THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Published on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

VOLUME XIX: NUMBER 2: DECEMBER 1977

CONTENTS

THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

VOLUME XIX NO. 2 DECEMBER 1977

CONTENTS

PUBLISHED TWICE YEARLY

on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

Annual Subscription £3.00 (U.S. $7.50) post free
Single Copies £1.75 ($4.00)

Applications for subscriptions should be addressed to the Managing Editor, The Jewish Journal of Sociology, 55 New Cavendish Street, London W1M 8BT

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BUTLER AND TANNER LTD
FROME AND LONDON

BOOKS REVIEWED

NOTICE TO CONTRIBUTORS

Papers submitted to *The Jewish Journal of Sociology* should be addressed to the Managing Editor at *55 New Cavendish Street, London W1M 8BT.* The papers must be original. They should not have been published previously, or be committed to publication elsewhere, in any language. When a paper has been accepted for publication, the author may not publish it elsewhere, in any language, without the written consent of the Editor of the *J.J.S.*

MSS. should be typewritten on one side only and double-spaced with ample margins. Pages (including those containing illustrations, diagrams, or tables) should be numbered consecutively. All quotations should be within single inverted commas; quotation marks within quotations should be double inverted commas.

Notes should follow the style of this *Journal* and should be given at the end of the article in numerical sequence according to the order of their citation in the text.

Bibliographical Details:

(*a*) *Books*
Give author, title, place of publication, year, and page reference. Underline all titles of books.

(*b*) *Articles*
Place titles of articles within single inverted commas. Underline the title of the book or journal in which the article appears. In the case of a journal, cite numbers of volume and part, and year of publication.

PROOFS. Authors making major revisions in proof will be required to bear the cost. Unless proofs are returned to the Managing Editor promptly, authors' corrections cannot be incorporated.

OFFPRINTS. Each contributor receives thirty free offprints of his article.

TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF JEWISH POLITICAL INTERESTS AND BEHAVIOUR

Peter Y. Medding

SINCE the Emancipation, Jews in the West have been citizens of many states embracing various forms of government. According to the conventional wisdom about Jewish political behaviour, Jews, regardless of differences in social structure and regime, have been consistently liberal or Left in their political responses and attitudes, rather than conservative or Right. Most theorizing about Jewish political behaviour, therefore, has attempted to explain this supposedly universal phenomenon. In fact, that conventional wisdom was based upon the assumption that the 'natural' Jewish political response was liberal and Left—which was anomalous, given the class position of Jews in Western societies.

This paper seeks to develop a more general theory of Jewish political behaviour based upon a broader view of Jewish political interests. It seeks to demonstrate that the political liberalism of Jews is a particular variant of Jewish political behaviour, occurring only under specific historical and social conditions, rather than a universal phenomenon.

A note on concepts

It should be recognized from the very outset that we are dealing with highly ambiguous terms and concepts, and with vague and often contradictory sources of evidence, and sets of facts. The Left/Right distinction is a relative one, depending upon the situation of the Centre, and the Centre itself often moves. What is Left in one society may be Centre or even moderate Right in another. Similarly, liberalism and conservatism are historical movements which are constantly changing. Thus there are major differences between important manifestations of the same movement in different societies and continents (for example, between Continental and Anglo-American liberalism). Moreover, what was liberal yesterday may be conservative today, because liberalism affirms the desirability of change, reform, and

progress. By the same token, what conservatives opposed yesterday they may tolerate today as part of an accepted status quo. Even more confusing is the absence of complete overlap between the terms Left and liberal, on the one hand, and Right and conservative, on the other. To begin with, radical and socialist are also commonly associated with the Left, and these, clearly, are not synonymous with liberal. Similarly there may be aspects of liberalism on the Right, and it is also commonplace by now to recognize a radical Right.

Determining what constitutes Left or liberal political behaviour is also extremely difficult. This is usually done by examining support for various political entities, such as parties, candidates, policies and programmes, orientations to issues involving change or reform, and general views of social organization. The problem is that political reality often does not correspond with the demands of theoretical consistency. The same party takes on different images in different parts of the country; liberal parties may offer illiberal candidates for election and vice versa; general programmes and orientations may be liberal, but specific policies and responses of particular candidates, politicians, party bodies, and governments may be illiberal, and so on. With so many liberal and Left criteria and so many varied aspects of political reality, contradictions and inconsistencies are bound to occur. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence of consistency and a common core to both liberal and Left politics, on the one hand, and conservative and Right politics, on the other, to suggest that the political scientist proceed with caution, rather than abandon the exercise completely.[1]

The conventional wisdom

Let us begin by examining the empirical evidence which provides the basis for the theory that constitutes the conventional wisdom. Survey research and other forms of electoral analysis have shown that in the past in a number of countries—the U.S.A.,[2] Britain,[3] Australia,[4] and Austria[5]—Jews have overwhelmingly supported parties to the Left of the political centre. In these countries and also in others in eastern and central Europe, Jews who were actively involved in politics at the parliamentary level were more numerous and prominent in Left parties.[6] What is more, Jews, in these and other countries, have been disproportionately prominent in the leadership of radical and revolutionary Left-wing political parties.[7] Jewish political attitudes have also been found to be overwhelmingly liberal in such matters as social justice, economic welfare, civil liberties, anti-discrimination, and internationalism.[8]

Had Jews in these societies been predominantly working class, the data would have aroused little wonderment. However, their pattern of

voting and political attitudes seems to run counter to their class situation and to the voting and attitude patterns of *all* other groups in similar socio-economic situations. This problem is heightened when it is recalled that with upward mobility other immigrant ethnic groups moved Right and became more conservative.[9] Jews clearly did not. The contrast is so marked in their case that they have sometimes been singled out as being especially altruistic and 'public-regarding' in their political choices.[10]

The intellectual history of the problem, therefore, has always been to account for this seeming paradox of Jews voting against their class and socio-economic interests—as can be clearly seen in the major attempts to explain Jewish voting behaviour and political attitudes. There are four major explanations, all of which, with the possible exception of the last, accept the anomaly of Jewish liberalism and Left voting as the universal norm to be explained.

a. The *value theory* propounded by Fuchs suggests that Jews vote Democrat because they are liberal in their attitudes, which in turn stems from traditional Jewish cultural values of charity, education, and non-asceticism.[11] This theory suffers from a number of difficulties. It has been shown that those most identified with the traditional Jewish values specified by Fuchs are often among the least liberal in their political attitudes and more likely to vote Right than Jews less identified with these values, who have been found to be the most liberal.[12] Moreover, Fuchs omits to show how these values give rise to liberal responses—a serious omission because similar values held by others (for example, some Protestant groups) do not result in liberal responses.

b. The *sociological theory*, associated in various ways with the work of Michels,[13] Lipset,[14] and Lenski,[15] emphasizes the discrepancy between the economic achievements of Jews and their social status and acceptance. Inferior or discrepant status positions lead to various forms of protest, such as Left voting and political liberalism, and in other cases to radical and revolutionary political activity. The lack of social acceptance and the conferring of inferior status by the dominant groups in the society create a sense of marginality which permits the questioning of accepted patterns of behaviour and prevents the development of the same pattern of vested interests and their promotion which characterizes other socio-economically advantaged groups.

c. The *historical approach*, mainly associated with the work of Werner Cohn,[16] suggests that after the Emancipation and the Revolutions of 1789 and 1848, despite all the high ideals of civil and political equality, Jews were not accepted fully or granted equality. The main forces opposing their full entry into society in France, Germany, Austria, and even England were to be found on the conservative, nationalist,

Christian Right. They were, however, accepted much more fully on the Left, and relied on the Left to win for them the full application of civil liberties and egalitarian principles in political, civil, and legal practice. As the Right became more openly antisemitic, Jewish support for, and dependence on, the Left increased.[17]

d. The *socio-cultural theory* is the theory of estrangement proposed by Liebman. It sees liberalism as the response of Jews who seek the 'options of the Enlightenment but rejected its consequences'. It is the search for a universalistic ethic which removes the differences imposed by the older conservative traditions (both Jewish and non-Jewish) but permits Jews to retain their nominal identification as Jews. It is being 'accepted into the traditions of the society without adapting to the society's dominant tradition'.[18]

I wish to argue that a more broadly conceived view of Jewish political interests than the conventional wisdom suggests would ask *not* why Jews are universally liberal and altruistic in spite of their socio-economic interests, but rather, What are Jewish political interests? How have Jews in different societies behaved politically in pursuit of their political interests? What would a comparative examination suggest with regard to supposed universal norms or traditions of Jewish political behaviour? Or put in another way, given these political interests, under what conditions are Jews liberal?; and is such liberalism particularly altruistic or public-spirited?

Jewish political interests

The outstanding political characteristic of Jews in the western world has been their vulnerability as an identifiable, conspicuous, and permanent political minority group. As such, their political interests can be separated into a set of immediate, micro-political interests, and longer-term macro-political interests.

Jewry's first political interest is for the survival of the Jewish group, not only of those Jews in the same society, but of Jews everywhere. Among other ways this manifests itself in the sheer 'instinct for survival'[19] of Jews as an independent people, and in intense concern with all aspects of physical security, the certainty of which is never, as with other interest groups, taken for granted, and in an ever-present need to replace psychological insecurity with a sense of security and well-being. Feelings of unease and insecurity are a given of minority existence and are not restricted to societies such as those of eastern Europe, or Germany in the 1930's. They are very real in all societies in which Jews live, as Norman Podhoretz made clear in an important article in *Commentary* magazine in 1971 entitled 'A Certain Anxiety'.[20] Similarly, a survey in the United States comparing levels of trust and distrust

among seven ethnic groups showed that on a scale ranging from +4 to −4, Jews were by far the most distrustful. Irish Catholics, the most trusting, scored 2·506; Italian Catholics (fifth), 0·502; WASPS (sixth), 0·242; while Jews (who were seventh) scored −3·106.[21]

Jewish concern with sheer physical survival and security as a basic and primordial political interest has, in recent years, been strikingly manifested in actions in support of Israel, particularly those seeking to ensure its continued physical existence. Throughout Jewish history threats to the survival of Jews in any place, and their actual persecution and destruction, made Jews everywhere apprehensive about their physical security and survival. This century differs only in the enormous magnitude of the threat, stemming from the unspeakable Nazi holocaust in the past, and the position of Israel in the present. Israel represents a two-edged sword with regard to Jewish security. On the one hand it offers the security of majority existence and the physical and military capacity to defend Jewish survival and political interests, and has therefore acted as an enormous psychological boost. It has, on the other hand, engendered marked apprehensions and insecurity, and once more conjured up the spectre of mass destruction of Jews, to the extent that fears are held for its ability to survive given the forces and resources ranged against it both in the Middle East and world-wide. Because of Israel's contemporary role as the central element in Jewish identity and sense of peoplehood and as a self-explanatory focus of ethnic self-worth, providing a *reason* for survival which nourishes the 'instinct for survival', its destruction would mean far more to Jews everywhere than the physical liquidation of a vast number of Jews—however horrendous that would be. It would strike at the very core of Jewish existence in such a way as to cast serious doubts upon the ability of the Jewish people to continue to survive.

The second immediate or micro-political interest of Jewry, closely connected with the issue of survival, seeks for Jews the capacity to participate fully and freely in the societies in which they live. Put negatively, it consists of opposing antisemitism specifically in all its forms, and of attempting to combat prejudice and discrimination in general. Jewry seeks to ensure that conditions do not arise which again threaten its physical existence, with the implicit assumption that discrimination and antisemitism, if unopposed, may easily degenerate into a threat to Jewish physical survival. Bearing in mind the lessons of Jewish history, many Jews in secular pluralist societies are simply not prepared to trust that their own society 'is different', often very firmly believing, however unpleasant and troublesome they find this, that every Christian society has untapped potential for antisemitism which could, under certain social and economic conditions, produce catastrophic results for Jews. There must therefore be constant vigilance and both public and private opposition to antisemitism.

Jewry's third immediate micro-political interest is the quest for social and political conditions which will permit the free exercise of Jewish religious and national values and allow a distinctive pattern of Jewish social organization and affiliation, without in any way infringing upon Jewish participation in the larger society and without requiring Jews to conform to any particular manner of participation. In other words, it seeks for Jews the freedom and opportunity to pursue as intensely as they desire all forms and manifestations of Jewishness and Jewish life, for whichever reason this may occur—be it a belief in ethnic self-worth, a commitment to the values of the religio-cultural tradition and their perpetuation, or a quest for the social support, solidarity, intimacy, and group warmth that are conferred by participation in the community's informal and formal social networks. In contrast with other religious groups, Jewry does not seek to universalize its values and interests, and it rarely makes claims upon its host society to follow Jewish values, goals, and aspirations. Rather, it seeks a more negative and limited goal—the achievement of a form of permissive consensus which will give *it* the freedom to pursue its own ends, although it does sometimes justify such an open-ended approach as being of benefit to society as a whole.

The economic concerns of Jews constitute a fourth and often neglected set of Jewish micro-political interests—although Glazer has recently drawn attention to them.[22] In the past, particularly in eastern Europe, Jewish communities were often divided along class lines with a significant urban working class. But in recent years—and particularly in the countries to which Jews emigrated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in North America, Northern Europe, Australia, South Africa, etc.—there has developed a characteristic Jewish pattern of occupational concentration in the middle and above middle sectors, especially in the professions, in managerial and administrative positions, and in independent business. An even distribution over the occupational and socio-economic class hierarchies would be divisive for Jewish political interests. Concentration unifies because it enables Jews to pursue their other interests without being cross-cut and weakened by class differences and antagonisms. It also adds complications. What might under other circumstances be seen merely as economic matters to be settled quickly on instrumental grounds, may become suffused with ethnic connotations of identity and group honour, not so easily given to compromise, and often leading to an intensification of conflict—as occurred, for example, in the New York teachers' strike of 1968. In general, where there is high concentration, economic interests become ethnic, Jewish interests.

Jewish middle-class economic concentration has important consequences. There is the direct and immediate sense in which middle-class concentration which reflects achievement and is often accompanied by

an accumulation of economic resources and social position, leads to the development of a vested interest in maintaining the social arrangements which made these possible, legitimates them, and facilitates their perpetuation.

Middle-class concentration also provides the leisure, skills, and financial opportunities for influencing political activity. Jews have the time and the means to devote to political activity, where their various and abundant professional skills are highly valuable. And if money is directly needed, it, too, is available. Middle-class urban residential concentration—a direct offshoot of their occupational distribution, historical traditions, and communal and social needs for propinquity—often produces crucial electoral concentration, thereby adding additional weight, bargaining power, and 'access' to politicians.

In sum, these immediate micro-political interests can be viewed as constituting a single over-riding immediate political interest concerned with order, stability, and predictability, and with those conditions which maximize these factors—in particular, the maintenance of constituted political authority. This is particularly so where there is an intense preoccupation with security and survival. Whenever security is tenuous or thought to be so, and whenever survival is in doubt (a given of the Jewish situation), the issue of political interests is transformed into a very immediate short-term calculation of how best to ensure survival. Particularly in such circumstances, political activity tends to proceed with the utmost caution, maximizing whatever possibilities of predictability exist, and refraining from political actions which seem to threaten and endanger whatever security, predictability, and constituted political authority exist. A common reaction in such precarious situations is to do nothing which might disturb the status quo and undermine constituted political authority (however undesirable and unacceptable it may be) because this may simply make things worse. Things are rarely so bad that they cannot be made worse. The tendency therefore is to make immediate and short-term compromises and concessions in the hope that these will head off further threats to security and survival.

In addition to these immediate micro-political interests, Jewry also has a *longer-term macro-political interest* in that type of legislation and that form of social organization and governmental structure which both makes possible the achievement of its micro-political interests, and promises to guarantee these permanently and unquestionably.

This is an interest in a liberal or open society where Jewry is not at the mercy of dominant groups for its rights, freedoms, and liberties. These are constitutionally guaranteed and cannot easily be removed. In this society, the rights of citizenship in the broadest sense are more or less automatically maintained by various checks and balances, by self-correcting mechanisms, by the existence of plural centres of power,

and by the intense form of political competition and seeking of public and group support that characterize its decision-making processes. Once granted, these rights tend to be maintained by the momentum of the workings of the system. No single group is powerful enough to be able to threaten or have removed the rights of weaker groups. (It is of course possible that a constellation of a number of groups could, if it so desired, remove the rights of other groups. But this possibility is one of the oldest problems of democratic societies: how to avoid the possibility of majority tyranny, and how to ensure that democratic majorities in a procedural sense will make 'right' decisions in a normative and substantive sense.) What we can say, however, is that the chances of majority tyranny are fewer in this type of society.

It therefore seems to be in the political interests of Jewry to ally itself with all groups which support and uphold the liberal society and to oppose all threats to its political and constitutional structure. Conversely, it is in the interests of Jews to oppose all forms of society in which they would be at the mercy of dominant groups, in which their security was always in question by being subject to the whims, wishes, or goodwill of the ruler or rulers.

In actual practice micro-political interests take precedence over macro-political interests, and only in so far as the former have been satisfied do Jews turn to the latter. Conversely, if immediate micro-political interests are threatened, Jews concentrate first upon securing these. The need for constant concern with immediate micro-political interests may, in both the short-, and the long-term, divert attention away from their macro-political interests. It means that often they may have to accept, acquiesce in, and refrain from opposing unpleasant and barely palatable forms of constituted political authority providing *relative* order, stability, and security. Actively to promote and seek the establishment of liberal constitutional regimes may, in certain situations, endanger further an already precarious political, economic, and physical security, because it directly challenges constituted political authority.

If this is true in practice it is not necessarily so in logic or theory. The radical political reformer may simply argue that all short-term compromises and solutions are self-defeating, and in the long run endanger security further by inviting additional pressure. The only solution therefore, in this view, is a complete and radical restructuring of society. Unfortunately, as we shall see below, in many historical cases the pessimistic view of the radical reformer that compromise was inevitably followed by further pressure turned out to be the grim reality. But it was only partly right. If compromise did not work for Jews, neither did the radical restructuring of society, which in many cases proved no better for them. In others, it proved somewhat worse because restructured societies conferred an enormous capacity for direct and effective

political and administrative control on their highly centralized leaderships.

On the basis of this analysis we can develop specific generalizations and expectations about Jewish political behaviour and responses which can then be examined in the light of historical experience.

1. In general, Jews will first seek to secure their micro-political interests, and only then their macro-political interests. The major concern will be to achieve a maximum degree of stability and security, *irrespective of the nature of the regime.*

2. The specific Jewish political response will be inversely related to the direction from which the greatest perceived threat to Jewish micro-political interests is seen to come.

I shall examine these generalizations by separately analysing the historical experiences of liberal and non-liberal societies.

Non-liberal societies

i) *Where the dominant political and social forces maintaining order, security, and stability are moderately right-wing, Jews will support and co-operate with them rather than seek to upset the status quo by strong open support for left-wing and socialist forces. This will hold true even where the moderate Right is antisemitic, but less so than the extreme Right which represents the source of the greatest threat to Jewry.*

It will also hold true even where the Left is generally sympathetic to Jews (even if not as unreservedly sympathetic as the previous scholarly model of a liberal Left and an antisemitic Right suggested[23]). This generalization fits closely the historical experiences of Jews in Romania and Poland between the two World Wars.

Romania: In Romania between the wars, the less extreme Right-wing political parties and organizations, in spite of their intense nationalist views, were not closed to Jews. For this reason, the extreme Right questioned the nationalist and Rightist bona fides of their more moderate allies. Thus the National Liberal Party (NLP), the main ruling party which was outspokenly nationalist and Rightist, formed an electoral alliance with the largest Jewish political organization in Romania, the anti-Zionist, assimilationist, and integrationist Union of Romanian Jews (UER). UER leaders entered Parliament on NLP lists, as did other Jewish politicians who were not members of the UER. Other Rightist parties such as the People's Party and the pro-Axis 'neo-liberals' also gained some Jewish support, as did the reactionary Transylvanian Hungarian Party.

During the inter-war period the politics of the Right in Romania were characterized by a consistent broadening of the base of anti-semitism from the extreme Right until it overcame *all* elements of the

Right including the more moderate, as the latter felt forced to compete with the antisemitism of its Rightist counterparts in order 'to take the wind out of their extremist sails'. Thus a rift between the UER and the NLP came with the elections of December 1937, the last in inter-war Romania, when the NLP concluded a non-aggression pact with the rabidly antisemitic Iron Guard. Even then, the NLP continued to nominate candidates of Jewish origin in constituencies with large concentrations of Jewish voters.

Romanian Jewry was divided into three main political camps: the 'Romanian Jews' opposed Zionism and the establishment of the separate Jewish political party in order to speed the integration of Jews into Romanian political and cultural life; the Zionists and other nationally inclined Jews sought national minority status and independent Jewish political organization; while the third and smallest group supported the communists and socialists. Although Jews were highly prominent in the latter—constituting, according to one estimate, 50 per cent of the Communist party—they totalled only about one thousand out of a Jewish population of 800,000.

The case of Romania is significant because there were no liberal or radical parties of the kind common elsewhere in Europe, yet in these circumstances the bulk of Romanian Jewry supported various rightist and antisemitic bourgeois parties, and gave little aid to the more sympathetic Socialist Left. Similarly the Zionists and other nationally minded Jews established a Jewish Party which was supported by the majority of Jews at the 1931 and 1932 elections, and gained some seats (although it failed in 1933 and 1937). Yet once in parliament, the Jewish Party made alliances with the bourgeois parties and leaders. If Jewish Left and liberal preferences were universal, they should nowhere have been more apparent than in majority Jewish support for the Socialist camp in Romania, but instead there was a firm alliance with a non-liberal and antisemitic Right, while support for the Socialist Left was marginal.[24]

Poland: Poland between the wars is particularly significant because the Jewish population of some 3·1 million represented nearly 10 per cent of the Polish population. They were divided politically into a number of national and Zionist groups led by the bourgeois General Zionists; the orthodox *Agudat Yisrael*; and the socialists, mainly in the Jewish Bund but with some supporters of the Polish Socialist parties. Both in the national elections and in the internal Jewish community elections, the bourgeois centrist and right of Centre groups enjoyed the preponderant political support of Polish Jewry throughout most of the period. In the external sphere this meant that 'a considerable section of Polish Jewry went on supporting the rightist anti-democratic and authoritarian ruling bloc', until late in the 1930's.[25]

The political activities and relations with the regime of the leaders of both the Zionists and the *Aguda*, the most powerful single organization, are particularly significant. The Zionists negotiated with the government in the mid-1920's to improve the lot of Jewry in Poland, and in doing so 'pledged Jewish support for an openly anti-Semitic government, in return for vague promises which they had no guarantee would be fulfilled', and in fact they were not, with the result that the Jewish condition continued to deteriorate.[26]

The basic strategy of the *Aguda* was to come to terms with the Pilsudski government and to accommodate to it publicly, despite increasing antisemitism, in order to improve the lot of Jewry through 'behind the scenes' negotiations. In 1928 this relationship was formalized with the entry into Parliament on the Government list of a leading *Aguda* politician. Here also results were minimal; in fact the *Aguda* politicians spent much of their time attempting to explain the obvious deterioration in the Jewish condition and the increase in antisemitism. The statement of the *Aguda*'s President in 1934[27] is characteristic of their view, and expresses their dilemma succinctly:

> No matter how many demands we have of the present regime, which has not fulfilled our just demands, it remains obvious that any other regime consisting of the present opposition would be incomparably worse for the Jews and for the country in general. . . . We remain firm in our belief that the present regime, which maintains order in the country with a firm hand, strongly and firmly protects the security of the Jewish population and prohibits all anti-Semitic outbursts.

Only in 1937 when government-directed antisemitism intensified to utterly untenable and unacceptable levels did the *Aguda* sever its political alliance with the regime, but by then it was too late to have any effect upon the fate of Jewry. In fact it was only in 1939 that the Jewish Left gained a majority among Polish Jewry, but events soon made this irrelevant.

Thus the general political experience of Polish Jewry until very late in the inter-war period was similar to that in Romania: 'The Jewish masses tended toward the bourgeois Center; a large section of the Jewish voters even backed the ruling rightist forces rather than the Left. Only a minority supported the non-Jewish Socialist Left.'[28]

ii) *Where the dominant forces of order and stability are extremely antisemitic Right-wing, the majority of Jews will be to the left of them. In the face of a rabidly antisemitic Right, if the political spectrum offers three options—Right, Centre, and Left—Jews will seek to maximize security and stability by adopting a position least threatening to the status quo, that is, Centre and moderate Left rather than more extreme Left. In a bi-polar Left–Right situation, given the complete capture of the Right by rabid and extremist antisemitism, Jews will support the*

Left. The first case approximates to the situation in inter-war Hungary, and the second, to that of inter-war Austria.

Hungary: The Right in Hungary was divided into a number of different groups whose antisemitism ranged from extreme, to rabid, and proto- and pro-Nazi. As in Romania, they competed among themselves over the purity of their prejudice against Jews, but unlike Romania, apart from a few isolated instances, even the less extreme Right was uninterested in Jewish support and co-operation.

Hungarian Jews were also politically heterogeneous. Some were prominent in the leadership of the Communist party, many of whose supporters were Jewish. Similarly, they were active in the leadership and membership of the Social Democrats, and among its intellectuals, journalists, and trade unions. A politically conscious and prominent bourgeois liberal and radical element was highly involved in the Centre bourgeois democratic parties. In addition, a small upper-class group sought to assimilate politically into the most moderate section of the reactionary Rightist ruling groups. The largest group by far, however, were the 'politically passive mass of hundreds of thousands of petit-bourgeois-minded, conservative, mostly observant Jews'.[29]

A brief examination of their voting preferences shows a slight majority of Jewry supporting the moderately Left centrist bourgeois liberals and radicals, and most of the remainder supporting the Social Democrats.[30]

Austria: Here the situation was much less complicated than elsewhere. The non-Socialists were Christian and ultra-nationalist who on principle refused to have anything to do with Jews politically (although this did not prevent some Jews lending political and financial support to these defenders of 'established interests'). Before the elimination of the Social Democrats in 1934, therefore, the vast majority of Austrian Jewry supported them.[31]

In all these cases the greatest perceived threat to Jewish security and survival was from the more advantaged groups in society, from above, from the superior groups in class terms, from the groups on the Right who either were the dominant forces maintaining order and stability by virtue of their control of constituted political authority and the wielding of the key political symbols of nationalist and religious purity and virtue, or were under pressure from more extremist groups. The masses, the politically disadvantaged classes, the groups below the Jews in class terms, the workers and peasants, while not generally thought or known to be sympathetic to Jews (and often recognized as infected with a vicious and primitive antisemitism which represented an incipient threat to Jews, and thus always made them available for mobilization by the dominant groups), were not usually perceived as the immediate

threat to Jewish security and survival. Yet despite the egalitarianism and liberalism of the Socialist and Communist parties and the disproportionate prominence of Jews in their leaderships, the majority of Jews reacted to the immediate perceived threat from the dominant groups on the Right in a way which least threatened the status quo, disturbed order and predictability the least, and was least likely to make their condition worse. Thus in seeking to guarantee security and survival, the majority of Jews adopted the most moderate and least extreme solution inversely related to the source of the greatest perceived threat, that is the solution closest to the Centre, to the status quo, and to constituted political authority. If the threat was from the extreme Right, they were Centre and moderate Right; if the threat was the whole Right, they were Centre and moderate Left; if the threat was Right and there was no Centre, they were Left.

iii) *If the dominant forces of order and stability are right-wing, authoritarian, and racist, although not specifically antisemitic, and where there is an obvious incipient or potential if not immediate threat from both above and below, the majority of Jews will support those more moderate and liberal political forces permitted to exist by the dominant non-liberal repressive constituted political authority. There will be a significant element of support for the dominant forces of the regime itself, which will tend to increase as long as its threat to Jewry remains incipient or becomes less apparent, or if the threat from below begins to loom larger.* Jews will generally not openly espouse or join in radical opposition to the dominant forces, and will, rather, remain silent or be acquiescent to the main contours of the regime, while keeping themselves politically separate from the underclass (the class which has no power and which is usually excluded from the political system). The emphasis is upon moderate support for the status quo represented by the constituted political authority or for slow moderate changes to the situation which do not threaten or endanger the status quo. A good example is South Africa.

South Africa: Here Apartheid—representing white supremacy and Afrikaner dominance—is not merely the dominant value, it is also the very structure of the society. To oppose Apartheid as racial inequality, therefore, is not just to oppose an abstract set of values or an ideology on theoretical grounds, *it is to propose the radical restructuring of society.* This has left its political marks on Jewry. South Africa is probably the only society in the contemporary Western world in which the dominant concepts of citizenship and national identity do not either act as a challenge to Jewry, or exert an attraction competing with the Jewish sense of peoplehood. Jews simply do not identify with Afrikaner national identity nor is this expected of them by the ruling Afrikaner and Calvinist groups. To speak of identification with the Blacks is simply not meaningful. The political results of such a society organized along

ethnic lines is further to emphasize Jewry's precarious separateness as a permanent minority in search of security and survival.

Apartheid has more or less foreclosed for Jews the liberal option of racial equality, characteristically supported by Jews in other Western societies. What in such societies would be moderate and even mainstream liberal responses in matters of race, become in South Africa radical threats to the system. It is moot whether the restructuring of society would be regarded by Jews as in their long-term interests (apart from the immediate need to avoid repressive action by the Afrikaner-controlled government following upon such demands). In any event, over time there has developed in South Africa the recognition that Jewish interests are best served by the maintenance of the status quo; and that the interests of Jews as an economically advantaged and successful group in society depend upon the continuance of white domination. Openly to promote racial equality therefore appears to many Jews to threaten their political and economic security, and would involve sacrificing themselves on behalf of another group, which, it seems, is not particularly well disposed to Jewry.[32]

Before 1934, the organized Jewish community acted on the principle that they had a collective political interest only in seeking to combat antisemitism and anti-Jewish discrimination. Accordingly it insisted that there was no 'Jewish vote' and that in all other areas of politics including race, Jews acted as individuals and not as an organized community. The majority supported the Smuts–Botha line of co-operation between the English and the Afrikaner, and their more moderate position on the racial question and not the narrow Nationalist line of Hertzog and Malan.

After 1934 the situation changed when the Nationalist Party then in opposition first officially opposed Jewish immigration and later adopted a general antisemitic programme, capped with declarations of neutrality when South Africa went to war against Nazi Germany. During this period the organized Jewish community openly supported Smuts's party, and strenuously opposed the Nationalist Party with its anti-semitism, totalitarian and fascist views, and its Nazi-like racist theories.

The year 1948 marked a significant turning point, for it was then that the Nationalist Party came to power, a position which it has maintained—and, since Afrikaners constitute 60 per cent of South Africa's white population, it is one they are likely to retain so long as white supremacy lasts. On coming to power, the Nationalist Party officially repudiated antisemitism. Consequently, the official organization of the Jewish community, the Board of Deputies, has reverted to the position that there is no 'Jewish vote', and no collective political outlook among South African Jews, who behave in politics as individuals.

There are no firm data on Jewish voting behaviour since 1948. However, it seems commonly agreed that the Nationalist Party though

steadily gaining support is still the least favoured by Jews, whose major support is being given to the more moderate United Party. The latter serves as a 'legitimate' opposition firmly committed to segregation, and fights elections on policies of 'white supremacy', but suggests 'race federation' rather than separate development.[33] Jews are also prominent in the Progressive Party, which seeks to establish a multi-racial society.

There has been a long debate in the Jewish community over its attitude to racial equality. While many on the Left, students, and the occasional religious leader took the position that on moral and ethical grounds Jewry should officially be in the forefront of the liberal camp, the Board of Deputies has clearly rejected official involvement. While emphasizing the ethical and moral dimensions of the problem and the question of justice, it has, bearing in mind the diversity of opinion on racial and political questions in the Jewish community, called upon Jews individually to promote these ends according to the teachings and tenets of Judaism.[34]

In rejecting the argument that Jews for their own self-protection should identify with the black man's struggle, the Board reflected the predominant desire of most Jews to separate the question of Jewish rights and Jewish security from that struggle, because to identify Jews with it would endanger their security.

Jewry's political position in South Africa thus seems to be based on the belief that its political fate is inseparable from that of the white man. Jews have nothing to gain and everything to lose by actively opposing Apartheid, since it would inevitably result in political and economic retaliation by the regime. Conversely, should a black majority ever come to power, the position of Jews would be no different from that of other white men. Most Jews therefore assume that in order to protect immediate Jewish interests, they must either support the status quo actively, or at the very least refrain from opposing it publicly or actively. (Others, of course, have simply left the country and settled elsewhere.)

iv) *If the dominant forces of order and stability are right-wing, authoritarian, and dependent upon direct military support, and where there is incipient anti-semitism from both above and below, the majority of Jews will support the various legitimate and recognized elements of the dominant groups upholding the status quo, particularly those promising economic stability.* This is by and large the situation in the large Jewish communities of Latin America.

