THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

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VOLUME XVII: NUMBER 2: DECEMBER 1975

CONTENTS

Aaron Steinberg — *Nahum Goldmann*

In Memoriam, Aaron Steinberg — *Gerhart M. Riegner*

Maurice Freedman — *Percy S. Cohen*

In Memoriam, Maurice Freedman — *Julius Gould*

Anthropological Studies in a Centralized State: The Bernstein Research Project in Israel — *Emanuel Marx*

Age Patterns in the Integration of Soviet Immigrants in Israel — *J. T. Shuval, E. J. Markus, and J. Dotan*

Social Stratification among the Jews of Cochin in India and in Israel — *David G. Mandelbaum*

Contemporary Jewish Studies and the Contemporary Crisis of the Jews (Review Article) — *Howard Brotz*

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The Jewish Journal of Sociology

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CONTENTS

Aaron Steinberg	*Nahum Goldmann*	113
In Memoriam, Aaron Steinberg	*Gerhart M. Riegner*	115
Maurice Freedman	*Percy S. Cohen*	121
In Memoriam, Maurice Freedman	*Julius Gould*	125
Anthropological Studies in a Centralized State: The Bernstein Research Project in Israel	*Emanuel Marx*	131
Age Patterns in the Integration of Soviet Immigrants in Israel	*J. T. Shuval, E. J. Markus, and J. Dotan*	151
Social Stratification among the Jews of Cochin in India and in Israel	*David G. Mandelbaum*	165
Contemporary Jewish Studies and the Contemporary Crisis of the Jews (Review Article)	*Howard Brotz*	211
Book Reviews		215
Chronicle		237
Books Received		243
Notes on Contributors		245

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MAURICE FREEDMAN ז"ל

AARON STEINBERG ז"ל

While this issue was in preparation Maurice Freedman, Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Oxford and Fellow of All Souls, suddenly died on 14 July after a heart attack in his London house. He was 54. This is therefore the last number presided over by its Editor.

Dr. Aaron Steinberg—who conceived this Journal—died on 17 August, aged 84.

We record here our profound and incalculable debt to the two great scholars who, with the late Morris Ginsberg (the first Editor of the *JJS*), gave birth to this *Journal* in 1959.

BOOKS REVIEWED

Author	*Title*	*Reviewer*	*Page*
Roger Adelson	*Mark Sykes, Portrait of an Amateur*	James Parkes	215
Myron J. Aronoff	*Frontiertown, The Politics of Community Building in Israel*	Ernest Krausz	216
Abner Cohen	*Two-Dimensional Man, An essay on the anthropology of power and symbolism in complex society*	Bernice Martin	216
William J. Fishman	*East End Jewish Radicals 1875–1914*	Lloyd P. Gartner	218
Don Handelman and Shlomo Deshen	*The Social Anthropology of Israel: A bibliographical essay with primary reference to loci of social stress*	Maurice Freedman	220
Irving Louis Horowitz	*Israeli Ecstasies/Jewish Agonies*	Ernest Krausz	221
Barry A. Kosmin and Nigel Grizzard	*Jews in an Inner London Borough: A study of the Jewish population of the London Borough of Hackney based on the 1971 Census*	Harold Pollins	223
Noah Lucas	*The Modern History of Israel*	Dan V. Segre	224
Bernard Semmel	*The Methodist Revolution*	David Martin	227
Marshall Sklare, ed.	*The Jew in American Society*	Howard Brotz	211
Marshall Sklare, ed.	*The Jewish Community in America*	Howard Brotz	211
Bryan S. Turner	*Weber and Islam, A critical study*	Michael Gilsenan	229
Bela Vago	*The Shadow of the Swastika, The Rise of Fascism and Anti-Semitism in the Danube Basin, 1936–1939*	Lionel Kochan	230
David H. Weinberg	*Les Juifs à Paris de 1933 à 1939*	Lionel Kochan	231
Meyer W. Weisgal, gen. ed.	*The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann* Volume VI, *Series A. March 1913–July 1914*	James Parkes	232
YIVO Institute	*YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Research,* Volume XV	Lloyd P. Gartner	233
Israel Zinberg	*Italian Jewry in the Renaissance Era, A History of Jewish Literature,* Volume IV	Arnaldo Momigliano	235

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Notes should follow the style of this *Journal* and should be given at the end of the article in numerical sequence according to the order of their citation in the text.

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AARON STEINBERG (1891–1975)

DR. AARON STEINBERG died quietly, nearly anonymously, as he had lived. The silence and modesty of his life are especially impressive in a period of Jewish history in which emotionalism, hysteria, and constant noises determine a good part of its aspect and atmosphere. Steinberg's extraordinary figure was like a remnant of older Jewish centuries, when the nobility of character, the encyclopaedic knowledge, and the noble quiet virtues of most great figures of Jewish life characterized and dominated our history. The wonderful legend of the Thirty-Six Just—who form the basis of human existence and whose names have to remain secret and hidden—is one of the most fascinating concepts in Jewish religion and ethics. If there are indeed such thirty-six *Tsaddikim* in our generation, Steinberg was assuredly one of them.

With regard to both his intellect and his character, Aaron Steinberg was a personification of the most classical type of Jewish leadership. The range of his knowledge, both Judaic and general, was extraordinary. He spoke many languages and was familiar with the literatures of Russia as well as of Western European civilization; and he was also, of course, a justly renowned scholar of everything Jewish.

His personality combined many aspects, apparently contradictory, which he managed nevertheless to mould into a harmonious whole. He was a revolutionary, yet full of gentleness, peacefulness, and goodheartedness. He was deeply religious and at the same time he was tolerant, hating all fanaticism. He was a deeply loyal and passionate Jew, but a great humanist and universalist in his knowledge and interests, in his thinking and in his character.

I have occasionally said that Jewish survival was based on two types of leader: on the one hand, the *Canaim*, the Fanatics; and on the other hand, the *Tsaddikim*, the Just. The former, by their intransigence and their refusal to make concessions and compromises explain to a large extent the miraculous survival of the Jewish nation in the last two thousand years in conditions of life which hardly any other people could have endured. But had the Jewish people been led by the Fanatics, they would have disintegrated. Those who maintained the integrity of the Jewish nation, and secured its cohesion, were the *Tsaddikim*. And Steinberg was one of them.

Those who had the privilege of knowing him and working with him felt the blessing of his personality. Whenever they were in his presence,

his qualities of intellectual leadership were outstanding, and were particularly apparent when over a period of more than two decades he directed the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress.

He must have left manuscripts of great significance. It is to be devoutly hoped that everything that can be done will be done in order to publish them.

He had been ailing for many years, and his friends were prepared for his death. Now that it has come, it has diminished Jewish moral and intellectual life. In the hearts and souls of those who knew him, he will remain an unforgettable man. Although he shunned fanfare, he was one of the truly great figures of his generation.

NAHUM GOLDMANN

IN MEMORIAM

AARON STEINBERG, 1891–1975

WE have come here* together this evening to honour and pay tribute to the memory of a man whom many of us regarded not only as a friend but also as a teacher—a man whom we loved and revered. It is fitting that we come together in this very room, where for 25 years, day in day out, assisted by his loyal assistant and friend Mrs. A. Klausner, he laboured for the Jewish people. In this room, every brick in the walls is still marked by his spirit.

It is very difficult to speak briefly of such a rich personality, of such a gifted man who had such a variety of interests; particularly when one has as many and as vivid memories as I have. I had the privilege of seeing him and talking to him in many places; sometimes we were together for weeks at a time here in London, or in Geneva, New York, Florence, Montevideo, Algiers, Israel—or wherever we attended conferences together.

I will try to say a few words about Aaron Steinberg, the human being; Aaron Steinberg, the Jew; and Aaron Steinberg, a leader of the World Jewish Congress. But any division I make is artificial, for there has rarely been a personality as integrated as his in whatever he did or undertook or in whatever he said or wrote.

Let me say a few words about the man, the human being. He was descended from a great Russian Jewish family—of whom anyone would be proud. He was an aristocrat in the real sense of the word: he belonged to an aristocracy of the kind developed only by the great Jewish families of the past. At the same time, his was a background deeply rooted in Russian culture. He was a gentleman, in thought and deed. He was a warm person, open to every human being he encountered. He was deeply religious—not ostentatious in his religious manifestations and even ambivalent in his relationship with the official religious establishment, but nevertheless a really committed religious person. At the same time he was tolerant, never trying to force his opinions on others but rather hoping to convince them by his own example. Above all, he had respect and a genuine sense of brotherhood for every human being.

* Address delivered at a memorial meeting held in Congress House, London, on 13 November 1975.

And he had a unique gift for communicating with people, for establishing warm human contact with complete strangers in the space of a few minutes. On one of the very numerous occasions on which I saw him make use of this gift, he engaged in conversation a Montevideo taxi driver—with whom he really had nothing in common—and in five minutes the man had told him the whole story of his life and they had found a point of common ground between them. Some people even criticized him for wasting too much time on persons, who, after all, were not all that important. But this commitment to brotherhood impelled him voluntarily to make that sacrifice of his time because he knew what it meant to the other man, particularly when the latter was of a more humble condition. He knew that the other man's sense of dignity was enhanced by the feeling that someone else understood him and cared about his hopes and worries.

He had a uniquely universal outlook in the great humanist tradition —this was perhaps the hallmark of his personality. He was a doctor of law, and very proud of it; he told me many times, 'I'm also a lawyer.' He wrote an important book on the Russian parliamentary system. He was a genuine philosopher; in his young years he was professor of philosophy at the University of St. Petersburg, and secretary of that city's philosophical society; he wrote an outstanding work on the idea of freedom in Dostoievsky; he was at home with German philosophy, Bergson, Sartre, Pascal, etc. He was a historian, not only because he translated Dubnow's *World History of the Jewish People*, but in his own right. He was in reality a philosopher of history; the sense of history—what it meant and what it can mean, what it can teach and where it can lead us—was the great problem with which he struggled all his life. He was also a sociologist, and it was no accident that the idea of *The Jewish Journal of Sociology* came from him and that it was created under his leadership.

He was a man of great artistic gifts. His wife sometimes used to tell me that we did not really know Aaron, that the real Aaron was the artist, the man who had written plays and novels which we had never read. But you could see his artistic ability when he described some event he had witnessed, when he suddenly started imitating people, when he tried to convey a scene of history by assuming the various roles of those involved in it.

His was, in brief, a many-faceted personality; he was a polyhistor. But, though a great scholar, he did not live in an ivory tower; he had both feet on the ground, and followed developments in politics as well as in the spiritual and intellectual world. He not only followed these developments, but at the same time sought a way in which man could help to influence events and thus aid God to complete the Creation which is never finished.

Let me say a few words about Aaron Steinberg the Jew. The most

important and decisive element of his Jewishness was the concept of the Jewish people—the Jewish *Weltvolk*, in Dubnow's words—and that idea brought him to the World Jewish Congress. His concept of Judaism was universalist, it was all-embracing. As I said before, he was deeply committed to religious Judaism, to *halakha*, which he considered binding on himself; but he accepted other trends and factors as well. He admitted the validity of all trends of Judaism, of all forms of Jewish self-expression and thought, no matter where it came from—secular, religious, Zionist, Yiddishist, Sephardi, Socialist, or whatever. His concept of Judaism was based on an attitude of positive neutralism vis-à-vis every creative contribution to Jewish life. Just as the trends were important and each of them was to be admitted and recognized, so were what he called the various 'tribes' of the Jewish people, meaning the different communities: the Russian Jewish community, the Polish, the French, the German, the Anglo-Saxon, and so on. Each had its special characteristics, its special gifts and shortcomings; each was a current and an offshoot of the one great stream of Jewish tradition which assured the creative survival, the uninterrupted continuity, of the Jewish people.

Judaism for him had a special mission in the world. It was often the catalyst; it was often the test of judging and measuring other ideas and other developments. I should not have been surprised, had he seen what is going on at the United Nations today, if he had pointed his finger at us and said, 'You see, it is again on the Jewish question that the world will be judged.'

Culture was for him the great spring of the creativity of man: all the national cultures of the peoples of the world, including Jewish culture, flowed into and enriched that spring, and together led to the many-faceted universal culture of man. It was no accident that he was particularly at home in U.N.E.S.C.O.: originally, the great concept of U.N.E.S.C.O. was that of the friendly competition of all the great cultural contributions of mankind which were to blend into a vast current propelling mankind into progress. It was no accident that Aaron Steinberg devoted many long months to one U.N.E.S.C.O. undertaking in particular—the publication of *The History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind*. He was deeply convinced that unless the Jewish people as such, and its special contribution to civilization, were recognized by the world, the Jews would not be acknowledged as a people standing on an equal footing with other nations. I still see him reading the scripts of nine of these enormous tomes written by eminent scholars, volume by volume, and making hundreds of suggestions for a fitting acknowledgement of the many Jewish contributions to civilization, century by century.

This great stream of universal culture (in which the Jewish contribution was merged) also flowed through him himself: his Judaism;

his deep roots in Russian culture; the great influence which German philosophy and the German classics had on him; his familiarity with French literature, art, and philosophy; his being at home with the great creative periods of Italy—all that was fused into a unique harmony, which I had the privilege of observing on many occasions. I vividly recall our staying together for several weeks in Florence on the occasion of a U.N.E.S.C.O. General Conference; his speaking to me of the influence of the great legal men of Bologna in the Middle Ages; his telling me of his philosophic studies in Italy; and our visiting together the great monuments of the Renaissance in Florence, Siena, and Pisa. There he was at home; every form of human self-expression flowed through him and joined in a unique oneness.

Let me end with a few words on Aaron Steinberg's contribution to the World Jewish Congress. It was a great honour for the W.J.C that a man of his unique calibre chose to serve it. It was typical of him that he accepted the task, because he was not only a great scholar and a great thinker but also a man of practical dimensions and action. In this very room, during the Second World War, there met the so-called Research Committee of the World Jewish Congress, which was the first body to prepare a post-war programme for the Jewish people. In this very room Dr. Steinberg gathered around him a number of outstanding and unique personalities from every walk of life—great scholars and great human beings—to study and discuss the problem. From around this table came some of the most revolutionary ideas, such as the concept of crimes against humanity, which became one of the bases of the Nuremberg Trials. It was from this very table that the request for collective compensation, for reparations to the Jewish people after the collapse of the Nazi regime, was carefully considered in very concrete terms. And it was from this very table that—to my knowledge, for the first time in Jewish history—a real concept of a cultural foreign policy of the Jewish people emerged. That was well before the State of Israel was created. (The idea that the Jewish people had to be represented in an international cultural organization was later, of course, to lead to his practical work in U.N.E.S.C.O. and elsewhere.)

He was also involved in all our major political discussions. Our friend Alex Easterman, who is here with us this evening, is I think the only remaining witness to these passionate discussions which took place during and after the war—discussions on the question of East and West and on relations with the Christian churches and with the cultures of Asia and the Third World. Aaron Steinberg was one of the first to understand those problems; he was deeply involved in all of them, and he has left his imprint on many of the policies which were eventually adopted.

He often played the devil's advocate, advancing any negative argument he could think of so that matters might be discussed from every

angle and the discussion pushed to its logical conclusion. He made use of his encyclopaedic knowledge and of his sense of history. He knew that if you want to meet the demands of today you have to anticipate what may happen tomorrow, and that planning, foresight, and long-range thinking were the most important elements in every political move.

In conclusion, I would like to say that perhaps his most outstanding quality, which overshadowed everything else, was his absolute independence. He was a man of independent judgement; he was nobody's tool; he would not swim with the stream; and, as a result, from time to time he was even very unpopular. He was often intentionally provocative, in order to make people see the consequences of their action: his task was to make others think, to guide them in their independent thinking, and to make them see through (and beware of) the slogans of the day.

It was comforting, in times like those in which we live, to see a man who—despite today's secularism, materialism, and conformism—tried to show us that it is still possible to live as an independent thinker and man of action and also as a truly religious person. It is refreshing as well as comforting that he showed us that the choice of freedom is possible in our time. And that is perhaps the greatest message he has left us.

He was a man of great labours; he has left numerous works and writings, some of which, unfortunately, are forgotten. A number of them are going to be published or republished, and thus his real originality and his real greatness will become available to a wider public. But apart from what he did and wrote and achieved, there was the man himself: a unique example of the universalistic Jewish spirit.

We shall not forget him. May his memory be blessed.

GERHART M. RIEGNER

MAURICE FREEDMAN

ALL of you will, I am sure, agree that pure eulogy is not necessarily the strongest tribute one can pay to a man: at least, not to a man like Maurice Freedman.* Nor, I am sure, is it something that those who loved him most would want. Pure eulogy is not true to a man and to speak of Maurice and not to be true to him would be to do exactly what Maurice himself would never do or want one to do. How unfitting it would be. And yet, what else is there? Maurice was not a perfect man, but a whole man: yet I cannot believe that he ever deliberately committed an act of spite or of vindictiveness. He may, in moments of anger, have been attracted to such acts. He was capable of anger or even, occasionally, of fury. He could wound with a remark that would make unswervingly for its target. But the damage from such remarks was temporary, if not slight. For, in all his dealings. Maurice lived up to the highest standards of decency and propriety. He was generous—perhaps, in some circumstances, almost to a fault. But not in a self-serving way and not to win approval where fairness and justice would dictate that he act otherwise. If he thought it right to be discreet rather than to gain approval by an indiscretion—even that seemingly discreet and guarded form of indiscretion which is designed to protect the indiscreet and to increase the value of the indiscretion—he remained discreet. He had an intuitive sense as well as an intellectual conviction that we act well—properly, honourably, fairly—only if we create rules and if we hold to them rather than simply rely on our better natures. He might, therefore, have given the impression (especially to those who did not know him well) that he was a stickler for rules and that he over-valued conformity and conservatism. But that would be poor judgement indeed, particularly for someone who claimed to know him well. For his moral commitment was deep inside him, not something given to him by the dictates of rule-books or even of custom. It was this which enabled him to judge when and how to apply different and often conflicting principles. In circumstances which demanded it of him he would, having made up his mind, hold firm. But he would never deny that he might at the time have felt uncertain. He opposed moral casualness; he did not propose moral infallibility.

I first encountered Maurice—and I use the word 'encountered' deliberately—about 25 years ago. I was, at the time, an undergraduate,

* Address delivered on 16 July 1975 at Hoop Lane Jewish Cemetery, London, before the Burial Service.

he a junior teacher of the Anthropology Department at the London School of Economics. I think that he and Judith then lived in Green Street. He liked to wear a dark suit, with a dark shirt and a bright red tie. There was about him then a touch of the bohemian; but he was clearly a serious and very determined scholar. Even an undergraduate could recognize that. He was standing quite near to his room on the second floor—he would never allow it to be called an office—when he noticed a Chinese student passing by. 'Forgive me,' he said—I had never heard his voice before, though I had seen him, here and there. It was clear, commanding, and precise but the tone and manner were extremely polite; there was no 'redundancy' as they now say in a jargon which he would doubtless have reacted to with Talmudic silence, accompanied only by a shake of the head and a small incredulous smile. 'Forgive me,' he said, 'if you have a moment to spare, would you be kind enough to help me with a translation problem I have?'

I knew him little during the remainder of my undergraduate days. (I even thought at the time that Judith was the wife of an ambassador.) He did not teach me then, though he did later—when I was a graduate student. But I soon came to recognize that quality which could, in those days, make Maurice appear formidable if one knew nothing more about him: he had that capacity to deflate pretentious verbiage and portentousness. Soon after I became a graduate student, I was presenting a paper to a seminar and explaining how I proposed to set about doing my fieldwork. I did not really know how I was going to do it, so I just let the words join themselves together and allowed ideas to spread themselves over pages and pages. When I had done and others had had their say—luckily they had played my game and there was world enough and time for me to learn the hard way—Maurice commented: 'In short, you're proposing to look at some different ways in which Yemeni immigrants form communities in Israel, you're going to look out for features which these communities may have in common and you're going to ask whether there is something peculiarly Yemini about them.' 'Yes,' I replied. What else could I say? I had already spent an hour saying less.

It was several years later that my wife and I really came to know the Freedmans and to experience those marvels of kindness and generosity of which they were almost effortlessly capable. And, although Maurice was not my supervisor, he always found time to talk to me about my work and to help with advice which always went direct to the heart of the matter. It was then that he taught me a rule which I have tried never to forget: the more complex the matter you are dealing with, the greater the effort you should make to write about it as though it were simple. I found nothing more difficult and demanding; and yet nothing, in that part of my life, more rewarding.

There will doubtless be other occasions for others to appraise

Maurice's work and to comment on the flawlessly elegant style in which he wrote. But, just in case anyone omits to say so, I shall anticipate their efforts to state that, superb scholar though he was, Maurice was more than a scholar. He had an almost unerring sense for the significant problem and a capacity for originality of thought not always acknowledged: for his ideas were never preceded by tiresome preambles or fanfares of one sort or another. Nor was his writing ever ostentatiously adorned with superfluous signs of learning and culture. Yet, no one reading his work or even speaking to him could doubt that he was a man of great literary sensibility and judgement. He never found it necessary to remind one that he read widely or that he knew what was happening in areas of scholarship, the arts, and life in general—areas which were not those closest to his own fields.

He could be dismissive, but then persuaded to have second thoughts. He could be impatient of vagueness but, in the end, persevere, even with the most seemingly aimless of research students. He might not have suffered fools *gladly*—who does, not even other fools do—but he would never bully a defenceless person, whether fool or otherwise. He was, as a teacher, marvellously disciplined and disciplining, inspired and inspiring. He was truly gifted, but never a prima donna.

I have said nothing of his humour which was often brilliant. And he was a good audience for a really good joke. He once sat behind me at a conference at which a colleague read a paper containing a rather uncompressed version of a very long myth. When the reader paused for breath after completing the account of the myth, Maurice leaned forward and said in Yiddish: *A ganse meguilah.* That phrase means, 'What an unnecessarily long story that was'; and it implies 'Who has time to listen!' But, of course, the word *meguilah* can refer to a legend or, I suppose, to a myth.* The double entendre was unmistakably Maurice's style. I need hardly add that he commented, a little later, as though to complete his sentence: 'But what a remarkable paper.'

Maurice with his individuality of life-style and his catholicity of tastes and interests, with all his boundless curiosity about man and his varied cultural works, sensed and recognized that all men who are whole men, fallible and imperfectible men, must live and feel deeply through some particular cultural forms of their own. Maurice was fully an Englishman and fully a Jew. Does that sound logically impossible? Perhaps a better formulation would make it not so. He would have known one. We shall all feel and know exactly whom we have lost.

PERCY S. COHEN

* The Hebrew word *meguilah* does not literally mean a legend. It means something which unfolds or or something which rolls on and on. In its common Yiddish usage it means a story which runs on and on. But a common Hebrew usage known to many Yiddish speakers is that of ' Meguilat Esther'—the book of Esther: a legend if not a myth.

IN MEMORIAM

MAURICE FREEDMAN 1920–75

Maurice Freedman, Professor of Social Anthropology at Oxford, Fellow of All Souls College, and Editor of this Journal, died after a sudden heart attack in his London house on 14 July 1975. With his untimely passing the international social science community has lost one of its most distinguished and respected members. Few of his many friends have, at the time I write these words, fully absorbed the blow. I cannot presume to measure the loss sustained by his devoted wife—Dr. Judith Freedman, who shared with him the editing of this Journal—and by his family. They will know, as was attested by the large gathering that accompanied Maurice to the graveside on that empty July day, that their grief is widely shared and that memories of Maurice's quality, as a man and as a scholar, will long survive his death.

The man and the scholar, in this case, are hard to distinguish. Maurice Freedman did not fit the stereotypes of modern academic man. He travelled widely, but his habitat remained the library rather than the airport lounge. He was a highly productive writer, gifted with an encyclopaedic range of knowledge—but, assisted as he always was by Judith, his work did not rest upon the distant management of research assistants. He was a skilled organizer of research programmes—notably of the remarkable London-Cornell Project on research in South-East Asia—but his leadership rested, first and foremost, on intellectual authority. He was an acute, vigilant, and fearless member of committees, both inside and outside the University world; but he never became a perpetual committee-man bent on bureaucratizing the life of the mind. He was a patient, ingenious, exacting, and much-loved teacher; but he did not romanticize his pupils for their youth nor did he seek popularity by mistaking his geese for swans. He saw very clearly the critical tensions that were developing between scholarship and the educational apparatus of our time—between the ambition of the individual scholar to pursue truth and excellence as he, or she, understands it and the pressures exerted on the modern university both by governments and by its mass clientele. He was not one of those who relished the broker's role which this situation provides for senior academics—one which they can embrace while distancing themselves from the search for truth, compensating for their own under-achievement, sometimes even hating the scholars whose costs and benefits they so loftily assess.

The anthropology which he practised was, in its detail and in his mastery of detail, a highly technical achievement. Its richness will, one hopes and expects, be both mined and assessed by his fellow professionals. But it was not only for them that he illuminated the exotica of Chinese and overseas-Chinese life, to the analysis of which he devoted almost thirty years. Those who did not specialize in Chinese social institutions could, and did, read with profit what he wrote (for example his book on *Chinese Lineage and Society*) as much for the elegance of his prose as for the courtesy and judgement with which he expounded and dissected views which he found it impossible to accept. These qualities were even more striking in his public lectures—notably his Malinowski Memorial Lecture in 1962 on 'A Chinese Phase in Social Anthropology' and his inaugural lecture as Professor at the London School of Economics entitled 'Rites and Duties, or Chinese Marriage'. The same qualities were to be seen in his work on non-Chinese subjects—for which, to one's continuing admiration, he was able to find both time and energy. Thus, to the study of the relations between 'races' (in Britain and elsewhere) he brought the same unwavering curiosity and professionalism as he devoted to Chinese geomancy or marriage rules. But the detail and the technique neither submerged him as a writer and a lecturer nor blocked his view of the overall purpose of the enterprise. That purpose was at once scholarly and compassionate—shaped by a sense of what was abiding in anthropology and other social sciences and what was open (at the level of theory and of method) to changing circumstance. 'It is in the nature of the subject', he wrote in his chapter in the forthcoming UNESCO volume *International Study on the Main Trends of Research in the Field of the Social and Human Sciences (Second Part)*,

> . . . that it is sensitive not only to the intellectual mutations among its fellow subjects, such that it moves its frontiers back and forth and changes its mind on a score of theoretical issues, but also to the fate of the human material of which it treats. . . . From time to time it may puff itself up in scientific pride, but its dominant mood is one of deep humility before the facts of human experience and of tenderness towards its sufferings.

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There can be no doubt that the incisiveness at which he aimed could appear (and sometimes was) dismissive, deflating or curt. He was conscious of his intellectual strengths—showing that self-esteem without which, I believe, it is hardly possible to esteem the quality of others. But there were also great stores of affection—sheltered by a sense of reserve and, at times, of formality. (In this, as in some other ways, he resembled, without imitating, Morris Ginsberg.) He enjoyed and embellished a conversation; he was a genial host; he had a rapier-like wit and tongue, allied to great clarity of mind. There were people and

policies that one knew he detested—but he never paraded these feelings nor allowed them to be swamped by malice or indiscretion. He understood the nuances of the English class structure as only someone who is marginal to it can do: but he was not over-awed by it nor were his reactions to people and situations governed by the snobberies or the defensiveness which so often deform the successful intellectual in this country. I think, with humility, that he 'understood' most of his colleagues and friends far better than they often realized—and when they did realize it they were sometimes, shall we say, disconcerted. . . . And, of course, they could rarely deploy in 'understanding' him the same range of cultural insights and social sensitivities.

He seldom despaired—there was always too much to discover and to write. But sometimes in the late 1960s, when, on occasion, his spirits had been lowered, he played with the thought of leaving the organized academic world and enjoying the leisure, the self-sufficiency and productivity of 'independent' scholarship. We talked then, as often, of his deep loyalty to, and concern for, the London School of Economics and Political Science, where he had studied and taught since 1946—and of the claims which great institutions of learning make upon those fortunate to live within their walls. To the winding corridors of the L.S.E. and to its intellectual community Maurice Freedman gave loyal and anxious service: he was still a Governor of the School at the time of his death. And when, in 1970, the call came from Oxford (as two years earlier I had told him it should come) he found further reserves of loyalty and affection—without abandoning his earlier connexions and friendships. He found a new congenial circle in the ancient fellowship of All Souls College. His translation from his Chair at the L.S.E. to the Chair at Oxford was not without its pains and frustrations. In his wide-ranging conversations there were, in the Oxford years, issues upon which he was conspicuously silent and discreet. Oxford was full of new pathways and folkways—its 'disorganization' he alternately admired and found exasperating. He came to them from the outside, but in time he found, with his customary charm and shrewdness, ways of living with and, on occasion, beating the system—or, rather, lack of system. But in so doing he never parted from the standards of conduct he set for himself and which he expected others to follow.

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It was not by accident that he became involved in Jewish studies. He once wrote, all too fleetingly, of 'the concurrent dissolution and rebirth of religion within the Jewish fold—secularization and revival in one'. Certainly—as his Chinese researches prove—he was fascinated by the interweaving of religion and other social institutions. He was not himself a religious Jew but never during the decades of our friendship did he

conceal his Jewish background and interests. On the contrary, he was able—despite his other concerns—to give very serious attention to Jewish social studies. He was also able to deal in his own fashion with the problems of being Jewish and English: and, indeed, there is no 'universal' mode of coping with those problems or, let it be said, of pretending that, in our enlightened times, they do not exist. He was drawn to the systematic study of the Jews in part by his wider sociological interest in minorities. As he put it at the end of a long review—succintly entitled '*Jews, Chinese, And Some Others*' (*British Journal of Sociology*, vol. X, no. 1, March 1959):

> . . . we are still only in the first stages of a sociology which will clarify our understanding of the interplay between minority and host, and sort out the structural changes from the mass of social and cultural data offered by the observers.

To that sociology his own essay in the book about British Jews which he edited, *A Minority in Britain* (published in 1955), was a characteristically acute and trenchant contribution. It so remains. Readers of this Journal will also recall his extensive book reviews and his paper (*J.J.S.*, vol. IV, no. 1, 1962, p. 92 et seq.) on 'The Jewish Population of Great Britain'—as well as his Noah Barou Memorial Lecture (1957), one product of his long involvement in the cultural and research activities of the World Jewish Congress. And, of course, in the editing of this Journal to the highest standards, again with the professional support of his wife, he was a worthy successor to Morris Ginsberg and Aaron Steinberg—the other founding fathers of the *J.J.S.* His interest in matters Jewish was governed also by his regard for what he called 'variousness' or 'difference'. 'The hardest thing in the social sciences', he wrote (*J.J.S.*, vol. 15, no. 1, 1973, p. 120):

> . . . is to gain an understanding of the categories of exotic societies and how those categories fit together. One form of liberalism and largeness of spirit is to strive to understand difference where it exists and to honour it by the effort so made.

That sense of 'liberalism and largeness of spirit' has been played down by many recent and intolerant intellectual fashions. But it informed Maurice Freedman's attitude towards his fellow-Jews as well as to distant, exotic peoples. It also informed his sympathies towards Israel and its diverse society. From 1956 onwards he visited Israel many times. Twice after the 1973 Israel-Arab war he was invited to President Katzir's special conferences on Israel's links with the Diaspora. At the first of those conferences, in December 1973, he surveyed British and British-Jewish reactions to the Yom Kippur War. And in that address (published in The *Yom Kippur War, Israel and the Jewish People*, edited by Moshe Davis, p. 162 ff.) he showed how a Jew, deeply committed to Israel's welfare

and progress, conscious too that 'nobody from outside has the right to tell Israelis what they must do', could, none the less, criticize Israeli attitudes, constructively and without giving offence. Active as he had been, and was to remain, in the cultural groups in Britain which sought to defend Israel against her highly organized detractors, he pointed out —with obvious and controlled distaste—how 'the social cosmology of the liberal imagination' had in 1973 so little room for Israel. And he reminded his audience of the limited role of British intellectuals in influencing British foreign policy:

> Government and politics in Britain are swayed by other forces—as perhaps Israelis may have already concluded from observations of British Jewry, which, in its unintellectual and political behaviour, will have given a clue to the nature of the society within which it is embedded.

He combined a love for and a realism about Britain—a society in which he also was embedded—with a love and hard-headed concern for Israel. The integrity with which he balanced those affections was clear for all to see—whether or not they were English and whether or not they were Jewish.

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Maurice Freedman was not alone, in the last decade, in sensing that in Western Europe we had come to the end of an era—an end symbolized for many by the Yom Kippur War, the oil crisis, and the Western failure of nerve in response to that crisis. He also saw—and at times was made to suffer from—the intellectual and moral disarray through which the academy and the social sciences have passed since the mid-1960s. He saw (indeed fore-saw) how his own discipline would be affected and would confront, in a new situation, the age-old issues between disinterested scholarship and its practical application. He did not believe that these issues would be rapidly or permanently or uniformly resolved. What he would insist upon is that they be faced and discussed in rational terms: he would have no place for the obscurantism, or facile relativism, that undermined such rationality. 'Our own title to civilization must be kept alive by our capacity to view the world impartially.' That in 1962 was his platform in support of a more sustained attention to Asian languages and cultures. It summarized, of course, a theme of much wider relevance. It was a theme which dominated his life: and it will give, as we recall that life, a fresh urgency and purpose to our own.

JULIUS S. GOULD

ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDIES IN A CENTRALIZED STATE: MAX GLUCKMAN AND THE BERNSTEIN ISRAEL RESEARCH PROJECT

Emanuel Marx

Max Gluckman's initiatives

THIS is a preliminary evaluation of one of the more ambitious research schemes to be attempted in social anthropology. The Bernstein Israel Research Project was initiated at the University of Manchester in 1963, and has up to now resulted in six books and numerous articles. More publications are in press and others will appear in years to come.[1] The project constitutes the first concerted effort by a group of social anthropologists to explore an industrialized state since Warner's Yankee City studies (1930–35), and should in the long run significantly influence the course of anthropological studies. It has also helped to establish social anthropology as an academic discipline in Israeli universities, and provided the impetus for continued anthropological research there. Max Gluckman directed the scheme from its inception. He chose me to assist him in its running, and I developed a profound admiration for his analytical powers, his unflagging energy and his fundamental honesty. Over the years we also became very close friends. On 14 April 1975 Max Gluckman died in Jerusalem; his work lives on, and the fruits of the research project to which he devoted the best part of twelve years will continue to be garnered.

Max Gluckman was born in Johannesburg in 1911. His parents were prominent members of the South African Jewish community; his father was a lawyer and his mother was one of the founders and leaders of Zionism in the country. At the University of Witwaterstrand he studied both law and social anthropology. The latter subject eventually became his specialism. His social background determined his major research interests: Africa, law, and Jewish identification are all represented in his work, though the emphasis varied at times. First and foremost he was an Africanist and all his major writings were focused on Africa.

Most of his fieldwork was done in Southern Africa, mainly among the Zulu and Barotse. As Director of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute from 1941 to 1947, he brought together a number of brilliant young scholars, several of whom later followed him to Manchester University, when in 1949 he became its first Professor of Social Anthropology. Gluckman often spoke about the joy and excitement of discovery he shared with his small group of students and colleagues, and about the impact of their co-ordinated research on social anthropology. His legal training also stood him in good stead; many of his writings were in the anthropology of law, and he became one of the acknowledged leaders in the field.

The Jewish element in Gluckman's background came to the fore only in later years. His parents had emigrated from Lithuania; while not practising Jews, they mostly associated with Jews, were proud of their Jewish heritage, and became active in the Zionist movement. His two brothers and sister moved to Israel, and their parents eventually followed. So that when in 1963 Sidney (now Lord) Bernstein and members of his family offered to finance research on Jewish immigrants in Israel, Gluckman avidly grasped the opportunity. From then on much of his time was devoted to the Israeli research scheme. Overburdened with commitments to write and teach in many corners of the world, he never managed to realize his intention to study the South African Jewish settlers. But he spent long hours administering the project, which had assumed unforeseen proportions. He personally taught the prospective field workers his brand of social anthropology, advising them to follow their material wherever it led them and to open their eyes and ears and shut their mouths. He inculcated a healthy respect for facts, and a sceptical attitude to glib theories, while insisting that every piece of work had to make a theoretical contribution; he went as far as teaching the Israelis idiomatic English, and the Americans what he considered to be proper English; he visited the members of the research team in the field, and helped them in their difficulties. In our periodical field-seminars, he usually listened patiently; but sometimes discussed the papers with some heat, while he helped the field-workers to clarify and refine their ideas. He rarely tried to impose his own point of view; he went painstakingly over the several drafts of each chapter of the theses, spotted the central idea, and helped the student to sharpen the analysis; at the same time he corrected the English style and eradicated such abominations as 'gotten' and 'finalize'; and when at last he had rushed his students through their final examinations, he made every effort to get their work published speedily. During his last years, while he battled with ill health, there were many times when he felt and expressed the keen pleasure of being involved in a wide ranging and in many ways innovative, research scheme, and training yet another generation of social anthropologists. He often remarked that he was lucky to have

been given a second chance to become the centre of 'a group united in exciting discourse about shared problems.'[2]

The project

I shall now briefly relate how the research scheme began and how it developed. The donors had in mind a study of the in-gathering of the Jews in Israel; they felt that this unique historical event was well worth recording and examining. In response to their suggestion, Gluckman and Emrys Peters worked out a detailed proposal,[3] which provided for

a. comparative studies of family and kinship among different ethnic groups;
b. intensive community studies of a limited region, to provide comparative data on varieties of leadership and political organization;
c. studies of interaction between different ethnic communities in urban enclaves and in factories;
d. if possible, studies of old-established Jewish and non-Jewish communities, as well as a continuing study of some groups over a period of seven years, in order to show any changes.

