THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Published on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

VOLUME XX: NUMBER 2: DECEMBER 1978

CONTENTS

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The Jewish Journal of Sociology

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PUBLISHED TWICE YEARLY

on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

Annual Subscription £3.00 (U.S. $7.50) post free
Single Copies £1.75 ($4.00)

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PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BUTLER AND TANNER LTD
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THE ETHNIC IDENTITY OF RUSSIAN IMMIGRANT STUDENTS IN ISRAEL

Uri Farago

Introduction

BETWEEN 1970 and 1977, more than 120,000 Soviet Jews immigrated to Israel.[1] Among them were a considerable number of young persons who had been born and educated under the Soviet regime and now had to adjust to Israeli society. In 1973, we investigated the ethnic identity of Russian students in various institutions of higher learning who had come to Israel the previous year.

The study focused mainly on the relative status of the Russian, Jewish, and Israeli sub-identities of the students, and on the interrelationship among these elements. To what extent were the students still influenced by the identity of the society they had left? What was the strength of their Jewish identity? What was the role played by the identity of their new homeland?

Ethnic identity was studied here from a social–psychological perspective, as a sub-identity which constitutes part of the self-identity of the individual. Miller has defined self-identity as 'the pattern of observable or inferable attributes "identifying" a person to himself and others.'[2] In addition to self-identity, Miller further distinguished between objective public identity, that is, the pattern of attributes as they appear to others, and subjective public identity, namely, the individual's perception of his appearance to others. These concepts, as well as the ideal public ethnic identity of the students (that is, how they would like to be seen by others), may be helpful in understanding the social–psychological state of the Russian students and their problems of adjustment in Israel.

The ethnic identity of immigrants should be viewed differently from that of native populations. Ethnic identity is a relatively stable construct under normal circumstances, but in the course of migration it may undergo rapid change. It is affected by psychological pressures arising from the need to justify the decision to emigrate and from the

anxieties accompanying migration. Later it is affected by social-psychological factors involved in the process of adaptation to a new country and by the influences of the new social environment.

It is difficult to assess the extent to which the ethnic identity of the students, a few months after their immigration, consists of elements acquired in the Soviet Union or of components developed during the process of migration.

Gittelman has described Soviet Jewry as being in a state of acculturation, without reaching the point of assimilation.[3] He claimed that most Soviet Jews are Russian culturally, but Jewish legally and socially, because they are defined as Jews in their passports and the Russians view them first and foremost as Jews. In this sense, the Jewish identity of a large part of Russian Jewry could be characterized as a 'minimal identity', defined mainly in negative terms from outside the group, by boundaries set by the majority group, and almost devoid of positive content.

Since 1967, however, increasing numbers of young Jews have been searching for positive elements in their identity, by way of religion or through an active interest in Israel. The degree of acculturation varied in different regions of the U.S.S.R. Jews were most acculturated in the central, European regions of the country, which experienced the longest and most powerful effects of the Soviet regime and Russian culture. In the western regions, which were annexed by the U.S.S.R. during the Second World War, more remnants of Jewish culture and religion persisted. In the southern, Asian regions, particularly in Georgia, Jews were less directly influenced by Russian culture and were more successful in preserving traditional ways of life and even some of their communal institutions.[4]

This paper will attempt to delineate the development of ethnic identity of the Russian students during the process of migration, as well as the variations among students who come from diverse regions of the U.S.S.R. and who differ in their attachment to Jewish traditions. There will also be an attempt to assess the contribution of the variables of ethnic identity to the adjustment of the students to Israel.

Jewish migration from the U.S.S.R. can be described as 'impelled' migration, which occurs, according to Petersen, when adverse conditions prevail in the country of origin, but the migrant retains some power to decide whether or not to leave.[5] Russian Jews may be expected to respond particularly forcefully to the act of emigration: unlike the case of other countries, the decision to leave the Soviet Union is irrevocable. Thus, the circumstances of emigration, including the difficulties created by the government, and the ambivalent attitude of Jewish immigrants towards the Soviet Union, are all factors which intensify the process of their dissociation from their Russian identity. Despite their ambivalence, the immigrants may nevertheless continue to be in-

fluenced for a considerable time by the norms and outlook of Soviet society and culture.

Like immigrants to other countries, those bound for Israel are presumably eager to be accepted into their host society and to adopt Israeli identity. However, this is usually a slow process and, less than a year after their arrival, the Israeli identity of the students is likely to be only in the preliminary stages of its development. It can be assumed that in the transitional period between the immigrants' renunciation of their Russian identity and their adoption of an Israeli identity, they would demonstrate a tendency towards the intensification of their Jewish identity.

The theoretical framework

The model of overlapping situations views the person as being subject to the influence of two or more psychological forces. This model seems particularly appropriate for the study of ethnic identity of students from the Soviet Union, who are affected by forces originating from three distinct reference groups—the Russian, the Jewish, and the Israeli.

A conceptual framework for the study of ethnic identity in overlapping situations was developed by Herman,[6] who adapted concepts derived from the field theory of Kurt Lewin.[7] The main properties of overlapping situations which will be analysed here are the extent of overlap between two ethnic identities, the degree of consonance or dissonance between them, and their valence and relative potency.

The degree of *overlap* between identities (more precisely sub-identities), denotes their pertinence to identical regions of the person's life space. When identities overlap, they can be either *consonant* (that is, compatible) or *dissonant* (that is, antagonistic) to one another.

Valence denotes the attractiveness (positive valence) or the repulsiveness (negative valence) of the ethnic group. *Relative potency* refers to the effect of a person's various sub-identities on his attitudes and behaviour.

With the use of these concepts it is possible to formulate more specific hypotheses concerning the ethnic identity of the students:

(1) Their Russian identity, which they tend to reject, will have low potency and negative valence.

(3) There will be overlap and dissonance between their Russian and Jewish identities, which are in a state of conflict.

(4) Israeli identity, which they are eager to adopt, will have positive valence, but low potency at this stage.

Variables related to the students' backgrounds give rise to further hypotheses. It is suggested that for religious students and for those from areas where Jewish traditions were better preserved (mainly from Georgia), their Jewish and Israeli identities will have more positive valence and higher potency, and their Russian identity will have lower

potency and more negative valence, than for non-religious students and students from the European regions of the U.S.S.R.

The data

A set of questions was selected from questionnaires which had been developed by Herman and Farago for the study of the Jewish identity of youth from Israel and other countries.[8] The questions were translated into Russian and administered in personal interviews during May–June 1973, as part of a comprehensive study conducted by the Research Division of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption.

A representative sample of 500 was selected out of the population of 1,100 students who had immigrated from the U.S.S.R. during 1972 and were studying in one of the institutions of higher learning in Israel. Only 50 (10 per cent of the original sample) could not be reached by the interviewers. Most of the respondents were young: 71 per cent were under the age of 22 years.

Two particularly relevant background variables were included in the analysis;

(1) *Geographical region.* Whereas most Russian Jews live in the central regions of the U.S.S.R., most immigrants to Israel have come from the western and southern regions. This was reflected also in the distribution of our sample: western region, 61 per cent; central region, 13 per cent; and Georgia, 26 per cent.

(2) *Religious background.* Whereas the majority of the students were not religious (55 per cent), a considerable minority described themselves as traditional (40 per cent), or religious (5 per cent). (In subsequent analyses we included the 'religious' in the 'traditional' category). More religious or traditional students were to be found among the Georgians than among students from other areas (Table 1).

TABLE 1. *Religiousness of students from different regions in the U.S.S.R. (in percentages)*

Religiousness	*Regions in U.S.S.R.* *Central* (N=60)	*Western* (N=272)	*Georgia* (N=118)	*Total* (N=450)
Religious	2	5	13	5
Traditional	30	29	62	40
Non-traditional	68	66	25	55

Results

In accordance with our hypotheses, the immigrant students expressed a positive attitude towards Jewish identity and a negative

attitude towards Russian identity. For most students (84 per cent), Jewish identity had high positive valence. Russian identity had positive valence for only 31 per cent while 49 per cent indicated emphatically that it had negative valence for them (Table 2*a*,*b*). Their Jewish identity was also more potent than their Russian identity. The relative potency of identities was measured by a pair of seven-point rating scales, from 'strong feeling' at one end to 'no feeling' at the other. Most students (88 per cent) indicated that Jewish identity had high potency (by selecting categories 1–3—see Table 2*c*); among them 41 per cent chose the highest category.

Conversely, 87 per cent indicated that Russian identity had low potency (by choosing categories 5–7—see Table 2*d*); among them 51 per cent selected the lowest category. When the relative potency of the two identities was measured on a seven-point bipolar continuum, 88 per cent indicated their position close to the 'Jewish' end and only 7 per cent chose the 'Russian' end of the continuum (Table 2*e*).

The Russian identity of the majority of immigrant students was not merely weaker than their Jewish identity: the two were dissonant to each other. Overlap and dissonance were perceived by 48 per cent of the students, whereas 46 per cent replied that there was no relationship between them (Table 2*f*).

This pattern of responses differed from the typical reply of Jewish students from western countries—such as the U.S.A., England, and even Argentina—who mostly indicated a lack of relationship, but not dissonance, between Jewish identity and the identity of their respective native countries. Israeli youth are characterized by a high degree of consonance between their Jewish and Israeli identities.[9]

When the responses to this set of questions were examined according to the religiousness of the students, the valence of Jewish identity proved to be considerably more positive, and its potency higher than that of Russian identity, for traditional students as compared with the others. The traditional students also indicated more dissonance between the two identities than did the non-traditionals (Table 2).

Despite the fact that many of the Georgian students were traditional, their pattern of answers did not correspond entirely to the differences between traditional and non-traditional students. As expected, the Georgian students indicated higher potency of Jewish identity, lower potency of Russian identity, and more dissonance between the two than was the case among students from other regions of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, the positive valence of Jewish identity was higher for the Georgians than for students from other regions. Russian identity, however, had less negative valence for the Georgians than for the others (Table 2). It seems that the Georgians, who had lived in a less antisemitic environment, had less negative attitudes towards the Soviet Union than did students from the European regions of the U.S.S.R.

TABLE 2. *Dimensions of Jewish and Russian identities (in percentages)*

	Religiousness		*Regions in U.S.S.R.*			*Total*
	Traditional (N=202	*Non-traditional* (N=248)	*Central* (N=60)	*Western* (N=272)	*Georgia* (N=118)	(N=450)
a. Valence of Jewish identity						
1. Very positive	55	35	40	40	55	44
2. Positive	35	45	32	47	28	40
3. Indifferent	10	17	24	10	17	14
4. Negative	0	3	4	3	0	2
b. Valence of Russian identity						
1. Very positive	5	8	12	3	13	7
2. Positive	22	26	22	27	19	24
3. Indifferent	21	20	16	20	25	20
4. Negative	52	46	50	50	43	49
c. Potency of Jewish identity						
1–3. High	84	70	71	73	86	77
4. Intermediate	8	14	14	14	5	11
5–7. Low	8	16	15	13	9	12
d. Potency of Russian identity						
1–3. High	5	11	12	10	7	8
4. Intermediate	5	6	7	5	6	5
5–7. Low	90	83	81	85	87	87
e. Relative potency of Jewish and Russian identities						
1–3. More Jewish	93	82	82	88	88	88
4. Mid-point	4	6	5	5	5	5
5–7. More Russian	3	12	13	7	7	7
f. Overlap between Jewish and Russian identities						
1. Consonance	6	6	13	3	9	6
2. No relationship	42	50	40	54	35	46
3. Dissonance	52	44	47	43	56	48

TABLE 3. *Intercorrelations among dimensions of Jewish and Russian identities (zero order correlations)*

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Valence of Jewish identity	—					
2. Potency of Jewish identity	·33*					
3. Relative Potency of identities	·22*	·47*	—			
4. Overlap between identities	−·09	−·16*	−·19			
5. Valence of Russian identity	−·09	−·14	−·18*	·18*		
6. Potency of Russian identity	−·19*	−·30*	−·51*	·29*	·20*	

*p<·001 N=450

When the matrix of intercorrelations among these variables was inspected (Table 3), two distinct clusters emerged. One was a cluster of moderate correlations among the dimensions of Jewish identity, including the Jewish–Russian continuum. The second was a cluster of lower correlations among the dimensions of Russian identity, including overlap and consonance between the two identities. Thus the dimensions of Jewish identity were more firmly interconnected than those of Russian identity. All the correlations between the two clusters were negative, which demonstrates the dissonance between them. Religiousness was correlated positively with Jewish identity and negatively with Russian identity, but these correlations were lower than might be expected from the differences in the responses of traditional and non-traditional students.

The definition of Jewish identity

A unique feature of Jewish identity is the interfusion of national and religious elements. The degree to which either of these elements is emphasized varies among Jewish communities. The model of overlapping situations can be helpful in explaining these differences by taking into account influences on Jewish identity exerted by the non-Jewish host society. Herman asserts that, 'Jewish identity in the Diaspora bears the mark of its interaction with the majority national identity with which it is associated.'[10]

In the Soviet Union the policy of the regime and the anti-religious education have made the religious option undesirable. Jews are officially defined as a national group, and are thus designated in their passports. This definition seems to have been accepted by most Soviet Jews and it was still prevalent among the Russian students in the study. Just over half the students (56 per cent) chose to define the Jewish group as a nation while most of the remainder (40 per cent) selected a combined definition of nation and religion. A similar emphasis on the national element was found among Jewish students from Argentina,

but it differed from the predominant definition chosen by Jewish students from other countries, such as the U.S.A. and Israel, who preferred the combined definition of nation and religion.[11]

The Jewish group was defined as a religious group by only a few of the Russian students (4 per cent). This description was selected mainly by students from Georgia (11 per cent), many of whom came from religious backgrounds (Table 4*a*).

The relationship of the Russian students to the Jewish people is based on strong feelings of interdependence and common fate. When asked to what extent they believed their fate to be bound to the destiny of the Jewish people, 48 per cent replied that they did so 'absolutely', and an additional 40 per cent believed this to be so 'to a great extent' (Table 4*b*). Kurt Lewin emphasized that group belongingness is based primarily on interdependence rather than on similarity.[12] This is particularly important for Jews acculturated into Russian society, since they have little in common with the culture of Jews from other countries.

TABLE 4. *Definition of the Jewish Group and Sense of Interdependence with it (in percentages)*

	Religiousness		*Regions in U.S.S.R.*			*Total*
	Traditional (N=202)	*Non-traditional* (N=248)	*Central* (N=60)	*Western* (N=272)	*Georgia* (N=118)	(N=450)
a. 'How do you define the Jewish group?'						
1. Religious group	7	1	5	1	11	4
2. National group	45	65	59	60	43	56
3. Both	48	34	36	39	46	40
b. 'Do you feel that your fate is bound to the destiny of the Jewish people?'						
1. Yes, definitely	52	43	52	43	55	48
2. To a great extent	39	42	36	45	33	40
3. To some extent	7	12	12	9	10	10
4. No	2	3	0	3	2	2

The Israeli identity

In the process of migration, Israeli identity was introduced among the psychological forces impinging on the students. We assumed that, less than a year after their arrival in Israel, this identity would be relatively weak, in comparison with their Jewish identity.

When the potency of Israeli identity was measured on a seven-point scale, one of the three high categories was chosen by only 33 per cent of the students (Table 5*a*). When the Israeli and Jewish identities were juxtaposed on the same continuum, 70 per cent indicated their position on the 'Jewish' side, 15 per cent chose the mid-point of the scale, and only 15 per cent elected the 'Israeli' side (Table 5*b*).

The potency of Israeli identity on the separate scale was higher for the traditional students and in particular the Georgians, than it was for the others. However, on the continuum where Israeli identity was opposed to Jewish identity, there were almost no differences, in terms of background variables (see Table 5).

TABLE 5. *Dimensions of Israeli identity (in percentages)*

	Religiousness		*Regions in U.S.S.R.*			*Total*
	Traditional (N=202)	*Non-traditional* (N=248)	*Central* (N=60)	*Western* (N=272	*Georgia* (N=118)	(N=450)
a. Potency of Israeli identity						
1–3. High	41	27	34	29	43	33
4. Intermediate	20	20	27	18	20	20
5–7. Low	39	53	39	53	37	47
b. Relative potency of Israeli and Jewish identities						
1. More Israeli	16	14	16	13	20	15
2. Mid-point	16	15	16	16	13	15
3. More Jewish	68	71	68	71	67	70

Although the Israeli identity of most Russian students was still weak at this stage, their attitude towards Israel and the Israelis was, on the whole, positive. Nearly all (94 per cent) conveyed a favourable impression of Israel and almost as many (87 per cent) were favourably impressed by the Israelis. The large majority of students (84 per cent) declared that they were generally satisfied in Israel and exactly the same proportion felt at home in their new country.

Ideal and subjective public identity

So far we have analysed the self-identity of the students—that is, how they feel about their ethnic identity. We now turn to the additional dimensions of their ethnic identity: (1) their ideal public identity, that is, how they would like to be seen by the Israelis; (2) their subjective public identity, namely, how they think the Israelis perceive them. The assumption is that Israelis are the principal reference group into which the Russian students would like to be accepted. It was expected, however, that on these dimensions, as in the previous questions, they would see their Jewishness as the main link to the Israeli group, because most of them did not yet consider themselves Israelis. Indeed, whereas 40 per cent expressed their wish to be seen as Israelis, the majority (58 per cent) indicated that they would like to be seen, first and foremost, as Jews (Table 6*a*).

The problems related to the social–psychological adjustment of the immigrant students can be demonstrated by comparing their ideal and subjective public identities. There was a considerable gap between

them, because the majority of the Russian students (63 per cent) believed that the Israelis perceived them, first and foremost, as Russians—the option which was chosen by a meagre 2 per cent as their ideal public identity. Only 35 per cent thought that they were seen as Jews, and a mere 2 per cent perceived their subjective public identity as Israelis. Considerably more of the non-religious students (72 per cent), and those who came from the western and central U.S.S.R. (68 per cent) believed that the Israelis saw them as Russians (Table 6*b*). This may indicate that the subjective public identity to some extent reflects their own self-identity and not necessarily their actual objective public identity.

Even if the disparity between the ideal and subjective public identities is only partially based on reality, it suggests that the Russian students did not yet regard themselves as an integral part of Israeli society. In particular, it may reflect their feelings of marginality within the wider student group.

The perceived psychological distance of the Russian students from their Israeli counterparts proved to be even larger when they were asked how they saw the Israeli students. The majority (70 per cent) perceived them first and foremost as Israelis while the remaining 30 per cent saw them primarily as Jews (Table 6*c*). Thus there is a vast discrepancy among the three dimensions: the Russian students thought that they were seen by the Israelis principally as Russians, while they would have liked to be seen by them as Jews, and they saw them first and foremost as Israelis. The disparity was somewhat less marked for the traditional students and particularly for the Georgians, who had a greater tendency than the others to perceive the Israeli students as Jews—as they saw their own selves.

TABLE 6. *Public identity (in percentages)*

	Religiousness		*Regions in U.S.S.R.*			*Total*
	Traditional (N=202)	*Non-traditional* (N=248)	*Central* (N=60)	*Western* (N=272)	*Georgia* (N=118)	(N=450)
a. Ideal public identity						
1. Jewish	66	51	41	55	70	58
2. Israeli	34	45	54	42	29	40
3. Russian	0	4	5	3	1	2
b. Subjective public identity						
1. Jewish	44	28	31	33	42	35
2. Israeli	4	0	0	0	4	2
3. Russian	52	72	69	67	54	63
c. Perceived public identity of Israelis						
1. Jewish	35	26	24	24	46	30
2. Israeli	65	74	76	76	54	70

The finding that most Russian students tended to see the Israeli students as Israelis rather than as Jews may indicate that in future in order to be like them, the Russians would wish to be defined also as Israelis. Thus the emphasis on a Jewish ideal public identity may be temporary.

In order to explore the relationship between ethnic identity and the adjustment of the Russian students to Israeli society, we analysed the correlations between various dimensions of ethnic identity and the experience of feeling at home in Israel. (As reported above, 84 per cent indicated that they felt at home in Israel.)

TABLE 7. *Correlations between dimensions of ethnic identity and adjustment to Israeli society*

	1. *Feeling at home in Israel*
2. Israeli identity	·37*
3. Jewish identity	·20*
4. Russian identity	−·20*
5. Religiousness	·10

*$p < .001$ $N = 450$ $R_{1 \cdot 2345} = .363$ $R^2_{1 \cdot 2345} = .132$

Inspection of Table 7 shows that the relationship with potency of Israeli identity was strongest (·37). The correlation with Jewish identity was ·20 while with Russian identity it was negative (−·20). The relationship with religious background was negligible (·10). These correlations suggest that, relative to other sub-identities, Israeli identity is crucial for the future integration of the Russian students into Israeli society.

Although these correlations were rather low, except for that with Israeli identity, most of them were statistically significant. Multiple correlation indicated that the dimensions of ethnic identity explained only 13 per cent of the variance in the experience of feeling at home in Israel. It is evident that additional variables should be sought to explain adjustment to Israeli society; this has, in fact, been attempted in other studies dealing specifically with the issue of integration.[13]

Conclusion

This study sheds some light on the Jewish identity of Russian immigrants in Israel, but it is important to note that the sample consisted solely of young students and therefore did not represent the whole population of Russian immigrants. However, these young Russians are of special interest because they were born well after the Revolution and educated entirely under the Soviet regime.

Two features of their ethnic identity distinguished them from Jewish

students from other countries: one was their emphasis on the national element in Jewish identity, and the other was the dissonance between their Jewish and Russian identities. Whereas the first reflects the influence of the norms of Soviet society, the second demonstrates the respondents' ambivalence towards their country of origin.

The ethnic identity of the students was studied in the conceptual framework of overlapping situations. This model proved appropriate for the analysis of the relative strength and interrelationship among the Russian, Jewish, and Israeli sub-identities of the immigrant students. The findings supported the hypothesis that the students would assign negative valence and low potency to Russian identity. This attitude helped them to justify in retrospect their decision to emigrate. On the other hand, they emphasized the positive valence of Jewish identity, which was their main link with Israeli society. Thus the relative strength of sub-identities seems to be part of a subconscious strategy of adjustment.

Their problems of integration into Israeli society at this stage were reflected by the disparity between their ideal and subjective public identities. They wished to be seen principally as Jews or as Israelis, but they thought that the Israelis viewed them first and foremost as Russians. The stronger relationship of feeling at home in Israel with Israeli identity rather than with Jewish identity or religiousness suggests that they will try to adjust to Israeli society mainly by strengthening their Israeli identity.

The findings that most students were generally satisfied and felt at home in Israel are consistent with the results of other studies on Russian immigrants.[14] Although the students had problems of adjustment to a new country, their sense of satisfaction constituted a sound basis for their prospects of successful integration into Israeli society.*

* The study on which this paper is based was carried out in partnership with Professor Simon N. Herman of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. We are grateful to the Research Division of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption of the State of Israel for their ready co-operation. Our study was supported in part by a grant from the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture, New York.