Latin America: There are considerable differences between Latin America and the other Western societies currently host to large concentrations of Jews: in Latin America the Left/Right distinction is less meaningful; the economy is under-developed and unstable, and the middle classes are weak. Nevertheless, there is sufficient common ground to enable us to deal briefly with Jewish political responses in that area.

Political conflict in Latin America is basically between those whose prosperity depends on the maintenance of the status quo, and those whose disadvantaged condition stems from it. Among the former are the landowners, industrialists, and those in commerce and in the provision of services, which covers most of the middle class. These groups have till now been strongly supported by the Catholic Church, and their dominance rests upon the support of the armed forces. On the other side are the trade unions, the mass of unorganized workers, and the peasants, often strongly supported by left-wing intellectual circles, university professors, students, and intellectuals. Jewry, as elsewhere, is heavily concentrated in the middle classes, which do not generally in Latin America constitute a strong force for democracy. Many of them follow upper-class behaviour and conventions, and they fear that entrusting power to the lower classes would jeopardize their future. Moreover, 'legality is not sacrosanct in Latin America; constitutional "illegitimacy" rather is the political norm, and the middle class is unwilling to make sacrifices for democracy if that entails basic changes in the social structure'.[35]

The political reactions of Jewry to the situation in Latin America are aptly summed up by Haim Avni:[36]

> Since throughout the continent the Jews are largely in the middle class, their response to economic and political developments is like that of other elements in this class. For a considerable number of the Jews this essentially conservative reaction may clash with the socialist beliefs of their youth, and others find themselves in conflict not only with themselves but with their children, particularly university students. But whether they like it or not, economic and social realities seem to impose on them the need for political identification with the status quo.

He goes on to point out that Jews, because of their occupational structure, are particularly vulnerable to a prolonged economic crisis—especially rapid and prolonged inflation. Of significance is the extremely apprehensive reaction of many middle and upper-middle-class Jews to the Allende regime in Chile: they left the country. Numbers of them returned when Allende was overthrown. The essentially conservative reaction of Jews and their political identification with the Right-wing upholders of the status quo, despite the existence of some strong anti-semitic sentiments on the extreme Right fed by nationalist views and pro-German and pro-Nazi activities, have now been further reinforced by the development of antisemitic, anti-Zionist and anti-Israel sentiments on the extreme and not so extreme Left.

Liberal regimes

i) *Where the greatest perceived threat to Jews comes from above, that is, from the dominant (and right-wing) socially prestigious and economically advantaged*

upholders of the established order and the status quo, Jews will be liberal in their political attitudes and outlooks. This will also manifest itself in support for liberal parties either of the Centre or of the Left, depending upon the particular circumstances and the options available. Typical examples are the United States, Britain, Australia, France, and pre-war Czechoslovakia.[37]

In those societies Jewish micro-political interests have been relatively well satisfied, and Jewish security and survival are hardly an issue, and are less in doubt than elsewhere. In meeting instances of discrimination and prejudice Jews have taken a militant public liberal position, thereby availing themselves of the system's liberal and egalitarian ideals and calling on it to put them into practice. In this way Jews are therefore directly encouraged to pursue their macro-political interests.

Where the dominant social and political values are basically liberal, and fundamentally egalitarian, historically the threat to Jews has generally come from the established and advantaged groups discriminating against Jews in housing, university admissions, civil service appointments, club memberships, and executive positions in large corporations. Where there is such social and economic discrimination or where there are fears among Jews of religious tests and the establishment of religion as a social category which either confers advantages or confirms disadvantages, Jews strongly promote the liberal view of society and politics *because this represents their political interests in the situation.* To that extent, of course, such a reaction is neither particularly altruistic nor public-spirited, but is basically self-regarding, except in the sense that all support for a liberal regime is public-spirited because it seeks to confer equal benefits upon all.

In liberal societies, therefore, the macro-political view of society dealt simultaneously with both their micro- and macro-political interests. More specifically, because the greatest perceived threat came from the Right and from conservative groups either less committed, or not committed, to the liberal view of society, Jews found their political allies among liberals and on the Left. The latter were also both more accommodating and more tolerant towards Jews, and themselves fully committed to the liberal view of society.

In non-liberal regimes, in order to gain a minimum of their micro-political interests and ensure their security and survival, Jews had to compromise with a status quo which was unpleasant and unpalatable, and to collaborate with social forces and dominant political groups which were often extremely antisemitic. In liberal regimes by way of contrast, they could seek the assistance of the free operation of the system in order to achieve their ends and better their lot, and simultaneously seek to improve society. This was an ideal situation for Jews: they could utilize the advantages of the system and exploit the

protections it afforded to both serve their own micro-political interests and also to promote benefits and advantages for all members of the society. The evidence of Jewish liberal attitudes and Left voting in liberal societies has been well documented elsewhere with regard to the United States and Australia, and need not be repeated here.[38] Let us instead briefly examine the cases of Britain and France.

Britain: There is no survey evidence about Britain (except for some very recent work), but it appears that in the first half of this century, Jewish support for the Labour Party was predominant, although since then there have been some dramatic changes. In the early period, according to Geoffrey Alderman, 'most Jews were Liberal. The Tory party was, after all, the party of the Established Church; the High Tory majority in the House of Lords had acted as a barrier to the advancement of Jewish emancipation for more than a decade; and some of the arguments put forward against the Jews, both in and out of Parliament, reflected the traditional Tory view that Church and State were part of an inseparable entity, in the promotion of which Jews ought to play no part.'[39] While the established and wealthy Anglo-Jewish leadership had moved into the Conservative camp, the Jewish masses at the turn of the century were solidly Liberal, particularly in view of Conservative support for the anti-immigration laws and its open espousal of anti-semitism.

With the rapid entry into English society of European Jewish migrants, many with socialist experience and traditions and an apprenticeship in the British trade union movement, and with the decline of the Liberal Party as an electoral force, the major Jewish political support swung solidly behind the Labour Party. This reaction was further reinforced by some Conservative support for the British Union of Fascists, by the appeasement policies of the Munich era, and by the 1939 Conservative Government's White Paper restricting Jewish immigration into Palestine. 'The children of the immigrants, educated in the ways of British democracy, were determined to build a better life. Entry into the Conservative Party was unthinkable, entry into the Liberal Party seemed pointless.'[40] Before 1945, and the complete turnabout on Palestine of the Attlee–Bevin Labour government, this resulted in many Jews joining and supporting the Labour party, and some were prominent as Labour M.P.s. From then on, as we shall see below, there was a decline in support for Labour.

France: In France, also, there was a similar pattern. In the nineteenth century, the political emancipation of the Jews was opposed by the established conservative and often reactionary Catholic forces. Jews were therefore more closely associated with the secular and radical elements in French politics, in particular those on the moderate and

constitutional Left and in the Centre. Such relationships were reinforced in the aftermath of the Dreyfus affair, which highlighted the anti-Jewish opposition on the Right, and made clear from where Jews were gaining their political support and where they were socially and politically welcome. In the early part of this century and later, Jews became active and prominent in various branches of the socialist movement.[41]

These relationships do not persist unchallenged even in liberal regimes. A change in the direction from which the greatest threat to Jews is perceived to come will produce changes in Jewish political responses. Where the threat comes from the Right and from above, and where support for the liberal society is concentrated on the Left, then Jews are liberal and Left. But what happens if the greater (or the only) threat to Jews is perceived to emanate from the Left, and from socially and economically more disadvantaged groups, from forces challenging the status quo and the established order? In such circumstances, according to our previous analysis we should expect the following reaction.

ii) *Where the greatest perceived threat to the status quo providing Jewish stability and security is from below, from the socially and economically disadvantaged and from the radical Left, Jewish political behaviour will move in a conservative direction. Movement will be a function of the differential degree of perception of threat.* Evidence supporting this expectation can be found by examining recent developments in the United States.

The United States: An extremely instructive example of changes in Jewish political attitudes is afforded by recent developments in the United States with regard to the American blacks. Until the mid-1960's Jews were among the staunchest supporters of the blacks' civil rights struggle. When the claim was for equal opportunity for the black to enjoy constitutional rights previously denied him, the Jews supported him, and disproportionately so. This was in keeping with the Jewish view of the liberal or pluralist society as providing the greatest security for Jews, particularly as the civil rights struggle till then sought merely the same universal opportunities as had facilitated the upward social and economic mobility of Jewry. The extent of the ideological commitment of American Jews to liberalism and liberal ideals can be gauged from the results of a survey in the late 1950's which found that one third of the respondents thought it essential if one wanted to be a good Jew, to be liberal on political and economic matters, while another third thought it desirable.[42] These proportions are so high that it has been suggested that for these Jews the meaning of Jewishness was to be liberal.[43]

As black claims came to be made in ascriptive terms, seeking social

advancement on the basis of colour, and membership of a historically disadvantaged group, and as quotas were applied, Jewry became divided in its attitude. Jewish opposition derived firstly from the fact that such claims—the antithesis of achievement and universalistic criteria of merit—threaten the individual basis of citizenship in terms of which the Jewish group sees its interests and its future. They carry the implicit threat that Jewry, too, will be judged as a group which Jews, having learned the bitter lessons of Jewish history, reject. Secondly, black claims were a direct threat to Jewish economic security, since Jews as a result of personal achievement currently hold many of the occupational positions to be gained by blacks on the basis of quotas.

Some of the recent political alliances of black militants have also been perceived by many Jews as threats to their own security, and indeed to Jewish survival. There was strong (and unexpected) black antisemitism in a number of conflict situations and, moreover, blacks were often supported by radical and New Left elements which were distinctly cool to Jewish issues and interests, and generally supported Israel's adversaries, including the terrorists.

Perhaps most threatening of all to American Jews was their seeming desertion by established liberal groups, previously supportive of Jewish interests. Now radicalized, many of them went to the aid of black claims and interests, even when this meant opposing those of Jewry. Jews became keenly aware of such desertion by their former liberal and Left allies, and began to feel hemmed in from both above and below:[44]

> If the crunch ever comes between the 'haves' and the 'have nots', the 'haves' are perfectly willing to sell out the Jews to the blacks to save what they have. . . . The truth is that both Jews and blacks are marginal to the power structure of the United States. The *goyish* world looks at Jews as a pool of brains to be used and at blacks as a pool of backs to be used. The WASP world would be perfectly willing to let the brains and the backs fight it out.

There is also survey evidence to suggest that urban Jews interpreted racial conflict as being directed specifically against them[45] and, what is more, in a 1973 poll during the New York City Democratic Primary, 49 per cent felt 'that anti-Semitism was a very important problem', with 44 per cent blaming blacks as the group chiefly responsible.[46]

The net result of these changes is that many are beginning to ask whether American Jewry is moving Right, becoming conservative, deserting liberalism, and supporting the Republicans rather than the Democrats. In fact, liberalism, previously so important to Jews, *has* declined in ideological significance. Thus, a survey of Reform Jews in 1970 found that half the respondents thought that 'it made no difference' to being a good Jew whether one is or is not a liberal, and only 15 per

cent thought it essential.[47] On some specific issues of conflict Jewish responses also tended to oppose the liberal position: in 1973 in New York City, only 19 per cent supported the use of quotas to ensure that minority group members were adequately represented in college admissions and civil service appointments while 58 per cent endorsed the strict merit system only. Over 60 per cent approved the 1968 strike by the predominantly Jewish New York City teachers' union to protest against school decentralization; 61 per cent supported the school boycott undertaken by Brooklyn parents against a school busing programme; and 65 per cent thought that active demonstrations by Jewish groups in Forest Hills against the construction of a low-income housing project in their neighbourhoods was justified.[48]

Various elections and referenda confirm these trends. In the 1966 struggle to establish a Civilian Review Board to oversee police actions in New York—which was supported by Mayor Lindsay, Senators Javitz and Kennedy, various civil rights and Jewish organizations, and endorsed by the Liberal Party, but opposed by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association and an assortment of conservative groups—approximately 60 per cent of Brooklyn Jews and 55 per cent of all Jews in New York, voted against the proposal.[49] Perhaps even more significant is the Jewish vote against Mayor Lindsay (formerly strongly supported by Jews) in the New York mayoralty election of 1969. In that year 42 per cent of New York Jews voted for Lindsay who stood on an avowed liberal ticket and programme, whereas 49 per cent voted for the conservative Democratic candidate Procaccino, and the remaining nine per cent for Marchi—a conservative Republican.[50]

The 1972 Presidential elections also reflected these concerns. Nationally, Nixon received 34 per cent of the Jewish vote and McGovern 66 per cent—which represented a gain for Nixon of 19 per cent compared with his 1968 performance—while in New York State the gain by Nixon was 23 per cent, and in Brooklyn it was 27 per cent.[51]

These findings signal a move to the Right among American Jews in line with this paper's original expectations, and the analysis gains further reinforcement as we discover that this move does not affect all groups in American Jewry equally. In fact, Jews whose security is most directly threatened by the mooted changes in society, for whom instability looms largest, are more likely to move Right and become conservative because their perception of the threat from below (aided and abetted from above) is more salient and acute. Jews whose security is more protected and who feel little, if at all, affected by the proposed changes in society—in short, those who do not perceive an acute threat to their security—remain liberal and continue to support the Democrats nationally.

To see the Jewish vote for McGovern in proper perspective it should

be noted that the proportions of Jews voting Democrat had rarely been higher than in the previous three elections. Thus, while Stevenson polled 64 per cent among Jews in 1952, 60 per cent in 1956, and Kennedy polled 82 per cent in 1960, Johnson gained an estimated 90 per cent of the Jewish vote in 1964, and in 1968 Humphrey received 83 per cent.[52] This meant that any Jewish class differentials in voting which may have existed previously[53] had probably disappeared after 1960.

The effect of the McGovern campaign was, however, not to reinstate the previous pattern of class voting, but to reverse it nationally, maintaining a trend that had earlier appeared in New York City. In general, the wealthier Jews voted for McGovern, and in fact, the upper middle classes, the professionals, and the suburbanites were the mainstay of the McGovern Jewish vote. Thus, figures which relate voting to income show that the Democratic loss between 1968 and 1972 ranged from three to 11 per cent in the income group $22,000–36,000, but from 17 to 27 per cent in the $6,000–19,000 bracket.[54] These trends had first been noticed in New York, where Lindsay received 42 per cent of the votes of all Jews, but an analysis showed that 55 per cent of the wealthy, 39 per cent of the middle class, and 36 per cent of the working class had voted for him.[55] An analysis of the vote on the Civilian Review Board by occupation also found that in Brooklyn—where 40 per cent of Jews overall supported the Board—among those in clerical occupations the figure was 20 per cent; among blue collar, 31 per cent; among business people, 46 per cent; and among professionals, 63 per cent.[56]

Despite these changes, Jews are still more liberal and more Democrat than equivalent groups of non-Jews. Thus the vote for Nixon in 1972 among non-manual Protestants was over 75 per cent. (In fact, of the major groups, only Jews and blacks gave McGovern a majority.[57]) Similarly, whereas 55 per cent of New York Jews opposed the Civilian Review Board, this compares with 70 per cent among Protestants, and 84 per cent of Catholics.[58] That the Jewish reaction was more against the McGovern candidacy, rather than against the Democrats in general, in support of whom they were among the strongest in the country, can be seen in the fact that in the Congressional elections of 1972 the Democratic Party was supported by 85 per cent of Jews.[59]

The change in attitudes among Jews arose over a new political agenda; on the older liberal agenda of social and economic issues, Jews still retained their liberal attitudes:[60]

> It is not fair to say that this is a conservative trend. In terms of traditional definitions of conservative, this is not a conservative shift. The people want federal action. They want mass transportation. They want medical care. They want all the things that used to be called 'liberal'. . . . It's liberalizing

on the economic and programmatic issues, and it's conservative or hard line or tough on the social issues.

How is one to put some semblance of intellectual order into this mass of conflicting data and trends: the retention of the old liberalism and the rejection of the new; the decline in the Democratic Presidential vote; the greater support for both liberalism and the Democrats among the better off and the suburbanites, and the decline in liberalism and Democratic support among the less comfortable and the urbanites, all of which go against the norm? In my view, as indicated above, the explanation lies in two differing views of Jewish interests, two differing perceptions of threat, and a differential incidence of the price to be paid for the changes in society. Both views operate out of concerns of self-interest.

Those who feel directly threatened from below (and who fear that they will not only be faced with social disruption and instability, but also that they themselves are going to pay either the whole price or a disproportionate share of it)[61] move to the Right because their micro-political interests are threatened. These, then, take precedence over their macro-political concerns. (For some, of course, particularly the ideologically aware and the intellectually committed, opposition to the new liberal agenda is differently explained. In their case, it is right to oppose the new social demands not, or not only, because they threaten the stability of the established status quo and undermine Jewish security, but because fundamental liberal social values of merit, achievement, universalism, and equality are threatened.[62])

Those insulated against the threat from below by virtue of their social, occupational, and residential situation, who thus do not perceive the new social demands as threatening Jewish security or undermining the stability of a status quo upon which their situation rests, remain with their previous macro-political position. They still see the greatest threat to Jewish security emanating more from above, from the dominant and established forces maintaining order and stability, from those determining social evaluations of prestige—those who, in short, maintain executive discrimination, residential closure, and demonstrate social distance, by exclusion from private social clubs.[63] In order to protect and maintain their interests and position they remain committed to the liberal view of society and to the liberal camp and seek to retain the support of key liberal groups and individuals.

At the ideological level, while recognizing that affirmative action and quotas may threaten fundamental liberal principles, they argue that there is a difference between quotas used as a means of holding down people which must be rejected in favour of merit as the correct principle, and quotas used to help minority groups sometimes in disregard of the merit principle and sometimes in order to realize the

merit principle. In short, merit is a major principle but not the only one; justice, equity, recompense, and minority rights also count. This is particularly relevant where people on top find and use merit as a social convenience, so that the formal defence of the equality of opportunity perpetuates extreme inequalities of condition because of different starting points.[64]

In general, therefore, the Jewish political response, stemming from its minority situation, is to oppose policies which are perceived to threaten Jewish security, *even if these are put forward in terms of liberal principles.* If they perceive their interests to be directly threatened, or believe that they will have to pay the price for these changes, the logical expectation is one of self-interested opposition in order to maintain the status quo. More generally, Jews may tend to oppose change even if put forward in liberal terms because the results are an unknown and it is therefore feared that they might be worse than the known status quo. For Jews who live in a relatively high state of permanent insecurity, their situation—whether good or bad—can always be made worse.

A concluding speculation and a note on the impact of Israel

It follows that in liberal societies where the threat to Jewry is perceived so to decline that it has no impact or influence upon Jewish security and political interests, then Jewish voting and political behaviour will be more directly influenced by socio-economic interests. This means that the majority of Jews in middle and upper middle class socio-economic situations would vote overwhelmingly for the Right. There is some evidence for this contention in the case of Britain. Geoffrey Alderman has established that in some London suburbs with heavy concentrations of Jews (accounting for nearly 40 per cent of London Jewry) the majority of Jews vote Conservative. In one such electorate (amounting to five per cent of the total Jewish vote in Great Britain), of those who voted in 1970, 55 per cent supported the Conservatives; 26·5 per cent, Labour; and 18·4 per cent, the Liberals. The intended vote for 1974 gave the Conservatives, 59·1 per cent; Labour, 15·9 per cent and the Liberals, 25·0 per cent. These figures were very much in line with those of the equivalent non-Jewish socio-economic groups.[65]

In Britain, Jews do not seem to differentiate between the major parties on the basis of their support for Israel; since 1948, they have felt disappointed with both parties. The absence of such differentiation adds to the significance of the socio-economic variables. On the other hand, the influence of attitudes to Israel was not completely irrelevant to Jews in determining their support for individual candidates, irrespectively of party. In all parties, candidates who supported Israel

strongly and publicly were rewarded—while those who did not do so polled less well in Jewish areas.[66]

In view of the centrality of Israel for Jewish political interests and for their sense of security, the attitude to Israel of candidates, parties, and governments, will significantly influence Jewish political behaviour. This will hold whether or not the internal threat to Jewry is perceived to continue or is seen to decline. Where the perceived internal threat continues, Israel will be one of many factors; where it is perceived to decline, Israel will take on a more central role. Also of great relevance will be the strength and intensity of the candidate's or party's attitude to Israel, on the one hand, and their capacity for assisting (or conversely harming) Israel on the other. One should perhaps also make a distinction between those in power and those seeking power. The former can be judged by their acts, the latter only by their promises; and in general, acts (even if not as positive as might be desired) will be more convincing than the strongest promises and undertakings.

There is already some evidence to hand on the influence of Israel on Jewish political behaviour. This issue was prominent during the 1972 Presidential elections in the United States. It was commonly suggested that Jews moved to the Right because of Nixon's support for Israel, which as President he had made tangible in various ways, and out of fear that McGovern would even reverse or weaken American support for Israel. Previously there had been some pressure upon Jewry to support unpopular American overseas commitments (Vietnam and Taiwan) on the grounds that Jews needed to do so in order to ask for an American overseas commitment to Israel. Jewish apprehensions about McGovern derived from his association with the radical coalition and the New Left, both of which were in the main regarded as anti-Israel. We cannot know if McGovern as President would have been less sympathetic to Israel; but the fact remains that attempts to gain Jewish votes for Nixon played on these apprehensions.

There can be no doubt that the question of Israel played some role in the 19 per cent swing to Nixon among Jewish voters, but it was neither crucial nor decisive. Thus in New York where Nixon received 35 per cent of the Jewish vote and McGovern 65 per cent, another survey found that 44 per cent of Jewish voters thought Nixon had the best policy on Israel; 21 per cent thought McGovern did; 11 per cent, both; seven per cent, neither; and 17 per cent did not know.[67] Those who believed that Nixon was better for Israel outnumbered by a ratio of more than two to one those who thought McGovern was. If we divide the other categories in proportion, Nixon was thought to be better on Israel by about 64 per cent of the Jewish voters, yet he received only 35 per cent of their votes.

In Australia the evidence suggests that the adoption by the Labor Government under Mr. Whitlam of an 'even-handed' policy on the

Middle East and subsequent condemnations of Israel at the U.N., together with various votes in favour of the P.L.O. at the U.N. (despite opposition to the resolution declaring Zionism to be racist), made Jews quite certain that the Whitlam government was opposed to Israel's interests. The result was, as far as can be ascertained, a very marked swing away from Labor in the 1974 and 1975 elections. Thus whereas probably more than half and possibly as high as two thirds of Melbourne's Jewish voters supported the Labor return to power in 1972 in line with the national mood, their disillusionment was such that by 1975 my own rough analysis of polling booths in areas of heavy concentrations of Jews suggests Jewish support for Labor was cut in half, which was far in excess of the national swing against Labor. It is also relevant that in 1975 it was known that the Liberal leader, Mr. Fraser, was strongly pro-Israel and not afraid to state it publicly. (It should also be noted that the Labor government's economic policies and management affected business conditions and profits, and also therefore Jewish economic interests, and this, too, must have influenced voting response.)

If the effect of Israel upon Jewish voting patterns and political attitudes in these liberal societies has been to move Jewry to the Right and to make it conservative, in France the opposite has occurred. France was Israel's staunchest ally and main supplier of arms between 1956 and 1967, and although the policies had been initiated under a Socialist-led coalition in the context of the Algerian crisis, and in the shadow of the ill-fated Suez Invasion, they were carried on and developed under the De Gaulle regime which was clearly on the Right. Before the 1967 Six-Day War, De Gaulle advised Israel not to strike the first blow under any conditions at the threat of losing French backing. When war began, De Gaulle attacked Israel strongly in what were regarded as antisemitic terms, and French policy took an about face. From then on France opposed Israel and sided with the Arabs. The result for French Jewry was not only outspoken opposition to the government's policies and public protests against them (for the first time in French Jewish history), but the propulsion of the vast majority of French Jewish voters clearly and directly into the Left camp, from the more central position that they had previously occupied.[68]

Israel remains a primordial Jewish political interest, and concern about its security will have a real impact upon Jewry in liberal societies above and beyond their party loyalties. This will be particularly so where governments have the capacity directly to affect Israel's security, whether positively or negatively. Even countries unable to supply tangible support in the form of foreign aid or weapons will be judged by Jews according to the degree of political support they give Israel's position in world bodies.

But just as the Jewish interest in Israel's security and its effect upon

Jews everywhere remains above party, so too is there, in liberal societies, no direct connection between party and policy towards Israel. Parties and governments on both the Right and Left can be and have been in favour of, or opposed to, Israel; and there is no logical or necessary ideological connection (or one of principle) between their political stance and their attitude to Israel. But that there is not a logical or necessary connection should not blind us to the fact that where there is a relationship to Israel, either positive or negative, it will have a direct and meaningful impact upon Jewish voting behaviour and political attitudes. As a general rule, where there is little difference between parties or candidates in relation to Israel, the traditional voting patterns of Jews will be maintained; where there is support for Israel on one side, and opposition to it on the other, Jewish electors will be under strong pressure to register their support of Israel in their voting preference.*

* An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Fifth International Seminar of Bar Ilan University's Institute for Judaism and Contemporary Thought, held at Kibbutz Lavi, June 1975. This and other Conference papers will appear in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., *The Jewish Political Tradition and its Contemporary Uses*, Ohio State University Press, forthcoming.

NOTES

[1] For a useful analysis illustrating such a position, see David Spitz, 'A Liberal Perspective on Liberalism and Conservatism' in R. A. Goldwin, ed., *Left, Right and Center*, Chicago, 1965, pp. 18–41.

[2] See L. Fuchs, *The Political Behavior of American Jews*, Glencoe, Ill., 1956; E. Litt, 'Status, Ethnicity and Patterns of Jewish Voting Behavior in Baltimore', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 22, no. 3, July 1960, pp. 159–64; M. Guysenir, 'Jewish Vote in Chicago', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 20, no. 4, October 1958, pp. 198–214; and M. Levy and M. Kramer, *The Ethnic Factor: How America's Minorities Decide Elections*, New York, 1973.

[3] See G. Alderman, 'Not Quite British: The Political Attitudes of Anglo-Jewry', in I. Crewe, ed., *British Political Sociology Yearbook*, vol. 2, London, 1975, pp. 188–211.

[4] See P. Y. Medding, *From Assimilation to Group Survival*, Melbourne, 1968; P. Y. Medding, 'Factors Influencing the Voting Behaviour of Melbourne Jews', in P. Y. Medding, ed., *Jews in Australian Society*, Melbourne, 1973, pp. 141–59. For evidence that Jews in Sydney did not share this Left preference as long as those in Melbourne, see S. Encel, B. Buckley, and J. Sofer Schreiber, *The New South Wales Jewish Community: A Survey* (mimeo), School of Sociology, University of New South Wales, 1972, pp. 114–15.

[5] See S. M. Lipset, *Political Man*, Anchor edition, New York, 1963, p. 256.

[6] While this is true of all these countries, the most outstanding example is Britain, where by 1974 there were 46 Jewish M.P.s of whom 32 were Labour (about 10 per cent of the Labour members). Interestingly in view of our later

analysis, the number of Jewish Conservative M.P.s rose from 2 in 1955–1966, to 9 in 1970, and 12 in 1974. See Alderman, op. cit., pp. 197–9.

[7] See R. Michels, *Political Parties*, Glencoe, Ill., 1915, pp. 275–6 and W. Cohn, 'The Politics of American Jews', in M. Sklare, ed., *The Jews: Social Patterns of An American Group*, Glencoe, Ill., 1959, pp. 614–26.

[8] See Fuchs, op. cit., pp. 100–11; and Medding, *From Assimilation . . .*, op. cit., pp. 254–63.

[9] See R. Dahl, *Who Governs?*, New Haven, Conn., 1961, pp. 23–25; R. Wolfinger, 'The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 59, no. 4, December 1965, pp. 896–908; and M. Parenti, 'Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 61, no. 3, September 1967, pp. 717–26.

[10] See E. Banfield and J. Q. Wilson, *City Politics*, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, p. 234.

[11] Fuchs, op. cit., pp. 171–203.

[12] See Medding, 'Factors Influencing . . .', op. cit., and C. S. Liebman, *The Ambivalent American Jew*, Philadelphia, 1973, pp. 135–68.

[13] Michels, op. cit.

[14] Lipset, op. cit.

[15] G. Lenski, *The Religious Factor*, New York, 1961.

[16] W. Cohn, op. cit.

[17] W. Cohn, op. cit.

[18] Liebman, op. cit., pp. 156–7.

[19] The term is used by Leonard Fein, 'The New Left and Israel' in M. Chertoff, ed., *The New Left and the Jews*, New York, 1971, p. 144.

[20] Norman Podhoretz, *Commentary*, vol. 52, no. 3, August 1971, pp. 4–10.

[21] This is a survey by the National Opinion Research Center (Chicago), commissioned by Dr. Melvin Kohn of the National Institute of Mental Health, quoted in S. D. Isaacs, *Jews and American Politics*, New York, 1974, p. 148.

[22] N. Glazer, 'Jewish Interests and the New Left', in M. Chertoff, ed., op. cit., pp. 152–65.

[23] On this point see Bela Vago, 'The Attitude towards the Jews as a Criterion of the Left–Right Concept' in Bela Vago and George L. Mosse, eds., *Jews and Non-Jews in Eastern Europe 1918–1945*, New York, 1974, pp. 21–50.

[24] ibid., pp. 22–26, 35–38.

[25] ibid., p. 42.

[26] Ezra Mendelsohn, 'The Dilemma of Jewish Politics in Poland: Four Responses', in Vago and Mosse, eds., op. cit., p. 208.

[27] ibid., p. 213.

[28] Vago, op. cit., p. 40.

[29] ibid., p. 39.

[30] ibid., pp. 38–40.

[31] ibid., pp. 43–44.

[32] E. Feit, 'Community in a Quandary: The South African Jewish Community and Apartheid', *Race*, vol. 8, no. 4, 1967, p. 402.

[33] On the racial policies of the various South African political parties, see C. P. Potholm, *Four African Political Systems*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970, p. 100.

[34] It has made many statements in this vein over the years. See, for example, *South African Jewish Board of Deputies Report 1970–2*, p. 6.

[35] Haim Avni, 'Latin America' in Louis Henkin, ed., *World Politics and the Jewish Condition*, New York, 1972, p. 251.

[36] ibid., p. 261.

[37] As I shall not examine the case of Czechoslovakia in any depth, reference should be made to Vago, op. cit., pp. 30, 42–43.

[38] See notes 2 and 4 above.

[39] Alderman, op. cit., pp. 189–90.

[40] ibid., p. 195.

[41] See W. Cohn, op. cit., and B. Wasserstein, 'Jews, The Left and the Elections in France', *Midstream*, vol. 19, no. 7, August/September 1973, pp. 41–54.

[42] M. Sklare and J. Greenblum, *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier*, New York, 1967, p. 322.

[43] N. Glazer, 'The Crisis in American Jewry', *Midstream*, vol. 16, no. 9, November 1970, p. 5.

[44] Arthur Hertzberg, President of the American Jewish Congress and an 'old liberal', quoted in Isaacs, op. cit., p. 166.

[45] L. Harris and B. Swanson, *Black-Jewish Relations in New York City*, New York, 1970, pp. 104–7, quoted in W. Schneider, M. D. Berman, and M. Schultz, 'Bloc Voting Reconsidered: "Is There a Jewish Vote?" ', *Ethnicity* vol. 1, no. 4, December 1974, pp. 345–92.

[46] Schneider *et al.*, op. cit., p. 364.

[47] L. Fein, 'Liberalism and American Jews', *Midstream*, vol. 19, no. 8, October 1973, p. 8. Cf. the Sklare and Greenblum figure above, where nearly two-thirds thought it essential or desirable.

[48] Schneider *et al.*, op. cit., pp. 384–5.

[49] Levy and Kramer, op. cit., p. 110; Isaacs, op. cit., p. 163.

[50] ibid., p. 171.

[51] ibid., p. 119.

[52] See the table in Levy and Kramer, op. cit., p. 100.

[53] Guysenir, op. cit., found that the Republican vote among Jews increased as socio-economic status (SES) improved. By way of contrast, Litt, op. cit., found that Jews with the highest SES were more Democrat than were those with a lower SES.

[54] Levy and Kramer, op. cit., p. 243.

[55] ibid., p. 117.

[56] ibid., p. 110.

[57] See the graph in Schneider *et al.*, op. cit., p. 348.

[58] B. Rosenberg and I. Howe, 'Are American Jews Turning to the Right?', *Dissent*, vol. 21, Winter 1974, p. 40.

[59] Levy and Kramer, op. cit., p. 244.

[60] Ben Wattenberg, quoted in Isaacs, op. cit., p. 181.

