THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

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VOLUME SIXTEEN 1974

Published on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

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THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

VOLUME XVI NO. 1 JUNE 1974

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PUBLISHED TWICE YEARLY

on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

Annual Subscription £1.40 (U.S. $4) post free
Single Copies 75p ($2.25)

Applications for subscriptions should be addressed to the Managing Editor, The Jewish Journal of Sociology, 55 New Cavendish Street, London W1M 8BT

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BUTLER AND TANNER LTD
FROME AND LONDON

BOOKS REVIEWED

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NORTH AFRICAN JEWS IN BELLEVILLE

Claude Tapia

THIS paper is concerned with Jewish immigrants from North Africa who live in Belleville, a district of Paris; it sets out briefly some of the results of field research[1] carried out with the help of a small team of social scientists.[2]

I had hoped that the records of the Fonds Social Juif Unifié would allow me to arrive fairly quickly at a reasonably exhaustive list of residents of Belleville originating from North Africa. Unfortunately, that was not possible—partly on account of the great mobility of the population. (Data derived from a random sample of blocks of flats showed that 693 Jewish households out of a total of 879 had changed their place of domicile within a period of 10 years.) Nevertheless, the F.S.J.U. records were used as a basis for further investigation; and each mail-box in the entrance way of buildings was examined in order to note names specific to North African Jews. When the names were not unequivocally North African, we sought the help of young persons in the district. In this way, we established a list of 1,500 names and addresses within a roughly sketched geographical area. We then drew a random sample of 200 households out of that total and gathered demographic and occupational data from each of them. Finally, we selected one hundred households which were individually approached with a more detailed and wide-ranging questionnaire.

Definition of the North African Jewish district

We decided on a minimum density of 3 per cent Jewish North Africans because estimates by French administrators (as well as by Jewish organizations in Paris) state that Jewish North Africans account for about one per cent of the total population of the capital.

The area which we took as that of our research roughly resembles a quadrilateral; it is bounded by the following metro stations: Colonel Fabien, Pyrenées, Père Lachaise, and Goncourt. Within those limits the density of Jewish North Africans ranges from 4 to over 25 per cent

—according to the state of repair of the flats, the availability of kasher food shops, and proximity to synagogues.

It is in the 20th arrondissement that we find the greatest density of the population studied: 800 households—or more than 50 per cent of the total number of North African Jewish households in the quadrilateral. These 800 households constitute about 7·5 per cent of the total number of households in the general population of the area (10,500 households); they are mainly of Tunisian origin. In the area adjacent to the 11th arrondissement there are 400 Jewish households out of a general total of 6,000 (or 6·5 per cent). About a quarter of the 400 households are housed in blocks of flats which are respectable in appearance and adequately maintained; they are mainly in the Rues Goncourt, de la Présentation, and Louis Bonnet. The residents, although they are of modest means, seem to belong to a social stratum higher than that of the inhabitants of the 20th arrondissement. Their surnames are in large part typically those of Algerian Jews—and we know that the latter are generally better off than their Tunisian correligionists. The 10th arrondissement houses only 200 Jewish households—or 15 per cent of the Jewish population in the whole area under review, and 5·5 per cent of the general population of that particular section of the 10th arrondissement. Finally, there are 100 Jewish households in the area of the 19th arrondissement which abuts on the other three localities just mentioned; these households account for 5·6 per cent of the Jewish population in the quadrilateral, and 4 per cent of the general population in the district—that is, just over the minimum of 3 per cent which we took as the threshold of North African Jewish density for our study.

However, in spite of the points of difference between the four arrondissements (the 11th, 10th, 20th, and 19th), it would be sociologically naive to deny that the district of Belleville—which straddles them—presents a picture of comparative homogeneity in its housing and in the occupational status of its inhabitants.

Within the quadrilateral there are concentric circles of Jewish density. At the core of the innermost circle there are the Rues Ramponeau, Denoyer, De Tourpille, and de la Présentation, where Jewish density ranges from 15 to 27 per cent. (It is worth noting here that there is no higher Jewish North African density in the whole quadrilateral, and that one cannot therefore validly speak of a ghetto, of a closed homogeneous society, or of an autonomous micro-society.)

Why did the immigrants choose to settle in Belleville? Some say that it was due to the existence for many decades of small industrial concerns and artisans' workshops (clothing, carpentry, leather goods, and footwear) managed by eastern European Jews. After the unrest in Tunisia around 1952–54, when the first waves of Jewish Tunisians arrived in Paris, Jewish agencies directed them to that area in the hope

that the local residents would provide the new immigrants with shelter and employment. That hope was not ill-founded—although the conditions of housing and of work were often hard. The next wave of Tunisians (1961–64) came to settle in the same general area, and those among them who had some capital acquired business concerns—mainly food—and spilt over into the 11th arrondissement across the Rues de l'Orillon and de la Présentation. Another important attraction of the district probably was the existence of the old-established synagogue in the Rue Julien Lacroix.

Some of the earlier North African immigrants had turned themselves into housing brokers and they found accommodation for the successive waves of immigrants who came to Paris after each serious crisis in Franco-Tunisian relations, or in the Middle East conflict—for example, the Suez campaign in 1956. The core of North African Jewish settlement is bounded on the north by the Rue Julien Lacroix, on the east by the Rues Palikao and Vilin, on the south by the Rues l'Orillon and du Moulin Joly, and on the west by the Rue de Belleville. A wider circle surrounds that central area, within which there are Jewish densities of between 7 and 10 per cent. In the third and widest circle of North African Jewish settlement the immigrants constitute from 4 to 6 per cent of the general population.

When our team enumerated the Jewish households street by street, they found variations in Jewish density within the same street, according to the level of rents. The flats were dilapidated and small. In 1967–68, a two- or three-room flat was rarely let at more than 80 francs a month—although the tenant might have had to pay as much as 3,000–4,000 francs as 'key money' (which was, in theory, an illegal payment).

The blocks of flats in the main streets at the periphery of the quadrilateral were built at the end of the nineteenth century and are well-maintained; but they house hardly any North African tenants. The latter are found mainly in streets with two- or three-storeyed houses, often with inner courtyards which have been transformed into workshops or warehouses. With few exceptions, the homes have tiny rooms, low ceilings, primitive sanitation, and are riddled with woodworm.

Most of the immigrants were economically depressed in their country of origin and could therefore bring little or no capital to France. On the other hand, many informants say that even those among them who could have afforded better housing were unable to secure it. The owners of well-maintained blocks of flats (or their agents) were unwilling to let accommodation to the immigrants and some of the native residents of the blocks grouped themselves into tenants' associations in order to prevent the North Africans from settling in their buildings. As for the new homes provided after slum clearance, they require

tenants to pay a monthly rent of about 300–350 francs for a three-room flat; that rent is far too high for the majority of North African Jews.

Our questionnaire interviews revealed that 56 per cent of the respondents chose to settle in Belleville because rents were cheap; 35 per cent said they had come because they felt more at home in the area ('On se sent moins seul ici'—'One is less lonely here'), or because there was a synagogue in the district and kasher food was available.

In the last few years those immigrants who prospered have tended to move out of the inner circle of the quadrilateral to the more comfortable areas at its periphery—or even to the more anonymous suburbs. Young couples, and even young single men and women, who have acquired a minimum of education or of skilled training, move right out of the general area of Belleville to live wherever they can find accommodation; but they come 'home', so to speak, several times a week to visit the district of their childhood. Some households or individuals have left France altogether to settle in Israel, and it is said that a few have gone to Canada, Australia, and South America. There are no longer other North Africans who move into the homes vacated by the departing households, since few Jews anxious to come to Paris are left in North Africa or even in French provincial cities such as Lyons or Marseilles.

On the other hand, there still remain the so-called 'militants de Belleville'—those who (in spite of their Zionism, their orthodoxy, or their improved economic condition) long to see in Belleville a renaissance of North African Jewish culture. They are aware, of course, that a segment of the local population see Belleville only as a transit area in their search for a permanent home.

Demographic data

We have stated that 200 households (out of the total of 1,500) were selected at random and interviewed in order to gather demographic data; and that 100 households (also selected at random) were interviewed to obtain sociological data. When we speak of a 'family' as

TABLE 1. *Household[a] composition*

														Total
No. of persons per household	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	
No. of households	17	22	27	34	26	24	20	9	16	1	1	2	1	200
No. of persons in each category	17	44	81	136	130	144	140	72	144	10	11	24	13	966

a A household consists of individuals sharing a common table, and includes spouses, their descendants, ascendants, and affines.

distinct from a household, we mean the unit consisting of a married couple and their descendants. Table 1 shows that there are an average of 4·8 persons per household (966 in 200 households). A study published in Tunis,[3] reveals a very similar average (5·01 persons per household in the *Hara* of Tunis, whence the majority of the Belleville immigrants originate).

If we assume that the same average obtains in all 1,500 households within the quadrilateral, we arrive at a total figure of about 7,250 individuals of North African Jewish origin. That modest total in the general population of the area is far from commensurate with the role the immigrants play in its economic and commercial life, or in its general socio-cultural activities.

On the other hand, although Table 1 shows that 50 per cent of the sample consists of households containing five or more members, it does not clearly reveal the number of children in each nuclear *family* unit, since grandparents are sometimes included in the households. When we examined the data in our 100 sociological questionnaires as well as the data from a study we made of schoolchildren, we found an average of 4·53 children per nuclear family unit; 50 per cent of all children were less than 15 years old. Thus the population under review has a large proportion of 'familles nombreuses'.

TABLE 2. *Population by age group*

Age	*Number*	%
0–19	474	49·0
20–59	417	43·1
60+	75	7·7
Total	966	99·8

Table 2 (based on the results of the demographic inquiry into 200 households) shows that half the population is less than 20 years old, while those aged 60 and over account for less than 8 per cent of the

TABLE 3. *Young persons (married or single) living away from their parents*

Place of residence	*Men*		*Women*		*Total*
	single	*married*	*single*	*married*	
Belleville	1	9	1	12	23
Greater Paris (excluding Belleville)	6	30	3	28	67
Provinces	—	1	—	1	2
Israel	7	8	3	7	25
North Africa	—	1	—	—	1
Other countries	—	1	1	—	2
Total	14	50	8	48	120

total. These percentages are very similar to those obtaining in the societies of the Third World—and of course, the country of origin of the immigrants is part of that world.

In 1968, the crude birth rate of the general French population was 16·6 per mille while the crude death rate was 10·8. In our North African sample, the crude birth rate was 25–30 per mille while the

TABLE 4. *Births, deaths, and population growth 1964–69*

Year	*Estimated size of sample on 1 January*	*Registered births*	*Registered deaths*	*Population growth*
1969 (3rd quarter)	955	16	5	11
1968	935	25	5	20
1967	915	24	4	20
1966	896	24	5	19
1965	874	25	3	22
1964	855	23	4	19

crude death rate was about five per mille, and the population growth 20–25 per mille. We must point out here that although our sample was representative of the North African population, there is still the possibility of errors in the data we gathered because our respondents may have given replies which were affected by their 'superstitions' or by their suspicion of the motives of our research. Furthermore, it is likely that many of the elderly had remained in their country of origin and that we have arrived at a distorted picture of the 'true' mortality

TABLE 5. *Fertility rate of sample*

Year	*Number of women aged 15–49*	*Registered births*	*Fertility rate per mille*
1968	224	25	107
1967	217	24	110
1966	208	24	115
1965	198	25	126
1964	188	23	122

rate. Notwithstanding these qualifications, we can state that the data we gathered place the population of our sample in the demographic category to which New Zealand and Israel belong, that is, half way between those of the Third World (40 per mille birth rate and 10–25 per mille death rate) and those of industrial countries (15–20 per mille birth rate and 8–12 per mille death rate).

Similarly, the fertility rate of our population (107–126 per mille) shows the latter also to be half way between that of the developing countries (180–200 per mille) and that of the industrialized nations (70–80 per mille). A more detailed examination of our data than is

shown in Tables 5 and 6 reveals that, in fact, younger women (15–29 years) have fewer children than those aged 30–49 years had when they were 15–29 years old; and that the young girls of Belleville marry at a later age than did their mothers or older sisters. That may be due in part to the fact that (1), men with skilled jobs or with ambition have left the 'community' of Belleville and are not generally available as marriage partners; (2), there has been a decline of marriage brokers;

TABLE 6. *Population growth of sample*

Year	*Birth rate per mille*	*Death rate per mille*	*Population growth rate per mille*
1968	26	5	21
1967	26	5	21
1966	26	5	21
1965	28	4	24
1964	27	5	22

and (3), young girls are now less easily willing to marry a man whom a few years ago they would have been persuaded to accept.

Here one should add that a number of households in our sample (resident in the outer circle of Belleville and belonging to the 'middle' class) have already acquired some of the values of their French-born neighbours; they practise birth control and they have a comparatively higher standard of living as well as better-paid and more stable employment than is the case with the mass of their North African correligionists —to whom they consider themselves superior.

Country of origin

Only 41 per cent of the population have acquired French nationality. Most of the remainder have not applied for it; indeed, many of those who came to France in 1950–54 have retained their nationality of birth. Both sets of questionnaires (the demographic and the sociological) showed that 82 per cent of the sample came from Tunisia, and that 90 per cent of that number used to live in the ancient Jewish quarter of Tunis, the *Hara*, in the areas bordering the *Hara*, or in the working-class suburbs of the capital.

Those originating from Algeria are largely (80 per cent) from Constantine or Bône, and have a general standard of living which is very similar to that of their Tunisian neighbours (although their age grouping and the number of children in the nuclear family show them to be more demographically 'advanced'). The Algerian immigrants came to settle in France in a massive flood in 1962, while the Tunisian Jews have been arriving in a steady stream—which swelled in the mid-fifties, when there were the riots which preceded the independence of

Tunisia and Morocco in 1956. One third of the Belleville immigrants then came to Paris. There was a further massive immigration after the bloody clashes between French troops and Tunisians at Bizerta, and again after the Six-Day War of 1967—when Jewish shops were looted in Tunisia.

Occupation and social structure

About 30 per cent of the North African Jewish immigrants of Belleville are gainfully occupied—292 out of 966, while in the general population of France the comparative percentage is 40—20 million out of 50 million. An examination of the results of research in Tunisia carried out by A. Chouraqui[4] shows that in 1946 only 28 per cent of Jews in the country were gainfully occupied. Paul Sebag found that 10 years later, in 1956, the percentage was almost identical: 27·8.[5] It seems, therefore, that the immigrants exhibit a pattern which is very similar to that of their place of origin.

Our sociological questionnaires showed that 70 per cent of the male respondents, and 75 per cent of the female, were either illiterate or had received only an elementary education; that fact naturally limited their ability to obtain gainful employment. More than a third of the gainfully occupied work in Belleville itself; and more than half (55–60 per cent) are employed in the spheres of activity which they had been engaged in when they lived in their native country; moreover, they have not risen in status within their old sphere. Many of the North African immigrants have followed the pattern of employment which their predecessors, the eastern Europeans who had settled in Belleville several decades earlier, had followed: they work locally in small leather workshops (mainly footwear) and small-scale clothing manufactories. On the other hand, they differ from the earlier immigrants in that about a quarter of the total gainfully employed are engaged in metal work—as plumbers, garage mechanics and electricians, car sprayers, etc.—and that their place of work is outside Belleville and in some cases even beyond the suburbs of Paris; there are proportionally more Algerians than Tunisians engaged in these fields.

Neither Algerians nor Tunisians work in large factories or industrial plants. Moreover, almost no person in Belleville is employed as a craftsman in electronics, in the aircraft industry, or in chemical works, since these branches require skilled personnel.

There are 58 women gainfully employed, or 20 per cent of the total of 292; a few work as domestics in the homes of the better-off, but most are either typists or shorthand-typists. Paul Sebag found that in Tunisia women accounted for 13 per cent of the total of gainfully occupied Jews;[6] there was, of course, a long tradition among Jews in Muslim countries for women to devote themselves exclusively to the home and

to the upbringing of their children. The Belleville men who are office workers are mainly junior clerks or messengers.

We have seen that there is a central core of Belleville which has the highest Jewish density of the whole area, and in which most of the kasher shops are to be found. Several decades ago the area was the centre of the eastern European Jews described by Charlotte Roland;[7] they started the clothing and leather workshops, opened food shops to cater for their needs and tastes, and established prayer-houses, a synagogue, and religious schools. By the 1950s, some of them had moved out of their homes 'over the shop', so to speak, towards the north and west of the wider Belleville district. When their North African correligionists arrived, they treated them somewhat as poor relations, employed them in their various concerns, and gladly allowed them the use of the synagogue of the Rue Julien Lacroix.

Gradually, the newcomers eased out many of the Ashkenazim from the management of the religious institutions (not without strains and stresses; they themselves relate how they effected their 'conquest of the Europeans'). At first, some of the eastern Europeans strategically retreated, but later there was some strife when the newcomers invaded the cafés and pavements which until then had been almost exclusive Ashkenazi preserves. But it was in the management of the synagogue and of its ritual that most of the conflicts arose, for the eastern Europeans felt bound to ensure the preservation of their practices.

By the late 1960s, more than a hundred of the total 130 shops and other business concerns to be found within the core of Belleville were owned by Tunisian Jews. About 80 per cent of the total consisted of food shops (including kasher butchers), cafés, and restaurants. There were about 500 men engaged in the kasher meat trade in Tunis in the 1950s; they were the shop owners, their employees, and the wholesale suppliers (*chevillards*). They constituted almost a caste; the employees were usually the poor relations of the shop-owners or of the wholesalers. These wage-earners stood apart from the rest of the Tunisian Jewish population, who looked upon them as a group of violent and ill-clad men. Even those members of the group who had acquired some wealth and led the life of bourgeois continued to live in the old Tunis ghetto, the *Hara*, or in other working-class areas of the capital or of the suburbs; a member of our Belleville research team has said that they constituted 'l'aristocracie de la plèbe'.

The butchers left Tunis for Paris in large numbers in the 1960s; some came after the serious clash at Bizerta, while others left when the Tunisian government took very strict measures to control the price of meat in the country. Those who had some means very soon acquired shops in the French capital; by the end of the 1960s, in fact, out of a total of 69 kasher butchers under the supervision of the Paris Consistoire, more than half (38) were owned by Tunisians. But there are also an

additional 30 butcher shops in the Paris region which are independent of the Consistoire; they are affiliated to the Association Culturelle des Israélites Nord-Africains; about 20 of these are owned by Tunisians. Many of the shops were established in districts of Paris where there was a Tunisian population, and indeed it was not rare for a Tunisian Jew settled in Paris to discover that his new local kasher butcher was the same man whose customer he had been some years earlier in their common native town.

In Belleville alone, Tunisian immigrants opened 21 butcher shops—of which only three were sanctioned by the Consistoire. That fact is only one of the examples which illustrate the independent turn of mind characterizing the North Africans, and which shows how unlike the earlier Ashkenazi immigrants they are. At first sight, it seems extraordinary that 21 butchers can make a living out of a total local North African population of about 7,000. But, in fact, they serve a very much greater geographical area; some, indeed, allege that they have clients who live as far away as Beauvais, Meux, Mantes, and Dreux. The same is also true of the 14 restaurants of Belleville, which could not have survived if they had been almost exclusively dependent upon the patronage of the local population, which is far from prosperous. These restaurants vary in their style of service and their comfort; a couple of them serve cheap grills, another two or three clearly attempt to present an elegant appearance which might prove attractive to discerning patrons, while the remainder range between these two extremes.

We observed these restaurants in the course of our field work, and noted that there was a great deal of variation in the type of clientele according to the hour of the day and according to the day of the week. At lunch time on week days there is not a great demand for meals; the customers are a few native Frenchmen who work in the locality as builders or mechanics, or some who are nostalgically tempted by a couscous which recalls for them their years of service in the armed forces stationed in Algeria, or the odd tradesman or craftsman who works in the area but lives elsewhere; there are also some North African Muslim customers. In the evening, the restaurants are not more crowded, but the diners then are almost exclusively North African Jews; they are often bachelors who live either locally or in adjacent districts, and who cannot do without their traditional meals.

On Saturday evenings, and to some extent on Sunday at midday, the restaurants are much more crowded and have a varied clientele; local households frequent them for an apéritif and sometimes for a meal, and many Jewish 'tourists', as they are called, come with their children from other districts of the capital and from the outer suburbs—they are often 'des anciens de Belleville', Belleville old-timers, and they sit out at the tables of the most expensive restaurants to boast of their more prosperous means. All these establishments exhibit notices stating that

they serve kasher meals, but we were reliably informed that only two or three of them have been granted the seal of kashrut by the Paris Consistoire; the remainder are said to buy their meat from butchers whose kashrut has not been confirmed by the Consistoire, and they handle money on the Sabbath.

There is one specific point of contrast between the North African Jews of Belleville and those eastern Europeans who had preceded them: the former are very fond of alcoholic drinks. Each restaurant has a very well-stocked bar, with shelves laden with Tunisian or Israeli spirits and liqueurs bearing exotic labels; there is a great deal of cheerful companionship among the men who regularly meet to drink and to get drunk. Just as a few lapses from strict kashrut are generally tolerated, so is male drunkenness; as to the former, the new immigrants hardly conceal the fact that they find the strict orthodoxy of the Ashkenazim or of some other Jews somewhat odd and excessive, although they themselves indulge in their minor 'superstitious' traditional beliefs.

The third most important economic activity in the realm of food—after butcher-shops and restaurants—is centred on grocery and pastry shops. Many local households live from the profits of these concerns. There are 15 grocers' shops selling a very wide range of products, just as was the practice in Tunisia; apart from the items which French grocers usually stock (such as sugar, flour, rice, etc.), these shops sell a variety of dairy produce, spirits and wines, oriental spices and condiments, various salads and North African-style sausages and salamis, snacks and sandwiches to take away, various breads (and, during Passover, matzot), and fruit and vegetables (some of which are imported from Tunisia). There are eight pastry-shops, far more than is needed to supply the resident population—but, as in the case of the local restaurants and butcher-shops, they supply customers who are drawn from a very wide area and include Muslims as well as some native Frenchmen who acquired a taste for the sweetmeats during their sojourn in colonial North Africa.

Thus, the various business concerns providing foodstuffs or meals are greatly dependent on the 'tourist' trade, which is largely confined to about 48 hours: from Friday afternoon to Sunday lunch. On Saturday evenings, after the Sabbath, the pavements of the Boulevard de Belleville are crowded—whatever the weather. The eastern Europeans gather to chat and gossip on one side of the pavement, between the Rues Ramponeau and de Belleville; on the same pavement, but on the other side of the Rue Ramponeau, there are groups of North African Jews (who sometimes overflow on to the Ashkenazi preserve and cause a great deal of resentment—but we heard of no actual cases of the resentment resulting in blows or physical injuries); the Muslims gather on the other side of the Boulevard, near the Rue de l'Orillon, close to some Muslim shops and to a cinema showing Arabic films. In addition, there is some

space in the middle of the Boulevard de Belleville which is left to various other immigrant groups; it is considered a kind of no man's land by the Ashkenazim and by the North African Jews and Muslims.

The week-end starts with tourists arriving in their cars, which they park in every available space, thus heavily blocking the streets; the men sit at café tables, sipping their drinks, while the women go from shop to shop and return laden to join their husbands; they check on their various purchases, add up the amount they have spent, then repeat their calculations, and eventually they get up to return to their cars, stopping on the way to greet friends and exchange news; there are also the odd bachelors who come to meet old friends, and rush to park their cars (without regard for other motorists) as close as they can to their favourite café, or to a group of friends chatting on the pavement.

Some resist the attraction of a regular weekly visit to Belleville, and limit their excursion to a few odd days—a Holy Day, a party, a bar-mitzva, or a special visit to friends—when they exchange news and gossip, stock up with their favourite groceries and other foods, avidly listen to rumour (which those who impart it and those who receive it often know to be false or malicious, but greatly appreciate), and exchange meaningful glances while good-humouredly listening to one another. They know that other onlookers consider North African Jews to be odd in their ways and practices, and they are amused by the onlookers' caricature of their style of life.

On autumn evenings, the immigrants chat nostalgically—not so much about the past in their native land, but about Belleville itself, about what Belleville might have become if it had not been allowed to disintegrate, if only an effort had been consciously made to transplant to the district the old culture in all its richness in such a way that the response evoked among onlookers might have been that of astonished respect.

Business enterprises unconnected with the supply of foodstuffs or cooked meals number about 30; apart from workshops, there are dressmakers, watchmakers, shoe-shops and cobblers, hairdressers, shops selling cloth by the yard, and others selling items connected with Jewish ritual. There are three retailers in the last category, and they are probably the only local shops (apart from those providing foodstuffs) which are not dependent almost exclusively upon the local residents for their custom. They stock Hebrew bibles and prayer-books, embroidered skullcaps, prayer-shawls, books in French on Jews and Judaism, records in the Arab dialect peculiar to North African Jews (*Judéo-arabe*), in Hebrew, and even in Yiddish, as well as fancy goods made in North Africa or in Israel. One of the three shopkeepers doubles as a photographer—thus reproducing a pattern common to Jewish shopkeepers in North Africa, that of engaging in apparently unconnected business activities under the same roof. The three shop-

keepers have preserved their friendly (and in some cases, intimate) relationships with other immigrants who had been their customers in North Africa, and who have recommended them to friends. The old and valued customers act as the shopkeepers' agents, so to say, and bring new customers; in return, they enjoy the respect and deference shown them by their protégés, and both parties are very well pleased with this subtle exchange, which seems to involve little effort on either side but results in a great deal of satisfaction all round. This type of social relationship is one of the characteristics of the Belleville system of interaction.

There are about a hundred owners of shops and other business enterprises in Belleville, and they generally constitute the élite of the community. It is from them that the leaders and spokesmen have emerged, and the management of the synagogue of the Rue Julien Lacroix is in the hands of a few of them. Most of the local news is disseminated by the traders, who select the items they consider worth transmitting; cases of hardship are first brought to a shopkeeper's attention for help or advice, before any application is made to the various government welfare agencies. In theory, it is the group of shopkeepers who act as guardians of the community, although in matters concerning religious practice, standards of morals, and the education of the young, they consult the Belleville rabbi. On the other hand, the rabbi (whose moral leadership and prestige have never been challenged) is familiar with almost every decision or event affecting his flock, since these usually bear on a resident's 'private life'—for instance, conflicts with groups in neighbouring districts and with large Jewish organizations or members of their personnel, problems of residence permits or of identity papers, the enrolment of teachers of religious education for the local children, agreement about shop hours during Holy Days, the collection of funds in order to celebrate publicly some Holy Days, etc.

Some Belleville leaders live in the central core of the district; this is true of the rabbi and of some of the shopkeepers. Others reside in neighbouring areas because they consider it more befitting their enhanced social standing to do so and because in such a way they may succeed in their aspirations to merge with the 'true' Parisian Jewish bourgeoisie. These men are generally accepted by Jewish organizations, as well as by local French politicians and government agencies, as spokesmen for North African Jews since the latter acknowledge them as their leaders. It is said that they have also helped Tunisian Muslims in Paris who have appealed to them for assistance or guidance; it is certainly true that there are about 80 Muslims working for Jewish business concerns in Belleville, mainly in restaurants and large grocery shops.

The population under study can certainly be divided into income groups; but the latter do not necessarily coincide with a classification

based on other criteria of social class such as type of housing, prestige, or occupation. For instance, a shopkeeper of moderate means may enjoy a higher social status than a prosperous business man because the former renders assistance to the residents and has dealings with influential members of the wider society; similarly, a social worker or a teacher earning a modest salary may enjoy a prestige which is not commensurate with his or her income, as a result of the influence resulting from his or her relationships with many local households. Nevertheless, it is necessary to examine the data resulting from the inquiry into the income of 200 households (Table 7).

TABLE 7. *Income groups*

Socio-economic group	*Households*		*Number of individuals in households*
	No.	%	
I. Business men, small traders, craftsmen, established employees	38	19	182
II. Junior employees, labourers	133	66	655
III. No visible income; unemployed or part employed	29	15	129
Total	200	100	966

Group I does not in fact constitute a homogeneous category; for the business men, craftsmen, and traders differ from the established employees (who are teachers, civil servants, and skilled technicians) in that the latter do not have roots in Belleville whereas the former do, and also provide the residents with leaders and notables. One cannot say that there is a clash between these two distinct segments, for the simple reason that the one seems utterly to ignore the other; the established employees, the *cadres*, constitute a marginal group.

Table 7 shows that Group I does not constitute a small percentage of the total population; indeed, the households within it (19 per cent) are more numerous than those in the lowest economic group, Group III (15 per cent). There are several business men and shopkeepers who are prosperous and who attempt to follow a mode of life which might place them within the ranks of the bourgeoisie; but their attempts have not generally been successful either because they have not devoted sufficient time and effort to acquire bourgeois values and modes of behaviour, or because these men and their families are not whole-heartedly committed to changing their social status as a result of their being aware (however confusedly) that such a change would irremediably cut them off from their local correligionists, whom they also hope to lead and to represent. These richer men do not appear to see any contradiction between their striving for membership of the wider bourgeoisie and their ambition to be and to remain the leaders of their Belleville com-

munity; they are apparently unable to choose deliberately whether to promote the welfare of their own local group or to promote their own individual interests by sustained efforts to find a niche within the general Jewish bourgeoisie of Paris. There is no doubt that if they opted for the latter alternative, the Belleville immigrants would suffer, for first and foremost they would be deprived of the financial support the prosperous members give to the synagogue and to religious institutions as well as to the paupers; they would also be deprived of the general assistance and guidance they receive from these leaders, who are happy to enjoy in return only local prestige; and finally, if the leaders moved right out of the geographical and business area of Belleville they would seriously impair the pattern of exchange of services which cannot always be evaluated in financial terms, and which plays an important part in the economic life of Belleville.

