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CONTENTS

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AFFIRMATION OR ENJOYMENT? THE COMMEMORATION OF INDEPENDENCE IN ISRAEL

Charles S. Kamen

Introduction

ALL societies commemorate events which, real or imaginary, are imbued with great symbolic significance. Durkheim saw in these commemorations the expression and reaffirmation of the 'collective sentiments and the collective ideas which make [thesociety's] unity and its personality'.[1] The particular form becomes traditional: the participants express themselves in ways which they have learned are appropriate to the occasion. Although the forms of commemoration may change in the course of time, the slowness of the change prevents discontinuity.

In some cases, however, such discontinuity is sharper—usually, when one social order is replaced by another and previously commemorated events cease to be deemed worthy of celebration. In other cases, it is the form of the celebration which is altered. New rituals are often introduced to mark the establishment of the new order, and it is then important that they be effective, since a new order is usually unstable at the outset and the celebrations can strengthen it by serving as a symbolically integrative focus.[2]

Sociologists have devoted little attention to non-religious celebrations.[3] Lipset refers to them in passing, while discussing the Fourth of July in the United States and Bellah[4] considers the ceremonies associated with the celebration of national holidays as examples of 'civil religion'. The divorce of the state from religion in modern societies has been followed by the establishment of civil religions which may demand the loyal adherence which religious ideologies once did. An analysis of their rites is important, because it can help to make us understand the symbolic bases of social integration in modern secular society.

Independence celebrations in Israel

When new holidays are established in a society, their rituals are usually drawn from existing traditional forms of celebration. For

example, some Christian feasts derive from pagan holidays; British royal pageants had their origins in the great continental displays of the Burgundian dukes.[5] Israel, on the other hand, has no old tradition of secular celebration. Its traditional forms of national celebration are religious, but these are adhered to only by a minority of the Jewish citizens.[6] Most of the population is unable to give religious meaning to Independence Day, nor does it wish to do so. Since the traditional symbolic forms most readily available for adaptation to the new holiday are unacceptable to the majority of Israelis, new forms must either be borrowed from other existing traditions, or they must be independently created. For the majority of the population, however, the alternatives which are available are even less familiar than the religious celebrations are to them.

These alternative forms derive from three main sources:[7] secular leisure-time types of entertainment in the period of the Yishuv, usually urban in origin (strolling in the streets); the 'pioneering' Zionist forms of leisure-time activity, usually of a rural character (folk-dancing; campfires); and western secular forms not peculiarly those of the secular Jewish community in Palestine and later in Israel (parades, fireworks). The present annual celebrations of Independence in Israel are increasingly characterized by western secular forms.

There are many reasons to account for this outcome, but perhaps the most important is the fact that in less than three years after the establishment of the State, the Jewish population had doubled.[8] The heterogeneity of the immigrants' backgrounds led to a rapid dilution of both the urban type and the Zionist style of entertainment in leisure hours. The readily available western secular forms replaced them.

Independence Day (*Yom Ha 'Atsmaout*) commemorates the proclamation of the State of Israel on 15 May 1948, immediately after the termination of the British Mandate. The occasion is celebrated according to its date in the Hebrew calendar (5 Iyar); and in the traditional Jewish manner, the day begins at sundown and terminates on the following evening. The celebrations are planned annually by a special committee of government officials representing the several ministries and agencies involved in the various arrangements—the Prime Minister's Office, Defence, Transport, Tourism, Police, etc. The round of principal events changes little from year to year, and includes both official ceremonies in which participation is limited by invitation only and what might best be called 'voluntary' celebrations involving the mass of the general public.

On the Eve of Independence Day, the streets in the centre of towns are closed to traffic and tens of thousands stroll about to the accompaniment of music broadcast over loudspeakers. At some street corners there are folk-dancing platforms upon which various groups provide entertainment; local artists perform at other platforms in parks and

main squares, attracting thousands of spectators. There are also spontaneous circles of dancers, usually young, who come together and join in the gaiety. Fireworks generally conclude the mass public activities at about 10.30 p.m., after which the crowds begin to disperse.

However, for many the evening has then only just begun; they repair to private parties in their homes or those of their friends, or go out into the fields and gather round campfires, sometimes until morning. In the decades until 1969, there was usually a military parade the next day, but that has now ceased to be a regular annual event. The family picnic has become the typical spontaneous activity on the morrow of Independence Eve, which is a holiday from work.

The various manners of celebrating Independence Day do not meet with universal approval. Concern is annually voiced by intellectuals and by government officials that the form and content of the celebrations—especially on the Eve—fail to express the significance of the Independence which they commemorate.[9] There is also concern about whether people really enjoy themselves on the occasion. Indeed, the degree of popular enjoyment has become the unofficial measure of the 'success' of any year's Independence celebrations. Consequently, the planners are continuously searching for celebratory forms which will allay the criticisms about lack of content but will nevertheless be enjoyable to the public.

Independence Eve activities

In this section I concentrate on an analysis of the informal or spontaneous forms of celebration—for those are the activities which have aroused concern. I employ 'enjoyment' as a key variable because of the emphasis on it in public discussions. The analysis is based on a survey (at the end of 1972) of 1,892 adult Jewish residents of four major urban areas—Jerusalem, Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Beersheva. The study was commissioned by the Government Information Centre and carried out by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research. The Centre had overall responsibility for the organization of the annual Independence commemoration. The aim was to gather systematic data which would help in the planning of the twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations, the following Spring.

My analysis will concentrate on responses to four questions[10] dealing with the evaluation of, and participation in, the activities of Independence Eve. (I have chosen the Eve—rather than the daylight hours on the morrow, or both parts of the holiday—because there has been most concern about the evening celebrations, which in any case are the highlight of the commemoration, and because those celebrations are communal in contrast to the activities on the following morning and afternoon, which tend to be individual or family arrangements.) I examine

here (1) the activities which are part and parcel of the holiday tradition; (2) the degree of participation; (3) the degree of enjoyment; and (4) the evaluation of the contribution which these activities make in providing 'happiness' for the participants.

Table 1 summarizes the responses to these four questions and shows that while there is wide variation in participation and in evaluation of the contribution these activities make to holiday happiness, there is

TABLE 1. *Independence Eve holiday tradition: participation in, and enjoyment of, the activities.*

Independence Eve Activity	(1) *Participation in the activity*	(2) *Enjoyment of participation*		(3) *Mentioned as part of tradition*	(4) *Contribution to holiday happiness*
	%	%	No	%	%
Walking in the streets	44	64	(800)	22	61
Dancing in the streets	11	83	(200)	46*a*	89
Watching street dancing	40	80	(728)		86
Watching entertainment stages	32	69	(582)	31	83
Watching fireworks	56	87	(1,019)	18	89
Festive dinner at home	41	94	(746)	10	78
Parties or entertaining guests	31	91	(564)	21	84
Campfires	10	82	(182)	9	75
Ceremony proclaiming the holiday	13	85	(236)	10	*b*
Watching television	52	82	(946)	*c*	68
Attending synagogue; lighting candles	19	86	(346)	8	55
Commercial entertainment	6	67	(109)	*c*	43

(1) Percentage of all respondents; (2) Percentage of respondents reporting participation who enjoyed their participation 'very' or 'fairly' much; (3) Percentage of all respondents mentioning this activity in response to an open-ended question, 'What is the tradition of Independence Eve celebrations?' (4) Percentage of all respondents reporting that the activity contributes 'greatly' or 'fairly much' to enjoyment of the holiday eve. *a* Respondents did not distinguish in their free responses between watching dancing and participating; *b* not included in the question; *c* mentioned by fewer than 5 per cent of the respondents, if at all. Columns 1, 3, and 4 are based on minimum numbers of 1728.

somewhat less variation in reported enjoyment of participation.[11] In order to summarize the data in Table 1, the distributions of responses to the questions about participation, enjoyment, and evaluation of the activity's contribution to holiday happiness were dichotomized, and the activities regrouped according to whether they were 'high' or 'low' in each of the three distributions. Each activity can be characterized according to the degree of participation in it, the degree to which respondents evaluate it as contributing to holiday enjoyment, and the degree of enjoyment on the part of the participants. If activities which

are high on all three dimensions are the most 'successful', then parties, festive dinners, watching fireworks, looking at television, and watching street dancing rank highest, while attending commercial entertainment ranks lowest.[12]

There are on the list mass activities as well as those which are limited to a comparatively small number of participants. Among the latter are commercial entertainment, street dancing, campfires, synagogue attendance, and candle lighting. Each of these activities, except the first, is the special province of a sub-group in the population: campfires and dancing are for the young while synagogue attendance and candle lighting characterize the religious respondents. Since they appeal to a limited audience, these activities are relatively low on participation. Those who do participate, however, enjoy them. Moreover, campfires and street dancing are seen even by non-participants as contributing to the enjoyment of the holiday; the same is not true of synagogue attendance and candle lighting. The campfire and the folk dance are 'pioneering' recreational forms which developed in the pre-State period, and their continued popularity is evidence of the enduring ability of some cultural forms developed during the period of the Yishuv to symbolize the 'pioneering' origins of the State. On the other hand, the strictly religious activities of synagogue attendance and candle lighting are not widely accepted by most Israelis as symbols of what is for them primarily a secular event.

It is unnecessary to discuss in detail each activity and its characterization.[13] The activities which are seen as contributing to the enjoyment of the holiday are of two kinds: the public, mass 'street' activities (fireworks, dancing, entertainment stages), and the private celebrations carried out within the family circle or with friends (parties and entertaining, festive dinners, campfires, watching television). As will be shown below, both are important for the enjoyment of the holiday, but they play different roles among different groups in the population.

My claim that the activities listed are in fact the traditional components of the holiday celebrations has been based thus far on the agreement between the activities mentioned by the 1,892 respondents in their answers to the open-ended question on the content of the tradition, and the list of activities prepared independently for the other questions. If the activities on the list are in fact the traditional ones, there should be general agreement among the respondents to this effect, with few sub-cultural differences. Respondents were therefore divided according to background characteristics, and the distributions of answers to the open-ended question on tradition were compared across sub-groups of the population according to age, sex, educational level, grade in which schooling began in Israel, religiosity, and ethnic origin. In very few cases were there differences of more than ten percentage points between sub-groups in their mentioning of specific activities as

forming part of the tradition. The greatest number of differences was found between national origin groups, followed by differences among respondents with varying educational levels;[14] even in such cases, only one or two activities were mentioned—dancing and/or fireworks. It seems reasonable therefore to conclude that there is wide agreement about the perception of what constitutes the tradition of Independence Eve celebrations, and that sub-group membership is not an important factor.

Participation in Independence Eve celebrations

The existence of a common tradition does not, as we have seen, necessarily mean that nearly everyone participates in the various celebrations in a uniform way. The most important factor in the pattern of differentiation is educational level; this is so even when we control ethnicity, religiosity, or grade in which schooling began in Israel. The data may conveniently be summarized if the major activities are divided into the two groups mentioned above: mass public street activities and limited, private activities.[15] Respondents who have attended school over a longer period are more likely to engage in private activities, and less likely to participate in public celebrations. Religious respondents are more likely to go to synagogue, light candles, and hold festive dinners.[16] There are no other major or consistent differences in participation in the activities related to background characteristics.

Participation in the major activities is related to their evaluation as contributing to the happiness of the holiday: respondents who engaged in an activity are more likely to evaluate it favourably in that respect than are non-participants. More important, however, is the fact that the *relative* ranking of the activities in terms of evaluations of their contribution to the happiness of the holiday is very similar when participants are compared with non-participants (Spearman $r = \cdot 928$).[17] Just as there is agreement on the content of the holiday tradition, there is also agreement on the relative contribution made by each component of the tradition to the happiness of the occasion.

Participation is also related to enjoyment of the holiday.[18] For the purpose of this analysis, a measure of participation in the most popular activities was created. It is based on a division of the evening's celebrations into three periods—early, middle, and late—and the selection from each of the periods of the particular activity in which participation was greater than in others in that period.[19] The selections were: early evening—festive dinners; middle evening—walking in the streets; late evening—parties and such forms of entertainment as playing cards, watching television, etc. The more activities the respondent engaged in, the more likely he was to report that he enjoyed

what he did on Independence Eve. This is true regardless of background characteristics—that is, whether respondents were divided according to family status, education, date of first year at school in Israel, ethnicity, age, or age of children in the same household.

To summarize: education is related to participation—the more formal education a respondent has, the more likely he is to prefer private celebration to the public activities; evaluation of the relative contribution of each of the activities to the happiness of the holiday is not related to participation in the activity, but those who participate are more likely than those who do not to evaluate an activity as contributing to happiness; when the major activities of the evening are considered, more participation is related to greater overall enjoyment. Non-participants do not enjoy themselves.[20]

Public and private celebration

The distinction between 'private' and 'public' or street activities is central to the understanding of the meaning of the Independence Eve celebrations. The division is not simply a handy conceptualization for describing the data; it emerges again and again in the analysis of the responses, as can be seen by the use of Smallest Space Analysis (SSA).[21] This is a computer mapping technique which expresses the relationships between variables by arranging them in a two- or three-dimensional space such that the distance between a pair of points representing two variables is inversely related to the size of the correlation coefficient between the two variables.

The SSA analysis[22] clearly shows that the five 'public' street activities form a distinct group, as do the three activities which I have called 'private'.[23] Responses to questions about the activities *within* a group are more highly correlated with one another, on the average, than they are with responses to questions about other activities falling outside the groupings. In other words, participants in one of the activities in the group tend to engage also in the others; enjoyment of one is related to enjoyment of the others; and if one is seen as contributing to the happiness of the holiday, the others also are.

Enjoyment of the celebrations

The commemoration of Independence should be a joyful event.[24] I have described above how participation is related to enjoyment of the holiday. The SSA analysis also shows *which* activities contribute more to enjoyment, and which contribute less. Whether we consider participation, enjoyment, or evaluation of the contribution to happiness, it is clear that general enjoyment of the evening's activities is more closely related to favourable responses to the public activities than it is to

favourable responses to the private arrangements. It is participation in the public events, enjoyment of them, and evaluation of them as contributing to the happiness of the holiday, which make the holiday evening generally pleasurable. It is not that the other activities are unimportant, but that the public celebrations are more important.

This finding is consistent with the responses of Israelis interviewed about the meaning of the different holidays,[25] and with the nature of the celebrations of Independence. The latter commemorates an event which is perceived to be central in the life of the nation, and therefore one with which every citizen can identify.[26] The public celebrations on Independence Eve are examples of those reunions, assemblies and meetings where the individuals, being closely united to one another, reaffirm in common their common sentiments, about which Durkheim wrote.[27] In the case of the street events on Independence Eve, there is little special content expressing the meaning of independence. But the fact that *only* on Independence Eve does this configuration of public activities occur infuses them with a particular symbolic meaning.

Enjoyment of the holiday and socialization to national values

The independence celebrations commemorate an historical event witnessed by hundreds of thousands, many of whom were still alive to celebrate it a quarter of a century later.[28] Presumably, those who were old enough at the time to appreciate the achievement find meaning in the anniversary by recalling their experience. In the early years of the State, these 'eye-witnesses' constituted a majority (and later they were still a substantial minority) of the potential celebrants. Today, however, they are a small minority, since most of the potential celebrants in the 1970's were either not born, were too young to understand, or were not in Israel in 1948. If the national values are to have meaning for successive generations, the descendants of the founders and of the immigrants must be socialized into them, and into the ways in which these values are commemorated. Even conscious and directed attempts at socialization, however, may only partially succeed, as can be seen on Independence Eve, when it is precisely those respondents who have been more exposed to socialization into Israeli national values who seem to be less involved in public celebrations.

Socialization to national values in Israel has been carried out primarily by the schools. During the pre-State period there were various educational systems, run mainly by political movements; after 1948, most of these were combined into a government school system, nationally organized and directed.[29] The schools were consciously used as channels for inculcating national ideas and sentiments. The amount of schooling in Israel, and in particular the grade in which education began in the country, can be taken as a rough measure of exposure to

socialization in national values, although it does not necessarily imply that the socialization has been entirely successful.

Earlier I described briefly the highlights of Independence Eve celebrations. For many years these festivities were the occasion for high school pupils, and especially for members of youth movements, to stay out later and have more excitement than on any other evening of the year.[30] Those who had dropped out of school or left the youth movement were much less likely to participate. After high school, compulsory military service led to an interruption of this type of celebration. When the young men and women were released from the army about two or three years later, most of them had to look for work—while some continued their studies. The social framework within which they had celebrated Independence Eve was no longer available to them.

TABLE 2. *Education, Grade in which schooling began in Israel, and Enjoyment of Independence Eve celebrations. (Percentage of respondents who enjoyed 'very' or 'fairly' much the things they did on Independence Eve.)*

Grade in which respondent began schooling in Israel	*Number of years at school*		
	0–8	9–12	13+
1–4	58 (112)	52 (306)	47 (159)
After high school if at all	71 (376)	67 (357)	59 (169)

Note. For example, among respondents who began their schooling in Israel in grades 1–4, and who did not complete more than eight years of schooling, 58 per cent reported enjoying their activities 'very' or 'fairly' much.

Nothing could be an improvement on the way Independence Eve had been commemorated in high school.

If this interpretation is correct, there should be two consequences. First, the more schooling a respondent has had in Israel, the greater, should be the discontinuity in his feelings about the ways in which he or she celebrated Independence Eve at school, and after leaving the army. Second, respondents who completed their primary and secondary education in Israel should note this discontinuity to a greater degree than did those educated abroad, and thus be less satisfied with their manner of celebrating the holiday as adults.[31] Table 2 shows the results of testing these two hypotheses. For each educational level, the proportion of respondents reporting enjoyment of Independence Eve activities is higher among those who were educated abroad than it is among those who began their studies in Israel. These differences are equally as great as are those obtaining between respondents with different educational levels. It seems reasonable to conclude that the experience of being socialized in Israeli schools is in some way related

to withdrawal from public participation in, and public affirmation of, the commemoration of Independence.

This outcome is not due to a greater ideological involvement of those immigrants (who were educated abroad) in Zionist ideals. The questionnaire included two separate measures of Zionist attitudes; when these measures are added as controls, the difference between those educated abroad and those educated in Israel persists.[32]

Not only do those educated in Israel report less enjoyment of the holiday celebrations, but the activities they enjoy are not those mentioned by Israelis educated abroad. The SSA analysis of interrelations between participation in the major Independence Eve activities, and general enjoyment of the evening—controlling for number of years of schooling and grade schooling begun in Israel—permits the following conclusions. For respondents who had all, or almost all, their schooling in Israel, regardless of educational level, enjoyment of Independence Eve is more strongly related to participation in the private activities than it is to participation in the public, street activities. The opposite is true for those educated abroad. For them, general enjoyment is more closely related to participation in the public, street activities than it is to participation in the private ones.

Discussion

The findings seem paradoxical. The tone of Independence Eve celebrations is set by the mass, public street activities, which are unequivocally seen as being part of the tradition of the holiday. Moreover, general enjoyment is more closely related to participation in, and favourable evaluation of, the street activities than it is to the private activities. On the other hand, most of the criticisms are directed against these public celebrations. Furthermore, respondents who have been more socialized to national values are less likely than their less-exposed countrymen to find enjoyment in the celebratory forms which are most clearly identified with the commemoration.

A possible explanation of the paradox may be sought in the way in which the Independence Eve celebrations have developed since 1948. The annual commemoration rapidly became institutionalized, both in law and in organizational form. The creation of appropriate celebratory symbols was put in the hands of a government committee.[33] A schedule of official activities was developed, and repeated each year with minor (and some major) variations. Symbols expressing the overt meaning of the holiday were central to the official activities.[34] Their content could be completely controlled by government planners, and the invited public participated only as passive spectators and in very limited numbers. The content of most of these official activities meets with little public criticism.[35]

The mass public activities are another matter. Israel is a democracy, and the planners have neither ways of enforcing participation nor a desire to do so. Yet it is demanded of them that they create a tradition which will involve the public in activities reflecting the symbolic meaning of the holiday. These activities, moreover, must also be enjoyable.[36] The demand for instituting a tradition is understandable, for all other holidays celebrated in Israel have established traditional forms, as do the national holidays of other countries which are used as models. The demand for appropriate content in the mass public celebrations results from a desire to make use of the commemoration as a means of instilling into new immigrants and the native young the values of nationhood, and to enable the older citizens who participated in the struggle for Independence to re-live the event. The demand for enjoyment stems from the conviction that the attainment of Independence was an achievement to be remembered with joy and gaiety, and at least as worthy of national celebrations with outward evidence of popular enjoyment as are similar occasions in other countries visited by Israelis. The most frequently mentioned parallels are the Fourth of July in the United States, the Fourteenth of the same month in France (the anniversary of the Prise de la Bastille in 1789), and Mardi Gras in Brazil.

In Israel, both the planners and the general public are intensely aware of the great efforts being made to create a tradition of national celebrations; they also realize the difficulties involved—for traditions usually have a way of becoming spontaneously established over time. However, since it is considered important for the Independence festivities to become truly popular and that this particular commemoration be cherished, the celebrations are scrutinized each year in order to discover which especial ones have reached the stage when they can at last be labelled 'traditional'. This annual scrutiny and evaluation may well be producing the opposite result by not allowing the crystallization of any particular form to develop quietly over a period of time.

Each year, following Independence Day, the national planning committee carries out an evaluation of the success of the celebrations. The planners have thus far not succeeded in introducing activities whose content reflects the symbolic meaning of the holiday, and in having these activities accepted and carried out by the public. This is probably the reason why they evaluate the holiday's success primarily according to whether people enjoy themselves. The criterion of enjoyment, in turn, becomes a major factor in planning future celebrations. It is much easier to devise forms of spectator entertainment than to create 'meaningful' traditions for participants.

The members of the annual planning committee have made serious attempts to introduce symbolic activities in the hope that they would be

generally adopted. In the first decade after Independence, four suggestions were repeatedly put forward: the display of the national flag outside private homes; festive decoration of the façades of houses and blocks of flats; a special Independence Day dinner, modelled on the Passover Seder; and a special Independence Day form of greeting. Only the first two have been successful: many decorate their porches and balconies with streamers, portraits of national leaders, and garlands, while many more fly the national flag. The other two suggestions proved utter failures. At one time it was proposed that a competition be organized with the aim of selecting an appropriate form of greeting, but the suggestion was not put into effect. On the other hand, a great deal of effort went into the attempt to create and establish an Independence dinner ritual which would have symbolic content: in 1956 the Ministry of Education and Culture sponsored the publication of a collection of appropriate prayers, readings, and songs, and a special menu was planned for the festive occasion. Radio programmes were especially arranged so that a special broadcast might be heard as an accompaniment to the meal; this practice has not been continued. Although many do serve a festive dinner on Independence Eve, few observe a special ritual.

Conclusion

Modern Israeli society is the product of both a national and a social revolution, the success of which led to the establishment of an independent state. With statehood, however, there arose a process of decline in the importance of collective goals; Israelis tended to become more concerned, in the course of time, with problems of an individual, personal kind[37] rather than with national and moral issues. That process was probably greatly hastened by the mass immigration of the 1950's, when the vast majority of the newcomers were neither active Zionists nor socialists.[38] They could not be expected to commemorate the proclamation of Independence with the same intensity of feeling which characterized the veteran citizens. In those early years, the annual commemorations in immigrant settlements were very muted; the residents had to be taught 'how to celebrate' the occasion, since they lacked both the symbolic meanings of Independence and a repertoire for expressing them.

Israel, of course, is not the only country which has been attempting laboriously to create a National Holiday: the new nations which have emerged since the Second World War have had to confront very similar problems. As stated in the Introduction, when an old order is suddenly replaced by another, there is an urgent need to establish new symbolic forms which will provide a climate of loyalty, will legitimize the new order, and create stability. Nowadays, it is the new ruling

government which will take upon itself the task of devising the forms which (it is hoped) will become eventually traditional. The celebrations must annually affirm and re-assert the achievement of Independence, but they must also provide meaning and joy for the great mass of the citizenry. It is extremely difficult to achieve the right balance in the first place and then to ensure that once the balance is struck successfully on any one year, it will retain enduring value for many succeeding years.[39]

NOTES

[1] Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Glencoe, Ill. 1965, p. 475.

[2] Werner Landecker, 'Types of integration and their measurement,' *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 56, no. 4, 1951, pp. 332–40.

[3] Some work on religious and semi-religious holidays has been done by James H. Barnet, 'The Easter festival: a study in cultural change', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 14, no. 1, 1949, pp. 62–70; Mark Benney *et al.*, 'Christmas in an apartment hotel', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 65, no. 3, 1959, pp. 233–40; Maurice Broady, 'The Organization of coronation street parties', *Sociological Review* (n.s.), vol. 4, no. 2, 1956, pp. 223–42; Edward Shils and Michael Young, 'The Meaning of the coronation', *Sociological Review* (n.s.), vol. 1, no. 2, 1953, pp. 63–81; and Norman Birnbaum, 'Monarchs and sociologists: a reply to Professor Shils and Mr. Young', *Sociological Review* (n.s.), vol. 3, no. 1, 1955, pp. 5–23.

[4] See S. M. Lipset, *The First New Nation*, New York, 1963, p. 75; and Robert N. Bellah, 'Civil religion in America', in Lawrence W. Levine and Robert Middlekauf, eds., *The National Temper*, New York, 1972, 2nd edn., p. 431.

[5] Sydney Anglo, *Spectacle, Pageantry, and Early Tudor Policy*, London, 1969, p. 5.

[6] The analysis in this paper relates only to the Jewish population of Israel. Celebration of Independence Day by Israeli Arabs is viewed by Jews and Arabs alike as extremely problematic, and will not be dealt with here.

[7] This discussion is based on material collected by Ora Cibulski.

[8] Government of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, Jerusalem, 1972, p. 21.

[9] This discussion of the content of the celebrations may be seen as a direct continuation of the parliamentary debate which was held in 1949, when Independence Day was legally established. While some speakers noted that holiday traditions develop only slowly, and used Jewish religious holidays as examples, others hoped for a rapid crystallization of a celebratory tradition for Independence Day.

[10] The wording of the questions was as follows: 'What is the tradition of Independence Eve celebrations?' (an open-ended question); 'Which of the following activities did you engage in on Independence Eve this year?'; 'How much did you enjoy your participation in this activity this year?' (asked only of respondents who reported participating in the activity); 'To

what degree do you think this activity contributes to the happiness of the holiday?' (asked of all respondents).

[11] Column 3 in Table 1 shows that there are no activities reported as forming part of the holiday tradition which are not included in the other three questions. Some of the activities thus included—watching television, and commercial entertainment—were not perceived as an important part of the tradition. They are included in order to permit comparisons between the older forms of celebration and the newer ones which technological innovations and commercial enterprise have provided.

[12] The fact that the characterization was made by dichotomizing leads to some borderline cases; thus, watching television, though the second-most popular activity, only just falls into the 'high' group on enjoyment.

[13] 'Walking in the streets', which most contributes to the visual character of Independence Eve celebrations, is not particularly enjoyed by those who do it, nor is it seen as contributing generally to enjoyment. 'Walking in the streets' has been the most obvious target of those critical of the celebrations; it has been described as aimless wandering by people who don't know what to do, but feel they have to be out doing it.

[14] In Israel these two characteristics are, of course, strongly related. It is not necessary to examine their joint effects for the purpose of this particular section of the analysis.

