# THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Published on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

VOLUME XX: NUMBER 1: JUNE 1978

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## The Jewish Journal of Sociology

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PUBLISHED TWICE YEARLY

on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

*Annual Subscription £3.00 (U.S. $7.50) post free*
*Single Copies £1.75 ($4.00)*

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# COVENANT AS THE BASIS OF THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION

Daniel J. Elazar

And I will bring you into the wilderness of the people, and there will I plead with you face to face. Like as I pleaded with your fathers in the wilderness of the land of Egypt, so will I plead with you, saith the Lord God. And I will cause you to pass under the rod, and I will bring you into the bond of the covenant. (*Ezekiel* 20:35–37)

THE thesis of this article is that there is a Jewish political tradition whose origins are to be found in the Bible, a tradition which emerged at the very beginning of the existence of the Jewish people and which has continued to influence Jewish political and communal life ever since. The basis of that political tradition is to be found in the Biblical idea of covenant and in the political principles and processes which flow from it. The Biblical political teaching, as manifest in the Jewish political tradition, is an important political teaching for Jews and non-Jews alike and has been so recognized throughout the Western world. At crucial moments in Western history its influence has been decisive. Nevertheless, after surviving changes of constitution and regime, exile and dispersion, the Jewish political tradition has been nearly lost in our times, for Jews as well as non-Jews, precisely at the threshold of the renewal of full Jewish political life. It must be recovered by systematic effort so that it may fill a vital and needed role in contemporary Jewish life, both in Israel and in the Diaspora—and, indeed, in contemporary political thought in general.

*The covenant idea*

In an interview reported in *The Jerusalem Post*, Professor Yuval Neeman, when asked why he was leaving the presidency of Tel-Aviv University to assume the post of Chief Scientist in Israel's Defence establishment, said: 'Because I feel like a shareholder in the corporation that is the State of Israel because when there is a war or danger,

I feel that I must do something.'[1] Professor Neeman was using one currently popular means of expressing the sense of partnership which informs Jewish peoplehood and which conditions Jews' attitudes towards their polity. That sense of partnership is a central theme in Jewish political life and thought, one that flows directly from the covenant idea.

The role of the covenant in Jewish life and thought does not require detailed discussion here. In the past decade or more, there has been a significant rediscovery of the covenantal basis of Judaism in most, if not all, contemporary Jewish intellectual circles and the literature dealing with the covenant and its implications has grown accordingly.[2] The thrust of this literature has been theological in character and properly so. Yet the covenant is as much a political as a theological phenomenon. Perhaps it is best described as a theo-political phenomenon, at least in its original Biblical form.

Like all great ideas, the covenant idea is at once simple and complex—simple enough to serve as a rallying point for a people, yet sufficiently complex for the entire world view of the Bible—and consequently the essential outlook of all Biblically rooted traditions—to be built around it.[3] The Hebrew term *brit* signifies a covenant, often meant to be perpetual, between parties having independent but not necessarily equal status, that provides for joint action or obligation to achieve defined ends (limited or comprehensive) under conditions of mutual respect, in such a way as to protect and enhance the integrity of all parties involved. A covenant is much more than a contract, though our modern system of contracts is related to the covenant idea, because it involves a pledge of loyalty beyond that demanded for mutual advantage, actually involving the development of community among the partners to it. The Biblical term *hesed* (often mistranslated as grace or loving-kindness, but actually meaning the loving obligation resulting from a covenantal tie) reflects this dimension of the covenantal relationship, adding a dynamic element to the character of the compact itself—as we shall see below. In essence, a covenant creates a partnership based upon a firm, legally defined relationship delineating the authority, power, and integrity of all the partners but which, at the same time, requires them to go beyond the legal definition to fully realize the relationship. In other words, the covenant relationship is to social and political life what Buber's I-Thou relationship is to personal life. Through covenants, humans and their institutions are enabled to enter into dialogue and are given (or themselves create) a framework for dialogue.

In its highest form, a covenant community embodies the kind of intimate bond described in *I Samuel* 18:1, 3: '... the soul of Jonathan was knit with the soul of David, and Jonathan loved him as his own soul ... Then Jonathan and David made a covenant, because he loved

him as his own soul.' In that sense, covenantal relationships have been compared to marriages in which the integrity of each partner continues to exist within the community they create. On the other hand, covenants are used in far more limited ways for the long-term resolution of international problems by creating limited but lasting relationships between former or potential enemies, as in *Genesis* 21:32–34 or *Joshua* 9:3–15.

The first covenants of which we are aware were vassal treaties between ancient West Asian (Near Eastern) rulers. Indeed, modern scholars have traced the covenant idea to those treaties and have shown how the classic Biblical covenants parallel them in style and structure.[4] Yet the concept as it appears in the Bible, while retaining ancient West Asian forms, is utterly transformed and infused with a new character. The Hebrew language describes the difference succinctly. The relationships in the first instance were between *ba'alei brit* (literally, masters of the covenant), or partners in a particular international agreement, while in the second they involved *bnei brit* (literally, sons of the covenant), or partners in a common entity created by covenant. The transformation was critical, opening up a whole new set of possibilities and relationships, both intellectual and operational.

In essence, the Israelites took over the idea and techniques of covenant-making from their neighbours but turned the idea on its head. Mesopotamian and West Semitic covenants were designed to limit previously independent entities by making them vassals, regulating their external behaviour but leaving their internal life alone. Israelite covenants, on the other hand, function as liberating devices that call into existence new entities. God, by entering into a covenant with humans, accepts a limitation on the exercise of his omnipotence, thus endowing mankind with freedom but the price of that freedom is the acceptance of an internal reform, as well as external obligations. The covenant becomes the framework for mutual obligation and the basis of a new law and politics internally and externally. Consequently both the covenant itself and the ideas or principles which flow from it create and inform a tradition. In the course of Jewish history, actual covenants and covenantal principles appear and reappear to give the Jewish political tradition both form and content.

In Biblical terms, God relates to his universe and the creatures within it, including man, through a system of covenants. We are all familiar with God's covenants with the patriarchs and Israel. Yet the Bible teaches us that God's covenant with Israel must be viewed in the larger context of God's covenant with all men. Our sages teach us that the beginning of this covenant relationship is implicit in God's relationship to Adam, particularly after man acquires knowledge of good and evil. But the first formal covenant was made with Noah after the flood (*Genesis* 9:8–17). Through Noah, the sages teach

us that a covenant is binding on all people as the basis for universal law.

So pervasive is the covenantal system in the Bible that even God's relationship with the natural order and lower forms of life is frequently portrayed in allegorical terms as a covenantal one (as in *Jeremiah* 33:25–26), as distinct from the Biblical presentation of God's covenants with man as experiential events. From this perspective, *brit* is a term used to capture the Jewish myth of politics, sometimes through real covenants and sometimes symbolically.

Extending the pervasive covenantal relationship between God and man, presented as the only proper one, the Bible necessarily holds that the covenantal relationship is the only proper basis for political organization, that is, the structured allocating of authority and power among men, as well. In a political sense, Biblical covenants take the form of constituting acts that establish the parameters of authority and its division without prescribing the constitutional details of regimes. Thus the Mount Sinai covenant establishes once and for all God's kingship over Israel and the partnership between God and Israel in *tikkun olam* (improvement of society, literally repair of the universe). It does not establish any particular political regime.[5] Rather, in the same weekly portion of the Torah (Jethro), it is explicitly pointed out that Moses's political reorganization of the emergent national government of Israel is based upon the highly utilitarian recommendations of Jethro, a Midianite priest far removed from divine authority (*Exodus* 18:12–27). The interplay is more subtle than that, since the Book of the Covenant which follows upon the giving of the tablets of the covenant (how much we obscure when we refer to them as the two tablets or, worse, the Ten Commandments) seems to be presented as God's response to Moses's delegation of power (*Exodus* 20:19–23 and 33). That is to say, as long as Moses himself was the sole judge and interpreter of God's commandments, they did not need to be set down. Specifics could be clarified through the direct and continuing discourse between Moses and God. Moreover, once the power of judging, or interpreting and applying the commandments, was delegated, then a written collection of basic laws was necessary to provide the basis for those who were not privy to direct communications with the Almighty. The fact that this written collection was explicitly linked to the covenant should speak for itself.

After the Sinai covenant, covenants are used to link the governors and the governed under God according to the terms of the great covenant and in the light of changing circumstances. The model of such covenants is found in *Joshua* 24:1–28, where Joshua assembles the representatives of the twelve tribes of Israel and the tribal and national officers near Shechem, after the conquest and division of the land, to renew before God the covenant of Moses and re-establish the Israelite

confederacy on a landed basis. As in the case of the original, that covenant also established (or re-established) the basic distribution of authority and powers but did not include a frame of government *per se*, simply accepting the frame established earlier. With the introduction of the monarchy, which represented a major shift in the structure of authority within the nation, a new covenant was made (*2 Samuel* 5:3). Similar covenants were initiated or renewed after every major political change or reform in the Biblical period.[6]

While those examples represent the most important uses of covenantal arrangements in the Bible, the term *brit* and the practice of covenanting involved a wide variety of situations, ranging from what were designed to be lasting or perpetual international treaties to secondary contractual obligations between rulers and ruled. This flexibility of usage is consistent with the Biblical world-view which sees the universe as built upon an interlocking and overlapping system of covenantal relationships, each with its own measure of demands and equivalent measure of responses.[7]

Covenantal politics are directed simultaneously towards linking men and communities as partners in common tasks and allowing them space in which to be free. The very idea of a covenant between God and man contains this implication in its most radical form. The omnipotent Deity, by freely covenanting with man, limits his own powers (or 'competence' in the European legal usage) to allow man space in which to be free, only requiring of him that he live in accordance with the Law established as normative by the Covenant. The Puritans' recognition of this aspect of the covenantal relationship between God and man in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Britain and America became the basis of their 'federal theology'—inventing the term 'federal' (derived from the Latin *foedus*, meaning covenant) to express this theo-political relationship. John Winthrop, the great Puritan Governor of Massachusetts, referred to this relationship as 'federal liberty', or the freedom to freely obey the Law.[8] In the process of the founding of the United States, the term federal was secularized by the descendants of the Puritans to become simply a political concept.

The ambiguous origins of the Hebrew word *brit* tell us much about this fettered freedom or liberating bondage. Of the two Akkadian words which scholars suggest are related to it, *biritum* means 'space between' while *bereiti* means 'fetter' or 'binding agreement'. This notion of dividing and then binding is present in the Hebrew phrase, *likhrot brit* and the ceremony that went with that term which in its earliest form involved the halving of an animal and passing between its two parts to symbolically reunite them.[9]

It can be said that, in Jewish tradition, the ties of covenant are the concretization of the relationship of dialogue which when addressed to God, makes man holy and, when addressed to one's fellows, makes

men human. As the Bible itself makes clear, the covenantal bonds transform a mystical union into a real one, making life possible in an all-too-real world and, at the same time, creating the possibilities for a whole new realm of what Max Kadushin in *Organic Thinking* has called 'normal mysticism', or the fusion of the highest goals of the mystics' quest with the demands of everyday living. The progress of civilization can be traced as corresponding to the periods in human history when the historical vanguard has recognized the covenant idea and sought to concretely apply it to the building of human, social, and political relationships.

Translated into less theological terminology, a covenant-based politics looks towards political arrangements established or, more appropriately, compounded, through the linking of separate entities in such a way that each preserves its respective integrity while creating a common association to serve those purposes, broad or limited, for which it was called into being. These purposes range from keeping the peace through a permanent but very limited alliance of independent entities to the forging of a new polity through the union of previously separate entities to create a new whole. A covenant-based politics is not simply a symbolic matter; it has to do with very concrete demands for power-sharing and the development of institutionalized forms and processes for doing so.

Whether in its theological form or secularized as the compact theory of the origin of civil society, the covenant idea is one of the two or three fundamental political concepts illuminating the origins and basis of political life. As a major political idea, the covenant principle has manifested itself in a wide variety of ways under a wide variety of conditions, in different places and times, always enduring as a central element in political thought, Jewish and non-Jewish.[10] Ultimately the concrete political embodiment of the covenant model took two forms, one the union of families or individuals to form bodies politic and the other the federation of bodies politic to form even more complex political systems. Both forms have manifested themselves in Jewish history. What follows is a brief survey of those manifestations within the Jewish body politic over space and time, and then a survey of the ways in which the covenant idea has been applied through the Jewish political tradition. It should be understood from the first that the covenant has consistently manifested itself on three levels: the intellectual, the cultural, and the operational. Here we should treat all three without necessarily distinguishing between them in so many words at every turn. The reader should be prepared to recognize these three levels and make the requisite distinctions.

*Covenant and partnership in the Jewish historical experience*

The first Biblical covenant explicitly involving Jews is the set of covenants between God and Abraham described in *Genesis* 15 and 17. They are pre-constitutional and provide the preconditions for later developments. While they involve God's promise to one individual only, since that promise explicitly forms the basis for the emergence of a new nation in a land of its own, it sets the stage for the more formally political covenanting at Sinai. God's reaffirmation of that covenant in *Exodus* 6: 2–8 links those pre-constitutional covenants with that of Sinai.

As already suggested, from the political perspective, the Sinai covenant is reminiscent of a social compact in that it provides the political and social framework for constitution-making but not the constitution itself. The restatement of the Sinai covenant in *Deuteronomy* 4 is constructed along more explicitly political-legal lines, the pattern characteristic of that book.[11] The Exodus and the Sinai covenant usher in a new epoch in Jewish history, whose principal political manifestation was the tribal federation. During this epoch, the Jewish people clearly began to forge its unique blend of kinship and consent as the basis of its political life, transcending the real or putative links of kinship which characterize tribal society to add the dimension of deliberate consent—one of the outstanding manifestations of the covenant idea—without destroying the people's or the polity's tribal base.[12] The Biblical phrase *'am v'edah* is a kind of statement of this linkage between kinship and consent. The term *'am* (people) reflects a common descent, a kinship, albeit with overtones of a special tie beyond mere kinship; the institutional embodiment of that tie is to be found in the *'edah* (the assembly of citizens which met regularly, also used to designate the form of government under the Mosaic covenants) which, as an assembly, is the operational embodiment of the principle of consent.

The political dimensions of the covenant were at their most pronounced at Sinai and in the desert where the Jewish people acquired a single national constitution and law (in fact, the two were not really separated) which was administered by a combination of tribal and national officers and which served a federation of tribes, each of which was in itself compounded as a union of families. This federation has been described by some scholars as an amphictyony—a limited confederation for religious purposes built around a common shrine.[13] Whatever elements of amphictyony may have existed in the tribal federation, according to the Biblical account, the tribes were linked in a true federation in the modern sense, that is to say, one based on a common constitutional and legal system applied in a non-centralized fashion with power shared among several different institutions and centres.[14]

One major stream in Jewish tradition has consistently viewed the tribal federation as the classical form of Jewish polity (for example, Joshua and Samuel, Ezekiel, the champions of the Elijah tradition, Josephus, Don Isaac Abravanel, and Martin Buber[15]). Moreover, the political model embodied by the tribal confederacy, particularly during its first two generations under Moses and Joshua, must be counted as one of the most influential political models in the Western world, while the subsequent history of the tribes during the period of the Judges and on through the attempt to restore the original regime in the days of Samuel, served as the raw material for the debates of political philosophers and constitution-makers in the Western world at least as late as the nineteenth century.[16]

The Bible itself offers contradictory assessments as to the success of the tribal confederacy as a polity. What is clear, however, is that its collapse was a result of external forces rather than internal weakness *per se*. A non-centralized polity based on a loose federation of tribes could not stand up to the assaults of the Philistines. In the process of responding to those assaults, Israel created its own particular brand of what is formally termed a monarchy, but which, in the literal meaning of the term—rule by one—was not that at all because it was limited by specific covenants and the covenant idea generally. According to the Biblical account, a limited constitutional monarchy was established and periodically reaffirmed through a covenant between God, people, and king. While under the monarchy a much stronger centre of power was created in the polity, other centres and institutions retained real powers as well and at least one, the institution of the prophets, was actually strengthened to counterbalance the king.[17]

The first such covenant was with David (*2 Samuel* 5:3; *1 Chronicles* 11:3). It introduced a new epoch in Jewish history, one that gave the federation of tribes a common capital with a national government capable of reaching into the lives of every citizen in ways far beyond the limited role of the Judges and Levites in the previous epoch. Despite the hereditary element introduced by David, his heirs apparently had to be confirmed through covenants with the representatives of the people. Thus Solomon and the people covenanted with one another before God at the time of the transferring of the Ark of the Covenant (*1 Kings* 8). This was at least so after crises involving a previously reigning monarch who had violated the covenant and thereby cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Davidide house, as in the cases of Jehoiadah, Josiah, Asa, and Hezekiah.

What was characteristic of that period is the combination of monarchic and tribal (or federal) institutions. David was elevated to the kingship by the tribal leadership speaking in the name of the people, Solomon was reaffirmed by that leadership, and Rehoboam was denied the kingship by ten of the tribes acting in concert when he went to them

to establish a similar compact at the beginning of his reign (*1 Kings* 12: 1–20; *2 Chronicles* 10). Considering his arrogant attitude towards the tribal leadership, it is clear that Rehoboam was required to go before them by the constitution and did not do so of his own free will. Subsequently, while multi-tribal institutions disappeared from the southern kingdom because of the dominance of Judah (with the original federal institutions surviving only in the realm of local government), the northern kingdom maintained them until the very end of its existence.

The disappearance of the tribal federation as a reality after the fall of the northern kingdom can be said to mark the end of the original monarchic epoch in Jewish constitutional history, leading to a search for new political arrangements which culminated in the days of King Josiah when the Book of Deuteronomy became the constitutional basis for the regime (*2 Kings* 22:3–13; and 23:21–25). The Josianic reform restored the idea that the Israelite polity was based on a tri-partite compact between God, Israel, and the King, with God as sovereign and lawgiver represented in day-to-day matters by his prophets (*2 Chronicles* 23: 1–11, 21; and 34: 29–32). Coming as it did after the reconstitution of the Israelite regime on a non-tribal basis, the reform reaffirmed the essentially covenantal basis of the Israelite polity, just in time to strengthen the Jewish will to survive after the destruction of the first Temple.

The prophetic vision of Ezekiel (Chapters 16, 17, 20, 34, 37, 44), which embodies the theo-political aspirations of the exiles in Babylonia, explicitly foresees the restoration of the covenantal polity in its full multi-tribal form. While the proximate restoration of Jewish rule in Jerusalem (on a home rule basis within the Persian empire) did not even approach that messianic vision, its political dimension was clearly based on a popular renewal of the covenant at the initiative of Ezra when the people assembled on Succot to hear the Torah and to assent to its authority—as graphically portrayed in the Bible (*Nehemiah* 8–10). As at Sinai, the Succot covenant set the framework for the renewed Jewish polity while the details of the regime were developed subsequently within it. Overall, the regime seems to have been a non-centralized union of families and community-congregations within the framework of the Torah and the developing oral law, whose local and national institutions, and their leaders, were extremely powerful within their respective spheres.

The Succot covenant was the last of the Biblical covenants. The regime it produced survived until the time of the Hasmoneans and nominally continued to be the basis of the Hasmonean regime as well. It was supplemented by an additional covenant between 'the priests, the people, the heads of the nation, and the elders of the land' on one hand, and Simon the Maccabean on the other, whom they designated

as 'high priest, commander-in-chief, and *nasi*' (literally one raised up [toleadership], and in modern Hebrew, President), which was embodied in a document (given in full in *1 Maccabees* 14:25–49). Even those later Hasmonean rulers who referred to themselves as kings in Greek, cautiously continued to call themselves high priests and *nesiim* in Hebrew. In both cases, political covenants confirmed the inauguration of new historical epochs for the Jewish people. Characteristic of the first was the abjuration of monarchic leadership in favour of what has been termed theocracy but is better characterized as a nomocracy in which powers of government were shared by priests, *soferim* ('secretaries' as in Secretary of State), and an assembly of family heads and notables. In the second epoch, a central political leader was added to the structure of the regime.

In the immediate post-Biblical period, Jewish political thought took two directions which had a vital impact on later generations' view of the covenant idea. Under Hellenistic influences, an attempt was made to reconcile the Biblical and philosophical world views by recasting the history of ancient Israel and the political teaching of the Bible in Greek modes. The Septuagint, Philo, and Josephus are the three most prominent exemplars of this effort. The effort was made to satisfy Jews who had come under Hellenistic influences and to explain Judaism to the non-Jewish world which engulfed it. This tended to substantially reduce the emphasis on the covenant idea—which was not indigenous to Greek thought—in Jewish intellectual circles. It had a lasting influence on our understanding of the Jewish political tradition, precisely because it filtered that tradition though a very powerful and compelling non-Jewish filter. Nevertheless, the continued utilization of the principle shows through in the descriptions of actual political behaviour from that period, as in the case of Simon.

The epoch initiated by the Hasmonean revolution reached a climax in the destruction of the Second Temple and came to an end after the failure of the Bar Kokhba rebellion. Subsequently, such institutions of national authority as the Jews were able to formally maintain (for example, the Patriarchate in Israel and the Exilarchate in Babylonia) were formally instituted by the foreign powers holding dominion over them and existed at the sufferance of those powers. One of the struggles of the millennium following the loss of Jewish sovereignty involved the Jews' effort to infuse their own consensual-covenantal dimension into institutions which were designed to rule them hierarchically precisely because they were forced upon them by foreign powers seeking to keep them in line.[18] This problem is reflected in the Chronicle of Rabbi Nathan which describes how the community acted to assume a role in the appointment of the Exilarch, a position that was actually hereditary:

When he is appointed, if the mind of the community has agreed to appoint

> him, the two heads of the Yeshivot meet with their students and all the heads of the congregation and the elders appoint.

In this way the dual principles of consent and power sharing were at least formally maintained.[19]

In the interim, however, the Jews had developed a device through which to maintain their own autonomy in a covenantal manner, namely the local house of congregation or assembly which is generally known by its Greek name, 'synagogue'. The congregation-synagogue became a crucial vehicle for Jewish self-expression precisely because it was based upon authentic Jewish political principles and was eminently suited to the wide variety of conditions under which Jews found themselves in their dispersion. As an institution, a congregation could be established anywhere, wherever ten Jewish males came together. Thoroughly portable, it could adapt itself to particular geo-historical conditions to provide the Jews with whatever degree of self-government they were allowed and had the strength to maintain. Thus in the land of Israel and later in the small Jewish settlements of the medieval Diaspora it was usually synonymous with the local community (as the Hebrew name it acquired—*kahal kadosh* or *kehilla kedosha*—indicates), while in the great Hellenistic cities, and later in the great cities of Europe and America, it was perhaps one of several synagogues, sometimes linked with a larger communal framework on a federal or confederal basis and sometimes independent for all intents and purposes.

Every congregation by its very nature came into existence through a compact or covenant between its founders which was extended to those who subsequently became part of it. Although there is some dispute in the halakhic literature with regard to the precise legal implications of this, in effect every local Jewish community, as a congregation, was considered to be a kind of partnership based upon a common contractual obligation within the framework of the overall Jewish constitution, namely the Torah. In the Sephardi world, these compacts came to be called *askamot*, perhaps best translated as articles of agreement. The flexibility of this form led to a variety of arrangements depending on local circumstances. In some cases, the entire community was organized as a single congregation with the appropriate governing bodies usually divided along functional lines. At the other extreme, the community as a whole consisted of a loose league of many independent congregations, each of which represented a particular religious point of view or socio-economic distinction.

The associational model which emerged from this congregational form became the basis for the entire web of Jewish communal organizations in the European Diaspora. *Sefer HaShtarot* (The Book of Contracts)—compiled in the eleventh century by R. Judah HaBarceloni as

the classic collection of model laws for the governance of the Jewish people in the Middle Ages—includes a model charter for establishing a congregation-community, whose Preamble (an excellent example of the style of covenant documents essentially unchanged since the first ancient Near Eastern vassal covenants) is worth quoting in full:

> We, the elders and leaders of the community of –x–, due to our many sins we have declined and become fewer and weaker, and until only few have been left of many, like a single tree at the mountaintop, and the people of our community have been left with no head or *nasi*, or head justice or leader, so that they are like sheep without a shepherd and some of our community go about improperly clothed and some speak obscenely and some mix with the Gentiles and eat their bread and become like them, so that only in the Jewish name, are they at all different. We have seen and discussed the matter and we agreed in assembly of the entire community, and we all, great and small alike, have gone on to establish this charter in this community.

The model charter continues to describe how the community, by this action, acquires the right to enact ordinances, establish institutions, and levy and collect taxes; in short, to carry on all the functions of a municipal government.

The principles of community enunciated in that document are clear. In order for the actions of a community to be legally binding in Jewish law, it had to be duly constituted by its potential members, preferably through a constituent assembly and a constitutional document. They must be able to say: 'We have met together as the elders', 'We have discussed the matter', and 'we have agreed in assembly of the entire community'. If these patterns were not followed, the action would not be valid.

In those cases where inter-community federations were created—as in northern France and the Rhineland, the Council of the Communities of Aragon, and the Council of the Four Lands—the compacts restored a strong federal element to the overall covenantal base.[20] Within communities, individual *ḥevrot* were similarly organized as partnerships on a sub-communal basis, usually with some functional orientation.[21]

The great questions of power and authority in the medieval Jewish community were for the most part based upon differences of opinion regarding the implications of this contractual base. So, for example, questions of the apportionment of taxation or the reduction of air rights (that is, a building's access to light and air, so important in densely populated medieval towns) were often related to the issue as to whether or not the community was a partnership, and if so, what were the rights of the partners. In essence, the partnership issue was important in all questions of whether decisions could be made by majority vote or required unanimity.[22] Thus the Rashba (R. Shlomo ben Aderet)

who, together with the Maharam (Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg), established the constitutional and jurisprudential basis for the medieval Jewish community, responded to a question from the Jewish community of Lerida in fourteenth-century Spain, as follows:

> In all matters of the community, no one part of the community is permitted to do as they please, unless the entire community consents. For the community are as partners in all communal responsibilities and in all communal appointments, such as tax collectors, unless there exist men who have been appointed to deal with communal affairs; those who are called by our sages the seven *tuvei ha'ir*. In most places, nowadays, the important men of the community direct the affairs of the community in consultation and agreement. In general, it is assumed that the individual avoids his own opinion, but if some of the community, even from among those who are not great in wisdom, object, their objection stands. This is certainly so, where the objection is made by some of the men who are normally those to be consulted.

He qualified this statement in a further response to the Jews of Saragossa:

> The customs of different locales differ in these matters, for there are places where all matters are handled by their elders and advisors, and there are places where even the council can do nothing without the consent of the entire congregation in which there is found the agreement of all, and there are places which appoint for themselves a group of men whose direction they will follow for a given period of time in all matters related to the group.