The study was defined in very general terms, so as to allow the field-workers free choice of their subjects. Gluckman felt strongly that leadership should be exercised not in the choice of the subject for research and the type of analysis, but in an insistence on rigorous standards of field-work and on a close relationship between data and theory. Such an approach may raise eyebrows in a world where so many affairs, including social research, are often run centralistically, and where a major research project is judged not so much by its results as by its size, its cost, and the brilliance of its planning and execution. A race of academic entrepreneurs has sprung up, whose members skim much of the money available for research, possess much influence within and outside their universities, and often also obtain honours traditionally reserved for intellectual achievement. At the time, I felt that more direction was needed, and in a seminar for the first field-workers recruited for the scheme I suggested a theoretical framework for the study of the absorption of immigrants.[4] I hoped that research would focus on that issue, which I then thought was central to the understanding of the 'ingathering of the exiles'. As events turned out, all our field-workers provided important insights into that problem, but none treated it exhaustively. Instead, they appeared to be attracted to a few types of society, and at first this seemed to justify my demand for more direction. Of the ten studies carried out under the auspices of the Bernstein research project, four were on cooperative small holdings (*moshavim*), three on new towns (the so-called 'development towns'), two on communal settlements (*kibbutzim*), and one on a sheltered

urban workshop for old people. This was neither a representative sample of Israel as a whole, nor did it promise to become a study of the adaptation of immigrants, since some of the populations investigated had been settled for many years. Over the years it became clear that this 'clustering' around a small number of research areas was mostly beneficial, and I had to admit that Gluckman had been right. There were several reasons for that.

First, it facilitated communication among members of the research scheme. They got together both in frequent informal meetings of two or three people and in formal seminars attended by all members of staff. There they freely and generously exchanged information and ideas, which enabled them to draw comparisons and check hypotheses. Perhaps surprisingly, that interaction reinforced their individual research interests. Thus each of the four staff members who worked in *moshavim* concentrated on certain problems and, in other areas, he could rely on the work of his colleagues, and could incorporate ideas common to all of them. In this manner all were able to co-operate in research and at the same time to compete for intellectual distinction. In other circumstances, direct competition among scholars may inhibit the free exchange of data and theory; in this case, the effects of specialization were beneficial.

Second, it was too much to expect one research project, even such a large one, to explore every aspect of 'Israeli society', but there was no harm in studying only selected aspects or segments of that society. Gluckman himself initiated a second research scheme which was to carry on from where the first had left off. Each of the three projected studies was to 'deal with relationships between a primary social unit and the general social milieu'. One study examined the links between a new town and the wider political system (M. J. Aronoff); another, regional co-operation among farming communities (E. Baldwin); and the third, dockworkers in one of the ports (L. Mars). Furthermore, some of Gluckman's former students, and their students in turn, extended the range of subjects covered, so that now we possess a picture of many facets of Israel more detailed than we had expected. The subjects investigated include, in chronological order, the only detailed study of an industrial plant, the assembly room of a television factory (D. Izraeli); the politics and marriage patterns of former Bedouin settled on the outskirts of a city in central Israel (G. Kressel); a group of small Arab villages in central Israel (J. Ginat); one of the oldest *moshavim*, many of whose members are raising turkeys on an industrial scale (N. Nevo); women prisoners and their relations to the world outside (O. Greenberg); the small Arab population in Jaffa (M. Shokeid); new immigrants from Georgia and their adaptation (Y. Elam); Beduin settled in a government-sponsored village near Beersheba (G. Lewando); the politics of an old people's home (H. Hazan);

and, finally, a slum area in Tel-Aviv (R. Ogen). Most of the research is complete or nearing completion and some works are already in press. That third wave of studies complements earlier ones; it is largely concerned with the Arab population and with urban problems.

The influence of earlier work on our research cannot be overrated. We built on the foundations laid by other anthropologists, as evidenced by the choice of research areas. In some instances, a direct line of descent can be traced, such as in the case of our studies of *moshavim*: both Deshen and Shokeid had previously done similar work under the guidance of Alexander Weingrod. Ideas found in Weingrod's *Reluctant Pioneers* (1966) and in D. Willner's *Nation-Building and Community in Israel* (1969) were taken up and developed. Our work on Arab villagers and Bedouin developed the ideas of H. Rosenfeld, A. Cohen and E. Marx.[5] The last two were trained by E. L. Peters at Manchester, and owed much to his work in Libya and Lebanon.[6] Other influences were more subtle and indirect. Kibbutz members sometimes held up M. E. Spiro's books on the kibbutz[7] as a warning to our field-worker that Israeli society has posed ethnologists some exceptionally difficult problems. The admonition was well taken, but Spiro's work also proved to be a source of many provocative and fruitful ideas. The same was true of E. Rosenfeld's research.[8] The late Yonina Talmon-Garber's influence was more pervasive: her work informed and guided our field-workers in kibbutzim;[9] she had taught several of the Israelis on the research team and, above all, she steadfastly supported Gluckman and his team in their efforts at a time when the Israeli sociological establishment did not rate anthropological work very highly. Percy S. Cohen, who had worked with Yemenites,[10] provided valuable advice at all stages.

Third, and most important, we had been under some misapprehension about the meaning of 'Israeli society'. We had not intended to study it in all its complexity but only to investigate some of its aspects, in particular immigrants from various countries of origin and their adaptation to a new land. Our image of Israel was that of a society contained within the territorial boundaries of the State. It soon dawned on us that this was not a significant unit for our purposes, because each social segment we took up for analysis had different boundaries, and these were not usually identical with those of the state. They often fell short of it and as often went far beyond it; for instance, many of the kinship links of the members of a *moshav* were localized, but others extended to the four corners of the earth.

A village that uses imported grain and cattle-feed, and exports a considerable proportion of its produce to foreign countries, is surely part of a world-wide economy. We were studying not one but many Israeli societies, each of which had a unique set of boundaries, a specific structure, and special research problems; it therefore had to be

treated as a 'society' in its own right. At the same time, all these societies had some features in common: one was their exposure to the pervasive influence of a number of centralized bureaucratic organizations, which together constituted the State. The Israeli state has more power over its citizens than most, because it has over the years obtained control of about half the nation's material resources. It had a tremendous impact on all the societies studied. Nevertheless, it was just one of numerous 'external' forces that impinged on them; there were others, such as the natural environment, economic and political ties in other parts of the nation and abroad, and so on. In each of the societies studied, the state appeared in a different guise. For it is not a monolithic giant—rather, it is divided into numerous organizations, which in turn are made up of many cross-cutting segments, each with its own personnel, organization, and aims. These may often contradict the objectives of other groups or individuals in the same organization, or those in other organizations. Furthermore, each organization interacts in a different manner with each of the societies studied: its representatives act not only in their official capacity but also as persons, whose other roles intrude on their work; moreover, the officials do not act unilaterally. Their actions are largely determined by the resources employed by the clientele. Thus each society provided some special information about facets of the state, and contributed to our understanding of the complex nature of the state. We soon felt that one of the major links between the various studies was the general preoccupation with the interaction of officials and aggregates of clients. Each study added new insights to the fascinating and inexhaustible subject of bureaucratic relationships.

Many of the things we learned about bureaucracy did not fit Max Weber's well-known characterization of it.[11] On reflection, this did not surprise us, because Weber was concerned with an ideal and not, in this context, with a description of reality. Albrow has shown[12] that many elements of Weber's ideal type of rational bureaucracy can be traced back to nineteenth-century German theories of administration. These writings reflected the 'managerial' viewpoint. The authors knew how officials behaved, that they tended to monopolize their offices, to serve their own interests, and to ignore instructions from their superiors. With the help of strict codes of behaviour, backed up by sanctions and a hierarchical chain of control, it was hoped that these tendencies would be checked and officials brought into line. As a law student, Weber had become familiar with such administrative theories; in his ideal type of bureaucracy, as distinct from his analyses of bureaucratic behaviour in China and elsewhere, he used the old material. Many of his students seem to treat his ideological statement as if it were a distillation of real-life situations, while it is only to be expected that the actual behaviour of officials will diverge considerably from the norm.

I shall now briefly discuss each study and point out first its contribution to our understanding of parts of Israeli life, and then its theoretical significance, particularly with regard to the study of bureaucracy.

There were four studies of *moshavim*. Each *moshav* farmer is given an equal share of land and equipment, and all members are required to market their produce through their co-operative and to engage in mutual aid. About four per cent of Israel's population live in *moshavim*. It may appear an extravagant use of limited resources to carry out four separate studies of such a small segment of the total population; admittedly, we were at first not very happy about this. However, we hoped, that each *moshav* would turn out to be different, and that each field-worker would concentrate on specific aspects. This hope was fully realized; each of the four studies complements the others, so that we can now piece together a developmental sequence and can understand many of the problems involved. Shokeid[13] lived among former villagers from the Atlas mountains, transplanted to a *moshav* in the Negev. The *moshav*, Romemah, is essentially an impressive success story; these former artisans and itinerant peddlers became successful farmers and adapted to a completely new political and economic environment in only four to five years. They had arrived penniless in Israel, and so became wards of the state, which sent them to become reluctant pioneers in the vast spaces of the Negev. Each household was allotted a home and a plot of land. Under the tutelage of numerous officials they were trained to become farmers; within a few years they had developed skills, accumulated some capital of their own, and gradually they became independent farmers who often ignored or subverted the order set up for them by officialdom. What had begun as a painful process of adaptation for the farmers now became an equally painful realization by the officials that they were gradually losing control. Abarbanel and Baldwin[14] take over where Shokeid leaves off. The former shows how the state regained control over farmers who had grown progressively independent, economically; it set up central planning bodies which worked out production quotas for almost every type of farm produce. That was the inevitable outcome of numerous successful ventures, such as Romemah. The output of many villages increased so rapidly that the market was flooded with their farm produce and that prices declined sharply. As each branch in turn began to overproduce, a production and marketing board was set up to plan production on a national basis. Milk came in 1959, soon to be followed by poultry and eggs, vegetables, etc. Each board allocated production quotas for its particular commodity to villages, which then distributed the quotas among the farmers. The producer received a guaranteed price for quantities of the commodity within the quota. If a farmer exceeded his quota, he received no subsidy for the added quantity; and he could also be fined.

By 1971 the boards controlled 87 per cent of the value of agricultural production.[15]

As at least half the members of the boards were appointed by the farmers, the latter could often exceed their production quotas with impunity; some of the older villages indeed used their political influence to increase their quotas.[16] Nevertheless, all farmers were gradually subjected to these controls, and *moshavim* once again became dependent on centralized bureaucratic organizations.

The results of that system of controls are evident in the cases studied. They are described in detail by Abarbanel for Sharon (founded in 1946), which one of the second-generation *moshavim*. Most of its settlers were of European origin, but not withstanding the stereotype of Ashkenazi ascendancy, they wielded little political influence and were unable to adjust to or ignore production quotas. Abarbanel and others show that centralized direction of production, combined with quotas of water, limits on the area of land available, and selective credit policies, affect farming communities in two ways.[17]

First, they induce the farmers to specialize in types of production which make use of the limited resources to their best advantage. Each farmer establishes himself in a particular niche in which he hopes to make full use not only of the farming resources allocated to him, but also of such things as his labour force, capital, know-how, and friendships which enable him to increase his cropping area. A farmer with a large household and an under-developed farm may decide to grow vegetables on a limited scale; another, with capital to spend and clerical or technical training, may invest in dairy farming and at the same time hold a job outside the village, and so forth. As prices are stable and controlled, 'increased profits came generally from increased efficiency and increased output'.[18] This expansion, however, leads farmers to exceed their quotas of land and water. It is thus very convenient for the farmers of Sharon that nearly one third of them hold jobs outside the village and maintain small farms. But all farmers have been encouraged to plant citrus trees on part of their land. As the trees reach maturity they require increasing amounts of water, until eventually the trees will need far more than is available for the entire village. Something will then have to give way; either the big dairy farmers with their lavish use of land and water will go out of business, or some of the citrus groves will have to be uprooted; even more farmers will then have to seek work outside the locality. The division of villagers into several 'complementary' categories of specialized farmers must be seen as a short-term adaptation to the system of centralized controls. In the long run the system leads farmers into an impasse: pressures to achieve economies of scale, to mechanize, and to specialize will continue, but whatever the combination of farm branches, the limited amount of land, and especially water, put a strict brake on develop-

ment and growth. Before the system of controls is replaced by one that considers the local combination of resources, and not only national and regional ones, many more farmers will be forced to abandon farming as a main pursuit and to turn to industrial and clerical work.

Members of a *moshav* studied by Mars[19] attempted an interesting solution to the problems arising from specialization and the resulting land and water shortage. A number of vacant farmsteads were let to families from a nearby town; they were not admitted to membership of the *moshav* and were not allowed to farm. The arrangement suited the tenants, who wanted cheap accommodation and were pleased to find it at commuting distance. They did object, however, to paying the high local taxes which were needed to maintain farming services of which the tenants made no use. Farmers constantly grumbled about the tenants who enjoyed services without paying for them, but the complaints never came to a head, because the farmers were in fact very happy to be able to use the land, water and production quotas of vacant farms.

The second point to emerge from the research on *moshavim* was that specialization combined with dependence on land, water, production quotas, and other bureaucratic controls, reduced co-operation. Members align in many situations according to their interests as producers; two or more interest groups divide up the scarce resources allocated to the village, and their members become so absorbed in their individual economic aims that their demands diverge considerably. What could have been common interests in non-economic areas are often neglected, or are pursued outside the village. Cultural and educational activities in particular tend to decline locally, because alternatives are easily found outside. Nearly every farmer owns a motorcar, which he uses for frequent visits to urban centres, never far away in a small country; in the city, there is an almost unlimited variety of entertainments and cultural events are available. Local schools also deteriorate and regional schools prosper and become dominant. Some farm services also follow the same trend; when regional tractor service stations, citrus packing sheds, and poultry slaughterhouses are set up, the equivalent village services are reduced or they even close down.

Where a fellow-villager is seen mainly as a competitor for resources, he is not trusted to represent the interests of other members fairly and objectively. As internal affairs now play only a subordinate role, as much of the village business depends on outside agencies and takes place in city offices, and furthermore, since the paperwork and negotiations are now so extensive as to require full-time attention (so that a village secretary has no time left for farming), it is not surprising that outsiders are often appointed to act as village secretaries. Abarbanel reports that a farmer in Sharon can ordinarily expect mutual aid only

on a limited scale, that village meetings are generally poorly attended and 'begin 45 minutes late',[20] and that the village secretary is indeed an outsider.[21]

There, the 'diversity of economic interests is recognized by all of the farmers.'[22] When the distribution of milk-production quotas came up for discussion, they settled the issue among themselves; the village meeting that put the formal stamp of approval on that decision was attended by less than a third of the members, and not even the dairymen turned up in large numbers. The nondairymen present abstained from voting.[23] The quantity of milk produced and the allocation of production quotas, land, and water is of profound importance to other farmers, because they determine future trends, for instance whether differentiation and specialization will or will not increase. If most villages did not attend the meeting it must have been because they believed that matters had gone quite beyond their control, and that the common interests of the village could no longer be successfully ensured.

In this dissociation of farmers from village affairs, the dairy farmers are an exception. They cannot do without a local dairy, which is relatively expensive to run, requires some complex equipment, and has to operate day in day out throughout the year. The men are in the awkward position of having to compete with other villagers for scarce land and water, while also relying on the community to equip and run the dairy for them. One way to avoid the dilemma is for the leading dairymen to assume control of village government; this they attempted to do in the *moshav* studied by Mars. Even where they do not go so far, the dairymen are always active in village politics, and they often wield power greater than their number would warrant.

Specialization does not always divide a village into such discrete interest groups. Kfar Hefer, one of the first *moshavim* to be established, had in the early years of the state of Israel played a significant role in national affairs. When Elaine Baldwin studied it in 1964–66, it had lost some of its power, but was not yet as dependent as most other *moshavim* on the state. The villagers were still widely represented in many of the organizations whose decisions affected their lives. Many of the older farmers still engaged in mixed farming comprising dairy, citrus, and poultry, but each farmer tended to specialize in one branch and to neglect the others. Their financial investment, age, and experience tied them to their way of farming, even when profits declined. Moreover, at a time when the younger dairy farmers sought to increase their production, one third of the older farmers, mostly those working without the help of sons, gave up dairying; they found the work too strenuous. Thus specialization and the formation of discrete interest groups made slower progress than elsewhere. While the Kfar Hefer farmers were also pitted against one another in the race for land, water, and production quotas, they still maintained joint interests. Moreover, they could still

obtain larger quotas and therefore could continue expanding. Their growing dependence on the state was reflected in the small number of participants at village meetings,[24] and by the appointment, from 1961 onwards, of an outsider as external secretary.[25] But the job of internal secretary could still be given to a member—only for a short period was an outsider employed in that capacity. It should be noted that in the other *moshavim* studied the shift to representation by non-villagers also roughly coincided with the setting up of the various production councils and the imposition of more government controls.

The kibbutzim are as a whole more efficient and more adaptable than the *moshavim*, because they can pool their tremendous resources, because they have set up centralized confederations, and because they maintain a cadre of full-time officials. Each kibbutz is affiliated to one of the four major federations, and each must delegate a fixed proportion of its members (usually about 2 per cent) to serve in its own kibbutz federation or in another national organization. The kibbutzim have thus became a powerful force. The extent of their influence can be gauged by the special attention they receive from the army; most of the young who volunteer for the *Nahal* units spend part of their compulsory army service working in an older kibbutz or setting up a new one. Some of these young men and women are kibbutz children, but most of them are not. A large number of *kibbutzniks* find their way into élite fighting units, which are often largely composed of kibbutz members. They remain with their peers for the greater part of their military service, relatively immune from outside influences; and they later return to their homes.[26]

The kibbutz federations established centralized bureaucracies both in order to develop various kinds of economic, educational, and cultural activities, and to represent members in the various national organizations. These central offices are all situated in Tel-Aviv, close to the government offices.

All this is not immediately obvious to an outsider. To him, a kibbutz presents itself primarily as a complex economic organization concerned with production and consumption—which activities are carried out according to egalitarian principles. Ethnographers who have worked in a kibbutz have tended to be absorbed in the observation of economic activities, of family life and education, and of local-level politics. They have rarely noted or commented upon the interaction between the kibbutz and its federation, and to the relationships of both with national organizations—such as the political parties, the trade unions and government departments. They did not easily gain access to the offices in Tel-Aviv, and they knew even less about the informal and highly personal contacts through which many important matters are negotiated and problems settled. There are few documents or written records on affairs arranged in that manner. The two members of our team who

worked in *kibbutzim*, T. M. S. Evens and I. Shepher,[27] were aware of that difficulty. Evens worked in a veteran settlement which was the intellectual and political centre of one of the kibbutz federations. He was well received and given every conceivable assistance, including access to the archives, but he nevertheless found great difficulty in gaining information about relations between the kibbutz and government. He therefore could not understand how the kibbutz factory making building materials continued production during the economic recession of 1966, when the building industry was in a slump. He only obtained snatches of information about the informal talks between the Ministry of Housing and a leader of the federation, which preceded new orders for materials.

The situation in the towns studied by members of the research team contrasted sharply with that in the *kibbutzim*. In the latter, relationships between the people and the representatives of bureaucratic agencies were elusive and could not be studied in detail; in the former, bureaucratic relationships were very much in evidence and almost obtruded themselves on the field-workers. There were several reasons for the high visibility of bureaucratic relations in the urban situations. First, towns are not nearly as collectively organized as kibbutzim, so that many individuals interact with officials; the greater the dependence on officials, the more individuated the townspeople become, and the easier it is to observe the relationships. All the urban situations studied involved a high degree of dependence on officials, but the ultimate case was Galilah, a new town in Galilee. There, unemployment made the residents almost totally dependent on relief work and welfare assistance. In addition, all the homes in the town belonged to a national housing corporation, and employment and medical aid could be obtained only through bureaucratic agencies. In households which became dependent on the assistance of bureaucratic agencies, there was a decline in the number and intensity of primary relationships which, even among close kin (such as siblings, or parents and children), became ineffectual while the situation lasted. A man would refuse to lend money to his brother and a son would not maintain his parents: they shifted the burden to bureaucratic welfare agencies.[28] Here was an almost unlimited scope for observations of bureaucratic behaviour.

Second, the towns are not affiliated to federations. Individuals therefore maintained direct relations with officials of every conceivable bureaucratic agency—political parties, welfare agencies, the army, or the police. A fair proportion of the interaction would take place locally and would thus be observable (if only the observer could be in many places at once). Others would be studied with the help of documents, which were more or less accessible.

Third, the difficulty of deciding on a social field in a town often makes researchers concentrate on municipal affairs, although the

physical agglomeration of a large number of buildings and people does not in itself turn a town into a suitable unit for sociological study. Almost any type of human activity which one chooses to observe in a town will not of course encompass the total area but will cut across its boundaries. One notable exception is municipal activity, which is specifically designed to serve the local inhabitants. Of course, even that activity is not exclusively carried out locally, nor are all the residents affected to the same extent. Students of town life therefore tend to look at a municipality and to study it especially at its very centre: the town hall.[29] Unless the ethnographer deliberately directs his attention to a particular segment of urban life, and not to 'the town', he will generally end up in observing municipal activities.

Members of the Bernstein research project conducted four studies in urban societies; it is no coincidence that all four paid some attention to bureaucratic relations, although each was carried out in a different locality and concentrated on different problems. Aronoff (Frontiertown) and Deshen (Ayara) examined municipal politics with reference to national bureaucratic organizations, such as political parties, while Handelman (SAGE) and Marx (Galilah) studied municipal welfare services.[30] Where bureaucratic institutions are so powerful and pervasive, it is to be expected that people often react sharply against them. In Frontiertown the inhabitants 'rebelled' against a government-controlled town council and they voted their own candidates into office; and in Galilah, they coerced officials into giving them what they considered to be their rightful entitlement.

In Frontiertown and Ayara national political parties intervened in local affairs, only to be in turn exploited by some of the townspeople, especially at election time. Aronoff looked at all the active political parties; he inevitably paid especial attention to the Labour party, the major political force nationally, while Deshen mainly observed the National Religious Party (*Mafdal*) in Ayara and was able to muster an imposing array of data on its activities.

Though the two parties have different political creeds, and also differ in their size and their potential electorate, their political activities in the towns studied are remarkably similar. This is due partly to the fact that they were observed mainly before and during elections, and partly to the type of resources available to them. The power of a political party which adheres to the rules of the democratic game fluctuates greatly. When the election is over and there is a return to power, the party relies heavily on the material resources it controls. As the state takes about half the gross national product, government is fully occupied with the distribution of these resources among many claimants and shows little interest in the inarticulate mass of voters. As election time draws nearer, the voter again becomes a valuable and sought-after commodity. The shift in the value of resources at that time is reflected in a degree of

de-centralization: party representatives drawn from the local population—often as a result of their own initiative—are given funds to obtain the support of prospective voters. Since these local people are familiar with the residents, they are given almost a free hand in the use of funds. (Party headquarters often prefer to be kept in ignorance about the means employed by local people, as long as the votes come in.) In its hour of need a party relies not only on its regular supporters (who may be too dependent on it to be effective), but it may also establish links with any influential individual whom it believes is capable of delivering votes. Ambitious and influential men and women will negotiate simultaneously with several parties for the best deal; they will align themselves now with one party and at the next elections with another. The question of party loyalty does not arise in such a situation, because once the election is over the party either loses interest in these persons, and returns to work with the dependable locals whose power derives from their party connexion, or it has the power to turn independent local people into dependents, by offering them jobs and other blandishments. The contingencies of electioneering create a situation in which local people become important and their needs and moods have to be taken into account.

In spite of their different size, both the Labour party and the Mafdal distribute similar resources in a similar manner: both parties have participated in coalition governments since the establishment of the State, and they have gradually established control over some ministries. Therefore, in return for votes, each party promises the townspeople as a whole facilities of a type its ministries can supply, and offers individuals either payments or jobs in affiliated organizations. The Labour party controls, among other things, the ministries dealing with economic affairs, and it may promise to establish industries in a specific town; the Mafdal runs several of the welfare ministries, as well as a large section of the educational sector, and it may offer to construct a ritual bathhouse.[31] or increase the size of a town's social assistance budget. Occasionally there is a degree of overlap, as when two organizations affiliated to the Labour party and Mafdal respectively donated sets of prayer-books to the same synagogue.[32]

We are given a new view of political power and centralization; although to all appearances the distribution of material goods between the parties and their voters remains constant, the actual balance of power fluctuates considerably. During elections votes become such a valued commodity that, at least for a while, the power structure is altered and becomes less centralized. It is fascinating to observe how at such times, when the individual is being consulted about the future of the state, he feels at one with it and considers the matter of voting very seriously and responsibly. This is well brought out in Deshen's impressions of election day in Ayara: 'There was a feeling of relaxation, celebration

and festivity in the air . . . There was a sensation of straightening of shoulders and raising of heads. The immigrants, . . . had been courted by officials and functionaries who, as candidates, had sought their votes.'[33]

Apart from the cyclical fluctuations of power between the townspeople and the party centres, there are other changes in the distribution of power, owing to a variety of processes. Frontiertown provides a good example of how a city's industrial development affects its position vis-à-vis the bureaucratic agencies. Aronoff argues that 'given the structure of the Israeli political system, all major political groupings [in new towns] will inevitably become absorbed into national political parties'.[34] From the viewpoint of Labour party headquarters that is undoubtedly true: more and more local and national organizations come under its influence and it mediates the flow of resources to them. It would be hard to find a voluntary association in Israel today that is not supported by state funds, obtained through the good offices of a political party. From the local viewpoint, however, another picture emerges, which is just as true: townspeople do indeed depend on political parties, and not only on them but also on a number of other bureaucratic organizations. This is not a unilateral dependence relationship, for people also negotiate with organizations and play them off against one another. Their capacity to do so depends on their own arsenal of resources. Changes in resources are often reflected in the local leadership, as is shown in the example of Frontiertown. The town was planned and set up by the Ministry of Labour, which is a preserve of the Labour party; in its early days it was administered directly by officials of the ministry, and the residents neither required, nor had access to, the good offices of political parties in municipal affairs. When some years later they were well established in houses and jobs, they began to press the authorities to give them a measure of local autonomy and representation. The Ministry yielded, and the first election to the town council was fought between two factions, both of whose leaders were members of the Labour party. Adam, the town's administrator, decided to throw in his lot with the residents and to run for election. His opponent Abel was the local manager of the construction firm which had built the town; it was a subsidiary of the Histadrut (largely controlled by the Labour party). On the one hand, the local inhabitants wished to gain some measure of 'independence', and to have a say in decisions affecting their town. On the other hand, they wished to remain close to the Ministry of Labour which still considered the town to be its pet project and which could still dispense valuable material resources. The Labour party was not directly involved in the election, which Adam won.

Once the townspeople ceased to depend on the particular resources offered by the Ministry of Labour, that Ministry lost its special

importance. People now wished to tap the resources of other national organizations; they therefore had to enlist the support of national political parties. The next election was again fought out between Adam and Abel. But their relative positions had changed. Now Adam was viewed as the local representative of a single national organization, who would be hampered in negotiations with other organizations by that close link. Furthermore, his career was bound to lead him to greater success and so to leave the town; therefore he would not spend all his energy on the city's development. Abel's livelihood tied him to the locality and to its people, and through his party connection he could gain access to many national organizations. The electors voted for Abel. Clearly, in this case, the social characteristics of the two candidates and not their personalities or party allegiance (they were affiliated to two factions of the Labour party) determined the outcome.

The dynamics of local representation in new towns seem, at first sight, to be quite different from those of *moshavim*. In *moshavim*, members are gradually replaced by outsiders as representatives, while the new towns seem to move in the opposite direction; at first they are represented by outsiders; but later, by local people. On closer inspection the differences between the two types of settlement lessen, and some similarities can even be discerned. The outsider who becomes external secretary in a *moshav* has been hired by the villagers to represent their interests, and to negotiate on their behalf with the various bureaucratic agencies. Only the diversity of local interests requires the appointment of an impartial representative, a 'stranger' who does not belong to one of the local groups struggling for ascendancy. As his task is not so much to extract resources from bureaucratic agencies, as to manipulate them and prevent them from increasing their hold on the village, he is not likely to be co-opted by the agencies; he therefore remains a local man, even if he has no deep roots in the community.

The new towns' attempt to rid themselves of leaders affiliated to a particular external organization; they seek to appoint in their place individuals who will represent *their* interests; these interests are so many and varied that, whoever is elected as leader, the majority of the voters will consider him a 'stranger' who can be expected to deal impartially with their problems.

Even after the elections are over, and the people as a whole lose much of their bargaining power, the centralized organizations do not have absolute rule. Nor do they function 'efficiently', in the sense that their officials faithfully adhere to their instructions. Our work has shown that in these centralized organizations decisions about local matters are based on partial and biased information, and are not necessarily implemented by local officials. The more centralized the organization, the less information flows from the town to the head office. Some of it

is designed to show that the local official has followed the instructions given out by head office. Other information stems from influential townspeople, who often initiate contacts with their head office when they are in need of its resources. They present their case in a manner conducive to their ends, and do not necessarily stick to facts; officials at the head office may therefore possess limited and biased knowledge about local affairs, and may fill in the gaps by recourse to stereotypes about the town and its inhabitants. Such stereotypes are readily available, and may be reinforced by some of the local people.

Here is a typical example. An official at a party headquarters explained to me that the town of Galilah could not be properly developed, because of 'the human material settled there. These Moroccans are unwilling to work and lack discipline. They are only fit for relief work, where they do not have to exert themselves'. He did not know that most of them were engaged in road building, a somewhat exhausting occupation, and that only the lack of alternative employment kept them in such work. The sources of the official's information were traced to the party's representative in Galilah: he was the mayor. He saw himself as a temporary emissary of party headquarters, as a man whose chances of advancement within the party depended largely on the town's vote in the national elections. He knew that industrial development would reduce his control of the townspeople's votes; he therefore did not make special efforts to attract new businesses and industries to the town. Newcomers with independent means or those holding secure jobs were few; when they did settle locally he treated them as 'outsiders'. At the same time, he himself employed outsiders in some of the key positions in the town hall. During his frequent visits to party headquarters he spoke of his efforts to promote the industrial development of the town, and attributed his failure to do so to the nature of the 'human material' available, often adding that nothing but an influx of western immigrants could stimulate the march of progress. A similar picture would be presented by the mayor's adversaries and competitors for office; they would try to enlist the support of party headquarters for their candidature, against promises to deliver large blocks of votes; they characterized the townspeople as docile, simple human beings, whom they could easily control. It is no wonder that the party officials at headquarters were grossly misinformed.

Local staff often found it difficult, or inadvisable, to carry out their instructions to the letter; they were working far from head office and they had to face their clients alone. Thus some officials in Galilah would not provide services to which their clients were legally entitled in order not to invite similar demands from others. Sometimes they bent regulations in order to satisfy the demands of influential people whose complaints might cost them their jobs; at other times, they submitted to threats of violence.[35] In all these cases, they found it easier to ignore

instructions and to provide superiors with incorrect information rather than to enter into arguments with clients. The activities of the centralized organizations were therefore not determined at the centre only, but at various other points as well.

The influence of clients on organizations was observed in some detail in Handelman's work on welfare cases in Jerusalem. He showed that one became a client by establishing a long-term relationship with the welfare department, and then fostered the relationship by diversifying demands. As long as a person had resources of his own, such as a choice between various welfare agencies, the capacity to work, or help from kinsmen, a welfare client could negotiate good deals with the agency. Only when his resources became depleted by age, illness, and the death of supporting relatives, did a client have to submit to the will of the welfare officials.[36]

In Jerusalem, the client dealt with a department, not with a single person, and therefore could not hope that the relationship would endure. He achieved results mainly by negotiating with several agencies at once, and choosing the best offer. In Galilah, on the other hand, a prospective client cannot choose between agencies: he deals with only one official and in most cases he is unable even to have access to a senior man. However, he can often establish a multiplex and lasting relationship with that one official and persuade him to accord him preferential treatment; the method is adopted most frequently when long-term benefits such as regular welfare assistance are sought. Where a benefit can be given once and for all, such as employment or the allocation of a flat, preferential treatment can often be obtained by either direct coercion of the official or by patronage. In this manner, people who appear at first to be utterly dependent on powerful organizations do actually obtain a certain measure of control over the activities affecting them; and, incidentally, they may cause the organization to deviate from the aims intended for it by the officials at head office.

The Bernstein Israel Research project has already produced a series of detailed studies of different areas, and more studies are scheduled. Nearly all the research completed so far has provided insight into the relations between the state and its citizens in a variety of contexts. A detailed comparative analysis should lead to a deeper understanding of the nature of centralized bureaucratic organizations. Max Gluckman's vision has borne rich scientific fruits. It will surely stimulate further research.

NOTES

[1] In these notes I mention only some of the work carried out under the auspices of The Bernstein Israel Research Project; I have not attempted to cover all the work. A fuller bibliography is available in D. Handelman and

S. Deshen, *The Social Anthropology of Israel: a Bibliographical Essay*, Tel-Aviv, 1957.

I wish to thank P. Gillon for his comments.

[2] M. Gluckman, 'Foreword', in S. Deshen, *Immigrant Voters in Israel*, Manchester, 1970, p. xxviii.

[3] M. Gluckman and E. L. Peters, *Proposals for Research on Immigrants into Israel*, Manchester, 1963, p. 11.

[4] E. Marx, *Theoretical Aspects of the Absorption of Immigrants*, Manchester, 1964.

[5] H. Rosenfeld, *Hem hayu fallahim*, Tel-Aviv, 1964; A. Cohen, *Arab Border-Villages in Israel*, Manchester, 1965; E. Marx, *Bedouin of the Negev*, Manchester, 1967.

[6] E. L. Peters, 'The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin in Cyrenaica', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, vol. 90, 1960, pp. 29-53; E. L. Peters, 'Aspects of Rank and Status Among Muslims in a Lebanese Village', in Pitt-Rivers, ed., *Mediterranean Countrymen*, the Hague, 1963.

[7] M. E. Spiro, *Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia*, Cambridge, Mass., 1956; M. E. Spiro, *Children of the Kibbutz*, Cambridge, Mass., 1958.

[8] E. Rosenfeld, 'Institutional Changes in the Kibbutz', *Social Problems*, vol. 5, 1957, pp. 110–36.

[9] Y. Talmon, *Family and Community in the Kibbutz*, Cambridge, Mass., 1972.

[10] P. S. Cohen, 'Alignments of Allegiances in the Community of Shaarayim in Israel', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 4, no. 1, 1962, pp. 14–38.

[11] M. Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, London, 1947, pp. 302–08.

[12] M. Albrow, *Bureaucracy*, London, 1970, pp. 50–51.

[13] M. Shokeid, *The Dual Heritage*, Manchester, 1971.

[14] J. S. Abarbanel, *The Co-operative Farmer and the Welfare State*, Manchester, 1974; E. Baldwin, *Differentiation and Co-operation in an Israeli Veteran Moshav*, Manchester, 1972.

[15] S. Pohoryles, *Hahaqlaut be-Israel*, Tel-Aviv, 1972, p. 51.

[16] op. cit., p. 46.

[17] N. Nevo, unpublished material.

[18] Abarbanel, op. cit., p. 112.

[19] L. Mars, *The Social Organization of an Israeli Co-operative Village*, Ph.D. Thesis, Manchester, 1970.

[20] Abarbanel. op. cit., pp. 173 and 212.

[21] ibid., p. 96, and Mars, op. cit.

[22] Abarbanel, op. cit., p. 219.

[23] op. cit., p. 215.

[24] Baldwin, op. cit., p. 141.

[25] ibid., p. 137.

[26] It would be going too far to view the *Nahal* units as compensation to the kibbutzim for their special contribution to the army. The *Nahal* soldiers were intended rather to man the frontier settlements, most of which were set up as kibbutzim. See Talmon, op. cit., p. 153.

[27] T. M. S. Evens, *Ideology and Social Organization in an Israeli Collective*,

Ph.D. Thesis, Manchester, 1971; I. Shepher, *The Significance of Work Roles in the Social System of a Kibbutz*, Ph.D. Thesis, Manchester, 1972.

[28] E. Marx, 'Some Social Contexts of Personal Violence', in M. Gluckman, ed., *The Allocation of Responsibility*, Manchester, 1972, p. 284.

[29] An exception that proves the rule is J. Gulick *Tripoli: a Modern Arab City*, Cambridge, Mass., 1967. On the face of it, Gulick treats the whole city as a unit of observation, even when discussing such diverse subjects as family life, migration of villagers to the city, relations between religious sects, and city administration. In reality, however, he works in different social fields, some smaller and some larger than the city, which seem to overlap only very partially. Only when he deals with city administration is the social field identical with the city. The reader thus gets the impression that the book is composed of many disjointed episodes.

