

THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Published on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

VOLUME XVIII: NUMBER 2: DECEMBER 1976

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The Jewish Journal of Sociology

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PUBLISHED TWICE YEARLY

on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

Annual Subscription £3.00 (U.S. \$7.50) post free

Single Copies £1.75p (\$4.00)

Applications for subscriptions should be addressed to the Managing Editor, The Jewish Journal of Sociology, 55 New Cavendish Street, London W1M 8BT

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EDITORIAL

The first three papers in this issue (by Deborah Dash Moore, Paula Hyman, and Stephen M. Poppel) were delivered at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association on 29 December 1975.

JEWISH ETHNICITY AND ACCULTURATION IN THE 1920s: PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW YORK CITY

Deborah Dash Moore

A FRESH debate about the nature of democracy in the United States engaged the attention of articulate Americans during the First World War.¹ The controversy, fuelled by the ferment and anti-foreigner hysteria of the war years, focused on the immigrants' position in American society. In this debate, which had profound implications, American Jews, in defending their own interests, found themselves defending also the rights of all immigrants and their native-born children.² In opposition to them stood the Americanizers, who rejected the previously popular melting-pot image of American immigrant assimilation both as too slow a process and as essentially undesirable because of its ultimately unknown end-product.³ Instead, they aggressively demanded from the immigrants speedy assimilation or Americanization, defined as anglo-conformity—that is, conforming to established Anglo-American social and cultural patterns.⁴ They proposed to achieve assimilation through rapid Americanization educational programmes designed to strip immigrants of their foreignness and transform them into Americans. The ability to speak English—which the earlier United Kingdom immigrants of course possessed—was put forward as a major requirement.⁵ In their search for an acceptable American alternative to Americanization, the Jews of the United States also rejected the melting pot. They responded to the Americanizers' explicit assimilationist ideology with the vision of democratic pluralism, which—as elaborated by such American Jewish thinkers as Horace Kallen—justified both a degree of immigrant acculturation and continued ethnic group existence in the United States.⁶ In values, language, and mores, immigrants and their children would accept the Anglo-American model; but in their personal customs, historical heritage, and social organization, they would preserve their differences and pass them on to succeeding generations. Kallen's symbol of democratic

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harmony was the symphony orchestra with each ethnic group, or instrument, contributing its uniqueness to the pluralist whole.⁷ Most American Jews recognized the idea of immigrant acculturation implicit in the theory of democratic pluralism as a legitimately American ideological alternative to assimilation. Now American Jews needed to wed the ideal of democratic pluralism to a viable programme which would ensure the survival of Jews in the United States.

Such a programme appeared in the doctoral dissertations of two American-educated Eastern European Jews, Isaac Berkson and Alexander Dushkin,⁸ who adopted the theory of democratic pluralism and built an educational programme on it. They proposed that education be the means to shape and promote Jewish ethnic group separateness in the United States. In making Jewish education the instrument for Jewish ethnic persistence in America, Berkson and Dushkin leaned heavily on John Dewey's theories of progressive education, especially his idea of education as a social process.⁹ Thus, as they faced the 1920s, American Jews had at hand a theory of democratic pluralism justifying their acculturation into American society while maintaining their separate group identity, and an educational programme designed to promote both Jewish acculturation and the continued existence of their ethnic group. They now only had to apply these concepts to the reality of American Jewish life. In the 1920s, an influential group of Jewish educators, with blueprints in hand, made a significant effort to put into practice these new theories; they turned their energies to the real life laboratory of New York City.

These educators shared similar backgrounds as children of Jewish immigrants who had attended the city's free public schools, arriving finally at Columbia University Teacher's College and the Jewish Theological Seminary. There they absorbed the theories of progressive education and cultural Zionism advocated by such influential teachers as William Kilpatrick at Columbia and Israel Friedlaender and Mordecai M. Kaplan at the Seminary. Armed with that inspiration, many sought careers in Jewish education; and a number became the leading American Jewish educators of the 1920s and 1930s; among them were Berkson, Dushkin, Samuel Dinin, Mordecai Soltes, Leo Honor, and Samuel Citron.¹⁰ Eager to devote themselves to the cause of Jewish religious education and dedicated to the free public school system as the socializing agent of democracy, they developed a theory of acculturation which, in the words of Israel Friedlaender, allowed them to 'sacrifice nothing that is essential to Judaism': they would not 'impoverish Judaism but enrich it'. They declared that this perspective would 'take fully into account what the environment demands of us, and shall yet preserve and foster our Jewish distinctiveness and originality'.¹¹ However, the ultimate justification for Jewish group preservation, as Berkson explicitly pointed out, was 'based not upon

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any demonstration of the value of the cultural contribution that any . . . group might make but upon the right to life and expression of personality inherent in the nature of the individual'.¹²

In confronting the facts of New York Jewish life in the 1920s, these educators moved in two different directions. Their concept of democratic pluralism assumed that any programme of Jewish education would supplement—but not supplant—that of the American state school.¹³ For them, a commitment to American democracy meant a commitment to public education; they therefore directed most of their efforts to restructuring Jewish extracurricular education in the city.¹⁴ However, democratic pluralism and progressive education also provided a mandate to restructure the state school into an instrument of ethnic legitimation as well as of acculturation. It was not sufficient merely for American and Jewish educators to acknowledge the consonance of American and Jewish values, the shared ethical and Biblical tradition. They must go further: Jewish educators could ask New York City schools in the name of democratic pluralism and progressive education explicitly to include the legitimation of ethnic diversity in America in its pantheon of ideals. However, to do so required that Jews face the hurdle of the separation of church and state. Therefore, Jewish identity first had to be conceived in secular, non-sectarian terms, so that Jews might successfully obtain recognition from the school authorities.¹⁵

The realities of New York City Jewish life encouraged the educators to resolve this dilemma quickly. Supplementary Jewish education was in disarray; Jewish educators were aware that despite all their efforts they reached, at most, only 27 per cent of the Jewish school population. By comparison, the city's schools enrolled almost all Jewish school-children—a mere one per cent of whom had chosen to attend Jewish day schools.¹⁶ Clearly, as Mordecai Kaplan noted, Jews had to look to the city's schools and universities for a part of the Jewish educative process. Kaplan saw no difficulty, since 'no culture can be complete without the principal cultural values of the Jewish civilization, especially those identified with the Bible'.¹⁷ For him, Judaism was an evolving religious civilization; Jewish acculturation and ethnic persistence in America required active participation in two civilizations. Although many Jewish educators welcomed Kaplan's forthright justification of the legitimacy of using the public educational network as an instrument to teach Jews about their Jewish culture, they shunned his emphasis on teaching the Bible. Kaplan himself acknowledged that 'the resistance which Jews everywhere display to the introduction of Bible reading into the schools is perfectly understandable and justified, because the spirit in which those who seek to make Bible reading a part of the school curriculum is sectarian'. However, he continued, by opposing the teaching of the Bible as literature in the

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city schools 'the Jews allow themselves to be manocuvred into a position which prevents their own children from ever gaining a knowledge of the Bible. Obviously, Jewish children will not get to know the Bible, if they are to depend solely for that knowledge upon their religious or Hebrew schools.'¹⁸

The cogency of Kaplan's argument notwithstanding, the majority of Jewish educators—convinced of the validity of using the city school as an agent of Jewish education—looked elsewhere for an appropriate vehicle to maintain Jewish identity; ultimately, they chose Hebrew language instruction as a subject to be taught in city schools.¹⁹ That choice brought to the forefront Zionist ideas concerning the nature of Jewish group separateness. The Zionist approach was secular and nationalist, encouraging comparisons of the Jews with other national groups in the United States. The Zionist ideas the educators employed derived largely from the Hebrew writer Ahad Ha'am;²⁰ their programmes stressed Jewish cultural and spiritual contributions to the world, but mastery of Hebrew loomed large in Zionist educational goals. For Zionists, knowledge of Hebrew had precedence over the Bible as the core of Jewish education.²¹ Thus, both in their definition of Jewish ethnic identity and in their educational programme, the Zionists tended to avoid a religious focus.

The rationale finally developed by these educators was presented to the New York City Board of Education in 1929. In justifying their proposals, they drew upon several sources and attracted widespread support among many segments of New York's Jews. The committee advocating the cause of Hebrew instruction included such notable New York City Jewish spokesmen as the Zionist leader and liberal rabbi, Stephen Wise; the Bureau of Jewish Education director Samson Benderly; the Republican politician (and later president of the Board of Aldermen), Bernard Deutsch; the Republican judge and Jewish philanthropist, Otto Rosalsky; and Congressman Nathan Perlman.²² These men specifically urged the Board to encourage local schools with large numbers of Jewish pupils to re-evaluate their definition of 'American' so as to include the recognition and promotion of Jewish secular ethnicity. In arguing for the acceptance of democratic pluralism in the high school curriculum, they deliberately dissociated religion from any description of Jewish identity. Instead, they defined Jewish ethnicity in cultural and national terms, frequently comparing Jews to New York's Italians or Germans.²³ The influence of cultural Zionism appeared also in their emphasis on the contemporary relevance of Hebrew rather than on its classical background. The spokesmen generally avoided comparisons with Latin or Greek:²⁴ 'Hebrew was to be taught as a living language', said Judah Lapson, and thus 'it was decided to employ the Sephardic pronunciation as spoken by the Yishuv in Palestine.'²⁵

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Use was also made of progressive educational theories in the arguments presented to the Board. Dewey's teachings, which put a new emphasis on the child's individual personality in society, allowed foreign language instruction to be seen from a different angle. Lapson noted that foreign languages became 'vehicles for developing the student's social awareness and for encouraging his appreciation of foreign cultures. If the culture he is to study is that of his parents and grandparents, so much the better'; Lapson continued that in that case the student 'comes more easily to accept both this culture and himself, develops into a better integrated personality and, hence into a better citizen as well'.²⁶

A lengthy memorandum was presented to the Board of Education in 1930 by Israel Chipkin, who was the head of the Jewish Education Association. To the Board's contention that Hebrew instruction would violate the separation of church and state, Chipkin replied: 'Democracy demands the recognition of all cultural values, and the free opportunity for all pupils, whatever their origin, to elect the studies which prove of interest and value to them . . .'²⁷ He went on to stress the major concern of American Jews, asking, 'to what degree is the public school system helping these [Jewish] children towards a self realization and towards the greatest contribution to society'. It was time for the Board of Education to correct the injustice the schools perpetrated on the children of Jewish immigrants. Jewish educators were 'repeatedly confronted with the physical and psychological maladjustments among Jewish youth which can be traced to the effects of public school education, which have estranged child from parent.' Chipkin explained that the Jewish child 'has been given a new set of values and has grown up in ignorance of those of his forbears. He has frequently grown up not only to misunderstand his parents and the people from whence he sprung, but to dislike them and to consider them a burden.'²⁸ It was hoped that Hebrew instruction under the Board of Education's auspices would restore the Jewish child's respect for his heritage, for his family, and for himself.

Despite the rhetoric and the concern about the devastating generational conflict which resulted from the Americanizing city schools, the supporters of Hebrew language instruction ignored the obvious claims of Yiddish—which was, after all, the daily language of most immigrants and the mother tongue of many of their children. Logically, the recognition of a secular Jewish ethnic identity in America could best be fulfilled by the teaching of Yiddish since that language truly paralleled Italian or German as the national language of immigrants who deserved to be included under the American umbrella of democratic pluralism.²⁹ In rejecting Yiddish, the educators placed Zionist imperatives above the need to lessen generational strife in immigrant households. Hebrew language instruction went hand in hand with

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acculturation; the Jewish identification it promoted focused on the spiritual goal of recreating a Jewish life in Palestine rather than on the practical reality of Jewish origins in eastern Europe. Nevertheless, in order to obtain the Board's consent that Hebrew be taught in the city's schools, first and second-generation Jews joined forces—as did American Jewish teachers and principals of the city schools and Jewish school teachers and principals.³⁰

Initially the seven-member Board of Education headed by George Ryan turned down the request in 1929: although the 1920s proved to be the most favourable to progressive educational theories in New York City, the Board decided that Hebrew instruction was sectarian. But when the Board's Jewish member—Samuel Levy, an orthodox Jew and ardent supporter of Yeshiva College—asked that the decision be reconsidered, the Board authorized in 1930 two experimental classes in two new Brooklyn high schools, Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln. Jefferson drew students from predominantly immigrant Jewish Brownsville while Lincoln's district included the second-generation Jewish neighbourhoods of Coney Island, Sheepshead, and parts of Flatbush. Two progressive American Jewish educators, Elias Lieberman and Gabriel Mason, served as principals of Jefferson and Lincoln respectively. They sympathized with the cause of Hebrew language instruction and its corollary, Jewish ethnic recognition by the public schools. Lieberman and Mason encouraged parents to let their children attend the experimental classes and they facilitated the introduction of Hebrew. Student enthusiasm for Hebrew was clearly evident in enrolment figures and led the Board to declare the experiment a success after one probationary semester. Thus, in 1931, Hebrew became an elective subject in the New York City high school curriculum.³¹

The Board of Education requirement of a three-year and a two-year language sequence for high school graduation did not make Hebrew compete for students of French or German, since many colleges did not accept Hebrew for admission purposes. Hebrew just became a popular two-year course.³² By 1940, there were 657 students in 20 classes who studied Hebrew at Jefferson, compared with 95 students in the original two classes. Hebrew instruction also spread throughout the city's high schools wherever Jews constituted a large segment of the enrolment. A decade after it was provisionally accepted by the Board of Education, more than 3,000 pupils in 11 high schools and three junior high schools were taught Hebrew by 33 teachers. Although only four per cent of the total number of Jewish high school students studied Hebrew in all high schools in 1940, this percentage rose in the local high schools where Hebrew was taught. At Jefferson, for example, 10 per cent of the Jewish pupils chose Hebrew.³³

Hebrew instruction in the city high schools acquired a significance

greater than might be suggested by the number of students enrolled. These classes not only reached a type of Jewish student who would not have taken up Hebrew in religious schools, but also offered a level of learning not often matched by part time Jewish schools. Even the majority of the Jewish pupils who did not choose Hebrew seemed to benefit psychologically from its presence in the curriculum: its recognition by municipal, and later by state, authorities symbolized American acceptance of the legitimacy of Jewish culture.³⁴ For American Jews in general, high school Hebrew instruction represented an example of democratic pluralism at work in the American state schools and pointed to the viability of a secular Jewish ethnic identity.

The achievement of that identity—resulting from the progressive educational theory which stressed the uniqueness and right to expression of each individual personality—was a successful transformation from the American appreciation of individuality into American legitimation of group distinctiveness. However, a viable secular Jewish ethnic identity existed only in the local urban sub-centres where Jews constituted at least a significant proportion of the local population. Within New York City itself, high schools in which Jews were a minority of the student body could not have been—and were not—asked to teach Hebrew; and in such cases the Jews themselves accepted their minority status. Thus, while the comparatively decentralized structure of the United States permitted democratic pluralism to flourish and encouraged the expression of a secular Jewish ethnic identity, that very structure could not be used to effect the transformation of democratic pluralism into a national programme.

NOTES

¹ Most notable, the anti-immigrant feeling aroused during the First World War culminated in the restriction of immigration into the United States. For the significance of this change, see John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925*, New York, 1963, reprinted 1970, p. 330.

² American Jews not only participated in the public debate in the press but also lobbied in Congress in support of immigrants. See Judith Goldstein, 'The Politics of Ethnic Pressure: The American Jewish Committee As Lobbyist, 1906-1917', Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation, 1972, and Naomi Cohen, *Not Free to Desist: The American Jewish Committee 1906-1966*, Philadelphia, 1972, pp. 19-53.

³ On the Americanization movement, see Edward George Hartmann, *The Movement to Americanize the Immigrant*, New York, 1948.

⁴ The best discussion of the different theories of assimilation held by Americans is in Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins*, New York, 1964, especially chapters 4-6.

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⁵ Hartmann, op. cit., pp. 24, 128.

⁶ Horace Meyer Kallen, *Culture and Democracy in the United States: Studies in the Group Psychology of the American Peoples*, New York, 1924, especially 'Democracy vs. the Melting Pot.'

⁷ Kallen, op. cit., pp. 124-25.

⁸ Isaac B. Berkson, *Theories of Americanization: A Critical Study: With Special Reference to the Jewish Group*, New York, 1920, and Alexander M. Dushkin, *Jewish Education in New York City*, New York, 1918.

⁹ John Dewey, *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, New York, 1916, reprinted 1964. For Dewey's impact on Jewish education, see Samuel M. Blumenfeld, 'John Dewey and Jewish Education', in Judah Pilch and Meir Ben-Horin, eds., *Judaism and the Jewish School: Selected Essays on the Direction and Purpose of Jewish Education*, New York, 1966.

¹⁰ See Mordecai M. Kaplan, 'The Teachers Institute', in Cyrus Adler, ed., *The Jewish Theological Seminary: Semi-Centennial Volume*, New York, 1939; and Nathan Winter, *Jewish Education in a Pluralist Society: Samson Benderly and Jewish Education in the United States*, New York, 1966.

¹¹ Quoted in Lawrence A. Cremin, *The Transformation Of the School: Progressivism In American Education, 1876-1957*, New York, 1961, p. 69.

¹² Berkson, op. cit., p. 122.

¹³ A number of Jewish educators, including Dushkin and Benderly, did opt for parochial education for a small dedicated minority, the 'saving remnant'. See Winter, op. cit., p. 114; and Dushkin, op. cit., p. 339.

¹⁴ On general developments in Jewish education during the 1920s and 1930s, see Meir Ben-Horin, 'From the Turn Of The Century To The Late Thirties', in Judah Pilch, ed., *A History of Jewish Education in America*, New York, 1969, pp. 54-113.

¹⁵ On the consonance of American and Jewish values derived from the Biblical tradition, see Daniel J. Elazar, 'American Political Theory and the Political Notions of American Jews: Convergences and Contradictions', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 9, no. 4, June 1967, pp. 10, 17; and see also pp. 13-14 for a brief discussion of the paradoxes leading to Jewish secularism.

¹⁶ Ben Rosen, 'Survey of Jewish Education in New York City', *Jewish Education*, vol. 1, 1929, pp. 82-83. Rosen estimated that 75 per cent of all Jewish schoolchildren attended Jewish schools at some point in their lives.

¹⁷ Mordecai M. Kaplan, *Judaism As A Civilization: Toward A Reconstruction Of American-Jewish Life*, New York, 1934, reprinted 1967, p. 470.

¹⁸ *ibid*, p. 550, footnote 5.

¹⁹ The schools of Chelsea, Massachusetts, and Chicago, Illinois, had set a precedent: they already offered Hebrew-language instruction. See *Jewish Daily Bulletin*, 7 May 1929.

²⁰ Ahad Ha-Am, *Selected Essays*, trans. Leon Simon, Philadelphia, 1936. See especially 'The Spiritual Revival', pp. 253-305.

²¹ On Hebrew, see Menachem Ribalow, 'The role of Hebrew in Jewish Education', pp. 135-37; and on Jewish culture, Hayyim Greenberg, 'Jewish Culture and Education in the Diaspora', pp. 131-34. Both essays are in Pilch and Ben-Horin, eds., op. cit.

²² *Jewish Daily Bulletin*, 4 May 1930.

²³ *Jewish Daily Bulletin*, 7 May 1929 and 4 May 1930. On the significance

for Italians of Italian language instruction in the city schools, see Leonard Covello, *The Heart Is The Teacher*, New York 1958, pp. 135-37, 149-51.

²⁴ *Jewish Daily Bulletin*, 11 January 1929.

²⁵ Judah Lapson, 'Hebrew In The Public Schools', *Jewish Frontier*, reprinted by Jewish Education Committee, New York, 1953, no pagination.

²⁶ Lapson, op. cit.

²⁷ Kaplan, in *Judaism As A Civilization*, op. cit., quotes extensively from the memorandum and gives information concerning Chipkin's authorship.

²⁸ As quoted in Winter, op. cit., pp. 125-27.

²⁹ The Yiddish Culture Society tried to have Yiddish taught as a foreign language in the city schools, but failed. See *Jewish Daily Bulletin*, 1 April and 9 June 1930.

³⁰ In interviews with the author, Dr. Judah Lapson and Rabbi George Ende stressed the importance of local initiative in efforts to get Hebrew introduced into the high schools. On the 'unusual stress laid by the schools on localism' in the 1920s, see Patricia Cayo Sexton, *The American School: A Sociological Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1967, p. 104. For more details on the activities of Jews in New York City regarding Hebrew in the public schools, see *Jewish Daily Bulletin*, 23 December 1930; Judah Lapson, 'Hebrew In High Schools And Colleges', *Hebrew Education*, reprinted by ZOA Pamphlet Series No. 14, New York, 1961, no pagination.

³¹ Lillian Zahn, *Jews In Secular Education* (1942); the typescript is in the New York City Municipal Archives, Works Progress Administration, Historical Records Survey, Jews of New York, Box 3632, Education.

³² Information given in an interview with Rabbi George Ende, 1973; see also Rabbi George Ende and Rabbi Kenneth Davis, 'Memorandum on Hebrew In The Public Schools', 12 November 1973, in Board of Jewish Education, New York City.

³³ Zahn, op. cit. The figures are taken from the Jewish Education Association's Jewish Child Population Study, 1935; typescript in the records of the Board of Jewish Education, New York City.

³⁴ Abraham Halkin, 'Hebrew in America', *Hebrew Comes To Life: The Role of the Hebrew Language and Culture in the Life of the Jewish People*, pamphlet prepared by Histadruth Ivrit of America, New York, n. d., pp. 17-18.

CHALLENGE TO ASSIMILATION: FRENCH JEWISH YOUTH MOVEMENTS BETWEEN THE WARS

Paula Hyman

THE definition of a form of Jewish identity which would allow integration into the larger society while at the same time providing a basis for Jewish group survival has been a major obsession of modern Jewish experience. The solution which the men of the Enlightenment and their successors deemed most appropriate for the conditions of the largely culturally homogeneous western nation-state was the purely religious definition of Jewish identity.¹ Often called the ideology of emancipation (or of assimilation), it promoted and served to legitimize the social and cultural assimilation associated with the process of Jewish emancipation, while retaining religious affiliation as the legitimate form of Jewish group survival.

It was in western Europe that the religious definition of Jewish identity first emerged. As early as the Napoleonic period, French Jews—the first to be emancipated—denied the importance of national elements within Judaism and adopted the comfortable formula of Frenchman by nationality and 'Israélite' by faith. Recognizing that their integration into French society was dependent upon their acceptance of French national culture, they asserted that Judaism was simply a religious creed like Christianity, and that Jewish culture and life-style had no basis other than the religious.² Despite the rapid secularization of French Jewry during the nineteenth century, the religious expression of the nature of Jewish identity remained the only acceptable public formula for Jewish self-definition in France until after the First World War. Even the Dreyfus Affair failed to alter the viewpoint of the vast majority of assimilationists. Its happy, if protracted, conclusion served to confirm their trust in the French political system and their faith in the correctness of their own position.³ In fact, of all European Jewries, the French segment remained most impervious to the message of Zionism, sensing that its assumptions were illegitimate according to French political norms. French Jews

believed that antisemitism did not threaten their own integration into French society.

This paper will examine the challenge to the ideology of emancipation issued by two Jewish youth groups, the *Union Universelle de la Jeunesse Juive* (World Union of Jewish Youth) and the *Eclaireurs Israélites de France* (Jewish Scouts of France). Both were established in 1923 and grew rapidly, with each numbering more than 1,000 members by 1930.⁴ Products of a generation which deliberately defined itself as distinct from its elders, both youth groups developed a critical approach to the adult Jewish community. Like the other national youth groups of post-war France, where the conflict of generations was exacerbated by the sense of a peace lost, they sought to create an authentic community which would by-pass adult institutions and transform society. As Jewish youth movements, they pitted themselves specifically against the older generation of Jewish leaders who determined the structure and content of Jewish communal life. They attributed the failures of that generation to its love affair with assimilation, a love affair which had upset the delicate balance of Frenchman and Jew, and to its hypocrisy at mouthing a religious definition of Jewish identity while remaining non-believing Jews.