[15] This division omits some of the major activities in the original list; commercial entertainment, synagogue attendance, and candle lighting; the ceremony proclaiming the holiday; and as noted earlier, watching television. Only the ceremony proclaiming the holiday is perceived as being part of the tradition.

[16] Religiosity was measured by answers to the question, 'To what degree do you observe the religious commandments?' There are four response categories. The item is a standard survey measure of Jewish religiosity in Israel.

[17] Rankings were based on the proportion of respondents evaluating each activity as contributing 'greatly' or 'fairly much' to the happiness of the holiday. The computation was based on the rankings of all activities for which data on participation and on evaluation of contribution to happiness were available.

[18] Respondents were asked a general question towards the beginning of the questionnaire: 'In general, how much did you enjoy what you did on Independence Eve this year?' Twenty-four per cent reported enjoying themselves 'very much', 32 per cent 'fairly much', 16 per cent did not enjoy themselves 'so much', and 21 per cent did not enjoy themselves 'at all', while six per cent did not remember.

[19] This was done in order to represent the most popular activities, and to insure that sufficient numbers of respondents would remain after profiles were constructed.

[20] Participation in the five street activities forms a Guttman scale (C.R. = ·94). If we compare the evaluation of an activity's contribution to happiness for respondents with different scale scores, we find that for the street activities greater participation is related to a more positive evaluation of the activity's contribution to happiness; for the non-street activities, there is no relationship.

[21] Louis Guttman, 'Integration of test design and analysis', *Proceedings of the 1969 Invitational Conference on Testing Problems*, Educational Testing Service, Princeton, N.J., 1970, pp. 53–65.

[22] Copies of the SSA maps are available on request from the author.

[23] In speaking of 'private' activities, I refer here only to campfires, festive dinners, and parties. These activities, when carried out on Independence Eve, are specifically related to the celebration of the holiday. The remaining 'private' activity, watching television, is not considered part of the holiday tradition (cf. Table 1).

[24] As noted earlier, one of the reasons for commissioning the study on which this analysis is based was the fear that people were not enjoying the holiday. A major study of Israeli cultural life—Elihu Katz *et al.*, *Israel Culture 1970* (Hebrew), Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, Jerusalem, March 1972, vol. 2, pp. 41–52—found that the meaning of the Independence holiday for Israelis was two-fold: it gave them an opportunity to rejoice, as well as a feeling of identification with 'the nation and with the state'.

[25] Katz, ibid.

[26] Katz found that the significance of Independence Day was either an opportunity to be happy (30 per cent of the respondents) or that it gave a feeling of belonging to the nation and to the state (63 per cent; Katz, op. cit., p. 50). Independence Day was cited by fewer respondents (2 per cent) than any other holiday as giving 'nothing'. Elsewhere (Elihu Katz and Michael Gurevitch, *The Secularization of Leisure*, London, 1976, p. 85), it is argued that 'the reply "to be free" [to do what I like] and the reply "the holiday has no meaning for me" are alike in that they de-emphasize the normative and collective in favour of the discretionary and private. It is only a collective sense of ritual and meaning—a shared norm—which makes a holiday more than just a day off . . .'

[27] Durkheim, op. cit., p. 475.

[28] On 15 May 1948, the Jewish population of the new State was estimated to number 650,000. I estimate that of those who were at least ten years old on that date, approximately 350,000 were alive in 1973, at the time of the twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations. The Jewish population in 1973 numbered more than 2·6 million (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, op. cit., pp. 23, 48–49).

[29] Aharon F. Klineberger, *Society, Schools and Progress in Israel*, Oxford, 1969, p. 123.

[30] See Yochanan Peres, 'Youth and youth movements in Israel' (*The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 5, no. 1, June 1963, pp. 94–110), for a discussion of Israeli youth movements.

[31] There should be no reason to expect differences in the feelings about the holiday by amount of education for respondents educated abroad, according to that argument. On the other hand, evidence from numerous surveys on a wide variety of subjects in Israel consistently shows that educational level is related to a critical attitude: respondents with more years of schooling are more critical (or less satisfied) in their evaluations of the actions of governmental or other public bodies. A similar pattern should be found with respect to enjoyment of the holiday celebrations.

[32] The two measures are: 'To what degree does the 3,000-year Jewish

history affect your feeling of belonging to the Jewish people?' and 'To what degree does the history of the modern Jewish settlement in Palestine affect your feelings of belonging to the Jewish people?' It is reasonable to take positive answers to these questions as greater evidence of a Zionist orientation than negative answers would be. (I am grateful to the late David Katz for suggesting this test.)

[33] This was probably an unavoidable consequence of the great importance which was immediately attached to the holiday by most public figures in the new country.

[34] Such as the kindling of twelve beacons near Theodore Herzl's grave; the military parade; the President's reception; the reception for foreign diplomats; the awarding of the Israel Prize; and similar events.

[35] One exception was the military parade. Criticism of the parade was not made on the grounds that it was an inappropriate national symbol, but rather that the emphasis on military prowess was undesirable. Partly as a result of such criticism, and partly because of the great expense involved, the parade has ceased to be an annual event.

[36] This discussion is based on protocols of planning committee meetings.

[37] Joseph Ben David, 'Conforming and deviant images of youth in a new society', *Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology*, vol. IV, Louvain, 1964, pp. 404–414.

[38] Judith T. Shuval, *Immigrants on the Threshold*, New York, 1963, p. 185.

[39] The research reported here is based on a survey carried out while I was on the staff of the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, Jerusalem. I am grateful to the Institute, and to the Director of the Israeli Government Information Centre (which financed the survey), for their co-operation in the analysis. My colleague, Eugene Weiner, read earlier drafts of this paper, and I have benefited much from his comments.

YOUTH MOVEMENTS IN ISRAEL AS AGENTS FOR TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD

Orit Ichilov

Introduction

THE limitations of the school to serve as an agent for transition to adulthood have been recently discussed at length by Coleman. His basic argument is that the school emphasizes acquisition of knowledge, but does not provide adolescents with adequate opportunities for experimentation with the wide variety of relationships which exist in adult society.[1] The school, therefore, cannot serve as the major agency in preparing the young to enter into adult society. In many countries, various types of youth organizations operate alongside the school as agents for transition to adulthood. They vary in their sponsorship, membership patterns, and structural properties. They include organizations of a military character on the one hand, and organizations which grant a large measure of autonomy to the youth, on the other.[2] The characteristic common to most youth organizations in a western-democratic society is their 'informal' nature in comparison to the school. That is, they are based upon voluntary membership, symmetrical (non-hierarchical) relationships, multi-dimensional activities, and relatively little adult interference and supervision.[3] In Kahane's opinion,[4] these qualities enable them to provide adolescents with opportunities for important social experimentation and for developing commitment to social values and norms.

The Israeli youth movements can serve as an example of 'informal' youth organizations inasmuch as they possess those characteristics. I argue, however, that their structural properties as 'informal' organizations can only partially account for their social contribution. The ability of the youth movements to function as agents for transition to adulthood is conditioned to a great degree also by the social context in which they operate. The Israeli youth movements originated in the Diaspora, established themselves in Palestine during the period of the Yishuv (Jewish settlement in the Holy Land before the establishmen of the State), and have continued to function since the creation of the

State. Over this extended period of time the movements have, in large measure, preserved their structural properties. However, changes in Israeli society have altered their status and have affected their ability to function as agents for transition to adulthood.

The structural characteristics of the youth movements as agents for transition to adulthood

Israeli youth movements reflect to a great extent the political party structure in Israel both in their value orientations and in their organizational and educational affiliations with the various political parties.[5] However, despite their particular political orientations, the various movements have much in common in terms of their goals, their organizational structure, and their methods of operation. As informal educational organizations, they possess certain features wherein they differ from both the school and the family. First of all, membership and participation in the movement are on a voluntary basis. Also, in contrast to the school which focuses on academic achievement and in which adults are responsible for directing activities and distributing rewards, the youth movement provides a wide variety of activities, and the presence of adults is not salient. The movement, like the school, is organized according to age groups, but the relationships among the members themselves and between them and adults differ from those which exist in the school. The group is led by a counsellor who is close in age to the members and who acts, to a great degree, as an intermediary for adult interference. The organization of the group's activities, including planning, setting up regulations, and supervising behaviour, is left largely in the hands of the members themselves. The peer group serves as the major directing and supervising force, yet the individual within the group is provided with opportunities to experiment with leadership roles and is not left to assume only a dependent role. The entrusting of a large measure of decision-making and activity to the youth is an expression of the adults' faith in their maturity.

In general, there is a great deal of similarity among the different movements in their organizational structure. They are decentralized and allow for local initiative despite the sponsorship of centralized bodies such as particular political parties, religious groups, the Jewish Agency, or the Government. The movement chapters operate from the local *ken* (the structure which houses the groups, similar to the scout den in the United States), which is divided into units according to age levels. Each age group participates in activities appropriate to its level and the members are gradually exposed to the movement's ideology.

In theoretical terms, the first stage can be described as 'reaching out' and is aimed at attracting the members to the movement. At this stage indocrination is minimal. The second stage is aimed at consolidating

the peer group and creating solidarity with the movement *ken*. The third stage attempts to foster commitment to the movement's ideology and values, and the last stage aims at commitment to the realization of those values. Thus, for example, the *ken* of the *Noar Oved Velomed* (Israel's largest youth movement) is divided into four levels: the 'preparatory level', ages 10–12; the 'training level', ages 13–15; the 'leadership level', ages 16–17; and the *garin* (literally, 'nucleus'—a group committed to pioneering and settlement), ages 17–18.

Leadership training occupies the central places in the older groups. There is an attempt to create cadres of leaders within the movement to serve as personal examples and as identity figures for the young members. The crowning point of the educational process comes with the pledge of the *garin*, a ceremony in which the members of the group commit themselves to settle on a kibbuts. This pledge constitutes a kind of initiation rite and its purpose is to encourage realization of the movement's ideals and way of life.

The various youth movements set forth similar educational objectives, though the particular emphasis and content may vary according to the movement's political orientation. They all aspire to inculcate in their adolescent members both social and psychological resources. The ideological statements and declarations made by the movements tend to emphasize the need to educate the youth for identification with the values of Zionism, to create in them an attachment to the political ideology of the party with which the movement is affiliated, and to encourage commitment to agricultural settlements.[6] The movements also hope to provide a meeting ground for adolescents from different ethnic backgrounds and from different socio-economic classes, and thus to contribute to social integration.

On the psychological plane, the movements aim to foster the creation of the new Israeli, the 'Sabra', who in many respects constitutes the antithesis of the European Diaspora Jew. The Sabra is perceived as one who is proud, forthright, and sincere, and who desires to innovate and reform. The youth movements, then, aim to help the individual adolescent to achieve social status and to crystallize a self-identity. They also encourage the development of an independent youth culture and attempt to equip the adolescents for various roles in the wider society. Although adolescent needs do not always overlap with the needs of society, the tension between the two in Israel appears to have been minimal. The relationship of the youth movements to the society at large has been based upon co-opting the youth and is not characterized by the rebellion of the youth or by their withdrawal from adult society.

The similarities between the various movements extend also to the area of activity content, notwithstanding differing emphases on the ideological level. The content includes ideological education in accord-

ance with the orientation of the movement: scout training which is intended to develop independence, responsibility, co-operation, and a love for nature among the members. Leadership training, as mentioned above, constitutes the major focus at the older levels in all the movements.

It is generally held that the youth movements have a dual function in Israeli society: for the adolescent youth they serve as a form of expression of youth culture while from the society's vantage point they constitute a socialization agent which facilitates the transition into adulthood, and enables it to proceed with minimal conflicts and tensions. In this later capacity, they possess structural characteristics which distinguish them, as we have seen, from other agents of socialization, notably the school and the family. However, a study of the role of the movements in Israeli society over an extended period of time shows that although the structural characteristics were basically preserved, the position of the movements as socialization agents changed as the country passed from the period of the Yishuv to the period of statehood.

The youth movements during the period of the Yishuv and after the establishment of the State

Most of Israel's youth movements had their roots in the European Diaspora, where they were allied with the various factions of the Zionist movement which expressed alienation from life in the Diaspora and the desire for revolutionary change in the life of the Jewish people through Jewish national revival in the Land of Israel.

During the period of the Yishuv, Jewish immigration from eastern and central Europe increased steadily. The new pioneer immigrants laid the foundations for the new society and future state. Through voluntary organizations, they established frameworks and instituted programmes in the areas of defence, economics, education, and politics even without the binding authority of the state.[7] During that period, the youth movements were considered a major framework for transmitting values to the younger generation even though they encompassed only a small proportion of the entire population of adolescents.[8] It appears that the central position occupied by the movements during that period can be attributed to the élite-formation function which they served. The movements succeeded in inculcating in their members the accepted values and in channelling them into central and prestigious positions in society. The movements also paved the way for their members to assume central roles in the new society by providing them with actual work experience in the areas of agriculture, defence, education, and culture—functions which were of primary importance during the pre-State period.

During the Yishuv, the youth movements operated within the framework of the educational system which was divided into trends affiliated with the various political parties.[9] This condition made recruitment of members easier and also contributed to the centrality of the youth movement.

With the establishment of the State, the role of the movement as an important educational and formative agent changed. Paradoxically, although the number of recruits increased in comparison with the previous period,[10] only a minority of the youth now continues to view membership in the movement as a primary obligation. For the most part, the members look to the movement primarily as a source of fun and recreation, and only to a lesser degree as a purposeful ideological and educational institution. The movement is no longer considered a primary socialization agency which prepares its members for the central roles and for the central values in Israeli society. These changes in the role of the youth movements are, to a great degree, related to changes in structure and in values which took place in Israeli society.[11]

With the establishment of the State, many functions and services—which had hitherto been performed by voluntary organizations—came under the control of central state agencies and governmental ministries. This transfer of authority was accompanied by changes in social values. The establishment of a sovereign state, after so long a period of life in the Diaspora, placed an even greater emphasis on the State as the symbol of national revival. The transfer of authority and responsibility from the voluntary organizations to the State became a matter of ideology as well as a matter of course. As a result, voluntary organizations either declined in importance or were dissolved altogether. As part of this centralization, the educational system underwent a process of depoliticization. It was converted from a decentralized system, affiliated with political movements, into a state system under governmental control.[12] The depoliticization of the educational system was expressed, among other ways, in a prohibition against the operation of the youth movements within the framework of the school. At a later point, the movements were again allowed to operate within the school—but in restricted fashion and under supervision, and not with the measure of autonomy exercised by the movements within the schools during the period of the Yishuv.[13] The dissociation of the movement from the school prevented co-ordination of educational activities between the two, and the relationships between the two agencies even became antagonistic at times. The movement and the school competed for the student's leisure time and some educators considered involvement in movement activities to have a detrimental effect upon scholastic achievement. On the other hand, the movement found it difficult to compete with the extra-curricular activities sponsored by the school. Unlike the movement, the school offered

recreational and learning experiences without demanding ideological commitment.

The youth movement had fostered the image of the classical pioneer, an image which combined readiness to be satisfied with little; postponement of immediate rewards of prestige, wealth and power; stress upon manual labour; and giving consideration to the good of the whole above and beyond the attainment of personal benefits.[14] The establishment of the State created new goals and new roles. The diffuse and eclectic role of the pioneer could no longer serve as a role-model to guide individuals in a modernizing society. The desire of the new state for economic self-sufficiency placed an increasing value upon professionalization and specialization. Military, scientific, and economic activities and roles took precedence over agriculture and manual work. These changes increased the importance of personal achievement and individualistic orientations as against collective values. The desire for a higher standard of living also contradicted the ideal of the simple life as the movement had conceived it. In addition, after the establishment of the State, the status of the kibbuts declined and with it the importance of the movements whose ultimate goal was training for kibbuts living.[15]

Demographic changes following the establishment of the State also had far-reaching social significance. From 8 November 1948 to 31 December 1972, the Jewish population in Israel more than tripled, with the yearly rate of increase averaging 6 per cent.[16] Beginning with the early 1950's, the proportion of Oriental Jews (those who came from Middle Eastern and North African countries) steadily increased as a result of both immigration and a higher birth rate. In Israel, Oriental and Western Jews constitute, to a great degree, two social blocs which differ in socio-economic status and cultural tradition. Although the Jews of Oriental origin now constitute more than 50 per cent of the entire population, they do not share proportionally in the national income, in educational attainments, or in positions of social and political importance. The youth movements were expected to incorporate members from different cultural backgrounds, to mould their initial identification with Israeli society, and to facilitate their absorption into that society. From the beginning of the period of mass immigration, the movements attempted to reach new immigrants and disadvantaged youth. The older groups of the Noar Oved, for example, were recruited to serve as counsellors in the *ma'abarot* (transit camps for immigrants). *Garin* groups of movement members were also sent to rural settlements and to slum neighbourhoods in the cities. However, as we shall see, the movements failed for the most part to attract members from these segments of society.

In general, it seems that even after the establishment of the State, the youth movements continued to foster the pioneering ideal which

was popular in the Yishuv period. This orientation ran counter to the values of modernization and economic independence which became central with the establishment of the State. As a result, the status of the youth movements within Israeli society changed. This, in turn, greatly affected their ability to function effectively for the achievements of their social and educational goals.

The impact of the movements upon their members

I have claimed that although the Israeli youth movements preserved their structural characteristics, their effective influence was greatly reduced because of changes in the social context in which they operated. In this section I will discuss the impact of the movement upon its members and the extent to which it succeeded in achieving its social goals.

Evaluations of the effects of movement training have commonly made use of several criteria concerned with the following questions: (1) Was the movement successful in attracting large numbers of adolescents? (2) To what degree did the movement serve as an instrument for the social integration of groups of different ethnic, cultural, social and economic backgrounds? (3) To what degree did the movement succeed in steering its members into actual agricultural settlement? (4) How much of an ideological impact did the movement have upon members who did not elect agricultural settlement? and (5) To what degree did the movement satisfy the expectations and needs of adolescents in the society?

There have been several estimates about the number of youth counted in the membership of the movements. According to Adler, despite the centrality of the movements during the period of the Yishuv, their membership constituted only a small percentage of the total adolescent population. Paradoxically, the number of participants in the movements increased after the establishment of the State, although the importance of the movements declined. Eaton and Chen[17] reported in 1970 that since the establishment of the State 70 per cent of the youth have held membership in a movement. Adler and Shapira[18] reported in 1975 that 70–80 per cent of Israeli youth have been members of a movement at some stage of their lives. However, only a small percentage of those who join maintain membership over a long period of time. Eaton and Chen[19] reported a drop-out rate of 75 per cent at age 16 and 90 per cent by age 19. Ben David[20] had found in 1954 that the drop-out rate increased as the pressure for ideological commitment and realization of the movement's objectives increased. He concluded that as the future plans of the individual came into conflict with the official collectivist ideology of the movement, the movement declined in importance as a reference group for the individual member.

As for the composition of the membership, the movements did not succeed in attracting the different social and cultural groups in Israeli society: for the most part, the membership was, and still is, drawn from the Western, older established, more educated, and higher socio-economic status segments.[21] In this sense, they constituted an élitist framework and were not an attractive force for the disadvantaged, the new immigrants, or youth of Asian and African origin. Only 16·3 per cent of the membership is drawn from the Oriental Jewish community although this group now comprises 26·2 per cent of the high school population. Because of their homogeneous social and cultural composition, the youth movements did not provide the opportunity for significant contact between members of the various ethnic, social, and cultural segments of the population.

If the criterion for evaluating the enduring impact of the movement is the degree to which the members committed themselves to agricultural settlements, then data show that only 20 per cent of the members —which constitute approximately 4 per cent of the entire youth population—chose settlement.[22] There is no reliable data concerning the number of those who remained on a kibbuts over a long period of time, but it is reasonable to assume that the percentage who committed themselves to kibbuts life on a permanent basis was even smaller.

On the other hand, there are those who feel that the impact of the movement must also be measured in terms of its effect upon those who did not choose agricultural settlement. The assumption is that there are thousands of Israeli citizens whose values and orientation to social and political issues were moulded by their membership of one of the movements. In a study of students at Tel Aviv University, Shapira and Etzioni[23] investigated the extent to which graduates of the movement expressed more commitment to the kinds of values fostered by the movement than did students who had never joined the movement. The study showed that the attachment to Israel was deeper among former members and that the attachment gained in strength with the number of years spent in the movement. However, when the sample was subdivided according to country of origin, it was found that while members of Western origin expressed greater attachment to Israel than did Western non-members, this trend was not pronounced among former members of Oriental origin. For the latter, membership in the movement had a very limited effect upon attachment to the country. On the other hand, in matters relating to the individual, such as the level of aspiration for socio-economic status and the choice of career, there were no significant differences between movement graduates on the basis of ethnic origin. It appears that membership in the movement does lead to a similarity of status aspirations among the different ethnic groups. However, the aspirations are not in the direction encouraged by the movement, but rather in the direction of occupations

which help to achieve individual upward mobility and which do not typically contribute to the solution of society's central problems. In the formation of social values and personal aspirations, however, it is very difficult to distinguish between the influences of the home and those of the movement. Adler and Shapira[24] report that there is a tendency for parents of movement members to have been members themselves, and for the affiliation with a particular movement to be carried over from one generation to the next. It is possible, then, that the movement rather than creating a change of values and orientations, merely reinforced existing tendencies among youth who have assimilated these values and orientations in their families.

The last criterion mentioned for the evaluation of the effects of the movement was the degree to which it satisfied adolescent needs. A study was conducted among youth in two broad groups: older established families consisting mainly of sabras and of others of Western origin; and new immigrant families, mainly of Oriental origin.[25] The youth from the established families regarded the movement primarily as a framework in which they expected to form friendships and to find a source of recreation and social life. This finding is supported by Eaton and Chen who show (as stated above) that recreation and social life constitute the primary motivation for joining the movement. This group placed very little importance on the movement as an agent for transmitting values or as an organization directed towards social, communal and volunteer activities. It appears, then, that the primary orientation of the members is personal and individualistic and not collectivist. They stress adolescent needs and not the search for solutions to social problems.

Immigrant youth, on the other hand, in the process of transition from traditional culture to modern western culture, look to the movement for help in solving social and cultural problems. In many cases, the kinship ties have been weakened in the process of immigration and the youth do not turn to their families for advice and guidance. When they do look to the movement counsellor for direction and guidance, it appears that their expectations are not satisfied. Slightly over half the respondents (51·7 per cent) did not consult a counsellor. Of the 48·3 per cent who did, 41·3 per cent received advice on matters concerning the movement; 1·8 per cent received advice on general matters; and only the remaining 5·2 per cent reported receiving advice from their counsellors on personal matters.[26]

Conclusion

This discussion of the youth movement as an agent for transition to adulthood has stressed that many factors are involved which affect the impact of the movement's educational programme. In general it

appears that the movement influenced social change to a very limited degree both during the period of the Yishuv and after the establishment of the State. Essentially, the movement reinforced already existing tendencies among members who represented primarily the higher socio-economic echelons of Israeli society. It failed, however, to reach the very youth who would have benefited the most—indigent youth, immigrant youth, and those of Oriental Jewish origin. We have also seen that to the degree that disadvantaged elements did join, the movement exerted only a limited influence upon their values, their social and political orientations, and their career aspirations. The movement was not structured to deal differentially with youth from disadvantaged groups, it lacked vertical differentiation—that is, a continuum of frameworks with varying degrees of stress on élitist goals. The movement also lacked horizontal differentiation—that is, a wide assortment of types of activity and activity content. This lack of structural adaptability perpetuated and heightened the feeling of alienation among disadvantaged youth and created the attitude that the movement was irrelevant as an instrument for absorption and integration into the wider society.

On the other hand, the limitations of the movement as an agent for the transition to adulthood are not only the result of built-in properties. They are also related to the position occupied by the movement within the total institutional web of Israeli society. During the period of the Yishuv, the movement trained youth for diffuse roles in a society operating on a diffuse and volunteer basis. The establishment of the State led to increasing specialization and to the concentration of various social functions in the hands of a central government. The roles and values which the movement had fostered in the pre-State period, and to which it ritualistically continued to adhere, lost their meaning since they did not answer the new social needs. The weakening of the foundations for social involvement created a shift from the dual role once played by the movement to an emphasis on the movement as primarily an expression of youth culture.

In order to serve again as a significant agent for transition to adulthood for a large segment of Israeli youth, the movement will probably have to redefine its goals and re-evaluate its activities and its methods of operation in the light of existing realities.

NOTES

[1] James S. Coleman, *Youth: Transition to Adulthood*, Chicago, 1974, pp. 1–7.

[2] Joseph W. Eaton and Michael Chen, *Influencing the Youth Culture*, Beverly Hills, Calif., 1970, pp. 39, 40.

[3] Reuven Kahane, *A Sociological Analysis of Informal Youth Organizations*

(Hebrew), Ministry of Education and Culture, Youth Department, Jerusalem, 1974, p. 1.

[4] ibid., p. 15.

[5] For a description of the various youth movements and their political orientations, see Eaton and Chen, op. cit., pp. 129–33.

[6] See, for example, the article by Avraham Aderet, 'Youth Movements in Israel' (Hebrew), *Niv Ha'kevutza*, vol. 11, 1962, pp. 609–26.

[7] For the development of Jewish settlement before the establishment of the State, see S. N. Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society*, London, 1970, pp. 7–34, 143–54.

[8] According to Adler, during the period of the Yishuv the youth movements encompassed only 20 per cent of the 12–18 year olds. See Chaim Adler, *The Youth Movement in Israeli Society* (Hebrew), Ministry of Education and Culture (Youth Department) and Szold Institute, Jerusalem, 1962.

[9] For a discussion of the history of the educational system during the Yishuv period, see Joseph Bentwich, *Education in Israel*, Philadelphia, 1963, pp. 18–29; see also Moshe Avidor, *Education in Israel*, The Jewish Agency, Jerusalem, 1957, chapter 2.

[10] According to Eaton and Chen, 70 per cent of Israeli youth join a movement: Eaton and Chen, op. cit., p. 134. Adler and Shapira report that 75 per cent of their respondents joined the movement at some point during their adolescent years: Chaim Adler and Rina Shapira, *Career Choices and Attitudes of Young Israeli Graduates and Non-Graduates of Youth Movements* (Hebrew), (Draft, 1975, to be published shortly as a book).

[11] Analysis of changes in Israeli society which took place after the establishment of the State are based, for the most part, on S. N. Eisenstadt, op. cit., pp. 59–71, 143–231.

[12] ibid., pp. 213–47.

[13] See the Bulletin of the Director General of the Ministry of Education and Culture on *Youth Movement Activity in Educational Institutions* (Hebrew), Ministry of Education and Culture, Jerusalem, 1971.

[14] For the image of the pioneer, see Eisenstadt, op. cit., pp. 17–18, 147–48, 165.

[15] Concerning the declining status of the kibbuts, see ibid., pp. 165–69.

[16] See Orit Ichilov and Michael Chen, 'The Political and Social Foundations of Education', in C. Ormian, ed., *Education in Israel* (Hebrew), Ministry of Education and Culture, Jerusalem, 1973, pp. 40–41.

[17] See note 10 above.

[18] See note 10 above.

[19] Eaton and Chen, op. cit., p. 124.

[20] Joseph Ben-David, 'Membership in the Youth Movement and Personal Status' (Hebrew), *Megamot*, vol. 5, no. 3, 1954, pp. 227–47.

