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CONTENTS

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ON MORRIS GINSBERG

Julius Gould

PROFESSOR Morris Ginsberg, the Founding Editor of this Journal, was for decades the leading British sociologist. Four years after his death Dr. Fletcher, in this commemorative volume,* has now brought together contributions by 13 of Professor Ginsberg's colleagues and associates and republished eight of Ginsberg's own papers together with a most valuable bibliography of his writings from 1914 to 1970 (prepared by Miss Angela Bullard under the aegis of Professor D. G. MacRae).

The contributions include a number of memorial essays and addresses—some of them previously published in this Journal[1]—while the two major sections deal with *philosophy and sociology* and *sociology and society*. In the former there is a clear exposition of the philosophical underpinnings of Ginsberg's thought from the pen of the late Professor H. B. Acton—stressing Ginsberg's intellectual debt not only to L. T. Hobhouse (his predecessor and mentor at the London School of Economics) but also to Henry Sidgwick; and Acton concludes with a tribute to Ginsberg's book *On Justice In Society* (1965) for its 'lack of romanticism and contrived eccentricities'. Acton comments on the rational egalitarianism which informs that book—an egalitarianism qualified by a belief in the realities of freedom and undistorted by the utopian passions for and against liberty which have abounded in political thought and practice. H. B. Rickman takes up some key questions of moral and linguistic bias in the social sciences, while Professor Bierstedt and Dr. Sklair re-examine (yet again) the idea of progress—the latter stressing the ideological uses of progress (especially what he calls 'innovational' progress) and insisting that specific problems of power and inequality cannot be dissolved by a general meliorist philosophical outlook. In the section on sociology and society there is a robust piece from Paul Halmos which flogs the irrationality of those 'critical' radicals who by 'battering society . . . claim to be bettering it'. Professor D. W. Harding neatly inverts Ginsberg's work on the

*Ronald Fletcher, ed., for the British Sociological Association, *The Science of Society and the Unity of Mankind, A Memorial Volume for Morris Ginsberg*, x + 292pp., Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1974, £6.50.

causes of war by examining the concept of peace, and Mrs. Floud pioneers an important new enquiry into the use of social background (as distinct from mental abnormality) as excuse for crime. She demonstrates that while the concept of social abnormality can be clearly described, it is hard as yet to see how it can be applied in the courts, let alone predict the political and legal consequences that might attend such application.

At a time when sociology had few practitioners in these islands—and, at times, it seemed, still fewer admirers—Morris Ginsberg, as Martin White Professor at L.S.E., pursued the discipline with a rigour and commitment uniting, by great gifts of scholarship and learning, leading strands both in the early British and the contemporary European traditions. Many of these virtues are explored by Dr. Fletcher in his introduction to this volume. It is clear that in Ginsberg's breadth of vision Fletcher sees an antidote to the narrowness which he believes disfigures contemporary British sociology (together with British universities and much else in our society). Mordant and personal though Fletcher's reflections are, they should not, by their polemical tone, deflect attention from the truth they contain, nor from a central intellectual issue that reflection on Ginsberg's life is bound to raise. That issue is more easily expressed than solved. How can one man, however gifted, grapple with the sociological dilemma? That dilemma is many-pronged. First, the subject lives by its data—by a sociography that is accurate, and in the changing world, up to date. Second, it needs concepts so that we may judge whether the data are appropriate or whether the 'right' questions are being put (and in the right way) to the material at hand. And third (though far from finally), the 'rightness' of the concepts is drawn from the framework of ideas (including moral ideas) into which, and from which, they feed. The intellectual strain set up is hard to support. Indeed, given its complexity it is both intractable and insupportable—perhaps best shared between teams of scholars yoked together by fortune or fate. In such a discipline it is hard to find a completely cumulative focus—one that is perhaps 'properly', perhaps 'narrowly', described as scientific: its frontiers with other social sciences and with history remain fluid and open: the links with philosophy are problematic but important. By many of the tests imposed by this dilemma Ginsberg's own achievement, considerable as it was, is itself problematic. He knew well how to handle certain kinds of data: his early work on anthropological material, his later brief pioneering essay on social mobility, his more frequent analyses of the social composition of Jewish communities—all show a wide-ranging skill. Yet it would not be on his role as a data collector that his major

reputation would rest. Rather it would rest—and for many critics fall—on his role as an exponent of an evolutionary tradition married to a moral concern with rationality, progress, and the unity of mankind (the latter being the subject of his famous Hobhouse Memorial Lecture) —themes which may seem too large or too vague to be 'operationalized' and which (to the hard-boiled youngsters of every generation) seem to raise 'philosophical' rather than sociological problems. Ginsberg originated no new range of concepts; he never made a song and dance about a conceptual framework. The one new term he introduced (used to good effect by subsequent writers, not all of them by any means intellectually close to its source) is that of *quasi-group*, but characteristically he did not brood upon its novelty nor exploit the concept itself in an operational as distinct from a reflective way.

The place of a subject in a country's intellectual tradition may be measured by what Edward Shils, in a distinguished paper, has called its 'institutionalization'—that is 'the relatively dense interaction of persons who perform that activity.'[2] It is well known that sociology did not become 'institutionalized' in Britain until relatively recent times: and Shils makes some pointed contrasts with the more rapid developments in the U.S.A. and within the Durkheim tradition in France. Commenting on the British 'lag' Shils observes that 'evolutionism, even of the more cautious type cultivated by Hobhouse, enjoyed little intellectual esteem at the time in British intellectual circles . . . Hobhouse's one distinguished protégé was Professor Morris Ginsberg . . . but Ginsberg was a shy person and lacked Durkheim's organizing skills'.[3] As for the evolutionary approach, its weakness has in recent years been expounded by such different writers as Robert Nisbet, Ernest Gellner, and J. D. Y. Peel,[4] and Ronald Fletcher's introduction to the commemorative volume does not, I feel, face up to the serious—as distinct from the factitious—criticisms that may be levelled at the 'evolutionary' school or schools in sociology. It is true also—to take up Edward Shils's second point—that Ginsberg could not assume the role of an academic entrepreneur and that, during the decades in which he dominated the field, his caution, soundly based on his own very exacting standards, delayed the development of a British 'school' in sociology and left it exposed—even in our own more 'institutionalized' era—to last year's novelties from Paris or Frankfurt or Southern California. The barriers to such an innovation in Britain in Ginsberg's day were beyond his control and were very strong indeed—combining wilful ignorance about sociology, insolent intellectual snobberies, and official indifference. (Yet it must be conceded that in other fields when circumstances made possible an opening and a suitable personality thrust past it, many—though not all—of the British barriers to innovation could be transcended: the success of Malinowski and his circle in social anthropology bears witness to this.)

To have fought successfully for resources in the interwar atmosphere was beyond Ginsberg's interest or power. But his contribution to the subject's survival in Britain as a moral and intellectual force—as distinct from a rag-bag journalism or a technical tool kit—was very real. Without his presence and work—to quote from Donald MacRae's memorial address (for some reason not reprinted in this volume along with four other very moving memoirs)—sociology at the L.S.E. 'would not have survived . . . and might not then have spread not only to such colleges in London as Bedford, but throughout Britain.'[5] And there is one act of 'institutionalization' for which Ginsberg could take much credit and which I have not seen mentioned. I refer to his work, along with the late Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders and Professor T. H. Marshall, in strengthening and redirecting the *Sociological Review* from about 1934 onwards—efforts which were, along with much else, to be halted by the outbreak of Hitler's war. Their intervention assuredly and immediately raised the quality of Britain's only sociological journal of that time and involved a simple (yet difficult . . .) dedication to duty. A decade and a half later, Ginsberg and Marshall, along with Professors Glass and MacRae, were to play a leading part in the creation of the new *British Journal of Sociology*.

It is right to make special reference here to Morris Ginsberg's attention to Jewish questions for it was obvious that he had a lifelong interest in Jewish history and thought. He was grounded from his youth in Talmudic learning and he had an early grasp both of Zionist classics and of the Zionist socio-political movements both in Britain and elsewhere. His attitude towards the Jewish religion was well expressed by the Liberal Rabbi, Dr. Leslie Edgar,[6] whose synagogue Ginsberg joined in the 1930s, and who is quoted by Dr. Fletcher in his introduction to this book.

> Without question, it was the universal aspects of Judaism which appealed to him—its contribution to the developing thought of mankind and to universal ethical ideals. I never knew what he thought or felt about some of the profoundest and most intimate aspects of religion . . .

While, as Rabbi Edgar points out, he never paraded his Jewish interests, his concern became more public and visible with the persecution of the Jews in Germany and elsewhere in the middle and late 1930s, and with the later development of Israel as a Jewish state. Ginsberg visited Israel in its early years and, at one time, found himself strongly pressed to join the teaching staff of the Hebrew University. His Zionist concerns were never concealed, and, on occasions, they were given moving and unusually eloquent expression. In a well-known

lecture (given in Jerusalem in 1950)[7] he reminded his hearers: 'To this audience it is not necessary to stress the power of an ideal, held with passion. "If you believe it, it is no dream", you were told. You did believe it, and it is no dream.'

It was during the Nazi period that he became very actively involved in the various non-denominational academic groupings that worked to rescue and find employment for German and other European Jewish intellectuals who came to Britain as refugees. (It is no secret that Ginsberg and his wife, though not herself Jewish by birth, gave very generously in that cause in terms of time, strain, and money.) It is obvious that these events drove Ginsberg to write with a sober urgency, on the Jewish crises of the time. The first fruits of this preoccupation were, probably, the paper on the 'Jewish Problem' in *Agenda*, (vol. 1, no. 4, 1942). Then came his masterly survey in 1943 of 'Anti-Semitism'[8] —of the phenomenon itself and of theories about it—which he re-published at least twice in subsequent collections of his essays. The essay is remarkable (given the date of its composition) for its self-control and detachment—remarkable, too, for the range of disciplines on which it draws and for the attention it gives to the 'peculiar position of the Jewish people'. '. . . whether they are a nation or not, the Jews are certainly a body of people who feel bound to one another, to whatever historical factors this bond of union may be due.'[9] He went on to state:[10]

> The term 'nation' does not perhaps adequately describe the historic unity of the Jewish people, but neither does the term 'religious community'. They are an ethnic group with a structure which resembles in some respects the structure of other ethnic minorities, but with peculiarities which give them a character of their own.

In this study of 'Anti-Semitism' Ginsberg shows a heightened awareness both of themes which elsewhere he can be criticized for neglecting (those of conflict—including murderous forms of conflict —and the political uses of ideology) and of questions to which in later years he came to devote increasing attention, such as cultural pluralism and the historical and psychological conditions which promote or inhibit the co-existence of different cultures. The study, in discussing one rather one-sided interpretation of antisemitism (that is, that for the Nazis it served as a disguised attack on Christianity) makes clear his very justified scepticism about the strength of an 'advanced' ethic within Western civilization.[11]

> . . . I very much doubt whether the principles of universal morality have ever been so firmly rooted in the Western peoples that an attack on them could only be made in deeply disguised form. It has not proved difficult in practice to reconcile Christian ethical principles with war, intolerance, and violent persecution. . . .

From this period, too, date Ginsberg's writings on the European and other Jewish communities, culminating both in the Noah Barou

Memorial Lecture in 1956 and in the address on 'European Jewish Communities Today' reprinted in Dr. Fletcher's volume. That so sceptical and detached a figure became convinced of the unity of the Jewish people is well demonstrated:[12]

> . . . we must not forget the essential unity of the Jewish people. This unity is due not only to the fact that Jews in different parts of the world are aware of each other and have a sense of solidarity but to the objective interdependence of the different communities which does not depend entirely on their own volition. I like to think in this connexion of the image used by Condorcet in describing the development of mankind. He adopted the 'happy artifice', as Comte calls it, of treating the successive peoples who pass on the torch as if they were a single people running the race. The image seems to me more appropriate in its application to the Jewish people.

At the end of this address (given in 1964) he raised with typical brevity the question of a meaningful Jewish survival, of 'whether there can be such a thing as a specifically Jewish culture in countries of high cultural level and, if so, what is its content and by what methods can it be further developed and transmitted to future generations.'[13]

Ginsberg's whole intellectual life was marked by the posing of such questions about ends and possibilities in social life, always with the conviction, to quote his own words, that 'reason penetrates into the ends themselves, brings them into clearer consciousness, defines and systematizes them, and in so doing transforms them.'[14] This belief in 'the power of reason to influence social movements' must have been hard to sustain in the dark days of Europe's self-destruction in the 1930s —but it was aligned with, though distinct from, the evolutionary faith to which Ginsberg stoutly adhered. There were, of course, all sorts of qualifications to that faith—but it rested on the belief that reason would prevail and that, as it prevailed, would increase our capacity to improve social arrangements by gradualist endeavour. 'Officially', so to speak, it by-passed the more tragic (especially the theological) views of the human condition and all the ambivalences which might threaten, or undermine, a rational solution to problems. (And, of course, it incurred the enmity not only of romantic reactionaries, but also of the impatient British progressives who saw the triumph of reason in such unedifying places as Vishinsky's Moscow courtroom, if not in the Gulag Archipelago itself . . .) In the 1970s we are all too familiar with the false face of reason, distorted into an instrument of power-seeking tyranny: the modern smilers with the knife; the 'liberating' assassins; the backroom mandarins with the computer who live to support, in both the moral and military senses of the word, the

modern means of official violence: all those who place their moral zeal and technical skills at the service of a higher anti-human irrationality. The strength and vitality of such movements, locked in conflict over power and in the defence of interests, dominate the politics of our time. It cannot be said that Ginsberg, whose mind and character were formed in times which, for all their difficulty, were often gentler, was unaware of this strain in modern history—or that his optimism about progress and the unity of mankind blocked out the pessimism, indeed the moral gloom, which our iron century must induce in any sensitive mind. Yet, by choice or accident or the design of others, he never exposed himself to the vulgar arena of contention and conflict or participated in the clashes of interest which create and disfigure the world of public affairs. The reasons for this abstention are, of course, unclear. True he feared excess and self-advertisement, almost trembled at disturbing his own balance between optimism and pessimism; feared that activism would destroy the vitality which is needed for sustained contemplation. No one has endless reserves of mental energy—and he must, too, have been over-conscious of the perils of involvement for his central role as he saw it: perhaps also he was too proud and too withdrawn to engage in such affairs—preferring rather to contemplate Hobhouse than to extrapolate from Hobbes. Yet I know, from many conversations, that he could appreciate, at a flash, a Hobbesian interpretation—and show an awareness, going beyond that of any junior colleague, of the thin crust that protects modern civility and polity from the barbarism below. My own feeling (and it can be no more) is that had he ventured into public life he would have attained a deeper insight into that jungle and would have brought both wisdom and character into handling the wild minutiae that make it up . . . One can only speculate on the reasons for his abstention—especially when so many of his distinguished peers at the L.S.E. were very actively and deeply involved in public life. Part of the answer must lie in his personality—and we know too little about his upbringing and early youth to know how that personality was formed. Part of the answer must lie in his moral assessment of his own role and his own capacities: proud and self-confident as, au fond, he often was, he never strayed into the manipulative mode that is inescapable from the conscious management of men—he had no taste for it and distrusted those who had. And part of the answer too must lie in his feelings of marginality. Professor Maurice Freedman in his 'personal recollection'[15] mentions his absorption into the more austere strata of English middle-class and professional life in the 30s and beyond. Academic honours came his way—honorary doctorates and marks of distinction. The Hampstead ethos in which, in Hampstead and Highgate, he and his wife both shared, was profoundly English—and, for all of its limitations, has contributed much to English life

and letters. Those who knew him and his wife[16] will recall the simplicity of their style of life—far removed from any ostentation or lavishness and centring on their service to (and need for) each other and to a small (and, alas, when I came to know them in the early 1950s, already dwindling) circle of friends. There was also a deep loneliness—reinforced as time went by, but not attributable to, personal losses and private anxieties: a capacity to withdraw into himself that he felt both pleasurable and painful. It was as if the young Talmudic student whom Professor Freedman describes, having mastered English, English philosophy, and English customs, having become English in so many minor and major ways, was unwilling either to push himself or to push his luck—even to appear pushing seemed a moral enormity. It was as if he suppressed the risk, over crucial decades of his life, of exploring the rough and tumble of a wider world—a world in which he might have been received, but one which, just conceivably, might, with silent but crushing finality, have rebuffed him as an intruder. Indeed, he never ceased to marvel that others—with a background comparable to his own, other Jewish scholars, many of them more recently arrived in Britain—were received so intimately (in some cases almost instantly) into the core of the English establishment, social, scholarly, and political. I often wondered whether he knew that their strengths were the mirror images of his own—their foreignness, their exoticness, their sometimes Machiavellian modes of manoeuvre and address—were attractive and seductive to the English: that their adventurousness *and* adventurism struck a fresh, responsive, and admiring chord among the English: that their brilliance, including but going beyond a mere showiness or ostentation, opened to them so many doors. The very Englishry of Ginsberg, unsnobbish and calm: his control of passion, his pervasive liberalism of outlook and of hope, must have seemed grey and unadventurous. Modesty, especially in an 'upstart' subject like sociology in the 1920s and 30s, can itself seem suspect: a failure to advertise can appear as timidity: a remarkably image-less prose can, though without justification, appear faint and monochrome. That way, in England, lies underestimation—albeit mingled with respect.

In a recent autobiographical essay Professor T. H. Marshall recalls how he was brought into the teaching of sociology by Morris Ginsberg and—towards the close—he makes a point of current but also fundamental importance. So many contemporary fashions in sociology, he observes[17],

> seem . . . to be inspired by the same purpose, namely to escape from the formal, structural, morphological, or, in a word, institutional kind of sociology into which I was inducted by Hobhouse and Ginsberg . . . They dig below the surface to discover what really happens at the level at which action is initiated. They open doors through which their disciples follow

them with high hopes of adventures to come. But how are they to get back? Where lies the power of return from analysis to synthesis? For, however profitable the analysis, synthesis must remain the ultimate goal of sociology, as of all sciences.

No one claims that Ginsberg produced such a synthesis—even in his masterly 'textbook' *Sociology* which distilled (albeit for the advanced reader) such a remarkable amount of comparative and historical material. Today such a synthesis is, in many quarters, deemed not only premature but unnecessary: there is a vogue—perhaps now waning—in sociology for a tasteless relativism, for juvenile linguistic mumblings and for a romantic, riskless, ahistorical probing of the 'self'. Against such fashions we may contrast the *gravitas* of Ginsberg's long career—and his unwavering conviction that the diversity of morals (to which we are today more sensitive than ever) does not entail a crude and undemanding relativism. To such a model (however imperfect), many scholars will find it salutary—and profitable—to return.

NOTES

[1] *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XIII, no. 1, June 1971, pages 7–15.

[2] Edward Shils, 'Tradition, Ecology and Institution in the History of Sociology', *Daedalus*, Fall 1970, p. 763.

[3] Shils, op. cit., p. 770.

[4] See R. Nisbet, *Social Change and History*, New York, 1969; E. Gellner, *Thought and Change*, London, 1964, especially ch. I; J. D. Y. Peel, *Herbert Spencer*, London 1971; J. Gould, 'Nisbet & his "Titans" ', *Encounter*, March 1970, and 'The Great Tradition', *Encounter*, May 1965.

[5] *J.J.S.*, ibid., p. 6.

[6] ibid., p. 16.

[7] M. Ginsberg, 'Ethical Relativity and Political Theory', in *Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy: Vol. 1, On the Diversity of Morals*, London, 1956, p. 30 fn.

[8] M. Ginsberg, 'Anti-Semitism'—paper first read to the British Psychological Society and republished in *Reason and Unreason in Society*, London, 1947, pp. 196 et seq.

[9] ibid., p. 199.

[10] ibid., p. 200.

[11] ibid., p. 210.

[12] R. Fletcher, op. cit., p. 128.

[13] ibid., p. 137.

[14] Ginsberg, 'The Unity of Mankind' (Hobhouse Memorial Lecture) in *Reason and Unreason in Society*, op. cit., p. 292.

[15] *J.J.S.*, ibid, p. 10.

[16] A book of his wife's poetry—*Poems* by Ethel Street—was published by Heinemann, London, in 1958 in the course of her long and fatal illness.

[17] T. H. Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', *International Social Science Journal*, vol. XXV, 1973, p. 97.

A SAMPLE SURVEY ON JEWISH EDUCATION IN LONDON, 1972–73

S. J. Prais*

1. *Need for a comprehensive survey*

THIS is a report on a sample survey of Jewish religious instruction in the London area; it was carried out mainly in the year between April 1972 and April 1973. The objects of the survey were to obtain estimates of the total number of Jewish children in London in their then final year of compulsory schooling (that is, children aged about 15); and to discover how many hours of religious instruction they had received in each year since the age of five from all sources (from day schools, synagogue classes, and private lessons), together with associated information on the frequency of lessons, etc. The pupils were also invited to comment and make suggestions on the instruction they had received.

The information available hitherto on the total number of Jewish children in London has been very approximate and based on indirect methods (relying on population estimates which, in turn, are based on certain assumed multiples of the number of Jewish marriages or deaths); that was one reason why it was desirable to carry out a direct survey of school pupils. The numbers enrolled for instruction each year in the various Jewish classes are, of course, known; but the number outside such classes is not known, nor do we know the degree of overlap in attendance among the various types of class. The result of these

* The inquiry on which this report is based was carried out with the whole-hearted co-operation of the staff of the Statistical and Demographic Research Unit of the Board of Deputies—Mrs. M. Hyman, Miss V. Korn, Mrs. M. Schmool and Mr. S. Shreter—to whom must go the full credit for its positive results; any errors are, however, my sole responsibility.

Guidance on many matters was provided by members of the Education Committee of the Council of Ministers of the United Synagogue, under the chairmanship of Rabbi Ginsbury, and by Dr. I. Fishman and Mr. A. Brown of the London Board of Jewish Religious Education. A number of joint meetings were held at the planning stage, and we are especially grateful for the help given in making initial contact with the schools. The present paper has also benefited from helpful comments made on a preliminary draft by the Chief Rabbi, Dr. I. Jakobovits, Mr. M. Davis (of the Chief Rabbi's Office), Mr. N. Rubin (United Synagogue), and Dr. J. Braude.

uncertainties was that the proportion of children receiving instruction could never be calculated with much confidence. We also wished to discover how evenly, or unevenly, the amount of instruction is distributed among pupils. It was hoped that this survey would cast light on these matters and—perhaps of greatest value—that it would provide a comprehensive and factual account of the complex state of religious education in London.

In outline, the inquiry involved three stages. At the first stage, all secondary schools (both Jewish and non-Jewish) in the London area were put into similar groups or strata (which are defined below), and a representative sample of schools was taken from each stratum. Second, for each school in the sample, Jewish pupils in the final year of compulsory schooling were enumerated. Third, a representative subsample of those pupils was given an eight-page questionnaire asking for a full history of the respondent's religious instruction since the age of five.

In the design of the sample our object was to obtain returns from approximately *one in ten* of all Jewish children in London in their final year of compulsory schooling. Questionnaires were distributed to some 200 children selected from the 60 representative schools included in the sample. A fuller account of the sample design, including various difficulties that arose, is set out in Appendix A; but we may briefly note here that only eight schools refused to co-operate, and that in the remainder questionnaires were completed and returned by 86 per cent of the children who were intended to fall into the sample. These response-rates compare well with another recent inquiry based on contacting children in schools.[1] Questionnaires which were not returned may to some extent relate to children who had received less religious instruction than did those who co-operated; but the possible bias from lack of response has been reduced by our procedure of re-weighting the results to take into account under-representation as between strata. It must also be kept in mind that we may not have received a full disclosure of the number of Jewish pupils in the schools contacted. However, the checks carried out, and described later in the paper, appear to confirm that these biases are unlikely to be serious. Apart from the refusals by a few schools, we found that a very good degree of co-operation was extended by all concerned.

2. *Number of Jewish schoolchildren in London*

The 800 secondary schools in London were divided into six groups, or strata, with the help of previous information on the approximate number of Jewish children to be expected in each school. Of course, this prior information was not accurate—some was out of date, and most of it was very approximate; but its use according to well-established

principles of sample design improves the efficiency of the survey. The strata are described in Table 1, which sets out the total number of

TABLE 1. *Sampling scheme and calculation of number of Jewish children aged 15[a] in London*

Stratum	*No. of schools in*		*Average no. of Jewish children per school in sample schools*	*Estimate of total Jewish children in population*	
	population	*sample*			
				No.[c]	%
A. Jewish day schools	5	5	80·6	403	16
B. Schools with Jewish withdrawal classes	16	3	14·3	229	9
C. Other schools with over 100[b] Jewish pupils	31	7	28·9	896	37
D. Other schools with 10–100[b] Jewish pupils	111	11	5·0	555	23
E. North London: other schools	345	18	0·76	262	11
F. South London: other schools	301	16	0·33	99	4
Total	809	60		2444	100

Notes:
a. The term 'aged 15' is used in this paper to mean children in their then final year of compulsory schooling.
b. Refers to the number of Jewish children in all classes in the school (the rest of the table refers only to the number aged 15).
c. Product of first and third columns.

schools in each stratum, and the number of schools chosen for the sample. The table also gives the number of Jewish children enumerated in the sample schools; from this information the total number of Jewish children in the population has been estimated for each stratum (by multiplying the number of schools in the population by the average number of Jewish children in the sample schools), and is shown in the penultimate column. The total number of children aged 15 for the whole of London calculated on this basis is estimated at about 2,440.

How does this compare with earlier, indirect, estimates of the number of schoolchildren in London? The most reliable of the earlier methods, in our view, is that based on the number of synagogue marriages in 1957, multiplied by the expected number of children per marriage. There were some 1,490 synagogue marriages recorded in London in that year; if we assume that the number of children born to Jewish mothers was the same as that in the general population, namely 2·09 children per marriage in that year, we arrive at an estimate of 3,120 children. Our recent inquiry into family size[2] suggests, however, that Jewish fertility is lower than that of the general population by about 20 per cent; we might therefore reduce our estimate in that

proportion, which leads to a figure of some 2,490 children aged 15 in London in 1972. But it is conceivable that it is only recently, with the general decline in fertility, that Jewish fertility fell to such an extent; in 1957 the deficiency may have been, say, only 10 per cent—leading to an indirect estimate of 2,800 children.

One cannot pretend that the indirect estimates are more than very approximate; it is nevertheless satisfying to find that the estimate based on the present sample survey is consistent with what may be inferred from the number of marriages and our notions on birth-rates. As is known, there is a large section of 'peripheral' Jews which could have contributed to a substantial discrepancy in estimates of numbers of children based on different approaches. The similarity between the results of the survey and the indirect method suggests that both deal with substantially the same affiliated core: our indirect method, relying on the number of marriages, is based on the number marrying in synagogues, and neglects those who went through only a civil ceremony; and in our present inquiry we are dealing only with those children who are prepared to have their religious affiliation known at school. These two sets of individuals may well come from much the same group of families.

The total number of Jewish children in London in 1972–3 for the eleven years of compulsory schooling, aged 5–15 years, may therefore be put in round figures at some 27,000. This estimate, it must again be emphasized, is based on those pupils prepared to have their religion disclosed in schools: there may be a number who are not prepared to do so, but for the practical purpose of planning Jewish instruction those can in any case be ignored for the most part.

3. *Distribution of Jewish pupils among types of school*

We may next examine how many Jewish pupils there are in the various types of school.

Jewish secondary day schools provide places for only some 16 per cent of Jewish children in London (see final column of Table 1). The remainder attend non-Jewish secondary schools, but at a small number of such schools there are 'withdrawal classes' arranged by the London Board of Jewish Religious Education; these schools are attended by a further 9 per cent of children. The remaining 75 per cent, in so far as they receive religious instruction at secondary-school ages, receive it at part-time classes.

The system of 'withdrawal classes' affects only 16 schools; these are no longer the schools which have the greatest number of Jewish children, though that may have been the case in earlier times. The 'withdrawal schools' today have an average of 14 children per school-year, whereas our survey indicates that there are 30 other (non-Jewish)

schools at which are to be found on average as many as 29 children per school-year; that is, there are some 30 schools at which there is a total of between 100 and 300 Jewish children per school. (In these schools there are a number of parallel classes, so that the proportion of Jewish children is not as high as may seem at first sight.) At these 30 schools (which form our Stratum C), over a third of all Jewish secondary schoolchildren in London are to be found (to be more precise, 37 per cent), totalling probably close on 6,000 children if we include sixth-formers, exceeding the total in all Jewish secondary day schools and in all schools offering 'withdrawal classes' together.

The number of Jewish children at what we have called our 'Stratum C schools' is so large that it is hardly surprising to find some kind of organized religious activity for Jewish pupils in each school. Most of it is informally arranged by the school, and is not sponsored by any of the Jewish educational authorities. There is great variation in the arrangements, but the following summary, based on supplementary inquiries made at a number of such schools, gives an indication of what is involved. First, with regard to prayers: a separate Jewish assembly is generally held on one or two days a week, usually conducted by a senior pupil (generally without guidance from a Minister), or occasionally by a Jewish teacher (if one is on the staff), and very occasionally by a Minister from a nearby synagogue. On other days of the week, Jewish pupils are excused assembly; but in some schools so-called 'non-denominational' religious services are held on certain days and are attended by Jewish pupils. These assemblies include English hymns, carols, and the like, but it is reported that obviously Christological lines are omitted. Second, during periods devoted to religious knowledge, Jewish pupils can opt out; and sometimes there are arrangements enabling Jewish pupils to take Old Testament studies.

Our object in this paper is primarily to establish the statistical facts; perhaps we need do no more than remark that much more attention requires to be given to the state of religious instruction at schools of this type by the appropriate communal bodies.[3]

As we have said, of the 75 per cent of all children attending non-Jewish secondary schools, one half are to be found in only 30 schools. The remainder are distributed as follows. Some 23 per cent of all Jewish children are in about a hundred schools with an average of five children per school-year; and 15 per cent are spread rather thinly in the remaining 600 schools with an average of under one Jewish pupil per school-year. Very few Jewish pupils are to be found in schools in South London.

We turn next to a comparison of the number attending Jewish *secondary* day schools with the number attending Jewish *primary* day schools. As is generally known, Jewish day schools have more available places at the primary than at the secondary level; 19 per cent of children in our

sample reported that they had previously attended a Jewish primary day school, compared with the 16 per cent in Jewish secondary day schools. The former proportion implies that some 480 children had been in their final year at a Jewish primary school five years earlier, that is, in 1967. Part of the interest of this estimate is that it provides a check on the validity of our survey. From an independent count it is known that in 1967 there were 3,270 children registered at London Jewish primary schools, corresponding to an average of 550 children for each of the six years of primary schooling;[4] this figure requires adjustment for comparison with our survey, since the number of children at Jewish primary schools was rising at that period by about a hundred a year. More children would therefore be in lower than in upper classes. If we assume a steady growth, it would follow that about 600 children were entering primary schools in 1967, and about 500 were leaving. It is the latter figure which is relevant, and it compares well with the estimate of 480 obtained from the present sample survey.

Our survey also shows that half the pupils who had attended a Jewish primary day school went on to a Jewish secondary day school; another third went on to schools which provided 'withdrawal classes', and a sixth to 'Stratum C schools'. Thus, only nine per cent of all children attend *both* a Jewish primary *and* a Jewish secondary school; a similar percentage attend a Jewish primary school, and then proceed to a non-Jewish secondary school; and seven per cent attend a non-Jewish primary school, and proceed to a Jewish secondary school. The JFS Secondary School was the only Jewish secondary school which received a substantial number of pupils who had not previously attended a Jewish primary school; at the other Jewish secondary schools virtually all the pupils had previously been to a Jewish primary school.

4. *The total amount of instruction*

Apart from attendance at a Jewish day school, children receive religious instruction by attending synagogue classes (held usually on Sunday mornings for 2–3 hours, and on two—or more rarely three—evenings a week for 1–1½ hours each), or by private tuition (given more particularly to boys before their Barmitzvah ceremony). There is an immense variation of possible combinations, and it is difficult to pick out any dominant or typical patterns: some receive no formal religious instruction at all, while others make use of all available classes and attend various study groups as well. In order to provide a manageable summary of the instruction received by our sample, we calculated for each pupil the total *time* he devoted to religious instruction for each of the ten years when he (or she) was aged 5–14; each hour of instruction is counted equally, and we ignore any variations in quality—important as they may be in practice. For each type of class attended,

the questionnaire asked for details of the length of the class (in minutes), and how frequently it was attended ('mostly', 'about half', or 'rarely': which answers were treated by us as equivalent to three-quarters, a half, and a quarter of the nominal class hours). Separate questions were asked for Sunday and weekday attendance at synagogue classes, since many pupils are enrolled only in the former.

The grand total of hours of instruction received from each source was converted to an equivalent number of school-periods per week, taken as being of 40 minutes each for 40 weeks in the year. This is convenient for purposes of comparison: the reader may like to bear in mind, in looking at the figures below, that four or five school-periods a week at secondary level are normally devoted to central subjects such as English or mathematics, two or three periods a week to important subjects such as a foreign language, and one period a week may be given to peripheral subjects such as singing or art. At Jewish day schools the time devoted to Jewish studies is generally equivalent to 8–10 periods a week, varying according to age and school (but substantially more in some schools, where additional optional classes are provided outside normal school hours).

For the sample as a whole, we found that the total quantity of instruction received over the 10 years of school life averaged 1,200 hours per pupil, corresponding to some four school-periods a week. This seems surprisingly high; but a rough check based on the total number of 'child-hours' of instruction supplied by the main institutions concerned casts no doubt on the accuracy of this figure.

The check is based on the following computation. Let us consider the number of children attending Jewish primary and secondary day schools, and those attending the main body of synagogue classes conducted at the 66 centres under the auspices of the London Board of Jewish Religious Education and let us evaluate the total number of periods of religious instruction they receive each week. We know from the reports of these institutions that in 1970 there were some 3,400 children at Jewish primary and 1,700 at Jewish secondary schools in the relevant age-groups; these received, say, an average of 10 periods of religious instruction a week, making a total of some 51,000 'child-periods' of instruction a week received at day schools. At the London Board's synagogue classes there was an average attendance on Sundays of 6,200 children for, say $3\frac{1}{2}$ equivalent school-periods; and 2,100 children attended for two weekday evenings of 2 periods each; this yields a total for the London Board's classes of some 30,000 'child-periods' a week. The total for Jewish day schools and these synagogue classes is therefore over 80,000 'child-periods' a week. To calculate an average per child, we have to divide by the total number of children which, on the basis of section 2, we would estimate at 25,000 children for the 10 years 5–14. Accordingly we find that three and a quarter

school-periods a week per child are provided by the main educational institutions just considered. If we make an allowance for instruction provided in other ways (by private tuition, by the schools at which there are 'withdrawal classes', and by synagogue classes provided by the Federation, the Reform, and Liberal communities), it appears that the estimate of four periods a week from all sources yielded by our survey must be accepted as realistic. We may notice, additionally, that Jewish day schools provide about half of the total quantity of instruction in terms of 'child-periods'.