Why did the ideology of emancipation, which had dominated French Jewish life for more than a century, encounter its first serious challenge in the youth movements of the inter-war years? Clearly, the tendency of such movements to be critical of the older generation—indeed to crystallize and institutionalize youthful rebelliousness—is one factor. For young Jews who had grown up with assimilation as something to be taken for granted, it was natural to lay the blame for the unresolved Jewish question upon the ideology of assimilation itself, so widely espoused by the older generation of native Jewry. Assimilation even to the point of conversion had been tried and had failed. The post-assimilation native-born young felt that their own alienation from the sources of authentic Jewishness had been a high price to pay for integration into a society willing to accept them only with reservations. As for the children of immigrants, they also believed that their own integration into French society had to follow a pattern different from what they saw as the bankrupt assimilationist model.

The youth movements thus expressed the psychological malaise of that generation. But they also reflected a new demographic fact in French Jewish life: with the arrival of 150,000 to 200,000 immigrants, native French Jews had become a minority of Jewish residents in France. Moreover, the second-generation immigrant stratum, although born and educated in France, was familiar with the ethnic Jewish culture and self-definition of eastern European Jewry and tended also to be sympathetic to Zionist concepts and sensitive to the extraordinary vigour of antisemitism not only abroad but in France. Struggling to

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unite Jewish youths of diverse origins—native French of 'old stock' with the children of immigrants from eastern Europe, the Levant, and North Africa—the youth movements attempted to re-invigorate a Franco-Judaism which they saw as moribund and to create a synthesis of French and Jewish values appropriate to the needs of their generation.

The impact of immigration from eastern Europe upon that post-war generation can be seen most clearly in the membership and ideology of the U.U.J.J. and of the Jewish Scouts. Although new immigrants preferred their own Yiddish-speaking and generally politically partisan youth movements, their children were attracted to these French-speaking organizations which did not reject, indeed asserted, Jewish culture. It is significant that the U.U.J.J., while founded by two French-speaking Sephardi immigrants from Salonica, had second-generation Eastern European immigrants as the majority of both its leaders and its members. The Jewish Scout movement, although it drew its leaders primarily from the native-born Jewish community, was founded by seventeen-year-old Robert Gamzon, who was not only the grandson of the former Chief Rabbi of France but also the son of an immigrant engineer from eastern Europe. Moreover, these Scouts brought together native and second-generation eastern European immigrants in a mutually productive exchange. The U.U.J.J. was the first Jewish organization in France to abandon the exclusively religious definition of French Jewish identity and to challenge assimilationism, which it saw as a threat to Jewish survival in France. It opened its ranks to all youth 'who feel themselves Jews and wish to affirm themselves as such'.⁵ As one writer for the movement's periodical noted, 'Even . . . unbelievers . . . want to be Jews. This proves that we are at least as much a people as a religion.'⁶ Only one leaning was to be definitely excluded from the organization and that was 'the tendency towards assimilation . . . destructive of the ethnic particularity of Israel.'⁷ Assimilation had been seen previously as both necessary and beneficial; now it was viewed as potentially dangerous. In contrast to the ideology of emancipation propounded for generations by the leaders of native French Jewry, either religious affirmation or the assertion of Jewish peoplehood was considered an acceptable form of Jewish identity. The U.U.J.J. recognized that in a secular age the linking of Jewish identity solely to religious belief would tend to exclude a majority of young French Jews from any sense of belonging to the country's Jewish community. Moreover, it recognized that the ideology of emancipation denied the validity of significant aspects of the Jewish experience.

While never precisely defining the meaning of Jewish peoplehood as a basis for Jewish identity, the U.U.J.J. developed a positive programme: although it refrained from formal affiliation with the Zionist Organization, it pledged active support to Zionism and promoted Jewish education as the foremost weapon in the fight against assimilation. As a

U.U.J.J. lecturer noted, Jewish education in France was too superficial to provide the basis for a renaissance of Jewish culture.

French Jews were brought up in a culture which was purely and exclusively French.⁸ To remedy that situation, U.U.J.J. statutes called for the study of the 'literary, social, political, and religious history of Israel'.⁹ Each section of the association was called upon to organize courses and lectures in Jewish history and literature; and each member was urged to learn Hebrew, the 'national language' and the official, though scarcely used, language of the U.U.J.J. The appeal was couched in romantic terms characteristic of contemporary youth movements: 'A language is a soul. . . . There would be no France without the beautiful French language—no Judaism without Hebrew.'¹⁰ Hebrew was thus put forward as the symbol of Jewish unity and solidarity; while the study of Jewish history took over the role hitherto played among French Jewry by religion: to enable the Jew to feel he belonged to a distinct collectivity.¹¹ The U.U.J.J. also used the struggle against antisemitism as a device for promoting a sense of Jewish solidarity by acting as a defence organization, concerned with protecting the rights of young Jews whenever necessary.

The U.U.J.J., while never advocating the abandonment of French culture, preached for the first time in the history of modern French Jewry that bi-culturalism and pluralism in acceptable definitions of Jewish identity were essential: if French Jewry was to survive as a vigorous entity, particularly in a secular age, then French Judaism, the U.U.J.J. asserted, had to release itself from the restrictive definition of Church imposed upon it during the process of emancipation.

The ideology of the U.U.J.J.—in particular its rejection of religion as the sole basis of Jewish identity and its pro-Zionism—brought the association into conflict with the leaders of native Jewry and with the French rabbinate. In 1928, in an article in the major French-language Jewish newspaper, an anonymous rabbi attacked the U.U.J.J. for placing itself 'outside the French Jewish community and the religious and civic principles which it recognized'.¹² He considered the members of the organization to be unassimilated, poorly educated, and undisciplined, and he attributed their support of the dangerous idea of Jewish nationalism to those very qualities. Finally, he asserted that a Jewish renaissance in France could not be based upon anti-assimilationism. Rather, he repeated the principle that only religious Judaism could preserve Jews in a modern society.¹³ The leadership of the native French Jewish community thus clearly was unprepared to accept the ideological as well as ethnic transformation of French Jewry which the U.U.J.J. portended.

The conflict was exacerbated when the U.U.J.J. reacted to the hostility it encountered by asserting its autonomy and by criticizing the rabbinate; later, it made attempts at rapprochement but native

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establishment circles expressed no interest in accepting the youth organization as a legitimate partner in the Jewish community; the ideological pluralism of the U.U.J.J., as well as the predominance of second-generation immigrants among its leaders, remained abhorrent to the older native generation which persisted in being committed equally to the uniquely religious nature of Jewish identity and to the maintenance of its dominant position in all manifestations of organized Jewish life in France.

The scout leaders, most of whom came from the native community, could not be as easily dismissed as those of the U.U.J.J. for being out of touch with the reality of French life. That was probably why the Jewish scout movement succeeded, as the U.U.J.J. had not, in formulating a new programme for Jewish identity in France while retaining a close—if occasionally strained—liaison with prominent adult members of the native community. Originally established to provide the benefits of the scout movement for young French Jews within a Jewish milieu, its initial goals were in no way radical. It merely set out to shape 'des Eclaireurs français de religion israélite', in the words of its adolescent founder—and incidentally, to prevent young Jews from being drawn to Catholic or free-thinking scout sections.¹⁴

During its first decade, however, the Jewish scout movement evolved in ways which sorely tried its Central Committee of native adult patrons. Under the influence of Edmond Fleg, a prominent French intellectual and Zionist, and of the young scout leaders (both native and immigrant) who were sensitive to the currents of antisemitism in contemporary Europe and receptive to cultural Zionism, the Jewish Scouts gradually developed a programme based on a pluralistic concept of Judaism. Fleg's 1926 suggestion that all the young 'who declare themselves to be Jews, including Zionists and even free-thinkers . . . be accepted in a Jewish scout movement'¹⁵ became the practice of the movement in spite of the objections of its adult patrons. Co-operation with Zionist scout groups was soon common, and by 1928 Zionist insignia were included among brevets available for local packs. Scout leaders were expected to take intensive courses in Hebrew, Jewish history, and liturgy in order to direct the education of their members; and the scouts themselves earned badges in Judaica, celebrated Jewish festivals in their encampments, sang Hebrew songs, re-enacted major events in Jewish history, and enthusiastically learned Hasidic and Zionist folk dances.¹⁶

As the Jewish programme of the movement, both religious and national-cultural, was strengthened, criticism became vocal. In 1930, the young leaders were informed by their patrons that in prominent circles there had been criticism of the National Council of Troop Leaders (Conseil Directeur des Chefs et Commissaires) for having exhibited 'a too Jewish tendency'.¹⁷ Both Fleg and Gamzon took the

opportunity to insist on the changed nature of the movement: 'The youth leaders admit', Gamzon stated, 'that the movement has evolved, since its origin, in a much more Jewish direction.'¹⁸ The debate was renewed when the National Council of the Scouts resolved in 1932 that the 'Jewish Scouts tend henceforth to a conception of Judaism which includes both the religious ideal and the Zionist ideal.'¹⁹ Horrified, the Central Committee members refused to ratify the vote and openly declared that it was they—and not the young leaders—who should direct the movement.

The debate soon assumed the form of a generational conflict about the nature of Judaism, French Jewish assimilation, and the position of Jews in French society. Zionism, the young scout leaders argued, was a legitimate part of Judaism and attractive to the young as a concrete ideal which was easier than the religious ideal for them to understand.²⁰ Moreover, they contended, it was time that young French Jews be taught Hebrew language and literature and be brought up in a more pervasive Jewish culture; for it could not be denied that French history and literature were profoundly imbued with Christianity, as was the environment in which Jewish scouts lived.²¹ Young French Jews would be of much greater service to France when they had recaptured their originality as Jews, which the present adult generation had lost.²²

To the members of the Central Committee, that goal was a repudiation of French Jewish patterns of assimilation. French Jews had always overlooked, or denied, the Christian basis of much of French culture, which they chose to see as the product primarily of the revolutionary-national consciousness, the equal heritage of all citizens of the *patrie*. The native Jewish élite of the Central Committee therefore argued that it was completely assimilated Jews, like Henri Bergson, who had made the greatest contribution to France, rather than Jews steeped in traditional Jewish culture.²³ Moreover, one prominent anti-Zionist rabbi (who was a member of the Central Committee) went so far as to claim that there was no Jewish culture and no original Jewish literature except for the Bible. He also lent the weight of his rabbinic authority to the contention that one could not be both French and Zionist. Finally, fears were expressed that the new posture of the Jewish Scouts was potentially harmful since it could be misunderstood by Gentiles as a form of ethnic particularism unacceptable to French society.²⁴

While attempting to be conciliatory in manner and reiterating the loyalty of all Jewish scouts to France, Gamzon asserted the independence of the movement from its patrons, who represented 'only one tendency, that of Parisian Judaism'.²⁵ And it was precisely Judaism as defined and practised by native Parisian Jewry which young Jews rejected. Gamzon declared, 'If a great number of young people are attracted by Zionism, it is because they see in it a living Judaism as against the dead one which western Judaism has become.'²⁶

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In the ranks of the movement its Jewish activity, including cultural Zionism, was to continue even more vigorously than before, spurred on by the advent in the 1930s of young Zionist German refugees. The last manual prepared by the scouts before the onset of the Second World War reaffirmed the adherence of the movement to diversity within the Jewish community. All types of Jews were eligible to be scouts, it declared, for 'at all times there have been different currents within the Jewish fold'.²⁷ Moreover, support for Zionism was openly stated as one of their goals: 'For some Jews, serving Judaism necessitates their leaving for Palestine in order to create a Jewish Home,' declared the manual. 'The task for us, who are called upon for the most part to remain in the Diaspora, is to facilitate their undertaking by helping them with all our means.'²⁸ Finally, the Scouts broke with the political quietism of the native adult leadership's reaction to antisemitism; although they remained politically non-partisan as a movement, they vigorously proclaimed their right as Jews to protest publicly against all manifestations of antisemitism and they proposed that individual scouts help the leftist Ligue Internationale Contre l'Antisémitisme (L.I.C.A.), the bane of the adult native Jewish élite.²⁹

The most difficult problem facing the Scout movement was the perennial one of finding an acceptable mode of integrating the French and Jewish facets of their identity. The national Eclaireurs de France had refused to accept the Jewish Scouts as an affiliate (though it accepted Catholic packs) because the former group did not limit its membership to religious Jews. That decision suggested a painful truth to Jewish youth groups—that French society in theory and in practice would neither favour nor help the development of an ethnic Jewish identity. France had welcomed immigrant groups, but always on the condition that they recognize the superiority and exclusiveness of French culture and adopt it as their own. Cultural pluralism was not an ideal expressed by any segment of French society. Jewish scouts then made use of the argument that their peculiar situation resembled that of French provincials. 'There is no contradiction between the fact of loving France and loving Judaism, any more than there is when a Corsican loves both France and Corsica', declared their scout manual.³⁰ The analogy was ingenious but strained, for Judaism (which the scouts defined not as a creed alone but as a religio-ethnic culture) was neither a geographical nor a cultural component of the French nation. However, the provincial parallel seemed to young French Jews the only acceptable way of describing their position as Jews within the French socio-political tradition. Since that tradition was rigid in structure, both the U.U.J.J. and the Jewish Scouts simply *added* an ethno-cultural component, essentially secular in definition, to the basic religious component of Jewish identity. However, while recognizing the primacy and the legitimacy within French society of the religious element in that

identity, both groups attempted to develop an awareness of its manifold varieties. Moreover, rejecting the facile identification of French and Jewish cultures, though never their love of France, both proclaimed that Jewish self-respect and integrity were essential if Jews were to make a contribution to France. The fact that they sought to serve France as Jews, rather than as individual citizens of the Jewish faith, itself implies a renunciation of the ideology of emancipation. The terms of Jewish integration into French society, defined early in the nineteenth century, were being modified by the most aware component of inter-war young Jewish Frenchmen. But that modification remained unacceptable for the host society in a period of growing xenophobia and cultural chauvinism within France.

NOTES

¹ For a discussion of the debate on the post-emancipation nature of Jewish identity, see Jacob Katz, *Out of the Ghetto*, Cambridge, 1973, pp. 57-79; Ismar Schorsch, *Jewish Reactions to German Anti-Semitism*, New York and Philadelphia, 1972, pp. 6-11; and Arthur Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews*, New York, 1968, pp. 350-68.

² Diogène Tama, *Transactions of the Paris Sanhedrim*, London, 1807, pp. 181, 194-96.

³ See Michael Marrus, *The Politics of Assimilation*, Oxford, 1971, *passim*; Paula Hyman, *The Jews in Post-Dreyfus France, 1906-1939*, unpublished dissertation, Columbia University, 1975, chapters one and three; and David Weinberg, *Les juifs à Paris de 1933 à 1939*, Paris, 1974, pp. 63-77.

⁴ In 1928 the U.U.J.J. had 2,627 members in France. See *Chalom*, 15 Aug.-15 Sept. 1928, p. 15 and *ibid.*, June 1931, p. 23. The EIF numbered 1,200 in 1930. Archives of the *Eclaireurs Israélites de France* (hereafter, EIF), General Assembly, 9 Oct. 1930.

⁵ 'Toujours l'Union défendra . . . les jeunes qui nous disent ne point avoir la foi mais qui se sentent Juifs et veulent s'affirmer tels.' Aimé Pallière, 'L'U.U.J.J. et l'esprit religieux', *Chalom*, Feb. 1929, p. 2.

⁶ 'Même incroyants, ils veulent être Juifs. C'est ce qui prouve que nous sommes au moins autant un peuple qu'une religion.' Meyerkey (pen name of Meyer Levyne), 'Chronique parisienne', *Chalom*, 15 April 1927, p. 19.

⁷ ' . . . la tendance à l'assimilation conçue comme destructive du particularisme ethnique d'Israël.' *Chalom*, July 1927, pp. 12-13.

⁸ 'Leur formation est purement et exclusivement française.' Léon Berman's lecture, reported by Jaime Azancot, 'Le Judaïsme de demain', *Chalom*, Feb. 1929, pp. 18-19.

⁹ *Chalom*, Oct. 1926, p. 11.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 10. Cf, also Aimé Pallière's speech at the 1926 Congress of the U.U.J.J., as reported by police informants, 2 Aug. 1926, Police Archives (Paris) 241.155-A-B-B¹-B².

¹¹ W. Rabinovitch, 'Rapport sur le travail de la section de Paris', *Chalom*, Aug. 1927, p. 7.

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¹² '... P.U.U.J.J. a entendu se placer en dehors de la communauté juive française et des principes religieux et civiques que celle-ci reconnaît.' Ben-Ammi, 'Pourquoi je ne suis pas U.U.J.J.-iste,' *Univers israélite*, 3 Aug. 1928, pp. 581-83.

¹³ *ibid.*

¹⁴ EIF, Minutes of the *Conseil Directeur des Chefs et Commissaires* (hereafter, CD) 8 May 1924. A cordial interview I had on 13 Sept. 1972 with Denise Gamzon, Robert Gamzon's widow, provided much information on Gamzon's life and on the evolution of the Jewish scout movement. For further biographical information, see Isaac Pougatch, *Robert Gamzon*, Paris, 1972.

¹⁵ '... tous les enfants qui se réclament de la qualité de Juif devraient pouvoir être admis dans un mouvement scout israélite, y compris les sionistes et même les libres-penseurs.' EIF, CD, Minutes, 29 Nov. 1926.

¹⁶ EIF, CD, Minutes, 21 Oct. 1928; General Assembly, 9 Nov. 1930; Edmond Fleg, 'L'Eclaireur d'Israël', in *La Voix d'Israël: Conférences israélites*, Paris, 1932, pp. 165-70.

¹⁷ '... la tendance trop juive...' EIF, CD, Minutes, 20 Nov. 1930.

¹⁸ 'Les Commissaires reconnaissent que le Mouvement évolue depuis son origine dans un sens beaucoup plus juif.' *ibid.*

¹⁹ '... les Eclaireurs Israélites de France tendent désormais vers une conception du Judaïsme comprenant à la fois l'idéal religieux et l'idéal sioniste.' EIF, CD, Minutes, 25 Feb. 1933; *La Terre retrouvée*, 25 Dec. 1932, p. 18. The vote on the resolution was 40 to 4.

²⁰ The argument was advanced by one M. Haït, a scout leader from Mulhouse, who was of immigrant origin. See EIF, CD, Minutes, 25 Feb. 1933.

²¹ 'Il faut bien reconnaître... que ceux-ci ont été élevés... dans une ambiance tout imprégnée de christianisme; il est temps de leur faire connaître la langue, la littérature hébraïque.' EIF, CD, Minutes, *ibid.* '... il ne faut pas se dissimuler que l'histoire et littérature françaises sont profondément imprégnées de christianisme.' EIF, CD, Minutes, 30 April 1933. The spokesmen for the scout leaders were Robert Gamzon and M. Haït.

²² 'Ils rendront beaucoup plus de service à la France quand ils auront reconquis leur originalité de Juifs que la génération actuelle a perdue.' EIF, CD, Minutes, 25 Feb. 1933.

²³ *ibid.*

²⁴ EIF, CD Minutes, 30 April 1933.

²⁵ EIF, CD, Minutes, 19 June 1933.

²⁶ 'Si un grand nombre de jeunes sont attirés par le sionisme, c'est qu'ils y voient un Judaïsme vivant en opposition avec le Judaïsme mort qu'était devenu le Judaïsme occidental.' *ibid.*

²⁷ 'De tous temps, il y a eu des courants différents au sein du Judaïsme.' EIF, typescript manual, p. 16.

²⁸ 'Pour certains juifs, servir le Judaïsme comporte de partir en Palestine afin de créer un "Foyer Juif". Notre devoir est de faciliter leur tâche en les aidant de tous nos moyens; nous qui sommes appelés pour la plus grande partie à rester dans la Diaspora.' *ibid.*, p. 18.

²⁹ Founded in 1928 by Bernard Lecache, L.I.C.A. was a major non-sectarian organization devoted to combating antisemitism. Its leftist political

orientation and activist style were offensive to the native-born Jewish leadership. For a discussion of L.I.C.A., see Hyman, *op. cit.*, chapter ten.

⁸⁰ 'Il n'y a pas d'opposition entre le fait d'aimer la France et d'aimer le Judaïsme, pas plus qu'il y en a pour un Corse d'aimer la France et la Corse.' *ibid.*, p. 16. The analogy had been suggested at least once previously within native Jewish circles, but without the connotation that Judaism was anything more than a religious denomination. Cf. the speech delivered by Felix Meyer, Director of the *Ecole de Travail*, reprinted in *Univers israelite*, 14 March 1913, pp. 5-7.

GERMAN ZIONISM AND JEWISH IDENTITY

Stephen M. Poppel

ONE of the most striking features of the German Zionist movement was that so few of its members in fact emigrated to Palestine—at least before 1933. This was so in spite of a resolution adopted by the German Zionist organization in 1912 which bound each member to the obligation, admittedly vague in point of time, of including such emigration in his 'life programme'.¹ The preponderating tendency of German Zionists not to leave their native land immediately raises the question of what Zionism could have meant for those of its adherents who chose to remain in the Diaspora.

At least a brief look at the early history of Zionism is necessary to answer that question. The origins of the modern Zionist movement are in Theodor Herzl's manifesto, *The Jewish State*, published in 1896; and in the international Zionist Congress which he convened in Basel in the following year. Herzl's goal was only the latest (but the most dynamic) in a series of attempts dating back to the late eighteenth century to provide a solution to the so-called 'Jewish question', which asked, quite simply, whether there was any place at all for the Jew, as a Jew, in the modern world. For over a century the positive solutions which were offered to this question rested on a very specific conception both of the Jew and of his place in the host society. Specifically, Jewish identity was defined along a religious dimension only, with no intrinsic political significance. As one member of the German Enlightenment put it, the Jew was 'more a man than a Jew', and as such could presumably be fully integrated into a modern, secular polity.² Or, in terms of a later formulation, the Jew would be a 'German citizen of the Jewish faith'. Essentially the ideal was that of a liberal, tolerant religious pluralism. Consequently, the solution for the Jewish question was to be found in emancipation, that is, the legal and civic integration of the Jews—a process that was expected to be matched by their social and cultural integration as well.

To a considerable extent, the emergence of Zionism must be understood as a reaction to the failure of emancipation, in two senses: first, that failure was total in eastern Europe; and second, in western Europe legal emancipation produced neither full integration nor (as

a close corollary) did it eradicate or appreciably diminish antisemitism. The Zionist response was also two-fold. First, it sought to re-establish the comprehensive nature of Jewish identity by restoring the national dimension which earlier reformers had tried to eliminate. In truth, Herzl insisted, the Jews were 'a people, one people'—not a mere confessional grouping.³ The second aspect was more directly political: Herzl contended that since emancipation had failed, the only effective and lasting solution must be the establishment of a Jewish state which would at once provide a refuge for those Jews whose situation was untenable, while easing at the same time the situation of those who chose, and were able, to remain in their native land. Thus Zionism would effectively serve a dual function.

This notion was elaborated in Germany in terms of what amounted to a theory of two altogether separate Zions. To begin with, there was the physical Zion, which would answer the needs of the economically oppressed Jewries of eastern Europe; in this context Zionism was seen as a largely philanthropic movement: it would take eastern European Jews to safety, with German Zionists contributing their organizational abilities and financial resources. That aspect of Zionism was humorously, and accurately, described as a third-person affair: one man collected money from a second in order to send a third person to Palestine.

