THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Published on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

VOLUME XVII: NUMBER 1: JUNE 1975

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The Jewish Journal of Sociology

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PUBLISHED TWICE YEARLY

on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

Annual Subscription £1.40 (U.S. $4) post free
Single Copies 75p ($2.25)

Applications for subscriptions should be addressed to the Managing Editor, The Jewish Journal of Sociology, 55 New Cavendish Street, London W1M 8BT

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BUTLER AND TANNER LTD
FROME AND LONDON

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THE SOCIAL-CLASS STRUCTURE OF ANGLO-JEWRY, 1961*

S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool

1. *The Registrar General's returns on social class*

IN the nineteenth century, when the Anglo-Jewish community was small and distinct, it was relatively easy to form a picture of its class structure. Jews could be identified by their names, and trade directories could thus be used to yield information on the number of Jewish silversmiths, tailors, cabinet makers, etc.; at the less fortunate extreme of society, the community's arrangements for poor relief—such as the distribution of Matsot for Passover—provided consistent information, year by year, on the numbers in need. Today, with a community that is well integrated into general society, such methods of inquiry are of very restricted value, and what results they yield are not adequately representative of the community as a whole. The differences in class structure that remain today between the Jewish and general populations are much finer; if these differences are to be investigated, great care has to be taken that the definitions of social class are strictly comparable in any samples used, and that those samples are adequate in coverage and representativeness.

The social-class structure of the Jewish community is of general interest in itself; but it also has a specialized interest for demographic research—in trying to understand, for example, to what extent the lower birth and death rates of the Jewish community may be attributable to a different class composition. In work of this sort precise comparability in the definition of social class is particularly important.

In this paper we report the results of a new method of inquiry made

* We are happy to acknowledge the very full co-operation of the Office of the Registrar General in making available to us the records relating to our sample, and for advice on many details in planning the study. We are also grateful to Mr. H. Landy for making available computing facilities. In the course of preparing this study, which has been proceeding on a part-time basis for a number of years (awaiting the publication of the Decennial Supplement to the population census for 1961), we have been assisted by the following members of staff of the Research Unit of the Board of Deputies: Miss R. Bezner, Mr. D. Shmulovitz, Mrs. H. Hyman, and Miss V. Korn, to whom we should like to express our appreciation. Our thanks are also due to members of the Research Committee of the Board of Deputies for their encouragement and comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

possible by the co-operation of the Registrar General of England and Wales and his Office. The Registrar General inquires into the class structure of the population on two occasions: at the decennial census, and on the registration of a death. The class grouping used is a broad one—five classes are distinguished—and is based on the occupation of the head of the household (more recently, a finer socio-economic breakdown has been adopted in the Registrar General's work but this has not been used here). Religion is not reported to the Registrar General, and in order to make use of his records for our purposes it is necessary to match his records against a list of names which are known to be Jewish. The easiest way of proceeding was on the basis of death certificates. Lists of deaths had already been obtained from Jewish burial societies for our earlier inquiries;[1] such lists, in somewhat greater detail, were requested relating to deaths in 1961, and sampled as described in the Appendix to this paper. The lists were forwarded to the Office of the Registrar General, and we received in return summary details relating to social class, on the basis of the class attached to those names after the death certificates had originally been lodged.

It might have been thought preferable to use Census of Population returns, which relate to the live population, rather than death records which are inevitably biased towards the older age-groups. We should then, however, have been faced with the difficulty of compiling a representative sample of names of the Jewish live population; this difficulty is far more serious than appears at first sight because a substantial proportion of the community is not affiliated to any communal organization and cannot therefore be traced from available lists. (According to our previous study,[2] about a third of the community falls into this category.) Many who are not overtly affiliated to the community during their lifetime nevertheless are buried as Jews; and by using death records we obtain the widest coverage that appears attainable of the various strata in the community. The bias towards older age-groups is not crucial, since comparisons with the general population can be made for individual age-groups. A further reason for using death records, rather than returns for the Census of Population, is that the Census is subject to greater official confidentiality restrictions, and is not organized to provide ready access for inquiries of this type; on the other hand, death records are open to public inquiry as far as most of the recorded information is concerned.

Some 1,200 names were chosen for the present sample inquiry, and it proved possible to obtain the relevant details for all except some four per cent.

Social-class groupings are inevitably arbitrary to some extent, and it is well known that comparisons are subject to difficulties.[3] In part, these arise from incorrect or inadequate descriptions of occupation on the certificates; in particular, there is the possibility of a bias leading

to an overstatement of social class. (To take an example, an accounts clerk, who should be included in Class III, might be described as an accountant and thus be included in Class I.) So long as such biases operate equally among the Jewish and non-Jewish populations, the comparisons are unaffected; but perhaps because of higher levels of aspiration it is possible that the biases may be greater among the Jewish population. One can only speculate on this. Our own view is that such differences between the Jewish and general populations are small today: and we find it difficult to think of a method of investigation likely to be subject to smaller bias than the present method. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that part of the differences noted below may relate to differences in class aspirations, rather than to differences in class achievement.

2. *Comparisons between the Jewish and general populations*

The five social classes distinguished by the Registrar General, and employed throughout this paper, are as follows (examples of occupations covered are given in brackets).[4]

I Professional (doctor, accountant, clergy, university teacher).
II Intermediate (most self-employed, shop manager, company director, engineer, hairdresser, insurance broker, nurse).
III Skilled (salesman, clerk, typist, electrician, tailor, cabinet-maker).
IV Partly skilled (street vendor, presser, packer).
V Unskilled (labourer, messenger).

Though retired persons are classified according to their last full-time occupation, some discrepancies nevertheless arise, and it is better to confine comparisons of social class to the working ages 15–64 years. Women who have been married are classified according to their husbands' occupations, with the result that the distribution among the social classes of males and of ever-married females is very similar. Because of the limited size of our sample, we combined these two groups in the comparisons below; single females have a rather different occupational and class distribution and are better omitted at this stage.

The main inferences that may be drawn from the results of this inquiry are set out in Table 1; the more refined comparisons made subsequently in this paper will be seen to add relatively little to what may be learnt from this simple table. The conclusions may be summarized under four heads. First, the largest group in the general population consists of the 46 per cent in the skilled occupations making up social class III; precisely the same proportion is to be found in the Jewish sample. Second, the next largest group in the general population is to be found one class lower, that is, in the partly skilled occupations which make up social class IV; but in the Jewish sample the next

largest group is to be found one class higher—in social class II, that is, in the group of occupations that are intermediate between the skilled and the professional groups: this reflects in part the greater degree of self-employment among Jews. Third, whatever may have been the case in earlier years when the professions were to a certain extent closed to Jews, it appears that at present there are relatively somewhat more Jews in social class I than in the general population; however, the difference is only two per cent, which is small compared with the differences noted above in classes II and IV. Fourth, it will be seen that no Jewish persons are to be found in the group of unskilled occupations making up social class V. This difference seems the most remarkable of all, and, it may be suggested, provides a key to understanding the upward 'tilt' of the remainder of the social-class distribution.

TABLE 1. *Social-class distribution of Jews and the general population*

Social class	*Jews*	*General population*
	%	%
I Professional	4	2
II Intermediate	34	14
III Skilled	46	46
IV Partly skilled	14	22
V Unskilled	0	13
Unoccupied and unclassified	3	3

If we look again at the general picture presented by the table, we shall see that it is not one that permits us simplistically to characterize the Jewish population as being predominantly in a single category, such as traders, or 'in the upper middle classes'. On the contrary, it is fairly widely distributed over the class structure; and, as far as the broadest group is concerned—the group of skilled occupations making up social class III—we have seen that it is to be found there precisely to the same extent as is the general population. The complete absence of an unskilled group is thus remarkable; it reminds one of the deep-rooted Jewish tradition that of a parent's five duties to his son, one is to teach him a trade (and R. Judah remarks further that a parent who fails in that duty has acted as if he had encouraged his son to be a thief).[5]

3. *Degree of synagogue affiliation and social class*

About a third of the names in our sample were of Jews who were not synagogue members during their lifetime (36 per cent of males, and 34 per cent of ever-married females). One might expect that this section of the community would be closer to the general population in their social characteristics, and that this fact would be reflected in their

distribution among the social classes. Table 2, which sets out the class distribution for synagogue members and non-members separately, shows that this is broadly true; but that even for non-members there are to be observed the same main differences already noted—a virtual absence of an unskilled class, and substantial over-representation (as compared with the general population) in the intermediate occupations in social class II. Non-members are to be found somewhat more frequently in lower social classes than are members (note especially the proportions in class IV), but this may in fact be attributable to the burden of synagogue dues which makes membership a luxury for some of the poorer classes.

In order to have adequate numbers for comparison, we have used the

TABLE 2. *Comparison of social-class distribution of synagogue members, synagogue non-members, and general population*

	Jews		*General population*
	Members	*Non-members*	
	%[a]	%[b]	%
I Professional	4	3	2
II Intermediate	34	30	14
III Skilled	46	40	45
IV Partly skilled	14	22	22
V Unskilled	—	1	14
Unoccupied and unclassified	2	5	3

Notes: a. Based on a sample of 460 deaths at ages 15–74.
b. Based on a sample of 250 deaths at ages 15–74.

wider age-group 15–74 years in drawing up Table 2 (rather than the narrower age-group 15–64 used in the previous section). The group termed 'non-members' includes those who were buried as non-members under synagogue auspices, and those who were members of Jewish Friendly Societies or who had subscribed to local burial boards without being synagogue members. Of course, it would be interesting to analyse separately the different types of non-member, as well as the different types of synagogue member (Orthodox, Reform, etc.), but the sample numbers are too small to yield any significant results.

4. *The younger and the older age-groups compared*

The older age-groups in the population follow a social-class distribution somewhat different from that of the younger age-groups for a number of reasons; two or three may be mentioned here if only to illustrate the complexity of the situation. As a person grows older and

gains more experience, he has a greater chance of moving into a supervisory or managerial position which involves, to a certain extent, a change in class; this is recognized in the Registrar General's classification, which is based not only on the occupation followed by an individual but also on his standing in that occupation (a manager or employer being put in a higher class than an employee). Younger people will have benefited from the increased opportunities in recent years for further training and education, and so they tend to be found in more skilled occupations; but the availability of occupational opportunities is also relevant, as determined by the industrial structure when a person enters employment and also subsequently. Among Jews we might also expect that the younger age-groups would be more

TABLE 3 *Social-class distribution by ages, 15–44 and 45–74, males and ever-married females, Jews and the general population*

	Jews		*General population*	
	15–44	*45–74*	*15–44*	*45–74*
	%[a]	%[b]	%	%
I Professional	7	3	3	2
II Intermediate	32	32	13	15
III Skilled	41	45	48	44
IV Partly skilled	16	17	20	23
V Unskilled	—	—	12	14
Unoccupied and unclassified	4	3	4	2

Notes: a. Based on a sample of 200 deaths.
b. Based on a sample of 516 deaths.

assimilated to the ways of the general population, and that their social-class distribution would therefore be closer to that of the general population.

Table 3 sets out a comparison of the class distributions for those aged under and over 45 (a finer breakdown by ages does not lead to useful results in view of the limited size of our sample). It will be seen that in practice the differences between the age-groups are very small, both in the Jewish sample and in the general population; it is apparently necessary to have a much larger sample and a more refined analysis to elucidate with any precision the effect of the type of influence noted above. However, the sharp rise in the proportion of Jewish professionals is worth noting: despite the small size of the sample, this difference from the general population is statistically significant, and seems to agree with general impressions (those anecdotes about 'My son, the doctor . . .'). Nevertheless, the more important conclusion to be drawn from the table is that the younger age-groups in the Jewish sample show quite as marked differences from the general population

as do the older age-groups. There is no real suggestion of a move towards the distribution of the general population; the differences in educational pattern and motives, to which we have drawn attention above, must be presumed to persist.

5. *Estimated social-class distribution for the live population*

The analysis so far has been based on distributions of social class at death; but it is also possible to derive from the figures that have been compiled an estimate of the distribution for the *live* Jewish population. This is based on a rather elaborate calculation, involving a multiplication of the reported deaths in the sample in each age-group and each social class by the reciprocals of age and social-class *specific*

TABLE 4. *Estimated social-class distribution of the live population and comparative average mortality and average fertility rates*

Social class	*Population distributions*		*Comparative mortality index*	*Index of completed family size*	*Index of fertility*
	Jews (1)	*General* (2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	%	%			
I	10	4	76	81	101
II	34	15	81	84	92
III	36	49	100	96	96
IV	10	19	103	113	108
V	—	8	143	126	119
Unoccupied and unclassified	8	5	—	—	—
Weighted averages:					
General population			100	100	100
Jews			89	90	94

mortality rates in the general population appropriate to that group. This calculation yields an estimate of the total live Jewish population in each social class, assuming that specific mortality rates are the same as in the general population. The results for the Jewish population are set out in the first column of Table 4, and the corresponding figures for the general population are shown in the second column. We do not wish to place too much emphasis on the detailed results of this calculation because of its indirect nature; nevertheless, it is of interest to notice that the tendency for Jews to be found in the higher social classes is reflected somewhat more strongly here than in the previous comparisons.

6. *Average fertility and mortality*

The main reason for preparing this estimated distribution of the live population was to provide a means of calculating for the Jewish

population the extent to which its average mortality and average fertility may be expected to be lower than those in the general population purely because of the differences in class structure. These calculations are set out in the right-hand half of Table 4; the third column shows the relative mortality rates for males aged 15–64 in the general population, as reported in the Registrar General's *Decennial Supplement* for 1961; the relative fertility rates for the general population are taken from the 1951 Census[6] and provide two measures: (a) an index of completed family size, based on women who have completed their family by the Census date (col. 4), and (b) an index of current fertility based on birth rates in the Census year (col. 5).

The weighted averages of these indices that we have calculated (shown in the last *row* of the table) imply that the average mortality for the Jewish community may be expected to be some 11 per cent below that of the general population on account of its social-class structure; and that fertility may be expected to be 6–10 per cent lower, depending on which measure of fertility is taken. The differences may seem small, but they are not negligible; these figures provide a useful summary indicator of the differences in class structure which we have been examining.

7. *Spinsters*

One of the incidental findings of this study relates to the proportion of unmarried females in the Jewish community. On account of the tendency for males to marry out of the faith more frequently than females, one might expect to find the number of unmarried Jewish females to be relatively high. Judging from our sample of deaths, that is not so: in the general population, 16 per cent of all females dying in 1961 aged over 15 were single (that is, were never married), but in our sample it was—to our surprise—lower, at 10 per cent. (In a sample of the size here available, 550 female deaths, the difference may be judged significant on the usual statistical criterion.)

A possible reason for our finding is that the deaths that we are examining come from a generation of which a large proportion (perhaps a half) were immigrants, coming from the Russian territories at the turn of the century, or from central Europe in the 1930s; the greater proportion of males always to be found among immigrants leads to the marriage of a greater proportion of females than otherwise. Further, as noticed in an earlier paper,[7] there has recently been a higher incidence of remarriages among Jewish males than in the general population (15 per cent as against 11 per cent in 1964); that would also tend to reduce the proportion of single females.

Finally, of course, one must bear in mind the great emphasis on the married state that is customary among Jews.

Regrettably, nothing can usefully be said about differences in the class composition of spinsters between the Jewish community and the general population, as the sample numbers in each class in the relevant age-groups are too small to yield statistically valid statements.

APPENDIX

Sources and sampling method

Sampling frame

The sample on which this study is based relates to 1,216 Jewish deaths registered in England and Wales in the calendar year 1961; Scotland was excluded on grounds of geographical convenience, since only deaths registered in England and Wales are recorded in the Registrar General's archives in London. The sample was drawn mainly from the registers of Jewish burial societies. These records provided the name, sex, age at death, date and place of death, and synagogue (or burial society) membership status (that is, whether contributions had been paid during life). These details were then augmented from the records at the Office of the Registrar General, relating to cause of death, socio-economic class (occupation), and marital condition.

The sample for the London area was drawn directly from the records of the eight London Jewish burial societies,[8] a research worker from the Unit visiting each society in turn. For the provinces, a postal questionnaire was sent to each burial society in the sample. Secretaries of the societies were asked to list the necessary particulars for *all* persons buried (or cremated) under their auspices in 1961; and names that entered the sample were subsequently chosen from these lists by the Research Unit, so as to avoid any possibility of bias owing to a secretary's not following rigidly the sampling procedure laid down. In one or two of the larger provincial centres, local contacts visited burial societies and prepared lists from the records. In other towns, cemeteries and crematoria were approached for the basic demographic data; and the synagogues in those towns were asked whether the persons were synagogue members. The names on each society's list were checked against any other lists for each town to eliminate duplication.

Stratification and sampling procedure

Ninety-five burial societies were involved in the study; these had been responsible for some 4,500 burials and cremations during the year. The largest society was responsible for some 1,600 burials while, at the other extreme, ten societies arranged only one burial each, and a further ten did not record any deaths in that year. Because of this great range it is more efficient to stratify the sample by size of town. The initial basis of stratification was the number of Jewish deaths (burials and cremations) recorded in each town.[9] Two strata were defined:

A: Large urban—towns recording 50 or more Jewish deaths;
B: Small urban—towns recording fewer than 50 Jewish deaths.

These strata correspond approximately to towns with an estimated Jewish population of 6,000 or over, and less than 6,000, respectively. Stratum A consisted of six towns (London, Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool, Brighton, and Birmingham), which between them contained 45 burial societies. These were all asked to provide basic data; 26 were contacted by post, and the remaining 19 were approached personally by research workers in London and the provinces.

In order to secure an adequate representation for the final sample of persons dying at younger ages, deaths in the large urban stratum were further classified according to age at death, to provide two sub-strata:

AY: Large urban/young—deaths at age 44 and under;
AO: Large urban/old—deaths at age 45 and over.

All deaths falling in stratum AY were included in the sample, but in stratum AO—where the numbers were of course much greater—only one in every four deaths was taken.

Stratum B covered 40 small towns which, between them, contained 50 burial societies. The Jewish communities in these towns varied in size from about 3,000 souls (Cardiff) to towns with only a few families (for example, Brynmawr). Instead of approaching all 50 burial societies it was decided, for the sake of economy, to introduce an additional sampling stage, and sample only a limited proportion of burial societies so as to cover a third of the deaths in the stratum. Seventeen (eventually increased to 19) burial societies were therefore selected at random from the 50 in the stratum. Each of the chosen societies was then asked to supply details for all persons buried (or cremated) under its auspices in 1961. Two societies were unable to provide the required data and substitutes were chosen. Deaths in stratum B were not stratified by age since the number of persons dying at ages under 45 was very small.

In summary, the sampling fractions were therefore as follows:

Stratum AY 1:1
AO 1:4
B 1:3.

It proved possible to obtain satisfactory details from the burial societies relating to 99 per cent of the names in the ultimate sample.

Tracing the additional information

The basic data obtained from the burial societies were copied on to transfer sheets; details relating to synagogue-group affiliation and sampling stratum were coded. Each death was then traced by the Unit's staff in the Registrar General's index of deaths at Bush House in order to obtain the relevant volume reference. The Registrar General's staff then located the appropriate death record, and full identifying particulars (namely, district and sub-district of registration, and entry number) were noted so that the data provided by the Unit could be matched against the Registrar General's (edited and confidential) statistical records.[10] From these latter records, coded information about cause of death, social class, and area of assignment[11] was

transcribed on to the transfer sheet. In order to assure the confidentiality of the material, typed lists were prepared from the completed transfer sheets, omitting the name of the individual, but giving the remaining details. These lists were returned to the Unit for analysis; after being transferred to punched cards, they were analysed on a counter-sorter.

NOTES

[1] See S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool, 'The Size and Structure of the Anglo-Jewish Population 1960–65', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 10, no. 1, June 1968.

[2] ibid., p. 11.

[3] See the Registrar General's *Decennial Supplement for England and Wales, 1961*, H.M.S.O., pp. 16, 22, for a discussion of some of the problems.

[4] Further details may be found in the *Decennial Supplement* for 1961, p. 5, and earlier *Supplements*.

[5] Recorded in Talmud, *Kiddushin*, 29a.

[6] We had hoped to use comparative fertility rates for 1961, but regrettably they are not available according to the five social classes for that year. We understand that such rates will be published again in connexion with the 1971 Census.

[7] See S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool, 'Statistics of Jewish Marriages in Great Britain: 1901–1965', *J.J.S.*, vol. 9, no. 2, December 1967, p. 169.

[8] The names of the societies and ancillary details are set out in our earlier paper, 'The Size and Structure . . .', *J.J.S.*, op. cit., p. 21.

[9] As obtained for our earlier study, ibid.

[10] Although the public volumes in Somerset House include data on social class (occupation), cause of death, and marital status, the Registrar General's Office kindly provided us with this information from its edited 'statistical records' in order to ensure strict comparability of our tables with those published for the general population of England and Wales, which are also based on the 'statistical records'.

[11] This is the area to which a death is assigned in the Registrar General's statistical tables although it might have occurred in another area: for example, the death of a holiday-maker in Brighton would be assigned to Leeds if that had been his normal place of residence.

RELIGION AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN ISRAEL

Charles S. Liebman

TO the best of my knowledge, there has been no systematic comparative attempt to describe the general relationships between religion and political integration. Even studies of individual societies are sparse. Any serious study, therefore, must begin by posing a series of questions about religion and political integration in each nation state. The answers will provide the raw material for systematic analysis. Obviously, to raise a series of questions about religion and political integration is to presuppose an understanding of each term. Political integration refers to the set of shared sentiments relating to political institutions and goals of the society. Political integration is encouraged, and often expressed, in the citizen's relationship to various symbols whose outward manifestations are quasi-religious. Political integration involves the delimitation of sacred symbols which, by definition, evoke special kinds of emotion and the acceptance of sacred myths concerning the creation or emergence, purpose, and values of the society.

One may choose to call this 'religious' rather than 'quasi-religious' depending on one's definition of religion. For the purposes of this paper, Bellah's definition of religion ('a set of symbolic forces and acts which relate man to the ultimate conditions of his existence')[1] seems most appropriate. Within the limits of this definition, church, traditional, or supernatural religion (the terms are used here synonymously) is always a *religion*, whereas political, national, or civil religion (the terms are meant to be interchangeable) which bears the values of political integration is always, at least, a *quasi-religion*. It may also be a religion, depending upon the degree to which its adherents view their symbolic referents as matters of ultimate concern or as relating to the ultimate conditions of their existence.

It is conceivable that the civil and church religions are part of the same institutional system. It is more likely, at least in modern society, that there will be two distinctive religious or quasi-religious systems. In that case, the study of religion and political integration involves a

study of two religious systems or a religious and a quasi-religious system whose relationship may be competitive, symbiotic, or perhaps even parasitic. There is a wide variety of questions that one may ask about religion and political integration. This paper confines itself to two which seem most important, at least in the Israeli context. Broadly speaking, the answers to these questions are the dependent variables in a study of the relationships between religion and political integration. They are:

1. To what extent and in what way are the symbols of political integration related to those of traditional religion? In other words, to what extent and in what manner does the civil religion rely upon traditional or church religion?

2. What relationship and what channels of relationship do the traditional religious élite and their immediate followers (that is, the 'religious' element of the population) have with the political élite and civil religion?[2]

Traditional religion and civil religion

The assertion of a national Jewish identity to the exclusion of a religious one is an entirely modern phenomenon. Only in the late nineteenth century does one find an ideology that asserts that a national formulation comprehends the totality of Judaism. Even this ideology assigned an important role to religion in preserving Jewish identity in periods when environmental forces prevented the realization of national ideals. Thus, Jewish nationalists felt entitled to appropriate religious symbols in the creation of their new political religion. Since all Jewish symbols were necessarily religious in the eyes of the masses, the nationalists really had little choice. The few symbols which they themselves created, such as a Jewish flag, also had a religious basis. What the nationalists sought to do was to transvalue and transform the Jewish symbols. This attempt is evident, for example, in their reinterpretation of the traditional Holy Days, which they infused with national and historical meaning, ignoring their traditional religious content (*transvaluation*), and whose ritual of celebration they also sought to change in accordance with their new values (*transformation*). The very expressions and style formerly associated with worship of God were transformed by a change of phrase here or a deletion there to the worship and glorification of the land, the people, and labour. Aspects of traditional religion which stressed equality, justice, man's responsibility to man, and the yearning for national freedom and a return to Zion were highlighted; elements stressing man's relationship and dependence on God were ignored.

This is particularly true of modern Jewish settlers in Palestine who created the major political-economic institutions of the pre-state period

and who, in addition, were not content to limit themselves to the transvaluation and transformation of religious symbols. The prevalent ideology was that of Zionist-Socialism. The symbols and myths of the Socialist world—an international working class, a socialist Utopia, May Day, the red flag, songs of revolution, and worker solidarity—provided an additional dimension to the civil religion of the period.

The process of transformation and transvaluation of religious symbols declined and was replaced in the 1940s and 1950s by a process which I shall label *penetration*. A variety of factors led to a decrease in the resonance which Zionist-Socialist symbols and myths held for the population and to a reassertion of religious symbols in their traditional context and meaning. Five factors merit special emphasis. First, the masses of immigrants who more than doubled Israel's population in the first few years of statehood included a disproportionately large number of religiously traditional immigrants for whom religious symbols bore their traditional resonance and for whom Zionist-Socialism had no meaning. Second, the unification of the elementary education system, under a Ministry of Education and Culture, had important consequences for the decline of Zionist-Socialism as a civil religion. Before the unification schools had been organized according to ideological trend and included Labour schools where Zionist-Socialism was stressed. Labour schools were now abolished but religious schools retained their character as a sub-system within the general educational system. (The more extremist religious-trend schools also retained their character but remained theoretically independent of the national system.) Third, the political élite sought to integrate traditionally religious segments of the veteran population which had, up to then, abstained from participation in the national effort. Their co-operation was deemed essential in the critical period of the creation of the State. Related to this is the fact that the creation of a State meant that governmental leaders as opposed to other political élites now had a larger voice in the utilization and application of national symbols. Coalition politics provided an opportunity for religious parties effectively to demand the judaization or 'religionization' of institutions and rituals, which before had not been under their influence. Fourth, the founders of Israel became increasingly sensitive to the sentiments of Western (particularly American) Jewry in this period, and accepted the notion that links with the Diaspora were more readily forged by stressing a common religious heritage than by creating a strictly national-Jewish identity which might estrange significant elements of the Diaspora. Finally, there is the special problem of legitimacy to which I shall return.

The 1950s and 1960s witnessed the direct penetration of traditional religious symbols into the civil religion. A 'Jewish awareness' programme with strong religious overtones was incorporated into non-religious schools; pig-raising was prohibited; public ceremonies such as those

conducted on Memorial Day incorporated many religious symbols and rites; State funerals were conducted in accordance with religious law; and the presence of the two chief rabbis was deemed necessary at the most important civil functions.

