and cannot for sampling reasons) address the ethnic issue fully, and specific research on ethnic variation and change in Jewish identity in Israel is clearly needed.

In the final chapter—entitled 'One Jewish World'—Herman considers Israeli-Diaspora relations, the need for the extension of Hebrew language training in Jewish schools outside Israel, and the ways to strengthen the mutual interdependence of Israel and Jews everywhere.

Jewish Identity should be required reading for social scientists who study and teach about Jews, for Jewish leaders in Israel and the Diaspora who need to view the nature of Jewish life within a comprehensive framework, and for Jews everywhere who are searching for self-understanding in the broad context of contemporary Jewish history.

CALVIN GOLDSCHIEDER

COLIN HOLMES, *Anti-Semitism in British Society, 1876-1939*, viii + 328 pp., Edward Arnold, London, 1979, £13.50.

GISELA C. LEBZELTER, *Political Anti-Semitism in England, 1918-1939*, ix + 222 pp., Macmillan (in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford), London, 1978, £10.00.

Like the poor, the antisemite seems always to have been with us—even as far back as pagan antiquity. It might almost be said to be an 'inevitable' concomitant of living in a Diaspora, that being different arouses resentment. Certainly the history of the Middle Ages, and indeed of the Reformation, shows not merely an attitude of anti-semitism but of actions taken to foster it. The story of medieval and early modern pogroms and massacres makes this point only too well. But even then, it was in many cases less antisemitism than anti-Judaism, and it was always possible to escape from both the persecution and the disabilities by a process of conversion to the dominant faith. Since in the Christian world the basis of antagonism was the rejection of the New Covenant, its belated acceptance served to wash away the antagonism itself.

It was not until the Age of Reason and the reaction which followed it, together with the growth of quasi-scientific theories of 'Race', that a newer form of antisemitism came to the front and culminated in the

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bestialities of the Holocaust. As a result of these same bestialities, the new antisemitism is much less acceptable than it might earlier have been, but it would be quite unjustifiable to assume that those who were antisemites would necessarily have been nazis. It is important in considering a wide range of public attitudes and governmental responses in Britain to many of the problems of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to recognise that many of the sentiments and feelings characteristic of continental antisemitism had their echoes and expressions on this side of the Channel. They may well never have been likely to achieve the same response as on the Continent, but it is essential to examine them within their historical context. Both these books attempt to do so, with a varying degree of success, and both throw a clear light upon some of the more noisome features of British politics in the present century.

Dr. Holmes writes of a broader period than Dr. Lebzelter, and with a very clear understanding of its social and economic background. In effect, he covers two generations and deals with the impact upon British society of two very different immigrations. It is important to understand how very different were the social and political backgrounds of these two waves of migration and how very different, in fact, were the numbers involved. These differences affected the ways in which, in turn, the host community regarded them and reacted to them.

Dr. Holmes rightly notes that the antisemitism which they faced in Britain had existed before the arrival of the first of these waves of refugees, that in effect their arrival may have exacerbated—but did not create—the hostility which appeared during the years he discusses. He mentions, but does not dwell upon for too long, the medieval roots of antisemitism—the fact, for example, that it was in England that there first occurred the infamous ‘blood-libel’; and if he does not discuss the various manifestations of antisemitic feeling of the late eighteenth century, he certainly sets the civil disabilities of the Jews in that period into the perspective of the parallel disabilities of their non-Anglican Christian contemporaries.

