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THE ADAPTABLE AMERICAN JEWISH FAMILY: AN INCONSISTENCY IN THEORY

Gerald S. Berman

IN his comments on some of the findings on the Detroit Area study, Lenski said: 'If weak familial ties facilitate upward mobility, how then can we reconcile the strong familial ties of the Jewish group with their obvious economic success?'[1] Adams, in reviewing the research on American kinship in the 1960s[2], made a similar observation (the italics are mine):

> The recent research in at least one ethnic category of American society—the Jews of New York City, Detroit, Providence, and suburban Chicago—leads to the conclusion that being part of an ethnic group is likely to foster all the positive and negative effects of *intense kinship involvement* in the modern, industrial world. Proximity, aid, intimacy, social solidarity, obligation, and conflict: these are key characteristics of ethnic kinship, *even among such successful, primarily middle class, categories as American Jews.*

These statements imply that the American Jewish family reflects a theoretical inconsistency of attributes. One family type shows the existence of what seem to be two mutually exclusive sets of attributes or themes: first, characteristics connected with close, intact family and kinship ties; and second, an external or extra-familial orientation and adaptation to the economic structures of the larger American society.

In this paper I intend, first, to explore the nature of this apparent inconsistency by looking at two descriptive types, well-known in the literature, which separately reflect these two divergent themes; second, to show that these two sets of attributes, family solidarity and extra-familial orientation, as they operate and interact in the Jewish family may indeed be only *apparently* inconsistent; and, third, to propose that it is this very improbable combination of themes which offers a possible explanation for the successful adaptation of the Jewish family to the achievement-based, economic-industrial structures of the larger society.

Adaptation of the family to the economic system

The nature of the inconsistency under discussion derives from the relationship frequently noted between family structure and the larger society. It has often been argued that the small isolated nuclear family is ideally suited to modern industrialized society.[3] Because of its emphasis on individual freedom for its members and its freedom of movement as a unit, the nuclear family is often assumed to be highly adaptive to the external demands and pressures of the economic system. American occupational institutions require a mobile labour force, as well as professional, executive, and managerial personnel willing individually or as a small kin group to uproot themselves and adapt to new cities and new environments, in order to further their employers' objectives and/or their own career goals.[4]

On the other hand, it is often pointed out that a close, solidary family unit and kinship system is *not* ideally adaptive to modern economic society. Individual or nuclear family mobility could result in the overtaking or at least the weakening of the ties linking the wider kinship group. Individualistic goals directed towards the non-family world, while not rejected outright, may be relegated to second place when there is a danger that they may threaten the welfare of the kinship unit.[5]

It appears that these two main global family types, the nuclear-conjugal and the solidary wider kinship unit, with their different ways of relating to the national economic system, reflect the conflicting themes Lenski and Adams have observed in the American Jewish family. Before focusing on the make-up of the Jewish family, one must therefore take a closer look at these two polar types with their divergent external adaptations.

The individual isolated nuclear family

The highly adaptive potential of the nuclear-conjugal unit is often stressed in the literature on the modern family. Florence Kluckhohn makes this comment[6] on the contemporary, upper-middle-class family in North America:

> If we are to produce achievement-minded, future-oriented, and independent individuals, we must have the kind of family which permits individualistic expression and allows its members to go free of bonds that would tie them to particular people and places. . . . Small and independent families between which bonds are few and tenuous is the family type suited to our kind of society.

The key to such a family's adaptability is an independence that operates at two levels: first, the nuclear-conjugal unit (mother, father,

and their children) is free from encumbering extended kinship ties; and second, individuals within such a unit are free to pursue their personal goals outside the home. The latter theme of extra-familial individualism has been clearly demonstrated by several case studies: Seeley *et al.*'s suburban Crestwood Heights family, Miller and Swanson's 'colleague family' marked by complementary differences in interests and functions on the part of its members, Hess and Handel's family called Newbold, distinguished by its 'constructive independence', Gans' 'adult-directed', upper-middle-class family of Levittown, and Fallding's 'adaptation type' family of Australia.[7]

All these families have in common an individualistic outward orientation. Separate activities constitute a distinct norm, with members searching for personal fulfilment and meaning *beyond* the family sphere—in jobs, community activities, social events, and largely with non-kin friends who share common interests, attitudes, and status levels. For example: 'A great personal involvement in an enthusiastic, active mastery in approach to the outside world' is expected from members of the Newbold family;[8] for them, the world is their oyster—to be used, manipulated, and exploited. That family comes together as a group only at meals, when they recount their separate activities of the day.[9] Gans similarly found that to the contemporary families of suburban Levittown, household and family concerns have to compete for time with the individual interests of household members outside the home.[10] An important characteristic is that children are trained early for 'achievement-in-isolation';[11] the young must be prepared to be socially and geographically mobile according to career opportunities.[12]

Individual independence results of course in the fact that one is often relatively isolated from extended kinsmen. The Crestwood Heights individual remains to a large extent physically and socially apart from his parents and siblings and their households, and from other more distant kinsmen, meeting them only on ritual or ceremonial occasions.[13] The suburban Levittown household had moved away from relatives: friends in the new community have become their groups of reference; nevertheless, a longing for the presence of close kin was sometimes expressed.[14] A recent follow-up study of families in greater London has shown that there is increasing isolation from the extended family, particularly since the Second World War; the small household of the nuclear family has emerged as the dominant unit.[15] Adams has noted in his Greensboro (North Carolina) sample that although there is frequent contact between parents and their adult children, ties between adult siblings and secondary kin (aunts, uncles, grandparents, cousins, and so on) are weak and insignificant.[16]

In sum, it is consistently stated that a unit which is free of constricting kinship ties and which stresses individual freedom can move about easily and successfully in the labour market. It could be suggested

that the two types of independence (that of the individual and that of the family unit) are interrelated: as the household moves in response to job opportunities, not only do children become accustomed to such geographical mobility, but they may in addition aquire special interpersonal skills—such as making friends quickly and separating easily—which will help them later in moving their own families of procreation.[17]

The solidary kinship unit

Close family ties are therefore said to obstruct the individual's striving for success in the wider society. Gans and Suttles came up with essentially similar findings in their different participant observation studies of Italian-American communities in Boston and Chicago. They noted that a working-class member of that type of ethnic group seeks the recognition and acceptance of his peers and especially of his family and wider kinship circle; attachment to the nuclear family and other kin would have to be broken if the hard and lonely climb upward were to be successfully undertaken.[18]

Other studies, also in lower- and working-class neighbourhoods, have shown a similar inverse relationship between strong kinship and nuclear family ties, on the one hand, and individual mobility, on the other. Adams reported that the white-collar individuals in his Greensboro sample are likely to move more often and over greater distances than are blue-collar adults. The movement of white-collar workers, he noted, tends to be in pursuit of occupational opportunities, whereas when blue-collar individuals move, it is likely to be due to problems within their household.[19] Komorovsky observed that a sizeable minority of the blue-collar workers she studied are restrained from moving by strong kin ties, especially those of the wife's.[20] These and other accounts of working-class communities have noted the correlation between strong 'particularistic', solidary family and kin relations, and the disinclination to move out and conform to the unfamiliar 'universalistic-achievement sector' outside the family.[21]

Religious differences

Lenski investigated the interrelationships between religion, family life, and rates of vertical mobility in his sample of Detroit area residents. He found a division of family types similar to the above, but in the case of Detroit there were differences according to religion.[22] He concluded on the basis of his data that the high rate of upward mobility among Protestants in America is to a large extent due to the tendency of Protestantism 'to turn interests of individuals beyond the limits of family and kin'.[23] Catholics in America, on the other hand, may be at a disadvantage when competing for economic rewards because of the

family and kinship value they derive from their involvement in the Catholic Church and in their sub-community; they 'seem to become more strongly attached to the kin group than Protestants, and therefore less able to make the break with home and family that is required in many of the more demanding and hence better-paid positions in contemporary American society'.[24]

According to Brown, the critical religious element in the development of achievement orientation may not inhere in the religious categories as such but in a particular religious-value outlook which he has called 'individualistic mysticism'. Protestantism stresses the importance of 'direct mystic communion between each individual and God', thus implying a strong reliance on one's own individual efforts.[25] He comments that religions which 'make compliance with formal rituals the essence of a good life . . . that make the priest a necessary intermediary between man and God, are not likely to produce a high achievement motivation'.[26]

Conflicting themes: the Jewish family

The Jewish family appears to be characterized by two conflicting sets of values:[27] on the one hand, it is a close-knit system at both nuclear and extended family levels,[28] and in this way it resembles the solidary kin unit of the non-Protestant working-class communities described by Gans and Suttles. On the other hand, the Jewish family orients its children to strive for success in the outside world, academically and vocationally;[29] in this respect, it is similar to the middle-class, nuclear-conjugal family with its 'extra-familial orientation'.[30] It has, therefore, what one might call a dialectic of themes: family solidarity *and* individual independence, familism *and* extra-familial orientation, *Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.*

Parenthetically, it might be noted that this dialectic in the Jewish family seems to parallel what Liebman has called the ambivalence of the Jewish community in America which strives, on the one hand, for full participation in the larger community and, on the other hand, wants to maintain its separate group identity.[31] Integration and group survival: polarities that appear also to reflect the dual thrust of outwardness and solidarity in the Jewish family. However, I shall argue that this duality which characterizes the Jewish family, reveals not so much incompatible ideals, but rather an adaptive balancing of opposites. In so far as the two divergent sets of characteristics are combined in one family system, that system will be referred to as a *combined* family type.[32]

Mechanism of adaptation

The combined family type resembles both the isolated nuclear family and the solidary kin unit, but is neither. Rather, it reflects a distinctive

new type, one in which both solidarity and extra-familial orientation converge in a manner which results in a particularly viable adaptation to the occupational institutions outside the family.

Here I put forward the proposition that it is that interaction of traits which enables this type of combined family to produce very ambitious children who have been oriented towards valued external achievement goals. In what way do these two sets of attributes act on each other to achieve that result?

First, the combined Jewish family maintains an individualistic, extra-familial orientation. Thus (as in the case of the isolated nuclear family), children are taught, encouraged, and expected to leave the family circle if that is necessary in order to achieve educational and career objectives.[33] However, unlike the case of the solidary kinship unit observed by Gans and Suttles (where leaving home may lead to a shattering of kin relations), the nature of the cohesion in the Jewish family is such that kin ties are not endangered by the social and geographical mobility of its members.

Sklare has pointed out that relationships between parents and children in the Jewish family are based on *extension* rather than *distinction*. Anything which happens to the children—success, failure—affects the parents as well.[34] I believe that this *extension* in the Jewish family does not depend on physical proximity, and that it affects (although with less intensity) kinship network members as well. That peculiar phenomenon might be called, clumsily, an 'extended extension', or an 'extended cohesiveness': each member of the group has a share in the achievements of his kinsmen—no matter where they are—and the latter reciprocally remain sensitive to the expectations of the family back home, as well as to their own object goals. Mark Lefton has suggested that a yo-yo might serve as a useful analogy in describing that kind of cohesiveness.[35]

Another explanation is suggested by the small group school. Studies have shown that the cohesive small group is more successful in gaining conformity to its norms of *productivity* than is the group lacking cohesiveness.[36] The combined family can be seen as a cohesive group which also maintains strong norms of extra-familial achievement, and which expects one to be productive in external activities—for example, at school or in one's career.

Research on family determinants of aspiration behaviour lend validity to this interpretation: children are more stimulated for achievement as a result of longer and more intense association with parents.[37] Therefore, any factors which intensify parent–child relations, (such as small family size, only or youngest child, isolation from peers, non-working mother, and so on) have been found to be correlated with high achievement motivation and behaviour. The common explanatory theme in these studies appears to be a sustained exposure to achievement values

of parents, assuming of course the importance of these values to the family, and the fact that the family is able to provide a warm, loving milieu in which these values can be effectively transmitted.[38]

Jewish mothers have often been accused of over-protecting their children: Alexander Portnoy is seen as the proto-typical neurotic consequence of excessive Jewish maternal solicitude.[39] Yet young Portnoy was a deceptive *schlepper* in so far as he had achieved a highly responsible position in the New York City administration. As Blau has argued, over-indulgence on the part of Jewish mothers may in fact be interpreted as 'close, careful, and strong attention in nurturing', which could contribute to the educational and occupational attainments of the children.[40]

The over-protectiveness and closeness observed in the Jewish family has often been explained as a reaction to a long and painful history of antisemitic persecution and exclusion by the host society:[41] Jewish parents perhaps have felt that they had to shield their children from a hostile world outside the family home. Although the danger which constantly existed in the eastern European ghettos and *shtetls* many years ago has in fact diminished, the insecurity may have persisted on a more subtle, psychological level—as a kind of depression syndrome. Things may be going well, but disaster might still be seen as impending; and one must always be prepared for the moment of doom. It could be that the careful nurturing of the Jewish child ('everything for the children') provides a protective structure, a comforting cushion if and when (God forbid) failure occurs. The love which has been attributed to the Jewish *mamme* finds expression in 'Mother will love you no matter what happens'. There is the conscious or unconscious hope that such unshakeable, unconditional love, combined with a careful guidance towards outside goals, will ensure a secure place in the non-too-friendly world beyond the family group. The combination of love and expectation can also act as a powerful psychological motivating force driving the child to success in the wider society.[42]

The extended kinship network may also provide, as Sussman has pointed out, an 'opportunity structure' for its members in a variety of ways: financial aid, job placement, 'connexions' as a source of customers, clients, or patients, and temporary housing and other assistance when moving to a new district.[43]

Furthermore, those kinsmen who have been highly successful may be a source of role and life style models.[44] Leichter and Mitchell have described how cousins' clubs—so prevalent among Jewish families in New York City—can provide members with fairly strong incentives for achievement.[45]

To sum up, the contemporary middle-class nuclear families produce highly aspiring children because of their determined extra-familial orientation—their young are launched early towards attainment of

valued object-goals outside the family sphere. However, according to the argument presented here, that type of orientation perhaps lacks an additional motivating force which may be found in the dynamics of the Jewish extended family type which (at both the nuclear and extended kin levels) helps to achieve individual goals outside the home. In the case of the solidary family, it is the strong kin ties which constitute the goal itself: ambitions outside the family unit are given secondary importance, and extra-familial activity is useful only to the extent that it serves the group goals which bind the family physically and socially together.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to answer the question posed by Lenski: How has the Jewish group advanced so well economically while maintaining cohesive family ties? Lenski offered an explanation based on the prevalence of Jewish family businesses where kinship ties in fact constitute a valuable asset.[46] I have put forward here another explanation based on the interaction of two sets of ostensibly divergent attributes—cohesiveness and extra-familial orientation—which are found in the make-up of the Jewish family in America. It is the *combination* of these apparently conflicting factors which has produced economically successful individuals.

NOTES

[1] Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor: A Sociological Study of Religious Impact on Politics, Economics and Family Life*, New York, 1963, p. 219.

[2] Bert N. Adams, 'Isolation, Function, and Beyond: American Kinship in the 1960's', *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, vol. 32, no. 4, November 1970, p. 588.

[3] For example, see Talcott Parsons, 'The Kinship System of the Contemporary U.S.', *American Anthropologist*, vol. 45, no. 1, 1943, pp. 22–38; William F. Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff, *Sociology*, Boston, 1950; William J. Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns*, New York, 1963; and Goode, *The Family*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964.

[4] See Clark E. Vincent, 'Familia Spongia: The Adaptive Function', *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, vol. 28, no. 1, February 1966, pp. 29–36.

[5] It should be pointed out, however, that some have taken issue with this relationship between industrialization and the nuclear family. They argue that because of modern systems of transport and communication, a kind of 'modified extended family' has survived which is able to cope quite well with the demands of industrial society. See Michael Young and Peter Willmott, *Family and Kinship in East London*, London, 1957; Marvin B. Sussman and Lee Burchinal, 'Kin Family Network: Unheralded Structure in Current Conceptualizations of Family Functioning', *Marriage and Family Living*, vol. 24, no. 3, August 1962, pp. 231–40; John Mogey, 'Family and Community in Urban Industrial Societies', in Harold T. Christensen, ed., *Handbook of*

Marriage and the Family, Chicago, 1964, pp. 501–34; and Eugene Litwak, 'Extended Kin Relations in an Industrial Democratic Society', in Ethel Shanas and Gordon Streib, eds., *Social Structure and the Family: Generational Relations*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965, pp. 290–323.

[6] Quoted in John R. Seeley, R. Alexander Sim, and Elizabeth W. Loosely, *Crestwood Heights: A Study of the Culture of Suburban Life*, New York, 1956, p. 223.

[7] ibid.; Daniel R. Miller and Guy E. Swanson, *The Changing American Parent*, New York, 1958; Robert D. Hess and Gerald Handel, *Family Worlds: A Psychological Approach to Family Life*, Chicago, 1959; Herbert J. Gans, *The Levittowners*, New York, 1967; Harold Fallding, 'The Family and the Idea of the Cardinal Role', in Gerald Handel, ed., *The Psychosocial Interior of the Family: A Sourcebook for the Study of Whole Families*, Chicago, 1967, pp. 220–47.

[8] Hess and Handel, op. cit., p. 209.

[9] ibid., pp. 277–78.

[10] Gans., op. cit.

[11] Seeley, Sim, and Loosely, op. cit., p. 88.

[12] 'The man and woman of the Heights have few bonds that cannot be broken at the promise of a "promotion". They have been prepared for this from the cradle': ibid., p. 119.

[13] ibid., pp. 159–223.

[14] Gans, op. cit., pp. 153–65.

[15] Michael Young and Peter Willmott, *The Symmetrical Family: A Study of Work and Leisure in the London Region*, London, 1973.

[16] Bert N. Adams, *Kinship in an Urban Setting*, Chicago, 1968.

[17] See, for example, Jules Henry, *Culture Against Man*, New York, 1963, pp. 147–81; and Phillip E. Slater, *The Pursuit of Loneliness*, Boston, 1970.

[18] Herbert J. Gans, *The Urban Villagers*, New York, 1962; Gerald D. Suttles, *The Social Order of the Slum*, Chicago, 1968.

[19] Adams, *Kinship in an Urban Setting*, op. cit.

[20] Mirra Komorovsky, *Blue-Collar Marriage*, New York, 1964.

[21] For example, see Elizabeth Bott, *Family and Social Network*, London, 1957; Bennett M. Berger, *Working-Class Suburb: A Study of Auto Workers in Suburbia*, Berkeley, Calif., 1960; S. M. Miller and Frank Riessman, 'The Working Class Subculture: A New View', *Social Problems*, vol. 9, no. 1, Summer 1961, pp. 86–97; Miller and Riessman, 'Are Workers Middle-Class?', *Dissent*, vol. 8, no. 4, Autumn 1962, pp. 507–13; Albert K. Cohen and Harold M. Hodges, Jr., 'Characteristics of the Lower-Blue-Collar-Class', *Social Problems*, vol. 10, no. 4, Spring 1963, pp. 303–34; Alan F. Blum, 'Social Structure, Social Class, and Participation in Primary Relationships', in Arthur B. Shostak and William Gomberg, eds., *Blue-Collar World: Studies of the American Worker*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964, pp. 195–207; Gerald Handel and Lee Rainwater, 'Persistence and Change in Working-Class Life Style', in ibid., pp. 36–41; and Murray A. Straus, 'Social Class and Farm-City Differences in Interaction with Kin in Relation to Societal Modernization', *Rural Sociology*, vol. 34, no. 4, December 1969, pp. 476–95.

[22] Lenski, op. cit., pp. 212–59.

[23] ibid., p. 247.

[24] ibid., p. 345.

[25] Roger Brown, *Social Psychology*, New York, 1965, p. 465. Slater, op. cit., noted that as a result of a strong child-centered orientation, the Puritan family, considered the forerunner of the modern Protestant family, encouraged self-expression and individuality in children and inadvertently weakened parental authority.

[26] Brown, op. cit., p. 465. See also Robert F. Winch, Scott Greer, and Rae Lesser Blumberg, 'Ethnicity and Extended Familism in an Upper-Middle-Class Suburb', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 32, no. 2, April 1967, pp. 265–72; and Robert F. Winch and Scott Greer, 'Urbanism, Ethnicity, and Extended Familism', *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, vol. 30, no. 1, February 1968, pp. 40–45, concerning family differences between Catholics and Protestants.

[27] Lenski, op. cit., p. 219.

[28] This has been an enduring characteristic of the Jewish family. The Jews, it seems, have maintained their traditional value of strong family and kinship ties in spite of their rapid acculturation into American middle-class society. See, for example, Pauline Young, 'The Reorganization of Jewish Family Life in America: A Natural History of the Social Forces Governing Assimilation of the Jewish Migrant', *Social Forces*, vol. 7, no. 2, December 1928, pp. 238–44; Ruth Landes and Mark Zborowski, 'Hypotheses Concerning the Eastern European Jewish Family', *Psychiatry*, vol. 13, no. 4, November 1950, pp. 447–64; Judson T. Landis, 'Religiousness, Family Relationships, and Family Values, in Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish Families', *Marriage and Family Living*, vol. 22, no. 4, November 1960, pp. 341–47; Paul H. Glasser and Lois N. Glasser, 'Role Reversal and Conflict Between Aged Parents and Their Children', *Marriage and Family Living*, vol. 24, no. 1, February 1962, pp. 46–51; Robert F. Winch and Scott Greer, 'The Uncertain Relation Between Early Marriage and Marital Stability: A Quest for Relevant Data', *Acta Sociologica*, vol. 8, 1964, pp. 83–97; Jack Balswick, 'Are American-Jewish Families Close Knit?', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 28, no. 3, July 1966, pp. 159–67; Hope J. Leichter and William E. Mitchell, *Kinship and Casework*, New York, 1967; Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Americans: Three Generations in a Jewish Community*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968; and Marshall Sklare, *America's Jews*, New York, 1971, pp. 73–102.

It has been said that the solidary kin ties constitute one important factor behind the strong opposition to intermarriage in the Jewish community. Apart from bringing two people together, a Jewish marriage is also considered as an alliance between two extended families. Therefore when a non-Jew, even a convert, marries into a Jewish family, he or she is likely to come in alone, like an orphan: the union will rarely bring about close harmonious relations between the two families. Indeed, Jewish parents will often complain, not unrealistically, that their intermarried daughter (or more likely, son) will be lost to the family as well as to the community, and if not their child, then surely their grandchildren will, in time. See Louis A. Berman, *Jews and Intermarriage*, New York, 1968, pp. 236–60, 283–88.

