THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Published on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

VOLUME XXI : NUMBER 1 : JUNE 1979

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The Jewish Journal of Sociology

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PUBLISHED TWICE YEARLY

on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
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Annual Subscription £3.00 (U.S. $7.50) post free
Single Copies £1.75 ($4.00)

Applications for subscriptions should be addressed to the Managing Editor, The Jewish Journal of Sociology, 55 New Cavendish Street, London W1M 8BT

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BUTLER AND TANNER LTD
FROME AND LONDON

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JEWISH EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN RELIGIO-ETHNIC RESPONSE

Bernard Steinberg

In terms of preserving group and individual identity, the crucial function of contemporary Jewish educational systems has become a highly complex one. Hitherto this function had been clearly defined within the setting of socially and culturally self-contained communities, as typified by those of eastern Europe. Today in the open societies of western Europe and North America, which have become the main centres of Diaspora Jewry, this is no longer the case. In particular, as a result of the emergence of national systems of education that are free, compulsory, universal, and for the most part secularized, the former centrality of Jewish educational institutions in community life has become irrevocably compromised.

Any study of this historical process reveals a further noteworthy factor. The respective national settings in which today's Diaspora communities exist provide their own formative influences upon Jewish life.[1] With specific regard to education, this means that in each community the schools (part- or full-time), the administrative and financial structure, the day-to-day problems, and all the other related details are the products of the national setting in addition to the corresponding features of the Jewish community. As a result, any consideration of these educational systems has to include not only the Jewish historical and religio-cultural foundations, but also the ways in which these respective wider national settings have impinged upon them. Jewish education in the United States provides an appropriate case in point. As the creation both of the Jewish community and of its host society it is thus the product of dual influences, not only in its historical development, but also in its distinctive contemporary characteristics.

In the wider setting, American history is to a great extent that of the absorption of immigrants and of their subsequent contribution towards an emergent national culture. The American social ethos evolved largely as part of this historical process.[2] At first the ideal of Anglo-Conformity prevailed, when the newcomers were expected to adapt

to the dominant English forms established by the original forebears of the new nation. In due course it became manifest that this ideal was not to be attained. The newcomers persisted in retaining their own life styles and particularly as a result of the post-1880 mass migrations (of whom the Jews formed only one of many groups), American society comprised a variety of cultural backgrounds. By the early years of this century, the well-known melting pot theory had gained wide currency. An emergent composite American culture was envisaged, for which the shedding of original cultural differences was a prerequisite. In its turn the melting pot ideal was not realized, and what is more important in this connection is the subsequent acceptance of immigrant subcultures as an integral element of American society. By the 1960's it was affirmed that 'The ethnic group in American society became not a survival from the age of mass immigration, but a new social form.'[3]

Similarly the history of education in the United States, as well as its related contemporary issues, can also be considered within the setting of a multi-ethnic and multi-denominational society. The Common School was the product of the melting pot ideal, in that it sought to Americanize children from many varied backgrounds. Furthermore, the official policy of excluding any specifically religious influences from the schools was also part of a deliberate emphasis upon the underlying common factor of Americanism. Religious education was to be the direct responsibility of the various denominations, and therefore had no place within the official school system.[4]

Over the past two decades the issues of ethnicity and of religion and education have come to assume great prominence within the American educational system. The Black Consciousness movement and other similar ethnic manifestations have led to the introduction of minority cultural elements in the school curricula and activities hitherto dominated by the Common School ideology. In addition, the religious issue has attained great prominence in recent years, notably through a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions and Acts of Congress relating to such matters as aid from public funds for denominational schools and the inclusion of prayers and religious instruction in curricula of the publicly administered school systems.

Some features of contemporary American Jewry are inevitably connected with all the above historical antecedents. For example, the threefold religious organizational division into Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform movements can be considered in terms of response and reaction to the influence of American society and culture. While the Reform movement originated with highly acculturated German immigrants in the middle of the last century, Orthodoxy is the expression of eastern European Jewry and emerged as a significant branch of American Judaism only in the 1880's. Conservative Judaism developed from about that same decade, having broken away from Reform

Judaism to become a movement incorporating important features of both Orthodoxy and Reform. Jewish education in the United States is today organized along the broad basis of these three divisions, having evolved not as a unified entity but rather as a group of systems each with its own distinguishing features. While they all aspire to the common goal of perpetuating Jewish identity and the Jewish religio-cultural heritage within American society, each has its own ideological approach.[5]

The inherent characteristics of Jewish education in the United States are thus not exclusively the result of Jewish factors, but also reflect the processes of adaption to the socio-political environment. An account of the historical development of Jewish education, and of the main features that have emerged from 1945 into the 1970's therefore also subsumes details of this interaction with this wider setting, as well as the distinctive characteristics of American Jewry itself.

The Historical Background

The earliest Jewish schools were those established in Colonial times by local congregations. The *Shearith Israel* Congregation in New York had its own school as far back as 1731, which taught not only Hebrew but also the three R's, English, and Spanish.[6] By the middle of the eighteenth century there was also a Jewish academy in Newport, Rhode Island. Apart from these institutions there appears to be no evidence at this stage of similar amenities organized in other congregations. Instead, Jewish education was largely acquired through the medium of private schools and tutors.

With the dominant cultural influence of Anglo-Conformity in the Colonial era and the first half of the last century, those immigrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds had to adapt to a predominantly English-based cultural tradition. In the process of absorption there inevitably arose problems in the sphere of education. There are examples at that time of ethnic groups, apart from Jews, who strove to preserve their own educational institutions. However, as far as the Jews were concerned, they 'exhibited a readiness, if not an eagerness to adapt themselves to the life and culture about them'.[7] This was expressed in a marked decline in Jewish learning and a correspondingly greater stress upon secular studies in such institutions as the *Shearith Israel* School.

For a number of years in the early nineteenth century, Jewish and other religious schools even received State financial aid. The situation changed significantly with the growth and development of a non-denominational educational policy in the country as a whole.[8] The first Amendment to the Constitution and Jeffersonian principle of the 'wall of separation' between Church and State were subsequently to form the basis of certain fundamental policies in American education.

With the development of a national public, non-denominational system, Jewish full-time schools declined in scope and influence. In their stead there emerged a network of part-time supplementary institutions, of which the first significant example was the Sunday school established in Philadelphia by Rebecca Gratz in 1838.[9] In Jewish communities throughout the country, parents withdrew their children from existing Jewish full-time schools, and enrolled them in the public school system. Admittedly, with an influx of immigrants from Germany in the middle of the nineteenth century, a number of new congregational and private day schools were opened in such cities as New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Boston, Albany, and Cincinnati, but for the most part even these schools were short-lived in the face of the growing attraction of the Common School ideal for Jewish parents.[10]

The corresponding rise of supplementary Jewish education was not only through the medium of Sunday Schools but also of parochial afternoon schools, many of which had formerly been all-day establishments. The change from an integrated to a part-time educational process produced the problems of time and of educational standards that were to become endemic over subsequent decades until the present day. New policies were called for. One approach was to adopt the catechismal method of teaching Judaism which had originated in the Reform communities in Germany, in direct contrast to the spirit of Jewish education in eastern Europe (which was in due course to make its own impact in America).

By the time of the mass immigration of eastern European Jewry between 1880 and 1914, the Jewish educational system was dominated by German Reform and by Conservative influences. The principle of supplementary Jewish schooling was more or less universally accepted. The Common School ethos with its pervading doctrine of Americanization began to dominate and conflict with the ethnic spirit of Jewish identity, and assimilation was the natural corollary.[11]

Given this situation, the transplanting on American soil of the traditions and spirit of Jewish education of the eastern European *shtetel* assumes special significance. The *Heder*, the *Talmud Torah*, and the *Yeshiva* were themselves the products of a society uninfluenced by surrounding cultures and were therefore in complete contrast to the supplementary schools of American Jewry. Moreover, they were not only incompatible with the prevailing forces of Americanization, but as the educational institutions of a highly organized communal structure within eastern Europe, they could not be successfully transplanted in a community with no such organization.

Some symptoms of this situation have been recorded. By 1918 the itinerant *melamed*, more often than not an ignorant man who could not make a living in his main occupation or trade, became an important feature of the system.[12] By then, there was a proliferation of private

establishments unsupervised by communal or congregational authority, and in New York City alone there were about 500 *Hedarim* with over 14,000 pupils.[13]

It was the *Talmud Torah*, attached to the synagogue and functioning after school hours, that became a more effective educational institution in the eastern European tradition. Unlike the *Heder*, it functioned under the aegis of the local congregation. As groups of immigrants established their own Orthodox-based congregations in the large cities, so these took on educational as well as synagogal and philanthropic functions. It also tallied with equivalent Reform and Conservative schools. This was particularly so when, by the inter-war years, the eastern immigrants predominated numerically and influentially.[14]

The educational aims and content of the Orthodox *Talmud Torah* were firmly based on eastern European traditions. The desired standards were those of Orthodox Judaism in the *Shtetel*, rooted in the past rather than in the more immediate American environment. In due course there arose a new type of part-time school, the *Heder Metukan*, which sought to synthesize the best elements in traditional Judaism with those of modern Zionism and enlightenment.[15]

As the institution of higher learning, the *Yeshiva* suffered mainly because its potential source of students was not forthcoming in these new conditions. The Reform and Conservative movements in establishing their own respective equivalent institutions—the Hebrew Union College in 1875 and the Jewish Theological Seminary in 1886—had done so primarily with a view to producing Rabbis who were versed also in secular learning, as befitted spiritual leaders in the American setting. This was completely out of keeping with the spirit of the *Yeshiva* of eastern Europe. It was, however, the Yitzchak Elchanan Yeshivah in New York, founded in 1897, which was to become the basic unit and embryo of today's Yeshiva University.

In contrast to the intensive religious aims which had generally predominated, a very important section of the eastern European immigrants introduced its own form of Jewish education. The Jewish Labour movement, inspired by radical ideals and using Yiddish as its medium of expression, began to establish its own folk schools at the turn of the century. At these establishments, not only was the Yiddish language stressed, but History was taught 'rationally and scientifically'.[16]

At this stage, Jewish education in the United States remained organizationally unco-ordinated and heterogeneous. Against the background of American society it reflected a plurality of attitudes towards assimilation and acculturation. Furthermore, different types of educational institutions represented respectively different expressions of Judaism. The *Talmud Torah* of Orthodox Judaism contrasted, for example, with the Sunday school that had become typical of the Reform movement.

When the first attempts were made to create an organized system, this basis of pluralism and variegation had to be taken into account. After the New York *Kehilla* was established in 1909, one of its first achievements was to institute a Bureau of Jewish Education, of which the first Director was Samson Benderly (1876–1944). Benderly is regarded as the creator of the first organized system of Jewish education that took into account the American setting. As he himself expressed it, 'The public school system is the rock bottom upon which this country is rearing its institutions, and we Jews must evolve here a system of Jewish education that shall be complementary and harmonious with the public school system.'[17]

As a planner and administrator, Benderly also set an example that was followed in other cities where similar Bureaus were subsequently established. Probably his most important achievement was to gather round him a group of young, dedicated associates who were to become leading educationists in New York and elsewhere. It was largely due to the influence of Benderly and this 'second generation' that the new approach introduced certain details that were to become permanent features of the system. No doubt in keeping with the current spirit prevailing in American education generally, there was an entirely new stress on pedagogical and administrative pragmatism and experimentation.[18] Detailed surveys and regularly held conferences were but two manifestations of this new approach. Long after the New York *Kehilla* disintegrated, the Board of Education survived, to be followed by its successor bodies. This was to be the pattern throughout the United States.

The question of finance and administration became a communal rather than a congregational concern. With the inauguration of Federations from the 1920's onwards in all the large cities as the main source of funding Jewish communal enterprises, this organizational principle was further enhanced. Most important of all, under the aegis of the Bureaus of Education, schools of all shades of opinion—Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and Yiddishist—were able to maintain their full autonomy.[19] This indeed is the pattern that has prevailed to this day, when the Bureaus are directing, advisory, and co-ordinating bodies rather than controlling entities.

The final stage in the administrative structure, at a national level, was attained in 1939 with the establishment of the American Association for Jewish Education. This body in turn was to provide the national and central co-ordinating and consultative machinery for the local educational agencies throughout the country. In effect, therefore, as a composite system Jewish education possessed a federal-type structure which in certain ways reflected that of American education as a whole. There was no centralized administration, either at a national or local urban level, while the principle of pluralism within a wider communal frame-

work was left intact. Instead there existed the principle of twofold affiliation—administrative and ideological.[20]

All these developments, notably in the inter-war years, took place against a background in many ways adverse to the ideals of Jewish education. This was the period of economic crisis and one when many American Jews were striving to merge into the wider society. It was the era of the second generation for whom Americanization took priority. By 1945, what was in every respect a voluntary form of education was provided for only a minority of Jewish children. Simarly, there was a parallel decline in Jewish spiritual values and culture in an atmosphere 'in which the Jewish cultural-religious heritage taught to the children was constantly curtailed in order to fit it to the ever shrinking requirements of American Jewish life'.[21] At the end of the Second World War, a leading educationist enumerated the four leading problem areas (which were to persist well into the 1970's). These were the re-evaluation of the Jewish teaching profession, the reconstruction of the Jewish school system, the re-organization of community support for Jewish education, and the reintegration of Jewish education with life in America, with events in Europe, and 'with the creative spiritual resources in Palestine'.[22]

The Contemporary Situation

The post-1945 history of Jewish education in the United States consists to a large extent of the quest to overcome the above four problem areas. There were also other factors and determinants. Firstly, the joint impact of the European Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel; secondly, the rise of ethnic consciousness in America in the last two decades; and thirdly, the mass entry of Jews into the professions and the middle classes, as well as the exodus from the city centres into the new suburbs.

As part of a plural society, the corporate identity of American Jewry since 1945 has been based predominantly on religious ethnicity.[23] This is so even taking into account the existence of hundreds of thousands of Jews who have no formal religious affiliation. Particularly during the 1950's and 1960's, the religious expression of ethnicity became a factor of special significance in American society. The absence of one dominant religious creed as well as the corresponding 'common faith' for all Americans of numerous and varied denominations and sects have their roots in early American history.[24] This detail is of special relevance, since America's Jews do not stand out prominently as a sole religious minority in a nation with one dominant faith, as had hitherto been the usual case in Diaspora Jewries.

The distinguished social philosopher, Horace M. Kallen, was one of the first to propagate the idea of an 'orchestra' of culture in which

each ethnic group could make its own distinctive contribution to American society, rather than submerge its own collective identity.[25] As a Jew, Kallen applied these ideas to Jewish education in America. His basic premise was that Jewish identity is essential not only for its own sake, but also for what it can contribute to the world in general. Thus the aim of Jewish education was 'to enhance the cultural pluralism in which the democracy of the spirit exists: never to teach Jewish things except in their dynamic connection with things not Jewish; ever to show how each enriches and strengthens the others, so that the virtues of any are in the solidarity of all.'[26] Of special significance was Kallen's acceptance of the principle of pluralism within the Jewish community itself, with equal status for the religious and secular Jew, as for the Hebraist and the Yiddishist.[27]

American Jewry is no monolithic entity in terms of communal organization and structure. Within the matrix of the average local community there generally exist side by side congregations owing allegiance to one of the three main synagogue movements, followers of Reconstructionism (an offshoot of the Conservative movement), unaffiliated congregations, cultural organizations adhering to Zionist or Yiddish secularist doctrines, or social and cultural groups with no particular ideology. The same principle applies at the level of the individual Jew. Marshall Sklare has used the term 'Subcommunity' to describe the collective product of this process of identification, and adds, 'Subcommunal structure is sprawling and inchoate: because its development rests more on individual initiative rather than on bureaucratic planning, it is necessarily irregular.'[28]

A workable complex of educational institutions can only be brought about through an appropriate organization and administrative superstructure. Hence the three tier formation of the American Association for Jewish Education, the three main 'denominational' movements, and the local Bureaus of Jewish Education. The entire administrative process has been described as 'co-ordination and standardization through unification of autonomous units in some loose form of organization.'[29]

In addition to the above pluralistic perspective, American Jewish education can also be considered within a generational framework. One frequently quoted approach has been to delineate three generations as the three stages in the Americanization of immigrants. While the first generation clung to the traditions and attitudes of the old country, the second did its utmost to reject its foreign origins and hasten the process of assimilation. A third generation in its turn has reacted against this attitude by seeking to rediscover its cultural roots.[30] In the history of American Jewish education this theory holds good for the first two generations. The post-1945 years, however, concern the third (and sometimes even the fourth) generation. A number of studies of Jewish

communities in the 1950's and 1960's certainly confirmed that with the post-war exodus from the city to the suburbs there had been an awakened interest in Jewish tradition, religious observance, and folkways, but with significant variations and modifications based on the new milieu.[31]

Furthermore, the third generation which sought to rediscover its cultural roots was by now highly acculturated and the Jewish educational institutions therefore had to adapt to this new situation. For example, these same studies of middle-class suburban Jewish communities clearly illustrate that the desire of many American-born Jews to preserve a form of religio-ethnic identity arose partly because they found themselves in a milieu where, interestingly enough, other groups were striving to do the same thing. In short, post-war Jewish education has as one of its important determinants the ethnic and religious revival in post-war America.

Post-war pluralism within American Jewish education has crystallized mainly in the form of the Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform triad. Since 1945 the secularist and Yiddishist movements have suffered a marked decline, largely because the Yiddish language and the European socialist ideals never made the same impact upon the American-born acculturated generation as they had done upon its forebears.[32] The Yiddish language today flourishes most of all within the ultra-orthodox educational institutions. After 1945, no independent system of Zionist education emerged within American Jewry, apart from youth movements. However, the place of modern Israel and the Zionist ideal are emphasized in all systems of Jewish education, with the exception of the ultra Orthodox.

The Report of the Commission for the study of Jewish Education in the United States, which appeared in 1959 as the most comprehensive survey of its kind, gave the following estimated percentage breakdown of pupil enrolment in New York and 94 other communities according to religious-cultural orientation: Orthodox, 21·0; Conservative, 38·6; Reform, 28·1; Yiddish, 1·3; and Other or Multiple Orientations, 11·0.[33] A survey completed in 1976 for the American Association of Jewish Education gave the following equivalent percentages for Greater New York and 59 other communities representing 86 per cent of the total estimated Jewish population of the United States: Orthodox, 26·5; Conservative, 29·9; Reform, 35·2; Inter-Congregational, 0·5; Communal/Independent, 7·5; and Yiddish, 0·4.[34]

Against this background, Orthodox Jewry in the United States consists today of a loosely knit collection of mainly urban congregations. Its adherents range from the so-called ultra-Orthodox elements, with a large representation of post-1945 immigrants, to affiliated members who can be described as 'residual' or 'non-observant' orthodox. A parallel duality is also to be found within the Orthodox educational

system, or rather systems, of day schools and supplementary schools. The Jewish day school principle in America is first and foremost an expression of the Orthodox educational philosophy of maintaining the most intensive Jewish content possible, and is also a rejection of the supplementary school approach which by its very nature defers to the ideal of the Common School.

Administratively and ideologically, there are two principal distinguishing components within Orthodox education. The first is the system of day schools in New York and the larger urban areas administered by *Torah Umesorah*, a system founded in 1944. Secondly, there exists a network of *Yeshiva*-type day schools, mainly in New York City, composed of single units or groups of schools belonging to the various Hassidic communities. Orthodox education was until comparatively recently a heterogeneous and diffuse sector without even a partially co-ordinating administrative organization. The establishment only in the 1970's of a National Commission on Torah Education marks the first significant attempt towards some form of policy co-ordination.[35]

These features also illustrate two separate and conflicting attitudes within American Orthodoxy. Many Orthodox bodies co-operate with other organizations under a local communal agency, or participate in the work at a national level of the American Association of Jewish Education. While not in any way compromising their religious principles, these orthodox groups at least acknowledge the impact of conditions in America upon the Jewish community.

On the other hand, the ultra-Orthodox are more uncompromising. Of the Hassidic groups, only one, the Lubavitch movement, makes any notable concerted attempt to propagate its ideals within American Jewry as a whole. In the ultra-Orthodox schools the intensive traditional approach—which had become so rapidly attenuated in the earlier decades of the century—forms the basic educational principle.

The 'Platform' of the National Commission for Yeshiva Education is a representative expression of the goals of 'middle of the road' Orthodox education.[36]

1. The *Yeshiva* (day school) is the most effective instrument for transmitting our heritage in the spirit of our Torah and tradition integrated with American democracy and way of life....
2. *Love* for the Jewish people, Medinat Israel and the Hebrew language constitute a basic part of historic traditional Judaism and should, therefore, be an integral part of the Yeshiva curriculum...
3. *Ivrit B'Ivrit* is the most effective method for accomplishing the objectives of the curriculum and for creating a positive atmosphere for the earning process....
4. Only an observant teacher can inculcate the proper religious spirit in children and, therefore, only such teachers should be employed in day schools....

As the oldest branch of organized American Judaism, the Reform movement is also the one that is most deeply rooted in the historical and cultural traditions of the country. Its antecedents, however, are in the German Reform movement which sought to facilitate the transformation of ghettoized Jews into Germans of the Mosaic religious persuasion. Compared with the other two movements, its adherents constitute a notably higher proportion of older-established American Jewish families. Consequently, in such diverse details as organizational structure, religious practices, and educational goals Reform Judaism represents a direct contrast to the more inward looking attitudes of Orthodoxy.

The *Goals of Reform Jewish Education*, published in 1975, are a synthesis of traditional and contemporary elements, and also indicate a decided move away from an originally radical approach.[37]

> The goal of Jewish education with the Reform Movement is the deepening of Jewish experience and knowledge for all liberal Jews, in order to strengthen faith in God, love of Torah, and identification with the Jewish people, through involvement in the synagogue and participation in Jewish life. We believe that Judaism contains answers to the challenges and questions confronting the human spirit, and that only a knowledgeable Jew can successfully discover these answers.

The Reform movement has from the outset propounded the doctrine of Judaism as an exclusively religious denomination within American society, although this doctrine has become modified in recent decades. This is best illustrated in the development of the Sunday School as the main educational institution of the movement, with its emphasis on the ethical teaching of Judaism and its comparative lack of emphasis on the Hebrew language and traditional Jewish observances. The movement has one central policy-making body on educational matters, the Commission on Jewish Education, on which the Union of American Hebrew Congregations and the Central Conference of American Rabbis are represented. Its three main functions are the preparation of curricula, the publication of educational material, and the training of teachers.[38]

The Reform Sunday School, with its origins in the last century, represents a characteristically American version of Jewish education. Inevitably, the time factor has led to a diminution of the Hebrew content in this type of school. Recently, however, the movement has been conscious of the defects of Sunday School education, and there has been a constant drive over the past two decades to convert more and more of these schools to weekday afternoon centres. This indeed is one manifestation of the strong tendencies within American Reform Judaism to veer more towards traditional practices and rituals, including the use of Hebrew in religious services.[39]

The typical Reform schools are those in suburban rather than metropolitan areas, even though suburban congregations tend to be smaller. The present strength of the movement is within its younger members and families. Reform education also tends to attract higher enrolments in those areas where there are no amenities organized by Orthodox or Conservative Congregations. There is in addition a tendency for Reform religious schools not to be formally accredited either with the local Bureau of Jewish Education or the parent Reform body, The National Association of Temple Educators. This indicates a desire for independence in educational matters on the part of individual Reform Congregations, and also an inclination towards an innovative and individualistic educational policy on the part of many of the schools.[40]

If Orthodox and Reform Judaism represent two extremes of an ideological spectrum, then Conservative Judaism has attempted to chart a path between the two. Itself the product of a synthesis between tradition and innovation, it has sought to develop educational principles based on reciprocal and interdependent influences. As a breakaway group from the Reform movement which was considered too radical in its disregard of traditional observances, Conservative Judaism subsequently gained most of its adherents in this century from the children of eastern European immigrants who were attracted to the synthesis. One of the leaders of the movement expressed its ideology as follows: 'We are not mechanical middle of the roaders who shun the logic of either extreme, but we are in truth the builders of a rational synthesis, the protagonists of a healthy equilibrium ... we want our children to sense the tensions between the ideal and the real—but within one unified reach of discourse and feeling.'[41]

Educational policy in Conservative congregations is co-ordinated by The Commission on Jewish Education of the United Synagogue of America. Organized in 1949, the Commission has affiliated to it a national system of part-time congregational schools as well as a group of Solomon Schechter day schools. In addition to its curricula, publications, and placement services, the Commission is also closely concerned with the evolution of educational policy through its Melton Research Center in New York. The fact that the vast majority of schools of the Conservative movement are attached to Synagogues has produced a degree of co-ordination that has helped the educational system to develop its educational standards and grow in numerical terms.[42]

For all this, Conservative Judaism remains at the centre of the ideological spectrum, and as a result two distinct and often opposing tendencies in the educational field have become apparent. Firstly, the movement has been responsible for some important innovations and for a more effective policy towards research and development than either Orthodoxy or Reform. For example, the development of the Congregational School as the most important educational setting ema-

nates from the Conservative movement and provides scope for constant interaction between school and congregation.[43] On the other hand, the movement by its very nature lacks the ideological cohesiveness of Orthodoxy or Reform, and this is reflected in the virtual pluralism in approaches to education. While some schools reveal strong Orthodox tendencies, others are markedly Reform in their orientation.