[21] On the élitist and selective nature of the youth movement, see Eaton and Chen, op. cit., p. 135; Eisenstadt, op. cit., pp. 237–44, 256–59; Adler and Shapira, op. cit., pp. 18–20.

[22] Adler, op. cit., pp. 5, 21.

[23] See Rina Shapira and Chava Etzioni, 'The influence of Youth Movement Membership upon the Values of Israeli Students' (Hebrew), *Megamot*, vol. 16, no. 3, 1969, pp. 274–85.

[24] Adler and Shapira, op. cit., p. 21.
[25] Michael Lotan, *Attitudes and Values in the Youth Movement* (Hebrew), Tsofit, 1964.
[26] ibid., p. 351.

AMERICAN JEWISH FAMILIES: THE OCCUPATIONAL BASIS OF ADAPTABILITY IN PORTLAND, OREGON

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GERALD Berman's recent article in this Journal,[1] 'The Adaptable American Jewish Family: An Inconsistency in Theory', is addressed to a question put by Gerhard Lenski in 1963: 'If weak familial ties facilitate upward mobility, how then can we reconcile the strong familial ties of the Jewish group with their obvious economic success?' Berman explains the inconsistency in his conclusion, where he notes that both cohesiveness and extra-familial orientation 'are found in the make-up of Jewish families in America. It is the *combination* of these apparently conflicting factors which has produced economically successful individuals.'[2]

The psychology of a family certainly shapes its offspring, but it is not the main determinant of a career trajectory. Occupational success is determined by individual initiative combined with the specific opportunities which particular circumstances have made available. To an historian who has amassed occupational, residential, and affiliational data on Jewish families over a period of 80 years in a single city, Berman's argument seems to rest on extremely vague evidence. To attribute individual success to psychological variables apart from community institutions is to substitute a precondition for an explanation.

In what follows I would like to suggest that Jewish family cohesion over generations has relied heavily on the interdependent business network of the entire community. As students of individual communities are consistently demonstrating, when Jews settled in American cities after 1840, they created a network of businesses which encouraged achievement in the next generation.[3] Jewish businesses, moreover, have been concentrated in specific retail and wholesale marketing lines, with which Jews had had experience in Germany and Russia, so that training acquired in one firm could easily be transferred to another.[4] Contacts between firms through trade associations, and social contacts between business associates in fraternal lodges, facilitated

communication of intelligence about new opportunities.[5] Ethnic ties have provided the basis for employment, and occupational mobility has occurred within a limited set of businesses and professions. Finally, as the structure of businesses changed over the years, some individuals failed despite close business ties within Jewish communities, while others sought similar employment in more promising areas. While the form of nurture in Jewish families no doubt influenced attitudes towards work, the structure of the business communities, and the examples set by clusters of successful businessmen in residential neighbourhoods provided specific opportunities for occupational mobility.

By focusing on the Jewish men of Portland for a decade, one can see how a business community was structured and how family trajectories were strongly influenced by that structure. Beginning with membership lists for the Portland B'nai B'rith for 1920, I have been able to determine the occupation of almost 1,000 Jewish males and to trace the occupational trajectory, residential mobility, and to a limited extent the family structure of about two thirds of them over the following ten years. Drawing on other B'nai B'rith membership lists back to 1866 and forward to 1930, and on manuscript census data for 1870 and 1880, I have been able to determine the changing occupational structure of at least a part of the Jewish community and to note the relative stability of men engaged in particular occupations. For selected families I can also trace intergenerational occupational and geographical mobility. But most important, one can see how business and fraternal affiliation reinforced one another, and provided a communal network which allowed many young people to find a comfortable niche. While these data throw very little light on methods of family nurture, they do demonstrate directly ties between fathers and sons, and brothers and cousins, through businesses and the B'nai B'rith lodge. They reveal a concrete basis on which family cohesiveness could be sustained, as well as the instability which loosened some family ties.

In 1919, partly in response to the growing Zionist movement and partly to meet local charitable and social service needs, the various B'nai B'rith chapters in Portland consolidated.[6] In an effort to recruit as many members as possible, Jewish men in the city and relatives in the armed forces were contacted and urged to join.[7] As a result, almost 1,200 men had their names entered on the rolls of the lodge. While we do not know precisely what percentage of the adult Jewish males in Portland this figure represents, a federal census of religious bodies for 1926 indicates that 12,000 Jews then belonged to the nine synagogues in Oregon.[8] Since no Jewish population centre existed outside Portland, we can take the figure of 11,000 as the minimum number of Jews in Portland choosing to affiliate with the community's religious bodies. Since Portland's sex ratio had finally reached approximate equality by 1920, and since, in such a population, adult males are usually 25

per cent of the total, we can with some assurance conclude that the B'nai B'rith members represented about 40 per cent of the Jewish community's adult males.[9]

According to data derived from the Portland city directories for 1920 and 1921 and entered in Table 1, almost 60 per cent of the B'nai B'rith members were in various forms of retailing and in the whosesale distribution or manufacturing of clothing. Another 20 per cent provided services like insurance, real estate, commission brokerage, pawn brokerage, and general salesmanship. A further seven per cent were engaged in the professions—primarily law, medicine, and pharmacy. Jews clustered tightly in a network of men's and women's clothing stores, Jewish-owned department stores, and general stores, furniture, hardware, and shoe stores, jewellers, cigar stores, and groceries. Jews also supplied these businesses with hides, wool, and furs, and ready-to-wear clothing. Jews provided wholesale distribution services as well as contacts with eastern manufacturers. Finally, they operated a large number of second-hand stores to reach a poorer clientele and to dispose of imperfect products.

As Table 2 illustrates, six Jewish-owned businesses—the two department stores, Meier and Frank, and Lipman, Wolfe & Company; Fleischner-Mayer dry goods; M. Seller importers; Simon's general store; and Ben Selling clothing—employed 68 B'nai B'rith members and presumably many more Jews, including women. Four similar family-owned stores specializing in cheaper clothing employed 19 members.

In the fruit business, a group of families—many of them Sephardi immigrants[10]—provided another circle of employment. The Hassans, Pihas, Benvenistes, and Menashes formed several interlocking partnerships and employed one another's relatives in their stores.

Furniture, hardware, and shoe stores were also primarily family businesses, though Baron's Shoe Store and Gevurtz Furniture employed several B'nai B'rith members in addition to the immediate families of the owners. The supply—and even in some cases the manufacture—of shoes was in the hands of the local Jewish families.

In manufacturing, virtually all of which should be classified as light industry, Jewish families again controlled individual firms; steel products, mattresses, tents, soap and soda water were each in the hands of one or two families, even though four to fifteen individuals engaged in the manufacture of each item are listed in the occupational charts.

Although much literature emphasizes the Jewish commitment to education and the proclivity of Jewish young men to enter professions, a Jewish professional class emerged slowly in Portland. The lack of local facilities for higher education, combined with family traditions and opportunities in commerce, led most young men into trade when they were in their mid-teens. According to the 1880 manuscript census

TABLE I. *Occupational Structure, Portland B'nai B'rith, 1920*

Retail, Wholesale, Clothing, Manufacturing	*No.*	%
department store, owners	9	
department store, employees	19	
general merchandise store, owner	16	
general merchandise store, employees	27	
novelty store	7	
importer/exporter	12	
men's clothing store, owner/family	75	
men's clothing store, employees	50	
women's clothing store	9	
tailor	36	
clothing manufacturer, incl. millinery	48	
shoe store, owner/family	24	
shoe store, employees	7	
shoe related (mfc., repair)	8	
sewing machine agency	2	
jeweller	43	
second-hand goods	18	
wool, hides, furriers	11	
hardware store	9	
furniture store, owner/family	30	
furniture store, employee	3	
fruit, grocery, fish, wholesale prod.	51	
restaurant	4	
pickle mfc.	1	
candy mfc.	7	
soda water mfc.	5	
cigar stores, supplies	21	
pipe store	1	
grain buyer	3	
coffee company	2	
cattle buyer	1	
	559	58·1
Other manufacturing		
metals (aluminium, steel, etc.)	15	
mattresses	5	
tents	5	
suitcases	4	
soap mfc.	2	
other	5	
	36	3·7
Craft		
printing	13	
butcher/meat mkt.	7	
watchmaker	3	
other	8	
	31	3·2

Semi-Professional	*No.*	%
insurance	19	
real estate	6	
actor/musician	3	
advertising	1	
mortgage company	1	
	30	3·1
Professional		
rabbi	4	
lawyer	22	
physician	18	
optometrist	1	
dentist	7	
chiropodist	1	
pharmacist	10	
teacher/principal	3	
engineer	2	
architect	1	
optician	2	
	71	7·1
Service		
auto related	28	
delivery services	5	
movie theatre	12	
cleaners/laundry	7	
fuel supply	3	
barber supply/barbers	8	
florist	3	
publisher/newspaper employee	8	
photographer/supply	3	
junk yard	9	
billiards	2	
apartment managers/rentals	4	
commission broker/agent	13	
stockbroker	3	
pawn broker	11	
collections/loans	3	
waiter	2	
peddler	4	
plumbing supply	2	
general salesman	30	
other	6	
	166	17·3
Other		
employee, large corp.	7	
employee, U.S. govt.	5	
employee, U.S. military	4	
employee, local govt.	4	
sec. Sailors Union	1	
employee, Chamber of Commerce	1	
student	3	
	25	2·6
No Occupation	45	4·9
Grand Total	961	100·0

for Portland, of the 166 identifiable Jewish men, only five were clearly professionals. Sons of the wealthiest families, as well as the sons of tailors and grocers, completed their education at local schools at the age of sixteen and immediately went to work in family or other Jewish-owned businesses. Almost 50 per cent of the adult males owned retail, wholesale, or small manufacturing businesses, while over 30 per cent more were employed as salesmen, clerks, travelling agents, or bookkeepers.[11]

In the years between 1891 and 1896 a new B'nai B'rith chapter was organized, composed of a merchant élite primarily in their late twenties and early thirties. Though many members were scions of wealthy families, it counted among its 66 members in 1896 only two physicians, two lawyers, one rabbi, and one architect. Its numbers and proportion of professionals were only slightly greater than those in an older B'nai

TABLE 2. *Major Employers of B'nai B'rith Members, 1920–1921*

Name of Firm	*Owners*	*Employees*	*Total*
Meier and Frank, department store	5	12	17
Lipman, Wolfe and Co., department store	4	6	10
Ben Selling and Co., clothing	1	4	5
Fleischner-Mayer, dry goods	4	14	18
M. Seller, importers	3	7	10
Simon's Store, general mechandise	2	6	8
Eastern Outfitting	1	5	6
N. and S. Weinstein, clothing	2	5	7
Pacific Outfitting	—	3	3
Pacific Clothing	2	1	3
	24	63	87

B'rith lodge organized 25 years previously.[12] In 1921, with a much larger and prosperous Jewish business community to serve as clients, the consolidated B'nai B'rith lodge included 22 lawyers and 18 physicians. But the proportion of professionals in the consolidated lodge was less than in the élite lodge in the 1890's.

Together with a continuation of concentration in clothing and allied businesses, the growth of the Jewish professional class is the most important occupational factor in the community during the 1920's. As in business, however, Jewish professionals were limited to specific fields. The limitations may have been imposed by the general economic base of the city, which lacked large universities or new and innovative industries requiring a variety of professionals. But the Jews may also have felt that professions which depended for employment on large firms would not be open to them. Only two engineers belonged to the B'nai B'rith in 1920; one of them was a member of a prominent local Jewish family, and he had left Portland by 1930. There were also only two Jewish architects.

Only a handful of Jewish men found employment with a state or

local government or with large corporations. Virtually all employees of the federal government, particularly with the federal agency created to operate the railways during the First World War, had left town by 1930. A physician, who had been employed by the United States Public Health Service, married during the decade and went into private practice. Although several young Jewish women became public schoolteachers, no member of the B'nai B'rith joined Hyman Barr, the principal of Irvington School, as an employee of the school district. Of the handful of employees of large corporations like General Electric, Southern Pacific Railroad, Western Union, and Woolworths, none had remained by the end of the decade. One of them, however, who had managed Simon's general store, left to manage a local branch of Montgomery Ward.[13]

For various reasons, related to the geographic diffusion of the Jewish population and the emergence of a self-conscious professional élite,

TABLE 3. *Geographic and Institutional Persistence, B'nai B'rith Members, Portland, Oregon, 1920–1930.*

	Numbers	%
Members not listed in city directories, 1920, 1921	174	15·1
Members not listed in city directory, 1930	329	28·6
Members in city directory who dropped B'nai B'rith affiliation, 1931	315	27·3
Members in city directory who retained B'nai B'rith membership, 1930	334	29·0
Total membership, 1920–1921	1,152	100·0

B'nai B'rith membership shrank by about 50 per cent between 1920 and 1931.[14] The careers and families of the original members have been traced wherever possible through city directories. Of the 1,152 members listed for 1920 and 1921, only 174 could not be found in city directories for those years. Over the next decade, about one-third of the remaining 978 had either died or left town. Slightly less than one-third had remained in Portland but dropped out of the B'nai B'rith, and slightly more than one-third remained in the city and in the lodge. While I have not yet attempted systematically to correlate occupations with continued residence in the city or membership in the lodge, I can discern from the raw data several significant changes in Jewish occupational structure and residential patterns. By combining occupational data for the two-thirds of the 1920–21 membership who remained in the city with similar data for the new members between 1926 and 1930, a pool of almost 1,000 names remains. And since, according to a federal census of Religious Bodies taken in 1936, Jewish synagogue membership in Oregon declined slightly between 1926 and 1936, those names represent again about 40 per cent of the adult Jewish males in Portland in 1930.[15]

Some occupations disappeared or diminished substantially; peddlers, who had accounted for about 10 per cent of the membership of the B'nai B'rith lodge for Russian Jews at the turn of the century, had virtually disappeared by 1920. Most of these men seem to have left for other cities rather than to have found other work or to have started successful businesses. Tailors had also diminished in number, though their disappearance from the B'nai B'rith was far out of proportion to their declining percentage in the occupational structure of the city and reflects a change in the focus of the lodge. As the Jewish community became more stable after 1910, new synagogues were founded and the number of rabbis grew slowly through the mid-1920's.[16] But the largest increase in the professions was clearly in law and more particularly in medicine and other healing arts. This occupational mobility was to a large extent inter-generational and heavily subsidized by older kinsmen. Of the 18 doctors in the B'nai B'rith in 1920, at least eight had relatives who were successful merchants in Portland, and of the 22 lawyers, this was also the case for eight of them. By the mid 1920's, although the small Jewish community had not emulated larger groups in cities like New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Detroit, and elsewhere and built its own hospitals, prominent doctors like Leo Ricen and Laurence Selling (both descended from very successful merchant families) held staff positions at Emmanuel Hospital.[17]

While Jews in the cigar business seem to have declined considerably, as Table 4 indicates, clothing, jewellery, and hardware shops continued to provide the core of Jewish employment. Family-owned businesses, however, provided only limited advancement for non-family employees, and many of the personnel at Meier and Frank, Fleischner-Mayer, and M. Seller sought work in other cities. When a firm like Simon's Store closed in 1925, with the Simon brothers moving to San Francisco, many of their employees left Portland also. The Simon brothers themselves found positions in Jewish-owned businesses in San Francisco. When firms with headquarters in San Francisco or Seattle, like Eloessner-Hyneman Shirt Makers, closed their Portland branch, many of their employees also left town. On the other hand, a buyer for Meier and Frank in 1920 found a similar job with Gimbel Brothers in New York during the decade but retained membership in the Portland B'nai B'rith.[18]

Statistical data say very little about the character of nurturing. But employment and residential data indicate that the psychological intensity which probably existed in Jewish families was reinforced in the market-place and the neighbourhood. I have not yet systematically traced the proximity of Jewish businesses and homes to one another, but a perusal of raw data suggests the following pattern. Those who owned large businesses or were in the professions were moving rapidly from the older west Portland neighbourhoods either into the hills

TABLE 4. *Occupational Structure, Portland B'nai B'rith Members, 1930*

Retail, Wholesale, Clothing, and Manufacturing	*No.*	%
clothing store owners, sales personnel	73	
clothing mfc., millinery	47	
tailors	5	
jewellers	25	
shoe stores	14	
hardware and furniture stores	32	
cigars	5	
food, retail	20	
food, wholesale, candy mfc.	19	
merchant, miscellaneous	35	
	275	48·3
Other Manufacturing		
metal mfc.	5	
mattresses	4	
soap mfc.	2	
bag mfc.	4	
other	12	
	27	4·8
Craft		
printer	5	
butcher	8	
other	5	
	18	3·2
Semi-Professional		
insurance	14	
real estate	4	
advertising	3	
musician	2	
	23	4·0

Professional	*No.*	%
rabbi	6	
lawyer	38	
physician	23	
optometrist	1	
dentist	8	
pharmacist	9	
architect	2	
teacher/principal	3	
optician	1	
	91	16·0
Service		
auto related	12	
amusement park	2	
cleaning/laundry	2	
fuel supply	3	
publisher/newspaper employee	10	
junk yards	7	
broker	4	
auctioneer	11	
loans/collections	1	
accountant/bookkeeping	3	
barber supply	1	
florist	1	
builder/contractor	2	
general salesman	39	
other	4	
	102	17·9
Other		
employee, U.S. govt.	1	
employee, local govt.	2	
student	2	
	5	0·9
No Occupation	28	4·9
Grand Total	569	100·0

overlooking the west side or across the Willamette River to new subdivisions. On the east side they settled almost exclusively north of Burnside, the street dividing the northern from the southern half of the city. Those who were employees or whose businesses were less successful changed residence as frequently, but generally remained in the older neighbourhoods. No ghetto existed, but most Jews voluntarily settled and resettled near one another in homes and apartments. Those who remained in the city over the decade, whether they changed residence or not, lived sufficiently close to other Jews to provide a sense of Jewish identity and occupational success for the next generation.

The patterns of residential stability and dispersal and some of their social consequences may be suggested by an examination of one sample street for the 1920's. I have chosen Johnson Street, between 20th on the east and 25th on the west, but the nearby streets like Kearney, Marshall, Northrup, Overton, or Lovejoy could have served as well. Jewish entrepreneurs had been moving to this residential neighbourhood since the 1890's, but they were settled among many Gentiles. The buildings in the area, in addition to the private homes, were two- and three-storey apartment houses and, on Marshall Street, there was the sprawling Good Samaritan Hospital. By 1920, according to B'nai B'rith records, 20 members and their families lived on the five blocks of Johnson Street under study. Thirteen, including a father and son, lived in the American Apartments at no. 673, while five lived two blocks to the west in houses between 23rd and 24th Streets, and two others in houses between 24th and 25th Streets. The clustering of so many lodge members and their families in one apartment house makes the residential pattern for Johnson Street exceptionally dense even for that neighbourhood. But it highlights rather than distorts the settlement pattern for Jews in the area because lodge members and their families lived in large numbers in homes and apartments throughout the neighbourhood.

The apartment house clustering, however, may have exaggerated the rapidity of dispersal during the decade and thus underestimated the social ties within the neighbourhood. While B'nai B'rith members had occupied 12 of the 35 units in the American Apartments in 1920, all had moved by 1930. In addition, all had been replaced by Gentiles.[19] Only five of the B'nai B'rith members who had lived in the building in 1920 still resided in Portland in 1930. A jeweller died in 1922, but another jeweller, seven other residents who were primarily employees of clothing concerns, a theatre manager, and an assistant manager, probably left town. The president of Gevurtz Furniture Company moved to the far east side, while two owners of clothing stores, a salesman at M. Seller and another at Blumauer-Frank Drug Company, found lodgings on the west side.

The home-owners were far more stable in their residences. A bachelor

and a salesman at Fleischner-Mayer, a tailor and his wife, and another resident (no occupation listed) and his wife owned their homes at nos. 773, 774, and 775 in Johnson Street. All of them remained at those addresses throughout the decade. The manager of a family business and his wife moved from no. 827 to no. 821 during the decade. The vice-president of the Metropolitan Hat and Cap Manufacturing Company and his wife moved to the near east side, while another resident, whose wife died during the decade, moved closer to his second-hand shop on First Street. In contrast to the apartment house dwellers, none of the home owners was employed outside the city during the decade. Furthermore, five new Jewish families moved to homes in Johnson Street in the 1920's and were living there in 1930. Moses and Herbert Sichel and their wives lived next door to each other. When Moses died, his widow remained in the house. Jacob Mazorosky,

TABLE 5. *Residential Mobility of Selected B'nai B'rith Members, by Occupational Status, 1920–1930, Portland, Oregon**

Type mobility/stability	*Owners and Family large firms*	*Small business/ crafts*[a]	*No Occup.*	*Employees*	*Profess.*[b]	*Widowed*[c]	*Dead*[c]	*Total*
Persons remaining in homes, apartments.	2	10	0	4	4	1	0	21
Persons moving to east side	2	5	0	3	1	0	0	11
Persons moving on west side	3	9	0	1	2	2	0	17
Persons not listed in city directory, 1930	2	9	1	4	3	0	3	22
	9	33	1	12	10	3	3	71

* Residents of Kearney, Marshall, Northrup, and Overton Streets, between 20th and 25th or 26th Streets.
[a] Includes primarily tailors, jewellers, and small clothing store owners.
[b] Includes physicians, attorneys, and an optician.
[c] Determining whether a person had died is somewhat difficult from available records. I have relied on notations of death in the Portland B'nai B'rith membership lists and on notations of widows in the city directories.

who lived a block away in Kearney Street, opened a garage at no. 767 in Johnson Street and his son, a mechanic, rented a house across the street at no. 766. The owner of a furniture and hardware shop in Front Street, and his wife moved to no. 786.[20] The older residents and the newcomers constituted a stable set of families similar in occupation and linked through a lodge (and probably through synagogue affiliation) to help nurture children in a fairly prosperous community.

To reinforce this picture I have assembled the residential trajectory of 71 B'nai B'rith members who lived in 1920 in four nearby streets, Kearney, between 21st and 24th, Marshall between 20th and 26th, and Northrup and Overton between 21st and 26th. Of this group, 17 remained in their homes or apartments over the decade, one widow remained in the family home, and three members moved two blocks or less in the same street. Nineteen members left town and six are known to have died by 1930. Twenty-six moved elsewhere in Portland, as did two widows of members. As can be seen from Table 5, the occupations of those who remained in the neighbourhood were somewhat

similar to those of residents who moved elsewhere in Portland. Perhaps the sample is too small, but it does seem significant that the two widows who moved went only a few blocks away rather than venture to the new subdivisions on the east side. Very likely they preferred to remain in familiar surroundings. Those who could not be found in the city directory for 1930 and who probably had left town were predominantly of lower occupational status, like tailors, salesmen, jewellers, and a few employees of large businesses like Meier and Frank and Fleischner-Mayer. Two others who owned small clothing stores, as well as one member of the Barde Steel Company family, also left Portland.

Jewish businesses, though often changing specific locations, largely remained on the west side in the traditional commercial districts. But where many small shop-keepers before 1910 often lived in the small buildings above or at the back of their shops, only a handful of grocers did so by 1920. A combination of clustering in a few lines of business, the close physical proximity of those businesses, and a residential persistence of about 25 per cent for those remaining in the city (including widows), created a fairly close social network.[21] The continued success of Jewish-owned businesses like Meier and Frank, Lipman, Wolfe & Company, and Fleischner Mayer, and the plethora of clothing, jewellery, shoe, and furniture stores provided employment opportunities for those who did not enter the professions, those who lacked capital to start their own businesses, or those whose businesses had failed.

An examination of a sampling of individual families of B'nai B'rith members indicates that unmarried sons and daughters, and in many cases married siblings, continued to live in the parental household even though they might be gainfully employed. In some cases married brothers lived within a block or two of each other, and married children often lived very near their parents. Clearly, many Jewish families thrived by remaining close to one another, but these ties of sentiment were reinforced by occupational opportunities. With the exception of a handful of employees of large corporations and of the city government, virtually all members of the B'nai B'rith in 1920 and 1930 either owned their businesses, practised a profession that kept them close to the Jewish community, or found work in Jewish-owned businesses.

Finally, I would suggest that an explanation of Jewish occupational success should turn from the search for a unique psychological mystique to an assessment of the infra-structure of Jewish communities. As Richard Sennett has shown in one context, and James Weldon Johnson in another, the intensive nuclear and even the intensive extended family are hardly a Jewish monopoly.[22] The ready-made clothing business, however, with its manufacturing and supply sources, and its second-hand outlets, did provide a unique Jewish network for amassing capital, gaining credit, training entrepreneurs, and providing occupational opportunities over the generations. The wealth accumulated

from small-scale entrepreneurship, with the department stores and a few manufacturing plants at the apex, provided the means for subsequent Jewish occupational mobility. Intensive nurturing in Jewish families found in most cases immediate gratification because the entire adult community encouraged entrepreneurship and those professions which promised job security and a steady income.

There are perhaps two loose ends to this historical argument. First, the job structure of the Jewish community has changed considerably since the 1930's. Many small businesses have been absorbed by large national corporations and the children have often entered professions. Second, not all Jewish children nurtured in intensive families became successful in business or professional careers. Still, I would argue that as late as the 1960's the capital accumulated by earlier generations financed the professional education of the new generation, while the further decline of discrimination against Jews by management of large corporations provided new occupational opportunities.[23] As the national economy has spawned professions which barely existed before the 1960's, young Jewish men and women, subsidized by their entrepreneurial parents who had themselves often inherited family businesses, moved into them.

The destiny of those Jews who were not successful in the entrepreneurial network has been ignored by scholars. My research suggests that many peddlers, tailors, and owners of second-hand stores simply disappeared from Portland during the early twentieth century. We do not know where they went. Letters to the B'nai B'rith officers, notations on membership lists, and sporadic tracings in city directories suggest that many moved to other West Coast cities to seek work or to retire.[24]

NOTES

[1] Gerald S. Berman, 'The Adaptable American Jewish Family: An Inconsistency in Theory', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XVIII, no. 1, June 1976, pp. 9–12.

[2] Berman, op. cit., pp. 5, 12; Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor, A Sociological Study of Religion's Impact on Politics, Economics and Family Life*, New York, 1961, pp. 319–20.

[3] Margaret Walsh, 'Industrial Opportunity on the Urban Frontier: "Rags to Riches" and the Milwaukee Clothing Manufacturers, 1840–1860', *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, vol. LVII, no. 3, Spring, 1974, pp. 175–94; Marc Lee Raphael, 'The Utilization of Public, Local and Federal Sources for Reconstructing American Jewish Local History: The Jews of Columbus, Ohio', *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, vol. LXV, no. 1, September 1975, pp. 10–35; Thomas Kessner, *The Golden Door, Italian and Jewish Immigrant Mobility in New York City, 1880–1915*, New York, 1977, pp. 33, 37, 57–67,

94, 98, 110; Stephen Thernstrom, *The Other Bostonians, Poverty and Progress in the American Metropolis, 1880–1970*, Cambridge, Mass., 1973, pp. 135–42, 160–63, 173; Jonathan D. Sarna, 'The Jewish Immigration to North America: The Canadian Experience (1870–1900)', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XVIII, no. 1, June 1976, pp. 36–37; Albert Vorspan and Lloyd P. Gartner, *History of the Jews of Los Angeles*, San Marino, 1970, pp. 9–11, 34–36. Thernstrom and Kessner provide the most thorough studies to date of intergenerational occupational mobility, but do not discuss how particular firms or business networks promoted mobility.