At the same time, however, there was a second aspect of German Zionism which addressed itself directly to what were regarded as the needs of the German Jews themselves—needs of a spiritual, rather than a material, nature. This so-called spiritual distress of western Jewry was a product of the process of integration itself: for emancipation had not come easily or swiftly, but had rather been held out as a prize to be granted only to deserving Jews. Indeed the conditional nature of emancipation was reflected in the ease with which Christians debated whether it was proper to grant it, and once granted, whether it should be revoked. The German Jews in fact understood their situation in assimilationist terms, and assumed that the adoption by the Jew of German culture would be matched by the full acceptance of the Jew by German society. That is, they assumed that acculturation of an acceptable degree—acculturation short of the complete abrogation of any Jewish identity whatever—would secure the desired measure of political integration—emancipation—as well as social integration. Indeed, the use of the same term 'assimilation' to refer both to acculturation and to integration tended to imply that these two processes were functionally linked. On the contrary, however, not only are they separable in theory, but they were also often distinct in practice. The assumption that this would always be true stood as the basis of the Zionist position, which argued that the facts of the Jewish situation in Germany were defined not subjectively, by the way Jews regarded themselves, but objectively, by the way they were perceived by Gentile Germany.

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One early Zionist pamphlet (at the end of the last century) stated: 'German Jews had been exhorted to assimilate so that things would get better. We have assimilated. We have assimilated up to the nose. We have aped all the manners and customs of the Gentiles without asking what they are worth. We have denigrated our own customs and neglected our own culture.' But the effort had been vain. What good had it done? 'In the eyes of the Gentiles, we are still *Jews*, not believers in the Jewish religion, but children of a different nation. We have not held back from the brotherhood of nations, but *they* have never accepted us as fully belonging.' Meanwhile, the rejection of Jewish advances had brought the sting of unrequited love: 'We have wooed for the favour of the Aryan peoples long enough. . . . But the lady is coy, and the more one submits, the less she is pleased.'⁴ What was worse, in courting German favour, the Zionists lamented, the Jews had stripped themselves of the very tradition and values which might have comforted them in their rejection.

To this process of self-denial the Zionists ascribed consequences that were both psychological and political. In the first place, self-denial easily led to self-contempt and self-hatred. Furthermore, they argued that it was but a short step from hating oneself to being hated by others. Jews who denied their own comprehensive ethnic identity by the evasive label, 'German citizen of the Mosaic persuasion' thereby conceded, according to the Zionists, that there was indeed something inferior and contemptible in being Jewish, and thereby they themselves fostered or justified antisemitism.

Zionism offered to the Jew who was cursed with self-contempt the liberation of self-affirmation, the opportunity to present himself straightforwardly as a Jew, without finely differentiated reservations based on religious and civic ascriptions. Furthermore, just as the Jew's low regard for himself allegedly engendered the scorn of others, so it was now expected that his self-affirmation would stimulate their respect—however grudgingly offered. Unfortunately, that expectation was not realized in Germany. But there is no doubt that Zionism was effective in enhancing the self-image of its adherents, and thereby solved, at least for them, the difficult problem of German Jewish identity.

This psychological function of Zionism was most evident among those German Jews whose commitment to the movement represented a conscious and often dramatic rejection of an earlier assimilationism. The case of one member of a wealthy and assimilated Jewish family was typical. Brought up around the turn of the century in the exclusive, fashionable milieu of 'Berlin West'—a district especially favoured by families such as his—he had grown up in the closed world of the non-Jewish Jew, in which the members socialized with one another while apparently unaware either of the fact of their own Jewishness or of the absence of Gentile social partners. After a period of growing disquiet

with the life around him, that uneasy assimilationist came upon Zionism in a confrontation which he described explicitly in terms of conversion⁵:

Here were the answers to all the questions which I had long posed for myself and my acquaintances. Not through assimilation and baptism, but through independent achievement in one's own land would the relationship between Jews and other peoples be normalized, and anti-semitism overcome. Neither the imitation of an alien manner nor adaptation to the surrounding world . . . was capable of solving the personal problem which every Jew carried about with him. This solution had to come from within, from one's own nature. Here, and only here—in Zionism—could the Jewish personality finally develop free and unbroken. . . . It was a matter of affirming myself and thereby becoming free. . . .

That was an experience which recurred time and again—the growing and painful awareness of the severity of the 'Jewish question' and the inadequacy of previous attempts to solve it, the realization that Zionism articulated feelings that had been hitherto inchoate, and the liberating power of the movement's sweeping vision. Here then lay the real personal significance of Zionism for its adherents in Germany—not in fund-raising, charitable work for eastern European Jews, or the promotion of emigration to Palestine, but as the source of a coherent, integrated, and compelling world view. It was a world view of the sort that Freud had described as 'an intellectual construction which solves all the problems of our existence uniformly on the basis of one overriding hypothesis, which, accordingly, leaves no question unanswered and in which everything that interests us finds its fixed place'.⁶

The transforming experience of Zionist conversion has a further parallel in adolescent identity crisis and identity resolution, where old commitments are questioned in a crisis of uncertainty which may be resolved in a new sense of self. In its most dramatic form, this reshaping of identity may be felt by those who experience it as the equivalent of a second birth; for many young Zionists, that was in fact the case. Conversion to Zionism could be an act of rebellion against parental authority and parental values in the comparatively authoritarian context of German society, where the clash between generations was especially intense. This adolescent revolt writ large was the basis for the distinctive German youth movement, the *Wandervogel*, whose specifically Zionist counterpart, the *Jüdischer Wanderbund Blau-Weiss*, shared its programme of outdoor rambling, its glorification of nature, and its rejection of urban culture and bourgeois adult values, but cultivated in addition a comprehensive sense of Jewishness. Zionism, with its recognition of Jewish peoplehood, represented a dramatic repudiation of the liberal, assimilationist world of adult Jewry; it had appeal for the young who were seeking an avenue for revolt.

It is not altogether surprising that Zionism could provide its adherents with an identity. What was peculiar about German Zionism,

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however, was that it served to rationalize a *continued* Jewish existence in Germany on the basis of an ideology of national separatism. That is, while Gentile Germans regarded the Jews as a distinct and unassimilable people, it was precisely as such that the Zionists chose to affirm themselves, restating in positive terms what in the context of assimilationism had been seen as an obstacle. But the paradoxical consequence was that in asserting themselves as members of an independent Jewish *Volk*, one which was as valid as the German *Volk*, the Zionists seemed to have found for themselves a stable basis for remaining in Germany—in psychological if not in political terms. This was evident not only in the fact that they continued to live in Germany, but even more specifically in their explicit awareness of the consequences of Zionist allegiance. Thus one prominent Zionist argued that 'the Jew can live in Germany freer of conflict if he recognizes the problematic nature of the Jewish situation, and does not occupy himself with pointless opposition to antisemitism. . . . The alleged dangers of so-called dual loyalty are the product of an anxious imagination.'⁷

However great the psychological advantage to be derived from Zionism, the problem still remained of coming to terms with the reality of the German political situation. On this issue the Zionists took the apparently paradoxical position that a nationally assertive Jewry could find a place in Germany, at least for the foreseeable future, on the basis of some kind of nationalist pluralism. That was certainly an astonishing stance, given the Zionists' criticism of any reliance on a presumed religious pluralism in Germany. Indeed, the Zionists had attacked assimilationism precisely because it assumed the separability of religious and political affiliations, since the distinction was not one generally recognized by Germans. It was for this reason that the Zionists had argued that there was no possibility for the Jews to be accepted as German citizens of the Jewish faith. Nevertheless, there was a strand in German Zionist theory from the very beginning which made an even stronger assumption—namely, that state and nation were separable, and that separate loyalties to *Staat* and *Volk* were therefore not necessarily incompatible: the Jew's self-affirmation in terms of Jewish nationality in no way would prejudice his political standing, and it would therefore be possible for the Jews to exist in Germany as 'German citizens of the Jewish *Volk*'. Not only did those Zionists deny any conflict which assimilationists might allege existed between Zionism and German patriotism, but they went so far as to make the astonishing suggestion that the Zionist's nationalistic consciousness itself actually made him more valuable than the assimilationist, since the Zionist stood closer to an understanding of 'the national sensitivities of the soul of the German *Volk*'.⁸

The entire line of argument on this point was revealing: it betrayed a serious self-contradiction. The unified German identity whose nature

—according to Zionism—made assimilation impossible, was no more likely to tolerate differences of *Volk* than it was likely to tolerate religious particularisms. To speak of Germans of the Jewish *Volk* finding a place, even a temporary one, in a Germany defined in *völkisch* terms may have been psychologically reassuring, but it was a formulation that appeared to ignore the realities of the situation—not as perceived by Jews, but as established by Germans. The Zionists rightly criticized as self-deluding the assimilationists' conviction of the significance of their subjective feelings of belonging in Germany. Nevertheless, the Zionists' affirmation of their own subjective patriotism was similarly irrelevant. The implications of the Zionists' version of nationalist pluralism were at least as intolerable as the assimilationists' dream of religious pluralism. It was fortunate, as one Zionist put it in retrospect, that the whole matter remained a largely academic one, a debate that was possible 'only at a time when a liberal conception of the state could tolerate such intellectual radicalism without drawing the consequences which would have been certain to endanger the existence of the Jews as citizens'.⁹ Thus to a certain extent the Zionist analysis of the Jewish situation in Germany had some of the same shortcomings as the assimilationist view. If there was no room in Germany for assimilationists, then neither was there for the Zionists.

The parallels between Zionism and assimilationism were not limited to this unexpected similarity in political theory, but also extended to psychological aspects. Zionism's striking success in providing its adherents with a viable version of German-Jewish identity did not deny the fact that the conflicting assimilationist version seemed to function equally well for what was, after all, the overwhelming majority of German Jews. Contrary to Zionist denunciations, assimilationism was not in fact the same as cringing self-abnegation, and it could involve an affirmation of Jewishness and an enhancement of Jewish self-respect which was equal in significance to Zionism's, though different in content.

Given the fact that these two ideologies had such similar results in practice, it would be of great interest to know both why an individual chose one rather than the other, and what set the Zionists apart from the assimilationists. Unfortunately, this is a question to which I cannot supply a definite answer. Apart from the commitment to Jewish nationality, Zionism was sufficiently vague to make it difficult to determine exactly wherein lay the strength of the special identity which it provided. Furthermore, although admittedly little detailed information survives, the lack of any evident correlation between the espousal of Zionism and particular sociological variables makes it impossible to identify any causal factors which would have drawn some individuals specifically to Zionism.

In the matter of cultural background, for example, while the majority

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of Zionists were of recent eastern European origin, there was no absence of longer-settled German Jews, especially in positions of leadership in the German Zionist organization. Similarly, as far as can be determined, neither economic class nor religious outlook seems to have been significant. Jewish 'notables' of the professional and rentier classes could be found in both the Zionist and the assimilationist camps, as could the whole range of religious belief. The problem of distinguishing between Zionists and assimilationists is additionally complicated by the fact that in terms of practical activity there was so little difference in their day-to-day pursuits. Even in their intellectual outlook, the Zionists were as deeply rooted in German culture as any of their fellow Jews. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the Zionists had the monopoly of Jewish learning or Jewish culture which their propaganda sometimes seemed to claim.

Altogether, then, there may be no differentiation between Zionism and assimilation in terms of their abstract functional significance as sources of equally viable though theoretically opposed versions of German-Jewish identity. Zionists thought themselves more at ease than the assimilationists, but assimilationism seems to have functioned perfectly satisfactorily for those who continued to espouse it.

Nevertheless, it must be granted that, as far as the 'objective' Jewish question went, one claim of Zionism was correct—that whether a Jew was regarded as fully a German or not was indeed a matter for Gentile Germans to determine, and that decision was often negative. To say this is not to give the Zionists more than their due. If, in the end, the Zionist analysis proved accurate, that does not necessarily mean that it was as valid at all times as it eventually proved to be. The course of history is more complex than the path of a projectile, and the successful prediction of an outcome does not imply the discovery of the laws of historical motion. The conviction of the Zionists that the Jewish question was both objective and incapable of a solution through assimilation rested, after all, on their own subjective perception of the German situation, a perception that was not shared by most German Jews. Nevertheless, it is clear in retrospect—and here retrospect can validly intervene—that the Zionist analysis of the situation of the Jews in Germany was not simply a matter of fortuitous prescience, but rather involved both the identification of many of the factors that later proved to be significant, as well as an accurate description of their effects. To be sure, the German Zionist theory had some flaws, such as the peculiar notion that some kind of nationalist pluralism was possible. Its virtue, however, was that it integrated and made sense of what the Zionists viewed as the reality of Jewish life in Germany. In retrospect, this was its real achievement.

Thus the absence of any substantial emigration to Palestine did not indicate simply the failure of Zionists to act on the strength of their

convictions. To surrender present comfort for some possible remote advantage requires an immense faith in one's principles, as well as integrity and courage. In the end the Zionists proved to be right, but they were more right than they ever realized.

NOTES

¹ The complete text of the resolution is in *Jüdische Rundschau*, vol. 17, no. 23, 7 June 1912, p. 205. For a full treatment of German Zionism, see my *Zionism in Germany: The Shaping of a Jewish Identity*, Philadelphia, 1976.

² Christian Wilhelm [von] Dohm, *Ueber die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden*, 2 vols, Berlin, 1781 and 1783, vol. 1, p. 28.

³ Theodor Herzl, Introduction to *Der Judenstaat*, in Herzl, *Zionistische Schriften*, 3rd rev. enlarged edn., Tel Aviv, 1934, p. 26.

⁴ National-jüdische Vereinigung, *Der Zionismus*, Cologne, ca. 1896, p. 10.

⁵ Richard Lichtheim, *Rückkehr: Lebenserinnerungen aus der Frühzeit des deutschen Zionismus*, Stuttgart, 1970, p. 68.

⁶ Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, trans. and ed. James Strachey, New York, 1965, Lecture 35, 'The Question of a Weltanschauung', p. 158.

⁷ Kurt Blumenfeld, 'Ursprünge und Art einer zionistischen Bewegung', *Leo Baeck Institute Bulletin*, no. 4, July 1958, p. 136.

⁸ Richard Lichtheim, 'Das Märchen vom Radikalismus', *Jüdische Rundschau*, vol. 19, no. 27, 3 July 1914, p. 289.

⁹ Richard Lichtheim, *Die Geschichte des deutschen Zionismus*, Jerusalem, 1954, p. 168.

COMMUNITY AND THE MEANING OF THE MODERN STATE: THE CASE OF ISRAEL

Shlomo Swirski

The state as a conceptual variable

THE modern state is a European creation.¹ As a decision-making and administrative apparatus within a territorial unit, it developed over the last few centuries, crystallizing into two major forms: decentralized parliamentary democracy in England, and authoritarian, centralized bureaucratic administration in France, which first spread to neighbouring countries, and later to the whole of Europe.² European colonialism and imperialism brought it to the rest of the world, and one can now identify some 140 'states'. In most of those, it is possible to point to structures and mechanisms which can be referred to as 'state': a government (president, cabinet), a bureaucracy, some form of legislature, an army. Thus, on the face of it, we can analyse various states using the same conceptual scheme and make comparisons, formulating generalizations and treating the state in Zaire, or India, or Germany, or France as discrete units of one and the same generic phenomenon.

But upon closer examination it becomes clear that the state is not a delimited and discrete social institution which can be carried over intact from one society to another, unaffected by either the nature of the country of origin or that of destination. The state as a social institution was organically connected to the general pattern of development and change of the social structure and social values of concrete historical societies. Therefore, the very nature and meaning of the concept of 'state' have to be analysed in terms of these concrete historical contexts. This holds both for Western Europe and for the other areas of the world to which it spread. In Western Europe, the growth of the state was connected with various other developments, most important of which was the rise of capitalism. The formation of the state began with the drive of medieval courts to establish absolute control over given territories. Absolute control meant, among other things, neutralization

of competing claimants and local foci of power. This was accomplished through the neutralization of the nobility by the court, with the financial aid of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, and by means of the establishment of armies and bureaucracies. The bourgeois revolutions later changed the nature of the state, from a proprietary territorial state—the domain and personal inheritance of the king—into a nation-state, which claimed universal representation, embodying the common will of the entire population. Finally, the struggle of socialistic and populist movements, representing workers, farmers, and lumpen-proletariat, turned the bourgeois claim of universalism into at least partial reality through the institution of what is called the ‘welfare state’.³

It is clear, then, that the nature and meaning of ‘state’ at any particular time, in any particular country, depended on such things as the peculiar system of structured inequality, the distribution of power among the various groups, the development of means of production, and the action of various popular and revolutionary movements. Thus, there were important differences between the ‘feudal state’, the ‘bourgeois state’ and the ‘welfare state’, parallel to the differences between feudal society, early nineteenth-century capitalist society, and present-day ‘advanced’ capitalist society.⁴ Moreover, a detailed analysis reveals significant differences not only between various ‘stages’, but also at any given stage, among the various European countries—in accordance with the different developments in their social structure.⁵

The state has been various things at various times in various places in Western Europe, where it originated; this is certainly also the case outside Europe. That fact is slowly becoming recognized in both major approaches to the study of the new states: the ‘nation-building’ approach and the Marxist view. Both approaches—being essentially European intellectual products—start by assuming that development in the non-European world will be along lines similar to those of the European model. This assumption has been challenged, mostly by social scientists from non-European backgrounds, who maintain that the non-European state (having been formed under different circumstances) is different in nature and performs functions which differ from those of the European state. As for the ‘nation-building’ approach,⁶ the claim is that, contrary to the situation in Europe—where development culminated in the formation of strong centres (‘state’, ‘nation-state’) with a great capacity for social mobilization—development in Third World countries *starts* with a centre, a modernizing centre which is a creation of European expansion. Thus Silva Michelena has pointed out that the entire process of centre formation in Latin America was different from that of Europe, because no Latin American society could be regarded as an independent system; rather, it was a European dependency, whose centre acted as an extension of the European centre.⁷ Rajni Kothari has noted that the ‘underlying assumption of a

lot of Western theory (according to which the critical development and "inputs" come from society, to which the State responds in the form of "outputs") is . . . not confirmed by evidence from the new nations, where the major thrust of development consists in the permeation of the social structure from one or more political centers.⁸

As for the Marxist approach to development,⁹ the claim has been made that, unlike the situation in Europe (where capitalism was developed by the bourgeoisie and the state was an auxiliary for purposes of domination in the process of industrialization), in non-European countries it has been the state itself—and not any particular class—which has taken on the tasks of industrialization and development. Attempts have been made to develop the concept of the state as an actor independent of class. Poulantzas, for example, has developed the original Marxist notion of a Bonapartist state into the broader category of 'state of exception', where the state becomes an autonomous policy carrier.¹⁰ Several Marxist-influenced Latin American scholars have developed the 'theory of dependence' to explain, among other things, the absence of a local modernizing class;¹¹ some of them have developed typologies in which the state acts as a modernizer.¹² In an attempt to integrate Poulantzas's theoretical formulation and those of the theorists of 'dependence' to produce a theory of the state as an autonomous body, Sorj, claiming that this formulation of a 'state of exception' is conjunctural and not structural, develops the concept of 'superstructural groups'—with structural interests of their own—in order to account for the role of the state as modernizer in Latin America.¹³

Thus we see in 'nation-building' as well as in Marxist approaches to the study of modernization and development attempts to take into consideration the different nature, function, and meaning of 'state' in the context of non-European societies.

It is largely in the same vein that Peter Nettl suggested some years ago that the 'concept of state is and ought to be treated as a variable in social science, as a reflection of the varying empirical reality with which social science concerns itself.'¹⁴ One should ask, according to Nettl, whether there is any historical tradition for the existence, primacy, and sovereignty of a state, whether the political ideas and theories of the society incorporate a notion of state, to what extent individuals have generalized the concept and cognition of state in their perceptions and actions, and to what extent those conceptions are salient.¹⁵

Nettl's guiding questions are limited mainly to the cultural-intellectual meaning of state—what we may call the 'tradition of statehood' or, to borrow a phrase from Friedrich, the tradition of 'management of the business of the community'.¹⁶ Though this is no doubt a most important dimension, a comprehensive understanding of the conceptualization of the state in various societal contexts must take into

account two other important dimensions. The first is the nature of the 'business of the community'—which the state is supposed to manage. In Western Europe, in the period of formation of the modern state, this was commercial and industrial capitalism, which the state managed largely by the maintenance of order, the control of the labour force, and the regulation of markets.¹⁷ This dimension is important because a change in the nature of the 'business of the community' brings about changes in the nature of the state—the 'feudal state', the 'bourgeois state', and the 'welfare state'.

The other additional dimension concerns the constellation of group relations—especially class relations—or, more broadly, the nature of the social structure. This dimension is, of course, intimately related to the nature of the 'business of the community'. In order to understand the nature of the state in any given period, we have to know the nature of the social structure at that time. It is by looking at all three dimensions that one can grasp the 'varying empirical reality' which Nettl refers to¹⁸ and understand the variation in the meaning and nature of state cross-nationally.

When we come to non-Western states, and especially those which were formed as a consequence of European expansion, the picture becomes even more complex. For here we have to take into account not only those aspects which were adopted from Europe, but also the traditional social structure, the traditional 'business of the community', and the tradition of management of that business, as well as the dialectical relationship between the European influence and the local traditions. In non-Western societies the state in its present form came into being as a result of European capitalist expansion—either by imitation or adoption, or, more frequently, by direct imposition. The very territorial and demographic units which emerged as the present-day states were in many cases delineated by the Europeans, who established the mechanisms and structures of government which served as the bases for the future independent states. And the main tasks faced by most new states, their 'community business'—industrialization, development, modernization—were usually imposed by European capitalism. Independence, self-determination, and national dignity came to mean doing the things the Europeans do, but in one's own way.¹⁹

While certain aspects of stateness were European, the import became organically integrated into the local socio-economic-political context, and in that process it was itself transformed. It is through a complex interplay of the foreign and the local, the new and the traditional, that one can arrive at an understanding of the nature and meaning of state in non-Western contexts.

Stateness in Israel

Israel presents a very interesting case for the study of the inter-connexions between stateness as a European creation and imposition, and the traditional social structure, the traditional 'community business' and the traditional way of managing it. The State of Israel is one of many established after the Second World War;²⁰ it is, in its concrete forms, a European 'import' or adaptation. Israel's boundaries, like those of most new states, were drawn by the great powers, and the machinery of government was largely inherited from the Mandate. Yet there are many indications that in Israel stateness differs from its original European mould. Both in the way it operates and in the way it is conceptualized, it exhibits several peculiar characteristics. In his analysis of the Israeli political system, Leonard Fein notes that the distinction between state and society which is so common in the West is largely blurred in Israel: 'The relationship between the two is so close that it is hardly possible to distinguish between a social and a political sphere. It is entirely unclear where Caesar ends and the people begin.'²¹ And he goes on to give many examples of the extensive functions of the government in particular, and the political institutions in general, in Israeli society.

An empirical study of socio-political consciousness of Israeli student activists has revealed an unusual conceptualization of the state.²² From long in-depth interviews there emerges an impression of the state as standing above society and economy—managing them, manipulating them, changing them—without being in turn shaped by them. The various lines of social cleavage (ethnic, class, religious) are seen to exist at a level different from that of the state which seems to reflect a different dimension of collective life, at a 'higher' level. Structural changes in the economy—a move from a more or less co-operative-socialistic economy to a capitalistic policy—are not perceived to have changed the nature of the state—which is perceived as having instituted the change, and as being capable of effecting a return to the original economic structure. It is as if the state had its own set of themes and goals, separate from those of the various social groups which make up the society. The state is perceived as dealing with 'more important' questions—such as the destiny of the nation, and its survival. Moreover, when they talk about state, the students rarely refer to the bureaucracy, or the various branches of government: in discussions, they invariably focus on a very small number of ruling political leaders, who for them seem to epitomize the state. The personalization of their approach reminds one of the literature on totalitarian regimes.²³

Eisenstadt notes that in Israel there are two basic attitudes towards the state: one views it as a distributive agency, while for the other it is the epitome of the aspirations of the collectivity.²⁴ While the first

attitude is close to the European idea of the 'welfare state', the second approach is certainly rare in the European concepts of stateness.