This is the kind of debate which can only occur in a covenant-created setting where what is at stake is the definition of how much autonomy each partner maintains. The resolution of this issue (and there are opinions on both sides) is less important for our purposes here than the fact that it was an issue at all, that the discussion was not whether there should be rule by one or by the few, or by the many; but how, in a system in which the many were assumed to rule, they were to arrive at their decisions. The fact that many communities did become oligarchies and a few even fell under autocratic domination is significant and deserves exploration in its own right as well as in relationship to the theory, but the theory also reflected real circumstances, perhaps more so than any of the other forms. We know this because we find records of the debate not in the esoteric writings of learned men and abstract thinkers but in the responsa of the great sages of those generations, who were forced to adjudicate real disputes.[23]

These questions took on special importance in cases involving the admission of new members to the community, particularly people who wanted to move in from outside in situations where the non-Jewish ruling power made living conditions particularly difficult for the existing Jewish residents.[24] In short, the greater part of Jewish public law

in the medieval period had to do with interpreting the meaning of compacts and the rights and obligations of those who came to be party to them, so much so that several historians of the period have suggested that Jewish thought on these matters anticipated the political thought of Hobbes, Locke, and other seventeenth-century social compact theorists—in my opinion, a correct observation on their part, particularly since both schools flowed from a common source.[25]

With the breakdown of the medieval community, Diaspora Jewry had to reorganize itself once again. As the Jewish people ceased to be regarded as a nation among the nations, their polity ceased to be a state within a state. The reorganization was partly forced upon the Jews by the governing authorities of the new nation-states which emerged in the seventeenth century and subsequently, and partly followed internal Jewish initiatives seeking to adjust to the situation. It resulted in the creation of quasi-voluntary communities in the sense that Jews could now choose to cease to be Jews but, if they chose to remain within the Jewish fold, they had to be members of a Jewish community. Legally, these communities were religious associations organized on a membership basis in keeping with the associational or contractual character of modern liberal society. In the German states and the other Central European countries under Germanic influence, local communities were further federated into country-wide bodies. In France, a centralistic pattern common to modern French society was imposed upon the Jewish community as well, while the Jewries of Great Britain were united just as was the United Kingdom. In short, the tendency for the local Jewish community to take on the organizational characteristics of its host environment was continued, at least in externals. In this case, however, the organizational forms of modern society served to strengthen the contractual character of the communities more often than not. Whatever the formal framework, the associative and increasingly voluntary character of the community maintained the by now traditionally Jewish covenantal base in the forefront, even if the community itself functioned on a reduced basis.[26]

In the New World, the voluntary character of the Jewish community was total from the very first. Even where Jews were not fully admitted into the larger society, nowhere in the New World were they required to be members of a Jewish community. While kinship propelled them towards membership, affiliation came only on the basis of active consent. As a result, Jewish institutions were built on an entirely voluntary or associative basis. The initial affiliation of Jews was voluntary and the subsequent linkage among Jewish organizations was even more so.

The Jewish response to New World conditions was to adapt the covenant principle through federative arrangements, generally without any awareness that they were continuing the Jewish political tradition.

In the United States, the Jews developed federations of Jewish social service agencies, on the one hand, and federations of congregations on the other.[27] In Canada, they developed a country-wide federation of local communities compounded out of community relations and Zionist bodies.[28] In Latin America, country-of-origin groups formed their own communities which, over time, confederated with one another to create city-wide or country-wide bodies for limited purposes.[29] Whatever the particular form, characteristic of the whole was the contractual relationship and the institutional structures and processes which flowed from it.

To no small extent, the reconstituted Jewish polity in Israel also reflects a continuation of the covenant tradition, although, after 1948, a state of the nineteenth-century European model was superimposed on what started as a continuation of older Jewish practice along new lines.[30] The beginnings of modern Jewish resettlement in the land followed the patterns of Jewish 'colonization' that had apparently existed since the earliest days of the Diaspora, adapted to local circumstances. That is to say, Jewish householders banded together to establish pioneering societies to accomplish specific or general tasks, whether the construction of new neighbourhoods outside the walls of Jerusalem, or the establishment of agricultural settlements, or the organization of cooperative enterprises. In doing so, the householders compacted together by drawing up articles of agreement reminiscent of those establishing medieval communities or modern congregations, which served as both covenants and constitutions for their enterprises. Parallel to these developments in the land of Israel proper, Zionist societies were organized abroad on the same basis, as pioneering nuclei, as fund-raising instrumentalities, or political action groups, finally coming together as the World Zionist Organization which began as a federation of Zionist societies and rapidly became a federation of movements.

The Zionist experience is a classic example of the Jewish use of federative arrangements. Zionism as a whole quickly came to represent the common messianic movement at the cutting edge of modern Jewry. However, in the Jewish fashion, agreement as to general messianic goals was accompanied by sharp disagreement as to the precise character of the goals to be achieved, which led in turn to the development of movements within the Zionist framework that were not only highly competitive on one level but essentially hostile to one another—since they represented sharply different approaches to solving the Jewish and human problems to which Zionism was directed. Nevertheless, the movements quickly came to recognize the necessity for common action in order to advance both the common and specific elements in their respective goals. The solution was a federation based upon inter- and cross-movement compacts for the sharing of power within the overall Zionist organization, and the division of resources within it. The

coalition politics based on the party key which became characteristic of the World Zionist Organization and, later, the State of Israel are the principal manifestations of this federative arrangement, the building blocks for all Zionist endeavours.

Parallel to the federation of parties, the *Yishuv* in Israel constructed federations of settlements and institutions (for example, the Histadrut), which together constituted the 'State on the way' of the inter-war period.[31] In the process, movements developed that offered their members a comprehensive environment providing them with educational facilities, social services, sports and recreational opportunities, and even military units. The network of charters and compacts from both provided a constitutional basis for the rebuilding of the land which culminated in the Declaration of Independence proclaiming the new State of Israel. The content of the Declaration, known as the Scroll of Independence in Hebrew, is, in itself, of constitutional significance in the traditional way—that is to say, as a founding covenant which sets forth the guidelines within which a constitution can be developed and a regime established without specifying either.[32]

While the Zionist pioneers relied upon Jewish political tradition, implicitly at least, in nation-building, when it came to state-building, they turned to the European models they knew, superimposing upon the network of compacts and charters a centralized and highly bureaucratic model of parliamentary democracy. In this respect at least, it is ironic that the communal structure of the Diaspora remains closer than the new Jewish state to the Jewish political tradition. The end result was not a replacement of a covenantal orientation with a bureaucratic one but a great dysfunctionality between the formal structure and the ways of doing public business rooted in the Jewish political culture. The transfer of functions from the parties to the state transformed the former from comprehensive movements—states within a state-in-the-making—into competitors for the rewards that only the state could offer. This led to a network of compacts for the division of those rewards to limit competition and give each party its due share. Inter-party compacts also survived in the various electoral blocs formed and reformed in the years since 1948 and in governmental coalition-making. The latter actually rest upon signed documents hammered out among the partners. The formal federative framework, as such, continued to persist only in the rural areas through the sectorial and territorial settlement federations such as the several kibbuts and moshav movements and the regional councils. There the gap between structure and practice has been much smaller, with notable results. In sum, where pre-State developments have survived, so too have federative arrangements. Where they have been replaced by post-1948 modes of organization or where such modes of organization have been instituted and have become dominant, only echoes of covenantal arrangements

are to be found, by and large in the semi-formal substructure that has grown up within the centralized state to make the latter work.

*Applying the covenant idea*

The above all-too-brief historical survey suggests that the covenant idea was manifested in the world of action in a variety of ways, reflecting the variety of circumstances to which it had to be adapted. In addition, the covenant idea has manifested itself through a variety of dimensions. The exploration of these ways and dimensions has hardly begun and remains a major task in the recovery of the Jewish political tradition. Nevertheless, it is possible to suggest some ways in which the covenant idea has been applied in practice. Here I shall attempt to do so in a suggestive rather than exhaustive way, through the perspective of some of the standard concerns of political science.

*Jewish political institutions and their organization.* I have already suggested how communities, congregations, and federations all reflect the covenant idea in operation. Figure 1 summarizes the various forms of organization which have predominated within the Jewish people since the Exodus and their particular internal character. The overwhelming majority of them were created by compact and many were federal. Even the ones that were not, were essentially unions compounded out of local communities and/or congregations.[33] In addition, the small congregations and *ḥevrot* which represented the first step beyond the family as an organizational unit reflect the same covenantal base. Traditionally, the Jewish people has consisted of a group of families rather than individuals bound together by covenant, thereby accommodating the realms of both kinship and consent.

Of the eleven general patterns of communal organization shown in the figure, only one, the Babylonian-Near Eastern Diaspora, was clearly organized on a hierarchical basis and only two others—the southern kingdom of Judah after the division of the tribes and contemporary Israel—were centralized arrangements imposed upon an earlier covenantal base in such a way as to formally supersede it. In all the rest, the covenantal framework was carried through from first to last, either directly or in one permutation or another. The Babylonian case (along with that of modern France) represents the hard case in the scheme. The fact that the Talmud was created in Babylonia under the hierarchical conditions which prevailed requires us to consider the implications of that case. What is significant about it is the way in which Jews tried to reintroduce the familiar and by then traditional framework through the back door. Thus the Talmud (*Sanhedrin*) discusses appointments to the district courts which, under the hierarchical system, were made by the Exilarch and how the Jewish communities

FIGURE 1. *Systemic manifestations of the covenant idea*

| *Regime* | *Political System* |
|---|---|
| Tribal Confederacy | Federation of tribes |
| Southern Kingdom | Monarchy overlaying union of local communities |
| Northern Kingdom | Monarchy overlaying federation of tribes |
| Ezra's Covenantal Community | Union of local community-congregations |
| Hellenistic Politeuma | Loose league of Diaspora communities (each the product of a local compact) and Israel |
| Babylonian-Near Eastern Exilarchate/Gaonate | Centralized polity with local home rule |
| Spanish and Rhenish Communities | Communities organized locally by compact which occasionally federated with one another on a regional basis |
| Eastern European Lands | Federated (for example, the Council of the Four Lands) unless prevented from doing so by the non-Jewish authorities |
| Near Eastern-North African Lands | Separated congregation-communities linked locally through leagues |
| Modern Diaspora | Federations of congregations, camps and/or agencies |
| Contemporary Israel | Centralized parliamentary state superimposed on network of co-operative associations |

insisted on parallel local appointees as well as local veto powers over the Exilarch's appointees after they appeared on the local scene.

> When he [the Exilarch-appointed judge] reaches his destination [a particular community], he chooses two of the important men of the town to sit with him.

Moreover, the establishment of the great Babylonian academies and the struggle between the leaders of those academies and the Exilarch may itself be a reflection of the conflict of traditions. The *Bereshit Rabbah*, the Midrashic commentary on the Book of Genesis, comments on the verse:

> The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor the ruler's staff from between his legs.

According to the Midrash, 'The sceptre ...' is interpreted as the Exilarchs in Babylon, who rule the people, Israel, with the stick, while 'the ruler's staff ...' are the patriarchs of the family of Rabbi (Rabbi Judah the *Nasi*), who teach the Torah to the populace in the land of Israel.

Another explanation of the verse is offered:

> The sceptre is the Messiah, son of David [*Mashiaḥ ben David*], who will rule over the kingdom, that is to say, Rome, with a stick. And the ruler's staff are those who teach *Halakhah* to Israel.

Even after the Messiah comes, there will have to be a separation of powers, for even the *Mashiah* is not to be trusted alone with all the powers. Even if he can rule over Rome, there still must be the great Sanhedrin to teach *Halakhah* to Israel.

As a partnership, the Jewish community is clearly republican in its orientation; it is a partnership which is based on the principle that the community is a *res publica*, a public thing, not the private preserve of any man or group, whose leaders are drawn from, and are *penultimately* responsible to, the people. *Penultimately*, not *ultimately*. Ultimately, all are responsible to God; but penultimately, for matters of this world, leaders are responsible to the people in some way. In fact, much of the internal political history of the Jewish people revolves around the balancing of power among those who are seen as representatives of God's will and those whose authority stems from the people. This fundamental division of powers is crucial to any Jewish polity and is even reflected in modern Israel in the deference shown those recognized as representatives of normative Judaism which goes beyond the demands of coalition politics.

The Jewish community is republican but it is republican in an aristocratic as much as in a democratic way. It must be carefully noted that, although the Jewish community has generally attempted to be democratic in its involvement of the people in covenants crucial to its formation and governance, it was not meant to be simply democratic, in the sense that we talk about any person acquiring leadership by virtue of some kind of public acclamation. It also seeks to embody the aristocratic ideal because leadership in the Jewish community was and is invariably invested in those able to claim legitimacy on the basis of some authoritative source which stands external to the members of the community, *per se*. Ideally, the source of authority of the communal leadership is God. According to tradition, it is He who determines what the earthly forms of legitimacy will be, through His covenant with the people and its expression in the Torah. After the days of the Judges, God, Himself, no longer directly anointed leaders. Consequently, even when Jews were God-fearing, they did not expect God to anoint their leaders, but they did recognize their ultimate responsibility to Him.

This apparent rejection of simple democracy in favour of a kind of federal republicanism is perhaps difficult to penetrate in a democratic era which increasingly equates true democracy with its Jacobin version. Nevertheless, Jews came to the conclusion that the maintenance of the special purpose of the Jewish people necessitated such a stance. While all power must be subject to checks by the people, ultimately the nature of the community is determined by something higher than the people; there is a vision that stands above the simple counting of heads. In practice, this has not always prevented the development of a rabbinic oligarchy supported by claims to Divine favour but most of the time it has created a framework for power-sharing which has prevented autocracy, even in the most autocratic periods of the history of the nation.

*The covenant idea in Jewish political thought.* Classical Jewish sources do not clearly separate political and other teachings. Indeed, the methodological problem of uncovering the Jewish political tradition from within those sources is deserving of extensive treatment in its own right. By and large, standard exegetical techniques (the midrashic method) serve to identify the political ideas contained in those texts and relate them to one another so as to uncover a systematic teaching.

The covenant idea can be seen to be significant in shaping at least five themes of Jewish political thought: (1) man's stewardship on earth; (2) the special role of Israel among the nations in God's scheme for redemption; (3) the appropriate political regime for the Jewish people; (4) the Jewish conception of the polity as such; and (5) the ideal polity of the messianic age and the political character of the age itself.

The Jewish world-view suggests that man and God are partners in the management of the world. This partnership began when God delegated to Adam the right to name the creatures. Adam, however, is entirely dependent upon God's good will. With Noah, the partnership is regularized through a covenant which is interpreted by the sages as having a political component in the requirement to establish courts of justice, or government, in the world. The Talmudic discussion of the seven Noahide *mitsvot* is very revealing in that it suggests that six of the seven were already demanded of Adam, but in effect, the sages teach us, they were not put together into coherent doctrine based upon a formalized relationship between man and God until God covenanted with Noah.[34] Of course, the stewardship question goes beyond that and can be explored in several directions, involving such concepts as *tikkun olam*, but the basis of man's relationship remains rooted in the covenant-created partnership.

The special role of Israel among the nations was established by the covenants with Abraham and at Sinai. Through the latter, God assumes direct responsibility for governing His people, a major aspect of their special position as a people set apart (made holy) for exemplary purposes. By and large, this issue is treated by contemporary Jewish thinkers as a theological problem. Yet Moses and the prophets treated it as a political problem first and foremost and there are even echoes of its political character in the Talmud, despite the very real efforts on the part of the Jewish leadership in those centuries to de-emphasize the strictly political dimension of Jewish life in an effort to adjust to the new conditions of exile and relative powerlessness. How does one deal with the problem of 'entangling alliances' that were such anathema to the prophets, or sharing the land with another people so strongly opposed in the *Humash* and the Book of Joshua, except from a perspective that emphasizes the resolution of the political problems involved as a necessary precondition to the attainment of theological goals?

At least as early as the Jews' encounter with Hellenism, the issue of Israel's special role became closely entwined with the question of whether the Jewish people existed simply by virtue of kinship, or common descent, or also by virtue of consent—an argument which has carried over into our own times. For those who believed the former, a Jew was set apart from all other men by virtue of his very biology and, even if he strayed, was more open to redemption than any non-Jew because of an inherited 'Divine spark'. This seems to have been the view of Judah HaLevi, the Maharal of Prague, and the late Rabbi Kook, among others.[35] On the other hand, there were those who argued that consent was at least as important as kinship, if not more so; that every Jew had to accept the covenant to be truly part of Israel. That seems to have been the view of Philo and Rambam, among others. Philo discusses the admission of proselytes on equal terms with those born Jews into the Jewish polity and suggests that the basis of that polity is not common descent but the common heritage of the Torah, that is, common consenting to the commandments of the Torah. Thus, in *De Specialibus Legibus*, Philo says, 'The native born Jews obtain the approval of God not because they are members of the God loving polity from birth but because they were not false to the nobility of their birth', while the proselytes obtain God's approval 'because they have thought fit to make the passage to piety' (*Spec.* 1, 9, 51). Philo terms such relationships 'kinships of greater dignity and sanctity' (*Spec.* 1, 58, 317).

The latter view is that of most modern Jewish theologians and thinkers, reinforced by the realities of the open society and the general commitment of the moderns to voluntarism. On the other hand, the former view remains strongly that of groups like the Habad Hassidim, which helps explain why, on the one hand, they pursue every Jew with equal vigour and, on the other, have a negative attitude towards conversions to Judaism. While one must approach the Talmud cautiously in such matters, in several places it suggests that it is the covenant between God and Israel that makes 'All Israel responsible for one another' (*T. B. Sota*, 376; *Ḥagigah*, 6a; *Zevahim*, 1156; *Meḥilta*, 11, 27; *Exodus Rabbah*, 5: 9). In the larger context, this seems to represent a synthesis between kinship and consent. Certainly the Hebrew term for responsible used in the passage, *arevim*, has strong contractual connotations.

The discussion of the appropriate political regime for the Jewish people has been linked with the covenant idea from the first, as illustrated in *Parashat Yithro*. As that *parashah* indicates, while the covenant establishes the constitutional grounding of the Jewish people, it does not establish any particular form of government. The Torah itself presents two options—a nomocratic tribal federation ruled by God and led by prophets and judges or one under the leadership of kings

and priests. These two options—the first based upon a highly non-centralized regime of locally rooted leaders and the second based upon a court with a bureaucratic structure—with some variations, remain the principal choices before the Jewish people throughout the Biblical period, and may even be seen as prototypes of the choices confronting the Jews as a polity ever since. Subsequently, other variations of those options were developed and instituted through various local compacts (or by outside powers where the Jews were unable to determine their own forms of government).

The struggle between the two options is generally couched in covenantal terms: namely, What were the demands of the original covenant at Sinai which established God's direct rule over His people and, Did God modify those demands by His covenant with David and his house? This is one of the great debates in Jewish political thought, manifested in the Talmud, in the medieval world (for example, Rambam versus Abravanel) and down through the ages until modern times (viz. Chaim Herschenson's *Malkhi BaKodesh* and Martin Buber's *Kingship of God*).[36] It has also operated on an immediate level in matters regarding the forms of governance, the organization of authority, and the distribution of powers within particular Jewish communities. The responsa literature is replete with references to these two options and seeks to apply them to local situations.[37]

If the Jewish sources do not mandate a particular form of government, they do have a great deal to say about what component elements are necessary for the construction of a good regime. These include both institutions and processes involving such things as the separation of powers and responsibilities, expectations of standards of behaviour of political office-holders, and requirements for the protection of individual rights, or, more correctly, privileges, responsibilities, and obligations. In short, an appropriate political structure within the covenantal framework is one that secures both the position of the Torah in the Jewish polity and the liberties (in the classic sense) of the Jewish people.

The lack of emphasis on a particular governmental form is a reflection of the emphasis of the covenantal approach on particular kinds of political relationship—between governors and governed, between components of the polity (or between polities), between God and man. Covenants, after all, are designed to create relationships which are then given form rather than creating forms which are then given content. This emphasis on relationships has been a distinguishing characteristic of the Jewish political tradition from the first and helps to explain why a variety of regimes have proved acceptable to the interpreters of Jewish tradition and also why some forms of regime are simply unacceptable, no matter what.

Every polity is built around certain basic tensions which play a major

role in giving it form and in defining its continuing concerns as a polity. Those tensions come on the scene in the course of the very founding of the polity in the first place and are, in all likelihood, inherent in the act of founding—representing unresolved conflicts leading up to the founding or tensions that necessarily result from the founding synthesis. Every generation must grapple with these tensions and work out some *modus vivendi* to manage them, so that they are not so exacerbated as to cause the dissolution of the polity in question. At the same time, the tensions are never completely resolved as long as the polity exists. In fact, they can be resolved only upon the demise of the polity. Thus, part of the dynamic of every polity is its particular set of tensions and the interaction that occurs between them.

The principal tensions within the Jewish polity are derived from, or closely related to, the covenant idea. One such tension revolves around the problem of reconciling divine and popular authority. On the one hand, God is the sovereign of the Jewish people and His authority is ultimate and unchallengeable. On the other, for day-to-day matters and even for matters of interpreting Jewish law, authority is vested in humans and, for many such matters, in human majorities. For example, the powers of legal interpretation were entrusted to the Sanhedrin as the ultimate human agency for interpreting the law, and, according to the famous *midrash*, their decisions are by majority rule even when God Himself gives a sign as to the rightness of the minority view. The covenant is perhaps the principal bridge between the two authoritative forces, since it is through the covenant that God has invested human institutions with authoritative roles. Moreover, it is through the various secondary covenants that humans have organized their institutions to exercise those roles.

Closely tied in with the question of the appropriate political regime for the Jewish people is the appropriate conception of the polity. Here the covenant idea plays an especially important role. If the Jewish political tradition conveys a clear sense of the existence of polities and their importance, it does not, in its authentic form, have any conception of the state in the modern sense of the term. The word *medina* appears in the Bible (as do almost all the words which we now take for granted as part of the Jewish language of politics), where it is used to describe a territorial unit possessing its own political or administrative institutions but clearly not an independent one, in other words, an administrative district (as the usage in *1 Kings* 20:14–19) or a province (as used throughout the *Scroll of Esther*). The Bible does not discuss sovereign states because, according to the Bible and the Jewish political tradition generally, sovereignty rests only in Heaven. All powers possessed by humans are subsidiary ones, delegated by the Almighty to the people or their representatives as variously defined.

In the Jewish political tradition, polities come in all forms—peoples,

nations, cities, tribes, kingdoms, empires, etc., in the Biblical period and, by extension, modern states as well—and none is considered to be *the* generic form, although the Bible seems to suggest that peoples are generic in some way. As time went on and the Jews experienced a wider variety of political systems, this principle became refined with a new dimension added, namely that a good polity is in some ways a partnership of its members. This was a natural outgrowth of the covenant idea.

The elimination of the problem of human sovereignty and the absence of any generic form of polity helped reinforce a strong predisposition in Jewish political thought towards the view that all government is a matter of delegated powers. The term *reshut*, which first appears in the Talmud, probably comes closest to encapsulating this concept, reflecting as it does an authority whose powers have been granted by another source. The principle of *reshut* has been institutionalized in Jewish liturgy and ritual as a sign of the equal sharing of God's covenant-granted authority among all Jews. Thus in the *Siddur*, the hosts of heaven grant *reshut* to one another to praise God and the leader of the *birkat hamazon* (blessing after the meal) requests *reshut* from his peers (literally stated, his teachers with the implication that those present are more knowledgeable than he) to lead them in the prayer.

The principle of *reshut* is politically implemented through *reshuyot* (authorities, as in the sense of the New York Port Authority). Among other things, this makes possible overlapping political jurisdictions and structures, each with its own powers or competences, a phenomenon which we already encounter in Biblical times as a feature of Jewish governments and which has been a continuing reality of Jewish political life ever since. This theoretical perspective was further reinforced by the long Diaspora experience of the Jews, where, in effect, the Jews had obligations to more than one polity simultaneously.

Finally, Jewish political thought has concerned itself with the messianic age and the ideal polity that is to come into existence with the coming of the Messiah. Jewish tradition is rather clear on this point. The messianic age will be the age of the realization of God's kingdom upon this earth with all the political implications contained in that phrase. Consequently, a political order will be necessary, but of course it will be the ideal political order. By and large, Jewish equivalents of utopias are directed towards discussion of the messianic polity. Both Isaiah and Ezekiel bring their versions of that polity, and Talmudic and post-Talmudic literature has other such visions.[38] In almost every case, they involve the fulfilment of God's covenant with Israel and the restoration of the tribal federation. All other aspects flow from those two starting points.

The sophistication of the covenant idea in Jewish political thought is

perhaps best revealed in the relationship between *brit* and *ḥesed*. *Brit* represents the structural manifestation of the covenant idea, while *ḥesed* is its dynamic component. If a *brit* creates a partnership, then *ḥesed* is what makes the partnership work.[39]

*Ḥesed* (as noted at the beginning of this paper) has been variously translated into English as 'loving-kindness' or 'grace'. In fact, there is no equivalent term in English which conveys its true meaning (one of the signs of the originality of the idea). Norman Snaith has translated it as 'covenant love', but that translation is too theological.[40] *Ḥesed* really means the obligation of a partner to a covenant to go beyond the narrowly construed contractual demands of the partnership in order to make the relationship between them a truly viable one. It is the Jewish answer to the problem of 'narrow legalism'. A covenant is, after all, a contract and the tendency in contractual systems is for people to act like lawyers, that is to say, to try to construe the contract as narrowly as possible when defining their obligations and as broadly as possible when defining the obligations of the other parties. That is what narrow legalism is all about. What *ḥesed* does is to insert into the relationship a more extended dynamic. Through it, Jewish tradition interprets one's contractual obligations broadly rather than narrowly, the broader the better. Thus, Hassidim have traditionally been those who have defined as their obligations *vis-à-vis* God and their fellow men to include a dimension above and beyond that which is normally required. Jewish history has known three Hassidic movements identified by that name: the Hassidim of the Second Temple, those of medieval Ashkenaz, and those who emerged in eighteenth-century eastern Europe. Each was a unique movement in many ways, but what was common to them all was this sense on the part of the movements' adherents that they were accepting a more broadly construed obligation than that which Israel's covenant with God ordinarily demanded. In essence, they were attempting to fulfil the dictum that *lifnim meshurat hadin din hu*, going beyond the law is the law, in their own lives.[41] A *brit* without *ḥesed* is indeed a narrow thing and, according to Jewish tradition, God himself provides the model of the extension of *ḥesed* by maintaining His relationship with Israel despite the Jews' repeated violations of the terms of the covenant. That is the finest example of taking the extra step.

*Political culture and behaviour.* The precisely proper combination of *brit* and *ḥesed* is left to theoretical speculation and the end of days. In the interim, however, the concepts have entered the political culture of the Jewish people to exercise a pronouced, if partial and necessarily flawed, influence on a regular basis. Even in the absence of systemic studies, a reasoned assessment of the evidence can lead us to a certain understanding of the matter. So, for example, as befits a people who see themselves as partners of the Almighty, Jews are not prone to relate to each other (or to others) hierarchically. Quite the reverse, even the authority

of particular leaders is accepted voluntarily on the basis of equality. For most Jews, not even the religious leadership is able to form a permanent élite. Every Jew feels free to recognize his own authoritative interpreters of the Torah. Acceptance of authority in other spheres may involve the recognition of sociological realities—for example, that in a voluntaristic community the wealthy will have more power since they contribute a larger share of the budget—but does not endow the leadership with any special status *per se.* The status exists by consent of the community in both cases.

Melvin Urofsky describes Louis Dembitz Brandeis's reaction to his first serious encounter with still-unassimilated eastern European Jewish immigrants to the United States when he acted as mediator in the great New York garment workers' strike of 1910:[42]

> While going through the lofts, he heard numerous quarrels between workers and their bosses, and was amazed that they treated each other more like equals than as inferiors and superiors. In one argument an employee shouted at the owner, 'Ihr darft sich shemen! Past dos far a Yid?' ('You should be ashamed! Is this worthy of a Jew?'), while another time a machine operator lectured his employer with a quotation from Isaiah:
>
> It is you who have devoured the vineyard, the spoil of the poor is in your houses.
> What do you mean by crushing My people, by grinding the face of the poor? says the Lord God of hosts.