Because of Israel's security problems, the army assumed particular significance. The army was among the highest status institutions in Israeli life—perhaps the only one, at least until the Yom Kippur War, to enjoy a full measure of public confidence. The Jewish religion is incorporated into army life to a remarkable degree. The army has its own rabbinate, and its chief rabbi holds the rank of general. In a formal sense, army life is conducted in accordance with the demands of religious law as interpreted by the army rabbinate. Admittedly, these provisions are often breached in practice, and the rabbinate itself is most compliant with the demands of a modern army; but on the other hand, serious efforts were and are made not only to conduct the army in accordance with Jewish law for the sake of religious soldiers but to educate non-religious soldiers, particularly the officers, in the values of the religious tradition.

The importance of religion in public life gained additional emphasis after the Six-Day War in 1967 through the growing penetration of religious symbols into the national culture in general and the civil religion in particular. One reason for this was the question of legitimacy about which something will be said below. In addition, the conquest of the West Bank, especially the Old City of Jerusalem (containing the prime national-religious symbol of the Jewish people—the Western Wall) aroused historical religious sentiments. It is quite true, as some secularists have argued, that one can interpret the Western Wall in purely national terms. But it is equally true that this is not how the Wall is treated by the Government. Rules pertaining to the proper conduct at the Wall are religious in character (men and women are separated as they approach the Wall, women are requested to cover their hair in accordance with the strictest of religious injunctions, etc.). The Wall is really treated as a religious shrine, and the activity deemed most proper at the Wall itself is prayer.

While the necessary empirical studies have not been carried out, it is my impression that a number of measures would confirm the steady increase in the penetration of traditional symbols in national life. Each year, at the conclusion of Independence Day, the 'Festival of Song' is held in the national auditorium in Jerusalem and broadcast on Israel's one television channel. The event serves to introduce new songs which are likely to become the most popular during the coming year. It has been suggested that an increasing number of these songs have a religious or Biblical content. The Bible itself, as the Deputy Prime Minister stated in his 1974 Independence Day speech, is what unites all Jews 'from atheists to the most religiously devout'. But the Bible, which

secularists led by Ben-Gurion once treasured as a pre-eminently national heritage, has become increasingly recognized by all segments of the population as an essentially religious document.

Immediately preceding Independence Day, Israel honours those who died for it in Memorial Day celebrations. I suspect that a study of changing patterns of Memorial Day observance would show an increasing use of overtly religious ceremonial. These and other measures indicate that since 1948 the relationship between traditional religious symbols and the civil or national religion has changed from that of transvaluation and transformation to that of penetration. These symbols have themselves undergone some change, but that is a topic beyond the purview of the present discussion.

The religious élite and political integration

There have been three core integrating values of Israeli society. First, Zionism—the belief in and efforts towards the concentration of the Jewish population of the world in Israel; second, Statism—the centrality and legitimacy of the State as a focus of loyalty exceeding that of any other private or public institution; and third, security—activity dictated by the belief that Israel and its population are faced with critical external threats to their survival. It is only with respect to the second value that the attitude of the religious élite has been problematical. The first value is accepted by the entire religious camp, although they would not necessarily call it Zionism. Religious law enjoins the Jew to live in the Holy Land, the Land of Israel. Not all religious Jews fulfil this commandment, but no one has disputed its force or propriety. The third value—security—is self-evident. Virtually all segments of the society have been prepared to defer to military judgement in determining what share of the national effort and what personal sacrifices must be devoted to the satisfaction of security needs. Since the Arab threat is perceived as a threat to the physical lives of Jews rather than simply to the existence of an independent State, the security value integrates even those religious elements whose attitude towards the State is ambivalent. It is therefore only the second value, the legitimacy of Israel, which is at all problematical vis-à-vis traditional elements.

The problem of legitimacy is a twofold one. Within the religious camp the question is whether Israel is Zion. Does Israel constitute a successor or potential successor, from a Divine point of view, to the two previous commonwealths? Is Israel the fulfilment (or at least the first step in the fulfilment) of God's promises to the Jews, or is it a political entity that happens to exercise hegemony over the territory of Zion and includes within its borders sizable numbers of Jews? The answer to this question is reflected in such differences of opinion among religious leaders as that about which prayers should be said on Independence

Day. The view that Israel is Zion, that its creation does represent a step in the Divine plan of ultimate redemption, has gained increasing ascendancy within the religious camp. Even many who deny this, and who were once opposed to the creation of the State, now have a more positive attitude towards Israel.

There is a second aspect of the question of legitimacy which involves the secular camp as well as the religious. Non-religious elements have sought an assent to Israeli legitimacy from the religious élite because, paradoxically, greater reservations concerning legitimacy have been expressed within the secular camp after the establishment of the State than before. The belief in, and commitment to, Zionist-Socialism before 1948 and the experience of the Holocaust left no room for doubts about the need for a Jewish state, the justice of that claim, and the willingness of the people to make any sacrifice necessary for its establishment. Although a substantial proportion of the religious population refused to recognize the legitimacy of that claim, this was a matter of indifference to the secularists. In that period, traditional religion was viewed as archaic and anachronistic. A chief rabbinate was elected at the insistence of the Mandatory power which preferred to view the Jewish community as religious rather than national, but the Jewish political élite ignored the rabbinate. Religious leaders were simply irrelevant.

This is of special interest because the Chief Rabbi of that period, Abraham Kook, has become a virtually mythical figure to the religious and non-religious alike. To the non-religious he has today assumed the image of a benign conciliatory religious personality who legitimized their national struggle and defended them against attacks by the militantly religious. The non-religious have erected a myth around the activity and personality of Rav Kook, thereby securing a religious legitimacy the need for which they had never before felt. By implication, and sometimes by direct statement, they can now cast responsibility for whatever tensions exist between themselves and the religious élite on to the latter, whom they claim to be less courageous, understanding, sympathetic, and imaginative than Rav Kook was. This argument finds some resonance among the religious population itself, to whom Rav Kook was a commanding religious personality towering head and shoulders above other religious leaders of his period or of today.

The political élite in the pre-State period was far more confident of its goals and in itself. The population, though less personally committed than the leadership to Zionist-Socialism, perceived its leaders as heroic figures worthy of emulation. Zionist-Socialism, with its own gallery of founders, martyrs, heroes, and leaders, needed no legitimation from traditional religion. The crises that overtook Zionist-Socialism after the creation of the State have changed all that. Traditional religion served as an alternative not only in unifying world Jewry and Israel or the

religious and the non-religious, but in the internal integration of the non-religious themselves. The failure of Zionist–Socialism as an integrating factor was also the failure of Jewish secularism. Most Israelis today accept the notion that being Jewish has at least something to do with Jewish religion. And if being Jewish is what Israel is all about, then in some however vague and undefined way, there has to be some connexion between Israel and religion.

Religion became an increasingly important legitimizing factor after 1967. Israelis are asked to make enormous sacrifices for their country. There is, perhaps, no other State that demands as much from its citizens in terms of taxes, military service, and sacrifice of life. Nor are these demands limited to a specific stratum. They are diffused throughout the Jewish population. It is inconceivable that the State could demand all that it does through coercion. Consequently, the legitimacy of the State, its leadership, and its goals are matters of the first importance. Expressions of reservation evoke immediate concern on the part of the political élite and the mass media. Thus, in 1972 a statement by a small group of high school seniors (aged 17–18 years) expressing doubts about military service created national alarm. Their statement was published in all the newspapers and aroused critical responses from the Prime Minister, government officials, and a host of newspaper commentators.

Before 1967, it was fairly easy to justify the demands of the State upon its citizenry in terms of Israel's physical survival. After 1967, when that survival seemed more secure, and when Israel itself laid claim to newly acquired territory on the basis of its 'historical rights' as well as on security grounds, and when it confronted an indigenous population which not only disputed that claim but the very foundation of the State, Israeli legitimacy required reinforcement. In other words, after 1967 various factors seemed to indicate that the traditional basis of Israeli legitimacy was undergoing a serious challenge. Religion now appeared as an important foundation upon which to ground legitimacy. This was particularly true to the extent that Israelis were being asked to make sacrifices for the sake of 'historical rights'. Historical rights, in the case of Judaism, necessarily bring one back to religious associations and religious claims. I do not believe that the process was anything but an unconscious one. But that does not make it any the less significant.

The Yom Kippur War, and its description in the mass media, reinforced that process. Enormous attention was devoted to the participation of religious youth in the war. Officers and soldiers were quoted as expressing their appreciation of the courage and activity of those young men, especially the students of *Yeshivot*. The participation of these students was given wide publicity in view of the fact that most *Yeshivot* forbade their students to serve in the army, and their military exemption was a cause of widespread unhappiness within the country.

The picture that seemed to capture the public imagination more than any other during the Yom Kippur War, was that of a young man (obviously religious) reciting his morning prayers while standing on or near a tank. Religious elements gloried in this portrait since it vindicated their patriotism and loyalty, which had sometimes been impugned in the religio-political conflicts to which I shall return. But the question is—why was this image so popular among the non-religious? Why did the mass media devote so much attention to the participation of religious soldiers, to their heroism and devotion, to the importance of religious education in preparing them for military service? I suggest that it demonstrated the need on the part of non-religious elements for the legitimacy that only religion could confer. The publicity far exceeded that required to demonstrate the existence of national unity.

The apparent centrality of religion in the political integration of Israel has another side. Religion is also a divisive force within the Jewish population. First, there are anti-religious or militantly secular strongholds which resent the increasing penetration of religious symbols into the civil religion and an increasing reliance on religion as a foundation of legitimacy. As far as these groups are concerned, religion may be dysfunctional to their political integration. I suspect that this helps to account for the emotional hostility as distinct from rational opposition which some sections of the population displayed towards the predominantly religious group which sought to establish Jewish settlements in Shomron, on the West Bank, in 1974. The centrality of religion may also have led to increased alienation of the Arab minority, but we have no studies of this question.

Second, the religious camp in Israel has not been content with the role of benevolent legitimizer. In fact, the co-optation of religious leaders and religious symbols into the political structure and culture of society has meant that religious leaders are inclined to take the religious significance, or at least the religious potential, of the State with increasing seriousness. If Israel is Zion and its establishment a stage in God's redemption of His people, then special religious significance attaches to what the State does or does not do. This helps to explain the militant foreign policy posture of the Zionist elements within the religious camp who were hitherto identified, quite properly, as the religiously liberal elements within that camp. It also explains the demands on the part of religious groups for laws which not only secure the right of religious Jews but also define the conduct of public life in Israel in accordance with religious law. In other words, the *prima facie* relationship between religion and State encourages the religious camp to take the religious implications of Israel seriously and therefore generates demands for further 'religious legislation'. These demands, which have met with partial success, cause inconvenience to the majority of the population who are not religious and increase their

sense of discontent. Although the combined vote of all religious parties in past elections has been in the neighbourhood of 14 per cent of the total vote, the National Religious Party (NRP), the largest of the religious parties, has been an almost constant coalition partner of the dominant Labour Party. But the relative success of the NRP's political demands, coupled with the knowledge that the religious parties in fact represent only a small proportion of the population, has made the party and especially its leadership extremely unpopular. Religious issues periodically explode in the public-political domain and provide a major source of dissension within Israeli society. While the Labour Party and the NRP succeed in papering over their differences, a residue of bitterness always remains in the popular mind. The contribution of the religious parties to the more diffuse acceptance of religious symbols as part of the civil culture is, therefore, two-sided. The increased penetration of religion into the civil culture has come about, in part, as an accommodation to the religious parties. On the other hand, the existence of these parties has meant the politicization of religion and the introduction of religious conflict at the political level.

Third, related to the above, is the fact that religious parties demand recognition not only as the representatives of religious Jews but also as the representatives of religion. They not only defend the political and economic interests of religious Jews but claim the authority to determine who or what is or is not religious. Thus, the religious parties (and the NRP in particular) resented and resisted efforts by the non-religious parties to establish their own religious networks and institutions. Now, they may have had good cause to fear that such programmes would only exploit the slogans and symbols of religion for partisan political purposes. But from the point of view of the non-religious parties, especially the dominant Labour Party, it is the religious parties which hinder the maximum utilization of religion in the service of political integration. The insistence of the NRP on its unique authority to interpret the religious system as it affects the political society makes it difficult to transform religion into a system capable of acceptance by the non-religious segments of the population.

As far as the political élite is concerned, in the best of all possible worlds there would be neither religious parties nor a religious élite—just religion, whose symbols could be manipulated as the political élite saw fit. Failing that, the political élite favour the modernization and reform of religion and its more overt accommodation to the élite's perception of reality. This helps explain, for example, the favourable attitude of the élite towards any step in the direction of religious reform within the religious camp. On the other hand, religious institutions, even in their present state, are also functional in furthering political integration. The religious parties, especially the NRP with an associated network of economic, cultural, and educational institutions, help to

socialize the majority of the religious population and offer them a sense of social participation. Second, it would be a mistake to attribute the basic religious conflict in Israeli society to the existence of religious parties. The religious conflict stems from basic differences over the ultimate purpose and values of the society. The religious parties sometimes exacerbate these issues and seek to arouse the religious public for partisan purposes. But, more often than not, they seek to mitigate the conflict, to conciliate the basic divisions, to find mutually agreeable alternatives precisely because they seek to maintain their alliance with the dominant political party within the society. Indeed the religious parties play far more of a mitigating and compromising than a radicalizing role.

The importance of traditional religion in Israel's political integration has also meant, as we have noted, that the religious élite has been assigned a place of special importance. But, whereas the rabbis have accepted all the perquisites to which their role entitles them, they have not been nearly as co-operative as the political élite had hoped. Both the NRP and the political élite have been concerned to select chief rabbis and judges of religious courts who would reflect a positive attitude towards the State, a conciliatory attitude towards the non-religious, and an understanding attitude towards the exigencies of government and politics. At the risk of over-simplification, it is reasonable to assert that they have sought a religious élite which would do what it was told in national matters by the political élite and in religio-political matters by the NRP leaders. However, even when the 'right' candidates were selected, they proved less malleable than expected. The reasons are not difficult to understand. By virtue of their intense and prolonged socialization within the strictest confines of the religious world, the significant reference groups for the religious élite are totally foreign to those of the political élite, and their perception of reality is also totally different. Rabbis do not seek political office. They do not have to satisfy or answer to an electorate or to political figures. They seek the recognition and approval of their religious peers and religious mentors—pre-eminently of other Talmudic scholars. Their code of right and wrong is dictated by their own religious understanding, their own perception of Jewish history and Jewish law, their own sense of the needs of the hour, and the internal pressures to which they are subject from within the religious world. Since they cannot conceive of themselves as living outside that world (nor could they remain religious leaders if they did), the kinds of political and even material reward and sanction which the political élite or even the NRP can offer them seem to them ephemeral. They may influence a particular issue; they are more likely to influence the outcome of an internal election such as selection of a Chief Rabbi, but they make no lasting impact on the predilections of the religious élite.

The religious parties, even the more moderate NRP, necessarily sup-

port the religious élite in a conflict with the political élite. On the other hand, the religious political leaders are far more secularized than the religious élite. They serve as a bridge between the religious and political élites, interpreting one to the other and conciliating between one and the other. Furthermore, co-operation is a matter of degree and definition. On the core issues confronting Israeli society—foreign policy, security, encouraging immigration, accepting the legitimacy of the political institutions, or more recently the need for economic restraint—the religious élite support the prevailing values of the political élite which are shared, in turn, by the vast majority of the population.

NOTES

[1] Robert Bellah, 'Religious Evolution', *American Sociological Review*, no. 29, June 1964, p. 359.

[2] There are no books or articles which address themselves directly to this topic. The exception is an unpublished paper by Emanuel Gutmann, 'Religious and National Integration in Israel'. Publications of general relevance include the following: Amitai Etzioni, 'Kulturkampf ou Coalition—le cas d'Israël', *Revue Française de Sciences Politiques*, 1958, pp. 311–31; Ervin Birnbaum, *The Politics of Compromise: State and Religion in Israel*, Cranbury, N. J., 1970; Emanuel Gutmann, 'Religion in Israeli Politics', in Jacob M. Landau, ed., *Man, State and Society in the Contemporary Middle East*, London, 1972; Eliezer Don-Yehiya, 'Religious Institutions in Israeli Politics' (in Hebrew), *Deoth*, no. 41, 1971, pp. 3–21; Eliezer Don-Yehiya and Charles S. Liebman, 'Separation of Religion and State' (in Hebrew), *Molad*, no. 25–26, August–September 1972, pp. 159–71.

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A RESEARCH NOTE ON 'DELAYED GRATIFICATION' AND ETHNICITY AND SOCIAL CLASS IN ISRAEL

Leonard Weller

THIS Note is based on two sets of studies. The first is the work of Mischel and his collaborators, who were among the pioneers in research on delay of gratification. Mischel[1] devised a simple but very effective technique to measure delayed gratification. The subject is given a choice: a small reward now or a larger reward later. In his study of children, the basic procedure was to give the child a choice between a small bar of chocolate (worth about 5 cents) which he would receive immediately and a very much larger bar (worth about 25 cents) which he would receive in the future. The first study was conducted in Trinidad, on two different ethnic groups. According to a common stereotype, the Negroes of Trinidad are 'impulsive, indulge themselves, settle for next to nothing if they can get it right away', while the East Indians are not so. The choice of chocolate bars was given to children between the ages of seven and nine years, of both groups. Consistently with the above observation, a larger percentage of Negro than of East Indian children chose the smaller immediate reward.

Still working on the Trinidad population, Mischel[2] administered the same test to a group of juvenile delinquents and to elementary schoolchildren. He found, as expected, that the former preferred the small immediate reward. Further research demonstrated a relationship between choosing the larger delayed reward and need for achievement[3] and social responsibility.[4]

The factors of age and social class are of particular interest for the present investigation. One would expect that as he gets older, the child will more readily be willing to wait in order to obtain the larger reward. Mischel and Metzner[5] did indeed find that until the age of nine there was a clearly visible increase in the number of children who selected the larger delayed reward, but that after that age there was no such

increase. Melikian in a study of Palestinian Arab children,[6] however, showed that the critical age period varies with the particular culture of the subject.

In Israel the most fundamental cleavage is that between the East and West, that is, between individuals who were born—or whose parents were born—in Asian-African countries (for example, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, Morocco), whose dominant culture is Muslim, and individuals who were born—or whose parents were born—in Europe.[7] Whereas before the establishment of the State of Israel, the former constituted 13 per cent of the population, today they constitute about 50 per cent. Whatever index of social class one employs—whether it be income, occupation, or education—Jews of Oriental extraction are over-represented in the lower social class. They are the least successful at school and represent the largest number of school drop-outs.[8] Studies have shown them to differ in the tests on field dependence-independence,[9] categorizing behaviour,[10] birth order effects,[11] and 'articulation of the body concept'.[12] There is also evidence that they differ in their patterns of leisure-time activity,[13] family relationships,[14] and reactions to abstract humour.[15]

The second set of studies from which the present research is derived is that conducted in Israel by Sharan and Weller.[16] The authors studied the classificatory pattern of young children, particularly as affected by social class, country of origin, and sex. The Siegel Sorting Task was administered to 357 children. In the Passive Condition, the child was shown three objects and asked to state why they went together. In the Active Condition, the child was given one object and then asked to choose other objects, from among eleven, which went together, as well as to give the reason why they belonged together. Each child did this 24 times, 12 in the Active Condition and 12 in the Passive Condition.

In addition, the authors employed the 'Draw a Line Test'. Here the child is asked to draw a vertical line between two horizontal lines *as slowly* as possible. The number of seconds taken by the child to draw such a line is recorded. The tests showed that while the results of the Siegel Sorting Task were relatively weak, this other measure yielded marked differences by social class, ethnicity, and sex. As predicted, children of Western origin in contrast to children of Oriental origin, and middle-class children in contrast to lower-class children, took longer to draw the line.

The question, of course, is what does this test measure? Strictly speaking, it measures motoric inhibition. But perhaps it measures delayed gratification as well. It may measure other psychological factors such as patience, or it could simply indicate which children are more used to following instructions.

In this particular study we were able to test whether it was a measure

of delayed gratification. On the assumption that the choice of chocolate bar is a valid test of delayed gratification, then a high correlation between the draw-a-line and chocolate bar test-results would indicate that in fact the former also measures delayed gratification.

On the basis of the research reported, both in and outside Israel, we advanced the following hypotheses.

1. Oriental and lower-class children will delay their gratification *less* than Western and middle-class children. Operationally, this difference will be manifest in the Oriental and lower-class children (*a*) preferring the immediate but smaller reward (smaller-size chocolate bar) to the larger delayed reward (larger bar), and (*b*) drawing the line more quickly.
2. There will be a high positive correlation between that choice and drawing the line; that is, those who delay (prefer to wait in order to obtain the larger reward) will draw the line more slowly; conversely, those who choose the immediate reward (select the smaller bar) will draw the line more quickly.

The study population consisted of 360 children in Israel, in grades 1 to 4 (aged 6–10 years). The children came from five schools, although not all the classes were interviewed in every school. Fathers of lower-class children were workmen (unskilled, semi-skilled, or skilled) or unemployed, while fathers of middle-class children were in white-collar occupations, merchants, or professionals. All the children were born in Israel. The parents of Oriental children had been born in Asia or Africa, the majority coming from Yemen, Morocco, Tunisia, and Iraq. Parents of children in the Western group had been born in Europe; the majority had emigrated from Poland.

Each child was tested individually. In accordance with Mischel's method, he was given a choice between a small bar which he would receive now, or a larger one which he would receive in a week. The child was also asked to draw very slowly a vertical line between two horizontal lines. After drawing the first line, the child was asked to draw another one. The amount of time taken to draw the line was reported in seconds. The higher the score, the longer it took the child to draw the line.

Delayed versus immediate reward

There are no significant sex differences in preference for either the smaller or larger bar (data not reported). There appear to be differences according to age. Table 1 presents the percentage of children in each grade, reported separately for each school, who preferred the larger delayed reward. Four of the five schools show a general increase

of delayed gratification in the higher grades. School number four, composed almost entirely of extremely poor children of Yemenite descent, differed from the others; the younger children delayed more. We frankly are at a loss to explain this departure and will refrain from offering *post hoc* explanations. (It will also be noted that in school number one, the third grade children showed a higher rate of delayed gratification than did the fourth grade children.)

TABLE 1. *Preference for delayed versus immediate reward by school grade (in percentages)*

School Grade	*School 1*	*School 2*	*School 3*	*School 4*	*School 5*
1st	43		48	38	
2nd	46	55		36	
3rd	86		64	22	61
4th	67	68		20	70

Table 2 presents the percentage of children who chose the smaller or larger bar of chocolate according to country of origin, for each of three schools. (There were not enough children of the two ethnic groups in two of the schools to permit such a comparison.) The results show no significant relationship between country of origin and choice of chocolate bar in two of the three schools. The third school, the one where

TABLE 2. *Preference for delayed versus immediate reward by country of origin*

Type of Reward	*School 1*				*School 2*				*School 3*			
	Oriental		*Western*		*Oriental*		*Western*		*Oriental**		*Western*	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Immediate	33	(41)	10	(32)	7	(24)	22	(36)	59	(78)	4	(31)
Delayed	48	(59)	21	(68)	22	(76)	40	(64)	17	(22)	9	(64)
	$X^2 = 0.70$				$X^2 = 1.0$				$X^2 = 11.79$			
									$P < 0.01$			

* Yemenite only

approximately 85 per cent of the children were of Yemenite descent, disclosed significant differences. As predicted, a larger proportion of pupils of Western descent preferred to wait, that is, to delay their gratification. However, that sample consisted of only 13 children of Western descent.

The results of the choice as affected by social class are reported in Table 3. The difference is highly significant and confirms the hypothesis that a larger proportion of middle-class children preferred to wait for the larger bar of chocolate.

TABLE 3. *Preference for delayed versus immediate reward by social class*

Social Class	*Type of Reward*	
	Immediate	*Delayed*
Middle	31	57
Lower	134	139
$X^2 = 5{\cdot}29$, $P < 0{\cdot}05$		

Draw-a-line

There was no sex difference in the amount of time it took to draw the line, nor were there any significant differences according to school grade. Table 4 reports the results of the statistical test of Analysis of Variance for the effects of social class and country of origin on the amount of time it took to draw the line. These results show that only social class, and not country of origin, affects the period it takes to draw the line.

TABLE 4. *Analysis of variance for amount of time to draw a line*

Source	*df*	*MS*	*F*
Social Class (A)	1	4779·23	8·29*
Country of Origin (B)	1	474·23	0·82
A × B	1	1350·97	2·34
Error	342	576·30	

* $P < 0{\cdot}01$

Delayed versus immediate reward and length of time to draw a line

The point biserial correlation was calculated between choice of chocolate bar and length of time taken to draw a line. Since the children drew two separate lines, a separate correlation was calculated for each of the two lines. To our surprise, the results showed no correlation at all: ·03 for the first line and ·05 for the second line. That is, there is no relationship between delayed gratification (waiting to obtain a larger reward) and ability to draw a line slowly.

Discussion

First, let us review the findings. For both the choice of chocolate bar and draw-a-line tests, the results are remarkably similar. For both, country of origin has no effect; nor does sex. For both, social class is important. Only for age do we find a difference between the tests; age affects choice of chocolate bar but not the amount of time taken to draw a line.

The finding of the importance of social class, rather than of country of origin, in Israel is of particular interest, for as I have noted,[17] most research studies in Israel analyse their results according to country of origin, and most have in fact found that Jews of Asian-African descent differ from Jews of Western descent. Unfortunately, relatively few studies have controlled for social class, a particularly important omission because of the overlap in the Israeli population between social class and country of origin. This study shows that it is class and not ethnicity which affects delayed gratification.

That finding would seem to indicate that in Israel ethnicity does not affect psychological processes in a unified fashion. As a number of studies (for example, on perceptual articulation, field-dependence, categorizing behaviour, birth-order effects) found ethnic differences, we had also expected to find similar results in delayed gratification, but there was no strong theoretical reason to justify the hypothesis. Actually, this study was not needed to prove that country of origin in Israel may not be as important a determinant of psychological behaviour as it has been previously thought. In evaluating other studies, we and others are guilty of focusing on the significant ethnic differences and paying less attention to the non-significant ones. For example, in one of our own researches[18] we found no ethnic differences in level of abstraction, but there were differences in the verbal rationale given as to why a particular set of objects were alike or went together. And yet when we summarize such findings, we are apt to report only the positive results.

Post hoc, the finding (as do most findings) makes sense. Immediate gratification has long been thought by sociologists to characterize the lower class. For example, in the United States more lower-class children do less well at school and more lower-class women give birth out of wedlock.[19] One (perhaps too facile) explanation of both phenomena is that a greater degree of impulsiveness characterizes the lower class. And there is no theoretical reason to expect delayed gratification to be related to country of origin.

The complete lack of correlation between the draw-a-line and choice of chocolate bar results came as a surprise, even more so in view of the finding that both measures do vary according to social class but do not vary according to country of origin. The lack of correlation does show that whatever else the draw-a-line test may measure, it does not measure delayed gratification. I am inclined to believe that the results signify more than just motoric inhibition, for how could one explain the finding that middle-class children took longer to draw the line? The most likely explanation seems to be that middle-class children are more used to playing with pencils and are more socialized to following instructions, particularly in a school setting.

NOTES

[1] W. Mischel, 'Preference for Delayed Reinforcement: an Experimental Study of a Cultural Observation', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 56, no. 1, 1958, pp. 57–61.