Four periods a week per child throughout his school-life seems far from a trivial average, both from the point of view of the time devoted by the child to these studies, and from the point of view of the quantity of resources that the community devotes to providing these facilities. If there is dissatisfaction with the results of that investment one naturally is driven to consider the efficiency with which those resources are deployed. One may ask, first, whether the distribution of instruction is particularly uneven as between different groups of pupils; and, second, whether the quality of instruction leaves something to be desired. These questions are considered in the following two sections.

5. *How uneven is the distribution of instruction among pupils?*

Our survey confirms that even in the present generation there is a disparity in the amount of religious instruction given to boys and to girls; on the average boys receive about half as much instruction again as girls (an average of 4·6 school-periods a week for boys, and 3·2 for girls). This will be seen to apply systematically throughout the more detailed analyses that follow. An older and long-standing attitude to women has persisted in this matter; the notion of sexual equality in religious instruction has apparently not made much progress.

Let us next consider pupils according to the type of secondary day school they attended, following the stratification adopted in our sample-design: for each of the six groups of secondary schools distinguished in this inquiry, Table 2 sets out the average number of equivalent school-periods of religious instruction received per pupil. It will be seen that there is a substantial variation, from nine periods a week for those at Jewish secondary day schools, to only one period a week for those attending schools in the South of London with few Jewish pupils. A systematic relation seems to hold: the fewer the number of Jewish pupils in the school, the less the amount of instruction received by the average Jewish pupil attending that school. This is partly because it is probably more difficult to provide adequate instructional facilities in areas where there are fewer Jewish families; and partly because a greater proportion of families less interested in Jewish facilities will settle in those parts of London.

TABLE 2. *Religious instruction during the ages 5–14, according to sample-strata (Average equivalent no. of school-periods a week)*

Stratum[a]	*Boys*	*Girls*	*Boys and girls*
A. Jewish day schools	9·8	8·8	9·2
B. Schools with Jewish withdrawal classes	8·3	4·4	7·4
C. Other schools with over 100 Jewish pupils	3·2	2·2	3·0
D. Other schools with 10–100 Jewish pupils	3·0	2·1	2·4
E. North London: other schools with fewer than 10 Jewish pupils	(*b*)	(*b*)	1·3
F. South London: other schools with fewer than 10 Jewish pupils	(*b*)	(*b*)	1·0
Total	4·6	3·2	4·0

Notes:

a. It should be remembered that the stratum referred to relates to the type of school attended when the pupil is aged 15; some of the instruction will have been received while at other schools and outside the school of day-time attendance (for example, some of the children in non-Jewish secondary day schools have previously attended Jewish primary schools; and their religious instruction includes that received at part-time and private classes).

b. Number of respondents too few to permit separate estimates for boys and girls.

The disparities become clearer if we consider primary and secondary education together, and contrast the minority of pupils (under a tenth of the total) who attended both a Jewish primary day school and a Jewish secondary day school with the great majority (three-quarters of all pupils) who attended non-Jewish primary and non-Jewish secondary day schools. The former received an average of 13 periods a week of religious instruction and the latter an average of 2½ periods a week (equivalent to attendance only at Sunday morning classes); this is perhaps the most important summary contrast to be drawn in this paper. Children whose day schools were partly Jewish and partly non-Jewish naturally received amounts of instruction that fall between those figures. Those who first attended a Jewish primary school and then a non-Jewish secondary school received a somewhat higher total of religious instruction than those who did the reverse, that is than those who started in a non-Jewish primary school and continued in a Jewish secondary school (an average of eight periods a week for the former, and five periods for the latter). Table 3 sets out these figures for boys and girls separately. It will be noted that the highest average is 16 periods a week for boys who attended both Jewish primary and secondary schools.

There is of course a substantial variation according to age in the amount of instruction received, as will be seen from Table 4. For boys, the maximum is reached at the age of twelve when Barmitzvah prepara-

TABLE 3. *Religious instruction according to type of primary and secondary school attended*
(Average equivalent no. of school-periods a week)

Type of school		*Percentage*	*No. of school periods*		
Primary	*Secondary*	*of children*	*Boys*	*Girls*	*Boys and girls*
Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish[a]	75	3	2	2½
Jewish	Jewish	9	16	10	13
Jewish	Non-Jewish[a]	9	9	6	8
Non-Jewish	Jewish	7	5	5	5

Note:
a. In the group of non-Jewish secondary schools we have here included also those schools which operate the 'withdrawal classes' scheme by arrangement with the London Board.

TABLE 4. *Religious instruction according to age*
(Average equivalent no. of school-periods a week)

Age	*Boys*	*Girls*	*Boys and girls*
5	2·7	1·8	2·3
6	3·8	2·8	3·4
7	4·6	3·4	4·1
8	4·7	3·9	4·4
9	5·3	3·9	4·6
10	5·9	4·0	5·1
11	5·6	3·6	4·9
12	6·1	3·4	5·0
13	3·5	3·2	3·4
14	2·6	2·2	2·4
All ages	4·5	3·2	4·0

tions are in full swing; for girls, the peak is reached earlier, when they are 10 years old and reflects the transfer to non-Jewish secondary school at that age. (Girls do not compensate by attending synagogue classes to the extent that boys do.)

To examine the extent of variation more fully, it was thought worthwhile to rank all pupils according to the amount of instruction received. On doing so, we found that the median pupil, that is the pupil who is half-way along the ranking (half the pupils receive more, and half less instruction than he does), had only 2·9 school-periods of religious instruction a week. This corresponds perhaps better with general impressions than does the arithmetic average of four periods a week noted earlier. A quarter of the pupils received 1·5 school-periods a week or less; for girls, the lowest quarter received 0·9 periods or less.

It is beyond the scope of a limited statistical inquiry such as the present one to offer an opinion on what would be a satisfactory number of hours of religious instruction. It is however clear that such a wide

variation in the degree of participation in the available facilities must lead to very different standards attained at various ages by pupils; and that must make for great difficulty in planning those facilities, and in providing classes that make efficient use of the limited time and resources available.

6. *The problems of part-time instruction*

The great variation in the age-span during which children receive religious instruction, and the varying and irregular number of times they attend classes during those ages, present particularly serious problems for part-time synagogue classes, which are our concern in this section. There are over 60 centres organized by the London Board of Jewish Religious Education, at each of which there is an average of some six classes on Sundays and four classes on weekdays; the average number of pupils in each class is not great, about 15 on both Sundays and weekdays.[5] But given the broad age-group to be covered, and the varying attainments of the children, each class inevitably includes children of much greater disparity in ages, in standards, and in intellectual ability than would be encountered (or tolerated) in a full-time day school.

This disparity poses serious problems to the teacher in maintaining the interest of the class as a whole: if he goes quickly, the less able will not follow; if he proceeds slowly, the more able will complain of boredom; and if he follows a middle path, some will be bored and some will not follow. Problems of discipline inevitably ensue and the efficiency of the class falls further.

These considerations are well known to those closely involved. If we repeat them here it is only by way of a reminder to the general reader that there is no easy answer to the frequent complaints, whether from pupils or their parents, about the quality of synagogue classes. As is known, dissatisfaction is widespread: and it appeared strikingly in the replies to a question in our inquiry asking the pupil which were the most important changes he would like to see made in synagogue classes, on the basis of his experience. Many took this as an opportunity to express opinions and grievances on a variety of aspects. A survey of the replies is set out in Appendix B, but the following summary perhaps conveys the main points.

First, the syllabus needs to be given more *meaning*, by a greater emphasis on understanding Hebrew, and not merely reading it and by being taught the principles of the Jewish faith (and not merely rituals). Second, the quality of *teaching staff* was heavily criticized (students, and Israelis with language difficulties, were mentioned); and the inability to maintain discipline was a frequent matter of comment. Third, the *classroom facilities* are very often inadequate and primitive. Fourth,

there were suggestions as to the need to improve the *organization* of the classes, by 'streaming' and other methods.

We have seen above that only a minority of children attend Jewish day schools, and though that minority is increasing, the majority will inevitably rely on part-time instruction for some decades ahead for what knowledge of Judaism they may receive. It is because of the important place that part-time instruction will continue to occupy that we thought it right to draw attention in this paper to the defects noticed by pupils and explicitly commented on in their replies.

7. *What is to be done*

It must be emphasized that what follows represents the personal assessment made by the author of this paper.

As indicated at the outset, our object in carrying out this survey has been to ascertain facts—to provide a comprehensive and balanced account of the many complex facets of Jewish religious education in London. Policy matters—what should be done, when, and how—lie outside the strict confines of our task. The patient reader, having got so far, is however entitled to know to what extent the various proposals advanced in recent years for the improvement of Jewish instruction in London fit in with the results of the present survey; and this final section attempts this task, at least in broad terms.

The policies for day schools and part-time instruction are of course quite distinct. For day schools, it is mainly a matter of *quantity*: there is a need for more schools and, on the basis of the figures yielded by the present survey of the total number of children of school-age, a more realistic assessment of needs may be attempted. For part-time classes, it appears more urgent to put right the *quality* of instruction before considering an increase in its quantity; we have seen that the variability of pupils in each class presents fundamental problems, and it seems worth indicating the means by which these may be alleviated.

DAY SCHOOLS

In assessing the number of day schools, we may find it useful to bear in mind some target proportion of children who may attend such schools. To take 100 per cent, or even 90 per cent, seems unrealistic for London at present—though at the beginning of the century that would not have seemed so inappropriate. If we look at the proportions in other towns today, we find that in two of the larger provincial communities, Manchester and Liverpool, about three-quarters of all children attend Jewish primary schools; as for secondary schools, about a third attend Jewish schools in Manchester and over two-thirds do so in Liverpool. It seems useful to take a notional target of 50 per cent

of children in day schools for the calculations that follow in order to ascertain the order of magnitude of the present deficiency.

Of the 2,500 Jewish children in each year of schooling in London, we thus have to think of primary school places for 1,250. The annual intake at existing primary schools is about 700 a year;[6] there remains therefore a deficiency of 550 places. Allowing an average of 30 children in a class would imply that we needed 18 new primary schools (treated as single-form entry schools, that is assuming that the school does not have parallel classes for each age group).

At the secondary level, the intake in existing schools is about 450 a year; the deficiency is therefore 800 places. If we think in terms of 3-form entry schools, again with 30 children per form, there is therefore a need for nine new schools; if the new schools are to be of the large 6-form entry type, four such schools would be required.[7]

The proposals for new schools, as summarized in the booklet issued in 1971 by the Chief Rabbi's Office, *Let my People Know*, call for the equivalent of three new primary schools (one double-entry and one single-entry) in the next five years ('phase I' of the programme), followed by 6–8 primary schools in the succeeding decade ('phase 2'); thus, a total of, say, a dozen new primary schools envisaged, compared with the 18 single-form schools noted above. At the secondary level, the proposals are for two new large schools (a six-form entry, and a five-form entry) at the first phase, followed by a further 2–3 schools at the second phase; if we allow for a variable degree of multiple entry at the secondary level, it appears that if these proposals were executed they would bring us quite close to the target number of secondary schools calculated above.

Ambitious as these proposals may seem when compared with the existing situation, it has to be noted that only in some 15 years' time will they bring us to that target; and that a 50 per cent target is not an ambitious one by the standards attained elsewhere.

Part-time instruction will therefore have to cater for more than half of all pupils for at least the next 15 years; and for a substantial proportion thereafter. We must therefore consider rather seriously what improvements may be effected in the quality of part-time instruction.

PART-TIME EDUCATION

The many problems facing part-time education would be much eased if there were greater central guidance; and this would probably be accompanied by some saving in resources. Greater central guidance requires both a larger central staff with appropriate authority and a willingness on the part of local centres to accept central direction. Local communal difficulties have prevented progress hitherto, and the suggestions that follow depend on overcoming them.

In brief the suggestions that should be considered—and which are

of course not new—relate to: a centralization or regionalization of classes, a finer detailing of the courses, and the provision of appropriate text-books and teachers' manuals.[8]

As has been noted, an average of six classes are held at each centre on a Sunday (fewer on a weekday); given the wide variation in ages and attainments of pupils, this means that each teacher is asked to take a group which can only rarely be taught effectively as a single class. If the number of centres were reduced from over 60 to, say, 20, the number of classes at each centre would be raised to a dozen; 'streaming' of pupils of nearer equal abilities would then become possible, and classes could be conducted more effectively. Problems of accommodating much larger numbers at each centre would arise. It has been suggested that this may be solved by using the premises of Jewish day schools, rather than the halls attached to synagogues which are, in any case, often not ideal; that solution may increasingly become practicable as more schools are built. Alternatively, the existing synagogue centres may be kept going, but grouped systematically into 'regional' units, each centre in such a unit providing classes for restricted sets of ages, and each 'regional' unit administered by a single headmaster.

We come next to courses. While some progress has been made in recent years in organizing a general syllabus scheme for the classes, it appears that much further work remains to be done in dividing the syllabus into smaller and distinct courses. Given the problems that are faced here, much may be learnt from the general system of organizing secular instruction in other countries. A course would typically be of a term's length, followed by a test set by the central body. Passing a number of tests, relating to courses at one level, would be a requirement for proceeding to courses at the next level. Each course needs to be defined in detail to the extent that virtually each lesson is spelt out for the teacher in a teachers' manual for the course. Pupils' text-books and teachers' manuals for Hebrew and religious instruction are available from the United States, covering the basic groundwork at a modern professional standard. These are now used with success in some day schools; and there is no reason why they should not also form a useful part of the syllabus in synagogue classes.

The adoption of these methods would do much to alleviate the problems which stem from irregular attendance by pupils, from the need to rely on only partially qualified teaching staff, and from the heavy turnover in teaching staff that is one of the features of part-time education.

Much more may be said about the shortage of teachers, and of the conditions that have led to that shortage. But that would take us too far afield. We need only note that in all subjects (not only in religious and Hebrew instruction) the modern trend is to rely increasingly on good teaching aids; the best teachers have to be occupied, not

in teaching, but in preparing text-books and manuals which others may use. It is in order to permit the preparation of this material that the central staff has to be strengthened, and aided perhaps by *ad hoc* advice from those who have faced similar problems elsewhere.

8. *Conclusion*

The main findings of this survey may be summarized as follows:

(a) There are approximately 2,500 Jewish children of each age in London, that is to say a total of about 27,000 aged 5–15 years.
(b) Our survey was based on those in the final year of compulsory schooling in 1972–3; of these, 16 per cent attended Jewish secondary day schools and nine per cent attended schools provided with 'withdrawal classes' under the supervision of the London Board. The remaining 75 per cent attended non-Jewish day schools. Half of the latter, that is 37 per cent of all pupils, were to be found in a small group of 31 schools each of which was attended by over a hundred Jewish pupils.
(c) Only about 10 per cent of pupils had attended *both* a Jewish primary school *and* a Jewish secondary school.
(d) The total amount of religious instruction received by Jewish pupils from all sources (day schools, synagogue classes, private lessons) was found to be equivalent to an average of four school-periods a week throughout the years of compulsory schooling.
(e) There was, however, an immense disparity in the distribution of instruction. The minority of pupils who had attended both Jewish primary and Jewish secondary schools received an average of 13 periods a week, while the great majority who had attended non-Jewish schools throughout their school-life averaged only 2½ periods. A quarter of the pupils received on average less than 1½ periods a week. There was also a disparity between the sexes, boys obtaining half as much instruction again as girls.
(f) The great disparity among pupils in the time devoted to religious instruction leads to serious problems in part-time classes. This was clearly brought out in the comments and suggestions made by pupils in the responses to the questionnaire.
(g) Existing plans for the expansion of the number of day schools, if fully implemented, may bring the proportion attending day schools close to 50 per cent in 15 years. But the majority of pupils will continue to rely on part-time instruction for some considerable time in the future.

APPENDIX A

Sample design, response rates, and possible sources of error

Stratification

This appendix describes in greater detail the statistical basis of the estimates. Our aim was to contact approximately one in ten of all Jewish schoolchildren in London aged 15. There are some 800 secondary schools in London, but there is a great disparity in the distribution of Jewish pupils: over 50 per cent of the Jewish pupils are to be found in some five per cent of the schools. It was therefore worth adopting some form of stratification: we took a sampling fraction varying from unity (that is all the schools in the stratum) for Jewish day schools (Stratum A) down to one-in-twenty for schools in South London (Stratum F), as well as for those in North London where it was thought there were fewer than 10 Jewish children in the school (that is, fewer than two children in each age-group—these formed Stratum E).

The preliminary information used for stratification was obtained from Rabbis and synagogue Ministers who were sent lists of schools in their districts and asked to provide estimates of the number of Jewish children in those schools; this was supplemented by interviews held at various synagogue classes where children were asked whether they knew of Jewish children at particular schools. The method was somewhat rough-and-ready, but proved adequate. It should be understood that errors in allocating schools to strata do not bias the final results.

There followed a secondary sampling stage: within each school falling in the sample, only a fraction of the Jewish children were given questionnaires. That fraction was chosen so as to compensate for differences among the sampling fractions at the first sampling stage, that is, in choosing schools for the various strata. Thus, where all schools in the stratum were included in the sample, only one in 10 of the children was chosen; and where one in 10 of the schools was chosen to fall in the sample, all the children in those schools were included in the sample. The result would be that in each stratum one in 10 of the children would be included in our sample.

For the benefit of readers not familiar with this method, a further word of explanation may be helpful. Had we simply taken one in 10 of all schools at random, without stratification, we should expect to include the same number of children in our sample as would be yielded by our more complex method, but we should have run the risk of missing the main Jewish day schools; after all, there are only five Jewish day schools, so that—on a one-in-ten chance—we should have been lucky to have included one of them. The results would therefore not have been so reliable. On the other hand, the schools having been stratified and a sample of schools having been selected by the use of a variable sampling-fraction, it is helpful to compensate by appropriately altering the sampling-fraction for the children in each school: if this had not been done, we should have relatively too many children from, for example, the Jewish day schools; these would have needed to be under-weighted in the final calculation. Further, given our limited resources, we could not afford to process the number of questionnaires that would have been received had we given questionnaires to all the children

in the sample-schools. A smaller number of schools would therefore have been chosen, again leading to a reduction in reliability.

In practice the scheme had to be slightly modified. In the four main strata, the scheme was carried through as described; but in the two strata where there are very few Jewish children in each school (strata E and F, where there was found to be an average of under one Jewish child per school in the relevant age groups), we contented ourselves with a sample of one in 20 schools (taking of course all the Jewish children who were found there). These two strata have to be given a double weight in the final calculation to correct for under-representation as compared with the rest of the sample; but, as we shall see below, further correction factors had subsequently to be adopted to allow for varying response-rates.

Response-rates and sources of error

Table 5 summarizes the two-stage sampling scheme adopted and sets out the response rates. Of the 60 schools planned to be in the sample, we succeeded in making contact with 52, of which 24 had Jewish pupils in the relevant age-group; in the remaining 28 schools we were told by the headmaster that there were either no Jewish pupils or none in the relevant age-group. In eight schools in our sample the headmaster or the local education authority refused permission for the inquiry to be carried out. It will be seen from Table 5 (the third and fourth columns of figures) that the main lack of co-operation on the part of schools was in Stratum D, namely in general schools in which we expected to find a total of between 10 and 100 Jewish pupils, or say between 2 and 20 pupils aged 15. Of the 11 schools in that stratum selected for inclusion in our sample, five refused to co-operate. These schools were situated (one each) in the Boroughs of Westminster, Tower Hamlets, Wandsworth, Harrow, and Redbridge. It is not thought that pupils in the omitted schools differed sufficiently from those in schools in the sample for that deficiency to lead to biased results. By the method of re-weighting, the missing schools were represented in the final results by co-operating schools in the corresponding strata.

Of the total of 193 questionnaires handed out to pupils in the schools which co-operated, 166 were returned, that is, 86 per cent. Co-operation by pupils was naturally better in Jewish day schools, and in those schools where there were 'withdrawal classes' (Strata A and B). It seems likely that those children not returning questionnaires on the average had a lower degree of Jewish education than others in the same school, but the proportion involved is not really very great (some of it must be attributed to absence from school), and therefore unlikely to lead to any great bias. Nevertheless, some overestimate in the average degree of religious instruction has to be kept in mind.

In forming general averages relating to all strata combined, we have attempted to correct for under-representation at both sampling stages by re-weighting. Taking into account for each stratum (a) the ratio of the number of schools in the population to the number attained in the sample, and (b) the proportion of children in the sample-schools which returned questionnaires, we see that the following multipliers should be attached to each questionnaire in the six strata, A–F, respectively: 1, 1.25, 1.25, 2.5, 3.5, and 3.5. The high values for the last two strata result mainly from the lower

TABLE 5. *Sample design and response*

	Schools				*Children*			
	No. of schools in population	*Sampling fraction*	*No. of schools in sample*		*No. in sample schools*[c]	*Sampling fraction*	*Questionnaires*	
			planned	*achieved*[a]			*handed out*	*returned*
A. Jewish day schools	5	1:5	5	5	403	1:10	40	40
B. Schools with Jewish withdrawal classes	16	1:5	3	3	43	1:2	20	17
C. Other schools with over 100 Jewish pupils[d]	31	1:5	7[e]	6	202[f]	1:2	91	77
D. Other schools with 10–100 Jewish pupils[d]	111	1:10	11	6(3)[b]	30	1:1	30	22
E. North London: other schools	345	1:20	18	17(2)	13	1:1	7	7
F. South London: other schools	301	1:20	16	15(5)	5	1:1	5	3
Total	809		60	52			193	166

a. Including schools in the sample that were found to have no Jewish pupils aged 15.
b. Brackets give numbers of schools where there were Jewish pupils aged 15 (other schools have either no Jewish pupils at all, or none aged 15).
c. Relates to children aged 15 at those schools which co-operated in the inquiry.
d. Note that this refers to the number of Jewish pupils in the whole school, whereas in the rest of the table we consider pupils only in the relevant year of schooling.
e. There is one more school here than might be expected, because of the method of sampling adopted: a random number was chosen for starting in stratum B, and every fifth school was then taken. This procedure was carried through into stratum C which, for this purpose, was taken as a continuation of Stratum B.
f. Includes one school where pupils were enumerated, but questionnaires were not permitted to be distributed.

sampling-fraction for schools (at the first stage of sampling) referred to above.

The justification for this re-weighting depends on the assumption that those children who co-operated in each stratum may be taken as representing also those omitted from the sample. This is the only assumption that can in practice be made, but it is not of course entirely justified; as we have just seen, it seems likely that those not co-operating will on average have a somewhat lower degree of association with Jewish matters, and to that extent our procedure will overstate the amount of instruction received by the average pupil.

We also gave some thought to the possibility that errors could arise from the large number of schools in which no Jewish children were reported. It seemed possible that children of less affiliated families attended such schools, and that their omission would bias our results. We therefore made a number of further inquiries in respect of such schools. It was found that in many cases the schools involved were Catholic schools (which, on reflection, might, have been better treated as a separate stratum); Jewish children, in very small numbers, were in fact reported by some Catholic schools, but we found no reason to doubt the 'nil returns' generally received from them. In other general schools we received the impression that the fewer the number of Jewish children, the better were they known by their headmaster; nevertheless, we cannot rule out that a small number have been missed.

The questionnaire

The preparation of the eight-page questionnaire was a lengthy procedure involving three pilot stages, after each of which the questionnaire was amended in the light of experience. We are happy to acknowledge the help given to the Unit at that stage by Dr. E. S. Conway, headmaster of the JFS Secondary School, and by Mr. A. Brown of the London Board of Jewish Religious Education. A specimen copy of the questionnaire may be obtained on application to the Research Unit.

APPENDIX B

Instruction at synagogue classes: comments by pupils

Pupils were asked: 'If you could suggest improvements in the synagogue classes or cheder what are the two most important changes you would make?' This question was as much included to provide the pupil with a feeling of participation and involvement, as for interest in the replies. In the event, it was answered by the pupils in a very intelligent way; and though teachers, and others directly involved, may not find the answers surprising, it was thought useful to provide a summary of the replies, especially since they relate to such a broad cross-section of pupils. It should be remembered that they were aged 15 when the question was addressed to them.

The comments may be considered under four broad heads: syllabus and content of lessons; teaching experience of the staff; conditions and amenities of the classrooms; and general organization of the classes.

Syllabus

One is impressed, when reading the school-children's comments, by the large numbers of complaints of how 'bored' they are at synagogue classes, and their expressed desire for 'more interesting' classes encompassing a wider range of subjects. Some voiced the opinion that the lessons should cover a broader field than work relating solely to a 'narrow exam syllabus'; and others thought that much of their studies in classes was irrelevant to modern needs. However, many were also prepared to make constructive suggestions regarding the subjects they would prefer to study.

The desire for more lessons in spoken Hebrew was the most widely voiced: 'We were taught to read Hebrew from the start and although I can read fluently, I do not understand a word of it'. The need to understand prayers is of course fundamental; but there seems to be little doubt that many thought that to be able to speak Hebrew is something desirable and 'useful'.

After spoken Hebrew, the subject most frequently suggested as deserving more time was Jewish history, or 'post-seventeenth century history, and not just about Israel'. It was also suggested that after a period of formal lessons in Jewish history, children 'should be taken to a well-equipped library (preferably within the synagogue) and shown good books on the subject and encouraged to read them'.

Aspects of Jewish thought and Jewish philosophy were considered to deserve more emphasis by another group of pupils. It was said that an appreciation of Judaism was more important than the kind of instruction, directed towards a narrow examination syllabus, which they were given.

Other suggestions were: lessons on the attitude of Judaism to other faiths; practical topics such as koshering and cooking; and a greater use of films and tapes to illustrate the subject under discussion. Several respondents suggested that it would be valuable to organize activities after lessons, such as outings to old synagogues. On a more particular point, it was remarked that translation of the standard texts should be modernized, and that the use of antiquated words should be discontinued.

One may speculate on the motives for the various suggestions, and as to why spoken Hebrew and Jewish history were the two most frequently mentioned subjects. It is probable that Hebrew, regarded as a modern language, seems to a pupil of that age to have the virtues of 'usefulness', and to be comparable to French at day school. The plea for more Jewish history may spring from the desire to learn more about the Jewish past and heritage, to compare with the kind of history (of England, etc.) which they are taught at school. There seems to be a feeling of lack of 'relevance' in the curriculum that they follow at present; whereas these two subjects are seen by the children as being relevant.

Teaching

The respondents dwelt nearly as much on the quality of teaching at the classes as on the subjects being taught. They pointed out that, with some exceptions, the classes lacked qualified teachers: they did not want student teachers, nor distinguished but unqualified members of the community, nor 'Israelis unable to speak English', but trained, proficient teachers, qualified

to take particular age-groups (especially necessary for the younger age-groups), and using up-to-date teaching methods.

There was much comment on the lack of discipline: lack of discipline, it was said, led to a lack of respect for the teacher; the noise level in the classroom interfered with teaching; unnecessary time was spent on 'telling off'; and there was a clear need for stricter teachers able to control a class. A final comment may be quoted, even if it seems somewhat extreme: 'Hebrew classes are dying out because there is a terrible standard of teaching and the lessons become boring.'

Classroom facilities

The conditions of the classroom and amenities were also criticized. The need for modernization of classrooms and equipment was mentioned; and though it is not obvious that their condition is worse than in some general day schools, the use of communal halls—which are sometimes required for other purposes—leads to difficulties. (In any case, perhaps a higher standard should be aimed at, so that one need not receive comments such as 'the facilities are appalling'.) The provision of stationery requires attention at some classes; and the provision of refreshments for those attending straight after school seems as yet not to be universal practice.

Organization

There were some perceptive comments on the overall organization of instruction. Several suggested that synagogue classes should be run in the same way as schools, that is with 'streamed' classes of uniform standard, each group working for the same examination, and graduation to the next class dependent on passing that examination.

Some pupils remarked that the 'social' side of synagogue classes should be developed; and that the classes should be run in such a way that they are treated both by parents and students as something very worthwhile, and not just as a necessary bore. 'Greater parent involvement' in the organization of the classes was suggested; and so was 'pupil participation', that is, the opportunity for pupils to make reasoned suggestions for changes in the curriculum.

NOTES

[1] In a recent survey to determine 'subject commitments', only 124 schools co-operated out of a planned sample of 169 representative schools. See G. A. Barnard and M. D. McCreath, 'Subject Commitments and the Demand for Higher Education', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, vol. 133, part 3, 1970, p. 360.

[2] S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool, 'The Fertility of Jewish Families in Britain, 1971', in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 15, no. 2, December 1973, p. 195.

[3] But perhaps the core of the problem is that there is no specific communal body charged with this responsibility; the local synagogue Minister is usually over-burdened with other duties, though it must be said that some do find time for school visiting. We learn that a small start has recently been made by a School Assemblies Council attached to the Jewish National Fund Educational Committee, and it will be of interest to see how far it will be able to meet the needs of the situation.

[4] The figures of school registrations were published originally by Dr. J. Braude in the *Jewish Chronicle*, and are now conveniently brought together in the booklet produced by the Chief Rabbi's Office, *Let My People Know*, London, 1971, p. 33.

[5] The discussion above is illustrated in terms of figures from the London Board

of Jewish Religious Education, which is by far the largest of the groups of synagogue classes in the London region.

[6] Based on a total registration of 3,900 children at primary schools in London (Dr. J. Braude, *Jewish Chronicle*, 20 July 1973; kindergartens have been excluded), divided by six, to give 650 per annum; and rounded up to allow for the upward-trend.

[7] This is not the place to debate the relative merits of large *versus* small secondary schools but, if asked, the author would have to admit a preference, on a balance of considerations, for smaller schools.

[8] The suggestions put forward here are based on discussions held with a number of headmasters of synagogue classes (and with members of the London Board of Jewish Religious Education). The last published plan put forward by the Board ('A Time for Action', published as an Appendix to their Annual Report for 1968) refers to some of the aspects mentioned above; the suggestions made here may be regarded as going further along those lines.

INTERMARRIAGE AND COMMUNAL SURVIVAL IN A LONDON SUBURB

Gerald Cromer

Introduction

THE lack of demographic and sociological research on the Anglo-Jewish community has frequently been commented upon by scholars and laymen alike. The editor of the first major contribution to this field pointed out that 'we have a distinguished body of historians of Anglo-Jewry, a sizeable Jewish population, not a few Jewish social scientists, and very little in the way of a sociology of the Jews.'[1] Little has changed since then. Anyone deciding to enter the field still has a more or less unrestricted area to choose from. Few aspects have been touched upon; none has been exhausted.

An important paper on future research studies selected the family as one of the five areas that 'should command some measure of "priority" consideration.'[2] This choice was largely due to the centrality of the home in Jewish tradition, and the role it has played in ensuring Jewish survival. Of even greater importance, though, was the growing disquiet about the future of the family as an agent of cultural transmission.

The main reason for this concern is the widespread belief that there has been a marked increase in the rate of intermarriage. A recent survey for instance suggested that it is now in the region of 30 per cent.[3] As well as posing the obvious danger of physical attrition on the communal level, this trend 'threatens the continuity of generations within the family, the ability of family members to identify with one another, and their satisfaction with family roles.'[4] Both the communal and familial aspects of the situation must therefore be analysed.

The research study

The research on which this article is based took the form of a comparative study of Jewish and non-Jewish family life in the London suburb of Wembley.[5] The steady growth of the local community and a number of proposals for its future development led the author to believe that it would soon become one of the major centres of Jewish population in London. In addition, it appeared to be typical of the

metropolitan Jewish community, as regards both synagogue affiliation and class composition.

The minority community tended to conform to the middle class image of suburbia to a much greater extent than did its non-Jewish neighbours. As many as two-thirds of the Jewish heads of households held managerial or employer status in industry, commerce, or the service trades. Over 16 per cent of them were engaged in professional occupations. The corresponding figures for the general population of Wembley were 19 and 7 per cent respectively. In order to eliminate the effects of this differential, the two sets of respondents were matched for social class by means of the Registrar General's occupational classification as modified by Guy Routh.[6]

The fieldwork therefore consisted of two series of interviews—one with a random sample of 40 Jewish families, the other with a control group of 40 non-Jewish ones.[7] Both were conducted by the author between October 1969 and July 1970; 35 of the families in each sample were covered completely, giving an overall response rate of 87·5 per cent. However, two Jewish families were interviewed only in part and have been included in the analysis wherever possible.

The emphasis on inter-generational relations necessitated the exclusion of all families without at least one child aged between 15 and 21 years. In each family both parents and the children within that age group were interviewed. However, in those instances where there were more than two children of the requisite age only the youngest and the oldest were interviewed.

The final sample included a total of 46 children. Comparison between the sexes, different age groups, or levels of education, was difficult because of the small numbers involved. Nevertheless, the size of these sub-groups should be noted. The sample was evenly divided between boys and girls. Nineteen of the children were under the age of 18, and 27 were aged 18 and over. As many as 42 per cent of the latter group were still engaged in full-time education. A further 20 per cent were involved in one form or another of part-time study and the remainder were working full-time.

The aim of the enquiry was threefold: to study the relationship between the contemporary Jewish family and the major social trends affecting the minority community; to investigate the nature and extent of the interaction between parents and their children; and to compare, wherever possible, the present position of the Jewish family with its non-Jewish counterpart. This particular article, however, is mainly concerned with one aspect of the enquiry—the attitudes of the parents and their children to intermarriage. Particular attention is paid to how they are influenced by the internal dynamics of the family, and the extent to which they pose a threat to communal survival.[8]

Friendship patterns

Parents tend to be particularly comfortable in the company of their fellow Jews (see Table 1 below). Over 55 per cent of them felt more at ease with their co-religionists.[9] Only a third of the children interviewed made such a distinction ($P < 0.005$).