With several composite systems of education, based on different and in some cases even conflicting aims and ideologies, it has been essential to achieve some degree of mutual understanding both at national and local communal level in order to avoid chaos. A state of co-existence has been maintained largely through the functioning of the local Bureaus of Education on which the three movements are represented. The underlying principle of these local agencies has been to serve all elements of the community. Their evolution since 1945 has often been a process of trial and error by means of which each local body has evolved according to local circumstances. These provide a rationalized administrative structure, dealing with such matters as office administration, the provision and maintenance of suitable premises, the recruitment and accreditation of teaching personnel, and the setting of suitable standards of instruction. In sum, therefore, the central educational agency is non-partisan; it recognizes the ideological autonomy of its affiliated schools, and in such matters as finance and overall planning its primary concern is the community as a whole.[44]

At the national level, the most important achievement of the American Association for Jewish Education since 1945 has been the encouragement of a more methodical and scientific approach towards Jewish education—largely by fostering the principle of local communal responsibility. Towards this end a number of systematic studies—some local, some regional, and some on a national basis—have been sponsored and organized. The most detailed and informative of these was carried out between 1951 and 1959.[45]

In its own way, finance has been the key element in the effectiveness of the entire system. It was estimated in the 1959 survey that in the year 1955–56 American Jewry spent $55,800,000 on Jewish education compared with approximately $18,000,000 in 1947.[46] In 1975–76 the amount spent had reached $260,000,000.[47] The financial structure is also a reflection of the variegated character of Jewish education and of the constant efforts towards co-ordination. A large proportion of income is derived from pupils' fees, and a further significant amount comes from organized functions and special local fund-raising campaigns. However, the most logical and ongoing source of income should be through the communal allocations of local Federations. Hitherto there had been marked charitable undertones in the financial basis of Jewish education. Moreover, only in comparatively recent years have Federations deemed Jewish schools worthy of substantial financial

support. Thus, both quantitatively and proportionately, Jewish education has become more and more the direct concern of the Jewish community. The general policy of Federations has evolved from one of tentative, and sometimes even reluctant, aid to the present-day increasing acceptance of their obligations in this sphere.[48]

Since 1945, American Jewry has also been directly involved in wider issues concerning religion and education. In terms of legislation, religion has been excluded from American public education largely in the spirit of the First Amendment to the Constitution which states that 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the exercise thereof.' This has been reinforced by the traditional 'wall of separation' between Church and State, of very special import in a country with so many religious denominations. For Jews, the resultant policy has obviously meant the avoidance of certain problems arising from their religious minority status. Hence, one of the reasons for their support of the Common School ideal. The three main issues that have persisted concern religious instruction, prayers on school premises, and aid from public funds for denominational schools.[49]

Since religious instruction in the public school system is expressly forbidden by law, a number of cities and school districts inaugurated schemes of 'released time' or 'dismissed time'. Pupils either finish school earlier on certain days, or are allowed to be absent for part of the school day in order to receive religious instruction under the aegis of their own denominations. Such instruction is held away from school premises and attendance is voluntary. A Supreme Court decision of 1952 held 'released time' to be constitutional when the religious instruction was conducted off school premises, and without pressure on children to participate.[50] On that particular occasion many Jewish organizations opposed the decision, despite the fact that numbers of Jewish children throughout the country were availing themselves of these facilities.

An even more contentious issue has been that of the recitation of prayers and the inclusion of religious literature in the day-to-day activities of the schools. A historic Supreme Court decision in 1947 provided a clear interpretation for the exclusion of all these religious influences, and this has remained a subject of particular concern to Jews.[51] Predictably, communal organizations and most Jews as individuals oppose the intrusion of religious influences into the public school system, since no matter how non-denominational this might be in form and spirit, the minority status of Jewish pupils would still be emphasized.

Over the question of aid from public funds, the attitudes of the main two divisions of America's Christian population have been clear from the outset. Whereas the Protestant denominations were on the whole firmly opposed to such aid, the Catholics on the other hand constantly campaigned for financial support for their nation-wide network of

parochial schools. Until 1945, when there were comparatively few Jewish day schools, the leading representative bodies of American Jewry were virtually unanimous in their opposition to state aid. However, with the spectacular post-war development in day school education, the community is today divided in its views.[52]

The Jewish lack of unanimity over the entire religious issue has been underlined on a number of occasions. For example, between 1954 and 1956 the New York City Board of Education submitted to representative bodies of all religious denominations drafts of a proposed programme of moral and spiritual ideals for use in the city's public schools. The Jewish reaction was one of cautious support. The New York Board of Rabbis—representing Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform spiritual leaders—acknowledged the attempt to eliminate sectarian practices in the schools, but disagreed with the programme by stressing that 'religious education and training are the exclusive responsibility of the home, Church and Synagogue'.[53] Other important bodies—such as the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish Congress—reacted in a similar tone, but to varying degrees of approval or disapproval, and without any semblance of unanimity.

A parallel development has been the growing involvement of Congress since the 1950's in providing direct aid to non-public educational institutions. This has been of direct concern to Jewish day school movements, constantly faced with financial problems. On the other hand, it runs counter to the attitudes of leading Jewish organizations, as indicated above. Under the provision of the 1958 National Defense Education Act, 32 Jewish day schools received $395,199 in loans. In 1966, *Torah Umesorah* received a $189,000 Federal grant to conduct 'Headstart' programmes in eight of its schools in New York.[54] The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 set out a five-year programme of grants to private as well as public schools for the acquisition of library resources, textbooks, and other printed material. The American Association for Jewish Education expressed its anxiety over this development, but the Act was supported by a number of bodies representing the day schools, and by sections of the Jewish press. On the other hand, the principle was violently opposed by such bodies as the American Jewish Congress, whose representative is said to have declared publicly about Jewish day schools, that Jews 'go there not because they love God but because they are afraid of the Negro'.[55]

A further example of this ambivalent attitude occurred in 1971 after a series of Supreme Court decisions declared that grants to sectarian educational institutions were illegal. The Joint Advisory Committee of the Synagogue Council of America together with the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council circularized their constituent agencies concerning these decisions. They recommended support for the principle of Church-State separation over such details as the pro-

vision of transport and textbooks, but for the first time supported grants from public funds for welfare services.[56] This general policy gained the support of all constituent organizations of these two bodies, with the significant exception of the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations, which remains uncompromisingly committed to the day school policy.

The entire question of church-state relations in education epitomizes the Jewish dilemma. So long as American schools remained secular, Jewish pupils could attend them in the spirit and traditions of a society in which group differences were recognized, but under a common American ethos; and Jewish education organized on a supplementary school basis fully complied with this attitude. But when forces within American society as a whole challenged this rigid separation in the schools, the original position became untenable. Moreover, the entire process has gained further momentum as a result of the spectacular development of Jewish day school education. While communal leaders can oppose in principle public aid for sectarian education, they have to recognize the financial needs of Jewish day schools. It is also by now generally acknowledged, however reluctantly, that Jewish day schools are essential as a bastion against the constant threat of assimilation.[57]

The Schools, the Pupils and the Teachers

The emergence of part-time, supplementary Jewish education from the turn of the century also forms the basis of the contemporary framework. By 1976, day schools accounted for 20 per cent of enrolments, compared with 12 per cent a decade earlier,[58] so that part-time Jewish education has remained the norm to this day. A part-time non-compulsory system has obvious inherent disadvantages with regard to ensuring regular attendance. Thus the pervasive, ongoing problem has been that of the Jewish children of school age who receive no Jewish education. Since 1945, various estimates have been given; it was stated in 1977 that 'one third of all Jewish children of school age will have no exposure to formal Jewish education in their lifetimes.'[59] An overall decline of 19 per cent in numbers of children enrolled in Jewish schools was recorded between 1958 and 1974.[60]

Of the immediate problems in the supplementary schools, the first has been that of accommodating a comprehensive curriculum within the very limited available time. Ideally this curriculum comprises Hebrew, Prayers and Worship, Customs and Ceremonies, Bible-Pentateuch, Talmud, History, Israel, and Contemporary Events. There is inevitably wide scope for variations in this range, with differing choices of priorities. The second problem has concerned regular attendance. Various surveys have indicated that the average pupil's attendance is by no means regular, and that his/her stay at a supplementary school is rarely longer than three years. The teaching of Hebrew and

Bible has become the main 'casualty' in this situation. The 1959 survey found that in 20 per cent of the Sunday schools, Hebrew was not taught. Similarly, it described Hebrew and Bible as 'the weakest aspect, the tragic side, of American Jewish education' in which 'the likelihood is that the vast majority of our children grow up without any knowledge of Bible text, either in Hebrew or in English'.[61]

One important and interesting experiment in American Jewish education has been the summer camp. It has its origins in the inter-war years, largely under the influence of Benderly and his contemporaries. The camp atmosphere—with its special emphasis on recreational activities, its characteristics of a total institution, and its stress on human fellowship—has been very successful in promoting Jewish education. By the 1960's there were over 200 summer camps annually organized by local Jewish congregations and communities, national synagogue bodies, the Zionist youth movements, and also by private groups. The success of the summer camp has been particularly noteworthy in the case of adolescents whose formal Jewish education ended with the onset of the teenage years.[62]

The most significant feature of the post-war era remains the expansion of Jewish day schools. From a total enrolment of 60,000 pupils in 1962, the number increased to about 92,000 in 1977,[63] with a significant proportion now at High School level. Another noteworthy change is that while the majority of these schools were at first in the Greater New York area, this bias has been reversed since 1960.

A number of theories have been put forward to account for this expansion. Firstly, there is the dissatisfaction with the public school system—a 'negative' factor, but nevertheless one that has been frequently cited, and which certainly gained more prominence after the 1950's when the official integration policies were endorsed within the public school system. In common with others, there were Jewish parents who sought 'private' schools in order to maintain educational standards for their children, and the Jewish day schools benefited accordingly. On the other hand, some 'positive' factors have also been noted. One of these is 'an increasing uneasiness about the quality of afternoon schools'[64] as effective educational institutions. The extent to which American Jewry as a whole has been affected by this reassessment is difficult to determine.

There is no doubt that the post-war Orthodox immigrants have had a decisive influence on the development of day schools. Gravitating *en masse* towards some neighbourhoods in New York and other large urban areas, these newcomers successfully transplanted their former European life-styles. The closely-knit, inward-looking communities in such areas as Williamsburg in New York established their own full-time educational systems in order to resist the influence of Americanization.[65] In this respect they stand out in complete contrast to the Jewish

immigrants of earlier decades. A further factor, particularly since the 1960's, has been (as noted earlier) the growth of ethnic consciousness within the United States as a whole.

There are three distinct approaches to the relationship between Jewish and secular studies in the day schools. Firstly, in the *Yeshiva* type school of the Orthodox Hassidic communities, undeviating priority has always been given to Jewish studies based on the Talmud and related subjects.[66] Secular studies occupy a subordinate status in terms of time and emphasis and are generally relegated to the last part of the school day; indeed, in many instances they take up the minimum time in accordance with regulations and standards prescribed by law. None of these schools is co-educational, and boys' and girls' departments are housed in separate buildings. The language of instruction for Jewish subjects is invariably Yiddish. Finally, standards in Jewish studies are rigorous; many of these schools have a ten-hour working day from Sunday to Thursday and a morning session on Friday.

A second type of day school can be described as the Orthodox-oriented Modern *Yeshiva*.[67] Here the Jewish sector of the curriculum does not adhere rigidly to Talmud-related studies, but includes such subjects as modern Hebrew literature, with the language of instruction for Jewish subjects being invariably Hebrew. A typical working day in these schools is from 8 a.m. to 4 or 5 p.m., with the entire morning devoted to Jewish studies and the afternoon to secular subjects such as English, Mathematics, and Science.

A variant of the policy of separating Jewish and secular studies is to be found in the third type of day school, which has been called the 'integrated Yeshiva'. Here an attempt is made to synthesize the Jewish and secular curricula and there is no division into respective morning and afternoon sessions. Hebrew is often used as the language of instruction for secular subjects, as part of the aim to integrate American and Hebraic cultures, or to achieve a blending of Judaic Americanism. Two of the largest and most famous day schools in America, the Ramaz School and the Flatbush Yeshiva in New York, adhere to this principle, as do the day schools of the Conservative and Reform movements.[68]

A convincing number of surveys and other empirical studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of a day school education in producing pupils who eventually become dedicated members of the Jewish community.[69] Opposition to day school development is nonetheless still strong in some circles, although it has been noticeably toned down in recent years. There has also been a more sympathetic attitude on the part of local Federations and a resultant increase in financial aid. Another cause of this stronger support and general interest has been the success of these schools in the secular field. Many day school pupils have by now completed their university courses with outstanding achievement. Moreover, a considerable number of pupils, particularly

in the New York area, have been awarded highly prized Regents', State Engineering, and other Scholarships. Indeed, the proportion in this respect is well above the national average. For all this, within the communal leadership there has been a somewhat ambivalent attitude—an opposition in principle to full-time denominational schools, together with an acceptance of their superiority to part-time institutions, particularly as the main source of future communal leaders.[70]

While the day school movement and ideology have been first and foremost an expression of American Orthodoxy, the other two movements are now also committed to the idea. In 1958, the Conservative United Synagogue Commission on Jewish Education clearly expressed itself in favour of day schools, stressing their potential to 'help the Conservative movement to create a reservoir of intensely educated and deeply dedicated men and women from whom the American Jewish community can draw professional and lay leadership'.[71] Since 1958, its Solomon Schechter Schools have been established in all the large centres of Jewish population. For many years the Reform movement steadfastly opposed the establishment of day schools, but it changed its policy in the early 1960's when the Commission on Education expressed cautious sympathy. The first Reform day schools were opened in 1970, and by 1977 there were six.[72]

Day schools are likely to become an important issue within American Jewry for the next few years, particularly within the general context of American society. The past decade has seen a spate of pronouncements and articles for and against them, as well as a steady stream of related academic dissertations and empirical studies. Despite the realization that such schools have become the most effective medium of preserving Jewish tradition and culture, the entire debate is far from being settled. On the one hand there is the traditional support for a social ethos in which Jewry does not stand out as a distinct entity, while on the other there is the conviction that the survival of American Jewry can be based only on the preservation of its distinctive characteristics. Until the upsurge of ethnic consciousness among other groups in this present decade, this debate posed serious ideological problems. In a sense, therefore, the present success of the day school idea is partly in response to developments within the wider context of American society.

It is only comparatively recently that teaching in Jewish schools has become a full-time career on any significant scale. Even with the disappearance of the *Heder* and the itinerant *melamed* during the inter-war years, and even with the emergence of organized supplementary schools, the teaching of Jewish subjects remained a part-time occupation. The comparatively small numbers of pupils continuing their Jewish education beyond the elementary stages precluded the emergence of an adequate number of well-qualified teachers. This shortage of

personnel has persisted since 1945, while the very 'image' of the Jewish teacher has not been an exalted one. Inevitably, teaching Jewish studies also became for many teachers a 'moonlighting' occupation, subordinated to their main source of livelihood.[73]

A number of important surveys have singled out the unsatisfactory state of the teaching profession as one of the basic reasons for the defects in Jewish education. One New York survey, for example, noted the poor conditions under which teachers had to work and their inadequate salaries in comparison with those of teachers of the public school system as only two reasons for the high turnover in the profession.[74]

On the other hand, organized Jewish teacher-training in the United States started at the end of the last century; and six teacher colleges were established between 1897 and 1924.[75] By the beginning of the 1950's a number of colleges were conferring graduate and post-graduate degrees, while three of them received full regional accreditation from the appropriate authorities. A survey of eight teacher colleges in 1948 and 1949 dealt with a total of 705 students, of whom 381 were men. Their academic backgrounds covered a wide range, and over half of them came from part-time Hebrew schools. In addition, the very process of teacher training was essentially a part-time one, with a quarter of the total student body still attending secular high schools. The survey also stressed deficiencies in standards, both in Jewish subjects and in the principles of Education and Pedagogics. The profession has therefore been a reflection of American Jewish education as a system of part-time pupils with untrained or part-time trained teachers employed to a large extent in a part-time capacity.[76]

The 1959 survey reported the same conditions in the teaching profession and in the field of teacher training. Of an estimated force of 17,483 teachers, 7924 taught in weekday afternoon schools and 9559 in Sunday schools. Only 62·2 per cent of the teachers in weekday schools gave Jewish teaching as their main occupation, while in the Sunday schools only 22·9 per cent held an official qualification, and 9·1 per cent had themselves received no Jewish schooling whatsoever.[77]

All the problems have persisted into the 1960's and 1970's. Except for those teachers in all-day schools, the profession has remained a part-time one. One interesting development has been the employment of increasing numbers of Israelis. At the national level the American Association for Jewish Education, by means of its National Committee on Teacher Education and Welfare, has sought to alleviate the situation. In a series of publications the AAJE has set out new policies with regard to such basic essentials as job security, adequate salaries, and proper accreditation of teaching qualifications.[78]

Apart from such perennial problems of enrolments, financial support, or the adequate provision of suitably trained teachers, the fundamental issues still concern the actual content and methods of Jewish

education. While each of the three religious wings of American Jewry has its own approach, they all have to contend with the task of producing viable curricula that can simultaneously preserve Jewish identity and yet facilitate the smooth integration of the Jew into American society. In his detailed study and critique of the three systems, the Israeli educationist, Zvi Adar, constantly refers to an inherent element of contradiction in the curricula and content, largely resulting from this process of attempting to reconcile Jewish identity with the American setting.[79] Other writers, including directly involved educationists, have also acknowledged this challenge which epitomises Jewish life in America.

The Impact of the Seventies

The momentous changes in American society over the past few years have inevitably exerted their influence upon the Jewish community, and more specifically upon Jewish education. The forces that produced these changes emanated from a series of developments in the 1960's. Time honoured values and standards in American society have been irrevocably altered in the upheaval, and this has exerted a tremendous influence upon American education as a whole. New philosophies of education have emerged, and the place of the school in American society is viewed in a new light, after a critical examination of the relevance of conventional educational theories and methods. The last decade has been one of pedagogic innovation.[80]

Young Jews have been attracted to new movements, particularly those which reject hitherto conventional American standards. There has been special concern about the disproportionately large numbers who, to the detriment of their Jewish identity, have been drawn to such diverse groupings as the radical left, the Eastern religious cults, and the Christian evangelical movements. The closing years of the 1960's marked an upsurge of intensified assertive ethnic consciousness within America's population, highlighted by the rejection by many Blacks of the principle of cultural integration. This development was accompanied by legislation aimed at providing special educational opportunities by means of Affirmative Action policies for Blacks and other underprivileged groups, partly through the integration of schools. Jewry has been influenced by this more emphatic expression of cultural pluralism, and has responded up to a point by its own affirmation of its distinct collective identity.[81] In addition, two developments in the Jewish world at large must be cited: firstly Israel's wars of 1967 and 1973 focused the consciousness of American Jewry upon the Jewish State, and therefore became a constant reminder of group identity; and secondly, the cause of Soviet Jewry had the same effect. The combined impact can be summed up in terms of co-existent respective centrifugal

and centripetal forces upon the individual Jew and upon Jews collectively.

Collectively, all the above factors have impinged upon Jewish education in the United States, exerting positive as well as negative influences. Many features of this decade are a direct continuation of developments described in previous sections of this account, while others constitute an entirely new dimension. The task for Jewish education has therefore been twofold—to solve the problems that have persisted for decades, and to adapt to the new conditions of the seventies.[82]

By the early years of this decade, it was generally admitted that Jewish education in the United States was not attaining its goals in terms of the religio-ethnic socialization of the younger generation. A perusal of the relevant literature—official surveys and reports, as well as articles in the Jewish press—reinforces this impression of inadequacy, if only through the recurrence of the themes of crisis, problems, and shortcomings.[83]

The incidence of high rates of intermarriage was often cited as a reliable indicator of a rising rate of assimilation, and consequently as an example of the failure of Jewish schooling. Lower enrolments, inadequate educational standards, and the absence of effective secondary education provided directly applicable data in support of a pessimistic assessment. Perhaps the most alarming evidence cited as an indictment of the shortcomings of Jewish education was that of alienated Jewish university students.[84]

Among the many studies and assessments during the present decade, the Colloquium on Jewish Education and Jewish Identity—organized by the American Jewish Committee and extending from 1972 to 1976—provides a noteworthy analysis of the situation, together with a series of recommendations. The participants at the Colloquium included leading personalities in the field of Jewish education as well as distinguished academics. While the diagnosis, 'that the present institutions of Jewish education are inadequate for the difficult task of shaping the Jewish identity of the next generation',[85] expresses no new sentiments, the conclusions and recommendations are of particular interest. It was noted that the representatives of Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform movements each expressed in his own way a specific educational doctrine as a valid formulation in confronting present and future problems. In brief, the three basic recommendations of the Colloquium set out a blueprint for future goals in terms that cover the broad range of American Jewish educational philosophies.[86]

A. The Colloquium recommends that it be a Jewish communal responsibility to make possible, in plural and diverse ways, educational opportunities and environments at a high level of excellence for persons of high school age.

B. The Colloquium recommends that there be a communal effort of the

highest priority to establish, augment and enhance Jewish educational opportunities, both formal and informal for college students.

C. The Colloquium recommends as a priority communal responsibility the intensification of efforts in Jewish family education.

In view of the wide terms of reference of the Colloquium, it is significant that its recommendations concentrate upon three specific settings for socialization—the high school, the college and the family—in which the most glaring inadequacies are today manifest. Furthermore, it is in these three areas that the greatest efforts at improving the situation have been exerted in recent years by breaking out of the limited dimensions of the conventional school. Specific developments can indeed be traced. Jewish schooling at the secondary level has always been regarded as an essential stage in achieving the required goals, yet for decades it remained quantitatively insignificant, since there was provision for only a minority of the age group concerned. With the widespread social norm of terminating formal Jewish education at *Barmitsvah* or *Batmitsvah* age, the majority of adolescents never experienced what should have been a crucial stage in their socialization as Jews. This was despite great efforts by all three synagogue movements to attract larger numbers to the supplementary afternoon and Sunday schools. The only real breakthrough has come with the expansion in day school education at the secondary level.

This expansion can therefore be regarded as one of the most realistic developments of this decade. Not only has it gained increasing approval from official community and funding organizations, but it has extended beyond the Orthodox sector. The Conservative Solomon Schechter schools, for example, have seen a marked expansion and accounted for nine per cent of the total day school enrolment by the mid 1970's. Even more significant is the recent change of direction within the Reform movement from general opposition to official commitment. Of the six Reform day schools in existence in 1977, five had been established in the course of the preceding year, and even more expansion was planned.[87] Finally, it needs to be stressed that while the part-time schools have in the past few years shown a steady decline in numbers, the day schools by contrast have shown an appreciable increase.

The University was for many years neglected as a potential mechanism for Jewish education, although its students are in an age group which is impressionable and receptive to a plethora of ideologies. One of the most noteworthy features of the second and third generations of Americanized Jews was the inordinately high proportion of young men and women who sought and received a university education at the great institutions of higher learning. In fact, during the post-1945 era Jewish college students in terms of denominational representation constituted a considerably higher proportion than did either Protestants or Catholics.[88]

The campus upheavals of the 1960's and the tangible evidence of widespread alienation among Jewish students led to a full realization of the consequences of communal neglect. The Hillel Foundations (which had been inaugurated in the 1920's) now became concerned with chaplaincy and counselling, in addition to their cultural and social activities. These new services have gained greater support and have expanded accordingly in recent years. More noteworthy has been the introduction of University courses in Judaic studies covering a wide range of fields and counting as credits for a degree. These courses can be regarded as a parallel development to the establishment of university departments and courses of Black (or other ethnic) studies. As far as Jewry is concerned, these departments and courses have now become a key medium for rectifying earlier deficiencies in the education of so many Jewish students.[89]

The family represents the setting of the most interesting contemporary developments in Jewish education. Of course, throughout Jewish history the family had been the key agency of socialization, in many respects more vital than the synagogue and the school; but in modern times the latter gained greater influence. Assimilation has generally been attributed to the weakening of Jewish content in American Jewish family life, which in turn made the task of the Jewish school more difficult. The only real exception to this phenomenon has been within the confines of Orthodox Jewish family life, in which the affective domain of Jewish education finds its strongest expression.

Accordingly, it is within the Conservative and Reform movements that new policies have emerged with greater emphasis on the family.[90] There has been a development of adult education programmes and the inauguration of organized family activities as opposed to formal pupil instruction, parallel with the current expansion of lifelong or ongoing education in the wider American society as a whole. In the Jewish community this upsurge of interest is best illustrated by the expansion of adult education lectures and courses, not only under the aegis of such movements as B'nai B'rith, but more important, within the framework of individual congregations. The most stimulating utilization of the family group, as opposed to the individual pupil, as the learning unit can be regarded as an attempt to restore to the former its traditional socializing and educational function in the survival process. Both the Conservative and Reform movements have concentrated on this aspect, and their literature and policy statements as well as their activities indicate a new dimension for the future.[91]

Reference must also be made to the rise of a Jewish counter-culture in the form of groups seeking, among other things, alternatives to a conventional Jewish education. One development has been the establishment of *Havurot*—groups of young people studying and sharing

Jewish experiences.[92] It is difficult to predict at this stage whether they will be ephemeral or will endure.

These innovations not only represent an ongoing attempt to come to terms with the realities posed by the host society, but also serve to intensify the Jewish component in the identity of the American Jew. Two expressions at official level have been firstly the move away from a policy of reliance on supplementary schooling, and the realization that schooling *per se* does not constitute education. Writers on Jewish life in America often stress the bicultural characteristics which pervade this entire theme. One familiar aspect that has been stressed in recent years is that of the opposing forces of integration into American society on the one hand, and the quest for Jewish group and individual survival on the other.[93]

The actual content of Jewish education and the development of curricula in accord with contemporary conditions constitute a further area of immediate concern. For the Orthodox Jew, it remains a matter of adhering to age-old principles and learning matter, since by its very definition Orthodoxy is resistant to externally imposed forces of change. Nevertheless, there has been an awareness of modern pressures, which has manifested itself primarily in the field of secular studies, to which there is now a more structured approach. In the Conservative and Reform movements, the problem has been more acute, and has been evident in constant experimentation and innovation. One recent Reform publication reflected this process in the titles of two of its issues entitled respectively 'Teach Us What We Want To Teach' and 'Teach Us What We Want To Learn'.[94] In all three movements there has also been an acceptance of the need for more effective and realistic work in the classroom itself. The theme of innovation has been greatly encouraged by the AAJE and the local bureaus, with such results as the greater use of teaching aids, a more flexible approach to the curriculum, and a greater concern with teaching methods.