Brandeis's experience is matched in Israel (or any other Jewish environment) every day. Jews do not 'obey orders'. They can be brought to act in a certain way either on the basis of understanding or trade-offs, but not on the basis of commands. Even in the military framework, where there is no problem of obeying immediate commands, the Israeli army has found that it must first inculcate understanding so that it can succeed in commanding. This, indeed, has been from the first the doctrine of *Zahal* (the Israel Defence Forces). Behaviourally, it manifests itself in a Jewish conception of leadership which involves leaders actually going first, what in the Israeli army is known as the *aḥarai* or 'follow me' principle. It is no accident that *Zahal* gains its greatest strength from this practice—just as, on a very different level, the most influential Jewish leaders in the United States are the big contributors to the annual campaigns: the only American Jewish leaders (apart from some elements in the Orthodox camp) who lead by going first and setting the pace.

The operation of this principle can be seen throughout Jewish history. Successful leaders were those who accepted the heavier burdens in whatever direction they desired to lead, or else they had no appreciable influence. It is highly significant that classical Hebrew has no word for obey (there is a modern word created for use in the army). Classical

Hebrew uses *shamoa* (translated as 'hearkening'), a term which embraces hearing before acting and implicitly involves the principle of consent. That is to say, an individual—as befits a partner to God's covenant whose integrity and autonomy are established—hears, considers, and decides. He cannot be ordered to do something, but must consent to it. Even the *midrash* which stands in greatest conflict with the covenant idea, the one describing Israel's acceptance of the Sinai covenant only after God held a mountain over them, still reflects this perspective. According to that *midrash*, God put Israel in a most untenable position, forcing them to consent, but they still had to consent. He did not simply force them to obey, and that is probably the most extreme example (and by no means to be taken as the mainstream view) of a master-servant relationship in classical Jewish thought. Thus a kind of partnership attitude is a basic datum of Jewish existence. Anyone who attempts to lead or govern—or even work with—Jews comes up against it every day in every way.

The covenantal solutions to the problems of Jewish unity can also be seen as cultural and behavioural manifestations of *brit ve-hesed*. Jewish political thought and culture are characterized by a strong messianic dimension, again as part of the sense that man works in partnership with God to reconstruct or redeem the world. An equally pronounced element in Jewish political culture and behaviour has been the conceptualization of the messianic task in a different way, creating a kind of pluralism within Jewish life which manifests itself in the division of Jewry into various movements or camps. It seems that a camp comes into existence when its adherents compact among themselves—implicitly or explicitly—to follow a certain form of Jewish discipline, in effect becoming congregations or covenantal societies within the overall framework of the Jewish people. So it was with the Pharisees and Essenes in the days of the Second Temple; so it is with the contemporary Orthodox, Hassidic, Conservative, Reform, Reconstructionist, Liberal, and Progressive religious movements; and so it has been with the Zionist parties.

The relationship among camps has been more problematic. Either some linkage has been achieved among them on a federative basis or there has been hostility even to the point of civil war. In the days of the Second Temple, the latter condition prevailed with disastrous consequences for the Jewish people. Since then, there have been moments when a similar result seemed to be in the offing, as in the struggle between Karaites and Rabbanites and later between the Orthodox and the Reformers, but the Diaspora situation of the Jewish people in effect prevented them from such suicidal behaviour. Twentieth-century Jewry, with all its problems, has implicitly (if not always happily) recognized that the camps are inevitable as long as Jews are free to pursue their respective messianic visions, but has also recognized the

necessity for national unity. Thus in both Israel and the United States, in particular, federative arrangements have been applied to create sufficient unity to undertake common action to protect common interests or advance common goals without interfering with the basic integrity of the camps themselves. Obviously, this involves a continuing process and has left some continuing problems as well, not the least of which is one inherent in the pursuit of any messianic vision—namely that there is a limit to the ability of one camp to tolerate another, particularly when contradictory visions and ways of life are involved.

In this respect, twentieth-century Jewry has managed to devise methods which flow out of the Jewish political tradition, even if unawares (one of the best indicators of the existence of a Jewish political culture is that such things can happen unawares), that have more or less satisfactorily dealt with a major flashpoint in Jewish life, one which has brought Jews great grief in the past. Thus the self-restraint of the overwhelming majority of the various Jewish camps of our times can be looked upon as a signal accomplishment, even if it leads to a certain amount of impatience on the part of those who see their particular messianic vision somehow compromised by the acceptance of various *status quo* arrangements.

Contractual behaviour, if one may so term it, that seems to be endemic to Jewish political culture, is manifested through the series of partnerships which constitute the Jewish community, each of which combines the fundamental autonomy of its members within a bargaining relationship. We have already suggested that leadership under such circumstances has to take on a different character. So, too, decision-making becomes principally a matter of negotiation among equals.

At various times in Jewish history, these partnerships have included such phenomena as *shutafim* in the study of Talmud, the kinds of partnership that S. D. Goitein describes as coming in place of employer-employee relationships in the Egypt of the *Geniza*, and the co-operative building of contemporary Israel.[43] It is likely that every society has some kinds of co-operative relationship within it, so that the discovery of such relationships is not definitive, *per se*. It is the prevalence and salience of these relationships which count. In that regard, the Jewish people is one of those societies that stand out in their utilization of partnership devices, all of which also have their roots in the covenant idea.

Political life in Jewish communities and polities has usually involved the following factors: (1) the initial consent of the members to the community's authority and to the authoritative structures and processes of governance within it; (2) a commitment towards participation in communal affairs on the part of a relatively substantial percentage of the citizenry; (3) the utilization of various forms of representation (usually pre-modern, and only recently modern ones) where direct

participation was not feasible; and (4) a system of dispersed decision-making with different tasks assigned to different bodies often involving the same individuals wearing many different hats, moving from body to body in their leadership capacities. It is within this framework that links between the covenant idea and the practice of governance in Jewish polities can be made.

It is obvious that the compass of the covenant idea is broad indeed. I am not the first to suggest either its sweep or its importance—the many references cited here attest to that. Precisely because of its breadth, the concept requires as much specification as possible. Perhaps the best way to emphasize its specificity is by indicating what would be inconsistent with covenantal relationships, that is, what is not covenanted. We can begin by excluding the relationship between master and slave (in any form, including political slavery). In that sense, any relationship which denies the fundamental freedom of any of the parties to it is not covenantal. In relation to polities, non-republican (in the classic sense of the term: a polity as a *res publica*, a public thing rather than the private preserve of its rulers) relationships are not covenantal.[44]

To suggest that the covenant idea informs a political tradition is not to suggest that it answers all questions, any more than the idea of law does in the tradition it informs. What it does do is to set the parameters of the debate.

The question remains: Given the theopolitical character of the covenant, is a covenantal basis for the Jewish political tradition still valid or even possible under the present conditions of secularization of the Jewish and other people? The answer to that question can be developed theoretically or empirically. Theoretically, to the extent that secularization involves a denial of the living God, it seems neither possible nor valid under such conditions. Empirically, the evidence is mixed as even secular Jews often seem to be striving for just such a relationship within their tradition.

This article was prepared for the Workshop in the Covenant Idea and the Jewish Political Tradition jointly sponsored by the Center for Jewish Community Studies and the Senator N. M. Paterson Chair in Governmental Relations, at Bar Ilan University's Department of Political Studies. An earlier version was presented at the 1975 Seminar of the Institute of Judaism and Contemporary Thought which focused on the Jewish Political Tradition and its Contemporary Uses.

## NOTES

[1] As quoted in *The Jerusalem Post*, 1 June 1975.

[2] See, for example, Arnold Jacob Wolf, ed., *Rediscovering Judaism*, Chicago, 1965, which includes essays by several of the principal North American exponents of this covenant theology, and Jakob J. Petuchowski, *Ever Since Sinai*, New York, 1961. Martin Buber emphasizes the covenant in all his works. See also Harold Fisch, *Jerusalem and Albion*, New York, 1964, for an examination of the modern secularization of the covenant idea and John F. A. Taylor, *The Masks of Society, An Inquiry into the Covenants of Civilization*, New York, 1966, for a contemporary American covenantal perspective. While this article seeks to expound and even shift our understanding of the covenant idea to include and emphasize its political dimension, it also uses theological terminology throughout because the Jewish political tradition of necessity has a theological base just as the European political tradition has a philosophic base. Political theology had declined in importance in the West, in recent generations, hence the usages may be somewhat unfamiliar to the reader, but it is none the less an old element in political science and legitimate in every respect.

[3] See Daniel J. Elazar, ed., *Covenant and Commonwealth: Readings in the Political Ideas and Institutions of Biblical Israel*, Philadelphia, 1978, especially Hans Kohn, 'Nationalism in Israel and Hellas'. From the perspective of the Jewish political tradition, the Bible must be read as a whole work, regardless of the correctness of the various theories of Biblical criticism. What is significant about it is not the extent to which the text in our possession is an edited amalgam but that, as a whole, it presents—and represents—a comprehensive tradition. For a fuller discussion of this problem, see Leo Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy?*, Glencoe, Ill., 1959. Strauss applies his perspective in *An Interpretation of Genesis*, Center for Jewish Community Studies, Jerusalem and Philadelphia, 1975.

[4] See George Mendenhall, 'Covenant Forms in Israelite Tradition', *Biblical Archaeologist*, vol. XVII (1959), pp. 50–76. For an interesting gloss on Mendenhall, see Moshe Weinfeld, 'Berit—Covenant vs. Obligation' in *Biblica*, vol. 56, Fasc. 1, 1975, pp. 120–28.

[5] The question as to whether or not the choice of regimes is open has been much debated in Jewish tradition. That is to say, is monarchy mandated by the Torah or a matter of choice? For our purposes here we need not determine which view is correct (although I believe that the choice is given). The very fact that the question is a perennial one with such distinguished figures as Don Isaac Abravanel opting for the latter view is sufficiently significant to demonstrate the point made here. For a summary of the sources, see Chaim Herschensohn, *Eleh Divrei HaBrit*, Hoboken, N.J., 1918–1921, 3 vols., and *Malkhi Bakodesh*, Hoboken, N.J., 1923–1928, 6 vols.

[6] For a fuller discussion of the political institutions of ancient Israel, see *Covenant and Commonwealth*, op. cit., especially the Introduction.

[7] All Biblical usages of the term *brit* have been assembled and classified in *HaMunach 'Brit' ba Tanakh* (*The Term 'Covenant' in the Bible*), a guide published by the Workshop in the Covenant Idea and the Jewish Political Tradition,

co-sponsored by the Center for Jewish Community Studies and the Institute of Local Government and Department of Political Studies of Bar Ilan University.

[8] See Perry Miller, *The New England Mind*, Boston, 1961, 2 vols., particularly vol. 1, Book IV, and Appendix B, 'The Federal School of Theology'.

[9] Moshe Weinfeld, 'Covenant' in *Encyclopedia Judaica*, vol. 5, pp. 1012–22. See also Delbert Hillers, *Covenant: The History of a Biblical Idea*, Baltimore, 1969, and Ruth Gil, 'Brit—HaMunach v'HaMusag' ('Covenant—The Term and the Concept'), an unpublished paper prepared for the Workshop. The Hebrew terminology of the Jewish political tradition is especially rich in covenant-related terms, ranging from at least three terms for covenant in the Bible itself to the terminology of contemporary Israeli political life with its emphasis on 'compounding' (rather than forming) governments and politics; 'consenting' to the conclusions of meetings, etc., etc. Even words like *shalom*, which have other manifest meanings, have been demonstrated by philologists to contain strong covenantal connotations. The Covenant Workshop has examined these terms in some depth and documentation of their covenantal character can be found in the Workshop files.

[10] No comprehensive study of the covenant idea as a political concept, comparable to the several such works on a parallel concept, natural law, presently exists. The Workshop is now laying the foundation for such a study. There are, however, studies of various political applications of the covenant idea such as those of Kohn, Hillers, Miller, and Taylor cited above.

[11] Rabbi J. D. Soloveitchik, among others, treats the two passages as referring to separate covenants, at least for homiletic purposes, in 'Lonely Man of Faith', *Tradition*, vol. 14, no. 3 (Summer 1974). Since he takes the covenant as the basis of Jewish peoplehood seriously, his discussion deserves particular notice even if it is only tangentially political in orientation.

[12] See Daniel J. Elazar, 'Kinship and Consent in the Jewish Community: Patterns of Continuity in Jewish Communal Life', *Tradition*, vol. 14, no. 4 (Fall 1974), pp. 63–79.

[13] See Martin Noth, *The History of Israel*, New York, 1958.

[14] The idea that the Torah should be understood as the constitution of the Jewish people is an old and oft-recurring one, expressed by traditional and modern thinkers, as diverse as Spinoza—who understood the Torah as a political constitution first and foremost—and Mendelsohn, who viewed the political dimension as utterly dispensable. See Benedict Spinoza, *Politico-Theologico Tractate*; Moses Mendelsohn, *Jerusalem*, and Eliezer Schweid, 'The Attitude Toward the State in Modern Jewish Thought Before Zionism' in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., *The Jewish Political Tradition and its Contemporary Uses* (forthcoming), Chapter 6.

[15] See, for example, Martin A. Cohen, 'The Role of the Shilonite Priesthood in the United Monarchy of Ancient Israel' in *Hebrew Union College Annual*, Cincinnati, Ohio, 1965, vol. XXXVI, pp. 59–98; Josephus's *Antiquities of the Jews*, Book IV, Chapter 8; Abravanel's commentary on *Deuteronomy* and *Samuel*; and Buber's *Kingship of God*, New York, 1967. While Elijah has traditionally been considered an anti-monarchist, the Biblical portrayal of him shows him to have a more complex position, supporting Ahab as king but

seeking to keep the monarchy tied to the Torah as mediated through the prophets. The reference here is to the tradition rather than to the more complex reality.

[16] See, for example, the references scattered through George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*, New York, 1950, rev. edn.

[17] See Norman K. Gottwald, *All the Kingdoms of the Earth*, New York, 1964. Those constitutional and practical issues such as the relationship between the covenants underlying the tribal federation, God's covenant with David and his house, and the division of powers under the monarchy are complex and involved ones which require detailed treatment in their own right. They are among the many subjects that remain to be investigated in the study of the Jewish political tradition and cannot be treated in the space of this paper.

[18] For a description of those efforts see Michael Avi-Yonah, *The Jews of Palestine, A Political History from the Bar Kokhba War to the Arab Conquest*, New York, 1976.

[19] For a study of power relationships in Babylonian Jewry, see Jacob Neusner, *There They Sat Down*, Nashville and New York, 1972.

[20] Louis Finkelstein, *Jewish Self-Government in the Middle Ages*, New York, 1964.

[21] Salo W. Baron, *The Jewish Community*, Philadelphia, 1938–1942, 3 vols.

[22] Menachem Elon, 'On Authority and Power in the Jewish Community: The Halachic Stance of the Traditional Community and its Contemporary Implications' in Elazar, ed., *Jewish Political Tradition*, op. cit., Chapter 8; Irving A. Agus, *Urban Civilization in Pre-Crusade Europe*, New York, 1968, 2 vols.; and Isidore Epstein, *Studies in the Communal Life of the Jews of Spain*, New York, 1968. I follow Elon in the view that, more often than not, majority rule was the accepted standard, a position entirely consistent with the covenant principle. The more important point is that either position supports the thesis advanced here.

[23] Thus the Workshop in the Covenant Idea and the Jewish Political Tradition, in co-operation with the Responsa Project at Bar Ilan, has systematically identified hundreds of practical applications of the word *brit* in the selected responsa presently stored in the Project's computer. They are now being classified and analysed.

[24] Gerald Blidstein, 'Individual and Community in the Middle Ages: Halachic Theory' in *Jewish Political Tradition*, op. cit., Chapter 4, and *Notes on Hefker Bet-Din in Talmudic and Medieval Law*, Center for Jewish Community Studies, Jerusalem, 1975.

[25] ibid.; Elon, op. cit.; Agus, op. cit.; and Epstein, op. cit.

[26] Daniel J. Elazar, 'The Reconstitution of Jewish Communities in the Post-War Period' in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XI, no. 2, December 1969, pp. 187–226.

[27] Daniel J. Elazar, *Community and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry*, Philadelphia, 1976.

[28] Moshe Davis, 'Centres of Jewry in the Western Hemisphere: A Comparative Approach' (first printed in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. V, no. 1, June 1963), reprinted in *Five Lectures Delivered at the Third World Congress of Jewish Studies in Jerusalem*, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, of the Hebrew

University, Jerusalem, 1964. See also the other lectures reprinted in that pamphlet.

[29] Moshe Davis, 'Centres of Jewry ...', ibid.

[30] See Emile Marmorstein, *Heaven at Bay*, London, 1969, and Daniel J. Elazar, *Israel: From Ideological to Territorial Democracy*, New York, 1970. Eliezer Don Yihyeh of the Covenant Workshop is presently investigating the conscious use of covenant forms and symbols in the development of the Zionist enterprise in the land of Israel. His preliminary findings strongly reinforce the point made in these paragraphs.

[31] S. N. Eisenstadt describes this process in *Israeli Society*, New York, 1967, pp. 7–70.

[32] Horace M. Kallen has examined the ideological implications of the Scroll in this way in *Utopians at Bay*, New York, 1958, pp. 15–19. For a discussion of the Scroll's quasi-constitutional character, see Amnon Rubenstein's work in Hebrew, *The Constitutional Law of the State of Israel*, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 1969, Chapter 1.

[33] For an understanding of the variety of federal arrangements, and the relationship of union as a constitutional form to those arrangements, see Daniel J. Elazar, *The Ends of Federalism*, Philadelphia, 1976.

[34] See Saul Berman, 'Noahide Laws' in *Encyclopedia Judaica*, vol. 12, pp. 1189–91, for a good summary and references to the relevant texts.

[35] Judah HaLevi, *The Book of the Kuzari*; Benjamin Gross, *Netzah Yisrael: HaShkafato Ha Meshihit shel ha Maharal mi Prague*, Tel Aviv, 1974; and Zvi Yaron, *Mishnato Shel HaRav Kook*, Jerusalem, 1974.

[36] See Gordon Freeman, 'The Rabbinic Understanding of the Covenant' in Elazar, ed., *Jewish Political Tradition*, op. cit., Chapter 2; also Chaim Herschenson, *Malkhi BaKodesh*, op. cit., and Buber, op. cit.

[37] See the material of the Responsa Literature Information Storage and Retrieval of the Institute for Data Retrieval of Bar Ilan University, and the files of the Covenant Workshop.

[38] See, for example, Stephen Schwarszchild, 'A Note on the Nature of the Ideal Society—A Rabbinic Study' in Herbert A. Strauss and Hanns G. Reissner, eds., *Jubilee Volume Dedicated to Curt C. Silberman*, New York, 1969.

[39] Nelson Glueck documents this in his *Hesed in the Bible*, Cincinnati, 1967, without attempting to make the point.

[40] Norman H. Snaith, *The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament*, New York, 1964, Chapter 5, 'The Covenant-Love of God'.

[41] I am indebted to Professor Arnold Enker of the Faculty of Law of Bar Ilan University for this point.

[42] Melvin I. Urofsky, 'On Louis D. Brandeis', in *Midstream*, January 1975, pp. 45, 94–130.

[43] S. D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1971, vol. II: *The Community*; and Harry Viteles, *A History of the Cooperative Movement in Israel*, London, 1966, 7 vols.

[44] There are those who argue that non-voluntary political associations cannot be covenantal. I clearly reject that position. A state association can be fully covenantal if it is internally constituted on the right principles, that is, is compounded of free citizens and is linked with other state associations in a federal manner.

# A NOTE ON THE LUBAVITCH HASSIDIM IN MILAN

Emanuela Trevisan Semi

THE present head of the Lubavitch Hassidim, Rabbi Menachem M. Schneerson, has adopted a missionary policy among Jews since he assumed leadership of the movement.[1] The Hassidic movement is characterized (as other studies have shown[2]) first, by a high degree of orthodoxy and of allegiance to the teachings of the Jewish Tradition, and second, by its dissent from official Judaism. On the other hand, Milanese Jewry consists in large part of assimilated Jews or of Jews on the road to assimilation.[3]

Jews were expelled from Milan in 1589. They returned to the city in the nineteenth century, as an offshoot of the Mantua Jewish community, and Milanese Jewry is now the second largest in Italy (after Rome). It is worth noting that in 1965 more than half the Jews in Milan had been born abroad: 4,488 out of a total 8,488. Of the 4,488, about three-quarters (3,217) came from Asia and Africa while the remaining 1,271 came from Europe and America.[4] By 1975, the Jewish population had risen to 9,500.[5] Waves of immigrants had come from Libya and other Arab countries, especially after the Six-Day War of 1967, augmenting the numbers of Milan's population of Sephardi origin, and raising it to become roughly half of the total. The Jews of Milan as a whole have a very low birth rate and are only mildly observant.[6] They have a very high incidence of intermarriage—in spite of the fact that they have the highest *per capita* rate of years of attendance at a Jewish school of any other community in Italy.[7]

On the one hand, there is the group of Hassidim, small and very active, strictly endogamous and numerically on the increase, extremely traditional and therefore strongly possessed of its own Jewish identity; while on the other, there is the wider Jewish community of Milan, largely assimilated. The interaction between these two communities could provide an indication of the mode of acceptance or of rejection by a 'deviant' community of what Gutwirth has called a *judéité distinctive*.[8]

It was reasonable to expect that relations between them would be ambivalent—now openly friendly and now openly hostile—and that eventually the smaller group would be integrated within the much

larger Jewry of Milan. I therefore carried out research among the Lubavitch Hassidim of the city in 1976–77, using the method of participant observation as well as open-ended interviews.

There were then ten families, with an average of about six children per couple, which shows an unusually high fertility. Six of the households were Ashkenazim—five had come from the United States and one from Canada; the other four were Sephardim—three were from Morocco, while the head of the fourth household was a native of Afghanistan married to a Moroccan woman. These ten families had been living in the city for periods ranging from a maximum of 20 years to a minimum of six years.

Although the members of this Hassidic group are heterogeneous, they are united by their common faith and by their veneration for Rabbi Schneerson and for Hassidism. The Ashkenazim among them were born into Hassidic families and the men were educated in yeshivot in the United States and in Canada, while the Sephardim joined the Lubavitch Hassidim when they went to *Talmud Torah* in Morocco (the women had gone to *Bet Rivkah*),[9] and later to yeshivot in France or in Israel.[10] The aim of the Hassidim in Milan is to proselytize—or at least to strengthen and reinvigorate Jewish traditional observance in the Italian community. They are employed in various occupations allied to religious practice in general and to *kashrut* in particular. Most of them are engaged in more than one form of employment. The heads of household work as *shohet* (ritual slaughterer), rabbi, cantor, *mohel* (circumciser), *mashguiah* (*kashrut* supervisor), *sofer* (Hebrew scribe), and teacher of Hebrew and religion; while one of them, a Sepharad who is a *shohet*, is also an importer of kasher cheese. The adult women are housewives; some of them work full or part time as schoolteachers. The Hassidic teachers are employed mainly in their own school (which has a kindergarten and a school for elementary and secondary pupils); but a very small number of them teach in the other Jewish school in Milan (which, in 1965, catered for about three-quarters of all Jewish children in the city[11]), and in the *Talmud Torah*.

The *shohatim* work in the four kasher butcher shops, which are therefore supervised entirely by Lubavitch Hassidim. The latter are also *kashrut* supervisors in a pastry-shop (which belongs to a Gentile), in a restaurant near an Ashkenazi synagogue, and in two large hotels with kasher kitchens[12] which cater for *bar mitsvah*, the *seder*, weddings, and other festive occasions. As for the *sofer* and the *mohel*, they also are employed by the wider Jewish community of Milan. The Hassidim, moreover, serve as rabbis in five synagogues and prayer-houses of various persuasions recently established in the city: in two of the four synagogues following the 'Italian ritual'; in two of the three following the Sephardi ritual; and in one of the two following the Ashkenazi ritual.

Given the very small total number of Hassidim in Milan (about

90), their place in the religious life of the whole Jewish community is certainly impressive: they might be said to have effected a religious *prise de pouvoir* which could be interpreted as a form of recognition by the Jewish community of the dominance exercised in the religious field by the Lubavitch. The fact that they are officiating in synagogues of different rites shows the priority they attach to their work as missionaries. The abandonment of a common *Beth ha-Knesset* (synagogue) for another separate one was in actual fact one of the characteristics which had set them apart from the rest of the Orthodox community and which had given rise to particular friction and hostility at the time when the Hassidic movement came into being.

In Milan, the Ashkenazi segment of the Lubavitch speak Yiddish or English in their households, while the Sephardim speak French or Judeo-Arabic; but all of them know modern Hebrew. They know Italian more or less well according to their length of residence in the country. The Sephardim, moreover, generally know also either Yiddish or English, which they use to communicate with the Ashkenazim.

Geographically, many Hassidim live close to the school which they established when they first arrived, in an area of the city which used to have a medium density of Jews,[13] near an Ashkenazi synagogue whose membership is largely observant and in which a Lubavitch rabbi officiates.[14]

There are also Hassidim elsewhere, mainly in a residential district where members of the middle and petite bourgeoisie live, where the principal office of the Jewish community used to be, and where there is a synagogue in which the Italian style of ritual is followed. On a lower floor of that synagogue there is an 'Oriental Oratorio' for the use of Sephardim.

In recent years, Milan's Jews have been moving from the eastern to the western part of the city; and the community's Jewish school was also transferred to the west.[15] The Lubavitch Hassidim, however, remained where they had first settled. There are thus in Milan two distinct areas of settlement: the earlier one in an Ashkenazi district, for the first Lubavitch who came to Milan were dominantly Ashkenazim; while the later settlement is in an area where there is a concentration of Jews in general. In Milan, therefore, the Lubavitch show a marked contrast with the situation in New York—where they have created their own Hassidic district.[16]

There is a saying attributed to Rabbi Schneerson which seems to me to be the principal basis of the proselytizing work of the Lubavitch: 'Where there is *minhag* [traditional observance], do not interfere.'[17] This directive is certainly put into practice within the group itself, for the Ashkenazi and Sephardi segments of the Lubavitch exhibit great tolerance *vis-à-vis* one another—a tolerance which is indicative of their general acceptance of different, and not only marginal, traditions.

Indeed, the Sephardi sub-group of the Lubavitch continue to follow their own traditional practices (with a degree of observance correlated to the length of their previous residence in a country of Sephardi settlement) side by side with others which they have acquired from Russo-Lubavitch culture. For example, they have retained their own traditional style of chants and music and they have far more *mezuzot* on their doorposts and far fewer photographs, on their walls, of their *rebbe* or the *rebbe*'s ancestors than there are in the homes of the Ashkenazi sub-group—which exhibit numerous photographs and paintings of present and past religious leaders. Moreover, in the Sephardi segment although there is veneration of the *Ba'al Shem Tov* (the 'Master of the Good Name', Rabbi Israel ben Eliezer, the founder of Hassidism) and his sayings and aphorisms are recounted, there are also references to sources of wisdom of Sephardi origin. Although the image of the *Tsaddik* retains its central and dominant position, it is flanked by other *Tsaddikim* who do not belong to the world of the Hassidim, but are associated with that peculiar Sephardi tradition which sees these men as capable of bestowing *barakah* on the faithful.[18]

The whole group, however, is united in directing its energies predominantly in the field of the education of the young and of education in general, and in its aim to disseminate Chabad philosophy. They have therefore dedicated themselves to the translation into Italian of some basic Chabad texts[19] and every week they send out approximately 6,500 copies of *Pensiero della settimana* (*The Portion of the Week*) to various Italian Jewish households. These are a series of short essays based on the *perashot* (sermons) of the relevant week of the Jewish calendar delivered by Rabbi Menachem M. Schneerson.[20]

The Milan Hassidim also give lectures and take part in the activities of the Jewish youth club of the city and in the meetings of the Association of Italian Jewish Women. They organize summer camps which welcome any young Jewish person, and they have established *kashrut* classes for women. They also teach Jewish religion in a French school attended by the children of French-speaking Sephardim, and in an American school where there are Sephardi English-speaking children (mainly Iranian).