[30] M. J. Aronoff, *Frontiertown*, Manchester and Jerusalem, 1974; Deshen, *Immigrant Voters in Israel*, D. Handelman, *Patterns of Interaction in a Sheltered Workshop in Jerusalem*, Ph.D. Thesis, Manchester, 1971; E. Marx, *The Social Context of Violent Behaviour*, London, forthcoming.

[31] Deshen, op. cit., p. 157.

[32] ibid., p. 159.

[33] ibid., p. 219.

[34] Aronoff, op. cit., p. 115.

[35] Marx, 'Coercive Violence in Official-Client Relationships', *Israel Studies in Criminology*, vol. 2, 1973, pp. 43–44.

[36] Handelman, op. cit., chapter 2.

AGE PATTERNS IN THE INTEGRATION OF SOVIET IMMIGRANTS IN ISRAEL

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Age and migration

IT is generally assumed that among adult immigrants age at time of arrival in the host society is negatively correlated with adjustment over time to the new social system. The effects of aging combined with the changes and adaptations resulting from migration are said to make the old especially vulnerable.

It is the purpose of this paper[1] to demonstrate that this generalization cannot be applied across the board in all spheres of life and furthermore that when the difficulties of aging interact with the problems of adjustment to the new society, the age group at greatest risk is not always the oldest age group; the latter, indeed, may be at an advantage when compared to younger immigrants.

Integration into a new society is a multi-dimensional process which proceeds along several axes, not necessarily correlated with each other. An immigrant can show positive integration in some life areas and negative integration in others; the overall process of adjustment is not uni-dimensional nor is there any one 'best' measure of integration. At different phases of the process some dimensions may be emphasized more than others; hence patterns of correlations among the dimensions may not be stable over time.[2] Moreover, different age groups may proceed along various axes at different rates. Therefore, it is of interest to map patterns of adjustment over time of different age groups in various areas of integration.

Many of the research findings concerning the aged seem to be especially relevant in a migration setting.[3] Migration is a form of social change which imposes new demands on the individual and renders much of his past 'expertise' obsolete. The old, with their heavy dependence on accumulated past experience, may be less willing or able to meet the needs of a different set of demands and expectations. Response

to the pressures generated by social change is a function of resources both external and internal, available to the migrant. Such resources are differentially distributed in age groups with the old having a relative paucity of some.

Aging is typically accompanied by growing frequency of illness and increased infirmity which may result in a generalized reduction in coping ability; it is also associated with a lowering in levels of flexibility and readiness for change; the older the migrant upon arrival, the more entrenched his previously acquired habits and styles of life and the more reluctant he may be to give them up.[4] Furthermore, the general slowing down associated with age could reduce the ability to learn the attitudes, and adapt to the norms, of the new society. With advancing age there is often a gradual reduction in contact with others and that trend could be sharpened by migration.[5] As a result the aged may be less subject to the impact of reference groups which carry the norms of the host society.

Employment is one of the central concerns of immigrants and success in this sphere is generally thought to be crucial to their integration. This is especially so in the case of the older immigrants. A 50-year-old professional who was at the peak of his career in his country of origin may find himself competing on the labour market with younger candidates; the latter may in fact be preferred by employers who would rather train men with less firmly established work habits and with a longer work future.

While one tends to assume that the adjustment process is easier for the young, it is unclear at what age that process becomes problematic. Differences between groups may be subtle, and little is known of the gradient of adjustment over time of different immigrant age groups. Adulthood stretches over a considerable number of years and these are differentiated by varying stages in work career, in family status, and in personal growth. The early stages in the new society may be difficult for all immigrants but how does the gradient of change shape over time for different age groups? What are the differences in the adjustment patterns for those who arrive in a new society at 20, 30, 40, or 60 years of age? The most recent large group of immigrants to come to Israel is from the Soviet Union: about 100,000 Jews arrived between 1967 and the end of 1974. The peak of the influx occurred in 1972 and 1973; more than 30,000 came in each of these two years; 15 per cent of the post Six-Day War immigrants were over the age of 60 and 33 per cent were over 45 when they arrived.[6] While about the same proportion of the Jewish population in Israel is over 60 (12·3 per cent), 26·4 per cent of the Jews in the Soviet Union are disproportionately young when compared to the demographic structure in their community or origin.[7]

Hollander has suggested that some problems of the old which have become acute in Western societies may not yet be so strongly evident in

the Soviet Union.[8] The housing shortage which frequently prevents young couples from setting up independent residential units has tended to slow down the dominance of the isolated nuclear family with its dysfunctional implications for the old. The high proportion of working mothers has given grandmothers an important continuing role in child care. According to Hollander, there is less of an obsession with youth in the Soviet Union than there is in the West, so that the old retain more value as sources of advice and information.[9] Comprehensive medical care is available to all age groups in the Soviet Union and the old, who are high utilizers of those services, presumably obtain such care in accordance with their needs. The same is true of other welfare benefits, so that in principle the elderly are less likely to suffer from the economic deprivations of old age which characterize societies with less developed welfare systems.

Taken together, these factors suggest that migration from the Soviet Union to Western societies—and particularly to Israel which is characterized by a combination of rapid change, tension, and a paucity of resources—may put the aged immigrant in jeopardy.

This paper focuses on patterns of integration over time of different age groups of Soviet immigrants in Israel. Our strategy is to look at the full range of adult age groups in an attempt to discern the extent of similarity difference among them. Three basic questions are of concern: (1) Do the older groups show a unique pattern of integration over time, when compared to the younger? (2) In which spheres of life do these differences, if any, occur? (3) At what age level is it meaningful to speak of special problems of the old and how do these differ in the various life areas?

Method

In 1971 a sample of 1,566 immigrants, who had come to Israel from the Soviet Union between 1960 and March 1971, were interviewed in their homes. The sample does not cover the large group who arrived after 1971, and therefore does not include immigrants from Georgia, but it does include those who came during the four years following the Six-Day War of June 1967 as well as a sample of earlier arrivals.

The sample was designed to include sub-groups who had been in Israel for varying periods of time, ranging from a few months to ten years, so as to allow for study of the question of changing patterns of integration over time. For purposes of analysis the sample was stratified into four cohorts by date of arrival in Israel, two before the Six-Day War and two after it. The average length of time these sub-groups had been in Israel in 1971 was one, three, five, and ten years respectively. Such an approach, which compares immigrants characterized by different lengths of exposure to the host society, provides insight into the

process of integration over time. It assumes that veterans are 'simulated' newcomers projected into the future and that patterns discerned among the veterans will eventually apply to the present newcomers.

While the latter assumption cannot take into account unique historical circumstances and events characterizing the different cohorts, examination of their demographic traits and their declared motives for migrating shows them to be surprisingly similar.[10] Although cross-sectional analysis of time cohorts is no substitute for a longitudinal study, it can provide insight into the process of integration over time.

The strategy used is to hold constant age at the time of immigration and to observe differences on a series of integration variables by length of exposure to Israel society.[11] Of the total sample, 1,273 persons were at least 20 years of age when they came to Israel; the analysis presented here is based on that segment of the total. This sample of adult immigrants was then divided into sub-groups by age at the time of immigration: 20–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65 years and over. The basic issue with which we are here concerned is whether people who immigrated to Israel at different ages show the same or different patterns of change with longer exposure to the host society. If the older groups are indeed different, at what point in the life cycle does their unique pattern become apparent? And in which aspects of integration? The question of age-cut points places particular focus on the sub-groups aged 45–54 and 55–64 at the time of immigration: does their integration over time resemble that of the younger or of the older age groups? How unique are those aged 65 and over?

The definition of integration used here focuses on the immigrant's subjective viewpoint rather than on his position in the social system. We assume that an immigrant is integrated in a society when he himself has a feeling of well-being, when he thinks that he can perform adequately, believes that he has dealt competently with the everyday problems of living, and thinks that he is interacting with others as much as he himself deems it desirable.

From this subjective viewpoint, a great many so-called integration variables are viewed as independent factors which may condition the immigrant's response. They include levels of conformity to the norms of the host society or its sub-cultures as well as his position in the new society. While there is considerable scientific interest in establishing whether immigrants are acculturated and how they are situated in the social structure, integration is defined here in terms of the subjective evaluation of the immigrant.

We used the following variables:

A. *Feeling and affect concerning the host society*

1 Morale: a general feeling of well-being and optimism.

2 Identification with Israel: feeling at home in Israel and wanting to

continue to live in the country: feeling like an 'Israeli' rather than as a newcomer.

B. *Solution of basic instrumental problems*

1 Employment: did the immigrant obtain a job, is it satisfactory, does he feel that it suits his skills, etc.?
2 Housing: how does the immigrant evaluate his present housing in terms of its size, location, quality, etc.?
3 Language: has the immigrant learned Hebrew? Is his knowledge adequate for his needs?

C. *Social integration*

How confined is the newcomer to his own immigrant sub-group? How frequently does he enter into contact with other members of the society?

Findings

The pattern over a ten-year period for all age groups, with the exception of the 65 and over, is one of stability or improvement in the level of morale. A different pattern is seen among the oldest, who start out rather euphorically. After only one year in Israel their morale is considerably higher than that of the other groups, but it decreases considerably over time; those who have been in Israel for as long as ten years are characterized by the lowest morale of all age groups. In this area, the

TABLE 1. *Affect variables: morale and identification by age of immigration and length of exposure to host society*

Age at time of Immigration	*Year of immigration (Average number of years in Israel in 1971)*			
	1970–71 (1)	*1967[a]–69* (3)	*1965–67[b]* (5)	*1960–64* (10–11)
	Percentage indicating high morale			
20–34	34 (86)[c]	33 (113)	47 (134)	49 (45)
35–44	31 (45)	46 (58)	30 (49)	35 (29)
45–54	29 (55)	43 (87)	41 (85)	30 (48)
55–64	27 (48)	49 (79)	36 (77)	48 (49)
65+	58 (41)	21 (42)	36 (51)	28 (45)
	Percentage indicating high identification with Israel			
20–34	32	30	36	38
35–44	25	36	32	43
45–54	27	44	46	49
55–64	38	55	47	49
65+	61	56	64	60

[a] June–December 1967 (after the Six-Day War).
[b] January–May 1967 (up to the Six-Day War).
[c] Numbers in parentheses are N's on which the percentages in each cell are based. These are approximately the same in all subsequent tables. They have not been repeated in order to facilitate readability.

oldest immigrants (65 and over) show a special pattern of their own, suggesting the unique impact of migration on them. One must bear in mind that after ten years in Israel, those who came when they were 65 are now 75 and are faced with the special problems of the old.

Identification with Israeli society is positively correlated with age and the correlation remains over time—that is, at increased levels of exposure to the host society. Regardless of the length of exposure, the oldest immigrants systematically show the highest level of identification. In that area, all age groups except the oldest reveal a similar pattern of increased identification with Israel the longer they are in the country. Only the oldest group, who start out higher in identification than any of the others, remain consistently at that level; despite increases among the other age groups over time, the oldest retain a level higher than that of any other group. This high level of identification of the 65's and over sets them apart from the contiguous age group and suggests that in this area their behaviour is unique. The contiguous group, aged 55–64, is more similar with respect to this variable to the 45–54 age group than it is to that aged 65 and over.

Solution of instrumental problems: employment, language, and housing

In 1971, 40 per cent of the Russian immigrants, who were 55 years and over at the time of the interview, were fully employed. Of the 60 per cent not fully employed, almost half said that they wanted to work

TABLE 2. *Instrumental variables: adequacy of income and language ability by age of immigration and length of exposure to host society*

Age at time of immigration	*Year of immigration (Average number of years in Israel in 1971)*			
	1970–71 (1)	*1967[a]–69* (3)	*1965–67[b]* (5)	*1960–64* (10–11)
	Percentage reporting adequate income			
20–34	35	36	35	60
35–44	25	45	22	58
45–54	18	36	31	43
55–64	23	22	31	26
65+	7	17	10	20
	Percentage reporting good ability to speak Hebrew			
20–34	52	69	80	82
35–44	18	29	37	52
45–54	22	36	44	33
55–64	10	15	23	27
65+	12	10	6	4

[a] After the Six-Day War.
[b] Up to the Six-Day War.

TABLE 3. *Instrumental variables: attitude toward housing by age of immigration and length of exposure to host society*

Age at time of immigration	*Year of Immigration (Average number of years in Israel in 1971)*			
	1970–71 (1)	*1967[a]–69* (3)	*1965–67[b]* (5)	*1960–64* (10–11)
	Percentage indicating general satisfaction with housing			
20–34	74	86	75	79
35–44	84	71	76	81
45–54	80	76	71	83
55–64	88	83	82	73
65+	81	73	88	78
	Percentage indicating satisfaction with the size of their dwelling			
20–34	63	59	58	52
35–44	77	68	74	59
45–54	71	74	76	59
55–64	90	68	81	76
65+	77	76	74	70

[a] After the Six-Day War.
[b] Before the Six-Day War.

and had sought employment unsuccessfully; three quarters of these stated that they had looked for jobs for over a year. When moving from a society in which the centrality of work was highly emphasized for both men and women,[12] the adjustment to 'forced' retirement can be especially problematic.[13]

The different economic and occupational structures of the two societies pose difficulties for Soviet immigrants of all ages but especially for the older segments. The immigrants are frequently confronted with the need for re-adjustment to somewhat different job requirements and at times to re-training problems. Since they have long-established work habits, the old are more likely to find such requirements difficult to meet. It is not only a matter of finding employment for workers whose skills are not entirely appropriate to the Israeli labour market, but also of absorbing older immigrant workers in the face of competition by younger candidates. In a tight job market the problem can be especially acute.

As shown in Table 2, reported adequacy of income and standard of living are negatively correlated with age: younger immigrants tend to be more satisfied than are older ones. All age groups show improvement over time. However, the 20–54-years old better their standard of living dramatically over time while those aged 55 and over improve at a lesser rate and after ten years in the country are at a markedly lower level than that of the younger groups. The economic sphere contrasts with the affective areas with regard to the critical cutting point: in

matters of feeling and affect, immigrants aged 65 and over differed from the 55–64 age group whose pattern over time was more similar to that of younger immigrants. In the economic sphere this middle-aged group had a pattern more similar to that of the 65's and over.

All immigrants except the oldest improve their knowledge of Hebrew with increased exposure to Israeli society. The young progressed the most over time (in this case also, at dramatic speed), while those aged between 45 and 64 years progressed far more slowly. As for the oldest group—65 and over—longer residence in Israel was not correlated with an improved command of Hebrew: increased infirmity or withdrawal from Hebrew-speaking social contacts apparently neutralized the effects of exposure to the new society. If social contacts do continue, they may be within Russian or Yiddish language groups and therefore do not help to learn Hebrew. In this context it is worth noting that more recent newcomers from the Soviet Union do not know as much Hebrew when they first arrive as the earlier immigrants did.

Overall satisfaction with housing is fairly similar in different age groups and the general attitude to housing varies little over time. On the whole, homes in the Soviet Union were more crowded and of poorer quality than the housing available to immigrants in Israel, so that there is generally more satisfaction in this area.[14] Moreover, the extent of that satisfaction is correlated with age: expanding families require more space; and in fact our data show that the younger adults were less happy than the old about their housing. Moreover, there is decreasing satisfaction over the ten-year period under study among all age groups. The average size of a Soviet immigrant household is 3·3 persons[15] so we cannot assume that objective housing needs change so very much over time: it therefore seems more likely that it is the levels of aspiration in this field which are rising.

Social interaction

We distinguish between interaction with neighbours and with friends: the distinction is especially relevant to the older immigrants.

Interaction within a neighbourhood is limited by geographical considerations and the availability of potential partners is at least partly determined by factors outside the direct control of the immigrants. Though it is generally true that the larger the neighbourhood, the greater the freedom of choice, this is not the case for older people who tend to have fewer people to choose from in their limited local range.[16] In contemporary urban communities with good public transport, relations with neighbours are likely to function at a less affective or intense level than relations with friends, who are often widely spread.

On the whole, the data show a decrease with age in frequency of interaction with neighbours and thus lend support to the theory of

TABLE 4. *Interaction variables: contact with neighbours, friends and other Israelis by age of immigration and length of exposure to host society*

Age at time of Immigration	*Year of immigration (Average number of years in Israel in 1971)*			
	1970–71 (1)	*1967[a]–69* (3)	*1965–67[b]* (5)	*1960–64* (10–11)
	Percentage reporting frequent contact with neighbours			
20–34	24	45	26	35
35–44	21	22	45	19
45–54	25	32	26	18
55–64	4	29	26	10
65+	19	26	28	12
	Percentage reporting frequent contact with friends			
20–34	45	47	51	46
35–44	29	45	26	20
45–54	31	41	40	42
55–64	27	41	37	36
65+	44	26	33	31
	Percentage reporting frequent contact with Israelis			
20–34	7	23	24	29
35–44	4	7	10	14
45–54	5	5	18	12
55–64	2	5	9	10
65+	5	0	6	10

[a] After the Six-Day War.
[b] Before the Six-Day War.

disengagement.[17] However, when we look at the various age groups in terms of length of exposure to Israel, we find an interesting curvilinear pattern of change among all of them. In their first six to seven years in the country there is a systematic increase in interaction with neighbours—as though they were reaching out for more contact with others or responding to overtures. Somewhere between the seventh and tenth year, there is a lessening of the frequency of neighbourly interaction. The pattern occurs among all groups regardless of their age at the time of immigration; it is not associated especially with the oldest segments. One explanation for such a pattern is a functional one: during the early years, neighbourly interaction serves a need for support, contact, mutual assistance, and sharing of problems. When these needs are reduced with time, so is contact with neighbours.

When we consider interaction with friends, we find that over time there are differences between different age groups. On the whole, younger immigrants report more interaction than do the older ones.[18] The youngest, who came when they were 20–34, have the highest frequency of interaction with friends and hardly alter with increased exposure to the new society, while the middle-aged groups, 35–64, show

a somewhat lower level of interaction when they first arrive but they increase the frequency over time. We could therefore assume that increased exposure to the new society is associated with an increased number of friends. However, a different pattern is seen among those who immigrated at an advanced age, when they were 65 and over: they report a high frequency of interaction with friends after only one year in Israel but there is a clear reduction over time; thus, they reflect the greater difficulty encountered by the old in entering into or maintaining social contact with self-selected friends. When social interaction is not geographically bound, the old are at a disadvantage.

The difference among the oldest group in their relationships with neighbours and with friends is probably explained by the physical closeness of the former and the wide geographical range which often characterizes the latter. Where friends are concerned the elderly are apparently more restricted than are the younger groups in the options available to them: they show a reduced frequency of interaction with friends very soon after their arrival, and the pattern seems to continue over time. When physical mobility is less of a problem, as in the confines of the neighbourhood, their pattern of change is similar to that of other groups, although the absolute frequency of interaction remains somewhat lower.

There is movement over time towards increasing informal contact with Israelis, and age plays an important role. Younger immigrants report more Israeli friends; the youngest, aged 20–34, show the greatest increase over time while all other age groups have a more gradual increase. In effect, the data suggest a dichotomization of the population into two age categories: the under-35's who sharply increase their social contacts with Israelis over time, and the over-35's who increase their contacts with Israelis but at a much slower rate. It therefore appears that, despite the general negative correlation of age and informal contact with Israelis, the old do not show a unique pattern over time.

Conclusion

Our method of analysis has permitted a distinction between two age-related phenomena. First, the relationship of age to the integration variables: whether there are differences among age groups in the affective, instrumental and interaction variables. Second, the relationship of age to the process of integration over time: whether the patterns of change associated with increased exposure of immigrants to the host society differ by age.

The first question does not consider the dynamics of the integration process and may reflect some age differences which are not exclusively associated with migration. For example, the findings show that age is negatively correlated with morale as well as with interaction with

neighbours and friends. It is not unlikely that this general pattern has been sharpened by the pressures of re-adjustment associated with migration. If this is the case, the old may be characterized by lower morale and even more isolation in a situation of migration than otherwise.

Other differences between age groups may be more exclusively associated with the migration process: the old are less skilled than the young in learning a new language and in earning a living in a new social context which requires occupational re-location.

In some areas the old are better endowed than the young. Despite comparative deprivation in several of the other integration variables, the oldest age group consistently feels more at home, more Israeli, and more positively identified with the new society. Nor does this feeling become diffused with time.

The second question focuses on the comparative dynamics of the integration process for immigrants who came at different stages of adulthood. In examining groups who have had different lengths of exposure to Israeli society, we have looked for patterns of change in the integration variables among age cohorts: improvement, worsening, and standing still. The findings point to different patterns in the various aspects of integration observed and differing behaviour by various age groups depending on the area. It is clear that one cannot point to a uniform age cut-off which is relevant to all aspects of migration. In some areas the 65's-and-over behave uniquely and the 55–64 cohort resembles the younger segments of the population; in other areas we may meaningfully look upon the 55–64 and the 65's-and-over as a joint category because their behaviour is more similar to one another than it is to the younger groups. And in some areas there are even more sensitive age cuts which point to a different pattern of integration over time. Finally, some aspects of integration show similar patterns of change for all immigrants regardless of the age at which they arrived in Israel.

Decreasing levels of integration over time are found among the old with respect to morale and interaction with friends. Younger groups are stable over time with respect to morale and generally show an increase in interaction with friends. The impact of migration is apparently particularly severe in these areas for those who immigrated when they were past the age of 64 years.

In other spheres the old show improvement over time—but at a slower rate than the young. This is the case in economic integration, in which there is some (but not very much) improvement in the standard of living of the old over the ten-year period considered. The 'improvement' might be seen as a form of relative deprivation: and when all other age groups are improving over time, standing still may be an even more severe form of deprivation. The old over time also do not

improve their command of Hebrew, while the very reverse is the case among the younger age groups.

Another sphere where there is no progress among the old is in the affective area: identification with Israel. However, that stability simply means that there was very high identification; it is therefore an asset. The younger groups, on the other hand, show an increase over time in the level of their identification but that level does not approximate—even after ten years in Israel—that of the oldest cohort.

Patterns of change with respect to neighbouring and out-group social contacts with other Israelis do not vary among cohorts who immigrated at different ages. While the absolute level of interaction of the oldest immigrants is lower than that of the young, the dynamics of the process do not differ between age groups.

In sum we may say that although it is generally assumed that age is negatively correlated with adjustment we have found that the age effect is differential. With respect to most of the integration variables observed, the meaningful age cut which shows a different dynamic pattern is immigration before or after 65 years of age. This is true of the affective variables, in the area of language, and in frequency of interaction with friends. In most areas examined there is no evidence to suggest that migration results in a 'regression' of the problems of old age to an earlier stage of life. However, in the economic sphere, there is a more significant cut at about 55 years of age. And in some aspects of integration the old do not differ very much from the young in their pattern of change over time: interaction with neighbours and contact with Israeli friends.

We need comparative data in order to see whether these patterns characterize only Soviet immigrants to Israel, or whether, as we think, they are true of other immigrant groups.

NOTES

[1] The research reported on here was sponsored by the Israeli Ministry of Immigrant Absorption. The authors thank Dr. Ephraim Ahiram and Mr. Eli Leshem for their interest and support.

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SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AMONG THE JEWS OF COCHIN IN INDIA AND IN ISRAEL

David G. Mandelbaum

FOR centuries, foreign visitors to the port city of Cochin have been intrigued by the existence there of a small enclave of anciently-settled Jews. They were clustered around seven synagogues in the former princely state of Cochin on the Malabar coast, now part of the Indian state of Kerala. Just as the peoples of Malabar, relatively isolated on the narrow southwestern strip of the subcontinent between the coastal ranges and the sea, developed their special version of Indian civilization, so did the Jews there maintain social features not found in other Jewish communities.[1]

They were divided into two (for a time, three) caste divisions. The members of each were equally devout and orthodox in their practice of Jewish rites, which they knew well through books and personal visits from European and Middle Eastern centres of Judaic learning. The higher ranking group, called white Jews, have lived for over 400 years at the upper end of Jews' Street in Cochin and kept themselves apart in worship, in marriage, and in general social relations, from the 'black' or Malabar Jews. The latter lived at the lower end of the same street, as well as in the town of Ernakulam across the harbour and in three nearby villages; almost all of them have now emigrated to Israel.

There is a considerable literature on the history of the Cochin Jews.[2] My own contributions have included an account written after several weeks of field observation among them in 1937,[3] a section in a chapter on the world religions introduced into India,[4] and a paper written in 1974 which emphasizes the Judaic aspects of their experiences in India and, latterly, in Israel.[5] My purpose here is to focus on what we can learn from the historical record of the Cochin Jews, which extends for about a millennium, about caste relations in Kerala and in Indian society in general, and to examine what has happened in recent years to people reared in a caste order when they are transplanted as a group into a very different kind of society—that of Israel.

Stratification, factions, and internal status divisions among Jews of a

locality have long been common features of Jewish life. These are, indeed, mainstays of the kind of humour that Jews often used in telling jokes about Jews. It is a matter for humour partly because so much of Judaic doctrine is stringently egalitarian. But the doctrine has not ruled out competition for status within Jewish communities and indeed status differentiation has been common. But it has generally been a shifting gradation, which has become blurred or replaced in time, so that the descendants of Jews formerly judged to be of lower status may well become the equals or superiors of those whose forebears had been superior in status rank. Perhaps only among the Cochin Jews (and, to some degree, the Bene-Israel of Bombay) has a rigid and pervasive ranking been maintained over centuries in the face of formal condemnation of it by eminent rabbis in their responsa to questions sent to them from Cochin.

The first clear record of the Jewish caste division is from about the year 1520 in a responsum from the renowned Rabbi David ibn Abi Zimra of Cairo. But Jews had been settled in Kerala long before that and the evidence of earlier settlement provides useful glimpses of the relations of Jews in Malabar with their neighbours and with the local Rajas.

The earliest records and their social implications

About the middle of the first century B.C.E., a Greek mariner discovered how to make use of the pattern of the monsoon winds. Thereafter Greek, Roman, and Arab voyagers sailed at the appropriate season from southern Arabia and, striking directly across the Arabian Sea, could reach the Indian coast in about 40 days. They took on precious cargoes of pepper, spices, ivory, teak, and other valuables and, when the prevailing winds shifted, made the return trip readily and regularly.

That Jewish traders sailed this route in the early centuries is quite probable. The Hebrew words used in the Bible for ivory, apes, and peacocks have been attributed to Dravidian origins.[6] The origin story told by the oldest of the Christian communities in Kerala relates that, in 52 C.E., St. Thomas arrived at Cranganore, then a principal port, some 20 miles north of the present harbour of Cochin. He stayed, the story goes, in the Jewish quarter of the town and made hundreds of converts, 40 of them Jews.[7] There is no firm basis for this legend but there is some circumstantial evidence that St. Thomas may have come to India about that time.[8]

There is quite specific evidence from the middle of the ninth century which bears on Christians and Jews in Kerala. A series of inscribed copper plaques dating from that period, now kept in the Syrian Christian Seminary at Kottayam, tells of grants bestowed by some of the

ancient Rajas on Christians. One of the sets of plaques records a gift to a Christian churchman (who was perhaps the leader of a group of Christian refugee colonists from the Iranian shores of the Persian Gulf), bestowing land and a series of rights to his church and congregation at Kollam, possibly the modern town of Quilon. The inscription stipulates that 'The *Ancuvannam* and *Manikkiramam* shall protect the church and its land.' According to Professor N. G. S. Narayanan, the former refers to the guild of Jews and the latter to the guild of Christians. Presumably both were well enough established then to be able to provide protection to the new foundation. Affixed to the ninth-century grant are signatures of witnesses written in three different scripts, 18 lines in Pahlevi (old Persian), 10 in Kufic (old Arabic), and three in Hebrew.[9]

That is an early indication of amicable relations between Christians and Jews in Kerala, and between each community and the local Hindu Raja. Both groups were probably extensively engaged in trade, since both had overseas contacts; maritime trade has been important in Kerala for about two millennia. Whatever mercantile rivalries may have existed between Christians and Jews (and also with Muslim Arab merchants at a later period) were overridden from time to time by common cause to co-operate and by the edict of the Raja, as these inscriptions testify.

The inscription of greatest importance to the Cochin Jews is on a pair of copper plates now in the keeping of the white Jews' synagogue. It records a grant of rights and privileges, made by the Raja when he was residing at 'Muyirikode' (later called Cranganore) to Joseph Rabban, 'Proprietor of the Ancuvannam'. Recent epigraphic and historical research has clarified the date and the meaning of this inscription: the date is now interpreted as the year 1,000.[10] The grant includes financial advantages and symbolic prerogatives of high status. The material endowment is of '. . . tolls by the boat and by other vehicles, Ancuvannam dues, . . . We have remitted customs dues and weighing fee . . . he shall be exempted from payments made by other settlers in the town to the king, but he shall enjoy what they enjoy.'[11] The privileges are listed as '. . . the right to employ day lamp, decorative cloth, palanquin, umbrella, kettledrum, trumpet, gateway, arch, arched roof, weapons and the rest of the seventy-two privileges.' Professor Narayanan comments that these were privileges enjoyed only by the aristocracy in Kerala. Another historian writes that they were concessions which would normally have been made only to the highest of the chieftains of the Nairs, the martial caste whose leaders ruled local principalities under the Raja.[12]

Some of the tax privileges for Jews were honoured by the Rajas of Cochin until their rule was ended with the establishment of the Indian Republic. I was told in 1937 that the houses in Jews' street were assessed for only a token land tax and that while householders paid municipal

dues, they were exempt from Cochin state taxes. And it was recalled that when some Cochin land was ceded to the neighbouring princely state of Travancore, 'about a hundred years ago', the treaty of cession contained a stipulation that the tax reductions granted on the paddy fields owned by a Jewish family were to be continued.

A Dutch administrator, Adriaan Moens, wrote a memorandum in 1781[13] for the guidance of his successor and included a note on the status privileges of the Cochin Jews:

> There is, however, a peculiarity which deserves to be mentioned here, namely that although some privileges are granted in this patent which have also been given to other people, no one else has ever been permitted to fire three salutes at the break of day or on the marriage days of anyone, who entered upon the marriage state, without a previous request and a special permission; this being a privilege which, to the present day, the kings of Cochin reserve to themselves. Yet even now it is allowed to the Jews as a permanent privilege and without previous application; and it is well known that native princes do not allow others to share lightly in outward distinctions which they reserve for themselves; so that if the Jews of Cochin had arrogated this privilege to themselves without high authority, the kings of Cochin would put a stop to the use of it by this nation, whose quarter or settlement adjoins the Cochin palace; but as things are they dare not.
>
> This peculiarity therefore is no small argument for the authority of the above-mentioned patent in favor of the Jews; for it is well known that all the laws and dispositions made by the Malabar Emperors are held in the highest respect by the Malabar kings to this day.

The grant of the year 1,000 apparently does not confer a village on Joseph Rabban. The term Ancuvannum (Anjuvannam) had been so translated, but Narayanan notes that it is clear that the term stands for a corporation or guild within a town or trade centre.[14] As for succession to the rights bestowed, the inscription reads: 'To Joseph Rabban, proprietor of the Ancuvannam, his male and female issues, nephews, and sons-in-law, Ancuvannam shall belong by hereditary succession as long as the world, sun and moon endure.'[15] In this part of the promulgation, the Raja was allowing the Jews to choose either or both of the forms of inheritance and descent that were observed in Kerala. If his sons and daughters were to inherit, the Jews would be following the patrilineal emphasis enjoined by both Judaic and Kerala Brahmin tradition. If his nephews and sons-in-law (real or classificatory sister's sons) inherited, the matrilineal code followed by the dominant Nairs would be used.

The right to have weapons, a right not lightly granted by Kerala Rajas, is also significant and may be related to both the timing of the grant and to the officials listed as attesting witnesses. In the year 999 there occurred a battle in which the forces of the Chola kingdom,

invading from the Tamil country to the east, defeated those of the Chera dynasty, whose king ruled in Cochin and other parts of the Malabar region. That battle, as Woodcock states, 'opened the hundred years' war between Cheras and Cholas which occupied the two dynasties for the whole of the 11th century'. Indeed, the ruler who bestowed the grant, Bhaskara Ravi Varman I, was killed in a later attack by Chola forces.[16] The King may have recognized the gravity of the Chola threat and taken measures to meet it. The witnesses to the grant are the five governors of provinces and the commander of the Raja's eastern forces who, Narayanan infers, formed the war council of the Chera sovereign. 'It also prompts us to envisage a connection between the imminent threat of war and the grant of privileges to the merchant prince.' The ruler may have made gifts in his giving 'in view of help in the form of money and materials for the prosecution of the war of resistance'.[17]

By the end of the first millennium, then, Jews were so well established in Cochin that the ruler thought it wise to mark them for special material benefits, to encourage them in their services and contributions to his state, and to honour them with symbols of high status, comparable to those enjoyed by the feudal lords of the martial castes. Feudatory nobles, in Kerala as elsewhere, were not usually enthusiastic about the distribution of high hereditary status symbols to others, lest their own status be thereby diluted. These lords were, in their respective domains, themselves seigneurs over bands of kinsmen, vassals, tenants, and labourers. Possessing such bases of power, they might possibly shift their allegiance from the Raja. But merchants like the Christians and Jews were more fully dependent on the sovereign and, lacking independent power, would be less likely to stray from his rule. These merchants managed and maintained important economic resources for the state, functions which few Hindus in Kerala performed since there seem to have been very few Malayalam-speaking Hindus who were traditionally of the Vaishya category, traders by scriptural classification and hereditary occupation.

Travellers' reports of the next five centuries mention Jewish settlements in various parts of the Malabar coast, as Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela did in the twelfth century, Marco Polo in the thirteenth, and Ibn Batuta in the fourteenth; but no accounts of their social situation are given.[18] Several events occurred during these centuries that affected their lives: a great flood of the Periyar River in 1341 simultaneously silted up the harbour of Cranganore and opened a good new roadstead at Cochin; some Jews soon moved to the new entrepôt; and the Kochangadi (or Angadi) synagogue was built there in 1344.[19] Among those Jews who remained in Cranganore, according to an old tale, there was subsequently an internecine struggle for leadership of the group, and those of the losing faction moved to Cochin.[20] After Vasco da Gama's expedition landed on Malabar soil in 1498 and opened the

route for their fleets, the Portuguese soon came to dominate a good part of Kerala. They imported missionaries and the Inquisition, so that Jews from outlying sections clustered into the Raja of Cochin's realm.[21] The Portuguese built and held a fort in Cochin city but all the rest of the town and the surrounding territories were under the Raja's benign rule.

The coming of the Portuguese brought some benefits as well as disadvantages to the Cochin Jews. In a few years, by 1505, a Portuguese Marrano (a converted or secret Jew) arrived with a chest of Hebrew books, including scrolls of the Torah, which he sold to the Cochin community; thus he brought them in closer touch with European Judaic learning and rites. Some Jewish merchants from Europe, perhaps driven out by persecution and attracted by the new opportunities for trade, apparently managed to ship with the fleets and then settled among their co-religionists in Cochin.

First accounts of caste-like divisions

The earliest account known so far of caste-like divisions among the Jews of Cochin is in a responsum, mentioned above, written by Rabbi David ibn Abi Zimra of Cairo, in reply to a personal request from Cochin for a ruling concerning the worrisome question of intermarriage and other relations between the two kinds of Jews there. The man seems, from the content of his petition, to have been a recent Jewish newcomer to Cochin who was, as Alexander Marx has surmised, 'choqué des conditions qu'il a trouvées'.[22] The responsum related that according to the information given in the original communication, there were 900 Jewish families in Cochin. One hundred of those were *meyuchasim*, those of lineage, Jews original and genuine—in the Hebrew phrase, Jews 'by trunk and roots'. (The enquirer here was presumably adopting the phrases of this group.) They refused to intermarry with the others whom they called slaves. Yet the latter were a large, prosperous, and religiously devout group. They were rich, observant of the commandments, and charitable. Learned in the scriptures, they were also close to the ruling officials and princes and constituted the base of the trading establishment. The smaller group were in quite the opposite position, the responsum continues: they were few and poor; and they called the others children of slaves out of jealousy and hatred. Their refusal to marry with the larger group had brought about contentions and arguments without end.

The petitioner acknowledged the mixed ancestry of the majority group. He noted that some were the descendants of unions between female slaves and Jewish merchants from Turkey, Aden, Yemen, and Caucasia.[23] Some of the merchants formally manumitted those women and their children; others left Cochin without freeing their slaves who remained in the community, freed by default as it were; they then

became accepted as Jews. Slave women who had not been manumitted but who could prove that they had had children by their masters, were freed because such was the law of the country. Some slaves had been freed by *meyuchasim* masters, or by their heirs, and presumably were accepted as Jews by the larger community. There were also voluntary converts and their descendants among them.

Although the petitioner had written that the Jews of the majority group were pious and learned, he ended by affirming that they did not know of the Talmudic rules concerning the manumission of slaves and that there was no one in Cochin learned enough to settle the question as to whether intermarriage between the two groups was Judaically proper or should be forbidden. Rabbi ibn Zimra's judgement was clear and was the first of similar decisions handed down from time to time over a span of more than four centuries, from about 1520 to 1951, by eminent Rabbis of other lands to whom that question was put.[24] All took the same line that intermarriage was proper; all were disregarded by those who kept themselves aloof. Rabbi ibn Zimra's answer was unequivocal: he asserted that those Jews who were shunned by the *meyuchasim* should undergo *Tebila* (take a ritual bath in the daytime in the presence of three witnesses), as is prescribed for conversion. It was not a difficult thing to do and would ensure that the proper rite had been performed. The disparaged ones were true Jews with full rights as Jews and should be so treated.

