

Critical Solidarity

Regarding the Relationality
of Anti-Arab and Anti-Jewish Racisms
in the *Guardian* and the *Independent* Newspapers



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PERSONAL DECLARATION

As an Israeli, living in the UK for now 18 years, I wish to declare my opposition to Israel's oppressive occupation against the Palestinian people. I oppose Netanyahu's governments as well as previous Israeli governments (e.g. Sharon and Barak's). I oppose Israeli claims over the entire area from the Jordan to the sea (or in Jordan). I oppose Israeli tactics of landgrabbing, 'low intensity' violence and full-scale wars. I oppose Israeli settlements and Israel's control over Palestinian movement. I object to the militant, religious strand of Israeli politics along with its noxious racist tones. I object to Israel's tolerance of criminal civilian elements and their on-going crimes against Palestinians.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis looks into representations of Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish non-elite civilians in the liberal press in Britain, namely the *Guardian* and the *Independent* newspapers. The period examined in the research follows the al-Aqsa Intifadah (since September 2000) and the Arab-Israeli conflict during the 2000s (2000-2010). The research findings look specifically into the coverage of the peace months of July and December 2000. The primary proposition of the thesis follows the burgeoning literature regarding the parallel, centuries-old histories of the Arab, Jew and the Idea-of-Europe in tandem, in one breath as it may (e.g., Anidjar, 2003, 2007; Kalmar and Penslar, 2005; Boyarin, 2009). This theorisation finds the Arab and Jew as two formational Others to the Idea-of-Europe, with the Jew imagined as the religious and internal enemy to Europe and the Arab as the political and external enemy (Anidjar, 2003). This research enquires how liberal-left forms of racialisations (not only extreme right racialisations) towards the Arab and Jew are contingent upon these centuries-old images and imaginaires, even during moments of peacemaking (not only times of heightened violence). The main hypothesis of the research is that in the mediated, Manichean packaging of the Arab-Israeli conflict in both newspapers the Palestinian and Israeli-Jew are reduced to two sediment polarized identities where no Palestinian exists outside the articulation of being oppositional to the Israeli-Jew through difference marked by violence, and vice versa. Critical Solidarity is proposed as a mode of Peace Journalism (e.g., Galtung, 2000; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005; Kempf, 2007) which hopes to address concerns at the intersection of news reporting about the conflict and race.

Bourgeois ideology... which is the proclamation of an essential equality between men, manages to appear logical in its own eyes by inviting the sub-men to become human, and to take as their prototype Western humanity as incarnated in the Western bourgeoisie.

FRANZ FANON (1967:131)

Modern political religions may reject Christianity, but they cannot do without demonology... It is never the flaw of human nature that stands in the way of Utopia. It is the working of evil forces.

JOHN GRAY (2007:25)

*You hear the news about the Palestinian?
Wherever he is they knife him
famine strikes him and flees
rumour hacks off an arm here, a leg there,
the media joyfully spread the news
the Palestinian rejects
he accepts his days as a sword
a hand that scatters the illusions of others
I testify “endurance is his strength.”*

AHMAD DAHBUR, “IN MEMORY OF ‘IZZIDDIN AL-QALAQ”
(IN JAYYUSI, 1987:196)

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

On 6 July 2005 I attended a public talk by Greg Dyke, then head of the BBC, in which, to my surprise, Dyke used my PhD research as the finale for his talk. Indeed, we had chatted a couple of months earlier, after Dyke's book launch at the London School of Economics. In his public talk Dyke recounted that an Israeli guy (me) had complained about the BBC's coverage of Palestinian issues. This made Dyke conclude that the BBC "must have done something right." Dyke also said that he had suggested to the Israeli guy that he accompany him to the Israeli embassy to counter its officials' repeated complaints about the BBC's coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict ('the conflict').

What is noteworthy in this example is Dyke's apparent worldview in which Palestinians and Israelis are neatly divided into two ideal-type, polarised groups. It was worthwhile suggesting that he parade me at the embassy since I was the metonymic exception to *the* Israeli that proves the rule in all other cases not excepted. Accordingly, Palestinians and Israelis are like cats and dogs, embroiled in a perpetual war and incapable of seeing each other's points of view as, supposedly I did, as the anomaly. In this example, any mutuality or intersection between the two antinomies, the Palestinian-Arab and Israeli-Jew, seemed to Dyke far-fetched and impossible. Correspondingly, complaints about the bad coverage of Palestinians 'cancelled out' complaints about the bad coverage of Israelis in a zero-sum game. Such an equation ratifies a mindset that imagines itself as a neutral, objective arbitrator between 'two sides' otherwise incapable of bridging such abyssal rifts themselves. Indeed, Dyke's inability to see beyond his own conception (of Palestinians and Israelis) is underscored by the way he saw such failures in others to be unique.

This anecdote is pertinent to this research due to Dyke's myopia in relation to the possibility that the BBC's coverage of the conflict could be negative to *both* Palestinians *and* Israeli-Jews. Permitting this possibility, media professionals like Dyke are *not* neutral and objective arbitrators of universal values. Rather, they are indebted to their own particular vested viewpoints, beliefs and positions. Accordingly, representations of non-white, non-European, non-Christian people in formerly British ruled areas have a long and complex history, and the discourse about these peoples is contingent upon such history.

Since about the mid 2000s repeated studies have thus pointed to the *mutual* rise of *both* Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in Britain and in Europe in general. For example, the report by the Pew Global Attitude Project, aptly titled “Unfavourable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe” (2008), a survey of nearly 25,000 people across 24 countries, concludes that:

Overall, there is a clear relationship between anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim attitudes: publics that view Jews unfavourably also tend to see Muslims in a negative light. (2008:1-2)¹

Indeed, in 1954, Gordon Allport had already stated that:

One of the facts of which we are most certain is that people who reject one out-group will tend to reject other out-groups. If a person is anti-Jewish, he is likely to be anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti any out-group. (1954:68)

In the post 9/11 era—with ensuing British military occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq—Allport’s “any out-group” easily applies to Arabs and Muslims. How, then, can one understand Europe’s attitudes² towards the Arab and Jew *in concert*; as positioned within a relationality to each other? Moreover, this research asks how these contingent (rather than separated) histories of *both* formative Eurocentric anti-Arab racism and Christian anti-Jewish racism appear in the progressive, quality liberal media; not only the more usual object of enquiry, the tabloid right-wing media.

The principal case study selected for this an investigation is the *Guardian*’s coverage of the al-Aqsa Intifada (also known as the Intifāḍat al-Aqṣā or the Second Intifada, AAI henceforth), with the *Independent* newspaper as a secondary case study. Starting on 29 September 2000, and lasting through the aftermath of the historic January 2006 PA elections and the Hamas takeover of Gaza (June 2007), this thesis looks into appearances in both newspapers during the 2000s with an emphasis on the early 2000s (see Methodology chapter). This work’s main research question asks how non-elite people

¹ See also the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia reports, such as *Muslims in the European Union – Discrimination and Islamophobia* (2006), and *Summary overview of the situation in the European Union 2001-2005 (updated December 2006)*. A study on group-focused enmity in Europe noted that “A person who holds negative sentiments towards immigrants is more likely to be prejudiced against other groups as well such as Jews, Muslims, and even homosexual persons or women etc” (Zick, Beate and Hinna, 2009:5). An EUMC report titled “The fight against Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia,” ties between the rise of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism with the media’s role in perpetuating “myths, clichés and stereotypes” (Diamantopoulou, 2003:101).

² Following Shohat and Stam, I take *Europe* to mean not only “Europe per se but also the “neo-Europeans” of the Americas, Australia and elsewhere” (1994:1). See also point 13 below.

(civilians), Palestinian and Israeli-Jews, are represented in the coverage of the AAI in the quality, liberal-left, print news media in Britain.

Crucially, this study does not focus on ‘typical’ Palestinian and Israeli perspectives of the conflict. For example, a study of Israel’s state terrorism (its belligerent, colonial occupation and dispossession affecting whole populations) could benefit from a variety of sources other than the two British daily newspapers. Instead, this study scrutinises the national debate in Britain regarding the Palestinian-Arab and Israeli-Jew as they appear in the quotidian news reports about the conflict. In other words, it looks into how media professionals become “cultural intermediaries,” organising the cultural production of symbolic goods (Bourdieu, 1984:359) in the light of centuries of political and religious contestations between Christian-Europe, Arabs and Jews. One can think of such a multi-discursive perspective on the same event as various reproductions of a canvas that is too large and detailed for anyone to see all at once (or a reality which no one perspective encompasses simultaneously). Some reproductions are taken with great care and up-close, some are snapped quickly from a far. While Palestinians and Israelis think about the conflict from their respective detailed perspectives, this study examines those other snappy and distanced reproductions: a hasty, 24 hours news cycle that is produced and consumed by a workforce (almost entirely) and an audience 5,000 kilometre away.

Revolving around a detailed key hypothesis (see below), the structure of this thesis is that of an hourglass. While the opening chapters lay the foundations which narrow this study towards its hypothesis, the ensuing chapters widen the review to examine the research sample through its lens. A brief summary of this key hypothesis is as follows. *Both* anti-Arab and anti-Jewish racisms can be found in the *Guardian* and the *Independent* newspapers: not as separate or distinct phenomena but in a particular relationality to each other, that of polar-opposites. As further developed below, racialisations towards the Jew as the internal theological Other to Christian-Europe interrelate to racialisations towards the Arab as the external political Other (Anidjar, 2003. See also Kalmar and Penslar 2005; Turner, 2002; Boyarin, 2009). The first is a destructive racialisation of those *internal* sub-communities inside Europe imagined as competent outcasts who are undermining Our sacred values from *within*. This I call Racialised Demonization (RD). The second is a pseudo-assimilative racialisation towards *external* Other defining the borders of Europe from *outside*, deemed morally incompetent and (eventually) politically ‘weak.’ This I call

Racialised Toleration (RT). Where RD finds the Jew as Christianity's theological ancestor (see below), yet in decline; in RT "well meaning" (Trepagnier, 2006), "positive" Orientalism (Turner, 2002:25) sees *sympathy*, not just historical confrontation (Said, 1978:121), as part of its imperious, pacifying and assimilationist gaze on Oriental peoples. The key suggestion of RT is that toleration of Palestinian elites' wrongdoing occurs not due to generative recognition but through a *selective* soft Orientalism (Kalmar, 2012) towards the Arab Nature in general. This form of soft Orientalism takes the shape of postcolonial paternalism and narcissism which imagines the Arab to be immature, morally fledgling and malleable. While We Occidental Europeans are in the "privileged position as the model for the world" (Shohat, 2006:9), They, with a little help, can become 'like Us': "almost the same, *but not quite*" (Bhabha, 1994:89). Since this paternal Eurocentrism magnanimously endures what it already finds intolerable, such pseudo-toleration is temporary, limited and instrumental. Seeing the Palestinian as an extension of the Eurocentric self-image is linked to an indulgent "imperial imaginary" (Shohat and Stam, 1994:130) which appears to itself as a saviour central for human progress. Hence, historical racialised Orientalism (Said, 1978; Macfie, 2000; Sayyid, 1997; Turner, 1994, 2002; Kalmar, 2012) that sees the Arab as irrational, cruel, backward and in need of external governance, can be "reformed" (Bhabha, 1994:100)—temporarily and instrumentally—to seeing the Arab as unknowing, passive, victimised and in need of saving. Both positions derealise the Arab and imagine her only as an extension of the Idea-of-Europe's own needs and desires. To give a brief illustration from the findings, Palestinians that *do not* reflect such a grand British view of itself, as in the case of the *Jordanian*-Palestinians (see below), or that *reflect badly* on it, as in the case of *Iraqi*-Palestinians since 2003 (see below), are excluded. Other Palestinians who merely dull Our taken for granted sense of difference from, and privilege over, Them—such as Palestinian academics, professionals, social activists, human rights groups, peaceniks, social workers, the business community, artists or sport persons—are also routinely left out of the coverage.

As above, such racialisations of the Arab as being passive and unknowing appear as diametrically oppositional to racialisations of the Israeli-Jew as carnal, controlling and a threat to world peace.³ *Figure 1* illustrates such theorization using 'classic' anti-Arab and

³ For example, a *Guardian* article (6 November 2006) reviews responses to a European poll which found

anti-Jewish images and one contemporary image from a BBC timeline of the conflict (2005, see below). RD (carnal and controlling in excess, lacking in spirit) and RT (mystical, ornamental yet politically immature and child-like) are synchronized as *two* diametric oppositions in British, Western⁴ imaginaire (see Parfitt, 2002:1). The BBC image does not depict two biographical persons who happen to appear as cartoon-like depictions of an Arab and Jew. Rather, it constitutes a constellation of conceptual relationships between diametrically oppositional cultural-historical conjunctions that confirm the reader's position as the subject at the centre of this formation; imagined as primarily secular, progressive, middle-class, Christian, European and white (see below). What unifies these polar oppositions is the European-British self-image as individualistic, secular (free of dogmas) and science-based, but still part of a virtuous community and upholding universally (as opposed to particularistic) accepted norms and values (rather than having immature or fledgling values). While being *moderately* materialistic (controlling her environs), the British Idea-of-Europe nonetheless imagines herself as a force for good in the world (rather than a force for bad or a misguided force) and as upholding progress, civilization and the rule of law for her own benefit but also that of others. A key theme in this work regards the notion of excess versus equilibrial mid-position: two rigid, unchanging diametric oppositions are constantly pulling away from each other with the middle pivotal position, in equidistance from both, constantly oscillating and reinventing itself anew.

Figure 1: The stereotypical Jew (unknown source), a BBC image (2005) and Jean-Léon Gérôme's The Snake Charmer (1870, also Said, 1978)



that 59% of the respondents named Israel as the greatest threat to world peace.

⁴ I use the term "Western" when it is applied in the quoted text.

While RT and RD reflect a Manicheanist division of the Arab and Jew as two antithetical groups, the notion of Critical Solidarity (CS) appears as the synthesis of this binary model. CS suggests an alternative mode of Peace Journalism (Galtung, 2000; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005; Kempf, 2007; Manoff, 1998) that hopes to contribute to a body of knowledge at the intersection of concerns relating to news reporting about the conflict and race.

A simplified metaphor for RT and RD may be seen in the following parable. A knight in shining armour climbs on his horse and scans the earth high and low for a damsel in distress in need of saving from an evil dragon. However, the knight is not really noble as he is accustomed to wars and violence under many names. The dragon is also not necessarily evil and the damsel not necessarily helpless, passive or beyond fault. On the one hand, the knight thus requires a constant source of ontological enemy figures against which to define his moral authority and high self (the dragon). On the one hand, the knight also requires inferior, non-competing and malleable others who see in him and his values a model for the good life (the damsel). Seeing himself as an imperious prototype, the knight imagines his moral authority in relation to *both* these willing replicas *and* evil forces, subverting them from the path of becoming 'like-him.' Assuming the high moral ground in relation to *both*, the knight slays the dragon *and* requires the damsel to be assimilated into his system of values and to abandon hers. When slaying the dragon, the knight's own wrongs are externalised and then rejected so as to bring about a new golden era of justice and rights. In contrast, the damsel in distress is projected with the knight's imagined own high ideals as 'lifting' her to 'his level' with his 'gifts' of civilisation and progress. Yet slaying the external dragon does not free the knight from his internal wrongs, and the damsel cannot fulfil the knight's unattainable, imagined ideals. These *two* differentiated yet interrelated modes of Othering, of managing difference (assimilative Othering) while maintaining purity (destructive Othering), run through this study.

1.1 The story of the research

Growing up in 1970s Israel, by the dunes and coastline of Herzeliya, I read children books with cartoons that openly depicted Arabs as evil and stupid,⁵ while seeing Bedouins herding their sheep from my bedroom window. At primary school we celebrated Israel's Independence Day with white T-shirts, white doves, and songs about peace (my school was even twinned with an Arab school from the lower Galilee). Yet, anti-Arab racism was pervasive and the Palestinian struggle for justice and independence was at best the subject of ridicule.⁶ At the same time, my primary school and playgrounds included safety pits for disposing of objects suspected to be bombs⁷ and the fear of an all-out war was normal. Herzeliya, however, was also at the fore throughout the 1930s and the Holocaust in the clandestine smuggling of Jewish immigrants (*maapilim*) into British-ruled Palestine. My childhood's coastal, political landscape simmered not only with unspoken remnants of Palestine and an emerging Jewish state, but also with fragments of the British Mandate. For example, my parent's house was (and still is) situated between Wingate Street (named after the British officer Orde Wingate, who trained Jewish armed groups) and Etzel Street (the acronym for Irgun Tzvai Leumi, the Jewish militant group that fought the British mandate). The Jewish Brigade Street (commemorating Palestinian Jews who trained alongside the British during WWII) and the Boat Junction (commemorating the *maapilim*), were just down the road from my parents' house.

Hence, the Israel I grew up in both upheld Britain's imperial rule (endorsing the 1917 Balfour Declaration) and resisted it. In 2000, when the AAI broke out, Israel was both an occupying, colonising force, ruling over another people through an oppressive military regime, and part of the story of post-World War II decolonisation (in Israel's case, from Britain) and the so-called Spring of Nations.

It is this view from the 'periphery' regarding British history in the Middle East with which I came to London in December 2000, a couple of months into the AAI. Yet, the Britain I experienced in liberal-left circles saw itself as a champion of universal rights and pax in

⁵ For example, the Hasamba series by Yigal Mossinson.

⁶ For example, the socialist *Matzpen* journal (first published on 22 November 1962), was a familiar target for such contempt and ridicule despite having only a handful of members (Greenstein, 2014).

⁷ Since the 1991 Gulf War, by law, all private residences are built with enforced safe rooms against rockets and gas attacks.

terra. The conflict featured daily in inescapable, large headlines with seemingly sympathetic reports projecting the Palestinian Authority (PA) with idealised liberal values, such as secularism, democracy and post-nationalism, yet little else (for example, Britain's imperial and Cold War history in Palestine). Israelis were a draconian people who had to be put right by Britain's 'experienced' (read 'measured') colonial past. I thus learned to speak Hebrew in public spaces in hushed tones, to blur Israeli references on my CV and become accustomed to the awkward silences which followed my answer to the question "Where are you from?" (what Bhabha recounts as "the solecism of a still silence," 2000). In one incident, when I called about a room for rent, I was told that "We don't want anything to do with Israelis because of what *you* do to the Palestinians." At work, at wedding receptions or at SOAS, I was at times challenged about Israel's recent actions—actions which I neither understood nor supported. For example, an article in the SOAS student union magazine⁸ explained that Palestinian violence against Israeli civilians, even children, is justified since "those who benefit from the immoral actions of a colonial state... cannot be considered as innocent." Anyone, it seemed, was in a position to reprimand me for the faults of 'my people'⁹ with news items being the conduits of such vindicated 'Gotcha!' moments: 'You see! Israeli-Jews are really so and so after all.'

Academically, I became engaged with the conflict through media studies, critical race theory and postcolonial studies, not through the arguably more common routes of history or political science. This engagement and thinking about the region came about from such organisations as B'Tselem (where I interviewed two former directors); the coexistence village of Wahat al-Salam / Neve Shalom; the Palestine-Israel Journal; SOAS Palestinian Society; Palestinian and Israeli Bereaved Families for Peace; the PRIME Peace Education Project; Breaking the Silence; Women Wage Peace; Keshev; the journalist-activist Amira Hass and the All Nation's Café (which organises weekly Palestinian-Israeli meetings).

This research thus sets out to explore anti-Arab and anti-Jewish racisms through the scrutiny of Peace Journalism (e.g., Galtung, 2000) and a post-colonial framework. For example, early in my research I encountered Richard Burton's *Personal Narrative of a*

⁸ Titled "When Only Violence Will Do," by Nasser Amin, SOAS Spirit, Issue 3 2005.

⁹ Fanon reflects on such sentiment as follows "I was responsible at the same time for my body, my race, for my ancestors" (Fanon 1968:112). Kumar tells a similar story, saying that hours after 9/11 he was jeered at: "Are you happy?" and was even asked to apologise for the attacks (2012:1).

Pilgrimage to El-Medinah and Meccah (1855-6). The book is an adventurer's fantasy and its Victorian imperialist Orientalism provides a pseudo-scientific view on other "barbaric" and "semi-civilised" people (see Said, 1978:194; Kabbani, 1986/1994:9). However, I also discovered Burton's *The Jew, the Gypsy and El Islam* (1898) where the "intolerable wrong" of Jews (1898:34), being a "parasitic race" (1898:17), included the mysterious disappearances of children and rites of human sacrifice. I could not but be amazed at the lack of research into how the first set of racialisations could enrich an understanding of the other set. Later I learned that similar notions also hold for the likes of Hegel,¹⁰ Max Weber or other historic figures who expressed the intersections of the "Eastern Question"¹¹ with the "Jewish Question." For example, contrast Marx's essay "On the Jewish Question," which discusses "the emancipation of society from Judaism" (1926:97), with his "Romantic Orientalist vision" (Said, 1978:154; also, Turner 1994:98). As Said (1978:154) quotes Marx

England has to fulfil a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating—the annihilation of the Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia.

It is important to stress that this research deals with the core years of the AAI during the 2000s. The political landscape has dramatically changed since, with the rise of Hamas after the 2006 elections, Netanyahu's ascendance since 2009, the Arab Spring, the rise and rise of the Israeli nationalist right and the emergence of the Islamic State (Isis), to name but a few dynamics. The insights in this study do not intend to be applicable to the situation in the Middle East in 2018. Rather, they examine the centuries' long exchanges between Europe, the Arab and Jew through the prism of the coverage of the first years of the AAI.

¹⁰ See Kalmar (2012:76).

¹¹ For example Said (1978:76); Macfie (1989).

1.2 Conceptual framework

“When an Arab is dirty he is picturesque, when a Jew is dirty he is filthy”

A WIFE OF A BRITISH OFFICER IN PALESTINE (QUOTED IN BRENDON, 2008:480)

Daniel Barenboim, the renowned orchestra conductor and a collaborator of Edward Said, used the metaphor of “painful listening” in one of his talks (2006).¹² Having opposing narratives yet an equal necessity for rights, Barenboim commented, “the Israeli narrative is no less painful to the Palestinians as the Palestinian narrative might be to many people in Israel.” However, what makes mere “listening” painful in a conflict that is filled with violence and loss? In Barenboim’s conception of listening the sides need to ‘shake up’ some of their deeply held beliefs and positions and, through the cracks, consider the Other’s beliefs and positions. This research adopts this concept of *ontological painful listening* as taking place between *three* points of view: the Arab, Jew and the British Idea-of-Europe¹³ (see Pagden, 2002; Delanty, 1995; Swedberg, 1994; Wilson and van der Dussen, 1993) as played out in the liberal-left British press. Such a multi-axial study not only decentres the British-European gaze on the Arab-Israeli conflict, it positions the British Idea-of-Europe *within* this very contentious exchange. Those seeing themselves as detached bystanders, neutral and synonymous with universal values, are now implicated as being invested politically, culturally and historically. Accordingly, that which was articulated through the binaries ‘Europe and the Arab’ and ‘Europe and the Jew,’ is now examined as a *threefold* triangle of conflict. While the Arab and Jew battle in Bethlehem and Jerusalem, Europe-of-the-Mind performatively revisits her own historic conflicts with her *two* Semitic Others. To use Michael Galchinsky, this encounter, existing within the realm of attitudes, not actions, is part of a “larger project: the project of disciplining the conceptual borders of the nation-state” (2002:5). That is, the “conceptual borders” of white, Christian Britain. The editors, journalists, photojournalists and opinion writers in both newspapers are more concerned with their British audiences

¹² Reith Lectures, Jerusalem (2006).

¹³ To use David Goldberg, despite Europe, Britain and England’s “internal contrasts, inconsistencies, and temporal registers,” as well as “the relative intensities of local national parochialisms and exceptionalisms,” one can talk of “racial *Europeanization*,” or Europe which is “white and Christian” (2009:179, emphasis in original). On “Europecentrism” (Said, 1993:335), or Eurocentrism, see also Shohat and Stam (1994) van Dijk (1993), Wallerstein (1997 and 2006) and Hall (1992).

than with any particular aspect of Middle East politics. Consequently, this study is *not* an analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather, it is an inquiry into what stories about the conflict tell us about those producing and consuming such stories. Kabbani elucidates this point about self and other representations when she writes “The Gaze into the Orient had turned, as in a convex mirror, to reflect the Occident that had produced it” (1986/1994). For Talal Asad “The problem of understanding Islam in Europe is primarily... a matter of understanding how ‘Europe’ is conceptualized by Europeans” (2002:209). A popular saying encapsulates this notion ‘We don’t see things as they are, We see them as we are.’

This research thus tells the story of the less familiar triad of British ethnocentrism and modes of Eurocentrism towards both the Arab and Jew. It trails the story of *two* modes of Othering and *two* modes of becoming: Us British-Europeans and Them Semites, Arab and Jew (Parfitt and Egorova, 2002:1; Anidjar, 2007). As Parfitt and Egorova put it:

...for hundreds of years the Jews and Moors together constituted perhaps the overriding ‘other’ against which Europeans defined themselves. (...) For although Jews and Muslims or Moors were no doubt quite discrete entities, none the less, in Western thought and writing there has frequently been a discernible linkage between them and there are ways in which in modern *mediatic coverage* of these broad groupings these oppositions and linkages persist. (2002:1, emphasis added)

Such study of mediatic enunciations of Europe *and* the Arab *and* the Jew follows diverging, yet relational, histories, geographies and spiritual journeys, stretching throughout past centuries. Boyarin, for example, marks the middle of the twelfth century as the start of his study into European becoming through the lens of the New World, Jews and Muslims (2009:29). As pointedly put by Anidjar (2003), Europe’s historical enmity against its own Jewish communities, the *internal religious enemy*, occurred simultaneously alongside another, yet dissimilar enemy figure, the Muslim-Arab at the outskirts of Europe, or the *external political enemy*. Despite such clear distinctions of geography and theology these hostilities occurred side-by-side during the same time periods, emanating from the same Christian Eurocentric mindset and reflecting, as Boyarin notes, a consisted, not autonomous (2009), parts of European history. To use Karen Armstrong, Europe and Europe’s anti-Arab and anti-Jewish racisms are invoked in this study as a “triple vision,” “in tandem” and “side by side” as a “three-sided conflict of pain” (talk at the RSA, 2009).

Accounting for Europe's two Semitic enemy figures in one breath, or engaging "the three "elements" at once" (Anidjar, 2003:xvii), occurs at the crossroads between geography, history, ethnicity and religion. Paul Gilroy's notion of "roots and routes" (1993:19) fits such an inquiry into the interchanges between roads and crossroads, or between where one is coming from ("roots"), and where one is going to ("routes"). Accordingly, this research asks how do racialisations against the Arab and Jew are informed by ethnicity and identity ("roots") as well as geographical, cultural and socio-political transformations ("routes")? To use Said, between what one *is*—a given, fixed past—and what one *does*—a multitude of present actions and mutualities (1981/1997:xxii).

LITERATURE REVIEW

1.3 Theorising polar oppositions

Do you know why we Palestinians are famous?
 Because you are our enemy.
 The interest in us stems from the interest in the Jewish issue.
 The interest is in you, not in me. So we have the misfortune of
 having Israel as an enemy, because it enjoys unlimited support. And
 we have the good fortune of having Israel as our enemy, because the
 Jews are the center of attention. You've brought us defeat and renown.

MAHMOUD DARWISH, 2004

In Darwish's poem fame did not come to Palestinians simply through interest in them alone. Rather, (Israeli-) "Jews," being the "center of attention," brought to Palestinians (ruinous) "renown" since the stakes in both have become intertwined. But how do the Arab and Jew find themselves interconnected, each "as the symptom of its opposite" (Žižek, 2006:258¹⁴)? What is this stem whose roots branch out in two connected yet opposing ways? Whose "attention" is referred to in the poem through which "transformatory principles" (Rapport and Overing, 2000:35) evoke keen interest in the Israeli-Jew and *inattention* and *uninterested* interest in the Palestinian? In other words,

¹⁴ Žižek is referring to "postmodern... anti-Semitism" and Muslims "as Europe's constitutive Other" (2006:258).

what is “interest in us,” which is in fact is an interest “in you, not in me,” and what is the polity of fame “brought” by others from the “center” to the periphery and which, presumably, could also be taken away?

In response to these queries this thesis looks into two-term binary systems. Taken from Saussurian linguistics and structural anthropology, meaningful terms are generated by relations and oppositions (Hartley, 2012). In this formation, an actuality or continuity is separated and segmented into relational binary terms so as to be comprehended and processed. Here, understanding the full underlying vocabulary of terms is necessary to work out individual meanings. For example, binary oppositions, such as children/adults, day/night or land/sea are mutually exclusive yet together they give a wholeness of complete systems: humanity, time and the surface of the earth. As Hartley writes:

Such binaries are a feature of culture not nature; they are products of signifying systems, and function to structure our perceptions of the natural and social world into order and meaning. (2012:27)

To maintain the unity of this system of opposing categories ambiguities are suppressed, ironed out or become taboo. Through a zero-sum game of either/or, elements in the natural world are ordered into social and ideological significations. For instance, the opposition of day and night provides the quotidian unity of time as experienced from earth. Yet in space, the statement ‘the sun will always rise tomorrow’ is always untrue: rise over what? Rather, this metaphor naturalises earth’s standpoint as being self-evident. For example, “on the moon the sun rises only monthly” (Lawson, 2001:108). This moot point regarding the earth revolving around the sun (heliocentrism), not the other way around (geocentrism), in Galileo’s time was a punishable heresy. Thinking through such oppositions of day/night, earth/space and humanity/God in terms of prohibitions and prescriptions invokes Jung’s observation that “Without the experience of the opposite there is no experience of the wholeness and hence no inner approach to the sacred figures” (1995:28).

Looking into the British press in the 2000s this research claims that wholeness, as derived from binary thinking, has continually imposed underlying social meanings through the use of classificatory systems, priming and prototyping (see below).

Foundational to such examination is the work of Levi-Strauss in social anthropology (1968). Levi-Strauss proposed that every language or speech-act follows from deep, unconscious structures of symbolic classifications which are based on a system of binary oppositions and their unification. For Lévi-Strauss, thinking through polar oppositions as high/low, nature/culture or fresh/dry is “neither a primeval fact, nor a concrete aspect of universal order. Rather it should be seen as an artificial creation of culture” (1969:xxix). Hence, such classificatory schemata reflect general, innate principals of human cognition and the interplay between experience, language, culture, aesthetics and traditions (Ellen, 1993). As Stuart Hall puts it, “[b]inary oppositions are crucial for all classification, because one must establish a clear difference between things in order to classify them” (1997:236). Oppositions, continues Hall, mark “two clear ends of the spectrum” which help to “put things in their place,” “establish pure classification” and therefore give “cultures their unique meaning and identity” (1997:236).

As in Darwish’s poem, two opposites are united by an underlying, transformatory relationality which imposes a comprehensiveness even if these opposites appear to be otherwise unrelated. Jakobson, referring to his work on phonological systems (Jakobson and Halle, 1956), remarks on such inferential relationality:

In an oppositive duality, if one of the terms is given, then the other, though not present, is evoked in thought. To the idea of white there is opposed only that that of black, to the idea of beauty that of ugliness, to the idea of large that of small, to the idea of closed that of open, and so on. Opposites are so intimately interconnected that the appearance of one of them inevitably elicits the other. (1956:235, quoted in Chandler, 2007:91)

In *Figure 1*, above, for example, the middle photograph of the Arab and Jew makes for such “intimately interconnected” (Jakobson and Halle, 1956) oppositions: Europe versus Arab and Christian versus Jew; Arab versus Jew. In this triadic relationality, *two* dyadic relationships are exhibited as *both* and *neither*. Christian-Europe as having ancestral, cultural and theological Jewish roots yet We are *anything like Them* and the Palestinian-Arab as longing to be ‘like Us’ yet she can *never* reach Our (imagined) high standard of humanity. *The binaries are asserted only to be negated*. As seen in the findings chapters, other paradigmatic oppositions such as female/male, child/adult, agrarian/industrial,

nature/culture or synchronic/diachronic are also inferred. *Chart 7* below gives a lengthy overview of such editorial constructs, in which the key principle of such dyads is separation; Them as separated from each other, and Us as separated from Them both. As an illustration, where Arabs and Jews are essentialised as either the feminised East in need of saving (even men) or a bellicose excessive masculinity (even women), We are Promethean and hold progressive gender politics. Where They appear as children of the desert, infantilised and fixated with reproduction (Said, 1978), and They appear almost exclusively as omnipowerful adult men, We appear to Ourselves as paternal protectors of others.

Hence the Arab and Jew find themselves in an “oppositive duality” (Jakobson, 1956:235) devoid of overlaps or correspondences. A sobering metaphor for such Manichean classifications of Us/Them, good/bad, is provided by Stefan Zweig (1935/1982, quoted in Alon and Omer, 2006:90). At times of war and social upheaval the world appears as if a cloth torn in two. Suddenly anything, even abstract ideas or inanimate objects must take sides in this abrupt and totalizing division. Within this newly imposed schism, those on one side appear to be as governed by different sets of principles and values to those on the other side. Mamdani, writing in the context of the 1994 Rwanda genocide, reflects on this binary as the denial of the positionality of corresponding interactions. Mamdani remarks:

there is no middle ground, no continuum, between polarised identities. Polarised identities give rise to a kind of political difference where you must be either one or the other...The difference becomes binary...It sustains no ambiguity. (2001:23, in Anidjar, 2003:xv)

The analysis below into RT and RD rests on this totalizing relationality of binary oppositions.

LITERARY REVIEW

2.0 NEWS AND RACE

As above, this study aims to examine the trichotomy of the Arab, Jew and Idea-of-Europe as invoked not separately but within a “dia-synchronic relationality” (see Brah, 1996:190) and an “inextricable conjunction” (Kalmar and Penslar, 2005:xiii). However, it seems that until the mid-2000s (e.g., Anidjar, 2003, 2007; Kalmar and Penslar, 2005; Bunzl, 2007; Schenker and Abu Zayyad, 2006) the study of European anti-Arab *and* anti-Jewish racisms appeared mostly on two separate parallel lines, hardly ever touching. As Anidjar writes “one cannot help but wonder at the absence of any consideration, any sustained analysis, or even any history of “Europe” in its relation to *both Jew and Arab*” (2003:xvii). A major factor in the division and politicization of academic thinking about Islamophobia and anti-Semitism¹⁵ is the enduring Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, Kalmar and Penslar ask:

Given, then, that Western discourses about Muslims have almost always had something to do with Western discourses about Jews, why has more work not been done on Orientalism and the Jews? (2005:xv)

Answering their own question, the authors point to the polarising Arab-Israeli conflict as ‘cooling’ researchers’ enthusiasm to challenge politicised alliances. In such a polarising environment, specifically in the 2000s, the study of Orientalism or Islamophobia is seen as ‘pro-Arab’ and the study of anti-Semitism as ‘pro-Israeli.’

Indeed, in British social spheres such divisive lines go beyond intellectual incongruity and into the realm of social mobilisation and political activism. The various calls for UK academics after 9/11 and 7/7 to monitor and inform on students suspected of terror-related activities (i.e., with a Muslim bias) appeared against the background of various campaigns against Israel (such as BDS, or Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions). The National Union of Journalists (NUJ), for instance, voted in favour of, and later revoked, the boycotting of

¹⁵ I see both terms as equally colloquial and fraught with definitional deficits. Why ‘phobia’ and ‘anti’ when *philia* and kinship are central to both?

Israeli goods (13 April 2007). At the same time, consecutive British Prime Ministers (Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David Cameron) openly avowed pro-Zionist leanings.

However, since C. 2003 there is a growing literature that infuses the contingencies of Europe, the Arab and Jew. Such texts provoke a synthesis of ethnicity, history, geography and religion in the scrutiny of Europe's "internal and external Orientalism" (Turner, 2002:24). These syncretic analyses include: Anidjar (2003 and 2007); the edited volume by Kalmar and Penslar (2005, e.g., Introduction); Boyarin (2009); Meer (2012); Majid (2009); Pasto (1998); Turner (2002); Shohat (1992); Bunzl (2007, 2010); Meer and Noorani (e.g., 2008); Anya Topolski (e.g., 2015); Firestone (2010) and Renton and Gidley, (e.g., Introduction, 2017). I further review these studies below. The edited volumes by Parfitt and Egorova (2002) and Schenker and Abu Zayyad (2006) give wide-ranging perspectives on the dual manifestations of prejudices as embodied by Islamophobia and anti-Jewish racisms. Yuval-Davis and Silverman (1999), and Silverstein (2010), give historical and descriptive accounts of the racialisations of Arabs and Jews in Britain, France and North Africa.

Cesarani (2007) reflects on the suggestion that current-day hostilities against Muslims are comparable to past anti-Jewish hostilities, or that 'Muslims are the new Jews.' While Cesarani examines key moments in the settling and unsettling of both communities, his main argument is that the two modes of animosities are "incommensurable" (2007:12), with no grounds for comparison between them. Differently to Cesarani, I propose that the grammars of alterity (Turner, 2004:176) regarding the idiomatic Arab and Jew *are* interlinked by their very incommensurabilities (or by their diametric opposition).

Another indication of the growing acceptance of a threefold analytical framework is the increase in the number of relevant conferences in recent years. In one such conference Jonathan Freedland, a senior *Guardian* editor, observed that there is a "very big market" for topics such as Islamophobia *or* terrorism, on the one hand, and anti-Jewish racism *or* the denunciation of Israel on the other hand. Yet Freedland adds, there is a "tiny constituency which wants to hear both": i.e., Islamophobia *and* concerns about terrorism and concerns about anti-Jewish racism *and* criticism of Israel.¹⁶

¹⁶ The Royal Institution (15 September 2014, <https://membership.theguardian.com/event/hatreds-old-and->

2.1 International news, ethnicisation and the ‘new’ racism

[T]he mass media are today the primary source of ‘ethnic’
knowledge and opinion in society
TEUN VAN DIJK (2008:111)

The East is a career
SAID (1978, EPIGRAPH)

International News and Discourse

This section fleshes out some of the literature relating to norms and values taken up by news professionals as they process and reproduce world-life events into news media text. It is through these professionalised news norms, production goals and bureaucratic routines (Gieber, 1964) that global events are deemed newsworthy, or not. International news is unique since it re-imagines Anderson’s “imagined community” (1983) as a wider zone of exchange encompassing a *global* imagined community of seven billion people.

However, the International News desk at the *Guardian* employs about two dozen reporters worldwide at any given time, with even fewer staff being employed by the *Independent*. What then are the tensions between these newspapers’ liberal ethos and the daily competition for space and attention to be divided amongst various global agendas? How do Britain’s historical interactions with Arabs and Jews configure in this tussle for a favourable news exposure?

The section below aims to link the analysis of deep-seated social attitudes regarding the Arab and Jew and the literature on news values and news desk routines. For example, Robert Irwin observes that it was the 1973 Israeli-Arab war and its ensuing Energy Crisis, with its “outrageously bad press in American newspapers,” that “provoked Said to research and write *Orientalism*” (2006:281). Indeed, Said’s subsequent book, *Covering Islam* (1981), which deals with the US news coverage of the Middle East. This examination then asks how distant others constitute, and are constituted by, mediated ideas and “social relations between individuals and groups in society” (Richardson,

new-jonathan-freedland-and-mehdi-hasan-discuss-antisemitism-and-islamophobia-12718560557).

2004:4). Commenting on the socialisation effect of mediated cultural products, Kellner writes that the media reflects:

our very identities; our sense of selfhood; our notion of what it means to be male or female; our sense of class, of ethnicity and race, of nationality, of sexuality; and of “us” and “them.” Media images help shape our view of the world and our deepest values. (1995:25)

In this “culturalist thesis” regarding journalists’ codes and procedures (Curran, 1989:120), culture and hegemonic ideology themselves are inscribed in news routines. It is the “hegemony by the culture,” as Said puts it, from which “no one could be free” (1983:14). De Burgh writes that what is at stake in the analysis of news criteria is less so the “transmission of information” and more so the “affirmation of orthodoxy” (2005:8). In reflecting on these views on hegemonic ideas and the role of the news media, McNair finds that “journalists are not necessarily biased towards the powerful – but their routine assumptions make them willing conduits of that power” (2003:59). For Manheim, studies on the patterns of socialisation and interaction between newsmakers and their audiences:

make it clear that news content is often less a function of events themselves than of the professional and sociological perspectives of those whose job it is to witness and report on those events. (1987:501)

However, the everydayness of this normative process of news setting is matched by its vagueness. Stuart Hall writes:

“News values” are one of the most opaque structures of meaning in modern society... Journalists speak of “the news” as if events select themselves... Yet of the millions of events which occur daily in the world... only a small fraction are actually produced as the day’s news in the news media... We appear to be dealing, then, with a “deep structure” whose function as a selective device is un-transparent even to those who professionally most know how to operate it. (1981:234)

An early enquiry into such “deep structures” of news values is by Manning White who coined the term “gate keepers” after a study of a small American newspaper and its middle-aged wire editor during the 1950s. In her research, White found that only 18 of the 423 stories she analysed were rejected by “Mr. Gates” (as she called the editor) due to ‘big-P’ politics with the rest being rejected due to bureaucratic routines, technical issues or personal observations (see also Breed 1956:447; Gieber, 1964; Cohen and Young, 1973; Tuchman, 1978).

News values may be summarised as the basic organizing principles, norms and practices for selecting and determining the content of the news agenda, appearing on the background of sociocultural factors and attitudes (see also, Östgaard, 1965; Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Price and Tewksbury, 1997; Gans, 1979; Cohen and Young, 1973; Tuchman, 1978; Shoemaker, Danielian and Brendlinger, 1991). Consequently, the relationship between normative organisational processes, cultural production and social sensibilities are not immune to the reproduction of injurious discourse about distant others (see UNESCO's report *Many Voices, One World*, 1980). Writing on "elite racism" in the media, Teun van Dijk remarks:

Nearly everything most people know about non-European countries, about immigrants and minorities, they know from the mass media, and the same is true for their opinions and attitudes, which in turn are the basis of the social practices of discrimination and exclusion. (2008:95)

For van Dijk, "...compared to the European ingroup, which represents itself as superior in all relevant attributes," the out-group is demarcated in the news media through negative social cognitions and as being wholly different (van Dijk, 2005). Rosenblum's book *Coups and Earthquakes* (1981) demonstrates how an influx of development journalism in the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s found media users at odds with the new set of issues, places and vocabularies presented in news reports. Such uncharted encounters were met with the indexing of developing countries through stories about natural disasters, elite personae and backwardness. Rosenblum writes:

It was overwhelming for those who had to keep track of the changing world. Suddenly a flood of new names were competing for attention. Problems never before faced had to be explained with the old vocabularies. Different value systems and approaches to life had to be absorbed and understood. (1981:203)

Indeed, one can see how coups and earthquakes make for simplified stories, having a clear beginning, middle and end, thus transcending for the viewers the apparent strangeness of these places. As Rosenblum observes in a later account:

From 1960 to the 1980s, forty independent African countries joined the world community. In 1989, US news organizations paid less attention to all of them together than to the trial of Zsa Zsa Gabor for slugging a Beverly Hills cop. Or to a few California grey whales trapped in Alaskan ice. (1993:270)

What explains these sins of omissions and commissions between reports about Them 'over there' (even whole countries) and Us 'here' (even a few celebrities)? Galtung and

Vincent's international news flow model, titled *Four Factor News Communication model* (1992, *Chart 1*), suggests four criteria for selecting *international* news. This study adds to an earlier work by Galtung and Ruge (1965) which highlights twelve criteria, or predominant factors, as a result of which *national* events tend to become news. These criteria are: frequency, threshold, intensity, unambiguity, meaningfulness, consonance, predictability, unexpectedness, continuity, composition and relevance to elite nations, elite people or something negative. To this list Galtung and Vincent add the following four criteria: reference to elite nations, reference to elite persons, personalisation (events are seen as the actions of individuals), and negativity (bad news is good news). Put differently, Galtung and Vincent's model highlights the Western media's disregard of positive or structural processes associated with non-elite nations. In the international news flow in the global north, "non-elite people" from "Non-elite countries" are not likely to receive "positive" and "structural" coverage regardless of how significant these news items are. In contrast, "elite personas" from "elite nations" have a high likelihood of being included in the news flow, regardless of however faint, false, or rumoured such news items may be. They write:

For non-elite (Third World) countries for news to be reported, there will have to be an over-abundance of highly dramatic events, including but not limited to vast quantities of individuals, but with no coverage of how structures are operating to produce these unhappy circumstances for poor people. (Galtung and Vincent, 1992:51)

An *Observer* article that aims to shed light on the "truths that exist behind press reporting," reflects on these deep-seated ideological perceptions:

In death, as in life, the valuation of humanity is unfair. The beautiful, the rich, the white, the famous, the exotic weigh far more in the balance of things than, say, the unnumbered victims of malaria in Africa. The best guestimate is that two million die from malaria each year. That got less attention from the media, from us, than the death of one German cameraman thought to have been killed by the world's most exotic disease, Ebola Zaire Virus. We were wrong, of course. He died from yellow fever. (7 November 1999)¹⁷

Chang (1998) also points to the high prospects of a few *core* nations being included in the international news cycle when compared with *periphery* nations. *Chart 1*, below, exemplifies Galtung and Vincent's theorisation of the disparities between elite people

¹⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/nov/07/johnsweeney.theobserver>

from elite nations and non-elite people from non-elite nations. Indeed, Hannerz (2004:54) suggests that news tends to be about “states” rather than “societies,” with preference for governmentalism and hard politics over local, complex and multi-directional social dynamics. This discussion echoes the findings in regard of the omissions of Palestinian and Israeli societies, as well as the framing of the peace talks as being *anything but* structural, (potentially) positive processes impacting upon non-elite people (see below). Galtung and Vincent’s model is as follows:

Chart 1. Galtung and Vincent’s Four Factor News Communication model (1992)

	<i>Person Negative</i>	<i>Personal Positive</i>	<i>Structure Negative</i>	<i>Structure Positive</i>
<i>Elite country; elite people</i>	No problem: any gossip; however false	Happy family events	Cabinet falls change	Elections, even minor
<i>Elite country; non-elite people</i>	Accidents lottery, wealth	Prizes crashes	Economic growth	Economic
<i>Non-elite country; elite</i>	Scandals (drugs) wealth	Prizes lottery change	Coup d’état but major	Elections,
<i>Non-elite country; non-elite people</i>	Mega- accidents	Miracles	Revolutions “trouble,” riots	No chance; however true

Galtung and Vincent’s findings echo a plethora of similar studies (e.g., Molotch and Lester, 1974; Gans, 1979; Bennett, 1983; Entman, 1989; Reese, Grant and Danielian, 1994). Sreberny’s study for UNESCO, covering 29 countries, shows a recurring emphasis on “North America and Western Europe, while the “invisible” parts of the world are Eastern Europe and the rest of the developing world outside own immediate area” (1984:132). Denis Wu’s study (2004:95), considering coverage of 44 countries, also indicates a high degree of selectivity in international news reports (see also Gerbner and Marvanyi, 1977).

Thussu points out that in the coverage coming from Africa, more stories dealt with wildlife than with the continent’s 54 nations and their myriad concerns (2004:53).

According to Thussu (2004:53), long-running conflicts, e.g., in Sierra Leone, Angola, or the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are scantily mentioned or entirely left out of the Western news media.

Yet when looking into the coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict, such notions as “compassion fatigue” (Moeller, 1999) or ironic solidarity (Chouliaraki, 2012:3), are usually attached to the coverage of the Global South, and are not the going currency. As examined below in relation to the conflict as a whole and the coverage of peace processes in general, instead of silences and systemic omissions one finds exhilarated commitment and enthusiasm. An index example of this disparity between fatigue and fascination can be found in the *Guardian*’s own data tags analysis of its own website (under the heading “An end of year rundown of the countries we wrote about most – and least – in 2010”¹⁸), which reveals that:

If we were to subtract UK-related coverage from our totals for Afghanistan and Iraq, China would sneak into third place (1243, with only 83 tagged China+UK). Not surprising given its size and economic muscle. Fourth place goes to the far smaller Israel. (1,008 content items, with 101 also tagged UK news)

The article continues “[s]o we’re obsessed with our home country, captivated by the US and disproportionately preoccupied with Israel? Maybe.” Yet Palestine *does not* appear in this overview (nor does the “West Bank” or “Gaza”). The omission of Palestine is even more peculiar, since the article specifically names “San Marino, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Palau and Comoros” as the *only* places that “tags forgot.” Palestine then, is even removed from the list of ‘forgotten’ places. In contrast, a search in NewsBank into the *Guardian*’s printed edition (*not* online) reveals that the keyword (not the data tag) “Israel” appeared 2,016 times in 2010 and the keyword “Palestinian” appeared 680 times.¹⁹ Such findings point to the prominence of the conflict in the *Guardian* that year. I then repeated this examination into the *Guardian*’s print edition for the years 2000-2010. The keyword “Israel” appears 31,532 times (3,534 in the headlines) and the keyword “Palestinian” appears 13,585 times (1,096 in the headlines).²⁰ In comparison, other conflict zones

¹⁸ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/help/insideguardian/2010/dec/29/top-countries-by-tags-2010> (accessed 19 August 2012).

¹⁹ These numbers are relative, not absolute, since some news stories appear more than once in different regional editions. Also, due to copyright laws, Reuters or AP articles are sometimes not included in NewsBank. This holds true for all other NewsBank references below.

²⁰ The keywords “Palestinian” and “Palestine” (appearing 11,630 times) are roughly interchangeable. “Israel” appears 11,187 times in the in the lead (first paragraph) and “Palestinian” appears 6,564 times.

around the world during the same period consistently received fewer mentions. For example, the keywords “Palestinian” and “Israel” together appeared more times than did the 23 countries affected by violence as listed in *Chart 5* (section 6.1) *put together*: 45,117 versus 44,474 times. Some of these 23 countries include Sudan, North Korea, Congo, Burma, Eritrea, Central African Republic, Nigeria, Somalia, Yemen and Sri Lanka. Indeed, looking into the disparities in *Chart 5*, the keyword “ Hamas” (with 4,880 appearances) appears more times than *each* of these countries, apart from Nigeria. “Boko Haram,” which operates in Nigeria, appears only 11 times between 2000 and 2010, and only 206 times between 2010 and 2015. Astonishingly, the terms “Palestinian” and “Israel” together also appear 1.8 times (1.798, to be exact) more than the key terms “global warming” (8,743 appearances) and “climate change” (16,346 appearances) put together: 45,117 versus 25,089 times.²¹

Yet as I show in the findings below, such discrepancies recur also in the case of Palestine, where *some* Palestinian issues too go altogether underreported. For example, the keyword “UNRWA”—being the United Nations Relief and Works Agency which provides aid for five million Palestinian refugees—appears in the *Guardian* only 84 times (2000-2010). UNRWA’s 26 Palestinian refugee camps in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan appear only 102 times combined (with one exception), while UNRWA’s 16 Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza appear 1,709 times (see *Chart 6*). I also show similar trends in relation to the keywords “Lebanon,” “Hizbullah” and two *Iraqi*-Palestinian refugee camps (“al-Ruwaishid Camp” and “Al-Karama Camp,” see below).

Hence, a closer look at the *Guardian*’s obsession and myopia in relation to global conflicts solidifies the notion of the Arab and Jew as models for alterity in the European mindset (see Boyarin, 2009) when thinking about other peoples and cultures worldwide.

Indeed, the notion of ‘obsession’ with the conflict keeps being repeated. For example, the *Guardian*’s own annual report, titled *Living Our Values* (December 2006), quotes the freelance *Guardian* journalist Daphna Baram that “The *Guardian* has always been obsessed with the question of Israel-Palestine” (2004). Likewise, the *Guardian* journalist

²¹ In contrast with this data a sizeable 2015 *Guardian* climate change campaign was titled “The *biggest* story in the world” (emphasis added).
<http://www.theguardian.com/environment/ng-interactive/2015/mar/16/the-biggest-story-in-the-world>

Nick Cohen made a similar remark on “our obsession with Israel” (2007:338). The BBC’s Middle East bureau chief, Andrew Steel, acknowledged the “racist” inclination in the selection of news in reply to the question “So why does this [Arab-Israeli] conflict receive so much coverage?” (interview, McGregor-Wood and Schenker, 2003). Steele’s reply was that:

[...] A lot of people know an Arab or a Jew, so there is a connection for people in Europe and the US. And people here look like us. It’s racist, but we care more about Jews and Arabs being shot dead than we do about Bangladeshis who drown in a flood, because that’s much more remote, it’s much more distant. And everyone has heard of Bethlehem, Jerusalem, etc. – every story we hear as a child, Christian, Jew or Muslim, mentions them. Even people who have never been here have a connection with it that they don’t have with trouble spots like Aceh or Chechnya.

Emma Freedman also discusses these issues in her PhD thesis (2009). Freedman interviewed journalists including both those from the Guardian (Suzanne Goldenberg, Chris McGreal, Martin Woollacott, Conal Urquhart and Daphna Baram) and the Independent (Eric Silver and Donald Macintyre) on issues relating to the prominence of the conflict in the British news media. Echoing the historicisation above regarding the theologico Jew, Freedman (2009) writes:

The most common explanation given for its [the conflict’s] importance was that the story appealed to anyone from a monotheistic background based on a shared connection to Jerusalem and its environs. Nearly all the correspondents mentioned this factor. Goldenberg pointed out that Jerusalem and the biblical sites were “so much a part of” everyone’s lives whether you were a believer or not. They were ingrained in Western culture and beyond...

Rodgers (2015), looking into the British news media coverage of the conflict, quotes the BBC correspondent to Jerusalem, Jeremy Bowen, as follows:

its the Holy Land, we grow up with this stuff in traditional Judeo-Christian societies. You grow up with Bethlehem, Hebron, you read about it at school... (2015:59)

Orr Hirschauge, a former Wall Street Journal and Haaretz journalist, noted that the conflict receives “over-exposure” in relation to other global conflict zones due to its “massive narrative arc that goes back thousands of years” (interview, Hagai van der Horst, 9 August 2017). Indeed, British school children with tea towels for keffiyehs act out yearly the Nativity Story as Arab shepherds reciting “Today in the town of

David a Savior has been born...” (Luke 2:11). The latent intersections of the keffiyeh-wearing Arab spreading the Good News and Judaism as ancestral to Christianity (in the same way that Jesus is a descendant of King David, and indeed, Abraham, see Matthew 1:1–17) cannot be more pronounced.

Emma Freedman (2009:150) thus notes three different journalists who repeated the loaded idiom “*Jews are news*” to explain the uniqueness of the conflict’s coverage. As noted by a BBC journalist, Jewish-related issues have had a “high news profile since the Jewish diaspora were over-achievers” (ibid). Another correspondent remarked that the international media wanted to ““bash” Israel and the Jews” (ibid). Freedman includes other suggestions for the uniqueness of the coverage, such as Britain’s historical role in the region; the regular ‘yield’ of ‘hard news’ and ‘human interest’ stories; the Holocaust; the reversal of the David and Goliath story and, finally, Israel’s special relationship with the US and its “potentially destabilizing force whose actions could have ramifications elsewhere” (quoting Suzanne Goldenberg).

Two books published in the early 2000s, Baram (2004) and Philo and Berry (2004), return to this notion of the ‘obsession’ with Israel in the *Guardian* and at the BBC. Philo and Berry show how references in BBC televised news reports were short of history and context while Baram’s book reveals the *Guardian*’s historical engagement with Zionist formations.

2.1.1 U.S. televised news during the Cold War: subversion and salvation

This thesis’ notion of two Others, constructed as polar-opposites in the international news discourse, is supported by Dahlgren and Chakrapani’s analysis (1982) of televised news in the U.S. relating to developing countries. For the authors, the use of a matrix of construed categories and binaries in the quotidian discourse of international news reporting amounts to a process of civil association and socialisation (1982:46), producing and reinforcing “Western culture’s perception of itself and its relation to the Third World” (1982:48). Accordingly, the “West” inscribes its own elevation and the inferiorisation of others within discursive oppositions which include *subversion-salvation*, *scepticism-*

reassurance, violence-peacefulness and primitivism-civilised modernity. Chart 2, below, shows how certain “ways of seeing” (as the authors quote Berger, 1972) of remote peoples and geographies are produced in the news text through a formative process of implications and negations that divide Us from Them. For example, the theme of violence seems to be naturalised and a tautology when appearing in developing countries. Their violence is not acted by “independent historical subjects,” but, rather, by some furious, uncontrolled, unleashed Nature (1982:51). Their primordial primitiveness, tribalism, and “collective and spontaneous action” (1982:53) implies Our diametrically oppositional nature of civilised harmony, stability, rationalism and peacefulness.

Chart 2. Dahlgren and Chakrapani’s “ways of seeing” of other people in other countries in the U.S. televised news during the Cold War.

<i>Definitive Motifs And sub-motifs</i>	<i>Implied Bipolar Opposite</i>	<i>Dispositional Orientation</i>
<i>Social Disorder Political violence Political subversion Military combat</i>	<i>Order/Stability Harmony Redemption Peace</i>	<i>Irony</i>
<i>Flawed Development Governmental corruption Human rights abuses Communism</i>	<i>Successful Development Ethical government Humanitarianism Capitalism</i>	<i>Scepticism</i>
<i>Primitivism Exoticism Barbarism</i>	<i>Modernism Familiar Civilised</i>	<i>Fascination</i>

The notions of *subversion* and *salvation* strongly resonate with this research’s core suggestions. First, two sets of Others are imagined and constructed according to Our interests and geo-political needs. In the Cold War context this meant the USSR and any developing country. Then, salvation occurs when the USSR is stopped from subverting the selected developing country from becoming progressive, or ‘more like us.’ “The helpless, naïve natives”, write the authors, “need deliverance from communism, much as they previously needed the salvation of Christianity” (1982:54). Still, the natives’ imagined ‘state of nature’ and ‘authenticity’ are easily replaceable with other ‘states’ such as ‘savagery’ or ‘swarming masses’ (1982:59).

“The bipolar opposite of this subversion becomes redemption, and America and the West are the redeemers” (1982:54), write the authors. The Third World is thus like a child being duped by evil outsiders (ibid) who then create the West’s “dual vision” (1982:55). First, holding these societies to be unaccountable to their own actions, articulates Western superiority over them. Then, it suggests that Western intervention in these societies is beneficial, not only for the West but also for these countries (ibid). This designation of *two* relational Others invokes this research’s main themes of RT and RD (as examined below). The USSR, with its depraved values and corruptible power, is seen as inevitably being inferior and diametrically oppositional to Our pursuit of the greater good. In the same breath, the Third World country is seen as an unknowing tabula rasa and as lacking *any* worthwhile values altogether; as being inevitably inferior and in need of being *elevated* to Our level (to use Gordon, 2002). In other words, the hapless Third World is ‘invited’ to become more ‘like us’ and to follow Our mould of civilization, yet this inclusion is only temporal and instrumental: limited to Our needs and interests it can always be withdrawn.

To summarise this section on news values, non-elite people from non-elite countries are likely to appear in the British news media (if at all) devoid of history or cultural or social contexts. Glossed over by elites, negative news or self-explanatory events (such as coups and catastrophes), as if by magic, these others appear ready for mass consumption: relevant to Our stories and always entertaining (see Shohat and Stam, 1994; Hallin, 1987). No prior knowledge is needed to have, in an instant, robust, durable persuasions or to cast clear judgments about these peoples. Where history and context are lacking, idealizations and oversimplifications appear in ample supply. Given that ongoing events do not appear in the folds of the mass media by some fortuitous accident, the news media’s role in shaping global attitudes is not lost on the actors behind the conflict lines. The section below examines this confluence of internal actors and invested external observers.

2.1.2 Ethnicisation: self-essentialism and the politicising of difference

[T]hose stirring the [ethnic] pot were confident that there was a pot to stir

MCNULTY (1999:283)

The notion of ethnicization emerged against the background of the critical examination of the media coverage in the US and Europe relating to the conflicts in Somalia and Rwanda (Philo et al., 1998; McNulty, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Stevenson, 2004; Pieterse, 2004). In general lines, the term ethnicization expresses a polarised and divisive propagation of a conflict that is based on a politicised and mobilised use of race and ethnicity, either by internal or *external* actors. Resonating with the key propositions of this thesis, ethnic entrepreneurs (Rothchild, 1981) promote an understanding of the conflict which stresses ahistorical, homogenous and inevitable ethnic divisions. Like cats and dogs (Prunier, 1995:xii, see below), the sole explanation for the violence is said to be the sides' primal tribalism or irreducible race, traditions or beliefs. To use McNulty (1999), knowing that there is a pot to stir to begin with, such harmful accounts of the violent outbreaks solidify around the interpretations commonly appearing from within the conflict zones themselves (McNulty, 1999:283). Such explanations for the violence, touted as fixed, timeless and antiquated sectarianisms, are exploited by political actors for *current* political gains. While violence, suspicion and division spiral higher and wider, constructive and contextual debates on healing and reconciliation become further out of reach.

Hence, the concept of ethnicisation contributes to an understanding of how heterogeneous and even opposing voices from within the conflict itself *self*-essentialise and consolidate their own diverseness at times of violence. At the same time, the notion of ethnicisation underlines how external observers, such as media professionals, motivated by news values such as simplicity, drama and ethnocentrism (Wolfsfeld, 2004), happily buy into and resell this opportunistic currency of politicised ethnic determinism.

Central to this predeterminism is the view that violence is inherent to the Nature of the conflicting parties: 'they are fighting and killing each other because this is simply who they are,' this logic goes. Accordingly, mediated accounts of ethnic conflicts in

developing countries readily construct the violence as being inevitable. Violence simply comes instinctually and mechanically to these people, it seems. Since the violent outbreaks override subjective moral accountability they are ascribed to either mad brutality, hapless innocence or both (Stevenson, 2004). Prunier unpacks such conceptions, writing that the 1994 Rwandan genocide was

a historical product, not a biological fatality or a 'spontaneous' bestial outburst. Tutsi and Hutu have not been created by God as cats and dogs, predestined from all eternity to disembowel each other... The Rwandese genocide is the result of a process which can be analysed, studied and explained. (1995:xii, quoted in McNulty, 1999:272)

As Bowen (1996:1) puts it in his paper "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict", ethnic conflicts are presented in the Western news media as "bubbling cauldrons and ancient tribal hatreds... Remove the lid, and the cauldron boils over." For Bowen, such ethnicisation suggests

first, that ethnic identities are ancient and unchanging; second, that these identities motivate people to persecute and kill; and third, that ethnic diversity itself inevitably leads to violence. All three are mistaken. (1996:3)

Against this deterministic view of ancient hatreds, Bowen continues, non-Westerners appear as incapable of coexistence of having multiple or fluid identities, while the historical role of Europe's colonial projects in the creation of such divisions is suppressed (Bowen, 1996:3). At the same time, the 'civilized' Westerner journalists, aid practitioners or diplomats appear generous, peaceable and neutral. Appearing to themselves to be free from reductive ethno-politics, the discourse of ethnicisation further legitimates external observers' self-image as bridging over-read stir-the abyss of ethnic hatreds (Bowen, 1996:4).

Seaton and Allen (1999:3) resonate with such accounts in the context of the conflicts in Rwanda and the Balkans, they write:

...it would be foolish to suggest that ethnicity does not influence behaviour. Once violence starts, ethnic identities become social facts, they are quickly ascribed to people whether or not they want to have them, and many protagonists will not hesitate giving highly essentialist ethnic explanations for what they are doing. The power of ethnicity becomes an acceptance by enough people that particular social divisions are natural and inevitable. *Analysts should be careful not to base their own interpretations on such insiders' perspectives, but should try to understand how such beliefs have become established.* [emphasis added]

For Seaton and Allen ethnicisation thus becomes a kind of a journalistic “lazy shorthand” with which to recount the plight of remote communities worldwide to local audiences. McNulty, writing on “media ethnicization” in international news, notes the “racist tendency” (1999:275) to simplify and label all conflicts in Africa as tribalism: a tendency that McNulty sees as a “Eurocentric straightjacket” (1999:285) in need of breaking away from. McNulty writes:

the Western media swallowed the ethnic interpretation of conflict promoted by interested parties locally... promoters of this historically-resonant sectarian agenda were pushing at an open door. Internally, propaganda was based on fear and ignorance; as elsewhere when sectarianism and genocide became state policy, those stirring the pot were confident that there was a pot to stir... the Western media described the war as ethnic, hence it must be so; local propaganda was reinforced, and there was no alternative source of information. (1999:283)

Propagators of an all-against-all war *inside* the conflict zone thus exasperate local fears and ignorance, while *outsider* observers frame such essentialist populism through familiar, non-challenging, and even self-gratifying terms for remote audiences. The “psycho-cultural power of ethnicity,” writes Božić-Roberson (2004:395), can be used by entrepreneurs to mobilize politicised ethnicity for both legitimisation and de-legitimisation, hatred and stereotyping.

The argument here is not that the *Guardian* and the *Independent* incite racial violence. Rather, inline with the proposition of the *attitudinal* Others, this study sets out to examine mediated trends which can, nonetheless, “manipulate ethnic rivalries to extend its power by using the fears and suspicions that had deep historical resonance” (Peleg, 2007:189). Having authority over the production of meaning in news reporting can indeed play the drum of ethnic divisions. The article below (*Figure 2*), which appeared just over a week into the al-Aqsa Intifada with the headline “It’s nothing personal. It’s Arab against Jew,” is only one illustration of the language of ethnicisation in the reports. Peppered with quotes such as “The poison seed has been planted, and it will not be easy to root it out, or to forget,” the article labours the point of an inherent, deep-rooted, all-out ‘war of civilisation’ between two warring tribes that are set apart by an “explosion of sectarian hatred” (*Guardian*, 11 October 2000). As above, the emphasis here shifts away from

calculations of gain and loss by agentive political elites who in fact drive the violence. Instead, it is the civil societies and non-elite people who, being plagued by antiquated, unfathomable hatreds, make violence inevitable and natural for those communities.

Figure 2: *Guardian* (11 October 2000)



The point here is *not* that the conflict is free from ethnic hatreds. Rather, that both newspapers were invested in an opposite mental image in which entrenched ideologies of racial violence ‘over there’ implied Our humanism and neutral, universal values ‘over here.’

Problematising “The People”

Canovan (2005) explores the term *The People* as the disjuncture and power dynamics between a synchronic abstract—e.g., “We, the people of the United States”—and a grouping of actual individuals with ever-changing sets of views and interests (2005:6). On the one hand, the figure entity of “the people” can be mobilised at times of nation building or group consolidation, sometimes moving individuals to act together as a body and to “generate power where there was none before” (2005:141, quoting Arendt, 1972:143). On the other hand, the abstracted and continuous “indefinite” existence (or ‘eternalised,’ see Barthes, below) of “the people” can become peculiarly open-ended, imprecise, amorphous and promiscuous (Canovan, 2005:140). “The people is every politician’s

friend,” continues Canovan, “its indeterminacy and ambiguities, its combination of resonance and banality make it a convenient support for all manner of causes” (2005:140). Canovan’s use of Rousseau’s *On the Social Contract* (2005:48) is revealing for this exploration. Rousseau remarks:

He who dares to undertake the establishment of a people should feel that he is, so to speak, in a position to change human nature, to transform each individual (who by himself is a perfect and solitary whole) into a part of a larger whole from which this individual receives, in a sense, his life and his being.

Rousseau’s sense of a new body and power also hints at *some loss* for individualised or particularised concerns within such newly formed unity: namely, *internal* struggles within. Hence, an abuse of such tenets of grouping formations *and* fragmentations can indeed be used to essentialise and derealise other peoples. As in the analysis below, these tensions continue between the internal needs of “*the People*” for consolidation and an immutable character (*the Jewish people, the Palestinian people, the Arab nation, the Jewish state*) and the *external* appropriations of these desires.

Below, I explore the notion of *Intersectionality* to flesh out these tensions between two seemingly unrelated forms of Othering.

2.1.3 Intersectionalities

The argument put forward in this analysis is that the mediated constructions of the conflict call attention to the need to overcome the omnipresent emphasis in the reports on dualisms and polar oppositions. To use Brah (1996), such binaries represent ahistorical, universal and predetermined constructs which conceal and skew other possible significations. Binary oppositions, handed down unchallenged through historical processes, are sites from which to begin to unpack and further investigate the historicity and power dynamics of racialised representations and practices (Brah, 1996). In reviewing the speech “Ain’t I a Woman” by the anti-slavery activist Sojourner Truth (1797-1883), for example, Brah notes how the dualistic master-slave narrative obscured trajectories of power and oppression that were impacting on Sojourner Truth both as a slave *and* a woman. In such intersectionality gendered modalities are obviously included but *not concluded* as feminine/masculine oppositions, allowing other articulations of power such as race, class, religion, or culture, to be examined as well. As Fellows and Razack’s note (1998),

racialised relations and forms of discrimination occur simultaneously and within hierarchical associations with each other.

Coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989, the term *intersectionality* related to the difficulty of addressing the issues of black women in the US using the contemporary analytical and legal framework. For Crenshaw (2003), intersectionality is defined as a “compound” or a “conjoining of multiple systems” of discriminations where the “interaction between two or more axes of subordination” amounts to systems of disempowerment that cross and overlap each other. Drawing on the metaphor of a junction as the meeting point of two or more roads of varying forms of traffic, the term applies to the meeting point of multiple spaces of discriminatory systems, for example racism, patriarchy or class oppression.

Drawing on Crenshaw’s legal work, the case of *DeGraffenreid v General Motors* (Crenshaw, 1989) is particularly revealing for this study. In this case, five black women brought a suit against General Motors on the grounds of employment discrimination against black women. However, since General Motors did hire women, *albeit white women*, and did hire black people, *albeit black men*, the court refused to see the case as the combination of gender discrimination *and* race discrimination. In other words, the court rejected the bringing of a suit on behalf of black women, as opposed to the ‘allowed’ cases on behalf of *either* blacks *or* women. This intersectionality of race and gender pointed to *new* modalities of prejudice for further analysis and action, *additional* to those of anti-women discrimination and anti-black racism.

What I wish to suggest here is that the experiences of racialisations of Palestinians from the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and of Israeli-Jews can be both similar *and* different to the experiences of the racialisations of Arabs in general and of Jews in general (to use Crenshaw, 1989:44)—specifically so at the intersection of both routes. Palestinians (about twelve out of about 450 million Arabs) and Israeli-Jews (about six out of 14 million Jews worldwide) do not represent the entire class of Arabs or Jews *but they should not be excluded as a class apart from them either*.

This model can be exemplified in Said’s *Orientalism* (1978). Said’s analysis is distinct from Orientalist discourses about Muslims in, say, Indonesia or China,²² or European

²² For example, the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region.

racism against non-white people (e.g., in Africa). Yet the modalities of discrimination in Said's Near East Orientalism intersectionalise with both Islamophobia (albeit that some Arabs are not Muslim²³) and Whitecentrism (albeit the divergent experiences of the Middle East and Africa²⁴). The intersections of racialised Orientalism, Islamophobia and whitecentrism in Said's work stand even if some Arabs are neither dark-skinned nor Muslim and some Muslims are neither dark-skinned nor Oriental.

As shown in the findings below, an analysis of the coverage using modalities of nationality, geography and religion reveals that the use of the term 'Palestinian' is prearticulated to mean one thing distinctly, but not another. For example, 'Palestinian' as meaning Muslim but *not* Christian-Palestinian²⁵ (and hence oppositional to Israeli-*Jews*) and from the *OPT* not elsewhere (and hence oppositional to Israel proper). Yet there are over six million Palestinians who live outside of the *OPT*, mostly in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and South America.²⁶ For instance, Palestinians make-up about half the population in Jordan (Takkenburg, 1998), yet there is virtually *no coverage* in both newspapers about Jordanian-Palestinians (see below). Indeed, "Palestine" and "Iraq" made two of the most reported international news stories in the *Guardian* in the 2000s, yet *Iraqi*-Palestinians (counting between 34,000 and 90,000 people prior to 2003²⁷) are virtually non-existent in the coverage. In March 2006, I called the *Guardian's* news desk after a string of UNCHR reports highlighted the persecution of *Iraqi*-Palestinians (including shootings, killings and the flight of a few thousands from their homes²⁸), but the story was still not picked up.²⁹

²³ Indeed, Said himself was a Protestant Christian.

²⁴ Poole notes how Arabs were ethnically unclassable in Europe for decades (2002) while Lawless (1995) reflects on the racialised constructions of Arabs as 'blacks.'

²⁵ The term "Christian Palestinian" appears in the *Guardian* print edition only 22 times (2000-2010, NewsBank).

²⁶ See Takkenburg (1998:20-21).

²⁷ See Sassoon (2009:27) and HRW, September 2006.

²⁸ For example, "UNCHR seeks solutions for Palestinians on Iraq-Jordan border" (28 November 2003), or "Iraq: UNHCR seriously concerned for thousands of Palestinians" (3 March 2006).

²⁷ The key words "al-Ruwaishid camp" and "Al-Karama Camp," where *Iraqi*-Palestinians were settled, recieved *zero appearances* in the *Guardian* (NewsBank, 2000-2010).

²⁸ For example, "UNCHR seeks solutions for Palestinians on Iraq-Jordan border" (28 November 2003), or "Iraq: UNHCR seriously concerned for thousands of Palestinians" (3 March 2006).

²⁹ The key words "al-Ruwaishid camp" and "Al-Karama Camp," where *Iraqi*-Palestinians were settled, recieved *zero appearances* in the *Guardian* (NewsBank, 2000-2010).

The term ‘Israeli’ is also prearticulated in both newspapers to mean *Israeli*-Jews and not non-Israeli Jews or non-Jewish Israelis. *This* form of speech relating to *these* Israelis is distinct from the speech relating to Israeli citizens who are, for example, Muslim, Druze, Bedouin or Christian. Hence, in both newspapers, racialisations of *Israeli*-Jews make a distinct class³⁰ (to use Crenshaw, 1989:41) from other forms of anti-Jewish racialisations due to the particular intersections related to place (Israel as geographically in the East), nationality (political Judaism), power (European geo-political interests in the Middle East such as oil, security and immigration) and ethnicity (given Israeli-Jews’ distinct common social markers, e.g., language or culture). For example, arguably, British or European Jews gave little cause for antagonistic hate speech post-War,³¹ yet Israel *has* been a problem for Britain. For instance, prolonged violence before, during and after the Second World War; the Suez crisis (1956); the escalation of the Cold War due to the 1967 Arab-Israel conflict; the 1974 Energy Crisis; terrorism (such as 9/11³²); Sharon’s government’s support for the 2003 Iraq War or simply Israel’s shameful echo of Britain’s imperialist past. Indeed, British-Jews themselves see Israeli-Jews as a distinct class for examination (Kahn-Harris, 2014) and scholars distinguish amongst plural forms of anti-Semitism³³ and “a variety of Jewish questions” (Ragussis, quoted in Davison, 2004:1).

Consequently, suggestions that in both newspapers there are no racialisations of *Israeli*-Jews due to the overall inclusiveness of *British*-Jews misses the particular intersections of place, nationalism, geo-politics and ethnicity. Below, I review the positionality of racial discourse, or of seeing categories about others as being historically, socially and politically situated, not simply as naturalised, taken for granted classifications (Brah, 1994:19).

³⁰ Distinct, but not exempt.

³¹ Being a small, integrated minority which makes roughly 0.005% of the population. As put by Firestone “When life is good, the economy is strong and people are optimistic, the deeply rooted anti-Semitism of Western civilization remains latent” (2010:7).

³² E.g., Al-Queda demands following 9/11, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3966817.stm

³³ To use Wistrich (2003), between forms of anti-Semitism such as classic, scientific, Soviet, Nazi, Muslim, liberal and global (e.g., South America, the Indian subcontinent or South-East Asia).

