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CONTENTS

Jewish Orthodoxy in America: Towards the Sociology of a Residual Category *Egon Mayer* 151

Religious Change in Native Orthodoxy in London, 1870–1914: Rabbinate and Clergy *Stephen Sharot* 167

The Fertility of Jewish Families in Britain, 1971 *S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool* 189

A Note on Southern Rhodesian Jewry *Barry A. Kosmin* 205

A Note on the Function of 'The Law of the Kingdom is Law' in the Medieval Jewish Community *Gerald J. Blidstein* 213

Assimilation: A Deviant Pattern among the Jews of Inter-War Poland *Celia S. Heller* 221

Book Reviews 239

Chronicle 256

Books Received 260

Notes on Contributors 262

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BOOKS REVIEWED

Author	*Title*	*Reviewer*	*Page*
Elaine Baldwin	*Differentiation and Co-operation in an Israeli Moshav*	Scarlett Epstein	239
Zevedei Barbu	*Society, Culture and Personality, An Introduction to Social Science*	Martin C. Albrow	240
Artur Eisenbach	*Kwestia Równouprawnienia Żydów w Królestwie Polskim*	Paul Glikson	241
E. M. Eppel, ed.	*Education for Cultural Pluralism*	Michael Banton	243
Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss	*Status Passage*	Martin C. Albrow	244
Jacob Katz	*Out of the Ghetto, The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation, 1770–1870*	Lionel Kochan	246
Orrin E. Klapp	*Heroes, Villains and Fools, Reflections of the American Character*	R. H. Pear	247
Peter Y. Medding	*Mapai in Israel: Political Organization and Government in a New Society*	Myron J. Aronoff	248
John O'Neill, ed.	*Modes of Individualism and Collectivism*	David Martin	252
Arun Sahay, ed.	*Max Weber and Modern Sociology*	Martin C. Albrow	253

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JEWISH ORTHODOXY IN AMERICA: TOWARDS THE SOCIOLOGY OF A RESIDUAL CATEGORY

Egon Mayer

THE sociological study of Jewish life in America is a rather inauspicious task. The findings of the major contributors to this field of inquiry appear to lead one to discover little more than an ordinary minority group of God-believing, other-directed, middle-class Americans. However, a more thorough analysis of the available literature makes one suspect that there may yet be new insights to be had into the encounter between traditions and modernity on American soil. Perhaps one can still proclaim in the teeth of modernity, 'Am Israel Chai!' It is with these conjectures in mind that the following review is undertaken.

Jewish sociologists and the sociology of Jewry

The sociological literature dealing with the Jewish experience in America can be characterized by two broad generalizations. One is that nearly all of it has been written by Jews. The other is that in nearly all cases Jewish Orthodoxy has been relegated to the position of a residual category. The few exceptions to this second generalization[1] are very much on the periphery of the body of literature on Jewish life in America. Only recently, Sklare, one of the best-known authorities on the sociology of American Jewry, came to the conclusion that '. . . Conservatism is incorrect in its diagnosis of Orthodoxy and especially in its prognosis of Orthodoxy's future. . . . The full story of the renaissance of American Orthodoxy has yet to be written.'[2] The present review will certainly not tell the 'full story' of American Orthodox Jewry, but it will attempt to provide the theoretical basis for the empirical investigation of the 'renaissance of American Orthodoxy'.

The problem of the sociology of Jews was summarized succinctly by Lipset in 1955.[3]

> While it is easy to reel off the names of dozens of important Jewish sociologists, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to list a dozen important

> sociological studies of the Jews. And those which do exist have for the most part been written by scholars who are not in the main stream of the field.

Lipset himself, however, anticipated some of the changes of the past seventeen years in pointing to the '. . . growing number of doctoral dissertations by Jewish students on the sociology of Jews!'[4] He attributed the change to the '. . . emergence of "third generation" Jews in the academic world'.[5] To a large extent he was correct in his analysis. What he failed to anticipate was the effect of the socialization process on Jews as they became academics, and the possible consequence of that process for the nature of the sociological insights provided by third-generation Jewish social scientists. It is not possible within the scope of this article to elaborate the intellectual history of the sociology of Jews. But the earlier comments by Lipset, coupled with some of the recent findings by Mazur,[6] necessitate some reflections on the two generalizations offered above.

It is probably no accident that the sociology of Jews has been written almost exclusively by Jews. And, as Lipset suggested, it is also probably no accident that that body of literature has grown in proportion to the emergence of the third generation in the academic world. The question that has not yet been posed and answered concerns the effect that Jewish sociologists have had on the sociology of Jews. Once again Lipset offers a point of departure:[7]

> Most research on Jewish communities around the world tends to investigate the 'Jewishness' of such communities, and to ask to what extent given communities are assimilating or retaining their 'Jewishness'. Such a point of view may be justified from a religious orientation. . . . But from an intellectual perspective it is difficult to defend. . . .

He correctly identifies what can only be called a 'nostalgic assumption' underlying nearly all sociological work on the Jewish experience in America. That assumption involves what is popularly known as the 'three-generations hypothesis',[8] according to which the first, or immigrant, generation is completely bound by traditions of an ethnic and/or religious nature and is unable to come to terms with 'modern' life in the New World, America.[9] The second generation is a generation of 'marginal' men, torn between the traditions of the first generation and the attractions of the host society. Finally, as one recent work has summarized it, 'If survival and uprootedness characterized the immigrant generation, and the tensions of success and marginality epitomized their children, the third generation may be described as the generation of security.'[10] What is important to note about the three-generations hypothesis when it is applied to American Jews is that it is an invention of the 'third generation' to explain its own position. What I have called the 'nostalgic assumption' is the assumption that the third

generation makes about the first: the assumption of traditionalism and orthodoxy, the assumption of an inability on the part of the immigrants to make changes in their habits of life and thought, and the assumption that the third generation is a generation of security. Liebman has questioned the popular notion that the masses of eastern and central European Jews who came to the United States between 1870 and 1924 were Orthodox:[11]

> There is reason to challenge this notion. . . . The early East European immigrants came to the United States at a time when traditional Judaism, even in Eastern Europe, had been thoroughly shaken by Enlightenment and secularism . . . the revival of traditional Judaism did not begin until the 1920's.

Yet, it is in 1928 that we find the first sociological work on Jewish life in America published by no less an authority than Louis Wirth.[12] In that near-classic study the author spelled out a theme that was to become the basis of most sociological studies of Jewry in America: the decline of the ghetto and the 'rationalization' of Jewish communal life. Writing of the traditional ghetto-dweller, he observed:[13]

> He discovered the ghetto quite accidentally, and the discovery shocked him beyond description. His whole world collapsed one evening when his eldest son, after the Friday evening meal, said to him that now, since he was going to law school and the family was pretty well fixed, and as he had acquired some friends whom he would like to invite to his house, they ought to move out of the ghetto. 'The ghetto!' said the father, 'Are you dreaming?' . . . Two years later, when the son had opened a law office, the father sold his store and began to dabble in real estate, using his son's office as his headquarters . . . He still played chess with his son, but instead of discussing the Talmud they discussed the real estate boom on Crawford Avenue.

Wirth's imaginative description leaves one wondering whether the father and son ever did discuss the Talmud, particularly in the light of Schiff's recent report on Jewish education.[14]

The idealization of the past that one perceives in Wirth as well as in subsequent studies is based on what I have called the 'nostalgic assumption'. It is this typing that has served as a sort of cultural base line against which later forms of Jewish expression have been evaluated. It is the nostalgic assumption which has led students of the Jewish experience to relegate the phenomenon of Jewish Orthodoxy to the position of a residual category. How did the assumption come into being? One can only hazard guesses. Mazur comments:[15]

> The data presented here confirm the common observation that Jewish academicians—at least in the social sciences—are relatively uncommitted to the Jewish religion. . . . On the other hand, most academics value

intellectuality, and so the Jewish academic is proud of the Jewish intellectual tradition.

One of the characteristics of the third generation is its wish to recapture some elements of its ethnic or religious ancestry; Herberg has suggested the reasons for this selective reconstruction of the past.[16] The intellectual, however, is confronted by the special problem of being subject to the pressures of the 'triple melting pot'(viz., the need to be a 'Catholic', 'Protestant', or 'Jew') and at the same sime to the pressures of being a member of a special community: the intellectual. Thus, his ability to select from his past is partly circumscribed by his special position in American society as an intellectual. This process of selection has led many Jewish intellectuals to attribute some characteristics to their ancestors which the latter may not, in fact, have had. That is the Jewish sociologists' 'nostalgic assumption'. Moreover, as Sklare has observed, the interest of social scientists '. . . has developed too late in the United States to study the crucial problem of the adjustment of the first generation'.[17] Consequently, most of those who have dealt with American Jewry have simply assumed that the first generation was Orthodox with ideal-type traditional characteristics, and have proceeded to concentrate their empirical efforts on showing the changing patterns of the *subsequent generations*.

Marshall Sklare's first work[18] was an attempt to show the impact of American society on traditional Jewish thought and communal life. He argued persuasively that Conservative Judaism (both as a system of religious thought and as a form of communal organization) was the most important single consequence of the contact between Jews and America; and he added[19] that Conservative Judaism was the wave of the Jewish future in America:

> Orthodox adherents have succeeded in achieving the goal of institutional perpetuation to only a limited extent; the history of their movement in this country can be written in terms of case study of institutional decay.

Sklare[20] saw the emergence of the 'pattern of Conservatism' and its appeal as resulting from the fact that it

> mediates between the demands of the Jewish tradition, the feeling of both alienation and nostalgia toward first and second settlement areas, and the norms of middle class worship. It must in effect borrow something from each of these elements and synthesize them into a new pattern.

However, Sklare provided no clear sociological *explanation* for the emergence and growth of the Conservative movement. He suggested several explanatory variables: (1) geographical mobility from an area of high concentration of Jewish population to areas of low concentration; (2) the status anxieties of middle-class Jews over what were considered lower-class religious practices; (3) the threat of anomie; (4) the need for group survival; and (5) the popularity of religious identification in

America. But he failed to provide a clear line of theoretical explanation of how the number of explanatory variables were related to one another, and how they collectively led to Conservative Judaism. Sklare did not then consider whether Conservative Judaism was one type of adjustment to American life made in response to the specific social circumstances obtaining at the period of its emergence. Recently, however, when revising his earlier study,[21] he devoted a chapter to 'Recent Developments in Conservative Judaism'. But in the index to his latest work[22] on Jewish life in America, he does not list a single reference to Conservative Judaism, although he never actually abandons his first appraisal of the Conservative movement.

The theme which has been given so much prominence by Sklare was aptly summarized by Gans: 'The main trends in the development of the American Jewish community can be traced most clearly in the changes that take place between the generations.'[23] The theme has been studied by many sociologists, and recently by Goldstein and Goldscheider.[24] In their study of the Jewish community of Providence, Rhode Island, they deal with the systematic differences among the three generations in the fields of family, social class, education, and religiosity. All these changes point to a general decline of Jewish distinctiveness: the Jews are like everyone else, only more so.

What special insights, then, have Jewish sociologists provided into the sociology of Jews? At the risk of being cast as an *enfant terrible*, I shall hazard an answer: none. That is not a condemnation. It is, in fact, an indication of the triumph of a value-free social science, and a measure of the degree to which Jewish sociologists have been socialized into their discipline. But what of the nostalgic assumption? Is it not a mark of residual ethnocentrism? I argue here that it is precisely because of nostalgia for the first generation that most sociologists of American Jewish life have chosen to relegate that generation as well as Orthodoxy in general to the position of a residual category: a form of Jewish expression that can be described but not explained. To the extent that Jewish sociologists have not dealt with the first generation of Jewish Orthodoxy in America, they have avoided the trap of ethnocentrism. To that extent, however, they have also failed to make a contribution to the sociology of Jewish experience in America. Jewish sociologists have been like all other sociologists, only more so.

The sociological literature of the Jewish experience in America can be divided into at least two distinct categories: the one dealing with so-called social problems, and the other with general processes of social and cultural change. In the first category we find two separate areas of research: (1) inter-group relations and antisemitism,[25] and (2) such problems as Jewish criminality and alcoholism.[26] Here I discuss the studies of the general processes of social and cultural change; they reveal a general acceptance of several sociological propositions.