Rabbi ibn Zimra's pupil and successor, Rabbi Jacob Castro, was confronted with the same question and in his responsum quoted his predecessor: he too prescribed the ritual bath and, in the words of an English translation, wrote,[25] '. . . and all those who prohibit them, after they had the ablution manumittance, to enter into the Congregations of either Priests, Levites, or Israelites deserve excommunication (Herem)'.

The data on Jewish society in Cochin given in Rabbi ibn Zimra's responsum shows some continuities and some discontinuities with subsequent accounts during the next four centuries. The later reports also tell of two principal divisions, one much more numerous than the other, with those of the smaller section keeping themselves apart from the other Jews of the locality and refusing to allow intermarriage with them. Those of the larger section protested vigorously and continuously against that assumption of superiority, never accepting their personal inferiority in status. That kind of struggle by groups deemed to be inferior by members of a closely similar group, proximal to it in the local caste ranking, is quite common in Hindu caste relations, in Kerala as elsewhere in India.[26] But in the case of the Cochin Jews the claims to superiority have been based entirely on the alleged impure religious ancestry of the larger group and not, as is common in Hindu caste ranking, on their impurity in dietary observance, social conduct, or ritual delinquencies.

The larger section may well have been the social descendants of the community mentioned more than half a millennium earlier in the inscriptions. They too were influential with the ruler and were among the prosperous of the state. The signatures in Hebrew on the grant to Malabar Christians seem to attest to the signatories' self-identification as well as to their witnessing of the deed. As for the acceptance of converts and freed slaves into the community, this was quite legitimate in Talmudic law, at least in the Middle Ages. That law not only laid down the rites and formal documentation for conversion and manumission but also insisted that once a non-Jew had undergone the proper procedure for conversion, he or she she must be treated as a complete Jew with full Judaic rights and obligations. Although in recent centuries conversion has not been encouraged by Jews, I met in 1937 some recent converts, former servants who had grown up in Jewish households, had become accustomed to Jewish ways and rites, and had voluntarily undergone conversion.[27]

For much earlier times, as Woodcock points out, 'we have to remember the religious and social fluidity of Kerala before the Brahmins locked it into India's most rigid caste system. Buddhists and Jains preached freely, made converts and enjoyed the protection of kings and noblemen ... up to the 11th century ...' During that period the anciently settled Christians and Jews probably made converts more readily than they later did. Woodcock also notes that the great Brahmin revival which virtually destroyed Buddhism and Jainism in Kerala did not wipe out the smaller Christian, Muslim, and Jewish communities. He surmises that they survived because they were not offshoots of Hinduism but 'solid self-contained communities which, without friction, could be incorporated into the set structure that society now assumed'.[28] The three religions also prescribed frequent or daily congregational worship, a rule which probably helped reinforce the social solidarity of each community in contrast with the more individual, less congregational, modes of worship of Hindus, Buddhists, and Jains.

While there were continuities with the past among the majority section, there soon developed some significant discontinuities; it remained the more numerous division, equally diligent in Judaic observances, but there was a reversal of fortunes. The smaller section became and stayed the wealthier, the more influential, and with leading merchants, while the other Jews were largely petty traders, small-scale artisans, and without much influence in affairs of state.

One unusual feature of the situation described by Rabbi ibn Zimra's correspondent before the reversal of economic position came about, was that the members of the larger, richer, more powerful, ritually devout group struggled to be accepted as the social equals of the smaller and poorer section. In the characteristic competition for status rank in India, a group so well situated is not likely to pay much attention to the

claims of a self-segregated minority section. The *meyuchasim* apparently had some power, standing, and self-esteem which impelled them to keep aloof from other Jews of the locality and which motivated the others to try to break down their aloofness. The correspondent who petitioned Rabbi ibn Zimra apparently gave the rationale that would have been advanced by the *meyuchasim*. He did not mention (as those of the larger group continually affirmed in other sources) that they were descended from Jews who had been dispersed from the Holy Land after the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem. Nor did he give any evidence of the allegedly purer ancestry of the *meyuchasim* save to state that they were 'Jews by trunk and roots'.

A possible explanation is that the distinction was introduced by a new set of Jewish immigrants from Europe and the Middle East. Those described as *meyuchasim* in the early sixteenth century may have been mainly recent arrivals in India—whole families who fled from the upswelling of persecution in southern Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They would have found in Malabar a community of fellow Jews so different in dress, language, diet, and many other cultural traits that they could not readily associate with them despite the undisputed religious affinity. Social barriers which were commonly eroded in time among European Jews may have been kept strong by the environing influence of caste in Kerala society. The Jews long-settled in the land, but more remote from Judaic centres, may have wanted to share in the more ample knowledge of Judaism that the immigrants possessed. The newcomers would also have had better knowledge of European trade practices and had command of languages understood by the Portuguese and other European traders who came to Malabar in the wake of the first Portuguese expedition. From the listing in Pereyra de Paiva's account of 1686, as we shall note below, it appears that a few of the older families, perhaps the most eminent among them, were accepted into the *meyuchasim*, but the walls of social separation were not thereby eliminated. If, as seems likely, the correspondent who wrote to Rabbi ibn Zimra was himself a new arrival, he would have been able to communicate better with the more recent Jewish immigrants and so would have put forward their rationale for the caste-like separation, even though he was puzzled by, and apparently unhappy about, it.

The suggestion that the caste separation originated with a new migration from Europe receives some indirect support from Pereyra de Paiva's relation of 1686. That report was the product of a mission sent by Amsterdam Jews, after the Dutch had ousted and replaced the Portuguese in Kerala, to investigate the conditions of the Jews of Cochin. One passage notes: 'In the year 5272 (1512 C.E.) there came the first Spanish Jews to Cochin in which place they settled down for good with their synagogue which is the one they have today, very pretty and of the size of that at London'.[29] That synagogue of the white Jews was com-

pleted in 1568 on land given by the Raja immediately adjoining his palace grounds and within earshot of the Hindu temple on those grounds. The reason why the synagogue and houses were sited so close to the Raja's own residence was, according to Ezekiel Rahabi's letter of 1768, 'to provide the Jews with immediate protection'.[30] He also allotted land for a matter of high communal priority, a burial ground.[31] That synagogue was and still is, called the *Paradesi*, the synagogue of 'the foreigners'.

Of the other Jews, called 'Malabaree Jews' by Pereyra de Paiva, the report tells that they had come to Cranganore in the Hebrew year 4130 (545 C.E.), 'from the Kingdom of Majorca whereto their forefathers had been taken as captives in the destruction of the second Temple by Titus Vespesiano.'[32] The grant to Joseph Rabban is mentioned, as is the descent from converts. Pereyra de Paiva relates both the white Jews' explanation for keeping their social distance from the others and the Malabar Jews' claim to honourable descent from ancient Jewish stock. He also tells of factional disputes in Cranganore, disputes which were said to have led to the destruction of the Cranganore community by a powerful prince, the Zamorin of Calicut. 'The King Joseph Azar (72nd in the male line since the first King Joseph Rabban) escaped by swimming with his wife on his shoulders, taking refuge in Cochin, with some few others, where I saw his tomb.'[33] So in the seventeenth century both divisions of Cochin Jews knew this story of the exodus from Cranganore to Cochin, but there was no mention of caste divisions among Jews during the centuries when they had lived in Cranganore.

The separation is mentioned by a Jewish traveller and merchant, Zacharia al-Dahri, who spent three months in Cochin about the year 1562. He tells that he sailed from Yemen and after 20 days reached Calicut, where he found no Jews (although a Jewish settlement had existed there earlier); and so he went on to Cochin. There he found a community of Sephardim and other communities of converts and freed slaves who practised Judaism.[34] Again, a visitor gives the white Jews' version of the origin of the Malabar Jews.[35]

Cordial and co-operative relations between Jews and their neighbours and with their Raja are again documented by the Dutch traveller Van Linschoten who visited Cochin in 1589. He relates that among the people of Cochin there live the 'nations' of Muslims, Brahmins, and in the words of the English translation of 1598

> many Jewes, that are very rich, and there live freely without being hindered or impeached for their religion ... These three nations doe severally holde and maintaine their lawes and ceremonies by them selves, and live friendly and quietly together keeping good pollicie and iustice, each nation beeing of the Kinges counsell, with his Naires which are his gentilmen and nobilitie: so that when any occasion of importaunce is offered,

then al those three nations assemble themselves together, wherein the Kinge putteth his trust . . .[36]

In a subsequent chapter, Linschoten reported that the Portuguese prohibited both Muslim and Jewish worship, on pain of death, in those parts of Malabar which they controlled. But in the Raja's dominion, both had complete freedom of worship. The Jews whom Linschoten met and talked with were evidently of the white community. He specifically noted that they were white in colour, had fair women, and that many of them had come from 'Palestina and Jerusalem thether, and speak over all the Exchange (verie perfect and) good Spanish; they observe the Saboth (day) and other iudicall ceremonies and hope for the Messias to come'.[37] It seems reasonable to suppose that the fathers and grandfathers of those Jews were among the bulk of Spanish Jews who fled eastwards to places in the Ottoman empire (including the Holy Land) in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and, after some years, continued eastward to Cochin. Linschoten does not mention caste divisions among Jews but makes a general statement that

> There are great numbers of Moores and Jewes in all places of India, as at Goa, Cochin, and within the land, some coming out of other places, and the rest (borne of Jewes and Moores in that country, and so) by birth right Indians, who in times past by conversation and company of those Jewes and Moores, have bene brought to their sect and opinion. In their homes and apparell they follow the manner of the land wherein they are resident . . .[38]

But the Jews whom Linschoten described as being 'of the king of Cochin's neerest Counsellers'[39] were probably of the Sephardi congregation to whom, some 20 years earlier, the reigning Raja had allotted a site closest to his own residential grounds for their 'foreigners'' synagogue. Why then, were they so favoured? One reason seems to be that they provided valuable services to the Raja in his dealings with the Portuguese and other Europeans. Such dealings were politically unavoidable and economically mandatory because of the continuing, and increasing, trade in pepper, spices, and other products of Malabar. The white Jews, despite the official Portuguese posture of the time towards them, acted as intermediaries for that trade, since they were fluent in European languages as well as in the Raja's native tongue, and familiar with European trade practices as well as with the perspective of the people of Kerala. And as was suggested above, the loyalty of the Jews to the royal court was undistracted by conflicting temporal obligations to landed kinsmen or sub-feudatory tenants.

The Malabar Jews, too, may have fulfilled special services for the Raja. In the early years of the Portuguese incursions, one of their chroniclers, Correa, mentioned that there were many Muslims and Jews in Calicut (where Zecharia al-Dahri later found no Jews) and that there were 2,000 Muslim and Jewish foot soldiers in that ruler's army. He

added that in 1550 the Raja of Cochin refused to fight a battle on a Saturday because on that day his Jewish soldiers would not fight; and they were the best warriors he had raised.[40] Since there were so few families of white Jews, those soldiers must have come predominantly from among the more numerous Malabar Jews. Another possible reason for the Cochin Rajas' continuing protective concern for them may have been on account of their services as craftsmen. In later centuries, some of the Malabar Jews were shipbuilders, a craft of particular interest to the ruler of a kingdom heavily involved in maritime trade.[41]

Why, also, were the relations of the Cochin Jews with their neighbours, Hindu, Christian, and Muslim, so prevailingly compatible? Such relations were implied in the inscriptions on the Christian copper plates of the ninth century. They are specifically noted not only by Linschoten but also by most of those who wrote about Cochin Jews in subsequent centuries, both by those writers who had made only brief visits and some, like the Dutch governor Moens, who had long acquaintance with the people of Cochin.[42] The observers agree on the harmonious relations between the Cochin Jews and all other Malayali-speaking residents of the kingdom, even when, as during Linschoten's time, the Portuguese tried to import their Inquisitorial animus.

The answer seems to be that the Jews, in their several congregations and divisions, together formed a self-contained enclave whose members did not impinge on the strivings or status rivalries of others. They were largely self-governing. The Raja, and later the Dutch Company, appointed a Mudaliar, a headman, who carried a staff of office as symbol of his authority. He could, presumably in council with Jewish elders, impose or remit fines and enforce some punishments. His decisions were subject to the Raja's judgement and in capital causes the Raja (or the Dutch Company in its time) held jurisdiction.[43] Whether the one Mudaliar's authority extended over both divisions of Cochin Jews is not clear. What is clear is that they were largely self-governing, as the Cranganore Jews seem to have been from the year 1,000. They did not compete for social status or symbols of high caste rank because their status and symbols were concentrated in their synagogue activities, an arena of competition as well as of united worship not shared with others. There may well have been some commercial rivalries and perhaps some jealousy of their favour with the Raja, but the prevailing tone in the state, with the several communities 'together keeping good pollicie and iustice' as Linschoten put it,[44] seems to have prevailed over a long time.[45]

Dutch influence and Jewish efflorescence in Cochin

When the Dutch challenged the Portuguese for the possession of Fort Cochin and for control of the Malabar trade, the Cochin Jews aided

them. They had every reason to want to see the Portuguese go. During a temporary setback for the Dutch, the Portuguese soldiers looted and burned the Jewish quarter, but soon the Dutch prevailed and when their Admiral took the formal surrender of the Portuguese in 1663 there was a leader of the Jewish community at his side, perhaps as interpreter or adviser.[46]

Following that change-over came a rise in the fortunes of the Cochin Jews, certainly of the white Jews. The Dutch needed their services as the Raja had done. In Holland there were thriving Jewish communities who aided the keen interest of the Dutch in trade. The Dutch presence in Malabar lifted over Jews the pall which the Portuguese had tried to impose. Communication between Jews of Cochin and of the Netherlands increased and in 1686 a delegation of four men of the Sephardi congregation of Amsterdam arrived in Cochin to inquire into the condition of the Cochin Jews. Although their stay was brief, their inquiries were wide-ranging, and included a list of specific questions to which they obtained answers. The results of their research were compiled in Portuguese (then still the language used within the Sephardi Congregation) by the leader of the mission, Mosseh Pereyra de Paiva, and published as a 15-page pamphlet in Amsterdam in 1687.[47]

This report confirms the caste distance between the two Jewish divisions and affirms their ritual congruence. After listing the heads of households among the white Jews, the author describes them as 'Grandissimos Judeos', learned in Hebrew scripture ('Ebahale Torah') and famous merchants. They were brown in colour, caused assuredly by the climate ('o que procede de clima certamente'). They were entirely separated from the Malabar division since they considered it a great disgrace to intermarry with them. The author here inserts a gloss, printed in the margin, noting that 'They allege as a reason they (the Malabar Jews) are slaves of slaves and that they are mixed with Canaanites, converts, and Muslims (Kenahanitas, Guerim, e Ismaelim)'. As before and later, the white Jews said that it was the others' defective ancestry which was the reason for eschewing close relations with them. The report notes that they did not 'eat of what they kill', that is, the white Jews did not eat the flesh of animals ritually slaughtered by any Malabar Jew. More important, they did not count any Malabar Jew as a member of a *minyan*, the minimum number of ten Jews needed for congregational worship.

Yet in Judaic ritual both groups followed the same practices and both shared a 'horror' of food that was not Kasher, not ritually pure according to Judaic law and practice. The rites of both differed only in a few details from those observed in the Amsterdam congregation; the author lists them, including going barefoot in the synagogue, but writes that he does so more for the sake of curiosity then for the importance of the differences. By then, the Cochin Jews possessed the principal ritual

guides, especially the detailed and comprehensive code by Joseph Caro of Safed in Israel, first published in 1567, which quickly became accepted as authoritative in practically all Jewish communities of the world.[48] Most of their Hebrew books had been published in Venice, and one or two in Amsterdam. Moreover, they had been visited by famous learned Jews; six are named, including one from Spain and another from Jerusalem. Some Cochin Jews emigrated. There is mention of an elderly woman, whose paternal grandfather was Aron Azar, of the Cranganore chiefly lineage, whose son and two daughters were then in Jerusalem.

Although none of the Cochin congregations had a Rabbi, there were men among them learned enough in Judaic law to settle 'ordinary cases'.[49] The number of synagogues of Malabar Jews is given as nine, two of them characterized as being of poor and two of well-to-do families; there were 460 families in all. The number of white Jewish families is not clearly given. Nineteen heads of households are listed, although in five instances a pair of brothers are named. The provenience of each family line is specified, two from Spain, two from Germany, most of the rest from parts of the Ottoman Empire. An internal struggle is indicated: a Semtob Castiel is listed as being retired in Paru (probably Parur, where there was a community of Malabar Jews) by order of Batavia, where the Dutch had their East Indies headquarters; he had had some troubles with the headman David Levy whose post of Mudaliar had been previously held by Castiel.

Perhaps because of the preponderance of families who had lived for some time in Islamic lands, the women did not go out nor would they show themselves even to honoured visitors at home, a practice not common in Kerala. Pereyra de Paiva tells that only with great difficulty was he able to see the two beautiful young daughters of one family and also two little girls of four or five. They all lived along one street, one end of which adjoined the royal palace; at the other they had set two stone pillars crossed by an iron bar as the 'Herub' (*aerev*), the symbolic fence that makes all of an area into a domestic enclosure within which some necessary chores can be done on the Sabbath.

At the other end, down the street, then as now there were Malabar Jews. The greater part of them, according to the author, lived and worked in the same place, as their few remaining descendants still do, making their living as shopkeepers and artisans.

The list of heads of households among the white Jews significantly names two brothers of one family and another head of household as being descended from the leading ('Primeiras') families of Cranganore. In another passage, Pereyra de Paiva writes[50] concerning royal descent through the mother. He also notes that at the time there were two men whose great-great-grandfather ('terceiro avô') was the famous Joseph Azar, last king of Cranganore ('ultimo Rey de Cranganore'). On this

account the Dutch commandant Van Ree granted them a monthly allowance.[51] This reference to matrilineal descent suggests that the headmanship of the Jews when they lived in Cranganore was inherited in the mode followed by the royal lineage, by the Nairs, and by other caste groups who emulated them, including some of the Kerala Muslims.

This account of the inquiry of 1686 concludes[52] with a list of 46 questions put to the Cochin Jews, together with laconic answers. Thus the question as to whether they communicated with Jews of 'Meca [Moka?] and Persia' is given the answer: they do. The author appends a final note that he put all these questions to them 'even though they follow our rites' because he much wanted to get solid information and so to walk on a sure footing.

The social situation of the Cochin Jews remained essentially the same, with only a few modifications, up to the eighteenth century until the Dutch, in their turn, were ousted from Fort Cochin in 1795 by the English. During much of that century the leader of the white Jews and one of the most eminent and influential men in Cochin was Ezekiel Rahabi (1694–1771). From about 1723 to the end of his life, a period of some 48 years, he was the chief merchant for the Dutch in Cochin, to the extent that, as a Dutch Governor wrote in 1781, he was almost the master of their trade in Cochin.[53] He was entrusted by the Raja and the Dutch with many diplomatic missions; he substantially aided families and congregations of Jews and of some Christians as well; he was a man of learning, both religious and secular; and he carried on a voluminous correspondence on matters commercial, administrative, diplomatic, and religious.[54]

One of his letters, written in 1768 to a correspondent in Amsterdam, gives an account of the Jews in Cochin at that time. He reported that there were 40 families of white Jews and listed ten synagogues of black Jews (one of which he built for them and supported) in seven localities, comprising 520 families.[55] The Jewish population had apparently increased somewhat since Pereyra de Paiva's visit in 1686.

Rahabi relates the same origin story: '. . . we, who are known as white Jews, were among those who came from the Holy Land. . . . The Black Jews were the converts from the natives and had been manumitted.' He too affirms the social separation of the two and their religious similarity. 'Their laws, regulations and prayers are the same as ours, but there is no inter-marriage amongst these two groups, and we keep ourselves apart from them.'[56] He added that there were some differences, one being that the Malabar Jews dress like the people of the country implying that the white Jews do not. In ritual matters, Rahabi notes, the majority of the Malabar Jews 'do not pay heed to the laws of Phylacteries, the Mezuza and the redemption of the first born'. This is one of the very few indications in the historical record of lapses in ritual orthodoxy among Malabar Jews.[57] The important rite of the redemp-

tion of the first-born male requires the participation of a *cohen*, a Jew of the traditional priestly descent. There were none among the Malabar Jews and apparently men so qualified among the white Jews were either not acceptable to the others or else would not accept their invitation. What the Malabar Jews did, at least in the twentieth century, was to wait until a Jewish visitor from elsewhere, who was also a *cohen*, came to Cochin; he then participated in the ceremony for all first-born males who had not yet undergone the rite. If a qualified visitor did not turn up for many years, the ritual, normally performed on the thirtieth day after the day of the child's birth, might be celebrated for young men in their twenties.[58]

The letter also mentions the Bene Israel, noting that they are distributed all over the Maharatta province. In her study of this group, Schifra Strizower says that the Bene Israel tell that their isolation from other Jewish communities was broken by the visit of David Rahabi. He was Ezekiel Rahabi's father who was born about 1644, died in 1726, and may be the person remembered by the Bene Israel.[59] Of them, Ezekiel Rahabi wrote: 'They know nothing as regards their faith except to recite the Shema and rest on the Sabbath, we had sent several teachers to them to improve their religious knowledge, but to no avail.' But one of them had come to Cochin for four years, learned 'our laws and regulations', and had returned to Bombay where 'we understand he has now become their teacher'.[60]

The teachers among the Cochin Jews, Rahabi wrote, were supported by the community. The studies he specifies are on *Halakhah*, *Rashi*, and *Talmud*—more than beginners' learning in Judaism. He does not mention who the teachers were; in the twentieth century some of the Malabar Jews were the Hebrew teachers of the white Jews' children. Rahabi does note that the Malabar Jews formed the majority; but 'By the grace of God they are under our control, recognizing our lead and submitting all their religious controversies to us for a settlement'.[61]

That the Malabar Jews were poorer than the white Jews is attested in two other accounts of the eighteenth century, in a description of 1723 by the Protestant chaplain Jacob Canter Visscher and in the memorandum of 1781 by the Dutch Governor, Moens. The latter noted that the majority of the Malabar Jews applied themselves to agriculture and cattle rearing as also to selling and buying victuals, especially butter and poultry. Visscher remarked that while the white Jews tried their very best to prevent marriage with the other Jews, such unions sometimes took place. Moreover, he tells of a great dispute which had occurred shortly before 1723 between the two divisions: the Malabar Jews wanted to compel the women of the white Jews to keep their heads uncovered, as their own women did. The effort towards equality in a matter of symbolic importance was taken to the Raja for decision. He ruled that the women of both sides could cover or uncover their heads as they pleased.[62]

This episode indicates that in 1723 the Malabar Jews were not as docile and subservient to the white Jews as Ezekiel Rahabi's letter of 1768 makes them out to have been. Moens, who was Governor of Cochin from 1771 to 1781, has more to say[63] about the continuing struggle of the Malabar Jews.

> They are treated by the White Jews with coldness and contempt, because being stronger numerically than the Whites, they, according to tradition, rose more than once against them in former times and even had the boldness to use so much violence that the ruler of the country had to interpose his authority and protect the whites.
>
> As far as I have been able to discover these differences are usually caused by the Black Jews constantly pressing for equality with the White Jews. The latter would not allow this, because they did not look upon the Black Jews as original Jews, but considered the majority of them to be either the issue of their released slaves, or of the natives of Malabar, who had been proselytes. It is related that the Black Jews always wanted to mix with the white by intermarrying; also that instead of behaving humbly towards the whites, they laid themselves out to be discourteous in greetings and salutations in the street; also that they were so bold as to take the first places in the synagogues, at public meetings and on other occasions; so that they always aimed, if not at superiority, at least at equality, a characteristic which as a rule [four pages, 361–64 of the ms. are here missing].

Despite Ezekiel Rahabi's statement that the Malabar Jews were 'under our control', it is clear that even in his time, when the white Jews were at the height of their wealth and power, the Malabar Jews kept challenging their claims to superiority and their self-segregation from them. In doing so, the Malabar Jews were acting in accord with both Jewish tradition and Indian caste practice. The Judaic tradition emphasized a certain measure of equality, certainly the right of an observant Jew to participate with others in congregational worship. And in relations among people of generally similar jatis (endogamous groups) those of a group deemed inferior commonly challenge their consignment to inferior status.[64]

The white Jews were acting in accord with the practice of superior jatis, and regularly cited the flawed descent of the Malabar Jews as the reason for keeping themselves apart. That was a valid reason in the light of common caste standards but it was contrary to Judaic law and tradition. Converts who were inducted according to the prescribed ritual and slaves who were freed with the prescribed deed of enfranchisement and were then properly converted were, as we have noted, fully Jews in Judaic law.[65]

The Moens memorandum of 1781 also foreshadows the decline in the fortunes of the white Jews which occurred in the next century. By 1781 traders from northern parts of the west coast, 'Canarins and Benyans', were competing for the Cochin maritime trade. Canarins seem to have been mainly Konkani Sarasvat Brahmins, and Benyans were of the

Gujerati- and Marathi-speaking groups known as Banias.[66] 'For the Jews, Canarins, and Benyans are secretly antagonistic to one another', Moens wrote, 'and although the trading Jews have more means and are generally more honest than the Canarins or Benyans, yet the last-named are much better business men and much smarter in all other respects'.[67]

The consequences of British rule: incipient social change

The decline of the position of the white Jews in Cochin's economy and society within a generation or two was probably due to a combination of forces. One was the competition of vigorous, aggressive merchants from other parts of India, another the shift in trade from Cochin; perhaps also there was some internal debilitation of the community despite the occasional infusion of new Jewish immigrants from Europe and the Middle East. And then there was the paramouncy, from 1795, of British officials and civilians who found no reason at all to favour the Cochin Jews whose linguistic competence, at that date, probably did not include fluent command of English.[68]

A Jewish observer, Rabbi David D'Beth Hillel, spent four months with them in 1828–29 and included an account of the Cochin Jews in the book on his travels which was published in Madras in 1832. Born and educated in Lithuania, he moved on to settle at Safed in Galilee. From there he embarked on travels thoughout the Middle East, Persia, and India, and was particularly concerned with the Jewish communities which he encountered in the course of his travels.[69]

He reported that in the time of the Dutch, the white Jews of Cochin were great and wealthy merchants, 'but they have since that time sunk weak and are even in a miserable state, living chiefly by the sale of trinkets and furnitures purchased in more fortunate days'. He added that they were too proud to work for their living; they spent their time chiefly in making visits and did not even do much reading of the scriptures. Some families still retained landed property on which the taxes, by ancient rights, were much reduced from the normal rate. One custom of the country which they had taken on was that of having elaborate costly weddings, lasting double the number of the seven days stipulated in Genesis 24 : 27. 'Their marriages, like those of the Hindus, are attended with considerable expense as to deter many young men from marrying.'[70]

The Malabar Jews, by contrast, were depicted in more favourable terms than in the accounts of the previous century. They were said to number about 1500 families, many more than before, while the estimate for the white Jews was 200 families. They had six synagogues and were described as 'good people'. Most of them were artisans; none was in agriculture at that time. The wheel of their fortune had turned upward again: 'many are in easy circumstances, and scarcely a poor man is to

be found among them. Yasoni, a ship builder, is reputed to be very rich and is in every point a respectable man.'[71]

What may have particularly attracted the visiting Rabbi to the Malabar Jews was that they were well acquainted with the Hebrew scriptures 'which they readily translated into Malayalam and as far as circumstances allow them they walk according to the law'. They had no hereditary priests or Levites but withall, the Rabbi stated, they were 'much more respectable for moral character and conduct than the white Jews'. As for the conflicting origin stories told by the two divisions, he commented that he was inclined to accept as correct the belief of the Malabar Jews that they were descended from Israelites of the first captivity who were brought to India and who did not return with the Israelites who built the Second Temple.[72]

But the Bene Israel of Bombay seem to have had no such sympathetic view of the Malabar Jews of Cochin. On 14 November 1899, the five wardens of the synagogue at Revdunda, in Kolaba district just to the south of Bombay City, said in a letter in English to an elder of the white Jews in Cochin that in a nearby town of Kolaba district, 'one Moses Elia Madai has been engaged as Hazan and Shohet [that is, cantor and ritual slaughterer of food animals] of the synagogue of that place on his giving them to understand that he was a White Jew from Cochin. But we are justly suspicious about his descent from the White race to which we have the honor to belong.' They pointed out that their suspicions concerning black Jews had been so strengthened by their late venerable Hazan that they had come to fear that if the new Hazan were really a black Jew by descent, the fact might make 'all the ceremonies performed by him irreligious according to our notions'. The writers then put four questions. To what class did the aforesaid person belong? If he was of 'Black descent' should he perform Judaic ceremonies? Were Black Jews in Cochin called up to read from the Torah in the white Jews' synagogue, and had one ever been appointed to be Hazan or Shohet there? Finally, had there ever been any marriage connexion between the two classes?

The letter concludes: 'we, as White Jews observe the custom from a very long time of not bestowing upon them, i.e., to Cochin Black Jews, the permanent office of Hazan and Shohet as that of a White one; which rule is observed intact for centuries among us up to the present time...'.[73] The Bene Israel may not have maintained such divisions when Ezekiel Rahabi mentioned them in 1768 but by the time that letter was written, at least some of them held convictions as strong about caste divisions in Indian Jewry as did the white Jews of Cochin.

In the nineteenth century, yet another jati of Cochin Jews appears in the reports: the *meshuhrarim* (*meshurarim*, *meshuchrarim*), the emancipated ones who were manumitted slaves of the white Jews and their descendants. Some were also former servants and employees who voluntarily

became converts but did not join the Malabar Jews. Rabbi D'Beth Hillel names two classes among them, the second being *Avadim*, slaves. However, he says of both that they were 'formerly slaves' and does not distinguish clearly between them, although he does note that persons of any one class among the Cochin Jews have not intermarried with families of the other classes 'although fornications are by no means uncommon'.[74]

The situation of the *meshuhrarim*, later known in English as 'brown' Jews, is detailed more fully in the article on Cochin Jews in the 1904 edition of *The Jewish Encyclopedia*. The authors, Joseph Ezekiel and Joseph Jacobs, say that slaves belonging to white Jews were allowed to undergo rites of conversion to Judaism but they had also to obtain a certificate of emancipation from their masters or mistresses before being treated as Jews at all. To make known his emancipation, a freed slave went about and kissed the hands of all the (white?) Jews in the city. That was done again at the end of the Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement) service. Even so, the freed converted slaves and their descendants, together with other voluntary converts were not given all synagogue privileges. They had to sit on the ground in the synagogue veranda, joining in the services from there. They were not called up to read the weekly portion of scripture—except on the celebration of *Simhat Torah* (the Rejoicing of the Law). Only at the Passover service (the celebration of Jewish liberation from Egyptian bondage) did they sit at table with their former masters and participate in the services. 'This was the only occasion on which they were treated as free men and women.'[75]

Two documents of manumission were examined by Rabbi Louis Rabinowitz when he visited Cochin in 1952. One of them was for 'bondswoman Hannah', dated 1826; the other was for Simeon 'heretofore our homeborn slave', dated 1835. (Slavery was abolished in Cochin state in 1854.) Both documents follow the explicit formula of emancipation stipulated in the Talmud, both proclaim that the freed ones shall enjoy all the privileges of Jews. In Hannah's case it is even stipulated that her sons shall be eligible to form a *minyan*. But Rabbi Rabinowitz was informed that the converted, emancipated persons were told that the document was understood to be 'according to the custom of Cochin' —and that custom did not entitle those freed converts to marry other Jews or to have equal rights in religious worship. However, the two documents examined do not in fact make any such qualifications.[76]

These manumitted slaves never numbered more than a handful of families, but before long they reacted as a jati and demanded symbols of higher status. In 1848 they asked that they might be allowed to occupy benches inside the synagogue. When that was refused, they removed themselves to the British territory of Fort Cochin. 'Led by Ava, a wealthy emancipated slave who acted as sofer and shohet [scribe and ritual slaughterer of animals] they built a synagogue; but their numbers

were soon diminished by the plague, and after Ava's death they were obliged to return to their old position in the synagogue.'[77] Their move had failed, but, like many Hindu jatis of inferior rank who have struck for higher status, they tried again later, using other means, and finally succeeded—though (as we shall see) in an unforeseen way.

By the early years of the twentieth century, all groups of Jews in Cochin were in less favourable circumstances than they had previously been. The Cochin State Manual of 1911 stated that they were far from being in affluent circumstances and that their political influence had become negligible. The white and Malabar Jews lived in peace, though their mutual relations could not be said to be cordial.[78] They were still similar in the nature of their religious observance,[79] but apart in social interchange. The two groups dressed somewhat differently. Those of Malabar wore a waistcloth and wooden sandals like local Muslims of similar economic status, while the white Jews, when they went outside their street, wore a long tunic, a waistcoat, and loose white trousers—but all the men wore sidelocks and a skullcap.[80]

Their staple foods, according to Ezekiel and Jacobs, were those of the country, rice and coconut milk, 'and though the Whites eat cooked fishes and chicken on the Sabbath, the Blacks ēat no meat'.[81] Whether the latter abstention was due to poverty or to the adoption of Brahmanical vegetarianism is not stated, but it is noteworthy that the Cochin Jews took over fewer of the Malabar Hindu festivals and customs than did the Syrian Christians, who were also of ancient settlement in the land.[82] Perhaps this was because the Jews were not spread throughout the countryside as were some of the Christians; they clustered about their synagogues more tightly, and the synagogue calendar was a very full one. Indeed, the accounts of the last two centuries confirm what Ezekiel and Jacobs wrote in 1904: among Cochin Jews 'rites and ceremonies are conducted on an extravagant scale'.[83] The extravagance of the ceremonies (although not the content) was in tune with the values of their Hindu neighbours.

We do not get any clear view, from the available accounts, of how their neighbours appraised the Jews. Woodcock states: 'White Jews, like Syrian Christians, were accepted at a high level in relation to the Hindu hierarchy, and any close mingling with low-class converts would have harmed their social standing'.[84] That may have been so, but Woodcock gives no evidence for it—nor have I found any firm evidence on this subject either in the historical or ethnographic literature or during my own brief observations. Perhaps there was no need for clear ranking because the Jews were such a small community; they were so encapsulated in their own synagogue and streets that their relations with others were mainly in the more impersonal environment of the market or in the occasional providing of artisan services.

Cochin Jews observed: 1937

The caste divisions had begun to alter somewhat when in 1937 I spent a few weeks among the Cochin Jews. But that social change was only in its beginning stages, being impelled by the vigorous efforts of A. B. Salem, the remarkably able leader of the *meshuhrarim*. It was also encouraged by the increasing western secular education of young people of the three Jewish groups, particularly of the white Jews. But these changes were to be overtaken by world events: in a little more than 10 years, much more drastic changes became available with the possibility of emigration to Israel. Within about 15 years, most of the Malabar Jews were gone—resettled in Israel. A good proportion of the white Jews had also emigrated. The *meshuhrarim* had virtually disappeared as a group, having become assimilated in several ways.

The observations recorded in 1937 which were published in 1939,[85] need only be summarized here, together with more data from my unpublished field notes and from reports of about the same period. Although the three jatis were commonly referred to by the terms white, black, and brown, skin pigmentation was not the distinguishing social criterion. While almost all the Malabar Jews were in skin colour very like their Kerala neighbours of other religions, the white Jews ranged in pigmentation from quite dark to quite fair: that was to be expected: they had incorporated a small but steadily continuous flow of migrants from Europe and the Middle East since at least the fifteenth century.[86]

In the distribution of blood types, according to Eileen W. E. MacFarlane, they were more markedly different. A sample of 106 Malabar Jews showed a high percentage (73·6 per cent) of Group O, similar to some of the Hindu jatis of Cochin while a sample of 50 white Jews showed a high proportion (62 per cent) of Group A, similar to the blood type distribution of Middle Eastern Jews.[87] The addition of converts was still evident in 1937. There were two men in the *meshuhrarim* section of the white Jews' synagogue who devotedly attended services, but could not read Hebrew. One was the son of a low-caste woman servant in a Jewish household who wanted her son to be circumcised and converted. The other became an employee of a Jewish family and decided that he wanted to be a Jew; his daughter learnt to read Hebrew.

A number of people in both divisions had been afflicted with filiarsis, the mosquito-borne disease then common in Kerala, which causes elephantine swelling of the limbs. In compiling a census of white Jews, I found that out of a total of 120 people, 15 were so stricken. Seventeen others had mental illness or a history of it. Though there was one vigorous family whose commercial enterprises were successful, and employed 13 of the men, there were a good many other men and women who had no occupation. They were supported by income from inherited

property, or, more frequently, from synagogue funds. Yet, despite these gloomy statistics, the lives of the white Jews in 1937 did not seem to me to be particularly depressing. There was a sense of security, a self-confidence, and—in synagogue celebration—a gaiety that lifted their spirits and made a visitor get a lift in being with them.[88] Though I saw less of the Malabar Jews and participated only briefly in their ceremonies, I felt that they too were living a kind of life which yielded a good deal of personal satisfaction and reward, despite their relative poverty and their vociferous resentment of what they proclaimed to be the invidious discrimination they suffered at the hands of the white Jews.