[61] As Arthur Hertzberg put it: 'It's in the interests of Jews and blacks to work this out together. Let's put it this way. I didn't ship any blacks over here as slaves, I never owned any slaves, but I feel a common responsibility for slavery. If prices ought to be paid, and I believe they should be—I just want [the Gentiles'] children to have to pay as well as mine.' See Isaacs,

op. cit., p. 166. Similarly, Ben Wattenberg, in affirming that Jews want 'all the things that used to be called "liberal" ', goes on to say: 'But they are not prepared to pay the price of social disruption for it'. See Isaacs, op. cit., p. 181.

[62] Views of this kind have been strongly stated by Glazer, op. cit.; by Podhoretz, op. cit., and also in 'Is it Good for the Jews?', *Commentary*, vol. 53, no. 2, February 1972, pp. 12–14. See also S. M. Lispet, *Group Life in America*, New York, 1972, pp. 21–23.

[63] There is evidence for this in Harris and Swanson, pp. 122–30, cited by Schneider *et al.*, op. cit., p. 389.

[64] This ideological view is taken from Rosenberg and Howe, op. cit., pp. 41–42.

[65] Alderman, op. cit., pp. 204–6.

[66] ibid.

[67] Levy and Kramer, op. cit., p. 243.

[68] Wasserstein, op. cit., and L. Abrams, 'France Votes', *Midstream*, vol. 21, no. 1, January 1975.

THE SOCIALLY DISADVANTAGED PEER GROUP IN THE ISRAELI RESIDENTIAL SETTING

Mordecai Arieli and Yitzhak Kashti

RESIDENTIAL education is more widespread in Israel than in many other countries. Approximately 18 per cent of Jewish youths between the ages of 13 and 17 are educated in residential frameworks in 350 institutions in Israel.[1] Beyond the age of 15, which is the age of the end of compulsory education in that country, the proportion of pupils in residential frameworks reaches some 25 per cent. Of these residential settings, 145 may be regarded as normative socializing alternatives to the ordinary secondary day schools; and these are populated by over half of all the pupils in residential settings. Further, there are 66 residential Yeshivot for the secondary school age-groups; approximately 50 settings for 'Youth Groups' in various kibbutsim—that is, residential institutions for adolescents whose families live in towns; and some 90 re-socializing institutions which cater for social and other 'deviations' of various types—such as correctional and treatment institutions.[2]

The prevalence of residential education in Israel has its source in two processes. First, the traditional Jewish society in both East and West was accustomed to sending the adolescent son away from home to study at a Yeshiva or prestigious Torah Centre. His studying in a Yeshiva promoted the adolescent's social standing in the community. Second, in pre-State days (before 1948), going on *hachsharah*—that is, joining a kibbuts youth group in Palestine or a training farm abroad—was considered a desirable stage in the progress towards fulfilment of the Zionist ideology. Thus, education away from home was perceived not only as treatment for deviants (delinquents, retarded, etc.) or those in need of shelter (for example, orphans, cripples), but also as providing élitist frameworks (the Yeshiva) or shaping a social avant-garde (kibbutsim, training farms).

With the establishment of the State, in addition to 'correctional' and 'treatment' institutions, four main types of residential education emerged. In the course of time these developed quantitatively, in the

diversity of their aims and their organization patterns, to become educational settings acceptable to broader and more variegated social strata: traditional and high school Yeshivot,[3] agricultural schools[4] and kibbuts youth groups,[5] youth villages for immigrant children,[6] and vocational residential schools. During the last two decades these residential institutions have served varied populations: young immigrants, native-born children from culturally mainstream families, and native-born children from a disadvantaged social background, who were usually placed in one heterogeneous framework. The heterogeneous nature of the population with regard to its social background was reflected also in differences in ability and achievements, and this helped—so the educators believed—the process of social integration, with the middle-class children presumably serving as models for imitation and identification in cognitive and affective areas. Partial confirmation of this process with regard to several affective aspects has been found in several studies.[7]

Two new trends which have recently emerged are likely to change the structure of the Israeli residential setting. First, the decrease in immigration to Israel means that fewer young persons from European countries are absorbed in residential education, while the maintenance fees required of culturally mainstream parents who are not entitled to governmental or public support[8] are unprecedentedly high and beyond the means of the average family. These factors yearly reduce the proportion of pupils from established social groups in residential settings. Secondly, in 1972, the Youth Aliyah Department, which is the largest agency for residential education in Israel, decided on special programmes for the intake of disadvantaged youth in its affiliated residential settings. Thus, in the 1976/77 school year some 90 per cent of Youth Aliyah's pupils can be classified as socially disadvantaged, while the remaining 10 per cent are new immigrant children who have come to Israel from the U.S.S.R. and English-speaking countries in the last four years and whose cultural background and educational attainments are similar to the norms prevalent among Israeli-born youths from the mainstream culture and middle-class groups.

The residential setting and the disadvantaged pupil

The failure of the disadvantaged in early adolescence is expressed mainly in the day school, which determines the conditions for success in the mainstream culture. On the one hand, the pattern of early socialization in the family tended to operate in a way which prevented success at school, and on the other hand the remedial influence of the school was limited by the simultaneous influence of the culture of the home and neighbourhood. The assumption which lies at the basis of the removal of the disadvantaged youth from his home and his placement

in the residential school is that preventing the clash between the counter influences of two conflicting cultures and exposing the disadvantaged youth over a period of several years to the daily influence of the residential institution (which acts primarily as an agent of the mainstream culture), may, under conditions which will be described below, operate in the direction of rehabilitating his functioning and adjustment.[9]

Feuerstein[10] claims that the residential setting may make effective use of the escape modality of adaptation, which is a possible type of response of youths in early adolescence to the situations of anxiety and instability typical of this stage. This adaptation modality was described by Hartmann as one of three possibilities of adaptation modalities. The young adolescent may respond to anxieties resulting from the changes he undergoes in adolescence by attempting to change the outside world (alloplastic orientation), frequently expressed in the tendency for 'acting out', or by attempting to adapt to the changes occurring both in the external and internal world (autoplastic orientation), an attempt involving intensive emotional and cognitive activity. Alongside these two solutions Hartmann described the escape modality of adaptation as another possible response to the anxiety resulting from the internal and external changes in adolescence. This type of response motivates the adolescent to leave the battlefield, to leave the environment where the conflict takes place, and to seek new horizons.[11]

Emotional and cognitive deprivation prevents the disadvantaged adolescent from adopting the autoplastic modality of response. Two possibilities may be open to him: aggressive and manipulative behaviour; or abandoning the environment where the conflicts and failures occur, his family and local school.

Feuerstein believes that the adolescent's need to break away from his original environment, as expressed in the escape modality of response, is apt to contribute to his willingness to leave home and turn over a new leaf. The possibilities offered by the residential setting may arouse in him new hopes for adjustment and development.[12]

The disadvantaged adolescent's entry into the residential setting may be considered as entry into a world governed and guided by the values and norms of the social centre—in other words, entry into the class and culture which determine the criteria for success in society as a whole.

In principle, there is considerable identity in the educational goals of the day school and of the educational residential setting. However, the adolescent's prospects of experiencing success in the residential framework are apparently higher than those he had in the day school. While the latter concentrates on transmitting norms of achievement and provides rewards principally for scholastic success, the residential school tends to extend the range of behaviours which are met with approval and reinforcement, in a direction which may give the disadvantaged adolescent the experience of achievement and the feeling of

success which follows in its wake. The cognitive and affective deprivation limit the adolescent's prospects of success in the areas chosen by the day school, but do not deprive him of success in behaviours connected with social relations, which are met with approval and support in the residential setting. These rewards alter the perceiving of learning as the main criterion for evaluating others and reduce the anxiety typical of the disadvantaged adolescent in the face of his failure, to an extent which permits him to make renewed attempts to study.[13]

As the residential setting extends over an entire life situation, it permits the adolescent to express himself in this realm in areas where his levels of functioning and adaptation have not been impaired by cognitive and affective deprivation. The decentralized organization structure allows for belonging to, and mobility in, several social subsystems—such as the school, the educational group, the work branch, or the extra-curricular study circle.

Furthermore, the residential school—whether because of traditional attachments to pioneering ideologies,[14] and whether because of an objective need for pupils to maintain the farm[15] and the services[16]—often tends to emphasize occupational values and provide rewards for them, often no less than the rewards given for success in academic studies.

Most of the members of the staff operate in the educational setting as bearers of specific roles and as mediators of different expectations to the pupils, each in his specialized field. In this way, the principle and the practice of role differentiation are mediated to the inmates.

The *madrich* (housefather) and *metapelet* (housemother), acting in the residential setting *in loco parentis*,[17] help the disadvantaged pupils to cope with the isolated world of the residential institution. They bring him into contact with all the different fields—such as the school, the extra-curricular programmes, and the services—, co-ordinate these fields on the basis of his needs, and help him to clarify his actions and reactions. Thus the disadvantaged adolescent is perceived by the houseparents not on the basis of the categorized abilities and inclinations of a member of a disadvantaged group, but as a charge being helped by them to integrate his or her personality. On the one hand, this role concept develops in the *madrich* and the *metapelet* an attitude of acceptance towards the pupils; on the other hand, their accepting attitude supports the individual who, perhaps, continues to fail in some of the aspects of his role as a pupil.

The first experience of success and the feeling of acceptance on the part of the *madrich* and the *metapelet* which accompany the disadvantaged adolescent in the course of his education in the residential setting are apt to lower the level of anxiety which had characterized him in the face of his repeated failures in the day school. These experiences apparently help to bring about a gradual transformation of the pattern

of escape response and alloplastic response which, as stated, tend to operate in the disadvantaged adolescent as central adaptation modalities, into the autoplastic response pattern and readiness for change.

The decentralized structure of the residential school, the various sub-systems operating concurrently, the approval and reinforcements given to the pupils for various types of behaviour, and the integrating role of the *madrich* and *metapelet*—all these direct the socialization processes of the setting towards various aspects in the pupil's personality and lend a versatile nature to the attempts at promoting the pupil. The approach, which is also the stated educational goal of various residential settings,[18] declares a kind of special moratorium for disadvantaged children in early adolescence, the aim being to prolong the period of their childhood and enable them to improve their level of functioning in cognitive and affective domains, and is not confined to training for specific skills.

The peer group in the residential setting

The inmate interacts with his peers and with adults on the educational staff. These interactions differ from each other in several ways:

(1) *The place and time of the interaction.* Interactions between the adolescent and the staff individually or in groups take place at set times in one of the sub-systems of the institution. In the morning he meets the teachers in the classroom, in the evening he meets the *madrichim* in the dormitory, and in the afternoon the extra-curricular instructors in the workshops, and so forth. However, the pupil has many contacts with his friends at other times and places, extending initially over all sections of the institution and all times of the day.

(2) *The role expectations directed towards the individual.* On the one hand, different staff members transmit various role expectations to the pupils, generally in accordance with their own specialities. The role expectations directed towards him or her by his friends are, on the other hand, more diffuse and expressive in nature and appeal to broader aspects of his characteristics and abilities.

(3) *Social status.* While the pupil's status in the given social system is different from that of the staff, owing to age and role differences, all the inmates in this peer-group-oriented setting have a fairly equal status.

(4) *Level of contacts.* The partial nature of the pupil's contacts with the staff in time and place, and their differential character, give them the nature of secondary relations[19] as opposed to the nature of primary ones typifying the relations among the pupils themselves because of their inclusiveness, their diffusiveness, and the common characteristics of the adolescent peer group.

These characteristics which tend to define the quality of the interactions among the pupils as opposed to their interactions with the

adult staff, are at the basis of our assumption that the peer group includes some of the major significant others and forms a cohesive informal system. In this way the peer group in the residential setting constitutes a central source of social learning, of supply of models for imitation and identification, and the most powerful instrument for changing attitudes.[20]

The status of the peers emphasizes the importance of the composition of their population with reference to the question, To what extent are they likely to serve as suitable agents of the changes which the institution seeks to bring about in its pupils? More specifically, we must ask, What is the optimal composition of the pupil population in the residential institution which seeks to rehabilitate disadvantaged youth, that is, to advance their level of functioning in the cognitive and affective fields, and also their level of adaptation to the norms and demands of the agents of the mainstream culture? What are the advantages and disadvantages of a homogeneous population as regards factors in the family background and level of functioning, as compared to a heterogeneous population? What levels of functioning in the disadvantaged require each of these types of population for their rehabilitation? What degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity is required for the advancement of a population at a given level?

The benefits of the heterogeneous population for the advancement of the disadvantaged have been brought out in the work of Coleman and his associates,[21] which shows that a heterogeneous class where mainstream and disadvantaged children study together is effective for the cognitive advancement and school achievements of the latter, provided that their number is slightly less than the number of mainstream children. The study also shows that the influence of the heterogeneous composition is particularly effective during adolescence. Coleman and his colleagues tended to interpret this finding against the background of the attitudes that the new reference group, based on representatives of the middle class, introduced to the disadvantaged youngsters through social learning which changed their motivational system.

The work of Coleman and his colleagues dealt with an entire range —from culturally deprived to firmly based in American mainstream culture. Both the disadvantaged and the mainstream youngsters represented many varied levels of ability and socio-cultural background. It should be asked, therefore, whether their rather generalized conclusion concerning the advantages of the heterogeneous class for the disadvantaged is valid for youth representing all levels of cultural deprivation. For example, what will be the effect on the lowest level of the culturally deprived population of mixing with adolescents of a high level? Will the rules of social learning operate on youths where the gap between them and the models offered them for identification and imitation is particularly great?

The problem of the gap between the disadvantaged and the middle class is particularly prominent in the light of the findings concerning patterns of cognitive development.[22] Kohlberg, for example, dealing with the stages of normal development as an aspect of cognitive development, reports that his subjects showed understanding of the stage of moral development at which they stood and of lower stages, and also understanding of moral statements of the stage immediately above their present one. However, they failed to understand moral statements from a realm of content of two or more stages beyond their present one.[23] Wolins,[24] referring to this finding, says that not much good will come of setting up an environment (residential) demanding a level of ability (of moral judgement or other) higher than the level of the inmate. According to him, this situation is liable to hinder or paralyse. The education of disadvantaged youths in a homogeneous residential setting from the point of view of level of functioning and home background factors primarily permits the three following conditions:

(1) *Similarity of the models and their modes of behaviour.* Among the factors affecting the modelling process which leads to social learning, Bronfenbrenner presents two factors which indicate the advantage of the homogeneous setting: the inductive power of the model grows to the extent that the person sees the model as resembling him; and a number of models representing similar modes of behaviour are more powerful modifiers than a single model.[25] The homogeneous peer group in the residential institution apparently permits the forming of models which fulfil these conditions more than does the heterogeneous peer group.

(2) *Social contacts without stigma.* In the mixed peer group where the disadvantaged child takes part in the day school and the social meeting-places in his town, he tends to be conscious of his difference in relation to his friends of middle-class origin. This difference, which is characterized by intellectual and socio-economic inferiority, is bound up with feelings of abasement, which lower his self-concept and seem to lead to aggressive or escape modalities of adaptation.[26] The homogeneous setting gives the adolescent a sense of security whose source is in the opportunity for inclusive social contacts without stigma,[27] even if it does not, apparently, solve the problem of the stigma set by the general society related to the fact of his belonging to an institution for the different.

(3) *Realizable educational aims.* In a heterogeneous setting the educators must introduce educational goals, particularly concerning the curriculum, which present a challenge to the middle-class children as well. The homogeneous setting, on the other hand, can adapt goals suited to the manifest level of functioning of its pupils. The absence of middle-class peers allows the institution to encourage the pupils to regress to age levels at which basic cognitive skills are learned, as well as the ordinary school subjects they missed at the time because of the

deprivation caused by their environment. In these conditions, the conflict between the adolescent's role concept and the child's level of functioning becomes less powerful. This state of affairs is apt to give the pupil a sense of security which will help to reinforce his motivational system and reduce anxiety.

The principal danger for disadvantaged adolescents in the homogeneous setting is also rooted in the potential influence of the peer group as opposed to the influence of the adult staff. In his monograph on the group of delinquents living in Cottage Six, Polsky[28] shows how, under conditions of intensive relations among the peers, the deviation the staff is trying to fight may become a social norm. For our purpose, there is a danger that the depriving sub-culture may be reinforced under the conditions of a homogeneous setting.

Nevertheless, it should be remembered that whereas Cottage Six operated as a total institution which the inmates were coerced into joining, entry into most residential settings in Israel is of a voluntary nature and involves the pupils' willingness to change, which calls for compromise and also a certain conformity to the norms offered by the educational staff. These characteristics appear to help resolve the potential conflict between the boarding school culture and the youth culture. In conclusion, it seems that the most decisive factors determining the optimal degree of heterogeneity or homogeneity in the peer group are connected with the initial level of functioning of the disadvantaged.

Although the effects of homogeneous versus heterogeneous peer groups in residential settings in Israel in rehabilitating socially disadvantaged pupils have not yet been directly compared, it appears that the heterogeneous setting will better serve youths of a relatively high level of functioning, who can face up to the educational requirements of the institution with a normative curriculum, and can, by social learning, make effective use of models from among their middle-class peers, both in changing their motivational and value systems, and as a result of intellectual stimulation of cognitive resources as yet unrealized owing to deprivation in their early socialization.

The homogeneous setting, on the other hand, is more suitable for pupils of particularly low levels of functioning and adaptation. These are less capable of effectively using models from middle-class peers, both on account of the size of the gap and because of their unreadiness to cope with the requirements of the curriculum. A homogeneous peer group, which permits social contacts without stigma, has realizable educational goals, and provides similar models for imitation and identification, will probably be found more effective.

NOTES

[1] For example, while the U.S.S.R. has 2 per cent (1966 figures) of its total school population in residential schools, England and Wales have 1·9 per cent. See R. Lambert, R. Bullock, and S. Millham, *The Chance of a Lifetime? A Study of Boys' and Coeducational Boarding Schools in England and Wales*, London, 1975, pp. 11–16.

[2] The 145 residential socializing settings include 60 which are either chiefly academically-oriented or which combine secular academic and rabbinical studies (*Yeshivot Tichoniyot*), 50 vocational and technical schools, 25 agricultural schools and 10 naval or maritime schools. Most of these residential schools prepare some of their pupils for the Israeli Certificate of Matriculation (*Bagrut*) and offer the others either four-year courses which do not include preparation for the *Bagrut* or shorter—usually vocational—courses of one to three years. The 66 Yeshivot stress mostly the study of 'Torah for its own sake' (without *Bagrut*). For about half of the 50 'Youth Groups' in the kibbutsim, there are four-year courses which offer academically-oriented programmes. The other half are *Hachsharoth Tseiroth*, or 'Training Groups for Adolescents'; they offer one to three year programmes, which include advancement in the learning of basic skills as well as experience in agricultural work, to youths aged 15–16 who previously dropped out of the Israeli Education System. Of the 90 re-socializing settings, 30 cater to 'maladjusted youths' and about 60 are small settings (with fewer than 70 students) which admit pupils who are classed as deviants in other respects (such as retarded). Sources: *The Prime Minister's Commission on Children and Youth in Distress*, Appendix 7: 'Residential education network for youths living away from home' (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1973; and Internal publications, Youth Aliyah Dept., Ministry of Social Welfare (in Hebrew).

Approximately 85 per cent of Israel's residential school pupils are maintained by government or other public funds. The main screening and placement agency is the Youth Aliyah Department of the Jewish Agency, which was founded in 1933 as a youth immigration project, but since 1972 has dealt mainly with socially disadvantaged adolescents (J. Carlebach, *The Future of Youth Aliyah*, London, 1968; M. Arieli, 'The residential treatment centres of Youth Aliyah', *Forum for Residential Therapy*, vol. 4, no. 2, 1972, pp. 331–42; M. Gottesmann, 'The care of the disadvantaged child in Israel', paper delivered at the Annual Conference of British Youth Aliyah, London, March 1977).

The Ministry for Social Welfare deals chiefly with the screening and placement of children 'in need of special care', while the Rural Education Department of the Ministry of Education looks after children who choose agricultural training.

Most of the residential schools connected with Youth Aliyah belong to public, often party, organizations. Youth Aliyah finances the upkeep (board) and the extra-curricular activities of the pupils recruited by it, through the payment of monthly 'maintenance fees', while the Ministry of Education finances their schooling. Youth Aliyah usually charges the parents 'contribution fees' for the maintenance of their children according to the parents' income. This is usually a relatively small sum (less than 25 per cent of the

actual 'maintenance fees'). Parents of Youth Aliyah children are usually exempt from paying their children's fees.

The Ministry of Welfare almost always exempts parents from paying for the maintenance and schooling of their children. Parents of pupils admitted to agricultural residential schools sponsored by the Rural Education Department pay both maintenance and graded tuition fees.

[3] M. Munk, 'The Residential *Yeshiva*', in M. Wolins and M. Gottesmann, eds., *Group Care: The Israeli Approach*, New York, 1971, pp. 176–95.

[4] G. Katz, 'Mikve Yisrael', *Yesodoth—the Israel (Hebrew) Residential Education Review*, vol. 9, 1970, pp. 64–81.

[5] M. Wolins, 'The kibbutz as foster-mother: Maimonides applied', in Wolins and Gottesmann, eds., op. cit., pp. 73–89.

[6] Y. Kashti, 'Educational and organizational trends in the youth village', in Wolins and Gottesmann, eds., op. cit., pp. 124–39.

[7] For example, Nevo found disadvantaged pupils in residential settings no less socially popular than their middle-class peers. Kashti found that disadvantaged pupils in residential settings scored significantly higher than their peers in day schools in 'social skills', 'attitude to school' and 'attitude to education'; Arieli similarly found that disadvantaged pupils in residential settings scored significantly higher than their peers in day schools in 'self-concept-as-pupils' and 'scholastic achievement values'. See D. Nevo, 'The social popularity of pupils from the residential school project for gifted disadvantaged youth', in Y. Kashti and M. Arieli, eds., *Residential Settings: Socialization in Powerful Environments* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1976, pp. 203–25; Y. Kashti, 'The residential school and its influence on change in values and attitudes of disadvantaged adolescents', ibid., pp. 226–50; and M. Arieli, 'Values of scholastic achievement of disadvantaged adolescents in residential settings and Youth Day Centres', ibid., pp. 251–84.

[8] Some 15 per cent of the parents of boarders pay all or the major part of the 'maintenance fees' as their relatively high income does not entitle them to be supported by either Youth Aliyah or the Ministry of Welfare. See note 2 above.

[9] These processes have been discussed by us in Y. Kashti, 'Aspects of residential education and rehabilitation of the culturally disadvantaged', in M. Arieli, A. Lewy, and Y. Kashti, eds., *The Educative Village* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1976, pp. 116–38; M. Arieli, 'The preparatory residential setting and its influence on the self-concept-as-pupils of its charges', in ibid., pp. 139–48; and Y. Kashti and M. Arieli, 'Residential schools as powerful environments', *Mental Health and Society*, vol. 3, no. 3–4, 1976, pp. 223–232.

[10] R. Feuerstein, 'The redevelopment of the socio-culturally disadvantaged adolescent in group care', in Wolins and Gottesmann, eds., op. cit., pp. 232–45.

[11] The three modalities of adaptation are described in H. Hartmann, *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*, New York, 1958. See in particular pp. 26–27.

[12] Feuerstein, op. cit., p. 237.

[13] R. Feuerstein and D. Krasilowsky, 'The "treatment group" technique', in Wolins and Gottesmann, eds., op. cit., pp. 140–65.

[14] Y. Kashti, 'Educational and organizational trends in the youth village', in ibid., pp. 124–39.

[15] In addition to the agricultural schools which have farms, many of the present academic and vocational residential schools in Israel were until the mid 1950's agricultural schools which were converted to assume their present roles owing to industrialization and urbanization processes which Israeli society underwent during that period. However, some of these retained parts of their farms.

[16] Pupils usually play an important role in cleaning the dormitories and the campus lawns and in helping the kitchen and the dining hall staff. Senior pupils are engaged in guarding and securing the campus.

[17] The *madrich* and the *metapelet* are child-care workers in charge of a group, usually co-educative, which is composed of 18–40 pupils of the same age group. Their roles are diffuse: group integration, individual care, supervision of homework and supervision of the cleanliness and the tidiness of the group's dormitory. Some *madrichim* work also as part-time teachers. For a discussion of the roles of the *madrich* and the *metapelet* see S. Shlasky, 'Changes in the role of the residential Madrich' (in Hebrew), in Kashti and Arieli, eds., op. cit., pp. 144–57; and S. Shlasky, 'The role of the residential Metapelet', *Yesodoth—the Israeli (Hebrew) Residential Education Review*, vol. 16–17, 1977, pp. 62–73.

[18] See, for example, R. Nevo, 'Education outside the home in *Neve Hadassah*', *Yesodoth—the Israeli (Hebrew) Residential Education Review*, vol. 5, 1968, pp. 33–43.

[19] Exceptions to this are the *madrichim* and the *metaplot*. See note 17 above.

[20] For discussions of the role of the peer group's informal system within residential settings see, for example, R. Feuerstein and D. Krasilowsky, 'The treatment group technique', in Wolins and Gottesmann, eds., op. cit., pp. 140–65 and R. Lambert, S. Millham, and R. Bullock, 'The informal social system', in R. Brown, ed., *Knowledge, Education and Culture*, London, 1973, pp. 297–316.

[21] J. S. Coleman *et al.*, *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, Washington, 1966. See pp. 29–30, 331.

[22] See, for example, J. Piaget, 'The growth of thought, intuition and operations' in *The Psychology of Intelligence*, London, 1967, pp. 119–55.

[23] L. Kohlberg, 'Stage and sequence: the cognitive-developmental approach to socialization', in D. Goslin, ed., *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research*, Chicago, 1969, p. 836.

[24] M. Wolins, 'The Benevolent Asylum: Some Theoretical Observations on Institutional Care', unpublished paper prepared for presentation at Child Care Institutions: A Working Conference on Policy and Planning, the University of Chicago, Center for Continuing Education, Chicago, 1971.

[25] A. Bronfenbrenner, 'Social factors in personality development' (in Hebrew), *Megamot*, no. 15, 1970, pp. 348–63; p. 352.

[26] Feuerstein, op. cit., p. 237.

[27] M. Hamburger, 'The milieu is the message: some observations on powerful environments', in Wolins and Gottesmann, eds., op. cit., pp. 264–74.

[28] H. W. Polsky, *Cottage Six: The Social System of Delinquent Boys in Residential Treatment*, New York, 1965, pp. 122–35.

THE CONQUEST OF A COMMUNITY? THE ZIONISTS AND THE BOARD OF DEPUTIES IN 1917

Stuart A. Cohen

HISTORIANS of the Balfour Declaration, issued in November 1917, have conventionally attached some significance to the meeting held at the Board of Deputies of British Jews on 17 June of the same year. On that day, the Board—which was generally (if inappropriately) regarded as the 'parliament' of Anglo-Jewry—appeared finally to disavow its previous opposition to Zionism. More precisely, a majority of members present passed a motion of censure on their President who, without consulting the Board, had signed an anti-Zionist *Manifesto* published in *The Times* some three weeks earlier.[1] This resolution had an immediate effect on the triangular relationship between the British Government, the Zionists, and the Conjoint Committee (an overwhelmingly anti-Zionist group, in whose name the *Manifesto* had been issued, consisting largely of representatives of the Board and of the Anglo-Jewish Association—AJA). Hitherto, the members of the Conjoint Committee had negotiated with the Government from a supposed position of strength. Their opposition to the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, they claimed, was representative of the views of the main body of Anglo-Jewry; the Zionists represented no more than a fringe faction. This position became untenable once the Board had expressed its 'profound disapproval' of the publication of the Manifesto and had called upon its representatives to resign from the Conjoint Committee 'forthwith'. They did so.

Henceforth, Chaim Weizmann could claim virtually sole command of the Jewish forces in this particular field of high diplomacy, and acted as the spokesman of a party which had gained the support of the most important representative institution in the Anglo-Jewish community. It was futile for Lucien Wolf, secretary to the Conjoint, to claim otherwise and to point out that a similar motion of censure had not been supported at an earlier meeting of the Council of the AJA. The vote at the Board, not the AJA, was considered to reflect the true state of Anglo-Jewish feeling, and it led to the comment at the Foreign Office that,

'Evidently, Mr. Wolf is now in decline.'[2] Apparently relieved, therefore, from any previous commitment it might have made to the Conjoint's position, the Government felt free to move deliberately, albeit cautiously, towards a close association with the Zionists and in the direction of the ultimate Declaration on Palestine.