Community and social structure

Works that have dealt with the study of Jewish communities have tended to accept the scenario first outlined by Wirth and more recently defined by Leventman as the movement 'from shtetl to suburb'.[27] This shift, it is argued, is accompanied (or perhaps even caused) by a number of other social structural changes in the Jewish community. Among the latter are the changes in: (1) Jewish secular education; (2) Jewish career patterns; (3) kinship patterns and the significance of the family; (4) communal organizational changes; and (5) traditional authority. What the various studies of the American Jewish community emphasize is simply that the Jewish community has not been exempt from the processes of bureaucratization and rationalization that have been the distinguishing characteristics of modern American life. They add that the Jewish community has indeed been affected by those processes to a greater degree than have many other sectors of American society. The causes of that apparent readiness on the part of Jews to accept the processes of 'rationalization' have not yet been fully determined. Some, like Max Weber, have attributed it to a rationalistic tradition in Judaism. A more likely explanation may be found in the position of Jews in America at the time when those processes gained momentum. The contemporary debate over the 'merit system' and university open-admissions programmes shows that the Jews had much to gain from the processes of bureaucratization and rationalization. By and large the works on American Jews have taken for granted a number of sociological generalizations, of which the most important is the thesis made popular by Vidich and Bensman. In their study of the relationship between local community and mass society, they have viewed the community, '. . . as a limited and finite universe in which one can examine in detail some of the major issues of modern American society . . . a stage upon which the major issues and problems typical of the larger society are played out'.[28] This thesis recurs in most studies of Jewish communities; there seems to be hardly any examination of whether the religious and ethnic character of the community has led to modifications in the style of adaptation to those pervasive forces of modern life.

Another assumption casually made by most sociologists is that Jewish communities eventually and, according to them, almost inevitably, move physically from what Fred Massarik[29] has called the 'Dense Jewish Urban Area' to 'Jewish Suburbia'. Although Massarik allows that 'The Dense Jewish Urban Area is the contemporary successor of the ghetto',[30] it is the ghetto-like features that have been stressed in most studies. Thus, the urban areas of Jewish settlement are seen as populated by: (1) the older; (2) the less mobile; (3) the less American-

ized; and (4) the lower social strata. In sharp contrast to what is referred to as the 'ghetto' (Wirth), or the 'area of first settlement' (Sklare), or the 'Dense Jewish Urban Area' (Massarik), stands the portrait of the Jewish community which is variously referred to as 'the third area of settlement' (Sklare), 'the gilded ghetto' (Kramer and Leventman), or simply 'Jewish Suburbia' (Massarik). As Massarik points out, 'The assumption is still widespread that Jewish Suburbia is a very homogeneous "upward mobile, young couple, tract home" type of community.'[31] This assumption is given added support in one of the recent *Lakeville Studies*; the authors assert:[32] '. . . just as differences in social characteristics between Jews and Gentiles are in the process of diminishing, so do we expect that in the decades ahead the Jews of the nation at large will increasingly come to resemble today's Lakeville Jews.' Since the thesis of 'suburbanism as a way of life' has not been made explicit in any of the specific studies of American Jewish communities, it has not been subject to questioning. Whereas the persistence of urban communities has received increasing attention in recent research, the study of Jewish communities on the American scene has been premised on the assumption of the decline of communities in urban areas and their relocation in a suburban context. That assumption has been made in spite of the near-violent struggles in the recent past over the issues of 'community control' and 'decentralization' in such places as New York City. The assumptions underlying the study of Jewish communities have also not benefited from some of the recent work on the persistence of community in urban settings. Sociologists such as Ross,[33] Mann,[34] and Litwak,[35] have produced increasing evidence that specific forms of 'local community' persist in urban areas. Litwak, especially, has cited evidence[36] which leads one to question the popular notion of the relationship between local community and mass society:

> Mature bureaucratic centralization leads to an explicit effort to coordinate and use formal organizations and local primary groups . . . The primary groups provide flexibility and ability to deal with the unanticipated . . .

Thus, the sociology of Jewish communities in America can be seen as resting upon general sociological assumptions which have been challenged, to say the least, in recent years. Once again, the scope of the present study does not permit a thorough investigation of the reasons for the apparent willingness of Jewish sociologists to make these assumptions. But it is clear that in making them they have neglected to study those patterns of community which have persisted or more recently emerged among Jews living in urban centres.

In addition to the assumption that the 'rationalization' of American life has led to the decline of the *Gemeinschaft*-like characteristics of the Jewish community, and that of the general 'suburbanization' of Jewish

life in America, the study of Jewish communities has rested upon a host of sociological generalizations about the relationships among education, class status, and communal organization. The transformation of the synagogue into a 'community centre' and the rabbi into a 'guidance counsellor' or 'social director' is seen as consonant with the educational achievements and status referents[37] of the changing Jews of America. Not only has it been assumed that changes in class position *necessarily* lead to changes in consciousness, but it has been accepted as 'natural' that as Jews rise in social class they will come to resemble some sort of American 'ego ideal'.

Culture and identity

Alongside the body of literature dealing with specific Jewish communities in America one finds the work dealing with Jewish culture and, more prominently, with Jewish identity. The mid-1950s saw a sudden flurry of intellectual activity related to Jewish culture, which culminated in several well-known publications. The dominant theme was spelled out by Gans, who, as mentioned earlier, saw the shape of Jewish culture as being determined primarily by the changes taking place in the generations removed from the immigrant generation. Thus, he saw the 'second generation' as pivotal in the formation of the future of Jewish culture in America:[38]

> The second-generation Jew, who has kept a custom here and a ceremony there from a once living complex, yet wants to experience them as 'richly' and 'fully' as if they were still the vital habits of old, has had to seek symbols, or tangible representations, outside himself in order to endow what he has preserved with concrete reality. These symbols have now become the appurtenances of what might be called an 'objectified' Judaism.

It was this generation which rejected its sense of 'total Jewishness' and, as Herberg has pointed out,[39] was becoming like everyone else in the 'triple melting pot' of America. It was also this generation, according to Glazer, which fuelled the 'revival' of Judaism in America. As the second- and third-generation Jews moved out of the communities of high Jewish population, 'Jewishness' declined. At the same time, 'Conservatism and Reform have thus grown greatly, partly at the expense of Orthodoxy, for their new adherents have been defecting Orthodox Jews, and more significantly, the children of the Orthodox',[40] giving rise to what Gans has called 'symbolic Judaism', a collage of traditional practices and beliefs adapted to the tastes and needs of the American middle class. The reasons for this transformation of integral Jewishness into Judaism are explained by Sklare and Herberg. Both see in American Judaism the accommodation of religious beliefs and practices to the demands of an open society, which—while it frowns on the particu-

larism of ethnicity—accepts and even encourages the particularisms growing out of differences in religion. Thus, Sklare sees American Judaism developing into what he calls an 'ethnic church',[41] and Herberg views the Judaism of the second and third generations as just one way of being American.

The change at the level of culture is seen, at least implicitly, as related to changes in identity. The 'minority status' experienced by the 'second generation' is seen by most social scientists as the primary source of the identity crisis of American Jews that has had far-reaching consequences for contemporary Jewish culture. As Leventman[42] has written,

> Undoubtedly, a major dilemma for American Jews is how to participate as widely as possible in the general society and be as much like everyone else as possible while preserving a distinctive and separate ingroup life.

The need to 'be like everyone else' is seen as the driving force behind the transformation of 'Jewishness' into 'Judaism' (that is, the compartmentalization of religious identity). What Sklare has called 'survivalism' and what Rosenberg[43] has pointed to as the 'need to remember' are seen, on the other hand, as the source of the cultural distinctiveness of Jewish Americans. It should be pointed out that, although the connexion between culture and identity is readily apparent, there has been no systematic formulation of it. Thus Sklare's recent exhaustive study of 'Jewish identity'[44] does not offer any conjectures as to how culture and identity might be related.

If we reflect upon the various studies of Jewish culture and identity, we see that a number of assumptions have been drawn from general sociology. On the cultural level it seems to be generally assumed that the 'secularization thesis' is true. That thesis rests on the argument first proposed by Max Weber that the rationality inherent in the modern economy has a 'disenchanting' effect on religion, leading to a removal of religious, magical, or other-wordly symbols from everyday life. That general displacement of religious concerns and institutions from the centre of the stage of everyday life is what students of religion in modern society have called the process of 'secularization'. The effects of the process on personal religiosity and on religious institutions have formed the major theme of the contemporary sociology of religion.[45] Though the sociological study of Judaism has assumed this process to be operant in contemporary Jewish life, the specific relationship between the forces of secularization and Jewish culture has not been examined. Once again, the tacit assumption of a sociological generalization in the study of the Jewish experience in America has prevented sociologists from systematically exploring the relationship between certain general social forces and a particular subculture. This lacuna in the sociology of Jewish life is particularly unfortunate in the light of some recent litera-

ture pointing to what Robert Alter has labelled the 'fever of ethnicity'[46] and the persistence of religion.[47]

The 'secularization process' is presumably realized through the changing generations. Thus, as each generation removed from the first becomes increasingly more *modern*, its expression of Judaism becomes more 'secularized'. That formulation is hinted at by Sklare when he writes, 'Most of the adjustment of the East European Jew to the modern world had to take place in America.'[48] The connexion between Americanization, modernization, and secularization is again suggested by Sklare in his summary of the respects in which the third generation modifies its religious practices,[49] the central consideration in this process being conformity with American middle-class norms.

An additional assumption underlying the alleged secularization of Judaism is a sort of gravitational theory of identity. That is, it is assumed that there exist in the individual certain identity needs such that if he belongs to a 'minority group' he will seek to bring his identity into harmony with the norms of the majority. Sklare makes this assumption almost explicit: '. . . when the interaction is that between a dominant group and minority group, the similarities produced by the contact result from the modification of the minority culture.'[50] Leventman's statement, cited earlier, about the Jews' need to be like everyone else also points to the assumption of an implicit theory of identity. However, such a theory has not usually been made explicit in any study of Jewish culture or identity. A notable exception is Verbit's[51] use of reference-group theory to explain the changes in the religious orientations of Jewish college students. The assumption is apparently made in all studies of Jewish identity that an individual who confronts American culture and society with a traditional Jewish identity experiences 'cognitive dissonance'.[52] The basic principles of the 'dissonance theory' seem to be automatically assumed in the sociology of Jewish identity, because it is suggested that in the confrontation between a minority identity and a majority culture, the individual who is in the 'cognitive minority'[53] will experience some form of discomfort that will exert pressure on him to change his identity, or, at least, to bring the more dissonant elements of his identity into consonance with the normative elements of the majority culture.

According to the theory, as it was first proposed by Festinger,[54] it was postulated that a stable identity requires cognitive consistency:

> The basic background of the theory consists of the notion that the human organism tries to establish harmony, consistency or congruity among his opinions, attitudes, knowledge and values. That is, there is a drive toward consonance among cognitions.

It was further suggested that the individual who experiences dissonance will seek to reduce that state either by obtaining confirmation of his

cognitions from his environment, or by abandoning or modifying those elements of his cognitions which are dissonant with the cognitive elements of his environment.

The basic postulates of Festinger's theory seem to be taken for granted in the studies of Jewish identity in America. Thus, Goldstein and Goldscheider[55] refer to the 'third generation' as the generation of security, suggesting that for the 'first' and 'second' generation of Jews the experience of cognitive dissonance was too strong to allow them to be comfortable in American culture. On the other hand, the 'third generation' have finally managed to bring themselves into line—cognitively speaking.

The major problem with the theory of cognitive dissonance—which in turn raises problems for the studies which tacitly assume its truth—is that it rests on a corollary assumption. It assumes that the cognitive context of the individual is normatively or affectively charged. That is to say, the theory rests on the assumption that individuals live in a world that is clearly defined and of which the majority of persons agree on the definitions. It is quite possible for such 'majorities' to exist. In fact, the Durkheimian concept of a *conscience collective* assumes the existence of such a majority. However, it is questionable, to say the least, whether it does exist in the United States.

Recent analyses of what some have called the 'post-industrial' era or the 'post-modern' culture of America have pointed towards the tendency of 'institutional isolation'. Zijderveld states:[56]

> This is the tendency of institutional sectors, such as the family, religion, government, education, the military system, etc., to grow autonomous. As autonomous sectors, they exert controls over the individual only in so far as he falls within their 'jurisdiction' . . . Living between various institutional sectors, each requiring from him a behaviour that conforms to its autonomous norms and values, the individual will automatically develop a pluralistic identity.

Although Zijderveld does not develop the theme of 'pluralistic identity', the concept is of great significance. What it suggests is that the social structural conditions of contemporary society produce individuals who do not in fact share a common over-arching definition of reality. The high degree of structural integration is not accompanied by a similar level of cultural integration. Quite the contrary: the cognitive orientations of individuals are controlled only within very limited bounds. The individual is for the most part left free (and, more often, anomic). Identity in contemporary society thus becomes *compartmentalized*, a large compartment being relegated to the *private sphere*. In the relative absence of cultural integration,[57] the likelihood diminishes significantly that an individual will experience cognitive dissonance if he is a member of a cognitive minority. And predictions regarding the fate of cognitive minorities in American society must be re-evaluated.

Conclusion

In the absence of a consistent theory of community or identity, the sociology of Jewish life in America proceeded on the assumption that certain social forces are persistent, and that the response to those forces at the cognitive and cultural levels is uniform. The upward social mobility of each successive generation of Jews in America and the associated dispersal from local urban areas with a high Jewish population density to suburban areas with a low Jewish density have been almost a cliché of contemporary Jewish history. The effect of those social facts on Jewish culture and Jewish identity has been presumed to follow patterns that one might expect on the basis of the theories of status congruency and cognitive consistency.