[2] W. Mischel, 'Preference for Delayed Reinforcement and Social Responsibility', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 62, no. 1, 1961, pp. 1–7.

[3] W. Mischel, 'Delay of Gratification, Need for Achievement, and Acquiescence in Another Culture', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 62, no. 5, 1961, pp. 543–52.

[4] Mischel, 'Preference for Delayed Reinforcement and Social Responsibility', op. cit.

[5] W. Mischel and R. Metzner, 'Preference for Delayed Reward as a Function of Age, Intelligence and Length of Delay Interval', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 64, no. 1, 1962, pp. 425–31.

[6] L. Melikian, 'Preference for Delayed Reinforcement: An Experimental Study Among Palestinian Arab Refugee Children', *Journal of Social Psychology*, vol. 50, August 1959, pp. 81–86.

[7] L. Weller, *Sociology in Israel*, Westport, Conn., 1974.

[8] M. Lissak, *Social Mobility in Israel*, Jerusalem, 1969.

[9] B. Zadok, 'Field Dependence-Independence among Oriental and Western Children', *Megamot*, vol. 16, no. 1, 1968, pp. 51–58 (in Hebrew).

[10] S. Sharan and L. Weller, 'Classification Patterns in Underprivileged Children in Israel', *Child Development*, vol. 42, no. 2, 1971, pp. 581–94.

[11] Y. Amir, S. Sharan, and Y. Kovarsky, 'Birth Order, Family Structure and Avoidance Behavior', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 10, no. 3, 1968, pp. 271–78.

[12] L. Weller and S. Sharan, 'Articulation of the Body Concept among First Grade Israeli Children', *Child Development*, vol. 42, no. 5, 1971, pp. 1553–59.

[13] M. Chen, D. Schifenbauer, and R. Doron, 'Uniformity and Diversity in Leisure Activities of Secondary School Students in Israel', *Megamot*, vol. 13, no. 2, 1964, pp. 188–99 (in Hebrew).

[14] R. Bar-Joseph, 'Role Differentiation in the Urban Family in Israel', R. Bar-Joseph and I. Shelach, eds., *The Family in Israel*, Jerusalem, 1969, pp. 167–82 (in Hebrew).

[15] L. Weller, 'Differential Reactions to Abstract Humor', mimeographed, 1973.

[16] Sharan and Weller, op. cit.

[17] Weller, *Sociology in Israel*, op. cit., p. 275.

[18] Sharan and Weller, op. cit.

[19] e.g., R. A. Cloward and J. J. Jones, 'Social Class: Educational Attitudes and Participation', A. H. Passow, ed., *Education in Depressed Areas*, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, 1963; F. C. Caro and C. T. Pihlblad, 'Social Class, Formal Education and Social Mobility', *Sociology and Social Research*, vol. 48, July 1964, pp. 428–39; J. Julian, *Social Problems*, New York, 1973, p. 357.

A FURTHER NOTE ON 'THE LAW OF THE KINGDOM IS LAW'

Leo Landman

THE law of the kingdom is law (*dina d'malkhuta dina*)[1] is a dictum that has been seen by some scholars to be the result of a diaspora (*galut*) mentality.[2] H. Graetz wrote: '. . . the enemies of the Jews who in all centuries took as their pretext the apparently hostile spirit of Judaism, and advised the persecution and complete extermination of the Jewish nation, could be referred to a Jewish law which, with three words, invalidated their contention'.[3]

However, Graetz's defence falls by the way since the law stated by the Talmudic sage Samuel is applicable to civil matters only. To the law as it applies to those matters the Jews have full allegiance. But in the realm of religion, the Jew declared that his conscience was dictated by a power that was beyond the state.

Similarly, there is ample evidence that negates the contention of S. W. Baron, who claims that fear was the underlying motive for this principle.[4] It is difficult to accept the conclusion he reached.

It has been shown that the law of the land was often obeyed even when it contradicted Jewish civil law. *Dina d'malkhuta dina* was not a 'necessary evil'. The state was not 'accepted by the Jewish people with great reluctance'.[5] Certainly the view of R. Samuel b. Meir[6] demonstrated the loyalty of the Jew to his land. In fact, according to that view, the entire concept of *dina d'malkhuta dina* depended upon the 'free will' acceptance of the people. Even the Tosafist view[7] was not based on fear of expulsion and deportation, but rather upon a recognition of ownership by the king of all the land under his dominion. If fear forced the Jew to accept the law of the kingdom as the law, this fear was not evident where religious or ritual law was involved. It is true that the Jews accepted *dina d'malkhuta dina* as a *modus vivendi* for diaspora life but without 'condescension' or 'antagonism' towards the secular government.

The approach which appears to be most cogent was recently set out by Gerald Blidstein in this Journal. He wrote:[8]

> The Talmudic dictum that 'the law of the kingdom is law' . . . has often been seen as the juridical expression of Jewish powerlessness in the diaspora. Unable to control his environment, the Jew eventually agrees—despite the various religious and ethical dilemmas raised by this concession—to shape even his own legal relationships according to the mould of that environment. The impulse for this adjustment was clearly political, not juridical . . . the basic issue came down to the conflict between integrity and survival and which of these two values was to be given priority, or again, how much ground could be conceded if and when necessary. . . .
>
> Here, rabbinic opinion became a potent counter to the demands of the state. At the same time, such opinion remained mysteriously 'theoretical'.

It is my contention, the above notwithstanding, that *dina d'malkhuta dina* evidenced just the opposite attitude. It demonstrated a spirit of Jewish ethical solidarity and, at times, absolute defiance rather than powerlessness.

Blidstein's description of the concept of *dina d'malkhuta dina* as an expression of 'Jewish powerlessness' at first blush appears to be accurate. After all, as we have pointed out, most cases involving *dina d'malkhuta dina* were a matter of internal concern for the Jewish community. As far as the outside world was concerned, the Jews obeyed whatever laws the kings enacted. Samuel's dictum, which lent or rejected legitimacy to any law, had in reality no bearing upon the state *per se*.

Yet the truth was not at all as bleak as that. In the first place, the ethical rejection, even if applied only internally, affected Jewish and non-Jewish relationships. Wherever Jewish law gave its stamp of approval to a secular law, Jews were required to abide fully by that law. On the other hand, whenever Jewish law labelled a monarch's edict as discriminatory, capricious, or without legal foundation, Jews were not honour-bound to violate their conscience by observing a law they considered illegal. They did not refrain from evading such a law. One example will suffice.

In a series of statements, rabbinic and lay leaders in Spain and the Franco-German centres declared all Jews to be 'freemen', permitted to travel wherever and whenever the spirit moved them. The Jews of Gerona made representation to Pedro IV to restrict the movement of rich taxpayers and were severely chastised for it. Crescas Elier, royal physician to Pedro IV, addressed an open letter to the leaders of Catalonia, calling their attention to this short-sighted and dangerous action.[9] One rabbi vehemently declared that such a right had never been challenged. It was a right which had been theirs for centuries.[10] Bensenyor Gracian added that this right was 'axiomatic'.[11] Samuel Benvenista wrote: 'I am not a scholar but I have spent my years in public office . . . Our eyes have seen, our fathers told us, and all people know that Jews have travelled openly and without subterfuge to the

Land of Israel and other parts of the Orient with their gold and silver, their wives and children. Indeed, before the fearful expulsion, they also travelled freely to France, Germany and other Christian countries in the north, and no one shut the door upon them . . . Year after year they migrate from Spain and no one halts them . . . How then shall we narrow our steps in bondage?'[12]

In France, the Jews claimed that right since the Roman period. They had been permitted to move about at will. Now they were forced to remain stationary just like the serfs, and they strongly objected. R. Isaac b. Samuel of Dampierre said: 'For we saw throughout the country that the Jews had the legal right, similar to the rights of the knights, to live wherever they wanted; and the law of the kingdom provided that the overlord should not appropriate the Jew's property after he had moved away from his town. This was the custom throughout Burgundy'.[13]

True, as E. E. Urbach[14] and G. Blidstein[15] have pointed out, R. Isaac here rejected legal title to land bought by any Jew after such an illegal confiscation took place. According to Jewish law the property still belonged to its original owner. Thus, within the Jewish community, the Beth Din did not recognize the 'law of the land' in such a case. R. Isaac's protest, however, was not made to the king. It remained within the Jewish community.

Nevertheless, under such circumstances, it was declared that one could conscientiously evade such illegal edicts by any means at one's disposal.[16] Hence, when government officials resorted to placing Jews under oath not to forsake their lands, Jews were forced to take the oath, but were permitted silently to add the word 'today' (*hayom*); that is, they qualified their oath to restrict their migration to that day only.[17] Of course, this was permitted only when the oath was taken under duress.

Equally, it must be pointed out that Jews probably served as the outlets for the rulers to convert such property to cash. The Jews were the merchants and bought and sold such items. If the Jewish community labelled confiscated property as 'royal robbery' no Jew would knowingly purchase it from the monarch. The obvious result would be that the market would drop out from under him. No protest could be more effective.

To prove my contention further, a more direct bit of evidence exists. In Germany, the Jews consistently refused to permit the government to appoint their spiritual leaders. They maintained that the authority of the rabbis stemmed from the chain of tradition going back to the Talmudic scholars and even to Moses. Furthermore, a second aspect of their authority over the members of the community came to them by their election by the community. The titles Rab and Rabbi showed this twofold source of power. The title of Rab indicated position by election

whereas anyone who possessed scholarship but had no position bore the title of Rabbi.[18]

On many occasions German kings and later on Polish governments tried to appoint rabbis, but without success. The Jews adhered to their old tradition of retaining autonomy in the management of their lives and they insisted that they alone could choose their leaders. When once a cantor (rabbi) was appointed by the intervention of a duke, R. Meir ruled the appointment void. 'In our country matters such as this are dealt with in strict measure . . .' In a similar case, a rabbi (cantor) became enraged when the mitre of office was placed upon his head by the duke and the pious candidate shouted: 'Sir, our law does not permit me to accept the office to worship our Lord from your hands'.[19]

These were direct acts of defiance based on the premise that the government had no jurisdiction in such matters and that any interference by the government was not lawful. In such cases, the law of the kingdom was *not* the law.

In essence, then, *dina d'malkhuta dina* played an important role in the relationships between the Jewish and the Gentile communities. The principle demonstrated, albeit in a limited scope, the free spirit of Jews who refused to capitulate to the capricious power of the state when that power acted unethically, illegally, or against their conscience. They manifested internally (and to some extent externally) their high standards of law and ethics.

At the same time, the complete silence of the Palestinians regarding *dina d'malkhuta dina* is evidence of their undaunted spirit in defying illegitimate rule. Certainly they obeyed Roman law or else they would have had to meet the awesome power of Rome. Yet, never once did they entertain the idea of granting any sort of legitimacy, religiously or in civil matters, to the force which they considered as that of invaders and conquerors.[20]

NOTES

[1] See my *Jewish Law in the Diaspora: Confrontation and Accommodation*, Dropsie University, Philadelphia, 1968.

[2] G. Blidstein, 'A Note on the Function of "The Law of the Kingdom is Law" in the Medieval Jewish Community', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XV, no. 2, December 1973.

[3] H. Graetz, *Geschichte der Juden*, Leipzig, 1853, vol. IV, p. 15.

[4] S. W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, vol. II, Philadelphia, 1952, pp. 25, 177.

[5] D. Hoffmann, *Mar Samuel*, Leipzig, 1873, p. 42.

[6] Landman, op. cit., chap. 3.

[7] ibid.

[8] Blidstein, op. cit., pp. 213–14.

[9] Y. Baer, *Toledot HaYehudim BiSefarad HaNotsrit* (*The History of the Jews*

in Christian Spain), Berlin, 1929–36, vol. I, pp. 219, 224a. See also L. Landman, 'Civil Disobedience', *Tradition*, vol. X, Fall 1969, pp. 5–14.

[10] See Baer, op. cit., p. 314; and Landman 'Civil Disobedience', op. cit.

[11] See Baer, op. cit., p. 315; and Landman, ibid.

[12] See Baer, op. cit., p. 316; Landman, ibid.; and R. Meir of Rothenburg, *Responsa*, Berlin, 1895, 1001.

[13] *Tosafot, Baba Kamma*, 58a, *s.v. inammi.*

[14] E. E. Urbach, *Ba'alei HaTosafot* (*The Tosafists*), Jerusalem, 1955, pp. 203–204.

[15] Blidstein, op. cit., p. 215.

[16] See Landman, 'Civil Disobedience', op. cit.

[17] *Tosafot, Nedarim* 28a; *Baba Kamma* 113a; Moses b. Jacob of Coucy, *Semag* (The Great Book of Commandments), Kopost, 1807, vol. II, 43d; Solomon Luria, *Yam Shel Shlomo* (*The Sea of Solomon*), Lublin, 1616; *Baba Kamma*, 18.

[18] For a detailed discussion see my *Jewish Law in the Diaspora . . .*, op. cit., pp. 64–73; Barfat, *Responsa*, Lemberg, 1805, 272; C. Lauer, *Jahrbuch der Jüdisch-Literarischen Gesellschaft*, Berlin, 1924, vol. XVI, pp. 1–42; S. Zeitlin, 'The Opposition to the Spiritual Leaders Appointed by the Government', *Jewish Quarterly Review*, vol. 31, Jan. 1941, pp. 287–300; A. M. Hershman, *R. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet and his Times*, New York, 1943, pp. 52–55.

[19] R. Meir of Rothenburg, *Responsa*, Prague, 1608, 137; Cremona, 1557, 190; Mordecai b. Hillel Ashkenazi, *Sefer Mordecai*, Riva di Trenta, 1559, *Baba Kamma* 107; S. Zeitlin, 'Rashi and the Rabbinate', *JQR*, vol. 31, July 1940, p. 44; L. Finkelstein, *Jewish Self-Government in the Middle Ages*, New York, 1924, pp. 154, 227. The principal figure involved most likely served in a dual capacity of rabbi and cantor, a combination which frequently occurred. See my *The Cantor: An Historic Perspective*, Yeshiva University, New York, 1972.

[20] See my refutation of G. Allon, *Toledot HaYehudim BeEretz Yisrael Be-Tekufat HaMishnah VeHaTalmud* (*The History of the Jews in Palestine in the Period of the Mishnah and the Talmud*), Tel Aviv, 1959, vol. I, pp. 346–50; vol. II, pp. 118–22, where he contends that Palestinian *amoraim* equally concerned themselves with the dictum of *dina d'malkhuta dina*, in my article, 'The Prerogatives of the Jewish and Non-Jewish King' (in Hebrew), *Bitzaron*, vol. 66, Oct.-Nov. 1974, p. 29.

MARXISM AND JEWISH NATIONALISM: THE THEORETICAL ROOTS OF CONFRONTATION

Robert S. Wistrich

MARXIST opposition to both Zionism and other variations of Jewish nationalism is not a recent phenomenon. The subject is not merely of academic interest, although some of the arguments used both for and against the validity of Jewish nationalism have ceased to be relevant since the creation of the State of Israel. What concern me here are the more constant features in the Marxist critique of Jewish nationalism, and in particular its rejection of any special pleading or moral obligation to further a distinctively Jewish existence in group form.[1] Marxists have traditionally argued that the survival of the Jewish collectivity—whether in a purely religious, a national, or state form—is politically reactionary.[2] They have followed the formula of the young Marx who dismissed Judaism as a wholly negative phenomenon, as a reflection of the money-lending era of capitalism, doomed to disappear with its demise.[3] The Marxist, like the liberal, analysis of the Jewish question assumed that antisemitism was a temporary and secondary phenomenon: with its dissipation the last factor encouraging the 'illusory' national cohesion of the Jews would also fade.

Although the march of events clearly exposed the Marxist analysis as inadequate, there has nevertheless been a remarkable continuity in attitudes on the Left towards the problem of Jewish nationalism. In several important respects the New Left, as well as the orthodox communist camp, continues to echo in a vulgar and grossly over-simplified form arguments about Zionism and the Jewish people which had been evolved before 1914. These arguments were misleading and tendentious then (although at least plausible)—today they are not only badly informed, but positively puerile. My aim here is not to trace the evolution, or perhaps more accurately, the degeneration of the Marxist critique of Jewish nationalism, but rather to reconstruct its original purpose. I shall analyse what leading Marxist theorists, especially in central Europe, had to say about the Jewish problem as it presented itself to the socialist movement at the turn of the twentieth century, and in particular their

evaluation of Jewish nationalism. That was a crucial period which witnessed the rise of a revolutionary socialist movement confronted by rival nationalist and antisemitic movements throughout Europe, as well as the emergence of political Zionism. It was also decisive for the development of European Jewry itself, confused amidst those contradictory movements, and having to choose for or against the revolutionary movement, between a class and a national orientation in politics. It was the era of Jewish national emergence in the Diaspora, of mass migrations from the lands of oppression to America and western Europe, of full emancipation, and also of political antisemitism.

Those Jews who joined the Marxist camp in eastern Europe and Russia fought for a socialist revolution together with non-Jews—they sought to achieve an emancipation modelled on conditions in western Europe. They fought not under a Jewish banner, but with Russian slogans for a Russian Revolution which would end all discrimination. They were assimilationists on principle, who rejected as inadmissible any notion of national rights for Jews. If there was one factor that united such well-known Marxist Jews as Leon Trotsky, Paul Axelrod, Paul Singer, Rosa Luxemburg, Leon Jogiches, Victor Adler, and Otto Bauer, it was their complete rejection of the very principle of Jewish national self-determination. There can be little doubt that this hostility of Marxist Jews to the Jewish national movement greatly influenced the attitude of other revolutionaries to the problem. Faced with this hostility, such a 'Galut' nationalist as the historian Simon Dubnow could remark, 'How much a Jew must hate himself who recognizes the right of every nationality and language to self-determination but doubts it or restricts it for his own people whose "self-determination" began 3,000 years ago.'[4] Anyone who has closely studied the personality and background of Marxist leaders of Jewish descent cannot deny the element of truth in this judgment—but there is no room to enter here into a deeper analysis of that psychology.[5] What I shall attempt is rather to determine whether, within the framework of the classic Marxist analysis of the Jewish problem, any other conclusions were really possible at that time.

It is an indisputable fact that the historical-materialist outlook formulated by Marx and Engels did not originally take sufficient account of the significance of the national problem in nineteenth-century Europe. In his early essay on the Jewish question, Marx had already reduced nationality to the factor of economic interest, and misleadingly identified the 'illusory' nationality of the Jew with that of the merchant and money-man.[6]

In the Communist Manifesto of 1848, national antagonisms were regarded as secondary, as a factor which would disappear with the expanding freedom of trade, the growing world market, and the resolution of class contradictions within individual nation-states. This was similar

to the view of Cobdenite liberalism, of bourgeois cosmopolitanism, which held that free trade was the road to international co-operation and the termination of national rivalries. The 1848 Revolution in Europe, which witnessed the resurrection of the German, Polish, Italian, and Slavic national movements, was already disproving that optimistic theory. Marx and Engels noted that development without fully understanding it. They accepted the right of the revolutionary nations, the Germans, Hungarians, Poles, and Italians to their national independence, but denied this same right to what they termed the 'historyless' peoples in southern and eastern Europe, whose historic duty it was to be absorbed by the more progressive civilizing influence of the big nations in Europe.[7] Above all, they opposed the Slav movement for independence because they feared it could only serve the reactionary interests of Czarism. This nationality doctrine is important because it later served Kautsky, Lenin, and other disciples of Marx in their polemics against Zionism and the Jewish national movement.

National movements were to be judged according to their 'revolutionism' in speeding up the disintegration of the feudal-absolutist monarchies in central and eastern Europe. Thus the Polish struggle for independence was supported because it fulfilled an important role in the revolutionary strategy of weakening Czarist Russia, but the South-Slav movement was rejected as the Pan-Slavist tool of Russian ambitions in the Balkans. It is significant that the future President of an independent Czechoslovakia, Thomas Masaryk, underlined in his *Philosophical and Sociological Foundations of Marxism* what he saw as the specific hostility of Marxism to the Slav and Jewish aspirations to independence.[8] Masaryk observed that Marx had totally ignored the cultural-historical side of the Jewish problem, that he had misunderstood the national and religious traditions of the Jewish communities in Russia and Austro-Polish Galicia, and that he had vastly overestimated the prospects of assimilation of the Jewish masses in eastern Europe. He was one of the first to point to the antisemitism of Marx, who identified the Jews with the worst aspects of capitalism and one-sidedly explored their so-called 'practical' essence.[9] His conclusion was that Marxist historical materialism made the same mistake it ascribed to the Jews—it was too practical, too objectivist, and narrowly materialistic.

Masaryk was writing at a time when the untenability of Marxist propositions about the national question was becoming increasingly visible even to the most orthodox of Marx's disciples. Socialist ideology was forced to come to terms with the fact that the bloodless cosmopolitanism of the Communist Manifesto was no answer to the national antagonisms between France and Germany, and above all to the national conflicts threatening to tear apart the Hapsburg monarchy in central Europe.[10] It is not surprising, therefore, that the reorientation of Marxist theory on the national problem should have first emerged in

the theories of the Austro-Marxists, most of whom were in fact 'assimilated' Jews. The most important theorists of this group were Otto Bauer and the Gentile Karl Renner. Their main purpose was to resolve the fierce internecine conflicts in the Austrian monarchy by depoliticizing the national conflict.[11] Their solution was to offer the maximum autonomy possible in the cultural sphere to the various nationalities in conflict with the state, to grant each nationality the right to legislate on its own affairs, run its own schools, and use its own language—and to preserve a federal parliament which would decide on all political and economic issues common to the nationalities within the Hapsburg Empire. This theory departed from one of the cardinal axioms of Marxism, the identification of nationality with the territorial principle —which was inapplicable to a multinational state of mixed populations, each asserting its 'national' rights against its neighbour. In place of the territorial principle of nationality, Renner proposed the personality-principle—the right of each individual to determine to which nation he belonged and to enjoy the full right of cultural self-expression accorded to that nationality. Significantly, Otto Bauer (who was Jewish) explicitly denied this right to the Jews and devoted a whole chapter of his *Social Democracy and the Nationalities Question* to proving that cultural-national autonomy was inapplicable to the Jews.[12] Since his arguments, while original, were nonetheless in the mainstream of Marxist tradition, I shall refer to them in some detail.

Bauer's basic presupposition was that western and central European Jewry was undergoing a process of de-nationalization. As an extra-territorial nation without a common territory, a common language or culture, the Jews were particularly susceptible to those processes of modern capitalism which were breaking down the barriers between nations and bringing about their assimilation and inter-penetration.[13] Because they were a pariah-nation, the Jews were forced gradually to adopt the culture, habits, and customs of the surrounding nations in whose midst they lived.

In feudal society, the Jews were able to preserve a certain semblance of independence, because their economic function as a monied class, their role as intermediaries between landowners and peasants, necessitated their preservation. But the evolution of industrial society was tending to level the differences between Jews and Christians, and to eliminate the specific economic functions which had hitherto preserved the traditional Jewish identity. Capitalist production made the Jews and Christians interdependent, and it was transforming the Christians into Jews—according to Marx's famous formula.[14] As Jews from the non-assimilated backward areas of Galicia and Bukovina began to be irresistibly drawn into capitalist branches of production, they would lose the distinctive characteristics giving rise to the illusion that there was a Jewish nation. This process of capitalist penetration of backward areas

was irreversible and would inevitably undermine the socio-economic structure of the Jews as a people-class.[15]

Unlike the other nationalities in the Hapsburg Empire, the Jews did not appear to have the territorial, linguistic, and cultural prerequisites for resisting that trend. As a scattered nation, they would inevitably gravitate to those areas which offered the best prospects of earning a living—and in this way, they would become integrated in all branches of modern capitalist production.[16] This process of economic differentiation, of social mobility, and freedom from the grinding Jewish poverty of the ghettos would eliminate what remained of specific Jewish characteristics. Assimilation of the Jewish minority was, in Otto Bauer's view, eminently desirable as a proof of the extent to which modern capitalism had succeeded in wiping out medieval particularism—the real secret of Jewish survival as a separate entity. In this Marxist conception, the Jews would disappear as a collective entity and their particular qualities as individuals would merge with those of European peoples among whom they lived. Karl Renner (whose theory of personal autonomy separated the right of cultural-national autonomy more sharply from its political and economic aspects) did not, unlike Otto Bauer, specifically deny that right to the Jews, and his ideas were taken up by Bundists and Jewish bourgeois nationalists in Russia, as a justification of their demand for Jewish 'national' rights.[17]

What attracted Jewish nationalists like Dubnow to Renner's theory of personal autonomy was that it implied a decentralized federal system with guaranteed minority rights for non-territorial groups, like the Jews, to preserve their culture and identity.[18] Renner, an Austrian social democrat aware of the need to make concessions to national minorities, did not apparently regard the fate of the Jews as being entirely determined by the evolution of modern capitalism. In general, the Austro-Marxists, while in favour of the rapid assimilation of the Jews under capitalism, envisaged (unlike Marx) a flowering of national differences under socialism.[19] Otto Bauer argued that socialism was an international movement which would take on a distinctive 'national' form in each country, consonant with the cultural traditions of that nation. In every case except that of the Jewish national movement, he argued that differentiation would increase under socialism, as the working-class came to absorb the national culture. On the problem of Zionism and the Russian pogroms, however, he remained silent. The only Austrian socialist to favour a national solution to the Jewish question was Engelbert Pernerstorfer, who stated that he saw no other alternative to the survival of the Jewish entity in Europe.[20] Pernerstorfer was the most 'nationalist' of the Austrian socialists.[21]

In order to understand the classic Marxist attitude to the Zionist movement, we must turn to the German social democrats, who were the leading socialist party in Europe before the First World War. While

accepting Marx's premise that the Jews could be emancipated only in a socialist society, some of them realized that the situation of the Jewish masses in eastern Europe in no way corresponded to Marx's image of the Jews as a predatory capitalist bourgeoisie.[22] Karl Kautsky, who was of mixed Czech-German origin, and was (unlike Marx) a philosemite, saw in the Jewish proletariat a class with a future, although he dismissed Judaism as a relic of the medieval past and a parasitic ghetto phenomenon in the pores of feudal society.[23]

The Jewish proletariat led by the Bund had in his view an important role to play in the revolutionary class struggle of the future, which its declining economic conditions were irresistibly forcing it to join. Marx had condemned the Jews as an excrescence of capitalism, but Kautsky at least recognized that they were undergoing a class differentiation which made them revolutionary. But this revolutionary role remained for Kautsky of a purely class-character—like other Marxists, he did not ascribe any 'national' characteristics to the Jews.[24] In his view, the existence of a non-territorial nation was a logical impossibility—which could not be reconciled with Marxist theory. The Jewish proletariat was therefore a revolutionary class without a nation. Because the Jews were not a 'normal' nation, but an anomaly, Kautsky could not find a way to accepting their claims for a non-territorial autonomy. Nevertheless, the rise of Zionism and the growing separatism of the Bund posed a problem. Kautsky's answer came in response to a request from the Polish Social Democrats Adolf Warski and Rosa Luxemburg to comment on the Kishinev pogrom in 1903.[25] In that important article, Kautsky analysed Russian antisemitism as a primitive reaction to the isolation of the Jews in the Pale, where they constituted a mass of petty-bourgeois 'Luftmenschen' and impoverished artisans. Because of this segregation, the Jews were regarded by the Russian masses as 'strangers', and as obvious scapegoats by the Russian autocracy. The Zionist movement, by emphasizing this segregation, would, in Kautsky's opinion, only strengthen antisemitism. It was playing into the hands of Czarism, aided and abetted by the financial support of Jewish capitalists in the West. Only the most rapid assimilation and participation in the Russian revolutionary movement could help the Jews, since the socialist idea was the sole counterweight to the antisemitism of the Czarist government and the Russian muzhiks. The solidarity of Jew and Gentile in the socialist movement was therefore in the interests of the Jewish masses, and corresponded for Kautsky to the best traditions of the Jewish race. The claim of the Zionist movement to transcend class interests was, on the other hand, an illusion, as was any attempt to preserve Jewish segregation in the ghetto.