2.1.4 Racism and racialisations on the left

Our worthiest souls contain racial prejudice
JEAN PAUL SARTRE (1963:210)

Figure 3: A vulture watches an emaciated Sudanese girl in southern Sudan



The image above, taken by the war photographer Kevin Carter (taken 1 March 1993), was published in the *New York Times* on 26 March 1993. The photograph is infamous since Carter disclosed that he did not offer the girl any aid.³⁴ Carter committed suicide in 1994 due to his turbulent career in photojournalism, only a few months after winning the Pulitzer Prize for this very image. Reading the photo semiotically, the individual, biographical Sudanese girl disappears, while *general* cause of Sudan's national catastrophe is promoted. To use Kekes, "general benevolence" trumped "limited benevolence" (1997:182). For Stanley Cohen, such a Western gaze reflects a post-colonial mindset which reproduces the Third World as "helpless," "dependent" and "childlike"; "enveloped caringly by the big superior Western man" (2000:178). Was Carter then 'racist'? An all-powerful adventurer (Said, 1978) amidst "landscapes of anguish" (Cohen, 2000:168-9) affecting only lesser beings? Was publishing the

³⁴ Simon Norfolk noted that Carter sat by the girl for about ten minutes, waiting for the vulture to spread its wings for added effect (LSE talk, 13 May 2011).

photograph a ‘racist’ trafficking in pain (Reinhardt, Edwards and Duganne, 2007; see also Moeller, 1999; Boltanski, 1993) or was it the “visual lynchpin of philanthropic efforts” (Edwards, 2007). If one assumes that the image includes racialising undertones, does this infer racist intent or effect? Were *New York Times* readers culpable in a racist exchange? Hence, this example highlights some of the problematics of the concept of racism as a prefigured and structured speech. In other words, who and what is racist, and who and what is not?

This work thus considers racism as a problematic rather than an explanation. A theoretical framework which itself begets an explanation within specific temporal and local paradigms (see Murji and Solomos, 2005:2; Small, 1994:33). Law (1996) writes on “the problem of conceptual definition and some of the difficulties of operationalisation” that one finds when thinking about racism and the critical analysis of news coverage. Below, I explore such themes as cultural racism (Blaut, 1992) and “well meaning” racism (Trepagnier, 2006), which are pertinent to this study in relation to racism on the left.

The current use of the term ‘racism’ appeared in the twentieth century to describe race-based discrimination (Lentin, 2004) and an evaluative system “of a distorted, false understanding of the world” (Miles and Brown, 1989). Prior to the Second World War conventional thinking saw humanity as being organised according to spurious biologically homogenous groupings. Ethnicity, skin colour, physical dimensions, philology or the colour of eyes; all were applied to form fixed and essential *mental classifications* about the *imagined* inherent Nature of other groups and peoples. However, after the Second World War conceptualisations of the term departed from such pseudo-scientific biological and phenotypical materialism (see Levi-Strauss, 1950 UNESCO, quoted in Lentin and Titley 2011:70; Miles and Brown, 1989; van Dijk, 1991; Hartman, Husband, and Clark, 1974; Downing and Husband, 2005). Arguably, the Nazis’ mobilization of eugenics diminished the credibility of ‘blood-line racism’ in the European mainstream and even in the far right (van Dijk, 2008).³⁵ As Robert Young writes, “[i]n the British model race is rejected as absolutist, biological, essentialist, or intrinsic” (2002:160). Put differently, ideas about race biologism were not acceptable categories in

³⁵ Though Soviet eugenics (e.g., Kremontsov, 2011) or white slavers experiments on black people (e.g., Manning, 2015), did not cause such grand shift in societal values.

the 2000s for thinking about complex inter-social relationships. The review below traces this shift in perceptions of ‘race’ from redundant ideas relating to pathologized physicality to the updated and ‘acceptable’ realm of cultural racialisations.

I use the term racialization as a distinct analytical category (Fanon, 1967; Murji and Solomos, 2005; Miles and Brown, 1989; Goldberg, 2009:226). Racialization is distinct, since it assumes an ongoing “dialectical” (Banton, 1998:184) and varied experience, or a “range of discriminatory phenomena” (Lentin, 2004:30) which are responsive to particular sets of power relations and social formations at a particular time. Wolfe (2002:58, quoted in Garner 2010:20) suggests a distinction between, on the one hand, race as a concept and, on the other, racialization as the “activation of that concept in the production of racial subjects.” Hence, as Garner (2010:21) writes, the term moves away from the “binaries of racist/anti-racist” to a “process of making ‘race’ relevant to a particular situation or context” and which “requires an examination of the precise circumstances in which this occurs”. This more fluid and variable view of race related offences sees ‘race’ as having an intricate relationship with a multitude of societal concerns regarding power and dominance (see Hall, 1988, 1991; Young, 1992; Gilroy, 1993; Brah, 1996). For Small, racialization suggests:

that social structures, social ideologies and attitudes have historically become imbued with ‘racial’ meaning, that such meanings are contingent and contested, and that they are shaped by a multitude of other variables... (1994:36)

Hence, Small’s historical process of something *becoming imbued* with racialised meaning also connotes an *unbecoming*, or a process in which utterances move *in and out* of what is and what is not considered to be racialised. Put differently, a racialised utterance in one context may appear not to be racialised in another context. Equally, one might unintentionally and unknowingly voice or act on (subtle, institutional or cultural) racialised content even if they openly hold distinct anti-racist attitudes and lifestyle. Indeed, it is virtually impossible to avoid making *any* harmful utterances about culturally and geographically remote peoples and their distinct histories or traditions. For example, it takes an intentional effort to discern whether the word ‘Eskimo’ is a derogatory term—to whom and where? Other ethnic slurs like ‘chink,’ ‘hymie,’ ‘gook,’ ‘pikey’ or ‘wop’ would appear neutral to the uninitiated (as they once did to me). For instance, when coming to the UK I thought that the term ‘Paki’ (see Brah, 1996:79) was a neutral urban

slang. The terms ‘Jap’ (derogatory for Japanese people) and ‘JAP’ (‘Jewish American Princess’) use a near identical signifier to mean different things to different people, and the terms ‘coconut,’ ‘cracker’ or ‘sauerkraut’ are only offensive in an offensive context.

Similarly, it might also take an intentional effort to recognise the historical links of racialised discourse. For example, between the “trumpeting” (Downing and Husband, 2005:40) of black people in news crime reporting (Hall et al., 1978) *and* the over-representation of black people in service jobs in general media content. In this illustration, the media text becomes racialised *in the aggregate*, regardless of whether each specific report is offensive, or not. John Gabriel explains the historical transition in the image of black people from the servile, willing Mammy (or the simpleton Sambo) to the crafty, dangerous savage black men (see also Hall, 1997:263; Husband and Husband, 1974; van Dijk, 1987; Gandy, 1998). Gabriel writes:

...the shift from Sambo, a figure introduced into musical theatre in 1795, to rapist brute in nineteenth-century discourse coincide with the US Civil War, the struggle for abolition and corresponding images of the compliant, against that of the freed, slave. (1988:42)

Hence, images, texts and ideas can be imbued with racialised content and yet appear conventional, ahistorical or lacking any unique context.

An example from this research is the visual depictions in the *Guardian’s* centrefold format, furnishing a different doublespread size image (over 62x48cm) from around the world every day.³⁶ In this format, ongoing since September 2005, images from the Global South repetitively show poverty, disasters, war, exotica or anonymous masses; depictions which might, or *might not*, be considered racialised. At the same time, however, depictions of Britain (and generally the Global North) exhibit an oppositional imagery, showing individuals, elites, arts, science, sports, high culture or pastoral, harmonious landscapes.³⁷ Arguably, such cemented editorialship and templated photojournalism may be considered as contingent to familiar post-colonial, Eurocentric and White-centric regimes of representations. As Hannerz (2004:132) writes in relation to Africa, depictions

³⁶ See Hagai van der Horst (forthcoming), where I examine how such tropes of the ‘West and rest’ appear continuously from September 2005 to September 2015. I also review the book *Eyewitnessing Decade* by *Guardian Publishing* (2010).

³⁷ Other centre-fold topicalisations include wild life, environmental issues and Eastern Europe.

in the international media can take the form of “Afro-pessimism,” or of a sense of exclusion from the world of progress and prosperity. According to such a sense of “abjection,” Africa is branded with “pictures of poverty, starvation, and war; refugees, chaos and charity” (quoting Ferguson, 1999:234), which “brings back to mind the old colonial usage denoting a stigmatised race category” (Hannerz, 2004:132).

Nonetheless, while the logic of racialised Eurocentrism and Whitecentrism legitimates a logic of separation, of Us versus Them—how We do things over here, and They over There—it is mostly rendered invisible in plain sight. The few cases below hope to flesh out such ‘soft’ and naturalised modes of racialisations. While the scope of these stories appears to be relevant to ‘world news’ rather than ‘news about the conflict,’ the focus of this thesis is on the British perspective *outwards*, towards the Arab and Jew as models of alterity, and *not* towards the conflict itself. There is thus nothing remotely racialised about the photograph below of the God-like, ‘glowing’ white women infused with studio lights³⁸ creating advanced animations on the Wallace and Gromit film set. Nor is the photograph of hundreds of half-naked black women and men taking part in the Saut d’Eau voodoo festival in Haiti racialised on its own terms (see *Figure 5*, the caption of this image reads “48 hours of total mayhem”).

³⁸ Nonetheless, Dyer refers to the production of whiteness in images of white women as invoking an “enlightened” “heavenliness” (1997:126) and “The light of the world” (1997:82).

Figure 4: Guardian centre-spread image (9 September 2008)



Figure 5: Guardian centre-spread image (2 January 2009)



Yet as discussed below, the *continuous* juxtaposition between Our superior values and Their inferior ways within the same visual format *does* suggest a quotidian template of

racialisations.³⁹ Indeed, the contrasting binary logic between the two images cannot be more pronounced: science and technology versus superstition and sorcery; modernity versus stagnated, backward traditions; an individual versus an unidentified mass; culture versus nature and progressive gender empowerment versus gender ambiguity (men and women mixing ‘inappropriately’ and ‘unknowingly’).

The point here is that such formulations of difference are regimented across this centrefold format over the past ten years. For instance, elsewhere (van der Horst, forthcoming) I provide an overview of the thematic appearances in September 2006 (exactly a year after the introduction of the centrefold format), which rehearses these contrastive binaries. For example, some centrefolds depicted such imagery as the artist David Hockney painting in the forest of Woldgate Woods, East Yorkshire; the creation of a 75ft sculpture, made from waste, by the artist Antony Gormley; “vertical rugby” played in Paris on a giant billboard; a glossy shot of the newly built Clyde Arc bridge in Glasgow, titled “Pretty in pink”; or an artisan “doll hospital” in Lisbon, where playing “dolls are given a new lease of life.” In sharp contrast, other centrefold images during the same month include, e.g., a photograph of men in full traditional dress at the annual “Goroka sing-sing” tribal event in Papua New Guinea; a dead cow, decomposing in the sun, with an out-of-focus crowd watching in the background during a drought in Lebehia, Kenya; the “Deda chicken processing plant” in Dehui City, China, with rows of indistinguishable masked workers line-ups as far back as the eye can see; a dad taking a photograph of his children as they “pose next to a [military] tank” under the headings “One for the family album” and “Coups in Thailand”; children and adults immersed in the sea in Mumbai, India, next to a boy standing pronouncedly in his underwear holding the figure of the “elephant-headed Hindu god Ganesh” during the Ganesh Chaturthi festival; “luxury flats built next door to a dilapidated shantytown known as Paraisópolis (Paradise City)” in Sao Paulo, Brazil; or a “Muslim man,” returning to work on a derelict floating fish farm in the Nile Delta, Egypt, after “praying near a floating shelter” on the first day of Ramadan. The antinomies and separation between these two inverted moral universes cannot be more distinct.

³⁹ The photographer was likely sent by the *Guardian* specifically to this festival, reaffirming the intentional editorialising behind the image. At the same time, England’s involvement in Saint Domingue or the 1791-1804 Haitian Slave Revolt is a historic context usually left out in the newspaper.

The Arab and Jew also appear in this format within prearticulated roles, as seen in *Figures 6 and 7*. The ‘sons and daughters of the desert,’ fused into the landscape’s fauna and flora (along with the admired qualities of the desert’s cleanliness and perils), and the stiff-necked Jews, with their carnal, ritual laws (along with a dilapidated setting, allegorical of their archaic, decrepitated morals): *both* are prefigured as Europe’s oppositional, Others.

Figure 6: Liwa desert, United Arab Emirates (Guardian, 25 November 2013)



Figure 7: Passover in Jerusalem (Guardian, 2 April 2007)



The *Guardian* centre-spread below (Figure 8) exemplifies RT's main trope of 'like Us, but not quite,' even if only subtly. The punctum of the image (Barthes, 1980:146) is the transfixed young Palestinian women putting her hand on Hawking's head as if hoping to magically 'rub off' some of his intellect through physical touch alone. Closed in by security, an anonymous mass and exclaiming young men snapping their phone-cameras, the symbol of Western science is contrasted with Oriental superstition and the bazaar-like spectacle surrounding him. At the same time, the ordinariness in the syntax of the image caption is telling. It reads: "Scientist Stephen Hawking is greeted by Palestinian students on his arrival at Birzeit University to give a lecture..." This caption misrepresents the experience through comic irony which aims to signify its *opposite*: 'really, he was savaged.' Still, this 'bazaar' image also demonstrates that an alternative photograph of Hawking lecturing to an attentive, studious Palestinian audience would be less newsworthy. As discussed in the peace chapter, Birzeit University—like other Palestinian institutions (for example, UNRAW, see below)—or Palestinian professionals in general (academics, lawyers etc.)—is unlikely to be included in the *Guardian*. For example, the keywords "Birzeit University" appear only 36 times between 2000 and 2010 in the *Guardian* print edition.

Figure 8: "Ramallah; West Bank" (*Guardian*, 13 December 2006)



While the *Guardian* covers the Palestinian plight through sympathetic images of war-torn neighbourhoods and helpless victimhood, an intertextual scrutiny highlights the wholesale omission of Palestinian civic life which, in turn, is preserved as the superior domain of Western normality. Yet open a copy of the London-based *Al-Ahram* newspaper (in Arabic) and suddenly depictions of ‘Arabs’ include celebrities, scientists or artists.⁴⁰ In *these* images, calm, dignified and suited political elites converse in spotless conference halls and smiling children play next to their capable parents. Moreover, *these* publications also include news reports *about* Palestinians *written by* Palestinians.⁴¹

Returning to this section’s main theme, current-day racism thus does not mean “a desire to wake up every morning and lynch a black man from a tall tree” (Young, 1970, quoted in Shohat and Stam, 1994:19), but, rather, the subtle, everyday ways in which inferiorisation and discrimination are turned through degradation and arrogance into naturalised privilege. To quote Salman Rushdie (1991:480), such ‘subtle’ discursive domains of power and dominance separate the ruled and the powerless from the ruling and the powerful. Rushdie writes:

Those who do not have power over the story that dominates their lives, the power to retell it, rethink it, deconstruct it, joke about it, and change it as times change, truly are powerless because they cannot think new thoughts.

Thus, the two *Guardian* cartoons below (*Figures 9 and 10*) therefore highlight how the image of the Orient as being monolithic and unchanging is reproduced even in the *most* banal representations. On the one hand, the irony meant in both cartoons reinforces the opposite of what is being said, that is: ‘of course the news about the birth of the Messiah is “legit,”’ and ‘who in their right mind would refuse Mary and Joseph a room.’ In contrast, the debris, dreariness, palm tree, donkey, attire, or spotty ground furnish a form of topographical reductionism (Shohat, 1994:148; Steet, 2000) or “primitive landscape” (Shohat, 1997:20) where current-day perspectives about Arabs intersect with pre-historic ideals of Christian origins. As Kalmar writes “The current peoples of the Orient, it was

⁴⁰ Moreover, as noted by Richardson, even when persons followers of Islam appear in a favorable light in relation to science or culture, such terms as ‘Islam,’ ‘Islamic’ or ‘Muslim’ are “usually not mentioned” (2006:116).

⁴¹ In an interview Khaled abu-Tomeh (van der Horst, October 2007) remarked that working as a Palestinian fixer for European journalists he not only organised meetings, drove, and translated but was also left at times to write reports signed by ‘our correspondent in Jerusalem.’

thought, lived in the same kind of civilization as their “ancestors” (2013:176). Accordingly, the everyday sightings of 20th century Arabs “could instantly take one back to earlier periods of Christianity” (Steet, 2000:89). Turner points to an Orientalist “discourse of gaps,” which marks the Arab by such absences of rationality, asceticism and cities (1983:29). Hence, the humour intended in the cartoons operates through a biblical imaginary of debris and stagnation, while excluding other ancient-time towering urban landscapes such as Memphis, Girsu, Babylon, Avaris, Thebes, Nineveh, Aksum, Meroe or Alexandria (Dumper, 2007). I witnessed such a predisposition when driving with a Christian friend through the outskirts of Jerusalem (around 2005). The busy metropolis and newly built infrastructure gave way to a badly paved road next to harsh rocky hills. ‘This is how I thought Jerusalem looked like,’ exclaimed my companion. “The *spaces* of the Other,” writes Goldberg (2009:227, emphasis added), are where the “epistemological constructs may be tested” and where “social knowledge” produces the “racialized Other.” In other words, in the racial status quo of today (Essed, 1991), the Oriental Arab is still imagined through an ahistorical cognitive landscapes of debris, spottiness, beasts of burden and restrictive traditions.⁴²

Figure 9: *Guardian* cartoon, *Technology* section (21 December 2000)



⁴² For example, the newly built “Rawabi,” the \$1 billion Palestinian West Bank city, appears in the *Guardian* as a keyword only four times (1998-2017, Newsbank).

Figure 10: Guardian cartoon, Technology section (7 December 2000)



In enters the notion of cultural racism. For Taguieff (1987/2001), the demise of biological racism and the existence of settled ‘human races’ at the turn of the twentieth century was followed by the fatalism of ascribing collective difference to sociocultural factors. That is, racism grounded on culturalist bases (see above). Racialised differentialism, writes Taguieff, keeps Us separated from Them within a hierarchical aspect of Our superiority over them (1987/2001). By the post-war period, write Balibar and Wallerstein (1991), individuals could be circumscribed and segregated into a single culture, collectivity or national frontier. The authors write:

culture can also function like a nature, and it can in particular function as a way of locking individuals and groups a priori into a genealogy, into a determination that is immutable and intangible in origin.

As Alana Lentin puts it:

Since the 1980s... explanations of racism have increasingly proposed the replacement of the discourse of biological legitimization that underpinned classical racist thought, with one of cultural incompatibility. (2004:86)

For Blaut (1992), societal shifts in theological ideas from the 1850s, and later shifts in scientific ideas since the 1950s, have meant that religious or biological racisms are far less acceptable today. Instead, such ideas were replaced by cultural historical racism. To illustrate, the idea that white people were descendants of Adam and Eve and were given, in the days of Genesis “agriculture, cities, and civilization,”⁴³ might seem redundant

⁴³ Incidentally adjacent to Mount Ararat, where Noah first found land, are the Caucasus Mountains after

today (Blaut, 1992:291). Similarly, the notion that non-white peoples were a denigrated expression of this “original form of man” (as Blaut quotes Bowler, 1989) might also seem implausible today. Instead, the contemporary adaptation of cultural racism sees non-Europeans as “not racially, but rather culturally backward” and inferior. This is not due to their race or “potential for achievement,” but is due to their history and “attained level of achievement” (Blaut, 1992:293). Accordingly, and inline with RT’s notion of mimicry (see below), “they must follow, under European guidance and “tutelage,” the path already trodden by Europeans as the only means of overcoming backwardness” (Blaut, 1992:293). This is echoed in van Dijk, who writes

modern racism need not presuppose the biological notion of race or its associated racial hierarchies, but presupposes their continued socio-cultural construction as it is adapted to the current historical context. (1991:25)

This supposedly more ‘egalitarian’ view of difference thus still maintains the “justification and rationalization for classical colonialism” (Blaut, 1992). According to this reorganized racial reasoning the world still has a permanent centre and periphery of which the core is inherently “inventive, innovative, [and] progressive,” while the periphery remains “traditional, culturally sluggish or stagnant” (ibid). Hence, Europe’s progress is due to “some quality of mind or spirit, some “rationality,” peculiar to Europeans,” which then ‘generously’ is diffused to the margins of humanity (ibid).

In the light of this culturalist theorem, this research is committed to the positionality of racial discourses in which ‘races’ are socially, politically and historically situated. “[R]acial categories,” writes Brah, “are not natural but constructs, not absolutes but relative, situational, even narrative categories, engendered by historical processes of differentiation” (1994:19). To use Law, race significations are allocated with negative attributes despite ‘races’ in themselves being “entirely mythical and imagined creations” (2002:23). Derogatory categorizations thus create “immutable boundaries” (Yuval-Davis and Silverman, 1999:26) which exclude and inferiorise, but which also form “the expression or activation of group power” (Essed, 1991:37) applied either to making sense of the world (Miles and Brown, 1989:79-80) or to articulating systems of dominance, pleasure or privilege.

which white Caucasian people were named (Blaut, 1992:43).

As an instance, Robert Merton (1948) demonstrates how “...prejudice and discrimination aimed at the out-group are not a result of what the out-group does,” but are based on the “structure of our society” and the historical positioning of that out-group (Merton, 1948:200). In other words, vice and virtue are adjusted to fit Our view of Ourselves in relation to others “as the occasion may demand” (1948:201). Merton gives the case of three imaginary figures. Abe Lincoln, Abe Cohen and Abe Kurokawa; a Christian, a Jew and a Japanese American shop owners, the first representing the ingroup and the latter two the outgroups. Acting in exactly the same way, for example, working late hours, would make Lincoln appear industrious and hard-working, and Cohen and Kurokawa appear undercutting and competitive. If Lincoln is a frugal, sparing hero, the other two are stingy and penny-pinching. If Lincoln is honoured for his intelligence and shrewdness the other two are scorned for their cunning and craftiness (Merton, 1948:191-192). The point here is that the mindset and self-image of the excluding ingroup should be taken as much into account as the actions of the outgroup.

Hence, this study points to a “culturalist thesis” in which culture and ideology are “inscribed in news routines” (Curran, 1989:120) and where the “liberal Press” (despite some notable advancements) stands “firmly within the dominant ethnic consensus” (van Dijk, 1991:248). Yet, “Racism,” writes van Dijk (2008:136), “is still often understood as an ideology of white supremacy, or as the kind of practices of the extreme right” removed from the mainstream left. In fact, for van Dijk (1991:249), “modern racism” with its “good intentions” and “subtle practices of stereotyping or discrimination,” “are much more difficult to combat.” Indeed, van Dijk (interview with Hagai van der Horst, July 2008) recounts being sued by a Dutch liberal newspaper for highlighting racism in its folds. Bonilla-Silva (2006:25) finds the “new racism”⁴⁴ to have the characteristics of “slipperiness,” of “now you see it, now you don’t.” As Albert Memmi writes :

There is a strange kind of enigma associated with the problem of racism. No one, or almost no one, wishes to see themselves as racist; still, racism persists, real and tenacious. (2000:3, quoted in Bonilla-Silva, 2006:1)

Nonetheless, a 2013 NatCen Social Research report titled “30 years of British Social Attitudes: self-reported racial prejudice data,”⁴⁵ shows that 27% of the respondents

⁴⁴ “New” for the 2000s pre the noxious racism of Brexit/Trumpism.

⁴⁵ <http://www.natcen.ac.uk/media/338779/self-reported-racial-prejudice-datafinal.pdf>

describe themselves as having a “little prejudice” against people of other races, and 3% as “very prejudiced,” with 24% of the respondents self-identified as Labour supporters, 18% as Liberal Democrats and 39% as Conservative.⁴⁶

The point here is to argue from within the liberal-left tradition against the pitfalls of naturalised privilege in which, to use van Dijk (1993:162-4), “cultural difference” can turn into “naturally grounded differences” which may circulate within “respectable mainstream” and be seen as “acceptable if not even liberal.” Indeed, Banton (1999:2) recalls Durkheim’s contention that “crime is a normal rather than a pathological social phenomenon,” concluding that “the same may be said of discrimination.” Banton (1999:2) continues “The formation of groups and societies depends upon the unequal treatment of members and non-members and is subject to regulation as a normal form of behaviour.” While this view is contentious, I would argue that race thinking is not exempt from the political left. Below I flesh out Trepagnier’s (2006) notion of “well meaning racism,” which is relevant to the notion of RT in the *Guardian* and the *Independent*.

Trepagnier (2006:3) points to a dualistic definition of racism among white people, where one is “not racist,” since one does not intentionally highlight racial difference. Such a self-serving definition of racism (or what Srivastava calls “strategic innocence,” 2000/2009:535) underplays structural and everyday racism while excluding forms of racism which are not blatant or intentional. Armed with this worldview, continues Trepagnier, white people tend to see racism only as rare and acute acts of hatred, or as an aberration from the norm which is seen as ‘not racist.’ Following Essed’s notion of everyday racism (1991), Trepagnier finds *silent racism* to be shared negative discourses and assumptions which permeate into culture and to which no one is immune to, not even those who in other settings favour racial equality (2006:15). With this hegemonic framing of societal attitudes (Gramsci, 1971), Trepagnier replaces the view of the dominant culture as being “not racist” with a continuum which moves between “More Racist,” “Moderately Racist” and “Less Racist” (2006:22). Resonating with RT, Trepagnier finds that the “Less Racist” silent racism includes “paternalistic assumptions” and a “sense of

⁴⁶ A similar report from 1997, titled *The European Commission Report on Xenophobia and Racism*, found that in Britain 66 per cent of respondents openly admitted to being “a little racist” and 32 percent openly admitted to being either “very racist” or “quite racist” (quoted in Richardson, 2004:1).

superiority” in black-white relationships (2006:6). Trepagnier also notes confusion and fear among white people when discussing race matters (what Omi and Winant call “racial etiquette,” 1986:62) and a disregard of institutional racism. An example from participants’ contributions in Trepagnier’s study includes:

I opened the door and she’s *black*. Oh! And I was just so mad at myself and embarrassed for thinking that. I mean like, ‘Oh, did that show?’ (2006:52)

Other examples of respondents’ inputs include sharing reactions to the Los Angeles riots, walking past a group of black men, or being offered a ride by a black taxi driver.⁴⁷

Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, in his book aptly titled *Racism Without Racists* (2006), finds that laissez-faire racism and colour-blind racism (see also Bobo and Smith, 1998) “has rearticulated elements of traditional liberalism (work ethics, rewards by merit, equal opportunity, individualism, etc.), for racially illiberal roles” (2006:7). For Bonilla-Silva “contemporary racial inequality is reproduced through “New Racism” practices that are subtle, institutional, and apparently non-racial” (2006:3). Balibar and Wallerstein also examine the “culturalist” (1991:24) aspect of “racism without race” (1991:23). While both Trepagnier and Bonilla-Silva focus on black-white relationships in the US, the point here is that Whitecentrism, Eurocentrism and the politics of Us and Them permeate into everyday experiences and should be tackled beyond the binaries of racist/not racist, left/right and normal/abnormal.

Hence, while race relations in predominantly white and Christian Britain are in constant flux (as in the 2000s and 2010s), they still make a “salient element of social relationships” (Garner, 2010:22). As Poole writes, simply saying that “blacks are inferior and should be segregated” (Poole, 2002:50) is no longer acceptable, yet different, more subtle and inventive sets of representations, can still postulate *implicational hierarchies* where people of minority groups are ‘put in their place’.

At the same time, self-serving indifference to historical and institutional racism paradoxically reinforces Our dominant superiority as ‘not racists’ over Those who are

⁴⁷ Richard Dyer remarks how sometimes bad drivers ignite correlations in his mind, which he is quick to correct, between the bad driver, gender and race (1997:7).

seen to be ‘very racist.’ An example of how anti-racism can be enlisted as rhetorical munitions can be found in Poole (2002). In the conclusion to her book, while acknowledging that the *Guardian* contests discrimination against minorities in Britain, Poole writes “this research has shown how its [the *Guardian*’s] exclusive form of liberalism did not always extend to Muslims...” Instead, the *Guardian*’s “liberal approach to human rights further rendered ‘Islamic’ practices irrational and barbaric” (2002:248). As shown below, this view holds true also for Jewish practices in the Israeli context of the conflict.

3.0 THE ARAB, JEW AND THE IDEA-OF-EUROPE

A key text covering the turbulent relationality of Europe, the Arab and Jew is Gil Anidjar’s *The Jew, The Arab: a History of The Enemy* (2003). Anidjar points out that the ontological formation of Europe to itself revolved around its constitution *and* deconstitution (2003:xix), membering and dismembering, from its two relational Others. On the one hand the Jew, the *religious and internal* enemy, is found in all corners of Europe yet having no sovereign place she is a “pariah status group” (Turner, 2002:24). The Jewish bible, seen as an ancestral “elder sibling” (Boyarin, 2009:2) to the Christian New Testament, is discarded so as to validate the newer form. “[T]he place of the Jew is in the past,” writes Akbari, “providing a template for the foundation of Christian identity, a mould that, after use, must be broken” (2005:50). In the same breath the Arab, taking the ‘ethnic’ marker (Anidjar, 2003:xiii), is the *political and external* enemy. This Other to Europe is defined by shifting political borderlines etched by historical military campaigns from the early Crusades untill the dawn of the Ottoman Empire. David Lewis, in his book aptly subtitled “Islam and the Making of Europe,” credits the “existence of the European Union ...” (2008:173) with the defeat of Charles Martel by Abd al-Rahman ibn Abd Allah Al Ghafiqi in the Battle of Poitiers (732AD, also known as the Battle of Tours). While Europe, “defining itself in opposition to Islam” (Lewis, 2008:173), turned to “religious persecution, cultural particularism, and hereditary aristocracy” (2008:174), a Muslim regnum benefitted from “trigonometry, Arabic numerals, the corpus of Greek philosophy” and religious tolerance (Lewis, 2008:173). “Europe’s emergence into history,” writes Djait, “took place—and could not have taken place otherwise—through the

mediation of Islam: in the beginning by means of a defensive recoil, afterwards by an offensive explosion” (1985, quoted in Boyarin, 2009:38).

Yet despite Europe’s “double alterity” (Anidjar, 2003:xix, quoting Denis Guénoun), and “trans-historical hatred” (Pasto, 1998:472) of the Arab and Jew (stretching, back literally, since antiquity) the place of the Arab and Jew *together* in relation to Europe’s becoming has been, until recently, vastly obscured. To use Anidjar, the self-constitution of Europe as Christian through “self-reabsorption and self-overcoming” (2003:xviii, quoting Jean-Luc Nancy) is circumvented through a Freudian internalised nosology inline with Freud’s *Totem and Taboo* (1918) and *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1904). This includes the disintegration and substitution, from and of, Europe’s constituting “enemy-objects” (2003:83), the Jew and the Arab. Anidjar quotes Richard Southern (2003:33-4) on Islam as being “Intellectually the nearest parallel” to Jews’ objections to Christianity, and Jeremy Cohen points to how Muslims and Jews were seen to be as harbouring “similar hostility toward Christendom” (1999:158) or as being “subsets in a large genus of hermeneutically constructed infidels who undermined the unity of Christian faith” (1996:162). Using the internal Jew, internal both geographically and religiously, to understand the novelty of the external Arab, both are lumped together as well as being assigned specific roles in this dichotomous antinomy. Anidjar writes:

Yet one of the dominant ways in which this association was reinscribed and made operative was precisely by insisting on the difference, *even the opposition*, between Arab and Jew, by locating each of them in distinct discursive spheres. The specific, if not always stable terms in which the complex web of associations that organised this opposition was cast became constitutive of the theologico-political. (2003:35, emphasis added)

Anidjar notes how historical contingencies of racial discourses about both the Arab and Jew are tied to the construction of a stable ‘idea’ of Europe. ‘Stable’ by means of *separating* its constructed self image from its constitutive Others and by relegating any possible relationalities between these Others into hermeneutically isolated terms. Anidjar continues (p. xviii):

The question that this book attempts to raise, then, is: What is Europe? What is Europe such that it has managed to distinguish itself from both Jew and Arab and to render its role in the distinction, the separation, and the enmity of Jew and Arab invisible – invisible, perhaps most of all to itself?

To use Sartre “The Other holds a secret – the secret of what I am” (quoted in Kalmar, 2012, epigram). Jonathan Boyarin, inline with Anidjar’s politico-theologico invokes the “geographical and the symbolic” as the meeting point of Christendom, Islam and Judaism (2009:6), and Turner writes on Islamic and Judaic Orientalisms (1983) and “internal and external Orientalism” (2002:24). For Turner, “Jews and Muslims were special targets” of racialised Orientalism “because their relationship to Christianity was paradoxically too close” (2002:26). Turner continues:

these imagined communities then constituted themselves by a *double enmity* – outwards as Orientalism and inwards as Occidentalism. The enemies of these states were constructed around racist parameters and were seen to be communities that existed at the borders of society. (2002:26, emphasis added)

Another key study regarding this triangular relationality is a collected book, edited by Kalmar and Penslar and aptly titled *Orientalism and the Jews* (2005). Noting the relationalities and discontinuities between Europe, the Arab and the Jew, the book’s introduction reads:

We believe that the Western image of the Muslim Orient has been formed, and continues to be formed in inextricable conjunction with the Western perceptions of the Jewish people. The major objective of this volume, consequently, is to demonstrate the urgency of making connections between the study of Orientalism and the study of Jewish history. (Kalmar and Penslar, 2005:xiii)

Echoing Anidjar’s account, Kalmar and Penslar find historical anti-Arab and anti-Jewish Orientalisms to be central to the study of how Christian Europe managed “its relations with both of its monotheistic others” (2005:xiv). As Tudor Parfitt writes “To Medieval Europe the two most obvious forms of the religious other were Jews and Muslims and to some extent this binary construct continued into the twentieth century” (2005:67). This thesis then looks into the familiar image of the Arab and Jew as being two polarized identities from the viewpoint of the forgotten ties that bind them together.

Edward Said himself famously recognised Jews as targets of Orientalism, he writes:

I have found myself writing the history of a strange, secret sharer of anti-Semitism. That anti-Semitism and, as I have discussed it in its Islamic branch, Orientalism resemble each other very closely is a historical, cultural and political truth that needs only to be mentioned to an Arab Palestinian for its irony to be perfectly understood. (1978:27-8)

For example, in referring to the coverage of the 1973 war and the ensuing Energy Crisis in the US, Said notes how Arabs with their “Semitic” features and “sharply hooked noses... were obvious reminders... that “Semites” were at the bottom of all “our” troubles...” Said continues “The transference of a popular anti-Semitic animus from a Jewish to an Arab target was made smoothly, since the figure was essentially the same” (Said, 1978:286). As Said wrote later:

[H]ostility to Islam in the modern Christian west has historically gone hand in hand with, has stemmed from the same source, has been nourished at the same stream as anti-Semitism. (1985:99)

Bryan Turner (1983:28–9), looking mainly at Marx and Weber, finds that Orientalism holds two related, “tenacious” and persistent (1983:28) discourses about Semites. The first, defining Islam by its absence of development and progress, or the “discourse of gaps”, the latter defining Judaism as “contradictory” by its nature to Christianity, due to its restrictive religious injunctions and rituals (1983:29). Examples of Islam’s series of gaps include absences of rationality, asceticism, cities, autonomous urban institutions, legal sensibility, a middle class, or “the absence of historical changes in the modes of production” (1997:24). On the other hand, Judaism is defined by the contradictory combinations at the heart of its religious injunctions (see also Turner, 2002:24). For instance, irrational rituals and rites (such as circumcision and dietary laws) and rational economy (Turner, 1983:26).

Yet this study does not focus on either the analogous *or* the anomalous correlations between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism (say, between Said’s despised Cold War Arabs and the despised historical Jew, as above). Rather, this research explores the synchronic *relationality* between dual antinomies that are unified by the Idea-of-Europe: on the one hand, assimilative ‘soft’ Orientalism (RT) and, on the other, its contrasting destructive ‘hard’ Orientalism (RD, see below).

While this study follows this division of the Arab-politico and Jew-theologico, it should be stressed that such a split is not historic, but is the product of spurious, racialised classifications. Islam, too, was seen as a theological threat and Jews were also imagined as political enemies (e.g., Kalmar, 2012; Majid, 2009; Fichtner, 2007; Berkowitz, 2007).

Instead, the politico-theologico separation should be seen as a *double* shorthand. Like a Venn diagram, while the racialised intersection of *either* the European-Arab *or* European-Jewish may be one thing, the overlapping of *all three plains*, or the European-Arab-Jewish, leads to new compounded spaces for inferiorisations and mystifications.

As further examined below, Kalmar and Penslar stress the importance of understanding the prism of Christianity as a generating and unifying drive within these discourses of Orientalism, they write:

...it is the Christian religious tradition that forms the missing link explaining the necessary, rather than accidental, connection in Orientalism between representations of Muslims and representations of Jews. (2005: xxi)

Pasto too makes this connection, preferring the term “Euro-Christian” to both “European” and “Western” (1998:439). For Pasto (quoting Hay, 1968, and Delanty, 1995), the Idea-of-Europe is “an extension and achievement of the ecumenical goal of Christianity” (1998:439). “[C]ontemporary European culture,” continues Pasto (ibid), “cannot be understood without the recognition of the influence of Christian ideas and religion.” Indeed, to use Talal Asad, the idea of ‘religion’ in Christian Europe in itself has become a “normalizing concept” (1993:1) in which the formative Arab and Jew are positioned in relation to Europe as being an appendage to other peoples and traditions. Tomoko Masuzawa (quoted in Topolski, 2014) observes that until 1789 it was common to categorize the world’s inhabitants according to four types of ‘peoples’: Christians, Jews, Mohammedans, and the rest (such as heretics, pagans, heathens, idolaters or polytheists).⁴⁸ This observation is repeated in Ania Loomba who notes that “in mediaeval and early modern Europe, Christian identities were constructed in a position to Islam, Judaism or heathenism,” with the latter “loosely incorporating all other religions, nature worship, paganism and animism” (1998:106).

This suggestion is significant as it resonates with this thesis’ findings regarding the vast disparities in both newspapers’ coverage of world affairs (see below). Is it possible that conflict zones such as Tibet, Congo, North Korea, Darfur, Turkmenistan, Eritrea or

⁴⁸ Topolski (2014) observes that “It was not until the 1880’s that the first non-monotheistic ‘religion,’ Bhuddism, was even categorised as a religion.” Indeed, “heathen” is also defined as “not of the Christian, Jewish, or Muslim faiths” (though in early use the term was also applied to Muslims).

Somalia are routinely omitted because they are too removed from the cultural-monotheistical constellation of a Christian-centric Europe and its two immediate satellite others: Arabs and Jews? Indeed, Said referred to the “mind’s geography” of “intra-Oriental” hierarchies, between the near and familiar Orient and a far and novel Orient (Said, 1978:58). It is the “Old World” that the Christian West is *returning* to, “as to Eden or Paradise,” while the “wholly new” Orient is imagined as the New World (Said, 1978:58). Ironically, the familiar configuration of the ‘*West and Rest*’ includes here a subset configuration of the ‘*Rest of the Rest*’: the Jew and the Arab on one hand, Africa, Asia, South America, the Caribbean and Oceania on the other. As Majid quotes from Fadique Furio Ceriol, Philip II’s adviser (circa 1550s):

in the whole world there are only two nations: that of the good and that of the bad. All the good, whether Jews, Moors, Gentiles, Christians, or some other sect, are of the same nation, family and blood; and the bad likewise. (2009:49)

In this light, one can suggest that the current *Guardian* sections of National and International News include an additional section of Arab and Jewish News. The two sections below exemplify this entangled triad of the Arab and Jew in the Eurocentric mindset.

3.1 “Jesus did not wear a Turban”

In his illuminating paper, Kalmar reviews how in church commissioned art from around the fifteenth century it was “common practice to represent biblical Jews as if they were Muslims” (2005:3). In such depictions, Jews were portrayed with the ‘Turk’ Turban or keffiyeh (the traditional Arabic headscarf), or in Bedouin or Persian clothing. Providing a long historical examination of the Islamisation (2005:6) and Ottomanisation of biblical Jews (2005:14), Kalmar notes how the practice originated in the thirteenth century and became “entirely commonplace” (2005:13) by the fifteenth century. In the nineteenth century these depictions were infused by the “Aryan myth” and its construction of Arabic and Hebrew as Semitic languages, and of Arabs and Jews as a Semitic ‘race’ (2005:18). For example, Kalmar examines Ernest Renan’s mistaken amalgamation of Arabs and Jews, Hebrew and Arabic (2005:23). Renan saw the New Testament as rooted in the Old Testament yet surpassing and opposing it, with Jesus being Jewish-born yet surpassing the “limitations of Judaism” (2005:5). This view then implicates Christian Western

civilisation as “completely superseding” (2005:16) her “spiritual origins in the East” (2005:5). The superiority of Christianity over Judaism then implicates the superiority of the West over the East. As Kalmar writes “The West has understood itself as risen from, and above, its oriental roots in the same manner as Christ rose above his Jewish ones” (2005:31).

Critical to the foundation of Christian theology, Kalmar continues, is the contrast of Jesus with his Jewish environment. These representations were not the result of historical or archaeological reflections, but of orientalist depictions of the Biblical Jew in the mind-eye of Western thought. As Kalmar quotes from Malcolm Warner, “the issue at stake in the portrayal of Islam in nineteenth-century art was not Islam at all, but Christianity” (2005:4). Accordingly, these depictions followed from representational dictates internal to Christian Europe itself, e.g.:

In the case of Doré’s Bible the disciples are shown as no longer oriental when they are filled with the HOLY SPIRIT. In the case of the Limbourg Brother’s manuscript, Joseph, standing for the Old Testament, is shown as oriental in contrast with Christ, but he is shown as occidental in contrast to the Magi and their retinue. (Kalmar, 2005:29)

It is through these persistent and positional depictions that Kalmar points to a “rule-governed” (2005:29), “implicational hierarchy of Biblical Orientalism” (2005:31). In this relationality Jesus is almost always occidental while the oriental depictions of other biblical characters depend on their adherence to the Old Testament, acceptance of the New Testament, or on neither acceptance nor rejection. This formulation features a hierarchy in which

each category to the left is more oriental (that is, more likely to be pictured in oriental attire) than any of the categories to the right. The formula is implicational for the following reason: If any of the categories is represented as oriental, then all the categories to its left must be represented as oriental as well. (Kalmar, 2005:31)

In other words, this hierarchy “prohibits representations that mark a category as oriental without so marking the categories to its left” (ibid). For Kalmar, there are no examples of “Christian” Jews, or of Jews as Disciples of Christ, shown wearing a *keffiyeh* while the Pharisees or the sceptical Jews, wear exclusively Oriental attire (2005:31).

(Kalmar, 2012:7) and the “lifeless automatism” of fanatic servility to Koranic textuality (Kalmar 2012:95).

Thus, the decimated, lowliest Jew, at the bottom of Auschwitz’s hierarchy, is then further denigrated by a displacing misrecognition of him as ‘Muslim.’ “In a ferocious irony,” writes Agamben, “the Jews knew that they would not die at Auschwitz as Jews” (1999:45, quoted in Majid, 2009:94). Such strange and “unbearable links,” comments Anidjar, reveal the Arab and Jew along the elusive lines of the theologico-politico. The emaciated Jewish Auschwitz inmate, who can no longer sustain the ideology of the mythical archenemy, leaps from the realm of abstractions and ideas (the New Testament versus the Old, etc.) to the realm of the weak geographical enemy in-the-flesh (borderland confrontations, colonial campaigns, etc.). Left with only muted corporality, the Jew who was associated with revolutions, plots and political unrest, crosses over to the other extreme to appear ‘like a Muslim,’ that is, lethargic, docile and lacking in agency. This implicational relationality is at the core of this thesis’ main proposition, as further developed below.

THEORETICAL REVIEW

4.0 THE KEY PROPOSITIONS OF THE THESIS

This study’s key propositions are divided into two main sections, the first reviewing the Arab and Jew as the antithetical, “incomparable” Others (Anidjar, 2003:128), and the second reviewing the contrasting relationality of RD and RT. Critical Solidarity, or CS, appears as the conclusion of the research.

4.1 The “incomparable” Others⁵¹

The primary proposition of this work is as follows. In the mediated, Manichean ‘packaging’ of the conflict in the *Guardian* and the *Independent* the sides are reduced to two sedimentary polarised identities, where no Palestinian exists outside the articulation

⁵¹ Anidjar (2003:128).

of being oppositional to the Israeli-Jew through difference marked by violence, and vice versa. The Arab and the Israeli-Jew as constituted to the Idea-of-Europe as “two polarised identities” (Anidjar, 2003:xvii).


Accordingly, racialised Orientalist notions of childlike irrationality and dependency are depicted as polar opposite to anti-Semitic notions of the Jew as an “archconspiratorial” (Berkowitz, 2007:XIII) “world power” (Kushner, 2002:68) motivated by possessive greed and religious zeal. The intentional and calculated Nature of one side implies the irrational, enchanted and impenetrable Nature of the other. Excesses appearing on one side already manifest the antithesis, flipside excesses on the other side. As Turner (2002:24) writes, “The West oriented its identity between two poles—the lazy, sensual Arab and the untrustworthy Jew.” Or, as Turner writes elsewhere, between “the libidinal, irrational Semite, and the Semite guilty of “religious treachery”” (1983).

Key to this theorization is the notion of turning History into Nature (Barthes, 1957:129; Hall, 1990:14; Mamdani, 2009:75). Such eternalising speech (Barthes, 1957:122) reduces the Arab and Jew into two finite essences, or to Palestinianess and Israeliness. Such speech, according to Balibar, freezes origin, culture or lived history and locks “individuals and groups a priori into a genealogy, into a determination that is immutable” (1991:22). Omi and Winant define such racialization as the “belief in real true human essences existing outside and impervious to social and historical contexts” (1994:187). Essentialised and objectified, the Arab and Jew are then weighed against each other only to appear symmetrically oppositional—and of equal distance from—the Idea-of-Europe. In other words, two stark antinomies are equally inferiorised as having a backward and malevolent Nature albeit through differentiated, indeed oppositional, imaginers. In this configuration, mutual recognition or reconciliation between these two oppositions is presented as an impossibility, as going against the very ‘Nature’ of both (Taguieff, 2001).

To use van Dijk (1993:256, see *Graphs 2 and 3*, below), a news-values model emerges, of both news worthiness and non-worthiness, delimited to two oppositional ideological icebergs. Only that which represents Palestinian-Muslims as diametrically opposite to Israeli-Jews floats up and becomes amplified, while that which does not is suppressed. As van Dijk suggests (1993:256) “...it is sometimes more important to specify what is not said by the text than what is actually expressed,” given that only a fraction of the

available information, or the tip of the iceberg, is made visible to the reader. Thus, the sides' respective key markers—history, religion, ethnicity, class, age, gender, attitudes or behaviours—either appear as polar opposites, and hence newsworthy, or as not polar opposites and hence not newsworthy. Where the former is amplified, the latter is omitted altogether. So, both peoples are essentialised, stereotyped and inferiorised, the discourse aimed against one also implicates the other. The link is imposed from 'above', by Eurocentric voyeurism (Shohat and Stam, 1994:126), and is hence external to both.

Graphs 2 and 3. Van Dijk's ideological icebergs model (1993:256)



In the interest of clarity, one can signify this implicational binary using symbols from mathematical set theory. The British-Idea-of-Europe *intersection* (using the symbol ' \cap ') with the Arab thus appears in *symmetrical difference* (using the symbol Δ) to the British-Idea-of-Europe's *intersection* with the Jew. Hence:

$$(\text{British-Idea-of-Europe} \cap \text{Arab}) \Delta (\text{British-Idea-of-Europe} \cap \text{Jew})$$

Or, as further suggested below, RT as appearing through *symmetric difference* to RD:

$$RT \Delta RD$$

A numerical metaphor which neatly clarifies this divisive dualism of RT and RD is the relationality of plus, zero and minus. The symmetrical opposition of minus and plus validates zero's place as the normative standard: the *permanent* originary point in space which makes difference identifiable and all measurements possible as being *relative* to itself. As in a gauge or scale's indicating needle, the constant state of *dynamic equilibrium* and *mutual oppositions* between minus and plus makes zero the default position to which both polar ends aspire to. Inline with this analogy, European ethnocentrism has been naturalised as a historical manifestation of a superior, baseline 'normality' "since Greek antiquity" (Malek, 1963). For Sardar, "Western civilisation, thus became the yardstick, as Christendom had earlier, by which Oriental cultures and civilisations were measured" (1999:30).

Nonetheless, an important caveat is that the *syntagmatic* contrasts of the Jew and Arab to the idea-of-Europe produce differentiated hierarchical *paradigmatic* relationships with Arabs who are *not* defined by Israel. For example, in the core years of the AAI (2000 to 2007), Western Sahara, Syria's military presence in Lebanon (until 2005) or simply Arab states (e.g., Algeria or Tunisia), received very different coverage than Palestine (or Lebanon during the 2006 war with Israel). As suggested in the findings chapters, a downscaling of affect in editorial recognition seems to be at play in which Arabs are granted or denied empathetic identification according to their relational positioning to Israeli-Jews. In such "moral alchemy" (Merton, 1996:191) and "fantastic" human categorization (Lakoff, 1987:92) the more an Arab is antithetical to Israeli-Jews the more

likely she is to be granted recognition and be newsworthy. In contrast, an Arab who is least related to Israeli-Jews is likely to receive little attention. Generally speaking, this downgrading scale runs as follows:

- Palestinians or non-Palestinian Arabs who are victims of Israeli-Jews
- Palestinian citizens of Israel who are victims of Israeli-Jews
- Israeli-Jews who are victims of Palestinians or non-Palestinian Arabs
- Palestinian victims of other Palestinians or non-Palestinian Arabs
- Non-Palestinian Arab victims of non-Palestinian Arabs

Hence, recognition of Palestinians and non-Palestinian Arabs is ever adaptable and predicated on Our varying needs and interests. The radical shift in “hierarchies of human value” (Shohat and Stam, 1994:127-8) between Palestine and countries such as Somaliland, Eritrea or Western Sahara, represents Our Eurocentric gaze and “narcissistic voyeurism” (Shohat and Stam, 1994:126). Consequently, Palestinian victimhood can sometimes appear *less* newsworthy than the victimhood of Israeli-Jews, not *despite* the former being sacralised and the latter profaned, but *because* of this ecclesiastical hierarchy of sacralising and profaning.

Martin Bernal (1987:202), quoting Aristotle on his justification of slavery, exemplifies this move of seeing oneself in the “mid position,” oscillating between two rigid oppositions. Aristotle argued:

The races that live in cold regions and those of Europe are full of courage and passion but somewhat lacking in skill and brainpower; for this reason, while remaining generally independent, they lack political cohesion and the ability to rule others. On the other hand, the Asiatic races have both brains and skill but are lacking in courage and willpower; so they have remained both enslaved and subject. *The Hellenic race, occupying a mid-position geographically, has a measure of both.* Hence it has continued to be free, to have the best political institutions and to be capable of ruling others given a single constitution. (emphasis added)

Aristotle’s “mid position” embodies this unity and “single constitution” of primeness as the sequential position between the under-developed, childlike exotic Orient, who is not yet ‘like Us,’ and the decayed, archaic Jew who can no longer can be ‘like Us.’

4.2 RT as diametrically oppositional to RD

That from which I am differentiated returns to me at the heart of what I am

JUDITH BUTLER (2000:35)

The second proposition of this study suggests that the representations of the conflict in both newspapers oscillate between two differentiated yet interrelated forms of racialisations; Racialised Toleration (RT) of the Palestinian-Arab and Racialised Demonisation (RD) of the Israel-Jew.

In the multi-layered analysis below, I first give a brief overview of both RT and RD. I then review the notion of a relationality between forms Othering and examine Adam Kahane's (2010) ideas of generative empathy and criticism. Using Kahane's conceptions I model scorched earth criticism (RD) and anaemic, limiting toleration (RT) as relational. Finally, I review the Greimas Semiotic Square which condenses these trilateral relationalities.

4.3 RT and RD: a bird's-eye view

The few paragraphs that follow give a brief summary of how RT and RD are contrasted and played out against each other.

Using RT, the British Idea-of-Europe extends her hand as a paternal saviour to inferior, unthreatening others (imagined as incompetent) who wish to imitate Our model of humanity and become just 'like Us.' These Others are imagined in ways not dissimilar to past imperial protectorates or the recipients of missionary Christianity: morally contained and incorporated in Our ideas of the good life. This mimicry (Bhabha, 1994) confirms Our central role in promoting human progress and the universality and superiority of Our values in relation to those who would leave their principles and ideals to assimilate into Ours.

RT thus reflects a Narcissistic worldview which sees its own image reflected back at it from willing, inferior “benevolent replica[s]” (McGarry, 2007) anywhere on earth. This archipelago of undifferentiated, interchangeable Others appears through *nominal* ‘equality’ (McGarry, 2007) with *any* difference being readily tolerated. This process denies both difference (They are not different to ‘Us’) and sameness (‘They are like Us, but not quite,’ to use Bhabha, 1994:89) with difference turning into sameness by narcissistically seeing others as a tabula rasa on which to project Our own high ideals.

In contrast, in RD, the Other appears as *anything but* Us, as an unnatural, non-worldly demon. She is literally not of this world. The demon is the absolute Other but she is also a necessary evil, defining and reinforcing the beliefs and ideals of the in-group as a moral society (Gordon Lynch, 2011; Alon and Omer, 2006:16). RD appears as the flip side of RT’s saviour complex (Mutua, 2001; Mamdani, 2009) and its ‘invitation to assimilate.’ Here, Our values and sense of self are reaffirmed in a sacred, zero-sum confrontation with those who define Us negatively, as Our absolute opposite. Here, only an outright victory will do: the complete eradication of the demon. While RT necessitates an ambivalent deviant (‘not quite’), in RD, shades of grey are seen as dangerous, as a demonic ploy to instil doubt and hesitation which weakens Our resolve. As Omer and Alon put it (2005), such doubts ‘bring the devil closer to home’.

Where, in RD, Otherness is thus enshrined, in RT Otherness is an unthinkable taboo since *anything but complete sameness would instantly appear to be as complete otherness*. Where in RD any difference is imagined as being cosmic, regardless how small, in RT no difference is big enough to disrupt seeing the other only as oneself (until such nominal sameness turns into explicit difference). While RD’s gaze is an unflinching stare, RT’s gaze looks *anywhere but* at the thing itself. RT then produces Otherness that is marked by that which is left unsaid, like traces or echoes around an ineffable space.

Conversely to RT's inexpressible scope, in RD there is a constant need to expose and unmask the underhanded disguises of the demonic forces around us, relentlessly plotting our destruction and threatening the sanctity of Our world (Alon and Omer, 2006:20). Here, the battle against the demon for Our sacred values is existential, with the victory over the demonic forces (again and a fresh, like a trauma which constantly has to be revisited) is believed to resurrect an age of purity, innocence, and a lost paradise (Alon and Omer, 2006). In RT, superiority over the tolerated group—implicitly seen as unprincipled, dependent, licentious, and lazy—is an assumed given. Yet openly asserting such an assumed sense of superiority is an anathema since it would shatter the illusion of instrumental pseudo equality and unity with Those who supposedly model their sense of humanity after Us. While Europe-of-the-Mind fancies itself to have a universal message for the world at large, the actual reception or implementation of Our gifts of progress and civilization in one 'backyard' of the globe or another, are irrelevant. Change and influence are unidirectional, flowing downwards unconcernedly from the elevated singular to the undifferentiated many below. Through this unconcern, others are tolerated while Their wrongdoing is presumed to be *intolerable in the first place*. At the same time, the promise of equality between the one saviour and its many imitations is nominal and tokenistic. Once the blind cheque of moral toleration has been cashed, colonial surveillance (Bhabha, 1984:89) of the tolerated Other ensues, and endemic cynicism refutes Their 'true' assimilation into Our values (Boyarin 2009): 'They are not like Us after all,' as this logic goes. In contrast to this delayed suspicion, in RD the Other is under constant suspicion of trying to subvert others from adopting Our prototype for humanity. Finally, while the demonic group has to be destroyed so to restore a foregone golden age, the tolerated group willingly dissolves through assimilation and the conviction of Our high ideals.

4.4 Trans-differential racialisations

The first task of this theorization is to unpack the notion of the relational, or how two distinct sets of ideas as RT and RD relate to each other via interdependent and continuously intersecting ways. Here I follow Taguieff's term "differential racism" (2001, see also Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991:21) and Werbner's notion of "[D]ifferential ontologies of racism" (2013:452). Reflecting on culturalist racism, Taguieff suggests two modes of racialisations which are in a state of relational contrast. On the one hand, communitarian-differentialist racism (2001:8), or the in-group's rejection of out-groups altogether; and, on the other hand, a universal-inegalitarian racism (2001:8) that denies difference and which moves towards homogeneity and a predisposition to the same. Hence, the notion of differential racialisations opens up a space in which to examine how two principal modes of racialisations appear within a system of difference (Baudrillard, 1968) to each other. In this context, anti-Arab and anti-Jewish racialisations do not make sense only on their own but also within their differentiation and their relative position from Europe and through Europe to each other.

For Werbner the "convergence between the Jewish and Muslim folk devils" (2012:459) thus occurs through *differential* ontologies of racism (2012:452). For Michael Galchinsky, Jews, Africans, Indians, Arabs and Scots were all subsets in a larger construction of Christian Britishness in which "national and marginal identities develop relationally" (2003:55). "[T]he meaning of both Englishness and Jewishness alters depending on which group Jews are compared to" (2003:55), concludes Galchinsky.

The point here regards the external-politico and internal-theologico as relational and differential, as distinct, yet appearing in a continuum to one another. For example, Turner (2002:24-25) points to a four-cell typology of Oriental interpretations. On the one hand, "negative/external" "Classical Orientalism" (2002:24) and, on the other hand, "positive/internal" Orientalism. External-negative racialisations involve basically seeing the Other as alien and dangerous within the corpus of the state while internal-positive racialisations are pseudo-affirmative. Hence, for Turner, external/negative racialisations allowed for the dispossession of the First Nation People in North America (seen as inferior to Christian-Europe's standards of reason, progress and culture); while idealised and sentimentalised internal/positive racialisations "converted the native peoples of North

America into ‘the Noble Savage’” (2002:25). Dispossession *and* idealisation, negative *and* positive Othering are positioned as being relational to each other. Indeed, Bhabha recognises the ambivalences that underlie the features of orientalist perceptions as a mix of both repulsion *and* attraction, ranging from “the loved to the hated” (1994:79). For Hall, Colonial India was seductive to the English through “fantasies of degradation and desire” (1992, quoted in Law, 2002:23) and Shohat and Stam (1994) reflect on the ambivalent and contradictory character of racial categories. Using the term “boomerang compliment” the authors write that “anti-Black stereotypes (repulsive bestiality, say)” can also be “recorded as positive (libidinal freedom, presumably)” (1994:21). For example, “The adulation of Black physical agility has as its corollary a presumed mental incapacity” (Shohat and Stam, 1994:21). Finally, Küpper and Zick (2014), writing about Group Focused Enmity, remark on “benevolent” or “positive prejudices” against outgroups which nonetheless have negative consequences (2014:129). For example, the idea that women are warm and emotional can legitimize social discrimination on the basis that men are more composed and rational.

A more detailed example of such “positive prejudices” (Küpper and Zick, 2014) may be the utterance ‘All Chinese people have strong work ethics.’ This statement reflects racialised prejudice by its undifferentiating attitude towards *all* Chinese people who, in turn, are seen as owning some singular and irreducible essence, albeit ‘positive.’ Here, credit for ‘hard work’ shifts from individual effort to group affiliation. ‘You’ve seen one Chinese person, you’ve seen them all,’ as this logic goes (Taguieff, 2001:114). Hence, this comment still applies inferiorising binaries of Us and Them, even if softer and less pronounced. For instance, Chinese people are static and interchangeable, while We are unique and ever-changing; Chinese people are useful and productive, but We are individualistic and creative, and; inclusion of Chinese persons in the ‘West’ is conditioned on their subdued character as hard working, model citizens. Ernest Renan put such racialising logic in chilling terms:

Nature has made a race of workers, the Chinese race, who have wonderful manual dexterity, and almost no sense of honour; govern them with justice, levying from them, in return for the blessing of such a government, an ample allowance for the conquering race, and they will be satisfied. (1871, quoted in Césaire, 1972/2000:38)

A framework, which crystallises these formations of racism of attraction *and* rejection, is Fiske's et al's. four-cell model of mixed stereotype content (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, And Xu, 2002). Applying this model to this research, a "paternalistic stereotype" of the Palestinian-Arab appears in a trans-differential relationality to an "envious stereotype" of the Israeli-Jew (2002:880). While the Arab scores high in "warmth," she is nonetheless categorised as of "low status": not agentive, not competent and "not competitive." The Jew, in contrast, scores low in "warmth" yet she is categorised as "competitive" and of "high status." One of the main propositions of RT is that historic anti-Arab racialisations can indeed persist even within a normative liberal discourse that rejects "uniform antipathy" (Fiske et al., 2002:880). *Chart 3* exhibits this four-cell model of mixed stereotypes.

Chart 3. Four types of out-groups (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, And Xu, 2002).

Warmth	Competence	
	Low	High
High	Paternalistic prejudice Low status, not competitive Pity, sympathy (e.g., elderly people, disabled people, housewives)	Admiration High status, not competitive Pride, admiration (e.g., in-group, close allies)
Low	Contemptuous prejudice Low status, competitive Contempt, disgust, anger, resentment (e.g., welfare recipients, poor people)	Envious prejudice High status, competitive Envy, jealousy (e.g., Asians, Jews, rich people, feminists)

Emphasizing the historic contingencies of stereotypes which are of low-competence but *high-warmth*, the authors write:

Although we do not dispute the importance of contemporary egalitarian norms, we note that paternalistic stereotypes of perceived low competence and high warmth are not a uniquely modern development. European colonialism and American slavery both were justified through stereotypes of non-Whites as warm and simple folk requiring the guidance of a superior culture. (Fiske et al., 2002:880)

This position in regard to racialisations that are positive, inclusive and cordial (warm) is not obvious in either academic literature or national debate in Britain (as seen in the news media). Being one of the lynchpins of this study it thus deserves further attention. Balibar

(1991) notes the difference between the racism of “extermination or elimination” and the “racism of oppression or exploitation.” The first is the racism of exclusion, which aims to purify the social body from external groups, the latter, which Balibar also calls “inclusive racism” (1991:39) or “imperialist racism” (1991:37), aims to hierarchize ‘minorities’ within the national or imperial space (1991:38). Goldberg (2002:234) also distinguishes between what he sees as a racial drive for extermination (or Naturalist racism), and a racial drive for assimilation (or Historicist racism). The first aims to eradicate difference, the latter to dissolve difference into sameness; a universality equated with whiteness.

As Lentin and Lentin (2006:6-7) note:

[Historicist racism] is based on the idea that racial progress is possible. In other words, through exposure to Europeans in the colonies, education and assimilation, “inferior” racial groups could eventually evolve and attain a higher level of humanity. This progressivist approach is at the heart of contemporary debates on the integration of immigrants and their descendants, as though imposing “our way of life” upon them were sufficient to make differences disappear and end racism. Historicist racism is the relationship between racism and universalism.

Another contribution to the interweaving of racialised rejection and attraction is Gerd Baumann’s notion of “reverse mirror-imaging.” Baumann expands on familiar binaries, such as “we are good, so they are bad” (2005:19), with a self/Othering classificatory structure in which the Orient is not only denigrated but is also desired. For example, “the sense of Western superiority entails also a sense of loss:” We are sober and materialist, “‘no longer’ so spontaneous, luxuriant or mystical” as They are (2005:20). Bauman reflects on Said’s (1978) analysis of the grammar of Orientalism used by such intellectual elites as Flaubert, Verdi or Gide, which also incorporated self-critique and “positive reversals of the orientalist grammar” (p. 20). For example:

Orientalism is thus not a simple binary opposition of ‘us=good’ and ‘them=bad,’ but a very shrewd mirrored reversal of ‘what is good in us [still] bad in them, but what got twisted in us [still] remains straight in them.’ (Baumann, 2005:20)

Similarly to Turner’s invocation of the Noble Savage, for Bauman:

The xenophiliac who searches for some special wisdom in Tibetan monks or rainforest Amerindians, and who discovers a special ‘natural grace’ in children of colour or Third World athletes is no less orientalist than the xenophobe who sees the West as democratic, reasonable and secularist and the Orient (wherever it may be) as despotic, fanatic, and fundamentalist. (2005:20)

It is the space for self-critique while “still finding the other strange and inferior” (ibid) which produces this Orientalizing intellectual/elite grammar. I thus add a third column, ‘Jew Negative’ and ‘Jew Positive,’ to Bauman’s chart below (*Chart 4*) which originally included only Occident and Orient. The Jew in this formation is imagined as both antithetical to the Idea-of-Europe and as innate to it: Our culture, yet in excess, Our spirit, yet in decline.

Chart 4. “Grammar of Orientalization or Reverse Mirror-imaging” with the columns “Jew Negative” and “Jew Positive” added on (Baumann, 2005).

<i>Occident Positive</i>	<i>Orient Negative</i>	<i>Jew Negative</i>
<i>Rational</i>	<i>Irrational</i>	<i>Outsmarting (cunning)</i>
<i>Enlightened</i>	<i>Superstitious</i>	<i>Carnal, fossilized</i>
<i>Technological</i>	<i>Backward</i>	<i>Mechanistic</i>

<i>Occident Negative</i>	<i>Orient Positive</i>	<i>Jew Positive</i>
<i>Calculating</i>	<i>Spontaneous</i>	<i>Exceptional intellect</i>
<i>Sober</i>	<i>Luxuriant</i>	<i>Unambiguous, unfettered</i>
<i>Materialist</i>	<i>Mystical</i>	<i>‘Good with business’</i>

Hence, through webs of fault *and* desire, superiority *and* self-critique, a positive European identity is validated through projections and introjections. On the one hand, the Arab is viewed as magical and spontaneous *but also* as superstitious and backward. On the other hand, the Jew is perceived as foundational to Christian traditions *but also* as base and redundant. Equidistance to both, the British Idea-of-Europe imagines itself as taking the middle position between two poles of excesses; as being ‘just right.’

Hence, RT emphasizes the inclination of contemporary racism towards inclusion and attraction, not only to exclusion and rejection. This analysis examines such notions as narcissism, paternalism, and the saviour complex. Below, I use Adam Kahane (2010) to discuss the interweaving of generative and degenerative criticism and empathy. I call this interweaving Critical Solidarity.

4.5 RT and RD as an anaemic solidarity and scorched earth criticism

Using Adam Kahane (2010), this section proposes a model of *how* a relational ‘system of difference,’ or demonization and toleration, in fact intertwine.

Based on Paul Tillich’s book *Power, Love and Justice* (1954), Kahane defines *power* as the drive towards self-realization (differentiation) and *love* as the drive towards unity. To succinctly explicate his theory Kahane uses a *cartoonish* construct of gender roles, quoting the feminist scholar Paola Melchiori (2010:7). On the one hand, *generative* masculinity is exemplified by a father going out to work, pursuing purpose and creating value in the world. However, the *degenerative* side of this masculinity may mean a behaviour that is tyrannical or emotionally detached, disconnecting from family and colleagues. In contrast, *generative* feminine love, or a drive towards unity, could mean literally mean giving life through birth or being the children’s primary carer. The *degenerative* side of such love may be an over-identification of the women with her family and the denial of hers and her family’s growth and self-realisation. Following from this simplified illustration, Kahane concludes:

Love is what makes power generative instead of degenerative. Power is what makes love generative instead of degenerative (2010:xxviii).

Power and love (unity), then, are complementary and mutually enhancing, each in need of the other to fully materialise. Martin Luther King, whose doctoral dissertation examined Tillich’s theology, puts this as follows:

Power without love is reckless and abusive, and love without power is sentimental and anaemic... It is this collision of immoral power with powerless morality which constitutes the major crisis of our time (1955, quoted in Kahane, 2010:8)

Taking from such theorization, “reckless and abusive” criticism, or criticism without solidarity, can too be oppressive and produce “scorched earth war that destroys everything...” (Kahane, 2010:xxx). While, at the same time, “sentimental and anaemic” empathy, or disinterested love (Kahane, 2010:80), may produce a “lifeless peace,” hobbled growth, and be ineffectual, deceitful and even end up reinforcing the status quo (Kahane, 2010:8).

Elsewhere, King cautions against the tendency to seeing power and unity as “*polar opposites*.” King:

the concepts of love and power have usually been contrasted as opposites, polar opposites, so that love is identified with a resignation of power, and power with a denial of love (1967, quoted in Kahane, 2010:vi).

Using King’s framework, the main proposition here is that discursive trends appearing in both newspapers exhibit a juxtaposition of censure and empathy as “polar opposites.” In RT, “sentimental and anaemic” solidarity with the Palestinian-Arab tolerates difference (however, self-servingly and temporarily) in the name of unity of swallowed boundaries which find Them to be ‘like Us,’ but not quite: Our self-reflection in another, yet in a lesser form. In this conditional empathy the other is instrumental in validating Our high ideals while leaving her ideals behind. This degenerative empathy *and* degenerative criticism reinforce a status quo that is negative to non-elite Palestinians, since it discards dynamics from within the conflict which support gainful changes (such as Palestinian reformists, the Palestinian peace camp, Palestinian professionals and business community and, indeed, the Israeli peace camp. See peace chapter below). At the same time, through RT’s gestural and odourless empathy, Palestinian elites’ wrongdoings are tolerated, even if they harm non-elite Palestinians. Hence, RT can be defined as being an indifferent toleration which, despite imagining Others through ontologized difference (Hastrup et al, 2002:76) still allows them to temporarily “share the social space” (see Walzer, 1997:12). RT then opens a temporary *moral gap* in which the other is ‘put up with,’ while already being seen as inferior and objectionable to begin with. For Boyarin (2009), RT oscillates between others *imagined potential* to fulfil Our highest ideals (to become ‘like Us’); Our endemic scepticism about their ability to fulfil such unrealisable standards; and Our reassigned sense of superiority at their inevitable failure. Nonetheless, RT falls under Trepagnier’s “well meaning racism” (2006). After all, for Said, *sympathy* and *classification*, not just expansion and historical confrontation, make the elements without which Orientalism “could not have occurred” (1978:121).

Simultaneously, RD proposes that the Israeli-Jew is rebuked through “scorched earth” criticism, devoid of empathy, which emphasises difference beyond the pale: They are not worldly and We do not share the same form of humanity with Them. Here, RT’s ‘over-identification’ is contrasted with no identification at all, or with seeing the Other as

‘anything but Us’; as dangerous, unnatural and inhuman. To use Kaposi, RD’s “metaphysical conception” (2014:22) ritualises ontological differences between Us and Them as between order and disorder, and “purity and impurity” (2014:22).

To conclude, RT and RD can be invoked as follows:

*Thou shalt not love nor project wrongs onto thy neighbour as thyself*⁵²

In the case of RT: thy shalt love thy neighbour as she who is only basically “as thyself” but who carries *significant* differences to thyself which are worthy of respect and exchange. To use Levinas, thou shalt see the other as other (see below). In the case of RD: thou shalt not inscribe unto others one’s *own* (“thyself”) internal wrongs (or the “Otherness of the Self,” as Bhabha invokes Sartre, 1986:xv-xiv), projected and externalized outward. Below I expand on this overview of RT and RD.

4.6 Racialised Toleration (RT)

4.6.1 Turning History into Nature; RT as denial by eternalizing

In the first component of RT, reducing others into an essence, even a positive one, eternalises their lived History and context as a fixed, predestined Nature. While They exist in an eternalised, unchanging state, We are morally autonomous, protean and forever capable of reinventing Ourselves; thus superior. Essentialism is seen here as a normative human behaviour and hence as part of the discourse of “everyday racism” (Essed, 1991), even within progressive text and practices.

Essentialising as inferiorizing

The foremost foundational feature of RT, also shared with RD, is essentialism as a form of inferiorizing. In this mode of Othering, others are reduced into ontologically fixed,

⁵² To paraphrase Romans 13:9 (also Galatians 5:14; Romans 13:9 and Leviticus 19:18).

finite and measurable static essence through a process of “metonymic freezing” (Appadurai, 1988a, 1988b). As in Clifford, through “representational essentialising... one part or aspect of peoples’ lives come to epitomize them as a whole” (1992:100). Others are thus distilled into an irreducible essence imagined as being as actual as elements in the periodical table, e.g., Palestinianess and Israeliness. Any attitudes or actions taken by actual Palestinians or Israelis are understood only through their group’s intrinsic Nature or essence. They are all “the same, and They are different from and worse” than Us (Küpper and Zick, 2014:1).

Inline with RT’s mode of “well meaning” racism (Trepagnier, 2006), even those viewed through such categories as *good* and *weak* (see below, Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum, 1957) can still be imagined as incapable of change, and thus inferior. As Turner states, even representations which aim to be positive can end up producing a racialised “accounting system” when highlighting the “social stationariness of the Orient” in contrast to the “progressive features of the Occident” (Turner, 1974a. Quoted in Turner, 1994:22).

For Said, essentialising the Orient means to “strip humanity down” to “ruthless cultural and racial essences” (1978:36). Said quotes Malek (1963) at length on the Orient as transmuted into a metaphysical object of study, an “ethnist typology” of “constitutive Otherness” which becomes the “inalienable and common basis of all the beings considered” (in Said, 1978:97). Such boiled-down, ahistorical “homo Arabicus,” as Said continues to quote Malek, is imagined as having existed since the “dawn of history” (ibid). Accordingly, *the* Orient is reproduced as a transcendent, Platonic knowledge, unresponsive to the forces of History, and incapable of manoeuvring, developing or advancing (ibid). Being “passive, non-participating... non-active, non-autonomous, non-sovereign,” writes Malek (ibid), it is the role of others outside the Orient to understand, define and act on its behalf. Hence, among the dogmas of Orientalism “there are still such things as an Islamic society, an Arab mind, an Oriental psyche” (Said, 1978:301), since these are viewed as unchanging, inherent properties. “Even the ones whose specialty is the modern Islamic world,” continues Said, “anachronistically use texts like the Koran to read into every facet of contemporary Egyptian or Algerian society” (1978:301). Inline with Patai’s infamous book, *The Arab Mind* (1973/2002), the Arab is referred to in the

singular, *the Arab mind*, and as something stationary which can be fully known and explained away by external observers.⁵³

Looking into the *Guardian* and the *Independent*, I claim that such essentialism is carried through to the Palestinian-Arab as well as towards the Israeli-Jew. ‘Insider’ and ‘expert’ writers are employed by both newspapers to explicate for readers how ‘They think’ and how Their predetermined Nature is tidily accessible for Us to fully know, judge, study, classify and control (Said, 1978:40).