The theory of status congruency[58] postulates that when a person has several elements in his *status set* he will seek congruence within his set; particularly, he will seek to make all his status elements congruent with his highest possible status. It is the tacit acceptance of this theory which has led students of the Jewish experience in America to expect that as Jews move upwards on the stratification scale their religious practices and the general pattern of their communities will increasingly resemble the patterns of upwardly mobile middle-class America. However, because of its very successes, Conservative Judaism (which is the ideological expression of Jewish status consistency) has, in the words of Marshall Sklare,[59]

> . . . not been notably successful in enlisting the loyalties of those who are part of the youth culture, who have little connection with East European culture, or who are antagonistic to the type of American culture on which the movement is based.

The assumption of the existence of a 'cognitive majority' along with the basic premises of dissonance theory has led to the expectation that those who are in a 'cognitive minority' will be forced by the pressures of that dissonance to abandon or modify their anachronistic practices and beliefs in favour of a less fundamentalist 'American religion'. Thus, those who have remained, or more recently joined, the 'cognitive minority' have not enjoyed the benefits of sociological scrutiny.

The only Jewish group that qualifies as a 'cognitive minority' is Jewish Orthodoxy.[60] It is to this group that a sociology of Jewish life must next devote its attention.

NOTES

[1] Howard Polsky, *The Great Defense: a study of Jewish Orthodoxy in Milwaukee*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1956; also George Kranzler, *Williamsburg: a Jewish Community in Transition*, New York, 1961; Solomon Poll, *The Hassidic Community of Williamsburg*, New York, 1962; and more recently, Charles S. Liebman, 'Orthodoxy in American Jewish Life', in *The American Jewish Yearbook*, New York, 1965.

[2] Marshall Sklare, *Conservative Judaism*, augmented edition, New York, 1972, pp. 264–65.

[3] Seymour M. Lipset, 'Jewish Sociologists and Sociologists of the Jews', *Jewish Social Studies*, 17, 3, July 1955, p. 177.

[4] ibid, p. 178.

[5] ibid., loc. cit.

[6] Allan Mazur, 'The Socialization of Jews into the Academic Subculture', in Charles H. Anderson and John D. Murray, eds., *The Professors*, Cambridge, Mass., 1971.

[7] Seymour M. Lipset, 'The American Jewish Community in a Comparative Context', in Peter I. Rose, ed., *The Ghetto and Beyond*, New York, 1969.

[8] First suggested by the historian Marcus L. Hansen, 'The Third Generation in America', *Commentary*, 14, 5, November 1952.

[9] This spirit is poignantly captured by Oscar Handlin in *The Uprooted*, New York, 1951.

[10] Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldscheider, eds., *Jewish Americans, Three Generations in a Jewish Community*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968, p. 8.

[11] Liebman, op. cit., pp. 27 and 29.

[12] Louis Wirth, *The Ghetto*, Chicago, 1928.

[13] ibid., p. 242.

[14] Alvin I. Schiff, *The Jewish Day School in America*, New York, 1966.

[15] Mazur, op. cit., p. 284.

[16] Will Herberg, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*, New York, 1955.

[17] See his introduction to P. Y. Medding, *From Assimilation to Group Survival*, Melbourne, 1968, p. xxi.

[18] *Conservative Judaism: an American Religious Movement*, New York, 1955.

[19] ibid., p. 43.

[20] ibid., p. 75.

[21] In his enlarged edition of *Conservative Judaism*, 1972.

[22] Marshall Sklare, *America's Jews*, New York, 1971.

[23] Herbert J. Gans, 'The Future of American Jewry' in *Commentary*, 21, 6, June 1956, p. 555.

[24] op. cit.

[25] Two recent major contributions in this area are: Charles H. Stember, *Jews in the Mind of America*, New York, 1966, and Benjamin B. Ringer, *The Edge of Friendliness*, New York, 1967.

[26] For example, see Sophia M. Robinson, 'A Study of Delinquency among Jewish Children in New York City', in Marshall Sklare, ed., *The Jews*, New York, 1958; also, Charles R. Snyder, 'Culture and Jewish Sobriety: the ingroup-outgroup factor', in Sklare, ed., op. cit.

[27] Seymour Leventman, 'From Shtetl to Suburb' in Rose, ed., op. cit., pp. 33–56.

[28] Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society*, New York, 1959, pp. ix–x.

[29] Fred Massarik, 'The Jewish Community', in Marvin B. Sussman, ed., *Community Structure and Analysis*, New York, 1959.

[30] ibid., p. 249.

[31] ibid., p. 250.

[32] Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum, *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier*, New York, 1967, p. 44.

[33] H. Laurence Ross, 'The Local Community: A Survey Approach', in Robert Gutman and David Popenoe, eds., *Neighborhood, City, and Metropolis*, New York, 1970.

[34] Peter H. Mann, 'The Neighborhood', in Gutman and Popenoe, eds., op. cit.

[35] Eugene Litwak, 'Voluntary Associations and Neighborhood Cohesion', in Gutman and Popenoe, eds., op. cit.

[36] ibid., pp. 595–96.

[37] An interesting study of the apparent effect of the changing referents of college students on their religious perceptions and attitudes is Mervin F. Verbit's, *Referents for Religion Among Jewish College Students* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University), 1968.

[38] Herbert J. Gans, 'The Future of American Jewry', part I, in *Commentary*, 21, 5, May 1956, p. 428.

[39] Will Herberg, op. cit.

[40] Nathan Glazer, *American Judaism*, Chicago, 1957, p. 109.

[41] cf. his *Conservative Judaism*, p. 133.

[42] op. cit., p. 34.

[43] Stuart E. Rosenberg, *The Search for Jewish Identity in America*, New York, 1965.

[44] 'The Lakeville Studies', op. cit.

[45] cf. Harvey Cox, *The Secular City*, New York, 1967; also, Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, New York, 1967.

[46] Robert Alter, 'A Fever of Ethnicity' in *Commentary*, 53, 6, June 1972.

[47] Andrew M. Greeley, *Unsecular Man: the Persistence of Religion*, New York, 1972.

[48] *Conservative Judaism*, 1972 edition, p. 23.

[49] Marshall Sklare et al., *Not Quite at Home*, New York, 1969, especially pp. 14–15.

[50] *Conservative Judaism*, p. 25.

[51] Verbit, op. cit.

[52] cf. Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, Stanford, Calif., 1957.

[53] This phrase, coined by Peter Berger, aptly captures the social-psychological status of 'Those who continue to adhere to the world as defined by religious traditions . . .' op. cit., p. 152.

[54] op. cit., p. 260.

[55] op. cit., p. 8.

[56] Anton C. Zijderveld, *The Abstract Society*, New York, 1970, pp. 70–72.

For a more popular account, see Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock*, New York, 1970.

[57] In the present context the relative absence of cultural integration means the general absence in contemporary American culture of norms which would challenge any particular item of belief or ritual in any religious system. The apparent resurgence and growing popularity of obscure, and even quite bizarre, beliefs and rituals (including black magic,' eastern mysticism, and horoscopes) on what was thought to be the religiously arid terrain of contemporary America seem to suggest, minimally, that the general social level of tolerance has increased, and more likely, that people opting for membership in such cognitive minorities no longer feel sufficient cognitive dissonance to prevent them from membership and identification. The nature and degree of identification are, or course, yet to be determined.

[58] cf. Johan Galtung, 'Rank and Social Integration', in Joseph Berger, Morris Zeldich, and Bo Anderson, eds., *Sociological Theories in Progress*, New York, 1966; also in the same work, James C. Kimerly, 'A Theory of Status Equilibration'.

[59] *Conservative Judaism*, op. cit., p. 279.

[60] This statement is meant to refer only to religion, not to politics.

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

VOLUME NINE OCTOBER 1973 NUMBER THREE

KASRAVI: THE INTEGRATIVE NATIONALIST OF IRAN **Ervand Duguid**

A PREVIEW OF THE GREAT GAME IN ASIA—III: THE ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH EXPEDITION TO EGYPT IN 1801 **Edward Ingram**

ARAB IMMIGRATION INTO PRE-STATE ISRAEL: 1922–1931 **Fred M. Gottheil**

PARTY TRANSFORMATION IN LEBANON: AL-KATA'IB AS A CASE STUDY **John P. Entelis**

YASIN THE GATE-CRASHER **M. Peled**

THE JEWISH COLONISATION ASSOCIATION AND THE ROTHSCHILDS IN PALESTINE **Anne Ussishkin**

SOME SOVIET WORKS ON ISLAM **Jacob M. Landau**

RECOLLECTIONS AND REFLECTIONS OF A BRITISH DIPLOMAT **J. B. Kelly**

BOOK NOTES

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RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN NATIVE ORTHODOXY IN LONDON, 1870–1914: RABBINATE AND CLERGY

Stephen Sharot

The emergence of the Chief Rabbinate

THE Chief Rabbinate evolved in the second half of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth from the rabbinate of the first and most important Ashkenazi synagogue in the chief centre of Jewry in England: the Great Synagogue in London. At first each synagogue in London appointed its own 'Chief Rabbi', but when Solomon Hirschell was elected Rabbi by the Great Synagogue in 1802, he was duly recognized as Chief Rabbi by the other London synagogues.[1] The rabbis of the other London synagogues were not subsequently replaced and 'mono-rabbinism' was established in the Ashkenazi London community. Hirschell was a traditionalist who did not aspire to the position of Chief Rabbi, but he came to be regarded by the majority of English Jews as the Chief Rabbi not only of London but of the whole country.

In the traditional European communities the rabbinate was neither centralized nor formally hierarchical, but in England a two-tier ecclesiastical hierarchy evolved, consisting of a single Chief Rabbi, in whose office religious authority was almost exclusively concentrated, and Jewish clergymen who performed non-rabbinical roles, such as the reading of the synagogue service. A number of factors contributed to the development of 'mono-rabbinism' in England: the voluntary basis of Jewish religious organization, the secular nature of Anglo-Jewry, and its democratic nature and social composition.

The Jews of medieval England had been expelled in 1290, and it was not until the second half of the seventeenth century that Jews were allowed to enter England and freely organize Jewish communities. The social and religious organization of the Jews was not regulated by any special legal provisions and a *kehillah* on the Continental model did not develop.[2] Unlike the other European communities, Anglo-Jewry was centred on the synagogue and based on a voluntary membership; financially, it was dependent on membership fees, not on community

taxes. In the eighteenth century the European *kehillot* were in large measure self-governing communities whose leaders had a number of legal sanctions at their command to exercise social control and maintain religious conformity. In England, the leaders of the community had no legal authority to enforce sanctions, and a primary concern was the very maintenance of some sort of coherent group life.[3] The emergence of the Chief Rabbinate was, in part, a response to this situation since it served as a centripetal institution for a community whose association-based organization was potentially liable to schism.

The problem of preserving community cohesion was related to the problem of the legitimacy of religious authority in a secular and associational body of Jews. In the majority of the eighteenth-century European communities, the religious law (codified in the *Shulhan Arukh*) was the source of religious authority, but the extensive acculturation of Jews to English culture and their concomitant secularization meant that they could no longer consistently regard the *Shulhan Arukh* as the source of religious authority.[4] The response of Anglo-Jewry to the problem of religious authority in a secular society was to substitute the authority of a religious office, the Chief Rabbinate, for the authority of the *Shulhan Arukh*. The traditional rabbi's authority rested on the recognition of his superior knowledge of the religious Law; the English Chief Rabbi's authority depended on his occupying that office. The *Jewish Chronicle*[5] maintained in 1846 that

> it matters little whether the [ritual] alterations introduced by the Chief Rabbi are an improvement or not; it is enough for us that he has authorized them, and our duty is to obey. The most Rev. the Chief Rabbi should be invested with the authority due to his high office . . . No committee of surveillance should be tolerated.

Thus, decisions on religious questions became the exclusive province of the Chief Rabbi, and other rabbinical positions were left unfilled since the lay leaders, who were unscholarly business men, preferred to save the expense of religious functionaries whose services they had little occasion to use.

That the Chief Rabbi of London became also the Chief Rabbi of England was related to the centralization of English Jewry in London.[6] In no other eighteenth-century European capital was there so great a proportion of Jews in relation to provincial Jewry. Some European capitals imposed quotas on the number of Jews who could reside there; from others, Jews were excluded altogether; and even in capitals where Jews were admitted, they were subject to restrictions, such as high taxes and laws forbidding the building of synagogues. Provincial communities on the Continent, particularly in eastern Europe, were often numerically larger and economically more important than the communities in the capitals, and the provincial rabbis often had a higher

status and greater authority than the rabbis in the capitals. There were no restrictions on Jewish residence in England, and nearly all the early rich Sephardi and Ashkenazi immigrants settled in London because of the capital's prestige and its commercial and financial advantages. The poorer immigrants settled near their rich co-religionists, who established synagogues and cemeteries, and often provided employment and charity. The eighteenth-century provincial communities were offshoots of the dominant London community and were founded by the poorer Ashkenazim[7] who maintained trading and other communications with their London co-religionists.