TABLE 1. *Degree of comfort with Jews and non-Jews according to generation, in percentages*

	Parents (N=72)	*Children* (N=46)
More comfortable with Jews	55·6	32·6
Equally comfortable with Jews and non-Jews	40·3	50·0
Others [10]	4·2	17·4

All but one of the children explained their attitude in positive terms. They referred to a 'certain affinity' or an 'additional point of contact'. Their Jewish friends can 'speak the same language' and there is therefore 'something special about being with them'. Even those who were not at all observant felt 'that there is something which is the same between all Jewish people.'

Parents on the other hand were more likely to be sensitive to the attitudes and behaviour of non-Jews. Over 15 per cent of them suggested that antisemitism was an inherent characteristic which could never be eliminated. Thus one father, who described himself as a Yiddishist, thought 'that every non-Jew is a potential antisemite'. Others were only slightly more optimistic. A sales director explained, 'It may remain dormant in our affluent society, but in bad economic conditions it will come to the surface and Jews will be the scapegoat again.'

Just over a quarter of the parents thought that there was a 'permanent barrier' between Jews and non-Jews. This, they pointed out, made it necessary always to 'mind one's p's and q's' and 'be on the lookout for something'. Thus one respondent who was 'not uncomfortable with Gentiles', nevertheless said that he constantly felt 'afraid of saying the wrong things, or putting my foot in it somewhere along the line'. A woman who lived in the street with the highest density of Jewish population explained: 'We had non-Jewish neighbours for about 15 years. The first time I went into their house was when the husband died. I'm in and out of my Jewish neighbours' though. One is always on guard with non-Jews especially in this district because it is a fifty-fifty area. It's a tight knit community and very much a matter of them and us.'

These feelings were sometimes based on past experience. A wartime refugee recalled: 'Lots of my close friends in Germany turned on me

overnight, and that had a lasting effect. I've never had many non-Jewish friends in this country because I'm afraid of being snubbed again.'

Two-thirds of both the parents and children thought that there should be more social contact between Jews and non-Jews. They believed that 'the more one mixes the more one understands each other, and the barriers of prejudice get broken down.' Thus 'both sides getting to know each other is the best way of eliminating antisemitism.' Only by showing the Gentile population that 'we haven't got horns will the problem be solved.' Until now, however, the barriers against social integration appear to be stronger than the desire to achieve it, particularly in the older generation.

Children mix with non-Jewish people to a much greater extent than their parents do (see Table 2 below). Nevertheless, nearly 60 per cent of them have mainly Jewish friends. Less than a quarter, on the other hand, mix predominantly with non-Jews.

TABLE 2. *Friendship pattern according to generation, in percentages*

	Parents (N=72)	*Children* (N=46)
Mainly Jewish	83·3	58·7
Half Jewish, half non-Jewish	11·1	17·4
Mainly non-Jewish	4·2	23·9

($P < 0{\cdot}005$)

Friendship patterns are similar in and out of school. Social life tends to centre on Jewish youth clubs and dances. In addition, there are a number of commercial places of entertainment that seem to cater for a mainly Jewish clientele. 'When you go out you just find that non-Jews go to different places.' Consequently, most of the children mix mainly with Jewish classmates at school. As one sixth-former explained: 'It's funny, but we always stick together in school. I expect we've got more in common. Out of school I mix with Jewish people. We go to the same parties and clubs. In school we talk about where we're going over the weekend.'

Parents, on the other hand, make an important distinction between business and pleasure. They meet mainly Gentiles at work but socialize with Jews. An accountant, the majority of whose friends were Jewish, explained, 'I've got lots of non-Jewish clients and I get on OK with them but we don't mix socially. You don't have to watch what you say to the same extent with Jews.' Even when they do participate in non-sectarian clubs or organizations the respondents tend to congregate. As one of them who belonged to an English golf club said, 'When everybody's finished playing, the Jews always tend to get

together.' Unconsciously perhaps, Jewish people continue to seek one another out.

Dating patterns

The extent of the respondents' religious observance was ascertained on the basis of the degree of adherence to three areas of the traditional ritual pattern—the dietary laws, the Sabbath, and the festival of Passover.[11] The respondents were then divided into three overall levels so as to allow cross-tabulation with other relevant variables. Not surprisingly, a close correlation was found between the level of religious observance and dating patterns (see Table 3 below).

All but one of the children who observed none of the traditional rituals included in the interview schedule had gone out with non-Jewish partners; none of those who completely adhered to the religious observances investigated had done so ($P < 0{\cdot}025$). Altogether over 60 per cent of both the boys and girls had dated non-Jewish friends.[12]

TABLE 3. *Dating patterns according to level of religious observance, in percentages*

	None/Minimal (N=15)	*Standard* (N=21)	*Strict* (N=10)	*Total* (N=46)
Dated non-Jewish friends	73·3	71·4	20·0	60·9
Never dated non-Jewish friends	26·7	28·6	80·0	39·1

Just over 15 per cent of those who had not gone out with a non-Jewish person attributed it to the fact that they did not date at all. As many as 45 per cent 'don't have any non-Jewish friends' and therefore 'have no opportunity to date them'. They 'mix in Jewish youth circles and don't come into contact with non-Jews'.

A further 22 per cent simply preferred Jewish partners. One girl, for instance, thought that non-Jewish boys were 'horrid' although she later admitted: 'I haven't really mixed with them. I suppose there are some nice ones.' This preference was again attributed to the feeling of 'having more in common' with their co-religionists. A girl who was a first-year business management student had found that 'they can't take us out in the same way that Jewish boys can. Anyway we can't talk about the same things because we come from different backgrounds.'

Not dating Gentile friends was attributed by just over 15 per cent of the children to the 'fear of getting involved.' One boy, who was gradually becoming more observant, wanted to ensure that he did not get himself into a position in which he had to put his 'beliefs to the test'. A girl who appeared more sure of herself was nevertheless against

dating non-Jewish boys for a similar reason: 'I'm only in contact with Jewish people. I don't think I'd let the matter arise because what's the point if it gets serious and you can't marry them?'

Of particular interest is the fact that none of the children interviewed mentioned parental attitudes as the reason for not going out with non-Jewish friends. Instead, they pointed out that their parents objected only after they had been dating a non-Jewish partner over a period of time. 'They don't say anything if I go out once or twice, but they start telling me if it drags on for a few months.' One 18-year old boy was in conflict with his parents over a long-standing non-Jewish girl friend. 'They consider that for a boy of my age it's wrong just to know one person. They also want me to know more Jewish people. It's thrown at me the whole time and it doesn't help matters at all. I'd like them to understand that they're dealing with people and not just with their religion.'

Parental opposition to more mixing with non-Jews is based on the fear that it may lead to intermarriage. A distinction is therefore sometimes made between different age groups. They could see no objection to social contact with non-Jews for 'mature people, but with youngsters and students it's not good on the scale that it's taking place in the universities today. It leads to the fantastic amount of intermarriage that we're witnessing at the moment.'

Those who gave a qualified approval to more social contact with the Gentile community found it difficult to weigh up the merits and dangers involved: 'It's not easy, because if you say no it sounds bigoted and isolationist. Provided one doesn't become too involved it's a good thing because it breaks down prejudices. You must make sure that you don't become too involved though.' They believed that 'it's a good thing as long as nothing serious arises.'

All but one of the parents who objected to their children's dating patterns did so for that reason. A mother who had not been 'even allowed to talk to non-Jewish boys' explained: 'I'm not as narrow as that with my son but I would prefer if he didn't go out with non-Jewish girls. I don't particularly like it because I'm against intermarriage and one never knows how far it will go.' One of the respondents was particularly worried about his daughter: 'I'm very much against it especially as far as my daughter is concerned. I don't want her to marry out of the faith. If my son went out with a non-Jewish girl he would only be playing around and it wouldn't be anything serious, but with her it may develop into something serious.'

In this respect, therefore, children appear to give an accurate account of their parents' views. However, as many as one-third of those respondents whose children had dated non-Jewish friends did not like them doing so. At least one parent objected in over 40 per cent of such cases. Why, then, did such a small proportion of the younger generation refer to these parental attitudes?

Of those parents who disliked their children going out with Gentile friends, over 40 per cent did not try to persuade or prevent them from doing so. One father was violently opposed to his son taking out non-Jewish girls, but had reluctantly decided that 'you can't control youth today. What are you going to do? Hold his hand when he goes out the door?' His wife feared that, 'if you say too much you push them closer together.'

Those parents who attempted to persuade their children not to date non-Jewish friends only did so to a limited extent. One mother 'infinitely preferred' her daughter not to go out with non-Jewish boys, because of 'all the complications of marrying out'. Nevertheless she was only prepared to 'persuade them by discussion and would never forbid them to do so'. The father involved in the conflict mentioned above was 'just hoping it doesn't get to the point of marriage'. Yet he was using 'suggestion rather than persuasion', in the hope that his son's 'conscience would start bothering him'.

At most, respondents had tried to persuade their children to join a Jewish youth club. Thus one daughter reported: 'My mother wanted me to go around more with Jewish people. She doesn't enforce anything, but she has spoken to me once or twice about joining the synagogue youth club. I haven't though.' In fact, all but one of the parents who had attempted, in one way or another, to prevent their children from going out with non-Jewish partners considered that it had been of no avail. One father, for instance, thought that it was 'like knocking your head against a brick wall.'

Parental opposition is therefore more widespread than the children's responses would lead us to believe. However, as a result of the lack of any persuasion at all by many respondents, and the limited action by the remainder, a number of children may have come to the conclusion that their parents were not really opposed to their dating Gentiles. Parental preferences, if not backed up by positive action, appear to have little or no effect.

Intermarriage: attitudes

Attitudes towards intermarriage were closely related to the level of religious observance (see Table 4 below). Within the group of strictly observant children there is categorical opposition to intermarriage. At the other extreme, four-fifths would consider marrying out, and even at the intermediate levels as many as two-thirds would seriously think of doing so. Consequently, over half the children interviewed would consider marrying a Gentile person. Just over a third, on the other hand, were not prepared to entertain the idea. Three-quarters of those who were against intermarriage explained their attitude in terms of Jewish factors. Some children emphasized their own personal

TABLE 4. *Children's attitude to intermarriage according to level of religious observance, in percentages*

	None/Minimal (N=15)	*Standard* (N=21)	*Strict* (N=10)	*Total* (N=46)
Would consider intermarriage	80·0	66·7	0·0	56·5
Would not consider intermarriage	6·7	23·8	100·0	34·8
Don't know	13·3	9·5	0·0	8·7

($P < 0{\cdot}001$)

involvement. One girl, who was already engaged to a Jewish boy, said: 'I would never have considered the idea of marrying anyone non-Jewish because I like my religion too much.' Others stressed the communal aspects; for example, 'I think that Judaism and the Jewish people have to survive and you have to do your best to continue it.' The importance of the family was mentioned by both groups. Respondents wanted 'to have a Jewish home' or felt that 'the family is the prime unit of Judaism'.

Intermarriage would sometimes be considered on the condition that the Gentile partner be converted to the Jewish faith. Thus a final year mathematics student, who taught at the local Hebrew classes, explained: 'I am proud of my heritage and my religion. I couldn't adapt my life to someone who was not Jewish and I'd like my children to be Jewish. I'd think of marrying a woman who was prepared to convert, though.' That course of action, it was hoped, would preserve tradition and prevent conflict.

Half of those opposed to marrying out adopted a negative attitude for pragmatic reasons.[13] They felt that intermarriage inevitably leads to discord and conflict and should therefore be avoided. As one 17-year-old girl explained, 'I haven't met any non-Jewish boys whom I wanted to go out with for a long time. I don't believe that people from different backgrounds and religions can mix together and marry each other. I don't think it can work out.'

Only three of the children interviewed would not entertain the idea of marrying out because their parents were opposed to it. Even then parental attitudes appeared to be a rather peripheral factor. One of those concerned, a student at Manchester University, said, 'I wouldn't be able to live the way I'd like to if I married someone non-Jewish. My parents impressed on me that they wouldn't like it and I suppose that also has an effect.'

A similar pattern occurred among those who were prepared to marry out. Just over 60 per cent of them thought that difficulties would arise if they actually did so. Less than half of these, however, mentioned parental opposition as a potential obstacle to marital success. A boy whose only attachment to things Jewish was that he was born

a Jew, thought that his final decision would depend on the extent to which his parents objected to him intermarrying. This was due to the fact that he had a friend 'whose father went into hospital because of the continuous rows about his marrying out'. But again parental attitudes often seemed to be of only marginal importance. Thus another boy regarded them as the least pressing of the problems involved in marrying out: 'There's the question of how to get married, the religious upbringing of my children and what my parents would think. They wouldn't really mind although they'd prefer me to marry a Jewish girl.'

In actual fact, however, nearly two-thirds of the parents interviewed (63·9 per cent) said that they would be unhappy if their children married out. A further 25 per cent would 'prefer them to marry someone who is Jewish' or would adopt different attitudes depending on 'circumstances' or 'the person concerned'. Only a small proportion, it seems, had no reservations at all.

Those respondents who are affiliated to a synagogue are more likely than non-members to be opposed to intermarriage. Nearly three-quarters of the former group would be unhappy if any of their children married out; less than a quarter of the non-members would be upset in such a situation ($P < 0{\cdot}001$). In addition, parents who belong to a United Synagogue adopt a negative attitude towards marrying out more often than do those affiliated to Reform and Liberal congregations. Just over half of the latter would be upset if one of their children married out; nearly 85 per cent of the United Synagogue members would be unhappy if such a situation were to arise ($P < 0{\cdot}05$). Not surprisingly, therefore, a close correlation was also found among parents between the level of religious observance and attitudes to intermarriage (see Table 5 below).

TABLE 5. *Parental attitudes to intermarriage according to level of religious observance, in percentages*[14]

	None/Minimal (N=23)	*Standard* (N=30)	*Strict* (N=19)	*Total* (N=72)
Very unhappy	26·1	40·0	100·0	51·4
Unhappy	13·0	20·0	0·0	12·5
Prefer otherwise	13·0	16·7	0·0	11·1
Would depend on person/circumstances	21·0	10·0	0·0	11·1
Indifferent	26·1	13·3	0·0	13·9

($P < 0{\cdot}001$)

Mothers are more likely than fathers to be against intermarriage (see Table 6 below). Neither of the parents had any misgivings about their children marrying out in only 15 per cent of the families studied.

Again, it is necessary to consider why the younger generation referred to these parental attitudes in such a small proportion of cases.

TABLE 6. *Parental attitude to intermarriage according to sex, in percentages*

	Fathers (N=36)	*Mothers* (N=36)	*Parents* (N=72)
Very unhappy	47·3	55·6	51·4
Unhappy	16·7	8·4	12·5
Prefer otherwise	8·4	13·9	11·1
Would depend on person/circumstances	11·1	11·1	11·1
Indifferent	16·7	11·1	13·9

Intermarriage: family dynamics

Parents are aware of, and influenced by, the general English middle-class model of the proper parent-child relationship: the grown child is an autonomous individual who must be allowed to make his own decisions and, if necessary, learn from his own mistakes. Some of them would have liked to assert more influence, but they realize that in the present climate of opinion it would have no effect at all, or perhaps even an adverse one. Consequently, a laissez-faire attitude is often adopted.

Only one of the parents interviewed referred to the traditional practice of 'sitting shiva' for a child who has married out, and then only to say that he did not intend to do so in such an eventuality: 'I wouldn't sit shiva for them but I'd put every obstacle in their way. I definitely wouldn't help them financially.' There were a few other parents who would prevent their children from intermarrying with 'whatever measures are available at the time'. One father who considered that 'nothing could be worse' than one of his children marrying out, affirmed that he would 'raise heaven and earth' if such a situation were to arise.

Many respondents, however, were rather perplexed about how to tackle the problem should one of their children decide to intermarry. Thus the mother of two daughters asked, 'I'd like to meet the Jewish parent who doesn't try, but how can you prevent it? I'd be so flabbergasted I wouldn't know what to do.' Another exclaimed, 'What can you do, lock them up?' Consequently, despite the widespread opposition to marrying out, only 15 per cent of the parents would do anything more than use persuasion. They would not attempt to 'influence the situation in any material way'.

A number of respondents would refrain from any 'threatening action' as a 'matter of principle': 'Children have to work out things for themselves' and the 'ultimate decision' is therefore left to them. One father went so far as to say, 'I don't prevent them doing anything because we've all got the right to look after ourselves. I'd only give my views if

asked to do so.' Similarly, a mother, one of whose children had already married out, believed that 'one hasn't got the right to have any objection to it.'

Others would do little for rather more pragmatic reasons. Action, it was widely believed, is unlikely to have any effect: 'I wouldn't try to stop him. I'd just talk to him; there's nothing else you can do and it wouldn't help anyhow.' In fact, it was often felt that concerted action might even have a negative effect. 'The more you prevent them, the more you push them into it.' One mother, who said she would be 'disappointed' if her son were to marry out, explained: 'I'd try and persuade him that it's not the wisest thing to do but I wouldn't do anything drastic about it. I'd let him know how I feel because it ought to be done against opposition but you must be careful not to push them into the pattern you want to avoid by opposing them.' This attitude was perhaps best illustrated by the case of a mother who had married out, but was opposed to either of her two daughters following her example. She 'would try and prevent them in a very subtle way—not the way my parents tried with me.'

'Forceful action' was also regarded as a threat to the parent-child relationship. This was a price that the respondents were not prepared to pay. Their main consideration would be, 'I'm not going to lose my child.' One father, both of whose brothers had married out, considered that 'it's better to have a son with a non-Jewish wife who visits you than a son you'll never see again'. Another, who thought the chances of an intermarriage being successful were very low, would 'sooner accept the situation than lose a child'. He even felt it his duty to 'help make the marriage a success'.

For a wide variety of reasons parents seem unwilling or unable to influence the marital decisions of their children. Not surprisingly, therefore, only scant attention is paid to their point of view. Those children who would not entertain the idea of intermarriage hardly ever adopt such an attitude simply for fear of parental disapproval; those who would seriously consider marrying out rarely mentioned parental opposition as a potential barrier to marital success.

Intermarriage: communal survival

Few parents, it seems, are prepared to combat intermarriage forcefully. Rather, they try to come to some form of accommodation with it. Marrying out is therefore less likely to become a source of family tension; it becomes instead an increasingly serious threat to communal survival. Thus major statistical surveys of British Jewry have indicated that 'the Jewish population in this country is declining at a substantial rate'. This is largely due to the 'changes in communal cohesion leading to marriage out of the group'.[15]

Adherence to Jewish law or concern with Jewish identity are no longer the main rationale for opposing intermarriage. Indeed, marrying out is no longer regarded as wrong, merely unwise. 'Married life has got enough problems without looking for more. Marrying somebody non-Jewish is asking for trouble, so why get into it?'

Nearly two-thirds of the parents who were opposed to intermarriage adopted this pragmatic approach. Even those who were not at all observant considered that conflict was likely to occur. Thus a father who adhered to none of the traditional rituals preferred his daughter 'to marry someone with a Jewish background because of the mutual interest and that feeling of Judaism that is within you even if you're not a practising Jew. Difficulties arise even if you're not religious.'

Relations between husband and wife appear to be the main source of anxiety: 'I don't believe in intermarriage with the problems of coming from different backgrounds. Married life has got enough difficulties without a mixed marriage. Things may look good at the time but it wouldn't be right after the heat of the moment.' Some parents feared that in the first quarrel their child would be called 'a dirty Jew' or 'a bloody Jewish bitch'. 'The difficulties involved in bringing up the children of a mixed marriage' and 'problems with in-laws and other members of the family' were also mentioned as being potentially disruptive.

However, it is gradually being recognized that intermarriages are sometimes successful. 'The chances of lasting happiness are rather small because of the differences in outlook and background, but on the other hand there are plenty that have worked out.' This growing awareness will probably make parental opposition both more difficult and less likely. Intermarriage will in turn become more frequent and less unacceptable.

Communal sanctions have been suggested as a way of remedying this situation. They would, it is hoded, reduce the rate of intermarriage and re-activate the stigma attached to it.[16] However, marrying out is the result rather than the cause of the decline in communal cohesion. Remedial action based on a symptom, albeit the most important one of an underlying malaise, is unlikely to prove effective. The problem must be tackled at its source—in the home.

The lack of parental influence is due to two major factors—the more pragmatic approach to the question of intermarriage and the middle-class model of the proper parent-child relationship. Little can be done to offset the growing democratization of the family. Emphasis must therefore be placed on the declining concern with religious observance in particular and Jewish identity in general. Hence the determination of both the spiritual and lay leaders of Anglo-Jewry to make education the community's prime concern, and to improve upon the present low standards.

The Wembley Jewish community is no exception to the general situation. The vast majority of parents attached considerable importance to the Jewish education of their children. Nevertheless, the amount received and therefore the standard attained was very low. Under 10 per cent of the children had attended a Jewish day school. On the other hand, as many as 15 per cent received no Jewish education whatever. The remainder had been enrolled at synagogue Hebrew classes. Just under 25 per cent of the children interviewed had attended for five years or less, and exactly half of them for a longer period. However, as many as 80 per cent of this group only went on Sunday morning. The twice-weekly sessions were rarely attended.

An Australian research study has indicated that the length and intensity of Jewish education influence both the level of religious observance and ethnic identification. However, without the support of a favourable home environment it appears to have only a marginal effect.[17] This conflict of values may also account for the fact that the limited evidence available on the effect of Jewish education in England suggests that it has no influence on attitudes towards intermarriage, and may even have a negative one on attitudes towards religious observance.[18]

Tension between home and school did in fact occur in a number of families. A father who adhered to none of the traditional observances, and who had joined a synagogue only for the sake of his children, explained: 'I tried to send them to Sunday School and take them to services, but they realized that I was not religious and that it means very little to me. I didn't try very hard because children are influenced by your way of life rather than by what you tell them.'

Not surprisingly, therefore, those concerned with the future of the Jewish community are becoming increasingly aware of the need to forge as many links as possible between home and school. Parental interest and participation in the running of the various educational institutions is the first step. The ultimate goal, however, must be 'to change their way of life so that the home may become a model of Jewish living'.[19] Otherwise formal education will have little or no effect. The family, for better or worse, still holds the key to Jewish survival.[20]

NOTES

[1] Maurice Freedman, ed., *A Minority in Britain*, Valentine Mitchell, London, 1955, p. xi.

[2] Maurice Freedman and Julius Gould, 'Topics and Methods of Future Research: Sociological', in Julius Gould and Shaul Esh, eds., *Jewish Life in Modern Britain*, London, 1964, pp. 142, 144–5.

[3] Michael Wallach, 'Marrying Out', *Jewish Chronicle*, 23 May 1969, p. 7.

[4] Marshall Sklare, 'Intermarriage and Jewish Survival', *Commentary*, vol. 49, no. 3, March 1970, p. 53.

[5] The two polling districts within the Wembley parliamentary constituencies which had the highest densities of Jewish population were selected as the fieldwork area—Town Hall West (30 per cent) and Wembley Park West (16·7 per cent). Strictly speaking the results of the survey only apply to these two districts, but for the sake of brevity the area of investigation will always be referred to as Wembley.

[6] Guy Routh, *Occupation and Pay in Great Britain 1906–1960*, Cambridge, 1965, pp. 155–7.

[7] Self-identification was used as the operational definition of Jewishness, following the principle adopted in those countries where questions on religion are included in the national census. As a result, the sample included one family in which the wife had married out and the husband had since been converted to Judaism. However, since the religion of each family was ascertained according to that of the husband alone, the sample also included two cases in which the husband had intermarried and the wives had not been converted.

[8] For further details of the other aspects of the enquiry, see Gerald Cromer, *A Comparison of Jewish and Non-Jewish Family Life with Special Reference to Intergenerational Relations*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Nottingham, 1973.

[9] No significant difference was found between the foreign-born (25 per cent) and native-born parents (75 per cent) in this respect.

[10] This group consists mainly of those respondents who made a distinction among different types of Jew. Very orthodox ones were regarded as a source of discomfort.

[11] Each of these areas of the traditional ritual pattern was particularly suitable for the purpose of subdividing the respondents according to their level of religious observance. Other important rituals (e.g., Yom Kippur) were not included in the interview schedule because it would have been more difficult to delineate the different standards of observance and therefore to divide the respondents according to their degree of adherence to them.

[12] This is an overall figure for the entire 15–21 years age group. The proportion of children who will have dated non-Jewish friends by the time they reach the upper age limit of the sample will therefore be much greater.

[13] The total is above 100 per cent because a number of children mentioned both Jewish and pragmatic reasons for their opposition to intermarriage.

[14] The odd number of respondents in two of the sub-groups is due to the fact that there was a marked difference in the level of religious observance between husband and wife in one of the families studied.

[15] S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool, 'Statistics of Jewish Marriages in Great Britain: 1901–1965', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. IX, no. 2, December 1967, pp. 149–74; S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool, 'The size and Structure of the Anglo-Jewish Population, 1960–1965', *JJS*, vol. X, no. 1, June 1968, pp. 5–34.

[16] Immanuel Jakobovits, *Intermarriage and Conversion*, United Synagogue, London, 1972, p. 7.

[17] John Goldlust, 'Jewish Education and Ethnic Identification: A Study of Jewish Adolescents in Australia', *Jewish Education*, vol. 40, no. 2, Summer 1970, pp. 58–9.

[18] Vera West, 'The Influence of Parental Background on Jewish University Students', *JJS*, vol. X, no. 2, December 1968, p. 277; Bernard Wasserstein, 'Jewish Identification Among Students at Oxford', *JJS*, vol. XIII, no. 2, December 1971, p. 143.

[19] Fannie Chipman, 'Parents—Are They Expendable'? *Jewish Education*, vol. 41, no. 3, Spring 1972, p. 11.

[20] For a more detailed analysis of this argument, see the author's 'Home and School: The Interaction Between Jewish Education and Family Background', *Jewish Education*, vol. 43, no. 1, 1973, pp. 29–35.

THE RECEPTION OF POLITICAL ZIONISM IN ENGLAND: PATTERNS OF ALIGNMENT AMONG THE CLERGY AND RABBINATE, 1895–1904

Stuart A. Cohen

THE Anglo-Jewish community occupied a place of particular importance in Herzl's early attempts to win support for political Zionism. As he himself subsequently put it: 'The still existing happy position of the English Jews, their high standard of culture, their proud adherence to the old race', as well as the power of the nation of which they were citizens, 'caused them to appear to me as the right men to realise the Zionistic idea'.[1] It was in London, therefore, that Herzl initially proposed to establish the headquarters of his Society of Jews; to an Anglo-Jewish group ('The Order of Ancient Maccabeans') that he looked for some of his first recruits; and in the *Jewish Chronicle* that he first published his ideas.[2] Within Herzl's own lifetime, however, political Zionism evoked more response from Gentiles in England than from the Jews. The British Government did, at least, offer the Zionists a settlement in East Africa.[3] The vast majority of Anglo-Jewry remained either indifferent to the idea or opposed it. Although the East End masses evinced considerable enthusiasm during Herzl's occasional public appearances in London, it was generally short-lived.[4] Even more disconcerting was the fact that the leaders of the community failed to provide him with the expected financial backing and political contacts.[5] They were equally unimpressed by both his ostentatious appearances at fashionable garden parties and his demonstrative appeals to the Fourth Zionist Congress in London.[6] Even those who were members of the older Chovevei Zion ('Lovers of Zion') movement were hesitant. Its leading officers did grant Herzl an interview (albeit somewhat reluctantly) in 1896; but in 1897 they voted by a two-thirds majority to reject his invitation to the First Zionist Congress. Being fearful of 'too bold an advance' beyond piecemeal colonization, they refused to participate in a public demand for an independent Jewish state.[7]

Several factors militated against Anglo-Jewry's early acceptance of

Herzlian Zionism. One, as later historians have noted, was ideological; for many among the immigrant community, especially, the attraction of socialism was too strong to leave much room for Herzl's ideas. Indeed, it was generally believed in some quarters that 'Zionism was engineered by capitalists in order to draw off the attention of Jews from the general social question'.[8] A further reason, as a distinguished contemporary pointed out, was structural. In a community divided between assimilationist-inclined 'apes', religiously-fearful 'asses', and missionary-minded 'foxes', there was no place for the Zionist lamb.[9] The *Jewish Chronicle*, certainly, gave political Zionism full coverage, even during the hostile editorship of Asher Myers.[10] Otherwise, however, the community leaders were determined to stifle discussion of the subject at any recognized communal forum. Thus, the leaders of the Anglo-Jewish Association overwhelmingly voted not to accept an invitation to the Clerkenwell Conference of English Zionists;[11] the Board of Deputies 'steadfastly abstained from discussing' the matter;[12] and the Maccabeans—after an initial series of debates on Zionism—virtually banned all mention of the subject after 1901.[13] The general attitude was expressed by F. D. Mocatta, Vice-President of the Jewish Board of Guardians. As early as 1896, he had dismissed Herzl's plan as 'utterly impractical'. Thereafter, he made every effort to have the topic removed from the communal agenda. Thus, when in 1903 the community pondered some form of united reaction to the Kishinev pogrom, he was determined that 'the name of Zionism shall not in any way be brought into the question'.[14] To some extent, this situation also prevailed at the level of the local synagogue. Thus, when several Zionists attempted to persuade the boards of management of their synagogues to convene a general meeting of the members 'for the purpose of considering the Zionist Question', their motions were ruled out of order.[15] Some synagogue authorities also refused to allow Zionist meetings to be held on their premises.[16] It is hardly surprising, therefore, that English Zionists should have suspected a 'boycott' on the part of the communal leaders against Herzl and his followers, and a 'dead set against the movement in official and representative circles'.[17]

One recognized and official public platform from which it proved impossible to exclude debate on Zionism was the synagogue pulpit. In general terms it may be true to say that in Edwardian Anglo-Jewry 'the important debates in society were increasingly conducted by intellectuals in the secular humanities', and not by the clergy.[18] Many community Reverends, overwhelmed by their duties as bookkeepers, debt-collectors, almoners and cantors,[19] rarely had the time (even when they had the ability) to make a serious contribution to the intellectual life of their congregations. Nevertheless, a significantly large proportion of the Anglo-Jewish clergy and rabbinate did discuss political Zionism in both their sermons and their writings. The *Jewish*

Chronicle protested that 'the synagogue is a place of worship, it is not the battleground of rival political factions',[20] but the rage of debate did not subside. Herzl's plans were discussed at almost every conceivably suitable opportunity in the Jewish calendar, and by representatives of every shade of religious opinion. Thus, the debate was not restricted to the sermons delivered by ministers to established congregations under the aegis of the United Synagogue (led by Chief Rabbi Hermann Adler) and the Sephardi congregations (led by Haham Moses Gaster). The merits of the case were also weighed during the course of intricate discourses to predominantly immigrant 'chevras' by traditional rabbis who had been born and bred in eastern Europe. Simultaneously, they were pondered by occasional preachers to the Reform communities and to the more liberal Jewish Religious Union recently founded by Claude Montefiore.

The discussion was in several instances invited and welcomed by the Zionists. As early as 1896 Herzl had elicited from the Rev. Simeon Singer a promise to advocate Zionism from his pulpit at the New West End Synagogue;[21] by 1903 the executive committee of the English Zionist Federation had made specific arrangements to provide synagogues with Zionist preachers during the forthcoming Passover festival.[22] But Herzl's opponents were equally active, and the Zionists sometimes discovered that the pulpit could be used as effectively against them as they hoped that it might have been employed on their behalf.[23] Indeed, as one immigrant observer pointed out, anti-Zionism was the one issue which appeared to generate any heat among the otherwise docile Anglo-Jewish clergy.[24]

The extent of the clerical discussion of political Zionism cannot be attributed solely to the propaganda value of the pulpit. Such a limited explanation would appear to ignore the fact that Herzl's scheme raised issues of theological, as well as political, importance. Admittedly, Anglo-Jewish preachers did not limit themselves to the strictly religious aspects of political Zionism, but also ventured their opinions on a range of purely secular issues. Was antisemitism indeed as inevitable as the Zionists asserted it to be?[25] Was there any point in the Jews founding what could only become a mini-Serbia in the Near East?[26] Was there any justification for raising possible doubts concerning the loyalty to Britain of those members of the community who would choose not to settle in the proposed Jewish state?[27] But not even the recurrence of such questions could mask the more fundamental issue of the possible theocratic character of the future state. This was a subject on which the clergy might legitimately claim the right to express an informed opinion. It was also one on which their counsel, together with that of the Zionists themselves, was expressly sought.

Herzl himself rarely doubted the practicability of separating Church from State.[28] L. J. Greenberg, his lieutenant in England, equally

blandly maintained that 'with the Jewish religion they, as Zionists, had nothing to do'.[29] But others found it far more difficult to ignore the question of rabbinic authority and of the enforced obedience of biblical law. Israel Zangwill, for instance, wanted information on the future position of the 'vexatious agricultural question' of the Sabbatical year;[30] Lucien Wolf enquired whether the state would permit polygamy or prescribe monogamy;[31] and various correspondents to the *Jewish Chronicle* asked whether 'If we lived in Palestine . . . the law would compel everyone to "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it Holy" '?[32] Such questions could hardly be satisfactorily answered by the empty hypothesis that 'those laws which Jews know best and desire to observe the most will . . . be the governing force in a Jewish state.'[33] Neither was it sufficient merely to wait upon events. Herzl's supporters may have found comfort in Rabbi A. Werner's advice to 'leave it to the Zionists to pursue their own course'.[34] His opponents no doubt derived equal satisfaction from the loud silence of many clergy on this point and from the admitted puzzlement of others.[35] Few were as convinced as Claude Montefiore that 'the State would have to leave religion severely alone'.[36] Not many were as forthright as Rabbi I. C. Daiches (at Leeds) in declaring that there was little point in an orthodox Jew supporting Zionism unless he could be assured of living under rabbinic rule.[37] Most appear to have shared Lucien Wolf's appreciation of the dilemma posed by the possibility that a theocracy would offend the modern political spirit and that a democracy would not satisfy traditional religious expectations.[38]

The debate which consequently ensued among Anglo-Jewish rabbis, preachers, and clergymen would appear to merit a closer examination than it has been accorded hitherto. Much attention has been focused on the split which political Zionism caused within the ranks of the community's laity (particularly in 1917);[39] but the differences to which it gave rise among the religious leadership at an earlier period have suffered proportional neglect. The numerous, and often vehement, sermons delivered on the subject in England during Herzl's lifetime have not been studied to the same degree as have the parallel polemics in America, Germany, and eastern Europe. Neither has an attempt been made to discern whether the attitudes adopted by the different sections of the Anglo-Jewish clergy correspond to any theological, institutional, or social pattern. The present paper proposes to illustrate the extent of that deficiency. The sample from which the evidence is drawn cannot claim to be comprehensive. The personalities discussed were usually the more prominent, articulate, and explicit exponents of the various positions, and not the majority. No attempt will therefore be made to posit an all-embracing pattern of clerical alignment on this issue. Rather, attention will be drawn to the difficulties of doing so.