The history and current evolution of Jewish schooling in the United States strikingly illustrate the principle of Jewish Diaspora life as a dialectic between Jewry and society at large. The sequence of development, as well as the inherent characteristics of the Jewish school, are therefore not only the product of centuries of the Jewish spiritual and cultural tradition transmitted from one generation to the next. They have also been tempered by the host society. In the case of American Jewry, group survival has become dependent upon a delicately balanced relationship with the wider society in a quest for a seemingly elusive compromise of 'Integration without assimilation, acculturation without absorption'.[95]

Projections into the future must needs take several factors into account. Recent and current developments, despite the promise they hold out, have still not resulted in any far-reaching solutions of the

many outstanding problems. Despite day school expansion, new programmes at the high school and university levels, and innovations in adult and family-based education, American Jewry still depends mainly upon the supplementary school. Accordingly, the problems and shortcomings for the immediate future at least will concern that type of school. Ensuring higher enrolment and attendance is an obvious priority, while the attainment of educational goals not only in the cognitive sense, but also affectively, presents a further challenge. Finally, the satisfactory recruitment and training of a permanent body of Jewish teachers has still to be realized. The essential problems of the past therefore remain.

The condition of American society as a whole is itself dynamic and unpredictable rather than constant. In the past, Jewry—and in particular Jewish education—had to undergo a process of continuous adjustment to changing conditions; it must continue to do so. Whether the present upsurge of assertive ethnic consciousness will endure, or will prove to be a passing phase, American Jewry will have to adapt to the prevailing social forces. It cannot pursue a path of independent development.

What of future events outside America—in Israel and in the rest of the Diaspora? It remains an axiom that the continued group identity of any Jewish community, as opposed to its ultimate demise through structural assimilation, depends upon the effectiveness of its systems of education in transmitting the Jewish heritage. Whether or not this same model of the American experience as religio-ethnic response is valid for other Diaspora communities is of course debatable. One certain conclusion, however, is that Jewish education in the Diaspora can be a practical and applied pursuit only within the framework of the wider society. Policy makers and others concerned with American Jewish education since the first organized systems in the 1920's have accepted this reality. As a result, an approach to education as the basis of Jewish survival in changing conditions has today become acceptable. Without doubt, the American experience provides a cautionary lesson for the rest of Diaspora Jewry.

NOTES

[1] Seymour Martin Lipset, 'The Study of Jewish Communities in a Comparative Context', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. V, no. 2, Dec. 1963, pp. 157–66.

[2] Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life*, New York, 1964, pp. 84–131.

[3] Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, 2nd edn., Cambridge, Mass., 1970, p. 16.

[4] Rena L. Vassar, ed., *Social History of American Education*, Chicago, 1965, vol. II, pp. 213–27, 314–27, 367–79.

[5] See Nathan Glazer, *American Judaism*, 2nd edn., Chicago, 1972, pp. 129–50.

[6] Jacob R. Marcus, *Early American Jewry*, Philadelphia, 1953, Vol. 1, pp. 82–85.

[7] ibid, vol. 2, p. 498.

[8] See Lloyd P. Gartner, ed., *Jewish Education in the United States: A Documentary History*, New York, 1969, for readings from relevant documents and publications from Colonial times to the present century.

[9] Rosa Mordecai, 'The Oldest Jewish Sunday School', Jacob R. Marcus, ed., *Memoirs of American Jews: 1775–1865*, Philadelphia, 1955, vol. 1, pp. 281–88.

[10] Alvin I. Schiff, *The Jewish Day School in America*, New York, 1966, pp. 22–25.

[11] Jeremiah J. Berman, 'Jewish Education in New York City, 1860–1900', *YIVO Annual*, vol. IX, 1954, pp. 247–75, describes the effects of the developing public school system and the rise of the part-time Jewish schools.

[12] Alexander M. Dushkin, *Jewish Education in New York City*, New York, 1918, p. 67.

[13] *The Jewish Communal Register* 1917–1918, New York, 1918, p. 396.

[14] Dushkin, op. cit., pp. 69–72. Other communities also established *Talmud Torah*. See, for example, Saul Adler and Thomas E. Connolly, *From Ararat to Suburbia*, Philadelphia, 1960, pp. 240 ff., for similar developments in the city of Buffalo.

[15] Leo L. Honor, 'Jewish Elementary Education in the United States (1901–1950)', *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society*, vol. XLII, 1952–53, pp. 1–43.

[16] Mark M. Krug, 'The Yiddish Schools in Chicago', *YIVO Annual*, vol. VII, 1952, pp. 276–307.

[17] *Bureau of Education: Bulletin No. 1 of the New York Kehillah*, New York, 1912.

[18] Israel S. Chipkin, 'Dr. Samson Benderly, Reminiscences and Reflections', *Jewish Education*, vol. 20, no. 3, Summer 1949, p. 21.

[19] Abraham P. Gannes, *Central Community Agencies for Jewish Education*, Philadelphia, 1954, is the definitive historical account on this aspect.

[20] Judah Pilch, *The Development of the American Association for Jewish Education, New York*, n.d.

[21] Uriah Z. Engelman, *Hebrew Education in America: Problems and Solutions*, New York, 1947, p. 37.

[22] Israel S. Chipkin, 'Proposals for the Study, Evaluation and Reconstruction of the Jewish Education System in America', *Jewish Education*, vol. 16, no. 2, Spring 1945, pp. 34–36.

[23] Daniel J. Elazar, 'A Note on the Structural Dynamics of the American Jewish Community', *Judaism*, vol. 20, no. 3, Summer 1971, pp. 336–40. See also Glazer, op. cit.

[24] Will Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew*, New York, 1962, is one of the seminal works on this theme.

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[26] Horace M. Kallen (ed. Judah Pilch), *'Of Them That Say They Are Jews' and Other Essays*, New York, 1954, p. 178.

[27] ibid., pp. 33–35.

[28] Marshall Sklare, *America's Jews*, New York, 1971, p. 106.

[29] Leo L. Honor, 'The Impact of the American Environment and American Ideas on Jewish Elementary Education in the United States', *Jewish Quarterly Review*, April 1955, p. 462.

[30] This model was frequently cited in writings on American Jewry in the 1950's and 1960's, and is derived largely from the writings on immigrants by Marcus Lee Hanson. See, for example, Marcus Lee Hanson, 'The Problem of the Third Generation Immigrant', *Commentary*, vol. 14, no. 5, Nov. 1952 (Reprinted from a paper presented to the Augustana Historical Society in 1938).

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[32] Eliezer Whartman, 'Jewish Secularism in America: At the End of the Road', *In the Dispersion* no. 5/6, Spring 1966, pp. 89–103.

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[34] Murray Rockowitz and Gerhard Lang, *Trends in Jewish School Enrollment in the United States 1974/1975*, A.A.J.E., New York, 1976, Table 3, p. 18.

[35] 'Objectives of the National Commission, *NACO TE Review*, June 1976, p. 1.

[36] *Yeshiva Education*, vol. 1, no. 1, Spring 1957, p. 2.

[37] UAHC-CCAR Commission on Jewish Education, *Goals of Reform Jewish Education*, New York, 1975.

[38] UAHC-CCAR Commission on Jewish Education, Minutes of Annual Meeting, October 23–24, 1977, New York City (mimeographed).

[39] These tendencies are stressed in a series of articles in *Judaism*, vol. 23, no. 1, Winter 1974, under the general heading 'Reform Judaism—A Centennial Evaluation'.

[40] Stuart A. Gertman, *'And You Shall Teach Them Diligently'—A Study of the Current State of Religious Education in the Reform Movement*, New York, 1977, pp. 27–28.

[41] Jacob P. Agus, 'Toward a Conservative Philosophy of Jewish Education', in Judah Pilch and Meir Ben-Horin, eds, *Judaism and the Jewish School*, New York, 1966, pp. 235–36.

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[43] See the successive editions of *The Objectives and Standards for the Congregational School*, U.S.C.J.E., New York, 1952 seq.

[44] All these details are set out in the *Self Study Report* of the Board of Jewish Education of Greater New York, 1972.

[45] Dushkin and Engelman, op. cit.

[46] ibid., p. 87.

[47] Alvin I. Schiff, 'Jewish Education in America: Achievement and Challenge', *Jewish Education*, vol. 55, no. 2, Spring 1977, p. 14.

[48] Charles Zibbell, 'Federations, Synagogues and Jewish Education in the '70s', *Jewish Education*, vol. 43, no. 3, Fall 1974, pp. 40–45.

[49] See Theodore R. Sizer, ed., *Religion and Public Education*, Boston, 1967. For the implications for American Jewry, see Philip Jacobson, 'Church-State Issues', *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 65, 1964, pp. 41–66.

[50] Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 306 (1952), Cited in *Religion in Public Education. A Statement of Views*, American Jewish Committee, New York, 1957, p. 15. (Details of important Supreme Court decisions on education in the United States are given in Edward A. Krug, *Salient Dates in American Education, 1635–1964*, New York, 1966.)

[51] Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing. Cited in A.J.C., *Religion in Public Education*, op. cit., p. 15.

[52] For example, news item 'Abram's Qualified Okay for Parochial Aid Stirs Jewish Opinion Clash', *The Jewish Week—American Examiner*, 3 Oct. 1976.

[53] New York Board of Rabbis, News Release, 2 Oct. 1956.

[54] Item in *The Pedagogic Reporter*, vol. XVII, no. 4, June 1966, p. 36.

[55] Quoted in Eugene Rothman, 'Whither the Hebrew Day School?' *Midstream*, vol. XVII, June/July 1971, p. 20.

[56] See *The Jewish Day School: A Policy Statement of the Synagogue Council of America*, 4 November 1971; and Circular letter to member agencies from the Joint Advisory Committee of the Synagogue Council of America and the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, 22 July 1971.

[57] The entire issue is succinctly summed up as 'integration without assimilation, acculturation without absorption—most American Jews would regard this as the optimum arrangement'. Robert Gordis, *The Day School and the Public School—A Strategy for Jewish Survival Today*, New York, n.d., p. 5.

[58] Rockowitz and Lang, op. cit., p. ii.

[59] Schiff, 'Jewish Education . . .', op. cit., p. 15.

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[61] Dushkin and Engelman, op. cit., p. 189.

[62] Uri Farago, *The Influence of a Jewish Summer Camp's Social Climate on the Camper's Identity*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Brandeis University, 1971, provides a detailed empirical study.

[63] Alvin I. Schiff, 'Jewish Day Schools in America: 1962–1977', *The Pedagogic Reporter*, vol. XXIX, no. 1, Fall 1977, p. 3. (The entire Fall 1977 issue is devoted to the Jewish day school.)

[64] Isaac Toubin, *The Relationship of the Jewish Welfare Fund to the Jewish Day School*, A.A.J.E., New York, n.d., p. 3.

[65] 'In summary, Satmarer [Hassidim] want their schools to serve primarily as a bastion against undesirable acculturation, as a training ground for Torah knowledge in the case of the boys, and, in the case of the girls, as a place to gather knowledge they will need as adult women.' Israel Rubin, *Satmar, An Island in the City*, Chicago, 1972, p. 140.

[66] Mordecai M. Schnaidman, 'The Orthodox Day School: An Overview of the Day and High Schools', *The Pedagogic Reporter*, op. cit., pp. 8–11.

[67] The Orthodox approach is set out in 'The Jewish Day School—A Symposium', *Tradition*, vol. 13, no. 1, Summer 1972, pp. 95–130.

[68] See Morton Siegel, 'The Conservative Day School: The Solomon Schechter Day School Association', and Daniel B. Syme, 'The Reform Day School: Its History and Future Prospects', *The Pedagogic Reporter*, op. cit., pp. 11–17.

[69] For example, Harold S. Himmelfarb, *The Impact of Religious Schooling: The Effects of Jewish Education Upon Adult Religious Involvement*, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1974.

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[71] United Synagogue Commission on Jewish Education, *Objectives and Standards*, Revised edn., New York, 1958, p. 22.

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[82] Walter I. Ackerman, 'Jewish Education—For What?' *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 70, 1969, pp. 3–36, provides a lucid analysis of the situation at the end of the 1960's.

[83] See, for example, Leonard J. Fein, 'Suggestions Toward the Reform of Jewish Education in America', *Midstream*, vol. XVIII, no. 2, Feb. 1972, pp. 41–50; Zalmen Slesinger, 'Jewish Education: A Crisis in Orientation and Educational Leadership', *Jewish Frontier*, Aug/Sept. 1975, pp. 34–42; and Meir Ben-Horin, 'Re-Schooling American Jewry', *Journal of Jewish Communal Service*, Spring 1976, pp. 278–80.

[84] *Clearing House* (a professional bulletin of Hillel directors and counsellors), Nov. 1971 and Feb. 1972.

[85] American Jewish Committee, *Colloquium on Jewish Education and Jewish Identity Summary Report and Recommendations*, New York, 1976, p. 4.

[86] ibid., pp. 23–31.

[87] See the articles by Siegel and by Syme in *The Pedagogic Reporter*, Fall 1977 issue, op cit., also Rockowitz and Lang, op. cit., Table 5, p. 20.

[88] Sklare, op. cit., pp. 51–69.

[89] Leon A. Jick, ed., *The Teaching of Judaica in American Universities: The Proceedings of a Colloquium*, New York, 1970.

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[91] Shelley M. Waldenberg, 'The Family School of Temple Isaiah', *Compass*, Fall 1977, pp. 5–7.

[92] Stephen C. Lerner, 'The Havurot: An Experiment in Jewish Communal Living', in Jack Nusan Porter and Peter Dreier, eds., *Jewish Radicalism*, New York, 1973, pp. 149–69.

[93] See Ch. 2, 'Integration and Survival', in Charles S. Liebman, *The Ambivalent American Jew*, Philadelphia, 1973, pp. 23–41.

[94] *Compass*, nos. 33 and 39, May 1975.

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CHANGES IN THE ETHNIC IDENTITY OF RUSSIAN IMMIGRANT STUDENTS IN ISRAEL (1973–75)

Uri Farago

Introduction

A STUDY of the ethnic identity of new immigrant students from the Soviet Union was first conducted in 1973 and reported in the last issue of this Journal.[1] In 1975, a further study was carried out to discover what changes had occurred in the interval.

The follow-up study made it possible to test more reliably two theoretical assumptions:

(1) Ethnic identity, which is a relatively stable construct under normal circumstances, may undergo rapid changes in the course of migration.

(2) Two main stages of change in ethnic identity may be discerned in the first years following immigration: in the first months, the changes reflect, to a great extent, reactions to psychological pressures arising from the need to justify the decision to emigrate and from anxieties accompanying the process of migration. Ethnic identity is later affected by socio-psychological factors involved in the process of adaptation to a new country and by the influence of the new social environment.

In the first years following immigration, adjustment to the new society is a major concern for most immigrants. At this stage, ethnic identity tends to be shaped by factors which advance the process of integration. This does not imply that ethnic identity is deliberately manipulated as part of a strategy of integration. Immigrants tend rather to adjust themselves subconsciously to the norms, values, and patterns of ethnic identity characteristic of their new society.

In our case, it is particularly relevant to take into account the ethnic identity of Israeli university students, with whom the students from the Soviet Union have most contact. The majority of Israelis—and even more so, the student bodies of most colleges—are not religious. In earlier studies, we found that while the Jewish identity of non-religious Israeli students is quite strong, their Israeli identity is still stronger, whereas Jewish identity is dominant for religious Israeli students.[2]

The results of the first study, conducted a few months after the arrival of the students in Israel, confirmed the hypotheses related to the first stage. The students tended to reject their Russian identity; this was interpreted to be, at least in part, a temporary reaction to their decision to leave the Soviet Union. Their Jewish identity proved to be the most important element in their ethnic identity; but we had no direct measure of their Jewish identity before emigration. However, according to various sources, while there was a minority with traditional backgrounds, a great segment of Russian Jewry was highly acculturated.[3] For many individuals, their Jewish identity could have been characterized as 'minimal', defined mainly by others' perception and almost devoid of positive content. In my opinion, their Jewish identity was intensified during the process of immigration as part of their preparation for establishing a common Jewish bond with their new country. Although their Israeli identity was weak in the first stage, it already showed the strongest correlation with feelings of integration into Israeli society; this strong correlation was also found in other studies of Russian immigrants,[4] and it triggered some of our hypotheses concerning the second stage.

In the second stage, contact with the non-religious Israeli society and fellow students can cause a trend towards secularization among Russian students from a traditional background, and such a tendency may also weaken their Jewish identity. This weakening of Jewish identity can be expected, because their emphasis on Jewish identity in the first stage, which was a preliminary step toward acceptance into Israeli society, was not reinforced by the Israelis. While the students wanted to be seen mainly as Jews, they felt that the Israelis viewed them mainly as Russians. The students, in turn, tended to perceive their Israeli colleagues mainly as Israelis, rather than Jews, and in the second stage they may adopt this model also for themselves. Their Israeli identity will tend to strengthen and become the main vehicle of integration into Israeli society. As the psychological over-reaction to immigration subsides, in the second stage, the rejection of Russian identity will tend to weaken, but the negative effects of Russian identity on integration may also decrease.

While integration was treated in the first stage only as a dependent variable, influenced by ethnic identity, in the second stage it will be used also to explain some of the differences in the change of identity. In the first stage, differences in responses were attributed mainly to variations in the degree of assimilation, in various regions of the Soviet Union. In the second stage, differences are expected to reflect more the varying experiences in adjusting to the new country. In particular, the possibility that many students from Georgia experienced difficulties in adjusting to Israeli society[5] might have an indirect effect on changes in their ethnic identity. Their discontent may be expressed by a firmer

attachment to their Russian identity and can affect negatively their Israeli identity, and perhaps even their Jewish identity.

The main hypotheses regarding changes in the ethnic identity of Russian students in the second stage were:

(1) There will be a trend towards secularization among those of traditional backgrounds.

(2) There will be a decrease in strength of Jewish identity, a considerable increase in strength of Israeli identity, and some strengthening of Russian identity.

(3) The students will tend to view their 'hosts' even more as Israelis than as Jews; they will also wish to be seen themselves more as Israelis than as Jews and will think they are perceived more as Israelis, and less as Russians, than they had been in 1973.

(4) The students will tend to define the Jewish people less as a nation and more as both a national and a religious group (thus adopting the definition given by Israeli students). Most non-traditional students will tend to see the meaning of their own Jewishness in national terms, while the traditional will define their Jewishness more in religious terms. Some students will still define their Jewishness as a 'minimal' Jewish identity.

(5) The sense of integration into Israeli society will increase. There will be a stronger relationship between integration and Israeli identity.

The conceptual framework

We studied ethnic identity from a socio-psychological perspective, as one of the sub-identities which constitute part of the self-identity of the individual. The relative status of the Russian, Jewish, and Israeli sub-identities of the students was examined within the conceptual framework for the study of ethnic identity in overlapping situations, as developed by Herman.[6] I will here refer mainly to the concepts of *valence*, which denotes the attractiveness (positive valence) or the repulsiveness (negative valence) of the ethnic group, and *relative potency*, which refers to the relative effect of various ethnic sub-identities on the person's attitudes and behaviour.

Following Miller, I will refer—in addition to self-identity (which he defined as 'the patterns of observable or inferable attributes "identifying" a person to himself and others')—to dimensions of public identity: *objective public identity*, the pattern of attributes of the person as they appear to others; *subjective public identity*, the individual's own perception of his appearance to others; and *ideal public identity*, how one would like to be seen by others.[7]

The data

A set of questions was selected from questionnaires which had been developed by Herman and Farago for the study of Jewish identity. The questions were translated into Russian and administered in personal interviews, as part of a comprehensive study of the integration of immigrant students from the Soviet Union, conducted by the Research Department of the Ministry of Absorption of the State of Israel. The questionnaires were administered twice, with some modifications: during May and June 1973; and from October 1975 to January 1976.

In 1973 (the 'first stage'), a representative sample of 500 was selected out of the population of 1100 Russian students who had immigrated during 1972 and were in the first year of their studies at one of the institutions of higher learning in Israel. Out of this sample, 450 students (90 per cent) were actually interviewed. In 1975–76 (the 'second stage'), our intention was to interview the same 450 students, now presumably in their fourth year of studies. However, many of them had interrupted their studies or changed their addresses, and they could not be located; only 178 were interviewed, accounting for 40 per cent of the first-stage sample.[8]

A comparison was drawn between the answers given in 1973 by those students who continued their studies in 1975 and those who did not.[9] The only differences were related directly to academic studies, such as command of the Hebrew language; no significant differences were found related to ethnic identity. To examine further the possibility of bias in a smaller sample, additional comparison was made between the answers given in 1973 by the total group of 450 students and the 178 constituting the reduced sample. As regards ethnic identity, no differences were found, on the whole. However, there were some differences in answers within specific categories of students from different regions of the Soviet Union; these will be discussed later in this section.

In order to avoid possible bias, answers from the second stage are compared only with the answers given by the same 178 students in the first stage. As I am concerned here with the assessment of change between the stages, such a procedure eliminates biases which could be introduced by variance between samples.

Two particularly relevant background variables were included in the analysis in both stages: geographical region in the U.S.S.R. and religiousness.

Regions in the U.S.S.R. Jews were most acculturated in the central, European region of the country.[10] In the western regions, annexed during the Second World War, more remnants of Jewish culture and religion persisted. In the southern Asian regions as well, Jews were less directly influenced by Russian culture and were more successful in preserving traditional ways of life. Whereas most Jews live in the central

regions (87 per cent), most Russian immigrants in Israel came from the western and southern regions, particularly from Georgia.[11]

Our sample represents the approximate proportions of students from various regions in the institutions of higher learning: western, 63 per cent (N=112); central, 15 per cent (N=27); and Georgia, 22 per cent (N=39). This distribution closely resembles the proportions exhibited in the first sample. However, more students from Georgia interrupted their studies, relative to other regions, and this group is therefore slightly under-represented in the second sample. It should also be noted that the actual number of students from central Russia and Georgia in the second sample is small and results related specifically to them should be treated with some caution.

Religiousness. Just over half the students (52 per cent) were not religious, while a considerable minority (43 per cent) described themselves as traditional, or religious (five per cent). (In the subsequent analyses we included the 'religious' in the 'traditional' category.) In this distribution, based on the position taken by the 178 students in 1973, there was a slightly greater proportion of traditional students than there had been in the full sample of 450.

In both samples, more religious and traditional students were found among the Georgians than among students from other regions. However, in the reduced sample, there were even somewhat more religious and traditional students from Georgia (81 per cent as compared to 75 per cent in 1973) and the western region (43 against 34 per cent), and somewhat fewer from the central region (23 per cent against 32 per cent), than had been the case in the first sample.

Because of the relationship between religiousness and Jewish identity, these differences also affected the answers related to ethnic identity. In particular, students from Georgia and, to a lesser degree, those from the western region, tended to indicate a somewhat stronger Jewish identity and a weaker Russian identity in the reduced sample. However, this should not affect the assessment of change in ethnic identity, which is based on a comparison of the 178 students only. There were changes in their religiousness between the two studies, which will be discussed in the following section.

Findings

Change in religiousness. The first hypothesis, which predicted that the contact with mainly non-religious Israeli society and student bodies would result in a trend towards secularization among the traditional students from the Soviet Union, was only partially supported. To examine the change in religiousness, we had two indicators: (1) comparison of their self-definition of religiousness in 1973 and 1975; and (2) self-report on their subjective perception of change as a response to the

question 'To what extent did your religious observance change since your immigration?'

When the self-definitions of the students were compared, between 1973 and 1975 a slight (statistically not significant) decrease (by seven per cent) in the proportion of traditional students was revealed (Table 1*a*). Secularization occurred particularly among respondents from regions in which Jews were more traditional: Georgia (10 per cent) and the western region (12 per cent). However, among the students from the central region, who usually come from less traditional backgrounds, there was a 13 per cent increase in the number of traditional students. The results of the reduced sample in the second stage are close to the distribution of the full sample in the first stage. Thus there may also be a trend of convergence with their own group and not only with the Israeli students.

TABLE 1. *Changes in the religiousness of students in 1973–1975 (in percentages)*

	Regions in U.S.S.R.						Total	
	Central (N=27)		Western (N=112)		Georgia (N=39)		(N=178)	
	1973	1975	1973	1975	1973	1975	1973	1975
a. Religiousness								
Traditional	23	36*	43	31	81	71	48	41
Non-traditional	77	64	57	69	19	29	52	59
b. Change in religious observance								
More observant	27	46†	19	21	5	11†	17	22
No change	69	42	80	68	81	73	79	66
Less observant	4	12	1	11	14	16	4	12

T test *$p<.05$ †$p<.005$

While in the first stage there was a stronger tendency to increased religious observance since immigration, in the second stage there was a somewhat opposite trend: in 1973, a total of 17 per cent reported they had become more observant while only four per cent said they had become less observant; in 1975 an additional five per cent—a total of 22 per cent—stated they were 'more observant', but an additional eight per cent said they were 'less observant' (Table 1*b*).