[4] I. M. Rubinow, 'Economic Conditions of the Jews of Russia', in United States Bureau of Labor, *Bulletin No. 72*, September 1907, pp. 484–574; Chester P. Higby, *The Religious Policy of the Bavarian Government During the Napoleonic Period*, New York, 1919, pp. 315–18; Moses Rischin, *The Promised City, New York's Jews, 1870–1914*, New York, 1964, pp. 19–33. Descriptions of the European background for many of Portland's Jewish pioneers can be found in Joseph Gaston, *Portland, Oregon, Its History and Its Builders*, Portland, 1911, vol. II, pp. 65, 75, 144, 149, 234, 258, 595, 608, 665, 671, 681, 749, and vol. III, pp. 146, 163, 167, 198, 593–95, 667, 759, 773.

[5] Minutes, Portland Lodge 416, B'nai B'rith, 1 October 1891, 16 June 1892, and 21 July 1892, Portland B'nai B'rith Papers, Judah Magnes Museum, Berkeley, California.

[6] *The Scribe*, vol. I, no. 1, 26 September 1919, p. 13; ibid., vol. I, no 2, 10 October 1919, p. 11; ibid., vol. I, no. 11, 5 December 1919, p. 1.

[7] The membership list for 1919–1921 is located in Lodge 65 Records, Portland B'nai B'rith Papers, Magnes Library. The list for 1919–1921 includes many members of the army and navy who paid an initiation fee and one or two dues payments. Other notations indicate men who were included on the rolls but never paid dues.

[8] United States Bureau of the Census, *Religious Bodies: 1936, vol. II* (Washington, 1941), p. 759, lists for 1916 seven synagogues with 1,315 members and for 1926, nine synagogues with 12,000 members. *Polk's Portland City Directory, 1926* (Portland, 1926), pp. 70–71, lists seven synagogues for Portland.

[9] *The Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920, vol. IV, Population, Occupations* (Washington, 1923), p. 204, shows 111,545 males and 106,016 females over 10 years of age, while in the *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910, vol. IV, Population, Occupation* (Washington, 1914), p. 194, there were 105,473 males and 75,180 females in that age group.

[10] *The Scribe*, vol. I, no. 1, 26 September 1919, p. 21.

[11] Manuscript Census Returns, *Tenth Census of the United States, 1880*, Multnomah County, Oregon, Schedule of Population (microfilm copy, Oregon Collection, University of Oregon Library) provide the names from which the population was tabulated. Persons were identified as Jewish (i) if they belonged to the B'nai B'rith; (ii) if they were identified from other sources, such as synagogue records, as Jewish; and (iii) if their surnames and occupation were similar to those of other persons identified as Jewish. The compilation is an approximation, though probably fairly accurate. The pattern of placing sons in businesses rather than sending them to college seems to have occurred in New York City until the end of the First World

War. See Selma C. Berol, 'Education and Economic Mobility: The Jewish Experience in New York City, 1880–1920', *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, vol. LXV, no. 3, March 1976, pp. 257–71.

[12] William Toll, 'Occupation, Fraternalism and Jewish Community Structure on the Urban Frontier: Portland Oregon as a Preliminary Case Study', unpublished manuscript, pp. 5, 7, 9.

[13] Occupational data on these men has been gathered from Portland city directories for 1920, 1921, and 1930.

[14] *The Scribe*, vol. VI, no. 3, 7 April 1922, p. 4, notes that the Portland B'nai B'rith in 1922 had 1,062 members. Ralph Herzog, executive secretary, Portland Lodge No. 65, B'nai B'rith, to Edward Zeisler, executive secretary, San Francisco District Grand Lodge No. 4, B'nai B'rith, 1 September 1931 (Portland B'nai B'rith Papers, Oregon Collection) reports a membership of 479.

[15] U.S. Census, *Religious Bodies, 1936, vol. II*, p. 759.

[16] In 1920, seven synagogues were listed in the city directory, although two Orthodox synagogues had no rabbi. In 1930, eight synagogues were listed in the city directory, but three Orthodox synagogues had the same rabbi, Joseph B. Fain. Rabbi Fain belonged to the lodge, but did not participate actively.

[17] *The Scribe*, vol. VI, no. 5, 21 April 1922, p. 14, notes completion of Mt. Sinai Hospital at the cost of $3.5 million. The argument for establishing additional Jewish hospitals in large cities by the late 1920's turned on the needs of Jewish doctors, rather than on the medical problems of Jewish patients. See Michael Davis to Jacob Billikopf, 26 April 1929, Federation of Jewish Charities Papers, Philadelphia Jewish Archives Center.

[18] Data on Simon's Store was obtained from Portland city directories for 1920–25. Myer Simon had left for San Francisco by 1922, according to a notation on the B'nai B'rith membership list, but he remained in partnership with his brother, who managed the store in Portland, then called Joseph Simon and Brother. Joseph had also left Portland by 1925. Although the Simon brothers had moved, they remained within the Jewish occupational network. According to San Francisco city directories for 1926, 1927, and 1929, Myer Simon became a manufacturer's agent. Joseph opened a wallpaper store in 1926, but the next year became a foreman for Zellerbach Paper Company, one of the largest Jewish-owned manufacturing firms in the city.

[19] Data on the residents of the American Apartments for 1930 are taken from the *Portland City Directory, 1930*, Portland, 1930, p. 1950. In 1930, for the first time, the city directory added a listing for each street, with the occupant of each home and apartment indicated.

[20] ibid., p. 1950.

[21] Howard Chudakoff, 'A New Look at Ethnic Neighborhoods: Residential Dispersion and the Concept of Visibility in a Medium-sized Town', *Journal of American History*, vol. LXI, no. 1, June 1973, p. 81, finds a persistence rate of only 20 per cent for Omaha as a whole between 1880 and 1890, and between 1900 and 1910. In addition, he finds that about 60 per cent of all immigrants from Germany, Italy, Ireland, Czechoslovakia, and Russian Jews had left Omaha after 10 years. For about two-thirds of B'nai B'rith

members to remain in Portland for 10 years, therefore, represents a high persistence rate, which I would suggest can largely be explained by the jobs available through the occupational network.

[22] Richard Sennett, *Families Against the City, Middle Class Homes of Industrial Chicago, 1872–1890* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 98–217. James Weldon Johnson, the black poet, novelist, and executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, in a series of letters to his wife and brother between 1912 and 1914 described an intense and sophisticated family whose mutual support was inspiring. See, for example, J. Rosamond Johnson to James Weldon Johnson, 10 October 1912, and James W. Johnson to Mrs. Johnson, 1 January, 30 January, and 6 February 1914; James Weldon Johnson Papers, Yale University. The same intensive concern for family welfare, education, and mutual support can be found in the papers of black upper-middle class persons like W. E. B. Dubois, Mary and Robert Terrell, Archibald Grimke, Alexander Crummell, and Booker T. Washington.

[23] This point is made, though not documented, in Leonard Dinnerstein and David M. Reimers, *Ethnic Americans, A History of Immigration and Assimilation*, New York, 1975, p. 127. For the best recent account of the ebb and flow of antisemitism in the United States, see John Higham, *Send These to Me, Jews and Other Immigrants in Urban America*, New York, 1975, pp. 116–98.

[24] Alexander Weinstein to Ralph Herzog, 19 September 1931, B'nai B'rith Papers, Oregon Collection. See also M. Sherman to D. Solis Cohen, 20 June 1925, D. Solis Cohen Papers, uncatalogued, Oregon Jewish Oral History and Archive Project, Portland, Oregon.

THE 'JEWISH ETHIC' AND THE 'SPIRIT OF ACHIEVEMENT'

Eva Etzioni-Halevy and Zvi Halevy

A TOPIC which periodically recurs in sociological literature is that of the 'religious' factor and its impact on social behaviour and attitudes.[1] One of the central questions in this context is, How can the outstanding achievements of Jews in modern society be explained? Several alternative theories have been put forward. We shall attempt in this paper to show that some are inadequate, while others (based solely on socio-economic factors) are far from comprehensive. We shall then set out our own interpretation of the phenomenon, an interpretation based on the values and self-images of Jews faced with the various strains and stresses of modern society. We hope that our hypothesis may be found to complement and somewhat reconcile some of the current theories.

Sociological interest in this subject was awakened by the Weber–Sombart controversy on the Jewish contribution to the development of modern capitalism. It is not our intention to revive that argument from the historical point of view. Rather, we wish to re-examine it in a contemporary perspective in the light of empirical evidence. Some features of Jewish activity in modern society to which Sombart called attention have since been noted again and again by modern sociologists: they have produced evidence to show that Jews have in fact been especially prominent in their achievements, attaining disproportionately high levels of education, income, and professional status.

In the United States, Goldstein's examination of the 1957 census data[2] showed that 30 per cent of Jews (as against 14·8 per cent of the general population) had been at university for at least a year; 78·1 per cent of Jewish males (against 58·4 per cent of the general male population) in the labour force were engaged in white-collar occupations; while annual incomes of $10,000 and more were reported by 17 per cent of the male Jews in contrast to 3·9 per cent of white male Protestants and 2·7 per cent of male Catholics. Gockel's research on 13 religious groups in a national sample revealed that Jews were second highest in educational attainment and highest in income and socio-economic status.[3]

The same pattern is also in evidence in England. Ernest Krausz

published in 1964[4] and 1969[5] the results of surveys which showed that the Jewish population was far ahead of the rest of the country in socio-economic achievement: in the professions, 16·2 per cent against 9·5 per cent of the general population; and as employers and managers, 40·8 against 29·9 per cent.

Nove and Newth have noted that in the U.S.S.R. in 1964,[6] 13·5 per cent of the Jewish population were in the professions against 2·4 per cent of the total population. Altschuler, in a paper published in this Journal,[7] noted that in 1970 Jews were over-represented in the Soviet Union both in establishments of higher learning and among the ranks of 'scientific workers': Jews accounted for 6·9 per cent of the total number of such workers, while they constituted only 0·9 per cent of the general population; and 2·3 per cent of all students in institutions of higher learning were Jews.

Other data on Jewish students in various eastern and western European countries in the twenties and thirties[8] showed that even then the percentage of Jewish students invariably exceeded that of Jews in the general population—except, of course, in the cases where there was a numerus clausus in universities.

The Jewish 'spirit of achievement'

It is reasonable to expect one prerequisite for advancement in modern society to be a pronounced spirit of achievement, or achievement orientation. The theoretical emphasis on the importance of such a factor may be traced back to Weber, for his concept of the 'spirit of capitalism' is closely akin to what has been more recently described as a 'spirit of achievement'.[9] Weber stated[10] that it had led not only to the advent of capitalism, but also to personal success and enhanced social and economic status. Some contemporary scholars, notably McClelland[11] and Atkinson and Raynor[12] have further developed the framework for the analysis of the drive for achievement.

There are two main questions. Are Jews in fact motivated by an intensely strong spirit of achievement? And if they are, does that spirit account for their extraordinary position in modern society, extraordinary because out of all proportion to their number in any one country?

Weber had argued[13] that although the ethic of ancient Judaism did contain several elements congruous with modern Western rationalism (the broader framework for the spirit of capitalism), latter-day Jews were the bearers of the spirit of a pariah capitalism which was completely alien to the modern rational spirit. In contrast, Sombart[14] attributed that spirit of capitalism (which he conceived in much the same vein) first and foremost to Jews, who were its bearers long before it had attained a foothold in the wider society in which they lived. He

characterized this Jewish spirit of capitalism as rationalism, individualism, competitiveness, initiative, inventiveness, and profit-seeking—factors subsumed in a general striving for achievement. It is a spirit which could almost be said to have been deliberately designed to facilitate material success in modern society.

Contemporary empirical analysis generally shows that Jews are, in fact, characterized by a particularly pronounced spirit of achievement. Glazer, in his analysis of the values of Jewish immigrants in the United States,[15] emphasized their foresight and sobriety, as well as their willingness to accept 'today's restraints for tomorrow's rewards'—an essential element, of course, in achievement orientation. Most of the various 'quantitative' analyses which dealt with values of achievement, aspirations for future achievement, and achievement motivations (as measured by the test of 'n-Achievement' evolved by McClelland and his associates) have noted that Jews were more strongly committed to achievement than were members of other ethnic groups in the United States.[16] Strodtbeck[17] found that a group of young Jews in New Haven, Connecticut, showed more pronounced values of achievement and stronger achievement motivations than did a comparable group of young Italians. Rosen reached similar conclusions[18] from his research into a sample drawn from 62 communities in the north-eastern United States: when he compared six ethnic groups, he found that Jews came close to being the highest in the 'achievement syndrome'—which included values, aspirations, and motivations for achievement.

Veroff, in his study[19] of a nation-wide sample of white males, found that Jews displayed the strongest achievement motivation; Catholics ranked second; and Protestants, third. He suggested that the unexpected differences between Protestants and Catholics might be due to the fact that Weber's thesis on the Protestant ethic is true only for some types of individual—particularly those with a higher socio-economic status (SES).

Lenski, in his study of a cross-section of the Detroit area population, compared Protestants, Catholics, and Jews on achievement-related values.[20] If we re-analyse his data by combining the major achievement-oriented items, we see that Jews rank highest—93 per cent of Jews as against 84 per cent or less of other groups chose one achievement-oriented item.[21] Furthermore, 42 per cent of Jewish males as against 30 per cent or less of others expressed positive attitudes towards work. However, when Schumann made a similar examination, the above differences had practically disappeared.[22]

In contrast, Featherman, examining longitudinal data on a representative sample of white males in metropolitan areas of the United States, found that Jews surpassed the rest of the population on achievement orientation. For instance, when he looked at intrinsic and extrinsic (instrumental) work orientations, he found that Jews attained a

mean score of 3·50 on the former and 4·17 on the latter, as against mean scores of 2·97 and 3·62 respectively in the total population. With regard to aspirations, a recent national survey by Rhodes and Nam of 14–19-year-old white youngsters showed that Jewish teenagers were more likely than their non-Jewish peers to plan to go to University: 86 per cent of the Jewish group as against 58 per cent or less of other denominations.[23]

It is significant that both in actual achievements and in achievement orientation, Jews were found to surpass members of other groups *even when various factors of social background were controlled.* For instance, the above survey found that among children of Jewish white-collar workers, 94 per cent planned to go to University as compared to 75 per cent of children of non-Jewish white-collar workers; among non-white-collar workers the contrast was even sharper: 72 per cent for the Jewish and 49 per cent for the non-Jewish children.[24] Re-analysing the data, Rhodes and Nam[25] point out that the differences persist even when, in addition to father's occupation, mother's education and family income are taken into account. Rosen[26] had reported that most of the differences in the 'achievement syndrome' found between Jews and various groups of non-Jews diminish somewhat—but do not disappear—when social class is held constant.

The differences between Jews and non-Jews in achievement and achievement orientation also persist *when rural-urban background is controlled for.* Thus Mayer and Sharp[27] demonstrated that Jewish economic and occupational achievements were higher than those of eleven other religious categories, even when rural-urban and foreign-native backgrounds were weighted. Featherman, in a later study, reported that Jews exceeded all other ethno-religious groups examined on achievement orientation, although the research was conducted *in metropolitan areas only.*[28] Similar data are reported by Sklare.[29]

Moreover, Featherman states that Jews had higher educational attainments *even when both rural-urban background and father's occupation were controlled for.* Gockel—comparing 13 religious groups—reports that the income of Jewish heads of households exceeded that of all other religious groups (except Episcopalians) even when the effects of education, occupation, as well as region and city size, were taken into account.[30] In both studies, the introduction of various controls reduced the differences, but did not abolish them. Goldstein reports in the same vein that with both rural/urban background and education held constant, income differentials between Jews and non-Jews decrease. However, the concentration of Jews in white-collar occupations remains far above that of Protestants and Catholics.[31]

All in all it can be seen that whatever the populations compared, whatever the measures used, and whatever the controls introduced, Jews are almost invariably found to surpass other groups in actual

achievements and in achievement orientation. However, it must be noted that some of these results have been criticized. It has been argued that many Jewish youngsters say they plan to go to University simply because it was expected that they should, and not because they have in fact decided to do so. However, even if this were so, *why* is it 'the done thing' for young Jews more so than it is for others? Does it not precisely imply that norms and values of achievement are especially prevalent among Jews?

For his part, Lopreato[32] has claimed that aspirations are affected by past experiences, and that members of ethnic groups which had in the past poorer opportunities, must necessarily show lower aspirations for the future. If we assume this conception to be correct, and apply it to the case of Jews in the United States, it seems that our case is *strengthened* rather than weakened. Surely no one could seriously claim that the early Jewish immigrants to the United States were welcomed by the new host society any more favourably than had been members of some other ethnic groups—with the exception of blacks. If the *present* level of their aspirations reflects experiences of past mobility, surely this is controlled (as we have noted above) by some recent studies in which socio-economic status is held constant and in which Jews still stand out as particularly achievement oriented. Even if in some of the studies in which socio-economic status is held constant the differences between Jews and non-Jews are somewhat reduced, the disparities which remain are still of sufficient magnitude to need accounting for.

This is so especially since these studies frequently compare ethnic groups whose members are relative newcomers to the United States, and whose baseline was therefore relatively low. In studies such as these, controlling for socio-economic status usually means controlling for past mobility as well. Hence, if Jews still stand out as particularly achievement-oriented, that cannot be attributed to more favourable past experiences of this nature. In fact, the differences which persist are all the more impressive if it is taken into account that studies in which socio-economic status is held constant are more likely to 'favour' ethnic groups where only a *minority* has risen to middle-class status and above, as against groups where a majority has done so. It stands to reason that in groups of the former type, those who have risen are exceptionally ambitious when compared to the rank and file members of their own community, whereas in the latter case, those who have risen come closer to being representative of the typical level of ambition prevalent in their group. It is thus a matter of comparing the 'élite' of one group with what comes closer to being the rank and file of another.

Thus, in view of the fact that many more Jews than is the case among most other minority ethnic groups have risen to higher status, the dice seem to be loaded *against* middle-class Jews displaying stronger

ambitions than middle-class members of other, generally less mobile ethnic groups. Hence the evidence which shows the opposite to be the case (even if the magnitude of the difference is not striking) cannot be lightly dismissed.

Queries have also been raised in the case of studies of 'n-Achievement'—specifically as to whether this test in fact measures what it purports to measure. According to McClelland the test measures 'concern with standards of excellence'.[33] Does *concern with excellence* denote a motivation *to achieve excellence*? As Keller and Zavalloni[34] point out, one would have to demonstrate some positive relationship between 'n-Achievement' and the actual aspirations of individuals in order to prove this point—and most studies have failed to do so. However, there has been research work (discussed below) which shows that persons with high 'n-Achievement' were likely to have greater actual achievement than were persons with low 'n-Achievement'. It is difficult to explain such a finding other than by positing some connection between 'n-Achievement' and actual motivation to achieve.

The sampling and interviewing procedures used in a few of these studies have been criticized.[35] But even if there were methodological flaws in some of them, why should this fact have almost invariably biased the studies 'in favour' of Jews? One would expect, on the contrary, such flaws to lead to random results, favouring now one group and now another. If, *in spite* of possible methodological shortcomings, Jews have almost invariably been found to display especially strong achievement motivations, that finding is surely worthy of note.

Moreover, studies of 'n-Achievement' *and* of level of aspiration *and* of achievement values have mostly shown Jews to be especially achievement oriented. So even if each method of study taken separately cannot be wholly relied on, the very fact that the results of various types of studies, using different methods, done on different types of samples of various populations, almost invariably (with one exception, as mentioned) point in the same direction, cannot fail to be impressive. Consequently it is reasonable to conclude that, notwithstanding Weber's analysis, and more closely in line with Sombart's, Jews—at least in the twentieth century—embody the 'spirit of achievement'[36] more than many other religio-ethnic groups do.

Is this pronounced achievement orientation a major explanatory factor of their disproportionate attainments? We believe that it is, although we cannot present conclusive empirical proof. We must bear in mind that, in fact, achievement orientation has been found to be related to actual occupational achievements;[37] to income;[38] and to level of intellectual performance and educational attainments.[39] The latter, in turn, have been found to be related to subsequent occupational achievements,[40] as was to be expected. Moreover, these

correlations were found to persist when social background factors were held constant.

We now come to the heart of the problem: How can this disproportionate Jewish achievement orientation and incessant drive for success be accounted for? And where does it stem from? Many theories have been put forward. We shall consider some of them before putting forward our own.

Weber and Sombart

According to Weber, the ethic of ancient Judaism was unique in the ancient world: it was characterized by relative rationality and lack of emphasis on magic and myth, by an active, this-worldly orientation (in contrast to the passive other-worldly orientation of some eastern religions), by a pronounced orientation towards the future (despite a parallel orientation towards the past), and by a special emphasis on man's control over his fate and environment.[41] Clearly, such an ethic is most favourable for the development of a spirit of achievement. Some empirical analyses have demonstrated that there is a close link between, on the one hand, a sense of control over one's destiny and environment, and an orientation towards the future, and on the other hand, actual attainments.[42] Moreover, these characteristics have been found to be especially applicable to Jews.[43]

Weber perceived only an indirect link between the ancient Jewish ethic and the modern spirit of capitalism, while Sombart argued that the connection was far closer. In contrast to Weber, he looked mainly at later, post-prophetic developments of the Jewish ethic; he saw it as characterized by an emphasis on inner-worldliness, self-control, sobriety, moderation, and restraint; and as encouraging the re-channelling of impulses and emotions into a religiously approved vein—all of which characteristics served to deflect enormous energies into economic activity. He commented:[44]

> What in reality is the idea of making profit, what is economic rationalism, but the application to economic activities of the rules by which the Jewish religion shaped Jewish life? . . . And so the rationalization of Jewish life by the Jewish religion, if it did not actually produce the Jewish capacity for capitalism, certainly increased and heightened it.

We agree with Hoselitz[45] that, although Sombart's interpretation is somewhat biased, some aspects of it are valid.

The marginality theory

This theory, proposed by Veblen in 1934, holds that it is the marginality of modern emancipated Jews which has enabled them to make such outstanding contributions in the scientific and intellectual fields.

They have broken with their religious heritage, but they have not yet been fully integrated into any other cultural tradition; and so they are outsiders twice over. Veblen argues that it is that uneasy position between different cultures which has given Jews a sceptical and original point of view, which in turn has led them to extraordinary success. We believe that Veblen's theory could usefully be stretched to apply also to Jewish economic achievements, for the same reason that he saw it as conducive to scientific and intellectual attainments.

Of course, it is not only the Jews but also the various other immigrant groups in the United States who have been conceived of as marginal. Both Park[46] and Stonequist[47] have applied the concept of marginality not only to Jews but to immigrants in general, while Kramer[48] in her analysis of minority groups in the United States points out that the marginality pattern applies to a variety of them. These groups, as Glazer and Moynihan[49] emphasize, have not completed the process of acculturation and thus continue to live on the fringes of two cultural traditions. Since marginality is not unique to Jews, it clearly cannot serve as the sole or even as the principal explanation of Jewish contribution and success, although it may constitute one of several explanations.

The 'veneration for learning' theory

Perhaps the best known and most popular theory is the one which claims that Jews have been overwhelmingly successful in modern society because they have had over several centuries a strong veneration for learning. Traditionally, that was centred on religious scholarship, but emancipated Jews transferred their interest to the secular sphere; and so it was that they became exceptionally successful in modern education and in the liberal professions.

The theory is primarily associated with Zborowski; but it has also been put forward by many others,[50] and has been widely accepted. However, Slater has sharply criticized it, arguing convincingly that there are basic differences between traditional Jewish scholarship and modern education.[51] Nevertheless, it is well worth wondering whether, despite such differences, the Jewish positive attitude to learning and to the virtues of long hours of study may not have led them to their undoubted success in academic pursuits. Admittedly, Jews have also excelled in business enterprise; but that does not necessarily invalidate the 'veneration for learning' theory. It simply shows that Jews want to have success and are prepared to work hard for it—whether it be success in the intellectual field or in the economic. In one way or another, they have become remarkably mobile in an upwards direction. What else may have led them to have this intense drive for achievement?

The 'urban background' theory

Many scholars—Lestschinsky,[52] Wirth,[53] Simpson and Yinger,[54] and Slater[55]—have suggested that it is the fact that Jews have on the whole lived for generations in an urban setting which has led to their extraordinary achievements. But, if we take the case of the Russian Jewish immigrants who came to the United States, we see that most of them had not come from cities—nor had they been descended from city dwellers. Mahler has shown[56] that in the latter part of the eighteenth century (according to the official census of 1764), at least one third of all the Jews of Poland lived in villages; while the majority of the rest lived in small towns of the *shtetl* variety. These Polish Jews were, to a large extent, the ancestors of the Russian Jews who came later to the United States.

The Jews of Russia were urbanized only towards the end of the nineteenth century; according to Lestschinsky[57] there were less than 100,000 Jews in Russian cities in 1855; by 1897 there were more than 400,000; while in 1910 they had exceeded the half million mark. The overwhelming majority of Russian Jewish immigrants came to the United States before the First World War;[58] and it seems almost certain, therefore, that most of them were not long-established urban residents.

The Russian official census of 1897 shows that 51 per cent of Jews then lived in either very small towns or in villages: 33 per cent in the former, and the remainder in the latter. Of the about 49 per cent who were classified as living in urban areas, a further examination of the data reveals that 10·23 per cent of them lived in fact in urban centres which had fewer than ten thousand inhabitants. Mahler has commented that although these small centres were nominally urban, they resembled both economically and in outer appearance villages rather than towns.[59]

As for Germany, the situation is even more clear-cut than it is for Russia: the Jewish immigrants who came to the United States left their native shores in the third quarter of the nineteenth century; and German Jewish urbanization occurred largely after 1871—by which time the influx of Jewish/German immigrants to America had begun to slacken. In 1871, only 16·8 per cent of all German Jews lived in the seven largest cities: Berlin, Frankfurt, Breslau, Hamburg, Cologne, Leipzig, and Munich. By 1925, just over half (50·3 per cent) of German Jewry lived in those centres.[60] Moreover, contemporary studies have shown that even when the urban/rural factor is held constant, Jews surpass other ethnic groups both in commitment to achievement, and in actual attainment.[61]

We must consider, therefore, whether the 'urban background' theory, if coupled with the 'middle-class background' theory, may prove more convincing.

The 'middle-class background' theory

Some have stated[62] that Jewish success can be explained on the grounds that, although Jewish immigrants were primarily engaged as wage-earning labourers when they first came to America, they had a middle-class background in their countries of origin. Slater has said:[63]

> . . . a Jewish mother wants her son to be a doctor only because she is an unusually ambitious middle class urbanite. Moreover, her status stems from her husband's pre-adapted business skills brought into an expanded economy.

Glazer had noted more than a decade earlier:[64]

> . . . the explanation of the Jewish success in America is that the Jews, far more than any other group, were engaged for generations in the middle class occupations of buying and selling . . . Now the special occupations of the middle class . . . are associated with a whole complex of habits. Primarily these are the habits of care and foresight.

There are several elements in these two quotations: first, it is said that Jews have been engaged for generations in middle-class occupations, especially buying and selling; second, that they have acquired special skills; and third, that they acquired some positive attitudes—ambition and foresight—all of which was most conducive to success in modern society. Let us now examine these elements, taking as the main example the case of the Russian Jewish immigrants in the United States.