The Lubavitch are especially proud of the school which they established in 1960, and to which they have directed their maximum efforts.[21] It is therefore necessary to look at that school more closely, as an indicator of the relations between the Lubavitch and non-Hassidic Milanese Jewry. I did gather data—both qualitative and quantitative—on the development of the school, on the origins of the pupils, their degree of religious observance, and the occupations of the parents. Although the numbers are too small to allow definite conclusions (especially if we exclude the pupils in the school who are the children of the Lubavitch Hassidim—31), I think it is possible, nevertheless,

to put forward a hypothesis on the present attitudes of the Jewish community.

The elementary school had been established for 16 years when I carried out my research. It was started at first as a kindergarten only, two years earlier, in a Lubavitch household, for their own children and for a few others. Then came the elementary school, and later the 'middle' or secondary school which in 1976–77 had only two classes.[22] (In 1977–78 a further form was added.) The teachers in the school belong to the Lubavitch Ashkenazi sub-group; there are also some other teachers who are sympathetic to the movement and, further, two Catholic teachers of Italian. These latter have nothing to do with the teaching of religion, but they collaborate with the Lubavitch to supervise the children's ordinary religious observances—for example, ensuring that the boys keep their heads covered with the skullcap and that all the pupils recite their prayers. The Lubavitch are of the opinion that it is better to employ a non-Jew who has religious faith than a Jew who is non-observant, for such a Jew might confuse young children.[23]

According to both the Lubavitch and the Milanese parents whom I interviewed, the first children who were enrolled at the school came either because they lived in the neighbourhood (the communal Jewish school is situated in a suburb of the town), or because they were children in need of special care whose parents believed they would be better supervised in a school with a limited number of pupils. Later, the children of the more observant Ashkenazim joined the school, and then the children of their friends did so. More recently, when more orthodox and more observant Sephardim came to Milan, their children augmented the numbers of the existing Sephardi pupils.

Nowadays, the parents of the present pupils are for the most part little observant; but they send their children to this school because they fear that in the absence of a Jewish culture their offspring will become totally assimilated and may later marry outside the faith.[24] Table 1 shows the school's enrolment for 1976–77, according to school form and to group—whether Sepharad, Ashkenaz, or Italian.[25] Less than a third (31) of the total number of pupils (104) are the children of the Lubavitch: they account for half the Ashkenazim and just under a third of the Sephardim.

TABLE 1. *School enrolment*

| | *Age* | *Italians* | *Sephardim* | *(Lubavitch)* | *Ashkenazim* | *(Lubavitch)* | *Total* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kindergarten | (3–5) | 11 | 20 | (3) | 13 | (6) | 44 |
| Elementary | (6–10) | 15 | 15 | (8) | 17 | (8) | 47 |
| Secondary | (11–12) | 1 | 4 | (1) | 8 | (5) | 13 |
| *Total* | | 27 | 39 | (12) | 38 | (19) | 104 |

The girls sit in the same class with the boys, but they have their own row of benches apart from the boys.

The largest numbers of pupils are in the kindergarten and the elementary school; Sephardi pupils are the largest single segment in the kindergarten and in the first form of the elementary school:[26] the increase in Sephardi immigration to Milan had taken place in the preceding years.

I collected data on the occupations of fathers of pupils in the elementary classes and found that in the case of the Italian group there is a greater proportion engaged in the liberal professions, while among the other two groups it is occupations connected with commerce and trade which predominate. This confirms the findings of Della Pergola and Sacerdoti[27] that the majority of recent Jewish immigrants in Milan are concentrated in the commercial sector (in the import and export trades), while those in managerial positions and in the professions account for 25 per cent.[28]

On the whole, I do not think the Lubavitch Hassidim of Milan are entirely justified in regarding their school as one of their great successes. After 16 years of existence, the development of the school has been slow and the numbers of pupils modest. Admittedly, as some of the representatives of the group say, the qualitative aspect is more important than the quantitative. On the other hand, if the number of pupils enrolled in the school is an index of the degree of acceptance by the Milanese Jewish community of the Lubavitch group, then the quantitative data inevitably assume a qualitative significance and seem to reflect a most remarkable slowness in the process of integration of that group within the community.

The data in this Note could be seen as generally exhibiting an apparent contradiction: while in one way the Lubavitch have succeeded in inserting themselves deep within the Jewish community of Milan, in another they seem to be encountering enormous difficulties in their school, which is a very sensitive problem for them. However, it seems that the contradiction might be resolved if one looks at the characteristics of the areas in which the Hassidim have obtained some major or minor success. It is clear that the Jewish community of Milan has allowed the Lubavitch to occupy positions certainly of much greater importance than would be consistent with their actual number. They have a series of roles which serve directly to ensure the *Jewishness* of the community—in the matter of *kashrut*, where they provide surveillance; in the matter of religious slaughtering, which they control in all the kasher butcher shops; and in the field of liturgy, where they provide personnel in good numbers in various synagogues.

In contrast, the Milanese Jewish community appears to have adopted as a defence mechanism an attitude of isolationism if not of outright rejection with regard to school education. Is not the proof of

it the fact that the Italian pupils (the children of Italian-born members of the Milanese Jewish community) are a minority group in the Lubavitch school? (It must be noted here that the Lubavitch school in Milan follows an Italian curriculum so that its pupils could carry on their studies later in Italian secondary schools.) Thus, the supremacy of the Hassidim in the religious field is accepted and it is recognized that they are the supervisors of the 'purity' of the whole city's community; however, that community does not seem prepared to alter its own way of life or its relations with the wider host society. In fact, although the peculiar composition of the Lubavitch group has allowed it to have great mobility and the ability to insert itself in the various sectors of the life of the newer Jewish immigrants, it is a group nevertheless strongly characterized by a tendency to be self-segregated and to aim at the defence of a distinctive Judaism.

In contrast, the Milanese Jewish community—and especially its old Italian component—appears to have reduced to extremely few elements the sphere of a distinctive Judaism, and therefore finds itself in conflict with this orthodox group which is perfectly in harmony with its own traditional culture but is also at variance in the context of the host society with which Milan Jewry, however, has very deep-rooted links.

It seems, therefore, that the Jews of Milan have until now made use of the Lubavitch group in so far as it could help in the maintenance of the community's *Jewish* identity, but that they have dissociated themselves from that group when there was a risk of casting doubt upon their specific identity as a *Milanese* community.*

*This paper has been translated from the Italian by Judith Djamour.

## NOTES

[1] On the missionary spirit of the Lubavitch, see Reine Silbert, 'L'esprit missionaire des Loubavitcher' in *L'Arche*, Aug.–Sept. 1968, pp. 138–39.

[2] See, for example, Jacques Gutwirth, 'Les Communautés Hassidiques, sources et trésors pour la sociologie religieuse de la judaïcité', *Social Compass*, vol. XVIII, no. 3, 1971/3; Jerome R. Mintz, *Legends of the Hasidim, An Introduction to Hasidic Culture and Oral Tradition in the New World*, Chicago, 1968.

[3] See Sergio Della Pergola, *Anatomia dell'ebraismo italiano*, Rome, 1976, pp. 228–37; also his 'I matrimoni degli ebrei a Milano', *Ha Tikwà*, no. 3–4, pp. 4 and 15; and no. 8–9, p. 4, 1962; and 'A Note on Marriage Trends among Jews in Italy', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XIV, no. 2, December 1972, pp. 203–4.

[4] See Sergio Della Pergola, *Anatomia* ..., op. cit., p. 72.

[5] See Della Pergola, ibid., p. 60.

[6] Data on religious observance were gathered by Sergio Della Pergola in the course of his research among Jewish households; he used four measures: the kiddush on the Sabbath, the eating of kasher meat, matsot during Passover, and the lighting of Hanukah lights. See ibid., pp. 173–83. On the birth rate, see pp. 124–25, ibid.

[7] According to Della Pergola, this high rate of attendance in Milan is due to the fact that the immigrants continue to send their children to Jewish schools in the years immediately following their settlement in Milan, as they had done abroad; ibid., pp. 198–99.

[8] Distinctive Jewishness here refers to all that characterizes the maintenance of a Jewish identity and which is therefore based on a different or distinct socio-cultural system. This is the concept especially associated with Jacques Gutwirth, who has commented as follows about Hassidic education: '... l'objectif commun de toutes ces communautés reste d'assurer un maximum d'intégration culturelle traditionnelle, c'est-à-dire une judéité distinctive, qui a, dans une certaine mesure, un caractère ethnique, puisque fondée sur un système culturel, social et linguistique différentiel.' 'Les Communautés Hassidiques', op. cit., p. 392.

[9] There were in Morocco 75 Lubavitch schools attended by 6,000 pupils and a technical school which manufactured *tephilim* and *mezuzot*; see Reine Silbert, op. cit.

[10] One of the men I interviewed (who had emigrated to Israel from Afghanistan in early childhood) was brought up by the Lubavitch in one of their institutions in Israel.

[11] See Della Pergola, *Anatomia* ..., op. cit., p. 195.

[12] In these two hotels they have the sole use of a kitchen which they can close and seal after they have finished cooking and serving.

[13] See Sergio Della Pergola, *Evoluzione e struttura demografica della popolazione ebraica in Italia*, unpublished Bachelor's dissertation, University of Pavia, 1966, pp. 172–82.

[14] On the Ashkenazim in Milan, see Annie Sacerdoti, 'I Chassidim di Porta Romana', *Shalom*, Dec. 1972–Jan. 1973, pp. 18–20.

[15] See Della Pergola, *Anatomia* ..., op. cit., p. 74.

[16] Certainly, the different numerical composition in Italy and the United States has played an important part in their choice; nevertheless, I believe that their geographical distribution was, in fact, determined by the missionary activities they could carry out in Milan. On the Hassidic districts in the United States, see Jerome R. Mintz, op. cit., pp. 37–47, and Harry M. Rabinowicz, *The World of Hasidism*, London, 1970, pp. 234–39.

[17] This was related to me in the course of a conversation with a Sephardi family.

[18] The custom of rendering homage to various *tsaddikim* is reminiscent of the widespread habit in Morocco of going on pilgrimages to the graves of saints, whether they be Jewish, Muslim, or of uncertain origin. They are venerated as saints or holy men, whatever their faith. See L. Voinot, *Pèlerinages judéo-musulmans du Maroc*, Paris, 1948.

[19] They have translated into Italian Rabbi Schneur Zalman di Liadi's

*Liqqute Amarim*, published in four volumes in Milan, 1967; and Jacob Immanuel Shochet, *Introduzione alla traduzione della Iggheret Ha-Qodesh*, Milan, 1974.

[20] They had originally been distributed every week as small pamphlets to the Jewish community of Detroit and later in all the cities of the United States and of Canada. They have also been collected into volumes.

[21] For a detailed analysis of the curriculum and of the methods used in the school, see Annalisa Pinter, 'Valori educativi nella cultura di un gruppo hassidico', in Egle Becchi, ed., *Scuola Genitori Cultura*, Milan, 1975.

[22] After they finish their studies in their school in Milan, the sons of the Lubavitch (and sometimes the daughters) and those newly recruited are sent to complete their studies to yeshivot abroad, in order to acquire an adequate training and eventually to find a suitable spouse.

[23] See Pinter, op. cit., pp. 203–4. Similarly, Jerome Mintz notes that the Satmar group prefer to employ Catholics in their school, for they fear them less than they fear the secularists. Mintz, op. cit., p. 148.

[24] This was the opinion of a schoolteacher whom I interviewed. He said that the mother of a pupil, in the course of conversation, used the significant expression, 'immersion in Judaism'.

[25] The group of 'Italians' includes children with either one or both parents born in Italy.

[26] In the first form of the elementary school there are 19 children: 6 Sephardim, 7 'Italians', and 6 Ashkenazim. I must note here that although every member of the Lubavitch whom I approached was extremely kind and courteous, I was not given any official data. Those in the Table were gathered for me, however, by influential members of the group.

[27] See Della Pergola, *Anatomia* . . ., op. cit., p. 83, and Annie Sacerdoti, op. cit., p. 18.

[28] Della Pergola, ibid., p. 84.

# FIELDWORK METHOD AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF JEWS: CASE STUDIES OF HASSIDIC COMMUNITIES

Jacques Gutwirth

*Research methods*

ANTHROPOLOGICAL fieldwork is mainly based on two complementary techniques: participant observation and open-ended interviews. Unlike sociological enquiries—which usually rely on questionnaires in order to collect socio-cultural data by seeking responses to preselected questions—anthropological research observes behaviour and attitudes which occur largely without any instrumentation by the fieldworker. In my opinion, and that of many others, this type of research has been shown to be, and still is, the most rewarding for the study of Hassidic communities.

I would go even further. I hope to show that starting with an intensive fieldwork study of a given Jewish group, one comes—of necessity—to know and to analyse for the sake of the research itself a whole sector, or even in some cases the entire spectrum, of the larger Jewish community. An example in point is my study of Antwerp Jewry. It was while I was working on the Belzer Hassidim of Antwerp for my doctorate research that I was able, by the gathering of complementary material, to produce a wider analytical study of that city's general Jewish population which, in 1966, amounted to about 10,500. I wanted to know why Antwerp Jewry—remarkable in many aspects, for it is largely dependent on the diamond industry—possessed such a strong Jewish identity. There was a strikingly high attendance of pupils in Jewish day schools, for example, and a widespread use in daily life of Yiddish as the general language of communication.[1]

In 1971, I undertook research among the Belzer Hassidim of Montreal, and again I was able to study not only that particular group, whom I reported on in my article for this Journal ('The Structure of a Hassidic Community in Montreal')[2] but also the wider Jewish community of the city, whom I discuss in my 'Hassidim et Judaïcité à Montreal'.[3] Since I had only the very limited period of two months for

my research in Montreal, there was then no question of my being able to study a Jewish population which numbered at the time more than 120,000. However, with the help of data from another piece of research carried out at the same time among the Hassidim of Montreal by William Shaffir[4] and the demographic research of Louis Rosenberg,[5] I was able to analyse the interactions and overlappings among several Hassidic communities, their relations with the Jewry of the city, and to see the whole within the wider context of Quebec and its own peculiar problems.

In 1975–76, I was able to carry out fieldwork for a longer period among a Hassidic community of Boston. On that occasion I was studying an 'American' group, that is, one whose spiritual leader had been born in the United States, and whose followers were largely second or third generation Americans. Naturally, in that case also, there was no question of my studying a Jewish population now estimated to total 195,000 and spread out in a vast urban and suburban area. On the other hand, starting from my intensive study of the community of the *Bostoner rebbe*, I was able to extend my research to cover the Orthodox sector and also to gain some further insight into the Boston wider Jewish community.

The fieldwork method of studying Hassidic groups is that of urban ethnography: the group and its individual members always exist within wider entities. This is soon apparent when one attempts to establish contact. It is certainly true that the Belzer, like most Hassidic communities—whether of Antwerp or of Montreal—wish to remain as much as possible a closed group; but in fact, this is never the case. Apart from a small number whose occupation keeps them at the heart of the community—such as the *melamed* or teacher in their own school—the others are engaged in a trade or profession which is part of a much wider socio-economic network, even if the range of the occupation is itself somewhat limited. The research worker must be aware of the influence which the exercise of a 'lay' profession may have on religious behaviour. Such wider research is essential.

The traditional Hassidim whom I have studied were (and still are, in part) reticent when faced by the curiosity of the research worker; this is often the case, of course, with minority groups. Even when he is observing behaviour—for example, religious ritual—which is not simply put on for his benefit, or listening to apparently truthful replies to his questions, the anthropologist is not shown all, he is not told every thing. One way of providing a check, or of filling in lacunae, is to have individual private conversations. Notwithstanding the apparent solidarity of the group, there will always be some dissension which will be revealed in gossiping. Moreover, one can collect important data from peripheral groups. For example, in Antwerp, I found that conversations with employers, clients, and colleagues of Hassidim in the milieu

of the diamond industry yielded very fruitful information. I was able then to understand the roles of Hassidim within that industry, as well as the balance of interests and pressures on both sides. I was finally able also to grasp the significance of this economic specialization for the persistence of a Jewish community which was far more traditional in Antwerp than elsewhere.

In Montreal, the gainful occupations of the Belzer Hassidim had a far wider range; there again, contacts and observation in various areas allowed me to obtain a better view of the group and of the somewhat important roles of the individual members who trade in the kasher products. Of course, kasher foods help in promoting the continued survival of the wider Jewish community not merely because of the religious requirement, but because delicatessens, special types of bread, pastry, etc., provide links with the eastern European old way of life.

The merits of intensive fieldwork and of the broader comparative approach soon become apparent when one studies Hassidim. Although Jewish ritual among various Hassidic groups is of a similar nature, yet each group will be eager to point out that faithful adherence to the teachings of their own *rebbe* (charismatic religious leader) entails special customs and modes of behaviour. The 'other' Hassidim are different—and the implication is that they are not quite as worthy. Upon further enquiry and observation, the fieldworker does, in fact, find significant differences between the forms of Hassidism. These may be reflected in personal appearance (such as the wearing of a special type of hat or other clothing), or they may be concerned with the aspect of the synagogue (varying attitudes concerning its aesthetic attributes or its opulence). Or again, there may be sharp contrasts in politico-religious attitudes—for instance, the anti-Zionist Satmar and the pro-Zionist Lubavitch. There are also differences based on geographic origin, occupations, and social and kinship networks. Of course, the lines of demarcation between different groups of Hassidim are not as clear-cut to a non-specialist as are those between Hassidim and other more or less observant Jews.

A Hassidic group has only comparatively autonomous institutions; it is closely linked to wider entities, often non-Hassidic. Except in the case of some powerful Hassidic congregations in New York (such as the Satmar and the Lubavitch), it cannot depend entirely upon its own resources for its religious requirements: *kashrut*, schools, Talmudic academies, cemeteries, etc. For example, the Belzer Hassidim of Antwerp are members of the *hevra kadisha* which serves the city's wider Orthodox community; they depend on it to bury their dead; in Montreal, three groups of Hassidim—of Belz, Satmar, and Vishnitz—maintain jointly a school for their girls; while the *Bostoner rebbe* supervises the purity of the milk which is sold to members of groups other

than his. Thus, one comes to perceive in every case that the community under study is part of a wider setting.

The method of intensive fieldwork is particularly useful in providing dynamic insight. Such insight will also have to take into account the historical perspective. The strongly structured and cohesive groups of Belzer Hassidim, in Antwerp as well as Montreal, came into being only after the Second World War; their members were survivors of the Nazi genocide, and their origins were diverse. As for the community of the *Bostoner rebbe*, after a humdrum existence for several decades in the old Jewish districts of the West End and of Dorchester, it was established in 1961 in Brookline, where it quickly flourished in a most striking manner. In all three cases, one must analyse the past, see the links with the present, and thus follow the development of the group; in some cases, one can draw upon available material: for example, the archives of philanthropic institutions which helped the refugees when they arrived in Antwerp and Montreal. In addition, interviews and informal conversations may bring to light valuable information.

Clearly, some Jewish communities—such as those of Antwerp and Montreal—make it possible for traditional Hassidim to live in their midst and survive economically. On the other hand, such Hassidim had not prospered in the past in Boston. However, both recent fieldwork and the Boston Community Surveys of 1965 and 1975[6] (which provided data of very great importance) show some of the reasons why the Boston Hassidim are now a fairly successful group, living as they do in the midst of a highly skilled and economically prosperous Jewish community.

The 1975 Survey revealed the following occupational structure of Greater Boston:[7]

| | % *Males* | % *Females* |
|---|---|---|
| Professionals | 40 | 36 |
| Managers and proprietors | 27 | 12 |
| Clerical and sales | 21 | 44 |
| Blue collar | 11 | 6 |
| Unspecified | 1 | 2 |
| | 100 | 100 |

Unlike the case among other traditional Hassidic groups, the occupational distribution of the *Bostoner rebbe*'s community is more or less similar to that of the wider Jewish society, especially in the high percentage of professionals.

Statistical and demographic official data on Jewish communities vary in availability from country to country. There were none for

Antwerp, while in the case of Montreal the Census Reports give precise figures. When I was working among the Belzer Hassidim of Antwerp, I started with a list of members of the group which I had been able to compile in the course of my fieldwork. It was then, and only then, that I was able to check my data against the official city records of Antwerp. But demographic data on the Belzer Hassidim had only little significance without a comparative approach. Of course I could not make a detailed demographic study of Antwerp Jewry; but I was able to make some rough estimates: for example, it seems that in the mid 1960's the majority of Antwerp Jews had been established in that city before 1940 or were descended from such established inhabitants. (This was contrary to the general opinion then prevailing in the community.)

*The* Bostoner *Hassidim*

Over a period of six months in 1975–76, I carried out field research among the 'Beth Pinchas' community, whose leader is Grand Rabbi Levi I. Horowitz, known as the *Bostoner rebbe*. That community consists of about 150 households; its headquarters are in Beacon Street in Brookline, which is a well-to-do district near the centre of Boston and also close to that city's large universities.

It was clear from the outset that in order to understand the somewhat complex structure of Beth Pinchas, and its religious and ideological beliefs, I would certainly have to look beyond the small group of actual Hassidic disciples of the *rebbe*. The greatest number of his followers are Orthodox Jews: they consist not only of traditionally observant immigrants, most of whom came to the United States after 1945, or their children; there is also an appreciable number of *baalei tshuva*, literally 'repenters', that is, Jews who had shown in the past a small degree of religious observance or none at all, but who now had come to embrace *Yiddishkeit*, traditional Orthodox Judaism, and in some cases, Hassidism. Many of the children of the immigrants and these 'repenters' are university students or graduates working on the campuses or employed in various laboratories in the Boston area.

The *baalei tshuva* have joined the community largely owing to the remarkable missionary activities of the *Bostoner rebbe*; he considers it to be one of his fundamental tasks to ensure that large numbers return to the practice of the Jewish faith.[8] His Hassidic centre includes a seminary for women and a Talmudic academy for men; they aim to educate those largely ignorant of the Jewish tradition and of the texts of the Torah. The *rebbe* also organizes *shabbaton*: weekends when he himself and the members of his group receive guests in their various homes; they join in the Sabbath prayers and rituals, and on the Friday night partake of the elaborate festive meal, which is served in a traditional Hassidic style at the home of the *rebbe*, in the Beth Pinchas

headquarters. There are very often students among the guests; the *rebbe* directs a great part of his missionary activity towards the student body: there are about 30,000 to 40,000 Jewish students in the Boston area,[9] many of whom have come from other areas of the United States (and are therefore somewhat uprooted), and like the majority of American Jews they are not Orthodox.

A great deal of money is required to finance the missionary activities of the *Bostoner* Hassidim, their educational institutions, and their hospitality in their own homes and at the table of the *rebbe*. The latter has brought together a support group of benefactors who make donations, often of large amounts. Most of them are American-born children of immigrants who were, on the whole, observant Jews and came to the United States before the Second World War. These benefactors are rich businessmen who live in wealthy suburbs and tend to be Conservative Jews—that is, they do not adhere to the strict code of practice of the traditional Jewish Orthodox movement. However, they are aware that the *Bostoner rebbe* is a dynamic leader actively engaged in an attempt to restore Jewish traditional practices, which they see as conforming to the ideas of the established order; for the businessmen, such zeal is of especial importance in the context of Jewish students. The latter—especially since the Vietnam war—have often proved very susceptible to 'subversive' influences of all types, from Maoism to the Hare Krishna movement; some of the children of the benefactors have been thus 'lost' to their parents.

It must now be apparent that from the beginning of my fieldwork, I became aware of the necessity of taking into account the attitudes and the concerns of a sector of the economic establishment and of the student population. While regularly attending the *rebbe*'s synagogue, I also noted that among the members of his community there were some leaders of Boston's Jewish day schools: the executive director of the New England Hebrew Academy (a school of the Boston branch of the Lubavitch Hassidim);[10] the headmaster of the Maimonides school, which is linked to the Young Israel movement (modern Orthodox); the headmaster of a small suburban school; and a teacher in Boston's Hebrew College (the only Jewish teaching institution in the Boston area which is of university level). This teacher also practises as a *mohel* (circumsiser) in the *rebbe*'s community. Thus, the *Bostoner* Hassidim had important, though quite informal, links with the Jewish educational system.

I also noted that some members of Beth Pinchas occasionally attend a *shtibel* (a small Hassidic prayer house) of the Lubavitch Hassidim, while others take part sometimes in the prayers and sometimes in the other activities of the Orthodox Young Israel movement in Brookline. On the other hand, a few followers of the Lubavitch and some Young Israel members attend Beth Pinchas services. Moreover, the 'sister-

hoods' (the female chapters) of Beth Pinchas and of the Young Israel synagogue regularly organize joint cultural activities.

Beth Pinchas does not have its own school; the children of its members attend either the Lubavitch or the Maimonides School. The founder and present head of that latter school is Rabbi Joseph D. Soloveitchik, a learned Talmudist of international reputation, who is an eminent professor at New York's Yeshiva University. He lives in Brookline, and on Saturday evenings he gives lectures on the Talmud in the Maimonides school; they are open to the public and many Beth Pinchas members attend them. A few other members occasionally go to a small synagogue whose rabbi is a Harvard University professor and the son-in-law of Rabbi Soloveitchik: he is also the son of the Talner *rebbe*, hence descended from a Hassidic dynasty, and it is on this account that he maintains his small synagogue—admittedly more Orthodox than Hassidic in style. Again, one can see some of the many links between the Beth Pinchas group and various Boston Orthodox groups and scholars.

According to the *1975 Community Survey* of the Jewish population of Greater Boston, barely 5 per cent of the total were Orthodox: fewer than 10,000 in a total of 195,000 Jews; the 1965 Survey had noted a much larger proportion—14 per cent of the then total of 208,000. The 1975 Survey has therefore revealed a very sharp and very startling decline in the numbers of the Orthodox in Greater Boston in only ten years. It stresses the increase in membership of the Reform Movement and of assimilatory ideologies. Nevertheless, the small Orthodox sector in Boston makes its presence very clearly felt, not only as a result of its own dynamism but also because it receives some support from non-Orthodox institutions and individuals in the region. Just as the *Bostoner rebbe* has a special relationship with his benefactors, so does Beth Pinchas, as a movement, play the role of faithful upholder of Jewish traditional values, not limited to the religious sphere.

During the period of my fieldwork in Boston, there were the bicentennial celebrations of the United States; these included so-called 'ethnic-months', and November 1975 was the 'Jewish Month'. Several cultural events were organized by the Jewish community, some of them being staged in the City Hall. About one-fifth of all these events were connected with Orthodox Jews: there was a film on the Lubavitch Hassidim shown in two Conservative synagogues; and a special public lecture by Rabbi Soloveitchik delivered in his school. A show with sound effects and slides on the hand manufacture of *matsot* by the followers of the *Bostoner rebbe*[11] and a 'festival' of Hassidic melodies chanted by a small musical group under the direction of the *rebbe*'s son were two events organized by Beth Pinchas; they were held on a Sunday afternoon in Boston City Hall and drew large crowds, since both the time and the place were popular. Many of the songs had Zionist

overtones; and since it was shortly after the notorious United Nations resolution condemning Zionism, the public showed their approval.