Transforming History into Nature

In this section I will examine Clifford’s “representational essentialising” (1992:100) through Barthes’ writing on myth as an *eternalizing* speech that “transforms history into nature” (1957:129). As above, *transforming history into nature* is seen here as a normative cognitive process and a subtle mode of everyday Othering relevant to the progressive left. In addition, Barthes’ concern with the unnamed ideology of the middleclass fits neatly with the subject of this study: two mass media publications with a widespread middleclass readership. Indeed, Barthes’ notion of ex-nomination refers to the process of *transfixing* (not unlike essentialising) an everlasting classificatory system to the randomness of everyday life. This asphyxiated, mythic speech applies to anything, vegetable prices or news reports. While Jungian archetypes relate to the mythic “enduring aspect of human existence” (Lule, 2002:277), Barth’s myth relates to making the fleeting and passing seem enduring and lasting. Mark Johnson (2007) highlights the tension between the circumstantial fragility of everyday life and the human desire for an “eternal realm.” Johnson writes:

Change, chance and contingency are a fundamental part of life that can sometimes leave us feeling helpless and out of control. In our desperation over this inescapable flux of existence, we reach out for anything we think might lift us above change to some *eternal realm* of fixed forms and standards of value. We go so far as to fool ourselves into thinking that there must exist absolute, unchanging forms and principles against which all our finite, changing, embodied experience can be measured, once and for all. (2007:104-105, emphasis added)

⁵³ Echoing the key themes of this thesis, a few years later Patai published *The Jewish Mind* (1977).

In Barthes' example, below, the European bourgeoisie recognises itself as superior exactly by seeing China as unchanging and of "limited contingencies" (1957:121):

China is one thing, the idea which a French petit-bourgeois could have of it not so long ago is another: for this peculiar mixture of bells, rickshaws and opium-dens, no other word is possible but *Sinness*. (1957:119)

Organised as a structural, pre-articulated system of signified meanings, Barth's myth takes over a signifier—for example Chinese bells, rickshaws or opium-dens—and as a "parasitical form" (1957:116) empties it of its distinctiveness, history and singularity. That which takes the place of the situated and positional now appears as a self-referential completeness: a pure, homogenising and closed lexis. It is this *eternalising* mythical speech that bestows a new unity, coherence and essence. Thus, that which carries meaning beyond itself (objects, behaviours or indeed, whole peoples) is reduced into speech so that its usage, function and motivation are predetermined and already in circulation. This reality is "eternalized" since it is subsumed into the 'natural' (Barthes, 1977:164), separated from referent biographical, historical or geographical meanings. For Barthes such mythical speech is no less "superstitious than those held by ancient or 'primitive' peoples" (Hawkes, 1996:146) and its understanding necessitates grappling with the "essence of the "classificatory systems" of primitive humanity" (Rogerson, 1970:495).

Stuart Hall echoes such transforming of History into Nature when discussing Eurocentric perceptions of colonised peoples. He writes:

Both [perceived coloniser and colonized] were displaced from the language of *history into the language of Nature*. Natural physical signs and racial characteristics became the unalterable signifiers of inferiority. Subordinate ethnic groups and classes appeared, not as the objects of particular historical relations (the slave trade, European colonisation, the active underdevelopment of the 'underdeveloped' societies), but as the given qualities of an inferior *breed*. Relations, secured by economic, social, political and military domination were transformed and 'naturalised' into an order of *rank*, ascribed by Nature. (1990:14, emphasis added)

Dahlgren and Chakrapani (1982) reflect on a similar "virtual ontology of the Third World" (1982:53) within the US Cold War televised news reports, writing:

Devoid of social, political and historical causation, the manifestation of disorder and violence take on the quality of eternal essences which define the nature of these countries.

The conflation of ideology, polity, impressions and signs thus leave History as a naturalised figure of speech. A phraseology emptied of context appearing as “*an image-at-one’s-disposal*” to “enjoy this beautiful object without wondering where it came from” (Barthes, 1957:151). For example “...the Spain of the *Blue Guide* has been made for the tourist,” Barthes writes, “and ‘primitives’ have prepared their dances with a view to an exotic festivity” (1957:151). For the bourgeoisie the world and the world of meaning are ready for consumption: always centred on Our viewpoint while appearing, without fail, to be normalised and self-evident, regardless of how skewed or voyeuristic.

In the context of this study, lived, experienced Histories related to the Arab and Jew—say past events or statements—are eternalised into the sides’ unchanging Natures. These imagined irreducible Natures then appear in some “eternal realm” (Johnson, 2007) where, being diametrically oppositional, They are in *constant relationality* to the Idea-of-Europe as the ‘happy medium’ between them. However We change, They change so as to remain the same: in constant distance from Us.

Rosch’s prototype theory

Another aspect of RT can be explained using Rosch’s prototype theory (1975). Through this quotidian process of making sense of the world, fictional classifications are ranked through priming. In the case of classifying other peoples such normative process can take the shape of ‘We are the prime exemplar for humanity, while They are an inferior example.’ Hence, the prototype effect is useful for the study of discriminatory discourse giving its innate mode of discrimination. For example, only *some* common attributes relating to the members of the set are encircled as *within* the category while others are excluded from it. Hence, even seemingly ‘positive’ priming is problematic in the case of an entire people (say, Palestinians), since prototyping itself means dismissing most members of the group (that is, most Palestinians) from representing the group’s prime example. Consequently, for news reporting which aims to be iconic⁵⁴ most Palestinians

⁵⁴ Linda Grant, interview with Hagai van der Horst (2 December 2008).

are not ‘Palestinian’ enough. It is not *whether* Palestinians are excluded through such priming, but, rather, which ones and according to whose and what logic?

Hence, for Lakoff, “Categorization is not a matter to be taken lightly. There is nothing more basic than categorization to our thought, perception, action, and speech,” he writes (1987:5). For Rosch (1975, see also Lakoff, 1987; Langacker, 1986) the prototype theorem suggests that categories are created and matched against a best or ideal example called a prototype (Lakoff, 1987:7), or that which best represents a semantic category, by containing most of its features. Lakoff succinctly relates the distinction between essential and accidental properties in the process of categorization:

Among the properties that things have, some are essential; that is, they are those properties that make the thing what it is, and without which it would not be that *kind* of thing. Other properties are accidental—that is, they are properties that things happen to have, not properties that capture the essence of the thing. (1987:161)

In her landmark paper Rosch (1975) thus tested dozens of students on what would be the best example of semantic categories such as birds, furniture, toys, carpenters’ tools, and more. Respondents found, e.g., Robin to be the “best example” to represent the category of birds, while Hawk was the least representative. Chairs were the most representative of the category of furniture with china closet, bench and buffet the least (Lakoff, 1987:41). Such priming and privileging of the level of goodness of members of a category, along with discriminating poorness in the typicality of features, make for the prototype effect.

Returning to the conflict, this study claims that both the Palestinian-Arab and Israeli-Jew are primed in both newspapers as oppositional prototypical categories. Through dual priming and relegation many Palestinians, for example, are sidelined as not typical enough to represent their set. These may include Iraqi or Jordanian Palestinians, the Palestinian peace camp or Palestinian professionals (see below).

A key component of the prototype effect which is significant for this dual process is the slippage between good and poor examples, with poor examples ‘spilling over’ and moving closer to other categories. As Rosch writes, the

best examples of categories are those items both with the most attributes in common with other members of the category in question and with the least attributes in

common with, or the least possibility of membership in, other categories. (1975:208)

In this either/or classificatory mode the ever-present categories of the Arab and Jew thus move away from each other to the point of diametrical opposition. This slippage occurs also between superordinate categories (the Middle East instead of Palestine) and subordinate categories (Muslim Palestinians instead of Christian Palestinians). It is through such “epistemological boundaries” that the coverage attains its gratifying and aesthetic quality of a self-explanatory “internal coherence” (Said, 1978:40).

Crucially, these oppositional classifications manifest an additional category, that of the European-British, or the proto-human. This classification is of a mode of humanity that is selfless, neutral, and which campaigns for rights and remote others’ causes worldwide. Conflicting instances to this imagined self-image are reduced to mere accidental or non-representative properties of Our set.

4.6.2 RT as the denial of both sameness and otherness

The second component of RT is a form of an undifferentiating universalism in which the Other appears through idealised projections of Our high self-devoid of an independent existence to Our own. This form of a “standardizing imperialism[s]” (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991:22) fancies the Other to be within diffused boundaries to herself. According to this logic, They stand only for what We stand (‘and why won’t they’), and the best They can do is to substitute Their social, cultural and political distinctiveness, values and ideas, with Ours. This view is attractive since, a) it already assumes Our superiority over Them, yet in subtle and unassuming ways, b) the mimicry of Our values in all corners of the earth validates the universality of these values, and c) Our alliance with protectorate weaker parties lends Us a form of social soft power which can be redirected at will to solidify Our ‘hard’ geo-political power (Clark and Reus-Smit, 2012).

Such denial of sameness *and* otherness thus spells both an *impermeable difference* and a *permeable indifference*, assuming no difference at all. It is through this form of *indifference beyond the pale* that the British Eurocentric mindset sees some Palestinians

as herself (not recognizing them as others) and other Arabs (not seen through RT) as wholly different (see below). While, in RD, the Other values total destruction and wickedness, in RT the Other is seen as having no worthwhile values to begin with. Here, the distinct values and historicity of Others can be emptied at will and, like an unknowing clean slate, or a tabula rasa, have Our values projected upon them. These malleable Others then appear both inferior and motionless (through denial of sameness) as well assimilated into Our values (through denial of difference). In this dependent enmeshment and lack of autonomy the Other is imagined as ‘invited in’ and incorporated into Our ideals and way of life. Both RT and RD uphold historic global hierarchies postulating Our superiority over others “as sovereign subject of the world” (Young, 2004:164).

Echoing such Eurocentric ideas concerning the denial of both sameness *and* otherness, JanMohamed writes:

If he assumes that he and the Other are essentially identical, then he would tend to ignore the significant divergences and to judge the Other according to his own cultural values. (1985:64-65)

Hence, for JanMohamed, colonised people appear through “specular” modes of representations like “a mirror that reflects the colonialist’s self-image” (1985:65). For Barthes, an exoticizing Eurocentrism postulates an Orient which is “profoundly similar to the Occident” (1957:94). Under this “basic unity of idealism,” this Orient is defused “as a pure reflection of the West. “Orientals have religions of their own? Never mind...” (1957:94), continues Barthes, “[I]n any case, the main thing is to deprive it of its history.”

The notion of the denial of sameness and otherness is found in Levinas’ *Totality and Infinity* (1979). For Levinas, the other holds an irreducible, non-contained “radical alterity” (1979:121) for me. Not seeing the other’s otherness as other, but seeing in others only oneself, or “a reduction of the other to the same” (1979:43), is a form of an “ontological imperialism” (1979:44). The self’s totality (i.e., sameness) and the other’s infinity (i.e., otherness) are in a constant struggle for acceptance and rejection; occurring in a spectrum between absolute resistance to the other and her *absolute assimilation*. As Caygill puts it “...the first violence is the shattering of the same by the other, while the second is the suppression of the other by the same or the violent subordination of its

alterity to a claim to totality” (2002:108). Wieviorka warns those taking up the cause of “[R]ational anti-racism” against the “Scylla of universalism and the Charybdis of differentialism” (1997:149); i.e., of moving between both spaces without being trapped by either. Pnina Werbner calls for the sustaining of “differential interests” and “legitimacy of difference” of groups in the face of “*coercive unity*, ideologically grounded in a single monolithic truth” (1997:21, emphasis added). Commenting on the “appropriating and subsuming of the other within the self,” Robert Young writes:

In Western philosophy, when knowledge or theory comprehends the other, then the alterity of the latter vanishes as it becomes part of the same... In all cases the other is neutralized as a means of encompassing it: ontology amounts to a philosophy of power, an egotism in which the relation with the other is accomplished through its assimilation into the self. (2004:45)

Incapable of recognising Others beyond their assigned Nature, such Others are assigned *Our* human nature through a swallowing assimilation. This nominal inclusion then turns into a mould for ‘lesser ones’ to follow, as Fanon writes:

Western bourgeois racial prejudices as regards the nigger and the [Cold War] Arab is a racism of contempt; it is a racism which minimises what it hates. Bourgeois ideology, however, which is the proclamation of an essential equality between men, manages to appear logical in its own eyes by inviting the sub-men to become human, and to take as their prototype Western humanity as incarnated in the Western bourgeoisie. (1967:131)

Makau Mutua (2001:201) describes this Eurocentric teleology in which “... history is a linear, unidirectional progression with the superior and scientific Western civilisation leading and paving the way for others to follow.” “We are humanity,” writes Taguieff, “we (the set of those who resemble us) and we alone incarnate humanity itself; we represent the essence of humanity” (2001:130). Imagining herself as a model for humanity others are thus not simply reduced, but rather are *elevated* to *Our* level (to use Gordon, 2002) and ‘invited’ to become human ‘like Us.’ As Hastrup suggests “If the others are equally human, it is because they are almost like us” (2002:85). To paraphrase the Quaker proverb:

It is the me in thee that is to me most precious
(originally: *It is the not-me in thee that is to me most precious*)

W.E.B. Du Bois (1920) also notes how Eurocentric utterances of *nominal* affinity can take the shape of ancient antagonisms. Du Bois observed:

We see Europe's greatest sin precisely where we found Africa's and Asia's—in human hatred, the despising of men; with this difference, however: Europe... has the splendid results of *widened areas of tolerance, sympathy, and love among men...*" (emphasis added)

Hence, Du Bois cautions that Europe's sins of war and hatred are reinscribed under the banner of tolerance and universalism.⁵⁵ Finally, sentimentalised benevolence, or Du Bois' 'love among all,' can normalise extreme prejudice and violence. To warily use James Fitzjames Stephen:

[A] man who has disinterested love for the human race – that is to say, who has got a fixed idea about some way of providing for the management of the concerns of mankind – is an unaccountable person ... capable of making his love for men in general the ground of all sorts of violence against man in particular. (1873:180, quoted in Kekes, 2003:117)

Resonating with Hume's ideas of "particular benevolence" (Vitz, 2002:284 and pp. 289-290), and reflecting Martin Luther King's "powerless morality" (see above), swallowed difference and nominal equality can indeed end lending legitimacy for "all sorts of violence." Below, I examine this denial of sameness and otherness in relation to the Palestinian-Arab.

Barthes notion of the scales

A useful visualisation for the denial of sameness and otherness is Barthes' metaphor of the measuring scales (1957:81). The scales' metaphor elucidates the power relations between those being weighed (appraised) and those doing the weighing, while highlighting the essentialism in seeing others as fixed and weighable—even when weighed 'positively.'

Two entities (e.g., the Arab and Jew) are first emptied of content or historical specificities so as to arbitrarily appear computable or weighable against one another. Then, the

⁵⁵ Mark Twain called the subjugation of tens of millions worldwide by European powers an act of "Benevolent Assimilation, which is the pious new name of the musket" (quoted in Balce, 2016:27).

ideology and interests of those doing the weighing become invisible and the arbitrary act of weighing and balancing becomes naturalised. Barthes writes:

...stating two opposites and balancing the one by the other so as to reject them both... reality is first reduced to analogues; then it is weighed; finally, equality having been ascertained, it is got rid of... both parties are dismissed... reducing it [ensuing reality] to two opposites which balance each other only inasmuch as they are purely formal, relieved of all their specific weight. (1957:153)

First, both of those being weighed— regardless if positively or negatively—are equally dismissed, since they are only measured in relation each other, never on their own terms. Secondly, such weighing confirms the superiority of those doing the weighing as the primary, unmoving baseline or *pivotal* mid-position.

Hence, under the gaze of being weighed, the scales act as a type of seesaw. Even those weighed positively, say a movement upwards on one side, only represent an oppositional, negative weighing or a movement downwards on the other side. Hence, inclusion, or a movement upward, is only temporary, mechanical and limited to non-exclusion. Put differently, the scales metaphor demonstrates RT's blanket inclusion, or inclusion that is indifferent to the values it includes too due its investment in what it excludes.

Put in context, the scales exemplify the British Idea-of-Europe as weighing the entire universe as if being its Archimedes point, a "motionless prototype" (Barthes, 1957:155) or a criterion "touchstone" (Said, 1978:169). Shohat and Stam (1994:200) describe this Eurocentric "hierarchizing mechanism" as follows:


White superiority is not so much asserted as it is assumed – Whites are the objective ones, the experts, the uncontroversial ones, those who cause no problems, those who judge, those "at home" in the world, whose prerogative it is to create laws in the face of alien disorder. (1994:200)

While all others are still 'under enquiry,' Their value still hanging, We are "objective": actual, empirical and free from others' varying interpretations.

A striking illustration of Barthes' post-colonial mindset, of Us as a yard-stick for humanity at large, can be found in the two cartoons below. In *Figure 11* (in Dyer, 1997:55), while supposedly depicting how the Black vote is measured against the Irish vote, an eerie equality is attained, albeit diametrically oppositional. The hats, feet, facial

expressions or body posturing, all appear as a mirror image of each other. And yet, the vicious, pollutant Irish *and* childlike, docile Black are *equally* rejected, their respective assigned Natures appearing in equidistance to Us. While Their values are *equally* hanging in the air, at best ‘put on hold’ (tolerated), Our values are set and universal.

Figure 11: Thomas Nast, “[T]he Ignorant Vote: Honors Are Easy,” *Harper’s Weekly* (9 December 1876)



In Butterworth's cartoon (*Figure 12*), a concerned and paternal (literally) Britain is contrasted with the symmetrically oppositional Arab and Jew who, as in the "[I]gnorant Vote" cartoon above, are equally dismissed.⁵⁶

Figure 12: "Well That's Something, John!" George Butterworth, Daily Dispatch (3 May 1946)



The Punch cartoon below (*Figure 13*, in Dyer, 1997:52), visualises RT's rejection of the other as *both* same *and* other. In the cartoon an "unblemished, white-faced Britannia is cast in the classic imperial role of protecting the good native (a straight-haired women) against the hairy, gesticulating ape-like rebel native" (Dyer, 1997:52). Through a racialised form of inclusion, the defenceless black women "reincarnates" (Levinas, 1968) as white. Accordingly, the black woman is denied both sameness (being dependent, helpless, agent-less and morally neutral) and difference (as her appearance is subsumed into Ours). Britannia's act of charity here, to use McNulty (1999:268), calculatedly throws a "cloak of humanitarian concern" over "military strategic interests" (being the rejection of Irish nationalism while supposedly upholding national projects elsewhere).⁵⁷

⁵⁶ British troops in Palestine, quotes Laqueur, "look[ed] down on the people in their care as a tiresome gaggle of Yids and Wogs" (2003:449).

⁵⁷ Metaphorically, Britannia's sword, titled "The Law," separates those 'like Us' from those 'wholly different than Us' through a sense of a divinised political might *and* moral right to rule over others.

Figure 13: John Tenniel 'Two Forces', *Punch* (29 October 1881)



What this example shows is that the *terms* of *indiscriminate inclusion* of the black (turned-white) “good native” were subjected to the terms of exclusion of the pollutant Irish. Caught in the power relations between those weighing and those being weighed, both included and excluded figuratively, never leave the scales; intrinsically they remain objectified: always weighable, they are always excludable.

A more updated, media-related example can be seen in Carruthers (2004), who points to the interchangeability in international news reports of Rwanda's Tutsi victims with those who enacted the genocide as "indistinguishable mass of "innocents" fleeing in fright" (2004:164). The "big story" (Carruthers, 2004:164) of altruistic Western humanitarianism had dictated an interchangeable image of refugees' victimhood and innocence, she writes. Those who already imagined Africans as afflicted, unidentified masses were indifferent to their respective histories; victims of genocide or those committing it. John Gray, referring to US Straussian Neo-Conservatives and their "liberal imperialism" (2007:161) in the 2003 Iraq war, thus quotes George Santayana as follows:

The humanitarian, like the missionary, is often an irreducible enemy of the people he seeks to befriend, because he has not imagination enough to sympathize with their proper needs nor humility enough to respect them as if they were his own. Arrogance, fanaticism, meddlesomeness, and imperialism, may then masquerade as philanthropy. (1995:87)

The notion of nominal inclusion as the counteraction to exclusion is key to the analysis of RT of the Palestinian-Arab (think of Darwish's "we Palestinians are famous? Because you are our enemy," as above). In line with Said's formulation, Palestinian elites are 'put up with' because of who They are, regardless of what They do (1981/1997:xxii). Seen already through barbarities, eccentricities and unruliness (Said, 1978:290), a "residual missionary attitude towards Orientals" finds These malleable Others ripe for "re-education" (1978:291).

Barthes “Adamism”

Those who hold power do not really have the feeling of belonging to a particular ‘race’... They belong to humankind. It is the others who present that particularity, partially or totally negative with regard to their humanity, of having the characteristics proper to a certain race, exposed by their bodies for all to see.

JEANNE HERSCH (QUOTED IN TAGUIEFF, 2001: 130)

Figure 14: An image from [T]he Great Family of Man exhibition (Steichen, 2002)



Barthes’ essay, “The Great Family of Man” (1957), reviews a large photography exhibition of the same title held in Paris by the same title. The exhibition, Barthes writes, depicted the “universality of human actions in the daily life of all the countries of the world: birth, death, work, knowledge, play...” (1957:100). Yet for Barthes, the exhibition displays a “moralized and sentimentalized” (ibid) worldview which reveals a mystification of the ‘human condition’ as moulded after the Idea-of-Europe’s own self-image. Markers such as history or ethnicity are thus suppressed since, for the Eurocentric mindset, ‘human nature’ can only mean Our human nature. As Barthes writes

The petit-bourgeois is a man unable to imagine the Other. If he comes face to face with him, he blinds himself, ignores and denies him, or else transforms him into himself... any otherness is reduced to sameness. (Barthes, 1957:151)

For Barthes then, a “superficial diversity” and postulating humanism (1957:101), in fact, act as a zoology: keeping in only the familiar and similar in scope and behaviour. Through

formal and “poetic” (1957:101) representation of diversity, of skulls, skin colour and exotic practices, a false commonality and unity assumes a single “human essence” (1957:100) and a “solid rock of a universal human nature” (1957:101). Moulded by the Euro-Christian imagination, this “meeting of all the ages of humanity at the most neutral point of their nature” narrates this global human family in the singular: a “Babel” morphology (1957:100) of an imagined communality, or simply “Adamism” (1957:102).

Produced by a worldview which observes difference without being able to accept it, a manufactured “human ‘community’” (1957:100) is therefore “magically produced” (ibid). “[M]an is born, works, laughs and dies everywhere in the same way,” a pseudo humanism which validates “the existence of a common mould” (Barthes, ibid) by which the peculiarity of identities becomes identical. Barthes writes:

Everything here, the content and appeal of the pictures, the discourse which justifies them, aims to suppress the determining weight of History: we are held back at the surface of an identity, prevented precisely by sentimentality from penetrating into this ulterior zone of human behaviour where historical alienation introduces some ‘differences’ which we shall here quite simply call ‘injustices’ (1957:101).

Images of birth tell us nothing, writes Barthes, about the world these children are born into (child mortality rates, life opportunities, etc.), just as images of death tell us nothing about the causes of these deaths or possible remedies. Instead, such crafted images and catchphrases merely construct an eternal, immobilised lyricism. Similarly to Kahane’s anaemic solidarity, Barthes warns against purely gestural representations which attach a “sterile identity” (1957:102) to others who, regardless of the “determining weight of History” (1957:101) appear ‘just like Us.’

4.6.3 RT as denial by indiscrimination

*Those high up that ‘hierarchy of belonging’ have the power to
grant or withhold tolerance from those at the bottom.*

GEORGIE WEMYSS (1999:123)

RT’s third component examines the discourse of indiscrimination. I use the term toleration somewhat distinctively from current-day debates on communal

multiculturalism or multi-faith neighbourliness. Instead, this work relates to the experience of social-based toleration as an undistinguishing endurance which, without deliberation, ‘puts up with anything’ from a position of self-gratifying power. This focus on “tolerance as endurance” (Witenberg, 2000:2) does not mean *acceptance* of something objectionable but a calculated and instrumental indulgence or moral disconcern towards it. As Witenberg writes, no one wants to be tolerated because of their gender, colour of skin, religion or culture (2000). In other words, to consider someone as inferior or barbaric, and then to restraining oneself from acting on that position does not constitute recognition but a form of intolerance.

Originally emerging on the background of the Dutch Concordia and the Protestant Reformation (see Rawls 1987:5), toleration indicated religious pluralism within the Christian state (Lecler 1960:45, quoted in Wemyss, 2009:130), and the separation between private spiritual matters and pragmatic state civil interests (see Canuel, 2004; Zagorin, 2003). John Locke’s *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (1689) pledged for a separation of church and state, calling for equal toleration and freedom towards all religious convictions as a means to stop those in power from using coercion to force their views on their subjects’ personal persuasions.⁵⁸ As Forst writes, the term toleration refers to the

conditional acceptance of or non-interference with beliefs, actions or practices that one considers to be wrong but still “tolerable,” such that they should not be prohibited or constrained (2008).

For Forst (2008), a key for understanding the concept of toleration is weighing the objection and acceptance components. On the one hand, the tolerated beliefs or practices are “considered to be objectionable and in an important sense wrong or bad” (ibid). On the other hand, certain positive reasons trump the negative ones in a relevant way. Although the negative judgment is not removed, the wrong in question is found not to be beyond endurance.

Incorporating the notion of power, Nicholson succinctly defines toleration as the

⁵⁸ However, this recognition of different confessions excluded Atheists and Roman Catholics (see Hastrup et al, 2002:74).

virtue of refraining from exercising one's power to interfere with others' opinion or action although that deviates from one's own over something important and although one morally disapproves of it. (1985:162)

Mendus, commenting on Nicholson's definition, highlights that "we cannot, properly speaking, be said to tolerate things of whose existence we are ignorant, nor can we tolerate those things over which we have no power or control" (1989). As Horton puts it plainly, "[T]he exercise of tolerance presupposes the power to interfere with others' conduct" (1996:29). For Hastrup, such a power imbalance in the act of toleration professes a pseudo equality with those already seen as inferior. Hastrup writes:

In objectifying 'the other', that is also in tolerating them, we are imperceptibly prone to see them as somehow inferior to ourselves, however. The very notion rests on a certain asymmetry between the tolerant and the tolerated, that belies the equality it professes. (2002:85)

As Wemyss writes "tolerance works as a discourse of power to naturalise those tolerated as essentially different and inferior from the tolerating subject" (2009:124). Indeed, for Witenberg (2000:3), tolerance and prejudice should not be seen as mutually exclusive or oppositional, yet "This possibility is rarely acknowledged in the literature," she writes. Hence, Hastrup (2002) explores the demands for toleration in a world of differences and constraints (2002:10). Examining such notions as the "ethics of conversation" (MacIntyre, 1999:135) and "constructive disagreement" (Hastrup, 2002:77), Hastrup is concerned with toleration which excludes openness and includes intolerable utterances. "The question remains one of where to draw the line 'between justified intolerance and unjustified suppression', and to transform it into a general insight," he writes (2002:77). Resonating with RT's *anaemic solidarity*, Hastrup finds negative toleration to be a "convenient blindness towards actual difference and, consequently, (negative) discrimination" (ibid). Hastrup continues:

Absolute endorsement of difference does not imply a toleration of otherness but a support of it... The truly tolerant supports the idea of difference but admits that particular differences may be hard to live with for some. (ibid)

Thomas Paine, in *Rights of Man*, accentuates this notion of the "absolute endorsement of difference" (Hastrup, 2002:77). Paine writes:

Toleration is not the opposite of intolerance, but is the counterfeit of it. Both are despotisms. The one assumes to itself the right of withholding Liberty of Conscience and the other of granting it. (1791/1998:137)

As Lewis Gordon puts it, racial discrimination can lead to “racial indiscrimination” (2002:250): indiscrimination or moral indifference towards the specific values of those ‘invited in.’ Goldberg reiterates these positions, writing that in “liberal modernity liberals are moved to overcome the racial differences they tolerate” by “bleaching them out through assimilation or integration” (1993:7). Goldberg continues:

The liberal would assume away the difference in otherness, maintaining thereby the dominance of a presumed sameness, the universally imposed similarity in identity. The paradox is perpetuated: The commitment to tolerance turns only on modernity’s ‘natural inclination’ to tolerance; acceptance of otherness presupposes as it at once necessitates ‘delegitimation of the other.’ (1993:7, quoting Bauman, 1991:8)

In Our “natural inclination” towards tolerance and equality difference itself thus becomes a taboo. Others become either wholly other or the same wholly: Us in another form yet ‘not quite.’

Accordingly, Witenberg invokes the notion of “racial tolerance” (2000:7), which aims to reflect on the “appropriate moral limits to tolerance” (2000:8). She writes “Without reflective thinking and deliberation, toleration can become an unquestioning acceptance of practices that should be disapproved” (2000:8).

To conclude, RT means, a) already seeing the other as morally wrong in some significant way, b) imagining Ourselves as morally superior and having the power to see beyond these wrongs, and c) imagining the other as lacking the moral agency to change her wrongdoing, now considered fixed, and hence paternally putting this wrong aside and enduring it, but not putting it away. Our ‘gift’ of charitable endurance, however, is conditional and temporary, limited to Our needs and interests. Such a power imbalance can be summarised as the distribution of some moral capital (regardless of how small), albeit under unequal terms (regardless of how bad).

Reducing others to an unchanging essence; weighing them positively only as far as they serve Our position of power; and painting such pseudo-sameness as equality—this, I claim—makes part of the British Eurocentric gaze towards the Palestinian-Arab when seen

in tandem with the Israeli-Jew. The findings below are replete with such power plays of paternal indiscrimination and endurance.

4.6.4 RT as denial by narcissism and swallowed boundaries

[T]he Orient and the Oriental, Arab, Islamic, Indian, Chinese, or whatever, become repetitious pseudo incarnations of some great original (Christ, Europe, the West) they were supposed to have been imitating. Only the source of these rather narcissistic Western ideas about the Orient changed in time, not their character (Said, 1978:62)

As in Said's quote above, another component of RT refers to a narcissistic idealisation of the Other into a formal humanity moulded after Us as some "great original." Accordingly, unrealisable ideals are projected unto the Arab as a displaced love-object reflecting back to the Eurocentric mindset its own inflated self-image. Such idealisations and projections also resonate with Kahane's (2010) anaemic solidarity as an indulgent, self-centred intimacy.

Key to RT's narcissism is the failure to distinguish and separate oneself from the external world; in contrast with RD's logic of separation. The gaze of post-colonial Britain towards Palestine, its former colony, or the gaze of the New Jerusalem (William Blake) towards the 'old' Jerusalem (along the lines of the New and Old Testaments), could be said to reflect a historic narcissism where 'its always about Us.' As Parfitt puts it, the invented identities attached to Moors, Muslims and Jews over the years often took the shape of the "idealization" of the "*known other*" (italics in original) which "contained reflections of the fine qualities of the colonist" (2005:67). In these constructions, continues Parfitt, "alterity merges with introspection" (2005:67). In other words, looking at Them We see Our own "fine qualities" and idealised reflections.

Figure 15: Narcissus, painted by Caravaggio (1594-96)



In Freud's (1914/2001) psychoanalysis, narcissism reflects the pursuit of oneself as one's love-object. Repetitively seeking this same love-object, such pursuit is often a search for an ideal self, and it is this projected idealness which gives it its Narcissistic stamp. For example, Freud comments on a cartoon headed "His majesty, the baby," showing a policeman holding up the traffic for a woman pushing a pram. "His majesty," writes Freud, "as we all once fancied ourselves to be" (1914/2001:91). Freud continues, "Parental love, which is so moving and at bottom so childish, is nothing but the parents' narcissism born again, which, transformed into object-love, unmistakably reveals its former nature" (ibid). "The child shall fulfil those wishful dreams of the parents which they never carried out—the boy shall become a great man and a hero in his father's place, and the girl shall marry a prince as a tardy compensation for her mother," writes Freud (1914/2001:91). For Freud, the immoral ego "pressed by reality," seeks security and refuge in such narcissistic projections onto the child.

Hotchkiss (2003) identifies personal boundaries, entitlement and exploitation as key features of Narcissistic attitudes which are revealing for this work. According to Hotchkiss "Narcissists, do not recognize that they have boundaries and that others are separate and are not extensions of themselves." As Staines puts it "The narcissist tends to view the world as a mirror of himself; he has little or no interest in external events except as they throw back a reflection of himself" (1983:264). Considering herself superior and entitled, the Narcissist holds unreasonable expectations of automatic compliance (Hotchkiss, 2003) while Narcissist exploitations can include instrumentalising others for

one's own benefit (even when their subservience is assumed, not real). In the context of post-coloniality, "Subject peoples could be of immense psychic use to their conquerors as their fantasy could be compelled in a variety of ways to reflect back to the imperialist a grandiose self-image" (Simmons, 2007:1). As Simmons writes, inferiorised, yet 'useful' and required in their presence, colonial subjects mirror back an imperialist mindset as being on the "glamorous, heroic, and self-defining mission of a superior people" (2007:2). Such fantasy of projection and mirroring mixes desire, adventure, domination and prestige into a display of "magical superiority" (Simmons, 2007:1). Those on the path of becoming 'like Us' are projected with Our image of an idealized "pomp and brilliance" (ibid). This programme, writes Loomba, becomes one of

building a new man who would feel himself to be a citizen of the world while the very face of the world was being constructed in the mirror of the dominant culture of the West. (1991:165)

Or as Fanon puts it:

The colonialist bourgeoisie, in its narcissistic dialogue, expounded by the members of its universities, had in fact deeply implanted in the minds of the colonized intellectual that the essential qualities remain eternal in spite of all the blunders men may make: the essential qualities of the West, of course (1961:161).

Indeed, Shohat and Stam (1994), remarking on Fanon (1967), find postcolonial racism as a "double movement of aggression and narcissism" (1994:19) in which the other's abuse is coupled with the self praise. To briefly hint at the findings below, Europe-of-the-Mind thus projects on the Palestinian-Arab with its imagined high ideals of secular liberalism while disregarding Palestinians' own values and traditions. It is not that both newspapers see Palestine as an exemplar of anti-racism, human rights, post-nationalism or the international law. Rather, since when looking at them We see only ourselves, They are imagined as being as progressive over there as We fancy ourselves to be over here.

4.6.5 *The Saviour Complex and the denial of moral agency*

*Starting from unlimited freedom,
I arrived at unlimited despotism*

FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, *DEMONS* (1872/1995)

In the saviour complex the British Idea-of-Europe appears to itself, through inflated delusions of grandeur, to be indispensable for the progress of other peoples and the removal of those subverting such progress. To use Balibar, RT's saviour complex is invested in auto-referential racism, or elevating Our side (1991:39), not only in inferiorising the other.

Take the knight metaphor from the introduction of this work. The greater the contrast between evil and innocence, the greater the knight's role as a virtuous saviour, superior to both. In this interdependent system the knight's appropriates the moral clarity of the victims to do all kind of acts of violence against the 'evil' party. A not wholly passive princess or not a wholly evil dragon could solve their own issues and deny the knight the stage upon which to reaffirm his high ideals and validate their universality. Shohat and Stam put such a parable as follows:

...since the Manichean allegory does not allow for two competing evils, or for lesser and greater evils, or for minor and major thugs, but only for the good against evil, it also allows for only one legitimate outcome: the annihilation of evil in a ritual sacrifice or exorcism that "cleanses" the accumulated iniquity. (1994:129)

As discussed above, Dahlgren and Chakrapani (1982) highlight the implicational triad of a *Salvationist* West delivering naïve and malleable Third World peoples from the subversive USSR (during the Cold War). The West becomes the redeemers of the Third World, "much as they previously needed the salvation of Christianity" (1982:54). Shohat and Stam (1994), writing on the US news coverage of the 1991 Iraq war, note how "Kuwait as the damsel in distress" (1994:128) was juxtaposed with the journalists as "authentic contemporary heroes" (1994:127) who promote spectators "to indulge infantile dreams of omnipotence" (1994:129) and "phallic vigour" (1994:128). In line with RT, Kuwait itself is recognizable in the reports only through the lens of Our heroism, not as the subject of its own history.

In the case of the coverage of the conflict, repeated examples portray the-Idea-of Europe as saving the naïve Palestinian from the underhanded plots of the Israeli-Jew with no conspiracy being big enough. The analysis below of Mutua's Saviours-Victims-Savages model further highlights this saviour complex as a form of, at worst, racialised misrecognition.

4.6.6 Makau Mutua's Saviours, Victims and Savages model

Mutua's Savages, Victims and Saviours model, or SVS (2001), interrogates the "grand narrative" and "damning metaphor" (2001:201) which has marked the human rights movement in the West since the UN's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Along with this work's tri-focal examination, Mutua historically situates the SVS triad as a "three-dimensional prism" (2001:202), implicating also the third-party group doing the observation.

For Mutua, "The grand narrative of human rights contains a subtext that depicts an epochal contest pitting savages, on the one hand, against victims and saviours, on the other" (2001:201). A purely bipolar formation, such bifurcation is a "black-and-white construction which pits good against evil" (2001:202). Accordingly, the victim, is imagined as innocent and the saviour as virtuous. The moral position of the former is transposed to the latter; the victim is 'good,' but too weak to act by herself, and the saviour only uses her power to do 'good.' To use Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum's notion of the Semantic Differential (1957), the victim as *weak, positive and passive* is assimilated or swallowed into the worldview of the *powerful, positive and active* saviour group. At the same time, the aggressor, seen as *powerful, negative and active*, is removed. For Mutua, such paternal 'saving' reinforces the saviour's self-image as a superior Eurocentric prototype, resulting "in an "othering" process that imagines the creation of inferior clones, in effect dumb copies of the original" (2001:205). Hence, echoing RT and RD, the SVS model produces a double Othering. On the one hand, the "Savage cultures and peoples are seen as lying outside the human rights orbit" (2001:205). On the other hand, the European believes "in the necessity of an imperial mission to civilize the other and to convert other societies into inferior versions of the same" (2001:212, quoting Slater, 1994:100). As the human rights corpus has its "theoretical underpinnings in Western

colonial attitudes,” it is “rooted in a deep-seated sense of European and Western global predestination” (2001:212). The victim is chosen and constructed according to the criteria which solidify the saviour’s superiority within a fixed and predetermined global hierarchy of worth. Such binary logic posits the superior, civilized and modern Westerner saviour in opposition to an inferior, barbaric and traditional Global South.

Adopting a “good against evil” construct (2001:202), the saviour complex thus appears to be “within the historical continuum of the Eurocentric colonial project” (2001:204) and civilizing mission. Along with a black-and-white totalizing missionary zealotry (2001:207), the movement appears to require that “all human societies transform themselves to fit a particular blueprint (2001:207) of the good society which is a “gift of civilization from the West” (2001:208). For Mutua, the SVS metaphor is “in fact necessary for the continuation of the global racial hierarchy” (2001:207).

The following account is a further detailed description of the model. Human rights bodies, e.g., the UN or INGOs, such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch (or the *Guardian* and the *Independent*, who endorse human rights), sit in the capitals of the world’s most powerful countries, from where they investigate, advocate and sanction actors, states and cultures in the global South. “In the human rights narrative,” writes Mutua (2001:207), “savages and victims are generally non-white and non-Western, and the saviours are white.” Human rights issues, Mutua adds, are generally believed to afflict “people “over there” and not people “like us”” (2001:232). At its heart “the SVS metaphor is premised on the transformation by Western cultures of non-Western cultures into a Eurocentric prototype” (2001:205). For Mutua, the problem does not lie with a particular organisation, text or event, nor does it lie with the inclination to help remote others worldwide. Indeed, Mutua recounts the various black liberation struggles which included white participants (2001:218-219). Rather, Mutua’s contention is with the familiar configuration of the European human rights corpus as located within Europe’s colonial history, not as a divergence from it. Accordingly, within this corpus, non-European cultures are stigmatized, while Europe’s own privileged position of power is naturalized. The “colonial administrator, the Bible-Wielding Christian missionary, the merchant of free enterprise, the exporter of political democracy, and now the human rights zealot” (2001:218), writes Mutua, thus all find the native’s ““bad” culture” in need of confirming to the European ““good” culture” (2001:203). Here, historically, untold

atrocities, such as slavery and colonialism, were redeemed against the high ideals of ““defending” and “civilizing” “lower,” “unfortunate,” and “inferior” peoples” (2001:208). Mutua notes how the human rights movement “originated in Europe to curb European savageries, such as the Holocaust” or the “abuses of Soviet bloc Communism” (2001:212), and yet:

Neither the enslavement of Africans, with its barbaric consequences and genocidal dimensions, nor the classic colonization of Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans by Europeans, with its bone-chilling atrocities, were sufficient to move the West to create the human rights movement.⁵⁹

Looking briefly into the UN Charter, Mutua laments how “the dignity and worth of the human person,” as he quotes from the charter, were presented as equal in “the streets of Nairobi, the slums of Boston, the deserts of Iraq, or the rainforests of Brazil,” even when the Charter “ratified power imbalances between the Third World and the dominant American and European powers” (2001:206).⁶⁰

The “savage”

In the European human rights movement, writes Mutua, the savage is almost always the Third World state, as “the quintessential cultural vision savage” (2001:225). However, such a state is stigmatized as the “mere proxy” (2001:220) for that society’s culture in general (2001:220). Hence, the savage, the actual human rights offender, is the culture, identity, norms and traditions which make the society in question. “Chastening of the state,” or replacing its evil culture with the “universal” culture of human rights, writes Mutua, “is therefore a cultural project” (2001:221). Part of the grand narrative of the human rights corpus is to expose (2001:220) and to sanction the pariah state which is “out-of-step with the rest of the civilized world” (2001:224-5).

In line with RD, Israel is thus the “savage” in both newspapers not simply due to its actions but because of to the very fabric of its society. In this discourse, the offender’s

⁵⁹ Resonating with section 6.4, Mutua writes “no one should miss the irony of brutalizing colonial powers pushing for the Nuremberg trials and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (2001:211).

⁶⁰ See for example the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

abuses are sadistic, barbaric, bloodthirsty and committed “against liberal values” themselves (2001:224). Following Western stereotypes of barbaric Others, Western advocacy, more than often, “evoked images of machete-wielding natives only too eager to inflict pain...” (2001:226). Correspondingly, Christian-European stereotypes of Jews as poisonous, stiff-necked people also find Them to be an affront to Our sacred values. These images, however, do not include machete wielding, but shadowy murders of children, mechanical bombings and racial chosenness and superiority.

As an example, the article headlined ““An affront to civilisation”” (Observer, 13 May 2001) reduces “civilisation” to the singular—Our “civilisation”—and with Their affronts posit Us as civilisation’s standard-bearers. Hence, first Israel is imagined as typifying the worst of European imperialism, for example: “a nineteenth century imperial power” fighting a “ruthless colonial war” by “mowing down ‘the natives’” with a modern equivalent of the “Maxim Gun” for its “unrestrained greed” for land grabbing (ibid). Only then to find Their ‘archaic’ values as unnatural and unpalatable to Ours, as in the article’s ending:

I very much doubt if there is, even in the murkiest annals of nineteenth-century colonialism, a remotely comparable instance of imperial arrogance and contemptuous regard for the rights of subject people. (ibid)

This blatant disregard for the millions of lives destroyed by the British Empire (say, in North America, Africa, China or Australia) is matched by the anaemic and self-serving regard for the Palestinian cause. Returning to Mutua, the article explores a few examples, including female circumcision (or FGM) and national democratization projects abroad as campaigns “which have relied heavily on demonization” and “have picked up where European colonial missionaries left off” (2001:226). Still, the example of FGM is also indicative of the interchangeability of the victim with the “savage” society from whence the practice emerges. For example, Engle (1992) identifies such forms of exoticisation in her study of human rights advocacy by women from the Global North towards the Global South. Haynes (2006), commenting on this study, finds that fault is moved to either the

woman who supports or perpetuates FGM, or one who is subjected to it. She can be both victim or victimizer, but what renders her Other is that “we” perceive her to hold a different world view because she (most likely) comes from a different culture. (2006:16)

This prejudice against the culture of the remote “savage” fails to engage with either the women who suffer from, or perpetuate, FGM. As long as the malicious culture does not conform to Western standards, victims appear merely as prospective offenders, even if implicitly.

The victim

The victim, writes Mutua, is the “engine which runs the human rights movement” without which “there is no savage or savior” (2001:227). In the Western human rights movement, the victim is imagined as non-white (2001:230), sympathetic, pitiful (2001:229) and innocent (2001:230). However, she is also powerless, passive, lazy and dependent (2001:232).⁶¹ Through such consistent semiotic depictions victims appear as “hordes,” “nameless” “masses” (Mutua, 2001:229) and in need of outside intervention (2001:229). The Other to Europe is then part of the “colonial texture” (2001:231) and Eurocentric “missionary zeal to help those who cannot help themselves” (2001:232).

The saviour

For Mutua, the saviour complex, which is at the heart of the human rights movement in the Global North, intertwines between “Eurocentric universalism and Christianity’s missionary zeal” (2001:371). Promoting the European mission and “eternal truths” (2001:234) in Africa, Asia, the Americas or the Pacific, has occurred on a “historical continuum” over the last five centuries. These formational events include proselytizing thinking in Christianity itself, the Crusades, the inquisition, and the civilizing mission at the heart of European colonialism and imperialism. Through such “impulses to conquer, colonise, save, exploit and civilize non-European peoples” (2001:235), the “primitive” is conquered and delivered into “civilisation” (2001:234).

Another characteristic of the saviour complex is that of moral certainty, or of seeing “good” and “evil” as “separated as night and day” (2001:240). Routinely purging or

⁶¹ Moreover, those imagined as lazy, primitive and rapacious but natal on their own land are re-articulated as violent, dirty and profiteering immigrants once they appear on Our lands.

“[R]ooting out evil” (2001:241) takes place outside of Western countries because of the inherent assumption of the West’s moral neutrality and the guaranteed aspiration to fully observe the human rights of others (2001:240, quoting Justice Higgins of the International Court of Justice). INGOs and human rights groups thus rarely see themselves as the subject of critique, assuming that there is a “universal consensus that they are the “good guy”” (2001:241). So, despite the repetitive failures of the United Nations in places such as Rwanda, Darfur or the former Yugoslavia, the UN is still seen in the West as the “grand “neutral” savior” (2001:238). Indeed, founded on a Western-European domination (through the veto power of the five Great Powers, of which four are European, being: France, Britain, the US and Russia. See Kennedy, 2006), “the ratification of international law instruments” means very little to Third World states (2001:236).

Hence, in the SVS’ exaggerated mindset the Saviour is imagined through the prism of her moral aspirations as an agent of global progress, *not* her actual history and past record.

Cohen’s seminal work *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* (1972/2011: xvi) also remarks on a similar “triangle,” which he applies to national crime news reporting. For Cohen, the bipolarisation (1972/2011:74) of demonology and hagiology⁶² (1972/2011:41) constructs a triangle between, a) the innocent victim as “saint” (1972/2011: 11), b) the “folk devil” evil perpetrator who is isolated from the rest of the community (1972/2011:41) and c) the bystander, passive ‘common folk’ (to use van Dijk, 1993:271).

Through the dramatic confrontation between these rhetorical maxims, publicised by the media in the role of moral entrepreneurs (1972/2011:10), such news reports materialise into a

main source of information about the normative contours of a society. It informs us about right and wrong, about the boundaries beyond which one should not venture and about the shapes that the devil can assume. (Cohen, 1972/2011:11)

As in the SVS model, the unification of opposites in demonology and hagiology, RT and RD, positions Us as in the virtuous agency fighting to keep the balance between both.

⁶² Hagiography being the writing on the lives of saints as well as a mark of scorn and mock-reverence (see Head, 2000:xiv).

4.6.7 Mamdani's humanising as a depoliticised discourse

Another study which supports the theorization of RT is Mamdani's book *Saviors and Survivors* (2009). Resonating with the notion of Turning History into Nature, Mamdani's remarks on "Writing race into history" (2009:75) in his discussion of Western attitudes towards the crises in Darfur and Rwanda. For Mamdani, the mobilisation around the Darfur crisis was based on a de-politicised and de-historicised Eurocentric worldview. This tendency reduced the conflict into a universal, "eternal clash" (2009:66) between "untainted victims and simply evil perpetrators" (ibid): between "blacks" and "Arabs." Referring to the Save Darfur campaign, Mamdani notes how Americans were interpolated "not as citizens but as humans" (2009:60, see also Barthes' Adamism above) through a "higher calling, a human calling" (2009:60) against evil and where "the response must be moral, not political" (2009:62). The success of the campaign was thus to "thoroughly depoliticise" Darfur as an issue (2009:60). The Darfur crisis, writes Mamdani, was "an act not of responsibility but of philanthropy" (2009:62), with its victims understood only through the European paradigm of the Holocaust (2009:65) and where Arabs were "cast in the role of contemporary Nazis" (ibid).⁶³ Armed with a simplistic "moral certainty" (2009:14) and "total ignorance" (ibid) about Darfur's history, polity or ethnic divide, "This voyeuristic approach accompanies a moralistic discourse whose effect is both to obscure the politics of the violence and to position readers as virtuous, and not just concerned, observers" (2009:66).

As seen in the findings chapters, both newspapers applied exactly this concoction of simplistic moral superiority, ignorance and an air of virtuous magnanimity. Using Mamdani's "depoliticising language of humanitarian intervention" (2009:282), and a-historical and apolitical "moral certainty" (2009:6), the conflict rematerialized as between good and evil. Here, Our values such as anti-racism, anti-war, pro human rights and the international law envelope the helpless victims (regardless of elites' policies and actions) to imagine a worldwide outcry against the evil perpetrators (regardless of the victimhood of non-elites) as universally ratifying such moral standards as those ushered in by Us (regardless of Our policies and actions in similar conflicts).

⁶³ Nonetheless, Mamdani belittles the Darfur crisis, referring to as "Bashir's own little war on terror in Darfur in 2003-4?" (footnote, 2009:281).

4.6.8 *Static model 1: the external-political Other*

Europe's emergence into history took place—and could not have taken place otherwise—through the mediation of Islam: in the beginning by means of a defensive recoil, afterward by an offensive explosion. (Djait, 1985:109, quoted in Boyarin, 2009:35)

Alongside the kinship relations of the Jewish bible, the Old Testament and the New Testament, the rise of Islam in the seventh century brought new ideational differences to Europe and Christendom. As mentioned above, David Lewis credits the Battle of Poitiers (732CE) with the emergence of a European identity and even Europe in its current form today. “There was no more important battle in the history of the world,” he writes (2008:173). Lewis also points out that the neologism and meta-category of “Europenses” (2008:173), later Europeans, was coined by an Andalusian, priest Isidore Pacensis in the *Mozarabic Chronicle of 754*, to describe those Christians from the western part of the continent after the Muslim armies defeat in 732 (2008:171). The Arab world, then, through historic sprawling centres such as al-Andalus, Aleppo, Alexandria or Baghdad, bears wide-ranging historic influences on contemporary Christian-European “strength and identity,” as a “sort of surrogate and even underground self” (Said, 1978:3).

Indeed, Europa, a Phoenician princess, was beguiled and abducted by Zeus (disguised as a snow-white bull) to Crete from the shores of Phoeniciav, today's Lebanon (Davies, 2014:xviii), and the third century St. George, later the Patron Saint of England—whose cross forms the national flag—was born in Cappadocia (modern Turkey) and died and was buried in Lydda, Syria Palestina (later Palestine, and today Lod, Israel).

Another example of this ‘surrogate self’ is that, by the end of the sixteenth century, a new English vocabulary entered the language from Arabic through routes of exchanges and mutual borrowing. These came about through the contributions of the Arab world (to use Bassiouni, 2012) to astronomy, mathematics, medicine (such as Ibn Sina, known as Avicenna or Husayn bin Ishak al-Ibadi, who translated the Hippocratic oath), algebra (for example, Ibn al-Haytham), Greek translations (Ibn Rushd, also known as Averroes) or philosophy (Farabi). Words such as ‘zero,’ ‘algebra’ or ‘chemistry’—as well as ‘sugar,’ ‘lemon,’ ‘coffee,’ ‘alcohol,’ ‘amber,’ ‘indigo,’ ‘guitar’ or ‘turquoise’—reflect this historic

trade, science and artisanship coming out of such places as Anatolia, Persia, Syria or Egypt (see Brotton, 2016).

Yet in the 2000s, the Arab world was most readily associated as the enemy at the gate, a physical, military and political threat at the borders of Europe. *These* historic formative interchanges with those called over the centuries “Saracens,” “Moors,” “Mohammedans,” “Ishmaelites,” “pagans,” or “Turks” (Anidjar, 2003:33), was highlighted by military confrontations, not theological heuristics (though these, to be sure, also existed, see Kalmar, 2012). As Boyarin notes “[T]o a considerable extent, Christian Europe came into being simultaneously with the rise of the new and aggressively expansive Islam and as an overt response to that expansion” (2009:43). Whether in the conquest of the Iberian peninsula (711), the medieval crusades, the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman’s occupation of Constantinople (1453), raids by Barbary pirates (starting from the 16th century⁶⁴), the expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain (1609), or the demise of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I (to name but a few highlights)—Christian Europe and the House of Islam were separated by military and political rivalry for over a millennium.

The point here is that Europe’s identity formation drew from a myriad of divisions *and* alliances with Islam and the Orient. European Orientalist scholars of the late modern era did not simply imagine an epitome of evil but adapted multifaceted imaginers in which Their subservience to Us expressed a welter of opportunistic applications and transactions: destructive *and* cooperative. As Said writes:

My contention is that Orientalism is fundamentally a political doctrine *willed over* the Orient because the Orient was weaker than the West, which elided the Orient’s difference with its weakness. (1978:204, emphasis added)

Elsewhere Said writes

Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point Orientalism can be discussed and analysed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of

⁶⁴ For example, in his controversial book Michael Oren (2007:31) notes how fear of North Africans pirates hastened the unification and the adoption of the American Constitution in 1789. Only a consolidated nation, it was reasoned, would be able to build a fleet strong enough to defend against the Berber threat overseas. As Oren quotes Thomas Bailey “In an indirect sense, the brutal Dey of Algiers was a Founding Father of the Constitution” (2007:31-32).

it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. (1978:3)

It is this sense of *willing over* that misrecognises the Orient as We see fit so as to match Our current needs. Anidjar's *politico* enemy (2003), as a weakened Orient within Our imperial project, is both 'useful' and pliable, not just a threat. Hence, looking at the height of Islamic-English relations towards the end of the sixteenth century, Brotton remarks that such terms as "Mohammedans," "Ottomites," "Saracens" or "Moors" induced in those hearing them "horror and disgust," but also "wonder and curiosity" (2016:17). Still, the term 'Muslim' itself would not be understood by the likes of Shakespeare and his contemporaries.⁶⁵ As Brotton writes:

At virtually no point was there an attempt to understand Islam on its own theological terms; instead throughout the Tudor period a powerful set of misrepresentations, misconceptions and misunderstandings developed which defined relations between the two faiths (2016:18).

Brotton continues, "The amicable relationship that prospered briefly under Elizabeth arose not from natural amity and tolerance, but from expediency and *realpolitik*..." (2016:18). For example, Brotton (2016a) writes how Pope Pius V's excommunication of Elizabeth I on 25 February 1570 brought England to establish diplomatic, economic, cultural and political exchanges with the Islamic powers of Turkey, Persia and Morocco, then England's common enemies with Catholic Spain. These included political treaties, exchanges of ambassadors and trading in metal, sugar, timber and even armour and ammunition. For instance, Brotton notes how, with an undenied sense of irony:

With the queen's sanction, Protestant English merchants were removing metal from [Catholic] ecclesiastical buildings—including lead roofing and bell metal—and shipping it to Constantinople to arm Muslims fighting against Catholics (2016:167).

Reselling tin from Catholic churches to the Porte to be used as cannon balls against Catholic Spain is indeed an example of alliance as political convenience. Once Elizabeth I was replaced by James I in 1603, political ties with Spain were renewed and relations with the Orient were severed. Yet about sixty books were published in England around


⁶⁵ Brotton notes that the term 'Muslim' was first used in English in 1615 and 'Islam' in 1625 (2016:17).

the end of the sixteenth century relating to the Muslim world (Brotton, 2016:353). One of these publications is Shakespeare's *Othello*,⁶⁶ which indeed makes for a quintessential example of antagonism *and* political expediency, and which deserves a closer look.

Othello is thus both rejected due to his animalistic 'dark' nature, including such utterances as "thick-lips" (1.1.66), "old black ram" (1.1.88), or "Barbary horse" (1.1.110); but he is also the loyal, noble and brave (1.3.288). How, then, was this Moor general—who was said to be "an erring barbarian" (1.3.351), "light of brain" (4.1.272), blinded by "tyrannous hate" (2.3.446) and superstitious—trusted to defend Venice and marry the Duke's daughter? As further discussed below, it is this *nominal inclusion* from a position of dominance and authority which moulds and remakes the Arab-Moor as it sees fit and according to its own needs. *Othello* is doomed *from the start* to fall back to his primordial, Oriental Nature but he is also the liminal, mimicking Other who is 'invited in' to fight the Turk on behalf of Venice on the borderland of Cyprus (cartographically, on Europe's edges) (1.3.220-2). As further developed below, the point here regards a chameleonic Orientalism of a European "self-endorsing power" (Said, 1981/1997:143) which sees the Orient as neither self *nor* other but which 'wills' it as an inferior extension of itself. The montage of images below from the *Guardian* Theatre Review (*Figure 16*), depicting current day productions of *Othello*, speaks volumes for the cultural impact of the Elizabethan era on the English Eurocentric imagination today. These images also tell a tale of the limits of toleration of the 'noble' Orient, as further developed below.

⁶⁶ Brotton (2016:21) remarks that Shakespeare began writing *Othello* only a few months after the arrival of the Moroccan ambassador to London.

Figure 16: A montage of Guardian images of *Othello* productions (details, clockwise: 16 November 2004, 10 November 2004, 7 December 2009)



Nonetheless, while racialised Orientalism was not inevitable for Said, gaps in the European “system of thought” (1978:96) about the Orient made familiar social cognitions about it inescapable. Reflecting on nineteenth century Orientalism as a discipline, Said writes:

it provided the Orient with sympathetic European students, genuinely interested in such matters as Sanskrit grammar, Phoenician numismatics, and Arabic poetry. Yet—and here we must be very clear—Orientalism overrode the Orient (1978:96).

Inline with Said’s “sympathetic European students,” this research findings regarding the coverage of the conflict in the *Guardian* and *Independent* exhibit a sympathetic focus on the suffering of women and children living under an oppressive occupation and stark hardships; *not* a focus on militants (or even men). This “sympathetic” focus reflects a divergent historicity. The review below points out that from 1683, with the end of the Ottoman siege on Vienna—as well as Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt (1797) and throughout the nineteenth century—the Ottoman Empire was reimagined as the ‘sick man of Europe’

and no longer as a threat. I use Paula Fichtner's book (2008) on the Habsburg Empire's confrontation with the Islamic world (1526–1850) to reflect on such developments of *varying* and *multitudinous* Orientalist engagements.

While still widely discredited as the “barbaric,” “animalistic” (2008:14) and “dreaded enemy” (2008:12), Fichtner describes different attitudes towards the Arab, such of magnanimity (2008:71), contentment, sensibility, and even conciliation. In her historical analysis, Fichtner points to diplomatic and commercial exchanges, military treaties, official documents, musical plays, books, cultural practices and scholarship which—time and time again after 1683—“spread the habit of looking at the Ottoman empire more coolly, even generously” (2008:83). For instance, Fichtner quotes the Austrian scholar Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, from the introduction to his ten-volume *History of the Ottoman Empires* (1827-1835), noting that:

love for the honourable and the good, with loathing for the shameful and bad, without hatred for Greek or Turk, without prejudice for Muslim or Christian, with a love of legitimate (*geregelte*) power and well-ordered government, for cultivation of law and the arts of war, for institutions of public benevolence and the expansion of learning, with hatred, on the other hand, for disruptiveness and oppression, cruelty and tyranny. (2008:16)

Von Hammer-Purgstall's non-partisan distinction between the rebuke of *any* elite wrongdoing (cruelty and tyranny) and the endorsement of *any* “public benevolence”—Greek or Turk, Muslim or Christian—resonates with the conclusion of this study regarding non-segmented solidarity and criticism (or Critical Solidarity). Another example from Fichtner's book can be seen with the unique licensing of the merchant John Diadato, exclusively privileged by the Habsburg court to sell coffee and other ‘Turkish drinks’ only two years after the end of the siege (2008:92). According to one account, by 1734, Turkish vendors selling coffee were seen throughout Vienna (Fichtner, 2008:92).

What I wish to demonstrate is that it is the eventual decline of the “hereditary enemy” (Fichtner, 2008:14), including Europe's colonial occupation and domination in the Middle East and North Africa, which makes the background for what some call “soft Orientalism” (Kalmar, 2012). As Kalmar writes, the Siege of Vienna in 1683 marked the diminishing of the Ottoman Empire and an era in which “the Muslim “threat” was no longer a serious issue for Western and Central European Christians” (2005:15). The

legions of horse-mounted Arabs as the ‘enemy at the gates’ gave way to the notion of Arabs as politically weak, simpleton natives and “colonial children” (Said, 1978:245). “Soft” Orientalism thus includes not only a backdrop of terror, but also romanticism and paternalism albeit from a position of political dominance. As Fichtner writes:

The stereotype of the Turk as the bloodthirsty and barbarian Muslim conqueror in central Europe and elsewhere morphed into the less daunting image of the Turk as a trivial, ignorant and hapless fool. (2008:98)

For example, Anidjar quotes the pre-Second World War children’s rhyme below, which rehearses such themes of Arab-Muslim weakness:

C-o-f-f-e-e
C-o-f-f-e-e,
Don’t drink so much coffee!
The Turk’s drink is not for children,
It weakens the nerves and makes you pale and sick.
Don’t be a Muslim
Who can’t help it!

In another example, the following quote from Flaubert’s *Sentimental Education* (1869) points to more than just moral eccentricity or oddness. “A young [Egyptian] fellow,” Flaubert writes “had himself publicly buggered by a large monkey... to create a good opinion of himself and make people laugh” (quoted in Said, 1978:103). This reference points to an irrationality which is as inexplicable and estranged to itself as it is to the world at large. This “young fellow” both engenders fanaticism, barbarism and cruelty (Sardar, 1999:44), as well as stupidity, numbness, servility and exotic sensuality. As reviewed above, a key aspect of this easily ‘ruled over’ (Said, 1978:3) Oriental weakness is the imagined malleability of a powerless and impressionable Arab. The exotic Orient, manageable and reduced into a “definite order of types, characters and constitutions” (Turner, 1994:21), becomes comprehensible through an absolute knowledge (Said, 1978/2003: 72): fully defined, it is thus fully controlled. As Turner writes “To know is to subordinate” (1994:21).

To be sure, this analysis does not disregard the grave realities of an antagonistic ‘hard’ Orientalism (Kalmar, 2012). Two media related examples which originally shaped my thinking about anti-Arab racism are by Jack Shaheen (2001, 2003) and Linda Steet (2001). Shaheen’s project, *Reel Bad Arabs*, examines as many as 900 Hollywood-produced films covering Arab representations that spanning a century (see also Shohat and Stam, 1994). Astonishingly, only five per cent of the films reviewed include “regular” or humanising images of Arabs (2003:192). The other 95 per cent follow a regime of derogatory and pernicious stereotypes happily vilifying Arabs. Such openly Orientalist racialisations include flying carpets, turbaned snake charmers, bazaars, lecherous Harems, thievish backstabbers, torture chambers and tyrannical Pashas. In the post-World War II era the tropes of belly dancers and buffoonary gave way to depictions of Arabs as relentless bloodthirsty villains. As in RD (see below), this crooked-nosed, wild-eyed Arab is patently denied any empathy. For example, Shaheen shows that of the 28 movies depicting the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1983 and 1998, not a single film represents Palestinians as innocent victims of Israel’s oppression, and only two scenes depict Arab families as “normal folk” (2003:186-7).

Linda Steet’s examination of a century of covering Arabs in the National Geographic (1880s-1980s) reveals consistent representational practices echoing Shaheen. Steet shows how a repertoire of stereotypes and tropes regimented binary oppositions, such as Western/non-Western, white/non-white, man/women (2001:25) so as to reaffirm European civilisation and “empire building masculinity” (2001:91) and Arab subordinate primitiveness, exoticism and difference. As Steet writes, sustained by a reductive and contradictory discursive strategy, “anxiously repeated” (2001:90), Arabs were depicted as both treacherous and warlike *but* hospitable; both idle and lazy *but* extravagant and full of vitality; both cruel and predatory *but* of magical essence. These imaginations, writes Steet, “needed no validation” outside their own “circle of meaning” (2001:91).

The point here is not that those producing the National Geographic or Hollywood films nurse a rabid hatred of Arabs. Rather, that the years of imperial occupations and state crafting in the Middle East, two World Wars, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Cold War, to name but few examples, were ‘push’ factors in a collective thinking about the Muslim-

Arab as vile and inferior or, at best, ready to follow Christian-Europe and its “Occidental cultural legacies” (Poole, 2002:252). The section below expands on the notion RD.

4.7 Racialised Demonisation (RD)

*You are from your father the devil
and you choose to do your father desires.*

JOHN (8:44)

While RT reflects on anti-Arab racialisations, RD relates to anti-Jewish racialisations as found in both newspapers. Like RT, RD too forms “lived everyday experiences” (Althusser, 1971) and the “expression or activation of group power” (Essed, 1991:37). For example, much of my theorization of RD is based on Alon and Omer’s notion of psychodemonisation (2006) which deals primarily with family and interpersonal dynamics.⁶⁷ Like RT, in RD also, the Other is reduced into an essence seen as fixed and eternalised. In such essentialisations broad-brush constructions of Israeli-Jewish women, men, children or the elderly encircle Them through an irreducible Nature which is both different and inferior to Us.

However, in contrast to RT’s slippery (Bonilla-Silva, 2006:25), “subtle practices of stereotyping or discrimination” (van Dijk, 1991:249), RD is an unsubtle, ‘classic’ racialization against the outgroup. While They are “out-of-step with the rest of the civilized world” (Mutua, 2001:224-5), We are peaceful, reasonable and pleasant. Difference here is metaphysical: They are not human ‘like Us,’ but outworldly, literally not of this world. As Wistrich writes, over the past centuries Jews were marked as the “counter-type, the paradigmatic “Other” race, inassimilable by definition, inclassable, outside the natural hierarchy of races, beyond the human pale” (1999:3). So, these Others are seen as inflicted with a civilizational deficiency with elites and non-elites, adults and children, already imagined as tainted, as wholly not innocent. The victimhood of non-elite Israeli-Jews, then, is met with coolness and distance. At the same time, wrongdoing by the Israeli-Jew is seen as an affront to Our sacred values who, in turn, demand urgent

⁶⁷ Though the authors stress the applicability of psychodemonisation to international conflicts (2006:x).

defence. As below, the Israeli-Jew materialises in the population as a quintessential, *but necessary*, figure of evil, validating and reaffirming Our values in opposition. Below I expand on the theorization of RD through such conceptions as psychodemonisation, empathy erosion, Christian anti-Jewish demonisations and the ‘Jew-Nazi’ analogy.

For *Guardian* and *Independent* readers the main assertions of RD might seem implausible⁶⁸ and in need of further explanation. Why, one might ask, would the stronger, occupying force in the conflict qualify for concern relating to anti-racism? This thesis suggests highlighting the plight of non-elite people, Palestinians *and* Israelis, while holding to account elites on both sides. While the Israeli state is a nuclear super-power, much Palestinian violence during the early 2000s was directed against Israeli non-elites. The point here is *not* to strike some artificial comparison in the coverage of non-elites in the international news sections of both newspapers. As above, an ‘objective’ distribution of attention does not exist, let alone within newspapers’ sections relating to World News covering seven billion people. Rather, this section enquires into *how*, and in *what ways*, are Israeli-Jewish non-elites reproduced in the reports. For example, the made-up utterance ‘Israeli-Jews are rats, they demote human rights’ uses a familiar, racialised “logic of differentiation” (Wieviorka, 1995:xv) against an entire population. Such logic is amplified when reproduced in Britain where, until the 1960s, similar utterances against Jews were non-apologetic. In what way do Israeli-Jews appear homogenous, dangerous and a ‘problem’ for Us to solve (see Anthias, 1995:288)? What do such pronouncements imply about Us and Our place in the world as promoters of human rights? To use Davison, this section looks into how anti-Jewish racism persists as a “consistent and readily adaptable component in British identity construction” (2004:14).

To take an example from the coverage, the *Guardian*’s G2 article headed “Them and Us: How Israel thinks” (24 October 2000), already condemns *Israeli society itself* already in the first weeks of the AAI. The dehumanised soldier on the G2 cover—semi human with a sniper’s telescope for an eye—reflects the article’s lengthy explanations of regarding the “inner workings of the Israeli psyche” and the “The psychology of the Israelis.” Hence,

⁶⁸ For example, Fine (December, 2012), <https://engageonline.wordpress.com/2012/12/21/robert-fine-on-doing-the-sociology-of-antisemitism/> accessed 12 July 2015.

the subheading “How Israel thinks” is answered by: ‘they shoot to kill.’ The heading “Them and Us” is also suggestive of the schism between Our (implied higher genus) inner character as European and Christian, and Theirs (implied bounded genus) as Israeli and Jewish. Where They are bent on particularistic nationalist-religious dogmas, We sanctify universal rights. In line with RT and RD, the article summarises the ‘deep psyche’ of Israeli-Jews through an equally Orientalist view of the ‘deep psyche’ of Palestinian-Arabs. It reads:

“Deep in the Jewish psyche is the legacy of cutting your losses, moving on, reinventing yourself in order to survive. Deep in the Arab psyche is the attachment to the land, to patience and endurance.” (24 October 2000)

Figure 17: “Them and Us: How Israel thinks” (*Guardian*, 24 October 2000)



Indeed, applying such shorthand ‘population thinking’ to ‘Those people’, as in “How Israel thinks,” also implicates a binary logic relating to ‘how Palestine thinks;’ those other Others. Another magazine-like *Guardian* article, by Linda Grant, that is worth mentioning is titled “Jews behaving badly; Ariel Sharon and the Jewish fascination with gangsters” (6 July 2002). As above, Jews old and new, “from Samson to Ariel Sharon” (as the subheading reads), appear motivated by an already known Nature and sets of

““classical” principles” (Said, 1978:261). As Young quotes Ernest Renan, “a race lives through its past” (1995:79). More references to “Jewish psychology,” under the page 2 headline “Defenders of the faith,” include Sharon, Samson, the Stern Gang and Golem. Indeed, the article’s *opening epigram*, quoting Isaac Babel, refers to this ‘deep psychology’ of violence among Jews, it reads: “Tartakovsky has the soul of a murderer, but he is one of us.”

Figure 18: “Jews behaving badly” (Guardian, 6 July 2002)



Figure 19: “Samson... the defender of the jews” (ibid)



4.7.1 The Gilad Atzmon affair

Never be rude to an Arab, an Israeli, a Saudi or a Jew
Never be rude to an Irish man, no matter what you do
Never poke fun at a Nigger, a spik, a woop or a craut
And never p... [big explosion followed by a green monster]

“NEVER BE RUDE TO AN ARAB,” MONTY PYTHON (1980)

Given that many find the theorisation of RD to be contentious, the following introductory example fleshes out perhaps the most openly anti-Semitic appearance with which I am familiar with in both newspapers. The article, written by Gilad Atzmon (*Commentisfree*, 12 December 2006)⁶⁹ follows two *Letters to the Editor* by Atzmon which were published in the print edition (*Observer*, 24 April 2005 and *Guardian* 12 May 2005). What makes this article unique is that, when probed, the *Guardian* stood by its content, stating “The Gilad Atzmon article was published after careful consideration by the Editor of *Commentisfree* at the time.”⁷⁰ However, in the finding chapters I will show that Atzmon’s references are not isolated appearances in both newspapers. For example, an editorial titled “Tell the truth about Israel” (Jemima Khan, *Guardian*, 1 November 2000) claims that Al Gore “has built his career on support from the Jewish lobby” and that “The media are largely controlled by the Jews, as is Hollywood and they account for more than half the top policy-making jobs in the Clinton administration” (see below).

Some of Atzmon’s claims in the *Guardian* thus include “American Jews (in fact Zionists) do control the world”; that “Unlike Nazism that belongs to the past, Zionism’s wickedness is a crime which is still unfolding and worsening”; that “American Jewry makes any debate on whether the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” are an authentic document or rather a forgery irrelevant”; that Zionists “maintain that the Jesus-killer libel is alive and well” so “the Jewish people may be doomed forever to view favourably the idea of a Jewish national shelter”; that “The current Israeli brutality [in the 2006 Lebanon war] is nothing but evilness for the sake of evilness”; that “Anti-semitism (rather than anti-Israel political reaction) exists solely in the Zionist’s mind” and, finally, since “anti-semitism

⁶⁹<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/dec/12/giladatmonrespondstodavid>

⁷⁰ Email correspondence with Matt Seaton (*Guardian* sub-editor) and Georgina Henry (*Guardian* Readers’ Editor) (17 January 2008).

has been replaced by political reaction,” attacks on synagogues, which are “in no way legitimate, should be seen as political responses rather than racially motivated acts or “irrational” hate crimes.” Indeed, Atzmon further clarifies his views about whether it “is right or not to burn down a synagogue” in a *Guardian* Letter to the Editor, print edition. Saying that he does not justify violence, Atzmon writes that “since Israel presents itself as the ‘state of the Jewish people’... *any* form of anti-Jewish activity may be seen as political retaliation” (24 April 2005, emphasis added). This exchange, explains Atzmon, took place at SOAS, where he debated “the question of rationality of anti-semitism” (*Guardian*, 24 April 2005).

But why does the *Guardian* insist on voicing Atzmon’s arson claims, knowing that synagogues double as community centres with nurseries and elderly clubs? Is considering something to be a “rational” “political retaliation” not lending it some justification? What are the implications of these claims for *Guardian* reports relating to attacks on mosques and churches in, say, in Iraq or Egypt (‘rational sectarian violence’? ‘Rational anti-Christianity’?) Hence, Atzmon’s article defines *any* such attacks on synagogues as *not* racially motivated hate crimes *a priori*; past, present or future, and on the basis of the religious denomination of the victims, not the nature of the act. As in the Monty Python segment above, the article mocks Jewish concerns about anti-Jewish racism. Using dysphemic discourse against civil boundaries and “covert prestige” (Mooney and Evans, 2015), We appear to ourselves as the radical vanguard which resists the standard language which only appeases Zionists’ control.

Still, the *Guardian*’s determination to publish the article also invokes RT. For example, the head of a large Palestinian campaigning organisation in London told the author that he had stopped engaging with Atzmon due to his use of anti-Semitism. Moreover, the article models the motivation of such imagined attacks *on its own* “rationality of anti-semitism,” with Israel’s impoverished human rights record in mind. Yet possible attackers may be motivated by a different “rationality,” e.g., religious racism (‘God dislikes Jews’), racial supremacy (‘Jews are impure’) or extremist ideologies (say, the Taliban’s). Again, the Other is imagined as one’s self; ‘attackers would only use My rationale, whose else?’ At the same time, the *Guardian*’s imagined role as heroic cloaks an anaemic solidarity which is indifferent towards the subject of its own advocacy. For

instance, attacks on West Bank mosques by Jewish extremists, often involving arson and improvised firebombs,⁷¹ go largely unreported in the *Guardian*.⁷² Still, a *Guardian* mock debate on *fictional* acts of arson (or whether Zionist-Jews “control the world”) is deemed newsworthy. As discussed below, demonization is both a degenerative mode of recognition *and* criticism.

Atzmon’s articles then demonstrate RD’s repertoire of emotions, including anxiety, rage and disgust. Atzmon’s views are extreme, but they nonetheless are echoed, albeit more subtly, in both newspapers. The following article was written by the *Guardian*’s former chief editor, Alan Rusbridger (1995-2015), a public figure as far from Atzmon as possible. Rusbridger wrote this long article (21 May 2001) after an assessment visit to the OPT and Israel. He writes:

We are forced to confront some uncomfortable truths about how the dream of a sanctuary for the Jewish people in the very land in which their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped has come to be poisoned.