True, the data reveal that a majority of Polish Jews in the latter half of the eighteenth century were engaged in occupations which involved 'buying and selling' at least to some extent[65]—although these occupations did not provide them with more than the bare minimum for survival.[66] But towards the end of the nineteenth century in Russia, only about a third of the Jews were engaged in trade (see Table 1). Moreover, it is important to differentiate between the Jews who remained in Russia and those who came to the United States.

The table shows clearly that while a third of the Jews in Russia were engaged in trade, only less than eight per cent of the Jewish immigrants to the United States had been so engaged before their immigration. (Only slightly more than that percentage had been engaged in both trade and transport.) Moreover, while only slightly more than a third of Russian Jews as a whole were employed as industrial workers and artisans, almost two thirds of the immigrants had been so occupied. Admittedly artisans often sell their products directly, but they are mainly artisans and not traders. May these artisans be regarded as imbued with middle-class values? Rubinow said at the time that a 'vast number of these artisans seem to have considerable difficulty in earning the necessary minimum'.[67]

As for the thesis that the Jews' middle-class occupations led to a middle-class mentality, namely ambition and foresight, how could small-scale traders and peddlers, or artisans, be said to have possessed the aptitudes which probably do go with large or medium scale enterprise in commerce and manufacture? Is it not at least as likely that the general poverty and miserable living conditions of peddlers and artisans hardly allowed them to develop a disciplined orientation towards the future, such as the planning and the postponing of immediate gratification for the sake of future success?

When Alston examined a national sample of the adult white population of the United States in the years 1939–69, he found that not only did Jews rank higher than Gentiles in the fields of education and gainful employment, but that the differences between the two groups increased significantly in the course of those three decades. Thus, while

TABLE I. *Occupations of Jews in Russia at the close of the nineteenth century and occupations of Russian Jewish immigrants upon entry into the United States during the years 1901–1906*

	% *Jews in Russia**	% *Jewish Immigrants to the United States***
Industrial workers and artisans	37·9	63
Personal services	19·4	25·2
Trade and transportation[18]	34·8	8·3
Agriculture	2·9	1·8
Professions	5	1·3

* Data from the 1897 census in Russia
**Data from I. M. Rubinow, 'Economic Condition of the Jews in Russia', *United States Bureau of Labor Bulletin*, no. 72, 1907, pp. 497–506.

among Protestants the highest ranking occupational group (upper white collar) showed an increase of three per cent, and among Catholics, of 11 per cent, in the case of Jews there was an increase of no less than 23 per cent. As for education, for Protestants there was an increase of one per cent in those who had been to college for at least one year, for Catholics it was five per cent, while in the case of Jews the comparable percentage was 28.[68]

If the decisive factor in the achievement of Jews had been their urban background at the end of the nineteenth century or before the First World War, then one would have expected that as each generation of Jewish and Gentile immigrants became more removed from its pre-American environment, there would have been a gradual decrease of the differences between them. Yet precisely the opposite was the case.

Moreover, when we look at Japanese immigrants in the United States, we see that two thirds had peasant origins—and, further, that they had been landless agricultural labourers.[69] Some decades later,

Japanese-Americans were characterized by extraordinarily high educational and occupational success—albeit falling short of the Jewish achievement.

Similarly, the Chinese of South-east Asia, more than ten million in number, were peasants by origin;[70] but within a few decades they had become entrepreneurs and had entered the liberal professions.[71] And that success has been explained by the strong values of achievement which characterized them.[72]

The Jewish Ethic: self-image and sense of obligation

The basic problem in the 'urban' and 'middle class' background theories is that they attempt to explain Jewish behaviour, attitudes, and ambitions solely on the basis of socio-economic factors; that framework is rather limited and indeed is almost 'deterministic'.

Our premise is that while socio-economic background cannot—and should not—be ruled out as an explanatory factor, the social behaviour and attitudes of a people might in some cases be better explained by their basic beliefs and values, which have their own internal dynamics of development, and which cannot always be traced back automatically to a socio-economic situation. We further believe that some of the most significant influences on social action are indirect. In many cases, a person's values influence his actions not because they are a basis for explicit behavioural rules, but rather because they influence the manner of interpreting his situation and also his self-image. Self-image in turn influences self-expectations, which finally influence actions.

The *complementary* explanation which we therefore suggest for the extraordinary Jewish drive for achievement is based not on the Jews' 'objective' situation, but on some of the values, interpretations, and self-images with which they have confronted their situation and by means of which they have tried to make sense of their own position. It is here that we must now bring into the discussion a factor not mentioned previously in this paper: the concept of the Chosen People—a concept modified by its translation from the collective religious sphere into the individual secular domain.

It is, of course, one of the central themes of Judaism, and permeates it from the Pentateuch, the Prophets, and the Psalms, to Talmudic and rabbinical literature, liturgy,[73] Kabbalah, some medieval poetry, and parts of modern Jewish philosophy.[74] It would therefore be astonishing if the idea of being Chosen had not left its mark on Jewish mentality.

This element of Judaism may be unattractive for those who boast of modern universalistic values; and if viewed from an unfavourable angle, it can be argued that it is a quasi-racist dogma. It is probably no longer acceptable in its original version to most non-orthodox,

modern Jews. In a modified, less obvious, and less explicit form, however, it probably continues to exert a discernible influence on the Jewish self-image, and on the Jews' conception of their place in the modern world.

It must be noted that in the sources the idea of chosenness is invariably linked with obligations and duties, the maintenance of a specially high standard of 'worthiness', and most important, the acceptance of the Torah—the Law—in turn associated with perpetual ('day and night') learning.[75] Originally, both the obligations and the learning were strictly of a religio-ethical nature. However, since the idea was so basic and central to Judaism, in the course of time it probably pervaded the entire Jewish collective as well as individual existence—for, as Kohler states, 'Judaism does not separate religion from life . . .'[76]

It might be argued that the concept of being chosen, like all other facets of the same 'Jewish Ethic', holds good for religious Jews only. But, as Weber has shown, an ethos may continue to exert its influence on mentality and behaviour, although perhaps in a modified form, even when it has lost part or all of its religious basis. Thus, when the orthodox faith in divine election, which commanded the Jewish people to maintain standards of special worth and 'holiness' no longer held sway for a large part of the Jewish community, the concept nevertheless evolved into one in which the emphasis was on self-commitment and obligation to prove oneself by adhering to such standards. As Ben Gurion once said, 'It is not God who chose Israel, but Israel who chose God.'

It seems to us that this sense of being chosen, even when its supernatural basis has largely lost appeal, this commitment to excel, even when no longer religiously imposed, is highly significant in Jewish life because it is by means of that self-image and self-expectation that Jews try to define their own place in a non-Jewish world. In fact, it may even be claimed that the loss of the religious basis may have served to *strengthen* the secular implications of the ethic. For while the orthodox Jew proves himself worthy first and foremost by fulfilling religio-ethical obligations, the non-orthodox person—who has nevertheless been brought up on these precepts, in their original or modified form—proves himself mainly by individual achievements in the secular world.

This pressure is reminiscent of, and yet differs from, the pressure on the Calvinist. According to Weber,[77] the latter was in constant anxiety about whether he had been born one of the elected. But while the Calvinist was concerned about proving in this world that he was among those who would find salvation in the next world, the Jew must show this-worldly worth according to the standards of merit prevalent in his own world. However, both Jew and Calvinist have in common this inner drive or compulsion to prove oneself. Furthermore, in contrast

to the bearer of the Protestant ethic, the Jew in the Diaspora is often an outsider in the wider society, which in many cases considers him unfavourably; there is therefore a conflict between the self-image in which he was brought up and the image which is reflected back to him by the host society—a conflict which may prompt him to even greater efforts in order to prove to himself and to others that he is a superior person and to gain approval from that society. Talcott Parsons has said:[78]

> . . . To be a select people, to feel destined to occupy the place of honor among nations, and at the same time to be condemned to a humble, often humiliating place, could not but create a deep-seated ambivalence of attitudes, a curious combination of humility and pride, which, in the more extreme cases, resulted in arrogance. Indeed, the pride and honor of being a Jew were in a sense the principal source of self-respect; but this self-respect could never be clothed in the accepted symbols of glory and greatness, as in the case of other peoples. It is not surprising therefore, that the Jews have often displayed a rather extreme sensitiveness in matters touching self-respect and status.

Conclusion

We have no way of proving empirically that our analysis is valid; we simply believe that it may merit further investigation. Such an investigation is feasible, although it may have to proceed in many tentative directions.

Our theory at least finds some support in the often reported findings that scholastic achievement is usually linked with the pupil's self-image and sense of obligation,[79] to a greater extent than most other variables, including family background. One could therefore check our theory by testing Jewish and Gentile pupils to discover whether when actual ability is held constant any differences in self-image between the two groups are maintained. A further test would be the evaluation of replies by the two groups to the question, 'How can a young person prove his worth to himself and to others?' If the Jews more often than others said that it would be by marked scholastic, occupational, or economic achievements, our hypothesis would be strengthened. It would acquire even more weight, of course, if the Jewish group commented that it was their *duty* to succeed in that aim, rather than if they simply stated that they wished to succeed. Finally, there could be a test administered to Jews only, with actual mental ability held constant, to see whether a sense of duty to achieve was positively correlated with awareness and sensitivity to various facets of the problem of Jewishness in a non-Jewish host society.

Of course, we do not claim that our hypothesis is one which can serve as the sole way of explaining why there is such a marked Jewish 'spirit of achievement'—but only that it gives a further dimension to

the other theories which we have examined here. Weber stressed the rational, active orientation and sense of control over the environment in ancient Judaism, while Sombart perceived similar orientations also in latter-day Judaism. That peculiar facet of the Jewish ethic, together with the self-image of special worth derived from the concept of being one of the Chosen People, are precisely two of the three attitudinal variables which Coleman found[80] to be most strongly related to scholastic achievement. That is why we believe that the *combination* of these two traits accounts for much of the outstanding Jewish striving and achievement. There is, further, the traditional veneration for learning (which was discussed earlier in this paper) which must also play a great part in intensifying standards of stringent self-expectation.

Finally, even the marginality theory strengthens our hypothesis: that marginality may well have endowed modern Jews with an 'original' and objective turn of mind, which, when combined with a high self-regard in one social setting, might well have given them the impetus to strive for, and attain a high degree of esteem in another social setting, which until then had failed to appreciate their merit.

NOTES

[1] See, for example, Miriam K. Slater, 'My Son the Doctor: Aspects of Mobility among American Jews', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 34, no. 3, June 1969; S. Goldstein, 'Socio-Economic Differentials Among Religious Groups in the United States', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 74, no. 6, May 1969; G. I. Gockel, 'Income and Religious Affiliation: A Regression Analysis', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 74, no. 6, May 1969; L. A. Rhodes and C. B. Nam, 'The Religious Context of Educational Expectations', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 35, no. 2, April 1970; D. L. Featherman, 'The Socio-Economic Achievement of White Religio-Ethnic Subgroups: Social and Psychological Explanations', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 36, no. 2, April 1971.

[2] Goldstein, ibid.

[3] Gockel, op. cit. Similar data have been obtained from surveys conducted in 1953 and 1955. See Donald J. Bogue, *The Population of the United States*, Glencoe, Ill., 1959; see also Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Americans*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968.

[4] E. Krausz, 'The Economic and Social Structure of Anglo-Jewry', in Julius Gould and Shaul Esh, eds., *Jewish Life in Modern Britain*, London, 1964.

[5] E. Krausz, 'The Edgware Survey: Occupation and Social Class', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 11, no. 1, June 1969.

[6] A. Nove and J. A. Newth, 'The Jewish Population: Demographic Trends and Occupational Patterns', in Lionel Kochan, ed., *The Jews in Soviet Russia Since 1917*, London, 1970.

[7] M. Altschuler, 'The Jews in the Scientific Elite of the Soviet Union', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 15, no. 1, June 1973.

[8] *Yiddische Ekonomik* (Warsaw-Vilna), I-1937, II-1938, III-1939.

[9] Thus, describing the person embodying the spirit of capitalism, Weber writes: 'He gets nothing out of his wealth for himself except the irrational sense of having done his job well' (Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* translated by Talcott Parsons, New York, 1958, p. 71). 'This', writes McClelland 'is exactly how we define the achievement motive . . .' And again, '. . . Weber's description of the kind of personality type which the Protestant Reformation produced is startlingly similar to the picture we have drawn of a person with high achievement motivation'. See David McClelland, *The Achieving Society*, Princeton, N.J., 1961, p. 47.

[10] Weber, op. cit., p. 68.

[11] McClelland, op. cit.

[12] John W. Atkinson and Joel O. Raynor, *Motivation and Achievement*. Washington D.C., 1974.

[13] Weber, op. cit., pp. 165–66, 180.

[14] Werner Sombart, *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*, translated by M. Epstein, Glencoe, Ill., 1951, pp. 115–59.

[15] N. Glazer, 'The American Jew and the Attainment of Middle Class Rank: Some Trends and Explanations', in Marshall Sklare, ed., *The Jews*, New York, 1958, p. 144.

[16] We could not locate any studies measuring Jewish achievement orientations outside the United States.

[17] F. L. Strodtbeck, 'Family Interaction, Values and Achievement', in David McClelland *et al.*, *Talent and Society*, Princeton, N.J., 1958.

[18] B. C. Rosen, 'Race, Ethnicity and the Achievement Syndrome', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 24, no. 1, February 1959.

[19] J. Veroff, *et al.*, 'Achievement Motivation and Religious Background', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 27, no. 2, April 1962.

[20] Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor*, Garden City, N.Y., 1963.

[21] This last datum was not presented in this form by Lenski himself, but was computed from his data as presented on p. 91.

[22] H. Schumann, 'The Religious Factor in Detroit: Review, Replication and Reanalysis', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 36, no. 1, February 1971.

[23] See Featherman, op. cit.; and L. A. Rhodes and C. B. Nam, op. cit.

[24] Charles B. Nam *et al.*, *Study of Inequality of Educational Opportunities*, Tallahassee, 1965–67, tables 21, 30.

[25] See Rhodes and Nam, op. cit.

[26] See Rosen, op. cit.

[27] A. J. Mayer and H. Sharp, 'Religious Preference and Worldly Success', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 27, no. 2, April 1962.

[28] See Featherman, op. cit.

[29] Marshall Sklare, *America's Jews*, New York, 1971.

[30] See Gockel, op. cit.

[31] See Goldstein, op. cit.

[32] Joseph Lopreato, *Italian Americans*, New York, 1970.

[33] See McClelland, op. cit., p. 103.

[34] S. Keller and M. Zavalloni, 'Ambition and Social Class: A Respecification', *Social Forces*, vol. 43, no. 1, October 1964.

[35] See Lopreato, op. cit., pp. 149–50.

[36] Which, as we have seen, is closely akin to what Weber termed the spirit of capitalism.

[37] See H. J. Crockett Jr., 'The Achievement Motive and Differential Occupational Mobility in the United States', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 27, no. 2, April 1962; and H. J. Crockett Jr., 'Social Class, Education and Motive to Achieve in Differential Occupational Mobility', in B. C. Rosen *et al.*, eds., *Achievement in American Society*, Cambridge, Mass., 1969.

[38] J. N. Morgan, 'The Achievement Motive and Economic Behavior', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. 12, no. 3, April 1964.

[39] See, for example, B. C. Rosen, 'The Achievement Syndrome: A Psychocultural Dimension of Social Stratification', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 21, no. 2, April 1956; McClelland, op. cit., Heinz Heckhausen, *The Anatomy of Achievement Motivation*, New York, 1967; D. L. Featherman, 'Achievement Orientation and Socio-Economic Career Attainments', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 37, no. 2, April 1972; J. W. Atkinson, 'Motivational Determinants of Intellective Performance and Cumulative Achievement', in Atkinson and Raynor, op. cit.

[40] Peter M. Blau and Otis D. Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure*, New York, 1967, pp. 167–77; Featherman, 'Achievement Orientation . . . ', op. cit., and J. Kelley, 'Causal Chain Models for the Socio-Economic Career', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 38, no. 4, August 1973.

[41] Max Weber, *Ancient Judaism*, translated and edited by Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale, Glencoe, Ill., 1952, pp. 219–55, 297–321.

[42] See Strodtbeck, op. cit., and James S. Coleman *et al.*, *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, Washington, 1966.

[43] See Glazer, op. cit.; Strodtbeck, op. cit.; and Rosen, 'Race Ethnicity . . .'.

[44] See Sombart, op. cit., p. 238.

[45] In his introduction to Sombart, op. cit., p. xxviii.

[46] R. E. Park, 'Human Migration and the Marginal Man', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 33, no. 6, May 1928.

[47] Everett V. Stonequist, *The Marginal Man*, New York, 1937.

[48] Judith R. Kramer, *The American Minority Community*, New York, 1970.

[49] Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, Cambridge, Mass., 1963.

[50] M. Zborowski, 'The Place of Book-Learning in Traditional Jewish Culture', in Margaret Mead and Martha Wolfenstein, eds., *Childhood in Contemporary Cultures*, Chicago, 1955; T. Parsons, 'The Sociology of Modern Anti-Semitism', in Isacque Graeber and Steuart H. Britt, eds., *Jews in a Gentile World*, New York, 1942; Strodtbeck, op. cit.; Glazer, op. cit.; Will Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew*, Garden City, N.Y., 1960, pp. 9–10; Goldstein and Goldscheider, op. cit., p. 64; and Sklare, *America's Jews*, op. cit., p. 58.

[51] See Slater, op. cit.

[52] J. Lestschinsky, 'The Position of the Jews in the Economic Life of America', in I. Graeber and S. H. Britt, eds., op. cit.

[53] L. Wirth, 'Education for Survival: The Jews', in Charles S. Johnson, ed., *Education and the Cultural Process*, Westport, Conn., 1943.

[54] George B. Simpson and J. Milton Yinger, *Racial and Cultural Minorities*, New York, 1958.

[55] See Slater, op. cit.

[56] Raphael Mahler, *Yidn in Amoilikn Poiln in Licht fun Tziffern*, Warsaw, 1958 and Raphael Mahler, *Tabelen Beylage zum Buch Yidn in Amoilikn Poiln in Licht fun Tziffern*, Warsaw, 1958.

[57] Jacob Lestschinsky, *Das Yiddisch Volk in Tziffern*, Berlin, 1922, p. 71.

[58] Jacob Lestschinsky, *Jewish Migration for the Past Hundred Years*, New York, 1944, p. 14.

[59] Raphael Mahler, *History of the Jewish People in Modern Times* (Hebrew), vol. I, Book 2, Merhavia, 1954, p. 269.

[60] Jacob Lestschinsky, *The Economic Fate of the Jews in Germany* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1963, pp. 53–55.

[61] See for instance Featherman, 'The Socio-Economic Achievement . . .', op. cit.

[62] See for instance Simpson and Yinger, op. cit., p. 563; Glazer, op. cit., p. 142; Herberg, op. cit., p. 10; and Slater, op. cit.

[63] Slater, op. cit., p. 361.

[64] Glazer, op. cit., pp. 142–43.

[65] Data from the 1764 Census (reported by Mahler in *Yidn in Amoilikn Poiln* . . . and in *History of the Jewish People* . . .) show that the Jews of Poland at that period were in three major occupational groups: (1) innkeepers, tavern owners, lessees, and winemakers; (2) artisans and dairymen; (3) traders, shopkeepers, and peddlers.

[66] See Mahler, *History of the Jewish People* . . . , p. 272 and Mahler, *Yidn in Amoilikn Poiln* . . . , p. 102.

[67] I. M. Rubinow, 'Economic Condition of the Jews in Russia', *United States Bureau of Labor Bulletin*, no. 72, Washington, 1907, p. 529.

[68] J. P. Alston, 'Aggregate Social Mobility Among Major Protestant Denominations and Major Religious Groups, 1939–1969', *Sociological Analysis*, vol. 34, no. 3, Fall 1973.

[69] William Petersen, *Japanese Americans*, New York, 1971, pp. 113–22.

[70] See William G. Skinner, *Chinese Society in Thailand*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1957, pp. 92–93.

[71] Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, London, 1965.

[72] See Skinner, op. cit., pp. 92–94.

[73] The theme of 'election' recurs perpetually in the prayerbook and appears several times in every prayer service, including the three daily required services.

[74] See, for instance, Solomon Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, New York, 1909.

[75] *Joshuah*, 1:8.

[76] K. Kohler, *Jewish Theology*, New York, 1928, p. 326.

[77] Weber, *The Protestant Ethic* . . . , pp. 110–15.

[78] Parsons, op. cit., p. 107.

[79] See for instance Coleman, op. cit., pp. 319–25.

[80] ibid.

WHO ARE THE ISRAELI ELITES?

Alex Weingrod and Michael Gurevitch

STUDIES of national élites have a certain popularity and fascination, Stories and gossip about those in the 'public eye' arouse natural curiosity, and hence constitute an obvious preoccupation of the media. At another level, and for somewhat different reasons, élites have long been the subject of study by social scientists.

Israel is certainly no exception. The press regularly reports upon the activities of leading and powerful figures, and a number of books and articles have also described various features of the Israeli élite.[1] One consequence of this is that, over the years, a kind of mythology or received wisdom has emerged; for example, it has long been held that the Israeli political élites are an aged group (a 'political gerontocracy'), and that the élite as a whole is mainly composed of persons with European backgrounds. To cite other examples, the claim has often been made that the élites are mainly self-made individuals who have a minimum of formal education, and that the Israeli army and some youth movements served as their training grounds.[2] The validity of these assumptions is, of course, open to question and study. However, these stereotypes must be seriously considered, since people tend to respond to them as if they were valid. Clarifying the composition of the élite is, therefore, an important issue.

What are, in fact, the social characteristics of persons who can be defined as members of the Israeli national élite? This article presents the results of a study of the social backgrounds of members of that group. The data were collected as part of a much wider study of acquaintanceship networks among the élites.[3] In contrast with earlier research which concentrated almost entirely upon political élites, our study includes persons drawn from different sectors: political, administrative, economic, academic, professional, and artistic-cultural. It is important to underscore this point; our range is wider than that of most previous studies, and allows therefore for comparisons between the various élite sectors.

The data were assembled in two different ways. First, questionnaires were posted to a list of 1,765 élite members, 782 of whom responded by filling out biographical information. Published sources (such as *Who's Who in Israel*) provided information on an additional

228 persons. Our data are therefore based upon a total of 1,010 persons defined as members of the Israeli national élite. The data were collected during 1972.

It is necessary first to describe briefly how the élite population was made up. Following Lipset and Solari, we defined members of that group as persons who hold 'those positions in society which are at the summits of the key social structures.'[4] The task of identifying these individuals required decisions regarding the *sectors* to be included as well as the specific *positions* in each of the élite areas. As noted above, six occupational sectors were included—political, administrative, economic, academic, professional, and artistic-cultural. Various sub-sectors were identified in each of these areas, and all those occupying positions in each of the sub-sectors were included. For example, the political élite includes all members of the Seventh Knesset, members of the central committees of the large political parties, the mayors of the main cities, and so forth. The administrative élite includes the top echelons in each government ministry, including the army; the economic élite includes, among others, the managing directors of large industrial enterprises, as well as the major banks and other large commercial companies; the academic élite is made up of all full Professors in Israeli universities; the professions are represented by the executive committees of the various Guilds and Associations; and the artistic-cultural élite includes well-known impresarios and entrepreneurs, the top echelons of the writers' and actors' associations, as well as a number of selected prominent artists who do not hold official positions. In brief, the population was constructed by including those persons who hold positions 'at the summits' in each of the six sectors.[5]

For each élite member on our list the following biographical information was sought: country of origin; father's and mother's country of origin (for those born in Palestine-Israel); year of immigration to Palestine-Israel (for those born abroad); level of formal education; name of high school attended for those educated in Palestine or Israel; current place of residence; and, for those who grew up in Palestine or Israel, their place of residence between the ages of six and eighteen. These data provide the basis for the analysis which follows.

The Findings

Age

As was noted earlier, the common assumption has been that the Israeli political élite is an aged group, and that there is a high proportion of 'ancients' throughout the higher circles. Table 1 below summarizes the élite age distribution by occupational sector.

Age, like beauty, is 'in the eye of the beholder': is one 'old' or 'still

young' at the age of fifty? It is usual for élites to be at least moderately advanced in age—time is required, after all, in order to gain entry into the ruling groups. Table 1 shows that Israeli élites are not a particularly aged group; on the contrary, the distribution shows a strong representation of younger persons. For example, the largest category is the 39–50-year-old group, while the smallest consists of 'ancients' who are 74 and older. To put it differently: taking age fifty as a midpoint, nearly half the élites (46·3 per cent) are below that age, while slightly more than half (52·2 per cent) are older.

Our data are similar to those collected in other industrial nations. For example, élite studies in Germany show that while the proportion over the age of seventy is higher in Israel (2·4 per cent in Germany,

TABLE 1. *Age Distribution, by sector, in percentages*

Age	*Sector*						
	Political	*Admin.*	*Economic*	*Academic*	*Professional*	*Artistic-Cultural*	*Total*
26–38	9·0	9·5	8·2	4·0	9·8	14·9	8·4
39–50	28·4	41·3	28·4	46·6	45·9	37·8	37·9
51–62	38·0	36·0	38·4	35·4	27·9	24·3	35·2
63–74	18·7	10·2	18·0	12·1	9·8	18·9	14·2
74+	2·8	2·0	6·0	0·4	3·3	4·0	2·8
No data	2·8	1·0	1·0	1·3	3·3	0·0	1·5
Total	99·7	100·0	100·0	99·8	100·0	99·9	100·0

7·0 per cent in Israel), the overall contour of the élite age distribution is generally comparable.[6]

On the other hand, Table 1 also shows that in three of the élite segments (politics, economics, and the arts) almost one fourth are over the age of sixty-three, while among the other three (administrators, academics, and professionals) the proportion drops to about 12 per cent. Indeed, administrators, academics, and professionals are mainly concentrated within the 39–50 age category, while politicians and economic leaders are strongly represented in the 51–62 age group. Interestingly, the age structure of the artistic-cultural sector shows a bimodal distribution—they are well represented both in the youngest and the oldest age groups.

How can these differences be explained? Several hypotheses can be suggested. First, politics has been a relatively 'closed' area in the sense that no major new political institutions were created in the past several decades, while in contrast, the bureaucracies and the universities have had over the years an explosive growth in personnel. It is therefore not surprising to find a higher proportion of younger persons in these latter areas. Second, it is likely that in both politics and economics

experience gained over time counts heavily, and a prolonged period of socialization is therefore required before an élite position is reached; in contrast, bureaucratic and professional positions may depend more upon technical training and excellence than upon experience, and consequently qualified persons may enter these élites at a comparatively early age. Third, in the case of politicians an advanced age may be associated with those particular qualities (dependability, loyalty, conservatism, sobriety) that many Israelis deem necessary for persons who hold those key roles.