[29] See, for example, Paul Barrabee and Otto von Mering, 'Ethnic Variations in Mental Stress in Families with Psychotic Children', in Arnold M. Rose, ed., *Mental Health and Mental Disorder*, New York, 1955, pp. 161–67; Bernard C. Rosen, 'The Achievement Syndrome: A Psychocultural Dimen-

sion', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 21, no. 2, April 1956, pp. 203–11; Fred L. Strodtbeck, Margaret MacDonal, and Bernard C. Rosen, 'Evaluation of Occupations: A Reflection of Jewish and Italian Mobility Differences', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 22, no. 5, October 1957, pp. 546–53; Judith R. Kramer and Seymour Leventman, *Children of the Gilded Ghetto*, New Haven, Conn., 1961; Nathan Hurvitz, 'Sources of Motivation and Achievement of American Jews', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 23, no. 4, October 1961, pp. 217–34; Marshal Sklare and Joseph Greenblum, *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier*, New York, 1967, pp. 24–44; Seymour Leventman, 'From Shtetl to Suburb', in Peter I. Rose, ed., *The Ghetto and Beyond: Essays on Jewish Life in America*, New York, 1969, pp. 33–56; and Miriam K. Slater, 'My Son the Doctor: Aspects of Mobility among American Jews', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 34, no. 3, June 1969, pp. 359–73.

[30] A term Lenski (op. cit., p. 244) uses to describe the outward orientation of this type of family.

[31] Charles S. Liebman, *The Ambivalent American Jew*, New York, 1973, especially pp. 3–87.

[32] It should be emphasized, however, that although the combined type may characterize the Jewish family, it is not necessarily 'Jewish'. Any group that shows the same combination of family attributes would be expected to exhibit a style of adaptation similar to that of the Jewish combined type.

[33] Although leaving home is permitted, it is not done without reluctant or ambivalent feelings. One mother in a study of Jewish families in New York City expressed this ambivalence: 'It does you good to feel that your children are making their way in life, but by the same token you will miss them very, very much'. Leichter and Mitchell, op. cit., p. 75.

[34] Marshall Sklare, *America's Jews*, op. cit., pp. 85–93.

[35] He says that in order to promote personal achievement, family and kinship ties are extended or stretched but not broken (personal communication).

[36] See, for example, Leon Festinger, Stanley Schachter, and Kurt Back, *Social Pressure and Informal Groups*, New York, 1950; Kurt W. Back, 'Influence Through Social Communication', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 46, no. 1, January 1951, pp. 9–23; Stanley Schachter *et al.*, 'An Experimental Study of Cohesiveness and Productivity', *Human Relations*, vol. 4, no. 3, August 1951, pp. 229–38; and Leonard Berkowitz, 'Group Standards, Cohesiveness and Productivity', *Human Relations*, vol. 7, no. 4, November 1954, pp. 509–19.

[37] See Elizabeth Douvan and Joseph Adelson, *The Adolescent Experience*, New York, 1966, pp. 63–64; and Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure*, New York, 1967, pp. 296–97.

[38] See Arnold M. Rose, 'Acceptance of Adult Roles and Separation from Family', *Marriage and Family Life*, vol. 21, no. 2, May 1959, pp. 120–26; Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, *Social Mobility and Industrial Society*, Berkeley, Calif., 1959, pp. 239–40; Blau and Duncan, op. cit., pp. 295–330; Ronald Davie, Neville R. Butler, and Harvey Goldstein, *From Birth to Seven*, London, 1972; and Morris Rosenberg, *Society and Adolescent Self-Image*, Princeton, N.J., 1965 Rosenberg found that only sons show particularly

high self-esteem and confidence as a result of the increased attention they usually receive; see pp. 107–112.

[39] Philip Roth, *Portnoy's Complaint*, New York, 1969.

[40] Zena Smita Blau, 'In Defence of the Jewish Mother', *Midstream*, vol. 13, no. 2, February 1967, pp. 42–49.

[41] See, for example, Louis Wirth, *The Ghetto*, Chicago, 1928, pp. 26, 32, for a classical statement of this position.

[42] See Louis Birner, 'Some Speculations on the Emotional Resources of the Jewish Family', in Gilbert S. Rosenthal, ed., *The Jewish Family in a Changing World*, New York, 1970, pp. 307–20; and Benjamin Schlesinger, *The Jewish Family*, Toronto, 1971, pp. 9–14.

[43] See the following papers by Marvin B. Sussman: 'The Help Pattern in the Middle Class Family', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 18, no. 1, February 1953, pp. 22–28; 'The Compatibility Functions of the Kin Family Network in Modern Industrial Society', paper presented at the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Montreal, Canada; and 'The Urban Kin Network in the Formulation of Family Theory', paper presented at the International Seminar on Family Research, Tokyo, 1965. See also, by Eugene Litwak: 'Occupational Mobility and Extended Family Cohesion', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 25, no. 1, February 1960, pp. 9–21; 'Geographic Mobility and Extended Family Cohesion', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 25, no. 3, June 1960, pp. 385–94; and 'Extended Kin Relations . . .', op. cit.

[44] Berman, op. cit., p. 88.

[45] Leichter and Mitchell, op. cit., p. 162. It is important to mention here that unless the family is oriented towards the value of familism, it would be less likely for these resources to be exchanged or utilized freely.

[46] Lenski, op. cit., pp. 219–20.

MARTIN BUBER'S CONCEPT OF THE CENTRE AND SOCIAL RENEWAL

Paul R. Mendes-Flohr

SOCIAL thought in Germany was accompanied, indeed shaped, by a pervasive feeling that modernity was a Trojan horse. Material progress, sponsored by liberalism, had erected a splendid edifice, but hidden deep within was an insidious, destructive force. Material progress demanded a radical transformation of social life: the factory and the metropolis displaced the workshop and the village. The warm, trusting relations of traditional society were alleged to be eclipsed by the competitive, calculating relations of bourgeois, urban life. The social life of the bourgeoisie was riddled with alienation and mutual suspicion; something profound was lost.[1] Ferdinand Tönnies gave this feeling sociological conceptualization in his famous treatise, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1887).[2] *Gemeinschaft* was Tönnies's designation of pre-modern 'community', *Gesellschaft* of modern, urban 'society'.

Buber read Tönnies's treatise with great care and with admiration. But he opposed what he believed to be Tönnies's pessimism that *Gemeinschaft* is forever locked in the past. To be sure, Buber commented in a 1919 discussion of Tönnies's thesis that *Gesellschaft* was rapidly displacing *Gemeinschaft* and that many characteristic institutions of the latter were irretrievably lost. He added that it would be foolish, if not impossible, to disregard history and to retreat to a pre-modern society.[3] But are we, he queried, to assume that 'the dissolution of *Gemeinschaft* is an inevitable evolutionary fact?' In reply to his own question, Buber introduced the observation that *gemeinschaftliche* relations persist on the interpersonal, sub-institutional level. Clearly, he argued,[4]

> . . . our associative life is no longer an elemental being-with-and-for-one-another [*elementare Ineinander*] but an accommodating being-next-to-one-another [*angepasstes Nebeneinander*]. Whenever a true glance meets another, however, do we not experience that the Thou [*das Du*] is still primary for us and that being-for-one-another [*das Einander*] is sacred?
>
> *Gemeinschaft* . . . exists today merely as a personal event, as a gracious dawning of truth between men.

. . . as often as man joins hands with another [there is *Gemeinschaft*].

No lived [*gelebte*] *Gemeinschaft* is lost.

By redefining it as essentially a trans-historical pattern of relations, Buber has rescued *Gemeinschaft* from the limited historicity that Tönnies had imposed upon it. *Gemeinschaft*, Buber said in *The Holy Way* (1919), exists whenever 'individuals open themselves to one another . . ., [whenever] immediacy is established between one human being and another'.[5]

The understanding of the structure of this pattern of relations would, he suggested, constitute the grammar for the renewal of *Gemeinschaft*, that is, the fostering of *gemeinschaftliche* relations.[6] Undoubtedly this concern underlies in part the central work of Buber's life, *I and Thou*, and much of his subsequent writings. Surely, the mutuality, the spontaneity, and the directness of the dialogical relations reflect that which define Tönnies's *Gemeinschaft*. There are serious differences, however. Foremost, the I–Thou relation is bereft of any institutional warranty, which assures its continuity. The moment of dialogue is evanescent: 'All response binds You into the It world. That is the sublime melancholy of our lot . . .'[7] This discontinuity of the I–Thou relation renders it problematic as a grammar for the regeneration of *Gemeinschaft*. If the desired relationship between men, *per definitionem*, is transitory, how can one meaningfully speak of *Gemeinschaft*, which after all, as a social fact, implies temporal duration?

Despite the discontinuity to which it is doomed, the I–Thou relation could acquire a semblance of constancy by frequent renewal. If an individual maximizes his openness to the Thou who stands against him, it might be said that *Gemeinschaft* has *for* him a measure of continuity. The continuity Buber speaks of here does not necessarily include the same particulars, the same *relata*, of the relationship. In the course of a day, one can conceivably have an I–Thou relation 'in the tiniest and most transient events'[8]—say, with a stranger with whom one exchanges a glance in a lift; and, in more permanent associations, with one's wife and children. In this context, one should perhaps speak of the I–Thou relation as a *Zwiegemeinschaft*. The transition from the *Zwie–* to the *Vielgemeinschaft* is, of course, the central problem. When speaking of a *Gemeinschaft* embracing a group of individuals (what I have called the *Vielgemeinschaft*) Buber preferred the term *die Gemeinde*, which for him denoted community *qua* enduring social fact.[9]

The relative continuity, as just observed, of the *Zwiegemeinschaft* is enjoyed only by one individual, the constant *relatum* of a sequence of I–Thou relations. To be sure, in such instances as marriage where daily and intimate contact permits the possibility of a repeated conjunction of the *relata* of the I–Thou relationship, the constancy of *Gemeinschaft* is indeed shared by two. Apart from such special cases, *Gemeinschaft*, in order to be seen as a fact of social continuity (a fact which is an enduring

characteristic of the associative life of three or more men who do not necessarily live in frequent, close interaction), one will have to assume the intensive multiplication of the I–Thou relation within a contiguous locality; furthermore, we will have to assume a periodic interaction of most *relata* of the *gemeinschaftliche* relation, albeit, of course, not necessarily with a conjunction of the partners. In such an instance we may speak of a *Vielgemeinschaft* or *Gemeinde*: within a given group of men, I–Thou relations abound to such an extreme that most of its members take part, with relative frequency, in the *gemeinschaftliche* relation.

A true *Gemeinde*, according to Buber, arises where a collection of men have 'a common relationship to the Centre'.[10] This proposition has caused considerable confusion for some of Buber's commentators. The Centre has been variously understood as a true, charismatic leader;[11] as 'the sphere of ultimate values';[12] as a metaphysical sensation that accompanies the effort to build a just, organic community;[13] as a transcendent 'central Thou' shared by numerous individuals, who thus, epiphenomenally, have a 'commonality'.[14] While none of these explications of Buber's concept of the Centre is incorrect, they are all inadequate.

A *Gemeinde*, Buber held, is founded when a host of men encounter and realize a common revelation, a Thou which addresses them collectively. In a 1930 essay bearing as a title the query: 'Wie kann *Gemeinschaft* werden?' (How can *Gemeinschaft* evolve?), Buber states:[15]

> When individuals really have something to do with one another, when they share an experience and together existentially respond to that experience—that is, when men have a living Centre about which they are constellated—then *Gemeinschaft* is established *between* them.

The Centre introduces an unconditionality into the lives of men which, in turn, induces an immediacy in the relations between men. As an illustration of the *Gemeinschaft* between men which emerges from the common realization of a shared Centre, Buber points, in 'What is Man?',[16] to

> . . . the close union which is formed for a few days among the genuine disciples and fellow workers of a movement when an important leader dies. All impediments and difficulties between them are set aside, and a strange fruitfulness, or at all events, incandescence, of their life with one another is established. Another transient form is seen when in the face of a catastrophe which appears inevitable the really heroic element of community gathers together within itself, withdraws from idle talk and fuss, but each is open to the other and they anticipate in a brief common life, the binding power of a common death.

In *I and Thou* he propounds a thesis:[17]

> True community [*die wahre Gemeinde*] does not come into being because people have feelings for one another (though that is required too) but

> rather on two accounts, all of them have to stand in a living center[18] and they have to stand in a living reciprocal relation to one another. The second event has its source in the first, but it is not immediately given with it [*ist aber noch nicht mit ihm allein gegeben*]. A living reciprocal relationship includes feelings but it is not derived from them. A community [*eine Gemeinde*] is built upon a living active center.
>
> . . . men's relations to their true ¡You, being radii that lead from all I–points to the center, create a circle. That alone assures the genuine existence of a community [*eine Gemeinde*].

This statement is reiterated, almost verbatim, in every discussion of Buber's on *Gemeinschaft*.[19] It may therefore be taken as his credo on the matter.

Being founded by a 'situational' revelation, the *Gemeinde qua Vielgemeinschaft*, like the *Zwiegemeinschaft*, is faced with an inherent discontinuity. But having once undergone the exalting occasion of a *Vielgemeinschaft*, men thirst for something spread out in time, for duration. Thus institutional religion is born: the Centre becomes God-object.[20] Concomitantly, men also 'thirst for something spread out in space, for the representation in which the community of the faithful is united with its God'.[21] The cult of a Centre-God thus arises. Both religion and cult initially serve to supplement the founding acts of relation of the *Vielgemeinschaft*, but in time they become substitutes for these relations. What is more, religious dogma and cultic practices tend to weaken one's attentiveness to the address of the eternal Thou. A group's relation to the Centre must be renewed in every situation, or else it ceases to be a genuine *Vielgemeinschaft* or *Gemeinde*.[22]

The tendency of a community of men to renew their relation to the Centre may be facilitated by their 'distinctive conception of the universe'.[23] This conception, first shaped by the 'original encounter'[24] of the community with the Centre, the eternal Thou, is continually 'reinforced by the subsequent generations that point in the same direction'.[25] This particular conception of the universe serves to sensitize those who share it to the Centre, to the address of the eternal Thou. Should, however, the group's view of the universe become detached from the Centre, or should the view fail to be periodically renewed by the 'breath' of the Unconditional it would cease to serve its primordial function. 'When a culture is no longer centered in a living and continually renewed relational process, it freezes into [an] It–world . . .'[26]

Buber referred to the sensitivity of a group of men to the Centre as an 'essential We'.[27] When the essential We is present, there prevails within a group 'an outer directness which is the decisive presupposition of I–Thou relations. The We includes the Thou potentially'.[28] But even the We does not exist *an sich*; it too suffers the threat of discontinuity. 'Just as little as the I, does the essential We allow itself to be carried into a

third person . . ., it actualizes itself and is no longer there'.[29] The essential We must forever be renewed.

Buber explains the process of intermittently renewing the essential We by an appeal to the Heraclitean idea of the logos. In a 1956 lecture, 'What is common to All' (*Dem Gemeinschaftlichen folgen*), he critically[30] examines 'the degenerate Western spirit' and to do so 'summons Heraclitus'. He contrasts the prevailing individualism of Western culture, 'the tendency toward the primacy of individual existence and toward self-glorification',[31] with the world-view of Heraclitus who said that mankind has a 'single cosmos in common' (*einen einzigen ihnen gemeinschaftlichen Kosmos*).[32] The eternal flux of the cosmos, according to Buber, means that men have both a corporeal and spiritual 'mutuality'[33] with the cosmos, in general, and with each other, in particular. The logos which governs this mutuality between men 'dwells in the substance of the word, that is common to all [*Gemeinschaftliche*] . . .'[34] Heraclitus 'thereby asserts that all men in the eternal originality of their genuine spoken intercourse with one another have a share in the consummation of this indwelling'.[35] In 'genuine spoken intercourse'—that which bears the dynamic 'tension' (*Spannung*)[36] of the 'common'—men shape the 'common cosmos' (*gemeinschaftliche Kosmos*), a task which belongs peculiarly to human culture. Implicit in Heraclitus's world-view, Buber states, is the notion of 'the genuine We' (*das echte Wir*)[37]—'the genius saying of We'.[38] Heraclitus 'would not have denied . . . that we cannot follow the logos more adequately than by saying We';[39] he goes on to state:[40]

> Man has always had his experience as I, his experiences with others, and with himself, but it is as We, ever again as We, that he has constructed and developed a world out of his experiences . . . Thus the cosmos is preserved amid the changes of the world images.

Moreover, without the renewal of the essential We—through renewed relations to the Center—the logos would be undermined and the cosmos would be (here Buber quotes Heraclitus) 'like a heap of chaotically spilled-out refuse'.[41] For 'the same meaning of existence which holds sway in the coming-to-be of words, the same genuineness for ever renewing itself in the fire of oppositeness is that which embodies itself in the world processes'.[42] The destiny of the logos depends on the periodic renewal of relations.

Buber quickly adds that despite his singular wisdom, Heraclitus failed to see that the requisite renewal can be inspired only by an address from the eternal Thou, the transcendent Thou that stands before us, commanding our response.[43] In communal context this renewal needs to be generated by a recurrent response to the Centre.

Buber admits that the *Gemeinde*, as conceived by him, cannot be comprehended by 'current sociological categories'.[44] Indeed, the *Gemeinde*

is not to be associated with any particular social structure. An essential We 'can arise in every kind of group, but it cannot be understood from the life of any single one of the groups'.[45] The structure of the *Gemeinde qua Vielgemeinschaft* is, and must remaïn, fluid and protean, for such is the logos or rather the address of the eternal Thou. Accordingly, Buber celebrated Hasidism as but 'a great historical example of a communal reality which can arise to this or that extent, in this or that form, at different times and different places'.[46] All *Gemeinschaft*, by definition, is situational:[47] that is a fact established by the realization of the situation's address. From that premise, Buber rejected the proposition that *Vielgemeinschaft* could be purposefully created. In reply to a question put to him at a 1923 lecture he delivered on the theme of community, whether '*Gemeinschaft* could be willed', he said:[48]

> *Gemeinschaft* comes into being not when it is willed: as an epiphenomenon it is not intended, it is not caused (*verursacht*). Willing, intending *Gemeinschaft* excludes [its very possibility].

As a dialogical response to a common Centre in a specific situation, *Vielgemeinschaft* is not determined by social or institutional structures. On the other hand, the dialogical response to a common Centre may have definite sociological consequences. Foremost, the ontic directness accompanying the I–Thou relation of many, permits them to 'stand against the alleged necessity, the economic and political'.[49] Yet, in apparent contradiction, Buber does talk of 'de-centralized cooperative settlements',[50] of 'aiming at a new organic whole',[51] of paths in Utopia. But he claims that when he discusses specific forms of *Vielgemeinschaft*, he is not being prescriptive:[52]

> . . . by 'community', the unfolding of whose forces I desire, I understand nothing that has already found its form in past time; and that, when I talk about realization, I think of certain conditions that will *presumably* be given for it.

His understanding of these conditions requisite for social renewal was inspired by his dear friend Gustav Landauer (1870–1919), the social anarchist. Buber consistently endorsed his friend's view that the state be reduced 'to its proper functions', and society be restructured as a federation of small *Gemeinden*. Undoubtedly, the profoundest lesson that Landauer taught Buber was that social renewal was not primarily a function of institutional change, but of a fundamental transformation of interpersonal relationships.[53]

Buber's philosophy of the Centre and social renewal may be designated as a metasociology: he seeks to identify a principle which although formally independent of social life, he holds to be the ultimate ground of 'genuine' communal life. This principle, we have observed, is identified by Buber as responsiveness to the address of the eternal Thou.

Dialogue is the common ground for genuine social and religious life. Buber's sociology has thus a decided religious quality. As Ernst Simon has observed,[54] 'out of "theology"—in so far as Buber's religious thinking can be so termed—there has evolved a religious sociology . . . A religious sociology—but not a sociology of religion'. But if we wish to underscore Buber's understanding of *Gemeinschaft* as an ever renewing and protean pattern of address and response, his philosophy of social renewal is perhaps best characterized as a Heraclitean sociology.

Heraclitean sociology, however, suggests an antinomy: the Heraclitean view of the world as a lawless flux clashes with the fundamental premise of sociology as a science, namely, the heuristic assumption that social relations are lawful. Buber would undoubtedly have conceded, we may surmise, that he was not truly interested in sociology in this formal sense. He would thus presumably have argued that there is only an apparent antinomy in a Heraclitean sociology, and that the paradox here is a necessary one: if social life is not to stagnate, if it is not to capitulate to the heteronomy of presumed laws and soulless conventions, it must continually be renewed by an unconditional response to the eternal Thou.

NOTES

[1] This essay is an expanded version of a lecture presented (in Hebrew) at a colloquium to mark the tenth anniversay of Buber's death, held at the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Jerusalem, 22 May 1975.

[2] F. Tönnies, *Community and Society*, (translated by C. P. Loomis, New York, 1957).

[3] Buber, 'Gemeinschaft', *Worte an die Zeit. Eine Schriftenreihe von Martin Buber*, vol. 2, Munich, 1919, p. 11.

[4] ibid., pp. 12, 16, 23, 26.

[5] Buber, 'The Holy Way', in Buber, *On Judaism*, N. N. Glatzer ed., translation by E. Jospe, p. 211. Cf. 'We want to build Zion, that is, we want to establish a pure, beautiful and ingenuous social life (*Zusammenleben*), a life of living immediacy between men.' Buber, 'Zion und die Jugend', in *Mitteilungen des Verbands des jüdischen Jugendvereine Deutschlands*, nos. 2 and 3; 5 March 1918, p. 169.

[6] With his concept 'Bund', Hermann Schmalenbach likewise sought to isolate the *gemeinschaftliche* relation of intimate solidarity between individuals from the primordial bounds of Tönnies's *Gemeinschaft*. Cf. Schmalenbach, 'Die soziologische Kategorie des Bundes', in *Die Dioskuren, Jahrbuch für Geisteswissenschaften*, Walter Strich ed., vol. I, 1922. In a discussion of Schmalenbach's essay, Edward Shils identifies it as the first and only work in German sociology to take *Gemeinschaft* in this direction. In the light of Buber's earlier essay (in 1919) on Tönnies and indeed the whole thrust of his subsequent social thought, Shils's observation seems incorrect. See Shils, 'Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. VIII, no. 2, June 1957, pp. 133–42.

[7] Buber, *I and Thou*, translated by W. Kaufmann, New York 1970, p. 89.

[8] Buber, 'What is Man?' (first published in 1943), in Buber, *Between Man and Man*, translated by M. Friedman, New York, 1965, p. 204.

[9] Though not consistent, Buber tended to make a distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gemeinde*, a distinction that parallels what I have called *Zwie-* and *Vielgemeinschaft*. Cf. 'Should [*Gemeinschaft*] of two individuals . . . in a relationship [of immediacy] become the basis of the social life of many, then the spatial boundaries of the latter are established. The proper form of *Gemeinschaft* as a social structure is the *Gemeinde*. [In this context, *Gemeinde* means commune.] Should these boundaries be over extended the quality of immediacy begins to vanish'. Buber, 'Grundsätze', in *Worte an die Zeit*, no. 1, 1919, pp. 8 f.

[10] Buber, 'Comments on the Idea of Community' (first published in 1931), in Buber, *A Believing Humanism*, translated by M. Friedman, New York, 1969, p. 88.