Linking the Jewish “spiritual, religious and political identity” to a societal sickness (‘poisoning’) affecting Israeli-Jews as a collective, is not accidental to the article but central to it. Titled “Between Heaven and Hell,” the article uses religious markers to classify Israel as “[H]ell.” In this logic goes, the “poisoned” Israelis are separated from other ‘healthy’ nations and the “international community” due to their malevolence. In turn, and due to Israel’s “high cost in human rights,” this nobler “community” is invited to rule on whether it is possible to “support this cost indefinitely”—immediately affirming—that such a cost is “harder and harder to justify.” The reader is then interpolated as part of a “virtuous” community (Mamdani, 2009) and as an all-knowing supreme judge ruling over a remote “poisoned” people with which they share a long, embittered history. Consider the article’s ending: “Israel has accumulated massive power over the past two generations: it is not clear that it yet knows how to use it humanely”: i.e., “humanely” like Us. Indeed, the “high cost in human rights,” due to

⁷¹ E.g., a Washington Post report (19 June 2012) covering the period between December 2010 and June 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/jewish-extremists-suspected-in-arson-attack-on-west-bank-mosque/2012/06/19/gJQAIza3nV_story.html

⁷² Perhaps this is due to the protests against inside Israel when and if such crimes are reported. Such opposing voices spoil the ethnocentric broth since they indicate that some Israeli-Jews can detect such wrongs for themselves, thus diminishing Our role as bearers of a moral standard for others.

British troops' past involvements, did not mean that British society was "poisoned" or that its collective identity had to be justified by others.

A few years after this article was published, I heard Rusbridger apologise in person for a "misjudged" *Guardian* article which stated that "Israel's actions in Jenin were every bit as repellent as Osama bin Laden's attack on New York on September 11" (lead editorial, 17 April 2002. Jewish Book Week, 2 March 2008). In this utterance, the Israeli-Jew appears as a cosmic threat, lethal to Us in the West—just as the 9/11 attacks were—not only to Palestinians. Similarly, two weeks into the AAI, the first sentence of a *Guardian* lead opinion article reads "If Palestinians were black, Israel would now be a pariah state subject to economic sanctions led by the United States" (15 October 2000). With the Israeli Pariah encircled, Britain appears as if standing firm with the international community to defend against this pathology. As in RT, the article naturalizes Britain and the West as disinterested saviours rushing to uphold their noble ideals worldwide. However, as shown in *chart 5* below, a keyword analysis relating to some conflicts involving black people found *significantly fewer* appearances between 2000 and 2010 *put together* than did the keyword "Israel" alone (these are "Darfur," "Congo," "Eritrea," "Mali," "Sierra Leone," "Central African Republic," "Nigeria," "Ivory coast," "Burundi," "Uganda," and "West Papua").⁷³ Rather than highlighting the *Guardian's* commitment to anti-black racism, the article merely exposes its failings. In one striking case, the *Guardian's* first report on mass killings in Darfur appeared in a fifty-word article on 20 March 2004, about a year after the crisis started (see *Figure 20*).⁷⁴ Despite comparing Darfur to the genocide in Rwanda, the "In brief" article appeared next to another fifty-word report headed "Man marries his grandma."⁷⁵

⁷³ 31,532 appearances versus 23,438. See also Owen Jones' articles in the *Guardian* (6 Mar 2015) and *Independent* (21 April 2013) lambasting, what he calls, a "manifestation of prejudice" (ibid).

⁷⁴ An earlier *Guardian* article (30 January 2004) focuses only on refugees, while calling the roughly ten months-long crisis an "unexpected new war."

⁷⁵ As Paul Kennedy writes, "Little outside attention was paid to those atrocities [the Darfur genocide] because the Western media was not focused upon them..." (2006:199).

Figure 20: First Guardian report devoted to large-scale atrocities in Darfur (20 March 2004)



The point here is *not* that the *Guardian* was shielding the Khartoum government and the Janjaweed during 2003, nor that it worked to trivialise their victims. Rather, Sudanese non-elites lacked the journalistic anchor which could interweave their stories into a positive ontological view of Ourselves and Our world—an anchor common to the Arab and Jew.

Incidentally, on 10 May 2001, while Rusbridger was in Israel,⁷⁶ two 14 years-old Israeli boys were tied up in a cave and stoned to death by Palestinian militants. In line with RD, both newspapers' headlines omit both the victims and the agency behind the stoning while placing the Israeli-Jew in the negative and agentic position. The *Guardian*'s headline reads "Israel vows revenge after boys are stoned to death" and the *Independent*'s headline reads "Israel in uproar at murders of biblical savagery." In the *Independent*, over and above the omission of both the victims' and aggressors's identities, the murders are presented as an internal Israeli affair, with "biblical" implying 'Jewish.' As further

⁷⁶ See Tom Gross, who accompanied Rusbridger to Israel: <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-gross110101.shtml>, accessed 24 December 2007.

examined below, the erosion of empathy is a key feature of RD, even when children are stoned to death.⁷⁷

Another indication of the relevance of examining anti-Jewish issues in the coverage is the last dispatches from *Guardian* Jerusalem correspondents, for example Suzanne Goldenberg (12 August 2002). Goldenberg ends her article writing:

“...the man at the end of the table chimed in: “Erasure,” he said, inspired by talk of an Arnold Schwarzenegger movie. “That’s what Israel needs to do”... “imagine if you could erase them all, starting from Jerusalem, Tulkarm and Ramallah.”

Elsewhere the article states that Israelis see Arabs as “animals, savage beasts,” and that “we [Israelis] have to eliminate them.” Hence, for Goldenberg, and in these reports in general, Israeli chauvinism is not anecdotal but is an indicator of a generalised civilizational gap: while They are hateful and exterminators (like Nazis), We stand for peace and anti-racism. As Goldenberg explains “Such certainties [regarding race thinking] do not exist *any more* in western countries” (emphasis added). Goldenberg continues by comparing a recent photograph of an Israeli soldier to a photo of

British souvenir hunters [from] more than 150 years ago, after the crushing of a rebellion by Indian soldiers against the East India Company in a whirlwind of massacres and sieges in 1858.

Yet Goldenberg’s repression of the scale of the 1857-9 rebellion (*not* 1858⁷⁸) or, more generally, the 150 years-long trials of Colonial India (e.g., Tharoor, 2016), make for an uneasy comparison. Applying a Freudian projection, Our unexamined, undesired emotions re-materialise in another. ‘What we got wrong 150 years ago but now get right, They still get wrong today,’ this logic goes.

⁷⁷ Few days later, another *Guardian* headline “Abraham’s sons still feud,” appeared along with the subheading “The land of Palestine as ever is locked in Biblical conflict” (13 May 2001).

⁷⁸ See Chakravarty (2004). The *Guardian* itself estimated the number of Indian casualties as exceeding 100,000.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/24/india.randeepamesh>, (accessed 15 May 2016)

4.7.2 *The demon as out-worldly*

The foremost characteristic of the demon is that of an out-worldly being, an “embodiment of the negative principle” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1987:168) who opposes Us and the world for which We strive. To use Freud’s concept of psychological projection, the other is projected and ascribed with one’s own rejected and unacceptable attributes as to appear separated and wholly different to Us (e.g., Maner et al., 2005). A key text for this theorization is Alon and Omer’s book *The Psychology of Demonization* (2006), written by two practicing family psychologists and looking at the notion of psychodemonization in everyday relationships in the West. For the authors, in the psychodemonic mindset others are regarded as unnatural or non-worldly beings (literally, not of this world), who do not share Our common humanity and who define Us, the ingroup, through negativity: for whatever beliefs We stand for, They stand for the opposite (Alon and Omer, 2006:16).

Alon and Omer introduce the notion of the “psycodemonic view” (2006:15) with the following true story from Alon’s trek in the Himalayas. Sustaining setbacks, the author had to return with a local guide to retrieve heavy equipment over icy, narrow paths towering over tall cliffs. Despite the guide’s vital help to the group up to then, suspicions arose quickly. “Your friend [the guide] may be a saint. But he knows a lot of money is hidden on your body... A little shove into an abyss and he’ll have enough money for himself and his family for the rest of his life” (2006:1), said one friend. So, for two days the author was moving between seeing the guide either as a friend or as a potential murderer. When the guide got drunk one night, the author suspected it was just a trick to get *him* drunk to make him an easier target. When the guide asked to walk at the back, the author suspected he wanted to push him off the cliff. Rapidly, even dull conversations seem to be filled with suspicion and doubt. For example, an apple offered to the author sparked doubts: “is it a gift of generosity or a way to blunt my alertness?” (2006:2-3). In such mental attitudes of suspicion, fear and antagonism, write the authors, even flimsy inklings are scrutinised to uncover hidden motives while, in contrast, calm appearances become something to be alert about and aware of (2006:3). Crucially, a “symmetrical negative process” occurs (ibid). While doubt and suspicion are cast in, trust and openness disappear (ibid). “Thinking,” continue the authors, “is impoverished and action rigidified” (ibid).

This example highlights how a demonizing mindset can thrive even due to slim suspicions. The authors base their observations on Christian demonology, starting with the Inquisition's *Malleus Maleficarum* (*The Witch's Hammer*), with the view that demonization is a set attribute in Western thought in general (2006:35-36, and p. 136).

Hence, in the psychodemonic process, all suffering appears to result from a nefarious "evil principal," which materialises on earth through various agents, such as demons, witches or heretics. With its ability to 'contaminate' a person and take over her body, the demon uses the human form as a deceitful, underhanded disguise from which it conspires in its wickedness to sow total destruction. To avoid the total destruction of Our way of life, this "hidden negative essence" (2006:3) must be unmasked, uprooted and destroyed. Hence, an uncompromising fight against the demon and its manifestations becomes the highest moral decree, with the pursuit of the good synonymous with a *redemptive* elimination of the evil incarnations on earth. In turn, exposing and uprooting such evil ushers in a redeemed era of purity and a "lost paradise" (2006:14). At the same time, the zeal of the faithful to uncover the underhanded demonic forces is matched by the fervour of these dark forces to trick and subvert gullible minds from the path of salvation (2006:26).

Below are some of Alon and Omer's characteristics of the psychodemonic "polarizing logic" (2006:15). These are:

a) All suffering comes from the principle of metaphysical evil. Other causes for suffering, such as chance or circumstances, are quickly rejected as implausible. Seen as fully intentional, the evil wrongdoing appears as measurable to the suffering at hand, as if in a closed system of proportionality. In such a "law of conservation of evil" (2006:15), evil too is conserved: today's victim will be tomorrow's aggressor by a "matching quantum of trauma" (2006:16). For example, Israeli-Jews do to Palestinians what the Nazis did to them, with Palestinians' suffering measuring equally to the Jewish suffering which preceded it; no drop of evil was lost in the exchange from one evil to another (see section 6.3). At the same time, any other factors relevant to Palestinian suffering are considered insignificant if not as a dangerous distraction.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Inline with RT, Palestinians too, at some future point, could administer to others the same evil that was,

b) Psychodemonisation means seeing others as “unnatural and evil creatures that constantly conspire to destroy you” (2006:16). The demonic forces can be both external and internal, like destructive weeds, rats or the hidden hand of a puppet-master which causes Us not to achieve Our ideal selves.

c) Similarly to the biblical story of the expulsion from the Garden of Eden, innocence is imagined as a basic human condition. Redemption, then, consists of restoring a lost state of purity and bliss by “purging the evil that has entered the soul” (2006:18). Through this circular narrative of history as “sin and redemption” (Gray, 2007:187), a millenarian utopian lost golden age can be restored, as Alon and Omer write:

The demonic view consists of the belief that evil forces are responsible for human suffering, and that an all-out fight against them is the only way to save humankind. Victory over the forces of evil signifies far more than a local victory over suffering; it restores the lost innocence of society and the individual, thus leading to salvation. The demonic view involves the belief in total innocence and purity. The fight against evil actually aims at the recovery of the lost paradise. (2006:14)

In the context of the conflict, Europe-of-the-Mind idealizes the Palestinian-Arab as the unknowing Noble Savage: as indigenes living primitively on the land devoid of divisions of polity, gender, class or race (or as embodying the British Idea-of-Europe own unrealisable ideals. As Baumann puts by “what got twisted in us [still] remains straight in them,” 2005:20). Then, this Eurocentric mindset imagines itself as enrolling to stop the Israeli-Jew from subverting this natal innocence and, by doing so, ushering in a nostalgic state of pre-consciousness, unlimited rights, harmony and a return to Nature.

d) The fourth characteristics of psychodemonisation is the relentless need to expose and unmask the demon. Here, evil is seen as deep-rooted and hidden, with that which does not ‘lie deep’ or ‘underneath the surface’ being discarded as ‘superficial’ or as of no real significance. Evil, it seems, must be exposed and extracted from the bottom up, never the other way (Alon and Omer, 2006:20). In fact, the evil forces can also be hidden from their own ‘host’ which further renders it futile to simply deal with apparently superficial conscious thoughts or symptoms (ibid).⁸⁰ The primary emotion here is of endemic

in turn, administered to them and the Israeli-Jews before them.

⁸⁰ E.g., the nineteenth century forgery of the Elders of Zion warns against the Jew’s “hidden hand,” pulling

suspicion so to expose what is ‘really’⁸¹ taking place beyond the deceptive disguises and surface appearances.

So, in RD, the ‘real’ cause of the conflict is the hidden root of all wrongdoing: the *Nature* of the Israeli-Jew. Here, Biblical occupations; greed for lands; historic Nazi persecution and the Jews’ supremacist exceptionalism (chosenness) are what leads ‘the Israeli-Jews’ to wage wars of extermination on (what They see as) Their racially inferior, non-Jewish neighbours. In contrast to these ‘real’ factors, ‘*superficial*’ and merely ‘symptomatic’ factors of the conflict (affecting both Palestine and Israel) may include: failed leaderships, *internal* divisions, militarism, chauvinism, economic factors, recruited media, education and religious authorities, big powers interventions (US, Russia, the Arab states, or imperial politics before 1948), the lack of political reforms, corruption, and high political dividends from violence alongside low political dividends from peace. Hence, it is *not* that anti-Arab racism among Israeli-Jews, or Israeli land grabbing, are not factors in the conflict. Rather, readers continually have their attention directed away from that which is deemed ‘superficial’ so as not to weaken their resolve to altogether ‘eliminate’ the ‘real’ causes and thus marshal in a golden age of rights and liberalism.

e) While the demonic forces are undetected beneath the surface, specialists apply specialised knowledge to pursue and unmask the demon’s disguises. These specialists, akin to specialist inquisitors centuries ago, see through the false disguises and detect the ‘real’ reality underneath (Alon and Omer, 2006). “In the psychodemonic world, nothing is what it seems,” the authors write (2006:39). Through these so-called experts, “The hypothesized negative underlying reality” invalidates any other views or perceived events (2006:39). “The mind comes to rest when it succeeds in establishing that what is present at the end was already present at the beginning” (Alon and Omer, 2006:16). Foreign correspondents are thus trusted to unveil and expose such immanent ontological threats to Our world. What is at stake are the perceived threats to Our ways and values, *not* threats of violence per-se, say in Darfur or Western Sahara.⁸²

the strings and derailing others’ struggle for liberty, equality and fraternity (Stephen, 2003).

⁸¹ The authors emphasize the word ‘really’ in pop psychology as a game of unmasking and pseudo introspection (2006:20).

⁸² Hence, *not* ‘if it bleeds, it leads,’ but ‘it leads if it is relevant to Us.’

f) Lastly, the imagined all-out battle to salvage and vindicate Our values ends with the eradication of the evil forces. Any partial solutions mean that the demon can repossess the body/group/nation. Compromises with the demon that do not ‘go to the root,’ create the false illusion that things are getting better which, in turn, delude the faithful to drop their guard (2006:25). Those compromising with the demon are “gradually viewed as no less guilty” (2006:25). Paradoxically, the view that the evil forces persist undetected, due to such partial improvements, only amplifies the sense of mortal danger. In contrast, an all-out war against the demon puts the mind at ease: the source has been recognised and all efforts are dedicated.

The peace finding chapter, below, demonstrates such psychodemonic thinking about compromise. First, the very Nature of the Israeli-Jew itself is alien to the idea of peace. Then, the peace process is depicted as a “sham” (*Independent*, 29 July), a “trap” (*Guardian*, 28 December) a “war by other means” (*Guardian*, 21 December) and even as an impending genocide (see Zick, Küpper and Hövermann, 2011:57). The peace process’s ability to provide only partial amelioration (the return of lands occupied by Israel in 1967, not 1948) was presented as a dangerous plot to divert attention from the ‘real’ issue: Jewish national aspirations in historic Palestine. Crucially, this psychodemonic construction is advantageous, not principled: ideologically, both newspapers supported a two-state solution (see section 11.2).

Isaiah Berlin’s reflections on the desire for perfection (1958/1966:18) appears here as both the zeal to expose the demonic Israeli-Jew *and* as post-colonial melancholia (Gilroy, 2004) towards the Arab for not achieving peace guided by Our (impossible to achieve to begin with) perfectionist high ideals.⁸³ Hence, both newspapers saw themselves as ‘exposing’ the Israeli-Jew and breaking the “conspiracy of silence” (Alon and Omer, 2006:25) around the putative ‘dangers’ of peacemaking. At the same time, empathy was withheld from non-elite victims of violence, even women and children while PA elites were shielded from criticism and presented as naïve, feminized and passive victims. The endemic suspicion of the “peace process” (appearing many times in ‘scare’ quotes) as deceptive was matched by the suggestion that the PA rejected the peace talks as it aspired

⁸³ Such perfectionist mindset still pressed for an unhindered peace, free of ‘compromises,’ even while Britain was deploying troops in Iraq.

to an 'authentic' peace. That is, the PA was projected with the British Eurocentric self-assumed high ideals, knowing that these "false standards" were "unattainable" from the start (to use Gordon, 2002: 243-44).

4.7.3 *The Lucifer Effect, Armageddon and Dysphemism*

Another study which interrogates modes of demonisation as everyday phenomena is Philip Zimbardo's *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil* (2007). Zimbardo's Lucifer Effect demonstrates how, within a normative environment which does not harbour a particular hostility to any specific group, enmity can still take the shape of harmful "ego-alien deeds" (Zimbardo, 2007:vii). Like Zimbardo's Lucifer Effect, the findings chapters show a systematic use of influence and authority in order to "abuse, demean, dehumanise" and to deny empathy (Zimbardo, 2007:5) even with non-elite people.

The demon figure also appears in Johan Galtung's analysis of news values and his peace research. Galtung's notions of Dichotomy, Manicheism, and Armageddon (2000:8) reflect a tendency to adopt sharp and simplistic divisions of the world as to conceive of Us as good and Them as bad and "struggling to subvert us" (Galtung, 2000:8). This struggle is "irreconcilable," apart from the complete triumph of good over evil. Galtung's notion of Armageddon reflects the religious imagination, even if in a secular form, in which final battle between God and Satan (Galtung, 2000:10) at the end of days ushers a newly formed human society.

Hence, while in RT difference is a taboo, in RD difference is valorised like 'night and day.' Another distinction between RT and RD are the sociolinguistic terms of euphemism and dysphemism. Allan and Burridge (1991) succinctly define these two forms of metaphorical thinking thus:

A euphemism is used as an alternative to a dispreferred expression, in order to avoid possible loss of face: either one's own face or, through giving offense, that of the audience, or of some third party.

A dysphemism is an expression with connotations that are offensive either about the denotatum or to the audience, or both, and it is substituted for a neutral or euphemistic expression for just that reason. (1991:221)

Euphemism, then, aims at harmony and avoiding being distasteful, unfavourable or improper ('May I be excused'); while Dysphemism seeks discord, or to disapprove or degrade others by using harsh and provocative metaphors ('I'm going for a piss'). In the mid-1980s, therefore, "the Soviet Union claimed to have been *invited* (euphemism) in Afghanistan," and "the Americans claimed that the Russians were *aggressors* (dysphemism)" (1991:27). In the same vein, the Eastern *Block* (dysphemism) was contrasted with the Western *Alliance* (euphemism, 1991:27). As put by the authors, dysphemisms "are used in talking about one's opponents" or "things one wishes to be seen to downgrade" (1991:27). Embodied dysphemic cognition ranges from low social esteem towards a denotatum, to "fear, abhorrence, loathing and contempt" (1991:28). Dysphemic references, such as derogatory comments or exclamatory swearing, are commonly used to release frustration or upset specific social conventions or expectations. While euphemism is used to conceal unpleasant aspects, to shield against anger or to display in-group cohesion, dysphemism is applied as the "use of language as weapon to assault another or perhaps just to exclude them" (1991:222).

Much like euphemisms and dysphemisms, RT and RD can also be viewed as two continuously alternating systems of thought. The two lists below exhibit how RT and RD divaricate in antonymous sets of rhetorical articulations and delivery:

RD	RT
<i>Offensive</i>	<i>Defensive</i>
<i>Abusive</i>	<i>Courteous</i>
<i>Suspicious</i>	<i>Unquestioning</i>
<i>Alert</i>	<i>Unguarded</i>
<i>Eager</i>	<i>Detached</i>
<i>Fastidious</i>	<i>Casual</i>
<i>Principled</i>	<i>Adventitious</i>
<i>Permanent</i>	<i>Temporary</i>
<i>Formalized</i>	<i>Informal</i>
<i>Deep-seated</i>	<i>Trivialised</i>

To give a brief example to animate this discussion (taken from the findings chapters), the *Guardian* and the *Independent* are (rightfully) committed to strongly condemning Israeli-Jews for anti-Arab racism (which is rife). Both newspapers cover it vigilantly and see it as a substantial concern in the conflict (which it is). In contrast, Palestinians' anti-Jewish racism⁸⁴ is magnanimously seen as understandable ('it's only natural'),⁸⁵ trivialised ('such racism is ineffective anyways') and temporal ('it will pass away once the conflict ends'). On this spectrum of diametrically opposed extreme positions Our own racism is neither endemic (Nazi/Apartheid-like) nor are We altogether exempt from moral scrutiny (say, as a child would be).

4.7.4 RD and "zero-degree empathy"

"Pity is treason"

MAXIMILIEN ROBESPIERRE (26 FEBRUARY 1794, QUOTED IN GRAY, 2007:27)

Remarking on the quotation above, attributed to Robespierre (the French Revolution figure implicated in The Terror), Gray (2007) notes how demonology and violence can be adopted by those fighting for utopian ideals. For Gray, the core of utopian thinking is not merely the pursuit of improvements in the human condition, but that *human nature itself* can be perfected by political action. This struggle for utopia justifies any measure of violence towards those "dark forces" that try to "block human advance" and "stand in the way of Utopia" (2007:25). For the French Revolution, writes Gray "[A] higher form of human life—even of human beings—were within reach but only once humanity had been purified by violence" (2007:27). Indeed, for Alon and Omer, the opposite of demonization and hostile suspicion is "empathy and compassion" (2006:8). Through hostile suspicion the enemy's otherness is viewed as absolute and violent retribution that follows from a sense of an acute threat, alienation and aversion. They write:

The more acute the conflict, the more one tends to polarize the world into "us" and "them." The antagonists are then viewed as though they were made of a different stuff altogether. (2006:17)

⁸⁴ E.g., Flores (PIJ, Vol. 12, No 2&3, 2005), or Litvak in the same edition.

⁸⁵ While it is unsurprising that the occupied hates the occupier, hatred should not be a prescription nor that by which the occupied comes to be defined.

While suffering requires compassion, in conflict empathy can appear as loss of control and even submission (Alon and Omer, 2006). Instead, fist-hearted attitudes are the going prescription. Moreover, compassion in itself can be interpreted as deception aiming to diminish the zeal of those engaged in an existential battle against evil. As an example, the authors point to the *Malleus Maleficarum*, in which the faithful were warned against “any misplaced compassionate stance toward witches; such a stance could only be inspired by the devil” (2006:36).

In the context of the news media, Dajani and Wolfsfeld (2003) examine the notion of “Demonizing the Enemy” in Palestinian and Israeli news reports (Wolfsfeld, PIJ, Vol.10 No.2 2003). Although relating to reports appearing from within the conflict, this analysis matches the findings above. Both countries’ news media, writes Wolfsfeld, remain “powerful tools for the demonization of the enemy” (ibid). One of the significant news routines for such demonization is the allocation of little space to the victims of the other side. These tragedies appear as “meaningless statistics,” depersonalised, anonymous and devoid of details. At the same time, Our victims (or the victims of those aligned with Us) “have names and faces, they have grieving families; they have lives” (ibid). “It is perfectly natural to grieve over one’s own victims and to lack any empathy for the enemy,” writes Wolfsfeld (ibid), and yet out of this contrastive moral mindset “[A] raw and instinctive anger inevitably rises up in even the most tolerant of viewers.” While *Guardian* and *Independent* readers are not in a direct confrontation with Israel, such “outrage and anger,” expressed in graphic stories, still brings a “compelling “proof” of our innocence and the enemy’s evilness” (ibid).

Another study valuable for the theorization of RD is Baron-Cohen’s (2011) notion of negative “zero-degree empathy.” Suggesting an empathy spectrum on which the term ‘evil’ is replaced by “empathy erosion,” Baron-Cohen points out how extreme harm brought against another person or group occurs where empathy has diminished. Through such detachment and thoughtlessness others are turned into objects. “In such a state we relate only to things, or to people *as if they were just things*,” writes Baron-Cohen (2011:5). In line with the discussion above, Baron-Cohen finds narcissism, or an inflated sense of one’s importance, as potentially leading to zero-degree empathy. Baron-Cohen’s

account also fits with this study's notion of everyday racism. Here, extreme cruelty is situated on a spectrum which anyone could potentially fluctuate on and off of.

4.7.5 Static Model 2: the internal-theological

It is clearly not easy for men to give up the satisfaction of this inclination to aggression. [...] In this respect the Jewish people, scattered everywhere, have rendered most useful services to the civilizations of the countries that have been their hosts; but unfortunately all the massacres of the Jews in the Middle Ages did not suffice to make that period more peaceful and secure for their Christian fellows. When once the Apostle Paul had posited universal love between men as the foundation of his Christian community, extreme intolerance on the part of Christendom towards those who remained outside it became the inevitable consequence.

FREUD (1930:114)

This section expands on Anidjar's (2003) notion of the Jew as the historical *theological* enemy figure to Christian-Europe. In line with what Said called "ecclesiastical politics" (1978:120), this socio-*theological* discussion (see Nirenberg, 2013) follows some of the theoretical pillars of this research, including Gramsci, Foucault and Said, as well as Boyarin (2009), Bhabha (1994), Shohat and Stam (1994), Dyer (1997) and Young (2004).

To use Gilroy's analogy, discussed above (1993), this overview relates to the *roots*, or *static* configurations, which are complemented by *dynamic* configurations, or routes. In other words, the traces of historic patterns of Christian anti-Semitism discussed below find a voice through contemporary and micro-patterns of prejudice (e.g., everyday racism, cultural racism, psychodemonisation or empathy erosion). These inextricable static and dynamic factors continuously inform each other and adopt new shapes. Accordingly, European thinking about the ongoing *century*-old Arab-Israeli conflict is entangled—rather than in complete continuity or discontinuity—with European ideas and imaginaries about the *centuries*-old Jewish-Christian conflict. This study thus rejects the concept of multigenerational 'collective memory' as a "quasi-mystical belief in the existence of a social mind" (Stone, 2010:103). Instead, it adopts a more transposed "successive summations" (Halbwachs, 1980:83) and the social interconnectivity of memory and power. Put differently, anti-Jewish racism does not reflect on 'Christians' in some reverse


racism in which ‘They are all the same.’ Rather, it reflects on timely constructions, significations and intertextualities within specific discursive patterns uttered in a specific time and place. Nonetheless, these specified (negative) constructions implicate an oppositional (positive) *self*-essentialising encircling Us and Our fixed and innate qualities (seen as positive and worthy).

As discussed above in relation to religious and scientific racism (Blaut, 1992), seeing Judaism as unholy or Jews as an inferior race might seem, post-War, as ideologically debunked. At the same time, the notions of *historical continuity*, *racial thinking adaptation* or “rigorous conjuncturalism” (Frankenberg and Mani, 1993), remain key features in texts that confront the legacies of colonialism and imperialism, with Fanon and Said’s projects being but two examples. To use Stuart Hall’s essay “When was the postcolonial” (1996), rather than affirming simplistic conceptions of an epistemological ‘break’ in the Althusserian/structuralist sense (1996:254), one needs to examine how new proximities, spatial managements and identity politics reinscribe previously held fixed categories, such as nation or skin colour. Downing and Husband, referring to “White racism, often mixed in with anti-Semitism and Islamophobia” (2005:76), note that:

The five hundred years of Western colonialism, neo-colonialism and slavery have left in their wake not only facts and structures, but also vibrant ideological discourses, capable of discursive reformulation (...)

For van Dijk (1991:33), the study of “historical continuity and change” of cultural expressions of racism at a macro-level should be complemented with a study of micro-level examination of how everyday practices confirm or challenge such historic positions. The tensions here are both between private opinions and group ideologies and between private practices and structural continuities (see *Graph 4*). Still, the continuity question cannot be fully explicated within this work. To use Winant, since changes in racial thinking represent “simultaneously a vast phenomenon framed by epochal historical developments, and a moment-to-moment experiential reality, we can never expect fully to capture it theoretically” (2004:49).

Graph 4: van Dijk (1991:36, *Racism and the Press*)



Nonetheless, the question of historical continuity of anti-Jewish racism in the British quality press in the early 2000s seems to cause much discomfort (e.g., Fine, 2012). Some explanations may include the post-war prosperity of British Jewish life; that both newspapers employ high-ranking Jewish journalists and editors; Israel's failure to peacefully reconcile its historic colonial status during the 1990s (at the same time that Australia and New Zealand attempted to reconcile the historicity of their national stories, e.g., the Cape York Institute, August 2014) or the ongoing violence of the AAI. Against this background, an enquiry into "anti-Semitism" appears petty, if not malicious (Fine, 2009; Kahn-Harris and Gidley, 2010). What is the liberal utility, one might ask, of looking into injurious speech towards this affluent population, rather than towards, say, impacted communities in the Sudan or Afghanistan?

Reflecting on these concerns, this study regards the conflation of Jewish and Arab/Muslim alterities as a model of difference for Europe's ventures for global ascendancy (to use Boyarin, 2009). An understanding of only one branch of this bifurcated relationality while discounting the other delimits both. For example, historically Jews' prosperity and social integration *gave ground* to anti-Jewish hatred, rather than mark its dissipation. This dyad of power/powerlessness warrants newer and less prosperous minorities to take account of the politics of belonging and assimilation in Britain. Following the same logic, the employment of high-ranking Jewish journalists and editors, *unmatched by their Arab or black colleagues* (see van Dijk, 1991:14), should be seen as the consequences of Jews' social history in Britain since their readmission in the 17th century, *not* as benevolent blind inclusion. Finally, the peace and reconciliation talks

in, say, Australia, face different colonial realities than do those in Palestine and Israel (see Greenstein, 2017; Barta, 2008). That Australia's indigenous people today make up only 2-3% of the population (see Wolfe, 2006) is not a differential feature that can be uncritically overlooked when Britain turns its gaze towards its postcolony, Palestine and Israel not excluded (where about 20% of Israelis are Palestinians citizens of Israel and about 50% of Israeli-Jews are indigenous to the region).

Another barrier to considering the Jew as the theological enemy in both newspapers is the convenient perception of anti-Jewish racism as meaning only Nazi anti-Semitism (see section 6.3). Finally, the burgeoning of secular liberalism in Britain in the 1990s-2000s, and the growing belief in a global civil society, in turn saw Jewish national polity as opposing this promise of an all-inclusive, universal humanitarianism. Such emerging, yet unexamined, Christian secularism (Asad, 2003) was then intertwined with assertions of Britain's military dominance in the Middle East as an imagined standard for global equality and democracy under a Christian-European model. Below I reflect on five foundational modes of anti-Jewish Othering, as emerging from the population itself.

Difference

A surprisingly high number of utterances present Judaism in the context of the conflict as having a negative influence in the world, while non-elite Israeli-Jews appear as debased and bloodlusting. Dozens of articles over the years present raging rabbis, militarised Jewish festivals or castigate Israeli non-elites as being uninterested in culture, kindness or higher values. The basic premise of difference and hierarchy thus follows the rudimentary positioning of self/other—or centre/periphery, primary/secondary—where, despite the liberal promise of equality *They* appear different from and inferior to *Us* (Young-Bruehl, 1998). Simultaneously, giving the centuries-long kinship between Christianity and Judaism, the tensions between *Our* and *Their* stories/beliefs/heroes/fears/cultural memory are unlike those between *Us* and, say, the USSR or China. Regardless of how powerful, noxious or dangerous these regimes appeared to British eyes in the early 2000s, *these* differences and perceived moral failings *were not* appraised as being ontological to how *We* see *Ourselves*.

Thus, there is nothing ‘anti-Semitic’ about *Figure 21* below, which is almost the size of an A4 paper (*Guardian*, 27 October, 2004). Yet, a surprising number of images in both newspapers present non-elite Israeli-Jews as prototypical, ultra-orthodox Jewish men, mostly with no connection to the article. For example, *Figure 21* is attached to an article on Israelis’ reception of the Gaza withdrawal. Other articles, say, covering election results or public life, routinely repeat this theological Othering of ‘the Israelis’ as 19th century Hassidic Jews, or as tribal, archaic and dogmatic. In addition, *this* stereotypical image excludes other alternative images of secular Israeli-Jews or women and children (see below). As shown in the collage in *Figure 22*, such depictions also appeared in the early 2000s in relation to Jews in general, not just Israeli-Jews.⁸⁶ At the same time, the diametrically oppositional image of the Palestinian-Arab as children, women, and under the mark of excessive Nature places Us as mature (yet not in decline), *saviours* of women and children (as oppose to targeting them) and under the sign of secular and inclusive pluralism (*not* religion). As Pasto writes:

Ignoring the Christian element... [is a] sort of epistemological trick that minimizes religious influences on European thought and is very much tied in with Orientalists and other representations which see the Other as “religious” and the west as “secular.” (1998:339)

Figure 21: Guardian (1 November 2004)



⁸⁶ With favourable Jewish persons appearing often with no Jewish markers (see Richardson, 2006:116).

Figure 22: *Guardian*, (from right to left: 2 February 2008; 2 December 2000; 25 February 2004; 3 May 2003; 16 Feb 2012; 22 May 2011, details)



Another excluded image of the Israeli-Jew is that of the Jew as victim. Global anti-Semitism (say in the Philippines or India), anti-Semitism in the Middle East or persecution of Jews in, say, Yemen,⁸⁷ go almost entirely unreported in the *Guardian* during the 2000s. Jews, it seems, can also be *not-news*.

Another aspect of difference is that of encircling visibility (Sander, 2013). Take for example the *Guardian*'s G2 section lead article headed "Michael Howard is set to become the first Jewish leader of a major party. How Britain has changed" (31 October 2003, Figure 23). This article is all but positive, with its long subheading reflecting on the exclusion of Jews from British politics until the 1950s. At the same time, putting Howard's Jewishness under the spotlight as *the* Jewish politician reinforces him as the exception to the norm within British Christian politics. Indeed, Ed Miliband's Jewishness was *not* paraded in the *Guardian* when he became the leader of the Labour party (for example, 25, 26, 27 and 28 September 2010). Attaching Howard's Jewishness to the Tory

⁸⁷ For example, www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/11/24/AR2009112403898.html

party for point-scoring testifies to the tenuous and politicised place of Judaism in the *Guardian*.

Figure 23: Michael Howard (*Guardian*, 31 October 2003)



Indeed, in the following years the *Guardian* reverted to displaying Howard in *dozens* of cartoons in full anti-Semitic mode, vampire-like and drinking the blood of Britain. Such stereotypical depictions rehash Bram Stoker’s Dracula’s own fin-de-siècle anti-Semitic Gothic tropes.⁸⁸ Appearing as bungling and incompetent, these cartoons do not aim to ‘alert’ their readers but to mock Jewish sensitivities. The analogy would be to use the N-word as credentials that ‘We are clearly not racist.’

⁸⁸ Davidson (1997:154) highlights such anti-Semitic stereotypes as Dracula’s fear of Christian crosses and holy water, “wild lust of pelf,” hooked nose, being followed by rats, owning a “*foetor judaicus*” body odour or having fifty cases of common earth smelling of “ole Jerusalem.” Stoker’s “deadly enemy of all mankind” (as quoted in Davidson, 1997:154) is *not* simply Romanian (like Michael Howard’s ancestry). In fact, Romanians are mostly invisible in the book (Walker and Wright 1997:72).

Figure 24: *Guardian* (4 March 2005 and 7 April 2005)



Moreover, as seen in *Figure 25*, such cartoons can sometimes appear *on the same page* with articles which include outright anti-Jewish tropes. For example, the opinion article headline “Now Europeans see Israel as a threat to their existence” (*Guardian*, 7 November 2003)⁸⁹ appears under a cartoon of Howard as an inept, demonic vampire. A Ken Livingstone opinion article referring to Israel as “the threat it poses to all of us” (subheading, *Guardian* 4 March 2005), appears under a cartoon of a goofy Howard drinking the blood of Britain.

⁸⁹ With a subheading reading “For the first time, moral critique and self defence have coincided.”

Figure 25: Guardian (7 November 2003 and 4 March 2005)



Other examples of such valorised difference and “threat” include such editorials headlined “An affront to civilization” (Observer, 13 May 2001, referring to Israel) or “Israel simply has no right to exist” (by Faisal Bodi, *Guardian*, 3 January 2001). What, however, is this inferred higher “civilization” which casts out lower ones? Where is Palestine within this Eurocentric hierarchical order? Additional examples in the *Guardian* include publishing the complete text of Caryl Churchill’s *Seven Jewish Children* (26 Feb 2009), or an edited extract from Shlomo Sand’s book *How I Stopped Being a Jew* (*Guardian*, 10 October 2014). The *Guardian* subheadline referring to Churchill’s play notes that some readers found the play “antisemitic” while inviting the reader to “Judge for yourself.” Indeed, the play includes such attributes to Jewish people as “tell her we’re [Israeli-Jews] better haters, tell her we’re chosen people...” Sand’s *Guardian* extract

invokes a pathological view of Judaism while, inline with RT, placing Islam as tolerated ‘for now’ and Christianity as being the standard bearer for both.

Anti-Christianity

On 23 March 2006, the *Guardian* published the editorial headed “Was Judas not a Judas? Even if Iscariot’s betrayal was God’s will, his name will always be invoked as the ultimate traitor.” This article reviews, with open contempt, the National Geographic’s project of documenting the recently revealed Gospel of Judas. “Judas,” the article continues:

will remain the most reviled and rejected of men because that’s what we need him to be... we need Judas, as an instant evocation of treachery of the darkest and deepest brew. Replacing Judas’s name with that of some substitute traitor could never have had such an instant and chilling effect.

The article, then, is unfazed that the name Judas denotes Judah or Jew (*Yehudah* and *Yehudi* in Hebrew), or the historic implications of Judas’ (read Jews’) religious treachery (see Turner, 1983; Mathew, 27:25) to Jews over the centuries. Other reports, such as this first page article headlined “Few shepherds watch their flocks by night in Bethlehem” (23 December 2010), clearly employ a Christian reading of Israeli-Jewish atrocities. Indeed, referring to Luke 2:8-9, the article’s lead reads:

If an “angel of the Lord” were to appear in the sky over Bethlehem today, there would be scarcely any shepherds keeping watch over their flocks to witness the scene.

In this framing, it is the *Israeli-Jew* who thwarts the “good news” for “all the people” (Luke 2:10) that “Today in the City of David a Saviour has been born to you. He is Christ the Lord!” (Luke 2:11).

The notion of anti-Christianity within the theorem of RD can thus be explained as specifically seeing Jews as seeking to impede Christian values and traditions. Accordingly, the Jew, marking the “the truth” of Christianity “by contrast” (to use Cohen, 2007:189), appears in the reports as a metaphysical and ontological enemy undermining Our consecrated values such as human rights, international law, and tolerance. As this logic goes, ‘Where They are zealots and child killers We are anything but,’ and ‘We need

to vigilantly defend Our ideals as They specifically aim to subvert them.’ While Israeli-Jews advance Their own particularistic values at the expense of others,⁹⁰ Our universal appeal as protectors of rights is extended to anyone on earth,⁹¹ much like Christianity did before.

To use the language of the *Nostra Aetate* (1965),⁹² “[F]rom ancient times down to the present” Christian antagonism towards Jews and Judaism was ubiquitous. As in the Greek term *Aposynagogos*, meaning ‘set apart from the synagogue,’ second and later generations of Christians, who lived and wrote after the death of Christ, pronounced a separation from Judaism and a desire for a de-Judaized Christianity. For example, anti-Jewish outbursts such as “These Jews killed Jesus and the prophets and for that reason they displease God and are the enemies of all mankind” (1 Thessalonians 2:14-16), or “You have the devil as your father” (John 8:44, see also Acts 7:51), appeared circa 100 CE. With this rift growing in the following decades, and since the second century CE, an invective tradition prevailed in Christian teachings of *adversus Iudaeos* (or *contra Iudaeos*), meaning “against the Jews.” By the middle of the sixth century anti-Judaism became widespread in the doctrine of mainstream Christianity, and by the Middle Ages a welter of denouncements blamed Jews for being sorcerers; well poisoners; traitorous Christ killers; ritual child killers; desecrators of the Eucharistic host; parasites; fifth column; a conspiring cabal seeking world domination and the devil incarnate itself (or the devil disguised in human form, congruous to the Godly Saviour in human form it aimed to destroy) (Wistrich 1999:7; Trachtenberg, 1943). Such accusations highlight the Jew as a threat and ‘at the bottom of all Our troubles.’

At the base of this Christian-Jewish denominational divide are St. Paul’s dualisms, seen generally through the oppositions between Law and Love, work and faith (see Kalmar, 2012). Indeed, Anidjar (2003) reviews Paul extensively, noting that the Jew as the theological enemy is “at the centre of Romans” (2003:8). To use Fredriksen (2005),

⁹⁰ E.g., Zick, Küpper and Hövermann show that 22.5% of British respondents agree with the statement “Jews in general do not care about anything or anyone but their own kind” (2011).

⁹¹ At the same time, the global reach of Britain’s military campaigns *since* 1945 include Palestine, Malaya, China (Yangtze), Korea, Egypt, Kenya, Cyprus, the Arabian Peninsula, Congo, Brunei, Borneo, Yemen, Northern Ireland, Oman, Zimbabwe, Falklands, Iraq, Kuwait, the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Iraq and Lybia.

⁹² The *Nostra Aetate* (“In Our Time”) Declaration represents a decades-long process of post-Holocaust introspection regarding the place of the Jewish people in the message of the Catholic Church.

Christian theologians have thus posited a calibrated cosmological mapping of the heavens in which the purest in spirit appears in the furthest circles from earth, and where earth represents material imperfections, carnal sin and decay. Earthly matters, then, represented the sphere of sin and were associated with the devil and, indeed, the carnal Jew. For example, Augustine's "Israel according to the flesh... [who are] indisputably carnal" (*Tractatus adversus Judaeos* vii, 9). The bridging between higher and lower moral cosmological realms, continues Fredriksen, is attained through sacrifice, or, in Hebrew, *hakrava*, meaning literally 'to bring closer.' Where sin brings separation from the high God, the Holy Communion is an essential ritualization of the sacrifice of the Crucifixion and its unity of the heavens and earth, spirit and matter, body and soul, flesh and blood, and the consecrated bread and consecrated wine. As Daniel Boyarin (1994:78) notes, since Jews rejected and betrayed the Son of God they appear in Paul's writing in opposition to the Christian through the following elemental dualisms (Romans 2:28–29):

<i>outer</i>	<i>inner</i>
<i>in the flesh (circumcision)</i>	<i>in the heart</i>
<i>in the letter</i>	<i>in the spirit</i>

The Jew is thus obsessed with the material (bodily) letter of the law, but overlooks the spirit of the law. The Jew's covenant, the act of the circumcision, is in the flesh and thus literal and not spiritual, or in the heart (Romans, 2:29).⁹³ Fredriksen summarises Paul's dualisms as follows: Gospel as opposed to law, grace as opposed to the works of the law, baptism as oppose to circumcision, spiritual as opposed to carnal and Gentile as opposed to Jew. The New people of God redeemed from the Old Jewish law (Pasto, 1998:443). As Paul writes "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law... so that the blessing promised to Abraham would come to the Gentiles" (Galatians, 3:13-14), "for the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life" (2 Corinthians 3:6), or "But now we are discharged from the law, dead to that which held us captive, so that we are slaves not under the old written code but in the new life of the Spirit" (Romans, 7:5-6, see also Galatians 4). So, in "[A]bout 140 A.D.," writes Adolf Harnack, "the transition of Christianity to the

⁹³ E.g., "if the uncircumcised man obeys the righteous requirements of the law, will not his uncircumcision be regarded as circumcision?" (Romans, 2:26). Or "written not with ink but by the Spirit of the living God, not on stone tablets but on tablets of human hearts" (2 Corinthians 3:3).

“Gentiles,” with its *emancipation* from Judaism, was complete” (1908:69-70, emphasis added).⁹⁴

Supersessionism

As above, such emerging Christian-Jewish relations were not simply rivalries between foes. Both Fredriksen (2010:88) and Daniel Boyarin stress that “Paul lived and died convinced that he was a Jew living out Judaism” (Boyarin, 1994:55). As Pagles puts it, first century Christian opposition to Judaism occurred while the Gospels’ writers were “Jews who wrote in a Jewish context” (1995, quoted in Cohen, 2007:25). Indeed, for Paul, Israel is the “kinsmen by race” (Romans 9:3). Patrick Girard echoes such account of intimacy and closeness, writing:

Modern anti-Semitism was born not from the great difference between groups but rather from the threat of absence of differences, the homogenisation of Western society and the abolition of the ancient social and legal barriers between Jews and Christians. (1980, cited in Bauman 1989:58)

As Anouar Majid notes “The Old Testament Jew was a theological challenge to the bible-believing Christian, despised and accused but part of the church’s corpus nevertheless” (2007:57). Writing on the Passion story of the crucifixion, Jeremy Cohen comments:

Precisely the intimate closeness and kinship between Jews in and outside the new Christian faith community intensified the harsh identification of the Jewish other with the demonic forces in the Passion narratives. (2007:25)

Hence, the demonization of Jews as *a deicide people*, as killers of the Son of God,⁹⁵ takes shape on the back of such ancestral relations of repudiating predecessors and resentful successors. As McManners observes, Christianity “consciously inherited from the Jews the role of God’s chosen people” (2001:2), replacing that which is fossilised (see Hegel’s account of Judaism, in Avineri, 1982), in decline and bounded to a ruined place (Page, 2004:127) with that which is flourishing and New. “Because the Jews rejected Christ, God in turn angrily rejected them, and revoked their covenant,” writes Tapie (2014:19).

⁹⁴ Paradoxically, even the celebrated Galatians (3:28) repeats prearticulations of the Jew as oppositional to the gentile in the same way that the free is oppositional to the enslaved. It reads: “There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.”

⁹⁵ See Matthew 27:25.

Or as Rajak writes, “God’s invitation to blessedness had been transferred to others” (2009:282). According to these supersessionist convictions, Christian notions of chosenness move away from belonging to a single, particular people towards a transnational spiritual chosenness of a trans-ethnic church open to humanity at large (Firestone, 2010:20).⁹⁶ Indeed, Ecclesia, or the Christian Church as a whole, means *the chosen* in Greek.

The Christian motherly figures of Ecclesia and Synagoga, which appear in art and architecture around the thirteenth century (Rowe, 2011), testify to this ancestral supersession. Ecclesia, personifying the church, is a crowned figure holding a battle standard and chalice. Synagoga, personifying Judaism, is slumped, blindfolded and holding a broken staff she drops the tablets. Debunked and rejected Jewish principles are thus contrasted with Christianity as the validated “new Israel of the spirit” (Jeremy Cohen, 2007:187). Standing for the exegetical tradition in which Ecclesia is “arising out of the ruins of Synagoga” (Mellinkoff, 1988:77), Synagoga then demonstrated to Christians “the truth of Christianity by contrast,” or the “replacement of the old law of Moses by the new covenant of Christ” (Cohen, 2007:189).

Figure 26: *Ecclesia and Synagoga (Cathédrale Notre Dame de Paris)*



⁹⁶ E.g., “For Christ is the end of the Law, that everyone who has faith may be justified” (Romans 10:4). Indeed, even the Roman centurion carrying out the crucifixion itself is morally swayed by Christ’s presence, saying “Truly this was a Son of God” (Matthew, 27:54); “Truly this man was a Son of God” (Mark, 15:39) and “Certainly this was a righteous Man” (Luke, 23:47).

Pesto writes on this replacement dynamics as follows:

The temporal dislocation of Jews is created by the invention of a Christian Time in which Jesus stands as the starting point, both temporally and socially. Judaism is situated on the pre-Jesus side of the temporal line, where its significance lies only in its function as precursor and preparation for Jesus and the Gospel. This implies the necessary demise of Judaism... (1998:440)

It is this sense of moral supersessionism of Euro-Christian investment in Jewish moral failings that creeps into this study's population. Where We are the New, in ascendant and the subject of History, They are the old, in decline and exiting History.

Subversion by conspiracy

An unsettlingly high number of reports blame Israeli-Jews for plots and conspiracies. For instance, the article below (*Figure 27, Guardian, 23 August 2003*) seems otherwise benign. Covering Elizabeth Laird's children book (2003), the article notes how the book's publisher "has received three demands for the book to be pulped," and that "[I]t is understood that others have come from Jewish pressure groups." Yet what makes *this* top-fold 1,100-word item an "International News" story is its specific Jewish anchor, as the headline reads "Children's author faces Jewish wrath." The religious implications of "Jewish wrath" denote angry and jealous Jewish forces as diametrically opposite to the brave, caring and progressive children books' author posing bravely, pen and pad ready, on a hilltop overlooking Ramallah. Where Laird stands for Our high ideals and human rights, 'Jewish groups,' and perhaps even "a powerful Jewish lobby," try to silence Us and subvert Our ideals. At the same time, Laird's collaborator, Sonia Nimir, "a lecturer at Bir Zeit University on the West Bank," is only mentioned in passing deep inside the article. Indeed, the article reduces Palestinian agency and polity to a 12-year-old boy who considers suicide bombing; a mental image of an eruptive, immature Orient validating Our self-image as rational saviours.

Figure 27: *Guardian* (23 August 2003)




Another example of the reoccurrence of the ‘conspiratorial Jew’ is the *Guardian* article headed “Solzhenitsyn breaks last taboo of the revolution,” subheaded “Nobel laureate under fire for new book on the role of Jews in Soviet-era repression” (25 January 2003). The article’s lead notes that Solzhenitsyn deals with “the most sensitive topics of his writing career,” namely, “the Jewish role in the revolutionary genocide and secret police purges of Soviet Russia.” As evidence the article quotes Solzhenitsyn that for Jews in the camps “life was softer than that of others,” that “two thirds” of the Kiev cheka [secret police] “were Jews,” and that “there were many Jews in the NKVD” (for a response see Petrovsky-Shtern, 2001). Like Laird, what makes *this* book international news is Solzhenitsyn’s “huge amount of bravery” in dealing with this “prohibited” “taboo” in the face of “Jewish leaders” reacting “furiously.” However, were ‘Jews’ ‘prohibiting’ this debate about their “role”? Remarkably, the white supremacist David Duke quotes this very *Guardian* article to assert the Jews’ role in the “genocidal secret police” (13 November 2005).⁹⁷ “The *Guardian*,” writes Duke, “mentions how the Jews in Russia were furious at Solzhenitsyn for even mentioning it in passing.”

⁹⁷ <https://davidduke.com/solzhenitsyn-on-the-jewish-role-in-the-bolshevik-terror/>


As seen below in relation to Yann Martel and Tom Paulin, a pattern ensues. First, We identify with those victimised lone voices who nonetheless expose Jewish malice at great personal expense. Then, as if against all odds, Our sense of moral authority is vindicated.

Figure 28: Guardian (25 January 2003)



As shown in the findings, both newspapers have included plethora of reports during the 2000s associating Jews with hidden plots The magazine-style *Independent* article headed “United States of Israel” (Figure 29), is but an overt example. The analysis below, looking into Christian anti-Semitism, explores the stereotype of the Jew’s ‘hidden hand’ as pulling strings and degrading the freedoms of other nations.

Figure 29: *Independent* (27 April 2006)



Fredrikson observes how, according to Paul, the Hebrew bible foretold the coming of Christ and the principals of Christian beliefs. Yet, the Jews being “hardened” (Romans, 11:7), “disobedient” (Romans, 11:30-32), and “contrary” (Romans, 11:24), were too base, carnal or lacking in spirit to comprehend these signs and higher meanings—or otherwise *maliciously* concealed and distorted them (Nirenberg, 2006). Such signs included God’s and the prophets displeasure with the Israelites; that Jews chose the golden calf over the Torah; that Jews, the descendants of Shem, would be superseded by Christians, the descendants of Japheth (Genesis 9:27, see Delanty, 1995:27); or that the granting of Esau’s birthright blessing to Jacob infers Christianity’s replacement of Judaism. “The problem was not the Bible, but the Jews,” writes Fredrikson, referring to Justin’s “rejection of the old Israel and the salvation of the True Israel” (in Trypho, 29:135, Fredrikson, 2008:70).

These accusations of concealment and the distortion of biblical Hebrew texts are tied to historic Christian perceptions of Jews as controlling and constraining Christian convictions. For example, 1 Thessalonians reads:

the Jews [15] Who both killed the Lord Jesus, and their own prophets, and have persecuted us; and they please not God, and are contrary to all men: [16] Forbidding us to speak to the Gentiles that they might be saved, to fill up their sins always: for the wrath is come upon them to the uttermost.

Jews, who are “contrary to all men,” subvert the “Gentiles” that “might be saved,” from upholding Our Christian ideals. This subversion is measured against the promise of salvation.

An apt example is the legend of the Septuagint Bible (second century BCE), being the first translation of the Hebrew Bible into Koine Greek. This legend tells the story of endemic suspicion of the Jews’ supposed contriving of control over Our sense of moral self and sacred meanings. In this legend, King Ptolemy II Philadelphus sent for 72 (later 70) translators from the High Priest in Jerusalem to come to Alexandria, where they were allocated separate workspaces yet miraculously produced an identical translation of the Bible. As Rajak writes:

The good King knew his customers, and his intent was to prevent the cunning translators from conspiring together in order to suppress the prophetic messages of the prophets which were obscurely present in the Hebrew scriptures. (2009:283)

While the story is one of sanctity inspired by the Holy Spirit independent from the translation of (Jewish) human agents, continues Rajak, “terrors lie beneath the superficial harmony” (2009:36). I.e., “terrors” that the truths and revelations of the ascending New people of God were being “withheld from the world” by Jews, who through their “jealousy, or sheer malevolence” subvert the Good News from being “given to all the peoples” (as Rajak quotes Saint Augustine, 2009:284). It is the controlling Jew who tries to debase Our sacred values and to subvert others from adopting them. As the 1881 Encyclopedia Britannica reflects on the term “The character of Judaism,” the Gospels were “a protest against the ruling tendency of Judaism” (1957:508-10, Julius Wellhausen 1883, quoted in Weinfeld, 2004) and its “particularistic, tyrannical, legalism [which] persists in Rabbinism” (Britannica, 1957:540).

That the Jewish authorities thus “pressed for the death of Christ” (to use the *Nostra Aetate*, 1965)⁹⁸ attests to the myth of “Jews persecuting Christians” (Maccoby, 2006:4) and the plea to liberate the Christian spirit from the Old law. Yet it also points to a *selective*

⁹⁸ As Jesus tells the Pharisees “I know that you are descendants of Abraham; yet you seek to kill me” (John 8:37).

emancipation in which Christ brought atonement to *all* mankind apart from the Jews themselves who, being responsible for his death, were still held responsible for their sins. As Ostow puts it:

Christianity, as a consistent theology cannot blame the Jews, but the gospels and generations of Christians did. Theological anti-semitism is a logical absurdity, but psychologically well founded. (1997:134)

One can also draw attention to the tenacity of *British literary* anti-Semitism, especially the invocation of the Jew as possessive and conspiratorial (Cheyette, 1993; Julius, 1995, 2006:148). Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, Marlowe's *Jew of Malta*, Shakespeare's *Shylock*, du Maurier's *Svengali* or Dickens' *Fagin*; all reflect familiar images of Jews as manipulators and polluters. As an example, T. S. Eliot's poem titled "Burbank with a Baedeker: Bleistein with a Cigar" (1919) includes the infamous lines:

*The smoky candle end of time
Declines. On the Rialto once.
The rats are underneath the piles.
The Jew is underneath the lot.*

Returning to the *Guardian* and the *Independent*, Eliot's lowly, ravaging Jew (see Julius, 1995)—the deep-seated, hidden root of evil—is echoed in a Tom Paulin's poem published in the *Observer* and titled "Killed in Crossfire" (18 February 2001). Written about the conflict, Paulin's poem reads:

*We're fed this inerts
this lying phrase
like comfort food
as another little Palestinian boy
in trainers jeans and a white teeshirt
is gunned down by the Zionist SS
whose initials we should
- but we don't - dumb goys -
clock in that weasel word crossfire*

For Eliot, the verminous Jew polluting the foundation of the Venetian Rialto explains the “the decline of the mind of Europe” (Eliot, 1975:51, quoted in Cheyett, 2000:62). In Paulin, the sorcerer Israeli-Jew tricks the world’s nations (or “We”) into not seeing her as a “SS” Nazi child killer. Like Eliot, Paulin’s mindset infers a trapped passivity (“inerts,”⁹⁹ “comfort food”), infected from within (“fed”), and which aims to ‘break free’ and expose (“clock”) the concealed evil. Paulin’s “dumb goys,” taken from Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* (“The Jews slyly dupe the stupid Goyim,” writes Hitler about Zionism, cited in Rash, 2006:225), corresponds to Eliot’s mockery of Jews in his choice of a name for Sir Ferdinand Klien—akin to Ferdinand of Aragon, who expelled the Jews from Spain (see Julius, 2010:104). In both poems, Jews are mocked by being likened to their persecutors.

On the very same page in the *Observer* (18 February 2001), just above the poem, Paulin includes a quote from Victor Klemperer (13 June 1934) comparing (early 1930s) ‘Zionists’ to Nazis.¹⁰⁰ Klemperer’s quote in the *Observer* reads:

To me the Zionists, who want to go back to the Jewish state of 70 AD (destruction of Jerusalem by Titus), are just as offensive as the Nazis. With their nosing after blood, their ancient ‘cultural roots’, their partly canting, partly obtuse winding back of the world, they are altogether a match for the National Socialists.¹⁰¹

In Paulin, the *Observer* reader is invited to imagine herself on the moral high ground ‘clocking’ the underhanded, diabolical Israeli-Jew who is, in turn, objectionable and in “perpetual hostility” (Julius, 2010:253) to Our sacred values. As Klemperer writes, “I shall go on writing. That is my heroism. I will bear witness, precise witness!” (27 May 1942, quoted in Deák, 2001:54).

Exceptionalism

As below, the conflict’s reportage is impressive in its size and temperament. These regimented recurrences in topicalisation, vocabulary and syntax point to a sense of

⁹⁹ As Gilman writes “[F]or the Jews focus on the dead, the inert” (1991:137).

¹⁰⁰ Using credentialing (Hewitt and Stokes, 1975, cited in Martin, 2013), that which could be perceived as racist is credentialised: ‘some Jews say that too.’ That Klemperer was a devote German and a Christian convert evades the *Observer*.

¹⁰¹ This quote also appears in the *Independent* (1 April 2006), www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-a-lesson-from-the-holocaust-for-us-all-472334.html

anxiety and moral panic. The coverage is unique due to the standard of omissions in world news reports. For example, during the 2000s the internal politics of states shaken by the Arab Spring since 2010—such states as Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen or Syria—were met with omissions in both newspapers. As above, the Darfur crisis was virtually invisible during 2003, as was Afghanistan under the Taliban prior to 9/11. What variable then explains this policy of media attention *and* inattention?

Inline with the cultural proximity thesis, this exceptionality refers to the distinct place of Judaism within Christian scriptures and teachings. This shared socio-theological history explains the exceptionalism in the coverage over other factors, such as professional norms (access, safety) or the intensity of the violence. Inline with RD, this “obsession” (see below) retraces the schism between Us, as ‘common folk’ (van Dijk, 1993:271), and Them as folk devils (Cohen, 1972).

Figure 30 (27 December 2005) talks to such impossible entanglement between reporting the world (not just Our world) and the commissioning of familiar cultural narratives. On the one hand, the Nativity story’s Three Kings and Magi “from the east” (Matthew 2:1-2) are held back by Israel’s separation wall not by, say, the Iraq war. On the other hand, the otherwise unrelated editorial just beneath notes that “The past 500 years have been dominated by westerners, so there’s little point teaching children about other societies,” while calling for the reconciliation of “new Britons [schildren] to our sense of cultural identity” (both subheadings). Such “cultural identity” is already in production in the intersection of Our high ideals, the backwardness of “Shaka Zulu,” the anti-Christianity casually associated with the Jew and the Arab in-need-of-saving.

Figure 30: Guardian (27 December 2005)

Too far too far

Natalie H...

Grime is or exciting so punk in th it should n

I has been 2005 has a and live re fashion. It genre of r tion, grim And many the hands An offshoot of electronics, grime East End in 2002 most charming s the acclaimed B tion, grime was j pirate stations it last October a g rising star, at the was cancelled of police were said safety risk. Wha grime scene has and sales of new From the UK, banned from th London, after a had nothing to police advising "dangerous" act looking good fo - There'll be a Vice magazine i ber gig that had names - Kano, Deep - playing faces of indie e editor, Andy C "That lethal if the police shut because of gan then, that lica there have been Some think i some scares th attract crowds, come as part of jump around w ting rowdy. It's see at a U2 con it reminds him the first punk j channelled in: As grime is: live, cancelling coverage, and press that con Preventing th ing is a form o But the big isn't grime m there would s attempt to stc live grime soc buying public lar fast and fu sounding lyri Maybe grime ple have a pri black kids on something cr not that gooc you don't list The chari only act to b but he was d recognisable by the NME. While I'r big thanks to labels and ad to comprom said to have rouse the enthusia of pupils as if they were fugitive birds, to be tempted out of trees with nuts. The logical outcome of this policy is that children will eventu ally learn only how to handle comput ers, change the wheels of cars and submit applications for credit cards. Even some upmarket schools offer curriculum options that allow pupils to sidestep anything difficult. This is crazy. Real learning cannot be easy, except to a few prodigies. Of course, inner-city schools have little use for Simon de Montfort. But the relentless pruning of aspirations for history teaching even in good secondary schools should dismay us all. Most of the QCA's thinking represents appeasement rather than remedy.

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David Arkin 2005

Max Hastings

The past 500 years have been dominated by westerners, so there's little point teaching children about other societies

The British educational establishment is defeatist about reconciling new Britons to our sense of cultural identity

This is the country of Drake and Pepys, not Shaka Zulu

Most of the coverage given to last week's report from the government's Qualifications and Curriculum Authority focused upon the decline of school language studies. Because I am a historian by background and inclination, my own attention fell upon its remarks about history. It expresses concern about the overwhelming Nazi focus. It argues that schools "undervalue the overall contribution of black and other minority ethnic peoples to Britain's past, and ... ignore their cultural, scientific and many other achievements". History, says the QCA, plays "an increasingly marginal role" in both primary and secondary schools, because of "a perception that it has only limited relevance to many pupils' future working lives". On the first of these points - the Hitler obsession - few thinking people will disagree. Even to me, who has written half-a-dozen books about the second world war, it seems quite wrong to allow teenagers to make that period their only encounter with the past. It should not be difficult to broaden the agenda for pupils who want to specialise in modern tyranny. They might, for instance, undertake comparative studies of Hitler, Stalin, Mao Zedong and Pol Pot, the 20th century's great mass murderers. Stalin and Mao command less interest than Hitler because no pictures exist of their crimes comparable with movie images of the Holocaust. In an age dominated by visual images, many find it hard to acknowledge any reality unless they see it on screen. There may be a second reason for this relative lack of interest. More than a few academics harbour a visceral reluctance to acknowledge that what was done in the name of communism should be judged by the same standard as the deeds of fascism. The QCA further urges a need to give more positive attention to the part of minorities in Britain's history. The authority's thinking is easy to understand: to a teenager of West Indian or Muslim background, medieval

exchequer practice or 19th century poor law seem remote. Surely we can offer such children knowledge that strikes a chord with their own heritage. Yet how is it possible to do much of this in a British school without distorting the western experience, which any one living here is signed up to? Pupils obviously focus their historical studies on the experience of subject races under foreign rule. But, as a profound sceptic about multiculturalism, I can't see the case for such an agenda, unless the vast majority of British people are to pretend to be something they are not. It may justly be asserted that - for instance - the Muslim peoples of the Middle East sustained much higher cultural values in the 12th and 13th centuries than the European crusaders they fought; that many Indian peoples possessed more impressive heritages than our own. But the world's development in the past 500 years has been dominated, for good or ill, by what westerners have thought and done. Other societies, again no matter whether for good or ill, have been losers whose power to determine their own destinies, never mind anyone else's, has been small. History is the story of the dominance, however unjust, of societies that display superior energy, ability, technology and might. If one's own people were victims of western imperialism, it is entirely understandable that one should wish to study history from their viewpoint. But, whatever the crimes of our forebears, this is the country of Drake, Clive and Kitchener, not of Tipu Sultan, Shaka Zulu or the Mahdi. Finally, there is the QCA's alarm call about the perceived "lack of relevance" of history to pupils' future working lives. This echoes the notorious remarks of Charles Clarke, when education secretary, dismissing medieval and classical studies. At the weekend, I glanced at some of my old school essays. The questions seem interesting. "Should one think of Henry II as a lawless and arbitrary monarch, or as the founder of an orderly legal and administrative system?" "Why did Edward I succeed in Wales and fail in Scotland?" "Can any-

thing be said in favour of James I's foreign policy?" Even in 1961, one could scarcely argue that familiarity with such themes contributed much to employability. They were no more "relevant" to middle-class white teenagers than to schoolchildren of West Indian or Muslim origins now. We addressed them, first, because education is properly about learning to think, and objectively to assess evidence; second, so that we knew something about a broad sweep of the history of the society to which, whether by birth or migration, we belonged. We were developing a sense of British cultural identity, which no amount of social engineering can honestly relocate far from Crecy and Waterloo, Pepys and Newton. The British educational establishment is today defeatist about reconciling new Britons to this. Yet a Washington historian told me recently that he often sees tears in the eyes of young Korean and Mexican Americans when he reads Lincoln's Gettysburg address to them. Why not likewise here? British education is increasingly perceived as a utilitarian process: all disciplines seeking to rouse the enthusiasm of pupils as if they were fugitive birds, to be tempted out of trees with nuts. The logical outcome of this policy is that children will eventually learn only how to handle computers, change the wheels of cars and submit applications for credit cards. Even some upmarket schools offer curriculum options that allow pupils to sidestep anything difficult. This is crazy. Real learning cannot be easy, except to a few prodigies. Of course, inner-city schools have little use for Simon de Montfort. But the relentless pruning of aspirations for history teaching even in good secondary schools should dismay us all. Most of the QCA's thinking represents appeasement rather than remedy.

4.7.6 The sacred and the necessary evil

The analysis below briefly looks into the notion of the Jew as an enemy figure subverting Our high ideals. Building on Durkheim (1912/2001) and Geertz (1973), the theologian Gordon Lynch (2007) examines the notions of the sacred and the profane in twenty-first

century Western popular culture. Despite the general assumptions of a secularized society (2007:2), for Lynch, sacred discourse is still infused in social life in the shape of norms which must be maintained to preserve society and highlight “evil that threatens to profane and pollute it, whether paedophiles, tyrants or terrorists” (2011¹⁰²). Lynch defines the sacred as:

Our sense of moral reality. It is a sense of the reality which underpins our lives, that we are often unaware of, unconscious of. We only become conscious of it in that moment that the sacred is profaned or bridged in some way. (RSA talk, 2011)

Far from being solely the conventional canon of religions, the sacred should thus be understood as a set of beliefs, values and symbols which ground identity and meaning in a social, political and cultural context (Lynch, 2007:129). Popular culture, either cinema or retail therapy (Lynch, 2007:129), can also serve such a functionalist understanding of religious needs.

Hence, the ritualised commitment and emotional intensity of the conflict’s coverage (2000-2010) marked those things around which the ingroup found its internal cohesion and—by extension—its differentiation from other groups. Referring to the 2006 Lebanon War and the 2008-2009 Gaza War, Lynch writes the following in an article aptly titled “The Gaza flotilla as sacred drama”:

the Israeli government is once again cast as profaning core sacred forms of Western modernity—human rights and the sacrality of the care of children—as well as the institution of international law which upholds these sacred forms. (2010)

Accordingly, in the Gaza Flotilla reports:

the conflict has moved from the decks of the boarded ships to various media spaces in which the narrative of the Israeli assault as a profanation of sacred values is being constructed and contested (Lynch, 2010).

In other words, the news story interweaves Our moral sense which underpins Our life (Lynch, 2011), and to which the Israeli-Jew appears as an offence.

¹⁰² RSA talk (18 October 2011).

The notion of the sacred then links the secular tenets of both newspapers with that which is, nonetheless, organized as a higher set of consecrated principals. Lynch's necessary stimulus of profanation as underlining that which is sacred correlates with the analysis of the Jew as a necessary evil in Christian thought. One such text is St. Augustine's *City of God* (*De civitate Dei*, 413–426 CE). For Augustine, Jews were enemies of God “for your sake” (quoting Romans, 11:28)¹⁰³ and thus should be oppressed but not destroyed, their suffering being a symbol of “the gravity of their error and the reality of their punishment” (Jeremy Cohen, 1999:33). A “hardening has come upon part of Israel” (Romans 11:25), continues Augustine, making the Jew the necessary enemy until “the full number of the Gentiles comes in. And so all Israel will be saved” (Romans 11:25-26). Fredriksen points out that it was only due to Augustine's doctrine that Jews survived at all as a scattered people under Christendom. However, Fredriksen also holds that Augustine's doctrine contributed to the near demise of Jews later on. Indeed, about a millennium later, Martin Luther, the key figure of the Protestant Reformation, called for the burning of synagogues and the destruction of Jewish homes so “you and we may all be free of this insufferable devilish burden—the Jews...” (*On The Jews and Their Lies*, 1543). Luther writes:

Such a desperate, thoroughly evil, poisonous, and devilish lot are these Jews, who for these fourteen hundred years have been and still are our plague, our pestilence, and our misfortune [...]

And concludes “We are at fault for not slaying them” (1543). Four centuries later Luther was quoted at the bottom of every page of the Nazi *Der Stürmer* with the words “The Jews are our misfortune” (rehearsed by Heinrich von Treitschke in the 1880s). To conclude, echoing those who once were blind to the ‘spirit’ behind the law, the Israeli-Jew's possessiveness for lands misses the value of living peacefully on the land; her rage for controlling power dismisses her growing international isolation (enacted by ‘common folk’ states); she contentedly shoots children using snipers (and roadblocks to smother life itself) since—due to her particularism and arrogant Chosenness—she cannot see care for non-Jews as worthwhile. While the Israeli-Jew's home is made of roadblocks' cement and barbwire she still cannot see the error of her own ways. Below, I review the Greimas Semiotic Square as a useful formulation of the trilateral relationalities of the Arab, Jew and the Idea-of-Europe.

¹⁰³ Romans (11:28) reads “As concerning the Gospel, they are enemies for your sakes: but as touching the election, they are beloved for the fathers' sakes.”

4.8 The Greimas Semiotic Square

*One should beware of believing that the inventive mind
operates according to chance*

DESTUTT DE TRACY (CITED IN GREIMAS AND RASTIER, 1968)

Critical to this study's theorization of rhetorical oppositions is the model presented by Algirdas Greimas and François Rastier, which is known as the Greimas Semiotic Square (1968, also Greimas, 1966). This macrostructure model, titled by the authors as the "elementary structure of meaning" (1968:87), is constituted as a four-cell diagram constituting four relational key signifying terms. Applied to the study of cultural objects (myths, literature, visuals, etc.) and semiotics, this isomorphic model configures sporadic literal artefacts into a complex, yet coherent, converging relationships of meanings and values. Hence, fundamental experiences which define human interactions (love, death, commercial goods, etc.) are expressed in the model as a "semiotic grammar" of discursive forms (Greimas and Rastier, 1968:105). Such a systematic structure transforms any of the enunciated substances into material language, morphemes or styles that are particular to any spoken language and cultural domains (Greimas and Rastier, 1968:87).


The model is based on the idea that, logically, any semiotic system could be "opposed by another system which is its contrary" (Greimas and Rastier, 1968:87). For example, the *contraries* of 'hot' and 'cold' (under the heading 'Absolute Temperature') as being *contradictory* to the *contraries* of 'not-cold' and 'not-hot' (under the heading 'Proportional Temperature').

An elementary working of this square is as follows (see *Graph 5*). The 'complex' horizontal S axis includes the contrary positions s_1 and s_2 , hence $S = s_1 + s_2$, and the 'neutral' horizontal axis includes the contrary positions of $\bar{S} = \bar{s}_1 + \bar{s}_2$. Both axes constitute a contradictory relation of $s_1 + \bar{s}_1$ and $s_2 + \bar{s}_2$. Looking at the vertical deixis, in the column of permissible prescriptions s_1 implies \bar{s}_2 and in the column of forbidden interdictions (or prohibitions) s_2 implies \bar{s}_1 , *but not the reverse*. The chart's *flow* can be explained by the quality of its oppositions: *contrary* oppositions defined as 'so related

that one *or neither* but not both must be true,’ and *contradictory* oppositions defined as ‘so related that one and only one must be true.’ As examined below, it is the square’s property of *particular* flow of implications that reveal its key ideological positioning: that which defines its terms as opposed to being defined by them.

The authors give the example of permissible and unacceptable sexual relations for French men in 1960s traditional French society. The original contrary opposition is between ‘normal’ and prescribed matrimonial sexual relations (by a married couple) and abnormal and forbidden sexual relations (such as homosexuality or incest). This binary is then contradictory to the opposition of ‘normal’ and not forbidden sexual relations (such as adultery by men) and ‘abnormal’ and non-prescribed sexual relations (for example, adultery by women). In this example \bar{S}_2 , as “not forbidden,” is the contradictory to the original contrary S_1 where matrimonial relations are “prescribed,” not “forbidden” but also not desired.

Graph 5: The Greimas Logical Square in use: permissible and unacceptable sexual relations (Greimas and Rastier, 1968:93)



Accordingly, \bar{S}_2 appears as the square’s giveaway, being the contradictory *non*-prohibition to the contrary prohibition (S_2) of the original prescription (S_1). Put more plainly, \bar{S}_2 represents the contradictory to the contrary, or a deduction masked by a double negative to the original binary opposition. \bar{S}_2 then is the position which is meant to remain invisible, “not so much asserted as assumed” (Shohat and Stam, 1994:200), as

it regulates both what is permissible and forbidden as well as that which is presupposed or left unquestioned.

When looking into the Arab-Israeli conflict through the square's "deep structure" I thus suggest the following. The S_1 position is reserved to the Jew, the nearly two millennia-long theological Other who is guilty of theological treachery (Turner, 1983) and tyrannical tendencies. The Muslim-Arab, Europe's political 'enemy at the gates' since the Seventh century, yet eventually politically 'weak,' is positioned in S_2 . While, in this original *contrary* of Arab and Jew, only one or neither can be true but not both; it is always the *contradictory* in \bar{S}_2 and \bar{S}_1 —or Us as Not-Arab and Not-Jew—which is *always* true (and its oppositions always wrong) "by a relation of double presuppositions" (Greimas and Rastier, 1968).