Country of Origin

As with age distribution, the country of origin of élite members has aroused widespread public interest. Since Israel is a nation of immigrants, there is great concern about the relative representation of the different immigrant-ethnic groups within the élite. (The late Prime Minister Ben Gurion often remarked upon the need for 'Yemenite pilots' or a 'Yemenite general'.) The view is widely held that those whose origins are in eastern and central Europe dominate the élite,

TABLE 2. *Country of Origin, by sector, in percentages*

Country	*Sector*						
	Political	*Admin.*	*Economic*	*Academic*	*Professional*	*Artistic-Cultural*	*Total*
Israel	24·4	31·4	27·9	17·9	32·8	32·4	26·7
Central and E. Europe	48·3	38·9	41·5	28·7	50·8	40·5	39·6
W. Europe	11·9	20·1	18·0	26·0	6·6	21·6	18·9
English-speaking	1·7	3·4	5·5	17·9	6·6	1·4	6·7
Middle East, N. Africa	8·5	2·7	1·6	2·2	1·6	0·0	3·2
Others*	2·8	2·7	4·9	4·9	1·6	0·0	3·4
No data	2·3	0·7	0·6	2·2	0·0	4·0	1·5
Total	99·9	99·9	100·0	99·8	100·0	99·9	100·0

*includes Southern Europe (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, and Spain), the Far East, and Latin America.

while those from the Middle East and North Africa (who now constitute the majority of the population) are poorly represented. Table 2 summarizes our data on country of origin.

Three broad conclusions can be drawn from this Table. First, it is clear that the central and eastern Europeans are the predominant group in the élite population: they constitute practically 40 per cent of the total, and they are also the largest segment in each of the occupational sectors. In the categories of 'politics' and 'professions' they

constitute nearly half of the élite membership, and in the economic as well as the artistic-cultural sectors they account for 40 per cent.

Moreover, when we consider the ethnic origins of the Palestine-Israel-born members, our data show that 70 per cent of these are the offspring of eastern and central European immigrants. Western Europeans and immigrants from English-speaking countries also belong to this ethnic category and bring the total 'Ashkenazi' members of the élite to nearly 90 per cent. Consequently, immigrants from Middle Eastern and North African countries, who constitute nearly 50 per cent of the adult Israeli population, account with their descendants for less then 10 per cent of the Israeli élite! Interestingly, nearly half the members of that small élite group are concentrated within the 'politics' sector. Politics, it seems, provide the main mobility ladder for those of Middle Eastern and North African origin.

Second, when we examine the data for tendencies of members of country of origin groups to concentrate in one or another of the élite sectors, we see that the Israel-born are strongly represented in the bureaucracies and among the professionals and artists; immigrants from western Europe stand out among the academics; and those from the English-speaking countries, while altogether a small group, are also mainly concentrated within the academic category. (Slightly more than six per cent are from English-speaking countries, but 60 per cent of those are university professors.)

Finally, it is relevant to note that the Israel-born constitute a large segment of the total élite; they are second in size only to the central and eastern Europeans. Moreover, they are strongly represented in nearly all the élite sectors, and particularly so within the bureaucratic segment. As we have noted earlier, 70 per cent of them are the children of parents born in central and eastern Europe, and 21 per cent have parents who were themselves born in Palestine-Israel, while the parents of the remaining nine per cent were born in western Europe. However, since they were born and educated in Israel, these élite members are by no means 'cultural replicas' of their parents. In many ways, the similarities in values and attitudes among them are probably greater than is their similarity to their diverse immigrant parents.

Period of immigration

We turn next to a related question. Table 2 shows that nearly three quarters of the total élite population were born outside Palestine-Israel. When did they first immigrate? Is length of residence in Israel a factor related to recruitment to the élite?

As shown in Table 3, the overall pattern is one in which length of time in Israel is positively correlated with membership in the élite. Thus, 73·4 per cent of those who came as immigrants arrived before

the establishment of the State in 1948. The predominance of the longer-term residents reflects the fact that time is a prerequisite for entry into some élite positions, especially those which require the attainment of legitimacy (as in the case of politics) or the acquisition of some culturally-specific skill (as in government administration). On the other hand, in those areas in which skills can be more easily transferred to the society (such as academics and professionals), there is a higher proportion of recent immigrants. We may therefore conclude that with

TABLE 3. *Period of Immigration by sector, in percentages*

Period	*Sector*						
	Political	*Admin.*	*Economic*	*Academic*	*Professional*	*Artistic-Cultural*	*Total*
Before 1920	3·0	3·0	2·3	0·5	0·0	2·0	2·0
1921–33	36·8	22·4	30·3	15·7	24·4	37·3	25·8
1934–39	25·6	41·3	35·6	28·7	29·3	23·5	32·4
1940–48	15·8	13·3	11·4	10·2	22·0	13·7	13·2
1949–56	6·0	9·0	6·8	14·6	14·6	3·9	9·4
1957–	2·3	4·0	5·3	15·7	4·9	7·8	7·1
No data	10·5	7·0	8·3	14·6	4·8	11·8	10·0
Total	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	99·9

the exception of areas in which special technical skills are salient, recruitment of immigrants into the élite is not an especially rapid process.

Interestingly, the largest proportion of élite immigrants came in the comparatively brief time span between 1934 and 1939. This category accounts for almost a third of the entire immigrant élite, and among the administrators, for 41 per cent. This period was characterized by a comparatively large-scale immigration from central and western Europe; some of the immigrants came as adults, but many others were young enough to have received their major educational training in Palestine-Israel.

Education

Different assumptions could be made regarding the level of education of the élite. On the one hand, it might have been expected that in an immigrant society whose founding fathers saw themselves as pioneering a 'return to the land', a relatively low emphasis would have been placed upon formal education as a criterion for recruitment to the élite. On the other hand, the institutionalization of élite positions inevitably requires the acquisition of certain technical skills, not all of which can be self-taught. Moreover, the tradition of learning in Judaism could also be expected to gradually increase the value placed on education.

Table 4 shows a high proportion of élite members with partial or completed university education: nearly 20 per cent have B.A. degrees, while only 11 per cent have not gone beyond the secondary school level. The total averages are, of course, biased upward by the large number of academics in the total élite population; thus, the nearly 30 per cent who hold Ph.D. degrees are principally university professors. On the other hand, the 17 per cent with M.A. degrees include only a small number of academics. It is therefore fair to conclude that a significant proportion of élite members have had an advanced higher education.

Table 4 also suggests interesting variations in the educational level of the different sectors. For example, politicians and economic élites have the highest proportion of 'elementary-secondary only' training;

TABLE 4. *Level of Education, by sector, in percentages*

Level of Education	*Sector*						
	Political	*Administ.*	*Economic*	*Academic*	*Professional*	*Artistic-Cultural*	*Total*
Elementary-secondary only	22·2	9·6	20·2	0·0	4·9	13·5	11·6
Partial university educ.	22·2	24·9	24·6	0·0	11·5	23·0	17·9
B.A.	26·6	22·2	22·3	1·4	32·8	20·3	18·9
M.A.	13·6	26·6	18·6	4·0	21·3	21·6	17·2
Ph.D	4·6	14·7	6·6	93·7	27·8	13·5	29·6
No data	10·8	2·0	7·7	0·9	1·6	8·1	4·8
Total	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	99·9	100·0	100·0

in these two areas élite positions seem to depend less upon specialized educational training and more upon other, probably more personal, talents (such as entrepreneurship and leadership). Naturally, both academics and the professionals (lawyers, architects, etc.) have a high proportion of holders of advanced degrees. On the other hand, it may be somewhat surprising that in the artistic-cultural élite there is also a large proportion of members with M.A. and Ph.D. degrees. Finally, the bureaucrats are an especially interesting case. The number of higher degree holders in this sector is impressive: 40 per cent have M.A.'s or Ph.D.'s, in contrast to 18 per cent among politicians and 25 per cent in the economic élite. Specialized educational training appears to be a prerequisite for gaining entry into the higher administrative circles.

Recent studies of élites in industrially advanced states indicate educational patterns similar to those described here. For example, the percentage of those with university degrees in the political élites of

Germany and Great Britain is roughly similar to the percentage in Israel.[7] It appears, therefore, that the process of institutionalization in the Israeli élite is now well beyond the pioneering stage. Indeed, our data show a growing trend in this direction, for when we compared age groups by educational level we found that the younger age groups have higher levels of advanced training. For example, those in the 26–38 age category have a dramatically higher percentage of B.A.'s and M.A.'s than do élites in all other age categories. We may therefore conclude that if membership in the Israeli élite previously depended upon personal skills and attributes, more specialized technical training is required in addition to these, at present.

Place of residence

The last point to be considered is place of residence. As is shown in Table 5, approximately 35 per cent of the élite reside in the two major urban centres of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. This pattern of concentration may not be surprising in a country the size of Israel. The table also indicates the continued importance of kibbuts members. Although the leadership of the kibbuts movement amounted in the total élite population to 3–4 per cent (commensurate with the proportion of the total

TABLE 5. *Place of Residence, by sector, in percentages*

Residence	*Sector*						
	Political	*Admin.*	*Economic*	*Academic*	*Professional*	*Artistic-Cultural*	*Total*
Jerusalem	15·9	60·4	10·4	39·9	13·1	10·8	32·6
Tel Aviv	46·6	24·9	66·1	29·6	73·8	64·8	43·1
Haifa	3·4	3·1	9·3	24·2	8·2	5·4	9·4
Kibbuts	22·2	4·4	4·9	0·5	1·6	9·5	6·8
Other*	9·1	2·7	7·7	2·2	3·3	1·4	4·6
No data	2·8	4·4	1·6	3·6	0·0	8·1	3·5
Total	100·0	99·9	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0

*includes middle-size towns, rural settlements, and moshavim.

kibbuts population in the population of the country as a whole), seven per cent of all élite members recorded residence in a kibbuts. This figure is comparable to the percentage of élite members who reside in Haifa—the third of the three major cities in the country.

Our data also show an interesting pattern of 'functional concentration' in residence; to judge by the place of residence of élite members, it appears that Tel Aviv is the nation's political, economic, professional, and artistic 'capital', Jerusalem is the major administrative 'capital', while the academic centres are distributed across the three principal

cities. The pre-eminence of Tel Aviv is clear; not only is it the largest population centre, but also the true hub of the nation. This is borne out most clearly by the fact that while Jerusalem is the national capital, nearly half the political élite continue to live in Tel Aviv.

The high concentration of kibbuts residents within the political élite is also worthy of comment. That is, not only are kibbuts members over-represented in the élite as a whole, but they make up practically a fourth of the entire political élite. For example, in the Rabin government of 1974–1977, four out of 18 members of the Cabinet were members of a kibbuts, although, of course, they spent their working lives far away from them.

We conclude this section on a somewhat speculative note. Data were also gathered on the place of residence of élite members when they were between the ages of six and eighteen years. The data revealed that roughly two per cent had lived in kibbutsim during this age period; since the percentage of kibbuts members in our sample is roughly seven, this indicates that the majority of the élite kibbuts members were not educated or reared in a kibbuts but rather joined as adults. Why should this be the case? Why are a smaller percentage of the kibbuts-reared represented in our sample? One explanation may have to do with time or age. Elite kibbuts members are mainly concentrated in politics, and the political élites are typically an older age group. Adequate time may not yet have elapsed for second-generation kibbuts members to have reached élite political positions. It may also be that kibbuts socialization discourages or inhibits the attainment of élite positions—the emphasis upon group or communal norms may discourage mobility into the higher circles. Which of these interpretations (or other explanations) is valid is, of course, not shown by our data, and the problem provides an interesting topic for future study.

Conclusion

Two different sets of conclusions may be drawn from our findings. The first relates to the overall élite profile, while the second refers to processes of change which have transformed Israeli society.

At the beginning of this article we noted a number of popular observations which are often made about Israeli élites. In some cases our data tend to confirm this 'received wisdom', but in most instances they do not do so. As an example of the former, we saw that in fact élites do tend to be European in origin, but that on the other hand, contrary to popular opinion, the findings also show that the élite groups are comparatively young and well educated. To cite another example, the suggestion has been made that the European or Israel-born tend to avoid political careers, and as a consequence Middle Easterners and North Africans have begun to dominate the élite political sector.[8] Our

data do not indicate such a trend: even though the percentage of Middle Easterners and North Africans is higher in politics than in any other sector, their representation in this élite category is still minor. Moreover, Europeans and the Israel-born thoroughly dominate the political as well as all other sectors of the élite. The data presented here thus constitute a 'social profile' of Israeli élites which can be used to examine stereotypes which have been advanced in the past. In addition, they provide a 'base' against which future changes in the composition of the élite can be assessed.

Finally, the data also indicate the continued trend towards institutionalization and routinization among Israeli élites. Historically, the first Israeli élite generation may have been composed of persons who, among other features, were 'self-made men' and in a significant number of cases were also members of kibbutsim; this type of leadership was functional in a society that was 'pioneering' and developing new institutions. However, since the 1950's, Israel has increasingly begun to adopt features generally characteristic of modern industrial nations, and as a consequence the social profile of its élite also changed. The similarities noted in the age composition and level of education between Israeli élites and those in Germany and Great Britain suggests that the recruitment processes in these countries may be largely similar. Changes in the élite composition thus mirror or reflect deeper changes taking place throughout the society.

NOTES

[1] R. Rosenzweig and G. Tamarin, 'Israel's Power Elite', *Transaction*, vol. 7, no. 10, July–August 1970; Y. Elizur and E. Salpeter, *Who Rules Israel?*, New York, 1973; and L. Seligman, *Leadership in a New Nation*, New York, 1964.

[2] See S. N. Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society*, New York, 1967, especially pp. 237–244.

[3] The data on acquaintanceship networks was published in our article, 'Who Knows Whom? Contact Networks in the Israeli National Elite' (in Hebrew), *Megamot*, vol. XXII, 1976, pp. 357–378. The study was supported by grants from the Hebrew University Research Fund, the Brandeis University National Science Foundation Allocation, and the U.S. Social Science Research Council. We wish to express our thanks to those institutions for their support.

[4] M. Lipset and A. Solari, *Elites in Latin America*, London, 1976, p. vii.

[5] While well-suited for our study, this 'positional' approach raises certain problems. First, since the data were collected in 1972, they do not reflect changes that may have come about as a result of the political crisis following the 1973 Yom Kippur War. This is not too serious a difficulty, since the changes were selective and limited to the political and military élites. Second, the method of selection was in some cases arbitrary; for example, all the top positions in a government ministry were included in our listing except in

cases in which so many names were listed that it would clearly have over-represented the category. Although this may have injected some bias, it is not likely to affect our overall results.

[6] See W. L. Guttsman, 'Elite Recruitment and Political Leadership in Britain and Germany since 1950: a Comparative Study of MPs and Cabinets' in Ivor Crewe, ed., *Elites in Western Democracies*, London, 1974, pp. 89–125.

[7] ibid., pp. 103, 107.

[8] S. Avineri, 'Israel: Two Nations?' in M. Curtis and M. Chertoff, eds., *Israel: Social Structure and Change*, New Brunswick, 1973, pp. 281–306, especially p. 292.

CHANGE AND PSEUDO-CHANGE IN SOCIOLOGY

Chris R. Tame

(Review Article)

THE last decade has clearly witnessed the shattering of the sociological consensus. We seem far removed from the time when, in 1954, Ely Chinoy could declare that 'the days of competing schools, each employing a distinct conceptual apparatus, are almost gone'[1], or even from Donald MacRae's statement, in 1968, that an intellectual 'lull', a sociological 'unity' had been achieved, and only a 'long period of logical refinement, and cleaning-up operations awaits us'.[2] Instead, what has occurred has been the explosive emergence of a myriad competing claimants to the mantle of revolution or 'paradigm change' in sociology. Phenomenology, ethnomethodology, symbolic-interactionism, critical theory, 'new', 'reflexive', 'radical', and 'humanistic' sociologies have all laid claim to the honour of being the agent of transformation. Yet, while noting their common elements, a commitment to 'liberation', to 'self-determination', and to various views of individual autonomy against 'social forces', it is necessary to observe, as one self-proclaimed 'humanistic sociologist' has indeed done, that 'it is not clear at all . . . how the various "elements", or, better, manifestations [of the "great first-order fissure" in contemporary sociology] cohere or are even compatible: the "radicalism" and struggle-orientation-even-unto-violence-if-need-be of some, with the dignity-preservation-for all at almost any other cost of others; the roles of prophet, soldier, healer, light-bringer . . . leader, planner, liberator, and—can it be?—controller'.[3] To what extent does the smoke of a somewhat self-satisfied bandying of new jargon and labels conceal the absence of any real fire of change? To what extent does allegedly revolutionary disputation with the orthodox tradition actually share with that tradition a cumulative background of ideas and numerous fundamental assumptions?—as Ernest Becker has queried with reference to similar conflicts in the past.[4] How far has *real* change occurred?

Dennis H. Wrong's *Skeptical Sociology** is no mere late-comer to the

*Dennis H. Wrong, *Skeptical Sociology*, viii + 322 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1977, £6.90.

ranks of contenders for the 'revolutionary' honours. Wrong has been a distinguished and long-standing (if insufficiently known in Britain) contributor to the growing stream of criticism of the structural-functional orthodoxy. This book thus gathers together most of his major published essays, dating from 1959, along with a number of previously unpublished items. Ranging in character from scholarly polemics, to serious contributions on major issues in sociological theory, and general discussions of diverse topics in politics and political theory, they present us with a timely illustration of the general direction of the 'new' and 'humanist' streams of thought, and numerous ('reflexive'!) reflections on the actual diversity of such intellectual currents. In examining the character of Wrong's own work, his observations on contemporary sociology, and the questions he both raises and fails to raise, we can go some way in assessing the true status of the 'new sociologies'.

In perhaps the most valuable section of the book, the Prologue and Part One on 'Human Nature and the Perspective of Sociology', Wrong provides, in fact, much needed criticism of some fashionable trends. An established critic of the positivism and 'scientism' of structural functionalism, he explains his reasons for no longer calling his own views 'humanistic'—not the least of which is its 'self-congratulatory aura' (p. 2) and its use as a 'virtual synonym for an engagé sociology aligned politically with the Left' (p. 2). Although indeed (in American terms) a 'liberal' and man of the 'left', Wrong does not hesitate to proffer some biting criticism of the 'critical theory' of the Frankfurt School and its followers. Not a few will welcome his declaration that the 'critical theorists' possess no monopoly on the 'reflexive' perspective, the critique of positivism, a critical perspective on the status quo, or on adherence to a 'utopian' vision. That critical theory's criticism seems remarkably parochial and one-sided, focused principally on the West and ignoring the conditions in socialist and Marxist states whose existence (whatever the status of their claim to such titles) poses certain analytical problems, is a point all too infrequently raised. Wrong's comments on 'the increasingly shadowy contours of "socialism" as an ideal', its use as a 'god-term' (p. 9), and likewise his sad observation that Marxism is now 'surely the most trendy tendency in the sociological academy' (p. 51), will provide a courageous and refreshing exercise in intellectual skepticism and independence for those who have read the voluminous 'radical' writings and experienced their growing concrete influence.

The core of Wrong's work, however, and indeed his most well-known contribution to the critique of structural-functionalism, is 'The Over-Socialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology'. This essay, his Postscript to it, and its companion piece, 'Human Nature and the Perspective of Sociology', constitute perhaps the most telling and well-

reasoned criticism of the holistic and deterministic outlook of conventional sociology. The latter's 'model of human nature, sometimes clearly stated, more often implicit in accepted concepts' (p. 35) is one of man as overwhelmingly an 'acceptance seeker', a passive internalizer of external social norms. Wrong does not, of course, deny the social nature of man, the existence of the 'vexatious fact of society' (to use Dahrendorf's phrase) but objects rather to the generalizing of a 'particular selective emphasis', and the subsequent 'extremely one-sided view of human nature' (p. 41), while ignoring or minimizing the 'obvious and massive fact' (p. 62) of human choice and autonomy.

Much of this critique, the appreciation of a far greater degree of human autonomy than was ever recognized by even the most 'balanced' of the older sociologists, is now, with the growth of varied 'humanistic' trends in sociology, anthropology, and psychology, quite widely accepted[5]—although Wrong's view of it as largely 'absorbed into the conventional wisdom of the discipline' (p. 47) surely goes too far and begs a great many questions. What is particularly noteworthy at this moment, however, is Wrong's recognition of the extent to which many of the 'new' sociologies still share much of the traditional, deterministic image of man. Thus, symbolic interactionism, in spite of its stress on the role-*making* aspects of human interaction and its perceptive 'readings' of the realities of social intercourse, draws heavily on the work of George Herbert Mead and Harry Stack Sullivan, both of whom present a concept of the self characterized by a distinct 'lack of any motivational energies of its own' (p. 66), as a 'social self', the product of 'the reflected appraisals of others' (Sullivan) and the internalizing of the 'generalized other' (Mead)[6]. As Wrong puts it (p. 67):

> Symbolic interactionists are not guilty . . . of suggesting that men are conformist automatons . . . Nevertheless [they] still see resistance to social demands and expectations as essentially a by-product, though an inevitable one, of socialization. The essence of man is 'the presentation of self in everyday life', even though it is recognized that the social world is discontinuous and permits some individuality and some resistance to social control to flourish in the interstices between rules and institutions. Instead of [as in structural-functionalism] successful 'tension management' imposed by the imperative of the social system, 'impression management' under the dominance of the self, a theatrical impresario cannily sizing up his audience, becomes the compelling social reality. Both views, though in different ways, present an oversocialized conception of man.

Similarly, much of the work of 'radical' and anti-functionalist 'conflict theorists' adopts either vague concepts of the dynamics of 'objective conditions' and conflicting 'interests' (which actually need further psychological explication), and Marxist reifications of class and history, or other views equally as holistic and deterministic as those of the functionalists. 'Their denial that society is a self-equilibrating system

in the structural-functionalist sense', Wrong writes, 'merely leads them to stress socialization in subgroups within total societies that are at odds with one another, as opposed to being united by an overarching, shared value system' (p. 60). The most notable example of the latter, of course, is that of Gerth and Mills who, in *Character and Social Structure* 'subscribed to conceptions of socialization that scarcely differed from those of Parsons and his fellow functionalists' (p. 48).[7]

On the subject of C. Wright Mills, Wrong in fact includes a full essay, an appraisal of 'C. Wright Mills and the Sociological Imagination', which contains a number of critical observations on the hero and inspiration of much 'radical' sociology, regarding whom a certain degree of 'demystification' is, in this writer's view, long overdue. While justly praising *The Sociological Imagination*, Wrong points to the 'striking discrepancy between Mills's own work and [his] admirable conception of what sociology ought to be . . .' (p. 28). Thus, much of Mills's work is actually characterized by its lack of an historical and comparative perspective, an absence of a truly rigorous reasoning to follow up imaginative insights and suggestions (most notably in his work on the power élite, where it was left to others to really clinch the case against 'pluralism'), and the 'grand theory' orientation of *Character and Social Structure*. It is a pity that Wrong does not include here his equally important and biting *political* observations, made in *Partisan Review*, regarding the statist and authoritarian inclinations of Mills.[8]

Unfortunately, however, much of Wrong's own alternative conception of human psychology is drawn from Freudianism, emphasizing the 'somatic, animal roots of our emotional lives' (p. 54). Here Wrong is open to the same sort of criticism he has made of Gerth and Mills, that he is subjecting Man to simply another form of determinism. He is not only apparently unaware of the devastating criticisms of Freudianism available,[9] and the extent of its predominantly deterministic nature,[10] but neglects the large body of 'humanist' or 'third force' psychology. The writings of the latter movement provide detailed and well-reasoned concepts of 'human nature' ('social but not entirely socialized'), and of the limits of 'socialization'.[11] Wrong's knowledge of the burgeoning 'humanistic' movement in psychology seems, alas, confined to some of the more anti-rational group psychotherapies distinguished (as he rightly points out) by anti-individualistic celebrations of group-induced emotion and of public self-exposure (p. 2).[12]

In the last two essays of this section, 'The Idea of Community: A Critique' and 'Identity: Problem and Catchword', Wrong makes a number of valid criticisms of two widely used concepts and of the prospects of measures aimed at the restoration of 'community' and secure 'identity'. Unfortunately, he fails to get to grips with the issue of their true scientific status and its significance for sociology. Herein we thus find a further example of the limits of the critique of traditional

sociology. Although well aware of Nisbet's famous work on the conservative-collectivist origins of sociology,[13] and citing Leon Bramson's less well-known, but important, *The Political Context of Sociology*,[14] Wrong does not subject these two central concepts to a truly critical analysis—indeed, he even seems to share, to a degree, their holistic-collectivist assumptions regarding the alleged need for rootedness, stability, and socially guaranteed identity. Yet such sociological concepts and theories rest, as Bramson pointed out, 'not on empirical research alone, but on a specifically anti-liberal [i.e. anti-individualist] philosophical approach to modern society'. They are 'derived from a number of assumptions concerning modern society few of them proven or even provable by scientific methods . . . they do not involve questions of fact, but rather, questions of fact structured by and saturated with values. They resemble philosophical rather than scientific propositions'.[15] Bramson illustrated his thesis by reference to 'mass society and culture' theory. A great deal of contemporary work in urban sociology has similarly demonstrated the inadequacy of what have proved to be essentially normative and holistic concepts in this area.

The essays in Part Two provide generally penetrating contributions to the criticism of structural-functionalism for its neglect of power, group conflict, and historical change—very well trodden ground by now, of course, if less so when originally published. Wrong's essentially Weberian analysis provides a sound explication of concepts (especially in 'Social Inequality Without Social Stratification'), re-affirming with welcome clarity a number of distinctions that are (as he says) widely, if not always clearly, recognized in theory while often ignored in research practice, and underlining the continued relevance of these concepts and distinctions to the understanding of contemporary social trends. Unfortunately, however, while Wrong is himself well aware of the danger in a 'retracing of familiar ground', of 'perpetuating the larger failure of so much contemporary sociological theory to overcome its purely definitional character, its tendency to produce a distinctive nomenclature rather than significant propositions about social reality' (p. 121), and stresses 'that conceptual analysis should lead directly into the elucidation of social processes and historical trends with which we are directly familiar' (p. 121), his own work still pays virtually no attention to the real structure and dynamics of power and privilege in contemporary America.[16] It is a serious reproach to sociology that virtually every major empirical contribution to our knowledge of the realities of power has come from outside the sociological profession, whether from 'New Left' historians and writers, 'right wing' conspiratorialists, or Radical Libertarian economists and theorists.[17]

The final section of the book is—as the author admits—a somewhat more heterogeneous collection of essays united only superficially in their concern with varied issues of 'Power and Politics', they range from

relatively theoretical discussions, through a criticism of Robert Heilbroner (one of America's leading contemporary socio-economic Cassandras), to a celebratory introduction to Weber and an explication of 'Ends and Means in Politics'. It also contains perhaps the weakest essay (although one of Wrong's self-proclaimed favourites) on 'The Rhythm of Democratic Politics', in which he delineates the thesis that 'democratic societies . . . experience a cyclical alternation of periods dominated by protest from the Left and retrenchment by the Right' (p. 226). Wrong, however, offers no real analysis of, or justification for, these misleading, vague, and emotive terms which, as his own essay actually demonstrates, beg so many questions and function as semantic weapons by which an ideology can lay claim to virtue and label its rivals opprobriously. It is again a cause for reproach that neither sociology nor political science has produced systematic and convincing analyses of this common categorization. Once more it has been left to journalists, academics in other disciplines, or activists, who feel such 'loaded' stereotypes do no justice to their own beliefs, to engage in such tasks.[18] That this essay originally appeared in a volume, *The New Conservatives: A Critique from the Left*[19], intended as a counterblast to the works of a group of writers also frequently termed 'revisionist *liberals*'—men of undoubted scholarly objectivity whose analysis and policy prescriptions were distinguished by a growing disillusionment with the failure of traditional so-called 'leftist' (that is, 'interventionist' or 'socialist') policies—surely indicates how 'loaded' such categorization and terminology can be.