[11] Robert E. Wood, *Martin Buber's Ontology, An Analysis of I and Thou*. Evanston, Ill., 1969, p. 76. Cf.: Buber's 'notion of the Centre sounds like relation to God, but Buber relates it to the *zaddik*, or holy man, of the Hasidic community', ibid.

[12] S. N. Eisenstadt, 'Martin Buber', in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 1968, vol. II, p. 162.

[13] Paul E. Pfuetze, *Self, Society, Existence*, New York, 1954, p. 155.

[14] H. Kohn, *Martin Buber, Sein Werk und Seine Zeit*, 2nd edn., Cologne, 1961, pp. 186 f.: '[Buber's *Gemeinschaft*] is not a chorus of many intertwined voices, it is rather a dialogue of I and Thou, in which the Thou is common to many Is [*Ichs*]. In this "*Gemeinschaft* of the Thou" the commonality of the Is is found [*Gemeinschaft* des Ichs]'.

[15] Buber, 'Wie kann Gemeinschaft werden?' In Buber, *Worte an die Jugend*, Berlin, 1938, p. 54.

[16] 'What is Man?', op. cit., p. 176.

[17] *I and Thou*, trans. by Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 93, 163. The German edition of *Ich und Du* quoted here is that published in Cologne by Jakob Hegner in 1966, pp. 56, 136.

[18] Ronald Gregor Smith in his translation of *I and Thou*, New York, 1958, capitalizes the term 'Centre'. In consonance with his wish to correct what he believed to be Smith's overly theological translation, Walter Kaufmann in his translation (see note 7, *supra*) spells the word without a capital C; he thus obscures the ontological character of the term. I follow Smith's version because it points to the special philosophical emphasis Buber gave it. On Smith's appreciation of what he calls Buber's 'ontology of community', see his essay, 'Martin Buber's View of the Interhuman', in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. VIII, no. 1, June 1966, pp. 64–80.

[19] Buber, *Religion als Gegenwart*: unpublished lectures held at Jüdisches Lehrhaus, Frankfurt a.M., in the winter of 1922 (Martin Buber Archive, Jerusalem, MS B/29, Sect. VIII, p. 7). See also *Martin Buber Abende*, 5 lectures held in Zurich from 24 November to 6 December 1923, unpublished (Martin Buber Archive, MS 47/d, Sect. I, p. 5, v. p. 4); cf. Buber, 'Wie kann Gemeinschaft werden?' op. cit., pp. 54 f.; and Sydney and Beatrice Rome, eds., *Philosophical Interrogations: Interrogations of Martin Buber, John Wild* et al., New York, 1964, p. 68.

[20] *I and Thou*, p. 166.

[21] ibid.

[22] Cf. 'Realization of the idea of community, like the realization of any idea, does not exist once and for all and generally valid (*sic*) but always only as the moment's answer to a moment's question.' Buber, 'Comments on the Idea of Community', op. cit., p. 88; cf. 'Renewal of community is only possible through an ever new and truer relation to the Centre of being', *Martin Buber Abende*, op. cit., lect. V., p. 4.

[23] *I and Thou*, op, cit., p. 103.

[24] ibid.

[25] ibid.

[26] ibid.

[27] 'What is Man', op. cit., p. 176.

[28] ibid.

[29] Buber, 'What is Common to All', in Buber, *The Knowledge of Man*, translated by N. Friedmann, New York, 1965, p. 106.

[30] ibid., p. 108.

[31] ibid., p. 97.

[32] ibid., p. 89. German: '*Dem Gemeinschaftlichen folgen*'. In Buber, *Logos. Zwei Reden*, Heidelberg 1962, p. 31; cf. Hermann Diels' standard translation of the same passage from Heraclitus: 'Hence it is one's duty to follow that which is common [*dem Gemeinsamen*]. Although the meaning is common [*gemeinsam*], the many live as though each had a private understanding.' Heraclitus, fragment 2, in Hermann Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, griechisch und deutsch*, Berlin, 1903, vol. I, p. 151. Diels retains this translation in all subsequent editions of *Die Fragmente*.

[33] 'What is Common to All', op. cit., p. 90.

[34] ibid.

[35] ibid.

[36] ibid., p. 91 (German original, p. 34). Heraclitus, according to all standard German translations, usually speaks of *Streit*; cf. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, loc. cit., fragment no. 80, pp. 79 f.

[37] 'What is Common to All', op. cit., p. 106 (German original, p. 65).

[38] ibid.

[39] ibid.

[40] ibid., p. 107; cf. *I and Thou*, p. 103.

[41] 'What is Common to All', p. 105.

[42] ibid., p. 90.

[43] ibid., p. 108 f.

[44] 'What is Man?', op. cit., p. 175.

[45] ibid.

[46] Buber in *Philosophical Interrogations*, op. cit., pp. 68 f.

[47] Cf. 'Gemeinschaft [ist] nicht dauernd, [sondern] nur situationshaft'. *Martin Buber Abende*, op. cit., lect. V, p. 2.

[48] ibid., lect. I, p. 6.

[49] Buber, in Sidney and Beatrice Rome, *Philosophical Interrogations*, op. cit., p. 74.

[50] Buber, *Paths in Utopia*, translated by R. F. C. Hull, Boston, 1958, pp. 58 f.

[51] Buber, *Paths in Utopia*, p. 79.

[52] Buber, in Rome, *Philosophical Interrogations*, p. 74, emphasis added.

[53] Buber's relation to Landauer is discussed at length in my doctoral dissertation, *From Kulturmystik to Dialogue. An Inquiry into the Formation of Martin Buber's Philosophy of Dialogue*, Brandeis University, 1973.

[54] Ernst Simon, 'Martin Buber and German Jewry', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book*, vol. III, 1958, p. 19.

A NOTE ON CORPORATE MOURNING IN THE HALAKHIC COMMUNITY

Joel B. Wolowelsky

THE grief and mourning which follow the death of a close relative constitute a very personal experience which on the surface affects only those members of the deceased's community who had direct contact with the deceased. The *Halakhah* (traditional Jewish law) has developed norms of behaviour and ritual to make the mourner face—and deal with—the tragic situation, so that he may adjust to the personal and social upheaval caused by the death.

Since an individual alone cannot normally cope with the many problems and the turmoil of emotions which usually affect the bereaved, the Tradition has provided forms of group expression of comfort and reassurance.[1] It is not just a small gathering of friends and neighbours who are involved, but in fact, the whole Jewish community must express its sorrow and compassion, and participate in the mourning. For that community is not simply an amalgam of separate individuals bound together as a collectivity; it is a corporate entity, a *tsibur* with its own identity.[2] And when one member is affected, the community must respond. Indeed, when there is not even one person to sit in mourning for the deceased, the *Shulḥan Arukh* decrees:[3]

> Where there is a case of a deceased who has left no mourners to be comforted, ten worthy men should assemble at his place [*bimkomo*] all seven days of the mourning period and the rest of the people should gather about them [to comfort them]. And if the ten cannot stay on a regular basis, others from the community may replace them.

It is worth noting here that the community is not enjoined to appoint just one single individual to mourn for the departed. It is not simply a case of *kibbud hamet*, a concern that the dead person be not so utterly neglected as to have not even a single human being mourn for him; it is a whole *minyan* which must mourn—ten men, the minimum required by the *Halakhah* to constitute a corporate prayer-group. The identity of each of the men is immaterial, since *any* ten Jewish adult males can at

any time constitute a *minyan*; it is the entity formed by the ten which is effective.

Similarly, in normal circumstances, if one is delayed in initiating *shiva* (the ritual seven-day mourning period), one counts seven days from the time one begins. But if the household as a corporate unit has initiated the mourning period without the bereaver, then if he joins them any time before the end of *shiva*, his own individuality is merged into that of the mourning household and he concludes his mourning with them[4]—even though his formal mourning period may have been much less than seven days.

The laws of mourning when a death occurs during a Festival Holy Day also reflect the basic *halakhic* tenet that all Israel must be seen as one unit. The requirement to rejoice on a Holy Day applies to both the individual and the community.[5] A bereaved individual, of course, will feel profound grief—but *the community as a whole* should be full of a joyous festive spirit and so cannot at the same time participate in the bereaved's sorrow and mourning. And since when there is ritual mourning or *avelut* it is the whole community which must mourn jointly with the immediate close kin, then if it cannot take part in the mourning there can be no formal *shiva* for the close kinsmen of the dead. For the Talmud put the rhetorical question: 'Shall his personal obligation [to mourn] upset the communal obligation [to rejoice]?'[6] Although every Jew maintains his identity as an individual, he cannot at will dissociate himself from his membership of the corporate *klal*, the corporate Jewish entity. Thus if a death occurs during a Festival, *shiva* must wait until after that Festival ends. The body is buried, but formal mourning for the dead (which normally begins immediately after burial) starts only when the Festival period is over and Corporate Israel is available to mourn with the bereaved.[7]

However, since the last day of a Festival in the Diaspora is not observed as a Holy Day in Israel, it cannot be argued that on that day the *whole* corporate community is unable to mourn with the bereaved. Hence *avelut* should commence on that day. On the other hand, the Jews in the Diaspora community in which the mourner lives are still enjoined to rejoice in the Festival, and out of deference to them he cannot mourn publicly. The conflict is resolved by letting him begin his *avelut*, but as private mourning.[8] Significantly, this private mourning is in contrast to the private mourning of *Hol HaMoed* (the intermediate days of the Festival): the latter is *not* included in the *shiva* count of seven days,[9] for on those days, of course, both the Jews who live in the Holy Land and those who live in the Diaspora are not available to mourn with him. (The normative private mourning of the Sabbath which falls during *shiva* is included in the seven-day count, for on the Sabbath the community has not withdrawn from the mourner, but remains available in theory; it is only the bereaved person who with-

draws from the corporate group temporarily in order to engage in private mourning).[10]

Of course, the period of *shiva* does not imply that the psychological adjustment to death requires exactly seven days. It is simply that some period of mourning must be specified in order to prevent the afflicted person from remaining interminably in his *avelut*, wrapped up in his grief and torment; and the seven-day period guarantees everyone the Sabbath experience of private mourning. After the set period, the bereaved are instructed to cease formal mourning and return to everyday life. Hence the custom of instructing the bereaved kin at the end of the *shiva* to leave the house for a short walk. If *shiva* began before a Holy Day, it must come to a halt when that Festival begins, even if less than seven days have elapsed.[11] For, as noted above, *avelut* must cease when a holiday begins; and the formal mourning is not resumed, since it is deemed too great an emotional strain for a mourner to resume sitting *shiva* once he had risen from it.

There are many areas of traditional Jewish practice which emphasize the unity of the corporate Jewish community; but it is perhaps in the observance of formal ritual mourning that the concept of the continuous interaction between the individual Jew and *klal Yisrael* is most forcefully expressed.

NOTES

[1] These were discussed in a previous article by the author, 'A Midrash On Jewish Mourning,' *Judaism*, vol. 23, no. 2, Spring 1974.

[2] On this point, see the third chapter of *Al HaTeshuvah* (in Hebrew), the 'Teshuvah lectures' of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchick as presented by Pinchas Peli (Jerusalem: Torah Education Department of the Jewish Agency, 1975).

[3] *Yoreh Deah*, 476:3. Note Isserles' gloss. Cf. Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah*, *Hilkhot Avelut*, 13:4 and commentaries there.

[4] ibid., 475:8.

[5] For an example of how the distinction between corporate and individual rejoicing can affect practical *halakhah* in the area of mourning, see Y. Tukatchinsky, *Gesher HaḤayim* (in Hebrew), vol. 2, chapter 17, section 5, pp. 157 ff.

[6] *Moed Kattan*, 14b.

[7] *Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh Deah*, 499:2.

[8] ibid.

[9] ibid.

[10] On this point, see the author's 'A Note on Shabbat Mourning,' *Judaism*, vol. 24, no. 1, Winter 1975.

[11] *Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh Deah*, 499:1.

JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO NORTH AMERICA: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE (1870–1900)

Jonathan D. Sarna

HISTORIANS of Canadian Jewry too often assume that the Jewish experience in the United States can serve as a model for understanding Canadian Jewish history.[1] In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, North America could be treated as a single large country;[2] and historians seem to believe that this was also true of the late nineteenth century.[3]

The history of eastern European Jewish immigration to Canada, however, shows such a conception to be misleading. In the last three decades of the nineteenth century, Jews came from eastern Europe both to the United States and to Canada; but the immigrant Jewish communities which took shape in both countries diverged strikingly. From 1870, immigrants to the United States settled overwhelmingly in East Coast cities, and were concentrated in a fairly narrow range of trades. In Canada, Jews from the same areas in Europe were far more widely diffused geographically and occupationally.

Jewish immigration to Canada: 1870–1900

Reliable Canadian Jewish immigration statistics are available only after 1901.[4] Nevertheless, for the 1870–1900 period a working figure of 15,000 Jewish immigrants can be accepted. Since Canada's Jewish population, as measured by the census, rose from 1333 in 1871 to 16,401 in 1901,[5] we are probably not far wrong, especially since many of the Jews who migrated from Canada to the United States were included in Canadian immigration statistics, but had departed before the census takers could have counted them.

While 15,000 is a small figure when compared to the some 600,000 Jews who were entering the United States during the same period, it is

large when viewed against the background of the great southward migration which was simultaneously driving thousands of Canadians out of their country.[6] Given the choice, why did any Jews come to the depression-wracked[7] Northern Dominion? Some probably had no alternative. Jewish relief agencies simply included Canada in their distribution plans. This was especially true of London's Jewish organizations which, like their non-Jewish counterparts, maintained closer ties with Montreal than with New York.[8] As early as 1875, Montreal's Young Men's Hebrew Benevolent Society (YMHBS) complained that the Ladies' Emigration Society of London was sending them impoverished immigrants indiscriminately.[9] Until 17 June 1882, London's Mansion House Committee sent 105 Jews to Montreal, 359 to Winnipeg and about 50 to other Canadian cities (Toronto, Quebec, Hamilton, and Queensport).[10] Mainland Europe also was sending Jews to Canada.[11] The 1891 Berlin Conference on Emigration, for example, considered the Northern Dominion to be one of a number of possible havens for fleeing Russians.[12] Only eight years later, the Jewish Colonization Association (ICA) directed no less than 2,202 Rumanian Jews to Canada's shores.[13]

Other Jews were transported to Canada upon arrival in New York. In 1882, Bella Rosenbaum was sent to Winnipeg together with a group of other immigrants with 'no relatives or friends to claim them'.[14] A year later, New York's Hebrew Emigrant Aid Society directed several newcomers to Montreal.[15] Moreover, there were cases of unfortunate Jews who were wilfully misled. In 1887, YMHBS of Montreal urged Europeans to fight swindlers who 'lie to immigrants' about their ultimate destination. A year later that society protested about having to care for Jews who believed that they were headed for New York.[16]

By the 1890's American immigration restrictions were more stringent; consequently, more immigrants came to Canada. A 'Mr. Lebowich', who wished to go to St. Louis, landed in Montreal since laws prohibited paupers from entering United States ports.[17] Others went to Canada when President Harrison quarantined immigrant vessels in order to prevent the spread of epidemics. The Dominion was then desperately in need of new settlers; it could not afford to be too selective.

Although it is certainly true that most eastern European Jewish immigrants to Canada had originally hoped to settle in the United States, it need not be inferred that those who came to Canada were unhappy with their lot. Before the turn of the century, it was still easy for a dissatisfied immigrant to stray south and enter the United States —legally or illegally.[18] Montreal Jews provided generous help when 'called upon to assist large numbers to different parts of the United States'.[19] Nevertheless, thousands remained in Canada, while some individual Jews (like Isaac Halpern and Alexander Harkavy) actually

moved to Canada after having settled in the United States.[20] Apparently, therefore, many Jews who came to Canada did so of their own free will.

Some may have come with dreams of setting up farms. Canada was eager to promote agricultural immigration during that period,[21] and paid particular attention to the possibility of enticing Jewish immigrants to her frontier. In early 1882, for example, Sir Alexander Galt, the Canadian High Commissioner in London, wrote to Canada's Prime Minister John A. Macdonald[22]:

> The Jewish persecution in Russia has induced me to write Rothschild suggesting that I would like to discuss with him the feasibility of removing the agricultural Jews to Canada. It seems not a bad opportunity of interesting the Hebrews in our North West.

Thomas Greenway, Premier of Manitoba, tried to draw Jewish farmers to his province in 1890; and a similar plan was taken up by the federal government a year later.[23] By 1897, Prime Minister Laurier actually agreed to grant Jews free land in Manitoba and offered them 'such a measure of self-government as will enable them to make their own by-laws substituting Saturday for Sunday'.[24] While nothing came of these schemes, Jews certainly responded to the invitation to populate the newly opened Canadian West. Many laboured on the Canadian Pacific Railroad and some certainly took advantage of generous homestead grants.[25] In the United States, by this time, frontier opportunities were already limited.

Jews in search of a warm welcome also had good reason to remain in the Northern Dominion, since immigrants to the United States, especially in the 1890's, faced both popular and official hostility.[26] Admittedly, French Canadian Catholics, fearing a further weakening of their social position, opposed the entry of all non-French immigrants (even the Irish Catholics), and especially Jews.[27] Trade union hostility was also evident, as was antagonism from other quarters.[28] But the contemporary English-language press was in favour of Jewish immigration: the *Manitoba Free Press* described Jews as an 'industrious population' and regretted that more did not come. The *Gleaner*, *Montreal Gazette*, and *Montreal Star* also had only sympathy and encouragement for those refugees of the 1890's.[29]

On the other hand, the United States at that period already had considerable legislation regulating and restricting immigration. A literacy test measure was killed only by executive veto. Earlier, President Harrison had warned that mass immigration of Jews 'is neither good for them nor for us'.[30] In Canada, meanwhile, immigration was unrestricted;[31] and Jews were offered bounties and special benefits if they would only come and settle.

The attitude of the North American Jewish community to the

immigration of co-religionists may also have drawn Jews northward. While the German Jewish community in the United States was ambivalent and cautious, alternatingly hostile and sympathetic, usually condescending and paternalistic,[32] the attitude of Canadian Jews was almost totally positive. When, in 1881, there was an increase in the number of refugees arriving in the New World, United States cities sent threats and denunciations; Montreal, on the other hand, asked for a delay 'until better arrangements than now existed could be effected'.[33] Even when, in 1891, YMHBS funds were almost totally depleted, the same attitude prevailed. A special board meeting voted that 'none of these people shd. [sic] be sent back as long as there was a dollar in the treasury'.[34] The Society's president, Harris Vineberg, declared: '. . . our earnest desire is to permanently benefit our poor, unfortunate and destitute co-religionists'.[35]

This concern and interest were buttressed by several factors which distinguished the Canadian Jewish community from its United States counterpart. Of greatest importance, as Louis Rosenberg has stressed,[36] is the fact that

> With few exceptions the Jews who came to Canada from 1881–1914 were from the same areas and from religious, cultural and social environments similar to those who preceded them.

Canadian Jewish leaders did not look down upon the eastern European newcomers.

The harmony of interests which allied old and new Jewish immigrants is most evident in religious observance. In the United States, of course, religious divisions reflected ethnic divisions: modern Reform Hebrews who worshipped in a Temple looked down on old fashioned, Orthodox Jews who *davened* in *Schule* (prayed in a synagogue). In Canada, on the other hand, most of the community was united in its devotion to Orthodoxy.[37] Solomon Schechter noted this difference while on his tour of North American cities: in the United States he found Reform Jews, the people of wealth and influence, constituting the kehillah, while other groups were the minyan; precisely the opposite situation, he discovered, prevailed in Montreal.[38]

Perhaps for this reason, there was surprisingly little hostility between Montreal's German-Polish Sha'ar Hashomayim Synagogue, and the more recent immigrant congregations. In the early 1890's, when Montreal Jews debated whether to pay school taxes to the Catholic or to the more pro-immigrant Protestant School Board, only Shearith Israel (the ritually Sephardi synagogue of Canada's earliest Jews) favoured the Catholics. Sha'ar Hashomayim, YMHBS, B'nai Jacob (the Russian congregation) and Emanu-El (the small Reform congregation) were united on the subject and they successfully championed the Protestant School Board.[39] Such an alliance would have been un-

likely in any of the ethnically and religiously divided Jewish communities of the United States.

The attitudes of the settler-Jewish communities towards their own immigrants were also influenced by considerations of status and image. Here again, Canadian Jews displayed far less concern than did their United States counterparts. Less successful, far less numerous, and living in an environment both tolerant of cultural diversity (Canada saw itself as a mosaic) and receptive to immigrants, Canadian Jews could welcome their brethren from abroad without fearing for themselves. Besides, as first-generation immigrants, the leaders of the Canadian Jewish community probably had greater understanding of the immigrants' lot than did the second-generation Jews who, in the main, were the leaders in the United States.

Once Jews had settled in Canada, for whatever reason, their relatives began to join them. H. Wolofsky reports that he came to Montreal in the late 1890's to join his brother;[40] Max Vanger gave the same reason for coming to New Brunswick some years later.[41] By then, however, Canada was much more attractive; from 1896, its economy showed a sharp upward trend: wheat prices rose, gold was discovered in the Yukon, and industry grew at a rapid pace. 'The nineteenth century was the century of the United States; the twentieth century will be the century of Canada,' asserted the Dominion's Prime Minister, Wilfred Laurier.[42] United States citizens, including Jews, began to move north of the border.[43]

Jewish settlement in Canada: 1870–1900

Eastern European Jewish immigrants to the United States tended overwhelmingly to settle in East Coast cities. Unlike their German predecessors, who had spread over the face of the country while engaged in peddling and entrepreneurial pursuits, those from eastern Europe moved into a handful of manufacturing industries (chiefly textiles) in urban port cities.[44] Since by the end of the nineteenth century, maximum opportunity in the United States lay in these very cities,[45] there was little incentive for immigrants to go further afield.

The Canadian situation was altogether different: the frontier was just opening up as eastern European Jews began to immigrate. There were abundant opportunities for pioneers and pedlars. Consequently, Canadian Jewish immigrants, unlike their counterparts south of the border, did not cluster in urban centres. Much like United States German Jews of the preceding generation, Canadian Jewry spread to the far reaches of their new-found homeland.

Table 1 makes clear that Canadian Jews were far more likely to head West in the 1870–1900 period than they had been previously. By the turn of the century, Jews were 4·74 times as likely to be in the

East than in the West, while the comparable figure three decades earlier had been 13·65. In the United States, of course, the trend was precisely in the opposite direction: during the period of mass immigration, the percentage of Jews in every sector of the country, except the East, declined markedly.

Many Canadian Jewish immigrants in this period settled in small towns (some of which, like Toronto and Winnipeg, rapidly became big cities), far removed from the economically stagnant eastern cities.