NOTES

[1] The exact number of Soviet immigrants to Israel in 1970–77 was 120,162. See the Central Bureau of Statistics, 'Aliya Statistics: Current Publications' in E. Leshem and J. Rosenblum, ed., *Immigrant Absorption in Israel. Current Research*, Jerusalem, 1978, p. 7.

[2] D. R. Miller, 'The Study of Social Relationships: Situations, Identity and Social Interaction', in S. Koch, ed., *Psychology: A Study of a Science*, vol. 5, New York, 1963, p. 673.

[3] Z. Gittelman, 'Patterns of Jewish Identification and Non-Identification in the Soviet Union', *In the Diaspora*, vol. 18, no. 79/80, 1977, pp. 157–62 (in Hebrew).

[4] M. Decter, 'Jewish National Consciousness in the Soviet Union', in N. Glazer, ed., *Perspectives on Soviet Jewry*, New York, 1970, pp. 19–26.

[5] W. Petersen, 'A General Typology of Migration', in C. J. Jansen, ed., *Readings in the Sociology of Migration*, Oxford, 1970, pp. 49–68. See also E. Tabory, *Motivation for Migration: A Comparative Study of American and Soviet Academic Immigrants to Israel*, Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Ramat-Gan, Bar Ilan University, 1975, p. 2.

[6] S. N. Herman, *Israelis and Jews—The Continuity of an Identity*, New York, 1970, pp. 26–30.

[7] K. Lewin, *Field Theory in Social Science* (D. Cartwright, ed), New York, 1951.

[8] U. Farago, *Continuity and Change in the Jewish Identity of Israeli High School Students 1965–1974*, Levi Eshkol Institute for the Study of Economics, Society, and Politics in Israel, Jerusalem, 1977, p. 18 (in Hebrew); and S. N. Herman, *Jewish Identity—A Social Psychological Perspective*, New York, 1977.

[9] Herman, ibid., p. 58.

[10] Herman, ibid., p. 24.

[11] Herman, ibid., p. 71.

[12] Lewin, op. cit., p. 148.

[13] J. Shuval, E. Marcus, N. Biran, and J. Dotan, *Patterns of Integration of Immigrants from the Soviet Union*, The Institute of Applied Research, Jerusalem, 1973 (in Hebrew) and H. Graff, *Absorption of Immigrant Students from the Soviet Union*, Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, Research and Planning Division, Jerusalem, 1975 (mimeo, in Hebrew).

[14] Shuval *et al.*, op. cit., p. 21, and J. Shuval, *Patterns of Integration over Time: Soviet Immigrants in Israel*, Jerusalem, 1975, p. 27.

VARIETIES OF IDENTITY TRANSFORMATION: THE CASE OF NEWLY ORTHODOX JEWS

David Glanz and Michael I. Harrison

DURING the past decade, social scientists have become increasingly concerned with the analysis of the transformations of individual identity which are associated with commitment to unconventional political and religious movements.[1] This paper seeks to extend the discussions of alternative models for the analysis of identity transformation by offering a synthesis and refinement of several available paradigms.[2] The typology developed here arose out of an attempt to apply existing conceptions to the case of young Jews from America and other English-speaking countries who have embraced the tenets of Orthodox Judaism and enrolled in special yeshivot in Jerusalem. By becoming part of the Orthodox yeshiva world, they have assumed an identity which is little known in contemporary Jewish life and which deviates substantially from more popular alternative life styles.

In seeking to describe the personal changes which young adherents of unconventional movements and sub-cultures have undergone, researchers and popular commentators alike have frequently turned to the literature on religious conversion. Yet attempts to apply concepts from this literature have increasingly shown that the conceptual schemes which were the stock-in-trade of students of conversion for many years are too simple to reflect the complex processes whereby individuals assume a new social identity around which their behaviour and beliefs are organized.

Types of identity transformation

The term conversion is conventionally associated with radical, often sudden shifts from one belief system to another. The popular conception of this process is heavily influenced by the examples of such historical religious figures as the Apostle Paul, who was transformed by his vision on the road to Damascus from a persecutor of the early Christians into a dedicated servant of their cause. Despite the prominence of such cases,

several other types of transformation have also been characterized as conversions. In his classic treatment of the subject, William James[3] not only describes dramatic turnabouts but also treats religious experiences achieved after years of active preparation and conversions of young people who were brought up in evangelical churches.

The use of the term to encompass such a wide range of phenomena clearly poses problems for sociological analysis. In seeking to avoid such ambiguities, several authors have defined conversion more exclusively as the radical reorganization of an individual's beliefs and behaviour in terms of a new ideological framework or world view.[4] In contrast to such radical reorganizations, are those experiences of religious regeneration which entail heightened commitment to a belief system to which the individual already partially adheres.[5] The experiences of deepened commitment which Christian evangelicals call conversion are typical of this latter type and should not be confused with full-scale conversions: such regeneration experiences are expected and approved within the community of believers,[6] and are not necessarily associated with substantial shifts in beliefs and behaviour.[7]

Travisano,[8] in an even more restricted conceptualization, characterizes conversions as dramatic changes in the informing principles of identity through the assumption of a negation of a former identity. As an example of conversion, he cites the case of Jews who became Hebrew Christians and thereby rejected their previous Jewish identity. In contrast to conversions are 'alternations', changes 'which are part of or grow out of existing programs of behavior'.[9] Thus, the affiliation of highly assimilated Jews with the Unitarian Society may be characterized as an alternation, since it does not require the rejection of their Jewish identity.

Gordon suggests a further refinement of the identity transformation paradigm.[10] In his study of Jesus People, he found what he terms 'identity consolidation', the assumption of an identity which combines two prior but contradictory identities. There are two phases to this process of consolidation: first, 'the partial adoption of an identity which rests on a change from one universe of discourse to another (that is, a partial conversion), and second, the adoption of an identity which rests on both of these universes of discourse'.[11] A similar process of consolidation or synthesis of two universes of discourse seems to have taken place in the Meher Baba cult described by Robbins and Anthony.[12] On the one hand, adherents dedicate themselves to a master who symbolizes universal love and thus embodies many of the expressive values of the youthful counter-culture from which the participants are drawn. On the other hand, by joining the cult, adherents are 'getting straight', abandoning their former patterns of drug use in favour of conventional work roles and instrumental orientations which are compatible with their middle-class origins.

Gordon's study also makes an empirical contribution by showing that recruits to the Jesus People underwent qualitatively different forms of identity transformation, depending on their original universe of discourse and their intervening involvements. Those undergoing an 'alteration' of identity (a term which seems preferable to Travisano's 'alternation') move easily into the Jesus movement from their fundamentalist backgrounds. 'Direct consolidators' returned to the fundamentalism of their youth, which they had abandoned when they entered the youth-drug culture. In contrast, 'indirect consolidators' found in the Jesus People a synthesis between their strong, non-fundamentalist religious upbringing and the life style of the youth culture.

Like Gordon, Harrison[13] found that not all recruits to Catholic Pentecostalism travelled the same route. Most underwent alterations, having experienced a sense of renewal of their already strong Catholic faith. Some underwent a process akin to Gordon's direct consolidation, returning to the Catholic faith of their youth, from which they had fallen away. A few from non-Catholic or marginally Catholic backgrounds underwent full-fledged conversions. These two studies suggest that several types of identity transformation may lead to the assumption of the *same* collectively defined identity.

Our study of recruits to Israeli yeshivot for *ba'ale teshuvah* ('returnees' to Orthodox Judaism), suggests that it is analytically and empirically fruitful to distinguish between four types of identity transformation which closely parallel those reviewed thus far. The fundamental differences between these processes lie in the degree of cumulativeness of the transformation sequences. Cumulativeness is to be understood here primarily in terms of the degree to which the transformed individual and the significant others—kinsmen, friends, colleagues—associated with the original identity define the new identity as a 'natural' or predictable extension of the original identity.[14] From this standpoint, the assumption of a new organizing identity through an *alteration sequence* is a process of taking a series of small, cumulative steps (alterations) which gradually and progressively render a new identity more central, while leading the person further and further away from the original identity. In such an alteration sequence, the new central identity is 'built up' without any sudden break with the past. *Direct consolidation* is a partially cumulative process in which, after a period of departure from a particular social identity, the person returns to that identity. *Indirect consolidation* is a less cumulative process, consisting of the adopting of a new identity, followed by a shift to a third identity, which is partially compatible with both the prior identities. Finally, *conversion* is defined as the assumption of a previously proscribed or alien identity.

The schema suggested here, which will be more fully elaborated in this paper's conclusion, grew out of our attempt to interpret the results of field research on *ba'ale teshuvah* in several 'beginners' yeshivot in

Jerusalem. These institutions emerged after 1967 to serve the needs of young men and women interested in studying Jewish law and sacred texts and 'learning' how to become Orthodox Jews. The students in these institutions come primarily from American and Canadian middle-class homes, which either lacked Jewish religious affiliations altogether, or were affiliated with non-Orthodox synagogues. The rabbis teaching in these yeshivot are primarily graduates of Orthodox rabbinical seminaries in America or other English-speaking countries. Five such institutions are in operation today in Jerusalem serving a male student body of approximately five hundred.

The field data on which this analysis is based were gathered by David Glanz in the course of a year's participant observation in one of these yeshivot and through twenty open-ended, semi-structured interviews he conducted with students in five of the yeshivot. In addition, documentary materials were examined by the authors and informal conversations with *ba'ale teshuvah* were conducted. While the data may not be claimed to be representative of the total student body enrolled in these yeshivot, they do appear to reflect the theorectically and empirically important variations in the types of students enrolled.

Unfortunately, at present we lack information on students in the affiliated institutions for non-Israeli women and in the independent programmes for Israelis. Preliminary reports from a study of Israeli women who have returned to orthodoxy suggest that the types of identity transformation described in this paper are also found among those individuals, although their relative frequencies are different.[15] Israeli women from secular backgrounds who became Orthodox appear to undergo a transformation much closer to conversion than is the case among American young men. The difference lies in the lack of felt continuity between the identity of the secular Israeli woman and that of the Orthodox Jewish woman.

Sociologically, the yeshivot studied resemble those 'greedy institutions',[16] which seek to socialize their participants by intensive commitments to a distinctive world-view. The life of the students in the yeshivot centres around prayer, meticulous observance of the precepts and practices of traditional Judaism and, above all, the constant study of Talmud and Torah, Judaism's classic sources. The acquisition of knowledge of Rabbinic law and lore contained in these sources and in the commentaries is seen as one of the highest forms of Jewish piety and the heart of yeshiva life. Through intensive and intimate interaction and contact with peers and rabbinical teachers, the *ba'al teshuvah* gradually comes to be more and more encapsulated in the Orthodox world and to internalize its norms and perspectives. The newcomer begins to restructure his habits and thought processes in terms of the dictates of religious law. What the *Halakhah*, the corpus of Jewish law as interpreted by the yeshiva tradition, has to say on any given topic

from sexuality (forbidding any type of sexual activity outside marriage) to hobbies (defining them as waste of precious study time) comes to dominate his thinking and daily behaviour.

Becoming a ba'al teshuvah—identity transformation processes

Despite the existence of a relatively homogeneous social identity which successful *ba'ale teshuvah* assume within the yeshivot, recruits may arrive at this destination via at least two different routes. In terms of the types of identity transformation discussed above, nearly all those studied underwent sequences of alterations or indirect consolidations. Direct consolidation is not found among students in the yeshivot under study because they do not attract young men whose original religious background was orthodox. Conversion, while possible, is rare.

Alteration sequences. As indicated earlier, this transformation process is a cumulative one entailing a series of gradual changes. Through these shifts, the *ba'al teshuvah* increasingly organizes his social identity in terms of his Jewishness. A residual, socio-demographic identity, with minimal implications for social action, becomes an increasingly salient and central ethno-religious identity.

Here is a typical personal history of a *ba'al teshuvah* who underwent an alteration sequence. Chaim comes from a small town in upstate New York about which he commented that 'in a town like that, you had to be Jewish'. He was involved in the Reform youth movement and attended their special Torah Corps summer study programme in his junior and senior years in high school. During his senior year, he studied in an exchange programme at the Reform movement's Leo Baeck School in Haifa, Israel. As a Freshman at a university in the Boston area, he regarded the *frumkeit* (orthodox piety) of the small closed circle of Orthodox Jews there as 'mumbo-jumbo' and, feeling alienated from them, 'tried to find spirituality' within non-Orthodox Judaism. Through contacts with university teachers and with other students, he slowly 'accrued tendencies' towards greater observance of traditional practices. He majored in Mediterranean studies, and spent a summer in a North African country studying its Jewish community. During the summer after his junior year, he directed the Hebrew programme at a camp run by the Reform movement. There, because of his religious observances, he was 'sort of the token frummy' (orthodox). After graduation he planned to emigrate to Israel and work in Arab–Jewish relations. On graduating he received a special fellowship which allowed him to return to North Africa for further research. 'For the first time in my life, I was thrown into the real world and confronted with the fact that the usefulness of my education was zero. I realized there had been a lack of method in my acquiring frumkeit. I had just been sort

of drifting toward the source.' He then decided to go to Israel to pursue his studies seriously. When he got to Jerusalem, he met a former friend who was studying at a yeshiva and enrolled.

Ba'ale teshuvah like Chaim, who underwent alteration sequences, typically came from non-Orthodox homes with a strong sense of Jewish identity and close ties to Reform or Conservative synagogues. Such families are a minority within American and Anglo-Jewry, since only about one-half of American Jewish families have any synagogue affiliation, and most of these are only nominally involved in synagogue life.[17] Even more atypical is the early interest these potential *ba'ale teshuvah* demonstrate in furthering their Jewish education and their active involvement in Jewish youth movements. At university, rather than engaging in the fashionable search for their 'true identities' by 'shopping' in the supermarket of alternative life styles, these young men continued to deepen their Jewish identities, often through combinations of programmes of study and activity in Jewish organizations. At some point in the process of 'becoming more Jewish', as a result of their contacts with observant Jews, these potential recruits began adopting such traditional requirements as *kashrut* (the dietary laws) and Sabbath observance, gradually adding on other ritual practices. This snowballing process reached a turning point at which they decided to become fully 'literate', observant Jews, capable of studying the classical sources of Judaism.

Thus, *ba'ale teshuvah* who underwent alteration sequences typically arrived in Israel with a more or less explicit desire to 'learn to be a Jew', in the traditional, religious sense of the term. Some even investigated the existing yeshivot in an effort to discover the one most suited to their purposes. Those who went to Israel without such explicit intentions to develop their Jewish identities were apparently seeking a moratorium on the obligations facing them at home; they found that their visit catalysed their desire to learn more about being a religious Jew and thus were attracted to the yeshivot.

Because of the cumulative character of such alteration sequences, *ba'ale teshuvah* of this sort typically experience little overt conflict with their earlier social milieux. While their parents may not be altogether happy about their son's shift of allegiance to Orthodox Judaism, they cannot honestly view it as an act of betrayal or a failure. If anything, they appear to feel that they 'succeeded only too well' in raising their sons as committed Jews.

Indirect consolidation. In contrast to *ba'ale teshuvah* who undergo alteration sequences, indirect consolidators pass through a stage of disjunction from their original home environments. Moreover, they more sharply experience becoming a *ba'al teshuvah* as a process of return or homecoming. However, the past to which they return is not their own, but a

re-creation of a mythic Jewish past. The assumption of the identity of a yeshiva student fulfils their spiritual quest by reorganizing their identity around a Jewish component which was typically marginal to them in their youth.

The experiences of Noah illustrate this process of the consolidation of two earlier universes of discourse through the assumption of the identity of a *ba'al teshuvah*. Noah's family belonged to an urban Conservative synagogue, but their involvement with Judaism was restricted to observing a set of familiar customs. By late adolescence Noah felt little allegiance to these practices. At college, in New York City, where he studied political science and obtained a teaching certificate, he became interested in Buddhism, read the works of Richard Alpert, and took up meditation. After graduating, he decided to head for Europe and then on to India. 'I was looking for a perspective on life. It had to be a spiritual one. I knew the world was a very special place. Buddhism had really heightened my awareness of the wondrous experience of being alive, and I felt the need to expand my awareness of other people.' Although heading East, he was basically just searching. 'If I found something, I was prepared to stay.' His visit to Europe was disappointing. A commune he sought out on a Spanish island had disappeared. The anarchy of one in a French village at first attracted him but soon disillusioned him. 'I was interested in finding a life style, but soon found you need direction.' From Europe he went to visit Israel, where a sister lived, whom he had not seen for thirteen years. There he renewed his acquaintance with a former Orthodox Jew who wanted him to study Jewish mysticism. Chance contacts with Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem impressed him, but still aroused ambivalence; he decided to stay on and rented an apartment in the Old City. There he met a Rabbi who, despite the fact that he spoke no English, became his first spiritual mentor and brought him into a yeshiva. 'Despite the language barrier, it was good. I began to see that the Torah spoke about real concrete relationships between people and how to act. It presented practical ideas of a beautiful way to live life. I had a big problem putting on a yarmulkah, but the rabbi said, come in, and I did. I found the essence of living life here—putting in more and more effort to be a Torah Jew. I've been here six years now studying and met my wife teaching in our women's program.'

Ba'ale teshuvah who underwent indirect consolidation of this sort typically came from more marginally Jewish homes than did those who underwent a sequence of alterations. Some had no Jewish education, while others had attended synagogue Sunday school for several years and had disliked the experience. None participated in Jewish youth movements, and most had parents who appear to have been only perfunctorily concerned with fostering their children's sense and understanding of their Jewishness. By their college years, they had virtually

discarded their Jewish identification and had become immersed in the campus youth culture. They became seriously interested in other religions and in such expressions of spirituality as vegetarianism and meditation; a few experimented with drugs. In their case, the discovery and entrance into the world of the yeshiva takes on much of the character of the classic conversion process. Following a period of search and disillusionment with available options,[18] they tentatively try out the yeshiva alternative. Once convinced of its value, they rapidly immerse themselves in this new identity.

Mystical experiences confirming the legitimacy of the transformation are not unusual among *ba'ale teshuvah* who underwent indirect consolidation. Noah, whose background was described above, recalled that before entering the yeshiva, while struggling with the questions of whether to remain in Israel and what to do there, he heard two statements in his head: *Ani yachol lalechet* (I can leave)—he did not then know the meaning of these Hebrew words—and the *Sh'ma Yisrael*, the central statement of Jewish faith, which he had neither said nor heard for years. Others who underwent indirect consolidation reported experiences of mystical knowing of the existence of God. One student described a vision of a long row of Rabbis stretching into the past and future with an open space for the *ba'al teshuvah* to take his place. Given the hyper-rational atmosphere of the yeshiva, which would tend to inhibit the disclosure of such experiences, and the fact that the interviewer did not actively solicit such reports, there is reason to believe that mystical experiences among those who underwent indirect consolidation are more common than might be expected.

The main difference between the indirect consolidation process which these *ba'ale teshuvah* undergo and that of classical conversion is that the identity assumed by these young men contains continuities not only with their immediately preceding universe of discourse, but also with their more distant past. Thus, the identity of yeshiva students synthesizes new content, elements from the students' immediate past in the youth culture, and elements from their more distant past as young middle-class American Jews. There are several structural and subjective continuities between the world of the yeshiva and the youth culture in which they were previously immersed. Becoming a *ba'al teshuvah* is felt to be the fulfilment of their spiritual search. In addition, the cooperative style of yeshiva life, with its strong peer groups, resembles in some ways the communes and youth-oriented patterns of the youth culture.

The distinctive aspect of this consolidation process is the synthesis of the earlier identity with elements from the individual's more distant past. Becoming a *ba'al teshuvah* expands the residual Jewish identity of the individual's youth and renders Judaism and Jewishness central to his personality. Also associated with this process is a return to a more

stable, instrumentally orientated life style which is more compatible with the student's middle-class background than was the life style of his more immediate past. Young men who may have previously been uninterested in their secular studies are now seen to take learning seriously. Similarly, after a period of time in the yeshiva, they often become anxious to marry, raise a family, and support themselves by working.

Continuity in transformation of identity, as Strauss has reminded us,[19] lies partly in the eyes of the transformed individual. Unlike true converts,,who often redefine their pre-conversion past as being undesirable and discontinuous with their new selves, *ba'ale teshuvah* see their transformation as a reaffirmation and realization of their true identities.[20]

The possible alienation of *ba'ale teshuvah* from their parents is moderated by the shared perception that becoming Orthodox is a fulfilment of one's inherent Jewish potential. The merits of the stable, instrumental aspects of yeshiva life are also appreciated: the parents of young men who previously expressed little or no interest in Judaism or in middle-class conventions may well feel relieved that their sons are attending yeshiva and talking about careers in Jewish education, rather than taking drugs and dropping out. Given these compatibilities with their familial origins, the full break with the past so characteristic of true conversions occurs only rarely among *ba'ale teshuvah*.[21]

Conversion

Conversion to the perspectives and life style of the yeshiva is, of course, theoretically and empirically possible. In those cases where the transition is only accomplished after a rejection of the past, true conversion may be said to have occurred. Such a case is that of a young Protestant minister from Northern Europe, who as an outgrowth of his studies of Judaism, decided to travel to Israel and study for official conversion to Judaism. Both before and after his formal conversion, he was enrolled as a student in one of the yeshivot. Before becoming—and being accepted as—a Jew, he had to traverse great social and psychological distances. The formal conversion process could only occur after he had largely accomplished this transformation, since the Orthodox Rabbis who judge the legitimacy of requests for conversion require evidence that the prospective convert has fully rejected his or her past beliefs and practices.

Conclusion

Four types of identity transformation have been distinguished which may lead to the assumption of an organizing social identity. The main distinction between the types lies in the degree of cumulativeness or

disjuncture in the transformation process. The term conversion was reserved for radically disjunctive processes. Alteration sequences were characterized as being the most cumulative forms of transformation, entailing the gradual evolution of a new identity through a series of small shifts, each of which is felt to be natural or plausible by the person undergoing the transformation and by his or her peers. Identity consolidations are partially disjunctive processes in which a third identity is assumed which is compatible with two previous identities and synthesizes elements from both prior universes of discourse. If the third identity is identical with the first, the process is one of direct consolidation; otherwise it is indirect.

Given these definitions, we characterized the assumption of the identity of *ba'ale teshuvah* as typically resulting from either a sequence of alterations or from an indirect consolidation. In the former case, young men with a strong sense of Jewish identity come to regard their Jewishness as more and more central to them. Parallel to this tendency was the growing acceptance of the traditional Orthodox definition of the meaning and content of Jewish identity. Behaviourally, these *ba'ale teshuvah* approached the Orthodox Jewish norm through a series of incremental steps, gradually 'adding on' observances. Entering the yeshiva world was seen as the means to the ultimate fulfilment of this process of becoming fully Jewish.