Table 7 also shows that about two-thirds of the Belleville population under review constitute Group II; the wage-earners in these households are labourers and small employees earning a modest (and in some cases extremely modest) living in leather workshops, clothing manufactories, or as junior clerks or messengers in offices which pay them less than 1,000 francs a month; there are also garage workers and plumbers who have fewer difficulties in managing to make ends meet by the end of the month because they receive tips and other gratuities in exchange for small extra services. The households in that general category can be said to belong to the proletariat, and even to the under-proletariat, but their circumstances are not desperate for although their earnings are small, at least they are not dependent on casual employment. Nevertheless, they have a very low standard of living and little hope of improvement; the majority of them are not French citizens and therefore cannot belong to effective and militant national trade unions; and their flats are small and dilapidated and they cannot ameliorate their job prospects by home study and further training after working hours. Some of these wage-earners have suffered a distinct lowering of status as a result of their transplantation from North Africa. In the sociological inquiry, we looked into gainful occupations in the country of origin and compared them with those engaged in in Belleville; we found that many former jewellers and their craftsmen (Jews almost had a monopoly of that trade in North Africa) were reduced to earning a living in Paris as zip-fastener manufacturers (for leather goods) and welders—while printing workers, carpenters and joiners, upholsterers, mattress-makers, etc., were unable to find employment in their trades when they emigrated to France, and had to look for work unconnected with their skills; this was especially the case for those who did not possess recognized qualifications or who were not highly skilled. It is these men who are especially discontented and impatient at the slow rate of improvement in their earning ability or conditions of living.

Our demographic research based on a sample of 200 households revealed that 45 out of a total of 196 wage-earners had formerly been (that is, in North Africa) owners of businesses or independent artisans, or skilled workers in the garment trade, in leatherwork, and in jewelry; they accounted for 23 per cent of the total. In Belleville, on the other hand, only 15 per cent of those gainfully occupied are owners of businesses or independent earners; the remaining 85 per cent are employees of one sort or another. It is relevant to note in this context that research carried out in Tunis by Paul Sebag[8] and by Jacques Taieb[9] showed that 70 to 75 per cent of all Jews gainfully occupied were employees.

The sociological inquiry into 100 households, on the other hand, revealed that 60 per cent of those gainfully occupied had remained within their old trade or occupational category (including a few cases of

TABLE 8. *Gainful occupations in North Africa and in Belleville*

Category	*North Africa, %*	*Belleville, %*
Unskilled workers and employees	32	63
Artisans and skilled workers	30	16·5
Business men and shopkeepers	22	9
Office workers	6	2·5
Teachers	6	5
Established employees (*cadres*)	–	1
Others (musicians, pedlars, etc.)	3	2·5
Total	99	99·5

retraining), 31 per cent had clearly fallen into a lower category, and the remaining 9 per cent had risen above the grade to which they had belonged in their country of origin.

Table 8 reveals that the greatest changes have occurred in the categories of business men and artisans (a large proportion of whom have been unable to remain in their former line of work) and of unskilled workers, and that there have been changes of occupation apparently as a direct result of immigration: generally speaking, the Belleville men have lowered their economic status. When, in the course of the sociological inquiry, we asked the respondents to state whether they thought their standard of living in France was higher than, the same as, or lower than, that which they had enjoyed in their country of origin, we received the following replies: 48 per cent said that it was much lower in France, 28 per cent said that it was higher, and 15 per cent thought it was generally similar to their standard of living in North Africa; the remaining 9 per cent were unsure.

It is important to comment here on one of the probable main reasons for the fact that many owners of businesses in North Africa found

themselves unable to remain in the same category when they came to France: it was possible in the colonial society to engage in a multitude of business concerns which required little liquid capital or few tools of trade, while in France one generally needs a substantial amount of money or of manufacturing equipment. Some immigrants who were either just lucky or else clever managers or entrepreneurs have been able to rise to such a position in France that they now employ their erstwhile North African employers.

Thus most of the Belleville residents are fully aware that they have not successfully integrated themselves into French economic and social structures, and that the sense of security they enjoy in Belleville is false and misleading. That is why 78 per cent of the respondents in the sociological inquiry say they are in favour of leaving the district. Admittedly, as many as 40 per cent of those are thinking of an eventual emigration to Israel, but we believe that such a plan is more of a day-dream than a definite determined objective. On the other hand, although the Belleville immigrants have become proletarianized as a result of their move to Paris, they have not generally become pauperized —for they generally are in employment, they are in receipt of some social benefits, and they can earn some extra money or obtain side-benefits which were not available to them in the Tunis *Hara.*

At the bottom of the pyramid, there are the households of the unemployed or the casually employed, who account for 15 per cent of the total number of households; they are very close to penury. They include the young out-of-work, those expelled from school, the invalids, the aged, the widows without any means whatsoever, and the unemployed adults. These persons are dependent on public funds (such as unemployment pay), on private charitable agencies, or on what they receive from begging. The rate of unemployment is certainly high—60 out of 292 in the labour force of the demographic sample, or 20 per cent; on the other hand, the apparent rate according to the data gathered in the sociological survey was 10 per cent—which at first sight seems surprising, but when the questionnaires were analysed, we saw that 10 per cent of the respondents failed to reply to the question concerning their type of employment. (The French national unemployment rate varies between 2 and 2·5 per cent.)

The Belleville unemployed may be divided into two categories: those who are truly unemployed in the sense that they have skills and the desire to work but are unable to find a job because they do not have French nationality, or because they are too old, or in poor health; and those who are professionally unemployed, so to speak—men maladjusted to industrial society, casual workers unable or unwilling to remain in permanent or regular employment, handymen, singers in cafés, go-betweens among dealers and traders, or merely beggars in disguise. There are very few who beg openly in Belleville, although

some class as beggars those old men who spend their days praying in the synagogue or who are always ready at very short notice to chant a prayer or help to form a *minyan* when one is necessary after a death, or on the occasion of some festival or other ritual occasion. In 1956, Jacques Taieb[10] found that one-fifth of the total Jewish population of the Tunis suburb of Arana was made up of such professional unemployed.

Conclusion

The immigrants from North Africa (and here we have dealt mainly with those of Tunisian origin) in Belleville are concentrated in the 20th arrondissement of Paris; and their main characteristics are those of a society in transition. They appear to have adapted themselves to the host society with the help of communal and welfare agencies; in fact, however, the immigrants have certainly not been successfully integrated. There was no concerted plan by either the French governmental authorities or the Jewish welfare agencies to provide homes or employment; there were only hasty and ad hoc arrangements.

Most immigrant groups in the past have consisted mainly of adult men (usually unskilled) in search of work; the Belleville group, on the other hand, are in the main made up of households (admittedly with an unusually small percentage of young adults, who have left the district). The wage-earners are engaged in a variety of occupations; and it is possible to classify them in socio-economic terms into several strata: unemployed; unskilled and semi-skilled labourers; artisans and craftsmen; office workers; shopkeepers; and a nascent bourgeoisie consisting of the households of prosperous business men and professionals such as schoolteachers.

Nevertheless, the Belleville immigrants are not a group in process of disintegration. They are fiercely defensive of their native traditions (including religious practices); they have attempted to retain their old crafts and business dealings; they have their own leaders and notables to whom they can, and do, appeal in times of crisis; they resent and aggressively resist any changes which they believe are being imposed upon them by the host society. These factors may help to stabilize the community only in the short run; the community may well survive over a period of many years, but it is likely to grow weaker both in character and in numbers.

NOTES

[1] The original French text of the completed study will be published under the title, *Le phénomène communautaire dans le judaïsme français*. The present article has been translated by Judith Djamour.

[2] I am indebted to my colleague Jacques Taieb for the demographic and for some other statistical data cited in this paper.

[3] Paul Sebag, *La Hara de Tunis*, Tunis, 1959, p. 35.

[4] André Chouraqui, *Les juifs d'Afrique du Nord*, Paris, 1952, p. 256.

[5] Sebag, op. cit., p. 47.

[6] Sebag, op. cit., p. 45.

[7] Charlotte Roland, *Du Ghetto à l'Occident*, Paris, 1962.

[8] Sebag, op. cit., p. 45.

[9] Jacques Taieb, 'Une banlieue de Tunis, l'Ariana', *Cahiers de Tunisie*, no. 32, 1960, p. 56.

[10] Taieb, ibid.

Soviet Jewish Affairs

A Journal on Jewish Problems in the USSR and Eastern Europe

Volume 4 Number 1 Spring 1974

ARTICLES

Published by the Institute of Jewish Affairs, 13/16 Jacob's Well Mews, George Street, London W1H 5PD

The Journal appears twice a year, in spring and autumn. Annual subscription £3 or $7.50 (air mail surcharge £2 or $5).

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS IN THEIR HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Kenneth D. Roseman

I

THE history of Jews in America is complex. Jews came from widely differing backgrounds and found a host civilization undergoing successive and equally varied experiences. What an immigrant Jew from Germany confronted in 1800 became a very different experience by 1850. Even in the same year, there were greatly different civilizations; Eureka, California during the gold rush posed a set of problems which had been solved a century before in the major East Coast cities. From many other perspectives, the scholar is confronted with a wide variety; the American Jewish experience is so rich that it is often difficult to make sense of it in terms of a central organizing principle.

Two essays have thus far influenced most attempts at uncovering such an organizing principle or structure in this highly varied experience. In 1958 at the Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Jewish Historical Society, its president, Jacob R. Marcus, entitled his address: 'The Periodization of American Jewish History.'[1] He argued that immigration with all its ethnic and national connotations has been the decisive factor in the understanding of that experience. Many historians agree that this periodization scheme, which describes American Jewish history in terms of a sequence of ethnic waves of immigration, has a compelling cogency; indeed, most other scholars have utilized this pattern in their own analyses.

A quite different argument appeared at the same time. Ellis Rivkin, in 'A Decisive Pattern in American Jewish History',[2] evaluated the experience of Jews in America by means of a dominant variable: the fate of the Jews in America was, and is, always related to the economic system of capitalism. As the capitalist economy was strengthened and expanded, America's Jews prospered, and when it suffered set-backs (in the Depression, for example), Jews suffered correspondingly. By

pointing to the dynamic interrelations of Jews and their skills with the economy of the host country, that article has made a major contribution to the understanding of American Jewish history.

Each scholar approaches the complex and sometimes perplexing experience of America's Jews from his own vantage point, and each different approach contributes a new element of understanding. The present article is an attempt to supplement the Marcus and Rivkin perspectives by viewing the experience of Jews in America from another standpoint. It begins with the assumption that we can learn a great deal about this experience by studying how Jews organized their communal activities and how these patterns were related to trends in the general American setting.

II

When Jewish communities were organized in America, they characteristically began with a single institution. That institution was frequently a synagogue; but often enough it was a burial association or a fraternal organization. The earliest records of many Jewish communities founded during the middle decades of the nineteenth century in America's western states refer to the founding of a cemetery. However, even in these cases, the synagogue soon emerged as the preeminent American Jewish institution; it directed the social welfare, charitable, and educational agencies of the community. Thus, the *Hevra Bikkur Holim*, the *Hevra Kaddisha*, the *Hevra Gemilut Hasadim* and the *Heder* all functioned as arms of the synagogue. Their directors were appointed by the synagogue board, and they generally met in the vestry rooms.[3] Not infrequently during this early phase, their services were restricted to members of the synagogue. Even when the synagogue's functionaries catered to the non-affiliated (as in the provision of Passover *matzot* or arrangements for circumcision), they made it very clear to the recipients that only members had a *bona fide* claim to such services.

Why, one might ask, did the synagogue achieve such an impressive hegemony? The answer is that most of the immigrants had had direct personal experience of organized European Jewish communities. What they had known in Europe was a unified community, where one agency —not the synagogue, but the *kehillah*[4] itself—administered the various communal functions centrally and exercised considerable power. The *hevrot*, synagogues, and other institutions depended (to a greater or lesser degree in individual communities) on the central organization. Religious articles (such as *sifrei Torah*, *shofarot*, and *menorot*) and physical property were the possessions of the *kehillah*, and salaries for officiants, teachers, and other officers were paid from the central treasury.

Undergirding this system, the fundamental principles of which remained relatively constant from Talmudic times until the Emancipation, was the state. Until the early nineteenth century, the Jew's relations with the secular government were generally only through his community, which had the responsibility of collecting taxes and special assessments and preserving social order. In exchange, the state upheld the power and authority of the central communal organization and its discipline. When challenges arose, as for example when early religious reformers attempted to provide liturgical alternatives in Germany, they were frustrated by communal appeals to the power of the secular government.[5]

It was therefore only to be expected that, when Jews established communities in America, they would attempt to pattern them on the model they had known. But the importation of the European concept of a unified community was not to be accomplished without cost. America in the eighteenth century differed crucially from most of Europe. Although there were periodic efforts, sometimes temporarily successful, to enlist the power of the state behind a particular church, religion in the Colonial and Early National periods of American history generally involved a personal and voluntary commitment. The notion of a *kehillah* which could mediate between the individual and the state was anomalous within the context of American voluntarism. Even had the state been willing to delegate some of its governing power to a *kehillah* on the European model, the militant and aggressive individualism of the colonial American would not have brooked such an intermediary.

If, then, a central Jewish organization in colonial America was incapable of exercising the same functions as its European counterpart, an alternative model was discernible among America's Christian churches. During the colonial period a new structure for the religious enterprise emerged, as the autonomous congregation achieved increasing importance. Beginning in Puritan New England, the congregational style of religious governance spread to all the colonies. Even strongly hierarchical churches found themselves modified through its influence.[6]

American Jews, therefore, assigned to the synagogue many of the functions of the *kehillah*. They retained the principle of unified communal government which they had known in Europe; but, through the adoption of a characteristically American institution, the self-governing congregation, the ideal was perpetuated in a way which made sense within the new context of Jewish life. From the first Jewish settlement in New Amsterdam in 1654 until well after the end of the eighteenth century, the synagogue served as the central Jewish institution. All other agencies and organizations were its appendages or dependent upon it; communal policy was generally co-ordinated, since the same few men were usually the leaders in both the synagogue and its subsidiary

agencies. The synagogue, during the first period of American Jewish history, functioned in fact very much like a European *kehillah.*

It must be remembered, however, that the total American Jewish community before 1820 was very small, numbering altogether no more than five or six thousand persons; even the largest, such as New York or Philadelphia, had fewer than 1,000 residents.[7] Their needs could be satisfied through a single congregational government. By about 1825, however, the Jewish population had begun to increase somewhat more rapidly. During the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the number of Jews had risen from roughly 6,000 in 1825 to about 50,000 by 1850. The problems confronting communal institutions became more complex. A new form of organization was needed to cope with these new problems; I suggest that in the second period of American Jewish history an attempt was made to create such a new organizational pattern.

III

The new period began with the splintering of the monolithic synagogue. Thus, for example, Shearith Israel, which had reigned unchallenged as New York's single synagogue from approximately 1655 to 1825, found itself confronted with at least fourteen new synagogues during the next twenty-five years. Some of these new synagogues were themselves structured very much like Shearith Israel; at least eight of them were parent organizations for one or more burial and mutual-aid societies.[8] They performed the same services and represented the same ideal of communal unity which had characterized the single synagogue of the earlier period.

Over a period of time, a new configuration emerged. A number of similar synagogues, each autonomous, now competed with one another. The emergence of such parallel organizations formed a part of the Jewish response to the complex and diversified needs of the newer immigrants. A different religious style, for example, called forth a new synagogue, where the ritual practices, liturgy, governance, and membership reflected a European experience which distinguished its congregation from others within American Jewry. The extension of old, and the emergence of entirely new, areas of Jewish settlement in the same city formed yet another dimension of this changing community. Established institutions could not always adapt to rapidly emerging needs; economic, cultural, ethnic, and geographical distances isolated them from the new challenges. New institutions, synagogues and others, were called into being to satisfy the needs.

During this same period, a second development occurred which served further to underline the fractionalization of the earlier central synagogue structure. In fact, even as early as the middle of the eighteenth

century, there were Jews who chose not to be affiliated to a synagogue. Some wished to deny their Jewish origins; some had married out of the faith; others could not subscribe to a religious system—deism and secularism had their impact on Jews as well as on Christians. The proportion of unaffiliated Jews probably increased in the nineteenth century but no firm data exist. We may infer the extent of this phenomenon, however, from varying population estimates. Isaac Leeser, writing of New York's Jewish population in 1860, gave a total of only 18,000. He based his estimate on synagogue affiliation, as indicated by pew ownership records.[9] Other estimates, however, indicate that the Jewish population of New York City in 1860 may have been as high as 40,000.[10] One can account for the significant divergence of these and other reports only by assuming that a substantial part of the Jewish population remained outside the synagogue.

Unaffiliated Jews still required communal services, both religious and secular. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the trend towards atomization had been augmented by the creation of a new structure: the autonomous non-religious agency. This had not been an unknown phenomenon in western European Jewish experience, as Jews began to live under conditions of freedom unknown by their eastern European contemporaries. Links between the autonomous organizations and the central co-ordinating body, however, remained. Marcus describes the situation in eighteenth-century Curaçao: 'All the confraternities were subject to the control of the *mahamad* and functioned as agencies of the local Jewish community, but they were semi-autonomous nonetheless, and were allowed considerable leeway.'[11] Baron describes a similar situation in western Europe:[12]

> . . . the community of Rome in the seventeenth century had twenty charitable and educational associations which operated outside the formal community.
>
> The official communal organs fully supported these autonomous bodies and, in 1617, even provided that any citizen refusing to stand with a box and solicit donations in public should be punished by a fine. In Amsterdam, two centuries later, the will of the distinguished philanthropist, B. Cohen, included bequests for 210 charitable and educational associations, to which he had more or less regularly contributed before his demise.

Responding to the need for philanthropic, educational, and social services, these new organizations were variously structured as *lantsmanshaften*, fraternal or social clubs, educational and library associations, and so on. The first major evidence of that trend is usually associated with the founding in 1843 of the Independent Order of Bnai Brith. But one may reasonably assume that the Jewish social club founded in Newport, R.I., in 1761[13] was not unique and that during the early decades of the nineteenth century other such organizations were established in response to new needs in the Jewish community.

This second period of American Jewish history, during which functions previously associated with the central synagogue became the province of independent agencies, also reflects trends in the general American society. Deism and secularism, religious voluntarism and congregational autonomy, democracy and individualism, were characteristic of the American ideal even before the Revolutionary War. But most students of the American past agree that it was during the presidency of Andrew Jackson (1829–37) that these principles of democracy attained full expression. With the election of the rough Tennessee frontiersman and military hero, the body politic expressed not a rejection of Jefferson and Hamilton and their contemporaries, but rather the full extension into practice as well as principle of many of their democratic ideas. As Grimsted points out,[14] this period may be best understood by

> . . . seeing democracy less as a legal and technical system than as a psychological construct: Everyman's sense of his equality of right to participate and of his ability to decide. Democracy in this psychological sense reaffirms the importance of Jackson on the political scene: his lack of formal education, his intuitive strength, his belief that anyone had the ability to handle government jobs, his transformation of the presidency from that of guide for the people to a personalized representative of the Democracy, all helped create a sense of power justly residing in the hands of each man rather than in the state and a sense of need for democratic citizens to pursue the right comparatively free from mere procedural trammels and from deference to their social and intellectual betters.

America in the second quarter of the nineteenth century was committed to individual endeavour in a manner which transcended political theory. Jackson personified the self-reliant, independent, aggressive New World man who brooked no restraint from the systems and institutions of the previous age.

In the realm of economics, Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776) had signalled the dawn of the age of freedom and competition, ruled only by the operation of the market mechanism. Similarly, the Monroe Doctrine (1823) symbolized the eager expansion of the American nation, now come of age. In extreme form, the Age of Jackson also spawned a series of public riots, as well as the ultimate form of individualism, the nullification of federal law by individual states, which first threatened the corporate welfare in 1832.

That the Jewish communal structures which emerged under these circumstances took a competitive, aggressive, and often confusing form can hardly be a surprise. Jews, no less than non-Jews, were swept along with the currents of the day. Whereas during the earlier period new services which met new needs were incorporated into the central synagogue structure, during the second period they were typically offered through independent agencies. Co-ordinated planning was

lacking; and when it was attempted, it failed. Even as late as 1888, when fifteen Orthodox congregations in New York invited Rabbi Jacob Joseph to become their Chief Rabbi, they failed to reckon with the impact of American religious voluntarism and mid-nineteenth-century individualism. 'The congregations did not hold together, some of the other Orthodox leaders challenged the authority of the newcomer, and the levy on kosher meat, which was expected to finance the innovation, could not be raised; there was no power to enforce such a tax as there was in the communities of the Old World.'[15] As Karp points out in his article, 'New York Chooses a Chief Rabbi', the implantation of a European-style Chief Rabbinate into the utterly different soil of America was doomed in advance to frustration and failure.[16]

Although formal co-ordination failed in 1888, it was clear that it would succeed very soon. Once again, the motive force for change was immigration and the consequent demand for additional services; the direction the change was to take followed the dominant model available in American society.

During the middle decades of the nineteenth century, a wide variety of Jewish social welfare agencies had been created to deal with a rapidly changing demographic reality. Between 1840 and 1860, the Jewish population of America grew from 15,000 to 150,000, a tenfold increase. The organizational structure which was developed to cope with this challenge succeeded to such a degree that it was preserved as the nucleus of all subsequent Jewish social welfare systems. Each agency, operating autonomously, served the needs of one area of an individual's life—subsistence, employment, education and Americanization, health, recreation, and religion. Collectively and (to the extent that interlocking directorates allowed) in concert, these agencies provided the finest system of comprehensive social services yet developed in the course of human history.

IV

This system of independent social-service agencies lacked the kind of central co-ordination provided during the first period by the synagogue. The indispensability of co-ordination in communal activity soon became apparent when the mass of eastern European Jews arrived. The services these new immigrants required, while not essentially different from those needed by earlier generations of immigrants, were monumentally different both in quantity and complexity. The number of Jewish residents in America grew from approximately 250,000 in 1880 to about 2,500,000 by 1920; with this increasingly heterogeneous population there arose heightened intra-group tensions and misunderstandings.

One may consider the last third of the nineteenth century as a transitional period during which the nature and dimensions of the crisis were sensed, and some faltering attempts at response were made. As early as the mid-1860s, joint fund-raising campaigns were projected in New York and Philadelphia. Other hesitant experiments may have been undertaken, without leaving any documentary record. We may date the beginning of the third period of the American Jewish communal experience from 1895, when the first Jewish federation was founded in Boston. A year later, another federation was established in Cincinnati; and before long, the extension of federated activity testified to the usefulness of the innovation.

The choice of this model once again was consonant with structural changes in American society, for it was during these decades that corporate co-operative enterprise began to supplant individual competitive entrepreneurship. (One might also suggest that the growth of large unions and the development of defence agencies in the Jewish community follow something of the same pattern.) Jewish communal enterprise thus adapted for social service a form which was proving to be successful in the economic sphere. For Jews, however, the federated model had venerable antecedents; the European *kehillah* was itself a co-ordinating and governing agency for all Jewish agencies in a particular area. Its American replica did, however, manifest two fundamental differences. The coercive power of the European *kehillah* could not be transferred to the American context; furthermore, synagogues and some other activities remained outside the federation.

In Jewish communal endeavour, as in American commercial enterprise, the central task underwent a major redefinition during the first quarter of the twentieth century. No longer was it necessary to initiate new forms of social service; nearly all the types of assistance required had long been in existence and had attained a high degree of specialized competence.

The problem was now stated in terms of management goals. In 1900, at the first National Conference of Jewish Charities in Chicago, Morris Loeb, a noted American chemist and philanthropist, stated the problem succinctly:[17]

> . . . we must all recognize some of the evils that a multiplicity of organizations entails. The bad results which I believe arise from too great an individualization of charities are threefold: waste in money; misdirection of energy, and deterioration of the communal spirit . . .
>
> . . . In the mutual rivalry for members, institutions disregard each other's policies and tread upon each other's grounds; there is constant overlapping of work through lack of systematic co-operation, or because one institution refuses to surrender to another work which the second is better equipped to accomplish. At times, again, necessary but distasteful work is not being done because no existing society is willing to take up the

> burden. Useful societies languish for lack of proper support; useless ones are founded, and if a voice is raised in opposition by some charity worker best qualified to judge of the circumstances, he is accused of jealousy, of spite, of fearing competition . . .

The federation, as the corporation, was conceived as a vehicle for the more efficient use of the means of production—in the one case, production of goods and in the other, production of services. Capital was raised efficiently by a central campaign. Centralized social planning helped reduce or eliminate deleterious competition at the same time as it assisted the community in establishing the goals of service-production. Nevertheless, a measure of autonomy inhered in each constituent division or agency of the federation, allowing for healthy elements of fraternal rivalry, a clearer definition of task specialization, and a greater personalization in the rendering of services.

V

In 1908, New York City's Police Commissioner, Theodore A. Bingham, published an article alleging a high incidence of criminality among eastern European Jewish immigrants. Various groups in the Jewish community were outraged by this antisemitic slur. Capitalizing on this crisis of 'defence', Rabbi Judah L. Magnes and other leaders of that unique Jewish community sought to extend the federation concept by creating an equally unique organization, the Kehillah. By linking the oligarchic leadership of 'Uptown' with the mass of Jewish population in the Lower East Side 'Downtown', they promised to activate wide circles of the Jewish quarter, co-ordinate and expand its services, foster self-help, and absorb immigrants into the life of the community. Here was a civic contribution of the first magnitude. Moreover, the give-and-take of the democratic process was expected to lead to 'intelligent social action', to a high degree of 'enlightened self-discipline', to 'social efficiency'.[18]

The Kehillah lasted from 1909 to 1922, a major experiment in adapting European-style communal self-government to the American milieu. Its activities (centring upon philanthropy, Jewish education, social research, and crime-fighting) probably represented an over-extension of the fledgling organization's meagre resources, and this weakened the organization. Promises were implied which could not be kept, and disillusionment ensued. Democratic federationalism failed, however, because of very real centrifugal forces in the urban society. The Kehillah and its successor Jewish Community Councils lacked an enforcement mechanism which could sustain a democratic voluntaristic consultation under such circumstances. As Baron states,[19] 'Without such enforcement, cross-currents created by the multiple forces which have given all modern community life an aspect of impermanence

(rapidly changing neighborhoods, high individual mobility, impersonality of human relationships, absorption in economic struggle, competition of interest intensified by newspaper and radio stimuli, etc.) have naturally played havoc with communal control in the Jewish area.'

As the Kehillah faltered towards dissolution, a more typical federated organization, the New York Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, was created. The Federation represented an alliance of social-service agencies controlled by a small group of large donors. As such, it was a less visionary but more effective structure for coping with the realities of the American Jewish situation.

Whether the corporate model may be so totally applied to the Jewish communal federation or not, it remains in my view true that federations represented the characteristic Jewish adaptation to the commual situation in early twentieth-century America. That the federation proved to be highly functional in coping with the crisis of massive immigration is a matter of record. That it also formed an essential building block of American Jewry's response to the international Jewish relief crisis of the First World War and the subsequent years seems also true.

VI

Up to this point, the analysis of the third period of American Jewish history has been concerned with the corporate aspects of Jewish communal organization at the local level. Even as early as 1899, however, a second phase of federated activity had its beginnings; and it was at the national level. In that year, the National Federation of Jewish Charities was founded. Originally a clearing-house to deal with the problems created by the intra-city migration of poor Jews, it subsequently grew to be the forum for discussing all aspects of Jewish communal affairs. As such, it was renamed in 1900 the National Conference of Jewish Social Service.

Religious congregations preceded other groups in forming national co-ordinating bodies. In 1873, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations was established, to be followed by the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations in 1898, and by the United Synagogue of America in 1913. Shortly after the First World War, in 1926, the Synagogue Council of America was founded as a national co-ordinating agency and a forum for the discussion of common religious concerns. Although the S.C.A. was never granted the power needed to become a major force in the shaping of American Judaism, its creation symbolized a growing national Jewish consciousness.

On another level, the crisis of survival which threatened European Jewry during and after the First World War stimulated a further

development of national consciousness. With the creation of the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in 1914, American Jewry made its first major corporate response to an international emergency. Collective action was undertaken on an unprecedented scale to provide funds for the relief and rehabilitation of destitute Jews in central Europe and the Middle East.[20]

A number of common interests were drawing American Jews into a closer union. During those years, the variety of immigrant Jewish strains were being moulded into a common American Jewish style. But not all communal relationships were marked by amiability and understanding. Intra-group dissension was widespread; it formed the background against which every step towards co-operation was that much more difficult and the results more fragile.[21] The American Jewish Congress (a co-ordinating body formed for the duration of the First World War emergency) was dissolved in 1920, and shortly thereafter a variety of competing and mutually suspicious organizations reasserted themselves. Nevertheless, the trend towards federation at the local, and co-ordination at the national, levels was well-established and irreversible.

It required a second major cataclysm, this one closer to home, for the trend towards a national federation of social-service agencies to reach its logical culmination. As America entered the depths of the Depression, it became imperative that the few resources available be carefully husbanded and used with maximum efficiency. This required expertise in planning not frequently available at the local level. A powerful national co-ordinating and advisory body was needed and, in 1932, the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds was brought into being. Research, advice, recommendation, and ultimately direction began to issue from the New York office as the collective wisdom of many Jewish federations was pooled with national expertise.