TABLE 1. *Distribution of Jewish Immigrants*

	United States					
Area	*Jews*[a] *1877*		*All Origins*[b] *1870*	*Jews*[a] *1905*		*All Origins*[b] *1910*
	No.	%	%	No.	%	%
North-East	116,017	50·64	30·9	1,103,700	70·80	28·1
South	45,122	19·64	30·9	125,510	8·11	32·0
North-Central	46,478	20·24	32·6	277,000	17·77	32·5
West	21,465	9·32	6·6	51,500	3·30	7·4

	Canada[c]					
Area	*Jews 1871*		*All Origins 1871*	*Jews 1901*		*All Origins 1901*
	No.	%	%	*No.*	%	%
East	1,242	93·16	97·01	13,544	82·58	87·98
West	91	6·84	2·99	2,857	17·42	12·02

[a] Joseph Jacobs, 'United States: Statistics', *Jewish Encyclopedia*, New York, 1911, vol. XII, p. 374. Jacobs's statistics do not add up to 100 per cent.
[b] David Ward, *Cities and Immigrants*, New York, 1971, p. 60.
[c] Louis Rosenberg, *Canada's Jews*, Montreal, 1939, pp. 10, 19.

Frontier communities needed pedlars, storekeepers, merchants, and wholesalers: and the Jews readily provided those services.

Indians came to rely on Jews as suppliers and distributors,[46] as did other settlers. A Mennonite historian relates:[47]

> Jewish immigrants were frequently drawn to the Mennonite towns. . . . Both groups were familiar with each other's ways of life from the Old Country, and were able to communicate easily with each other because of the great resemblance of Yiddish to German.

Jewish-Ukrainian relations could be similarly described. Many Canadian Jews hailed from the Ukraine and were familiar with the Ukrainian language and customs. For their part, Ukrainians had traded with Jews in Russia and they now gave them preference over other pedlars and merchants;[48] as a consequence, close personal relations developed. One Vasyl Yatsiw, who arrived in Winnipeg in

1892 and saved $200 in two years, even 'entered into a business partnership with a Jew'; unfortunately, they did not prosper.[49]

The careers of early eastern European Jews in Canada have been summed up by Lyon Cohen[50] (later President of the Canadian Jewish Congress):

> The occupation of the first East European immigrants on their arrival was selling wares among the farmers. When in the course of time their positions improved, they became general store-keepers. . . . Those who were more successful later came to Montreal and entered the retail, wholesale and manufacturing trades.

Of course, many immigrants did not attain the third stage, and some may never have wanted to do so. A typical example was Yudel Brown, described in Ephraim Lisitzky's autobiographical *In the Grip of Cross Currents*.[51] After several years as a village pedlar, Brown opened a shop in tiny Ahmic Harbor, Ontario. 'His store acquired a reputation, and farmers came to buy from far and wide';[52] but Yudel Brown never moved to the big city.

With such opportunities available in the hinterland, it is no wonder that Canadian Jewish immigrants, unlike their contemporaries in the United States, were advised to head for the frontier.[53] Peddling, while eschewed as degrading and unprofitable by eastern Europeans in the United States,[54] could still prove lucrative in the Northern Dominion; urban industries were clearly not the only possible road to success.

Of course, in 1901 more than 60 per cent of Canada's Jews did live in Montreal and Toronto; and most of them were recent immigrants[55] who, like their counterparts in the United States, tended to find work in the needle trades.[56] In the United States, however, 90 per cent of immigrant Jews were in big cities[57] and, according to Kuznets, 65·6 per cent of all Jewish immigrants (1899–1914) were involved in manufacturing. The comparable figure for pre-1920 Canadian Jewish immigrant occupations was 27·3 per cent. On the other hand, while 47·7 per cent of the Canadians were involved in transport and trade, only 9·2 per cent of those in the United States were in those occupations.[58]

Admittedly, Kuznets's figures were based on occupations in 1899–1914 while Rosenberg's data apply to the 1931 position of pre-1910 immigrants; but the margin is so vast that the contrast remains great. Further, it is striking that less than half of Canada's most successful early Jewish immigrants were in the clothing trade.[59]

It was only in the twentieth century that the overall geographic and occupational patterns of United States and Canadian Jews became increasingly similar. By then, the economic situation in Canada had improved, its frontier had been developed, and Jewish immigration to the Northern Dominion had increased sharply.[60]

NOTES

[1] I am grateful to Professors Eugene Black, Leon Jick, and Marshall Sklare for their assistance in the preparation of this paper.

[2] Marcus L. Hansen, *The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples* (completed and prepared for publication by John Bartlett Brebner), New Haven, Conn., 1940, deals with this theme. See also Ismar Elbogen, *A Century of Jewish Life*, Philadelphia, 1945, p. 133.

[3] See the translation by Ralph Noveck of Benjamin G. Sack, *History of the Jews in Canada*, Montreal, 1965. Sack agrees with American Jewish historians and propounds a trifold division of Canadian Jewish history into Sephardi, German-Polish, and Russian periods without any apparent historical basis; cf. Louis Rosenberg, 'Two Centuries of Jewish Life in Canada 1760–1960', *American Jewish Year Book*, no. 62, 1961, pp. 28–32. Joseph Kage in *With Faith and Thanksgiving*, Montreal, 1962, pp. 37–9, similarly interprets the Canadian Jewish economic structure on the basis of Oscar Handlin's 'A Century of Jewish Immigration to the United States', *American Jewish Year Book*, no. 50, 1949, pp. 11–18. Although recent scholars are more careful to distinguish between the United States and Canada—notably, Lloyd P. Gartner in 'North American Jewry', *Migration and Settlement: Proceedings of the Anglo-American Jewish Historical Conference*, London, 1971, pp. 114–27—some popular historians appear to persist in the old errors: see Rick Kardonne's portrayal of Canadian Jewish history in 'Montreal, Quebec: Up from the Ghetto', *Present Tense*, no. 2, Winter 1975, pp. 50–5.

[4] The basic statistical study of Canadian Jewry is Louis Rosenberg's *Canada's Jews: A Social and Economic Study of the Jews in Canada*, Montreal 1939. See also M. C. Urquhart and K. A. H. Buckley, *Historical Statistics of Canada*, Toronto, 1965.

[5] Rosenberg, *Canada's Jews*, op. cit., p. 10: the figure is for 'Jews by religion'.

[6] David C. Corbett, *Canada's Immigration Policy: A Critique*, Toronto, 1957, p. 121.

[7] Peter Waite, *Canada 1875–1896: Arduous Destiny*, Toronto, 1971, pp. 174–178, minimizes the extent of the 1873–96 Canadian depression, noting the growth in both Gross National Product and population during the period. Still, the mood in Canada was 'sullen with disillusionment, with disgust for the present and disbelief in the future': Donald Creighton, *A History of Canada, Dominion of the North*, Boston, 1958, pp. 353–5 and 365.

[8] Maldwyn A. Jones, 'The Background to Emigration from Great Britain in the Nineteenth Century', *Perspectives in American History*, vol. VII, 1973, p. 74.

[9] Simon Belkin, *Through Narrow Gates*, Montreal, 1966, p. 25.

[10] N. S. Joseph, quoted in Myron Berman, 'The Attitude of American Jewry Towards East European Jewish Immigration': unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Dept. of History, Columbia University, 1963, p. 528. See also Zosa Szajkowski, *Jewish Mass Settlement in the United States*, New York, 1966, p. 12, item 18, and Belkin, op. cit., p. 30.

[11] Bernard Figler, *Canadian Jewish Profiles: Rabbi Dr. Herman Abramowitz, Lazarus Cohen, Lyon Cohen*, Ottawa, 1968, p. 94.

[12] Zosa Szajkowski, 'The Attitude of American Jews to East European, Jewish Immigration (1881–1893)', *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society*, no. 40, March 1951, p. 259.

[13] Belkin, op. cit., p. 41.

[14] Bella W. Rosenbaum, *My Life*, Montreal, n.d., p. 8.

[15] Szajkowski, 'The Attitude . . .', op. cit., pp. 272, 274. On p. 272, seven immigrants are listed as having been sent to Montreal by New York's Hebrew Emigrant Aid Society during the whole of 1882, but on p. 274 a different document lists eleven immigrants sent by the same society to Montreal in the two months between 1st June to 1st August 1882.

[16] Young Men's Hebrew Benevolent Society, Minutes of Annual Meetings, February 1887 and October 1888, *YMHBS Papers*, property of Jewish Family Service, Montreal, Canada.

[17] Director's meeting, 17 May 1891, *YMHBS Papers*. The matter is broadly discussed in the memo sent by the President of YMHBS, Harris Vineberg, to Baron Hirsch on 20 May 1890: Max Kohler Archives, Box 13, American Jewish Historical Society, Waltham, Mass.

[18] Canada was the back door for illegal entry into the United States, according to the 1890 report of the House of Representatives Select Committee on Immigration: M. T. Bennett, *American Immigration Policy*, Washington, 1963, p. 21.

[19] Vineberg to Hirsch, 20 May 1890: Kohler Archives, Box 13. It is worth noting that Milwaukee Jews, eager to stop the 1882 tide of immigration to their city, sent a letter to Montreal in addition to their letters to New York and London: L. J. Swichkow and L. P. Gartner, *The History of the Jews in Milwaukee*, Philadelphia, 1963, pp. 82–3.

[20] Alex J. Goldman, *Giants of Faith*, New York, 1964, p. 237; Sack, op. cit., p. 218.

[21] Jones, op. cit., p. 64. See Norman MacDonald, *Canada's Immigration and Colonization 1891–1903*, Aberdeen, 1966, pp. 30–48, 107–8.

[22] Stuart E. Rosenberg, *The Jewish Community in Canada*, vol. I, Toronto, 1970, p. 77.

[23] Arthur A. Chiel, *The Jews in Manitoba: A Social History*, Toronto, 1961, p. 49. See also Benjamin G. Sack, 'A Historical Opportunity Forfeited', *Canadian Jewish Year Book*, Montreal, 1941, pp. 98–107.

[24] Sack, ibid., p. 105.

[25] Belkin, op. cit., p. 31. Ephraim Lisitzky's autobiography, *In the Grip of Cross-Currents*, New York, 1959, p. 190, suggests that by the turn of the century, American Jewish immigrants were well aware 'of those homesteads the Canadian government was giving free to all pioneers'. For a recent economic interpretation of the settlement of the Canadian West during this period, see K. H. Norrie, 'The Rate of Settlement of the Canadian Prairies', *Journal of Economic History*, no. 35, June 1975, pp. 410–27.

[26] John Higham, *Send These to Me: Jews and Other Immigrants in Urban America*, New York, 1975, pp. 116–73, and his *Strangers in the Land*, New York, 1955, pp. 35–105.

[27] Albert Rose, ed., *A People and Its Faith*, Toronto, 1959, p. 10. Cf. John B. Brehner, *Canada: A Modern History*, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1970, p. 216.

[28] In 1891, Mr. Davis of YMHBS suggested that 'we dispose of these people

[Jewish refugees] as quietly as possible so that labor unions be not aroused to interference': Directors' meeting, 27 July 1891, *YMHBS Papers*. See also the outburst against the Jews at Wapella agricultural colony in Chiel, *Jews in Manitoba*, op. cit., p. 47.

[29] *Manitoba Free Press*, 10 May 1882, quoted in Chiel, op. cit., p. 33, and newspaper clippings of the *Gleaner*, 16 May 1892 and the *Gazette*, 19 Feb. 1892, in *YMHBS Papers*. As for the Montreal *Star*, see the report of the Directors' meeting, 23 May 1892, *YMHBS Papers*.

[30] Quoted in E. Tcherikower, 'Jewish Immigrants to the United States, 1881–1900', *YIVO Annual*, vol. VI, 1951, p. 169. On United States restrictive legislation generally, see Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, op. cit., and Roy L. Garis, *Immigration Restriction*, New York, 1927.

[31] MacDonald, op. cit., p. 96.

[32] There is a vast literature on this subject: see especially Esther Panitz, 'The Polarity of American Jewish Attitudes Towards Immigration', *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, vol. LIII, 1963, pp. 99–130 and Zosa Szajkowski, 'The Yahudi and the Immigrant: A Reappraisal', *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, vol. LXIII, September 1973, pp. 13–44.

[33] H. E. Wilder, 'An Outline of the History of the Jews in Canada', *Israelite Daily Press Hundredth Anniversary Souvenir*, Winnipeg, 1932, p. 14.

[34] Special Advisory Committee Meeting, 27 July 1891: *YMHBS Papers*. See also Belkin op. cit., p. 34.

[35] Vineberg to Hirsch Fund, 11 February 1892, Borenstein Collection, item 5394, YIVO Archives, New York.

[36] Louis Rosenberg, 'Development of the Canadian Jewish Community', *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society*, vol. L, 1960, p. 136.

[37] Reform Judaism developed in Canada long after it had matured in the United States. On Montreal's Temple Emanu-El see *The Emanu-El Story 1882–1960*, Montreal, 1960. More generally, see Albert Rose, ed., *A People and its Faith*, and Michael Brown, 'The Beginnings of Reform Judaism in Canada', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 34, 1972, pp. 322–42.

[38] Rosenberg, *Jewish Community in Canada*, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 129.

[39] *New York Hebrew Standard*, 8 July 1892; Hirsch School Committee Meeting, 23 May 1892, *YMHBS Papers*. In addition to the YMHBS papers, see on this episode the Spanish and Portuguese Congregation Minutes (typescript in the possession of Mrs. E. Miller, Montreal). My account differs from that found in Sack, *History of the Jews in Canada*, op. cit., pp. 214–215; 232–4, since he ignores the position of Shearith Israel in this controversy.

[40] H. Wolofsky, *Journey of My Life*, Montreal, 1945.

[41] Max Vanger, 'Memoirs of a Russian Immigrant', *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, vol. LXIII, September 1973, p. 59.

[42] Edgar McInnis, *Canada: A Political and Social History*, New York, 1947, p. 370.

[43] Corbett, op. cit., p. 121; Gartner, 'North Atlantic Jewry', op. cit., pp. 121–2.

[44] Lloyd P. Gartner, 'Immigration and American Jewry', in *Jewish Society Through the Ages*, edited by H. Ben Sasson and S. Ettinger, New York, 1973, p. 306.

[45] The advantages of the city over the farm are explored in Fred A.

Shannon, *The Farmer's Last Frontier: Agriculture 1860–1897*, New York, 1945, pp. 349–78. See also David Ward, *Cities and Immigrants: A Geography of Change in Nineteenth Century America*, New York, 1971.

[46] Bella W. Rosenbaum, 'In My Lifetime', *American Jewish Archives*, vol. XIX, 1967, pp. 16–19.

[47] E. K. Francis, *In Search of Utopia: The Mennonites in Manitoba*, Glencoe, Ill., 1955, pp. 69, 142, 154–6.

[48] Ol'ha Woycenko, *The Ukrainians in Canada*, Ottawa, 1968, pp. 53–5. Cf. Chiel, *Jews in Manitoba*, op. cit., p. 58.

[49] Joseph Oleskaw, 'About Emigration', published in Russia in 1895, quoted in Vladimir Kaye, *Early Ukrainian Settlements in Canada 1895–1900*, Toronto, 1964, p. 29. Oleskaw, who was a leading proponent of Ukrainian emigration, commented that the Ukrainian 'naturally lost his money'.

[50] Figler, *Canadian Jewish Profiles*, op. cit., pp. 43–4. Compare Isaac Mayer Wise's famous typology of the German Jewish pedlar in his *Reminiscences*, 2nd edn., New York, 1945, p. 38.

[51] New York, 1959, pp. 196–8.

[52] ibid., p. 198.

[53] I. Medres, *Montreal Fun Nekhten*, in Yiddish, Montreal, 1947, p. 10. See Abraham J. Arnold, 'The Contribution of the Jews to the Opening and Development of the West', *Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba Transactions*, Series III, no. 25, 1968–9, pp. 23–37; and his 'The Earliest Jews in Winnipeg 1874–1882', *The Beaver*, vol. 305, Autumn 1974, pp. 4–11.

[54] Aaron Antonovsky and Elias Tcherikower, *The Early Jewish Labor Movement in America*, New York, 1961, p. 145; Abraham Cahan, *The Education of Abraham Cahan*, Philadelphia, 1960, p. 229. The popular theory that eastern European Jews scorned peddling as a 'shameful occupation' is not borne out by the Canadian Jewish experience.

[55] 'Montreal', *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, vol. 12, p. 286; 'Toronto', ibid., vol. 15, p. 261.

[56] Kage, *With Faith and Thanksgiving*, op. cit., pp. 37–9.

[57] Gartner, 'Immigration and American Jewry', op. cit., p. 306.

[58] Simon Kuznets, 'Economic Structure and Life of the Jews', *The Jews*, Louis Finkelstein, ed., vol. 11, New York, 1960, p. 1637 and Rosenberg, *Canada's Jews*, op. cit., pp. 377–86.

[59] Figler, op. cit., p. 95.

[60] For a comparative study of twentieth-century Jewish communities in the United States, Canada, and Argentina, see Moshe Davis, 'Centres of Jewry in the Western Hemisphere: A Comparative Approach', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. V, June 1963, pp. 4–26. On contemporary Canadian Jewry, see Stuart E. Rosenberg, *The Jewish Community in Canada*, vol. II, Toronto, 1971.

ISRAEL-CENTRISM AND DIASPORISM

Avraham Avi-hai

THE basic problem with which this paper deals essentially hinges on *galut* as perceived in Israel and in the American Diaspora.[1] Though the philosophical differences based on these perceptions cannot be bridged, I shall ask whether there has evolved a *de facto* truce, in which the dynamics of political, military, social, and psychological realities determine a new way of thinking. In other words is history doing what philosophy alone could not—is it bridging in fact what had been sundered and dichotomized in principle?

It is necessary to give first a brief and somewhat over-simplified restatement of the problem from a historical vantage point.

With Israel's assumption of independence, the century-old liturgical formulation was challenged: '*U-mipnei ḥataenu galinu me-artzenu. . . .*' [Because of our sins were we exiled from our Land], that Jews were unable to live in the Land of Israel and worship at its Holy Places, 'because of the hand' of foreign rule. Over the centuries Jews had seen themselves as living in *galut*; they, and the Divine Presence also, were in exile. The Zionist movement was a revolution against that exile and against the antisemitism which made Jewish life grey and bleak! Jews felt the threat of spiritual and material impoverishment: they had to fight a massive attack if they were to survive.

From the 1930s the sense of exile of European and Near Eastern Jewry was even more real and tangible. Any hopes for the post-emancipation new freedom of Jews in continental Europe faded in the face of systematic mass murder with the assistance of host populations, and with the passive acceptance of that Holocaust by the allied powers. European antisemitic nationalism was mirrored in the xenophobic nationalism of the Middle East, which used Zionism as an enemy against which to rally. Survival came to be seen by millions of Jews throughout the world as possible only if there were to be a restoration of Jewish sovereign power. A state of their own could legitimately use armed strength to defend itself, could admit Jews freely, and would abolish *galut* (exile). The State of Israel was created and gave expression to its basic tenet of the ingathering of the exiles in its Declaration of Independence and the Law of Return: Every Jew has the right to return to Israel as an '*oleh*' (an immigrant).

The countries in which the post-emancipation aim of equality held out the fullest promise and greatest progress were the former Anglo-Saxon colonies and dominions which were based on mass immigration —such as Canada and Australia, and especially the United States. In a state based on citizenship rather than on common ethnic-linguistic-historic origin, the sense of exile (of living in *galut*) diminished. Not only non-Zionists but also Zionists went on living outside Israel. Not to take the Israeli option was for them a legitimate Jewish choice. The Diaspora was for them a viable Jewish experience, of an on-going and desirable nature. Diasporism has room within it for greater or lesser attachment to Israel, for more or less interest in, or identification with, Israel; but to live in the Diaspora, it holds, is a legitimate variant of the Jewish experience.

By examining the early post-State statements of Diaspora Zionists, we may also learn about the attitude of non-Zionists. They saw Zionism as a collective political and material effort to support Israel and to bring to the new State, and absorb, the Jews who were forced to leave their homelands as well as those few who chose to leave the free countries of their birth in order to live in Israel. *'Aliyah* (immigration to Israel) was for others.[2] That was a kind of philanthropic Zionism. To legitimate the Diaspora option, a semantic (possibly philosophical) distinction was expressed by Mrs. Halprin, a delegate to the 1951 Zionist Congress. She echoed an earlier discussion with US Zionism:[3]

> Jews are in *galut* if they live in fear or deprivation or when they cannot leave their lands [of residence] and emigrate freely to Israel. But there also exist the *tefutzot* . . . (such as the USA) in which we live in freedom . . . we are able to leave and freely enter [Israel]. The choice is ours; therefore the concept of *galut* which is characterized by conditions of oppression does not apply to us and we cannot accept it.

The distinction made here by Mrs. Halprin is between *galut and tefutzot*, exile and dispersion. Rather surprisingly, Dr. Naḥum Goldmann took up the cudgels for the traditional Jewish interpretation:[4]

> There is a concept in Jewish history, a holy concept, mystical . . . the existence of the Jewish people is based on mystical concepts which are typical of this people, and *galut* belongs to these concepts.

The difference between the two positions is in perception. Goldmann perceives a sense of exile, Mrs. Halprin does not. There is of course an important experiential difference between the two: he who felt exile had been born in Europe and had witnessed the beginnings of the Holocaust. She, an American, did not feel alien in her home country. In spite of philosophical differences, there was not much distinction between their pragmatic approach to personal *'aliyah*: neither chose to live in Israel; and although Dr. Goldmann does maintain a residence in Jerusalem, he lives in the *galut* he perceived.

Organized political Zionism in the United States declined. But the lesson of the Holocaust, and the admiration for an embattled and struggling Jewish State, led to a general adoption by many communal leaders and most organized Jews of a philanthropic pro-Israel stance, and growing political sympathy with and support for the State. (Non-organized and non-affiliated Jews tended to drift away from all Jewish efforts, including those for Israel. A small group of anti-Zionists continued to expound their belief in the superiority or sole legitimacy of *galut*, and the illegitimacy of any Jewish state.)

The Diasporism of the Zionists was shared with the non-Zionists: the basic perception of not living in exile. The non-Zionists had, as exemplified by the American Jewish Committee, two other concerns. The first, the spectre of dual loyalty, was speedily laid by David Ben Gurion, when Prime Minister, and Jacob Blaustein (then President of the American Jewish Committee), who issued joint statements in Jerusalem in 1950.[5] Ben Gurion stated:

> The Jews of the United States . . . have one political attachment and that is to the United States of America. They owe no political allegiance to Israel. . . . The state of Israel represents and *speaks only on behalf of its own citizens* and in no way presumes to represent or speak in the name of Jews who are citizens of any other country.