How can these peculiarities in the operation and conceptualization of the state in Israel be explained? Both Fein and Eisenstadt use the nation-building approach;²⁵ Fein, assuming the Western model of state-society relationships to be the normal, finds the blurring of the boundaries in Israel between the two 'most discomfiting'.²⁶ He attributes it to the fact that at the time of independence, Israeli society had to confront several crises—war, large-scale immigration, and serious economic problems—and that only the state could cope with those emergencies. He goes on to say that 'there has not yet been time to develop a reasonably stable and articulated social order. In that sense, political development in Israel . . . is more complete than societal development.'²⁷ The underlying assumption is that there is one, 'normal', model of state-society relationships; that the situation in Israel is not normal because of the specific circumstances at the time of independence; and that eventually 'normality' will be attained. Eisenstadt's explanation also dwells on the circumstances of the creation of Israel, especially on the fact that the state in that country is heir to the goals of the National Zionist Movement—political independence and the ingathering of the exiles. Again, the underlying assumption is that once these goals have been accomplished, Israel will become a 'normal' state.

I think that while these explanations²⁸ contribute to the understanding of the peculiarities of the nature of stateness in Israel, they are far from being sufficient. Their basic weakness stems from the fact that they assume the European situation to be the 'normal'. More important, by focusing on the period of the establishment of the state, they disregard a very long history of Jewish communal existence—the fact that for centuries Jews had a well-developed communal life, with a peculiar social structure, a distinct 'communal business', and a distinct form of management of that business. Therefore, 'stateness' in Israel could not possibly mean what it does in Europe. The conceptualization of the state in Israel appears peculiar and abnormal only when seen through European spectacles; but viewed in its historical perspective, it looks normal and natural enough.

The Jewish Tradition of Communal Life

The Jews had gone through many of what are called 'stages' of nation building when, defeated by the Romans, they had to relinquish their ancient state and go into exile. They were at that time a well-defined collectivity. Exile gave rise to conditions which determined the nature of communal life as it developed over the centuries. It meant the absence of an autonomous and secure territory, limitation to specific

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spheres of economic (as well as political and cultural) activity, and dependence on the good will of the host society. Jews mainly existed on the margins of that society, participating only in a very limited sense in the processes of its development and change. At the same time, they were able to maintain, in most places and most of the time, a relatively autonomous community life, governed by their own values and norms. In many respects they lived in a 'world of their own'.²⁹

The history of Jewish communal life in exile is long and varied—it lasted nearly two thousand years, and over an area covering Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. A detailed historical analysis of the development of patterns of communal life would therefore have to cover this entire period, in many areas. But for our purposes it is sufficient to focus on what is today referred to as the traditional Jewish community, a community which crystallized in the Middle Ages and continued to exist until the Enlightenment and Emancipation.³⁰ It is this community which presents and embodies the last unified model of Judaism and Jewish life as shaped by the conditions of exile, before Emancipation and Enlightenment led to its gradual breakdown and to various alternative modes of Jewish collective life—from outright assimilation, to various forms of new religious expression, to modern Zionism.³¹

What are the major characteristics of the traditional Jewish community?³² In so far as social structure is concerned, the relevant unit was the local community—a town, or a small town with its surroundings—for throughout most of the period in question the Jewish collectivity had no socio-political framework which extended over an entire country or across countries. The essence of Jewish collectivity was represented in each individual community, since there were no inter-community or supra-community organs.³³ The typical community was small, and there was usually contact and interaction between all its members. Internal differentiation tended to be limited, whether in terms of activity and occupation, or of political and economic power and status.³⁴ Obviously there were differences in wealth and power—but there was very little in the way of institutionalization of the differences or development of legitimizing mechanisms for them. The low degree of structured inequality was due, of course, to the conditions of existence—the lack of an autonomous economic base, the restrictions on economic activity, and the precariousness of communal existence.

As far as the 'business of the community' is concerned, we can point to three major dimensions: a community of *fate*, a common faith, and a belief in eventual redemption. Historical conditions had created the community of fate. The survival of the community as a whole meant the survival of individual Jews, and a threat to the individual meant a threat to the community as a whole.³⁵ Survival thus became a 'community business'. However, it is religion which defined the collectivity

as such, and which provided the main distinctive content of collective action. That Jews were a religious community, a collectivity distinct from the host societies in their religious way of life, is well known. Hence the important role played by spiritual leaders—embodied institutionally in the Rabbinate, as well as in the primacy assigned to spiritual (that is religious) activity, as opposed to economic pursuits.³⁶ Finally, in addition to the concern with survival and the practice of a common faith, there was a hope for national redemption—whether political or eschatological. As Katz has put it, ‘Acceptance and/or adherence to the Jewish faith entailed . . . consciousness of being the son of a nation, ill fated in the present, divinely endowed in the past, and with splendid prospects for the future.’³⁷

Of course, Jews were engaged in mundane economic activities and earning a living was most probably the foremost preoccupation in their traditional community. But what defined it as a collectivity was not—as in the case of most European societies—a common system of production, but rather the continuance of the practice of the faith, the securing of survival, and the furtherance of the dreams of redemption. In contrast to the situation in European societies, where the leadership—élite, ruling class, ruling party—expressed and represented the interests of particular groups or classes, in the traditional Jewish community leadership was of the whole, epitomizing the values and norms, the aspirations and the goals, of the entire community. Individual leaders can be traced back, of course, to specific social or economic origins—but their leadership cannot be interpreted as representing a particular group interest. Their goal was a collective, communal one: survival, ensuring the continued existence of the community as a whole.³⁸

Since the traditional Jewish community was very different from its European host societies, it is doubtful whether one can discuss it in the same terms. The conventional European terms of reference for collectivities are ‘society’, ‘state’ and ‘nation’. This holds for both the ‘nation-building’ approach which makes clear distinctions among these three aspects of collectivity and even views them as stages in a developmental sequence,³⁹ and the Marxist approach.⁴⁰ The distinction arises from a historical experience in which the amalgamation of a given population into a collectivity was accomplished at different points in time, by different social interests, and under distinct historical circumstances. ‘Society’ denotes one aspect of collectivity (for example, division of labour), ‘state’ another (for example, control over decisions affecting the entire society), and ‘nation’ yet another (for example, a certain collective ‘consciousness’).

Such a distinction is not very helpful when applied to the traditional Jewish community. I think the concept of ‘moral community’ is more useful. ‘Community’ here emphasizes the cohesive, relatively homogeneous and relatively undifferentiated social structure, as well as the

leadership which represents the interests of the whole. The term 'moral' serves to define a religious community united by a common fate as well as by a belief in redemption.⁴¹ Furthermore, the concept of 'moral community' emphasizes the peculiar nature of the relationship between individual and collectivity in the traditional Jewish community. This can perhaps best be illustrated by reference to another conceptual distinction of the 'nation-building' approach—the distinction between centre and periphery. According to Shils, societies have a centre, which is the locus of power and authority, as well as embodying the central values of the society. It is through the exercise of that authority that the centre gives 'some form to the life of a considerable section of the population of the society'.⁴² The majority of the population—at least in pre-modern times—was outside the distribution of authority, and experienced the central values system more 'intermittently' than did those at the centre.⁴³ In the traditional Jewish community there was no real distinction between centre and periphery. The 'business of the community' was that of every member. The values of Judaism and the Jewish way of life were embodied in every Jew—not merely in a 'centre' while the 'periphery' adhered to them only intermittently. When groups of Jews found themselves in a new location, they could recreate the entire structure of community life, as if Judaism were a 'portable home' which could be carried around from place to place.⁴⁴

The tradition of community and the present meaning of state

Present-day Israel has moved very far from the traditional Jewish community. Yet it is not difficult to trace the links between them. In the first place, the changes brought by Enlightenment and Emancipation did not have uniform effects on various European Jewish communities. Those of western Europe were changed much more profoundly than those of eastern Europe—where the majority of the Jewish population lived. The changes that took place were, of course, significant, but they did not create a totally different type of community.⁴⁵ To quote Katz, 'Jews [after Emancipation and Enlightenment] entered European society but did not merge with it. Rather, their community became a novel and singular social entity, and, at the same time a thoroughly recognizable variation of the ancient Jewish community.'⁴⁶ A most important consideration in this context is that despite the changes that took place, including the growth of clear-cut social stratification (especially in eastern Europe), the main lines of cleavage which developed were concerned with the 'moral' aspect of community.⁴⁷ Israel as an independent state was created by a national movement which involved the transplantation of communities or parts of communities which were the direct descendants and heirs of the traditional

Jewish ones. Finally, one can find in contemporary Israeli social life traces of a direct continuity with the traditional concerns; for example, the preoccupation with survival⁴⁸ and with the 'moral' content of collective life.⁴⁹ In short, the traditional Jewish community is for Israel what its traditional society has been for any modern society—a historical experience which has shaped and influenced it. Therefore in order to understand the nature of Israel's 'modern' Jewish society one must go back to traditional Jewish society.⁵⁰

The interaction between the two is of course varied and complex, and requires very thorough socio-historical research. In this paper I would like to limit myself to a few observations. The tradition of community provides a clue to an understanding of the meaning of state as a territorial social unit—nation-state. Statehood was the main operative goal of the Zionist movement, and was sought so as to enable Jews to have a free, independent, and secure communal existence. Statehood, once achieved, became the contemporary reincarnation of the traditional Jewish community. Statehood in this sense is perceived in Israel to be a new framework for communal existence. This is evident in many ways—from the very definition of the state as a Jewish state,⁵¹ to the meaning of the word 'state' in daily usage.⁵² Thus, in contrast to the European experience, where state as a unit (nation-state) is a phenomenon of the last few centuries, representing one stage in the development of collectivity, in Israel statehood provides a new framework for the continuation of a well-developed tradition of community.

This provides us with the necessary background for the understanding of the meaning of state in the sense of a governmental apparatus. If statehood is the new framework for the existence of the community, the state—in the sense of a governing institution—represents a reincarnation of the traditional communal leadership. It is the new means of managing the 'business of the community'—where the definition of community is very much along traditional lines. In Europe the state developed as the representation of the interests of particular groups, of particular classes. In Israel, owing to the tradition of community, the state is seen as representing the whole, not a part of society. It is not perceived as the creation of a particular historical social interest—court, feudal aristocracy, or bourgeoisie—but rather the representation of a collectivity defined as a community.

The state in Israel inherited the symbolic meaning of the traditional form of management of the 'business of the community'. It is through this interpretation of the meaning of stateness in Israel that we can understand the peculiarities in conceptualization of state noted earlier in this paper. It is thus that we can understand Fein's observation that there is a blurring of boundaries between state and society in Israel, or the Israeli students' conception of the state as standing above society and economy, manipulating them and yet not shaped by them. This

view is due to the fact that the state is seen as the representation of the community as a whole; and as such, it regulates the activities of all the various groups and interests. The state has a set of themes and goals which are more important than the mundane affairs of society and economy; it embodies the leadership of the traditional community, and is seen as charged with such things as the survival of the community (state) or the fate of the Jewish nation. It is thus that we can understand Eisenstadt's observation that the state is the epitome of the collective goals of the society, which he sees as the goals of the Zionist movement. Finally, it is in this light that we can understand the students' personalized view of the state. Such a view expresses the traditional mode of relationship between individual and community. To emphasize the state apparatus, or the bureaucracy, would mean to interpose detached bodies and institutions between the individual member and the community as a whole, embodied in its leadership. A personalized interpretation of state accords with the conceptualization of the leadership in the traditional community, where it was not a separate body, but rather the epitome of community, representing its values and aspirations, aware of its needs and desires. Thus, the totalitarian flavour noted in the students' discussions is due to the total experience of community—and not to the total imposition of state on society familiar in European autocratic societies.

To recapitulate, the tradition of Jewish community provides the background for an understanding of some of the peculiarities in the conceptualization of state in Israel. These do not stem from the fact that anything is 'wrong' with Israeli society. What is wrong is the application of concepts derived from one socio-historical experience to describe and analyse a different one. It becomes clear that what appears peculiar is in fact not out of line with the past development of Jewish society. Moreover, we should not expect a development towards a 'normal' relationship between state and society in Israel, if 'normal' means Western. Because of the tradition of Jewish community life in the past, the nature and meaning of stateness in Israel are bound to be different—and to continue to be different—from what they are in other states.

Some problems of stateness in Israel

The interaction between the tradition of community and the structure and meaning of the modern state in Israel gives rise to some problems. Israel is quite different from the traditional Jewish community: it is a full-scale autonomous society, with a diversified economy, and bears a great resemblance to other industrial societies. In contrast to the marginality of a Jewish community in exile, Israeli society is 'normal'. Statehood also means a government, a legislature, a bureaucracy, a

police, armed forces, etc.—all of which the traditional community did not possess.

The tradition of community has enabled the Israeli state to wield powers which are perhaps comparable to those of dictatorships in some specific contexts—such as military mobilization, settlement of border areas, and absorption of immigrants. The sentiment of community has also been invoked—often very effectively—in cases of industrial or ethnic conflict.

But the effect of tradition has not been entirely beneficial. The apparatus of the state in Israel has been in the hands of one particular sector, the 'Labour movement', which in various forms and coalitions has ruled for several decades.⁵³ That movement has come to benefit from the traditional conceptualization of community and leadership, to the detriment of other movements and parties. With the passage of time (and owing, no doubt, to its strategic role in the achievement of statehood), the labour movement and its leaders have come to symbolize not merely a party, not merely a government, but the state itself—the community. Thus such individuals as David Ben Gurion or Golda Meir seemed to embody Jewish fate—not only the leadership of a party. Moreover, they were able to portray their opponents not only as political adversaries, but as groups acting against the best interests of the community: opposition to them was anti-community. Thus in the pre-state period the para-military organizations of the right were called *porshim* (those outside the camp). They could be freely persecuted, and even handed over to the British for punishment.⁵⁴ The same is true today, when the most common way of stigmatizing—and combating—the various radical groups opposing official policy is to identify them with the anti-community, the Arabs.⁵⁵ The concept of community has no doubt helped to suppress the various attempts of Oriental immigrants to organize en masse—for such attempts are depicted as threats to the unity of the community.⁵⁶ In other words, the tradition of management of the 'business of the community', derived from the days when there was little structural differentiation, has helped those who now control the state to perpetuate their rule, while it has hampered the development of new patterns of expression by groups which came into existence later and which represent other interests.

Thus, on the one hand, the tradition of community makes the state in Israel a very powerful tool in the hands of those who control it. But, on the other, it presents the state with a task and a challenge which it can hardly be expected to fulfil. The 'business of the community' in the traditional society was, as we have seen, 'moral'—in sharp contrast with the 'business' of modern states; and Israel is a modern state. The 'moral' tradition imposes on Israel expectations that it be more than an 'ordinary' state. These demands and expectations are put into clear relief by the identification of state and community, by the view of the

state as the epitome of community. The problem is that the concrete mechanisms and structures of the state in Israel—which are, as we noted, not different from those in Europe—were never intended to fulfil a ‘moral’ function. They were developed in Europe largely for the management of the business of capitalism. Under such circumstances, there are several possibilities for development. First, the identification of state with community may lead, as some critics of modern Zionism have argued, to an accelerated process of de-‘moralization’ of community which would in turn lead within a few generations to the end of the Jewish people as a distinct moral community.⁵⁷ Alternatively, if the concern with ‘moral’ content proves to be strong enough in Israeli society to create movements of ‘moral’ regeneration or revival, we may witness the process of devaluation of the role of the state to a position of a mere tool in charge of specified material necessities, in much the same way as the traditional Jewish community viewed the Gentile state. Finally, it is of course logically possible for the state in Israel to take on ‘moral’ tasks—which would make for an original Israeli contribution to stateness. But that seems highly unlikely.

NOTES

¹ An earlier version of this article was read at the annual meeting of the Israeli Sociological Association in Tel Aviv in April 1976.

² See Heinz Lubasz, ‘Introduction’, in Heinz Lubasz, ed., *The Development of the Modern State*, New York, 1964; and J. P. Nettl, ‘The State as a Conceptual Variable’, in *World Politics*, vol. 20, no. 4, July 1968.

³ This account relies on Lubasz, *op. cit.*

⁴ See Lubasz, *ibid.*

⁵ We have already noted Lubasz’s distinction between the French and the English ‘models’ of state. See also Nettl’s analysis, which differentiates between the historical experience of stateness of various European countries and of the United States: Nettl, *op. cit.*

⁶ For some basic concepts and models of the ‘nation-building’ approach, see Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality*, Cambridge, Mass., 1953; Karl W. Deutsch, ‘Social Mobilization and Political Development’, in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 55, no. 3, September 1961; G. Almond and James Coleman, eds., *The Politics of Developing Areas*, Princeton, 1960; Edward Shils, ‘Centre and Periphery’, in *The Logic of Personal Knowledge*, London, 1961; Stein Rokkan, ‘Models and Methods in the Comparative Study of Nation Building’, in *Acta Sociologica*, vol. 12, no. 2, 1969; S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966; S. N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Building States and Nations: Models and Data Resources*, Beverly Hills, 1973; and Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton, 1975.

⁷ J. A. Silva Michelena, ‘Diversities Among Dependent Nations: An

Overview of Latin American Developments', in vol. 2, Eisenstadt and Rokkan, eds., op. cit.

⁸ Rajni Kothari, 'The Confrontation of Theories with National Realities: Report on an International Conference', in vol. 1, Eisenstadt and Rokkan, eds., op. cit.

⁹ For a Marxist analysis of the state in its European context, see, in addition to Marx's own writings, Lenin, *State and Revolution*, London, 1919; S. H. M. Chang, *The Marxian Theory of the State*, New York, 1931; Ralph Miliband, 'Marx and the State', in *Socialist Register*, 1965; Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society*, London, 1969; E. Mandel, *The Marxist Theory of the State*, New York, 1971; Robin Murray, 'Internationalization of Capital and the Nation State', in *New Left Review*, May 1971; and Nicos Poulantzas, *Fascisme et dictature*, Paris, 1970. See also Foster Carter, 'Neo Marxist Approaches to Development and Underdevelopment', in *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol. 3, no. 7, 1973.

¹⁰ Poulantzas, op. cit.

¹¹ A. G. Frank, *Lumpenbourgeoisie: Lumpenddevelopment*, New York, 1972; C. Furtado, *Development and Underdevelopment*, Berkeley, 1964; H. Jaguaribe, *Economic and Political Development*, New Haven, Conn., 1968; and F. H. Cardoso and E. Felleto, *Dependencia y Desarrollo en America Latina*, Buenos Aires, 1973.

¹² Jaguaribe, op. cit.

¹³ Baruch Sorj, *State, Industrialization and Social Change in Underdeveloped Countries*, Unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Haifa, 1974.

¹⁴ Nettl, op. cit., p. 562.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p. 566.

¹⁶ The phrase is quoted in Nettl, op. cit. Nettl criticizes it for being too comprehensive, being even broader than Parsons's definition of politics as goal attainment (Nettl, op. cit., p. 570). I find the phrase very useful, for it allows one to view society (community) as engaged in one dominant pattern of collective action—such as industrial capitalism, or feudal agriculture. This use of the phrase will become clear in the following pages.

¹⁷ Robin Murray, op. cit., offers a useful classification of the economic functions of the state, from a Marxist point of view.

¹⁸ Nettl's analysis concerns mainly Europe and the United States. As for developing nations, he says that the notion of state has not taken hold there, and that stateness is achieved mainly in the context of international relations. In short, he regards state as a meaningful concept only in the West. See Nettl, op. cit., pp. 589–91.

¹⁹ For a pertinent analysis focusing on the rise of nationalism as a response to European capitalist expansion, see Tom Nairn, 'Marxism and the Modern Janus', in *New Left Review*, December 1975.

²⁰ It differs in several respects from the typical—or stereotypical—new state. First, most of the (Jewish) population was not present at the time of European expansion, its very return to the territory in question having been largely facilitated by the fact of European domination in the area. Second, the Jews were more clearly self-defined as a collectivity than were many other societies of the new states before the establishment of the modern state in Israel.

²¹ Leonard Fein, *Politics in Israel*, Boston, 1967, p. 231. The book is one of a series on Comparative Politics, edited by Almond, Coleman, and Pye.

²² See Shlomo Swirski, *Critics and Successors: A Study in Socio-Political Consciousness of Israeli Student Leaders*, Jerusalem Academic Press, Jerusalem, 1977.

²³ *ibid.*

²⁴ S. N. Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society*, London, 1967, p. 362.

²⁵ Eisenstadt sees Israeli society as one of the 'crystallizing modern societies'; Eisenstadt, *ibid.*, p. 5.

²⁶ Fein, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

²⁷ *ibid.*, p. 232.

²⁸ There is very little published in the way of Marxist analysis of the state in Israel; therefore it is rather difficult to make a comparison of alternative explanations as was done in the introductory part of this paper. One attempt to deal with some aspects of the question is Arie Bober, ed., *The Other Israel: The Radical Case Against Zionism*, Garden City, N.Y., 1972. The contributors to that book present a more or less orthodox Marxist analysis of class and state in Israel. The state is shown as largely dependent on foreign capital, and consequently as playing the role of controller and distributor of that capital. There is little attempt to link the state with the social structure, or to point to the peculiarities of the role of the state in Israel. See especially chapter 5.

²⁹ Jacob Katz, *Tradition and Crisis: Jewish Society at the End of the Middle Ages*, New York, 1961, p. 29.

³⁰ The following analysis of the traditional Jewish community relies heavily on various writings of Jacob Katz: Jacob Katz, *op. cit.*; and his 'The Jewish National Movement: A Sociological Analysis', in H. H. Ben Sasson and S. Ettinger, eds., *Jewish Society Through the Ages*, London, 1969; and *Out of the Ghetto: The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation, 1770-1870*, Cambridge, Mass., 1973. These works by Katz constitute the foremost attempt at sociological analysis of that community and its later developments. However, material can be found in a variety of sources: see, among others, Salo Baron, *The Jewish Community*, Philadelphia, 1945; Louis Finkelstein, *Jewish Self-Government in the Middle Ages*, New York, 1964; H. H. Ben Sasson, *Perakim be Toledot haYehudim biYmei haBenayim* (Chapters in the History of the Jews in the Middle Ages), Tel Aviv, 1958; and the same author's contribution in vol. 2 of A. Malamat, H. Tadmor, M. Stern, S. Safrai, H. H. Ben Sasson and S. Ettinger, *Toledot Am Israel* (History of the Jewish People), Tel Aviv, 1969.

³¹ For a general historical review of the period following Emancipation and Enlightenment, see H. M. Sachar, *The Course of Modern Jewish History*, New York, 1958; and S. Ettinger, *Toledot Am Israel ba-Et haHadash* in Vol. 3 of A. Malamat et al., *op. cit.* For an analysis of social and cultural changes, see Katz, *Out of the Ghetto . . .*, *op. cit.*, and Salo Baron, 'The Modern Age', in Leo Schwarz, ed., *Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People*, New York, 1956. For a review of the various types of modern Jewish communities, see Daniel Elazar, 'The Reconstitution of Jewish Communities in the Post-War Period', in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. xi, no. 1, June 1969.

³² The following analysis is focused on the traditional European Jewish community. This is, first, in order to show the contrast between the

traditional Jewish community and the European societies from which the concepts concerning state and stateness grew. Second, the descendants of the European Jewish communities constituted the majority of the Zionist movement which established the state of Israel, and they have been the dominant group in Israeli society. Their heritage, therefore, is the most relevant for our analysis. However, from the point of view of this paper, the experiences of the North African and Middle Eastern Jewish traditional communities were not fundamentally different: see André Chouraqui, *Between East and West: A History of the Jews of North Africa*, Philadelphia, 1968; H. Hirschberg, *A History of the Jews in North Africa*, Leiden, 1974; and H. Cohen, *Ha-Yehudim be-Artsot ha-Mizrah ha-Tihon be-Yameynu* (The Jews in the Modern Middle East), Tel Aviv, 1972.