Kautsky's choice for the Jews between isolation and revolutionary assimilation was the basic alternative that European Marxism had to offer. Since Jewish group survival was doomed anyway, Marxists ar-

gued, the Jews had nothing to lose by joining the revolutionary movement. But the Jewish masses had first to be re-educated, to shed their Judaism, which had been rendered obsolete by the development of capitalism. With the vanishing of religion, Jewish peculiarities would disappear as the remnants of a moribund ghetto-culture. Kautsky also emphasized that Jewish nationalism was pernicious in that it would preserve the hereditary traits of a 'caste' of urban financiers, merchants, and intellectuals—who were the real targets of antisemitism. Jewish solidarity was a poor substitute for proletarian solidarity and, in his view, it had no future. As he wrote in his *Rasse und Judentum*, there were no more vacant areas in the world where the Jewish national ideal could be realized, and Palestine, for practical reasons alone, was not a serious prospect.[26] The land was too infertile, the Jews were hopelessly outnumbered by the indigenous Arab population, and the prospects of a viable industrial base were far too remote. Indeed after the First World War, Kautsky's prognosis of Jewish prospects in Palestine was even more pessimistic; he was convinced that the Palestinian experiment would end tragically as soon as Anglo-French domination of the Middle East collapsed. In any case, on the theoretical level, he regarded Zionism and other varieties of Jewish nationalism as reactionary, 'a spoke in the wheel of progress', and based on an untenable doctrine of historical rights.[27]

Kautsky's critique influenced German, Austrian, and Russian communists after the First World War, even though he was treated in other respects by Lenin and his followers as a 'renegade' from socialism.[28] The Communists held tenaciously to the view expressed in *Die Neue Zeit* as early as 1897 that Zionism was an ephemeral phenomenon—the last beautiful pose of a 'moribund nation' before it left the stage of history.[29] Otto Heller, an Austrian Jewish communist, repeated Kautsky's thesis in an orthodox Leninist form in 1931, predicting that the assimilation of the Jewish bourgeoisie in the West and of the Jewish lower middle-class and proletariat in eastern Europe was an historically inevitable process.[30] Zionism was the last and most wretched manifestation of Jewish nationalism, the end of the road, the symbol of the 'downfall of Judaism' in capitalist society. The pre-1914 Marxists, led by Kautsky and followed by Jewish socialists and Bundists in Russia and eastern Europe, had said much the same thing, with perhaps more justification. Their main concern was with the class struggle of the Jewish proletariat —and Jewish nationalism was perceived as a dangerous competitor in their fight for the support of the Jewish masses. Zionism, it was alleged, was counter-revolutionary because it preached to Jews that they could not rely upon the solidarity of their Gentile comrades, and because it argued that antisemitism was 'eternal' and inevitable, and that the Jews should work for their own goals and interests.

What the Zionists proposed in Palestine was held to be a mirage, the

shallow dream of a Jewish state where Jewish capitalists would continue to exploit the workers. This kind of argument was especially put forward by Jewish Marxists from eastern Europe, who were the most hostile of all to the idea that the Jews constituted a nation. They demanded 'democratic' rights for the Jews, not separate 'national' interests, which were portrayed as a reactionary return to the ghetto. The duty of Jewish social democrats was to raise the cultural level of the Jewish masses by introducing Western ideas of socialism and democracy.[31] This had to be done first in Yiddish and later in the language of the country; ultimately the Jewish workers should speak the same language as their Christian comrades. The goal of Jewish social democracy was not anti-national; it was revolutionary brotherhood and solidarity.

The negative attitude of Marxist Jews to nationalist 'deviations' like Zionism had many sources. One driving force was the internationalist conviction that the nation-state was an anachronism, an obsolescent relic of the capitalist era.[32] Its psychological motivation was perhaps a guilt-complex about devoting oneself to Jews when there were other more pressing problems in the world. It stemmed also from revulsion against the 'nationalist' persecution of the Jews as 'outsiders'. Whatever the underlying causes of this hostility, Jews often formed the 'internationalist' wing of the socialist movements in Europe, and this commitment seemed infinitely more important to them than the Jewish problem, which was an issue they sought to evade. Zionism especially touched a sensitive nerve which often brought out a latent self-hatred in Jewish socialist intellectuals.[33] The latter rejected any form of Jewish particularism, insisting that nothing should distinguish Jews from other nationalities, and condemning Judaism as an archaism doomed to dissolution and absorption by international socialism.

The neutrality, the impartiality, and the apparent objectivity of the Marxist historical method were a perfect cover for the subtle repressed antisemitism that expressed itself either in silence on Jewish issues or in condemning any Jewish national aspirations. Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Radek, Parvus, and Otto Bauer were all classic examples of this peculiar neurosis. Anything self-consciously 'Jewish' was intolerable in their eyes—as was the notion that the proletarian revolution could be contained within any arbitrary ethnic, geographical, or political boundaries.[34] It is equally no surprise to find that it was the 'Jewish' Bolsheviks and Mensheviks who led the polemics against the Bund in Russian social democracy and denounced with special vehemence their right to speak for the Jewish proletariat. The vision of the new society projected before 1914 by European Marxists, whether Jews or Gentiles, rejected any Jewish ethnic particularism—even of a socialist type.

It was the Gentile socialists in the labour movement, particularly those of a 'revisionist' turn of mind, who proved more sympathetic on the whole to the appeal of Zionism. The doctrine that each nation

should be master in its own house gradually came to dominate socialist thought around the turn of the century. The failure of the Second International and the First World War gave this trend an irresistible impulse. Zionism could now for the first time find a hearing within the international socialist movement. Reformist social democrats like the Belgians Vandervelde and Huysmans, the Frenchman Longuet, and the Austrian Pernerstorfer, and even democratic socialists of Jewish origin like Eduard Bernstein and Léon Blum, became friendly to Poale-Zion and Zionist colonization in Palestine during the 1914–18 war.

The principle of self-determination for Jews, even the idea of a Jewish State, became increasingly acceptable to reformist socialism after 1917. The Jewish national idea was now seen as democratic, and in harmony with the main tendencies of modern development. The result was the formation of a socialist Committee for a Workers' Palestine in the 1920s, patronized among others by the British socialists Lansbury and Ramsay MacDonald, and the Dutchman Van Kol, as well as by the above-named sympathizers of Zionism.

Only the international communist movement, dominated by the Russian Bolsheviks, remained fixed in the mould of rigid pre-1914 formulas, evolved by Kautsky and Otto Bauer. The Bolsheviks, inspired by Lenin and the Western Marxist viewpoint, were convinced that assimilation was the only answer to the Jewish problem.[35] Zionism was an ideology that promoted a fictitious Jewish solidarity and ran counter to progressive ideas, since it opposed the absorption of the Jews by the peoples among whom they lived. It was purely a reaction to antisemitism—but far from curing the evil, it would merely strengthen it. Zionism and antisemitism were, for the Bolsheviks as for Kautsky, two sides of the same coin—ideologies produced by declining classes in a moribund society.

Lenin, for example, was quite unequivocal in his condemnation of Jewish national culture, even when proclaimed in its most moderate form by the Jewish Bund, as 'a slogan of the rabbis and the bourgeoisie'.[36] Jewish nationalism in his opinion was a product of 'backward and semi-barbarous countries' like Galicia and Russia, which kept the Jews segregated from the rest of the population as a caste. Any manifestation of Jewish nationalism could not be progressive but was, by definition, motivated by a desire to perpetuate this '*caste* position of the Jews' in eastern Europe.[37] In his polemics against the Bund, Lenin ridiculed with particular vehemence the Bundist and Zionist bogey of 'assimilation'—claiming that 'only those who with reverential awe contemplate the "backside" of Jewry shout against assimilation'.[38] He cited in contrast the melting-pot of New York and the conditions prevailing in America generally as proof that modern civilization was grinding up national distinctions. 'The best Jews, famous in history, who gave the world foremost leaders of democracy and socialism' were

his models of progress, and they 'never shouted against assimilation'.[39] Thus, although Lenin (like Marx) supported the national liberation movements of oppressed nationalities when it suited his revolutionary strategy, that support categorically did not apply to Jewish nationalism. The latter was seen as a backsliding movement which could serve no useful purpose in the break-up of the Czarist state; moreover, even in its proletarian form as expressed in the demand for cultural-national autonomy by the Bund, it was for Lenin an example of the virus of bourgeois nationalism which might contaminate the labour movements of other oppressed nationalities in the Russian state. Stalin, writing in 1913,[40] followed Lenin's critique of the Bund and of Jewish nationalism in general—emphasizing that because the Jews lacked a common territory or culture, they were not, in any sense of the word, a nation. At least, they were not a real or living nation, but the scattered remnants of an obscure religious community, lacking the economic, territorial, and psychological prerequisites for nationhood. There was, in Stalin's view, nothing in common between Russian, American, Georgian, or west European Jews, except obsolete relics of the past.

The Marxist conception of the national problem in general, and of the Jewish question in particular, offered no framework in which it was possible to take account of Jewish national aspirations before 1914. The premise of Jewish peoplehood was denied, and with it the legitimacy of Jewish national rights, the creativity of the Jews as a group, their will to autonomy, and the validity of their traditions and culture. The negative attitude of Marx, Lenin, and their disciples to the Jewish problem before 1914 has continued to influence and shape communist doctrine right up to the present day. Not even the rise of Nazism and the appalling catastrophe of European Jewry could shake the communist belief in the infallibility of Marxist-Leninist theses on the Jewish question. But the evident failure of communist régimes in Russia and eastern Europe to resolve this problem demonstrates how over-simplified the ideal of an internationalist answer to the Jewish predicament really was. Despite its shortcomings, the Jewish national movement has proved more practical and tenacious than any of its Marxist critics ever believed it could be. The theoretical confrontation between Marxism and Jewish nationalism has not ended, but in the light of recent history and especially of communist practice, the case of the Left against Zionism appears distinctly unconvincing.

NOTES

[1] For a neo-Marxist critique of this idealist tradition in Jewish historiography, see Maxime Rodinson's introduction to Abraham Léon, *La Conception matérialiste de la question juive*, Paris 1968, pp. v ff.

[2] ibid.

ETHNIC PUZZLES

Maurice Freedman

(*Review Article*)

THE twelfth in the series of volumes of papers arising from conferences organized by the Association of Social Anthropologists of the Commonwealth* is, like its predecessors, a good guide to what the profession, or at any rate a sizable fraction of it, is thinking about. (But perhaps one had better say: were thinking about; for the conference from which the book springs was held in 1971.) The theme being 'urban ethnicity', one might have supposed that the contributors would spend some time debating what both words might mean, but it turns out that, with one exception (Dr. S. R. Charsley, in 'The Formation of Ethnic Groups'), none of them bothers with 'urban'. Most of the authors seem to assume that term to be unproblematic. Dr. Charsley, on the other hand, wisely says (pp. 351 f.):

> There is of course in anthropology a strong tradition of making a firm division between the urban and the rural as social worlds. . . . The making of the division was certainly valuable in establishing the autonomy of urban studies in anthropology . . . But the nature and the scope of the divide has perhaps sometimes in the past tended to be exaggerated into a dichotomous system of thought: the town was not only different in certain respects to the country, but it has sometimes been thought of as its very opposite.

All that Professor Cohen, the editor, has to say on the subject, in his introductory essay, 'The Lesson of Ethnicity', is: 'Ethnicity is essentially a form of interaction between culture groups operating within common social contexts. It is for this reason that the phenomena of ethnicity are so dramatically evident in the cities, in both developing and developed countries' (p. xi). Ethnicity, he goes on, is of course not confined to the cities, and the 'city is today but a part of the national state . . . Urban anthropology is indeed the anthropology of the complex structure of the new national state' (ibid.). One may not think much of that as an argument, but when we reach Professor Cohen's final paragraphs we see his drift, for there he commends the study of 'members of . . . . tribes within the context of the developing towns' partly on the ground that research

*Abner Cohen, ed., *Urban Ethnicity*, xxiv+391 pp., A.S.A. Monographs no. 12, Tavistock Publications, London, 1974, £4.50.

of that sort 'will usher social anthropology into the systematic study of the complexity of contemporary industrial society, without our discipline losing its identity, i.e. without social anthropology becoming sociology, or political science, or history' (p. xxiii). That is to say, 'urban anthropology' will save us (the social anthropologists) from extinction. Since some of the contributors to the book hold posts in sociology, the anthropological boundary-maintenance (perhaps boundary-extension) might be thought a shade indelicate.

What is lost on 'urban' is made up for on 'ethnicity'. Both in Professor Cohen's introduction and in the eleven essays that follow it, the possible meanings and usefulness of the word are touched on many times, but the treatment is not, it seems to me, exhaustive, and it had better be said now that a collection of this kind, for all its qualities, does not appear to be a suitable vehicle for sustained argument about a difficult set of problems. In an ideal composite work the introduction and the substantive papers would be carefully tailored and stitched; but conferences are not the best workshops for that high craft. What we are given, well short of the ideal, is a group of interesting, and in the case of some, absorbingly interesting, papers round a theme. The papers are not all about one part of the world, they are not all directed to the same points, and they seem to be arranged in an arbitrary order. A reviewer has to read the book right through at one go, but it is not in fact the sort of volume that shows up best in that treatment of it. One might be better advised to approach it as though it were an anthology into which on occasion to dip with profit.

On the other hand, Professor Cohen's views on ethnicity (along with those of Fredrik Barth)[1] are constantly referred to by the contributors, and that feature of the volume provides some element of continuity. I shall try to deal with those views, but there is a preliminary step to be taken for the benefit of readers who come to the topic from studies of 'race relations'. 'Race' and its adjective appear but little in this book; their place is taken by 'ethnic group' (sometimes 'ethnic category'—of which more later) and 'ethnic'; while in some sense 'ethnicity' replaces 'racialism'. The squeezing out of the older vocabulary by the newer does not appear to the contributors to be worth comment, but I think it is in fact of some intellectual and social importance.

The language of social science is the language of ordinary men made more particular. The specialized use of words allows special discourse without sealing off that discourse from the world of common speech. Having acquired in its development some complex popular (and lexicographical) meanings, the word 'race' has in the last decade or so seemed sometimes capable of infecting the language used by social scientists and, more important, likely to lead ordinary men to read more into the social scientist's use of it than he meant to say. If, for example, he wants to discuss Sikhs or Jews in Britain, the anthropologist or sociologist does

not wish, by speaking under the heading of race relations, to be thought to imply that Sikhs or Jews are a race in the sense in which that term is likely to be taken by ordinary readers: a defined biological entity—that is to say, a group defined *from the outside* as biological. Better to do away with 'race' and manage with 'ethnic group'. (The French are more fortunate in having a simple noun: *ethnie*.) The Research Unit (at the University of Bristol and financed by the Social Science Research Council) that began by being about race relations changed its name soon after its creation in order to be about ethnic relations. We have become so used to euphemistic or hypocritical changes ('developing countries' for economically backward ones, 'underprivileged' for poor, and so on) that we may be inclined to dismiss the transition from 'race' to 'ethnic group' as yet another case of intellectual trimming; but it is not. It is an altogether justified move to prevent misunderstanding.

Of course, there can be no guarantee that as time goes on 'ethnic' will not develop its own folk meanings to the point that social scientists will feel the need to retreat to a remoter lexical camp. One has to pay the price of using technical language that greatly overlaps with ordinary speech. The alternative, a highly esoteric jargon, would be far worse in its implications: the ordinary reader has a right of access to the literature composed by social scientists, and while his folk categories may sometimes embarrass the labours of those specialists, his attention to them has the advantage of urging them to maintain decent literary standards. Without that check the language of sociologists and social anthropologists would be far worse than it already is.

And yet something may have been lost by the drift from 'race' to 'ethnic group'. The first term concentrates the mind upon entities that conceive themselves such in virtue of their common origins. When 'ethnic group' comes into play that element may be missed, as we can see in the case of Professor Cohen's introductory essay. Quite correctly he says that the 'literature of social anthropology abounds in cases where we can see the use of ethnicity in articulating the organizational functions of interest groups. . . .' (p. xviii), moving from there to an example drawn from what has been written about 'the now widely known case of the economic elite, or elites, that dominate the City of London, the nerve-centre of the financial system of Britain' (p. xix). The ethnography he summarizes in a few paragraphs is certainly interesting, for it shows how crucial decisions are taken in our society by small highly interconnected face-to-face groups that develop their own modes of communication. But is that ethnography relevant to ethnicity? The doubt may be strengthened as the reader's eye passes to the next paragraph, where a transition is made to Hausa traders in Yoruba towns (whom Professor Cohen has described so well in *Custom and Politics in Urban Africa*, 1969). What the two examples have in common is that they are of trading groups making use of 'a series of customs to overcome

technical problems of business' (the City men) and using 'customs to create relationships of trust in the trading network' (the Hausa) (p. xxi). (A third obvious example springs to mind: the Jewish diamond business in Antwerp.) 'In short,' Professor Cohen continues, 'City men are socio-culturally as distinct within British society as are the Hausa within Yoruba society.' I doubt that very much, but ethnographic exactness is not the point at the moment. 'They are indeed as "ethnic" as any ethnic group can be, but they are not usually described as an ethnic group because the term is principally social and political, not sociological . . . To many people, the term ethnicity connotes minority status, lower class, or migrancy' (ibid.). What in fact has happened is that in the course of making a point of the first importance about the nature of complex societies, and making it well, Professor Cohen has slipped, as I see it, from one sociological province into another. What he is saying in effect is that we too easily fail to recognize that our society is so constructed (and throughout) that 'the processes by which the symbolic patterns of behaviour implicit in the style of life, or the "sub-culture", of a group—even of highly individualistic men like members of an elite—develop in order to articulate organizational functions that cannot be formally institutionalized' (ibid.). He might have usefully taken the point further by noting how, contrary to superficial sociologizing about the uniformities imposed upon social and cultural life in the process of industrialization, the introduction of mass communications, 'nation-building', and the like, the fate of the modern world may be the fate of increasing differentiation within greater or lesser groups. There is of course a link between a proposition of that sort and the theme of ethnicity: witness the growth in Britain of lesser nationalisms; but Professor Cohen only obscures it by lumping all such differentiation under one head. I do not think it is useful to bring the interconnexions of City men, trade unionists, intellectuals, or pigeon-fanciers (the last three examples are mine) under the rubric of ethnicity.

Some of the contributors to the book seem to share my doubts. In one of the most thoughtful and valuable of the papers, 'Ethnic Identity and Social Stratification on a Kampala Housing Estate', Dr. R. D. Grillo writes (p. 159) that the concept of the ethnic

> would seem to imply, in the first place, a classification or ordering of the human world into a comprehensive set of categories defined by reference to an idea of common origin, ancestry, and cultural heritage. Underpinning this classification is usually an ideology that specifies the relationship between those with the same or different identities. . . . These ideologies may be considered not so much as prescribing solidarity as providing a set of ideas and symbols by reference to which a claim to solidarity (or opposition) may be made in inter-group and interpersonal relations. A major problem of ethnic studies is to understand how and when such claims come to be made and accepted or rejected.

And compare Dr. Enid Schildkrout in 'Ethnicity and Generational Differences among Urban Immigrants in Ghana': 'Descent is an important part of the concept of ethnicity. . . . Ethnicity also seems always to involve some notion of common origin and descent, even though recruitment and identity may be brought about in other ways' (p. 191).

I turn to a more important problem. Professor Cohen shows himself rather impatient with the kind of view expressed by Barth in the context I have already referred to. He writes that Barth sees 'ethnic categories as classifying persons in terms of their "basic most general identity" as determined by their origin and background. Some writers attribute primordiality to this basic identity' (p. xii). And he proceeds, referring to the passage in which Barth writes 'In other words, ethnic categories provide an organizational vessel that may be given varying amounts and forms of content in different socio-cultural systems', that such an approach has description as its central theme and that its argument is essentially circular. Professor Cohen fully allows in principle for the complexity of the analysis that must be made if one is to account for the emergence and perpetuation of ethnic entities, but he himself appears to favour what I may call a theory of economic and political mobilization. That is to say, we may know the nature and importance of ethnic entities by the ways in which, as interest groups, they enter into struggle for economic and political values. That view indeed seems to rest upon a competitive and agonistic model of behaviour; and it is not one that commends itself to all the contributors to the book. Dr. Charsley, in the paper I have already cited, says very sensibly: '. . . even if, once interests are identified with a particular defined group, their prosecution can explain the growth of ethnicity, there remain the prior questions of why such interests should be seen in group terms at all and why the group to be concerned should be defined in a particular way' (pp. 347 f.). Dr. Shlomo Deshen, in 'Political Ethnicity and Cultural Ethnicity in Israel during the 1960s', is more forceful, saying of his own approach that it 'tries to show the possibility of existence of ethnic manifestations that are primarily cultural, and perhaps not relevant at all to problems of conflict and competition. Such manifestations might better be interpreted primarily in terms of strategies to solve problems of identity, belief, and culture, and perhaps only secondarily in terms of political strategies' (p. 282). (He is concerned mainly with Tunisian Jews in Israel and the revival of their *hillulot*, memorial celebrations.)

The trouble with 'mobilization theories', as we may call them, is that they presuppose what needs to be explained: the prior existence of something (not necessarily a group) to be mobilized. The difficulty is parallel to that which emerges when racial prejudice (must I now say ethnic prejudice?) is explained by reference to competition with that against which the prejudice is displayed. Many years ago, in a book which

today is a largely unread classic, I. D. MacCrone said: 'It is not because of their economic competition that Jews and Japanese excite hostility, but it is because they are Jews and Japanese that their competition is unfair, or underhand, or an offence to those who are neither Jews nor Japanese'.[2] At what point then do we start the analysis?

That question leads us to ethnicity as the potential basis for forming social ties and allegiances when economic and political opportunities, or prejudice and discrimination, provide the occasion. What in turn is that ethnicity based upon? Individuals placed within a complex society may seize upon one of several markers to differentiate themselves along with some others from all others. There is a significant categorization of the social world within which ethnicity develops. Now, the word 'category' and the term 'ethnic category' recur in *Urban Ethnicity*. 'Ethnic category' is listed in the Index as appearing only three times, but is in fact more in evidence than that. Surprisingly, the term is sometimes used as though it meant something like a social group. Even Dr. Clyde Mitchell, in a highly sophisticated treatment of the relationship between what people perceive and the manner in which they group themselves ('Perceptions of Ethnicity and Ethnic Behaviour: An Empirical Exploration'),[3] slips at one point into saying: 'The members of an ethnic category who are performing a folk-dance in a multi-ethnic situation. . . .' (p. 21). I do not see how the members of a category could do anything so active as dance. But one can see how the usage arises. A block of social phenomena may be categorized by an outside observer (the anthropologist or sociologist) and arranged by criteria he thinks to be significant. If it is a matter of ethnic arrangement, then he may decide (on the basis, say, of language, settlement pattern, family system, or art-style, or any combination of them) that the 'objective' relationships he detects justify a taxonomy of a particular form. The people upon whom he is gazing may have made their own (several) categorizations, which are likely to be different from those made from outside, yet the two sets are not completely independent because outsider though he may be, the observer must in many cases be taking the significance of the markers from that which is attributed to them by the people he is studying. The categories formed by the insiders may shape the manner in which one set of people will deal with another, keeping them at a distance or admitting them to intimacy.[4] At that point we see that a category may be a basis for active grouping; it is not itself such a grouping. I imagine that Morris Ginsberg had something of the sort in mind, at least in part, when in a well-known passage he wrote of quasi-groups: 'There are other aggregates or portions of the community which have no recognizable structure, but whose members have certain interests or modes of behaviour in common, which may at any time lead them to form themselves into definite groups. To this category of quasi-groups belong such entities as social classes, which, without

being groups, are a recruiting field for groups, and whose members have certain characteristics in common. . . .'[5]

Curiously enough, the book under review hardly deals with a major form of modern ethnic classification and its consequences. Except in Professor Edward M. Bruner's 'The Expression of Ethnicity in Indonesia', and then only incidentally, and in Dr. Ulf Hannerz's 'Ethnicity and Opportunity in Urban America', the essays do not touch upon the potent ethnic super-categories which in our day have great political consequences. I have in mind such ideas-becoming-social realities as 'African' and 'Amerindian'/'Native American'. Nor do I recall any mention in the book of the great ethnic classifications, again with political consequences, embracing people in different states, such as Kurds, Gypsies, or even Jews.

The disparity between the observer's categories and those of the insiders may lead to difficulties of another sort, which I may illustrate from Dr. Schildkrout's essay. Her comparison of first- and second-generation immigrants in Ghana leads her to conclusions, she says, 'about the importance of structural factors and the irrelevance of culture for explaining the persistence of ethnicity as a basis of personal and group identity' (p. 187). (By 'structural' she clearly means social-structural, as do all the other writers in the book who use the term; the 'structure' of structuralism has not penetrated the work represented in the collection. I make that point by way of clarification, not criticism.) Again: 'Ethnic communities *may be* culturally differentiated within a particular society, and they may use culturally defined symbols to express their distinctiveness, but I suggest that ethnicity *basically* has nothing to do with cultural differentiation, or, in other words, with cultural pluralism, although it is very often associated with it' (pp. 191 f.). Then, having qualified her proposition, she goes on: 'But I am still suggesting that we should not regard cultural differences as necessary conditions of ethnicity. It is sufficient that ethnic categories exist; the specific cultural coefficients that may but need not help to distinguish ethnic communities are of secondary importance' (pp. 192 f.). A few pages further on we find Dr. Schildkrout distinguishing what she (twice) calls 'real cultural differences'; for her, diacritical symbols are not such: 'If merely the idea of belonging to one descent group or another, having a distinct place of origin, or wearing a different coloured dress, rather than having different values, constitutes a difference of culture, I would agree that ethnic communities do maintain some minimal degree of cultural distinctiveness. However, it does not seem to me that the simple recognition of boundaries implies that the content within the boundaries differs in any objective cultural sense, that is in terms of cultural *values*' (p. 217).