The second topic really centred on the subject of Diasporism and Israel-centrism. Many Israeli spokesmen—and particularly Ben Gurion—believed and often said that Diaspora Jewish existence was untenable: that Jewry was doomed in the West by the process of assimilation, that it would disappear through the kiss of death.[6] Ben Gurion would not yield on that issue, and Blaustein saved face, in 1961, by agreeing to a statement which admitted that there were varying interpretations 'on the essence and meaning of Judaism and Jewishness'. Misunderstandings 'might have arisen' since Ben Gurion 'now and then takes the liberty of expressing views . . . that are his own rather than those of the Government of Israel.'[7]

The debate is but a symptom of Ben Gurion's basic Israel-centrism, which may be defined as an attitude which stresses the superiority of Jewish life in Israel over that in the Diaspora, and the primacy of Israeli over Diaspora interests. The attitude is common to most Israeli Zionists, and was perhaps expressed in its clearest form by Ben Gurion,[8] who believed that Jewish history is a battle of quality versus quantity. The Jewish revolution of this century is not against a régime, but against the Jewish people's historic fate. What is done in Israel to strengthen the state, increase its population, build its economic and military strength, enhance its scientific and scholarly capability, and heighten its prestige, power, vitality and ability to survive—these efforts are positive, vital, central, and necessary. Diaspora life is derivative, second-rate; its fruits are grown by people who are not free, but

fettered in mind and soul. Jewish independence is a leap across history from the Second Jewish Commonwealth to the Third; it recreates Jewish authority over Jews, in contrast to the Diaspora where Jews live under the dual authority of a non-Jewish state (and environment) and their own limited Jewish institutions.

Israel-centrism is rooted in a sense of Jewish authenticity, autonomy, and the freedom of the Jew to be himself. It rejects *galut* as unfree and inadequate. Ben Gurion said:[9]

> I know not one country in which the Jew is truly free to follow his heart's desire—even if the law does not formally discriminate against him . . . the freedom of action of the Jews is limited in every single place, either by the law or the police, or by the political and social reality. The Jews of the Diaspora do not control the forces which surround them, and they are unable to do what they wish to do as Jews.

Later he said:[10]

> Exile in which Jews lived and still live is to me a wretched, poor, backward and inadequate form of life. We must not be proud of it—on the contrary, we must reject it utterly and completely . . .

(I am aware that it is to some extent misleading and unbalanced to concentrate only on the aspect of Israel-centrism which is critical of the Diaspora, but the exigencies of this paper require it.)

Ben Gurion, in particular, hoped that all Jews would wish to live in Israel, but held that by definition two types of Jews *must* do so: the Orthodox and the Zionists. Both wave a banner: one the *tallith* (prayer shawl), the other the blue and white flag derived from the *tallith*; both, according to him, involved *mitzvot ma'asiyot* (the carrying out of practical commandments). What I have called philanthropic Zionism, Ben Gurion called pseudo-Zionism. Commenting on giving the Zionist a choice between *'aliyah* and engaging in pro-Israel activities in the Diaspora (that is, a legitimation for staying in *galut*), he said:[11]

> The pseudo-Zionism of today helps Jews to be naturalized and more deeply rooted in a non-Jewish environment and in the processes of assimilation which endanger the future of Jewry in the Diaspora.

Ben Gurion turned his back on the organized Zionists.[12] He began to evolve a total Israel-centred 'ideology' or programme for Diaspora Jews in order in part to strengthen their Jewish identity and in part to create reservoirs for *'aliyah*. He proposed a blend of Messianic faith (Jewish national redemption as a stage towards universal redemption as prophesied by Isaiah and Micah); study of the Bible in the original; and study of Hebrew; visits to Israel; and periods of study in Israel for younger people. He was doubtless impelled by the feeling that when they had tasted Jewish authenticity and autonomy, those engaging in these programmes would have their sense of *galut* enhanced.

Thus in the earlier State period, there was a continuum which excluded the anti-State and anti-peoplehood groups: the American Council for Judaism and *Netorei Karta* on the one hand and the *Kena'anim* (Canaanites) on the other. The Council, an offshoot of extreme Reform Judaism, and the ultra-Orthodox *Netorai Karta* (Guardians of the City) both rejected the State as opposed to religion: the one, because Israel's mission to spread monotheism transcended geography, while the other, because the Return to Zion without the Messiah was to play a precocious game with history by advancing 'the end of days'. The *Kena'anim*, at the other extreme, sought to create a Middle Eastern Hebrew-speaking pagan people turning its back on the historic Diaspora and on Jews who lived in other lands. Between these extremes, the continuum was between Israel-centrism and Diasporism. Ben Gurion and the Israeli Zionists were Israel-centric, demanding *'aliyah* and rejecting the possibility of life in the Diaspora. Non-Israeli Zionists engaged in pro-Israeli activities. To a great extent non-Israeli non-Zionists also began more and more to identify themselves as philanthropic Zionists in sympathy with Israel's causes; and they supported the State but did not choose to join a Zionist organization. Both groups of non-Israelis were Diasporists and believed in the viability of Diaspora Jewish life and in its legitimacy.

Thus there was:

ISRAEL-CENTRISM	*DIASPORISM*
Ben Gurion Israeli Zionists —non-viability of Diaspora	Non-Israeli Zionists Non-Israeli non-Zionists —support for Israel —viability of Diaspora

The axis of time

The above description, with some movement in either direction, could be applied to the 1948–67 period. An entirely new situation evolved after the Six-Day War. A people who had renewed its consciousness of the Holocaust, partly owing to the Eichmann trial in 1961, to new studies of the Holocaust period, and to the literary efforts of a few gifted men, again felt threatened when Egypt moved without hindrance by the United Nations or by any power in order to throttle Israel. During the three-week period from the beginning of Nasser's threat until the Six-Day War broke out, Jews in Israel and outside the State experienced the awesome loneliness which characterizes Israel's role in the world and apparently that of the whole of Jewry.

The awesome dread, and the subsequent relief—the unification of Jerusalem and the overwhelming victory—served as a second turning point. (The first had been, of course, the creation of the State in 1948.)

Its effect on the Diaspora has been much discussed and described: many Jews saw Israel's survival as linked to their own; Jewish solidarity increased, and a sense of common fate and oneness became a basic datum. The Zionist article of faith, 'We are a people—one people', became the conventional wisdom possessed by all. The United Jewish Appeal (UJA) and the Israel Bonds Organization[13] became a Surrogate Zionism, enabling Jews to express their solidarity with, and support for, Israel: they also served as foci of information. The UJA in particular began to fill gaps in adult Jewish education which synagogues and other organizations (political, defence, communal) had not been able to do. The return to Jewish peoplehood made possible more intensive educational efforts by all groups. The cause of Israel's survival and that of all Jewry created this Surrogate Zionism: 'Surrogate' for two reasons: it replaced the older and shrunken political Zionist organization whose politics and 'ideological' rifts had failed to appeal to most American Jews—as they had failed to do for Ben Gurion; and it offered a programme of action without (or in place of) *'aliyah*. This Surrogate Zionism pervaded the organized community and infused into all its limbs and levels a new vitality.

The pragmatism of Levi Eshkol as Prime Minister and the idealism of Dr. Ya'acov Herzog (then his chief assistant) led to the attempt by Israel to give expression to its generally-accepted central role in Jewish life through various consultative and organizational frameworks. In 1968, the Prime Minister convened a Jerusalem Economic Conference which aimed to involve Diaspora business and technology in Israel's development. In 1969, he invited heads of all Jewish organizations covering an unexpectedly wide spectrum (from the right-wing non-Zionist orthodox Agudat Yisrael to the non-Zionist American Jewish Committee) to deal with 'spiritual' and cultural matters. The conference stressed the need for deepening Jewish education and all but issued a world-wide call for *'aliyah*. That same year, after Eshkol's death, Mrs. Golda Meir and the then chairman of the Jewish Agency, Aryeh Pincus, convened a Conference on Human Resources. It gave Diaspora Jewry's fund-raising heads a role in planning and supervising Israel's social and educational absorption and the housing of new immigrants, as well as a hand in dealing with other Israeli social problems. Out of this came a Reconstituted Jewish Agency for Israel, in which 'non-Zionists' (that is, the leaders of Surrogate Zionism as represented by the UJA and the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds in the United States, as well as their non-American equivalents) were accorded a formal and important permanent place in dealing with these policies and problems.

Some of us, who were involved in planning and conducting these conferences, saw them as an expression of a new national covenant of the Jewish people, centred on Israel. Such an approach does not place Israel-centrism in opposition to Diasporism, but strives to place Israel-

centred activities and programmes at the heart of Diaspora Jewish life.

The new development was noted by a number of Jewish public figures; I shall cite only two. A US religious activist in the Reform movement said: 'The most influential leaders of the Jewish people are the political leaders of the State of Israel.'[14] An American Jewish historian (who is a rabbi and an organizational leader) stated: 'The State of Israel is in our days equal to the Jewish religion'—as a factor ensuring Jewish survival throughout the world.[15] In other words, as a cohesive spiritual force, Israel provides much of the mortar for Jewish unity which used to be obtained through traditional piety and learning. This is both a recognition of the weakness of modern Jewish life and of the strength of the national idea and fact. Sovereignty provides Israel with a qualitative advantage over the Diaspora, and hence its leaders are also the leaders of the Diaspora.

The President of the Hebrew Union College has said: 'The Diaspora has needs which in many areas only Israel can provide.'[16] Diaspora dependence on Israel for fulfilling these needs through educational and cultural programmes is demonstrated by the fact that almost all Jewish organizations have developed special educational programmes in Israel. Thousands of Jewish students and others from the United States study in Israel: the Orthodox mainly at *yeshivot*, and the Conservative and the Reform at their own Jerusalem schools and at the Hebrew University. Hundreds of American University students participate in annual and summer programmes at Israel's centres of higher learning. Youth organizations of various synagogues and of B'nai B'rith conduct institutes in Israel, while all Jewish organizations use Israel as a venue for retreats, seminars, and conferences, drawing on Israeli teachers and lecturers.

In other words, since 1967 the Diaspora has more and more engaged in Israel-centred and Israel-based programmes. I propose here to distinguish between Israel-centrism as a philosophical approach, and Israel-centred activities and programmes as a social reality. It seems to me that we have reached a stage of Israel-centred Diasporism which is widely accepted by most organized Jews.

The dread of the Yom Kippur War and the fear for Israel's survival which it aroused have worked a further change in this direction: ample documentation is provided in *The Yom Kippur War: Israel and the Jewish People*, based on a conference held at President Katzir's residence in Jerusalem in December 1973.[17] Another significant attempt to express a consensus for American Jews was made by Norman Podhoretz in an article entitled 'Now, Instant Zionism'; he stated that the Jews of America 'have all been converted to Zionism'; which he defined as 'supporting the idea of a sovereign Jewish state in Palestine'.[18]

This support or, as he called it, 'depth of concern' was most striking among 'Jewish intellectuals . . . not previously identified to any great

degree with Israel or the Zionist movement'; it was paralleled on the campuses. The activities of Jewish students, however, 'were nothing compared with the explosion of support from the American Jewish community as a whole . . .', which amounted to 'the complete Zionisation' of the community, to which almost every Jewish American has been 'so thoroughly and passionately and unequivocally converted'.

Irving Howe has summarized the new solidarity as follows: 'Whatever meaning may reside in being a Jew today, whether it is encompassing of our lives or merely marginal to them is inseparable from the fate of Israel.'[19] The welcome given to Yassir Arafat at the United Nations in 1975, and that Assembly's subsequent condemnation of Zionism, heightened the awareness of that solidarity. It is my opinion that the basic change since the Yom Kippur War (a change which the knowledgeable began to apprehend during the War of Attrition from 1968 to 1970) was the result of a final and unshakable recognition by Jews that the people of Israel were in far greater peril, which they were fighting with their lives, than were Diaspora Jews; and that the latter depended on Israel for the maintenance of national identity, dignity, and pride. Podhoretz goes even further and speaks of a 'hidden apocalyptic terror' lest a second Holocaust presage a *Judenrein* planet. That theme has also been pursued by Cynthia Ozick.[20]

War, terrorism, death on the battlefield, and disruption of normal life have been the daily fare of Israel since October 1973; and to a great extent, even much earlier. Surrogate Zionists and Israel-centred Diasporists recognize that these dangers, faced by Israel's people, constitute a defensive war for Jewish survival everywhere. However, the almost intolerable psychological and material strain and stress on Israelis cannot be shared—however much empathy there is. 'Only here in the Land of Israel', Ben Gurion once said, 'did I learn that the realisation of Zionism is a matter of life and death.'[21] I cannot refrain from quoting from a factual and undramatic letter sent to me by a then 19-year-old Israeli girl, a junior officer in the army, who lost two out of the seventeen male classmates of her high-school graduating class in the few days after the Yom Kippur War: 'Our only class reunions nowadays take place at the cemetery.' Ultimately, as Karl Jaspers has written, 'Politics is concerned with the seriousness of power which is based on staking one's life.'[22] A new or refurbished metaphor must tragically be used in describing Israel-Diaspora relations: Israel is indeed the frontline of Jewish survival. Diaspora Jewry recognizes that this line holds together the remnants of a people: remnants who knowingly or unknowingly fight a spiritual battle in order to survive in the comfortable diasporas, and a brave struggle to associate, to learn, and to emigrate from the Arab and Soviet lands.

It is therefore difficult to foresee Israelis en masse abandoning their Israel-centric concept of the Jewish world and according 'legitimacy'

to the Diaspora. To do so would raise the inevitable question that if an Israeli may live fully, freely, and equally as a Jew in the Diaspora, why should he face terror, crushing taxation, and almost unbearable strain in Israel? Inequality of danger must, in this view, be reflected in inequality of status. The cost of living in Israel is high in more than one sense. (For many Israelis, of course, the reward—in a Jewish sense—of living in Israel is great enough to outweigh the cost.)

To return to the front-line metaphor, and in spite of the asymmetry of danger, one must note a renewed undertone—in my ears, discordant—of a renascent Diasporism. This chord goes beyond the natural clash of interests experienced to a greater or lesser extent by heads of local communal and national institutions in the United States, owing to the vast sums of money contributed to Israel (leading sometimes to a loss of revenue by these local institutions). Out of a sense of responsibility, many of these leaders indeed 'bite the bullet' and mute their public complaints. There is also a compensatory trend justifying expenditure within the USA in order to maintain a 'strong Diaspora' for Israel's sake. In visits to North American communities, I found local leaders tending to view allocations to defence or educational institutions in terms of Israel's interests: 'ADL [the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith] fights Arab propaganda; Jewish education is important because UJA will need contributors twenty years from now too. . . .'[23]

One may note beyond these partly conflicting interests, a shadowy and almost petulant reaction to Israel's renewed central role, as documented above. The pattern is as follows: first, there comes a disclaimer: the individual (or group) stresses his (or its) dedication to Israel; second, there is criticism (often shared by Israelis or Zionists in whole or in part) of an aspect of Israeli foreign policy, cultural achievement or level, or the status of religion—and irreligion—in Israel; at the third stage—the operative one—there is a demand for a re-ordering of American Jewish priorities, and a truculent accusation that Israel occupies the centre of American Jewry's interest. Out of devotion to Jewish survival some urge the creation of American Yavnehs, lest embattled Jerusalem falter. One must build a new Yavneh because, of course, the fall of Jerusalem is apparently anticipated. Finally, an 'ideological' rationale, creating new dialectical opponents, is put forth:[24]

> So far as Jews are human and live . . . within the human condition, Zionism and the State of Israel . . . have virtually nothing to say to the enduring and eternal issues of life. . . . Zionism never raised the question . . . of Jewish existence as it is phrased by Judaism, and the state of Israel hardly can claim to be central to the formulation of answers to these questions.

In brief, 'Israel is simply irrelevant to important aspects of Jewish existence'.

The distinctions here are between 'Israel' and 'the human condition',

between 'Judaism' and 'Zionism'. In that formulation, the impression is given of a disembodied (Christian-like) faith, separate from the land and its people. Beyond this 'theology' there seems to be an additional question of logic: If Jews are part of the human condition, is Israel separate from them and from it? The timing of this interpretation of 'Judaism' promulgated less than a year after the Yom Kippur War has been viewed by some as adding the injury of divisiveness to the insult of what Professor Emil Fackenheim has called 'obfuscating ideological terminology'.[25] What is probably closer to the majority, and accepted, opinion of most affiliated Jews is a statement by a prominent American Jewish educator:[26]

> I am convinced that a new set of living patterns will emerge from the most potent Judaic motivation of our time—the State of Israel. So potent is it that most of the standard political, social and ideological questions young American Jews ask themselves in this country seem to become irrelevant when articulated in Israel. This is because the entire issue of how one can be a human being and a Jew at the same time ceases to have meaning. . . . Israel, beyond all else, enables a Jew *to be*.

One may predict that the range of Israel-centred activities and programmes is working an unmistakable, if as yet only very partially charted, sociological-educational change in American Jewry. Within the context of the general Diasporism of Surrogate Zionists, the process seems to lead in the direction of creating a 'hinterpeople'—to use Weizmann's phrase—interacting with Israel. Karl Deutsch, an authority on the role of communications in building nation-states, has demonstrated that nationality is fostered by 'social learning' and the forming of habits of interlocking communication. These flow from a considerable increase in trade, travel, correspondence and other contacts between cities and their rural hinterlands.[27] That pattern—as revealed in the educational programmes conducted in Israel for American children, students, and adults, as well as tourism, immigration, trade, and investments—leads to a similar (if not exactly the same) effect. The positive process evolving between Israel and American Jewry is reinforced by the rise, with both positive and negative implications for the Jewish community there, of a new ethnicity. It has forced many American Jews (particularly in liberal circles, and especially on the college campuses) to reflect on their Jewish identity and, in a way, to fit this identity into a legitimate or re-legitimated American post-pluralism.[28] This extremely important factor must now be—for reasons of focus—considered, and then set aside.

Requited relationships

At this point, some reflections are in place as to whether Israel reciprocates the Diaspora's Israel-centred tendency with an interest in

the Diaspora *per se*, that is for it itself and not as a response to Israeli needs. Eliezer Schweid has not spared Israel criticism in that its schools produced, especially before the Six-Day War, young people who 'ceased to see' the significance of their lives 'for the destiny of the whole Jewish people' and were losing 'their attachment to the Jewish people'.[29] One may add that Schweid's analysis does not apply to the 30 per cent of Israeli young people educated in Orthodox schools, whose attachments are quite different—as Simon Herman has demonstrated.[30]

However, even if we accept Schweid's as a reasonably accurate description of the attitude of a large number of 'secularist' Israelis before 1967, we must note that he, too, saw a change after the Six-Day War: the grim geopolitical awareness of isolation led the process to reverse itself, 'identification with the Jewish people' and with 'Jewish history' became strengthened.

Israelis perhaps have not—probably cannot—come to terms with Diasporism as a 'legitimate' variant, but many of them have accepted as a sociological fact that for the meantime the vast majority of Diaspora Jews—barring cataclysm—will remain where they are. The sense of Israel's dependence on the Diaspora for political, moral, and material support has been paralleled by greater identification with the Jewish people. The Six-Day War led Israelis to believe that the Diaspora gained strength from Israel. The Yom Kippur War has perhaps shown that Israel, in its growing isolation among nations, takes strength from the Diaspora.

These dynamics make it acceptable today for Israeli intellectuals to use with more sureness the word 'interdependence'. Thus Moshe Davis, in his 'Reflections on an Agenda for the Future', writes[31]:

> Neither the fiction of Diaspora-centrism nor the ideology of Israel-centrism can serve as the basis for world Jewish interdependence . . . the terms 'Israel' and 'Diaspora' are not dichotomous. Together *Eretz Yisrael* and the Diaspora constitute one entity. Israel is within the Jewish people and not separate from it.

The analysis in this paper of the reciprocal satisfaction of needs which exists between Israel and the Diaspora shows that that interdependence may be said to exist not so much in the realm of ideas, but as a recognized mutuality of interests and needs.

Prognosis

Israel is dependent to a great extent on Diaspora political, moral, and material support. It requires the importation of capital and technology, and know-how, which exist in important American Jewish centres. Diaspora Jewry needs Israel's existence for its own survival and dignity, as well as Israel's resources in educational and cultural areas.

That trend of interdependence is growing. The new ethnicity, while it may not evoke a sense of exile, may increase the feeling of separateness of Jews and reinforce the movement for greater Jewish self-awareness and education. Whether American Jews or Israelis experience further traumas like the Yom Kippur War, or economic travail, both Jewries will continue to need each other. The new social and political realities to emerge from a reshuffling of the world economic order are too distant to be used as a basis for projection. Yet under better or more adverse circumstances for either or both communities, a tolerant Israel-centrism and a deepening Israel-centred Diasporism will continue to lead the committed segments of Jewry to a heightened perception of mutuality of interests and to interdependence. I foresee increased co-operation between the Israeli centre and the Diaspora communities, and greater involvement by the latter in some areas previously reserved to the former: for example, the Reconstituted Jewish Agency, which has claimed and exercised more supervision of Diaspora funds spent in Israel. Israel-centrism in Israel, tempered by increased recognition of dependence on the Diaspora and of its Israel-centred programmes, will change the model presented above. We may predict more overlap between Israel-centred Israelis and Zionists and Israel-centred Diasporists—both Zionist or Surrogate Zionist. The relationship will continue to be determined by social and international realities and processes rather than by ideology.

NOTES

[1] I wish to thank Professor Emil L. Fackenheim for criticism of drafts of this paper; but he is not of course responsible for any of its shortcomings. The paper, which was delivered at the Conference of the Association of Jewish Studies, Harvard University, in October 1974, appears here in a revised form.

[2] See, for example, the statement by Mrs. Israel (Bert) Goldstein, Press Bulletin 10, Twenty-Third Zionist Congress, Jerusalem, 16 August 1951.

[3] Mrs. Samuel (Rose) Halprin, *Ha-Congress ha-Tzioni ha-Kaf-gimmel* (Twenty-Third Zionist Congress, Stenographic Record), Zionist Organization, Jerusalem, 1951, p. 150. The record (on file 132Z) at the Zionist Archives in New York is in Hebrew and I have carefully considered possible variants in what I assume was the English original. Hayim Greenberg attacked the *galut-tefutza* distinction as early as 1944; see 'Notes on the Melting Pot', in Howe and Greenberg, eds., *Voices from the Yiddish*, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1972, p. 235.

[4] Dr. Nahum Goldmann in *Ha-Congress* . . ., op. cit., p. 229.
(Dr. Goldmann, to whom a copy of this paper was sent for his comments on the quotation, states in a letter to the Managing Editor of the *JJS*:

> As for the quotation given in the paper . . ., it is to be explained, in a certain way, on the religious level. Although, as you know, I am not one of the negators of the Diaspora, and regard the Diaspora as a legitimate

sphere of Jewish life, once there is also a center in its own homeland or state, I have never, on the other hand, accepted the theory that the Diaspora and the State are of equal significance. The relationship of the Jewish people with the land of Israel is irrational and reaches out in the sphere of religion and mysticism. This explains the unique fact of the bonds between the land and the people which have outlasted two thousand years of dispersion and which are a significant—if not the major—argument justifying the Zionist demand for the return to Zion and the establishment of a Jewish homeland there.)