Indirect consolidators adopted the Orthodox Jewish identity after a period of alienation from all aspects of Jewish identification, during which they were immersed in the spiritual experimentation of the youth culture. The continuity of their new identity with the residual Jewishness of their past distinguishes them from true converts, who break completely with their past.

While our typology has been developed out of an attempt to interpret data on transformations among individuals who assume a single type of religious identity, the scheme appears to be applicable to a range of religious and non-religious identity transformations. As a suggestion of the analytic generality of the typology and its potential empirical value, Chart One provides a schematic summary of the characteristics assumed to distinguish the types. As the entries show, the typology implies a series of hypotheses about phenomena that are assumed to cluster together empirically. For example, the entries under the heading for Alteration Sequence indicate that in this process, there may be as little as one shift in identity, although there are typically several, small, shifts. Even if the final identity is far from the original one, the process of transformation is felt by the individuals involved and their peers to be a natural outcome of a developmental process. Therefore, the degree of social alienation from the original social milieu is likely to be low or moderate. Changes of this type are typically not accompanied by 'bridge-burning ceremonies',[22] since there is no need to renounce

former obligations. A gradual estrangement may, of course, occur in more thorough-going alteration sequences. Finally, because the steps in this type of transformation are incremental, it is relatively easily accomplished, with less internal or inter-personal conflict than occurs in the more disjunctive processes.

CHART ONE. *Four types of identity transformation*

Characteristics	*Type*			
	Alteration Sequence	*Direct Consolidation*	*Indirect Consolidation*	*Conversion*
Descriptive metaphors	Evolution, growth	Return, reaffirmation	Synthesis, resolution	Break with past, radical shift
Minimal number of shifts in transformation	One	Two	Two	One
Relation of final identity to original	Similar, 'natural development'	Identical	Similar, compatible	Negative, major departure
Degree of alienation of individual from original social milieu	Low–moderate	None	Low	High
Bridge-burning events associated with shifts	No	1:* Yes 2: Possible	1:* Yes 2: Possible	Yes
Difficulty of accomplishing shifts	Low–moderate	1:* High 2: Low–moderate	1: Moderate–high 2: Low–moderate	High
Centrality of final identity	Variable (can be low)	High	High	High

* Step 1 is from original to second identity. Step 2 is from second to final identity.

The ultimate value of any conceptual scheme lies in its ability to help us make sense of the empirical world. In this study, distinguishing between conversion and less disjunctive processes of identity transformation provided a useful way of distinguishing the process of becoming a *ba'al teshuvah*, with its sense of return, from genuine conversion, with its sense of estrangement from earlier identities. In addition, the typology provided a useful way of distinguishing among the behavioural patterns which are often grouped together under the heading of *teshuvah*, or return to Judaism. Return to orthodoxy in the literal sense of the term (that is, direct consolidation) was rarely found among the students we studied, because of the nature of the yeshivot with which they were associated; and it seems to be rare among contemporary Orthodox Jews as a whole. Among our subjects, return was found to entail either the completion of a process of constructing a traditional Jewish identity (an alteration sequence) or the adoption of an identity which synthesized elements of a previously marginal Jewish identity

with aspects of the youth culture (an indirect consolidation). It is our hope that this preliminary report and our analytical typology will also prove useful to others seeking to identify alternative routes to the assumption of the same socially defined identity and will lead to more effective accounts of the causes and consequences of the various types of identity transformation.

NOTES

[1] See, for example, Luther Gerlach and Virginia Hine, *People, Power, and Change: Movements of Social Transformation*, New York, 1970; John Lofland and Rodney Stark, 'Becoming a World-Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant Perspective', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 30, 1965, pp. 862–75; Thomas Robbins and Richard Anthony, 'Getting Straight with Meher Baba: A Study of Mysticism, Drug Rehabilitation, and Post-Adolescent Conflict', *Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion*, vol. 11, 1972, pp. 122–140; Benjamin Zablocki, *The Joyful Community: An Account of the Bruderhoff*, Baltimore, 1971.

[2] This article, which has equal authorship, is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1977 annual meeting of the Israeli Sociological Association. On transformations of identity, see Anselm Strauss, *Mirrors amd Masks: The Search for Identity*, San Francisco, 1969, pp. 89–131.

[3] William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, Garden City, N.Y., 1961.

[4] Lofland and Stark, op. cit., p. 862.

[5] Kurt Lang and Gladys Lang, *Collective Dynamics*, New York, 1961, pp. 157–60; see also Michael Argyle and Benjamin Beit Hallahmi, *The Social Psychology of Religion*, London, 1975, pp. 41–43, 59–62.

[6] Hans Zetterberg, 'The Religious Conversion as a Change of Social Role', *Sociology and Social Research*, vol. 36, 1952, pp. 159–66.

[7] Thomas Hood and his colleagues found that 62 per cent of those coming forward to 'make a decision for Christ' at a Billy Graham rally in fact had undergone reconversions or reaffirmations of their faith. Thomas Hood *et al.*, 'Conversion at a Billy Graham Crusade: Spontaneous Event or Ritual Performance', Paper presented at the 1971 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association. See also Donald Cleland *et al.*, 'In the Company of the Converted: Characteristics of a Billy Graham Crusade Audience', *Sociological Analysis*, vol. 35, 1974, pp. 45–56.

[8] Richard Travisano, 'Alternation and Conversion as Qualitatively Different Transformations', in G. Stone and H. Farberman, eds., *Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction*, Waltham, Mass., 1970, pp. 594–605.

[9] Travisano, op. cit., p. 601.

[10] David Gordon, 'The Jesus People: An Identity Synthesis', *Urban Life and Culture*, vol. 3, 1974, pp. 159–78.

[11] David Gordon, op. cit., p. 166.

[12] Robbins and Anthony, op. cit.

[13] Michael Harrison, 'Preparation for Life in the Spirit: The Process of Initial Commitment to a Religious Movement', *Urban Life and Culture*, vol. 2, 1974, pp. 387–414; and Michael I. Harrison, 'Sources of Recruitment to Catholic Pentecostalism', *Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion*, vol. 13, 1974, pp. 49–64.

[14] See Travisano, op. cit.

[15] The study is being conducted by Sarah Almog under Michael Harrison's supervision.

[16] Lewis Coser, *Greedy Institutions: Patterns of Undivided Commitment*, New York, 1974; Egon Bittner, 'Radicalism and the Organization of Radical Movements', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 28, 1963, pp. 928–40.

[17] Data from the National Jewish Population Study, the only national survey sample of American Jewry, indicate that only 8 per cent of all American Jewish adults are members of Orthodox synagogues, 25 per cent belong to Conservative synagogues, 17 per cent to Reform synagogues, and 50 per cent have no current affiliation. See Bernard Lazerwitz and Michael I. Harrison, 'Denominational Differentiation within American Jewry', mimeographed, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel. For a recent review of the state of American Jewry, see Charles Liebman, *The Ambivalent American Jew: Politics, Religion and Family in American Jewish Life*, Philadelphia, 1973.

[18] See Lofland and Stark, op. cit., and Hans Toch, *The Social Psychology of Social Movements*, Indianapolis, 1965, pp. 117–21.

[19] Strauss, op. cit., p. 147.

[20] See Peter Berger, *Invitation to Sociology*, Garden City, N.Y., 1963, pp. 54–65, for a useful discussion of the process of reinterpreting the past in the light of newly adopted interpretive frameworks.

[21] Compare John Lofland, *Doomsday Cult*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966; Rosabeth Moss Kanter, *Commitment and Community*, Cambridge, Mass., 1972; and William Kornhauser, 'Social Bases of Political Commitment: A Study of Liberal and Radicals', in Arnold Rose, ed., *Human Behavior and Social Processes*, Boston, 1962, pp. 321–29.

[22] See Gerlach and Hine, op. cit., pp. 125–6, 137–8.

A RESEARCH NOTE ON JEWISH EDUCATION IN MEXICO

Shimon Samuels

THE Jews of Mexico are estimated to number about 40,000, nearly all of whom live in Mexico City.[1] The four provincial Jewish communities of Guadalajara, Monterrey, Puebla and Tijuana number a total of only about 350 households.[2] Individual families are scattered among the smaller towns of Irapuato, La Paz, Torreón and Veracruz.

There are six Jewish high schools in the capital;[3] they are almost wholly dependent on Israeli teachers for the courses in Hebrew and Jewish studies. Communal leaders were concerned that Mexican Jewry had not produced its own educators. Moreover, very little was known about the number of professionals and academics or about the sense of Jewish identity of the younger generation of school age.

I therefore carried out a study in 1976–77,[4] in the course of which I compiled a list of all Jewish (*a*) university teachers and research workers; and (*b*) graduates of institutions of higher learning engaged in various professions. The material was gathered by means of questionnaires, a telephone survey of 1,000 Jewish households, and interviews with leading members of each congregation in the Jewish community; this was followed up by verifying membership lists of communal organizations and the names of the academic staff at the major universities in Mexico City.

As for the pupils of the capital's six Jewish high schools, I examined the records of those who completed their studies in 1971–75 to discover the proportions who had continued their education in universities or similar institutions. I also sent a questionnaire to those in the upper grades of all six schools in 1976 and 1977 to find out whether they would choose to register for a university degree in Jewish Studies if one were available in Mexico.

Academics and professionals

There were 510 university teachers and research workers and 2,113 members of various professions. The latter consisted of 554 engineers;

351 physicians; 316 high school teachers; 162 accountants and business administrators; 153 architects; 131 lawyers; 118 dentists; 92 painters, sculptors, and writers; 51 psychologists; 50 scientists; 37 nurses, therapists, optometrists, and social workers; 30 journalists; 26 social scientists; 21 language interpreters; and 20 rabbis.

Out of the total number of 2,623 Jews in university posts and the professions, less than one third (791) were affiliated to congregational *kehillot*. On the other hand, more than 90 per cent were contributors to the United Jewish Appeal. The contrast was even sharper among university teachers: only 143 out of 510 were members of a synagogue, while 406 made donations to the U.J.A. Their Jewish identity thus seems to have a Zionist rather than a religious base.

There are 10 universities in and around Mexico City which have Jews on their teaching staff; just over three quarters of the Jewish academics (391) are at the National University (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico).

Jewish high school pupils

There are six Jewish high schools in Mexico City:

Colegio Israelita (Yiddische Schule) is the oldest and largest high school; it was originally Bundist in orientation and still emphasizes the Yiddish language. It had 32 boys and 46 girls in its graduating classes in 1975.

Colegio Tarbut is Zionist-oriented, with emphasis on the Hebrew language. There were 29 boys and 19 girls in the 1975 matriculation classes.

Colegio Yavne is Mizrahi-oriented Orthodox. It had only seven boys and 12 girls in its 1975 graduating classes.

Colegio Monte Sinai, the educational organ of the Syrian community had 12 boys and 14 girls in these classes in 1975.

Colegio Sefaradi, the educational organ of the Balkan Sephardim, had 10 boys and 15 girls in the 1975 graduating year.

Nuevo Colegio Israelita Peretz (Neue Yiddische Schule) is the newest Jewish high school in the city. It lays emphasis on Yiddish. Matriculation classes—with 8 boys and 13 girls—were established only in 1975.

Thus, in 1975, the six high schools had a total of 98 boys and 119 girls in their graduating classes. Sixty of the boys (61 per cent) and 76 of the girls (64 per cent) continued their education in institutions of higher learning. The comparable proportions for 1971 were 66 per cent of the boys (55 out of 83) and 60 per cent of the girls (48 out of 80).

There was a marked increase in the further education of pupils from the two Sephardi schools. In 1971, only one of the nine boys but none of the five girls in the Balkan Sephardi College matriculation classes went to a university or similar institution; by 1975, nine of the 10 boys and

10 of the 15 girls did so. As for the Monte Sinai Syrian School, in 1975, 11 of the 12 boys (compared with only two out of six in 1971) and seven of the 14 girls (two out of four in 1971) continued their education.

Pupils of all six schools registered in 1971–75 for degrees or diplomas in accountancy, architecture, dentistry, education, engineering, law, medicine, nursing, psychology and social sciences, science and the humanities. There has been a shift in recent years among Jewish students towards nursing, the social sciences, and the humanities. This is in part due to the fact that girls (who are registering for higher studies in increasing numbers) are more drawn to these professions. In 1975, 10 per cent of the girls chose the social sciences; nine per cent chose nursing; and three per cent, the humanities.

In 1976 and 1977, I carried out a survey of pupils in the upper grades of the six high schools. The response rate was just over 80 per cent: 402 out of the total number of 496 pupils. The aim was to discover whether they would choose a university degree in Jewish studies, if such a programme were available in Mexico. The main questions put were the following:

(1) Do you intend to continue your studies at an institution of higher learning?

(2) If so, what subject do you intend to study?

(3) In which university do you intend to pursue these studies?

(4) If a Mexican university were to offer a B.A. in Jewish Studies, would you be interested in such a programme?

(5) If so, at which university?

(6) If so, order your preferences among the following: Bible, Rabbinics, Hebrew language and literature, Jewish history, Modern Israel and the Contemporary Middle East.

(7) Would your parents accept your choice of such a degree? Why? Why not?

Out of the 402 respondents, 47 were planning *aliya* to Israel and a further eight intended to pursue their studies in the United States or elsewhere. All the remaining 347 pupils who intended staying on in Mexico without exception stated that they wished to continue their studies at a university. One third (116 pupils) said they would be interested in a course in Jewish Studies, either as the main or as a minor subject for their degree; and they thought the most appropriate university for such a programme would be the Jesuit Iberoamerican University.

These 116 respondents gave a variety of reasons for their interest in Jewish Studies: 'in order to know ourselves'; as the only alternative to *aliya*; for Jewish self-defence; to enlarge the scope of the Jewish education acquired at school; to understand why Jews still exist as Jews; in order to study among Jews while still living in Mexico; to contribute Jewish values to Mexican culture; for greater identification with Israel;

to transmit Jewish values to one's children; and to cope with personal practical problems and anxieties.

Their choice of subject was, in order of preference, Modern Israel and the Middle East; Jewish History; Hebrew Language and literature. Bible and Rabbinical Studies came last and attracted only the pupils of the orthodox high school, *Colegio Yavne*. This is perhaps a further indication that the base of Jewish identity for Mexican Jews is more Zionist than religious.

For the two-thirds of the pupils who said they would not choose to follow courses in Jewish Studies at University, the reasons they gave were that (1) they were more interested in other subjects; (2) they aimed at a broad and universal range, rather than the limited parochial one; (3) they thought that a career in Jewish Studies not only lacked prestige in the Mexican Jewish community, but also—an important consideration—would provide inadequate remuneration for an acceptable standard of living. Elaborations of this argument included statements that Jewish education was a career for Israeli teachers in Mexico; Jewish Studies lead to a career which is practical only for a rabbi; Judaism is a religion and not a profession; and finally, that a graduate in Jewish Studies would be dependent upon community institutions for a post. Moreover, these respondents believed that their parents would oppose such a choice of studies because of its limited scope as a career and/or the low income the graduate would command if employed in Mexico.

On the other hand, the 116 pupils interested in following a Jewish Studies programme stated that they felt assured of their parents' support both because their parents had strong feelings of Jewishness and because they would always back their children's reasoned choice of study.[5]

It is from the ranks of these 116 pupils that Mexican Jewry can hope to recruit its future native-born Jewish educators.

NOTES

[1] The estimated figure of 40,000 Jews in Mexico was cited by Mr. Sergio Nudelstejer, the Secretary of the Mexican Central Jewish Committee, on the occasion of the First Convention of Mexican Jewish Communities held in Mexico City in November 1973. (It is also the number given by the *American Jewish Year Book*.)

[2] The figures cited for three of the four provincial communities of Mexico at the same Convention were as follows: 120 Jewish households in Tijuana; 110 in Monterrey; and 95 in Guadalajara. Approximately half of the households in Tijuana live on the United States side of the border. I was able to obtain the number of households in Puebla (22) after the Convention.

[3] The only Jewish schools in the provinces are at the primary level in Guadalajara, Monterrey, and Tijuana.

[4] I am most grateful to two eminent figures in Jewish education: Professor Moshe Davis of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who inspired the project; and Dr. Jaime Constantiner of Mexico City, with whose generous support it was carried out.

[5] By law, every private denominational school in Mexico—and, for that matter, throughout most of Latin America—must provide a fixed percentage of school places for both boys and girls, on a scholarship basis, to nationals not of the school's denomination. In the case of Mexico, the requirement is 10 per cent, resulting in the presence of three or four Gentile pupils in each of the high school forms studied here. It is interesting to note that almost all the Gentile pupils who responded to the questionnaire expressed an interest in taking a university degree in Jewish Studies.

AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISRAEL: THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF RESPONDENTS IN PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

Ran Lachman

THIS article analyses the attitudes of the American public towards Israel.[1] It demonstrates the need to consider the social composition of the public whose opinion is analysed. In opinion surveys, people are usually presented as a 'faceless' mass, although they belong to various social groups. Their attitudes are at best related to a few isolated socio-economic characteristics, which in no way can represent the social composition of the sample.

Most studies of attitudes towards foreign groups[2] and most public opinion polls deal with relations between attitudes and such isolated characteristics. Crude percentile breakdowns of survey results according to these types of relation are not only of little use in the study of the sources of public opinion—at times, they may be misleading. For example, a high standard of education or Jewish origin is usually associated with favourable attitudes towards Israel, while less favourable attitudes are associated with little education or Catholic origin.[3] On the other hand, some respondents may hold favourable opinions of Israel despite their low level of education if they are Protestants who have great respect for the Old Testament.[4]

This study is directed at identifying specific combinations of socio-economic characteristics which can explain variations in attitudes towards Israel. On the basis of such combinations of factors, I attempt to divide the attitudes of the American public (in 1974 and 1975) into more or less homogeneous segments, and to examine the attitudes towards Israel within these segments. The purpose of this article is to show that this will provide not only a better explanation of the range of attitudes, but will also give an insight into the social composition of respondents, and so might lead to conclusions which could not have been reached otherwise.

Background

Studies on attitudes towards foreign countries show a variety of theoretical approaches. Some of the researchers approached the issue from the ethnocentrism-stereotypes conceptual scheme[5] while others focused on structural elements in society[6] or on personality factors.[7] The ethnocentrism-stereotypes approach explains attitudes through a series of variables which are connected with perceived 'social distance' from the foreign country, familiarity with its people, and the extent of the stereotypical perception of these people. For example, Regrotski and Anderson examined how German and French respondents rated themselves and each other on 12 national characteristics;[8] in this way, the authors established that each nation has a stereotypical view of the other nation. However, only two predictors of the set of variables examined by them were found to be related to the stereotype held by their respondents: 'acquaintance with the foreign group' and 'education'. The more familiar one was (or the more contact one had) with a foreign group, the more positive one's view of it. Education was related in the same way—the higher the education, the more positive was the attitude towards the foreign group.

Using the psychological framework, Farris considered social-psychological variables—authoritarian personality and political anomie—as predictors of attitudes to foreign affairs.[9] However, the relation between the psychological factors and such attitudes disappeared when education was controlled. Hence, education was found to be the main factor related to attitudes to foreign affairs. Taking a structural approach, Galtung[10] divides the public into two segments by social position: one segment, termed 'center', can be characterised as consisting of 'opinion leaders' who concern themselves with foreign policies and the 'outside world' and form their own opinion on such issues; the residual segment, termed 'periphery', is not much interested in foreign affairs and does not form opinions on such issues, but is influenced by the opinions of the 'center'.

Most of the studies cited above report that very little of the variations in attitudes were explained by the predictors used. Very few variables, if any, were found to be related to the attitudes. One of the reasons for their poor explanatory power may be the attempt to explain attitudes of the public by a series of isolated variables without taking into account the possible interactions among the variables used. Interacting factors may have a specific effect on people's attitudes, which is quite different from the effect that is found when each variable is treated independently.

It is particularly common for the public opinion pollsters to disregard the interaction effects: almost all the results of their surveys are reported by breakdowns according to isolated socio-economic factors like education, income, religion, ethnicity, political affiliation, etc.[11]

The approach to attitude analysis in this paper is closer to Galtung's. However, while Galtung predetermines two social groups by a combination of eight socio-economic factors, no specific groups are predetermined here. Out of a variety of factors, the data analysis can identify any number of combinations which determine the social groups. A higher differentiation of the public into social groups can better explain the variation in attitudes.

The basic proposition of this study is that certain combinations of attitude predictors create unique effects, not to be expected otherwise. Therefore, the purpose here is to identify these interaction effects by generating, rather than testing, hypotheses.

Methodology and procedure

This study is based on secondary analysis of data which were collected as part of the 1974 and 1975 General Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (N.O.R.C.) of the University of Chicago. The interviews took place during March 1974 and April 1975; the median length of an interview was 60 minutes. The 1974 data include 1,484 completed interviews; while in 1975, there were 1,490 completed interviews. Both samples are cross-sectional samples of persons over 18 years, living in non-institutional arrangements within the continental United States.[12] Existing data sets have the disadvantage of being limited to the variables and measures used by the data collectors. This limitation was not a serious impediment in this study since most of the relevant variables were included in the N.O.R.C. data, even though, ideally, it would have been preferable to include some more variables.

Definitions of variables. The attitude towards Israel was measured on two scales. One scale was included in the N.O.R.C. survey and the other derived from it.

The original scale of attitudes towards Israel, as well as towards seven other countries (Egypt, England, Canada, Brazil, Japan, China, and Russia) was based on a ten-point scale of 'liking' the country.[13] It will be referred to as Scale 1. An effort was made to overcome two shortcomings of this scale. One problem which is quite common in survey questionnaires is known as the 'response set' bias: some people tend to answer questions in a consistent 'set' (for example, 'yes' saying). Thus, some of the responses on the scale of the attitudes towards Israel may be due to this bias, particularly as the question was asked for the eight countries in sequence.

The other problem is more substantive. Scale 1 does not give any idea about the position of the respondents *relative* to their position towards other countries. For example, if a respondent dislikes all other

countries and likes Israel, his *relative attitude* towards Israel is much stronger than that of a respondent who likes most countries and also likes Israel—even though both may have the same score on the 'absolute' scale. It is important, therefore, to capture this relative dimension of the attitude. In order to do so, a 'relative' measure of the attitude was derived—standardized by the attitude towards Egypt. Egypt was selected in order to gauge the relative attitude towards the two 'confrontation' countries.[14] In constructing the derived scale 'liking Israel relative to Egypt' (Scale 2), the score on the scale of liking Egypt was subtracted from the score on the scale of liking Israel. To avoid negative numbers, a constant 10 was added to the result. Thus, the derived Scale 2 ranges from 1 (disliking Israel and liking Egypt) through 10 (attitude towards Israel similar to that towards Egypt) to 19 (liking Israel and disliking Egypt). The closer the score to 19, the higher the preference for Israel; the closer the score to 1, the higher the preference for Egypt; and a score of 10 means an undifferentiated attitude towards the two countries. Thus, this scale corrects for the response bias as well as presents the respondent's relative position.