His main opening point concerns the agitation which built up in the 1870s over Disraeli and his foreign policies, and the various accusations which were levelled against him of being opposed to Russian policy in the Balkans for reasons which had nothing to do with national interests or morality. He quotes *Punch* with effect, though there are many more instances of *Punch* cartoons which could be cited with even more telling effect, such as that of a small boy who included the presence of the Jews in Egypt as the most significant of the Ten Plagues. He analyses the vast range of polemic and quasi-scientific literature which appeared in those years and which attempted to show how undesirable the Jews were on social, medical, or even economic grounds. He discusses the various religious arguments which were adduced to

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prove that the Jews ought to be regarded as being outside normal society. At the same time, however, the point might validly be made that much of the feeling which was to emerge against the immigrants as they arrived in comparatively large numbers (perhaps some 100,000 between 1880 and 1914) was expressed in terms of an anti-alien rather than an avowedly antisemitic agitation. There were various sections of all classes of society which felt themselves to be under social and economic pressures, and their resentments—ranging from fears over jobs and housing to beliefs that social values were no longer what they had been—emerged in an unofficial but very widespread feeling of antagonism to the foreign-born intruders in their midst.

One of the great virtues of Dr. Holmes's work is that he analyses not merely those who expressed these ideas but the very ideas themselves, and in so doing illustrates very clearly the roots of such productions of that period as the so-called *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Indeed, not the least of his achievements is that he gives what must now be accepted as the definitive account of its unmasking by *The Times* and its correspondent, Philip Graves. Moreover, by taking a sufficiently long time-span he is able to put the story of the inter-war years into a fairer perspective. The fascism of that period emerges in these pages not in terms only of British reactions to a wave of theories and ideas sweeping the central European mainland, but rather in terms of these together with the almost subconscious prejudices of several generations. With this book as a basis, so much else of general British governmental policy about a whole range of European and imperial problems falls into perspective; for example, we gain a clearer understanding of some of the British attitudes to Palestine and to Jewish immigration into that land.

Gisela Lebzelter deals with a much narrower canvas with respect both to the time-scale within which she is operating and to the range of activities with which she is concerned. Her title describes, more or less accurately, the limits of her enquiries so that although she does on occasion lift up her eyes to look at the context of her main theme, the major part of her book—and the thesis from which it emerged—concentrates both on politics and the inter-war years. This certainly gives her considerably more scope than Dr. Holmes has, and she shows herself very much at home with a depth and width of reading which is, to say the least, highly impressive. The result is an interesting and important book, which must remain essential reading for anyone studying political antisemitism in the inter-war period.

In setting the two books side by side, however, one raises a large number of significant questions. Dr. Lebzelter's work suffers above all from a lack of perspective; when, for example, she quotes Harold Nicolson's remark, 'Although I loathe anti-Semitism, I do dislike Jews' (p. 34), she claims that it indicates 'a sweeping indictment of

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the Jewish race', failing to relate it to the equally revealing comment of others who stated, 'Some of my best friends are Jewish'. The mildly offensive nature of such a remark can be understood only in terms of a much broader discussion than is possible within a study of twenty years. It is only in the context of such a broad study that one can discover that many individuals who might in themselves have been mild 'social antisemites' would have been distressed at anything approaching official antisemitism and were in both their public and private lives more than fair and equitable when the occasion arose. On the other hand, Dr. Lebzelter not only analyses some of the parallels between Britain and the Continent, but also—and that is even more important—suggests reasons for the lack of parallel by pointing out the entirely different natures of English and of German society, as well as of the Jewries of those two countries.

The appearance of these two books within about one year might well have been thought to represent an almost unfortunate degree of overlap. In fact, they complement each other and together provide a detailed study of recent antisemitism in Britain.

AUBREY NEWMAN

JOHN STONE, ed., *Race, Ethnicity, and Social Change. Readings in the Sociology of Race and Ethnic Relations*, xvi + 399 pp., Duxbury Press, North Scituate, Massachusetts, 1977, n.p.

SAMMY SMOOHA, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict*, xviii + 462 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1978, £12.50.

The attention of the race relations student is drawn, in John Stone's astutely conceived reader, to two important points: one, that the neglect among modern writers of classical sociological insights into race and ethnicity cannot be justified; and two, that the real world is too complex to allow analysis of race relations by means of any *one* of the three models—the liberal, the Marxist, and the separatist. Yet the major analyses and predictions of the patterns of race and ethnic relations have been carried out primarily by means of one or other of the models mentioned. This is reflected in many of the selections included, but the editor avoids any particular bias by means of a judicious selection of papers and extracts which make up the three parts of this book: theories and typologies; the effects of social change on race and ethnic relations; and the current debate on the resurgence of ethnicity.