[5] See Avraham Avi-hai, *Ben Gurion State-Builder*, Jerusalem and New York, 1974, especially pp. 234 ff. The full statements appear in *In Vigilant Brotherhood, The American Jewish Committee's Relationship to Palestine and Israel*, A.J.C., New York, 1964.

[6] Perhaps the clearest formulation is in Ben Gurion's speech to the Zionist General Council in December 1960, cited in Avi-hai, op cit., p. 237: 'Judaism . . . in free and prosperous countries . . . faces a kiss of death—a slow and imperceptible decline into the abyss of assimilation.'

[7] *In Vigilant Brotherhood* . . ., op. cit., p. 70; cited in Avi-hai, op. cit., p. 238.

[8] Avi-hai, op. cit., p. 38 ff.

[9] *Hazon ve-Derekh* (*Vision and Way*), Tel Aviv, 1951–57, vol. 1, pp. 199–200.

[10] 'Zionism and Pseudo-Zionism' in *Forum for the Problems of Zionism, Jewry and the State of Israel*, Proceedings of the Jerusalem Ideological Conference of August 1957, Jerusalem, 1959, pp. 149–50.

[11] ibid.

[12] See the chapter entitled 'The Jew Who Left the Zionists Behind', in Avi-hai, op. cit., especially pp. 242–45.

[13] The United Jewish Appeal is the major fund-raising organization of America's Jews, now embracing the United Israel Appeal (the US equivalent of the British Joint Israel Appeal) and local Jewish social, educational, cultural, and health institutions. Israel Bonds, sold in the USA and many other countries, are dollar bonds issued by the government of Israel for a 10 to 15-year period at a rate of interest lower than the normal rate for bank loans. Both organizations function through 'mass' or public activities.

[14] Rabbi Richard Hirsch, *The Jerusalem Post*, 1 January 1970.

[15] Dr. Arthur Hertzberg in President Shazar's *Study Circle on Contemporary Jewry*, 1 March 1970.

[16] Dr. Alfred Gottschalk, 'United States of America: Perspectives', in Moshe Davis, ed., *The Yom Kippur War: Israel and the Jewish People*, New York, 1974, p. 46.

[17] See M. Davis, ed., op. cit.

[18] *The New York Times Magazine*, 3 February 1974.

[19] *New York* (Magazine), 24 December 1973.

[20] *Esquire*, November 1974.

[21] *Hazon ve-Derekh*, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 165.

[22] *The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers*, New York, 1957, p. 59.

[23] Speeches in Greensboro, N.C.; Hyannis, Mass.; Cleveland, Ohio, etc.

[24] Professor Jacob Neusner at the Synagogue Council of America, 5 September 1974.

[25] Emil L. Fackenheim, 'Canada: Perspectives', in *The Yom Kippur War*, op. cit., pp. 120–21.

[26] The late Shraga Arian in *Response*, Winter 1970/71, p. 22.

[27] See Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, Cambridge, Mass., 1966; also Dankwart, Rustow, *A World of Nations*, Washington, 1968.

[28] See especially 'The New Ethnicity', *The Centre Magazine*, July 1974.

[29] Eliezer Schweid, *Israel at the Crossroads*, Philadelphia, 1973, pp. 206–9.

[30] Simon Herman, *Israelis and Jews*, New York, 1971.

[31] *The Yom Kippur War*, op. cit., p. 347.

ZIONISM AND NATIONALISM

Aubrey Newman

(Review Article)

THE nineteenth century saw the emergence of a wide variety of nationalisms. There were those of Western and Central Europe, expressing themselves not merely in the countries which had been for long organized on an independent state basis but also in such terms as the desire for unification and nation–state organization, evidenced in the pressures for the 'unification' of Germany and Italy. There were also the pressures elsewhere in Europe towards the reappearance as independent states of areas whose populations had either not previously been recognized as comprising nation–states or whose existence as such had been so long in the past as to make it difficult to realize that they had such valid claims. Poland could, for instance, serve as an exemplar of one such 'hidden' nationality, the Greeks or the Bulgarians as exemplars of the other. The continuance of these pressures into the twentieth century saw the emergence on to the map of eastern and south-eastern Europe of a tangle of states claiming for their justification of their right to exist the magic concept of national consciousness; the existence within the territories of their nation–state of a large number of different sorts of minorities, more or less tolerated as the case might be, more or less deprived of full citizenship and subject to varying degrees of discrimination, did nothing in the eyes of the world to diminish the basic recognition of their claims to 'statehood'. All these differing claims for recognition had, however, one basic common feature. The peoples claiming a national existence—and consequently international status—lived in territories which were in some form or other linked historically with an earlier period of independence and with which the peoples could claim some degree of historical continuity. There was in fact only one group of national claims for international recognition which had in practice to look to a territory remote from that in which its members were living, who had to admit that as a group they were living in conditions of almost perpetual exile, and who managed to maintain an ideal of nationalism divorced almost entirely from physical contact with the territories to which they claimed a connection.

That after all is the historical context of Zionism, and that is the

theme of the two books here under review.* They treat their subject from entirely different points of view, and what their authors have to say is of considerably different value.

David Vital's *The Origins of Zionism* puts its subject very firmly into Jewish perspective, and indeed links the philosophical basis of Zionism with its historical and social origins. He demonstrates, for instance, the way in which the religion of Judaism was very closely connected with its nationalism; indeed, since Judaism had been the first of the great historic religions to break away from its territorial basis and to continue to exist even after its adherents had been carried off into their first Exile, it is hardly surprising to find that that religion could foster a national spirit. In the daily prayers of observant Jews—and almost all Jews were then observant—ritual and dogma combined to preserve a sense of tie and commitment; such concepts as the need to keep the remembrance of the Holy Land alive were linked with a specifically historical basis to religion as a further aspect of this phenomenon. On the other hand, a Messianic religion did not require that anything be actively done to recreate a close connection between the people and the land. As one sixteenth-century sage indicated, God had granted every nation its proper place, giving to the Jews the Land of Israel; equally every nation should cohere and none should be subservient to any other. Only the Jews in Exile presented an anomaly, and that in turn would be remedied at the advent of the Messiah. Until then they must be patient, and not even seek through prayer to hasten the process. He also illustrates carefully the various ways in which, through the years, a continual link between the Diaspora and the Holy Land was in practice maintained. The break had never been complete, and there were over the generations many pilgrims. Some went merely to die while others went to study. There were also those who wished merely to set foot on holy soil, and who did not feel it necessary even to visit holy shrines. But it was mainly within a nineteenth-century context that there emerged, from a variety of sources, a revived nationalism. It is, however, within this context that an initial criticism can be made. Professor Vital, in discussing what is uniquely Jewish about Zionism, misses the general context of non-Jewish nationalism; in analysing the particulars about one set of phenomena he fails to recognize the general truths of which that set is but a part. And if he were to reply to this criticism that he has already, elsewhere, dealt with various aspects of nationalism and the nation-state, then I would comment that it must surely remain important to make some sort of cross-reference in this particular study.

DAVID VITAL, *The Origins of Zionism*, xvi + 396 pp., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, £8.50p.

JAY Y. GONEN, *A Psychohistory of Zionism*, x + 374 pp., Mason/Charter, New York, 1975, $15.00.

If the essential roots of Zionism are to be found partly in religion and partly in the general philosophical background of the nineteenth century, they must be found also in the state of the Jewish population among whom the movement took root. Here again Professor Vital provides essential background in discussing in detail the conditions of European Jewry in general and Russian Jewry in particular in the middle of the century. He shows most convincingly how life was gradually made increasingly impossible for Jews within the Russian Empire and in various areas of the Balkans, particularly in Roumania, and how they had increasingly to escape from those conditions of oppression into a freer life. Here again, however, there are several criticisms which an historian might legitimately make. Obviously Professor Vital does not seek to hide the fact that many Russian and eastern European Jews made their way to North America (mainly to the United States); but he does fail to point out that the majority of these Russian emigrant Jews went West: the percentage who migrated to the Holy Land was small indeed. He does discuss the so-called 'American' solution without pointing out the difference between an American Zionist solution—that is, the creation of a specifically Jewish area of settlement in the American West, almost a new Pale of Settlement—and the vision of America as a land of free opportunity, the *Goldene Medinah* so cherished by tens of thousands of settlers or would-be settlers. It makes little sense to discuss the practical application of Zionism as a programme of agricultural settlement by individuals and by households in the Holy Land if one omits parallel aspects of this modern *Volkswanderung*. The failure, it seems to me, goes deeper than that. If, for example, we look in greater detail at the impact both of Zionism and of its great publicist, Theodore Herzl, upon Great Britain, there are particular points of discussion which arise. The late nineteenth century saw in England a remarkably rapid growth of the Hovevei Zion movement of which the reader will find some mention but little analysis. It is vital, however, to try and determine the extent to which that movement attracted support in the long-established Jewish communities as distinct from the much more recently arrived, and therefore comparatively rootless, immigrants. The extent to which Zionism as a whole attracted such wide support in the Diaspora as a result of the impact of Russian Jews as compared with the support given to the movement from stable, culturally assimilated Jewish communities is not apparently one to which Professor Vital feels able to devote much space, yet it seems to be an issue which is essential to the understanding of Zionism. Again, Professor Vital ignores the clashes of personality and of much else between the Rothschilds and Samuel Montagu, and seems unaware of how significant it was that although in Great Britain Herzl got little enthusiastic support even from sympathisers in the West End of London, his reception in the East End was overwhelming. The West End

contained those who had 'arrived'; the East End those who had only just landed.

However, these are comparatively minor points of criticism, and they must be set against the major virtues of a book which has already received acclaim. Professor Vital has produced an important piece of work which has been well researched, is well written, and will remain for many years to come a standard, perhaps the standard, treatment of its theme. He has not, after all, set out to write a specific history of nineteenth-century Jewry, but an account of the origins of Zionism; and that he has done extremely well.

Professor Gonen's analysis of Zionism follows entirely different lines. He too examines the Jewish people as a group, but he is far less concerned with history—despite his use of historical examples—than with an analysis of the psychology of the Jew and above all the psychology of the Zionist Jew. It may well be said that his work can only properly be reviewed by a fellow specialist, and that an historian attempting such a task is, in fact, incapable of fulfilling it. Nonetheless, I must say that I find his arguments unconvincing, if only because the State of Israel represents an amalgam of individuals with such widely differing experiences and backgrounds as to make it almost impossible at this stage to contemplate some stereotype whose psychology could be assessed and presented as typical of the whole. How is it possible to take a survivor of the concentration camps, a third-generation *sabra*, and an immigrant from North Africa or from Iraq, and to consider that they have enough unity of purpose, of motivation, or of historical background, for one to be able to lump them together—however broadly? Even the nature of their Judaism—the only link binding them together—is so widely different as to allow some even to imagine that they are hardly of the same religion. I am far from saying that historical problems can be discussed adequately only by historians; indeed, I welcome an increasing participation by 'non-historians' in the discussion of historical problems. But I think it is essential to comprehend the historical dimensions of these problems before embarking upon a fruitful discussion of them.

IDEAS OF JEWISH HISTORY

Lloyd P. Gartner

(*Review Article*)

THE scientific study of the Jewish past began about 150 years ago, but it inherited modes of thinking about that past which extend back to Biblical times. Michael A. Meyer's anthology* is a substantial, carefully edited, and well translated sample of these ideas. The Bible itself asserts a view of history in its unique, overpowering fashion. There, God reveals Himself in the inner history of the Jews, and also through events which befell them at the hands of others who thus also became actors in the divine drama of Jewish history. Superimposed upon this Biblical conception is the view prevalent among the Talmudic masters, who sought historical understanding of the destiny of God's people, by then mostly living in exile. Such understanding was found through the midrashic, homiletic exposition of Scripture. Indeed, a considerable part of the Midrash's exposition of the Biblical books in fact consists of overt or veiled references to Jewish contemporary history.

Scholars from Zunz to G. D. Cohen have done wonders in tying historic events to Midrashic texts, although not without errors. But the rabbis who are recorded in the Midrash and elsewhere in Talmudic literature did not suppose they were writing history as the Greeks and Romans did. Occasional works of chronology, like the *Seder 'Olam* and the later Epistle of Rabbi Sherira Gaon, provided essential information on the succession of masters, reaching back to Moses at Mount Sinai. Apparent historical works had as their underlying purpose to verify the sacred tradition, strengthen faith through the memory of martyrs, or fortify trust in messianic redemption. Throughout the centuries of classic rabbinic Judaism these were the views of the utility of history. The recounting of events in terms of human motives or social forces was not the reason for writing history. Even Maimonides, the giant of rationalism, thought little of history as an autonomous subject. There

* Michael A. Meyer, ed., *Ideas of Jewish History*, xiv + 360 pp., Library of Jewish Studies, Behrman House, New York, 1974, $12.50.

was an exception in the secular trends of Renaissance Jewish historiographers, but their influence was very limited; and L. Fuks has also drawn attention recently to popular chronicles written in the eighteenth century on Amsterdam Jewry.

Different as were their respective interpretations, both Judaism and Christianity regarded the course of Jewish history as foretold by Scripture, and discoverable therein only by inspired interpretation of the sacred text. The sort of research undertaken by later historians was not merely unknown; it would have been pointless.

The rise of secular historical consciousness may be traced back to the Renaissance, but the shaping of modern techniques of research, a development associated with the early work of Leopold Ranke, occurred during the 1820s and 1830s. The new Jewish historiography emerged in Germany a few years later. History as written in Germany dominated historiography throughout the world until at least 1914. Its dominant trend conceived the movement of history as the growth of Spirit; man's most exalted creation was the State, which incarnated Spirit in historical time. History was therefore properly the study of the past structure and functioning of States. The sanctification of the State by German historians readily followed, fostered by the submissive reverence towards it which dominated German Protestantism into the Nazi period. The German historians were remarkably skilful in discovering and employing written materials. Their stress upon the philological method which contemporary classical scholars had perfected enabled them confidently to reconstruct the past by means of written remains, while they either disregarded or glorified their own leaps of imagination and their social and political prejudices. The German historians generally showed no interest in vast areas of the human past not conveniently accessible to their accustomed methods, and were hostile to the social sciences, whose nature to generalize ran counter to their own insistence on the uniqueness of each historical datum.

The modern study of Jewish history essentially derives from this German historical school of the nineteenth century. The slightly earlier Galicians Nahman Krochmal (1785–1840) and Solomon Judah Loeb Rapoport (1790–1867) had to take their Western culture second-hand, and their accomplishments are the more remarkable for having been reached almost in isolation. Yet Krochmal's historical thinking was also formed by German idealist philosophy. The massive Jewish erudition possessed by such German Jewish masters as Zunz, Frankel, Geiger, Steinschneider, and Graetz was transformed as a result of their studies in German universities. Leopold Zunz (1794–1886), the first and perhaps the greatest of them, who was exactly contemporary with Ranke, produced his earliest work in 1817. He regarded the unearthing and scientific study of the full repertoire of Jewish literature of all ages as the key to comprehending the Jewish spirit; to comprehend the Jewish

spirit was to realize the essence of Judaism, and thus to know Jewish history. This conception was also that of Zunz's contemporary Immanuel Wolf, whose 'On the Concept of a Science of Judaism' in 1822 provided an influential theory. Abraham Geiger's leadership of Reform Judaism was nourished by his scholarly achievements in studying the literary emanations of the Jewish spirit. Jewish history therefore became nearly synonymous with Jewish intellectual history. Like their German contemporaries, the Jewish scholars were barely interested in what literary sources did not contain, or did not somehow concern Jewish literature. Here Heinrich Graetz, the greatest Jewish historian of the nineteenth century, furnishes a significant exception. His 'Structure of Jewish History' argued that the Jewish people existed before Judaism, and that the fullness of Judaism required a Jewish society for its realization. But Graetz, it may be noted, was a dissenter, preferring French to German culture, and growing alienated from the triumphal Germany of Bismarck. He became somewhat of an embarrassment to patriotic German Jewry. (We now have a fine collection of his works in English: *The Structure of Jewish History and Other Essays*, translated, edited, and introduced by Ismar Schorsch, New York, 1975.)

For these characteristics of nineteenth-century Jewish historical writing there were other, not purely intellectual, reasons. One was mundane: Jewry in Germany and other lands, seeking emancipation or just beginning to enjoy its fruits, preferred to see its 'usable past' as a religious group which had contributed greatly to Western culture. Political, economic, mystic, and messianic aspects of Jewish history were better overlooked. Another reason, less mundane, lay in Jewish tradition itself which, as mentioned, regarded the memory primarily of martyrs and scholars as worthy of commemoration and study. While the techniques of the founders of the 'Science of Judaism were new, and revolutionized Jewish learning, their scholarly interests fitted both the needs of emancipated Jewry and the emphasis commended by Jewish tradition. Yet it is also important to observe that while the founders of modern Jewish historiography carried on some of the grand historical conceptions of their traditional predecessors, it was by using these conceptions to guide their original research that they became pathbreakers. They were practising historians as well as exponents of the theological or philosophical meaning of Jewish history. Not always did the two functions harmonize.

It is a century ago that emancipation as the ideal faded, and that the conception that the Jews possessed a comprehensive national past even outside their homeland began its rise to dominance in world Jewry. The implications for Jewish historical thought were obvious. From the time of Dubnow the attempt to grasp historically the essence of Judaism was abandoned. The emphasis has indeed been reversed, as later historians drew from their predecessors' work the opposite lesson—that

there was not an essence but pluralism and diversity all through Jewish history; the essence of Judaism, if there was one, was for theologians and philosophers to define. The touchstone of Jewish historiography became instead the Jewish national idea, about which there was a great variety of viewpoints.

Historians like Y. Kaufmann, Dinaburg-Dinur, the Marxist Mahler from a Borokhovian position, and Y. F. Baer (unfortunately unrepresented in Meyer's volume) stressed the land as the focus, even when few Jews lived there, and pointed to the insecurity and distortions within Jewish life in Exile. Dinur's postulates on these points are so far-reaching that little would be left for research except to dub in the details. Not every Jewish historian, however, accepts the spiritual hegemony of the Land either in its devastation or its rebirth. Salo W. Baron has long led those who stress the historic duality and interplay between the Land and the Diaspora, with its creative aspects as well as the dangers of rift and detachment. (Simon Rawidowicz, omitted by Meyer, upheld similar views.) Two other features in Professor Baron's work—the indissoluble bond between Jewish social and religious life, and the ties between the Jewish and the Gentile environment—likewise provide flexible frameworks for research. In contrast, the 'unity concept' by which Ellis Rivkin ties together the entirety of Jewish history looks back to Immanuel Wolf; elsewhere in his *Shaping of Jewish History*, in sections not excerpted by Meyer, he leans heavily on rather leftish social science. Leo Baeck's memorable essay of his last years, 'Theology and History', fittingly closes Meyer's volume. Baeck departs from the German philosophic mentors of his youth in his conclusions, that when Jewish theology reckons with 'the historic whole of Judaism' this means not only 'its universal idea' but also 'its particular tradition'.

Enough has been said, I hope, about *Ideas of Jewish History* and what lies outside its covers to suggest the richness of Jewish historical thought. But it is a one-sided opulence. Since the dawn of modern Jewish historiography, historians have erected grand schemes of periodization, and structures of meaning are attached to them. Not only was there a kind of intellectual necessity somehow to organize time which had stretched over more than three millenia, but Jewish historians readily assigned transcendental meanings to periods. The destruction of the two Temples, for examples, or the redaction of the Mishnah as chronological landmarks, obviously reveal a good deal about the meaning of homeland, exile, or Oral Torah. One looks long (and as a rule in vain, however) for significant statements at the level between heaven-storming teleological chronologies and the books and articles published all the time on the most specialized and arcane subjects. Where, for example, does one encounter the often fruitful discussions which occupy so much space and attention in Western historical journals, concerning the use of other disciplines in history—demography, sociology, psy-

chology, and economics, to mention a few? There has been a rather depressing poverty of thought concerning the methods of writing Jewish history.

During the nineteenth century, Jewish and general historical thought tended to stay close together, as we noted. But matters appear to have changed in the last fifty to sixty years. The course of the twentieth century has no doubt fostered an emphasis on the uniqueness of Jewish history. This in its turn has advanced the tendency, noticeable especially in Israel, to isolationism in Jewish historical thought and indifference to contemporary trends in historiography. True enough, the problems of epistemology and causality are universal to historians, as Meyer observes, but they appear to be keener in the vastness of Jewish history. The separation from the social sciences (with the now famous exception of depth psychology as applied by Scholem to Sabbetai Zevi) tends to sterilize a good deal of conscientious historical research. It was Scholem also who remarked that the Jews paid a high price for the historical necessity of the messianic idea, and that it should be laid aside for a while—presumably to restore the concrete reality of Israel. In like spirit one would like to hope that grandiose historical philosophies, once necessary to orient Judaism to its own historic meaning, may be let alone in favour of some hard thinking on the place of Jewish history in general history, and that Jewish historical research may end its intellectual retreat and again find its bearings within contemporary historiography.

BOOK REVIEWS

GERALD BLIDSTEIN, *Honor Thy Father and Mother: Filial Responsibility in Jewish Law and Ethics*, Library of Jewish Law and Ethics, edited by Norman Lamm, xiv + 234 pp., Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1975, $15.

This is a very erudite analysis (61 pages of notes to 157 of text) of a basic ethical question as it appears in the Jewish classical sources, particularly the Halakhah. It is concerned with the nature and scope of filial responsibility, with the meanings the Tradition discovers in it, and the problems which arise within this ethos and the way they are tackled by the authorities.

Dr. Blidstein observes that he does not examine the sociological impact of the relevant teachings throughout history. He does not seek to answer such questions as the degree to, and the ways in which parents were in fact honoured and how central the maintenance of parental respect was in eighth-century Babylon, twelfth-century Spain, or sixteenth-century Poland. Yet he believes that the sources he has isolated will be useful to the historian–sociologist. Dr Blidstein provides, within his conceptual framework, excellent insights into the manner of thinking of the great authorities and the way in which they faced realistically the conflicts inherent in the parent–child relationship. To what extent is a son obliged to look after his senile or mentally disturbed parent? Is a son obliged to give up the girl of his choice if his father orders him not to marry her? Does the fifth commandment apply even where the parent is a scoundrel? Whose side should a son take when his wife and mother cannot abide one another? Is a daughter exempt from her filial duty if her husband objects to it being carried out?

The duty of obedience to parents was a source of considerable tension during the early days of the Hasidic movement, when fathers invoked the fifth commandment against their sons who adopted the Hasidic way and journeyed to the Tsaddik despite parental disapproval. There is elsewhere a good deal of fascinating material on this struggle, which is of direct relevance to the author's thesis.