As above, I wish to suggest that \bar{S}_2 reveals the ideological motivation of masking power as norms and History as Nature. Accordingly, Our aggression in the name of Our values is made legitimate since its promise of progress is assumed to be shared universally. For example, the presumption that the Palestinian-Arab would imitate Our imagined values (human rights, adherence to the international law, anti-racism, democracy etc.) and leave her values behind (imagined as inferior), naturalises Our 'role in the world' as agents of progress and civilisation. In the same breath the Israeli-Jew, with her archaic theological particularism, aims to subvert this universal civilisation moulded after Us. *Graph 6* applies such a configuration.


Graph 6: Applying the Greimas Square to the research findings

Israeli-Jew

- Evil enemy to world peace: 'Not like-Us'
- Intentional and mechanical violence
- Racist, religious possessiveness for lands
- Child-killers, an affront to Our values
- Archaic, wishes to control History
- Victimiser, not victim

Palestinian-Arab

- Malleable, want to be 'like-Us'
- Irrational violence: helpless and passive
- Governed by Nature, amoral 'children of the desert'
- Childlike, in awe of Our values
- 'Discovered': brought into History
- Victim, not victimiser



Not-Arab

- A moral model for others to follow
- A rational, powerful agency
- Civilising mission
- Paternalistic, a moral yardstick
- The subject of History
- Saviour, adventurer

Not-Jew

- Global 'peace police'
- Legitimate violence upholding a liberal world order
- Cosmopolitan, free of dogmas, anti-racist
- Saviour of children
- New count of History (IAD, arguably also post-WWII)
- Fighting evil

For instance, They (S_1) are child killers and archaic, They (S_2) are child-like and politically immature and We (\bar{S}_2 and \bar{S}_1), in opposition to both, are a paternal standard of civilisation: We save children, protect fledgling nations and punish the wicked. The section below stands for the conclusion of this research hypothesis.

4.9 What is Critical Solidarity?

Critical Solidarity (CS) is best conceptualised as a theoretical form of Peace Journalism (Galtung, 2000; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005; Kempf, 2007; Manoff, 1998) dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict from the perspective of the liberal British news media. CS is relevant to both news producers *and* consumers, specifically in highlighting where the British news media *tends to get it wrong* when reporting on the Arab-Israeli conflict, rather than what they *should do* to ‘get it right’ (see Margalit’s notion of “negative politics,” 2004:112). Albeit coming out of the findings themselves, CS stands as the conclusion of the theoretical section and as an additional framework of analysis.

CS is unique due to three key factors. First it aims at a *non-segmented advocacy of rights*. This *tripartisan* approach aims to avoid the conflict’s manipulation of human value in which the human freedoms of some humans are upheld, while those of others are disregarded. Secondly, CS holds that for criticism to be generative, instead of degenerative, it needs to be empathetic to non-elites, avoiding scorched-earth criticism. In the same instant, for empathy to be generative, instead of degenerative, it needs to have a critical awareness of power structures, thus avoiding anaemic, ineffectual empathy (see Kahane, 2010). Thirdly, CS highlights the need to reduce cultural distance between societies in conflict.

CS thus aims to expedite avoiding the conflict’s manipulation of human worth in the news media. As Amartya Sen puts it:

[I]t is unsustainable to have a defence of the freedoms of human beings that separates out some people whose liberty matters from others not to be included in that select category. (RSA talk, 7 July 2010)

Or, as put by Aldous Huxley, “The propagandist’s purpose is to make one set of people forget that certain other sets of people are human” (1936). As shown in the findings, such forgetfulness holds a materialist actuality in which the respective human populations are separated by positioning within the newspaper (first/last pages, upper/lower fold, etc.), prominence (headlines and images) and pre-assigned choices of wordings and grammatical structures. Reflecting on such separation in the media framing of the conflict, Wolfsfeld quotes Gamson on how “only one injustice frame at a time is allowed

into this form of discourse” (1992:56). After all, writes Wolfsfeld, it would be “quite confusing to have two sets of victims” (1997:150, see also Mutua, 2001). Nonetheless, resonating with the notion of double Orientalism, “the feuding neighbours frame does seem to have two villains,” writes Wolfsfeld (1997:150). CS then teases out the propensity in conflict news reporting in which:

*What ever empathy is gained by group A is lost to group B,
and
what ever censure expressed against group B is withheld from group A.*

How can a non-segmented solidarity and criticism adopt different shapes in the news media? CS can be formulated as follows:

Empathy towards non-elite people on all sides:
since promoting the human rights of one group while denying those of another culminates in politicising and instrumentalising them.

Criticism towards all authorities on all sides:
since moral indifference to authorities’ wrongdoing, or ‘putting up with anything,’ is not an act of kindness but an insult.

CS sees both generative solidarity *and* generative criticism as acts of giving and recognition. On the one hand, generative solidarity calls for empathetic engagement and *improvement without illusions*: seeing the other as other, and avoiding boundless, narcissistic and utopian aspirations. On the other hand, generative criticism calls for an analysis of power without jumping to dystopian suspicions and projections. The point here is not that a balance can be struck once and for all, but to keep returning to the practice with fewer illusions.

Hannah Arendt (2007) articulates a correlating conciliation of criticism and solidarity with her notion of “Solitaire-Solidaire” (solitude-solidarity): to be involved but of one’s

own mind, empathetic but also detached.¹⁰⁴ Said writes of the “combination of intimacy and distance” (1978:259) in which cosmopolitan humanism firstly means a fresh look inward and the ability to judge one’s home with a certain “spiritual detachment and generosity” (1978:259). “[T]o stand away from “home” in order to look at it with exile’s detachment” (Said, 2000:185).

Exemplifying degenerative criticism, Said questions what he sees as a harmful *withdrawal* of censure regarding the Arab world (al-Ahram, 21-27 June 2001).¹⁰⁵ Dealing with state control and dissent in the Arab world, Said writes:

Because of Israel’s abominable behaviour toward Palestinians, most Arabs—myself included—have tended to direct our criticism less on the general situation in the Arab world than we might ordinarily do. [...] If we accuse Israel of what it has done to the Palestinians, we must be willing to apply exactly the same standards of behaviour to our own countries. This norm is as true for the American as for the Arab and the Israeli intellectual, who must criticize human rights abuses from a universal point of view, not simply when they occur within the domain of an officially designated enemy.

Hence, for criticism to be generative it must apply to all authorities on all sides, not only to “designated” enemies.

Al-Ali makes similar remarks regarding degenerative criticism, following her experiences with British activists during the late 1990s. She writes:

I was also involved in the British-based anti-sanctions movement, but often felt uncomfortable with the frequently apologetic tone when it came to the regime of Saddam Hussain. Many of my Iraqi friends shared the frustration and even anger that some of the anti-sanctions groups and individual activists who in the process of condemning British and American policies in Iraq, particularly the sanctions regime, often glorified the Ba'ath regime and dictatorship of Saddam Hussain. (2011:100)

In the context of the conflict, Al-Ali’s “transnationalism from below” (2009:6) and “transnational feminism” which is “going beyond false universalism” (2009:5) could, to my mind, apply as a form of Critical Solidarity relevant to Palestinian and Israeli women

¹⁰⁴ Following Scholem’s accusations that Arendt was “not being Jewish” when criticising the Jewish Judenräte (Arendt, 2007).

¹⁰⁵ <http://www.mafhoum.com/press/52P7.htm> (accessed 15 July 2016). See also Khalidi (1997:203).

invested in anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, Peace-building and post-conflict processes (to use Al-Ali, 2009:6).

Looking into international news reporting, Paul Slovic (2007) laments the little empathy appearing in the early coverage of the Darfur crisis alongside the invisible presence, at the time, of Sudan's President Omar Al Bashir. In his paper "Psychic Numbing and Genocide" (2007), Slovic discusses how "ABC news allotted a total of 18 minutes on the Darfur genocide in its nightly newscasts in 2004, NBC had only five minutes, and CBS only three minutes" (2007:82). Slovic (2007)¹⁰⁶ also notes how, during his lectures, he used to ask if anyone in the audience knew the name of the President of Sudan, or had seen his picture. Almost no one did or had. As above, degenerative empathy of non-elites occurred alongside degenerative criticism of elites, and a convenient sheltered existence in news reports in the West for Al-Bashir and the Khartoum regime.

Lastly, the *Guardian's* Jonathan Steele himself remarked on the Western media's "one-sided coverage" and "outright propaganda" in its *uncritical* acceptance of pro-mujahedin violence when the enemy was the Soviet Union (quoted in Brian McNair, 1988:60). *Figure 31* exemplifies such degenerative criticism with a 1993 *Independent* article featuring Osama Bin Laden as a "mujahedin legend" (Robert Fisk, 6 December).¹⁰⁷ References to Bin Laden's "peace" efforts, "large-scale building projects," "gold-fringed robe" or "high cheekbones" exemplify such mock-reverence which tolerates what it finds to be wrong in significant ways, yet puts it 'aside, but not away.'

¹⁰⁶ Talk at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University (2007), two years prior to the ICC arrest warrant against Al-Bashir.

¹⁰⁷ To clarify, Fisk writes *to, not against*, supportive US policies for the mujahedeen, or "our brothers," as former US President Ronald Reagan called the mujahedeen in 1981 (Kumar, 2012:72).

Figure 31: RT and Osama Bin Laden in the Independent (6 December 1993)



In contrast to these examples, CS's *generative* criticism calls for a 'healthy' unease, or "an ethic of discomfort" (to use Foucault, 1979/1997:448) with one's own ingroup's commitments and ideas.

An example of *avoiding* scorched earth criticism can be found in Mahatma Gandhi's view of the English people and the British Empire. For Gandhi, fighting the British rule in India did not mean hating the English people. In an LSE talk (10 November 1931), in a reply to a question about his love for the "Englishman" and dislike for the "British Government," Gandhi remarked:

Man is superior to his method. A man's method may be vile, and yet you may not apply the adjective to the man himself... [...] if I have humanity in me, I should love the Britisher that God had made, and yet I detest his method and I am doing my best to destroy his methods.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸Ramachandra Guha (LSE talk, 25 October 2011)

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=1212>; <https://thewire.in/77770/gandhi-west-africa-exploring-affinities/>

Degenerative Empathy

Moving from degenerative criticism to degenerative empathy, Paul Bloom's ideas on "rational compassion," which he titles *Against Empathy* (2016, 2016a), correlates with CS. To be clear, Bloom is concerned with only the specific case of empathy where psychological processes of prosocial care are applied through vicariously feeling what others are feeling. Accordingly, Bloom differentiates empathy from the mental processes of compassion and kindness (quoting, for example, Singer and Klimecki, 2014; Jordan, Amir, Bloom, 2016).

Put succinctly, Bloom visualises empathy as a spotlight, or a highly focused attention magnifier, zooming-in even to the extent of being parochial and bigoted. Contrarily, Bloom visualises his appeal for "rational empathy" (2016) as a drone survey (talk with Steve Paikin, 14 Feb 2017) maximising one's impact while seeking the bigger picture and a degree of cerebral distance.

Bloom's main contention with empathy is thus its all-encompassing emotionality which can lead to narrow-mindedness and bias. Such concern is especially relevant to media stories about globally remote others. For example, Bloom (2016) brings Paul Slovic's example of how a missing of an 18-year-old American student, Natalee Holloway, received far more attention than the ongoing genocide in Darfur (Slovic, 2007). Bloom cites a host of studies highlighting how the empathetic act of figuratively imagining oneself in someone else's shoes is: a) open to ingroup bias, b) innumerate, favouring empathy with one or a few persons over thousands or millions (Bloom, 2016; Kogut and Ritov, 2005 and 2005a), c) favouring the 'identifiable victim' over unknown or remote victims, and d) favouring ongoing issues over future issues or preventable measures. Examples of empathy as divisive and discriminatory include a study in which male soccer fans showed more empathetic neural response to those described as fans of their own team over those of the opposing team (Hein et al., 2010). In another study, looking at the neural activation in the anterior cingulate cortex, less empathy was shown towards those said to be infected by AIDS through intravenous drug use (and hence due to poor personal choices) than to those who were infected with AIDS by a blood transfusion (Decety, et al., 2010).

Bloom also reflects on empathy “as a tool,” which “can also be exploited to motivate people to harm others” and to “generate animosity towards outgroups” (2016). Here, empathy can be instrumentalised and weaponised. For example, Buffone and Poulin (2014, quoted in Bloom, 2016), show how, in a competition setting, participants who were motivated to feel empathy for a certain student administered a larger dose of hot sauce to her competitor. On the relationality between empathy and aggression, Bloom quotes Adam Smith as follows:

When we see one man oppressed or injured by another, the sympathy which we feel with the distress of the sufferer seems to serve only to animate our fellow-feeling with his resentment against the offender. We are rejoiced to see him attack his adversary in his turn, and are eager and ready to assist him. (1790/2006:69)

Bloom thus comments that “When some people think about empathy, they think about kindness, I think about war” (2016a:188). For example, Bloom notes how gruesome accounts of Saddam Hussein and his sons “were used to support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003” (2016). Indeed, in 1991, stories about premature Kuwaiti babies thrown out of their incubators by Iraqi troops were contributory to a subsequent US invasion (Kellner, 1992:399; *New York Times*, 28 February 1991).

The findings chapters, in line with Bloom, thus exhibit how empathy can become instrumentalised, gained by some while being denied to others. In line with the analysis of news values above, such as simplicity, immediacy, drama and ethnocentrism (Wolfsfeld, 2004), storytelling media outlets stir *towards* empathy as a biased and innumerate spotlight. In contrast, CS reflects Bloom’s rational compassion in which generative empathetic engagement and critical engagement are interwoven together. Where the spotlight, zooming-in mode of empathetic connection is more emotive, associative, stereotypic, tribal and instinctive; the big-picture drone-mode of critical solidarity is more rational, calculating, effective, independent, conscious and effortful. It is the constant tension between these two systems,¹⁰⁹ back and forth, which makes them both more affective and effective.

¹⁰⁹ Not unlike Kahneman and Tversky’s System 1 and System 2 (1974; Kahneman, 2011).

Hence, Mother Teresa's quote:

"If I look at the mass I will never act. If I look at the one, I will"
(quoted in Slovic, 2007),

Could be paraphrased as:

*Acting for the one I cerebrally slow down so I will not overlook the mass;
acting for the mass I am emotionally open so I will not overlook the one.*

5. METHODOLOGY

The basic remit of this research probes at attitudes in the British liberal press towards non-elite people from non-elite countries (Galtung and Vincent, 1992). When choosing a methodology for such a study one considers the strength and flexibility of a given system of "laws of reason" (Feyerabend, 2001:12) and its claims to extracting meaning. In other words, how helpful is a given methodology in understanding how knowledge is created and for what purpose? Yet methodology within the social sciences is limited in its production of non-conflicting 'truth claims' relating to its subject of study (Fowler, 1991:68). Both the processes of producing and analysing meaningful content are complex and irreducible (see Jäger and Maier, 2009:36). Just as there is no 'normative reality' readily available in neatly separated, arithmetical categories (Potter, 1996:115), so do representations of reality do not magically lend themselves to nucleus, enunciative modalities. Rather, *both* representations and their unpacking allow for other incommensurabilities, silences and counter memories (Foucault, 1980) to be patchworked into the "infinite text" (Laclau, 1980:87) of the social fabric.

Due to the contested nature of the conflict, the methodology applied in this research was chosen for its rudimentary features. To borrow from Popper (1935), these aim to be: a) systematised and transparent, b) reproducible, c) able to trace the conjunctive leap from theory to practice and, d) able to use thick descriptions (Geertz, 1973) when linking

phenomena and explanation. The section below reviews how such approaches were implemented throughout the research.

5.1 The choice of the Guardian and the Independent as case studies

I chose the *Guardian* as my main case study due to its liberal ethos, central position in Britain, and its loyal readership among Britain's intellectual, political and media elites. The *Guardian* thus makes for a good case study from which to extract generalised cognitions about social trends and progressive thinking in Britain. Commenting on quality newspapers, Richardson writes "The reproduction of "racial ideologies" is particularly consequential given the educated, empowered and economically successful status of broadsheet readers" (2004:50). Below, I first review the *Guardian* and then the *Independent*.

The *Guardian's* history, and its own narration of this history, speaks to its legacy as a quality, liberal publication and hence as an adequate candidate for the study of liberal forms of racism in Britain. First published by John Edward Taylor in 1821 as *The Manchester Guardian*, Taylor witnessed the Peterloo Massacre in Manchester (16 August 1819) and looked for a campaigning platform from which to tell the story of the events. A prospectus explaining this mission remarked:

it will zealously enforce the principles of civil and religious Liberty... it will... tend to promote the moral advantage or the political welfare of the community.

When C.P. Scott was appointed editor (1872-1927), the newspaper vitalised its principled roots, e.g., in its support for parliamentary reforms, women's suffrage or opposition to the Second Boer War (1899-1902). Yet while Scott opposed "militaristic, annexationist imperialism" he did not oppose

a 'true' imperialism that emphasized voluntary emigration 'devoted to cultivation and commerce not conquest', and self-supporting colonies patterned after the ancient Greek example rather than the Pax Romana. (Hampton 2001:180)

In the *Guardian's* 2006 report titled *Living Our Values*, C.P. Scott is quoted as laying out the newspaper's values as being "Honest, cleanness, courage, fairness, a sense of duty to

the reader and the community” (1921, 2006:5). Indeed, the report marks the *Guardian*’s goal “to become the leading trusted liberal voice in the world” (2006:4). However, the section titled “Fairness: Israel-Palestine” (2006:13-16), boasts a deep pro-Zionist bias by C.P. Scott, saying that “[T]he *Guardian*’s subsequent editor WP Crozier turned the paper into a tool of Zionist advocacy” (2006:13). The report then devotes half a page to review Daphna Baram’s 2004 book (titled *Disenchantment: the Guardian and Israel*, published by the *Guardian*), which plays down accusations that the newspaper was “anti-Israeli” (2004:13). But do “cleanness” and “fairness” not contradictory to “advocacy” and bias?

The *Guardian* 2006 report also quotes from the foreword to Baram’s book that “the evidence showed that the paper was neither anti-semitic nor anti-Zionist” (2004:13). Yet the charges of an Orientalist anti-Arab slant is *never even brought forward, let alone discussed*.

Still, the 2006 report quotes Baram as follows:

The *Guardian* has always been *obsessed* with the question of Israel-Palestine, carries a burden of guilt and responsibility for its part in its creation, and constantly seeks ways to get it right (emphasis added).

Again, such self-grandising Eurocentric notions as carrying the “burden,” “guilt,” and “responsibility” smacks of Kipling’s White Man’s Burden (1899) and Gilroy’s postcolonial melancholia (2004).

While the *Guardian* makes the key case study of this thesis, the *Independent* is a suitable secondary source for cross-examination since both compete for the same market share. As the *Independent*’s former editor, Andrew Marr (1996-1998) writes, “we were the nearest to the *Guardian*” (2005:199). In contrast to the *Guardian*’s long history, the *Independent* was founded in 1986 at a time when new technologies and decreased production costs attracted new investments (Seaton and Curran, 2003:99). The *Independent* aimed to break “away from the old world of proprietors” (Marr, 2005:191) in which newspaper’s editorial thinking was made to toe the line of its ownership’s political leanings. The *Independent*, as the name suggests, would be neither left nor right, but would break the stronghold and “bi-partisan tradition of journalism” (Seaton and Curran, 2003:99) pertained in the 1990s. Still, in March 2010 the *Independent* and

Independent on Sunday newspapers were sold to the Lebedev family for £1,¹¹⁰ and on 26 March 2016 the *Independent* stopped its print edition and moved to a digital only format.

The *Independent* describes itself as a “proudly liberal newspaper” (27 January 2013)¹¹¹ and even “radical”,¹¹² a term also used by *Guardian* editors.

5.2 Research sample

Given the foundation of this study on Peace Journalism, I look mainly at the coverage of key peace moments. Roughly, these amount to about 300 articles between the *Guardian* and the *Independent*. The peace moments reviewed include the entire months of July and December 2000. The first was the Camp David peace summit (97 articles) and the latter the historic peace negotiations around the Clinton parameters (111 articles). I also mention a few isolated examples from the coverage of the peace talks since 2001. The use of blocks of an entire month is useful, since it reduces a pick-and-choose bias, increases coding reliability and allows for the study of *omissions* of trends and themes, not only commissions.

I also include shorter findings sections, which appear as general findings (*Chapter 8*). These sections, which are smaller in scope, aim to give a more generalized sense of the reportage and their sample is also more widespread, looking at the years 2000-2010. Considering the intersection of Orientalism, Eurocentrism, Whitecentrism, Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, this introductory and broader examination also includes comparative analysis of news in both newspapers relating to Arabs, non-Europeans, non-whites, Muslims or non-Israeli Jews. In addition, these findings sections review themes related to non-elite people which appear more sporadically than, say, a peace summit. These sections include a quantitative review of the appearance of keywords, an analysis of the

¹¹⁰ <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/press/independent-titles-sold-to-lebedev-family-company-1927436.html>, accessed 27 May 2012.

¹¹¹ <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/editorial-a-liberal-gamble-too-far-8468336.html>

¹¹² <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/jun/05/theindependent.pressandpublishing>

coverage of the history of the conflict, an analysis of comparisons between Jews and Nazis, and an examination of reports about Palestinian and Israeli women.

Originally, I also examined the 2006 Lebanon war (13 July to 13 August), the January 2006 PA elections (from December 2005 to February 2006), and selected reports covering children victims of violence. Yet due to lack of space these analyses were left out.

In *Section 6.2*, reviewing the conflict's history, I use three online timeline resources, as further discussed below. All the analysed articles (apart from these three timelines) were collected from the print, *not* the online, editions of both newspapers. This process entailed hundreds of photocopies from scanned microfiche located at the British Library. I chose the print editions since their limited space and rich visual layout gives a more concentrated pronouncement about how editors make “sense of relevant events” or “what is at issue” (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989:3).

Finally, I apply an inter-textual “multi-genre study” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001:125), considering the textual and visual context (Jäger and Maier, 2001:55) of the entire newspaper, including opinion pieces, cartoons, graphs, obituaries and the various supplements (G2, Weekend, etc.). The consistent appearances of reports about the conflict across these diversified genres verify the *continuity* of the story and how it resonates within British society, as seen through the prism of both newspapers.

5.3 Content and discourse analysis

I use quantitative content analysis to highlight the frequency of selected themes (Holstie, 1969; Gunter, 1999), and qualitative discourse analysis to explore nuanced meanings and linguistic constructions. Looking into Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (e.g., Fowler, 1979, 1991; van Dijk, 1993, 1996, 1998; Fairclough, 1989, 1995; Wodak, 1996b, 2001), and ‘critical linguistics’ (Fowler et al. 1979; Fairclough 1985, 1989), this study examines how ideology, sociocultural structures and power relations are manifested within linguistic forms, semiotics and shared cognitions.

As Van Dijk puts it, giving the multi-faceted nature of discourse itself, discourse analysis (DA) exists on the crossroads between linguistics, psychology and the social sciences such as sociology or history (2005:5). As an analysis of linguistics DA highlights coherences sometimes to large amounts of text as embedded within grammar, wording, schematic forms or overall topics. In psychology, DA looks into cognition, memory, comprehension, metaphors, and techniques of denial and appropriation. In the social sciences, DA scrutinizes broader social interactions and communications within and between societies.

Discourse analysis complements content analysis as it asks what social cognitions can be made from examining certain discursive appearances and analysing their results? For van Dijk then, discourse analysis looks at:

subtle modifications of intonation or volume in speech, syntax, lexical choice, topic selection, storytelling, argumentation or conversational strategies in order to detect underlying prejudices of language users and the institutions they represent. (2005:6)

CDA explores how regimented, already in circulation, discursive patterns and “overall frameworks of interpretations” (van Dijk, 1993:242) link discourse, power, discriminatory practices, and social critique. CDA, notes van Dijk, is a form of a dissenting research which explicitly aims to understand, unravelling and resisting social inequality (2001:352).

This research’s anti-racism framework aims to analyse opaque and transparent structural relationships of power that appear within received wisdoms, metaphors, insinuations, idioms and clichés. Resting on Foucauldian and Gramscian analyses, such exploration decentres the personal agency of media professionals whose personal preferences are not the focus of this work. Taking up Althusser’s notion of the ideological state apparatuses (1971), this study thus employs DA as invested in macro notions of power and domination yet within their enunciation at the micro-level of discourse and practice (Wodak, 2001:115).

Below, I review three examples of analytical heuristics from the discourse analysis toolbox, (see Wodak and Meyer, 2001), that are taken up by this work.

Topicalization

In topical analysis, or Topicalization (van Dijk, 1991), one looks at the overall selection of what kind of subjects are taken up and which are left out, or the systematic attention and lack of attention to certain topics. Through such a semantic macrostructure of themes (ibid), an overall coherence of meaning appears throughout the coverage, not only within a single report or a single day. The news editors' selection criteria for topics are expressed through macropropositions in the headlines and leads, which reflect the text inside the article. In turn, readers are guided as to how to interpret the stories and the events they represent (van Dijk, 1991: 73). As van Dijk says, topics which relate to the dominant group are diverse and varied as so to reflect general public concerns, while topics which relate to minority groups are constrained. "In general," van Dijk notes

what we find is a preference for those topics that emphasize Their bad actions and Our good ones. However, Their good actions and Our bad ones are not normally emphasized by topicalization (2000:38)

As seen in the findings, Palestinians and Israeli-Jews are discussed almost exclusively through such topics as violence and backwardness. In such *template reporting*, the dates and names are changed, but the outline framing is already in place.

Passive and active transformations

Fowler (1991) shows how passive transformations are constructed by a syntactic re-ordering within the sentence structure in relation to the active equivalent. The positions of the left-hand and right-hand noun phrases are switched, so the patient (or the affected) occupies the syntactic subject position on the left-hand, which is usually associated with the agent position (1991:77, see also Billig, 2008:19). The examples below (adapted from Fowler, 1991:78) share (to a large extent) the propositional content and transitivity, yet within Halliday's functional linguistics their ideological motivation and structure are altered. These are:

- (a) 'PC shot boy from 9 inches'
- (b) 'Boy was shot by PC from 9 inches'
- (c) 'Boy was shot from 9 inches'

Both examples ‘a’ and ‘b’ incriminate the police, yet only in ‘a’ does the agency of the action, the police, appear in the *active* position, and on the left side of the noun, “implying clear responsibility” (Fowler, 1991:78). In contrast, in ‘c’, the agency of the action is deleted and replaced with the *passive* phrase “was shot.” This phrase, in turn, moves from its position on the left to the right side of the noun (from “PC shot boy” to “Boy was shot”), thus “leaving responsibility unspecified” (Fowler, 1991:78). In addition, in ‘c,’ the emphasis on the number of inches adds a syntactical complexity which dulls the heading’s focus.

In the context of RT and RD, the passive form acts as a syntactic mechanism in which moral accountability is in a constant slippage from those paternally imagined as childlike and unknowing, towards those imagined as demonic and intent on wrongdoing. Dahlgren and Chakrapani demonstrate how actions taken by Third World countries during the Cold War were reported in the U.S. televised news as having no human agency, as if an ongoing process, unfolding like Nature itself (1982). In contrast, McNair’s notion of the “Fundamental attribution of error” (2003:119) refers to attributing others full intentionality to do harm, while excluding the relevant context or circumstances.

Nominal transformations

Fowler (1991:79) comments on how the use of *derived nominals*, or predicates (verbs and adjectives) is actualised as nouns, e.g., ‘allegation’ is replaced with ‘allege.’ Such substitution allows for “substantial ideological opportunities” in the case of discourse and power, including concealment, reification and mystification (Fowler, 1991:80). Accordingly, in the sentence ‘Police investigates allegations,’ what is omitted is the full proposition, or ‘X has alleged against Y that Y did A and that B’ (ibid). The nominal form also allows for the deletion of chronological indicators (as there are no tensed verbs) and related participants.

5.4 *Visual analysis*

A key aspect of this study is the reference to images and text *together*, as a cohesive and unified semiotic system of meaning construction. Decoding such *visual journalism* reflects both the wide use of graphics aides in the reports, as well as the centrality of imagery to racialized discourse.

Hence, Shohat and Stam (1994:125) observe how the repertoire of tropes, clichés, imagery and narratives drawn from colonial and imperial discourses enable hidden voyeurism and narcissistic pleasures in contemporary mass media outlets (Shohat, 1999:216, see also Said, 1993:132; Wodak, 2001:8; Peltre, 2004:11). A variety of studies thus examine images and visual textuality (van Dijk, 1993:12). Few examples include Parry's image analysis of news coverage of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict (2010), and Robson's examination of the so-called Palestinian "Baby Bomber" photograph in news reports (2004).

Visual journalism can be summarized as the aesthetic appeal (Zelizer, 2004:122) and "visual grammar" (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006) acting as the voice or body language of the reports' literal written word. Accordingly, the images, graphs, maps, fonts, layout and lines become part of the newspapers' "moral-political discourse" (Hall, 1973:179). In an interview with Mark Porter, the *Guardian's* Head of Design (Hagai van der Horst, 2009), Porter described visual journalism as "using photography and info-graphics which are as strong as the written reporting and comment". Porter continues:

along with however good your reporting and comments and everything else is, you also have to be able to tell the whole story on a *visual level* if you are going to give a satisfying reading experience to people who only have a quarter of an hour to go through the paper.

Indeed, Porter commented on how most people read most of the newspaper on a "visual level." They may read only a fraction of the text but they will *look at all the images*. Commenting on Peace Journalism, Porter saw "a tension between being as honest as you can" and engaging "people's interest." Stripping "emotion, and subjective viewpoint[s]... is never going to be a kind of mass market form of communications," he continued. Hence, coding this rich aesthetic content reveals these stories' visual editorializing and

what readers are invited to pay attention to (Sontag 2003:104). Spiekermann neatly summarises how the visual layout acquires its instantaneous appeal:

Anyone looking at a printed message will be influenced, within a split of a second of making eye contact, by everything on the page: the arrangement of various elements as well as the individual look of each one. In other words, an overall impression is created in our minds before we even start reading the first word. It is similar to the way we respond to a person's presence before we know anything about him or her, and then later find it difficult to revise our first impression. (1993:37)

This description, when applied to familiar yet remote Others through emotive images and headings, indeed sediments such an "overall impression" before the article is even read, or what José Ortega called "understanding without knowledge" (Max-Neef, 2009).

6. FINDINGS I: INTRODUCTORY FINDINGS

6.1 UNEQUAL COVERAGE

Tell me to what you pay attention and I will tell you who you are
JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET (1959)

Looking at the *Guardian* and the *Independent* in the early 2000s, any single day might include multiple, prominent articles directly related to the conflict. These could be found on the first page, the news sections, in opinions pieces, key cartoons or Letters to the Editor. However, the conflict also appeared prominently in the obituaries pages or in the various supplements and reviews pages (films, books etc.). Such coverage included large, emotive imagery and headlines, illustrations, info-graphics and multi-page reports. What can explain theoretically this mammoth network of thousands of appearances invoking a heightened sense of attachment, passionately revisited daily, again and a fresh, over the course of years?

As discussed above, this coverage spells an unequal image of the world. For example, in considering the *Guardian's* print edition between 2000 and 2010, the keyword "Israel" (appearing 31,532 times, 3,534 in the headlines) along with the keyword "Palestinian" (appearing 13,585 times, 1,096 in the headlines)¹¹³ appeared more times together than the

¹¹³ Similarly, the key-word "Jews" appeared 2.125 times more than the key-word "Arabs" (9,064 versus 190

23 countries (representing conflict zones worldwide) shown in *Chart 5* put together: 45,117 versus 44,474 times.¹¹⁴ These two terms, “Palestinian” and “Israel,” also appeared 1.8 times (1.798 exactly) more than the key terms “global warming” (8,743 times) and “climate change” (16,346 times) put together. Also, the keyword “ Hamas” (with 4,880 appearances) appears more than *any* of the keywords in *Chart 5*, apart from Nigeria, and 2.5 times more than the keyword “Darfur.”

Chart 5. Appearances of keywords related to conflict zones worldwide in the Guardian print edition (2000-2010).

Keywords	Appearances	Comments and specific findings
“North Korea”	4,404	
“Darfur”	1,982	While the violence erupted in February 2003 (discussed in the UN on September 2003), the keyword “Darfur” appears twice in 2003, three times in 2002 and not at all between 1998 and 2002. The keyword “Janjaweed” appears zero times in 2003 and only 345 times between 2004 and 2010 and with only 13 headlines. “Omar al-Bashir,” Sudan’s President, clocks zero appearances in 2003 and only 269 appearances and four headlines between 2000 and 2010. The keyword “Sudan” appears 3,843 (2000-2010).
“Congo”	3,811	The term DRC appears 414, almost always along with the key-word “Congo.”
“Western Sahara”	133	The keyword “Polisario” appears 52 times and neighbouring Mauritania appears zero times.
“Tibet”	1,683	Tibet appears in 197 headlines, of which 82 are in 2008, the year of the Beijing Olympics. ¹¹⁵ The “Qinghai Tibet Railway” appears only 15 times. The Xinjiang region appears only 269 times and “Uyghurs” (“Uyghur”) appear only 10 times. Together, the keyword “China” appears in 4,096 headlines between 2000 and 2010, compared with 4,630 appearances of the keywords “Palestinian” and “Israel.” ¹¹⁶

4,264 times). The key-word “Israel” appeared 2.32 times more than the key-word “Palestinian.” Between 2000 and 2010 both the key-words “Jews” and “Israel” appear the most times during 2002 (1,046 and 3,646) and 2006 (1,045 and 3,857), being the height of the AAI and the 2006 Lebanon war.

¹¹⁴ See footnote 19.

¹¹⁵ Similar grievances were not directed against Britain during the 2012 London Olympics.

¹¹⁶ It is worth quoting Paul Collier that “in the 1960s Mao Zedong hurled China into ruin, to an adoring

“Eritrea”	711	Isaias Afewerki, Eritrea’s autocratic President since 1993, appears <i>three</i> times.
“Burma”	2,609	The keyword “Myanmar” appears 1,524 times. The term “Karen people” appeared 16 times, “Karen National Union” and “KNU” appeared 11 and 10 times respectively.
“Somalia”	2,570	
“Somaliland”	110	
“Yemen”	1,664	
“Mali”	1,622	
“Sierra Leone”	2,209	
“Kashmir”	2,163	The keyword “India” appears in 3,061 headlines, fewer than “Israel.”
“Central African Republic”	215	
“Chechnya”	2,254	
“Turkmenistan”	440	“Saparmurat Niyazov,” Turkmenistan’s notorious President, is mentioned 48 times.
“Nigeria”	6,719	See “Boko Haram” above.
“Ivory coast”	2,280	
“Burundi”	554	
“Uganda”	3,244	The key term “Lord’s Resistance Army” appears only 193 times, “LRA” 93 times and “Joseph Kony” 74 times.
“Kurdistan”	1,060 times	The keyword “Kurds” appears 2,229 and “PKK” appears only 255 times.
“Sri Lanka”	8,974/ 3,678	While “Sri lanka” appears 8,974 times, the terms “Sri Lanka”+“cricket” appears 5,296, leaving only 3,678 appearances that are arguably unrelated to sports. Indeed, the term “Tamil Tigers” appears only 393 times. Also, “Mahinda Rajapaksa,” Sri Lanka’s leader during the 2009 war, appears only 110 times and in only <i>two</i> headlines.
“West Papua”	91	

chorus from the Western media” (2007:66).

Looking at the chart above a standardised template journalism is revealed in which ongoing events are amplified or omitted according to predictable patterns.

As discussed above, similar omissions apply also in relation to *some* Palestinians. For example “UNRWA,” the United Nations Relief and Works Agency providing aid to five million Palestinian refugees, appears in the *Guardian* only 84 times (2000-2010). Moreover, in *Chart 6* I show how UNRWA’s 26 Palestinian refugee camps in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan appear by name only 102 times combined (with the exception of the Shatila Camp), while UNRWA’s 16 Palestinian refugee camps in the OPT appear 1,709 times combined. The Shatila Camp does not appear even once on its own, yet it appears 178 times within the term “Sabra and Shatila” (see below). “Tal al-Zaatar” received only *one* mentioning in passing and “Nahr al-Bared” received only 39 appearances and only during the 2007 onslaught (May to November). “Al-Ruwaishid camp” and “Al-Karama Camp,” two of the camps where *Iraqi*-Palestinians have settled after fleeing Iraq since 2003 received *zero* appearances. From the perspective of British high moral standing *these* Palestinians were thus not newsworthy. As further discussed below, these omissions highlight the focus, even in the liberal media, on the aggressor (the Israeli-Jew), not the victim.

Chart 6. Utterances in the Guardian print edition of Palestinian refugee camps in the Middle East (2000-2010).

	<i>Camp</i>	<i>Occurrences</i>	<i>Occurrences per country</i>
<i>Lebanon</i>	“Ein el-Hilweh”	11	229/51
	“Burj el-Barajneh”	1	
	“Burj el-Shemali”	0	
	“Mieh Mieh”	0	
	“Wavel”	0	
	“Dbayeh”	0	
	“Beddawi”	0	

	“Shatila”	0/178 (“Shatila” appears zero times on its own and 178 times within the term “Sabra and Shatila”)	
	“Nahr al-Bared”/ “Nahr el-Bared”	39 (9)	
<i>Jordan</i>	Baqa'a	0	34
	Wihdat (Amman New Camp refugee camp)	4 (0)	
	“Jabal el-Hussein”	0	
	“Husn”	2	
	“Zarqa”+“camp”	7	
	“Irbid”	10	
	“Jerash”	11 (all travel related)	
	“Souf”	0	
	“Marka”	0	
<i>Syria</i>	“Sbeineh”	0	17
	“Neirab”	0	
	“Hama”+“Palestinian” (“Hama”+“camp”)	6 (3)	
	“Homs”	11	
	Jaramana	0	
	Khan dunoun	0	
	Khan eshieh		
	Qabr Essit	0	
<i>West Bank</i>	Tulkarm	96	858
	Dheisheh	3	
	“Balata”+“refugee”	66	

	Jenin	683	
	Beit Jibrin	0	
	Shu'fat	0	
	Aqbat Jabr	0	
	Nur Shams	0	
	Qalandia (also Kalandia)	10 (7)	
Gaza	Rafah	584	851
	Khan Yunis (Khan Younis)	155 (51)	
	Jabaliya (Jabalia)	92 (30)	
	Bureij	12	
	Nuseirat	10	
	Deir El-Balah	5	
	Maghazi	3	

Another example of the politics of omissions and commissions is the appearance of the keyword “Hizbullah”¹¹⁷ in the *Guardian*. During the Second Lebanon War (July-August 2006), “Hizbullah” appears 107 times (and 140 times during 2006 itself), clocking more appearances than the remaining nine years of the examined period put together (2000-2010, with an average of 10.8 times per year). Indeed, the term “Lebanon” appears 244 times during 2006, about 500% more than the average of 47.4 appearances during 2000-2010. Such a construction of the Orient, as a reflection of Our interests (given Israel’s involvement), is evident also with the appearances of the keyword “Shia” (the Hizbullah is a Shia organisation). For example, in the wake of the 2003 Iraq War the keyword “Shia” spiked from 3 appearances in 1999 to 699 appearances in 2004. Stories relating to Shias, the “lesser Arabs” of the Middle East (Nasr, 2006:175), were simply not part of Our collective landscape before being ushered into History by the 2003 Iraq war. The same applies to the 2001 war in Afghanistan when appearances of the keyword “Taliban” spiked from 33 in 1999 and 165 in 2000 to 2,544 in 2001.

¹¹⁷ The *Guardian*’s spelling.

Still, this political economy of attention/inattention, recognition/mis-recognition, makes for an uneasy discussion for some journalists. In my interview with Seth Freedman (2009), the *Guardian's* freelance correspondent to Palestine and Israel, the issue of imbalance in the coverage was a matter of contention. For Freedman, the issue was the struggle against the illegal Israeli occupation, which he experienced first-hand as an Israeli soldier (Freedman, 2009). While Freedman agreed that there is an imbalance between the *Guardian's* coverage of the conflict and that of other conflicts worldwide, he maintained that this was due to the conflict's cultural, geographical and geopolitical significances to Britain. Accordingly, the global conflicts in the 2000s had less geographical, cultural or geopolitical significances for Britain. Indeed, *some* Palestinian affairs, too, were not considered culturally or politically relevant enough and thus omitted. Palestinians in Jordan, Lebanon or Iraq; the Palestinian peace camp; Palestinian moderates or key Palestinian institutions (education, health, media, economy etc.) are examples of Palestinian issues casually considered not newsworthy in the *Guardian* under the very terms of inclusion invoked by Freedman: they lacked the familiar cultural anchor otherwise afforded to white, European Israeli-Jews.

Another perspective on the imbalance in the coverage was put forward by the freelance *Guardian* journalist Daphna Baram. In an interview (van der Horst, 2006) Baram sardonically pointed to a cynical distinction in journalists' circles. While *conflicts perceived as white peoples' conflicts*, such as Israel, the former Yugoslavia or Zimbabwe, got much coverage, *non-white people's conflicts*, say, in Africa or Asia, got very little. As Moeller (1999) quotes one reporter, racism in the press is foremost "the choice of what to cover and ... the amount of coverage." Accordingly, "the situation of Africans killing Africans is not worth covering by the news media" (1999:288). Such presumption of Eurocentric Whitecentrism in the news cycle reflects the findings of this work. Another, more systemic, indication for this idiosyncratic view of world affairs can be found in Ian Mayes (2007), the *Guardian's* Readers' Editor (1997-2007). Aptly titled *Journalism Right and Wrong: Ethical and Other Issues Raised by Readers in the "Guardian's" Open Door Column*, Mayes' book reflects readers' concerns regarding fairness and balance. However, most of the crisis areas at the time hardly feature in the book. For example, Sudan, Darfur, Sri-Lanka, Burma, Kashmir, Tibet, Western Sahara,

Morocco, Syria, Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Tunisia or Ethiopia are not mentioned at all. Eritrea, North Korea and India are mentioned only once each and China is mentioned only three times. Were there no ethical issues raised by *Guardian* readers regarding *these* crisis zones?

In contrast, Palestine and Israel are prevalent in various segments of the book. Related appearances are as follows: Palestine (pp. 55, 77, 88-90, 100-102, 106-108); Israel (pp. 52, 77, 88-90, 97-99, 100-108); Lebanon-Israel violence (pp. 89, 103-105) as well as references to Jerusalem; Gaza City; Jenin; Haifa; Tyre (Lebanon) and Yasser Arafat. Jordan, where the majority of the population is Palestinian, is mentioned once.

Mayes himself addresses the issue of media omissions in the book by reviewing the *Guardian's* reports about a "ferry disaster off the coast of west Africa... in which some 750 people died" (2007:78). The *Guardian* covered the story twice: in a brief 320 words article on page 15, headed "750 feared dead as ferry sinks," and two days later in a 47 words news brief headed "Ferry death toll nears 1,000" (2007:78). Mayes comments on a letter from a reader asking whether "racial attitudes" "determined the coverage and presentation" in which the lives of "presumably black and relatively poor" persons "have a different value?" Mayes conceded that "The answer may be no but the signal sent out sometimes says yes" (2007:79). In line with the formulation above, Mayes concludes: "We kept our distance." Mayes' suggestion of an editorial yardstick is also telling. "One assessment that editors must make," Mayes writes, "is the degree to which readers of the newspaper will identify with the victims and relatives." Consequently, the vast coverage of *some* aspects of the conflict reflects an assessment that readers identify with *some* victims while the limited coverage of *other* aspects of the conflict reflects the lack of identification with other victims. Mayes' formulation is illuminating due to the contrasting forms of *corresponding* incoherencies in the coverage of the conflict, in line with RT and RD.

Unequal coverage: Palestinians and Israeli-Jews

As the analysis above shows, world news reports in both newspapers reflect a consistent, rather than accidental, bias where the news is always ‘about Us,’ with different issues around the world reflecting on Us differently. In this light, and as discussed above, the image of the Arab and Jew in *Figure 1*, reflects on a triadic relationality where *two* Others reflect on Us in differentiated, yet “intimately interconnected” (Jakobson and Halle, 1956) oppositions: Europe versus Arab and Christian versus Jew.

As noted above, these *two* dyadic relationships between Christian-Europe and its ancestral, theological Jew Other and the yet-to-be civilised Palestinian-Arab, infer other paradigmatic oppositions. *Chart 7*, below, reviews the principle of separation between these dyads; Them as separated from each other and Us as separated from Them both.

*Chart 7. Editorial constructions of the Palestinian-Arab as diametrically oppositional to the Israeli-Jew and the British Idea-of-Europe as oppositional to both.*¹¹⁸

‘The Palestinian’	‘The Israeli’	‘Us’ (British European)
<i>Female</i> <i>Routinely represented through images of women who, in turn, appear central to the conflict. Men are feminised.</i>	<i>Male</i> <i>Routinely represented as bellicose men while Israeli-Jewish women appear as incidental to the conflict or are masculinised.</i>	<i>Progressive gender politics</i>
<i>Child</i> <i>Routinely represented through children while adult Palestinians appear child-like, infantilised or fixated with reproduction (Said, 1978).</i>	<i>Adult (impaired maturity)</i> <i>Hardly any representations of Israeli-Jewish children who, in turn, appear as incidental to the conflict.</i>	<i>Paternal, developed maturity</i> <i>Protector and guide of fledgling others.</i>
<i>Muslim</i> <i>Palestinians are routinely represented as Muslims, omitting Christian</i>	<i>Jew</i> <i>Israelis are routinely represented as Jews. Israelis who are Muslim, Druze,</i>	<i>Democratic and multi-cultural</i>

¹¹⁸ Based on Rabinowitz (2002).

<i>Palestinians. Nonetheless, the term “Sunni Muslim” is also omitted.</i>	<i>Bedouin or Christian, despite making about 22% of Israel’s population, appear almost always only as oppositional to Israeli-Jews.¹¹⁹</i>	
<i>Under the sign of ethnicity</i> <i>‘The Arab’ as an ethnic classification connoting desert, camels and donkeys.</i>	<i>Under the sign of religion</i> <i>“The Jewish state”¹²⁰ as a theological classification with Israeli-Jews often indexed as ultra-orthodox and Judaism often used to explain contemporary developments.</i>	<i>Cosmopolitan</i> <i>Protean, fluid</i>
<i>Idle, passive</i> <i>Lethargic, dependent, and malleable. Lacking even in self-control.</i>	<i>Relentlessly active</i> <i>Relentlessly controlling.</i>	<i>Active, but not to excess</i>
<i>Unknowing masses</i> <i>The ‘Arab masses’ as distant, depersonalized and interchangeable (Memmi, 1957/1965).</i>	<i>Omnipotent individuals</i> <i>Excessive agency and demon-like omnipotency. Each Israeli-Jew is a potential Mossad agent; calculated, cold-blooded and iron fisted.</i>	<i>Agentive individuals, but not to excess</i>
<i>Under the sign of excessive Nature</i> <i>Essentialised as ‘natural’ to the land like flora and fauna.</i>	<i>Under the sign of excessive Culture</i> <i>Essentialised through biblical occupations and Jewish rites inscribed since antiquity.</i>	<i>Imbued with Culture and cultivated Nature</i>
<i>Exotic</i> <i>Romanticised from a distance.</i>	<i>Forbidding</i> <i>Stiff-necked people (e.g., Acts 7:51)</i>	<i>The standard for others</i>
<i>Demonstrably Arab (‘like Us, but not quite’)</i> <i>A ‘Western’ image of Palestinian non-elites and elites is routinely de-emphasised.¹²¹</i>	<i>Decayed Europeanness (anything but Us)</i> <i>Considered as a proto-European colonial society, Israeli-Jews of Arab decent are de-emphasised, despite making</i>	<i>Post-racial</i>

¹¹⁹ Yet, Bedouins and Druze serve in the Israeli army.

¹²⁰ The term appears 724 times in the *Guardian*’s print edition between 2000-2010 (see section 2.1.2).

¹²¹ For example, the key words “Salam Fayyad,” the reformist former PA Prime Minister and Finance Minister appears only 113 times in the *Guardian* print edition (2000-2010); the peaceniks “Hanan Ashrawi”

	<i>up over 45% of all Israeli-Jews.</i>	
<i>Dark-skinned</i> <i>De-emphasis on Palestinians of European appearances.</i>	<i>White-skinned</i> <i>See above.</i>	<i>Multi-cultural,</i>
<i>Irrational, ‘honour and shame’</i> <i>Impenetrable reason.</i>	<i>Ruthlessly calculated</i> <i>Excessive reason and demonic efficiency which implode into themselves (self-defeating).</i>	<i>Reason and affect</i>
<i>Agrarian, organic, peripheral</i> <i>Sticks and stones.</i>	<i>Technocratic, hierarchical, metropolitan</i> <i>Robot-like, inhumane.</i>	<i>Humane modernity</i>
<i>Poor</i> <i>Affluent, middle class or the business class are routinely left out.</i>	<i>Rich</i> <i>Low-income Israelis are routinely left out.</i>	<i>Middle class</i>
<i>Naïve</i>	<i>Scheming</i>	<i>Reason and judgement</i>
<i>Rootedness</i> <i>‘Children of the desert,’ seen as inseparable from the landscape. Yet historically, there was a normative movement of Palestinians across the Levant.</i>	<i>Uprootedness</i> <i>The ‘wandering Israeli-Jew’ is everywhere but belongs nowhere. Yet a small minority of Palestine’s Jews (about 10%) and Oriental Jews (about 900,000 in the 1940s) lived in the Middle East for generations.</i>	<i>Natives, but with a rich history of mixing</i>
<i>Synchronic</i> <i>Timeless, existing before History: trying to enter History (Said, 1978).</i>	<i>Diachronic</i> <i>Archaic, in decline: defunct from History.</i>	<i>The subject of History</i>
<i>The Arab street</i> <i>Palestinian polity appears through the principles of honour and shame.</i>	<i>The Jewish Lobby</i> <i>A corrupt, world-moving cabal shaping international priorities.</i>	<i>Democratic</i>
<i>Weak</i>	<i>Omni-powerful</i>	<i>Powerful but humane</i>

and “Sari Nusseibeh” appear 73 and 25 times respectively and Professor “Manuel Hassassian,” the PA representative in the UK, does not appear at all.

<i>Even effective political and military elites appear weak and out of control.</i>	<i>Elites and non-elites alike take part in demonic schemes.</i>	
<i>Infantilized violence</i> <i>Palestinian violence is routinely represented as emotional and personal, the result of individuals' uncontrollable rage or helplessness. Organisational attributes such as hierarchy, planning, networks, recruitments, or even means, goals or binding ideology are omitted.</i>	<i>Violence as a 'threat to us all'</i> <i>The Israeli-Jew's manipulative ruthlessness are a threat to her neighbouring countries and the world at large. Any violence is merely the tip of the iceberg of wrongdoing of monstrous proportions.</i>	<i>Judicial use of violence</i>

6.2 HISTORY AS THE SECOND DRAFT OF JOURNALISM

Even God cannot change the past

AGATHON (447-401 BC)

[L]anguage is an ideologically contaminated medium, and what it can and cannot do is dependent upon the use to which it is put, and for what social and political purposes

ALUN MUNSLOW (1997:14)

6.2.1 Introduction

At a Chatham House event (2005), Greg Philo, the co-author (with Mike Berry) of *Bad News from Israel* (2004), was asked whether history itself was not inherent to the conflict and one of the issues over which the sides were at war in the first place. Indeed, for both Palestinians and Israelis history is not simply 'in the past.' This chapter presents a critique of historiography which finds History not as an untainted substance, readily available 'out there,' but as accounts written by someone, at a certain time, and for certain audiences and purposes.

The aim of this section is to give some historical context, even when the history of the conflict itself is not simply neutral. Instead of emphasizing and deemphasizing conflicting historical accounts and settling clashing narratives, this section asks the following question: how are these historical narratives represented in both newspapers themselves? To answer this question I compare three online historical timelines, two in the *Guardian*¹²² and one in the BBC.¹²³ Although not part of the main focus of the thesis, I use the BBC timeline since the *Independent* did not include such a resource when the chapter was written (2006), and given the BBC's general central-left orientation in the 2000s.¹²⁴ The vast corresponding differences and similarities between these timelines further justify such investigation.

Still online on 1 May 2014, these timelines are titled: "The Arab-Israeli conflict: A brief history," which is interactive and pictorial but has concise text (*Guardian*, roughly 900 words). "Israel and the Middle East: Key Events" (*Guardian*, roughly 1,700 words), and is only textual, and the BBC's elaborate timeline "Israel and the Palestinians: In Depth," (roughly 4,000 words).

6.2.2 Historiography and the conflict

Said writes:

history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and rewritten, always with various silences and elisions, always with *shapes imposed* and *disfigurements tolerated*. (1978/2014:xviii)

Looking into the history of the conflict, it is clear that all the key sides in the conflict – Britain included–had enshrined Said's shapes, impositions and disfigurements in their historic narratives. As a result, historical events take conflicting accounts albeit identical claims of scholarly validity. Was 1948 a war of national liberation or an orchestrated campaign of massacres? Was 1967 an imperialist campaign or a war of no choice? Such

¹²² www.guardian.co.uk/flash/0,,720353,00.html, and www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jan/02/israel1

¹²³ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/v3_ip_timeline/html/default.stm

¹²⁴ Alan Rusbridger, the *Guardian* editor at the time, called the BBC the best media organization in the world (talk at the Frontline Club, 25 June 2008).

divisive binaries did indeed provoke some soul-searching among historians. For example, Geshoni, Erdem and Wokock (2002:4) question the contribution of the historical enquiry itself, given the emergence of “two supposedly equivalent narratives – the story of the Palestinians and the story of the Zionists”? They write:

It certainly appears that scholars have missed an opportunity to contribute to the effort to provide a more realistic and balanced historical view of the topic to the public discourse being conducted in the context of this ongoing, heated, political dispute. (ibid)

Hence, the historical debate has become a contentious “reservoir of resentment” (Rotberg, 2006) which fans the fight for moral superiority and national mythology—the very building blocks of the conflict itself. Kimmerling and Migdal neatly summarise this point as follows:

we hope to write against the grain of the sort of history that has been written as part and parcel of the mythmaking national project. [...] The historiographical debate has been an integral part of the conflict between Palestinians and Jews [...] The search for connection with the past has sometimes transformed history into a handmaiden of those seeking to give the nation a proper pedigree – an effort that involves denigrating the adversary’s experience of the past. This exercise has been as evident on the part of Jews as Palestinian advocates. (2003:xxvi)

Echoing this need for self-criticism, Said calls for Palestinians and Arabs “to explore our own histories, myths, and patriarchal ideas of the nation...,” a task burdened by wars, occupation and oppression (al-Ahram Weekly, May 1998).¹²⁵ Such voices not only highlight the multiple narratives of history, but also the need for a self-reflexivity that looks beyond them.

Munslow echoes this historiographical critique of seeing history as ever changing (1997). For Munslow, research into past events should include the very representations and narratives about these events through the years. This notion of historicizing the historical story posits the study of history apart from the natural sciences, as if hypothesis-testing, deductive reasoning or experimental processes can produce incontrovertible facts and empirically recoverable ‘truths’ (what Munslow calls “naïve realism,” 2003:56). Instead, Munslow suggests that historical interpretations are closer to “a class of literature”

¹²⁵ http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/Archive/1998/1948/378_said.htm, accessed December 2017.

(1997:5) constituting “a cultural product existing *within* society... rather than an objective methodology and commentary *outside* of society” (Munslow, 1997:10).”

6.2.3 Looking into the *Guardian* and the *BBC*’s timelines

Figure 32 below appears in the BBC timeline’s opening page as a visual index for the timeline itself. Depicting an elderly Arab man wearing a Keffiyeh and an ultra-religious, white-European Jewish man, the image presents the conflict through the prototypical typecasting used in cartoons worldwide about it.

Figure 32: *BBC timeline, introductory image*



As in this work’s main theorem, this exaggerated, oversimplified image classifies the Arab and Jew as *both* oppositional to each other *and* to the Idea-of-Europe itself. Marked by clichés of entrenched tribalism, *both* appear as opposites unified by their equal moral distance from Our progressive ideals. Their *equal* rejection of individualism, secularism, equality, modernity or diversity, as inferring Our championing of such ideals.

The BBC timeline’s opening line echoes this discussion, it reads “The struggle between the Israelis and the Palestinians is one of the most enduring and explosive of all the world’s conflicts.” Yet this self-serving formulation conceals a reality much closer to home where many of Britain’s former colonies, not just Palestine, still endure “explosive”

conflicts. A partial list might include Sudan, Burma, Iraq, Kashmir, Tibet, Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, Central African Republic or Zimbabwe.¹²⁶ The generalized reference to “Israelis and the Palestinians” highlights that the fault lies not with both sides’ respective state apparatuses but with the very people that make these communities. It is Them ‘over there’ who are the problem for Us to solve.

In line with the discussion above, the Idea-of-Europe imagines herself as the subject of History and equidistant from the synchronic Arab and diachronic Jew. Accordingly, the Arab as static, outside of History (Said, 1978) and undeveloped is *ushered into* modernity moulded after the “universal validity” of the ‘West’ (Foucault, 1980b:54). For Robert Young:

...if history is the product of human actions, then it only can be said to begin properly when ‘primitive’ societies give way to (European) civilization (2004:161)

On the other hand, the Jew is imagined *within* History but—being fossilized and stripped of moral authority—she is *superseded* by a new era, a new Chosen People (*ekklesia*) and a new Christian count of history (AD). The Idea-of-Europe thus imagines herself in the mid-position between those who are only shaped by history, but who can never shape it and those who try to control history to excess.

6.2.4 The Palestinian as weak and lacking in agency

In all three timelines the Palestinian consistently appears through the imperial imaginary as passive, under the sign of Nature and lacking in agency. In such appearances the Arab is depicted as ‘children of the desert,’ incapable of self-organisation or self-governance and led by instincts and the ‘politics of the Arab street.’ Said quotes Hamady (1960, 1978:310) on how “collective action” is imagined as “alien” to Arabs:

The Arabs so far have demonstrated an incapacity for disciplined and abiding unity. They experience collective outbursts of enthusiasm but do not pursue patiently collective endeavours... They show a lack of coordination and harmony in organization and function, nor have they revealed an ability for cooperation. Any collective action for common benefit or mutual profit is alien to them.

¹²⁶ None of which were issued similar timelines.

For example, up until the 1960s these timelines omit almost entirely the presence of a central and resourceful Palestinian leadership, municipalities, elites or other forms of societal organisations (e.g., newspapers, commerce, active port, international exports, etc., e.g., Khalidi, 2002). This description of Palestine as devoid of political representation well into the 20th century appears in all three timelines. For instance, the Supreme Muslim Council, the Arab Higher Committee, the Arab Executive Committee, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, Shaykh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, or the big Palestinian families (see Pappe, 2010), are not mentioned in *any* of the timelines. In the *Guardian Key Events* Arafat is the only Palestinian politician mentioned in 120 years (1881-2001), an omission made even more striking with whole sections devoted to Zionist forming politics in this timeline ('1881', '1896' and '1897'). Indeed, the first reference to *any* Palestinian polity in the timelines—in the BBC *1929-1936* section—refers in generalised ways to non-elites rather than any specific agency. Hence, this section notes that Jewish immigration into Palestine was “provoking unrest in the Arab community,” the *Guardian interactive* mentions “clashes between Jewish immigrants and Palestinians” (1930s section), and the *Guardian Key events* notes that “[A]larmed by the rapid expansion of Jewish settlement, Arabs riot in many areas” (1929-1936). Yet in line with RT, “clashes,” “unrest” and “[A]larmed” are imbued with normalisations and passivisations that conceal an accountable, specific elite agency while non-elite Palestinians—“community,” “Palestinians” and “Arabs”—are presented as the culpable agents for the events. Nonetheless, even these 1930s appearances are limited as the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt is not mentioned by name in any of the timelines, the 1929 riots mentioned only in the *Guardian Key Events*, and the 1921 riots are entirely unmentioned.

Key Palestinian occurrences taking place through the 18th and 19th century thus are also omitted. For example, the *Guardian interactive* gives wide context for the Ottoman Empire in the 14th century and the BBC reviews “Arab Muslim” conquests of 638 AD and the building of the al-Aqsa Mosque in the 8th century. Yet all timelines exclude the rule of Zahir al-‘Umar, 1730s-1775 (Joudah, 1987; Cohen, 1973); Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat in Acre to Ahmad al-Jazzâr Pasha (1799); the Muslim revolts of 1808 and 1826 in Jerusalem; the *formative* 1834 Peasants’ Revolt against an Egyptian conquest (1831-1840, see Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003); or the creation of the instrumental municipality

of Jerusalem under Ottoman law in 1863. Indeed, the formative Ottoman and Egyptian influences are omitted altogether.

Hence, lacking in polity or organisation Palestinians are ‘simply there’: angry faceless masses (Zogby, 2003, quoted in Zayani, 2006:183) who spontaneously erupt. For example, the BBC 1929-36 section takes the language of ethnicisation *per se*. It notes that “Zionist-Arab antagonism *boiled* over” and that “Arab discontent again *exploded* into widespread civil disobedience.” As above, the sides are like “bubbling cauldrons” of “ancient tribal hatreds... Remove the lid, and the cauldron boils over” (Bowen, 1996:3). In the BBC the emphasis on “widespread *civil* disobedience” in relation to the militarised 1936-1939 Revolt further indicates instinctive ‘eruptions’ of violence while the Revolts’ paramilitary (rather than “civil”) factions and leaders (notably, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni or Shaykh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam) do not appear in *any* of the timelines. In contrast to this image of Palestinians as homogenous, reactionary and an anonymous collectivity, *all* timelines include references to British figures as individualised agents. These include Orde Wingate, Herbert Samuel, Henry McMahon, Lord Balfour, Lord Peel and others. As in RD, Israeli-Jews also appear as individualised agents actively shaping world events and the *BBC* elaborates on Jewish history under the subheadings of 1250 BC, 961-922 BC, 586 BC, 333 BC, 165 BC, 63 BC, 70 AD, 118-138 AD and 1897. Nonetheless, essentialised as White-Europeans (and hence ‘proactive agents’), there is no mention in any of the timelines of Jews from Arab countries (roughly 45% of Israeli-Jews today).

All timelines thus mention the Balfour Declaration (including links, quotes and images), yet the McMahon-Hussein correspondence (1916) is mentioned only in the BBC, and only in a single sentence. Still, *only McMahon* is mentioned, *not* Sharif Hussein of Mecca, with the former generously ‘promising’ post-war independence to an anonymous “Arab leadership.”

Palestinians also appear as ambivalent masses through the disappearance of the al-Nakba, or *catastrophe*, in these timelines. This formative event is mentioned *only* in the BBC timeline which also includes an empathetic image of Palestinian refugees, women and children, with the caption “Thousands of Palestinians were displaced.” Still, the BBC does not mention how many Palestinian refugees left their homes, nor that some

Palestinians were *expelled*, not merely “displaced.”¹²⁷ However, the BBC does quote the UN as saying that the 1967 war “displaced another 500,000 Palestinians” (omitted from the other two timelines). The *Guardian Interactive* ignores the Nakba and the Palestinian refugees issue until its 2004 section. This section does conclude the timeline with an empathetic note which reads: “Just over 4m Palestinians, who fled Israeli expansion, and the 1967 war, are *still in exile in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Syria Lebanon, and Jordan*” (emphasis added).¹²⁸ Yet this timeline *also* omits to say that some of the 1948 refugees were *expelled*, not just “fled.” The *Guardian Key Events* notes that “At least 700,000 Palestinians are now refugees” (1949 section). This appearance fails to mention the Nakba by name while concealing, through the use of the temporal predicate “now,” *how* and by *whose actions* these “Palestinians” became “refugees.” While omitting the Nakba, this timeline allocates an entire section (1961) to the Adolf Eichmann trial.¹²⁹ Moreover, all timelines fail to mention that these 1948 Palestinian refugees were also indefinitely barred (by Israel) *from returning* to their homes in Palestine.

Despite their titles, e.g., “The Arab-Israeli conflict” (*Guardian Interactive*), “Israel and the Middle East” (*Guardian Key Events*) and “A History of Conflict,” Palestinian events taking place in ‘non-elite’ Arab countries are left out, while Israel’s involvement in Egypt, Syria or Iraq *are* considered history. As with RT and RD, only Palestinians who qualify as being diametrically opposite to Israeli-Jews are considered within history. Below, I review such omissions of Palestinians *outside* Palestine.

A good departure point for such an overview is the omissions of the events of Black September (Jordan, 1970) in the BBC and the *Guardian Interactive* despite thousands of Palestinian civilian casualties. In this near civil war, Palestinian forces threatened to topple King Hussein resulting in Jordanian forces directing their firepower against Palestinian camps (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003:435; Morris, 2001:373). While the *Guardian Key Events* notes that “Jordan’s King Hussein orders his army to destroy the PLO,” it refers only to “bloody fighting” while omitting the heavy casualties among Palestinian civilians (Massad, 2001), estimated to be between three and five thousand.

¹²⁷ See Bassiouni and Ben-Ami (2009:196).

¹²⁸ Clearly Palestinians are *not* in exile in the West Bank and Gaza.

¹²⁹ The statement “[Eichmann] is the first and only man to be judicially executed in Israel,” is at odds with Israel’s many *extrajudicial* assassinations during the AAI.

The timeline also wrongly states that the PLO, not George Habash's PFLP, kidnapped the three passenger airplanes and dates Black September in 1971.

The *Guardian Key Events* is also the only timeline to mention the PLO's expulsion from Jordan to Lebanon, noting that it was "driven out" (dated wrongly as 1971). The timeline's claim that "[the PLO] re-bases in Lebanon" is also odd, since it was never based in Lebanon before 1970. Still, once in Lebanon, the Palestinians did not merely 're-base,' but formed a de-facto state within a state, including resourceful administration, institutions, schools and hospitals (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003:265). *None* of the timelines mention Arafat's flight from the West Bank to Jordan, and only the BBC mentions (in passing) the PLO's expulsion from Lebanon to Tunisia (1982).

Another disappearance from *all* timelines is the prolonged Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990). The *Civil War itself*, its (roughly) 20,000 Palestinian casualties or the Palestinian leadership's role in the spiralling of the war (O'balance, 1988:3; Gowers and Walker, 1990:152) are also omitted. Hence, the War of the Camps (1985), or particular attacks on Palestinian camps, as in Karantina, Maslak, Tel el-Zaater or Jusr-al-Pasha (1976), go unmentioned in any of the timelines. In the Palestinian refugee camp of Tel el-Zaater, Christian Phalangists militias (or the Kata'ib militias) massacred about 2,000 Palestinians after besieging the camp for 52 days (22 June to 12 August 1976), a siege which had already begun in January of that year and included bombardments, sniper fire, starvation and torture (Cobban, 1984:142; Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003:270; Gowers and Walker, 1990:158; Kazzuha, 1979). The camp was razed to the ground after the siege and never rebuilt (Gowers and Walker, 1990:152).

The 1982 Sabra and Shatilla massacres in Lebanon are omitted in the two *Guardian* timelines but are covered extensively in the BBC. The *Guardian Interactive* devotes a whole section to Israel's invasion of Lebanon, covering the years 1982-1985, but omitting the Lebanese civil war itself (1975-1990) and the Sabra and Shatilla massacres. The BBC also ignores the 15 years-long civil war, focusing only on Israel's 1982 invasion and the Sabra and Shatilla massacres. While the BBC mentions the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, the leader of the Christian Phalange, it does not connect it to the Sabra and Shatilla massacres that occurred two days later. Deleting agency in familiar ways,

Gemayel apparently “was killed by a bomb,” not a human agent while Elie Hobeika, the leader of the Christian Phalange who led the massacres in Sabra and Shatilla is not mentioned.

Other omissions in these timelines include Kuwait’s expulsions of 300,000-400,000 Palestinians in the aftermath of Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein in 1991 (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003:329; Morris, 2001:613; Kumaraswamy, 2013:353), or the expulsion of 30,000 Palestinians from Libya in 1995 (Shiblak, 1995).

In contrast to these wide-brush omissions of Palestinian mass casualties, smaller scale wrongdoings against Israeli-Jews casually make it into the narrative. For example, the *Guardian Key Events* devotes a section to Israel’s “remarkable raid on Entebbe” (Uganda, 1976), where a single Israeli officer was killed,¹³⁰ and both the *Guardian Key Events* and the BBC refer in some detail to the death of eleven Israeli athletes at the 1974 Munich Olympics.

Other omissions from these timelines include the Cold War, despite its detrimental impact on the conflict over four decades (e.g., Khalidi, 1997; Sayigh and Shlaim, 1997; Breslauer, 2015). For Halliday, Arab-Israeli wars in the 1950s and 1960s “marked at once the high point of the global Cold War in the region” (2005:115). Halliday also writes that:

1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars occasioned crises between the USA and the USSR more dangerous than any that arose over Indo-China or Europe, less dangerous only than that which erupted in 1962 over Cuba. (2003:11)

Rashid Khalidi also describes how the superpowers were on the brink of a nuclear confrontation during the 1973 war (2010:29). While Israel came to be viewed as a Cold War ally in the aftermath of the 1967 war, writes Halliday, the Arabs, “enraged by Palestine, Suez and the war for independence that had broken out in Algeria in November 1954, came to sympathise with the Soviet Union” (Halliday, 2005:114).

¹³⁰ Yoni Netanyahu, Bibi’s brother (not mentioned).

Rashid Khalidi (2010) thus summarises the American-Soviet proxy wars in the region as follows:

how much harm to the internal political development of this region, and in particular to its peoples' aspirations for democracy, was done by the two superpowers' obsessive focus on each other, sometimes to the exclusion of all else, and their constant, insidious jockeying for Cold War advantage? (2010:200)

Finally, oil politics (e.g., the 1973-4 Energy Crisis, mentioned briefly only in the BBC timeline), are also left out of these timelines.

6.2.5 The well meaning empire

"The British set out well meaning but hopelessly impractical proposals..."
GUARDIAN KEY EVENTS (1939 SECTION)

"Britain controls today the destinies of some 350,000,000 alien people, unable as yet to govern themselves, and easy victims to rapine and injustice, unless a strong arm guards them. She is giving them a rule that has its fault, no doubt, but such, I would make bold to affirm, as no conquering state ever before gave to a dependent people."

PROFESSOR GEORGE M. WRONG, 1909 (IN FERGUSON, 2012:IX)

In line with the two quotations above, all three timelines reflect a congratulatory British self-image, introjected into the historical story of the conflict. Through such Eurocentric self-exaltation, Britain is imagined in all timelines as a disinterested caretaker, pacifier (peacemaker) and defender of embryonic protectorates.

As an example, the *only* mentioning of imperialism or colonialism in relation to Britain, in all three timelines is the soft and distanced reference to Britain as "*imperially-minded*" (*Guardian Key Events*, 1916 section). Was the British Empire in 1916 thus only a mindset?¹³¹ The BBC timeline does mention that "Britain occupied the region," yet this

¹³¹ By 1922 Britain dominated roughly a quarter of the globe's land surface and nearly all its oceans.

vague reference is the only one of its kind in all three timelines. Hence, the *Guardian Key Events* (1916 section) reads:

“the imperially-minded French and British governments reach an understanding on how the Middle East should be carved, post war, into zones of influence”

Strikingly, the use of “understanding”, “carved” and “influence” represents an attempt to describe the *lived* history of the British mandate through the very *legal and euphemistic* language of the League of Nations’ mandate itself. In a similar fashion, the *Guardian Interactive* reads:

“the League of Nations granted France and Britain control (‘mandates’) over former Ottoman territories.”

And the BBC reads:

“Britain occupied the region at the end of the war in 1918 and was assigned as the mandatory power by the League of Nations”

Hence, all timelines use a soft and euphemistic language to describe the 34 years-long military rule over Palestine and the British and French ‘scramble’ for the Middle East.¹³² Such terms as “*assigned* mandatory power” (BBC), or “*granted... control*” (*Guardian Interactive*), use passivisation to conceal that Britain’s hold on Palestine was neither “assigned” nor “granted” by the local population. Indeed, the *Guardian Key Events* reads “The British continue to administer the area west of the Jordan river...” However, given its position in the League of the Nations (Paul Kennedy, 2006), Britain effectively *assigned to itself* control over the region, and ‘*administered*’ the region on behalf of itself.¹³³ Only the BBC refers to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, noting that it was “secret,” though without explaining why it was kept “secret” from the region for which it was intended. The 1916 clandestine Agreement, with its imperial legacy of ‘lines in the sand’, was found in the Kremlin vaults by Russian revolutionaries in 1917, and was thereafter revealed to the region.

¹³² To use the language of the Israeli hard right regarding Greater Israel, by the 1920s, British control swayed from the Nile to the Euphrates.

¹³³ Again, naturalising the language of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which refers to a “tutelage” of “colonies and territories” and “administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time they are able to stand alone” (Article 22).

Finally, all the timelines depict Britain as selfless and helpful. The *Guardian interactive* notes that “Britain gave up its mandate” (1947 section) and the BBC notes that Britain “handed over responsibility for solving the Zionist-Arab problem.” Was Britain not *made* to give up its mandate? Was it not part of the “problem”? Does “responsibility for solving” not reek of Kipling’s “Burden”? The analysis below shows that Britain “handed over” and “gave up” its mandate only after the three years of the Arab Revolt’s armed insurgency.

6.2.6 The Arab Revolt

Another example of the depictions of the British Empire as a peace mission of sorts is the timelines’ review of the 1936-1939 Arab revolt. The revolt included a general strike (April to October 1936) and later an armed insurgency, increasingly also against the British. Benny Morris describes the revolt as:

...the biggest and most protracted uprising against the British in any country in the Middle East, and the most significant in Palestinian history until the anti-Israeli Intifada fifty years later. (2001:128)

Indeed, Elpeleg recounts one of the revolt’s slogans (by the Arab Higher Committee) “The English to the sea and the Jews to the graves” (1989:177-8, quoted in Morris 2001:158). For Hughes (2009), official British figures state that about 2,000 Arabs were killed by the British army and police, of which “100–112 were hanged, and 961 died because of ‘gang and terrorist activities’” (2009:348). The total number of Arab casualties during the revolt include “approximately 5,000 killed and 10,000 wounded, while those detained totalled 5,679 in 1939” (Khalidi, 2007:107; see also Khalidi, 1971:846–49; Swedenburg, 2003:xxi; Morris, 2001:159; Sayigh, 1979/2007:43). Kimmerling and Migdal point out that the revolt slipped into targeting Christians, Druze, and even resourceful Arab urban elites, with hundreds of Arabs killed in such infighting (2003).¹³⁴ The revolt also aimed to end Jewish immigration and land purchases and strove for national independence (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003:111).

¹³⁴ Other objects of the revolt included ending Jewish immigration and land purchases, ending the British rule and striving for national independence (Kimmerling and Migdal, 1994).