Monica B. Morris's *An Excursion Into Creative Sociology** provides an interesting contrast to Wrong's work, while serving to underline many of the points I have made so far. An admittedly partisan work, it is designed to serve as a relatively comprehensible introduction to the range of phenomenological, ethnomethodological, and interactionist perspectives she designates as 'creative sociology'. Their common character, in her view, is that 'all have an image of human beings as creating reality in interaction with others. They all call into question the deterministic notion that the "solid structures" of society act as forces on the individual, deciding his fate. They all use methods of study that are different from the natural-science methods of positivistic sociology' (p. 42). However, that an introduction, a 'simplification', and demystification even, of such streams of thought should prove necessary constitutes more than a little reproach to their proponents. As she points out, they 'present their programmatic statements in language so obscure that many readers become quickly confused, frustrated and discouraged. Terminology is introduced that is far from self-explanatory, sentences are tortuous, much chaff surrounds the wheat of wisdom that

*Monica B. Morris, *An Excursion into Creative Sociology*, xii + 212 pp., Oxford, 1977, £6.25.

awaits those patient enough to sift through the terrible wordiness' (p. viii). Indeed! Moreover, much of the jargon is quite indefensible (do we *really* need to call 'objectivity', 'open-mindedness' or absence of presuppositions, 'performing the epoché', 'bracketing', or 'reduction'?), masks either repetition, prolixity, and assertion (rather than validation), or simplicity, banality, and truism[20] which is anything but 'profoundly complex' (p. viii).

In fact, Morris performs her self-appointed task remarkably well. She delineates the principal achievements of the 'creative' sociologies, their analysis of the 'amazingly ordinary phenomenon of daily life' (p. ix), the structure and tactics of ordinary language and discourse, with facility. Her account of her own research into the justifications by newspaper editors of the nature of their treatment of the Women's Liberation Movement (pp. 108–114) is particularly incisive and interesting, as is her description of the work of Fishman, West and Zimmerman, and Cicourel and Kitsuse on the role of expectation and linguistic conflict in ordinary life. Yet, while noting the differences among the various 'creative' sociologies, Morris is too expository and insufficiently analytical. To what extent does 'creative sociology' depart from the core assumptions of the traditional paradigm? Her account of Mead shows no recognition of the deterministic orientation of his work, although she does note that Berger and Luckmann's work 'appears to smack considerably more of social determinism than do other phenomenological approaches' (p. 59) and cites Jack Douglas's comments that 'in the grafting of structural ideas onto situational analyses, Berger and Luckmann have largely denied the necessary freedom of individuals implicit in the whole idea of situated meaning and have reinstated the "objectified" absolutist tyranny of the structuralists' (p. 166). The question she fails to ask is, to what extent the 'creative sociologies' have either disposed of the 'deterministic notion' or adequately and systematically dealt with the exact limits of socialization and social constraints. Her failure in this respect is that of 'creative sociology' as a whole. Peter Berger's *Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective*[21], for example, presents no more (probably less) of a systematic discussion of the role and limits of socialization and the status of *homo sociologicus* than did Ralf Dahrendorf in his famous essay *Homo Sociologicus* and its postscript, 'Sociology and Human Nature'.[22]

Both Wrong and Morris leave us, then, if not with any *direct* answer to our initial question—how far has real change occurred in contemporary sociology?—at least with a clearer picture of the points at issue and of their significance. If the new trends in sociology represent manifestations of a 'view of man as having a measure of autonomy, choice and self-determination',[23] what is the extent of that choice and at what point does it constitute a 'quantum jump' from the traditional sociological views? To what extent, moreover, does sociology *qua*

science necessarily focus on the 'socialization' process, or depend upon *homo sociologicus* as either an allegedly true representation of human nature or a self-conscious construct, a heuristic tool? And to what extent do the 'humanistic' propositions either constitute, or need to be developed into, a new 'paradigm'? Wrong at least indicates implicitly his attitude when he declares that he has 'no intention of creating a new movement or tendency within sociology'. In his view 'skeptical sociologists may wryly recognize a kinship with one another under various disguises, but it would be self-defeating for them to organize as a group or even to adopt a common label. In the end, there can be no such thing as a skeptical sociology, only skeptical sociologists' (p. 14).

For those, however, whose 'skepticism' goes further, who adhere to a much broader rejection of the holistic and determinist concepts and values inherited by sociology from classical conservatism (and reinforced by the more collectivist varieties of socialism), a different task lies ahead. In perhaps the most forthright and successful attempt so far to outline a voluntaristic or individualistic sociology, that of Dick Atkinson,[24] we find a clear recognition that many of the 'critics and dissenters, the advocates of an alternative, radical sociology [are] in fact . . . part of the orthodox consensus' and that this is a measure of the crisis facing sociology and students of sociology.[25] If a thoroughly new sociological 'paradigm' is to emerge, a sociology that is a 'science of liberty', methodologically, psychologically, and normatively individualistic, then a great deal more radical thought and change will have to take place.

NOTES

[1] Ely Chinoy, *Sociological Perspective: Basic Concepts and Their Application*, New York, 1954, p. iv.

[2] David G. MacRae, Introduction to Percy S. Cohen, *Modern Social Theory*, London, 1968, p. viii.

[3] John R. Seeley, 'Humanizing the Superconscious: A Foreword to "Humanistic Society" and a Prelude to a Humane Society', in John F. Glass and John R. Staude, eds., *Humanistic Society: Today's Challenge to Sociology*, Pacific Palisades, Calif., 1972, p. xvi.

[4] Ernest Becker, *The Structure of Evil: An Essay on the Unification of the Science of Man*, New York, 1968, p. 403, Note 1.

[5] For useful summaries of, and introductions to, such trends, see Fred W. Voget, 'Man and Culture: An Essay in Changing Anthropological Interpretations', *American Anthropologist*, vol. 26, no. 6, December 1960, and Mary Ellen Goodman, *The Individual and Culture*, Homewood, Ill., 1976.

[6] A similar recognition of the rather grim and deterministic image of man in ethnomethodology can be found in John F. Glass, 'The Humanistic Challenge to Sociology', in Glass and Staude, op. cit., p. 4.

[7] Another criticism of Gerth and Mills's holism and determinism can be found in the important but neglected essay by Benjamin Schwartz, 'The

Socio-Historic Approach', *World Politics*, vol. VIII, no. 1, October 1955, especially pp. 141–43. Schwartz points out that in their work the person is 'nothing more than a combination of internalized social roles which, in turn, are part of the social process' (p. 141). Alastair MacIntyre, in 'Breaking the Chains of Reason' (in E. P. Thompson, ed., *Out of Apathy*, London, 1960) also accuses Mills of sharing, with Parsons, 'the deterministic vision of man' and giving, in his work, 'no picture . . . of the resistances that man can and does offer to such processes' (p. 224).

[8] In 'Reading from Left to Right' (*Partisan Review*, vol. XXX, no. 2, Summer 1963), Wrong quoted extensively from Mills's selected essays, *Power, Politics and People*, to illustrate the obvious attraction power, when wielded by the correct, enlightened hands, held for him. He thus concluded that 'Mills sometimes sounds as though what he most wanted was to be President of the United States. Long before he became briefly an apologist for Castro's dictatorship and began to give Krushchev's Russia the benefit of too many doubts, there was an unpleasant note in his preoccupation with power: he never tired of blasting the "power elite", but he had a strange mixture of contempt for their intellectual mediocrity with a desire to stand in their shoes, and this feeling seemed to occupy him more than did his vision of a more fraternal, decentralized society' (p. 296).

[9] For example, Andrew Salter, *The Case Against Psychoanalysis*, London, 1953; Richard LaPiere, *The Freudian Ethic*, New York, 1959; Sebastian de Grazia, *Errors of Psychotherapy*, New York, 1952; Coyne H. Campbell, *Induced Delusions*, Chicago, 1958; and Maurice Natenberg, *The Case History of Sigmund Freud*, Chicago, 1958. The telling arguments of such writers, of course, do not necessarily vindicate their own alternative propositions.

[10] See Isidor Chein, *The Science of Behaviour and the Image of Man*, London, 1972. Chein observes that 'this model [i.e. Freudianism], commonly thought of as a purposive one, leaves Man a passive victim of the interplay between constitution and environment no less than do the non-purposive stimulus-response models. Man, as such, has nothing to do with the outcome. He does nothing; things happen to him' (p. 6).

[11] Among a large and growing number, see especially the work of Abraham Maslow, in *Motivation and Personality*, New York, 1954, and *Toward A Psychology of Being*, Princeton, N.J., 1968; Frank G. Goble, *The Third Force: The Psychology of Abraham Maslow*, New York, 1970, for a general over-view; and Nathaniel Branden, *The Psychology of Self-Esteem*, Los Angeles, 1969, especially his discussion of 'volitional consciousness', pp. 36–63.

[13] Similar criticisms of such anti-rational tendencies and advocacy of total public self-revelation have been made repeatedly by writers within the 'humanist' tradition. See, for example, Nathaniel Branden, *The Disowned Self*, Los Angeles, 1977, pp. 127–28, 159, and Sigmund Koch, 'Reflections on the State of Psychology', *Social Research*, vol. 38, no. 4, Winter 1971. Koch especially points to the 'ultimate theory of man as a socius' (p. 706), inherent in the ideas of such alleged 'humanists'.

[13] Robert A. Nisbet, 'Conservatism and Sociology', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. LVII, no. 2, September 1952; 'The French Revolution and the Rise of Sociology', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. XLIX, no. 2, September 1943; 'De Bonald and the Concept of the Social Group', *Journal of the*

History of Ideas, vol. V, no. 3, June 1944; and *The Sociological Tradition*, London, 1970.

[14] Leon Bramson, *The Political Context of Sociology*, Princeton N.J., 1967.

[15] ibid., pp. 43, 44.

[16] It should be noted that he does include some more concrete material in his review article 'Jews, Gentiles and the New Establishment', and in 'How Important is Social Class?', on the extent of ethnic loyalties among American 'workers'.

[17] For the 'New Left', for example, see Gabriel Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism*, Chicago, 1967; James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State*, Boston, 1968; G. William Domhoff, *The Higher Circles*, New York, 1971; *Fat Cats and Democrats*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1972; and *The Bohemian Grove and Other Retreats*, New York, 1975. For the so-called 'right wing' conspiratorialists see, for example, by Garry Allen, *None Dare Call it Conspiracy*, Rossmoor, Calif., 1971; *The Rockefeller File*, Seal Beach, Calif., 1976; and *Who Controls the Press?*, Belmont, Mass., n.d; see also Dan Smoot, *The Invisible Government*, Belmont, Mass., 1965. For the Radical Libertarians see, for example, R. A. Childs *et al.*, *The Political Economy of Liberal Corporatism*, New York, 1977, and Murray N. Rothbard and Ronald Radosh, eds., *A New History of Leviathan*, New.York, 1972.

[18] Thus, see Sam Brittan, *Left and Right: The Bogus Dilemma*, London, 1968, and his 'Further Thoughts on Left and Right' in Sam Brittan, *Capitalism and the Permissive Society*, London, 1973; Murray N. Rothbard, 'Left and Right: The Prospects for Liberty' in Tibor Machan, ed., *The Libertarian Alternative: Essays in Social and Political Philosophy*, Chicago, 1974; Jerome Tuccille, *Radical Libertarianism: A New Political Alternative*, New York, 1971, especially pp. ix–xix; Lawrence McGann, 'The Political Spectrum', *Rampart Journal*, Larkspur, Colorado, vol. III, no. 4, Winter 1967, and the symposium on the subject in *Rampart Journal*, vol. IV, no. 2, Summer 1968.

[19] Lewis A. Coser and Irving Howe, eds., *The New Conservatives: A Critique from the Left*, New York, 1974.

[21] See Stanislav Andreski's biting comments in *Social Sciences as Sorcery*, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1974, pp. 246–48, and his general explanation for the prevalence of such pomposity and obscurantism, *passim*.

[21] Peter Berger, *Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective*, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1966.

[22] Ralf Dahrendorf, *Homo Sociologicus*, London, 1973.

[23] Glass and Staude, op. cit., p. xi.

[24] Dick Atkinson, *Orthodox Consensus and Radical Alternative: A Study in Sociological Theory*, London, 1971.

[25] ibid., p. 143.

BOOK REVIEWS

M. AVI-YONAH, *The Jews of Palestine: A Political History from the Bar Kokhba War to the Arab Conquest*, *xviii* + 286 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1976, £8.00.

The late Professor Michael Avi-Yonah was not only well loved and respected by all who knew him for his affable personality, sense of humour and wide-ranging culture, but also generally acknowledged as one of Israel's most eminent archaeologists. Though primarily an archaeologist concentrating on the hellenistic, Roman and Byzantine periods, his work also extended to historical geography and to cultural and political history. He was equally at ease with the arcane technicalities of excavation reports as with the more popular kind of writing designed for consumption by that mysterious but none the less real character, the general reader. The book under review is mainly intended for the latter, though the specialist historian will also find it valuable and useful, not least because in its present form it gives us the author's considered, final, and updated account of his subject.

The book has had a long history. It was originally published in Hebrew, in 1944–46, under 'the rather romantic title' (Avi-Yonah's own words, p. xii) *In the Days of Rome and Byzantium*, with the author's own preferred title—similar to the one of the present English edition—figuring as a sub-title only. Since then the book has appeared in revised editions and reprints, and in 1962 also in a German translation under the misleading title, *Geschichte der Juden im Zeitalter des Talmud.** (In fact, Avi-Yonah's history invites comparison, for a variety of reasons and not merely because of the similarity of the titles, with G. Alon's (Hebrew) *History of the Jews in Palestine during the Mishnaic and Talmudic Period.*) The English version was prepared by the author himself but went to press after his untimely death. It therefore supersedes all previous editions not merely in the chronological sense and as reflecting the views held by the author in 1973. More important is the fact that Avi-Yonah could take into account, when preparing the English version, not only comments and corrections suggested by reviewers of the earlier editions but also the extraordinary wealth of archaeological evidence that has come to light in recent years, especially since 1967.

Like every serious piece of historical scholarship, the present work does not seek to hide its ideological pre-suppositions without, however, allowing them to influence unduly the actual presentation of the material.

Earlier histories of the Jews were often said (perhaps a trifle unfairly) to have been mainly concerned with religion, religious literature and martyriology. In recent decades 'social' histories of the Jewish people, paying increasing attention to economic, demographic, and political factors (including religion and culture as social dimensions) have become the fashion. Avi-Yonah wanted to present a political history of Palestinian Jewry during a period when this part of the Jewish people was already stripped of political independence but still possessed a political existence of sorts and—even more relevant from the author's point of view—a 'political will', that is, the capacity to contemplate the regaining of a fuller political existence as a realistic possibility. In fact, towards the end of the period surveyed, the author still notes a brief interlude of 'Jewish rule in Jerusalem' (from the Persian conquest in 614 until the 'betrayal' of the Jewish cause by the Persians and the restoration of Byzantine rule). With the Arab conquest, also the 'political will' was broken and political aspirations became messianic dreams and longings.

Every historian has to make up his mind as to how to divide history into periods. His periodization will determine not only the scope of his book but very often also the subdivision of the latter into chapters. This particular reviewer happens to agree with Avi-Yonah's periodization. No matter how much Jewish theology (that is, rabbinic thinking as reflected in talmudic aggadah and midrashim) upgraded the significance of the destruction of the Second Temple as the major caesura in Jewish history, in terms of 'political history' the decisive date is the final collapse of the Bar-Kokhba revolt after the battle of Beth-Ter (Bethar). The Arab Conquest, because it extended beyond Palestine and affected no less decisively the great Jewish centre of Babylonia, did in fact mark the end of what can be called the 'Talmudic period' as a whole. In between these dates we can follow the history of a decimated and impoverished Palestinian Jewry struggling to hold on and even recover. The period under review exhibits diverse attempts at reconstruction; the creation of a new para-political establishment (the 'Patriarchate'); renewed crises (especially such as were consequences of the more general crisis—political as well as economic—of the declining Roman empire); revolts and pacifications; the emergence of new forms of religious authority and literature; the Christianization of the empire and the consequent upsetting of the delicate balance and modus vivendi that had evolved between Palestinian Jewry and pagan Rome; the ups and downs of messianic agitations; the last great but fleeting chance of restoration under Julian, and the increasingly repressive legislation of Christian Byzantium. Especially valuable for the non-Talmudist reader is the exploitation of the relevant (halakhic, aggadic-homiletical, and anecdotal) material from the Talmudic literature for the light it can help to throw on political and economic

realities—no mean feat for an historian who was himself no Talmudic specialist but an archaeologist. The author convincingly describes the Roman policy of relative 'appeasement' towards the vanquished Palestinian Jewry and shows that this *de facto* compromise usually meant not the repeal but merely the non-enforcement of certain laws. 'New persecutions' therefore do not necessarily mean new legislation—though this was certainly the case with Constantine the Great and Constantius II—but enforcement of earlier laws that had deliberately been neglected. Avi-Yonah accepts and defends the identification of Antoninus, the 'friend' of the Patriarch R. Judah I, with Caracalla. It is not surprising that Christianity should receive considerable attention in this political history: the Judaeo-Christians and the problem of the *minim;* and the attitudes towards the Jews of what was at first a Christian minority, then Christian rulers, next a Christian majority in the country, and finally a fully Christianized empire. Of special interest is the description of the recovery and strengthening of Jewish life as a result of the material prosperity during the Byzantine period and of the internal divisions in the Christian camp—a prosperity that came to an abrupt halt with the renewed anti-Jewish legislation of Justinian. Perhaps the author describes the 'honeymoon' between Palestinian Jewry and the Persians (the latter being the only serious enemies of Rome in the East) in too rosy colours. And perhaps some sort of 'political' existence was maintained even after the Arab conquest: there is not only the political dimension of *dhimmi*-autonomy but also the evidence of the Palestinian rabbinate's struggle for primacy against the claims and the growing weight of the Babylonian gaonate. But in all essentials Avi-Yonah's history is a reliable, instructive, and extremely readable guide.

Since a reviewer is expected, almost by definition, to complain about something, it may be permitted to express regret at the author's omission to refer in his notes to the wealth of scholarly literature dealing more fully and in greater detail with the many points and issues (some of them simple and straightforward, others controversial) raised in the book. It is true that the author occasionally refers to modern research but in the main he refers only to the primary (Greek, Latin, Talmudic, etc.) sources and makes little or no mention of the secondary literature. The book is well produced and misprints are few.

R. J. ZWI WERBLOWSKY

ARTUR EISENBACH, *Wielka Emigracja wobec Kwestii Żydowskiej 1832–1849*, 476 pp., Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warsaw, 1976, 66 zł.

After the collapse of the insurrection of November 1831 in the Kingdom of Poland, many thousands of people, among them prominent political

and military leaders, writers, and artists, went abroad to continue the fight for Poland's independence in the free world. They established an imposing network of legal and clandestine organizations, engaged in widespread diplomatic activities, and launched a propaganda campaign to make the world aware of the righteousness of the cause. In fierce ideological controversies and unending discussions and polemics, the émigrés tried to find means to rectify the political and social ills which had led to the demise of the old Polish Commonwealth and to the defeat of the ill-fated November insurrection. They set out to formulate a model for a liberated Poland of the future. In view of the influence they exerted in shaping the ideological orientations in Poland, and, above all, in view of their outstanding cultural achievements, they are known in Polish historiography as the Great Emigration.

Another group of émigrés reached the West after the revolutionary upheavals of 1846 and 1848 in Galicia and Poznania. The last wave came after the fall of the January 1863 insurrection in the Russian-dominated parts of Poland.

Professor Eisenbach's meticulous study is the first part of a large monograph dealing with the attitudes of Polish political émigrés to the Jewish question. The present volume covers the period 1832–49; the second, to be published later, will deal with the period 1850–70.

The demographic and legal position of the Jews in the Kingdom of Poland, the western provinces of Tsarist Russia, Galicia, and the Grand Duchy of Poznania—that is, in all the lands which before the partition had belonged to the old Commonwealth—is described in the first chapter. It also examines the territorial mobility of the Jews, and the fiscal policies of the respective governments vis-à-vis the Jewish population. Of special interest is the section analysing the stereotype of the Jew and of the Jewish community at large, as conceived by other groups in the society. The generally accepted image was far from favourable: Jews were considered to be cunning, grasping, idle, superstitious, fanatical, dishonest, culturally backward, of low mental and moral character, and with criminal propensities. Their only redeeming feature was their exemplary conduct within their own family circle. They were seen as an alien element, indeed as a 'state within a state', with their own language, customs, and historical traditions. It was maintained that they were economically harmful, and responsible for the decline of the towns and the misery of the peasants. Prince Adam Czartoryski, who later became one of the leaders of the Great Emigration, wrote in 1815: '. . . as an alien nation, the Jews have no right to citizenship, and any conferment of rights and privileges enjoyed by the Poles is given to them as an act of favour and generosity'.

Some writers, such as Wawrzyniec Surowiecki, advocated a more positive attitude towards the Jews, and thought that they ought to be

encouraged to restore the depopulated towns and to revive crafts and commerce. Some publicists and politicians were postulating a programme of total assimilation—to be enforced, as they thought necessary, by administrative measures—as the most efficacious method of solving the Jewish problem. Within the Jewish community, under the impact of external pressures and the *haskala* movement, the attitudes varied, but all Jews, irrespective of their material circumstances or ideological orientation, were deeply convinced that they ought to be granted civil and political rights. Even the most orthodox Jewish leaders joined in this struggle—their traditional attitudes did not clash with such aspirations. The rather ambivalent attitude of the political and military leadership during the November insurrection towards the problem of military service and emancipation of the Jews gave rise to many controversies which lasted until the final defeat.

These were resumed by the émigrés in changed circumstances and conditions. The main trends of pre-insurrectional and insurrectional politics continued abroad, but two became of lasting significance: the constitutional-monarchic camp of Adam Czartoryski, and the predominantly republican democratic left whose main ideologue and spokesman was the eminent historian Joachim Lelewel. It was Lelewel who issued (on 3 November 1832) the manifesto *To the Israelite People* in which he drew parallels between the historical fate of the Jews and of the Poles. Their common fate and destiny called for mutual aid and co-operation and for a common struggle. All recrimination must be laid aside; final accounts would be settled after the liberation.

Another attempt to gain the good will and support of the Jews was the establishment of an Association for the Emancipation of the Jews under the honorary chairmanship of General Lafayette, and hence known in historical literature as the Lafayette Committee. The main organizer and moving spirit of the Association was in fact Jan Czyński, writer and publicist, himself of Jewish origin, an untiring fighter for Jewish emancipation who was active among the more radical circles of the émigrés. The Committee was short-lived (1833–34), but in the course of its activity it tried to set the problem of Jewish emancipation in Poland in a wide international context, and also supported indigenous emancipation movements among Jews in other countries.

Discussions and polemics among the émigrés focused on many aspects of the Jewish question in Poland: the economic function and activities of the Jews in the past; the reasons for their inferior legal status; their isolation and the reasons for their separate national identification; the need to grant them social, civil, and political emancipation; and their rôle in the future Polish commonwealth. Professor Eisenbach chose four questions for closer examination: (i) interest in the Jewish past in Poland; (ii) evaluation of the policies of the insurrection leadership with regard to Jews in the Kingdom of Poland;

(iii) Polish Jews as allies in the struggle for independence; and (iv) the political emancipation of the Jews. In addition, he analyses in a special section the attitudes to the Jews of the three greatest Polish poets, Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Słowacki and Zygmunt Krasiński. They saw the problem on a high spiritual plane; Mickiewicz and Słowacki were influenced by the messianic ideas of Adam Towiański and propounded his idea of the divinely appointed rôles of the Jewish and the Polish peoples.

The last two chapters describe the contacts of the émigrés with their homeland, their part in initiating and propagating revolutionary attitudes, and insurrectional actions, and their direct participation in—and support of—the revolutionary movements during the heady days of the Spring of Nations in 1848.

A cursory survey of the contents of the book cannot but fail to give an adequate idea of the richness of the material collected and analysed, and of the fascinating minutiae of details which, however, never obscure the lucid flow of presentation. The book is based on rich archival material and extensive multilingual literature devoted to the Great Emigration. Generous acknowledgement is given to the pioneering research of Professor Abraham Duker of Yeshiva University and Brooklyn College, whose own doctoral dissertation was devoted to the same subject.

Professor Eisenbach has presented us with an important book. He has recently celebrated his seventieth birthday. May he have many more years of fruitful work. The second volume of his study will be impatiently awaited.

PAUL GLIKSON

PATRICK GIRARD, *Les Juifs de France de 1789 à 1860; de l'émancipation à l'égalité*, 302 pp., Collection 'Diaspora' (dirigée par Roger Errera), Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1976, n.p.

The history of modern French Jewry has been curiously neglected. While the struggles of German Jews for emancipation during the nineteenth century and their intellectual and ideological confrontations with modernity have long attracted the attention of scholars, the smaller and more quiescent Jewish community in France has basked in relative obscurity. Jewish historians seem to have shared the prejudice of French Jews themselves that they had no history worth mentioning in the century that elapsed between their emancipation during the Revolution and the traumatic outbreak of the Dreyfus Affair. All that is beginning to change, however. Within the past decade a number of young scholars have begun to explore the evolution of French Jewry in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Much of their work has been brought to the public in the Diaspora series, published by Calmann-Lévy, under the direction of Roger Errera.

Patrick Girard's *Les Juifs de France de 1789 à 1860* is the first volume in that series devoted to the emancipation of French Jews and to the impact of emancipation upon the two succeeding generations of French Jewry. Girard's discussion of the fate of that community during the Revolution and the First Empire, while intelligent, contains little that is new. However, he does bring much new material to bear in his analyses of the socio-economic and ideological consequences of emancipation and of the institutions and internal debates among French Jews in the nineteenth century.

Following the latest trends in modern Jewish historiography, Girard asserts that, contrary to the notion commonly held by French Jews themselves, complete legal equality was not bestowed upon France's Jewish community once and for all during the Revolution. Ambivalence was built into the emancipation process in all countries. In France there were significant set-backs under Napoleon, and the last legal disability afflicting French Jews, the oath *more judaico*, was not eliminated until 1846. Similarly, Girard indicates that the process of social and ideological change was both slow and complex. Major economic and demographic shifts—the urbanization and upward social mobility of French Jewry—for example, did not occur in any substantial manner until the July Monarchy. Relying heavily upon the unpublished dissertation of Phyllis Albert, Girard also notes that the consistories, the Jewish communal institutions established by Napoleon, did not assume their final centralized and lay-dominated form until mid-century. Even then, they retained many of the characteristics of the pre-emancipation *kehilla*. Furthermore, the acceptance by all sectors of French Jewry of a Judaism denationalized and redefined as a religious sect was not complete until 1960. For Girard documents considerable Orthodox resistance not only to the introduction of religious reforms but also to the domination of the consistories by the less observant 'notables' and to the articulation of extreme forms of assimilationist ideology.

In his treatment of the doctrines of assimilation, the author argues persuasively against the view of assimilation as total and abject surrender to the values of the larger society. The expression of all but the most radical assimilationist doctrines, he notes correctly, coexisted with a high degree of particularism. The propagators of assimilation did not seek the disappearance of Judaism but rather the redefinition of the relationship of Judaism to the dominant society in response to the new legal status of the Jews. In doing so, according to Girard, they 'assured, in difficult conditions, the maintenance of a certain form of Jewish identity in France' (p. 11).