The book is both comprehensive and generally accurate, but the following should be noted. The term for fear is *mora*, not *morah*, and Ezekial should read Ezekiel; while Rabbi Shneur Zalman was of Liady, not Lida. A surprising omission—for the topic is discussed in the Talmud—is the duty of a child to honour his dead parents; the best

example of it nowadays is, of course, the recital of the *kaddish*. And nothing is said about the later Rabbinic extensions of the fifth commandment to include other senior kinsmen: grandparents, older brothers and sisters, and step-parents.

Finally, to the wide-ranging list of legal and ethical sources cited, the following may be added: *Shene ha-Mattot* (published in Vienna in 1884), by the London Rabbi Naftali Halevi, which has a full Halakhic treatment of the subject; Responsa *Knesset Yehezkel* by Ezekiel Katzenellenbogen (Altona, 1732, no. 35) discusses the case of a father who ordered his son to refuse the honour of being a *sandek*; Responsa *Avne Tzedek* by Jekuthiel Teitelbaum (Lemberg, 1888, vol. II, *Yoreh Deah*, no. 99) deals with a father who objected to the marriage of his daughter: the objection was deemed by the Rabbi to be for selfish motives and he rebuked the parent; and an important source is the section on honouring parents in the well-known compendium, *Derekh Pikkudekha*, by Zevi Elimelech of Dinov.

LOUIS JACOBS

HENRY R. HUTTENBACH. *The Emigration Book of Worms: The Character and Dimension of the Jewish Exodus from a small German Jewish Community 1933–41*, viii + 120 pp., Koblenz, 1974, n.p. (Reprinted from: *Dokumentation zur Geschichte der jüdischen Bevölkerung in Rheinland-Pfalz und im Saarland von 1800 bis 1945*, Vol. 7: Dokumente des Gedenkens.)

For nine hundred years, there was a Jewish community in Worms, in the Rhineland. As its tragic end came into sight, one of its schoolteachers (Miss Herta Mansbacher) began compiling a list of those who left the town. She noted each person's name, birthplace, date of birth, nationality, occupation, and destination. The list survived and has now found a resting place in Jerusalem.

Professor Huttenbach of New York (himself born in Worms) has now edited the document and has written a substantial introduction and analysis. In 1933 the community had 1,100 members, of whom 643 became emigrants—mainly to neighbouring countries. Only 136 are estimated to have survived. Of those who had not emigrated by the time war broke out in 1939, four-fifths were on waiting lists for visas to countries (including Great Britain and the United States of America) which had set a limit to their immigration quotas.

Professor Huttenbach came to England as a child, with his family, and then settled in the United States. He set himself the task of preparing this book as a memorial—a bitter task, which he has carried out with dedication.

S. J. PRAIS

ROBERT A. NISBET, *The Sociology of Emile Durkheim*, ix + 293 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1975, £4 (paperback, £1.80).

Writing on Durkheim has become one of the most flourishing occupations in sociology. Since 1972, two to three books have appeared each year on Durkheim. Professor Nisbet now contributes what he calls 'a Durkheim primer . . . intended for the student or general reader whose knowledge of the subject may be presumed incomplete . . . and who desires a concise introduction to Durkheim's fundamental ideas. . . .'

This end is pursued with admirable clarity. Instead of following the development of Durkheim's ideas, the author has described and discussed them under such headings as one would expect in a general introduction to sociological theory (method, social structure, social psychology, etc.). Each section contains a lucid account of Durkheim's contribution to the subject; a sketch of the intellectual antecedents of his ideas; and an attempt to assess their significance today. That gives an excellent impression of the influences which shaped Durkheim's thought. But there is no attempt at the actual reconstruction of how Durkheim arrived at his own conclusions. Often it is not evident whether Durkheim solved something left unresolved by his predecessors, or only re-stated their questions and answers in a new language.

The assessment of the present-day significance of Durkheim's ideas is similarly general. The author does not say specifically which of Durkheim's concepts and explanations are still useful and which are not, and why. We are only given such statements as: 'One can see why young historical minds of the originality of Bloch's, Febvre's and Braudel's would have been attracted to Durkheim's work. In this work lay . . . concepts—social structure, social function, collective conscience, the sacred, the cult, and others—that could be utilized by historians. . . .' It would be useful to know which of these has actually been utilized and with what success.

Perhaps because his book is intended as a primer, Professor Nisbet stresses the general philosophical impact of Durkheim's thought rather than his specific scholarly influence. Durkheim is seen as one of the main exponents of historical pessimism, as opposed to the evolutionary optimism of liberals and socialists; as one of the main interpreters of the disintegrative tendencies in modern society; and as one of those who most clearly recognized the universal importance of religious elements in all (including present-day) societies.

It is true that Durkheim had all these attitudes and views, but—as Professor Nisbet correctly indicates—there were many others who shared them; they do not therefore sufficiently account for Durkheim's unique significance. To my mind, this is not to be sought in his general philosophical views, but in his unique attempt at creating a scientific

sociology—an attempt which was a mixture of success and failure. Durkheim succeeded brilliantly as an educator and institution builder; and he had considerable success as a sociological interpreter of deviance, religion, and the relationship between politics and public morality. But his attempt at the creation of a general theory of a sociology of culture was unfinished, and remained bogged down in fundamental ambiguities in the definition of social and cultural phenomena and in a dated evolutionism. Professor Nisbet's account is, of course, accurate, so that the careful reader will detect some of these complexities of the Durkheim story. But the absence of a more explicitly critical analysis is regrettable, since one can learn from the failures of classics such as the works of Durkheim almost as much as one can from their achievements.

Another minor point of criticism concerns the insistence of the author on classifying Durkheim as a conservative. According to present-day American academic usage (which frequently sees no difference between 'radical' and 'liberal', and labels as conservative any person who does not subscribe to every word written by Lenin), Durkheim was indeed a conservative. Still, one is surprised that Professor Nisbet submits to this semantic tyranny of the Left. And above all, it is not very instructive to describe as conservative a man who devoted a lifetime to the search of a basis for the moral cohesion of societies in which the autonomy of the individual is the highest value and who believed societies to be capable of change.

However, these are minor criticisms of a book which is an excellent and most useful introduction to Durkheim.

JOSEPH BEN-DAVID

MOSHE USSOSKIN, *Struggle for Survival, A History of Jewish Credit Co-operatives in Bessarabia, Old-Rumania, Bukovina and Transylvania*, xxxi + 345 pp. + 25 pp. in Hebrew, Jerusalem Academic Press, Jerusalem, 1975, n.p.

A little-known chapter in the history of European Jewry is told in the pages of this handsome, illustrated volume, whose author was one of the chief architects of the Jewish credit co-operatives in a large part of eastern Europe. These co-operatives were a landmark in Jewish philanthropy; they created work and opportunities, instead of handouts, for thousands of Jews living in abject poverty. They were a combined project of the Jewish Colonization Association (ICA) and the American Joint Distribution Committee, working through the American Joint Reconstruction Foundation, chiefly under the leadership of Herbert H. Lehman.

The four provinces of Rumania had a Jewish population of 760,000, according to the official census of 1931: 260,000 in Old Rumania,

228,000 in Bessarabia, 182,000 in Transylvania, and 90,000 in Bukovina. By 1938, the total was estimated to have reached 900,000, of whom about half (48·3 per cent) were traders, a third (32·8 per cent) were artisans and small manufacturers, four per cent were engaged in agriculture, 2·4 per cent in transport, while the liberal professions and 'public officials' accounted for 2·7 per cent. The remainder—less than 10 per cent—were engaged in a variety of other occupations.

The first co-operative was established in Kishinev in 1901; the movement was in operation in all four provinces until 1949, when the Jewish co-operatives in Rumania ceased to function. In 1939, there were about 800 credit co-operatives financed by the American Joint Reconstruction Foundation, in Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the four provinces of Greater Rumania, and Turkey. There was then a membership of about 350,000 and a capital of approximately three and a half million dollars (p. 313). The Foundation was wound up in 1951.

The author relates, with painstakingly accurate detail, all the activities of co-operative credit 'kassas' in Greater Rumania; apart from mundane banking operations, they catered for the cultural needs of the Jewish communities in all four provinces. The country's banks gave preference to profit-making clients engaged in large business enterprises; there were hardly any financial institutions ready to help the Jewish 'little man' other than on ruinous terms, while the members of the Jewish middle class were unable to gain a foothold in normal banking activities. The credit co-operatives thus supplied an essential service; Mr. Ussoskin's account reveals both the incredible poverty of Jewish artisans, small shopkeepers, and petty traders, which the 'kassas' helped to relieve, and the devotion with which the staff (whether voluntary or paid) conducted their activities.

There were several thousand Jews involved in establishing and administering the co-operatives in the first half of this century; Mr. Ussoskin, who now lives in Israel, is one of the few who survived. He gave long years of service, with love, devotion, and self-sacrifice; and he has now made available the results of an outstanding piece of research. In a Foreword to the book, Dr. Joseph J. Schwartz (who died in January 1975, while it was in press) says of Mr. Ussoskin that 'it may be difficult to appreciate fully how important a role he played in the Jewish life of Rumania'. Behind the dry figures of the Tables printed in this volume, there are the figures of his martyred colleagues, some of whom this reviewer had the privilege of knowing and admiring for their selfless dedication in creating opportunities for thousands of Jews bereft of a living.

Most importantly, this book fills a gap in the Jewish economic history of the first half of the twentieth century.

ELIZABETH E. EPPLER

MEYER W. WEISGAL, General Editor, *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Vol. VII, Series A. August 1914–November 1917*, edited by Leonard Stein, xliv + 569 pp., Oxford and Israel University Presses, London and Jerusalem, 1975, £9.

This volume, of which the last entry records that the 'Balfour Declaration' has been sent on the same day to Lord Rothschild, marks the natural climax and conclusion of this section of the publication of the Weizmann archives. We have met the young and lonely Weizmann, and his growing love for Vera Khatzman, we have grieved at his insecurity, and at his everlasting battles and misunderstandings within the Zionist movement. He has risen steadily in the movement, and now he stands out as an obvious leader. Meanwhile there has been also his advance as a scientist, and in this volume his discoveries are seen to be essential for the successful prosecution of the war. He has moved to London, he is in constant touch, in both his interests, with the government. The battle is still on, but victory is now assured for the acceptance of the Zionist interpretation of Jewish history against the assimilationists; and for the implementation of his plan that the future should lie in the hands of Great Britain, not of France.

The strain is a heavy one, and very occasionally the old, insecure nervousness appears; but the new and confident note of his 'private and personal' letter to Philip Kerr, later Marquis of Lothian but then occupying an important position on the cabinet staff, is typical of his new maturity: 'Whatever happens we shall get Palestine . . . No force on earth can stem a movement which springs from the depths of a nation which has learnt to suffer and to work tenaciously and energetically with a single mind and a single purpose' (p. 527).

With hindsight one must say that the greatest mistake of those years was Weizmann's failure to travel to Egypt for a full discussion with Arab leaders. He has discussed it with Sir Mark Sykes, who at one point tells him to drop propaganda and go; and during April 1917, it really looks as though the two may be out there together. But the visit is constantly deferred, and the opportunity is finally lost. Weizmann gets no nearer the Arab world than a discussion with American Jews whom he meets in Gibraltar, but who are concerned with relations with the Turks and not the Arabs.

As I write these words on the day of the news of the utterly foolish vote of the United Nations in November 1975, I inevitably wonder whether in those early days anything decisive could have been done to make an autonomous Jewish National Home acceptable to the general and local Arab creators of opinion. Had Sykes and Weizmann spent some weeks together in Egypt and elsewhere in the area, could they have made 'the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine' realize that, together with the immense service which they were themselves

receiving in the liberation of the Arab world, the creation of a Jewish state was also a legitimate reward for the Jewish people who, through no fault of their own, had been reduced to an apparently negligible minority, although they had never been absent from their original homeland?

JAMES PARKES

R. J. ZWI WERBLOWSKY, *Beyond Tradition and Modernity, Changing Religions in a Changing World*, Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion, 11th Series, ix + 146 pp., Athlone Press, London, 1976, £3.50.

A book by Zwi Werblowsky is certain to be characterized by wide learning, scholarly courtesy, and English English. Moreover, it will give evidence of a sociological sensibility, which includes not only a feeling for sociological categories and issues but a willingness to take risks. The historian and the linguist are peculiarly inhibited when it comes to large-scale comparison or speculation about basic trends or inventive daring in the adumbration of explanatory hypotheses. Professor Werblowsky has overcome such inhibitions and declares himself prepared to erra fortiter.

His theme requires it. The questions raised by the encounter of traditional religion with modernity are not answered by timid minds cultivating their chosen allotment or espousing scholarly virginity. Moreover, one has to be prepared for some unpleasantness from those who reckon they have already solved the problem of tradition and modernity or who do not like religious commitment observed from the Archimedean point of comparative sociology. Werblowsky begins with Christianity, because Christian civilization is the original matrix of his problem, and one feels that he is—paradoxically—most at home when watching the various attempts of Christians to cope with the modern situation. He enjoys the dialectical twists whereby theologians try and work themselves out of a trap. They positively embrace the enlightenment criticism of religion and triumphantly dip it in the font or else they see the non-religion of the modern world as the new creation of Christianity, itself the first of the non-religions. The wrath of man, more especially theories of alienation, can be turned to divine praise providing, of course, one has a true conception of what is really meant by 'divine' and 'transcendence'. But for Werblowsky this is so much disguised apologetic and includes 'a very Christian disappointment with the record of the Visible Church'. The leap of faith jumps away from the social reality of religion, either towards liberation, especially political liberation, or towards God and His judgement. And the former (that is, all the theology of secularity) has largely taken over from the

latter, but retained its horror of mere 'religion'. So we have a paradox: an anti-institutional gospel realizable only through involvement in culture and social relations.

Perhaps I should emphasize that Werblowsky is largely concerned with intellectual adaptations, not with the social movements which have from time to time expressed an adaptation at the practical level. Perhaps this is because he sees Methodism as the last creative adaptation, which means presumably that the charismatic movement or Catholic aggiornamento are reactive adjustments without independent dynamism. Yet when Werblowsky moves to Judaism he begins to include the ideological problems of a movement on the ground—even, moreover, a movement on the holy ground: Zionism. Perhaps this is because Christianity has reached a different stage and faces a different problem from that posed by the mission of a particular people. Judaism does not so much have the problem of relations with culture as such, but it has relations with *other* cultures and questions as to the modus vivendi inside the Jewish world. When you discuss Judaism you can't help discussing the concrete problems of a people as well as intellectual dialectics about the relation of religion *with* culture. Yet there *is* a specific problem of a religion as well as a problem of a culture. In Werblowsky's words 'a sober study of the cultural and educational policies of the state of Israel may almost create the impression that they were designed to illustrate the thesis of Durkheim that in religion society reifies, projects and worships itself'. A matter-of-fact religion that needs no conversion to the world (or of the world) easily becomes a matter-of-society religion. 'If Judaism is what Jews believe and do, then we are not really invoking the theological category of *ijma'*, but rather evoke the cultural and (pseudo-) historical category of *jinsiyah*, or even *jinsiyah 'urfiyah*.' The terminology used in that sentence reminds one that the problem of Judaism, as a matter-of-fact religion is also the problem of Islam, except that Islam is many peoples and not one. The dramatic character of the tension brought to the fore by Israel can be illustrated by graffiti in the Jerusalem district of Mea She'arim: 'Judaism and Israel are diametrically opposed.' Or it may be illustrated in the positions taken up by someone like Professor Leibowitz: Thou shalt obey the Law and incidentally tolerate the government of the Land in which thou livest.

It is in the discussion of Judaism that I feel Professor Werblowsky raises both the general problems and his own existential problems. First, what does it *mean* to speak of a God of history? It is not that the holocaust can undermine that affirmation at the logical level, any more than the attempted genocide of the Armenians can, but something happens when the holocaust is perceived by a modern mind. Second, what does it mean when we speak of 'transcendence' faced with the apparently self-explanatory and self-sufficient character of the cosmos?

What is it that the heavens declare, what *is* the plenitudo eius? And if it is a matter of saying with Humpty-Dumpty, 'There's glory for you', what of all the other manifestations of glory to which we might transfer the prestige-word 'revelation'? Such as music. Of course, there is Buber's approach, which is to affirm the all-pervasive, totally interfused nature of 'Thou', and to see a godward intention whether or not one knows God or actively intends Him. As Werblowsky points out, this too has its difficulties, since what is all-embracing allows no relevant distinctions or tensions: when God is all in all *here*, He is nothing. God can only be all-in-all as an eschatological category: as the impossible possibility.

The above discussion, which is in large part summary, is intended to suggest a style and a kind of content rather than to give an exhaustive account. Werblowsky goes on to discuss the problem of modernity in Islam as well as in Hinduism and Buddhism. And he concludes with a careful survey of the available options: religion as catalyst of modernity, as finally realised in modernity, as complementing and filling out modernity, as purified by modernity, as a coding device for the transition to modernity, and as providing an idiom for rejecting modernity. To summarize his summary in this way is to do violence to a rich and sensitive text, and one which pursues the underlying philosophical problems even as it pursues the evident sociological ones. It does both with exemplary elegance and fairness of mind.

DAVID MARTIN

DAVID M. ZOHAR, *Political Parties in Israel, The Evolution of Democracy*, Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government, xix + 195 pp., Praeger, New York, and Pall Mall Press, London, 1974, £6.50.

Israel, considering its size and population, has probably one of the most keenly observed political systems in the world, and the classified catalogues in libraries abundantly reflect that fact. Nevertheless, monographs on specific subjects such as Israel's political parties—among the most intricate and complex in Western-type democracies—are still rare.

Zohar's book does not seem to fill the gap. It is—as the author readily admits—based entirely on secondary sources. Like so many earlier books concerned with Israeli politics, *Political Parties in Israel* takes us back to Moses Hess's *Rome and Jerusalem* and to the early pioneers and settlers. This is followed by the inevitable historical survey of the development of the pre-State self-government system. Although one third of the text of Zohar's book deals with history, it is not as informative of the institutional evolution of Israel as are some other

works—for example, Professor Eisenstadt's *Israeli Society*. The pre-State period indeed accounts for the power structure in Israel, and parties *have* played a predominant role in Israel all along, since they were not only political organizations but also powerful instruments of socialization in an immigrant society. However, it is the power bases of the parties, the leadership recruitment patterns, and the political cleavages *after* 1948, and even more so after 1967, which are the crucial problems in the system. These elements the author does not sufficiently analyse.

The wealth of facts and figures he has assembled loses most of its informative impact because the material is not rigorously organized. There is a constant shifting from one period to another in an attempt to blend a discussion of the parties with an overview of Israel's various political institutions. As a result, the reader finds it difficult to distinguish institutional and structural from historical and ideological factors. Many politicians are casually mentioned—without any background information for the uninitiated reader, who thus cannot assess which of them plays an important role. Likewise, familiarity with some political institutions is taken for granted, when a footnote at least would have been helpful.

There are many errors. Deganyah, the first kibbutz, was established in 1909, not in 1911 (p. 3); the Jewish Agency was not organized in 1929 (p. 4): it had existed in 1922; the 'Canaanites' began to act as a group in 1942, not on 15 May 1948 (p. 4). The Irgun Tsvai Leumi did not have its origins in the reorganization of Beitar (the paramilitary youth movement affiliated to the Revisionists) in the Second World War (p. 49). The Irgun came into being in 1931, when a split occurred in the Haganah. Furthermore, contrary to what Zohar states, the Irgun *did* co-operate with the British in the war against Germany, at least until the definitive victory of the Allies in the Middle East; David Raziel, the commander-in-chief of the Irgun, was killed in Iraq in 1941 while on a secret mission for the British.

The second half of the book consists of tables and documents. The author gives the composition of the 1974 Cabinet, but a comparative table of former Cabinets would have been helpful in that section.

DAVID LAZAR

CHRONICLE

René Cassin died last February, in his eighty-ninth year. He had been awarded the Croix de Guerre 1914–18 and the Médaille Militaire for his heroism in 1914 on the front, at Saint-Mihiel, where he was severely wounded. He was Membre de l'Institut (Académie des Sciences morales et politiques), honorary President of the Council of State of France, Grand Croix de la Légion d'Honneur, and Compagnon de la Libération. In 1968, which was International Human Rights Year, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace; and in 1973, the Goethe Prize.

Cassin was born in Bayonne in 1887; his family had been settled in France for centuries. He studied law first at the University of Aix and then at the Sorbonne; he was called to the bar in 1909. After the First World War he was appointed to a chair at the University of Lille; in 1929 he went to a chair of Law in the University of Paris. From 1924 to 1938 he was a member of the French delegation to the League of Nations; he was later to be France's delegate to the United Nations from 1946 to 1951.

In June 1940 he landed in Plymouth with the son-in-law of Marshal Foch to join General de Gaulle, who told him that he had arrived just in time to draft the legal decrees recognizing him as head of the Free French Forces. It is reported that he commented, 'I take it that it is understood that we are not a French legion in the British Army but the French Army'; 'We are France,' came the reply. Cassin then proceeded to draw up the historic agreement between Great Britain and Free France. His legal acumen enabled him to give a juridical status to the Free French movement and to present the arguments for the illegality of the government of Vichy; he made numerous broadcasts on the foreign network of the B.B.C. In 1940–41 he was Permanent Secretary of the Defence Council and later was appointed to other important posts under de Gaulle, including that of Commissioner for Justice and Education.

After the Allied victory in North Africa he became in 1943 the President of the Commission de Législation de l'Assemblée consultative in Algiers; it was then that he was asked by de Gaulle to take in hand the network of schools which had been established by the Alliance Israélite Universelle. It was also then that he became aware of the importance for French culture and Jewish tradition of the A.I.U., which had been created in Paris in 1860 by young French Jews; he was later to become the president of that institution and to work indefatigably for its development. At the centenary of the Alliance's foundation there were no fewer than 50,000 pupils in the 127 schools of the A.I.U., from Morocco to Iran.

After the Liberation of France he became Vice-President of the Conseil d'Etat, and in 1945 he helped to establish U.N.E.S.C.O. In 1946 he was appointed deputy chairman of the U.N. Commission drafting the Declaration of Human Rights; Eleanor Roosevelt described him as the principal

author of that Declaration, which was adopted in December 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations. When he received the Nobel peace award in 1968, he used the prize money to establish the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg, where he had long served on the European Court of Human Rights; he presided over that Court from 1965 to 1968.