The present article does not intend to retrace this particular chapter of Zionist diplomacy, which is exhaustively treated in the existing literature. It aims, rather, to direct attention to a somewhat different, although related, aspect of the episode—the meaning of the vote at the Board of Deputies in terms of internal Jewish communal politics. At this level of enquiry, one particularly 'radical' interpretation of the event appears to have entered the realm of Anglo-Jewish folklore. The vote at the Board is regarded as an expression of the inexorable progress of Zionist feeling within the community and to have been the result of a sustained Zionist campaign to overthrow those of the Movement's opponents who claimed to be communal leaders. It brought about a fundamental 'revolution' in Anglo-Jewish politics. The rejection of the anti-Nationalist attitude hitherto adopted by the Board heralded the end of a long period of strife within the community over the merits of Zionism; it also represented a significant stage in the process whereby the Zionists ultimately replaced the old plutocracy as the leaders of Anglo-Jewry. Indeed, after 1917 the entire leadership of the community is said to have been 'radically altered'. This was as much a matter of tone as of personnel. 'The spirit that henceforth animated the Board', it is claimed, 'marked a definite break with the past.' Ultimately, and following this lead, the community as a whole was soon to be captured for Zionism. The vote at the Board, in this view, opened the floodgates: increasing numbers of pro-Zionist resolutions were thereafter to be passed (often without demur) in a large number of communal bodies and in congregations belonging to the United Synagogue and the Federation of Synagogues.[3]

In common with other such 'whig' interpretations of history, this view of the significance of the proceedings at the Board in June 1917 is open to criticisms of both detail and substance. Most obviously, it is clear that the Zionists did not, at one fell swoop, conquer the entire community; to claim that they did so is to telescope a fairly protracted process, since there were still debates on Palestine at the Board itself as late as 1943. Significantly, the most substantial of the studies on the Balfour Declaration (by Leonard Stein) was rather cautious on this point. Summarizing the effects of the entire period, Stein pithily remarked that even after the publication of the Balfour Declaration 'there were still some implacable anti-Zionists'.[4] This was putting it mildly. To some extent, the vote at the Board, rather than assuaging the debate on Zionism, merely emphasized and increased the divisions within Anglo-Jewry on the subject. Several of the anti-Zionists on the

Board, instead of renouncing their opposition, founded the League of British Jews, with the avowed purpose of 'upholding the status of British subjects professing the Jewish religion' and 'resisting the allegation that Jews constitute a separate nationality'.[5] Many more, while not going to such extreme lengths, refused to become members of the Zionist Movement. In their view, the vote against the Conjoint Manifesto had not necessarily been a vote for Zionism. Ultimately, as the record of the debate of 17 June at the Board itself shows, the merits of the Movement were not the only, or indeed the principal, issues of the day. Only a chance constellation of events had allowed the debate on Zionism to be mixed up with a far more fundamental struggle for responsible leadership within the community—as was publicly stated by Simon Rowson, a Deputy who had himself voted with the majority against the Manifesto. The vote, he later claimed, was a victory for the contention that the members of the Board had a right to be consulted by their leaders and thus also a victory for communal democracy. He commented, 'I sincerely hope the decision will not be strained to represent support for the principles of the Zionist Organisation.'[6]

I

There is no implication here that the proceedings at the Board in June 1917 were irrelevant to the progress of Zionism within Anglo-Jewry. Undeniably, that was the first occasion on which an established communal institution, in its corporate form, had shown any inclination to relent in its hostility towards Zionism. As such, it marked a sharp change in standard practice. Hitherto, all discussions even remotely related to Zionism in such communal councils had been either bluntly stifled or drastically curtailed. Most of the senior Anglo-Jewish institutions of the period possessed well-defined functions; their executive officers were therefore not obliged to permit discussion on any and every matter of Jewish interest brought to their attention. On the contrary, they could legitimately claim that pressure of more formal and regular business precluded their doing so. The full reports which the *Jewish Chronicle* carried of the meetings of the more important religious, philanthropic, and political bodies indicated that this guillotine had been regularly and effectively employed, with almost complete success, whenever the subject of Zionism had been raised before 1917. It was most obviously so in the case of the community's principal ecclesiastical and social bodies. Thus, as early as 1897, the Elders of the Sephardi Congregation had attempted to muzzle Moses Gaster (their Haham), whose frequent expressions of support for Zionism they found embarrassing; they therefore exploited the occasion of a debate on ministerial salaries to instruct him to curtail his Zionist activities on the grounds that these were affecting his pastoral duties. By 1915, the same policy

was justified on the grounds that, owing to the War, 'there was no time to discuss small questions of sect'. Consequently, Sir Francis Montefiore (the president of the Elders and himself a quondam supporter of Herzl) bluntly 'refused all attempts on the part of individuals or associations to discuss the so-called Jewish question'.[7]

Similarly, all early attempts to introduce the topic into the Council of the United Synagogue (and the Annual General Meetings of some constituent synagogues), had been tersely ruled out of order. The appointment of such a staunch Zionist as Joseph Hertz to the Chief Rabbinate in 1912 might have indicated the possibilities of a change in this attitude. Yet, as late as 1915, it proved difficult to obtain sanction to table motions that synagogue representatives at the Board of Deputies demand the recognition of a 'special Jewish interest in Palestine.'[8] Meanwhile, Zionists had even been denied a platform at various non-synagogal forums which aspired to serve the intellectual needs of Anglo-Jewry's professional classes. Thus, once their initial curiosity about Herzl had subsided, prominent members of the Maccabeans insisted that a 'very innocent reference' to Zionism be expunged from their club's report; they also refused to give Ahad Ha'Am a hearing at the Association of Jewish Literary Societies, where even such a popular lecturer as Israel Zangwill had to agree to the qualification: 'not Zionism, or at least not much of it'[9] Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that English Zionists should long have suspected that they were being subjected to a 'boycott' and that they complained of a 'dead set against the movement in official and representative circles'.[10]

Admittedly, it had proved impossible to ban all mention of Zionism at either the Board of Deputies or the AJA before 1917. After all, the subscribers to the latter were supposedly committed to international political activity on behalf of their co-religionists; and the former elected delegates to the Conjoint Committee with a specific brief to take action on all matters affecting Jews abroad. Moreover, with the increase in the magnitude and urgency of several Jewish questions (including that of Palestine) after the outbreak of the World War, the work of the Conjoint Committee was subject to considerable public scrutiny and criticism. Individual Zionist members had long attempted to exploit these circumstances and to make their views heard at both the Board and the AJA. However, they had enjoyed little success before 1917. They had made very few breaches in the wall of resistance which both bodies had erected some two decades earlier, when the Board had been instructed 'steadfastly' to abstain from associating with the English Zionist Federation, and the AJA had been warned that 'for the work of the Association in conjunction with the Alliance (Israelite Universelle) . . . and for their relationship with the Governments of various countries, it was of cardinal importance that they should not seem to

commit themselves to, or in any way be in relation with, the Zionist movement'.[11] At most, the AJA and the Board had been prepared to consider a suggestion that they consult with Sokolow on the Russian situation (which they accepted in 1906); and to debate Wolffsohn's occasional invitations to 'General Jewish Conferences' on specific matters of common interest (which they usually declined).[12] Neither body, however, had felt any pressing need to heed the warnings of individual Zionist members that they respect the 'national aspirations of the Jewish masses and change their policies towards Zionism accordingly'.[13] In the case of the AJA (membership of which was open to persons willing to subscribe one guinea annually to its funds), such indifference was to be justified. There, as Lucien Wolf correctly informed the Foreign Office, sporadic Zionist 'snipings' had in no way affected the complexion of the Council, all the members of which were regularly re-elected before and during the War and most of whom remained convinced anti-Zionists long after it was over.[14] But even at the Board of Deputies there had been few indications of the storm which was to break in June 1917. Until then, the anti-Zionist Executive had been largely successful in parrying the criticisms which individual members had directed at the Conjoint Committee, and had evinced considerable resilience when retaining their traditional domination over the Board's affairs. As recently as March 1916, one motion—that the constitution of the Conjoint Committee be completely revised specifically to allow for predominant 'popular' (presumably Zionist) representation—had to be withdrawn for lack of support. Another, which specifically demanded the non-renewal of the Conjoint agreement between the Board and the AJA, was defeated by an overwhelming majority in the following June.[15] Subsequent more explicitly pro-Zionist motions presented to the Board were equally unsuccessful. Thus, after a lengthy and somewhat heated debate in October 1916, Sidney Newman was finally prevailed upon to withdraw his motion that 'the Conjoint Committee be urged to use its best endeavours towards the acquisition of Palestine as an internationally and legally safeguarded home for the Jews after the War'.[16] Even in May 1917, by which time the breakdown of negotiations between the Conjoint Committee and the Zionists was public knowledge, the supporters of the National programme could make little headway. A minority of the Deputies present (26) supported a motion presented by Rabbi Dr. Samuel Daiches that 'the President convene a special Meeting of Deputies for the purpose of considering the issuing of a declaration to the effect that the British Jews hope that the historical claims of the Jewish people on their ancient home-land will be recognised and that Palestine will be made a Jewish centre.'[17]

II

From one point of view, this record of the Board's earlier opposition to Zionism serves to emphasize the 'revolutionary' nature of the sympathetic resolution which its members passed on 17 June 1917, and thus to illustrate the extent of the Zionist achievement on that occasion. At the same time, however, it increases the difficulties of attempting to account for the alignment of Deputies which brought about that result. The disavowal of the Conjoint in 1917—precisely because it marked an apparently abrupt reversal of the previous voting pattern at the Board—cannot be attributed solely to the activities of a handful of Deputies who had hitherto constituted no more than a dissident minority. For this reason, it is difficult to accept the thesis that the victory of 17 June was accomplished by a defined and disciplined faction of Zionists at work within the Board. A hard core of Zionist sympathizers did sit on the Board as representatives of individual congregations, and they were decidedly vociferous; but they were not sufficiently numerous to bring about a communal revolution of the magnitude portrayed by later Zionist historiography without the aid of previously unsympathetic members. Non-Zionists, perhaps even anti-Zionists, still constituted the great majority of the Board in 1917 and it is clear that without the support of a substantial contingent of these Deputies the motion against the Conjoint Manifesto would never have been passed. A comparison of various sources suggests that of the Deputies who voted with the majority in June 1917, only about a dozen were active and prominent in Zionist affairs. This number must undoubtedly be increased in order to account for the 26 who had voted in support of Daiches's motion the previous May; but their weight must be balanced against such other, larger, interest groups as the members and supporters of the Conjoint Committee and such usually 'neutral' bodies as the B'nai B'rith and the United Council of Jewish Friendly Societies.[18] Certainly, on the eve of the critical vote of 17 June, the balance sheet looked (from the Zionist point of view) distinctly unfavourable. As Jacob Moser confided to Haham Moses Gaster only a fortnight before the debate, any attempt to convert either the Board or the AJA to Zionism was bound to prove 'extremely difficult'.[19]

This was especially bound to be so since, in effect, no organized Zionist 'faction' existed on the Board when the Conjoint Manifesto was censured; neither was the formation of any such caucus contemplated. A study of the Zionists' own views of their communal strategy reveals that the idea of forming an avowedly pro-Zionist pressure group at the Board was not seriously mooted until *after* the vote of 17 June (and then, in terms which indicate that the idea was sufficiently novel to discount suggestions that it might have represented merely an attempt to

improve upon a method which had already proved successful). Only in the spring of 1918 did Harry Sacher earnestly urge Simon Marks[20] to

> . . . carry through and organise all Zionist forces on the Board of Deputies. . . . We must form a Zionist party with Whips and endeavour to fill every vacancy with Zionists. . . . My idea about the party is that it should quite definitely declare that its organisation is not intended to affect the ordinary work of the Board or to introduce any kind of party vote but to create an organisation which would secure proper representation in full force on the Board when Palestine and related questions come up for discussion. We must have a central organisation for that and you have in London the material for it. There should be a provincial whip or whips and a London whip or whips and we should keep an account of the names of every member of the Board who is in sympathy and who is summoned to a special meeting.

The English Zionist Federation did not found a 'Communal Organisation Committee', deliberately intended to influence the composition of the Board, until the eve of the triennial election of Deputies in 1919. Only then were Zionists in England urged to take the 'immediate action' necessary to secure adequate Zionist representation there. Congregations already affiliated to the Board were instructed to 'select Zionist candidates who are able to attend the meetings of the Board in London regularly' and, if unable to do so, to 'write to this Committee, which will submit suitable names of London Residents'. Congregations not yet affiliated to the Board were educated in the manner of so doing.[21] Similarly, no determined efforts were made to co-ordinate the activities of the individual Zionists who already sat on the Board until after the 1919 elections were over. Only then was effect given to the Organisation Committee's recommendations that 'We could issue special whips, we could circularize and educate the waverers on the Board. We could bring pressure to bear on deputies from the Zionists in the institutions they represent. Moreover, we will devote ourselves to encouraging all congregations eligible to elect candidates in the Colonies to do so.'[22]

Admittedly, such ideas were not totally original. As early as the Second Basle Congress of 1898, Herzl had himself urged Zionists to 'conquer' the local Jewish communities.[23] Thereafter, his English lieutenants had indeed considered ways and means of implementing this plan by infiltrating Anglo-Jewry's principal institutions. In some cases, their task was considerably eased by the fact that several prominent Zionists already possessed influential footholds on these bodies: Gaster and Hertz were vice presidents of the AJA, of which Joseph Cowen was also a member; Zangwill was a leading Maccabean light; Herbert Bentwich and Leopold Greenberg were prominent members of the Deputies, and the latter also represented the Hampstead synagogue on the Council of the United Synagogue; and Sir Francis Montefiore,

even during his Zionist period, was a senior Elder of the Sephardi Congregation which he represented at the Deputies until 1913. In other instances, the Zionists hoped to force an entry into the communal arena by making token donations to charitable organizations ('as the means to the end of mixing with the better classes') and by placing some of their meetings on the agendas of the genteel 'drawing-room circuit'.[24] Activity of this kind might suggest the existence of an overall strategic pattern. Thus, attention might be drawn to the fact that even at an embryonic stage of Anglo-Zionist activity, Gaster attempted a judicious presentation of new candidates for communal offices. In 1899, for instance, he prodded both Sir Francis Montefiore and Leopold Greenberg to become eligible to stand for office at the AJA. 'I am going round to get more subscriptions', he wrote, 'so I can have a list of my own nominations for the next elections to the council'. He also encouraged several 'Zionist' synagogues in London to take the steps necessary to obtain representation at the Board of Deputies.[25] Greenberg, during the same period, seems to have toyed with the idea of furthering this policy; he attempted to impress upon both Herzl and Wolffsohn the importance of exploiting every sign of a difference of opinion over communal policy at the Board of Deputies, the AJA, and the Board of Guardians where, indeed, he, Bentwich and Cowen for some time constituted a noisy faction.[26]

It is tempting to view these efforts as portents of things to come—especially at the Board. Yet the evidence indicates otherwise. Ultimately, all the Zionists managed to do was to create some unpleasant 'scenes', for which they were soon branded as obstreperous troublemakers.[27] They made little progress towards conquering these institutions; and in any case any attempts which they might have made to do so were clearly unco-ordinated and sporadic before 1917. Only once, in 1906, does Greenberg seem to have thought of writing to all Zionist societies in the country in the hope that their members would 'do their best to influence their representatives at the Board of Deputies and the AJA to agree to take part in the General Jewish Organisation'.[28] In 1912, it was only after a 'lengthy and heated discussion' that a 'small majority' of activists decided 'that the Zionists in England should take part as Zionists in all matters Jewish in this country and especially in Jewish communal politics.'[29] More significant is the fact that both Greenberg and Bentwich had resigned their seats on the Board before 1917 (Greenberg in 1908 and Bentwich in 1913) and that before that date, Weizmann also appears consistently to have shied away from attempting to confront his Jewish opponents on that particular battleground.

In fact, Weizmann did not himself agree to be nominated for election to the Board until after the vote on the Conjoint Manifesto;[30] previously he had doubted whether partisan attempts to introduce pro-Zionist motions into its proceedings would be 'of very great value'.

Were they to succeed, he argued, such resolutions would give the Board (and not the Zionists) the honour of asking the Government for Palestine; should they fail (as was more likely), 'then the B. of D. stands committed *against* Zionism, a position which may be utilised by some of our enemies'.[31] Instead, throughout the War period, Weizmann himself preferred the paths of quiet diplomacy. At most, and prodded by Rothschild, he was prepared to open up lines of contact to individual 'leading Jews in London'; but he did not attempt to muster potential support among them in any organized fashion. On the contrary, he persistently opposed the campaign—launched by the *Jewish Chronicle* and supported by several prominent English Zionists—designed to bring pressure to bear on the Conjoint Committee and to change the allegiance of members of the AJA and the Board. Such 'beatings of the big drum', and local displays of *trop de zèle*, Weizmann maintained, would only reveal the extent of the rift in the community and thus do harm to the Zionist cause.[32] Confident (mistakenly, as it later transpired) that the anti-Zionists on these bodies 'simply could not' oppose Jewish national claims in public, he seems to have believed, before 1917, that it would be possible to 'cut the grass under their feet' merely by acting without them. Thus, Harry Sacher's advice that the Manchester Committee be utilized to 'put the screws' on the Conjoint was rejected on the excuse of overwork; and persistent suggestions that the Zionists call an Anglo-Jewish conference to further that aim were deliberately deferred.[33] That Weizmann himself did not acknowledge the effect which a vote at the Board of Deputies might have until after the Conjoint Manifesto had been censured is no less striking than the fact that, when doing so, he undoubtedly exaggerated the contribution which the Zionist movement, as a body, made to that event.[34] In effect, it would appear that the Zionists—as a party—neither foresaw the alignment at the Board in June 1917, nor could they claim sole responsibility for bringing it about.

III

In the absence of convincing evidence that the vote at the Board of Deputies on 17 June 1917 was either the culmination of a steady growth of Zionist feeling in that body or the result of Zionist pressure and planning, the division list of that day calls for a somewhat closer examination than it has merited hitherto. For this purpose, attention must be centred on the structure of the Board and (as far as can be ascertained) on the background and affiliations of the individual members who cast their votes. At this level of enquiry, the critical fact appears to be that those who voted with the ultimate majority, and therefore against the anti-Zionist Manifesto, did not score a resounding success. In fact, they only just scraped home by a majority of 56 to 51 (with six abstentions). These figures to some extent justify Lucien Wolf's

subsequent claim that the warring parties were 'more evenly balanced than was generally supposed'[35]; they also necessitate a degree of statistical interpretation.

Any analysis of the division figures of 17 June must begin by noting that the attendance on that day was the highest ever recorded in the life of that particular 'Parliament', which was itself the largest in the Board's history hitherto. (Elections to the Board were held triennially; the most recent before 1917 had been in May 1916.) Of the 143 Deputies entitled to vote on 17 June 1917, no less than 113 (or 79 per cent) did so—a remarkable fact when it is noted that the average attendance for the previous nine meetings was 55·8 Deputies (39 per cent) and for the subsequent 20 meetings (until the elections of May 1919), 55·3 (38 per cent).[36] There therefore appears to be no reason to question the charges which the defeated party made immediately after the vote—and which some of the victors subsequently admitted—that a

TABLE 1. *Attendance at Board Meetings before and after 17 June 1917*

17 June 1917		*Before 17 June 1917*		*After 17 June 1917*	
Votes		*Frequent*	*Infrequent*	*Frequent*	*Infrequent*
√	56	18	38	22	34
×	51	26	25	26	25
O	6	4	2	4	2
	113	48	65	52	61

√ = supported the motion to censure the Conjoint Manifesto.
× = opposed the motion to censure the Conjoint Manifesto.
O = abstained.

considerable degree of 'whipping' went on before the meeting.[37] In fact, no fewer than 65 of those who voted on 17 June had been 'infrequent' in their attendance before then; and 61 were to be so subsequently ('infrequent' is here defined as attending less than 40 per cent of the meetings). Furthermore, 19 of the Deputies who voted had attended no more than one meeting before 17 June; and 20 were to turn up for only one subsequent meeting. On the other hand, four normally 'frequent' members did not attend on that day.

The interest of these figures seems to lie in the voting performances of these two categories of Deputies. The pattern, especially among the 'infrequent' members, although not altogether uniform is nevertheless instructive. Of the 65 'infrequent' members before the vote, 38 supported the motion to condemn the Conjoint Manifesto; of the 61 subsequently 'infrequent' Deputies, 34 did so (see Table 1). Even if the lower figure is taken, it becomes immediately apparent that most of the Deputies who voted against the old Executive can be described as persons who did

not usually play an active role in the Board's regular meetings. Conversely, the majority of the 'regular' attenders attempted to defend the behaviour and prerogatives of the established leadership.

A comparison of the experience in community service on the Board which the two parties could muster is also revealing. Here, the most important general fact appears to be that the Board which voted against the traditional leadership in 1917 was a relatively new body. This was true in terms of both the congregations represented and the Deputies themselves. Over 50 new single-member constituencies had been admitted to the Board since the turn of the century; 18 of them since the last general election to the Board in 1913. Furthermore, for 34 of the 143 members, the session of 1916–19 was the first which they had ever attended; 33 others had joined the Board since 1913. Therefore, almost half the members of the Board were totally new to its procedure and traditions when called upon to discuss the wide range of questions raised by the War. Admittedly, they did not all attend its meetings in order to do so. Of the total of 67 relatively new members of the Board who had joined its ranks since 1913, only about 25 did so 'frequently' (the exact figures are 25·66 before the 17 June vote and 24·33 after that day). Of the 34 members for whom 1916 marked their first entry into this arena, no more than 15 attended regularly (exact figures, 14·00 and 15·00). Nevertheless, in keeping with the other members of the Board, these men turned up in force for the vote of 17 June: of the 67 members who had joined since 1913, 58 took part in the division; of the 34 new members since 1916, no less than 32 did so. In both cases, moreover, the 'new' Deputies voted against the Manifesto (which was said to represent the views of the old guard) by majorities of about two to one, and ultimately constituted the majority of those who voted for the motion. (Of the 58 new members since 1913, 38 voted for, 16 against, and four abstained.) This ratio rises even further, to three to one in condemnation of the Manifesto, when the statistics concerning the voting pattern of the 'new' members are correlated with those of the 'infrequent' attenders. It may then be seen that 41 Deputies can be classed as both 'new' and 'infrequent' in their attendance before June 1917; 27 of these voted with the 'ayes'. Whichever measurement is taken, two clear blocs of voters appear to emerge: most of the more experienced and frequent members of the Board voted in defence of the Manifesto; by contrast, most of the more recent arrivals (especially when infrequent in their attendance) voted to condemn that document (see Table 2).

Attendance and experience were not, however, the only lines of division cutting across the Board in 1917. If the picture which has emerged hitherto is to be further refined, the members must be subjected to a third 'cut', and analysed on the basis of their constituency representation. At this level, the statistics supplied by the Board itself are somewhat misleading. The constitution of the Board provided for

two categories of synagogal representation. The first consisted of long-established Metropolitan congregations, whose numerical representation was embodied in a special clause in the constitution (and whose financial contribution played a large part in its budget). Specifically, this clause entitled the Spanish and Portuguese Synagogue at Bevis Marks to six Deputies; the West London Synagogue in Berkeley Street to five; and the United Synagogue to 22 (of which the Great, Central, Bayswater, New West End, and Hampstead synagogues had two apiece). The

TABLE 2. *'Newer' and 'Older' Members: Attendance and Voting Patterns*

		Frequent	*Infrequent*
*New**			
✓	38 (22)	11 (7)	27 (15)
×	16 (9)	4 (2)	12 (7)
O	4 (1)	2 (1)	2 (—)
	58 (32)	17 (10)	41 (22)
Old			
✓	18	7	11
×	35	22	13
O	2	2	—
	55	31	24

✓ = supported the motion to censure the Conjoint Manifesto.
× = opposed the motion to censure the Conjoint Manifesto.
O = abstained.
* The 'New' Deputies are those who had joined the Board since 1913; there were 58, of whom 32 had joined only since 1916 (some were admitted *after* the general election). Figures relating to the attendance and voting of these 32 are in brackets.

second category of constituency representation consisted of any other congregation in the United Kingdom or the Empire which possessed certified marriage secretaries and paid annual dues to the Board. These could elect one Deputy for their first 200 male seat-holders, with the option to appoint an additional Deputy for every further 100 seat-holders (in effect, only the Great Synagogue in Manchester took up this option). The result of this situation was that of the 143 members of the Board in 1917, 45 represented congregations situated in London and its environs; nine sat for congregations in the Colonies; and the remaining 89 represented provincial synagogues. In effect, however, the electoral practices of the Board permitted—and even encouraged—a number of anomalies. The constitution of the Board, when defining the eligibility of prospective Deputies, contained no residence quali-

fication clause. Candidates were only required to be male Jews over the age of 21 who had rented a seat in the congregation of their choice for at least one year before election. They had not necessarily to be residents of the area which they aspired to represent. As a result, and not surprisingly in view of the exigencies of travel in wartime, several provincial congregations deliberately elected Londoners as their representatives to the Board—with the result that no less than 110 out of a total of 143 Deputies in 1917 came from London.[38]

In view of the probably continuing demographic predominance of London during the period, these figures would not themselves be remarkable had they not concealed a further—sociological—division. Specifically, the largely immigrant 'East End', as critics who lived in the area did not cease to point out, was grossly under-represented at the Board. There were only 20 Deputies for the numerous Jewish synagogues situated in that area, and in the expanding communities of north and south London. Moreover, 11 of them sat for constituents of the United Synagogue, which were not the places of worship most frequented by the new residents of these districts.[39] Proportionately, a far greater number of seats at the Board went to the less populous, but more fashionable, communities in the west and north-west of London. In addition, the residents of the latter areas often provided Deputies for several of the far-flung congregations, thereby further increasing the influence which their particular section of the community was able to exert. For instance, at least three of the nine Colonial Deputies were active members of synagogues situated in the 'West End': Hillier Holt (Cape Town) was a Warden of the West London Synagogue; Sir Charles Henry, M.P. (Adelaide) sat on the Board of the Western; and Moss Davis (Auckland) was a prominent member of the Central Synagogue. Moreover, of those Londoners who represented provincial congregations, it has been possible to establish with an acceptable degree of certainty that at least 14 were at various times *office-holders* in the more fashionable London congregations. In some instances, this gave rise to cases of considerable over-representation. Brondesbury, for instance, was entitled to one elected Deputy (in 1917, Alfred van Noorden). Members of the Board of Management of that synagogue, however, also sat as Deputies for Wolverhampton (Morris Duparc); Chatham (Joseph Freedman); Durham (Dr. Meyer A. Dutch); and Merthyr (Joseph Prag); and together with van Noorden they all voted in defence of the Conjoint Manifesto on 17 June. Bayswater also had additional representation in the Deputies for Ebbw Vale (Isidore Salmon, who voted with the two members for Bayswater in defence of the Manifesto) and for Upton Park (Leopold Frank, who abstained). The Central Synagogue was represented by David L. Alexander, the President of the Board and a joint signatory of the Manifesto itself. Additional seats for members of this congregation were to be found at Abertillery Synagogue (represented by the

anti-Zionist President of the United Synagogue, Albert Jessel, who was replaced after his death in 1916 by Rev. Ephraim Levine, the minister of the New West End Synagogue, who voted in defence of the Manifesto), Pontypridd (Alfred Instone, who did not attend), and West Hartlepool (Joseph Trenner, one of the few of the resident London Deputies who voted for the motion).

The provincial congregations which appear most commonly to have appointed Londoners as their representatives at the Board were those with the smaller Jewish populations. The majority were situated in southern England and in Wales. By contrast, those provincial congregations with the heaviest Jewish concentration (and with large immigrant communities) evinced the greatest degree of local patriotism (or parochialism, depending on one's point of view) in their choice of Deputies. This is not to imply that the provincial Deputies of this type were necessarily drawn from the 'immigrant' community; they were not. It does suggest, however, that they were likely to be more sensitive to specifically local needs and aspirations. This was particularly so in the case of the large bloc of Deputies who sat for congregations in the north-east and north-west of the country. Thus, of the 28 Deputies representing congregations in the Liverpool–Manchester area, 24 were active in local communal affairs; of the 16 who represented congregations in Yorkshire and Durham, ten were in this category. These figures should be contrasted with the 16 non-metropolitan congregations south of the Trent, of which only six were represented by local residents; and the 14 Welsh congregations, of which only three were represented by local residents.

In accordance with the classification outlined above, I have divided the Board of Deputies of June 1917 into three broad groups (Table 3). The first (Group I) consists of the long-established metropolitan congregations whose representation was defined in the constitution: the United Synagogues; Bevis Marks; the Western and the West London Synagogues—a total of 32 Deputies, of whom 28 took part in the vote. Group II consists of those Deputies who, although Londoners, sat for provincial and colonial congregations—a total of 55 Deputies, of whom 42 voted. Group III consists of those provincial Deputies who sat for their own congregations and for the London congregations which were of fairly recent origin—a total of 56 members, 43 of whom took part in the vote. A survey of the voting patterns of these groups reveals that only Group II (Deputies representing provincial and colonial congregations but living in London) were fairly equally divided on the motion to censure the Conjoint Manifesto: 18 voted for the motion, 23 against, and one abstained. The other two groups, however, reveal definite patterns of alignment. Thus, Group I (established metropolitan congregations) voted 22 to four, with two abstentions, in defence of the anti-Zionist Manifesto; and the members of Group III voted 34 to six,

with three abstentions, against the Manifesto.[40] On the day of the debate, then, most of the Deputies prepared to take a stand against the attitudes and actions of the old Executive came from the last group. This seems to remain true even when liberal allowances are made for probable (perhaps unavoidable) errors in measurement and tabulation.

Although not all the evidence points in a single direction, there appears to be sufficient grounds to maintain that the group of Deputies who came from the provinces and who represented the newer London synagogues were those who ultimately gave the 'ayes' their victory. Moreover, their contribution is further highlighted when they are sub-

TABLE 3. *Voting by Constituency and Place of Residence*

	Total Possible Votes (newer members in brackets)	*Average Usual Attendance before June 1917*	*Voted on 17 June*	
Group I: United Synagogue: 20 Bevis Marks: 6 West London: 5 Western Synagogue: 1	32 (6)	14·52	28 (5)	✓ 4 (1) × 22 (3) ○ 2 (1)
Group II: Provincial Deputies residing in London: 46 Colonial Deputies residing in London: 9	55 (30)	22·33	42 (24)	✓ 18 (12) × 23 (11) ○ 1 (1)
Group III: Deputies representing newer London Synagogues: 13 Provincial Deputies residing in Provinces: 43	56 (31)	19·03	43 (29)	✓ 34 (25) × 6 (2) ○ 3 (2)
	143 (67)	55·88	113 (58)	

✓ = supported the motion to censure the Conjoint Manifesto.
× = opposed the motion to censure the Conjoint Manifesto.
○ = abstained.

jected to the previous scales of 'frequent-infrequent' and 'newer-older' members. It then becomes apparent that Group III contained the highest number of new members of the Board in 1917 (31), and that they voted overwhelmingly to condemn the Manifesto (25 to two). Moreover, on 17 June 1917 it was the members of this group who improved upon their rate of average attendance by a higher percentage than did any other. Consequently, they were able to play a proportionately more important part in the proceedings of that day than had usually been the case hitherto, and they ultimately controlled 40 per cent of the total votes then cast. (This was particularly so in the case of

the provincial representatives: they usually averaged an attendance of 10 Deputies, but on this occasion totalled 31.) The fact that large numbers of this group had not attended the previous meeting of the Board (in May) must largely account for the failure of the pro-Zionist motion which Daiches had tabled on that occasion. They had then commanded only 29 per cent of the attendance.[41]

IV

Why did such a large proportion of the provincial and newer London Deputies vote to condemn the Conjoint Manifesto? Some, certainly, can be identified as active and prominent Zionists of long standing: Bertram B. Benas (Wallasey); Solomon J. Cohen (Manchester, Holy Law); Rabbi Samuel Daiches (Leeds, Beth Hamedrash); Joseph Hamwee (Manchester, Austrian); Sidney Newman (Stamford Hill); Rev. Isaiah Raffalovich (Hope Street, Liverpool); and Israel Sieff (Manchester, United Synagogue). These, however, were in an obvious minority. Others, presumably, may have been convinced by the arguments adduced by the proposer and seconder of the motion during the debate itself—or by the *faux pas* of their opponents; Henry S. Q. Henriques was reported to have aroused particular disdain by his failure to understand the meaning of the term *hilul hashem* (sacrilege, lit. 'profanation of the [Divine] Name'). A third category, not necessarily included in the above two, might have voted with the majority in response to pressure from their individual constituencies. Before the meeting of the Board on 17 June resolutions protesting against the Manifesto were reported to have been passed at special meetings in 26 of the congregations represented on the Board, only one of which was situated in London; 17 of the Deputies concerned voted in accordance with these sentiments.[42] It is, however, difficult to know exactly how much weight should be given to this factor. Individual examples do not prove the case, since the evidence itself is not conclusive. Thus, of the four Deputies who represented constituents of the United Synagogue at which pro-Zionist resolutions had been passed by Annual General Meetings in 1915 (St. John's Wood, Hampstead, Stoke Newington, and Dalston), only one (Alexander Ruebens at Dalston) voted to censure the Conjoint Manifesto. Moreover, several of the Deputies who voted against the wishes of their constituents—as expressed at specially convened meetings—were returned to the Board when they stood for re-election in 1919. Conversely, many of those who voted in accordance with the stated wishes of their congregants, and against the Conjoint Manifesto, failed to be re-elected.[43] Significantly, even after the vote at the Board, the Zionists themselves admitted that their strength in the Provinces still left much to be desired.[44] Without detailed local studies of the elections to the Board, it is impossible to determine the extent to which the votes

of June 1917 had an effect on the results of the subsequent elections in 1919. But in any case, that is really another story. There certainly appears to be sufficient evidence, even at this stage, to submit that the vote at the Board of Deputies cannot be described solely as a victory for particular pressure groups at work on behalf of the Zionist cause in the constituencies represented at that institution.

It might be suggested that a more adequate clue to the behaviour of the Provincial and newer London Deputies on 17 June 1917 is perhaps provided by the record of previous dissension within the Board on issues other than Zionism. This reveals that the unwillingness of the Executive to consult with either the Provincial representatives, or those who spoke on behalf of such new voluntary institutions as the Jewish Friendly Societies, had long provided a bone of contention. Ever since the turn of the century (at least), proceedings at the Board had been liberally interlaced with complaints that the leadership, by failing to grant such forces an adequate share in the conduct of the Board's affairs, was flouting the principles of democracy and thereby undermining the respect to be accorded to the Board as a whole. These sentiments, rather than any specific leanings towards Zionism, underlay the original intentions of the founders of the B'nai B'rith in England, and account for much of the acrimony with which the Executive of the Board challenged this new organization's mandate to intercede with the government on such matters as the Aliens Act or the Slaughter of Animals Bill.[45]

Complaints on this score were not, of course, limited exclusively to the Board of Deputies. As early as 1905, the Provincial members of the Anglo-Jewish Association, for instance, had declared that the influence exerted by London members was unwarranted and had therefore insisted that the Association hold a biennial general meeting at a provincial centre. At the Conference of Jewish Ministers, similarly, demands were constantly heard for a reorganization of provincial communal life which would take account of specifically provincial needs; when the procedure to elect a successor to Chief Rabbi Hermann Adler was set in motion in 1911, the community was warned that 'grave consequences' were likely to result from a failure on the part of provincial Jewry 'properly to safeguard its interests in the matter'.[46] But such sentiments had been given particular expression at the Board itself. It was there that the representatives of Manchester Jewry had put up a spirited defence of their unilateral appeal to Winston Churchill on the aliens question during the 1908 by-election in that city; and there that demands for the adequate representation of provincial Deputies on the executive committees of the Board were loudest.[47] A movement in this direction appears to have gathered momentum in 1913, when an extended correspondence and several meetings between David L. Alexander (the President of the Board) and Louis Kletz (prominent in the Manchester movement) led to changes in the Board's

bye-laws designed to meet specifically Mancunian aspirations.[48] Moreover, as is often claimed to be the case, this lead was soon followed in other provincial communities. Within the space of two years, wider communal councils ('Soviets' to their opponents) had been established in Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool, Bradford, and Manchester itself.[49]

Not the least significant aspect of this process was that those who demanded that the Board respond to, and respect, the supposed views of the provincial and the growing metropolitan organizations, scored their greatest successes precisely at the time when specifically Zionist sentiments were finding very little support among the rank and file of the Deputies. Indeed, this divergence of fortunes became even more marked during the War years which immediately preceded the vote on the Conjoint Manifesto in 1917. The Executive of the Board was defeated on its motions to postpone the annual general meeting of 1914, and to rescind the right of small provincial congregations to combine in 1916. Later that year, it was forced to accede to pressure that it widen the scope of the Conjoint Committee by allowing the attendance of two Deputies 'more or less in close touch with the great mass of Russian Jews in East London'.[50] However, these changes had taken place without the instigation of the avowedly Zionist members of the Board (their principal proponents were Nathan and Neville Laski, whose affiliation to Zionism occurred somewhat later), and in some cases against their expressed wishes. Most strikingly, in 1916 the Zionists had objected to the expansion of the Conjoint Committee by the inclusion of two representatives of the United Council of Jewish Friendly Societies. The change, the Zionists appreciated, could only benefit the status and interest of that Council. It could hardly further the Zionist cause since a condition of the appointment of the two new members was that they previously agree to the broad outlines of the Conjoint's anti-Nationalist policy regarding Palestine.[51]

There are indications that even the motion ultimately debated on 17 June 1917 did not take the form originally desired by the Zionists themselves. Significantly, when presenting his motion, Elsley Zeitlyn (who spoke as one 'outside the Zionist organization') did not call for an explicit expression of support for Zionism. The motion took the negative and less forthright course of expressing 'profound disapproval' of the Conjoint's Manifesto and of its publication. For that reason, Gaster subsequently complained that it 'did not go far enough'.[52] During the debate itself, the principal charge to emerge was the failure of the Board's representatives on the Conjoint to consult with the parent body before signing the Manifesto. At issue, in effect, were the authoritarian practices—and not necessarily the anti-Zionist principles—of the traditional leadership. At this level, the publication of the Manifesto might have appeared to many of the provincial and newer London

delegates as a proper opportunity to press for changes in the structure of the Board—which they had in any case long desired. By taking issue with the Executive of the Board on a matter charged with high emotional content, these delegates were, in effect, exploiting sentiments which were only in a tenuous sense related to the aspirations which they might have had in mind. To judge by their previous terms of reference as revealed in former divisions at the Board, and by their alignment on the day of the debate itself, many among this group of Deputies might have seen the motion as an extension of their lengthy struggle against the undue influence of the small coterie of traditional leaders. By regarding the motion as one of 'no confidence', and therefore resigning once the result was known, the Executive itself certainly seems to have viewed the proceedings in accordance with these wider terms of reference. Within this context, the question of Zionism might have done no more than provide the immediate occasion of the upheaval; it was not necessarily its underlying cause.