The nominal religious affiliations of the parties to the debate does not provide a comprehensive guide to their respective views on political Zionism. Neither did the contrasting receptions accorded to Herzl's scheme harden existing differences between the various religious trends within the community. On the contrary, the possibility that this topic might provide at least one platform for agreement between the 'orthodox' and 'progressive' elements had become evident even before the advent of Herzl himself. It is significant, for instance, that Claude Montefiore found only one argument truly worthy of praise in an otherwise scathing criticism of Michael Friedlander's *The Jewish Religion.* The relevant passage[40] reads:

> The hope with which our religion inspires us can never lead us to intrigues, political combinations, insurrection, or warfare for the purpose of reconquering Palestine and appointing a Jewish government . . . Even if a band of adventurers were to succeed in regaining Palestine for the Jews by means of arms, or reacquiring the Holy Land by purchasing it from the present owners, we should not see in such an event the consummation of our hopes.

This is not to imply that these two wings of religious thought came to their view of political Zionism along exactly the same path. Montefiore's opposition, for instance, stemmed from his belief in the universal nature of the Jewish mission, which could be accomplished only if the religion were freed from the restraints of nationalism.[41] For Friedlander, by contrast, the return of Israel to the Holy Land was an essential facet of the Messianic era. His objection was less to the ultimate goal of the Zionists than to their proposal to attain it without awaiting Divine deliverance.[42] The point to be made, however, is that not even such conflicting approaches precluded agreement between the two wings on opposition to Zionism. Indeed, by the turn of the century it had become even more evident that, as O. J. Simon pointed out, 'the words "orthodox" or "reform" are entirely misleading in this matter'.[43] Simon himself provides one clear instance of this lack of demarcation. He certainly disagreed with Chief Rabbi Adler on the possibility of joint Jewish-Christian religious services. Yet, he so completely agreed with his opposition to Zionism that he even quoted Adler's opinions when addressing predominantly Gentile audiences.[44]

The extent to which the debate on political Zionism among the religious leaders confounded their existing demarcations was further evident at the institutional level. Neither the strength of the organizational ties among preachers within a particular affiliation, nor the particular authority of any single individual (lay or cleric) within the community, completely governed alignments in the reception of Herzl's scheme. Attention must be drawn, rather, to the examples which illustrate the failure of the official leadership to ensure a consistent pattern among the clergy and rabbinate. The United Synagogue constituted

the most highly organized religious institution in Anglo-Jewry, and within that body Chief Rabbi Adler's ecclesiastical rank often seemed thinly to disguise executive control over his ministers. Not even he, however, proved capable of imposing his views on political Zionism throughout his clergy. Admittedly, most other United Synagogue ministers shared Adler's opinion that political Zionism was not only opposed to the teachings of Judaism, but 'impolitic, aye, charged with great peril'.[45] Simeon Singer, in particular, argued that 'an artificially enforced return to Jewish statehood would invite material, moral and religious disaster'.[46] But the feeling was not universal. Both Gollancz at Bayswater and A. A. Green at Hampstead (neither of whom was a convinced Zionist) could never really rid themselves of the suspicion that the movement had much to commend it.[47] Similarly, the degree of unanimity among preachers to progressive congregations must not be exaggerated. The majority did agree with Claude Montefiore that, as he told Herzl, political Zionism demanded a 'revolution' in their views.[48] Morris Joseph and Philip Magnus equally 'abhorred' the notion of a militant Jewish state;[49] Israel Abrahams and Lilian Montagu were equally upset by the thought that Jewish enthusiasm might be wasted 'over a conception which has no roots in the past and no fruits to offer for the future'.[50] Abrahams went as far as to ask Zangwill to write some stories 'to do justice to the "Assimilationist". The class of those who retain a deep Jewish sentiment, yet are not Zionists . . . these people are much misunderstood.'[51] Yet, dissenting voices could be heard in this camp too. Dr. Strauss in Bradford, as well as the Rev. I. Harriss in London and the Rev. A. Wolf in Manchester, all of whom preached from Reform pulpits, expressed the view that it was 'the duty of all true Jews to support the Zionist cause.'[52]

In neither the United Synagogue nor the progressive congregations was the recalcitrant nature of some of the clergy reflected by a similar division within the laity. Adler's views were largely supported by the President of the United Synagogue, Lord Rothschild,[53] and Joseph's opinions were publicly echoed by a warden of his synagogue, Laurie Magnus.[54] Within the Sephardi community and the Federation of Synagogues, however, the lack of a unified attitude was more pronounced. Thus, even the clerical authority of Haham Moses Gaster and the distinguished ancestry of Sir Francis Montefiore proved insufficient to win over other members of the Sephardi congregation to their pro-Zionist view.[55] Indeed, at their annual meeting in January 1899, the elders of the Bevis Marks Synagogue passed a motion asking Gaster to abstain from taking further part in Zionist agitation. They also instructed him to state on every occasion at which he addressed public meetings that his views were personal, and not those of his congregation.[56] At the Federation, the roles were reversed. A personal visit from Herzl did not convert its President, Sir Samuel Montagu, to

political Zionism; he remained convinced that support for the scheme would be both unbecoming to a patriotic Englishman and irresponsible on the part of a religious Jew.[57] Consequently, he utilized his official position and public influence to urge the clerical functionaries of the Federation to 'prevent the poor Jews of the East End from becoming involved in [these] ill-judged schemes'.[58] However, despite some initial response, his writ was not instantly obeyed. Within two years Montagu again found it necessary to remind his clergy of their duties.[59] His later proposal to omit Zionism from the agenda of a forthcoming conference on the affiliation of provincial synagogues to the Federation met with stiff opposition and proved one cause of the poor attendance.[60]

The difficulties of establishing a comprehensive theological or institutional factor in the attitude of the Anglo-Jewish religious leadership towards political Zionism is complemented by the lack of a clear sociological distinction. At one level, opposition to Zionism does appear to have been the preserve of the clerical 'establishment', very much as it was also the passion of the lay leadership. Indeed, at times the two arms of the 'Anglicized' sector of the community seemed to join forces against the Zionists. Thus Adler and Montefiore vehemently opposed Gaster, and loyally supported each other, when the Romanian-born Haham attempted to introduce the subject of Zionism into the councils of the Anglo-Jewish Association in 1898 and 1899.[61] Similarly, Singer and Montagu, despite their disagreement on the propriety of the Religious Union, were united in denouncing the 'rabble rousing' tactics of the Zionists in the East End. Montagu refused Herzl's offer to chair a meeting at the Working Men's Club, and Singer challenged Gaster to stand for election by a popular vote of his congregation.[62] Even when anti-Zionist views were expressed by clerics who were not of English birth, a similar pattern might sometimes be detected. The opinion that there was no need for a Zionist movement, and that true Sabbath observance would of itself bring about the promised redemption, was expressed by the Polish-born Dayan B. Spiers.[63] Some of the severest criticisms of Herzl were voiced by the recently arrived *magid* (preacher) from Kamenets, H. Z. Maccoby.[64] Yet these men, too, were associated with (albeit not part of) the establishment. Spiers was known to be personally attached to Adler[65] and Maccoby, it was asserted, was influenced by the fact that he received a stipend from Montagu.[66]

Within this context, some significance might also be attributed to the alignment of the parties in the Liverpool Shehitah trial of February 1904. Many contemporaries regarded that case as an important stage in the struggle waged by the immigrant rabbis for status and authority in a land ruled by Adler's pontifical regime. At issue was the latter's right to declare ritually impure (*taref*) meat sold by butchers who were

trading under a licence issued, not by the Chief Rabbi, but by the local immigrant Rabbi, Gershon Ravinsohn. Among Adler's witnesses for the defence was at least one avowed anti-Zionist (Montagu); those for the prosecution included two well-known Zionists, Werner and Y. Rabinowitz.[67] It might also be noted that within Liverpool itself, Ravinsohn, a supporter of Zionism, preached to a largely immigrant flock. But his colleague at the Old Hebrew Congregation in Princess Road (Rev. S. Friedeberg) opposed Herzl's scheme.[68] Moreover, the latter also ministered to a congregation which paid his salary from a bequest which specifically stated that the Minister had to be English and born to English parents.[69]

The overall social picture, however, was somewhat more complicated. It would not appear legitimate wholly to classify the differing attitudes towards political Zionism in terms of the struggle between the established clergy and the independent new arrivals. Any attempt to do so would, firstly, have to ignore the parallel debate taking place within the latter's eastern European countries of origin. Secondly, it would fail to correlate with the situation among that group within Britain itself. At least one contemporary observer noted that some of the staunchest pockets of resistance to Herzl's ideas were to be found precisely among the immigrant communities.[70] Zangwill had already portrayed a similar situation among his own *Children of the Ghetto*.[71] As a contemporary later noted, even within a single immigrant congregation (the Sunderland Bet ha-Medrash) successive religious leaders might express totally different opinions.[72] The immigrant rabbis' attitude towards Herzl, far from being one of consistent support, exhibited elements of rejection as well as of attraction.

Support for political Zionism among this group stemmed from a variety of sources. One, undoubtedly, was that to many of them a reborn Jewish state in Palestine seemed the only escape from the dual threat of religious disintegration in the land of their adoption and Tsarist oppression in the land of their origin.[73] Furthermore, no orthodox rabbi could deny that there were religious precepts which it was possible to fulfil only in the Holy Land (*mitsvot ha-teluyot ba'arets*).[74] Neither would he have wished to release himself from the love of Zion inculcated by the generations who prayed for the Return. Before the advent of Herzl, even Adler and Singer had waxed poetic on the beauty of Palestine and the glories of the future Messiah.[75] But sympathy with a future religious aspiration did not necessarily imply support for a contemporary political movement. Thus, very few of the immigrant rabbis were prepared to go as far as M. J. Wigoder (at Dublin), who favourably compared Herzl and his supporters with the most faithful Israelites of the exodus from Egypt.[76] Detached from the mainstream of debate in eastern and central Europe, many preferred to wait upon events and most adopted a more guarded attitude.[77]

They proved hesitant to join forces with the non-orthodox elements in the Zionist camp,[78] and were reluctant to challenge the traditional argument that a spiritual return to Judaism was the soundest recipe for a national return to Zion. As Daiches put it in a sermon at Leeds[79]: The Jews

> will not be restored to their country and their land until they rectify their values and innermost thoughts. Only then will the Lord gather us from the four corners of the earth and lead us upright to our land.

The guarded ambivalence which characterized the attitude of many orthodox rabbis towards political Zionism was particularly evident in December 1902. A conference of immigrant rabbis was then convened in Manchester, precisely in order to discuss the attitude which they should take towards Herzl's scheme. The dozen assembled rabbis do appear to have been aware of the growing popular support for Zionism. After two days of intensive discussion in closed sessions they finally agreed 'to play a full part in the Zionist movement'. They also published a manifesto (which followed the line taken by Rabbi I. Reines and the Mizrahi movement in Europe) calling upon their congregations to buy shares in the Jewish Colonial Trust. But their accompanying resolutions and subsequent activities indicate that this was not their sole aim. Some of the delegates were clearly as anxious to strengthen traditional rabbinical control in England as they were to further the fortunes of Herzl's movement within their respective communities. One of the central points in their programme was the foundation in England of a *yeshiva* (talmudic seminary) designed to compete with Jews' College, the more modern training-ground of the United Synagogue ministers. Another was the establishment of a new rabbinical organization (*Agudat ha-Rabbanim ha-Haredim be-Anglia*) which was to attempt to influence elections to clerical positions throughout the country. Furthermore, the rabbis expressed their combined distaste for the religious affiliations of the leaders of political Zionism. Their support for the cause was to be strictly conditional. Thus, orthodox Jews were to establish new communal societies only with the consent of their local rabbi, and Zionist speakers were not to be allowed to use the synagogue premises without his prior permission.[80] It is hardly surprising that Adler, who shunned an invitation to join the group, did express his agreement with its independent attitude towards Herzl's movement.[81]

Initially, several of the rabbis present at Manchester attempted to implement the Zionist resolutions passed there, and embarked upon a series of sermons in support of the movement. But their efforts seem gradually to have sagged.[82] The newly-founded organization was racked by personal differences and, it was asserted, the relationship between the rabbis and the Zionists continued to be plagued by

religious doubts.[83] An attempt to establish a similar organization in London, in 1903, proved equally fruitless.[84] A forceful *Agudat ha-Rabbanim* in England did not appear until 1911, while the foundation of the united Mizrahi movement did not take place until 1918.

By the latter date, a new generation of clerical leaders had begun to make their presence felt within the community. Most prominently, Chief Rabbi Joseph Hertz (a staunch Zionist) had overcome much of the opposition initially expressed to his appointment as Adler's successor.[85] Moreover, even for the period before Herzl's death in 1904 it is occasionally possible to correlate a difference of age with a difference of attitude towards political Zionism. The clerical debate did, of course, continue long after the death of the first generation. And even during the first stage of the controversy, it was not unusual for such youthful ministers as Michael Adler (of Hammersmith) to declare that the Zionist movement was 'unwise and impolitic'.[86] Nevertheless, the signs of a generation gap were not lacking even among the members of a single family. Thus, the opposition of Chief Rabbi Adler might be contrasted with the sympathy shown towards Herzl by his only son, Alfred S. Adler;[87] the hostility of Friedlander might be contrasted with the enthusiasm of his son-in-law, Gaster. A similar pattern is evident within the immigrant sector of the community. Salis Daiches had already shown himself to be a readier supporter of Herzl's scheme than his father, I. C. Daiches, had been;[88] I. J. Yoffey had already proved less fearful of rabbinic criticism than his late father-in-law, Joseph Yoffey, whom he succeeded at the Central Synagogue, Manchester, in 1897.[89]

The pattern thus revealed, although perhaps of some interest, is by no means conclusive. The lines of debate during Herzl's lifetime were not sufficiently clearly defined to permit a positive correlation between any particular factor and individual expressions of opinion. The evidence would appear to suggest that the reception initially accorded to political Zionism by the Anglo-Jewish clergy and rabbinate was complex and varied. No hypothesis concerning the pattern of alignment within that section of the community can be advanced without a considerable degree of qualification.

NOTES

[1] Herzl's letter to the Zionist Conference organized by the Chovevei Zion Association of England at Clerkenwell Town Hall, 28 Feb. 1898; quoted in P. Goodman, *Zionism in England, 1899–1929*, London, 1929, p. 15.

[2] A. Bein, *Theodore Herzl, A Biography*, Philadelphia, 1940, p. 158.

[3] O. K. Rabinowicz, 'Herzl, Architect of the Balfour Declaration', *Herzl Year Book*, ed. R. Patai, vol. 1, New York, 1958, pp. 1–106.

[4] For example, J. Cowen, 'Referat über den Zionismus in England', delivered on the third day of the Fourth Zionist Congress, London, 15 August 1900, *Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des IV Zionisten-Congresses in London*, Vienna, 1900, pp. 163–66, and Weizmann's letter to Ussishkin, 14 July 1904, *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, Gen. ed. M. Weisgal, vol. III, Series A, London, 1972, no. 264, p. 282.

[5] Herzl's letter to de Haas, 15 March 1897, *Kitvei Herzl*, ed. A. Bein, vol. 9, 'Letters, 1895–97', Tel Aviv, 1961, no. 202, pp. 218–19.

[6] *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, ed. R. Patai, trans. H. Zohn, 5 vols., New York, 1960, vol. 3, p. 1161. Note Weizmann's later criticism of Herzl's attitude regarding the venue of the Fourth Congress in C. Weizmann, *Trial and Error*, London, 1949. p. 78.

[7] Minutes of the meeting of the Headquarters Tent, 31 May 1897, Records of the Chovevei Zion Association of England, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem (hereafter, CZA), A 2/4; N. Bentwich, *Early English Zionists*, Tel Aviv, n.d., p. 24.

[8] H. Burrows (President of the United General Workers' Union), in a lecture to the South Place Ethical Society, reported in *Jewish Chronicle* (hereafter, *JC*), 5 Feb. 1904, pp. 29–30; see also Goodman, op. cit., p. 9; and L. P. Gartner, *The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870–1914*, London, 1960, pp. 116–19.

[9] I. Zangwill, speech at Shoreditch Town Hall, *JC*, 20 Dec. 1901, pp. 20–21.

[10] J. Fraenkel, 'The Jewish Chronicle and the Launching of Political Zionism', *Herzl Year Book*, vol. 2, New York, 1959, pp. 218ff. On the *JC* as a source for this period, see C. Roth, *The Jewish Chronicle, 1841–1941*, London, 1944, p. 115.

[11] Letter from the secretary of the AJA to H. Bentwich, Records of the Chovevei Zion Association, CZA, A 2/8, no. 22.

[12] *JC*, 18 July 1902; there is no mention of Zionism in C. H. L. Emanuel, *A Century and a Half of Jewish History, Extracts from the Minute Books of the London Committee of Deputies of the British Jews*, London, 1910.

[13] M. Wohlgelernter, *Israel Zangwill, A Study*, New York, 1964, p. 125.

[14] Letter to L. Wolf, 6 July 1896, L. Wolf Mss, CZA, A 77, 1/3; and to M. Gaster, 1903, quoted in Chaim Bermant, *The Cousinhood*, London, 1971, p. 169.

[15] See, e.g., reports of Annual General Meetings at the Central Synagogue and the St. John's Wood Synagogue, London, in *JC*, 5 May 1899, pp. 22–23.

[16] For example at Belgrove St., Leeds, *The Messenger of Zion* (a Zionist monthly), Nov. 1899, p. 1.

[17] H. Bentwich, reported in *JC*, 14 April 1899; and A. A. Green's letter to H. Bentwich, 'private and confidential', 20 Oct. 1898, H. Bentwich Mss, CZA, A 100/7a, no. 22.

[18] S. Sharot, 'Religious Change in Native Orthodoxy in London, 1870–1914: Rabbinate and Clergy', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology* (*JJS*), vol. 15, no. 2, Dec. 1973, p. 183.

[19] S. Schechter, 'Despising a Glorious Inheritance', *Four Epistles to the Jews of England*, London, 1901, p. 12; and M. Goulston, 'The Status of the Anglo-Jewish Rabbinate, 1840–1914', *JJS*, vol. 10, no. 1, June 1968.

[20] *JC*, 'Notes of the Week', 22 March 1903.

[21] Herzl's Diaries, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 297; within a few months, however, Herzl realized that Singer 'needs stirring up a bit': ibid., p. 406.

[22] *JC*, 3 April 1903, p. 26.

[23] For this reason Bentwich left his congregation at Hampstead, and some of his colleagues threatened to do likewise at Singer's Hill, Birmingham; R. Apple, *The Hampstead Synagogue, 1892–1967*, London, 1967, p. 65; and *JC*, 1 Jan. 1904, pp. 12–15.

[24] I. I. Black, *Shevilei ha-Yahadut be-Anglia*, Liverpool, 1903, p. 62.

[25] A point on which not even all immigrant rabbis agreed. Compare, e.g., Y. Rabinowitz (Edinburgh), *Shevhei Ya'akov*, London, 1906, p. 14; M. Chaikin (Sheffield), *Apologie des Juifs*, Paris, 1887, p. v, and M. Chaikin, *The Celebrities of the Jews*, Sheffield, 1899, p. i.

[26] G. J. Emanuel, of Birmingham, was also alleged to have asked: 'What right had we to Palestine but the right of conquest, and since we had lost that right . . . we could not claim the land as ours'. *The Jewish World* (pro-Zionist weekly), 3 Nov. 1899, p. 9.

[27] As Adler, particularly, warned: see I. Finestein, 'The New Community, 1880–1918', in V. D. Lipman, ed. *Three Centuries of Anglo-Jewish History*, London, 1961, p. 17. For an example of Adler's intense patriotism, see 'Judaism and War', a sermon delivered at the North London Synagogue, 4 Nov. 1899, in H. Adler, *Anglo-Jewish Memories and other Sermons*, London, 1909, pp. 106–16.

[28] *The Jewish State*, translated by H. Zohn, New York, 1970, p. 100.

[29] *JC*, 3 June 1904, p. 21. The record continues 'Cheers and some dissent'.

[30] 'Zionism', Oct. 1899, in *Speeches, Articles, and Letters of Israel Zangwill*, ed. M. Simon, London, 1937, p. 161.

[31] 'The Zionist Peril', in *Jewish Quarterly Review* (*JQR*), vol. 17, Oct. 1904, p. 22; the same paper had been delivered to a public audience, before Herzl's death, the previous May, *JC*, 27 May 1904, pp. 13–15.

[32] I. A. Goldstein, *JC*, 3 June 1904, pp. 18–19 and E. Pinto, *JC*, 10 Jan. 1902, p. 6. For one classic Jewish interpretation of Leviticus 19 : 17, see Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah*, '*Hilkhot De'ot*', 6 : 6–8.

[33] M. Vecht, *JC*, 17 Jan. 1902, pp. 6–7.

[34] A. Werner, (1837–1912), rabbi of the orthodox Mahazike ha-Dat congregation in London, letter (dated summer 1900) printed in B. Homa, *A Fortress in Anglo-Jewry, The Story of Machzike Hadath*, London, 1953, pp. xxvii–xliv and 24–26.

[35] For example, H. Gollancz, 'The Return to Palestine', sermon delivered at St. John's Wood, 29 May 1897, in *Sermons and Addresses*, London, 1909, pp. 499–505.

[36] 'Nation or Religious Community?', Presidential Address to the Jewish Historical Society of England, 3 Dec. 1899, *JQR*, vol. 12, 1900, p. 193.

[37] Speech delivered at Manchester, winter 1902, in *Bet Va'ad la-Hakhamim*, vol. 2, no. 7, Leeds, 1902, pp. 7–11.

[38] 'Zionism', *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 10th edn., London, 1903, vol. 9.

[39] For example, L. Stein, *The Balfour Declaration*, London, 1961, pp. 166–181, 442–61; I. Friedman, *The Question of Palestine, 1914–1918*, London, 1973, pp. 25–37, 227–43.

[40] M. Friedlander, *The Jewish Religion*, London, 1891, pp. 161–62, and

C. G. Montefiore, 'Dr. Friedlander on Jewish Religion', *JQR*, vol. 4, Jan. 1892, pp. 204–44, especially p. 226.

[41] See, e.g., 'One God, One Worship', a sermon delivered at Berkeley St. Synagogue, *JC*, 14 Feb. 1896, pp. 19–20, and *Liberal Judaism, An Essay*, London, 1902, p. 176; also M. Wiener, 'The Concept of Mission in Traditional and Modern Judaism', *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science*, vol. 2–3, 1947/8, pp. 18–19.

[42] See, e.g., Friedlander, *Textbook of the Jewish Religion*, London, 1899, pp. 48–49. For one frequently quoted source for the rabbinical injunction against a concerted Jewish attempt to restore political independence without Divine assistance, see the commentaries on Song of Songs 2 : 7 in *Talmud Bavli, Ketubot* 111a (translated in I. Epstein, ed., *The Babylonian Talmud*, vol. 14, London, 1936, p. 713).

[43] O. J. Simon's letter to Sir F. Montefiore, printed in *JC*, 3 Feb. 1899, p. 11.

[44] See his letter to *The Times*, 3 Sept. 1897, p. 5; 'The Return of the Jews to Palestine', in *The Nineteenth Century*, Sept. 1898; and 'Political Zionism, Grounds of Opposition Among Jews', a paper delivered to the Christo-theosophical Society, Bloomsbury Sq., *JC*, 7 Jan. 1898, p. 23.

[45] H. Adler, *Religious versus Political Zionism*, a sermon preached at the North London Synagogue, 12 Nov. 1898, London, 1898, p. 7.

[46] Sermon at the New West End Synagogue reported in *JC*, 15 April 1898, and at Manchester, 20 Oct. 1900, in I. Abrahams, ed., *The Literary Remains of Simeon Singer*, London, 1908, vol. 1, pp. 142–50.

[47] For example, Gollancz's speech at W. London Zionist Assn., *JC*, 7 Dec. 1900, p. 22, and sermon at Bayswater, 16 May 1903, *Sermons and Addresses*, pp. 318–21; A. A. Green's sermon delivered on Day of Atonement 1903, *JC*, 9 Oct. 1903, p. 20, and Apple, op. cit., pp. 65–66.

[48] Herzl's diaries, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 408; and C. Montefiore, 'A Diehard's Confession', a lecture to the Religious Union, Oct. 1935, in L. Cohen, *Some Recollections of Claude Goldsmid Montefiore, 1858–1938*, London, n.d., pp. 226–27.

[49] See, e.g., Joseph's sermon, 'Messianism and Reform', *JC*, 15 April 1898, p. 28; and Sir P. Magnus's sermon, 'The History and Obligations of Judaism', *JC*, 1 May 1896, p. 6.

[50] Abrahams' sermon, 'The Mantle of Judaism', Manchester, *JC*, 17 Jan. 1902; I. Abrahams' *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, London, 1896, p. xxiv; L. H. Montagu, *Thoughts on Judaism*, London, 1904, p. 53.

[51] Abrahams' letter to Zangwill, 2 Dec. 1899, Zangwill Mss, *CZA*, A 120/53a.

[52] *JC*, 10 Nov. 1899, p. 21, and 9 Oct. 1903, pp. 14–15; *Hayehoodi* (Hebrew language, pro-Zionist, weekly paper published in London), 5 June 1902; and P. S. Goldberg, *The Manchester Congregation of British Jews, 1857–1957*, Manchester, 1957, p. 64.

[53] See, for example, Herzl Diaries, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 1291.

[54] *Aspects of the Jewish Question by a Quarterly Reviewer*, London, 1902, and letter to *The Times*, 4 Sept. 1903, p. 9.

[55] Sir Francis Montefiore (1860–1935) was president of the EZF and after 1904, President of the Elders of the Sephardi Congregation.

[56] *JC*, 3 Feb, 1899; compare A. M. Hyamson, *The Sephardim of England*, London, 1951, p. 410.

[57] Herzl's Diaries, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 280; and L. H. Montagu, *Samuel Montagu, Baron Swaythling, A Character Sketch*, London, 1912, p. 39.

[58] *JC*, 28 Oct. 1898, p. 21.

[59] *JC*, 2 Nov. 1900, p. 24.

[60] *JC*, 25 Oct. 1901, p. 18; *Hayehoodi*, 17 April 1902, pp. 17–18.

[61] *JC*, 8 July 1898, pp. 12–14, and 14 July 1899, pp. 22–24.

[62] Herzl's Diaries, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 423; Singer's letter to *JC*, 21 Oct. 1898, p. 8, and 4 Nov. 1898, p. 8. On the relationship between Montagu and Singer see *The Literary Remains of Simeon Singer*, op. cit., vol. 1, p. xvii.

[63] D. B. Spiers, 'Divre Devash, *Ethical Sermons Delivered to the Working Classes at the Great Synagogue and Other Places of Worship*, London, 1901, no. 11 (1898), p. 85.

[64] M. Manski, ed., *Imre Hayyim*, Tel Aviv, 1929, p. 12.

[65] N. Cohen 'Dayan Baruch Spiers', *The Jewish Monthly*, vol. 5, no. 10, Jan. 1952, pp. 588, 592.

[66] M. Bar-Ilan (Berlin), *Mi-Volozhin ad Yerushalayim*, new edn., Tel Aviv, 1971, vol. 2, pp. 381–82, and *Hayehoodi* 25 Oct. 1900, p. 12.

[67] On the case, see *JC*, 26 Feb. 1904, p. 7, 4 March 1904, pp. 8–12, and 11 March 1904, p. 10; *Hayehoodi*, 17 March 1904, p. 11; Black, op. cit., pp. 59–60; and B. B. Benas, 'Later Records of the Jews in Liverpool', *Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire*, 1929, pp. 25–26.

[68] Compare *JC*, 16 Sept. 1898, p. 9 and *Hayehoodi*, 26 Dec. 1901, p. 5.

[69] J. Jacobs, ed., *Jewish Year Book Volume 1 5657–1896*, London, 1896, p. 78, and B. B. Benas, 'A Survey of the Jewish Institutional History of Liverpool and District', *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England*, vol. 17, 1951–52, pp. 31–32.

[70] Black, op. cit., p. 76.

[71] See especially the fears expressed by Guedalyah, the Greengrocer, in *Children of the Ghetto*, 3 vols., London, 1892, vol. II, p. 6.

[72] I. Cohen, 'Some Early Reminiscences and Impressions of Zionism in Sunderland', in A. Levy, *History of the Sunderland Jewish Community*, London, 1956, pp. 249, 256.

[73] Gartner, op. cit., p. 250.

[74] For a discussion of the relationship between this point and Herzl's scheme see, e.g., Y. Rabinowitz, *Sefer Hilkhot Erets Yisrael*, London, 1900, p. 9; and G. Silverstone (Belfast), *Pirhe Aviv*, London, 1901, pp. 33–34.

[75] H. Adler, *A Pilgrimage to Zion*, A sermon preached at the Great Synagogue Shabat Korach, 5645, London, 1885, and S. Singer, *The Messianic Idea in Judaism*, A paper read before the Jews' College Literary Society, 22 May 1887, London, 1887, pp. 8, 18.

[76] M. J. Wigoder, *Sefer Bet Yehudah*, Jerusalem, 1910, pt. 6, pp. 24–31, sermon delivered on the anniversary of Herzl's death; see also M. J. Wigoder, *My Life*, London, 1935, p. 75.

[77] See the criticism to this effect expressed by Reines in 'Mikhtav le-Rabbanei Yisrael Asher be-Anglia', *Hayehoodi*, 27 Feb. 1902, pp. 6–7.

[78] For instance, the sermon by Rev. Orliansky, *magid* of the *Chevra Torah*, London, in *Hayehoodi*, 22 Aug. 1901, p. 8. Samuel Montagu's ire was said

to have been aroused by the receipt of a postcard which Herzl had written on the Sabbath: J. de Hass, *Theodor Herzl, A Biographical Study*, vol. 1, Chicago, 1927, p. 120.

[79] I. C. Daiches, *Derashot Meharyah* (Sermons), Leeds, 1920, no. 38; also Silverstone's sermon to the Belfast Dorshei Zion Association in *Pirhe Aviv*, op. cit., pp. 60–62.

[80] See 'Kol Koreh mi-Rabbanei Anglia ha-Haredim' in *Hayehoodi*, 15 Jan. 1903, p. 2. For reports of the conference proceedings (in ascending order of usefulness) see *JC*, 19 Dec. 1902, p. 26; *Hayehoodi*, 18 Dec. 1902, p. 5; and I. C. Daiches, *Bet Va'ad la-Hakhamim*, vol. 2, no. 9, Leeds, 1903, pp. 3–5. The Conference was attended by Rabbis Yudelevitch, Degutsky, Yoffey, Levine, and Schlossberg (all from Manchester), Daiches and Herzog (Leeds), Glickman (Dublin), Bloch (Birmingham), Sandlesohn (Newcastle), Silverstone (Belfast), and Rabinowitz (Edinburgh).

[81] Adler's letter to Yudelevitch, 25 Dec. 1902, printed in *Hayehoodi*, 5 Jan. 1903, p. 5.

[82] Daiches, Herzog, Yoffey, and Yudelevitch appear to have been particularly prominent in the early stages: *Hayehoodi*, 25 Dec. 1902, p. 12, and 30 Jan. 1903, p. 32; *JC*, 26 Dec. 1903, p. 23.

[83] Daiches, *Bet Va'ad*, ibid.; *Hayehoodi*, 5 March 1903, p. 9, and 14 Jan. 1904, p. 2.

[84] *JC*, 27 March 1903, p. 18; *Hayehoodi*, 26 March 1903, pp. 4–5 and 2 April 1903, pp. 2–4.

[85] Note, particularly, the extract from S. Japhet's diary dealing with Hertz's appointment quoted in A. Newman, *Chief Rabbi Dr. Joseph H. Hertz, C. H.*, London, 1972, pp. 5–7.

[86] *JC*, 8 Oct. 1897, p. 27.

[87] See, e.g., A. S. Adler (1876–1910), 'Thoughts on Herzl's Death', *JC*, 8 July, 1904; *Hayehoodi*, 28 May 1903; and P. Ettinger, '*Hope Place*' *in Liverpool Jewry*, Liverpool, 1930, p. 78.

[88] See, e.g., S. Daiches's sermon, 'The People of Israel, Past and Present', *Bet Va'ad la-Hakhamim*, vol. 1, no. 2, Leeds, 1902, pp. 34–38.

[89] Compare the assurance of I. J. Yoffey, *Kenesset Yisrael*, Manchester, 1910, with the intricate talmudic arguments adduced by Joseph Yoffey in *Ahavat Zion Virushalayim*, Vilna, 1890; 2nd edn., Tel Aviv, 1946, pp. 21–26, 124–26, and the warnings against precipitate action in *Yosef Biur*, Vilna, 1881, pp. 22–23.

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TRENDS IN ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION ON ISSUES RELATED TO THE ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT 1967–1972

Abel Jacob

STUDIES of the Arab-Israeli conflict generally discuss its causes in historical terms. Emphasis is placed on the seemingly inherent incompatibility between Jewish nationalism as expressed by the Zionist movement and Palestinian Arab nationalism. According to such interpretations the basic causes of the conflict have not changed in the past 60 years. In addition to the original causes, new problems have emerged such as refugees, borders, occupation forces, and various formulae for negotiations. What is absent from most of these studies is an examination of public opinion, its formation, focus, and relationship to the continuation of the conflict.

Using data based on public opinion surveys carried out by the Israeli Institute of Applied Social Research (IIASR), between 1967 and 1972, this study will examine some of the attitudes of the Israelis on issues relating to the conflict until the end of 1972.[1] No attempt will be made to analyse either actual behaviour or the merits of the arguments made by the Israelis.