The trend away from religious observance is most evident among the students from the western region. Among those from Georgia (most of whom are of traditional Sephardi backgrounds), there was somewhat more of a decrease than an increase in religious observance, particularly in the first stage. This tendency was similar to the trends of secularization among immigrants from Oriental countries in earlier years.[12] However, it subsided in the second stage, perhaps indicating a preference for adhering to their own group rather than integrating into Israeli

society. Increased religious observance was most notable, during both stages, among the students from the central region; it seems that some of them (who originate from the most assimilated area) have chosen religion as a means of asserting their Jewish identity.

Change in the valence and potency of Jewish, Russian, and Israeli identities. As hypothesized, the positive valence of Jewish identity was weakened somewhat in the second stage (by 13 per cent, from 89 to 76 per cent,

TABLE 2. *Dimensions of Russian, Jewish and Israeli identities (1973–1975), in percentages*

	Regions in U.S.S.R.						*Total*	
	Central (N=27)		Western (N=112)		Georgia (N=39)		(N=178)	
	1973	1975	1973	1975	1973	1975	1973	1975
a. Valence of Jewish identity								
1. Positive	80	84	91	76*	92	70*	89	76*
2. Indifferent	20	8	8	20	8	19	10	18
3. Negative	0	8	1	4	0	11	1	6
b. Valence of Russian identity								
1. Positive	31	24	30	28	24	32	29	29
2. Indifferent	15	12	19	19	30	21	21	18
3. Negative	54	64	51	53	46	47	50	53
c. Potency of Russian identity								
1–3. High	12	7	8	18†	0	14†	6	15‡
4. Intermediate	8	8	3	11	8	13	5	11
5–7. Low	80	85	89	71	92	73	89	74
d. Potency of Jewish identity								
1–3. High	73	85	81	63*	92	68*	82	68‡
4. Intermediate	15	8	10	21	3	14	9	17
5–7. Low	12	7	9	16	5	18	9	15
e. Potency of Israeli identity								
1–3. High	32	85‡	31	50‡	43	50	34	56‡
4. Intermediate	32	4	16	22	19	21	19	19
5–7. Low	36	11	53	28	38	29	47	25
f. Relative potency of Jewish and Israeli identities								
1–3. More Israeli	20	39	15	22‡	10	13	14	22‡
4. Midpoint	16	15	12	31	14	26	13	28
5–7. More Jewish	64	46	73	47	76	61	73	50

T test *$p<.05$ †$p<.005$ ‡$p<.0001$

Table 2*a*), but there was no overall change in the negative valence of Russian identity (Table 2*b*). A decrease in the positive valence of Jewish identity was apparent, particularly among students from Georgia (by 22 per cent) and the western region (by 15 per cent). Among the Georgians, there was also a change towards a positive valence of Russian identity, while there was an increase in negative valence among the others.

The changes in the configuration of ethnic identity were most discernible when relative potency of identities was examined (as measured

on a seven-point scale ranging from 'strong feeling' to 'no feeling'). Confirming hypothesis 2, the rejection of Russian identity subsided to some extent as its potency rose slightly (by nine per cent, Table 2*c*). Potency of Jewish identity decreased in the second stage (by 14 per cent, Table 2*d*) while that of Israeli identity increased considerably (by 22 per cent, Table 2*e*). When Jewish identity and Israeli identity were juxtaposed on a bipolar continuum at the second stage, 23 per cent fewer (50 per cent against 73 per cent in 1973) chose the Jewish end, but only eight per cent of them moved all the way towards the Israeli end; while the remaining 15 per cent moved only to the middle (Table 2*f*). Despite these changes, even at this stage potency of Jewish identity was higher than that of Israeli identity, and there were more respondents at the Jewish than at the Israeli end of the continuum.

The pattern of changes varied according to region. The tendencies seen in the overall results are most representative of the students from the western regions, who accounted for the majority of the sample. The Georgians showed the strongest decrease in potency of Jewish identity (by 24 per cent), the highest increase in potency of Russian identity (by 14 per cent), and the lowest increase in potency of Israeli identity (by seven per cent). These results could be caused by the combination of the decline in traditionality among the Georgians and their reaction to problems of integration into Israeli society.

Among students from the central region, on the other hand, the earlier pattern was strengthened: the potency of their Russian identity continued to decrease (by five per cent), potency of their Jewish identity increased (by nine per cent), and the increase in their Israeli identity was considerably higher (53 per cent) than it was among students from other regions. These results can be partially explained by some of the students from the central region becoming more religious, and also by their successful integration into Israeli society (as reported in the last section).

Changes in public identity. Psychological problems related to the integration of the students were reflected in the discrepancy between their ideal and subjective public identities. In the first stage, the ideal identity (the way they wanted to be seen) of the majority of the students was Jewish, but their subjective public identity (the way they thought Israelis saw them) was Russian, and they tended to view the Israeli students as Israelis rather than as Jews.

In the second stage, after longer contact, they perceived the Israeli students even less as Jewish and more primarily as Israelis than they had done before (by 14 per cent). This perception of Israeli society was important in directing their own orientation. In line with this perception and our hypotheses, seven per cent fewer students wanted to be seen primarily as Jews, while 10 per cent more wanted to be seen as Israelis. Moreover, while three per cent had a Russian ideal public

identity in 1973, there were none in that category by 1975 (Table 3*b*). However, the disparity between their ideal public identity and subjective public identity continued. While in the second stage no one wanted to be seen as Russian, the feeling that they were seen mainly as Russians by the Israelis did not weaken; in fact, it was strengthened slightly (Table 3*c*).

These trends were strongest among the students from the western region, while there was almost no change at all among those from Georgia. Among the students from the central region, there was a decrease in the distance between ideal and subjective public identities, which indicates better adjustment; in 1975, 21 per cent more than in

TABLE 3. *Public identity (1973–1975), in percentages*

	Regions in U.S.S.R.						*Total*	
	Central (N=27)		Western (N=112)		Georgia (N=39)		(N=178)	
	1973	1975	1973	1975	1973	1975	1973	1975
a. Perceived public identity of Israelis								
1. Jewish	23	16	27	11	47	33	30	16
2. Israeli	77	84	73	89	53	67	70	84
b. Ideal public identity								
1. Jewish	44	63	50	34	70	71	53	46
2. Israeli	52	37	46	66	30	29	44	54
3. Russian	4	0	4	0	0	0	3	0
c. Subjective public identity								
1. Jewish	21	42	34	18	38	40	33	27
2. Israeli	0	12	3	7	3	2	3	6
3. Russian	79	46	63	75	59	58	64	67

1973 thought they were seen mainly as Jews; 12 per cent thought they were perceived as Israelis, when none had thought so in 1973; and considerably (33 per cent) fewer that they were seen as Russians.

The definition and meaning of Jewish identity. One of the interesting findings in the 1973 study was the tendency of the majority of the Russian students to define Jews as a national group. A large minority chose the combined definition of both a religious and national group, which is a characteristic response of most Jewish students from Western countries and from Israel. Only a few (four per cent) chose to define Jewry as a religion.[13] We believed that this 'national group' definition was influenced by Soviet ideology. But there was no change in this respect by 1975, as would have been expected. That may indicate that the students' perspective on many facets of life was still affected

by views acquired in the Soviet Union; their definition might have been reinforced also by their impression of Israel as a non-religious society.

In order to achieve a better understanding of how the Russian students viewed their Jewishness, we added in the second study an open-ended question: 'In what sense do you see yourself as a Jew?' We found that there were differences between their objective definition of Jewishness and their subjective perception of their own Jewishness—more students defined the latter in religious-traditional, rather than in national terms. Nearly a third of the total (31 per cent) indicated observance of religious practices, Jewish traditions, and values. A feeling of belonging to the Jewish people characterized the Jewish identity of 14 per cent, and an additional 13 per cent expressed a sense of Jewishness related to their immigration to Israel, 'to live in a Jewish state'. However, the largest single group of students replied in terms of 'minimal identity': 35 per cent indicated that they saw themselves as Jewish because they were born Jews or because others define them as Jews. Such 'minimal identity' is probably the result of the extensive acculturation of the majority of Jews in Soviet society, particularly in the European regions. However, it seems that a large number had not yet succeeded in finding a positive content for their Jewishness during the time they were in Israel.

As seen earlier, some of the students from the central region have acquired a positive Jewish identity by becoming religious; we found the definition of 'minimal identity' less frequently among them (24 per cent) than among those from the other regions. That definition was most prevalent among students from the western region (40 per cent), but, surprisingly, it was also given by nearly a third (31 per cent) of the Georgians. The dominant definition among the Georgians, however, was the religious-traditional (53 per cent). The self-definition of 'minimal' Jewish identity occurred more among the non-traditional (40 per cent) than the traditional (28 per cent) students; the latter tended to define their Jewishness in religious-traditional terms (49 per cent), much more so than did the non-traditional (17 per cent).

The meaning of Israeli identity. When the students were asked 'In what sense do you feel you are an Israeli?', 53 per cent indicated a feeling of belonging to, and identification with, the people in Israel—the country and the state. Kurt Lewin distinguished between alignment with a group based on similarity and based on interdependence, the latter of which he considered to be more fundamental.[14] 'Israeliness' as related to being part of the Israeli culture and life style, which indicates a belonging based on similarity, was mentioned by 12 per cent of the students. Concern with the problems of Israel, which indicates feelings of interdependence, was expressed by eight per cent. Nine per cent related the meaning of their Israeliness only to formal symbols,

such as citizenship and service in the army. A total of 14 per cent replied that they did not yet see themselves as Israelis. Such a feeling was most widespread among the Georgians (19 per cent), who had the highest proportion of formal definitions, such as service in the army (also 19 per cent), while not a single one of them felt part of the Israeli culture. The Georgians indicated the least sense of belonging to the people in Israel (46 per cent). At the other extreme were the students from the central region, the large majority of whom expressed a sense of belonging to the people in Israel and to the country (73 per cent). There were almost no differences in the definitions of 'Israeliness' given by the traditional and non-traditional students—in sharp contrast to their disagreement over the meaning of Jewishness.

Perception of, and attitudes towards, Israel. In answer to a question inquiring whether in their opinion Israelis are an indivisible part of Jewry or a separate people, 29 per cent in 1973 but 47 per cent in 1975 stated that Israel was a separate nation.

The students were asked directly to what extent they were satisfied with the Jewishness of Israelis. More than half (55 per cent) replied that Israelis were less Jewish than they would have liked them to be. Such dissatisfaction was strongest among respondents from the central region, and in contrast with the previous question, hardly changed between 1973 and 1975 (69 and 68 per cent). The feeling that Israelis are not Jewish enough increased (by 13 per cent) among the traditional students, and decreased (by 20 per cent) among the non-traditional.

"Lacking in Jewishness' did not necessarily mean 'deficient in religiousness' for the Russian students, many of whom did not define the Jewish group in terms of religion; 33 per cent expressed dissatisfaction with the religiousness of Israelis in 1973, while only 18 per cent did so in 1975. The dissatisfaction was strongest among the Georgians and increased considerably with time; their concern with the non-religious character of Israelis has also been indicated in other studies[15] and seems to be one of the obstacles to their integration. The feeling that Israelis are not religious enough increased considerably (from 21 to 50 per cent) among traditional immigrants; surprisingly, it increased somewhat (from 12 to 22 per cent) also among the non-traditional students, although even more of these considered Israelis to be too religious (30 per cent).

Between 1973 and 1975 there was a slight decrease in a positive impression of Israel, particularly among the Georgians. But, in general, the students had a positive attitude; 89 per cent of the total continued to express a favourable impression of Israel.

Integration and ethnic identity in the second stage. 'Feeling at home in Israel' was used as an indicator of the subjective perception of integration into Israeli society; 86 per cent of the students reported in 1975 (against 80 per cent in 1973) that they felt at home—and of these, 51

per cent said they felt completely so, as compared to only 33 per cent in 1973.

Students from the central region were most adjusted; in 1975, 96 per cent felt completely or to a great extent at home—while 72 per cent had been in that combined category in 1973. Among those from the western region, 89 per cent felt integrated, seven per cent more than in the first stage. Among the Georgians, 71 per cent indicated feeling at home in Israel, which was six per cent less than in the first stage, again reflecting their difficulties in adjusting.

The relationship between feelings of integration and variables of ethnic identity was stronger in the second stage. It should be noted that the 1973 correlations between the feeling of integration and variables of ethnic identity differed somewhat in the reduced sample from the correlations in the full (N=450) sample (which I presented in the earlier paper, in the last issue of this Journal). While in the full sample

TABLE 4. *Correlations between dimensions of ethnic identity and adjustment to Israeli society (1973–1975)*
1. Feeling at home in Israel

	1973 (N=178)	1975 (N=178)
2. Russian identity	−·38*	−·33*
3. Israeli identity	·29*	·41*
4. Jewish identity	·23*	·28*
5. Religiousness	·06	·11
	$R^2_{1\cdot2345}$=·196	$R^2_{1\cdot2345}$=·242

*p<·001

in 1973, the correlation was already strongest with Israeli identity, for the reduced sample in 1973 the negative correlation with Russian identity was the highest (Table 4). It seems that for these students, more than for the others, integration in the first stage was related to the rejection of their Russian identity. In 1975, however, the negative correlation with Russian identity decreased (from −·38 to −·33), while correlation with Israeli identity increased considerably (from ·29 to ·41) and became strongest. Contrary to our expectation, the correlation with Jewish identity also increased, although it remained moderate (·28). The correlation with religiousness increased somewhat, but still remained low (·11).

Multiple correlation indicated that the potency of ethnic identities explained in the second stage 24 per cent of the variance of feelings of integration, which compared with only 20 per cent of the variance in the first stage (and only 13 per cent for the full sample, in 1973). Thus ethnic identity becomes with time an increasingly important factor influencing the integration of the immigrant Russian students.

Discussion and conclusion

The follow-up study provides a picture of the process of change in the ethnic identities of Russian immigrant students which is naturally clearer than that shown in the first study. The results tend to confirm the general two-stage hypothesis of change in the first years after immigration, as well as most of the specific hypotheses derived from it.

Second-stage findings also help to confirm some of the explanations for the findings of the first stage, which tended to be speculative because we had no means of ascertaining to what extent the students' ethnic identities consisted of elements acquired in the Soviet Union or in the course of immigration. Thus, the finding that Russian identity was strengthened in the second stage—which is opposed to the usual, commonsense expectation that identification with the abandoned country will gradually decrease with time—confirms that weakening of Russian identity in the first stage was indeed a psychological over-reaction to the decision to immigrate. Weakening of Jewish identity in the second stage also confirms that its intensification in the first stage was at least in part the result of an effort by the immigrants to establish the first link with Israeli society through the one common characteristic.

The most significant second-stage development was the strengthening of Israeli identity for a large segment of the students. There was a tendency to perceive their new society as less Jewish and more Israeli, and more students from the Soviet Union wanted to be seen not only as Jews but also as Israelis. Their perception of Israeli society, into which they wanted to be accepted, influenced the shaping of their ethnic identity.

Israeli identity proved at this stage to be most related to the feeling of integration; by 1975, the majority of students had a stronger Israeli identity and felt more at home. Among the students who felt less integrated, particularly those from Georgia, there was also less of a tendency to strengthen their Israeli identity.

Jewish identity weakened in the second stage, but still remained the strongest element in the ethnic identity of the majority of the students. Many continued to express discontent with the lack of Jewishness in Israel; this can be related to our finding that, despite their strong Jewish identification, many students did not succeed in enriching their Jewish identity with any positive content, and almost a third of them still defined Jewishness in terms of 'minimal identity'. This problem needs more attention because we found, contrary to our hypothesis, that the relationship between Jewish identity and feelings of integration became stronger in the second stage.

I tended to underestimate the importance of Jewish identity in the second stage by emphasizing, in the hypotheses, mainly influences

intensifying Israeli identity. However, our studies of Israeli youth indicate congruence and overlap between Jewish and Israeli sub-identities, even among the majority of non-religious youth.[16] It seems that among the students from the Soviet Union there is also a tendency to arrive at a balance between the two, rather than merely to strengthen the Israeli identity at the expense of the Jewish one.

Among the hypotheses that were only partially confirmed was that contact with the mainly non-religious Israeli society would create a trend towards secularization among students from traditional backgrounds. There was a tendency towards secularization in the second stage, particularly among students from the western region, but it was less marked than expected on the basis of experience of previous waves of immigrants. We found also that in the entire period since immigration, there was more of an increase than a decrease in religious observance. Many students, particularly those from traditional backgrounds, also tended to define their 'subjective' Jewishness in religious terms, despite the general tendency of Russian students to define the Jews as a national group.

It seems that not enough weight was given to the possibility that at least some of the traditional students might take the religious minority, rather than the non-religious majority, as their reference group. Some of the Russian students may have been especially attracted to the active nationalistic religious youth; this may have been so in the case of a section of those from the central region, who became religious after they immigrated. This was an interesting, unexpected, finding and we have no data to ascertain whether it was a unique choice of some of the students in our sample or whether it is characteristic of other Russian youth from the most assimilated backgrounds who search for a positive content to their 'minimal' Jewish identity. Moreover, since there was only a small number of students from the central region and from Georgia in the reduced second sample, one must exercise caution in generalizing from the data concerning them.

Many of the differences in ethnic identity of students from different regions are explained in the second stage by varying experiences in their integration, a particularly strong case being presented by those from Georgia. Despite their traditional backgrounds, the Georgians' Jewish identity was weakened more, their Israeli identity intensified less, and their Russian identity strengthened more than was the case among those from other regions. On the other hand, for students from the central region, who felt best integrated, Jewish identity decreased less, Israeli identity increased more, and Russian identity continued to decrease more than it did among the others. Students from the western region are in a middle position, and being the largest group in the sample, are represented best by the total results.

There was also a strengthening in the relationship between feelings

of integration and variables of ethnic identity; most students developed an ethnic identity more helpful to integration into Israeli society, and by 1975 they felt more integrated. But in the second stage, integration—which had been viewed in 1973 only as a dependent variable—was applied also as an independent variable to explain developments in ethnic identity. However, it is not always clear to what extent integration is affected by ethnic identity, and to what extent it is the affecting agent. Further analysis and study are needed to clarify this important relationship.*

NOTES

[1] Uri Farago, 'The Ethnic Identity of Russian Immigrant Students in Israel', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 20, no. 2, Dec. 1978, pp. 115–27.

[2] U. Farago, *Continuity and Change in the Jewish Identity of Israeli High School Students 1965–1974*, Levi Eshkol Institute for the Study of Economics, Society and Politics in Israel, Jerusalem, 1977 (in Hebrew); and S. N. Herman, *Jewish Identity—A Social-Psychological Perspective*, New York, 1977.

[3] Z. Gittelman, 'Patterns of Jewish Identification and Non-Identification in the Soviet Union', *In the Diaspora*, vol. 18, nos. 79/80, 1977, pp. 157–62 (in Hebrew); and M. Decter, 'Jewish National Consciousness in the Soviet Union', in N. Glazer, ed., *Perspectives on Soviet Jewry*, New York, 1970, pp. 19–26.

[4] J. Shuval *et al.*, *Patterns of Integration of Immigrants from the Soviet Union*, The Institute of Applied Research, Jerusalem, 1973 (in Hebrew), p. 9.

[5] The main problems revealed in a study of a Georgian community in Israel were: (1) they were greatly disappointed by the prevailing secular environment they found in Israel; (2) their inability to carry on with a complex system of familial and communal obligations essential to their communal life; (3) the income level (mainly income additional to wages) dropped after *aliyah*; and (4) the range of occupations had been limited since *aliyah*, through transfer from crafts and small trade to manual labour. See Y. Elam, 'Anthropological Study of the Georgian Community in Ashkelon', in E. Leshem and J. Rosenblum, eds., *Immigrant Absorption in Israel—Current Research*, Jerusalem, 1978, pp. 63–66.

[6] S. N. Herman, *Israelis and Jews—The Continuity of an Identity*, New York, 1970, pp. 26–30.

[7] D. R. Miller, 'The Study of Social Relationships: Situations, Identity and Social Interactions', in S. Koch, ed., *Psychology: A Study of Science*, vol 5, New York, 1963, p. 673.

[8] Of the 272 who were not interviewed, 5 had completed their studies, 6 were in military service, 10 were out of the country, 32 refused to be interviewed, and 221 could not be located. Among the 178 who were interviewed

* The study on which this paper is based was carried out in partnership with Professor Simon N. Herman of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. We are grateful to the Research Division of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption of the State of Israel for their ready co-operation. Our study was supported in part by a grant from the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture, New York.

in the second stage, there were 39 who were no longer students; among the 272 not interviewed, only 31 were registered students.

[9] H. Graff, 'Absorption of Students from the Soviet Union—Report No. 2', November 1976, Department of Research and Development, Ministry of Absorption of Immigrants (mimeo, in Hebrew).

[10] M. Decter, op. cit.

[11] Y. Litwak and M. Checinsky, 'Soviet Jewry: Population Census of 1970', in E. Leshem and J. Rosenblum, eds., op. cit., pp. 37–40.

[12] Herman, *Israelis and Jews* ..., op. cit., p. 123.

[13] Farago, 'The Ethnic Identity of Russian Immigrant Students in Israel', op. cit., p. 121.

[14] K. Lewin, *Field Theory in Social Science*, ed. D. Cartwright, New York, 1951, p. 148.

[15] Elam, op. cit., p. 63.

[16] Herman, *Israelis and Jews* ..., op. cit., pp. 44–45.

PATTERNS OF ILLEGITIMACY IN ISRAEL

Eitan F. Sabatello

ILLEGITIMACY in Israel has been only sporadically studied, possibly because of its very low incidence. Out of 60 countries ranked by their illegitimacy ratio in the early 1960's, Israel was 57th with three illegitimate births per 1,000 live births. This ratio was far lower than that of most Mediterranean countries (including Morocco and Algeria).[1] In 1971–73 (the period under review in this paper), the average ratio in Israel was still only about eight (7·6) per 1,000 live births.[2] Within Israel, the recorded out-of-wedlock ratio for the non-Jewish (mostly Muslim) population was even lower than the low general average.

Goldscheider's study[3] of births to unmarried Jewish women in Israel revealed some differential patterns in illegitimacy among the various sub-groups according to geographical origin, date of immigration, length of residence in the country, place of residence, education, etc. However, his analysis (focused on the years 1966–68) had to rely on inadequate methodological tools, such as comparisons between total and out-of-wedlock births in terms of percentage distribution. This was because of a lack of appropriate data on the population 'at risk': unmarried women by age group and other relevant characteristics.

The present study, which is focused on births only to Jewish never-married women, was carried out when more information on the population at risk was available. Its aims are:

1. To review some of the issues of the Goldscheider study, by using more refined measures, and in particular to examine the relationship between illegitimacy and degree of integration in the country, as affected by place of residence, place of birth, and date of immigration.
2. To consider various reasons for the very low rate of illegitimacy in Israel and for the differential patterns among sub-groups of the Jewish population.

Source of data

Data on illegitimate births are available in the official records of birth registration. Hospitals are legally required by the Ministry of the

Interior to ensure that the standard forms are filled in, and the Central Bureau of Statistics produces annual returns on births. Since the late 1960's, practically all Jewish births occur in hospitals[4] and there is therefore a fairly high standard of accurate registration.

The registration forms have entries requiring *inter alia* details of:

(i) the date of birth of the child's mother and father, their marital status, place of residence, and country of birth (to be copied from their respective identity cards); and

(ii) their years of schooling, employment, date of immigration if born abroad, father's country of birth for the Israeli-born, date of marriage of the child's parents (if applicable), and the child's birth order; this information must be obtained from the child's mother and entered on the registration form.

For the purposes of this study, the data on births to Jewish never-married women in 1971, 1972, and 1973 were merged and their age-specific averages (by various sub-categories) were related to the pertinent population at risk taken from the 1972 Census of Population and Housing. Since this census was carried out on 20 May 1972, the small difference between the population on that day and the mid-1972 population is unlikely significantly to affect the results and conclusions of this study. There was an annual average of 493 illegitimate births in 1971–73.

Using age-specific illegitimacy rates per 1,000 never-married women in each group in 1972, the general illegitimacy rates (per 1,000 women aged 14–39,[5] by place of birth, period of immigration, and place of residence) were accordingly computed and standardized on the age-group structure of the total never-married Jewish female population of the country in 1972.

Age at delivery of never-married mothers

In Israel, as in many other countries, it is mainly—but not exclusively—young women who give birth to illegitimate children.[6] In 1971–73, more than one third (35·1 per cent) of out-of-wedlock births were to girls under the age of twenty, while in the same period, only six per cent of all births were to mothers of that age. More than three quarters (78·3 per cent) of the births were to women under the age of 25—almost twice the rate (43·6 per cent) for all the births. The percentage of out-of-wedlock births to very young mothers was even higher among Israeli-born women: their median age was 20·3, as compared with 22·4 for the Afro-Asian never-married and 23·8 for the European. The median age of all the never-married mothers in 1972 was 21·7—several years less than that of all mothers (26) and about one and a half years less than that of all primiparae (23) (see Table 1). More than 90 per cent of never-married women belonged to that last group.