As a test of validity, the scores on the two scales were correlated with each other and found to be moderately correlated ($r = \cdot 60, p < \cdot 001$).

A wide range of socio-economic characteristics were included in the study as predictors of the attitude towards Israel. The predictors were 1: age; 2: sex; 3: education; 4: father's education; 5: family income; 6: financial satisfaction; 7: occupational prestige; 8: father's occupational prestige; 9: subjective perception of own social class; 10: religion; 11: intensity of religious belief; 12: liberalism; 13: political preference; 14: ethnic origin (including race); 15: region of the country; 16: type of residence (rural or urban); and 17: union membership. All these variables were included in the data of both the 1974 and 1975 surveys.

Analysis. Data analysis is directed at the segmentation of the sample into social groups which are relatively homogeneous in terms of socio-economic characteristics, and which differ from each other in terms of their attitude towards Israel. The socio-economic characteristics of the groups are determined by various combinations of predictor-variables which are correlated with the attitude. The power of the resultant segmentation to explain the variance in attitudes is also tested.

The technique employed for achieving the first objective is called Automatic Interaction Detector (A.I.D.); it is based on a stepwise, one-way analysis of variance performed on each combination of classes of variables. At each step of the analysis, the classes of each predictor are dichotomized into various possible combinations and analysis of the variance is performed for each dichotomy. At each step, the dichotomy of classes that is found to have the highest explanatory power constitutes

the basis for splitting the sample into two groups. Each of the resultant groups becomes in turn a candidate for further splits following the same procedure. In other words, at each step (or before each split) all the dichotomies of predictor classes are examined anew, and the split is performed on the predictor which has the highest explanatory power at that stage. This stepwise splitting process stops when the size of the resultant groups is small (N=20), when the increase in the variance explained by a further split is small (less than ·005), or when the resultant group is 'fully' explained. The groups that cannot be further split are called 'final' groups.

The result of this process is a tree-like split of the total sample into groups which are relatively homogeneous in their socio-economic characteristics and which vary in their average attitude towards Israel. The final groups consist of a combination of predictors used along the splitting process (branch).

Since the A.I.D. analysis is directed at maximization of the variance explained, it does not follow any theoretical considerations and thus may result in splits which do not make sense or are spurious. It is up to the researcher to try to avoid such situations by forcing the procedure to use dichotomies which have meaning theoretically, or by eliminating those which do not. Moreover, by running alternative A.I.D. analyses in which dubious predictors are substituted by others, one can minimize spurious splits.[15]

For testing the explanatory power of the resultant trees, the Multi-Classification Analysis (M.C.A.) model is employed. The interaction terms detected by the A.I.D. analysis are recoded as new variables and subjected to the M.C.A. analysis.[16]

Findings. The attitude of the American public towards Israel is described first. Table 1 presents the percentile distribution of liking Israel in 1974 and 1975 and, for the purpose of comparison, that of liking Egypt. In 1974, 54 per cent of the respondents expressed a favourable

TABLE 1. *Distribution of attitudes towards Israel and Egypt in the 1974 and 1975 samples*

	Israel				*Egypt*			
	1974		*1975**		*1974*		*1975*	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
Like very much	24	(330)	20	(261)	10	(137)	7	(90)
Like somewhat	30	(400)	27	(362)	22	(291)	20	(262)
Indifferent	28	(377)	32	(429)	36	(481)	40	(531)
Dislike	18	(240)	21	(278)	32	(438)	33	(448)
*Total***	100	(1347)	100	(1331)	100	(1347)	100	(1331)

* Percentage diferences between 1974 and 1975 are significant at the ·001 level.

** 137 respondents in the 1974 Survey, and 159 in the 1975 Survey, did not express attitudes towards Israel and Egypt.

attitude towards Israel, while in 1975 only 47 per cent did so. Egypt, which was much less popular than Israel in 1974, suffered a similar decrease in popularity in 1975, from 32 to 27 per cent. This comparison suggests that the decrease in popularity is not exclusive to Israel and might possibly be part of a more general phenomenon characterizing American public opinion in 1975.

Can we tell the trees from the forest?

The above percentile distribution of the attitudes towards Israel and Egypt indicates a slight shift between 1974 and 1975. However, these 'forests'—the gross percentile distributions—which appear to be similar in 1974 and 1975 are actually composed of different 'trees'. The attitudes towards Israel relative to Egypt (Scale 2) were analysed by the A.I.D. (tree) analysis in both the 1974 and 1975 samples. The tree analysis for the 1974 data (Figure 1) splits the range of attitudes of the total sample into 10 final groups. The base of the tree (the upper box) indicates the number of people in the sample ($N=1{,}347$), their average attitude score on the scale ($\bar{Y}=11{\cdot}24$), and the variance of scores around this mean ($V=8{\cdot}54$). The first split divides the sample into two religious groups: group 2, including 1,257 Christians whose mean attitude score is $Y=11$; and group 3, including 90 Jews and 'others' whose mean attitude score is $Y=14$. By this split, the sample with its undifferentiated average attitude towards Israel was divided into two distinct groups who have quite different mean attitude scores. Each of these resultant groups is further split to increase the differentiation in attitude scores, and so on.

The tree in Figure 1 indicates that there is an interaction among predictors, which is manifested by their differential effects on the attitudes. Some predictors have an effect on the attitude only in combination with certain other variables, but have little or no effect alone. For example, education has an effect only on attitudes towards Israel (relative to Egypt) held by Christians and has no effect on attitudes held by Jews. Race affects attitudes of Catholics, Lutherans, and Baptists who have higher education, and apparently does not affect attitudes of people with other characteristics. Each of the 10 final groups in the tree represents an interactional effect.

The variables that compose this 'tree' are of two types: socio-cultural and socio-structural. The former type includes religion, race, and ethnicity; while the latter includes education, income, father's education and, to some extent, political orientation. If the branch that is formed primarily by Jewish attitude is disregarded, one can see that the analysis focuses on the differentiation of the attitude of more highly educated non-Jews.[17] There is a considerable variation in attitude scores (scale 2) among the highly educated and its differentiation follows basically

FIGURE 1. *AID (tree) analysis of Scale 2 1974 data*



* *Mainly of Puerto Rican and Mexican origin.*

the two more or less distinct branches—the socio-cultural and the socio-structural. Even though the variables used on each branch are of a different type, some of the resultant groups on one branch have mean attitude scores similar to those of groups on the other (for example, groups 13 and 16, groups 12 and 14). This finding suggests that similar attitudes do not represent homogeneity among the attitude holders in terms of social characteristics.

The ten final groups in the tree represent, as mentioned, the segmentation of the general attitude into groups which are basically homogeneous with respect to their members' attitude. These ten groups can be ranked in terms of their mean score on liking Israel relative to Egypt (See Table 2).[18]

TABLE 2. *Attitude towards Israel relative to Egypt (1974), final groups in rank order by their averages*

Mean attitude score	*Per cent of total sample*	*Group no.*	*Description of group*
15·34	4·0	19	Jews of eastern or western European origin.
13·10	3·0	11	Methodists, 'Other Protestants', and people of no religion with 12 or more years of education, whose father had 0–6 years of schooling.
12·56	7·0	17	Methodists, 'Other Protestants', and people of no religion, with 12 or more years of education, whose fathers had higher education (7 or more years).
12·43	3·0	18	Jews and people of no religion from Black, Irish, English, or German ethnic background.
11·83	8·0	13	Baptists, white or Latin,* with 12 or more years of school.
11·40	14·0	16	Methodists, 'Other Protestants' and people of no religion, with higher education (12 or more years), higher father's education (7 or more years), and family income of up to $5,000 or over $8,000 a year, who consider themselves liberals.
10·83	24·0	12	Catholics or Lutherans, white or Latin,* with high (12 or more years) education.
10·44	30·0	4	Christians and people of no religion who had 0–11 years of school.
10·33	3·0	14	Methodists, 'Other Protestants' and people of no religion with higher education (12 or more years), higher father's education (7 or more years), and with low income ($5,000–$8,000 a year).
9·73	4·0	8	Blacks, Catholics, Lutherans, or Baptists with higher education.

* Of Puerto Rican or Mexican Origin.

The rank order can be divided into 'strong' support for Israel and more 'balanced' attitudes. Groups 18, 17, 11, and 19 can be considered to fall into the former category with relatively high preference for Israel,

while groups 13 and 16 also prefer Israel to Egypt, but not as strongly. The other groups present more or less balanced attitudes.

Two points can be made: first, 39 per cent of the respondents liked Israel more than Egypt and 61 per cent had 'balanced' attitudes; second, and more important, Table 2 reveals the social characteristics of respondents in each group who hold similar attitudes, whether supportive of Israel or 'balanced'. As stated earlier, these characteristics can be quite different despite the similarity in attitudes. For example, white educated Baptists (group 13 in Figure 1) have mean attitude scores similar to those of Methodists and people with no religion who have higher status elements (high education, high father's education, and average and high income), and who do not consider themselves conservatives (group 16). Groups 12 and 14 can serve as another example.

Figure 2 shows the tree analysis of scale 2 for the 1975 data. This tree indicates very clearly that socio-structural variables had a major effect on the attitudes towards Israel relative to Egypt. These variables reflect elements of socio-economic status. There is a marked difference between the attitudes of middle and upper-class respondents, irrespectively of age (group 3 in figure 2) and those of younger people, under forty, who ranked themselves as working or lower class (group 12). Religious affiliations increase the range even more to place middle and upper-class Jews at one extreme and lower-class Protestants at the other (groups 2 and 14 respectively).

The 1975 tree analysis also indicates the existence of an interaction effect. The low status elements had a cumulative negative effect on the attitude scores, while the higher status elements had an almost substitutive effect in maintaining a more or less similar mean of attitude scores. The mean attitude scores, on Scale 2, of groups with the substitutive higher status elements (with the exception of age) hardly changed after four splits ($\bar{Y}=10{\cdot}7$ in group 2 and $\bar{Y}=10{\cdot}3$ in group 13). On the other hand, the means of the attitude scores decreased considerably with the accumulation of low status characteristics (from $\bar{Y}=10{\cdot}7$ to $\bar{Y}=8{\cdot}9$ in group 12).

The final groups of this tree analysis (see Table 3) can also be classified in terms of 'strong' support and 'balanced' attitudes. It is quite clear that the favourable attitudes in 1975 are less intense than in 1974. Only the group including Jews (group 5) had a mean score within the range of the 'strong' support of 1974. However, while 39 per cent of the sample in 1974 liked Israel more than Egypt (scale score of 11·4 and over), in 1975, 58 per cent liked Israel more than Egypt (scale score 11·3 and over). This means that preference for Israel increased in 1975 by almost exactly 50 per cent. At the same time, the 'balanced' attitudes decreased from 61 per cent in 1974 to about 40 per cent in 1975. Thus the decrease in the intensity of attitudes towards Israel in

FIGURE 2. *AID (tree) analysis of Scale 2, 1975 data*



TABLE 3. *Attitude towards Israel relative to Egypt (1975), final groups in rank order by their averages*

Mean attitude score	*Per cent of total sample*	*Group no.*	*Description*
13·71	4·0	5	Upper and middle class and non-Christians.
11·42	10·0	7	Working and lower class with high education (13 or more years)
11·30	43·0	4	Upper- and middle-class Christians.
10·91	22·0	9	Working and lower class with 0–12 years of school, who are 40 years or older.
10·76	10·0	11	Working and lower class, younger than 40 with 0–12 years of education, who have an income of $8,000–$14,999 or over $20,000 a year.
10·30	6·0	13	Working and lower class, with 0–12 years of education, who are younger than 40, whose income is less than $8,000 or $15,000–$20,000 a year, and whose fathers had high education (7 years or more).
9·81	2·0	15	Working and lower class with 0–12 years of education, who are younger than 40, whose income is less than $8,000 or $15,000–$20,000 a year, whose fathers had low education (0–6 years), and who are Catholics, 'Other Protestants', or have no religion.
7·78	2·0	14	The same characteristics as above but are Baptists, Methodists, Lutherans, or non-Christians.

1974 was compensated by an increase in the basis for support. In 1975 more people took sides than in 1974, and most of those took the Israeli side.

The comparison of the trees for the two years shows that they differ: the socio-cultural dimension which played a considerable role in the 1974 analysis almost disappeared in 1975, to give way to the socio-structural dimension of status. To test the possibility that this outcome might be spurious, a few additional A.I.D. analyses were performed by excluding socio-structural variables to allow socio-cultural variables to form the splits. These analyses resulted in very small trees with negligible explanatory power. Thus, the dominant effect of socio-structural variables in explaining the attitudes towards Israel (relative to Egypt) in the 1975 sample seems valid.

To assess the explanatory power of the predictors of attitude scores on Scale 2 and the interaction effects of these predictors, a multi-classificatory analysis (M.C.A.) was employed. The interaction effects detected by the A.I.D. analyses were recorded into separate categories and together with the other predictors were subjected to the M.C.A. The M.C.A. model for the 1974 data accounts for 16·1 per cent of the

variance in scores in Scale 2. The following predictors were found to explain at least ·005 of the variance in attitudes, and therefore were included in the model: religion, education, ethnic origin, occupational prestige, family income, region of the country, social class, father's education, liberalism, age, effects of interaction among status elements, and interactions of ethnicity and religion.

The M.C.A. model for the 1975 data accounts for only 10·6 per cent of the variance in Scale 2 scores. The variables which were included in this model are: 'status effect' (the combined effect of education, income, and father's education, as expressed in the 1975 tree); social class; education; religion; ethnic origin; age; the interaction of 'status effect' with religion; family income; and occupational prestige.

Discussion and conclusion

The findings strongly support the basic assumption that people may have similar attitudes despite their different backgrounds. In trying to understand the sources of attitudes, it is not sufficient to associate attitudes with isolated variables taken from one theory or another: the use of combinations of variables and their interactions provides a far better explanation.

The importance of studying the social composition of respondents in public opinion polls concerning Israel is well demonstrated by almost every finding here, particularly by the results of the A.I.D. analysis. In the 1974 A.I.D. tree (Figure 1), the split branches are along socio-structural and socio-cultural variables. The main split in the group of highly-educated Christians (group 5) is into what can be viewed as more orthodox churches on the one side, and less orthodox churches and those with no religious affiliation on the other. In the former, the religious factor continues to affect the attitudes towards Israel by splitting the more fundamentalist from the less fundamentalist churches (groups 12 and 13). In the latter, the social status elements and political orientations affect the attitudes towards Israel.

It is noteworthy that there is a relatively small variance in the attitudes of respondents with average and low education (group 4). Despite the considerable differences in their educational levels and probably other characteristics (such as race or income), none of the variables in this study could meaningfully differentiate their attitudes towards Israel. It seems that in 1974 the effect of low and average education overrides other factors in affecting the attitudes of this group towards Israel relative to Egypt.

It is also interesting to note that some variables which are commonly associated with attitudes towards Israel were not found to have a very significant effect: race, for example, did not have an across-the-board

effect. In 1974, race unfavourably affected only the attitudes of the segment that may be called 'black intellectuals' (in group 8, Figure 1), although the majority of Blacks in the U.S. have had less than 12 years of education,[19] and are probably included in group 4.

Political orientation is another example: it was not found to have a general effect on attitudes towards Israel in 1974. Whether one was conservative or liberal made a difference only for a specific segment of the sample (group 15).

The comparison of the A.I.D. analyses of the 1974 and 1975 data shows clearly the underlying changes in the nature of the factors affecting attitudes towards Israel relative to Egypt. The socio-cultural elements which played an important role in accounting for the 1974 attitudes had very little effect on those of 1975. The latter are almost solely explained by socio-structural elements, particularly in low status groups. One possible interpretation of this change may be attributed to the economic recession in the U.S.A., which reached its deepest point at the beginning of 1975. It may be that this recession had an impact on people's attitudes and perceptions, particularly among the working and lower classes, who were most affected by the economic situation. On the other hand, when the economic pressures are not felt, the effects of status elements lose their dominance and give way to the effects of other factors, such as religious and ethnic affiliations.

This interpretation can be supported by the results of polls held in the U.S.A. at that time. They indicate that a proportion of the American public held unfavourable attitudes towards Israel because of the economic situation caused by the oil shortage and the steep increase in the price of oil which followed the Yom Kippur War of 1973.[20]

The percentile distribution of attitudes towards Israel and towards Egypt presented in Table 1 shows little change between 1974 and 1975: a drop of seven percentage points in liking Israel and of five percentage points in liking Egypt. Lipset and Schneider report similar findings in the results of major public opinion polls (for example, Roper, Gallup, and Harris).[21] Roper polls taken between 1974 and 1977 show that sympathy for the Arabs was constant at 5–7 per cent, and sympathy for Israel fluctuated in these years between 36 and 47 per cent.

However, by comparing the distribution of attitudes towards Israel relative to Egypt which resulted from the AID analysis for 1974 and 1975 (Tables 2 and 3), one can read different conclusions. Not only did the preference for Israel over Egypt not decrease from 1974 to 1975, it actually increased—as noted above—by 50 per cent (from 39 to 58 per cent).[22] Moreover, the comparison of Table 2 with Table 3 indicates a change not only in scope, but also in intensity of support. In 1975, the proportion of respondents who expressed strong preference for Israel decreased, and the proportion expressing moderate support increased. In other words, in 1975 more people supported Israel than

in 1974, but their support was a less 'enthusiastic' one. This is, of course, a very different finding from those reported by Lipset and Schneider, or which can be derived from Table 1.

In Tables 2 and 3, another important point is illustrated: people from different backgrounds may have similar attitude scores. In other words, if respondents are grouped together by their attitude scores, their different socio-economic background is not revealed, and they appear to be homogeneous groups. But since the socio-economic background of respondents is relevant for an understanding of the sources of attitudes, such an understanding may be impaired when their social composition is ignored.

In conclusion, the findings presented here have implications on the methodological, theoretical, and substantive levels. From the methodological point of view, they demonstrate the need for studying in detail the social composition of respondents in public opinion surveys: simple percentile breakdowns constitute not only an insufficient analysis, but they may also be misleading since they blur the interactional effects.

On the theoretical level, the findings indicate that quite drastic changes may occur in the social composition of groups of respondents over relatively short periods of time (a year), without this fact becoming apparent. The 'forests' may look alike even though they are made up of different trees. People may hold similar attitudes for different reasons; grouping them together on the basis of similarity in attitudes may hinder the understanding of the sources of the attitudes.

On the substantive level, the findings indicate that the sources of support for Israel changed drastically between 1974 and 1975, although the proportion of those who liked Israel did not alter much. The proportion of respondents who liked Israel more than Egypt increased, but the intensity of the support decreased. Changes of this type may frequently occur and will be better understood by analysing the socio-economic backgrounds of respondents in public opinion polls.

NOTES

[1] This study was made possible in part by funds granted by the American Jewish Committee. I am indebted to Kevin Clancy for his valuable suggestions and comments.

[2] See, for example, D. Druckman, 'Ethnocentrism in the Inter-nations Simulation', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 12, no. 1, 1968, pp. 45–68 and C. Farris, 'Selected Attitudes on Foreign Policy as Correlates of Authoritarianism and Anomie', *Journal of Politics*, vol. 22, 1960, pp. 50–67.

[3] See, for example, S. M. Lipset and W. Schneider, *American Opinion Towards Israel and Jews*, monograph circulated by the Israel Academic Committee on the Middle East, Jerusalem, 1977.

[4] ibid.

[5] See, for example, W. Buchanan and H. Cantril, *How Nations See Each Other*, Urbana, Ill., 1953; Druckman, op. cit.; R. Mapp, 'Cross National Dimensions of Ethnocentrism', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, vol. 6, no. 1, 1970, pp. 73–96; and E. Regrotski and N. Anderson, 'National Stereotypes and Foreign Contact', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 23, 1959, pp. 515–28.

[6] For example, N. W. Cutler, 'Generational Succession as a Source of Foreign Policy Attitude: A Cohort Analysis of American Opinion', *Journal of Peace Research*, 1970, pp. 46–66; and J. Galtung, 'Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position', *Journal of Peace Research*, 1964, pp. 206–31.

[7] See Farris, op. cit. and B. Smith, 'The Personal Setting of Public Opinions' in Harold M. Proshanski and Bernard Seidenberg, eds., *Basic Studies in Social Psychology*, New York, 1965.

[8] Regrotski and Anderson, op. cit.

[9] Farris, op. cit.

[10] Galtung, op. cit.

[11] See *Gallup Opinion Index*, Princeton, N.J., 1967–71; *Harris Survey Yearbook of Public Opinion*, New York, 1969–71; and Lipset and Schneider, op. cit.

[12] For more details, see *General Social Survey*, 1974 and 1975 Code books.

[13] The scale is based on the answers to the following question: 'Boxes on this card go from the highest position of "plus 5" for a country you like very much to the lowest position of "minus 5" for a country you dislike very much. How far up (or down) the scale would you rate the following countries?' This scale will be referred to as Scale 1.

[14] Another scale standardized by the mean attitude scores of all other countries was also constructed, but was found to be inappropriate for measuring the 'relative' position towards Israel. It was strongly affected by the attitudes towards some of the other countries in the questionnaire.

[15] For a more detailed explanation of A.I.D., see John A. Sonquist, *Multivariate Model Building*, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1970; J. A. Sonquist and James N. Morgan, *The Detection of Interaction Effect*, I.S.R., Ann Arbor, 1964; and J. A. Sonquist, E. Baker, and J. N. Morgan, *Searching for Structure*, I.S.R., Ann Arbor, 1971.

[16] A detailed discussion of the M.C.A. can be found in Frank M. Andrews *et al.*, *Multiple Classification Analysis* (second edition), I.S.R., Ann Arbor, 1973 and Sonquist, *Multivariate Model Building*, op. cit.

[17] Group 3 is composed mainly of Jewish people. The term 'Other Religions' refers to an unspecified residual category on the questionnaire for religious affiliations other than Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant. Respondents in this category are concentrated mainly in group 18 and constitute a very small proportion of the sample—less than three per cent.

[18] It must be emphasized that the ranking should be regarded as an ordinal one and not as an equal-intervals scale.

[19] *The World Almanac*, Newspaper Enterprise Association, New York, 1978.

[20] Lipset and Schneider, op. cit., pp. 22–23, cite examples of such surveys.

[21] ibid.