The homes of the white Jews in Cochin were side by side along their single street, at the head of which stands the synagogue. The few homes of *meshuhrarim* were then interspersed among them. Farther down the street were the houses, shops, and two synagogues of the Malabar Jews. Two other synagogues were in Ernakulam, across the harbour from Cochin City, and three in nearby villages. The quarters in which the Jews lived were ghettoes, but voluntary ghettoes. A few of the more affluent had houses elsewhere, but all returned to their homes in the Jewish section, close to the synagogue, during the high holidays. The dead, no less than the living, were segregated: there were separate burial grounds for white and for Malabar Jews. When the leader of the *meshuhrarim* set up a separate congregation in 1848, he staked out a separate cemetery also.[89]

There was some disparity of average family income among the divisions. The Malabar Jews were generally poorer, only a few being moderately prosperous merchants by local standards. The others kept small shops in the front of their houses, peddled foodstuffs, or worked as artisans. There were some petty tradesmen and artisans among the white Jews also, but most of their families relied either on inherited wealth, synagogue charity or the mercantile enterprise of the Koder family.[90] Both white and Malabar Jews were then officially rated as being 'backward classes' in education; government stipends were available to encourage their young to carry on their studies.

In the major aspects of Judaic ritual and belief, all three groups were equally devout. All Cochin Jews observed the dietary regulations to the letter; all honoured the Sabbath and the holy days with full devotion, though a white Jew allowed that the Malabar Jews generally observed the holy days 'with more sincerity than we do'. Judaic learning was prized among the Malabar Jews, so that the teachers of Hebrew for the white children were from the other congregations. One of them had made the voyage to Jerusalem in fulfilment of a vow and had returned with a Jewish wife he had courted and married in the holy city. By then, the *shohetim* were also drawn from among the Malabar Jews. The Zionist cause was another element which they shared; some members of all

three jatis were active in the movement to return Jews to the Holy Land and to establish a Jewish state there.

In 1937, however, the three divisions were still being kept separate in important ways. Not only were Malabar Jews not counted as part of a *minyan* in the Paradesi synagogue but, at least on one occasion, at the synagogue in the village of Parur, visiting white Jews were not considered eligible for a *minyan* there. And no intermarriage had yet taken place. By the time of Rabbi Rabinowitz's visit in 1952, one had occurred between a white Jewish girl and the son of A. B. Salem, the leader of the *meshuhrarim*. The wedding could not be held in Cochin, so strong was the white Jews' opposition, but it was celebrated in Bombay. When the young couple returned there was a stormy interlude which had not quite calmed down by 1952. When the bride came to the white Jews' synagogue on the Festival day following her wedding, all the other women left their gallery in protest. Meanwhile, arguments had been raised which impugned the groom's ancestry in specific accusations, not only because he was of the *meshuhrarim* but also on account of alleged misdeeds of his parents and grandparents. Rabbi Rabinowitz, who was then Chief Rabbi of the Transvaal in South Africa, was asked for a rabbinical decision on the matter; he followed rabbinical precedents dating over four centuries in pronouncing the union to be Judaically legitimate.[91]

The most vigorous mobility effort in 1937 was being waged by A. B. Salem towards gaining equal rights with the white Jews for his little band of *meshuhrarim*. That extraordinary man, born in 1882, became a lawyer; in his very active life he personified a series of struggles, from that which he carried on for his minute community to the great national and international issues of his time. He worked for Indian independence as an early and fervent member of the Congress party, holding both appointive and elective positions in the Cochin Legislative Assembly. He defended the rights of labour as President of the local postal workers' trade union; he was a prominent activist in the Zionist organization and twice visited Israel.[92]

In fighting for his community's rights, he used methods old and new. He undertook a Gandhi-like *satyagraha* (non-violent resistance) in the Paradesi synagogue. He appealed to learned Jewish authorities. In 1937 he had withdrawn from the lowly place assigned to his group in the white Jews' synagogue and was meticulously conducting the full round of Jewish services in his home. He did make some gains: at one family celebration that I attended among the white Jews, several of the leading men ate with Mr. Salem in a room above the main dining place, separate so that the other guests might not leave because of Salem's presence; and his people were allowed to sit inside the synagogue and to have some synagogue privileges, though not full rights.[93] Furthermore, as has been said, one of his sons did break the intermarriage taboo;

but two of his daughters, physicians like their mother, married educated men of other religions.

The Malabar Jews did not accept the inferiority imputed to them but at that time they were making no strong overt efforts to combat it. In a manner common to jatis in India, especially in sectarian jatis, there was social splintering even within the Malabar Jews. One of their congregations, that of the Riverside synagogue in Cochin town, had had a falling out with the other Malabar Jews, apparently over the ordination of a *shohet*. The consequence was that for some years no member of that congregation would be counted as part of a *minyan* in other Malabar congregations. Intermarriage with members of the ostracized group was forbidden to the others. When one young man did take a bride from the Riverside congregation, he was ousted from his own synagogue and thenceforth attended services in the synagogue of his wife's family.[94]

Such a process of antagonistic fission, even among so small an enclave, has not been uncommon in the history of Jewish society in various parts of the world. In this, Judaic and Indic social processes have been similar; the vigour of this split, the ostracism, the bans on intermarriage and on common worship, are common among the jatis through much of India.[95] Both white and Malabar Jews were, and are, very like their Cochin neighbours of other religions in everyday dress, diet, and language. Jewish men of both groups wear the skullcap, both communities observe the Judaic rules in diet, and they use Hebrew and other non-Indian words in their version of Malayalam.[96] They have adopted a good many Kerala traits, from the use of the *tali*—a neckpiece given to the bride at her wedding and worn by all married women—to the way in which two men will saunter along the street holding hands in token of their friendship.[97] A more serious practice was that of outcasting, done more in the Indic way than in the Judaic model of religious excommunication: an unfortunate woman of the Malabar Jews, whom I happened to see and enquire about during a ferry trip across the harbour, had been cast out of the whole Jewish community because she had borne an illegitimate child.[98]

These Jewish groups also resemble many Hindu jatis in holding to two kinds of origin story. One explains the cosmos and the nature of human society, the other justifies the actual or sought status of one's group in the social order.[99] The cosmic explanation of the Cochin Jews came from the Hebrew rather than from the Sanskrit scriptures. Their more specific explanations were derived from the conflicting claims about pure descent. Each group claimed to be of ancient Israelite origin, the whites asserting and the Malabar Jews denying that the latter were all of base ancestry. However bitter the internal struggle for status might be, none of the contestants denied that their opponents were Jews; and in facing the external society, the antagonists were inclined to present a smoother image than an insider would see. When that most

fiery contestant A. B. Salem wrote an excellent guide for visitors, *Cochin Jew Town Synagogue*[100] on the Paradesi synagogue, he did not mention the internal divisions but rather emphasized certain parallels between Hindu and Judaic practice which an Indian visitor would respond to and understand.

He explained how the 'idea of purity underlies the position of the Synagogue':[101] to the orthodox Jew cleanliness is not a mere matter of soap and water, so that the synagogue has to be kept as far away as possible from pollution and its absolute purity ensured. Hindus, whether orthodox or not, can readily grasp this emphasis on ritual purity and pollution. Salem further noted that the *cohanim*, the hereditary priests, must wash ritually before blessing the congregation. Moreover, all male Jews are scripturally enjoined to wear fringed garments, the fringes being 'sacred threads'. He pointed out that the houses along Jews' street are built contiguously to form, as it were, one house with many compartments, 'as in a Brahmin Agraharm', the typical street of Brahmins in South Indian villages.[102] The prophet Elijah, whose special place in Cochin Jewish belief Salem mentions, is like 'the Rishis of India . . . a *Jeevanmuktha*'. The most solemn holy day of the Judaic calendar, the Day of Atonement, 'corresponds very much to the great Brahminical Upakarma ceremony day . . .'. And the ritual of attainment of religious majority by Jewish boys at the age of 13, the Bar Mitzvah, is compared to the initiation rites for those Hindu boys who assume the sacred thread. 'A corresponding idea is in the Brahminical Upanayanam ceremony.'[103]

The description of the Passover ceremony provides the author with an opportunity to dwell on the traditional devotion of Jews to personal liberty and independence, a reference which would not have been lost on visiting Indians during the last decades of British rule, and specifically the parallel between Moses and Aaron and Gandhi and Nehru. Salem nevertheless concludes his booklet with an affirmation of the centuries-long loyalty of the Cochin Jews to the Rajas of Cochin and their concomitant, undiminished love for their 'natural Spiritual Home in Zion . . .'.[104]

Some of Salem's parallels are superficial, but others touch a more profound level of belief and behaviour in which followers of the disparate religions have something in common. The wearing of the Judaic fringed garment is a symbol of religious belonging as is the wearing of the sacred thread, with the important difference that all Jewish males are enjoined to wear one, whereas adult males of only the highest, purer, 'twice-born' Hindu categories may wear the other. Religious heroes and examplars like the legendary Hindu Rishis have their counterparts in the legendary prophets of Hebrew scripture, both portrayed as being inspired by divine grace, though the figure of the Rishi is less apt to harp on the social and religious failings of his fellows than is the prophet.

Rites de passage marking the stages of the human life cycle are religiously celebrated among people of various faiths, although the specific content of, and the junctures for, passage vary widely. So both the Hindu Upanayanam and the Jewish Bar Mitzvah mark a boy's assumption of a man's rights and responsibilities. While the former is permitted only for the three higher categories of Hindu society, the latter is incumbent on all male Jews among those communities in which it has been institutionalized. Both religions postulate salvation for all souls of the faith. The Jewish concept of salvation, unlike the Hindu *moksha*, involves a personal saviour and a Heavenly City that also happens to be a temporal, if temporary, municipality. Even the comparison of Moses and Aaron with Gandhi and Nehru is not utterly far-fetched despite the vast gap of time, culture, and historicity which separates the pairs. The first of each pair was a visionary, an inspirer, who was not himself permitted to enjoy the success of his leadership. The other two were administrators and establishers, the kind of men who have to turn an inspired vision into a practical reality.

The Cochin Jews, like their Hindu neighbours, were religiously preoccupied with ritual purity and pollution as inherent in objects, acts, and people. The highest of the Kerala Brahmins kept themselves most pure ritually; a pure diet was an important feature of their ritual eminence. But even the lowliest among Hindus, who could not afford some ritual niceties and were not allowed to practise others, nonetheless guided their own observances according to similar standards of purity and pollution.[105] The Cochin Jews were meticulous in their observances concerning purity and pollution as laid down in the Judaic codes: Pereyra de Paiva reported that, like their orthodox brethren in Europe, the Cochin Jews had a 'horror' of ritually impure food.'[106]

Impure ancestry was given as a valid reason for social denigration among Cochin Jews as among Kerala Hindus. But Hindus recognized different degrees of group pollution because of descent, they also stigmatized those who practised polluting occupations and customs, and attributed differing degrees of rank in consequence. The white Jews consigned all the Malabar Jews and *meshuhrarim* to the same general level of inferior status, whatever their current ritual practice might be. We do not know how their neighbours assessed the jati divisions and the standards of purity among the Cochin Jews, but as suggested above, there may have been so little personal interchange outside the market-place that those of other faiths felt no need to know about these matters.

The case of the splinter congregation among the Malabar Jews reflects a process not uncommon among Hindu jatis. Arguments between factions within a jati reach a pass when one withdraws from the other and redefines its social boundaries to exclude it. In time, those of one group may become clearly superior to their former jati fellows, and

the separation tends to be explained in terms of the inherent ritual pollution of the inferior group.[107]

As we saw earlier, the lavish celebration of ceremonies, especially of weddings, was noted by several who wrote on the Cochin Jews. In this matter also, the Cochin Jews were in tune with the environing culture. Throughout India, and not least in Kerala, people were motivated by their pervasive hierarchical perspective to compete vigorously for status rank within their jati, as well as with those at other social levels. A principal way of attaining higher status among families, or of validating a status that was already high, lay in making a prestigious match for one's child and in staging the wedding with so bountiful a hand that the expenses might well drain off a large part of the family's income for the year. For the Jews as for their neighbours, the wedding was not only a critical event in the unending race for high status in the jati; it was also a prime occasion for aesthetic display and performance, for creating and enjoying humour, for reaching a high point of personal satisfaction within one's family and community. That satisfaction was further enhanced if prestigious guests of other communities put in an appearance on the occasion and so graced the event with the aura of their presence, and perhaps also communicated the glory of its extravagance beyond the jati.

The Cochin Jews, like the other people of Kerala whether Hindu, Christian, or Muslim, tried to lead a God-centred life, however much secular distractions might be necessary to earn a livelihood. Like the highest, purest groups among Hindus, like the most devout of the Muslims and Christians, the Cochin Jews were absorbed in ritual acts—of the day, the year, the life-cycle. But the rhythms of their Judaic rites were totally different from those prescribed by the other religions. The Jews followed a different calendar for their day, their year, their life-span, and that isolated them culturally and socially from their neighbours in the other quarters of the towns or villages where they lived. The Hindu matrix of Kerala culture allowed for, indeed was postulated on, a variety of groups, each having its own ways, so long as none infringed on the purity of the higher jatis, and all in some fashion contributed to the good of the Raja and his state.

Living in this cultural environment, the Cochin Jews steadfastly maintained their identity as Jews, not only within their own domestic terrain, but also by wearing voluntary diacritical marks of dress, such as the men's skullcap and sidelocks, wherever they went. It is one token of their clear self-identification that from the ninth to the nineteenth centuries, Cochin Jews wrote their signatures in Hebrew characters. Even their eighteenth-century notable, Ezekiel Rahabi, who carried on a large international business, and who was an accredited envoy extraordinary and a student of western science, signed his Hebrew name in Hebrew script whatever the language of the communication or contract to which he appended his signature.[108]

Their stability in Kerala society contrasted with the tensions that for centuries continued to afflict relations among the jatis of Cochin Jews. The white Jews accepted the Malabar and *meshuhrarim* as Jews but not as social or ritual equals. They were acting in consonance with explicit Kerala precepts of caste ranking but, as the repeated rabbinical responsa show, contrary to the precepts held by world Jewry, of which they keenly felt themselves to be members. The Malabar Jews and *meshuhrarim* were more consistent, though their consistency was for a long time of little avail. They shared the Judaic concepts of the ritual equality of all Jews and also the implicit Indic self-esteem that often impels those of a group deemed inferior to challenge the attributed superiority of those who are next above them in a local hierarchy.[109]

Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Kerala society

The Christians and Muslims of Kerala were also firm in their self-identity and had to deal with similar tensions between the egalitarian ideology of their respective scriptures and the caste mould of their social environment. Both religions numbered many more followers in Kerala than did Judaism, no doubt because proselytization was encouraged in both. The number of Cochin Jews was at 2,000 or fewer for several centuries.[110] All the Jewish congregations except the one in Mala village were located in the present district of Ernakulam. In 1961 Christians composed 42·6 per cent (792,458 people) of the district population and Muslims, 11·3 per cent (210,400). In the whole of Kerala state adherents of these two religions make up about 40 per cent of the population.[111]

Kerala Christians and Muslims have maintained caste-like groups similar to those of the Cochin Jews, in which those sections whose members claim purer descent keep themselves apart from their co-religionists who, they assert, are the descendants of base-born converts. There are more such divisions among them than among the Jews of Kerala, not only because of their greater numbers but also because followers of each of these two introduced religions were geographically far-flung, along the whole length of the Malabar coastal plain, with the Christian population more concentrated in the south of Kerala and the Muslims more concentrated in the north.

Most of the Kerala Muslims are of the cluster of jatis collectively called Moplahs (Mappillas). In the northernmost district of the state, Muslims of that name are divided into five separate endogamous sections whose members, up to the 1950s, did not interdine or worship in the same mosques. Each had its own religious organizations and burial grounds. Three of the five claim descent from pure lineages that originated outside India; two divisions are ranked below them, one because of descent from converts, the other for that reason and also

because their men specialize in the lowly occupation of being barbers.[112] The same kind of dual grouping is found among the many millions of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh state in North India. Members of the several sections in the higher moiety, called *Ashraf* ('honourable') keep themselves aloof from Muslims of the lower division, the *Ajlaf*. Those of the higher rank attribute their superiority to the purity of their descent, as well as to their better life style. In North India, however, the social distance among Muslim sections is not as great or as rigidly kept as D'Souza depicts it to be among the Moplahs of Kerala: members of the higher sections, at least among North Indian Muslims, will dine and worship together and they may occasionally intermarry.

The contrast between Muslim and Hindu social stratification in India has been discussed by Mattison Mines,[113] who notes that Muslim caste divisions are not principally based on or explained by differences in ritually pure behaviour, and that there is no integrated ideology to justify them. There is a clear parallel here with the condition we have noted for the Jews of Cochin, and seems to be true of the Mappillas of Kerala. Muslim social cleavages in Tamil Nadu in South India as in Uttar Pradesh in the north, may be grounded in an array of causes in addition to that of pure or impure descent, as in differences of sect, of ethnicity (mainly language and region), and of occupational specialization.[114]

Among the Christians of Kerala, the principal bases for separate endogamous sections lie in differences of sect or denomination. Converts made by successive generations of European missionaries added separate Christian groups to the church congregations founded in the first millennium. As with the Muslims and Jews of Kerala, those Christians who claim more ancient and religiously pure descent hold themselves to be superior to Christians of more recent conversion and less exalted ancestral rank.[115]

For Christians, Muslims, and Jews alike the social structure of Kerala Hinduism was the matrix for their own social organization. Though their respective scriptures decreed that all who kept the faith were ritual equals, that idea was challenged by the hierarchical perspective of the Hindus around them, who took rigid stratification and the radiation of pollution to be axiomatic. So if the devotees of these imported egalitarian religions were to be taken as worthy, respectable people by the majority in the region, they too had to demonstrate their relative purity, at least by keeping the more polluted of their own faith at a suitable social distance.

The matrix of Kerala Hinduism was altered from time to time, with consequent effects on the structure of those communities adhering to foreign religions. Historians of Kerala tell us that until about the eleventh century, there was more social mobility and readier conversion than there was in later centuries, especially after the ritual hegemony of Nambudiri Brahmins became established and fully acknowledged.[116]

In the sixteenth century the vigour of the Roman Catholic counter-reformation was quickly felt along the west coast of India: within two years of the establishment of the Society of Jesus, St. Francis Xavier had settled a mission in Goa; soon after, many Jesuits and other Catholic missionaries were devoting their energies and lives to converting to their persuasion Indians of all religions, including the anciently settled Syrian Christians. This may well have stiffened Hindu and Syrian Christian loyalties to their established rites and social organization. For the Jews of the region, it meant that scattered Jewish families and settlements sought refuge in the relative security of the Cochin Raja's domain and thus increased the Cochin Jewish congregations to a viable size. The firm establishment of British influence and rule in the nineteenth century introduced many changes, technological, political, and educational, into Kerala. But the internal social and religious matrix of the people of Kerala was not radically altered until the twentieth century.[117]

During the four centuries following the advent of the Portuguese, the Cochin Jews no less than the Christians and Muslims of Kerala were trying to cope with conflicting influences on their internal social relations. Their principal reference category did not fit with the models presented by their reference groups. (A reference category consists of those books, codes, and other non-personal messages that a people try to live by.[118]) For the Cochin Jews the reference category of Judaism was particularly precious, partly because it related their small remote community to a widespread numerous congregation of fellow believers, and partly because Judaism assured them that they were the chosen of God and that their rites were beloved of God. In their daily prayer, they repeated over and again the sacred history of their founding ancestors and the divine promise of redemption. In contrast, their reference groups were their high-status Hindu neighbours, whose conduct they could see and some of whose standards they wanted to emulate in order to maintain a respectable position among them. The most important of these groups were the Raja and his court of Nair administrators and warriors. For the Raja, as we have noted, the Jews were among his useful specialists, particularly since they were expert in trade negotiations. They were all the more valuable to him because their alien religion and fewness in number made them no threat whatsoever to the maintenance of his role and that of his dynasty. The Nambudiri Brahmans of Kerala were a small proportion of the total population but were powerfully influential as examplars of purity and as legitimators of the secular authority of the Raja and the Nairs. They had no reason to oppose the Jews, who did not encroach on their ritual superiority or secular advantages, and did contribute to the good of the state. The dominant Hinduism in Kerala supported the religious hierarchy and both found it useful to have Christians, Muslims, and Jews in the state.

Kerala society began to be transformed after Europeans established

their presence, although the great political and social changes did not emerge until the twentieth century. Kerala was geographically isolated from the rest of India by the jungles and heights of the Western Ghats (the railway did not reach the present capital city, Trivandrum, until the 1920s), but the Malabar coast was exposed to European influences earlier than was most of India through the ancient and continuing maritime connexions. The trade routes were also followed by Jewish travellers, who brought to Cochin current information and Hebrew books. Some also sold packets of earth from the Holy Land which were placed under the head of a Cochin Jew at his burial so that he could be said to have made his last resting place on a bit of the sacred soil. So the Judaic reference category was periodically reinforced among Cochin Jews by living proponents of Judaic values and ritual conduct.

The great social and political changes which emerged in India after the First World War were exemplified on the small stage of Cochin by A. B. Salem. His local struggles took in a wide range of causes, as did the tidal movements that were then sweeping over the subcontinent. He fought for the ritual equality of his *meshuhrarim* and for the freedom, in a new Israeli state, of his harassed co-religionists. He was a leader in the effort to improve the economic position of Kerala workers and prominent locally in the fight to gain political independence and democracy for his country. He was even an early champion of women's rights; he married a woman who became a physician and his two daughters followed in their mother's footsteps, as was noted above.

When political independence was achieved in 1947, all the princely rulers, including the Maharaja of Cochin, were stripped of their power and the new Republic of India became a functioning democracy with universal suffrage. Like other minority groups, the Cochin Jews were uncertain of what might be in store for them in a new regime in which the number of votes a group could muster was a main avenue to influence, advantage, and power. Those in the principal sectors of Kerala society had to realign themselves, at least for political purposes, so that the old fractioning based on claimed ritual purity did not stand in the way of fusion to build larger groups in order to achieve voting strength. Hence in Kerala, as in democratic states with free elections in most of the world, the consolidation of ethnic groups was accelerated, the people of each such group seeing themselves as having certain primordial bonds, some basic culture elements in common, and often reverting to a tradition or sense of common ancestry. Thus some of the consolidations were grounded in religion, as among Kerala Muslims and Christians, while others rose from caste affiliations, as among the Nairs and Ezhavas. These consolidations were, of course, considerably less than complete, but were strong enough to make such voting blocs an important factor in Kerala state politics.[119]

Migration to Israel and its consequences

The Cochin Jews were too tiny a minority and too separate to be able to make ready alliance with larger groups. So when in 1948 they learned that the new State of Israel had been established, was welcoming Jewish immigrants from all corners of the Diaspora, and would help them move and get settled in the Holy Land, most of the Malabar Jews readily decided to go. All the more so since they and their ancestors had regularly prayed for this restoration. They began to go in 1948; in 1952–54 a few hundred children aged 12–16 were taken to Israel; and in 1953–55 most of the Malabar Jews emigrated. Some of the white Jews also went but, since the wealthier families had some property in India, they were less quick to leave the country.

In Israel the Malabar Jews were placed in several *moshavim* (co-operative agricultural settlements). They offer an example of an Indian jati transplanted quickly, bodily, and collectively into a completely different social and cultural environment. One of their settlements was studied by Gilbert Kushner in 1961–62.[120] The 203 Malabar Jews who then lived in the moshav which Kushner calls Bet Avi had to earn their living as farmers. Very few of them had done so in Cochin, most having been small shopkeepers, government employees, and teachers, while a few had been well-established merchants. The land assigned to them was not very good; to the persistent struggle with the meagre soil was added the need to watch continually over their crops and lives, since the border was not far away and hostile raids were common. Instead of having the synagogue's endowment and the Maharaja's protection to rely on, they now were dependent on the instructors assigned to them by the resettlement agency who, in turn, had to depend on a complex congeries of remote governmental agencies. These instructors had none too bright a view of their charges; some thought the Cochin Jews were too slight in physique for heavy farm work; others believed that they were too irresponsible about the time schedule necessary for successful farming; most thought that they were much too inclined to engage in trading in Jerusalem and that far too much of their time, resources, and energies went into religious and domestic celebrations.[121]

Most significant for the Malabar Jews was the change in the pace and the focus of their lives: from being centred on the rhythms and rites of the synagogue they were exhorted to place work at the core of their interest and efforts. Indeed, the dawn-to-dusk routine of farm work prescribed by the instructors prevented them from being as punctilious in their religious observances as they had been in Cochin. They still spent very many hours in the synagogue and on its celebrations: the time and energy they were urged to expend in work left most people in Bet Avi too little time and energy for the synagogue. So, in 1961–62,

most people in Bet Avi were not happy with that facet of their new life in the Holy Land.

Caste stratification and caste contention were gone but new forms of stratification became important to them and factional antagonisms continued. The *vaad*, the elected village council, was composed of five young men who were successful farmers and who spoke Hebrew well. The old dominance of the elders had lost its base. Those who worked hard and efficiently earned more and so could buy more of the household furnishings, farm equipment, and electrical appliances which were now the insignia of eminent, respectable status in the group. However, although the majority were not satisfied with their allotments or with the new rhythms of their lives, the people at Bet Avi acknowledged that, on the whole, their life conditions were better than they would have been had they remained in Cochin.[122]

In 1973–74, about twenty years after their arrival in Israel, the social psychologist Dr. Aviva Menkes worked in the same *moshav* as part of a comparative study of two Cochin, two Kurdish, and two Yemenite settlements; she focused on the incidence of physical and mental illness. Dr. Menkes has kindly shared her (as yet unpublished) observations with me. She found a marked contrast between the two settlements of Cochin Jews she studied and still greater differences in a third that has been reported on but which she did not visit. The people of Bet Avi are still lively, ebullient, and not very tidy in their farms or houses. There is still a good deal of factional dispute (not uncommon either in Cochin or in Israeli *moshavim*), which prevents them from getting as much government funds and other help as they could have if they were more united. A recent bitterly contested issue concerned the burial of a woman who had committed suicide because of her only son's imminent wedding to a girl who was not from Cochin and whose demeanour was not to her taste. Her body was buried next to her husband's grave in the village cemetery; but this is contrary to Judaic law and a strong faction has argued that it should be disinterred and reburied in a field—as Holy Writ prescribes. No doubt that in this, as in most factional struggles, more is involved than just the manifest issue in the case.

The other *moshav* of Cochin Jews studied by Dr. Menkes is quite different, much neater, its people more prosperous; but their lives are closely and sternly controlled by one autocratic man who has succeeded by dint of industry, intelligence, and manipulation in bringing all the families of the settlement under his control. In that, he is reminiscent of the eighteenth-century figure Ezekiel Rahabi, whose control extended not only over the Jews of Cochin but over the whole of the Dutch trade in Cochin as well.

More dramatic changes have come about in the third *moshav* of Cochin Jews, located in the arid Negev region which was studied by

Moshe Shokeid in 1962. He found that the site was so lacking in water and good soil, and so exposed to Bedouin depredation, that four different groups of settlers who had successively tried to wrest a living had failed, and had abandoned it. In 1954, 80 families from Cochin were sent to live there. By 1962 they too had been so battered by the hardships of the place that they were disappointed, bitter, and apathetic.[123] Then something happened to the settlement, though what it was has not yet been studied and reported on. That group of Cochin Jews has succeeded in transforming its desert tract into one of the most prosperous *moshavim* in Israel; they grow flowers for export and have attained considerable communal success.

Different as the two Cochin settlements studied by Dr. Menkes are, they do share some common traits. For those in their forties and younger, Hebrew is the common language. Only the older generation speak Malayalam by preference. They are eager for a better social and economic position in Israel's kind of social stratification and a principal avenue upwards, in Israel as in India, is via higher education. One of the men of the more prosperous settlement has a university education and so has been able to secure a post in the agricultural division of a government agency. This connexion with state power is useful for his family and friends.

The hardworking successful farmers compose the more prestigious levels of both settlements. But the synagogue is still the arena in which achieved prestige is dramatized. Secular success is demonstrated through gifts to the synagogue and in the honours accorded during synagogue rites. The tales told by those who remember life in Cochin show a certain nostalgia for the independence and self-esteem they enjoyed there.

In Israel, as in India, Malabar Jews still prefer fairness of skin and avoid discussion of darkness of pigmentation. The men drink liberally in Israel as they did in Cochin but they complain Israeli brandy is more harmful to health and more expensive than the alcoholic potions they enjoyed in Cochin. Their neighbours in Israel say that the Cochin Jews are 'good people' but that they are much too unaggressive and passive. Even the Israeli-born children of Cochin parents are said to be much more passive and 'lacking in healthy aggression' than are other schoolchildren.[124]

There are virtually no contacts between the Malabar Jews and the few families of white Jews and *meshuhrarim* who now live in Israel. There is some intermarriage with Israelis of other origins and with a few Bene Israel families from Bombay. Some of the more extremist orthodox Israeli rabbis alleged that the Bene Israel were of impure religious ancestry; but the Cochin Jews did not encounter that kind of opposition —which, in the case of the Bene Israel, was finally overcome by government action. Shalva Weil, an anthropologist from the University of

Sussex who had been studying the Bene Israel settlers in Israel, told me (in a personal communication) that Cochin Jews are settled in some 18 places, 12 of them *moshavim*. There is a tendency for the Israeli-born among them to work in cities as skilled labourers. In this they are being true to the artisan traditions of their forefathers, though on a more sophisticated level, as in the case of about 30 or more who are employed in the Aircraft Industry at Lod. On a visit to a *moshav* where settlers from Cochin live among those from Poland and Romania, Shalva Weil had the impression that there was not much interaction among these families, mainly because everyone was so busy working... A family whom she visited rose at 4 a.m. and usually worked until 8 p.m. They 'cannot remember the last time they went to the cinema because who would look after the cows?' Cows were important in Cochin, indeed were sacred for their Hindu neighbours and rulers. But in Cochin a Jew would scarcely forfeit a pleasurable experience for the sake of cows; there, most social pleasures were experienced regularly and communally in the bright sacred precincts of the synagogue—and not only occasionally during a few hours snatched from work, when one gazes alone at an illuminated screen in the secular darkness of the cinema. The family 'is very pro-Israel and would not consider leaving'. The same seems to be true of the other Jews from Cochin, but their nostalgic tales of life in Kerala indicate that although they have gained much in Israel, they have lost something precious that was rooted in their way of life in Cochin.

Social stratification and its cultural matrix

The long history of the small group of Cochin Jews suggests some basic elements of caste relations in India. For them, a supporting ideology was not necessary for the maintenance of caste relations. Their Judaic ideology was, like that of the Kerala Christians and Muslims, directly opposed to caste distinctions within the fold of their co-religionists. The rationale given by the white Jews for their assumed superiority was the allegedly impure ancestry of the Malabar Jews. The latter, in their turn, did not abjure caste discriminations, but like most aspiring jatis only denied their own inferiority and insisted that they merited a higher rank in the local caste order. In their case, the higher rank was that of ritual equality with the white Jews.

A coherent authoritative ideology of caste legitimacy was probably necessary to maintain the general structure of Kerala society which formed the matrix for the caste divisions among the Jews. But that legitimating ideology included far more than the account in *Manu* and in the many other Hindu scriptural texts. Those texts, important as they were and are, are best seen as the articulated outcroppings of certain underlying widely shared perceptions. The texts justify and reinforce the

common perception that social relations are always hierarchically ordered. This is a perception that a child in the society absorbs as soon as he absorbs any social precepts.[125] Such perceptions were shared at all levels of the society, even by people who were not allowed direct access to the sacred texts. The official legitimating ideology, in this broader sense, is an expression of basic ideas. These ideas are both reflected in and reinforced by ritual activities, from the rite of daily greeting to the grand ceremonies of the year and of the life cycle. The Judaic ritual observances were so encompassing, pervasive, engrossing, rewarding, and different that their performance effectively isolated the Cochin Jews from their neighbours of other religions. They did become acculturated to Kerala ways in language, dress, and in a range of attitudes and customs, but less so than did the Syrian Christians who participated in some of the Kerala ceremonies or those Kerala Muslims who took on—or as converts continued to maintain—matrilineal descent. It is worth noting here that the many Hindu groups of Kerala whose kinship relations were matrilineally oriented nonetheless maintained one of the more rigorous systems of caste, despite their profound departure from the patrilineal emphasis of the received texts of Hindu scripture.

The case of the Cochin Jews also draws attention to some of the economic and political aspects of caste relations. Those of higher and more powerful jatis have commonly taken economic advantage of those in the less powerful lower ranks. A jati of the latter, if its members succeeded in gaining power and raising their rank, generally did the same to those below them. But there were at least two periods when the supposedly inferior Malabar Jews were richer, more powerful, more numerous, and as ritually impeccable in their conduct as the white Jews —as was noted in the responsum of 1520 and as was still largely true in 1828–29, according to Rabbi D'Beth Hillel.[126] But the economic, political, and numerical preponderance of the Malabar Jews was not great enough to enable them to gain equality with the white Jews. Perhaps that preponderance was too short-lived to be effective in the long term.

Throughout the four centuries and more for which we have records of protests of Malabar Jews against white Jews, there is no evidence of economic exploitation by the white of the Malabar Jews or of competition between them either economically or politically. In a number of ways, as we have seen, the white Jews asserted their bond of common religion with the Malabar Jews, but they may also have needed to use the Malabar Jews in order to establish their own respectable status in the state, as the Brahmins and Nairs needed lower jatis to establish and help keep up their own superiority. Economic exploitation, especially of the jatis of landless labourers by the jatis of landowners, was undoubtedly a central part of the pre-colonial caste system, particularly in its Kerala version.[127] Our discussion of the function of ideology may be

relevant for that understanding of Indian caste to which Dumont alluded when he wrote: 'It is not impossible, although it is hardly conceivable at present, that in the future the political-economic aspects will be shown to be in reality the fundamental ones, and the ideology secondary.'[128]

Economically the Jews of Cochin were in a special position because, at various times, they had a special contribution to make to the economy and external political relations of the state. Those among them who could facilitate overseas trade were of high utility in a kingdom whose ruling groups had engaged in maritime commerce since the first millennium B.C.E. The economic usefulness of the Jews explains the Raja's generosity to them in the year C.E. 1,000 and the special protection he gave them when in 1565 he sited their homes and synagogues close to his own royal compound.

In the sixteenth century the Cochin Jews needed strong protection against the Portuguese who had brought hostile attitudes towards Jews, along with their more relaxed views on caste and colour. The Dutch also protected the Jews because they found them as useful to them in trade as they were to the Raja; moreover, the Dutch had a tolerant rather than hostile attitude to Jews.

The British, during their years of paramouncy in Malabar, tried to keep themselves disentangled (not always succesfully) from the difficult decisions concerning caste and religion. They were much more interested in the profitability of their business enterprises and in the smoothness of their administration than they were in the rescue of souls for the Church. They used the mercantile services of the Cochin Jews, but by that time there were others in Cochin who could render those services as well or better.

Soon after the establishment of the independent Republic of India, as we have noted, many of the Cochin Jews took the newly opened opportunity to migrate to Israel. Only half or less of either jati remained in Cochin, but their leaders staged one grand, probably final celebration of their long history when in 1968 they commemorated the four hundredth anniversary of the completion of the Paradesi synagogue. The event was graced by the attendance of notables—local, national, and foreign. Government authorities co-operated generously in the fête. A commemorative stamp was issued and a handsome volume recording the proceedings was published. Not least important, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, came and made a brief felicitous speech. She took the occasion to remind her audience—her remarks were broadcast and widely published in India—that the ancient, harmonious, and honourable story of the Jews of Cochin demonstrated the historic tolerance of the Indian people and showed again how important it was for the modern Indian republic to be a secular state in which religious passions should have no place as political factors. So, towards the end of their

story, the Cochin Jews provided occasion for a homily for political guidance, as in earlier centuries they had provided services to the rulers of Cochin.

The case history of the Cochin Jews is also relevant for an understanding of Judaism, as I have commented in a paper written for the memorial volume for Professor W. J. Fischel.[129] The Jews of each jati maintained full ritual devotion to Judaism and held steadfastly to their identity as Jews without the cohesive force of religious oppression, without benefit of rabbis, and without participating significantly in the development of Jewish law and learning. That also demonstrates the importance of understanding the general culture and society within which a group of Jews lives. As S. M. Lipset has cogently written, a comparative study of Jews must be linked inseparably with the comparative study of their non-Jewish neighbours.[130]

When many Cochin Jews settled in Israel, not only the scene but also their life scenario was changed. Although the synagogue remains an important locus of social as well as religious activity, it is no longer the sole locus. Their life rhythms are no longer greatly different from those of their neighbours, and the measure of the religious rhythm has to be in tune with, even subordinated to, the pulse of the work rhythm. And the work is in the modern mode of agricultural and industrial production. They have been strongly urged to concentrate on it, in order to achieve for themselves a respectable place in the Israeli social order and, in so doing, to help their new country achieve security and respect among nations. Caste stratification is no longer a significant element in their lives. However, there is a new order of social stratification which also entails factional oppositions within their settlements, efforts towards social mobility by ambitious families, and the emulation of prestigious groups in Israel.

NOTES

[1] I thank my father-in-law, Mr. Samuel Weiss, for much help with this paper in translating from Hebrew sources and in guidance concerning Jewish customs and scriptural references. I am grateful to Shlomo Deshen, Arthur and Shirley Isenberg, Aviva Menkes, Moshe Shokeid, and Shalva Weil for helpful comments; a number of their suggestions have been incorporated into the paper. Funds from the University of California Committee on Research enabled me to obtain secretarial and bibliographical assistance.