TABLE 1. *Jewish Births by mother's age group, place of birth, marital status at delivery, and parity order*
1972

Place of birth, marital status, and parity order	*Absolute numbers*	*Total*	*Aged Up to 24*			*Aged 25–29*	*Aged 30–34*	*Aged 35–39*	*Aged 40+*	*Median age at delivery*
			Total	*Up to 19*	*20–24*					
Grand Total	64,490[a]	100·0	43·6	(6·0	37·6)	30·3	15·7	8·3	2·1	26·0
thereof: Primiparae	21,834[a]	100·0	75·7	(14·8	60·9)	19·8	3·2	1·0	0·2	23·0
Never-married[b]	493	100·0	78·3	(35·1	43·2)	12·6	4·9	4·2	—	21·7
Israel—total	23,502	100·0	56·6	(9·8	46·8)	25·8	11·6	5·3	0·7	23·3
thereof: Primiparae	10,775	100·0	83·2	(18·4	64·8)	14·2	1·9	0·5	0·1	22·4
Never-married[b]	217	100·0	88·0	(45·6	42·4)	6·0	3·7	2·3	—	20·3
Asia–Africa—total	28,782	100·0	34·8	(4·2	30·6)	31·2	19·9	10·9	3·2	27·4
thereof: Primiparae	6,572	100·0	72·2	(14·8	57·4)	21·2	4·6	1·6	0·4	23·1
Never-married[b]	216	100·0	74·1	(27·8	46·3)	16·7	4·6	4·6	—	22·4
Europe–America—total	12,182	100·0	39·4	(2·8	36·6)	37·3	13·6	7·9	1·8	26·4
thereof: Primiparae	4,478	100·0	63·2	(6·3	56·9)	31·2	3·9	1·3	0·4	23·8
Never-married[b]	60	100·0	58·3	(23·3	35·0)	21·7	10·0	10·0	—	23·8

[a] Includes place of birth not stated
[b] Averages for 1971–73

Never-married mothers born in Israel had a median age at their last delivery lower than that of primiparae of their same origin group, while never-married mothers and primiparae born in Europe-America had the same median age. On the other hand, the smallest absolute difference between percentages of births to all and to never-married mothers was found in the oldest age group (35+), which included 10 per cent and four per cent of the births, respectively.

In specific age-group terms, out-of-wedlock birth rates rise steadily with age and reach a peak in the oldest age group (30–39 years—see Table 2). This is a feature peculiar to Israeli illegitimacy; in other

TABLE 2. *Out-of-wedlock births per 1,000 never-married women, aged 14–39 years, by migratory status and period of immigration*

Averages for 1971–73

	Total	*Israel-born*	*Immigrated*	
			up to 1960	*1961 and after*
Total	2·1	1·4	3·9	3·3
14–16	0·3	0·2	1·4	0·5
17–19	1·8	1·5	2·8	2·8
20–24	3·4	2·5	4·2	5·6
25–29	4·1	2·2	4·5	7·1
30–39	6·6	5·1	6·7	8·8
Total standardized[a]	×	1·5	2·9	3·2

[a] Standardized on age distribution of the total never-married Jewish female population, aged 14–39 at 1972 Census of Israel. This standard was used for all the following tables.

countries, the highest illegitimacy rate is usually found among mothers in their early or late twenties. Therefore, Israeli never-married women aged 30–39 constitute the only age group which approaches the illegitimacy levels of women of that age cohort in other countries.[7] Although no clear-cut evidence is at present available, one should not assume that older never-married women are less capable than the younger ones of avoiding unwanted pregnancies; rather, it may be that when marriage is undesirable or felt unlikely in the future, older women are more reluctant to resign themselves to childlessness.

Migrational and ethnic-generational variables in illegitimacy

The Israeli Jewish population, largely composed of immigrants and their children, offers a wide spectrum of ethnic-cultural sub-groups, differing among and within themselves according to length of settlement in the country. Some sociologists have noted a link between illegitimacy and immigration: the undermining of cultural identity and of

old values may lead to deviant socialization.[8] In this context it is worth reconsidering the main issues raised by Goldscheider:

(1) To what extent are illegitimacy levels higher among immigrants than among Israeli-born?

(2) Are there differences in the level of illegitimacy among the various sub-groups of the immigrant population?

(3) Are illegitimacy levels different for first and for second generation immigrants?

The data in Table 2 show that the more recent the arrival of the immigrants, the higher the illegitimacy rate: a standardized illegitimacy rate for Israeli-born mothers is only 0·8 in contrast to 2·9 for earlier immigrants (up to 1960), and 3·2 for new immigrants. However, within the teenage immigrant group, age-specific illegitimacy rates were lower for those who came after 1961 than was the case for those who had arrived before that date. It is therefore the women in the central childbearing age groups (20–34 years) who account for most of the overall difference in illegitimacy according to period of immigration. In other words, the earlier the acculturation the lower the out-of-wedlock birth rate.

TABLE 3. *Out-of-wedlock births per 1,000 never-married women, aged 14–39 years, born abroad, by continent of birth*

Averages for 1971–73

	Continent of birth			
	Total	*Africa*	*Asia*	*Europe–America*
Total	3·6	5·2	2·8	2·3
14–16	0·6	1·0	—	0·4
17–19	2·8	3·9	1·3	1·7
20–24	4·7	8·3	3·0	2·3
25–29	5·3	8·7	4·9	3·7
30–39	7·4	12·0	5·2	6·9
Total standardized[a]	2·9	4·7	1·7	1·7

[a] See footnote in Table 2.

We know that Israeli-born women have the lowest rate of illegitimate births. The relationship between immigration and illegitimacy is shown in Table 3, which gives out-of-wedlock age-specific birth rates for the three major immigrant sub-groups—those born in Asia, Africa, and Europe—America. The data reveal important differences: the African-born display the highest illegitimacy rates in each age group; Asian women under the age of 20 have the lowest rates (lower even than those for the Israeli-born); while above the age of 20, the lowest rates are generally found among European mothers.

These patterns seem somewhat inconsistent with those found by Goldscheider for 1966–68; he noted that among women above the age of 20, there was a greater concentration of out-of-wedlock births among

Western-born women than among those born in Israel and the Afro-Asian segment.[9] The explanation may be found in the altered structure of the female population, especially under the age of 20, by place of birth: within this group, the proportion of mothers born in Israel rose sharply from 24 per cent in 1966-68 to 60 per cent in 1972. It is therefore worth tabulating *a*) the Israeli-born mothers by their parental origin according to their father's place of birth; and *b*) the immigrant mothers according to their continent of birth and their time of arrival in Israel.

It must be noted that at the 1972 census (May 1972), about two-thirds of the total immigrants from Asian countries had come to Israel during the very first years of the establishment of the State (1948–54), while one fifth had immigrated after 1955. Almost all the African-born came between 1948 and the early 1960's. Most of the immigrants from

TABLE 4. *Out-of-wedlock births per 1,000 never-married women aged 14–39 years, born in Israel, by their father's place of birth*
Averages for 1971–73

	Father's place of birth		
	Israel	*Asia—Africa*	*Europe—America*
Total	1·1	1·9	0·9
14–19	0·5	1·2	0·4
20–24	1·9	4·3	1·3
25–29	4·8	2·6	1·7
30–39	6·0	4·7	5·0
Total, standardized[a]	1·1	2·2	0·8

[a] See footnote in Table 2.

Asia and Africa had lived in traditional and relatively closed communities, with low educational attainments and inadequate occupational skills; and they moved to Israel within the framework of a wider family-migration pattern. As for the European-born, almost one third had come before 1948, and another third arrived between 1948 and 1954.[10]

The overall differential pattern of illegitimacy by immigration period is consistent for each origin sub-group. After age-structure standardization, relatively new immigrants display out-of-wedlock birth rates which are from 13 per cent (for Africans) to 50 per cent (for Asians) higher than those of the immigrants of the same origin who had arrived before 1961. However, there is an exception in the case of those under the age of 20, born abroad; and particularly those among them who are up to 16 years old (see Table 5). For these very young ages, new immigrants have illegitimacy birth rates lower than those

of earlier immigrants. Only a tentative explanation for this can be suggested, by linking variables in out-of-wedlock natality not to immigration period only, but rather to the age at arrival in Israel.

In other words, the impact on illegitimacy of 1) age at arrival in the new society and 2) general conditions for integration into the host society during the early years of immigration should be evaluated. The assumption is that 1) the younger the age at arrival, the greater the likelihood of patterns similar to those of the Israeli-born emerging, and the less the exposure to deviant socialization (including the factors linked to illegitimacy); and 2) the greater the political, economic, and social stability of the host country, the easier the social integration of the immigrants and of their children.

TABLE 5. *Out-of-wedlock births per 1,000 never-married women aged 14–39, born abroad, by continent of birth and period of immigration*

Averages for 1971–73

	Continent of birth and period of immigration					
	ASIA		*AFRICA*		*EUROPE—AMERICA*	
	Up to 1960	*1961+*	*Up to 1960*	*1961+*	*Up to 1960*	*1961+*
Total	3·2	2·0	5·5	4·4	2·3	2·3
14–16	1·9	0·3	2·3	0·7	0·5	0·1
17–19			3·5	4·2	1·4	2·3
20–24	2·5	5·2	7·6	9·0	2·2	2·4
25–29	5·1	2·8	6·3	12·4	2·7	5·0
30–39	4·7	6·9	12·0	12·1	6·9	6·9
Total, standardized[a]	1·1	1·7	4·6	5·2	1·5	1·9

[a] See footnote in Table 2.

Israel in the 1960's and early 1970's could offer better and greater absorption assistance to new immigrants than had been the case in the 1950's. Many girls aged 13 to 16 years in 1971–73 (who had immigrated after 1961) arrived in the country young enough for their families to have become adjusted before the girls reached puberty with its attendant adolescent problems.

Many of the foreign-born girls older than 17 years in 1972, and who had come to Israel after 1961, had been in their early teens when they first arrived and they had had to face simultaneously the adjustment problems of their new immigrant household as well as their own adolescent pains.[11]

Residence variables

Although illegitimacy rates tend to be higher in the urban than in the rural areas of many countries, it seems by no means proven that

there is a direct correlation between the process of urbanization and an increase in illegitimate births.[12]

In Israel, age-specific illegitimate birth rates are higher in towns than in rural settlements. However, since in 1972 almost 85 per cent of the total Jewish population resided in urban areas, it is worth analysing the various sub-divisions of the Jewish urban population. One can distinguish the three *large cities* (Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa) from *other towns* (some of which are situated in the outskirts of Tel Aviv or Haifa, while others are in the peripheral regions of the country), and from *urban localities* of relatively small size in the developing northern and southern areas of Israel.

The large cities have the highest age-specific illegitimacy rates, while the other towns have the lowest. Urban localities and rural settlements lie in the middle. The widest differences between the large cities and the other groups of localities occur at the younger ages. For the age groups 14–19, the illegitimacy rate in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa (5·6) is seven times that of other towns (0·8). This ratio decreases steadily as the age of the mothers rises: 3 : 1 for the 20–24 cohort and less than 2 : 1 after the age of 25.

The very low incidence of out-of-wedlock births at young ages in other towns might be partly due to family pressure on unmarried pregnant girls to move away from home to a large city, where an illegitimate birth may occur in a more anonymous atmosphere, and where hospital services and other forms of assistance are available.

Discussion

We have seen that, on the whole, out-of-wedlock natality in Israel is mainly concentrated, in absolute terms, among the young which is consistent with the fact that at the 1972 census, about 84 per cent of all never-married Jewish women aged 15 and over were younger than 25 while more than half the total (57 per cent) were under the age of 20. Under the circumstances, why is the illegitimacy rate among teenagers in Israel so much lower than that in most other countries, and why are there different rates according to father's country of origin among the Israeli-born unmarried mothers?

Before we attempt to answer these questions, we must examine empirical data on the set of variables involved in the process of reproduction.[13]

(1) 'Exposure to intercourse' variables, and in particular those which are most relevant to never-married women: (i) age of entering into a sexual union; and (ii) frequency of intercourse.

(2) 'Exposure to conception' variables—that is, the use or neglect of contraceptives.

(3) 'Gestation' variables or induced termination of pregnancy.

(4) 'Marriage after pregnancy' variables, which obviously affect illegitimacy rates.

We can expect a low illegitimacy rate when unmarried young girls rarely enter into sexual unions, and when those who do so have infrequent intercourse; when there is widespread and effective use of contraception; when abortions may be procured fairly easily; or when there is a high percentage of pregnant brides. In the case of Israel, such evidence as we have on these factors is scanty and inconclusive.

1. *Exposure to intercourse.* There is some evidence that a proportion of Israeli Jewish youngsters of both sexes enter at a very young age into sexual unions and have frequent intercourse. According to a study, by Lancet *et al.*,[14] carried out in 1972 among a large sample of Israeli post-primary school pupils concerning their sexual knowledge, attitudes, and practices, five per cent of girls in their ninth and tenth grades (aged about 14 to 16 years), and at least 16 per cent of girls in the last two grades (up to 18 years old) had already engaged in full sexual intercourse. Since these figures refer to girls who were still at school, and since early sexual activity and early school leaving may be correlated,[15] it is likely that there is an even greater percentage of unmarried teenage girls who are sexually experienced. (The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics found that about 25 per cent of Jewish girls aged 14–17 were not registered at school in the session 1971–72.[16])

The Lancet study tentatively suggests that younger girls seem to be more sexually promiscuous than their elders: 24 per cent of those girls in the ninth and tenth grades who are sexually experienced have had intercourse with more than one partner, while this is the case among only 14 per cent of the schoolgirls in the eleventh and twelfth grades.

It would seem, on the basis of the Lancet data, that in 1972 a conservative estimate of about 10,000 girls aged between 14 and 18 years had engaged in sexual intercourse,[17] and that many of them had done so on repeated occasions, with either the same or with different partners. The Lancet study does not yield detailed cross-classified data on the sexual behaviour of high school girls according to their place of birth or date of immigration. However, a rough distinction between girls of Israeli, Western, and Oriental (Afro-Asian) descent shows that the Orientals displayed the lowest degree of sexual activity in both the younger and the older age groups. This finding seems to conflict with the fact that the illegitimacy rate is higher among Oriental girls. On the other hand, computations based on Central Bureau of Statistics data on young Jewish girls aged 14–17 in 1971–72 show that only 18 per cent of those of European/American origin were not attending school, while nearly half those of African/Asian origin (48 per cent) had left school.[18] In the age group 15–17, the drop out rate of Oriental pupils is twice that of the Western pupils.

If we assume that teenage girls still at school are less sexually active than those who have dropped out, it follows that those of Afro-Asian origin as a whole may run a greater risk of becoming pregnant.

2. *Exposure to conception.* The Lancet study does not go into details of the contraceptive behaviour of the pupils it surveyed. About two thirds of the girls who had sexual intercourse declared that neither they themselves nor their partners used any means of contraception. The authors note that 1) most of the sexual encounters were not planned, but occurred 'by chance' and 2) the teenagers exhibited a very low level of general knowledge of contraception, and were largely ignorant of the variety of methods which could be employed. This finding is consistent with others concerning the Jewish adult female population of Israel as a whole. Reviewing the irrationality and the ignorance prevailing in the country in matters of family planning, Friedlander[19] drew attention to the peculiar situation 'where fertility levels are relatively low, but usage of contraception is also low'. His study and the earlier research by Bachi and Matras[20] show that married women of Afro-Asian origin are those less likely to plan their families or to use such modern methods as the pill or the intra-uterine device.

If it is in fact the case that married women in Israel generally do not use contraceptive methods competently, and that this particularly applies in the case of the Orientals, then the same would be true also of the unmarried women. It would explain the different illegitimacy rates according to group of origin; but it would not explain why the total rate of illegitimacy in Israel is so low when compared to most other countries.

3. *Abortions and pregnant brides.* The incidence of sexual activity among young schoolgirls, the higher frequency of intercourse among those who have dropped out of school, and presumably among those in the army (18–19 years old) and at university and among other unmarried girls, when coupled with low and/or unsophisticated use of contraception, should result in a relatively high number of out-of-wedlock pregnancies. On the other hand, since there are only fewer than 500 illegitimate births per year, while many thousands of spinsters are involved in more or less regular sexual activity, it seems reasonable to infer that there must be extensive use of abortion and/or a high proportion of pregnant brides.

According to Israeli law, in 1972 legal abortions could be performed only in very special instances. Women therefore go to private practitioners, who are of course unwilling to provide information on their illegal (though more or less tolerated) activities. Thus, very little information is available at present about the frequency and the conditions of induced abortion in general, and as affecting unmarried women in particular. No research about it seems to have been carried out in Israel since the 1960's,[21] with the exception of a recent study on family planning

which has some data on abortions among married women, but gives no information about any pregnancies terminated before they were married.[22]

A bill, enacted in the Israeli Parliament in January 1977, provides for legal abortions in a range of 'social cases', subject to the consent of a panel composed of two physicians and a social worker.

Marriages hastily arranged after the girl becomes pregnant are likely to be widespread in a society, such as the Israeli, where some traditional family values seem still to predominate; and the smallness of the country and the salience of the Jewish heritage are factors leading to some sort of social control of the consequences of pre-marital unions. Empirical evidence is required to support or to reject this thesis. There are some data concerning girls below the age of seventeen—the minimum legal age for marriage. Special authorization to marry below that age may be granted—usually when the applicant is pregnant— but statistics reveal that such marriages are few in number.[23] We may therefore infer, at least in the case of this very young age group, that it is abortion rather than the marriage of pregnant brides which is the chief reason for the low illegitimacy rate.

Conclusion

In the early 1970's, illegitimate births in Israel accounted for only a very small percentage of total natality. We have seen that illegitimacy in that country, as elsewhere, is a predominantly urban phenomenon, largely concentrated among teenagers and young (up to 24 years of age) adult women; however, unlike the case in other countries, illegitimate age-specific births steadily rise with age and are the highest after the age of 35.

We have also noted that the overall incidence of out-of-wedlock natality is higher among more recent immigrants than it was among those who had come to the country before 1961, and that it declines further among the Israel-born never-married women. This might mean that the longer the stay in the country and the exposure to its socio-cultural patterns, the lower the likelihood of illegitimacy, which is viewed as a symptom of deviant behaviour. On the other hand, it appears that the age at which the unmarried mother immigrated, and the conditions then prevailing for the absorption of new arrivals, are relevant factors to consider when we try to discover why, for very young ages, illegitimacy around 1972 was higher among earlier immigrants than it was among more recent newcomers.

Clearly, intensive detailed research is required to determine—in view of the alleged permissive sexual behaviour of Israeli teenagers—the reasons for the very low illegitimacy rate. Since young girls seem to

have an inadequate knowledge of effective birth control, it is presumably extensive abortions and/or the marriages of pregnant brides which account for so few out-of-wedlock births.*

NOTES

[1] See Shirley Foster Hartley, 'Standardization Procedures in the Analysis of Cross-national Variations in Illegitimacy Measures', *Journal of Biosocial Sciences*, vol. 2, no. 2, January 1970, pp. 95–109, p. 104.

[2] See Central Bureau of Statistics, *Vital Statistics 1972*, Special Series no. 466, Jerusalem, 1974.

[3] Calvin Goldscheider, 'Out-of-Wedlock Births in Israel', *Social Problems*, vol. 21, no. 4, Spring 1974, pp. 550–67.

[4] See *Vital Statistics 1972*, op. cit.

[5] No out-of-wedlock births to women aged 40 or more were recorded during 1971–73.

[6] See Shirley Hartley 'The Amazing Rise of Illegitimacy in Great Britain', *Social Forces*, vol. 44, no. 4, June 1966, pp. 533–45; Sidney Goldstein, 'Premarital Pregnancies and Out-of-Wedlock Births in Denmark 1950–1965', *Demography*, vol. 4, 1967, pp. 925–36; National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) 'Trends in Illegitimacy, United States 1940–1964', *Vital and Health Statistics Series 21*, no. 15, Washington, 1968.

[7] NCHS, 'Trends in Illegitimacy ...', op. cit.; and S. Goldstein 'Premarital Pregnancies ...' op. cit.

[8] Kingsley Davis, 'Illegitimacy and the Social Structure', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 45, no. 2, September 1939, pp. 215–33.

[9] C. Goldscheider 'Out-of-Wedlock Births ...', op. cit., pp. 560, 565.

[10] Eitan F. Sabatello, 'Israel in the Framework of the Mediterranean Migrations: an Atypical Case', *Emigration from the Mediterranean Basin to Industrialized Europe*, pp. 146–67, Institute of Demography, University of Rome, Rome, 1976.

[11] Age at arrival as related to period of immigration for teenage girls in 1971–73 is schematically indicated in the following table:

Age in 1971–73	Born in	Age at arrival of girls who immigrated up to 1960	1961 and later
13–16	1955–60	up to 5	0–16 (but mostly younger than 10 years)
17–19	1952–56	up to 8	7–19
20–24	1947–53	up to 13	8–24 (but mostly in their early teens)

* This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the XVIII General Conference of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, in Mexico City, in August 1977.

The basic output data were processed at the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, with the support of the Demographic Center, Prime Minister's Office, Jerusalem. Mr. J. Gidanian provided useful research assistance.

[12] S. Goldstein 'Premarital Pregnancies...' op. cit.; S. Goldstein and K. Mayer, 'Illegitimacy, Residence and Status', *Social Problems*, vol. 12, no. 4, Spring 1965, pp. 428–36.

[13] Judith Blake and Kingsley Davis, 'Social Structure and Fertility: an Analytical Framework', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. 4, no. 3, April 1956, pp. 211–35.

[14] M. Lancet *et al.*, *Behaviour, Attitudes and Knowledge of Youth on the Subject of Sex*, Demographic Centre, Prime Minister's Office, Jerusalem, 1974 (in Hebrew, mimeographed).

[15] ibid.

[16] Central Bureau of Statistics, *Labour Force Surveys 1972*, Special Series no. 451, Jerusalem, 1974.

[17] Rough estimate obtained by multiplying Lancet's age-specific sexual activity rates by the unmarried female population in the corresponding ages in the 1972 Census: 5 per cent of about 50,000 aged 14–16=2,500; and 16 per cent of about 50,000 aged 17–18=8,000.

[18] Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1973*, no. 24, Jerusalem, 1973. In the age group 14–17 years, 824 out of every 1,000 girls of European/American origin were at school, while for the Afro/Asian the comparable figure was 522: 17·6 per cent of the Western girls and 47·8 per cent of the Oriental girls had thus left school in the academic year 1971/72.

[19] Dov Friedlander, 'Family Planning in Israel: Irrationality and Ignorance', *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, vol. 35, no. 1, February 1973, pp. 117–30.

[20] Roberto Bachi and Judah Matras, 'Contraception and Induced Abortions among Jewish Maternity Cases in Israel', *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, vol. 40, no. 2, April 1962, pp. 207–29.

[21] ibid. See also Robert Bachi, 'Induced Abortions in Israel', *International Conference of the Association for the Study of Abortions*, Hot Springs, 1968.

[22] Nurith Yaffe, *Family Planning in Israel* (Supervisors, C. Goldscheider and D. Friedlander), The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1977 (mimeographed, in Hebrew).

[23] *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1973, op. cit.

THE SYNAGOGUE HAVURAH—AN EXPERIMENT IN RESTORING ADULT FELLOWSHIP TO THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

Daniel J. Elazar and Rela Geffen Monson

The Havurah Idea

NO single institution has appeared on the American Jewish scene in the past two decades which has been as well received as the *Havurah*. For the American synagogue, it has been the first institutional innovation of magnitude since Mordecai Kaplan put forth the idea of the synagogue centre two generations ago. Responding as it does to the new quest for intimacy, the *Havurah* has been hailed as a potentially saving force in American Jewry, especially in the matter of restoring Jews to traditional Jewish practice.

According to Reisman, 'a chavurah is a small community of like-minded individuals and families who form together as a Jewish fellowship to offer one another social support and to support and to pursue self-directed programs of Jewish study, celebration, and community service'.[1] *Havurot* are usually characterized by their small size—usually consisting of fewer than 25 adults; by regular meetings in informal settings such as private homes; assumption of responsibility by the members for the leadership of their group with minimal dependence on professional staffing; and by an understanding by the members that joining is a commitment. While the first *Havurot* were campus-based, including a number that were residential in character and others that were independent bodies—such as those constituting the Federation of Reconstructionist Havurot in Denver, Colorado—many synagogues soon found the *Havurah* idea to be an attractive one for dealing with their own members' Jewish needs. In some cases, rabbis have been the prime movers in establishing *Havurot* in their congregations; in others, groups of congregants have taken the lead on their own, even in the face of rabbinical opposition in some cases.

One of the characteristics of *Havurot* mentioned above, that of the

commitment of the members to active personal involvement, highlights the *Havurah* as a response to adverse criticisms of American Jewish communal organization levelled by some of its most astute rabbis and intellectuals.[2] These critics have observed that joining a Jewish organization today does not really entail 'joining' at all. In fact, it is customary to be a 'card-carrying' member of many groups. Even synagogue affiliation, apparently an association requiring some ideological commitment, has been reinterpreted as a fee paid to entitle one to receive certain services at various points in the life cycle—services performed for the member by a professional who is on duty. This phenomenon has been variously referred to by Kelman as 'supermarket' Judaism and by Elazar as 'service station' Judaism: one goes to the market or station for the needed service, buys it, and then goes out again until the next fill-up or service is required. One of the major findings of an important study of the Reform movement was that membership had become a passive act and that the synagogue had become a peripheral institution in the lives of its members.[3] The *Havurah* has emerged in the community in an effort to reverse this trend.

The concept of *Havurah* as fellowship was revived in the 1960's by Jacob Neusner in an essay analyzing *Havurot* in the first and second century of the Christian Era, by Jakob Petuchowski in an article in *The Reconstructionist* proposing the revival for contemporary Jews, and Daniel J. Elazar who described early experiments with *Havurot* among young families in a Midwestern community.[4] The first extensive effort to build *Havurot* was initiated in Denver through the Reconstructionist movement as a substitute for the conventional synagogue.[5] Those, and others like them, founded during the same period, united couples and families who maintained their own households and activity networks.

A different model *Havurah* was founded by Rabbi Arthur Green in 1968 in Somerville, Massachusetts. His *Havurat Shalom* was a small communal household of teachers and students dedicated to studying and living Judaism. In defining his theoretical 'ideal type' *Havurah*, Green stated: 'When we enter into *Havurah* we accept certain obligations upon ourselves. Without obligations the *Havurah* could not exist. We affirm that the *Havurah* has a right to make serious claims upon our time and energies.'[6] A rabbi active in creating *Havurot* in his synagogue, interviewed in the course of our study, summarized their purpose thus: 'The groups experience Jewish things or experience things Jewishly.'