[22] The percentage of favourable attitudes towards Israel (relative to Egypt) is different in its meaning from the percentage of the 'absolute' favourable attitude towards Israel reported. The former tells us that in 1974 about 40

per cent of the people had a considerable preference for Israel over Egypt, while the latter indicates that 54 per cent of the respondents expressed some kind of 'liking Israel'.

THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN SYNAGOGUE RITUAL IN CANADIAN CONSERVATIVE CONGREGATIONS

Morty M. Lazar

NOWADAYS, Jewish women are making ever increasing demands for a more adequate recognition of their rights in religious practice and ritual. While these demands may be heard in all quarters and ideological schools, they do not present the same sort of problem to Reform and Orthodox Judaism as is the case with the Conservative Movement. Reform Judaism *formally* abolished inequalities in religious practices long ago (although, in fact, some inequalities still exist). It should be noted, however, that the problem for the Reform Movement was not especially difficult since that Movement had comparatively few traditional religious practices and rituals.

Orthodoxy presents a radically different perspective. Both men and women are obliged to fulfil *mitsvot*. Men must adhere to all 613 commandments. 'The woman, on the other hand, is excused from the performance of certain positive commandments which are restricted to specific time periods, in recognition of her primary obligation to family and home duties.'[1] For the upholders of Orthodoxy there is no problem: men and women have their separate but 'equal' obligations, which are spelled out clearly in traditional religious law—the Halakha.

Conservative Judaism, on the other hand, faces much greater difficulties than those encountered by either Reform or Orthodox Judaism. Its major challenge is to make traditional law function in the modern world; the responsibility for this rests in large part with the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of the Rabbinical Assembly—the international association of Conservative rabbis. It appears, at least from the actions of that Committee, that efforts are being made to avoid either abandoning traditional practices for the sake of abandonment (as is sometimes said to be the case in the Reform Movement) or adhering to traditional practices simply because they are traditional (as seems

to be the Orthodox situation). Rather, the Committee attempts to modify traditional practices on the basis of various precedents to be found in Talmudic and post-Talmudic legal formulations—that is, to change what can be changed, but in a manner defined as being correct according to the Halakha.

Conservative Judaism occupies a middle ground between the Reform Movement and Orthodoxy. One major result of this is that it lacks a clearly understood and exact ideological position, both internally and vis-à-vis the two other major branches of Judaism. This apparent lack of a clearly understood ideology has created a number of problems and difficulties for Conservative Judaism. These can be seen most clearly in the manner in which changes and modifications (particularly those dealing with the abolition of inequalities in religious practices and rituals relating to women) have been implemented. The various modifications have been carried out in what might be called a typical Conservative fashion—congregational 'local option': several changes sanctioned by decisions of the Rabbinical Assembly are thus viewed as 'permitting' but not 'compelling' individual rabbis or congregations.[2] Although these changes are considered not to infringe traditional law, they are not seen as binding—the argument being that to make them binding upon all congregations might upset local tradition and practice.

On the one hand, this type of development may reflect, as Sklare has observed,[3] differences in ideological orientations and commitments of Conservative rabbis and laity with regard to the problem of making traditional law function in the modern world. On the other, however, this development may be indicative of the realization by the organizational hierarchy that lay persons rather than rabbis were the real founders of Conservatism and that to ensure the continuation of the movement, some degree of lay input and freedom in the field of religious practice and ritual must by necessity be institutionalized.

It should be noted, however, that the Rabbinical Assembly is not totally at the mercy of congregational or lay local option with regard to institutionalizing changes. In 1945, the Prayer Book Commission of the Rabbinical Assembly introduced a significant symbolic change in the *siddur*: it rephrased the three preliminary blessings in the morning service which had aroused a great deal of controversy. The blessings traditionally read as follows: 'Blessed art Thou O Lord our God, King of the universe, Who has not made me a gentile, a slave, a woman.' In the Conservative prayer book these were changed to: 'Blessed art Thou O Lord our God, King of the universe, Who has created me in His image, has made me free, and made me an Israelite.'[4]

In March 1976, the Religious Services Committee of a Canadian affiliate of the United Synagogue of America (the Conservative congregational body) sent a questionnaire to all Canadian Conservative synagogues, formally affiliated with the United Synagogue body. There

were twenty-eight affiliated congregations (excluded were those that define themselves as being within the Conservative Movement but not formally affiliated to it). The questionnaire dealt almost exclusively with the role of women in synagogue practices and rituals. Twenty-one congregations (75 per cent) responded to the questionnaire; since they were in all regions of the country, it may be assumed that a fairly accurate picture of synagogue practices and rituals for the Conservative Movement in Canada was provided.

The Bat Mitsvah. In terms of public worship and/or ritual, the existence of the Bat Mitsvah ceremony (between the ages of twelve and thirteen, when a Jewish girl comes of age religiously) may be viewed as a tentative first step towards the abolition of inequalities in synagogue practice; the ceremony is now practically universal in Conservative synagogues.[5] All the responding congregations observe it. While at first glance this appears to be an extension of the rights of women in these congregations, one can question whether the ceremony has the same symbolic importance as does the Bar Mitsvah for males.

Evidence of this possible difference in symbolic significance can be found in the congregational responses concerning the nature and structure of the ceremony itself. Only nine (43 per cent) of the twenty-one congregations indicated that the ceremony was conducted exactly like the Bar Mitsvah. The possible inconsistencies of the situation are further compounded when one examines the nature of the ceremony, particularly in the light of its two key elements—saying the Haftarah and receiving the Maftir honour. There is little question as to a properly educated young male receiving both the Maftir honour and saying the Haftarah. However, while the vast majority of the congregations (eighteen of the twenty-one or 86 per cent) allow or require the Bat Mitsvah to recite the Haftarah, only eleven (52 per cent) allow her to receive the Maftir honour. This splitting of religious rituals normally associated with a single religious ceremony is a clear indication of inconsistency in religious practice as it applies to females.[6] In effect, the implication is that the Bat Mitsvah ceremony made available to them is of second-class symbolic significance; it does not carry the same degree of importance to highlight the same event in a girl's life as does the Bar Mitsvah ceremony for a boy.

Post-Bat Mitsvah. The pattern of less than equal treatment of women which is evident in the Bat Mitsvah ceremony is even clearer in the structure of adult religious participation. In none of the institutionalized public traditional rituals from opening and closing the Holy Ark (where Torah scrolls are kept) to counting all adults in a *minyan*, do a majority of the congregations provide for equality of participation by women. Nevertheless, there appears to be a hierarchy of practice—a hierarchy which one is tempted to say runs from least offensive to most offensive to the male-dominated congregations.

The least innocuous practice in the area of adult participation seems to be allowing women to open and close the Holy Ark during religious services: eight (38 per cent) of the twenty-one congregations allow them to do so. While this is a highly visible form of participation (the congregation's attention *is* focused on the Ark), its significance as a major ritual is not great: the scrolls are neither removed nor touched. Moreover, even in the case of such a relatively unimportant public ritual, only just over a third of the congregations allow women this form of participation.

Next in importance is the practice of permitting women to recite a Haftarah other than at the time of their Bat Mitsvah. One third of the congregations (seven) do so. Once again, while this is a highly visible activity, and one that is of ritual importance, the Haftarah is not read from a Torah scroll and thus does not directly involve touching this most sacred object. Nevertheless, for the majority of congregations, the practice of women reciting a Haftarah seems to be a one-time-only affair, limited to the Bat Mitsvah.

Two practices involving the Torah scrolls are of major importance: reading from the Torah and carrying it in procession. What is initially inconsistent is not the small number of congregations—four (19 per cent)—which allow each practice, but rather that no congregation allows both practices. In addition, two congregations stated that women were allowed to carry the Torah in procession only on special occasions (unfortunately neither indicated what those occasions might be, though it could be safe to assume that it was on Simhat Torah).

Since reading from the Torah is obviously more important than carrying it in procession, one might have predicted qualifications and/or restrictions (for example, allowing it only on a special occasion) with regards to the former. However, it should be noted that one does not normally touch the Torah scroll when reading from it: a pointer is used.

Two additional practices should be noted at this point—giving women *aliyot* and counting them as part of a *minyan*. Three congregations (14 per cent) indicated that women can receive an *aliyah*. In all three, however, this was possible only on special occasions. All indicated what these occasions were and in each congregation the pattern was consistent—a wife being 'permitted to join her husband' or 'a Bride permitted to join the Groom' for an *aliyah*. Under normal circumstances, an adult female is not allowed this particular form of public religious participation.

Finally, only one of the twenty-one congregations counts women as part of a *minyan*, the quorum of ten adults without which public worship is not possible. In one sense, then, this may be more indicative of the exact nature of the position of women in synagogue practices than are the various other elements of public ritual behaviour. The Bar Mitsvah

ceremony publicly symbolizes the initiation of a male into covenantal-legal power, with full adult responsibility within the sphere of religious obligations and rights; immediately after, he can be counted as a member of a *minyan*.

Since twenty out of twenty-one congregations do not count women, but all do have a Bat Mitsvah ceremony, one may assume that that ceremony *does not* confer on females the rights and duties which the Bar Mitsvah entails for a male.

Discussion

It is clearly evident from the available data that Conservative congregations in Canada are not providing full equality for women in public ritual participation. It is after the Bat Mitsvah ceremony that major sex role differentials become most apparent, since no distinction is made between pre-adolescent boys and girls.

The proscriptive nature of adult female participation in public ritual can be explained (or rationalized) in a number of different ways. While it is not within the scope of this short paper to deal with these 'explanations', it is worth considering one of the most common arguments now in use, since its spuriousness may point to a quite different explanation.

In effect, the argument is made that men will be driven away from the synagogue if women are given full and equal rights. Men would be embarrassed by women who might be better at saying the blessings, reading a Haftarah, or reading from the Torah.[7] In a sense, the male ego is viewed as quite fragile. While, obviously, this type of argument overlooks the impact of the various inequalities on the female, its spuriousness lies elsewhere. If the argument is valid, as so many seem to believe, then why is it not extended to the Bat Mitsvah ritual as well? After all, is not the ego of a thirteen-year-old male as susceptible to embarrassment as that of an adult male's, if he too has to face the possibility of a twelve- or thirteen-year-old female performing better than he can? It seems clear that a more adequate explanation is necessary.[8]

By dichotomizing the various rituals and practices into one category which includes only *aliyot* and *minyan* and another which includes all other rituals and practices, a more tenable explanation may be possible. It is clear that a hierarchy of symbolic social distance is present regarding the rituals in the second category. The closer the ritual brings *the adult woman* to *actually handling* the Torah scrolls (the most sacred symbolic object in Judaism), the more discriminatory are congregational practices.

A more plausible explanation may be that there are residual elements of the Orthodox concept of *niddah* (that is, the belief that women are unclean during menstruation—or ritually impure). If a menstruating

woman is considered to be in some way unclean or impure (even if only vaguely), she might contaminate sacred objects if she handles them.[9] Thus, the hierarchy of discriminatory ritual practices may function as an institutionalized attempt at preserving or perpetuating a residual folk element of religious tradition.

Canadian Conservative Jewish adults stem largely from Orthodox or quasi-Orthodox homes and tend to retain some nostalgic attachments to aspects of Orthodox traditions.[10] Thus, while the concept of *niddah* is not a publicly articulated component of Conservative Judaism, it may well be that some degree of awareness of *niddah* still exists among those who identify themselves as Conservative Jews.

As for the first category, *aliyot* and *minyan* are the two most basic religious rights (or obligations) involving the individual male at the time of Bar Mitsvah; in terms of symbolic significance, they serve as public indicators that he is a fully participating member of the adult world in religious ritual and practice. If congregations gave full and equal *aliyot* and *minyan* rights to adult women, then it would become even more difficult to debar them from full and equal participation in the other rituals and practices. (Using this frame of reference, it becomes somewhat more understandable that full and equal participation of adult women in *aliyot* and *minyan* seems not to be the first step in providing equality of participation, which logic would dictate as a normal progression from Bat Mitsvah to adult status, but rather the last.)

Finally, the committees of the Rabbinical Assembly which have had the responsibility of interpreting the traditional laws have tended in the past to lean towards conservative or rightist interpretations.[11] However, it is clear that the situation today has changed. The Rabbinical Assembly has made significant advances in the religious enfranchisement of women—but the congregations have lagged behind. This reflects the perennial dilemma of the Conservative Movement: legitimation of change is either too slow or too fast for the laity.

NOTES

[1] Rabbi Menachem M. Schneerson, 'The Jewish Woman', *Vaad L'Hafotzas Sichos*, vol. VII, no. 7, May 1974, p. 2.

[2] Robert Gordis, 'Women Rights in Jewish Life and Law', *United Synagogue Review*, April 1977, p. 5.

[3] Marshall Sklare, *Conservative Judaism: An American Religious Movement*, Glencoe, Ill., 1955, pp. 199–245.

[4] Gordis, op. cit., p. 30.

[5] The Bat Mitsvah has gained some tentative acceptance in Orthodox circles. Nevertheless, the rationale for allowing it (and even the physical loca-

tion of the ceremony) clearly indicate that it is, and must be kept, quite different from the Bar Mitsvah. An elaboration of the role and the place of the Bat Mitsvah in at least one segment of the Orthodox community appears in Immanuel Jakobovits, 'Jewish Law Faces Modern Problems', in Leon D. Stitskin, ed., *Studies in Torah Judaism*, New York, 1969, pp. 365–67.

[6] It should be noted that this inconsistency in practice may be related to the fact that the Maftir honour is read from the Torah scroll itself, while the Haftarah is not.

[7] See Blu Greenberg, 'Jewish Women: Coming of Age' in *Tradition*, vol. 16, no. 4, Summer 1977, p. 85.

[8] The other major argument is one of tradition. Women have simply not engaged in these various public rituals. This is an equally spurious argument. The various 'innovations' have all been sanctioned by the Rabbinical Assembly as being legitimate in terms of traditional law. In addition, of course, the Conservative Movement has made and implemented other major changes.

[9] It should be noted that according to the Babylonian Talmud (tractate *Berakhot* 22a), there is no objection to a woman holding the Sefer Torah at any time. The anthropological literature provides numerous examples of the concept of menstrual impurity. The idea is also well institutionalized among Orthodox Jews (see for example, Jacob Smithline, *Torah Laws for the Modern Woman*, New York, 1968, pp. 33–51). However, it should be pointed out that the idea of menstrual impurity or uncleanliness may be much more widespread in North America than many believe. See, for example, Janice Delaney, Mary Jane Lupton, and Emily Toth, *The Curse: A Cultural History of Menstruation*, New York, 1976.

[10] Evelyn Kallen, *Spanning the Generations: A Study in Jewish Identity*, Don Mills, Ontario, 1977, p. 72.

[11] Sklare, op. cit., p.236 and Charles S. Liebman, 'The Religion of American Jews', in Marshall Sklare, ed., *The Jew in American Society*, New York, 1974, p. 240.

GERMAN ZIONISM

Werner J. Dannhauser

(*Review Article*)

I

PROFESSOR Poppel has studied an important and intriguing phenomenon with the requisite intensity; the result is a useful book.* The subject of German Zionism can hardly be said to be *terra incognita*, especially since it appears at times that there was no German Zionist of note who failed to write voluminously—a fact that may not be accidental or trivial. Yet questions remain and even proliferate, it being curiously difficult to 'find the proper handle' for an adequate treatment. For those looking for the latter, Poppel is of invaluable assistance not only by way of the text he has produced but by virtue of the statistics he has collected as well as the illustrations he has chosen—almost all of them illuminating. The book is not without flaws but it demands exposition before criticism.

Poppel has decided to delineate his subject matter rigorously, as is indicated by the title and sub-title of the book, in order to achieve a sharp focus on what he considers Zionism's provocative but overly narrow conception of Jewish identity. He seeks to understand Zionism as it understood itself (according to Poppel as a kind of *volkish* nationalism) and to extend the same courtesy to German Jewry as a whole. He considers his procedure scientific and forthrightly insists on the accuracy of his conclusions.

Before venturing on his sociological-historical study, Poppel surveys the 'territory' in an introductory chapter. He agrees with Kurt Blumenfeld's characterization of Zionism as a 'post assimilatory phenomenon'. In Germany, as elsewhere, it had to confront and combat the view of Judaism as simply a religion. That view, a result of Jewish emancipation in the nineteenth century, was coeval with the disappearance of the ghettos under the onslaught of the French Revolution. If the Jews were simply citizens of their various countries, separated from other citizens merely because of their religion, they could enter the mainstream of the life of their countries—or so they thought. A number of them thus

* Stephen M. Poppel, *Zionism in Germany, 1897–1933: The Shaping of a Jewish Identity*, xviii + 234 pp. The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1977, $7.95.

began to think of themselves not primarily as Jews but as 'German citizens of the Jewish faith'.

When assimilation proved to be unquestionably impossible (especially in Germany) because the Jews were never fully accepted into the mainstream of national life no matter what they did, and perhaps undesirable because the attempt to join clubs which grant admission begrudgingly (if at all) exacts a considerable psychic cost, Zionism became a way of reasserting the peoplehood of the Jews. It was above all a commitment to a full Jewish way of life. According to Herzl, 'Zionism is our return to Judaism even before our return to Zion.'

While Poppel attempts to give Herzl his due, he is not uncritical of the Zionist stance. Just as one could well be an assimilationist and an honourable man, one could well be, and frequently was, a Zionist and profess views beset by contradictions. The above quotation by Herzl points to a tension plaguing the thought and lives of many Zionists: they managed a return to a Judaism of sorts, but they did not dream, or merely dreamed, of returning to Zion. Instead, they rationalized their dilemma by thinking in terms of two Zions, an ideal for German Jews, who needed spiritual sustenance while continuing to reside in the Reich, and an actual homeland, a material Zion, for their eastern European brethren who had never been emancipated and were subjected to mounting persecution.

Such a bifurcated Zionism was inevitably headed for trouble. Before entering into the wars of the spirit soon to characterize the German Zionist movement, Poppel traces the latter's organizational history. He makes clear that the Zionists never constituted more than a small minority among German Jewry, less than 10 per cent even in 1933. Prominent among them were professionals, the young, and recent arrivals from countries to the east of Germany, whom many contemptuously referred to as *Ostjuden*. Neither the peculiar sociological profile of the Zionist movement, nor the dearth of membership was likely to depress the leadership. In fact, Poppel refers to the 'self-congratulatory' elitism of top Zionists like Kurt Blumenfeld. Be that as it may, German Zionism could be characterized not only by self-confidence but by diversity as well. For example, it did not limit itself to the political orientation stressed by Herzl and his followers; led by figures like Buber and Schocken it was active in what came to be known as cultural Zionism.

In the beginning the predominant spirit of German Zionism in speech as well as deed might be characterized as either moderate or passive, depending on one's orientation. The German Zionists worked for a Jewish National Homeland but their labours resembled charity work in that a Jewish state was viewed as a haven for less fortunate Jews, a rubric from which the Jews of Germany excluded themselves. Then, in 1912, Blumenfeld engineered the passage of the Posen Resolu-

tion, which called for every Zionist 'to incorporate emigration to Palestine in his life program'. Such radicalization came about not only as a result of Blumenfeld's design but because of the accidents inevitably associated with parliamentary manœuvrings. Its import was not immediately apparent and later its opponents took it more seriously than did its champions. The Posen Resolution was successful in yielding publicity for the Zionist cause, and its call for commitment may have appealed to those in whom a noble devotion was waiting to be awakened. To say this is to acknowledge that it was unsuccessful in its call for *Aliyah*. When all is said and done one must come to terms with the melancholy truth that the German Jews talked about going to what was then Palestine but remained in what was soon to become Hitler's tyranny.

A whole chapter of Poppel's book is devoted to 'The Failure of Alyah', it being surely necessary to pay attention to the fact that between 1919 and 1933 a mere 2,000 German Jews took their Zionism seriously enough to effect a return to Zion. The author maintains that while the Posen Resolution may have galvanized the movement, it also exacerbated the split between rhetoric and reality that always plagued German Zionism. It is possibly because of that split that he unhesitatingly labels Zionism an ideology.

The author sees a close and inevitable connection between ideology and identity; it is pre-eminently within this frame of reference that he analyses the functions of German Zionism. The ideology impelled a move from self-denial to self-affirmation and in the process produced an alleged or real discovery of self or identity. The process might be sudden or gradual, quiet or fervent. The roads to Zion were many, a number of them resembling a religious conversion or a quasi-mystical experience. Yet the new identity was never free of tension, for the ideology informing it emphasized a need to leave Germany that in most cases entailed no practical consequences. Since assimilationists could also affirm their Judaism and thus gain or regain an identity, no compelling reason seemed to exist for the Zionism of most Zionists.

Nor, according to Poppel, was the Zionist understanding of antisemitism superior in all respects to that of the assimilationists. The latter, to be sure, tended to be grossly deluded in their hope of acceptance by a Germany in which dislike of Jews covered the whole spectrum of political view-points. But the Zionists were prey to lesser misunderstandings of their own, thinking they might actually earn the *respect* of Germans by forthrightly identifying themselves as a *Volk* within the German state. Their theorizing about the meaning of *Volk* was but one of political viewpoints. But the Zionists were prey to lesser misunder- They were efficient; they took pride in organization and efficiency; Buber's murky talk of blood appealed to them; and they even formed fraternities complete with duels and excessive consumption of beer.

The author makes a convincing case for a specifically German influence in what at first sight might appear as an un-German trait among German Zionists, namely their disproportionate representation in groups committed to a 'dovish' policy towards Palestine's Arabs. They provided much of the energy for the various programmes of binationalism, and some of them held fast to their principles long after Arab practices exposed their views as highly unrealistic. One might associate things German exclusively with militarism, but such fanatic pacifism can also be said to be rooted in a unique brand of German idealism which entails utter political naiveté. Be that as it may, in Palestine the German Zionists acted curiously like their assimilationist adversaries did in Germany; they thought that through sweet reasonableness they might win the goodwill of those who hated them.

Not even Hitler's advent to power in 1933 brought all the German Zionists into an adequate contact with reality. Indeed, the movement endured a debate concerning the possibility of doing business with the Nazis. The leaders of Zionism lived on into the Holocaust and beyond it, but few of them excelled in learning the lessons of history. Arriving at this conclusion, Poppel praises German Zionists and Zionism within limits only. His final verdict combines praise for giving a number of Jews a new identity with blame for Zionism's failure as an ideology. The German Zionists understood a good deal but Germany itself was not one of their objects of comprehension, and they were as much history's victims as they were its makers.