³³ On the structure and nature of the traditional Jewish community as the epitome of collectivity, and on the relations between this community and various temporary supra-community organizations, see Katz, *Tradition and Crisis*, op. cit., chapters 11–13, and Ben Sasson, *The Middle Ages*, op. cit., chapters 8, 12, and 16.

³⁴ Katz, *ibid.*, pp. 200–209.

³⁵ *ibid.*, chapters, 3, 4, and 10.

³⁶ According to Katz, in the traditional Jewish community economic activity was not regarded as an end in itself. In contrast with Protestantism, which (as Weber noted in his analysis) ascribed a positive role to economic activity in the struggle for spiritual salvation, Judaism never considered worldly success as a criterion of spiritual virtue. Economic success was of importance only in so far as it facilitated the pursuits of spiritual activities such as the study of the Torah, the observance of the commandments, and the performance of meritorious deeds. See Katz, *Tradition and Crisis*, op. cit., p. 73.

³⁷ Katz, 'The Jewish National Movement', op. cit., pp. 268–69.

³⁸ This, of course, meant different things at different times—securing an extension of a residence permit or continued permission to operate in designated economic fields, or coping with physical or religious attacks, or defending the boundaries of autonomy in community affairs. These interests were not generally those of one group as opposed to those of another, but rather the concern of the community as a whole, even if not all its members benefited equally from any particular activity.

³⁹ Deutsch (in *Nationalism . . .*, op. cit., 1953) distinguished between the three. Various later models differentiate between nation building and state building, taking the prior existence of society for granted. See G. Almond and G. Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, Boston, 1966.

⁴⁰ See, for example, Henri Lefebvre, *The Sociology of Marx*, New York, 1968, chapter 5.

⁴¹ Though religion and messianic aspirations would be better described as 'spiritual' rather than 'moral', I prefer the term 'moral' because it conveys an important part of traditional Judaism: the emphasis on a complex and comprehensive set of rules of conduct, the Halakha, which regulated most aspects of a Jew's life. This is what made traditional Judaism a living religion; that is, a religion regulating a living society. To call the traditional

Jewish community a 'spiritual community' would take away from its character as a living society, and would bring it too close to such social entities as religious sects, religious movements, or various types of communes and temporary communities—that is, organizations which are part of a larger social whole, but distinct in one or more specific spheres of action. The traditional Jewish community, in contrast, was a social whole in itself—though, as explained, a very peculiar social whole. That is why the vast literature on sects and religious movements, as well as on communes and communities, is of little relevance for the understanding of the traditional Jewish community.

⁴² Shils, 'Center and Periphery', op. cit., p. 120.

⁴³ *ibid.*, p. 126.

⁴⁴ Heinrich Heine, quoted in Katz, *Tradition and Crisis*, op. cit., p. 226.

⁴⁵ Concerning these changes, see note 31 above.

⁴⁶ Katz, *Out of the Ghetto*, op. cit., p. 216.

⁴⁷ It is interesting to compare here two attempts to explain present-day cleavages by reference to the period of emergence of the modern nation-state. Lipset and Rokkan's 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignment: An Introduction', in S. M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignment*, New York, 1967, attribute the nature of party and voter alignments in contemporary Europe to the cleavages which developed in the process of nation building. The cleavages they consider are centre-periphery, state-church, peasants-landowners, and workers-employers. Reuven Kahane's '*Defusim shel Zehut Le'umit be-Israel*' ('Patterns of National Identity in Israel') in S. N. Eisenstadt, et al., eds., *Hinuch ve-Hevra be-Israel* (Education and Society in Israel), Jerusalem, 1958, in an attempt to explain various patterns of national identity in Israel—converging mostly in various parties and movements—goes back to the equivalent period in Jewish history. He finds that the relevant cleavages, in contrast to those described by Lipset and Rokkan, concern mainly 'moral' issues: the type of ideological and existential answers given by various elements within the Jewish community to the twin dilemmas confronting them after Emancipation and Enlightenment—how to maintain their identity while at the same time enjoying the advantages of participation in the newly opened society, and how to maintain their religious distinctiveness at a time when rationalist values seemed to prevail. Kahane traces many of the present-day ideological tendencies in Israel to the historical cleavages which developed as a consequence of these dilemmas. These two articles show clearly the nature of the difference between the traditional Jewish community as a 'moral community' and European society.

⁴⁸ The frequent wars have been occasions when the theme of survival emerged again and again, with symbols taken from the past. Thus, for example, there have been serious attempts to portray the Arabs as antisemites who have acquired the long-standing desire of Gentiles to annihilate the Jews. See Yehoshofat Harkavi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel*, Jerusalem, 1972.

⁴⁹ One prominent early Zionist thinker thought that the goal of the movement should be the establishment of a spiritual-intellectual centre, and not necessarily a full-fledged state, with all its material implications: Ahad Ha'am, *Ten Essays on Zionism and Judaism*, London, 1923. Within present-

day Israel, there have been critical suggestions that the establishment of the state in and by itself does not constitute a sufficient means for the continuation of the 'moral' tradition of the Jewish people. See Yeshayahu Leibovitz, *Yahadut, Am Yehudi u-Medinat Israel* (Jewishness, Jewish Nation and the State of Israel), Tel Aviv, 1975; and Eliezer Livneh, *Israel ve-Mashber Hatsivilizatsia Hama'aravit* (Israel and the Crisis of Western Civilization), Tel Aviv, 1972.

⁵⁰ It is interesting to note in this context that the Zionist movement made a conscious effort to 'erase' that period of Jewish history and to show modern Israel as the direct successor of ancient Israel—that is, to emphasize the two periods of national independence and to gloss over the period of exile and national humiliation. This was an especially marked policy of the late David Ben Gurion; it has also left its mark on Israeli sociology. In their analyses of the formative background of Israeli society, Israeli sociologists rarely go beyond the first colonizing waves of modern Zionism. The analysis of the European Jewish community is left to historians.

The Yishuv (the period from the first colonizing waves to the Declaration of Independence in 1948) is seen as the history of Israel; the traditional European—or, for this purpose, Oriental—Jewish communities are seen as prehistory, and as such not as relevant for the understanding of present-day Israeli society.

⁵¹ The Law of Return, which enacts the basic policy on immigration, grants automatic citizenship to any Jew arriving in Israel. Non-Jews have to go through a process of naturalization.

⁵² In addition to designating the political institution and the international entity, the word 'medina' ('state') is used as one of several definitions of the Jewish collectivity in Israel.

⁵³ For a history and analysis of Mapai, the main component within the Labour Party, see Peter Medding, *Mapai in Israel: Political Organization and Government in a New Society*, Cambridge, 1972.

⁵⁴ For an account by its most prominent leader of the major paramilitary organization of the pre-state period, the Irgun Tsvai Le'umi, see Menachem Begin, *The Revolt: Story of the Irgun*, Tel Aviv, 1964.

⁵⁵ See Bober, op. cit.

⁵⁶ Not just by the Ashkenazim, who control the state, but by many of the Oriental Jews themselves. See Swirski, op. cit.

⁵⁷ The identification of state with community was in part consciously strengthened by a move during the first period of statehood to transfer to the state the functions up to then performed by voluntary organizations, especially political parties and the Histadrut (the Federation of Trade Unions). This move, known as 'mamlakhtiut', resulted in a slow devaluation of the role of parties—until then the major community builders in Israel. For an English account of 'mamlakhtiut', see Medding, op. cit., chapter 11. For an analysis of the nature of the pre-State parties in Israel, see Benjamin Akzin, 'The Role of Parties in Israeli Democracy', in *Journal of Politics*, vol. 17, no. 4, 1955.

ANIMALS AND GOD-MAN-NATURE IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

Milton Jacobs

Introduction

FOUCAULT has said: 'The language of a people gives us its vocabulary, and its vocabulary is a sufficiently faithful and authoritative record of that people; simply by comparing the different states of a nation's vocabulary at different times one could form an idea of its progress.'¹ I have borne in mind that statement while engaged in my study of animals in the Old Testament. I have also been influenced by the stimulating Biblical research of Douglas,² Leach,³ and Andriolo,⁴ as well as by a review of Braudel's *The Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. The reviewer commented that for Braudel, 'societies live within nature, dominated by the inexorable logic of the relationship between environment, biology, tradition, and mind',⁵ and that historical analysis must therefore give importance to physical and biological conditions.

Leeds and Vayda⁶ in their discussion of Clifford Geertz's concept of ecosystem, of the inter-relatedness of cultural, biological, and physical variables, had stressed the importance of 'the role of animals in human ecological adjustments' and noted that 'consideration of biological and environmental factors can add to our understanding of cultural phenomena'; it was therefore important for anthropologists to look into 'the influence of cultural phenomena upon the uses to which animals are put by human beings'.⁷

In this paper, I seek to discover whether the manner in which animals are depicted in the Old Testament helps us to understand some of the historical Jewish values about man's relationship to the animal world and, more generally, the God-man-nature concepts.

Cultures have evolved their own peculiar philosophies. It has been said that American Indians 'deified everything in nature that was beyond their feeble powers of comprehension . . .'⁸ and that for the Cheyennes 'the world order is a system of those governed by a supernatural being who knows how to operate and uphold its domain',⁹ while the Pueblo Indians 'generally hold a world view that man and the

universe are interrelated and in equilibrium—an equilibrium that man can disturb'.¹⁰

Both Judaism¹¹ and Christianity,¹² of course, have helped to shape the beliefs current in the Western world. The medieval Christian view stressed that God 'must be obeyed and worshipped',¹³ while Maimonides stated¹⁴ that 'mankind is low in rank as compared with the uppermost portion of the Universe . . . the Spheres and the stars; but as regards the Angels, there cannot be any real comparison between man and Angels, although man is the highest of all beings on earth . . .'.¹⁵ Moreover, all other things—such as animals and plants¹⁶—exist only to satisfy man's needs.¹⁷ But a man without knowledge is like a beast.¹⁸

William Irwin has commented that 'Hebrew thinkers recognized man's kinship with the lower animals' and that for them man was 'half-mythical, primeval', although he was also 'of exalted origin' and 'both earthy and divine'.¹⁹ For Fohrer, the use of animal metaphors in the Old Testament reveals how close was the bond between man and beast in the semi-nomadic life led by the Biblical tribes.²⁰ Pfeiffer has analysed Biblical regulations about permitted and prohibited animal foods, and notes that men are enjoined to treat animals with kindness; he has commented on the frequent use of animal metaphors, on Jeremiah's strong feeling for nature, and on Job's knowledge of the habits of animals and his use of animal metaphors in his descriptions of humans. He has also observed that there are many references to plants in I Kings and to animals in Proverbs.²¹ Erich Fromm notes that the Old Testament lays stress on a 'new harmony'—that 'between man and nature';²² but he also refers to man as the prisoner of nature, who becomes free by becoming fully human;²³ and he claims that 'the aim of human action is the constant process of liberating oneself from the shackles that bind man to the past, to nature, to the clan, to idols'.²⁴ However, these statements are not as contradictory as they may appear, for Fromm is describing an evolutionary process recorded in the Bible: 'The God of Abraham and the God of Isaiah share the essential qualities of the One, yet they are as different from each other as an uneducated, primitive, nomadic tribal chief and a universalistic thinker a millennium later.'²⁵ Man becomes human when he begins to acquire some of the qualities of God.²⁶

In sum, while the American Indians are said to see the world as an inter-relationship of humans, animals, plants, and spirits—as a continuum—both Judaism²⁷ and Christianity²⁸ are first God-centred and then man-centred: animals and plants exist for man's exploitation. But is there in fact in the Bible evidence of a God-man-nature continuum? Louis Jacobs has asked, in this context, 'Why should there be animals at all . . . what purpose do they serve?'²⁹ In this paper, I have made an attempt at answering that kind of question.

Aims and methods

The Old Testament—sacred to Christians and Muslims as well as to Jews—covers Jewish history and experience for more than a thousand years. Although its various books and sections have been written by different authors, it must be read in a special sequence and it can be seen as a closed narrative. Narratives have been studied and analysed by anthropologists. In a recent work he edited, *Handbook of Social and Cultural Anthropology*,³⁰ Honigsmann has included an entire chapter on narrative by Colby and Peacock.³¹ They cite Ruth Benedict's use of narratives in her study of cultures and Propp's *Morphology of the Folktale*,³² which they praise as 'imaginative' and 'thoroughly operational'. They also discuss the use of statistical method, of word counts and of contents analysis³³—methods which I have used in the present study. There have also been, of course, other approaches.³⁴

I do not propose to enter here into semantic arguments about the similarities or differences between narratives, myths, traditional tales, legends, and folktales. I am more concerned with the methods which have been used to study and analyse such bodies of usually verbal material. There does appear to be reasonable agreement that all these forms are related. *Studies on Mythology*³⁵ contains articles by Lévi-Strauss, Firth, Leach, and Rivers; for Firth, the term 'traditional tale' encompasses myth, legend, and history,³⁶ while Rivers seems to use 'myth' and 'narrative' almost interchangeably.³⁷ In my own analysis in this paper I follow generally the concepts used by Lévi-Strauss in his structural analysis of myth: he finds what he calls 'bundles of relations' or the 'harmony of the core' at the heart of the meaning of myth.³⁸ I take as my starting point such a 'bundle of relations'—which I have called the God-man-nature inter-relationship; and I attempt to trace it through the narrative of the Scriptures (a term I use here synonymously with the Old Testament). Like Lévi-Strauss, I believe diachronic and synchronic analysis to be important; and also that, as he says, 'the function of repetition is to render the structure of the myth apparent'.³⁹

I have attempted a quantitative or content analysis of the Old Testament in an effort to answer the following questions: (1) How are animals depicted in the Old Testament? (2) What do narrative passages which mention an animal and its function tell us about the God-man-nature relationship? and (3) Does a discernible pattern emerge from an examination of the three divisions of the Masoretic Bible,⁴⁰ the Law, the Prophets, and the Writings? We must bear in mind that the Law is the most sacred of all, then come the Prophets, and finally the Writings⁴¹—which are the least sacred.⁴²

It was in 1834 that Jonathan Fisher first published his *Scripture Animals: A Natural History of the Living Creatures Named in the Bible*,⁴³ in which he

lists 85. However, with the additional help of Potter's *Is that in the Bible?*²⁴⁴ (published almost exactly a century later, in 1933), and of other sources, I was able to trace mentions of 88 wild and 16 domestic animals as well as references to unspecified 'animals' and 'beasts'. These animals were mentioned in 305 passages, identified by chapter and verse; and I have coded them within five contexts:

1. G: God-related—God speaks or is being addressed;
2. M: metaphorical—animal quality attributed to humans or vice versa;
3. F: food-related—animals for human consumption;
4. N: nobility-related, as well as a class or hierarchical connotation such as a prince on the back of a mule; and
5. W: relating to wealth.

I made no attempt at coding animals according to pejorative or other connotations because of the danger of too much subjectivity being present in such evaluations.

Analysis

I was able to discover 702 references to animals in the Old Testament, and coding them within the framework just described revealed that almost half (46 per cent) were God-related; just over a quarter (26 per cent) were metaphorical; 13 per cent were food-related; 7 per cent were in the context of nobility, class, or hierarchy; and the remainder (8 per cent) were connected with wealth ($\chi^2 = 373.3$, $df = 4$, $p = < 0.01$). The animals are categorized into classifications in Table 1, which gives the total for all animals as well as for, separately, domestic and wild animals. A high frequency means a great use of a class of animals to portray a specific value, while a lesser frequency correspondingly means that there is a lesser use. In this way, it is possible to compare the various classes of animals according to the five values used for coding categories.

In the case of wild animals, they were ordered according to their frequencies, first as God-related; second, metaphorically; third, food-related; fourth, nobility- or hierarchically-related; and finally, fifth, wealth-related.

As for domestic animals, they were also primarily God-related; but the order then differed: wealth came second, followed by metaphorical use in third place, while the remaining two (F and N) equally ranked last. Briefly, therefore, we see that while *all* animals are first of all God-related, domestic animals are then most significant as symbols of wealth and wild ones are mostly used metaphorically. There is a statistically significant difference between the values of wild and of domestic animals ($\chi^2 = 89.3$, $df = 4$, $p = < 0.01$).

I stated earlier that an important question was whether there was a discernible pattern in the references to animals—that is, whether the

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TABLE I. *Frequencies of Animal Mentions According to the Codes*

Animal Classifications ^b	G		F		M		N		W		Total	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
<i>Wild Animals</i>												
Birds	95	48	45	23	48	24	8	4	3	2	199	101
Game Animals	13	45	8	28	7	24	1	3	—	0	29	100
Insects	38	45	3	4	26	31	13	15	5	6	85	101
Water Living	12	57	5	24	4	19	—	0	—	0	21	100
Reptiles	7	37	2	10	10	53	—	0	—	0	19	100
Dangerous Animals	37	41	—	0	48	53	4	4	1	1	90	99
Small ground-living	10	48	8	38	2	10	—	0	1	5	21	101
Miscell.	3	27	2	18	1	9	3	27	2	18	11	99
Total	215	45	73	15	146	31	29	6	12	3	475	100
Rank Order	(1)		(3)		(2)		(4)		(5)			
<i>Domestic Animals</i>												
Beasts of Burden	21	38	2	4	12	21	12	21	9	16	56	100
Domestic	76	53	15	10	13	9	5	3	35	24	144	99
Total	97	48	17	9	25	12	17	9	44	22	200	100
Rank Order	(1)		(4.5)		(3)		(4.5)		(2)			
Behemoth ^a												
Leviathan ^a												
Dragon ^a	4	50	—	0	3	38	1	12	—	0	8	100
Animal, beast	8	42	1	5	7	37	—	0	3	16	19	100
Total	12	44	1	4	10	37	1	4	3	11	27	100
All Animals	324	46	91	13	181	26	47	7	59	8	702	100
Rank Order of All Animals	(1)		(3)		(2)		(5)		(4)			
											$\chi^2=373.3$	
											df=4	
											p=<0.01	

^a These animals have been separated from the others for a number of reasons. Radin refers to them as fanciful beasts.⁴⁵ Jacobi believes that behemoth and leviathan are one and the same monster and emphasizes the symbolic importance of behemoth, leviathan, and dragon.⁴⁶ Jacobi also refers to the Egyptian and Sumerian interpretations of dragon.⁴⁷ Gordis reports that the meaning of behemoth and leviathan are confused; leviathan has been translated as crocodile, whale, or dragon; behemoth has been translated as elephant or crocodile.⁴⁸
^b For a detailed list, see the Appendix. Present-day Israel is said to have 80 species of reptiles, 60 species of mammals, and 350 species of birds.⁴⁹

arrangement of the various portions of the Bible is correlated with patterns of the animals mentioned and their values. Table 2 provides data which help to answer that question.

Many students of the Bible⁵⁰ have commented on the significance of wild animals in the Scriptures;⁵¹ I have organized Table 2 so that the attributes of these animals can be readily compared with those of domestic animals.

When we look at the codes according to the part of the Scriptures in which the animals are cited, we see that the God-related and food-related values decrease in frequency from the Law to the Writings,

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TABLE 2. *Frequency of animal references according to the codes*

<i>Portion of The Scriptures</i>	<i>G</i>		<i>F</i>		<i>M</i>		<i>N</i>		<i>W</i>		<i>Totals^a</i>	
	<i>f</i>	%	<i>f</i>	%	<i>f</i>	%	<i>f</i>	%		%	<i>f</i>	%
<i>The Law^b</i>												
Wild Animals (N = 89)	84	52	66	41	8	5	2	1	—	0	160	99
Domestic Animals (N = 51)	36	51	14	20	2	3	6	8	13	18	71	100
All Animals (N = 140)	120	52	80	35	10	4	8	3	13	6	231	100
<i>The Prophets^b</i>												
Wild Animals (N = 110)	90	46	5	2	78	40	16	8	7	4	196	100
Domestic Animals (N = 41)	29	45	2	3	15	23	5	8	14	22	65	101
All Animals (N = 151)	119	46	7	3	93	36	21	8	21	8	261	101
<i>The Writings^b</i>												
Wild Animals (N = 77)	44	37	1	1	61	52	9	8	3	2	118	100
Domestic Animals (N = 48)	32	48	1	2	8	12	6	9	19	29	66	100
All Animals (N = 125)	76	41	2	1	69	38	15	8	22	12	184	100
All Animals in the whole of the Old Testament	315	47	89	13	172	25	44	7	56	8	676 ^c	100

^a The variation of the total percentages (from 99% to 101%) is due to rounding.

^b For the three portions of the Old Testament, χ^2 's between the distributions of the codes of wild and domestic animals were computed:

The Law: $\chi^2 = 37.9$, $df = 4$, $p = <0.01$.

The Prophets: $\chi^2 = 20.8$, $df = 4$, $p = <0.01$.

The Writings: $\chi^2 = 43.3$, $df = 4$, $p = <0.01$.

^c 96% of the total animal references in Table 1 are used in Table 2. Ape, animal, beast, dragon, behemoth, and leviathan do not appear in Table 2.

while those which are nobility and wealth related, as well as those which are metaphorical, increase. The Law, of course, is embodied in the earliest part of the Old Testament; the Prophets occur later, and the Writings are last in time. Biblical scholars are best qualified to explain the subtlety of the patterns which have emerged from my analysis. For my part, I can only note that the G and F columns—showing decreasing trends—are most related to the sacred, the M column reflects links between humans and animals, while N and W occur in secular contexts—the rise and fall of fortunes, judges, prophets, and princes. I see the G, F, and M categories as dependent, and the N and W categories as independent, variables. I believe the historical changes which occurred in economic and political affairs to be the main cause of the diminishing importance from the Law to the Writings of the passages in the Old Testament which mention animals in the context of God and of food.⁵²

In Table 3, G, F, and M are combined to represent a religious-ecological variable, while N and W together have a politico-economic

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TABLE 3. Percentages of animal references according to the combined codes

Portion of The Scriptures	G + F + M		N + W		Total	
	%		%	f	%	
The Law	91		9	231	100	
The Prophets	85		16	261	101	
The Writings	80		20	184	100	
Entire Old Testament	85		15	676	100	

$$[\chi^2 = 10.5, df = 2, p = <0.01]$$

value. For both wild and domestic animals there is a historically linked decline in G, F, and M while N and W increase in frequency. It would be interesting to discover whether an analysis of the New Testament would reveal the same historical trends. Baly has commented, in his *Geography of the Bible*, that there are fewer references to wild animals in the New Testament,⁵³ at a period in time when there was more order and civilization.

The historical evidence

There is a wealth of material on ancient Jewish history.⁵⁴ For the purposes of this paper, it is necessary to state only the barest facts, which seem to be that between 1,600 B.C.E. and 70 C.E. the Jews of the Old Testament progressed from nomadism, pastoralism, and tribalism to an agrarian society; urban centres developed and the occupational structure became increasingly diversified to include craftsmen, merchants, scholars, physicians, and administrators. The political power and authority of elders and tribal chiefs became vested in priests and kings. Jerusalem had become the royal capital during the reign of David around 1,000 B.C.E. Baron has noted that in the fifteenth century B.C.E. there had already been more than a hundred small towns and villages; Joshua and Judges list about 30 cities. According to Baron, the urban population of the Old Testament lands had more than doubled between 1,000 and 586 B.C.E.—the date at which the Temple had been destroyed and the Second Commonwealth had begun with the Babylonian Captivity. Briefly, the Biblical Hebrews became increasingly urban and sedentary in the course of their history.

The God-man-nature complex

Where a Biblical passage contained a reference to an animal, I had to decide whether that passage could be coded in any one of three ways: God-related and food-related; God-related and metaphorical; or food-related and metaphorical. I have considered any one of these possible combined codes as indicative of the God-man-nature complex.

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In the 305 passages which I studied, I found 198 which could be coded as GF, GM, or FM—that is, which can be said to reflect the God–man–nature complex. The distributions of the frequencies in the different parts of the Scriptures are set out in Table 4. The last column of the Table shows that 198 passages in the 1,130 pages of the Masoretic Bible give a ratio of 0.18.