The *Bostoner rebbe* stresses his spiritual links to the Holy Land: both his father and grandfather lived in Jerusalem before 1914. He links the original background of his 'dynasty' with a pro-Israel ideology; and the leaders of various other Jewish movements in Boston certainly support Israel.[12] It seems that the *Bostoner rebbe*'s group were granted a somewhat important part in the events of the 'Jewish Month' on account of the *rebbe*'s energetic missionary zeal as well as the vigour of his Jewish identity, both religiously and politically. Of course, the 'Jewish Month' was an unusual event, but it led me to more basic data. As I noted earlier, universities are, in Boston, influential centres which are receptive to various nonconformist ideologies. Such famous institutions as Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as well as many others, exert strong assimilatory influences. Their Jewish students, although numerous, are nevertheless a minority; there is a strong statistical probability that they will marry out, and that they may become affected by various prevalent ideologies remote from Judaism.

On the other hand, Boston's Jewish institutions (as is often the case) have leaders who are both rich and of a high social status;[13] it is therefore not surprising that they support free enterprise capitalism and its values—and the latter are certainly compatible with the religious values of Orthodox Jewry. The secular leaders therefore extend willing support to the Hassidim who, although they constitute a small minority, are remarkably dynamic. Thus, the *Bostoner rebbe*'s *shabbaton* received a grant from the Combined Jewish Philanthropies both in 1975–76 and 1976–77. The C.J.P. also gives substantial support to the Hillel Houses for Boston's Jewish students.[14] Boston University's Hillel House (which is the largest in the city) is under the direction of a rabbi who belongs to the Lubavitcher Hassidim. (Boston University is said to have a large proportion of Jewish students: 30–40 per cent.[15]) The experience of my colleagues and my own fieldwork observations have shown me that one can rely on a disciple of the Lubavitcher *rebbe* (Menachem Mendel Schneerson) to combine tactical ability, and the subtlety needed in a student milieu, with a strategy aiming at the propagation of religious and ideological modes of behaviour of the most traditionally Orthodox and Hassidic type.

The C.J.P. also subsidize Jewish day schools in Greater Boston. One may at first be surprised that in 1975–76 and in 1976–77, about 80 per cent of day school allocations went to either Orthodox or Hassidic schools; but then, these account for three-quarters of all Jewish day schools in the region. I could go on citing yet further examples of the influence of the traditional Jews; for instance, the only bookshop of some importance which specializes in Judaica has a very strictly Orthodox management.

*Conclusion*

Sociological surveys can, and do, gather valuable basic demographic and other data. However, they sometimes fail to reveal important trends and interactions between various sectors of the population they survey. I was able to complement the data I gathered by my own anthropological fieldwork with other material—such as Jewish newspapers, pamphlets, annual reports of various organizations, etc. In that way, I was able to note, especially in Boston, the links between the dominant majority institutions and the minority Jewish Orthodox community—although the patterns of interaction were certainly ambivalent and far from being openly admitted. They were not revealed in any sociological surveys or enquiries. For example, the *1975 Community Survey* of Greater Boston does not suggest any relationships between the opposite poles of religious observance. The Survey gives the impression of a Jewish population which is fragmented and scattered, and where Reform Judaism (which certainly does not require much religious observance) and various assimilatory forces are gaining ground. For instance, mixed marriages are said to be increasingly prevalent and, moreover, generally more acceptable. All this may well be true. However, such a general picture fails to show up the subtle shades in the background, or the attempts made at influencing ideologically Boston Jewry by various means and at various points, which were revealed by intensive fieldwork techniques.

I have used that method to study Hassidim in three countries, and it has enabled me—of course, in varying measure—to arrive at a sociology of Jewish populations in these cities. The technique should be equally rewarding in other fields of research. I recently became interested in the problem of the 'repenters' in the United States and also in that of converts (from Christianity to Judaism and vice versa); and I am confident that in these cases as well as in others—for example, mixed marriage, the family, education—intensive fieldwork within groups, districts, universities, etc., combined with a broader comparative approach, will yield useful and reliable insights, which would prove to be scientifically valid.

I am grateful for assistance from the National Science Foundation of the United States and the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.

This is an English version of a paper for the *Colloque International: Communautés juives (1880–1977), Sources et Méthodes de recherche*, held in Paris on 13–15 February 1978. The translation from the French is by Judith Djamour.

## NOTES

[1] See Jacques Gutwirth, 'Antwerp Jewry Today', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. X, no. 1, June 1968, pp. 121–37.

[2] *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XIV, no. 1, June 1972, pp. 42–62.

[3] *Recherches Sociographiques*, vol. 14, no. 3, 1973, pp. 291–325.

[4] William Shaffir, *Life in a Religious Community: The Lubavitcher Chassidim in Montreal*, Toronto and Montreal, 1974.

[5] See, for example, Louis Rosenberg, 'Changes in the Geographical Distribution of the Jewish Population of Metropolitan Montreal in the Decennial Periods from 1901 to 1961 and the Estimated Possible Changes during the Period from 1961 to 1971', *Canadian Jewish Congress Research Papers*, 1966, A, 7. That Congress has also published other useful demographic papers by Rosenberg, in various series.

[6] M. Axelrod, F. J. Fowler, Jnr., and A. Gurin, *A Community Survey for Long Range Planning: A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston*, Boston, 1967; F. J. Fowler, Jnr., *1975 Community Survey: A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston*, Boston, 1977.

[7] See *1975 Community Survey* ..., op. cit., p. 47.

[8] In this way, but on a much smaller scale, his efforts are very similar to those of the Lubavitcher *rebbe* and his movement, whose headquarters are in Brooklyn, New York; that is a much larger Hassidic organization, with international ramifications.

[9] See M. Schapira, ed., *Jewish Boston, 1973–74*, Boston, 1973, p. 5.

[10] The Academy has pupils from nursery school to high school, for boys and for girls. Until about May 1976, the Lubavitch movement made its presence noticeable in Boston largely through this school.

[11] See my 'Les pains azymes de la Pâque' in *Objets et Mondes*, vol. 16, no. 4, 1976, pp. 137–48.

[12] More than 60 per cent of the expenditure of the Combined Jewish Philanthropies in 1975–76 ($7,903,400) and 1976–77 ($7,698,700) went to the Israel Emergency Fund and the United Jewish Appeal (most of whose funds go to Israel). See the details of the budgets published in Boston's *The Jewish Advocate* on 5 November 1975 and 5 August 1976, respectively. See also A. Iser *et al.*, 'C.J.P.: A Question of Priorities', *Genesis 2*, January 1975, p. 1.

[13] See A. Marcus, 'C.J.P. Meeting Looks Inward' in *Genesis 2*, November 1975. He states on p. 7: 'Candidates were judged on the basis of merit and interest as well as wealth and status.'

[14] See *The Jewish Advocate*, 5 November 1975 and 5 August 1976. The budgets also show that *Genesis 2*, the monthly 'newspaper of Boston's Jewish Student and Young Adult Community', was one of the 'Jewish Student Projects' receiving a subsidy from the C.J.P. In the April 1976 issue, an Editorial on the first page stated that it was 'aiming to become fiscally as well as editorially independent'.

It is interesting to note that in 1975–76, the managing editor of *Genesis 2* was a very orthodox female student.

[15] See B. Lynn and M. Fitzimmons, 'Students Complain About Religious Holiday Policy', *Genesis 2*, February 1976, p. 7.

# VARIETIES OF ORTHODOX RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOUR: A CASE STUDY OF YESHIVA HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES IN ISRAEL

Ernest Krausz and Mordechai Bar-Lev

*Introduction*

IN traditional Jewish society, as in most other traditional societies, religious thought, action, and institutions were of supreme importance, both structurally and substantively. Generally, in any case of tension between sacred and secular elements, religious values and institutions were the dominant and decisive factors, since they were seen in traditional Jewish life as the sole source of social legitimation.[1] The central position of religion gradually led to the crystallization of a more or less homogeneous set of behavioural norms in the area of religious observance and the establishment of a stable pattern of religious standards and strictures, at least within specific geographic regions.

The development of modern society, and the strength of the processes of social change within it, brought about a radical decline in the status of religious values, and concomitantly shattered the consensus in the area of religious behaviour. In this new age, according to Bryan Wilson, religion and religious institutions have gradually lost their dominant status, and their social influence has declined dramatically, as 'religious thinking practice, and institutions lose social significance'.[2]

These processes of secularization,[3] as would be expected, affected Jewish life as well. Since the end of the eighteenth century, they have steadily eroded both the structural and functional integrity of traditional Jewish society as a 'total world'. In Palestine the secularization processes appeared only during a somewhat later period, with the intensification of the intra-communal strife for supremacy in the political, social, and ideological fields throughout the *Yishuv* (Jewish Settlement in Palestine) and in Jerusalem in particular.

This conflict began to develop at the end of the period of Ottoman rule and in the early years of the British Mandate in Palestine. On one side of the battle were the representatives of secular Jewish nationalism, Zionists and their supporters; among them were a significant

percentage of the ideologues of the New *Yishuv*. Their opponents, primarily associated with the Old *Yishuv*, held to a traditional religious conception of Jewish life, which found its political expression in the positions taken by the Orthodox Agudat Israel party. The conclusion of this struggle produced a grave crisis in the legitimation of Orthodox Judaism in Palestine.[4] As a consequence, not only was there a decline in the social status of religious institutions and increased tensions between the religious and secular sectors; but in addition, changes took place in the religious behaviour of even those individuals who identified themselves with those very religious institutions and values.

We draw on the work of Peter Berger[5] to understand the problem of the tensions generated between the sacred and the secular, and to examine the effect of such tensions on religious behaviour.

Berger, in his analysis of the social situation of Protestant sects in America, focuses on the essential changes emerging as a result of the transition from a traditional religious society rooted in a specific locality, to a modern society which is pluralistic in terms of religious behaviour, both structurally and functionally. The existence of a variety of forms of religious expression in the same territorial area, none of which occupies a monopolistic position, places religion, according to Berger, in a 'market situation' of free competition. Each religion is therefore compelled to compete for 'consumers' ('customers'), whose loyalty to their 'product' is not guaranteed *a priori*. In such a situation of free competition, two alternative reactions are possible:

(a) The first is that of adaptation, at different levels, to the new pluralistic system and acceptance of the rational 'rules of the game' in a 'free market'. Such an adaptation necessitates fitting the 'price' to market conditions—that is, the concession of moderating any extreme religious demands, the tolerance of deviance from traditional religious norms, and the like. All this is done to 'sell' these religious values to both 'regular customers' and potential 'new consumers'.

(b) The alternative option involves the rejection of the basic principles of a pluralistic system, coupled with a voluntary and principled renunciation of any participation in the 'free market' game. The strategy usually takes the form of physical and/or social-structural isolation, as in various religious sects, and the continuance of activities in accordance with their traditional structures of meaning. A rejection demanding such a very high 'price', including the acceptance of extreme religious demands and a constant wariness against any deviations from traditional religious norms, means that only a small minority of individuals will be prepared to 'pay' the 'membership fee' for such social groups.

This study will explore the actual types of religious behaviour among a specific population of observant Jews who represent a very particular

stratum within the religious Orthodox community in Israel.[6] The specific population investigated consists of the 'graduates' of Yeshiva High Schools, the latter being a novel type of educational institution established by religious Zionist circles in the early 1940's. In these schools, religious studies in the style of the traditional Yeshiva (Talmudic College) are combined with secular studies leading to University entrance examinations.[7] Pupils in the Yeshiva High Schools represent some 15 per cent of the total number of male pupils attending academic type high schools in Israel (that is to say, excluding those in technical and agricultural high schools). In addition there are female pupils in six parallel religious high schools for girls, called *Ulpana*.

The Yeshiva High Schools are fee-paying boarding schools, the fees being higher than those of secular boarding high schools; that is justified on the grounds of longer teaching hours owing to religious subjects being included in the curriculum. Although the Yeshiva High Schools differ from other high schools (including other non-Yeshiva religious high schools) in so far as the organizing of their curricula and time-tables is concerned, they are subject to the supervision and inspection of the Ministry of Education, which also sets the examinations. Their success may be seen in the steady increase in the number of pupils entering these schools in the 1960's (mainly at the expense of the non-Yeshiva religious high schools). The numbers have become stabilized during the 1970's. Here we will consider:

(a) Whether or not the religious behaviour of the respondents in a sample survey (described below) is basically uniform, and how it corresponds to the standards of religious behaviour of Jews in traditional societies.

(b) If their behaviour is of a mixed nature, what kinds of religious practice are displayed by the respondents? Specifically, in which particular aspects do the respondents maintain the religious rituals and norms, as they were kept in traditional Jewish life, and in what areas do they engage in various sorts of personal choice and selection among the traditional religious rituals and norms which they do observe?

The question of this 'mix' of traditionalism and personal decision will be examined in the social life of the sample respondents, who continue to subscribe to religious values and institutions while they live in the midst of a pluralistic cultural reality, confronted constantly by the basically secular values and social norms of Israeli society.[8]

*Population and sampling procedure*

The population investigated consists of 'graduates' of Yeshiva High Schools in Israel. This is an exclusively male population of high-school age (15–18 years) preparing for University entrance examinations (academic stream) of the Ministry of Education. A 'graduate' was

defined as one included in the lists of students presented for examination purposes by these institutions; lists were obtained directly from the schools.

The sample was selected from 'graduates' of all the 22 Yeshiva High Schools in existence in 1975. The newer schools whose pupils had not reached matriculation examinations, and older schools (which for various reasons have closed down), were excluded. The first cohort chosen for the sample was the one which concluded its studies in 1955, since this was the first year when an organized group of students presented themselves for matriculation examinations from all the institutions in existence at the time. As for graduates after that date, proportional systematic random sampling was employed in order to select the sample from all the Yeshiva High Schools.

After ascertaining the number of graduates in each year, the following sampling procedure was adopted: (a) for the period 1955–64 all graduates in alternate years were selected—that is to say, five graduating years were included; (b) for the period 1965–74 half the graduates in every third graduating year were selected, alternate names being chosen from alphabetical lists. While this sampling method controlled for time-cohorts,[9] it left variables—such as religion, ethnicity, and educational specialization—uncontrolled. Thus the sample figure reached 1,832 graduates, drawn from nine graduating years and covering all Yeshiva High Schools. The final operative sample numbered 1,610 graduates.[10]

*Research techniques*

As a result of background information concerning the nature of the variables involved, the relatively homogeneous character of the population to be investigated, and especially considering the very wide geographical spread of the graduates, it was decided to adopt the technique of a postal survey. The questionnaire included only closed questions. (Graduates were told that the anonymity of the replies would be ensured.) A pilot survey, involving 84 pupils (from graduating years not included in the sample design) was first carried out. Its results helped to finalize the questionnaire design.

The survey itself was carried out during the months of January and February 1975. As an immediate response, 962 completed questionnaires were received. In order to ensure the representativeness of the sample, a sub-sample of the first-stage non-respondents, numbering 210, were contacted personally in their homes. Of these, 144 graduates produced completed questionnaires, thus bringing the total of respondents to 1,106, or 69 per cent of the operative sample of 1,610. First-stage non-respondents were compared with those who responded without personal contact. No significant differences were found

between the two groups in either social background or level of religious observance.

The material gathered, involving 165 variables, was analysed by computer, and was subjected to statistical tests of significance. In addition, an index of religiosity was built on the principles of the Guttman Scale[11] based on ten questions involving religious ritual.

*Findings*

The ten closed questions mentioned above related to the index of religiosity[12] of the graduates and focused primarily on those *mitsvot* (commandments) possessing social characteristics. These included *mitsvot* of both positive and negative natures, among them commandments referred to colloquially as 'simple' or 'easy', as well as others termed 'difficult' or 'demanding'.[13]

The questions dealt with the following areas: the wearing of *tefillin* (phylacteries); the observance of the Sabbath; participation in public prayers; fixed times for the study of Torah (taken in the broadest sense to encompass Bible, Talmud, and rabbinic writings); the avoidance of social bathing in sexually mixed settings; the avoidance of mixed social dancing; the renunciation of television viewing because of halakhic (Jewish legal) considerations; the purchase and consumption of only kasher food; the strict separation of all dairy and meat utensils; and in the case of married men, the wife's covering of her hair (a traditional norm of modesty on the part of a married woman).

(1) *The wearing of tefillin.* According to the Orthodox interpretation of Jewish law, every male from the age of *bar-mitsvah* (13 years) and above must place phylacteries on his arm and his head *every* day, with the exception of the Sabbath and the Holy Days. The tradition holds that a Jewish male who does not put on his *tefillin* even for a single day—and even in the case where he is not rejecting the commandment but rather because he will lose some work, time, or money, or is simply lazy—is placed in the category of 'complete transgessors'.[14] (This does not apply in cases of illness.) Nevertheless, our findings demonstrate that a not insignificant percentage of the population studied is negligent in various ways in the total fulfilment of this important ritual: 6·3 per cent of the respondents report they do not conscientiously 'lay' (put on) *tefillin* every day, while another 10·2 per cent do so only irregularly or not at all.

(2) *Sabbath observance.* A somewhat higher level of uniformity was found among the subjects in terms of general Sabbath observance: 86·3 per cent of the sample claim to observe the Sabbath in strict accord with the *Halakha* (the totality of codified Jewish law). The commandment to observe the Sabbath has come to be defined exclusively in halakhic terms and to occupy such a central place in Jewish

law that only those who responded, 'Yes, absolutely', should be seen as falling in the category of Sabbath observers. Those who are partially observant ('In general, yes', 'I am not conscientious', 'I do not observe the Sabbath according to the *Halakha*', etc.) engage in some selected practices such as candle-lighting, *kiddush* (the blessing over the wine), and buying *ḥallot* (the special Sabbath bread which is generally blessed): these have become semi-secular, symbolic rituals and nothing more.[15] Even in the case of this fundamental *mitsvah* of Sabbath observance—which is strongly reinforced by extensive social control owing to the public nature of its observance or non-observance—there are some expressions of deviance in religious behaviour.

(3) *Participation in public prayer.* From a strictly formal legal point of view, the Jewish male must fulfil his obligation of prayer three times daily—*shaḥarit* (morning), *minḥa* (afternoon), and *maariv* (evening)—through individual private prayer. However, according to Katz,[16]

> Private prayer was regarded as the exception. The proper form of worship in communities large enough to maintain a *minyan* (the quorum of ten males of the age of thirteen or over) was public prayer in the synagogue, in the *bet hamidrash* or house of study, or even in a private home ...

This traditional form of participation in public prayer for all three daily services is subject in modern society to very powerful economic pressures.[17] Consequently, Orthodoxy in recent times has shown some degree of tolerance and flexibility: there is a sort of implicit compromise to overlook non-attendance at public prayer on weekdays. Concomitantly, however, participation in public worship on the Sabbath and Holy Days is viewed as a minimal condition, and those who are not conscientious about meeting this limited obligation are viewed as transgressors. Table 1 below indicates the wide range of behaviour associated with this religious norm. (There were 46 'No reply'; 1,060+46=1,106.)

TABLE 1. *Participation in public prayer*

| | *Absolute Number* | % |
|---|---|---|
| (1) I try to pray with a *minyan* every day or almost every day. | 604 | 57·0 |
| (2) I try to pray with a *minyan* every Monday and Thursday [when the Torah is read in public], in addition to the Sabbath and Holy Days. | 58 | 5·5 |
| (3) I try to pray with a *minyan* every *Rosh Hodesh* [the first of each month] in addition to the Sabbath and Holy Days. | 83 | 7·8 |
| (4) I try to pray with a *minyan* every Sabbath and Holy Day. | 219 | 20·7 |
| (5) I try to pray with a *minyan* in general on the Sabbath. | 34 | 3·2 |
| (6) I pray occasionally with a *minyan* on the Sabbath and Holy Days. | 33 | 3·1 |
| (7) I am accustomed to pray with a *minyan* only on *Rosh HaShanah* [New Year] and *Yom Kippur* [the Day Of Atonement]. | 17 | 1·6 |
| (8) I do not go to the synagogue at all. | 12 | 1·1 |
| Total | 1,060 | 100·0 |

(4) *Fixed periods for Torah study*. The fundamental halakhic requirement to be engaged in Torah study and learning, which is mandatory during every moment of an adult male's free time, with the exception of the time required to fulfil the so-called 'practical' *mitsvot*—those involving some physical action, to earn a livelihood, to satisfy basic needs, etc.—has never been expected of all individuals. As Katz points out,[18] this totalistic expectation was an ideal norm; it was realized in practice only by a small minority of rabbinic scholars who devoted all their time and energy to the *mitsvot*. The commandment to engage in Torah learning, as practised by the majority of the community in traditional Jewish life, was satisfied by the establishment of fixed times for study in the home, or in other frameworks outside the home, such as the synagogue, which was often termed 'the House of Study'. The behaviour of our respondents with respect to this *mitsvah* was also found to vary: while approximately one-third of them studied consistently every day, almost the same percentage did not have any regular schedule for religious learning. The remaining third tended to engage in Torah study one to three times a week.

(5) *Social bathing in mixed settings*. The type of religious behaviour we are concerned with in this section is best described as a prohibition growing out of a 'negative' *mitsvah* ('You shall not ...'), as are the sixth and seventh sections which follow this discussion.

In traditional Jewish society, almost any social meeting between men and women was perceived as a form of deviance and potential source of immoral sexual entanglements.[19] Therefore, participation in a mixed social event like bathing in the sea or a swimming pool (especially given the nature of swimming costumes) with members of the opposite sex was among the most strictly forbidden acts in the traditional Jewish community. The change of values in modern society in the general field of leisure activities, as well as in the status of women and in social relations between the sexes in particular, is clearly reflected in our findings: 65·5 per cent of those who were asked whether they bathed in sexually mixed settings said they did so or would not object to doing so.

(6) *Mixed social dancing*. The halakhic norms against mixed social dancing are also tied to the prohibition against social intercourse between the sexes.[20] Yet the research findings on the religious behaviour of the sample population are radically different in this area from the replies concerning mixed bathing. While about two-thirds of the subjects were untroubled about engaging in mixed bathing, only one-third participated in mixed social dancing:[21] 25·1 per cent in mixed ballroom dancing and 8·2 per cent in mixed folk dancing. Mixed ballroom dancing is perceived in Orthodox circles in Israel as representative of the worst in secular culture. Slightly more than half of the respondents—56·1 per cent—did not engage in any form of mixed dancing

whatsoever; and even restricted themselves still further to only traditional yeshiva-style dancing. A further 3·3 per cent engaged in folk dancing exclusively among males. Finally, there is a group whose behaviour in this respect is slightly atypical, although in keeping with elements of the traditional position: namely, the remaining 7·3 per cent of the respondents, who stated that they participated in folk dancing where men and women dance in separate circles. That is associated, especially in the last several years, with alumni of the religious youth movement.

(7) *Television viewing.* Television is a recent technological innovation which has been available in Israel only since the end of 1967. However, in a few years it has become a very influential medium in shaping the cultural norms of Israeli society.[22]

Despite the fact that traditional Jewish society in the past could obviously not have taken any position with respect to television viewing, contemporary extreme Orthodox circles have expressly forbidden the purchase of television sets, as well as the viewing of any television programmes—regardless of their nature.[23] Our findings indicate that 92·7 per cent of the Yeshiva High School graduates questioned watch television during their leisure time, without any apparent halakhic qualms, and are thus exposed to its cultural influence.[24] The remaining 7·3 per cent of the sample said that they did not watch television mainly because of religious reasons.[25]

(8) *The purchase of kasher food.* The details of the laws governing the *kashrut* (ritual purity) of the Jewish table acted at different periods as barriers to social contacts between Jews and Gentiles. At times, this was done with an eye towards maintaining maximal segregation from the Gentile population, while during other periods it was intended to reinforce the self-consciousness of the Jew who of necessity came into contact with Gentiles on a day-to-day basis.[26]

Even in Jewish society in Israel today, meticulousness in *kashrut* observance can present obstacles to social intercourse between 'religious' and 'non-religious' Jews. The position of our respondents, however, is clear on this question: nearly 98 per cent of them comply with the requirement by buying only certified kasher food for the home, or when eating out.[27]

(9) *The separation of all dairy and meat utensils.* In this area of ritual also, as in the buying of kasher food, we are dealing with a form of religious behaviour which reinforces the social exclusiveness of the observant Jew. The maintenance of separate sets of utensils for dairy and meat products not only serves to reassert the social distance between the Jew and the Gentile in the Dispora, and the 'religious' and 'non-religious' Jew in Israel; it also functions, in our view, as a mechanism for social integration of those who do structure their eating patterns in such a fashion.

It is, therefore, not surprising to discover that this is the most widely observed ritual among our research population. The fact that 98·3 per cent of the respondents maintain separate sets of dairy and meat utensils demonstrates the centrality of this practice, since many who are neither conscientious about, nor committed to, the other behavioural norms are observant only in the matter of *kashrut*.[28]

(10) *The wife's covering of her hair.* On the assumption that a correlation exists between the total religious behaviour of the Yeshiva High School graduates and the religious behaviour of their wives, each of the 580 married respondents[29] was asked whether his wife covered her hair. Jewish law views the married woman (including the widow and the divorcée) who does not cover her hair as 'transgressing the Jewish religious law'[30] and a legitimate object of scorn and social sanctions. However, our research demonstrates that only half of the wives of married respondents observed this practice.[31]

*Classification according to the Guttman scale technique*

The varieties of religious practice among respondents, presented earlier by means of an examination of the behaviour in respect of each particular ritual or observance, take on a much more concrete and meaningful form when we try to rank the individual rituals in a descending order, from what is in the respondent's eyes most 'difficult' to what is 'easiest' for him to accept.

The attempt to create such a ranking based on the Guttman scaling technique demonstrates that the particular items investigated all relate to the same substantive area of religious observance. All the earlier questions appear to be relevant to the relationships among the values

TABLE 2. *Index of Yeshiva Graduates' Religiosity*[32]

| *Rank Order* | *Variable* | *Frequency* | % | *Cumulative %* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | For halakhic reasons does not view television. | 47 | 4·3 | 4·3 |
| 9 | No mixed social bathing. | 210 | 19·0 | 23·3 |
| 8 | Wife covers her head. | 153 | 13·8 | 37·1 |
| 7 | No mixed social dancing. | 156 | 14·1 | 51·2 |
| 6 | Studies Torah regularly. | 184 | 16·6 | 67·8 |
| 5 | Wears *tefillin* daily. | 125 | 11·3 | 79.1 |
| 4 | Observes the Sabbath according to *Halakha*. | 63 | 5·7 | 84·8 |
| 3 | Prays in a *minyan*. | 56 | 5·0 | 89·8 |
| 2 | Buys only kasher food. | 52 | 4·7 | 94·5 |
| 1 | Maintains separate sets of dairy and meat utensils. | 42 | 3·8 | 98·3 |
| 0 | Does not observe even one of the above rituals. | 18 | 1·6 | 99·9 |
| Total | | 1,106 | 99·9 | — |

of our 'global' religiosity variable and these relationships are systematic in their nature.

In addition, it was found that all the modes of behaviour in question ranged themselves according to their 'intrinsic' difficulty. Thus, for example, a respondent who replied that he observed a more 'difficult' ritual, also behaved in a 'religious' way with respect to those rituals which were 'easier'.

An examination of the coefficient of reproducibility showed that the number of deviant responses was very small in relation to the total size of the sample respondents who replied to the survey. The coefficient of reproducibility was 0·9586, and we therefore feel confident that our data base is sound when we propose Table 2.

*Social profiles related to divergent patterns of religious observance*

The ranking system developed on the basis of the Guttman scaling technique enables us not only to observe, as we mentioned earlier, ten different types of religious behaviour. It also permits us to collapse specific behavioural variables into more general categories, and thus to create a typology of divergent patterns of religious behaviour within our research population. In this way we discovered four separate groups, each representing a different pattern of religiosity of graduates of Yeshiva High Schools. The first group includes respondents who received a scaled 'religiosity grade' average of 7·000 and above—those who at the very least did not engage in mixed social dancing and may even have been still more 'traditional' in terms of our scale of religiosity. The next group represents those whose 'grade' was between 6·000 and 6·999 (having fixed times for Torah study). The third stratum received 'grades' ranging between 4·000 and 5·999 (those who observe the Sabbath according to the *Halakha* and wear *tefillin* regularly). Finally, the last group included those with scores of 3·999 and less (pray in a *minyan*, or do not do so, but observe *kashrut*)—or at the other extreme do not follow a single one of all the listed observances.