II

The preceding summary, albeit inadequate, should convince impartial potential readers of Poppel's book that he has touched on a number of crucially important matters. What is more, he has obviously approached his topic with a commendably firm determination to do justice to all the men and movements he discusses, their intentions, successes, failures and historical effect. Usually the author succeeds in this endeavour; in fact, a number of times he succeeds to a fault. A single example will suffice. Poppel seems to be moderately sympathetic to the German Zionists, but he wishes to be fair to their opponents, the assimilationists. The latter have had a bad press since 1933, so it is refreshing to have their cause presented in the best possible light. It ought to go without saying, but these days it does not, that an assimilationist is not a convert to Christianity. He may have a Christmas tree in his house, and he may eat prawns as a matter of principle, but he remains a Jew, perceiving himself as such. No other Jew has the right to read him out of the community. The assimilationist's life is attended by dilemmas and contradictions, but so is the life of every Jew who takes cognizance of the credos of modernity.

One of Poppel's virtues is that he gives the assimilationists their due—but he goes on to do more than that. Attracted by the well-known phenomenon that two opponents frequently share more fundamental views and errors than either of them cares to admit, Poppel is too ready to discover symmetries, and he surely goes too far when he declares that 'the Zionist analysis of the Jewish situation in Germany was little better than the assimilationist one' (p. 122). That statement is not supported adequately by the analysis preceding it and one can say no more on Poppel's behalf in this case than that he is leaning over backwards to be fair.

That, of course, is an endearing failing, if it is a failing at all. Unfortunately the book also contains flaws which are impossible to transfigure into virtues. For one thing, by limiting his discussion too rigidly to the time and place indicated by the title the author has done himself a disservice. He does include a backward glance but is apparently too constrained to be able to allow a single mention of Moses Hess. In addition, and more importantly, he is so rigid in limiting his inquiries, that he steers clear of the many German Jews who were active primarily in the World Zionist movement. He has thus managed to do something that is not all that easy, write a book on Zionism in Germany that does not mention Max Nordau at all. The narrow focus forces him to slight events as well as men, as can be seen from the neglect of any serious treatment of the dilemma posed for German Zionists in 1917 by the publication of the Balfour Declaration in a country with which Germany was then at war. Having to abstract from too much, Poppel has written a book too much suffused by abstractions.

Nor is the book held closer to the specifics of reality by Poppel's predilection for writing and thinking within the framework of modern social science. The discussion of identity, indebted to Erik Erikson, is not very illuminating, or at least not as enlightening as those quotations the author provides in which German Jews tell of their troubles in more common speech. The talk of ideology is at times unclear because the concept of ideology is abused by a social science unwilling or unable to distinguish among philosophy, common opinion, true and false evaluations, profound reflection, and debased popularization. Poppel's dwelling on the split between rhetoric and reality in German Zionism is potentially fruitful, but he rarely fulfils the potential interest in his reflections. He appears insufficiently aware of the fact that a split between rhetoric and reality necessarily characterizes all political movements. Indeed, it informs all human existence, for what we say can scarcely be perfectly consonant with what we do. It is by no means necessary to regard the split as tragic or evil. It does, it is true, involve what may be considered hypocrisy, but in that case one must ponder the wisdom of La Rochefoucauld's saying that hypocrisy is the tribute paid by vice to virtue. The words describing deeds are better than the

deeds they describe; words justify actions. The abolition of the split between rhetoric and reality can be attained only by lowering the aspirations embodied in rhetoric and never by raising the actions perpetrated in reality. Even then, the split may be natural and thus would reappear—in lower actions. For example, what would have happened had Zionist rhetoric in Germany been in line with Zionist reality? One may well doubt that anybody would have acted better. On the other hand, the 'idealism' of the Posen Resolution may well have elicited a few noble deeds by a 'chosen few'. In other words, theory may elevate practice and the only way to bring and keep them in line may be through a perpetual lowering of one's sights.

However, *Zionism in Germany* has considerable merits in spite of these and other shortcomings. One can learn from Poppel's volume. The following concluding remarks owe a good deal to him (though this reviewer has learned most about German Zionism from the profound reflections on the subject by Leo Strauss and Gershom Scholem).

III

The connection between things German and Zionism is deep. Anyone disposed to deny that assertion would have to begin by accounting for the fact that the three classic works of Zionist theory were all written in German: *Rome and Jerusalem* by Moses Hess (1862), *Auto-Emancipation* by Leo Pinsker (1882) and *The Jewish State* by Theodor Herzl (1896). In addition, the specifically Jewish spoken language was, before the birth of modern Hebrew, Yiddish. Its closest relative among the family of languages was unquestionably German, though it was never, as far too many German Jews were prone to think, simply a barbarized form of German. Finally, the culture of the West which the majority of Jews adopted or yearned for after Emancipation tended to be expressed in German. After all, its greatest philosophers were Kant and Hegel, its greatest poet Goethe. Jews and Germans were thus destined for intricate interaction.

The German reaction to Jewish entry into what Heine called the world-theatre was, to put it most charitably, ambivalent. One finds few friends of Jews among German thinkers and poets, while one can discover among their writings much that expresses indifference, disdain, disgust. Even the indubitable benevolence of Lessing has been widely misunderstood, for the latter was candid in admitting that he yearned for a world containing neither Christians nor Jews. Others were not given to such Olympian impartiality. For a Jew to read the remarks on Jews by men of the stature of, say, Goethe and Kant is to experience pain—especially, of course, if one admires these writers. One may say that the same sentiments are found in Burke and others of the English tradition of thought, but the dislike of Jews in Germany

by eminent men fell on ground fertile for breeding hatred of Jews and probably contained a special edge of virulence. If one accepts the wise nineteenth-century Jewish adage that an antisemite is someone who dislikes Jews more than is reasonable, one has to acknowledge that in the country of thinkers and poets its poets and thinkers—all honour to exceptions like Nietzsche—disliked Jews more than was reasonable.

In that respect the leaders of the spirit were representative men. The German nation as a whole did not take kindly to its Jews and was obsessed by them, though by 1933 they constituted scarcely more than one per cent of the population. Talk of a German–Jewish dialogue or a German–Jewish symbiosis in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is, as Gershom Scholem has shown brilliantly, so much prattle. Instead there arose widespread concern over the Jewish problem or question, the *Judenfrage*. The term came into use only in the 1820's; before that there was no talk of a problem because there was no thought of a possible solution. But the nineteenth century was enraptured by dreams of progress, and everyone began to look for a solution to the Jewish problem, everyone from the Jews themselves to their worst enemies.

Everyone failed. That can be cause for rejoicing when one reflects on the Nazis' attempt at a final solution, though the joy fades when one contemplates the Holocaust. The liberals failed because a state compelling its citizens to 'accept' Jews is no longer a liberal state. The conservatives failed because, as Maurice Samuel showed, Jews make bad gentlemen. The Marxists failed because they never understood either religion or nationalism. Meanwhile, the hatred of Jews grew worse. In the 1870's it came to be called antisemitism. Hitherto, conversion to Christianity was a possibility, but once the Jews were claimed to be a biological entity, there was no escape from one's fate as a Jew by changing one's faith.

Everyone failed, including the Jews themselves. The assimilationists' failure was in many cases attended by poignancy as well as delusion. Many of them were forced to wrestle with an irreconcilable contradiction. Calling themselves German citizens of the Jewish faith, they lacked faith in Judaism and were thus hard put to define either their loyalties or their refusal to attempt to become Christians.

Everyone failed, including the Zionists, but theirs was in all likelihood the most interesting failure and the one most attended by partial successes. As a group, one must acknowledge them to have been certainly more far-sighted and probably more noble than their fellow Jews in Germany. In many ways, it is true, they resembled the assimilationists. On both sides the rhetoric was rife with references to Kant, Fichte, Goethe, Schiller. Both took pride in their culture and education, their German *Bildung*. Both were apt to believe themselves superior to other Jews, especially those from Poland and other countries to the East, the *Ostjuden*.

Yet at this very point, one must begin to distinguish the German Zionists from their fellow Jewish compatriots. It is all very well to say they were ultimately not so far apart and one can even argue that by seeking to make the Jews a nation like all other nations, the Zionists were themselves assimilationists of a kind, but the German Zionists demand recognition for the various ways in which they were superior. Their stance towards the *Ostjuden* is a case in point. It was by no means all it might have been, but a German Zionist was simply more likely to believe that 'all of Israel are brothers' than was his non-Zionist brother. He was less likely to think that the ability to quote Schopenhauer was an immeasurably more worthy accomplishment than knowledge of the Talmud.

What is more, one finds it impossible to escape the impression that the German Zionists were, *qua* Jews, simply more intriguing than others. To a large extent the history of German Zionism is the history of its leaders, and one wishes Poppel had devoted more attention to this part of the tale, though he does provide fascinating glimpses of men like Kurt Blumenfeld and Robert Weltsch. The former emerges as an altogether attractive personality. Poppel does not mention that after the state of Israel was founded, he was one of the few leading figures who failed to Hebraize his name—was that pride in things German? Weltsch too emerges as an interesting person, though quite different from Blumenfeld. He maintained his convictions that the Arabs could be won over by appeasement long after evidence to the contrary had become overwhelming. A talented journalist, he is presumably responsible for the stunning slogan, 'Wear it with pride, the yellow badge!', which appeared as a headline in the *Judische Rundschau* in 1933, but the editorial underneath it entertained the hope that Jewish pride would actually change Nazi policies.

Other German, or German-speaking, Zionists merit attention and elicit fascination—beginning, of course, with Herzl, part visionary and part fop, so often right about strategy and so often wrong about tactics. There is Nordau, dedicated and doctrinaire, and the author of *Degeneration*, a book almost unbelievably skewed in its arrogant judgements on men like Nietzsche and Ibsen. There is Buber, sometimes vain and bombastic, but unexpectedly brilliant and effective as the great editor of a great journal, *Der Jude*. A whole galaxy of others—Richard Lichtheim, Ernst Simon, *et al.*—merit biographical-historical study.

The distinguished group of men surely deserve the praise Poppel gives them for instilling pride in Jews and may escape his implicit charge that they were the captives of an overly narrow ideology. One should also honour the German Zionists for possessing a political acumen which was vastly greater than that of non-Zionists in Germany They knew along with Herzl that Jews simply had no future in a country in which they were disliked by the majority of the citizens.

They knew that Jews desperately needed a plot on earth to call their own, and the Revisionists among them even knew that it could be acquired only by fighting. The German Zionists made many mistakes but they knew a few most fundamental facts.

And yet—to repeat—the German Zionists failed, notwithstanding their lofty aspirations, plenitude of gifted members, and political sagacity. They failed, just as everybody failed. German Jewry is no more and the Jewish problem persists.

What happened and why? Most of Poppel's criticisms of German Zionism are partly or wholly valid. One can also argue that Zionism simply came too late, that by 1896 the die had been cast for Germany and for its Jews. Other explanations can be advanced but perhaps all explanations for the failures of German Zionism—and Zionism as such—are beside the point. Perhaps only success would have to be explained, since complex human problems are usually beyond the power of men to solve. In that sense, failure may be natural.

But failures may nevertheless be noble or base, and German Zionism surely represents a noble failure. If the Jewish problem persists, it is because the Jewish people have survived, with Israel as the vital centre of Judaism.

BOOK REVIEWS

MOSHE DAVIS, ed., *World Jewry and the State of Israel*, Foreword by Professor Ephraim Katziz, A Publication of the Continuing Seminar on World Jewry, vol. 2, xix + 372 pp., Arno Press, New York, 1977, $12.00.

The contents of this book are drawn from the papers and discussions at the second Seminar on World Jewry and the State of Israel held in 1975 under the auspices of Israel's President. The participants included an international group of scholars from a variety of disciplines and a number of community leaders. The Seminar was concerned with three themes: antisemitism or, as some participants preferred to call it, anti-Jewishness; Jewish identification; and the relationship between the Diaspora and the State of Israel. Each of these three subjects is wide enough for a single seminar, and the attempt to cover all three was, perhaps, over-ambitious. The subjects range from the relationship of the Diaspora to Eretz Israel in the ancient period to contemporary antisemitism in Argentina, and each theme is analysed by different scholars from a number of perspectives: sociological, social psychological, philosophical, political, and religious. Some papers are attempts at an objective analysis while others contain mainly value statements and policy suggestions. Each of the three sections ends with a 'discussion' in which most of the participants say their own piece without referring to the papers or to the views of other participants.

The contributions are mostly of a high standard, but the attempt to cover three large issues has left large gaps in each subject. In the first paper on antisemitism, Shlomo Avineri distinguishes five areas in which the recent antisemitism is being expressed (the Arab world, the communist countries, New Left circles, the Black Power movement, and radical theology), but only the first two areas are covered by other papers. The section on identification includes interesting general and conceptual articles by Peter Medding, Simon Herman, and Aharon Lichtenstein, but only one article, an acute study of Jewish identification in the Soviet Union by Zvi Gittelman, analyses a particular national community in depth. In the sections on antisemitism and identification there is very little on the contemporary scene in Europe and the United States. On the other hand, in the section on the relationship between the Diaspora and Israel, there is almost nothing on the Diaspora apart from the United States. Nevertheless, even with these gaps

the book contains a wealth of information and interesting arguments, and only a few of its themes can be picked up here.

The papers on 'current manifestations of anti-Jewishness' show that little has changed in the content of antisemitic expression; the same hoary myths reappear with great monotony. What has changed is that there is a new target, Israel, against which the old myths are directed. Many Zionists believed that a Jewish state would provide a cure for antisemitism, but since Israel has become a focus for attack there is the problem of the distinction between anti-Zionism and antisemitism. Most anti-Zionists reject the charge that they are antisemites and some have made a distinction between the 'true' Jews—they have nothing against them—and the 'false' Jews, the Zionists. Since it is often made clear that a Zionist is anyone who is against the politicide of the State of Israel, it would be difficult to find many 'true' Jews. However, the existence of anti-Zionist Jews among some religious groups (such as the Neturei Karta) and in some New Left circles may be used to support the argument that the anti-Zionist is not necessarily antisemitic. Shlomo Aveneri appears to reject this possibility. He argues that just as the Blacks have established the right to decide what constitutes white racialism, so the Jews are the ones to decide whether anti-Zionism is antisemitic, and since the State of Israel has become the core of Jewish self-identification, a demand for its destruction must be seen as an expression of antisemitism. One problem with this argument is that not all Jews define anti-Zionism as antisemitic, and while one might like to argue that anti-Zionist Jews of the New Left are self-hating antisemites, the same accusation can hardly be made against the Neturei Karta. A more general problem is that antisemitism is often understood as a form of racialism, and, although racialist anti-Zionist literature exists in abundance, one must admit the possibility of a non-racialist anti-Zionism.

In addition to some change in the target of the antisemites, there has also been a change in the geographical centres of antisemitism: Russia remains an important centre, but Arab and South American countries have taken the place of Europe in the production and dissemination of antisemitism. The two changes are, of course, related. In his article on anti-Jewishness in the Arab world, Moshe Ma'oz shows that the Jews only came to be seen as the major enemy of the Arabs from the end of the nineteenth century when the Jewish settlers in Palestine were perceived as a political threat. Up to that time Christendom was the major political enemy, and Christians under Arab rule suffered greater subjection and persecution than the Jews. The traditional Muslim attitude towards the Jews was ambivalent rather than categorically negative, and when the Jews replaced the Christians as the major political enemy, the Arabs drew heavily upon motifs taken from Christian antisemitism.

Haim Avni, in his article on Peru and Argentina, also points to the importance of Christianity as a basis of antisemitism, but his main concern is to show that antisemitism has recently become more entrenched at governmental levels. This development is related, in part at least, to these countries' increasingly friendly relations with Arab countries. Russia's antisemitism is also tied to its foreign policy but, as Mikhail Agursky shows in his paper, antisemitism is important in Russia's internal political struggles; it is used as a political weapon both by communists and by those against the regime, by the dominant Russian nationality and by subordinate nationalist collectivities who accuse the Jews of supporting russification. In fact, as Zvi Gittelman demonstrates, the Jews are the most acculturated major nationality in the Soviet Union. But it is a case of acculturation without assimilation; the intermarriage rate is no higher than in the United States or Europe, and the Russian Jews see themselves (and are seen by others) as a distinct group, 'a community of fate'. The Soviet policy of maintaining an official Jewish national identity, but disallowing it any content, results in acute identification problems. It is little wonder that despite the persecution of 'Zionists' many Russian Jews turn to Israel as the focus of their identification.

In addition to its importance as a focal element in Jewish identification, some contributors stress other aspects, actual and desired, of the centrality of Israel for the Jewish world. Irving Greenberg notes that, in the post-Holocaust world, Israel has become a Jewish demographic centre and the only Jewish community with a natural increase in its population. This point is made more relevant by Zev Katz's statistical projections of the demographic attrition of Russian Jewry through emigration, assimilation, and natural decrease. However, Greenberg discusses the demographic point without reference to the proportion of Jews in the population of Israel. At present Jews comprise 64 per cent of Israel's population (including the administered territories), but a recent demographic projection by Moshe Hartman predicts that over the next 22 years Jews will be reduced to 47 per cent of the population. The present ratio could only be maintained by a substantial immigration which, barring a major persecution, is most unlikely. While many express concern over the declining number of Jews in Diaspora communities, little attention is given to the declining proportion of Jews in Israel; but for a Jewish state a declining proportion of Jews is surely a more important consideration than an absolute increase in numbers.

Movements like Gush Emunim and even members of the Israeli government continue to produce plans of Jewish settlement in the conquered territories without any realistic assessment of demographic factors and future immigration. As Gerson D. Cohen points out in his paper, Zionist spokesmen have not been able to come to terms with the fact that, in the sense of *aliyah* and settlement, most Jews have seen

Zionism, and continue to see it, as a last resort. Cohen argues that the Zionists' distortion of Jewish history stems from their condescension and contempt for the *galut*. The Zionist portrayal of the *galut* has sometimes contained antisemitic stereotypes, and for many Israelis this has resulted in a tension between their Jewish and their Israeli identities.

Cohen, together with other contributors, calls for a relationship of mutual kinship and respect between Israel and the Diaspora. Various aspects of the interdependence between Israel and the Diaspora are stressed, but Charles Liebman shows that the Diaspora has very limited influence over Israeli public policy. One reason for this is that Israel strongly resists any pressure from the Diaspora. Another is that Diaspora Jews do not view Israel as a suitable object of influence; Israel represents their Judaism, it is an important symbol of their Jewish identity, but they do not have a vision of a different Israel. Liebman hopes that this will change, but his analysis and the analyses of other contributors do not give rise to much optimism.

Although some contributors point to the fact that the reality of Israel is far from the classical Zionist ideology, in a certain sense the Zionist goal of achieving a 'normal' Jewish society has been achieved; Israel has its Jewish prostitutes as well as its doctors and scholars, its Jewish delinquents as well as its yeshivah boys, its corrupt officials as well as its outstanding citizens. Rabbi Jakobovits bemoans 'the drive towards normalization', and his remedy, which is shared by a number of other contributors, is a return to Judaism as a religion. A return to the *mitsvot* is unlikely, but in this book there is little evidence of a secularist vision of a future Jewish society.

STEPHEN SHAROT

SIMON GREENBERG, *The Ethical in the Jewish and American Heritage*, Volume IV in the *Moreshet* Series, Studies in Jewish History, Literature and Thought, xvi+327 pp., Jewish Theological Seminary of America, New York, 1977, $15.00.

The first and longest chapter in this book discusses the general question of the relationship between religion and ethics with particular reference to Judaism, arguing that ethics implies a transcendental ground which only Theism can provide. It is not that the atheist is incapable of leading a good life—experience shows that he is and it also shows that not all religious folk are—but that the atheist's sense of the *ought* as opposed to the *is* receives no satisfactory explanation on his own premises. This idea is not new but here obtains enrichment from the classical Jewish sources. Dr. Greenberg is an intensely honest thinker who does not shrink from examining the unethical aspects of Biblical thought, the command to exterminate the Canaanites, for example, or the demand

that capital and corporal punishment be meted out for purely religious offences. He is also realistic about the golden rule, impossible for the ordinary man to follow if it is understood too literally. He is rather too realistic when he accepts the dubious proposition of Ahad Ha-Am that, unlike Christianity, Judaism would frown on a man giving his life for his friend. To be sure, Judaism does not see this as an obligation (neither, for that matter, does Christianity), but that is a far cry from the suggestion that on the rare occasions when a man does make the supreme sacrifice in his love of others, he is acting wrongly because his life is not his own to give away.

Chapters II and IV consider respectively ethics and law in the American tradition and some affinities between the Jewish and American historical experience, while Chapter III deals with Jewish ethical attitudes with regard to the development of Jewish law where, without this development, the law would be responsible for injustices. Special attention is paid to the vexed question of the *agunah*, the woman who has been divorced in civil law but whose former husband refuses to release her by giving the Get. These four chapters were written at different times so that they do not entirely fit together. There are some repetitions—a poem by Robert Frost on the American Declaration of Independence being quoted twice in full, for instance. Nevertheless, the book is a unit, demonstrating for the first time the striking affinities (without ignoring the differences) between the American and the Jewish peoples as they reflected on their destiny.

Dr. Greenberg is right to note that the Zohar nowhere states, as is often claimed, that God, Israel, and the Torah are one. (In fact, Dinur failed to find this formula in any Jewish source before the rise of the Hassidic movement in the eighteenth century but Tishby has recently traced it back to the writings of Moses Hayyim Luzzatto at the beginning of that century.) He is very good on the less theologically involved version, his own, that Israel and the Torah are one in the sense of their mutual indispensability, Israel believing that the Torah is unmatched and the Torah having faith, as it were, that at least a saving remnant in Israel will always live by its standards. This idea is courageously explored to yield the thought that not all the passages in the Torah have been seen by Israel as being of the same significance. Even if one maintains, as do the Talmudic Rabbis, that the verse: 'And Timnah was the concubine of Eliphaz the son of Esau' (Genesis 36:12) was divinely revealed, this does not necessarily imply that the verse is as revelatory of the Torah's excellence as are the Ten Commandments.

LOUIS JACOBS

BERNARD S. JACKSON, ed., *The Jewish Law Annual. Volume One*, x + 274 pp. E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1978, 84 guilders. Published under the auspices of the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists and the Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies.

The stated aims of *The Jewish Law Annual* are 'to promote research in Jewish Civil Law; to foster interest in the Jewish legal system amongst comparative lawyers and secularly-trained Jewish lawyers; and to provide a medium for communication between lawyers and students of halakha, and between Israel and the Diaspora'.

In an introductory note, Dr. Jackson reminds us of how, through the centuries, 'halakha has served as a unifying focus for the Jewish intelligentsia'. Whether or not it continues to do so will depend on what sort of dialogue it can establish with other legal systems in which Jews find themselves; and such a dialogue can only be fruitful when founded upon a satisfactory conceptual framework for comparative analysis. The plan is for each volume of the journal to carry 'a symposium including dogmatic, historical, comparative and analytical treatments of [a] chosen topic', and also a 'Chronicle' of current developments in Jewish law and in law affecting Jews both in Israel and the Diaspora.