Still, despite Britain's culpability, the Revolt *never* appears by name and is mentioned in passing in only two timelines. Moreover, in both accounts British forces appear as *containing the violence, not complicit in it*. For example, the BBC includes two short and separate mentions of the revolt. The first reads: "Arab discontent again exploded into widespread civil disobedience during a general strike in 1936." Yet "Arab discontent" and "widespread civil disobedience" paint the uprising as civil grievances *brought before* British authority, not as violence turned *against* it. The second brief appearance simply notes that the revolt was "crushed," concealing such policies as assassinations, house demolitions or torture.¹³⁵ Finally, the caption under this section's main image reads "British forces failed to *contain* the violence" (emphasis added). But was the British Empire in Palestine a neutral force for restraint and containment? Also, this image depicts a precarious British armed car carrying only two soldiers, thus portraying the British forces as outnumbered and heroic. According to Hughes, however (2009), 25,000 British servicemen were stationed in Palestine during the revolt. Khalidi (2007:109) and Sayigh (1979/2007:43) note about 20,000 troops.

Figure 33: British soldiers during the Arab revolt (BBC timeline)



British forces failed to contain the violence

In the *Guardian Key Events* (1929 section), the only reference to the (1936-1939) Revolt reads "The [1929] riots are a precursor to a more bloody Arab uprising in 1936, in which

¹³⁵ Hughes notes the use of waterboarding and death by starvation (2009:338-341).

Palestinian and Jewish paramilitary groups clash for the first time.” Again, the Revolt is presented as bipartisan, devoid of British involvement, while attacks against civilians, rather than “paramilitary groups,” are ruled out. The *Guardian Interactive* includes only a single vague reference to the revolt, reading “There were clashes between the Jewish immigrants and Palestinians supported by neighbouring Arab states” (1930 section). At the same time the 1916-1918 Arab revolt appears by name, it reads “the British supported an Arab revolt against the Ottomans promising them self-rule.” In this timeline, it seems, once the British promise of self-rule fails, such use of clear action agency (“the British supported”) gives way to passivisation and concealments.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that it was Sir Herbert Samuel who appointed the young and radical al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni—first as the Mufti of Jerusalem (1921) and then the President of the Supreme Muslim Council (1922)—so as to “maintain political control” and balance clan interests (mainly between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis, PASSIA, 1990:39). As Kamel puts it (2013), al-Hajj Amin was *imposed* upon the Palestinian society and later acquired increasing power,¹³⁶ rather than being simply a direct representative of the population.

By the end of the revolt, thousands of Palestinians were detained by British forces and many other potential leaders were either killed or exiled, as was al-Hajj Amin (Mattar, 1988). The devastating destruction of the Palestinian leadership during the revolt, as Khalidi says, left a weakened Palestinian leadership for over a decade, leading to the devastating 1948 war and the Palestinian al-Nakba (Khalidi, 2007; Morris, 2001:159; Sela, 1997; Kimmerling, 2008:13)

6.2.7 The relentless Israeli-Jew

In contrast to depictions of the Arab as unknowing and lacking in agency, the Israeli-Jew appears as a relentless threat to Our sanctified high ideals. Since wrongdoing by the Israeli-Jew is metaphysical and full of intent, the primary sentiments towards her appear as suspicion and disgust, while empathy is eroded.

¹³⁶ Through generous budgets and control over Muslim courts, schools, religious endowments (awqaf) and mosques.

As an example, *dysphemic terms* such as “massacre,” “terrorist,” “nationalist” or “extremist” (BBC, see full list below), are almost exclusively used to describe violence by the Israeli-Jew while violence against her is consistently described through soft euphemisms. Were there no massacres against Israeli-Jews or Palestinian extremists (see below)? Hence, until 1948 the BBC timeline includes *only three* terms specifically describing Arab violence against Israeli-Jews. These are “violent clashes,” “violent opposition” and “invaded.” In the 1960s, the PLO’s violence is described as “armed operations” and “armed struggle.” The 1967 war is described as “hostilities” and the 1973 war as “clashes,” “major offensives” and “advances.” Yet the 1973 war involved over 4,000 armored vehicles, making it the largest of its kind since World War II (Halliday, 2003).

Since the 1970s, descriptions of Arab attacks against Israeli-Jews blur the lines between legitimate military targets and the illegitimate targeting of innocent civilians. Hence, PLO violence in the “1970s” is described as “a series of attacks” and an “armed struggle.” In the Munich 1974 Olympics, the Israeli athletes “were killed” and the 1982 section casually refers to “Palestinian guerrilla,” despite repeated attacks against civilians at the time. In the 1990s, the wording used to describe attacks on Israeli-Jewish civilians in the 2000s include:

“suicide bomb attacks in Israeli cities,” “intense campaign of attacks,” “hotel bombing,” “attacks inside Israel,” “Palestinian attacks continued,” “armed operations campaign of attacks,” “Palestinian suicide bombing,” “devastating suicide bombings,” “numerous Palestinian rocket attacks on Israeli towns” and “post-election attacks.”

In contrast, descriptions of Israeli violence through the BBC timeline include a litany of dysphemic terms signifying rage, fear and repulsion. *Few* examples include:

“suffering and loss,” “years of Zionist lobbying,” “orchestrating attacks,” ““liberating” [trans-Jordan]... by force,” “clearing operations,” “massacred,” “massacre spread terror,” “massacres,” “killed hundreds,” “one of the worst atrocities of nearly a century of conflict in the Middle East,” “massacre,” “heavy loss of life [among civilians],” ““terrorist” past,” “fired on praying Muslims,” “bloody three-week bombardment,” “shooting of Gaza boy,” “The death toll soared,” “air strikes and incursions,” “massacre,” “war crimes,” “bloody incursion,” “religious nationalists,” “Jewish religious extremist” and “iron fist.”

It is not that Deir Yassin was not a “massacre [that] spread terror,”¹³⁷ that Begin did not have a ““terrorist” past,” that Rabin was not “iron fisted,” or that there was no Israeli “Jewish religious extremist.” Rather, such value judgements and propositions were withheld from Palestinian political elites (say, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the PLO, PA, Hamas or the Islamic Jihad, who historically were also implicated in iron fisted policies, religious extremism, terror and massacres) within a triad, already-in-place, system of differentiation. Accordingly, the Israeli-Jew appears through valorised immorality while the Palestinian appears through liminal moral ranking: ‘tolerable, but from a distance.’ In the same breath, Our high moral standing is naturalised. The BBC’s presentation of the Sabra and Shatilla massacres as “one of the worst atrocities of nearly a century of conflict in the Middle East,” thus connotes a *differentialised* position separating Us, as the standard-bearer (disregarding Britain’s *own* imperial atrocities in “a century of conflict in the Middle East”), for both the tolerated Arab (putting aside, but not away, such atrocities as Black September or Tel el-Zaater) and the malevolent Israeli-Jew (“the worst”).

Where Israel’s culpability for the 1948 war is reviewed in strong and condemning terms, and appropriately so, violence against Israeli-Jews is described using soft and detached utterances with no mention of the roughly 6,000 Israeli casualties of the war. Hence, the 1948 section applies an “*invaded... but*” formulation. It reads:

“The day after the state of Israel was declared five Arab armies from Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq immediately *invaded* Israel *but* were repulsed...”
(emphasis added).

Indeed, the *Guardian Interactive* reiterates this formulation, noting that “Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan *invaded but* were beaten back” (1947 section). To use Johnson (2007:96), “but” signifies a break in the direction of the reading and a move from considering the initial proposition (“invaded”) towards other propositions.

¹³⁷ Deir Yassin is not mentioned in the two *Guardian* timelines. Nonetheless, Gelber remarks that the killing of 250 Arabs in Lydda in July 1948 was even more extensive than in Deir Yassin (2006:318).

The appearances of the 1967 war in the BBC and the *Guardian interactive* use nominal transformations (“tensions,” “hostilities”) naturalising the agency behind these actions (Fowler, 1991:79). The former reads “Mounting tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbours culminated in six days of hostilities...” and the latter reads “Hostilities between Israel and its neighbours continued and both sides built up their military strength.”

All timelines depict the 1973 war as a mere territorial skirmish while omitting the war’s heavy casualties (including 2,300 Israelis, Morris, 1999:431) and the possibility of Soviet and Israeli nuclear attacks (Khalidi, 2010:29 and p. 288) (emphasis added):

“Unable to *regain the territory* they had lost in 1967 by diplomatic means, Egypt and Syria launched major offensives against Israel...” (BBC)

“Syria and Egypt launched a surprise attack on Israeli-held lands... After initial losses, the Israelis *regained* nearly all of the *territory* they occupied during the six day war.” (*Guardian Interactive*)

“After initial reverses, the Israelis strike back hard, *regaining* all and more of the *ground* initially lost.” (*Guardian Key Events*)

The ‘regain territories’ frame in these timelines is factual (Morris, 1999:387), yet it disregards other frames (Morris, 1999:398, and p. 406). The BBC itself claimed later that “[Israel] found itself facing a war of national survival on two fronts.”¹³⁸ The *Guardian*’s own correspondent, Max Hastings, writes that in October 1973 Israel “came closer to destruction than blind Europe seems willing to recognise” (9 May 2009).¹³⁹

This presentation of the Jew as victimiser, while playing down the victimhood of non-elites, repeats in the formative years of the conflict. For example, all timelines omit the 1921 riots and the 1929 riots ,not mentioned in the *Guardian interactive*, appear in the BBC as:

¹³⁸ In a report titled “Legacy of 1973 Arab-Israeli war reverberates 40 years on,” <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24402464> (accessed 5 October 2013).

¹³⁹ <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/may/09/israel-middle-east-max-hastings>. Applying classic Orientalism, Hastings asserts that in 1973 he saw Israel as “a bastion of western civilization in the Middle East.” Hastings also explains how he “fell out of love with Israel.” That is, how removed Israel was from such ideals which, supposedly, were still upheld by Britain.

“Zionist-Arab antagonism boiled over into violent clashes when 133 Jews were killed by Palestinians and 110 Palestinians died at the hands of the British police.”

Using an equivocating language (“Zionist-Arab”), nominalization (“antagonism,” “clashes”) and passivisation (“were killed”), Jewish civilians who were murdered in the riots are presented as equally accountable for the “clashes.” Yet for Morris the 1929 riots in Jerusalem, Safad, Tiberias, and Hebron were “Programs” (2001:115), and Kimmerling and Migdal refer to the massacre of “men, women, and children” (2003:92).

Other omissions of Jewish victimhood include the 500 Jewish victims of the 1936-1939 Arab revolt (Kimmerling and Migdal, 1994:125); British policies against Jewish refugees from Nazi-occupied Europe (Louise, 2000; Kushner, 1994; also Jeffery, 2010:690) or the War of Attrition (or *Ḥarb al-Istinzāf*, 1967-1970), which are not mentioned in any timeline despite heavy casualties.

The use of the term ‘terrorism’ is also noteworthy. In the BBC the term is not associated with *any* Palestinian faction apart from when “The Palestinian National Council... renounce[s] terrorism” (1988 section), or when it is applied by Israel as a ruse for further violence, as in “...Israel carried out operations *it said* were aimed at destroying the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure” (2002 section, emphasis added, also 1991, 1998 and 2002 sections). As above, recognition denied to non-elite Israeli-Jews (even attacks on busses and schools) occurs alongside the shielding of Palestinian elites from criticism (giving presumptions about Their immature and eruptive ‘Nature’).

In addition, all timelines omit the flight of roughly 900,000 Jews from Arab countries.¹⁴⁰ Such omission, seen often in the coverage, paints a binary civilizational division between Palestinians as Orientals and Israeli-Jews as Europeans and so foreign to the region. While these timelines discuss “the persecution of *European* Jews” (*Guardian Interactive*, 1930s section), “vicious pogroms” in *Russia and Romania* (*Guardian Key Events*, 1881 section) and “*European* anti-Semitism” (BBC, 1897 section), “persecution” and “anti-Semitism” against Jews in the Middle East are left out.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ No doubt, due to the competing narrative of Israel’s accountability for the enduring Palestinian refugee problem.

¹⁴¹ For example, reports on the persecution or anti-Semitism against Yemenite Jews are virtually non-existent (*Guardian*, NewsBank, 1998-present).

The BBC introductory overview is worth examining, it reads:

“For the Palestinians the last 100 years have brought colonisation, expulsion and military occupation, followed by a long and difficult search for self-determination and for coexistence with the nation they hold responsible for their suffering and loss.

For the Jewish people of Israel, the return to the land of their forefathers after centuries of persecution around the world has not brought peace or security. They have faced many crises as their neighbours have sought to wipe their country off the map.”

The Israeli “colonisation” of Palestine in “the last 100 years” (thus, 1905-2005) is rightfully framed (note the keyword “expulsion”), yet it excludes the British “military occupation” (1917-1948, or Ottoman rule, 16th century till 1914) or the “search for self-determination” of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan or Iraq. At the same time, the Jew is marked by religion (“forefathers,” “return”) and her “persecution” excludes its “neighbours.” However, Jews from Arab countries (rather than from “around the world”), and a small, consistent Jewish presence in Palestine, did not “return” or were expelled (made to ‘return’). While Palestinians (*not* Israeli-Jews) seek “coexistence,” only the Jewish national project is questioned in the light of its retroactive failures. But, did Arab countries secure “peace and security” for their people? Did Britain secure “peace”? Indeed, the reference to Arab countries’ destructive intentions (“wipe... off the map”) is not reiterated *anywhere* inside the BBC timeline (with the 1948, 1967 and 1973 wars represented in soft terms). The *Guardian Interactive* includes a similar isolated reference, it reads “[the PLO] vowed to reclaim their land and destroy the state of Israel.” Again, the emphasis on “state” (or the BBC’s “country”), excludes an empathetic frame for non-elites.

The aim of the analysis above is not to capture the large canvas of the conflict’s history but to apply the small brush of this research.

6.3 THE 'JEW-NAZI'

What do you call a Jewish German in the UK? A dirty Nazi!
OLIVER POLAK (A GERMAN-JEWISH COMEDIAN)

Originally, this chapter was set up to explore the relationality in the coverage of the Holocaust and the al-Nakba as two distinct (not comparable) national stories. Since such investigation is too extensive I pursue only its Jewish branch.

Both the *Guardian* and the *Independent* are consumed with the Holocaust and the Second World War. For example, the keyword "Holocaust" appears in the *Guardian* print edition 5,265 times (2000-2010), while the keywords "Darfur" and "Congo" put together clock 5,793 appearances during the same period. The keyword "Nazi" appears 9,584 times. Indeed, in both newspapers the Holocaust appears as highly newsworthy, with reports covering even such frivolous topics as "Nazi gnomes" (*Guardian*, 15 October 2009), "Nazi orgy" (*Guardian*, 15 July 2008) or "Nazi sticker album" (*Guardian*, 28 January 2009). These appearances reflect a more general social trend in which the heritage of the War has been sedimented into language itself, with Nazism surpassing other malevolent regimes in references to, for example, authoritarianism ('Nazi teacher'), punctilious behaviour ('Nazi attention to details') or simply evil ('you Nazi!'). Given the (unsurprising) continuous British preoccupation with Nazi evils, the equation between Jews and Nazis, as seen in the sample below, deserves a second look.

Comparisons between Israeli-Jews and Nazis thus follows such psychodemonisation as 'Our aversion to Nazism matches to Our aversion to Israeli-Jews,' and 'We might not always get it right but Their wrongdoing is Nazi-like; it is beyond the pale.' For example, Zick, Küpper and Hövermann note the theme in which "Jews try to take advantage of having been victims during the Nazi era" (2011:57). According to this logic, Israelis/Jews use the Holocaust to cage Europe in its shameful past while Their own Judeo-supremacist dispossession of Palestine continues unabated. While Israeli-Jews try to outsmart the gentile nations and conceal their Nazi-like crimes, We, the heroic vanguard, expose Their crimes for what they are. This 'Jew-Nazi' analogy is best summarized by Gerald Kaufman, a former Labour MP (House of Commons debate on Gaza, 15 January 2009). Kaufman declared that

The present Israeli government ruthlessly and cynically exploit the continuing guilt from Gentiles over the slaughter of Jews in the Holocaust as justification for their murder of Palestinians.

And that “A German soldier shot her [Kaufman’s grandmother] dead in her bed... [She] did not die to provide cover for Israeli soldiers murdering Palestinian grandmothers in Gaza.” Although controversial, Kaufman’s claims are familiar (see below). But, one might ask: what “continuing guilt”? Is Britain’s ‘guilt’ over the Nazi Holocaust not a strategic ‘guilt of choice,’ outweighing other possible expressions of ‘guilt’ over Britain’s *own* imperial past? Hence, the first argument of this enquiry is as follows:

Britain’s commendable World War II heroism, which defeated Nazism and Fascism, has become instrumental sources in occluding from the British collective narrative some of Britain’s own forms of Fascism and inhumanity during the centuries of slavery, colonialism and imperialism.

As Gilroy remarks on Fanon’s “little family quarrels” statement (1952/2008:115),¹⁴² what was at the time reasonable when perpetrated outside Europe, became promptly abhorred once perpetrated inside Europe.¹⁴³ Césaire encapsulates this sentiment writing that:

[Hitler] applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the “coolies” of India, and the “niggers” of Africa. (1955)

Or as Du Bois writes:

there was no Nazi atrocity—concentration camps, wholesale maiming and murder, defilement of women or ghastly blasphemy of childhood—which the Christian civilization of Europe had not long been practicing against coloured folk in all parts of the world in the name of and for the defense of a Superior Race born to rule the world. (1947/1965:23)

Hence, Britain and other European imperial powers, committing some of the greatest crimes globally *prior* to Second World War,¹⁴⁴ became de-facto *the law* after the War. To

¹⁴² Fanon writes “Granted, the Jews are harassed—what am I thinking of? They are hunted down, exterminated, cremated. But these are little family quarrels” (1952/1986:115-16).

¹⁴³ On Holocaust uniqueness see Rosenbaum (introduction, 1996:23), Rosenfeld (1997), or Kent (2006:377).

¹⁴⁴ E.g., that 84.4 per cent of the earth was controlled by European powers by 1914 (Shohat and Stam, 1994), the destruction of North America’s First Nations Peoples (what Stannard called an “Anglo-American genocide,” 1993:223), accusations of British genocidal policies in Australia and Tasmania (Barta, 1987; Moses and Stone, 2013) or that British ships carried about 3.4 million enslaved Africans across the Atlantic (e.g., Richardson, 1998:441-2).

use Kennedy (2006), the creation of such international bodies as the UN, IMF, the World Bank, GATT or the WTO, was supposed to uphold internationalism with the charter to prevent the gross human rights violations of the War from being repeated. Yet such internationalism was founded on the basis of providing the UN's five Great Powers¹⁴⁵ the US, Britain, France, Russia and China—incidentally, some of the greatest imperial offenders pre-Second World War—overarching authorities through a veto power in the Security Council (Mazower, 2009; Shohat and Stam, 1994:17). As Mazower writes “The Great Powers had returned” (2009). Accordingly, some of Britain's *pre*-Second World War imperial influence transmuted into Britain's legal and ethical authority *post-war*. The defeat of Nazism with the Holocaust being its signature evil was a key feature in making this metamorphosis appear naturalized (see Mehta, 1999; Pitts, 2005). In this post-war, renewed British becoming the self-referential oppositions of the ‘Jew-Nazi’ interlinked with the construction of a favourable British image and the *dissociation* with other histories beyond this syntactic binary. While the Reichstag, the Beetle car or the Nazi helmet became symbols of evil, the Houses of Parliament, the Land Rover or the British Pith Helmet assumed a benign or at worst, awkward status.

This sense of a self-assigned, self-serving guilt can be explained using René Girard's study *Violence and the Sacred* (1977/2013). In the arbitrary, mythical attribution of guilt, writes Girard, unanimity arises: “At the point where two, three, or hundreds of symmetrical or inverted accusations meet, one alone makes itself heard and the others fall silent” (1977/2013:88). “The old pattern,” continues Girard, “of each against another gives way to the unified antagonism of all against one” (ibid). Girard thus describes a snowball effect of dizzying speed, where the group's “ever-expanding uniformity” (1977/2013:89) and conviction are based on “no other evidence than the unshakable unanimity of its own illogic” (ibid).

Thus, Italy, Japan, Austria, or other allies of Nazi Germany—including varying alliances with Poland, Ukrain, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, France and, indeed, Britain—found themselves, post-war, in the “unshakable unanimity” of being exonerated from the blame encircling Germany within that category. While focusing on Germany was not

¹⁴⁵ See also Bosco (2009). Initially Roosevelt rejected adding China, the only non-European country, to the 5P (Mazower, 2013). Other European standards, solidified globally post-war, are in such fields as aviation, shipping, medicine, toxins, nuclear energy, communications, the environment and more (see Cooper, 2008).

‘arbitrary,’ the united desire by Britain and other big European powers to promote a new era of internationalism and law structured this emerging legal system as *virtually not retroactive*: effectively *decriminalizing* their own pre-War aggression ex post facto. The transformation of violence from “each against another” to “all against one” (Girard, 1977/2013:88) as binding the Jewish Holocaust with Britain’s post-War sense of moral authority. “Generative unanimity,” writes Girard, “is a process for changing bad violence into stability and fecundity” (1977/2013:303). Indeed, according to Kennedy, the allies’ objective was to move away from the all-incriminating memory of the War with future-looking hopes of global law and governance.

The second argument of this examination reads:

As above, the post-war reinstatement of a heroic British self-image was tied to the semiotic binary of the Jew and Nazi as absolute victims and aggressors. Yet when the Jew pursued national determination—which like many other national struggles was attained through violence—semiotically, the only available move from the ‘Jew victim’ was to the ‘Nazi aggressor.’ Defined negatively by what she was not, once exhibiting aggression the post-war Jew was redefined by that which had marked her until then in opposition: an archetypal enemy bent on destruction and a threat to world peace.

Thus, by some ‘magic’ the Israeli-Jew seems to fit right into the semiotic position of the Nazi. For example, when a Palestinian violinist was asked to play his violin at an Israeli road block,¹⁴⁶ or when an Israeli officer number tagged captured Palestinian militants with a marker on their foreheads,¹⁴⁷ the *Guardian* roared with Israeli-Nazi comparisons. At the same time, historic events which *should have been* compared with Nazi crimes received little attention.¹⁴⁸

The Buddhist verse by Seng-tsan (circa 590, see Mitchell, 1989) seems to encapsulate this logic, it reads “Make a hair’s breadth difference and heaven and earth are set apart... The struggle between “for” and “against” is the mind’s worst disease.” Thus, constructing the ‘Jew-Nazi’ as antithetical opposites means that alterations in the composition of either polarity could *collapse it into the other*. Being as far as heaven and hell, Jews are *also* as

¹⁴⁶ “Israel shocked by image of soldiers forcing violinist to play at roadblock” (*Guardian*, 29 November 2004).

¹⁴⁷ *Guardian* (12 March, 2002).

¹⁴⁸ For example, the Hutu Power use of Nazi ideology in 1994 or the Pol Pot’s ideology of racial superiority.

close to Nazis as a hair's breadth. The 'Jew-Nazi' is an *interchangeable* binary due to its main ontological purpose, to idealise Us as saviours. This commitment then to the memory of the Holocaust is *not* simply a reflection of the Nazis' extreme violence against Jews. Indeed, centuries of the slave trade, the plight of First Nation peoples in the Americas or the Russian Gulags did not produce similar attachments. Hence, Kaufman's claim of decades-long British guilt over the Jewish Holocaust is not merely a historical inaccuracy.¹⁴⁹ Rather, it reveals how this *guilt-of-choice* buttressed Britain's less examined guilt towards the victims of its own violence, giving way to blamelessness and self-satisfaction. Associating Israel's crimes with Nazi crimes went along with *disassociating* Britain's crimes from Nazis crimes. The semiotic grammar which glued Israeli and Nazi atrocities also dissolved other wrongdoings closer to home. While the 'Jew-Nazi' comparison became naturalized, a Britain-Nazi comparison materialized as an unthinkable taboo: something neither discussed nor thought of.¹⁵⁰

An astounding example is the *Guardian's* coverage of the High Court case brought against the British government by survivors of the British rule in Kenya during the Mau Mau uprising (1952 to 1960). As Elkins (2005) describes, the dimensions of the British devastation of the Kikuyu Society in Colonial Kenya were overwhelming, with an estimated 1.5 million Kikuyu people being detained (2005:x) in work camps which "were not wholly different from those in Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia" (2005:153, 335). Still, the print edition coverage of the trial (6 June, 2013) spiked and disappeared within two weeks. Altogether, the key terms "Mau Mau" and "Kikuyu" appear 225 and 162 times, respectively, in the *Guardian* print edition (2000-2010).

The last argument in this section reads as follows:

Selective recognition of the Jewish Holocaust was instrumental in the construction of a British high moral self post-war. Yet with the British Empire's pre-War wrongdoing becoming a distant memory in liberal and democratic Britain during the 2000s, this constructed narrative appeared somewhat redundant. In other words, tying Jewish victimhood to a sense of British benevolence appears mysteriously self-censoring and stifling: 'Why do We compel Ourselves to uphold the Jewish War tragedy more than other current global issues?' When the Israeli-Jew is doing wrong, such a mindset

¹⁴⁹ See Postone and Santner (2003:98) who point to the low visibility of the Holocaust up until the 1960s. See also Slavic (2007) and Powers (2002) on genocide and inaction.

¹⁵⁰ I am *not* calling for a Britain-Nazism comparison but only highlighting these disparities.

feels betrayed. Suddenly, Jewish victimhood seems caging and manipulative, mysteriously subverting Britain from upholding its values towards Palestine, or pursuing its interests in the Middle East.

The examination below looks into relevant utterances in both newspapers.

6.4 Holocaust ‘denial light’ on the Left


In the examples below from the *Guardian* and the *Independent*, the ‘Jew-Nazi’ rhetorical contrast appears as a maxim. There is no need to ask which Israeli-Jews are silencing which British persons, when or how: suspicion alone is proof enough (Alon and Omer, 2006). John Pilger’s article headlined “The pro-Israel lobby intimidates journalists to ensure that most coverage remains biased in its favour” (*Guardian*, 23 September 2002), or Greg Philo’s claim that many journalists speak of “waiting in fear for the phone call from the Israelis (meaning the embassy or higher)” (*Guardian*, 11 May 2011, lead paragraph), convey this sense of a stifling and silencing Israeli-Jew and a caged, bewildered British victimhood. Looking into hundreds of Holocaust themed articles in both newspapers, a form of *Holocaust denial light* emerges which is tied to such defence of Our high ideals from silencing and subverting Jewish influences. I use ‘light’ since the Holocaust is not denied. Instead, the sanctity of the memory of this mass murder is repeatedly degraded and tainted using representations of the Israeli-Jew as a contaminating pollutant. Such *Guardian* formulations in the 2000s *both* tacitly fights *and* fosters anti-Semitic racialisations regarding the Holocaust (see Julius, 2010:473). Wistrich recorded such contradiction as “I loathe anti-Semites, but I really dislike Jews” (talk at Wiener Library, December 2012). Hence, the persecution of European Jews in the 1930s and 1940s becomes mixed with the ever changing, contemporary ideas, perceptions and mediations about these years. In the first years of the AAI, this meant that ideas about the Holocaust were mixed with ideas about the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Take, for example, the reprint in the *Guardian* of two long extracts from Finkelstein’s book *The Holocaust Industry* (12 and 13 July 2000¹⁵¹). In these extracts the Holocaust is

¹⁵¹ Due to lack of space I only review the first extract.

not denied outright, but its memory is scrutinized with endemic suspicion. The dramatic G2 cover (Figure 34) reads: “‘If everyone who claims to be a survivor actually is one,’ my mother used to exclaim, ‘who did Hitler kill?’”

Figure 34: Guardian G2 cover (12 December 2000)



This cover does not claim that Hitler did not kill anyone, nor that survivors are only impostors. Nonetheless, the dramatic, urgent graphics and the exposé-styled framing *are* suggestive and open-ended. The imposition of the Nazi Yellow Star on the cover is also unfortunate since it invokes a core symbol of the Holocaust as something which begets revision and rethinking. Coupled with the sweeping accusations inside the article, these suggestive tones accommodate an aggressive ‘open season,’ where anything related to the Holocaust can be tarnished. For example, the article’s inside headline, “The business of death,” infers a malevolent Jewish greed which is then ‘confirmed’ in the article’s mocking images, quotations and captions. To highlight a few examples, “exploitative” Jewish organisations “extort money from Europe” with “sensationalist scare tactics”; they use the memory of the Holocaust as an “ideological weapon” and “[B]ecause survivors

are now revered as secular saints one doesn't dare question them"; wearing a "crown of martyrdom" these survivors then sell-out for "power and profit" while the Holocaust industry "has been used to justify the criminal policies of the Israeli state" and secure an "immunity to criticism, however justified." The captions under the images of Simon Wiesenthal and Deborah Lipstadt, appearing in denigrating poses, read "Dachau meets Disneyland" and "Crank targets."

Figure 35: *Guardian* (12 December 2000) excerpts from Finkelstien's *Holocaust Industry*



The *Independent* however (Natasha Walter, 16 July) lambasted Finkelstien's book in an article headlined "We need more, not fewer, memorials to our crimes." In line with the propositions above, the article remarks that "Americans—and Britons—would rather wring their hands over the Holocaust than over their own crimes against humanity."

Another example is the article titled "The death pit" (*Guardian*, G2, 27 January 2004), by Janina Struk, taken from her 2004 book. The article includes a large picture (27x35cm) which depicts four naked men and a boy standing next to their soon-to-be assassins.

Figure 36: *Guardian* (27 January 2004)



Looking into Struk's book, on which the article is based, the back-cover notes that Holocaust photographs are "above all – exploited for propaganda purposes," and that such "political interests" invoke questioning "whether or not these images can serve as "evidence", as true representations of the events they depict." In the *Guardian*, Struk presents such conclusions on the basis that the perpetrators' uniforms are unidentified and that the soldier on the right, pointing downwards, was cropped out of other copies of this picture. The article does not claim that Holocaust images are fabrications, but its suggestive tone is unmissable. For example, the article's three evocative large subheadings read:

"...But who are the killers, who are the victims, who took it – and why?"

"...was there a lull in the proceedings so the picture could be taken?"

"This is the only version that I am aware of in which the uniformed man on the right has not been cropped out."

The emphasis in the article on the mysterious cropped man insinuates that the picture was staged. Indeed, Struk reveals her actual conclusion about the image *only in the last two paragraphs of the article*. Struk notes that the image was dutifully cropped by curators and archivists, who appropriated it, even if the identities of the victims and perpetrators

were not confirmed. This lukewarm conclusion, hidden and tucked away, falls short of the article's exposé-styled psychodemonic framing.

Another example is the article titled "This is ours and ours alone," covering the opening of the new Yad Vashem museum in Israel (*Guardian*, 15 March 2005).

Figure 37: *Guardian* (15 March 2005)



With "ours" in the headline referring to Israeli-Jews, the article banishes Israeli-Jewish collective identity as possessive and even anti-humanist in regard to the memory of the Holocaust. Applying classic Orientalism, the article uses 'experts' (e.g., Segev) to openly debate 'What is on the mind of the Israeli-Jew?' (see Said, 1978:301). The article thus finds Israeli-Jews to be unscrupulous in their 'wheeling-and-dealing' in the memory of the Holocaust. For example, the new Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum was built "to trump similar establishments abroad" and to become "the primary keeper of the memory." "Israel," the article continues:

is trying to gain back the monopoly on the Holocaust; the Holocaust is ours and ours

alone, and no humanistic or universal values should overtake what we feel about the Holocaust. (*Guardian*, 15 March 2005)

Hence, the carnal Israeli-Jew debases the Holocaust, seeing in it only prospects for power and control, while blocking deeper humanist engagements; i.e., universal, humanism such as Ours. The article's first lines thus labour the notion that Israeli-Jews use the Holocaust as a tool for propaganda. It reads:

Young Israeli conscripts, their guns slung loosely across their backs, can seem horribly out of place passing through the galleries of Yad Vashem, Jerusalem's memorial to the Holocaust. But the soldiers are not brought to the museum to mourn so much as to learn.

Hence, the Holocaust museum is used to mislead soldiers into thinking that they have the moral legitimacy to oppress Palestinians. Yad Vashem's message, which is "the same message conveyed to soldiers," is that "as victims we [Israeli-Jews] can do no wrong and this is the narrow Israeli interpretation of the Holocaust" (quoting Tom Segev). Other "lessons of the Holocaust," such as "to fight for democracy," to "defend human rights," or "to object to all forms of racism" are lost on the Israeli-Jew—with the underlying contrasting suggestion that We are well in position to instruct others on such values. The article adds that, initially, Israeli-Jews regarded Holocaust victims as "shameful" "weak Jews," and only the "younger generation, deals with it [the victims' weakness] with much more compassion."

Another *Guardian* article (G2 section, 23 June 2010), titled "Jewish people don't own the Holocaust," rehashes to the theme of Jewish possessiveness.

Figure 38: Guardian (23 July 2010)



The article's main subheading reads

"Yann Martel has been critically savaged for writing about the Holocaust in his follow-up to *Life of Pi*. But, he says, artists have a right to tackle anything."

The only other subheading reads "you no more own a historical event than people own their language..." In line with this ownership framing, the possessive Jews and their friends "savaged" the heroic, progressive Martel for merely "writing about the Holocaust." In turn, the Holocaust is referred to as "some sanctified piece of history," and Martel is said to be rejecting the idea that the Holocaust is "indescribable, that it should be sacred..." Quite literally, according to the article, the Holocaust is overly sacred and should be profaned. An example from the book appears in its an unenthusiastic review in the *Independent* (30 May 2010):

Your daughter is clearly dead. If you step on her head, you can reach higher, where the air is better. Do you step on your daughter's head?

Illustrating an 'ethical conundrum' in the form of a playful children's mind game, the memory of the deceased child is desacralized by the bereaved parent's meek attempt at selfish survival.

To conclude, this section highlights some of the mediatic processes by which the abuse of the collective memory of the Holocaust has contributed to seeing the Jew through RD. Due to lack of space, the few reports above are only a small sample for a more exhaustive forthcoming research project.


6.5 GENDERING THE ARAB AND JEW: AN OVERVIEW FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Another mode of racialisations which becomes visible in the intersection of the Arab, Jew and the Idea-of-Europe are representations of women in the coverage. Due to lack of space, I only include a comparative overview of depictions of Arab and Jewish women, not of British women. As shown in the findings chapters, the Palestinian-Arab appears in many images and textual references as either women in need of saving or emasculated men displaying dependency, passivity and incompetency (see Friedan, 1963; Milestone and Meyer, 2011:92). This feminized Palestinian Other, derealised through grammars of inferiority and always defined by others, is seen in the reports through “supine malleability... requiring Western attention, reconstruction, even redemption” (Said, 1978:206). As shown above, even Arafat or Palestinian military elites are repetitively depicted through passiveness, submissiveness and reserved indignity. While such mediations of the suffering of Palestinian women open up spaces for moral recognition, they also imagine an Orient which is nascent and dependent (Ahmed, 1992; Abu-Loghod, 2013; Kabanni, 1986). In line with what Leila Ahmed terms “colonial feminism” (1992, see also Zine, 2004:117), the Christian-European gaze at the veiled, Muslim-looking woman imagines itself to be progressive and egalitarian, as liberating Arab women from *their own* patriarchal, oppressive societies (Ho, 2007:290). To use Spivak, “White men saving brown women from brown men” (1988:93). Or, as Fletcher writes, “The veiled woman was thought to be ignorant, illiterate, and oppressed, and her images functioned as a marker of Muslim cultural inferiority” (quoted in Steet, 2001:25). The inferior Muslim culture is then interpolated to emulate the dominant universal Western cultural hegemony (Hasan, 2012:58). With Us as the protectors of Palestinian “womenandchildren” (Enloe, 1990:166), *these* gendered depictions sideline other depictions of Palestinians as teachers, lawyers or activists. Omitted also are depictions of the institutions and locations of power through which such Palestinian self-governance

materialises or is struggled for, such as political reforms or universities. Indeed, Palestinian (and Israeli) women's peace organisations and networks are consistently left out of the reports.¹⁵²

At the same time, Israeli-Jews are gendered through a diametrically oppositional image of bellicose masculinity, leaving women almost entirely out of the frame. However, the few representations of Israeli-Jewish women that are published also reproduce an image of an exaggerated, aggressive masculinity. I first noticed this thematic trend in an online *Guardian* report about the death of Haifa Police chief, Brigadier General Ahuva Tomer (*Figure 39*).¹⁵³ Tomer died from her injuries (12 December 2010) due to the deadly 2 December 2010 Mount Carmel forest fire.

Figure 39: The late Brigadier General Ahuva Tomer, Guardian (6 December 2010, online)



Despite the tragic fire, the Punctum (Barthes, 1980:146) of the report's image is Tomer's military-style haircut and military demeanour. Such a portrayal of the Israeli women as militarised and hardened is metonymic to an Israeli-Jewish society which values hostility and wars in each node of its being, exclusively and exhaustively, from its institutions down to its social roots. The Israeli home is thus imagined as a barricade of metal and cement, unwelcoming and harsh. The Israeli woman blocks the door, she is

¹⁵² E.g., Samiha Khalil, the woman welfare campaigner running against Arafat in the 1996 PA elections, is *never* mentioned in the *Guardian* (1998-2017). In another example, a coalition of twenty-two Palestinian and Israeli Women's organisations delivered a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State at the time stressing the role women play as peace builders (6 February 2005, Powers, 2006:138).

¹⁵³ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/06/israeli-policewoman-ahuva-tomer-dies>

unsympathetic and nurtures her children with chauvinistic ideals of unnatural violence and biblical occupations. The Israeli-Jewish woman, then, is denounced with an additional, intersecting stratification of rejection; the denial of her womanhood. This hardened un-femininity ‘proves’ the ontological wrong with Israel’s Jewish society *as a whole*, while marking Our ways as oppositional. For example, in my study of the *Guardian*’s centrefold, double-spread format (see above), British women are depicted as refined, progressive, complex and multidimensional. Such depictions include celebrities, artists, scientists, athletes, women experimenting with their sexuality or just women walking in sunny, pleasant parks. While there is no space here for further discussion, these depictions stand as antinomies to both the images of the Arab and Jewish women in the coverage.

For example, as seen in the peace chapter, there are *no* images of Israeli-Jewish women in the *Independent* newspapers during July and December 2000. In the *Guardian*, from only three images of Israeli-Jewish women during *both* months, two are negative. One image depicts women demonstrators with a placard comparing Arafat to Hitler (10 July), and the other image shows a settler woman with a baby in a newly built settlement (7 July). The third *Guardian* image, which aims to be positive, still shows an Israeli women settler posing with her husband.

Another facet of these representations is the *relatively* higher number of Israeli-women’s fatalities compared to Palestinian women’s fatalities between 29 September 2000 and 26 December 2008 (a period including the period of the AAI and the Hamas takeover of Gaza). During these eight years there were 147 Palestinian women fatalities and 231 Israeli women fatalities (179 of the Israeli women casualties were killed inside Israel proper).¹⁵⁴ However, violence against non-elite Israeli women appeared in the reports (2000-2008), at best, as superficial, while violence against Palestinian women appeared as central to the conflict: a programmatic assault against the Palestinian society as a whole. While the right for freedom from violence is not extended to non-elite Israeli women, in turn, they appear as *colluding against* such universal right. *These* women testify to the moral decay of their society and Our forensic vigilance in detecting such

¹⁵⁴ Since 27 December 2008 to 30 April 2018 there were 442 Palestinian women casualties and 17 Israeli women.

failures. Contrastingly, Palestinian women are placed on the pedestal of mock hagiography and proto-victimisation. Seen as a malleable tabula rasa, *these* women are projected with Our imagined high ideals while, at the same time, We already assume that They cannot be redeemed from Their backward traditions and war-like Nature.

Figure 40: *Guardian* (10 July 2000)




Figure 41: *Guardian* (7 July 2000)




Figure 42: *Guardian* (26 October 2000). “Shifra Hoffman takes aim at the range” (image caption); “Israelis gear up for armed struggle” (headline)



Figure 43: *Guardian* (4 November 2000)




Figure 44: *Guardian* (24 September 2011). “Women at the Jewish settlement of Pnei Kedem practice firing pistols and high-powered rifles” (caption)¹⁵⁵



Figure 45: *Independent* (19 October 2015)



¹⁵⁵ The “high-powered” rifles have no magazines and could not be “firing.”

Figure 46: *Women in a funeral* (Guardian, January 23, 2003)



Another surprising statistic relevant to the stratification of gendered imagery in line with RT and RD, relates to foreign citizens killed in the conflict. The murder/killing¹⁵⁶ of the peace activist Rachel Corrie by an Israeli army bulldozer in Gaza, gives insight to such exploration. Corrie and other International Solidarity Movement (ISM) activists were trying to prevent the demolition of Palestinian houses by the Israeli army (the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions finds that close to 50,000 homes and structures were demolished by Israel in the OPT between 1967 and 2018).¹⁵⁷ In the *Guardian*, Corrie's story and other cases of murder and killings of foreign citizens by the Israeli army are aptly reported. For example, in the *Guardian* print edition (2000-2010) the names "Rachel Corrie" and "Tom Hurndall" appear 157 times and 116 times respectively. Altogether there were ten foreign citizens who were killed or murdered by Israeli security forces during this period, nine of which were men. However, the 54 foreign citizens killed by Palestinians, of which 16 were women¹⁵⁸ and three were children, received *no*

¹⁵⁶ <http://rachelcorriefoundation.org/trial/the-legal-docket-case-overviews>

¹⁵⁷ <https://icahd.org/our-mission-and-vision>

¹⁵⁸ Accessed February 2011, the names of the 16 women foreign citizens killed by Palestinians, according to B'tselem's website, are: Jitladda Tap-arsa, Tatiana Igelski, Katherine Berruex, Rozalia Beseneyi, Perosca Boda, Maria Antonia Reslas, Goldi Taubenfeld, Hayla Abraha Hawqi, Jang Minmin, Idiliana Qunnan, Rivka Roga, Marla Bennet, Janice Ruth Coulter, Perla Harmaleh, Shoshana Judith Greenbaum and Rosaria Rias.

mentioning. A keyword search of the names of *these* foreign citizens showed *zero* appearances. The point here is not to compare between victimhoods. Palestinian's human security is immeasurably worse than that of Israelis. The full-scale wars in 2006, 2008-9, 2012 or 2014 are just shorthand indications of this devastating reality and much of the quotidian violence of the Israeli occupation goes unreported. Rather, the point here is to demonstrate the discrepancies in the coverage of foreign citizens fatalities according to RT and RD. For example, a four-page G2 *Guardian* article about Rachel Corrie (18 March 2003, a day before the Iraq War was launched) quotes Corrie on Israel's "chronic, insidious genocide" (main headline, G2 cover) while another headline refers to Palestinians as representing the "basic ability for humans to remain human in the direst of circumstances. I think the word is dignity. I wish you could meet these people."¹⁵⁹ The point here is to highlight this symbolic civilizational separation between victimisers who are never victims, victims who are never victimisers, and a saviour punishing the wicked and saving those who cannot help themselves: both the scales of justice and the sword of moral authority.

¹⁵⁹ My contention here is not with the young, idealist Rachel Corrie, but with the *Guardian* editors' own emphases.

FINDINGS II: REPORTING ON PEACEMAKING

7. THE COVERAGE OF THE PEACE PROCESS

“I came here to write about peace, I still hope that one day I can”

SUZANNE GOLDENBERG, THE *GUARDIAN* JERUSALEM CORRESPONDENT (2000-2001),
AFTER WINNING THE EDGAR WALLACE TROPHY

“Nimeh Rashadieh, a mother of 10 children, ululated with joy [that the talks failed]. She was unconcerned by predictions that a new cycle of violence could begin between Arab and Jew... ‘It’s a war,’ she said yesterday, clutching a poster of Mr Arafat to the embroidered bodice of her dress. ‘Soon the blood will be knee-deep. Yes, I want another war and another Intifadah...’”

SUZANNE GOLDENBERG (*GUARDIAN*, 27 JULY 2000)

“The Jewish lobby... attempt to force the media to obey Israel’s rules is now international.”

ROBERT FISK, *INDEPENDENT* (13 DECEMBER 2000)

7.1 Introduction

Given this study’s foundations in Galtung’s Peace Journalism, I use two key moments in the peace process as my main case study, being July and December 2000. Exploring the coverage of peace talks represents a ‘light-handed’ approach, avoiding other ‘heavy-handed’ analyses into, say, Israel’s raid on Jenin (April 2002), Israel’s siege on the Church of the Nativity (April-May 2002), The *Karine A* affair (January 2002), the 2006 Lebanon war (July-August) or the 2008-9 Gaza war (December-January). I chose the coverage of peacemaking to exemplify how the appearances of everyday racialisations appear even at times of (relative) nonviolence, as in July.

As above, both the Arab and Jew are equally derealised in the coverage in differentiated yet relational ways inline with RT and RD. The child-like, lacking self-control and in need of saving Arab appears as diametrically opposite to the controlling, arch-conspirator and manipulator of global affairs Israeli-Jew. Equidistant from both, the British Idea-of-Europe fancies her high ideals as being of peace, civility and cosmopolitanism and hence contrasting with, and superior to, the Arab and Jew’s dogmatic and chauvinist Nature.

For example, a key *Independent* editorial (1 July) frames the conflict as a “...seemingly incompatible, faith-based conflict...” (subheading). On the one hand, “...in the schools of the West Bank, the children are taught... not to love freedom, but to hate Jews.” On the other, Israeli-Jewish soldiers shoot Palestinian children with either orders or impunity. “So, Ehud [Barak]” the article concludes, “tell your soldiers not to shoot children.”

I use the altitudinal metaphors of ‘*descent*’ and ‘*deepening the abyss*’ to describe the tensions in the coverage of the peace talks during July and December 2000 respectively. In July, the peace process is explained as a feeble attempt by two uncivilized Others to mend their barbaric ways—an attempt viewed as doomed for failure from inception—only then to fall back onto their entrenched, warlike Natures. The drama in this reportage therefore comes from anticipating this moment of breakdown, when the thin, civilized ‘façade’ of ‘peaceful engagement’ is torn and the sides’ primordial instincts soar. The analysis of July 2000, three months prior to the AAI and at the pinnacle of the peace process, is subtler than that of December, while sharing many of its tropes. I use the notion of *deepening the abyss* to describe the coverage of the talks during the violent month of December 2000 (two months into the AAI). Here, the ongoing violence is depicted as ‘validating’ existing preconceptions: ‘now we know how limitless and inexhaustible Their wickedness actually is.’

It is not that the coverage is entirely devoid of generative empathy towards non-elite Palestinians or generative criticism towards Israel’s military occupation.¹⁶⁰ Rather, the headings, visuals, leads, wording and graphs tell a different story. Take, for example, the headings below:

Ancient quarrels pothole the road to peace
(*Guardian*, 21 July)

Fear of descent into fresh bloodshed as leaders return home
empty-handed (*Independent*, 26 July)

“It’s nothing personal. It’s Arab against Jew”
(*Guardian*, 11 October 2000)

¹⁶⁰ E.g., opinion articles by Rashid Khalidi (*Guardian*, 27 July) and Amos Oz (*Guardian*, 11 July).

In these headlines the agency attached to the violence materialises as the sides' ancient, eternal hatreds which, like the animus between cats and dogs, cannot but 'bubble up' from below. Seeing the conflict as inevitable, as inscribed into 'who They are,' also discounts peacemaking or common ground as impossibilities; as going against the sides' very Nature.

7.2 Reporting peace; a comparative perspective

The following *Guardian* headline appears inside this study's sample; "Horn of Africa rivals sign deal pact" (13 December 2000). The lead paragraph reads:

Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a peace treaty in Algiers yesterday, ending their two-year border war which has claimed 100,000 lives and displaced more than a million people on the Horn of Africa.

Yet, other headlines related to the negotiations between Ethiopia and Eritrea appeared far in between: 8 December 2000 (in "The week that was: Abroad"), 4 August, 5 June, and 1 June. A few months earlier, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was signed (28 August 2000)¹⁶¹ with virtually no mention in the *Guardian*.¹⁶² In other examples, headlines referring to peace talks either apply pink-tainted predictions, or a distanced, unempathetic "law and order" framing (Wolfsfeld, 1997). For example, only a handful of headlines (2000-2010) cover the talks between the Lord's Resistance Army and the Ugandan government with one such headline optimistically stating that "Truce pledge could end Ugandan insurgency" (*Guardian*, 31 December 2004). In another example, a *Guardian* article headlined "Oil deal puts Sudan a step closer to peace" (22 December 2003), hails the North-South peace talks. Yet the article's *last sentence* vaguely alludes to the *nine months long* crisis in Darfur:

Meanwhile other conflicts continue to rumble in Sudan, including a rebellion against the government by two other rebel groups in the western region of Darfur.

¹⁶¹ <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/arusha-peace-and-reconciliation-agreement-burundi>

¹⁶² One mention of the talks reads "More than 200,000 have died since 1993" (*Guardian*, 24 August 2000, *last paragraph*). Another brief appearance, covering the death of a British aid worker in Burundi, notes that "[N]early 400,000 people are still displaced within Burundi since civil war began in 1993..." (30 August 2000, 19th paragraph)

About a week later, the headline “Signing of Sudanese power-sharing deal boosts hope of *peace in Africa*” (*Guardian*, 1 January 2004, emphasis added), includes a side remark in the *thirteenth paragraph* regarding a “separate conflict in Sudan’s western Darfur region” where “70,000” have died “since March” 2003 (see also *Guardian*, 28 August 2006). This article also refers in passing to the “peace agreement in Senegal” signed the same week.

Finally, hardly any reports cover the failed negotiations between Morocco and the Western Sahara Polisario movement. Former US Secretary of State, James Baker’s Plans I (2001) and II (2003) (see Solà-Martín, 2007) clock zero appearances in the *Guardian* print edition (2000-2010). As one *online* article says:

The UN has been trying for eight years to organise a referendum on the future of the territory, which is mostly controlled by Morocco.¹⁶³

These examples display disproportionately little visibility or emotional engagement compared to the coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks. Do such conflicts in Darfur or Eritrea lack human drama? Is the violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that exceptional? This brief comparison of the *Guardian*’s reports about peacemaking raises disconcerting questions.

In the same vein, this chapter does not hold that the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks in July and December 2000 were either exceptionally good or bad. Rather, it examines how the talks were framed, and for whom. Such endlessly repeated terms as ‘lasting peace,’ ‘generous offer’ or ‘rejectionist’ did not reflect both newspapers’ political assessment of the talks but the imagined interaction of their readership with *these* stories, peoples and geographies—but not others.

Still, a comparison between, on the one hand, the coverage of the December 2000 talks and, on the other, the Geneva Accord (October 2003) and the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Plan (the People’s Voice, July 2002) also shows vast disparity. In general lines, the negotiations *since* 2000 followed from the Clinton parameters (23 December 2000) and are more or less comparable in kind, though not in degree. Yet the December 2000 talks were met

¹⁶³ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/may/16/4?INTCMP=SRCH>

with rejection and disgust¹⁶⁴ (see below), while the Geneva Accord and the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Plan were warmly embraced. The *Guardian* even contributed in funds and organisation to the Geneva Initiative (Klein, 2007). This vast disparity is *not* the outcome of a painstaking political analysis. Rather, Geneva and Nusseibeh-Ayalon were only watermark agreements made by private actors to challenge the stagnated political consensus. In other words, *these* peace moments were supported as the exception that proves the rule: ‘despite these few outstanding individuals, there will never be peace there.’ This contrast in the reception of these comparable peace moments puts in question these newspapers’ framing of the 2000 talks. Arguably, the downplaying of the Jordan-Israel 1995 peace agreement in both newspapers also supports this notion of journalistic opportunism; ‘there will never be peace there and there never was.’

In interviews I conducted with Yossi Beilin (Geneva Initiative) and Ami Ayalon (Nusseibeh-Ayalon), both on August 2008, I indeed heard directly from these towering figures that the peace talks in 2000 were, for sure, faulty, but nonetheless conducted in good faith. Recent interviews with key negotiators, including Saeb Erekat,¹⁶⁵ highlight the countless failures during these talks but also corroborate this assertion that the talks were not a sham or a front for a secret Apartheid war.¹⁶⁶ For example, Yair Hirshfield (2000), points for six preconditions for peace negotiations and claims that Barak failed to meet almost all of them. Yet this detailed criticism of Barak and, indeed, Arafat, is not *metonymical* to who Jews or Arab *are*. Yizhar Be’er, a former B’Tselem Director (interview, van der Horst, 22 August 2017), also claimed that the talks were an authentic aspiration to reach a peace agreement. Moreover, multiple surveys conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) regarding the Clinton parameters (23 December 2000), show support for the Accords from both Palestinians and Israelis.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴ As did the January 2001 Taba talks and the 2007 Annapolis talks.

¹⁶⁵ E.g., interview, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FgV1YNR3Z4w> (3 and 10 October 2015), accessed 1 June 2018.

¹⁶⁶ I acknowledge other voices about the peace talks, such as Said (2000), Khalidi (2013) and Pappe and Chomsky (2015).

¹⁶⁷ E.g., Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll (<http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/436>), or Shamir and Shikaki (2010). Other polls include the Peace Index (Hermann and Yaar, Tami Steinmetz Centre for Peace Research) and the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (JMCC): 1997-2003, 2007-2009 (www.jmcc.org/imagesfolder/35_24_11_5_3_2009.jpg, accessed 15 June 2017).

A simpler indication that the rejection of the talks in 2000 by both newspapers was opportunistic, not ideological, is that when ever the talks looked doomed to fail they gained instant support. Examples include headlines such as: “Bombs shatter hopes of peace in Middle East” (*Independent*, 29 December), “US hopes for peace in Mid-East Evaporate” (*Independent*, 23 December), or “Wall of hatred on both sides blocks deal” (*Guardian*, 29 December). If the talks are a dangerous ‘sham’ why hope for their success or be alarmed when they fail?

7.3 Peace making and the news media as awkward bedfellows

There are countless texts on the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks (for example, Shamir and Maddy-Weitzman, 2005; Hanieh, 2001; Ben-Ami 2006; Shaath, 2001; Golan, 2007; Malley, 2001; Malley and Agha, 2001; Qurei, 2006; Meridor, *Camp David Diaries*, *Haaretz*, 29 July 2011; Swisher, 2009; Sher, 2001; Ross, 2004; Ginossar, 2005; Beilin, 2004; Klien, 2007). Yet this corpus is as polarised as the conflict itself. In contrast, there is only scant writing on the role the news media plays in peacemaking and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (e.g., Kempf, 2014; Tiripelli, 2016). One such study is by Wolfsfeld (2004). Looking into the Oslo Accords (1993), the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty (1994) and the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland (1998), Wolfsfeld’s first argument is:

“due to a fundamental contradiction between the nature of a peace process and news values, the media often play a destructive role in attempts at making peace” (2004:15)

Hence, Wolfsfeld points to a rudimentary antinomy between the news media’s obsession with dramatic events, images and elite personas and the needs of peace talks which include secret channels, complex documents, committees, prolonged processes and at least some consideration of the needs of the other side. Wolfsfeld writes:

Simply put, it is a hell of a lot easier to promote conflict to the media than peace. While conflict can be considered the sine qua non of news, peace and news make for awkward bedfellows. A successful peace process requires patience, and the news media demand immediacy. Peace is most likely to develop within a calm environment and the media have an obsessive interest in threats and violence. Peace building is a complex process and the news media deal with simple events. Progress towards peace requires at least a minimal understanding of the needs

of the other side, but the news media reinforce ethnocentrism and hostility towards adversaries. (2004:16)

Wolfsfeld thus highlights four journalistic news values as problematic when news media professionals come to report about peace. These are simplicity, immediacy, drama and ethnocentrism. As Wolfsfeld later writes on political contestation and the news media “The media are dedicated more than anything else to telling a good story and this can often have a major impact on the political process” (2011:4). Wolfsfeld’s chart below (2004:16), shows how such news values clash with the needs of a peace process.

Chart 8. Wolfsfeld’s “News of peace: the editorial process” (2004:16)

	<i>News</i>	<i>Not News</i>
<i>Immediacy</i>	<i>Events Specific Actions</i>	<i>Process Long-term Policies</i>
<i>Drama</i>	<i>Violence Crisis Conflict Extremism Dangers Internal Discord Major Breakthroughs</i>	<i>Calm Lack of Crisis Cooperation Moderation Opportunities Internal Consensus Incremental Progress</i>
<i>Simplicity</i>	<i>Opinions Images Major Personalities Two-sides Conflicts</i>	<i>Ideology Texts Institutions Multi-sided Conflicts</i>
<i>Ethnocentrism</i>	<i>Our Beliefs Our Suffering Their Brutality Our Myths/Symbols</i>	<i>Their Beliefs Their Suffering Our Brutality Their Myths/Symbols</i>

In contrast with the news media’s obsession with breaking news and clear-cut, short-term events, peace making is concerned with processes and long-term policies. While compromise, moderation and reconciliation may appear boring, naïve and even weak, violence and conflict are sensational and newsworthy. As Wolfsfeld puts it “Drama is the quintessential element of any “good” news story” (2004:18). Accordingly, the news media are more likely to cover personas and visuals than complex ideologies, institutions, long texts or a multifaceted historical narratives (Wolfsfeld, 2004:21). Through constant

simplification, media coverage tends to include a limited range of indexed voices and personas (ibid). Finally, through news media’s ethnocentrism, reproducing Our “shared myths, symbols, and traditions” (Wolfsfeld, 2004:22), “News stories are almost always about “Us.” News about “others,” continues Wolfsfeld, “centers on how they affect us” (ibid). Our enemies are always threatening and one-dimensional, yet Our heroes are presented in graphic descriptions and Our victims leave long and lasting collective scars (Wolfsfeld, 2004:23). As Wolfsfeld writes “Claims about our own acts of aggression and the other’s suffering are either ignored, underplayed, or discounted” (ibid).

Wolfsfeld’s summary echoes with this study’s focus on racialisations “The news media are extremely powerful and omnipresent mechanisms for intensifying and solidifying hate between peoples” (2004:23). This observation, continues Wolfsfeld, is “especially important concerning images of the enemy that are based on long histories of conflict and hate. In times of war, the press is an important agent of vilification” (2004:14). Sadly, this description fits the analysis below.

Seeing the peace talks as a zero-sum game with clear-cut ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (Wolfsfeld, 2004:195) also translates to advancing rights in a zero-sum game between *Our dependents* (those ‘almost like Us’) and *Our dependents’ enemies* (those who are ‘nothing like Us’). So, *Our dependents’* beliefs, suffering, and myths are likely to be newsworthy while *Our dependents’ enemies* would not be. *Chart 9* paraphrases Wolfsfeld in line with this binary thinking.

Chart 9. A paraphrase on Wolfsfeld’s “News of peace: the editorial process” (2004:16)

<i>News</i>	<i>Not News</i>
<i>Our dependents’ beliefs</i>	<i>Our dependents’ enemies’ beliefs</i>
<i>Our dependents’ suffering</i>	<i>Our dependents’ enemies’ suffering</i>
<i>Our dependents’ enemies’ brutality</i>	<i>Our dependents’ brutality</i>
<i>Our dependents’ myths/symbols</i>	<i>Our dependents’ enemies’ myths/symbols</i>

The findings below strongly correlate with Wolfsfeld’s key points.

7.4 Rejecting the peace talks: July 2000

The coverage of the peace talks during July 2000 includes 42 articles in the *Guardian* and 56 articles in the *Independent*. Most stories appeared in the international news sections (53), seven articles appeared on the first page and 12 were opinion or editorial articles.

Both newspapers rejected the peace talks in July 2000, from their very inception, in ways which neatly mirror Wolfsfeld's analysis. *Chart 10*, below, reviews how both newspapers rejected the talks at the height of the peace process in seven nearly identical phases.

Chart 10. Trends in both newspapers' rejection of the talks (July 2000).

<i>Peace talks begin</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Established peacemakers and those showing support for the talks are kept out of the reports. Challengers and contenders (see below) easily grab images and headlines regardless of how small or politically peripheral their protests are.2. Societies on both sides of the conflict are left out and appear only through a metonymic and limited index of personas, namely, Arafat and Barak. Virtually all non-elite civilians who appear in the reports reject the peace talks.3. PA and Israeli threats of violence are woven throughout the coverage.
<i>Talks are in progress</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none">4. Negative/reductive motivations are allocated to all three sides.5. Almost sole focus on issues framed as 'deal breakers.' <p>Due to the secret nature of the negotiations, with no hard news to report, persona's trivial routines, dinner menus or flight schedules also become newsworthy.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">6. Consistent coverage depicts the PA and Israel as anti-peace and war-minded.
<i>Peace ending</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none">7. Hindsight pseudo justifications for the talks' failure.

The examination below further develops each of these themes.

7.4.1 *Challengers and contenders*

In both newspapers, especially during July 2000, challengers to the peace talks found it easy to grab large headlines and images, while peace-oriented groups were shunned out. While marginal and under-budgeted anti-peace protests broke into the mainstream news cycle with trivial “gimmicks” (Wolfsfeld, 1997:86), established peace-oriented actors were ignored altogether. Using sentences as the unit of analysis, there are 18 appearances of challengers in the *Guardian* (seven in the headlines) and 10 in the *Independent* (four in the headlines). Almost all of the challengers are Israeli.

“Members of the outlawed [extreme and militant] Kach group” (*Guardian*, 25 July), thus suddenly received space in both newspapers to air their concerns regarding the peace talks. Other examples include a settlers’ photo-opportunity protest against the dismantling of settlements using a house-like makeshift structure taken down by a tractor (*Figure 48*); an Israeli anti-peace demonstration with a few sheep (warning that Israelis are led like ‘blind sheep,’ *Figure 47*), or Israeli demonstrators with a poster comparing Arafat to Hitler (*Figure 49*). At the same time, the *Independent* omits any images of the “Thousands of people” demonstrating “in support of a peace agreement” outside of Barak’s residence (12 July), a demonstration not even reported in the *Guardian*.

Nonetheless, once these settlers or militants enter the mainstream news they lose any control over their message (Wolfsfeld, 1997), having been paraded as a synecdoche for their respective societies’ war-minded intransigency.

Figure 47: Independent (24 July)



Figure 48: Independent (17 July)



Figure 49: Guardian (10 July)



Figure 50: Independent (6 July)




In line with RT, an overall omission of any discussion regarding the PA's internal politics also spells the exclusion of divergent Palestinian voices during July. Indeed, there are *no* images or headlines that depict Palestinian objectors in the *Guardian* and the *Independent* includes only one article and one photograph. The article covers Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (14 July, *Figure 52*) and the photograph depicts gun-waving, masked Palestinian men burning a Bill Clinton poster with the words “*Hypocrite Zionist*” written on it with a marker (*Figure 51*). This image demonstrates the ease with which challengers enter the mainstream media while established, long-standing peace and coexistence organisations are left out.

Figure 51: Independent (30 July)



Figure 52: Independent (14 July)



Still, one *Independent* article (26 December), headed “Rain and prayers in Bethlehem. But little hope,” includes two large images: the Pope who “sought peace in the Holy Land,” and an American riding a camel from Iraq to Bethlehem dressed “as a king... on a pilgrimage of peace” (from the Nativity Story) (*Figure 53*). While the Palestinian and

Israeli peace camps are excluded almost entirely, idealised Christian “prayers” for peace, and a camel ‘gimmick,’ are granted easy access. In contrast with this piety, the article quotes an Israeli tabloid newspaper (standing for how They think) that called the talks a “battle for Jerusalem.”

Figure 53: *Independent* (26 December)



Indeed, repeated appearances refer to this imagined notion of Christian Love and peacefulness. For example, the lead editorial “Sadly, peace and goodwill are not the currency of the modern Middle East” (headline, *Independent*, 23 December) implies that “peace and goodwill” *are* the currency ‘over here’ while contrasting the “modern” Middle East—dominated by Muslims and Jews—with the Middle East of the time of the Gospels. The article headlined “Herod rages still, in Coventry as in Bethlehem” (*Guardian*, 28 December), while not dealing with the conflict directly, compares Herod’s “massacre of the innocents” with today’s Bethlehem and Israel. The headlines “Building the new Jerusalem” (*Guardian*, 28 July) and “A new Jerusalem” (editorial, *Guardian*, 21 July) openly invoke William Blake’s poem *New Jerusalem*, Britain’s unofficial anthem for many years. *Chart 11* reviews appearances of challengers in both newspapers.

Chart 11. Sample of headlines and images of challengers during July 2000

Guardian		
	Headlines	Images
6 July	“Summit hopes hit by defectors”	Israeli Interior Minister, Natan Sharansky, announcing his resignation.
7 July	“Furious West Bank settlers feel betrayed”	A settler woman with her baby in a settlement.
10 July	“Israeli coalition collapses on eve of peace summit” (page 2)	Close-up of a frowning Barak. The subheading reads “disaster unfolded around him.”
10 July	“Barak on the Brink; Defections imperil Camp David summit” (Key editorial)	
12 July	“The enemy within” (opinion article regarding internal political divides)	Large cartoon of a man about to be stabbed in the back.
July 17	“Last stand: Settlers protest against talks with Palestinians”	

Independent		
	Headlines	Images
10 July	“Barak flies to talks as coalition crumbles” (first page)	
11 July	“Barak clings to power as summit starts” (first page)	A close-up of an upset Barak.
14 July	“Don’t sell out our right to return to our homes, refugees warn Arafat”	A small close-up of a Palestinian teen.
17 July	“Right-wing protesters warn Barak they will not accept West Bank compromise”	Settlers’ log-tower knocked down by a bulldozer.
24 July		Israeli anti-peace demonstration with a few sheep.
26 July		Israeli demonstrators “trying to fly an Israeli flag at the Dome of the Rock” are being arrested.

7.4.2 Excluding both Palestinian and Israeli societies

Apart from a few utterances of civilians rejecting the peace talks, Palestinian and Israeli civil societies are left out of the coverage almost entirely. This exclusion extends to

societal organisations, e.g., peace-oriented NGOs, civic organisations, track-two negotiators, academics, pollsters, journalists or human rights activists. The implicit image here is of an artificial peace agreement signed by self-serving elites against the will of their respective constituencies.

Examples of such omissions include the People-to-People initiative (P2P) (1993-2000) involving about 80,000-100,000 Palestinian and Israeli civilians in about 500 projects and over 100 organizations (Herzog and Hai, 2005; Atieh, 2005; Hanafi, 2007). Other examples include the coexistence village of Wahat al-Salam~Neve Shalom (Oasis of Peace), the Peres Center for Peace, the *Palestine-Israel Journal* or third-track dialogues (see Maddy-Wiezman, 2002). Despite this robust ‘peace from below’ the prevalent framing in both newspapers is that of eternalised hatred and separation. Indeed, the coexistence village Neve Shalom~Wahat al-Salam for example, appears in the *Guardian* print edition only 6 times (2000-2010).

7.4.3 Negative motivations

Throughout July 2000 all three parties were blamed for having negative and base motivations for participating in the talks. Conversely, both newspapers omit virtually *any* mentioning of the negotiating teams’ concern about the future needs of their own societies, let alone concern for the needs of the other side.

For example, repeated utterances relating to Clinton include “A president in search of his legacy” (*Independent* 10 July, headline), “[Clinton’s] long-cherished ambition to secure a place in history” (*Independent* 27 July), or his aim to “salvage” a “place in history” (*Guardian*, 26 July). Clinton, apparently, was hoping that a “historic accord” would “help erase the stain of scandal from his presidency’s legacy” (ibid) and “his tawdry sexual exploits” (*Independent*, 27 July). Bill Clinton, the *Independent* writes, “ruled the world’s greatest superpower yet could not even control himself” (10 July). The *Independent* also accused Clinton that “He allowed his ambition to interfere with the immensely complicated process of settling an ancient conflict” (27 July). Still, Clinton’s “legacy” was not mentioned in the *Guardian*’s reports during the month in relation to his involvement in the Good Friday Agreement (see below).

The same reports also referred to Barak and Clinton as wild ‘gamblers.’ Examples of headlines include “President Clinton turned delicate talks into a high-risk, high speed haggle” (*Independent* 27 July), and “Barak Plays for high stakes at summit” (*Guardian*, 7 July). The latter article’s image caption reads “Jewish settlers on the West Bank fear they will be the bargaining chips as Mr Barak gambles on a lasting peace settlement...” The heading “Betting man – Barak gambles all...” (*Guardian*, 6 July) also appears under Barak’s picture, posturing as if rolling d/ice. In the *Independent*, the headline “Gambling on peace” (23 July) suggests that the PA is squandering the fruits of a future peace on its Jericho casino. These headlines frame the attitudes of key actors as a thoughtless, short-term game of chance. At the same time, repetitive dominant headlines suggest that money or peace dividends were the key motivations for both sides, e.g.:

“US ready to pay for peace deal – Middle East Agreement will depend on support.”
(*Guardian*, 17 July)

“Clinton will ask EU for billions to back peace deal”
(*Independent*, 17 July)

“Dollars for Peace”
(*Guardian*, 18 July)

“Barak’s allies soften up the Americans for a billion-dollar dividend”
(*Independent*, 21 July)

As above, We value peace and cooperation while They follow Their base dogmas and avaricious Natures.

7.4.4 Almost sole focus on issues framed as ‘deal breakers’

Throughout July 2000 both newspapers continually framed a limited range of indexed negotiation issues as “core issues” and “deal-breakers.” Overall, there were 16 headlines and a total of 184 mentions (using sentences as the unit of analysis) which framed four negotiation issues as “core” or “make or break” issues (see *Chart 12*). In fact, in July the terms “deal breakers,” “make or break,” or “stumbling blocks” appeared 30 times in both newspapers. These recurrent emphases dramatized the talks as having ‘shaky foundations,’ while considerable areas of cooperation were left out or trivialised as superficial in relation to peacemaking.

Throughout the month *different* “core” issues were used to explain the talks’ failure. Given the confidential nature of the negotiations, media professionals filled the space with guesswork, writing on *what they thought* had happened. Settlements and borders (for example “‘Immovable’ town bars the way to a new state of Palestine,” *Independent* 17 July), refugees (“Don’t sell our right to return to our homes, refugees warn Arafat,” *Independent* 14 July), or Jerusalem (“Jerusalem is still the stumbling block,” *Guardian* 21 July), freely alternated as the ‘core’ issue collapsing the talks.

Chart 12. *Appearances in both newspapers of ‘core’ issues*

	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>The Independent</i>
<i>Jerusalem</i>	29	32
<i>Borders</i>	12	18
<i>Settlements</i>	10	23
<i>Refugees</i>	13	17
<i>Issues discussed as “deal breakers,” “make or break,” or “stumbling blocks”</i>	14	16
<i>‘Core’ issues appearing in the headlines</i>	10	6

In line with RT’s anaemic solidarity, the sanctification of the Right of Return appears alongside disregard of the Palestinian refugees *themselves*, whether in Lebanon, Syria or Jordan (see above). For example, the following detrimental comment by the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on 28 December 2000 (AFP)¹⁶⁸ was omitted by both newspapers. It reads:

[Hariri] repeated Lebanon’s refusal to grant Palestinian refugees citizenship as a result of any peace deal reached between Israel and the Palestinians. He said that “all the communities in Lebanon have remained steadfast against (a permanent) settlement” of Palestine refugees there...

Our concern for Palestinian refugees is thus simplified and constrained to their binary relationality to the Israeli-Jew.

¹⁶⁸ <https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/3790975C4E7E4084852569D6006553B3> (accessed 1 June 2017).

7.4.5 *Profaning and sacralising the needs of the sides*

As above, the talks were reduced to, and framed around, four “core issues.” Yet arguably, these issues could be said to represent only Israel’s *negative* needs in the talks. For instance, what percentage of the 1967 OPT would Israel *give back*? What parts of Jerusalem would Israel *hand over* to Palestinian control? In contrast, there are only ten well-concealed, virtually invisible, references to *positive* Israeli needs in the talks. These are: a) recognition of Israel’s right to exist in peace, b) a declaration of an end to the conflict and c) end to incitement.

End to incitement *never* appears, end of conflict appears *twice*, but only in the *Independent*. These are “[Israel has not] won a declaration from Mr Arafat that the conflict is finally over...” (26 July), and “The Israelis and Palestinians would have to declare an end to the conflict” (28 July). Israel’s security concerns appear four times in each newspaper, though four times as an Israeli pretext for *more* violence. Examples include:

“Israel’s security demands are the stuff of science fiction”
(*Guardian*, 14 July)

“[Israelis want] money for weapons—essentially, they will say—to guarantee their security” (*Guardian*, 18 July)

“[Israelis] continue to believe Arabs are determined, sooner or later, to annihilate the Jewish state” (*Independent*, 21 July)

In line with RD, Israel appears through these dismissive appearances as an outright aggressor who could not have any legitimate demands in the talks. Conversely, and in line with RT, the PA appears as an outright victim against whom no demands could be made.

However, are the Israeli demands for non-violence, end of incitement¹⁶⁹ and the end of the conflict not Palestinian needs too? Did non-elite Palestinians not demand reconciliation, security cooperation, regional disarmament or the consolidation of Palestinian multiple security forces? Did they not demand a media sphere free from

¹⁶⁹ For example, Human Rights Watch report (2002:40-42).

government control and intimidation (interview, van der Horst, Abu-Tomeh, October 2007)?

7.4.6 *Threats of violence*

Throughout July 2000 both newspapers include as many as 33 references to Arafat's call for a unilateral declaration of Palestinian independence in case the talks should fail. Of these utterances, 25 refer to threats of violence. Yet no explanation is given as to why would a peace summit would mutate into bloodshed; following what political goals or ideology? It is also unclear why a political declaration is framed as a threat in the first place. In line with RT, presumed future bloodshed is not attributed to any specific agency but simply to who Arabs *are*: 'murderous outbursts should be expected.' For example, the *Guardian* writes:

Failure [of the talks] could mean resurgence of violence in the West Bank and Gaza (...). The fear is that the new state will be born in blood if the talks fail and Mr Arafat makes a unilateral declaration. Israeli security officials have warned of huge stockpiles of arms in Palestinian areas. (12 July)

"[R]esurgence," "born in blood," "stockpiles" and "areas"; all apply nominalisations and passivisations. But, whose violence would be resurgent, and whose blood would be spilling? Do the "huge stockpiles of arms" belong to any particular organisation or just to 'Palestinians' in general? Are these "stockpiles" just a ruse by "Israeli security officials"? As discussed below, *while there are dozens of reports regarding the PA's threats of violence during the (relatively) non-violent month of July,¹⁷⁰ there is no mention of these threats during the violent month of December*. Instead, the AAI, which began about two months later, repeatedly appears as a spontaneous outburst by Palestinian non-elites and *not* as a political action taken by particular political elites and for particular political gains.¹⁷¹ Decontextualized threats of violence by the PA, as reported in July, thus rematerialised in December as holding to account a ubiquitous Arab 'inner character.'

¹⁷⁰ Putting aside the structural violence of a military occupation over a civilian population.

¹⁷¹ Harel and Issacharoff (2004) note the failures on both sides which led to the outburst of violence. See also Shikaki's (2002) analysis of the division between the "old guard" and "young guard" as a factor in the AAI.

Chart 13: *Appearances of threats of violence, using sentences as the unit of analysis*

	<i>Guardian</i>	<i>Independent</i>
<i>Israeli threats of violence</i>	8	6
<i>Palestinian threats of violence</i>	6	7
<i>General threats of violence</i>	15	9
<i>Threats of violence in headlines</i>	2	4
<i>Arafat's September statement as a threat</i>	18	15
<i>Arafat's September statement and possible violence</i>	12	13

7.4.7 *Hindsight justifications for the rejection of the talks*

In line with RT and RD, the Israeli-Jew appears as taking part in the talks only as a ploy to intensify the violence while the childlike, malleable Arab is justified as resisting the ‘fake’ talks and turning to violence so as to bring an ‘authentic peace’ (moulded after Our imagined high ideals).