[2] See Walter J. Fischel, 'The exploration of the Jewish antiquities of Cochin on the Malabar coast', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 87, 1967, pp. 230–48. 'The Contribution of the Cochin Jews to South Indian and Jewish Civilization', in *Commemorative Volume, Cochin Synagogue, Quatercentenary Celebration*, P. A. Velayudhan *et al.*, eds., pp. 15–48, Kerala Historical Association, Cochin, 1971; and *Unknown Jews in Unknown Lands, the Travels of Rabbi David D'Beth Hillel (1824–1832)*, New York, 1973.

[3] David G. Mandelbaum, 'The Jewish Way of Life in Cochin', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 1, 1939, pp. 423–60.

[4] Mandelbaum, *Society in India*, vols. 1 and 2, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970, pp. 550–63.

[5] Mandelbaum, 'A Case History of Judaism: The Jews of Cochin in India and Israel', to be published in a memorial volume for Professor W. L. Fischel, edited by M. M. Caspi, Keter Press Enterprises, Israel.

[6] K. P. Padmanabha Menon, *History of Kerala*, 4 vols., Trivandrum, 1924–29, vol. 1, pp. 297–98.

[7] One Malayali church scholar points out that, according to the ancient tradition of Malabar Christians, St. Thomas founded seven churches in specific places. Six of them are in locations where there are, or were, Jewish settlements. The author also notes that the ancient wedding songs of the Malabar Christians tell of St. Thomas landing in Cranganore '. . . in the company of a Jewish merchant called Habban and his being received by a Jewish flute girl . . . he arrives in the company of a Jew and is welcomed by a Jew' (Thomas Puthiakunnel, 'Jewish Colonies of India paved the way for St. Thomas', *The Malabar Church*, Jacob Vellan, ed., Orientalia Christiana Analecta, no. 186, 1970, pp. 187–91).

[8] K. M. Panikkar, *A History of Kerala, 1498–1801*, Annamalai University, Annamalainagar, 1960, pp. 4–5; and George Woodcock, *Kerala, A portrait of the Malabar Coast*, London, 1967, pp. 111–13.

[9] M. G. S. Narayanan, *Cultural Symbiosis in Kerala*, Kerala Historical Society, Trivandrum, 1972, pp. 4, 29, 35, 58, 91.

[10] F. C. Burkett, 'Hebrew Signatures on the Copper-plate', *Kerala Society Papers*, Series 6, 1930, p. 323; see also Mandelbaum, 'The Jewish Way of Life in Cochin', op. cit., p. 425.

[11] I rely on the summary of relevant research given in Narayanan, op. cit., pp. 23–30, 79–85. Narayanan provides two translations of this inscription, on p. 29 and again on p. 81. The two differ in some details, mainly stylistic. I have quoted portions from each version, selecting the rendering that seemed clearer to me.

[12] Narayanan, op. cit., pp. 29, 81–82; Elamkulam P. N. Kunjan Pillai, *Studies in Kerala History*, Kottayam, 1970, pp. 377–78, 387; and Woodcock, op. cit., p. 124.

[13] A. Galletti, A. J. Van Der Burg and P. Groot, *The Dutch in Malabar, Selections from the Records of the Madras Government*, Government Press, Madras, 1911, p. 196.

[14] Narayanan, op. cit., p. 29.

[15] ibid.

[16] Woodcock, op. cit., pp. 88–89; and Kunjan Pillai, op. cit., pp. 234–37.

[17] Narayanan, op. cit., p. 28; and Kunjan Pillai, op. cit., p. 387.

[18] Mandelbaum, 'The Jewish Way of Life in Cochin', op. cit., pp. 426–27; and Fischel, 'The exploration of the Jewish antiquities . . . ', op. cit., p. 231, fn. 7.

[19] David Solomon Sassoon, *Ohel Dawid*, vol. 2, London, 1932, p. 577.

[20] Moses Bensabat Amzalak, *Notisias dos Judeos de Cochin mandados por Mosseh Pereyra de Paiva*, Museu Comercial, Lisbon, 1923, pp. 10–11, and Woodcock, op. cit., p. 126.

[21] Another reason for moving to Cochin was that Cranganore became a battlefield among various contenders. A Muslim historian of the sixteenth century relates that in 1524 a disagreement arose between the Muslims and Jews of Cranganore. The Muslims rallied their co-religionists from other places and together they attacked the Jews, at the same time falling on the 'Franks' (Portuguese and other Europeans) there. After burning the houses and synagogue of the Jews, the Muslim attackers proceeded to burn the homes and churches of the ancient settlement of Christians. A 'misunderstanding' thereupon arose between the Muslims and the Nairs, the warrior group. Several Nairs were killed, 'in consequence of which the Mahomedans who dwelt in Cranganore were compelled to seek for safety elsewhere . . .', Zain al-Din (Zeen-ud-deen) *Tohfut-ul-mujahideen, An Historical Work in the Arabic Language*, translated into English by Lieut. M. J. Rowlandson, Oriental Translation Fund, London, 1833, pp. 119–20.

[22] Alexander Marx, 'Contribution à l'histoire des Juifs de Cochin', *Revue des Études Juives*, vol. 89, 1930, p. 295, fn. 2.

[23] Marx, op cit., p. 294.

[24] Louis Rabinowitz, *Far East Mission*, Johannesburg, 1952, pp. 113–20.

[25] Quoted in H. Gaguin, *The Jews of Cochin* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1956, pp. 31–32 from the *Jewish Chronicle*, 5 October 1906; see also Jacob Castro, *Ohole Ya'acob*, Livorno, 1783, pp. 149–50; Marx, op. cit.; and Naphtali Bar-Giorah, 'Source Material for the history of relations between the White Jews and the Black Jews of Cochin' (in Hebrew), *Sifunot*, Publication of the Ben-Zvi Inst., The Hebrew Univ., Jerusalem, 1956, pp. 243–78. I am indebted to Yael Katzir for her translation of the article by Bar-Giorah.

[26] Mandelbaum, *Society in India*, op. cit., pp. 487–96.

[27] Mandelbaum, 'The Jewish Way of Life in Cochin', op. cit., pp. 445–46.

[28] Woodcock, op. cit., pp. 115–16.

[29] Amzalak, op. cit., p. 8.

[30] S. S. Koder, 'A Hebrew letter of 1768', *Journal of the Rama Varma Archeological Society*, Trichur, 1949, vol. 15, p. 2.

[31] Moens, quoted in Galletti *et al.*, op. cit., p. 197.

[32] The Jewish community of Majorca produced the leading cartographers and navigators of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. But what relation, if any, that fact bears to the legend quoted by Pereyra de Paiva is problematical (cf. Anita Libman Lebeson, 'The American Jewish Chronicle', in *The Jews: Their History*, Louis Finkelstein, ed., New York, 1970, pp. 487, 522).

[33] Amzalak, op. cit., p. 11.

[34] Yehuda Ratzaby, *Sefer hammusar by* [sic] *Zacharia al-Dahri* (in Hebrew), Ben-Zvi Institute, Jerusalem, 1965, pp. 28, 130; and Sassoon, op. cit., pp. 1026, 1030.

[35] This author, whose manuscript in Arabized Hebrew tells of adventures in many places, gives a long tale in rhyme about an escapade in Cochin. But very little information can be gleaned from that picaresque tale. The editor of the manuscript, Yehuda Ratzaby, notes that while the historicity of the author's travels cannot be denied, it is not an historical work but one in which the requirements of rhyme take precedence over fact (Ratzaby, op. cit., p. 26). I am indebted to Mr. Sheldon Brunswick, of the University of California, Berkeley, Library, for his assistance with this source.

[36] John Huyghen Van Linschoten, *The Voyage of J. H. Van Linschoten to the East Indies*, A. C. Burnell, ed., vol. 1, pp. 70–71, Hakluyt Society, vol. 70, London, 1885.

[37] ibid., p. 286

[38] ibid., p. 285.

[39] ibid., p. 286.

[40] Amzalak, op. cit., p. 15.

[41] T. W. Venn, *Cochin-Malabar, Palms and Pageants*, privately published, Calicut, 1951, p. 106; and Fischel, 'The contribution of the Cochin Jews . . .', op. cit., pp. 26–27.

[42] Galletti *et al.*, op. cit., p. 190.

[43] Fischel, 'The exploration of the Jewish antiquities . . .', op cit., p. 237.

[44] Linschoten, op. cit., p. 70.

[45] That continued to the end of princely rule. Woodcock writes that in the 1920s and 1930s the Maharajas of Cochin were very attentive to the claims of their subjects and gained a reputation for reasonableness. He quotes a veteran Congress leader of Cochin, K. P. Madhaven Nair, on the Congress Party's negotiations with the then Maharaja; the quotation concludes with the sentence 'He was a wise ruler' (Woodcock, op. cit., p. 239).

[46] See Galetti *et al.*, op. cit., p. 197; and Koder, op. cit., p. 2.

[47] Facsimile in Amzalak, op. cit., separately paginated pp. 1–15.

[48] Cecil Roth, *A History of the Jews*, rev. edn., New York, 1970, p. 262.

[49] The office of Rabbi, as Professor Shlomo Deshen has noted in a personal communication to me, was not well institutionalized among Jews in Yemen, with whom the Cochin Jews long maintained contact. The office, he adds, is a relatively late development, and was not intrinsic to traditional Jewry. Among European Jews, full institutionalization came in late medieval times.

[50] Amzalak, op. cit., p. 9.

[51] Hendrick Adriaan Van Rheede was the first regularly appointed Dutch governor (Commandeur) in Cochin. His period in that office was 1673–77: see Panikkar, op. cit., p. 453.

[52] Amzalak, op. cit., p. 15.

[53] Galletti *et al.*, op. cit., p. 222.

[54] Fischel, 'Cochin in Jewish History', *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, vol. 30, 1962, pp. 45–59.

[55] So in the English translation published by Koder, op. cit., p. 3. Fischel quotes this passage but gives a slightly different enumeration ('Cochin in Jewish History', op. cit., p. 53).

[56] Koder, op. cit., p. 3.

[57] J. B. Segal, 'The Jews of Cochin and their Neighbours', in *Essays Presented to Chief Rabbi Israel Brodie*, London, 1969, pp. 393–94. The practice of wearing phylacteries and that of affixing *mezuzot* were certainly observed in subsequent times. A photograph of Malabar Jews wearing phylacteries appears in L. K. Anantha Krishna Iyer, *The Cochin Tribes and Castes*, vol. II, Madras, 1912, facing p. 420.

[58] Mandelbaum, 'The Jewish Way of Life in Cochin', op. cit., p. 445.

[59] Schifra Strizower, *The Children of Israel: The Bene Israel of Bombay*, Oxford, 1971, pp. 35–36, and Fischel, 'Cochin in Jewish History', op. cit.,

pp. 45–46. An earlier influence from Cochin may have been in China. Several inscriptions in stone from synagogues in China mention that Judaism was brought there from India (T'ien-chu). These inscriptions are in Chinese —the equivalent years being 1489, 1512, 1663, and 1679 (William Charles White, *Chinese Jews*, 2nd edn., New York, 1966, pp. 11, 20, 43, 97). A similar inscription of 1151 is mentioned in a general account of Cochin Jews (H. G. Reissner, 'The History of Cochin's Jewish Community', *India and Israel*, vol. 2, 1949, p. 20). Rabbi David D'Beth Hillel who visited the Cochin Jews in 1828–29 wrote that Judah Ashkenazi of the white Jews had told him of a Cochin Black Jew, whom Ashkenazi had seen, who went to China and there met some Chinese Jews (Fischel, 'Unknown Jews in Unknown Lands, . . .', op. cit., p. 115).

[60] Koder, op. cit., pp. 4–5.

[61] ibid., p. 3.

[62] Visscher in Padmanabha Menon, op. cit., pp. 50–57.

[63] ibid., p. 198.

[64] cf. Mandelbaum, *Society in India*, op. cit., pp. 624–27.

[65] Haim Hermann Cohn, 'Slavery', in *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, vol. 14, Jerusalem, 1971, pp. 1655–60.

[66] T. I. Poonen, *A Survey of the Rise of Dutch Power in Malabar*, Univ. of Travancore, Trivandrum, 1958, pp. 258–59.

[67] Galletti *et al.*, op. cit., p. 223.

[68] One family of white Jews, however, did correspond in English on business matters, with an agent of the English East India Company. That agent, James Forbes, notes his dealings in 1772 with Samuel Abraham, whom he describes as a native of Poland. Forbes says of the Cochin Jews: 'They are a people distinct and separate from the surrounding Malabars, in dress, manners and religion, as well as in their complexion and general appearance' (quoted in Fischel, 'From Cochin (India) to New York', in *Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume*, American Academy for Jewish Research, Jerusalem, 1965, pp. 272–73). In 1790 Samuel Abraham sent a letter in Hebrew to a Jewish merchant of New York in which he says; 'the trade here is declining so fast as puts it beyond any hope of its answering to our mutual or even to one of our advantages' (ibid., p. 256), and George Alexander Kuhut, 'Correspondence between the Jews of Malabar and New York a Century Ago', in *Semitic Studies in Memory of Rev. Dr. Alexander Kuhut*, G. A. Kohut ed., Berlin, 1897, p. 425. The shift in trade had apparently begun before the take-over of Fort Cochin by the British.

[69] Fischel, 'Unknown Jews in Unknown Lands . . .', op. cit., pp. 12–16.

[70] ibid., pp. 113–14.

[71] Another Jewish visitor, J. J. Benjamin II of Moldavia, was in Cochin briefly about 1850. Of the Malabar Jews he wrote: '. . . they live apart from the others, and occupy themselves with trade, in which many of them have obtained a brilliant position . . .': J. J. Benjamin II, *Eight Years in Asia and Africa, from 1846 to 1855*, published by the author, Hanover, Germany, 1859, pp. 151–52.

[72] Fischel, *Unknown Jews in Unknown Lands* . . ., op. cit., p. 114.

[73] See holograph ms. in Judah Magnes Museum, Berkeley, California.

[74] Fischel, *Unknown Jews in Unknown Lands* . . ., op. cit., p. 115.

[75] Joseph Ezekiel and Joseph Jacobs, 'Cochin' *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, 1904, vol. 4, p. 136.

[76] Rabinowitz, op. cit., pp. 111–13.

[77] Ezekiel and Jacobs, op. cit., p. 137.

[78] C. Achyuta Menon, *The Cochin State Manual*, Government Press, Ernakulam, 1911, p. 231.

[79] Both divisions practised the levirate, as enjoined in Deuteronomy 25: 5–7, 10 (Ezekiel and Jacobs, op. cit.). Anantha Krishna Iyer observed that the levirate was mandatory among them only if the widow were childless. He added that the practice was followed among some of the low-ranking Hindu castes (Anantha Krishna Iyer, *The Cochin Tribes and Castes*, op. cit., pp. 415–16). It was also honoured among some of the landowning groups of North India.

[80] ibid.

[81] Ezekiel and Jacobs, op. cit., p. 136.

[82] Menon, op. cit., p. 226; and Woodcock, op. cit., p. 116.

[83] Ezekiel and Jacobs, op. cit., p. 137.

[84] Woodcock, op. cit., p. 122.

[85] Mandelbaum, 'The Jewish Way of Life in Cochin', op. cit.

[86] Best known of the pre-Vasco Jewish immigrants in the historical record is 'Gaspar das Indias', originally from Posen, who came to greet Vasco da Gama in 1498 when he was repairing his ships on an island off the Malabar Coast (Sylvain Lévi, 'Quelques documents nouveaux sur les Juifs du sud de l'Inde', *Revue des Études Juives*, vol. 89, 1930, pp. 30–31). The Portuguese chroniclers told of other Jews in Kerala, including a Jewish woman from Seville, who had come there before Vasco's expedition (cf. Linschoten, op. cit., p. 222, fn. 2).

[87] Eileen W. Erlanson Macfarlane, 'The Racial Affinities of the Jews of Cochin', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, Letters*, vol. 3, 1937, no. 1, pp. 13–16.

[88] cf. Rabinowitz, op. cit., pp. 135–36.

[89] cf. A. B. Salem, *Eternal Light or Jew Town Synagogue*, S. D. Printing Works, Ernakulam, 1929, pp. ii–iii; and Rabinowitz, op. cit., pp. 117–18.

[90] I recall with gratitude the hospitality and assistance given to me in Cochin in 1937 by two men who are no longer alive, S. S. Koder and Dr. A. I. Simon, as well as by S. S. Koder, Jr., Lily Koder, and Joseph Hai.

[91] Rabinowitz, op. cit., pp. 117–20.

[92] See E. Elias and E. Isaac, *Jews in India with Who is Who*, Indo-Israel Publications, Ernakulam, 1963, p. 85.

[93] Rabinowitz, op. cit., p. 117.

[94] Macfarlane, 'The Racial Affinities . . .', op cit., p. 5; and Mandelbaum, 'The Jewish Way of Life in Cochin', op. cit., p. 449.

[95] cf. Mandelbaum, *Society in India*, op. cit., pp. 488–93, 535, 542, 555.

[96] Woodcock, op. cit., p. 120.

[97] cf. Macfarlane, 'The Racial Affinities . . .', op. cit., pp. 11–12; and 'A White Jew's Wedding', *Maharaja's College Magazine*, vol. 19, pp. 1–7, Ernakulam, 1937.

[98] Anantha Krishna Iyer, *The Cochin Tribes and Castes*, op. cit., p. 416.

[99] Mandelbaum, *Society in India*, op. cit., pp. 429–30.

[100] Salem, op. cit.

[101] ibid., pp. 2–3.

[102] ibid., pp. 11, 32, 69.

[103] ibid., pp. 6, 61, 71.

[104] ibid., pp. 45, 66, 68.

[105] See A. Aiyappan, 'Social and Physical Anthropology of the Nayadis of Malabar', *Bulletin of the Madras Government Museum*, n.s., vol. 5, no. 1, 1937; and K. C. Alexander, *Social Mobility in Kerala*, Deccan College Dissertation Series, no. 29, Poona, 1968.

[106] Pereyra de Paiva in Amzalak, op. cit. p. 15.

[107] Mandelbaum, *Society in India*, op. cit., pp. 487–93.

[108] Fischel, 'Cochin in Jewish History', op. cit., p. 54. It is worth noting here that the letter of 1899, from the wardens of a Bene Israel synagogue to a Cochin elder, enquiring about the caste status of a Cochin Jew who had been employed for synagogue duties, is signed by each of the wardens in Marathi but not in Hebrew. Their protestations about maintaining the purity of their Judaism seem a little strange in view of their apparent lack of enough Hebrew for a signature on a communication concerning the affairs of a synagogue. Perhaps an awareness of such a deficiency impelled them to be all the more ardent about their ritual and 'racial' purity.

[109] cf. Mandelbaum, *Society in India*, op. cit., pp. 624–27.

[110] Mandelbaum, 'The Jewish Way of Life in Cochin', op. cit., p. 451.

[111] A. Sreedhara Menon, *Kerala District Gazateers*, Ernakulam Government Press, Trivandrum, 1965, p. 238.

[112] Victor S. D'Souza, 'Social Organization and Marriage Customs of the Moplahs on the South-West Coast of India', *Anthropos*, vol. 54, 1959, pp. 488–491. Kathleen Gough also notes two main groupings among Mappillas of North Kerala but says that the higher ranking ones are believed to be descendants of converts from Brahmans and Nayars, high-ranking Hindus (Kathleen (Aberle) Gough, 'Mappilla: North Kerala', in *Matrilineal Kinship*, D. M. Schneider and Kathleen Gough, eds., Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961, pp. 418–19). A good many of the Mappilla groups maintained a matrilineal form of kinship and descent similar to that of the dominant Nairs, despite its obvious conflict with the heavily patrilineal emphasis of Islamic scripture (ibid.; and D'Souza, op. cit., pp. 493–502). This was also true of the Muslims of the Laccadive Islands, presumably colonized from Kerala. The 2,620 Muslim inhabitants of Kalpeni Island at the time of A. R. Kutty's study (on which Leela Dube's book—*Matriliny and Islam, Religion and Society in the Laccadives*, Delhi 1969—is based) had a matrilineal kinship organization and were divided into three ranked endogamous jatis (Gough, 'Kinship and Marriage in Southwest India', *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, vol. 7, 1973, pp. 104–34). The principal Muslim jati of Ernakulam district is called Jonaka Mappilla but there are also residents of other Muslim jatis there, such as the ethnically different Gujarati and Kutchi Menons and the sectarian jati of Boras (Sreedhara, *Kerala District Gazetteers*, op. cit., pp. 260–61; and Anantha Krishna Iyer, *The Cochin Tribes and Castes*, op. cit., pp. 459–84.

[113] Mattison Mines, 'Muslim Social Stratification in India: The Basis for Variation', *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, vol. 28, 1972, pp. 333–49.

[114] *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, vol. 28, 1972, pp. 334–39

[115] cf. Anantakrishna Ayyer (Anantha Krishna Iyer), *Anthropology of the Syrian Christians*, Ernakulam, 1926, pp. 60–62; and Woodcock, op. cit., pp. 113–16.

[116] Kunjan Pillai, op. cit., pp. 18, 265, 311–13; Narayanan, op. cit., pp. 2–4; and Woodcock, op. cit., pp. 115–16.

[117] A. Aiyappan, *Social Revolution in a Kerala Village: A Study in Cultural Change*, Bombay, 1965, pp. 128–31.

[118] Mandelbaum, *Society in India*, op. cit., pp. 447–62.

[119] cf. A. K. Gopalan, *Kerala, Past and Present*, London, 1959, pp. 30–35; Aiyappan, *Social Revolution . . .*, op. cit., pp. 167–69; Woodcock, op. cit., pp. 219 ff; and Georges Kristoffel Lieten, 'Communism and Communalism in Kerala', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 10, 1975, Bombay, pp. 71–74.

[120] Gilbert Kushner, *Immigrants from India in Israel, Planned Change in an Administered Community*, Tucson, Ariz., 1973.

[121] ibid., pp. 70–76.

[122] ibid., pp. 86–87.

[123] See Moshe (Minkovitz) Shokeid, 'Moshav Sela: Frustration and Crisis in the Process of Absorption', in *Rural Settlements of New Immigrants in Israel*, Ovadia Shapiro, ed., pp. 103–24, Settlement Study Centre, Rehovot, 1971; and Don Handelman and Shlomo Deshen, *The Social Anthropology of Israel, A Bibliographical Essay with Primary Reference to Loci of Social Stress*, Institute for Social Research, Tel Aviv University, 1975, p. 13. Professor Moshe Shokeid has noted, in a personal communication to me, that in 1962 the Jewish Agency Land Settlement Department decided to compensate for past neglect of this settlement and supported the village with massive investments and intensive farming instruction. In addition, public morale was boosted by the building of an impressive community centre; the late David Ben Gurion was present at its inauguration. Since then new processes have developed in the village.

[124] Similar behaviour has been noted in India. Thus in a village ninety miles north of Delhi, where the Rajputs, traditionally a warrior group, were studied, it was noted that the extended family—whose members share cramped living quarters and share in the family income—is subject to dangerously disruptive tensions. 'Emotional control is therefore valued and outbursts of aggression are generally discouraged' (Leigh Minturn and William W. Lambert, *Mothers of Six Cultures*, New York, 1964, p. 238).

[125] cf. Mandelbaum, *Society in India*, op. cit., pp. 623–27.

[126] Fischel, 'Unknown Jews in Unknown Lands . . .' op. cit., pp. 113–14.

[127] See Adrian C. Mayer, *Land and Society in Malabar*, London, 1952; M. S. A. Rao, *Social Change in Malabar*, Bombay, 1947; and Joan P. Mencher, *Anthropology*, vol. 15, 1974, pp. 469–93.

[128] Louis Dumont, *Homo Hierarchicus*, Chicago, 1970, p. 39.

[129] Mandelbaum, 'A Case History of Judaism . . .', op. cit.

[130] Seymour Martin Lipset, 'The Study of Jewish Communities in a Comparative Context', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1963, pp. 157–166.

CONTEMPORARY JEWISH STUDIES AND THE CONTEMPORARY CRISIS OF THE JEWS

Howard Brotz

Review Article

THESE two readers or source books* on the condition of contemporary American Jewry are complementary. (I shall refer to them hereafter by the abbreviated titles of *Society* and *Community*.) As their titles imply, *Society* looks, so to speak, outwards, *Community* inwards. Each book contains 13 independently written papers; those in *Society* are: American Jewry/Social History (by Gartner, Sherman, Dawidowicz, Halpern); Social Characteristics of American Jews (by Goldstein); The Jewish Family (by Blau, Mitchell); Jewish Religion and the American Jew (by Goldstein and Goldscheider, Liebman); Jewish Identity/Self-Segregation, Acculturation, Assimilation (by Lipset and Ladd, Cohen, Schwartz); The American Jew and Israel (by Goldscheider). Those in *Community* are: The Informal Community (by Gans, Sklare, and Greenbaum); The Formal Community (by Axelrod and Fowler and Gurin, Elazar); Religious Movements (by Liebman, Sklare, Fein and Chin, and Dauber and Reisman and Spiro); Jewish Education (by Gartner, Ackerman); The Jewish Community and the General Society (by Dawidowicz and Goldstein, Glazer, Lipset, Ringer). That is a comprehensive array of topics. While the individual papers are unequal in scope, they are uniformly solid and informative. The historical and demographic papers by Gartner and Goldstein are encyclopaedic in quality: in a small space they answer all the main questions one would want to raise about population growth, location, fertility, and intermarriage. Ben Halpern's essay 'America is Different' is a trenchant analysis of the reasons why the anti-Jewish political party which arose so characteristically in many continental European countries did not find its counterpart in

* Marshall Sklare, ed., *The Jew in American Society*, 404 pp.; and *The Jewish Community in America*, 383 pp., Library of Jewish Studies, General Editor Neal Kozody, Behrman House, New York, 1974, $12.50 each volume.

America (and also, as he might point out more emphatically than he does, in the rest of the English-speaking world). Halpern's thesis is that the Jews in America did not attain civil rights via a revolution—in the concrete case, against throne and altar—of which they were not simply the beneficiaries but also in a crucial respect the pawns. By contrast, the Jews in the English-speaking world entered a structure in which the question of religious toleration was settled in such a way as to nullify the possibility of a counter-revolutionary reaction. I contend that he would have to go further to show the essential connexion between this structure and commerce or capitalism. He would also have to make clear, along Tocquevillean lines, how this liberal-commercial régime was not only compatible with —but dependent upon—a general respect for religion. But as far as he has gone, his paper is powerfully clear and alive. Among the contributions on religion one will find of interest the observations about the resurgence of orthodoxy and the declining morale of the Conservative movement. Lipset and Ladd in 'Jewish Academics in the United States' point out, among many other things, the remarkable gains which Jews have made in academic life since the end of the Second World War.

Sklare in his introduction to *Society* defines his field of scholarship and the subject matter of these books as 'contemporary Jewish studies, a specialty which utilizes the perspectives of social science to gain an understanding of the Jews of today and their immediate forebears'. He never really defines in a hard and fast way what he means by 'social science'. It is perhaps just as well, since he is left free to pick and choose without doctrinaire methodological constrictions. He quickly, however, moves to state that the origins of his field lie in the reaction of Jewish nationalism to *die Wissenschaft des Judentums*, which he describes as 'humanist' scholarship that was hostile to the 'analytical methods of social science'. The quarrel between Jewish nationalism and *die Wissenschaft des Judentums* is, of course, a historical fact. But Sklare's interpretation of that quarrel blurs, as just indicated, the fundamental issue at the basis of it. This was that *die Wissenschaft des Judentums*, with its Enlightenment prejudices, was seen by Jewish nationalism as preparing the Jews quietly to commit suicide. As the work of Scholem makes crystal clear, what is at issue is much more than 'methodology' or a penchant for the past rather than for the present. What is really primary is how one looks at the past and the present and, consequently, the future. Precisely, the issue is whether one faces one's situation honestly or tries to run away from it. In blurring that issue, Sklare has in fact done an injustice to himself by obscuring the foundations of that which gives some coherent direction to contemporary Jewish studies. This is surely more than a random collection of facts about Jews—as his own implicit criteria of selection confirm.

In the light of these remarks, the question is, What is the main

thrust of these books as a major statement about the Jewish fate and future in America, in Israel, and, indeed, everywhere where there are Jewish communities? In this respect it is sad to say that the papers in these books under review have been outrun by events—namely, the Yom Kippur War and the political crisis in the United States brought about by the reaction to Watergate and the Viet Nam War. These books have appeared at a moment of acute crisis for the Jewish people. It is pleasant to say that these events have now in turn been outrun, somewhat, by events which have relieved the atmosphere, somewhat. But still the situation today is grave and full of anxiety as contrasted with those years in the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust and the end of the Second World War. Today, I need hardly argue, people are concerned about the survival of the State of Israel which they now see and feel, as never before, as connected with the survival of Jewry throughout the world. As such it is now apparent that this question of survival, to put it most crudely, is as much the architechtonic question of contemporary Jewish studies as it was of the reaction to *die Wissenschaft des Judentums*. I hope it will not seem uncharitable on my part to say that none of the papers in these books reflects the urgency of the present crisis. This is fully explained by the time factor. What is more, a number of papers—particularly those by Glazer, Lipset, Dawidowicz, and Halpern—point to it. Lipset's paper, for example, on 'Intergroup Relations/The Changing Situation of American Jewry' was written before the 1972 election campaign in which the successful contender for the Democratic presidential nomination (McGovern) had been accused by the unsuccessful contender (Humphrey) of being anti-Israel. The accusation cleared the air, as the election results showed, for many traditionally Democratic Jewish voters. But Lipset points out that in the preceding period there were tensions and cleavages within the Jewish community as Jews were wrestling with the dogma of 'No enemies on the left' in the face of clear-cut conflict between the left and Jewish interests. The 'new' left turned its 'anti-imperialist' rhetoric against the State of Israel, siding with the Third World bloc in the United Nations. In the purely domestic context the 'new' left also supported the demand for ethnic (and now sexual) quotas in employment, against the interests not only of qualified Jewish applicants for jobs but also of Jews in education and the civil service who had worked their way up to superior positions by the procedures of a merit system. Glazer's paper on 'The New Left and the Jews' documents this conflict; it was, to its credit, one of the first papers to expose something which many liberal Jews found it painful to recognize.

The practical question which emerges from these considerations is, What kind of international order and—keeping in mind the power and influence of the United States in world affairs—what kind of régime is possible in the modern world which is safe for the Jews? How is this

régime undermined by those currents at work in modernity which are at the root of the 'new' politics, whether of the 'new' left or of the 'new' right? I am thinking here of the now-vanquished Nazism, which many people seem to be unaware was a 'new' right. Are the 'new' left and the 'new' right, with their common root in the modern assault on reason, closer to each other than either is to the 'old' left or to the 'old' right? In addressing itself to these questions, which reach out for theoretical guidance to clarify and protect decent practice, the study of contemporary Judaism would obviously have to liberate itself from time-worn prejudices. But the pressure of events would sooner or later compel it to question these, as has already happened. To go further, contemporary Jewish studies would have to transcend the 'contemporary' or the transitory, not to run away from the present situation but to be able to see it and deal with it in the light of 'non-transitory' criteria in a comprehensive manner. On this basis one could see, in a wholly non-parochial manner, a coincidence between the interests of the Jews and the interests of the West.

BOOK REVIEWS

ROGER ADELSON, *Mark Sykes, Portrait of an Amateur*, 336 pp., Jonathan Cape, London, 1975, £7.50.

Mark Sykes, sixth baronet, of Sledmere in Yorkshire, has his own place in the story of the contemporary Middle East. He was born in 1879, the only child of eccentric and ill-matched parents. His father loved travel, and took Mark to Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria when he was ten. This was the beginning of a life-long love-affair with the peoples of the Middle East. At first it was the Turks who interested him. Later he saw them as tyrants over more interesting peoples. While his father took him travelling, his mother saw to his religion and education. She had him accepted into the Roman Catholic Church as a baby, and sent him—somewhat irregularly—to Roman Catholic schools and later to Cambridge. Travel and parental whim prevented him from receiving a regular or systematic education; hence he remained 'an amateur' all his life. For example, he never learned either Turkish or Arabic systematically.

A lieutenant in the South African war, he first painted his guns and transport to conceal them in the landscape—the beginning of camouflage. Thereafter he retained an interest in public life, much concerning himself with the territorials. In 1911, he became 'Tory-Democratic' member for Hull.

The war of 1914–18 gave him the opportunity he wanted. Through a mutual friend, he became early in 1915 Kitchener's representative on the government committee concerning itself with the Middle East (the de Bunsen Committee). This was the first of a continuous activity, never within the routine political or military cadre, which lasted until his death from exhaustion early in 1919. Turkey was now an enemy, and Sykes was concerned with her Asiatic non-Turkish subjects. At the end of 1915, the Foreign Office started to think out an Anglo-French policy for the future settlement, safeguarding British interests and acceptable to the indigenous peoples. The French end had become necessary after a visit by M. Georges-Picot of the Quai d'Orsay, and Sykes was called in to work out an agreement with him. This central activity associated with his name is fully and well described in this volume, and gives it its permanent value. Sykes thought that 'the French and British should not "employ Europeans if they can do without them" so as "to avoid any shadow of control" that would appear to compromise Arab independence'. He was equally concerned with the future of the Kurds, Armenians, Druzes, and Zionists; but, in the long run, he was side-tracked as an amateur while professionals had the last word.

Professor Adelson has done a very good job.

JAMES PARKES

MYRON J. ARONOFF, *Frontiertown, The Politics of Community Building in Israel*, xiv + 313 pp., Manchester Univ. Press and Jerusalem Academic Press, Manchester and London, 1974, £4.95.

One's first impression when starting to read the book is of an exciting piece of anthropological research about the establishment and changing social structure of a development town in Israel. But rather like the members of this new community, whose early enthusiasm was dampened after some years by their inability to maintain local autonomy and a high level of participation in public affairs, the reader's high expectations are disappointed by its contents.

Aronoff has executed his research project competently, but he fails to keep up the interest for two reasons. The first is that both his theoretical and methodological approaches slavishly follow the leads given by a number of well known social scientists, such as the late Max Gluckman, Victor Turner, J. Clyde Mitchell, and Erving Goffman; he produces, however, very little that could be called original or innovative in either approach or contribution to social theory. Secondly, the theme, being after all the story of a community, could have been written somewhat more interestingly, instead of being presented as a research monograph or dissertation.

The major focus of the work is on socio-political relationships within 'Frontiertown' and the effects that the links with the larger Israeli society have on the local scene. The author's conclusions are interesting but somewhat surprising. He maintains that success in this experiment in community building was achieved in two senses. First, the original settlers became involved in the affairs of the community through competition and rivalry and were responsible for the emergence of a community spirit and pride within a short period, and of a positive identification with their newly created community. The second aspect of success, the author claims, was that the very inability of the settlers to control their own destinies and political affairs by resisting outside pressure testified to the integration of the community into the institutions of national Israeli society. To call this 'national success' is to identify the *status quo* as desirable. Such a view is difficult to accept.

ERNEST KRAUSZ

ABNER COHEN, *Two-Dimensional Man, An essay on the anthropology of power and symbolism in complex society*, xii + 156 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1974, £2.75.

The two dimensions of Abner Cohen's title are Symbolist Man and Political Man, and as his sub-title indicates, the book is essentially an essay on the dialectical relation between the two. Professor Cohen has drawn on the classical anthropological tradition and here attempts to integrate it with sociological perspectives, particularly currently influential approaches like the phenomenology of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman and the social drama perspective of Hugh Dalziel Duncan. For illustrative material he

draws extensively on his own published studies of the Creoles of Sierra Leone and an Arab border village in Israel, though monographs by other anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists are utilized too.

Cohen argues, with some justification, that sociologists have been too mesmerized by Weberian generalizations about the rational contractual and secular nature of modern society to be able to see how important symbolic, ritual, and non-rational aspects of the behaviour of twentieth-century man remain. Many contemporary sociologists, particularly those working on religion, would wholeheartedly agree and point to a growing volume of sociological work documenting just this point. Nevertheless, it is good to have an experienced anthropologist pointing up the relevant lessons which his discipline has to offer. The result is a clear and stimulating essay.

Cohen's contention is that anthropology has isolated two main variables, the kinship and ritual systems and the systems of political and economic power. These he condenses (by a sleight of hand which some readers may be sceptical about) into the symbolic and the political variables as the central duo of human social life. All social relationships, he argues, are shot through with the dimension of power and at the same time are articulated through symbols. The two dimensions however are analytically separate, and more importantly, autonomous spheres—neither is a simple determinant or reflection of the other. The relationship between the two is therefore a real dialectic, with neither side 'rigged' to be the natural victor. Cohen is highly critical of holistic models of society and insists on the permanence of flux—change is normal and endemic not problematic—and on the central importance of symbolization to create, maintain, and re-create the selfhood of individual and social group alike amid the constant threat of anarchic loss of meaning which permanent change and the irreducible dilemmas of mortality carry with them. In this process symbolism is inevitably politicized because the problems of selfhood crystallize into two sets of 'oughts', man's obligations to other men (which operates mainly via kinship in simple societies) and his obligation to the universe (which mainly operates through ritual).