Two problems confronted Jewish social-services agencies during this second phase of the third ('federated') period of American Jewish history. The first, of course, was the provision of relief to those hardest hit by the Depression. For this task, the Jewish agencies were remarkably well-prepared, since they had had long experience of dealing with their destitute and displaced brethren.

The second challenge emerged somewhat later, as conditions improved. The flow of immigrants had dried to a trickle by the early twenties; as the effects of the Depression abated, American Jewry and its organizational structure were securely middle-class. What would be the character of Jewish life in America for the next generation? What would replace the settlement house, the dole, the Americanization programme? What new directions in Jewish communal work would emerge, and what roles would the C.J.F.W.F. and the N.C.J.S.S. play?

The reader might note that these same challenges, on a much more extensive scale, also confronted the first and second administrations of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Local and state governments could no more cope with the crisis in general American life than could the local Jewish federation within the Jewish community. Strong national leadership and direction filled the vacuum in both spheres. This paper has consistently held that the organizational framework in the American Jewish community has tended, in response to its internal problems, to follow structural models dominant in the society at large. This inter-relationship was not always consciously developed; but Jewish business men and professionals generally found it reasonable to import into their communal leadership activities those processes, structures, and influences which they found to be effective in their own careers. That American Jews should have chosen to create a strong national organization in this era of emergent strong central government is exactly what could have been predicted.

Thus, the federated period of American Jewish history appears to resolve itself in two phases, one at the local level and one at the national. The local federation of Jewish agencies emerged as a response to massive immigration between the last decade of the nineteenth century and the mid-nineteen-twenties, taking as its combined model the traditional Jewish kehillah and American business corporation: The national federation of Jewish federations came into being when the Depression emergency and the need to create a new American life-style forced both government and private philanthropy to organize on a previously unknown scale.

VII

What, then, of the period since the Second World War and the founding of the State of Israel? These decades have been characterized by extensive American international involvements—the United Nations, foreign aid, and multi-national business conglomerates, to cite only a few—and the development of a corresponding overseas commitment and hegemony on the part of American Jewry. One would expect, if the paradigm expounded in this paper holds true, that a new international Jewish superstructure would have been created. It has been. It may be persuasively argued that the governance of the Jewish enterprise now rests on an axis between New York and Tel Aviv, and that its direction comes from a conglomerate composed chiefly of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds and the United Jewish Appeal. How this new period of international federationalism will appear to the communal historian of the future is still quite uncertain. All we can safely report at this time is that a new phase has begun and that its characteristics are pretty much those which could have been

predicted on the basis of the general pattern of development of Jewish communal agencies in America. Whether that pattern will persist, now that a new cultural variable (the Israeli) has been introduced, only the historian of the future will tell.

NOTES

[1] Jacob R. Marcus, 'The Periodization of American Jewish History', *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society*, Vol. XLVII, 1957–58, pp. 125–33.

[2] Ellis Rivkin, 'A Decisive Pattern in American Jewish History', *Essays in American Jewish History*, American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, 1958, pp. 23–61.

[3] The *hevrot* or societies for the performance of pious works included the *Hevra Bikkur Holim* or Sick Visiting Society, *Hevra Kaddisha* or Burial Society, and *Hevra Gemilut Hasadim* or Philanthropic Society. The *Heder* was a Jewish elementary school. For an exceptionally comprehensive treatment, see in Jacob Rader Marcus, *The Colonial American Jew: 1492–1776*, Detroit, 1970, such index entries as, e.g., 'Education', 'Hebrah', and 'Mahamad'.

[4] Arthur A. Goren in his book, *New York Jews and the Quest for Community: The Kehillah Experiment, 1908–1922*, New York and London, 1970, p. 3n., makes the following point: '. . . kehillah refers to the local community organization of European Jewry or, in a generic sense to the Jewish community in its East European context. Kahal . . . was used in Eastern Europe to designate the Jewish communal administration. By extension it frequently replaced kehillah in daily usage. For the sake of clarity, this term is here avoided.'

[5] W. Gunther Plaut, *The Rise of Reform Judaism*, World Union for Progressive Judaism, New York, 1963, pp. xix–xx.

[6] See for example Martin Marty, *Righteous Empire: The Protestant Experience in America*, New York, 1970.

[7] Hyman Grinstein, *The Rise of the Jewish Community of New York: 1654–1860*, Philadelphia, 1947, pp. 469–71.

[8] ibid., pp. 472–78 and 491–96.

[9] *Occident*, Vol. XVII, 1859–60, Philadelphia, p. 88.

[10] Grinstein, loc. cit., pp. 469–71 (see especially n. 14).

[11] Marcus, *The Colonial American Jew*, op cit., p. 197.

[12] Salo W. Baron, 'American Jewish Communal Pioneering', *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society*, Vol. XLIII, 1953–54, p. 140 and n. 8.

[13] Morris U. Schappes, *A Documentary History of the Jews in the United States, 1634–1875*, New York, 1971, pp. 35 ff.

[14] David Grimsted, 'Rioting in its Jacksonian Setting', *American Historical Review*, Vol. LXXVII, no. 2, April 1972, p. 367. For the classical treatment of Jackson, see Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The Age of Jackson*, Boston, 1945.

[15] Rufus Learsi, *The Jews in America: A History*, Cleveland and New York, 1954, pp. 208–09.

[16] Abraham J. Karp, 'New York Chooses a Chief Rabbi', *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society*, Vol. XLIV, 1954–55, pp. 182 ff.

[17] Morris Loeb, 'Federation or Consolidation of Jewish Charities', in

Robert Morris and Michael Freund, eds., *Trends and Issues in Jewish Social Welfare in the United States, 1899–1958*, Philadelphia, 1966, pp. 144–48.

[18] Goren, op. cit. p. 246.

[19] Salo W. Baron, *The Jewish Community: Its History and Structure to the American Revolution*, Philadephia, 1945, p. 26.

[20] Oscar Handlin, *A Continuing Task: The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 1914–1954*, New York, 1954.

[21] Robert Rockaway, 'Ethnic Conflict in an Urban Environment: The German and Russian Jew in Detroit, 1881–1914', *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, Vol. LX, no. 2, December 1970 ,pp. 133–50 and Ronald Howard Bayor, *Ethnic Conflict in New York City, 1929–1941*, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1970, especially pp. 122–97.

NATIVE JEWRY AND THE RELIGIOUS ANGLICIZATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN LONDON: 1870–1905

Stephen Sharot

THE immigration of eastern European Jews into London began to exceed the number of Dutch and German Jewish immigrants in the 1870s, rose rapidly in the 1880s, and remained at a high level until the Aliens Act of 1905.[1] The number of Jews in London increased from about 40,000 in 1880 to between 140,000 and 150,000 in 1902–03 and about 180,000 in 1914.[2] The native Jewish community did not welcome the sudden appearance of large numbers of foreign Jews,[3] but when it became clear that their efforts to discourage immigration had little impact they adopted a policy of absorbing the immigrants by anglicization.

The anglicizing efforts of native Jews included schemes to disperse the immigrants from the East End, supporting apprenticeship to draw Jews out of the 'Jewish' trades, English language evening classes, youth clubs, the Jews' Free School, and the provision of Talmud Torahs to replace the *hedarim* which were believed to perpetuate the immigrants' foreign culture.[4] This paper is concerned with anglicization within the context of synagogue organization and the provision of religious services, and this can only be understood against the background of the non-Jewish reaction to the mass immigration and the position of native Jewry in English society.[5]

Anti-alienism and Anglo-Jewry

The English public showed sympathy for the persecuted eastern European Jews in the early 1880s, but an anti-alien campaign began in the middle of that decade and culminated in the 1905 Aliens Act which stipulated that immigrants would be allowed into the country only if they showed evidence of religious or racial persecution.[6] From 1888 the campaign for alien restriction became a political issue and was

conducted in Parliament mainly, but not exclusively, by Conservatives and Unionists. In large measure the controversy over the aliens centred on the supposed deterioration of the East End of London. The major arguments of the restrictionists were concerned with employment and housing; they claimed that the immigrants competed unfairly with English labour, increased unemployment, lowered wages, were responsible for the sweating system, endangered social reforms, brought overcrowding, and caused the deterioration of the neighbourhood, forcing English working men to leave the area. Many of these accusations were false or exaggerated, but the extent of the agitation did vary with the size of the immigrant inflow, the level of unemployment, and the supply of housing.[7]

Many of the restrictionists emphasized the 'foreignness' of the aliens —their clannishness, lack of patriotism, insanitary habits, strange customs and diet, and inferior 'racial' characteristics.[8] A few predicted that violence would occur if restriction was not imposed; but, apart from isolated and sporadic incidents, mainly confined to window-breaking, the anti-alien movement was not accompanied by violence.[9] A significant section of public opinion, in both the middle and working classes, was against restriction. The anti-restrictionists disputed the arguments of the anti-aliens and emphasized the right of asylum and England's traditional hospitality towards religious refugees; and some Liberals even compared the immigrants favourably with the English working class, perceiving the immigrant as a symbol of Victorian social and economic morality.[10]

It is difficult to assess to what extent the anti-alien campaign was encouraged and supported by antisemitism, but it is clear that while anti-alienism was respectable, antisemitism was not. Although the anti-alienists tried to avoid the word 'Jew', everybody understood that the great majority of aliens were Jews and it is difficult to distinguish the more xenophobic anti-alien statements from antisemitism. For some sections of the English working class in the East End, particularly the costermongers and small traders who suffered from immigrant competition, anti-alienism and antisemitism were clearly synonymous.[11] Nevertheless, all the leading restrictionists, including those who made the vilest accusations against the aliens, denied that they or their supporters were antisemitic. Anti-restrictionists on the other hand attempted to discredit the anti-alien movement by accusing it of antisemitism,[12] and native Jews did not necessarily believe the restrictionists' protestations that they were innocent of racialism. In 1895 the *Jewish Chronicle* argued that 'practically the whole agitation against the Russian and Polish immigrant is the result of antipathy towards Jews, albeit racial rather than religious.'[13] In the early 1880s, even before the anti-alien movement, the *Jewish Chronicle* expressed the fear that non-Jews would regard all Jews as foreigners. The writer argued that non-Jews

directed their attention towards the eastern European Jews and took little notice of 'the occupant of a West End mansion or the habitué of a club, who, although he is a Jew, is like any other English gentleman'.[14] It was, therefore, a 'calamity [to] bring Poland to England', and there was a 'danger that Jews in East London will relapse into that state of separation which has done so much in the past to embitter the relations of Jews and their neighbours. English Jews have fortunately risen above both separation and its consequences.'[15]

The restrictionists were unanimous, however, in praising the virtues of the native Anglo-Jewry.[16] C. Russell, in his study of *The Jews of London*, published in 1900, found that English Jews were 'surprisingly popular' among Gentiles. 'They are pronounced to be good fellows, and "just like us Christians" ', but foreigners were 'cordially disliked'.[17] Hostile statements against the rich native Jews came not from the leading restrictionists but from a few socialists who mostly disclaimed antisemitism and did not extend their hostility towards the immigrants.[18] There was little evidence of discrimination against native Jews and it was clearly far less significant in England than in other European countries or the United States. Some discrimination in the form of social snobbery no doubt existed in the West End,[19] but it touched the middle-class native Jews rather than the Anglo-Jewish 'aristocracy'. Discrimination against Jews in the higher professions had declined, Jewish children were accepted by the major public schools, the Court circle of Edward VII included a number of prominent Jews, and, from the late 1860s, many rich Jews left the Liberal party and joined the Conservatives.[20] The social acceptance of the upper-class Jews was important since it was they who provided the leaders of the Anglo-Jewish community.

These leaders were divided in their attitude towards the immigrants and the policies they should pursue. A few demanded restriction. The majority were anti-restrictionists but tried to discourage immigration and persuade the arrivals to return to Russia or re-emigrate to America.[21] There was, however, general agreement that the immigrants who stayed should be anglicized. The *Jewish Chronicle* argued: 'As long as there is a section of Jews in England who proclaim themselves aliens by their mode of life, or by their very looks, by every word they utter, so long will the whole community be an object of distrust to Englishmen however unmerited that distrust may be.'[22]

Synagogue and hevra

A large proportion of native Jews in London were affiliated to the United Synagogue, a union of orthodox (but highly anglicized) middle-class congregations. The religious services in the United synagogues were sedate and decorous, and the congregations were served by ministers who had adopted the appearance and non-sacramental roles

of Christian clergymen.[23] In contrast, the more traditionalistic religious services in the immigrants' *hevrot* (religious societies) lacked decorum and were held in small rooms in private houses, shops, huts, back-yards, and attics.

Native Jews expressed alarm at the growth of the *hevrot* and the visibility of a 'foreign' Jewish culture. The *Jewish Chronicle* showed concern, in 1873, that the consecration of a *Sefer Torah* in the East End was attended by 'the undignified and highly objectionable accompaniment of a public procession of Jewish ceremonial through London streets on the Sabbath of millions of our fellow-countrymen'.[24] In a letter to the *Jewish Chronicle*, in 1876, a reader criticized the *hevrot* because he could 'conceive nothing more detrimental and obstructive than a foreigner voluntarily segregating himself and nursing his prejudices and retaining habits and customs wholly unsuited to his surroundings and his new home'.[25] The *Jewish Chronicle* disliked the 'small and unhealthy rooms' in which the immigrants prayed, and it declared: 'It is a decided disadvantage to have joined to the community a number of persons who affectionately cling to the worst traditions, social and religious, of imperfectly civilised countries.'[26]

Several readers called for the destruction of the *hevrot*,[27] but others argued, more realistically, that the immigrants should be anglicized within their own *hevrot*. In the 1870s several native Jews gave financial assistance to a number of immigrant *maggidim* (preachers) who shared common symbols and identities with the majority of immigrants but who were willing to act as transmitters of English culture. A 'Maggid Society' was formed to support H. Dainow, a Russian *maggid* who immigrated to England in 1875 and who attracted large congregations at an East London synagogue.[28] The *Jewish Chronicle* argued that the native Jews should remunerate the *maggid* because it was 'clearly our duty . . . to try to assimilate to us these immigrants as quickly as possible. Now, what better means offers itself for this purpose than to avail ourselves of the instrumentality of a man who possesses their confidence and the power to speak to their hearts, to rouse them and guide them in the right path.'[29] Dainow died in 1877, but his role was taken over by Kohn-Zedek who, the *Jewish Chronicle* asserted, was 'to the adult members of these *Hebras*, what the Free School is to their children'.[30] Thus, the *Jewish Chronicle*[31] believed that it was short-sighted to seek to destroy the *hevrot*, even if it was possible:

> [The members of the *hevrot* are] as a rule not suited to enter at once our communities. Marked differences in language, taste, association of ideas and modes of thinking keep them from us. They for a time occupy the position which the dissenters hold in the general population. The labourers and small tradesmen do not feel comfortable in the stately church side by side with the proud squire and opposite the sleek parson. They feel much more comfortable in their humble chapel with their equals under the spiritual

> guidance of one as humble as themselves who understands them and they him. Do not embitter the feelings of these dissenters. Let them but get on in life and come a little nearer the level of the well-to-do classes, let them but be raised a little in the scale of education so as to be able to understand the parson, and the chapel will be exchanged for the church . . . Just so with these members of the *Hebras*. They would feel strange in our synagogue. They must pass through a period of transformation. They must serve their apprenticeship to English feelings and English institutions. This service the *Hebras* perform for us. As soon as the transformation is accomplished, whether in their own person or in that of their children, they will either join the native community or their *Hebra* will have grown into a congregation and be fitted for taking part in Anglo-Jewish spiritual life, [and] will increase the number of constituents of the United Synagogue. . . .

This editorial was written in 1876, before the mass immigration. After 1881, it became less realistic to regard the *hevrot* as agencies of acculturation; they were clearly institutions for the preservation of the 'old world' culture.

Anglo-Jewish leaders believed that their religious institutions and ministers should contribute to the process of anglicization, lest many immigrants turn to revolutionary socialism or anarchism. It is possible that some shared the exaggerated view, propagated by restrictionists, of the immigrants as a dangerous revolutionary force. A minority of the immigrants were members of the radical, secular, and anti-religious Jewish movements which developed in eastern Europe, especially after 1881, but neither anarchism nor socialism was an important force in the East End ghetto. The Jewish socialists in England, unlike the English socialists, were revolutionaries, but the small scale of the major immigrant trades (garment and boot and shoe making) was not conducive to the growth of a socialist movement. The Jewish socialist movement in England declined in the 1890s, as did the independent Jewish trade unions after 1899,[32] but a number of Jewish socialists and anarchists continued to stage anti-religious activities. On the Day of Atonement in 1904, there were fights between orthodox Jews and Jewish socialists in the East End. The orthodox claimed that the socialists had provoked the fights by issuing posters announcing free meals on the fast day, by smoking in the streets, and by entering the synagogues smoking.[33] The activities of the socialists were also directed against the rich native Jews. In 1889 a 'synagogue parade' of three to four hundred Jewish 'sweaters' victims' marched through Whitechapel to the Great Synagogue on a Sabbath, but their entrance was barred by the police.[34] In 1894, in response to a manifesto issued by the Jewish Unemployed Committee, calling upon the unemployed Jews of the East End to take possession of the Great Synagogue, between five and six hundred Jews attended a Sabbath Evening Service and refused to leave the building after the service in protest against their 'starving condition'. Many were

persuaded to leave by the warden but others had to be forcibly ejected by the police.[35]

Only a minority of the immigrants supported the anti-religious activities of the socialists and anarchists, but the dangers of socialism among the immigrants was an important concern of Samuel Montagu, a rich native Jew who was the leader of the Federation of Synagogues.

The Federation of Synagogues

After a scheme for the amalgamation of the *hevrot* in London was proposed at a meeting in the Spital Square *Hevra* in February 1887,[36] Samuel Montagu entered into correspondence with the President of that *Hevra* and, at a conference of *hevrot* in October 1887, he proposed the formation of the 'Federation of Minor Synagogues'.[37] The formally stated objects of the Federation were: (1) to provide a minister or preacher who would devote his attention to the needs of the immigrants; (2) to provide burials at a moderate cost; and (3) to obtain representation on the Board of Deputies, the Board of Guardians, and the Board of Shechita. Montagu also stated that the objects of the Federation were to reduce antisemitism by dissociating the 'foreign' Jews from Socialists and Republicans and by dispersing the immigrants over a wider area.[38]

The Federation was an organization for immigrants in London who regarded the religious services in the native synagogues as insufficiently 'Jewish', but who nevertheless sought to orient themselves positively in some degree to the English, and, more specifically, Anglo-Jewish society. Yiddish was the first language of the majority of Federation members, but, under the Presidency of Samuel Montagu, the organization's meetings were held in English. The Federation supported and promoted the knowledge of English: one of the Russo-Jewish Committee's English classes was held in a Federation synagogue,[39] and the Federation persuaded the Machzike Hadath, a traditionalist religious organization, to change its policy from teaching only in Yiddish in its *Talmud Torah* to teaching half in Yiddish and half in English.[40] The Federation met the native Jews' criticisms of 'unhealthy and unsafe' *hevrot* by closing those buildings which its surveyor condemned.[41] As the members of the *hevrot* grew more prosperous they acquired larger and more 'respectable' buildings, and in a few cases they displayed some degree of religious acculturation. For example, the Sandy's Row Synagogue, which was one of the first minor synagogues to join the Federation, abolished the auction of *mitzvot* and replaced it by a fixed tariff in 1892;[42] and, in the same year, the Synagogue introduced children's choral services.[43]

Samuel Montagu was elected Liberal M.P. for Whitechapel in 1884, and made Lord Swaythling in 1907. Unlike the leaders of the United

Synagogue, Montagu had not been born into the Anglo-Jewish 'aristocracy'. He was the son of a small tradesman and was educated at the Mechanics Institute in Liverpool, which he left at the age of fourteen. But he had studied in the evenings, and at the age of seventeen was employed as a bank manager. He went on to found a number of banking firms and became a very rich man.[44] Montagu helped to found the New West End Synagogue, which was the richest constituent of the United Synagogue, and he was the warden of that Synagogue for many years; but, as a member of the *nouveaux riches*, he could not attain the Presidency of the United Synagogue, which at that time was the prerogative of the Rothschilds. Like other rich native Jews, Montagu wished to prevent a total division between the Anglo-Jewish and immigrant Jewish communities; and, unlike those born into the Anglo-Jewish 'aristocracy', his lower-middle-class background and religious orthodoxy made him an acceptable leader of an immigrant religious organization. Montagu provided the immigrants with an example of a man who was both anglicized and orthodox; he acted as a spokesman for the immigrants, and at Federation meetings criticized the non-observance, religious looseness, and assimilation of the native Jews.[45]

Montagu reserved graves for himself and his wife in the Federation cemetery to show that there was no distinction in the organization between the rich and the poor,[46] but he made it quite clear that one important object of the Federation was to counteract the influence of socialism, which he correlated with atheism. He described the march of the Jewish 'sweaters' victims' in 1889 as 'scandalous and disgraceful'. He said[47]:

> One of the principal objects of the Federation was to endeavour to raise the social condition of the Jews in East London and to prevent anything like anarchy and socialism . . . The blessings of the Patriarchs that they would increase their cattle and amass wealth, and the prophecy that the poor would never cease out of the land, were in themselves evidence that Judaism did not recognise anything like social equality amongst all classes of people.

After the Jewish Tailors' strike in 1889, Montagu wrote: 'My experience gained during the recent strike convinces me that the influence of a few Atheists over the Jewish working class can no longer be ignored.' In order to counteract the influence of the 'atheists', he said that he would pay the salary of a *Maggid* to visit the East End Jews and preach in Federation synagogues.[48]

Montagu saw the Federation as contributing to the maintenance of the prevailing class structure and, since he provided loans to the Federation synagogues and funds for its central organization, he was able to govern it on autocratic lines. Federation Board meetings were postponed if Montagu was ill, and the Board members were merely spectators at the governing of the organization. In a letter to the Board

in 1909, Montagu wrote: '. . . it is my intention to select a Chief Minister of the Federation' and he placed £5,000 in the hands of trustees to provide for the Chief Minister's salary for ten years.[49] A member of the Federation Board declared that the members of the Federation did not want a Chief Minister, but there was only 'subterranean grumbling' since their deference to Montagu prevented them from protesting.[50]

Montagu tried to bring the Federation into the established Anglo-Jewish community and he proposed, at the first meeting of the Federation, that he should be elected Vice-President and that Lord Rothschild, the President of the United Synagogue, should be appointed President of the Federation.[51] The arrangement did not, however, turn out very satisfactorily. At the second meeting of the Federation Board, Lord Rothschild addressed the representatives as follows[52]:

> . . . in coming to England, unacquainted as you are with its laws, some of you may at first be led astray by the desire to keep up strictly the customs, I will not say the religious practices, of distant countries which might clash with the laws of the land. . . . If you elect a *Dayan* (rather than a minister), who may be a foreigner, he might at some time or other be engaged in a contest with the civil authorities . . . I warn you of this danger.

Describing the Federation meeting at the United Synagogue Council, Rothschild said[53] that he had

> found a large number of gentlemen who had no idea what they had assembled for, or what purpose the Federation was intended to serve . . . In order to calm them he stated . . . that the United Synagogue did not in any way desire or intend to impose its authority on them . . . He would always strenuously oppose the appointment of a *Dayan*, who according to the views of their foreign brethren was a judge, competent to grant divorces and who would keep the Jews apart from Christians . . .

At a meeting of the United Synagogue Council, in which Montagu proposed that the United Synagogue should approve the representation of the Federation on the Board of Shechita, Montagu protested at a ruling made by Lord Rothschild. Rothschild said that he could not allow anyone to protest against his ruling, and he asked Montagu to withdraw his protest. Montagu made a further protest, which Rothschild called upon him to withdraw. Montagu said finally: 'I will withdraw from the meeting and will never again co-operate with your Lordship on any Committee.'[54] Rothschild was not re-elected as President of the Federation: he was made Honorary President and Montagu was elected acting President.[55]

In a letter to the Federation in 1888, Lord Rothschild wrote that 'the Executive of the United Synagogue . . . is most favourably disposed towards the Federation',[56] but the United Synagogue's attitude soon

changed when the Federation started to affiliate synagogues outside the East End. When the New Dalston Synagogue joined the Federation, Montagu said that its example should be followed by all other 'isolated minor synagogues in the community'. The United Synagogue Executive stated that Montagu's advice was 'in a direction very hostile to the interests of the United Synagogue', and it would not help an organization 'whose policy must inevitably tend to disunion and disintegration'.[57] Lord Rothschild said that by the omission of the word 'Minor' from the title 'The Federation of Minor Synagogues', the Federation had become a rival and hostile institution to the United Synagogue.[58] Montagu hoped that the presence of Lord Rothschild at the consecration of a Federation synagogue in the East End in 1892 was the beginning of co-operation between the two organizations,[59] but when Rothschild refused to open a Federation synagogue in Notting Hill in 1900, Montagu said that it was because the United Synagogue believed the Federation was trespassing in the West End.[60] In 1910 Montagu proposed an alliance between the two organizations, but his scheme was rejected by the United Synagogue.[61]

The United Synagogue

The United Synagogue had its own anglicizing policies. Its leaders emphasized that their ministers should do charitable work among the poor in the East End, and in order that the Chief Rabbi might raise the immigrants' 'moral and social status' they made the maintenance of a residence in the East End a condition of holding the Chief Rabbinate office.[62] Most of the immigrants responded unfavourably to the 'non-Jewish' appearance and behaviour of the native ministers and Chief Rabbi. The religious immigrants referred to Hermann Adler, the Chief Rabbi, as the 'Chief Reformer', and the socialists saw him as a representative of the 'exploiting class'. In 1892, Adler received a delegation from the Jewish Unemployed Committee who proposed to organize a barefoot march of the Jewish unemployed in London. The spokesman for the Committee asked the Chief Rabbi to use his influence on Jewish employers to obtain a reduction in the hours of work to eight or ten a day. Many of the unemployed were 'practically starving' but they wanted work, not charity. The spokesman asked the Chief Rabbi to allow members of the deputation to preach labour sermons in the synagogues since 'the law of Moses itself was Socialistic'. The Chief Rabbi replied: 'I also have to toil from morning till night and far into the night, and I probably work harder than any of you . . . But just because we feel so keenly for your misfortune, we deem it our duty to dissuade you as strongly and emphatically as we possibly can from your projected barefooted march.' He pointed out to the deputation that they were not worse off than their 'Christian fellow working-men', and

concluded: 'It is also not true that the rich are lacking in sympathy for the poor. This assertion is contradicted by the splendid charitable institutions that exist in our community . . . You have spoken harshly of certain employers of labour. This is unjust and unwise . . . Let me earnestly warn you not to indulge in threats against the existing state of society.'[63] The proposed march was abandoned,[64] but the Jewish Unemployed Committee declared in a manifesto that the Chief Rabbi had 'proved that he cares nothing for the Jewish unemployed'.[65] In a sermon to the New West End Congregation in 1894, the Chief Rabbi advocated 'an institution, akin to Toynbee Hall, where the indwellers of the East and the West would meet together, and where our working class would be taught correct conceptions about the relations of Labour and Capital, of employers and toilers'.[66]

The United Synagogue financed 'free services for the poor', which were intended to discourage the immigrants from attending the *hevrot* and to familiarize them with a more decorous form of service. High Holy Day services were held for the poor in a number of halls[67] and 'Saturday Afternoon Services for Working Men and Women' were started at the Great Synagogue in 1889.[68] The services were well attended when addresses were given in Yiddish but they were very poorly attended when they were in English.[69] The Warden of the Great Synagogue regretted the continuation of the services because the Synagogue was 'partially empty' when English addresses were delivered, but crowded when the '*maggidim* discoursed in a jargon which ought never to have been admitted'.[70]

The United Synagogue held more anglicized services for the younger immigrants and the second generation in the East End. In 1891 the 'Committee of Visitors among the Jewish Poor' asked the United Synagogue to institute services for the young women in the East End. The Committee reported that the young women rarely, if ever, attended synagogue, and it asked that the service be 'arranged and conducted as to interest and attract the masses'.[71] More than two hundred young women attended the first service. The *Jewish Chronicle* reported that in 'appearance and behaviour [they] suffered nothing by comparison with a similar gathering of their English sisters'. The service lasted about an hour and it was almost entirely in English. The Chief Rabbi sanctioned the service and he wrote a special English prayer for it, but the service was held in a hall because the Chief Rabbi would not allow it to be held in an orthodox synagogue.[72] The United Synagogue also held High Holy Day services for children at various day schools.[73]

The most ambitious plan of the United Synagogue to anglicize the immigrants was the 'East End Scheme'. In 1885 the President of the United Synagogue proposed that a committee be appointed to inquire into the East End. He argued that 'unless the powerful leverage of the Council of the United Synagogue can be brought to bear, it is to be

feared that the immigrants will remain "foreigners" in our midst. Our desire should be to find out a mode of civilizing them.'[74] The committee reported that they had found no 'spiritual destitution' in the East End but there was a social ghetto 'within which he [the immigrant] has but little opportunity to shake off the habits which have accompanied him from his home'. The committee recommended that 'steps must be taken to cause the foreign poor . . . to imbibe notions proper to civilized life in this country'.[75]