One sees what she means. A similar point has often been made about some Jews in the West, when an attempt to make the distinction between

structural separateness and cultural levelling has been expressed in the words 'acculturation without assimilation'. But while I should not wish to dispute her particular findings, for I do not know her material well enough, I think that in so far as she generalizes she lays herself open to the objection that she is confusing what *she* decides to be important ('real cultural differences') with what is important to the people being studied. Some of the diacritics may appear minute and trivial to us, the outsiders; it does not follow from that that they are so for those for whom they have meaning and value. If I may come back to the case of the 'acculturated' Western Jews: they may seem to outsiders to be exactly like the non-Jews among whom they live (except in a very narrowly circumscribed religious field), but what they see in one another (in speech, manner, bearing, gait, and behaviour) is, so to say, a magnification of minutiae that escape the eyes and ears of outsiders.

I hope that what I have said so far has shown that *Urban Ethnicity*, by raising central problems in sociological conceptualization and analysis, has something to offer the professional reader. But of course it does more than that: it presents a number of case studies, each of which will attract its own readership. It will perhaps have been evident from my earlier notes that Africa bulks large in the studies, an unremarkable fact given the nature of the British profession of social anthropology. In fact, seven of the eleven essays are based upon African ethnography—those by Dr. Mitchell, Dr. David Parkin ('Congregational and Interpersonal Ideologies in Political Ethnicity'), Dr. Grillo, Dr. Schildkrout, Dr. P. C. Lloyd ('Ethnicity and the Structure of Inequality in a Nigerian Town in the Mid-1950s'), Dr. David M. Boswell ('Independence, Ethnicity, and Elite Status'),[6] and Dr. Charsley. The remaining four essays are upon the United States (by Dr. Hannerz), Britain (by Dr. Badr Dahya: 'The Nature of Pakistani Ethnicity in Industrial Cities in Britain'), Indonesia (by Professor Bruner), and Israel (by Dr. Deshen). For professional reasons, I find myself more attuned to the descriptive material in these four papers, and I shall comment briefly upon them in turn.

Dr. Hannerz's contribution seems to me to be quite remarkable (and in this collection unique) in its control of the data upon a complex society—a control coupled with an appealing modesty. And I think it is worth making the point that, writing upon a society foreign to him (he is a Swede), he illustrates part of the strength of the anthropological tradition: the outsider has something to add, even if only by way of shifting emphases and raising questions, to what the insiders (in this case Americans, and voluble enough) themselves contribute to an understanding of their own society. A good deal of what Dr. Hannerz has to say is inspired by Professor Cohen's work on Ibadan, and that too shows an aspect of anthropology at its best: the give-and-take between scholars working upon widely separated parts of the world. Concentrating upon Italians, Jews, and (as he calls them) blacks, Dr. Hannerz

[3] See István Mészáros, *Marx's Theory of Alienation*, London, 1970, pp. 29–30.

[4] Simon Dubnow, 'On the Tasks of the Folks-Party', *Nationalism and History*, Philadelphia, 1961, p. 230.

[5] This subject has been exhaustively analysed in my doctoral dissertation, *Socialism and the Jewish Question in Germany and Austria 1880–1914*, University of London, 1974.

[6] *Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels Werke*, Berlin, 1964, vol. 1, p. 375.

[7] See the detailed critique of this Hegelian-Marxist aberration in Roman Rosdolsky, 'Friedrich Engels und das Problem der "Geschichtslosen Völker" ', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 1964, vol. IV, pp. 87–283.

[8] T. G. Masaryk, *Die Philosophischen und Sociologischen Grundlagen des Marxismus*, Vienna, 1899, p. 454.

[9] ibid.

[10] See Annie Kriegel, *Le Pain et les roses, jalons pour une histoire des socialismes*, Paris, 1968, pp. 79–94.

[11] Robert A. Kann, *The Multi-national Empire*, New York, 1950.

[12] Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, Vienna, 1907, pp. 366–81.

[13] ibid., p. 370.

[14] ibid., p. 368.

[15] ibid., p. 376.

[16] ibid., pp. 378–79.

[17] See Dubnow, *Nationalism and History*, op. cit., p. 368, for a favourable reference to Karl Renner.

[18] ibid., p. 368.

[19] See Yves Bourdet, *Otto Bauer et la révolution*, Paris, 1968.

[20] Engelbert Pernerstorfer, 'Zur Judenfrage', *Der Jude*, Berlin, 1916, p. 308.

[21] See Robert S. Wistrich, *Socialism and the Jewish Question* . . ., op. cit., Chapter 22, on Pernerstorfer.

[22] See Robert S. Wistrich, 'Karl Marx, German Socialists and the Jewish Question 1880–1914', *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, vol. III, no. 1, 1973, pp. 92–97.

[23] Jacob Lestschinsky, *Marx i Kautskii o evreiskom voprose*, Moscow, 1907, pp. 25–29.

[24] ibid.

[25] Karl Kautsky, 'Das Massaker von Kischineff', *Die Neue Zeit*, 1902–03, pp. 303–09.

[26] Karl Kautsky, *Rasse und Judentum*, Berlin, 1914, p. 79.

[27] ibid., p. 67.

[28] See Otto Heller, *Der Untergang des Judentums*, Vienna and Berlin, 1931, pp. 21–22.

[29] Johann Pollack, 'Der Politische Zionismus', *Die Neue Zeit*, 1897–98, pp. 598–600.

[30] Heller, *Der Untergang des Judentums*, op. cit., pp. 21–22.

[31] Max Zetterbaum, 'Probleme der jüdisch-proletarischen Bewegung', *Die Neue Zeit*, 1900–01, pp. 368–73.

[32] Isaac Deutscher, *The Non-Jewish Jew and other Essays*, Oxford, 1968, p. 26.

[33] See Chapters 8 and 22 of my Ph.D. thesis, op. cit.

[34] Deutscher, op. cit., p. 26.

[35] Marc Jarblum, 'Soixante ans du problème juif dans la théorie et la pratique du bolchévisme', *La Revue Socialiste*, October 1964, no. 176. See also V. I. Lenin, 'Critical Remarks on the National Question', *Prosvescheniye*, October/December 1913.

[36] V. I. Lenin, 'National Culture', *Questions of National Policy and Proletarian Internationalism*, Moscow, n.d., p. 31.

[37] ibid.

[38] ibid., p. 35: 'backside' of Jewry is the version given in the Moscow Foreign Publishing Translation of Lenin's article.

[39] ibid.

[40] J. V. Stalin, 'Marxism and the National Question', in B. Franklin, ed., *The Essential Stalin, Major Theoretical Writings 1905–52*, London, 1973, pp. 62–65.

discusses 'ethnicity and opportunity' within a general setting in which the 'Anglo-Saxons have been the host group to other immigrants from the beginning of colonization' (p. 46). (That perspective is different, as he points out, from that adopted by students of ethnicity in, at least, post-colonial Africa.) The WASPS (he does not use that acronym) 'usually seem not to be considered an ethnic group at all; they are non-ethnic "real Americans", while those usually thought of as "ethnic" are the later immigrants. . . .' (ibid.). It is an interesting point that later in the book an American anthropologist, Professor Bruner, looking at Indonesia, says of the Javanese that they 'do not really understand what ethnicity is about; they are the WASPS of Indonesia' (p. 275). That is well put.

Inter alia Dr. Hannerz comments upon the various strategies used in the rise of immigrant minorities, 'ethnic hegemonies' (he is very good here on criminality among Italians), entrepreneurship within ethnic boundaries, ethnic brokers, and ethnic solidarity in relation to class. In this last context he discusses in a couple of excellent pages the conflict within American Jewry from the late nineteenth century to the 1930s. He concludes (p. 66):

> One question readily arises out of these facts. Why did the Eastern European and the German Jews come to form a single group in the United States at all? Most new ethnic groups which emerge in urban communities seem to have a wider base of cultural similarity than that shared by these two groups, coming from different countries, entering the United States at different times, and occupying, originally quite different niches in the opportunity structure. Perhaps one part of the answer involves the peculiar power of the dominant group in the United States to decide what people should share, willingly or unwillingly, one ethnic label. The German Jewish group, which could conceivably have desired not to become identified with the later arrivals, was not free to define its own ethnic boundaries.

I do not think it likely that a Jew would have raised that question, and it is all the more valuable for that. Perhaps Dr. Hannerz is overlooking the point that in so far as the German Jews in the United States wanted to remain a separable entity (and some presumably did not, disappearing into WASPdom), it could only be on the terms that they stay attached to some version of the Jewish religion; and that of necessity brought them into a wider group, however much Reform Judaism may once have served to distinguish them. If Dr. Hannerz had raised a different question, Why did the German Jews in the United States not become Germans *tout court*?, he might have got on to other aspects of the American mosaic. If he does not already know the section in the biography of the American anthropologist Alfred Kroeber that illustrates the Germanness of the German Jews in nineteenth-century Manhattan, he might

with profit turn to it. Mrs. Kroeber writes of the 'subcommunity of bourgeois German-Gentile-Jewish immigrants and first-generation and second-generation Americans'; of the time before 'the serener German identity was lost and all subcommunities in the city had become—whatever else—separately Gentile, separately Jew'; and of 'the relative slowness of the mingling between the Anglo-Saxon and German strains of the city at a time when the lines between German-Gentile and German-Jew had not been drawn.'[7]

Dr. Badr Dahya's paper brings me close to home. His sharp observation of Pakistanis in Bradford and Birmingham is exemplary, as is his ramming home of the lesson that social analysis, to be successful, must start from an understanding of what is intended by those under study. There are a few pages (102–108) where Dr. Dahya skilfully tackles some of what he looks upon as the fundamentally mistaken interpretations of Pakistani behaviour in the housing market. His prime targets are Rex and Moore on Sparkbrook, saying of them that 'they have imposed their own political perspectives on the immigrants' housing situation in Sparkbrook' (p. 106), and going on, having drawn Krausz into the argument, to assert that the writers he is discussing 'have assumed that the immigrants and the authors share a single frame of reference, a similar perspective; so that what appears to the observer to be poorer housing with low amenities and overcrowding is similarly viewed by the immigrants. But the situation as seen from the inside, that is, by the immigrants, and contrasted with living conditions in the immigrants' village of origin presents a different picture. . . .' (p. 108). I am not sure that Dr. Dahya is completely fair in his onslaught, but he has an engaging directness and no-nonsense style.

Dr. Dahya's essay stands on its own to illustrate the situation in Britain, and in that light one might well think that something more general should have been included on that country, so that, at the very least, we were made to see the Pakistanis within some general framework of British ethnicity. Dr. Dahya might have tried his hand at that, surely. Turning to Professor Bruner's essay on Indonesia, I confess to some disappointment at what seems to me to be the author's reluctance to venture with more confidence outside the range of experience afforded him by his field work among the Batak in their Sumatran homeland and in Bandung in Java. Since I have earlier taken the opportunity to underline some of the advantages of social anthropology, I should now point to one of its weaknesses: a certain timorousness before the literature upon a large and complex society. I think one might fairly have expected that the sole contribution to the book on Indonesia would have dealt more fully with the literature. On the credit side, Professor Bruner goes interestingly over the contrast between Medan and Bandung, drawing attention in particular to the contrast between a 'city of minorities' and one dominated by a majority, the

Sundanese. Moreover, the paper introduces a fresh theoretical note in 'symbolic interaction theory', although there may be differences of opinion about the novelty of the approach except in regard to its name. I have already quoted one of Professor Bruner's perceptive comments; there is another I should like to reproduce: 'There are two ways for a leader to commit political suicide; one is to deny his ethnicity and the other is to be too obviously ethnic. In Indonesia, ethnicity must be expressed, but it must be disguised' (p. 277).

I come finally to Israel, which, like Indonesia, does not seem to me to be generally enough treated. To begin with, Dr. Deshen's essay is confined to Jews; in 1975 one is likely to be interested in some entity called Palestinian—ethnic groups are born and die in history, and by no means simply because their members perish. Men reclassify themselves and are reclassified. 'Arab' itself is a case in point, 'Palestinian' a case now to be studied.[8] Perhaps by their ethnic perennity, Jews are inclined to look upon more recent entities as upstarts.

In an earlier part of this review I mentioned Dr. Deshen's support of the view that 'ethnic manifestations' may be 'primarily cultural'. What he seems to be trying to do is to avoid talking about ethnic groups, giving pride of place to 'the elemental components of ethnicity, namely, particular actions that may be described as ethnic actions' (p. 282). But one had better know that for Dr. Deshen 'group' appears to imply group 'in a corporate sense' (p. 281), and that must surely be a limitation upon his sociology. His general argument for Israel is that since the 1960s the political mobilization of ethnicity has been on the decline, political ethnicity giving place to cultural, a general trend he derives from his data on Tunisian immigrants. However, the generalization made at p. 284 seems to be considerably qualified at p. 295 where Dr. Deshen writes: 'In fact it would not be difficult to produce data to document the continuing potency of political ethnicity in Israel. . . . But in the kind of social contexts I have been describing, the declining trend of political ethnicity is undeniably there.' I think that one would need to know much more about Israeli politics, ethnicity, and religion to evaluate the various strands in Dr. Deshen's argument.

At the very least, *ASA 12* (to give the book its professional short title) will have shown how perplexing are the problems it approaches, and how difficult it is in the social sciences to devise a language that, not too far from common speech, will state those problems clearly.

NOTES

[1] In his Introduction to Fredrik Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, Bergen, Oslo, and London, 1969.

[2] *Race Attitudes in South Africa*, London, 1937, p. 254.

[3] 'I wish to distinguish first between "ethnicity" as a construct of perceptual

or cognitive phenomena on the one hand, and the "ethnic group" as a construct of behavioural phenomena on the other; and, second, between commonsense notions and analytical notions of ethnicity' (p. 1). For its methodology, this paper would deserve a review to itself; I simply bring it to the attention of the reader.

[4] cf. what Dr. Mitchell writes at pp. 20 ff.

[5] *Sociology*, London, 1934, p. 40.

[6] The reader puzzled (as he should be) by the quotation from Barth that appears at pp. 316 f. in Dr. Boswell's essay needs to be told that it contains two misprints, one of them so serious that it makes nonsense of Barth's argument. In line 2, p. 317, for 'derived' read 'divorced'.

[7] Theodora Kroeber, *Alfred Kroeber, A Personal Configuration*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970, pp. 25, 38 f. A separate German Jewish community in New York was able to absorb other Jews into its ranks; cf. Charles S. Liebman, 'Religion, Class, and Culture in American Jewish History', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. IX, no. 2, Dec. 1967, p. 235: 'As one astute observer of Jewish life at the turn of the century noted, when Russian and Polish Jews made money, they moved uptown and overnight became Germans.' (The reference is to a privately printed work by Judah David Eisenstein, 1929.) For Philadelphia see E. Digby Baltzell, 'The Development of a Jewish Upper Class in Philadelphia: 1782–1940', in Marshall Sklare, ed., *The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group*, Glencoe, Ill., 1958, on the assimilation of German Jews into 'the various German-American communities', p. 278; and on the historical blending of German and East European Jews, p. 284. And cf. Lloyd P. Gartner, 'Immigration and the Formation of American Jewry, 1840–1925', pp. 39 ff., in Marshall Sklare, ed., *The Jew in American Society*, New York, 1974.

[8] See, e.g., Bernard Lewis, *The Palestinians and the PLO, A Historical Approach*, A Commentary Report, published by Commentary Magazine, New York, 1975.

BOOK REVIEWS

DAVID NOVAK, *Law and Theology in Judaism*, with a foreword by Louis Finkelstein, xvi + 176 pp., Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1974, $10.

David Novak is a young Conservative Rabbi in Baltimore, who is a member of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of the Rabbinical Assembly, and to his present work Louis Finkelstein justly prefaces a warm commendation. The book is, in effect, a series of expanded responsa on a variety of topics—abortion, hunting, war, suicide, the *aguna* (a wife who is still bound to a husband either because he is lost or because he refuses to give her a *get* or bill of divorcement, and who therefore cannot in Jewish law remarry). It is clear from a reading of this worthwhile book, from the detailed references to the relevant literature, and from the lucid and intelligible summaries of the arguments, that Rabbi Novak, as a practising Conservative Rabbi, is concerned with Jewish law in the modern world.

The author takes his text from Boaz Cohen in *Law and Tradition in Judaism* (p. 56): 'What principles should guide us in interpreting Jewish law today? Interpreting law presupposes a mental picture of what we are doing and why we are doing it. What is it we do when we interpret law? To what authorities do we turn for guidance? To what extent are we influenced by them?, and in case of conflicting opinions how do we choose between them? . . . These are problems in philosophy.' Are they not rather problems of justice and public policy? And are they not analogous to the problems faced by a judge who has before him conflicting precedents, many decided under vastly different social conditions? Analogous; yet, for two reasons, not identical. First, secular law can be changed by a legislature. It is true that—until recent times—the power of making *Takkanot* (or ordinances) was often exercised. Second, a judge, while giving due weight to the current views of society brings to adjudication his own notions of justice acquired from his intellectual discipline and his experience of life. The *Dayan* (or Rabbinical judge), is, by nature of his office, circumscribed. Yet, one would have thought, some training in legal ways of thinking and in the judicial process would be of great value to give a broader outlook—an ampler air.

In his first chapter, 'Law and Theology in Judaism', Rabbi Novak explains his terms and the wide scope, as well as the limitations, of the Rabbinical office. Judaism, he observes, of any period historically understood, is composed of *Halakhah* (law) and *Aggadah* which he renders as theology—a term which comprises not only a conceptual approach but an outlook upon the whole of life. 'Judaism revolves on an axis whose poles are the legal point of Halakhah and the theological point of Aggadah . . . To understand the relationship between Halakhah and Aggadah is a task of philosophy' (p. 1). By 'philosophy' he means 'the systematically intelligent

enquiry into the essential structures of an object . . .' (ibid.). These components are interrelated: each is essential to the other. Precepts and concepts, by themselves, are inadequate. 'The religious effectiveness of the rabbinical vocation depends on *how* the rabbi understands the essential interrelation between law and theology in specific cases' (p. 2). 'The Rabbi must be the practical philosopher of Judaism' (ibid.). Halakhah is analogous to the data in empirical science; Aggadah, to the model that widens the perspective (p. 4). 'The task, then, is to see how the relationship functions' (ibid.). 'Law and Theology in Jewish Marriage' is selected as an example. Halakhically, Jewish divorce is consensual. Yet, 'The Aggadah has tempered the Halakhah by placing a limitation on the grounds for divorce' (p. 8).

Perhaps the most interesting and the most important chapter in the book is that dealing with 'The Agunah, or the case of the Unco-operative Husband' (chap. 4; pp. 31–54). Here one can read of the attempts made, especially in recent years, to solve the problem within the possibilities of Jewish law. There are two categories of *Agunah*. A husband is lost at sea, or missing in battle. In Jewish law his death cannot be presumed. There must be at least one witness from whose evidence the fact of death can be established. In this type of case, the Rabbis have eased the rules of evidence, but one witness is still essential. Another solution—whose adoption was widespread during the Second World War, and the wars in which Israel was engaged—was for the husband, before leaving for the front, to give his wife a 'conditional' divorce which stipulated that if, within a given period, he did not return, the divorce should operate restrospectively (p. 31).

The real difficulty is in the second type of *Agunah*, the woman who cannot obtain a *get* from her husband. No solution has yet commanded universal Rabbinical acceptance, though several solutions (examined in this chapter) have been proposed by eminent scholars, chiefly (though not entirely) by Conservative Rabbis. The issue is bedevilled by confrontation between Orthodox and Conservative. Further, the Orthodox Rabbinate does not appear to view with favour the suggestions even of an orthodox scholar whose vocation is academic—teaching and writing—and who neither holds a Rabbinical office nor has published a recognized volume of Rabbinical responsa (*Teshubot*).

A civil decree of divorce is granted under the law of the land, but the husband subsequently refuses, through spite or except on payment of a substantial sum, to deliver a *get*, essential to dissolve the marriage in Jewish law. By the law of the land, the parties can remarry; by Jewish law, they are bound and cannot remarry. If the wife remarries by the law of the land, her children, by any subsequent civil marriage, become in Jewish law *mamzerim* (children of a prohibited union) and will be under certain Jewish matrimonial disabilities. Historically, if there have been some breaches of the conjugal status the *Beth Din* can compel the husband to deliver the *get*, but if he declines, no sanction can be applied. In the State of Israel, where the parties are Jews and are nationals of, or resident in, the State, they are governed in matters of personal status by Jewish law, and should the husband improperly decline to deliver a *get*, he can be imprisoned; but there have been cases where the husband has preferred to accept that sanction.

Rabbi Novak analyses the major modern proposals, giving relevant

references, and then offers his own. One of these solutions is 'conditional marriage'—first mooted by the French Rabbinate in 1907 and, later, by the Turkish Rabbinate in 1924. The *Ketubah* would stipulate that if the marriage is civilly terminated and, within a specified period, no *get* is delivered, the marriage is retrospectively annulled. The main orthodox proponent of this view has been Eliezer Berkovits of Chicago, who, in a detailed study in 1966, pleaded to orthodoxy to implement his suggestion—apparently, without result. But in 1968, the American Conservative movement took up his proposal in a responsum, and put it into practice (p. 44). An ante-nuptial agreement effectuates the purpose, in which the bridegroom makes a declaration to the bride (to which she consents), as follows: '(1) If the marriage should end in civil divorce, and within six months I give you a *get*, betrothal (*kiddushin*) and marriage (*nissuin*) will have remained binding. (2) If, however, the marriage should end in civil divorce but within six months I do not give you a *get*, our betrothal and marriage will have been null and void.' The responsum closes, saying that the decree of nullity is simply 'a last resort to prevent *iggun*'. It is recommended that when a decree is issued to the wife, a similar decree will not be issued to the husband in default. Nor will he be granted permission to remarry, unless he gives his wife a *get*. 'This proposal has not yet received universal rabbinical consent' (p. 45).

Another suggested solution had been 'Pre-arranged Divorce', based on halakhic sources and proposed in 1930 by a distinguished American scholar, Louis M. Epstein, to the Rabbinical Assembly. At the celebration of the marriage, the husband would execute an instrument authorizing the *Beth Din* to give his wife a divorce in his absence, and appointing the necessary witnesses and agents. The authority for divorce by proxy would be included in the *Ketubah*. Since, in Jewish law, the husband must personally appoint the scribe and the witnesses for the divorce, Dr. Epstein suggested that the husband appoint his own wife as his agent, to write her own *get* with rabbinic approval. In the *Ketubah* he drafted a clause giving her that authority —but 'only if at any time I disappear or fail to support her or fail to fulfil my conjugal duty for a period of 3 years or if we are divorced from each other by the action of the civil court' (p. 47). The Agudat HaRabbanim published a broadside and issue was joined between Orthodoxy and Conservatism (p. 48). The suggestion was withdrawn. The practical difficulty with this, and with the previous proposal, was that it made 'the marriage ceremony a prelude to divorce' (ibid.).

'The most conservative of all the contemporary proposals' on *agunah* has been made by Professor Saul Lieberman—one of the greatest Talmudists of the day. Early in 1950 he proposed a new clause in the *Ketubah*, whereby both husband and wife agree to be bound by the *Beth Din* of the (Conservative) Rabbinical Assembly and the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. The parties agree to recognize this *Beth Din* as having authority 'to counsel us in the light of Jewish Tradition and to summon either party at the request of the other, in order to enable the party so requesting to live in accordance with the standards of the Jewish law of marriage . . . We authorize the *Beth Din* to impose such terms of compensation as it may see fit for failure to respond to its summons or to carry out its decision' (pp. 49, 50). A later English version of the Aramaic clause reads: '. . . and if either spouse shall

fail to honour the demand of the other or to carry out the decision of the *Beth Din* or its representatives, then the other spouse may invoke any and all remedies available in civil law and equity to enforce compliance with the *Beth Din*'s decision and this solemn obligation' (p. 50). This proposal Rabbi Novak has himself adopted, with the amendment that the new clause be the subject of a separate ante-nuptial agreement, in order to meet the objection to an innovation in the text of the *Ketubah*.

Professor Lieberman's proposal was attacked in 1959 by Rabbi Norman Lamm, a distinguished Orthodox authority, on the ground that the clause was too vague and indeterminate to become, in Jewish law, the basis of an agreement. Rabbi Novak deals with those objections (pp. 52–53). Two further practical objections have been raised: (1) that 'there is no serious contemplation at this time of marital controversy', but as Rabbi Novak points out, social conditions have changed considerably since 1959; (2) 'the proposal would not stand up in a civil court of law'. In 1973, a Canadian Court made a declaratory order that, following a civil divorce, the applicant wife was entitled, as one of her rights under the *Ketubah*, to have delivered to her by the respondent husband a Jewish bill of divorcement, or *get*. (Excerpts from the judgement of Wilson J. are set out in *Israel Law Review*, vol. 9 (1974), pp. 440–47, and comment at p. 443, by Ze'ev Falk who observes that the order would need to be more explicit and specify the steps to be taken if the husband were obdurate. However, the reviewer understands from Professor Falk that the judgement has been reversed on appeal, but no report is yet to hand.)

Professor Falk, a historian of the Halakhah and a noted authority on Jewish family law, has recently re-examined systematically all the relevant Halakhah in a socio-historical approach. He discusses severally and at length the various remedies possible in Jewish law, with suggestions of his own—and proposes his own draft of an ante-nuptial agreement. This valuable monograph (in Hebrew) was published after Rabbi Novak's admirable contribution was already in press: Ze'ev W. Falk, *The Divorce Action by the Wife in Jewish Law* (Assistance in Sociological and Statistical Aspects, Dan Schnit), Institute for Legislative Research and Comparative Law, Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 1973.

GEORGE J. WEBBER

IGNAZ MAYBAUM, *Trialogue between Jew, Christian and Muslim*, xi + 179 pp., The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973, £3.

It is not easy to review a collection of some thirty papers and addresses dealing with such diverse subjects as, for example, 'Hasidism', 'Martin Buber and his biographers', 'Paul and Mohammed', 'The Jewish World Diaspora', 'The Doctrine of the Trinity', 'The Cycle of the Jewish Year', 'Shylock', and 'Humanism as a Monotheistic Heresy'. As a matter of fact, these thirty brief pieces are neither articles nor essays in the academic sense of the term; they

could be characterized more adequately as short addresses to a religiously interested audience or perhaps as the kind of material suitable for the 'religious column' of a weekly journal. Perhaps the most adequate name for this particular *genre littéraire* is the 'mini-sermon', and Dr. Maybaum's mini-sermons exhibit all the virtues as well as weaknesses of that genre. They are apodeictic and pontificatingly dogmatic, as befits a preacher's pathos and enviable self-assurance. The views expressed are uninhibitedly one-sided and pompously generalizing, as befits the style of an enthusiastic gospeller who feels that he has a message to proclaim. All this does not make the author's views any less stimulating, though some readers may occasionally be stimulated also to dissent or even irritation.

The book opens with a somewhat unkind reference to Unitarianism which could be infuriating were it not so amusing (Preface, p. x). According to the author, the God of the Unitarians 'is the product of the syncretism prevalent in times of religious decline', and hence Unitarians have no contribution to make to the 'trialogue' between real Jews, real Christians, and real Muslims. The historian of religion may well shake his head at this cavalier dismissal, and wonder at the ease with which some eager Jewish dialogual or trialogual enthusiasts write off the Unitarians instead of considering them as the closest approximation to the rabbinic ideal of the 'Noahide'. What renders the situation doubly amusing is the fact that rabbis who consider themselves spokesmen of the trend called 'progressive' Judaism (alas! few things are as quaintly archaic and outdated as the progressivisms of yesterday!) rarely show awareness of the fact that occasionally the boot can be on the other foot. There are many ecumenically-minded Christians who want to engage in a dialogue with 'real' (that is, orthodox) Jews rather than with that strange syncretism called Progressive Judaism.