The attempt to group these different levels of religious behaviour can now be set against various aspects of the social backgrounds of these different sorts of Yeshiva High School graduates. Here we are referring to such variables as post-high school education, military service, occupation, nuclear family, residence pattern, leisure activities, etc., which typify the four groups, in the sense of a dominant pattern emerging within each of the different groups. We suggest that the basic findings presented here, tying the religious behaviour pattern to the social profile of each of the groups, may lead to a deeper understanding of the complex mechanisms and diversity we have found within a particular segment of Orthodox Jewry in Israel today.

(1) *The highly religious pattern.* Members of this group had studied in

post-high school, higher-level *yeshivot*, and did not plan to attend university. They did not do regular military service, nor did they serve in the framework of *yeshivot hesder* (which offer an opportunity of a combined programme of military service and Torah study). Their wives generally had received only a completely traditional Jewish education. They tended to reside in primarily religious sections of major urban areas and to send their children to the educational institutions of the more traditionally Orthodox, non-Zionist groups. In the Knesset and in local municipal elections, they voted for the Orthodox Agudat Israel party. It is also fair to characterize them as proponents of a specific sort of Orthodox 'Torah-true' culture in terms of their leisure-time activities. The only newspapers they read were those published by religious parties and their radio listening was confined primarily to programmes with a religious content. They did not maintain a library of 'secular' books at home, nor did they attend the cinema, theatre, concerts, light entertainment, etc. They accounted for slightly more than half the total number of respondents: 51·2 per cent.

(2) *The above-average pattern of religiosity* was found among 16·6 per cent; they had continued their full-time yeshiva studies beyond high school for longer than a year or two. Typically, they did their military service as privates (that is, not as officers) or in some sort of quasi-religious military framework, such as the military rabbinates, as members of a religious outpost settlement (*Nahal*), or in a *yeshiva hesder*. They tended to have sought higher education at Bar Ilan University (which was founded as a 'religious' institution) or at some other religious institution for post-high school learning, where they followed courses in Jewish Studies, education, humanities, or the natural sciences. Their wives did not have an exclusively religious education and the respondents in this group tended to dwell in urban areas with religious population clusters, in religious rural settlements, or in newer urban areas with a high percentage of religious Israelis and immigrants. Their children attended state religious schools within the general school system. The graduates themselves were mostly salaried employees, in upper-middle-class occupations. Many of them were members of religious political organizations and in elections they voted for *Mafdal*, the Orthodox-Zionist religious party. In almost every case, their parents were native-born Israelis of Ashkenazi origin, or had immigrated to Israel before 1954. This group may be said to have a traditionalist Orthodox cultural world-view concerning their free-time activities, although they allow themselves a limited degree of freedom and openness in those types of leisure activity which they perceive as being 'neutral' with respect to religious values.

(3) *The moderate pattern of religiosity.* Respondents in this category account for 17 per cent of the total; their pattern of moderate religiosity falls in the middle of our typology. In their army service

they were officers or senior non-commissioned officers. They did not attend any higher-level *yeshivot*, religious university, or other religious institutions for higher education. They tended to have studied in secular universities in the areas of the social sciences, medicine, law, architecture, and engineering. They lived in urban areas with a mixed population of the observant and the non-observant and were mainly professionals, generally self-employed. This category is particularly striking for the number of its members whose parents immigrated to Israel from North Africa or Asia between 1955 and 1966. Their fathers in the past often worked in low-prestige occupations and in contrast to the sons, had received only a very limited religious education at the *heder* (elementary school) level. They exhibit remarkable upward social mobility. The nature of their leisure-time activities may be described as completely secular without any restrictions whatsoever on general social patterns of leisure-time activity, which are perceived by them as being totally 'neutral' with respect to their religious values.

(4) *The pattern of minimal religious observance.* In this category (the remaining 15·1 per cent of the total), there are the sort of individuals whose wives served in the army. (Under Israeli law, women who choose to define themselves as 'religious' may obtain exemption from compulsory military service, since the army is viewed in traditional Orthodox circles as an environment unfit for a young girl.) These graduates also send their children to non-religious kindergartens and elementary schools. They were often active in non-religious political groups and voted in elections for secular political parties such as the Labour Party or Herut—and later, Likud. In their free time, they participated completely and unself-consciously in all aspects of society's secular cultural life, including such things as visits to nightclubs. They attended concerts of popular singers and performances of light entertainment at least once a month, and went to the cinema very frequently. The books in their homes were almost exclusively on secular subjects.

*Conclusion*

The results of our survey suggest clearly that religious pluralism has developed within the ranks of the Yeshiva High School graduates. An extremist attitude to religion—expressed in terms of strict adherence to traditional Orthodox precepts on the one hand, and the wholesale abandonment of religious practices on the other—is characteristic only of small groups out of the sample investigated. Nearly half the sample of Yeshiva High School graduates appear to have opted for a somewhat more diluted expression of Orthodoxy—an approach which does not regard television viewing or mixed bathing, for example, as anathema to Orthodox religious practice. In the Guttman scale, too, a fair

measure of religious pluralism is reflected: the variable response in all the ten questions, dealing only with ritualistic behaviour, leads us firmly to the conclusion that a heterogeneous tendency is clearly evident in this religious population, and that this holds even for the more basic religious practices.

In the light of these conclusions we put forward the proposition that a Neo-Orthodoxy has become established and that this may be seen as an adaptive response to the demands of what Peter Berger calls the 'market situation', given Israel's secularized society. This Neo-Orthodoxy has evolved from the complexity of the behavioural style which is typical of the vast majority of the graduates. That complex identity, with leanings towards Western cultural norms, is gaining ground over the exclusively Jewish religious identity which characterizes members of traditional Jewish society. We should not overlook, however, the ambivalence which may ensue from this complex approach involving both religious and secular tendencies. Moreover, the ambivalence may naturally reflect the structural tension inherent in this new type of religious educational institution,[33] so that both the institutional development and its products may be regarded as reflecting the 'cost' which has been incurred, or the 'price' which has been paid, by a section of religious Jews who are prepared to adjust to the 'market situation' in the secularized environment. Nevertheless, this Neo-Orthodoxy has produced an element possessing an intense Jewish identity carried by a 'Torah-schooled intelligentsia' moving between tradition and innovation.[34]

We wish to acknowledge gratefully the assistance we received from David Glanz; the support given by the Institute for the Study of Ethnic and Religious Groups at Bar Ilan University; and the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture, New York.

## NOTES

[1] On the role of religion in traditional, non-Jewish societies (including Christian and Muslim), see Roland Robertson, ed., *Sociology of Religion*, Baltimore, 1972, pp. 115–38; and L. Huizinga, *Herbst des Mittlealters*, Munich, 1928.

[2] See B. R. Wilson, *Religion in Secular Society*, London, 1966, p. 14.

[3] Concerning the sociological meaning of 'secularization', see L. Shiner, 'The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, vol. 6, no. 2, 1967, pp. 207–20.

[4] On the social turmoil during this period in the Ashkenazi Old *Yishuv*,

whose members were centrally involved in the struggle and crisis over legitimation, etc., see M. Friedman, *Society and Religion: The Non-Zionist Orthodox in Eretz Yisrael (1918–1936)* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1977.

[5] See P. L. Berger, 'A Market Model for the Analysis of Ecumenicity', *Social Research*, vol. 30, no. 1, 1963, pp. 77–93. See also by P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*, New York, 1967, p. 153, and his *The Social Reality of Religion*, London, 1969, pp. 137–49.

[6] In our research, we are not concerned with the various types of religiosity found among the 'secular' population (i.e. the non-Orthodox). On the problem of secular religiosity or 'non-religious religion', in the non-Orthodox sectors of Israeli society, see I. Shelach, *Indications Towards Secular Religion in Israel* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1975, pp. 39–40.

[7] For details, see Mordechai Bar-Lev, *The Graduates of the Yeshiva High School in Eretz-Israel—Between Tradition and Innovation* (Hebrew), Ph.D. thesis, Bar Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, 1977.

[8] Although some scattered religious norms operate within Israeli society in general as approved by the state legislature, the basic sources of legitimation in that society are secular in character. On the isolated instances of religious norms which play a role in the life of the society, see M. Elon, *Religious Law* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1968, pp. 55–56.

[9] The first period (1955–64) was one during which the older institutions became well established; while the second period (1965–74) saw the fast growth in the number of institutions and graduates.

[10] 222 graduates were lost from the original sample owing to the following: 71 were overseas at the time of the research; 14 had died; and for 137 graduates it was not possible to obtain their addresses. Thus, 7·5 per cent of the graduates in the original sample were not located. This is a fairly small proportion when compared with other studies. See, for example, Elihu Katz and Michael Gurevitch, *The Culture of Leisure in Israel* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1973, Appendix A, p. 2, in whose study 25 per cent of the original sample were not located.

[11] See C. A. Moser, *Survey Methods in Social Investigation*, London, 1968, p. 239.

[12] The choice of, and stress on, the ritual dimension and the conscious disregard of the other dimensions of religiosity, such as experiential, ideological, intellectual, and consequential—as formulated by C. V. Glock, ed., in his own essay on 'Dimensions in Religious Commitment' in *Religion in Sociological Perspective*, Belmont, Calif., 1973, pp. 9–11—are based on the hypothesis that Orthodox Jewish society in Israel judges and evaluates the success of the religious socialization of its members in terms of their actual behaviour. What we wish to stress is that from the perspective of the internal criteria of the Orthodox community, the fulfilment of halakhic norms is viewed as *the* most important and fundamental yardstick in measuring an individual's religiosity. The selection of these specific ten types of ritual was based on the authors' personal familiarity with both the subject area itself and the spiritual worldview of Orthodox circles.

[13] A number of the questions do not relate to *mitsvot* performed exclusively in public, such as wearing phylacteries or the study of Jewish texts at fixed times.

[14] See Rabbi Joseph Karo, *The Shulchan Aruch—Code of Law* (Hebrew), *Orach Haim*, section 37, paragraph 11.

[15] On secular rituals, see Note 6.

[16] See Jacob Katz, *Tradition and Crisis*, New York, 1974, p. 176.

[17] It should also be pointed out that even in traditional Jewish society some difficulties arose with respect to communal prayer on weekdays, especially in connection with the afternoon *minha* service. See Katz, op. cit., Note 16, pp. 178–79.

[18] ibid., p. 74.

[19] ibid., p. 162.

[20] On the prohibition against mixed social dancing see, for example, H. D. Halevi, *Find Yourself a Rabbi* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1976, pp. 192–97; O. Joseph, *Yabia Omer I* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1954, p. 106; M. Feinstein, *Letters from Moshe, Even Haezer II* (Hebrew), New York, 1964, p. 326.

[21] Perhaps it is possible to explain these apparently contradictory findings by noting that Israeli society sees sea bathing as a clear case of an activity associated with health and popular relaxation; while on the other hand, in the case of mixed social dancing, the religious individual finds a much greater degree of social control operating on him from those who do not engage in such dancing—the family, peer group, rabbis, adults in general, etc. This is especially so in the case of mixed ballroom dancing, where a man usually holds his female partner very close to him. The *Halakha* forbids even the slightest contact.

[22] On the development and impact of television in Israel and the public's attitude towards it, see E. Katz and M. Gurevitch, op. cit., pp. 166–213.

[23] For an analysis of the formulation of this prohibition as being based on the *Halakha*, see Y. Didavoski, *Machneha Kadosh* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1976.

[24] 73·3 per cent of the subjects watched television regularly at least once a week.

[25] Only 3·7 per cent of the sample responded in this manner exclusively. A further 3·6 per cent who were non-viewers gave in addition other reasons such as, 'It is a waste of time', or 'Most of the programmes are at a low level'.

[26] On the social and religious distinctions between Jews and Gentiles, see Jacob Katz, *Between Jews and Gentiles* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1960, pp. 46–56.

[27] The uniformity of behaviour in this area of ritual life was defined simply in terms of the demand by the subjects that the food be certified kasher. With respect to the source of the rabbinic supervision, it is possible that different respondents will buy only food certified by certain groups or rabbis whose *kashrut* they personally trust (e.g. the Chief Rabbinate, the Beth Din Zedek of Jerusalem, etc.). In any case, no further data are available on this question.

[28] It is unquestionable that the desire to preserve social relations and commensality with parents and other close relatives (brothers, sisters, in-laws, etc.) plays a central role in the considerations of this group of respondents.

[29] The total sample of 1,106 consisted of 580 married respondents, 520 single men, 4 divorcés, and 2 'no answers'.

[30] For a review of the halakhic sources on the necessity for a married

woman to cover her hair, see G. Ellinsohn, *Women and the Mitsvot* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1974, pp. 117–20.

[31] There are variations in the fashion and style in which a woman conceals her hair from view. These range from a simple kerchief (partly or entirely covering the hair) to a wig (sometimes worn over a shaven head). In practice, most of the wives in this study did not concern themselves with more than the basic demand for a minimal covering of some sort.

[32] The most 'religious' respondent would score ten points on this scale, while the least 'religious' only a single point. Someone without a single 'religious' response would receive a rating of zero.

[33] See M. Bar-Lev, op. cit., pp. 142–46, 411–17.

[34] The founders of the Midrashia, one of the best known Yeshiva High Schools in Israel, used this expression in the 1940's. See Y. R. Etzion, 'Intelligentsia Toranit', in *15 Lamidrashia* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1961, pp. 22–25 and M. Bar-Lev, 'The Social Profile of Midrashia Graduates as Compared with Graduates of Other Yeshiva High Schools' (Hebrew), in *Niv Hamidrashia*, no. 13, 1978.

# THE JAPANESE AND THE JEWS

R. J. Zwi Werblowsky

(*Review Article*)

AMONG the major subjects of Jewish history during the Nazi period are the movements of refugees to whatever havens seemed to be open to them, the formation and fate of their various—transitory or more permanent—communities, and the patterns of Jewish life that they were capable of creating and cultivating. Sociologists will be interested in the variety of refugee experiences, in the institutions which such groups evolved to run their affairs, in the authority and leadership structures that emerged, and in the forms of relationship to their environment which they developed. Unless a group of persons settles on a desert island, the environment will include the 'powers that be' (government agencies and/or military authorities), the local population, and—in the case of the Jews—more particularly the already established local Jewish community (or communities) and its institutions. All these will determine the process of settlement and the manner of the refugees' absorption at the margins, in the interstices, or in the centre of existing structures. In the case of Jewish refugee groups it is very often also a matter of international Jewish relief agencies coming into play, and the swing of the pendulum between, on the one hand, Jewish solidarity and a closing of the ranks in the face of grave danger and, on the other hand, mutual distrust and conflicting micro-loyalties exacerbated by the frustrations, disappointments, fears, and suspicions of refugee existence.

The Shanghai Jewish refugee community* and the environment in which it found itself were, moreover, unique in several ways. The environment was a strange compound of the familiar and the exotically alien. Shanghai was part of China, no doubt, but only a section of the city was actually (or even theoretically) controlled by the Shanghai Municipal Council. The city was divided, under international treaties which were irritating and humiliating to the Chinese, into sectors ('foreign concessions') until the final and complete Japanese take-over. Some managed to find accommodation in the 'International Settlement', but most had to make do with the slums or near-slums of

* David Kranzler, *Japanese, Nazis and Jews: The Jewish Refugee Community of Shanghai, 1938–1945*, 644 pp., Yeshiva Univ. Press, New York, 1976, $17.50.

Hongkew. Refugees with means could get into the more prestigious French Concession ('Frenchtown'), until forced to move from there when (in 1943) the Japanese decided to concentrate the whole Jewish population in what practically became a ghetto in part of the Hongkew area—the Japanese-controlled sector of the International Settlement dubbed 'little Tokyo'. The social environment consisted not only of the indigenous Chinese population but also of the small, non-indigenous and established Jewish communities (the 'patrician' Sephardim of Indian and Iraqi provenance with their British leanings, and the Russian Jews), the foreign 'colonies', and the large number of non-Jewish, especially White Russian refugees and settlers—the latter as anti-Soviet as they were also antisemitic.

The decisive element, however, was the Japanese presence. It was the situation created by the tangled international treaty arrangements plus the *de facto* Japanese control of the port of Shanghai which, oddly enough, made immigration to Shanghai possible. In fact, it was the only port in which a Jewish refugee (and for the period 1933–39 this meant essentially German Jews) could disembark without affidavit or visa. (Ironically enough, the serious problems created by this one open door subsequently caused some Jewish relief agencies to collaborate with other interests in trying to stop, or at least limit, the influx of refugees to Shanghai.) Once in Shanghai, German, Polish, and Russian Jews, thoroughly assimilated Jews, and the orthodox élite of Talmud-students from the Mir yeshivah found themselves thrown together. But to understand why and how this was possible at all, and how and why Jews could get into Shanghai right up to Pearl Harbor, another factor has to be taken into consideration: the attitude of the Japanese to the Jews, the policies which they framed in accordance with their (mis)understanding of the subject, and the changing patterns of their resistance to—and compliance with—German pressures and Gestapo initiatives.

Japan had been, and still was to all practical intents and purposes, a country without Jews. The history of Japanese 'antisemitism'—a thoroughly artificial antisemitism, so to speak—is therefore of particular interest. The Japanese, ignorant of Judaism and Jewish history, and lacking the 'intimacy' with the 'Jewish problem' and Jewish realities which—for better or for worse—was part of the cultural and sociopolitical heritage of both Christian and Muslim nations, frantically tried to bring themselves up-to-date on this puzzling subject. Eagerly reading and studying everything Western literature could teach, the Japanese also learned about the Jews—needless to say from predominantly biased and antisemitic sources. In the twenties and thirties antisemitic publications began to appear, and research agencies were set up (*inter alia* by the 'Bureau of Information' and the 'Research and Analysis Department' of the Foreign Ministry) to gather informa-

tion on the Jews. By that time the Japanese already had a practical concern in the matter, for they wondered what possible use to make of the sizeable Jewish presence in Manchuria. We might mention here, in parentheses, that between 1895 and 1939 several waves of emigrants, first from Czarist and then from Soviet Russia, arrived in northern Manchuria. This movement was greatly facilitated by the new Chinese Eastern Railroad (1895). In due course the Russian Jewish refugee population shifted to southern Manchuria (Mukden and Dairen), and to Shanghai. The Jewish community in Harbin, which numbered 10,000 in 1929, had dwindled to 2,500 by 1939. Some Japanese army officers stationed in Manchukuo (as it was called by the Japanese) were especially involved in the attempts at 'policy making', and the results were curious and puzzling by Western standards. Thus, a Captain Inuzuka published, under the pen-name Utsunomiya, some vile antisemitic tracts and articles. Later, he proved to be a fair and even humane and friendly person—in fact, almost a protector of the Jews—when he was in authority in Shanghai as head of the Bureau of Jewish Affairs. (A written expression of Jewish gratitude for his protection, which he had kept in his possession, actually saved his life at a war-criminals trial.)

In the 1930's, the Japanese were convinced, after due study and research, that the Jews were indeed powerful, and that there was an international 'Jewish connection'. This view of things was not inspired exclusively by the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, though these were diligently peddled by the White Russians in the Far East. (They were actually translated into Japanese by another 'expert', Colonel Yasue, Chief of the Military Mission in Manchuria, and later in charge of liaison with the Jewish Far East Council, grinding out his antisemitic publications—like Captain Inuzuka—under a pen-name.) The Japanese had good cause to remember their unique experience of Jewish 'money power'. It was the New York banker Jacob H. Schiff who had been instrumental in floating the loans that were crucial for the build-up of the Japanese navy and for the Japanese victory over Russia in the 1904–05 war. The Japanese Minister of Finance (and later Premier), Takahashi, as well as his colleagues, was no doubt aware that these loans were possible only because of Schiff's connections with other (Jewish) banking firms such as Cassell in England and Warburg in Germany, and because of his deep personal grudge, as a Jew, against Czarist Russia. Hence also the Japanese manner of always dealing very gingerly with the 'Jewish problem', and always wondering whether the Jews could not prove useful in contexts requiring international financial or political support—for example, the development of Manchuria in the framework of Japan's Greater Asia Plan; abortive projects of exchanging the Shanghai refugees against Nissei internees in U.S. camps; peace feelers towards the end of the

Second World War, etc. In fact, so sure were the Japanese of the international standing and 'immunity' of the Jews (at least in the eyes of the Allies), that they stored ammunition in the ghetto, assuming that the latter would never be bombed. The attack by Okinawa-based bombers on the Japanese radio station in Hongkew in July 1945 wrought not only destruction and death in the ghetto, but also came as a shock and surprise to the Japanese.

By and large, however, the Japanese authorities exhibited moderate and even kind behaviour, and in this respect the experience of the Shanghai Jews was very different from that of the British, the Dutch, and others caught by the Japanese invasion in South-East Asia. The Japanese even resisted, to a considerable degree, the pressure applied by their German allies. In Japan the ordinary population gave evidence of spontaneous sympathy and human warmth towards the more than 4,000 Polish refugees—many of them uncouth and outlandishly garbed rabbis and yeshivah students—who arrived in Kobe 'in transit' after a 6,000-mile trek across Asia. They came in several groups between July 1940 and January 1941, and many proceeded to the western hemisphere. Over a thousand who could not obtain visas to Western countries ended up in Shanghai during the latter part of 1941. Individual Japanese officials went out of their way to be helpful. Thus the transport of Polish yeshivah refugees was possible because the Japanese consul in Kovno (who happened to be at that crucial spot at a providential time—from the end of 1939 until August 1940—for normally there was never a Japanese consulate in Lithuania) provided transit visas to owners of passports stamped 'final destination Curacao'. That was another fiction which required the co-operation of the Dutch consular authorities. (Consul Sugihara's name is inscribed among the 'righteous Gentiles' at Yad va-Shem). Another Japanese civil servant, Vice-Consul Shibata, stationed in Shanghai, warned the Jewish community of plans hatched—under German pressure—by the Japanese authorities. (Mr. Shibata, who spent several months in prison for this indiscretion, is now an Honorary Member of the Jewish Community of Tokyo.) In fact, there was only one pathological persecutor among the Japanese 'Lords' of the Shanghai ghetto.

So far, I have neither reviewed nor even summarized Dr. Kranzler's work, but merely given some glimpses of the extraordinary amount of the most diverse material and of the many different research-areas which had to be synthesized in the making of this book. It is impossible in the space of even a review article to give an adequate summary of the many subjects dealt with, all of equal fascination and interest to the social historian: the functioning of the various institutions created for or by the refugees such as the *Heime*; kitchen; hospital; schools and educational facilities; cultural life (including theatre and press); the activities of, and frequent competition between, the various

relief organizations; the pioneering of what is now a flourishing industry but was at that time a complete novelty—'reprint editions' made by the Mir yeshivah students who maintained their studious and cloistered life with the help of primitive photo-reprints of Talmudic works; the Jewish *pao chia* (auxiliary police) for self-policing of the ghetto, imposed and supervised by the Japanese ... The list could be indefinitely extended. The author carefully chronicles and describes the economic and sanitary conditions, even the food rations distributed at the kitchens of the refugee organizations, the secular-cultural as well as the religious life of both the Polish Jews and German Jewish *Gemeinde*, and the diverse forms of interaction, co-operation and conflict between the refugee community and the more privileged local Jews (which meant, *after* the outbreak of the Pacific war, essentially the Ashkenazim—since the Sephardim completely lost ground, having been identified with British interests and loyalties as well as with the Chiang Kai-Shek government). A detailed account is given of the friction and rivalry between the various relief organizations as well as between the various Japanese agencies supposed to deal with the Jews. Dr. Kranzler's account ends with the end of the ghetto and the departure of its inmates to other shores, after the Japanese surrender. In 1957, about one hundred Jews still remained in Shanghai (p. 581). Twenty years later that number had dwindled to about a dozen old people.

The story told by Dr. Kranzler is, when all is said and done, that of a minor and even relatively happy episode in those years of unspeakable horror and darkness, but one characterized by extraordinary complexity. To write this story the author had not only to deal with many different subjects—ranging from Far Eastern history and politics to internal Jewish affairs—but also to collect and analyse a vast amount of the most diverse source material: official documents, newspaper and magazine articles, confidential reports, letters, biographies and memoirs, and—above all—a simply staggering quantity of interviews and reminiscences, most of them taped.

He also examined the files of many organizations, especially those of the various relief agencies. Special mention must be made of the valuable and illuminating 'confidential reports' of Miss Laura Margolies, the Joint Distribution Committee's representative and extraordinarily competent social worker. Her reports incidentally also provide unintentional lessons in social psychology and illustrations of the typical biases of even a professional social worker who has to function in an unfamiliar environment. The frictions, tensions, and bickering between the various factions in the *Heime* were ascribed by Miss Margolies to the fact that these refugees 'were very clumsy in using the technique of democratic organizations, which do not come naturally to those of German background' (p. 140). Miss Margolies's remarkable

success in activating the people at a time 'when they were probably hungrier than ever before'—by arranging for more self-government in the *Heime*, elections, etc.—was probably not so much due to the electrifying infusion of a spirit of American democracy, as to the creation of a scope for activity and the renewal of a sense of dignity and importance (for instance, by becoming 'voters' or even candidates for camp committees) which she brought into the depressed and lethargic atmosphere that had prevailed hitherto. Miss Margolies was in fact the first professional relief worker in a community which had for far too long been ministered to in the traditional manner by its charitable patrician leaders.

Much of this material was not taken from archives but obtained through the author's personal and relentless efforts, either directly or through the helpful co-operation of friends in Japan and elsewhere, and it evidently involved tracing as many of the ex-'Shanghailanders' (or their relatives) as was possible. Mention must also be made of the many photographs he obtained from diverse sources.

In view of this enormous and impressive collection of source material, it would be ungracious and ungrateful to cavil about details. The author's use of Japanese and Chinese texts is perforce second-hand (with due acknowledgements given), and there are several mistakes—or perhaps misprints—in the rendering of Japanese words. Dr. Kranzler, clearly no specialist, seems to have discovered his subject matter and 'fallen for' it; a professional social historian would probably have presented the material in a different manner and a different style. His personal sympathies and loyalties are evidently with orthodox Judaism and with the Jewish values represented by the rabbis and students of the Mir yeshivah. *Honi soit qui mal y pense*, even though few historians (and for aught I know, also few theologians) would share Dr. Kranzler's belief, expressed in his Preface, that the Shanghai episode exemplifies the miraculous workings of Divine Providence and the 'hidden hand of the Almighty in the warp and woof of history'. Since nobody is likely to make another first-hand study of all the material so assiduously assembled and synthesized by Dr. Kranzler, his book will in all probability remain the standard work on the subject for a long time to come—no matter what minor corrections or complements will be brought to it. The author certainly deserves our gratitude for providing not only a fascinating account of a unique episode in modern Jewish history but also (as Dr. Abraham Duker says in his Foreword) for making important contributions to our 'knowledge of migrations, World War II, antisemitism, international relations and the Far East ... refugee adjustment, Jewish self-help, community organizations, [and] relief activities and policies'.

Any writer on Japanese and Jews after the end of the Second World War will have to continue from where Dr. Kranzler left off. He may

ignore Shanghai and China, and even the Nazis, and must concentrate instead on utterly novel developments which, although strictly speaking outside the scope of this review article, may nevertheless be mentioned briefly.