The early provincial communities usually had only one religious functionary to fulfil the multiplicity of roles required.[8] Since religious knowledge was not an important criterion of status and there was little concern to conform to the ritual minutiae, English provincial Jews neither required a scholar to give the community status and direct religious studies, nor a rabbi to answer ritual questions. Thus, the provincial religious functionaries were rarely ordained rabbis, and the few ritual problems that did arise, such as the form of the synagogue ritual, were sent for solution to the Chief Rabbi in London.

Before the election of Nathan Adler as Chief Rabbi in 1844, the office of the Chief Rabbinate had developed in spite of, rather than because of, the occupants of the post. Solomon Hirschell, who was elected Chief Rabbi in 1802, was the last of the traditionalist Chief Rabbis; he dressed in eastern European garb, spoke only a little English, and devoted his life to the study of the Torah. Hirschell gave two talmudical discourses every year and went to the Great Synagogue for prayers, but most of his time was taken up with study. The secularized laymen were dissatisfied with the traditional interpretation of the rabbinic roles, and a contemporary claimed that Hirschell was 'indifferent to the bulk of his synagogue'.[9] He died in 1842.

Since the Rabbi of the Great Synagogue was accepted as the British rabbinical authority by the majority of British congregations, the lay officers of the Great Synagogue decided to extend membership of the electoral body of the Chief Rabbinate to all the large and medium-sized congregations in Britain.[10] The congregations met and a committee was appointed to select candidates for the office. It was agreed that the allocation of votes to each congregation was to be fixed according to the amount it was willing to subscribe to the Chief Rabbi's salary. The larger congregations and greater wealth of the London synagogues gave them a substantial majority of the votes.

The office, duties, and powers of the Chief Rabbinate were decided by the representatives of the congregations who had agreed to unite under the office. It was laid down in the terms of office that 'the Chief Rabbi shall have the general religious direction and superintendence of each of the uniting congregations', and that 'he shall determine all

questions on religious points referred to him by any member of any such congregation'. The Chief Rabbi had to officiate at the marriages of seatholders of the uniting London congregations, supervise *shehitah* in London and the provinces, visit schools, and occasionally visit the provincial congregations.[11]

The appointee, Nathan Adler, did not object to performing the ritual and pastoral roles required of him by the laymen, and, as a 'modern' Chief Rabbi, he was able to extend the Chief Rabbinate's authority beyond that of his more traditional predecessors. In one of his earliest sermons, he expressed a wish for uniformity of the service in the synagogues,[12] and for that reason, and in order to consolidate and reinforce his authority, he issued the 'Laws and Regulations for all the Synagogues in the British Empire' in 1847. The following laws were included:

> The duty of superintending the Synagogues as far as religious observances are concerned, devolves on the Chief Rabbi . . .
>
> The erection of a new Synagogue must have the sanction of the Chief Rabbi . . .
>
> Without the consent of the Honorary Officers and of the Chief Rabbi no one shall be permitted to deliver a religious discourse in the Synagogue.

Many synagogues did not immediately follow all the rules and regulations,[13] but the Chief Rabbi was firmly established as the rabbinical authority in Britain.

The Chief Rabbinate, 1870–1914

The formation of the United Synagogue in London in 1870 further strengthened the office of the Chief Rabbinate. The United Synagogue was a union of five predominantly middle-class, native congregations: the Great, Hambro, and New synagogues in the City, the Central Synagogue in Great Portland Street, and the Bayswater Synagogue. The congregations agreed to amalgamate their finances and charities and to become constituent synagogues of one centrally governed institution. The United Synagogue's Act of Union of 1870 stated that its objects 'shall be the maintaining, founding, erecting, and carrying on, in London and its neighbourhood, of places of worship for persons of the Jewish religion who conform to the Polish or German ritual . . .'. By 1915 the number of constituent synagogues had grown to seventeen but only a small proportion of the immigrants had become affiliated and it remained a union of largely middle-class native congregations. The Act of Union provided for the 'maintenance of a Chief Rabbi' who was to supervise and control the religious officers and the religious observances of the constituent synagogues. The authority and duties of the Chief Rabbi were not formulated in detail in the organization's consititution, but opportunities to define and establish them in written laws (both in relation to the United Synagogue and to other Jewish

congregations) occurred after the death of Nathan Adler in 1890 and that of Hermann Adler in 1911, in the intervals preceding the appointment of a successor. Since the Chief Rabbinate was a newly created office with a considerable amount of religious authority, its roles took on their definitions under its first incumbents. Only when the office was 'unoccupied' could it be reviewed and defined more effectively by the lay bodies.

A clause in the United Synagogue Deed stated that when a vacancy occurred in the office of Chief Rabbi, the United Synagogue should, together with other contributing congregations in the United Kingdom, arrange the election to the office. Although the United Synagogue was the only organization to have written the authority of the Chief Rabbinate into its constitution, the authority of the office was presumed to extend far beyond the boundaries of the major group of synagogues in London. Its upper-class acculturated lay leaders mixed socially with Anglicans and they were concerned that Anglo-Jewry should have a religious head who would occupy a position of authority somewhat parallel to that of the Archbishop of Canterbury in the Anglican Church. However, their efforts to achieve this end were only partly successful. Most of the native provincial and colonial congregations did not dispute the religious jurisdiction of the 'Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the British Empire', but their contributions to the Chief Rabbinate Fund were often small and irregular. Twenty-seven congregations agreed to contribute to the Fund in 1852; but by 1871, nine provincial, one colonial, and four London congregations had ceased to do so, and only eleven provincial congregations sent regular contributions. Despite the growth of the provincial congregations only one had increased its contribution.[14] The Fund did not, therefore, meet the salary and expenses of the office, and the United Synagogue had to find the salary from its own resources. In 1886, a United Synagogue committee on the Fund maintained that the organization should impress upon the provincial congregations 'that they exist not for themselves only, but are members of the great body-corporate of Jews of the Empire who are amenable to the spiritual guidance of the Chief Rabbinate'.[15] The leaders of the United Synagogue encouraged the provincial congregations to increase their contributions to the Fund; but, from the financial point of view, the Chief Rabbi remained an employee of the United Synagogue.

At each Conference to elect a new Chief Rabbi, the lay leaders of the United Synagogue attempted to extend the religious jurisdiction of the office. In 1890 they invited the Sephardi and Reform synagogues in London to send delegates to the Conference, but both congregations declined the invitation. A total number of seventy delegates (representing the London, provincial, and colonial congregations who contributed to the Chief Rabbinate Fund) attended the Conference, but

the congregations represented were not bound to adhere to the decisions taken at it. In 1912 the sub-committee of the Conference wrote[16] that each small community was

> a kingdom unto itself, acknowledging in some cases the authority of the Chief Rabbi, but in other instances being swayed by some self-elected *Rav*. The Conference is anxious that, when feasible and possible, the *Rabbonim* should be drawn into and attached to the body politic . . . The Conference was imbued with the paramount idea of bringing the different Ashkenazi congregations, scattered throughout the breadth of the Empire, into one homogeneous whole, paying allegiance to an Ecclesiastical Chief.

At a meeting of the United Synagogue Council, A. H. Jessel, an honorary officer, said: 'I think a community like ours requires an ecclesiastical head . . . We should have an ecclesiastical officer who should be recognised by the whole of His Majesty's subjects as the person to whom they could apply in matters as to which other ecclesiastical heads were invited to give their co-operation.' To illustrate the importance of the Chief Rabbinate, Jessel related that on one important social occasion the Jewish community was not represented because Hermann Adler was ill, and the hosts would not accept a minister as a substitute. Hence, 'the status of the Jewish community is raised by having at its head a man of supreme importance . . . , and for the internal government of the community, it is desirable that there should be someone in authority whose directions can be obeyed.'[17]

Although the lay leaders of the United Synagogue wanted the Chief Rabbi's authority to extend over the British Empire, they reserved the right of the United Synagogue to have the majority of votes in his election. Only those congregations who contributed to the Chief Rabbinate Fund were invited by the United Synagogue to the Chief Rabbinate Conference. When 13 synagogues in Manchester were not invited to the 1912 Conference, they held a meeting to protest that the United Synagogue was electing a Chief Rabbi 'to rule over Jewry without asking whether they had the permission of Jewry'.[18] The United Synagogue reiterated that electoral votes were allocated according to the amounts the synagogues had contributed to the Chief Rabbinate Fund. The delegates from the London Federation of Synagogues, an association of immigrant synagogues in London, protested against the ruling and seceded from the Conference.[19] Thus, to all intents and purposes, the Chief Rabbi was elected by the United Synagogue.

The majority of native congregations accepted the religious authority of the Chief Rabbi, but the immigrants (and the immigrant rabbis in particular) resented the Chief Rabbi's monopoly over rabbinical functions, such as ritual slaughter. Hermann Adler's jurisdiction in the authorization of *shohetim* was disputed by immigrant groups in three cases before the civil courts: in Liverpool (1904), Manchester (1907),

and London (1911). In each case Jewish butchers in the immigrant community sued their local *shehita* board which was authorized by the Chief Rabbi to issue licences to the ritual slaughterers. The *shehita* boards had published notices referring to the meat of these butchers, who had refused to submit to the boards' authority, as *trefa* (non-kasher). The plaintiffs argued that their own rabbis had as much authority as the Chief Rabbi to license *shohetim*, and that in any case Jewish law did not recognize the position of a 'Chief Rabbi'. That position, however, was recognized by the Liverpool and Manchester courts; while in London the jury could not agree and there was no judgment. The Chief Rabbinate's exclusive jurisdiction was consequently put in doubt; and the London Board of Shehita no longer referred to meat authorized by other rabbis as *trefa*, but instead issued the statement that 'the Board does not hold itself responsible for the *kashruth* of so-and-so'.[20]

A deputation of 'foreign' rabbis to the Chief Rabbinate Conference sub-committee in 1912 stated[21] that

> their experience of other countries showed that where a Chief Rabbi existed orthodox Judaism entirely disappeared. They advocated that Principal Rabbis should have absolute authority and autonomy in the management of local, ecclesiastical affairs . . . The Chief Rabbi should not be allowed to interfere with the provincial Rabbi in questions appertaining to the *Shulchan Aruch* especially with regard to affairs of *Shechita*.

The power of the lay leaders to extend the jurisdiction of the Chief Rabbinate outside the United Synagogue was limited, but they opposed any attempt, by laymen or ministers, to question it as the sole religious authority of the United Synagogue. After the death of Nathan Adler, a petition (signed by 470 members of the United Synagogue) was submitted to the President and Council of the organization. The petitioners desired more liberty to pass ritual modifications, and proposed that the 'powers hitherto solely vested in the Chief Rabbi' with regard to synagogue worship and ritual should be divided between the Chief Rabbi and a representative lay board, and that the constituent synagogues should be allowed to make alterations in the ritual if three-quarters of the voting members approved, although the lay board would have the power to veto. A counter-petition, signed by 136 members of the Bayswater Synagogue, declared that the passing of the resolutions in the first petition would 'degrade that high office and weaken the authority and great influence it has exercised throughout the British Empire . . . It is very undesirable to make any change in the religious government of the Community.'[22]

In 1894, a Council member proposed that the opinion of rabbis, other than the Chief Rabbi, should be sought on the issue of instrumental music in the religious services. The Chairman of the Council meeting said that he could not accept the motion because, 'for us, the authority

of the Chief Rabbi is supreme'. The Chairman also ruled that the Council could not vote on the desirability or otherwise of instrumental music because it did not have the authority to give an opinion on religious matters.[23]

The centralized organization of the Church of England made an impression on the Jewish lay leaders, but in their support for 'mono-rabbinism' they clearly went beyond the model provided by the Anglican Church. The lay leaders were rich business men who sought to apply the pyramidal and autocratic models of authority with which they were familiar in the business world to both the lay and the religious organization of the community. The constitution of the United Synagogue provided for the democratic election of leaders and for the source of authority to rest in the Council; but, in fact, the real power and decision-making were in the hands of the honorary officers. The leaders of the United Synagogue were a self-recruiting élite group; the men they nominated into their ranks were generally accepted by the Council, they were invariably re-elected by the Council, and they remained in their positions until they voluntarily retired. Their high economic and social status enabled them to extend their power beyond the authority that was laid down for their offices in the organization's constitution. For example, the fact that Lord Rothschild was a very rich and highly honoured peer meant that he was able to act in an autocratic fashion as president of the United Synagogue. He was known as, and he referred to himself as, 'the lay head of the Anglo-Jewish community'.[24] It is not surprising that the lay leaders also sought to impose an autocratic governmental model upon their religious organization.

The concentration of religious authority in the Chief Rabbinate left the ministers with very little authority or power. Nathan Adler sanctioned ritual modifications in the late 1870s without reference to the ministers. In 1891, the United Synagogue laid it down that when a synagogue submitted proposals to alter rituals, the Chief Rabbi should consult a committee of ministers 'unless he [the Chief Rabbi] shall deem it proper to authorize such alterations without consultation with the proposed Committee'. Hermann Adler consulted the ministers in 1892, but the final decisions on the proposed modifications rested entirely with him.