TABLE 4. *The God–man–nature (G–M–N) Complex*

<i>Portions of The Scriptures</i>	<i>GF, GM, FM</i>		<i>Ratios of G–M–N</i>		
			<i>G–M–N Codable passages</i>	<i>G–M–N animal mentions</i>	<i>G–M–N No. of pages</i>
<i>The Law (Most Sacred)</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>%</i>			
<i>The Prophets (Sacred)</i>	80	40	80/89 = 0.90	80/231 = 0.35	80/256 = 0.31
<i>The Writings (Least sacred)</i>	79	40	79/114 = 0.69	79/261 = 0.30	79/514 = 0.15
	39	20	39/102 = 0.38	39/184 = 0.21	39/360 = 0.11
<i>Entire Old Testament</i>	198	100	198/305 = 0.65	198/676 = 0.29	198/1130 = 0.18
	χ^2		65.67	22.96	46.17
	df		2	2	2
	p		<0.01	<0.01	<0.01

In his study of myths, Lévi-Strauss⁵⁵ distinguishes between those relating to nature and those concerned with culture. It is clear now that the same distinction can be made here: the religious-ecological (G + F + M) factors are related to nature while the political-economic (N + W) are close to culture. Table 4 shows the decline in importance of the God–man–nature complex from the Law (which is most sacred) to the Writings—which are least sacred. The trend is consistent throughout, that is, whether the base of comparison be the codable passages, the animals specifically mentioned, or the number of pages in the Scriptures.

Conclusion

Gersh has asserted that 'Judaism bars worship of any physical thing—animate or inanimate . . .'⁵⁶ My analysis of the Old Testament has, I hope, shown that the earlier books reveal a profound concern with the inter-relationship between God, man and nature. The portion of the Bible—the Torah or the Law—which Jews consider most sacred and

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most prescriptive emphasizes and dramatizes the close links binding man and nature with God.

Genesis relates⁵⁷ that God told Noah and his sons:

‘As for Me, behold, I establish My covenant with you, and with your seed after you; and with every living creature that is with you, the fowl, the cattle, and every beast of the earth with you; of all that go out of the ark, even every beast of the earth. And I establish My covenant with you; neither shall all flesh be cut off any more by the waters of the flood; neither shall there any more be a flood to destroy the earth.’ And God said: ‘This is the token of the covenant which I make between Me and you and every living creature that is with you, for perpetual generations.’

Many centuries later in Ecclesiastes—which is said to have been written after the destruction of the Temple in 586 B.C.E.—man and beast are again closely linked⁵⁸:

It is because of the sons of men, that God may sift them, and that they may see that they themselves are but as beasts. For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them; as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that man hath no preeminence above a beast; for all is vanity. All go unto one place; all are of dust, and all return to dust. Who knoweth the spirit of man whether it goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast whether it goeth downward to the earth?

There seems to have been a very definite decline in the intensity of the inter-relationship between God, man, and nature in the thousand years of Jewish history recorded in the Old Testament; and that trend is historically correlated with increasing urbanism and secularization.

I have suggested that a parallel study of the New Testament texts, written during a period when urban centres and sophistication were more prevalent, might well reveal a continuing sharper decline in the beginning of the Christian era of the values relating animals to God and food, and less metaphorical use being made of animals—the religious-ecological variable, which I have here coded G, F, and M. A similar study of the text of the Koran, the third Holy Narrative which has links with the Old and New Testaments, would also be most valuable. Moreover, a comparative examination of the attitudes towards, and the uses of, animals by the peoples of Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, and Rome might provide us with fruitful data. We already have Auguet and Toynbee’s works on animals in Roman times,⁵⁹ Brodrick’s *Animals in Archaeology*,⁶⁰ and Carson’s *Man, Beasts, and Gods*,⁶¹ all of which have been published in 1972 and 1973. Perhaps they reflect the fact that in recent years scholars are becoming increasingly aware of the relevance for our age of discovering the place which Humans have in the scheme of nature. That, of course, is the age-old question; but it seems today to be of greater importance than it has ever been.

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APPENDIX

*Animals in The Old Testament
utilized in this study*

I. *Classified as wild animals (N = 88)*

A. *Birds (N = 29)*

bird
bittern
buzzard
cormorant
crane
dove, turtle-dove
eagle
falcon
fowl
hawk, nighthawk
heron
hoopoe
kite
lapwing
osprey
ostrich
owl
partridge
peacock
pelican
pigeon
quail
raven
seagull
stork
swallow
vulture
winged
woodcock

B. *Insects (N = 17)*

ant
bee
cankerworm
caterpillar
flea
fly
gnat
grasshopper
hornet
horse-leech

lice
locust
moth
palmerworm
scorpion
spider
winged, swarming

C. *Game Animals (N = 11)*

antelope
gazelle
hart
hind
mountain sheep
pyarg
roe buck
wild ass
wild bull
wild goat
wild ox

D. *Dangerous Animals (N = 10)*

bear
behemoth
dog⁶²
dragon
fox
jackal
leopard
lion
weasel
wolf

E. *Aquatic animals (N = 7)*

crocodile
dolphin
fish
frog
leviathan
sea monster
whale

F. *Reptiles (N = 6)*

adder
asp
viper

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creeping thing	bullock, bull
chameleon	calf, heifer
lizard	camel
	cattle (collective)
G. <i>Burrowing animals</i> ($N = 5$)	cow
cony	dromedary
hare	flock (collective)
mouse	goat, kid, ram
mole	herd (collective)
rock badger	horse, steed, stallion
	lamb, sheep
H. <i>Miscellaneous</i> ($N = 3$)	livestock (collective)
ape	mule
bat	ox
snail	swine

II. *Classified as domestic animals*

($N = 16$)

ass

III. *Classified as 'animal' or 'beast'*

($N = 2$)

NOTES

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- ²² Erich Fromm, *You Shall Be As Gods*, Greenwich, Conn., 1966, p. 15.
- ²³ Fromm, op. cit., p. 57.
- ²⁴ Fromm, op. cit., p. 57.
- ²⁵ Fromm, op. cit., p. 21.
- ²⁶ Fromm, op. cit., p. 44.
- ²⁷ Cf. the discussion of the views of The Old Testament held by a Jewish theologian in Jacobs, op. cit., p. 22.
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⁵¹ Pfeiffer, op. cit.: see note 21 above.

⁵² Perhaps the reader will see a Marxist bias here; it is not mine. However, Yinger in writing about religion states:

'It is inconceivable that [such] major changes in the economy could proceed without having powerful effects on religion. They drastically reorganize the relations of men to one another—the productive relations as Marx called them; they alter the distribution of income, power, and prestige; they put received systems of value under severe strain; they open up avenues of hope and aspiration.' Milton J. Yinger, *The Scientific Study of Religion*, The MacMillan Company, London, 1970, p. 373.

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⁶¹ Gerald Carson, *Man, Beasts, and Gods*, New York, 1972.

⁶² Radin states that in Biblical times the dog was not seen as man's companion but was considered filthy, cowardly, and treacherous; it was abhorred as a scavenger. Radin, op. cit., pp. 223, 224.

ON THE CLASSIFICATION AND SYNTHESIS OF SOCIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

John Scott

(Review Article)

THE dominant approach to sociological analysis in Western sociology has frequently been characterized as 'positivist'.¹ This orthodoxy is epitomized in the approach to sociology associated with Comte, Durkheim, and Parsons—which Bauman has aptly termed 'Durksonian'.² This is not to say that there are no differences among these writers; what I am arguing is that they are united around a broadly 'positivist' epistemology and an emphasis on the objectivity and facticity of social reality. Dispute rages about the term 'positivism': some writers restrict the concept to Comte's political philosophy, while others employ it as a blanket term of abuse. The usage adopted here is that positivism is an epistemological standpoint which stresses the unity of method between the natural and the social sciences, and which sees explanation as nominalistic and deductive. While it is no doubt misleading to characterize Durkheim and Parsons as 'positivists', it is certainly true that the positivist interpretation of science was their main point of reference. These writers were the most outstanding and systematic representatives of a positivist tradition, and each explored, in differing ways, its limits. Substantively, the dominant approach has been characterized as 'structural-functionalist', but this term does not grasp its full complexity. Not all the adherents to the point of view that social reality was objective, external, and constraining shared Parsons's concern for the normative and the systematic aspects of social life. Writers such as Rex and Dahrendorf, who emphasized the pervasiveness of social conflict, in no way departed from the Durksonian conception of the social fact. Both Rex and Dahrendorf took up the Weberian theme which was latent in Parsons's early synthesis of classical European sociology; and both explored the limitations of a structural-functional approach.³ Western sociology was a unity, albeit a complex unity. It was widely accepted that there was only one approach to sociology,

although different writers might construct different theories *within* this orientation.

But this approach to sociology was not the only approach, it was the *dominant* one. Even in America the orthodoxy was not as all-pervasive as Gouldner has suggested, the tradition of symbolic interactionism being kept alive by writers such as Blumer who were extremely critical of the dominant approach.⁴ However, since the late 1960s alternative approaches have proliferated, and the dominant orientation has all but lost its dominance. The unity of sociology is increasingly questioned as writers dispute whether sociology is, in Fletcher's words, 'one or many'.⁵ Writers who have opposed the orthodoxy have emphasized those features which Durksonian sociology neglects, particularly the subjective and historical aspects of social reality. Such writers have been concerned to emphasize that objective social facts have their origins in subjective processes of negotiation and reality construction, and that specific social facts are relative to particular historical phases. Of course, it would be untrue to say that orthodox sociology neglects these features of social reality; they are merely assigned to a secondary place in the scheme of analysis. What is characteristic of the recent approaches to sociology is that they place subjectivity in the centre of their analysis and exhibit a more self-aware, reflexive concept of sociological knowledge. In this situation there have been many attempts to understand the philosophical roots of sociological thought and to acquire some understanding of its historical development. Writers have attempted to characterize the main developmental patterns in terms of such labels as 'order' and 'control', 'system' and 'action', 'dialectical' and 'categorical', and so forth.⁶ A major outcome is that some of the more sophisticated approaches are developing a set of dimensions for the classification of sociological knowledge.⁷

Both books under discussion here* are an outcome of this situation and they reflect the recent interest in the work of Jürgen Habermas.⁸ Habermas's work on critical theory is part of the wider growth of interest in Marx and in the philosophical foundations of sociology during the last ten years, and it has stimulated much positive and negative comment. Until recently, debate on critical sociology was limited to Germany, but translations of Habermas's work and some of the more important commentaries have brought this debate into English-speaking circles.⁹ Habermas's own work attempts to bring about a synthesis of the Marxian analysis of the instrumental and material aspects of society with the analysis of its socio-cultural aspects in phe-

* Hermann Strasser, *The Normative Structure of Sociology: Conservative and Emancipatory Themes in Social Thought*, ix + 275 pp., Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1976, £6.95 (£3.95, paperback).

Janet Wolff, *Hermeneutic Philosophy and the Sociology of Art: An approach to some of the epistemological problems of the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of Art*, vii + 149 pp., Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975, £3.95.

nomenology and hermeneutics. Some years ago David Lockwood argued that Marxian materialism and Parsonian normative functionalism were complementary approaches to social reality, and it is interesting that Habermas has not only come to accept a similar point of view, but also presents remarkably 'Parsonian' analyses of social phenomena.¹⁰ In their different ways the books by Strasser and Wolff are both concerned with relating such apparently disparate tendencies in social thought, although they come to different conclusions about the possibility of synthesis.

Hermann Strasser and the classification of sociological knowledge

Strasser gives two dimensions along which social theories may be compared: cognitive interests and vocabularies of explanation. He classifies cognitive interests into 'conservative' and 'progressive' and argues that they relate to Mannheim's categories of 'ideology' and 'utopia'. A conservative orientation towards social phenomena involves a social-technological interest, while a progressive orientation involves a social-emancipatory interest. Vocabularies of social explanation are divided into 'order' and 'conflict' vocabularies along fairly conventional lines.¹¹ Strasser claims to follow Habermas in seeing the cognitive interests which underlie and structure social thought as 'anthropological' rather than psychological or sociological. These interests are not conscious or unconscious value judgements, but refer to a necessary conceptual link between knowledge and action.¹² However, his actual usage shows that Strasser sees such interests as psychological or sociological and that his affinities are with Gouldner rather than Habermas. The cognitive interests, for Strasser, are the scientist's background and domain assumptions.¹³ Strasser cross-classifies cognitive interest with vocabulary of explanation so as to generate a four-fold typology of sociological 'theories': conservative order theory, conservative conflict theory, progressive order theory, and progressive conflict theory. These four categories are then applied to the emergence of sociological thought in Britain, France, and Germany. His argument is that the dominant form of theorizing has been 'conservative order theory' which was rooted in Hobbes and elaborated by Comte, Durkheim, and Parsons. A subordinate role has been played by progressive conflict theory (rooted in Rousseau and elaborated by Ferguson, Millar, Marx, and Gouldner), although the other two forms of theorizing have emerged at certain points. Strasser argues that the central topic in the emergence of sociology in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the emancipation of the individual from traditional constraints and that the two main strands of thought are characterized by different attitudes towards this orientation.¹⁴ Strasser's main discussion deals with the manner in which Montesquieu, from the standpoint of conservative conflict theory, criticized the arguments of both Hobbes and Rousseau on the grounds

that the structure of society could not be deduced from human nature, but required an empirical study of human association. This re-orientation of social thought initiated the search for structural laws of society and thereby marked the beginning of a real sociology separate from philosophy. This was marked in both major traditions of thought, although Strasser argues that it was only in Comte's conservative order theory that a clear awareness of sociology *as a discipline* appeared. Both Comte's work and the progressive conflict theory of the Scottish Enlightenment were associated with what Strasser terms progressive order theory: a term which is intended to encapsulate the fundamental similarities between Saint-Simon and Adam Smith, both of whom he sees as associated with the works of de Bonald, de Maistre, and Burke. There are serious problems with this classification, but it is indisputable that Strasser has correctly identified the two main sources of modern sociology.¹⁵ These two strands were most clearly articulated in the classical period by Durkheim and Marx, and were elaborated by Parsons and Gouldner. During this process of consolidation in sociological theorizing Strasser recognizes the intermittent emergence of various kinds of conservative conflict theory—von Stein, Simmel, Coser, and Dahrendorf.

Strasser places his own work squarely in the progressive conflict theory tradition and adopts Gouldner's position as his own. He follows Gouldner closely in his analysis of Parsons, but adds an important discussion of Parsonian methodology. In particular, he includes a useful account of Parsons's distinction between concrete, empirical, and theoretical systems, although in discussing Parsons's substantive sociology he confuses the theoretical/empirical system distinction with the system integration/social integration distinction.¹⁶

The basic problem with Strasser's book is that it concentrates too much on separate studies of the individual theorists, much of which is available elsewhere, and too little on developing the historical epistemology which his analysis presupposes. Of the seven chapters in the book, only one (the first) is concerned with the latter—just under ten per cent of the total length of the book. The second chapter looks at Hobbes, Rousseau, and Montesquieu; the next three examine early developments in Britain (or strictly speaking in Scotland), France, and Germany; and the last two chapters discuss modern sociology. Strasser's failure to develop an historical epistemology leads to confusions in classifying individual theorists—a common difficulty with typological approaches to sociological theory. For example, Lorenz von Stein is classified as a conservative conflict theorist, but Strasser argues that he also takes over some elements of structural-functionalism (conservative order theory), and Marx is classified as a conflict theorist although it is argued that he uses some 'order' ideas. Instead of employing these dimensions and their associated labels to identify *themes* and *tendencies*

which both attract and repel individual theorists, Strasser uses the labels as *boxes* in which to 'catch' individual theorists as specimens. Instead of attempting to use the dimensions to locate the *specificity* of the views of individual theorists, Strasser uses them to emphasize *similarities*. It is impossible to reduce all the important components of sociological thought to the two dimensions which Strasser advocates, no matter how useful they might be in highlighting tendencies of thought in individual writers.

It is perhaps significant, and rather surprising, that Strasser includes no discussion of Max Weber. Of all the writers of the sociological tradition, Weber is probably the most difficult to categorize in simple terms. Weberian sociology gives equal consideration to both order and conflict, although writers from each of these traditions, as depicted by Strasser, claim to be Weberian. Strasser's failure to locate Weber in his analytical framework shows the poverty of his classification. An awareness of many more distinctions and dimensions in sociological thought is necessary before an adequate characterization of *any* individual theorist can be given. If Strasser had a more complex framework available to him he could not only give adequate descriptions of individual writers, but could also compare the works of different writers along many dimensions; his book is a move in the right direction, but it does not move far enough.

Knowledge, interests, and the uneven development of sociology

I have already argued that Strasser departs from Habermas's view of cognitive interests. It is also true to say that he fails to distinguish between what Habermas called the 'practical' and the 'emancipatory' interests. Habermas identifies three cognitive interests—technical, practical, and emancipatory—which relate to three different kinds of knowledge. The technical interest corresponds to the purposive-rational structure of action and underlies research which provides the resources for controlling environmental factors. The form of knowledge associated with the technical interest is the 'information' produced by the empirical-analytical sciences of the natural world. The practical interest relates to intersubjective, symbolic actions and produces the form of knowledge termed 'interpretation' or 'understanding' which is associated with the historical or hermeneutic method of the humanities. Finally, the emancipatory interest relates to mobilization and domination. The emancipatory interest involves an attempt to achieve increased autonomy from historical and social constraints, and the form of knowledge it produces is 'critique'.¹⁷ Habermas argues that only an emancipatory interest can yield adequate social knowledge: sociological explanation goes beyond both 'information' and 'interpretation'. Although he is not completely clear on this point, Habermas seems to be arguing that the 'critique' generated by an emancipatory interest is the basis for synthe-

sizing the limited, one-sided approaches to social knowledge yielded by research on the basis of technical and practical interests. This seems to be the basis for his attempts to synthesize and build upon both Marx and Parsons.¹⁸

At first sight, Strasser's categorization of interests seems to follow closely that given by Habermas: Strasser's social-technological interest certainly corresponds to Habermas's technical interest. But there is no such correspondence between the two writers' notions of the emancipatory interest. Strasser conflates the latter with the practical interest, which Habermas sees as a distinct category. But this follows only in part from Strasser's inadequate epistemology. It is due to two other factors also: Habermas's own substantive sociology seems to make such a conflation appropriate; and the history of sociology shows that the two interests have frequently been associated. Owing to the dominance of the approach outlined above, critical and interpretive approaches have frequently emerged together. The uneven development of sociological thought has meant that attempts to synthesize the knowledge generated by the technical and practical interests has first had to develop the 'interpretive' knowledge associated with the practical interest. Hence, many writers other than Habermas are interested in the relationship between 'phenomenological' approaches and Marxism.¹⁹ This feature of the development of sociology has influenced Habermas's own work. The work of critical theorists such as Adorno and Horkheimer explicitly developed the critique of culture and was, to this extent, Hegelian rather than Marxian. Habermas has continued this trend and, although he recognizes the need to synthesize the critique of political economy with the critique of ideology, his own work on a 'communication theory of society' has tended to minimize the importance of political economy.²⁰

This brief discussion has already shown the need for a far more sophisticated set of categories than either Strasser or Habermas supplies, although each writer offers something useful. Not only must 'information' be contrasted with 'interpretation', but also 'material' and 'ideal', 'objective' and 'subjective', approaches, and many more. The west and the warp of sociological thought require systematic analysis, and the variety of dimensions cannot be reduced to one or two over-riding dichotomies without distorting the distinctiveness of individual contributions.

Janet Wolff and the synthesis of sociological knowledge

Wolff regards empirical studies of art and literature (which she defines as 'positivist') as being of limited value in the construction of a sociology of knowledge.²¹ Such studies only make sense if complemented with a phenomenological approach to knowledge and the 'hermeneutic' approach of Gadamer and Habermas. In working out an alternative approach to sociology she shows how the works of Gadamer and

Habermas enable the positive achievements of writers in the Durksonian tradition to be retained. Whereas phenomenology has tended to concentrate upon the *production* of social action and on subjective meaning, Durksonian sociology pays more attention to the *product* of social action and to objective meaning.

According to the phenomenological orientation to the sociology of knowledge, actions are constructed in terms of the actor's taken-for-granted knowledge, a most important part of which comprises the common-sense knowledge of the natural attitude.²² The life-world (*lebenswelt*) as a whole is a more or less consistent unity of multiple realities, and everyday actions, art, science, etc., all have their origins in the life-world and must be understood in relation to it. Actors acquire their life-world through socialization and it may therefore be regarded as a *social* phenomenon: it exists prior to any individual actor and it is acquired through communication in interaction. The mind and its modes of thought are the products of social interaction, language, and experience. This creates a necessary relativity or 'perspectivism' in thought, and the sociology of knowledge aims to investigate the genetic mechanisms which produce perspectives. Wolff concludes this part of her discussion with the argument that we cannot know or even sensibly talk about any reality beyond our perspective-based knowledge of reality. It is possible to discover some of the determinants of knowledge, but in the end epistemology defines the limits of ontology. Wolff's discussion of phenomenology eventuates in a view of social knowledge, and of sociological knowledge, which denies the possibility that some explanations may be *better* than others. That is, she claims that 'reality' cannot be an arbiter between rival definitions of reality.

It is at this point that she turns to those sociological approaches which emphasize objective meaning. Ideas and values are formed in a social context and the question of the unity of collective world-views must be investigated. If a world-view is the meaning system of a social group as a correlate of the life-world of the individual actor, can the world-view have the same unity as the life-world? Wolff discusses the contributions of Mannheim, Lévi-Strauss, Goldmann, Durkheim, and Parsons to this problem; but she draws mainly from Goldmann and Parsons. She argues that Goldmann aims to discover the origins of the mental structures which generate various manifestations in literature, politics, philosophy, etc. Goldmann finds these origins in the material structure of class relations, and he argues that classes are the only groups whose consciousness tends towards a global vision, and that, for this reason, they are the only groups to which world-views may be attributed. Wolff's objection to this approach is that to look only at social classes is too restrictive. She finds that Parsons's analysis of the cultural system and its internalization is a useful contribution since it shows that the culture of a society is not totally consistent, but may be a combination of

variants of the dominant ethos, each variant being associated with a particular social group. Wolff sees the main limitation of Parsons's work as the fact that it has an inadequate understanding of the ways in which meanings are constructed. She concludes that the structural and phenomenological approaches are complementary to one another.

The problem, of course, is that of *how* the two orientations are to be brought together. Wolff draws on Habermas's work in her own attempt to construct a sociology. Her argument is that Gadamer's approach to hermeneutics²³ provides an initial basis for combining the two approaches and that Habermas's own work rounds this out. Gadamer is mainly concerned with historical method, and Wolff argues that that method cannot be applied directly to sociology. She takes over Gadamer's concept of the 'cultural horizon' and attempts to relate it to Habermas's analysis. She seems to argue that Gadamer's hermeneutics is a systematic analysis of communication and that it can be related to the 'material' factors of labour and mobilization. The horizon of consciousness has its origins in such material factors and expresses the life-world of the members of the culture.

Wolff's attempt to construct a new foundation for the sociology of knowledge is not wholly successful. Although she argues for a fusion of 'cultural' with 'material' approaches, she fails to show how that can be brought about, and she also fails to advance beyond a cultural analysis. However, her book is important because it shows how necessary it is to use dimensions of analysis to isolate *tendencies* in individual writers. She reveals the poverty of Strasser's taxonomic strategy; and makes it clear that while writers such as Lévi-Strauss, Goldmann, Parsons, Gadamer, and Habermas may differ along all sorts of dimensions, they are similar in respect of the one dimension which is of interest to her: the analysis of the objectivity of cultural products. Other sociologists with other purposes in mind may be interested in another dimension of social thought and so produce a different line-up of writers for consideration. The major contribution of Wolff's book lies not in its contribution to the sociology of art, but in its contribution to the classification and synthesis of sociological knowledge.