The different approaches and biases could be harnessed, as Stone suggests, towards a more truly 'scientific' advance in this sociological area by studying some crucial race relations issue or a particular society from the various angles, and thus testing their usefulness as explanatory

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schemes. Israel could be such a society and the gap between the Oriental and Ashkenazi Jews could be such an issue.

Sammy Smootha comes some way toward this aim in what is undoubtedly the most comprehensive statement to date on ethnic relations in Israel. Smootha considers the functionalist model of 'the nation-building perspective' which sees Oriental-Ashkenazi relations in terms of processes of absorption-modernization; the Marxist model termed as 'the colonial perspective' which sees in Ashkenazi dominance over both Arabs and Arab Jews (Jewish Orientals) the colonial attributes of the Zionist state; and the pluralist perspective, which Smootha regards as a synthesizing approach and a framework within which he can develop the paternalism-co-optation model so far as Oriental-Ashkenazi relations are concerned.

Smootha concludes that the situation in which the Orientals are co-opted into an Ashkenazi-dominated system, remaining 'unqualified' to move freely into the higher echelons because of Ashkenazi paternalism, yet improving their status owing to the erosion of certain inhibitory forces, leads, at least temporarily, to stabilizing inequality in what is essentially a pluralistic structure. He sees clearly the pluralistic reality of Israel but argues that in the long run the inequalities and conflicts could destabilize the structure and adversely affect national cohesion and political stability. A more radical approach is, therefore, necessary, in order to close the gaps and do away with inequalities. Smootha's book offers both an explanatory scheme and a policy orientation, and it should arouse attention and debate among both sociologists and policy makers.

ERNEST KRAUSZ

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Last July, the Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews announced in a press release that it had collated the marriage and death returns for 1978 for the Jewish population of Great Britain. It stated:

'The number of synagogue marriages fell yet again, by 87 or 6 per cent, to 1,291. The numerical decline shown in Table 1 affected all sections of the religious community about equally. The biggest proportional loss was among the Right-wing Orthodox grouping who until 1978 had been steadily increasing their annual total. The distribution of marriages in Table 2 very clearly reflects the distribution of male synagogue members recently published in *Synagogue Affiliation in the United Kingdom 1977* when the Right-wing and Central Orthodox totals are combined since, in practice, there is considerable overlap between their family memberships.

TABLE 1. *Synagogue marriages by sub-groups*

	<i>5-year average</i>		1976	%	1977	%	1978	%
	1974-78	%						
Central Orthodox	1016	69.4	957	68.5	953	69.1	895	69.3
Right-wing Orthodox	93	6.3	97	6.9	103	7.5	89	6.9
Sephardim	49	3.3	50	3.6	44	3.2	41	3.2
Reform	204	13.9	203	14.5	184	13.4	175	13.6
Liberal	104	7.1	90	6.5	94	6.8	91	7.0
TOTAL	1,466		1,397		1,378		1,291	

TABLE 2

	<i>Percentage of male synagogue membership 1977</i>	<i>Percentage of marriages 1978</i>
Central Orthodox	73.6	69.3
Right-wing Orthodox	3.5	6.9
Sephardim	2.7	3.2
Reform	13.1	13.6
Liberal	7.1	7.0
	} 77.1	} 76.2

The total number of burials and cremations under Jewish religious auspices in 1978 was 4,901, an increase of 152 over 1977, but very close to the 5-year average of 4,893. The distribution among the synagogue groupings in Table 3 showed very little change from the usual pattern.