The ministers were also excluded from decision-making in lay matters: they were not represented on the local boards of management, the United Synagogue Council, or the Board of Deputies. One minister, A. A. Green, said that 'with regard to his position as the Secretary at meetings of the Board of Management, he should be given a position in the councils of the administration of the synagogue more approximating to that of the vicar of a church than the mechanical recording of the minutes of proceedings in which . . . he has no right to say a word and may even be denied permission to offer it'.[25] The minister of the New

West End Synagogue complained to his congregation that the synagogue officials in the United Synagogue 'turn the prayer wheel. Everything is organized. Everything is prescribed . . . The congregations turn to one Chief Rabbi for guidance and are thus able to rest content with synagogue officials instead of teachers of the synagogue.'[26]

The ministers made a number of attempts to remedy that situation. In 1912, they issued a scheme for the religious administration of the community whereby an Ecclesiastical Board (composed of the rabbis and preachers of the congregations accepting the authority of the Chief Rabbinate) would elect about 20 rabbis and preachers to form a Central Consistory to assist the Chief Rabbi in settling questions 'heretofore decided by the Chief Rabbi on his sole authority'. The ministers wanted a clause in the United Synagogue Deed to be reworded to read: 'The form of worship . . . be under the supervision and control of the Chief Rabbi *in Council with the Central Consistory*.'[27] The delegates at the Chief Rabbinate Conference jeered at the ministers' scheme. Lord Rothschild, the President of the Conference, said that he was astonished at the ministers' scheme, which 'would put the Chief Rabbinate in slavery and chains'.[28] The sub-committee of the Chief Rabbinate Conference received a deputation from the ministers, but it declared: 'the new Chief Rabbi ought to be invested with all the authority and influence which were exercised by his predecessor, . . . the Ministers' Scheme could not but fail to impair that authority and influence'.[29]

In 1913 the Standing Committee of the Conference of Anglo-Jewish Ministers asked the United Synagogue to postpone the election of the Chief Rabbi in order to receive a deputation from the ministers. When the ministers' request was refused on the grounds that their views were already known, the Standing Committee resolved to protest 'most strongly to the entire Jewish community against such treatment of the official representatives of its Clergy . . . In no other religious denomination would there have been possible the contemplation of an appointment of this character without regard to the opinions and the special knowledge of those most immediately concerned.'[30]

In a paper to the Ministers' Conference in 1911, J. F. Stern said that the Chief Rabbinate was an autocracy, and he recommended that an Ecclesiastical Board should replace it. He said:

> A great advantage would accrue to the community and to the Rabbinate if our ecclesiastical government, like the Episcopate of the Church, were vested in a body of men, instead of in an individual.
>
> The Bishop of London is said to be the hardest-worked man in the public life of the Metropolis, but ably supported as he is by three Suffragan Bishops and three Archdeacons, and limited as his responsibility is to London north of the Thames, his task must be a light one compared with that of the Chief Rabbi of United Congregations of the British Empire.

In their 'Provincial Congregational District Organization Scheme'

the ministers suggested that nine provincial district councils, each composed of rabbis and preachers, should deal with religious questions arising in their respective districts. The ministers claimed that their scheme 'in no way involves any interference with, or usurpation of, the function of the ecclesiastical authorities in London', since the local councils would only deal with 'questions of a local character'.[31] As with the ministers' scheme to replace the Chief Rabbinate by a Central Consistory, the decentralization scheme was ignored by the lay leaders and therefore not implemented.

Changing roles of the Anglo-Jewish clergy

It is not surprising that, in the years before the First World War, the ministers' suggestions for change in religious organization were often based upon Christian models since, in their appearance and performance of many roles, the Anglo-Jewish ministers had come to differ little from the Anglican and Nonconformist clergy. The Jewish 'minister', who performed the roles of preacher, teacher, pastor, and administrator, had evolved from the traditional *hazan* whose single role was to read and intone the services correctly. Before the eastern European immigration there were very few rabbis in England, and the *hazan* was the most important congregational employee until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. However, in the last decades of that century, the growing number of middle and upper-class anglicized laymen (who belonged to the United and other native synagogues) demanded a 'minister' who would perform roles similar to those of the Christian clergy.

The religious employee's adoption of the role of preacher was a slow process; the first sermon in English was given in a Liverpool synagogue in 1806;[32] and in mid-century the West London Reform Synagogue was the only synagogue in London where weekly sermons were given. The Chief Rabbi preached occasionally in the Great Synagogue and twice a year to the New and Hambro congregations.[33] Preachers were appointed, however, in the newly established synagogues in the West End and suburbs of London. There was some disagreement among seatholders in 1854 over whether to appoint a 'scholar' or a 'singer' in the proposed Central Synagogue,[34] and it was finally decided to appoint a man able to perform the roles of both reader and minister. The Bayswater, Borough, and North London synagogues also appointed men who could preach, but sermons remained infrequent in the City synagogues.[35] Candidates for the office of Reader at the Great Synagogue, in 1871, had to state whether they were competent to preach in English, but it was not made an imperative condition of employment.[36]

In a letter to the *Jewish Chronicle* in that year, a reader wrote: 'If I want to hear such vocal exhibitions I go to the opera. I attend syna-

gogue to pray, and be instructed, but I find that instruction which I crave rarely given.'[37] The *Jewish Chronicle* commented, however, that 'a fine voice is still held to be the *sine qua non*, to which all other qualifications are rendered subsidiary if not sacrificed'.[38] Ten years later, in 1881, the same weekly wrote: 'For most Jews the sermon is perhaps the most distinctive part of the ritual . . . and the general impressiveness of religious ceremonies depends in a large measure on the extent to which the sermon has appealed to the congregation.'[39] This was probably an overstatement of the change of preference from reader to preacher; many native Jews, both in the City and the suburbs, still preferred a 'singer'. Several members of the New Synagogue effectively opposed, in 1882, an attempt by the Board of Management to elect a preacher, and the Board finally resigned over the issue.[40] In 1895, however, the New Synagogue invited applications from candidates who could both preach and sing and who were willing to take on 'extra synagogue duties'.[41] The Council of the United Synagogue had resolved, in 1883, that the ability to preach in English was not a necessary condition for candidates to the post of Reader at the North London Synagogue. A member of the Council, who proposed that readers should be able to preach in English, argued that readers were required 'whose intelligence and culture was such as would attract the young to the synagogue, and who would promote, like the clergy of other denominations, the opening of Sabbath schools and other useful aids to their religious advancement'. Other speakers said that they preferred the 'old fashioned' *hazan*. Lionel L. Cohen, who chaired the meeting, said that he would rather hear a service read correctly than 'any number of sermons'.[42] The *Jewish Chronicle* commented on the fact that the 'difference of tastes is not confined to Jews. In one church there is an [*sic*] ornate a service, musically speaking, as it is possible to have; not only do the choir sing but the clergy too. In another, the minister only reads, and the singing is left to the choir.'[43]

The more prosperous suburban congregations overcame the 'singer or preacher' dilemma by employing two separate religious officers. The Reverend A. L. Green performed the roles of reader and preacher in the Central Synagogue from 1855 to 1882, but the congregation decided in 1882 to appoint a minister in addition to a reader.[44] In 1875, the United constituent synagogues employed a total of eight readers, two ministers, and two officers who performed both roles. In 1911, the constituent synagogues employed 17 readers, nine ministers, and six officers who performed both roles. In many synagogues, pulpits were built in addition to the reading desks.

The laymen's increasing demand that the religious officers perform the role of preacher was an instance of their acculturation to Christian models. The Christian laymen in the Victorian churches regarded preaching as the clergy's most important role. Elliott-Binns wrote: ' The

Victorian Age loved oratory, from platform and pulpit alike . . . There was no objection to long sermons.'[45]

The acculturated laymen expected a minister to perform also the role of pastor. In the more traditional communities, the visitation of the sick was entrusted to the laymen; one of the chief functions of the immigrant friendly societies was to organize visits to the sick and to mourners. The Visitation Committee of the United Synagogue included both laymen and ministers, but after 1870 visitation became more and more the responsibility of the clergy. When, in 1871, the office of reader at the Great Synagogue became vacant, the Council approved a suggestion of the Synagogue's Board of Management that the new officer should visit the sick and poor.[46] A candidate for the office assured the electors of the Great Synagogue that he had 'ever esteemed it among the highest duties of a minister of our holy religion to visit the sick, to comfort the mourner, and to console the afflicted'.[47] In the same year, 14 religious officers of the United Synagogue signed a letter in which they stated their willingness to co-operate 'in rendering their services to the poor and afflicted of the community'.[48] In 1886, Hermann Adler wrote a code of laws to guide ministers in their pastoral role, and he convened a meeting of them in order to impress upon them the need for regular and systematic visitation.[49] The United Synagogue overseers of the poor asked the ministers, in 1902, to form a Committee of Workers among the Jewish Poor. A centre was opened in the East End, and ministers sat in attendance to deal with enquiries and give advice to the poor. The largest proportion of applicants who called at the centre sought material assistance, but the ministers also gave legal advice, provided hospital tickets, advised new immigrants, helped applicants to obtain admission to convalescent homes, and found work for the unemployed.[50]

The lay leaders of the United Synagogue stressed the importance of the pastoral role. A. H. Jessel said that charitable work 'was one of the highest functions they [the ministers] could discharge',[51] and Lord Rothschild said that he wanted 'a minister living like a Christian clergyman in the midst of his flock'.[52] When, in 1911, the United Synagogue Executive opposed a rise in the salary of a minister because he had objected to visitation work, F. A. Davis, a vice-president, said that it 'should be a minister's primary duty'.[53] The ministers were also expected to persuade the members of their congregations to give money to charity.

In addition to the role of religious teacher of the young, which was adopted by the United Synagogue ministers in the 1880s and 1890s, a minister was also expected to perform the duties of administrator or secretary to the synagogue. In 1875, five of the 11 religious officers employed by the constituent synagogues combined their duties as reader or minister with that of secretary. In 1911, 13 of the 32 readers

and ministers were also secretaries. Several ministers disliked the administrative role. Solomon Schechter, for example, wrote that the minister was regarded 'as a sort of superior clerk in whom business-like capacity is more in demand than any other virtues they may possess'.[54]

The acculturated laymen wanted their ministers to approximate to the 'cultured gentlemen' clergy of the Church of England, and to act as worthy ambassadors to the non-Jewish world. A member of the Central Synagogue's Board of Management stated[55] the qualities required of a minister:

> The minister should be a man of good address and cultured mind whose pulpit addresses would be marked by refinement and learning; a man whom the members would look up to as their friend and counsellor; whom they would be proud to receive in their home, and introduce as the type of what a Jewish minister should be. Learning was an essential quality but due importance should be attached to those graces of style and manner which characterise the leading ministers of other denominations.

At a meeting of the Jews' College Council in 1877, the Chairman, A. Cohen, said that the College should produce ministers like those in the Church of England where 'in every parish, however remote, they could always find one cultivated gentleman'.[56] At a prize-giving at the College in 1895, Claude G. Montefiore said that the minister would be able to influence his congregation only if he was 'a cultured and cultivated Englishman as well as a cultured and cultivated Jew'.[57] A United Synagogue Executive report[58] on the requirements of ministers noted:

> Academic distinction, while very desirable, is not everything, and other requirements should not be sacrificed to the attainment of profound scholarship. If the congregation have the opportunity of listening to a simple sermon which touches their hearts, and is morally and spiritually a help to them, they will readily forgive the preacher if he has not the Rabbinical Diploma, and has never been heard of by foreign contemporary scholars . . . [The minister] must be prepared cheerfully to bear his share of the useful drudgery of visitation work and the humble labours of Committees.

Presenting the Executive report to the Council, A. H. Jessel said that a minister had too much scholarship when he was not understood by the average member of his congregation and when the scholarship was 'useless for practical purposes'. He urged the Jewish ministers to adopt the roles of the Church of England clergy and to follow the example of the Chief Rabbi who had gained the respect of the 'world at large' by doing for his community 'what the higher functionaries of the Church did for theirs'.[59]

Not only the roles, but also the styles of the Christian clergy were adopted by the Jewish ministers. At a conference in 1909, they decided that the term 'Reverend' should apply to *hazanim* as well as to ministers,

but not to *shohetim*.[60] The Rev. A. A. Green made rather extravagant claims[61] for the clerical collars and garb which the Jewish ministers had taken to wearing:

> the clerical garb . . . had shown the Christian world . . . , the foreign Jew . . . [and] the English Jewish boy and girl that a Jewish minister had the bearing, the position and the educational standing of ministers of other denominations . . . The foreign Jew had learnt that a Jewish minister can be an English gentleman, and the same revelation had been made to thousands upon thousands of Christian Englishmen whose idea of a Rabbi had been the man who cut the throats of bullocks for the Jews.