The Executive of the United Synagogue reported, in 1890, that the migration of the richer Jews from East London had widened the gulf between the rich and the poor, and it proposed 'to improve the religious, moral and social status of the poorer classes' by establishing a provident society and a large synagogue of a thousand seats which would take the place of 'the many unsuitable and unsanitary places where they now resort for Divine worship'. Since the qualifications of the ministers of native congregations did not 'render them specially acceptable to or influential with the number of foreign Jews in the East of London', the committee proposed the appointment of a chief official, combining the offices of *dayan* and minister, who would elevate the immigrants' 'social condition by inculcating lessons of morality, health and cleanliness'. The committee considered that 'the main problem' was 'to attract the Jews of all classes in the East of London, whether foreign or native, within the fold of the body politic' and to afford foreign Jews 'that share in the government and administration of the great Communal establishments which attachment to the Community should properly confer, and which it is believed the poorer Jews desired and would appreciate'.[76] Benjamin L. Cohen, a vice-president of the United Synagogue, wrote that a large synagogue was needed in the East End in order that 'the better class might . . . gradually refine the lower class. The lower class would not contaminate the upper . . . By conducting the services . . . with a due regard for the wishes of the majority, we may slowly and steadily inoculate these persons with ideas of reverent and orderly Divine worship.'[77]

In a letter to the United Synagogue, Samuel Montagu wrote that no further synagogue accommodation was required in the East End for there were vacant seats in the Federation synagogues, and the United Synagogue's services at the Jews' Free School attracted only about a hundred worshippers on ordinary Sabbaths.[78] The implementation of the scheme was postponed; but two years later, in 1891, a meeting was held to reconsider it. One United Synagogue leader argued: 'the class of people we propose to benefit are only accessible through religion. The *Shool* is the centre of their religious and their social life, and they can only be approached through the *Shool* . . . The habits of the foreign Jews in the East End, if not a menace, give rise to serious reflections on the community as a whole. Our motives are not wholly philanthropic;

our own personal interests are involved, for we will have to take care of ourselves in looking after them.'[79]

The United Synagogue found that there was little enthusiasm for the scheme and it was temporarily abandoned. It was reintroduced in a modified form in 1893, when it was proposed to build a new large Hambro Synagogue in Spitalfields. The proposed Synagogue was to be situated near a number of Federation synagogues, and Montagu strongly opposed the scheme on the grounds that it would retard the migration of Jews from the East End and consequently increase antisemitism.[80] The scheme was abandoned again,[81] but it was reintroduced in a modified form in the following year. A United Synagogue committee reported that the aim was to avoid a split between the 'two communities', and it recommended that a large synagogue be built in Commercial Road. A minority report was submitted by Samuel Montagu who pointed out that immigrants had established *hevrot* near the New West End and Central synagogues, and if the United Synagogue had not attracted the immigrants who had moved to the West End, it was unlikely to attract those in the East End. The majority report was adopted by the Council,[82] and by a special meeting of the United Synagogue seatholders,[83] but Samuel Montagu continued effectively to oppose the scheme.[84]

Another East End scheme was submitted by the Honorary Officers to the Council of the United Synagogue in January 1896. A site had been purchased on which it was proposed to erect a *Beth Din*, a *Beth Hamidrash*, a Communal Hall, and a Synagogue with a thousand seats for men and four hundred seats for women. The Honorary Officers stated that 'in the last few years the Jewish question in East London has become more and more acute. The repeated complaints of County Court Judges and of Magistrates (whether well-founded or not) should be taken as a serious warning to those who have at heart the well-being and good name of the community.' Endorsing the Honorary Officers' report, the Executive Committee wrote: 'within the pale of the social Ghetto there is no anglicising influence operating to reclaim him [the immigrant] . . . It is the object of the East End scheme to supply this influence.'[85] B. L. Cohen, who proposed the adoption of the scheme to the Council, criticized the Federation which, he maintained, had 'tended to cleavage and disunion . . . [and] retarded the Anglicising influence which I ardently desire to see'. Noah Davis, an overseer of the poor, said: 'it is admitted on all sides that their [the immigrants'] condition is such that what today is a menace to the good name of the community may tomorrow, if nothing is done, become a pressing danger . . . Personally, it does not matter to me whether the people in the East End go to *Shool* or not . . . The synagogue is a means to an end [anglicization].'[86]

The Council adopted the scheme, but, after the Honorary Officers

had negotiated with Samuel Montagu, it was modified and presented again. The Honorary Officers had agreed to erect a smaller synagogue, and in return Montagu guaranteed that the opposition to the scheme would cease.[87] Proposing it to the Council, Lord Rothschild made it clear that he would have preferred a larger synagogue. The scheme was yet again deferred.[88]

The final East End scheme, presented in 1898, did not include a plan for a large synagogue. Instead, the committee proposed to erect a large building which was to be used by the United Synagogue for High Holy Day services, but which would be available for the rest of the year for non-religious activities. The building would accommodate judicial boards of arbitration, a provident society, a thrift society, a central visiting committee, mothers' meetings, classes and lectures in English and technical subjects, and clubs for adults and children. The committee report proposed that the members of the 'Lads' Club' should be urged to join a 'Brigade', similar to the 'Church Lads' Brigade', in which they would be taught 'habits of obedience, discipline, tidiness and self-respect'.[89] The proposer of the scheme to the Council said: 'It has been found that charity alone could not bridge over the great chasm between East and West . . . The object could best be attained by the establishment in East London of centres of activity similar to those that had been formed by other denominations, such as Oxford House, Toynbee Hall, Cambridge House, and Cheltenham House.' One of the Council members criticized the scheme and said that the methods of other denominations were inappropriate for the Jews because, 'whereas the majority of Gentile families visited in the East End were utterly devoid of religious aspirations and feelings, the position was reversed as regards Jews. The Jewish visitor was often wanting in that religious feeling, which would appeal to the poor Jew.'[90] The Council adopted the scheme,[91] but it was later abandoned because of the lack of interest of the committee members who had been chosen to implement its provisions.[92] This was the last of the East End schemes; but part of it was implemented in 1905 when the Jewish Institute (later Adler House) was opened in Whitechapel.[93]

The shelving of the East End schemes, despite the support of Lord Rothschild and other United Synagogue leaders, was due to the apathy of the majority of the native community and the opposition of Montagu and the immigrants. The level of public support which was required before the United Synagogue would commit a large capital outlay was not forthcoming.[94] The predominantly middle-class membership of the United Synagogue wished to see the anglicization of the immigrants, but their social status in the general community was less secure than that of the upper-class United Synagogue leaders; and some may have felt that the incorporation of large numbers of immigrants would jeopardize the high status and anglicized image of the United Synagogue.

The leaders of the United Synagogue said that it was in the interests of Montagu, as President of the Federation, to oppose the erection of a large synagogue, but Montagu was probably correct when he argued that a large synagogue in the East End would not induce the immigrants to desert the *hevrot*. The *hevrot* performed important functions: they were cultural nuclei for the preservation of the 'Old World' culture, and social centres, integrating the immigrants in familiar groups of regional origin and social background. Native Jews tended to perceive the newcomers as a homogeneous mass, but there were important social divisions within the immigrant community. The President of a small immigrant synagogue wrote that the *hevrot* could be divided into 'upper class' and 'lower class' and that members from the better *hevrot* would avoid a large East End synagogue because it would mean mixing with those beneath them.[95] Thus, although many immigrants in the East End were willing to accommodate to their new environment by joining the Federation, it is unlikely that many would have accepted the more extensive anglicization proposed by the United Synagogue.

Conclusion

The leaders of the United Synagogue wished to protect the social position of the Jewish community by transforming the 'foreign' Jew into an 'English' Jew. Their policy was influenced both by the general middle-class and upper-class attitudes on the 'proper' relationships between the classes and by the policies of the Church of England and Nonconformists in urban working-class areas. The object of both the Christian Settlements and the Jewish East End schemes was to 'civilize' the urban poor, but unlike the middle-class Christian workers in the East End, whose major aim was evangelization, the major aim of the United Synagogue was anglicization. The Church of England and Nonconformist 'special services for the poor' were the means of 'bringing religion' to the 'pagan poor';[96] the United Synagogue's 'special services for the poor' and the proposed large synagogue in the East End were intended to introduce to the religious but unacculturated immigrants anglicized and decorous services.

NOTES

Abbreviations: *J. C. Jewish Chronicle*
M.B. Minute Books of the United Synagogue

[1] Lloyd P. Gartner, *The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870–1914*, London, 1960, pp. 38–49. The number of Jewish immigrants rose rapidly after 1910, and by 1914 the yearly number had risen to the pre-1905 figure. The peaks of immigration were in 1881–82, 1891–92, 1896, and 1903–04: V. D. Lipman, *Social History of the Jews in England: 1850–1950*, London, 1954, p. 86.

[2] ibid., pp. 89–90.

[3] Gartner, op. cit., pp. 49–56.

[4] ibid., pp. 149, 174–75, 221–25, 231–40.

[5] I attempt to account for the different reactions of native Jewish communities in western Europe and America to eastern European immigrants in my *Sociology of Modern Judaism*, forthcoming.

[6] For detailed histories of the campaign and the events leading up to the Aliens Act, see Bernard Gainer, *The Alien Invasion: The Origins of the Aliens Act of 1905*, London, 1972, and John A. Garrard, *The English and Immigration, A Comparative Study of the Jewish Influx 1880–1910*, London, 1971.

[7] Gainer, op. cit., chs. 1, 2; Garrard, op. cit., ch. 9; Gareth Stedman Jones, *Outcast London*, Oxford, 1971, pp. 153, 215–30, 281–82.

[8] Gainer, op. cit., pp. 46–55; Garrard, op. cit., pp. 51–65.

[9] The most serious violent incidents against Jews in Britain before the First World War occurred in several small towns in the Monmouth valley, South Wales, in 1911. No one was bodily harmed, but Jewish stores were looted and there was some destruction of property: Geoffrey Alderman, 'The Anti-Jewish Riots of August 1911 in South Wales', *The Welsh History Review*, Vol. 6, no. 2, 1972, pp. 190–200. In 1904–05, the Jewish community of Limerick was driven out by an economic boycott following antisemitic sermons by the parish priest: Louis Hyman, *The Jews of Ireland from Earliest Times to the Year 1910*, London, 1972, pp. 210–17.

[10] Garrard, op. cit., pp. 67–69, 85–102; Gainer, op. cit., ch. 7. In administering the act, the Liberals largely nullified it: Garrard, op. cit., pp. 101–111.

[11] Gainer, op. cit., pp. 31–35. Garrard writes: 'The overt anti-Semite was a rare being, even in the East End'; op. cit., p. 79.

[12] ibid., p. 87.

[13] *J.C.*, 22 Nov. 1895. Quoted by I. Finestein, 'Jewish Immigration in British Party Politics', in A. Newman, ed., *Migration and Settlement*, London, 1971, p. 128.

[14] *J.C.*, 12 Dec. 1884.

[15] *J.C.*, 12 Aug. 1881. Quoted in Stanley Kaplan, 'The Anglicization of the East European Jewish Immigrant as seen by the London Jewish Chronicle: 1870–97', *Yivo Annual of Jewish Social Science*, X, 1955, pp. 267–78.

[16] Garrard, op. cit., pp. 55–67; Gainer, op. cit., pp. 118–25, 260–61. Arnold White, described by Gainer as the only prominent restrictionist who 'was a self-confessed and unrepentant anti-semite' (p. 121), denied that he wished to attack the Jews as a race and praised the 'beneficial, discriminating and munificent' influence of native Jewry (p. 125). He also said that 'some of his closest friends were Jews' (quoted in Garrard, op. cit., p. 65). The British Brothers League, whose membership was mainly drawn from the Gentile working class in the East End, did at one time claim that the rich Jews helped the immigrants to take over the property of Englishmen (L. J. Greenberg, 'Alien Immigration', *Jewish Year Book*, 1902–03) but even they praised the virtues of Anglo-Jewry (Gainer, op. cit., p. 261).

[17] C. Russell and H. S. Lewis, *The Jew in London, A Study of Racial Character and Present-day Conditions*, London, 1900, p. 25.

[18] Garrard, op. cit., pp. 192–93. There was also some antisemitism among

a few Catholic intellectuals, such as Hilaire Belloc and G. K. Chesterton who perceived the Jew as a symbol of materialism.

[19] There is little direct evidence of social snobbery against middle-class Jews but the Anglo-Jewish novels of the period indicate that it was present in a mild form. For an analysis of the native Jews' social situation see my 'Religious Change in Native Orthodoxy in London, 1870–1914: The Synagogue Service', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XV, no. 1, June 1973.

[20] The honorary officers of the United Synagogue included a number of notable Conservative political figures. Israel Finestein, 'The Lay Leadership of the United Synagogue since 1870', in Salmond S. Levin, ed., *A Century of Anglo-Jewish Life 1870–1970*, London, 1973, pp. 34, 41.

[21] Gainer, op. cit., pp. 55–56; Gartner, op. cit., pp. 49–56.

[22] *J.C.*, 7 Aug. 1891; quoted by Finestein, 'Jewish Immigration. . . .', op cit., p. 134.

[23] See my 'Religious Change . . ', op. cit., and 'Religious Change in Native Orthodoxy in London, 1870–1914: Rabbinate and Clergy', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XV, no. 2, December 1973.

[24] *J.C.*, 19 Sept. 1873.

[25] *J.C.*, 28 July 1876.

[26] *J.C.*, 21 Nov. 1884.

[27] A provincial Anglo-Jewish minister wrote: 'The sooner the *Hebra* movement is crushed out of existence the sooner we will remove from our midst the only draw-back to the advancement of Jews in this country.' Quoted in Gartner, op. cit., p. 201.

[28] *J.C.*, 7 July and 29 Sept. 1876.

[29] *J.C.*, 4 Aug. 1876.

[30] *J.C.*, 16 Nov. 1877.

[31] *J.C.*, 24 Nov. 1876.

[32] Gartner, op. cit., ch. 4.

[33] *J.C.*, 23 Sept. 1904.

[34] *J.C.*, 22 March 1889.

[35] *J.C.*, 2 Feb. 1894.

[36] *J.C.*, 4 Feb. 1887.

[37] The word 'Minor' was omitted from the name of the organization in 1889: *J.C.*, 22 Feb. and 14 June 1889.

[38] *J.C.*, 21 Oct. and 11 Nov. 1887.

[39] Joseph E. Blank, *The Minutes of the Federation of Synagogues*, London, 1912, pp. 38–39.

[40] *J.C.*, 16 March 1906.

[41] *J.C.*, 9 Sept. 1892.

[42] *J.C.*, 16 Sept. 1892.

[43] *J.C.*, 21 Oct. 1892.

[44] Lily Montagu, *Samuel Montagu*, London (private circulation), 1913.

[45] *J.C.*, 28 Nov. 1888; 12 May 1905.

[46] *J.C.*, 21 June 1889.

[47] *J.C.*, 22 March 1889. Montagu sponsored conservative trade unions and arbitrated in labour disputes. He was one of two particular targets of the Jewish socialists' anti-religious propaganda. The other was Hermann Adler, the Chief Rabbi: Gartner, op. cit., pp. 114–15.

[48] *J.C.*, 15 Nov. 1889.

[49] The proposed Chief Minister's salary was far higher than the salaries of the *rabbanim, hazanim,* and *maggidim* employed by the Federation synagogues, which varied between ten and forty shillings a week: *J.C.*, 10 Sept. 1909.

[50] *J.C.*, 6 Aug. 1909.

[51] *J.C.*, 11 Nov. and 9 Dec. 1887.

[52] *J.C.*, 20 Jan. 1888.

[53] *J.C.*, 6 July 1888.

[54] *J.C.*, 7 Dec. 1888. The United Synagogue did not oppose the representation of the Federation on the Board of Deputies and Board of Guardians, but they denied it a share in the administration and income of the Board of Shechita.

[55] *J.C.*, 14 Dec. 1888; 25 Jan. 1889.

[56] Blank, op. cit., p. 17; letter dated 21 Feb. 1888.

[57] *M.B.*, 7 Feb. and 3 July 1888; Executive Report: 11 June 1889. The executive reported that Montagu had said that the example of the New Dalston Synagogue should be followed by other 'isolated *orthodox* synagogues in the community' rather than 'isolated *minor* synagogues', as reported in the *J.C.*, 14 June 1889.

[58] *J.C.*, 22 Feb. and 14 June 1889.

[59] *J.C.*, 27 May 1892.

[60] *J.C.*, 20 July 1900.

[61] *J.C.*, 11 Nov. 1910.

[62] United Synagogue Executive Committee Report, 1891.

[63] *J.C.*, 18 Nov. 1892.

[64] *J.C.*, 25 Nov. 1892.

[65] *J.C.*, 23 Dec. 1892.

[66] *J.C.*, 2 Feb. 1894.

[67] *J.C.*, 15 Oct. 1876. By 1910, the United Synagogue was providing free Holy Day services in four buildings.

[68] In 1891 the Secretary of the Jewish Working Men's Club reported that the services for the poor had been successful with regard to attendance, decorum, and the discouragement of the *hevrot*: *M.B.*, 27 Oct. 1891.

[69] *M.B.*, 7 Nov. 1911. In 1910 the average attendance at the six services with a Yiddish address was 300, but the average attendance at the twenty 'Special English Services', which were intended to attract the young, was 66.

[70] *J.C.*, 17 May 1901. Services with addresses in Yiddish were also held at the East London Synagogue from 1905, but attendances were very low, averaging between 100 and 150 persons. *M.B.*, 14 Nov. 1905; 15 Nov. 1910; 7 Nov. 1911.

[71] *M.B.*, 27 Oct. 1891.

[72] *J.C.*, 30 Oct. and 13 Nov. 1891. The content of the service was as follows: *Adon Olam*, selections from the Prayer Book in English, *Shema* in Hebrew, a psalm sung in English, a sermon, an English prayer, and a benediction. According to Lord Rothschild, 'Hebrew services had little charm for English-born Jewesses in the East End'.

[73] *M.B.*, 6 Nov. 1900; 14 Nov, 1905; 3 Nov. 1908; 15 Nov. 1910; 7 Nov. 1911.

[74] *J.C.*, 9 Jan. 1885.
[75] *M.B.*, 3 March 1885.
[76] *M.B.*, 18 Feb. 1890. The report is quoted extensively in Aubrey Newman, 'Growth and Change', in *A Century of Anglo-Jewish Life 1870–1970*, op. cit., pp. 115–27.
[77] Letter to *J.C.*, 19 Oct. 1888.
[78] *J.C.*, 17 Jan. 1890.
[79] *J.C.*, 8 May 1891. Quoted in Newman, op. cit., p. 121.
[80] *J.C.*, 5 May 1893.
[81] *J.C.*, 9 June 1893.
[82] *M.B.*, 3 April 1894. Letters were received from the Hambro, New, North London, and New West End synagogues opposing the scheme: *M.B.*, 1 May 1894. Two meetings were held in the East End, one supporting and the other opposing the scheme. Montagu chaired the opposition meeting: *J.C.*, 29 June and 6 July 1894.
[83] *J.C.*, 6 and 13 July 1894. 540 members attended the meeting.
[84] In a letter to the United Synagogue, Montagu charged that the procedure at the members' meeting was unfair and had been calculated to achieve a positive vote: *M.B.*, 4 Dec. 1894.
[85] *M.B.*, 22 Jan. 1896.
[86] *J.C.*, 24 Jan. 1896.
[87] *M.B.*, 12 May 1896.
[88] *J.C.*, 15 May 1896.
[89] *M.B.*, 10 Nov. 1898.
[90] *J.C.*, 18 Nov. 1898.
[91] *J.C.*, 10 Feb. 1899.
[92] *J.C.*, 21 April 1899.
[92] *J.C.*, 21 April 1899.
[93] Gartner, op. cit., pp. 268–69.
[94] This was made clear at the meeting in 1891. Lord Rothschild said that he could not conceal from himself 'that there is little or no enthusiasm for the present scheme . . . No scheme of this kind can be successful if it does not meet with the moral and financial support of the whole Jewish community'.
[95] *J.C.*, 28 Sept. 1888.
[96] K. S. Inglis, *The Churches and the Working Classes in Victorian England*, London, 1963, especially pp. 5–23, 28–30, 57–61, 91–95, 143–74, 333–36.

THE MELBOURNE JEWISH COMMUNITY AND THE MIDDLE EAST WAR OF 1973

Ronald Taft and Geulah Solomon

IN 1967 this Journal published a paper on the impact of the Middle East crisis on Jews in Melbourne; it was based on a social survey of householders conducted just after the end of the Six-Day War.[1] It reported that there was a widespread, almost universal, deep personal involvement in the crisis which reached a very intense level in the case of almost one half of the respondents. Even more significantly, with few exceptions the householders expressed the opinion that the 1967 war and the victory had had an effect on them that would be long-lasting. There was clear evidence that many of them experienced an increase in their positive attachment to Israel and to their Jewish identity.

When the 'Yom Kippur War' broke out it was night in Melbourne and most of the community learned about it on the following day, a Sunday. The authors realized that this unexpected event could provide a useful opportunity to investigate further the attitudes of Melbourne Jews and the stability of those attitudes over time; but the investigation was not begun until after the cease-fire of 24 October, mainly because it seemed that any earlier inquiry would have been too much affected by day-to-day variations in the situation. It may, however, be of significance to a consideration of the scientific status of operational research that we were most reluctant while the war was in progress to attempt to involve a team of Jewish interviewers and respondents in an activity aimed at making a detached scrutiny of their own agonized reaction. We later learned that no such reluctance inhibited public opinion investigators in Israel who carried out vital surveys of attitudes and morale from the second day of the war.

The Melbourne Jewish community

This community has been surveyed on a number of occasions, especially during the 1960s.[2] It consists of approximately 33,000 persons[3], who are characterized by an extreme diversity in national

background. The community contains descendants of British and German immigrants who came in the nineteenth century and of Russians who arrived in the early twentieth century, central European refugees from Nazism, eastern European survivors of the Second World War, and recent voluntary immigrants from other lands, mainly Britain and Israel. The numbers involved in the refugee groups were so great that they and their descendants now represent the majority of families in the community. Immigration has been low in the past ten years and its statistical effect has been to increase the percentage of Australian-born Jews.

Before we look at the actual findings of the survey, it will be useful to give some general impression of the reactions of the Jews of Melbourne to the 1973 war. The most obvious feature was an obsession with news reports, rumours, and speculations concerning the progress of the fighting. In this respect the reaction resembled that of 1967, but in 1973 it was clearly accompanied by more depression, anger, bitterness, and vague feelings of insecurity. Many more Jews of Melbourne had lived in or visited Israel than previously, and several of them had children or other close relatives there. The survey reveals that 15 per cent had at one time lived in Israel, and a further 50 per cent had visited it. Seven per cent of the respondents had a child or parent living in Israel at the time of the War, and one quarter of *all* the respondents telephoned a relative or friend there after the fighting began.

The involvement of Melbourne Jews in the war is reflected in the fact that donations to the emergency appeal reached an unprecedented figure of an average of over £400 (sterling) per household for the entire Jewish community, while for the members of the Reform congregation (who may be taken to represent the most assimilated segment of the organized community), the figure was £700. During the war an official moratorium was called by the Jewish Board of Deputies on all other appeals and also on all social functions, public and private.

The response in 1973 of assimilated Jews who had attained élite positions in Australian society in such fields as law, the universities, medicine, politics, and public service is perhaps of special significance. The authors noted that several such persons privately expressed obsessive fears about the motives of the Australian and other governments which made a virtue of their alleged 'neutrality' or 'even-handedness', and also their misgivings about the apathy of the general population. Several of these 'élite' Jews commented that they had developed feelings of insecurity that they had not known since the fall of Nazism. This phenomenon was not observed during the 1967 war and seems to reflect a new and potentially important factor which will be further considered after the findings of the survey have been reported.

The 1973 survey

The survey was conducted by interview in the homes of a representative sample of Jewish householders in Melbourne. In order partially to keep under control the external situation pertaining at the time, it was decided to limit the interviewing period to 28 October–11 November. This was strictly adhered to, even though it restricted the size of the sample to 77 usable interviews.

All eleven interviewers were Jewish; eight of them had taken part in earlier surveys of the Jewish community. They were all given a preliminary training session by the senior author.

The interview schedule consisted of 92 questions on the respondent's reactions to the war, his attitudes towards aspects of being Jewish, some background details, and a few subsidiary matters. The type of question ranged from direct 'true-false' or self-ratings to completely open-ended, and many of them repeated those included in previous surveys. Some further questions asked the respondent to compare his reactions to the 1967 and 1973 wars.

Where necessary, the responses to the open-ended questions were coded before being analysed. Three coders were used, one of whom had worked on the 1967 study; all coding was checked by a second coder, and where disagreements on ratings occurred these were reconciled either by discussion or by an arbitrator. Finally, the senior author (who directed the coding in both the 1967 and 1973 studies) checked the ratings for consistency of level between the two studies.

As in the past surveys, the sample was drawn at random from the community lists which provide an almost complete register of all residents of Melbourne who regard themselves as Jewish.[4] A total of 121 households were drawn and were allocated to the interviewers, with the sexes of the respondents alternated. The interviewers were instructed to ask for the male or female householder, according to the sex indicated on the card, and to substitute the spouse only when there was no respondent of the pre-arranged sex in the household.

Of the original 121 names, 3 were incorrectly drawn (wrong address or not Jewish), 12 could not be visited within the time limit, 19 were not available for contact during the period (known to be absent temporarily, or ill), leaving a total possible sample of 87. Of these, 10 refused to be interviewed, representing a refusal rate of 11·5 per cent, and leaving a final sample of 77 respondents, consisting of 39 males and 38 females. Since this number is rather small, it is important to examine the possibility that some systematic biases interfered with the representativeness of the sample. There was no geographical bias in the location of those who were not (or could not be) contacted.

The 10 refusals need to be looked at carefully since it is possible that their reaction could reflect apathetic attitudes towards the war, or

attitudes that would be unpopular among Jews. Fortunately some information is available about several of the non-respondents; it seems that no more than 5 of them, and probably less, could have refused because they held unpopular attitudes. When the findings are interpreted, the possible, though small, biasing effect of the refusals must be borne in mind. Most of the non-respondents, however, were probably persons whose attitudes were not atypical. They were all in their forties or older, and eight of the ten were European-born females. Previous experience with surveys has indicated that middle-aged and elderly women from Europe are reluctant to give their opinions; one such respondent suddenly broke down in the middle of the interview and said that the interviewer was perhaps a supporter of Arab guerrillas.

Findings

To provide further information on the sample, some background characteristics of the 1973 respondents are presented in Table 1 with comparisons from the 1966 Adult Survey.

TABLE 1. *Some characteristics of the 1973 and 1966 samples (in percentages)*

		1973 (N = 77)	*1966* (N = 504)
Age	*under 35*	22	11
	35–54	36	50
	55 and over	42	39
Birthplace of respondent's parents	Australia–U.K.	18	11
	Eastern Europe	59	60
	Western and central Europe	22	25
	Israel, Other	1	5
Birthplace of respondent	Australia–U.K.	32	23
	Eastern Europe	43	46
	Western and central Europe	19	25
	Israel, Other	5	7
R. has ever visited, or lived in, Israel		65	44
R. can speak Yiddish		41	41
R. favours teaching Hebrew to Jewish children		75	74
R. favours Jewish Day schooling for children		44	49
R. describes self as 'religious'		27	(not asked)
R. describes self as a 'Zionist'		57	(not asked)

As expected, there were more Australian-born respondents and fewer western and central Europeans, presumably owing to deaths among those who had immigrated in the years 1938–47. Another point to note is the considerable increase in the under-35 group among the householders, owing mainly to the age 'bulge' of those born in 1945–52. This is a distinct change in the community structure that could affect attitudes towards world events. Another change worth noting is the

considerable increase in the percentage of respondents who have either visited, or lived in, Israel.

Overall ego-involvement in the war

As in 1967, the interviewers recorded a series of subjective accounts of the respondents' reactions to the various stages of the conflict and these were rated by the coders on degree of ego-involvement and emotional reaction in the manner described in the reports on the 1967 war. The overall ratings of the degree of ego-involvement in Israel's cause are presented in Table 2 with a comparison with the 1967 ratings.[5]

TABLE 2. *Coders' ratings of ego-involvement in the war (in percentages)*

Degree of ego-involvement	*1973* (N = 77)	*1967* (N = 54)
1. No interest at all	0	0
2. Casual interest without involvement	3	0
3. Slight involvement but somewhat superficial	13	4
4. Moderately involved—some changes in normal routine and definite concern and distress shown	53	52
5. Considerable involvement—marked changes in normal life and considerable concern or distress. Identification of self with Israel. Crisis changed respondent's outlook on life	29	39
6. Very intense involvement—Israel treated almost as a complete projection of self	3	6

Again, as in 1967 the modal point was 'moderate involvement' with some changes made in normal routine and definite concern or distress. There were, however, fewer 'more intense' and more 'less intense' involvements than in 1967. Only two of the respondents appeared to have a merely casual interest in the war, but this number might have been increased to seven or eight if those who refused interviews had expressed their opinions. However, even on that assumption, the relatively non-involved group would still have represented less than 10 per cent of the respondents. Thus it appears that, as in 1967, a definite involvement in the war was close to universal among Melbourne's Jewish householders.