To conclude: the main advantage of Strasser's work is that he takes a historical approach to sociological knowledge, although he fails to construct and employ the developmental epistemology which his analysis requires.²⁴ The main advantage of Wolff's work is that she attempts to synthesize different approaches to sociological knowledge, although she fails to employ the realist epistemology which would enable her to assess the merits of the various approaches.²⁵ Both writers have contributed to the growing debate on the dimensions of social thought, but until an epistemology which is both developmental and realist is established and widely accepted we can make little advance in understanding the history of sociology, or in building its future.

SOCIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

NOTES

¹ For discussions on the concept of 'positivism' used here, see A. C. Giddens, ed., *Positivism and Sociology*, London, 1974; L. Kolakowski, *Positivist Philosophy*, Harmondsworth, 1972; and R. Keat and J. Urry, *Social Theory as Science*, London, 1975. The varying usages of positivism are surveyed in C. G. A. Bryant, 'Positivism Reconsidered', *Sociological Review*, vol. 23, no. 2, 1975.

² Z. Bauman, *Towards a Critical Sociology*, London, 1976. The term 'Durksonian' refers to the 'Durkheimian-Parsonian' tradition.

³ Parsons's synthesis is in T. Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, New York, 1937. Views on the dominant approach to sociology which agree with my interpretation, though each gives it a slightly different slant, are: A. Dawe, 'The Two Sociologies', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 21, no. 2, 1970; D. Atkinson, *Orthodox Consensus and Radical Alternative*, London, 1971; and G. Ritzer, *Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science*, Boston, 1975.

⁴ A. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*, New York, 1971; and H. Blumer, *Symbolic Interactionism*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969.

⁵ R. Fletcher, 'Evolutionary and Developmental Sociology', in J. A. Rex, ed., *Approaches to Sociology*, London, 1974, p. 39.

⁶ See Dawe, op. cit.; M. Albrow, 'Dialectical and Categorical Paradigms of a Science of Society', *Sociological Review*, vol. 22, no. 2, 1974. A number of such attempts are reviewed in P. Corrigan, 'Dichotomy is Contradiction', *Sociological Review*, vol. 23, no. 2, 1975.

⁷ R. Robertson, 'Towards the Identification of the Major Axes of Sociological Analysis', in Rex, ed., op. cit.

⁸ Four major works by Habermas have so far been translated into English: J. Habermas, *Toward A Rational Society*, London, 1971; *Knowledge and Human Interests*, London, 1972; *Theory and Practice*, London, 1974; and *Legitimation Crisis*, London, 1976.

⁹ Perhaps the most important source is T. Adorno *et al.*, *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, London, 1976. It is a collection of papers occasioned by the debate between Popper and Adorno in 1968 and includes articles by Habermas, Dahrendorf, Albert, and others. An attempt to take the 'positivist dispute' beyond the bounds of German sociology is Giddens, ed., op. cit.

¹⁰ D. Lockwood, 'Some Remarks on "The Social System"', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 7, no. 2, 1956; idem, 'Social Integration and System Integration', in G. K. Zollschan and W. Hirsch, eds., *Explorations in Social Change*, London, 1964. The parallel between Parsons and Habermas was pointed out in G. Therborn, 'Jürgen Habermas: A New Eclecticism', *New Left Review*, no. 67, 1971. Habermas comments on his attitude towards systems theory in 'Habermas Talking: An Interview', *Theory and Society*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1974. It is illuminating to compare the following analyses of social evolution: T. Parsons, *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966; J. Habermas, 'Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism', *Theory and Society*, vol. 2, no. 3, 1975.

¹¹ See, for example, Percy Cohen, *Modern Social Theory*, London, 1968, pp. 166 ff.

¹² Habermas makes this clear in 'A Postscript to *Knowledge and Human*

Interests, *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, vol. 3, no. 2, 1973. This article is a reply to criticisms of his position, many of which can be found in the Review Symposium in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, vol. 2, no. 3, 1972.

¹³ Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*, op. cit., pp. 29 ff.

¹⁴ This general thesis is forcibly argued in R. Nisbet, *The Sociological Tradition*, London, 1967, and R. Fletcher, *The Making of Sociology*, Vol. 1, London, 1971.

¹⁵ A. Swingewood, 'Comte, Marx and Political Economy', *Sociological Review*, vol. 18, no. 3, 1970.

¹⁶ The relevant distinctions are made in Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, op. cit., and in Lockwood, 'Social Integration and System Integration', cit.

¹⁷ Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, op. cit., appendix. See also G. Radnitzky, *Contemporary Schools of Metascience*, Vol. 2, Goteborg, 1970, pp. 4 ff; and T. Schroyer, *The Critique of Domination*, New York, 1973, Chap. 4.

¹⁸ The 'positivistic' tendency in Marx's work is discussed in A. Wellmer, *Critical Theory of Society*, New York, 1971.

¹⁹ See in particular: G. Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness*, London, 1971 (originally, 1922); E. Paci, *The Function of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man*, Evanston, Ill., 1972; and M. Merleau-Ponty, *Adventures of the Dialectic*, London, 1974. A recent overview of some of these attempts is in B. Smart, *Sociology, Phenomenology and Marxian Analysis*, London, 1976.

²⁰ J. Habermas, 'Toward A Theory of Communicative Competence', in P. Dreitzel, ed., *Recent Sociology*, no. 2, London, 1970; J. Habermas, 'On Systematically Distorted Communication', *Inquiry*, vol. 13, no. 4, 1970. This analysis of Habermas's work is well argued in Schroyer, op. cit.

²¹ Wolff does not specify which studies she has in mind.

²² Wolff draws particularly on Schutz and Berger: A. Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, London, 1972; P. Berger and T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, London, 1967.

²³ H. G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, Tubingen, 1965; it has now been translated as *Truth and Method*, London, 1975.

²⁴ The foundations for such a developmental epistemology can be found in N. Elias, 'Sociology of Knowledge: New Perspectives', Parts 1 and 2, *Sociology*, vol. 5, nos. 2 and 3, 1971.

²⁵ On realism, see Keat and Urry, op. cit., and R. Bhaskar, *A Realist Theory of Science*, Leeds, 1975.

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JÜRGEN HABERMAS, *Legitimation Crisis*, translated by Thomas McCarthy, xxv + 166 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1976, £5 (paperback, £2.80).

This is the English version of *Legitimations probleme im Spätkapitalismus* (1973) and completes the series of translations which Heinemann have published. The book consists of a return to the substantive issues involved in analysing 'late capitalism'—issues which were first raised in *Toward A Rational Society*, and which Habermas here investigates in the light of the detailed philosophical considerations presented in *Knowledge and Human Interests* and *Theory and Practice*. Consequently, we are now able to evaluate the 'pay-off' from his preparatory work in the theory of knowledge. Of course, many of Habermas's arguments are well-known from his earlier writings—particularly his views on the inadequacies of the labour theory of value and his analysis of 'technocratic' ideology—but here he approaches these topics with a new battery of concepts derived from phenomenology and modern systems theory. The book is a self-conscious preparatory survey which summarizes and integrates his earlier arguments, presents alternative explanatory models produced by his students and colleagues, and outlines areas of future research. Like so much of Habermas's work it is 'preparatory' to something else, but in this case we are given a fairly concrete preparation for detailed empirical research.

If Weber can be considered as the 'bourgeois' Marx, then it is becoming even more clear that Habermas is the 'proletarian' Parsons. He attempts to construct a large-scale theory of social evolution by drawing not merely on the Marxist tradition but also on phenomenological analyses of the socio-cultural life world and on the social system approaches of Parsons and of Niklas Luhmann. In attempting to synthesize these various strands, he makes some important contributions to sociological analysis, but he also makes some rather misleading mistakes.

For Habermas, the social system is the mediation of two fundamental features of social life: the instrumental actions involved in material production (the appropriation of outer nature) and the communicative actions involved in cultural socialization (the appropriation of inner nature). These analytically distinct forms of action and their associated sub-systems are combined to form a social system according

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to certain 'organizational principles'. The organizational principles constitute the particular forms of domination characteristic of the society: domination in material production is exploitation, and domination in cultural socialization is 'systematically distorted communication'. The degree of system autonomy which a society has depends upon its organizational principle and determines its 'steering capacity', that is, the ability of the society to regulate its development in a co-ordinated way. Habermas analyzes the social system and its steering capacity in terms of three social sub-systems: economic, political, and socio-cultural. He follows Parsons in arguing that the socio-cultural system is fundamental to the existence of a society in so far as it is through the operation of this system that the society's members develop a sense of solidarity and identity. However, he makes a basic error when he misuses Lockwood's distinction between social integration and system integration. He equates system integration with the economic and political systems and social integration with the socio-cultural system; whilst for Lockwood, system integration refers to the relations between abstractly defined *parts* of the social system, and social integration refers to the relations between actors and groups. Lockwood's fundamental distinction between the two levels, system and interaction, is confused by Habermas, who allocates all concrete patterns of action and interaction to the socio-cultural system and, therefore, finds difficulties in analyzing the internal tensions and contradictions of the latter. These difficulties run throughout Habermas's work and so make it difficult for him to formulate some of his major arguments.

Each major form of society which he identifies is held to be characterized by a particular pattern of contradictions and, therefore, by a particular form of social crisis. Primitive, Traditional, and Modern are the major forms of society, with the Modern type being sub-divided into Capitalist (Liberal Capitalism and Late Capitalism) and Post-Capitalist (Habermas's terms for the societies of eastern Europe). His viewpoint seems to be that these are stages on the way to some form of Post-Modern society, and that the driving force of social development is crisis. For this reason he sees his main concern to be an examination of the crisis tendencies of late capitalism and the type of social conflict with which they are associated. In late capitalism, characterized by a monopolistic economy and by state intervention, it is possible to resolve the traditional economic crisis tendencies, but only at the cost of displacing them to the political level. Thus there are persistent administrative and fiscal crises for the capitalist state. However, whilst the market economy of liberal capitalism could generate its own legitimation through the myth of the exchange of equivalents, the advanced capitalist state is unable to do so and therefore faces a legitimation crisis which can be resolved only at the socio-cultural level. Legitimation in post-traditional societies must take a rational form, as Weber

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recognized. But 'rationality' is a broader idea than the technical and instrumental notions involved in the élitist and technocratic ideologies which are fostered in late capitalism, and so there is a tendency for rationally grounded political claims to go beyond these limits. Habermas argues that rational discourse, which the limited ideologies of late capitalism invoke, presupposes a society free of repression and domination. Hence he draws upon his theory of communicative competence to show that the legitimation crisis of late capitalism is that it tends to bring into being a fully rational society. In this way we see the significance of the title of Habermas's first work to be translated, *Toward A Rational Society*. His analysis in this present book is a reformulation of Marx's model of the development of Communism as a fully human society.

There is much that is important in this book, and much with which to disagree. The author has produced a systematic theory of the nature and future of advanced capitalist society, and his analysis deserves to be fully considered. He provides an overall framework for interpreting a vast number of existing sociological researches and he points out the areas in need of further study. At the same time, his attempt to synthesize such a diverse range of sociological perspectives, despite its many limitations, shows the potential for theoretical advance in sociology. Habermas, warts and all, is a force to be contended with.

JOHN SCOTT

MARIE-LOUISE MARTIN, *Kimbangu: An African Prophet and his Church*, Foreword by Bryan R. Wilson; translated from the German by D. M. Moore; xxiv + 198 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975, £5.50.

The story is told that at a time when Israel felt the need of friends in Africa the apostles of Kimbanguism were invited to the table of Golda Meir. Mrs. Meir was initially surprised by their reluctance to begin eating and was told they were waiting for grace. The Israeli side then informed their guests that grace came afterwards. But the meal concluded, grace was forgotten in favour of a speech of political welcome. Nothing daunted, and not understanding Hebrew anyway, the Kimbanguists punctuated the speech with the enthusiastic cries of 'Hallelujah' and 'Amen' which they normally reserved for grace.

Kimbanguism has one thing in common with Judaism: Jerusalem. But Jerusalem is in Zaïre. It also has some settlements run on Kibbutz principles and a conception of salvation close to what the word shalom means in Hebrew: peace, justice, community benefit. In other respects Kimbanguism is more akin to Christianity. The founder, Simon Kimbangu, was born in 1889; he lived a life very reminiscent of the account

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of Christ's ministry in the gospels, with the Catholic Church of the Congo playing the role of the Pharisees. He was persecuted, whipped, imprisoned, and eventually died in 1951. His followers were regarded as subversives and were treated as Zealots. The subversive label stuck the more easily because there was a passive wing more directly in the line of Kimbangu and his sons, as well as an active, anarcho-revolutionary, wing. Tolerance came late and when it did, Kimbanguism resisted the Constantinian temptation to attempt to become the state church of Zaïre—though by this time it encompassed a moral community as large as Israel. Instead, it maintained a classic division of church and state, and acted to extend its moral community across tribal frontiers and to bring people together in such a way as to create brotherhood in the place of multiple disintegrations, notably in the family.

Kimbanguism is indigenous African Christianity and was received into the World Council of Churches in 1969. It belongs to various movements which attempt to attach Christian themes to native aspirations: the Unification Church is another, as is the Church of the Lord Aladura. But whereas the Unification Church probably lies across the border of syncretism, the Church of Simon Kimbangu increasingly lies within the Christian tradition. True, it invokes its 'saints'—but the use of mediators has not so far excluded Catholicism from the Christian fold. Simon Kimbangu is not a second Christ but an ambassador of Christ who—through his preaching, healing miracles, and suffering—makes Christ manifest to the black man. The biggest stumbling-block is perhaps the way in which the sons of the prophet are also kings and princes in the new Church. The prophet was buried in N'Kamba-Jerusalem and all nations shall come to Zion and to the temple in which lie the mortal remains of Kimbangu. Kimbangu led his people to the edge of the Promised Land just as did Moses; and like Noah he saved them—posthumously—from the great flood of the Civil War of 1960-67.

Here we have a re-ordering of symbols rooted in Judaism and Christianity with a margin of magic and messianism such as would give the orthodox of those religions pause. Dr. Martin's book is a careful examination of the line between a classic, indigenous Christianity and a syncretistic development. Like the World Council of Churches the author regards the Kimbanguist Church as a case of Africanization without dilution or unacceptable deviation. We may not have the theological interest of Dr. Martin but she does excellent sociology in pursuit of her theological aim. She gives a clear and careful account of the history of Christian missions in the Congo, of Simon Kimbangu's life, and of the social and religious development of his Church. As Bryan Wilson puts it in a most helpful Foreword, 'It provides not merely new light on Kimbangu himself as a charismatic leader, but

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provides some preliminary indications of the way in which the movement is being institutionalized, is acquiring systematic and routine procedures, is becoming concerned with the regulation of the training of a ministry, and is devising methods of socializing a stable clientele.'

DAVID MARTIN

MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP, *Cyprus*, Report no. 30, M. R. G. (36 Craven Street, London WC2), London, 1976, 45p.

During the last quarter of a century, Cyprus has repeatedly engaged the attention of the world because trouble, often of a violent kind, flared up on the island. The latest stage in its troubled history began in July 1974 when Turkey invaded the northern part of Cyprus, leading to bloodshed, the destruction of wealth, and a mass of refugees. The Minority Rights Group Report succeeds, despite its briefness, in presenting a vivid, if somewhat schematic, picture of the problem of Cyprus; and it is to be hoped that it will encourage a wider section of the international public to take an interest in the present condition and the future prospects of the island's unfortunate people.

The Report is divided into two parts. Part I is written by 'a journalist who has lived in Cyprus for a number of years, but who wishes to remain anonymous'. The author of Part II (which is described as 'an alternative analysis') is Dr. Peter Loizos, a social anthropologist teaching at the London School of Economics. The professional training and experience of the two authors is reflected in their respective approaches, which should be regarded as complementary. The anonymous journalist presents a useful bird's eye view of the island's modern history, right up to the Turkish invasion and beyond; but even this straightforward narrative cannot be properly understood unless it is placed within the framework of a developing configuration of power relations among indigenous and external interested parties. Dr. Loizos does so with subtlety; his text contains one of the best brief accounts of the dynamics underlying the successive phases of the Cyprus problem.

What is referred to as 'the Cyprus problem' is not, in fact, a single issue, but an ever-changing tangle of disputes as to what is to be the island's international status and—if it is to be that of an independent and sovereign state—its internal constitutional system. Both authors give prominence to the fact that the two main ethnic communities (the Greek Orthodox majority of 80 per cent and the Turkish Muslim minority of 18 per cent) have consistently taken opposing sides in these disputes. From their complementary standpoints the two authors attempt to analyse (perhaps not as systematically as one might ideally have wished) the social and ideological forces within both communities, and also the surrounding international circumstances, which helped

shape the last three phases of the island's political development. These phases may be summarized as follows:

A. Independence from British rule under a bi-communal Constitution, in August 1960. In the 1950s the Greek Cypriots rejected all British proposals for limited self-government and, with Greek mainland support, organized a militant campaign to unite the island with Greece. The Turkish Cypriots resisted this fiercely and, with mainland Turkish support, organized their own militant campaign to partition the island. After a period of growing Greco-Turkish hostility, a compromise settlement was reached: Cyprus would be an independent Republic in which the Greek and Turkish communities would share all the posts in the Government, Parliament, the Civil Service, and the Police in the ratio of seven Greeks to three Turks. That ratio, as well as some veto rights which the Turks obtained, were greatly resented by the Greeks.

B. The breakdown of the bi-communal Constitution in December 1963 and the creation of armed enclaves. Dr. Loizos makes it clear that Independence was a second-best solution for both communities whose leaders began quarrelling over the Constitution. In December 1963, open hostilities broke out; whereupon many thousands of Turkish Cypriots barricaded themselves in a number of enclaves, and there—with the advice and support of Turkey—they eventually set up their own quasi-state. The internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus was left entirely in the hands of the Greek Cypriots who used their diplomatic skills in order to obtain international support against a possible Turkish invasion. They offered minority status within a Greek-controlled state to the Turkish Cypriots who resisted for a decade and stagnated in their state-within-a-state situation, while the Greek Cypriots developed their economy to an impressive level.

C. The Turkish invasion in July 1974 and its aftermath. The Greek Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios, was overthrown on 15 July 1974, in a military coup. Turkey, on the pretext of restoring the 1960 Constitution, dispatched an invasion force which eventually occupied 40 per cent of the territory in the north, forced 180,000 Greek Cypriots into the south, and regrouped Turkish Cypriots behind the dividing line.

Now Cyprus is brutally partitioned and awaits a new constitutional settlement. Both the Greek and the Turkish sides declare their willingness to negotiate for a new Federal Republic, but there is little hope of reunification unless agreement can be reached on a number of central issues which Dr. Loizos identifies as: (i) The refugees and how many of them will return to their former homes; (ii) the territorial issue—what percentage of the territory will be held by each community; (iii) the constitutional form of the state—the number of regions in the proposed Federation and the powers of the central Government; and (iv)

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WALTER SCHWARZ, *The Tamils of Sri Lanka*, Minority Rights Group Report No. 25, 16 pp., M.R.G., (36 Craven Street, London WC2), London, 1975, 45p.

This report is one of a series on the situation of minorities, published by the Minority Rights Group; the author is an experienced foreign correspondent who has worked for several years in the Indian sub-continent. It is an excellent analysis of the ethnic conflict between Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka. From the aspect of political history, it is a very commendable condensation of a vast amount of material. Schwarz sets the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict in the context of the tensions between minorities and ruling majorities which arose in several ex-colonial countries after independence. He points out that many of these problems developed out of the creation of a unitary state, under imperialist aegis, of what had been separate societies, if not states. The separate histories, now made one, perpetuate themselves in political perspectives and aspirations. In an illuminating discussion on the relation of myth and the writing of history, Schwarz highlights the examination of a topic which is long overdue in the sociology of Sri Lanka: the extent to which the writing and interpretation of history have helped to define the grounds of conflict between the ethnic groups. As Marx well put it: 'The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.' The Sri Lankans are still going through that nightmare.

Schwarz summarizes a comprehensive range of data: the settlement of the island by the Sinhalese and the Tamils, the numerous wars between the Sinhalese and Tamil kingdoms together with their 'cross-cutting ties' which eventually led to Tamil kings ruling, qua Sinhalese, in the last stronghold of the Sinhalese kingdom in Kandy. He outlines the impact of the colonial period, particularly the British, who introduced Indian labour to work on the plantations in lieu of the recalcitrant Sinhalese. For decades there was a symbiosis between the Sinhalese, the Jaffna Tamils, and the Indian Tamils; however, it was eroded in the years after independence. The question is, why and how.

Schwarz indicates some of the political reasons—the need of the new ruling class to disenfranchise the Indian plantation labourers who had little to gain from supporting the political aims of the Sinhalese bourgeoisie. But the main thrust of the Sinhalese attack on the rights of Tamils was to come a few years later. To understand this movement it is perhaps necessary to look at developments in the economy as well. There is, at present, no good evidence to support such a view, but it is likely that, as a result of rice subsidies, etc., a stratum of rich peasant 'kulaks' was created which sought not only advantages in the economy but also a position in the polity and the culture. It is, probably, their electoral power that accentuated ethnic tensions and gave the

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particular twist to politics in Lanka in the years following 1952. The economic underpinning of ethnic and linguistic politics appears to be ignored in Schwarz's account. An analysis of it may make sense of the amazing gyrations of Lankan politicians—right, centre, and left—in the last couple of decades.

CHANDRA JAYAWARDENA

YONINA TALMON, *Family and Community in the Kibbutz*, xii + 266 pp., Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1972, £6.

Yonina Talmon died in 1966, when she was barely forty. She had, by then, become a sociologist of international repute and distinction. She had also established herself as a teacher, researcher, and thinker of unique and remarkable ability and intellectual style; she already had her own research unit at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and she had begun to produce her own special breed of academic progeny. One of the remarkable things about them—and therefore, of course, about *her*—is that while they were enthused with her ideas and research interests they were never dominated by them.

There were several important strands to Yonina Talmon's thinking and modes of research. To her teacher, Martin Buber, she owed much of her philosophical sensibility; but to him she also owed an interest in the whole Durkheimian tradition of sociology—not only the philosophical—which informed much of her work. And from Buber also she came to respect the important contribution which anthropology could make to some, if not to all, types of sociological study. She was a much loved and valued member of the graduate and research seminars in social anthropology at the L.S.E. in 1950–51, when she came as a visiting post-doctoral student. She then learned the difficulties of relating the modest complexities of fieldwork evidence to the arrogant subtleties of theory. However, unlike those too immersed in their own adopted 'tribes', she never lost sight of the main arguments; while, unlike those too deeply immersed in their own ideas, she never forgot what it was that those ideas were about.

Much though she was influenced by British social anthropology—not only its senior practitioner at the L.S.E., Raymond Firth, but also by Evans-Pritchard at Oxford, Meyer Fortes at Cambridge, and Max Gluckman at Manchester—she remained a sociologist of modern, complex societies and mastered the most rigorous research techniques, especially those fashioned and used in the United States, where she was later to spend a year—at Harvard. Further, she immersed herself in social theory, from the Greeks to the moderns. She managed, nevertheless, to continue to write and to speak with precision and simplicity.

Though Yonina Talmon is remembered for her work in a variety of fields, she is best known for what she has written about the kibbutsim.

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And this volume of posthumously edited and published essays contains her most important contributions in this area. She started out with a governing and seminal idea which remained with her throughout her kibbutz studies and which she modified in the light of her evidence. This idea, derived in the main from Tönnies, Durkheim, and Schmallenbach, was that the early form of the kibbutz was that of a *bund*; and that its later form is that of a commune. Much else that has happened to it can be explained in terms of the causes, concomitant characteristics, and consequences of the process of transformation from *bund* to commune.