V

The impression which thus emerges appears to be further reinforced by a consideration of the pattern of events at the Board immediately after the vote of June 1917. By 1919, the principal alterations in the Constitution were the expansion of the Board to include the representatives of several non-synagogal institutions and an even greater number of provincial Deputies. The most important changes in personnel were the election of Sir Stuart Samuel as President of the Board, and the appointment of seven new members to the committee charged with the management of foreign affairs. The principal issues facing the Board were (in external affairs) the representations to be made at the forthcoming Peace Conference and (in internal affairs) the attitude to be adopted towards the League of British Jews. In none of these areas is it possible to speak of specific Zionist gains, or to discover clear manifestations of the effects of a Zionist 'revolution' in the management of the community's affairs. The Zionist Movement was not, for instance, one of the 'non-synagogal institutions' to gain representation at the Board: the United Synagogue was granted 12 independent representatives in addition to the individual synagogue Deputies; the Federation, six autonomous Deputies; the Council of United Jewish Friendly Societies, three; and various orders affiliated to the B'nai B'rith, twelve—of which only one seat went to the avowedly Zionist Order of Ancient Maccabeans. Consequently, and as has been seen, the Zionists in England had to make unprecedented efforts to gain the return of their supporters to the Board even after the constitutional changes had come into effect. Furthermore, Sir Stuart Samuel—although more flexible in his attitude towards Zionism than had been his predecessor

on the Board—was decidedly not an avowed supporter of the Basle Programme. For this reason, perhaps, the Zionists were rather suspicious of his intentions and had initially preferred for the presidency either Edward Langdon or Herbert Samuel—both of whom were thought to be more conspicuous in their support of the Movement.[53]

Only the decision to end the old Conjoint Committee, passed by a large majority in the euphoric aftermath of the June 1917 debate, can be considered a specifically Zionist advance. Otherwise, however, the Zionists could record few gains. The subsequent meeting of the Board, called to discuss the manner in which the traditional relationship with the AJA was to be continued, was held on a weekday (a 'trick' which opposition elements on the Board were quick to denounce, but powerless to prevent). Eventually, the few Deputies who met on that occasion did no more than pass a mild resolution 'hoping' that the AJA—which throughout the June turmoil had remained unrepentantly anti-Zionist—would be 'agreeable' to terminating the old arrangement with the Board and to suggesting methods whereby it might be slightly reformed.[54] The constitution of the new Joint Foreign Committee, as ultimately approved by the Board at a series of subsequent meetings, was similarly unremarkable. It retained the old association with the AJA; compromised with the latter body on the necessity for withholding some information from the parent bodies in particular circumstances; and—after some hesitation—specifically empowered this new-old group to deal with questions related to Palestine.[55] Significantly, the Zionists failed conspicuously in their deliberate attempts to prevent the renewal of the 'treaty' with the AJA by the Board newly elected in 1919. When faced with Sir Stuart Samuel's threat to resign were the agreement not renewed, the opposition capitulated. The motion for renewal was carried by an overwhelming majority.[56]

Zionist attempts to sway the Board on specific matters of substance were no more successful. When, in November 1917, the Board voted to thank His Majesty's Government for the Balfour Declaration, it deliberately rejected one motion which would have pledged 'cooperation with the English Zionist Federation and other bodies' in the furtherance of the establishment of a 'National Home'. As finally carried, the resolution merely thanked the Government for its 'sympathetic interest' in Jewish affairs, without specifically mentioning national aspirations at all.[57] A similarly unwelcome compromise was forced upon Zionist Deputies during a highly charged and acrimonious debate in April 1919. Having been specially convened to discuss a letter which ten members of the League of British Jews had addressed to the *Morning Post*, the Deputies did vote to deprecate the aspersions which that publication had cast on the political affiliations of immigrant Russian Jews. The majority were not, however, prepared to add a paragraph (suggested by Samuel Daiches) which further condemned the League for

'casting the stigma of Bolshevism on the National [Zionist] section' of the community.[58] Only once, in February 1919, could Daiches claim to have broken this pattern of defeat, when he managed to carry the rejection of one clause in the Joint Foreign Committee's programme for Palestine (clause 5: 'that no political or economic privileges or preferences be created in favour of any race or religious Community'). However, at the very next meeting, this decision was reversed. Disregarding the noisy objections of Zionist Deputies, Sir Stuart Samuel was sympathetic to allegations that the initial vote had not been 'representative', stating that he himself rejected the Zionist claim for 'special privileges' in Palestine; instead, he suggested that the clause in question be amended to allow for 'the fullest equality' for 'all races and religious communities' in that land.[59] In view of the manner in which Sir Stuart handled that particular debate, and its outcome, it is little wonder that many Zionists felt that the victory of June 1917 had gone somewhat sour. As early as January 1918, there were some public complaints that the 'revolution' of the previous summer 'had been undone'. Under these circumstances, the Zionist leaders felt that they could do little besides asking Lord Rothschild to intercede with the President of the Board on their behalf.[60] The 'revolution' at the Board, if indeed such it was, can hardly be construed to have produced results of a wholly satisfactory nature to its Zionist members.

The argument presented here is that Zionist recriminations on this score were basically unjustified. The Zionists had not, in any organized form, planned the overthrow of the old Executive on the Board of Deputies in June 1917; neither could they claim sole credit for whatever changes took place as a result of the resolution then passed against the Conjoint Manifesto. Despite the considerable popular support for Zionism within the community at large, there is little evidence that before 1917 Zionists were capable of using this lever to bring pressure to bear on the Board. On the contrary, the indications are that they had to some extent abandoned all hope of doing so; they did not change their tactics until 1919. The 'victory' of 1917, in fact, seems to have surprised them no less than their opponents. In immediate terms, had the anti-Zionists on the Conjoint Committee not lost their nerve and blundered by publishing the Manifesto, Zionist fortunes on the Board (although not necessarily elsewhere) might have continued to languish for a considerably longer period. The Zionist Deputies had certainly shown themselves capable of making a great deal of noise; but they had in effect constituted a chorus which could not play a decisive part in the action. For this reason, the excessive attention concentrated on the activities and attitudes of this small group of Deputies on the Board, both before and during the June debate, has masked the processes at work within that body and within the community at large. In the long run, the meaning of the vote at the Board in June 1917 appears to extend

beyond the confines of a specifically Zionist debate. To judge by the voting pattern at the Board both before and after June 1917 (admittedly not the only criterion, but surely a relevant one), the lines of cleavage within the community were more complex and varied than a simple division on pro-Zionist and anti-Zionist lines would suggest. Also at stake were the claims of delegates with substantial new bases of support in London and elsewhere to an equal share in the government of the community, a province hitherto reserved for the wealthy and the distinguished. It must, therefore, remain an open question whether the *novi homines* who tipped the balance against the Conjoint Committee in 1917 were utilized by the Zionists, or whether they themselves exploited the tension to which Zionism was in any case giving rise.

NOTES

[1] The Manifesto, entitled 'Palestine and Zionism—Views of Anglo-Jewry', was published in *The Times* on 24 May 1917 and stretched over two full columns. It claimed that 'the establishment of a Jewish nationality in Palestine . . . must have the effect, throughout the world, of stamping the Jews as strangers in their native lands, and of undermining their hard-won position as citizens and nationals of these lands'.

[2] Isaiah Friedman, *The Question of Palestine*, London, 1973, p. 239; see also Leonard Stein, *The Balfour Declaration*, London, 1961, pp. 442–62.

[3] See especially, Friedman, op. cit., pp. 239–40; Nahum Sokolow, *A History of Zionism*, vol. 2, London, 1919, p. 69; Israel Cohen, 'British Jewry's Reaction', in Paul Goodman, ed., *The Jewish National Home*, London, 1943, pp. 23–24; Paul Goodman, *Zionism in England*, London, 1948, p. 43; 'Board of Deputies of British Jews', *Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel*, Raphael Patai, ed., vol. 1, New York, 1971, p. 147; and (quoting Stein), Chaim Bermant, *The Cousinhood*, London, 1971, p. 261, and Walter Laqueur, *A History of Zionism*, London, 1972, p. 194.

[4] Stein, op. cit., p. 567.

[5] The League was founded on 14 November 1917. For an outline of its aims see *Jewish Opinion* (the League's monthly organ), vol. 1, no. 1 (December 1918), p. 1. The League's activities were to be a source of irritation to the Zionists for some time to come. See, for example, the correspondence between Weizmann and Sokolow during 1918 and 1919 in the London files of the World Zionist Organization, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem (hereafter CZA), Z4/305/1.

[6] The *Jewish Chronicle* (hereafter *JC*), 22 June 1917, pp. 21–22. As late as 1922, Rowson described himself as, at best, 'lukewarm' in his attitude towards Zionism and therefore refused to take an active part in the Movement's campaign during the 1922 General elections: 16 February 1922, Rowson to Goodman, London files, CZA, Z4/1845/1.

[7] J. M. Levy to Gaster, 7 September 1897, Gaster Mss., CZA, A203/104

and 25 April 1898, A203/105; *JC*, 3 February 1899, pp. 12–13; 24 December 1915, p. 12; and 9 February 1917, p. 12.

[8] See *JC*, 15 May 1899, pp. 22–23; 7 February 1902, pp. 12–13; and 24 April 1915, p. 11. On the attitude of Hertz, see Aubrey Newman, *Chief Rabbi Dr. Joseph H. Hertz, C.H.*, London, 1972, pp. 4–7 and 10–11.

[9] 25 March 1897, H. Bentwich to Herzl, Herzl Mss., CZA, HVIII 67; 25 March 1908, I. Zangwill to J. Cowen, Zangwill Mss., CZA, A120/72; and 7 August 1902, I. Abrahams to Zangwill, CZA, A120/53.

[10] H. Bentwich in *JC*, 14 April 1899; and 20 October 1898, Rev. A. A. Green to Bentwich (private and confidential), Herbert Bentwich Mss., CZA, A100/7a, no. 22.

[11] *JC*, 18 February 1898, p. 14, and 18 July 1902, pp. 14–15; there is no mention of Zionism in Charles H. L. Emanuel, *A Century and a Half of Jewish History, Extracts from the Minute Books of the London Committee of Deputies of the British Jews*, London, 1910.

[12] On the Sokolow invitation, see 20 March 1906, Gaster to Montefiore, Gaster Mss., CZA, A203/149; 19 April 1906, Sokolow to C. H. Emanuel (Secretary of the Board), ibid.; and 23 May 1906, Emanuel to Gaster, CZA, A203/143. The AJA accepted the invitation to a conference on Uganda 'subject to it being clearly understood that . . . the Association is not in favour of the establishment of any Jewish colony with political autonomy', M. Duparc (Secretary of the AJA) to Wolffsohn, Vienna files, CZA, Z1/33 no. 15; and Robert G. Weisbord, *African Zion*, New York, 1971, p. 158. On the attitude to further conferences in 1906 and 1912, see: 30 December 1905, L. Greenberg to Wolffsohn, Wolffsohn Mss., CZA, W78; and *JC*, 19 January 1906, p. 12; 16 February 1906, p. 13; 24 June 1906, p. 23; and 13 December 1912, p. 37.

[13] See, for example, S. B. Rubinstein's speech at the 1914 Annual General Meeting of the AJA, *JC*, 18 December 1914, pp. 20–21.

[14] 7 January 1915, Wolf to Montefiore, Wolf Mss., CZA, A77/3a.

[15] Reports of the meetings of 26 March 1916 and 25 June 1916 in *JC*, 31 March 1916, p. 11; and 30 June 1916, pp. 11–12 respectively. On the latter occasion, the motion was defeated by 61 to 19.

[16] Meeting of 22 October 1916 in *JC*, 27 October 1916, pp. 16–17. The fact that the motion was ever debated was some small success for Newman. He had been subjected to appeals from the chairman (David Alexander) to strike the motion from the agenda since 'it would not only prevent all cooperation between the Zionists and the Conjoint Committee; but it would certainly lead to a very angry controversy which would compromise existing rights of emancipated Jews all over the world.'

[17] The motion was defeated by 33 votes to 26. Newman proposed a second resolution in the following terms: 'Now that the establishment of a Jewish Home in Palestine is a matter of practical politics, this Board recommends that the Conjoint Committee enter into negotiations with the Zionist Authorities with the view to formulating a joint policy to be presented to the British Government; and that in the event of a mutual policy being agreed upon a manifesto be immediately issued to that effect.' He had, however, to withdraw this motion and it was never debated. See report of meeting of 20 May 1917 in *JC*, 25 May 1917, pp. 11–12; and 22 May 1917, Wolf to L.

Oliphant (Foreign Office), Conjoint Reports for the period in CZA, K14a/57, pp. 64–65.

[18] To the seven members of the Conjoint Committee who were Deputies of the Board throughout the period, must be added the members who represented the Reform and Sephardi synagogues, all of whom regularly voted in support of the Committee. It has been calculated that of the 11 members of the B'nai B'rith who participated in the June vote, seven voted with the majority, three against, and one abstained. Elsley Zeitlyn, *A Paragraph of Anglo-Jewish History: The Board of Deputies and the B'nai B'rith*, London, 1936, pp. 1–8. Three members of the United Council of Jewish Friendly Societies participated in the June vote and were also divided on the issue; one voted for, one against, and one abstained.

[19] 1 June 1917, Moser to Gaster, Gaster Mss., CZA, A203/56.

[20] 12 April 1918, Sacher to Marks, Harry Sacher Mss., CZA, Z4/120.

[21] Circular, *n.d.* (probably 1919), copy in CZA Z4/618; see also the letter to the Jewish press entitled 'A Call to Arms' signed by Major William Schonfield (chairman of the Communal Organisation Committee) and Joseph L. Cohen (honorary secretary), published for instance in *JC*, 9 May 1919, p. 10, and 23 May 1919, p. 2.

[22] 15 May 1919, Schonfield and Cohen to Landman (secretary of the English Zionist Federation, hereafter EZF), CZA, Z4/618; they were as good as their word. In July 1919, the EZF circularized all members of the Board with a list of its own nominees for seven of the Board's executive committees; CZA, Z4/1833/1.

[23] Speech delivered by Herzl on 28 August 1898, *Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des II. Zionisten-Congresses*, Vienna, 1898, p. 5.

[24] 30 May 1900, L. Loewe to Herzl, CZA, HVIII 527 and 21 November 1913, EZF to Actions Committee (Cologne), CZA, Z3/803.

[25] 23 April 1899, Gaster to Greenberg, private, CZA, A203/133; 12 January 1903, P. Goodman to Gaster, ibid.

[26] 15 July 1896, de Haas to Herzl, CZA, HVIII 513; 15 November 1901, Cowen to Herzl, CZA, HVIII 161; and 6 April 1903, Greenberg to Wolffsohn, CZA, W78.

[27] Thus, during a discussion of the Aliens Act at the Board in 1904, David Alexander (the president) had to call upon Bentwich to resume his seat but, according to one account, 'he remained standing for some minutes, in spite of the repeated commands of the chair and calls of "Order" from all parts of the meeting. Unable to obtain a hearing, Mr. Bentwich left the room slamming the door behind him.' *JC*, 22 April 1904, pp. 13–14. By 1913, Alexander was openly referring to Bentwich as 'the opposition' at the Board.

[28] 23 March 1906, circular, CZA, Z2/411.

[29] *JC*, 29 November 1912, p. 33.

[30] 21 June 1917, Weizmann to Rev. I. Raffalovich (Liverpool), Meir Weisgal, general editor, *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, vol. 7, Jerusalem, 1971, no. 439, p. 448; and even then he did not, eventually, stand. See also, Isaiah Raffalovich, *Ziyyunim Ve-Tamrurim* (Memoirs), Tel Aviv, 1952, pp. 144–5.

[31] 17 October 1916, Weizmann to I. Sieff, *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, op. cit., no. 284, pp. 305–7.

[32] ibid., nos. 34, pp. 39–40; 60, p. 71; 73, p. 87; and 88, pp. 102–3.

[33] 29 November 1914, Weizmann to Sacher and L. Simon, ibid., no. 48, pp. 58–60 and no. 111, pp. 137–8. See also, 'Proceedings of the EZF Annual Conference', *JC*, 16 February 1917, pp. 17–19; 2 March 1917, A. Lewis (organizing secretary, EZF) to Sokolow, Sokolow Mss., CZA, A18/35; and Minutes of the EZF Executive for 16 August 1917 in CZA, Z4/674. Weizmann's struggle for control of the EZF during this period is a chapter in its own right. For further information, see P. Goodman, *Zionism in England*, pp. 28–42; *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, vol. 7, op. cit.; Minutes of the Political Committee, Goodman Mss., CZA, K11/6/1; *Gaster's Diary*, A203/146; and Sokolow Mss., CZA, A18/35.

[34] 20 June 1917, Weizmann to Sacher, *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, vol. 7, op. cit., no. 435, p. 445, and his speech to a special conference of representative British Zionists in London, 21 September 1919, transcript in CZA, Z4/1833/1. But compare this with the more modest claims in Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error*, New York, 1949, p. 204. Significantly, perhaps, there is no mention of the vote at the Board in T. R. Fyvel, 'Weizmann and the Balfour Declaration' in Meir Weisgal and Joel Carmichael, eds., *Chaim Weizmann, A Biography by Several Hands*, New York, 1963, pp. 143–70.

[35] 18 June 1917, Wolf to L. Oliphant (Foreign Office); quoted in Friedman, op. cit., p. 239.

[36] These figures are themselves somewhat distorted by an attendance of 94 at the first meeting of the new Board in June 1916, and by an attendance of 92 Deputies at the first meeting immediately after the vote on the Manifesto (when interest in the Board's proceedings was at its height) in July 1917. If these are discounted, the averages drop to 51·0 and 50·45 respectively. The information contained in this and the following sections is largely derived from the *Annual Reports* of the Board of Deputies published in December of every year by Wertheimer, Lee and Co.; from *The Jewish Year Book* published annually by the *Jewish Chronicle*; and from the reports of the proceedings at the Board in the contemporary press. The full division list of 17 June 1917 is in *JC*, 24 June 1917, p. 14.

[37] See, for example, the letters which A. Posener (of the defeated minority) and L. Kletz (of the majority) addressed to the *JC*, 10 August 1917, p. 9.

[38] Persons living in London occupied all the places allotted to the metropolitan synagogues (55); all nine of the Colonial seats; and represented 46 of the provincial communities. In some cases, so it was alleged, Londoners had themselves offered to pay the dues owing to the Board by some small provincial congregations in return for the privilege of representing them. When this charge was once brought up at the Board itself, H. S. Q. Henriques replied: 'If these congregations liked to sell their inheritance for a mess of pottage that was their own affair.' *JC*, 26 January 1912, p. 18.

[39] Although many of the immigrant Jews did occasionally frequent individual constituents of the United Synagogue, especially for the Sabbath afternoon addresses in Yiddish, they rarely became paying congregants. See Dov B. Spiers, *Divre Devash: Ethical Sermons Delivered to the Working Classes at the Great Synagogue and Other Places of Worship*, London, 1901, Introduction; and Meir Manski, ed., *Imre Hayyim* (a biography of H. Z. Maccoby), Tel

Aviv, 1929, Introduction. Immigrant Jews were more likely to have paid dues to congregations affiliated to the Federation of Synagogues, only six of which were represented at the Board.

[40] As is so often the case, the exceptions are no less interesting than the rule. Among the Deputies who voted in a somewhat irregular fashion, particular mention might be made of Edward L. Mocatta, the only Bevis Marks Deputy to vote with the majority; Howard L. Rothband, the only Manchester delegate to vote with the minority; David G. Baker, the Deputy for Shaw Street, Liverpool, who—having attended every previous meeting of the Board and having criticized the Conjoint Committee on several occasions—abstained on the critical vote; and Louis Kletz, one of the most vociferous of the provincial critics of the Board, who did not make an appearance for the vote.

[41] 18 Deputies in all. Of the 34 members of this group who voted against the Conjoint in June, only 14 had come in May: 5 from London and 9 from the Provinces.

[42] Reports of such meetings in *JC*, 8 June 1917, pp. 20–21; 15 June 1917, p. 10; and 22 June 1917, pp. 19–20. Sokolow, *A History of Zionism*, vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 65–66, has a somewhat different list. For specific descriptions of local feeling in Manchester and Glasgow on 17 June 1917, see S. Marks to Weizmann, S. Marks Mss., CZA, A247/18; and 19 June 1917, S. Grasse to Gaster, Gaster Mss., CZA, A203/53, respectively.

[43] Prominent among the re-elected Deputies who had voted in defence of the Conjoint Manifesto, despite the express wishes of their constituents, were Joseph Prag at Merthyr; L. Benjamin at South Shields; and S. E. de Haas, the representative of Middlesbrough. Among the provincial Deputies who did not gain re-election, despite their condemnation of the Manifesto, were Max Guggenheim at Dublin; E. R. Harris at Newcastle Old Synagogue; Montague Hart at Portsmouth; J. Lewis at Cardiff; and Mark Moses at Philpot Street in East London. In the last instance, the congregation at Philpot Street did not hold any election at all in 1919, since 'the Board does not adequately represent the true interests of Jewry'. *JC*, 9 May 1919, p. 25.

[44] 5 August 1917, L. Simon to Kellen, Leon Simon Mss., CZA, K11/200; and 7 November 1918, *Report on Provincial Zionism*, CZA, Z4/617.

[45] On these episodes see *JC*, 21 October 1910, pp. 16–17; 11 August 1911, pp. 12–13; 24 November 1911, pp. 15–17; and 26 January 1912, pp. 16–18. Information on subsequent contacts between individual members of the B'nai B'rith and leading Zionists is to be found in 28 November 1914, Weizmann to Sacher and Simon, in *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, vol. 7, op. cit., no. 48, p. 60; and 7 June 1917, entry in the minute book of the Zionist Political Committee, P. Goodman Mss., CZA, K/11/6. In general, see Paul Goodman, *B'nai B'rith. The First Lodge of England, 1910–1935* London, 1936, chapter 2; and Walter M. Schwab, *B'nai B'rith. The First Lodge of England. A Record of Fifty Years*, London, 1960, chapter 3.

[46] *JC*, 3 November 1911, p. 10, and 1 December 1911, p. 13. In 1905, L. Greenberg had suggested enlarging the United Synagogue to include provincial congregations: *JC*, 10 March 1905, pp. 25–27.

[47] On these episodes, see reports of the Board meetings in *JC*, 24 July 1908, p. 28; 9 December 1912, p. 8; and 20 April 1913, p. 10.

[48] The correspondence is published in the *JC*, 9 May 1913, p. 13; see also 31 October 1913, pp. 14–16.

[49] The absence of detailed and authoritative local histories of individual provincial congregations for the period allows for no more than a brief sketch of what appears to have been a highly significant phenomenon. For the general background, see Cecil Roth, *The Rise of Provincial Jewry, 1740–1840*, London, 1950; Vivian D. Lipman, *Social History of the Jews in England, 1850–1950*, London, 1954, chapters 7 and 8; Lloyd P. Gartner, *The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870–1914*, London, 1960. On specific communities, see, for example, Bertram B. Benas, 'Later Records of the Jews in Liverpool', *Transactions of the Historical Society of Lancashire and Cheshire*, 1929; and 'A Survey of the Jewish Institutional History of Liverpool and District', *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England*, vol. 17, 1951–52; Philip Ettinger, *'Hope Place' in Liverpool Jewry*, Liverpool, 1930; Arnold Levy, *History of the Sunderland Jewish Community*, London, 1956, especially pp. 195–7; and Ernest Krausz, *Leeds Jewry*, Cambridge, 1964, pp. 4–27. The latest, and most substantial, of the local Jewish histories indicates that the independence of spirit shown by the Manchester community had a lengthy pedigree: Bill Williams, *The Making of Manchester Jewry, 1740–1874*, Manchester, 1976. See also *Provincial Jewry in Victorian Britain, Papers for a Conference at University College, London, Convened by the Jewish Historical Society of England*, prepared by Dr. Aubrey Newman, July 1975.

[50] *JC*, 25 December 1914, pp. 12–13; 14 January 1916, pp. 12–13; and 31 March 1916, p. 11.

[51] B. Fersht and M. Cash were the invited representatives of the Jewish Friendly Societies. They were joined by Lord Swaythling, Sir Mathew Nathan, Lionel Cohen, and Chief Rabbi Hertz; the first three were avowed anti-Zionists, and only Hertz was a gain from the Zionist point of view. On Hertz's reaction to the Conjoint Manifesto, see S. Landman, 'Origins of the Balfour Declaration: Dr. Hertz's Contribution', in I. Epstein, E. Levine, and C. Roth, eds., *Essays in Honour of the Very Rev. Dr. J. H. Hertz*, London, 1942, pp. 261–70.

[52] Address by Moses Gaster to the National Union for Jewish Rights, *JC*, 29 June 1917, p. 23. The limited success of the Zionists at the Board should be contrasted with their total victory at the National Union, an East End body which the Conjoint had originally set up as a means of mustering popular support *against* the Zionists (17 January 1916, Wolf to Zangwill, Zangwill Mss., CZA, A120/16). By 1917, however, the Zionists on the Union had forced Wolf to resign as President and had replaced him by Gaster; see *Gaster's Diary* for the period in CZA, A203/146, p. 6; and 17 April 1916, Zangwill to Richards, Zangwill Mss., CZA, A120/78.

[53] 18 June 1917, H. Samuel to Gaster, Gaster Mss., CZA, A203/4, and 4 July 1917, Sokolow to Rothschild, London Files, CZA, Z4/117.

[54] Only 36 members attended the meeting, of whom 24 voted in favour of the motion: *JC*, 17 August 1917, p. 12.

[55] *JC*, 26 October 1917, pp. 12–13; 26 January 1918, pp. 10–11; and 22 November 1918, p. 15. A contending motion to appoint a special committee of the Board in order to deal with Palestine was defeated by 23 to 21 votes. Ultimately, two committed Zionists were appointed to the Joint

Foreign Committee: S. J. Cohen and B. Benas. However, their influence was limited since they rarely attended its meetings. On the other hand, such members of the 'old guard' as Henriques, Sir Adolph Tuck, and Sir Philip Magnus recorded a high rate of attendance.

[56] The majority was 104 votes to 3; *JC*, 27 June 1919, p. 17.

[57] The compromise, as proposed by Henriques, attempted to steer a delicate course between a pro-Zionist motion presented by Bertram M. Jacobs and the stern opposition of Joshua M. Levy—an avowed anti-Zionist: *JC*, 23 November 1917, p. 13. Subsequently, the Board also rejected one motion that it 'cooperate in a practical scheme for the establishment of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine': *JC*, 22 March 1918, p. 12; and caused the withdrawal of another, that it take steps 'forthwith to obtain direct representation at the Peace Conference' where Palestine questions were to be discussed: *JC*, 27 December 1918, p. 12; and 31 January 1919, p. 9.

[58] *JC*, 2 May 1919, p. 17.

[59] Daiches's original motion was carried by 22 to 15 (*JC*, 21 February 1919, p. 10) and Samuel's subsequent amendment by 46 to 1, with several abstentions (*JC*, 28 March 1919, p. 15).

[60] Letters to the *JC* on 26 January 1918, p. 11, and 1 February 1918, p. 10; see also 12 December 1918, H. J. Morgenstern (Secretary, EZF) to Weizmann, CZA, Z4/617.

THE SECULAR JEW: DOES HE EXIST AND WHY?

Israel Finestein

(Review Article)

THE title of this book—*The Faith of Secular Jews**—calls for an explanation. Why 'faith'? Hope, desire, even longing, yes. 'Faith', after all, is the language and substance of notions repudiated by the secularist. Or is the secular Jew, by definition, different? Unwittingly, and even contrary to express intention and implied disclaimer, the volume is somehow an exercise in delineating the difference. The book consists of extracts from the works of nineteen 'secular Jews', including the Editor—who teaches Jewish Philosophy and Yiddish Literature at the Herzliah Jewish Teachers Seminary (Graduate Faculty) in New York.

All the writers, save for Albert Einstein and Horace Meyer Kallen, were born in eastern Europe. They include such diverse figures as Abraham Golomb, champion of the Yiddish secular-school movement, who for nearly twenty years after the Second World War was principal of the Jewish Day School in Mexico City; Chaim Greenberg, the Zionist publicist who in the 1920's in Berlin edited *Haolam*, the official organ of the World Zionist Organisation, and who in 1934 became editor in New York of the Labour Zionist monthly, *Jewish Frontier*; and two leading American philosophers of the pragmatic school, the non-Zionist Morris Raphael Cohen (principal founder in 1939 of the journal *Jewish Social Studies*) and the German-born Zionist, Kallen. The Editor's Introduction reveals the American context of much of his thought and assumptions, but the themes are of universal Jewish interest. He traces the sources of modern Jewish secularism in the *Haskalah*, and examines its 'transplantation' to the United States.

Professor Goodman is evidently aware of the potential anomaly of associating 'faith' with rationalist humanism. Towards the end of his Introduction he profers what is in effect an explanation, at least terminologically, for so doing. In a section strangely headed 'Religious Secularism as a Philosophy for Jewish Humanists', he seeks to resolve

* Saul L. Goodman, ed., *The Faith of Secular Jews*, with an Introduction by the Editor, xiii + 301 pp., The Library of Judaic Learning (Jacob Neusner, ed.), Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1976, $15.00 (paperback, $5.95).

what he acknowledges to be the 'apparent contradiction', by resorting to John Dewey's description of the term 'religious'. 'Any activity', wrote Dewey, 'pursued in behalf of an ideal and against obstacles, and in spite of threats of personal loss because of conviction of its general and enduring value, is religious in quality.'[1] On such basis, what the Editor, following Dewey, refers to as 'an attitude, a disposition, a commitment', can properly be denoted by the adjective 'religious'. Dewey distinguished 'religion' in so far as it connotes dogma, ritual, and establishments on the one hand, from the altruism of the *religious attitude*, on the other hand.

This is hardly an explanation. Yet, equipped with this glossary, the Editor proceeds far. He writes: 'In view of this definition, it follows that when a Jew bets his life on the survival of his people, when he makes an effort to inculcate Jewish values in his children, or when he is deeply involved in Jewish cultural activities, all of these experiences are religious in character.' Almost every word of this proposition begs the question, namely as to what is the rationale of the secular Jew. An alternative form of the question is, Why ought or why need the secularist wish to be distinctively Jewish? Do the extraordinary peculiarities of Jewish history, notably the influence and survival of the Jews, retain for him a mystery, the consciousness of which he is not yet able to shed?

For his own purposes, the Editor might usefully also have referred to the other 'quality of experience' which Dewey imported into the word 'religious'. It is the experience which so relates a person to the world as 'to effect an adjustment in life, an orientation, that brings with it a sense of security and peace'. The combination in Dewey of pragmatism and idealism is bound to have a special appeal to the secular Jew trained in Jewish messianism and educated to see the ideal and the actual as interwoven. The 'working union of the ideal and the actual', wrote Dewey, is 'identical with the force that has in fact been attached to the conception' of the divine in the supernatural religions. 'The things in civilization', he concluded, which 'we most prize are not of ourselves. They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the continuous human community in which we are a link. Ours is the responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values we have received that those who come after us may receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we have received it. Here are all the elements of a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and militant.'[2] Not for nothing did Morris Cohen write[3] that 'if there could be such an office as that of national philosopher [in America], no one else could be properly mentioned for it' but Dewey, despite Cohen's reservations on some aspects of his philosophy and the reactions to Dewey's system on the part of the Churches.