In the traditional religious communities, there were no formal visible signs to distinguish the 'official' rabbis from other scholars or from other Jews; but the ministers of the secular Anglo-Jewish communities felt a need to 'set themselves apart'. They adopted the clerical garb both to induce the 'appropriate' responses of laymen and to increase their status by approximating to the appearance of Anglican clergymen. It is not surprising that the immigrants sometimes refused to recognize the native minister as 'Jewish', for in their eyes 'the "minister" was indistinguishable in manner and appearance from any Protestant pastor'.[62] Israel Zangwill wrote that the Anglo-Jewish minister was 'a copy from tie to toe of the Christian clergyman, and the resemblance often extends even to his sermon. Sometimes he is got up like a Jesuit.'[63]

'*Minister*' *or* '*Rabbi*'

At a United Synagogue Council meeting in 1905, A. H. Jessel argued that ministers did not require rabbinical diplomas because the members of their congregations did not ask them questions of Jewish law.[64] A. A. Green admitted that he had only once been called upon to exercise a rabbinical function; a man had brought a fowl to him which he declared *trefa*, but the man had then taken it to the *Beth Din* which pronounced it *kasher*.[65]

Few ministers put an emphasis upon the scholarly role; study of the Law was viewed as being not so much an end in itself as one requirement for the more important role of preacher. Solomon Schechter noted that 'the duty of learning (or study of the Torah) seems to be of least moment in the life of the minister', and that the minister found little time 'to increase his scanty stock of Hebrew knowledge required in his undergraduate days'.[66]

The feeling between native ministers and immigrant rabbis was one of mutual contempt,[67] but some ministers believed that the absence of the rabbinical qualification jeopardized their status. Since there was no provision for the award of rabbinical diplomas in England, they had to be obtained abroad; diplomas were received by S. Singer from a Vien-

nese Rabbi, in 1890, and by H. Gollancz from a Galician Rabbi, in 1897. The Chief Rabbi refused to recognize Gollancz's *semikhah*, and Singer refrained from using his rabbinical title in order to avoid friction with the Chief Rabbi. The practice of obtaining rabbinical qualifications abroad was perceived as a threat to the authority of the Chief Rabbinate; and in 1899, Hermann Adler awarded rabbinical diplomas to two past students of Jews' College. The diplomas contained a qualifying clause which stipulated that the rabbinical functions could be exercised only under the supervision of the Chief Rabbi. In 1903, Jews' College began a rabbinical course and in 1908 it held the first examination for a rabbinical diploma. Hermann Adler explained that, before the eastern European immigration, 'members of our community . . . were fully satisfied with the facilities for deciding religious questions afforded by the Chief Rabbi and his Beth Din', but the immigrants had created a need for men with rabbinical diplomas.[68]

The granting of those diplomas made little difference to the roles and image of the Anglo-Jewish minister up to the First World War, but there was some disagreement between the staff of Jews' College and leading laymen on the relative importance of the minister's different roles. In its report on Jews' College in 1910, the United Synagogue Executive complained that the Jewish clergy, unlike the Anglican clergy, had no practical knowledge of the poor and social problems.[69] Jews' College replied that its function was to provide a full theological training and there was no time for lectures on social subjects.[70] The Principal of the College said: 'The United Synagogue seems to know what the functions of its Ministers are supposed to be—to read the prayers, to preach, and to teach as little as possible . . . In England . . . the Minister is considered to be only for the poor.' The Principal objected to ministers performing charitable work which, he said, the laymen could do as well.[71]

According to the majority report of a Jews' College committee in 1914, the rabbi should

> (a) be versed in Jewish literature, in Bible, Talmud and Rabbinical writings; (b) regularly instruct adults in the religious and moral doctrines of Judaism; (c) supervise the religious instruction of the young; (d) know scientific methods and apply them to the development of the knowledge of Judaism.

A minority report, signed by three leading laymen, suggested that the College should admit graduates only, become residential, and be moved to Oxford or Cambridge. *Dayan* Feldman commented: 'The signatories of the minority report wanted to produce an Anglo-Jewish type, and those who signed the main report wanted a Jewish type of Rabbi . . . The Jewish atmosphere did not exist in the Universities.' The Chief Rabbi supported the suggested move to Oxford or Cambridge because

'they must endeavour to surround the College with some of the glamour which it so badly lacked', but the suggestion was defeated at a meeting of the Jews' College Council.[72]

Status and role

Despite the efforts of the ministers to adopt the roles and behaviour patterns of the Christian clergy and to become quite distinct from the readers,[73] their status remained low and, in comparison with their congregations, they felt relatively under-privileged both in income and social honour. The salaries of the majority of United Synagogue ministers were in the 'comfortable' middle-class range and were higher than the salaries of most non-Jewish clergymen, but one minister argued that 'in a rich community like ours there ought to be more levelling up of the financial status of men of equal standing'.[74] It is evident, however, that many laymen did not regard the ministers as having 'equal standing' with themselves. J. F. Stern, the minister of the East London Synagogue, said that 'the Jewish Ministry is looked down upon with disparagement. Those who devote their lives to the service of God and their fellow men are treated as social outcasts by those whose money is their God.'[75]

The reason most frequently given by the ministers for their low status was that the majority of ministers were recruited from the lower-middle class. J. F. Stern said:[76]

> In the National Church and in Nonconformist Christian communities we find members of the best and wealthiest families devoting themselves to the service of their religion, to the ministry of their faith. Have you ever heard of a wealthy and influential Jew devoting one of his sons to the service of the Synagogue?

A. A. Green said that the laymen had

> taken it for granted that the clergy is no calling for the son of a well-to-do man, that its aspirations find no place in the upbringing of the aristocracy or our upper-middle classes, and that its position is regarded as socially inferior . . . We find that the students [of Jews' College] have been and are the sons of parents who, finding that they have clever boys, whose abilities they do not care to see wasted in a small, unprofitable business, and for whom they can find no influential outlets in the liberal professions, have taken them to the College to enter the clergy.[77]

The Jewish clergy was an avenue for social mobility from the lower-middle class, but the absence of the upper-middle class in that clergy was more a result than a cause of its low status. The ministers had a low status because they did not perform a highly valued central role. They possessed neither the institutionalized charisma of the Anglican clergy nor the scholarly status of the traditional rabbinate. The ministers had

no authority to sanction change in the synagogue service since this was the exclusive province of the Chief Rabbi, in whose election they had no say. They sought to raise their status by adopting many of the functions and symbols of the Anglican clergy, but the Anglican priest owed much of his status and authority to his sacerdotal role, a role which was alien to post-biblical Judaism. The Jewish ministers were able to adopt the Anglican clergy's non-sacerdotal roles, but these functions were beginning to lose their status-giving quality as a result of changes in English society. The lay professions were taking over many of the priest's functions, the priest's knowledge was held in less esteem than that of the scientist, and the important debates in society were increasingly conducted by intellectuals in the secular humanities. Thus, the Anglo-Jewish minister was unable to adopt a highly valued role to replace the rabbinical role of interpreter of the law—which had itself lost significance and prestige in the acculturated and secularized native congregations.

NOTES

Abbreviations: *J. C. Jewish Chronicle*
M. B. Minute Books of the United Synagogue

[1] Cecil Roth, *Essays and Portraits in Anglo-Jewish History*, Philadelphia, 1962, pp. 250–61.

[2] At the beginning of the nineteenth century a few Jews tried to gain support for a state-recognized *kehillah*, whereby the London Jews would have been relieved of the local parish rates and the *kehillah* would have taxed the London Jews and administered charity to the Jewish poor. There was strong opposition within the Jewish community, particularly from the Sephardim, and the matter was dropped.

[3] For details on Jewish religious organization in England in the eighteenth century, see Stephen Sharot, *The Social Determinants in the Religious Practices and Organization of English Jewry with Special Reference to the United Synagogue*, unpublished D.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1968, pp. 64–70.

[4] Evidence of the acculturation and secularization of Anglo-Jewry in the eighteenth century are to be found in the sermons of the rabbis of the Great Synagogue: C. Duschinsky, *The Rabbinate of the Great Synagogue*, Oxford, 1921, pp. 9–16. For a comparison of the secular English community with the traditional eastern European communities, see my D.Phil. thesis, op. cit., chap. 2; also my 'Secularization, Judaism and Anglo-Jewry', *A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain*, 4, 1971, pp. 121–40.

[5] *J.C.* 13 Nov. 1846.

[6] This point was particularly stressed in N. Cohen, 'Non-Religious Factors in the Emergence of the Chief Rabbinate', *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England*, XXI, 1968, pp. 304–13.

[7] V. D. Lipman, 'Plymouth Aliens List 1798–1803', *Miscellanies of the Jewish Historical Society of England*, 6, 1962, pp. 187–94.

[8] Benjamin Yates in Liverpool filled the offices of *mohel*, *shohet*, *hazan*,

secretary, and collector of charities in the community, but he was also an engraver and jeweller: Stuart M. Samuel, *History and Genealogy of the Jewish Families of Yates and Samuel of Liverpool*, London, 1901.

[9] Duschinsky, op. cit. The *J.C.* also blamed Hirschell for the religious apathy and indifference in the English community: *J.C.* 14 Oct. 1844.

[10] *Voice of Jacob*, 3 Feb. 1843.

[11] *Voice of Jacob*, 3 March 1843.

[12] *J.C.*, 18 Aug. 1848.

[13] *J.C.* 19 Feb., 9 Oct. 1847.

[14] *M.B.* 8 May 1871.

[15] *M.B.* 2 March 1886.

[16] *M.B.* 13 May 1912.

[17] *J.C.* 10 Nov. 1911.

[18] *J.C.* 15 Dec. 1911.

[19] *J.C.* 2 Feb. 1912.

[20] W. Summerville, 'Killing a Monopoly: A Communal Controversy', *J.C. Supplements*, Dec. 1933, 26 Jan. 1934.

[21] *J.C.* 5 June 1891.

[22] *M.B.* 6 May 1890.

[23] *J.C.* 9 Nov. 1894.

[24] For further details on the organization of the United Synagogue, see my D.Phil. thesis, op. cit., chap. 7. For a popular account of the Anglo-Jewish 'aristocracy', see Chaim Bermant, *The Cousinhood*, London, 1971.

[25] *J.C.* 11 Nov. 1898.

[26] *J.C.* 22 April 1910.

[27] *J.C.* 5 Jan. 1912.

[28] *J.C.* 19 Jan. 1912.

[29] *M.B.* 13 May 1912.

[30] *J.B.* 7 Feb. 1913.

[31] *Second Conference of Anglo-Jewish Ministers*, pamphlet, 1911; *J.C.* 27 Jan. 1911. The *J.C.* suggested in several editorials that the powerlessness of the clergy would be remedied if Anglo-Jewry followed the examples of ecclesiastical organization in the Church of England and Nonconformists bodies: *J.C.* 12 Sep. 1872; 15 Nov., 6 Oct., and 9 Aug. 1878; 17 Oct. 1884.

[32] A. Hyamson, *Jews' College*, Newport, 1955, p. 15.

[33] In the 1840s, weekly sermons in English were given in the Liverpool, Birmingham, Manchester, and Bristol synagogues: *J.C.* 11 Aug. 1848.

[34] *J.C.* 8 Sep. 1854.

[35] *J.C.* 17 Feb. 1871.

[36] *M.B.* 9 Jan. 1871.

[37] *J.C.* 24 March 1871.

[38] *J.C.* 16 June 1871.

[39] *J.C.* 15 July 1881.

[40] *J.C.* 14 April 1882.

[41] *J.C.* 19 July 1895.

[42] *J.C.* 12 Jan. 1883.

[43] *J.C.* 11 May 1883.

[44] *J.C.* 12 Jan. 1883.

[45] L. E. Elliott-Binns, *Religion in the Victorian Era*, London, 1936.

[46] *J.C.* 27 Jan. 1871.

[47] *J.C.* 10 Feb. 1871. The *J.C.* received many letters on the '*hazan* or clergyman' issue: *J.C.* 17 Feb. 1871.

[48] *J.C.* 30 Jan. 1871.

[49] *J.C.* 15 Jan. 1886.

[50] *J.C.* 19 Feb. 1904.

[51] *J.C.* 4 Feb. 1910.

[52] *J.C.* 9 March 1894.

[53] *J.C.* 10 March 1911.

[54] S. Schechter, 'Four Epistles to the Jews of England', *Studies in Judaism*, Philadelphia, 1945. A. A. Green said that a minister 'should not be identified with the collection of dues': *J.C.* 11 Nov. 1895. The Minister of the Central Synagogue criticized in his sermons the combining of secretarial and religious roles: *J.C.* 21 Oct. 1892.

[55] *J.C.* 20 June 1884.

[56] *J.C.* 27 April 1877.

[57] Isidore Harris, *Jews' College Jubilee Volume*, London, 1906. Jews' College, which attempted to produce the 'cultured' ministers desired by the Anglo-Jewish congregations, was opened in London in 1855. For the kind of training of ministers demanded by the secular Anglo-Jewish communities, the traditional type of *yeshiva* was obviously not considered, but by mid-century there was a demand for a seminary to train men to become professional ministers. Jewish seminaries on 'modern' lines were established in other European countries in the first half of the nineteenth century and, in England, the Christian churches were putting an increasing emphasis upon the professional training of their clergy. Jews' College met the approval of Reform as well as native 'orthodox' laymen: Hyamson, op. cit., p. 64.

[58] *J.C.* 28 Jan. 1910.