Some of the reasons for the continuation of the conflict seemed to rest upon the psychological insecurity of the protagonists. There seemed to be an increase in mistrust, frustration, threat perception, prejudice, and suspicion on the part of the Israeli public towards the Arab world. Several developments took place between 1967 and 1972 which intensified suspicion.

Until 1967 violence between the Arabs and the Israelis was confined to border settlements. That was understandable and expected and therefore more tolerable. After 1967 violence increased deep inside Israel through terrorist and guerrilla activities. Sporadic and unpredictable acts of violence in cinemas, supermarkets, bus terminals, and airports raised the level of suspicion and hatred of the Arabs. Violence was also perpetrated against Israelis and Jews around the world and

that heightened the level of suspicion and anxiety to the point where Arab terrorism was the problem that most worried the Israeli public.

Another development was the discrepancy that emerged between the seemingly increasing political strength of the Arabs on the international level and the increasing military strength of the Israelis on the regional level. From Israel's point of view, because of this discrepancy, various peace proposals demanded substantive concessions from Israel while only promises of good-will were demanded of the Arabs. The more that tendency persisted, the greater the likelihood for deepening the level of mistrust and threat perception in Israel. These orientations became an important factor contributing to an increasingly non-conciliatory attitude on the part of the Israeli public towards the Arabs.

A third development was the frustration emerging as a result of the realization that even after a spectacular military victory the prospects for political settlement were not improved. Bitterness and intransigence followed. Because of these developments an incongruence developed in the perception of the role of the Israeli foreign policy makers. While the outside world viewed the decision-makers as hawks, a substantial part of the Israeli public tended to view the same decision-makers as doves. The greater this gap, and the longer it continued, the greater the chances that the level of suspicion in Israel would grow. The cumulative effect of these developments over time seemed to generate a host of psychological orientations which made the resolution of the conflict more difficult.[2]

In the light of the recent Yom Kippur War and its aftermath, an explanatory note is in order. The climate of opinion in Israel has changed since the surveys cited here were conducted. During the five years after the 1967 War the Israelis believed themselves to be masters of their own fate and assumed that time was on their side and that the situation of no war-no peace would continue indefinitely. The fallacy of that outlook was exposed on 6 October 1973. In the post-1973 period the concerns of students of Israeli public opinion should be the extent to which public opinion attitudes have changed on the issues relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the extent to which attitudes, once established and entrenched, can be manipulated. In other words, can public opinion be brought up to date to meet changing policies and conditions? To answer these questions a post-1973 survey should be conducted and then compared with the results of the findings in the present study.

I. Major issues examined

Five major groups of issues were selected for their relevance to the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the purpose of this analysis, it was necessary to find poll questions which repeatedly tapped opinions on the same

issues. The first group of issues deals with items that worried the Israeli public. Questions were selected measuring worries on four specific items related to the conflict: terrorism, the general security situation, the military capability of the Israel Defence Forces, and the general political situation of Israel. The second group deals with opinion about the occupied territories. Questions about two specific items were examined: willingness to return specific areas and the position on the territories in relation to American pressure. The third group looks at the public's attitude to a tougher or a more moderate policy towards the Arab states. As part of that issue, attitudes towards the Arab refugees were also examined. The fourth group measures the chances for peace with the Arab states in general and with Egypt in particular. The fifth group deals with social contact between Jews and Arabs and the impact of that contact.

In addition to the analysis of trends in the five groups, two background variables will be discussed: education and country of origin. An attempt will be made to analyse the relationship between educational level and country of origin for each of the five groups of issues. Finally, there will also be an attempt to look at the relationships among the various groups.

II. Issues of concern

The continuing Survey repeatedly asked questions about issues which worried the Israeli public. 'Worries' (*deagot*) were generally divided into two categories: worries about private matters (economic situation and health) and worries about collective or public concerns (terrorism, security conditions, fighting capability of the army, and political, economic and social conditions). In the majority of the surveys (10 out of 13), there was a higher level of concern over public than over private issues. Within the public sector three of the four issues selected for this study aroused the greatest concern. The percentage who said that they were worried or very worried about the four issues selected for their relevance to the Arab-Israeli conflict are given in Table 1. Terrorism was clearly the most worrisome issue, while the military capability of the Israeli army was the least worrisome issue. (The latter's relative position may have changed since 1973.) Although the percentage of those who expressed concern over terrorism declined, this survey does not cover the period in which the Lod Airport massacre and the killing of Israeli athletes in Munich took place. The increase of Arab guerrilla activities will probably be reflected in future surveys by an increase of those who are worried about terrorism. This trend may have become intensified even further by recent developments. As the disengagement of forces between Israel and Egypt and Syria is maintained, focus on Palestinian terrorism will probably increase.

TABLE 1. *Issues which worried the Israeli public*

	Percentage who said they were worried or very worried about the following:			
	Terrorism	*Security conditions*	*Fighting capability of army*	*Political situation*
February–March 1968	90		35	71
November–January 1968/69	90		35	72
February–April 1969	89		25	69
June–July 1969	89		25	72
October–November 1969	87			
February–March 1970	86	76		
June–July 1970				
November–December 1970	74		36	
March–April 1971	73	77	39	78
June–July 1971	80	74	38	72
October–December 1971	79	77	33	69
January–March 1972	71	64	29	54

Source: II ASR Survey VI, p. 31.

The concept of *deaga* was further refined by the IIASR tapping emotional and instrumental attributes of worry. Emotional attributes are defined by responses of insecurity, fear, and anxiety. Instrumental attributes are defined as more cognitive orientations when the respondent followed the events in the mass media. Among the public issues, terrorism and security affairs were expressed in more emotional terms.[3] This finding may be significant for a psychological study of frustration and aggression in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The analysis of the data points to a trend in the relative level of concern raised by the issues under consideration. It appears that the more direct control Israel had over an issue, the less worried the public became. The further an issue was from being controlled solely by Israel, the greater was the tendency to worry over that issue. Several factors support this trend. First, the fact that the fighting capability of the Israeli army consistently evoked the lowest level of concern is a case in point. Of the four issues examined, the fighting capability of the army was the least dependent on non-Israeli factors (although, as the Yom Kippur War indicated, it was highly dependent on American aid). Second, a surprisingly high level of concern was registered on the issue of general security. In the last two surveys shown in Table 1, 77 and 64 per cent said that they were worried or very worried over the security conditions of the country, while during the same period 95 and 94 per cent of the respondents said that the government was handling the country's security problems very well.[4] If we add to this paradox the obvious relationship between fighting capability and security conditions, we are left with the conclusion that factors such as Soviet military aid to the Arab countries, American military aid to Israel,

and border incidents were uppermost in the minds of the public when considering general security conditions. It has been suggested that the Israelis are highly suspicious of the outside world and that this leads them to emphasize self-reliance, which in turn translates itself into a hard-line position.[5] A third indication that the Israelis were more concerned when they had less control over an issue is seen by examining the responses to terrorism. A higher level of concern was registered over terrorism carried out abroad. For example, during June–July 1971, 80 per cent said that they were worried about terrorism in Israel while 84 per cent were concerned about terrorism outside Israel.[6]

Finally, a correlation analysis of three variables—concern about the situation, assessment of the situation, and the government's handling of the situation with regard to the issues of security and political conditions—supports the trend mentioned above. Table 2 shows the relationship. The assessment of the healthiness of the situation was more closely related to the estimation of how well the government was handling the situation in the security and political arenas. The level of concern over the two issues seemed to be more independent. This suggests again that irrespective of how well the government handled security and political matters and how the public assessed the situation, the level of worries remained. It appears, therefore, that in so far as security and political affairs were dependent on non-Israeli forces and events, this dependence was a causal factor of continued concern.

TABLE 2. *Correlation among concern for the situation, assessment of healthiness of the situation, and the government's handling of the situation*

		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
Concern about situation	1. Security		0·68	0·20	0·03	0·01	−·17
	2. Political	0·68		0·15	0·19	0·14	0·06
Assessment of situation	3. Security	0·20	0·15		0·59	0·36	0·03
	4. Political	0·03	0·19	0·59		0·32	0·46
Government's handling of situation	5. Security	0·01	0·14	0·36	0·32		0·52
	6. Political	−·17	0·06	0·03	0·46	0·52	

Source: IIASR Survey VI, p. 40.

Observers of Israeli society generally maintain that country of origin is an important variable for understanding most aspects of the society.[7] That belief is certainly confirmed by this study. However, country of origin had a smaller influence upon the distribution of responses to issues of concern than upon responses to other issues discussed below. Respondents were asked to what extent they were worried by terrorist activities (in their own vicinity, in Israel, and against Israelis abroad),

by the security situation of Israel, by the political situation of Israel, and by the military capability of the army in the event of another war. Their responses showed that, except in regard to military capability, there was a generally high level of worry. There were some variations according to country of origin. Those respondents not born in Israel indicated a slightly higher level of concern. Of that group, those who came from Asia and Africa (Orientals) showed a consistently higher level of concern. This was particularly true on the issue of terrorism. The groups registering the lowest responses of concern were Israeli-born (Sabras) of European and Oriental fathers. Sabras whose fathers were also Sabras came closer to the Europeans/Americans in their responses.

Level of education indicated a much stronger influence on the distribution of responses than did country of origin (see Table 3). There seemed to be a dramatic relationship between level of education and the level of worry. Perhaps the reason for the strong inverse relationship is that terrorism and security affairs elicit a higher proportion of emotional responses, while education, by its very nature, elicits more instrumental responses.

TABLE 3. *Education and issues of concern*

Level of education		*Percentage who said they were worried or very worried about the following:*			
		Terrorism	*Security situation*	*Fighting capability of army*	*Political situation*
		%	%	%	%
no schooling	N=67	81	75	46	61
up to 4 years	N=75	82	76	44	67
5–8 years.	N=541	81	73	38	60
9–10 yrs.	N=317	75	77	28	54
11 yrs.	N=129	66	56	16	58
12 yrs.	N=392	65	59	23	48
post high school and partial univ.	N=230	65	62	20	51
full university	N=166	43	47	15	48
Total	N=1917	71	64	29	54

Source: IIASR Survey VI, p. 33.

III. Territories

Perhaps no issue measured Israeli public opinion towards the Arabs as concretely as did the issue of the territories. While the other groups of issues measured cognitive, affective, and evaluational orientations, the issue of territories measured primarily evaluative orientations towards specific, visible, and highly recognizable objects. Furthermore,

some of the other issues depended on both the Arabs and the Israelis for their fulfilment while the issue of the territories was more within the power of the Israelis. (This statement must be qualified in the light of the events since the Yom Kippur War.) Finally, the issue over the territories stood out because most of the diplomatic activities which took place between 1967 and 1972 focussed on the territories.

From Israel's point of view the basic questions about the territories were the following: (1) Was it necessary to return the territories for the sake of peace or for the sake of a partial settlement? (2) If the answer was yes, should there be a total withdrawal from all territories or from only some of them, or should there be a partial withdrawal from all or some of the areas—and if so from what parts?

Immediately after the 1967 War there were proposals which suggested the return of most of the territories in exchange for peace. The most noted Israeli favouring that type of settlement was David Ben-Gurion, the leading architect of the State of Israel.[8] However, when no such settlement was made, a very hard position was soon adopted. The hard-line position, with some slight modifications, remained fairly constant (see Table 4).

The results in Table 4 illustrate a common problem arising out of an analysis based on poll data over time: it is difficult to find the same question being posed with the same range of answers. There were several variations to the range of answers which respondents could give to questions about returning the territories.[9] Thus, in February and April 1968, they were given two choices: 'To keep' or 'Not to keep'. On this simple basis the overwhelming majority would not yield the territories. On the one area where there seemed to be moderation, namely Sinai, time seemed to work against such moderation. In the following two surveys, a third choice was included (conceding only part of the territories) which accounted for the decrease in the percentages. At the same time, however, when the choices were increased and the percentages remained the same, or perhaps even showed an increase in the number of hard-liners, the responses revealed the intensity of opinions; there were hardly any changes about the Golan Heights.

The first column in Table 6 suggests another possible interpretation of the public's attitude on the territories. In the March–April 1971 survey we have the results for the three answers a respondent could give. Since we are interested in trends of public opinion let us concentrate on the three territories listed in Table 4 which suggest a definite decrease in the hard-line position (Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Sinai). If we evaluate the March–April 1971 survey through the simple keep-not keep frame of the first survey, and if we assume that those willing to concede only part of the territory in question would fall under the 'keep' category, we find that 84 per cent wanted to keep the Gaza

TABLE 4. *Willingness to return territories in order to obtain peace*

Area	*Percentage of those not willing to return occupied territories*						
	February[1] *1968*	*April*[2] *1968*	*November*[3] *December 1968*	*February*[4] *March 1969*	*March*[5] *April 1971*	*May*[6] *July 1972*	*October*[7] *November 1972*
Golan Heights	99	98	94	97	92	92	93
Sharm el Sheikh	93	91	82	87	91	90	96
Gaza Strip	85	86	73	75	70	69	66
West Bank	91	92	73	75	56	47	58
Sinai Desert	57	66	46	52	31	36	41

Source: IIASR Survey VII, p. 72.
The range of possible responses varied in the following way:
1. (*a*) not to keep; (*b*) to keep;
2. same as above;
3. (*a*) not to keep; (*b*) depends on conditions; (*c*) to keep;
4. same as the third survey;
5. (a) to concede everything; (b) to concede only part; (c) not to concede anything;
6. (*a*) to return everything; (*b*) to return most of the areas; (*c*) to return only a certain part; (*d*) not willing to return anything;
7. source: *The New York Times*, 19 April 1973.The range of possible responses was not specified. However, the following information was included: 59% said that they were willing to return part of Sinai in exchange for peace without specifying which part; only 5% would give back most of the territory of the West Bank, and only 3% would return all of it.

Strip, 94 per cent wanted to keep the West Bank, and 90 per cent wanted to keep the Sinai. Thus, if we consider the impact of the several variations on the theme of the territories we find that the trend remained fairly constant with perhaps a slight increase among the hard-liners on Sharm el Sheikh.

One of the outstanding differences between the Arabs and Israel on various steps which might help solve their conflict was their attitude concerning the role of the Great Powers. Briefly stated, the Arabs wanted the big powers to intervene, while Israel did not. The Arabs hoped that the United States would be able to put pressure on Israel to return some of, or all, the territories. Given the close ties between the United States and Israel and the total hostility of the Soviet Union towards Israel, it was important to measure the potential influence which the United States might have on Israel. To put it another way, a strong index of public opinion on the territories can be obtained by measuring responses to the impact of American pressure on Israel to return the territories.

The results in Table 5 clearly show that more than 80 per cent of the public did not want Israel to yield to American pressure on the territories. That attitude was expressed within a year of the American sponsored cease-fire along the Suez Canal. Also during the same period 75 per cent of the public thought that the United States would be helpful to Israel in the political arena.[10] Thus, the overwhelming majority of the Israelis were able to separate the territories from the most likely source of outside pressure and maintain their hard-line position while expressing confidence in the United States.

TABLE 5. *U.S. pressure and concessions on territories*

'If the U.S. placed great pressure on Israel to return to the borders prior to the Six-Day War, with slight modifications, within the context of a peace settlement, in your opinion should the Government of Israel accept this position or not?'	*March–April 1971* N=1620	*June–July* 1971 N=1770
	%	%
1. Even under great pressure Israel should not accept this position under any circumstances	53	49
2. It seems to me that Israel should not accept this position	28	33
3. It seems to me that Israel should accept this position if great pressure is exerted	15	14
4. Israel certainly should accept this position if pressure is exerted	5	4

Source: IIASR Surveys III and IV, pp. 82 and 69, respectively.

The high level of consensus on the territories registered by the general population suggests that the impact of background variables was slight. This is indeed reflected in Table 6. Nevertheless, the Oriental

community registered a slightly higher proportion of intransigence. This trend conforms with the general agreement among observers of

TABLE 6. *Willingness to return territories and country of origin*

N=1620 *March-April 1971*

Area		EAm* N=810	AsAf N=390	IAsAf N=110	II N=70	IEAm N=240
	Total %	%	%	%	%	%
Sinai						
1. Concede everything	10	10	13	14	8	9
2. Concede only part	58	65	44	51	54	64
3. Not concede anything	31	25	43	35	38	27
West Bank						
1. Concede everything	6	8	4	4	10	8
2. Concede only part	38	44	27	28	41	40
3. Not concede anything	56	49	70	67	48	52
Gaza Strip						
1. Concede everything	16	20	12	19	15	17
2. Concede only part	10	10	8	6	6	14
3. Not concede anything	70	70	81	75	79	69
Sharm el Sheikh						
1. Return to Egypt	2	1	2	1	4	2
2. Return to U.N.	7	6	9	6	11	10
3. Not concede anything	91	93	88	93	86	89
Golan Heights						
1. Concede everything	1	1	1	1	—	1
2. Concede only part	7	9	5	8	6	8
3. Not concede anything	92	90	95	91	94	91
East Jerusalem						
1. Not to keep	1	1	1	1	—	1
2. To concede part of E. Jerusalem so that it will belong to Israel and the Arabs	6	7	5	5	9	8
3. To keep	93	93	94	94	91	91

Source: IIASR Survey III, pp. 81–82.

* The following initials designate country of origin: born in Europe/America=EAm; born in Asia/Africa=AsAf; born in Israel of a father who came from Asia/Africa=IAsAf; born in Israel of Israeli-born father=II; born in Israel of a father who came from Europe/America=IEAm.

the Israeli scene that the Oriental community holds stronger anti-Arab views than does the European community.[11] Two reasons are generally given. The first states that because the Orientals have experienced life under Arab rule they have more reason to hate them. The second states that owing to some 'Arab' characteristics (for example, language, dress, family structure, etc.) which Oriental Jews have adopted, they have low self-esteem in a European-dominated society, and therefore the object of their frustrations is the people they consider responsible for their adopted characteristics. The point here is that whichever

explanation one accepts, the factor of time should change the attitudes of the Orientals. If one believes more strongly in the first reason it can be argued that with time the bad memories will diminish. And if one adopts the second reason, it can be argued that with improved economic and social conditions the low self-esteem will decrease. A plausible proposition might therefore suggest a continually declining level of anti-Arab orientations among Oriental Jews until they come closer to the mainstream of Israeli society on that issue.

IV. Policies towards the Arabs

The majority of Israelis supported their Government's policies towards the Arab states and its handling of the Arabs residing in Israel. It is also true that most observers of the conflict viewed the position of Israel as being rather hawkish. It may be surprising therefore to see that anywhere from a half to a third of the Israeli population favoured a more aggressive policy towards the Arab states than that adopted by their government.

On that issue there was an unusual distribution of opinion, as is shown in Table 7. The pattern obtained was almost linear with the extreme hawkish position containing about ten times as many respondents as the extreme dovish position. If we combine the first two questions and the last two questions we find that there were almost four times as many hawks as doves. Thus, there existed a high level of consensus on the hawkish side, 75–90 per cent of the respondents either agreeing with the government's policy or advocating a more aggressive policy.

It is interesting to note again the influence upon responses of the wording of a question. In March 1971, the question was worded somewhat differently and this may explain in part the variations in responses to the second, third, and fourth questions in the first column. The question asked the following: 'Given the present situation, in your opinion should the policy towards the Arab countries be more aggressive or less aggressive than now?' The use of the phrase 'less aggressive' instead of 'more moderate' seems to have introduced an element of bias towards the two moderate positions (questions 2 and 4).

It is interesting to compare the results shown in Table 7 with those of a similar poll taken in 1962. The question posed then went as follows: 'To what extent would you prefer a policy of activism on the part of the Israeli government towards the Arab States?'[12] Respondents gave the following answers: definitely, 17 per cent; somewhat, 22 per cent; not too much, 20 per cent; not at all, 32 per cent (9 per cent did not answer). Commenting on the significance of the choice of the term 'activist' rather than 'aggressive', Alan Arian says the following: 'By

TABLE 7. *Responses on aggressive policy towards Arab states*

'Given the present situation, in your opinion should the policy towards the Arab countries be more aggressive or more moderate than now?'	*March*[a] *April 1971* N=1620	*June*[b] *July 1971* N=1770	*October*[c] *December 1971* N=1892	*February*[d] *March 1972* N=1859
	%	%	%	%
1. A great deal more aggressive than now	21	22	18	14
2. Somewhat more aggressive than now	44	26	24	21
3. Same as now	10	41	48	50
4. Somewhat more moderate	23	11	9	13
5. A great deal more moderate	2	1	1	2

Sources: (*a*) IIASR Survey III, p. 79; (*b*) IIASR Survey IV, p. 67; (*c*) IIASR Survey V, p. 73; (*d*) IIASR Survey VI, p. 54.

1969, with a changed security position and new problems facing the state, the milder term "activist" was no longer part of the everyday vocabulary . . . The contours of this issue in public opinion have taken on entirely different proportions, especially since the 1967 war.'[13] It seems clear that the period between 1967 and 1972 saw a shift towards greater militancy on the part of the Israeli public vis-à-vis the Arab states.

Any major accommodation between Israel and the Arab states (as contrasted with Israel and the Palestinians) will essentially hinge on Israeli-Egyptian relations. After the ceasefire between Israel and Egypt was reached in the summer of 1970, several proposals were made to achieve some kind of partial agreement.[14] Israel was quite relieved when the cease-fire went into effect. It may therefore be surprising to find that 45 per cent of the public advocated a more aggressive policy towards Egypt. Table 8 indicates that the distribution of responses on

TABLE 8. *Responses on aggressive policy towards Egypt*

'Recently there has been talk about a partial agreement with Egypt. That is to say, the opening of the Canal with certain conditions. In your opinion should the policy of Israel on this topic be more aggressive or more moderate than now?'

	N=1770	*June–July 1971* %
1. A great deal more moderate		2
2. Somewhat more moderate		11
3. Same as now		43
4. Somewhat more aggressive		19
5. A great deal more aggressive		15
6. Completely reject a partial agreement		11

Source: IIASR Survey IV, p. 68.

the question dealing with Egypt was almost identical with that of the responses given concerning the Arab states in general.

No surveys were available on the relationship between country of origin and aggressive attitudes towards the Arab states. Educational level is positively correlated with a less aggressive position. Increased level of education is a strong moderator of the rate of support for a more aggressive policy. The figures in Table 9 illustrate this relationship.

TABLE 9. *Opinion on aggressive policy in relation to education*

'A great deal more aggressive, or a more aggressive policy, towards the Arab countries is desirable.'

Level of Education	N=1917	*February–March 1972*
		%
1. No schooling	67	44
2. 4 years	75	46
3. 5–8 years	541	41
4. 9–10 years	317	32
5. 11 years	129	41
6. 12 years	392	34
7. Post High School and a Univ. education	230	25
8. Full University education	166	23

Source: IIASR Survey VI, p. 48.

No single issue within the kaleidoscope of issues impinging on the Arab-Israeli conflict has received as much attention as the one dealing with the Arab refugees. A careful analysis of the relationship between Israel and the Arab refugees would have to take into account the heterogeneity of the refugees in terms of their variegated historical experience over the past 26 years and their different geographical locations and social and political structures. Here we shall have to deal with the refugees as a single unit, dividing them only between those of 1948 and those of 1967.

A majority of Israelis supported their government's position on the refugees. That position, simply stated, was that the refugees were the responsibility of the Arab nations just as the Jewish refugees from the Arab states were the responsibility of Israel. Almost two-thirds of the public disclaimed responsibility for the solution of the problems of the refugees resulting from both the 1948 and 1967 wars. There was a slightly higher tendency to view the 1948 refugees in a more sympathetic light (see Table 10). If we were to construct an index of hostility or suspicion based on the issues of the territories, aggressive policies, and attitudes towards the refugees, it would appear that on the last issue the Israeli public was least hawkish.

Place of birth was an important factor; the more extreme anti-refugee statements were made by Orientals (see Table 11); next came the Europeans; and finally those born in Israel from various backgrounds. Educational level was also clearly associated with the position

TABLE 10. *Attitudes towards the Arab refugees*

	N=1892	*October–December 1971*		
	Certainly yes	*Thinks yes*	*Thinks not*	*Certainly not*
	%	%	%	%
1. 'In your opinion is the State of Israel obliged to solve the problem of the refugees from 1948?'	10	30	25	36
2. 'And what about the Arabs who became refugees after the Six-Day War (those who fled from their homes during and after the war)? Should Israel allow them to return to their places?'	8	26	26	40

Source: IIASR Survey V, pp. 72–73.

taken on this issue. Increased level of education considerably moderated an anti-refugee stance. At most educational achievement levels, the Orientals took the strongest anti-refugee position, followed by the Europeans, and then by the Sabras.

TABLE 11. *Attitudes towards refugees by education and country of origin*

	N=1892	*October–December 1971*				
	Level of education	*Country of origin*				
A. Percentage who say: 'The State of Israel certainly does not need to solve the problem of the 1948 refugees' (36%)	1. 12 years plus	AsAf* 38	EAm 33	II 26	IEAm 23	
	2. partial high school	AsAf 43	II 41	IAsAF 37	IEAm 31	EAm 28
	3. 8 years and less	IAsAf 47	AsAf 44	EAm 43		
B. Percentage who say: 'The State of Israel certainly does not need to solve the problem of the 1967 refugees' (40%)	1. 12 years plus	AsAf 37	EAm 37	IEAm 25	II 20	
	2. partial high school	AsAf 54	EAm 43	II 40	IEAm 35	IAsAF 21
	3. 8 years and less	AsAf 56	IAsAf 50	EAm 48		

Source: IIASR Survey V, p. 63.
*See foot of Table 6 for code.

V. Prospects for peace

In the measurement of cognitive, affective, and evaluational orientations of the Israeli public on a variety of subjects all dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict, one of our objectives is to see the relationships among some of the groups of issues. The estimation by the Israeli public of the chances of peace seems to be one matter which would affect its attitudes on other topics. A correlation analysis of some of the

issues will be reserved for the conclusion. At this point it is not surprising to note (see Table 12) that the overwhelming majority were pessimistic about the chances of peace.

TABLE 12. *Opinion on Arab attitudes towards peace*

Percentage of those who were of the opinion that the Arab states were not ready to talk about real peace with Israel, or were less ready now than before.

	%
1. November 1968–January 1969	83
2. June–July 1969	86
3. October–November 1969	87
4. February–March 1970	89
5. November–December 1970	65
6. March–April 1971	70
7. June–July 1971	77
8. October–December 1971	81
9. January–March 1972	66
10. May–July 1972	78

Source: IIASR Survey VII, p. 69.

The relatively sharp decrease in pessimism in November–December 1970, the period after the cease-fire between Egypt and Israel, indicates the important effect specific events have on public opinion.[15] At the same time, the gradual increase in pessimism thereafter points to a relationship between a stabilized status quo and decreasing optimism.

In the first column of Table 13 we have the results of four questions

TABLE 13. *Chances of peace with Arab states*

N=1620 *March–April 1971*

	Total %	EAm* N=810	AsAf N=390	IAsAf N=110	II N=70	IEAm N=240
A. Will the Arab states be ready now to talk about real peace?						
1. Certainly they will be ready now	3	3	5	4	5	1
2. Perhaps they will be ready now	26	28	27	25	24	19
3. No, they are not yet ready	63	61	59	66	65	73
4. Now they will be even less ready than before	7	8	10	5	7	7

	N=1620 *March-April 1971*					
	Total %	EAm* N=810	AsAf N=390	IAsAf N=110	II N=70	IEAm N=240
B. In your opinion what are the chances that we will achieve peace with at least some of the Arabs in the next five years?						
1. No such chance	14	12	18	24	9	12
2. I don't think there is such a chance	29	28	23	35	34	38
3. I think that there is such a chance	53	57	54	35	55	47
4. I am certain that there is such a chance	4	4	5	5	2	3
C. In your opinion are there forces in the Arab world interested in peace with us with conditions that may be acceptable to us?						
1. Certainly there are	26	24	29	30	23	24
2. Perhaps there are	51	52	47	41	51	54
3. I don't think there are	16	17	14	16	26	15
4. Certainly there are none	7	6	11	14	—	7
D. In your opinion is Egypt interested in peace with us on conditions that may be acceptable to us?						
1. Certainly interested	5	5	6	8	2	4
2. Perhaps interested	33	34	32	28	31	33
3. I don't think she is interested	38	40	35	38	52	35
4. Certainly not interested	24	20	27	26	15	28

Source: IIASR Survey III, pp. 79–80.
*See foot of Table 6 for code.

dealing with peace: peace with the Arab states in general; peace with the Arabs in five years; peace with some forces in the Arab world; and peace with Egypt. There is an interesting trend here. First, when the focus was on one country (Egypt) instead of on the Arab states in

general there was a slight increase in optimism. Second, the future seemed to elicit greater hope for peace than the present. Third, as one moved away from Arab states to what is referred to in the question as 'forces in the Arab world' there was a dramatic increase in optimism (from 30 to 77 per cent). There was thus a variegated image of the Arab world in the Israeli mind. Country of origin seems to have had a slight impact on perceptions of Arab attitudes towards peace. The only consistent pattern which emerged was that Sabras with Oriental fathers were slightly more pessimistic about the chances for peace than were the other groups.

VI. Social contacts between Jews and Arabs

An increasingly important factor for future Arab-Israeli relations is the attitude of the Jews towards the Arabs living in Israel. In general, the Arabs living in Israel were not viewed as clearly separated from the Arabs across the borders. Israel was seen as a Jewish state and the Arabs as a foreign element. One anthropologist has commented, 'Moslems are generally classified by the Jews into two types: those who admit to opposition of the State and those who do not make such an admission but who oppose it nevertheless.'[16] Most Jews have kept quite aloof from their Arab neighbours. Thus, two general attitudes can be said to have characterized the feelings of Israelis towards the Arabs: distrust and indifference.

It may therefore be quite surprising to find that the data in Table 14 show that more than half the population were prepared to form friendly ties with Arabs. Furthermore, the pattern obtained shows that the extreme 'agree' position was almost twice the number of the extreme 'disagree' position with the exception of the June–July 1969 survey. Of course, it is one thing to be prepared to make friends and quite another thing actually to go out of one's way to develop such friendships. Three quarters of the respondents said that Arabs never visited their homes, while somewhat more than half had never visited an Arab home. The difference between Arabs visiting Jewish homes and Jews visiting Arab homes may in part be due to the socially important custom of hospitality practised by Arabs. It may also be due to the fact that the Arabs had more practical reasons to have contact with Jews.

Another survey[17] showed that in every single case, a higher level of education was correlated with increased readiness for friendship with Arabs. When education was held constant, Oriental Jews tended to have more anti-Arab views than did either Sabras or Europeans.

In the few weeks immediately after the Six-Day War the IIASR carried out three special quick surveys to ascertain the impact of the consequences of the war. In one of these surveys the public was asked

TABLE 14. *Social contacts with Arabs*

A. '*Would you be prepared to befriend an Arab?*'

	June 1967	*February March 1968*	*April June 1968*	*June July 1969*	*October December 1971*
	%	%	%	%	%
1. Certainly prepared	32	32	43	26	31
2. Perhaps, depends on conditions	21	24	11	34	34
3. Not prepared	29	25	21	14	16
4. Certainly not prepared	18	19	25	26	19

B. '*Have Arabs visited your home?*'

	February–March 1968	*June–July 1969*	*October–December 1971*
	%	%	%
1. Never	73	77	73
2. Once	6	5	5
3. 2–3 times	9	7	8
4. Many times	12	11	14

C. '*Have you visited an Arab house?*'

	%	%	%
1. Never	56	57	56
2. Once	11	12	10
3. 2–3 times	15	12	13
4. Many times	18	19	21

Source: HASR Survey V, p. 60.

TABLE 15. *Liberal attitudes towards Arabs and previous personal contacts, in percentages;* N=2500

	Jews visiting Arabs				*Arabs visiting Jews*		
	Never	*Once*	*2–3 times*	*Many times*	*Never*	*Once*	*2–3 times*
1. Not ready to live in a neighbourhood which has Arab residents	75	71	64	60	73	63	58
2. Not ready to live in a house with an Arab family	68	63	47	53	64	56	48
3. Not ready to befriend an Arab	61	44	39	38	56	37	36
4. Arabs will never reach the level of Jews	64	55	52	59	62	50	48
5. It would be better if the Israeli Arabs left	16	13	10	12	15	19	6
6. It would be better if the Arabs from the occupied territories left for Arab countries	25	21	16	17	22	27	19

Source: *Baayot Hatsibur* (Public Problems), Special Survey No. 3, 20–29 June 1967, Jerusalem, September 1967, p.19.

to respond to several questions which in the aggregate would measure degrees of prejudice; Table 15 shows the results of that survey. What is particularly significant is the relationship between social contacts with Arabs and various opinions about them.

There is a commonly held 'liberal' proposition which states that increased social contact among different groups, especially antagonistic groups, will eventually lead to a lessening of stereotypes and prejudice. The data in Table 15 provide little support for that notion. While in more instances than not increased social contact did diminish anti-Arab prejudice, in several instances the opposite was true. In the fourth column in Table 15 four out of six answers indicate increased antagonistic attitudes. It appears, therefore, that greater social contact sometimes simply reinforces previously held beliefs. Unfortunately, the later surveys did not put these questions, so that no trend can be ascertained.

VII. The Arab-Israeli conflict and public opinion

Three general themes require a brief analysis: the relationship between the various groups of issues; trends in public opinion between 1967 and 1972; and the impact of the background variables on public opinion. At first three groups of issues were selected for a correlation analysis: Israel's policy towards the Arabs; Arab policy towards Israel; and the willingness on the part of Israel to return territories. A very weak relationship was found between the normative hard/soft policy towards the Arab states by Israel and the assessment of the readiness of the Arabs for peace with Israel. Furthermore, a weak relationship was also found between the assessment of Arab intentions about peace and the willingness on the part of the respondents to return the territories.[18]

These findings suggest what could be construed as two contradictory explanations. On the one hand it can be argued that a conciliatory attitude of some Israelis did not depend on the perception that a similiar conciliatory attitude existed across the borders. It follows from this that since Israel's 'doves' arrived at their position independently of the Arabs' posture, Israel needs, according to the 'doves', to take the first steps to get the conflict off dead centre. On the other hand, we have already seen that the 'doves' were a small minority in the society. The weak correlation (0·20) between an optimistic/pessimistic estimation of Arab intentions about peace and the willingness to return the territories suggests that irrespective of what the Arabs intended to do, the decision on the territories was independent and, as we have seen, tended to favour the hawks.