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TABLE 3. *Burials and cremations under Jewish religious auspices*

	<i>5-year average</i>		1976		1977		1978	
	1974-78							
	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>
Orthodox	4115	84.1	4183	82.6	3950	83.2	4080	83.3
Reform	430	8.8	488	9.6	456	9.6	482	9.8
Liberal	348	7.1	397	7.8	343	7.2	339	6.9
Total	4,893		5,068		4,749		4,901	

The proportional distribution of Jewish marriages, deaths and synagogue membership between London and the Provinces is shown in Table 4. It is interesting to note how closely they align both between the basic indicators and over the years.

TABLE 4. *Geographical distribution by percentage*

	<i>London</i>	<i>Provinces</i>
<i>Burials and cremations</i>		
1976	66	34
1977	67	33
1978	66	34
<i>Synagogue marriages</i>		
1976	72	28
1977	69	31
1978	70	30
<i>Male synagogue membership</i>		
1977	67	33

No Synagogue grouping marries more people than it buries but the Reform proportion of young people marrying at 13.6 per cent continues to significantly exceed its proportion of deaths among the aged, which is only 9.8 per cent. London, too, has a healthier than average age structure with a larger proportion of the marrying generation (70 per cent) than those dying (66 per cent). The same pattern occurs in Manchester which has 10.5 per cent of Jewish marriages but only 8.2 per cent of deaths. Southend was the only centre in 1978 where more people were married (60) than died (54). This suggests that it is a younger community than that other coastal town, Brighton, which had just over 3 per cent of the total deaths but only 1 per cent of marriages. The only other provincial centre to show a balance on these indicators was Glasgow, which had 3 per cent of both marriages and deaths. This suggests its age structure is typical of the overall national picture.'

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Israel's population rose last September to 3,806,600: 3,194,100 Jews and 612,500 non-Jews. This represents an increase since September 1978 of 2.5 per cent in the Jewish population and of 3.6 per cent for non-Jews.

*

The chairman of the Knesset Immigration Affairs Committee is reported to have stated last August that it is estimated that about 2,000 Israelis leave every month to settle abroad permanently. A scheme to attract emigrants back has not been markedly successful: only 6,000 returned to Israel in 1977, and still fewer—5,100—in 1978.

On the other hand, there has been a firm upswing in immigration: in the first six months of 1979, a total of 17,500 came to Israel compared with fewer than 12,000 in the same period in 1978.

*

The March 1979 issue of *Jewish Cultural News*, issued by the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress in Jerusalem, notes:

The Synagoga Mare a Croitorilor—The Great Synagogue of the Tailors in Bucharest—has been converted into a museum of the history of the Jews of Romania. Their presence is recorded by hundreds of artifacts—religious objects, manuscripts, scrolls and tablets—dating as far back as the Roman conquest of Romania in the first century c.e. The latter are the original tablets engraved with the names of Jewish legionnaires who were conscripted into the Roman army in Judea. The museum's exhibition traces the history of the community through the Middle Ages up to the Holocaust with its grim documentation.

*

Last July, leaders of the Joint Distribution Committee attended the dedication of a new Jewish home for the aged in Bucharest. The President of the J.D.C. met the President of Romania, who is reported to have given assurances that any Romanian Jew wishing to leave the country for family reunion in Israel or any other country would be free to do so.

The J.D.C. gives social assistance to more than 10,000 of the 40,000 Jews who are estimated to live in Romania.

*

Last July, at its annual meeting in Geneva, the Board of Trustees of the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture allocated a total of \$1,814,825 for a variety of cultural programmes in several countries. The Trustees represent 48 international and national Jewish cultural and religious organizations.

The grants included scholarships for research students, teachers, rabbis, and artists; support for Jewish study programmes in universities and for special

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training for Jewish communal workers and educators; and allocations for documenting and commemorating the Holocaust.

*

Torah Umesorah, the national society for Hebrew day schools, announced in New York last September the establishment of five new Hebrew day schools in various parts of the United States and Canada.

When *Torah Umesorah* was established in 1944, there were only about 30 schools in three states. There are now 467 schools—318 elementary and 149 high schools—in 36 states in the U.S.A., and 54 in Canada, bringing the total of Hebrew day schools in North America to 521.