The chosen topic for this volume is Maimonides's great Code, the *Mishneh Torah*, which according to many scholars was completed exactly 800 years ago, in 1178. The literature on Maimonides, and even that on the Code itself, is vast, and despite the appropriateness of opening the first volume of *The Jewish Law Annual* with a section devoted to the single greatest work of Jewish law, the initial reaction may well be to question the need for yet another Maimonides symposium. Some of the studies included—for instance, Jacob I. Dienstag's erudite and admirably concise summary of the sources of *Mishneh Torah*—would find an honoured place in any one of a large number of already established journals, and one is therefore prompted to ask, 'Why *The Jewish Law Annual?*' The answer to this is important, and emerges from consideration of the symposium as a whole. We now have, for the first time to my knowledge, a fairly comprehensive picture of Maimonides as a jurist within the twelfth century context. This is not to belittle the extensive literature which has grown over the centuries on specific issues dealt with in the great Code, or the small number of studies which have appeared from time to time in recent years on this or that facet of Maimonides's method of compilation of his Code, or his relationship with his predecessors both Jewish and Islamic. It is rather that the piecemeal attempts are now given a focus; and the sophisticated tools of modern comparative legal analysis, especially as developed recently with regard to *Mishpat ha-Ivri*, are brought to bear on the material in a way which enables us to appreciate Maimonides's activity as that of a masterly

'professional' jurist rather than as a philosopher who also happened to put together a code of law.

The symposium opens with an account by Pierre Legendre of the work and methods of Western jurists in the twelfth century. It is of course no coincidence that the century of Gratian and of the Glossators is also that of Maimonides and the early Tosafists. Nevertheless, I feel it would have been more to the point, if we were to see Maimonides in the twelfth century juridical context, to have had some account of the developments in Muslim law of which he would have had first-hand knowledge. Altogether, there is a remarkable absence from the symposium of any serious attempt to relate Maimonides as jurist to his Islamic milieu, though the editor rather casually concedes (p. 3) that such was the milieu in which he worked, and both he himself (p. 171) and Haim Cohn (p. 25) do in fact make apt specific references to Muslim law.

Several of the studies deal with the overall purpose and structure of the *Mishneh Torah*. Haim Cohn lists and analyses six 'aims' of the work—Clarity, Brevity, Uniformity, Completeness, Exclusiveness, and Finality. Maimonides, he claims, was moved to write it primarily because he believed that scholarship was progressively deteriorating. Never did Maimonides intend to discourage the study of the Talmud; he was indeed shocked at the very suggestion (p. 33 n. 92). Cohn raises the important question as to the role of consensus in determining Jewish law, and relates this to a well-attested Islamic concept with which Maimonides would have been familiar. I do not know whether Cohn means to imply that the consensus concept is unknown in earlier Jewish law, for this would be incorrect. One instance which comes to mind is the undoubtedly pre-Islamic statement of Rava (B. Shabb. 88a) that the Jews *kiblu alehem*, that is, established a consensus, to accept the authority of the Torah in the days of Ahasuerus; another is the well-known Talmudic principle that a rabbinic enactment does not become law unless most of the community accepts it as such.

Shamma Friedman discusses the passage in the introduction to *Sefer ha-Mitzvot* where Maimonides speculates, in anticipation of *Mishneh Torah*, whether it would be better to organize such a code on the basis of the Mishnah as a model, or according to a freely chosen logical arrangement. Neither Friedman nor his opponents seem to understand that these are not exclusive possibilities, and that the reason Maimonides does not state a commitment to one option or the other is that in fact he takes the best from both worlds; his system incorporates a great deal from the Mishnaic one, but is revised according to Maimonides's own sense of order and logic.

Nachum Rabinovitch illustrates with three examples that where Maimonides appears to substitute a reason of his own for that offered in the Talmud for a particular ruling, he is in reality not rejecting, but

rather commenting upon, and even supplementing, the Talmudic source. Jacob S. Levinger argues convincingly that Maimonides both adds and deletes laws as a consequence of his philosophical views, though he avoids changing any that he retains in the code, preferring generalization and slight modification to radical alteration.

Gerald Blidstein contributes a valuable article on Maimonides's concept of Oral Law, maintaining that his literal insistence on its Sinaitic origin led him to narrow considerably the field of what could be classified as Oral Law.

The two studies, one on Maimonides's treatment of *Dina de-malkhuta Dina* ('The Law of the State is Law') and the other on his definitions of *Tam* and *Mu'ad* (categories of damage caused by animals), by Shmuel Shilo and Bernard Jackson respectively, seem to me to epitomize the purpose of *The Jewish Law Annual*, and I should have liked to see more of a similar calibre. Both authors write with a clear understanding of legal concepts and their development against the historical background. Dr Jackson's subject forces him to come to grips with the literary problems involved in the formation of Maimonides's tannaitic sources, and he does this with a skilful use of the Neusnerian literary-historical approach which regrettably is still ignored at their peril by many who dabble in Talmudic studies. If Lenn Evan Goodman does not always manifest the same standards of meticulous scholarship, his article on 'Maimonides's Philosophy of Law' is perhaps even more important in the wider context of the significance of the Maimonidean—and hence the Jewish—approach to Law and Society. Maimonides, he asserts, rejects the Sophists' view (which he finds also in such divergent writers as Locke and Lenin) of the role of legislation as confined to the protection of vested interests, but adopts instead the Platonic view which sees trust as more fundamental in human relations than rapacity, and therefore seeks a higher, broader or more universal role for legal activity. I left Goodman's stimulating and wide-ranging article with a great desire to see in print a satisfactory history of Jewish political thought. We do not lack popular histories of Jewish philosophy (for instance, those of Husik and Guttmann); but they are surprisingly threadbare on the topic of political philosophy. At one time I thought this was because we Jews, lacking a country of our own, did not take any interest in political philosophy per se. But if I had not already made the discovery, I think that Goodman's article would have convinced me that this was an error.

The second part of the volume, the 'Chronicle', brings together a number of rabbinic responsa on such matters as refusal to grant a religious divorce, impotence as grounds for divorce, sterilization, and euthanasia. A valuable section is devoted to an account of ways in which Jewish law has become involved in decisions of the Supreme Court of Israel—for instance, the Maimonidean doctrine of 'market overt' was

quoted in a recent judgement in a case concerning the unwitting sale of a stolen car. Another section is devoted to non-Israeli law affecting Jews in other countries, for instance the United Kingdom Race Relations Act of 1976, and the right, under the 'first amendment' in the U.S.A., to refuse to testify, invoked unsuccessfully by some Jews in New York in an attempt to avoid incriminating their co-religionists. The volume concludes with a 'Survey of Recent Literature' from a non-specified date. The information is well classified, but as well as some omissions which may be due to the indefinite 'terminus a quo' (for example, under the heading 'Medico-Legal Problems' Dr. Jakobovits's revised *Jewish Medical Ethics* is listed, but not David M. Feldman's *Marital Relations, Birth Control and Abortion in Jewish Law*), the references to recent rabbinic responsa are sparse and arbitrary, and the rabbinic journals of halakha are not reviewed at all. One has the impression that Dr. Jackson received less than whole-hearted co-operation from his rabbinic contacts, and one hopes that in future they will see the benefit of ensuring that their work is not ignored by the academic and professional public.

The publication of this first volume of *The Jewish Law Annual* is an event of major importance in the worlds of law and of Jewish scholarship. We look forward eagerly to the special issue due later this year on 'Modern Research in Jewish Law', and to forthcoming volumes which will present symposia on such topics as Codification and Restatement, Unjust Enrichment, Family Law, Medico-Ethical Problems, and Employment Law. Dr. Jackson is to be warmly congratulated on his enterprise, and on assembling an editorial panel consisting of so many contemporary leading scholars and practitioners of Jewish Law.

As with most other publications by E. J. Brill, one has the prestige of the publisher's name, excellent binding, accurate type, and satisfying layout. The disadvantages are also the usual ones from E. J. Brill—slightly shiny paper and a dearth of Hebrew type (one of the very few examples is on p. 168—Dr Jackson's own article). The price of the *Annual* is extremely high, but no serious student of Jewish or comparative law—or of Jewish society—can afford to be without it.

NORMAN SOLOMON

SANFORD LABOVITZ, *An Introduction to Sociological Concepts*, xxi + 244 pp., John Wiley, New York, 1977, paperback, £4.65 or $8.00.

Teachers of sociology must be immune, by now, to what appears to be an unending stream of first-year American introductory sociology textbooks. These works are often based on the author's own course of lectures, as is the case here. Labovitz's fare is palatable: it consists of a good mix of simple methodological guidance plus the clarification and

application of the five basic concepts of norm, value, role, status, and power. Yet, like many such textbooks it suffers from a wish to satisfy the lowest common denominator among American students. Thus, is the concept role necessarily best introduced by the sentence 'Suppose you just arrived from a distant galaxy and you knew nothing about the patterns of social life on Earth'? (p. 90); or is social power best explained by vivid examples of phoney experiments involving supposedly venomous snakes, solutions believed to be nitric acid and shock-inducer apparatus? (p. 179).

A more serious criticism is that the author does not refer, even briefly, to the process of conceptualization itself. This shortcoming is particularly noticeable since, in an Epilogue, he does discuss the interrelationship of concepts and the importance of reconceptualization. One would certainly concur with Labovitz's view that the definition of a concept by the social scientist is of critical importance. So, while not asking him for a wide-ranging essay on the epistemology of conceptualization, somewhat more attention, for instance, might have been given to the process of conceptualization which takes place both among ordinary people and among sociologists. It is true, however, that a discussion of this nature could have upset the balance in what is, after all, a fairly simple introduction to the subject matter of sociology.

ERNEST KRAUSZ

HOWARD M. SACHAR, *A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, xviii+883+xlix (index) pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1977, £14.00.

Contemporary history has dangers for the historian and the reviewer alike. The historian has to make judgements on the basis of evidence which has not yet been fully revealed, while the reviewer is in danger of finding his own comments outdated by subsequent events. And yet it is essential both for the historian to write and the reviewer to use his judgement if general readers are to make in their own turn the informed comments which it is important for them to do. Professor Sachar is certainly no stranger to the history of the Middle East or to the history of the State of Israel, and he has established for himself a reputation in his recent books on various aspects of the development of the Mandate and the early years of the State. It has almost become inevitable that this most recent work should concentrate specifically on Israel from the beginnings of modern Jewish nationalism, relating for the general reader as well as the specialist the ways in which that state resulted from generations of persecution in eastern Europe. From the academic point of view his antecedents are perfectly respectable and his bibliography—all forty-eight pages of it—is eminently impressive. His book

begins, almost classically, with the early days of Jewish nationalism, but he goes on with the conscious determination to bring it right up to the present day which for him, publishing in the United States in 1976, meant June 1975.

His book falls chronologically into three main sections—that dealing with the themes and years preceding the granting to Britain of the Mandate; the years of the Mandate both inside and outside Palestine; and the years following the creation and recognition of the State of Israel together with the impact of that State upon the concept of Zionism. It is not a history of the State alone, but it is not either a history of Jews in the period of Zionism; it is tied to the concept of the State and takes it for granted that the State had inevitably to come into existence. In the first of these sections Professor Sachar includes a study of the very much earlier roots of Zionism than the conventional point of the middle of the nineteenth century, and deals also with the Old Yishuv; he comments on the French Sanhedrin as well as on the settlements round Safed in the sixteenth century. Inevitably he must be prepared for comparisons with Dr. David Vital's book on this subject and, it must be confessed, the comparison is not to Sachar's advantage. He writes at length in a quasi-popular style, but it remains heavy and his format prevents him from giving references for his comments or from adducing additional evidence for his arguments. Certainly he makes in this section a certain number of slips which in themselves may well be trivial but which when added up inspire less than confidence in a book which is intended to be authoritative and readable. Only Anglo-Jewish readers who are Sephardim would recognize Haham Gaster as a Chief Rabbi, while no one who has any acquaintance with the Royal Navy in the First World War would accept 'frigates' in 1916. Above all, with a British Consulate in Jerusalem since early in the nineteenth century, there was no need suddenly in 1917 to find a British 'rationale' for a foothold in the Holy Land beyond that which already existed.

The second section—the years of the Mandate and the relations of the Mandate territories with the Diaspora—is similarly a very complex one. No historian can confidently claim to be dispassionate, but it is very interesting to see how differently an Anglo-Jewish historian looks at these years as compared with an American–Jewish one, and how differently again an Israeli-based historian sees them as compared with one based in the Diaspora. Here, as later, Professor Sachar is not afraid to put down on paper some truths, such as comments by Zionist leaders of these years on the Arabs and their place under the Balfour Declaration. His quotation 'Be careful, gentlemen of the Zionist movement. Governments come and Governments go, but a people remains forever' ought to have been remembered some forty years later when the issue of the 'Palestinians' was being discussed. On the other hand, in this section also Professor Sachar cannot provide anything like the

definitive study of the period of the Mandate. Neither he nor those on whom he relies had been able to investigate and absorb the archives of the Colonial Office and of the Foreign Office which have only recently become available as a result of the alteration of the Fifty Years' rule to a Thirty Years' rule. Moreover, the project—sponsored by the British Academy and its Israel counterpart—to identify and locate the many collections of private papers in Great Britain and in Israel must result in a complete revaluation of British official and private attitudes and of the circumstances in which the Mandate came to an end.

The third theme—the State of Israel—is inevitably dealt with at greatest length and assumes for Professor Sachar the greatest importance. In a sense he covers much of the same ground as the parallel works of Dr. Lucas (reviewed in vol. 17 of this Journal, December 1975) and of Professor Laqueur. Lucas's *Modern History of Israel* is less detailed, although more readable; admittedly, he does not discuss the events of the 1970's (and particularly what may be not unfairly termed the Six-Year War) with any degree of perspective, but it would be only fair to suggest that Professor Sachar does not do that either. In this book he does not deal with some of the major internal problems facing the State, although he does not shirk many issues and is prepared to be frank. When he considers the question of the 'Oriental' Jewish communities—surely a most vital issue—he discusses it briefly and, I fear, with undue optimism.

Nor does he deal with the developments of Zionism with the same skill as did Walter Laqueur. The impact of Zionism upon the State of Israel is one subject, but the ways in which the State has had an impact upon Zionism and the ways in which that movement has changed, developed, and altered in the last decades is another matter. The last few years have brought into question the extent to which the State of Israel can or cannot depend upon the unswerving loyalty of the Zionist movement in the Diaspora; there have been very critical debates concerning the influence the movement could, or ought to, have in the conduct of state policy. Recent political changes in Israel have administered a shock not only to that country but to the Diaspora as well.

This is a difficult book to review, almost as much as I suspect it was difficult to write. It falls into so many different areas of activity—each of which has its own problems and needs its own expertise. It is certainly an important piece of work, and yet it falls short in several ways. It is a work of popularization, and yet both its bulk and its price will deter many of its would-be readers. It is written in an anecdotal style—which will put off many historians—and yet at such length that the general public will not turn easily to it. A more general complaint is the author's habit of referring to ideas, events, and themes which have not as yet been introduced.

However, in spite of the many pitfalls, it is essential for the academic to be prepared to enter the arena of contemporary history. It is also essential for the non-specialist to be able to turn to the professional for guidance. If Sachar's book is not destined to be the definitive study of the first thirty years of the State of Israel and of its origins, it will certainly be included among the most essential works to be consulted and understood before that study can be completed.

AUBREY NEWMAN

U. O. SCHMELZ, P. GLIKSON, and S. DELLA PERGOLA, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1973*, 463 pp., Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Jewish Population Studies Series, Jerusalem, 1977.

This volume, presenting the edited proceedings of the Demographic Sessions of the Sixth World Congress of Jewish Studies held in Jerusalem in August 1973, continues the good work of the Jewish Population Series. It begins with a lengthy statement by Roberto Bachi on the aims and ways of comparative research on Jewish demography, stressing the importance of obtaining reliable estimates back to the eighteenth century and of the influence of 'modern development' on family size, urban distribution, migration, conversion, and identification. There follows a section on methodology, some chapters on better use of those censuses which give religious and ethnic data (Canada, Israel) and some on improved survey methods where surveys provide the only information available (U.S.A., France, etc.). Most helpful here is M. G. Sirken and S. Goldstein's article on Multiplicity Rules in survey work, a complex but highly ingenious method of reducing sampling error in small sample surveys.

The remaining papers are divided by area, those on America covering fertility trends in the Argentine and Jewish identification in the U.S.A.; this latter wisely indicates the inner and outer boundaries (those with strong loyalties to Israel or to traditional Jewish religious customs and those with Jewish parents but no sense of identification or involvement) and leaves it to the researcher to select the particular boundary most suitable for his work. Those on southern Africa cover the socio-economic and marriage characteristics of Jews in South Africa and the migration factor in Rhodesia. Those on eastern Europe have the Holocaust survivors or successors in mind and examine the Jewish populations of Poland, Bohemia-Moravia, and Yugoslavia from that viewpoint. Those on western Europe are more concerned with recent censuses (Switzerland) or special surveys (U.K., Netherlands), and the reliability of the information obtained; it is interesting to see some of the results of the work undertaken by the Statistical and Demographic Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, especially the

finding that Jewish fertility has risen slightly—to the general population level—and that the trend towards civil marriages seems to be associated with a trend towards intermarriage.

There are several chapters on the population of Israel itself, and some on migration: the recent decline in immigration, never large, from North America;the recent increase in immigration from the Jewish communities of Latin America; the patterns of integration of 'potential immigrants', that is, those admitted under the special regulations of 1969 which allowed foreign Jews to live for some time in Israel on an experimental basis with full social benefits but no political rights. What emerges from these chapters is, first, the general similarity of American Jewish immigrants, and second, the departure of one-third of potential immigrants within three years of arrival. Other chapters discuss the use of divorce statistics to measure ethnic cleavage in Israel, mainly between Afro-Asian and European-American Jews, and the slightly larger families produced by native-born Israeli women compared with their European parents. One explanation here is that a people once in minority situations, perhaps persecuted, may feel freer to have more children when they achieve majority status and can control the destiny of their country.

Schmelz concludes the contributions with an assessment of Israel's demographic structure and future after 25 years. The main points here are: changes in immigration from refugee inpouring to selective smaller-scale flows; the near end of the 'marriage squeeze' whereby the age distribution forced more numerous younger women to chase less numerous older men, so bringing down male age at marriage and raising that of women; the rapid fall in the fertility of Afro-Asian immigrants; various projections of population size showing, by 1990, about 3.87 million with an average migration gain of 25,000 a year; 4.19 million with 40,000 a year; and 4.41 million with 50,000 a year. Even this last figure, over-optimistic though it probably is, leaves a very small Israeli population to confront a hostile Arab world forty times as numerous.

In general the papers show a high level of competence and much scholarly care and restraint. A major interest in Israel itself is clearly the slowness of probable growth and the demographic and social difference between Afro-Asian and European families. In the Diaspora, the major concerns are obtaining reliable estimates of numbers, assessing the survival power of the various Jewries, and measuring intermarriage, family size, economic status, and rates of conversion. The results of this concerted scholarly effort, in many countries, are very impressive. There is certainly more known about the Jewish minorities of the world than any other—a fact which speaks well for the energy and dedication of those scholars concerned. It also suggests, however, a fear of ultimate decline in importance and a hope that the married

couples of the Jewish world will not only more than replace themselves but support Jewish schools and generally rear their children as loyal members of the chosen people.

CHARLES PRICE

STEPHEN SHAROT, *Judaism. A Sociology*, 224 pp., David and Charles, Newton Abbot, Devon, 1976, £5.25.

Dr. Sharot is no stranger to this Journal. His articles on the acculturation of Anglo-Jewry and of the immigrants of the late-nineteenth century in earlier volumes have already drawn attention to his work in this general field, so that the book under review serves to put his ideas into a wider perspective. As here presented, it gallops breathlessly over broad areas of time and place—from the time of the Babylonian Exile to the problems of the State of Israel, from China if not to Peru at least to the Argentine—in order to try and develop a sociology of modern Judaism. His framework is largely chronological, but within that he deals competently and effectively with his varied geographical subdivisions. His conclusion makes a number of points which will certainly be a springboard for further work by his professional colleagues both here and in Israel.

At the same time his work is significant enough and important enough to warrant various caveats and disagreements. His publishers have not served him well enough by restricting him to a book of this size, for inevitably, in translating his thesis into a book, he has been led into the error of trying to include a bit of everything. He would have been better advised to have forgotten a little of his history and have included more of the recent past and current analytical discussion. On the other hand, however, the historian will without any doubt fail to discover in this book a great deal for which he would legitimately seek an answer. For there to have been no discussion (or even mention) of the 'Jew Bill' controversy of 1753 in the scamper through Anglo-Jewish history is a little surprising. Dr. Sharot's discussion of Jews in the French Revolution needed more space, if only to make some valid points about Napoleon and his extremely convoluted manoeuvres with the Assembly of Notables, the Sanhedrin, and the 'Infamous Decrees'. He could and ought to have allowed himself more space to discuss the social and economic backgrounds to the differences between the Hassidim and Mitnagdim during the course of the eighteenth century. And in more modern times, Dr. Sharot would surely have wished to give more space to the ways in which the development of 'Higher Education' in Anglo-Jewry has affected the falling-away of religious education and religious observance and practice in recent years. He would, I know,

agree that that has a greater significance than might perhaps be grasped from the book here under discussion.

All in all, as might be expected, Dr. Sharot's work has served to whet the appetite. It is very much to be hoped that he will proceed to provide us with extra sustenance at an early date.

AUBREY NEWMAN

SEYMOUR SIEGEL, ed., with Elliot Gertel, *Conservative Judaism and Jewish Law*, xvii+337 pp., Studies in Conservative Jewish Thought, volume 1, The Rabbinical Assembly, New York, 1977, $15.00 (distributed by Ktav Publishing House).

This volume tells the story of the conceptual encounter of Conservative Judaism with Jewish law. Published by the Rabbinical Assembly and edited by the Chairman of its Committee on Jewish Law and Standards, *Conservative Judaism and Jewish Law* claims to be a representative sample of the movement's thinking on the subject of *halakha*. Contributors include leading Conservative rabbis and ideologues: Louis Ginzberg, M. M. Kaplan, Jacob Agus, Robert Gordis, Boaz Cohen, A. J. Heschel, Simon Greenberg, and Louis Finkelstein. The essays range from 1938–39 (Ginzberg and Cohen) to 1974 (Philip Sigal). And the majority of papers agree in the main with each other, differences in nuance and emphasis notwithstanding.