The next correlation analysis attempted to find the relationship among the following: estimation of the chances of peace; concessions

on the territories; attitudes towards the Arab refugees; and social contacts between Jews and Arabs. These groups of issues were divided into two categories: conciliation (estimation of peace, territories, and Arab refugees) and social contact. The groups of issues within the same category were more closely related than were those in the different categories. The two issues with the highest correlation (0·40) not in the same category were the attitudes towards the territories and the willingness to befriend an Arab. With that exception, the correlation between social contact and the territories was very low. In fact, there was little relationship between social contact and attitudes measuring conciliation. There was also a low relationship (0·17) between the hard/soft policy towards the Arabs and the assessment of the willingness of the Arabs to talk about real peace.

If we couple these findings with the relatively consistent pattern of a stable hard-line position on the territories, a desire for an aggressive policy towards the Arab states and a pessimistic view of the chances for peace (interpreted as the first steps towards peace having to be taken by the Arabs), the prospects for conflict resolution during the period examined, in so far as Israel's public opinion was concerned, were quite dim.

The one hopeful finding was the strong impact of the background variables, especially education, on public opinion. Since the continuation of the conflict over the past two generations was reinforced by the accretion of perceptions based on suspicion, fear, bad memories, and/or low self-esteem, education, proven to be a strong moderating force in the past, may show the way out of the tunnel.

The bulk of the current writing on the Arab-Israeli conflict is based on event-analysis which is typically buttressed by polemical interpretations. What is needed is studies which would incorporate social-psychological, sociological, and political dimensions. An analysis of the structure of public opinion by itself is of course insufficient unless it is linked to the foreign policy making process. It is hoped that this study may be a step forward in the long and complex chain providing links between foreign policy and public opinion.

APPENDIX

The data used in this study were made available by the Israeli Institute of Applied Social Research (IIASR). I should like to take this opportunity of thanking the IIASR for its kind assistance. The IIASR, with the co-operation of the Communications Institute of the Hebrew University, conducts a continuing survey three times a year on a variety of topics. The samples in these surveys generally consist of about 2,000 subjects drawn either from the voters' register or from municipal lists of residents. The sample consists of a representative cross-section of adult Jews of the four main cities (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Beer-Sheva) and their environs. Whenever

possible, the IIASR publishes the findings of the surveys. The seven following reports were used in this study. For the sake of brevity each report is given a code which is used in this study.

Tziona Peled, *Tamtsit Hamimtsaim al Hatmurot Shechalu Bebaayot Hatsibur Vedaat Hakahal Meaz Milchemet Sheshet Hayamim Vead Yuli 1969* (Summary of the findings of the changes that have taken place in public problems and public opinion from the Six-Day War to July 1969), Jerusalem, September 1969—IIASR Survey I.

Shlomit Levi and Louis Guttman, *Mivneh Vedinamika Shel Deagot* (Structure and Dynamics of Worries), Jerusalem, December 1970—IIASR—Survey II.

Shlomit Levi and Louis Guttman, *Tguvot Hatsibur Lebaayot Hashaa* (Public Reactions to present-day problems) Jerusalem, June 1971—IIASR Survey III.

Tziona Peled, *Hamatsav Hanochechi Beaynay Hatsibur* (The present situation as seen by the public) Jerusalem, October 1971—IIASR Survey IV.

Tziona Peled and Chaviva Shimreling, *Hamatsav Hanochechi Beaynay Hatsibur* (The present situation as seen by the public) Jerusalem, March 1972—IIASR Survey V.

Tziona Peled and Chaviva Shimreling, *Hamatsav Hanochechi Beaynay Hatsibur* (The present situation as seen by the public) Jerusalem, July 1972—IIASR Survey VI.

Zeev Ben-Sira, *Hamatsav Hanochechi Beaynay Hatsibur* (The present situation as seen by the public) Jerusalem, December 1972—IIASR Survey VII.

NOTES

[1] See Appendix.

[2] Amnon Rubinstein, 'Why the Israelis Are Being Difficult', *The New York Times Magazine*, 18 April 1971.

[3] IIASR Survey V, pp. 17–25.

[4] IIASR Survey VI, p. 36.

[5] Rubinstein, op. cit.

[6] IIASR Survey IV, p. 64.

[7] The literature on ethnic relations in Israel is extensive. See, for example, S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants*, London, 1954; Judah Matras, *Social Change in Israel*, Chicago, 1965; Alex Weingrod, *Israel: Group Relations in a New Society*, New York, 1965.

[8] *Ma'ariv* (Hebrew daily), 18 August 1972.

[9] The problems of varying questions and wording are discussed by John E. Mueller, 'Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam', *American Political Science Review*, vol. LXV, June 1971, pp. 358–75.

[10] IIASR Survey IV, p. 69.

[11] For the difference in outlook towards Arabs held by Orientals and Europeans, see the excellent analysis by Yochanan Peres, 'Ethnic Relations

in Israel', in Michael Curtis, ed., *People and Politics in the Middle East*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1971.

[12] Quoted in Aaron Antonovsky, 'Israeli Political-Social Attitudes', *Amot* (Hebrew), No. 6, 1963, p. 10.

[13] Alan Arian, 'Stability and Change in Israeli Public Opinion and Politics', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 35, Spring 1970, p. 24.

[14] The best known of these proposals was the 'Rogers Plan', which called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the immediate Suez Canal area in exchange for which Egypt would re-open the canal to all ships.

[15] Nevertheless, since there is a fairly high level of consensus on the issues examined, events do not seem to have a major impact on changing public opinion. Within the American scene there is considerable discussion on the impact of foreign policy events on public opinion. See William R. Caspary, 'The "Mood Theory": A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy', *American Political Science Review*, vol. LXIV, June 1970, pp. 534–47; see also Mueller, op. cit.

[16] Edward Robins, 'Attitudes, Stereotypes, and Prejudices among Arabs and Jews in Israel', *New Outlook*, vol. 15, November–December 1972, p. 45.

[17] IIASR Survey V, p. 63.

[18] The tables showing the correlation analysis are in the author's file. The author would be happy to provide copies of these tables.

NEW EVIDENCE ON BASIC ISSUES IN THE DEMOGRAPHY OF SOVIET JEWS

U. O. Schmelz

Introduction[1]

IT is well known that the Soviet population censuses contain figures on Jews as one of the recognized ethnic groups ('nationalities'). For obvious ideological reasons, they do not supply data on the adherents of the various religious denominations. The last pre-war census was taken in 1939. The next followed 20 years later, being held in January 1959. Meanwhile there had been the cataclysm of the Holocaust and major boundary changes in territories which were once densely inhabited by Jews. For the first time since the Holocaust, the 1959 census furnished comprehensive data on the Jewish population of the U.S.S.R., whose total was given as 2,267,800; but it also raised a host of problems of interpretation, some of which I shall consider here. The absence in that census of direct data on the age composition of the Jews has been much regretted by students of Jewish demography. For the major Soviet Republics, however, information was published on the proportion of married persons among the Jews—for all adults and for 10 specified age groups separately; and by comparing the analogous data for the general population, it was possible to infer that the Jewish population was more aged. But this general inference could not, of course, compensate for the missing direct data; and that lack of data was a serious limitation, since demographic analysis is capable of extracting important information on the dynamics of a population from its known age distribution.

In January 1970, the second post-war population census was taken in the Soviet Union; a total of only 2,150,700 persons were enumerated as Jews. The fourth volume of the official census publication contains information on ethnic groups ('nationalities'). Among a great many age distributions according to ethnic group and geographical division, only a single section relates to Jews. This is the age structure of the Jews in the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). It is

certainly very curious and quite unexplained why age data on Jews were given for a single republic, albeit the principal one, but neither for the others nor for the whole U.S.S.R..[2] However, since there is so very little statistical documentation on Soviet Jewry, one must make the best use of what has been published.

While the disclosure of the age distribution of the Jews in the R.S.F.S.R. gives us a chance of applying some analytical techniques and obtaining important additional findings for the Jews of the R.S.F.S.R. themselves, it is obvious that the extension of that analysis to the totality of Jews in the U.S.S.R. (by our assuming that they have a roughly similar age distribution) cannot be other than tentative. On the other hand, there is an intrinsic likelihood in that assumption, as will be explained below.

The newly published age data

Let us first look at the published data, which are presented here in Table 1:[3]

TABLE 1. *Age distribution of the Jews in the R.S.F.S.R.*

Age	*Absolute numbers*	*Per cent*
0–10	56,002	6·9
11–15	34,335	4·3
16–19	31,375	3·9
20–29	88,006	10·9
30–39	121,675	15·1
40–49	129,563	16·1
50–59	131,592	16·3
60 and over	213,379	26·5
Unknown	1,988	
Total	807,915	100·0

The first impression obtained from looking at that table is that the population is a strikingly 'aging' one: the proportion of young children is tiny, that of old people very large; in contrast to the case of an expanding population, the older each 10-year age group is, the greater is its percentage of the total Jewish population. In fact, the impression of severe 'aging' is highlighted when the Jews of the R.S.F.S.R. are compared with the general population in the whole of that republic as well as with that in its two major cities of Moscow and Leningrad and with that in its total urban localities.[4]

Intercensal change

A few preliminary points need to be made.

(*a*) The intercensal evolution of the size of the Jewish population

TABLE 2. *Selected age groups among the Jews and the general population of the R.S.F.S.R. (in percentages)*

	*0–19 years**	*60 years and over**
Jews	15·1	26·5
General population:		
Moscow	25·0	15·1
Leningrad	24·8	14·1
Total urban in R.S.F.S.R.	33·5	10·7
Whole R.S.F.S.R.	36·0	11·8
U.S.S.R.	37·0	11·8

* Per 100 of population.

according to the published figures was as follows: U.S.S.R.—from 2,267,800 in 1959 to 2,150,700 in 1970, that is, a decrease of 117,100 or 5·2 per cent over 11 years, or of nearly 5 per mille annually; R.S.F.S.R.—from 875,300 in 1959 to 807,900 in 1972, that is, a decrease of 67,400 or 7·7 per cent over the 11-year period, or of 7 per mille annually.

(*b*) The intercensal change should be seen as resulting from a combination of the following factors.

i. Natural change, that is, the difference between births and deaths.

ii. External migration. In fact, there was hardly any immigration, but virtually only emigration, predominantly to Israel; 12,000 went there over the whole intercensal period, according to published Israeli statistics.[5]

iii. In the case of the R.S.F.S.R., there was migration to and from other Soviet republics; such movements are classified as internal migrations within the entire U.S.S.R.

iv. The balance of persons joining the Jewish group as against losses by assimilation. The possibilities for formal changes of this kind seem to be limited in the Soviet Union, where the 'nationality' of each adult is entered in his or her identity papers and is not easily changed. But a case in point is the choice of 'nationality' exercised by the children of mixed couples, when they reach the age of 16 years and receive their own identity papers.

v. There might be changes in 'census coverage' with regard to Jewishness, that is, different returns of 'nationality' in the two censuses without formal alteration of status, as when the same person was returned as Jewish only in one of the censuses—either in 1959 or in 1970. According to the census regulations obtaining on both occasions, no documentary proof was to be required from the respondents. To the extent that this rule was applied in the letter and in the spirit—by both emunerators and respondents—a man could define himself 'nationally' without reference to the entry in his identity documents.

(*c*) Since we have data on Jewish age groups only in the R.S.F.S.R., I shall here adopt the crude working hypothesis that the proportionate age composition of all Soviet Jews in 1970 was the same as that reported for the Jews of the R.S.F.S.R. The latter constituted about 38 per cent (a sizable proportion) of all Soviet Jews enumerated in both 1959 and 1970. The rough analogy between the two age compositions can be justified in the light of the following considerations.

i. For cogent demographic reasons, among the major sections of Soviet Jewry only the Asian and Caucasian Jews are to be assigned an age structure radically different from that in the R.S.F.S.R. But they were a small minority estimated at approximately 4–5 per cent of the total number of Jews in the U.S.S.R. in the period under review.[6]

ii. Since the Jews in the western regions of the pre-war territory of the U.S.S.R. had been even more affected by the Holocaust than the totality of Jews then residing in the R.S.F.S.R., it seems not impossible that in the 1959–1970 period the 'aging' among the Jews in the Ukraine and Belorussia was even more severe than was the case in the R.S.F.S.R. These two republics accounted together for about 43 per cent of all Soviet Jews in both recent censuses. Therefore any greater 'aging' of the Jews in the Ukraine and Belorussia, compared with the R.S.F.S.R., would have counteracted the opposite influence of the Asian and Caucasian Jews. The age composition of the Jews may have been somewhat younger in some western fringe republics (Moldavia and the Baltic republics), but all these together accounted for only 7–8 per cent of the total number of Soviet Jews.

At any rate, however simplistic the assumed analogy of the Jewish age structure in the whole Soviet Union with that in the R.S.F.S.R. may be, the findings to be obtained with the help of this assumption will be salient enough so as not to require to be altered if it turns out that there are limited differences between the empirical age distributions, for 1970, of the Jews in the R.S.F.S.R. and the whole of the U.S.S.R.—should the latter become known. The conclusions in Sections III–V below would be made more trenchant if the age composition of all Soviet Jews were to prove to be 'older' than in the R.S.F.S.R.

(*d*) The Jews returned in 1970 in the age groups 11 and over had been enumerated among the Jews of all ages (starting with age 0) in the 1959 census. By use of a reverse projection technique, it is possible to calculate the conjectural number of persons alive in 1959 of whom the Jews enumerated in 1970 at ages 11 and over were survivors. This procedure relies on mortality alone among all the factors of change listed in *b* above, and is therefore unaffected by the uncertainties surrounding some of the other factors. To carry out the desired calculation, it was necessary to choose an appropriate life-table (in the absence of an empirical one for the Jews in the R.S.F.S.R. or the U.S.S.R.). At the high level of life expectancy now reported for the

general population of the U.S.S.R. any likely divergencies in the Jewish mortality schedule could only have a limited influence on the results of the computations. I made two computations with alternative life-tables.

(1) The life-table of the general population of the U.S.S.R. in 1964–65 was: mean length of life for males, 66·3 years, and for females, 74·0 years.[7] The Jewish population in the R.S.F.S.R. aged 11 and over in 1970 being taken as a basis, a conjectural figure of 896,600[8] was obtained for Jews of all ages in 1959. In other words, the 751,800 Jews of the R.S.F.S.R. in 1970 who were enumerated at ages 11 and over[9] were found to have survived from about 896,600 persons in 1959. Similarly, if we work backwards from the roughly 2,001,300 Jews in the whole Soviet Union in 1970 who may be assumed to have been aged 11 and over (according to the age composition borrowed from the Jews in the R.S.F.S.R.), a conjectural figure of 2,386,800 is obtained for the entire age range of the Jews at the time of the 1959 census.

(2) Alternatively, the life-table of the Jewish population in Israel for 1961 was used.[10] It has a greater mean length of life for males than in the U.S.S.R. (70·5 years for males, 73·6 years for females) and, as is usual with Jewish populations, there is a particularly low child mortality[11] and a comparatively greater mortality among the elderly. Because of this latter feature and of the heavy proportion of aged persons among Soviet Jews, the application of the Israeli life-table resulted in a somewhat higher estimate of deaths for the period 1959–1970. But, on the whole, there was only a small difference in the Jewish population totals obtained by that method and the calculations based on the Soviet life-table. The conjectural figures for 1959, according to the Israeli life-table, were 899,300 for the R.S.F.S.R. and 2,394,100 for the whole U.S.S.R.

In what follows, I shall take the average result of the alternative calculations according to the two life-tables: a conjectural Jewish population figure for 1959 of 898,000 in the R.S.F.S.R. and 2,390,400 in the U.S.S.R.

Since most of my further arguments will rely on the results of this reverse projection, which themselves depend on the life-table(s) used, the appropriateness of the latter and the margin of error in the results are important matters, to which I shall return later.

Interpretation

1. Age distribution in 1959

The method by which the conjectured Jewish population totals for 1959 were arrived at consisted in tracing back from 1970 to 1959 the number of Jews in each age group in the R.S.F.S.R.—and, analogously

in the whole U.S.S.R.—by adding the appropriate age-specific estimate of those who died during the intercensal period. In that way, an age distribution of Jews in 1959 was obtained.[12] The age groups resulting for 1959 are somewhat unusual, because they are due to backward shifting by 11 years of the age groups in the 1970 census. Nevertheless, a rough comparison is quite possible. The population showed strong aging in 1959, and the situation was even more acute in 1970. The data in Table 3 relate directly to the Jews of the R.S.F.S.R.; but they probably apply, by and large, to the Jews of the whole U.S.S.R.

TABLE 3. *Age distribution of the Jews in the Russian Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) in 1970 and estimate for 1959 (in percentages)*

1970		*1959*	
Age	%	*Age*	%
		0–4	3·9
0–10	6·9	5–8	3·5
11–15	4·3		
16–19	3·9	9–18	9·9
20–29	10·9	19–28	13·8
30–39	15·1	29–38	14·9
40–49	16·1	39–48	15·6
50–59	16·3		
60 and over	26·5	49 and over	38·4
Total	100·0		100·0

II. Birth and death rates

For the Jews enumerated as such in the 1970 census, the number of births during the intercensal interval is equal to the number of enumerated children aged 0–10 years, plus a figure to account for those who were born in that period but died before the 1970 census. That figure can be obtained from an appropriate life-table; in fact, I averaged the results computed from the two life-tables used above. The births considered here are of children born into the Jewish group. There may have been other children with at least one Jewish parent (in particular, one who was returned as Jewish in the 1970 census) who were born in the intercensal interval and survived to 1970, but were not enumerated as Jews in that census. These cases are not included in the present computations. We are thus dealing with *de facto* Jewish births only.

Total deaths during the intercensal period are made up of: (a) deaths among persons born before the 1959 census; and (b) deaths among children born in the intercensal interval. The computation

of (b) has been explained; (a) is the difference between the conjectured 1959 figures of 898,000 and 2,390,400, respectively, and the corresponding population aged 11 and over (that is, the survivors) in the 1970 census, who numbered 751,800 and 2,001,300 respectively.

The denominator for the calculation of the birth and death rates is the geometrical average of the conjectured population figure for 1959[13] and the Jewish population (of all ages) enumerated in 1970. The rates computed in this way are identical for the Jews in the R.S.F.S.R. and the U.S.S.R., since the age composition of the former was applied to the latter and the same life-tables were used for both.

An average annual birth rate of approximately 6 per thousand and a death rate of about 15·5 per thousand were disclosed by these calculations.

III. Natural decrease

If the annual birth rate was about 6 and the death rate 15·5 per thousand, the Jews of the R.S.F.S.R. suffered an average annual decrease of more than 9 per thousand during the intercensal period. Roughly the same applies, by analogy, to all Jews in the U.S.S.R.

The 1960s witnessed a drastic decline in the natural increase of the general population in the Soviet Union; this was especially marked in the case of the western republics. There has been very little natural increase in the general populations of Moscow and Leningrad in recent years, and the net reproduction rate of Belorussia and the Ukraine dropped to 1 or below,[14] that is, no future inter-generational growth was to be expected.

In recent decades Jewish communities throughout the world have usually had lower rates of natural change than the corresponding general population, that is, they have had a smaller natural increase or a decrease. In continental Europe, in particular, nearly all the Jewish populations which it has been so far possible to study have shown a natural decrease, partly as the result of the Holocaust. These ravages were particularly severe among the children who would otherwise have grown into young adults by 1970. Hence the low proportion of the 20–29 years old in the Jewish age distribution for the R.S.F.S.R. in 1970. This paucity of young adults, in turn, reduces the frequency of current births (and, therefore, the proportion of young children in the age distribution) even below the effects of the obviously very low fertility. Moreover, severe 'aging', which was also found in the R.S.F.S.R., raises the number of deaths.

The fact of a strong natural decline shows, incidentally, that one must view with reserve the widely circulated population estimates of the American Jewish Year Book since 1959 in respect of Soviet Jewry. These estimates rose from the official census figure of 2,268,000 for

January 1959 to 2,644,000 at the end of 1971, by adding annually an alleged substantial increase.

IV. Apparently improved census enumeration of Jews in 1970

One of the general difficulties nowadays in enumerating Jews is the existence of 'marginal' individuals whose Jewish identity is weak and whose enumeration as Jews depends on their uncertain readiness to return themselves as such in the specific situation of a given census or survey. These problems are well known in the free countries of the world. It is only to be expected that they also exist *mutatis mutandis* in the special circumstances of Soviet Jews: religion has long been officially discouraged as a criterion of Jewishness; the identity documents of adults do state their 'nationality', although the census regulations in 1959 and 1970 laid down that no documentary proofs were to be required by the enumerators; some who are Jewish by descent and have some degree of Jewish identity may have, in fact, a non-Jewish 'nationality' recorded in their papers; antisemitism and the consequent social pressures lead some to conceal their Jewishness when circumstances allow; and so on. In the next section, I shall consider the probable limits of the group of marginal individuals who failed to be returned as Jews in the censuses.

We have seen that the yearly decline in the number of Jews in the R.S.F.S.R. during the intercensal period was 7 per thousand, while the natural decrease amounted to more than 9 per thousand. The decisive aspect of this discrepancy can be expressed as follows: the 751,800 Jews aged 11 and over who were enumerated in the R.S.F.S.R. in 1970 represented the survivors of a Jewish population of all ages in 1959 whose conjectured size, considering only the effects of intercensal mortality, would have been 898,000 as computed above; in actual fact only 875,300 Jews were enumerated in the R.S.F.S.R. in 1959 (a difference of 22,700 or −2·5 per cent).[15] We have so far argued back from 1970 to 1959, because an empirical age distribution of the Jews is available only from the later census. Applying to the 875,300 Jews enumerated in 1959 the age structure conjectured for that date on the basis of the 1970 data (see Section I above), we find that the 'expected' number of Jews aged 11 and over in the R.S.F.S.R. in 1970 would have been only 732,500, while in fact 751,800 were enumerated (a difference of 19,300 or +2·6 per cent). Moreover, some emigration and perhaps also some losses by assimilation occurred in the intercensal period, reducing the census figure for 1970. If it had not been for their influence, the difference between the numbers expected from the effect of mortality and the actual numbers would have been even greater.

The corresponding figures for the Jews in the whole U.S.S.R.

(based on the assumed analogy of age structure with the Jews in the R.S.F.S.R.) show a wider relative discrepancy between the results of the two enumerations. The intercensal decline per annum was only 5 per thousand as compared with a natural decrease of more than 9 per thousand. The Jews enumerated in 1970 as aged 11 and over had survived from about 2,390,400 of all ages in 1959, while only 2,267,800 were enumerated at that date (a difference of 122,600 or −5·1 per cent). And inversely, applying to these 2,267,800 the age structure conjectured for 1959, we see that only 1,897,800 aged 11 and over should have been enumerated in 1970, while their actual estimate[16] was 2,001,300 (a discrepancy of 103,500 or +5·5 per cent). If the known emigration of 12,000 Jews and any losses by assimilation are taken into account, the differences increase still further.

When we consider the numerical evolution of the whole Jewish population (of all ages), the greater relative discrepancies found for the Jews in the whole U.S.S.R. are arithmetically explained by the larger differences between the actual rate of decline (5 per thousand) and the computed natural decrease (9 per thousand), as compared with the Jews in the R.S.F.S.R. (7 and 9 per thousand, respectively). The lesser difference between these rates for the Jews in the R.S.F.S.R. could be the result of a negative balance of internal migrations vis-à-vis other Soviet republics. We know far too little about the internal migrations of Soviet Jews in the intercensal period, but there are a few signs of some drift from the two largest republics to the smaller ones.[17]

When taking into account only those who survived, one finds discrepancies of more than 2–5 per cent between the number of Jews in the two recent Soviet censuses. In the absence of an empirical life-table for Soviet Jewry, this discrepancy was computed by using substitute life-tables which assume a reasonable level of longevity. Several control calculations were undertaken in order to evaluate the computations.

(*a*) Earlier in this century, Jews often had a markedly greater mean length of life than the host population; but these differentials have been greatly reduced in recent decades. In order to subject the effect of any such Jewish-Gentile differential in the Soviet Union to a drastic test, the highest level of longevity in the well-known model life-tables by Coale and Demeny was applied to the hypothetical survival of all Soviet Jews in the intercensal period. This level assumes a mean life span of 73·9 years for males and 77·5 years for females, which is in excess of the mean length of life found at present in any large known population. Even so, a discrepancy of 107,200 or 4·5 per cent was found between the expected figure of all Soviet Jews in 1959 and the number recorded in the census of that year. Hence most of the previously found discrepancy of more than 5 per cent persisted, although an unrealistically high longevity had been assumed.[18]

(*b*) On the other hand, a deviation of only 0·2 per cent from the direct intercensal comparison was found, when applying the Soviet life-tables of 1964–65 for a calculation of survival in the general population of the U.S.S.R. between the censuses of 1959 and 1970. This is in marked contrast to the discrepancies of more than 2–5 per cent obtained for the Jews, which therefore (and added to *a* above) are unlikely to have been due merely to the limitations of the procedure used here.

(*c*) The difference between the 2,267,800 Soviet Jews enumerated in 1959 and the estimate of 2,001,300 Jews aged 11 and over in 1970 amounted to 266,500. About 11,000 of those were emigrants to Israel.[19] For no more than the remaining difference of about 255,000 to have been due to mortality—considering the over-aged structure of Soviet Jews—their mean life span ought to have approached 100 years, which is of course absurd.[20]

Other control calculations tested the effects of possible departures from the assumed similarity between the Jewish age distribution in the whole of the U.S.S.R. and that recorded for the R.S.F.S.R. It was found that major divergencies in age composition (which are unlikely) would have been needed in order to cancel the discrepancies discussed here between the 1959 and 1970 censuses.

While the inferred discrepancy between the censuses is particularly striking for the total number of Soviet Jews, it existed also in the case of the R.S.F.S.R., whose age distribution in 1970 is actually recorded. The smaller scale of the discrepancy in the R.S.F.S.R. may well be attributable to a negative balance of internal migrations, as noted above.

It can therefore be asserted that the Jewish population in the R.S.F.S.R.—and more markedly in the U.S.S.R.—declined less than would have been expected from the effects of births and deaths. Further factors may have exercised a negative influence on the intercensal change in Jewish population size, such as emigration and any losses owing to assimilation (apart from those already reflected in the low number of intercensal births, if less than half of the children born to mixed couples in the intercensal interval were reported as Jews).[21]

If nevertheless the Jewish population in the R.S.F.S.R. (and even more so in the whole U.S.S.R.) did not decline between the two censuses to an extent corresponding to the natural decrease, let alone the joint impact of natural decrease and of other negative factors, it seems reasonable to infer that the coverage of those enumerated as Jews must have been wider in the later census. Apparently, more marginal individuals who had concealed their Jewishness in 1959 disclosed it in 1970, which explains the otherwise unaccountable discrepancy in the number of Jews in the two censuses.[22]

If it had not been for this improved coverage, the number of Jews

in the 1970 census would have dropped even further below the 1959 mark than it did according to the official figures. The figure for 1970 would have been approximately 2,035,000 according to computed natural movement and recorded emigration. This estimate is based on the following components: 1,897,800 survivors from among the persons enumerated as Jews in 1959; plus 149,400 children aged 0–10 in 1970 (the total of 2,150,700 Jews less the estimate of 2,001,300 for ages 11 and over); but minus 11,000 emigrants born up to 1959. The difference of about 115,000 between the conjectured figure of 2,035,000 and the census result of 2,150,700 is essentially accounted for by the balance of improved coverage over any losses by assimilation in the intercensal period (apart from those already reflected in the low number of children under the age of 11 in the 1970 census).

The census coverage of the Jews for the whole of the U.S.S.R. seems to have widened by about 5 per cent. If it had not been for this change, the population enumerated as Jewish would not have decreased from 2,267,800 to 2,150,700 or by 5 per cent, as is shown by the official figures, but from 2,267,800 to about 2,035,000, that is, by as much as approximately 10 per cent. It is tempting to link the inferred rise in the census coverage of Soviet Jews with the momentous upsurge of Jewish national feeling in the U.S.S.R., which is one of the most arresting spectacles on the contemporary Jewish scene.

V. Excessive estimates of the 'true' number of Soviet Jews

When the results of the 1959 census became known, many speculated that there was the likelihood of a large under-enumeration of Soviet Jews according to reported 'nationality'. While the 1959 census showed little more than two and a quarter million Jews, figures of three million or even far in excess were put forward.

Since the difference would have to be accounted for by Jews of various types of marginality, thorny conceptual problems of 'Who is a Jew?' are raised by such claims (though not, as a rule, fully faced). In any modern Jewish population, so too in the Soviet Union, some undercoverage of marginal elements in an enumeration, particularly an official one, is quite possible and even probable. However, it should also be realized that the more marginal elements are likely to have a weaker Jewish identity and less capacity to hand on that identity to future generations.

The census taken in the U.S.S.R. in January 1939 indicated 3,020,200 Jews. On the eve of the Second World War, about two million more Jews lived in the areas that were subsequently annexed by the Soviet Union, but their great majority perished in the Holocaust and many of the survivors emigrated at various dates (but before 1959), predominantly to Israel.[23] The Jews in the western regions of the pre-war

Soviet territory suffered appalling losses from the Holocaust. It has always been assumed that the size of post-war Jewry on the enlarged territory of the U.S.S.R. considerably fell short of the pre-war figure for the smaller pre-war Soviet territory. For instance, publications of the Institute of Jewish Affairs as well as the American Jewish Year Book indicated, before the release of the 1959 census figure, a rough estimate of only two millions for the Jews in the whole of the extended present Soviet territory—in contrast to the pre-war figure of three millions in the earlier and smaller territory.

On the other hand, the present reasoning and calculations based on the 1970 census have revealed a strong natural decline in the 1959–1970 interval, estimated at more than nine per thousand yearly on average for that period. Such a remarkable natural decrease means that the years 1959–70 must have been preceded by a transition period—of not inconsiderable length—with lesser but intensifying rates of natural decrease.

In most other Jewish populations in continental Europe a short-lived 'baby-boom' occurred soon after the end of the Second World War; it was followed by an essentially declining trend in the 1960s and 1970s. That trend was due to the prevalence of: (*a*) natural decrease—because of insufficient fertility and heavy 'aging', the latter aggravated by the after-effects of the Holocaust; (*b*) losses partly connected with out-marriages. Unless these negative influences are counteracted by a positive migration balance, the Jewish populations in Europe tend to shrink; and this process can be accelerated by a negative migration balance (including aliyah to Israel). On the whole, the typical overall evolution of the Jews in continental Europe since the end of the Second World War—irrespective of migratory influences—can be summarized as one of numerical decline.

The published age distribution of the Jews in the R.S.F.S.R. shows no direct evidence of a 'baby-boom'. It may be that this is mainly due to the crudeness of the classification. The Jews aged 20–29 in January 1970 were given as one category (see Table 1), the birth-year cohorts of 1940–44, which were worst affected by the Holocaust, and the potential 'baby-boom' cohorts of 1945–49 being thus lumped together. But the small proportion of the 16–19 years old, who corresponded to the birth-year cohorts 1950–53, indicates that even if any 'baby-boom' did take place among Soviet Jews, it was very short-lived. In view of (*a*) the sharp natural decrease of Soviet Jews during 1959–70 and the weak effect, if any, of a 'baby-boom' in the late 1940s, and (*b*) the analogy with other European Jewish populations, it seems reasonable to assume that the overall demographic evolution of Soviet Jews between 1945 and 1970 was marked by a numerical decline.

If the losses of the Holocaust among the Jews in the old Soviet territory exceeded the addition of surviving Jews (excluding emigrants)

in the annexed areas and, consequently, the initial post-war figure (excluding those emigrants) fell markedly short of the 1939 level of 3 million, and if the subsequent evolution resulted in a further numerical decline, it follows that the 'true' number of Soviet Jews in 1959 ought to have been considerably *below* three million. The gap between the reality and the alleged figure of three million or more Jews must have widened further during 1959–70, because of the accumulating natural decrease.[24]

Since the census of January 1970, the number of Soviet Jews must have declined still further, because of (*a*) a continuing natural decrease which, under present conditions, cannot have been reversed, as the 'aging' of the Jewish population is intensifying, and (*b*) the emigration of Jews to Israel, which neared a total of 80,000 persons during 1970–1973.

Conclusion

In view of the importance of Soviet Jews in World Jewry and the paucity of available statistical information on them, we are called upon to make special efforts, and even to resort to indirect methods, in studying their basic demographic problems. The calculations presented here are tentative, and their results should be viewed as no more than rough estimates. However, it ought to be realized that these calculations serve only to test, and to substantiate numerically, some fundamental facts whose essential nature is fairly evident even without them. The greatly over-aged structure of the Jews in the R.S.F.S.R., as revealed by the published results of the 1970 census, signified both heavy 'aging' in the previous decade (that is, by the time of the 1959 census) and the prevalence of a substantial natural decrease. In particular, the very small proportion of young children in 1970 is evidence of a very low birth rate among Jews, while the excessive proportion of old people must have resulted in a high death rate. Heavy 'aging' and a natural decline are found in other Jewish populations of Europe, so that the newly published data from the Soviet Union need neither surprise nor arouse suspicion. For this reason, *inter alia*, the assumption of an age structure among total Soviet Jews roughly analogous to that among the Jews in the R.S.F.S.R., as has been made here, is probably not far-fetched. At any reasonable level of longevity for Soviet Jews, the number of survivors to age 11 in 1970 from among all Jews enumerated in 1959 in the R.S.F.S.R.—and, by analogy, in the whole U.S.S.R.—must have been considerably below the comparable figure in the 1970 census; the logical way of explaining the discrepancy is to assume that the latter census covered the Jewish population more fully. If it had not been for this improved coverage, the number of Jews in the 1970 census would have turned out to be even lower than it actually did.

Finally, if the colossal losses of the Holocaust were followed by a prolonged period of natural decline, the 'true' number of Soviet Jews in 1970 (if we make a generous allowance for marginal individuals who were not reported as Jews in the official censuses) must have been below the 3,000,000 mark of 1939, notwithstanding the territorial expansions of the Soviet Union.