Yet to the liberal, secular, Jewish humanist, the question 'What then becomes of the Jew?' goes to the heart of such or any comparable body of thought.

Perhaps of particular interest are the passages (reprinted in this volume) from Cohen's autobiography, *A Dreamer's Journey* (1949), published two years after his death. 'Spinoza', wrote this student of William James,

> like the other great religious teachers and the morally wise men of science, teaches the great lesson of humility—that there are always vast realms beyond our ken or control, and that the great blessing of inner peace is unattainable without a sense of the mystery of creation about us and a wisely cultivated resignation to our mortal but inevitable limitations . . . Men cling to sanctified phrases not only because of the insights they contain but even more because, through ritual and repetition, they have become redolent with the wine of human experience . . . And though I have never gone back to theologic super-naturalism, I have come to appreciate more than I once did the symbolism in which is celebrated the human need of trusting to the larger vision, according to which calamities come and go but the continuity of life and faith in its better possibilities survive.

In this guarded confessional passage, one may be forgiven for detecting in respect of a highly sophisticated mind not only the hold of the past but also the yearning for a lost, irretrievably lost, communion. In a deeper sense than that proposed by the Editor, the state of mind of a secular Jew is often hinged to a faith which transcends the declared categories of his philosophy.

What is a secular Jew? It would do less than justice to his position to say only that he is a Jew who is a secularist. He is a Jew who wants to remain a discernible Jew and distinctively Jewish, and who is a secularist. Is this a contradiction in terms? The enthusiasms which lay behind this wish spring from a civilization grounded in metaphysical concepts, which as a secularist he excludes from his calculations and which form no part of any premiss for him. The secular Jew faces quandaries unique to the Jews. These quandaries cannot arise for the 'secularist Christian', for (unless by Christian is meant a Christian-type moralist without Christianity) that category does not exist. Nor does any quandary arise for, let us say, the 'secularist Englishman'. There is nothing in his character as an Englishman which conflicts with complete secularity, should he choose it. Perhaps in the course of medieval Christian uniformity or in the days thereafter when *cujus regio ejus religio* ('whose the region is, his the religion shall be'—a slogan pregnant with diverse and contradictory consequences for posterity) sought to prevail, there could be inherent tensions between citizenship and any idea of utter secularity. But these categories of thinking do not arise in the modern world, unless one finds them in analogies of dissidence, which do not relate to the particular nuances of the subject under review.

In December 1942, the noted educationalist and philosopher, Sir Richard Livingstone, wrote that 'our biggest need' was 'the need of values and standards which are more than mere habits, which go down below the soil of custom and into the rock of clear conviction and are founded in a philosophy of life'. Livingstone was writing in the heat of war, with concern for the educational future. His words are of perennial value, and possibly of greater import today than ever. He added, '. . . ultimately virtues depend on beliefs, and though sound habits are admirable, it is dangerous to rely on them in an age of change.'[4]

But what are 'Jewish values'? Are they specifically, essentially, and inherently Jewish? Or are they but the product of history, and not necessarily enduring in a changed world? If they be the product of history, must they be retained if the entire historical context which gave them birth is dissolved? Are nostalgia, habit, and pride a sufficient justification for their active retention? And what are 'Jewish cultural activities'? You need not be a Jew to be deeply interested in Jewish history or even to feel much influenced by the Jewish past. The Judeo-Christian heritage is common to the western world and beyond. Nor is any phase of the Hebrew language a closed book to the Gentile world. Is there any moral compulsion on the Jew to imbibe or inculcate such values, whatever they be, or to engage in such studies and activities?

There is such a phenomenon as the secular Jew. The fact has to be stated, for, obvious though it be, it is a recent development in Jewish history. The early emancipationists would for the most part not have understood the concept, and, when understood, would have rejected it. Indeed, it would have appeared to some of them as dangerous to their campaign, for it would instantly have raised the spectre of the separated and separatist Jew. Differences of *religion* were positively a cementing factor in an increasingly liberal age.

The comparative modernity of the secular Jew is perhaps illustrated by the fact that the earliest of the writers presented in *The Faith of Secular Jews* are Peretz (1852–1915) and Ahad Ha'Am (1856–1927). The contrasts between these two personalities, as well as their common ground, epitomize the growth and inherent limitations of the stand of secular Jews. They shared a common scepticism, which with Peretz amounted to agnosticism; but with both of them there was, in some phases, a tinge of deism. They also evinced, scepticism notwithstanding, an intermittent conviction that the Jews had a providential role in human history, which was by no means yet fulfilled. However, there was a considerable contrast between them. It was in eastern European life of the period, with its Yiddish springs and Hassidic fables, that Peretz saw the all-important imperviousness to alien penetration and the promise of distinctive continuity. To Ahad Ha'Am, alien penetration by way of Jewish imitation was the inevitable order of the day. He saw

no salvation for the once unitary elements in Jewish life, save by the establishment of a spiritual or moral centre located in the old Palestinian home, which would inspire and reinvigorate all the widely-flung, disparate and ever-increasingly enervated sections of the Jewish people.

Writing in Warsaw a few years before the First World War, Peretz declared:

> Jewish life must burst into blossom again. With the Bible as germinating seed and with folk symbols and folk legends as dew and rain, the field will sprout again, the people will revive, the Jews will rise once more to suffer anew for their truth and will reaffirm their faith in ultimate victory.

This statement was made in an article, reprinted by the Editor of the volume under review, entitled 'What is this Jewish Heritage?' It is a remarkable statement from an intellect in revolt against all the elements of that creed which alone (poetry aside) give the words meaning. If the 'ultimate victory' is to be the regeneration of mankind, and even if the Jews by their genius and example may have a particular task in its accomplishment, one may fairly ask whether the task is promoted or satisfactorily defined by reference to the kind of twilight philosophy so congenial to those in love with a tradition which their intellect repudiates.

To Peretz, the Jewishness which he wanted to preserve, and which he believed was self-perpetuating, was the acute, suffering self-consciousness of his Yiddish world. It was in the forefront of his nationalism. He had little vision of the sophisticated Jewish rejection of suffering. He offered little satisfaction to the Jewish imitators of the West. To Ahad Ha'Am, Judaism was no more than enlightened morality, the guise or medium in which the national idea had revealed or expressed itself. In spite of the intellectual refinement of his system, he did no more than throw the national idea back into itself; that is to say that while he might rebuke the assimilationist for surrender and even while he might defend the spirit of the halakha against the critique of Claude Montefiore, he saw the national will existentially, as moving where it listeth.

Among writers in English during this century, one of the most intelligent critics of the Judeo-Christian tradition has been Aldous Huxley. His objection was essentially against that strand in Judaism which comprises what might be termed morality by command. What in effect he inveighed against was the presumed legitimacy—inviolable and overriding—of the received moral code, with its source in authority, and its alleged consequences of self-righteousness and intolerance.[5] What to his way of thinking was nothing more than an imposed and inhibiting morality, was to the adherents of Jewish tradition an extension, and in some respects, a restatement or the articulated acknowledgement of natural law, as they saw it. To Huxley, it was the reverse of natural law and hostile to the Greek ideal of free human inspiration, which for most of his life he admired.

The issue between the conflicting approaches of the old tradition and Huxley concerns the definition of—and the rationale for—good behaviour. It goes beyond any question as narrow (however painful) as antisemitism. True, those who tend to adopt the Huxley view also tend to succumb to literary and perhaps other overt forms of antisemitism. They personalize their intellectual and philosophical antipathy. Sometimes it is difficult to say which, if either, comes first: the personal distaste for Jews (for whatever reasons) or the aversion to the Judaic element in Western religion and thought.

Be that as it may, there is, in a particular sense, a point of contact, or rather an analogy, between the rejection of the central themes and convictions of that Judaic element by the Hellenistic philosophic sceptics, and the repudiation by the secular Jew of the matrix from which the distinctive Jew sprang. That matrix is much more than a set of philosophical canons. It was, as in fact the critics contend, fashioned by a belief in design and purpose and in the existence of authority. Huge intellectual and philosophical questions arise when one comes to consider any particular role of the Jews in that design and purpose, and the nature of the ultimate authority. No person of sensitivity and intelligence could make light of those questions, or of the greater question as to whether indeed they arise at all. But the questions which surely arise when one seeks to maintain the tree without the roots are likewise formidable.

What is not sufficiently appreciated is that the secular Jew may properly be said to live on the capital of the tradition which he rejects. He needs the lively tradition in order to test and sharpen upon it his assessment of what constitute the distinctive features of Jewishness. Each succeeding generation of secular Jews finds itself faced with increasingly intense problems relating to Jewish identity, its definition, and the object of its retention. The nearer the secular Jew is to fountains of the tradition, the easier for him to advance his philosophy without concern over whether this philosophy is transmissible or Jewish. In such circumstances, the task of defining Jewish identity and Jewishness is less urgent.

It may well be that accordingly the urgency is today more acute than ever before. This book does not face these realities. Given the intellectual humanism of the secular Jew, it is all the more ironic that in some instances, however unwittingly, there is an undercurrent of complacency. The outlook is sometimes pseudo-forward-looking, in that at its heart is a longing for the past, for all its messages for the future. One need not be unmindful of the difficulties of the old school, in order to detect in the new schools a sense of desperation. The central problem is transmissibility, including the worthwhileness of transmission. The Editor, in his Introduction, writes that 'the edifice of Jewish secularism . . . if renovated in each generation may serve as a satisfactory rationale

for modern Jews in the Diaspora and in Israel' (p. 38). He also acknowledges the evolving nature of the 'complex of ideas known as secularism' (p. 39). The words 'renovated in each generation' constitute the inescapable question-mark while at the same time they comprise the pith both of the Editor's hope and of his conviction.

The intensity of belief in the value of secular culture can amount to a form of secular religion. In her recent work entitled *Varieties of Unbelief: Atheists and Agnostics in English Society 1850–1960* (1977), Dr. Susan Budd writes as follows (pp. 266–7):

> The most general ambiguity which all humanist bodies have had to face is as to whether they are secular religions, however defined, or pressure groups on behalf of the non-theological. Are they social or psychological substitutes for religion, alternatives to it, or modes of transcending and overcoming it?

It is not far-fetched to detect in some secular Jews the fervour of secular religion. It is as though they have fought with themselves against yielding up the treasured assumptions of chosenness (whatever its meaning), redemption (in whatever form), and the mystery of Jewish destiny. But in the end, stripped of inherited language-forms, none of it remains. The secular Jew is obliged to seek other grounds for his 'faith'.

A striking common factor among secular Jews is the relationship which they draw between Jewish achievement, and the desire and need to retain a self-conscious and distinctive Jewishness. Indeed, they relate the achievement to the very nature of Jewishness. Writing in 1949, Albert Einstein, in a passage included in this book, posited the following features as the 'two characteristic hereditary traits' and 'the most fundamental ones'. First, the democratic ideal of social justice. Second, the 'high esteem for every form of intellectual striving and spiritual effort'. He adds: 'I see the essence of Jewish nature in these sharply marked ideals'. In a further quoted passage, on 'Jewish Ideals', Einstein says of Judaism that it '. . . is not a creed . . . It is . . . an attempt to base the moral law on fear, a regrettable, discreditable venture.' 'Nevertheless,' he observes, 'it seems to me that the strong moral tradition in the Jewish people has largely liberated itself from this fear.'

There we have the dilemma fully revealed. Has that 'liberation' left a residue of distinctiveness which ought to be retained? The 'moral tradition' grew out of the system and outlook from which the 'Jewish people' have been 'liberated'. That tradition is or should be part of the common stock of civilized man, however diverse the forms in which it finds expression. In the historical meantime, what sustained the Jewish distinctiveness, as well as deepening old attachments, were the anti-Jewish outside pressures. 'More than on its own tradition,' comments Einstein, 'the Jewish group matured on the basis of the oppression and hatred it constantly encountered in the world.' If the desire that the

group should continue its separate identity is founded on an acceptance that its continued separateness is in any event inescapable, then many questions are at once put to rest. If antisemitism, or what it has brought about, is the ground-work of the secular Jew, then for the purposes of defining an intellectually satisfying rationale for intentional survival, such matters as Jewish achievement and Jewish ideals lose much of their relevance. Naturally it is more gratifying, if you *must* accept group survival, to be able to point to positive characteristics, even if you are not taken up with a nostalgia which might in any event provide for some an adequate nourishment to pride.

There is even a temptation to fall back on the Jewish ideals and expound them and their consequences as though they were the result of some genetic quality, which came into being by processes of inheritance and adaptation and which accord to 'the Jews' a special proclivity. It may well be, without reliance on a certain currently advanced genetic theory, that the case has been made out for attributing the prominence of Jews in the van of socially ameliorative movements and in intellectual achievement, to a series of hard historical facts which imposed upon them a particular way of looking at things. An imposed detachment, for example, could well have endowed Jews with the advantage of an outside view, less fettered and inhibited, rendering them more socially aware. The much-discussed historical factors of this kind, which may have given Jews some specific familiar predispositions and aptitudes, are hardly a base—whatever the pride—on which to establish a justification for separate group survival.

From this point of view, there is greater force in Chaim Zhitlowsky's assertion of what he means by 'Jewish secular culture' than in many a more intellectualized definition based on 'Jewish ideals' or 'Jewish values'. That famous Yiddishist spent the second half of his life in America, and is a natural choice for inclusion by Professor Goodman. 'When a Jew', wrote Zhitlowsky in 1939, 'satisfies his spiritual-cultural needs in Yiddish, when he reads a Yiddish neswpaper or a Yiddish book, goes to a Yiddish lecture, when he attends a Yiddish play or a Yiddish movie, or sends his child to a modern Yiddish secular school, when he listens to a Yiddish radio hour, or carries on a conversation in Yiddish about Jewish or non-Jewish matters or problems—he is without doubt a Jew, a member of the Jewish people.'

However, passages such as that fail to take account of the point which arises by implication and ironically, out of Zhitlowsky's next strangely inserted sentence: 'People of non-Jewish ancestry who become accustomed to the Yiddish linguistic sphere and become part and parcel of it, almost assimilate with it, such people also occur, but they are such rare exceptions that we can disregard them entirely.' The fact is that Yiddish, which plays so large a part in Jewish secularism, is a vehicle and not the substance, much as the Yiddishist may feel driven to deny

the distinction in some respects. It belongs to an epoch in history. Where it does not exist, its absence does not affect the nature of the questions which remain to be answered. In fact, its hold can cloud the questions, which at their heart are concerned not solely with techniques for survival but paramountly with reasons why it is desirable and necessary to strive for it, whether there be outside pressures or not. When the reasons are accepted, the techniques tend to find themselves.

Of all the writers included in this volume, none appreciated this more clearly than Simon Dubnow. Writing seventy years ago, Dubnow repudiated the idea that Jewish 'nationality' can exist solely 'by virtue of the law of psychic heredity and cultural-historical factors'. He observed that 'in practice, this theory would make it possible to justify religious apostasy'. 'If', he wrote, 'we wish to preserve Judaism as a cultural-historical type of nation, we must realise that the religion of Judaism is one of the integral foundations of national culture and that anyone who seeks to destroy it undermines the very basis of national existence.' It is an important principle, which it is well to stress in the philosophy of the so-called secular Jew. The principle is not deprived of its central feature by Dubnow's immediate distinction between orthodox and 'evolutionary' Judaism.

Dubnow described as 'a most important question' the issue raised by those who do not accept religion in general and the Jewish religion in particular. His conclusion is that 'absence of faith takes the Jew out of the national community only if he believes in complete national assimilation'. Dubnow emphasized that conversion to another faith means, 'under conditions prevailing in the Diaspora', separation from the Jewish nation. These propositions, with their echoes in Israel today, leave open the question as to those who, 'in the absence of faith', seek their reasons (other than lack of welcome outside) for not wanting any degree of national assimilation and who yet neither were drawn to Zionism nor are drawn to Israel, nor find current relevance in Dubnow's brand of nationalism.

That question is at once more acute in America than elsewhere in the West and yet at the same time, in everyday-life, it is less sharply felt there. Morris Ginsberg commented in 1956 that 'there is a certain sense in which what is called "The American Way of Life" is itself a religion.'[6] It is, he stated, 'a faith common to all Americans and overriding the differences of the "official" religions'. 'As far as the Jews are concerned,' Ginsberg went on, 'it is their refusal to become Christians as much as their positive adherence to Judaism that throughout the history of the Diaspora has kept them separate.' Whatever may critically be said about that sweeping generalization, it has been sufficiently true since the eighteenth century to render the observation highly pertinent now. He added: 'The same factors now operate to preserve the distinctiveness of the Jewish community in the U.S.A. American Jews

live in accordance with the American way of life. But they do so with a difference, a difference due to their Jewishness.'

The patent ethnicity of American life and its unspent utopianism blunt on the American scene some of the questions here posed. Nevertheless, the task of defining that 'difference' and that 'Jewishness' in the end makes the questions unavoidable even to, and more particularly for, the American Jew, as well as for Jews elsewhere. As Ginsberg pointed out, the answer to the question as to what is the content of Jewishness 'eludes' us. 'It has its roots', he commented, 'in ancient traditions and memories.' It is when those traditions are eroded and those memories exploded, that the secular Jew is faced with his ultimate question: Does he still exist as a Jew, and why?

Jewish secularism, in the sense of the term understood by the Editor, can have no truck with Arthur Koestler's assertion that in default of emigration to Zion there is no sensible or purposeful alternative but to let Jewish identity in the Diaspora be submerged.[7] Nor does the Zionist secular Jew adopt Ben-Gurion's equation of Zionism with *aliyah*. The secular Jew in the Diaspora disowns all such conceptions and affirms the Diaspora. In a telling passage written in 1954 (and reprinted in this book) Maurice Samuel, the American Zionist *littérateur*, rejected the pessimism of those ideas. 'Imitation', he wrote, 'does not necessarily lead to dissolution. It can lead to the reassertion of the self in a new form.' And yet the secular Jew is faced with the residual question of 'Why?' He stands unaided by faith, adept at discarding the shibboleths of the past, and doing his utmost to fashion his *raison d'être*. He tends to rest his philosophy ostensibly upon choice and preference, while the pointers all the time are that at best he is but rationalizing what exists.

The essence of the matter is, I believe, to be found in the remarks of Morris Raphael Cohen, published in 1949 and reproduced in this volume. He wrote:

> The members of any hereditary group which, like the Jewish, is regarded as in some way inferior by dominant opinion are apt, by way of reaction, to intensify this pride . . . a realistic view shows that for the most part we must accept our heredity and do the best we can with it. In any case, we cannot achieve self-respect if we are afraid of self-knowledge, of knowing the history of our ancestors and how we came to be what we are.

Even if an hereditary group is not regarded as inferior but only as different, the same reaction may be expected. The predicament of the secular Jew is that with each generation the need for 'self-knowledge' is less felt. In the modern world the chain of faith is not immune to a like response, but neither has the secularist alighted upon any saving formula.

NOTES

[1] John Dewey, *A Common Faith*, New Haven, Conn., 1934, p. 27.
[2] ibid., pp. 13, 57, 87.
[3] Morris Raphael Cohen, *American Thoughts: A Critical Sketch*, New York, 1962, p. 364.
[4] Richard Livingstone, *Education for a World Adrift*, Cambridge, 1943, p. xiv.
[5] See in particular the first essay in Huxley's *Do What You Will*, London, 1929, entitled 'One and Many'. It is a sustained critique of Judaic monotheism and its effects in the West.
[6] Morris Ginsberg, *The Jewish People Today: A Survey*, The Inaugural Noah Barou Memorial Lecture, published by the British Section of the World Jewish Congress, London, 1956.
[7] Arthur Koestler, *Promise and Fulfilment*, London, 1949, pp. 332–5.

JEWISH GOLD AND PRUSSIAN IRON

Lloyd P. Gartner

(Review Article)

HISTORIOGRAPHY knew un-persons before the term made its way into the vocabulary. Un-person does not apply to the mass of humanity, of whom only an infinitesimal proportion can ever appear in any historical work, but to the more intriguing case of persons who occupied prominent positions, or were even at the centre of great affairs, and have been obliterated from the place in historical writing which they should reasonably be given. The case of Trotsky comes of course to mind. Un-personhood, one assumes, befalls one who backed the wrong horse or betrayed a trust.

In *Gold and Iron*,* however, we have the case of Gerson Bleichröder (1821–1893), a Jew who was the richest man in Berlin, one of Germany's foremost financiers, and Otto von Bismarck's personal banker and business confidant: a man who found the right side and remained on it all his life. For nearly thirty years he enjoyed easy access to the Iron Chancellor and corresponded with him extensively. As an eager social climber, Bleichröder lived grandly, entertained sumptuously, and sought out the company of Junkers, especially after he was ennobled in 1872 and could add the mystic *von* to his name. Contemporary gossip made much of Der Bleiche, as he was called in ironic contempt, and of his closeness with Bismarck. But his noble (fellow-noble, Bleichröder would have unabashedly said) derogators solicited his help with their financial problems, an assistance which he appears to have been rather generous in granting. He was regularly visited by diplomats and ministers of high rank who consulted him on weighty matters of finance and statecraft, knowing they could often reach the Chancellor's ear through his discreet, exceptionally well-informed banker.

There is probably no historic personage of the last two centuries who has received more attention from historians than Bismarck; perhaps only Lincoln or Lenin rival him. The few friends and numerous subservient officials who surrounded him, most of them resplendent with *Graf* and *zu* and *von* in their multiple or hyphenated names, have also been lavishly treated, their biographies written, and their papers

* Fritz Stern, *Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire*, xxiv + 625 pp., 16 plates, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1977, $17.95.

published. But as to the Jewish banker, the learned editors of Bismarck's writings saw fit to omit what was then known of the correspondence between the two men. However, did not Bismarck himself give the cue? His voluminous memoirs virtually omit Bleichröder. The canon of German history during the era of national unification was largely the work of able scholars of the Prussian conservative school, who when not outright antisemites, generally regarded the Jews with disdain. They laid the basis for what their successors, even those who were philosophic opponents, were to write. Thus, in the general German histories by such liberal democratic emigrés as Erich Eyck and Hajo Holborn, Gerson Bleichröder appears only as Bismarck's skilful personal banker. Such historians may have felt it was preferable not to dwell on Jews, for reasons of humane tolerance. In the historic drama of German unification under Prussian domination as conceived by the conservative nationalist scholars, Jews were outsiders. Their emancipation was not the recognition of human rights but an act of lofty Christian charity. In the politics and diplomacy of the German Empire, not to mention its sanctum sanctorum, the army, there could be no place for them. Low matters like money might be left to Jews, so that only a financial role could be conceived for a Bleichröder. It was intolerable to suppose that the exalted Bismarck would take the advice of a Jew in affairs of state.

Quite a few contemporary sources of the sort historians normally evaluate and possibly put to use implied, frequently in an antisemitic way, that Bleichröder had a great deal more to say in public affairs than the historians allowed. While no one would suggest it be taken at face value, such material could have pointed to paths for less biased investigation. But attacks on Bleichröder were often indirect attacks on Bismarck; would not, then, obscuring Bleichröder indirectly enhance Bismarck? The lustre of the Iron Chancellor and the glory of the German Empire he founded were not to be tarnished by the possibility of any significant Jewish role.

Jewish historians more or less accepted the standard evaluation of Bleichröder as merely Bismarck's private banker. It was the might of the Rothschilds which was trumpeted when Jewish bankers were spoken of. Bleichröder was known to have been active in the cause of Roumanian Jewish emancipation at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and it was believed he had something to do with Bismarck's suprising zeal in the matter. I myself observed elsewhere some years ago, 'This banker normally stayed well out of politics and knew thoroughly the limits of his influence with his formidable master' (*American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, LVIII, 1968, p. 112). I was then expressing more or less the conventional wisdom.

The Nazi upheaval destroyed what remained of Bleichröder's bank after its long decline following the founder's death in 1893. His descendants, who were practically nonentities and no longer Jews, fled for their

lives and scattered. The Bleichröder archives were brought to the United States, where some years ago they came to the notice of Professors David Landes, the economic historian now at Harvard, and Fritz Stern, the Columbia University historian of Germany. Landes's history of the Bleichröder bank has yet to appear, while Stern's study is at hand. *Gold and Iron* is a highly original and important work about the interrelationship of finance, politics, and diplomacy in German history from 1860 to 1890, as seen through the association between Otto von Bismarck and Gerson Bleichröder. It is built upon three archival treasures: the mass of letters to Bleichröder, including those from the Chancellor; the archives of the Paris Rothschilds, who were the banker's early sponsors to Bismarck and his principal financial connection; and those of Bismarck himself, still in the keeping of his descendants. Stern puts to use still other archives, including that of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, as well as the immense literature on nineteenth-century Germany, and he has become well acquainted with Jewish historiography of that era. His is a massive work, over 300,000 words in length plus introductory matter and apparatus, and it is sustained throughout by a vivid and consistently energetic style.

New and fresh as is his material, Stern's historical method is quite traditional. There is no quantitative history here, nor is any direct attention given to matters like social structures. What we see is men in action, understood profoundly against the social and economic backgrounds as Jew and Junker, financier and landowner, social arriviste and aristocrat determined to ensure that his class retain its dominance. British, French, and American historians have applied such methods without hesitation to the histories of their respective countries, but in the German historiographic tradition there was a sense of impropriety about linking Macht with Geld rather than Geist. Bismarck, apotheosized in this tradition, had no such inhibitions himself, as is to be seen with relentless clarity from Stern's study. The windfall sale, negotiated by Bleichröder, of the government's rights to buy the profitable Cologne–Minden railway enabled Bismarck to continue in the war with Austria in 1866, against the parliamentary opposition which he was determined to crush. The finances of that war, and the arrangements for the payment of the French indemnity after the Franco-Prussian War, are newly illuminated. One may continue with a long list from the twenty-eight years of Bismarck's tenure in office. The obvious conclusion is that the state stood supreme over economic interests, to which it dictated as necessary. Moreover, the Chancellor did not hesitate to share freely his inside knowledge in order to assist Bleichröder to become a very rich man. Personal profit was a much coveted by-product of high policy, although it never determined Bismarck's conduct of the affairs of state.

It has long been wondered why Bismarck pressed hard the claims of

the creditors of the disreputable railway promoter Strousberg, a converted Jew, against Roumania, and why he took such interest in Roumanian Jewish emancipation. That had been guaranteed by the European powers, with Prussia among them, when they established the Danubian Principalities, which soon became Roumania, by the Treaty of Paris in 1856. However, any attempt by a power to exercise its right to intervene in Roumania infuriated the Roumanians, especially if it was on behalf of the Jews. With Bismarck's sympathy, the victims of Strousberg's default and European Jewry both pressed claims against a hostile Roumania. We now learn that Strousberg's investors included many of the Chancellor's fellow-Junkers, who stood to be ruined by the default along with thousands of ordinary Germans. Perhaps Bismarck was also influenced by Bleichröder's pleas for the Roumanian Jews, but backing the Jews was another useful form of pressure on the Roumanian regime which had allegedly guaranteed interest payments on the defaulted securities. When Strousberg's creditors were somewhat satisfied, the Chancellor quickly lost interest in the Roumanian Jews. Stern admirably, and at last, clarifies these connections between Bismarck, the Strousberg creditors, and Roumanian Jewry.

For his part, Bleichröder was a formal, proper Jew who treasured the opportunity his diplomatic efforts afforded him to acquire the esteem of Montefiore and Crémieux. They accepted him while high German society did not—yet Bleichröder had a thick skin, for he seems to have disregarded innumerable slights visited upon him. In his last years, however, he was tormented by antisemitic personal attacks, against which neither Bismarck nor anyone else in high places took the trouble to defend him.

Whether or not Bleichröder is to be called a court Jew like his eighteenth-century predecessors is not a matter hinging upon his temperament, suitable though that was for the role. What did count was that the German Empire, founded in the century of European liberalism and industrialism, was dominated by a patriarchal monarchy and a landed military aristocracy which made it possible for a Bleichröder to play a dangerously anachronistic political and economic role. His advancement came not through liberalism but by its opposite. He himself fervidly supported the system, which more and more of his fellow-Jews were beginning to question or oppose. Stern's great book brings forcefully yet subtly to our attention the ironic, problematic aspects of Gerson Bleichröder and Bismarck's Germany (p. xviii):

> Bleichröder's life described this yearning for acceptance and his social presence exemplified the anxious snobbery that was the very stuff of bourgeois society.
>
> Bleichröder's career takes us from Bismarck's chancellery to the furthest limits of German imperial penetration in China and Mexico, and yet at the heart of the story is Bleichröder's Jewishness, which shaped his life,

> enhanced his sufferings, divided him from his peers and progeny . . . The ambiguity of Jewish success was embodied in his career: by virtue of his wealth and service he was allowed to rise to the top; by royal fiat and on parchment he was an equal to Prussian nobles—and yet in his mature years he became the magnet for all the malice, frustration, and resentment that festered in German society.

That which festered in the era of Bismarck and Bleichröder became cancer during their grandchildren's lifetime. But skill at political manœuvring and financial arranging differs from—it probably opposes—prophetic vision.

BOOK REVIEWS

THEODOR W. ADORNO, HANS ALBERT, RALF DAHRENDORF, JÜRGEN HABERMAS, HARALD PILOT, and KARL R. POPPER, *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, translated from the German by Glyn Adey and David Frisby, xliv + 307 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1976, £6.50 (paperback, £3.90).

This book has a curious history. At the Tübingen conference (1961) of the German Sociological Society the organizers planned what they anticipated would be a lively debate on the scientific and logical foundations of sociology between Professor (later Professor Sir) Karl Popper and the doyen of the Frankfurt school, Professor T. W. Adorno. The papers presented by these scholars are reproduced in this book (pp. 87–122). Popper first presented his famous 27 theses, not all of which were new—but all of them are subtle, complex, and important. Adorno in his turn offered, in effect, a long exposition of critical theory —something which for him, and others of the Frankfurt school, was antithetical to positivism in most of its protean forms. Professor Adorno did make reference to what Popper had said but as Ralf Dahrendorf observed, in his comments (included in this book on pp. 123ff.) on the Popper-Adorno symposium, it was much less of a confrontation than might have been expected. As we shall note below, Popper is not a positivist—and so a debate on this subject between him and Adorno was somewhat misconceived. But, again, as Dahrendorf reports, it was obvious to those who listened that there was an 'extraordinary difference in the concept of philosophy' held by the two speakers. This difference was more important than any apparent failure by Adorno to confront Popper.

> . . . the fundamental difference in the cognitive hopes and aspirations of Popper and Adorno becomes clear—a difference which permeated the entire discussion. . . . Whilst Adorno regards it as possible to reproduce reality itself in the cognitive process and, consequently, even to apprehend and utilize a categorial apparatus inherent in the object, for Popper, knowledge is always a problematic attempt to capture reality by forcing upon it categories and, above all, theories. (p. 125)

And, earlier (p. 124),

> Criticism (or more precisely, 'a critical theory of society') means for Adorno the unfolding of the contradictions of reality through their apprehension [Erkenntnis]. One is tempted to examine this concept of a

> critical theory—which, in the Kantian sense, is, at least potentially, thoroughly dogmatic—in its derivation from the critique of the Left Hegelians. For Popper, on the other hand, the category of criticism is completely lacking in definite content; it is a pure mechanism of the provisional confirmation of general scientific statements: 'We cannot ground our assertions', we can only 'expose them to criticism'.

After Dahrendorf's 'Remarks on the Discussion', the book continues with some lengthy interchanges (published between 1963 and 1968) between Habermas, Albert, and Pilot in which the controversy started at Tubingen was further developed—the argument over 'dialectical justification' and critical theory being further expanded and widened. I especially refer the reader to the contributions by Albert which are, by the standards of German theoretical writings, remarkably pellucid and to the point. But the whole exercise (and this is the extraordinary feature) is now prefaced by a new 66-page introduction by Adorno which is both an overview of the argument and a most vigorous defence of the new dialectics. Here, there is an even more obvious tendency to diminish opposing views by dubbing them 'positivist'. This is followed by nearly twenty *more* pages of Adorno—drawn from an article which originally appeared in 1957. Both Albert and Popper clearly resented this further skewing of the argument and say so in no uncertain terms in their concluding comments (pp. 283ff.),—Popper in his distinguished essay 'Reason or Revolution?'. This essay and Albert's contributions form the most valuable part of the work. This book is, of course, an English translation from the German—published in 1969. One of the translators, David Frisby, says in his introduction that one commentator (B. Willms) somewhat acidly remarks, 'on the one hand, this dispute is still relatively unfruitful, and on the other, it already covers so much ground.' The word 'positivist' in the title seems itself to be a source of confusion. What we are presented with—as Frisby's introductory essay seeks to clarify—is a running argument in the debate over scientific method which, of course, goes back to the Max Weber period and has gone on beyond 1969 (let alone 1961) to produce further exercises (at least, so it seems to me) in the higher obfuscation. But many of those who have laboured in, or reviewed, this 'positivism' debate have already observed that the voice of any known positivist is missing, and that there is little detailed attempt to present issues in the light of concrete, empirical research. Whatever positivism is, quite clearly Professor Sir Karl Popper is not among the positivists. He has spent many, many years expounding and promoting his own form of 'critical rationalism'. He has long made clear the philosophical gap between his own thinking and that of the 'logical positivists': so far as the social sciences are concerned, his critical rationalism (and his Tubingen contribution makes this clear) is expressly opposed to that element in positivism which he calls 'misguided naturalism'.