In complex societies power relations are multiplex, and exist not only at the level of the state and the political party but at many levels of informal group activity. Indeed, by the logic of the foregoing argument he asserts that the articulation of group identity as such *must* have a political dimension. All group existence requires distinctiveness or boundaries, internal and external communications, decision-making, authority and a leadership process, ideology (which may be more or less stable and formal), and belief and symbolic action including a socialization process: these all involve symbolization and politicization. He goes on to show very succinctly and persuasively that it is possible to study the dialectic between symbols and power in informal groupings within complex societies. His examples are all taken from cases in which it would be structurally dangerous for a group to be seen as an overtly political entity, either because it is vulnerable, like a low status ethnic minority, or because it is disproportionately powerful for its size, like the Jewish cousinhood or the City élite in contemporary Britain. His case studies of politically 'invisible' organizations touch on ethnic groups, élite groups, religious groups (no mention here of religious minorities or for that

matter football in eastern Europe, but the cap would fit), secret ritual groups, and cousinhoods. There is enough in this all too brief section to demonstrate how illuminating the perspective can be.

Marxists and perhaps some structural-functionalists will not like all that Professor Cohen has to say about complex societies. He finds economic determinism and the whole neo-Marxist (and neo-Weberian) apparatus of social class analysis irrelevant. Instead of focussing on whole 'classes' and 'stratification systems' he advocates the study of definable groups even of a very informal kind so that the actual dialectic between power relations and the symbolism of status can be revealed. This kind of heresy deserves every encouragement. I hope that one fruit at least of this little book may be a detailed analysis, following Cohen, of modern stratification patterns as a species of segmentation.

BERNICE MARTIN

WILLIAM J. FISHMAN, *East End Jewish Radicals 1875–1914*, xii + 336 pp., Duckworth in association with the Acton Society Trust, London, 1975, £6.50.

There is a fond, rather sentimental aspect about William J. Fishman's view of East End Jewish radicals during the decades of the eastern European Jewish immigration. He does not evaluate them dispassionately, nor does he pursue them with hard or sceptical questions. He likes them, and he would like his reader to like them. These amiable qualities are a virtue of Mr. Fishman's book.

Probing questions ought to be asked, however, and since Mr. Fishman scarcely does this, perhaps we could. The strident revolutionary movement among East European Jewish immigrants in the 1880s split in 1891 into anarchist and socialist wings, and thereafter the anarchists predominated in London. Since socialists were in control among Jewish immigrant radicals everywhere else, why was London so different? The question acquires greater force when one recalls that during this period the newly founded British Labour Party, not at all anarchist, was firmly establishing itself in the East End of London. It does seem strange that East End Jewish radicals should mean only anarchists to Mr. Fishman even while Jewish voters in that area were gradually moving, it would seem, from liberalism to socialism. True, socialists in the Jewish quarter were weak and created little literature, but what there was of trade unionism was linked mainly to them. Possibilities existed among the socialists of mass action and of collaboration with the British Labour Party.

Except that they said it in Yiddish, the Jewish anarchists had little to say to the Jews as Jews. What does it reveal that it was 'our rabbi', as some of them called their Gentile leader Rudolf Rocker, who discouraged anti-religious demonstrations, promoted interest in contemporary Yiddish literature, and urged his Jewish followers to unite with socialists in a protest against the Kishinev pogrom? Characteristically, the anarchists' most enduring accomplishment was good Yiddish translations of contemporary authors like Zola, Ibsen, and Maeterlinck. The anarchist message was that all traditions were

dishonest and outworn, fit only to be repudiated by honest enlightened persons. The task, then, was to bring radical enlightenment to Yiddish-speaking Jews. They therefore maintained punctiliously the worst possible relations with 'establishment' Judaism, and were burdened with what may reasonably be called a compulsive need to flaunt their contempt for Judaism by provocative anti-religious demonstrations. One may wonder why they ate their ham sandwiches on Passover in the street opposite poor East End synagogues and not opposite, say, the Bayswater Synagogue. There are questions to ask about psychological background and motivation.

The picture emerges of a coterie of philosophical anarchists devoted to one another and led by Rocker. Kropotkin was an honoured personage. They rejected violence, but the failure to turn away some men of violence from their Jubilee Street club cost them dear. The social processes grouped in the term 'assimilation' affected the anarchists as they affected all of Jewish immigrant life. Once, surprised that the question should even arise, the comrades agreed that none of them could properly own a bankbook: yet three are mentioned who succeeded in small capitalist ventures and subsidized the Jubilee Street club. The fall of London Yiddish anarchism was by no means a gradual process, however. The internment of Rocker as an enemy alien, the closing of the club, and the suppression of the *Arbeiter Freind*, all in 1914, obliterated the movement. It was not reconstituted after the war. Yiddish anarchism must have had shallow roots.

At the technical level, *East End Jewish Radicals* is a mixed performance. The account of Aaron Lieberman is the fullest in English, but it gives a wrong date of birth and disregards his significance as a Hebrew writer. Lieberman, it is interesting to add, had as a furtive collaborator the Hebrew *maskil* Yehudah Leib Levin (1844–1925). As a child in a privileged family, Levin had seen Jewish children from poor families shanghaied into the Russian army in 1853, with the complicity of the *kahal*. The horror and the hypocrisy genuinely traumatized him, as he recalled in his memoirs. Fishman's discussion of social protest within nineteenth-century Russian Jewry would be enhanced by this point. Besides, his citations are often ragged and hard to follow. For example, a Wess diary is mentioned (p. 213) but nowhere cited in full. Saul Yanovsky's important memoirs are not used, nor are those of Kalman Marmor. The comments of Herman Frank and Joseph Cohen concerning London anarchism's influence in America are interesting, and perhaps mitigate the sense of final failure in 1914. Mr. Fishman is rather coy about the supposed prophetic value of an anarchist critique of Zionism (251), instead of adequately presenting the viewpoint on a highly important subject. These remarks are only supplementary for the research has been extensive and painstaking.

The reviewer's points of disagreement with Mr. Fishman are suggested by Berl Katznelson's 1940 review of the memoirs of Abraham Frumkin, the anarchist journalist and translator who was a son of old Jerusalem. Katznelson wondered that Frumkin could leap from piety, Talmud study, and Hebraism to anarchism with no appearance of inner conflict or crisis:

> Tidings of a new world, a world without exploitation, without fetters, without ignorance, without the rule of man by man. A world wholly perfected. And this

> world, the dream of all generations, is not of the distant future. It is about to arise, in our day, not piecemeal but all at once . . . What would a Jewish youth seeking the good not pay for 'honey tasted'? (*Kitvei*, IX, Tel-Aviv, 1948. p. 280)

The world was not to be as the anarchists dreamed. They clung to the vision and to one another; without either the other vanished. Mr. Fishman shares some of their vision but he should have asked a few hard questions even if it chilled the warmth of the anarchist coterie.

LLOYD P. GARTNER

DON HANDELMAN AND SHLOMO DESHEN, *The Social Anthropology of Israel: A bibliographical essay with primary reference to loci of social stress*, 58 pp., Tel Aviv University, Institute for Social Research, 1975, $1.

This modestly presented essay cum-bibliography is of some considerable importance, especially in view of its first sentence: 'The purpose of this essay is to introduce the range and content of socio-anthropological studies carried out on Israeli society in the past twenty-five years.' Those of us who have a casual acquaintance with the literature of the social sciences on Israel must often have wondered where to look for a guide to what has been done under the name of social anthropology. This new publication comes not a moment too soon.

It raises some very interesting reflections. The first of them must be some puzzlement about the sub-title of the work, which in fact expresses very accurately the dominant theme of the essay. If the authors are of the opinon that the study of what they call 'loci of social stress in Israeli society' is the most important part of what has been accomplished under the name of social anthropology in their country, well and good. But can it really be the case that 'the range and content of socio-anthropological studies carried out on Israeli society in the past twenty-five years' are adequately represented by this apparently narrowly conceived essay? If so, that says something not altogether to the credit of the discipline of social anthropology as practised by the research workers who have taken Israeli society as their subject-matter.

A second thought likely to be raised by the essay in the mind of the reader is the thoroughly conventional manner in which the authors assume that social anthropology must be about low-level organizations and institutions. The essay surveys work done on the kibbutz, the moshav, what they call 'urban areas', and 'traditional villages and nomadic groupings' (this last category providing them with an opportunity of discussing work done on non-Jews).

I suppose it could be argued that the authors assume a division of labour that allocates large-scale phenomena to the sociologists, who, after all, are academically more visible in Israel than the social anthropologists. But an observer from afar might venture the opinion that a social anthropology content with the corner allotted to it is not likely to mark up any major intellectual successes. Reading the essay one may be haunted by a number of

social and cultural problems that do not seem to have aroused the interest of the authors. Even religion is treated only incidentally, and one could not possibly imagine a more central topic for a properly organized effort of social anthropological research in Israel.

The bibliography lists work carried out almost entirely by American and Israeli authors, with a few British thrown in. Concentrating upon the Israeli authors, one's mind naturally turns to the question of the extent to which social anthropology *in* Israel is about Israel. If, as one suspects, the scholars who call themselves social anthropologists in that country are preoccupied with studying it (and if moreover like Dr. Handelman and Dr. Deshen, they are bemused by 'social stress'), then one may perhaps wonder whether what they are doing is social anthropology after all. It is quite all right for foreigners to do social anthropology in Israel. Israeli social anthropologists ought to be doing much of theirs elsewhere. Of course there are doubtless all sorts of practical reasons why Israeli social anthropologists are not—except in a few cases—carrying out research work abroad; and some of those reasons are probably compelling. But one might have expected the authors of this otherwise very useful work to have shown themselves aware of the consequences for the development of their discipline of its concentration upon what is close at hand and obvious.

MAURICE FREEDMAN

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ, *Israeli Ecstasies/Jewish Agonies*, xi + 244 pp., Oxford Univ. Press, London and New York, 1974, £4.40.

The publication of a series of essays on subjects concerning the volatile situation in the Middle East and the fast changing society of Israel can look badly out of date even when its appearance occurs only a few short years after the author has actually set pen to paper. Horowitz's book suffers from this drawback. However, the issues discussed concerning Jewish existence in Israel and the Diaspora are certainly not ephemeral. In these areas the author raises some provocative points and I have selected the relevant chapters for detailed comment. This is not to say that the other topics contained in this volume, such as Jewish identification in Latin America, Jews in the Soviet Union, or the student as Jew, are not deserving of review comment. I am simply exercising my reviewer's prerogative to select.

One cannot escape the overall impression that the author has written a series of apologetic pamphlets designed to convince young Marxist Jewish radicals of the right of Israel to exist. This would explain a number of strands that run through the essays: an uncompromising stand on the need for a secularist ascendancy in Israel; a liberal-socialist approach as to what ought to be the ideological tenet of Jewry; and an almost obsessive attempt to identify Israel with the Third World.

Taking the last point first, Professor Horowitz is at his weakest when he tries to prove certain affinities with the Third World through superficial parallels like that drawn between the militaristic appearance of Cuba and Israel (there are soldiers to be seen in the streets of both countries!); or like

the parallel drawn between the political structures of India and Israel, adducing as an example the dominance of a single party since the establishment of these states. Similarly, one is surprised when he expresses doubt about the centrality of the relationship between the Jewish state and Jewry overseas. He states: 'It is more important, for example, that a Uganda ruler opens up a legation in Jerusalem than that 90 conferences between American Jews and Israeli Jews are held in Israel. The state needs legations more than conferences, needs Africans at least as much as Americans, needs support from poor nations no less than from wealthy Jews' (p. 79). Now, it is a matter of judgement as to what is more important when Israel faces the supreme test of survival. But, surely, Professor Horowitz: has Israel not tried to befriend the Third World? What else can she do short of miraculously transforming herself into a black or 'coloured' country?

The second strand, the liberal-socialist ideology, allows the author some deft manoeuvering. He seems to be walking a tightrope when nostalgically contemplating socialism (of which he still sees a large measure in Israel), implying disapproval of the American Jewish capitalist classes which support Israel, and loudly cheering Jewish democratic liberalism. However, in tracing the roots of Jewish liberalism he indulges in some far-fetched and obscure historical speculations (see for example p. 60).

Finally, let us look at his anti-religious stand—a stand which Horowitz is perfectly entitled to take. Here he not only makes contradictory statements concerning theocracy in Israel; being 'surprised by the paucity of visible theocratic overtones in the country' (p. 40), yet asserting that 'the potency of the religious "zealots" can hardly be minimized, given the cultural stamp they implant on the nation' (p. 34). Much the worse offence is to come in his sections dealing with the religious elements in Israel, containing paragraphs that reek with unfair generalizations and are replete not only with anti-religious sentiments but with unfounded statements as well. He says, for example, that 'The Orthodox Jewish population seems only marginally concerned with the fate of Israel'; that there is a tendency among them 'to train their children to speak Yiddish or any other European language rather than the sacred language'; that 'most Israelis resent Orthodox Jews for the unwillingness, particularly of the young Orthodox Jews, to enter into the mainstream of Israeli life, specially the "universal" military obligation' (p. 40).

To make such statements despite some well known facts is quite unforgivable. There are 20 Orthodox religious kibbutzim in Israel and 79 moshavim (co-operative settlements); close to 30 per cent of Israel's children attend religious elementary schools (see: *Information on Educational Statistics*, no. 57, April 1975); there are over 4,100 students in the 26 Yeshiva High Schools, the latter representing a small section of the larger total of students in religious high schools and Yeshivot; there are seven *Yeshivot Hesder*, which combine Yeshiva training with full army service. These sources have produced the many tens of thousands of Orthodox boys who have served in Israel's wars and the large number of Orthodox soldiers who have fallen in the Yom Kipur War. Is this proof of their unwillingness to do their military obligation?

As for the lack of concern the Orthodox show for the fate of Israel, here are some facts: 69 per cent of religious youth interviewed in the Tel-Aviv area

disagreed with emigration from Israel for economic or vocational reasons, whilst 60 per cent of non-religious youth accepted emigration for such reasons (survey to be published in *Megamot*, the Israeli social science journal). A secular Jew, the well-known Israeli journalist Ephraim Kishon, writing in *The Jerusalem Post* (26 February 1975) about religious youth, and expressing views similar to those of many other non-religious writers and commentators, had this to say: 'They do not toy with the notion of leaving this country. . . . They prove to our neighbours that not everything has been eroded here yet. . . . And we also remember the front-line defenders with Torah scrolls in their hands. . . . When people gather to discuss what can after all still be done to improve our society, encourage immigration, create new settlements, you can bet there will always be plenty of skullcaps around. . . . We breathe easier at the sight of the knitted skullcap.' Are these the Orthodox who are forsaking Israel's national interests?

Regarding the speaking of Yiddish rather than Hebrew among the Orthodox, evidently Professor Horowitz has not mingled much with the young people of Bnei-Brak or of the Orthodox sections of Jerusalem.

There can be no easy explaining away of such gross errors on the part of a professional sociologist. For Professor Horowitz *is* aware of different kinds of Orthodoxy—see his use of terms such as 'ultra Orthodox' (p. 192) and 'neo-Orthodox' (p. 180); yet he lumps them all together for the purposes of negative statements. Should he simply have confused the religiousness of the many with the zealotry and extremism of the few, then his sociological perception is lacking indeed.

If some of his writings in this volume are indicative of the 'imagination' he advocates for his 'new Sociology', then I join the ranks of those who are vigorously opposed to such developments in our discipline.

ERNEST KRAUSZ

BARRY A. KOSMIN AND NIGEL GRIZZARD, *Jews in an Inner London Borough: A study of the Jewish population of the London Borough of Hackney based on the 1971 Census*, 40 pp., Reasearch Unit, Board of Deputies of British Jews, London, 1975, £1.

Readers of such Anglo-Jewish sociology as there is can be excused for thinking that London Jewry is characteristically settled in the north-west of the metropolis in middle-class suburbs. Studies of Edgware and of Wembley, for example, have been published in this Journal; but the large settlements in the less socially desirable north-east London have hardly been looked at. Here now is an excellent (if brief) examination of the Jews of Hackney, a district whose name will be known from social histories to outsiders as the place to which East Enders traditionally first went before moving to outer suburbs. It still retains a large Jewish population, estimated here at 30,000 in 1971, bigger than all provincial communities except Manchester.

In one sense the choice of Hackney was fortuitous. The purpose was to experiment in the use of official statistics, which in Britain do not distinguish according to religion or ethnicity, in order to see if useful information can be

obtained. The validity of the whole exercise depends on the methodology, and this appears to be impeccable. Part One takes us through the stages whereby this particular geographical area was chosen and the methods used to identify Jewish households, followed by the preparation of a sample.

These included the use of the 'Distinctive Jewish Name' approach, on the probably reasonable assumption that in Hackney the 'ethnicity factor with regard to surnames' would be high. The local electoral register was combed for Jewish names, the results determining which wards had high concentrations of Jewish voters. A sample of Population Census enumeration districts was drawn from these wards, using a number of criteria, notably that Jews should form at least 70 per cent of the voting population. The basic information comes from the Census of Population material for the selected enumeration districts: this includes non-Jews but is used on the assumption that where at least 70 per cent of the population of an enumeration district was Jewish (by name), 'the Gentile minority possessed no overwhelming characteristics which were in total opposition to those of the Jewish population'. This approach was supplemented by fieldwork, and other relevant sources of information ranging from the Greater London Council to *The Steering Wheel*, the taxi trade paper.

From this divers information the authors have been able to produce all manner of useful information: for example, population structure, characteristics of households, and occupations. They throw a flood of light on a previously under-researched and almost unknown segment of Anglo-Jewry, of men employed in manufacturing, of taxi-drivers, and girls working as typists and in the needle trades.

The most impressive feature is the demonstration that so much can be learned from the systematic use of such statistics; but the authors are very conscious of the limitations and difficulties of the exercise. This important piece of work is marred slightly by one or two factual errors in the historical section: Benjamin Goldsmith for Goldsmid, and Charles Booth confused with General Booth. For its intrinsic worth as a study of the borough of Hackney and as a model piece of research which can be adopted for use elsewhere, it deserves the highest praise and the widest readership.

HAROLD POLLINS

NOAH LUCAS, *The Modern History of Israel*, xii + 500 pp., Asia-Africa Series, ed. Kenneth Ballhatchet, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1974, £6.

I came to this book prejudiced against it from the very beginning. To explain, as Noah Lucas does, 'the puzzle of the Jewish survival', that is, 3,500 years of Jewish civilization, and all that goes with it in terms of economic, cultural, religious and political activity, as the result of a 'potent myth of biological or tribal unity', seemed to me a bit unwarranted, to say the least. But his suggestion that 'the unique sociological content of the Jewish survival, in fact that which most crucially survived, is the myth of the Jewish survival', was a preposterous effort of tautology which seemed to indicate from the beginning the general tone and value of Lucas's book. With this thought at the back

of my mind as well as displeasure at not seeing my own analysis of Israeli society even so much as mentioned in the detailed bibliography, I started scanning the 443 pages of text of this new history of Israel and came to the surprising conclusion that it is one of the best I have read on the subject.

However, in the view of at least one historian, it might have been more prudent (as Dr. Lucas himself admits) to omit the epilogue and the couple of pages immediately preceding it. The events he deals with (for example, the elimination of a Palestinian identity, which the Arabs themselves—Palestinian leaders included—refused to recognize until 1964, as well as the occupation of Arab areas in the wake of a war willingly—even if irrationally—imposed by the Arabs upon Israel in 1967, and subsequent events) are too recent to be dealt with in a serious manner in 19 pages of text. Moreover, the personal, ideological, and psychological bias of the author is too strongly evident to do him justice as an historian. With this bias, I vehemently disagree, believing that it is part and parcel of a selective political morality which so many western intellectuals espouse in our time. Yet, just because I object so strongly to the book's epilogue, I feel that an honest critical judgement should remain aloof from passions in order to recognize the value of the preceding pages.

Dr. Lucas follows the well-trodden path of chronological investigation of the Jewish national movement which, in less than a century, matured into the birth, development, and expansion of the Israeli state. He uses very competently a vast quantity of Hebrew and non-Hebrew source materials. His insights into often-ploughed aspects of Zionist history are obviously drawn from a fruitful combination of direct intellectual involvement and scholarly detachment from the subject.

This is all the more creditable as the author has to deal with miniaturized social, political, and historical situations which, in spite of their size, became integral parts of much larger Jewish, Israeli, and world events. It is one of the author's great merits that he has been able to plunge deep into the myriads of tiny bits of documents which make up the extraordinary history of modern Israel, retain full sight of the general historical picture, and present both with an original interpretation of events. For example, his description of the complicated political and ideological minuets of the two main Zionist labour parties—Hapoel Hatzair and Ahdut Avoda—in the twenties, gives a clear (even if obviously not original) picture of an extremely complex miniaturized situation. At the same time he rightly stresses (p. 79) the importance of the success of the two parties in obtaining a share in the road-building programme of the British administration. It was an economic opportunity which had nothing to do either with the politics or ideology of the parties in question; which was indeed open to, and taken up by, Arabs as well as by Jews. But the fact that each of these two Zionist parties became a direct building contractor for much-needed roads was to have major consequences on the political-economic structure of the Yishuv and, as Lucas puts it, 'engendered extraordinary duplication of institutions'. The book is full of such brilliant analyses-cum-original insights, each example offering the reader much material for thought on that extraordinary human adventure which is Zionism.

In a clear, concise style, the author wends his way through the well-known jungle of British, Jewish, and Arab inter-relations and misunderstandings,

from 1917 to 1939, and the founding of Jewish self-government and Jewish self-defence. This last subject, to which Lucas attaches much importance in the subsequent chapter dealing with the struggle for the establishment of the State itself, is one of the best in the book and the reader is left bewildered by the intricacies, the richesse, and the astonishingly unplanned development of the Zionist movement, which has succeeded in such a short period of time in compressing so many events, in producing so much energy, and in creating so many problems in such a tiny geographical area of the world.

Much as Dr. Lucas is impartial, rational, and honest in his judgement, his utter lack of appreciation of Judaism as a national and trans-national culture and civilization represents a major weakness. But can this indeed be called a weakness? It is, after all, very like the well-known failing of the European discoverers of the sources of the Nile, who perceived everything about the river except that the natives had always known whence it sprang. Similarly, Western students of African history are 'discovering' that continent's past from evidence which is new to them (oral history, documents, etc.) but not to the local population; their discoveries were stimulated by their sense of guilt about colonialism and contributed new cultural dimensions to the wider political process of decolonization.

Jewish history, similarly, was known to the Jews as part of their traditional culture; secular western and westernized scholars (Jews and non-Jews) had, or wanted, to discover it afresh. Yet, in this specific case, there was no sense of guilt or urge to decolonize. The wide current literature shows little sign of it in any case—at least until very recently. Jewish historians, like so many African intellectuals of the évolué type, have continued the process of Jewish cultural assimilation without noting the striking similarities with the process of non-Jewish colonial cultural assimilation.

We touch here upon the fundamental problem of modern Jewish historical research. If the social historian's study of Israel is carried out on the assumption that this history fits and can be explained according to western models, that is, according to the structure and dynamics of western institutions, ideologies, and political cultures, then the analysis of Dr. Lucas and of many other brilliant Jewish and non-Jewish (including Arab and even Palestinian) scholars is as impeccable as it is useless. In fact, I think it misses the central issue of the whole Jewish problem which is not a western problem, however much it is part of European history. It is a problem which, like those of all new, emerging non-European states, cannot be explained according to western models. We are back to the dilemma of the discovery of the sources of the Nile which, as such, could be called a discovery only within a self-centred colonialist conception of the world.

If, on the other hand, the same phenomenon (that is, the modern chapter of the political and social history of the Jews in their ancestral land) is regarded as part and parcel of an uninterrupted, 3,000-year-old process called Judaism, then the 'myth of the survival' which is at the basis of Dr. Lucas's view of the history of Israel, is a misleading starting point. As any other myth would be, including that of the Elders of Zion, of Israeli imperialism, and so on, however important the kernel of truth in each of these myths may happen to be.

My quarrel with the author, however, has little to do with his brilliant

work; it centres on the problem of the decolonization of Jewish history which, for reasons linked to Zionist fashions as much as to psychological prejudices, few historians of modern Judaism have undertaken. It could not be otherwise since from the point of view of colonization, the Jews and the Israelis remain to this day the most colonized, non-western society of the world. Zionism, I have no doubt, will one day be recorded as one of the major motive forces for the Arab national movement, just as the Italian Risorgimento was for Slav national self-affirmation, notwithstanding the short period of the Italian conquest of parcels of Yugoslav territory. If its colonizing character ever appears, it will not be in terms of the Arabs, but rather in terms of the Jews. For it is they who have contributed together with the Enlightenment (Haskalah) movement and the assimilation, to a movement of westernization more deep and complete than any other non-European country ever exposed to foreign influences.

It is regrettable perhaps to see that once more in this age of world-wide decolonization, scholars involved in Jewish history and individually so sensitive to the problems of native societies should be unable to look at the history of Israel as a vital, millenarian, traditional society and at its political and social behaviour as an expression of the inevitable clashes between modernization and traditionalism so common to any colonized society.

But to do so would mean that the European discoverers of the sources of the Nile should have been culturally native-conscious. This is a contradiction in terms which makes efforts like those of Dr. Lucas valuable, as were the efforts of a Speke and a Burton, but a little outdated for the understanding of what is happening today in Israel and of the direction in which the revived Jewish political commonwealth is moving.

DAN V. SEGRE

BERNARD SEMMEL, *The Methodist Revolution*, x + 273 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1974, £3.

After the enormous controversy over Weber and the role of the 'Protestant Ethic' with respect to science, capitalism, and democracy it now seems a comparable controversy may occur over Halévy and 'The Methodist Ethic'. However, the issue of science is not prominent in the new controversy. What is at issue is perhaps equally important: what was it tipped Anglo-Saxon civilization towards liberal utilitarian democracy and what tipped the majority of continental movements towards 'totalitarian democracy'? A parallel issue is the generation of an ethos which might back up England's sense of national mission. What Bernard Semmel argues is essentially a return to Halévy in that he sees Methodism and the wider Evangelical Revival as lying heavily in the scales with respect to both issues. Historians have been inclined from time to time to see Methodism as repressive and regressive, partly no doubt because it lacks the kind of worked out revolutionary system which they can approve of. Semmel reverses that judgement. It was, he says, precisely the combination of old and new elements that enabled Anglo-

Saxon civilization to pick its way through the several perils of the industrial revolution without enduring the ardours, the social polarization, and incipient totalitarianism of the French Revolution. In so doing he pays Methodism the compliment of examining its ideas, which have often been seen as too muddled to merit serious attention. For Semmel the 'muddle' is a complex shifting balance complementary to the complex shifting balance required as Methodism walked the tight-rope between straight reaction and revolution. As 'election' was to the Calvinist eruption of the seventeenth century so the idea of man grasping at the universal possibility of redemption was to the psychic base of reform and progress. The constant danger was a shift from enthusiasm to riot, from full personal redemption to a practical antinomianism threatening the bases of personal and social order. Methodism mobilized and disciplined without unleashing the power of the emerging groups which it affected. It saved them from anomie and alienation simultaneously. And, of course, what historians of the left have felt is that it saved them from anomie by recourse to alienation. Hence the hostility and denigration.

The argument is complex, particularly as regards the much disputed questions of election and final perseverance versus free will and Christian perfection. Like the Established Church, Wesley leaned towards freedom of the will and universality, but in a manner designed to prevent the slide to indifferentism or moral anarchy. The argument with regard to Wesley's politics is also complex since he shifted over time from a Jacobite to a Hanoverian view. Indeed there was a kind of logic in this inasmuch as, once established, the Hanoverians might benefit from the older views of passive non-resistance which had once bolstered the Stuarts. In any case, the disorders associated with Wilkes and the American Revolution inclined him to support the powers that be, on scriptural, prudential, and general social grounds. The power of King Jesus ran constantly against and yet in partial conjunction with the power of King Mob. Wesley preferred the King to King Mob. So the Methodist movement was set in an orderly mould which was backed up by its careful organization and internal discipline. In short, the 'enthusiasm' unleashed in a political form in France became an enthusiasm controlled in a religious form in England.

The argument with regard to the 'progressive' side of the coin exactly parallels Lipset's arguments about the relationship of Arminian theology to democratization in America. Methodism provided self-respect, initiative, social advancement, education, and also elements of autonomy vis-à-vis the established order even while it accepted it. It ran parallel to Parsons's 'modern' characteristics of universalism, self-orientation (conscience), achievement, and affective neutrality—this last being acquired by a rational discipline after an emotional conversion. Methodism took the rootless and turned them into a potentially universal brotherhood, exploring the possibilities of self-government, first gradually in the religious sphere, and then gradually later in the political sphere. 'Despotism', said Tocqueville, 'may be able to do without faith but freedom cannot.' By its combination of faith and limited, constrained yet real freedom, Methodism made the slow evolution to larger freedoms possible, and made evolution more likely than revolution. And it gave a concomitant humanitarian and missionary thrust a

world-wide stage through diverting some of the evangelical enthusiasm to the mission field.

The argument, it seems to me, is eminently plausible. It restores a respect for theology to the discussion, provides an alternative genealogy of freedom to that of 'totalitarian' democracy, and raises the Halévy thesis to its proper place alongside the Weber thesis.

DAVID MARTIN

BRYAN S. TURNER, *Weber and Islam. A Critical Study*, ix + 212 pp., International Library of Sociology, ed. John Rex, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1974, £4.50.

Perhaps initially the very idea of writing a book on Max Weber's interpretation of Islam seems a dubious undertaking. Compared with his studies on China, Hinduism, and Ancient Judaism the scattered lines that make up Weber's comments—they can hardly be called analysis—appear more the material for a scrapbook than a monograph. When the reader realizes that Dr. Turner in fact disagrees with one of the best known strands in Weber's writings on Islam, namely that it owed its basic character to the warrior ethic of its first bearers, one almost wonders what there is left to say.

But the author is able to make a virtue of necessity by taking his project as an opportunity to discuss Weber's general theories of the nature of charismatic authority, law, the city, and the characteristics of patrimonialism both to shed light on the sociology of Islam and to serve as a series of critical reflections on broader theses. Weber and Islam then becomes the peg on which to hang a commentary on many of the most contentious issues that are part of Weber's legacy.

In the process not only the central place given to 'the warrior ethic' comes in for criticism. Dr. Turner is equally severe on Weber's failure to utilize with any consistency his own *verstehen* precept of the crucial nature of actors' definitions. Turner suggests the work of phenomenologist Alfred Schutz and C. Wright Mills's thinking on the vocabulary of motives as possible leads here, though there are complex problems at which he only hints in the use of such work in historical writing.

Most of the book is given over to a suggestive and interesting examination of the theory of patrimonialism, with Marx on the nature of the Asiatic mode of production as a complementary theme. Turner sees the reasons for the 'stagnation' of the Muslim world and the non-development of capitalism very much in terms of the political structure of Ottoman rule—asiatic bureaucracies riddled with favouritism and inflexible in form, the absence of an independent burgher class in autonomous cities, the fatal dependence on the military as controllers of both state and economy.

Sometimes almost too much ground is covered in too short a space for the reader's peace of mind. The reasoning occasionally slips into a schematic argument as to what must necessarily have been the case, though the evidence is lacking. Indeed evidence is always a problem. Turner uses English-language secondary sources in the main. Fair enough. But many of those

sources are now being critically called into question, and he perhaps is at some disadvantage in assessing the validity of some of the theses he adopts from other writers.

Yet if there are major problems it is because he has succeeded in raising a host of stimulating questions, certainly enough to keep sociologists of the Islamic world occupied for some time. *Weber and Islam* is an important contribution to debates that are only just beginning.

MICHAEL GILSENAN

BELA VAGO, *The Shadow of the Swastika. The Rise of Fascism and Anti-Semitism in the Danube Basin, 1936–1939* vi + 431 pp., Published for the Institute of Jewish Affairs by Saxon House, Westmead, Farnborough, Hants. 1975, £6.50.

The Introduction to this book correctly points out that the growth of fascism in the Danube Basin in the inter-war period has been seen in terms of source material from German archives and, rather more sparsely, from the extreme right-wing movements of the period. It was thus a very happy inspiration on the part of Professor Vago to make available documents from the British Foreign Office archives that enable the growth of fascism in the three countries concerned—Romania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary—to be seen through the eyes of Western and democratically inclined observers. As such, the documents emanating from British diplomats which form the body of the book are indispensable to any serious students of the period and in particular, of the growth of antisemitism. In both respects the documents collected here are indispensable to the study of the related phenomena of appeasement and the Holocaust. Thus Troutbeck (first secretary at the British Legation in Prague in 1937–39) noted, on the morrow of the Munich Agreement, 'a deliberate policy of driving the Jews to the wall' and commented that 'a virulent and new-born anti-semitism would indeed be an unfortunate offshoot of the policy of appeasement inaugurated in Munich'.

If this was the case in such a comparatively tolerant country as Czechoslovakia, then it can well be imagined how desperate was the position of the Jews in countries of endemic antisemitism such as Romania and Hungary.

There is a lengthy general introduction to the documents (as well as a shorter and more detailed one to those emanating from each country) and Professor Vago repeatedly emphasizes that such interest as Britain took in south-eastern Europe was governed by the view that nationalist movements represented the best defence against further German and/or Italian expansion and that these nationalist movements should not be hampered by association with the defence of the Jews. In furtherance of this policy, Britain (and France also) accepted a moderate degree of antisemitism so as 'to take the wind out of the sails' of the extreme, fascist right. Beyond this, neither government would go, as is well exemplified in the advice by Sir Reginald Hoare, British Ambassador in Bucharest, to the effect that the position of King Carol of Rumania be not weakened lest his opposition to the Iron Guard be jeopardized; nor should the Rumanian government be 'bad-

gered' to an extent such as would allow the Iron Guard to raise the cry of 'foreign interference in the internal affairs of Romania . . .'

Vago argues that the western powers should in fact have supported democratic and socialist forces against the right wing. But with the best will in the world it is not possible to see in this an effective policy, given the evident weakness of those forces. The picture is utterly cheerless—that in which well over a million Jews, abandoned to their own resources, faced increasingly antisemitic right-wing parties, to say nothing of the external pressure exercised by Germany and Italy. In the face of that abandonment it is not surprising that Professor Vago should seem to be clutching at straws. But he has rendered great service to all students of the period.

LIONEL KOCHAN

DAVID H. WEINBERG, *Les Juifs à Paris de 1933 à 1939* trans, from the English by Micheline Pouteau, 287 pp., Collection 'Diaspora' (dirigée par Roger Errera), Calmann-Levy, Paris 1974, n.p.

This book is the French translation of an English original. It is one of the very few important studies of a period in Franco-Jewish history that has been unaccountably neglected. The author early makes the point that between the two World Wars the Jewish population of the French capital rose sharply to about 150,000. Moreover what distinguished Paris was the co-existence of two sharply contrasting communities—the native-born French Jews and the Jews of eastern European origin. It would be true to say that Professor Weinberg balances his analysis on this co-existence, for it runs through the whole of the book. It is evident for example, in the nature of organizational life. French-born Jews belonged to the Consistoire or its affiliated bodies (if indeed they belonged to any Jewish organization at all) whereas the immigrant Jews from eastern Europe rejected French-Jewish organizations and formed a structure of affiliation modelled on a conjunction of the *Shtetl* and the secular-progressive world of the west. The growth of antisemitism in the thirties forced both sections to question the effectiveness of their organizations, but no basic change was produced. The same division ran through occupational distribution. Thus, of the 60 per cent of Jews from eastern Europe employed in industry or handicrafts, more than 83 per cent were either home-workers or factory-workers in textiles or ready-made clothing. Only 8 per cent of immigrant Jews were employed in the liberal professions as against 25 per cent of 'French Jews'. But the immigrants, in the course of the thirties, did enlarge their occupational basis and engage, as Weinberg puts it, in enterprises ranging from antique dealers to travel agents.

The book falls into three parts: first, an analysis of the economic, social, and political structures of the two communities; second, the nature of Jewish identity that these, and their various sub-groups, respectively entertained; third, the various responses to antisemitism in France and central Europe. Weinberg has relied very largely on the Jewish press of the period which

did indeed give full publicity to all viewpoints. On the other hand, there is perhaps an inevitable lack of 'feel' about this material. Again, an imbalance results from the fact that whereas the archives of the Paris Consistoire could be consulted (but not those of the *Alliance*), the archives of the immigrants, including those of the Jewish section of the French Communist Party, have either been destroyed or are inaccessible or simply lost. But these handicaps have not prevented Professor Weinberg from making a very useful contribution to modern Jewish and French history.

LIONEL KOCHAN

MEYER W. WEISGAL, gen. ed., *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, Volume VI, *Series A. March 1913–July 1914*, xxxv + 454 pp., Oxford Univ. Press and Israel Univ. Press, London and Jerusalem, 1974, £9.

The letters in this volume carry right up to the beginning of the First World War, but they give no hint of the imminence of the entry of non-Jews and national governments into the centre of the Zionist picture. In fact Gentiles and Gentile authorities hardly appear in the volume's 386 letters at all. Once Baron Edmond de Rothschild had become interested in the project nearest Weizmann's heart of a Hebrew University in Jerusalem, there is a passing reference to the Baron's concern that it does not damage his reputation with Turkish or other European interests. There is an equally casual reference to the possible usefulness of the university, once established, to young Turks and Arabs.