The national president of *Torah Umesorah* estimated that the 1979–80 enrolment would be about 93,000 pupils, of whom about 11,000 were Canadian day students.

*

Last September, the vocational training division of the Ministry of Labour in Israel enrolled 22,000 students—mostly teenage boys—in the 80 industrial schools and apprenticeship centres it sponsors and supervises.

The students are 'difficult learners'. The head of the Ministry division commented in an interview with *The Jerusalem Post*: 'We take youngsters who cannot find their place either in academic or regular vocational schools, and offer them an alternative. First, we teach them basic subjects such as English, mathematics and civics in very small classes. Furthermore, we teach them a trade in which they immediately earn some money—and with the promise of a recognized certificate of qualification if they persist in their training and finish their course.' He added: 'We keep our class size to a maximum of 15 pupils . . . the actual training on the plant floor is usually on an individualized basis.'

The pupils can be trained in aircraft production, automotive mechanics, metal work, printing, and a variety of other skills.

*

The April–May 1979 number of *W.I.Z.O. Review* has an article on the Women's International Zionist Organisation Centres for Arab and Druze women in Israel. These centres were established at the request of the local communities. There are nine: five for Arab women in Wadi Joz (East Jerusalem), Ein Maahal, Kafr Renni, Yassif, and Nazareth; and four for Druze women in Peki'in, Dahliat el Carmel, Ussefiya, and Jatt.

There are sewing and cutting classes and courses in handicrafts, including mosaics. In Wadi Joz, women can bring their young children and leave them in the care of W.I.Z.O.-trained kindergarten staff while they attend various classes.

A club, open to all religious communities, has been established in Haifa. 'In the mornings there are classes in sewing and cutting, knitting and embroidery and ceramic work, for young girls, and there is also an ulpan for the study of Hebrew. Children in the 8–12-year bracket take over the club from

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four to six in the afternoon, and the 16- and 17-year-olds have the use of it for their study circles, folk dancing, and sports activities from six to eight in the evenings. . . . An additional service which W.I.Z.O. offers to the groups of Arab and Druze women is an annual week's holiday for mothers of five or more children at its Bet-Heuss recreation centre in Herzlia Pituach. Each group comprises 24 women who are given a restful vacation from their household duties, and the opportunity to take part in hobby circles, hear lectures, and join excursions to places of interest.'

*

The chairman of the Zionist Council—an umbrella organization of all Zionist agencies—is reported to have stated in Tel Aviv last September that the Council has encouraged student associations and youth movements to supply labour to pick citrus fruits.

The Farmers Federation of Israel had applied to the Ministry of Labour for a permit to import some 5,000 Turks to pick the season's crop in time, but in view of the availability of students, the request was refused. The chairman of the Zionist Council said that it was necessary to halt the growing trend to rely on foreign labour in Israel.

He also announced that thousands of students have volunteered to work in the Negev to replace foreign labourers who would otherwise be needed for work connected with the military redeployment in the area.

*

The May 1979 issue of *Bar-Ilan University News* states that the university had in 1978-79 a total of 7,852 students: 4,310 males and 3,542 females. More than a thousand were registered for higher degrees; there were 906 M.A. and 215 Ph.D. students.

Bar-Ilan University, in co-operation with the World Sephardi Union, will launch in the 1979-80 academic session a three-year programme for Rabbis who will serve Sephardi communities in the Diaspora. The courses 'will include academic studies leading to a B.A. degree as well as specific training in terms of language, customs, local problems, etc.' of the various Sephardi communities.

*

It was announced last August that the President of the State University of New Mexico and the Director of the Sdch Boker Research Institute of Israel have signed an agreement for a broadly based programme of scientific co-operation.

The programme is concerned with research in the fields of water resources, food production, agricultural management, and energy production in arid zones. There will be an exchange of scientists between the two institutions.