As further examined below, the rejection of the talks in both newspapers was opportunistic, not ideological. This rejection represented an editorial gambit that the talks *would fail* (or produce a hobbled deal), not a political conviction that the talks *should fail*. An early *Guardian* lead editorial (10 July) makes this point clearly:

...a deal is reachable and far preferable to what may otherwise follow. Up to 90% control of the West Bank and Gaza; some form of limited power-sharing in east Jerusalem; the consolidation of the remaining Jewish settlements in the occupied territories into contiguous blocs; an international commission for the resettlement or rehabilitation of the estimated 3.5m Palestinian refugees... It is hardly heroic; not the stuff of celebration or even satisfaction. But it is the reality of the present.

Nonetheless, both newspapers justified, even celebrated, the PA’s rejection of the talks in July and December. This instant justification occurred even when there was little information about the *actual content* of the rejected proposals. For instance, the editorial headlined “Why Mr Arafat hesitates” (*Guardian* 28 December), and sub-headlined “Deals built on shaky ground fall apart,” unequivocally withdraws any accountability from the PA. This editorial also notes that a “bad peace” may not “last a month” and

could be seen by Palestinians as “treachery.” Astonishingly, the article ends with the following claim: “If Mr Arafat says no, he should be understood rather than blamed.” However, is withholding fault-finding from a national leader who had been in power at the time for three decades, an act of kindness towards non-elite Palestinians? Is it generative towards a viable, independent Palestinian state? Is denying Palestinians an ‘imperfect’ peace now in favour of an ‘un-shaky’ and ideal peace later, not a violent desire for perfection (Berlin, 1958/1966:18)? Is such a drive for perfection not a narcissist projection of Our high-ideals, knowing they are unattainable to begin with?

The rejection of the Clinton Parameters was also welcomed in the *Independent*: “Of course, Mr Arafat could not accept the terms...” (29 December). And “the ever more humiliated Mr Arafat is going to be blamed yet again for turning down that infamous “last chance for peace”” (*Independent*, 29 December). Again, Arafat is not negotiating the fate of millions but is an Orientalised subject limited to personal emotions (“humiliated”). The *Independent* also repeated the ‘perfectionist’ frame during July, it writes “This is an unjust peace from the beginning. We don’t want a state at [any] cost. It just won’t last” (30 July). Like the *Guardian*, the *Independent* also warned about Palestine being turned into unviable, Apartheid-like Bantustans. “Mr Arafat’s statelet is born a mutant,” it writes (16 December, see below). In the *Independent* a future “fractured” Palestinian state, akin to South Africa’s Bantustans, had long been an inevitability:

But the long-term picture was never anything but dark for the Palestinians. The most they could ever get from the peace “process” begun in Oslo seven years ago is a fractured, demilitarised state... (26 July).

The use of the scare quotes in “process” is a repeated theme that is used to justify the talks’ rejection on the grounds that they were a sham. The scare quotes also signify an exposé of what is ‘really’ going on. For example “Sham summit promised little for the Palestinians” (*Independent* headline, 29 July). On 19 December the *Independent* includes the quote “[I]f it walks like a duck, if it talks like a duck, if it sounds like a duck, it’s a Palestinian state,” and on 11 July the *Independent* included a cartoon playing up the theme of the peace process as a lame, broken-legged swan (*Figure 54*). The *Independent* also uses the term “lame-duck” in relation to the talks on 16 December.

Figure 54: *Independent* (July 11)



Hence, a false dichotomy appears between, on the one hand, relentless oppressors, as in “... the Israeli delegations are behaving as if they are negotiating on maintaining the occupation,” as quoted in the *Independent* (18 July). On the other hand, compliant simpletons, as in “We’ve [the Palestinians] gone down the road of ‘peace’ as we were asked to. Meetings and summits without end. And what’s the result?” as quoted in the *Guardian* (18 December). According to this rhetorical contrast, the *humiliated*, Arab is celebrated for standing up to her *arrogant* Jewish adversary. For example, the day after both newspapers reported that Arafat had rejected the Clinton Parameters (27 December), Arafat is identically congratulated in both newspapers as an “unyielding” (*Guardian*) hero standing up to a grotesque looking Barak and Clinton (see *Figures 56 and 57*). Beaming, and giving a ‘victory’ gesture, both newspapers identically present Arafat as a naughty pupil deifying his overbearing teachers. Yet in line with Khalidi’s seminal work, framing “failure as triumph” (1997:195) is a long-standing criticism against this very Palestinian leadership. In one sizeable *Guardian* article (27 July), Khalidi’s trope of masquerading ‘failure as victory’ is particularly clear. The large headline “Crowds out for Arafat, daggers out for Barak,” and subheadline “Palestinians like firm stance at summit...,” appear next to a large image of Arafat being warmly embraced (*Figure 55*). Yet the article’s second paragraph reads “In a *choreographed* demonstration... thousands of Palestinians gave a conqueror’s welcome to Mr Arafat, hailing his courage for refusing to yield...” (my emphasis). The image caption adds that its “[Arafat’s] Palestinian

Authority, which assembled the welcoming crowds.” Hence, the “crowds” were ‘assembled,’ not merely “out.” However, if the “conqueror’s welcome” was “choreographed,” why does the article lend it that much credibility? Why are the PA’s “costly victories” (Khalidi, 1997:199) supported in the *Guardian*? In contrast to the *Guardian*, Robert Fisk writes that “the ruler of ‘Palestine’” received a “dictator’s reception” (*Independent*, 30 July). In line with RT, the following paragraph in the *Guardian*’s article reeks of anaemic solidarity. Reminiscent of Conrad’s ‘Heart of Darkness’ (1899), this paragraph locates the setbacks in the peace process in the ‘Arab mind’ and its dark fantasies of violence and honour. As already quoted above:

Nimeh Rashadieh, a mother of 10 children, ululated with joy. She was unconcerned by predictions that a new cycle of violence could begin between Arab and Jew... “It’s a war,” she said yesterday, clutching a poster of Mr Arafat to the embroidered bodice of her dress. “Soon the blood will be knee-deep. Yes, I want another war and another Intifadah if that is what it takes to get our country back.” (*Guardian*, 27 July)

Thus, the headings and images which use *mock reverence* to ‘victorious’ Palestinian elites include, in the subtext, derision of Palestinian non-elites and Arabs in general. Here, the conflict is not political but civilizational, fought “between Arab and Jew.” *Figure 55*, attached to the article and plastered almost on the entire page, depicts a nose kiss between Arafat and a PA official celebrating the talks’ outcome. The image underlines Arab culture itself as the Other in the report: ‘Their men do that?’

Figure 55: Independent (27 July)



Figure 56: Guardian (26 July)



7.5 “Nearly there”: Palestinians as ‘not like Us after all’

On 14 September 2000, two weeks before the al-Aqsa Intifadah, the *Guardian* published a four-page G2 article titled “Nearly there; Palestine is on the verge of becoming a nation. But is it ready?” (Figures 58-60). The article addresses the *Guardian*’s expectation that a peace deal would soon be brokered, celebrating an anticipated “onrushing tide of historical inevitability.” This article is significant since it reveals that the *Guardian*’s rejection of the talks was opportunistic, not ideological: enticing drama and a ‘good story,’ *not* a detached political analysis. The article is also unique since it offers a peek into the *mindset at the limits of toleration*. Namely, that which was ‘put aside, but not put away’ is now moved to the fore. Here, the lens shifts from paternally seeing the Palestinian-Arab as ‘like Us,’ to seeing her through *surveillance* and endemic cynicism (Boyarin, 2009). Those seen before as ready to imitate Our model of humanity are suddenly called into question: ‘do Palestinians *really* stand for liberalism, anti-racism and freedom?’ ‘Can they *really* comply with Our standards of human rights and the international law?’ As in the article’s heading “Palestine is on the verge of becoming a nation. But is it ready?” the implicit answer is thus: ‘actually, no.’

Putting an end to ‘putting up with anything,’ the article *entirely* stands apart from the rest of the research sample. Instead of depictions of passive and victimised Palestinian women and children, four of the article’s five photographs depict non-victimised, non-elite Palestinian adult men, and *no* Israelis. The one image of non-elite Palestinian women is also exceptional (see below). As if, for the first time, Palestine is thus imagined not in opposition to the Israeli-Jew, but *on its own terms* as a mature, accountable agent (who, suddenly, is made up mostly of men). Through the use of irony the spatial metaphor “[N]early” signifies that We are already “there,” at the ideal place of progress, while They are somehow always “Nearly there”: almost, but not quite. This endemic cynicism is reinforced in the article’s last paragraph, which sediments backwardness and terrorism deep in Palestine’s “*genes*.” It reads:

Even now there won’t be much charity around for the new infant: conceived amid hatred; born into poverty; with war, oppression, tyranny and terrorism deep in its genes.

The article’s cover thus depicts a Palestinian policeman, armed only with keys, proudly standing in front of a border gateway with two large painted Palestinian flags. The image

is metaphorical of a renewed Palestine, keys almost in the door leading to a new era. Yet the second-rate camouflaged uniform and the peeling, dry-paint flags set the article's derisive framing. The faded "PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY" or the faint attempt at cosmopolitanism "BON VOYAGE," are allegorical of a Palestine born into decay. The article's main subheading also leaves no doubt that this natal deterioration is an essential attribute of the "incipient state of Palestine." The subheading reads "But as the country at last stands poised on the verge of freedom, Mathew Engel asks whether it has the *collective* will to survive." Doubts and suspicions thus implicate Palestinians in general, *not* a particular leadership or polity. The odd use of "will to survive" lends to an image of a lethargic Orient foundering submissively when kept away from Our caring embrace.

The cover page heading "Palestine is on the verge of becoming a nation," rather than becoming a *state*, is also peculiar. Does the *Guardian* view Palestinians in 2000 as not yet a nation?

As above, one of the five photographs in the article depicts two young Palestinian women. In contrast to the rest of the population, these women are not wearing the Abayas, nor are they surrounded by children. Instead, they wear jeans button-shirts and jeans dresses and are walking busily on the high-street by the "PLO flag shop." The image caption reads "Freedom... a growing sense of independence is evident in Palestine." Hence, the Jeans in the photo appear as a 'Western' icon metonymic for an imagined fledgling attempt at Westernisation and the supposed diffusion of Western values, such as individualism and self-liberation. Still, one cannot escape the irony in the image caption, with "Arafat blow-up dolls" pointing to jingoism and populist nationalism, not "freedom" and "independence." Indeed, the ellipsis in "Freedom..." also colours these sardonic overtones. This irony is repeated in the subheading "Arafat has talked of making the country 'the Singapore of the Middle East,'" appearing next to an image of a dark café with two Palestinian men smoking a Hookah water pipe, with the image caption reading "Palestinians wait for independence" (*Figure 60*). Reminiscent of 19th century Orientalist paintings, the two men look apathetic and idle; "waiting" for that which elsewhere would be actively won.

Indeed, another image depicts an unarmed policeman clearly displaying an oversized badge reading somewhat ominously, “Police of Tourism.” *This* Palestinian is not heroically fighting for freedom, but is the butt-end of a joke: ‘will he really police tourists?’ The image also includes a Palestinian-Christian priest in the background, highlighting a national diversity as well as a Muslim-Christian, majority-minority internal subdivision. To my knowledge, this is one of the few images of Christian-Palestinians in the *Guardian* in the early 2000s.

In line with RT and RD, the article’s lead paragraph separates “Israel and Palestine” into a clear contradistinction: “the start of the Jewish Sabbath; the end of the Muslim equivalent.” The article then finds Israel to be an Apartheid state while Palestine is “reminiscent of the old, mad South African statelet of Bophuthatswana, which the Apartheid regime created out of several, unrelated bite-size chunks. In fact, it is even more complicated...” At the same time the future Palestine is said to be “neither more nor less *holy* than most of the 190-odd countries which already exist” (emphasis added), addressing the mock-hagiography and presuppositions of ‘holiness’ elsewhere in the coverage. Where Israel had the “moral certitude” (read, chosenness) that allowed it to “suppress Palestine indefinitely,” “*The Israelis*” have “many qualities but empathy is not one of them” (all Israelis?)

To conclude, the article’s double Orientalism echoes with Daphna Baram’s book (2004). Those ‘disenchanted’ today with Israeli-Jews (as in Baram’s title), who imagine themselves as superior and ruling judgement over them, may find themselves equally ‘disenchanted’ with Palestinians tomorrow. The terms of disenchantment from one already apply to both.

Figure 57: Guardian (14 September)



Figure 58: ibid



Figure 59: *ibid*



7.6 Images of non-elites during July 2000

Throughout the relatively peaceful month of July, both newspapers included 61 images of political elites (53 of them of Arafat, Barak and Clinton), 8 images of Israeli soldiers, 6 images of settlers, one image of a Palestinian militant, and 16 images showing Palestinian and Israeli civilians. Yet these images of civilians did not include persons discussing their hopes and concerns in relation to the historic talks. Indeed, during both July and December the *Guardian* and the *Independent* do not include a single image of civilians supportive of the peace process nor of non-elite Palestinians and Israelis together. Virtually all images of non-elites during July (apart from one) depict Arab and Jewish non-elites as 'ethnic types,' or stereotypical "decontextualized, aestheticized subjects" (Trivundza, 2004). Cartoon-like Palestinians appear in traditional garb while, 'in contrast,' Israelis appear as ultra-orthodox Jews praying by the Western Wall. Each

civilian grouping is visualised as an atomised, metonymic unit, embodying the abyssal separation between the sides.

Thus, throughout July non-elite Palestinians are depicted as poor, barefooted shepherds, farmers and fishermen. These romanticised depictions also frame Palestinians as backward, morally rigid and seeped in timeless traditions and ideologies. For example, this chapter's epigram, "Soon the blood will be knee-deep," is not by a militant but "a mother of 10 children" (*Guardian*, 27 July). It is Palestinian culture itself which is at fault (for joyfully ululating in the face of an impending war, as the quote goes), not any particular elite or polity. The article also quotes a Palestinian saying "I believe we cannot get our land back peacefully. We have to use force" and that "Mr Arafat has redeemed their [Palestinians'] honour." Again, the Arab opts for war and "honour," not 'Western' ideals such as pragmatism or peace.

Two images of Palestinian non-elites are unusually reminiscent of classic Saidian Orientalism (1978). These appear in the *Guardian* (21 July) and the *Independent* (20 July). The *Guardian* image, though small in size, depicts four Palestinian women standing with animated hand gestures in traditional full-embroidered dresses in front of the al-Aqsa mosque. The *Independent* image depicts aged Arab men sitting and drinking coffee by the street side with the caption reading "Street life in east Jerusalem, almost a law unto itself."

Figure 60: East Jerusalem (*Independent*, 20 July).





Figure 61: Women next to the al-Aqsa Mosque (Guardian, 21 July).



These two voyeuristic images reproduce their Arab subjects through idealization and exoticism consistent with Victorian imagery (see Kabbani, 1994:10; Macfie, 2000). Reduced to a quintessentially oriental essence, the Arab is limited to unknowing femininity and immature political masculinity. Where the wailing Arab women reflect the performativity of feminized Otherness, denotative classifications and rigid traditions—pinned down as Islamic by the pronounced al-Aqsa Mosque in the background. The archaic politics of the ‘Arab street’ find those seen as “capricious, passionate, and futureless” (Said, 1978:178) to be equally exotic and explosive. For example, the utterance “[Palestinians would] take their grievances to the streets” (*Independent*, 13 July) spells bloodshed, not peaceful demonstrations. Also, the al-Aqsa Mosque, consistently reappearing in the coverage, is *both* a romanticised and de-historicised spectacle as well as the site of dogmatic beliefs and a barrier for peace. Finally, the framing of Palestinians as Muslims further sidelines Christian Palestinians.

In the same breath, non-elite Israeli-Jews are essentialised through such markers as entrenched religion, archaic ideologies and unnatural violence. As Saeb Erakat is quoted in the *Guardian*: “Israel [is] a society of “fascists and racists”” (10 July). Figures 63 to 68 thus depict rioting religious settlers, anti-peace demonstrators and praying crowds. The religious settler mother posing with her baby at an illegal settlement encapsulate such atavism: ‘While Israeli-Jews educate Their young to value biblical occupations, We educate Ours to value peace and equality.’ The emphasis here is on the production of an all-pervasive Nature of the Israeli-Jew, applicable to soldiers, civilians or children alike: ‘its who They are.’

Figure 62: Independent (20 December)




Figure 63: Independent (26 December)



Figure 64: Independent (17 July)



Figure 65: *Guardian* (7 July)




Figure 66: *Guardian* (17 July)



Figure 67: *Guardian* (10 July)



The reports in July also include a polarising visual theme where contrasting ‘prototypes’ (Rosch, 1978) of Palestinian-Arabs and Israeli-Jews are collaged together in a single visual appearance. In these photos of Palestinians and Jews together These incommensurable Others appear like ‘cats and dogs,’ or two mutually opposing primordial entities. On the one hand, the imperialist, greedy for lands, masculinized Israeli-Jew is faceless and inhuman. On the other hand the Palestinian, being helpless, feminized and in need of saving, appears through images of women, children, elderly and Outside-of-History shepherders and fishermen. Within this rhetorical contrast the Israeli-Jew (even a child) appears bellicose and calculated, while the Palestinian-Arab (even a militant) appears victimised and irrational. In line with an Orientalist indigenization of the Palestinian-Arab Middle-Eastern societies are seen as Feudal and incapable of adopting post-Enlightenment values or Western modernisation, urbanisation, industrialisation or bureaucratisation (see for example Malaolu, 2014). In line with RT, the Eurocentric imaginer of barefoot natives living in authentic, preconscious innocence *also* finds Them to be superstitious, morally inferior and of uncontrolled, eruptive tempers.

Examples from July include an image depicting two Palestinian men on a stand-up paddle boat with a threatening military Israeli boat in the background; a young Palestinian man herding sheep on a background of an ominous Israeli settlement; an elderly-looking Palestinian man in keffiyeh and jellabiya juxtaposed with an armed Israeli soldier; Palestinian farmers argue with Israeli soldiers, or the Al-Aqsa Mosque juxtaposed on the background of the Israeli flag and an Israeli soldier. Thus, these images contrast synchronic (or “timeless eternal,” Said, 1978:72) Oriental shepherds, fishermen and farmers with diachronic, industrialized and calculating Israeli-Jews. The “Israeli military vessel” is juxtaposed with the “Palestinian fishermen [who] practice their timeless trade” (image caption, *Independent*, 8 July) and the carefree shepherd is contrasted with “Maale Adumim, built to block a cohesive Palestine.” Hence, in these images the Arab and Jew are reduced into ideal type examples of their group through *double* projections and classifications. In line with Rosch’s prototype effect (1978), the morally repugnant Israeli-Jew and unknowing Palestinian-Arab become the best representatives of their set or are otherwise left out (also Johnson, 2007:180). Hence, the dualistic images above simultaneously reinforce *both* their own constituent category *and* their oppositional

category. Indeed, Linda Grant (interview, van der Horst, 2 December 2008) noted the *Guardian's* motivation to produce *iconic* news, which I understand as meaning news stories reduced to representational functionality. For example, the image captioned “A Palestinian woman walking past Israeli police in East Jerusalem” (*Independent*, 20 July), do not simply describe the daily trials of Palestinian women. Rather, it is suggestive of extreme violence, of soldiers arbitrarily shooting women for merely walking past them.¹⁷² This positing appears self-evident by the syntactic simultaneity of the self-referential categories of ‘Israeli soldiers’ and ‘Palestinian woman.’ The images of the fishermen, the mosque, the child, or the elderly man in keffiyeh; all readily produce the same contrastive effect. Another *Guardian* utterance, regarding the shooting of Muhammed al-Durrah and his father, reads “They blundered into the path of Israeli soldiers. The boy hid behind his father’s back for safety and was killed, a clean shot” (30 December). Merely walking by Israeli soldiers is enough to end in an execution-style (“clean shot”) murder of a child.

Figure 68: *Independent* (8 July)



¹⁷² Certainly, Israel’s military occupation over millions of people does indeed produces *quotidian* acts of violence, with virtually no oversight, legal or otherwise.

Figure 69: Independent (16 July)



Figure 70: Guardian (22 July)



Figure 71: Guardian (25 July)



Figure 72: Independent (20 July)




Figure 73: Independent (25 July)



Here, one can recall Kulka's (1996) theorization of kitsch art. The superimposition of the full moon, swans, palm trees or kissing lovers is compressed and exaggerated so as to valorise the signification of the image. In the same manner, the Arab and Jew are also superimposed through immoderate, obtrusive markers—already in circulation—“gaudily coloured like an old-fashioned postcard” (Barthes, 1957:94).

7.6.1 *Palestinian violence and the Arab Nature*

Throughout July, repeated articles tie together the threat of Palestinian violence and an essentialised Arab Nature. This correlation occurs despite almost no violent events being reported in either newspapers.¹⁷³ As above, the Eurocentric self-image of restraint, intellect and refinement is contrasted with the Oriental's incivility, pre-conscious instincts and uncontrolled emotions (Hall, 1997:258). To use Dahlgren and Chakrapani (1982), Arab violence is seen as "collective and spontaneous" (1982:53), not the doing of "independent historical subjects" (1982:51). Such violence appears as lacking in human agency through the use of wording connotating a lack of control, e.g., "fury" (18 July), "explosion of violence" (10 July), or by applying hydraulic metaphors which invoke an anthropomorphic will behind the violent act. For instance, "bubbling frustration that could boil over" (*Guardian*, 26 July) or "anger is building among Palestinians, and... this could spill over..." (*Independent*, 11 July). Such representations create a cognitive image as if "bloodshed on large scale" (7 July), or "large-scale violence" (10 July) would be uncontrollably unleashed due to Palestinians' alleged furious Nature, *not* due to their elites' political actions. For example, the syntax "looming confrontation turns violent" (*Guardian*, 26 July) applies passivisation, nominalization and concealment all at once. Does the violence 'takes shape' and 'turns' by itself? For 'Arabs,' apparently, "sentiment" may "translate into large-scale violence" (*Guardian*, July 10). In contrast, and as seen in the *Guardian* quotations below, through RT's anaemic solidarity Palestinian elites are in fact distanced from the violence. Hence, utterances such as "warnings from Palestinian officials" (7 July), or "[Arafat's] problem is how to retain control of mass action [violence] once it starts" (26 July), present "officials" as those warning about the violence bubbling from the masses 'below.' Examples from the *Guardian* of the coupling of violence and *the* Palestinian 'eruptive Nature' are as follows (emphasis added):

7 July

"Mr Barak is acutely conscious of warnings from Palestinian officials and his own security chiefs that the consequences of failure at Camp David could be *bloodshed on large scale*. (...) evident of Palestinian *frustration*..."

¹⁷³ Nonetheless, structural violence such as arbitrary arrests, house searches, military patrols, or roadblocks are ongoing realities of the occupation even if they mostly go unrecorded.

- 10 July “Within the territories ruled by the Palestinian Authority, *frustration* is spreading. (...) The fear is that *sentiment would translate into large-scale violence* if a Palestinian state were declared later this year...”
- 10 July “(...) the likely *explosion of violence* and instability that may be expected should the talks collapse.”
- 20 July [Hanan Ashrawi:] “there would be a resurgence of distrust and of *anger*, perhaps of *hostilities*... This is extremely precarious now.”¹⁷⁴
- 26 July [describing “training exercises for young Palestinians”] “they also provide an important outlet for *bubbling frustration* that could *boil over* given a pretext.”
- (...) “His problem [Arafat] is how to retain control of mass action once it starts.”
- 26 July [Leader editorial] “It is increasingly doubtful whether he can maintain his grip on an *angry*, dispossessed nation... If this looming confrontation *turns violent*, Mr Arafat may well not be able to control it.”

This linking of Arab ‘sentiments’ with violence is also repeated during December. As above, the Arab’s “boiling point” is a precursor to violence (*Guardian*, 18 December); “resentment” motivates the Arab towards “war” (*Independent*, 5 December); and the Arab “streets” “will catch fire” as if by themselves (*Guardian*, 19 December).

7.6.2 Reporting a firebombing during July 2000

In line with RD, a “fundamental attribution of error” (McNair, 2003:119) entails “empathy erosion” and “zero-degree empathy” (Baron-Cohen, 2011). Simply, the demon’s unnatural violence makes her an unlikely candidate for recognition. The news item below reports that a mother and her baby were “badly injured” by a Molotov cocktail (*Independent*, 23 July). Despite the dramatic event the article, headed “Gambling on


¹⁷⁴ Throughout both July and December moderate peace activist, like Ashrawi, are quoted only when opposing the peace process.

peace” and showing an image of a croupier, is framed around the Jericho Casino. Appearing in the *last* two paragraphs of the article, the item reads:

An Israeli woman and her two-year-old child were badly injured when their car was hit by a Molotov cocktail thrown by a Palestinian as they were driving through Jericho at night. Israel’s response was to seal off the roads to the town for several days - starving the casino of almost all its clients.

It was another reminder to Palestinians that, no matter what grandiose or deceptive language is being used in the talks at Camp David – be it that of “autonomy” or “implied sovereignty” – Israel is the boss, and will remain so.

Figure 74: *Independent* (23 July)



In line with RD, degenerative empathy for non-elites appears next to seeing the roadblock, following the attack, as evidence exposing Israel’s peace efforts as a web of lies. As reported in the article, such terms as “autonomy” or “implied sovereignty” (appearing in scare quotes) were merely “deceptive.”¹⁷⁵ Israel’s ‘real’ Apartheid-like plan of action is “starving” and “seal[ing] off” Palestinian towns and businesses (see section 12.3.1). Alongside degenerative criticism of Palestinian elites, the firebombing appears as a superficial distraction from the ‘real’ dangers at hand. The point here does not regards Israel’s (still ongoing) policy of crushing blockades of Palestinian towns. Rather, that the

¹⁷⁵ The negotiations were about full nationhood.

prospects of peace, supported by the newspaper only a few weeks earlier, now appeared diabolical, while the space for empathy, even towards a wounded baby, was eroded.

A similar occurrence appears in the *Guardian* (9 January 2001), where only the *last sentence* of the article reveals that five girls were injured in an attack on 31 December, in which both their parents were murdered after the family car was gunned in a roadside shooting.

7.6.3 Stockpiling of weapons gone ‘out of control’

Two months into the AAI (December 2000) Arafat and the PA are portrayed as ‘out of control’ and incapable of a centralised chain of command. The various militant groups, this logic goes, were operating independently and not on orders from the PA. The aim of these utterances is to shield the Palestinian leadership from criticism as it battles against Israel, the region’s superpower. Yet, asserting in *December* that the AAI was a spontaneous outburst by Palestinian non-elites seems awkward given the *Guardian’s own* reports during *July* of calls for a second Intifada and the stockpiling of weapons. For example, a day after the talks broke down, the headline “Breakdown leaves West Bank facing bloodshed,” appeared, with the subheading “Violence: forces on alert as September countdown gathers pace” (*Guardian* 26 July). This July article reports that:

“many in the refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza now talk about a new Intifadah.”

“Yasser Arafat’s Fatah movement have [sic] been conducting military training exercises for young Palestinians [including] firing at imaginary Israeli soldiers.”

The lead editorial that day also warns of a “looming confrontation” in September. Other appearances include:

“hundreds of Palestinians... marching in Gaza, calling for a new Intifadah” (*Guardian*, 26 July).

“Lieutenant-General Shaul Mofaz said that Palestinian forces were buying ammunition and weapons, including anti-tank missiles...” (ibid).

Hence, warnings of future “bloodshed on large scale” (*Guardian*, 7 July), or “large-scale violence” (*Guardian*, 10 July), were common in July yet they are non-existent in December. In line with RD and RT, such reports withhold empathy for Israeli non-elites, magnanimously shield Palestinian elites from criticism and locate the agency that is accountable for the violence with non-elite Palestinians as a whole.

Indeed, the July reports already include an *a priori* defence of the PA. It is Arafat who tries to hold back “angry” non-elite Palestinians from turning to violence,¹⁷⁶ e.g.:

With his [Arafat’s] leadership already weakened... it is increasingly doubtful whether he can maintain his grip on an angry, dispossessed nation which had given him one last chance to talk his way to peace (*Guardian*, 26 July)

Another article, published two weeks before the AAI (*Guardian*, 14 September), includes the quote:

“We know the Palestinians are preparing for a struggle... They are training their people. They have these youth camps for children aged seven to 13, teaching them to kidnap Israeli soldiers.”

Are these Israeli lies? If yes, why print them? If the claims are accepted, should such militarised youth camps not be the subject of further scrutiny?

Inline with RT, withholding criticism from the PA relating to a possible second Intifadah was not an act of kindness, but an anaemic solidarity maintaining a status quo that is negative to non-elite Palestinians.

¹⁷⁶ Harel and Isacharoff report on the miscalculations and missteps on both sides which led to the AAI (2004).

8. DEEPENING THE ABYSS: THE DECEMBER 2000 PEACE TALKS

In contrast to the little direct violence during July, by December the AAI had been ongoing for more than two months. Despite these drastic differences, the coverage during these months is mostly analogous. Where July's coverage emphasises peacemaking as unnatural to both sides, in December violence is presented as natural to them, as part of 'who They are.'

The immediate first impression from this vast coverage is formed by its many images. According to RT and RD, a nearly symmetrically contrastive visual narration comes into view. Omissions of images of Palestinian elites and Israeli non-elites appear next to a profusion of images of Israeli elites and Palestinian non-elites. Hence, Israeli elites appear in both newspapers in 46 images: 21 images of political elites, i.e., Barak, Sharon, Netanyahu and Olmert, and 25 images of the Israeli army apparatus. Palestinian non-elites appear in 42 images: 28 in the *Guardian* and 14 in the *Independent* with children appearing in 21 images and women in 12 images. In the same breath, political Palestinian elites do not appear *at all* in the *Guardian*, while the *Independent* includes only two images of Arafat and one image of Mohammed Dahlan. Even Peres, Clinton and Netanyahu appeared in more images than Arafat: three each. Palestinian militants appear in *only five* images in the *Guardian* (two presenting PA militants as controlled by Israel, one of unarmed men burning flags, and two of Hamas militants), and *two* in the *Independent* (one depicting the 12 October Ramallah lynching of two Israeli soldiers, 30 December). Despite the *Guardian's* own reports of daily shootouts, the newspaper includes only *two* images of Israeli civilians as victims of violence, both settlers and both unharmed. There are no images of Israeli civilians injured or killed in the *Guardian* during the month. The *Independent* includes three images of injured Israeli civilians, of which two relate to a Tel-Aviv bus bombing (29 December). No images of Israeli women appear in the *Independent* in either both July or December, and only three images appear in the *Guardian* (a settler, a protestor comparing Arafat to Hitler, and a settler couple). *Chart 14* displays these visual appearances.

Chart 14. Thematic appearance of images during December 2000

	<i>The Guardian</i>		<i>The Independent</i>	
	<i>Palestinian</i>	<i>Israeli</i>	<i>Palestinian</i>	<i>Israeli</i>
<i>Non-elites (general)</i>	28	5	13	4
<i>Non-elites, women</i>	10	3	2	0
<i>Non-elites, children</i>	13	1 (with tank)	7	0
<i>Non-elites victims of direct/indirect violence</i>	28	2	13	3
<i>Non-elites <u>not</u> as “declarative and self-evident” (Said, 1978:72) ethno-types</i>	1	2	0	2
<i>Israeli occupation/ Palestinian militants</i>	5	14	2	7
<i>Elite personae</i>	0	8	3	13

As in July, withholding criticism from Palestinian elites occurs alongside locating the agency accountable for the violence with Palestinian non-elites and the ‘Arab Nature’ in general. For example, both newspapers include the same number of images of Palestinian children waving guns as they do of Palestinian militants with guns. Where the *Independent* included two images of Palestinian children with guns, the *Guardian* included two images Palestinian militants with guns (see above). Hence, despite the daily shooting, the *Independent* excludes *any* visual references to armed Palestinian militants but, instead, relates this mental image of Palestinian violence to children. Appearing arbitrarily, with no context or connection to the articles, one photo (*Figure 76*) depicts a child in a bunny sweatshirt standing next to another child, perhaps five-years-old, sucking on his thumb. To use Robson (2004), this metonymic image portrays a “perversion of childhood innocence,” in which infants are not cared for, but are rather nurtured with dangerous indoctrination. In this formulation, it is “women and children” who are “ideologically aligned” and “identified as combatants” (Robson, 2004:65). Finally, the image captions “Refugees” and “Palestinians in a West Bank refugee camp” further legitimises a particular political reading of these images, i.e.; whether *these* refugees–militants ‘from birth’–should be allowed to return to Israel.

Figure 75: *Independent* (27 December)



Figure 76: *Independent* (28 December)



At the same time, and in line with RD, the Israeli-Jew appears through zero-degree empathy and as a controlling and malevolent people. For example, both newspapers together include only one image of an Israeli child throughout the month (*Guardian*, 18 December). Appearing on a G2 cover, the image depicts a pale-white girl standing next to a tank in a military-like pose, seemingly surveying the hills below. The superimposition of the naïve-looking girl and the ragged tank interpolates the viewer to re-evaluate the

‘true’ Nature of Israeli-Jews: ‘They may look like Us, but even girls carry the anima shadow of brutal violence.’ The headline “Under the gun” places the girl within the category of those doing the gunning and excludes her from the category of those being gunned (see the end of section 12.3.2).

Figure 77: *Guardian*, G2 section cover (18 December)



The point here is not to create a false symmetry between Palestinian and Israeli experiences. According to B'Tselem (<https://www.btselem.org/statistics>), the number of Palestinians killed by Israelis between 29 September 2000 and 31 December 2016 is 9,392 (civilians and security forces). The number of Israelis killed by Palestinians during the same period is 1,298. The number of Palestinians wounded exceeds Israeli wounded by a far greater factor. Palestinians also suffer a gruesome military occupation, which includes land annexation, administrative detentions (including minors), unlawful interrogations, torture, curfews, restricted movement, separation of families, a

Kafkaesque military judicial system and bureaucratic abuses. The full-scale wars in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2008-9, 2012, 2014) caused thousands of Palestinian and Lebanese casualties. At the same time, ongoing violence against Israelis included bus bombings, roadside shootings, rocket fire, long-range missiles, attacks by underground tunnels, kidnappings and stabbings. A *failed* mega-terror attack against Pi Giliot, Israel's biggest fuel depot at the time (23 May 2002), had casualty estimates in the thousands.¹⁷⁷

During December 2000 itself, according to B'Tselem, 48 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces in the OPT of which 12 were children under 18 years old and 24 participated in hostilities. Five Israeli non-elites were killed by Palestinians, all of them civilians killed in roadside shootings, as well as three soldiers. On 30 December, the death toll included 322 Palestinians and 41 Israelis since the beginning of the AAI.

8.1 Appearances of non-elite civilians during December

"His injuries left a pool of blood on the Via Dolorosa - the route which is revered as the road Christ took to his crucifixion. Youths dipped their hands in the blood, brandished them aloft and defiantly daubed the walls with hand prints"

INDEPENDENT (9 DECEMBER)

In line with RT and RD, the December 2000 coverage differentially contrasts the 'real' Nature of *Palestinianess* and *Israeliness* as being inferior to Us.

On the one hand, the farmer in keffiyeh and jellabiya arguing with soldiers (*Figure 97*) or the hijab-wearing elderly women "Lighting a candle for peace" (*Figure 81, Guardian*, 22 December) magnanimously represent the nascent aspirations of remote Others to adopt Our universal ideals. On the other hand, there were virtually no images during December

¹⁷⁷ www.nytimes.com/2002/05/24/world/bomb-explodes-at-israeli-fuel-depot-but-disaster-is-averted.html

of Palestinian peaceniks, human rights activists/lawyers, journalists, doctors, intellectuals, moderates, or simply Palestinians who rejected the violence. Indeed, there were no images of Palestinian elites in the *Independent*, and only three in the *Guardian*. These omissions of a Palestinian image, beyond an a-historic, universalised humanism moulded after Us, represent an instrumental toleration of that which We already find to be wrong: Their backward, nationalist, chauvinist and superstitious Nature. While raised to 'Our level' They are already seen as being incapable of fully grasping Our high ideals.

Simultaneously, depictions of the Israeli-Jew as inhuman soldiers and ultra-orthodox men appeared alongside the exclusion of markers of a common humanity. For example, Israeli-Jewish civilian victims of violence are virtually invisible in both newspapers. These depictions epitomise *These people* as being nothing 'like Us,' being ruthless, controlling and a threat to Our sanctified principles.

Hence, similarly to July, 14 images during December depict the Arab and Jew as contrasting 'prototypes' (Rosch, 1978) in a single visual appearance.

For example, *Figure 79* depicts a veiled Palestinian woman looking up at an Israeli soldier. Appearing 'under the boot,' the soldier's inhumanity (head cropped) corresponds to the women's diminished footing (cropped knees). On its own, this is a commendable image. Yet the Islamic attire of the women suggests that the binaries of Palestinian/Israeli, Muslim/Jew, civilian/soldier, occupied/occupier, colonised/coloniser and male/female include other antinomies such as Europe/Arab, Christian/Muslim, modernity/tradition, secularism/religion, saviour/saved and active/passive. Where They need protection *and* moral guidance, this logic goes, We are charitable, secular and progressive.

Stretched onto a full page, this image displays mock-reverence which empathises with *some* of this women's misfortunes (Israeli wrongdoing) while putting others aside (Palestinian elites' wrongdoing). These latter wrongdoings are then subsumed into Arab culture itself. Could this woman be Nimeh Rashadieh, who wants "another war" and vows that "the blood will be knee-deep" (*Guardian*, 27 July 2000)?

Indeed, both newspapers continuously represent the AAI as a civilian mass movement motivated by popular protests, not as militarised actions driven by military and political elites. It is spontaneous, not orchestrated, and without a central command. Accountability then shifts from Palestinian elites to non-elites. Two exceptions include the Hizbullah leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, who “urged” the Hamas to “continue their uprising until Israel was destroyed” (*Guardian*, 30 December), and Saddam Hussein who called for a “holy war on Israel” and “Jihad” (*Independent*, 26 December). These utterances reveal the content that was available, yet suppressed by both newspapers—in the name of withholding criticism—only to re-emerge as ‘the will of the people.’ Framed as a civic action, the coverage thus *excludes* virtually entirely any ‘Stop the War’ framing. After all, the will of *the* Arab people for war is already assumed. Below is a *sample* of images of Palestinians during December.

Figure 78: *Guardian* (19 December. See Finkelstein, 2001 cover, for a clearer image)¹⁷⁸



¹⁷⁸ The man on the left was badly Photoshopped out in Finkelstein’s book cover. Was his appearance not ‘Muslim’ enough? Did he upset a more ‘desirable’ Palestinian-female/Israeli-male binary?

Figure 79: Guardian (28 December)



Figure 80: Guardian (22 December)



Figure 81: Guardian (15 December)



Figure 83: Women next to the al-Aqsa Mosque (Guardian, 19 December)




Figure 82: Independent (16 December)



Figure 83: Guardian (22 December, detail)



Figure 84: Independent (29 December)



Figure 85: (Guardian, 29 December)



Figure 86: Guardian (18 December)



Figure 87: Lebanese child injured by an old Israeli mine (Independent, 11 December)



Figure 88: Boy and banner reading “Barak” in a barbed wire font (Guardian, 18 December)




Figure 89: Guardian (18 December)




Figure 90: Palestinian men praying and Israeli soldiers (Guardian, 18 December)




Figure 91: Guardian (12 December)




Figure 92: Independent (23 December)



Figure 93: Guardian (5 December)




Figure 94: Guardian (30 December)



Figure 95: Guardian (22 December)



Figure 96: Independent (9 December)



Figure 97: Independent (23 December)



Israeli undercover police arresting Palestinians AP

Figure 98: Guardian (19 December)



Figure 99: Youth with a Palestinian flag (Guardian, 18 December)



Figure 100: *Independent* (31 December)



Despite the “well meaning” (Trepagnier, 2006) editorial line, repeated discursive appearances show how degenerative empathy becomes an amorphous critique of an essentialised Arab Nature. For example, a key *Independent* editorial reads:

What is more, behind Mr Arafat stand less rational forces, bent on martyrdom, seeking glory in blood, ready to fight the Zionist state to the death, even if it is their own. The critical question of the next few weeks is how far this infection has spread through the Palestinian people as a whole (23 December)

This quotation asks whether “the Palestinian people,” as a uniform entity, are being infected with fanaticism in the same way that a contamination might “spread through” a single organism. Are “the Palestinian people” a single unit? Why is it “critical” to *redirect* criticism levelled towards elites (the “less rational forces”) to an entire (“whole”) population? In line with RD, the victims of such “martyrdom” and “fight... to the death” are not Israeli non-elites but merely the “state.” Other examples refer to the Palestinian “uprising which exploded with far greater savagery than the original intifada” (*Guardian*, 9 December), or “the Middle East jungle” (*Independent*, 13 December). Are “savagery” and “jungle” not crude colonial degradations? In the appearance “[Mr Arafat’s] ungovernable, dispossessed people” (*Independent*, 28 December), it is, again, the people

in general who are at fault, not any “ungovernable” militants or political factions competing for influence.

As in July, ‘socio-hydraulics’ explanations are used to explain violence by Palestinians during December. These include references to the “boiling point” (*Guardian*, 16 December) by which collective Palestinian “frustration” (ibid) turns into collective violence. In another example, discussing the killed/murdered 12-year-old boy Mohammed al-Durrah,¹⁷⁹ an end of the year review remarks that:

[The Israelis announced that] the Palestinians were cynically dispatching their own children to die for the cameras. But even if this was true, why were the Israelis so keen to kill them? The martyring of one’s own children no longer seemed like the crazy behaviour of an otherworldly people. It suddenly seemed human instead. The Israelis appeared to the world like old-fashioned monsters: like a mob (*Guardian*, 30 December).

In line with RT and RD, while *the* Palestinians ‘martyr’ their own children (deniability clause included), *the* Israelis are “keen to kill them.” In contrast to both, the Idea-of-Europe, like an all-knowing judge, casts one group as “monsters” while ratifying the actions of the other group as being interposed between “human” and “crazy”: “[H]uman” as they “suddenly” seem to Us *now*, but maybe not later.

The *Independent* includes a similar appearance:

“But the attempt to force the media to obey Israel’s rules is now international. We must say that... Palestinians indulge in child sacrifice (rather than question why the Israeli troops have shot so many Palestinian children).”
(*Independent*, December 13)

As above, the controlling Israeli-Jew is a threat to Our freedom of speech and free political will. While We want to help children in the Middle East (a norm entirely imagined), Israeli-Jews want to kill them.


At the same time, trying not to deflect attention from the Palestinian plight, empathy towards non-elite Israeli-Jews becomes an anathema. For example, despite the daily

¹⁷⁹ According to B’Tselem (<http://www.btselem.org/statistics>) there have been 1995 Palestinian minors killed by Israeli security forces between 29 September 2000 and 30 September 2016.

shootings of non-elites and two suicide bombings during December, only one image in the *Guardian* (Figure 108), and three in the *Independent* (Figures 109-111), depict Israeli-Jews as possible subjects for recognition. Of these images, the size of a postcard combined, three depict settlers and one depicts soldiers (i.e., negative depictions of the Israeli-Jew). In another example, both newspapers present ‘ideological’ settlers as “dangerous extremists who believe that God wanted the West Bank and Gaza to be the exclusive preserve of the Jews forever” (*Guardian*, 1 December). Or, as in the *Independent*, as having “a long beard, a skullcap, an M-16 automatic rifle, wild, staring eyes, and an extreme set of opinions” (10 December). The *Independent* article adds that “Enough of the 200,000 settlers” (...) “conform to this stereotype for it to have a strong basis in truth.”

In a more subtle example, Figure 103 (*Independent*, 28 December) depicts a silhouetted outline of a cartoon-like, ultra-orthodox Jewish figure as overshadowing the al-Aqsa mosque. The metonymy here is of Israel overshadowing Palestine,¹⁸⁰ and Israeli-Jews as being no more than an outline. While ultra-orthodox Jewishness appears as an obstacle to peace, Islam—symbolised by the Dome of the Rock—is tolerated ‘for now.’

Figure 101: *Independent* (28 December).



¹⁸⁰ The contrasting image would be an Arab person overshadowing the Western Wall.

Figures 104 and 105 again frame the theologico ‘Jew’ through clichéd, stereotypical depictions: “Jews recite from the Book of Lamentations” (*Guardian*, 18 December).

Figure 102: *Guardian* (18 December)




Figure 103: *Guardian* (18 December)




Figure 106 (*Guardian*, 29 December) depicts religious Jewish men cleaning a protestor’s paint stain from the Western Wall. The stained Western Wall epitomizes a tainted and atavistic Judaism. Indeed, the headline calls the Western Wall, the holiest prayer site for Jews, a “Wall of hatred.” It reads, “Wall of hatred on both sides blocks deal.” In line with RT and RD, the article’s third paragraph equates between the “fundamentalism” of the

mayor of Jerusalem at the time, Ehud Olmert, who symbolically moved his office next to the Western Wall, and “The bombing of a bus in Tel Aviv, in which 13 were injured [and which] was another, an act of extremism by the other side.” In this false equation, Olmert “blocks deal” but a bus bombing less so. The hateful imaginer of a tarnished Judaism, huddling men, skullcaps and dogmatism, materialises alongside the denial of empathy to non-elite Jewish victims and the shielding of Palestinian military elites from censure.

Figure 104: *Guardian* (29 December)

With talks stalled between Israelis and Palestinians, hardliners are seizing the moment to stage provocations

Wall of hatred on both sides blocks deal

Ewen MacAskill in Jerusalem

A black and white notice on a soft yellow sandstone building opposite the Wailing Wall in the Old City of Jerusalem yesterday seemed innocuous enough: “Mayor’s Office”. But it was the most provocative symbolic act by a hard-line Israeli since Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in September, setting off the Palestinian uprising.

The Israeli mayor of Jerusalem, Ehud Olmert, normally lives in the Jewish part of the city. He moved into temporary headquarters in the Old City yesterday morning in protest against the proposed Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement, which includes the division of Jerusalem, in particular the holy site known to Jews as Temple Mount and to Arabs as the Noble Sanctuary.

The kind of fundamentalism displayed by Mr Olmert yesterday was one reason why the planned meeting between the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak, and the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, was cancelled. The bombing of a bus in Tel Aviv, in which 13 were injured, was another, an act of extremism by the other side.

The prospect of a meeting between Mr Barak and Mr Arafat, the first since October, gave hope that a peace deal might be possible. It may yet be resurrected, but the problems in the way of a settlement remain huge.

Mr Olmert was voicing Jewish fears that if the proposal put forward by the US president, Bill Clinton, was adopted, the upper half of the holy site would be under Palestinian control and Palestinians might drop stones, or fire shots, at Jews praying and kissing the Wailing Wall below, as they have done in the past.

Surrounded by supporters singing religious songs, Mr Olmert opposed any compromise. “Our deep link with Jerusalem did not begin with Clinton or Arafat but with King David 3,000 years ago, Jerusalem was, and will remain, the Israeli capital,” he said.

Many of the Jews visiting the Wailing

ing similar fear at the prospect of Palestinian police and soldiers being stationed high above them. One of them predicted that the fight between Israelis and Palestinians would last for ever.

An even bigger problem than the holy site and dividing the myriad streets that make up Jerusalem between Israelis and Palestinians is the fate of the 3.5m Palestinian refugees.

This is by far the main sticking point. Palestinians who fled or left in 1948, and their descendants, are in camps throughout Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and other parts of the Middle East. Mr Arafat demands a peace settlement that recognises their right to return to Israel and to homes since occupied by Israelis. The Israelis refuse to countenance the potentially destabilising consequences of such a return.

Refugees

Mr Clinton proposed a compromise, recognising the right of the refugees to return to “Palestine”, which is basically the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But Palestinians would react with uproar and accuse Mr Arafat of a sell-out if he agreed to such a deal.

It would mean that most of them would have to remain in exile. The Palestinian economy would be incapable of absorbing the refugees.

The Palestinians round Mr Arafat argue that Mr Barak and Mr Clinton are pressed for time and that the Palestinians do not have to rush to join in what has been dubbed “fast-food diplomacy”.

Mr Clinton’s presidency ends on January 20 and Mr Barak faces an election on February 6. Mr Arafat’s advisers are convinced that Mr Clinton’s deadline of this weekend is an artificial one and that they can continue pressing for more concessions up to January 10.

But many Palestinians do not want a deal even if Mr Arafat manages to squeeze out more concessions. Some members of his own organisation, Fatah, oppose a compromise, as does the youth wing, the Tanzim, which has been active in the uprising and leaders of the refugee camps.

Both the fundamentalist groups, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, are, predictably, opposed in principle to a settlement.

It is against this background that the Palestinian leadership sent a letter to Mr Clinton on Wednesday expressing doubts about his proposal. It was the letter that caused Mr Barak to cancel the summit meeting with Mr Arafat at the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh.

Time is running out for Mr Barak, who needs a deal fast. He is trailing badly in the polls. That too is a factor in Palestinian thinking. Even if Mr Arafat agreed a deal, he could not be sure that Mr Barak would get the agreement through the Israeli parliament, or win the election, and his opponent Mr Sharon has said he would not abide by any agreement.

Mr Arafat and Mr Barak may yet hold their summit and find a messy compromise. Reaching a settlement would be hard enough, but selling it to their respective sides would be even harder.

Clinton keeps his eyes on history

Julian Borger in Washington

Bill Clinton has been trying to piece together a comprehensive Middle East peace deal for eight years, but it has remained tantalisingly beyond his grasp. Now he has three weeks for a last attempt to cement his legacy as a statesman.

His scetchy remarks yesterday that there was no point in further talks between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators unless both accepted the basic framework for peace he had laid out reflected what is at stake. A Nobel peace prize would go a long way towards scrubbing away the stain of impeachment.

Despite the low expectations, the time from the White House has been relatively upbeat. A “senior administration official” was quoted prominently in yesterday’s New York Times as saying that Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the moderate pillars of the Arab world, had reacted positively to the latest US peace plan.

The reaction from President Hosni Mubarak, King Abdullah and King Fahd was as different as “night to day” from the cool reception they gave Mr Clinton’s compromise proposals at Camp David in July the official said.

There is widespread concern in Israel and the Arab world that when Mr Clinton leaves office on January 20 the Middle East will fall from the top of his agenda to the bottom of George W Bush’s. His only foreign policy experience is a one border talks with Mexico.

None of his senior advisers is a Middle East specialist, and Colin Powell’s contacts are almost wholly military.

An Israeli cleans off paint sprayed on the Wailing Wall by a protester. Jews such as Jerusalem’s mayor Ehud Olmert, right, fear a peace deal may threaten the site. Main photograph: Natalie Behring/Reuters

Special report on Israel at www.guardian.co.uk/israel

A front-page article headed “Clinton calls peace bluff” (see also below), notes in paragraph 8 that “After four days of relative calm a bomb went off in Gaza yesterday killing two Israelis and injuring three others” (*Guardian*, 29 December). As above, devoid of images, headings and obscured deep inside the article, non-elite Israeli-Jews are met with cold distance while military elites are shielded from criticism. Did the “bomb went off” [sic] by itself? Other mitigating markers include such pardon-granting accountability that compliments the militants for “four days of relative calm”; that the violence until then was “restricted to the border areas” and; that this bombing was “only the third inside Israel proper...” (emphasis added).

In the *Independent*, this bombing appears on the front page under the headline “Bombs shatter hopes of peace in Middle East” (29 December). Despite the prominent editorial positioning, this framing deletes the agency of the attackers and the identity of the victims. Also, the bombing’s framing is not that of human rights, invoking victims and suffering, but of a “Law and Order” framing (Wolfsfeld 1997) limited to political implications. At the same time, “Middle East” is a generalisation akin to substituting ‘Europe’ with ‘Scotland.’ Could *this* “peace in the Middle East” have eased the devastating UN sanctions on Iraq, ongoing at the time ongoing (1990-2003) and supported by Britain?¹⁸¹ The same framing is repeated in the *Independent* headline “US hopes for peace in Mid-East evaporate,” which appeared the very day the historic Clinton parameters were presented (23 December). Incidentally, this bombing (22 December) is not reported in the *Guardian*.

Figure 105: *Guardian* (1 December)



¹⁸¹ E.g., UNICEF quoted that the “sanctions have contributed to the deaths of 500,000 children” in Iraq (November 2000, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/nov/18/iraq.comment>).

Figure 106: Guardian (1 December)




Figure 107: Independent (29 December)




Figure 108: Independent (23 December)



Figure 109: Independent (31 December)



The point here is that while the news media favoured a single, neat conception, the AAI included diverse and entangled experiences. Indeed, ruthlessly efficient violence was also directed against Israeli non-elites and Palestinian elites too used the talks for strategic manoeuvres.¹⁸² This more intricate depiction does not cancel out Palestinian victimhood or Israeli accountability but *adds* to them and releases them from an imposed narcissistic order.

¹⁸² E.g., Fatah-Hamas politics or using the talks to position the formerly Tunisia-based, ‘old guard,’ over the local ‘young guard.’

8.2 *Appearances of elites during December*

8.2.1 *Palestinian elites and RT*

“But let us not be romantic about the Muslim world...”

ROBERT FISK, *THE INDEPENDENT* (29 DECEMBER)

“Speak of me as I am; nothing extenuate; Nor set down aught in malice”

SHAKESPEARE, *OTHELLO* (V.II.340-356)


Fisk’s quote, above, echoes Shakespeare’s Othello’s last paragraph. Why does Othello asks *not* to be judged by *extenuating measures* after murdering a defenceless woman? Why is Fisk assuming that a romantic sentimentality towards the “Muslim world” already exists and is in need of being contested? As this section shows, the Eurocentric presuppositions which *already* see the Arab as inferior and backward, paternalistically imagine *granting* her extenuating measures.

In line with RD and RT, degenerative anaemic solidarity with Palestinian non-elites coincides with degenerative, soft-footing criticism of Palestinian elites. Degenerative, scorched earth criticism of Israeli elites coincides with degenerative, eroded empathy with Israeli non-elites. Hence, while most of the images and headlines depict Israeli-Jews as a threat to Our values, Palestinian elites—on the path of becoming ‘like Us’—were sheltered from being evaluated altogether. For example, the term “Palestinian Authority” does not appear *even once* in any of the headlines in both newspapers during the month, nor does “ Hamas” or “the Islamic Jihad” (despite reported violence). “Fatah” appears *once* in a headline in each newspaper and “Arafat” appears in two headlines in the *Guardian* and five in the *Independent*. Palestinian military and political elites are thus near invisible entities in the headlines and imagery. Shielded from the light of scrutiny and framed as agentless and unaccountable, some headlines refer to the PA simply as “Palestinians,” as in “Palestinians say talks in crisis” (*Guardian*, 23 December) or “Palestinians rebuff Barak’s latest peace offer” (*Independent*, 1 December). In other headlines, the agency of Palestinian military elites is deleted using passivisation and nominalisation, as in “10 die as violence flares on West Bank” (*Guardian*, 9 December),

“Israeli tanks blast police after killing of settlers” (*Independent*, 9 December), “Israeli teacher killed in West Bank shooting attack” (*Independent*, 8 December) or “Suicide bomber dims hopes of Mid-East peace” (*Independent*, 23 December). In the latter article, the small image attached shows “Israeli undercover police arresting Palestinians” (as the caption reads, *Figure 102*), not the victims of the bombing. In other headlines Palestinian elites appear as victims. For instance, despite daily attacks by Fatah militants against Israeli civilians, the only two appearances of “Fatah” in the headlines are “Fatah activist killed in West Bank” (*Independent*, 13 December) and “Guns for sale; how stolen Israeli weapons arm Fatah’s fighters” (*Guardian*, 16 December). The headline “Why Mr Arafat hesitates” (*Guardian*, 29 December) openly withholds criticism from Arafat.

Another headline “Fierce battle in heart of Bethlehem” (*Guardian*, 5 December), appears above an image of a mosque, with the caption reading “*Israeli* tracer bullets and grenades hit Beit Jalla, in a gun battle....” (emphasis added). While the headline positions armed militants alongside Christian sensitivities relating to Bethlehem and Jesus’ Sacred Heart, the caption conceals the identity of the *other* ‘bullets’ in the “gun battle” and, indeed, their recipients. In line with RD, the photo’s telephoto effect shows tracer bullets going behind a mosque’s minaret as if targeting it indiscriminately. The laconic description “attempt to storm Rachel’s Tomb, a Jewish pilgrimage site,” is also ‘balanced’ by such RD utterances as “unleashed its tanks and combat helicopters,” “hurling tank shells into shops,” “helicopters, machineguns, tanks,” “This is a deliberate and planned escalation... We appeal to the whole world... [against] this ugly crime” (*Guardian*, 5 December).

Figure 110: Guardian (5 and 8 December)



In another example, Palestinian militants shooting at Israeli civilians were called “guerrillas,” implicitly suggesting that Israeli families or school buses were legitimate targets, like soldiers or army bases. For example, Palestinian “guerrilla” violence is attributed to nightly shootings at Israeli homes in Psagot (*Guardian*, 8 December), “car and bus bombings in which numerous civilians have died” (*Independent*, 17 December) and “drive-by attacks” and shootings on civilian commuters (*Independent*, 9 December). Similar references to “guerrilla” violence also appeared in the *Guardian* on December 16th and 29th and in the *Independent* on December 1st, 2nd, 7th, 12th, 17th. Palestinian militants are also euphemistically described as ‘activists’ and ‘members,’ terms reserved for social or political workers, as in “left-wing Israeli activists” (*Independent*, 9 December).¹⁸³ For example, the *Independent* attributes “car and bus bombings” to “guerrilla war” “activities” (17 December, see also the 10th and 16th), and the *Guardian* notes “a senior activist in the armed wing of Hamas” (6 December). Another example reads “The murder of 12-year old Mohammed Jamal [sic], caught in an exchange of gunfire between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian demonstrators...” Here, Muhammad al-Durah was murdered (see also *Guardian*, 1 November 2000 and *Guardian*, 30 December), but the “exchange of gunfire” was with non-elite “demonstrators.”

Despite the ongoing violence, there is only one *Guardian* article and two *Independent* articles in *either* months which focus on criticism of Palestinian elites in relation to violence against Israeli non-elites. These three isolated articles deserve further scrutiny and they are reviewed below.

8.2.2 Palestinian elites: the *Guardian* article

Only one *Guardian* article during July and December openly criticises Palestinian elites (8 December). Headlined “Stop spilling our blood, people tell Arafat,” it includes two subheadings, “[P]alestinians turn against gunmen and leaders” and “[W]hy should we risk our lives for our leaders to become rich.” The article itself deals with Palestinian militants who use Palestinian homes in Beit Jala to shoot at Israeli homes in the

¹⁸³ Philo and Berry (2004) refer to the term “militant” in the coverage of the AAI, yet without accounting for the multiple military factions at the time (2000-2004).

neighbouring settlement of Gilo. Indeed, a B'Tselem report notes “nightly” firing at homes in Gilo, Psagot, Hebron and Vered (December 2000). Despite the framing in the article’s headings, the *Guardian* article praises Palestinian elites while editing out Israeli non-elites altogether.

For example, the article’s large image does not depict gunmen or civilian victims nor does it show Gilo or Beit Jala. Instead, as the caption reads, it portrays “Arab gunmen burn an Israeli flag near the Church of Nativity. But residents say they bring destruction to the city.” This random, archive image positions ‘wild-eyed’ Arab gunmen as *a threat to Us* by superimposing them with the church symbolising Jesus’ birthplace (not mentioned in the article). In this framing, unique in the coverage, *not all* Palestinians want to adopt Our ways: some are baddies who do not want to be ‘like Us.’ *These* militants are then distanced in the image caption, being called “*Arab* gunmen,” not ‘Palestinian gunmen.’

Figure 111: the *Guardian* (8 December)



In line with RD, Israeli civilians whose homes are shot at are referred to in the article only in unintelligible ‘codes,’ *never* directly. The word “Gilo” appears only once in the article (12th paragraph), and only in reference to “Israeli tanks.” This is also the article’s only attempt to describe the violent exchanges. It reads:

“[local Palestinians are] trapped between the Palestinian gunmen and the bombardment by Israeli tanks guarding the Jewish settlement of Gilo on the opposite ridge”

In contrast, attempts by the PA to ‘stop the shooting’ are praised despite never being criticised in the first place. The article’s first sentence reads:

“Arafat has ordered his militia commanders to stop shooting from Palestinian cities and towns...”

However, “Shooting from” never indicates ‘where to’ or at whom, deleting the identity of the victims (civilians in their homes). The emphasis on the ‘order’ and the process of ‘stopping’ also conceals whether the shooting *actually* stopped. This selective emphasis is repeated throughout the article, e.g., “I know it is not easy to stop.” This lead, unique in the coverage, also praises Arafat as active, strong, responsive and responsible. The second paragraph reads:

“Faced with a growing public clamour to rethink his Intifada strategy and pull back the gunmen, the Palestinian leader told his Fatah lieutenants on Wednesday to hold fire.”

Arafat is complimented unquestionably, but did the firing stop? “[H]old fire” against whom? The third sentence reads:

“Mr Arafat made an almost unheard of personal intervention, telephoning the Latin patriarch... to arrange a meeting with his Fatah area commander.”

Compliments turn to mock reverence: is “telephoning” really “unheard of” in matters of life and death? The fifth paragraph reads:

“There is also anger, and disillusionment... militia leaders had already washed their hands of Mr Arafat’s intifada: two weeks ago they laid down their guns in protest at corruption in his Palestinian Authority.”

The PA is criticized, but for generic “corruption,” not sniper-fire at civilians. Paragraph six complements an “extraordinary meeting” and “the most determined effort to stop the shooting in any of the areas under Mr Arafat’s control.” In contrast to these efforts by elites, “Most of the Palestinian people want to continue with the Intifada...” says a “Fatah commander.” The commander continues, “It is a decision according to the needs of the

people.” Invoking Canovan’s promiscuous exercise of “*the people*” (2005:140), the “needs of the people” are decided by the military. Paragraph eight reads:

“The order has also gone out from militia commanders in the West Bank cities of Hebron and Ramallah, and in Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip.”

More praise: “militia commanders” swift compliance with the rule of law. Paragraph nine reads:

“The effort to shield Palestinian civilians from further bloodshed is a delicate matter. The gunmen have no central command: Fatah militiamen are organised regionally, they owe their allegiance to local commanders and only indirectly to Mr Arafat, and they are swayed by local conditions.”

Arafat, apparently, is in control when the violence stops, and not in control when it starts. Extenuating measures include “effort,” “delicate,” “no central command,” “indirectly” and “local conditions.” Paragraph ten:

“An Israeli military operation... could sabotage Mr Arafat’s effort to steer the uprising along a less lethal course. Two previous orders to stop shooting from residential areas bought a few days of relative calm to Beit Jala and other towns, but then the bloodshed resumed.”

Israel ‘subverts’ the PA, while “less lethal” violence is awarded paternalistic praise. The syntactic ordering of “resumed” on the right-hand side of “bloodshed” deletes the respective agency: who resumed? How? Paragraph eleven empathises the “Fatah commander” and “gangs of Tanzim (militia)”:

“I know it is not easy to stop,” he said.”

Arafat’s responsiveness is complimented again in paragraph twelve:

“The decision to try to reign in Bethlehem’s gunmen was forced on Mr Arafat by local people...”

In paragraph thirteenth “use citizens’ houses” is a euphemism for shootings at houses. Paragraph fifteen notes “guerrilla-style actions by the militias operating from residential areas.” But, were the militants not also “operating” against residential areas, not only

“from” them? Are unarmed civilians legitimate targets for guerrilla warfare (“actions”)?

“Paragraph sixteen includes more praise:

“The aim of the Intifada is not to put pressure on the Palestinian people... we do not want them to suffer more...”

In paragraph seventeen “reduction,” “waves” and “quality” cynically suggests *more focused* violence with *greater* casualties. Do non-elite “Palestinians” also think about the “action”?

“There is a tangible reduction in the level of confrontation. This intifada is taking the shape of waves, and the Palestinians are now thinking more about the quality of action.”

Paragraph eighteen compliments militants for pursuing an ‘authentic’ peace, not Arafat’s “fractured peace.”

“...gunmen gave up on Mr Arafat’s intifada two weeks ago, sensing that he was ready to reopen negotiations with Israel. They accuse him of being too eager to pick up the pieces of the fractured peace process.”

In paragraph nineteen, a “Fatah area leader” promotes his agenda unquestionably: “The Intifada has already stopped,” but did it?

In contrast to this soft-footing criticism, Israel’s wrongdoing appears demonic. For example, “people [Palestinians] are complaining of an unbearable toll in civilian deaths and suffering...” (first sentence); “[Beit Jala] pummelled relentlessly by Israeli tank and machine-gun fire...” (third sentence);¹⁸⁴ “...half the population is out of work, and acres of Palestinian olive groves and farmland have been bulldozed by the Israeli army”;¹⁸⁵ “missile strikes or the assassination of militia leaders”; “bombardment by Israeli tanks”; “300 houses have been damaged by heavy Israeli fire”; “the toll in human life and the

¹⁸⁴ Manifestly, Israel caused widespread destruction during the AAI, the Lebanon war (2006) or Gaza wars (2008-2014). The point here is that seeing Israeli violence as unnatural evil occurs alongside pseudo-tolerance of Palestinian elites’ violence while classifying Britain’s own violence (say in Iraq or Afghanistan), as categorically incomparable. None of these assumptions is generative towards Palestine.

¹⁸⁵ On the uprooting of Palestinian trees by Israel see Braverman (2009).

economic cost of Israel's blockade"; "the Palestinian people are already suffering from siege and from hunger."

In line with RD and RT, this unnatural violence both legitimates the "actions" of "gangs" and "militiamen" as well as further presenting their efforts to "stop" as selfless altruism.

8.2.3 Palestinian elites: two Independent articles

The *Independent's* article titled "'Collaborator' gets death sentence in Palestinian court" (8 Dec 2000) follows in the lines of the analysis above. While Israel is accused of "murder," "blackmailing," and 'assassination,' only the ninth paragraph reveals that the "Palestinian court" in discussion is a military court ("state security"), not a civil court. 'Putting aside' criticism of the PA then coincides with degenerative empathy with those Palestinian non-elites who face these courts. The ninth paragraph reads:

"There are no appeals against state security court verdicts but the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, must approve an execution before it is carried out."

The seventh paragraph reads:

"It was the first time a Palestinian court has sentenced a convicted collaborator to death. Before, collaborators have been summarily executed by Palestinian activists without trial."

Here, the paternalistic and complimentary "first time" celebrates the PA's conviction through the courts, as opposed to executions "summarily" carried out by "activists." The *'first time'* format implies the 'fledgling' morals and 'baby steps' They take when adopting Our high ideals.

The second *Independent* article, titled "The broken revolutionary" (by Robert Fisk), severely criticises the PA and Arafat but only for 'corruption' and for forging an 'unauthentic' peace with Israel, the 'puppet' of the US.

Nonetheless, toleration does not mean seeing Them as 'like Us.' *Figure 114* depicts a hooded Hamas supporter yielding a Koran which doubles as a knife next to a mural of

Ayatollah Khomeini. This spectacle of Otherness (appearing with no connection to the article, headlined “Palestinians say talks in crisis”) is paraded to place the routine images of victimised Palestinian women and children in their ‘real’ context: ‘in fact, They are as removed from Us as possible.’ Indeed, the ironic caption “Marchers in Gaza yesterday marked al-Quds (Jerusalem) Day,” shields the Hamas through the odd nominalisation “[M]archers” while implicating non-elite Gazans in general as being hooded ‘fanatics.’

Figure 112: “Marchers in Gaza” (Guardian, 23 December)



Another example of RT in relation to ‘the Arab’ within the thesis sample relates to Osama Bin Laden. Headlined “Forget the peace process...” (Fiske, *Independent*, 29 December), the article exhibits a degenerative solidarity with the Taliban and Bin Laden (nine months before 9/11), while the “Afghan population”—generally invisible in the piece—appears as the agency responsible for “hiding” Bin Laden, the “Super-Beast.” Fisk writes:

And in 2001, we will no doubt be enjoined to support a new Israeli-American-Western struggle against “international Islamic terror”; the first blow – a double whammy from Washington and Moscow to further impoverish the penniless Afghan population for hiding Osama Bin Laden – came with increased sanctions this month. Bin Laden has already been turned into a Super-Beast, although his demand for an American withdrawal from the Gulf makes increasing sense to a disenfranchised, humiliated Arab public. The attempted sinking of the USS COLE in Aden harbour – presented, of course, as another act of “terror” against American democracy – falls into this category. And we shall surely see more such murderous acts in 2001.

The following *Guardian* appearance (28 December) also shows concern for Taliban elites, with little regard for Afghani non-elites. It reads:

In Afghanistan, the leader of the ruling Taliban, Mullah Omar, told his countrymen that the United States and Russia had a plan to isolate Muslims worldwide, beginning with Afghanistan. Washington and Moscow are the co-sponsors of a UN resolution imposing new sanctions on the Taliban, including restrictions on foreign travel for its leaders.

The US, he said, was also trying to thwart the Taliban in particular, using as a pretext the sanctuary which Afghanistan has given to the man who is at the top of Washington’s most-wanted list of terrorists, Osama bin Laden.

This victimization of elites, while paying little attention to non-elite Afghanis, is truly astonishing.¹⁸⁶

8.2.4 RD and Israeli elites

In line with RD, Israeli elites appear under Our unwavering gaze as demonic agents set against Our sacred values and diverting others away from them. According to RD’s “evil principal” (Alon and Omer, 2006:15) all that is bad and which frustrates the good originates from an evil entity. Accordingly, even suspicion alone can materialize as threats of the total destruction of Our ways, yet still lurking unseen underneath the surface. Hence, as further examined below, settlers are compared to Nazis (*Guardian*, 5 December), “Jews” are said to have control over Hollywood and the media (*Guardian*, 1 November), as does the “Jewish lobby” (*Independent*, 13 December); Israel is inferred to

¹⁸⁶ In another article, headed “Taliban: no subversive gateaux: As Titanic fever grips Kabul, hardline militia proves no match for ... iced cakes” (*Guardian*, 24 November 2000), wedding cakes became story anchors while the Taliban largely remained invisible in the newspaper.

have “plots” to destroy the Al-Aqsa (*Guardian*, 18 December); it chokes Palestine into South African like “Bantustans” (*Independent*, 1 December); it targets women and children and crushes cattle with bulldozers (*Independent*, 7 December) and it does so cold-bloodedly but joyfully, with a “wink” (*Guardian*, 7 December). Finally, Israel has an underlying master plan for cultural genocide (or worst) which could engulf the entire region (*Independent*, 6 December).

In contrast to who They are, We represent universal norms which supposedly benefit everyone. To use Cohen, these articles exhibit the role of the news media as a source informing ‘common folk’ on the “normative contours” of society beyond which threats to Our common virtues take their shape (1972/2011:11).

Yet Israeli violence was not ‘unnatural’ or ‘uninhibited’ but *comparable* to *post War* British violence, which, in turn, was not ‘restrained.’¹⁸⁷ Indeed, the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq also included air raids, curfews, bombings and assassinations.¹⁸⁸ *It is this comparability* which is so threatening to a progressive, liberal British identity: ‘We are not that different from Them after all.’

Israel’s violence in the early 2000s was, and still is, tremendously destructive and the appearances of RD in the reports do not change that. Yet such violence was not an incomparable, exceptional, act of evil, nor was it unprovoked. These reports are not merely a disapproving censure, rather, they construct a mental image which degrades and excludes others through the “use of language as weapon to assault another” (Allan and Burrige, 1991:222).

¹⁸⁷ As was Britain’s *pre-WWII* colonial violence. For instance, Hochschild muses on how British campaigners’ against King Leopold’s colonial rule of the Congo “never saw themselves as being in conflict with the imperial project.” The sense was that if “the moral authority of England were distributed across the earth” it could set a “Moral Empire of loftier intent” (1999:212, quoting Jan Morris). In relation to the occupation of Ireland Stannard writes “Still, Britain’s people considered themselves the most civilised on earth...” (1993:98).

¹⁸⁸ For example, one estimate of Iraqi civilian fatalities, for which coalition forces alone are responsible, is of 6,882 deaths in the invasion phase, 41 days into the war (20 March - 30 April 2003, see IBC, July 2005, quoted in *The Report of the Iraq Inquiry*, 2016:180). The estimate of Palestinian civilians killed by Israeli security forces between 29 September 2000 and 30 June 2015 is 6,759 (B’Tselem, <http://www.btselem.org/statistics>, accessed January, 2016). This figure excludes Palestinians who took part in the hostilities, but includes Palestinians killed by targeted assassinations or by other Palestinians.

8.2.5 The Clinton Parameters: an anatomy of RT and RD

An example of how both newspapers applied RT and RD to dismiss the peace talks, almost identically, can be seen in the first reports (28 December) relating to the PA and Israel's reactions to the Clinton parameters. The parameters were presented on 23 December, with a deadline set for the 27th. As seen below, even basic details—who accepted, who rejected, how and when—is mystified to avoid puncturing the narratives at play. For example, Israel's parliamentary vote in favour of the parameters, or the PA's letter of rejection,¹⁸⁹ were suppressed nearly-identical ways in the the headlines, images, wordings and editing in both newspapers.

In line with RT and RD, shielding the PA from criticism occurs alongside scorched earth criticism of Israel. Accordingly, while the romanticised Arab used violence only in search of a 'lasting peace,' Israel's peace efforts were a trap to intensify the violence. Echoing JanMohamed's "Manichean allegory" (1985), both the subjugated native (1985:66) and the calculating coloniser are drawn into the vortex (1985:63) revolving around the axis of their fetishized oppositions. Below is a line-by-line analysis of these articles.

¹⁸⁹ As reported in both newspapers. In fact, the still unpublished letter included qualifications which Clinton's saw as 'No but' (Bill Clinton, 2005:944-945)

Figure 113: Guardian front page (28 December)

[illegible]

Figure 114: Independent front page (28 December)

[illegible]

Headlines

Both newspapers' headlines and subheadings present Clinton's parameters as if *equally rejected* by Arafat and Barak.

Guardian "Middle East talks founder"

Independent "Crisis in Middle East as peace talks shelved."

Using the passive "founder" and "shelved," both headlines equally delete agency and sequence of events: who "shelved" or 'founded' the talks? The identical indistinct reference to Israel and Palestine as "Middle East" also sensationalises the risks from the talks to Our interests in the region (while their benefits are virtually never generalized).

Subheading and image caption

Both the *Guardian's* subheading and the *Independent's* image caption (the article has no subheadings) focus on Arafat's meeting with Mubarak, strongly suggesting that Arafat 'went forward' with the talks while Barak 'walked out.'

Guardian "Arafat to meet Egyptian president without Barak"

Independent "Hosnie Mubarak: Will meet Yasser Arafat today"

Lead paragraph

The lead paragraphs in both newspapers reinforce the omissions in the headings. Using passivisation and nominalization, such as, "received a great setback," "was suddenly cancelled" and "was cancelled," agency is further deferred.

Guardian "Hopes of a Middle East settlement received a great setback early today when a planned summit between the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, and the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, was suddenly cancelled."

Independent "The planned summit between the Palestinian President, Yasser Arafat, and the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, was cancelled last night, plunging the Middle East into deep crisis."

Paragraph 2

Both leaders appear equally un-invested in the talks.

Guardian “It would have been the first face-to-face meeting between the two men since October...”

Independent “The meeting... would have been their first for two months.”

Paragraph 3

Details about the talks trickle in. In the *Guardian*, while Israel’s “pulled out” is abrupt and final, the PA’s “expressed deep reservations” is open-ended. The claim that Israel would make its “final decision” “later today” is also problematic, due to the reported parliamentary vote reported in paragraphs 5 and 13.