Nearly one third of them (32 per cent) were rated as showing 'considerable' or 'very intense' involvement, while 16 per cent were rated as being somewhat less than 'moderately' involved, that is, they provided no evidence of undue concern or distress as a result of the war nor did they appear to have changed their normal routine, although they were concerned to some extent. The distribution of the ratings in Table 2 suggests that the degree of involvement, though quite marked, was not as strong as it had been among the 1967 respondents.

In view of the possibility that the information about their own

reactions to the stages of the war might not have fully represented their feelings, the respondents were also asked to rate themselves on a five-point scale of degree of involvement in the war. Not only did this self-assessment augment the information used in making the coders' ratings, but it also acted as a check on the reliability of the latter. The coders' ratings were made without knowledge of the self-ratings, and there was only one case where the two sets differed by more than one category. The intercorrelation of the two sets was 0·85 (product moment). On the self-ratings, only one respondent described herself as 'not particularly concerned'. Thirty-eight per cent described themselves as having 'a fair amount of interest and concern, enough to cause some change in routine'—for example, listening to news more than usual, attending a meeting, talking to others about it, etc.; 39 per cent as having 'considerable concern and distress, deeply caught up in the crisis'; and 22 per cent as so concerned that their 'whole life revolved around the war'. If the coders' ratings and self-ratings are combined, 38 per cent of the respondents appear to have had an all-absorbing degree of involvement in the war, and only two respondents had a merely casual interest.

From these two sets of ratings we conclude that the reaction to the 1973 war was generally similar to that in 1967, with a slight reduction in the degree of involvement. The quality of the involvement was also similar; there was the same type of obsessive dependence upon news reports and disruption of everyday activities as was observed in 1967; nearly all reported donating money in response to the emergency appeal, 38 per cent attended a meeting or rally (48 per cent in 1967), 12 per cent attended a special religious service (11 per cent in 1967), and 15 per cent volunteered their services to help the cause (17 per cent in 1967). There was a volunteer to go to Israel in 14 per cent of the households, compared with 11 per cent in 1967.

In answer to a specific request to compare their degree of involvement in the 1973 war with that in 1967, 56 per cent of the respondents claimed to have been more, and 5 per cent less, involved in 1973. Thus while the independent measures suggest that the degree of involvement was approximately the same in the 1967 and 1973 samples, it seems likely that the 1973 respondents' high involvement in the 1967 war had faded somewhat in their memories.

Variables associated with the degree of ego-involvement

In 1967 the degree of involvement in the war was not significantly related to any of the following factors: age, sex, satisfaction with life in Australia and assimilation into Australian society, place of birth, degree of contact with Israel, or association with Zionist movements. There was, however, a significantly higher degree of involvement among those who came from Yiddish-speaking homes, those who were more identi-

fied with aspects of Jewishness, and finally, those who perceived Australians as being friendly to Jews.

In 1973 no relationship was found between degree of involvement in the war and the sex of the respondents, their identification with Australia, or their perceptions of the attitudes of non-Jewish Australians towards the war. Interestingly enough, there was also no relationship with whether the respondent believed that there could be another holocaust anywhere in the world in his lifetime. As far as age is concerned, there was a highly significant drop ($p < \cdot 01$) in degree of involvement among respondents under the age of 34 years, and only 3 out of the 15 in that category rated themselves as highly involved, a matter of some importance when it is realized that this was the group most heavily involved as late adolescents and young adults in 1967.[6]

Respondents born in eastern Europe were more highly involved in the war than those born in Australia or in other English-speaking countries. This is partly a function of age, in that the younger persons tend to be Australian-born, but it also seems to be related to national background even when the effect of age is controlled. As in the 1967 study, the variables which are the most highly related to degree of involvement are the indices of ethnic identification and general commitment to Israel. However, unlike the case in 1967, there was a positive relationship in 1973 between having visited Israel and the degree of involvement in the war.

The two low scorers on involvement are interesting. One was an Israeli-born woman in her middle twenties who had come to Australia as a child of nine and now has no close relatives or friends in her native land. She claims to have no emotional ties with Israel ('divorced from it'), or to the Jewish community, nor does she report any positive feelings about being Australian. She considers that antisemitism is a problem in Australia, and she resented Australia's stand in the 1973 war. While her sentiments in the war were pro-Israeli, she stated that she had not been very perturbed by the conflict—but that she was more involved in 1973 than she had been in 1967. It is possible that this respondent had repressed her childhood connections with Israel, and is now just emerging from that stage. The other low scorer was also a young woman who came to Australia in her early childhood, but from Poland. She also had no emotional ties to Israel, to the Jewish community, or to Australia. She felt some sympathy with Israel in the war but thought that its policy should be less rigid. She also claimed to have been more involved in 1973 than in 1967, and may, like the previous respondent, be emerging from a stage in which she had repressed her Jewish identity. Thus, it is possible that while some aspects of the private lives of these two women had produced overall attitudes to life which included a detachment from Israel, the war either initiated or coincided with a new stage in their emotional and psychological

development. A rather similar change was revealed in a letter from a young Jewish academic (not a respondent) who emigrated from Poland in his early teens and is now in his middle thirties and married to a non-Jew.

> My immediate reaction to the 1967 war was one of dimly sensed antagonism. I remained somewhat emotionally distant from the early victories but remember being swept into the euphoria of pride. It was simultaneously uncomfortable but gratifying. In 1973 it was quite different. For most of these two weeks I remained glued to the transistor. I had total sense of concern [*sic*], and of commitment to Israel's victory. It brought out with starkness the sense of involvement with Israel's fate and the dangers it faced.

The reactions of the respondents' children

In 1967 it appeared that the older children living in the households of the respondents were at least as involved as their parents in the war. Once again, the reactions of the children in 1973 were rated from the information supplied by their parents; they are set out in Table 3 for the 16–24 age group, with the comparative figures for the 1967 war. The impression is that, while the children were quite involved in 1973, the

TABLE 3. *Ego-involvement of the young in the war, with comparisons by age groups (in percentages)*

Degree of involvement	*16–25 Years*			*1973 Householders (self-ratings)*	
	Children of respondents (Coders' ratings)		*Youth survey (retrospective self-ratings 1968)*	*23–34 years*	*Over 34 years*
	1973	*1967*			
	(N = 26)	(N = 31)	(N = 115)	(N = 15)	(N = 62)
None or little	12	13	3	7	0
Moderate (some concern and changes in routine)	31	19	39	73	29
Considerable or intense (e.g. 'Very depressed', 'Not interested in studies', 'Volunteered to go to Israel')	58	68	58	20	71

level was not as high as in 1967, but it must be borne in mind that the ratings are based on second-hand information only. The self-ratings made retrospectively by the respondents in the 1968 Youth Survey are included for comparison as well as the self-ratings by the younger and older respondents in the 1973 survey of householders. It seems that the young in 1973 were not nearly as involved in the war as their parents (the older group of respondents), but that they were more involved than the group of young marrieds aged under 34 years.

Emotional reactions to the war

As in 1967, the respondents were rated on the intensity of their emotional reaction to the war. The distribution was very similar to that of 1967; compared with 41 per cent in 1967, 39 per cent of the 1973 respondents reported that they were so deeply affected that they experienced psychosomatic symptoms, or were otherwise seriously impeded by their emotions from carrying out their normal pursuits. Only two of the fifteen younger respondents in 1973 came into this category.

In response to direct questions on the comparison between their reactions in 1973 and 1967, 86 per cent of the sample said that they worried more in 1973 and 47 per cent claimed that they had felt more 'personally threatened'. In making the comparisons, respondents referred in particular to their shock at the possibility of Israel's defeat, depression and bitterness at the reactions of other nations, grief at the high casualties, and apprehension about the future. One third of the respondents mentioned the length of the war as an important factor in causing their depression and feelings of apprehension.

Effect of the war on outlook on life

One of the notable findings of the 1967 study was that almost all the respondents reported that the war had had some sort of lasting effect on them, mainly that of boosting their feelings of self-esteem (mentioned by 48 per cent of the sample). If these effects had been enduring, one would not expect as much from the 1973 war, although the differences between the two conflicts allow room for some variation. A comparison of the reactions shows that in 1973, 45 per cent of the respondents reported no lasting effect, while only 8 per cent did so in 1967. The greatest effect in 1973 was apprehension about the future and a militant suspicion of the non-Jewish world. Typical comments were: 'I am frightened the world is against us', 'More disappointed in the world', 'I have become more cynical', 'It made me feel terribly insecure', 'You can't rely on people, we have to look after ourselves'. Of those who claimed that the war had affected their outlook, one half made such comments when expressing their concern about the attitude of the world to Israel and, by implication, to the Jewish people as a whole.

A number reported momentary feelings of pride and elation at the ultimate military success of the Israeli army but, in contrast to the effect of the success in 1967, this time none of the respondents reported any enduring boost to their self-esteem. The overwhelming feeling in 1973 was one of fear and anxiety.

In answer to another question, 'Do you think that a holocaust could happen again to the Jews in your lifetime?', 23 per cent answered 'Yes', and 42 per cent, 'Possibly'.[7] Only 16 per cent claimed that their

answer had been affected by the 1973 war and, in view of this, it would probably be safest to conclude that although the general reaction was very gloomy, it did not in most cases precipitate a sense of impending catastrophe.

Effect of the war on identification with Judaism

Respondents were asked whether their feelings about being Jewish had changed 'in the past two months', and nearly half (47 per cent) claimed that they had become more positive. A check on this opinion is afforded by the comparison of the responses to two relevant questions which were asked in the 1966 Adult survey and again after the 1967 and 1973 wars. The findings, which are set out in Table 4, show that in 1973 a greater percentage had very strongly positive feelings about being

TABLE 4. *Comparison of self-ratings on identification with Judaism (in percentages)*

	1973 (N = 77)	*1967* (N = 68)	*1966 Adult Survey* (N = 504)
a. 'What are your feelings about being Jewish?'			
1. Negative feelings	0	3	2
2. No feelings for or against	4	9	5
3. Slightly positive	12	9	12
4. Strongly positive	31	46	40
5. Very strongly positive	53	34	41
b. 'Does being Jewish play an important part in your life?'			
1. Plays no part	4	7	2
2. Of little importance	14	4	12
3. Plays an important part	35	46	40
4. Plays a very important part	47	43	45

Jewish, although there is certainly no evidence of an increase in the ratings of the importance in their lives of being Jewish.

Effect of the war on attitudes to Israel

When asked what effect the war had had on their outlook, one in ten of the respondents spontaneously referred to a strengthening of their bond with Israel. Table 5*a* indicates that two trends have operated since the 1966 survey: on the one hand, some of the respondents have become highly ego-involved with Israel, presumably mainly as a result of the 1967 war; on the other hand, there has been an increase in the number who, in reply to the question of what Israel meant to them

personally, said that they were non-involved. The table also indicates that the percentage who would like to live in Israel has not changed since 1966, but that a higher proportion would favour their children living there. These trends are interesting but it is difficult to estimate the degree to which they have been influenced in one direction or the

TABLE 5. *Comparison of attitudes towards Israel (in percentages)*

	1973 (N = 77)	*1967* (N = 66)	*1966 Adult Survey* (N = 504)
a. 'What does Israel mean to you personally?'			
1. Unfavourable or indifferent	7	2	8
2. Favourable response but no ego-involvement	41	31	40
3. Some positive ego-involvement	36	51	45
4. Very strong positive ego-involvement	15	12	6
5. No answer, Don't know	1	3	1
b. 'If you didn't live in Australia, where would you like to live?'			
1. Spontaneous mention of Israel	49	—	53
2. Would like to live in Israel (after prompt question)	11	—	9
3. Would not like to live in Israel	28	—	29
4. No answer	12	—	10
c. 'Would you like your children to live in Israel?'			
Yes	37	—	27
No	41	—	37
Conditional answer ('It all depends')	21	—	37
d. 'Would you be prepared to support Israel if other countries insist that she withdraw without proper guarantees?'			
1. Unequivocal support expressed	79	89	—
2. Support with minor reservations	17	9	—
3. No support. Israel should be more cooperative or trusting	4	2	—
e. 'If the choice had been between Israel's defeat or a world war, how would you have chosen?'			
1. Israel's defeat	9	—	—
2. World war	54	—	—
3. No answer	36	—	—

other by the war; in response to a direct question, only 4 per cent stated that these answers were in fact so influenced.

There can be no doubt that the unequivocal support shown for Israel's stand is still almost as strong as it was in 1967 (Table 5*d*1). The responses concerning a world war are quite startling as an index of the identification of more than half the respondents (54 per cent) with Israel's existence. However, it should be noted that many of those

opting for a world war believed that any situation that involved the destruction of Israel would automatically imply a global war.

Effect of the war on attitudes to Australia

In 1967 the Australian government had placed less emphasis on the neutrality of its stand than it did in 1973. What effect did this have on the respondents? Table 6 shows that the vast majority perceived the Australian government as being unfavourable to Israel. A few attempted to make excuses ('It's in the best interests of Australia'), but most expressed disgust or disappointment (for example, 'They should go to the devil', 'In a word—lousy'). On the other hand, half of the respondents (51 per cent) believed that the average Australian was favourable to Israel in the war, compared with 69 per cent in the 1967 survey (Table 6*e*). Nevertheless, 68 per cent believed that their own reactions to the war were 'a great deal different' from those of non-Jews. They were still positive about being Australians, although slightly less so than were those interviewed in 1966 (Table 6*b*) and 14 per cent thought that their feelings had become less positive as a result of the war (Table 6*c*). There was also a decrease in the proportion of those who stated they would like to spend the rest of their lives in Australia (Table 6*d*), and a slight increase in the estimates of the degree of antisemitism in Australia.

Over one third (36 per cent) of the 1973 respondents thought that the destruction of the Jews in Australia could possibly occur in their lifetime, and the figure for the younger respondents (aged under 34) was actually two-thirds. The corresponding figure for the 1968 Youth Survey was only 17 per cent. It is striking that in the 1973 survey, 53 per cent of those under 34 thought that a holocaust in Australia was possible in their lifetime, though the prospect did not affect to any significant extent their emotional reactions to the war or their Jewish and Australian identities.

To sum up, the war has led to a considerable degree of disapproval by the respondents of the stand taken by the Australian government, and considerable loss of confidence about their future in Australia, although the general degree of positive feeling about Australia is still fairly high.

Attitudes towards other nations

Critical comments were made spontaneously against Russia by one third of the sample (fewer than had been the case in 1967), but other countries, such as France and Britain, came in for relatively more unfavourable comment than in 1967. Not surprisingly, Holland was mentioned favourably by one quarter of the respondents. When asked specifically about the United States government, 60 per cent were un-

TABLE 6. *Attitudes towards Australia (in percentages)*

	1973 (N = 77)	
a. 'How do you feel about the attitudes and actions of the Australian government (with respect to the war)?'		
1. Respondent's reaction is favourable	8	
2. Respondent's reaction is unfavourable	71	
3. Reaction is mixed—both favourable and unfavourable	17	
4. Other and No answer	4	
b. 'What are your feelings about being Australian?'	*1973*	*Adult Survey 1966*
1. Negative feelings	0	0
2. No feelings for or against	17	11
3. Slightly positive	26	24
4. Strongly positive	33	40
5. Very strongly positive	24	25
c. 'Have your feelings about being Australian changed as a result of the war?'	*1973*	
1. Become more positive	3	
2. Become less positive	14	
3. No change	83	
d. 'Would you like to spend the rest of your life in Australia?'	*1973*	*Adult Survey 1966*
Yes	55	70
Yes with reservations	12	10
Don't know	11	8
No	22	11
e. 'How do you think that the average non-Jewish Australian felt about the war?'	*1973*	*1967*
Australians were		
1. Favourable to Israel	51	69
2. Unfavourable to Israel	5	0
3. Mixed—both favourable and unfavourable	11	22
4. Neutral or uninterested	22	6
5. Don't know, No answer	11	4
. 'How much antisemitism do you think there is n Australia at present?'	*1973*	*Adult Survey 1966*
1. None or a little	20	33
2. Some	39	32
3. A fair amount	26	26
4. A great deal	12	8
5. Don't know, No answer	3	2

reservedly favourable, while the remainder expressed distrust. Altogether the stand taken by most nations aroused in the respondents feelings of disappointment, cynicism, and insecurity, and, in reply to a direct question asking them to compare their feelings in 1967 and 1973, 86 per cent stated that they felt more upset by world reactions and 23 per cent that they felt more isolated from non-Jews in 1973.

Strangely enough, many of the respondents were not hostile to Arabs; this had also been the case in 1967. When asked how they felt, 42 per cent expressed antagonism to 'the Arab people' (compared with 30 per cent in 1967), while the others tended to make excuses for them, blaming their ignorance, their leaders, or the Russians, for their aggressiveness.

Perception of the future in the Middle East

Many of the respondents hoped for peace and stated that Israel must be prepared to make concessions to that end, while at the same time remaining strong. But they were not optimistic; when asked whether they thought that there would be another war between Israel and the Arabs, only 3 per cent said, 'No', while 37 per cent expressed no opinion; almost half of the 60 per cent who thought that there would be another war believed that it would occur within 12 months. In the event of such a war, 45 per cent of the respondents thought it possible that Israel might be defeated.

Conclusion

Generally we found that the community's reactions reflected positive concern for Israel and active interest and involvement in the war. Most Jews had realized that the state of 'no war, no peace' since 1967 was temporary and they expected a renewal of fighting at some time; so that when war broke out they were shocked but not totally surprised. There was almost universal concern for Israel's safety and survival, obsession with news, and ready financial support to an unprecedented extent.

If the Yom Kippur War made only a marginal difference to the Melbourne community's strongly positive attitudes towards its Jewish identity or to individual involvement with Israel, it is probably because the Six-Day War had already achieved almost the maximum amount of identification. Israel was an accepted fact of Melbourne Jewish life; that was demonstrated in the greatly increased numbers who have now visited that country, or who had relatives and close friends there during the war, and in the very great numbers of people who telephoned Israel immediately on hearing about the war. Further, the fact that there has been no significant change between 1967 and 1973 in the

desire to live in Israel may largely be because the matter was settled after the Six-Day War.

As in 1967, the highest degree of emotional and ego-involvement was found among older, east-European-born Jews, and the lowest degree among younger and Australian-born Jews of all ages. It is a characteristic of the Australian culture and life style to respond to critical events and situations in a 'low-key' fashion, and that may partly account for the apparently lower involvement of Australian-born Jews. Respondents in the under-34 age bracket tend to concentrate their energies on establishing their marriages, homes, families, and economic independence, so that their degree of preoccupation with external events is lowered by their being in a relatively self-centred and perhaps transitional stage of life during which personal needs take precedence over communal matters. It may, however, also be relevant to their reactions to the war that this is the generation that did not have personal experience of the Nazi era, and therefore there are fewer historical memories to be re-awakened by current events.

The reaction of these young adults is interesting in the light of the 1968 survey of the Jewish youth of Melbourne. The report of that study noted[8]:

> One quarter of the youth respondents show little or no involvement in Israel, while nearly one-half (45 per cent) are highly involved. This involvement takes the form of concern for the fate of Israel, and an interest in living there if Australia is no longer to be their home . . . even during the War [1967] there was evidence that the youth were even more involved in Israel's fate than their parents. The contrast between the attitudes of youth towards Israel and those of the previous generation of Australian educated Jews suggests that the Jewish youth do have an attitude towards Israel that is unique to the present generation. It is possible, however, that this special attitude may disappear as they, too, grow into adulthood.

From the evidence of the 1973 study it seems that this last-mentioned possibility may have been partially fulfilled, although it is clear that no dramatic change has occurred. The indications concerning the next generation, aged 16–25, are that its members were not quite as involved in the 1973 war as that age group had been in 1967 (see Table 3), although they were still far from being apathetic.

The position of the older Australian-born respondents is worth considering a little further. They all revealed at least a moderate degree of concern for Israel, and many of them expressed themselves quite aggressively against the Australian government, while commenting that they felt exposed and insecure for the first time in their lives. Perhaps the reason was that on this occasion, unlike that in 1967, they had to come to terms with the fact that by involving themselves with a foreign event that was not seen as Australia's cause, they were to that extent

lessening their status as Australians. The spectre of conflicting loyalties has apparently once again raised its head.

Many of the differences in response to the two Middle East wars were due to their different nature. In 1967, for instance, Israel's military strength and victory created a new Jewish image which was ego-boosting. The 1973 war, involving the possibility of Israel's defeat, and loss of former support from the Western world, made Jews aware that they were again vulnerable. Spectres of antisemitism, persecution, and concentration camps were revived. This fear of a return to pre-Israel times when Jewish existence was precarious and there was no Jewish homeland even for the persecuted explains why, in an extremity, more than half the respondents would have opted for a global war rather than face a world in which Israel no longer existed. While such extreme feelings were more typical of the immigrant refugees, they were not absent from the older Australian-born respondents. Nevertheless, that stand did not basically alter existing attitudes to Jewish institutions and Jewish life in Australia.

Finally, the reactions of Melbourne Jews to the 1973 war seem to have paralleled those of Jews in other countries.[9] Just as the 1967 war re-awoke feelings of ethnic identity in many Jews in the Diaspora, the 1973 war appears to have strengthened their consciousness of a common fate with World Jewry in the face of the crisis of confidence about the future of Israel and of the Jewish people.[10]

NOTES

[1] A general survey of the Melbourne Jewish community was carried out in December 1966–May 1967. Another survey was conducted after the Six-Day War, and the findings were reported in an earlier issue of this Journal: R. Taft, 'The Impact of the Middle-East Crisis of June 1967 on Melbourne Jewry', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. IX, no. 2, December 1967, pp. 243–62. An abbreviated version appears in P. Y. Medding, ed., *Jews in Australian Society*, Melbourne, 1973. We refer below to the earlier survey as the 1966 Adult Survey and to the latter as the 1967 Survey. In 1968 there was also a survey of young Jews, aged 16–25 years, the children of a representative sample of the 1966 Adult respondents.

[2] See P. Y. Medding, *From Assimilation to Group Survival*, Melbourne, 1968, and Medding, ed., op. cit. These works provide a detailed account of the community based on census data and on an extensive survey of Jewish adults conducted in 1966–67. The data include demographic and communal details, and a report on the Jewish identification of the members of the community. Brief details are also presented in Taft, 1967, op. cit.

[3] This represents a decline since 1967 of approximately 1,000, presumably owing to emigration, to the excess of deaths over births, and also perhaps to a change in self-identification.

[4] Support for the representativeness of the register is provided in Taft,

1967, op. cit., p. 245, and in Medding, ed., op. cit., pp. 268–69. It is possible, however, that the register is somewhat deficient in its record of young Jews who have married non-Jews and have so far shown no interest in Jewish institutions or activities.

[5] In theory, respondents could have been ego-involved in the war and yet unsympathetic to the Israeli cause, but in fact all the involvement that was observed in the respondents represented an identification with Israel's cause and should be treated as such.

[6] This is based both on parents' statements, reported in Taft, 1967, op. cit., pp. 258–59, and on the young Jews' own reports made in a further survey conducted in January 1968 (see Taft, 'Beyond the Third Generation', in Medding, ed., op. cit.).

[7] No comparable question was asked in the 1967 study, but it was asked in the Youth Survey of 1968. On that occasion 37 per cent answered 'Yes' and 10 per cent, 'Possibly'.

[8] Taft, 'Beyond the Third Generation', in Medding, ed., op. cit., p. 203.

[9] The authors' knowledge of the reactions of World Jewry is based on a brief preliminary report of a seminar held on this subject in Jerusalem, 24–26 December 1973.

[10] A similar viewpoint has been expressed by the Acting Head of the Jewish Agency, who was reported as saying that 'where before there had been a sense of partnership, there was now a feeling that the Jews of Israel and the Diaspora formed one people' (*The Jerusalem Post Weekly*, 2 January 1974).

THE PRECONCEPTIONS OF CRITICAL THEORY

Lewis S. Feuer

(Review Article)

THE Institute of Social Research is probably the only independently endowed Marxist research institute ever to have existed. Martin Jay has written a vivid, thorough, sympathetic, and well-documented book on its history from its founding in Frankfurt in 1923 to the return of its director from America in 1949.* The effect of the Institute on American intellectual history has probably been greater since 1960, long after its removal as a formal organization from America, than it was in all the previous years. Professor Jay's noteworthy book enables one to cope with questions concerning the historical roots of this school of thought, its social composition, its choice of postulates, and its cleavages, along with the strains of its personalities and historical circumstances.

The idea of a Marxist institute was conceived in 1922 by Felix J. Weil, the son of a German grain merchant in the Argentine. His father, Hermann Weil, provided an endowment which brought in an annual income of the then munificent sum of thirty thousand dollars. It was intended to call the organization the Institute for Marxism, but in its first use of 'Aesopian' language, the more academic 'Social Research' was substituted. Attached loosely to the University of Frankfurt, its new building on the campus was dedicated in 1924; its director was a Marxist political scientist, Carl Grünberg, the successor to an economist, Kurt Gerlach, whose death had come prematurely and suddenly. Grünberg's chief interest was in problems in the history of the labour movement, but on his becoming seriously ill, Max Horkheimer succeeded him as director in 1930, and a new phase in the Institute's career began. Horkheimer, a philosopher, aged thirty-five, exercised his 'dictatorship of the director' in ways which basically shaped the Institute's character and ideology.

Horkheimer was also a prudent manager of the Institute's resources. Though many Marxists were at the time ridiculing the Nazi expectation

*Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923–1950*, 382 pp., Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1973, £3.50.

of power, Horkheimer arranged in 1931 to transfer the Institute's endowment to Holland. Then in 1934 he somehow elicited from the conservative president of Columbia University, Nicholas Murray Butler, an offer to the Institute of affiliation with the university and a home in one of its smaller buildings. It obviously must have taken a Marxist magician to accomplish that feat, and Horkheimer himself at first could not believe he had done it. But the word 'Marxism' tended from then on to be avoided. For protective colouring in the American setting, the Instituteers (if I may use this neologism) began instead to speak of 'Critical Theory' and 'the materialistic theory of society'. Instead of 'Communism' they wrote: the 'constructive forces of mankind' (p. 205).

'The thirties', Martin Jay writes, were 'perhaps the most fruitful decade of the Institute's history' (p. 78). But the Institute during those years had very little influence on American thought. Professor Jay suggests that this was because the Instituteers insulated themselves from American life; they continued, for instance, to publish their journal in German. There were other and deeper reasons, however, for their separation from American thought which I can recall from my own observations at that time in New York. Marxism was then making great inroads among the graduate students. The Frankfurt Institute, however, evoked little confidence. Where did it stand ideologically? Its scholars were more Marxist than the German Social Democrats whom they excoriated for their pusillanimity. But then they were not Communists either, and repudiated any such suggestion. None the less, they never allowed themselves to utter a single criticism of the Soviet Union; clearly they were not Trotskyists; they were not prepared to sunder a Stalinist lifeline. They were super-Marxist scholars, but the aroma of defeat and decadence surrounded their Institute. Scholars learned in Marxism, they had not lifted a finger to stop the Nazis from taking power, for all their talk of *praxis*. Moreover, when one read their articles, one was overcome by the strange feeling that they sometimes sounded like their Nazi counterparts. When Adorno condemned jazz as a 'commodity in the strictest sense', when Marcuse assailed the abstract character of mathematical method, when words like 'totality' and 'concrete' were given a mystic valence revealed only to a chosen élite, they seemed the ideological mirror-images of the Nazis who denounced jazz as the degenerate expression of the bourgeois order, attacked Einstein's theory of relativity as the product of Jewish mathematical abstraction, and depicted themselves as the votaries of the concrete totality as against the lowly shopkeeping, number-mongering, analytic rationalists. Young students at that time felt a greater kinship with the handful from the Vienna Circle who made their way to the United States. Though the Viennese Positivists, too, had sustained a defeat, the Austrian Marxists had in 1934 fought a few brief days of

civil war; their thinking, rigorous and precise, blended with the scientific logic of Charles Peirce and P. W. Bridgman. They punctured the verbal pomposities of Martin Heidegger, the German metaphysician who supported the Nazis; Marcuse, on the other hand, a favourite pupil of Heidegger's, was trying to synthesize Heidegger with Marx. Thus the Institute for Social Research seemed to New York students as an Institute for Hegelian Marxist academics living in subsidized irrelevance, having nothing to say on such issues as the Moscow trials, and who kept repeating in Roosevelt's time their pre-1933 clichés about the bankruptcy of liberal capitalism.

The central tenets of Critical Theory, as they emerged during the thirties, can be seen clearly in Martin Jay's historical description. First, Critical Theory stood opposed to empiricism, to positivism, to any standpoint which began with the 'social facts'; it alone, it claimed, aimed at breaking the tyranny of the 'given', of the status quo, and at going beyond it. Horkheimer argued for the right of the observer to go beyond the givens of his experience (p. 48). There was no substratum of Durkheimian 'social facts' but rather, Horkheimer maintained, 'an ongoing process of interaction between subject and object', 'a constant interplay of particular and universal, of "moment" and totality' (p. 54). Positivists, according to the Frankfurt School, hypostatized 'present facts' as the only reality, thereby making a fetish of a part of the whole (p. 189). Second, Critical Theory, breaking the bond of the demand for verification, affirmed that in its negation of existing society, it was vouchsafed a glimpse of a world that was in Horkheimer's words, 'an entirely other' (p. xii). In later years, Horkheimer asserted that 'the traditional Jewish prohibition on naming or describing God and paradise was reproduced in Critical Theory's refusal to give substance to its vision' (pp. 56, 200), a view in which Habermas has noted a kinship between German idealism and medieval Jewish cabbalism. But Critical Theory would not go beyond its 'negations'; it refused to predict or specify the traits of the Emerging Other Society (p. 65). Only in art was the character of the yearned-for Utopia truly preserved, according to Horkheimer and Adorno (p. 179). A kind of Bergsonian hostility to formal logic developed in the Frankfurt school, reaching a peak in Benjamin's notion that 'formal logic was the barrier that separated the language of Paradise from its human counterpart' (p. 262). The infant's world, pre-logical and pre-linguistic, merged with the ineffable Other Society.