[59] *J.C.* 4 Feb. 1910. As Chief Rabbi, Hermann Adler sought to defend the orthodox ritual, but he nevertheless adopted many of the roles and role signs of the Christian Church leaders. He wore episcopal garb, attended state services at Westminster Abbey, and appeared alongside the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Cardinal of Westminster on public occasions.

[60] *J.C.* 31 Dec. 1909.

[61] *J.C.* 21 Feb. 1902.

[62] C. Lewis, quoting his immigrant father in *A Soho Address*, London, 1965, p. 57.

[63] *J.C.* 13 Nov. 1891.

[64] *J.C.* 1 Dec. 1905.

[65] *J.C.* 22 Nov. 1907. Without the impact of the eastern European immigrants it is unlikely that the London *Beth Din* would have survived. The secularization of native Jewry had led to a progressive decline in the functions and status of the *dayanim*. In 1876 the United Synagogue considered abolishing the *Beth Din* (*J.C.* 28 April 1876), and the *J.C.* asserted in 1884 that 'for the bulk of the community it [the Beth Din] is of little or no practical use . . . It bears no relation whatever to the religious life of English Jews . . . The ultra-orthodox, who live physically in the nineteenth century but intellectually in the sixteenth, are wont to invoke its counsel.' The *J.C.* suggested that the *Beth Din* should be replaced by a Council of Ministers similar to the

Convocation of the Church of England and the assemblies of Nonconformist ministers: *J.C.* 18 April 1884. In 1891 a United Synagogue committee rejected suggestions that the *dayanim* should assist the Chief Rabbi in such matters as synagogue ritual, religious instruction in schools, and visiting provincial synagogues; they argued that visitation was 'exclusively the function and duty of the Chief Rabbi, as is the visitation of a diocese by its Bishop': *M.B.* 17 Feb. 1891.

[66] Schechter, op. cit.

[67] In a conference held at Leeds in 1911, immigrant rabbis referred to the 'ignorance' of rabbinic teachings on the part of the native ministers, objected to those wives of ministers who did not wear a *shaitel* (wig), and resolved that the ministers 'should abstain from visiting places of amusement'. The native ministers protested against the 'foreign' rabbis' 'return to medievalism', and held that they would create antisemitism and jeopardize the position of Jews in England: *J.C.* 27 Jan., 10 and 17 March 1911.

[68] *J.C.* 17 Feb. 1950.

[69] *J.C.* 4 Feb. 1910.

[70] *J.C.* 14 March 1910.

[71] *J.C.* 6 May 1910.

[72] *J.C.* 20 Feb. 1914.

[73] In 1911, a number of ministers resolved to secede from the Anglo-Jewish Conference of Ministers when the readers used their voting majority to elect a reader to the Vice-Presidency and a majority of readers on to the Standing Committee of the Conference: *J.C.* 16 June 1911. The readers avoided a split with the ministers by withdrawing their Vice-President and resigning the majority of their places on the Standing Committee. They were replaced by ministers, and the number of readers on the Standing Committee was reduced to four out of a total of twenty-two members: *J.C.* 7 July 1911. At a Conference debate one minister said that the way to raise the status of the ministers was to bring about an 'absolute separation of offices': *J.C.* 30 June 1911. A revised constitution of the Conference, in 1913, restricted the number of readers who could attend the Conference to ten from the provinces and ten from London: *J.C.* 11 April 1913.

[74] *J.C.* 24 Nov. 1904. The average annual salary of United Synagogue clergymen in 1875 was £393, and 54 per cent of the officers received not less than £400. Over the period 1885 to 1911 the average income of the officers remained almost static while the average income of gainfully occupied persons in the country rose by about £20. In 1911, the average income of the religious officers, excluding some small grants from a central fund, was £325 and only 34 per cent received £400 or more. The salaries of the officers of the richer congregations remained fairly stable or rose a little; the fall in the average salary was the result of the fall in the revenue of the City synagogues and the affiliation of congregations in the second area of settlement. (Figures abstracted from the annual accounts of the United Synagogue.)

[75] *J.C.* 10 June 1892. Other complaints of United Synagogue ministers with respect to their status: *J.C.* 25 Nov. 1904, 9 Feb. 1906. (Evidence of the low income and status of ministers over the whole country is provided by Michael Goulston, 'The Status of the Anglo-Jewish Rabbinate, 1840–1914', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. X, no. 1, June 1968.) United Syna-

gogue ministers were also irked by the method of appointment. The candidates for a minister's post had to demonstrate their talents to the congregation by a trial reading or sermon and then the seatholders elected by ballot the candidate of their choice. Once elected the minister's position was by no means secure; he was generally elected for a probationary period of two or three years and was subject to three months' notice. One of the first resolutions of the Ministers' Union, formed in 1894, was that the system of electing officers should be abolished: *J.C.* 16 Feb. 1894; see also I. Livingstone, *The Union of Anglo-Jewish Preachers*, pamphlet, London, 1949.

[76] *J.C.* 10 June 1892.

[77] *J.C.* 11 Nov. 1898.

THE FERTILITY OF JEWISH FAMILIES IN BRITAIN, 1971

S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool

1. *Introduction*

COMPARISONS of the vital statistics of the Jews and of the general population have for long been of interest; pre-war studies of many European countries,[1] for example, have shown how trends in the vital statistics of the Jewish community have anticipated those in the general population. For more recent years such comparisons have proved difficult. Statistics relating to the remnants of the Jewish communities on the European mainland continue to display an unfavourable vital balance and an abnormal age-structure in consequence of the wartime massacres; other countries that have received Jewish migrants from Europe also show relatively low birth rates for similar reasons.[2] In Britain, where the Jewish community has a relatively normal age-structure, official statistics take no account of religion; the information available on Jewish fertility is therefore sparse, and very little can be said on the basis of comprehensive figures. Nevertheless, what can be said on the lower level of Jewish fertility in this country on the basis of samples of mothers is of considerable interest, especially in the light of the continuous fall in the general birth-rate in the last seven years.

The Board of Deputies of British Jews has taken steps in recent years systematically to gather communal statistics on marriages, births, and burials in order to build up a reliable picture of the development of the population.[3] Information on births has been collected by means of statistical returns from 'authorized Mohalim', who ritually circumcise virtually all Jewish male children; the information gathered has not, however, been entirely comprehensive. A first report based on returns of births for 1965–68 led to the provisional conclusion that the number of births to the synagogue-affiliated community was probably adequate to ensure replacement; but there were uncertainties in the figures and there was scope for a deeper inquiry.[4]

Subsequently, a more refined inquiry was carried out in relation to a sample of some seven hundred Jewish male births in 1971, and the

results of that inquiry are discussed in the present paper. The mothers of these newly-born children were asked (by the Mohalim) to state the number of children previously born to them, and the date of their marriage; this enables us to make a comparison in respect of family size and the time-pattern of family formation with the Registrar General's returns for the total population of England and Wales. In addition, mothers were asked about the section of the community to which the family belonged (Orthodox, Liberal, etc.); the effect on fertility of the different attitudes to family planning adopted by the various sections could then be studied.[5]

2. *Sample and response*

A pilot investigation was carried out in the summer of 1970 to test the questionnaire and to assess the likely degree of co-operation. The questionnaire was then amended (the version used in the main inquiry is reproduced as an Appendix to this paper) and the main inquiry was carried out from October 1970 to October 1971. It was decided on the basis of the pilot investigation that full coverage of the community was impracticable because of the voluntary nature of the inquiry. Moreover, only a small sample of the eighty Mohalim in the country (those who have larger practices) would be approached, and the objects of the inquiry would be explained to them individually.

From the point of view of fertility, it is the small 'Right-wing Orthodox' group which is particularly interesting: they allow contraceptive practices only in special circumstances; in order to ensure an adequate response from this section of the Jewish community, Mohalim practising among those families were over-represented in the sample.

Twenty Mohalim (out of some thirty approached) sent in completed questionnaires during the inquiry. The returns were in respect of 694 births (or about a third of the estimated total number of Jewish male births in the country from October 1970 to October 1971). There was little difficulty in gaining the co-operation of mothers in completing the forms; the proportion of refusals was under two per cent.

The sample was predominantly from the London region (where about two-thirds of the Anglo-Jewish community resides). Though the Mohalim co-operating in the enquiry may differ in certain respects from those who did not, there is little reason to suppose that the mothers they visited would provide a sample unrepresentative of the whole community. However, two adjustments were made to the sample results; these were incorporated in the tables below in the form of a 'reweighted' total, which is shown as a supplement to the straightforward sample results.

The first adjustment attempts to take into account the fact that families not affiliated to synagogues may have been under-represented in

the sample, because they may tend to employ 'unauthorized' rather than 'authorized Mohalim'.[6] The proportion of mothers not connected with a synagogue, whether through their husbands' membership or attendance, was found to be 20 per cent of the total. This is significantly lower than the 35–40 per cent of Jewish burials which were found to relate to non-synagogue members in an earlier study.[7] However, there is no *necessary* inconsistency. It is known that the proportion of the community that is formally affiliated to a synagogue has increased in recent decades and consequently the discrepancy between the two proportions *may* be no more than a reflection of such a trend. Nevertheless some under-representation of the non-affiliated seems likely, and in the 'reweighted' totals (in the tables below) the weight of non-members has been increased by a half, so that they form some 30 per cent of the total, instead of 20 per cent as in the original sample returns.

The second adjustment relates to the 'Right-wing Orthodox' who, as stated, were deliberately over-represented in the sample; in the reweighted totals their numbers have been halved so that they form 5·5 per cent of births (to correspond approximately with their proportion of synagogue marriages in recent years).

Reform and Liberal births formed 10 per cent of births in the sample of mothers declaring a synagogue affiliation. This is lower than might be expected on the basis of statistics of marriages (18 per cent of all synagogue marriages in 1960–65 were Liberal or Reform), but is close to their estimated proportion of the population[8] (10 per cent). It will be seen below that there is little difference between the family formation patterns of Liberal and Reform Jews on the one hand, and of Central Orthodox Jews on the other, and any reweighting between them would not affect the estimate for the whole community. No adjustment was therefore made.

3. *Number of previous children in family*

In Table I a comparison of the size of family attained by mothers before their current birth is set out for our sample of Jewish mothers and for mothers in the general population of England and Wales as tabulated by the Registrar General. (The latest available figures for the general population are for 1969—not 1970—but so small a difference may be disregarded.) The main comparison to be made is between the second and third columns which give the reweighted totals for the sample and the general population respectively. This indicates that Jewish families are, on average, smaller in size than those in the general population. Thus there are more Jewish mothers than in the general population who have had either only one, or no, previous child; these two categories account for 85 per cent of Jewish mothers as against 71 per cent of mothers in the general population. But for larger families

there are fewer Jewish mothers than in the general population; this holds true for women who have previously had two, three, four, and five or more children. Further, the proportionate discrepancy rises with the size of the family. For the largest sizes the relative discrepancy is very marked; thus, in the general population 5 per cent of mothers have had four or more previous children, but only 1 per cent of Jewish mothers have had families of such sizes.

TABLE 1. *Distribution of mothers according to number of children previously born to them, Jews 1970, and general population of England and Wales 1969*

Number of previous children	*Jews*		*General population*[c]		
	Sample results	*Reweighted*	*All mothers*	*Mothers aged over twenty at marriage*[d]	*Excluding marriage durations under 8 months*[e]
	(1) %	(2) %	(3) %	(4) %	(5) %
0	48·0	49·2	38·5	39·7	31·7
1	34·4	35·7	32·7	33·1	36·2
2	12·1	10·9	15·8	15·4	17·6
3	3·3	2·8	6·9	6·5	7·7
4	0·6	0·5	3·1	2·8	3·5
5 and over	1·6	0·6	3·1	2·6	3·4
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Average no. of children per family[a]	1·81	1·72	2·16	2·10	2·29
Index of completed family size[b]	2·08	2·03	2·60	2·52	3·17

Notes: *a.* The average number of children previously born to mothers giving birth in the year stated, plus the present child.
b. Total number of births divided by the number of first births (see Hajnal, 1948).
c. Calculated from table MM of the Registrar General's *Statistical Review*.
d. Includes all durations of marriage.
e. Includes all ages of marriage.

At this stage we can see from the table that reweighting our sample has little effect on these comparisons, and nothing of substance would be changed if the unweighted first column were used instead of the weighted second column. The small differences that arise upon reweighting are, of course, the result of the different fertility patterns of the various sections of the Jewish community, which are examined below.

The average age of marriage of Jewish brides is more than a year later than that of brides in the general population,[9] and it might be thought that this fact could contribute significantly to the differences just noted in family size. A further comparison of our sample results has therefore been made with those mothers in the general population

marrying over the age of twenty (column 4). This narrows the gap, but only slightly. It might further be thought that pre-marital conceptions are less frequent among Jews (for various possible reasons); and that the comparison of our sample results should therefore be restricted to those mothers in the general population who have borne their children after nine months of marriage. Such a comparison is set out in column 5 of the table, but it widens the gap slightly (the reason is that pre-marital conceptions are generally of first children, and by their being excluded the average family size of the remainder is raised).