> This misguided naturalism establishes such demands as: begin with observations and measurements; this means, for instance, begin by collecting statistical data; proceed, next, by induction to generalizations and to the formation of theories. (p. 90)

And if another hallmark of positivism is hostility to speculative thought, then it is also, and equally, clear that Popper does not share this prejudice.'I have always been in favour of criticizable speculative thought and, of course, of its criticism' (p. 290, footnote).

Few English readers have followed—even on a year to year basis—the stresses of German sociology since 1961 to which this book is a helpful though often turgid monument. The book gives more than a flavour of what was to its participants an important and politically charged controversy over the cruces of value—freedom, the nature of scientific method, and 'dialectical' interpretations in the social sciences. If it sometimes appears musty and jejune, then this is in part a result of difficulties in the translation of such intractable material. (The affinity of Popper and Dahrendorf to the English language contrasts markedly with the style of most of the other writers.) Difficulties of this kind are often unavoidable—but it is saddening as well as misleading to be confronted at certain points by jarring infelicities due, I believe, to problems of proof-reading.

JULIUS GOULD

J. DAVID BLEICH, *Contemporary Halakhic Problems*, xviii + 403 pp., The Library of Jewish Law and Ethics (Norman Lamm, ed.), vol. IV, Ktav Publishing House and Yeshiva Univ. Press, New York, 1977, $15.00.

A young man wishes to emigrate to Israel in spite of his parents' objections. Does the fifth commandment apply? Should the demands of terrorists be acceded to in order to rescue hijack victims? Is it right to introduce the death penalty for convicted terrorists? May one use a lift (elevator in the U.S.A., where this book was written) on the Sabbath? Can women be counted in the quorum for prayer (*minyan*)? May the same dish-washer be used for both meat and dairy utensils? Is cosmetic surgery permitted in view of the prohibition against inflicting any injury upon the human body? (When a Hampstead rabbi met a congregant who had had her nose altered, he is said to have exclaimed: 'A thing of beauty but a *goy* forever'.) Are there any circumstances when cannibalism is allowed? (This question was widely discussed after the plane crash in the Andes Mountains in Chile when the survivors kept themselves alive by eating of the corpses of their companions.) Is there a ban against Jews residing in Spain? And, extremely far-fetched though it is, does a Jewish astronaut on the Moon have to keep the precepts?

These and many other questions, covering a wide range of topics—unknown during the period when the classical Halakhic works were compiled but regarding which contemporary Jews loyal to the Halakhah seek guidance—are examined with profound erudition and admirable clarity in Rabbi Bleich's volume. Anyone who wishes to understand how the Halakhah operates and how decisions are arrived at, the way in which the Halakhists use precedence and apply it to new situations, why there are so many differences of opinion among Rabbis and why the appeal is to human reasoning rather than to a kind of divine inspiration, would be well-advised to study this work.

It is painful to have to record, nevertheless, that Rabbi Bleich can be faulted on a number of grounds. First, it is a pity that the book consists mainly of (amplified) articles which appeared originally in the journal *Tradition*. An approach entirely suitable for a brief survey of current Halakhic discussions in various Rabbinic periodicals is far from ideal for a whole book with the title this one has. The reader who wishes to know, for instance, how Jewish law views the question of warfare, will not find here the full-scale treatment this subject demands and which the learned author could certainly have provided if he had adopted a better plan.

Secondly, the author, an Orthodox Rabbi and teacher, limits his inquiries to Halakhists belonging to the Orthodox wing of Jewry. The editor notes in his Foreword: 'The author has endeavoured to include as many opinions as he can on each controversial subject *but, because of the nature of his work, he restricts himself to those authorities whose credentials as decisors of Halakhah are widely recognized by the community of those who are committed to and observe the Halakhah*' (*my italics*). It is disappointing to discover that this effectively rules out all non-Orthodox consideration of Halakhic problems such as that of J. Z. Lauterbach, Solomon B. Freehof, and a host of Conservative thinkers. Indeed, in a reference to Conservative Judaism, Rabbi Bleich writes: 'The deliberations and publications of the Rabbinical Assembly do not, in the ordinary course of events, come within the purview of a work devoted to Halakhah. Much is to be said in favour of simply ignoring pronouncements with regard to Jewish law issued by those who have placed themselves outside the pale of normative Judaism.' Why this excludes Conservative Rabbis (whom Rabbi Bleich quotes with what seems to be a conscious omission of the title 'Rabbi') is spelled out: 'Normative Judaism teaches that Halakhah is not derived from any temporal "worldview" or "social situation" but expresses the transcendental worldview of the Divine Lawgiver.'

These are brave words but Rabbi Bleich cannot be unaware that the Halakhah has been studied from the historical point of view so as to render extremely dubious the whole concept of a monolithic structure handed down more or less intact from generation to generation. The

massive researches of historical scholars of the Halakhah—Zecharias Frankel, I. H. Weiss, Louis Ginzberg, Solomon Zeitlin, Saul Lieberman, Louis Finkelstein, David Daube, David Halivni, Robert Gordis, Jacob Agus, Jacob Neusner, and others too numerous to mention—have uncovered the real motivations of the Halakhic masters and have shown conclusively that the social, political, economic and cultural background had its undoubted influence on the shaping and development of the law. Leaving aside the very difficult question of the origins of the Halakhah in the earliest period, as discussed, for instance, by Y. Baer, can it really be maintained—to give but one example from the Middle Ages—that Maimonides's legislation regarding women owed nothing to his Islamic enviroment? The truth is that over and above particular contemporary Halakhic problems, there is the general problem, for the contemporary Jew who is moved to follow the Halakhah, of Halakhic sanction and authority in view of the comparatively new but entirely convincing idea that Halakhic institutions, like all others, have undergone a long process of development and change. This work is devoid of any real sense of history and is consequently guilty of the most blatant anachronisms. On the basis of a late Midrash it accepts (p. 298) as literal truth that when Israel was journeying through the wilderness it was necessary for each of the wanderers to present documentary proof or to adduce witnesses prepared to testify with regard to the geneological purity of the petitioner's lineage, in order to be granted recognition 'as a Jew' (*sic*). The notion of an intact, static body of practice reaching back in all its details to Moses at Sinai, including, as Rabbi Bleich suggests, the two conflicting views of, say, the Schools of Hillel and Shammai, both given directly by God, is a useful tool by means of which the Halakhists have operated in the past, but it ought to be seen for what it is: a powerful myth which, rightly understood, points to the unity of the Halakhah without obscuring that element of legal dynamism without which the Halakhah—and with it Judaism as a whole—would have become fossilized.

LOUIS JACOBS

HENRY A. FISCHEL, ed., *Essays in Greco-Roman and Related Talmudic Literature*, with a Prolegomenon by the editor, lxxvi + 533 pp., The Library of Biblical Studies (Harry M. Orlinsky, ed.), Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1977, n.p.

This volume contains reprints of 27 essays by distinguished scholars, arranged chronologically, on the comparisons between Hellenistic thought and the Talmudic literature. It is impossible in a brief notice to list all these valuable articles but of special interest to the readers of this Journal will be: Boaz Cohen, 'Letter and Spirit in Jewish and Roman Law'; David Daube, 'Alexandrian Methods of Interpretation

and the Rabbis'; Morton Smith, 'Palestinian Judaism in the First Century'; S. Stein, 'The Influence of Symposia Literature on the Literary Form of the Pesaḥ Haggadah'; Saul Lieberman, 'How Much Greek in Jewish Palestine?' and 'Some Aspects of After Life in Early Rabbinic Literature'; and, finally, Judah Goldin's delightful 'A Philosophical Session in a Tannaitic Academy'. The work is greatly enriched by the editor's Prolegomenon and especially by his excellent annotated bibliography of works on the subject, which is also arranged chronologically so that the development of scholarly endeavours in this field can be clearly observed.

LOUIS JACOBS

TOM FORESTER, *The Labour Party and the Working Class*, x + 166 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1976, £3.75.

The final chapters of Mr. Forester's short book describe a research study on the Constituency Labour Party (CLP) of Kemptown in Brighton, which he carried out in 1973. That part of the book is thus among the most recent of a series of such 'local' studies—of which my own analysis of 'Riverside' (*Fabian Journal*, no. 14, 1954) was an early example. Mr. Forester's questionnaire was answered by 464 persons: its focus was on testing certain hypotheses on the alleged decline, at the grass roots, of working-class politics in Britain.

It appears that, though membership of the CLP was 'disproportionately' middle class and its middle-class members, again, 'disproportionately' active, this did not represent any great break with the past. There was, however, no middle-class 'takeover'—nor were ward organizations weaker in working-class areas. Of course, what was true of Kemptown is not necessarily true of other places: nor would the summation of many such studies shed any light on the desirability, let alone the imminence, of 'socialism'. The author was clearly exercised by the thought that the 'decline' hypotheses were 'reactionary'—'because their obvious corollary is that the prospects for the Labour Party and the prospects for socialism are worse today than they have ever been . . . The Labour Party . . . has now fully established itself as a natural governing party' (p. 125). All this is as may be. However, this political concern has evidently inspired Mr. Forester not only to do the Kemptown study but also to produce four informative introductory chapters which summarize in a crisp and lucid manner most of the surveys and much other material concerning the study of the Labour Party at the local and community level and the complex relationships between class and British politics. It is all intended as a popular exposition—and the reader who wishes to follow up the source material is given ample guidance. The book will be of service to many who do not share its author's political hopes and outlook.

JULIUS GOULD

CELIA S. HELLER, *On the Edge of Destruction: Jews of Poland Between the Two World Wars*, xi + 369 pp., Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1977, $14.95.

If for no other reason, this book is to be welcomed as one of the very few studies to deal with Polish Jews in 1919-1939. It is the work not of a historian but of a sociologist, and the author follows Carr's dictum: 'The more sociological history becomes and the more historical sociology becomes, the better for both.' The author is Polish-born and adds an autobiographical ingredient to the blend of history and sociology. The resultant compound seeks 'to convey reality', to quote the introduction.

It is difficult to comprehend the level this book is aimed at. At one extreme the author describes Hassidic dress and indulges in innumerable commonplaces concerning the Jewish 'Sense of Community'; at another she provides a remarkable analysis of the myriad forms of Polish–Jewish assimilation. On the whole, however, the book is a sympathetic and informative guide to some aspects of the largest Jewish community in the inter-war world. It begins by defining the Jews socially, in terms of their alleged inferiority, alien origin, distinctiveness (dress, language, diet, etc.), high degree of urbanization, and occupational concentration in commerce and handicrafts. All these factors went to make up a picture of a highly visible Jewish 'caste'—constituting, in fact, almost ten per cent of the total Polish population. There are then two sections which deal with patterns of oppression and antisemitism.

The second half of the volume is concerned with the Jewish response to a situation growing ever more hazardous. This is perhaps the most valuable part of the book, for it presents a wide spectrum of views from assimilationism to Zionist self-assertion. Here, as elsewhere, it is clear that a whole case-book of examples of self-hatred could be extracted from both the left-wing and the right-wing thinkers—who had their own individual reasons for rejecting a patent reality. Their respective rationalizations make compelling reading. Dr. Heller has indeed recreated a special area of Polish-Jewish 'reality', which within its chosen limits is a very useful introduction to the subject.

LIONEL KOCHAN

CATHERINE JONES, *Immigration and Social Policy in Britain*, ix + 291 pp., Tavistock Publications, London, 1977, £7.85.

Irish immigration to Britain from 1800 to 1861, Jewish immigration from 1870 to 1911, and New Commonwealth immigration from 1950 to 1971, and their relationships to statutory social policy in Britain over this whole period, are all described in this book. To write about any one of these specific immigrations, or to examine social policy in a much shorter period, or in a particular aspect, would, to many social researchers, be more than enough. To take on all of these, and to attempt historical

comparisons in the context of a general 'theory' of the development of social policy, seems (and is) a task of staggering proportions. We are bound to find shortcomings in a book which attempts so much—perhaps its greatest shortcoming is that it *did* attempt so much—but we also find a very sound historical account, some careful commentary, and much documentation that is of value.

Mass immigration is seen by Catherine Jones as providing a test of, and a commentary on, statutory social policy. She asks of each successive influx, 'How did social policy respond to the new arrivals?' and, 'What impact did the new arrivals have on the development of social policy?' The book is divided into Part I, containing a brief discussion of immigration and social policy and a 35-page account of social policy development in the host society; and Part II, which gives accounts of each of the immigrations and the respective policies they engendered. In all three cases, she draws widely on existing accounts; but the analysis of the New Commonwealth immigration is longer and is supplemented by a survey of welfare agencies. (That survey was sponsored by the Social Science Research Council.) The strength of the book undoubtedly lies in the comprehensiveness of its data. Its weakness, as already hinted, lies in the inability of a loose analytical framework to cope with the multitude of questions which the author necessarily raises.

As a consequence, much of the material is simply descriptive; some questions of interpretation are expressed but left only half-answered. Thus in the first section dealing with the development of social policy, the author asks whether welfare reforms should be understood as natural responses to industrialization, as self-interested manoeuvres of the ruling classes, or as the result of pressure from the disadvantaged lower orders of society. Of course, these are not exclusive alternatives, and in any case we cannot expect a definitive answer in 35 pages. On the other hand, this short chapter is so inconclusive that it cannot provide a framework for what is to come—the analysis of social policy development, massive immigration, and the relationship between them over 170 years of British history. Rather, the reader is simply reminded of the main outlines of the operation of Poor Laws, public health provisions, and so on, up to the present Welfare State. Similarly, the accounts of the three immigrations mainly constitute a drawing together of some of the main lines of historical progression. She frequently makes interesting (if *ad hoc*) historical comparisons, but the reader's appetite is often whetted for a kind of detail and incisiveness which—because of the immense scope of the book—could not be provided.

In the Jewish case, for example, she shows very instructively how some of the inadequacies of existing social services provisions were overcome by voluntary action which depended on the strength of the Anglo-Jewish community. This is a marked contrast with the weakness of internal organization seen later among the New Commonwealth immi-

grants. Some chief sources of support for the latter came from liberal pro-immigrant opinion in the host population, and the author describes how this in turn gave rise to difficulties in providing assistance for the immigrants. She touches here on the core of a vitally important and interesting question, but her analysis of it is limited in depth. The three immigrations differed in the characteristics which marked them off from the indigenous population. The Irish were 'suspect' as Catholics; the Jews were marked off by religion and sometimes dress, style, and language; while the New Commonwealth arrivals were identifiable by some or all of these signs plus the obvious 'badge' of colour. Here again there is a basis for an important series of comparative analyses—and the author is fully aware of it and makes many interesting suggestions; but again the scope of the book does not allow the kind of incisiveness which some readers would like.

The section on New Commonwealth immigration (pp. 118 to 254) was in my view the best, particularly for the account of social policy in relation to that immigration, and the new data on the welfare agencies. Of greatest interest is the strain between 'universalism'—the aim to treat all equally—and the evident pressure to make special provision for people clearly requiring special treatment, without at the same time undermining those universalist principles or alienating the host population. This is perhaps the most crucial question touched upon in the present study and much of the information and documentation necessary to such a debate can be found here. The author shows how Britain's 'pragmatism' and piecemeal approach were sometimes its strength by providing a necessary flexibility, while on the other hand these very characteristics also resulted in a dreadful lack of foresight and the inability to meet real needs. Although she shows how legislation to ensure 'harmonious race relations' and 'anti-discrimination' was tied to restriction of immigration as attempts to satisfy simultaneously two wings of opinion (many other commentators of course have noted this), she does not in my view demonstrate adequately the devastating effect which successive control measures have had upon immigrant communities. One could justifiably argue that the immigration control acts have been the *real* instruments of race relations policy in Britain. Their impact on immigrant communities, and the senses in which they can be viewed as racist acts, have been well documented by Robert Moore and Tina Wallace in *Slamming the Door*, and in several monographs by other authors. Further, Catherine Jones mentions but does not fully explore the fact of economic recession which has influenced public attitudes and policy vis-à-vis both immigrants and general welfare provisions in recent years. I found particularly unsatisfactory her concluding sentence that New Commonwealth immigration 'may turn out, *par excellence* perhaps, to be a case of mistimed belated arrival'.

The language is occasionally irritating. I did not like, for example,

the description of social policy as 'a problem-exacerbating resource' (p. 7), but for the most part the account is expressed in clear and balanced terms. The book as a whole represents a remarkable achievement of hard work, documentation, and commentary on a vitally important topic. There are many people who will find it valuable. However, as in the case of British social policy, some of its greatest virtues are also some of its greatest shortcomings.

C. STEPHEN FENTON

ELIHU KATZ and MICHAEL GUREVITCH, *The Secularization of Leisure: Culture and Communication in Israel*, with the assistance of Hanna Adoni, Gila Brand, Oved Cohen, Hadassah Haas, and Leah Isaac, 288 pp., Faber and Faber, London, 1976, £6.50.

The fieldwork for this study was carried out in the early summer of 1970, midway between the wars of 1967 and 1973 and two years after the large-scale introduction of television. It is a joint product of the Communications Institute of the Hebrew University and the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, and it was initiated by the late Minister of Education and Culture, Zalman Aranne. What the Minister asked for was a sociology of Israeli culture: patterns of taste and the availability of culture, the differential influence of occupation, generation, ethnic background, and religion; and the role of the nation, of recent history, and of religious tradition in shaping Israeli consciousness. The Minister got most of what he asked for, minus an analysis of the content of culture and minus an account of the dynamics of creating and distributing cultural products. The latter omission is to be repaired later since it concerns the very important issue of the proportions of imported and of indigenous culture.

The analysis is set in the context of international comparisons and it clusters around a fundamental question: how are the broad homogenising trends of modern culture shaped and modified by the special filter provided by Jewish tradition and by the special circumstances of a newly-acquired statehood still under threat? Theoretically that is a very important question because it documents the changes and responses found in a nation whose consciousness and raison d'être have been uniquely informed by religion. A study of leisure and communication elsewhere would not have been entitled 'The Secularization of Leisure', nor would the issues raised have pointed so directly at the heart of national survival and cultural continuity. There is another aspect to the theoretical importance of this material, and that is the setting of this particular pattern of secularization alongside other patterns. The book provides almost all the raw materials for such a comparison. The most obvious one is with the United States: the concept of the pilgrim nation links national survival with religious mission, and it also welds together a vast variety of sub-groups under that overall umbrella. At the same

time, the imperatives of nationalism alter the content of feasts and practices; and there is a shift towards privatization and personal choice. For obvious reasons choice has not been so widely celebrated in Israel as in America. When it comes to the modern ideal of self-expression, Israel leans in the direction of tradition.

So much remains the same; so much is different. With such an embarrassing richness of material it is difficult to know what to select. Let me take just the Sabbath, the Feasts, the Book, the Family, and the sense of organic incorporation in Israel and in its mission. These are, after all, pretty fundamental.

Some three quarters of Israelis affirm their preference for a 'quiet and homey' Sabbath: there are no significant differences on this between generations, just as there is no important generational difference over religiosity in general. So much remains the 'same'. Yet about half the population, more especially the educated, want some liberalization of facilities for entertainment and culture. Sixty-one per cent want public transport on the Sabbath. The impact of television on the activities of Sabbath eve was equivocal. It pushes out radio and newspaper reading but if anything reinforces home-centredness. The sense of festivity, shared meaning, and collective experience remains. As to major feasts and holidays, only Israel Independence Day has meaning for everybody; on the other hand, less than one person in ten finds Passover, Purim, Jewish New Year, and Hanukkah without meaning. It is perhaps significant that three of these holidays celebrate victories in which the weak Jews emerge triumphant with the help of God and a hero. The most interesting case is Yom Kippur. Sixteen per cent say they find it meaningless, presumably because it is less easy to relate to nature or to fill with familial, seasonal, or social meanings.

Jews are 'the people of the Book' but the Enlightenment half-converted them into people who delight in books. Jews still produce and read more books than other peoples, and their reading has an important public focus in the literature of the Holocaust and the Six-Day War. Most reading is in Hebrew, though the books are largely translations. But verbal symbols have become relatively privatized and study more related to self development. The commitment to study for its own sake still remains; and the religious are markedly more studious, especially at the lowest educational levels. It is here that the authors underline the chances for adult education in Israel.

As to the family, it remains absolutely central—a centrality expressed more especially in visiting and child care. A preference for Friday as a second day of rest reflects this commitment to family and tradition. As to overall identification with Jewishness, this remains high, with little difference between the generations. Perhaps the young are somewhat less Puritan, more immediate in their interests, and more concerned with social justice. The dividing lines are primarily religious and educational,

not ethnic. Major forms of integration are provided by travelling, by holidays, and newspapers—newspapers in particular mediate involvement with the State and society.

No doubt a lot of this is very well known to those with sociological interests in Israeli society but even for experts there is a mass of carefully connected material here, some of which is surprising. I had no idea, for example, that concert goers were such a small proportion of the population or that they were so concentrated among the older and more Western groups. In sum, I feel this is one of the very best introductions to Israeli culture.

DAVID MARTIN

THOMAS KESSNER, *The Golden Door: Italian and Jewish Immigrant Mobility in New York City, 1880–1915*, xxvi + 224 pp., The Urban Life in America Series (Richard C. Wade, general ed.), Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1977, £7·95.

GEORGE SURGEON, JUDITH MAYO, and DONALD J. BOGUE, *Race Relations in Chicago, Second Survey: 1975*, viii + 182 pp., Community and Family Monographs, Community and Family Study Centre, Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, 1976, $3.00.

Kessner's book is a modest but very solid and competent study which achieves precisely the goal the author set forth for himself. This was to show, contrary to the debunking of the Horatio Alger legend which became vocal in recent social science, that the legend was not altogether wrong as a description of America. In short, social mobility did in fact take place as shown by the experience of immigrant Jews and Italians in New York. His indices of this process are the familiar ones of occupational and residential change. He judiciously combines statistical data with historical observations, and the book is gracefully written.

It is not intended as a disparagement but it is nonetheless true to say that for one who either partook of this immigrant experience, or is familiar with such old Chicago studies as Louis Wirth's *The Ghetto*, there is nothing *fundamentally* new in this book. Kessner has well documented the New York story, and he has some interesting comments about the reasons for the lower rate of mobility among Italians. But still the fundamental character of the process was an established fact. Thus what is new is his need to reassert his thesis in the light of a new intellectual context which invited a critical polemic. Precisely as a polemic, however, one is bound to say that the book does not go far enough. The author would have had to examine critically the assumptions of the debunkers to articulate the grounds of a realistic position. What understanding of America or, more pertinently, of equality could have ever led people to deny or to minimize the facts he has adduced? In clarifying, via this question, the content of current radicalism, one would have a firm

basis for seeing not only what is actually happening in the society but what it is reasonable to expect in the dimension of social mobility. Among other things this question points to theoretical reflection about systematic causes of changes in the occupational structure. The nub of much current radicalism for example, is still, *incredibile dictu*, Marx's old prediction about the impoverishment of the proletariat as they became displaced by technology. Kessner's findings in fact dispute this. On yet another tack, by way of conclusion, one is also impelled to suggest that what was once thought to be the most prominent feature of American society, as observed, for example, by Tocqueville—namely, the continual process of rising *and* falling—may no longer deserve this prominence. Pension schemes, guaranteed annual wages, and life tenure in even industrial occupations obviously do make a difference.

Race Relations in Chicago is not simply a survey in the old fashioned sense but is a compilation and analysis of modern 'survey research', organized in four chapters around the following topics: structure and context of white racial attitudes; images of the poor; attitudes towards race and welfare; black opinion about race relations in Chicago; and opinions of blacks and whites about race relations in Chicago's schools. The book is replete with provocative and interesting tables.

A main problem in this, as in all survey research, is that the analysis is guided by certain political assumptions which underlie the statistical research. This means, first, that the tables do not 'speak for themselves', and second, that the assumptions have to be made explicit and discussed in a politically responsible manner. I give one example. A major conclusion of Chapter One is that racial attitudes in the United States have become less liberal since 1970 (pp. 74–88). The basis of this conclusion is the contrast seen between the general support for civil rights in the abstract (before 1970) and the frictions that have occurred since then over such things as bussing and affirmative action, in the context of concrete personal adjustments. One cannot dispute the existence of this contrast. But one can dispute what it means. Is the opposition to compulsory bussing illiberal? Is the opposition to compulsory or engineered equality illiberal? Simply to mention that the achievement of total equality along these lines might require nothing less than compulsory intermarriage suffices to show that the issue is, to say the least, discussable. To fail to discuss such issues would make seemingly scientific surveys the carriers of prejudices or current opinions which are no less prejudices when held by people engaged in the 'fight against prejudice'. For this 'fight', as every critical student of the Enlightenment now knows, can also become a prejudice.

HOWARD BROTZ

EMANUEL MARX, *The Social Context of Violent Behaviour: A Social Anthropological Study in an Israeli Immigrant Town*, xii + 130 pp., Routledge Direct Editions, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, Henley and Boston, 1976, £3.50.

Let it be clearly said at the outset that this book suffers from a handicap that can in no way be regarded as the fault of the author: it is produced in one of the publisher's 'Direct Editions', which euphemism relates to the fact that it is reproduced from a typewriter and gives the casual browser in bookshops the idea that this is some marginal production upon which the publishers hesitate to take any great entrepreneurial risk. This is more than a pity, since *The Social Context of Violent Behaviour* is an excellent piece of work, well written, and relatively unusual in that it is a social anthropological study in the area of deviant social behaviour. The foreword by the late Professor Gluckman offers some interesting observations on this general point.

What Marx has done here is to study a small new settlement in Israel that has absorbed a population of immigrants—Jews from North Africa —wholly unlike those who were responsible for the founding of the modern state of Israel. In terms of their cultural attitudes, living standards, and experience of technology, they have almost everything in common with the populations of the societies which have cast them out and in a sense are like aliens in their spiritual homeland. It is noticeable that their contribution to the total volume of crime and juvenile delinquency in Israel generally is quite disproportionate, and in the little town described by Marx the other relevant dimension to their existence is clearly in evidence, namely their total dependence upon the material support of the state. 'This', says Marx, 'is the welfare state at its extreme'. In consequence, some of the most significant social relations occur in the context of encounters between the people of Galilah—the 'clients'—and the agents of bureaucratic welfare who are in positions of considerable power with regard to the distribution of material resources. That these encounters should on occasion be violent ought hardly to cause surprise, but what is interesting about Galilah is that its violence is relatively humdrum and 'normal' rather than 'pathological'. The great merit of Marx's analysis is that he shows various acts of violence to be rationally related to the existing conditions of social structure rather than evidence of aggressive tendencies and distorted psychic development. In so doing he points up the fundamental absurdity of such clichés which are used to describe violence as 'meaningless' or 'senseless'. In fact, as anyone who takes the time to look at the situations described in such clear terms by Marx can see, violent acts are only too meaningful and sensible, in that they are directed towards quite readily discernible ends. In a second chapter on the 'Social Definitions of Violence' he discusses—with useful comparative reference to Nuer and Bedouin societies—the *coercive* qualities of violence. Un-

fortunately for the bureaucratic agents who control Galilah, they have, in consequence of a different cultural inheritance, a capacity to interpret threats of violence in a way which is quite different from that in which their clients view such threats and social gestures.

Now the reader may be tempted to dismiss a study of a small town far away in the Middle East as being a trifle irrelevant to the central concerns of the analysts of social deviance, whose subject matter is to be found for the most part in the inner cities of the western industrial world. Yet what Marx has done is to show just how mistaken such a dismissal would be, because the problematic dimension of the social structure of Galilah is to be found within the so-called 'welfare ghetto' of the great industrial city. First, the bulk of the population is wholly dependent upon the benevolence of welfare officials for the economic necessities, including shelter; second, there is a cultural gulf between the social expectations and the social competence of clients and administrators and welfare officials, a gulf which is not infrequently ethnic as well as class specific. Third, much of the violence of the 'welfare ghetto' consists in the use of threats in welfare offices, labour exchanges, housing departments, and social security bureaux; it is a violence which is as important for what it does by way of reinforcing the unfavourable stereotypes of clients as it does by way of underscoring the sense of powerlessness experienced by the recipients of bureaucratized welfare.

Dr. Marx is far from ill-informed with regard to various theories about violence which seek to place it in an essentially psycho-pathological context, and among the merits of this book is the fact that he is able to show that violence does not necessarily spring from some psychopathological source but that its character is correlated with particular types of social situation. This is extremely important in the analysis of violence against the official in the welfare office of the 'welfare ghetto', because crude and unsophisticated theories of a positivistic character have been eagerly adopted to promote such ideas as the natural inferiority of the client, whether by reason of genetic inferiority or the so-called 'cycle of deprivation'. In the mouth of the *petit fonctionnaire* it takes the form of phrases like 'These people are just substandard mentally and socially', or 'Each generation just reproduces itself'. It is probably one of the most neglected areas of study as far as social conflict is concerned.

Reading this book, I was not simply impressed by the scholarly excellence with which the author discusses the theoretical issues, but with the *social relevance* of what he has to say. True, he claims to be concerned with sociological analysis and not with social criticism; that is an election he is entitled to make. But since social scientists are nowadays so readily bought by governments to advise them upon the planning and execution of their social policies, it is not unreasonable to suggest that a work of sociological analysis is relevant reading matter not only for

those who have taken the 'Queen's Shilling' or the Congressional Dollar, but also for those who are critically concerned with the ethics and the propriety of some manifestations of policy. I was reminded also of another anthropological work among the socially disprivileged—Liebow's *Tally's Corner—Washington D.C.* The comparison is not disadvantageous to Marx.

In short, this book is a socially relevant, scholarly, and for all the author's disclaimers about social criticism, an intensely sympathetic work telling a story about very real people. Certainly at £3.50 it represents excellent value and it deserves to go on the reading lists not only of those who teach the sociology of deviance, but of those who teach social administration.

TERENCE MORRIS

EZRA MENDELSOHN, ed., *Essays on the American Jewish Labor Movement*, Yivo Annual of Jewish Social Science, vol. XVI, vii + 423 pp., Yivo Institute for Jewish Research, New York, 1976, n.p.

Soon after its transfer to the United States from Vilna at the beginning of the Second World War, YIVO—the Yiddish Scientific Institute, or the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research as it was later called—produced an impressive history in Yiddish of the Jewish labour movement in the United States in two bulky volumes: *Geshikhte fun der yidisher arbeter-bavegung in di Fareynikte Shtatn* (edited by E. Tcherikower, New York, 1943, 1945). It was unsuccessfully translated, edited, and abridged by A. Antonovsky as *The Early Jewish Labor Movement in the United States* (New York, 1961). Elias Tcherikower edited and to a considerable extent wrote the record of that movement only up to 1890—before its stable basis actually existed. Tcherikower died in 1945, the year of the second volume's appearance. More than thirty years later, after several abortive attempts to carry on the history, a successor volume has appeared with Dr. Ezra Mendelsohn of the Hebrew University as its 'Guest Editor' (one wonders, have armies got Guest Generals?).

The new volume's scheme presents an introductory survey chapter, followed by four special studies, and concluding with a suggestive interpretative essay. After the many attempts which have been made without any consensus emerging, all concerned avoid yet another effort at defining the Jewish labour movement. They seem simply to take for granted that it is constituted of Jewish workers as the majority in some trades unions with Jewish leaders, and possesses an ethos and programme which are distinctive without any one being quite certain how. Imprecise as that is, it allows the authors to get on with their book.

The opening chapter by Joseph Brandes, 'From Sweatshop to Stability: Jewish Labor Between Two Wars', is a substantial basic statement well grounded in original sources. While it is focused on the two leading trades unions, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union

and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, smaller groups of milliners, bakers, Hebrew printers, and others are also taken into account. Despite his title Brandes starts further back, but his best sections take up the 1920's and the New Deal period of the 1930's. Here and there Brandes's chronology wanders, and his discussion of the Second World War period is confined to the Jewish labour movement's response to overseas events; on the latter his judgement is rather severe. He concentrates on New York City, while his colleagues hardly ever cross the Hudson to discuss affairs in other cities.

Besides editing the volume, Mendelsohn contributes 'The Russian Roots of the American Jewish Labor Movement', demonstrating with his wonted clarity and brevity how Russified Jewish revolutionists became Yiddishized radical labour organizers in America. Unfortunately, he stops before 1900, while the flow of refugee revolutionists continued into the 1920's.