By now, several versions of the *Havurah* have filtered into the mainstream of American Jewish life. The most prevalent version is the *Havurah* located within the framework of a synagogue. It is closer to the first model described above and has emerged as a tool for repersonalizing the synagogue as an institution and reactivating members so that their Judaism is no longer simply something to be delegated to the rabbi.

The Study

Between 1973 and 1976, the Center for Jewish Community Studies undertook a study of the future of the synagogue in America under the sponsorship of the Institute for Jewish Policy Planning and Research of the Synagogue Council of America. As part of the study in 1975, a survey questionnaire was posted to the Rabbis of all known synagogues in the United States. After eliminating synagogues without Rabbis from the universe, 1,466 synagogues remained. Of these, questionnaires were returned by Rabbis from 470 congregations (32 per cent). Evaluation of returns showed that they were proportionately representative of congregations of different branches of Judaism, and proportionately distributed among urban and suburban areas and the several geographical regions of the United States. The survey dealt with a number of questions about *Havurot* and included data on the year of founding; who was responsible for their founding; the age range of the members; the number of *Havurot* in each synagogue; the range of activities sponsored by the *Havurot*; the size of their adult membership; and the level of the Rabbis' satisfaction with *Havurot* as an aspect of congregational life.

As another dimension of that study, in-depth field interviewing was conducted in thirteen metropolitan areas around the United States during which the same questions were raised on a more elaborate basis in face-to-face interviewing. Finally, the Center co-sponsored a comprehensive study by Gerald Bubis and Harry Wasserman of synagogue *Havurot* in the Los Angeles area. That study—like the Reisman study at approximately the same time of *Havurot* in 12 Reform and Conservative synagogues in the Boston area—concentrated on an analysis of the meaning of the *Havurah* for individual members and families in synagogues in particular geographical areas.[7]

As a result of the response to the questionnaire as supplemented by the other sources, we are now in a position to examine aspects of this contemporary development inaccessible to those doing studies in specific localities only, and therefore can complement their findings.

In 1975, 20 per cent (95) of the responding congregations reported some form of *Havurah* and two thirds of these had more than one, for a total of 376 *Havurot*. Ten synagogues had ten or more *Havurot* including one with 27 and one with 43, both of which had made their congregations *Havurah*-centered. Analysis of the data showed significant trends among congregations which sponsor *Havurot* with regard to metropolitan and regional location, movement affiliation, size, and age range of membership. In short, a *Havurah* within the framework of the synagogue was an accepted and growing phenomenon, a new institution apparently meeting certain needs in patterned ways.

Location. Synagogues in some regions of the United States have been

pioneers in the development of *Havurot* within their structures. Perhaps this is because of one or two strong, creative rabbis in a given region who successfully implement the *Havurah* idea in their own synagogues and then are emulated by others who see the structure working personally and feel the competitive pull which results from any successful innovation. The best example of this phenomenon of emulation occurred in the Los Angeles area. Table 1 shows the frequency of synagogue *Havurot* by geographical region in 1975, using a regional typology of spheres as the basis for analysis.[8] The West stands out as the region where the synagogue *Havurah* has become most important. Nearly half of the reporting congregations in the West have *Havurot* and there are more than twice as many with *Havurot* than the region next in rank.

TABLE 1.* *Percentage of Synagogues with Havurot by Spheres*

	Have Havurot (N=95)	*No Havurot* (N=308)
Sphere		
Greater North East (N=280)	20	80
Greater South (N=63)	19	81
Greater West (N=60)	43	57
$x^2=15{\cdot}3$ with 2 d.f.	$p<{\cdot}0005$	

* The reader will note that the base number of responses changes from table to table. This results from calculating percentages in each case based only on the valid responses to the items included in the table. Excluding 'missing cases' yields more accurate data.

Another aspect of location is the urban or suburban setting of a congregation. Urban synagogues tend to have an older average membership, to have fewer families with young children, and to have been founded earlier than suburban ones. Members of the urban synagogues may have greater access to alternative institutions which usually develop in densely populated areas, and so the urban synagogue may have less of a community-centre function than is the case in the suburbs.

We found that synagogues whose rabbis defined them as suburban were significantly more likely to develop *Havurot* than were synagogues whose rabbis defined them as urban. Thus, of the 163 identified as urban, 18 per cent had *Havurot* in 1975 while of the 168 identified as suburban, 29 per cent did ($p<{\cdot}07$). This may reflect the search for community on the part of families separated by commuting and other compartmentalizing aspects of their lives. These households consist of nuclear families almost exclusively and are characterized by high educational attainment. Many have demonstrated a need for intellectually and emotionally rewarding intimate experiences.

Such suburban families, particularly in newly-formed communities, have the characteristics of families on what Elazar has termed the metropolitan-technological frontier.[9] In this light, it is especially notable that the Los Angeles Jewish community—the epitome of the new frontier—has been the site of the greatest development of the synagogue *Havurah* movement. Thus, it was not only the existence of leaders but also the structure of the situation which enabled the blossoming of the movement there. Similarly, Phoenix, Arizona, an even newer Jewish community in most respects, has witnessed an intensive introduction of *Havurot*.

On the other hand, one large urban congregation recently added a third rabbi expressly to work with *Havurot* on the grounds that since it is a large congregation in a heterogeneous urban setting, it needs to create a greater sense of personal contact with its members. The leaders of that congregation envision *Havurot* as 'part of a larger kind of general approach that people do belong, as an antidote to future shock, depersonalization and estrangement'.[10]

Movement Affiliation of Synagogue. Orthodox synagogues are characterized by higher commitment to Jewish law and practice by their members than is the case among Conservative and Reform congregations. They are also often smaller in size, more likely to be in urban neighbourhoods, and to already contain small study groups or to provide other regular forms of interaction—such as *minyanim*—for a significant proportion of the members. On the other hand, Conservative and Reform synagogues are more likely to be large institutions in suburban areas where there is considerably less interaction among large sections of the membership. We therefore expected that *Havurot* would be most needed and prevalent in the latter congregations, rather than among the Orthodox. Table 2 shows that the results of our survey supported this theory.

Of course, the ideological affiliation of the synagogue is not the sole determinant of receptivity to a new concept such as the *Havurah*. We shall see below that the predominant age group in the congregation, the size of the membership, and even the age of the congregation itself are significantly related to the presence of *Havurot*.

TABLE 2. *Existence of a Havurah by Affiliation of Synagogue (in percentages)*

	Have Havurah (N=95)	*No Havurah* (N=310)
Reform (N=131)	29	71
Conservative (N=193)	27	73
Orthodox (N=70)	6	94
Other (N=11)	9	91
$x^2=17{\cdot}1$ with 3 d.f.	$p<{\cdot}0007$	

Internal Structure of the Congregation. Reisman found that in Boston, 'There are more younger people, those under age 35 in *Havurot* . . . and less older people, those aged 55 and over in *Havurot*. . . . These figures indicate that the *Havurot* particularly tend to attract people in the 35–54 age group, people whose children are likely to be living at home.'[11] In our data, as well, those over 59 are under-represented with 39 per cent of *Havurot* found in synagogues having a predominant age of 40–59, 33 per cent made up of those who are 25–39, none reporting a predominant age of 60 and over, and 28 per cent reporting mixed ages. We can augment these findings by comparing the presence of *Havurot* or their absence in synagogues with varying overall age structures. Table 3 shows that the age of congregational membership is signficantly related to the existence of *Havurot.*

TABLE 3. *Existence of Havurot by Predominant Age Range of Congregation Membership in 1975 (in percentages)*

Age Range	*Have Havurot* (N=78)	*No Havurot* (N=278)
25–39 (N=63)	17	83
40–59 (N=204)	27	73
60+ (N=48)	15	85
Mixed (N=41)	12	88
$x^2=7{\cdot}5$ with 3 d.f.	$p<{\cdot}057$	

Though congregations of all types have *Havurot*, those with most members in the 40–59 age group are clearly most receptive to them. Despite the difference in age categories used, this may well strengthen Reisman's finding that it is adults of this age range who are most often members of *Havurot* where they exist in Boston. While there were no *Havurot* in the sample made up completely or predominantly of people over 60 years of age, there were mixed-age or cross-generational *Havurot* which included members over 60.

Havurah as a Device for Overcoming Impersonality. Every theoretical discussion of the development of *Havurot* deals with the *Havurah* as an antidote to the impersonality of the modern synagogue in America. This impersonality is best indicated by the size of the membership relative to the number of participants in congregational activities, the number of professionals necessary to serve their needs, and the general inability to encourage personal contact. We found a consistent relationship between size of adult membership of synagogue and the existence of *Havurot*—reflecting that the *Havurah* provides a community for those who seek it.

Reisman raises the issue of the relevance of *Havurot* to small synagogues.[12] One instance of such relevance found in our study is that of 'geriatric' congregations: we noted, for example, that congregations with

TABLE 4. *Size of Congregation and Existence of Havurot (in percentages)*

Number of Adult Members	*Have Havurot* (N=92)	*No Havurot* (N=302)
0–170 (N=71)	6	94
171–320 (N=77)	13	87
321–575 (N=75)	21	79
576–1000 (N=96)	29	71
1001–1600 (N=37)	43	57
1601+ (N=38)	47	53
$x^2=39{\cdot}5$ with 5 d.f.	$p<{\cdot}0000$	

a predominant membership age of 60 and over were more likely than others to have *Havurot* which sponsored weekly services. In those cases, the *Havurah* solved a problem for a limited younger group within the congregation by providing the framework for an alternative service. It may well be that larger congregations will continue to have more *Havurot*, but needs of special groups can be met by *Havurot* with synagogues of all sizes. *Havurot*, after all, usually range in size from 10 to 25 adult members—a small group even within the context of a congregation of 150 adults.

Size and Number of Havurot. Among the *Havurot* in our survey, the size of the first *Havurot* recorded for each congregation which had a *Havurah* did not vary significantly by region, urban location, movement affiliation, predominant age of congregational members, or the size of the congregational membership.

More than two thirds of the congregations sponsoring *Havurot* had more than one: 21 had two, 23 had between three and five, and 18 had six or more *Havurot*. Though there was a higher percentage of congregations in the Western United States, and within the Reform movement, who had more than one *Havurah*, these differences were not statistically significant. Either one *Havurah* provides an attractive model leading other members of the congregation to request the formation of another, or more than one is founded at the same time. Thus, although the majority of the congregation's membership is not usually involved in *Havurot*, clusters of fellowship groups appear within most of the synagogues which sponsor them.

Finally, we noted that the year of founding of the congregation was significantly related to the emergence of *Havurot*. The 'younger' the institution, the more likely it was to contain *Havurot*. Thus, 16 per cent of congregations founded between 1881 and 1920, 20 per cent of those founded between 1921–45, 31 per cent of those founded between 1946–55, and 34 per cent of those founded between 1956 and 1974 had *Havurot* ($N=95$, $p<{\cdot}05$). This may be linked to the frontier phenomenon discussed earlier, or to the younger average membership of newer congregations leading to more receptivity to innovation.

In sum, the synagogues most likely to have *Havurot* are large, non-Orthodox, suburban, founded after the Second World War, and with a predominant membership of adults aged between 40 and 59 years. If they are in the Western part of the United States and have the other characteristics, they are most likely sponsoring several *Havurot* which have been in existence for a few years.

Now that we know where the *Havurot* are most likely to be found, it is important to examine what the members do together—that is, the content of the experience.

Havurah Activities and Internal Structure

Are *Havurot* just adult study groups with a new label? Every analysis of this 'new' institution must grapple with that question. Thus Reisman begins his chapter on programmes and activities by asking: 'What do chavurot do? One way of approaching the question is to distinguish chavurot from study groups with the rabbi.... Three distinctions can be identified: (1) Source of Learning ... (2) A Learning Community ... (3) Affective Involvement.'[13] By source of learning, Reisman means the autonomy of the group and their own responsibility for preparing materials and presenting them. A learning community is one which has a tolerant atmosphere, with many points of view expressed among equals. Affective involvement refers to the non-cognitive aspects of *Havurah*, when learning inevitably leads to experience and celebration in the *Havurah*. 'Not only do they learn about the Jewish calendar—they taste Jewish foods; in sum, they feel the rhythm and flavor of the Jewish heritage.'[14] Or, as one of our respondents stated, 'Anything Jewish would be an accepted activity.'

A list of a number of activities which *Havurot* typically sponsor was included in our survey. The frequency of these varying types of activities among all *Havurot* in the study is recorded in Table 5, based on the responses of 88 rabbis of congregations sponsoring *Havurot*.

TABLE 5. *Existence of Various Havurah Activities (in percentages)*

Havurah Activities		*Have*	*Do Not Have*
Study Groups	(N=88)	86	14
Communal Meals	(N=88)	57	43
Communal Holiday Celebrations	(N=88)	51	49
Some Services	(N=88)	42	58
Retreats	(N=88)	33	67
Weekly Services	(N=88)	9	91

It is clear that study groups are the most common form. Other activities may then emerge out of the successful formation of an adult group with one goal—that of learning. Relatively few groups sponsor regular religious services and/or retreats—since these require long-term preparation

and extensive time commitments. Thus, these more intensive activities which the theoreticians of the *Havurah* have suggested as the best antidote to synagogue impersonality are also the least frequently found forms.

In analysing the incidence of certain types of activity found together and thus characterizing types of *Havurot*, we found three statistically significant relationships and several suggestive ones. Sponsoring weekly services is significantly related to having retreats ($p < .05$), though these two are the least frequent forms of activity found in *Havurot*. Having some services is significantly related to communal holiday celebrations ($p < .0002$) and, in turn, sponsoring communal holiday celebrations is highly related (as we would expect) to sharing communal meals ($p < .0000$). This follows the Reisman findings concerning the motivation of people for joining *Havurot* and the subsequent ordering of priorities among activities in *Havurot*. In Boston,[15]

> The actual program activities place a high premium on the Jewish purposes of the chavurot. Adult Jewish discussion is the most frequent chavurah activity.... The activity next most frequently reported is family celebration of Jewish holidays. Family celebration is cited first by 41 per cent of the respondents; and is ranked first or second by 84 per cent. General adult discussions and adult socializing follow in importance.

The more intensive aspects of our study make it evident that moving beyond the study group model usually leads the group to related intensive commitments—to a cluster of activities which go together because of the nature of Jewish celebration. Thus, the Shabbat afternoon study group for adults leads to a family centered *Havdalah* service. A Friday night meal leads to a service. Holiday celebrations invariably involve food. According to this theory, these contacts should lead to the desire to spend a whole holiday or Shabbat together with study, food, and celebration for whole families, and so a retreat is planned.

In fact, there appears to be some real difference between theory and practice, at least to the extent that one level of *Havurah* activity does not necessarily lead to another, with many *Havurot* being satisfied with less intensive activities and very few reaching the most intensive forms. Thus, while there is not yet sufficient evidence to draw firm conclusions, it would seem to be a mistake to view the *Havurah* experience as one which necessarily leads to a serious intensification of Jewish activity on the part of members. Most study-group *Havurot* remain study groups and do not move beyond that already common form of Jewish self-expression. Our qualitative interviews also tend to refute the evolutionary theory. Most of those *Havurot* which engage in more intensive activities began with those activities rather than evolved towards them. Only a few *Havurot* have been able to move from the more casual to the more intensive activities—a process greatly facilitated by the direction of a strong leader.

Do the Rabbis Think Havurot are a Success?

Nevertheless, many rabbis are ambivalent about *Havurot*. The concept of *Havurah* as fellowship has been translated into a reality as an institution within the synagogue in the nearly two decades since it was first proposed. Although the reality does not always embody the intense commitments and range of activities envisioned by the theoreticians and philosophers, the *Havurah* as an institution is fulfilling important and real needs of adult American Jews to reassert the meaning of joining and commitment; to experience the warmth of primary group involvement beyond the nuclear family; and to intellectually explore Jewish tradition on an adult level. While *Havurot* present an opportunity to improve the personal involvement of synagogue members in Jewish life, they may also represent a threat to the authority of the Rabbi because they restore to the members independence from professionals. In reply to a question on the motivation for founding *Havurot* in their synagogues, over half the 60 rabbis who responded said that the main motivation was the desire of the rabbi to organize one in order to fulfil special needs he perceived. The others reported that the impetus came from members who expressed interest in such a programme after hearing about it from others, or as a follow-up on some other meaningful experience such as a retreat or study group already in progress but not labelled as a *Havurah*.

When asked about the success of the *Havurah* in their congregations, 27 per cent rated them as highly successful, 42 per cent as moderately successful, and 31 per cent as low on success. Why don't more of these rabbis see the *Havurah* as a highly successful programme? Our data do not allow us to draw any firm conclusions, but some sense of who perceived their *Havurot* to be successful can be gained from the following findings.

Rabbis in the South—where there are fewer *Havurot*—are more likely to rate their *Havurot* as successful than are those in the West, who have the most developed ones to compare with. There is no statistically significant relationship between number of members and rating of success by the Rabbi, nor is there a relationship between movement affiliation of the Congregation and success rating by the Rabbi. This increases the likelihood that the feeling of success is related to contextual variables such as the number of *Havurot* in the neighbourhood synagogues, the types of activity they sponsor, and the relative success of other synagogue programmes such as youth activities, the elementary Hebrew or Sunday school, and social action programmes.

The intensity of rabbinical involvement seems to be related to rabbinical assessment of the level of the success of the *Havurot* in a particular congregation. In one congregation with ten *Havurot*, the rabbi serves as overall leader and resource person, providing information and learn-

ing kits, arranging retreats and the like for the groups. He initiated the *Havurot* within his synagogue by introducing the subject in a Rosh Hashanah sermon. He then called in eight to ten people from different segments of the synagogue membership and 'sold' them on the idea. Once a group was formed, he selected a leader-liaison person to be his link with it. The same rabbi experimented with a *Havurah* for senior citizens, but it required too much work and direction on his part and he let it lapse.

Generally, the members of his *Havurot* are people in their thirties and forties. The rabbi held a retreat with the ten potential *Havurah* leaders before the groups were formed. These leaders are crucial since they enable the congregation to maintain a number of *Havurot* without overtaxing the rabbi; many of those active in *Havurot* had been active in the synagogue. Their *Havurah* experience has made them even more active and more closely identified with the synagogue in the rabbi's view, which is no doubt a contributing factor in his highly positive evaluation of the programme.

A similar pattern, instituted in another congregation of the same movement in the same western metropolitan area, brought an equally favourable rabbinical evaluation. In that congregation, twelve *Havurot* were organized in one year, divided into three categories: young singles (ages 21–35); adults (ages 36 and over, including those widowed and divorced); and families with young children. The rabbi initiated the movement because he felt the congregation had become too large and was losing the warm relationships its members had experienced when it was smaller. Each *Havurah* has been kept to a maximum of ten couples; each has a co-ordinator, and the co-ordinators are leaders of the sisterhood and brotherhood. Each *Havurah* designs its own programme—indeed, one of the driving forces behind the formation of these *Havurot* was the congregants' desire to express their own interests in more intimate settings, 'to get together on happy occasions, not just sad ones'. The rabbi's evaluation is that participation in the *Havurot* has helped intensify participation in the life of the congregation as a whole.

Alternative Approaches

Despite the growing popularity of the *Havurah* as a concept and of the term itself to describe various phenomena already found in the synagogue, in a more contemporary idiom, there continue to be a number of programmes which have not been designated *Havurot* but which function in the same manner. A few examples typify these alternatives.

One large metropolitan congregation has a bi-weekly study group of 40 participants ranging in age from 24 to 60, which represents a mixed spectrum of the synagogue membership. It includes marrieds and singles, nearly all of whom do not have children living at home.

The group was originally organized as a task force within the temple to work on a particular project; they later decided to remain together. Since then, there has been some change-over in membership but the group is a continuous one. Its members are among the most active participants in all the synagogue activities, and many are on the board. 'They are always the first to volunteer for anything special.' As part of their programme, they have two retreats a year, as well as communal meals at various times. They do not have their own worship service. Significantly, they call themselves 'The Open Circle'.

A Long Island congregation has organized a programme called 'Bagels and Torah', a typical 1950's name, in which some 25 adults come together on Sabbath morning for brief services, coffee, and study sessions. In another congregation, the adult education committee which had been established to examine the possibility of setting up *Havurah* programmes for others decided to form a *Havurah* themselves. The rabbi took over the leadership of the 25 members, who meet every three weeks. Numerous synagogues have retreats in which the same people participate on a recurring basis, but they do not necessarily have a continuing programme between weekends away. One Midwestern congregation in a medium-sized Jewish community has a number of study groups which have been in operation for 20 years or more, with the same people involved in them. While the study sessions are confined to the adult members, in several cases the families have come to share Sabbath and holiday experiences with one another as a group but, because they were established 'back when', they still refer to themselves as study groups rather than *Havurot*. The rabbi—who is the active leader in those groups—generally has been unenthusiastic about *Havurot* as such, although his congregation has one, which was established entirely on the initiative of its members (a younger and more Jewishly involved element in the congregation).

In another congregation, a parent education programme was made mandatory for parents of first-year Hebrew school students: no child can be enrolled in the Hebrew school if the parents do not participate in parallel weekly evening classes where they are taught the children's curriculum as well as material and religious approaches the rabbi wishes to impart. In addition to the study sessions, there are some social events as well as a *Shabbat Kallah* (retreat). The school's teachers, the principal, and the rabbi serve as staff. The programme follows a three-year course; the first year is mandatory, the second voluntary, while in the third, an adult education seminar is held. Despite the fears of the board, the programme gained wide acceptance among both parents and children. From the rabbi's perspective, the goals are not only to impart Jewish education and a positive attitude towards Jewish study but also to enable him to get to know at least some of the members of the congregation and to restore the connections which he believes

existed between him and the members when the congregation was smaller. The programme has between 40 and 50 families in any given year.

Why Havurot Have Not Been Established

Although the quantitative study could not yield information on congregations without *Havurot*, our qualitative interviewing did lead us to discover some of the reasons why *Havurot* have not been initiated. One rabbi stated: 'The synagogue is a stable one in which both the members and the staff feel that what they are doing is good enough and that there is no need to experiment with new things.' The same rabbi indicated that he would not be opposed to trying *Havurot* if he had the staff to lead them. Another commented: 'The idea for organizing *Havurot* first came to me when I came to the synagogue 27 years ago, but people wanted their privacy. Now I am considering it again.' In some congregations, home study groups are seen as *Havurot* in all but name, so that they did not think there was any need to institute such structures. 'Approximately 110 people participate in our home study programs and another 60 in the rabbi's classes (in a neighboring area people are joining *Havurot* as a means of social identification, this is not necessary in the city).' Perhaps the most interesting reason of all came from one rabbi: 'The American family structure is ever weakening. A *Havurah* experience is very intimate and such an exchange of ideas in group sharing of experiences can lead to sharing of partners.'

In many respects, *Havurot* represent an extension of an already conventional phenomenon on the American synagogue scene—the study group, the Saturday or Sunday morning 'bagels and lox' group, the retreat. In other respects, they represent an innovative dimension, not only in their name or in the expectations they generate, but even in practice: in their efforts to strengthen the family with a family-oriented group, bridge the generation gap, and create a more personal form of Jewish experience. Like every institution, the *Havurah* has not lived up to the exaggerated expectations which accompanied its emergence, first as an idea and then as a fact on the American Jewish scene. By the same token, *Havurot* have become useful tools for fostering Jewish attachment in a number of significant cases and have made it possible for synagogues to accommodate diversity more easily. They have been useful in reviving study groups in an age when affective rather than intellectual activity is in style. They have provided ways in which Jews can act together as families, something which even the American synagogue as it has developed has not encouraged. Apparently, *Havurot* have also provided some surrogate for the extended family. In a few cases, they have done what their advocates had hoped—namely, they have

created for their members viable frameworks for more intensive Jewish self-expression.*

NOTES

[1] Bernard Reisman, 'The Havurah: An Evaluative Assessment', *Analysis*, no. 63, January 1978, p. 26.

[2] Samuel Dresner, 'The Dais and the Pulpit: The Tension Between Federation and Synagogue', *Moment*, vol. 1, no. 5, December 1975, pp. 24–28; Jacob Neusner, 'Jewish Fellowship and Jewish Ethics', in Jacob Neusner, ed., *Contemporary Judaic Fellowship in Theory and in Practice*, New York, 1972, pp. 93–120; and Elihu Bergman, 'The American Jewish Population Explosion', *Midstream*, no. 23, October 1977, pp. 9–19.

[3] L. Fein *et al.*, *Reform is a Verb*, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, New York, 1972.

[4] Jacob Neusner, *Fellowship in Judaism: The First Century and Today*, London, 1963, pp. 11–30, 60–74; Jakob Petuchowski, 'Toward a Modern Brotherhood: The Earliest Proposals', in Neusner, ed., op. cit., pp. 33–50; and Daniel J. Elazar, 'An Academic Havurah' in Neusner, ed., op. cit., pp. 201–10.

[5] Ruth Jezer Teitelbaum, 'From the Denver *Havurot*', in Neusner, ed., op. cit., pp. 227–35.

[6] Arthur Green, '*Havurat Shalom:* A Proposal', in Neusner, ed., op. cit., p. 150.

[7] Gerald B. Bubis, Harry Wasserman, and Alan Tert, *A Study of Havurot in Five Los Angeles Synagogues*, Hebrew Union College—Jewish Institute of Religion, Los Angeles, 1977; and Reisman, 'The Havurah ...', op. cit.

[8] Daniel J. Elazar, *Community and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry*, Philadelphia, 1976, p. 64.