Dr. Maybaum seems well aware of the fact that his culture-hero, Franz Rosenzweig, completely distorted Islam wherever and whenever he referred to it in his *Star of Redemption*. Unfortunately Maybaum's own references to that religion do not exhibit a profounder or more adequate understanding —certainly not a good omen for a successful 'trialogue'. I very much doubt whether a modern Muslim would recognize himself in Dr. Maybaum's high-handed pronunciamentos, though it is easy enough to identify the functional *Sitz im Leben* of the author's treatment of the subject: Islam can serve as a convenient (pejorative) peg on which to hang an analogy with orthodox Judaism. Traditional Jewish *halakhah* is handled by the orthodox rabbis exactly as traditional Muslim law is handled by the orthodox *'ulama* and *fuqaha*. The comparison, trite and commonplace as it is, is undoubtedly also useful on the level of simplistic analogies. But to take it too seriously and even to speak of the 'Islamic view of the law' held by medieval Judaism (perhaps it was the other way round and the weakness of Islam was to have held a 'Jewish view' of the *fiqh*?) but subsequently discarded by the progressiveness of progressive Judaism is really turning a pretty little metaphor into a propagandistic slogan. Ultimately the author's argument is designed as a spirited defence of the West—which Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are said to represent each in its own way—against mysticism (from which God and all his saints preserve us), and more especially against the most insidiously dangerous form of the latter: Asian mysticism which is nothing but

the nihilism that leads to the destruction of man (cf., for example, pp. 41, 151). No doubt Professor R. C. Zaehner would have heartily concurred, but some other readers will stop shaking their heads and merely gape with open mouth at this solemn Jewish re-affirmation of an old chestnut of Christian theology.

It would be ungracious and ungrateful to list all the wilfully arbitrary pronunciamentos in this book. Not every reader will accept the matter-of-course identification of the 'Greek Spirit' with 'holy madness' (p. 5) and with its so-called dionysiac component. There are plenty of people around who somehow consider sobriety, measure, and rationality as constituting a major part of the Greek legacy. And some of us even vaguely remember something about ecstatic prophets foaming at the mouth in the Old Testament! Since this reviewer is an incurable liberal, he gladly affirms that the author, like every other polemicist with strong convictions, is entitled to his views and idiosyncrasies, and this includes the right to consider Bèshtian Hasidism as an aberration and to praise the *mithnaggedim* as the representatives of 'true unadulterated Judaism' (p. 4). In fact, one is glad to learn that there are at least some people who really do know what 'true unadulterated' Judaism is! But to assert that Hasidism had no doctrine is so patently untrue that even the most easy-going and liberal reviewer must enter a protest. There is plenty to object to in Buber's interpretation of Hasidism (which is almost as wilful and arbitrary as Maybaum's interpretation of Judaism), but Buber's mistake was not in attributing a doctrine to Hasidism, but in the sources he chose and in the method he employed for reconstructing that doctrine. Hasidism as a form of pietism is a trite commonplace, and it is useful to be reminded of it once again by Dr. Maybaum. But the real problem is the crucial transition from pietism to mysticism. Is it possible to maintain seriously that Sephardi Jewry had kabbalah but no pietism? What about the greatest classic of Jewish pietism, Bahya ibn Pakuda's *Book of the Duties of the Heart*? And if pietism is an inevitable antidote to the petrification of pilpulistic Talmudism, has the latter ever been pilloried more vehemently than in the great kabbalistic-pietistic work SheLaH (ca. 1600)—an attack far more impressive than those emanating from the Enlightenment or from progressive rabbis because it came from one of the greatest Talmudists of the period? No doubt it broadens (though it does not deepen) our understanding of Hasidism if we set the latter in a wider cultural European context. But why does the author dwell at such length on the well-known but essentially irrelevant comparison with Protestant pietism, but fail to discuss the emergence of Russian orthodox *staretz*dom in the area and in the period in which Hasidism originated? The great *staretz* Paissi was a contemporary of the Besht! Dr. Maybaum is surely entitled to his anti-Zionism. *Honi soit qui mal y pense.* But to call Buber's *Israel and Palestine*—one of his finest books—a monument to 'blood and soil ideology' seems to be going beyond the bounds of fairness and of (even polemical) good taste.

The bibliography at the end of the volume is essentially a guide to the author's own background reading. It is not so useful to the reader desirous of deepening his knowledge of the many interesting issues raised in the volume—whether Buber's thought, Hasidism, Islam, or Christian theology. Readers who are not so concerned with the conventional demands of

academic scholarship will derive much profit and enjoyment from Dr. Maybaum's spirited mini-sermons. They may at times be exasperatingly wrong-headed, but they are also stimulating; they may be one-sided, but they try to make a point; they substitute an at times pompous pathos for scholarly prudence, but they are written *con brio*. One reader at least has laid down the book with the knowledge that he learned nothing at all about the 'Trialogue between Jew, Christian and Muslim'—a very questionable notion at best, and certainly a most misleading title for the volume under review—but that he has encountered an interesting and stimulating sample of the kind of theological thinking that is going on in some sections of contemporary Jewry.

R. J. ZWI WERBLOWSKY

GERSHOM SCHOLEM, *Sabbatai Sevi the Mystical Messiah, 1626–1676*, xxvii + 1000 pp., The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1973, £9.

This great book was originally published in Hebrew in 1957. The English version by Zwi Werblowsky—the best possible translator—is in fact a new edition with conspicuous additions and changes by the author. A summary of the results is given by Scholem in his article on Shabbetai Zevi (or Sabbatai Sevi) and the Shabbetean Movement in the *Encyclopaedia Judaica*. All the articles contributed by Scholem to this Encyclopaedia on Kabbalah and related subjects (and therefore also the article on Shabbetai Zevi) have been collected in a substantial volume by the Keter Publishing House of Jerusalem (1974). This second volume provides the indispensable conceptual introduction to the monograph on Shabbetai and adds information on various personalities of the Shabbetean movement: furthermore, it gives the only comprehensive account in English of the Frankist movement, which Scholem considers to be a development (and in a sense the conclusion) of Shabbeteanism.

Messiahs, one must admit, are not such a rare commodity. But Shabbetai Zevi, a native of Smyrna, was a Messiah in the very middle of the seventeenth century, a time of millenarian beliefs, and although he operated within the Ottoman Empire his appearance caused a profound commotion among the Jews living in Christian countries and even among non-Jews. He is a Messiah in the full light of history, as not many Messiahs are. Another uncommon feature is that we can exactly identify the man—the Kabbalist Nathan of Gaza—who confirmed Shabbetai in his vocation and played with him what Scholem calls the double role of 'the John the Baptist and the Paul of the New Messiah' (p. 207). What is more, Shabbetai is perhaps unique in having become an apostate Messiah. On 31 May 1665 he declared himself a Messiah in Gaza, and after a ride through the streets on horseback he appointed twelve of his followers to be the representatives of the twelve tribes. (The sequence of events is only approximate.) In the following year, on 16 September 1666 in Adrianople, when the Turkish authorities placed before him

the alternative of death or of conversion to Islam, he chose conversion and never went back on it. But he apparently continued to remain convinced that he was the Messiah and certainly retained a part of his followers, including Nathan of Gaza. A minority of the faithful became, at least outwardly, Muslim like him, but the majority remained Jews and formed a secret sect, the influence of which on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Judaism represents one of Scholem's problems. Nathan of Gaza and others had to reinterpret Messianism in view of the new fact—the Messiah turned apostate. This implied a new theology.

Scholem's monograph is first of all a masterpiece in what we may call the conventional art of biography. He has discovered, critically evaluated, and put together in a consistent picture an astonishing amount of new material—some of which came to light as a consequence of the interest raised by the earlier Hebrew version of this work. Shabbetai Zevi becomes a new person in this book in the same way as J. Burckhardt has become a new person in W. Kaegi's biography—by the discovery and sober examination of new facts. But the book is far more than that. As I have already implied, Scholem had to build up almost *ex nihilo* the conceptual framework for his biography. Shabbetai Zevi is not a man whose life can be told simply by collecting biographical data and by presenting them within a recognizable social and cultural context. His thoughts, actions, and influence make sense only if related to religious speculations and beliefs which were for all practical purposes unknown to western scholars until Scholem discovered them. It is part of the situation that the direct heirs of the Kabbalistic tradition and/or the Messianic experiences of the Shabbeteans were unable to explain themselves to outsiders. Thus the present work is the culmination and verification of all the research done by Scholem to understand the Kabbalistic tradition both as a manifestation of Judaism and as a phenomenon of religious life at large.

The belief in the advent of a Messiah is, of course, independent in origin from Kabbalistic speculations: but Kabbalistic speculations in Judaism are never independent of Messianic beliefs. How many Jews were interested in Kabbalah during the seventeenth century, it is impossible to say. But Scholem has shown that the spreading from Safed of the mystical speculations of 'the divine Rabbi' Isaac Luria (1534–72) gave a new impulse to Messianic expectations. Lurianic Kabbalah was a myth of exile and redemption, and apparently Luria himself, as well as some of his pupils, believed that he was the Messiah son of Joseph, the harbinger of the Messiah son of David (the former was subject to the transmigration of souls, the latter free from it). By modifying Lurianic ideas the prophet of the Messiah Shabbetai, Nathan of Gaza, was able not only to present a meaningful interpretation of Shabbetai's role, but to justify all the anomic features of his personality, including his conversion to Islam. Like the red heifer of Numbers 19, the Messiah purifies the unclean but in the process becomes impure himself.

Scholem makes the very important point that the tremendous and immediate enthusiasm with which the Jews everywhere, without any obvious class pattern, received the news of the arrival of the Messiah is not to be explained as a simple reaction to the parlous situation of Ashkenazi Jews in Poland and Russia since the massacres of 1648. Amsterdam, Leghorn, and Salonika,

three of the Jewish communities most receptive to the Shabbatean movement, were very far from the places of persecution. Sephardi Jewry was deeply involved. In Shabbetai himself the experience of the exodus from Spain must have counted for something if in his moments of mystical elation he sang the Spanish erotic song on Meliselda, the emperor's daughter (M. Athias, *Romancero Sefaradi*, Jerusalem, 1961, p. 82). But Shabbetai's family was not of Sephardi stock: it had come to Smyrna from Morea and was said to be of Ashkenazi origin. Marrano attitudes undoubtedly eased the way to his conversion to Islam and helped to make it acceptable to his most devoted followers. The Messiah and his immediate disciples became involved in rites of breaking the law: they used the blessing of 'He who permits the forbidden'. But the Jews at large, to judge from contemporary reports, were far more moved by the call to repentance and by the other traditional aspects of Messianism: rumours of the appearance of the prophet Elijah and of the reappearance of the ten lost tribes were among the earliest sources of excitement. Interestingly enough, Shabbetai could be so effective in his Messianic impersonation because, basically of a passive nature, he expected events to declare his own destiny. He had to be discovered and recognized by Nathan of Gaza; and later he found confirmation of his vocation in the strangeness of his own adventure. This poor good Jew had never expected to become an apostate and therefore found a great, though obscure, meaning in what to his eyes could only be abomination. He was, once again, the 'suffering Servant'.

Scholem is legitimately interested in Shabbetai as a Jew, and in his similarities with, and differences from, Jesus. There is indeed evidence that Shabbetai and Nathan of Gaza were concerned with Jesus and his position in the scheme of salvation. Scholem has profound pages about the new value of pure faith, unaccompanied by specific works and requiring no sign of miracle, which Shabbetai (or Nathan of Gaza?) introduced into Judaism. Scholem constantly assumes that Shabbetai's followers and believers were good Jews, but is not surprised to find that Jacob Frank, who started as a Shabbetean prophet, led his disciples to baptism. The failure of Shabbetai as Messiah is for Scholem the event which opened or re-opened all the gates of Judaism: conversion to Islam and to Christianity, assimilation, Hassidism, and Zionism became possible. Though Scholem does not exclude *a priori* external influences in the Shabbetean movement, he is obviously impatient with those Jewish scholars like H. Graetz who were only too glad to transfer the embarrassing Shabbetai to the cares of Fifth Monarchy Men and other Chiliastic groups of the seventeenth century (B. S. Capp, *The Fifth Monarchy Men*, London, 1972, pp. 213, 236). Future research will decide on this point. But the Book of Daniel was far more important for the English Chiliasts than for the immediate followers of Shabbetai (cf. P. G. Rogers, *The Fifth Monarchy Men*, London, 1966). This question cannot be separated from the other question of whether Hassidism is, as Scholem has always maintained, a trend of Jewish mysticism born out of the defeat of Messianic Shabbeteanism, or has something to do with contemporary Russian sects (but see Scholem's remark in *The Messianic Idea in Judaism*, London, 1971, p. 362, n. 37, on Y. Eliach, *Proceedings of the American Academy of Jewish Research*, vol. 36, 1968, pp. 57–83). We can only hope that Scholem will soon give us

his book on the aftermath of the Shabbetean movement in Jewish life. He is aware, more than any other historian of Judaism, that the 'Jewish people have paid a very high price for the messianic idea' (p. xii). We can consider ourselves privileged in having a historian like Scholem among us. (Cf. the analysis of the Hebrew original of this book by C. Wirszubski, a pupil of Scholem who has done essential work on the thought of Nathan of Gaza, *Rivista Storica Italiana*, vol. 77, 1965, pp. 78–95. On the relevant chapter of B. D. Weinryb, *The Jews of Poland*, Philadelphia, 1973, pp. 206–35, see C. Abramsky, *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, vol. 4, 1974, pp. 98–99.)

ARNALDO MOMIGLIANO

MOSHE DAVIS, ed., *The Yom Kippur War, Israel and the Jewish People*, xviii + 362 pp., Arno Press, New York, 1974, n.p.

Like many books written and published in a hurry, this volume bears all too clearly the marks of its origin. It was a thoughtful and commendable idea of the President of Israel—and Professor Katzir contributes a foreword himself—to summon to Jerusalem, at the end of the year in which the Yom Kippur war took place, a number of Israeli scholars and Jewish intellectuals from the Diaspora to survey the Jewish scene as it stood during and after the conflict. For some future historian their immediate reactions will have significance, although the level of their contributions was very uneven and in some cases banal. There is, however, no record of their actual discussions. Instead we have a number of factual accounts of the record of various Jewish communities in fund-raising, volunteering, etc., some extracts from material recorded by the Oral History division of the Hebrew University Institute of Contemporary Jewry, and some miscellaneous documents indicating support for Israel's cause from a variety of groups.

All this provides the material for thought, without most of it being very thoughtful. All one can say is that the situation of Israel is now so precarious, the need for action of some kind so pressing, and the uncertainties as to what can or should be done both in Israel and elsewhere so manifest, that no genuine effort to get these matters discussed can be dismissed as unnecessary. It is also useful to have before one some facts that might not have been guessed at and which set one thinking, for instance that the financial contribution of British Jewry (in per capita terms) was greater than that of American Jewry—a fact which may in part be explained by the suggestion of Professor Daniel J. Elazar, in one of the most impressive of the papers, that the war actually widened the gap between the concentric circles of which the American Jewish Community is composed, bringing the inner rings closer to Israel while the outer circles drift away from Jewishness altogether.

While it is no doubt heartening to read of the willing self-sacrifice and devotion of a minority in the Diaspora and of the undimmed faith of the Jewish leadership, religious and secular, the book as a whole cannot fail to be depressing like the War itself. It is depressing because it revealed a falling-off in the support for Israel in the Gentile world at large as compared even with 1967, a falling-off accentuated by the decision to meet the Arab oil

weapon by measures of appeasement but not precipitated by it. It has also shown the hollowness of the Zionist claim that the creation of the State would solve the Jewish problem by 'normalizing' the relations between Jews and their neighbours; on the contrary, it has created a new political division to add to the existing religious and social ones and this is not confined to countries dependent on Middle East oil. For instance, Jewish voters in Australia (like Jewish voters in other western democracies) have tended to support the Left, in this case the Australian Labour Party. As a result in part of their votes, Australia has a Prime Minister, Mr. Gough Whitlam, who is the first Australian Prime Minister to be anti-Israel. How should Australian Jews vote next time? The old sources of division and indeed of antisemitism—religion in particular—may reinforce the divisions over policy towards Israel. The attitude of the Roman Catholic Church was highly equivocal in most countries—just as it has been in Ireland in regard to I.R.A. terrorism. More painful, because more unexpected, has been the attitude of Protestant fundamentalist Churches in the United States and Canada where their 'third world' sympathies have propelled them in a strongly anti-Israel direction, a fact even more hurtfully paradoxical when one recollects how much support for the original Zionist movement came from Bible-reading Christians—for instance, Lloyd George.

All this kind of thing matters more because the War and its sequel at the United Nations have shown that even with the whole-hearted support of the Diaspora, Israel cannot survive by virtue of Jewish strength, Jewish brains, and even Jewish faith alone. The Israelis can bring about a new and more terrible Massada—they are not in a position to emulate the successes of the Maccabees, unless they have the support of part of the Gentile world to balance the increasingly powerful forces of their enemies. The importance of the Diaspora lies not primarily in the money it can give or even in the immigrants it provides—though men and money help; it lies in the extent to which it can help to sway governmental decisions in Western countries.

It is not a popular role, and one understands why it was easier to get up sympathy for the Jackson amendment and for the disagreeable, but for the most part not lethal, plight of Russian Jewry than for an Israel that daily faces enemies pledged to its extinction. For to press for policies favourable to Israel may be to run the risk of being accused of an alien allegiance where simple anti-Sovietism is quite acceptable.

The other difficulty clearly implicit in this book is the incongruity of this new role with the traditional stance of Jewish intellectuals, particularly but not exclusively in the United States. For having found their friends among the upholders of fashionable left-wing causes—on racial questions for instance—they now find themselves part of a movement which is basically antagonistic to Israel. There are signs indeed that they are, in America at least, beginning to question the validity of philosophies that have got them into this predicament.

But it is of course not possible to go far along this road without being drawn into criticism of the Israeli ruling élite itself. Israel's own diplomacy now lies largely in ruins—all the cultivation of African countries has not been worth one vote in the United Nations. On the other hand, by the neglect both in the formulation and presentation of their policies, of their

likely impact on foreign governments and peoples, Israeli governments have obviously made harder the task of their would-be spokesmen abroad. And this has been made even more difficult by their fostering of the legend of Israeli military invincibility, which may have had some deterrent effect in the past, but now makes it harder to awaken people to the reality of the threat to the country's very existence. As Professor Maurice Freedman says specifically, and as emerges implicitly in some of the other papers, there is good reason to question the depth of Israel's own understanding of the environment with which the State has to grapple and the psychology of other peoples whom it is necessary to influence. Successful political operations depend upon good intelligence, and reliance on the traditional rhetoric and on the automatic responses of committed Zionists is inadequate. Israel's diplomatic defeats cannot all be put down to the power of the oil weapon, the malevolence of Arab governments, or the self-interested meddling of the Russians.

There is evidence in this volume of some degree of self-examination by parts of the Diaspora, especially in the United States; there is rather less evidence of any fundamental rethinking of positions on the Israeli side. But perhaps the situation is one where reason itself is inadequate and where faith alone gives the courage to hold on. In these circumstances the critical approach might cause resentment, but it is no good pretending that this is anything but a disappointing book for one with so distinguished an imprimatur.

MAX BELOFF

JÜRGEN HABERMAS, *Theory and Practice*, translated from the German by John Viertel, ix + 310 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1974, £4 (paperback, £1.80).

This is the third volume of Habermas's work to appear in English. *Towards A Rational Society* contained the important essay 'Technology and Science as "Ideology" ' and other essays presenting his conceptual and theoretical analysis of the general structure of advanced capitalism, as well as essays on the decline of the working class and the rise of student groups as agencies of political changes; *Knowledge and Human Interests* outlined an epistemological programme for a theory of scientific knowledge and attempted to ground this programme in a social theory which takes the form of a philosophical anthropology; and now *Theory and Practice* extends his theory of advanced capitalism and the concept of 'critique' and discusses various issues from social and political philosophy which are relevant to the question of the relation of theory to action.

Habermas is a difficult writer to understand, and it is therefore unfortunate not only that many of his essays appeared in English some ten years after they were written but also that each of the volumes of translations contains essays written at different times—the volume under review contains essays written between 1963 and 1971 and his essays as a whole span a

similar period. The first two chapters of *Theory and Practice* discuss aspects of political philosophy and the idea of natural law and are followed by three chapters discussing aspects of Hegel's work. The final two chapters, together with the introduction, will be of greatest interest to the sociologist: they discuss the notion of critique and its relation to social practice, outline the main characteristics of advanced capitalism, and reflect upon some criticisms made of Habermas's position.

Habermas seeks to develop the Marxist notion of 'critique', which lies formally somewhere between positive science and philosophy; substantively he describes it as a philosophy of history oriented by political interests but which is scientifically testable (p. 212). A critique derives its validity from its relation to the social crisis, for without such an objective location in social practice, critique can only be subjective and arbitrary moralizing. An understanding of critique, therefore, must be related to an understanding of crisis. When Marx wrote, positive science and philosophy were united and were directly involved in practical action. Since that time the institutionalization of academic subjects has led to a separation of philosophy from science and to a differentiation between economics, sociology, and political science; while the doctrine of value freedom has led to the separation of theory from practice. For this reason, a mere critique of political economy will no longer suffice—the whole notion of critique must be re-examined.

At the same time, the social crisis has changed. Contradiction, the Hegelian negation, is the crisis which must be resolved through rational critique. Marx saw this crisis as a material process, analysable in terms of the dialectics of social labour—the labour theory of value, exploitation, surplus value, and the crisis of overproduction. However, argues Habermas, certain changes in advanced capitalism, merely intimated by Marx in parts of the *Grundrisse*, require that our conception of crisis be modified. The scientific development of the technical forces of production has become a source of value itself, independent of the physical labour embodied in the machinery. Within an expanding capitalist system, therefore, the weaker economic classes can pursue their interests in the political arena and ensure that state intervention brings about a political regulation of distribution which does not threaten profit maximization. A Keynesian policy of crisis management incorporates elements of the superstructure into the economic base and ensures that social development is not solely determined by the inherent dynamics of the economy. The changed crisis of capitalism requires a new critique. However, as Habermas himself remarks, such generalizations are no substitute for detailed empirical study; indeed, one is left wondering why such an obviously penetrating intellect should spend so much time restating such—dare I say it?—commonplace facts.

In these conditions of advanced capitalism, argues Habermas, the relationship of theory to practice appears only as the purposive-rational application of techniques based on empirical science. But Habermas believes that in so far as this socially effective theory is not directed towards the consciousness of human beings interacting with one another, but is solely concerned with individuals who manipulate one another's behaviour, it cannot be satisfactory. A danger arises when scientific discourse goes beyond the limits of technique to practical ethical issues without departing from the criteria

of technological rationality. Society should be seen as a system of action in which humans communicate through speech and interact through conscious communication. From this point of view, theory must enter into practice in such a way that individuals are able consciously to form themselves into a collective subject capable of action in concert. This application of theory involves an extension of the concept of rationality from the purely formal level to a more substantive focus. This wider notion of rationality extends beyond both labour and interaction and points to a new ideal of society as a system of free communication. Critique, as the embodiment of rationality, is a contribution to the self-awareness of society.

In the Introduction to *Theory and Practice*, Habermas reflects upon some of his critics and outlines where his thought has developed since he wrote the main body of the book. His approach, as in most of his work, is still negative—charitably we might term it critical. At very few points does he outline an alternative framework to those which he is criticizing.

Later in the text he argues that the 'interests' which ensure a unity between the logical structure of a body of knowledge and the pragmatic structure of its application are neither sociological or psychological motives nor biological invariants, but must instead be seen as necessary conditions of human experience (a point of view developed at length in *Knowledge and Human Interests*). In his Introduction he argues that these interests are generalized motives in systems of action (p. 21) which can only be understood in terms of a theory of socio-cultural evolution. But this latter theory, he remarks, cannot be developed within the scientific framework which it is itself supposed to legitimate; it must be dependent upon some kind of prior understanding. Habermas correctly notes that this argument is speculative, but fails to see the true importance of the point: the whole status of his approach depends upon this speculative argument. Without acceptable reasons being offered, we have no grounds for preferring Habermas's approach to any other. Presumably his solution would be to claim that the interest in 'emancipation' gives his theory of evolution its objectivity—but such a claim would only clarify the theological basis of Habermas's scheme by making clear its relation to Scheler's notion of knowledge born of a desire to achieve salvation.

The second problem area discussed in the Introduction is the Leninist problem of organization. Habermas seeks to answer the question of through what processes theory is to be related to practice. This is certainly an improvement over mere assertion that theory *does* or *should* relate to practice in some unspecified way. Habermas argues that any answer to the question must deal with the separate issues of the kind of organization which leads to the formulation of critical theory, the organization of the processes through which conscious reflection and enlightenment are made available to the mass of society, and the selection of appropriate strategies and tactics in political struggle. In the European working-class movement all three of these tasks were assigned to 'the Party', and Habermas claims that this is no longer appropriate. Each of the three tasks has a relative autonomy and may require a specific form of organization. But Habermas gives no indication of the precise forms of organization. He negates the conventional position but offers no negation of this negation.

There are many difficulties involved in reading Habermas without some

background in the kind of issues he discusses. Not only are there difficulties of translation from the original German and difficulties of Habermas's own style; there are also the difficulties inherent in the complexity of his subject matter. Habermas addresses himself to many of the most important questions of our day, and while his positive solutions, where they are offered, must be regarded as inadequate, his discussion of these issues is at times most fruitful. Because of this, the difficulties in reading the book are unfortunate; *Theory and Practice* is not a book for the uninitiated.

JOHN SCOTT

ALFRED SCHUTZ AND THOMAS LUCKMANN, *The Structures of the Life-World*, translated by Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., xxx + 335 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1974, £4 (paperback £2).

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, *The Prose of the World*, edited by Claude Lefort, translated by John O'Neill, xlii + 154 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1974, £2.50.

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, *Adventures of the Dialectic*, translated by Joseph Bien, xxvii + 237 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1974, £3.

The phenomenological ideas of Husserl have in the last decade permeated sociology and have shaken the edifice of Anglo-Saxon positivism. They have been mediated first of all by Alfred Schutz, who in turn has been a major influence on Aaron Cicourel and Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. Their two books, respectively *Method and Measurement in Sociology* (1964) and *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966), were the most important contributions to the methodology of sociology in the sixties.

These translations are well timed to catch this rising interest in versions of social thought far removed from positivism, where the idea of what is social comes under critical, philosophical analysis. Phenomenology can lead either to the generation of new categories of analysis or else to the dissolution of categories altogether. Merleau-Ponty's work tends in the latter direction and he is correspondingly less important to the sociologist. Schutz, on the other hand, points us in the direction of new taxonomies of social action and this accounts for his far more extensive influence.