The topic which clearly emerges as the major issue for contemporary Jewish law is the need for, and legitimacy of, change. This perspective is further stressed by the editor's demonstration of the movement's vitality by listing items of Conservative liberalization and by the choice of responsa published in the volume. Other issues are also considered—for example, the nature of revelation and the source of legal authority—but these are usually discussed as functions of the problem of change. An encounter with Jewish law might easily produce a varied sheaf of studies dealing with topics in religious phenomenology, philosophical anthropology, ethical theory, or the philosophy of law—but these areas are not represented. The selection before us presents, then, a regrettably thin version of the religious and intellectual fare suggested by the totality of Jewish law. Some exceptions ought be noted: the essays by Finkelstein, Heschel, and Ernst Simon sensitively examine the actual content and experience of Jewish law. On the whole, *Conservative Judaism* expounds the liberalizing ideology of the Conservative movement, though it does include some poignant reflections on the relationship of this ideology to faithfulness to Torah. This editorial perspective also outlines the problematics of contemporary Jewish life as defined by the Conservative movement.

The dynamic of change and stability compels discussion of the career

of *halakha* in the past and present, and the dual issues of revelation and authority. The Conservative reading of history stresses that '... Jewish law has always responded to new conditions with a readiness to modify and change', rather than the complementary fact that Jewish law has also responded to new conditions with stubborn faithfulness to its *sancta*. Yet despite a belief in continued development as the only legitimate path for Judaism in the future, many contributors acknowledge the novelty of their movement, for they urge a new method and not merely liberalized rulings. Jewish law has proceeded in the past, it is stated, by interpretation of its sacred texts, and Boaz Cohen argues that this traditional method is in fact adequate for the future—a future of controlled halakhic change. Indeed, most of the responsa published in this volume as examples of Conservative method, follow the interpretative mode.

But Siegel, Agus, and Gordis suggest that interpretation was at best an unconscious (and at worst, a deceptive) cover for historic change, and that Jews in an historically self-conscious age have no choice but openly to adjust the law to their spiritual and social priorities and needs. Thus Siegel: 'If the precedent is deficient in meeting the needs of the people, if it is clearly foreign to the group of law-observers in the community, if it is offensive to our ethical sensitivities or if we do not share its basic scientific, economic, and social assumptions, then the law can be modified either by outright abrogation, or by ignoring it, or by modifying it.' The basic choice is between two concepts of law. *Halakha* can be seen as a discipline possessing authoritative content and method, a source of religious and moral instruction inviting the dynamic interaction of revealed norm and human creativity. Or it can be seen as a religio-social device with admirable aspirations but little authority. The effect of the latter view is clearly to invite a massive invasion of the halakhic body by matter foreign in substance and spirit. So does Gordis's analogy to a living organism, 'not a single cell of which remains unchanged' over the years. I do not wish to quibble over the scope of rabbinic power, which is of course quite extensive. But it is simply not enough to be reassured that 'identity means continuity, and continuity is preserved because the changes are gradual'. If change is truly the order of the day, it must be informed by far more—both methodically and substantively—than gradualness! What are the genetic bonds that in fact mean identity and thus create continuity? How is development integrally related to its roots? It is surely symptomatic that the study of Torah, so dominating and, yes, controlling, a factor in the traditionalist scheme, is appreciated only by Ernst Simon. How forlorn is (even) Cohen's plea for an intensification of study so as to 'dissolve the feeling of inadequacy and inferiority ... enable us to use the Shulhan Arukh more intelligently ... remove ... the reproach of our Orthodox opponents ...'.

The openness characteristic of the Conservative approach probably correlates with the centrality granted to the dual concepts of 'historic Judaism' and 'Catholic Israel', concepts 'basic to any understanding of the approach of Conservative Judaism to Jewish law'. 'Catholic Israel' becomes the major organ of revelation, and its common voice is the legitimate source of religious authority: 'The people Israel institutes laws of justice and equity . . . signs and rituals, mitzvot and ordinances. . . .' In our time, Catholic Israel is to define the direction and development of Jewish religiosity and law. Now both Frankel's 'historic Judaism' and Schechter's 'Catholic Israel' were designed on conservative nineteenth-century models as rebuttals of radical reform; religion, in the original sense of these concepts, is an organic expression of the national soul and must develop slowly and gradually. Yet current, more radical, use of the doctrines does not really distort them; the people *are*, in this view, the legitimate and immediate creators of law and lifestyle. Indeed, Rotenstreich has claimed that Frankel's disagreement with Geiger was more a matter of temperament than of principle. It is questionable, though, whether these concepts can stand up under the much heavier burden—guiding and legitimating the processes of change and development—that has become their twentieth-century function. Indeed, both the figurative view of revelation expressed in many of these essays and the dubious relationship of the Jewish people's present relationship to its religious law, would easily allow the decline of 'Catholic Israel' and 'historic Judaism'. That they are doggedly retained demonstrates that peoplehood has become a central object of faith and a religious value. Of course, the traditional scheme also knows of the people Israel as a source of law, and it probably perceives the religious leadership as essentially an organ of the people, also. But in its thrust towards holy living the people has believed itself bound by objective elements of method and content that channel its search for authenticity and wisdom. The people perceives itself, classically, as both the master of Torah and its fortunate servant.

Two points ought to be made in this connection. There is, first, the reduction of the Divine, at least in His role as articulator of Law, to the people of Israel. Obviously, this implies a serious restructuring of God as He who spoke His will at Sinai, He to whom the people Israel pledged its faith. Dissatisfaction with this reductionism leads Simon Greenberg to write, poignantly, that, '. . . the question facing those who are committed to the preservation and enhancement of Jewish life is whether it can be done without the concept not merely of Law but of *revealed Law* . . . after more than four decades of . . . intimate contact with thousands of Jewish laymen I cannot name a half-dozen who were moved by . . . rationalizations to become traditional Sabbath-observers . . . I believe that every thinking Jew—if he is to remain a *profoundly committed* Jew—must come to terms intellectually and emotionally with

the concept of a revealed Law, either as formulated by the Tradition or with some version of it that is more acceptable to him.' The conceptual correlate of this cry is the question whether sanctity does not assume, in the Jewish scheme, a revelatory Being beyond man himself. The liveliness of this issue surfaces time and again as our authors polemically engage the Reconstructionist movement, and labour to demonstrate that the Conservative approach goes beyond loyalty to 'folkways'. And though these polemics mostly date from the 1940's and 1950's, recent attempts in Israel to re-awaken a sense of halakhic commitment independent of a traditional concept of revelation, indicate that this is still a crux, for intellectuals at least.

Second, one must beware of the actual dissolution of the normative element itself. It will not do to substitute sociological fact for normative value. In this way we ultimately reach Gordis's conclusion that 'the final authority . . . rests with the Jewish people, though the formal retention, reinterpretation, or surrender of Jewish observances should come from accredited rabbinic leadership'. The term 'authority' requires serious attention here. Ought Moses to have commissioned a public opinion poll on Golden Calves? The problem before us is not how to describe what is happening, but how to decide what ought to be happening. And unless we want to say that whatever is, is also good, the solution suggested by 'Catholic Israel' does not get us very far. A great many among the Jewish people, moreover, are religiously indifferent—is this the voice of Catholic Israel? Alternatively, would the protagonists of Catholic Israel accept as authoritative the practice of those Jews who are in fact most faithful to the Law?

This is not to say that the human, national, component does not exist in Jewish law, or that response to modernity is irrelevant. The most significant example of the renaissance of Jewish normative behaviour in this century—the building of the Jewish State—is fundamentally rooted in the people. It is equally clear, though, that such creativity ought to mesh with the structures and values that have meant holy living for this people. Similarly, we cannot say that an adequate conceptual model of the halakhic process now exists. The phenomena highlighted by the Conservative school have become part of the intellectual baggage of the thinking Jew, but have not yet been integrated into a total picture. Yet in an authentic confrontation with modernity, the category of change narrowly conceived as a rejection of answers given in the past, will miss the mark. The scope and content—social and scientific—of the new is so truly extensive, that it begs most for normative instruction and interpretation. Injustice does exist in the present scheme—particularly, it seems to me, in the area of matrimonial law—but this may be within the range of rabbinic solution, as Conservative writers have urged. An authentic and sacred engagement with the condition of Jewish nationhood in these decades after the establishment

of the State might call for a restructuring of some elements in prayer and calendar. Yet these are not the major battlefields for the soul of a nation, though these issues—reflecting the willingness of the bearers of the tradition to confront reality—may well have immense public resonance. The major challenges to Jewish legists in this era are to inform the new ethico-political situation of Jewry, and the changing technological horizon of humanity, with the discipline of holiness drawn from the tradition. And the educator's task of restoring the Jewish people to its heritage requires, largely, meaningful exploration of the experiential relevance of that heritage, not its revision. If Bialik's famous plea, 'Give us Halakha!' voiced the need of our time, I doubt that its answer is to be found in the papers collected in *Conservative Judaism and Jewish Law.*

GERALD J. BLIDSTEIN

CHRONICLE

The Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews has published data it gathered and analysed on Jewish marriages and deaths in 1977 in Great Britain.

There were 1,378 synagogue marriages—19 fewer than in 1976, when there were 1,397. Orthodox weddings accounted for 79·8 per cent of the total (79·0 in 1976); Reform, for 13·4 per cent (14·5 in 1976); and Liberal, for the remaining 6·8 per cent (6·5 in 1976).

A detailed analysis of the 79·8 per cent Orthodox marriages showed that the Central Orthodox proportion was 69·1 per cent (68·5 in 1976); the right-wing Orthodox, 7·5 per cent (6·9 in 1976); and the Sephardi, 3·2 per cent (3·6 in 1976). In 1975, the right-wing Orthodox had accounted for 5·6 per cent, and the Director of the Research Unit commented on 'their slow but steady increase in their share of the total'.

While both in 1975 and 1976 the proportion of synagogue weddings in London was 72 per cent and in the provinces, 28 per cent, there was in 1977 an increase for the provinces to 31 per cent, with a corresponding decline to 69 per cent in London. The records further show that, 'Greater Manchester has had a boom in marriages. Nearly half the provincial ceremonies over the country, 195 out of 422, took place in the Manchester area. In comparison, the whole of Yorkshire including Leeds, Bradford, Hull and Sheffield had only 54 marriages.... Manchester acts as the magnet for young Jewish people in other northern towns.'

There were 44 Sephardi synagogue weddings in Great Britain in 1977, and half (22) took place in Manchester. Almost 20 per cent of the right-wing Orthodox married in Greater Manchester; 15 per cent of the Central Orthodox; and nearly 10 per cent of the Reform. 'Manchester is the only centre with the variety of affiliation to compare with London.... It looks as if Anglo-Jewry is more and more becoming a tale of two cities, London and Manchester.'

There were 4,749 burials and cremations under Jewish religious auspices in 1977—319 fewer than in 1976 and 111 fewer than the average over the past five years. 'The drop in deaths was expected because the influenza epidemic of 1976 took a heavy toll of the elderly that year. Taking 1976 and 1977 together, the average figure is close to the five-year average and mirrors the national trend. This showed a similar proportional fall in the death rate from a high of 12·2 per thousand in 1976 to 11·7 in 1977.'

The Orthodox do not allow cremations; there were 3,950 Orthodox burials in 1977 (83·2 of the total of Jewish funerals); 456 Reform burials and cremations (9·6 of the total); and 343 Liberal burials and cremations (7·2 of the total).

The Research Unit report notes: 'A healthy population marries as many people as it buries. In 1977 Manchester was the only centre to do this. The demographically unhealthy situation in some areas is illustrated by the case

of Wales, where only 16 people married but 59 died. The situation in Scotland was a little better, with 90 persons marrying compared with 157 deaths.'

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The September 1978 issue of *News and Views*, a publication of the World Jewish Congress, records that the first International Congress for the Study of the Heritage of Sephardi and Oriental Jewry took place last June in Jerusalem; it was attended by several hundred scholars and visitors from overseas. 'The Congress probed deeply into the history, literature, languages, art, culture, music and folklore of the communities that once lived and flourished in Spain and then were dispersed throughout the Mediterranean and other countries. The conference explored the idea of creating a permanent forum and an organ for the exchange of information between scholars and organizations on developments in the field. Some 100 papers were read at the Congress. The Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress was the initiator and one of the conference's sponsors together with the World Sephardi Federation; the Ministry of Education and Culture; the World Zionist Organization—Sephardi Department; and the Council of the Sephardi and Oriental Communities in Israel.'

*

The same issue of *News and Views* states that on 26–28 June an advisory panel on international law met in London under the auspices of the Institute of Jewish Affairs of the World Jewish Congress; it was the second meeting of international lawyers from Europe, Israel, and North America. The panel 'in its discussions on current matters of Jewish concern, and problems affecting world Jewry, draws upon the resources and talents of noted legal experts in different fields.... Papers were presented on various aspects of human rights, in particular cultural rights and minority rights, on the problem of racism before the United Nations, terrorism, the rights of asylum, legal problems of Soviet Jewry, and the Arab boycott. The meeting agreed on a detailed research programme on subjects of Jewish concern.'

*

The Executive Vice-President of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society stated last September in New York that H.I.A.S. assisted 6,659 Jewish men, women, and children to find new homes in the first six months of 1978. This is an increase of 32 per cent over the corresponding period in 1977, when 5,039 were resettled.

The United States received 5,875 (88 per cent of the total); Australia, 322; Canada, 289; Western Europe, 117; Latin America, 32; and New Zealand, 24. Nearly all the refugees who came to the United States were from the Soviet Union: 5,875; they represented an increase of 39 per cent over the number of assisted Russian Jews—4,164—who came to the United States in the corresponding half of 1977. In 1978, just over two-thirds (68 per cent) of the Soviet Jews came from the Ukraine: 3,930.

Canada received 259 Soviet Jews; the remaining 30 refugees came from other eastern European countries, Morocco, and Latin America. Almost all

the immigrants who were resettled in Australia and New Zealand were Russian Jews. Of the 32 persons who found new homes in Latin America, 23 came from other countries on that continent; six were from the Lebanon; and three were from Romania.

H.I.A.S. estimate that they will assist more than 13,000 refugees in 1978, the majority of whom will probably come to the United States. In 1977, the agency helped 8,675; 7,080 of them settled in the United States.

*

Israel had more than a million visitors in 1977: 1,007,000, representing an increase of 23 per cent over 1976, when there were 816,000. The figure does not include 131,000 who came to the Administered Territories; most of them also visited Israel proper. There were 544,000 tourists from Europe; among them were 110,400 from West Germany—a rise of 74 per cent over the previous year's number from that country. There were 271,500 from the United States (21 per cent more than in 1976) and 35,300 Canadians. Argentinians numbered 10,300 and Brazilians, 5,400; Australia and New Zealand accounted for 17,000 and South Africa for 24,600.

The director of the Israel Government Tourist Office in London stated last June that in the first nine months of 1978, 40,000 tourists came to Israel from the United Kingdom—an increase of 35 per cent over the corresponding period in 1977. The large majority of them—35,000—came by air.

*

The Ninth Jerusalem International Book Fair will take place on 19–25 April 1979 at the Jerusalem Convention Centre. There will be exhibitors from 45 countries, according to *Israel Book World* (July–October 1978 issue), which states that the Round Table of National Centres for Library Services 'has officially informed the Fair's management that it has decided to hold its annual meeting in Jerusalem to coincide with the J.I.B.F.'.

The various facilities at the Fair will include a new Exhibitors' Club, conference rooms, a Post Office, and some banking services.

The Board of the Ninth Fair is 'composed of representatives of publishers, authors, journalists, libraries, importers, the Publishers Association of Israel, the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism, and the Ministry of Education and Culture. In addition, the City of Jerusalem is represented by its City Manager, who serves as Chairman of the Board, and a Deputy Mayor.'

Among the special exhibitions at the Fair, there will be 'The Oxford University Press and the Spread of Learning: An Illustrated History 1478–1978', which has been organized by the Press to celebrate 500 years of printing.

*

The first number of a new quarterly Journal, *Social Networks*, an international Journal of structural analysis, was published last August. It is edited by Professor Linton C. Freeman. The publishers state that free specimen copies can be obtained from Elsevier Sequoia S.A., P.O. Box 851, 1001 Lausanne 1, Switzerland.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Bachi, Roberto, *The Population of Israel*, xv+428 pp., The Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1978, n.p.

Carlebach, Julius, *Karl Marx and the Radical Critique of Judaism*, xi+466 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1978, £8.00.

Coombs, H. C., *Australia's Policy Towards Aborigines, 1967–1977*, 20 pp., Report No. 35, Minority Rights Group, 36 Craven St., London WC2N 5NG, 1978, 75p.

Elazar, Daniel J., *Community and Polity. The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry*, xv+421 pp., The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1976, $12.00.

Epstein, A. L., *Ethos and Identity: Three Studies in Ethnicity*, xvi+181 pp., Tavistock Publications, London, and Aldine Publishing Co., Chicago, 1978, £6.95 (paperback, £2.95).

Giner, Salvador and Archer, Margaret Scotford, eds., *Contemporary Europe. Social Structures and Cultural Patterns*, viii+323 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Henley, and Boston, 1978, £8.50 (paperback, £4.95).

Heymann, Michael, ed., *The Minutes of the Zionist General Council, The Uganda Controversy*, vol. 2, vi+382 pp., The Institute for Zionist Research of Tel Aviv University, Jerusalem, 1977, n.p.

Hobbs, Donald A. and Blank, Stuart J., *Sociology and the Human Experience*, 2nd. edn., xxiv+484 pp., John Wiley, New York, Chichester, Brisbane, and Toronto, 1978, £6.90.

Jaques, Elliott, ed., with R. C. Gibson and D. I. Isaac, *Levels of Abstraction in Logic and Human Action, A theory of discontinuity in the Structure of Mathematical Logic, Psychological Behaviour, and Social Organization*, vi+313 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1978, £10.50.

Katz, Jacob, *Out of the Ghetto, The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation 1770–1870*, ix+271 pp., first published in 1973, Shocken Books, New York, 1978, paperback, $6.50.

Kowalski, Isaac, *A Secret Press in Nazi Europe. The Story of a Jewish United Partisan Organization*, 3rd. edn., 352 pp., first published in 1969, Shengold Publishers, New York, 1978, paperback, $2.50.

Levin, Nora, *Jewish Socialist Movements 1871–1917. While Messiah Tarried*, xii+554 pp., Littman Library of Jewish Civilization Series, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1978, £9.00.

Linzer, Norman, *The Nature of Man in Judaism and Social Work*, xxiii+198 pp., Commission on Synagogue Relations, Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, 130 East 59 St., New York, paperback, $5.00.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, ed., *Emerging Coalitions in American Politics*, x+519 pp., The Institute for Contemporary Studies, 260 California St., San Francisco, 1978, paperback, $6.95.

Nachmias, David and Rosenbloom, David H., *Bureaucratic Culture. Citizens and Administrators in Israel*, 212 pp., Croom Helm, 2–10 St. John's Road, London, S.W.11, 1978, £8.95.

Palley, Claire, *Constitutional Law and Minorities*, 23 pp., Report No. 36, Minority Rights Group, 36 Craven St., London, WC2N 5NG, 1978, 75p.

Porter, Jack Nusan, ed., *The Sociology of American Jews, A Critical Anthology*, xi+282 pp., University Press of America, Washington, D.C., 1978, paperback, $9.75.

Safran, Nadav, *Israel: The Embattled Ally*, xvi+633 pp., Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1978, £12.95.

Schermerhorn, R. A., *Ethnic Plurality in India*, xii+369 pp., Univ. of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1978, $12.95 (paperback, $6.45).

Smooha, Sammy, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict*, xviii+462 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1978, £12.50.

Stinnett, Nick and Birdsong, Craig Wayne, *The Family and Alternate Life Styles*, x+230 pp., Nelson-Hall, Chicago, 1978, $12.95.

van den Berghe, Pierre L., *Race and Racism, A Comparative Perspective*, 2nd. edn., xxiii+171 pp., John Wiley, New York, 1978, £4.50.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

DANNHAUSER, Werner J.; Ph.D. Professor of Government, Cornell University. Author of *Nietzche's View of Socrates* and editor and co-translator of Gershom Scholem, *On Jews and Judaism in Crisis: Selected Essays*. Currently engaged on research on Nietzsche and Goethe.

FARAGO, Uri; Ph.D. Lecturer in Social Psychology and the Sociology of Education, Haifa University. Chief publications: *Continuity and Change in the Jewish Identity of Israeli Youth, 1965–1974* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1977; and 'The Relationship between Jewish Identity and Zionism of Israeli Youth' (in Hebrew), *Iyunim BeChinuch*, no. 17, March 1978.

GLANZ David; M.A. Executive Co-ordinator, Institute for Judaism and Contemporary Thought, Bar Ilan University. Author of 'An Interpretation of the Jewish Counterculture', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 39, Winter–Spring 1977. Currently engaged in research on the sociology of religion.

HARRISON, Michael I.; Ph.D. Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, Bar Ilan University. Chief publications: 'Preparation for Life in the Spirit: The Process of Initial Commitment to a 'Religious Movement', *Urban Life and Culture*, January 1974; 'Sources of Recruitment to Catholic Pentecostalism', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, vol. 13, March 1974; 'Dimensions of Involvement in Social Movements', *Sociological Focus*, vol. 36, Summer 1975; and 'The Maintenance of Enthusiasm: Patterns of Involvement in a New Religious Movement', *Sociological Analysis*, vol. 36, Summer 1975. Currently engaged in studies of professionalism and union organization in Israel.

LACHMAN, Ran; Ph.D. Lecturer in the Faculty of Management, Tel Aviv University. Currently engaged in studies of factory workers in developing countries.

LAZAR, Morty M.; Ph.D. Assistant Professor of Sociology, Mount Saint Vincent University. Currently engaged in research on the survival of ethnic identity among Jewish communities in Atlantic Canada.

SAMUELS, Shimon; Ph.D. Deputy Director of the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Chief publications: 'Japan' in *American Jewish Year Book*, 1971; 'Sosua—Moshav in the Caribbean', *A.J.Y.B.*, 1972; 'Observations from Tokyo', *Midstream*, February 1973; 'Elections in Israel' (in Spanish), *Estudios Orientales*, vol. 8, no. 3, Mexico City, 1974; and 'The Road to Peace—Forty Years or Seven Hours', *The Jewish Quarterly*, Winter 1977. Currently engaged in a study of Arab and Israeli information services in Latin America.

THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

EDITOR
Maurice Freedman

MANAGING EDITOR
Judith Freedman

VOLUME TWENTY 1978

Published on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

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A Journal on Jewish Problems in the USSR and Eastern Europe

Volume 8 Number 1 Spring 1978

ARTICLES

Published by

The Institute of Jewish Affairs Ltd.,
13/16 Jacob's Well Mews, George Street,
London W1H 5PD

The Journal appears twice a year, in spring and autumn.
Annual subscription £4 or $8.00 (air mail surcharge £3 or $5.50).
Single issues £2·25 ($4.50), with additional charges for air mail.