[9] Daniel J. Elazar, *Cities of the Prairie*, New York, 1970.

[10] Comment in a face-to-face interview.

[11] Reisman, 'The Havurah ...', op. cit., p. 3.

[12] ibid., p. 7.

[13] Bernard Reisman, *The Havurah: A Contemporary Jewish Experience*, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, New York, 1977, p. 101.

[14] ibid., p. 100.

[15] ibid., p. 103.

* This article reports findings from a part of the study of the American Synagogue in Transition conducted by the Center for Jewish Community Studies and sponsored by the Institute for Jewish Policy Planning and Research of the Synagogue Council of America.

BOOK REVIEWS

PHYLLIS COHEN ALBERT, *The Modernization of French Jewry: Consistory and Community in the Nineteenth Century*, xxii + 450 pp., Brandeis University Press, Hanover, New Hampshire, 1977, $27.50.

How the first emancipated Jewish community in Europe accommodated itself to the demands and opportunities of its new civil status is a story well worth telling, and little told until now. Phyllis Cohen Albert has given us an important chapter in that tale of French Jewry in her massive and exhaustively researched book. Focusing on the development of the consistories, the Jewish communal structure established under Napoleon's aegis, she has written a rich institutional history which touches upon various aspects of demographic, socio-political, and religious change among French Jews from the Napoleonic era until the Franco-Prussian war.

Drawing upon a wide variety of previously unmined archival sources, both Jewish and governmental, Albert describes how Jewish leadership took advantage of the quasi-governmental status of the consistories and of prevailing French political tendencies to press for increasing centralization of consistorial power in Paris, the dominance of laymen in decision-making roles, and a consistorial monopoly over Jewish life in France. The consistories were initially established to administer the Jewish communities, improve the moral and socio-economic behaviour of the Jews, and especially to exercise surveillance over them. However, as they developed, their police function diminished while they assumed such new tasks as self-defence and consolidation of their own power. Ruled by a wealthy, integrationist elite, the consistories took most seriously the task of 'regenerating' the backward Jewish masses. Towards that end, they set out to create an appropriately modern form of Judaism through a series of moderate ritual reforms. In doing so, they also engendered the passive resistance of the traditionalist masses, who expressed a potentially lethal combination of social, cultural, and religious resentment of consistorial leadership, but succeeded only briefly—in the wake of the Revolution of 1848—in mounting a challenge to the self-perpetuating consistorial oligarchy. Similarly, the establishment of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in 1860 by a younger and more activist segment of the Jewish population, who found the consistory's posture on self-defence activities insufficiently vigorous, never

displaced the consistory leaders from their pre-eminent position within French Jewry.

Perhaps the most important legacy of the triumph of the consistorial system, as Albert convincingly argues, was its effect upon the development of the French rabbinate. While the German rabbinate continued in the course of the nineteenth century to attract to its ranks the best minds, now university-educated, the French rabbinate became a comparatively low status profession. It served as a vehicle of upward social mobility only for the sons of the lower classes in the more traditionally observant provinces of Alsace-Lorraine. By opting, in collaboration with the government, to keep rabbinic salaries low, by denying freedom of speech and action to the clergy, and by failing to enforce high academic standards for rabbinic students once the traditional criteria of Talmudic learning were supplanted by secular ones, the consistories shaped a rather unimpressive nineteenth-century rabbinate. By both traditional and modern standards, French rabbis were, for the most part, neither profound scholars nor powerful and articulate leaders. And it seems apparent that a docile and generally mediocre rabbinate suited the lay leadership of French Jewry in the first generations after emancipation. In its impact upon the rabbinate the existence of the consistorial system thus appears to have made a difference. Similarly, the centralized structure of the consistories was a major factor, as Albert hints, in the co-optation of the reform impulse and the prevention of a full-fledged independent Reform movement in France until the early twentieth century.

It is less clear, however, that the consistorial structure made a significant difference in the modernization of French Jewry, as distinct from French Judaism. As Albert herself admits, many of the changes associated with the emergence of modern French Jews—attraction into the orbit of French culture, embourgeoisement, and urbanization, to name but three—did not occur as a result of consistorial pressures or policy. Rather, they were the outcome of the gradual adaptation of Jews, collectively and individually, to the opportunities presented by a relatively liberal and economically developing society.

Because consistorial policy had so little direct impact on social change among French Jews, Albert would have served her material better had she liberated herself from her close reliance on the legal and institutional development of the consistories as the organizing principle of her book. Ever mindful of the centrality of the consistories in her schema, she often provides information about organizational activity which is mind-boggling in its detail and occasionally obscures, rather than illuminates, the larger questions she has raised. Further, a number of critical issues would have emerged more clearly had they been treated separately and at length instead of appearing as incidental to consistorial history. The failure of a Reform movement to take hold

in France, for example, deserves a fuller treatment than it is allotted here, where it is touched upon in scattered references and resolved summarily in a footnote. Similarly, a sustained analysis of the effect of continued, if sporadic, social and local governmental discrimination upon Jewish political strategy and socio-economic choices in nineteenth-century France might tell us more about the modernization of French Jewry than an account of consistorial correspondence with the Ministry of Cults does. While Albert presents much of the raw material for a consideration of both these questions, and many others as well, she could have presented it more effectively.

Nevertheless, all future investigations of nineteenth-century French Jewry will build upon Albert's achievement. She has revealed the complexity of the creation of a modern Jewish community in France and has placed her story squarely within the context of French political and social history.

PAULA E. HYMAN

MOSHE DAVIS, ed., *With Eyes Toward Zion: Scholars Colloquium on American-Holy Land Studies*, xxii+252 pp., Arno Press, New York, 1977, $18.00.

Recent American attentiveness to Israeli affairs has been characterized as a 'special relationship'. The phrase, it seems, is not a mere slogan or designation conveniently intended to serve transient American interests, but is rooted in the cultural life of the American people. At least, this is the suggestive theme which runs through the pages of this book.

Its contents consist of an edited selection of papers presented at a 1975 colloquium in Washington's National Archives. Under the sponsorship of the American Jewish Historical Society and the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a distinguished group of Jewish and Christian scholars gathered for an exploration of an uncharted area of America's past—its relationship with the 'Holy Land' before the First World War. The newness of the subject dictated that this initial phase of the inquiry be limited primarily to an examination of the accessible sources—archives and depositories of material related to the subject. Professor Moshe Davis, the prime mover behind the project and editor of the collection, looks forward to a culmination of this task with the establishment of 'a specialized American-Holy Land documentary library'.

The immediate result, however, brings forth a series of bibliographical essays of varying strength and quality interspersed with statistical vignettes, specimen documents, and a listing of 373 American biblical place names. This diverse array is held together by the 'working hypothesis' that the theme of Zion or Holy Land 'is part of the continuing

spiritual history of America illuminated by interplay of ideas among its diverse religions and cultural elements'.

Most of the participants agree with Davis about the existence of America's biblical heritage, its regard for Hebraic proper nouns, and that its attachment to the religious ideas of Zion sensitized American consciousness towards Palestine and its spiritual meaning.

Professor Robert T. Handy, the distinguished church historian, although not denying the basic validity of the premise, quietly warns, however, of the inherent limitation of its applicability. He notes, for example, that the American white Protestants' regard for Zion ought not to be translated to mean that individual Christians or their corporate establishments were necessarily sympathetic to the tribulations of the living people of the Holy Land. For most Christians, he observes, the Holy Land was primarily a place where Jesus lived, suffered, died, and rose again. This knowledge affected very slightly Christian compassion for, or interest in, the physical and spiritual needs of the Jewish and Muslim inhabitants of Palestine. American Protestants were captivated by the Book and the Land, not by the modern inhabitants who seemed on occasion even to repel them.

The reader is reminded, in an all too brief discussion by Professor Lawrence M. Jones, that the Afro-American both in bondage and freedom also drew a spiritual nourishment from the Land and the Bible. The American Black was captivated by those accounts which dealt with the movement of Moses and his people from Egyptian slavery to 'Canaan Land'. These events provided the black community with a vicarious dream of liberation. For it, the Holy Land was less a place than a symbol of freedom. To what degree such biblical association conditioned American blacks towards an understanding of Jewish Zionist aspirations is yet an unanswered question, but one well worth pursuing.

In a discussion of the sources of American-Holy Land relations, Professors Moshe Maoz, Roderick H. Davidson, and other writers underscore the meagreness, disorganized state, and inaccessibility of the source material found in the European—and especially the Turkish—archives. Nineteenth-century American relations with the Ottoman Empire were, after all, extremely limited and the relevant documents are consequently scarce. Few Americans—Christians or Jews—travelled or lived in Palestine before 1900, and little is known about their lives.

On the other hand, the most fruitful sources of this relationship lie in a variety of depositories and libraries of the United States—the National Archives, the Library of Congress, university libraries, presidential libraries, church and missionary collections, and in countless other places yet to be specifically identified. The difficulty of this identification is compounded by the fact that much of the nineteenth-century

American interest in the Holy Land had little to do with public policy, but was a private and personal matter. It was an emotional and subtle attachment that the scholar must glean from countless hymns, sermons, and religious tracts. Even American Jewish interests in Palestine before the 1880's—that is, before the outburst of Russian pogroms—was rarely articulated. Professor Yohai Goell's and Martha B. Katz-Hyman's 'Selected Bibliography of American Travelers to Palestine from 1850 to 1890' includes only four Jewish authors.

Nevertheless, students seeking an introduction to the history of American-Israeli relations will have to begin with this book. They will be grateful not only for its numerous bibliographical clues but also for its identification of particular areas that need further scholarly probing. Little is known, for example, about the image of the Holy Land that emerges from American Sunday school texts and missionary literature. The view of American Black Christians, as well as that of Roman and Greek Catholic churches in the United States, towards the entire issue of American-Holy Land relations needs also to be examined. For these reasons alone, this book should find a permanent place on the shelves of those seeking to explore a neglected dimension of America's past.

EGAL FELDMAN

MILTON M. GORDON, *Human Nature, Class, and Ethnicity*, xiii+302 pp., Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1978, £6.50.

This work contains twelve articles by the author, all previously published in the period between 1941 and 1975, except for the lead article on 'Human Nature and Sociology'. The papers are organized under five headings: 'Human Nature and Social Action'; 'Subsocieties, Subcultures, and Ethnicity'; 'Assimilation and Pluralism'; 'Social Class'; and 'Marginality'. The volume provides an excellent introduction to an important writer in the area of race and ethnic relations and will prove useful both as a reference book and as a textbook in courses on minorities, stratification, and social policy and intergroup relations.

In the long lead article on human nature, divided roughly into two parts, Gordon surveys the ways in which classic and contemporary sociologists such as Durkheim, Weber, Pareto, Mead, and Parsons have dealt with human nature, and then presents his own theory of human nature which takes into account both biological predispositions and tendencies and the social and environmental forces with which they interact. He perceptively observes what too many social scientists have either ignored or failed to take into account. That is, that 'the extrapolation of policy implications from research results will usually depend heavily on the assumptions about the nature of man which underlie

the sociologist's recommendations. Thus, the accuracy of these assumptions becomes an unavoidably crucial issue ... [and] the construction of a valid theory of human nature ... indispensable to the sociological enterprise' (p. 40).

Gordon's summary of the role of human nature in the work of early and contemporary sociologists is short, concise, and useful. Of particular interest is his discussion of dominant motifs in American sociology and its recent opponents such as Wrong, Lenski, and van den Berghe who have challenged the emphasis on cultural determinism, value consensus, structural-functional explanations of social institutions, and the essential plasticity of man. He concludes the section by observing that we have a long way to go in our 'search for a valid conception of human nature which realistically combines the biological and the social-cultural elements which interact to form the human being' (p. 40).

To this task Gordon turns his attention in the second half of the essay. While cautioning against biological and psychological reductionism, he accepts a developmental understanding of human nature. The remainder of his essay is devoted to outlining the complex mixture of physiological needs, emotional capacities, cognitive capacities, and motivations which Gordon believes are inherent in human nature. In describing what he calls 'over-arching drive motivations' he devotes considerable space to patterns of co-operative and aggressive behaviours. Finally, he concludes that it is the tension between these complex tendencies 'provided by the interaction of every man's human nature with every other man's human nature that constitutes the most telling aspect of society and social institutions' (p. 63). Unfortunately, Gordon's analysis provides few fresh insights for sociological theory or policy implementation. Jumping between psychological tenets and sociological concepts without demonstrating the interconnections between the two, his synthesis on the whole is unsatisfying.

After presenting the case for including psychological variables in sociological analysis, Gordon follows with excerpts from his earlier articles and books. Most significant is his treatment of intergroup relations, group culture, and social processes. Gordon is a particularly astute observer of minority interaction patterns and of the complexity of the assimilative process in America. 'The Subsociety and the Subculture' and 'The Nature of Assimilation' are penetrating essays dealing with this theme. In the former he introduces his now famous concept of the 'ethclass', the transection of class and ethnicity. It is in these subsocietal units that most primary relationships take place, and that individuals tend to feel most comfortable. This is a reality that some liberals intent on integration at all costs are prone to forget.

Other recurring themes in Gordon's work are the relationship between the intellectual and the ethnic sub-culture, and the relationship between ethnicity and marginality. He does an admirable job in

analysing the inherent tension between these groupings in the section on marginality. Less successful is his treatment of ethnicity and social class which, because it restricts class to status groups, emphasizes values and primary group interactions without paying sufficient attention to the system's economic underpinnings.

CAROL SCHMID

ABRAHAM D. LAVENDER, ed., *A Coat of Many Colors. Jewish Subcommunities in the United States*, xiii+324 pp., Contributions in Family Studies no. 1, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1977, n.p.

This book focuses on seven Jewish sub-communities in the United States: small-town Jews, southern Jews, poor Jews, Hassidic Jews, Black Jews, Jewish women, and Sephardi Jews. Abraham Lavender, who both compiled and edited the book, presents thirty-two articles drawing attention to segments of American Jewry not captured by the popular stereotype characterizing it as white, male-dominated, middle-class, of eastern European background, and concentrated in urban areas. With the exception of one article, they are reprinted from Jewish publications, scholarly journals, and newspapers.

The section on small-town Jews begins with a short piece by Susan Brown about how these Jews view themselves, and is followed by two articles which present conflicting outlooks on their status. On the basis of data collected in 'rural' New York State, Peter Rose argues that small-town Jews are best viewed as 'strangers' in alien territory, while Eugen Schoenfeld's material—on small-town Jews in southern Illinois—attempts to illustrate that they integrate into the host community and assume the characteristics of the non-Jewish population. (Peter Rose's paper is reprinted from *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*'s December 1961 issue.)

Lavender's essay in the section on southern Jews focuses on the interaction of the southern and Jewish subcultures; he notes values which are basic to each of them and examines how individuals who are members of both cultures are affected. It is followed by a paper by Theodore Lowi, first published in this Journal in 1964, 'Southern Jews: The Two Communities'. Lowi contrasts two communities in a town in the Deep South; one consists of Jews who have lived in the South for several generations, while the other is made up of newcomers. He states that the 'basic distinction is in the degree of Southerness' of the city's two Jewish groups. The next two papers—the first written anonymously and the second by Mehling—centre around segregation and discrimination. The former is an extreme response by a Jew to those issues, while the latter chronicles the discrimination and antisemitism encountered by Jews from the 1920's to the 1950's in the largest southern

Jewish community—Miami. The section ends with a discussion by Jerome Wolfe on the future of southern Jewry.

The popular image of American Jews as well-to-do has deflected attention from the Jewish working class and the Jewish poor. The extent of that poverty is dramatically highlighted by Ann Wolfe; her article is followed by comments on, and criticisms of, it by Saul Kaplan and by James Rice, with a rejoinder by Wolfe. Elinor Horwitz then describes the poor of Miami while Mark Effron tells of those in New York City, mainly elderly Jews. Effron lists some of the attempts made at relieving their poverty and loneliness; 'Project Ezra', for example, is a volunteer organization which came into being in the early 1970's in order to help those in the Lower East Side. Apart from six full-time workers, there are 60 volunteers, most of whom are college students.

In contrast to the Jewish poor who have remained largely invisible, the Hassidim—the fourth sub-community to be examined—have attracted attention and curiosity both in the Jewish and the Gentile communities. The contributions in this section provide a richly flavoured description of the life-style of these ultra-Orthodox Jews and focus on different aspects of life in Hassidic communities in the New York area.

As for the Black Jews, the major problem centres around their authenticity as Jews. Albert Ehrman traces their origins in the United States and examines their community in New York. His paper is followed by a very brief description of a small community of Black Jews who settled in South Jersey. Harold Goldfarb then considers the issue of 'Blacks and Conversion to Judaism'; he stresses that in order to be recognized as a Jew, a person must either provide proof of being Jewish according to the Halakhah or accept the traditional rite of conversion, and that this requirement applies to *all* would-be Jews. The last article in this section is by Robert Coleman, a Black Jew by conversion; his short contribution is entitled 'Black and Jewish—and Unaccepted'. He cites cases of Black converts who have found themselves unacceptable by white Jewish parents as prospective spouses for their children; and of Black Jewish children placed by a Jewish welfare agency in Black Christian foster homes when there were no available Black Jewish homes. When approached, an agency supervisor explained that it would be 'psychologically bad' for them to live in white Jewish homes. Coleman concludes with a call for a 'rabbinic statement on what the Jewish tradition says about racism'.

In his Introduction to the book, Lavender explains the reason for including a section on women in spite of the fact that they are not a distinct sub-community. He states that since they 'are sometimes recipients of unequal treatment and are outside the mainstream community in terms of power, ... we are concerned with the factors that have led to the position that women occupy and the role that they fulfill

within the American Jewish community' (p. 16). The section opens with Eugene Lipman's short paper, which stresses that the Torah and rabbinic law grant Jewish women many important rights. On the other hand, Ruth Brin's essay, 'Can a Woman be a Jew?', stresses the disabilities of a female in the fields of ritual participation and of divorce, and concludes with the assertion that 'women are Jews, and could be much better Jews if they were given equal opportunity with men' (p. 251). The next paper is by Lavender, who considers the impact of college education on Jewish women. He analyses data obtained in 1971 from a sample of Jewish undergraduates in the University of Maryland—264 females and 224 males; and finds that on such important issues as intermarriage, Israel, and the treatment of Soviet Jews, the women's level of Jewish identity was higher than the men's. He concludes that female graduates capable of filling positions of leadership, and willing to do so, could therefore contribute a great deal to the American Jewish community.

The section ends with Blu Greenberg's paper, 'Feminism: Is It Good for the Jews?' He states that the notion that equality means identity must be rejected. 'From the perspective of Judaism, there can be separate clear-cut roles in which men and women function as equals without losing their separate identities' (p. 271).

The final section deals with Sephardi Jews, who settled in New Amsterdam in the 1650's, and were to constitute the majority of American Jewry until the second decade of the eighteenth century. American Sephardim have been a minority within the Jewish community ever since. In the first essay, by Marc Angel, we are told that the first Sephardim who came to settle in Seattle, Washington, at the beginning of this century had difficulty in convincing the local Ashkenazim that they were Jewish; for they did not speak Yiddish but Judeo-Spanish and their names did not sound Jewish to Ashkenazi ears. Angel deplores the 'Ashkenazication process' of Sephardim throughout the United States, which has resulted in the almost total loss of their Judeo-Spanish heritage.

Victor Sanua summarizes several recent studies of Sephardi communities. He himself carried out research in New York City among the Syrian Jews of Brooklyn and Egyptian Jews in both Brooklyn and Queens; he found that the Brooklyn Syrians have retained their identity to such an extent that they 'are possibly the last remaining homogeneous Sephardi religious group in the United States'. They support two yeshiva day schools which have a full enrolment; they have built their own synagogues; they live in the same area and even go to the same resorts in summer. In contrast, the Jews from Egypt are scattered in New York City, and do not form a cohesive group; nor are they as religiously observant as Syrian Jews; and they also have more contact with Gentiles. Both groups are in the middle and upper socio-economic strata.

The next contribution in this section is by John Schulter, who describes Washington's Moroccan Jews. He says that they number only about 250 individuals, but are a close-knit group who cling firmly to their traditional customs. Seymour Liebman then outlines the history of Jewish settlement in Cuba from the beginning of the sixteenth century until Fidel Castro assumed power in 1959. The following year saw a large-scale emigration of Cuban Jews to the United States, and Liebman tells of their successful adjustment in South Florida. Finally, Lavender reports on the Sephardi revival in the United States. Yeshiva University instituted a programme of Sephardi studies in 1964; three years later the American Society of Sephardic Studies was founded; while in 1973 both the World Institute of Sephardic Studies and the American Sephardi Federation were established.

Lavender's efforts in organizing the book are indeed impressive. While each section stands as a comprehensive unit, the book as a whole is integrated around the processes and mechanisms of identity maintenance, social control, and relations with the larger Jewish community characterizing each of the sub-communities under study. His introductory lead-ins to each section offer useful background information and provide extensive reference material for further reading. The academic who is interested in the sociology of Jews and in Jewish life in the United States will find this book indispensable; while the lay reader will learn a great deal about segments of the American Jewish community which are outside the mainstream and which have therefore often been neglected both in scholarly and in popular accounts.

WILLIAM SHAFFIR

HENRY LEVER, *South African Society*, 312 pp., Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg, 1978, R.12,00 (paperback, R.8,95).

HENRY LEVER, ed., *Readings in South African Society*, 218 pp., Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg, 1978, paperback, R.6, 60.

Professor Lever, as he explicitly states in his Preface, was moved to write *South African Society* by virtue of the extraordinary dependence that had come about in South African universities upon American studies of American society. Given the fact—which he duly notes—that there are at least one hundred times as many sociologists in the United States as in South Africa, this dependence is not altogether surprising. Since Lever, however, is anything but parochial, his real concern was not so much that America (or Britain) was being studied but rather that South African society, lacking an accessible monographic account, was being ignored, either directly or in a comparative framework. And the complexity of the situation in South Africa makes it hardly uninteresting, least of all to South African students of sociology.

What Lever has written is neither a source book nor a systematic treatise but precisely such a monograph which thoughtfully brings together a large amount of information—much of it drawn from out of the way publications of local research institutes or little magazines—on a variety of topics: crime, voting, ethnic attitudes, attitudes and opinions of Africans, etc. One may take issue with Lever as to whether his topics are theoretically co-ordinate or exhaustive. He himself admits that his big problem was what to exclude. Still, this consideration is of secondary importance given his goal of bringing to light the existence of an empirical sociology of South Africa while raising those questions which further research would elucidate. In this respect, *South African Society* is unambiguously successful. A distinctive intellectual merit of the book is the author's avoidance of the all too common obsession with government ideology, whether pro or con, as *the* key to grasping the South African socio-political situation in its human complexity. This obsession has had the unfortunate if unwitting effect of becoming the ground of a conspiracy theory which tries to 'fit' every fact into some pre-arranged mould and which, by reducing all behaviour to ideological standpoints, oversimplifies it and distorts it. Lever is totally free of this vice. Anyone who thinks that South Africa can be exhaustively 'explained' by the factor of 'racism' should read the account of the discussion which Lever has cited between the late Nat Nakasa (an African journalist) and an Afrikaner Nationalist.

In about a dozen lines (pp. 183 f.), one can see the essential tension between ideology and that feeling of a common humanity which can break out of racial barriers and which an ideological explanation would completely lose sight of. The Afrikaner had spent that afternoon trying to keep alive a Black baby abandoned on the pavement, and he was now drinking and smoking with Nakasa before dinner; the latter, puzzled, relates that he enquired, 'But what kind of a Nationalist are you?' The Afrikaner had offered him a room in his house when he heard that Nakasa had nowhere to sleep that night. With mounting irritation, he asked, 'Don't you want the races separated?' He states that the man looked at him appealingly and said: 'You see, I am an Afrikaner. The National Party is my people's party. That's why I vote for it.'

Naturally, one can hardly describe South Africa without dealing with the doctrinaire policy which has such a profound effect upon the life of the whole country. And in his two concluding chapters Lever does indeed give a succinct sketch of the apartheid policy and its alternatives. In this context, I must note the article by Kenny and Kantor in the companion volume which Lever has edited, *Readings in South African Society*, and which appeared simultaneously with his own book. That article, entitled 'The Poverty of Marxism', is the most lucid critique of neo-Marxism I have read. South Africa, with its historical supply of cheap and racially stratified black labour, has readily invoked

the thesis that the fundamental intention of the apartheid policy is to serve capitalist 'interests' by perpetuating this supply of cheap black labour. Yet this thesis runs into the embarrassing fact that industry in South Africa has opposed and resisted the crucial economic aspect of the policy, namely, politicized and anti-economic decentralization. The adherents of this thesis then find themselves confronted with the task of explaining away this resistance, a task which does not make them any the less strident in view of their necessity to assume the existence of a homogeneous capitalist 'class interest'. This critique, in shattering what is not so much an assumption as a myth, goes a long way to restore a correct understanding of the tension between economics and politics in South Africa. As such, it is an important supplement to Lever's own sketch of the dimensions of the apartheid policy.

HOWARD BROTZ

LAURENCE D. LOEB, *Outcaste: Jewish Life in Southern Iran*, xxv+328 pp., Library of Anthropology (Editor, Anthony L. LaRuffa), Gordon and Breach, New York, 1977, £13.30.

Authors are not generally considered to be good judges of their own work. Here is an exception: Loeb clearly and candidly sets out the essence of his book (p. 2):

> This book is a study of a society's adaptation, not to a harsh physical environment, but to a hostile social clime. It is hoped that the descriptions and interpretations offered ... will allow a greater understanding of some aspects of the relationship between a dominant population and an isolated, intimidated pre-industrial urban minority. The viewpoint adopted here is sympathetic to that minority through whose eyes we try to understand their world.