The veteran scholar Rudolf Glanz, who contributed to the original history, offers 'Some Remarks on Jewish Labor and American Public Opinion in the pre-World War I Era'. He draws as usual on recondite and out-of-the-way sources to show the generally favourable public notice given to the Jewish labour movement. Of particular interest is his attention to the Jewish role within German–American radicalism. On the other hand, reference to available secondary materials would have clarified such episodes as the train-load of Jewish immigrants arriving in Milwaukee in 1882, or thrown more light on such persons as Solomon Schindler.

A praiseworthy, path-breaking study by Isaiah Trunk discusses 'The Cultural Dimension of the American Jewish Labor Movement', mainly the educational activities of the Workmen's Circle and the Yiddishist school movement. We also see that the inner conflict between cosmopolitan internationalists and ethnic culturalists which began around 1905 lasted even into the 1930's, when Yiddish in America was fast declining and the threat of Nazism shadowed Jewish life everywhere. Abe Cahan, in recent years the object of sentimental veneration, as late as 1931 contemptuously dismissed Yiddish education, reiterating his conviction that 'the most important educational goal' for young Jews was to 'grow up an American with a thoroughly American pronunciation, intonation and gestures' (p. 366). Even uptown *yahudim* thirty years earlier rarely dared speak so bluntly.

The most noteworthy study in the book is Jonathan Frankel's extensive 'The Jewish Socialists and the American Jewish Congress Movement', which shows Jewish labour and socialists confronted with a challenge to themselves as Jews during the First World War. Frankel's keen sense of power relations and ideologies, alongside his skilful fusion of rapid narrative and incisive analysis, make his the standard study of this important subject.

In '"Another Great Prize": The Jewish Labor Movement in the Context of American Labor History', Bernard Mergen too briefly sets forth his thesis that Jewish ethnic identity within the American labour movement strengthened and encouraged the continuation of a distinct Jewish movement. Many interesting parallels are drawn, especially with the International association of Machinists, and one hopes to read a fuller exposition at a later date.

The hand of militant pedantry, alas, lies heavy on this book. Any person, however he is listed in directories, encyclopedias, or library catalogues, who wrote or was written about in Yiddish, is subject to the transliteration of his name into another form. Feinstone is Faynshtayn, Shiplacoff is Shiplyakov, Sachs is Zaks, Vladeck is Vladek, Liessin becomes Lyesin, Max Zaritsky appears as Maks Zaritski; Cahan, untouched in the text, appears in notes as Kahan. The editor of the original YIVO labour history, who appears on its title page as Tcherikower, is rendered Tsherikover. What lack of consistency or of the courage of conviction spared readers the sometime Yiddish writer Dovid Ben Guryen? His organization remains Poale Zion, not Peyle Tsiyen. Ben Zvi's protektsia is insufficient, however, and so he emerges as Ben Tsvi. All this is not just silly and irritating, but requires librarians, who may or may not do so, to insert cross-reference cards in their catalogues, and it confuses biographical and bibliographical work. Had those who inflicted this nuisance upon the readers composed the index which this book ought to have, they would have confronted the difficulty soon enough. However, the intrinsic high quality of the work as a whole overcomes this disservice, and it assumes a rightful place as a major contribution to American Jewish and labour history.

LLOYD P. GARTNER

JOHN O'NEILL, ed., *On Critical Theory*, vi + 265 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1971, £5.50.

This book of essays is an outcome of the recent revival of interest in the so-called 'critical theory' of Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Habermas, and other writers associated with the 'Frankfurt school'. The unifying theme of the essays is their attempt to both understand and contribute to this revival. O'Neill and Agger outline their views on the social role of critical theory; Lenhardt, Davies, and O'Brien review the works of some key figures of the early Frankfurt school; Weber, Piccone, and Wilson try to place critical theory in a broader philosophical context; and Shapiro, Misgeld, Sixel, and Wellmer concentrate on the works of Habermas.

O'Neill and Agger are critical of Habermas's restricted view of critical theory. Whilst they recognize the importance of Habermas's investigation of communicative competence, they argue that the 'ethical materi-

alism' of early critical theory embodied a broader concern for art, music, literature, aesthetics, and sexuality. For Marcuse in particular, the emancipatory interest was utopian and united the cognitive element of rational discourse with the sensory element of practical life. O'Neill claims that Marxism must develop a 'pedagogic practice' adequate to its critical theory: since the proletariat is excluded from the forms of language and reflection which would enable it to participate in a dialogue, the intellectuals must learn from the masses by 'engaging' with their practical struggles of everyday life. Socialism must learn to work 'with men and not upon men' (p. 8). Agger extends this point and states that it is necessary to abandon the view of socialism as a long-term construction. Rather, we must learn from the practical expressions of socialism which can be found in the present. The critical theorist moves away from the notion of theory as 'discourse' so as to discover the prelinguistic basis of theory, 'the *carnal* grounds of socialism' (p. 13). Theory is not an abstract intellectual system: 'Theory sings, paints, writes, makes love' (p. 19). However, if the somewhat pretentious and obscure style of this essay is anything to go by, critical theory has failed to seduce this reviewer.

Three essays investigate some of the key figures in the earlier phase of critical theory. Lenhardt reviews Adorno and Horkheimer's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, O'Brien considers Fromm's early essays, and Davies discusses Walter Benjamin. These essays are of uneven quality: Lenhardt presupposes considerable knowledge on the part of his reader, O'Brien is competent and thorough, but Davies is so taken up with the niceties of his own literary style that it is difficult to see exactly what he is getting at. The attempts to locate critical theory in its philosophical context are more consistently successful. Weber relates critical theory back to the main figures of the German idealist tradition. She constructs a development trend from Kant through Schiller, Hegel, and Marx to critical theory as such. Critical theory attempted to synthesize Marx's historical materialism with the arguments of idealism so as to take account of the phenomena of culture, ideology, and consciousness. Whilst she sees Habermas's work on 'distorted communication' as the highest point of this synthesis, she argues that it must also look at the sensuous, aesthetic features and that, in particular, Habermas's notion of an 'ideal speech community' must be complemented with an 'idealized reciprocity, which is founded on pleasure' (p. 98). Piccone fills out this historical analysis by looking at the Hegelian Marxists of the 1920's —Lukács, Gramsci, and Korsch. Each of these writers drew on idealism so as to restore a 'subjective' dimension to orthodox Marxism, and attempted to develop a conception of the working class as a society of self-conscious subjects, a 'collective subjectivity'. Early critical theory tried to show the impossibility of realizing collective subjectivity under the conditions of advanced capitalism and Piccone concludes that the

problem of a revolutionary theory without a subject can only be resolved by drawing upon Husserl's phenomenology, although he gives no indication of what this would involve. Wilson's concern is rather different. He starts out from the 'debate' between the Popperians and the critical theorists over the logic of the social sciences, and attempts to show that both approaches make the work of Max Weber their point of departure.

The remaining essays concentrate on the work of Jürgen Habermas. Misgeld gives an overview of the debate between Habermas and Gadamer on hermeneutics, and Sixel gives a comparable survey of the discussion of systems theory in the exchange between Habermas and Luhmann. Shapiro examines the contrast between action which is constrained through its 'embeddedness' in history, and action which involves liberation. Finally, Wellmer examines Habermas's discussion of cognitive interests in terms of the distinction between instrumental and communicative action, and he relates this distinction to Habermas's theory of language and communication. Each of these articles contains important information and ideas, but they also presuppose a certain degree of knowledge about Habermas's work.

The book is both thought-provoking and frustrating. It is thought-provoking because it includes discussions of many important intellectual and political issues. It is frustrating for two reasons: the density and obscurity of grammar and style makes it a difficult book to read, and this same failing means that it fails to live up to its expressed aim of making contact with people in their everyday lives. If critical theory wishes to depart from abstractions, it still has a long way to go.

JOHN SCOTT

CHRONICLE

The *Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality Statistical Yearbook, 1976* gives the following facts and figures:

Housing

There has been an increase of 14 per cent since 1968 in the number of residential units in the Municipality: in 1968 there were 125,370 apartments; by 1976, there were 143,500. There has also been a steady increase of government building: 603 apartments were completed by the public authorities in 1973; 1,326 in 1975; and 1,837 in 1976. Immigrants were allocated 25 per cent of the apartments built by the State in 1969–76; 27 per cent went to young couples; 40 per cent were for slum clearance projects; and the remaining 8 per cent were for various building trust saving schemes.

Public Works

Ten kilometres of roads were built in 1976, with a total area of 100,000 square metres, and nine kilometres of pavements. However, Tel Aviv has a worsening traffic problem caused by an increase both in the number of vehicles used by residents, and in the number brought into the city by visitors. At the beginning of 1976 there were only 49·3 square metres of road for every vehicle, compared with 54·3 square metres in 1972, and 83·5 square metres in 1961.

Transport

There has been an increase of 2·2 per cent since 1974 in the number of lorries in Tel Aviv, while the number of motor cycles has declined by 9·4 per cent. Over the last decade, the proportion of private cars has increased from 51 per cent of all motor vehicles in the city, to 65·1 per cent in 1976, while that of motor cycles decreased from 21·2 to 8·1 per cent. The proportions of other vehicles in the city reported for 1976 are: 20·3 per cent lorries, 3·9 per cent buses, 1 per cent taxis, and 1·6 per cent 'special vehicles'.

Education

There were 10,075 children in non-private kindergartens compared with 9,914 in 1975, and 9,692 in 1974; 8 per cent of the children were aged 2–3 years, 34 per cent were aged 4, and 58 per cent were 5 and older. In 1976/77 there were 207 municipal kindergartens (compared with 206 the previous year), with an average of 29 children per class. Three new municipal kindergartens were completed in 1976.

There were 37,057 pupils in all elementary schools in the city, with an average of 25 per class. Over the last decade there has been an increase at the municipal post-elementary level in the number of pupils staying on beyond the twelfth study year: from 19 per cent in 1966/67, to 28 per cent in 1976/77. In the vocational schools, the increase was much greater: 21 per cent in 1976/77, compared with 4 per cent in 1966/67.

At the intermediate level and in post-primary schools, there was an expansion of Arab-language studies: 89 classes or study groups had an average of 3 Arabic lessons a week in 1976.

A study of 14–17-year-olds, by the Municipality Department for Research and Statistics, showed that 85 per cent of 17-year-olds of European–American origin completed twelve years of study, compared with only 45 per cent of Asian–African pupils of the same age. It was also found that 22 per cent of pupils of Asian–African origin were 'above the normal age for their class', compared with only 7 per cent of those of European–American origin.

In 1975/76, a total of 6,000 hours of auxiliary lessons for under-privileged and immigrant children were given in all high schools.

Tel Aviv University continued to expand. There were 15,404 students in 1972/73; 16,755 in 1973/74; 17,550 in 1974/75; and 19,376 in 1975/76. There was, however, a slight drop in the percentage of students registering for higher degrees: 16 per cent in 1975/76, compared with 16·7 per cent the previous year. In 1975/76 there were 1,159 professors and lecturers out of a total academic staff of 2,775.

In 1974/75, 1,995 degrees were awarded; they included 220 M.A.'s and M.Sc.'s, and 24 Ph.D.'s. This was a decline compared with the previous year, when out of a total of 2,055 degrees, there were 252 M.A.'s and M.Sc.'s and 55 Ph.D.'s. There was also a slight drop in the percentage of degrees awarded in Jewish and Social Studies, and in the Humanities: 62 per cent in 1974/75 compared with 65 per cent in 1973/74. Twelve per cent of Jewish students at Tel Aviv University were of Asian–African origin.

Municipal libraries and museums

There were 18 municipal libraries in Tel Aviv in 1976—11 lending and 7 reference libraries—with 641,098 volumes: an increase of 7·6 per cent over the previous year. About two thirds of the books are available for lending out, while the rest are in the reference libraries. The central Sha'ar Zion Library—the largest municipal library—houses 37 per cent of all books.

A survey showed that 16·5 per cent of Tel Aviv's residents made use of the services of the municipal libraries at least once a year.

The number of visitors to all city museums in 1976 increased by 13 per cent: 936,452 compared with 813,665 in 1975; 45 per cent of the visitors went to the Ha-Aretz Museum and 40 per cent to the Tel Aviv Museum—which attracted 44 per cent more visitors than in the previous year.

Entertainment

The total number of attendances at cinemas, theatres, dance groups, and music halls decreased. There has been a continuing marked decline in the cinema industry: there were 115,000 fewer film-goers in 1976, compared with the previous year—a decrease of 29 per cent. Nevertheless, cinema-going remains the city's most popular form of entertainment, accounting for 80 per cent of all attendances, and Tel Aviv has a higher ratio of cinema seats and film-going per resident than any other Israeli city.

Attendance at concerts in Tel Aviv has fluctuated in the last few years: 335,000 in 1974; 442,000 in 1975; and 330,000 in 1976.

Municipal services

In November 1975, a central information bureau was established to deal with urgent complaints by citizens of Tel Aviv-Yafo. The bureau is open 24 hours a day, including weekends and holidays; it had 11,000 cases brought to its attention in 1976, and 2,000 in the last two months of 1975. The bureau was able to deal immediately with 93 per cent of all 13,000 cases. About half of them concerned sanitary problems.

*

The Director of the Returning Israelis section of the Jewish Agency held a press conference in Tel Aviv last August, at the end of a seminar attended by 30 Israeli engineers living abroad. They met potential employers, representatives of the Technion Alumni Association, and Government of Israel officials.

According to the Jewish Agency there are more than 15,000 Israeli graduates living abroad; about 20 per cent of them have doctorates and find great difficulty in obtaining satisfactory employment in Israel.

There is now a Returning Israelis Committee, with representatives of the Jewish Agency and of various Government departments such as the Ministry of Absorption, and the 'Academics' Placement Centre' which had been under the aegis of the former Ministry of Labour. In the first half of 1977, 40 per cent of Israelis who returned to the country were graduates.

*

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem has announced that 60 of its student were awarded scholarships last July by the Moroccan Immigrant Association. This is the eighth year that the Scholarship Fund of the Association has granted scholarships to students from low-income large families; the aim is to bridge the existing gaps in higher education in Israel. About 2,300 scholarships have been given to students at Israel's five universities and the Technion in the past seven years.

*

Last May, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem awarded two scholarships, from the Engel Fund of the American Jewish Committee, to two Arab students. One was a third-year chemistry student from a village near Acre, while the other was a third-year female student in the Department of International Relations. That Fund stipulates that one of the two recipients must be a woman.

*

A total of 813 higher degrees and post-graduate diplomas were awarded by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem last June. There were 584 Masters: 118 in the Humanities, 173 in the Social Sciences, 140 in Science, 58 in Agriculture, 34 in Basic Medical Sciences, 32 in Public Health, 10 in Pharmacy, 8 in Librarianship, 6 in Social Work, and 5 in Law.

There were 105 diplomas in various subjects, such as Business Administration, Library and Archives Studies, Communications, Criminology, Scientific Translation, Textile Chemistry, Groundwater Research, Ophthalmology, and the training of Community Centre Directors and Senior Personnel.

Of the remaining 124 higher degrees, 82 were awarded to new doctors of medicine and 42 to new dentists. At a ceremony at the beginning of July, 169 Ph.D. degrees were conferred.

*

The Technion awarded last June 365 higher degrees. There were 262 M.Sc. graduates (30 of these were women); 47 Doctors of Science and 19 Doctors of Science and Technology (10 of these were women). The Technion also has a Medical School, whose fourth graduating class in 1977 received 37 Doctors of Medicine degrees (7 of these to women).

*

There was a special seminar last summer in Israel for 24 Christian scholars from 10 African countries. The two-month programme on 'Biblical Tradition and Community Development' was sponsored by the Israel Inter-faith Committee and the African Committee for an Ecumenical African Biblical Institute in Jerusalem.

The African scholars included Anglicans, Catholics, Lutherans, Moravians, Methodists, Presbyterians, as well as a Baptist, a Congregationalist, and a Quaker.

Half the programme, at Mount Scopus, was devoted to various aspects of Jewish thought, history, liturgy, and practice—and special attention was given to the relationship between Judaism and early Christianity. The other half was centred on kibbutsim and moshavim as models of community development; it was held in collaboration with the International Co-operation Department of the Foreign Office of Israel. That Department has continued over the last three years to attract Africans to other programmes which it runs, in spite of the fact that most African countries severed diplomatic relations with Israel after the Yom Kippur War.

*

Ort vocational training schools have been established in Bombay and Iran.

Ort schools in France have helped great numbers of North African Jews; the pass rates of Ort students in French State examinations have been well above the national average: among adult students, 96 per cent were successful in 1976. It was announced last July that French Ort plan to open a new technical school in Toulouse, which would welcome any students of a nearby Yeshiva who wished to combine study of the Talmud with technical studies.

*

The Secretary of the Association of Kibbuts Industries held a press conference in Tel Aviv last August. He stated that in the last Hebrew calendar

year production had risen, mainly in plastics, metal, rubber, electricity, and electronics. Whereas five years ago, only 50 per cent of the workers were kibbuts members, today the percentage is 61. Out of 235 kibbutsim in Israel, only 24 do not have any industrial plant. Kibbuts industry accounts for five per cent of all industrial production in Israel, but its output per worker is higher than the national average.

*

Last September a two-man Bulgarian delegation came to Israel—for the first time since Bulgaria broke off diplomatic relations in 1967.

They attended a Bulgaria Day celebration in Bat Yam, one of the centres of Bulgarian Jews in Israel. The head of the delegation told the audience of the success of painters, composers, and actors in the Jewish community still living in Bulgaria; and a film was screened showing how Bulgaria subverted the Nazi programme to annihilate Jews in the Second World War. The other member of the delegation was on the Council for External Relations and Friendship Societies.

*

The Eighth Jerusalem International Book Fair was held last spring; it drew a record-breaking crowd of 108,000 visitors.

A member of the organizing committee was quoted as saying, on the last day of the Fair, that in only one week 'about 100 firm trade contracts for co-publication and printing orders were established'.

There were 1,021 stands and pavilions exhibiting works from 880 foreign and 138 Israeli publishers. Rumania was the only Eastern Bloc country represented at the Fair.

*

In the September 1977 issue of *News and Views*, a publication of the World Jewish Congress, the Executive Director of the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture reviews the activities of that organization, which was established in 1964. He states: 'Since it began operations, the Memorial Foundation has allocated approximately $20,600,000 for a variety of cultural programs in more than 30 countries throughout the world. During the 1976–77 academic year, the Foundation made grants in 24 countries totalling $1,707, 800: of this amount, $729,500 was allocated for research and publication, $287,200 for training programs, $107,400 for university Jewish studies, $241,500 for general educational and cultural programs, $21,800 for the Community Service program, and $320,400 for scholarships and fellowships.'

*

The Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews released

last July data it had gathered and analysed on marriages and deaths in 1976. Jewish synagogue marriages have continued to decline:

Synagogue Marriages

	5 year Average 1965–69		*5 year Average 1970–74*		*1975*		*1976*	
	Number	%	*Number*	%	*Number*	%	*Number*	%
Orthodox	1,502	81·9	1,455	79·9	1,237	77·9	1,104	79·0
Reform	199	10·8	244	13·4	222	14·0	203	14·5
Liberal	133	7·3	122	6·7	129	8·1	90	6·5
Total	1,834	100	1,821	100	1,588	100	1,397	100

More than two-thirds of all synagogue marriages take place in London: in 1974, 70 per cent in London and 30 per cent in the provinces; while in both 1975 and 1976, London accounted for 72 per cent and the provinces, 28 per cent.

Burials and Cremations Under Jewish Religious Auspices

	5 year Average 1970–74		*1975*		*1976*	
	Number	%	*Number*	%	*Number*	%
Orthodox	4,197	86	4,168	85·7	4,183	82·6
Reform	391	8	331	6·8	488	9·6
Liberal	295	6	365	7·5	397	7·8
Total	4,883	100	4,864	100	5,068	100

Two-thirds of the burials and cremations took place in London in 1974 and 1975: 67 per cent. There was little change in 1976: 66 per cent in London and 34 per cent in the provinces. The Research Unit comments:

'One feature which strikes all those concerned with the annual collection of the death returns is the continuing attraction of a Jewish religious burial. Nearly every Chevra Kadisha in the small centres can provide examples of people asking to be buried as Jews, who were completely unknown to the local community during their life-time. It is this factor which accounts for the situation of small communities which can hardly raise a minyan on the High Holydays, or have closed their synagogue entirely, yet regularly bury several persons a year.'

*

The May 1977 Official Bulletin of the Central African Jewish Board of Deputies includes some data on Jewish schoolchildren in Rhodesia. There

are a total of 712 between the ages of 5 and 17 years who are enrolled in Jewish day schools, government schools, and private schools. 'Salisbury and District' have a total of 438; 'Bulawayo and District', 245; and 'Other Centres', 29. There are 398 pupils in primary schools: 239 in the Salisbury area; 144 in the Bulawayo area; and 15 in other centres. The large majority of them attend Jewish communal schools: 83 per cent in Bulawayo and 72 per cent in Salisbury. On the other hand, of the total number of 314 in high school, only 20 per cent in Bulawayo and 17 per cent in Salisbury are enrolled in Jewish schools.

Rhodesia's Jewish population has been steadily declining as a result of emigration. In 1977 there were 1,850 Jews in Salisbury, 1,400 in Bulawayo, and 50 in the smaller centres. The Jewish Communal Fund is under the control of the Board of Deputies; about 40 per cent of its total income is allocated to the Jewish Day Schools; in addition, 18 students were given bursaries and loans in 1977.

*

A World Congress on Jewish Music will be held at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem on 31 July–5 August 1978. The Congress is sponsored jointly by the National Council of Culture and Art of Israel's Ministry of Education and Culture and the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress; it will have the co-operation of the Musicology Departments of the Hebrew University, Tel Aviv University, and Bar-Ilan University. The official languages will be Hebrew, English, and French.

The following subjects will be discussed in 4 sub-committees:

A. Liturgical music—East and West.
B. Music in the Jewish home and family—East and West.
C. The Essence and Configuration of Jewish Music originating in the Hebrew language.
D. Jewish Art Music.

Details can be obtained from The Conference Secretariat, World Congress on Jewish Music, 3 Tel-Hai Street, Tel Aviv, Israel.

*

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Agassi, Joseph, *Towards a Rational Philosophical Anthropology*, xx + 404 pp., The Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation Series, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1977, 57.50 guilders.

Ardagh, John, *The New France*, 3rd edn., 733 pp., Penguin Books in association with Martin Secker and Warburg, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1977 (first published, 1968), £1.95.

Bensimon, Doris and Lautman, Françoise, *Un mariage. Deux traditions: Chrétiens et Juifs*, 248 pp., Centre National des Hautes Etudes Juives, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles (publié avec le concours du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris), Brussels, 1977, B.Fr. 600.

Botz, Gerhard, Brandstetter, Gerfried, and Pollak, Michael, *Im Schatten der Arbeiterbewegung: Zur Geschichte des Anarchismus in Osterreich und Deutschland*, mit einem Vorwort von Karl R. Stadler, 190 pp., Schriftenreihe des Ludwig Boltzmann Instituts für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, Europaverlag, Vienna, 1977, n.p.

Bugliosi, Vincent with Gentry, Curt, *Helter Skelter: An Investigation Into Motive*, 623 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1977 (first published, 1975), 95p.

Burnett, John, ed., *Useful Toil: Autobiographies of Working People from the 1820s to the 1920s*, 365 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1977 (first published, 1974), £1.00.

Davis, Moshe, ed., *World Jewry and the State of Israel*, with a Foreword by Professor Ephraim Katzir, President of the State of Israel, xix + 372 pp., a Publication of the Continuing Seminar on World Jewry, vol. II, Arno Press, New York, 1977, $12.00.

Dubb, Allie A., *Jewish South Africans: A Sociological View of the Johannesburg Community*, xii + 190 pp., Occasional Paper no. 21, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa, 1977, R5.50.

Fintersbusch, Kurt and Wolf, C. P., eds., *Methodology of Social Impact Assessment*, xii + 387 pp., Community Development Series, vol. 32, Dowden, Hutchinson and Ross, Stroudsburg, Penn., 1977, £15.00, $25.00.

Ginwala, Frene, *Indian South Africans*, 20 pp., Report no. 34, Minority Rights Group, 36 Craven Street, London, W.C.2, 1977, 75p.

Handelman, Don, *Work and Play Among the Aged: Interaction, Replication and Emergence in a Jerusalem Setting*, xvi + 193 pp., Van Gorcum, Assen and Amsterdam, 1977, 29.50 guilders.

Ions, Edmund, *Against Behaviouralism: A Critique of Behavioural Science*, xiii + 165 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1977, £6.00 (paperback, £2.75).

Kaiser, Robert G., *Russia: The People and the Power*, edited and abridged by the author, 469 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1977 (first published, 1976), £1.25.

Kamin, Leon J., *The Science of Politics and I.Q.*, 252 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1977 (first published, 1974), 95p.

Kotlan-Werner, Henriette, *Kunst und Volk, David Josef Bach: 1874–1947*, mit einem Vorwort von Bundesminister Dr. Hertha Firnberg, viii + 174 pp., Materialien zur Arbeiterbewegung Nr. 6, Ludwig Boltzmann Institut für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, Europaverlag, Vienna, 1977, n.p.

Labovitz, Sanford, *An Introduction to Sociological Concepts*, xii + 244 pp., John Wiley, New York, 1977, £4.65, $8.00.

Lader, Malcolm, *Psychiatry on Trial*, 202 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1977, 80p.

Laing, R. D., *Do You Love Me? An Entertainment in Conversation and Verse*, 60 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1977 (first published, 1976), 50p.

Link-Salinger (Hyman), Ruth, *Gustav Landauer, Philosopher of Utopia*, with a scholarly bibliography edited by Professor Arthur Hyman, xiv + 171 pp., Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis, 1977, $17.50.

Marnham, Patrick, *Nomads of the Sahel*, 19 pp., Report no. 33, Minority Rights Group, 36 Craven Street, London W.C.2, 1977, 75p.

Mischel, Theodore, ed., *The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues*, xiv + 359 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1977, £9.00.

Piaget, Jean, *The Moral Judgement of the Child*, with the assistance of seven collaborators, translated by Marjorie Gabain, 399 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1977 (first published, 1932), £1.95.

Piaget, Jean, *The Origin of Intelligence in the Child*, translated by Margaret Cook, 464 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1977 (first published, 1936), £1.95.

Poppel, Stephen M., *Zionism in Germany, 1897–1933: The Shaping of a Jewish Identity*, xviii + 234 pp., The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1977, $7.50.

Reed, David, *Anna*, 189 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1977 (first published, 1976), 70p.

Roberts, K., Cook, F. G., Clark, S. C., and Elizabeth Semeonoff, *The Fragmentary Class Structure*, viii + 200 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1977, £5.50.

Rosenthal, Gilbert S., ed., *The American Rabbi: A Tribute on the Occasion of The Bicentennial of the United States and the Ninety-Fifth Birthday of the New York Board of Rabbis*, x + 200 pp., Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1977, $10.00.

Sachar, Howard M., *A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, x + 883 + xlix pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1977 (first published, 1976), £14.00.

Schmelz, U. O., Glikson, P, and Della Pergola, S., eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1973: Proceedings of the Demographic Sessions held at the 6th World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, August 1973*, 463 pp., Jewish

Population Studies, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1977, n.p.

Smith, David J., *Racial Disadvantage in Britain: The PEP Report*, 349 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1977, £1.25.

Stadler, Karl Rudolf, Steiner, Herbert, Exenberger, Herbert, and Maimann, Helene, *Osterreicher im Exil, 1934–1945*, 40 pp., Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestllte für Oberösterreich, Linz, 1977, n.p.

Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality Research and Statistical Dept., *Statistical Year Book, no. 16, 1976*, cii + 400 pp., Tel Aviv, 1977, $5.00.

Terkel, Studs, *Working: People talk about what they do all day and how they feel about what they do*, xiv + 479 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1977 (first published, 1974), £3.00.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

ARIELI, Mordecai; M.A. School Inspector, Youth Aliyah Organisation, Tel Aviv, and Editor of *Yessodot*. Formerly External Teacher, Tel Aviv University School of Education. Chief publications: 'The Residential Treatment Centers of Youth Aliyah', *Forum for Residential Therapy*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1972; 'The Preparatory Residential Setting and its Influence on the Self-Concept-as-Pupils of its Charges', in M. Arieli, A. Lewy, and Y. Kashti, eds., *The Educative Village* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1976; co-editor, *Residential Settings: Socialisation in Powerful Environments* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1976; with Y. Kashti, 'Residential Schools as Powerful Environments', *Mental Health and Society*, vol. 3, nos. 3–4, 1976; with Y. Kashti, 'A Typology of Residential Settings' (in Hebrew), in D. Nevo and S. Reshev, eds., *Sefer Ucko*, Tel Aviv University, 1977. Currently engaged in research on role norms of socially disadvantaged adolescents in Israeli residential and day schools.

COHEN, Stuart A.; D. Phil. Senior Lecturer in General History and Political Science, Bar Ilan University. Chief publications: 'The Reception of Political Zionism in England: Patterns of Alignment Among the Clergy and Rabbinate, 1895–1904', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 16, no. 2, December 1974; 'Peace Conferences: The Formal Aspects', *Jerusalem Papers on Peace Research*, vol. 1, 1974; 'The Genesis of the British Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914', *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 12, no. 2, May 1976; 'The Zionist Revolution', *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, vol. 1, no. 4, Summer 1976; *British Policy in Mesopotamia, 1903–1914*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1976. Currently engaged in research on Zionism and the politics of Anglo-Jewry, 1895–1922.

FINESTEIN, Israel; M.A. Crown Court Judge, Queen's Counsel, and Vice-President of the Hillel Foundation. Formerly President, Jewish Historical Society of England. Chief publications: ed., James Picciotto's *Sketches of Anglo-Jewish History*, London, 1956; 'Sir George Jessel 1824—83', *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society*, vol. XVIII, 1958; 'Anglo-Jewish Opinion During the Struggle for Emancipation', in ibid., vol. XX, 1964; co-editor, *Essays Presented to Israel Brodie*, London, 1967; 'Jewish Immigration in British Party Politics in the 1890's', in Aubrey Newman, ed., *Migration and Settlement*, London, 1971. Currently engaged in preparing a volume of some of his lectures on Victorian Anglo-Jewish history.

GARTNER, Lloyd P.; Ph.D. Professor of Modern Jewish History, Tel Aviv University. Chief publications: co-author, *History of the Jews of Milwaukee*, Philadelphia, 1963; co-author, *History of the Jews of Los Angeles*, Philadelphia, 1970; *The Jewish Immigrant in England 1870–1914*, 2nd edn., 1973; 'Cecil Roth, Historian of Anglo-Jewry', in D. Noy and I. Ben-Ami, eds., *Studies in the Cultural Life of the Jews in England*, Jerusalem, 1975; *History of the Jews of Cleveland* (in press).

KASHTI, Yitzhak; D.Phil. Lecturer, School of Education, Tel Aviv University, and Director of the Helping System for Educational Networks, Tel Aviv University. Formerly Director of Compensatory Education Programmes, Youth Aliyah Dept., Tel Aviv. Chief publications: 'Educational and Organizational Trends in the Youth Village', in M. Wolins and M. Gottesmann, eds., *Group Care: An Israeli Approach*, New York, 1971; co-author, *Human Relations in Schools* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1974; co-editor, *Residential Settings: Socialisation in Powerful Environments* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1976; 'Organizational Compatibility to Socialization Objectives: the Case of the Youth Village', in ibid; 'The Residential Setting and its Influence on Change of Attitudes and Values of Disadvantaged Adolescents', in ibid. Currently engaged in research on the culture of the school and the problem of the disadvantaged.

MEDDING, Peter Y.; Ph.D. Reader in Politics, Monash University. Formerly Visiting Professor, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1975. Chief publications: *From Assimilation to Group Survival: A Political and Sociological Study of an Australian Jewish Community*, Melbourne, 1968; *Mapai in Israel: Political Organization and Government in a New Society*, Cambridge, 1972; ed., *Jews in Australian Society*, Melbourne, 1973. Currently engaged in preparing a book on the Israeli Labour Party.

THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

VOLUME NINETEEN 1977

Published on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

CONTENTS

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

AUTHORS OF BOOK REVIEWS

BOOKS REVIEWED

Soviet Jewish Affairs

A Journal on Jewish Problems in the USSR and Eastern Europe

Volume 7 Number 1 Spring 1977

CONTENTS

REVIEWS

Published by the Institute of Jewish Affairs, 13/16 Jacob's Well Mews, George Street, London W1H 5PD

The Journal appears twice a year, in spring and autumn. Annual subscription £4 or $8.00 (air mail surcharge £3 or $5.50). Single issues £2·25 ($4.50), with additional charges for air mail.