Thus, in the third place, logic generally came under the ban of Critical Theory. Adorno said that the 'reification' of logic was founded on the equivalence of the exchange values of commodities, and that true dialectics sought rather 'to see the new in the old instead of simply the old in the new' (p. 69). Marcuse criticized scientific objectivity, advancing a doctrine of the 'hidden truth', where 'the truth speaks

as strongly against facts and is as well hidden behind them as today. Scientific predictability does not coincide with the futuristic mode in which the truth exists' (p. 77).

Fourth, Critical Theory took it as virtually self-evident that the bourgeois structure of society was the primary fount of evil and the corruption of mass culture. Marcuse wrote of 'the actual unfreedom and powerlessness of the individual in an anarchic production process'. From Adorno's standpoint, the standardization of mass culture, the banality of radio programmes, the allegedly fascist character of Stravinsky's music, the 'soulful' conductors of orchestras, all expressed the evolving evil inherent in bourgeois society (pp. 191, 193, 185, 184).

In the fifth place, however, Critical Theory from the outset abstained from the empirical study of Soviet reality. It never undertook to test its generalizations about jazz and mass culture as expressions of bourgeois society, and the alienation of men; it never used Mill's method of difference under the varying conditions of socialist existence. It was almost as if the critical theorists sensed that the alienation and corruption of mass culture would turn out to be far greater in socialist societies than in capitalist ones, that a free literature and a free science would endure far more precariously in a socialist environment than in a capitalist one. The Institute for Social Research almost from the beginning therefore entered into a collective conspiracy of self-repression as far as Soviet reality was concerned. Critical Theory could not risk seeing itself disconfirmed by anything as lowly as perceptual facts concerning the Other, even though Moses, they seem to have forgotten, was granted a glimpse of God's back (Exodus, 33: 23). Thus, as Martin Jay writes, 'the Institute maintained an almost complete official silence about events in the USSR'; 'they never focussed the attention of Critical Theory on the left-wing authoritarianism of Stalin's Russia' (p. 20). Pollock's book on the Soviet economy in 1929 'carefully avoided commenting on the political consequences of the Revolution and the forced collectivization of the 1920's' (p. 19). The Instituteers maintained this silence even when they privately came to believe that the Soviet economy was a variant of state capitalism (p. 153).

Sixth, though they themselves were affected by a variety of repressions, not only with respect to Soviet reality, but also with regard to the sources of their own hostility to scientific method and their attraction to an unverifiable 'other', the Frankfurt School made of their integration of psychoanalysis with Marxism a primary methodological tenet. Erich Fromm especially pioneered this move, and his studies led to a theory of social character. By the late thirties, however, Fromm was separated from the Institute, which did not take kindly to his critique of Freud's death instinct and to the liberal overtones in his work. Marcuse by contrast, distinguishing between the death instinct as a Nirvana principle and as an aggressive drive, in later years evolved

his theory of the increasing surplus repression in society. Actually, the combination of psychoanalysis with Marxism was not altogether original with the Frankfurt School. After all, it was the essence of Alfred Adler's original heresy from orthodox Freudian doctrine, and in America, such writers as Max Eastman and Floyd Dell had in the twenties without much fanfare tried to work in this direction. Moreover, after the war, 'Horkheimer and the others were less than anxious to publicize their involvement with Freudian theory' (p. 102).

Seventh, unlike all previous schools of Marxism, the Frankfurt School was noteworthy in that after 1930 'its prime interest lay in its [capitalist society's] cultural superstructure' (p. 20). Kautsky, Bernstein, Lenin, and Rosa Luxemburg had been concerned with the evolution of the capitalist economic base itself, but the Critical Theorists, turning from the base, and probably doubtful whether a dialectical law wrote the doom of the capitalist order, were all the more sedulous in devoting themselves to the critique of its art and morality; their study of popular culture thus subserved an ideological purpose, but none the less opened new inquiries in the sociology of literature in the work of Leo Lowenthal.

Eighth, above all, the Frankfurt School looked to the redemption of *praxis*. This had nothing in common with the workings of American political pragmatism. *Praxis* was a political practice of a Messianic kind; it proposed a Mosaic liberation in which they, and intellectuals like themselves, would guide the new Exodus into the Land of the Promised Other. Marcuse, adapting Heidegger to Marxism, wrote of 'the ontological importance of history'. Classical philosophy from Thales to Russell had affirmed the ontological significance of physics and biology. It would not have occurred to them to attach an ontological priority to human history. But when Marxist intellectuals imported from theology the notion of history as a field for a Mosaic mission to transfigure humanity, *praxis*, i.e. the making of history, became a domain for applied ontology. With the phenomenological idiom, one could define revolution as the 'universalizing of authentic being' (p. 72).

Most of the members of the Institute for Social Research were the sons of Jewish business men or merchants. Horkheimer was the son of a 'prominent Jewish manufacturer' (p. 6); Adorno's father was a 'successful assimilated Jewish wine merchant' (p. 22); Marcuse came of 'a family of prosperous assimilated Jews' (p. 28); Henryk Grossman was the scion of 'a well-to-do family of Jewish mine owners' (p. 16); Franz Neumann derived from 'an assimilated Jewish family' (p. 144); Carl Grünberg, the son of Jewish parents, had been converted to Catholicism to help his academic advancement (p. 9); Friedrich Pollock was 'the son of an assimilated Jewish businessman'; Erich Fromm had a unique Jewish education; Walter Benjamin came from

'a family of well-to-do assimilated Jews', his father having been an antiquarian and art dealer (p. 199); while Leo Lowenthal's father was a Jewish doctor. The small minority of Gentile members, Karl August Wittfogel and Paul Massing, both, interestingly enough, members of the German Communist Party, were never part of the Institute's 'inner circle'. 'On theoretical issues he [Wittfogel] was considered naïve by Horkheimer and the other younger members of the Institute who were challenging the traditional interpretation of Marxist theory. Wittfogel's approach was unapologetically positivistic, and the disdain was clearly mutual' (p. 15), while Massing thought that his Gentile origin 'prevented his full acceptance by the Institute's inner circle' (p. 170).

According to Martin Jay, in the German Jewish community 'there raged a struggle between fathers and sons'; Hannah Arendt has written that 'in the case of numerous Communists from well-to-do homes', the conflict was resolved by the sons' 'aspiring to things higher than making money' (p. 35) while the fathers footed the bills. This situation had intellectual consequences. In the first place, the Instituteers tended to play down their Jewish derivation, often to the point of self-hatred and the obscuring of fact. They were indifferent to the 'Jewish question' and Zionism, and denied any significance to their Jewish identity; Franz Neumann, author of the authoritative study of Nazism, *Behemoth*, declared that 'the German people are the least anti-Semitic of all' (pp. 32, 162). Pollock wrote that their ethnic descent had given rise to 'no feeling of insecurity' (p. 33), though Jay conjectures that 'a residue of bitterness' must have fed their radical critique of society as a whole (p. 34).

In a profound sense, however, the compulsive animus which the Frankfurt School had against 'bourgeois society' probably derived from their situation as the third-generation educated sons of self-made Jewish business men. Their experience of capitalism was curiously meagre and second-hand. They denounced the 'unfreedom' of the 'anarchy of production', but they had never known the feeling in business men, from Daniel Defoe to their own fathers, that commerce and industry were domains in which a man's freedom and initiative could express themselves. The joy in a merchant's calling which Defoe had set forth in *A Complete Tradesman* was something alien to the imagination of the intellectuals of the left, something far from the polemics against the 'marketing personality'. Their unconscious definition of 'bourgeois' was that it was whatever was part of their fathers' way of life. Their vague conception of the new society was very much like the university classroom projected on a macro-social scale; the good schoolboy would get his promotion automatically from the authorities. Indeed, the Frankfurt School thought that in its Institute it had 'a microcosmic foretaste of the brotherly society of the future' (p. 31), ruled by a

benevolent dictator who rewarded them for their well-written essays, and provided for from the endowment by an Argentine grain-merchant, the fact being repressed that their Marxist oasis could exist only in a capitalist environment. We might call this 'the intellectual's fallacy', his misperception of concrete capitalism.

The Frankfurt School's opposition to empiricism had its social source too, for the Instituteers were mostly aesthetic-literary intellectuals who wished to practise social science at a time when advances in mathematics and physics were rendering obsolete the pretensions of metaphysics to a higher knowledge. The sun's eclipse in 1919 had confirmed the authority and method of Einstein. By comparison with the theory of relativity, the verbal pretensions of metaphysicians from Hegel to Heidegger seemed hopelessly hollow. Karl Marx himself had said that no body of knowledge becomes truly scientific until it attains a mathematical form. The Frankfurt School, however, looked back to the pre-Einstein era. Horkheimer had written several novels (unpublished); Adorno had essayed to be a composer of music; Marcuse was a pupil of Heidegger; Fromm was trained in Judaica; and Wittfogel had been a playwright. The opposition to empirical verification and mathematical method, stated in high-sounding pontifical terms, actually may have concealed the anxiety of the displaced metaphysical aesthetic-literary intellectual, struggling against the trauma of obsolescence. For all their psychoanalytical avowal, the Frankfurt School could not bring themselves to look squarely at their own possibly unconscious motivation.

Curiously, the Frankfurt School's critique of empiricism vaguely resembled that of Karl Popper; but the resemblance disappeared on closer examination. The Instituteers claimed that their Critical Theory could not be proven by empirical facts since they went beyond the 'given'. This sounded somewhat like Popper arguing that a theory cannot be verified but only falsified. But then according to Critical Theory, falsification was likewise impossible. Their claim that an Unverifiable Other Society was to be born of their *praxis* was not something which could be tested or falsified in the present. Popper's criterion of falsifiability was the outcome, he has written, of his experience in Vienna after the First World War with Marxists and Adlerians who would always evade or explain away any empirical contravention. The Frankfurt School was drawn to a similar 'negation' of methodology.

The assault of Critical Theory on positivist empirical sociological laws falls apart when it is given any critical scrutiny. The Critical Theorist claims 'the right of the observer to go beyond the givens of his experience' (p. 48); he says that positivists hypostatize 'present' facts (p. 189), and are thus committed to the status quo. But no scientific law is confined to observed, present facts. Every law, in so far as it states the relationships among independent and dependent variables,

entails an infinite number of assertions of what would happen under circumstances now unobserved. Thus Durkheim, a 'positivist' sociologist, argued from his laws of integration that a development of functional associations would lead to a decline of the rate of suicide. Similarly, when Marx and Engels predicted that the state would 'wither away' under communism, they were founding themselves on the currently observed, presumably empirical, law that state institutions of coercion vary directly with the degree of class exploitation. The 'unverifiable other' turns out to be a solution for an elementary sociological equation; the latter is so simple that the Critical Theorist might well feel that it imperils his claim to sophistication.

Moreover, the Frankfurt School could not help covertly appealing to empirical evidence. For the trouble with the Unverifiable Other, the Higher Society, was that the Nazis also presented a version of the Unverifiable Other and the Higher Society, and so did the Technocrats, Anarchists, Primitivists, Syndicalists, and Managerialists. Critical Theory held that its general truths 'could not be verified or falsified by reference to the present order, simply because they implied the possibility of a different one' (p. 82). Sociologists sympathetic to the Nazis such as Othmar Spann said precisely the same thing. Each could assert that his society awaited the inauguration of the 'qualitative leap' of *praxis*. If Critical Theory believed its sketch of the future had a greater probability, it was because willy-nilly it was actually extrapolating from the observable consequences of the spread of education, the growth of the trade unions, the rising numbers of intellectuals, the difficulties of capitalist depression, and the increase of interventionist measures to the advent of its 'Unverifiable Other'. It believed indeed that there was more evidence to support its proposed developmental sequence for history than there was for that of its rivals. The real problem was that an enormous component of projective wish-fulfilment entered to guide the extrapolation from slender scraps of evidence which in fact were consistent with alternative evolutionary schemes. Among their own number, Franz Neumann had set out a theory of Nazi society as a 'totalitarian monopoly capitalism' whose downfall from its inner evolution did not seem assured. One could attack its 'technological rationality' on ethical grounds, but the assurance of inevitable breakdown was gone.

It is noteworthy that whenever the Frankfurt School turned to the empirical investigation of actual social reality, it promptly shed the whole baggage of Critical Theory. Wittfogel's studies of Oriental despotism, Neumann's analysis of Nazi society, and above all the volumes of the series *Studies in Prejudice*, such as *The Authoritarian Personality*, dispensed with the metaphysics of Critical Theory.* With

*Franz Leopold Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*, New York, 1942; T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, R. Nevitt Sanford,

America's entry into the Second World War, the Institute sought to merge itself more with American life. Horkheimer had thought in earlier years that the right of exile would be terminated even in the United States when the international capitalist class came to recognize that it was in its interest to end it (p. 206). (Meanwhile, the only countries to have abrogated the right of exile are the socialist ones.) But in 1942 the spirit of the war against Nazism was strong. There was even one social evening when the Instituteers sought rapprochement with the editors of the more Communist *Science and Society*. Marcuse joined the Office of Strategic Services to prepare memoranda and learned chapters on the political bearings of German existentialism. But Horkheimer and Adorno sufficiently overcame their self-repression of matters Jewish to negotiate in 1942 with the American Jewish Committee for research commitments. Then in 1944 Horkheimer entered into a scholarly alliance with a group of empirical social psychologists on the West Coast, and from their collaborative efforts was born *The Authoritarian Personality*. Professor Jay concedes that *praxis* was no longer stressed as the testing-ground of theories, but he says that the Institute still retains its critique of the 'hypothesis-verification-conclusion model of social research' (p. 240). In practice, all this meant, however, was that public opinion questionnaires were regarded as inadequate for studying latent levels of personality, and that intensive individual interviews were used to get beyond the manifest level. But that is all well within the logic of hypothesis and verification. When Freud investigated dreams and slips of the tongue to enquire into the 'hidden' workings of the unconscious, he was in no way breaking with the ordinary logic of hypothesis and verification. Rather he was broadening the domain of scientific hypotheses and the usable empirical facts. In so far as Horkheimer and Adorno were in their writings still affected by Critical Theory, it led to the pathetic reiteration that antisemitism was the self-hatred of the bourgeoisie projected on to the Jews, and the assertion in 1946 that 'at present the only country where there does not seem to be any kind of anti-Semitism is Russia. This has a very obvious reason. Not only has Russia passed laws against anti-Semitism, but it really enforces them; and the penalties are very severe' (p. 228). Critical Theory?

One wishes that the Critical Theorists had applied some of their psychoanalytical talents to finding out why they were so attached to 'negation', to 'formulating the negative' (p. xii). Philosophers have varied in the choice of logical notions which they have felt emotionally and logically basic. Kierkegaard dwelled on 'either-or'; William James was generously attached to 'and'; one cantankerous logician gave

et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York, 1950. The writings of Karl August Wittfogel culminated later in his *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*, New Haven, Conn., 1957.

primacy to 'incompatible'. The Critical Theorists, as if in a child's perpetual temper tantrum, always rebuking the father, made a fetish of 'no' and the Great Refusal. Critical Theorists maintained that the Enlightenment, by eliminating negation from language, had made men unable to articulate their protest. Yet it is a strange notion which assumes that protest is primarily negative. If a hungry man says, 'I want food', he is affirming something; and it is the oppressor who negates when he says, 'Thou shalt not have food'. Was there possibly some unresolved Oedipal urge which was the latent director of the Critical Theorists' search for the Unverifiable Hidden Other? For the Cabbala, which even the most erudite Jewish scholars rarely studied, can scarcely have been the source of this conception, whereas those scientists like Einstein who felt the inspiration of the Jewish God and Spinoza's, found that His mathematical simplicity led them to the discovery and verification of laws of nature; the Jewish God was not always a hidden one, though in His infinite character He could never be known to man at any instant in his history.

RACE IN THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION: FROM PARK TO PARSONS

Michael Banton

(*Review Article*)

THE study of race relations made great advances in the United States during the 1930s, but after the publication in 1944 of *An American Dilemma* there was a reaction and the interests of sociologists moved elsewhere; George C. Homans told me in 1955 that the bright graduate students were not attracted to race relations because it was a field in which no one 'could make a big kill'. I thought to myself that when people believe this of a field of study it is often the moment when the enterprising research worker can make his mark, but Homans's judgement seems to have fulfilled itself in that few exciting contributions were forthcoming. Perhaps Essien-Udom's *Black Nationalism* has some of the classic quality of *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* but how few other monographs there are, considering the events of the last twenty years, which deserve a place beside Dollard's book!

Stanford M. Lyman's little volume raises this question in a constructive fashion.* It is a question of such importance that I may be permitted to pursue it into areas that he does not explore. In some respects Professor Lyman goes much further than I would. He concludes: 'The thesis of this book can be simply stated: The sociology of the black man has not yet begun' (p. 171), while elsewhere he refers to the 'fact' that 'of all areas of sociological enquiry the field of race relations is theoretically the least developed' (p. 23). Many American sociologists would assent to the latter proposition, because, I suspect, of the way race relations is usually taught in their universities, and because, too, they have not considered the many potential fields of sociology which are not yet accepted specialisms. In my view race relations compares quite reasonably with most of the existing specialisms (which all have skeletons in their cupboards) and I would assure

* Stanford M. Lyman, *The Black American in Sociological Thought* (New Perspectives on Black America series, General Editor, Herbert Hill), vii + 220 pp., G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1972, $6.95.

Professor Lyman that the sociology of the police, for example, is a lot less well theoretically developed. Moreover I would insist that we need a sociology of the police, not just a sociology of the policeman; a sociology of Jewish-Gentile relations, not just a sociology of the Jews; and, by the same token, a sociology of race relations, not just of the black man —the substitution of that phrase, indeed, is a symptom of the muddle and panic into which American sociologists have talked themselves by neglecting their sociology.

The way Americans teach race relations is well illustrated by the reader prepared by Mrs Rose.* As only eight of the 46 readings in it are repeated from the 1965 edition, it will be seen that a great deal has been done to up-date it. The coverage is wide and falls into six sections: the nature of minority problems in the United States; minority problems in other parts of the world; types of tension and discrimination; group identification and minority adjustment; race and the causes of prejudice; and proposed techniques for eliminating minority problems. It is less Americo-centric than most such readers, but it has a 'current affairs' bias, being angled so as to make better citizens of the students instead of encouraging a systematic sociological approach. Relatively few of the readings are from academic journals; many are from popular organs or publications like the pamphlets of the Anti-Defamation League which, though admirable for their purpose, are not of the intellectual level of the reading assigned for college courses in physics, zoology, or economics.

As, following Sir Karl Popper, I incline to the view that knowledge grows through the correcting of our mistakes, it was with high anticipation that I saw that Professor Lyman refuses to compete with the newsman or the orator. The jacket of the book tells us that the sociology of racial conflict in the United States has failed 'because of a faulty perspective: the refusal to see the black American as a figure with a history'. It looked as if the author was going to argue that the failure arose from the refusal of teachers and research workers to treat sociological writing on racial conflict as a process with a history, for his five chief chapters are devoted to critical reviews of the main studies, or groups of studies, by which this history is signposted.

The first author selected for examination is Robert E. Park. Lyman sees him as synthesizing social Darwinist thought, but under-rates the extent to which Park struggled with that heritage. From the beginning, social Darwinism relied on untestable propositions (like that of the survival of the fittest) and shaded into a philosophy of history. Park, as I read him, sought an alternative. It is illuminating to compare the textbook *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* produced by Park and Burgess in 1921 with Sorokin's *Contemporary Sociological Theories* of 1928.

* Arnold M. Rose and Caroline B. Rose, eds., *Minority Problems*, 2nd edn., x + 483 pp. Harper & Row, New York, 1972, £3.25.

Sorokin accepts the Darwinist framework and the validity of many of the findings presented within it. At the end of his chapter on the 'Anthropo-racial, Selectionist, and Hereditarist School' he concludes that the school seems to be right in many respects including its 'claim that racial groups are different physically and mentally' and that it had been 'one of the most important and valuable schools in sociology' (pp. 291, 308). There is no conception at all of race *relations* as a social phenomenon. Park swept aside much that Sorokin thought important. He dismissed racial typology. But more of the difference is to be traced to the two men's being interested in different kinds of question. Park had been a journalist, had studied under Simmel, and had written a thesis on the Mass and Public Opinion. He laboured to develop sociology as the science of collective behaviour and to provide an alternative to those who saw society as grounded in like-mindedness. Park argued that society was corporate action; he introduced into American sociology the concept of interaction as a basic category that divided into four processes: competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. There is much in this to echo social Darwinism, though in 1918 Park was pointing to the differences between organic and socio-cultural evolution, explaining that social tradition had to be studied independently. This was one of the fundamental lines along which to attack social Darwinism. Nevertheless Park was still bent under the intellectual load accumulated by some of his Darwinistically-minded predecessors. This is noticeable in the distribution of selections printed in the *Introduction*. After Park himself and Simmel (fourteen and ten extracts, respectively) the next most quoted are Darwin, Sumner, and Small with four each. Sumner and his concept of the mores are given an honoured place. The conceptualization of conflict, class, interests, structure, and related concepts is feeble. But Park is not using the material as Sorokin does. He uses the biological extracts and the evidence on animal society to point towards the sort of ecological framework that has become so much more fashionable in our own day. Competition is as basic a process among humans as it is among plants in a rock garden. Race prejudice is a restriction of competition in which groups try to develop monopoly power. This insight still has value for sociologists.

Though concentrating on collective behaviour, Park did not see the individual as a puppet directed by greater forces. He tried to formulate concepts which would interrelate social processes and observable behaviour, such as social distance, racial etiquette, and the marginal man—all imaginative innovations. Yet Lyman gives little place to this. He represents Park as continually elaborating upon a major guiding idea, that of the race relations cycle. Why was this cycle so important to him? Because, says Lyman, Park was in thrall to Aristotle's concept that science must deal with the slow and orderly development of

immanent qualities and not with accidents or the real history of events. The evidence for this is insufficient. Lyman describes the Aristotelian theory and then states, 'All the principles of Aristotle's theory of change are reproduced in Park's race-relations cycle' (p. 30). I do not find the resemblance so close. Moreover, there is much else in Park's writing to indicate that this was not his philosophy of science. Park worked on the idea of a cycle in the late twenties. It did not feature in the 1921 *Introduction*, while Lyman himself states that in his later years he began to have doubts about it. It was scarcely so crucial to Park's outlook as this critique implies.

Lyman claims that, because of his devotion to the supposed cycle, Park 'cut off sociological investigation at precisely that point where it should have begun—at the institutions wherein intimate contact presumably takes place, in schools, jobs, and other situations of secondary contact' (p. 69). The record as I read it was that Park was one of the first professors of sociology to send students out to study such things. His mistakes, and they are easily forgiven considering the state of sociology in his generation, stem from another quarter. Had there been sufficient empirical research using an adequate conceptual framework, it would have brought to light the partial nature of Park's vision and the need to supplement his ideas.

The next chapter concentrates on Dollard's study in the early 1930s of Indianola, Mississippi. It concludes that he and others saw Southern race relations as characterized by caste whereas in the North relations were governed by a racial prejudice which was rooted in the personality. Lyman's analysis is in important respects incomplete, for it does not explain the key features of the colour-caste concept as formulated by Lloyd Warner and therefore cannot account for such instances as that reported by Dollard (p. 292) in which a Negro, with impunity, beat up a white debtor. Lyman complains that Dollard and other authors failed to see both caste and prejudice as features of racism. It would be better, he thinks, to examine breaks in the pattern of race relations and to search for the antecedent factors that brought them about. Coming from someone who professes such principles and who criticizes Park for discouraging the study of black history, this chapter is breathtaking in its own innocence concerning the relevance of Southern history to any assessment of the 1930s studies. After the Civil War the south-east was seriously overpopulated and living conditions deteriorated. Between 1870 and 1930 the acreage devoted to agriculture diminished but the labour force on the farms almost doubled. Negro-operated farms produced less cotton. The fecundity of Negro women declined because of pellagra and venereal disease. Fighting to retain their position in a declining economy, the whites pushed the blacks ever further down. Dollard's study was conducted in the depths of a recession which, because of over-population, hit the cotton-producing areas particularly

hard. The only escape for the Negro was emigration, but except for wartime, whenever there were jobs going in the North, white immigrant labour came in to seize them. The weakness in Dollard's study, to my way of thinking, is his failure adequately to show how patterns of relations inside Indianola were related to political forces generated at the state and federal level by economic and status interests.

Next on the list comes Gunnar Myrdal, who made some quite interesting mistakes in the creative synthesis of others' work that constituted his classic *An American Dilemma*. One of these was his conception of 'The Negro Community as a Pathological Form of an American Community'—to quote one of his sub-titles at p. 927. Another was his over-estimation of the American creed as a set of values to which all Americans subscribe. To understand why he made them it is necessary to appreciate that the United States can look different, and Americans can seem to share more values, when seen through an outsider's eyes, especially when those eyes are Swedish. In 1890 one out of every ten Swedish-born persons was living in the United States. America was the golden land, and it had a special attraction for Swedish radicals because by emigrating the people were voting with their feet and showing what they thought of the highly stratified Strindbergian Swedish society.

The Enlightenment had a particular hold on Swedish radicalism. Myrdal has documented this himself in the book which he wrote with his wife Alva, published as *Kontakt med Amerika* (Bonniers; Stockholm, 1941). Since other commentators have neglected this source, it is worth quoting several passages. The Myrdals wrote that the American, even the scholar, is not very aware of what is distinctive about his society. 'The secret is that America has a living system of explicit ideals for human association that is more coherent, firm, clearly formulated and alive in popular consciousness than in any other country, large or small, in all the Western world . . . in America we used to talk about "the American creed" to identify what we had in mind' (p. 33). The main roots of this value system were listed as: the philosophy of the Enlightenment, the Anglo-Saxon conception of law, and low-church protestant religiosity. This is recapitulated in *An American Dilemma* but in the original Myrdal wrote in more enthusiastic tones: 'America has preserved in almost undamaged form the Enlightenment's morning-clear confidence in reason, its belief in the individual's potentialities, its passion for individuals' rights' (p. 34). There was also a profound kith-and-kin strain in the Myrdals' conception of the United States: 'For us Swedes America can never be one foreign country among other foreign countries because somewhere between a quarter and a third of people of Swedish descent live in that country. There they have struggled forward, built their homes, and grafted themselves into the great American democracy . . . In our many and long journeys we have met them in all the states of the Union' (pp. 315–16). It is also worth noting

that Myrdal's original chief assistant, Richard Sterner, was seconded to the research from the Royal Social Board, Stockholm.

Myrdal acknowledges his philosophical position in the 'personal note' which concludes the text of *An American Dilemma* and where he asserts, 'Social study is concerned with explaining why all these potentially good people so often make life a hell for themselves and for each other' (p. 1023). This philosophy—to invert the title of a famous sociological essay—is grounded in an undersocialized conception of man. People have long presented themselves as moral and have put the blame upon immoral society: it avoids some nasty questions. People are conditioned also, and their societies make conflicting demands upon them (increasingly, perhaps) so that some situations have to be defined as different from others. It is his eighteenth-century rationalism which explains the mistakes in Myrdal's central theory: that moral unease in individuals will be the principal factor causing change at the social level, eliminating the allegedly particularistic value systems which would say that it is no more wrong to treat blacks differently in socially intimate situations than to recognize a sphere of private life distinct from the sphere governed by civic obligations. Myrdal never managed adequately to relate his recognition of the importance of economic power in the social structure to his definition of 'the Negro Problem and Modern Democracy' (his sub-title) as 'A White Man's Problem' lying on the moral plane.

Professor Lyman takes a view of Myrdal different from mine. He thinks that Myrdal accepted his mechanical model of change as the reality of American life, and that his view of the Negro's reverse rank order of discrimination (which I read as a matter of tactics) is occasioned by Myrdal's belief that blacks have no long-term future other than assimilation. Though Myrdal introduced many new and valuable notions, sharply criticizing the conservative, laissez-faire, and fatalistic bias of conventional sociology, Lyman doggedly insists that he was captured by the tradition of classical American sociology.

Chronologically, the major race relations study to appear after *An American Dilemma* and *Black Metropolis* was Oliver C. Cox's *Caste, Class and Race* (1948). This remarkable volume by a black Trinidadian is more deserving of careful examination than several books that Lyman discusses, and it presupposes an orderly development of immanent qualities just as much as Park or Myrdal, yet it is never mentioned. Cox saw the need to attempt a critical appraisal of his predecessors and he has had a considerable influence on the whole field. His criticisms of Park and Myrdal have often been repeated, though I would argue that he did not identify their weakest points. It is also interesting to note twenty-six years later how many assumptions Cox shared with those he criticized, and to recall his conclusion: 'The race problem then, is primarily the short-run manifestations of opposition between an

abiding urge among Negroes to assimilate and a more or less unmodifiable decision among racially articulate, nationalistic whites that they should not'. He added that 'the solidarity of American Negroes is neither nationalistic nor nativistic . . . its social drive is toward assimilation' (p. 545). This view at least did not set him in opposition to Park, Dollard, and Myrdal.