NOTES

[1] The author wishes to thank Dr. M. Altshuler and Mr. B. Bloch of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, for reading the typescript of this paper and offering valuable suggestions.

[2] Even more strangely, age-specific proportions of married persons among the Jews were published in the 1970 census for several Soviet Republics but not including the R.S.F.S.R.

[3] The age breakdown adds up to 805,927, as against the stated total of 807,915; the difference of 1,988 is apparently due to persons whose age was not stated in the census, and it is so presented in our table.

[4] 31%, 20%, and 97% of all Jews in the R.S.F.S.R. were enumerated in 1970 in Moscow, Leningrad, and total urban localities, respectively.

[5] See Central Bureau of Statistics. *Immigration to Israel, 1948–1972*, Part I, Table 4, 1973 (Special Publication no. 416). The marked rise in the volume of aliyah to Israel occurred after the 1970 census. Jewish emigrants with destinations other than Israel are generally assumed to have been few in number.

[6] The percentage of all Jews enumerated in the Asian and Caucasian republics in 1959 and 1970 was considerably larger, but many are considered to have been in-migrants from European Russia. See M. Altshuler, 'Outline of the demography of Soviet Jewry' (in Hebrew), *Gesher*, vol. 12, no. 2–3, Sept. 1966.

[7] See *Norodnoie Khozjastvo SSSR v 1965g. Statisticheskij Yezhegodnik*, Moscow, 1965, p. 45. No published life-table for the R.S.F.S.R. is known to me. The mean length of life of the general population in the Ukraine in 1963–64 was reported as 68 years for males and 74 years for females; see, *U.N. Demographic Yearbook, 1971*. In the U.S.S.R. females exceed males in both the Jewish and the general population. For the latter, an official life-table of the two sexes together is available, which *eo ipso* takes account of the sex imbalance.

[8] The conjectural figures here and below are to be taken as no more than rough estimates. They are given rounded off to the nearest hundred—and not to the nearest thousand—merely in order to show somewhat better the ratios and differences between them and other figures.

[9] After proportional distribution of the 'age unknown' cases.

[10] The data for 1961 were chosen for reasons of technical convenience. There would have been little difference if a year nearer the middle of the Russian intercensal period had been selected.

[11] U. O. Schmelz, *Infant and early childhood mortality among the Jews in the Diaspora*, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1971.

[12] It reflects the Jewish population from which the persons enumerated in 1970 as Jews aged 11 or over were the survivors; they slightly exceeded those actually enumerated as Jews in 1959 (see section IV).

[13] The conjectured (not the officially enumerated) Jewish population figures of 1959 had to be used for this purpose, since only the former were germane to the natural movement of the Jewish population; the latter being too small (see Section IV), their use would have somewhat increased the rates.

[14] David M. Heer, 'Recent Developments in Soviet Policy', *Studies in Family Planning* (issued by the Population Council), vol. 3, no. 11, Nov. 1972.

[15] Here, and subsequently, the percentages of deviation are calculated on the basis of the expected values.

[16] According to the analogy with the Jewish age structure in the R.S.F.S.R.

[17] In addition to non-statistical information, it may be pointed out that, according to the census figures, the number of Jews declined much more in the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukraine from 1959 to 1970 than in the smaller western republics (in Moldavia, it even increased by 3 per cent); there are also movements of Jews to and from the Asian republics which, on balance, are probably positive for the latter.

[18] This also means that neither the conjectured age composition for 1959 nor the natural decrease will be substantially altered, if life-tables different from those used here are applied—provided they keep within the range reasonable under the known demographic circumstances of Soviet Jewry and of the surrounding general population.

[19] i.e., the total of 12,000 emigrants minus an allowance for emigrating children born during the intercensal period.

[20] Any coinciding losses by assimilation aggravate the absurdity still further.

[21] The mixed couples might have married many years ago, long before the recent upsurge of Jewish national feeling in the U.S.S.R.

[22] It is possible that some individuals who failed to be enumerated altogether in 1959, irrespective of 'nationality', were covered in 1970 and returned as Jews; but this alone cannot have accounted for the comparatively large absolute and relative differences involved.

[23] The Jews enumerated in the annexed areas in 1959 and 1970 are not necessarily the same as the survivors or descendants of the pre-war Jewish population who reside in the expanded post-war Soviet territory. There seem to have been internal migrations of Jews in both directions—to and from the annexed areas.

[24] J. Lestschinsky thought that about 10 per cent of the Jews failed to be reported 'nationally' as early as in the 1939 census. Without wishing to enter here into the merits of the issue, we may assume that even in this case the reasonable maximum of Jews in the U.S.S.R. would have been well below three millions by 1970, the more so in that precisely some of these early alienated Soviet Jews, or of their descendants, would meanwhile have severed their formal or, at any rate, all practical ties with Jewishness.—Some semi-official statements from the U.S.S.R. loosely alleging a Jewish population much in excess of the census figures have been analysed and disproved by M. Altshuler, 'The Jews in the Soviet population census' (in Hebrew), *Behinot*, no. 2–3, 1972.

THEORY AND PRACTICE: ETHNOMETHODOLOGY VERSUS HUMANE ETHNOGRAPHY

Howard Brotz

(Review Article)

THIS collection of readings* is essentially a variety of examples of the kind of research which ethnomethodologists do. The editor, in the very first words of his introduction, states that he has avoided in this collection merely programmatic statements of what ethnomethodology should be. There is, however, an introductory paper by Garfinkel on the origins of the term; and it is, of course, impossible to read the papers without raising the question of exactly what it is that ethnomethodology is driving at. In this respect the paper by Garfinkel is not only useful but indispensable.

An acrimonious and intemperate critic might easily debunk ethnomethodology, on the basis of the examples in this book, as the sociology of nothing or, to be more precise, the sociology of the *voyeur*, who unlike the usual *voyeur*, however, can become entranced by the spectacle of someone buying a bottle of aspirins. Such a judgment, however much it may seem to be warranted as we shall see in a moment, would, nonetheless, ignore the serious philosophical problem buried in the concerns of ethnomethodology of which its practitioners have something of a glimpse. Hence, it would not only be intemperate but unfair. One would learn nothing from it, as is true generally of a debunking attitude. On the other hand, one is bound to point out that such a judgment would also be unfair to the *voyeur*. For while he certainly does not have the theoretical aspirations of the ethnomethodologist, the *voyeur* at least knows why he is looking or peeping.

Let us, guided by the editor's explicit intention, begin *in medias res* by turning to one of the examples given of ethnomethodological research. While virtually any one of them would do, the one I have selected is that by David Sudnow called 'Counting Deaths', pp. 102–108. This is a short excerpt, from a much longer work about dying,

*Roy Turner, *Ethnomethodology, Selected Readings*, 287 pp., Penguin Modern Sociology Series, General Editor Tom Burns, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1974, £1.10.

which is very clear and virtually free of any jargon that might conceal exactly what the author is saying. Sudnow's problem in this paper is the way medical personnel in a hospital—nurses and doctors—count deaths that occur among their patients, which as we all know take place more frequently and even more normally in a hospital than, let us say, in a bus. The grounds for his inquiry are that 'the frequency of encounters with an event is a mark of one's competence and authority. It is hence useful to consider, if only briefly, some of the ways in which such "counting" occurs and is properly presented' (p. 103). It is not at all clear to me why this is so because it is even less clear whether the previous assertion is really true. The author himself admits that medical staff do not go around boasting about the number of people who have died in their wards!

Let us, however, leave this complication on one side, for what follows is even more curious. This is that after having posed the question of 'how one counts', the author then finds that after a certain point one 'stops counting'. This is the sum and substance of his paper. 'One apparent mark of sophistication among one's peers is reached at that point when some occurrences are no longer counted, i.e., when "I've lost count" is properly given as an answer. It is instructive to describe the way this point is achieved' (pp. 103 f.). He then points out how student nurses at the beginning of their training report 'nearly everything' that they do or witness in the course of their work. But some things lose their 'countability' more quickly than others. These are, principally, giving injections and administering enemas. In fact, as this author, who leaves absolutely nothing to the imagination, points out, the 'count seems to end' for these two procedures after the first occasion (p. 104). As for deaths, which he probed by asking student nurses how many they saw, the highest answer he got was 'eight'. This, he concludes, is the point at which 'losing count' occurs (p. 104). Rare, unusual, and unexpected deaths, not surprisingly, are remembered.

I dare say that if the author had chosen to extend his research into a parallel study of carpenters and shoemakers, he would have found that they too tend to forget how many nails they have hammered or how many shoes they have repaired. And why have they all 'stopped counting'? Let me give an answer of which the author is, I am sure, absolutely aware but which eludes his articulate formulation. This is that they are not crazy. As such they will naturally avoid cluttering up their heads with detail the compulsion to remember which would render it impossible for them to do anything else, including their proper work.

The real problem is not why practitioners of an art do not keep a precise statistical tabulation of the most routine events occurring in the course of their work. Nor is it why medical personnel are not

morbidly fixated on the number of deaths occurring among people many of whom have fatal illnesses and would not otherwise be in a hospital. The real problem is why anyone would think this is a problem. What could induce someone to seize upon the manifestations of ordinary sanity as if this were some kind of a marvel? To answer this question we must go beyond Sudnow's paper. This is because he is so overpowered by the 'methodology' that he 'uses' it without reflecting about it.

We must turn then to Garfinkel, who is the 'methodologist' par excellence of this school. It was he who coined the term 'ethnomethodology' and in his paper, 'The Origins of the Term Ethnomethodology', he frankly relates how he 'dreamed up the notion'. He was working on a study of how jurors behave. In the course of writing up his research he came across the terms 'ethnobotany', 'ethnophysiology', and 'ethnophysics' in the Cross-Cultural Area Files. These terms all meant 'popular' botany and the like, or, common-sense knowledge of these subject-matters, or, if one likes, folk-lore. To Garfinkel the jurors in their deliberations had a 'methodology' which was certainly not scientific. Hence, this could be called a 'popular' or 'ethno' methodology. Ethnomethodology as a scientific standpoint, however, then becomes an invitation or demand for social scientists to treat common-sense knowledge seriously. This, to be sure, is a wholly legitimate canon and one which every competent ethnographer or student of men and manners has been doing since Herodotus. What is paradoxical, however, is that ethnomethodologists, as represented in this volume, are unable to conform precisely to this canon. There is something blocking or preventing them from doing this, as we saw in the example of Sudnow's work. For surely no student nurse would look at the world the way Sudnow thinks she looks at it. She does not think there is anything problematic in her perspective, but he does. Hence, he does not really reproduce her perspective or her common-sense view of her experience. Neither does Garfinkel, as I shall show in a moment.

The root of the problem lies, of course, in this word 'methodology' with all its presuppositions. This term in its modern and prevalent meaning is of Cartesian origin and was something opposed to common sense. The right 'method' for Descartes and the entire tradition of modern science he initiated was to doubt common sense in the most radical way possible as the basis for establishing the solid truths of science that would survive the test of this 'methodical' doubt. Common sense, as one can still read in almost every introductory sociology textbook, could be dismissed as folk-lore, superstition, delusion. What was begun by Descartes was then completed by the epistemological elaborations of the ensuing centuries. These culminated, after having dropped the Kantian distinction between theoretical and practical

reason, in the view that *all* reality—including the moral sphere exempted by Kant—is a 'meaningless' array of subjective impressions which are 'ordered' by 'conceptual schemes' of which the scientifically constructed conceptual scheme is the perfection. As we all know, this view has played a very important role in American social science since the Second World War. It has underlain the conception of theory proper not as the discussion of real problems and questions but as the construction of systems of categories for 'cognizing' reality. And as we also all know, this view of theory has profoundly undermined the status of good old-fashioned ethnography or, if one likes, plain horse-sense, by calling it into question as 'untheoretical' or 'dust-bowl empiricism'.

It is evident that what has impelled Garfinkel and his colleagues to their position is a revolt against these categorial systems. The grounds for this are that these artificial categories, far from 'ordering' reality, in fact sterilize it. This is certainly the case. Instead of ascending from common sense, with all its admitted contradictions, the categorial systems merely lock themselves in a covert way into common sense but on the lowest possible level. This is because they 'abstract' from what are in fact the temporarily regnant prejudices, opinions, and experiences of their own societies. Because the abstracters think that this experience is a 'meaningless chaos', they do not feel obliged to compare this experience with that of other societies *prior* to making the abstractions. Hence, in their rush to abstract, they simply bind themselves into the horizon of a particular experience without being aware of it and it is this which is the unwitting ground of their abstractions. These abstractions thus have only a delusory universality and are, in fact, conceptually ethnocentric. They at best fit only the experience that is their actual though unadmitted ground. And as C. Wright Mills showed years ago, all that these categorial systems do is to translate banalities into obscurities, which often cannot even be understood unless retranslated back into the language of everyday life.

As such one might reasonably see that there is a problem in that *kind* of science or theory which, while paying the highest respect to theoretical activity, is compelled to run away from the world. Along the lines opened up and pointed to by the phenomenological standpoint of 'recovering the phenomena', one can see that notwithstanding the fantastic success of modern science in 'conquering nature' there remains a humanly perceived world which is not 'constructed' but is 'there' and is in proportion to man's natural powers of knowing. It is, furthermore, in the context of this world that 'we see'—in fact, cannot help seeing—what the conquest of nature means, in a manner that is unintelligible in terms of that very science which has made possible the conquest. And it is within this same context that we can see whether a social science, imitating the methods of this science, makes sense or not. Moved by the ripples emanating from phenomenology, ethno-

methodology thus seems to stand for a recovery of the reality in which we humanly live. It seeks to restore, without the mediation of a screen of obfuscating categories, the observability of a 'slice of life', which seems to be the equivalent of the common-sense world.

In fact, however, its view of this world is fundamentally no different from that of the scientism or positivism against which it has revolted. No more than positivism does it take seriously the 'sense' or *bon sens* or *seichel* in common sense, as distinguished from the delusions, errors, prejudices, opinions, and contradictions which *also* are present in common opinion. It does not, true enough, categorize the common-sense reality out of recognition as does the latter-day positivism with its dogmatic adherence to a self-contradictory epistemology. But since it does not differentiate the sense from the nonsense within common-sensical opinion, it cannot grasp hold of the former for exactly what it is. Without making this distinction, it cannot take the former seriously —that is, listen to it with the respect given to something from which one might learn. There is thus no basis in ethnomethodology for an ascent from common sense to a humane social science which, while it does not reject mere common opinion outright, must seek to deepen it and move beyond it in the correction of its contradictions, partiality, and errors.

All in all, then, to ethnomethodology common sense is fundamentally as undifferentiated and, hence, as irrational as it is to positivism. This means that the only difference between the ethnomethodologists and the scientists is as follows. To the scientists common sense is uninteresting because it is 'unscientific'. To the ethnomethodologists common sense is interesting because it has vitality. But it is still the Cartesian view of common sense. If now the common sense of pre-scientific thinking is not wholly misleading for leading a human life as one makes a distinction, let us say, between a mother and child, then ethnomethodology must distort reality as much as scientism. It will, just as much as scientism, engage in elaborate research projects to prove what a ten-year-old child knows. It remains, in short, scientism, if scientism *malgré soi*.

If Sudnow's paper were not sufficient to demonstrate this point, let me amplify it with some remarks about Garfinkel's paper which raises more important problems. In the first place, it will be recalled, Garfinkel had decided that the jurors were 'doing methodology' in their deliberations. But no juror, diplomat, or political man generally would ever use the term 'doing methodology' to refer to deliberation. This term has an altogether different meaning from 'methodology'; and in describing deliberation as 'doing methodology', Garfinkel is unwittingly imposing a scientistic, extra-political category upon the political reality which will inevitably distort it. This is the obverse of the fact that the term 'ethnomethodology' itself is a self-contradiction.

In doing this, Garfinkel violates the fundamental canon of ethnography, which is that one begins the study of people by using only their terminology. One need not, of course, limit oneself to this terminology, though I am bound to say that the entire vocabulary of constructed terminology regnant in sociology today, which is drawn not from the actual experience of a political community but from external physical or physiological 'models', which have nothing to do with human beings at all, or from the theatre, could be—and will be—abandoned without the slightest loss to understanding whatsoever. Before, however, one coins a new term to describe other people's experience, one must satisfy two conditions. The first is that one must have exhausted the limits of their terminology as they account for their own experience. The second is that the new term must be elicited by experience which they are in fact groping to articulate. Otherwise one will self-evidently alienate oneself from the experience of the people and, hence, lose sight *ab initio* of the validity (and, hence, sufficiency as the case may be) of their own understanding of reality.

Garfinkel's specific question on this jury study was 'What makes them jurors?' This process of 'making' was seen by the students of this project as the result of an 'interactive' process that begins after the jurors retire to the jury room. The researchers, having 'bugged' the jury room, then taped the deliberations of the jurors and analysed them. Garfinkel states that he encountered jurors who behaved very much the way the Subanum behave about problems of health.

Note the word 'them' in Garfinkel's question. Is it not strange that a co-citizen should put such a distance between himself and these jurors? This alienation, however, blocks his access to both the question and the answer that easily come to sight within the true perspective of *practice* which a moment's 'de-alienation' would restore. What 'makes them' jurors is exactly what would 'make' Garfinkel or any other social scientist a juror, namely, the law which calls one to jury duty. The law and the regime of which it is a part lay down a context which exists *before* the people ever get into the jury room. Furthermore, the law is part of an overall political context within which a certain civic education takes place about the functions of jury duty. Everyone knows what a jury in a criminal case is supposed to do, namely, to decide whether a person accused of a crime has in fact committed it. Where is the mystery? Now it is an eminently reasonable undertaking for a social scientist to make a study of whether juries do this well, comparing not only juries with judges but also different kinds of jury with one another. But this is tantamount to raising the question of whether democracy works or the conditions under which it works. Do jurors vote their prejudices, let us say, against people of a different race or ethnic group? Why was it that a Black man could never get justice from the all-White juries in the South during the Jim-Crow

regime, in any conflict between him and a White person? Why is it that a juror, who knew that the defendant was innocent and wanted to vote for his acquittal, was afraid to stand up against his neighbours, who also were aware of the innocence of the defendant? How is it that in the height of that period a Black chauffeur, accused of rape by his White employer, having been discovered *in flagrante delicto*, was acquitted by a Connecticut jury in less than thirty minutes? Are jurors sympathetic to defendants who are like them and are they subject to the influence of a demagogic defence which knows this? Why do trial lawyers have a right to reject jurors whom they think will be biased? These are the questions which arise when one takes practice seriously, within the perspective of practice or action.

These questions are not the ones raised by ethnomethodology. In fact they get lost by an alienation from the practical perspective which ends up by blurring the difference between a jury and a discotheque. Garfinkel, as he admits in his paper, has evidently tired of the term 'ethnomethodology' because of what certain people have made of it. He does not give any details about this weariness. However, he now proposes that the term 'ethnomethodology' be replaced by the term 'neopraxiology' (p. 18). While one can see what he is driving at, this term will solve nothing since it preserves the alienation from the practical perspective that is the heart of the matter. This is inherent in its connotations that there can be a 'theoretical' science of 'practice'. But this is impossible. A genuinely theoretical attitude is the detached pursuit of knowledge not for the sake of action but for its own sake, of which mathematics is still an intelligible example. But one cannot possibly have the same concern about an equation as one can and even must have about whether the country will collapse into anarchy or tyranny. Among other things, this political change could have the consequence that the detached mathematician or philosopher is persecuted, not even for what he thinks but because of his ethnic identity. The social sciences, since they are inherently concerned with action or practice, thus cannot be theoretical in this original sense of the term, with which even Comte would, of course, agree.

The problem in the social sciences, however, is created by the rise of the 'new science' (that is, modern mathematical physics), which depreciated the old theoretical attitude as useless and replaced it by a new kind of theory which was 'useful' or 'practical'. This, of course, refers to the familiar conquest of nature by scientific technology. It underpins the prevalent distinction between 'pure' science and the 'applied' science which is derived from the former. In the hey-day of the idea of progress, the core of which was a belief in the unqualified beneficence of the new science, it was possible for a figure such as Comte, among many others, to identify without any doubt the sphere of rational 'practice' with the 'application of science' and to elaborate

a project for reconstructing the social sciences on the model of the new physics. But today it suffices merely to mention such words as 'pollution' or 'thermonuclear war' to make clear, as Gadamer has trenchantly put it, that the 'application of science' is precisely what practice is *not*. Practice returns to sight as an autonomous sphere, as shown by the fact that we can hardly avoid raising the question of how scientific technology *affects* practice. That a practical science, concerned with action, cannot be truly theoretical is something, however, that many people have difficulty in seeing, not because they are unaware of the dangers of thermonuclear war but because they are still in the grip of the Comtean equation of 'practice' with the 'application of science'. And they remain in it, somewhat, because in the first place the alternative to this seems to be nihilism. And in the second place they have the all-too-understandable hope that what science can do, science can undo. This is the hope that there will always arise a 'counter-weapon' or a new 'social technique' that will eliminate the danger. But that is tantamount to admitting the existence of this broader ground of practice or human life in the light of which we can see how something, including science itself, affects it. If now social science really sought to imitate the technological model, it would place itself in the following dilemma. It would be saying, in effect, we can understand and overcome the danger of 'applied science' by the application of the scientific method to this human or political problem. But then, what about the dangers of this? What about the possibility of charlatans and pseudo-prophets who get political power and institute vile policies in the name of social science? To say then that we can understand or predict and overcome the danger of *this too* by yet another 'application of science' would mean that we are plunged in an infinite regress. But we know what constitutes a danger to civilized life. And we know this not by virtue of science but by virtue of practical reason or educated common sense. Hence, we are not in an infinite regress. 'Praxiology' as much as 'ethnomethodology' is thus a self-contradiction. The awareness of why this is so, which is rooted in reflection of social science about itself, is the only genuinely *theoretical* consideration with which the social sciences, as practical sciences, are concerned. This is the problem of understanding their proper boundary and how this can be undermined by that which can undermine the status of reason itself.

Ethnomethodology has attracted to its ranks a considerable number of thoughtful people who are seriously confused. They have been overpowered by positivism, and they do not know how to liberate themselves from what they are aware is a serious problem. They see that positivism, in its 'quest for certainty', has sought to assimilate the 'method' for studying human beings with the method for transforming matter. And they see how this obliterates the proper boundary and

quality of the specifically human world. In their quest to recover the human reality the ethnomethodologists have a vitality which is lacking among the scientists. For they, like the projectors in Laputa, are so turned inward on their own 'constructions' that they fail to notice the world unless they are hit by a flapper. The world exists only as 'stimuli' for their own 'constructions' or semantic puzzles. Because of their dogmatic slumber they refuse to face the fact that they could not live a human life on the basis of these 'constructions'. Hence, they are unable to see the problem in this. And if there is any doubt about what this means, one merely has to contrast how a sociological 'constructor' talks when giving a paper about 'how human beings talk' in a sociological congress with how he himself talks ten minutes later in the halls when he is talking with his friends or, perhaps, even looking for a job.

By virtue of their respect for vitality, the ethnomethodologists have in a way seen this disproportion between 'science' and 'life'. But because of the fundamental ground they share with positivism, they cannot properly deal with this insight. This convergence exists in two respects. The first is in the agreement on the Cartesian view of common sense. I have dealt with this earlier in examining the presuppositions of the research papers. But in a theoretical paper called 'Similarities and Differences between Science and Common Sense' (pp. 21–26), Elliott, following Nagel, makes this point explicitly. What he tries to do, however, is to 'save' common sense by arguing that in 'doing science', the scientist uses his common sense perceptions. That is, when he looks at a thermometer or the table and chairs in his laboratory, he 'never seriously departs from the world of everyday life' (p. 23). But this is to blur both the problem and also the difference between the scientist and the charwoman who cleans up his laboratory. His science itself, let us say the propositions of mathematical physics, is certainly not 'the world of everyday life'; and in terms of these propositions the scientist's own activity as a scientist—that is, the 'doing science'—is unintelligible. That the non-philosophical physicist, in possession of a technologically successful science, can, so to speak, 'pass the buck' about the disproportion between his science and his human activity as a scientist is, essentially, the problem of modern science. But only by confronting rather than by trying to blur this disproportion can one see what an impossible position positivism is for the social scientist for whom human activity, including his own, is his *most* proper subject matter. Unlike the physicist, the social scientist thus cannot 'pass the buck'.

The second respect in which the ethnomethodologists show the impress of modern positivism is in their unpolitical outlook. In their case this is something of a minor virtue since it has deflected them from succumbing to that kind of politicization which destroys the boundary between theory and humane practice, not in the name of scientific

theory but in the name of ideology. In this crucial respect the ethnomethodologists are on the whole theoretically open-minded. Their unpolitical orientation is, nonetheless, a defect because it prevents them from perceiving the fundamental political context of action which defines the crucial tone of different human situations. A jury under a tyranny is going to vote differently from a jury in an easy-going democracy where there are no sanctions for being foolish. By depreciating the importance of the political context, one will either 'individualize' the 'structure of social reality', and, hence, blur the outlines of the structure through some such conception as 'a web of social relations'; or else one will move outside the realm of practice, in its commonsensical, practical perspective, to seek 'determinants' of action which contradict the possibility of practical action as we humanly know it. But this is positivism all over again.

To conclude, I contend that ethnomethodology has three options facing it in the future. The first is to remain in a state of confusion. The second is to move upwards. And the third is to move downwards.

To move upwards means to recover, through the writings of such people as Kurt Riezler, Leo Strauss, Erwin Straus, and H.-G. Gadamer, who have confronted philosophically the issue posed by modern science, the outlines of a humane psychology or of the human condition. In this lies the recovery of a *theoretical* understanding of the difference between theory and practice. This is an understanding which both restores and protects the status of that human reality which is undermined by scientism on the one hand and ideology on the other. Although it may seem to be tangential, I should also mention the work of the ethologists such as Lorenz, Portman, and Tinbergen, who in their studies of the way animals behave under natural conditions are establishing new frontiers. In fact if there is any source within modern science proper which ultimately will undermine the scientism in the social sciences, it is here; and the rise of the point of view in Germany called the '*Neue Anthropologie*', with which the ethologists are allied, points to this new turn. Leo Strauss in particular in his methodological writings has perhaps done more than anyone else in this century to restore an understanding not only of the necessity but also of the possibility of common sense beginnings, arguing not merely against scientism but also against the intellectually much more powerful nihilism reigning in twentieth-century thought.

On the basis of the questions raised and re-opened by these writers, one could restore the status of a humane, comparative ethnography, or if one prefers, comparative sociology. Paradoxically, so it might seem, one need not explicitly pursue the most theoretical questions of political philosophy or social science in order to engage in this ethnography or, simply, to 'see the world'. To be sure, what one sees and the questions one asks will be enriched to the extent that they are guided

by an education in the highest questions of political philosophy. And in a reciprocal manner these questions presuppose that knowledge of the variety of experience which comparative ethnography would supply. Aristotle's *Politics*, for example, presupposed such a comparative ethnography, which he himself undertook, but which is unfortunately one of the lost books of antiquity. But in the present intellectual atmosphere it is necessary to emphasize the relative autonomy which careful and thoughtful ethnography, like practice itself, possesses with regard to these ultimate questions. Take, for instance, what was certainly a classic ethnographic study done in American sociology before the ascendancy of scientism, namely, E. Franklin Frazier's *The Negro Family in the United States*. This was in no sense a philosophically guided study, but its quality as an account was not diminished by that fact. Still less was it a 'scientific' study. There were no 'hypotheses', 'methodology', 'categories', and the usual paraphernalia of a 'scientifically designed' research 'project', but there were very good statistics. It had information from which one could learn something. Thus it is possible to 'do' ethnography or to see the world without subordinating it to 'general' theoretical questions. In fact, it is my central thesis that it is impossible to see the world as it really is and to articulate it in its human fullness if one is blinded by theoretical blinkers. For these will induce one to select in advance only those aspects of reality that 'fit' the theory. Notwithstanding the success of this methodology for a physics which seeks to transform matter, in the social sciences such a methodology has the function of a prejudice. One sees what one wants to see, rather than what is there, which is what it means to have a prejudice.

Thus the problem today is not whether one can 'do' ethnography but, rather, whether one can defend it. With the ascendancy of scientism, ethnography of this sort was depreciated as 'unscientific' or 'pre-scientific'; and the notion that science moves in a necessarily progressive direction was a convenient formula for avoiding the question of whether there may not have been a regress. With the virtual extinction, or exile to 'the bleachers', of the ethnographic tradition for which such figures as Robert Park and his pupils stood, what has replaced it is scientific categorizing about the world without that prior look at the world. This means that sociology became completely dependent upon non-sociology for its information, much of which was bound to be mere opinions which fitted the categories. That is not a progress but a regress. Scientism then was attacked in the name of ideology or 'action'. As such, the ruling choices in sociology became a choice between the scientific sterilization of reality on the one hand and an anti-intellectual, partisan apologia for a kind of action that would destroy the university or free inquiry on the other hand. In this crucial respect, the scientists who have resisted the latter, regardless of the

extent to which their work invited it, are the superior men. For in so far as thought is what is distinctively human, they remain the friends of humanity against its enemies. In the light of these two poles, however, ethnomethodology must be seen as a defective attempt to restore the ethnographic tradition that is not a compromise between these two poles but a position which is superior to both. It cannot, however, be restored simply as it was. It now has to be aware of the theoretical grounds with which to defend it.

For ethnomethodology to go downwards is for it simply to relapse into the sociology of 'vitalism' or 'authentic experience', where it seems that anything that anyone does is 'interesting' if 'real'. One way of doing this is to catch a person off-guard where he will exhibit a 'real' reaction. The less, however, said about this aimless research the better.

BOOK REVIEWS

NIGEL ARMISTEAD, ed., *Reconstructing Social Psychology*, 330 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1974, £1.

There has been much discussion among social psychologists in recent years about the state of the discipline and equal concern as to the direction it should take in the future. Thus Marie Jahoda, in her Special University Lectures in the University of London, 1974, entitled 'Social Psychology: Relevant or Irrelevant', commented on the plethora of facts amassed by social psychologists and the paucity of theories developed to integrate them. In a thought-provoking volume of critical essays written by European social psychologists, Henri Tajfel has lamented the lack of concern for the 'social' in the work of social psychologists: Israel and Tajfel, *The Context of Social Psychology*.

The demand of students of the social sciences in the last decade for 'relevance' coincided with this re-examination of the state of the science. Whereas the students' demand was frequently for the personal, the immediate, and the transitory to be the concern of social psychology (a sort of scientific Sunday supplement), the concern of Jahoda, Tajfel, and others was for a more stable predictable theoretical base from which new insights, new hypotheses, and new research could flow. This Penguin volume, edited by Nigel Armistead, takes advantage of both the above currents, but reflects mainly the students' demands, and this accounts for much of its unevenness.

Armistead's Introduction itself indicates the uncertain and shaky foundations on which much of the demand for a 'new Social Psychology' is based. It indicates a need to find in the discipline answers which its practitioners never considered themselves competent to give, to questions they did not ask—and he then castigates the science for not solving what apparently is a personal dilemma. 'I see most social psychology as an alienated study by alienated people (I am guessing my own alienation is not untypical). My original questions . . . were never really answered' (pp. 9 f.).

I doubt very much whether the papers in this volume contain the answers to Armistead's questions. They certainly do not seem to me to have the critical bite, the intellectual incisiveness that invests the Israel and Tajfel volume referred to earlier. The paper by Sedgwick on 'Ideology in Modern Psychology' seems to plead for concern with immediate political passions in the guise of the 'macro', a plea supported by a petulant cry that social psychologists should forswear the 'psychology' of their discipline and 'go outside the logic of their own training and take up explicit political positions in order to master an outlook on the social order . . .' The section following the paper by Sedgwick is slightly more useful. It is on methodology, with interesting papers by Shotter and Mixon, and with less useful and well argued papers by the remaining contributors to the section. However, like

so many writers making what are often political points (and perhaps denying the possibility of 'points' without politics), the straw man of 'method' they build up to destroy with telling blows is not a very accurate model of the field of social psychology.

The book contains two more sections, one on Topics and one on Approaches. The papers in the section called Topics are unfortunately predictable—alienation; the family—does it exist? And so on. The papers stress all the time the limits imposed by existing values on the discipline, and seem to assume that the imposition of another ideology or value system will 'free' or 'liberate' the discipline, rather than impose a different (perhaps better, perhaps worse) set of constraints. Too many of the contributors, when examining social psychology, were disappointed to find that it was psychology, *not* sociology or politics. Their own unfounded expectations were disappointed. One is reminded of the dear old lady who was so disappointed in Kenneth Tynan because 'Oh Calcutta' was not about the British Raj!

There are some papers of interest in this collection, papers which will perhaps outlive the immediate fashion and fad (rather than the social context as is claimed) that informs much of 'alternative social psychology', and outlive the pretentiousness of papers with 'no references'; the papers by Richards and Harré are two, to join that of Shotter referred to earlier. This volume is perhaps remarkable in that it must be one of the few attempts to reconstruct a science made by individuals who are not necessarily practitioners of the discipline and whose allegiance is often to subjects other than social psychology. Who's for a reconstruction of molecular biology?

BERYL GEBER

LÉON POLIAKOV, *The Aryan Myth, A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in Europe* (trans. Edmund Howard), Columbus Centre Series, Studies in the Dynamics of Persecution and Extermination (General Editor, Norman Cohn), xii + 388 pp., Sussex Univ. Press in association with Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1974, £5.

LÉON POLIAKOV, *The History of Anti-semitism*, Volume 1, *From Roman Times to the Court Jews* (trans. Richard Howard), xii + 340 pp.; Volume 2, *From Mohammed to the Marranos* (trans. Natalie Gerardi), xiii + 399 pp., The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1974, £4.25 each volume.

The five 'Studies in the Dynamics of Persecution and Extermination' to have appeared so far appear from their titles to be a mixed bag. *The Aryan Myth*, I should imagine, is likely to prove the most informative and the most fruitful in the long run, for although it is limited in its scope to Europe, its scholarship is of the sort that stirs the historical and sociological imagination out of the half-sleep in which horrors are disposed of as dreams. Dr. Poliakov is determined—quite without histrionics—to demythologize the Aryan Myth: that is to say, not to expose the Myth itself (for that would be a superfluous task) but the meta-myths with which its origins and course are surrounded.