René Cassin was given a state funeral on 25 February with military honours and in the presence of the Prime Minister of France, of the Presidents of the Senate and of the Conseil Constitutionel, the Grand Chancelier de l'Ordre de la Légion d'Honneur, the Grand Chancelier de l'Ordre de la Libération, representatives of the U.N. and of U.N.E.S.C.O., the Ambassadors of several nations, as well as representatives of several Jewish organizations in France and abroad. The Chief Rabbi of Paris conducted the burial service, in the presence of the Chief Rabbi in France, who delivered one of the funeral orations at the graveside. The procession had started from the Esplanade of the Grande Chancellerie de l'Ordre de la Libération. There, the Prime Minister of France spoke at length of René Cassin's devotion to the cause of freedom and of his juridical work, commenting that he had been a worthy heir of the great jurists of the Mediterranean Renaissance; he noted that Cassin was fearless in his defence of men who were in conflict with the authority of the state; and he stressed the contribution which that eminent jurist had made in the establishment of a modern doctrine of law which took into account the necessity for a legal apparatus of justice based on a rigorous adherence to fundamental principles.

The last speaker at the graveside was a Christian priest, who said he spoke for all the Christian friends of René Cassin who wished to join in the prayers for his soul. He said that he felt it important to underline Cassin's unfailing loyalty to his ancestral judaism, his practice of that *tsedaka* which is so eminently characteristic of that judaism, his constant devotion to justice and to the rights of man, his adherence to the command to love one's neighbour and to the injunction in Leviticus to care for the stranger in one's midst, bearing in mind that the Jews had been strangers in the Land of Egypt. 'To the end, he worked to perfect all that he had initiated, and all his enterprises converged towards the same goal: peace with justice and brotherly love. That is where Jew and Christian meet, where their ethics coincide, where the Torah and the Gospel come together. "Shema Israel, the Lord thy God is one . . . Thou shalt have no other gods before me." That is the first and the greatest of the commandments. A second commandment goes hand in hand with it, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." The whole law and the Prophets hang on these commands. So spake Jesus, so speaks the entire Tradition of Judaism. And that was also the religion of René Cassin.'

*

Israel's Open University, sponsored by the Rothschild Foundation, began enrolling candidates last spring. (It is patterned on the United Kingdom's Open University, which has been operating for several years.) It is non profit-making; and it is hoped that it will win public confidence more readily than some commercial correspondence schools. Its Secretary is

reported to have stated last March that the University has been recognized by Government, and to have commented:

"But since permission to grant the B.A. is given only retro-actively, after it has been proved that the institution deserves it, we cannot promise the degree in advance. But we are serious, and we hope we will be taken seriously and trusted."

In the first instance, six courses will be offered: Jewish studies; biology; chemistry and physics; geology; 'technology'; and mathematics. One of the team of four who prepared the natural sciences courses said that they tried out the curriculum on 20 experimental students:

"Some were students who had not finished high school but had great interest in the field, while others were university graduates in other fields who wanted to know something about science. Our experience—though I do not want to draw conclusions from such a small sample—was that the students without a high school diploma were the ones who stayed the course.'

Candidates, after they select the course of their choice, will receive 'sample material including self-evaluation questions designed to see if the level is appropriate' to them. There will eventually be an adult education programme starting at the matriculation (*bagrut*) level so that if any student finds the university courses too difficult, he 'can start in the adult education programme and perhaps move up. But that is still in the future, 1977 at the earliest.' So far, the material is all in Hebrew, including many translations prepared by the staff of the Open University. A special course is being designed to help students read scientific material in English.

It is hoped to expand the curriculum 'in width as well as in depth to include the social sciences and the humanities'. The Secretary is also reported to have stated: 'We do not see ourselves as providing a B.A. in one specific subject, as universities here do, but rather offering general education similar to that American universities give. Taking an average of three courses a year—most students couldn't handle more than one at a time—it will probably take a student about six years to get a B.A. . . . I would not encourage my 18-year-old son to study at the Open University. Even the best Open University cannot offer a young person the stimulation and social life of a campus. But there is definitely a need for educational opportunities for the person who wants to learn and has the ability but cannot go to a full-time university, either because he lacks a high school diploma or simply because he does not have the time, or both.'

One of the proponents of the Israeli Open University was dean of mathematics at the British O.U.; he reported that it had been very successful in its teaching methods—to such an extent that some of its original teaching material has been adopted by established universities in the United Kingdom.

Tuition fees in Israel will be IL400 for each course; but since a high drop-out rate seems inevitable, a student will pay only an initial sum of IL200 so that he will lose only half the fee if he fails to stay the course, so to speak.

*

It was announced last March that the Ministry of Education of Israel had completed a survey of nine high schools; 240 pupils in the tenth and eleventh

grades were asked to listen to recorded stories in the English language; only about 65 per cent of them were able to give correct answers based on their understanding of three stories they had listened to during a timed period.

The Ministry is now considering whether a test in comprehension of spoken English should in future become part of the matriculation examinations; so far, candidates have been tested in English for proficiency in composition, sight reading, and speaking. The majority of teachers and students believe that a test in comprehension of the spoken language should be included in the final matriculation examination.

*

Bar Ilan University has announced the opening next September of a centre for Jewish education and community leadership; the Centre will train Diaspora students for service abroad and the Chancellor of the University is reported to have stated last March that the institution will pay all expenses 'from flight tickets to food bills', for 'there is a crisis in Jewish education which—if it remains unsolved—we won't be able to survive'.

It is believed that there are, outside Israel and the Communist countries, 1,800,000 Jewish children of school age; only about 700,000 of them receive *any* kind of Jewish education, while only about one fifth of the 200,000 teachers of Jewish subjects around the world have benefited from any kind of pedagogical training. The Chancellor commented that some ORT schools in South America even have non-Jews teaching Jewish subjects because they are unable to recruit qualified Jews.

In exchange for the scholarships awarded by Bar Ilan University, the students will have to undertake to spend from one to three years of study in Israel and then return to their countries of origin to enter their chosen field; on the other hand, if one of the students discovers that he wishes to remain in Israel after he has completed his course, and refuses to return to his native country, Bar Ilan 'will not take him to court'.

Bar Ilan, which is under Orthodox auspices, will select the students by committees set up abroad; preference will be given to promising yeshiva students, teachers and social workers, as well as to 'young and idealistic Jews who as yet have no profession'.

*

Earlier this year Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics published figures relating to Israeli universities in the decade 1963–73, during which 50,000 degrees were awarded. In 1961, there were 36,000 graduates, whose average age was 46 years; by 1974, there was a two and a half fold increase, while the average age had dropped to 39.

There are 100,000 persons in Israel who have University degrees; nearly 60 per cent of them had received them from Israeli universities—but 70 per cent of those with only bachelor's degrees are local graduates. The percentages of Israelis with foreign qualifications are as follows: 16·7 from Rumania; 16·3 from the United States; 12·7 from the Soviet Union; 6·9 from Poland; and 6·9 from France. As for the subjects studied, the per-

centages were: the humanities, 21·3; the social sciences, 20·2; engineering and architecture, 18·7; natural sciences, 15·3; medicine and dentistry, 13; law, 9; and agriculture, 2.

In the decade 1963–73 there was a four-fold increase in the number of those who graduated in the humanities and the social sciences, compared with the position in 1961; while those with degrees in medicine, engineering, or law very nearly doubled in number. Over a third of those awarded degrees during that decade were women; in 1961 only one quarter of all graduates were female. Eight per cent of native-born Israelis (sabras) now boast degrees, as do exactly the same proportion of immigrants from Europe and America; but that is the case for only 1·2 per cent of those who came to Israel from Asia and Africa.

In Israel, three fifths of the total number of gainfully occupied graduates work in the public sector or are employed by the universities. Three quarters of the total are engaged in pursuits for which they specialized; they include 13,000 schoolteachers, 11,000 engineers and architects, and 8,000 doctors and dentists. A further 10,000 have managerial posts of various kinds.

There are also 80,000 Israelis with post-matriculation qualifications which fall short of a university degree; they include: 30,000 schoolteachers (mainly in primary and intermediate schools); 9,000 nurses; and 6,500 technicians; while 10,000 have managerial posts of various kinds. That group of 80,000 is relatively young in age (they average 35 years); 70 per cent are women; and 80 per cent of the total qualified in Israel.

*

Moetzot Hapoalot (Pioneer Women) announced last February that they had endowed a Centre for study and research into the status of women at Ben Gurion University in Beersheba; the Centre will be part of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities. Its director, a woman, has already been appointed.

*

The head of Israel's Ministry of Labour's vocational training division announced last February that his division's budget for the present year was IL235 million, of which IL200 million would be spent on the five main areas of responsibility of the division: (1) apprenticeship programmes and allied schemes for some 20,000 young persons between the ages of 15 and 17 years; (2) teaching new skills to between 5,000 and 10,000 unskilled adults in order to enable them to raise their incomes; (3) retraining professionals so that nearly 2,000 'unplaceable' college and university graduates —both immigrants and Israelis—might obtain suitable posts; (4) the training of some 9,000 new technicians and practical engineers (*handassaim*); and (5) the rehabilitation of about 3,000 handicapped or disabled persons, so that they might become capable of gainful employment.

*

The National Insurance Institute of Israel last March published a report on housing conditions; it is based on data for 1974 supplied by the Central Bureau of Statistics. That year showed a great improvement on 1968, when 28 per cent of all children in the country slept three or more in one room; the comparative percentage for 1974 was only 16. In absolute figures, this means that in 1968, about 54,000 Jewish households with more than a quarter million children lived in crowded conditions; while by 1974 there were about 37,000 Jewish households with some 150,000 children sleeping three or more in one room.

As for homes with four or more children, the improvement has been even more marked, the percentage of overcrowding having come down from 54 to 34; but that still means that some 22,000 large households were enduring overcrowded conditions.

On the other hand, while in 1968 there were 63,000 homes with one person or less in one room, in 1974 there were 91,000; but the report stressed that it must be borne in mind that more than 99 per cent of these households consisted of a couple with only child—while fewer than one per cent of the households enjoying spacious living accommodation had four or more children.

The report was made for the Knesset Labour Committee which was examining the implementation of the Slum Clearance and Reconstruction Law.

*

The Jerusalem Post of 1 March 1976 reported a demonstration outside the Prime Minister's Office in Jerusalem, on the previous day, by 200 members of the Association of Landlords. They wanted the lifting, or at least the easing, of rent control legislation.

The 1969 Raveh Commission had recommended that there be a transition period until 1973, during which formerly protected rents would be brought up to 'realistic levels'; the landlords claimed that too little had been done to implement that provision.

The landlords are an aging group: 56 per cent of them are between the ages of 65 and 75, while 22 per cent are older than 75; their chairman is 82 years old. He told the *Post* reporter that the rent of a two-room flat had risen from £4.50 per month in 1939 to about IL100 in 1976—an increase of '22 times', while a subsidized bus fare had risen 140 times, oranges 400 times, and average salaries about 300 times.

The Association claim that there are 42,000 households which are protected tenants of private landlords; about half are headed by merchants or members of the liberal professions, with above average incomes, able to afford the payment of a realistic rent. Landlords are especially bitter about the fact that some 10,000 protected tenants—who took over flats decades ago without payment of 'key money'—benefit from the law which allows them to keep two-thirds of the amount of legal key money which they obtain when they transfer their tenancy. That sum is tax-free; but the landlords have to pay tax on their own third of the amount, to which they are entitled in such circumstances. They also resent the fact that some of their rent-controlled

tenants were able to buy flats over the years—flats which they themselves let at market prices, while they continue to enjoy the benefit of protected rents, at the expense of their landlords.

*

Israel's Minister of Education and Culture announced last February that he was setting up a Public Council for the Quality of Life (*tarbut haḥayim*). The Council 'would strive through education and information to improve the quality of life, so that Israeli society will be a pleasant society to live in'.

The Council has set itself a number of goals: increase public awareness of the need to improve behaviour patterns in public and private life; encourage cleanliness and reduce noise in public places; show greater tolerance and more consideration for the feelings of others; promote greater respect for the laws of road safety; and encourage more volunteer work. The Council will co-ordinate the activities of all government, public, and voluntary agencies concerned with these various fields; 19 government bodies will participate (including ten ministries), as well as the Civil Service Commission; the State Comptroller; the Israel Broadcasting services (as well as the army broadcasting station); and the Police. There will also be representatives from the Council for a Beautiful Eretz Yisrael, the Association of Cinema Owners, the Nature Protection Society, women's organizations, kibbutz groups, the Jewish Agency, and associations of parents and of pupils and students.

The Ministry of Education and Culture is to provide the staff for the Council as well as the budget.

*

There was a conference last March in Tel Aviv of a group of several hundred English-speaking immigrants who met in a hotel to consider more than 900 suggestions for 'improving the quality of life in Israel'; they set up a co-ordinating committee to consider the suggestions. The committee will then make active recommendations which it will bring to the attention of government agencies, service organizations, and the general public. More than 800 persons attended the conference sessions, and the committee will maintain contact with all of them, so that their wish 'to do something' may be channelled through existing organizations. That group of English-speaking immigrants has called itself *Koah Kan* (strength here). There were four workshops at the conference, which discussed road manners and safety, general manners and etiquette, consumer affairs, and ecology. The former Chief Rabbi of South Africa gave an address; the meeting was the brainchild of the South African Zionist Federation, who were joined in the initiative by the Zionist Federations of Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as by the Association of Americans and Canadians living in Israel.

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The Zionist Organization of Canada—which has no affiliation with any political party in Israel—set up a commission last April to discover why 'a full 40 per cent of Western immigrants return home within five years of their

aliyah'. The Commission placed advertisements in *The Jerusalem Post* and immigrants from Canada who replied were sent a questionnaire; forty of the respondents were then asked to prepare written briefs about the difficulties of absorption.

The Commission intends to produce a report, which it will publish and make available both abroad and in Israel.

*

There was a meeting of the Rumanian Jewish Congress in Bucharest at the end of April. The bi-monthly magazine of the Jewish community, *Revista Cultului Mozaic*, has published the address given by the Chief Rabbi of Rumania at the Congress. He is reported to have stated that Rumania's 90,000 Jews are better off now under the Communist regime than they ever had been in the previous centuries of their settlement in the country. That regime has given for the first time full citizens' rights to Jews and full religious freedom; it also allowed Rumanian Jews to emigrate. There were 135 synagogues in the country, but there were not enough rabbis or enough kasher butchers. There were 22 schools where the younger members of the community attended classes in Hebrew, Jewish history, and Jewish literature.

*

Last February Harvard University announced that it plans to establish a Harvard Center for Jewish Studies. The University had its first chair in Jewish Studies in 1925, when the first incumbent was H. A. Wolfson—whose early education had been in Lithuanian yeshivot and who had graduated from Harvard in 1912. In 1970, a second chair in Jewish studies was established.

The new centre will include eight full professorships in various areas of Jewish scholarship, 24 graduate fellowships, its own publication programme, and a very large library of Judaica; there will also be seminars, symposia, and public lectures, as well as invitations to visiting professors and scholars. Harvard's President is reported to have stated that the centre would be 'nothing less than a major step in the enrichment of Harvard University, the U.S., the Jewish People, and the Western world . . .'; it would represent 'the joining of one of the major strains of culture in the Western world with an institution which has been a symbol of intellectual excellence . . .'

The Hebrew language has been taught at Harvard since the University's inception; the first graduate class in 1642 had a written examination with a choice of the following themes: 1. 'Hebrew is the mother of languages'; 2. 'The Hebrew consonants and vowels are of equal age'; 3. 'The *hatef* vowel does not form a syllable'.

In 1945, only ten American universities offered courses in Jewish Studies; today there are 150 institutions of higher learning which do so. Graduates of the new centre will probably find no difficulty in obtaining teaching posts in the United States.

*

The Social and Demographic Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews has published a report on Jewish marriages and burials and cremations in Great Britain in 1975. There was a continuing decline in the number of synagogue marriages which in 1968–72 averaged 1,880; that figure dropped to 1,753 in 1973, 1,678 in 1974, and to 1,588 in 1975.

Marriages in Orthodox synagogues accounted for 77·9 per cent of all synagogue weddings in 1975; of the remainder, 14 per cent took place in Reform and 8·1 per cent in Liberal synagogues. In 1975, nearly three quarters of all synagogue marriages took place in London—72 per cent; in 1974 the percentage had been slightly lower: 70.

As for Jewish burials, the total number was 4,862 in 1975— showing little change from the 1974 figure of 4,866. In 1968–72, the annual average had been 4,917. The percentage of Orthodox interments in 1975 was 85·7; Reform burials and cremations accounted for 6·8 per cent, and Liberal, 7·5 per cent. The geographical distribution remained virtually unchanged over the past three years: two thirds in the capital and the remaining third in the provinces.

*

The Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, published last spring a *Survey of Research in Jewish Subjects in Europe*. The compiler states in the Introduction that the survey 'covers only recent and unpublished material, which falls into two groups: research now in progress, and theses and dissertations registered since 1970' in Europe, with the exception of the United Kingdom and Russia. The Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies has already compiled a Register of Research in Jewish Studies in Great Britain.

*

Keter Publishing House of Jerusalem have just published the first volume (A–B) of a Shorter Encyclopaedia Judaica in the Russian language, *Kratkaya evreyskaya entsiklopediya*. The Editorial Preface states that it is an abbreviated version of the 16-volume encyclopaedia published by Keter in English in 1972. It is pointed out, however, that some of the articles have been markedly expanded, as have the entries relating to Russian and Soviet Jewries, in order to include more recently available data.

*

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(*Books listed here may be reviewed later*)

Abramsky, S., *War, Revolution and the Jewish Dilemma*, An Inaugural Lecture delivered at University College London, 28th April 1975, 33 pp., published for the College by H. K. Lewis, London, 1975, 65p.

Adorno, Theodor W., Hans Albert, Ralf Dahrendorf, Jürgen Habermas, Harald Pilot, and Karl R. Popper, *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, xliv + 307 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1976, £6.50 (paperback, £3.90).

Bensimon-Donath, Doris, *L'éducation en Israel*, 406 pp., Editions Anthropos, 12 avenue du Maine, Paris, 1975, n.p.

Elazar, Daniel J., *The Jewish Community of Iran*, ii + 92 pp., Center for Jewish Community Studies, Philadelphia, 1975, n.p.

Eppler, Elizabeth E., ed. and compiler, *International Bibliography of Jewish Affairs 1966–1967, A Select Annotated list of books and articles published outside Israel*, ix + 401 pp., André Deutsch for the Institute of Jewish Affairs in association with the World Jewish Congress, London, 1976, £10.00.

Forester, Tom, *The Labour Party and the Working Class*, x + 166 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1976, £3.75.

Gusfield, Joseph R., *Community, A Critical Response*, xi + 120 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975, £4.00.

Halpérin, Jean and Georges Levitte, eds., *Solitude d'Israel, Données et Débats, VIe Colloque d'Intellectuels juifs de langue française organisé par la Section Française du Congrès Juif Mondial*, ix + 190 pp., Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1975, n.p.

Hiro, Dilip, *The Untouchables of India*, 16 pp., Minority Rights Group, Report No. 26, London, 1975, 45p.

Katz, Elihu and Michael Gurevitch, *The Secularization of Leisure: Culture and Communication in Israel*, 288 pp., Faber & Faber, London, 1976, £6.50.

Miale, Florence R. and Michael Selzer, *The Nuremberg Mind, The Psychology of Nazi leaders*, xiv + 302 pp., Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., New York, 1975, $10.95.

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Roth, Stephen J., *The Helsinki 'Final Act' and Soviet Jewry*, Institute of Jewish Affairs in association with the World Jewish Congress, London, 1975, 50p.

Strasser, Hermann, *The Normative Structure of Sociology, Conservative and Emancipatory Themes in Social Thought*, x + 275 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1976, £6.95 (paperback £3.95).

Tagliacozzo, Amedeo, *I 'Sabra' del Kibbutz, La socializzazione nei villagi collectivi israeliani*, 111 pp., Barulli, Rome, 1975, 3,000 lire.

Williams, Bill, *The Making of Manchester Jewry 1740–1875*, x + 454 pp., Manchester University Press and Holmes & Meier Publishers, Manchester and New York, 1976, £6.00.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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BERMAN, Gerald S.; Ph.D., M.S.W. Research Associate at the Work and Welfare Research Institute, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Formerly Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Michigan. Co-author, 'New Careers: Bridges or Ladders?', *Social Work*, vol. 18, no. 4, July 1973. Currently engaged in research on the work and career adjustment of North American immigrants in Israel.

GARTNER, Lloyd P.; Ph.D. Professor of Modern Jewish History, Tel-Aviv University. Formerly Associate Professor of History at the City College of the City University of New York. Chief Publications: co-author, *History of the Jews of Milwaukee*, Philadelphia, 1963; co-author, *History of the Jews of Los Angeles*, Philadelphia, 1970; *The Jewish Immigrant in England 1870–1914*, 2nd edn., 1973; 'Cecil Roth, Historian of Anglo-Jewry' in D. Noy and I. Ben-Ami, eds., *Studies in the Cultural Life of the Jews in England*, Jerusalem, 1975.

MENDES-FLOHR, Paul R.; M.A., Ph.D. Lecturer in Modern Jewish Thought in the Faculty of Humanities at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Formerly lecturer at the Freie Universität, West Berlin and Visiting Assistant Professor at McGill University. Chief Publications: Co-editor *Texts and Responses. Studies presented to Nahum N. Glatzer*, Leiden, 1975; 'The Road to *I and Thou*: An Inquiry into Buber's Transition from Mysticism to Dialogue' in *ibid*; 'Kan and Rosenzweig: Two Views of Ritual and Religion' in *Studies in Jewish Intellectual History in Honour of Alexander Altmann* edited by K. Bland, J. Reinharz, and D. Swetchinski, 1976; 'Werner Sombart's "The Jews and Modern Capitalism"—An Analysis of its Ideological Premises', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book*, vol. XXX, 1976; ' "Alte und neue Gemeinschaft"—An Unpublished Buber Manuscript', *Association for Jewish Studies Review*, Spring 1976. Currently engaged on a study of the Jewish intellectual in Wilhelmian, Germany.

NEWMAN, Aubrey N.; D.Phil., Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, Reader in History, University of Leicester. Has published *The Stanhopes of Chevening*, London, 1969, and various articles on Anglo-Jewry. His *History of the United Synagogue 1870–1970* is in press. Currently engaged in studies of provincial Anglo-Jewry in Victorian Britain.

SARNA, Jonathan D.; B.A., M.A., B.H.L., Graduate Student in the Department of History at Yale University. Received Patrick T. Campbell Award in History at Brandeis University.

WOLOWELSKY, Joel B., B.S., M.S. Teacher in the Departments of Mathematics and Jewish Philosophy, Yeshivah of Flatbush, Brooklyn, New York. Chief Publications: 'A High School Course in Philosophy of Religion', *Journal of Critical Analysis*, vol. 2, no. 1, April 1970; Editor *Yavneh Studies in Parashat HaShavuah*, 5 volumes, New York, 1969–72; 'A Midrash of Jewish Mourning', *Judaism*, vol. 23, no. 2, Spring 1974; 'A Note on Shabbat Mourning', *Judaism*, vol. 24, no. 1, Winter 1975.

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