This is the more surprising in that in the very beginning of the volume (letter 4) he tells his wife that, had the Zionists the money, 'it would now be possible to buy literally half of Palestine, and it's dreadful that the Jewish conscience is so hard to rouse'. The Turks were suffering from the defeats of the Balkan wars, and 'they are now *seeking* Jewish support'. But the moment passes, and the main interest of the volume is the planning of the university, not the overall future of the Jewish people.

This involves immense detail, constant friction with individuals who had other ideas, and fills letter after letter with monotonous repetition of his own proposals, and his reasons (generally sound) for rejecting the alternatives offered. A very important place is taken by his discussions with the Rothschilds. The two other themes of interest in the volume are the decision that Hebrew is to be the language of education in Palestine, and the battle between the German Hilfsverein and the World Zionist Organization for the control of the Haifa Technion—then called the 'Technicum'.

Weizmann was still at Manchester and rejected ideas that he should move to Berlin—fortunately, in view of the outbreak of war in August 1914. The climate of Manchester clearly did not suit Vera Weizmann, for she was frequently obliged to seek warmer climes.

JAMES PARKES

YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Research, Volume XV, 374 pp., YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, New York, 1974, n.p.

The Yiddisher Visnshaftlekher Institut was founded in Vilna in 1925 as the archives and secular expression of Jewish cultural idealism. As the Yiddish Scientific Institute it was re-established in New York during the Holocaust period. Somewhat later it was renamed the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research. Today it is one of YIVO's functions to be a monument to the Jewry of eastern Europe, where its roots were. The *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science* first appeared in 1946; one of its purposes was to naturalize YIVO on the American scholarly scene. The early volumes consisted mainly of translations from previous YIVO Yiddish publications, while the present volume, to judge at least from its table of contents, shows that a transition has been effected to English and to American Jewish subjects. None of the sixteen articles is translated from the Yiddish, it would appear, while one or two first appeared in Hebrew. It is paradoxical that 'Translating from Yiddish' now becomes the subject of a contribution from Irving Howe. In fact, nine or ten articles would readily fit into the *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* or the *American Jewish Archives*. However, the level of the Americana, as a whole, stands beneath that of the other studies—with exceptions of course.

The best article is without doubt that by the younger Israeli historian Yosef Salmon, 'The Yeshiva of Lida: A Unique Institution of Higher Learning', founded by Rabbi I. J. Reines in 1903. Lida was Reines's second modernistic yeshiva, and both had to meet severe old-line opposition. Salmon analyses with subtlety and imagination the changing *paideia* of the Lida yeshiva as it was affected by Haskalah and socio-economic influences. Dan Miron's 'The Discovery of Mendele Moykher-Seforim and the Beginnings of Modern Yiddish Literature' is a fascinating description of the fictional personality of Mendele, which is meticulously set off from his creator. Miron, an Israeli literary scholar, finds parallels to Mendele in nineteenth-century European literature and concludes that it is the Mendele narrator figure which sets the point of origin for modern Yiddish literature. Few articles approach the standard set by Salmon and Miron, but one which does is Robert Rockaway's 'The Eastern European Jewish Community of Detroit, 1881–1914'. One awaits with interest the author's forthcoming history of that Jewish community.

The connexion between antisemitism and the revolt against modernism and industrialism in Germany sets the theme of Werner E. Braatz's 'The *Völkisch* Ideology and Anti-Semitism', with emphasis on Lagarde and Treitschke. Joseph M. Kirman's 'Note on Friedrich Paulsen', the German philosopher, rests on nothing more than slurring remarks about Jews in Paulsen's memoirs. The interpretative level is exemplified by quoting from his visit to the Amsterdam Jewish quarter, whose sights 'tend to make one doubt the possibility of assimilation'; whereupon Mr. Kirman observes, 'This adumbrates the notorious "Final Solution" '. Other articles deal still more closely with Holocaust subjects. Moshe Gottlieb, in 'Boycott, Rescue, and Ransom: The Threefold Dilemma of American Jewry in 1938–39', leaves the reader unclear as to the dilemma. The author unsuccessfully attempts to present the complex American Jewish diplomatic picture from the records of the Joint

Boycott Council, and the general historical background is wanting. On the other hand, Michael Mashberg provides the best account to date of the futile Evian Conference on Refugees in his clear 'American Diplomacy and the Jewish Refugee, 1938–1939'. Gerd Korman's complex and impassioned reflections are set out in 'Warsaw Plus Thirty: Some Perceptions in the Sources and Written History of the Ghetto Uprising'. Assailing the 'presumptuous provincialism' of cultivated Americans like George F. Kennan, he observes how they continually refuse to recognize the group existence of the Jews as fighters and victims in the Second World War. But, Korman admits, American Jews were also otherwise occupied during the Holocaust. He has sharp words about social science schemes which would comprehend the horror of the Holocaust within slick analytic models. Even 'the heroes of twentieth century secular Jewish peoplehood . . . young, strong' (the rest reads like a Leon Uris stereotype) make it hard to evaluate the Warsaw ghetto uprising on its own terms. Contemporary Jews tend to view it within the millenial chronicle of Jewish martyrdom, or to take it 'as the first round in the campaign to establish the Third Commonwealth'. Just how the Warsaw ghetto uprising is to be classified, if such a word is permissible, Korman leaves in mid-air.

A group of articles probes American Jewish history. Ida Cohen Selavan, 'The Education of Jewish Immigrants in Pittsburgh, 1862–1932', provides interesting oral and written evidence on public and night schools in that city. David Rudavsky, 'Louis D. Brandeis at the London International Zionist Conference', has material of interest, but does not re-examine the myths and clichés about the Brandeis-Weizmann relationship. Had Morton J. Merowitz paid more attention to the social and cultural dimensions of Jewish education and to influences emanating from the public schools, his 'Max Lilienthal (1814–82)—Jewish Educator in Nineteenth-Century America' would have been much more useful. One wonders at Isidore David Passow's discussion of 'Shmuel Niger's Ideas on Building a Jewish Community in the United States, 1920–1933', which provides no historical or comparative background and not even a single quotation from the voluminous writings of the great Yiddish man of letters. J. N. Porter, B. Rackovsky, and the late Anita Bach Agrillo replicated at Northwestern University in 1968 the questionnaire on secular and religious attitudes administered by Meyer Greenberg to Jewish students at Yale in 1945. It is not the differences between 1945 and 1968 which struck this reviewer, but rather the constants in the thinking of these students: basic, if blurry, Jewish loyalty, and planning towards economic advancement.

The 'Two Settings for Jewish Studies' confidently described by Jacob Neusner are the rabbinical seminary and the university. The university wins, for there Neusner finds universality of method and interest, while the seminary is a 'parochial institution' rife with 'inbreeding . . . intolerant provincialism . . . rigidly proscribed ideas and unread books', and other maladies of the intellect. (I happen to know at least one university which answers this characterization.) Neusner illustrates the vices of the rabbinical seminaries by attacking, without one direct citation, the 'credulousness and lack of critical acumen' allegedly exhibited by two eminent Talmudists, Zacharias Frankel (1801–75) and Hanoch Albeck (1890–1970). To be sure, Albeck

was a Hebrew University professor; his religious convictions, however, and 'the theological legacy of the Science of Judaism . . . proved his undoing'. In general, Professor Neusner's method is really to evaluate the highest ideals of university study against the poorest defects of rabbinical seminaries. He is offended by the 'parochial school' scholar who stated that, 'Just because a university board of trustees has declared a person to be a Jewish scholar, that does not make him a Jewish scholar at all': a statement I admit to be forthright and true. The recent upsurge in Jewish studies at American universities is certainly a positive development. It may in good time show major scholarly results, but the scholarly record of the rabbinical seminaries in their field of specialization remains monumental.

Finally, mention must be made of Rudolf Glanz, 'The Spread of Jewish Communities Through America Before the Civil War', which breaks new ground in American Jewish demography. Dr. Glanz is the senior contributor, for he was one of the original YIVO group in 1925. Perhaps YIVO will itself retain ties with its great past and likewise break new ground, as the present volume, with some success, attempts to do.

LLOYD P. GARTNER

ISRAEL ZINBERG, *Italian Jewry in the Renaissance Era, A History of Jewish Literature*, vol. IV, trans. and ed. by Bernard Martin, XV + 214 pp. Hebrew Union College Press, Cincinnati, Ohio and Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1974, $12.50.

As is well known, Israel Zinberg, a chemical engineer by profession (1873–1938), devoted his leisure to the composition in Yiddish of a monumental history of Jewish literature from the Middle Ages. It was a work of scholarship and love, and he paid for it in the Stalin era by dying in a concentration camp in Siberia. The publication of the English translation by Bernard Martin was undertaken by the Press of Case Western Reserve University and has now, with this fourth volume, been taken over by the Hebrew Union College in co-operation with the Ktav Publishing House. The work is beautifully produced.

Though at least two major books of synthesis on the subject of the Italian Jews in the Renaissance have appeared since Zinberg's death—C. Roth, *The Jews in the Renaissance* (1959) and M. Shulvass, *The Jews in the World of the Renaissance* (1973, original Hebrew text 1955)—Zinberg's volume is by no means superfluous. The other two books deal with the communal life of the Jews as a whole, whereas Zinberg concentrates on literature. He talks only of books he considers important and does so with refreshing directness. His sympathies are clearly with the rationalists, and he gives pride of place to Elijah Levita as a philologist, to Leone (da) Modena, especially for the daring pseudepigraphon *Kol Sachal* (The Voice of the Fool), and to the latter's pupil Joseph Solomon Delmedigo of Candia, whom he considers an anti-Kabbalist in disguise.

Moses Zacuto, the poet and mystic who at first accepted Shabbetai Zevi

as the Messiah, is chosen to conclude the book, presumably as the sad symbol of the decline of the Renaissance spirit in Italian Jewry. The position of Delmedigo and Zacuto is, of course, not so simple as that; nor has the enigma of the *Kol Sachal* been solved to everybody's satisfaction. Inevitably the reader feels that not enough is said to account for the complexities of these thinkers. One misses precise references to contemporary Christian historical and theological thought. When Joseph Solomon Delmedigo theorizes dissimulation, he simply adapts current Italian thought to Jewish conditions. This has become a commonplace since the researches by A. Casadei and D. Cantimori: a recent valuable contribution is A. Biondi, 'La giustificazione della simulazione nel Cinquecento', *Eresia e Riforma nell'Italia del Cinquecento*, Vol. I, Florence, 1974, pp. 7–68. Azariah dei Rossi can hardly be separated from the revival of Hebrew studies in the contemporary Christian world, especially in France. It is symptomatic that, like Guillaume Postel, dei Rossi, and before him Obadiah Sforno (A. I. Baumgarten, *Journ. Jewish Studies* no. 25, 1974, pp. 313–15), fell for Annio da Viterbo's 'Chaldaic' forgeries (S. W. Baron, *History and Jewish Historians*, Philadelphia, 1964, p. 228).

But it would be absurd to quarrel with the heroic Zinberg about the limitations imposed on him by the time and place of his labour. I feel, however, that the translator and editor should have done something to indicate more modern approaches and to define the historical environment. The bibliographical references he has appended at the end of the volume are certainly useful. But they are indiscriminate, not always correct, and altogether uncontrolled. To confine myself to only some of the remarks one could make on the bibliographical appendix to the first chapter, I note the following:

It is odd to find among the 'most valuable historical accounts' of Italian Jewry the notorious pamphlet by Paolo Orano, *Gli Ebrei in Italia*, which started the antisemitic campaign of 1938, apparently by direct order of Mussolini: see some of the circumstances in R. De Felice, *Storia degli Ebrei Italiani sotto il Fascismo*, Turin, 1962, p. 247. Professor Martin includes in the same category of leading books the very honest elementary schoolbook by G. Volli, *Breve Storia degli Ebrei d'Italia*, Milan, 1961, but leaves out N. Ferorelli, *Gli Ebrei nell'Italia meridionale*, Turin, 1915 and even U. Cassuto's great book on the Jews of Florence during the Renaissance (1918). Cassuto's book is, however, mentioned later (in the posthumous Hebrew translation of 1967) for a secondary purpose. Gregorovius' romantic sketch *Das Ghetto und die Juden in Rom* is transferred from 1853 to 1948, but the only critical edition I know of Leone Ebreo (Juda Abrabanel)'s *Dialoghi d'Amore*—by Santino Caramella, Bari, 'Scrittori d'Italia', 1929—is omitted. Carlo Dionisotti, not Dinizotti, is the author of the research on these *Dialoghi* which appeared in *Italia medievale e umanistica*, Vol. 2, 1959, pp. 409–28 and which is a model of what research on the relations between Jews and non-Jews in Italian Renaissance literature should be. An important study of the destruction of the Jewish communities in Lombardy at the end of the sixteenth century has now appeared: Renata Segre, 'Gli Ebrei Lombardi nell'Età Spagnola', *Memorie Accademia Scienze Torino*, Vol. IV, no. 28, 1973.

ARNALDO MOMIGLIANO

CHRONICLE

The Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, published last August a Research Report on the Jewish population of Switzerland, based on the 1970 census. The Census of Switzerland records data on religion, sex, nationality, age, and civil status.

There were 20,744 Jews in 1970 (19,984 in 1960). The total Jewish population in the country has varied between 18,000 and 21,000 in the course of this century—but the number of Jews expressed as a percentage of the total population has declined. The Research Report comments:

'The reasons for this state of affairs are those common in Diaspora Jewry. Firstly, an age-structure relatively biased towards the old, with the concomitant expectations of low birth rate and high death rate. For instance, almost half of the Jews of Switzerland, but less than one-third of all Swiss, were aged 45 or over in 1970. The proportion of Jews aged 65 and over almost trebled in the 40 years to 1970, and the number of Jews in each five-year age group below 25 in 1970 indicates a declining birth rate in the years since 1950. By 1970 the average Jewish wife had produced 1·8 live children, as against 2·2 children per wife amongst all the Swiss. The other reason for the declining Jewish proportion of the total population was potential loss through intermarriage. According to figures supplied by the Jewish community, the rate of intermarriage had increased such that in the years 1961–73, 40·9% of Jews who married had taken non-Jewish spouses. The 1970 census indicated that 18·8% of all married Jews then living were partners in mixed marriages. . . .

'In regard to their residence Swiss Jews display the normal Jewish characteristic of high urbanisation. In 1970, 60·9% lived in towns with more than 100,000 inhabitants, as against 17·7% of the entire population of Switzerland living in these towns, and in all, while only 45·3% of the total population lived in towns with 10,000 or more residents, 84·0% of Jews did.'

As for education, the 1970 Census reveals that 26·1 per cent of Jewish men and 7·8 per cent of Jewish women had been to university. The comparable figures for the general population were 5·6 per cent for men and one per cent for women.

The occupational structure of Swiss Jewry shows that very nearly two thirds (62·6 per cent) of those gainfully occupied worked in businesses and administration (mainly as office workers, buyers, salesmen and commercial travellers, and owners and managers). Over a quarter (26·7 per cent) were engaged in the liberal professions, using the term in a broad sense: medical and para-medical personnel, teachers and social workers, artists, editors, journalists, authors, translators, musicians, and composers.

In addition, 5·6 per cent were artisans and industrial workers while the remaining 5·1 per cent were engaged in various other occupations, including transport, agriculture, and the tourist trade.

The total number of Jews who were gainfully occupied were 79·2 per cent

of men and 33·4 per cent of women in the 15–65 age group: they constituted 39·4 per cent of the total Jewish population. Of the remaining 60·6 per cent, a quarter were children under the age of 16 years and young persons over 16 who were full-time students; 18·4 per cent were pensioners, and persons of independent means; 16·1 per cent were housewives; and 1·1 per cent were mainly inmates of institutions.

*

The Social and Demographic Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews released the following data last May. In 1974, there were 1,678 Jewish religious marriages in Great Britain; 1,326 (79 per cent) were solemnized in Orthodox, 238 (14·2 per cent) in Reform, and 114 (6·8 per cent) in Liberal synagogues. The 1974 total shows a decline when compared to the 1973 figure (1,753 religious marriages), which in turn was less than the average figure for 1968–72—1,880.

In 1974, 70 per cent of the marriages were solemnized in London, and the remainder in the provinces; in 1973 the respective percentages were 72 and 28. There are no statistics on marriages of Jewish couples in a Register Office. Research workers know that in the provinces many Jews marrying for the second time do so in civil ceremonies only; and that the same is true also in the case of first marriages in London. The Research Unit comments: 'Comparison of the Jewish religious scene with that of Christian denominations in this country reveals that in some ways Judaism is more successful in retaining its hold over adherents. There has been a significant decline in organised religion in Britain during the last few decades. Civil marriages in England and Wales between 1929 and 1962 rose from 26 to 47 per cent of the total, and between 1964 and 1974 in traditionally more religious Scotland, civil marriages rose from 20 to 34 per cent of the total. The number of Anglican Church marriages declined from 56 to 37 per cent of the total in England and Wales between 1929 and 1962, and a recent report by a Catholic demographer has postulated a drop-out rate among Roman Catholics of 250,000 a year. Between 1958 and 1972 the proportion of Catholics married in their own church fell by 43 per cent, a loss which was due in no way to demographic decline.

In 1972 Jewish marriages accounted for 0·71 per cent of all religious ceremonies in England and Wales. However, synagogue ceremonies composed 3·7 per cent of all religious marriages in Greater London which was the most secularised area of the country and where only 47 per cent of all couples had a religious ceremony.'

As for Jewish burials and cremations, the total was 4,866 in 1974; 85·8 per cent were according to Orthodox rites; 8 per cent, Reform, and 6·2 per cent, Liberal. The 1973 total was 4,755; and the average total for 1968–72 was 4,917.

*

The 1976 edition of the American Jewish Yearbook gives a total of very nearly two million Jews (1,998,000) for Greater New York. It is said to represent a decline of one-sixth since 1962. On the other hand, there has been

a steady movement towards suburban Westchester and Nassau-Suffolk. The latter now has an estimated Jewish population of 605,000—larger than the estimate for any of the five boroughs of New York City: Brooklyn: 514,000; Queens: 379,000; Manhattan: 171,000; the Bronx: 143,000; and Staten Island: 21,000. Greater New York, which used to be one third Jewish in the 1930s, is now less than one sixth so.

The average size of Jewish households in greater New York is just under 2·8 persons while at the other end, Nassau-Suffolk's average is 3·64 and Westchester's, 3·28. Children under 14 constitute a large proportion of Westchester's Jewish households; in contrast, the Bronx and Manhattan have the highest percentage of elderly Jews.

*

Israel's population rose by 69,000 in 1975—all of it due to excess of births over deaths. The Arab population grew by 18,000 (to 537,000) and the Jewish population by 51,000. The total number of inhabitants at the end of the year was only 10,000 short of 3·5 million.

The total number of immigrants who came to Israel in 1975 was 20,000. There were 8,400 from the Soviet Union—just less than half those who had come in the previous year—17,000.

Twenty thousand immigrants, including about 8,400 from the U.S.S.R., came to Israel in 1975—according to the Minister of Absorption. He commented that there were also about 3,000 immigrants from the U.S.A. and Canada in that year; they accounted for 15 per cent of the overall total.

An Israeli government spokesman has stated that 16,000 Israelis will probably leave the country to settle abroad during 1976. This figure compares with 12,000 who left in 1972, 15,000 in 1973, 24,000 in 1974, and 19,000 during 1975.

Tourists numbered 617,500 in 1975—only 1·5 per cent less than the total for 1974.

*

The Department of Research and Statistics of the Municipality of Tel-Aviv-Yafo published in December 1975 a Special Survey (no. 48), *Changes of Purpose of Dwellings in Tel-Aviv-Yafo (1970–1974)*.

The Introduction states that in the 1960s 'demographic growth stopped and for the first time in the history of the first Hebrew city a migration of residents, especially young ones, towards the city's suburbs and the adjacent towns, was recorded. On the other hand, the economic prosperity in the country (except the recession years of 1965–66) led to a rapid economic development of T.A.-Yafo . . .'

Consequently, many domestic dwellings were turned into business premises not only in and around the business centre of the city but also in the 'old' northern areas. Moreover, the demolition of many blocks of flats in slum areas (mainly in old Yafo) was not accompanied by a massive rebuilding of homes, so that there was an overall decrease of 5,010 dwelling units between 1970 and 1974.

*

The Director of the National Hebrew Culture Council has stated that Hebrew is now taught to more than 6,000 pupils in 144 state government high schools in 21 states in the U.S.A. The overall annual cost has been estimated at U.S.$2·5 million; it is borne entirely by the school authorities as part of their regular budget.

The American Association for Jewish Education is reported to have stated that there are now 75,000 students in Jewish high schools in the United States: this represents an increase of 76 per cent in the past 15 years; 15,000 of these pupils are in all-day Jewish schools.

*

According to a survey made by a teacher at Syracuse University, 9 per cent (60,000) of all university teachers in the United States are Jews. American Jews constitute only 3 per cent of the total population of the country. The survey further states that 22 per cent of all teachers of medicine are Jewish; the percentage is even higher in the case of teachers in faculties of law: 25. Jews also constitute 20 per cent of the teaching staff in American faculties of physics and economics.

The author of the survey comments that most of these Jewish university teachers have no interest in religious matters or in specifically Jewish problems, in spite of repeated efforts by the established Jewish communities of America.

*

The Tel-Aviv Institute for the Translation of Hebrew Literature has published a *Bibliography of Modern Hebrew Literature in Translation*; it contains more than 600 entries and lists publications translated into Arabic, Bulgarian, Danish, Dutch, English, Esperanto, Finnish, French, Frisian, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Norwegian, Persian, Polish, Portuguese, Rumanian, Russian, Serbian, Spanish, Swedish, Turkish, and Yiddish. It has an index of authors and translators and an appendix listing about one hundred monographs on modern Hebrew literature. The Institute has also published a series of Hebrew plays which have been translated into English; the series is published with the co-operation of the Cultural Department of the World Zionist Organization.

*

The June–September 1975 issue of *Israel Book World* publishes data on the 1975 International Book Fair in Jerusalem; it has been held every two years since 1963. There has been a steady increase in the number of participating countries—from 22 in 1963 and 1965 to 42 in 1975, while the number of books exhibited has more than doubled (from 15,000 in 1963 to 33,000 in 1975) and that of public attendance has soared from 21,000 to 75,000.

The first Hebrew book was printed in Calabria in 1475: a facsimile of it was displayed at the stand exhibiting Five Hundred Years of Hebrew Printing.

*

The Pontifical Institute of Rome and the Hebrew University's Department of Bible have jointly developed a pioneering venture, with two main goals: to teach Vatican students the Hebrew language, Biblical research, and archaeology; and to improve Jewish-Christian understanding. Last February the students came to Jerusalem from Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas for the first year of a three-year course leading to a Licentiate in Sacred Scripture. They will become instructors in Catholic seminaries throughout the world. Before attending the Hebrew University, they spent four months in Rome studying Biblical and modern Hebrew. Soon after arriving in Jerusalem, they were enrolled in an intensive Ulpan in modern Hebrew.

There are plans now under way to repeat the programme next year and possibly to expand it.

The Secretary of the new Vatican Commission for Religious Relations with Judaism is reported to have stated during a visit to Israel: 'I do not know of any good Biblical scholar in my Church who now would imagine that he can study the Bible and propose new interpretations while ignoring the Jewish tradition. The origins of the renovation of my Church, which is by no means complete, spring from this renewal of biblical studies.'

*

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem was formally opened in 1925, seven years after the laying of its foundation stone on Mount Scopus. In June 1975, it celebrated its Jubilee; it was attended by 30 representatives of foreign universities which had sent delegates to the 1925 ceremony. A special commemorative stamp was issued; it depicts a number of buildings on the university's campus.

*

Teacher's certificates were awarded last June to 307 graduates of the Hebrew University's Secondary School teachers Training Programme. All the graduates, 260 women and 47 men, held a bachelor's or a master's degree before entering the School of Education. Most of them will teach the humanities while 52 will teach science.

*

A new Jewish publication has been launched in Toronto: the *Jewish Times*; it appears twice monthly and is geared towards what the Editor calls the 'new era in Jewish history which began on October 6, 1973', the start of the Yom-Kippur War.

Cape Town has a new quarterly journal, *Survival*. Its aim 'is to explore alternatives to stereotyped concepts in Jewish life today from an unhibited critical but constructive point of view'. The first issue has a symposium on Jewish Day Schools.

*

In 1975 there was an enrolment of 34,377 in Argentina's Jewish schools; the figure represents almost 20 per cent of Jewish pupils in the country.

There are nearly half a million Jews in Argentina; the community ranks fifth in size—after the Jewish populations of the United States, the Soviet Union, Israel, and France.

*

A centre for Jewish studies has opened in Mexico City. It provides courses in Judaica, Jewish literature, and the Hebrew language. The University of Mexico has already a Chair in Jewish Studies which is said to attract many students.

*

An Institute of Jewish Studies has been established at the Rand Afrikaans University in Johannesburg. The aim of the Institute, which is sponsored by the Zionist Federation and the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, is to promote adult education through university extension courses, lectures, and seminars.

The North Hebrew Congregation of Johannesburg has an adult education programme; it is made up of 22 courses which are divided into six study areas. More than 500 persons have enrolled.

*

Chel Chana is a new centre in Melbourne: it offers advanced Jewish studies for women; the centre is a branch of the Yeshiva-Beth Rivkah colleges, which provide an orthodox education for 750 children.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

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Bogue, Donald J., ed., *The Basic Writings of Ernest W. Burgess*, xxv + 406 pp., Community and Family Study Center, Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., 1974, $6.50 (paperback, $4.00).

Bunzl, John, *Klassenkampf in der Diaspora, Zur Geschichte der jüdischen Arbeiterbewegung*, 183 pp., Ludwig Boltzmann Institut, Linz, Austria, 1975, n.p.

Eisenstadt, S. N. and Azmon, Yael, eds., *Socialism and Tradition*, vii + 262 pp., Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, 1975, $10,00.

Fox, Marvin, ed., *Modern Jewish Ethics, Theory and Practice*, xii + 262 pp., Ohio State Univ. Press, Colombus, Ohio, 1975, $14.50.

Gonen, Jay Y., *A Psychohistory of Zionism*, x + 374 pp., Mason/Charter, New York, 1975, $15.00.

Kerr, Malcolm H., ed., *The Elusive Peace in the Middle East*, v + 354 pp., State Univ. of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1975, $14.95 (paperback, $6.95).

Moore, Maurice J., *Death of a Dogma? The American Catholic Clergy's Views of Contraception*, xii + 142 pp., Community and Family Study Center, Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., 1973, $2.00.

Neusner, Jacob, ed., *Understanding American Judaism, toward the Description of a Modern Religion*, Volume One, *The Rabbi and the Synagogue*, xxv + 306 pp., Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1975, $12.50 (paperback, $4.95).

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Poll, Solomon and Krausz, Ernest, eds., *On Ethnic and Religious Diversity in Israel*, 126 pp., Institute for the Study of Ethnic and Religious Groups, Bar-Ilan Univ., Ramat Gan, 1975, n.p.

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Scaepaci, Jean A., ed., *The Interaction of Italians and Jews in America*, Proceed-

ings of the Seventh Annual Conference of the American Italian Historical Association, Co-Sponsor: American Jewish Historical Society, viii + 117 pp., The American Italian Historical Association, 209 Flagg Place, Staten Island, New York 10304, 1975, $4.00.

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Weisgal, Meyer W., gen. ed., *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, Volume VII, *Series A, August 1914–November 1917*, edited by Leonard Stein in collaboration with Dvora Barzilay and Nehama A. Chalom, xliii + 569 pp., Israel Univ. Press and Oxford Univ. Press, Jerusalem and London, 1975, £9.00.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

BROTZ, Howard; Ph.D., Professor of Sociology, McMaster University, Ontario. Chief publications: 'The Position of the Jews in English Society', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 1, no. 1, April 1959; 'Functionalism and Dynamic Analysis', *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. II, 1961; *The Black Jews of Harlem*, New York, 1964; *Negro Social and Political Thought*, New York, 1966; 'Social Stratification and the Political Order', *American Journal of Sociology*, vo. 64, 1969. Currently engaged in research on race, politics, and industrialization in South Africa.

COHEN, Percy S.; B. Comm., B.Sc. (Econ.), Ph.D. Professor of Sociology in the University of London at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Formerly, Dean of Undergraduate Studies at the L.S.E. Chief publications: *Modern Social Theory*, London, 1968; 'Student Revolt and Generational Conflict: Phantasy and Reality'; *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 13, no. 2, December 1971; and various articles in *British Journal of Sociology*, *Man*, *Race*, etc. Currently engaged in research for the Institute of Jewish Affairs.

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MANDELBAUM, David G.; Ph.D., Professor of Anthropology, University o California, Berkeley. Formerly Visiting Professor at Cambridge University. Chief publications: *Change and Continuity in Jewish Life*, Plotkin Library, Glencoe, Ill., 1954 (abridged version reprinted in *The Jews*, Marshall Sklare, ed., Glencoe, Ill., 1958); *Society in India*, Volumes I and II, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970; *Human Fertility in India*, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, 1974. Currently engaged in a study on comparative religion and social theory.

MARKUS, Elliot J.; Ph.D., Lecturer in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Senior Research Associate at the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research. Chief publications: 'Relocation Stress and the Aged', *Interdisciplinary Topics in Gerontology*, vol. 7: *The Regulatory Role of the Nervous System in Aging*, in H. Blumenthal, ed., New York, 1970; 'The Impact of Relocation on Mortality Rates of Institutionalized Aged Persons', *Journal of Gerontology*, vol. 26, no. 4, 1971; 'Some Factors and their Association with Post-Relocation Mortality among Institutionalized Aged Persons', *Journal of Gerontology*, vol. 27, no. 3, 1972; and *Non-Utilization of Welfare Services* (in Hebrew), Institute of Applied Social Research, Jerusalem, 1974. Currently engaged in research on patterns of integration of Russian Immigrants.

MARX, Emanuel; Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Tel Aviv University. Formerly Senior Simon Fellow at Manchester University. Chief publications: *Bedouin of the Negev*, Manchester, 1967; with Y. Ben-Porath, *Some Sociological and Economic Aspects of Refugee Camps on the West Bank*, Santa Monica, Calif., 1972; 'Some Social Contexts of Personal Violence' in M. Gluckman, ed., *The Allocation of Responsibility*, Manchester, 1972; 'Circumcision Feasts among the Negev Bedouin', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 4, 1973.

RIEGNER, Gerhart M.; Secretary-General of the World Jewish Congress. Studied law and political science at the universities of Berlin, Heidelberg, and Freiburg, at the Sorbonne in Paris, at the Graduate Institute for International Studies in Geneva, and at the Academy of International Law at the Hague. Formerly International Chairman of the World University Service and also Chairman of the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and of the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in consultative relations with U.N.E.S.C.O. Has published articles in various legal and Jewish periodicals.

SHUVAL, Judith T.; Ph.D., Associate Professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Senior Research Associate at the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research. Chief publications: *Immigrants on the Threshold*, New York, 1963; *Social Functions of Medical Practice*, San Francisco, 1970; 'The sick role in a setting of comprehensive medical care', *Medical Care*, vol. 10, 1972; 'Illness: a mechanism for coping with failure', *Social Science and Medicine*, vol. 7, 1973; 'Towards a definition of pluralism in Israeli society, in *Society and Development*, D. Soen, ed., Proceedings of 3rd World Congress of Engineers and Architects in Israel, Tel Aviv, 1974. Currently engaged in research on the integration of Russian immigrants in Israel.

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CONTENTS

Aaron Steinberg, *by Nahum Goldmann* 113
Age Patterns in the Integration of Soviet Immigrants in Israel, *by Judith Shuval et al.* 151
Anthropological Studies in a Centralized State: The Bernstein Research Project in Israel, *by Emanuel Marx* 131
Books Received 100, 243
Books Reviewed 3, 110
Contemporary Jewish Studies and the Contemporary Crisis of the Jews (Review Article), *by Howard Brotz* 211
Correspondence 95
Chronicle 96, 237
Ethnic Puzzles (Review Article), *by Maurice Freedman* 55
Further Note on 'The Law of the Kingdom is Law', A *by Leo Landman* 37
In Memoriam, Aaron Steinberg, *by Gerhart M. Riegner* 115
In Memoriam, Maurice Freedman, *by Julius Gould* 125
Marxism and Jewish Nationalism: The Theoretical Roots of Confrontation, *by Robert S. Wistrich* 43
Maurice Freedman, *by Percy S. Cohen* 121
Notes on Contributors 104, 245
Notice to Contributors 4, 111
Religion and Political Integration in Israel, *by Charles S. Liebman* 17
Research Note on 'Delayed Gratification' and Ethnicity and Social Class in Israel, A *by Leonard Weller* 29
Social Class Structure of Anglo-Jewry, 1961, The *by S. J. Prais* and Marlena Schmool 5
Social Stratification among the Jews of Cochin in India and in Israel, *by David G. Mandelbaum* 165

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

Brotz, H. 211
Cohen, P. S. 121
Dotan, J. 151
Freedman, M. 55
Goldmann, N. 113
Gould, J. 125
Landman, L. 37
Liebman, C. S. 17
Mandelbaum, D. G. 165
Markus, E. J. 151
Marx, E. 131
Prais, S. J. 5
Riegner, G. M. 115
Schmool, M. 5
Shuval, J. 151
Weller, L. 29
Wistrich, R. S. 43

AUTHORS OF BOOK REVIEWS

Albrow, M. 81
Beloff, M. 76
Brotz, H. 211
Freedman, M. 55, 89, 220
Gartner, L. P. 83, 218, 233
Gellner, E. 94
Gilsenan, M. 229
Kahn-Freund, O. 87
Kochan, L. 230, 231
Krausz, E. 216, 221
Lewis, G. 90
Mair, L. 88
Martin, B. 216
Martin, D. 91, 92, 227
Mayer, A. C. 85
Momigliano, A. 73, 235
Parkes, J. 93, 215, 232
Pollins, H. 223
Scott, J. P. 78
Segre, D. V. 224
Webber, G. 67
Werblowsky, Z. 70

BOOKS REVIEWED

Adelson, Roger, *Mark Sykes, Portrait of an Amateur* 215

Aronoff, Myron J., *Frontiertown, The Politics of Community Building in Israel* 216

Cohen, Abner, *Two-Dimensional Man, An essay on the anthropology of power and symbolism in complex society* 216

Cohen, Abner, ed., *Urban Ethnicity* 55

Cohn, Norman, *Europe's Inner Demons, An Enquiry Inspired by the Great Witch-Hunt* 88

Davis, Moshe, ed., *The Yom Kippur War, Israel and the Jewish People* 76

Fishman, William J., *East End Jewish Radicals 1875–1914* 218

Habermas, Jürgen, *Theory and Practice* 78

Handelman, Don and Deshen, Shlomo, *The Social Anthropology of Israel: A bibliographical essay with primary reference to loci of social stress* 220

Hill, Michael, *The Religious Order, A Study of Virtuoso Religion and its Legitimation in the Nineteenth-Century Church of England* 92

Horowitz, Irving Louis, *Israeli Ecstasies/Jewish Agonies* 221

Kedourie, Elie, *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies* 90

Kosmin, Barry A. and Grizzard, Nigel, *Jews in an Inner London Borough: A study of the Jewish population of the London Borough of Hackney based on the 1971 Census* 223

Kushner, Gilbert, *Immigrants from India in Israel, Planned Change in an Administered Community* 85

Landau, Jacob M., *Middle Eastern Themes, Papers in History and Politics* 94

Liebman, Charles S., *Aspects of the Religious Behaviour of American Jews* 83

Lucas, Noah, *The Modern History of Israel* 224

Maybaum, Ignaz, *Trialogue between Jew, Christian and Muslim* 70

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, *Adventures of the Dialectic* 81

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, *The Prose of the World* 81

Novak, David, *Law and Theology in Judaism* 67

Price, Charles A., *The Great White Walls are Built, Restrictive Immigration to North America and Australasia 1836–1888* 89

Scholem, Gershom, *Sabbatai Sevi, The Mystical Messiah 1626–1676* 73

Schutz, Alfred and Luckmann, Thomas, *The Structures of the Life-World* 81

Semmel, Bernard, *The Methodist Revolution* 227

Sherman, A. J., *Island Refuge, Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich 1933–1939* 87

Sklare, Marshall, ed., *The Jew in American Society* 211

Sklare, Marshall, ed., *The Jewish Community in America* 211

Sobel, B. Z., *Hebrew Christianity: The Thirteenth Tribe* 91

Turner, Bryan S., *Weber and Islam, A critical study* 229

Vago, Bela, *The Shadow of the Swastika, The Rise of Fascism and Anti-Semitism in the Danube Basin, 1936–1939* 230

Weinberg, David H., *Les Juifs à Paris de 1933 à 1939* 231

Weisgal, Meyer W., gen. ed., *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, Volume V, *Series A, January 1907–February 1913* 93

Weisgal, Meyer W., gen. ed., *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, Volume VI, *Series A, March 1913–July 1914* 232

YIVO Institute, *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Research, Volume XV* 233

Zinberg, Israel, *Italian Jewry in the Renaissance Era, A History of Jewish Literature*, Volume IV 235

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