He is aware of the intellectually awkward fact that the liberal temper of our time tends to inhibit free enquiry into racial problems. He says (p. 5):

> . . . some of the subjects we propose to deal with have been guarded, particularly since 1945, by a taboo which will not make our task any easier.
>
> There can be no doubt that if, at the beginning of this century, the West still entertained the flattering notion of its superior civilization, often thought of as an Aryan birthright, the Hitlerite catastrophe banished such ideas from political and public life so effectively that now a fresh confusion has arisen, between science and ethics. Anti-racism has been promoted to the rank of a dogmatic orthodoxy which the present state of anthropological knowledge is unable to corroborate, but which will brook no criticism, and which is an impediment to sober thinking.

And he goes on to make the point that it now looks as though '*through shame or fear of being racist, the West will not admit to having been so at any time*, and therefore assigns to minor characters only (like Gobineau, H. S. Chamberlain, etc.) the role of scapegoats. A vast chapter of western thought is thus made to disappear by sleight of hand . . .' I daresay it could be argued against him that, in this broad characterization, he has overlooked some of the work written in English that goes against the main current, but even if that criticism were successful, it would still leave his book to stand as the most impressive piece of scholarship of its kind.

The book is composed in two parts, the second of which is concerned with the Aryan Myth itself. The first is made up of six chapters on early myths of origin in Spain, France, England, Italy, Germany and Russia; and it seems to me that the originality of the work lies mainly here. Those hundred pages should be made required reading for students of European history, for they show the genealogical thinking that lies behind Western conceptions of culture, peoplehood, and nation. Much of that genealogizing is of course bound up with the sons of Noah, and it is a good idea when studying Dr. Poliakov's exposition to have close at hand Genesis IX–XI and 1 Chronicles I (the genealogical data of which could usefully have been displayed in the text). European Jews need perhaps to be reminded that as Ashkenazim they are not the descendants of Noah's great-grandson Ashkenaz, but as speakers of a German tongue are the beneficiaries of a genealogical system that made the Germanic 'people' issue from Japheth's grandson—to produce the paradox that Ashkenazim are descendants of Shem. The Biblical charter with which the Germans equipped themselves is one of the confusing elements of the Aryan Myth. Dr. Poliakov might have documented one of his points from Ben Jonson's *The Alchemist* (Act II, Scene 1):

Mammon: I'll show you a book where Moses, and his sister,
And Solomon have written of the art;
Ay, and a treatise penned by Adam—
Surly: How!
Mammon: O' the Philosopher's Stone, and in High Dutch.
Surly: Did Adam write, sir, in High Dutch?
Mammon: He did;
Which proves it was the primitive tongue.

The strength of the book lies in the mastery of the literature, the sense of European history, and the skill in following the winding course of cultural

and biological ideas. Among the conclusions to be drawn from this survey the one which seems to me the most important can be expressed best in Dr. Poliakov's own words (pp. 327 f):

> When, among the ruins of the *ancien régime*, Adam died as a universal ancestor, first scientists and then philosophers affiliated Christian peoples to other patriarchs, and these were not Biblical but Indian. It should be emphasized that, at least to begin with, this genealogy did not imply any political exclusions. In fact the real founder of the Aryan myth, Friedrich Schlegel, was a supporter of total emancipation for the Jews. . . . So the Aryan theory does indeed belong to the tradition of anti-clericalism and anti-obscurantism; it is a product of the first gropings of the sciences of man as they tried to model themselves on the exact sciences and so strayed into a mechanistic and determinist blind-alley where they remained for a century.

Yet it needs to be pointed out that the author's own view of how the sciences of man ought to be setting about their business is governed by what strikes me as a naive Freudianism. The argument of the book breaks off from time to time to venture into psychoanalytic explanation; I have to confess that those brief interludes are not merely unsatisfactory but take away from the value of the book as a whole. When he is addressing himself to historical matters, Dr. Poliakov commands the data and goes to the heart of the matter; in his half-hearted Freudianism (as it strikes me as being) he fumbles.

For what it manages to say this is a very short book; and nobody could justly complain that more ought to have been said on this and that. Every reader will doubtless make his own additions and footnotes. My own include an expansion of the remarks on the way in which India was selected as the extra-European 'homeland'. What sense of fellow-feeling with India was achieved through the Aryan theory was in fact extended further east: in the 1870s that theory was brought in to posit a common origin for Western and Chinese civilizations—another Schlegel (Gustaaf) traced Western astronomy to Chinese; he and Edkins sought common roots for both Chinese and Aryan languages; Dennys wrote on Chinese folklore and its 'affinities with the Ayran and Semitic races'; and so on.

Mr. Howard's translation reads well, but he has slipped (p. 313) in describing H. S. Chamberlain as Wagner's step-son. He was of course his son-in-law.

Dr. Poliakov is well known for his history of antisemitism, and it is clear enough that although *The Aryan Myth* stands as an original and independent work, it feeds upon his vast knowledge of ideas about and attitudes towards Jews. So that, for example, he is able in the chapter on Spain to point to the degrading treatment of the *conversos* (New Christians) after the *Reconquista* as the 'first appearance in European history' of 'an institutional form of racism'—'the rejection of Christ had corrupted the *conversos* biologically' (pp. 12 f.). The first two volumes in his history have now appeared in translation as part of the Littman Library, the second volume for the first time in England—not so the first volume, for that was published in London in 1966 by Elek Books, a fact not mentioned in the present edition, which lists only the American edition of 1965.

That first volume was in fact reviewed in this *Journal* (vol. 9, no. 1, 1967, pp. 113–15) by Morris Ginsberg, who concluded his notice: 'What is here given whets the appetite for what is to come. It is much to be hoped that the

appearance of the later volumes will not be long delayed.' Alas, Ginsberg has not lived to read the second volume. I suspect, however, that it would have disappointed him a shade, for the theoretical apparatus of volume 1 left him unsatisfied, partly because it was not fully developed. It turns out that volume 2 is even more of a narrative history than the first, lacking any firm framework of theory; and it is not even focused closely upon anti-semitism, a theme that from time to time gets lost in the details of the history of the Jewish fate in the Islamic world and Spain. As a résumé of that history, volume 2 is a fine piece of writing, but it seems to me to be intellectually dry.

That defect may be bound up with what in his Foreword Dr. Poliakov describes as the change in his views since he wrote volume 1. 'He had thought that by yoking himself to the task of writing a detailed history of anti-Semitism, he would make a useful contribution to the struggle against this unhealthy passion. Today he is not so sure' (p. vii). For the Jewish historian must fall into the role of the 'denouncer' of the wrong-doers and of the wrongs done to his subjects, and in that role he runs the risk of reviving and perpetuating that which he deplores (pp. vii f.). That sad fearfulness may have inhibited the author's initial analytic bent. What in the end is displayed in volume 2 is the tragedy of the three-cornered struggle among Jews, Christians, and Muslims in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Iberian peninsula. The precedents are not cheerful.

Book One, 'Islam', briefly traces the emergence and rise of that religion and sets out its complex attitudes towards the other two monotheisms. Book Two, which takes up over half the volume, is entitled 'Spain' but in fact also covers Portugal. There Dr. Poliakov recounts the massive shifts between Islam and Catholicism, and the creation and history of the Marranos. In two appendices he deals with the Jews of the Holy See and the expulsion of the Moors from Spain, the latter account serving by its stark tragedy as a balance to that of the wretched fate of the Jews, and reinforcing the Spanish gloom. Spain, we are reminded, was once the land of the Three Religions. Dr. Poliakov is deeply aware of the potentialities for discord laid up in the intertwined origins and theological ideas of the three monotheistic religions: it is precisely because they are close to one another that they are reciprocally dangerous.

The translator appears to have done her job well enough (some minor blemishes of translatorese apart), but the editors of the Littman Library deserve to be taken to task for putting out an unimproved English version of the original: volume 2 was published in French in 1961 (volume 1 in 1955) and, in the nature of things, must be bibliographically out of date. For example, at p. 225 we are referred to Sicroff's unpublished thesis, 1955, on 'purity of blood' in Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; that thesis was in fact published in 1960.

MAURICE FREEDMAN

SAMUEL J. ROBERTS, *Survival or Hegemony? The Foundations of Israeli Foreign Policy*, Studies in International Affairs, Number 20, xi + 163 pp., The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1974, £1.40.

In the space of just over 140 pages of text, Dr. Roberts has presented a succinct and cogent analysis of the nature and sources of Israeli foreign policy. The essence of his thesis, which is consistently sustained, is that the modern state of Israel in its practice of foreign policy parallels the conduct of earlier Jewish Commonwealths and of the Zionist movement prior to May 1948. The mode of analysis adopted by the author is to point up the extent of the parallel in state practice in the course of a systematic examination of historical precedent. Many common, if unremarkable, factors emerge in the course of this analysis, namely a scrupulous adherence to the dictates of *raison d'état*, a strong propensity to resort to force, a recognition of the need for an alliance relationship with an external power (whose reliability cannot be taken for granted), and also a tendency to territorial expansion beyond divinely sanctioned borders in the interests of national security. The extent of the parallel becomes even more striking historically when Dr. Roberts moves from a consideration of ancient Judah and Israel to look at Zionist policy in the period of the Mandate. Notable common links between this period and that beginning with independence are the function of great power patrons, a militant and unsympathetic outlook towards local antagonists, and importantly the role of the diaspora not only as a major source of material assistance but also as a major source of political pressure on succeeding great power patrons. Of all the parallels identified perhaps the most significant one governing Israeli attitudes is the perpetual sense of transience of great power protection exemplified most painfully in the evident failure of the major powers to make a vigorous effort to rescue European Jewry and so prevent the full horror of the holocaust. The modern dilemma experienced by the state of Israel, arising from the need to rely on the support of a major power who is less than fully reliable, is regarded by Dr. Roberts as the explanation for a willingness to resort to force. He maintains that 'Israeli foreign policy has been pervaded by the conviction that Israel can realize its vital territorial and political objectives only by means of the successful application of force in its international relations' (p. 107). Such conviction has been underpinned, until very recently, by the assumption that a clash of arms will produce a favourable outcome for Israel.

In scenarios in its later pages, indicating the prospect of Israeli-Egyptian accommodation based on an Egyptian toleration of the status quo, the book does not provide for President Sadat's military initiative in October 1973. And, of course, such a prospect was not contemplated in Jerusalem either. However, what is significant about the clear identification of those factors of continuity in Israeli foreign policy is that assumptions are highlighted which have served to govern the conduct of foreign policy in so far as Israeli military superiority has compensated adequately for a less than fully assured great power support. Now that Israeli self-reliance has been tested and found wanting, it seems likely that a practice of foreign policy will unfold which

will depart somewhat from the consistent form that Dr. Roberts has so ably portrayed in this stimulating monograph.

MICHAEL LEIFER

STEPHEN STEINBERG, *The Academic Melting Pot, Catholics and Jews in American Higher Education*, A report prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, with a foreword by Clark Kerr, xxi + 183 pp., McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1974, $8.95.

This is one volume of the invaluable and apparently endless series of reports on American higher education commissioned by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, chaired by Clark Kerr, former president of the University of California. It contains two somewhat distinct parts. The first considers the entry of Jews and Catholics into American higher education, as students and faculty, from the point of view of the rapid entry of Jews and the slower entry of Catholics, and considers whether this difference can be explained by the values and social, cultural, and economic backgrounds of Jewish and Catholic immigrants. As such, it of course forms another section of the lengthy discussion opened by Max Weber on the relationship between religious background and ethos and suitability for modernity, in a number of aspects. For the present book, the specific aspect of this discussion that is most relevant is that raised by Robert K. Merton in his argument that Protestants were better suited to contribute to modern science, owing to the specific values fostered by Protestantism, than Catholics. Steinberg considers whether supposed American Jewish 'intellectualism' and Catholic 'anti-intellectualism' really exist and whether they explain their different histories.

On this question, Steinberg's contribution is modest. He has reviewed the major secondary sources, and argues that against some specific Jewish values which encouraged education and scientific inquiry (others have pointed out of course that the type of scholarly inquiry fostered by Jewish tradition was scarcely in harmony with the canons of modern science), we should place more weight on the fact that Jewish immigrants were, compared with Catholics, more literate, better educated, and more highly concentrated in skilled occupations. Thus, despite their poverty on arrival, they were well suited for the massive entry into American institutions of higher education that followed soon after the arrival of east European Jewish immigrants. And Catholic immigrants were the converse, and that explains *their* late entry into American higher education as students and faculty in numbers comparable with their numbers in the population. For Catholics, further, their late entry into the mainstream of American higher education must be explained by the Catholic Church's fear of apostasy in a Protestant-dominated lower and higher educational system, which led to the creation of Catholic schools and colleges principally concerned with the maintenance of faith rather than the expansion of knowledge. For Jews early entry was also facilitated by the practical bent of American higher education, which led to the abandonment of Greek and Latin requirements just about the time when east European immigration was at its peak. (But if Greek and Latin had been maintained,

would that have hindered the Jewish entry? Hardly. This part of Steinberg's argument is not persuasive.)

Steinberg emphasizes both for Jews and Catholics the importance of pre-existing economic and social circumstances in explaining educational patterns; for Catholics he adds the value of maintaining the faith. But to my mind he has scarcely disposed of the question of the role of values in Jewish intellectual pre-eminence: there are the intriguing data (in Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum, *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier*, 1967) that *German* Jews, more prosperous than east European Jews in the community studied, did not invest as many years in higher education; and there is an interesting paper by Morris Gross on 'Learning Readiness in Two Jewish Groups: A Study in "Cultural Deprivation"' (New York, Center for Urban Education, 1967) which argues that Sephardi Jews in New York have *less* interest, and competence, in education than east European Jews. The issue of whether values explain the Jewish role in intellectual life is not so easily disposed of.

The second part (related to the first but still somewhat distinct) is an empirical one: just what is the place of Catholics and Jews in American higher education today? Here Steinberg bases his study on the surveys of the Kerr Commission, in particular the enormous study of American faculty organized by Martin Trow for the Kerr Commission (and of which fascinating reports have already been presented by Seymour Martin Lipset and Everett Ladd, Jr., in a number of places—see in particular, 'Jewish Academics in the United States: Their Achievements, Culture, and Politics', *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 72, 1971). Jews, who form 3·2 per cent of the population of the United States (in 1958: undoubtedly the proportion was lower in 1969, when these surveys were taken), make up 8·3 per cent of faculty, 10 per cent of graduate students, and 5·3 per cent of undergraduates. Catholics, 25·7 per cent of the population, make up only 18·5 per cent of faculty, but 25·1 per cent of graduate, and 29·3 per cent of undergraduate students. The proportion of Catholics *rises* as the academic quality of an institution falls; the proportion of Jews *falls* as academic quality falls. Thus, in universities of high rank, Jews form 17·2 per cent of faculty, Catholics only 13·2 per cent; 16·0 per cent of graduate students, Catholics 20 per cent; 20·1 per cent of undergraduate students, Catholics 26·7 per cent. The proportion of Catholic faculty rises among younger faculty, and similarly with Jewish faculty. But Steinberg believes the proportion of Jewish faculty has reached its peak, while that of Catholic faculty will continue to rise. He does not refer to any *political* factors that may support such a projection, only to the fact that the proportions of Jews among students preparing for a career in teaching is now no greater than that of the proportion of Jews among faculties, while the proportion of Catholics among students preparing for college teaching jobs is larger than the proportion of Catholic college teachers. I think a more complex analysis is required.

Steinberg conducts a rather elaborate search through the survey data in order to explain Jewish prominence as faculty and students in the better institutions. It cannot be explained by comparative Jewish affluence; by the residential locations of Jews; nor by better grades for Jews, when one compares Jews with non-Jews in comparable institutions: it is explained pri-

marily by the fact that Jews 'more often begin their academic careers at quality undergraduate institutions. This seems to establish their further path to the better institutions, first as graduate students and later as faculty' (p. 111). This crucial fact is not further analysed.

Steinberg shows that Jewish faculty is particularly concentrated in law, medicine, the theoretical natural sciences, and the social sciences, with low representation in the minor professions, the humanities, and art and music. Catholics, on the other hand, show in general the converse pattern. When one analyses faculty by age, one finds most striking the rapid rise in the proportion of younger faculty who are Jewish in law (18·9 per cent for 55 or older, 35 per cent for less than 35) and medicine (from 18·2 per cent for the oldest age group, to 28·6 per cent for the youngest).

One of the most interesting chapters is titled 'Religious Commitment and Scholarly Productivity'. Jews consider themselves indifferent to or opposed to religion (Protestants 32 per cent; Catholics 25 per cent: Jews 67 per cent), are much more liberal in whatever religious beliefs they have, attend religious services very much less than Protestants or Catholics ('once a month': Protestants 49 per cent, Catholics 67 per cent, Jews 10 per cent), but strikingly are not markedly less frequently affiliated with a church (not affiliated: Protestants 20 per cent, Catholics 19 per cent, Jews 26 per cent). Steinberg discovers that Protestant and Catholic 'apostates' (those indifferent or opposed to religion) *increase* in number as the rank of an institution rises, but this is not markedly so for Jews. Similarly, while the proportion of Protestant and Catholic 'traditionalists' among the faculty drops as the quality of an institution rises, this is not so for the Jews. In other words, for Protestants and Catholics, there seems to be a contradiction between religious faith and academic success, but not for Jews.

Those who are affiliated with a church or synagogue but are not religious Steinberg calls 'ethnics'. There are very few among Protestants and Catholics, but among Jews they are substantial and increase as the faculty gets younger. No less than 43 per cent of Jewish faculty under 35 are 'ethnics'.

Perhaps the most striking demonstration of the distinctiveness of Jewish religiosity is its relationship to scholarly productivity. At every level of institution Jews are more productive than Catholics and Protestants; but while Protestants and Catholics who are *less* religious are *more* productive, this is not markedly the case for Jews.

Finally, Steinberg analyses the relationship between political attitudes and religion (as is well known, Jews are much more liberal politically) in order to determine whether the lower productivity of the more religious is related to a general conservatism. There seems to be no strong relation between political outlook and productivity. But once again one notes a Jewish exceptionalism: while politically conservative Protestants and Catholics are slightly less productive than moderates, liberals, and radicals, this is not true for Jews.

The data are intriguing. They are not too well integrated with the larger thesis which asserts that Jewish values are not of major importance in producing 'Jewish intellectualism'. Indeed, to my mind the second part can be considered somewhat contradictory to the first part, and I have pointed to some of the data which suggest the presence of a distinctive set of Jewish

values that are not simply to be attributed to the occupational and educational characteristics of eastern European Jewish immigrants. This is a useful book but it does not end the argument.

NATHAN GLAZER

BERNARD D. WEINRYB, *The Jews of Poland. A Social and Economic History of the Jewish Community in Poland from 1100–1800*, xvii + 424 pp., Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1973, $10.

It is a remarkable fact that very few useful studies—it is tempting to say, virtually none at all—exist in English on the history of Polish Jewry. This is all the more remarkable given the cultural importance and numerical preponderance of Polish Jewry in modern times. It appears that the roughly 10,000 Jews living in Poland at the end of the fifteenth century increased to approximately three-quarters of a million in less than three centuries. These figures by themselves are a measure of the importance of the book. On such grounds alone, therefore, Professor Weinryb's book will receive a warm welcome. It brings together, not only the results of a wide range of specialist studies but also much of the fruits of Weinryb's own work in primary sources in the economic structure and commercial life of Polish Jewry.

The book covers the growth, efflorescence, and decline of Polish Jewry, for the German background of the initial Polish-Jewish settlement soon gave way to an 'indigenous' Polish-Jewish culture. At the end of the fifteenth century Professor Weinryb has a composite portrait of the ideal Polish Jew formed of 'the piety, virtue, moral and social perfection of the German Hassidim, combined with acuity of Talmudic study . . . interwoven with mysticism and symbolism. All of this was set against a background of practical activity, business affairs and worldly interests which had a moderating effect on the other-worldly trends.' The bulk of the book is then devoted to the interaction of these factors with the evolution of Poland itself. A notable feature of this section is the care with which Professor Weinryb attempts to elucidate the true consequences of 'the deluge' that overtook the Jews of the Ukraine in the two decades 1648–1667—amidst massacre, invasion, epidemics, and expulsion. Weinryb concludes that the number of Jewish victims totalled about 40–50,000 (20–25 per cent of the Jewish population). He also makes a point of 'the relatively small loss of [Jewish] property . . . The credit rating of the Jews and their community organization, the kehilla, among non-Jews both in Poland and abroad remained about on the same level as before 1648.'

Another noteworthy and not unrelated feature of Polish-Jewish life was the self-identification of many Jews with Poland. Weinryb brings forward a mass of testimony in support of his contention about the very positive attitude upheld by many Polish Jews towards Poland and its institutions. He quotes the sixteenth-century Karaite, Isaac of Troki, for example, who compared the religious wars, disorders, and evil in western Europe (England, Spain, France) whence Jews had been expelled, with the tranquillity enjoyed by Jews in countries elsewhere, evidently including Poland. There is evidence too, that Jews sometimes spurned their own institutions in favour

of non-Jewish ones. This was apparent in the preference for Gentile courts and municipal offices. Similarly, the luminary Isaiah Horowitz sought to counter the argument that 'a healthy and rich man does not need the redemption' with the advice that such people should think about past and possible future dangers. Clearly, this cluster of attitudes was more characteristic of the wealthy than of the poor. *Their* hopes, frustrations, etc., were in part expressed through the Hassidic movement to which Weinryb devotes his final chapter. The many generations that came and went between the century of Casimir the Great and the century of Baal Shem Tov are finely recaptured in Weinryb's work.

L. KOCHAN

WEISGAL, MEYER W., gen. ed., *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, Volume IV, *Series A. January 1905–December 1906*, edited by Camillo Dresner and Barnet Litvinoff, xxxvi + 358 pp., Oxford Univ. Press, and Israel Univ. Press, London and Jerusalem, 1973, £6.25.

This volume tells the story of a very lonely and unhappy Jew, living and working in a world which he disliked, among Jews many of whom he despised, with a background of fear and anxiety for his family in Russia, which was in the throes of the disturbances and pogroms of 1905 and 1906. His misery was intensified by his failure to get his beloved fiancée, Vera Khatzman, accepted by English academic regulations to complete her medical studies by his side in England. Nine tenths of the volume are, in consequence, his letters to her in Geneva, while he remained in Manchester. The volume ends with his marriage, and her joining him in England.

It was a somewhat dreary period in Zionist development, which intensifies the sad atmosphere of its pages. Quarrels, largely based on personalities within the movement, quarrels with the 'great ones' of Anglo-Jewry over their fears of Zionism and of eastern European Jewish immigration, take the place of the positive planning conspicuous in previous volumes. He is growing more secure academically, but there is as yet little sign of the love of England which was to possess him later.

JAMES PARKES

CHRONICLE

The *Statistical Yearbook of the Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, 1973* gives the following facts and figures:

Housing

The number of dwelling units in the city increased from 125,370 at the end of 1968 to 137,330 by April 1973; this represents an increase of 9·5 per cent.

Surveys carried out by the Central Bureau of Statistics in 1971 found that about 50 per cent of all housing units in Tel Aviv-Yafo were apartments of one or two rooms; 43 per cent had three rooms; and the remaining 7 per cent had four rooms or more. Sixty per cent of all homes were owner-occupied, the remaining 40 per cent being rented.

Consumer goods

In 1972 nearly every home in the city had a refrigerator: 98·5 per cent of all households. There was a television set in 75 per cent of households, compared with 66 per cent in 1971; a telephone in 59 per cent of all homes (52 per cent in 1971); a washing machine in 40·3 per cent of all households (38 per cent in 1971); while 22·8 per cent owned a car and 11·3 had an air conditioner. In 1963 there were 45 private cars per 1,000 inhabitants; in 1971 there were 111·7; and in 1972, 124·4.

Education

In 1973, seven kindergartens were completed, as well as two elementary and two high schools, and a youth centre. A further 70 classrooms were added to existing municipal schools. There were also 23 kindergartens and four schools under construction.

There were 502 educational institutions approved by the Ministry of Education and Culture in 1973, compared with 478 in 1971; the number of pupils increased from 88,730 in 1971 to 91,600 in 1973; and there was also a rise in the number of teaching posts—from 5,235 to 5,755. There were more students in vocational schools: 9,120 in 1972 and 9,940 in 1973.

There were 34,600 pupils in 119 elementary schools. Whereas in 1963 the average number of pupils in each class was 32, in 1973 it was only 25.

More kindergarten and school teachers are being trained in special colleges: there were 2,200 in 1972 and 2,720 in 1973—an increase of 24 per cent.

Tel Aviv University has continued to expand; it had 10,680 students in 1970 and 15,400 in the academic year 1973–74—an increase of 50 per cent. In 1973 the Faculty of Arts and Communication was inaugurated, with an enrolment of 540 students.

Municipal libraries

There are 17 libraries; 10 are lending libraries and the remaining seven are study and reference libraries. A new Central Library is under construction. The number of books in all these libraries increased from 508,000 in 1972 to 552,100 in 1973.

Social welfare

The number of families requiring assistance has been rising steadily: in 1970/71—11,750; in 1971/72—13,100; and in 1972/73—14,630. The number of households in receipt of financial support rose from 2,137 in April 1972 to 2,828 in April 1973.

Religious services

There were 690 synagogues in the city in 1973. The Religious Council employs 141 rabbis, maintains 16 ritual bathing establishments, and supervises kashrut in 700 factories, businesses, and institutions.

*

The Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel stated that in September 1974 the total population of Israel (excluding the Occupied Territories) was 3,400,000; 2·9 million of these are Jews. The Jewish population rose by 2·6 per cent over the previous year, while the increase among non-Jews was 4 per cent.

*

The Director-General of the Jewish Agency is reported to have stated last September that some IL21 million were spent in the first eight months of 1974 in loans and grants to new immigrants to assist them in obtaining employment or in setting up their own businesses.

*

The Immigrant Absorption Ministry, Israel, has published a study which reports that 30 per cent of the immigrants who arrived from the West in 1970 had left the country within three years; but only five per cent of those who came from eastern Europe, Asia, or Africa had done so. Most of the newcomers from western Europe and North America had registered only as 'potential immigrants'. When all the immigrants were asked, after two months' stay in Israel, whether they intended to remain, 86 per cent of them said 'yes', but only 32 per cent of the potential immigrants gave an affirmative answer.

The study notes that there is more of a tendency to leave among the young than among the older newcomers (aged 30 and over), while professionals are more unsettled because of job difficulties. Settlers from the West are often satisfied with their immediate material and work situation, but are not sure

whether they will stay, while those from the Soviet Union are less satisfied but identify more with the country and have confidence in the future. The authors state that ideological considerations come before material satisfactions in determining whether a person wants to become permanently an Israeli.

In 1973 immigration from the Soviet Union increased by six per cent, compared with the year before, while the inflow from other countries fell by 12 per cent. There has also been a decline in the proportion of single persons; they constituted 35 per cent of all immigrants in 1970; 29 in 1971; 19 in 1972; and 17 in 1973.

It was expected that 3,500 families would make their own arrangements for housing, but because of inflated prices only 2,400 did so, while the remainder required a flat to be provided by the housing authorities. In 1973, 3,500 persons were accommodated temporarily in flats rented from private owners, 80 per cent of them in the coastal zone. It was expected that in 1974 their number would be doubled (7,000).

The report also states that in the 12 months ending August 1973, 18,000 immigrants found work, 40 per cent of them in industry and 50 per cent in the services. The unemployed numbered 10 per cent after the first year, 7 per cent after the second year, and 5 per cent after the third year. This figure is higher than the national unemployment rate (2·5 per cent). The difficult situation facing those who are over 55 years old has improved thanks to the Special Pensions Plan which came into force in April 1974. It ensures a minimum income after retirement even for people who did not complete the requisite 10 years of membership in a pension scheme. In addition, three aid projects have been devised for professionals: a fund to subsidize salaries; a Centre for Absorption in the Sciences, which finances research activities for qualified immigrants; and most recently a New Enterprises Fund, which helps people and companies to launch 'technologist-intensive' investments. The report concludes that 70 per cent of the immigrants are satisfied with their present situation.

*

The Board of Deputies of British Jews published the following data last July on statistics of marriages and deaths in 1973. The Statistical and Demographic Research Unit of the Board of Deputies has completed its annual review of marriages and deaths in the community for 1973. The numbers returned, with comparisons for the previous five years, are as follows.

	No. of persons marrying in Synagogues	*No. of persons dying*
1968	3,646	4,942
1969	3,806	4,839
1970	3,872	4,835
1971	3,730	4,902
1972	3,744	5,069
1968–72 (Average)	3,760	4,917
1973	3,510	4,776

These figures show a fall of 6·25 per cent from the previous year, following the very slight rise of 0·5 per cent in that year. This decline does not differ significantly from the fall of 6·67 per cent recorded for the general population of England and Wales when the provisional data for the first three quarters of 1973 (all that are at present available) are set against those for the corresponding period in 1972.

This fall is not in line with the estimates produced by the Unit on the basis of Synagogue marriages a generation ago. The Unit's predictions for the past five years have accurately pinpointed the direction of annual fluctuations and bearing in mind the national trends, it can only be assumed that unpredicted external forces have been affecting the pattern of marriages both generally and in Anglo-Jewry. However, it should be noted that the fall in Synagogue marriages is confined to the orthodox sector of the community which, in 1973, accounted for 79·5 per cent of these marriages compared with an average of 81·5 per cent for the previous five years. The nature of the present compilation does not permit speculation as to why the fall is so restricted.

It may be felt that this fall in orthodox marriages is to some extent accounted for by marriages in Israel.

This is the first year since compilations began that the orthodox proportion has fallen below 80 per cent

	1973 %	*Average 1968–72* %
Orthodox	79·5	81·5
Reform	13·5	11·5
Liberal	7·0	6·9

The number of burials and cremations in 1973 was 4,776 which shows a decline of 5·8 per cent from the previous year. A fall of approximately 1·0 per cent was found in the general population.

The funerals were distributed among the main Synagogal groups as shown below:

	1973 %	*Average 1968–72* %
Orthodox	86	87
Reform	8	7
Liberal	6	6

*

The Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, issued the following Research Report last May on Jewish Population Statistics for West Germany.

There are now 26,876 Jews registered with the Jewish Community in the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin. The number has remained almost static during the last fifteen months; on 1 January 1973 the Jewish communities had 26,611 members. This emerges from the latest quarterly report of the *Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland* (Central Social Welfare Agency for Jews in Germany), giving the membership data on 1 April 1974.

In a report prepared for the World Jewish Congress Conference of European Jewish Communities in London in January 1973, the late Dr. H. G. van Dam, General Secretary of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, estimated that another 5,000 to 7,000 Jews resided in West Germany without being members of its Jewish communities. This estimate is borne out by official census figures available from the census of 27 May 1970. These show 31,684 Jews in the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Thus about 84 per cent of the Jews in West Germany are registered members of the Jewish communities.

The largest Jewish communities were on 1 April 1974:

West Berlin	5,280 members
Frankfurt	5,037
Munich	3,682
Düsseldorf	1,620
Hamburg	1,429
Cologne	1,225

The average age of Jews registered with the Community was 45·6 years on 1 April 1974. 8,621 persons or 32·1 per cent are over 60 years of age; 13 per cent over 70. On the other hand, the number of children under 6 years is only 1,078 or 4 per cent. In several communities, particularly the smaller ones, the median age is even higher than the national average, e.g. 56·7 years in Wuppertal-Elberfeld (90 Jews), 54·8 years in Neustadt/W (229 Jews), 54·1 in Herford/Detwold (43 Jews) and 65·8 years in Baden-Baden (62 Jews).

By comparison, United Nations estimates for the total population of the Federal Republic show only 17·9 per cent over 60 years of age and only 7·6 per cent over 70, while the percentage of children under 6 was 11·6. The proportion of old people in the general population is almost half of that among Jews; the proportion of small children more than double.

During the last 15 months, i.e. since 1 January 1973, 1,328 immigrants have registered with the Jewish communities while the number of emigrants from among community members was 537. This increase by immigration indicated by the community statistics corresponds to the census figures. Between 1961 and 1970 they show an increase of 52 per cent in the Jewish population of the Federal Republic (without West Berlin) which in this over-aged community cannot have resulted from natural increase but only from net immigration.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Alvarez, A., *The Savage God, A Study of Suicide*, 320 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1974, 45p.

Berlins, Marcel and Wansell, Geoffrey, *Caught in the Act, Children, Society and the Law*, 124 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1974, 40p.

Blum, Alan F., *Theorizing*, xi + 272 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1974, £3.50 (paperback, £1.75).

Brown, Wilfred, *Organization*, 493 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1974, 75p.

Carnoy, Martin, *Education as Cultural Imperialism*, v + 378 pp., David McKay Company, New York, 1974, $8.95 (paperback, $3.95).

Cohen, Abner, *Two-Dimensional Man, An essay on the anthropology of power and symbolism in complex society*, xii + 156 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1974, £2.75.

Fraenkel, Peter, *The Namibians of South West Africa*, Minority Rights Group, Report No. 19, 48 pp., London, 1974, 45p.

Gratch, Haya, ed., *Twenty-five Years of Social Research in Israel, A Review of the Work of The Israel Institute of Applied Social Research 1947–1971*, 292 pp., Jerusalem Academic Press, Jerusalem, 1973, n.p.

Habermas, Jürgen, *Theory and Practice*, trans. from the German by John Viertel, ix + 310 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1974, £4.00 (paperback, £1.80).

Halmos, Paul, ed., *Professionalisation and Social Change*, The Sociological Review Monograph No. 20, ii + 338 pp., University of Keele, Keele, Staffordshire, 1973, £2.10.

Head, David, ed., *Free Way to Learning, Educational Alternatives in Action*, 167 pp., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1974, 50p.

Horowitz, Irving Louis, *Israeli Ecstasies/Jewish Agonies*, xi + 244 pp., Oxford Univ. Press, New York and London, 1974, £4.40.

Kohler, Foy D., Gouré, Leon, and Harvey, Mose L., *The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War, The Implication for Détente*, xii + 131 pp., Monographs in International Affairs, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, 1974, n.p.

Krausz, Ernest and Miller, Stephen H., *Social Research Design*, x + 118 pp., Longman, London, 1974, £2.00 (paperback, £1.00).

Lemarchand, René and Martin, David, *Selective Genocide in Burundi*, Minority Rights Group, Report No. 20, 35 pp., London, 1974, 45p.

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