*

CHRONICLE

The Advisory Panel on International Law of the World Jewish Congress Institute of Jewish Affairs met in London on 9–11 July. The panel includes professors of International Law—at universities in Denmark, France, Israel, Italy, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States—as well as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Israel and officers of the World Jewish Congress concerned with international legal matters.

A report on the meeting noted: 'A central issue under consideration was the present state and further advance of group rights, covering minority, religious, cultural and linguistic rights. The panel also surveyed legal developments of Jewish concern in the U.N., particularly on the issues of terrorism, taking of hostages, crimes against peace and security of mankind, humanitarian law and the human rights of aliens. It reviewed the machinery of protecting Jewish rights in Europe, in Latin America and through the follow-up conference of the Helsinki final act. The problem of self-determination was another issue discussed. A novel item was an analysis of the possible impact of the peace process in the Middle East on general Jewish interests in the international legal field.'

*

The Latin American branch of the World Jewish Congress published in Buenos Aires last April the first issue of a periodical entitled *Coloquio*.

The first article is by Attilio Dabini. It is entitled 'Historia tragigrotesca del racismo fascista' and first appeared in the August 1969 issue of *Indice*.

The second article, 'Integración y diversidad cultural en América Latina' by Eugenio Pucciarelli, is the text of a lecture delivered in Buenos Aires in November 1976 at the First Colloquium on Cultural Pluralism.

The third article, 'Un análisis del Holocausto: Algunos dilemas de lenguaje y método', by Alice and Roy Eckardt, is a translation of an article which appeared in vol. XXVII, no. 2 (Spring 1978) of *Judaism*.

The fourth article, 'Notas sobre "clases medias" y crisis política en América Latina: Su impacto en algunas comunidades judías', is by Leonardo Senkman and Mario Carranza.

The last article is a translation of Martin Buber's 'Open Letter to Mahatma Gandhi' in February 1939.

These articles are followed by a compte-rendu of Natan Lerner's book on Jews and non-Jews in Israeli law and by a summary of an article originally published in *Foreign Policy*, no. 30 (1978) by S. Fred Singer on the limits of the power of Arab oil.

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(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