Guardian “The Israelis pulled out of the summit after the Palestinians expressed deep reservations about US proposals... However, the Israeli cabinet secretary, Isaac Herzog, left the door slightly ajar, saying a final decision would be made later today.”

Independent “Cairo announced it was called off just before 2am local time, after the Palestinians rejected an Israeli demand that some 3.5 million refugees abandon their long-standing dream of returning to the [sic] homes inside what is now Israel, from which they were expelled in 1948. Dr Samir Gusha, a member of Mr Arafat’s decision-making body, said “The American ideas did not comply with the Palestinian principles, and the Palestinian principles are clear and obvious.”

In the *Independent*, the PA is shielded from criticism with the suggestion that it rejected only a single “Israeli demand” (the right of return), not the proposals in general. In line with RT, both newspapers present the PA’s rejection using the PA’s own words with no hint of criticism. For example, in Samir Gusha’s “did not comply” (*Independent*) and in Abed Rabbo’s “far from the principals of peace” (*Guardian*, paragraph 9). Strikingly, both newspapers qualify the PA’s rejection with an *identical* use of the passive transformation, or the re-ordering of the syntactic agency and affected party in the sentence (Fowler, 1991:77). In the *Independent* “Cairo announced” appears on the left

side of “*after* the Palestinians rejected,” and in the *Guardian* “The Israelis pulled out” appears on the left of “*after* the Palestinians expressed deep reservations.”

Paragraph 4

Both newspapers frame Israel’s acceptance as conditional, only then to note that the condition is not content-related but a corresponding PA acceptance. But, can a *mutual* agreement not be ‘conditional’ on a *mutual* acceptance?

<i>Guardian</i>	“Israel said it conditionally accepted US President Bill Clinton’s plan... provided that they remain unchanged as a basis for discussion also by the Palestinian side...”
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<i>Independent</i>	“Within an hour, Mr Barak’s office said Israel had conditionally accepted Mr Clinton’s plan “as a basis for discussion provided that they remain unchanged as a basis for discussion also by the Palestinian side.”
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Paragraph 5

Both newspapers laconically report on Israel’s vote in favour of Clinton’s parameters deep in the article, paragraph 5 in the *Guardian*, and paragraph 7 in the *Independent*.

<i>Guardian</i>	“Ten cabinet ministers voted in favour of the plan, two against, while two abstained.”
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<i>Independent</i>	“Ten cabinet ministers voted in favour of the plan, two against and two abstained.”
--------------------	---

Paragraph 6

Both newspapers include an Israeli symbolic rejection of the talks by the opposition leader Ariel Sharon (paragraph 9 in the *Independent*).

<i>Guardian</i>	“[Barak’s] “main opponent [Sharon] has threatened to reject the plan.”
-----------------	--

Independent "... [Sharon] already announced that he would not honour any agreement negotiated in line with Mr Clinton's draft."

Paragraph 8

Despite a parliamentary vote, Israel is still presented as rejecting Clinton's parameters. In the *Guardian*, with "reluctance to attend," and in the *Independent* with "he [Barak] would not sign."

Again, the PA's rejection is shielded through euphemisms ("unhappiness") and syntactic passive transformation with the affected, "Mr Barak's reluctance," appearing left of the agent "after the Palestinians had issued statements."

Guardian "Mr Barak's reluctance to attend the summit came hours after the Palestinians had issued statements expressing their unhappiness at Mr Clinton's proposals."

Independent "Mr Barak had indicated, however, that he would not sign any agreement ceding the disputed Temple Mount... to Palestinian sovereignty. He was prepared to grant the Palestinians *de facto* control only."

Paragraph 9/10

Again, the PA's rejection is supported unquestionably.

Paragraph 9 *Guardian* Yasser Abed Rabbo... "The offer we have is not an opportunity but a trap. It is very far from the principles of the peace process and the principles of negotiation."

Paragraph 9 *Independent* The summit's cancellation appeared to spell the end of the diplomatic process.

Both articles end with criticism leveled at Israeli non-elites (paragraph 15 in the *Guardian* and 10 in the *Independent*). In the same breath, 'Western' concepts such as opinion polls are a currency not afforded to Palestinians.

Paragraph 15 (last) *Guardian* "In an opinion poll in yesterday's Jerusalem Post, 52% opposed a peace plan compared with 38% in favour."

**Paragraph
10 (last)** *Independent*

“Israelis across the political spectrum were united, however, in resisting a Palestinian right of return... inside Israel.”

Paragraph 10

The *Guardian*’s article includes five more paragraphs than the *Independent*. The unquestioning utterance “the Palestinians were still discussing Mr Clinton’s proposals” is contradicted again in paragraph 13.

“... Mr Arafat said the Palestinians were still discussing Mr Clinton’s proposals. “God willing, it will represent a strong start in which a Palestinian boy or girl will raise the flag of Palestine over the walls, minarets and churches of Jerusalem.””

Paragraph 11

Again, the PA evades scrutiny, but was Barak not under pressure? Were there no Arab states that pressured Arafat to sign a deal (Ben-Ami, 2006:273)?

“Mr Arafat is under huge pressure at home and from other Arab states not to concede on the key issues...”

Paragraph 12

Again, the PA’s rejection is duly accepted.

“Saeb Erekat, the chief Palestinian negotiator, ruled out any concessions on the right of return.”

Paragraph 13

The shielding euphemisms used above, such as “unhappiness” or “deep reservations,” are replaced with “cannot accept.”

“After a meeting yesterday of Palestinian legislators, a letter was sent to Washington in which “the Palestinian leadership said it cannot accept these American ideas as a basis for a settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”

Paragraph 14

In line with RT and RD, concealing the PA’s rejection appears alongside the concealment of Israeli concessions.

Paragraph 14

“It is understood that Israel has agreed that Palestinians can have control over Arab east Jerusalem and more of the West Bank.”

Paragraph 15

“The Israelis have offered a compromise... the Palestinians to have sovereignty over the top of the site [Temple Mount] and the Israelis to control the area underneath, including the Wailing Wall.”

Another article with a similar format of mystification appears during the Taba talks (January 2001). In the same article (*Guardian*, 16 January) the headline “Israel breaks off talks after killing of settler,” is contradicted in paragraph 5, which reads “the talks *could resume* as early as today”; and paragraph 12 (out of 15) which reads “Hours later... Mr Barak announced that the talks were back on.” In contrast to Israel’s strong, agentive and negative syntactic positioning (“Israel breaks off”), the murder in question appears through passive and agentless wordings, such as “after killing of settler” and “had been abducted.”

8.2.6 ‘Classic’ anti-Semitism in the reports

During December 2000 there were few utterances of ‘classic’ anti-Semitism. While these dotted appearances are of concern, the discourse of RD is not limited to overt expressions.

For example, Jemima Khan’s *Guardian* editorial titled “Tell the truth about Israel” (1 November 2000), ‘bravely’ sets out to ‘expose’ (Alon and Omer, 2006) the controlling Jewish ‘hidden hand’ lurking underneath the surface. For instance, that Al Gore “has built his career on support from the Jewish lobby,” is entwined with the fact that Muhammad al-Durah was shot in “cold blood” by Israeli “assassins” intent on killing him;¹⁹⁰ and that the two Israeli soldiers “killed” in the Ramallah lynch (12 October 2000) “were clearly undercover hit squad agents.” The article also includes the following xenophobic paragraph:

¹⁹⁰ See also Pualin’s poem above.

Hillary Clinton, who a year ago called for a Palestinian state, has been forced into a complete U-turn in her Senate campaign. The Jews have been remarkably successful as a people, despite historic adversity. As a result, the Israeli lobby in the US is rich and influential. The media are largely controlled by the Jews, as is Hollywood and they account for more than half the top policy-making jobs in the Clinton administration.

Figure 115: *Guardian* (1 November 2000)

Jemima Khan

Tell the truth about Israel

Generally, I am sceptical about conspiracy theories. However, I feel the current furor in the Muslim world about western media coverage of events in the Middle East is justified. First, I watched horrified as Israeli soldiers shot, in cold blood, Mohammad al-Durra, a 12-year-old Palestinian boy. His father tried to shield his cowering son while begging the assassins in vain to hold fire. Equally shocking was the senseless killing of the Palestinian ambulanceman who then arrived. I watched this scene on several news channels and all reported that the boy was caught in crossfire. This was blatantly untrue and the captured images showed clearly that the firing was one-sided and unprovoked. The Palestinians claim that father and son innocently went shopping to Gaza. Israel claims they were violent protesters. But even if they were, since when did the hurling of rocks warrant gunfire?

I was equally appalled by TV images five years ago when a Palestinian suicide bomber blew up a restaurant in Israel packed with children, but the difference is that those reporting the blast were as outspokenly horrified as I was by the images of mutilated children's bodies. In this case, however, far from condemning the brutal public execution of a young boy, I was amazed to read the western press condemning Palestinians for "sending their children out to die" for the sake of "scoring media points". That doesn't explain the shooting of an 18-month-old baby girl in the back seat of her father's car. Or how another 12-year-old boy was shot in his own garden.

Then two Israeli soldiers were filmed being brutally killed by Palestinian protesters. It made shocking viewing. The news channels reiterated the Israeli claim that they had mistakenly "strayed into Ramallah". Yet Ramallah is a city under total Israeli military siege and is completely blockaded except for one entrance, which is entirely under the control of Israeli military checkpoints. They were clearly undercover hit squad agents who had deliberately infiltrated a funeral march. They were recognised, and although Palestinian police attempted to protect them, the furious mob invaded the police HQ and killed them in full view of the international media. This was presented immediately as justification for subsequent Israeli aerial attacks, and increased block-

ades. No one can condone the frenzied killing of these two Israeli soldiers and the perpetrators will certainly be called to account — unlike the soldiers responsible for killing the 12-year-old Palestinian boy.

But why did Madeleine Albright present her immediate condolence to the families of these two Israeli soldiers, when more than a fortnight has passed without any such comments for the families of the dozens of killed Palestinian civilians?

And she persistently refers to "violence on both sides" (regardless of the obvious disparity between a nuclear state and a lightly-armed police force. At the last count, there were 126 Palestinian fatalities, 35% under the age of 15, 4,000 Palestinian casualties and seven Israeli fatalities). In the presidential elections Al Gore and George Bush were forced in one of their first debates to compete in an almost farcical fashion over who would be more loyal to Israel. Gore, the clear winner, who has built his career on support from the Jewish lobby, said he would pressure Yasser Arafat to stop "provocative acts of violence".

Hillary Clinton, who a year ago called for a Palestinian state, has been forced into a complete U-turn in her Senate campaign. The Jews have been remarkably successful as a people, despite historic adversity. As a result, the Israeli lobby in the US is rich and influential. The media are largely controlled by the Jews, as is Hollywood and they account for more than half the top policy-making jobs in the Clinton administration.

Driving to pick up my son from school yesterday, I was horrified to see a freshly painted red sign on a wall: "Kill all Jews. Jihad". And a statement has just been issued from a London based Islamist group that "all Jews and Americans have now become targets in the Muslim lands as a result of American policy". Abhorrent as this kind of extremism may be, it is a direct result of what Muslims see as gross injustice, due to overwhelming Jewish influence in US politics and the media. The situation can only worsen, with an increase in fundamentalism.

Many of my friends are Jewish, as was my paternal grandfather. The sad part is that I know the majority of them desperately want peace in the Middle East, but that peace can only be achieved once the US acts as an honest broker, and the US media as impartial commentators.

Jemima and Imran Khan live in Islamabad

In another example, a *Guardian* opinion article remarks that “[Al Gore] has been nurtured and hand reared for the role for 35 years,” towards being “the most totally committed partisan of Israel ever to be president” (12 December). The article continues “At Harvard, he was taught by Martin Peretz,” the Jewish owner of the *New Republic*, who flashed the publication with an “uncritical or even fanatical support for Israel, right or wrong.” The same article also quotes George Bush Senior’s “heartfelt words” that he was “one lonely little guy down here,” referring to Israel’s “lobbying.”

In an *Independent* article titled “I am being vilified for telling the truth about Palestinians” (13 December), Robert Fisk, referring to the “*Jewish* lobby,” wrote that the “attempt to force the media to obey Israel’s rules is now international”. In line with RD, Fisk imagines himself as fighting dark global forces since *the* “lobby” includes a “large number of US negotiators who are Jewish” and because, as he quotes Charlie Reese, “Palestinians won’t get their independence until Americans get theirs.” While using wordings such as “ruthless abuse,” “unprecedented,” “McCarthyite proportions,” and “a threat to us all,” Fisk’s supporting evidence includes, among others, a complaint to a newspaper in Johannesburg, a comment in a public talk in Ireland, and an article in an unnamed “Australian lobby group’s magazine.”

Finally, Robert Fisk’s article headlined “General tries old guerrilla tactics to make United Nations toe Israeli line” (*Independent* 15 December) peddles the image of the Israeli-Jew’s ‘control’ and humiliation of key global players. Apparently, “the UN is now *quietly* coming to understand” its “lesson” and so it “will go on watching and waiting and being *abused*” (my emphases).

8.2.7 Hillary Clinton's 'anti-Semitic slur'

The *Independent* published three articles discussing an alleged anti-Semitic slur by Hillary Clinton and the Jewish vote in the US.¹⁹¹ The articles' headlines read:

"Anti-Semitism 'lie' hits Hillary Clinton's campaign" (16 July).

"Is Hillary Clinton anti-Semitic" (22 July).

"Hillary campaign trips in panic over race slur claims" (23 July).

In line with RD, these articles depict an extortive and shrewd Jewish minority 'playing the race card' and skewing the 'normative' political process. Nonetheless, this charged framing, appearing in the headlines, images and leads, is contrasted inside the articles themselves.

Moreover, the linking of Jewish influence and Hillary Clinton during the July peace talks appears alongside accusations against Bill Clinton that the peace talks were an Israeli-American trap. Indeed, iterations such as "Some in the Jewish community resent her [Hillary Clinton's] support of the Palestinian cause" (23 July), tie together Jewish craftiness and American foreign policy.

Figure 116: *Independent* (16 July)



¹⁹¹ See also the *Guardian* online: "Hillary faces voters' wrath for alleged ethnic slur" (18 July 2000) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jul/18/selections2000.usa>

Figure 117: *Independent* (22 July)

IS HILLARY CLINTON ANTI-SEMITIC?

Comment in the American press on allegations that the Senate hopeful made an anti-Semitic remark 25 years ago

DAILY NEWS

HILLARY CLINTON is accused of calling a campaign aide a "Jew bastard" during an argument. She has some serious explaining to do, not just to Jewish voters, but to all New Yorkers. The alleged victim and his wife confirm the incident. Clinton denies the charges. Some of her defenders say that even if these words were uttered, it was 25 years ago. Hardly a justification.

the offensive phrase. Hillary's Jewish problem centers on the fact that the remark rings believable. For the first time in Clinton's public life, she needs the support of Jews to get ahead. But do they really need her? Hardly. Jews don't need to believe she called anyone, Jewish or otherwise, a "f---ing bastard" to realize that the woman has long displayed indifference, bordering on hostility, to Jews. (Andrea Peyser)



large number of Jewish voters. These Jewish voters, and all others, can throw this latest allegation onto the trash heap or take it into the voting booth. Either way, it is a lousy piece of garbage to have to carry around. (Marie Coçco)

NEW YORK POST

IT MAY not matter to some Jews whether Hillary hurled

NEWSDAY

OVER THESE many years, it has been suggested that Hillary Clinton is a lesbian, an

THE NEW YORK TIMES

HILLARY CLINTON denied the Frays' charges, and her outrage seemed genuine, just as it did when Rudy Giuliani accused her of being an enemy of religion. After years of dodging allegations about White House cover-ups and health care

screw-ups and questionable profits on cattle futures. Hillary Clinton has enjoyed several opportunities during her campaign to deny responsibility for things she actually did not do. Nobody else has come forward with another example of Mrs Clinton ever having made an anti-Semitic statement. A former Arkansas campaign aide, meanwhile, jumped in on the side of the Frays. In the end, the public will have to decide whether Hillary Clinton, one of the most politically correct people on the planet, chose to express her anger 25 years ago by homing in on the ethnicity of a guy's great-grandmother. (Gail Collins)

Figure 118: *Independent* (23 July, cropped)

Hillary campaign trips in panic over race slur claims

BY DAVID USBORNE
IN NEW YORK

HILLARY Rodham Clinton is battling criticism that her Senate campaign over-reacted to a claim that she once called one of her husband's political aides a "f---ing Jew bastard" and that it asked supporters in the Jewish community last week to lie on her behalf.

The Clinton camp went into full panic mode the instant the charge surfaced one week ago, sources reveal. That reflected deep anxiety both about the state of the election race generally - she remains neck and neck with her Republican foe, Rick Lazio - and about the softness of support for her among Jews. Some in the Jewish community resent her support of the Palestinian cause.



The First Lady gets defensive

SUZANNE PLUNKETT AP

leaked to the press. Most damaging was the fact that supporters were warned they should not reveal who had asked them to place the calls.

Written by an aide, the memo is on Hillary Clinton headed paper: "I would appreciate it if you could call these people as concerned citizens (It is important that you do not say that you are calling because the campaign asked you to, but because you are outraged with what was said about her)."

One of those journalists targeted was Adam Dickter of *The Jewish Week*. He describes receiving a stream of calls all of a sudden from people he would otherwise never hope to hear from. Mr Dickter says it was a clumsy and desperate stunt, which may have damaged Mrs Clinton more

All three articles thus create an emotional sense of urgency and alarm. For example, wording such as "trips in panic", "full panic mode", "race slur claims" "hits", "battling criticism," "deep anxiety," "crisis" or "a damaging accusation," appear next to images of a defiant and "defensive" Mrs Clinton (23 July). The heading "Is Hillary Clinton anti-Semitic?" (22 July), is jeering and wry: 'is Hillary Clinton attacking Jews or attacked by them'?

Nevertheless, the text inside these articles contradicts their framing. The alleged 1974 incident appeared in an excerpt promoting a book by the former National Enquirer tabloid reporter Jerry Oppenheimer. Also, the person allegedly offended "was not, in fact Jewish"

(16 July) and Jewish support for Hillary's Senate campaign was *not* in "panic" (23 July). Apparently:

"Even by last Monday, the First Lady might have considered herself protected from real damage after all three of the country's main Jewish organisations issued statements decrying Mr Oppenheimer's reporting as unbelievable and clearing both her and Mr Lazio of any anti-Semitism" (23 July, fourth paragraph).

The article's *last* paragraph refers to a Daily News survey with similar implications. Nonetheless, these articles peddle the idea of Jewish voters as a problem which needs to be put in check. Such utterances include, "neck and neck" election race (23 July), "damaging accusation" (16 July), detailed statistics on the Jewish electorate ("roughly 15 per cent") and voting patterns ("Mrs Clinton has between 50 and 55 per cent of the Jewish vote..." 23 July).

As seen in the image of a subjugated Hillary Clinton (23 July), these articles thus infer that even a minor upset to Jewish sensitivities can stifle the US political process, even 25 years later.

8.2.8 Grammar of psychodemonisation

Both newspapers construct Israeli elites as metaphysical, conspiring evildoers even within nucleolus syntactical forms. Such formulations of RD, at times limited even to a single sentence, place Us as far apart from Them: They value and find a sense of accomplishment in inhumane cruelty and brutality.

Take, for example, the following utterance "In the Bethlehem suburb of Beit Jala, pummelled relentlessly by Israeli tank and machine-gun fire..." (*Guardian*, 8 December). Here, Israeli violence appears as an ongoing, constant state of affairs as if Israeli tanks mindlessly and indiscriminately bomb Palestinian towns (while implying that Our military violence is measured and proportionate, see footnote 191 above). Indeed, both 'relentless' and 'pummel' suggest repetitive, unceasing and systematic strikes. This unleashed fury is also presented as unprovoked aggression that is excluded from context or possible mitigating circumstances (for example, intense violence against Israeli civilians). In principal, these appearances are thus presented as war crimes; as cold-

blooded, premeditated intentionality to maximise harm. Indeed, “The Palestinians,” the *Guardian* reports “[were] hoping to haul Israel before a war crimes tribunal” (5 December). While this formulation magnanimously excepts Palestinian elites from a legal inspection—since They are morally ambivalent, with shootings and bombings against civilians ‘put aside’—Our imagined image as a trusted protector of the weak and needy is reinforced.

Another article, headlined “Israelis bulldoze homes, orange groves and cattle” (*Independent*, 7 December), describes how Israeli “huge, sinister machines” were attacking a Gazan “hamlet” whose residents only wanted to “collect their harvest in peace.” As above, utterances regarding violence by “Israelis” (all of them?) invoke ontological moral panics. These include “drive them off the land,” “uprooting... orange and olive orchards, transforming them into a moonscape,” “deadly fire,” or “[S]everal of their cattle were crushed to death as the bulldozers flattened the cow sheds.” The utterances regarding violence against Israeli non-elites appear in the ninth paragraph:

“The razing happened two days after two Israeli settlers had been killed, and five children severely injured, when a Palestinian roadside bomb blew up a school bus.”

and

“a day earlier... a Palestinian gunman [infiltrated Kfar Darom settlement and]... killed two Israeli soldiers.”

Despite the school bus bombing, the article notes Israel’s “security measures” in scare quotes while pointing out that these measures cloaked a calculated “strategy” of destruction. ‘In contrast’ with these calculated schemes, Palestinian elites are said to be lacking *any* control, e.g., “anarchy is prevailing in Gaza, with at least nine armed groups operating outside of Yasser Arafat’s control.” Which nine groups though? These are never even named in either newspaper.

The article’s large photo (*Figure 121*) reinforces this image of “Israelis” as inhuman, “sinister” bulldozers capable of unnatural wickedness. The point here is not to contest the article’s grave accusations. Indeed, Israel continues to this day (2018) with such destructive acts as home demolitions and expulsions (see footnote 160). Rather, that inline with RD, the D9, machine-guns and tanks were synonymous with *the* “Israelis” while any humanising imagery was suppressed.

Figure 119: Independent (7 December)



Figure 122 below (*Independent*, 1 December), of a jubilant Barak, appears in an article headed “Palestinians rebuff Barak’s latest peace offer,” with the article next to it headed “Bethlehem cancels Christmas amid riots and gunfire.” While seemingly innocuous, the image reflects a sense of fulfilment and satisfaction with its own malevolence: ‘rejoice; no peace and no Christmas.’

Figure 120: Guardian (1 December)



In line with RD, the Israeli-Jew is syntactically positioned in the headlines as bad, active and powerful (Osgood et al., 1957). Examples include “Israel threatens...” (*Independent*, 2 December), “Israeli destruction [of Palestinian homes]...” (*Independent*, 7 December), “Israeli tanks blast...” (*Independent*, 9 December), “Israel accused...” (*Independent*, 17

December), “Israel tightens...” (*Independent*, 30 December), “Israel targets...” (*Guardian*, 13 December), “Israel drops... [resistance to inquiry]” (*Guardian*, 4 December), or “Israeli army tactics criticised” (*Guardian*, 7 December). *This* unwavering agency spreads its wrongdoing remorselessly.

Another feature of psychodemonisation as a form of syntax is the inclusion of demonising blurbs, or “stockpiling” (Huggins 2000, quoted in Dudai, 2012), which stack muckraking accusations. For example:

“[Israel] has killed more than 250 Palestinians, blocked Arab towns and villages for weeks, flattened large areas of olive and citrus groves, conducted undercover assassinations... and bombarded homes with tanks and helicopters” (*Independent*, 18 December).

This arrangement and rhythmic structure, reoccurring in both newspapers, culminates in an inexorable sense of blame beyond the pale.

Another theme in the syntax of RD reflects on the glossary of the three terms: cold-blooded, excessive and disproportionate. Accordingly, small but significant telltale signs of moral excess are enough to incriminate the group as demonic. While They employ vengeful and unrestrained violence which They justify even by the smallest harm to Them—We use violence only in ‘good measure.’ In the same breath, Palestinian militants and political elites employ violence as a last measure, and virtually never ‘excessively,’ ‘disproportionately’ or ‘cold-bloodedly.’ Examples of such glossary include:

“Israel is using excessive firepower to quell unarmed Palestinian demonstrators.” (*Guardian*, 7 December)

“The Palestinians accuse Israeli soldiers of using excessive force, and firing on unarmed civilians” (*Guardian*, 12 December)

“...he had been cut down in cold blood” (*Guardian*, 12 December)

“Palestinian charges of [Israeli] excessive use of force...” (*Independent*, 12 December)

“[Israeli commanders] admit openly that their army might have used excessive force, particularly in the killing of several hundred unarmed Arab rioters” (*Independent*, 16 December)

The point here is not that Israeli violence was not excessive. Rather, that both newspapers naturalised a glossary of ‘explaining words’ which separated Them from Our normative standards: ‘excessive’ in relation to the imagined gold-plated baseline set by Us. At the same time, the fledgling Palestinian-Arab is still too immature to be assessed as an autonomous moral agent.

Figure 123 exemplifies such excessive use of force and moral repugnance. The soldier on the left appears careless and self-satisfied with the seemingly random shooting of the soldier on the right.

Figure 121: Independent (28 December)



Indeed, an *Independent* article (12 December) quotes Israel’s Deputy Defence Minister, Ephraim Sneh, saying that the assassinations of known guerrillas are “a reason to be happy.” “Israel,” the article adds, “announced it “had nothing to be ashamed of...””

8.2.9 “Guns for sale”

A lengthy ‘exposé’ article, titled “Guns for sale – how stolen Israeli weapons arm Fatah’s fighters” (*Guardian*, 16 December), blames Israel for secretly encouraging an illegal trade in arms to Palestinian militants so as to undermine a possible peace agreement, even at the price of Israeli casualties.

However, the 30th paragraph notes that the PA receives arms from Israel through previous mutual security arrangements, that “[T]he peace agreements gave the Palestinians the right to raise police forces” and that the “Tanzim” already has 70,000 guns. Hence, the framing in the headings and images of a secret Israeli plan to undermine the peace process is contradicted deep inside the article. In line with RT, paragraph 22 casually notes that the “Fatah organisation” is the “paymaster” paying for the illegal firearms on the Palestinian side and either sells them or “doles them out for free.”

Thus, while Israel’s ‘hidden hand’ is ‘exposed,’ Palestinian militants appear agentless and unaccountable. As the article reads:

Many of the fighters now aiming their guns at Jewish settlements also believe that they are operating with Israel’s tacit approval. “If they want to stop a fly from getting to Bethlehem they can, so I don’t know why they cannot control the ammunition coming in,” says a militia commander directing gunfire against the Jewish settlement of Gilo from the Palestinian town of Beit Jala.¹⁹²

Inline with RD, suspicion alone is proof enough with statements made by militia commanders and criminal arms dealers brought unquestionably as ‘evidence.’ Thus, the article’s sub-headline reads:

“Palestinian rifles and bullets taken from army depots are killing settlers and soldiers. Why is the enemy turning a blind eye?”

Answering that:

“Israel secretly encourages the trade – even now – hoping to provoke a civil war that will see Palestinians turn their guns on each other once the battle with Israel is over and a peace deal struck.”

In turn, Israel’s destructive plan

“would make it practically impossible for Mr Arafat to enforce an eventual truce, and move beyond the cycle of killing and revenge that now consumes both peoples. Even if there is a deal, the gun could still rule.”

Thus, Israel is bent on subverting the process at any cost. At the same time Palestinian elites are exempt from criticism: peace would be “practically impossible... to enforce.”

¹⁹² In contrast with the analysis above, Gilo *is* mentioned since the agency behind the attacks is said to be Israel itself.

One of the article's images, showing an Israeli sniper, rehashes RD as a cold-blooded intent to maximise harm. As the caption reads: "An Israeli soldier trains his sights on Hebron stonethrowers [sic]." For the inhuman Israeli-Jew, Palestinian youth are merely training targets.

The article's *opening* sentence is a cliché of evil kindred with Spielberg's Schindler's List's Amon Göth. It reads:

"Three shots ring out in the still of the afternoon, and three Palestinians run for cover. The Israeli army sniper on the 25 metre-high [sic] security tower watches the men below scatter and dive for gaps in the concrete wall."

This repugnant scene proposes a calculated, coldblood numeracy of 'one Palestinian, one bullet.'

Figure 122: Guardian (16 December)



At the same time, references to Israeli non-elite victims of violence are technical and laconic. That militants "*spray* settlers' cars with bullets" or are "*directing* gunfire against the Jewish settlement of Gilo" (my emphasis), shifts attention from the victims to the

bullets' mode of delivery. Indeed, *these* victims have a near invisible presence in the article.

In line with RT, one of the two images of armed Palestinians in the *Guardian* during the *entire* month are included in this article (with the other image showing a knife). These images do not aim to criticise Palestinian violence, but to 'expose' how Israel duped these militants. There are no images of armed Palestinians in the *Independent*.

Figure 123: Guardian (16 December)



8.3 Peacemaking with the demon

“They have killed everything, there will be no Christmas this year in Bethlehem”

(*Guardian*, 5 December)

“This is the worst Christmas since the birth of Jesus Christ”

(Headline, *Independent*, 23 December)

As above, Barak and Clinton appear in the reports as trying to trap Arafat into a peace deal which is war by other means. One *Guardian* opinion piece even implicitly concedes with the PA’s propaganda that Israel was conspiring to destroy the al-Aqsa Mosque (18 December).¹⁹³ Such a myriad of views about the peace talks drove Robert Malley, an American negotiator at Camp David (July 2000), to write a *New York Times* article titled “Fictions About the Failure at Camp David” (8 July, 2001):

“...if unchallenged, their [the talks’] respective interpretations will gradually harden into divergent versions of reality and unassailable truths – that Yasir Arafat is incapable of reaching a final agreement, for example, or that Israel is intent on perpetuating an oppressive regime.”

However, in the *Guardian* and the *Independent* such “unassailable truths” were already ‘hardening’ even before the talks ended. For example, a *Guardian* opinion piece titled “Why peace processes are breaking down all over,” notes the propensity of peace processes, with an emphasis on the conflict, to become the “continuation of war by other means” (21 December). A week later, the *Guardian* quotes Yasser Abed Rabbo as follows “The offer we have is not an opportunity but a trap. It is very far from the principles of the peace process and the principles of negotiation” (28 December). A first page *Guardian* headline the next day called the peace talks a “bluff” (December 29), and an *Independent* article from that day opens with “It was the year the lies ran out,” saying that “It was a year of illusions” (Robert Fisk, 29 December).

¹⁹³ For example, Arafat remarked that “They [Israel] want to wipe out our existence on our land... to obliterate and destroy our holy places and to Judaize our Jerusalem” (Budd, 2012:85; BBC, 26 May 2001). The *Independent* (26 December 2000) reports that Saddam Hussein “accused Israel of defiling Muslim and Christian sanctuaries and of trying to exterminate Palestinians, with the help of the US.”

Figure 124: The Guardian (29 December)



In Fisk's article, phrases such as "sort of sovereignty" or the "peace process" written in scare quotes, imagine naïve PA officials outsmarted by cunning forces. Earlier in the coverage, the *Guardian* reported that Hanan Ashrawi was "...accusing the Israelis of trying to dictate the peace" (July 20), and the *Independent* quotes "Palestinian negotiators" "accusing the Israeli side of bad faith" (December 23). Arafat's spokesman, Marwan Kanafi, is quoted in the *Guardian* as saying "This is another trick that we have been suffering for the last seven years" (1 December) and Marwan Barghouti is quoted as saying that "The US proposals were Israeli ideas in disguise," while Clinton's ideas meant maintaining the occupation (*Guardian*, 27 December). Other 'exposing' headlines include "Wheels come off a golden carriage that was always just a pumpkin" (*Independent*, 26 July), or "Circus comes to the President's woodland retreat" (*Independent*, 11 July). On 20 December the *Independent* presented the Oslo Accords as an unforgivable flaw of Shimon Peres, and on 18 December it referred to the Accords as "the so-called Oslo peace process." Robert Fisk (*Independent*, 29 December), in an article headed "Sham summit promised little for the Palestinians," writes that:

the Americans insisted that the latest Clinton proposals would give Mr Arafat 95 per cent. But careful reading of the Clinton document proves that to be untrue... Arafat was still likely to get no more than 64 or 65 per cent.

However, Clinton's parameters were *not* published at the time and were probably not 'read carefully.'¹⁹⁴ The parameters (far from Barak's offer in July 2000¹⁹⁵) *open* by stating that "the solution should be in the mid-90%'s, between 94-96% of the West Bank territory of the Palestinian State."¹⁹⁶ Another *Independent* article (23 July) falsely claims that the talks' "deceptive language" meant that the negotiations were over a Palestinian "autonomy" or "implied sovereignty," *not* full statehood status. Yet the PA's assumed gullibility also assumes it is incapable of doing "careful" (*Independent*, 29 December) reading for itself. The quotes above by PA officials like Barghouti, Abed Rabbo, Arafat's spokesman or Ashrawi, also beg asking: do liberal newspapers always print unquestionably self-serving statements by politicians? Such mock reverence also finds Arafat's 35 years-long leadership to be 'noble,' regardless of whether he takes the path of painful compromises or violence?

An *Independent* cartoon (27 July) shows Barak and Bill Clinton 'washing their hands' from the talks using Arafat's kuffiya (headgear) as a towel, with Arafat himself stuck in the toilet seat and UN resolutions 242 and 338 written on torn toilet paper.

¹⁹⁴ As noted elsewhere in the *Independent* itself: "Mr Clinton's guidelines have not yet been published" (29 December).

¹⁹⁵ Newman (2002) notes that understandings regarding borders included "approximately 90 percent of the West Bank, including the Jordan Valley region in the east..." and some minor territorial compensations.

¹⁹⁶ Peters and Newman (2012:440).

Figure 125: Cartoon, *Independent* (27 July)




However, following his visit to Ireland and involvement in the Good Friday Agreement, Clinton was also described through such *headlines* wording as “guardian of peace process,” “brave peacemaker” (*Guardian* 12 December), “Clinton cheers” (*Guardian* 13 December) and an “Irish hero” (headline, *Guardian* 13 December). Clinton the peacemaker who is “bigger than the Pope” (as quoted in the *Independent*, 12 December)—when contaminated by the demonic Israeli forces—was turned into an agent of race wars and an illegal occupation. *Figures 128* and *129* depict these tensions between Clinton’s “uncertain” (29 December) and ‘heroic’ legacy.

Figure 126: Guardian (13 December)



Figure 127: Independent (29 December)



In line with RT, the Arab, as the ambivalent Other, *also* appears hostile to peacemaking, albeit in different ways. The Palestinian peace camp is omitted, as are non-elite Palestinians who supported a peace deal, and key peacenik Palestinian elites (such as Hanan Ashrawi, Abed Rabbo or Mustafa Barghouti) are quoted virtually *only* when lambasting the peace talks. These key figures are virtually never quoted referring to the ample opportunities for non-elite Palestinians that could come from a future peace deal. In such RT formulation, the subaltern is rendered inaudible apart from her role in voicing serviceable Eurocentric narratives regarding the inevitable abyss of local 'tribal' conflicts. As McGarry (2007) remarks on Bhabha's notion of colonial Mimicry, "suppressed groups find their identities constructed on their behalf, compelling them to enact the roles attributed to them by their imperial masters."

8.3.1 *Apartheid and Nazi analogies*

A string of articles equates Israeli peacemaking with South Africa's Apartheid, and even with Nazi crimes. Terms such as "Bantustans," "cantons" "chokehold," and "lebensraum" (see below), were meant to 'expose' Israel's peace effort as a plan of destruction and a race war. For example:

Israel offered them much less – a demilitarised statelet that would have been broken up into cantons, held in an economic chokehold by Israel, and deprived of strategically crucial chunks of Arab land now occupied by Jewish settlements (*Independent*, 1 December)

On 16 December the *Independent* warns that "Mr Arafat's statelet is born a mutant" and on 8 July Fisk warns against an Israeli ploy of endless negotiations, "By which time, there may not be much of Palestine left to negotiate." Matthew Engel (*Guardian*, 5 December) writes on "reminders, again and again" of the analogy between Israel and South Africa's Apartheid. For example:

The analogy with South Africa can be pushed too far. But the belief that black South Africans could be confined to separate Bantustans, delineated on a map drawn up for the whites' convenience, was catastrophic for the notion that the whites had any honourable intentions (*Guardian*, 5 December).

In the same article, Engel also compared Israel with Nazi Germany, referring to a previous online article (28 November¹⁹⁷) in which he wrote "They [settlers] are even more palpably an arrogant and immoral attempt at gaining lebensraum [Nazi concept of 'living space'], which should be abhorrent to Jews above all people". In the print version, Engel regrets this comment—while cynically repeating it—with the immediate qualification that "Jewish suffering [in the Holocaust] can be made to justify Jewish oppression [of Palestinians]," thus suggesting a supposed Jewish abuse of the Holocaust (see section 6.3).

Nonetheless, Engel finds 'Arabs' to be "predators" against which Israel must "safeguard its people and defend" from. Also, "to have any meaning, Israel [*not* Palestine] has to have moral authority." "Moral authority," it seems, is not the yardstick with which to

¹⁹⁷ The article's headline reads: "Israel is defending the indefensible: The settlements policy is immoral and should be abhorrent to Jews." Yet, the corresponding proposition that, say, the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan should be abhorrent to Christians, would be meaningless: 'We do not need telling and We should not be pigeonholed by religion.'

evaluate the Arab, while Our “meaning” and “moral authority” are naturalised as the baseline for others.

To clarify, it is difficult to see how Palestinians during the 2000s (let alone under Netanyahu’s governments since 2009), *would not* make the Israel-Apartheid comparison. Indeed, a line of prominent Israelis do too. Assassinations, dual legal system, arbitrary arrests,¹⁹⁸ house demolitions (see footnote 160), curfews, an Escher-like system of exclusive highways (Weizman, 2007:182; Barda, 2012) or the compounded restrictions in Hebron are but *few* examples from the early 2000s that are comparable to Apartheid. Yet the point here is not to assess whether rhetorical domains successfully ‘cross over’ (Johnson, 2007) from one conflict to another.¹⁹⁹ There are better sources for the study of Israel’s many failings than the *Guardian* and the *Independent*. Rather, the point here is to examine *how* the metaphor of Apartheid South Africa was used in the coverage in the light of RT and RD. In *this* narrow investigation, racism is at the core of who Israeli-Jews *are*, yet racism aimed against Israeli-Jews is seen as inconsequential. Attaching racial supremacy and arrogance to an *essentialised* Israeli-Jewish *inner character*—from 5,000km away—also tends to historic notions regarding chosenness and particularism: ‘They reject Our message of universal equality since They only care only for their own (see above).’ Or ‘They see harming non-Jewish others as morally permissible while We treat to all of humanity equally.’ Echoing Jewish exceptionalism, Israeli-Jewish criminality appears exceptional and singular: *only* Israeli-Jews are suited to the Apartheid analogy. As above, the community doing the outcasting constructs itself as virtuous and exempt altogether from being analogised with Apartheid.

At the same time, the a priori suggestion that Israeli violence is solely motivated by race politics and *not* by elite Arab violence is problematic given the ANC’s *late* turn to *limited* violence against infrastructure, military targets and symbols of white supremacy (e.g., Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014:914). Also problematic is the comparison between persecuted Jews between the 1880s and 1940s, and the *prototype* colonial movement lead by white

¹⁹⁸ The Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association finds that more than 800,000 Palestinians were arrested by Israel since 1967. See also B’tselem (e.g., July 2011,) or UNICEF (February 2013) reports on Palestinian children imprisoned by Israel.

¹⁹⁹ For example, in my interviews with two former B’tselem’s directors, Yizhar Be’er and Jessica Montell (August 2008), both felt uneasy with the comparison but could point to it in specific examples.

supremacists, such as Cecil Rhodes.²⁰⁰ Here, seeing both Israeli-Jews as embodying the wrongs We cannot face in Ourselves, and Palestinian elites as unknowing and helpless, inflates Our role as blameless saviours.

Accordingly, racism among Palestinians is temporarily and magnanimously tolerated given Their ‘baby-steps’ progress in adopting Our values of anti-racism. Projected with Our unattainable high ideals, racism by Palestinians is both a taboo and an assumed given: implicit complete sameness (‘like Us, Palestinians support anti-racism and equality’) overlaps with complete difference (‘all Arabs are racists’).

Finally, the notion that the *Jewish* state is an ethnocracy (Yiftachel, 2006) is in itself useful and descriptive. Yet, it is problematic when used to construct a diverse population as beset by racism so to infer on Us as inclusive and tolerant. Moreover, inline with RT, the reduction of Jewish ethnocentrism to an exceptional blight to humanist values occludes the role of Christianity in national polity (can Italy be ‘not Christian? Can Britain?) while *already* being reproachful towards the role of religion in Arab states (not withholding Palestine under the PLO or Hamas).

Thus, Israel’s violence—including air bombings, assassinations, arbitrary arrests or road blocks—is thus seen as self-evidently a race war while violence against Israel is seen self-evidently to be concocted and fictitious, or “security concerns” (in scare quotes) as “the stuff of science fiction” (*Guardian*, July 14). In contrast, British violence—including air bombings, assassinations, arbitrary arrests or road blocks—is seen as self-evidently ‘not racist.’ Indeed, Nazism and Apartheid are not accidental metaphors. Rather they represent categorisations reflecting Our recent, formative history defined by our fight against both. Appropriately, Gil Anidjar’s proposes that the U.S. and Britain’s involvement in Iraq (2003) *should not* be exempt from being considered as a race war (talk at SOAS, 29 October 2013).

The Apartheid analogy *is*, then, useful when afflicting comfortable Israelis and comforting afflicted Palestinians (to paraphrase Dunne, 1902). However, it is unhelpful

²⁰⁰ Not to say that European Jews in the 19th century were not Eurocentric or Whitecentric.

when it imagines a Savage who is barely human, a Saviour representing gold-plated moral standards and a Victim who is instrumentally tolerated ‘for now.’

Lastly, giving that almost half of Israeli-Jews *are* Arabs, or considering the none-segregationist reality in Israeli hospitals or universities, repetitive claims such as “Palestinians feel the heat as police enforce beach apartheid” (*Guardian* headline, 3 June 2000)²⁰¹ are indeed problematic. I thus wish to suggest the notion of *Aparthood* (*Apart-hood*), or simply translating “heid” (Afrikaans) to English. The aim of this proposed term is to address the *daily* reality felt by Palestinians—including tanks, curfews, military courts etc.—*without* the historic specificity of South Africa.²⁰² The emphasis here is on Israel’s policies of separation and the rhetoric of enmity, not on signifiers of a self-serving British saviour which bleach Britain’s own history and *race wars*, including First and Second Boer Wars and various Middle East campaigns. Being invested in praxis, not binary constructs of redemption and damnation, *Aparthood* is as relevant to race violence in Palestine as it is in, say, Western Sahara. Finally, overlooking the objections towards *Aparthood* policies *within* Israel (with central/left parties making either over 45% of the electorate, as in 2015, or over 50% as in 2012 and 2009), amounts to an anaemic solidarity and a narcissistic Saviour complex. Namely, We either save the victim or destroy the savage, mere assistance short of complete salvation, regardless of how valuable, is but a diluted compromise which stands in the way of a world modelled after Us.

8.3.2 Ahdaf Soueif’s two articles

On 18 and 19 December the *Guardian* published two lengthy, commissioned articles written by the acclaimed novelist Ahdaf Soueif (G2 section, roughly 11,000 words). While Soueif’s dedicated pro-Palestinian activism²⁰³ deserves full credit, the articles are a striking demonstration of Stefan Zweig’s allegory of a polarized world torn in half (see above). According to this separating logic of ‘Us and Them,’ even trees, taxi drivers or

²⁰¹ See also the visual, 14,800 words *Guardian* G2 article comparing Israel to Apartheid (6 February 2006).

²⁰² Yizhar Be’er, former head of B’Tselem (interview, van der Horst 21 August 2017), noted that *Aparthood* captures the intention and practice behind the term.

²⁰³ Soueif writes “Now at last I can do something; I can go see for myself, and write” (18 December), and, “I am shedding aspects of me which are superfluous to the situation... completely focused, recording, recording” (19 December).

supermarket yogurts are regimented into self-referential dualisms. Whilst Palestine is ornamentalised as the place of hagiographical innocence Israel, which does not want to be a “nation among nations,” appears as an excluded category of humanity. These binary descriptions pit, on the one hand, militarized, fanatics elites against dependent and passive women and children—and, on the other hand—elites who are passive, humane and “helpless” against non-elites who are adult male, militarized and zealot.

The point here is not that Soueif is ‘anti-Arab.’ Rather, knowing her audience (imagined as white and Christian-European), Soueif campaigns *too hard* to assert recognition of a Palestinian common humanity, already assuming *it might not be there to begin with*. For example, descriptions of children’s playfulness, school pick-up times, girls’ infatuations or stories of generosity and hospitality are placed, it seems, to dispel preexisting prejudices: ‘Palestinians, evidence shows, are human after all.’ While Soueif’s writing is impressive, her eagerness to dispel essentialisms about *the* Orient ends up summoning new determinisms which, too, beget being explained and redeemed (see Young, 2004:170). For example, Soueif tackles such Oriental clichés as corruption in the PA, or the use of children in the violence by Palestinian militants, but with virtually no context or analysis.

At the same time Soueif’s depiction of Israeli-Jews is alarming. For example, the page 2 headline (18 December) opens with:

“I have never, to my knowledge, seen an Israeli except on television. I have never spoken to one. I cannot say I have wanted to.”

This long headline ends with:

“I have longed to go to Palestine...”


The image under this headline shows the Allenby Bridge into Israel with the sign “STOP; BORDER AHEAD,” demarcating people like Us and people like Them (see *Figure 130*). Inside the article, Soueif repeats her disdain for *non-elite* Israelis as a whole, for example:

“Soon I will have to try to meet some Israelis.”

“Maybe there are cafés in West Jerusalem or Tel Aviv where intellectuals, artists, people, sit around... films, recitals, cabarets. I consider taking a taxi and simply buying a ticket. But even the thought makes me uneasy.”

“There are some good Israelis, Rita says, people of conscience... Are you in touch with them? “Not any more.” We realised they would go so far and no further.”

Figure 128: *Guardian* (18 December)



This framing of Us and Them is repeated in the articles' rich imagery. While ten images depict Palestinian women and children, and eight images depict army and soldiers (counting up to two themes in every single image), only one image shows Palestinian men (praying at the al-Aqsa Mosque) and *no* images show Palestinian militants or Israeli women. There is one image of an Israeli child, albeit a highly negative one, showing a

girl posing next to a tank (see above) and Israeli women are mentioned in passing in only three sentences throughout both articles. These dualisms of good/bad, civilian/military, child/adult, woman/man are consistent throughout the articles. *Chart 15* notes all the appearances of Palestinians and Israelis as polar opposites in the section titled “Monday” (2,088 words).

Chart 15. Appearances of Palestinians and Israelis in one section (18 December)

The Israeli-Jew

“Israeli soldiers... their eyes behind shades, their faces behind machine-guns and above them two crossed Israeli flags: one fluttering in the breeze, the other caught in some spike of machinery and lying limp.”

“...woman in army uniform”

“A polite young Israeli”

“...five soldiers armed with machine-guns.”

“...three armed soldiers. One stands up and blocks my path”

“...local men from the administration”

The Palestinian-Arab

“a row of bedouin women walking elegantly along a ridge”

“our driver makes [helpful] inquiries”

“woman with whom I’ve shared the taxi”

“small daughter ...called Malak – Angel”

“Angel’s mother”

“Umm Angel (Angel’s mother)”

“An orthodox priest in black robes”

“An exhausted woman”

“two women and a red-haired child”

“small grocers, hairdressers”

“Girls in school uniform and headscarves... chatting, laughing. Boys loiter”

–

“A small boy, maybe four years old [chants]... ya Saddam, come and blow up Tel Abeebe”

“...the women come out of prayers... They want to know if I have somewhere to stay, otherwise any one of them will take me home”

“...Umm Yaser’s home. Her two young daughters-in-law are both students. They whisper and laugh together over their books.”
“[settlers] pick quarrels with the young people”

“That day my son was playing football and the ball hit one of them [the settlers]... Two hundred of them came...”

“At the [the Israeli] Hadasa hospital they would not treat us...”

“rubber bullets which the Palestinian children peel to extract the steel marble within, which they then aim back at the soldiers with their slingshots”

“78-year-old neighbour”

“...young Jewish men in black clothes”
“...mild-looking man wearing a yarmulke and leading two children... children chanting in Hebrew”

“a man at a stall... He finds a chair for me and places a glass of water on the ground at my side.”

“army car and... soldiers”

“Two young men” [saying that Palestinians are] “mice in a trap”

“news comes through of five workers killed by settlers. A sixth man had managed to get away.”²⁰⁴

“[ambulances] stopped by the army”

“Everybody in the shop has stopped in mid-motion and is watching the [TV] set.”

“someone’s wife wails on the screen”

Soon I will have to try to meet some Israelis.

Thus, the “Israeli soldiers... their eyes behind shades, their faces behind machine-guns” are contrasted with “a row of bedouin women walking elegantly along a ridge” and a woman and her “small daughter ...called Malak – Angel.” In another example, an Israeli flag “caught in some spike of machinery and lying limp” is contrasted with “Girls in school uniform and headscarves... chatting, laughing. Boys loiter.” Soueif’s separated

²⁰⁴ B’Tselem (<https://www.btselem.org/statistics>) note three incidents of settlers killing Palestinians in 2000, two in October and one in November.

moral universe also splits inanimate objects into opposing camps. The settler's house is "bare and functional"; two Israeli buildings are "modern, precise, their angles are sharp, they fly the Israeli flag, and they are the only ones with closed gates that are made of steel bars"; the border terminal has "rubber plants and plastic flowers droop from dusty glass shelves"; and the Israeli flag is "the white flag with blue star." One appearance applies an Apartheid-like separating logic to yogurts:

"Every pot of yoghurt I pick up is labelled in Hebrew only. "Don't you have any Palestinian yoghurt?" I ask and the man ushers me to another refrigerator."

In contrast, Palestinian physical environments are described as enclaves of virtuous, solemn humanity, for example, "Through a green iron door I step into paradise... trellises with vines, doorways that the old man opens with big keys and that lead into vaulted chambers where ancient Sufis meditated and prayed to be vouchsafed a vision"; "jars of water and dates"; "wide-open doors and an inviting garden; there is a smell of roasting coffee"; "delicate drawings of flowers and birds"; "I sit on a low stone wall under the open sky... and sense utter peace"; "Ornate stone balconies ...the air is clean and fresh, the light is so perfect we could be on a film set."

While these dualisms attempt to generalize Palestinian suffering as part of *the* human condition (read, Our human story), localized, temporal or internal politics and power structures are omitted, so as not to dull this universalised narrative. Consequentially, soft-footing around the PA's wrongdoing marks it in absence: a gaze which looks anywhere apart from at the thing itself. For example, the sentence "Every car I pass [in Jerusalem] I imagine exploding into flames," begets asking whether these Israeli cars explode by themselves? Who is targeted by these explosions, for what political purpose, under what ideology, and using whose resources?

Hence, in 11,000 words the keyword "Arafat" appears only once (quoted in an Israeli newspaper), and the seven appearances of the term "Palestinian Authority" are all uncritical. The appearance "[F]or the past two months Birah and Ramallah have been shelled every night from Psagot," glosses over Palestinian militants shooting at Gilo and Psagot (see above).

Another example of RD and RT from Soueif's articles is the suggestion that Israel planned to destroy the al-Aqsa mosque, e.g.:

"...he prays for al-Aqsa itself. Again and again he implores God to protect it from the plots being woven against it, again and again the women's voices from the Dome and the men's voices from al-Aqsa rise: Amen."

And:

"She talks of the threat to her mosque..."

An allegorical appearance quotes a driver:

"now with the curfew this old man who has prayed in it every day of his life cannot set foot in it?"

These appearances in the *Guardian* thus naturalise the circulation of conspiratorial suspicions regarding Israel's "plots." Yet were such fears regarding the al-Aqsa Mosque not generated by local elites to mobilise the al-Aqsa *Intifadah* in the first place (Harel and Isacharoff, 2004, see also Rothchild, 1981:99)?²⁰⁵

Soueif also interviews Marwan Barghouti, then the leader of the Tanzim, Fatah's military wing.²⁰⁶ Presented as the "chief executive officer of Fatah," Barghouti's role is immediately depoliticized. Apparently, Barghouti is "on the streets with the shabab (youth)" and he "formed the People's Watch, groups in each village" in order to "defend the villagers against the settlers." Yet the Tanzim is not a youth nor a civilian organisation, nor is it purely defensive or limited to small villages (Weinberg and Pedahzur, 2003:99). Indeed, two days earlier, the *Guardian* reported that the Tanzim owned 70,000 guns (16 December). On 29 December the *Guardian* simply called the Tanzim the "youth wing" of Fatah. The keyword "Tanzim" does not appear at all in the *Independent* during December. In the *Guardian* it appears in only three other articles.²⁰⁷

Nonetheless, the interview *does* criticize Marwan Barghouti, though only within the familiar frame of Orientalist chauvinism, honor and shame. This text reads:

²⁰⁵ As opposed to the early 2000s, movements such as Temple Mount Faithful are gaining increased following (see Inbari, 2009).

²⁰⁶ Barghouti is imprisoned by Israel since 2002.

²⁰⁷ The keyword "Tanzim" appears zero times in the *Guardian* between 1998 and October 2000, 58 times between October and December 2000, 8 times during 2001 and 38 between 2002 and 2010. An increase in violence thus correlates with a reduction in appearances.

“He points at a poster of Muhammad al-Durra and says: “We need to get away from the image of the Palestinian as a victim. This is a better poster,” pointing at a poster of a child confronting a tank.

I say: “That kid was killed two days later.”²⁰⁸

He says: “Yes.”

I wonder whether there is space to get out of the “victim” frying-pan without falling in to the “fanatical Islamic terrorist” fire.” The margin is terribly narrow.

And:

The man insists: “You have to stop him [Barghouti’s “16-year-old son” from clashing with Israeli forces].” And for a moment the militia leader looks helpless: “I can’t,” he says. “How can I?”

For Barghouti, then, Palestinian children *should* clash with the Israeli army and not be ‘meek’ victims, even if they may die in the process. At the same time, it is the Fatah strongman who, beyond the bravado, quickly appears “helpless,” while, in a contrastive choice of wordings and imagery, Israeli forces *bait* Palestinian children into mortal danger. In line with RT, Soueif’s “terribly narrow” margins between the Arab as an absolute “victim” *and* an absolute “terrorist,” teases out the Palestinian as the ambivalent deviant: ‘like Us’ (“victim”) but ‘not quite’ (“terrorist”). Another utterance from the article repeats the theme of soldiers luring and shooting children, it goes:

“I have seen women pushing their sons behind them, shoving them to run away, screaming at the soldiers: “Get out of our faces. Stop baiting the kids”
(*Guardian*, 19 December)

While I had to edit out the chapter dealing with children victims of violence, appearances during December reflect RD and RT. For example, utterances displaying eroded empathy and soft-footing criticism in regard to children include:

“... two Israeli settlers have been killed, and five children severely injured, when a Palestinian roadside bomb blew up a school bus about a mile up the road - the main north-south route in the 40-mile strip” (*Independent*, 7 December)

“A few miles away, Palestinian gunmen fired at an Israeli school bus. None of the children was hurt, the Israeli army said” (*Independent*, 14 December, last sentence of the article)

²⁰⁸ This poster could be of the 14-years-old Faris Odeh (photographed 29 October 2000) who was shot by Israeli forces on 8 November 2000.

“[An Israeli settler saying] Those children on the bus - I pray that God will never ask me to pay such a terrible price. But if He does, I shall pay it” (*Guardian*, 19 December)

Utterances displaying bottomless, scorched earth criticism regarding children include:

“... heavily armed Israeli soldiers shooting stone-throwing Palestinian adolescents” (*Independent*, 1 December)

“Why is it necessary, even allowing for the necessity of the defence of Israeli citizens, to shoot these misguided kids dead?” (*Independent*, 1 December)

“[British demonstrator] We believe they are supporting a system that justifies killing children and that this is morally wrong” (*Independent*, 10 December)

“Israel’s brutal response—the live-firing at child stone-throwers, the Israeli snipers picking off protestors from rooftops—provoked the Palestinians to abandon stones for guns” (*Independent*, 29 December)


“[Israel’s] military flails away in a war against schoolboys...” (*Guardian*, 29 December)

“Let them shoot me. Am I worth more than any of these youngsters?” (*Guardian*, 19 December)

“...evidence of shells and mortars on the building surrounding the square... Doctor’s clinics, toyshops, a hairdresser: rubble, soot, shattered glass and pockmarks” (*Guardian*, 18 December).

Finally, as seen in the demonstration placard in *Figure 131*, where They, Israeli-Jews, support “oppression,” We support “freedom” (the Iraq sanctions notwithstanding²⁰⁹).

Figure 129: Independent (10 December)



²⁰⁹ See footnote 176.

In the same breath, and as discussed above, bottomless reverence towards the Arab as ‘children of the desert’ (Said, 1978), finds Them picturesque and dangerous in equal measure. Examples from Soueif’s articles include:

“A small boy, maybe four years old [chants]... ya Saddam, come and blow up Tel Abeeb [Tel-Aviv]” (18 December).

“The shabab [youth] chant of the Prophet’s victory against the Jews at Khaybar in the 7th century” (19 December).

“As prayers end, groups of young men and boys start gathering there. But there the army and police are solidly waiting and everyone knows that if one stone hits that wall someone will be shot. But the shabab (youth) are in the grip of fervour and a man who some say is a “Fatah element” starts yelling Hamas slogans and, playing Pied Piper, leads them away... to the relative safety... There they stop” (19 December).

It is the “boy,” “youth” and “boys” who chant “blow up [Tel Aviv],” who yell Hamas’ slogans (“Khaybar”) and who reach the boiling point (“fervor”) of violence. At the same time, Palestinian *elites* (“Fatah”) stir the eruptive youth away from the fanatic Israeli-Jews (“if one stone hits that wall...”). Kipling’s formulation of “Half-devil and half-child” comes to mind (from “The White Man’s Burden,” 1899). It reads:

Take up the White Man’s burden –
Send forth the best ye breed –
Go bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives’ need;
To wait in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild –
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half-devil and half-child.

It is Our paternalistic burden to uplift these less civilized, “half-child” Others. Yet, We already know from the start that those Others are bound to fall back to Their old ways, being also “half-devil”.

In a chapter dealing with the 2006 Lebanon war, and edited out due to lack of space, I further examine *Guardian* representations of children victims of violence in Lebanon, Gaza and Israel as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan (July-August 2006). To give but one

example, *Figure 132* (*Guardian*, 22 March 2003) is the first of *any* Iraqi non-elite persons in the 2003 Iraq war. It appears three days after the war broke out, on page seven. Called a “Desert dweller” in the heading, the boy “...offers a packet of cigarettes to soldiers on a passing US army convoy...” (caption). This ridicule of Iraqis continues in the adjacent headlines “[B]unkers feel the power of the navy’s big guns” and “[D]ealing with the hard reality that conflicts cost lives.” Here, Iraqi casualties are dehumanized (bunkers do not “feel”) while, the article dealing with the “reality that conflicts cost lives,” cynically reflects solely on the lives of British troops, not of Iraqi civilians.

Figure 130: Guardian (22 March 2003)

Desert dweller Watching American troops roll towards Baghdad

A boy offers a packet of cigarettes to soldiers on a passing US army convoy as troops crossed from Kuwait to the southern deserts of Iraq. Photograph: Ka Pflaiberg/Reuters

Bunkers feel the power of the navy's big guns

Jamie Wilson
on HMS Marlborough

It took only 20 seconds for HMS Marlborough's main gun to fire 10 rounds at the Iraqi bunker complex six miles away on the Faw peninsula. The shock wave of each high explosive round exiting the barrel might have shaken the 3,500 tonne ship to the core, but it was nothing to the effect the shells had when they hit their target 25 seconds later.

Moments after the final shell had reached its destination the radio on the bridge crackled in silence. "Total mission, good shooting," said the Royal Artillery spotter on the ground who had ordered the strike on the bunker. "Enemy positions thoroughly neutralised," he added.

Exactly how many Iraqi casualties the salvo inflicted nobody on the ship yet knows, but those soldiers who survived the white-hot razor-sharp shrapnel were in no doubt they did not want to go through the experience again. Minutes later the artillery spotter was back on the radio. "Possible white flags being raised," he reported.

The first round, fired at 0720am, had landed 400 yards short. The spotter had purposefully called the strike in short to give those in the bunker a chance to surrender.

After the next three shots had been "switched" progressively closer, and with still no sign of submission despite a misfire that had given those inside the bunker a few precious extra minutes, the spotter had asked for the full force of the warship to be released.

It was a story that was repeated several times yesterday on the Faw peninsula, as the Royal Navy ships Marlborough, Chatham and Richmond

and the Australian frigate Anzac unleashed a barrage of fire. By the end of the morning not only was the bunker system in ruins, but a large military installation on the southern tip of the peninsula also appeared to have been destroyed.

The invasion of Faw had begun on Thursday night when US navy Seals secured the Kuwaiti at Amara and Mina al Bahr oil terminals, which had been used to supply the UN oil for food programme. The first coalition boat landed on Iraqi soil moments later as members of the Royal Marines Bravo Company captured the oil pumping station on the mainland that piped oil to the terminals.

As they bunkered down to wait for support, helicopter troop carriers containing the other three companies of 40 Commando Royal Marines were already in the air from Viking, the code name for their base in Kuwait, while smaller units were deploying from the aircraft carriers Ocean and Ark Royal, both of which had moved up into the waters of the northern Gulf.

The peninsula, a flat, featureless wasteland of mud, sand and a thick jungle of date palms, is roughly five miles wide and 10 miles long. To the west, across the Kuwait al-Ah river is Kuwait; to the east the Shatt al Arab waterway and the border with Iran.

Strategically it has been vital to the Iraqi regime and it is the country's only route to the sea and a conduit for smuggling oil and drugs. On Tuesday the Iraqi military had seized the Mina al Bahr terminal and ejected the five UN workers who remained, raising fears among the coalition's military leaders that Saddam Hussein was planning to blow up the terminals, in an attempt to release thousands of gallons of oil into the sea around the Gulf.

The operation to take down the terminal was vital. Few Iraqis were killed and 13 were captured during Bravo Company's operation to take the pumping station, while no marines were injured.

Dealing with the hard reality that conflicts cost lives

War briefing
Timothy Garden

The reality of war is that it is about people dying. As the news comes in of the first casualties, the politicians rehearse their messages of sympathy to the families of those killed. The remarks are undoubtedly sincerely meant, but are scarcely listened to by the wider public, and the families have much grieving ahead.

In the military we are used to handling unexpected death, in peace as well as in war. Exercises, training and operations are always hazardous, and anyone who has spent time in the modern armed forces will have lost friends and colleagues. Like everything else in military life, there is a well tried system for managing such tragic events.

The most urgent task is to make sure that the next of kin are told of the circumstances as quickly as possible, and certainly before the news becomes public. With distant operations and the instant media coverage, this becomes ever more difficult.

Usually a senior officer from the local unit will go to break the news in person. New arrangements for partners who are not married will ease some difficult situations.

Casualties tend to hit particular units, and the effect can be considerable. The right British marines who died in the helicopter crash in Kuwait may only be the first of such tightly knit groups to experience such a loss.

Dividing support between a difficult.

Ultimately death is something western nations have given unused to. There has been an almost perverse pride that the British are more willing to take casualties than other nations. The "body bag syndrome" was used as a term of derision for perceived US unwillingness to take casualties after the Vietnam war.

Their withdrawals from Lebanon and Somalia were cited as examples of the need for casualty-free operations. The same punditry claims that everything is different after the terror attacks on Washington and New York. America is at war and claims that it will do what is necessary regardless of the risk.

The conduct of the Afghanistan campaign did not indicate any dramatic change. We shall have to wait to see whether smaller forces, equipped with new technologies, can deliver quick victory. Few would doubt that there is a greater risk of taking casualties with such an approach.

Sir Timothy Garden, a former air marshal and director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is visiting professor at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London.

In the *Guardian* layout below, titled “The reality of war on the ground” (22 March 2003), the “reality” “Inside Iraq” is of Us being ‘humane,’ ‘victorious’ and ‘helping out.’ For example “US marines give an Iraqi soldier water; civilians caught in crossfire signal for help for their wounded... a US soldier tending a wounded Iraqi captured...”

Inside Iraq

The reality of war on the ground

Clockwise from bottom left, Iraqis with their hands on their heads surrender to British marines in southern Iraq; US marines give an Iraqi soldier water; civilians caught in crossfire signal for help for their wounded; prisoners in handcuffs under escort and surrendering on their knees to a British marine; and a US soldier tending a wounded Iraqi captured as marines took control of an oil pumping station. Iraqi soldiers' faces have been obscured in accordance with the Geneva convention. Photographs: AP/Pool; Itaso Inouye/AP; Desmond Boyland/Reuters; AP/Pool; Mark Auerbach/Agence France Press

How many stories can I tell? How many can you read? In the end they all point in the same direction. Every Palestinian I meet tells me the same thing: what Israel wants is a Palestine as free of Arabs as possible. This is the big push, the second instalment of 1948.

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reluctant hero”—the British Rugby Captain representing Our triumphant high-self—towers over the Arab embodied as the damsel in distress with the Israeli-Jew lurking from the text as the latter-day Nazi. Once more, We are interpolated to save from extinction others (“as free... as possible”) who mirror back Our golden standards and stamp evil wherever We find it. Right to form, the headline “Georgia leader quits in velvet coup,” repeats Rosenblum’s international news framing of coups and catastrophes (1981).

Figure 132: *Guardian promotional poster (2003)*

8.3.3 Critical Solidarity and peace reporting

Like Peace Journalism, CS also finds the Arab-Israeli peace process to be politicised and contentious. What, then, is the political project of CS given that, since 2000, the formula of land for peace had turned into a landgrab and violence? In 2018—in the wake of the horrific 2014 Gaza war, the proliferation of settlements, the rise of the Israeli nationalist right, the rise of nationalist sentiments in Europe and the US, the Hamas hold in Gaza and Isis presence in the region—is any discussion about a resolution for the conflict not simply misguided? Resoundingly not.

The various groups and projects which encompass Palestine and Israel, at times harrowing (violence, racism, ethnocentrism), and at times heart-warming (peace work, women's marches, humanitarianism) are here to stay. In examining attitudes created 5000km away, CS challenges the mindset which eternalises whole populations as being incapable of forging peace; or that 'there will never be peace there.' Understanding how generative empathy and criticism reflect on CS's tenets of *non-segmented advocacy* and *improvements without illusions* is beneficial to both peace reporting and peace thinking/acting alike.

A key series of studies relating to such peace thinking is by Dweck, Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski and Gross (2011), who look into the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Growth Mindset. The authors conducted four studies with Israeli-Jews (Study 1, N=500; Study 2, N=76), Palestinian citizens of Israel (Study 3, N=59), and Palestinians from the West-Bank (Study 4, N=53). Adapted from two earlier papers (Chiu, Hong, Dweck, 1997 and Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu, 1997), participants in these studies were randomly assigned an article to read that does not refer to the conflict but that portrays aggressive groups as having either a fixed nature (e.g., "[G]roups can't change their basic characteristics"), or who are open to change. Then, in ostensibly another study, participants who learned about brain plasticity had significantly more positive attitudes towards the outgroup (Palestinians or Israeli-Jews) than those in the fixed condition. These participants also had more willingness to support major compromises for peace, and the willingness to meet with the other side and hear their point of view on the conflict (a specific feature of Study 4). The authors write:

In thinking that groups have the potential to become better, adversaries may be more likely to bypass fixed, global, negative judgments—judgments that delegitimize or dehumanize each other—even when they have a long history of mutual animosity (2011:2).

Echoing the analysis above into RD and RT, Dweck et al. show the negative effects of seeing others as having “fixed traits.” Those who understood wrongdoing as emanating from a fixed Nature favoured solutions involving “punishment and retaliation” (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu, 1997). In contrast, those who believed that others are susceptible to change were “less likely to recommend punishment for a wrongdoer,” and more likely to recommend negotiation or education (Chiu, Hong, Dweck, 1997; Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu, 1997). As opposed to seeing others as either ‘like Us’ or as ‘anything but Us,’ the focus here moves to altering the “motivations or situations” of the negative behaviour (Dweck et al., 2011). This dispelling of distrust and animosity with minor interventions highlights the potential of promoting a Growth Mindset and explaining the harm of a Fixed Mindset in relation to the coverage of the conflict.

Another example for CS’s potential for peace thinking can be seen with Omer and Alon’s “tragic view,” as an “antidote to the demonic view” (2006:14). This perspective is not relevant to only to peace reporting, but also to neo-liberal mediated attitudes which tend to contrast heroes and villains. The tragic view replaces endemic suspicion and eroded empathy with compassion, constructive acceptance and the assumption that “suffering is inseparable from life” and that it “does not require an explanation in terms of an external specific cause” (Omer and Alon, 2006:14). The tragic view rejects the *demonic cycle* of total innocence, perverting external forces, exorcism and a return to purity. Instead, self-reflexivity, rejecting perfectionism, accepting bad circumstances or understanding the errors of the other side as a growing snowball (with every roll adding more wrongdoing and hatred) that can be layered off; these can be applied to *reduce* the conflict, even if not to solving it completely.

9. CONCLUSION

While there are thousands of studies about topics such as anti-Arab racism, anti-Jewish racism, the Arab-Israeli conflict, post-coloniality, or racism in the news, this study is unique since it explores the small segment where they all overlap. Accordingly, this research is not a study of the conflict *per se*, but an investigation into Europe's long-range vectors of attachments about it. This work thus asks how does the British left *imagines itself* when addressing the Arab and Jew through issues such as human rights, international law, just war, colonialism, political activism and racism.

Looking into anti-Arab and anti-Jewish racisms in tandem (e.g., Anidjar 2003, 2007; Kalmar and Penslar, 2005; Boyarin, 2009) this work hopes to shed light on how both historic prejudices are implicated through a unified system of racialisation in both newspapers. This study proposes both static (historic) and dynamic (ongoing) explanations. Historic explanations include Saidian Orientalism and Islamophobia (e.g., Said, 1978; Sardar, 1999; Allen, 2010), Eurocentrism (e.g., Hall, 1997; Shohat and Stam, 1994), white-centrism (e.g., Dyer, 1997), Christian anti-Semitism (e.g., Cohen, 1993) and ethnicisation (Rothchild, 1981). Dynamic explanations look into everyday racism (Essed, 1991), cultural racism (Blaut, 1992) and everyday interactions such as Group Focused Enmity (Küpper and Zick, 2014), psychodemonisation (Alon and Omer, 2006), the Lucifer Effect (Zimbardo, 2007), zero-degree empathy (Baron-Cohen, 2011) or empathy as being biased and misconstrued (Bloom, 2016). Such static and dynamic factors continuously pulsate forwards and backwards, they are never either 'on' or 'off.'

This study also challenges the preconceptions that forms of racism exist only on the far right, that they are full of intent, limited only to exceptional harm or that they are tied to 'race' as a biological attribute. Instead, this work proposes a more nuanced reflection in which racialised utterances can be unconscious, structural, bequeathed by social norms, small-scale, implicit or the result of ignorance. Moreover, forms of racialisations can also be "well meaning" (Trepagnier, 2006), sympathetic (Said, 1978:121) and quasi "positive" (Turner, 2002:25).

This study's main proposition examines the relationality of Racialised Toleration (RT) towards the Palestinian Arab and Racialised Demonisation (RD) towards the Israeli-Jew.

This study suggests the notion of Critical Solidarity (CS) as an integrated model where a) critical awareness of power structures makes empathy with non-elites generative, instead of anaemic and ineffective, and b) empathy with non-elites makes critical awareness of power structures more generative instead of ‘scorched earth.’ Such thinking about elites and non-elites through a healthy *discomfort with all power structures on all sides* and a *non-segmented advocacy of human worth* destabilises the formulation of criticism=bad, and (nominal) empathy=good. This work thus presents a theorem in which racialisations towards the Israeli-Jew as arch-conspiratorial, controlling and omnipotent, are relational to racialisations towards the Palestinian-Arab as unknowing, out of control, passive, and in need of saving. Where the former is met with scorched earth criticism which holds all in contempt, even non-elites, the latter is met with anaemic empathy and mock reverence, even towards elites. With both RT and RD amounting to degenerative empathy *and* degenerative criticism, they result in maintaining the very negative statusquo they set out to confront. At the same time, We imagine Ourselves as saviours and the standard bearers for others to follow.

Using simple content analysis of keywords’ appearances (Newsbank, 2000-2010), this study highlights a persistent unequal image between *the* conflict and other violent conflicts as well as within the conflict’s coverage itself. Here, that which was self-proclaimed as being neutral, unbiased, and representative of universal values appears as politically and historically embedded and indebted to its own parochial preconceptions. For example, Palestinians in Jordan or Palestinian peaceniks appear not to be newsworthy in either newspapers.

Chapter 9, looking into the history of the conflict, shows how, in line with RT and RD, We were persistently good, powerful, saviours, and upholding the law for Our sake and the world at large; Palestinians (and non-Palestinian Arabs) were persistently passive, irrational, incapable of organization and dependent, and; Israeli-Jews were persistently bad, powerful, possessive and relentless.

The analysis which looks into comparisons between Jews and Nazis in the coverage points to Alon and Omer’s psychodemonisation and the “law of conservation of evil” (2006:15). Here, the wrongdoing Nazis did to Jews becomes a shorthand explanation for

the wrongdoing Israeli-Jews do to Palestinians. Infected by Nazism, an infection which makes Them who They are, They then go and do to others that which was done unto Them. Nonetheless, such pop-psychology also implicates the Palestinian-Arab in this “conservation of evil”: are Palestinians also infected? Will They too do to others that which was done to them? At the same time, while the binary of absolute victim and absolute victimizer are interchangeable the category of the Saviour is constant.

The antinomies of RT and RD are also consistent in the peace chapter. While Palestinian elites are shielded from criticism during the peace talks, the Palestinian peace camps or pro-peace Palestinians were non-existent. In the same breath, mock reverence towards Palestinians as solely women and children—as passive, unknowing, on the brink of destruction but also politically immature and incapable of organization—appeared alongside omissions of Israeli-Jewish women and children despite reports of bus bombings and daily shootings.

As a final note, an issue not addressed in this study is that of anti-Zionism. Anti-Zionism from the Palestinian perspective is self-explanatory: Israeli-Jews live in areas where Palestinian towns and villages used to be. Yet anti-Zionism from the perspective of British RT and RD holds additional meanings. Seeing anti-Zionism as a pseudo state-building exercise—aimed towards a future Palestinian state, not just “pitchfork politics” (Mounk, 2014)—means the dissolution of Israeli state institutions due to Israel’s unnatural colonial beginning and poor moral credentials. However, this simplified political closure *inevitably* means naturalizing Britain’s own moral right for a nation state as unquestionable—regardless of Britain’s colonial history or moral record—while granting Palestinians a nation state on *Our* terms by temporarily putting Palestinian elites’ moral record aside, but not away. In this Janus-faced empathy, the British proclivity for state building decrees an anaemic, formalized Palestine which embodies Our own imagined high self: an exemplar of liberalism, democracy, anti-racism and anti-nationalism (values which Israeli-Jews aim to subvert). Nevertheless, even an imagined future Palestine which attains these *unachievable* standards would still be under Our endemic surveillance (see Boyarin, 2009). Simply, being ‘like Us, but not quite,’ Palestine too could be the target of yet another ‘nation un-building’ exercise, namely: anti- Palestinianism.

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