Thomas Luckmann has assembled *The Structures of the Life World* from the material for a book which Schutz was preparing at the time of his death in 1959. He has had to collate chapter headings, notes, and excerpts and from these to produce a book which cannot be anything else except Luckmann's version of Schutz. The authenticity of this enterprise is not to be doubted, not only because of the long-standing association of Schutz and Luckmann but because the future development of his thought was already fixed by Schutz in *The Phenomenology of the Social World* which was written in 1932, although not translated until 1972. We also have the *Collected Papers* of

Schutz translated and edited by Maurice Natanson in 1967 so that we can clearly identify the place of this new volume in the corpus.

Once again we can go in considerable depth into Schutz's idea of pre-scientific reality, the natural attitude, the essentially inter-subjective nature of this world, the importance of sedimented group experience and the typifications which make up much of what passes for knowledge. This everyday world is presented as arranged or stratified on the basis of a number of principles, including space, time, spheres of influence ('zones of operation'), and social arrangements. In these arrangements a fundamental variable is that of the continuum from the 'we-relationship' to the 'they-relationship'.

In this book phenomenology is clearly linked with the social nature of the world and the structuring of sociality. The importance for sociologists generally of Schutz is made greater by the fact that in this book he suggests at various points clear links with more main-line ideas in sociological theory, especially those of Cooley, G. H. Mead, and W. I. Thomas. On the level of method Schutz reveals the complex interleaving of subjectivity and objectivity in social life: the subject experiences in social life that which has been objectified out of the prior subjective experiences of others. The image of sedimentation vividly portrays the time dimension involved in the continual creation and use of cultural objects.

Schutz's representation of what everybody knows makes the social world a highly structured sphere. In arguing that the typification in everyday life is the real source of the ideal type concept and indeed is the basis of communication with all people outside the we-relationships, Schutz provides a far more convincing account of the relationship between social life and sociological concepts than Weber did. For Weber the everyday world was a conceptual chaos which the social scientist brought to order and sense through ideal type concepts. After Schutz it is impossible to return to that position. He provides us both with the basis of reconstructing sociology and also an image of society which takes us far from the nominalism, individualism, and value-irrationalism of Weber. The reconstruction is only partial. One big gap in Schutz's work is the lack of any treatment of the problem of values in social life and an account of intersubjectivity in the construction of normative standards. For him knowledge is still the most interesting category, but until the notion of intersubjectivity is extended to embrace the value sphere as well as the cognitive an adequate intellectual mapping of what 'everyone knows' has not been achieved.

The German intellectual style is such that phenomenology operates through the desire to categorize, through making the mundane large with significance, sometimes simply through spelling out the obvious. Max Weber once remarked on the French capacity to make literature out of administrative prose, noting that the French Civil Code was more important often for its literary style than its legal logic. Merleau-Ponty's *The Prose of the World* is a fine example. This account of the nature of language tries to do justice to its essentially creative nature, sees it as a gesture of renewal and recovery, the reverberation of my relations with self and others. Throughout he plays on the theme of the tension between the necessary degree of standardization in a communication medium and the expression of individuality. This account licenses the author's own creativity and concentration upon

brilliant apothegms. Certainly in this way his individuality is secured but one could wish that he had been more concerned to return that personal experience to the common stock of knowledge at hand.

Adventures of the Dialectic is a series of essays on Max Weber, Lenin, Georg Lukacs, Trotsky, and Sartre. For the sociologist the quality of the whole is best sampled through the essay on Weber which rightly emphasizes his concern for creative choice but in general is vague and inconclusive. The whole volume has this character. The texture is dense with a large number of interwoven themes, such as ideas and reality, praxis, force, freedom and, revolution. But an argument is difficult to discern. The volume was published in French in 1955. These very abstract formulations of the human condition appear more bound to their time, place, and coterie than many a less ambitious cultural product.

MARTIN ALBROW

CHARLES S. LIEBMAN, *Aspects of the Religious Behavior of American Jews*, xvi + 285 pp., Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1974, $12.50.

When Charles S. Liebman wrote his 'Orthodoxy in American Jewish Life', which appeared in 1965, the concerns of American Jewry were rather different from what they are today. The same is true even of his 'The Training of American Rabbis', which came out in 1968, and somewhat true of 'Reconstructionism in American Jewish Life' of 1970. All were originally published in the *American Jewish Year Book* and are republished unchanged with a new author's introduction. Today American Jewry is much more involved in Jewish international affairs, and the economic problems of maintaining the Jewish community have regained some of the prominence they had a generation ago.

In 1965 American Jewish Orthodoxy could look back on a quarter of a century of expansion which had come from two sources. There were Jews or their children who had held to Orthodoxy from immigrant days and were now reaching a plateau of acculturation and prosperity. The synagogues and schools which were the institutional expression of their Orthodoxy passed through roughly the same process. The second source was what Liebman terms 'sectarian Orthodox', led by Hassidic *tsaddikim* and Talmudic authorities, *roshei yeshivot*. Most of the latter Orthodox were immigrants of the 1930s and 1940s, but some were of earlier stock. These newcomers brought an unprecedented militancy and exclusiveness, much of which was aroused by the annihilation of European Judaism. The last stand of Judaism as they knew it had to be in the United States. They were sceptical about, and some of them were hostile to, the Orthodoxy they found in America, but they needed its aid; all were anti-Zionist in varying intensity. Contrary to reasonable expectation, the 'sectarian Orthodox' grew stronger and attracted followers. They also had an extremely high birth rate. Undoubtedly much of their success is due to their intransigence and hard work, and to the decades of material prosperity which nourished their institutions. Even more of it is due, however, to the profound disenchantment with the

ideals of science and reason and enlightenment of western culture. The 'sectarian Orthodox', unlike the modernists, stressed the dichotomy between classic, rabbinic Judaism and modern western culture. By 1965 they were quite influential and had become the principal challengers of the modernists, replacing the Conservative challenge from the left with theirs from the right. It is hard to speak of dialogue between the two tracks of Orthodoxy since 1965, however. The 'sectarians' have been aggressively dogmatic, while the modernists have treated them with hesitancy and embarrassment and shown vulnerability to their pressure.

Liebman's focus on religious behaviour and manifest beliefs leads him to slight somewhat, it seems to me, the deeper cultural significance suggested here. However, 'Orthodoxy in American Jewish Life' remains a very valuable study, I believe the first to take American Orthodoxy on its own terms and to examine it with the critical sympathy of an insider rather than to treat it as a vestige from immigrant days or a preamble to Conservative or Reform Judaism. Liebman largely employs the analytic methods of sociology of religion, and includes a brief history of twentieth-century Orthodoxy and extended descriptions of organizations and institutions. He does not shy away from personal portraits of the interesting gallery of Orthodox leaders; laymen hardly appear. Among its other characteristics, contemporary American Jewish Orthodoxy submits to rabbinic authority to a remarkable degree.

Liebman's study of rabbinical training is more specialized. It draws mainly on answers to a questionnaire concerning family background, education, religious beliefs, and career expectations which the author sent to rabbinical students. Candid interviews were held among students as well as teachers. One emerges with sympathy for the earnest young men who are burdened by doubt and ambivalence over their future as rabbis. This is not merely what a prospective lawyer or physician might feel concerning his ability to function in an established profession, but hesitation about the character of the profession itself. So great is the distance between Judaism as taught at the rabbinical seminaries and Judaism as practised by American Jews that many new rabbis choose other careers to avoid spending their lifetime straddling the gap. The teachers at the Conservative and Orthodox rabbinical schools generally belittle congregational service, a habit unknown among professors at universities where physicians and lawyers, for example, are specifically trained to serve patients and clients. It may be added that Orthodox rabbinical training has changed little since 1968. However, the retirement of Louis Finkelstein in 1971 and the incumbency of Gerson D. Cohen as Chancellor of the Jewish Theological Seminary have lessened the atmosphere of piety and Talmud study.

An illuminating article discusses Reconstructionism, the de-supernaturalized, ethnically oriented Judaism expounded and led by the venerable Mordecai M. Kaplan. As he admits in his new introduction, Liebman tends to polemicize with Reconstructionism before providing an adequate account of its principles. While it has received much attention from intellectuals, the movement has had only a spasmodic institutional existence, with a long and tense relation with the Jewish Theological Seminary where Kaplan taught for two generations. The Seminary's turn to the religious right left

the Reconstructionists institutionally bereft until they opened their own rabbinical school in Philadelphia in 1968. Moreover, the widespread acceptance by American Jewry at large of organized community life and communal centres and Jewish arts (part of the Reconstructionist doctrine) tended to take much of the wind out of Reconstructionist sails. Liebman argues that Reconstructionism, by accepting and sanctifying elements of common American religiosity and patriotism, and by insisting on the parity of American with Jewish principles, has incorporated Jewish folk religion into official ('élite') religion. But perhaps the Reconstructionists are doing in articulate fashion what Reform and Conservatism have long been doing unofficially or apologetically. Only Orthodoxy, Liebman seems to imply, maintains a desirable critical distance from the clichés of popular religion. Yet it is a fact that Orthodoxy is permeated with the folk religion of Ashkenazi Jewry, and that the Orthodox modernists' efforts have included the partial replacement of European with American Jewish folk religion. Isaac M. Wise insisted long ago that Judaism required reform in America to emerge as American Judaism; this was Reform Judaism of his day. Perhaps Conservative Judaism was the American Judaism of eastern European immigrants from about 1880 to 1950. Now the Orthodox Jewish remnant, having stemmed the flow to Conservatism and Reform, is becoming still another form of American Judaism by a more subtle process. There are signs (viz., *Commentary*, November 1974, Letters to the Editor, pp. 22 ff.) that also the 'sectarian Orthodox' will gnash their teeth and yet say amen.

LLOYD P. GARTNER

GILBERT KUSHNER, *Immigrants from India in Israel, Planned Change in an Administered Community*, xviii + 151 pp., Univ. of Arizona Press, Tucson, Arizona, 1973, $6.95.

In 1962, Professor Kushner spent seven and a half months in the new immigrant settlement (*moshav olim*) of Bet Avi, which lies a few yards from the main road linking Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. The village was inhabited by 203 people who had come there in 1954 from the small but ancient Jewish community in Cochin on the south-west coast of India. There they had been craftsmen and petty traders, clustering round their synagogues in a tightly organized and orthodox community of some 2,000 souls, almost all of whom had now emigrated to Israel. How had they fared in the very different surroundings in which they now found themselves?

The people had been settled in this village by Israeli planners for two main purposes. One was to teach them how to support themselves in an unfamiliar climate by totally new occupations and, by so doing, to increase the agricultural production of the nation. The other was to inculcate in them the Israeli way of life, and teach them how to organize their village into the autonomous, co-operative, but non-collective form of village known as *moshav ovdim*. To these ends, work in the village was controlled by instructors living there, and frequent visits were paid by a plethora of agents from

various social and technical government agencies, and a village council and secretary were expected to aid in the administration and development of the village.

But though the village had no lack of advice and instruction, the response was, in Israeli eyes, disappointing. The people only did what *they* thought was enough farm work, which fell below the targets and expectations of their instructors; and the village council rarely met and took no initiatives or responsibilities. The Israelis saw the village as lacking progress, and Kushner asks, what factors lie behind this situation?

His answer lies in his view that Bet Avi is an example of an 'administered community', that is, a community 'which does not effectively control its own affairs . . .' and where 'a feeling of powerlessness is pervasive' (p. xvi). In such communities, attempts by a sanction-wielding bureaucracy to develop initiative are self-defeating; the more the official action, the greater the dependence and lack of response. The problem for Kushner is, then, to suggest ways in which administered communities can be turned into autonomous ones (it being taken as axiomatic that this is the more desirable form, both for the government and for the inhabitants) although a caveat is made that no community is truly autonomous. Comparative data are provided from two other examples of administered communities (American Indian, and Japanese relocation centres). Indian community development programmes, in which similar goals of local initiative and increased production are sought, are not considered, although the patterns of public response in them might have proved interesting when compared with those of the South Asians of Bet Avi.

The book thus has as its main emphasis the study of administered communities, rather than the study of the Cochini. The 22 pages devoted to Bet Avi provide many questions which a more extended account could have considered. For instance, why did the villagers change their affiliation from a religious to a secular settlement federation, and what factors lay behind the election of the village secretary? In both cases it is said that the reasons for the changes are 'not clear'; but the people surely had views about what had happened, even if these conflicted, and they could have formed part of an analysis of the internal political structure, which might have told us about those parapolitical factors significant for the relations of villagers with officials. Again, the people formed a small proportion of the total Cochini population in Israel, and we are told that there was visiting of other Cochinis. What were the latter doing, what had been their experiences, and had these influenced the attitudes of those in Bet Avi? As Kushner shows, the people of Bet Avi were adapting to the new conditions in the sense that they viewed life in Bet Avi as 'reasonably adequate'; more data on the village would have explained why this was so, as well as enabling Kushner to consider the degree to which the Bet Avi people were actually manipulating the situation to their advantage, rather than being the powerless inmates of an administered community.

In sum, the book will be useful for the reader interested in the construction of the administrative community as a social type and with the problems involved in its transformation (although the recommendations for changing it, made at the end of the book, are very general indeed) and for the person

seeking concise accounts of the history of emigration and settlement in Israel: but the reader wishing to know something more about Cochin Jewry and its transformation in Israel is given only an introduction to the situation.

ADRIAN C. MAYER

A. J. SHERMAN, *Island Refuge. Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich, 1933–1939*, 291 pp., Paul Elek, London, 1973, £3.80.

This is a detailed, carefully documented, and dispassionate account of British policies and attitudes towards the refugee problem from Hitler's accession to power in 1933 until the outbreak of war in 1939. It was made possible by the publication of hitherto secret official documents, including Cabinet minutes and internal Foreign Office and Home Office papers. Its readers, including the surviving victims of the great tragedy of the Jewish exodus from central Europe, can now witness the struggles and the agonies of those who presided over their destinies.

Any reader of this book—especially if he is Jewish—is in constant danger of falling into the trap of his own hindsight. At every page—but most particularly in the earlier parts of the book describing refugee policies before the Anschluss of March 1938 and the pogrom of November 1938—one must constantly remind oneself that the British civil servants and politicians responsible for defining these policies in the 1930s did not know what we now know about the events of the 1940s. They could not have foreseen Auschwitz and Maidanek even if they had been endowed with superhuman imaginative powers—and the book shows that their power of imagination was often anything but superhuman.

Mr. Sherman carefully describes the development of the official policy towards the admission of refugees to Britain; he shows that there was, in fact, a degree of adaptability to changing events which was greater than one might have expected—a very much more liberal and humane attitude than that of many other governments, and especially of the government of the United States (whose friendly sentiments, so often expressed in words, led to only the slightest mitigation of the cruel quota system of immigration).

Nevertheless, almost to the last moment the British Government maintained its refusal to make any grant of public money towards the settlement of refugees; and even into 1938 it persisted in its policy in no circumstances to do anything that might cause any irritation to Hitler and his government. It took the wholesale persecution and expropriation of late 1938 and of 1939 to induce the government to change these policies.

For the student of political attitudes and of the formative factors of policy-making, this book is a paradigmatic study in the psychology of fear. Reading the decisive Cabinet Minutes and the secret correspondence between civil servants in the Foreign Office, the Home Office, and the Colonial Office, one is made to realize how much each political decision is a diagonal in a parallelogram of apprehensions—fear of the reaction of progressive public

opinion, fear of growing xenophobia and antisemitism, fear of American reactions, fear of Nazi reactions, fear of Arab reactions, fear of the 'thin edge of the wedge' which might be driven further by the governments of Poland and Romania, and perhaps Hungary, only too anxious to get rid of 'their' Jews. There are of course in these papers traces of sheer obtuseness. The worst case is that of the British Minister in Prague suggesting that the Soviet government might be sounded as to its willingness to receive anti-Nazi 'Sudeten Germans into their spiritual homeland'. Another example is the high official in the Foreign Office totally unable to understand why—after Munich—any moral responsibility for Czech and German political refugees from Czechoslovakia should fall upon the British Government. Yet—although these examples could be multiplied—they are not what this reviewer is likely to remember about the book. What he will remember is the battle fought by men and women such as Josiah Wedgwood and Eleanor Rathbone. Nor will he forget those politicans who were responsible for formulating official policies. True, they were the victims of their fears and of their prejudices, but they did—within their limitations—try to uphold something of the English liberal tradition.

To have exposed these fears and prejudices, and yet paid its due tribute to what Britain did for the sake of humanity, is the chief merit of this fascinating and agonizing book.

O. KAHN-FREUND

NORMAN COHN, *Europe's Inner Demons, an Enquiry Inspired by the Great Witch-Hunt*, Columbus Centre Series, Studies in the Dynamics of Persecution and Extermination, xvi + 302 pp., Chatto Heinemann for Sussex Univ. Press, £4.50.

The dominant interest in all Dr. Norman Cohn's work has been in the arguments that men use to rationalize the persecution of their fellows. In *The Pursuit of the Millennium* the theme was the need to exterminate communities whose existence hindered the coming of heaven on earth—specifically, the Jews. In *Europe's Inner Demons* it is the need to destroy the allies of the devil—specifically, persons accused of witchcraft. Dr. Cohn distinguishes between folk-beliefs which ascribe individual misfortunes to the malice of neighbours and the sophisticated demonology of churchmen, in which the witch was the enemy of religion and the servant of God's principal adversary. He traces the origin of the ideas which came to be combined in the myth of the pact with the devil and the witches' sabbath, beginning with the Hellenistic notion that the Jews worshipped a god with the form of a donkey, which, he says, may have sprung from the fact that the sacred Hebrew name for God sounds something like the Egyptian word for a donkey.

This book has not the concentration on a central theme that made *The Pursuit of the Millennium* so impressive. But we can learn as much from its digressions as from the main argument. Dr. Cohn demolishes—finally, one

hopes—Margaret Murray's persecuted adherents of a primitive fertility religion with their joyous 'ébats' distorted into the word 'sabbat'. His most lethal weapon in this exercise is the restoration to their place in the records she quoted of passages that she thought fit to excise. He also demonstrates that some of the most famous stories of witch-trials are pure forgeries. But he does not go on to suggest, as some have, that the actual extent of European witch-hunts has been greatly exaggerated.

Although Dr. Cohn gives considerable attention to the kind of reasoning that could make the actions and powers attributed to witches seem plausible, his conclusion is that witch-beliefs are a 'collective fantasy' which he interprets in Freudian terms. The cases of free confession that are on record he sees as descriptions of trance experiences. It would be for psychologists to evaluate this argument. The school of Lévi-Strauss would be more inclined to see in many of the characteristics ascribed to witches that basic dualism according to which evil, as the opposite of good, is associated with all kinds of other reversal of the normal, without calling any repressed desires in aid of the interpretation.

It is valuable to have the distinction drawn between folk and sophisticated witch-beliefs, but where folk-beliefs are in question it is perhaps important to look beyond Europe and see what kind of ideas can arise without any specific common source. It is also important to be aware that societies untouched by Christian theological arguments have often welcomed prophets offering means of eradicating witches once and for all; it is true that their methods have not included wholesale burnings. It *may* have been a popular belief in Europe that old women were the enemies of young life, and hence far more likely than men to be guilty of *maleficia*. This idea is not paralleled in the records of anthropologists, and outside Europe all the *other* elements in the popular stereotypes of the witch could be applied to either sex. Dr. Cohn might also have taken account of the fact, which his own material seems to demonstrate from Europe, that actual suspicions arise when some misfortune follows a quarrel, and the victim finds the source of his trouble not by considering who among his acquaintances conforms to the witch stereotype, but by asking who his enemies are.

LUCY MAIR

CHARLES A. PRICE, *The Great White Walls are Built, Restrictive Immigration to North America and Australia 1836–1888*, xviii + 323 pp., The Australian Institute of International Affairs in association with Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1974, $A9.95.

In the first sentence of his Foreword to Gunter Barth's *Bitter Strength, A History of the Chinese in the United States 1850–1870* (1964), Professor Oscar Handlin said: 'Until the appearance of the Chinese on the Pacific Coast in the middle of the nineteenth century, the traditional American policy of open migration remained inviolate.' On a grander scale (California now joined by British Columbia, Australia, and New Zealand) Dr. Charles Price, the distinguished

Australian demographer, takes up the theme of the impact of Chinese immigration upon the new English-speaking societies on both sides of the Pacific. Although the book concentrates upon Australia, it carefully handles the historical data from all four areas, demonstrating the advantage of treating them all together: they received the same kind of Chinese (and in a few cases the very same individual Chinese), attracting them by the same sorts of economic opportunity (goldmining stands in the forefront); they influenced one another by their attitudes, legislation, and experience. To all four, the Chinese seemed to pose a threat: at one level, they excited the hostility of competing White labour, stirring up the kind of working-class racialism we have seen in more recent times; but at another level, and that the more important, the Chinese were a deviant and apparently unassimilable group in societies struggling towards some ideal of cultural and racial uniformity. Dr. Price points the ironical comment made on the nineteenth by the twentieth century: 'By the mid-1960s . . . these four countries [U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand] had repealed most of their discriminatory legislation on occupations, naturalization and civil status. (Paradoxically, Great Britain, who had often tried to soften the restrictions and discrimination imposed by her wayward colonies, felt impelled to impose severe restrictions on the entry of British nationals from India, Pakistan and the West Indies.)'

This book is the first of a pair, and it seems to me that we should await the second before attempting an assessment of the first, for the argument on the White Australia policy is apparently not yet complete: one looks forward to the sequel, hoping that it will not be long delayed. On the other hand, it is already clear that this is a work of very great interest to students of race relations, and an impressive compilation of the evidence. It does not, of course, set out to be profound about the Chinese immigrants themselves, but I think that that side of the account might have been strengthened by a closer look at the comparative evidence from other areas. At the least, there might be something to be said for adducing the example of another kind of overseas Chinese goldmining community: in West Borneo.

MAURICE FREEDMAN

ELIE KEDOURIE, *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies*, viii + 327 pp., Frank Cass, London, 1974, £5·95.

This book, which comprises nineteen papers written during the last decade, continues and complements the author's *The Chatham House Version* (1970). Its major theme is 'the failure of constitutionalism in the Middle East during the last hundred years or so, the transformation of a native tradition of autocratic rule into a European-style absolutism, and the increasing radicalization of political thought which accompanied this transformation.'

It makes a far more coherent book than do many such collections of papers, though one could have wished that the author had collated Chapters 1 and 2 ('The Fate of Constitutionalism in the Middle East' and 'Political

Parties in the Arab World') so as to eliminate some repetitions. He could also, when telling on p. 38 of the 'presumably final destruction' of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954, have referred the reader to p. 208 for their short-lived resurgence ten years later. The Hidden Imam is the eleventh not the twelfth descendant of Ali (p. 13). Some terms should have been explained; not everybody knows what is meant by a *Khatt-i Humayun* or *'ahd al-aman* or *salafi*, and one has to read fifteen pages of Chapter 19, 'The Sack of Basra and the *Farhud* in Baghdad', before being told what a *farhud* is.

These minor grumbles aside, the book is warmly recommended, full as it is of good stuff which is not general knowledge. It is fascinating to read, for example, how in one Muslim state after another the rise of representative institutions led to a decline in the citizen's ability to make his voice heard. Chapter 5, 'The Death of Adib Ishaq', is particularly interesting, a case study of the rise of religious scepticism in the second half of the nineteenth century. But every chapter is absorbing. The reviewer's favourites are Chapters 15 and 16 ('Sir Mark Sykes and Palestine 1915–16' and 'Young Turks, Freemasons and Jews'), from which it emerges that the support for Zionism of some leading figures in England was due at least in part to their paranoiac dread of 'World Jewry', a dark power which they thought they had better conciliate. 'The Oriental Jew is an adept at manipulating occult forces', as the Embassy in Constantinople solemnly informed the Foreign Office in 1910. Even if by 'occult' was intended what we would nowadays term 'undercover' (which is by no means certain), it shows one should never overlook the role of stupidity in policy-making.

Professor Kedourie's style is as engaging as ever. On p. 130, for instance, he speaks of 'that salutary scepticism about the benevolence of power which life under traditional despotism (innocent as it is of brainwashing techniques) has—as one of its saving graces—always inculcated in its subjects.' Learned, thoughtful, and readable; what more can one ask?

GEOFFREY LEWIS

B. Z. SOBEL, *Hebrew Christianity: The thirteenth tribe*, xiv + 413 pp., Contemporary Religious Movements, A Wiley-Interscience Series edited by Irving I. Zaretsky, John Wiley & Sons, London and New York, 1974, n.p.

Professor Sobel's book on Hebrew Christians is a model of its kind. It is clearly written, finely structured, and informed by a first-class intelligence. This means that it is easy to read. The mind takes in each page with the pleasurable recognition that each point is logically appropriate, sociologically sound, and theologically aware.

In the sociology of religion relatively small movements can attract and generate the most penetrating and widely applicable analyses. To read the history of the Orange Order, for example, is to recognize a battleground where all the major sociological themes contend. Similarly, the history of Christian approaches to Judaism provides a manual of sociological materials

with regard to religion, race, and community. The nub of the question is that central to all missionary activity: conversion to a new religion involves a break not only with beliefs but with the seamless web of culture. Add to this difficulty the reinforcing and spiralling mutual repulsions of Jew and Christian and the question of evangelizing the Jews can become the test case for the power of the Christian evangel.

Professor Sobel traces that history of Jewish-Christian relations with exemplary clarity, from the pre-Constantine period, through the time of the medieval Church, to the mixed gains and losses of the Reformation. The crucial period for his purpose is the era of Anglo-American missionary effort when large resources were expended on the conversion of the Jews, mostly to little effect. When Jews leapt over the ghetto wall they did so largely to gain enlightenment, not the light of the world. Just how proverbial Jewish resistance is and has been comes out in Marvell's apostrophe to his coy mistress:

> And you should if you please refuse
> Till the conversion of the Jews.

But there has gradually emerged a new possibility: the Jewish Christian, asserting his Hebraic character, embracing both Jewish Nationhood and Zionism. Initially this only touched marginal Jews, socially low and psychologically disturbed, but in the wake of the recoil from the cultural revolution of the 1960s other less marginal young people began to join. There appeared the Jews for Jesus. Naturally enough, the Hebrew Christian Americans took their combination of loyalty to Jewish race and Christian religion to Israel. It does not require developed sociological insight to guess that they were unwelcome, first as disturbing the peace of Israel and second because they were stereotyped as free-thinking drug-addicted Americans, which emphatically they were not.

That, very shortly, is the story. Professor Sobel discusses all the complexities with acumen, including the survival of antisemitism, which the Hebrew Christians believed themselves able to eliminate, and the inability of the Hebrew Christians to hold a second generation. In the second generation it is easier just to assimilate to Christianity.

Professor Sobel has had a hard as well as a fruitful time conducting his research. He reiterates the language of fundamentalist Christianity as to the manner born and confesses that there were few things more unbearable and ethically awkward than the 'love' lavished on him by Hebrew Christians. He is to be congratulated on a wholly convincing study.

DAVID MARTIN

MICHAEL HILL, *The Religious Order, A study of virtuoso religion and its legitimation in the nineteenth-century Church of England*, vii + 344 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1973, £4.50.