The author implies that he concentrated more on description of Jewish life in Shiraz than on anthropological analysis; that he considered the Jews to be a suppressed ethnic minority; and that the Jewish viewpoint is uppermost in his mind. These basic attitudes inform the whole book and endow it with a distinctive character and unity. Let us examine them one by one.

First, there is the author's self-imposed emphasis on description, as against analysis. He does not intend the book to be 'a theoretical *tour de force* ... It is rather a contribution to the ethnography of ethnic groups' (p. xix). In view of his premonition that the community was doomed, he may well have felt it his duty to record its ethnography as fully as possible, and to engage in 'rescue anthropology'.

Alas, recent events may have proved him right. His descriptions range over a wide field, from community organization and economics,

through kinship, to education and leisure, all the while stressing the Jewish elements. In addition, a series of chapters are devoted to the religious practices of the Shirazi Jewish community. Historical data are also given, wherever available. The result is an encyclopaedic coverage, that leaves the reader rather bewildered. With some effort, however, the author could have used the wealth of material to elaborate a working model of present-day society. This would have permitted him to depart from normative statements about particular aspects of the society, and to make fuller use of his observations of complex daily life.

Second, the author's concern with the danger of physical and moral extinction hovering over the Jewish community of Shiraz is evident throughout the book. It defined his major problem—'how does ... the community survive?' (p. xxiv). It often affected his interpretations of reality. This comes out most clearly in the opening passage of the book (p. 1): 'In the Autumn of 1910 ... the last major pogrom was initiated against the Jews of Shiraz. Murder, pillage, rape and extensive vandalism were reported to have left the entire community of 6000 virtually homeless and terrorized.'

That incident, which took place some seventy years ago, provides the key not so much to the present as to the author's mood. One result of this is Chapter 2, which deals exclusively with 'Shi 'a Intolerance' from early times until today. Another is his concentrated interest in the Jews living in the overcrowded old Jewish quarter (chapter 4), in the 'segregation of Jews from Muslims' (pp. 76–78), and in the 'poverty' of the Jews (pp. 79–80). An appendix is devoted to 'Restrictive Codes' which were in force up to the nineteenth century (pp. 292–294). Last, but not least, there is the title of the book, *Outcaste*, which leads one to expect the Jews to be restricted to a small number of unclean occupations. A case is ostensibly made out for such an argument: on the one hand, 'The Jew is considered ... ritually polluted and polluting' (p. 20), and on the other, he engaged until recently in a small number of trades. 'Although rarely "forced" into particular occupations, there was little incentive to compete with Muslims directly and so Jews sought out those professions abhorrent to Muslims.' (p. 82)

Yet a close reading of the text reveals another side of the picture. A quarter of the Jewish population of Shiraz lives outside the ghetto (p. 35), and Jews have entered every possible occupation (p. 83). 'They have bought wide tracts of land within the city, gardens in the surrounding villages and even whole villages' (p. 98), and 'have become the owners of Shiraz's major movie theatres, office buildings and stores' (p. 87). In short, they are not as segregated and suppressed as the author suggests. Could the author's heavy weighting of the negative aspects then be due to prophetic insight?

Third, Loeb presents only the Jewish viewpoint. He had little contact with non-Jews (p. xxv), and thus could not produce a detailed and

balanced picture of the interaction that undoubtedly took place between Jew and Gentile. His portrayal of Jewish life falls into two parts. Where religious practices are concerned, his views are frankly ethnocentric: where local religious custom and ritual departs from western rabbinical prescription, which he calls the Jewish 'Great Tradition', he occasionally tends to attribute it to ignorance (p. 183), to magic (pp. 213–21), or to Persian influence (p. 165). He is very much in sympathy with the 'reforms' advocated by the students of the orthodox Yeshiva of Shiraz, such as not removing shoes in synagogue, or introducing new melodies in the religious service. He fails to see that the Yeshiva graduates were also trying to supplant traditional religious teachers and ritual slaughterers (pp. 146–47). But when he discusses the influence of Jewish philanthropic organizations from abroad (Chapter 3), he takes the side of the local community. The well-meaning administrators of those agencies had at their disposal relatively large amounts and knew what was best for the community. So they provided essential services without consulting the local leaders. Soon, people came to depend on their services. The local community organization could not compete with the foreigners and discontinued some of its own services. The synagogue remained its last stronghold. While the community resented interference, there was little it could do. Only when the foreigners after some time demanded nominal payments for their services, did the simmering resentment come into the open. The community rallied and immediately proceeded to bite the hand that fed it. The foreigners responded by restricting their activities and eventually left the country.

This process appears to have occurred at least twice. First, the Alliance Israélite Universelle established a school system in Shiraz in 1903, which lasted until the 1920's. The Alliance director, during persecutions, 'requested direct intervention of foreign consuls. He was himself something of a consul, giving shelter to harassed Jews . . .'. He also arranged for famine relief and compensation for losses suffered by Jews in pogroms' (p. 61). The Alliance claimed 'that it finally left Shiraz because the community refused to pay a fair share of the budget' (p. 136).

Then, in 1950, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee established health and education programmes, and soon became the single largest employer of Jews (p. 62). By the early 1970's, the community leadership forced it to curtail operations. Again, this was after the foreign welfare organization had asked the local community to participate in running its projects. This infusion of power gave Shirazi Jews a chance to reorganize and then to turn against the foreigners.

Loeb's analysis of these long-term processes is one of several interesting discussions which bring the material alive.

EMANUEL MARX

Postscript to review article, 'The Japanese and the Jews'. (*J.J.S.*, vol. 20, no. 1, June 1978, pp. 75–81)

In my review of David Kranzler's *Japanese, Nazis and Jews: The Jewish Refugee Community of Shanghai, 1938–1945*, I referred to the author's extremely interesting account of the Japanese belief in international Jewish financial and political power, and to the (mainly military) 'experts' who attempted to frame policies in accordance with their (mis)conceptions. On the role of the Japanese officers Yasue and Inuzuka, see the entries under their names in the index to Kranzler's book.

Dr. Kranzler's account can be supplemented by an interesting testimony on which I accidentally stumbled during a recent research trip to Japan (concerned exclusively with the study of Japanese religions, and not at all with Jewish history). The author of the testimony—which I quote below—, Mr. J. Jurai, is now well advanced in years but still very active as chairman and director of several large business concerns. He has retained a lively interest in politics. In his earlier years he served as a government official in a variety of functions: in the Osaka Prefectural Government (1944); as Private Secretary to Prime Minister Yoshida of the first properly elected post-war cabinet (1946); and as Director-General of the 'Cabinet Research Office', a kind of intelligence service, in 1952. He was also active in reorganizing the Japanese police force, and in 1960 served as director of the Kyushu Regional Police Bureau. (It will be remembered that this was the year of the Miike Coal Mine labour dispute, which almost ended in a violent showdown between police and strikers.) In 1964, he was Deputy Minister in charge of the Tokyo Olympic Games.

In 1941, Mr. Murai had been assigned to duty in Shanghai, and of this period he briefly tells in an article published in the weekly *Sekai to Nihon* ('The world and Japan') on 16 May 1977; the relevant paragraphs can be found at p. 45 of that issue. They constitute a valuable supplement to Dr. Kranzler's account:

Unsuccessful Policies Regarding the Jews

The sixteenth year of the Showa Era [= 1941] was a fateful year for Japan. In that year Japan was being slowly strangled by the economic blockade of the U.S.A., Britain, and other nations, and was forced into making one of three choices: total submission, self-destruction, or war. I was assigned to Shanghai at that time and was gravely concerned with the future of Japan. I sought advice from my close friends in the military services. They all agreed that Japan must refrain from going to war against the U.S.A. and advised me to solicit help from the Jewish financial group, even though it might be in vain.

I consulted with Colonel Yasue of the Army and Captain Inuzuka of the Navy, who were regarded as experts on Jewish affairs. Both advised on two courses. The first one was to provide a place for Jewish refugees to settle down. Since I was involved in city planning then, I immediately undertook

the task. The second one was to work on the most influential group in Asia, the Sassoon group. After some difficulty, I finally managed to negotiate with the group and was ready to work even harder for results. However, I was abruptly ordered home, and the initiative was thus nipped in the bud.

I have in my possession a photograph taken at a meeting which shows, in addition to Mr. Murai, Captain Inuzuka (Colonel Yasue, who should have attended, was away on duty in Manchuria), Sir Victor Sassoon, a prominent Japanese businessman (who was Sir Victor's confidant in his dealings with the Japanese), and a senior Japanese official.

R. J. ZWI WERBLOWSKY

CHRONICLE

The Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews published last January a booklet entitled *Synagogue Affiliation in the United Kingdom 1977*. There were 82,998 male members in that year and 28,461 female members in their own right, bringing the total membership to 111,459. In 1970 there had been 88,434 male members. Most of the decline was in the Greater London area; it is partly attributed to migration to the counties surrounding London.

'Increased running costs have also resulted in the closure and amalgamation of synagogues. This has led to a decline in the number of synagogue buildings from 345 in 1970 to 315 in 1977 and the number of actual congregations from 368 to 351.'

The following table shows the breakdown of synagogue membership according to religious grouping.

Religious Grouping	*Provinces*	*London*	*Total*	*Percentages*	*London Percentages*	
					1970	*1977*
Right-wing Orthodox	556	2,327	2,883	3·5	2·6	4·2
Central Orthodox	22,476	38,663	61,139	73·6	72·3	69·7
Sephardi	375	1,853	2,228	2·7	4·5	3·3
Reform	3,286	7,577	10,863	13·1	11·9	13·7
Liberal	811	5,074	5,885	7·1	8·7	9·1
TOTAL	27,504	55,494	82,998	100	100	100

*

Christian News from Israel (vol. 26, no. 3–4, 1978) reports that a 'two-month summer seminar on "Biblical Tradition and Community Development" brought together twenty-four English-speaking Christian scholars from ten countries of the African continent—Ghana, Uganda, Cameroun, Angola, Ethiopia, Zambia, Tanzania, Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya. Sponsored by the Israel Interfaith Committee and the African Committee for an Ecumenical African Biblical Institute, the contents of the programme and the attendance were even fuller than its successful precedent, last year, for francophone Africans. . . . Discovering the Jewish sources of Christianity is a central feature of the many Christian study projects thriving in Jerusalem; for our African students, its significance is heightened in the context of a general quest for an ethnically authentic religious expression that minimizes the mediatory influence of Western Christianity.'

*

The annual meeting of the International Liaison Committee between the Catholic Church and Judaism took place in Madrid on 5–7 April. The main subjects of the meeting were the image of Judaism in Christian education and the image of Christianity in Jewish education. The opening session of the meeting was held in Toledo's El Transito Synagogue, which is now a museum of

Sephardi culture. The Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo received the members of the Committee at his residence and attended the opening session.

On 8–15 April, also in Madrid, a symposium was held on the main theme of the religious, cultural, and social aspects of Israel and Spain. The symposium was organized jointly by the Israel Interfaith Committee and the Madrid Centre for Christian-Jewish Studies, with the assistance of the World Jewish Congress, the Madrid Jewish Community, the Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Committee, and the World Zionist Organization. Eleven Israeli scholars participated as well as many Spanish theologians, historians, and social scientists from the Universities of Madrid and Salamanca.

*

A conference devoted to the study of Hebrew language and literature was held in Amsterdam last October; it was organized by the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress and the Brit Ivrit Olamit (the World Association for Hebrew Language and Culture). The conference was under the auspices of the University of Amsterdam; the participants were heads of departments of Hebrew and Judaic Studies in eastern and western Europe and in Israel.

A previous conference was held in 1976 in Vienna. It was agreed to hold the next conference in 1980 under the auspices of the University of Warsaw.

*

A report published in 1978 by the American Association of Jewish Education states that there are 523 day schools in North America, compared with 442 in 1973, when its previous report was issued. There are now in the United States and Canada 2,715 Jewish educational institutions of various types: day schools, synagogue schools, etc.

*

West Germany's Minister of Education and Science and Israel's Minister of Labour and Social Affairs held a press conference in Jerusalem last March. They announced that co-operation between the two countries in research and technology, industrial training, and the treatment of the handicapped would be intensified.

Since 1976, 35 Israelis had been sent to West Germany every year for advanced industrial training courses; from 1980 onwards, the number will be increased to 50. Germans would also come to Israel for training courses; the first group of ten to twelve will come at the end of 1979. The Israeli Minister stated: 'Israel is a small country with specific problems, but we have managed to find solutions which countries like West Germany would benefit from.'

*

The President of the American ORT Federation reported in New York last January that in 1978 there were 97,776 students enrolled in ORT programmes in 24 countries. In 1977 there had been 84,000 in the establishments of the Organization for Rehabilitation through Training.

There are 88 ORT schools in Israel, with an enrolment of 67,750—almost double the total of 34,394 in 1969. Israelis therefore accounted for two thirds of all ORT students and 25,863 completed their courses in 1978.

More than 6,000 Soviet Jews attended the ORT language classes in Rome last year. Provision has been made for greater numbers in 1979.

*

The Soviet Jewry Research Bureau of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry reported last January that 28,858 Soviet Jews emigrated in 1978, a considerably greater number than the 1977 total of 16,737.

The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics stated that 11,700 Soviet Jews came to Israel in 1978; in 1977, there were 8,300 Russian immigrants. The total number of immigrants and 'potential immigrants' from all countries was 26,200 in 1978, an increase of 22 per cent on the 1977 total of 21,400. The number of newcomers from the United States increased from 2,600 in 1977 to 3,000 in 1978.

*

In an address to the twelfth convention of the World Council of Synagogues (Conservative) in Jerusalem, the Chief Rabbi of Chile is reported to have stated that there were about 35,000 Jews in Chile. The great majority (28,000) live in Santiago, and there are about 2,000 in the coastal town of Viña del Mar. Santiago has a Jewish day school which caters for 1,200 pupils, a quarter of the capital's estimated total of Jewish children. There is a Jewish day school also in Viña, attended by 200 pupils.

Chilean Jews of Russian and Sephardi origin are largely in the Conservative movement's liberal wing, while those of German origin are in that movement's traditional wing. Jews of Polish and Hungarian origin are within the Orthodox fold. Each congregation maintains its own Talmud Torah.

The Santiago Jewish community has a cultural and sports centre with a membership of 2,500 households. There are also seven B'nai B'rith lodges.

*

The November/December 1978 issue of *Britain and Israel* has a special report on Magen David Adom, the Red Shield of David. M.D.A. had its origins in the First World War, when 500 Palestinian Jewish women volunteers enrolled in an auxiliary medical service. 'They were the first to wear the badge of the Red Shield, which at that stage received official recognition from a grateful British administration.... In 1949, Israel's Parliament passed a law recognizing M.D.A.... as the nation's voluntary medical service, and M.D.A. assumed responsibility for the whole community.'

In 1967, the year of the Six-Day War, 'Mobile Clinics helped thousands of Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian prisoners-of-war; warm clothing and food parcels were distributed to prisoners; thousands of wounded prisoners were repatriated.' After the war, it transmitted 170,000 letters to and from Arab countries. In 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, M.D.A. evacuated 5,000 Israeli and Arab wounded.

In peace as in war, M.D.A. 'is on full alert at every hour of the day, on

every day of the year, and remains Israel's sole public, voluntary, emergency medical service . . .'. Apart from its 63 branches and 120 sub-branches throughout the country, it maintains 11 casualty centres, 60 ambulance stations, beach rescue stations, and emergency first-aid posts.

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The February 1979 issue of *Challenge*, published by the Sephardi Council of Jerusalem, reports that the Department of Volunteer Services of Tel Aviv Municipality has selected 40 students who will give ten hours of voluntary community work each week in exchange for a furnished apartment in 'a poverty neighbourhood'. There were 200 (mostly male) applicants who replied to the Municipality's advertisements on university bulletin boards and in newspapers.

The students will organize clubs for adults, youth activities, and house committees, and will work in close co-operation with the local housing authorities. The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare and the Ministry of Absorption are keenly interested in the project.

A professor in the Department of Psychology of Tel Aviv University is quoted as saying, 'We want to learn from this experiment. We want to see how this year will affect the student and the neighbourhood itself.'

*

A new Journal, *The Journal of the History of Sociology*, appeared in the autumn of 1978. Volume 1, no. 1, Fall 1978, states that the Founding Editor and Publisher is Jack Nusan Porter, the Editor in Chief is Glenn Jacobs, and the Book Review Editor is Ellsworth R. Fuhrman.

Subscription enquiries should be sent to Dr. J. N. Porter, 42 Englewood Avenue, Brookline, Mass. 02146, U.S.A. Manuscripts (three copies) should be sent to the Editors of the Journal at the Department of Sociology, University of Massachusetts, Harbor Campus, Boston, Mass. 02125.

This first issue contains five articles, a review article, and book reviews. Barbara R. Keating writes on 'Elsie Clews Parsons: Her Work and Influence in Sociology' and Mary Jo Deegan on 'Women and Sociology: 1890–1930'. The third paper is by David Earl Sutherland, 'Who Reads European Sociology? Reflections on the Relationships between European and American Sociology'. It is followed by Roscoe C. Hinkle, 'Toward Periodicization of the History of Sociological Theory in the U.S.'. The fifth paper is by E. R. Fuhrman on 'Images of the Discipline in Early American Sociology'. David L. Westby reviews in an essay James T. Carey's *Sociology and Public Affairs: The Chicago School*, Vernon K. Dibble's *The Legacy of Albion Small*, and Fred H. Mathews' *Quest for an American Sociology: Robert E. Park and the Chicago School*.

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A *Jewish Folklore and Ethnology Newsletter* has been issued by the Jewish Folklore and Ethnology Section of the American Folklore Society and the Max Weinreich Center for Advanced Jewish Studies (YIVO). YIVO announced last October that the Newsletter would appear 3–4 times a year.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Adam, Barry D., *The Survival of Domination. Inferiorization and Everyday Life*, xi+179 pp., Elsevier, New York, 1978, $16.50.

Communauté Israélite de Bruxelles, *La Grande Synagogue de Bruxelles, Contributions à l'histoire des Juifs de Bruxelles 1878–1978*, 173 pp., Brussels, 1978, 380 Belgian Francs. (Copies may be obtained from the Communauté at 2 Rue Joseph Dupont, 1000 Brussels.)

de Lange, Deborah J. and Barry A. Kosmin, *Community Resources for a Community Survey. The Methodology of the Redbridge Jewish Survey*, 52 pp., Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, London, 1979, £1.00.

Diller, Jerry V., ed., *Ancient Roots and Modern Meanings: A Contemporary Reader in Jewish Identity*, liii+291 pp., Bloch Publishing Co., New York, 1978, $12.50 (paperback, $7.95).

Encel, S. and B. Buckley, *The New South Wales Jewish Community, A Survey*, 2nd edn., viii+133 pp., New South Wales Univ. Press, Kensington, N.S.W., 1978, n.p.

Erlich, Josef, *La Flamme du Shabbath*, 289 pp., translated from the Yiddish by Marc and Léa Rittel, Plon, Paris, 1978, n.p.

Gordis, Robert, *Understanding Conservative Judaism*, xiv+235 pp., The Rabbinical Assembly, New York, 1978; distributed by Ktav Publishing House, $12.50.

Halpérin, Jean and Georges Levitte, eds., *Communauté Musulmane, Données et Débats, XVIII^e Colloque d'Intellectuels juifs de Langue française organisé par la Section Française du Congrès Juif Mondial*, vi+130 pp., Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1978, n.p.

Horowitz, Irving Louis and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Dialogues on American Politics*, xi+200 pp., Oxford University Press, New York, 1978, £5.25 (paperback, £1.75).

Leichter, Hope Jensen and William E. Mitchell, *Kinship and Casework. Family Networks and Social Intervention*, xlvii+355 pp., 2nd enlarged edn., Teachers College Press, Columbia University, New York and London, 1978, n.p.

Linzer, Norman, ed., *Judaism and Mental Health, A Social Service Perspective*, vii+96 pp., Board of Education of Greater New York, New York, 1978, $3.00.

Mercer, John, *The Sahrawis of Western Sahara*, 24 pp., Minority Rights Group Report no. 40. 36 Craven St., London, 1979, 75p.

Pryce, Ken, *Endless Pressure, A Study of West Indian Life-styles in Bristol*, xiii+297 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1979, £1.95.

Schoffeleers, Mathew and Daniel Meijers, *Religion, Nationalism and Economic Action. Critical Questions on Durkheim and Weber*, 94 pp., Van Gorcum, Assen, 1978, Dutch Florins 15.90.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Scholem, Gershom, *Fidélité et Utopie, Essais sur le judaïsme contemporain*, 283 pp., Collection 'Diaspora' dirigée par Roger Errera, translated by Marguerite Delmotte and Bernard Dupuy, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1978, n.p.

Steiner, Stan, *The Mexican Americans*, 19 pp., Minority Rights Group Report no. 39, London, 1979, 75p.

Tajfel, Henri, *The Social Psychology of Minorities*, 20 pp., Minority Rights Group Report no. 38, London, 1978, 75p.

Tel-Aviv-Yafo Municipality's Centre for Economic and Social Research and Israel Gerontological Society, *Characteristics, Attitudes and Needs of the Old People in Tel-Aviv-Yafo*, lxvii pp. in English + 197 pp. in Hebrew, Tel Aviv, 1978, $8.00.

Vander Zanden, James, W., *Sociology*, 4th edn., xvii+683 pp., John Wiley, New York and Chichester, 1979, £9.00.

Winick, Myron, ed., *Hunger Disease. Studies by the Jewish Physicians in the Warsaw Ghetto*, xiv+261 pp., translated from the Polish by Martha Osnos, John Wiley, New York and Chichester, 1979, £10.00.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

ELAZAR, Daniel J.; Ph.D. Senator N.M. Paterson Professor of Governmental Relations, Bar Ilan University; Chairman, Center for Jewish Community Studies, Jerusalem and Philadelphia; Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of Federalism, Temple University; and President, Jerusalem Institute for Federal Studies. Chief recent publications: *Community and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry*, Philadelphia, 1976; 'Towards a Renewed Zionist Vision', *Forum* (Jerusalem), no. 1, 1977; 'Israel's Compound Polity', in Howard R. Penniman, ed., *Israel at the Polls: The Knesset Elections of 1977*, Washington, D.C., 1979; editor of *Federalism and Political Integration*, Ramat Gan, 1979, and of a colloquium entitled *Self Rule/Shared Rule*, Ramat Gan, 1979.

FARAGO, Uri; Ph.D. Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, Haifa University. Chief publications: 'Four Profiles', in S. Herman, ed., *Israelis and Jews—The Continuity of an Identity*, New York, 1970; *Continuity and Change in the Jewish Identity of Israeli Youth, 1965–1974* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1977; 'The Relationship Between Jewish Identity and Zionism of Israeli Youth' (in Hebrew), *Iyunim BeChinuch*, no. 17, March 1978; and 'The Ethnic Identity of Russian Students in Israel', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 20, no. 2, December 1978.

MONSON, Rela Geffen; Ph.D. Assistant Professor of Sociology, Gratz College in Philadelphia and Associate, Center for Jewish Community Studies. Chief publications: 'The Case of the Reluctant Exogamists: Jewish Women and Intermarriage', *Gratz College Annual of Jewish Studies*, vol. V, 1976; with Benjamin Gorman, 'Sibling Set Composition and Female Occupational Achievement', *Sociological Symposium*, Spring 1976; *Bringing Women In: A Survey of the Evolving Role of Women in Jewish Organizational Life in Philadelphia*, pamphlet published by the Philadelphia Chapter of the American Jewish Committee, Philadelphia, 1977, and in Hebrew translation in *Tefutsot Israel*, vol. 15, no. 3–4, December 1977; 'Reaching the Jewish Adolescent Today: A Sociologist's Approach', *Gratz College Annual of Jewish Studies*, vol. VI, 1977; and 'The Jewish Family in America Today: Is it Jewish?' in *Jews and Jewish Perspectives: Essays in Honor of Wolfe Kelman*, The Rabbinical Assembly, New York, 1978.

SABATELLO, Eitan F.; Ph.D. Director, Division for Demography, Population, Health, and Immigrant Absorption, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; and Lecturer in the Department of Statistics of Ben Gurion University of the Negev. Chief publications: 'Social and Occupational Trends of the Jews in Italy' in U. O. Schmelz *et al.*, eds., *Studies in Jewish Demography—Survey for 1969–71*, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1975; 'Israel in the Framework of the Mediterranean Migrations: An Atypical Case', in Institute of Demography, University of Rome, *Emigration from the Mediterranean Basin to Industrialized Europe*, Rome, 1976; and 'The Emigration

from Israel and its Characteristics' (in Hebrew), *Betefutsot Hagolah*, vol. 19, no. 85–6, 1978.

STEINBERG, Bernard; Ph.D. Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Education, University of Cape Town. Chief publications: 'Jewish Schooling in Great Britain', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. VI, no. 1, 1964; 'Jewish Education in Great Britain During World War II', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 29, no. 1, January 1967; 'Jewish Education in South Africa', *Jewish Education*, vol. 39, no. 4, December 1969; and 'European Immigration and Ethnicity—Some Considerations Relating to South Africa', *The South African Journal of Sociology*, no. 13, June 1976.

Soviet Jewish Affairs

A Journal on Jewish Problems in the USSR and Eastern Europe

Volume 8 Number 2 Autumn 1978

ARTICLES

DOCUMENT

REVIEWS

Published by
The Institute of Jewish Affairs Ltd.,
13/16 Jacob's Well Mews, George Street,
London W1H 5PD

The Journal appears twice a year, in spring and autumn.
Annual subscription £4 or $8.00 (air mail surcharge £3 or $5.50).
Single issues £2·25 ($4.50), with additional charges for air mail.