- Anwar, Muhammad, *The Myth of Return. Pakistanis in Britain*, x+278 pp., Heinemann, London, 1979, £8.50.
- Ashworth, P. D., *Social Interaction and Consciousness*, ix+227 pp., John Wiley, Chichester, New York, Brisbane, and Toronto, 1979, £11.00.
- Desroche, Henri, *The Sociology of Hope*, translated from the French by Carol Martin-Sperry, vii+209 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Boston and Henley, 1979, £8.95.
- Endelman, Todd M., *The Jews of Georgian England 1714-1830. Tradition and Change in a Liberal Society*, xiv+370 pp., Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1979, \$14.50.
- Fawcett, James, *The International Protection of Minorities*, Report no. 41, 20 pp., Minority Rights Group, 36 Craven Street, London W.C.2, 1979, 75p.
- Friedlander, Dov, and Calvin Goldscheider, *The Population of Israel*, xxv+240 pp., Columbia University Press, New York, 1979, \$21.90.
- Gartner, Lloyd P., *History of the Jews of Cleveland* (Volume VIII in the Moreshet Series, Studies in Jewish History, Literature and Thought), xvii+385 pp. A joint publication of The Western Reserve Historical Society and The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1978, \$15.00.
- Gibson, Tony, *People Power. Community and Work Groups in Action*, 288 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1979, £1.25.
- Haberman, Jacob, *Maimonides and Aquinas: A Contemporary Appraisal*, with a Foreword by Joseph L. Blau, xx+289 pp., Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1979, \$17.50.
- Jackson, Bernard S., ed., *The Jewish Law Annual*, vol. II, x+270 pp., E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1979, 84 guilders.
- Martin, Bernard, ed., *Movements and Issues in American Judaism: An Analysis and Sourcebook of Developments Since 1945*, vii+347 pp., Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn. and London, 1978, £13.50.
- Mausner, Bernard, *A Citizen's Guide to the Social Sciences*, xii+314 pp., Nelson-Hall, Chicago, 1979, \$15.95 (\$7.95 paperback).
- Myerhoff, Barbara, *Number Our Days*, xiv+306 pp., E. P. Dutton, New York, 1978, \$12.95.
- Raphael, Marc Lee, ed., *Understanding American Jewish Philanthropy*, xiv+257 pp., Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1979, \$15.00.
- Roe, Ben M., *A Blend of the Two. An autobiography*, compiled and edited by James M. Rock, xv+131 pp., Friends of the University of Utah Libraries, Salt Lake City, Utah, 1978, \$6.00.
- Shack, William A., and Percy S. Cohen, eds., *Politics in Leadership: A Comparative Perspective*, xiv+296 pp., Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979, £10.00.
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- Shestack, *Essays on Human Rights—Contemporary Issues and Jewish Perspectives*, xiv+359 pp., The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1979, \$12.00.
- Skinner, G. William, ed., *The Study of Chinese Society: Essays by Maurice Freedman*, xxiv+491 pp., Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1979, \$28.50.
- Spiro, Melford E., *Gender and Culture: Kibbutz Women Revisited*, A volume in a series based on the Howard Eikenberry Jensen Lectures on Sociology and Social Action, xix+116 pp., Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1979, \$9.75.
- Suter, Keith, *West Irian, East Timor and Indonesia*, Report no. 42, 27 pp., Minority Rights Group, 36 Craven Street, London W.C.2, 1979, 75p.
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- Zipes, Jack, *Breaking the Magic Spell, Radical Theories of Folk and Fairy Tales*, xxii+201 pp., Heinemann, London, 1979, £3.95.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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- BROTZ**, Howard; Ph.D. Professor of Sociology, McMaster University, Ontario. Chief publications: *The Black Jews of Harlem*, New York, 1964; *Negro Social and Political Thought*, New York, 1966; 'Social Stratification and the Political Order', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. LXIV (1969); 'Theory and Practice: Ethnomethodology Versus Humane Ethnography', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XVI, no 2 (December 1974); *The Politics of South Africa. Democracy and Racial Diversity*, Oxford, 1977. Currently engaged in research on the politics of ethnicity.
- GREILSAMMER**, Ilan; Ph.D. Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Studies, Bar-Ilan University. Chief publications: *Les Fédéralistes en France de 1945 à 1974*, Paris, 1975; *Les Communistes Israéliens*, Paris, 1978; 'Israeli Communism', *Survey*, Summer 1977-78, vol. XXIII, no. 3 (104); 'Le Juif et la Cité, Quatre Approches Théoriques', *Archives des Sciences Sociales des Religions*; vol. XLVI, no. 1 (July-September 1978); 'Jews of France, From Neutrality to Involvement', *Forum*, no. 28-29 (Winter 1978). Currently engaged in research on Jewish politics, and the relations between Israel and the European Economic Community.
- SANDLER**, Shmuel; Ph.D. Lecturer, Department of Political Studies, Bar Ilan University. Chief publications: 'The Impact of Protracted Peripheral Wars on the American Domestic System', *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, vol. III, no. 4 (Summer 1978) and 'Historique du conflit israélo-arabe', *Les cahiers du Fédéralisme*, no. 5 (January-March 1979). Currently engaged in research on American foreign policy and on the Arab Israeli conflict.
- SHEPHERD**, Michael Anthony; B.A. Lecturer in Social History, University of Warwick. Author of 'The Origins and Incidence of the term "Labour Aristocracy"', *Bulletin of the Society for Study of Labour History*, no. 37 (Autumn 1978). Currently engaged in preparing a book on 'Jews' Jobs and Jewish Emancipation in England and France 1750-1870'.

THE
JEWISH JOURNAL
OF
SOCIOLOGY

EDITOR
Maurice Freedman

MANAGING EDITOR
Judith Freedman

VOLUME TWENTY ONE 1979

Published on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

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