Michael Hill's *The Religious Order* breaks fairly new ground in the sociology of religion as at present conducted. Fundamentally he takes up the idea of

the religious 'virtuoso' and applies it both to the individualistic spiritual athletics of the Desert Fathers and to the institutionalization of virtuosity in Catholic orders. This immediately involves him in the task of relating the order as a specific type of religious organization to the various formulations of the sect-type. The basic distinction between order and sect turns around the absence of millenarian expectation within the order and its organic relation to the universal church. In short, the order accepts a specialized role and acknowledges that only *some* need to be or can be 'eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake'. This attitude is the basis of the distinction between counsels and precepts around which monasticism turns.

Having carried out a careful analytic discussion of the relationship between sect and order along all the relevant dimensions, Dr. Hill breaks new ground by moving into fields outside the sociology of religion. He sets the order within the notion of normative compliance as elaborated by Etzioni, and also considers how far an order fits Goffman's concept of a 'total institution'. Clearly, the monastery is a special type of total institution in so far as it is freely chosen, though Dr. Hill shows the ambiguities behind the ideas of free choice in situations where people are heavily pre-socialized in the monastic direction.

Perhaps the basic idea set forth by Michael Hill is the 'revolution by tradition'. Religious innovation frequently begins by a reference back to original charters, and different types of innovation take off from varied conceptions of the content of the charter. For some it is the practice of the Medieval Church, for others the Bible, or the primitive church, or 'the great saints through the ages'. He explores these varied types of appeal in different contexts, more particularly the Wesleyan movement and the Oxford movement. In the latter case he takes the revival of female orders and shows the complex interrelation among a particular style of legitimation, such social structural elements as outlets for women, and the pragmatic motivation of many church leaders: an interesting and subtle exercise. This is not a book for methodological pedants. It cuts a large swath through the complex jungle of church history and across varied periods. It points to certain continuities, including the tradition of revolution by tradition. It necessarily involves a varied learning, and also gives evidence of sympathy with and feeling for monasticism. Dr. Hill's book is an excellent pioneering study.

DAVID MARTIN

MEYER W. WEISGAL, gen. ed., *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, Volume V, *Series A, January 1907–February 1913*, edited by Hanna Weiner and Barnet Litvinoff, xxxviii + 431 pp., Oxford Univ. Press and Israel Univ. Press, London and Jerusalem, 1974, £9.

Had the career of Chaim Weizmann ended with this volume, the record would have been a sad one. He had three hopes in these six years: to become a full professor at Manchester, to be able to write the coveted letters 'F.R.S.' after his name, and to be able to achieve, after a suitable time as a British

professor, a laboratory of his own at the Haifa Technion. He was disappointed in all three hopes. When one adds to these academic disappointments the bitter political and personal conflicts within the Zionist organizations, both British and international, it is not surprising that there is a note of highly emotional bitterness running through the volume.

At the same time, and in spite of the disappointments, Dr. Weizmann was gradually establishing a reputation, both as a scientist and as a Zionist leader; and the general European background, with the revolution of the Young Turks, plus the Balkan wars, gave added weight to the demands of 'the practicals' of whom he was increasingly the spokesman. In the course of the volume Dr. Gaster gradually gives place to Achad Ha-am as his adviser and confidant.

Apart from academic and political conflicts, the years recorded were years of ill-health for his beloved wife that caused him continual anxiety.

JAMES PARKES

JACOB M. LANDAU, *Middle Eastern Themes, Papers in History and Politics*, vii + 309 pp., Frank Cass, London, 1973, £3·75.

This is a collection of thirteen essays, ranging from nineteenth-century social history (notably of Jews in Egypt) and ideological history (Al Afghani) to analysis of contemporary politics, in particular Israeli Arab, Turkish, and Lebanese politics. Dr. Landau combines the skills of historian and of political scientist and appears to have a most remarkable linguistic range. The essays are packed with interesting and relevant information, which is very well presented. On the other hand, there is no unity of underlying theme. The volume will clearly be appreciated by specialists in the Middle East of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Its quality is such that one greatly looks forward to a full and coherent book by Dr. Landau, with a sustained treatment of some major theme. Such a volume should then also reach a far wider public.

ERNEST GELLNER

CORRESPONDENCE

M. Claude Tapia writes:

SIR,

I should be grateful if you would publish the following acknowledgement.

My article 'North African Jews in Belleville' (*The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 16, no. 1, June 1974, pp. 5–23) was based on research carried out under the auspices of the 'Service Communauté' of Paris, with assistance from the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture.

I regret that I inadvertently omitted to state this fact in a note to that article.

CHRONICLE

The December 1974 issue of *Congress Bulletin*, published by the Canadian Jewish Congress, sets out the following data on Canada's Jewish population, based on the 1971 census.

The Jewish 'ethnic group' consisted of 296,945 persons; 276,025 (or 93 per cent) of them also stated that their religious denomination was Jewish. Of the remaining 20,920, almost half (9,755) said they had 'no religion'; 3,340 said they were Catholic; 2,075 belonged to the United Church; and 1,705 were Anglican. The remainder were classified in various other religious groups.

As for language, 69·7 per cent of Jews (206,950) said that English was their mother tongue, while 16·6 per cent (49,175) gave Yiddish, and 3·8 per cent (11,215) French. Next came Hungarian (2·5 per cent) and Polish and German (1·8 per cent in each case); with the remainder giving several other languages as their mother tongue.

The figures relating to language spoken in the home do not coincide with the figures given for 'mother tongue'. For example, 83·9 per cent reported that English was the language spoken in their home; and only about half the number of those whose mother tongue was Yiddish gave it as the language of the home in 1971: 25,100 out of 49,175.

Almost a quarter of the total Jewish population (23 per cent) stated that they spoke both English and French; on the other hand, about one per cent said they could speak neither language. (Approximately 1·5 per cent of the total population of Canada reported they could not speak either English or French.)

The province of Ontario has the largest Jewish community—45·4 per cent of Canada's Jews; Quebec is next with 40·2 per cent, and Manitoba third with 6·8 per cent. The remainder are in British Columbia, Alberta, Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan, etc.

Canada's Jews are almost exclusively town-dwellers—99·2 per cent were classified as 'urban'. Moreover, 95·7 per cent live in towns which have a minimum of 100,000 inhabitants.

*

The 43rd General Assembly of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds was told last November that a total of $15 million was allocated in 1974 for Jewish education in the United States. There were 75,000 children in Jewish day schools, 200,000 in week-day afternoon schools, and 125,000 in Sunday schools. The chairman of the Committee on Federal Planning for Jewish Education is reported to have stated: '. . . allocations to all-day Jewish schools continue to grow at a faster rate, and

in our large cities already represent 22 per cent of all funds expended for Jewish education.'

*

The European Council of Jewish Community Services announces the establishment of a Jewish Studies Centre in Geneva. The Centre is the result of concerted action between the European Council, the Paris University Centre of Jewish Studies, and the local Community. The regular programme will include courses of lectures on 'Jewish Thought', the Talmud, and Modern Jewish Literature. There will also be seminars and Hebrew classes. The Centre has been granted a subsidy from the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture.

*

The Alliance Israélite Universelle inaugurated two new establishments in Israel in 1974: the Lycée René Cassin, called after the Alliance's President, and the Institut Kerem. That Institute is for the training of Israeli teachers in the humanities. In 1973, there were 4,859 pupils in Alliance Schools in Israel: 4,112 in Morocco, 3,634 in Iran, 480 in Syria, 408 in the Lebanon, 160 in Spain, and 51 in Tunisia. In 1960, the centenary year of the foundation of the Alliance, there were 28,702 pupils in Morocco, 6,220 in Iran, 3,560 in Tunisia, and 1,297 in the Lebanon.

*

Haifa University announced last November that 5,500 students were registered in the current academic year; about a quarter of them (1,300) were freshmen. The academic staff consists of 700 professors, readers, and lecturers.

Among the new students are young men from Western countries who had come to Israel to fight in the Yom Kippur War.

*

The Federation of Writers in the State of Israel (an umbrella organization linking the Unions for writers in the Hebrew, Arabic, Yiddish, and Russian languages) was formally established last December in Tel Aviv. The Federation has a general council made up of 117 members from the Hebrew Writers Union, 18 each from the Arabic and Yiddish Unions, and nine from the Russian Union.

*

The Director of ORT Overseas Operations was reported to have stated last January that ORT intends to spend in 1975 about ten million dollars in France, where there are about 6,000 students enrolled in various

ORT schools. There are some 300,000 North African Jews who settled in France in the past decade and the majority of them do not have modern skills; they present a real challenge to ORT to make them economically self-sufficient.

In Israel, ORT runs 84 schools with an enrolment of 46,000 students and a teaching staff of 2,000. The majority of the students (31,685) are aged between 13 and 19, and are engaged in full-time studies. There are also eight ORT technical colleges in Israel.

ORT has establishments in 24 countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, Niger, Nigeria, and Iran.

*

Two major British charities merged last March. They are British Ose (Organisatio Sanitaria Ebraica), which promotes the physical and mental health of underprivileged Jews overseas, and the Central British Fund for Jewish Relief and Rehabilitation.

The two societies have co-operated closely in the past and their amalgamation will help to reduce administrative costs.

*

The Minister of Tourism of Israel is reported to have stated in Tel Aviv last January that 623,000 tourists came to Israel in 1974—a drop of 6 per cent from 1973. He pointed out that in many countries tourism had declined by as much as 30 per cent over the same period. The Minister added that the figure he gave for 1974 did not include 125,000 Arab visitors, who represented a 4 per cent increase over the number of Arabs who had come to Israel in 1973. There were 19,000 tourists during Christmas week, as against 18,000 in 1973.

In 1974, there were 298,000 visitors from Europe, 204,000 from the United States, 10,600 from Argentina (almost double the previous year's number), and 18,000 from South Africa. The Minister noted that tourism remained the country's largest source of foreign currency earnings—two hundred million dollars in 1974.

*

A West German Tourist Office was established in Israel last January by the Federal German Tourist Authority. The head of the Israeli office stated that 43,000 West German citizens had visited Israel in 1974 and 30,000 Israelis had gone to the Federal German Republic in the same year. He is reported to have commented that German tourists stay longer in Israel than the average time spent by tourists from any other country, and that many young Germans come to live in kibbutzim for several months at a time.

*

The national secretary of the American Physicians Fellowship, an affiliate of the Israel Medical Association, was reported to have stated last February that more than 800 U.S. and Canadian doctors have already registered for volunteer medical service in Israel, in case of a national emergency. A further 1,200 are expected to register within the next few months.

The volunteers might be asked to replace doctors called up for duty or to work in hospitals.

*

The Chairman of the Jewish Agency's Youth and Hechalutz Department is reported to have stated last January that since the Yom Kippur War 13,000 volunteers have come to work in Israel; 2,000 of them were not Jews.

*

The thirteenth International Conference on the Sociology of Religion will be held this year at Lloret-de Mar in Spain from 31 August until 4 September. The theme of the Conference will be Religion and Social Change. The Secretariat of the Conference is at 39, Rue de la Monnaie, 59042 Lille Cedex, France.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Books listed here may be reviewed later*)

Abarbanel, Jay S., *The Co-operative Farmer and the Welfare State, Economic Change in an Israeli Moshav*, with a foreword by Max Gluckman, xvi + 236 pp., Manchester Univ. Press, Manchester, 1974, £4.50.

Ainsztein, Reuben, *Jewish Resistance in Nazi-Occupied Eastern Europe, with a historical survey of the Jew as fighter and soldier in the Diaspora*, xxviii + 970 pp., Paul Elek, London, 1974, £12.50.

Aronoff, Myron J., *Frontiertown, The Politics of Community Building in Israel*, xiv + 313 pp., Manchester Univ. Press and Jerusalem Academic Press, Manchester and Jerusalem, 1974, £4.95.

Berger, Nan, *Rights, A Handbook for people under age*, 160 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1974, 60p.

Berger, Peter L., Berger, Brigitte and Kellner, Hansfried, *The Homeless Mind, Modernization and Consciousness*, 232 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1974, 50p.

Black-Michaud, Jacob, *Cohesive Force, Feud in the Mediterranean and the Middle East*, with a foreword by E. L. Peters, xxx + 270 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975, £5.50.

Central Statistical Office, *Facts in Focus*, 2nd edn., 245 pp., Penguin Books in association with H.M. Stationery Office, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1974, 60p.

Cipolla, Carlo M., *The Economic History of World Population*, 6th edn., 154 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1974, 45p.

Claiborne, Louis, *Race and Law in Britain and the United States*, 19 pp., Minority Rights Group, Report No. 22, London, 1974, 45p.

Deutsch, Akiwa W., *The Eichmann Trial in the Eyes of Israeli Youngsters, Opinions, Attitudes and Impact*, 107 pp., Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 1974, n.p.

Errera-Hoechstetter, Irène, *Le Conflit Israélo-Arabe (1918–1974)*, 135 pp., Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1974, n.p.

Fishman, Joshua A., ed., *Studies on Polish Jewry, 1919–1939, The interplay of social, economic and political factors in the struggle of a minority for its existence*, x + 294 pp. (in English); x + 500 pp. (in Yiddish), Yivo Institute for Jewish Research, New York, 1974, n.p.

Foss, Brian, ed., *New Perspectives in Child Development*, 266 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1974, £1.00.

Fraser, Morris, *Children in Conflict*, 188 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1974, 50p.

Handelman, Don and Deshen, Shlomo, *The Social Anthropology of Israel: A bibliographical essay with primary reference to loci of social stress*, 58 pp., Institute for Social Research, Tel Aviv University, 1975, $1.00.

Jewish Socialists' Group, *What's Left on the Jewish Question*, 71 pp., Jewish Socialists' Group, 3 Wood Grove, Whitefield, Manchester 25, 1975, 20p.

Jick, Todd, *Labour Management Relations in an Israeli Textile Factory: A Social Anthropological Study*, 111 pp., Research Report No. 180, Publication No. 532, The Henrietta Szold Institute, Jerusalem, 1974, n.p.

Johnson, Bert W., Wilder, Frank and Bogue, Donald J., eds., *Information, Education and Communication for Population and Family Planning, A Guide for National Action*, xvi + 207 pp., Community and Family Study Center, Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, 1973, n.p.

Katz, Herschel and Seliktar, Ofira, *Jewish Political Behaviour, Two Studies*, Survey Research Centre, Occasional Paper No. 1, iv + 44 pp., University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, 1974, n.p.

Kovadloff, Jacobo, ed., *Comunidades Judias de Latinoamerica (1971–1972)* 430 pp., Comite Judio Americano, Instituto de Relaciones Humanas, Buenos Aires, 1974, $5.00.

Leach, Penelope, *Babyhood, Infant development from birth to two years*, 481 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1974, 90p.

Lucas, Noah, *The Modern History of Israel*, xii + 500 pp., Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1975, £6.00.

McCarthy, Charles J., S.J., ed., *Philippine-Chinese Profile, Essays & Studies*, xiv + 247 pp., Pagkakaisa, Monograph No. 3, Pagkakaisa Sa pagunlad, Unity for Progress, Manila, 1974, n.p.

McGuffin, John, *The Guineapigs*, 188 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1974, 40p.

Marger, Martin, edited by Agocs, Sandor, *The Force of Ethnicity, A Study of Urban Elites*, ii + 110 pp., Journal of University Studies, Ethnic Monograph Series, Winter 1974, vol. 10, no. 5, Wayne State University, Detroit, 1974, n.p.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, *Phenomenology, Language and Sociology, Selected Essays of Maurice Merleau-Ponty*, edited by John O'Neill, lxii + 352 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1974, £5.50 (paperback, £2.90).

Moskowitz, Moses, *International Concern with Human Rights*, ix + 239 pp., A. W. Sijthoff International Publishing Co., Leiden and Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1974, *Dfl.* 45.00.

Newill, Robert, *Infertile Marriage*, 188 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1974, 50p.

Newman, William M., *The Social Meanings of Religion, An Integrated Anthology*, viii + 373 pp., Rand McNally College Publishing Company, Chicago, 1974, n.p.

Nir, Nehama and Jick, T., *Kedmah (Parent–Teacher Discussion Groups)*, 95 pp., Research Report No. 172, Publication No. 525, The Henrietta Szold Institute, Jerusalem, 1973, n.p.

Nisbet, Robert A., *The Sociology of Emile Durkheim*, ix + 293 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1975, £4.00 (paperback, £1.80).

Parker, Howard J., *View from the Boys, A Sociology of Down-Town Adolescents*, 237 pp., David & Charles, Newton Abbot, Devon, 1975, £2.45.

Parkes, Colin Murray, *Bereavement, Studies of Grief in Adult Life*, 267 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1975, 80p.

Pelz, Werner, *The Scope of Understanding in Sociology, Towards a more radical reorientation in the social and humanistic sciences*, xi + 283 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and Boston, 1974, £5·50 (paperback, £3·75).

Pizzey, Erin, *Scream Quietly or the Neighbours will Hear*, Edited by Alison Forbes, 143 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 45p (hardback, £2.90).

Poliakov, Léon, *The History of Anti-semitism*, vol. III, *From Voltaire to Wagner*, trans. from the French by Miriam Kochan, x + 582 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1975, £8.00.

Rapaport, Chanan and Marcus, Joseph, in collaboration with Miriam Glikson, Witold Jedlicki, and Sheldon Lache, *Early Child Care in Israel*, 225 pp., Publication No. 541, The Henrietta Szold Institute, Jerusalem, 1974, n.p.

Rapoport, Robert N., *Mid-Career Development, Research Perspectives on a Developmental Community for Senior Administrators*, xiii + 290 pp., Tavistock Publications, London, 1974, £1.50.

Reid, Ivan and Wormald, Eileen, *Sociology and Teacher Education, A Symposium*, vi + 127 pp., Sociology Section of the Association of Teachers in Colleges and Departments of Education, 3 Crawford Place, London, W1H 2BN, 1974, £1.25.

Rotenstreich, Nathan, *Reflections on the Contemporary Jewish Condition*, The Philip M. Klutznick International Lecture, 42 pp., Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress and Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1975, n.p.

Rowbotham, Sheila, *Women, Resistance and Revolution*, 288 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1974, 60p.

Schmelz, U. O., Glikson, P. and Gould, S. J., eds., *Studies in Jewish Demography, Survey for 1969–1971*, 354 pp., Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem and Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, 1975, £2.50.

Shaffir, William, *Life in a Religious Community: The Lubavitcher Chassidim in Montreal*, xi + 244 pp., Hold, Rinehart & Winston of Canada, Toronto and Montreal, 1974, n.p.

Shoham, S. Giora, *Society and the Absurd*, with a foreword by Harold D. Lasswell and Lawrence Z. Freedman, xviii + 214 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1974, £3.25.

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Shostak, Arthur B., *Putting Sociology to Work, Case Studies in the Application of Sociology to Modern Social Problems*, xviii + 283 pp., David McKay, New York, 1974, $4.95 (paperback).

Shulvass, Moses A., *The Jews in the World of the Renaissance*, trans. Elvin I. Kose, xv + 367 pp., E. J. Brill, Leiden and Spertus College of Judaica Press, Leiden, 1973, 58 guilders.

Silberman, Alphons and König, René, eds., *Künstler und Gesellschaft*, 353 pp., Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, DM 46.

Sklare, Marshall, ed., *The Jew in American Society*, ix + 404 pp., Library of Jewish Studies, Behrman House, New York, 1974, $12.50

Sklare, Marshall, ed., *The Jewish Community in America*, 383 pp., Library of Jewish Studies, Behrman House, New York, 1974, $12.50.

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Vago, Bela, *The Shadow of the Swastika, The Rise of Fascism and Anti-Semitism in the Danube Basin, 1936–1939*, vi + 431 pp., Saxon House for the Institute of Jewish Affairs, Westmead, Farnborough, Hants., 1975, £6.50.

Weinberg, David H., *Les Juifs à Paris de 1933 à 1939*, trans. from the English by Micheline Pouteau, 287 pp., Collection 'Diaspora' (dirigée par Roger Errera), Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1974, n.p.

Weinstein, Deena and Weinstein, Michael A., *Living Sociology, A Critical Introduction*, xix + 488 pp., David McKay, New York, 1974, $5.95.

Weisgal, Meyer W., gen. ed., *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, Vol. VI, *Series A. March 1913–July 1914*, edited by Gedalia Yogev, Shifra Kolatt, and Evyatar Friesel; English edition, Barnett Litvinoff, xxxv + 454 pp., Oxford Univ. Press and Israel Univ. Press, London and Jerusalem, 1974, £9.00.

Weller, Leonard, *Sociology in Israel*, Contributions in Sociology, no. 11, xiii + 315 pp., Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn. and London, 1974, £6.25.

Wilson, James, *Canada's Indians*, 32 pp., Minority Rights Group, Report No. 21, London, 1974, 45p.

YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Research, vol. XV, 374 pp., YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, New York, 1974, n.p.

Zinberg, Israel, *Italian Jewry in the Renaissance Era*, vol. 4 of *A History of Jewish Literature*, trans. and ed. by Bernard Martin, xv + 214 pp., Hebrew Union College Press, Cincinnati, Ohio, and Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1974, $12.50.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

FREEDMAN, Maurice; M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Social Anthropology, University of Oxford, and Fellow of All Souls College. Formerly Professor of Anthropology at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Chief publications: (ed.) *A Minority in Britain: Social Studies of the Anglo-Jewish Community*, London, 1955; *Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore*, London, 1957; *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China*, London, 1958; *Chinese Lineage and Society*, London, 1966; (ed.) *Social Organization: Essays Presented to Raymond Firth*, London, 1967; (ed.) *Family and Kinship in Chinese Society*, Stanford, Calif., 1970; (trans. and ed.) Marcel Granet, *The Religion of the Chinese People*, Oxford, 1975. Is now working upon the Western perception of Chinese religion.

LANDMAN, Leo; Ph.D., Associate Professor of Jewish History at the Bernard Revel Graduate School, Yeshiva University, New York. Chief publications: 'Jewish Attitudes toward Gambling', *Jewish Quarterly Review*, April and July 1967 (vols. 57 and 58); *Jewish Law in the Diaspora: Confrontation and Accommodation*, Dropsie University, Philadelphia, 1968; 'Law and Conscience: The Jewish View', *Judaism*, vol. 18, winter 1969; *The Cantor: An Historic Perspective*, Yeshiva University, New York, 1972; ed., *Judaism and Drugs*, New York, 1973; 'In Truth They Said' (*BeEmet Omru*), in *Finkel Festschrift*, New York, 1974; 'The Prerogatives of the Jewish and Non-Jewish King' (in Hebrew), *Bitzaron*, vol. 66, Oct.–Nov. 1974. Currently engaged in research on 'Halakha l'Moshe mi'Sinai'.

LIEBMAN, Charles S.; M.A., Ph.D., Associate Professor, Chairman of Department of Political Studies, Bar-Ilan University. Chief publications: 'Dimensions of Authority in the Contemporary Jewish Community', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 12, no. 1, June 1970; *The Ambivalent American Jew: Politics, Religion and Family in American Jewish Life*, Philadelphia, 1973; *Aspects of the Religious Behavior of American Jews*, New York, 1974; 'The Ben-Gurion-Blaustein Exchange', *Jewish Social Studies* (forthcoming); *Pressure Without Sanctions*, to be published in 1976. Currently engaged in a study of civil religion, traditional Judaism, and political integration.

PRAIS, S. J.; M.Com., Ph.D., Sc.D., Visiting Professor at the City University, London, and Senior Research Fellow, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London. Formerly Consultant to the Statistical and Demographic Research Unit, Board of Deputies of British Jews; Economist, International Monetary Fund; Adviser to the Government of Israel on economic statistics; Assistant Lecturer in the University of Cambridge. Chief publications: (co-author) *The Analysis of Family Budgets*, Cambridge, 1955 (2nd impression, 1971); 'Measuring Social Mobility', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 1955; 'The Measurement of Changes in the Cost of Living', *J.R.S.S.*, 1958; Con-

tributor to Tew and Henderson, eds., *Studies in Company Finance*, Cambridge, 1959; co-author, 'Statistics of Milah and the Jewish Birth-rate in Britain', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 12, no. 2, December 1970; 'Synagogue Statistics and the Jewish Population of Great Britain, 1900–70', *J.J.S.*, vol. 14, no. 2, December 1972.

SCHMOOL, Marlena; B.Soc.Sc. (E.P.S.). Formerly Research Officer, Statistical and Demographic Research Unit, Board of Deputies of British Jews, London. Chief publications: co-author, 'Statistics of Jewish Marriages in Great Britain: 1901–65', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 9, no. 2, December, 1967; co-author, 'The Size and Structure of the Anglo-Jewish Population 1960–65', *J.J.S.*, vol. 10, no. 1, June, 1968; 'Register of Social Research on the Anglo-Jewish Community', *J.J.S.*, vol. 10, no. 2, December, 1968; co-author, 'Synagogue Marriages in Great Britain, 1966–8', *J.J.S.*, vol. 12, no. 1, June 1970; co-author, 'Statistics of Milah and the Jewish Birth-Rate in Britain', *J.J.S.*, vol. 12, no. 2, December, 1970; 'Register of Social Research on Anglo-Jewry, 1968–71', *J.J.S.*, vol. 13, no. 2, December, 1971. Currently engaged in research into the structure and role of the Anglo-Jewish Rabbinate.

WELLER, Leonard; Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Bar-Ilan University. Chief publications: 'Articulation of the Body Concept among First Grade Israeli Children', *Child Development*, vol. 42, no. 4, 1971; 'Personality of Recidivists and First-Time Offenders, and of Property and Violent Offenders', in S. Shoham, ed., *Israel Studies of Criminology*, vol. II, Jerusalem, 1973; *Sociology in Israel*, Westport, Conn., 1974; 'Birth Order and Marital Bliss in Israel', *Journal of Marriage and the Family* (forthcoming). Currently engaged in research on ethnic differences in Israel, and on the effects of birth order on attitudes and behaviour.

WISTRICH, Robert Solomon; Ph.D. Editor of *The Wiener Library Bulletin*. Formerly, Literary Editor of *New Outlook* and Research Assistant at the Department of Hebrew and Jewish Studies, University College London. Chief publications: 'German Socialists and the Jewish Question', *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1973; 'Karl Marx and the Jewish Question', *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, vol. 4, no. 1, 1974; 'An Austrian Variation on Socialist Antisemitism', *Patterns of Prejudice*, vol. 8, no. 4, July-August 1974; 'Victor Adler: A Viennese Socialist against Philosemitism', *The Wiener Library Bulletin*, vol. 27, New series no. 32, 1974. Currently engaged in preparing for publication his London University doctoral thesis, *Socialism and the Jewish Problem in Germany and Austria, 1880–1914*.

Soviet Jewish Affairs

A Journal on Jewish Problems in the USSR and Eastern Europe

Volume 5 Number 1 Spring 1975

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REVIEWS

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Published by the Institute of Jewish Affairs, 13/16 Jacob's Well Mews, George Street, London W1H 5PD

The Journal appears twice a year, in spring and autumn.
Annual subscription £3 or $7.50 (air mail surcharge £2 or $5).
Single issues £1·60 ($4), with additional charges for air mail.