Following upon the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality* in 1950, much attention switched to psychological theories. Lyman has little to say about this volume or those published with it. He prefers to concentrate on Gordon Allport's work, which he thinks limited; he balances it with an exposition of Herbert Blumer's unexciting thesis about prejudice as a sense of group position. Of course the personality theories are limited! Is it not more interesting to ask why social scientists often fail to recognize how limited are the applications of new theories? If there has been a 'failure of perspective' in American sociology, it is not—as Lyman assumes—simply a failure on the part of key authors. It is also a failure on the part of sociology as an institution to sort out the wheat from the chaff and to discipline the advances made possible by conceptual innovation. We could do with an analysis of the bandwagon effect whereby in American sociology new ideas are damaged by the inflation that results when their meanings are illegitimately extended and they are treated as philosophers' stones. In the present case one can guess that the popularity of psychological theories in the 1950s was not unconnected with the McCarthy era when it was risky to maintain that the source of racial conflict lay in the social structure, but such issues are not mentioned in this book.

And so to Parsons. We are given a simple and sympathetic account of Parsons's view of the sources of frustration and his reasoning that blacks had to wait their turn behind other groups before they could be included in the American society. Parsons sees race relations as controlled by laws of evolutionary development because his sociology is basically deterministic, and these assumptions Lyman considers objectionable.

Nowhere does Professor Lyman demonstrate that there has been a failure of sociological perspective. He simply asserts that blacks remain a sociological puzzle. Why? The impression with which I was left is that Lyman's underlying irritation is with the assumption by white sociologists that the inevitable fate of blacks in the United States is assimilation, so that blacks have no choice in the matter. It is this problem with which the author is really concerned and which explains both his concentration on Park as a *bête blanche* and the selection of his other targets. Though Park started with erroneous ideas about racial temperament he moved to the view that race itself provided no logical basis for social grouping. If the popular notion of race was a mistake, it was reasonable to expect that people would eventually realize this and

stop drawing a colour line. Assimilation would then follow unless some other factor intervened. If black writers dislike this as a one-sided picture in which everything depends on white prejudices, they must explain where it is inaccurate and identify the other factor which offers a basis for black identity. There is a puzzle here which has become increasingly apparent in recent years. Several sociologists have illuminated it, but they cannot resolve it. That requires political action by black Americans.

Professor Lyman concludes his book with the statement that the principal reason for the imputed failure has been that American sociological thought has been dominated by a progressively more complex version of Aristotle's view that all things change according to principles of slow, orderly, and continuous motion. The argument is, in a sense, the author's tribute to the persuasiveness of his anti-Aristotelian teachers at Berkeley. One may welcome it for its contention that the weaknesses of sociologists can be traced back to their implicit philosophies and that we can learn from their errors. Methodological essentialism of the kind commended by Aristotle is still influential in sociology, but it is misguided to heap on it all the blame for the failure to solve a puzzle that does not lie fully in the academic domain. Nor is it easy to accept the claim that the weaknesses in the work of Park, Dollard, Myrdal, Allport, Parsons, and others stem from this single source.

Professor Lyman asks that in place of the kind of sociology he criticizes we try to develop along Weberian lines a sociologically informed history of the black American from sixteenth-century West Africa to the present day. He notes that when integration has appeared a likely possibility black leaders in the United States have espoused nationalistic movements, and he wants the new history to recognize that social change has been discontinuous because the people at the core of it have been making choices. Yet Professor Lyman has not altogether broken away himself from the standpoint he criticizes. When he refers to prejudice and colour-caste as 'features of a larger and prior phenomenon—racism, a value that arose at a particular time and became embedded in complex ways in the fabric of Western social organization' (p. 95), we seem to be back with an Aristotelian entity, for Lyman never defines this much-abused term and relies for his history on Winthrop Jordan, a historian who is careful to avoid it. If we are to follow Lyman's advice and study ways in which racism is a value that has been institutionalized, why should we not see it as institutionalized in racial prejudice and colour-caste?

An alternative view is that Park, Dollard, Myrdal, Allport, and Parsons in their writings on race relations made different kinds of mistake and that we have not learned as much from them as we might because the critical literature in the race relations field has been so

poor. We need a good history of this branch of sociology as well as a better history of black Americans. When it comes to be written I suspect that it will find not only that Park was the beginning of one intellectual period but that Parsons marked its end. Around 1960 the character of race relations in the United States changed as blacks asserted themselves in new ways. Sociology has changed too, and is learning from what it sees of the efforts of black Americans to resolve a puzzle that is theirs rather than sociology's.

BOOK REVIEWS

ZVI Y. GITELMAN, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics. The Jewish Sections of the CPSU, 1917–1930*, xii + 573 pp., Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N.J., and Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1972, £10.00.

ABRAHAM ASCHER, *Pavel Axelrod and the Development of Menshevism*, 420 pp., Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., and Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1972, £9.25.

There are, as Zvi Gitelman recognizes in his opening passages, various ways of approaching the study of Soviet politics and society. Certainly one of the most persuasive, and pervasive, adopted by Western scholars has been to perceive the relationship of state and society in terms of the growing supremacy of totalitarian control over society's need for self-expression and self-assertion. The result of this (short-lived) conflict is seen as the imposition of a passive role on society and the accretion of monolithic power to the state (that is, Party). While not rejecting this totalitarian model, Gitelman chooses here to see the first decade of Soviet power as a period in which an authoritarian régime was attempting to mobilize social and economic resources for the purpose of rapid modernization, political integration, and political development. In terms of interpreting the end result, this approach changes nothing, but it does impart a sense of the dynamism and of the range of options in the period when the eventually fossilized relationships were still fluid.

During the first quarter of the twentieth century Russia was a modernizing society, and so was Russian Jewry, which at least since the Great Reforms of the 1860s had had some choice in questions of religion, culture, language, and economic and social life. Between the alternatives of assimilation and withdrawal into the ghetto, to a lesser degree than Western Jews who favoured the former, the Jews of the East sought various means to synthesize the choices open to them. Hence Zionism, Jewish Socialism, Hebraism, Yiddishism, Territorial Autonomism, religious and cultural reformism, and ultimately Jewish Communism, which forms the subject of this book.

Distinguishing between two types of modernization policy, Bolshevik up to 1928 and Stalinist thereafter, Gitelman (quoting Eisenstadt) characterizes the former as 'nationalist revolutionary', which ' "while aiming at long-term structural transformation . . . attempted . . . to take into account some of the major social strata and groups, or at least permit them some autonomous expression . . ." ' (p. 7). By contrast, the Stalinist model imposed the 'checkerboard' pattern (Chalmers Johnson) where one sector was intensively developed while others were demobilized by the totalitarian instruments of control and repression. The aim of the present book is to recount the history

of the 'nationalist revolutionary' period of modernization in relation to the Jewish population, as expressed and attempted by the Jewish Sections of the CPSU, which were institutions created specifically to effect the integration of modern Jewry into Soviet Society. To achieve this evidently hopeless task, it was necessary both to weaken the 'primordial attachments' and promote a sense of loyalty to the Soviet state, its goals, and its ideology. Where the territorially, ethnically, and culturally well-established Russians were concerned, this aim may have been genuinely Utopian. In the case of the Jews, despite their ready-made rootless cosmopolitanism, the primordial attachments were to prove no less recalcitrant. Additional factors hampering Jewish integration were competing Jewish authorities, the poverty and the economic marginality of the Jews, the limitations imposed on cultural development by Bolshevik ideology, and Jewish attitudes. As for the impediments suffered by the members of the Jewish Sections themselves, first of all they were agents of the Bolshevik leadership, and secondly they were painfully aware that they had come over to Communism only after the success of the Bolshevik seizure of power. Moreover, the history of the relations between the Bolsheviks and the Jewish Social Democrats (Bundists), who now emerged in the Jewish Sections, had since the beginning of the century been one of head-on conflict precisely over the inextricably linked issues of the role of the national (that is, ethnic) social democratic organizations in Russia and the structure of the All-Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party, which became the Russian Bolshevik Party.

It is appropriate here to mention Abraham Ascher's book, the first attempt at a full biography of one of the Jewish revolutionaries involved in the birth of the Russian Social Democratic Party. The leading Mensheviks in their first phase of existence were an important phenomenon in the history of the Jews in Russia, for it was they as individuals, overwhelmingly of Jewish origin, who mounted the main attack on the only Jewish organization of the Party, the Bund, which was demanding the restructuring of the Party along ethnic lines and on federative principles, with itself as the sole representative of the Jewish workers in the Party. Axelrod, although his revolutionary zeal had been fired in the 1870s by his awareness of the backwardness of the Jewish masses, was by 1903 too well integrated into the Russian revolutionary establishment to espouse such 'special' causes, and like the greater part of the revolutionary movement, he tended, albeit with greater sophistication than most, to view the socialist revolution which would sweep away the tsarist system as the solution to Jewish (as to all other) problems. Perhaps because their main adversary was Lenin, the Mensheviks took upon themselves the role of conscience of the Party, and among them Axelrod was preeminent in this function. The Mensheviks assumed the mantle of pure social democracy, while Lenin and his Bolsheviks were tarred with the brush of opportunism and Blanquist élitism. Ascher traces the influence exerted by Axelrod's thinking on the evolution of Menshevik doctrine, emphasizing its persistent anti-Leninist recognition of the role of the organized working class, but he resolutely resists any temptation to speculate upon the piquancy, to say no more, of the Jewish ascendancy in the Menshevik movement. He has written a valuable study of an important figure who, though he may have fermented nothing more dangerous than yoghurt for the Russian

émigrés of Switzerland, deserves the reputation he acquired as their conscience and mentor in the socialist cause for the best part of thirty years.

To return to Gitelman. It was effectively Jewish Menshevik assimilationism which prevailed in the ascendant leadership of the CPSU and which undermined the work of the Jewish Sections, for it envisaged the integration of the Jews into Soviet society as a whole: they were not to constitute a special or separate ethnic entity. Reinforcing this attitude, large sections of the Jewish population were ready, in Russia as elsewhere, to abandon their separate identity in favour of identification with the dominant culture. This trend was already apparent in the pre-revolutionary pattern of russification among the Jewish intelligentsia as well as in the impact of physical mobility on the Jewish working class. Dynamic, or restless, sections of the Jewish population had long ago descried the rewards of assimilating to the more 'modern' Russian and European culture. Only the Jewish socialists, organized as Jews in the Bund, had sought to find a formula for revolutionary conservation among the Jewish masses, and they had been condemned by the 'Russian' Social Democrats, foremost among them assimilated Jews like Martov, Trotsky, and Axelrod. Perhaps what the assimilationists failed to note was that the Bund was more than a political organization. Increasingly its scope widened to become a sort of cultural decompression chamber for Jewish artisans edging their way out of the religious, psychological, and economic confines of the ghetto, while at the same time seeking for a way of life that did not entail repudiation of Jewish identity and yet expressed their espousal of socialist goals and internationalist ideals. As Plekhanov quipped, this was the outlook of Zionists afraid of sea-sickness.

A significant result of Gitelman's approach is that the changes of tactics made by the Jewish Sections have the appearance of adjustments to specific Jewish problems, yet at the same time it is made clear that such swings are parallel to changes in the grand strategy of the CPSU. For example, the backward *shtetl* and its *kustars* (self-employed artisans), useful under NEP, became harmful impediments when the Party veered away from a gradualist to a more radical economic policy, and thus the Jewish Sections 'began to search for more potent medicines than the palliatives of Yiddishization, *kustar* cooperatives, and work in the *shtetls*, which had failed to stem the growth of unemployment, to supply the *kustars* with raw materials or to bring new industries to the *shtetls*' (p. 379).

Similarly, the Party policy of 'nativization', embarked on in 1923–24, was reflected in the Jewish context not as a response to genuine needs, but as the introductory phase of long-term Stalinist nationality policy for general application: 'socialist in content, national (ethnic) in form'. Here it was that the crucial difference between the Jews and the other nationalities assumed major importance for the long term. To enhance the traditional cultures—the literature, language, and folklore—of the other nationalities could seem like an investment in their eventual integration into a multi-national, culturally rich Soviet totality, without fear of national separatist movements arising as long as the supranational CPSU held power. The Jewish case was less attractive. Traditional Jewish culture is religious and Hebraic and was therefore condemned. All that remained was the folk language, Yiddish, from which Jews had been emancipating themselves in favour of 'superior'

Russian. Jewish institutions were nonetheless Yiddishized, but were little more than translation machines for the Party line. The same thing was in part true of the other nationalities, but there at least the native language was more widely used in the administration, and indeed could be said to have a base in the locality where the population was also more homogeneous in general.

Nevertheless, ethnic or national institutions were not, nor have they become, expressions of ethnic views of Soviet life, but are instead expressions of the official 'Soviet' view of Soviet life in different languages. The Yiddishization policy foundered because the Jews remained scattered, because they were everywhere dependent on the Russian-speaking system whether in higher courts or secondary schools, and because assimilation and emigration had deprived the Jewish population of a Yiddish-speaking professional class. Finally, Yiddishization dissolved under the impact of force majeure, the state policies of industrialization, collectivization, and the forcible integration of Jewish agricultural workers under the terms of the 'internationalization' policy. The Jewish Sections themselves, like many another national minority institution, were dispersed in 1930 when the CPSU undertook to modernize and unify Soviet society without regard to the help that might be got from relatively autonomous sections of the population. Henceforth, social homogeneity would be achieved by Procrustean methods; 'un-Soviet' elements would either be forced into passivity within society or excluded completely. Ironically, despite the terrible hardships suffered by the Jews during the first decade of Soviet power, through pogroms, Civil War, and the damaging effects of shifts in main policy, it turns out that there was hardly ever a better time for them in Russia: in the past they had invariably been excluded from legislative plans, and what was in store later is beyond compare.

In conclusion, Gitelman's source material is rich, his footnotes so informative at times as to vie in significance with the narrative. His somewhat heavy sociologizing, though palatable, is limited in the main to the opening passages of his introduction and conclusion, and the book is otherwise written in a lively and clear style. It will be highly valued by students of Soviet policy—economic, political, social, and nationality—as well as, of course, by those aware of the paucity of such scholarship as has existed until now.

HAROLD SHUKMAN

EUGENE B. BOROWITZ, *The Mask Jews Wear. The Self-Deceptions of American Jewry*, 222 pp., Simon and Schuster, New York, 1973, $7.95.

Eugene B. Borowitz, theologian and educator in American Reform Jewry, sets out to demonstrate that many American Jews wear a mask of self-deception about themselves as Jews, which he would persuade them to recognize and remove. Their mask is the conviction that their synthesis of liberal politics, ethical universalism, and devotion to high culture have nothing to do

with the trivial but somehow nagging fact of their being Jews. In personal though not historical terms, it began with their immigrant forbears' passion 'to transform themselves quickly and expertly into proper Americans' (p. 36) by shedding as much as they could of their Jewish externals. They became 'modern Marranos', in Borowitz's rather infelicitous term. Their progeny who penetrated into American society adopted the tastes and imitated the cultivation of the upper middle class, and indeed outdid the model. Now these Jews are patrons of ballet, modern art, the American Civil Liberties Union, and arty-crafty home decoration. They by no means deny that they are Jews, but belittle the matter as parochial, while regarding themselves as universalists.

It is Professor Borowitz's endeavour to point out to this substantial group that the very fervour of their universalism helps to make them Jews. The most effective chapter of the book traces back to Hermann Cohen the teaching that the essence of Judaism is ethical universalism, and argues that the bearers of ethical idealism in America are not to be found in its political life, profit economy, educational and cultural institutions, nor in its contemporary art, science, or even philosophy. All these are at best ethically neutral. Nor has the sentimentality about human nature now fashionable in the behavioural sciences anything to offer. Only transcendentally grounded ethics, borne by a committed minority group in 'creative alienation' such as the Jews, possess thrust, realism, and staying power, and can bestow these virtues upon Jews who live by them. The author's critique of these contemporary idols is not fully worked out, but it has an allusiveness to situations which are familiar to today's Americans. Borowitz's argument is strengthened by the erosion of the moral and intellectual universalism which many musicians, physicians, scientists, and others once found in their respective fields.

Borowitz writes not only to make his points but to win over the group he is describing. He would like the prosperous universalists among American Jews to recognize the Jewish roots of their faith, and to permit their repressed Jewishness to emerge into the open once they become conscious of their own psychic roots. Borowitz declines to speak of any historical or revelational essence of Judaism, preferring the subjective 'existentialist sense of Jewishness as a way of centering our commitments . . .' (p. 211). Each individual must come to terms with his own Jewishness in his own way. Perhaps it is just that this reviewer is unschooled in existentialist modes of thinking, but one wonders how and where—indeed, whether—this individualist Jewishness finds its link with Judaism as known and practised. The relationship between the existentialist perceptions of the American Jew who may be persuaded by Borowitz's book and essentialist Judaism, awaits, as I believe, further elucidation—it is to be hoped, by the author himself.

LLOYD P. GARTNER

SUSAN BUDD, *Sociologists and Religion, Themes and Issues in Modern Sociology*, viii + 196 pp., Collier-Macmillan, London, 1973, £1.00 paperback, £2.00 hardback.

MICHAEL HILL, *A Sociology of Religion*, x + 285 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1973, £1.50 paperback, £3.50 hardback.

If there is need for a reminder that the London School of Economics is maintaining its scholarly excellence, this is provided by the above volumes, whose authors are younger sociologists on the academic staff of that institution. Both books evince competence and a high degree of sophistication. In a general sense they also reinforce the widely accepted view that the study of religion provides a most fertile ground for the advancement of theoretical clarification in sociology.

Drs. Budd and Hill present us with roughly similar fare. They pay the necessary and expected attention to the classical writers on the significance of religion in society, that is, in particular to Weber and Durkheim. Quite naturally the authors have their own leanings, so that Hill, for example, follows Weber rather than Durkheim. His views, however, are quite balanced and one gains the same impression from Dr. Budd's work, except for the fact that she manages to squeeze Marx into a prominence which the latter does not deserve from the point of view of his influence on the sociology of religion.

Secularization is recognized by both authors as the most important current issue. The major problems in analysing this process are: (1) the shifting meaning of the concept of secularization (Budd, p. 119); and (2) that whilst the conclusion of any argument on secularization depends to a considerable extent on its basic premiss—how we define secularization—it hinges perhaps even more fundamentally on how we define religion (Hill, p. 228). The dilemma of definitions is very simply this. If the definition of religion is too wide, then the very concept of 'secularization' becomes perforce meaningless. If it is too narrow then it excludes certain belief-systems from the discussion, such as some of the ostensibly political 'isms'—for example, Communism. This would be unrealistic precisely in modern industrial and developing countries where these 'isms', by providing some cosmological and eschatological schemata and symbol-building of a religious kind, tend to become the 'functional equivalents' of religion.

Dr. Hill's own definition, based on an intellectual bifurcation, hardly helps to resolve the dilemma. He says: 'Religion can be defined as the set of beliefs which postulate and seek to regulate the distinction between an empirical reality and a related and significant supra-empirical segment of reality; the language and symbols which are used in relation to this distinction; and the activities and institutions which are concerned with its regulation' (p. 42). The central question still remains: What is meant by 'supra-empirical'? If it includes, for instance, the supra-empirical aspects of contemporary 'isms', then there is hardly any place left for a discussion of secularization. If it does not, then how does this really differ from other narrow or narrower definitions, such as those based on belief in supernatural powers? And in what basic sense is Hill's distinction different from Durkheim's sacred/secular dichotomy?

The prospective reader must be alerted to another point. These are textbooks for students working towards examinations. The researcher will not find much 'operational' guidance. Dr. Hill is more sensitive than Dr. Budd to such requirements when he states that there is a pressing need for concepts 'to be tested and reformulated continually in the light of available empirical data' (p. 206), but he does not give us a clue as to how this is to be done. To mention just one case, how would he probe the question of religious affiliation in contemporary society in the light of his definition of religion which is based on the concept of 'supra-empiricism'?

Since both works are intended as course texts let me end on a practical note. Dr. Hill's book is somewhat more comprehensive and also clearer. Dr. Budd's contains a good deal of sharp observation and many useful insights. I would recommend Hill as the main textbook and Budd as the additional, but most useful additional, reading.

ERNEST KRAUSZ

PETER Y. MEDDING, ed., *Jews in Australian Society* xiii + 299 pp., Macmillan, Monash University, Melbourne, 1973, $ Aust. 7.95.

Jews have lived in Australia since white settlement began at the end of the eighteenth century. Most of the Jewish immigrants during the nineteenth century came to Australia from England, but a substantial proportion were of German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Polish origin. The major influx, however, was in this century, just after the First World War and then in greater numbers after 1938. Of these, the great majority stem from the Yiddish-speaking communities of eastern Europe. Today Australia's total Jewish population numbers around 70,000, mostly concentrated in the metropolitan centres of Sydney and Melbourne, with smaller communities in the other State capitals. Melbourne, with a Jewish population of 34,000 and a wide range of communal institutions, is generally acknowledged (save perhaps by some New South Wales partisans) as the major centre of Jewish life in Australia. What are its characteristics as a community? In 1967 the Jewish Social Service Council of Victoria, on the initiative of its Chairman, Walter Lippmann, sponsored a sample social survey of Melbourne Jewry in order to provide some 'hard data' as a basis for formulating its own policies. Later, in 1969, a Conference on Sociological Studies of Jews in Australia was held at Monash University, at which some of the survey results were first presented and other papers delivered. All this material was subsequently reworked and brought together to form the present volume.

Walter Lippmann himself presents the introductory profile of Melbourne Jewry. It is not an unfamiliar picture: a predominantly immigrant group marked by high achievement orientation and a notable degree of social and economic upward nobility. But material success cannot be achieved without cost. To take only one aspect, small family-size is adaptive for upward mobility and allows for the higher education of one's children, but it may also raise questions about the community's capacity to reproduce itself, particularly when low birth rates are accompanied by a rising incidence of out-

marriages. At issue then is the whole problem of Jewish identification in Melbourne. This is the central concern of contributions by Dr. Medding and Professor Taft, a paper on Yiddish in Melbourne by Manfred Klarberg, and a number of personal essays by young Jewish intellectuals.

Medding examines the question in terms of the categories of orthodox, liberal, and secular Jews. Seculars are those who have little connexion at all with synagogues, or religious practice; they represent about 16 per cent of the sample. This, of course, tells us little about religious involvement in the other categories. According to the survey, 62 per cent attended services at Orthodox synagogues and 18 per cent at Liberal Temples, but this needs to be set against the fact, reported in another context, that 41 per cent of the total sample belonged to no congregation. Interestingly, secularism does not emerge as a popular alternative among Australian-born Jews, and their attendance at religious services is higher than among any other group. Medding comments that for Jews born in Australia some degree of formal religious identity is part of being Jewish, whereas for the immigrants Jewishness may well be part of immigrant minority status and need no reinforcement from formal religious preference. The Australian-born, some of whom are now third or fourth generation Australians, are of course more tightly integrated into Australian society, and their higher attendance at religious services may, by a kind of paradox, be a reflection of that very degree of integration. For belonging to different congregations is one of the few forms of exclusiveness that has been acceptable in the Australian ethos. Attending a Sabbath service carries no implication for the other aspects of traditional Jewish observance. Religion thus becomes compartmentalized and Judaism reduced to the status of a church among other churches; whereas their Christian neighbours go (when they go at all) to service on Sundays, Jews (when they go at all) go on Saturdays.

Some of the points raised in Medding's chapter are taken further in Professor Taft's paper on Jewish identification. Recognizing that being Jewish has many facets, Taft (a social psychologist) has attempted to develop an index of identification employing a number of different criteria—defence of Jewish identity, social relations, communal involvement, and so on. Scores are examined and compared in terms of national origin and 'generation'. It is not possible here to follow Taft's analysis in any detail, but it may be worth dwelling on some of his points relating to attitudes towards Israel as an index of ethnic identity because the initial survey was conducted before the 1967 Six-Day War and Taft has included in the volume his follow-up study (first published in this Journal) of the impact of the crisis on Melbourne Jewry. In the pre-War survey he observes that as far as the British-Australians were concerned, Australia (and perhaps England) was the only country with which they were involved. Israel was just another country with which there were certain historical connexions. By contrast, the survey conducted a week or two after the War established that there was a widespread, almost universal absorption in the crisis among Melbourne Jewry. Does this mean that there was a profound change of attitudes in the period between the two studies? Or does it mean that the concern was always there, but latent, at a level that the techniques of the investigators were not sensitive enough to expose? My doubts on this score only serve to highlight other questions about the

meaning we can attach to attitude surveys of this kind, and the inferences we can draw from them. Curiously enough, it is only when we come to the personal essays that we get any feel of the texture of Jewish life in Melbourne. Dennis Altman, a lecturer in Government at Sydney, opens his own memoir by recalling childhood visits to his grandmother and the smells emanating from her kitchen and he goes on to ask 'Who more than we Jews, define themselves by cuisine?' Since the question was not explicitly posed by the investigators, food habits and tastes (apart from the observance of the dietary laws) are excluded as an index of identification. But more important, is there not perhaps some clue here to Mr. Altman's own continuing acceptance of himself as a Jew despite his lack of social, religious, or cultural ties with the community and his obvious abhorrence of many features of Melbourne Jewish life? For if one is to achieve a deeper understanding of the nature of ethnic identity, of what generates and maintains it, or how it withers, we need to know more about its emotional roots, and that requires an instrument more probing than the attitude survey.

Jews in Australian Society suggests and at times explicitly draws comparisons with other Jewish communities of the Diaspora. The similarities are many, and many of the findings confirm those of American studies, but as one of the few studies available on Australian Jewry this book deserves to be widely read. Its tone throughout is sombre and it offers no easy optimism for the future. The mood is caught, with less 'scientific' detachment but with greater urgency, in some of the essays of the young intellectuals. Some of these have harsh things to say of the dominant values of contemporary Melbourne Jewry and one makes the pertinent comment that attempts to keep Jewish youth in the community are so frenetic precisely because there is so little to preserve. But behind much of this criticism is not rejection but concern, a concern to see re-established a set of values more consistent with the Jewish tradition. That so many Australian Jewish academics and intellectuals should have come together in the production of this book is in itself a matter of no small significance.

A. L. EPSTEIN

ANTHONY STORR, *Human Destructiveness*, Columbus Centre Series, Studies in the Dynamics of Persecution and Extermination (General Editor, Norman Cohn), viii + 127 pp., Sussex Univ. Press in association with Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1972, £1.50.

HENRY V. DICKS, *Licensed Mass Murder. A Socio-Psychological Study of Some SS Killers*, Columbus Centre Series, Studies in the Dynamics of Persecution and Extermination (General Editor, Norman Cohn) xiii + 283 pp., Sussex Univ. Press in association with Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1972, £3.00.

These two books compose the psychiatric contribution to the Columbus Centre series of studies on the Dynamics of Persecution and Extermination.

The first examines the problem in general, the second studies the 'German Case' as a 'paradigm of a planned, highly organized mass murder operation'.

Human Destructiveness is a slim volume, really a long essay in four chapters, in which Dr. Storr sets himself the task of inquiring into the underlying sources of human aggressiveness. After warning against the tendency of the psychotherapist to extrapolate from experience based on the study of a few selected abnormal individuals to explain mass phenomena, he launches into an intelligent if rather superficial survey of the currently popular ideas about man's aggression. He calls attention to the semantic problem, that the word aggression may be used merely as a synonym for self-assertion or alternatively for hatred and hostility. He points out, as has often been pointed out before, that man is the only animal who kills pointlessly, enjoying cruelty for its own sake. He gives the extreme points of view on the nature–nurture controversy of the origin of aggression as expounded on the one hand by Ardrey and Lorenz and on the other by Ashley Montagu, who believes aggression to be an entirely learned phenomenon. He tells about the now famous Milgrim experiment in which American psychology students were easily persuaded, in the interests of 'research', to administer what they thought were painful electric shocks to fellow students.

This general survey of ideas is followed by two chapters, each of which deals with a pathological condition in which cruelty is conspicuous: psychopathy, where cruelty tends to be casual and incidental; and sado-masochism, where it is central. His particular interest in the latter is in comparing the Freudian position that this syndrome is sexual in origin with that suggested by ethologists, that it has more to do with the primate's historical struggle for dominance in a status hierarchy. Both these chapters end with further speculation on the origin of aggression, and he specifically sets out two main alternatives:

(1) that the 'hateful' ways we have of raising children predispose them to cruelty, and
(2) that there is a 'basic flaw' in human beings that makes them potentially cruel.

After discussion of two psychiatric syndromes which he had said in advance could not contribute much to the understanding of mass violence, we come to the final chapter, 'The ubiquity of paranoia'. Here at last we hope to get to the heart of the matter. Starting with the 'paranoid delusions' of normal people (such as antisemitism, witchcraft, etc.), he launches into a discussion of infants' needs with reference to the human infant's long period of dependence, the disadvantages of no longer being carried on its mother's back, the results of Harlow's experiments with deprived baby monkeys, Spitz's findings on babies reared in institutions, the effects of isolation on prisoners and researchers, the methods of the Russian secret police, and possible connexions with the practice of infant swaddling, etc. He then explains, in Kleinian terms, the two main ways of handling anger, the paranoid and the depressive. At the end there is a ray of hope in his summary of DeBoer's description of Eskimo society, where a baby's first year of life simulates, as nearly as possible, his earlier existence in the womb. It is a little surprising that an avowed Kleinian should find cause for optimism in the Eskimo example.