As a *bund*, the kibbutz was relatively small, homogeneous, and with little internal differentiation—the tasks were varied, but there was little specialization; moreover, there was as little differentiation as possible even between the sexes. The cohesion of the community rested on a common and powerful commitment to an ideology of equality and comradeship; it relied little on formally structured authority. There might be informal leadership; though it would be highly constrained by collective decision-making. In such a group there was little place for privacy or family: the comrades were ideological brothers; and any emphasis on private affective ties, such as those between couples (married or not) or between parents and children, would weaken the bond of collective endeavour and aspiration which characterized this particular utopian experiment.

In time, each kibbutz tends to become a commune: it adopts new forms of technology and organization of work; it recruits new members who are not part of the original band; it grows in size also through reproduction; its economy becomes established; its decision-making becomes bureaucratically formalized; there is a growing division of labour and, especially, a growing segregation of sex roles—a segregation in some respects greater than is to be found in many urban families in Israel. The division between the generations creates a new set of bonds as well as an additional contribution to heterogeneity: for no generation is quite like the preceding one, since the ever-changing contexts of a modern society and of its educational systems have their influence. Increasingly, each kibbutz becomes linked with other kibbutzim within their political associations, with other local communities within regional structures of administration, and with other sectors of the economy and the polity. All of this makes for a loosening of the original bond and the replacement of the original band by a 'normal' community. The influence of ideology remains but its power is weakened by growing instrumentalism so that ultimately almost every principle is compromised to a greater or lesser degree while some tenets are even abandoned. (A symbolic representation of this was reported recently from a kibbutz celebrating its jubilee year: the centre-piece of the celebration was a pageant of the kibbutz's history; at the end of it the red flag was lowered, folded, and placed in a drawer; and some veterans were seen to weep.)

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In her papers, Yonina Talmon not only documents and explains how this process has occurred; she also seeks to show its relevance for the resurgence of family life and even of family-centredness, family structure and size, aspects of upbringing, mate selection, ageing, élite selection, and changes in ideological patterns.

The author's use of the ideal-typical *bund*-commune dichotomy should not be equated with those of either Durkheim or Tönnies. For, in the case of the kibbutz the early basis of cohesion in uniformity and low differentiation is dependent upon the prior commitment to an ideology of equality, collectivism, and secular asceticism: the ideological character of the early kibbutz therefore distinguishes it from the social structures of relatively simple or even peasant societies; for the simplicity, in the case of the early kibbutz, is imposed by shared values less than by other circumstances. The later stage of commune has less in common with Tönnies's model of a *Gemeinschaft* than with Durkheim's ideal form of organic solidarity; though it can certainly not be equated with the latter.

Yonina Talmon was not satisfied to document these generalizations and their implications. She sought also to show that the degree and extent of the major changes vary from one kibbutz to another and, what is more important, from one kind of kibbutz to another. She hypothesized that much of the variation could be explained in terms of a relatively small number of factors, such as whether the kibbutz is now still close to being a *bund* or is a commune and, if it is a commune, whether it is federated—that is, composed of a number of groups, each one of which is internally cohesive—or whether it is unified; whether it is a pioneering or an established kibbutz; whether it is smaller or larger than the norm; whether its initial ideology was such as to make for greater persistence of social-political goals as opposed to economic ones. Furthermore, she takes account of the possibility that in some kibbutzism the process of change may even, in some respects—such as the emergence of family-centredness—be the opposite of what is expected, given the particularities of history, such as the time and circumstances in which a new kibbutz is founded.

It is unfortunate, in view of the influence on her of social anthropology, that the evidence presented by Yonina Talmon was almost all of the survey type; though it is clear that her background knowledge was also the product of direct observation on her own part and on the part of her students. But each essay is a gem of analytical and descriptive clarity.

Harvard University Press is to be congratulated on publishing this fitting tribute to the memory of Yonina Talmon which is introduced by S.N. Eisenstadt and prefaced by Shemaryahu Talmon.

PERCY S. COHEN

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BILL WILLIAMS, *The Making of Manchester Jewry, 1740-1875*, x + 454 pp.; 10 figures, 3 plates, 8 maps. Manchester Univ. Press, Manchester, 1976. £6.

Provincial Jewry in Britain has for long been left in some sort of outer darkness; though several of the leading historians of Anglo-Jewry have given some sort of indication of the principal landmarks to be looked for, most of its study has been either left to local amateurs or else completely neglected. It is remarkable that even though some twenty-five years have passed since the first real attempt was made by Cecil Roth to penetrate this obscurity in his *Rise of Provincial Jewry*, it is only in recent years, with the work of such historians as Lloyd Gartner and Vivian Lipman, that the balance has begun to swing the other way. But there has been so little source material available that much of their work has had perforce to be tentative rather than definitive. For their part the amateurs, with the best will in the world, have not been sufficiently aware of the problems involved to be able to provide those answers which in their turn ought to be the foundations of further questions for the workers in a wider field. The result has been either neglect of local history or even worse, a state of ignorance which too readily assumes either that the stereotypes of one generation are universally valid or else that what is true of one part of the world—usually London—is equally true of the rest of the country. This is not, of course, something peculiar to Anglo-Jewish history and historians, for much of the work of the Department of Local History at Leicester University has been in the nature of propaganda in order to convince historians that the study of local history is academically respectable; it has meant that one important field in the study of Anglo-Jewish history has remained virtually untapped. Of recent years, however, the emergence of a Jewish History Unit at Manchester Polytechnic, interested precisely in this field, has enabled a start to be made not only in the examination of centres of Jewish population outside London but also in the application of recent techniques of historical scholarship by 'professional' and 'amateur' historians alike. The use of census materials and of statistical sampling methods have enabled new sorts of questions to be asked, while direct approach to a number of institutions has unearthed an unimagined richness of archive materials which otherwise would have remained unavailable to historians and lost to future generations. The energy of the (non-Jewish) director of this unit, combined with the enthusiasm of various members of the Manchester Jewish community, have led to the appearance of this volume, the first to deal adequately with the early history of a large provincial Jewish community.

Mr Williams has used communal and private archives, newspapers, and various census data, and has put together in *The Making of Manchester Jewry, 1740-1875* an interesting story which explores at length

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many problems relating directly to its subject. He discusses the origins of many Manchester Jews and in so doing throws a deal of light on the city's early commercial enterprise. The emergence of the Rothschilds as merchants rather than as financiers is spelt out; and the attraction of Manchester as a cotton centre for various European factors, who hoped by their move to that city to secure the profits of the middlemen as well as their retailers' returns, is also demonstrated. At a different level Mr Williams details the arguments and counter-arguments over synagogue politickings, and shows their connections with the rise and fall of various social and economic groups within the community as a whole. In a sense, however, these are the 'bread-and-butter' aspects of any communal history and in these days one would expect rather more of a projected two-volume survey even of a community as large as this one. That is precisely what Mr Williams has also done, opening up two specific themes of great importance for the student not only of Anglo-Jewry but also of nineteenth-century English history. In one sphere he illustrates most interestingly the conflict between London and Manchester that can be seen in this century in so many ways. It is significant that Manchester's general feeling of sturdy independence from the South is mirrored in the Manchester Jewish community, even over such issues as the extent of the authority to be exerted by the London-based Chief Rabbi over provincial communities. The other important problem unearthed and discussed by Mr Williams concerns the migration of refugees from Central and Eastern Europe by a trans-Pennine route from Hull through Manchester and Liverpool to North America. Obviously Jews were not alone in using this route, and in the years after 1848-49 there must have been a large number of Germans mingling in Liverpool with Irish transatlantic passengers. But the study of the records of the local Jewish Boards of Guardians, dispensing small sums in charity relief, as well as a study of places of birth as recorded in censuses, shows that many more than had hitherto been suspected had begun entering this country by the middle of the last century. Records of various other Jewish communities along this route would reveal more about such patterns of migration, and the decisions of many of those migrants to go no further but to settle down under 'intermediate' communities suggests much about their growth and about the appearance of new industries in this area. Until the opening of full trans-Pennine railway facilities towards the end of the 1840's there must have been many difficulties facing those who contemplated the journey, and one suspects less of a conscious motivation and more of a determination by one welfare and relief organization to pass on to the next community the hapless migrant—but the existence of such possibilities undoubtedly affected the development of the North of England. There is obviously scope for a great deal more work among these parallel communities. Certainly Mr Williams is to be congratulated

lated upon having raised many topics to which he and his colleagues will have to find answers.

There are, however, some points on which it would be fair to make further comments and criticisms. Mr Williams has not been served well either by his publishers or by his proof-readers, and in this book the standard of production of the Manchester University Press is not as high as one would normally expect. The print is too light, the type is too small, and the maps at the end are not clear and compelling. Mr Williams himself has both the virtues and the defects of being an outsider looking at the Jewish community; he sees clearly at times the significance of various apparently minor disputes which almost certainly would have escaped the 'insider', but at others he perpetrates the occasionally jarring solecism—such as the comment about the members of the Sephardi 'communion'. Nor, in another context, would it be altogether accurate to suggest that in 1806 the Sephardi financiers of London and Amsterdam had a great significance in the London money-market. The French occupation of the Netherlands had emphasized a collapse which had begun much earlier. A deeper problem, however, is posed by Mr Williams's very success in using the materials which form the basis of this present work. In pioneering the use of census records and in particular the enumerator's notebooks, he and his associates have shown others how to do the same elsewhere: a Jewish local history group in Birmingham has done work of great value in analysing the returns for the year 1851. The danger is, however, of becoming so wedded to this technique that no alternative becomes possible. It must be pointed out that the method is of most value when there are comparatively few people to be identified and analysed, and that this period of the history of the Manchester community is not that of the greatest inflow of newcomers in numbers. When the census returns for 1881 become fully available, the developments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries will need to be studied, and Mr Williams will find that his techniques will need substantial modification for his second volume.

Few would doubt the need for such a sequel. The Manchester community is very important and ought to be studied; in this volume Mr Williams has shown his skill and capacity as well as his enthusiasm for that task. Twenty-five years ago Cecil Roth wrote that 'the compilation of the history of a community so important as that of Manchester is a task which it is impossible to take in one's stride'. Mr Williams has not exactly taken it in his stride, but then this is not a work of compilation. It is a study, a survey, an analysis. It deserves high praise and an important place not merely within the all too few works dealing with Anglo-Jewish history but among those works concerned with British history as a whole, and also among those which show the historian how he can apply the tools of the social sciences to his own particular needs.

AUBREY NEWMAN

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Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics reported last September, at the end of the Jewish year 5,735, that the total population of the country was 3,549,000, of which three million were Jews. At the end of 1949, there were one million Jews; that figure had doubled by the middle of 1962; while by the end of 1970, the Jewish population amounted to 2,582,000.

There was an increase of 76,000 in the total population—both Jewish and non-Jewish—during the year; the figure represented a 2.2 per cent rise for 5,735. The Jewish segment grew by only 1.9 per cent (56,000) while the non-Jewish percentage growth was 3.5.

Of the total increase of 76,000, only 4,000 resulted from the 'immigration—emigration' ratio—the balance of those who had entered the country over the number who had left it; the remaining 72,000 constituted the excess of births over deaths.

Preliminary figures show that there were 20,000 new settlers in 5,735. As for the 16,000 Israelis who left the country in the course of that year, the Bureau has not classified them as emigrants since it has no indication that they will remain abroad on a permanent basis.

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Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics last May released figures of the urban population. Jerusalem has replaced Tel-Aviv as the most populous city in the country: by the end of 1975, it had 356,000 inhabitants against Tel-Aviv's 354,000, and the gap is widening. Before the Six-Day War Jerusalem had a population of 201,000; the addition of 65,000 Arabs from East Jerusalem pushed the city ahead of Haifa into second place. Rapid development in recent years accounts for its overtaking of Tel-Aviv. However, Tel-Aviv has a larger population than Jerusalem in its metropolitan region: 1,175,000 compared with 100,000.

Of Jerusalem's residents, 96,000 are non-Jews. A separate study made for the Municipality shows that the Arab proportion of the population has increased only slightly in the past nine years—from 26 to 27 per cent—despite a higher birth rate. This factor is accounted for by Jewish immigration.

Haifa's population at the end of 1975 was 227,000—2,000 more than in the previous year—while Tel-Aviv lost 5,900 residents. Bnei Brak, Ramat Gan, and Givatayim lost a total of 1,400 between them while the Bat Yam-Holon area gained 2,600, as did other cities further away from the metropolitan region.

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The Jerusalem Post published last June a report from a London correspondent about the emigration of Russian Jews, a considerable number of whom

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are said to 'drop out' in Vienna. Many of them fear that Israel will, like the Soviet Union, increasingly stress the need for a corporate identity and self-sacrifice, while others have been discouraged by rumours that they were not welcome by the people of Israel and also by the fear of military service and of living in a theocratic state.

The *yordim*—those who first went to Israel but later re-emigrated to Western Europe or to the United States—are estimated to number six to seven thousand. A further incentive for Russian Jews to drop out en route for Israel springs from the rumours that many who first went to Israel and later wished to re-emigrate were refused admission to Western countries after acquiring Israeli citizenship. Their fear is that by going to Israel, they will be taking an irrevocable step, whereas re-emigration from Western countries will be easily feasible.

*

The Jewish Agency Immigration and Absorption Department released in Jerusalem last November figures showing that 59 per cent of Soviet Jews who had left the U.S.S.R. during October with visas for Israel declared in Vienna that they had changed their mind about their destination. Nearly all—90 per cent—those coming from Odessa and Kharkov decided not to proceed to Israel. A spokesman of the Jewish Agency commented that it was deliberate Soviet policy to show preference in the granting of visas to Jews 'of lesser Jewish and Zionist convictions' in order to inflate the 'drop-out' figure.

*

In the last issue of this Journal, we included in the Chronicle an item about Israel's Open University (also known as Everyman's University), which began enrolling students last Spring. It started its first full year of operation last October with about 3,000 students; more than 1,000 other applicants had to be refused admission because it would not have been possible to provide adequate tuition for a larger number. At a press conference, the President of the University stressed that students did not need matriculation certificates or any other entrance requirements.

There are three 'pre-academic' courses—in electricity, electronics, and computer science—in the adult education department; and five 'academic' courses—in biology, chemistry and physics, mathematics, geology, and Judaism—which were tried out last year on small experimental groups. Twenty centres have been established throughout the country, where students can receive individual or group guidance as well as make use of laboratory facilities and of closed-circuit television. 'Home laboratory' kits are provided, but it will be necessary to make use of a centre's laboratory for experiments beyond the range of these kits. Each student is to go to a centre in his area at least three times during his course of studies.

*

Ben Gurion University, established in Beersheba by the Israeli government in 1969, 'to spearhead the development of the Negev area', is now facing

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severe financial difficulties owing to cuts in public spending. Many projects (including the construction of buildings to replace the present pre-fabricated huts) have been frozen at the planning stage. The university's goal of 10,000 students by 1980 will almost certainly not be achieved; it now has about 4,500 students—an increase of only 1,400 over the past four years. There are 450 full-time members of the academic staff, and several hundred part-time instructors.

Its Faculty of Medicine has already been internationally recognized; it has been granted the status of 'collaborating institution' by the World Health Organization, which gives it a yearly grant and provides funds for visiting advisers.

Moreover, the Faculty's Medical Centre has entered into an agreement with the Ministry of Health and the Kupat Holim for the Centre to administer all the public health services in the Negev area—hospitals, community clinics, ambulances, etc. The Faculty's medical students are carefully interviewed before admission and are expected, on completion of their studies, to practice in the Negev.

More than two thirds (70 per cent) of the population of the Negev is of Oriental origin; and 25 to 30 per cent of Ben Gurion University's students are Sephardim.

The University also caters for new immigrants, Beersheba being one of Israel's major absorption centres: about 500 students and many new members of the staff come from the Soviet Union—while more than a quarter of the total staff are new immigrants.

*

The 1976–77 academic year at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem opened with an enrolment of more than 14,000 students in its seven faculties and eight schools; there are about 4,000 first-year students.

Owing to the need for stringent economies, changes have been introduced in the structure of several faculties and institutes in order to bring about substantial savings in administration without any reduction of standards, or of the choice or variety of courses. The Institute of Philosophy has been linked with the Institute of History, Geography, and Regional Studies; and the Department of Jewish Philosophy and Kabbala has now become part of the Department of Jewish Thought. Students scholarships, however, have suffered no cuts: indeed, the grants have now been linked to the cost-of-living-index.

New courses of study have been established in several faculties: consumer protection and legal aid in the Faculty of Law; an interdisciplinary approach in the Faculty of Science, which will offer combined courses in geography, climatology, and geology; while the School of Pharmacy has a new graduate course in clinical pharmacy—the first of its kind in Israel. The School of Education has also introduced three new programmes.

The School for Overseas Student shows a 20 per cent increase in the number registered for its one-year Study Programme; this session, most of these students have mastered the Hebrew language sufficiently to attempt at least one regular University course.

Finally, the Centre for Pre-Academic Studies has now instituted a course

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extending over twenty months for pupils who have not completed their secondary education.

*

Bar Ilan University, which was established in 1955, now has about 7,600 students. It is the only Israeli university to have a Charter from the New York Board of Regents. Since it is a religious university, its Jewish students (with rare exceptions) must attend courses in Jewish Studies, whatever the field of their specialization.

The Rector announced last June that Bar-Ilan was facing a difficult year financially. The expenditure planned for the operation of the various departments had been reduced by 15-50 per cent, while almost 10 per cent of the teaching staff had been given notice of non-renewal of their contract of employment. Cuts would also have to be made in services and in the buying of new equipment and books.

*

A new Chair in Metallurgy has been established at the Haifa Technion, with the help of the American Technion Society. The University of Haifa inaugurated last July a Chair of social planning, named after the late Richard Crossman; there will be provisions for research, especially in the field of welfare policy.

Tel Aviv University announced last August that it planned to start a new course in banking in the autumn. It will be the first of its kind in Israel and it is sponsored by the Banking Association, which is eager to raise the professional level of senior bank officials.

*

Two members of Tel Aviv University's School of Education published last September the results of a recent survey of fifty-three Oriental Jewish teenage pupils of a vocational school in Jaffa. The girls come from very traditional families, who carefully guard them against modern influences, but do not prevent them from listening to the radio, watching television, or reading newspapers. One of the authors had earlier been a teacher at the school, and had become interested in the comments of her pupils about the life they wished to lead eventually as wives and mothers.

The survey revealed that although in their parental homes there was a very clear division of labour between fathers and mothers and no sharing of tasks, the pupils expected to be equally responsible with their future husbands for decisions on their children's education and the household finances. However, they considered such domestic chores as cooking and cleaning to be exclusively women's work. They declared that they themselves would wish to engage in a paid occupation, even after they had children; some said they would do so only if the husband's salary was inadequate while others asserted that for them going out to work after marriage was an end in itself. Whereas their mothers had married at the average age of 17.4 years, the

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girls expressed a preference for marrying at an average age of 19.6. The average number of children in the respondents' households was just over six; the girls wanted to have half that average—about three children.

The authors of the survey have stressed that more research is needed to evaluate such trends towards modernization.

*

A symposium held last August in the sociology department of Haifa University was told by one participant that Sephardi representation in positions of influence in Israel's 'power structure' amounted only to 10–15 per cent; and furthermore, that there were 25 Ashkenazim for every Sephard in the top echelons of the Government administration and the state-run agencies. For every five Ashkenazi pupils who finished high school, there were only two Sephardim. The speaker added that the country's efforts at narrowing social and cultural gaps had been remarkable—but these efforts had so far only succeeded in preventing the gulf from widening.

The chief scientist at the Ministry of Education also addressed the symposium. He is reported to have said that only 50 per cent of parents from Asia/Africa who had themselves enjoyed the advantage of an academic education were providing one for their own children.

*

According to the findings of a recent survey (carried out by a member of the Labour Studies department of Tel Aviv University), 90 per cent of students of the social sciences and the humanities have gainful occupations while attending University; they are said to earn more than the average wage of the country. The study also reveals that a large number of students come from well-to-do homes.

It was reported last August that the Israel Ministry of Education would provide financial help for students in the current academic year; 40 per cent of the assistance would be in the form of loans repayable at 15 per cent interest; repayment will be due a year after graduation. Special preference would be given to applicants of Afro-Asian origin and to recent immigrants.

*

Israel's Minister of Education stated last August that despite severe cuts in spending, his department is concentrating on improving the level of education of children from disadvantaged backgrounds, at a cost of IL 360 million. During the school year 1976–77 there would be 47 special projects (against 28 in the previous year) put into operation in disadvantaged urban and rural areas; they would benefit from more resources, better teachers, and advanced teaching methods.

A total of about one million pupils were enrolled in the present academic year; 62,000 of them in Tel Aviv's 372 schools. ORT's 86 vocational schools in Israel have an enrolment of 30,000 pupils; and are providing training for

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about 15,000 adults. ORT has also recently established a School of Engineering at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a new computer department at one of its centres in Tel Aviv.

WIZO announced that its ten agricultural and vocational high schools in Israel would be introducing in 1976-77 several new courses including forestry, children's nursing, and photography.

*

A recent Israeli amendment to Jordanian Law has granted Arab women on the West Bank the right to vote; there are 32,997 women among the 88,341 eligible voters in the area, and more than two thirds (about 68 per cent) of the women went to the polls. The daughter-in-law of the mayor of Bethlehem commented, 'All women, young and old, felt they were now part of the society. They felt that they now had the same dignity and the same rights as men.' A community worker in Ramallah stated that women voted mainly in favour of a candidate from their clan; the same was also said to be true of Bethlehem. Some of the candidates courted the new voters by promising that, if elected, they would improve conditions for women. On the other hand, the men are said to have succeeded in one town in suppressing the female votes; it is alleged that the women concerned did not voice any protest.

Some women—like a well-known Ramallah journalist—refused to go to the polls; she publicly declared that she did not think Arab women should take advantage of the new legislation, lest Israel use this law for propagandist purposes. However, another journalist published an article urging that since the law represented a progressive step, Arab women should make use of it regardless of the fact that it was a law enacted by the Israeli government.

*

Since June this year what has become known as the Good Fence between Lebanon and Israel has enabled 11,000 victims—about 4,000 of them Muslims—of the Lebanese Civil War to receive treatment in Israeli military medical units along the Fence. By the middle of October, 350 Lebanese had been hospitalized in northern Israel at the expense of the Ministry of Defence. From 1 October, those able to pay for the treatment will be required to do so, but the Ministry will continue to bear the cost in other cases. There are also along the border clinics manned by Israeli doctors and nurses; two other clinics employ Lebanese nurses paid by Israel.

There are 130 Lebanese villages on the border with an estimated population of 250,000; about 20 per cent of them are Christians. The inhabitants have been openly trading with Israel; by last October they had bought mainly flour, sugar, and agricultural produce. About 300 Lebanese workers have been employed in various factories in northern Israel and have been paid Histadrut wages. By the middle of October, a further 200 work permits had been requested by other Lebanese villagers, and 300 Lebanese had been allowed either to visit Israel or to use Ben Gurion Airport at Tel Aviv en route for Europe and the United States—since Beirut Airport had then been

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closed. It was also reported that Israel had agreed to buy the entire southern Lebanese tobacco crop when it would be ready for sale in February 1977; and that some months ago it had bought the previous year's crop and paid for it mainly in Israeli currency.

*

The World Health Organization issued a report earlier this year on medical facilities in Israel's Administered Territories. It states that although the number of hospitals has remained unchanged since 1967, the facilities they offer are much improved—some sophisticated services with expensive equipment have been introduced. The prevalence of communicable diseases has fallen and particular efforts are being made to reduce tuberculosis.

In its own report, the Israel Health Ministry notes that services have been increased in the Administered Areas despite the economic recession. The number of trained personnel on the West Bank (including doctors, midwives, pharmacists, technicians, and others) rose from 709 in 1967 to 1,203 in 1975, while in the Gaza and Sinai areas the increase in the same period was from 850 to 1,140.

*

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VOLUME EIGHTEEN 1976

Published on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

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