The victory of the Maoist revolution spelled the end of Shanghai Jewry. It obviously spelled the end of the Sephardi ('British') community, many of whose members—like many of the Russian Jews—moved on to Hong Kong in the expectation that this Crown Colony would remain British at least in the foreseeable future. The Russian Jews were faced with the choice of returning to Soviet Russia (which some of them did, with disastrous results) or becoming stateless—that is, 'Displaced Persons'. For the German Shanghailanders there was no question of a return to Germany, but, as Dr. Kranzler points out, 1948 was not 1938. Even those who despaired of obtaining an American visa could now go to Israel and claim Israeli citizenship, be it only for the purpose of ridding themselves of their stateless status and returning, with their brand-new passports, to other shores, including American-occupied Japan. There they met a different kind of Jew, for there were many Jews among the 'G.I.s' and also among MacArthur's administrative staff. The American military presence in Japan was subsequently extended as a result of the Korean War, and the concomitant 'boom' also attracted a small business community. From a strictly Jewish point of view, one of the significant by-products of the American military personnel was the presence of Jewish U.S. Army Chaplains who served the embryonic community, concentrated mainly in Tokyo, until it could constitute and organize itself, build its Community Center and Synagogue, and appoint a full-time rabbi. Some of the Jewish ex-G.I.s and businessmen married Japanese women who converted to Judaism. Japanese interest in Judaism was greatly stimulated, also on the academic level, by the existence of the State of Israel. This meant not simply the presence of an Israeli Embassy in Tokyo, but academic exchange programmes, joint research projects, and a lively interest in the Kibbuts Movement. Perhaps it is not an oddity but should be accepted as 'normal', that the Chair of Hebrew at one of the major British universities is currently held by a Japanese who did his graduate work in, and received his Ph.D. from, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The Japanese officers writing their 'research reports' on Judaism in the twenties and the thirties would not have foreseen that a book entitled *Nihon-jin to Yudayo-jin* ('The Japanese and the Jews', first published in 1970) by a Japanese author writing under the intentionally misleading pen-name of Isaiah Ben-Dassan would for a long time top the best-seller list in Japan.

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Published by
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**13–16 Jacob's Well Mews**
**George Street**
**London W1H 5PD**

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# BOOK REVIEWS

MICHAEL BANTON, *The Idea of Race*, vi+190 pp., Tavistock Publications, London, 1977, £6.50.

The thesis of this book begins with a historically correct observation which deserves more attention than it has received. This is that the idea of race, as a biological, scientific category for classifying mankind, is a modern idea which emerged and came into vogue in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The author then contends that the theory and practice of 'race relations' is based on this modern idea of race. Since, as he further contends, the idea of race is biologically and socially erroneous, the study of race relations, which is based on this erroneous idea (p. 169), must give way to something else. In a tentative way, the author proposes as an alternative to the concept of race that of 'minority' (p. 170). But this point is not developed nor is it very clear to me.

I am bound to say that I find this thesis eccentric. To begin with a minor point, it is unlikely that the term 'race relations' is going to disappear. Notwithstanding the ambiguities in both the theoretical and even practical use of this term, it is a meaningful term in ordinary speech. If it were conceivably suppressed, it would only return in another guise: in fact, it seems to have done so—'community relations'. Then, too, Banton refers to the replacement in modern genetics of the concept of 'racial type' by that of 'population'. The latter he states is an entity which is 'always changing' and must be studied 'statistically instead of typologically' (p. 6). But will this change render obsolete the amazing techniques of forensic anatomy for identifying by bone structure the race as well as the sex and age of murder victims? To come to the crucial point, however, I simply deny Banton's central contention that the very conception of race relations presupposed an intellectual context dominated by the biological idea of race (pp. 2f.). One cannot, of course, quarrel with the fact that biological typologies were the ground of the racialism, strictly speaking, which propounded the doctrine of the mental inequality of the races. It is also true that pseudo-scientific racialism affected popular opinion. But did racialism or the scientific idea of race create the groups which were brought or thrown into 'relations' with each other? Did racialism cause slavery? Did not, in fact, slavery—that is, in the modern world—when it came under attack invoke racialism to legitimate itself precisely before the modern tribunal of the equal rights of man, seeking to deny that the

black was a man? Banton himself (p. 54) considers this as a possibility. And, as can be seen so easily in the extreme case, is there any essential difference in the subjection or oppression of one group by another, whether it be the blacks in the Southern states, or the Armenians in Turkey, or the Jews in Czarist Russia, or a dozen other examples—past and present—which one could mention? If the Armenians were not regarded as an 'inferior race' by the Turks—who let it be said did not give a fig for the writings of Gobineau—did this alter the fact of group competition and conflict? Did it offer any solace to the Armenians?

If Banton's position runs into difficulties in the face of such a commonplace, one is impelled to wonder why. I suggest that he has, paradoxically, been overpowered by the very idea from which he is seeking to liberate current thinking—namely, the biological idea of race as a determinant. The reason for this is that he began his historical reflection not at the 'beginning' but 'in the middle'. Had he begun at the 'beginning', that is, the common sense ground of all scientific abstraction, he would have seen that the biological or scientific idea of race was not and could not be a wholly new idea. It was rather a modification of the pre-scientific or common sense idea of race and its equivalents—*genos, ethnos, gens, natio*, people. These are terms which arose directly, without the mediation of science or philosophy, out of the experience of social and political life. In the pre-scientific sense race meant not an abstract, classificatory, biological 'type' but simply a group of people, smaller or larger, who had and acknowledged a common descent. (Note the following passage in Thackeray's *Vanity Fair*: '"Recollect it's not his father that breaks the match off", old Sedley cried out. "It's I that forbid it. That family and mine are separated for ever. I'm fallen low, but not as low as that: no, no. And so you may tell the whole race—son, and father, and sisters, and all."'—Modern Library Edition, p. 198.)

To the best of my knowledge there is no language which lacks or ever will lack this conception of common sense thinking. What then happened in the nineteenth century is that under the impress of popularized racialism the pre-scientific meaning of race became intertwined and confused with the scientific categorizations. Ultimately, in the struggle against racialism, the term race—in its pre-scientific sense —became discredited. One can see this from the career of the term 'Jewish race': by the 1930's the term had become unacceptable because of its biological connotations. But even black groups have objected to defining themselves as a 'race' rather than a 'nation'.

Now Banton, who has an unusual flair for the nuances of language, is aware of the fact that while the terms 'race' and even 'blood' were on every Victorian's lips, something more or other than simple racialism was being articulated by this terminology, at least in in-

dividual cases. He points out, for example, that Charles Kingsley 'often uses the word "race" very loosely' (p. 76) and thought that racial backwardness was due to 'moral or cultural causes' (ibid.). Kingsley, in other words, for all his preoccupation with 'race', was not a racialist! Indeed, one could go further and say that when people such as, for example, Booker T. Washington appealed to the blacks to develop 'race pride' on the model of the Jews, they were talking about *exactly* the same phenomenon which is now called 'ethnic pride'. It is the same wine in a new bottle. There is in this change in terminology no question whatsoever of a scientific 'progress'. This is so because while the terms used in ordinary discourse may become deformed by modern scientific abstraction, the phenomena that they seek to identify, in so far as they are natural, are permanent. And what is more natural than the foundation of every ethnic group, namely, the attachment to one's own which begins with the tie between parents and children?

Thus true scientific progress in the social sciences would consist of recovering the phenomena obscured by the physical-scientific categorization which distorts human reality. Indeed, the sociological definition of race, along the lines of Robert Park (which Banton discusses in pp. 8f.), that sought to free the conception of race from its purely biological connotations, had precisely this objective in mind. There is, I hasten to emphasize, much more involved in the above considerations than an academic quibble. Today the term racialism (or 'racism') is used not merely to attack manifestations of racial or ethnic bigotry but also to question the legitimate rights of ethnic survival of any group which is not allied with the majority view in the United Nations. There can be no adequate defence against this political aberration that does not entail in part a precise or phenomenological history of the conception of race. Such a history would elucidate the permanence of what we would now call ethnic rather than racial sentiments. While I do not think that Banton has succeeded in this attempt because of his verbal commitment to the idea of scientific progress, he is the first sociologist in the area of race relations with whose work I am familiar who is aware that there is a theoretical crisis in the field.

It is thus not surprising that this book which, however discursive, is full of flashes of common sense and sobriety, culminates in a quiet polemic against the demagogic use of the word 'racism' so current today. Banton properly sees the moral flaw in using slogans for vilification which one does not have to define (p. 157). One thus welcomes Banton's attempt to protect sociology and modern politics from such demagogic rhetoric. On the symptomatic level this rhetoric is an important element in the self-hatred and loss of nerve of the West which is so fashionable among certain 'intellectuals'. But then one must ask whether Banton's analysis, which sees 'race' problems as originating in the 'Western' idea of race, does not undermine his own salutary

intention. In his chapter on the 'Racializing of the West', for example, why does he fail to bring into true political relief where and when the principles which saw slavery and racial discrimination as evil were laid down as standards for the world? To cite the England of 1850 as some kind of turning point for an upsurge of popularized racialism is to make light of the work of Wilberforce and of the fact that not only the slave trade but slavery itself had *already* been outlawed in the British Empire. The same thing can be said of his comments about Lincoln (pp. 1f.). On the basis of these, one would never suspect that Lincoln had anything to do with the abolition of racial slavery. I find it difficult to comprehend this oversight.

All this suggests that at the bottom of the contemporary cacophony about 'racism', there is much more involved than 'thinking in terms of racial categories'. One would have to turn to the operation of other factors. These include such things as *ressentiment* and the cheap guilt feelings to which modern ideologies pander.

HOWARD BROTZ

MOSHE CARMILLY-WEINBERGER, *Censorship and Freedom of Expression in Jewish History*, vii+295 pp., Sepher-Hermon Press with Yeshiva Univ. Press, New York, 1977, $12.50.

This pioneering inquiry examines how inner censorship operated among Jews and promises to become the standard work on this fascinating subject, giving the lie to the absurd claim of Jewish apologetics that Judaism has always been tolerant of dissent and freedom of thought. Thoroughly researched and adequately documented, the survey covers the whole period from the early post-Biblical age down to the public ban by 200 Orthodox Rabbis in 1945 of Rabbi Mordecai Kaplan and his Reconstructionist Prayer Book. The book is the outgrowth of the author's Hebrew work *Sefer veSayif*, the first book to be written on this very important subject. At times the English, though otherwise very clear and readable, does seem as if it were a translation from the Hebrew—for example, in the first paragraph: 'at the time the world was created' or 'many generations in the history of mankind have been marked by man's struggle'. The transliteration is also somewhat erratic: *Makel Noam* for *Makkal Noam* (construct state); *Mahzik Berahah* for *Mahazik Berakhah*; *Noda BiYehudah* for *Noda Biyhudah*; *Gemarah* for *Gemara*.

The aim of the work is to demonstrate how and why some Jews throughout Judaism's history sought to stifle, for various reasons, the expression by other Jews of their ideas. There have been bans against books and their authors and bans against the bans and their authors. The bans were by no means confined to the traditionalists. The 'pro-

gressives', too, were not averse to engaging, with the same zeal, in the sorry process. Dr. Carmilly-Weinberger provides us with numerous fresh illuminations of hitherto obscure episodes in the Jewish past. We learn, for instance, that Rabbinic approbations were not originally a kind of imprimatur, guaranteeing that the book contained no heresy, but were first introduced in Ferara in 1554 in order to make sure that the book contained no attacks against the Catholic Church (!) which could have had severe consequences for the whole Jewish community. Another motivation for authors seeking Rabbinic approbations was purely economic, in order to safeguard their copyright. From the end of the seventeenth century a particular source of offence in a book was any suggestion that it acknowledged the false Messiah, Shabbetai Zevi. One book was even banned because it had a picture of two deers on its title page (*zevi*='deer' in Hebrew). The author lists some 250 to 300 books which came under the ban in one form or another. One result has been that some of them have become so rare as to be collector's items.

Dr. Carmilly-Weinberger is generally objective and cautious. The following observations are not offered to decry his work in any way but only for his consideration if, as is probable, a second edition will be called for. He is far too categorical in stating: 'The Talmud, that magnificent creation of the Jewish people, bears witness to the freedom of thought and of speech that were practiced: every teacher and sage was at liberty to state his point of view without hesitation.' To say nothing of the fact that we do not have all the material current in the Talmudic age, the editing of the Talmud being itself a form of censorship, there are a number of Talmudic passages in which the sages did try to prevent the views of other sages being given a hearing—for example, *Berakhot* 19a and 27b; *Moed Katan* 16a–b; *Yevamot* 121a; *Bava Metzia* 59b and 84a; and a number of other passages. It is not brought out sufficiently that the reason for the strong opposition to Saul Berlin's *Besamim Rosh* was on the grounds that he had presented his 'enlightened' ideas as those of R. Asher ben Yehiel, the *Rosh*. Another literary forgery that aroused the ire of many Rabbis and which should have been mentioned was Friedlander's edition of the alleged *Yerushalmi* to the Order *Kodashim*. The banning by zealots in the Holy Land of Rav Kook's works might also have been noted (see Rivka Schatz in *Molad*, Vol. 6, 1974, pp. 251f.). On the relationship between faith and knowledge, the author remarks: 'Judaism has always stressed the importance of knowledge and the eternal quest for truth. The Prophets of the Bible, particularly Hosea and Isaiah, placed special emphasis on the "knowledge of God".' But historically considered, the 'knowledge of God' in the Biblical idiom is not cognitive at all but is a synonym for the practice of righteousness—see, for example, Jeremiah 9:23–24 and 22:16.

LOUIS JACOBS

HASIA R. DINER, *In the Almost Promised Land: American Jews and Blacks, 1915–1935*, xvii+272 pp., Contributions in American History Series (Jon L. Wakelyn, ed.), no. 59, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1977, $17.50.

This book deals with the question of how and why Jewish leadership became involved in the Black cause. There are now a number of books on the subject. This one proceeds on the basis of assumptions drawn from individualistic psychology which are explicitly stated in the Introduction. The author's argument is that the Jews in America, in the first decades of the twentieth century, were so insecure that they were afraid to speak out boldly on behalf of their own interests. Hence, they needed an ally or a prop and used the Black cause unconsciously as a vehicle for their own frustrations. After the Holocaust, however, they lost their timidity and abandoned the Black cause although, as the author says, 'with a certain sadness'.

I find this argument simply unconvincing. To begin with, if the Jews in America were so insecure, why did mass immigration continue until terminated by changes in the immigration laws? Furthermore, is it really true that Jewish leadership never acted or spoke out openly, unambiguously, in favour of Jewish interests? The history of the Zionist movement in America, and its pressure to admit refugees from Nazi persecution, would hardly bear this out. In taking account of these overwhelmingly obvious considerations, one would have a more accurate framework for dealing with the relations between Jews, Blacks, and other groups.

HOWARD BROTZ

EVA ETZIONI-HALEVY with RINA SHAPIRA, *Political Culture in Israel: Cleavage and Integration Among Israeli Jews*, xxiv + 251 pp., Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government, Praeger, New York, 1977, £13.40.

There is little new in stating that for a sociologist, Israel is a fertile ground for research. However, it is more surprising that systematic research on Israel's political culture—designated here as 'a set of beliefs, orientations and attitudes in the political realm'—is not much older than fifteen years. (This might be explained in terms of the time it took American research traditions to be applied in Israel.) By now, of course, a large number of surveys, monographs, and accounts of research work on specific themes and groups in Israel have been published.

The present study, by two Israeli sociologists, endeavours to test methodological hypotheses current in the study of political culture. They undertake a secondary analysis of the mass of data accumulated

over the last fifteen years, in on-going inquiries and polls carried out in Israel. The authors presumably have also taken account of other relevant empirical studies. The material has been used to present an overall topographic view of Israel's political culture. They follow traditional research lines: political orientations, the political reflection of cleavages between new immigrants and veterans, between old and young, and the relationships between all these groups and the political establishment, in terms of political involvement, efficacy, disaffection and consent, which are treated in detail. Also analysed within this framework are social mobility, political integration, and national identification.

Moreover, the authors go beyond this kind of 'horizontal' panorama by introducing a 'vertical' analysis: research done previously serves to portray, within the dimension of time, changes in the way the Israeli rank and file have been relating to politics and ruling élites, roughly, since the inception of the State. (There is also the inevitable, though concise, survey of the pre-State period.) The analysis extends to well after the 1973 Yom-Kippur War, and includes problems of morale and solidarity in 1967 and 1973. Thus, the book gives a clearer picture of the dynamics of Israeli political culture in its chronological development than can be obtained from any other single work centred on a specific period. On the whole, the scientific data used by the authors validate many of the assumptions made in the past by contents analysts.

Left-right political orientation is no longer meaningful in Israel today—not, at least, in the classic European dichotomy: for example, one can well be in favour of a socialist system yet advocate an aggressive foreign policy. The younger generation tends to be more 'rightist' than the veterans. There are increasing numbers of native Israelis who are the children of immigrants from Islamic countries and who (for socio-economic reasons) are more inclined towards a protest posture against a socialist-oriented Establishment—at least in its slogans and official ideology. We learn that religious belief is diminishing and that the orthodox identify more strongly as Jews and Israelis and are more attached to Israel than is the case with those who had no traditional upbringing.

There is an interesting analysis of the steady and perceptible shift to the right since the 1967 Six-Day War. It seems, *inter alia*, that the Labour political establishment was losing ground without really trying to re-think its ideology in order to bolster dwindling consent among voters. New elements, though too briefly dealt with, are the protest movements (such as the 'Black Panthers' before, and 'Our Israel' after, the 1973 War). However, the 'Gush Emunim' type of phenomenon is not treated at all, although it is highly relevant to the problem of consent and legitimation in post Yom-Kippur War Israel.

The questions that cannot be answered in this kind of study—which

illustrates the free democratic nature of Israel's political culture—are those dealing with the degree to which the Government through policy-making and the education system has influenced the citizen's way of relating to the political system.

Paradoxically, from the vantage point of late 1977, the study offers some insight into the background of the 'landslide' in the May elections of that year. With hindsight, the explanation of the Likud's rise to power by Carter's stance on the Palestinian issue or the financial scandals among top Labour leaders, only partly account for what happended. One realizes that political shift had been simmering over a long period. This is borne out—though not predicted—by this well-documented and well-organised work.

DAVID LAZAR

LEON A. JICK, *The Americanization of the Synagogue, 1820–1870*, xi + 247 pp. + 8 plates, University Press of New England for Brandeis Univ. Press, Hanover, New Hampshire, 1976, $12.50.

The development of Reform Judaism in the United States is closely linked with the acculturation of German Jewish immigrants in that country during the nineteenth century. This is not the discovery of historians or sociologists, for it was proclaimed by the early leaders of the movement themselves. They ceaselessly argued that the Jewish religion must keep pace with the social and intellectual progress of the age. In their view, emancipation and the end of compulsory segregation required deliberate, extensive change within Judaism. Professor Leon A. Jick of Brandeis University has now described the spread of American Reform Judaism under the tell-tale title, *The Americanization of the Synagogue*. He argues in forthright fashion that Reform rabbis and theology had almost nothing to do with the mass adoption of Reform Judaism. It was only economic success and acculturation which counted.

Jick finds that the Jews who arrived in the United States from Germany were quite Orthodox, and founded synagogues which were, with one or perhaps two exceptions, likewise Orthodox until 1850 or even 1860. Their religious leaders, hardly any of whom were properly ordained rabbis, were Orthodox also—with the exception of a few middle-aged ideological Reformers who came during the 1850's. The newcomers quickly outnumbered earlier American Jewry, which was weak and held itself aloof from them. When their synagogues turned Reform—only in the late 1850's and the 1860's—they did so with startling speed. Laymen with little rabbinic direction and less Jewish learning hastily overturned the sanctified ways of many centuries. Jick will not accept any intellectual causes for all this change, insisting that

full and sufficient explanation is to be found in the rapid economic ascent of the German Jewish immigrants and the social aspirations which this prosperity generated. They became eager to appear as other Americans in their religion and style of life, and therefore adopted regnant Protestant models of worship. Orthodox requirements in personal life, such as Sabbath and dietary restrictions, were sharply modified or abolished.

A deep fault runs through Jick's thesis, which as a whole is attractively presented. While he ties Reform to the increasing material prosperity of German Jews in the United States, he nowhere treats this economic success in necessary detail; there are only a number of broad remarks that they were getting on nicely. His proof tends to be circular: their adoption of Reform demonstrates the prosperity of German Jews in America, rather than the other way round. Thus, he is unable genuinely to correlate economic advance with the progress of Reform, as he might indeed have done in the case of a few cities or individual congregations. This is admittedly a painstaking, difficult process; but if it had been done, something like proof of the thesis might have emerged. As it is, we have an account of the rise of Reform Judaism. Contrary to Jick, I have not found it all happened as quickly as he says; he ought to have pondered whether Reform was not latent under the surface Orthodoxy of the 1840's and 1850's. Moreover, the author should have taken some account of the historic instances of prospering Jews who did not turn to Reform, and of why they did not do so: the old Sefardi congregations, nineteenth-century Anglo-Jewry, or American Jews in the present century who adopted Conservative Judaism. In other words, given their readiness for religious change, why did German Jews in mid-nineteenth-century America choose Reform Judaism? Here, at least, we must enter the realm of philosophical ideas and intellectual history.

Professor Jick cuts off German Jewry in America from its native land a good deal too sharply. There was much social and cultural Germanism among them, all of which is ignored in this book. Jews of traditional learning could be found, a few of whom exerted local influence. And after all, were not the basic ideas of Reform Judaism, however they changed in America, of German origin?

The problem of Jewish education is treated mistakenly as a matter of weekday afternoon versus Sunday schools. The real question was State schools versus Jewish schools; if Jick had grasped this, his argument would have had added force. He would also have helped his case by noticing that there were cities where the original congregation underwent a secession during its early years—in some intances led by opponents of Reform tendencies and in others by those demanding more drastic Reform. A comparison of the socio-economic and religious positions of the respective congregations might have yielded important

results. The book is, all in all, factually correct; however, the sumptuous new Temple Emanu-El of 1868 was certainly not a remodelling of the synagogue it had owned in 1854; text and plates are in contradiction (p. 179).

Had Jick substantiated his arresting thesis by more precisely correlating economic ascent with religious change, looked deeper into individual congregations and communities, and scrutinized Reform Judaism by the light of other religious movements in comparable historical situations, a major work could have emerged. His loose presentation of his thesis leaves us instead with a useful, tendentious survey of the rise of American Reform Judaism.

LLOYD P. GARTNER

OSCAR KRAINES, *The Impossible Dilemma: Who is a Jew in the State of Israel?*, x + 156 pp., Bloch Publishing Co., New York, 1976, $6.95.

In a land like Israel, where everything is new and everything is old, it is not surprising that so novel an issue as 'Who is a Jew?' should involve so ancient a topic as 'What is a Jew?' Until the modern age these themes were rarely, if ever, raised, save as questions which answered themselves. In recent years, both forms of question have in practice raised a third subject for debate, namely as to which authority or authorities shall be entitled by the law of the State of Israel to pronounce upon the substantive issues. The following query has been raised in some quarters. If *halakha* is to be the basic rule, then whose *halakha*? To some minds, this question is by definition at best impermissible, and at worst destructive.

An important ingredient, however, in all these and related discussions is the fact that it has ultimately been the Supreme Court which, subject to the Knesset, interprets, decides, and applies the law. The Supreme Court regards itself as competent to review the judgements of the religious Courts.

Dr. Kraines, a former lecturer in public law in New York, has produced a pithy account of the main events and controversies surrounding the topics since the inception of the State. He adds a useful bibliography. His summary of the principal cases pays attention both to the consistency of the approach of the majorities in the Supreme Court, and to the essential features of the individual disputes.

The approach of the Supreme Court can properly be described as plainly historical. The point is well illustrated by the Father Daniel (Oswald Rufeisen) case of 1962 and the Shalit case of 1967. Rufeisen was a Polish-born Jew who became a Christian in 1942 at the age of 20. He settled in Israel in 1958 and claimed recognition as a person of Christian religion and Jewish nationality. He declined to apply for

citizenship by process of naturalization, and applied for automatic citizenship under the Law of Return. His application was refused. The majority of the Judges, while accepting that in general the *halakha* did not treat apostasy as depriving the apostate of his character as a Jew, refused to hold Father Daniel to be a Jew by nationality. Eventually, he sought and was granted naturalization.

The Israeli-born Benjamin Shalit married a Christian lady of British nationality who became an Israeli citizen by naturalization. The marriage was a civil ceremony in Scotland, and took place in 1960 shortly before Mrs. Shalit settled in Israel. Both their children were born in Israel. As they were not born of a Jewish mother, the children were not Jews as far as the *halakha* was concerned. But the Supreme Court by a majority held that they should be registered as Jews. 'The determination', declared Justice Sussman, 'of the affiliation of an individual to a given religion or a given nation derives principally from the subjective feeling of the person concerned.'

It must be added that Justice Sussman pointed out that 'the issue under discussion does not raise the question of who is a Jew'. The *ratio* of the decision was concerned with the question of whether the registration laws required the Ministry of the Interior to register the children as 'members of the Jewish nation'. However narrowly the Court's decision might be interpreted—such as by treating it as a kind of administrative clarification for the guidance of officials handling the population register—the approach of the Court to the wider questions was manifest.

The author devotes much consideration to proposed amendments to the Law of Return. In particular, he traces the history of the attempt, after the Zeidman case in 1970, to procure legislation whereby the Law of Return would expressly recognize only Orthodox conversions. Mrs. Zeidman was born in America of Christian Gentile parents. On her marriage to a Jew, she went through a process of conversion under Reform auspices in Israel. Her request that she should be entered in the Population Register as a person of Jewish nationality was rejected, as was her request that she be recorded as being a Jew by religion. The reason was that her conversion was not an Orthodox conversion. In due course, the lady underwent an Orthodox conversion, the announcement of which preceded by some hours the adjudication of the Supreme Court on her case. In the circumstances, no ruling was pressed for or given.

The general issues raised by the Zeidman case became entangled with party politics and aroused deep religious feelings. The recognition or non-recognition of non-Orthodox conversions remained a live subject of dispute, and continues so to be in the politics of the State of Israel. Dr. Kraines makes a plea for the mutual acceptance by the Orthodox, Conservatives, and Reform of each other's marriages,

divorces, and conversions. He does not conceal his awareness of the profound difficulties in the way of such acceptance.

It is well-known that twenty years ago Ben-Gurion sought the opinions of a number of Jewish scholars throughout the world as to registering as Jews children born in Israel of mixed marriages. At the heart of his enquiries was the anxiety to know whether and how far it was now considered legitimate and safe, given a religiously pluralistic Jewish State, to divest 'Jewish nationality' of any particular conscious religious kernel. Dr. Kraines appropriately describes Ben-Gurion's request as 'unique in modern political history'. It was indeed eloquent testimony to the wholly special character of Jewish history and to the wide implications of the issues raised.

ISRAEL FINESTEIN

GILBERT S. ROSENTHAL, ed., *The American Rabbi: A Tribute on the Occasion of the Bicentennial of the United States and the Ninety-Fifth Birthday of the New York Board of Rabbis*, x + 200 pp., Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1977, $10.00.