Girard's description of the religious and ideological conflicts within French Jewry in the first half of the nineteenth century raises a number of questions to which his volume only begins to offer answers. Do the several doctrines of assimilation identified by Girard represent real, or

merely semantic, differences? Do they correspond to different social groups? The author provides little information on the social origins either of the articulators of different models of assimilation or of the contending camps in the struggles over religious reform. Moreover, while Girard admits that by 1860 all segments of French Jewry accepted the definition of Judaism as a religion rather than a nationality, he offers little explanation for the emergence of this ideological consensus.

He does better at accounting for the religious compromise which paralleled the ideological consensus. The dissension between orthodox and reformers resulted in a schism neither of the right nor of the left but in the introduction of moderate reform in ritual. Girard suggests that the legalistic mentality of the reformers and their expectations of the consistory preserved unity on the left, while the dependence of orthodox rabbis on the consistories for their jobs as well as the gradual implementation of reforms protected the right flank. More emphasis should be placed, perhaps, on the role of the consistorial structure itself in moderating the reformist impulse while remaining open to change, and in keeping the orthodox, however grudgingly, within the fold. Indicative of the importance of the government-imposed and sanctioned consistorial monopoly on religious organizations is the fact that the separation of church and state in 1905 resulted in the establishment of France's first Reform congregation and in a Congregation of Strict Observance, both unaffiliated with the consistory.

It does not detract from Girard's accomplishment, therefore, to state that his work suggests numerous avenues for further research. The areas of social change (where Girard's information is sketchiest), communal conflict, and religious development should prove most productive. What does detract from the author's otherwise fine study is his tendency to fail to provide evidence for numerous assertions—for example, that the indifferent 'represented at most 5% of the Jewish population' (p. 212)—and to omit sources (as he does throughout the chapter on socio-economic developments) for specific data. He would have served himself and the community of scholars better had his documentation been more complete.

PAULA E. HYMAN

BARRY A. KOSMIN, MARZY BAUER, AND NIGEL GRIZZARD (with an Historical Introduction by Kenneth Lunn), *Steel City Jews: A Study of Ethnicity and Social Mobility in the Jewish Population of the City of Sheffield, South Yorkshire*, iv + 28 pp. Research Unit, Board of Deputies of British Jews, London, 1976, n.p.

This local community study could well serve as a model for other comparative studies in Anglo-Jewish research. It is solidly based on an

historical account of the origins and development of Sheffield and its Jewish community, and on a comprehensive statistical census covering 483 households with a total of 1,159 persons. Besides the clearly presented statistical results covering demographic characteristics, community structure, economic activity, occupational patterns, social mobility, and ethnic identification, this compact Research Report contains rich sociological analysis employing a wide variety of concepts and postulating significant theoretical propositions.

One such proposition put forward is that 'there is a demographic saturation point beyond which ethnicity changes from a resource to a burden'. In other words, 'once an ethnic group is large enough to operate consistently within its own social and economic milieu, and denies itself interaction with the majority group it will lose many of the benefits group solidarity has for the individual members in terms of social and economic mobility'. The authors stress the tentativeness of this proposition by saying that 'no actual percentage can be labelled as the "tipping point"' (p. 28) and that this interrelationship between the two key variables of demography and ethnicity requires further analysis. The proposition could, however, be of close relevance to Jewish as well as other ethnic groups and therefore merits further attention.

In the case of Sheffield Jews ethnicity, the authors tell us, was used as a resource and the group was highly successful in its socio-economic ascendancy. They lapse, however, into unnecessary value judgement when they apply the term 'success' more widely to describe not only socio-economic advancement and educational achievement, but also to a shift 'from isolated and community orientated social and political contacts to leadership in city-wide and general interest groups' (p. 24). One may well ask: 'success' from whose or what point of view? For success in the Jewish community's integration process into the wider British society may ultimately mean lack of success in the cohesiveness or continuity of the Jewish people.

Another minor criticism concerns the use of a seventeenfold classification for socio-economic groups. It is clear that when applying this to a relatively small population many of the cells remain empty or are likely to contain few cases (see, for example, Table XIV, p. 24). Therefore, a more condensed classification scheme, showing broader socio-economic categories, would have been advisable.

But on the whole, Dr. Kosmin and his associates have proved how valuable material can be produced by highly competent social scientists even when only modest means are made available to them. And by stressing particularly the importance of local studies Dr. Kosmin has given a further boost to the work of the Board of Deputies' Social and Demographic Research Unit.

ERNEST KRAUSZ

IRVING J. ROSENBAUM, *The Holocaust and Halakhah*, x + 177 pp., The Library of Jewish Law and Ethics (Norman Lamm, ed.), Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1976, $12.50.

Halakhah, from the root *halakh* ('to go', 'to walk') is the Jewish *way*, the detailed pattern of behaviour according to which the observant Jew conducts his life. According to the Halakhic scheme, the ultimate sanction for which is, on its own premisses, the will of God, every one of life's situations has its correct responses, to be discovered by a study of the deliberations of the sages of Israel, these receiving their final recording in the great Codes, the most authoritative of which is the *Shulhan 'Arukh* compiled by Rabbi Joseph Karo in the sixteenth century.

Rabbi Rosenbaum's book is a study of how the lives of approximately half a million Jews were governed by *Halakhah* during the Holocaust period. During that period, Halakhic discussions of the past, some of them purely theoretical, such as when and when not one's life is to be placed in jeopardy, now became severely practical. Here are some of the terrible dilemmas for which Rabbinic guidance was sought. A number of *yeshivah* students had been rounded up to be killed by the Lithuanians, who were only too ready to obey Nazi orders. It was suggested that a Rabbi should try to appeal to the Lithuanians to set the students free; but by so doing he was placing his own life in danger. Is he *obliged* to take the risk and, if he is not, is he *allowed* to endanger his own life for the sake of others? A group of Jews hiding from the Nazis in a bunker noticed that an infant who was with them was beginning to cry; the sound would lead to their discovery and death. One of the men placed a pillow over the infant's face to stifle his cries and, as a result, the child was suffocated. Does the man have to undergo a penance or was his act permissible? On 7 May 1942, the Nazis in Kovno promulgated a decree stating that any Jewish woman found to be pregnant would be put to death immediately. Was it permitted in these circumstances to resort to artificial methods of birth control, and if a woman did become pregnant could she abort her child? In both instances Rabbi E. Oshry, the Rabbinic authority in Kovno, gave a permissive ruling. Rabbi Oshry has published his Responsa on these and similar questions, based on a careful analysis of the Rabbinic sources. Rabbi Rosenbaum describes with great skill, in English, the methods used by Rabbi Oshry and the others in arriving at their decisions.

A different kind of question put to Rabbi Oshry was whether a Jew condemned to forced labour could honestly recite the daily benediction: 'Blessed art Thou, who hast not made me a slave'. The learned Rabbi replied:

> Heaven forfend that they should abolish the saying of this benediction, which was instituted by the great sages of old. On the contrary, especially at this time is the obligation upon us to recite this benediction; in order

that our enemies and oppressors recognize that, in spite of the fact that we are in their power to do with us as their evil desires dictate, we still see ourselves not as slaves, but as free men, temporarily in captivity, whose salvation will speedily come and whose redemption will soon be revealed.

From it all there emerges the astonishing power of the *Halakhah* to inspire its followers with an almost superhuman courage. As their foes set alight the mad fires of death and destruction, these Jews and their Rabbis tried to bring some semblance of order and sobriety into the Hell in which they found themselves, affirming to the end that there are objective standards of right and wrong, that man by his reasoning powers is capable of discovering these and applying them, and that, in the process, God is served even though He has hidden His face. As the Editor remarks in his Preface: 'Thus, a semblance of normality was restored to the inmates of the vicious madhouse, as the norms of the Halakhah provided a minimal psychic structure of human dignity and morale.'

LOUIS JACOBS

CHRONICLE

The Seventh Yonina Talmon Prize will be given in 1978 for an article on the Sociology of Collective Settlements. This prize carries an award of $350.00.

Unpublished work and that under consideration for publication may be submitted. Manuscripts must be in either English, French, or Hebrew and be appropriate for publication in a social science journal. Published work is not acceptable. Persons may apply up to ten years after receiving their doctorates.

Candidates should submit six copies of their manuscript and six copies of their curriculum vitae as follows:

Hebrew manuscripts:	c/o The Yonina Talmon Prize Chairman, Department of Sociology The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
French and English manuscripts:	Dr. Charlotte Green Schwartz 164 Gardner Road Brookline, Massachusetts 02146 U.S.A.

The deadline for the receipt of manuscripts is 1 November 1977. For further details, please write to the Secretary of the Department of Sociology at The Hebrew University or to Dr. Charlotte Schwartz.

Selection Committee for 1977: Steve Barnett, Joseph Ben-David, A. L. Epstein, Esther N. Goody, Charlotte Green Schwartz, and Dov Weintraub.

*

The European Branch of the World Jewish Congress inaugurated earlier this year a programme to establish the nucleus of a Jewish communal library in eight small communities in Europe. About 150 books were donated to each centre and in each case 'it was ascertained that there is a responsible organization capable of maintaining the libraries and that adequate facilities existed for housing them'.

There are only two existing libraries (in Athens and Bremen) which have also benefited under the scheme. 'The consignment to each community includes books in the language of the country, or books in languages according to the community's requirements. Thus, most of the libraries include books in two, three or even more languages.

The books are all recent publications and cover fiction and non-fiction. The main emphasis was given to basic publication in fields such as Jewish history, sociology, philosophy and religion, Holocaust literature and volumes

on Israel and Zionism, enriched by biographies of famous Jewish personalities. Each library is also being presented with some books in easy Hebrew for adults and children, and most of them also with books in Yiddish.'

This is a pilot project which, if successful, will be expanded. It was made possible by a grant from the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture.

*

Israel's first Arab Book Week was held last October, under the aegis of the Arts and Culture Council of the Ministry of Education. A total of 19,000 books were displayed at three 'exhibition points'; although the emphasis was on the works of Israeli Arabs, thousands of books were brought from Jordan, Egypt, and other Arab states.

*

A Hebrew-Georgian Dictionary has been published in Tel Aviv, under the sponsorship of the B'nai B'rith Lodge of Jewish immigrants from Georgia. About 40,000 Jews from Soviet Georgia have settled in Israel in the last decade.

*

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem awarded last December Master of Public Health degrees to 16 students who have attended its international course in public health and social medicine. The students came from Bolivia, Brazil, Holland, Honduras, Thailand, and the United States to attend the 15-month course leading to the degree of M.P.H.

The University also runs an international course in groundwater research, for the exploration and exploitation of water resources. In the autumn of 1976, 13 students from ten countries were registered. They included engineers, hydrologists, and geologists from Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Swaziland, Thailand, and Turkey.

Both the public health and groundwater courses are given in English, and both include extensive field work in addition to classroom studies.

*

The President of the American Friends of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem announced last March the establishment of a new Chair of Central European Jewish History. Hungarian Jews in America 'responded with great enthusiasm' when the proposal was first suggested; the Chair will be named after a former President of the American Branch of the World Federation of Hungarian Jews.

*

It was announced last March that the Universities of Berne and Bar Ilan have signed an agreement to pool general scientific and academic data. There will also be an exchange of lecturers and graduate students and joint research projects.

*

The State University of New York announced last January that it had entered into a programme of cultural and scholarly exchange with seven Israeli institutions of higher learning: the universities of Bar Ilan, Ben Gurion, Haifa, and Tel Aviv as well as the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; and the Technion and the Weizmann Institute.

The programme will start this year; there will be collaboration in research projects as well as exchanges of students and teachers.

*

The Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel published last January a survey of family expenditure. In 1976, the average monthly family income was I.L. 4,088 gross, and I.L. 3,250 net. Those of American/European origin had a monthly per capita income of I.L. 1,225 compared with I.L. 675 for those of Asian/African origin.

There has been a decline since 1968/69 in family expenditure 'on education and culture' from 13 to 10 per cent. On the other hand, consumption of subsidized goods has risen—for example, in the case of milk, from a monthly average of 14 litres per household in 1969 to 22 litres in 1976.

The rate of savings from income decreased from 11 to seven per cent.

*

Last March the Minister of Social Welfare was reported to have stated in the Knesset that there had been a steady decrease in the number of persons receiving financial assistance from the State. The total in March 1975 was about 98,000; two years later, in February 1977, it had dropped by 34,000 to 64,000.

*

The head of the 'corrections division' of the Ministry of Social Welfare in Israel announced last March that there had been a decrease in the number of juvenile offenders from 8,895 in 1975 to 7,516 in 1976. All minors arrested are referred to the youth probation service of the Ministry. The rate of recidivism was highest among 16-year-olds.

It is believed that the decline in juvenile crime is partly due to the increased social and educational services available to the disadvantaged young. Many schools now have social workers who can help pupils likely to commit offences.

*

The Israeli commissioner for tourism in North America is reported to have stated last February that 225,000 Americans visited Israel in 1976—a 33 per cent increase over the previous year.

The total number of tourists in 1976 was 795,000—28 per cent higher than in 1975 and nine per cent more than in the previous record year of 1972. He estimated that more than a third of United States tourists are non-Jews;

the number of visits by Christian pilgrims, especially from the Southern States, has shown a dramatic increase.

*

More than 100,000 French tourists went to Israel in 1976—a 50 per cent increase on the 1975 total. France now leads all European countries and comes second only after the United States. Two main reasons have been put forward: the devaluation of the Israeli pound, and the offer of package tours which have proved especially attractive in the French provinces.

*

More than 76,000 tourists from the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland went to Israel in 1976—an increase of 11 per cent over the previous year. There were fewer visitors from cruise ships, spending only a day or two in Israel, and more who stayed at least two weeks.

*

The Ministry of Tourism in Israel announced last April that a record number of visitors came to the country in the first quarter of 1977: 190,000. This is 30 per cent more than in the same period in 1976; the income from tourism increased by 25 per cent.

*

The Israel Aliyah Centre announced in Toronto last February that the number of Israelis returning home from Canada in 1976 doubled in comparison with the previous year: 149 against 74 in 1975.

In 1976, there were 243 Canadians going to Israel as new immigrants; there had been 210 in 1975. Quebec Province led aliyah figures in 1976, with 138.

Israelis returning home from the whole of North America numbered 2,334—almost three times as many as in 1975, when there were 843.

*

The Hebrew Immigration Aid Services reported that some 600 Soviet Jews who were to go to Israel came to Canada in 1976—about the same number as in 1975.

There are now about 2,000 Soviet Jews in Toronto; several hundred of them met last February to establish the Association of Jewish Immigrants from the Soviet Union. Concern was expressed about, among other things, employment, medical care, housing, and cultural-educational-religious matters.

About 110 Russian Jewish families (close to 300 persons) have settled in Winnipeg since 1973, according to a report issued last February by the Jewish Child and Family Service, which has assisted them to settle. Of the

41 families who came in 1976, 10 needed help for only one month, 14 for two months, and 12 for three months; five remained on 'the aid rolls' for a further month only. Basic furniture and houshold items were given to each family by the Service as an outright gift.

The Winnipeg immigrants have established two associations: the New Life Club, to meet their social and cultural needs; and the Manitoba Association of Russian Specialists, which helps new arrivals with advice about suitable employment.

*

The Aliyah Centre in New York stated last March that its 16 offices in the U.S.A. and Canada dealt with a total of 2,545 North Americans who emigrated to Israel in 1976—a small increase on the 1975 total of 2,357.

Those figures do not include emigrants who did not seek assistance or North Americans already in Israel (as tourists or students) who changed their status.

*

According to the Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency, there has been a recent increase in the number of South Africans settling in Israel: 432 in 1974; 415 in 1975; and 583 in 1976.

*

The October 1976 issue of *Jewish Affairs* has a brief survey of Jewish education in Johannesburg. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Johannesburg Hebrew Congregation established a Jewish School which provided both religious and secular instruction. There are now in Johannesburg several nursery schools with an enrolment of about 2,000, Jewish Day Schools with 4,030 pupils, and afternoon Hebrew Schools which cater for about 1,100.

Johannesburg has also had for some years a seminary for the training of Hebrew teachers; a total of about 260 have graduated and are employed not only in South African schools but also abroad.

*

The International Conference on the Sociology of Religion will hold a meeting at Strasbourg from 28 August to 1 September. The theme of the meeting will be on religious and secular symbolism and social classes. There will also be special sessions on the sociology of religion in Japan, in South America, and in Poland as well as on 'The Religious Situation in Alsace'.

About 50 papers will be presented; they will be available before the Conference to all those who will have registered. The address of the Secretariat is 39 rue de la Monnaie, 59042 Lille Cedex, France.

*

We have been asked to print the following announcement:

'In memory of the late Yitzhak Tabenkin, one of the leading founders of the labour and kibbutz movements in Israel, the Kibbutz Ha'meuchad movement has founded the Yitzhak Tabenkin Institute for Kibbutz Studies.

The aim of the Institute is to further the systematic study of the kibbutz and other communal societies by a variety of activities, among them, the establishment of a special library and archives, the holding of Advanced and Graduate Studies in conjunction with the University of Tel Aviv, publications, and local and international symposia and seminars.'

Correspondence should be addressed to The Secretary, Tabenkin Institute for Kibbutz Studies, P.O.B. 16040, Tel Aviv 52955, Israel.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Bogue, Donald J. and Elizabeth J. Bogue, *Essays in Human Ecology1*, viii + 138 pp., Community and Family Monographs, Community and Family Study Center, Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, 1976, n.p.

Brownmiller, Susan, *Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape*, 472 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977, 95p.

de Beauvoir, Simone, *Old Age*, translated by Patrick O'Brian, 654 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977, £1.95.

Della Pergola, Sergio, *Anatomia dell'ebraismo italiano: Caratteristiche demografiche, economiche, sociali, religiose e politiche di una minoranza*, xvi + 358 pp., Collana di Cultura Ebraica, no. 4, Beniamino Carucci Editore, Assisi and Rome, 1976, L. 8,000.

Etzioni-Halevy, Eva with Rina Shapira, *Political Culture in Israel: Cleavage and Integration among Israeli Jews*, xxvi + 249 pp., Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government, Praeger, New York, 1977, £13.40.

Fitzgerald, Mike, *Prisoners in Revolt*, 278 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977, £1.00.

Goldmann, Nahum, *Community of Fate, Jews in the Modern World: Essays, Speeches and Articles*, with an Introduction by A. J. Sherman, xii + 178 pp., Israel Universities Press, Jerusalem, 1977, $5.95.

Goodman, Saul L., ed., *The Faith of Secular Jews*, with an Introduction by the editor, xiii + 301 pp., The Library of Judaic Learning (Jacob Neusner, ed.), Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1976, $15.00 (paperback, $5.95).

Halevy, Zvi, *Jewish Schools Under Czarism and Communism, A Struggle for Cultural Identity*, with a Foreword by George Z. F. Bereday, vi + 298 pp., Springer, New York, 1976, $14.50.

Halpérin, Jean and Georges Levitte, eds., *La conscience juive face à le guerre: données et débats, XVIe Colloque d'Intellectuels juifs de Langue française organisé par la Section Française du Congrès Juif Mondial*, x + 163 pp., Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1976, n.p.

Halpern, Joel M., ed., *From Shtetl to Destruction: The Jewish Experience in Eastern Europe*, compiled by Eliyho Matzozky, 39 pp., Exchange Bibliography no. 1240, Council of Planning Librarians, Monticello, Ill., 1977, $4.00.

Har-Paz, H., Martin Wolins, Isabel Sivan, and Nili Koren, *Young Adults on Welfare: Trends, Objectives and Expectations*, xxxv + 149 pp., Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality Dept. of Research and Statistics, Tel Aviv-Yafo, 1977, $5.00.

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Young People, xxvii + 76 pp., Survey no. 50, Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality Research and Statistical Dept., Tel Aviv-Yafo, 1976, $4.00.

Hartman, David, *Maimonides: Torah and Philosophic Quest*, with a Foreword by Shlomo Pines, xvii + 296 pp., The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1976, $7.95.

Heilman, Samuel C., *Synagogue Life: A Study in Symbolic Interaction*, xiii + 306 pp., Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1976 (first published in 1973), £9.95.

Heller, Celia S., *On the Edge of Destruction: Jews of Poland Between the Two World Wars*, xi + 369 pp., Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1977, $14.95.

Jones, Catherine, *Immigration and Social Policy in Britain*, ix + 291 pp., Tavistock, London, 1977, £7.85.

Kessner, Thomas, *The Golden Door: Italian and Jewish Immigrant Mobility in New York City, 1880–1915*, xxi + 224 pp., The Urban Life in America Series (Richard C. Wade, general ed.), Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1977, £7.95.

Kippenberg, Hans G., ed., *Seminar: Die Entstehung der antiken Klassengesellschaft*, 393 pp., Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1977, n.p.

Lang, David Marshall and Christopher Walker, *The Armenians*, 24 pp., Report no. 32, Minority Rights Group, 36 Craven Street, London WC2, 1976, 45p.

Linzer, Norman, ed., *Understanding Bereavement and Grief: Proceedings of two Interdisciplinary Educational Conferences in 1974 and 1975, co-sponsored by the Jewish Funeral Directors of America, Inc., Yeshiva University and allied professions*, co-edited by Harriet Feiner and Adelaide Jablonsky, xvi + 253 pp., Ktav Publishing House, Yeshiva Univ. Press and Jewish Funeral Directors of America, Inc., New York, 1977, $15.00 (paperback, $6.95).

Mendelsohn, Ezra, ed., *Essays on the American Jewish Labor Movement*, vii + 423 pp., Yivo Annual of Jewish Social Science, vol. XVI, Yivo Institute for Jewish Research, New York, 1976, n.p.

Mitford, Jessica, *The American Prison Business*, 329 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977 (first published in 1973), £1.00.

Newman, Aubrey, *The United Synagogue, 1870–1970*, xv + 239 pp., Routledge and Kegan Paul, Henley-on-Thames, 1977, £5.50.

Nir, Yeshayahu, *The Israeli-Arab Conflict in Soviet Caricatures, 1967–1973: A Research Monograph in Visual Communication*, (Yechiel Bar-Chaim, English ed.), 126 pp., Tcherikover, Tel Aviv, 1976, n.p.

O'Neill, John, ed., *On Critical Theory*, vi + 265 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1977, £5.50.

Sephiha, Haïm Vidal, *L'Agonie des Judéo-Espagnols*, 131 pp., Editions Entente, Paris, 1977, n.p.

Strassfeld, Sharon and Michael Strassfeld, eds., *The Second Jewish Catalog, Sources and Resources*, with editorial help from Mark Nulman, Nessa Rapoport, and Levi Kelman, 464 pp., The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1976, $7.50.

Surgeon, George, Judith Mayo, and Donald J. Bogue, *Race Relations in Chicago, Second Survey, 1975*, viii + 182 pp., Community and Family

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Tomalin, Claire, *The Life and Death of Mary Wollstonecraft*, 398 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977 (first published in 1974), £1.50.

West, D. J. and Farrington, D. P., *The Delinquent Way of Life: Third Report of the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development*, with the assistance of Gwen Gundry, B. J. Knight, and S. G. Osborn, ix + 209 pp., Cambridge Studies in Criminology XXXV (Sir Leon Radzinowicz, general ed.), The Heinemann Library of Criminology and Penal Reform, Heinemann, London, 1977, £6.00.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

ETZIONI-HALEVY, Eva; Ph.D. Senior Lecturer, Department of Sociology, Tel Aviv University. Chief publication: co-author, *Who is the Israeli Student?* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1973. Forthcoming publication: co-author, *Political Culture in Israel*, New York, 1977. Currently engaged in a comparative study of electoral manipulation.

GUREVITCH, Michael; Ph.D. Lecturer in Sociology, The Open University. Formerly Lecturer and Associate Director, The Communications Institute, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Chief publications: co-author, 'Towards a Comparative Framework for Political Communication Research', in Steven Chaffee, ed., *Political Communication*, Beverly Hills, Calif., 1975; co-author, *The Secularization of Leisure: Culture and Communication in Israel*, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1976; co-editor, *Mass Communication and Society*, London, 1977.

HALEVY, Zvi; Ph.D. Senior Lecturer, Centre for Educational Studies, University of New England, Australia. Formerly Assistant Professor, Brooklyn College, City University of New York. Chief publications: *Jewish Schools in Russia*, New York, 1976; *Jewish University Students and Professionals in Tsarist and Soviet Russia* (monograph), Tel Aviv, 1976.

ICHILOV, Orit; Ph.D. Lecturer, School of Education, Tel Aviv University. Formerly Lecturer, Hunter College, City University of New York. Chief publications: co-author, 'The Social Foundations of Education in Israel', in C. Ormian, ed., *Education in Israel*, Jerusalem, 1973; 'Educational Alternatives for Youth Outside School in Israel', *Studies in Educational Administration and Organization*, no. 5, 1976. Forthcoming publication: co-author, 'Girls' Attitudes Toward their Future Families as Related to their Perception of Existing Patterns in their Family of Origin', in *Journal of Marriage and the Family*. Currently engaged in a study of the perception of 'The Good Citizen" by Israeli adolescents.

KAMEN, Charles S; Ph.D. Lecturer, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Haifa. Formerly Research Director, Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, Jerusalem. Chief publications: *Research Methods in Social Science* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1976; co-author, *The Demand for Urban Water*, Leiden, 1976. Currently engaged in studies of the creation of tradition through the establishment of national holidays, and of the institutionalization of social norms.

TAME, Chris R.; B.A. Employed at the Institute of Economic Affairs, London. Chief publications: 'Revisionism from the Centre', *Libertarian Forum*, vol. IV, no. 9, November 1972; 'Max Stirner in Context: The Profanization of Hegelianism and the Genesis of Marx's Historical Materialism', *Minus One*, no. 32, 1973; 'Man, Concepts, and Society', *Wertfrei*, no. 2, Spring 1974; co-author, 'A Note on Lionel Robbins', ibid. Forthcoming publication: 'The Revolution of Reason: Professor Gay, the Enlightenment, and the Ambiguities of Classical Liberalism',

Journal of Libertarian Studies, vol. 1, no. 3. Currently engaged in research on the history of American radical thought, on the methodology of the social sciences, and on Classical Liberalism.

TOLL, William; Ph.D. Assistant Professor, Department of History, University of Oregon. Chief publications: 'Harold Cruse on the Negro Intellectual', *Midcontinent American Studies Journal*, vol. XI, no. 2, November 1973; 'W. E. B. DuBois and Frederick Jackson Turner: The Unveiling and Preemption of America's "Inner History"', *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, vol. LXV, no. 2, April 1974; 'The Genie of Race: Problems in Conceptualizing the Treatment of Black Americans', *Journal of Ethnic Studies*, vol. IV, no. 3, Fall 1976. Currently engaged in research on American Black intellectuals in 1880–1920.

WEINGROD, Alex; Ph.D. Professor of Anthropology, Department of Behavioural Science, Ben Gurion University of the Negev; President, Israel Anthropological Association. Formerly Professor of Anthropology, Brandeis University. Chief publications: *Israel: A Study in Group Relations*, New York, 1965; *Reluctant Pioneers*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1966; 'Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 10, no. 3, 1968; 'Patronage and Power' in E. Gellner and J. Waterbury, eds., *Patrons and Clients*, 1977. Currently engaged in a study of local disputes in contemporary Jerusalem.

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