For how can we assume as inevitable the murderous rage in each infant breast if, in fact, there is even one society where babies do not cry and where they grow into contented children and 'totally unaggressive' adults?

There is a lot in this pot-pourri which is diverting, interesting, and provocative but little that is original or that sheds new light on the problems of individual or mass violence. In fairness to the author, however, Dr. Storr makes no great claims for his contribution. There is one idea in his book which I found intriguing and the only one I regretted being quickly dropped; that was the idea that the damage done by groups may be done not so much because of man's aggressiveness as because of his tendency, rooted in his biological history, to follow the leader. Dr. Storr points out the unhappy fact that man's tendency towards obedience is much stronger than that towards compassion.

This 'tragedy of obedience', as Dr. Dicks calls it, is conspicuous *in Licensed Mass Murder*, a study of eight SS murderers convicted at the Nuremberg Trials of crimes against humanity and interviewed in prison some twenty-five years later. This grim but fascinating study focuses on 'the effects of the interaction between certain German males of military age and their cultural environment'. Its aim is to understand how large groups of men, Europeans with hundreds of years of Christian tradition behind them, could become so debased as to be able to plan, direct, and carry out the brutal extermination of millions of men, women, and children.

Dr. Dicks, like Dr. Storr, interprets the evidence in terms of the Klein-Fairbairn model of child development. The infant is seen to proceed from an early 'paranoid-schizoid position' in which his own anger and hatred are projected on to the outside world, to a 'depressive position' in which the badness is re-incorporated, leading to a sense of guilt and a need to make reparation. Eventually, if he is lucky enough to have good mothering, he learns to accept his own ambivalence and to identify with the parental models through whose agency the conscious, and unconscious, values of the society are transmitted. These concepts, extended into social phenomena, permit a rough and approximate division between those societies which can be considered paranoid (that is, authoritarian), so that armed police are necessary to exert absolute authority over feared, despised, child-like citizens and those which are considered depressive (that is, democratic), in which it is assumed that guilt has been internalized so that people may generally be expected to do what is right.

German society, from early Wilhelminian days, is examined in this light with emphasis on the rigid status structure in which everyone knew his place, toadied to the man above him, and bullied the man below in a series of steps from the Kaiser at the top of the pinnacle to the unskilled labourer at the bottom. But even the latter came into his own as the undisputed head in a family system where father's word was law and mother's role was denigrated, even degraded. As a result of membership in such a family a boy had to deny the tender side of his nature and to repress, rather than resolve, the oedipal conflict with such a punishing and omnipotent father. The unresolved aggression was then peculiarly available for projection on to scapegoats, such as Jews, Communists, gypsies, the mentally deficient, or any other 'enemies of the state'.

The author draws a composite profile of the Nazi personality based on the eight convicted murderers, and on a much larger group of German prisoners examined by him during the Second World War, as well as on some 61 self-descriptions of Nazis written before 1939, presumably with a view to advancement in the hierarchy. The configuration of traits in this profile is, Dr. Dicks points out, strikingly similar to that of the 'authoritarian personality' arrived at by Adorno and his co-workers in the United States. Thus, the proper Nazi was non-Christian, although he might be either deist or atheist. He had an unresolved bond with a powerful punishing father-figure, and a dearth of positive feeling towards maternal figures. Tenderness is despised. There is a homosexual 'cult of manliness'. The open expression of sadism is allowed but it is seen as a necessary defence against persecution by the dangerous victim. Neurotic anxiety is absent except when capture is imminent, but it can then be quite pronounced. (I would myself question whether this last reaction can properly be called neurotic anxiety.)

The body of the book contains descriptions, summaries of the official histories and court proceedings, and the author's skilled interviews with the eight killers. Dr. Dicks sees these men, all of whom did the dirty work with their own hands, as being still in the 'paranoid-schizoid position' with only minimal excursions into the self-doubt and guilt characteristic of the 'depressive position'. Their unspeakable tortures have a strong nursery flavour, forcing objects into mouth and anus, burying live people in excrement, killing babies in their mothers' arms, etc. He is very ingenious in fitting the observed facts to Kleinian theory, and also in showing enough of Nazi training methods and of the cultural atmosphere to explain the process of indoctrination and brutalization. However, to go along with him, we must take a good deal for granted. The acme of the 'paranoid-schizoid' position is generally understood to be during the first year, if not the first months, of life. And yet there is virtually nothing in these life histories to give us any information about the first years of life for any of these men. Even when talking in general about the German family system we do not get any picture of the early mother-baby relationship, nor of the customary ways of treating toddlers. We may infer that it was bad from the way these men turned out, but this is a circular argument. There is, I think, a real dichotomy in this study in that all the facts about the killers have to do with their later childhood and young adulthood, but the interpretations are based on the events of the early years, especially the first. Moreover, this concentration seems to prevent the author from examining some of the interesting material in the histories; for example, of the eight men studied, two had lost both parents, by separation or death before they were nine, and six had lost their fathers before they were eleven. Is it not possible that this early loss of the father had something to do with their subsequent careers? But even if we go along with Dr. Dicks's assumption that people who engaged in such monstrous behaviour must have been grossly deprived early on (and I for one would go along with that), the Klein-Fairbairn model is by no means the only one which would make sense of what went wrong. Other analytic theories would be equally applicable although, since all assume that the early years are most critical, they would all have to be based in part on theory and other experience rather than on the material gathered from the case histories. In Erikson's

terms, one could certainly see them as lacking the 'basic trust' and the 'sense of autonomy' which show satisfactory resolution of the conflicts of the first two or three years. It is, perhaps, even easier to see them as people who did not progress beyond Freud's 'anal' stage with its emphasis on dirt and its savagely punishing, and not yet internalized, super-ego. At this stage the conscience is outside. They could, therefore, obey the rules of the Weimar Republic, or their prison warders, or Hitler's henchmen with equal punctiliousness although they would naturally perform their 'duties' under Hitler with greater enthusiasm since they were thereby permitted to act out their most primitively destructive drives. This might indeed make more understandable what seemed to me puzzling when interpreted in Kleinian terms, that is, the undeniable fact that these men were not insane nor were they, before or after the Nazi period, criminals. They were even able to form some sort of relationships, as evidenced by the fact that most were married and some had children. If their emotional development had not progressed as far as the 'depressive position' it is hard to understand their comparative normality. For what is most impressive, and most depressing, in this vivid presentation of eight Nazi murderers is that they were not psychotic, nor even according to ordinary definition, psychopathic; but, despicable as they were, these were ordinary men, like hundreds of thousands of other ordinary men who, given the same circumstances, would probably have behaved in the same way. Why such circumstances arose in twentieth-century Germany remains a mystery in spite of the author's reasonable conjectures.

Anthony Storr has marshalled facts and theories about human destructiveness. Henry Dicks has examined what may rank as the most monstrous example in human history. The questions are highlighted, especially in Dr. Dicks's haunting study. They are not answered. Perhaps they are unanswerable.

DORIS Y. MAYER

AILON SHILOH and IDA COHEN SELAVAN, eds., *Ethnic Groups of America: their Morbidity, Mortality and Behavior Disorders*, Volume I, *The Jews*, xix + 425 pp., Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Ill., 1973, $17.50.

It has long been known that some diseases are commoner and some rarer in Jews of European origin than in their Gentile neighbours, and some if not most of these differences have a genetic origin. More recently it has been shown that there are systematic differences between the two communities in the frequencies of the normal 'marker' genes such as those determining the blood groups. The special psychological characteristics of Jews are proverbial both in their own community and among their neighbours, but there is little agreement as to how far these are hereditary and how far cultural. Since so many medical research workers and psychiatrists are Jewish, it is not surprising that much of the study on the topics mentioned has been done by Jewish investigators. The results, however, have been published in a wide

variety of journals. It will therefore be a great convenience to all who are interested in the biology, in its widest connotation, of the Jewish community in America and elsewhere to have available this well chosen collection of reprints of authoritative articles, which cover demography, blood groups, genetic disorders, varieties of cancer, patterns of morbidity, and behaviour disorders, with a short editorial introduction to each of these main topics. The first paper, 'Jewish Populations in General Decennial Population Censuses, 1955–61; a Bibliography', by Erich Rosenthal, was originally published in this Journal in 1969.

The papers, though technical, should mostly be understandable by anyone with a general biological or medical background. With one exception they were published, in a variety of journals, between 1960 and 1970. The paper by Rakower on tuberculosis among Jews, published in 1953, is of historical rather than of current medical interest. Each paper has its own bibliography and these differ greatly in completeness; each is also inevitably limited by the original date of publication. It would therefore have been helpful to those using the book as a research tool if supplementary select bibliographies could have been added, increasing the scope of those of the authors, and bringing them up to date. This is a matter which might usefully be considered by the publishers when they are planning further volumes in this series.

The book is well produced and there are very full indexes of subjects, and of authors including all those cited in bibliographies. The print is large and the paper rather thick, giving a book which is perhaps unnecessarily large. It deserves a wide circulation among Jews and among doctors and human biologists generally.

A. E. MOURANT

CHRONICLE

The Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds has sponsored, with contributions from member Jewish Federations in the United States, a National Jewish Population Study. The following summary of the main findings appeared in a recent report by Fred Massarik, *Intermarriage, Facts for Planning.*

The National Jewish Population study defines *basic* intermarriage as a marriage in which one or the other partner was identified with a non-Jewish religious-cultural viewpoint *at the time that he/she met his/her future spouse* (as identified by self-description or as described by another household member).

With this definition, the present Study—based on a nationwide sample of Jewish and other households seeking a representative picture of the U.S. Jewish population—presents the following findings (this report considers currently existing marriages only):

1. Of all Jewish persons now married, some 9·2% are intermarried.
2. The proportion of Jewish persons intermarrying in the period 1966–72 is much greater than corresponding proportions in earlier periods; 31·7% of Jewish persons marrying in this recent time span chose a non-Jewish spouse.
3. The combination of a Jewish husband and a non-Jewish wife is about twice as prevalent as the combination of a Jewish wife and a non-Jewish husband. (Some three per cent of married are classified as '*marginally*' Jewish with no religious preference by the husband or some mixed pattern.)
4. About one-fourth of all intermarrying non-Jewish females report conversion into Judaism; in contrast, few intermarrying non-Jewish males have converted.
5. Nearly half of marriage partners who were non-Jewish prior to marriage subsequently identify as Jewish, regardless of formal conversion.
6. In a very large majority of cases, when the wife is Jewish though initially the husband is not Jewish, children are raised as Jewish. On the other hand, when the husband is Jewish and the wife initially not Jewish, about one-third of the children are raised outside the Jewish religion.
7. A belief in the Jewish religion is widely professed, both in intermarried and non-intermarried households, but such belief is somewhat more prevalent among the non-intermarried. There is continuing widespread belief in One God.
8. Regardless of marriage pattern, active participation in temples and synagogues is the exception, not the rule. Somewhat more intensive

participation in temple or synagogue life appears for the non-intermarried and in those households in which the wife is Jewish and the husband is not Jewish. Relatively higher levels of involvement in Jewish organizations appear for the non-intermarried, but in absolute terms these levels, too, are generally low.

9. Among non-intermarried, four in ten indicate that they had never dated a non-Jew.
10. Reported parental opposition to interdating is significantly linked to marriage *within* the Jewish group; reported lack of parental opposition to interdating is associated with intermarriage.
11. Non-intermarried couples and those with a Jewish wife report similar patterns in their early upbringing: a majority describe their own childhood upbringing as 'strongly Jewish'. In marriages with a Jewish husband and a non-Jewish wife, the childhood upbringing is rarely described as 'strongly Jewish'.
12. The chance that intermarriage will take place is greatest for those who cannot clearly describe their upbringing, but also very high for those who describe their own upbringing as marginally Jewish. Positive Jewish identity in childhood is associated with marriage within the Jewish group.

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The Israel Archives Association has published an English edition of its *Guide to the Archives in Israel*. It is edited by P. A. Alsberg, who says in the Preface that the Guide 'contains twenty-one short surveys and lists of institutions which have in their custody archival material occupying some forty-five kilometres of shelving. The surveys and lists were prepared by each of the institutions.'

The archives listed and described are: the Israel State Archives; the Military (I.D.F.) and Defence Establishment Archives; the Jerusalem Municipality Archives; the Tel Aviv–Yafo Municipality Archives; the Central Zionist Archives; the Archives of the Jewish Labour Movement; the Archives of the Jabotinsky Institute in Israel; the Archives of Religious Zionism; the Archives of the Kibbutz Artzi Hashomer Hatzair; the Hakibbutz Hameuhad Archives; the Archives of the Israel Teachers' Union; the Weizmann Archives; the Israel Labour Party Archives; the Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People, Jewish Communities, Institutions and Organizations (in alphabetical order by countries); the Yad Vashem Archives; the Archives of the 'Ghetto Fighters House in memory of Yizhak Katznelson'; the Aaronson House Archives; the Archives of the Jewish National and University Library; the Archives of the Gnazim, Bio-Bibliographical Institute; the Archives and Manuscripts Division of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; and finally, 'Various Archival Institutions and Collections'.

Orders for the *Guide to the Archives in Israel* should be addressed to The Israel Archives Association, P.O. Box 1149, Jerusalem, Israel. The price of the Guide, including postage, is U.S. $10.00.

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The Modern Language Association of the United States reported that in the autumn of 1972 there were 19,565 students enrolled in courses in Hebrew language and literature in American colleges and universities. This represented a 15 per cent increase on the 1970 total of 16,992, a significant increase in view of the fact that there has been a 10 per cent decline in registration for Foreign Language courses. In 1972, the overwhelming majority of the students (16,462) attended courses in Modern Hebrew in 136 institutions; 1,400 of them were graduates. There were also 3,103 students enrolled in courses in Classical or Biblical Hebrew in 138 smaller institutions (mainly Christian denominational schools). American colleges and universities also give courses in English on Hebrew culture or civilization, such as Jewish History, Jewish Movements, Modern Israel, and Hebrew and Yiddish literature in translation.

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It was reported last February in Jerusalem that the Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel is to undertake a survey of graduates living in Israel. The 1972 population census showed that nearly 90,000 persons held degrees from institutions of higher learning; the comparable figure for 1961 was 36,000. Moreover, the 1972 census showed that a further 160,000 had had some kind of post-secondary school education.

Israeli universities now award more than 200 doctorates annually in the natural sciences and engineering alone. Furthermore, many of the immigrants from the West and from Russia are university graduates, and there are also Israelis at foreign universities who will eventually return to their native land. It is hoped that the survey will yield data which will be of great help to various ministries.

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The executive director of the New York Association for New Americans (NYANA) was reported to have stated last December that more than 400 Russian Jews settled in the greater New York area between 21 August and 30 November 1973. That group brought to about 1,200 the number of Russian Jews who had been helped by NYANA to settle in New York since the end of 1969. They came to the United States through the efforts of the United Hias Service. The Russian immigrants, many of whom have professional qualifications, were being rapidly absorbed into American life. About two months after their arrival, two-thirds of them had at least one member of their household at work and helping to maintain the other members of the family. Among those who came in August–November 1973, there were 21 engineers, 18 physicians, 3 lawyers, 2 architects, 2 film directors and 20 teachers, translators, etc.

The acting chairman of the Jewish Agency was reported to have stated in Jerusalem on 31 January that 33,600 Russian immigrants had come to Israel in 1973, and a further 2,500 in January 1974. A total of 83,000 Soviet immigrants had come in the past three years and fewer than one per cent of the total had left the country.

One of the major problems was the absorption of professionals: there were 3,000 academically trained persons without gainful employment. A special loan fund had been set up to help solve the problem.

A spokesman for the Weizmann Institute in Rehovoth is reported to have said last January that there were more than forty Russian immigrants at the Institute; they included 5 senior scientists, 20 graduate students, 5 engineers, and 14 members of the technical and service staff.

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Last February, the Head of the Youth Aliyah department of the Jewish Agency is reported to have stated that the number of Youth Aliyah wards rose by 2,500 to a total of 13,500 in 1973. They originate from 70 countries. One fifth of the 1973 wards (500) are from the Soviet Union; there are now a total of 2,000 Youth Aliyah wards who are the children of Russian immigrants.

Youth Aliyah is also looking after 8,850 'disadvantaged' Israeli children; of those, 5,300 are at Youth Aliyah villages, 1,350 in kibbutzim (under the aegis of Youth Aliyah), and 2,200 in youth centres. It was added that Youth Aliyah would spend IL 90 million in the current fiscal year, of which about 80 per cent would be for the education and maintenance of its wards.

*

It was announced last January that there was a slight drop in immigration to Israel in 1973: 54,800 compared with 55,900 in 1972. There were also fewer tourists in 1973: 661,600 compared with 727,500 in 1972.

A spokesman of the Jewish Agency is reported to have stated in Tel Aviv last January that there were 9,000 persons in absorption centres; 6,000 of them were accommodated in hotels in smaller towns such as Arad, Nahariya, and Sefad. The Agency had rented 30 hotels to serve as absorption centres for professionally trained immigrants and another 25 hotels to house elderly people. A further 6,000 were living in temporary homes, such as rented flats, which were often shared by two or three households. The Agency is building six absorption centres, but they are unlikely to be ready before 1975.

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The American Ort Federation at the end of its fifty-second annual National Convention in New York last January adopted a 1974 budget of US $35,360,000 for educational, vocational, and economic aid to 70,000 persons in Jewish communities in 21 countries. The Director-General stated that nearly two-thirds of the funds would be allocated to ORT's 84 technical schools in Israel. Expenditure in Israel will be double that of 1973.

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The International Sociological Association announces that the Eighth World Congress of Sociology will be held in Toronto, on 19–24 August 1974.

The theme of the Congress will be 'Science and Revolution in Contemporary Societies'.

Plenary Sessions. There will be formal presentations on:

1. Social aspects of the scientific and technological revolution;
2. Sociologists in a changing world: observers or participants?
3. Population changes and social development;
4. Equality as a sociological issue.

Working Groups. There will be 14 working groups on:

1. Science, technology, and new forms of social differentiation and social integration;
2. Functions and changes of power systems;
3. Science, technology, and new professions;
4. Science, technology, and education problems;
5. Sociology of scientific and technological policies;
6. Social relations and personality problems in a technological society;
7. Industrial leadership, entrepreneurship, and economic development;
8. Sociology of old age;
9. Problems of youth;
10. Emerging, established, and declining social classes in the world;
11. Comparative sociology of civilizations;
12. Role of trade unions in contemporary societies;
13. Changing occupational and family roles of women;
14. Problems of technological innovation in non-industrialized countries.

Round Tables. The subjects will be:

1. Is there a crisis in sociology?
2. The construction of social indicators;
3. New technologies and possibilities of changes in industrial working conditions;
4. Cultural intelligentsia and power;
5. Quality of life;
6. Resurgences of ethnic and national identity;
7. Comparative analysis of social structures in U.S.A. and Western Europe;
8. International tensions and disarmament;
9. Difficulties of international research in the social sciences;
10. Functions of school systems.

Symposia. The subjects will be:

1. Comparative analysis of the development of sociology as a discipline;
2. Epistemology of sociological knowledge;
3. National dependence and independence;
4. The study of decision-making processes;
5. Formalization in sociology;
6. Programmes and computers in sociology.

Research Committee Sessions. There will be 32 discussions on:

1. Armed forces and society;
2. Aspirations, needs, and development;

3. Community research;
4. Sociology of Education;
5. Ethnic, race, and minority relations;
6. Family sociology;
7. Futurology;
8. History of sociology;
9. Innovative processes in social change;
10. Sociology of international relations;
11. Sociology of law;
12. Sociology of leisure;
13. Logic and methodology of sociology;
14. Sociology of mass communication;
15. Sociology of medicine;
16. Sociology of migration;
17. Sociology of national movements and imperialism;
18. Sociology of organization;
19. Political sociology;
20. Sociology of poverty;
21. Psychiatric sociology;
22. Sex roles in society;
23. Sociology of regional and urban development;
24. Sociology of religion;
25. Sociology of science;
26. Social ecology;
27. Sociolinguistics;
28. Sociotechnics;
29. Sociology of sport;
30. Social stratification;
31. Urban sociology;
32. Sociology of work.

General inquiries about the Congress should be addressed to the ISA Secretariat, Via Daverio 7, 20122 Milan, Italy.

Inquiries about accommodation, tours, and receptions, should be addressed to Professor Harry Nishio, Department of Sociology, University of Toronto, 563 Spadina Avenue, Toronto 5, Canada.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Alsberg, P. A., ed., *Guide to the Archives in Israel*, viii + 257 pp., Israel Archives Association, P.O. Box 1149, Jerusalem, 1973, $10.00.

Altman, Alexander, *Moses Mendelssohn. A Biographical Study*, xvi + 900pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1973, £6.25.

Avni, Haim, *Argentine, 'The Promised Land'. Baron de Hirsch's Colonization Project in the Argentine Republic* (Hebrew), 370 pp., The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1973, n.p.

Bell, Daniel, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. A Venture in Social Forecasting*, xiii + 507 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1974, £5.50.

Coote, Anna and Gill, Tess, *Women's Rights: A Practical Guide*, with drawings by Posy Simmonds, 349 pp., Penguin Books, London, 1974, 60p.

Efron, Iedidio, *Amdur, My Native Shtetl*, viii + 285 pp. (Yiddish, with an introduction in Spanish by Lazaro Schallman), Comite de Homenaje a la Memoria de Iedidio Efron, Buenos Aires, 1973, n.p.

Esh, Shaul, *Studies in the Holocaust and Contemporary Jewry* (Hebrew), 427 pp., Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Yad Vashem, and the Leo Baeck Institute, Jerusalem, 1973, n.p.

The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, *Aspects of Sociology*, translated from the German by John Viertel, xii + 210 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1973, £2.80 (paperback, £1.40).

Giddens, Anthony, ed., *Positivism and Sociology*, with an Introduction by Anthony Giddens, x + 244 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1974, £3.50 (paperback, £1.50).

Halpérin, Jean and Levitte, Georges, eds., *l'Autre dans la conscience juive. Le Sacré et le couple. Données et débats*, Proceedings of the 12th and 13th Colloques d'intellectuels juifs de langue française, organized by the French section of the World Jewish Congress, viii + 336 pp., Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1973, n.p.

Hill, Michael, *The Religious Order. A Study of virtuoso religion and its legitimation in the nineteenth-century Church of England*, vii + 344 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1973, £4.50.

Landau, Jacob M., *Middle Eastern Themes. Papers in History and Politics*, vii + 309 pp., Frank Cass, London, 1973, £3.75.

Maxwell, Neville, *India and the Nagas*, Minority Rights Group, Report No. 17, 32 pp., London, 1973, 45p.

Minority Rights Group, Report No. 18, *The Montagnards of South Vietnam*, 28 pp., Minority Rights Group, London, 1974, 45p.

Maybaum, Ignaz, *Trialogue between Jew, Christian and Muslim*, xi + 179 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1973, £3.00.

Nisbet, Robert, *The Social Philosophers, Community and Conflict in Western Thought*, xiv + 466 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1974, £4.50.

Rieff, Philip, *Fellow Teachers*, 243 pp., Harper & Row, New York, 1973, $6.95.

Rodgers, Barbara N. and Stevenson, June, *A New Portrait of Social Work. A study of the social services in a Northern town from Younghusband to Seebohm*, ix + 262 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1973, £4.25.

Rupp, Erik, *Zur Kritik der Wissenschaftsforschung, Wissenschaftslogik-Wissenschaftssociologie*, 83 pp., Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, Düsseldorf, 1973, DM12.80.

Scholem, Gershom, *Sabbatai Sevi, The Mystical Messiah, 1626–1676*, xxvii + 1,000 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1973, £9.00.

Semmel, Bernard, *The Methodist Revolution*, x + 273 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1974, £3.00.

Sherman, A. J., *Island Refuge. Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich 1933–1939*, 291 pp., Paul Elek, London, 1973, £3.80.

Tandon, Yash, *Problems of a Displaced Minority: The New Position of East Africa's Asians*, Minority Rights Group, Report No. 16, 31 pp., London, 1973, 45p.

Turner, Roy, ed., *Ethnomethodology*, 287 pp., Penguin Modern Sociology Readings, London, 1974, £1.10.

Weinberger, Leon J., trans., *Jewish Prince in Moslem Spain: Selected Poems of Samuel Ibn Nagrela*, viii + 167 pp., Hebrew and English, University of Alabama Press, Alabama, 1973, $10.00.

Weinryb, Bernard D., *The Jews of Poland. A Social and Economic History of the Jewish Community in Poland from 1100 to 1800*, xvii + 424 pp., The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1973, $10.00.

Weisgal, Meyer W., Gen. Ed., *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Volume IV, Series A, January 1905–December 1906*, edited by Camillo Dresner and Barnet Litvinoff, xxxvi + 358 pp., Oxford Univ. Press, and Israel Univ. Press, London and Jerusalem, 1973, £6.25.

West, D. J. in collaboration with Farrington, D. P., *Who Becomes Delinquent? Second Report of the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development*, xv + 265 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1973, £4.50.

Whitley, Richard, ed., *Social Processes of Scientific Development*, ix + 286 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1974, £5.95.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

BANTON, Michael Parker; Ph.D., D.Sc., Professor of Sociology, University of Bristol and Director of the Social Science Research Council's Research Unit on Ethnic Relations. Formerly, Reader in Social Anthropology, University of Edinburgh. Chief publications: *The Policeman in the Community*, London, 1964; *Roles*, London, 1965; *Race Relations*, London, 1967; *Racial Minorities*, London, 1972; *Police-Community Relations*, London, 1973.

FEUER, Lewis S.; Ph.D., Professor of Sociology, University of Toronto. Formerly Professor of Philosophy and Social Science, University of California, Berkeley. Chief publications: *The Scientific Intellectual*, New York, 1963; *Marx and the Intellectuals*, New York, 1969; *The Conflict of Generations*, New York, 1969; *Ideologies and the Ideologists*, forthcoming; *Einstein and the Generations of Science*, forthcoming. Currently engaged in research on the sociology of intellectuals, and of philosophical and scientific ideas.

ROSEMAN, Kenneth D.; Ph.D., Dean and Assistant Professor of American Jewish History, Hebrew Union College, Jewish Institute of Religion, Cincinnati, Ohio. Chief publications: 'Power in a Midwestern Jewish Community', *American Jewish Archives*, vol. XXI, no. 1, April 1969; 'Dear Diary: A Day in the Life of Marcus Adler', *Keeping Posted*, vol. XVII, no. 6, March 1973; 'Teaching Jewish History in the Upper Grades', *Jewish Teacher*, February 1963; 'Teaching History through Research', *Jewish Teacher*, February 1966. Currently engaged in a revision of his Ph.D. dissertation for publication: *The Jewish Population of America, 1850–1860: A Demographic Study of Four Cities.*

SHAROT, Stephen; D.Phil., Lecturer in Sociology, University of Leicester. Chief publications: 'A Jewish Christian Adventist Movement', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 10, no. 1, June 1968; 'The Three Generations Thesis and the American Jews', *The British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 24, no. 2, June 1973; 'Religious Change in Native Orthodoxy in London, 1870–1914: The Synagogue Service', *J.J.S.*, vol. 15, no. 1, June 1973; 'Religious Change in Native Orthodoxy in London, 1870–1914: Rabbinate and Clergy', *J.J.S.*, vol. 15, no. 2, December 1973; 'Minority Situation and Religious Acculturation: A Comparative Analysis of Jewish Communities', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 16, no. 3, June 1974; *Sociology of Modern Judaism*, forthcoming.

SOLOMON, Geulah; Ph.D., Lecturer in the Sociology of Education, Rusden State College of Victoria. Formerly, Humanities Teacher, Mt. Scopus College, Melbourne; Assistant Editor, Australian Jewish Herald; and Lecturer in the Education Faculty, Monash University. Chief publications: 'Jewish Education in Australia', in P. Y. Medding, ed., *Jews in Australian Society*, Melbourne, 1973; 'Jewish Education in Australia', *Jewish Education*, vol. 40, no. 2, New York, 1970; 'Jewish Contribution to

the Church-State Debate and Education in Victoria 1872–1900', *Journal of the Australian Jewish Historical Society*, vol. VI, part 4, 1968. Currently engaged in research on aspects of migrant education and its relationship with immigration; in education (particularly kibbutz education) in Israel; and in comparative studies in Jewish education.

TAFT, Ronald; Ph.D., Professor of Social Psychology, Faculty of Education, Monash University. Chief publications: *From Stranger to Citizen*, London, 1966; 'The Impact of the Middle East Crisis of June 1967 on Melbourne Jewry: An Empirical Study', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. IX, no. 2, December 1967; 'Jewish Identification of Melbourne Jewry' and 'Beyond the Third Generation' in P. Y. Medding, ed., *Jews in Australian Society*, Melbourne, 1973. Currently engaged in research on ethnic identification and adaptation of immigrant schoolchildren.

TAPIA, Claude; docteur en sociologie, Chargé d'enseignement at the François Rabelais University, Tours. Chief publications: 'Une expérience de co-gestion en milieu agricole', *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, no. XLV, July–December 1968; 'Les fonctions sociales des colloques', *C.I.S.*, no. L, June 1971; 'Contacts interculturels dans un quartier de Paris', *C.I.S.*, no. LIV, June 1973; 'Dynamique de groupe et pédagogie', in *La Pédagogie*, publication of the *Dictionnaires du Savoir Moderne*, October 1972; 'Le phénomène communautaire', *Les Nouveaux Cahiers*, no. 24, March 1971. Currently engaged in research on temporary groups and their social functions and on relations between the generations.