As the sub-title to this collection of essays may indicate, there is little in this book to greatly interest the sociologist. The essays are written by rabbis and, I suspect, mainly for rabbis. Of the ten essays, one is a history of the New York Board of Rabbis, six concentrate on the achievements of rabbis in particular roles, and three are more general accounts of the changing and likely future roles of the American rabbinate. The essays on the rabbi as scholar, theologian and philosopher, preacher, and his role in world Jewish affairs are little more than lists of rabbis prominent in these fields with brief summaries of their biographies, works, and ideas. The essay on the rabbi and Jewish education includes a general history of Jewish education and emphasizes the contribution of American rabbis to the growth of Jewish education in America including the day schools, *yeshivot*, and summer camps. The essay on the military chaplaincy is somewhat more interesting. The author describes the development of the Jewish military chaplaincy in the historical context of the Christian chaplaincy in America, and he points to a number of results of the sudden growth of the Jewish chaplaincy during the Second World War. The chaplaincy improved the status of the rabbi and provided training in those roles (educator, cultural and recreational organizer, personal counsellor, and representative of Jews) which were to become important after the war. During the war, many American Jews saw in the set of roles of the Jewish chaplain the model for the Americanized rabbi, and when they moved to the suburbs this model provided them with a clear idea of the kind of rabbi they wanted.

From the last three essays by an Orthodox, a Reform, and a Conservative rabbi on the changing and future roles of the rabbi it is possible to draw out the central problem of the modern rabbi: there is no highly valued role which he can truly call his own. The Reform rabbi, Rabbi Saperstein, notes that the traditional roles of scholar and interpreter of the law are no longer relevant in most American Jewish communities and argues that the new type of rabbi—performing of roles of preacher, educator, pastor, conductor of the religious service and spokesman of the community—was largely a product of American Reform. However, many of these roles (such as educator, counsellor, and public relations officer) are increasingly held by professional specialists, and the absence of a distinctive status-giving role may be one reason why a great number of modern rabbis are frustrated and unhappy. One response of many has been to become specialists themselves, and many rabbinical students have shown a preference for non-congregational positions in other Jewish organizations, in education and community service. But greater specialization and non-congregational positions only serve to highlight the question: is there any role of the modern rabbi which is both distinctive and provides status? Saperstein's view is that the rabbi 'must be the authority on Jewishness' and apply Jewish values to each of his roles, but this rather vague and unexplicated formula is hardly a convincing answer to the status and role problems of the modern rabbi.

Saperstein and Waxman, the Conservative rabbi, predict little change in the roles of the rabbi. Saperstein predicts further specialization and more rabbis adopting the new rabbinic style with its greater measure of informality and spontaneity. Waxman predicts that the future rabbi will continue to perform the same roles but in different degrees: greater attention will be given to adult education, to counselling as a result of increasing tensions in the family, and to the pastoral role as a result of the increase in the aged population. Waxman notes that although a rabbi is still judged by his skill as preacher, the sermon has become less popular; in its place the rabbi must become a 'programmer', organizing activities to meet the requirements of different groups in his congregation.

The Orthodox rabbi, Rabbi Roth, in the most closely argued essay in the book, describes what the rabbi *ought* to be in the light of the failure of the modern rabbi to inspire a sense of Jewish commitment among his congregation. He believes that the answer is a return, in part, to the traditional roles, but with an activistic stance within the Jewish community. He notes that the great attention that rabbis have devoted to religious education has not inspired commitment and he argues that since commitment emerges out of practice more than knowledge, rabbis should emphasize the observance of the *mitsvot*. The problem here is that, in the traditional Jewish community, religious practice was found

together with an emphasis on the value of religious knowledge, and that to stress practice where there is little value given to religious knowledge may prove as ineffective as the emphasis on Jewish education. Roth acknowledges the contemporary rejection of the law but believes that the rabbi must attempt to reverse this and restore his classic role of 'guardian of the law'. In general, he should challenge the secular trends in society rather than adopt them. We might predict that if most rabbis did act in this way they might increase the Jewish commitment of a minority, but their total congregation would greatly decline. The options for the rabbi in a secular society are not happy ones: he may either adopt the modernized roles, none of which combine both high status and role distinctiveness, or he may return to the distinctive traditional roles, but at the expense of loosing his congregation.

STEPHEN SHAROT

JOHN F. SWEETS, *The Politics of Resistance in France, 1940–1944: A History of the* Mouvements Unis de la Résistance, xii+260 pp., Northern Illinois Univ. Press, DeKalb, Ill., 1976, $12.50.

Despite its sub-title, this book does not confine itself to a study of its subject-matter in the Vichy zone, although the central chapters place the emphasis on that area. It is well researched but, apart from reports of a few unrevealing interviews conducted by the author with men associated with the events he describes, most of the material has been amply available for a good many years.

Mr. Sweets has certainly succeeded in getting a feel for his subject. He has an imaginative understanding of the special problems of the members of his movements when, for example, they were confronted by an apparent lack of outside support, or by suspicion or high-handedness from General de Gaulle and his aides, or by insensitive handling from President Roosevelt. It is a moot point whether Mr. Sweets allows himself to be swayed too much by his sympathy for his subject when, for example, he fails even to acknowledge that there might just be a case for moral opportunism when it can save lives, as when the Americans tried to work through Darlan in Algiers. There is, in fact, a steady undertone of moral rectitude in this book which might, for some, detract from its undoubted synoptic merits; and, on page 113, the author leaves the side of the angels for the still greater heights of 'destiny' which, he says, 'had chosen [de Gaulle] to lead France toward a brighter future'.

It is a pity that this work is marred by some quite awful translations from the French: what, for instance, does one make of de Gaulle's desire 'to prevent uncontrollable overturnings by proceeding voluntarily

with the inevitable changes' (p. 226)? Still, as a synoptic account of its subject, the book is sound enough.

HERBERT TINT

ZOLTÁN TAR, *The Frankfurt School: The Critical Theories of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno*, with a Foreword by Michael Landmann, xxiii+243 pp., A Wiley-Interscience Publication, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1977, $22.80 or £13.45.

The growing interest in the work of the 'Frankfurt School' of 'Critical Sociology' has generated a great amount of secondary material on the various writers associated with the School. Most such discussions have concentrated on Habermas and his contemporaries, but there are signs that the works of the founders of the School—Horkheimer and Adorno—are now receiving their due attention. The most important study in recent years has, without doubt, been Martin Jay's *The Dialectical Imagination* (Heinemann, 1973), which gave an account of the early history of the Institute of Social Research at Frankfurt and of the various individuals associated with it. Tar's book is explicitly written in relation to Jay's. While Jay concentrated on the history and the personalities involved, Tar studies the nature of the theory produced by Horkheimer and Adorno themselves.

Tar examines the theoretical work of these writers in terms of two phases: the period from the 1930's to 1950 involved the construction of 'Critical Theory', and in the period after 1950 the modified version of this theory is termed 'Theory of Society'. The first period was marked by theoretical reflection upon the rise of fascism and its social and psychological bases. The second period involved theoretical reconstruction in the light of a dialogue with post-war sociology. Throughout these periods Tar sees Horkheimer as the greatest contributor to the developing body of theory.

Critical theory was conceived in opposition to 'Traditional theory', that is, the conventional philosophy of science which is today castigated for its 'positivism'. The epistemological differences between the two 'theories', according to Horkheimer, are based in different views of the relationship between theory and practice. Tar shows that Horkheimer's Critical Theory (the term is, significantly, capitalized throughout) was intended to establish that 'facts' are not externally given to the theorist but are defined in relation to his values, interests, and actions. In particular, the two writers are contrasted as concerned with 'the preservation and gradual reformation of society' and 'a radical transformation of existing social arrangements' (p. 31). The 'critical' aspect of Critical Theory has a dual reference: to the radical criticism of society and to the criticism of theory. Thus, the model for Critical

Theory is Marx's critique of political economy, although the Frankfurt writers have consistently separated themselves from some of the basic tenets of Marx's political and economic theories. The concrete expression of Critical Theory is to be found in the two major empirical studies carried out by the Institute, *Studien über Authorität und Familie* (1936) and *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950). Fascism was seen, in orthodox Marxist terms, as the typical form taken by late capitalism and is characterized by new forms of social domination: science, technology, and bureaucracy, as aspects of 'rationalization', are the major forms of domination and the main objects of critique. A particular feature of Critical Theory is an emphasis on the 'subjective', symbolic, ideal features of social life, and the empirical work aimed to show that the 'mentality' which supports fascism, and authoritarianism generally, is generated in a specific family structure.

After the Second World War, Horkheimer and Adorno returned to Germany from America and became involved in the attempts to reconstruct German sociology after its virtual disappearance for twenty years. Adorno saw his main task as being the codification of a Theory of Society which would elaborate the themes of Critical Theory and avoid the pitfalls of both the abstracted empiricism and the grand theory which he saw as being imported from America to Germany. It has to be admitted, however, that the results of this codification were hardly inspiring (see *Aspects of Sociology*, 1973). The aim of Adorno's work was to see all social phenomena as structurally related into a 'totality', the 'essence' of which can be grasped by social science. The main outcome of this work was the series of confrontations, or rather non-confrontations, between Adorno and Popper (*The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, 1976). In this 'dispute' basic differences over social scientific method were disclosed but not resolved.

Tar gives an excellent discussion of the philosophical and sociological ideas of Horkheimer and Adorno, and he places these ideas in the broader context of their work on aesthetics and traces many of the influences on their thought. He concludes with a short critical assessment. His account is quite readable, in contrast with the original works of the writers, and we should be grateful to him for providing a useful introduction to a significant body of thought.

JOHN SCOTT

ISRAEL ZINBERG, *The Jewish Center of Culture in the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 5, part 6 of *A History of Jewish Literature*, trans. and ed. by Bernard Martin, xviii+204 pp., Hebrew Union College Press, Cincinnati, Ohio, and Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1974, n.p.

The expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492 prompted many of the exiles to seek sanctuary in the Ottoman Empire where they received a cordial welcome. Immediately following his conquest of Constantinople, Muhammad II invited Jews to settle in the city, which soon became a major centre of Jewish culture, along with Adrianople, Salonika, Safed and other cities in the Ottoman demesne. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Sephardi culture flourished in its Turkish setting, engendering considerable literary creativity. Mystic speculation and messianic yearning among the exiles from Spain fostered the study of Kabbalah and produced a climate of messianic expectation which culminated in an explosion of popular support for Shabbetai Zevi and the promise of redemption.

The period covers the great legal codifications, the *Bet Yosef* and the *Shulhan Aruch* of Joseph Karo and his mystical *Maggid Mesharim*, as well as the activities of the important centre of Kabbalah in Safed and the extraordinary theories of Isaac Luria and his disciples, than which few systems of mystic speculation can be more intriguing. The period was also rich in poetry, much of it again concerned with mystic yearning, particularly in the work of such poets as Israel Najara and the Yemenite Shalem Shabbezi.

In Amsterdam, too, Sephardi culture flourished in the wake of the arrival of Spanish-Portuguese Marranos in the Netherlands. Here, again, interest in messianic mysticism was intense, and Menasseh ben Israel—who played no small part in the readmission of the Jews to England—was among its leading adherents. His imaginative flights of fancy stand in sharp contrast to the penetrating philosophy of his brilliant contemporary Baruch Spinoza.

With the débâcle of Shabbetai Zevi's apostasy and the subsequent wave of disillusion which swept the Jewish world, the creative springs of Sephardi Jewry ran almost dry. The Turkish-Palestinian community ceased to play a significant role in the cultural history of the Jewish people, and the hegemony of Jewish culture gradually passed to the Ashkenazi Jews of central and eastern Europe.

The fifth volume of Professor Martin's translation of *A History of Jewish Literature* from the original Yiddish maintains the handsome format of its predecessors. The author, Dr. Israel Zinberg—a chemical engineer who died in 1938 during the Stalinist purges—was an erudite scholar, and his remarkable *History* represents a very serious attempt to make a complex story both comprehensible and readable. Although the style is at times a little florid, the author wears his impressive

scholarship lightly, and the wide range of printed books and manuscripts with which the narrative deals is presented harmoniously and with a measure of grace, in spite of an inevitable plethora of names and a tendency, unavoidable perhaps in a work of this kind, to write about things rather than give their essence. The characters are presented sympathetically, although Dr. Zinberg can, at times, be denigrating, and his own partialities are plain to see. He is clearly no adherent of Kabbalah, but he gives an almost lyrical exposition of its teachings. The volume is always informative, and the reader is conducted smoothly and logically from one subject to the next. Time and again Zinberg's sensitivity to literature comes through a narrative which is often pregnant with hints, ideas, and lines for further research. In numerous passages the literary atmosphere and mental climate of the period are recaptured, as in his exposition of the relationship of the Amsterdam community to the Sabbatian movement, or the dire effect of the Chmielnitzki massacres, or the splendid juxtaposition of Baruch Spinoza and Shabbetai Zevi. For the most part, the translation is pleasing, apart from some of the poems where the English version can be prosaic. Fortunately, a number of poems are given in transliteration, which helps the reader to get the feel of the original. The volume contains useful bibliographical notes, but a more liberal use of dates in the body of the text might have proved helpful. This ambitious project is being realized in commendable fashion and deserves high praise.

DAVID PATTERSON

# CHRONICLE

According to the Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel, the total population of the country was 3,650,000 at the end of December 1977; it rose by 2·1 per cent in the course of that year. There were 3,076,000 Jews and 574,000 non-Jews. The growth rate of the Jewish population was 1·8 per cent (compared to 2·1 per cent in 1976), while the rate for non-Jews was 3·5 per cent (3·9 per cent in 1976). Most of the Jewish increase (52,000) was accounted for by the excess of births over deaths. There were 21,500 immigrants, as against 17,500 emigrants.

*

A statistical report issued by the Ministry of Immigration of Quebec notes that 586 Israeli citizens immigrated to Quebec Province in 1976. They were the thirteenth largest immigrant group of the 50 which came to Quebec in that year. Nearly half of them (285) were born in Israel.

Only 163 had sponsors in Canada; 197 came on job transfers, and the remaining 226 as 'independent persons'. Children under 15 years numbered 181, while at the other extreme only 22 were over the age of 65.

Of those gainfully occupied, 53 worked in the natural sciences, mathematics, or a technical field; 27 in personnel administration; and 17 were entrepreneurs. Nine each were administrators or directors; teachers; in the field of medicine or health; and in the arts or literature. A further five were in the social sciences, and three were rabbis.

The report noted that as many as 236 (out of the total 586) Israeli immigrants came to Quebec with no knowledge of either French or English.

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The Central Bureau of Statistics reported that 9,800 Israeli students were granted degrees or diplomas in 1977: 6,800 received first degrees; 1,400 an M.A. or its equivalent; and 330 were awarded doctorates. There were 280 medical doctors among the graduates. About 1,000 students were granted diplomas—mainly in education.

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem produced the largest proportion of graduates: 31·8 per cent. Tel Aviv was second (24·1 per cent), followed by the Technion (14·7 per cent) and Bar Ilan (10·5 per cent). Haifa University accounted for 9·6 per cent; Ben Gurion University of the Negev, 7·9 per cent; and finally, the Weizmann Institute for the remaining 1·4 per cent.

The Report notes that the total number of graduates in 1977 showed a 75 per cent increase compared with 1970.

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The Rector of Tel Aviv University announced last October that there were about the same number of students registered for the 1977–78 session as in the previous year: 15,000; but the number of applicants had been 7 per cent higher. In some faculties—medicine, engineering, accountancy, and social work—the ratio of applications to admissions was as high as 14 to one.

In addition to the 'regular students', there were about 600 'adults' who would attend non-credit courses in the University's new External Services Unit.

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The Hebrew University of Jerusalem has established the Rita and Max Haber Chair in Holocaust Studies. At the dedication ceremony, it was stated that 'unless we were to keep the memory of the Holocaust alive as part of our heritage, the world will forget'.

*

The Canadian Secretary of State was the guest of honour at a reception in Jerusalem last April to mark the Canadian Government's contribution of $250,000 towards the establishment of a Chair in Canadian Studies at the Hebrew University. An equal sum is to be given by private Canadian sources.

*

It was announced last October that the Jewish Welfare Federation of San Francisco, Marin County, and the Peninsula had established a visiting professorship in Jewish Civilization at Stanford University in California. The first appointment is expected to be made in the 1978–79 academic year. The holder of the Chair, in addition to teaching, will give at least one public lecture.

The President of Stanford University is quoted as saying that the new Chair 'will greatly strengthen not only the field of religious studies, but the broad spectrum of the humanities to which Jewish thought and culture have, throughout history, contributed beyond measure. We are tremendously grateful to the Federation for its initiative and its generosity.'

*

A conference of 1,000 adult-education workers was held in Ramat Gan, Israel, last December. A spokesman for the Ministry of Education stated that the Ministry will consider adult education as one of its most important priorities.

A learning centre was established in Beersheva last November which men and women could attend for 'a long school day once every two weeks'. In another school in Jerusalem, mothers of large families were given a course of elementary education lasting a week.

The Ministry intended erecting a building to serve as an adult school and training centre for teachers who would work with adults; the building would also house a central library of books on adult education.

*

It was announced last January that the American ORT Federation—at its 56th annual conference in New York—approved a budget of $52,553,000 for the operation of its programmes in twenty-four countries in 1978.

The President of ORT stated that in 1977 there were a total of 83,000 trainees in all its institutions. More than two-thirds (65,503) were in Israel; in the last thirty years, there has been a thirty-two-fold increase of pupils in ORT vocational schools in Israel. The Arab population of Israel will also benefit in the proposed expanded network for 1978.

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The December 1977 issue of *Les Cahiers de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle* (no. 197), reports that at the end of the academic session 1976–77 there were 13,082 pupils in the 54 establishments of the Alliance, or affiliated to it. That was a slight increase on the previous year's total of 12,900.

Israel had the greatest number: 5,432 pupils in nine schools (four in Jerusalem, two in Haifa, and one each in Tel Aviv, Holon, and Safed). Iran came next, with 3,532 in 25 schools: eight in Teheran; four each in Hamadan, Isfahan, and Kermanchah; three in Yezd; and one each in Senandadj and Broudjerd. Morocco had 2,486 pupils in twelve schools: seven in Casablanca and one each in Agadir, Fez, Meknes, Marrakesh, and Tangiers. Only one school remained in Syria, in Damascus, with 576 pupils. As for Canada, there were 481 students in three schools in Montreal affiliated to the Alliance. In France's two schools, there were 143 students in the Ecole Normale Israélite Orientale in Paris and 224 in its secondary school in Pavillons-sous-Bois (total, 367). Finally, in Spain, two affiliated schools had a total of 208—132 pupils in Madrid and 76 in Barcelona. The three Alliance schools in the Lebanon were closed in 1976–77.

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The *Jevrejski Kalendar* for 5738 states that some 5,800 Jews are registered as members of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Yugoslavia, but estimates the total Jewish population of the country to number about 7,000. They range from 1,385 in Belgrade to three in Becej. In 1941, there were about 75,000 Jews in Yugoslavia; only some 15,000 survived and more than half of those emigrated.

*

A Christian-Jewish seminar was held last March at the Ecumenical Institute in Switzerland. It was organized by the Institute and the sub-department on Christian-Jewish dialogue of the World Council of Churches in co-operation with the World Jewish Congress, the Lutheran World Federation, and the Jewish community of Geneva.

There were 60 participants, who came from Britain, Canada, Cameroon, France, East and West Germany, Holland, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. There was a large contingent of Orthodox Jews at the seminar.

*

Representatives from more than 30 countries—including Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria—attended the Fourth World Conference of Synagogues and Kehilot in Jerusalem last February. This was the first time that delegations from eastern Europe attended the World Conference, which represents some 12,000 synagogues—7,000 of them in Israel. This World Conference is held every three years.

*

The December 1977 issue of *Israel Book World* states that the Ninth Jerusalem International Book Fair will be held on 19–25 April 1979. At the Eighth Fair, in April 1977, 86 per cent of the foreign participants were in favour of the Fair remaining a biennial event; and 78 per cent considered the arrangements to have been 'very good', while a further 16 per cent described them as 'satisfactory'.

There were more than 60 Israeli publishers represented at the 1977 Moscow International Book Fair. The Israeli booth displayed about 600 volumes in Hebrew, English, Russian, and Yiddish, with the exhibits set out according to subject—Bible, children's books, biographies, etc. *Israel Book World* comments:

> The booth drew thousands of visitors, many of whom identified themselves as Jews and repeatedly emphasized their happiness at seeing books about Israel and printed in Hebrew. A large proportion of these visitors returned every day.
>
> The visitors leafed through the books for hours, read and took notes of the titles and other information. A Bible with an artistic cover was a 'sensation', constantly fondled and admired. Those who could read Hebrew found themselves at the center of crowds who asked for explanations regarding the text and illustrations.

*

The Second Annual Arab Book Week was held in Haifa last October; like the first, it was sponsored by the Arts and Culture Council of the Ministry of Education and Culture. About 30,000 books were displayed; they were published in Egypt, the Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Israel.

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In 1976, Israel imported U.S.\$5·9 million worth of books and pamphlets—double the amount in 1975: \$2·87 million; on the other hand, the increase in the cost of imported newspapers, journals, and periodicals, was less marked: \$2·12 million in 1976 against \$2·04 million in 1975. The largest quantity was from the United States—\$3·98 million in 1976; the United Kingdom ranked second (\$1·19 million); France, third (\$831,000); and West Germany fourth (\$570,000).

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## CHRONICLE

It was announced in New York last October that nearly 900,000 Jews are members of the Zionist movement in the United States. This represents an increase of more than 200,000 since 1971.

The fifteen national Zionist organizations which constitute the American Zionist Federation had been asked to submit registered membership lists before the election of delegates to the World Zionist Congress. Hadassah had 376,830 members; the Zionist Organization of America, 129,000; the Religious Zionist Movement, 124,300; the Labor Zionist Movement, 100,000; the United Zionist Revisionists, 92,400; the Bnai Zion, 31,180; the Progressive Zionist List, 12,500; the American Jewish League for Israel, 11,910; and the Reform Movement's Zionist Organization, 10,000.

*

## BOOKS RECEIVED

*(Books listed here may be reviewed later)*

Albert, Phyllis Cohen, *The Modernization of French Jewry: Consistory and Community in the Nineteenth Century*, xxii+450 pp., distributed for Brandeis Univ. Press by University Press of New England, Hanover, New Hampshire, 1977, $27.00.

Bailey, Ron, *The Homeless and the Empty Houses*, 287 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1977, 95p.

Banton, Michael, *Rational Choice: A Theory of Racial and Ethnic Relations*, 68 pp., S.S.R.C. Research Unit on Ethnic Relations, Univ. of Bristol, Bristol, 1977, £1.25 or $2.50.

Baron, Salo W. and Wise, George S., eds., *Violence and Defense in the Jewish Experience*, xii+362 pp., Papers prepared for a seminar on violence and defense in Jewish history and contemporary life, Tel-Aviv Univ., 1974, Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, Penn., 1977, $12.00.

Berman, Morris, *Social Change and Scientific Organization: The Royal Institution, 1799–1844*, xxv+224 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1978, £11.00.

Bogue, Donald J., ed., *Adolescent Fertility: The Proceedings of an International Conference*, with the assistance of Katherine Oettinger, Martha Thompson, and Patricia Morse, ix+193 pp., First Inter-Hemispheric Conference on Adolescent Fertility held at Airlie, Virginia, 31 August–4 September 1976, Community and Family Study Center, Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, 1977, n.p.

Brym, Robert J., *The Jewish Intelligentsia and Russian Marxism: A Sociological Study of Intellectual Radicalism and Ideological Divergence*, viii+157 pp., Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, 1978, £8.95.

Cohen, Bernard Lande, *Jews Among the Nations: A Message for Christians and Jews*, iii+338 pp., Philosophical Library, New York, 1978, $10.00.

Cohen, Stanley and Taylor, Laurie, *Escape Attempts: The Theory and Practice of Resistance to Everyday Life*, 232 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1978 (first published, 1976), £1.00.

Crouch, Colin, *Class Conflict and the Industrial Relations Crisis: Compromise and Corporation in the Policies of the British State*, xviii+302 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1977, £7.50.

Davis, Moshe, ed., *With Eyes Toward Zion: Scholars Colloquium on America-Holy Land Studies*, xxii+252 pp., Arno Press, New York, 1977, $18.00.

*Family Planning Résumé*, Donald J. Bogue, ed., vol. 1, no. 1, 1977, Community and Family Study Center, Univ. of Chicago, 1411 East 60th Street, Chicago, Ill.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

Foucault, Michel, ed., *I, Pierre Rivière, having slaughtered my mother, my sister and my brother . . .: A case of Parricide in the 19th Century*, xiv+289 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1978 (first published in France, 1973 and English translation first published in the U.S.A., 1975), £2.25.

Frankel, S. Herbert, *Money: Two Philosophies, the Conflict of Trust and Authority*, x+163 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1977, £6.50.

Gordon, Milton M., *Human Nature, Class, and Ethnicity*, xiii+302 pp., Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1978, £6.50.

Grant, Lawrence, Patricia Hewitt, Christine Jackson and Howard Levenson, *Civil Liberty: The NCCL Guide to your Rights*, third edn., 621 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1978, £1.75.

Greenberg, Simon, *The Ethical in the Jewish and American Heritage*, xvi+327 pp., Moreshet Series, Studies in Jewish History, Literature and Thought, vol. IV, The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, New York, 1977, $15.00.

Halpérin, Jean and Levitte, Georges, eds., *Le Modèle de l'Occident: Données et Débats, XVII<sup>e</sup> Colloque d'Intellectuels juifs de Langue française organisé par la Section Française du Congrès Juif Mondial*, with a Preface by Jean Halpérin, vi+215 pp., Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1977, n.p.

Haraszti, *A Worker in a Worker's State: Piece-Rates in Hungary*, translated by Michael Wright, with a Foreword by Henrich Böll, Penguin Books in association with *New Left Review*, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1977 (first published, 1975), 85p.

Heilbroner, Robert L., *Business Civilization in Decline*, 103 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1977 (first published, 1976), 80p.

Lavender, Abraham D., ed., *A Coat of Many Colors: Jewish Subcommunities in the United States*, xiii+324 pp., Contributions in Family Studies, no. 1, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1977, n.p.

Loeb, Laurence D., *Outcaste: Jewish Life in Southern Iran*, xxv+328 pp., Library of Anthropology (Anthony L. LaRuffa, ed.), Gordon and Breach, New York, 1977, £13.30.

Obrebski, Joseph, *The Changing Peasantry of Eastern Europe*, edited by Barbara and Joel Halpern, xxxii+101 pp., Schenkman Publishing Co., Cambridge, Mass., 1976, n.p.

Reisman, David, *Richard Titmuss: Welfare and Society*, with a Preface by R. A. Pinker, xvi+192 pp., Studies in Social Policy and Welfare (R. A. Pinker, ed.), no. III, Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1977, £6.00 (paperback, £2.50).

*Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economics, Historical Systems, and Civilizations*, Immanuel Wallerstein, ed., vol. I, no. 1, Summer 1977, State Univ. of New York at Binghampton, Binghampton, New York 13901.

Robertson, Roland, *Meaning and Change: Explorations in the Cultural Sociology of Modern Societies*, v+284 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1978, £8.85.

Rogaly, Joe, *Grunwick*, 199 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1977, 80p.

Sandford, Cedric, *Social Economics*, x+286 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1977, £8.75 (paperback, £3.25).

Siegel, Seymour, ed., with Elliot Gertel, *Conservative Judaism and Jewish Law*, xxvi+337 pp., Studies in Conservative Jewish Thought, vol. I, The Rabbinical Assembly, New York, 1977, $15.00.

Tel-Aviv—Yafo Municipality, Center for Economic and Social Research and The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Dept. of Geography, *Offices in Tel-Aviv—Yafo: Development, Distribution and Characteristics of the Activities*, liv pp. (English)+224 pp. (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1977, $6.00.

van Gennep, Arnold, *The Rites of Passage*, translated by Monika B. Vizedom and Gabrielle L. Caffee, with an Introduction by Solon T. Kimball, viii+198 pp., Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1977 (first published, 1970), £2.25.

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## NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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