Differences in recent fluctuations in marriage numbers may also contribute to the average family size of mothers recently giving birth. For example, if there were a greater relative number of recent marriages amongst Jews than in the general population, one would expect relatively more small Jewish families. But in fact the trend has been in the other direction. While the numbers marrying have recently been rising both in the general population and among Jews, Jewish marriages have fallen in relation to marriages in the general population (see Table 2). Consequently, one would expect—on this ground—the size of families of mothers recently giving birth in the general population to be low in relation to that for the Jewish population.

TABLE 2. *Number of marriages, Jews and general population of England and Wales, 1961—70*

	General Population	*Jews*
1961–65	100	100
1966	108	101
1967	109	100
1968	115	100
1969	112	104
1970	117	106

Differences in social class may also be thought important, but the relevant evidence is rather limited. It seems very likely that the Jewish population has a greater proportion of middle-class households, and family limitation has long been known to be more prevalent in that class. There is the oft-quoted evidence of the 1949 Royal Commission on Population which included figures on under 200 Jewish mothers: they controlled their births more frequently than the remainder of the sample (that is, Protestants and Catholics). It also appeared from these returns that the husbands of the Jewish mothers were more frequently in middle-class occupations (classes I and II of the Registrar General's classification).[10]

The 1961 Census of Population confirmed that middle-class fertility was low in the general population but a more recent survey suggests that class differences are narrowing. That survey was carried out by Dr. Myra Woolf[11] of the General Register Office; mothers were asked

the likely number of children they expected during their marriage, and the replies were analysed according to their husbands' socio-economic group. For those marrying in the last decade, there was no difference on average between the expectations of those belonging to manual and other occupations though there had been differences for those marrying in earlier decades.[12] A slightly rising trend over time was found in the expected size of families in the managerial classes, which led Dr. Woolf to speculate that, if current trends continued for a further decade, those classes would have distinctly larger families than the rest of the population, so reversing the hitherto conventional view. However, these differences cannot be expected to be very great, and the relevance of Dr. Woolf's findings to those of the present study is that they increase the contrast with our present findings: Jewish fertility thus seems particularly low.

A digression on one further result of Dr. Woolf's study[13] may be permitted, though it takes us beyond our intended scope. In her study, mothers were also asked what they considered the ideal number of children for (a) families with 'no particular worries about money, or anything like that' and (b) families 'like yourselves'. On the average, the difference between these two answers was approximately one additional child. Financial considerations are thus clearly important. Jewish families might be thought to have less grounds for such worries; on the other hand, material considerations may figure more prominently in their minds. One cannot speak with any pretensions to scientific objectivity on these matters, but it is clearly possible that the ideal of providing the best possible environment—both material and emotional —for one's children may conflict with the desire for a larger family. Furthermore, the higher average educational standard of Jewish families may enable them to use contraceptive measures more effectively.

Two measures of average family size can be calculated from returns of births, and are shown in the last two rows of Table 1, to provide summary comparisons between the Jewish and the general populations. The first average, though apparently of a familiar kind, is not usually calculated in demographic work when fuller information is available, because of its restricted meaning. The average number of children born to mothers in the sample (that is, the average number of children previously born to mothers in the sample *plus* the present birth) relates only to those mothers who gave birth in the year of the inquiry; women who had no child in that year, and women who remained infertile, are inevitably excluded from the calculation. Despite this limitation, it is interesting to note that for mothers in the general population in 1969 who had been married for a period of 15–25 years, and who had therefore substantially completed their families, the average family size was 2·22 children[14] which is very close to the calculated average of 2·16 shown in the table for the general population.

In practice, therefore, these calculated averages may be taken as an indicator of differences in family size, especially as our interest is in comparing two populations living in the same country at the same time. Hence the difference between the average Jewish family size of 1·72 children and that of the general population of 2·10 children (to take the values from Table 1 which show the minimum gap) may be considered as indicating a substantially lower fertility, by about a fifth, among Jewish mothers. The average family size in the general population, calculated in this way, has not changed significantly in the past decade.

The second measure of average family size that can be derived from our survey is an estimate of the average *completed* family size; it is shown in the final row of the table. The method was originally proposed by Hajnal[15] for comparing family size in different occupational groups from the birth returns for any year; its significance as a measure of completed family size depends on assumptions of the stationarity of the population, but, irrespectively of whether these assumptions are fulfilled, it is a valuable method of comparing Jewish and general fertility. Jewish fertility on this measure also appears at about a fifth lower than in the general population.

The general population of England and Wales has been thought (at least until recently) to be increasing by some 19 per cent in a generation; this projection relied on expectations of an estimated high birth-rate and declining mortality.[16] If similar trends hold for the Jewish population, and if the above fertility difference were the sole factor to be taken into account, an optimist might therefore expect that the Jewish population would remain fairly constant in absolute terms over the next generation, though declining in relation to the general population. However, the other factors thought to be operating almost certainly have the effect of reducing the absolute size of the Jewish population. The synagogue marriage-rate is low, partly because of marriage out of the faith, more especially in the case of men; and that in turn partly leads to a higher proportion of spinsters in the Jewish community. (The suspected lower mortality among Jews is effective mainly after the child-bearing age and cannot be of much importance in redressing the balance.) Consequently, a decline in the absolute size of the Jewish population is to be expected on present trends.

4. *Tests for bias in recording*

The low average family size found in our sample led us to question whether the response was likely to have been biased. In particular, was there any reason to suppose that mothers had not recorded all their previous children? After examining the returns we eventually rejected this possibility; but the calculations carried out may have a wider

interest and are therefore reported here. It is known that in earlier times girls were often substantially under-reported in official birth statistics, and some freak sex-ratios have been noted in nineteenth-century statistics of Jews, especially in eastern Europe. We therefore examined the sex-ratio for the previous births reported in our sample and were not surprised to find a high proportion of boys—55·6 per cent compared with a national average of 51·4 per cent. A test of the statistical significance of this difference was not conclusive. On the usual assumptions, it suggested that in a sample of this size such a proportion could arise by chance once in twenty times; that is, it was on the verge of significance on the usual rules. Had the difference been smaller, we should not have bothered to look further; had it been larger, we should have felt more convinced that our search for bias was justified. In the circumstances we proceeded with a search for possible reasons for the high proportion of boys.

The usual reason for finding a high proportion of boys in statistical returns is that boys are more fully reported than girls (girls are, somehow, 'forgotten'). If this were the reason for our findings here, we should expect that the reported ratio of boys to girls would be particularly high amongst the Right-wing Orthodox section, which contains a higher proportion of recent immigrants. In fact, the reverse was found. Boys and girls were precisely equal amongst the right-wing orthodox families (69 of each); and the excesses of males were reported in the other sections of the community which are closer to the general population in their behaviour.

An alternative explanation of the high proportion of boys in the sample was that mothers reported too many boys. This might have arisen from the form of the question which asked, 'Apart from the present child, how many children have been born to you?' Though the Mohel may be presumed to have taken care to elicit a correct response, itseemed possible that some mothers included the present son in answering this question. In formulating it we were conscious that such a difficulty might arise; nevertheless this form of words was chosen in order to agree with the form of the question asked by the Registrar when the mother officially registers the birth. We hoped our figures would thus be properly comparable with those produced by the Registrar General.

To examine whether such a bias was likely, we separated out the returns of those Mohalim which showed a particularly high proportion of boys. There were seven such Mohalim; boys formed 70 per cent of the 131 children previously born to the mothers reporting to these Mohalim. If there had been an error of the kind just described we should expect to find that a relatively low number of these mothers would report no previous children (since, on this hypothesis, they would include the present boy in the answer to the question). But this possibility was rejected by the facts. It was found that 47 per cent of these

mothers returned no previous children, which was virtually identical with the 48 per cent in the rest of the sample. The average number of previous children (both boys and girls) born to the mothers reporting to those Mohalim was also very similar to that in the rest of the sample (0·76 and 0·82 previous children per mother respectively). The possibility of over-statement in the number of boys was therefore also ruled out.

A final possibility remains which cannot be excluded. It is possible that some mothers may have given a combined figure for boys and girls which was entered on the form in the space for the number of boys. On some returns it was noticed that there was a crossed-out figure, with a reduced number of boys and a compensating entry for girls. In other cases it may be that, if the error was recognized, it was regarded as too trivial to be worth correcting. Clearly such errors did not arise on a large scale, otherwise the discrepancy between the number of boys and girls would have been larger. In future, however, it seems advisable to choose a more explicit form of wording for this question.[17]

The conclusion to be drawn from these limited tests is that there is no reason to doubt the substantial accuracy of the returns and, as far as can be seen, the lower fertility of Jewish families must be regarded as established.

5. *The time-pattern of family formation*

The tables we have compiled suggest that the smaller size of Jewish families is associated with a shorter period of child-bearing. It is not that children are simply more widely spaced in Jewish families; it appears rather that the spacing of early children is much the same, but that Jewish mothers complete their families earlier in married life. The consequence is a relative paucity of large families.

These generalizations are based upon an examination of the distribution of births according to the number of years elapsed since marriage, as summarized in Table 3. Early births (before the eighth month of marriage) are less frequent in our Jewish sample (but not unknown);[18] in the first year of marriage, the proportion of Jewish births is consequently only half that in the general population. Not too much importance attaches to this from the point of view of fertility, though of course the contrast is of interest from the general point of view of social habits and traditional moral sanctions. In each of the subsequent six years of marriage the proportions of births for the Jewish sample are consistently higher than for the general population, especially during the second to fifth years of marriage (completed years 1–4 in the table) during which 62 per cent of births occurred in our sample compared with 46 per cent of births in the general population. Four-fifths of all births to Jewish mothers were reported to have taken place before their sixth

wedding anniversary, whereas in the general population that proportion is spread over a further two years.

The differences in later years of marriage are equally striking. In the general population, 13·3 per cent of births occur after the tenth year of marriage, but among Jews the proportion was only 4·6 per cent. It is worth noting that the tendency to reduce the child-bearing period is a widespread phenomenon: in the general population the proportion of births after ten years of marriage has fallen steadily from 16·4 per cent in 1960, to 14·1 per cent in 1966, and, as stated, to 13·3 per cent in 1969. The Jewish population, at 4·6 per cent, may be only reflecting the same trend, but at an accelerated rate.

TABLE 3. *Distribution of births according to number of years since marriage, Jews 1970, and general population of England and Wales 1969*

Time since marriage[a]	*Jews*[b]	*General population*
	%	%
0–7 months	2·4	10·5
8–11 months	5·4	4·8
1 year	17·0	12·3
2	14·5	12·2
3	14·8	11·4
4	15·4	9·5
5	9·7	7·6
6	6·4	6·0
7	3·6	4·9
8	4·2	4·1
9	2·1	3·2
10–14	3·3	9·2
15–19	0·9	3·2
20 and over	0·3	0·8

Notes: *a.* The proportion shown, for example, against 2 years represents those born between the second and third anniversaries of the marriage.
b. Based on 658 births (25 returns did not include sufficient information to be entered in this table); the proportions have been calculated from reweighted totals.

A calculation of the average number of years that elapse between marriage and the birth of the first, second, third child, and so on, provides further insight into the differences in patterns of family formation. Such comparisons between our sample and the general population are set out in Table 4. (No comparisons are given for children after the third birth, since there are too few families in our sample to yield significant results.) The first child is born on the average slightly (only two months) later in Jewish families than in the general population; this is related to the fewer pre-marital conceptions to which reference has been made above. The average second child comes virtually after the same interval as in the general population (the difference of a month is not statistically significant). The average third child in the Jewish

sample comes rather earlier than in the general population; however, this calculation is based on only 80 births, and one cannot infer that there is any significant difference with regard to the third child.

Summarizing these figures broadly, therefore, one can only say that up to the third child the spacing of births of Jewish families is very similar to that in the general population—for those families that have only that number of children. But, as we have already seen from Table 1, there are relatively fewer Jewish families with more than two children; and Table 3 shows that the substantial difference is that Jewish mothers cut short their child-bearing period.

TABLE 4. *Average number of years elapsed since marriage till birth of children of given parity, Jews 1970, and general population 1969*

	Jews	*General population*
First child	2 years 5 months	2 years 3 months
Second child	4 years 10 months	4 years 9 months
Third child	6 years 10 months	7 years 6 months

6. *Fertility according to religious sub-group*

The Jewish community today exhibits a considerable variety of life-styles, embracing those who follow a traditional and stricter pattern of life (close to what is generally known as 'Victorian') and those who are virtually indistinguishable from the general population. Our questionnaire, apart from enquiring in which synagogue the mother had married, asked to which synagogue the husband belonged (the husband is usually registered as the synagogue member, and the rest of the family are not registered separately). To ensure correct identification of the sub-group in case of 'dual loyalties', there was a further question about the name of any other synagogue which the husband attended more regularly than that to which he formally belonged.

The returns were classified into four groups: (a) the Right-wing Orthodox, consisting of those families adhering to certain synagogues mainly in North London—they closely follow a traditional way of life in which family planning is exceptional; (b) the Central Orthodox group, to which the majority of Anglo-Jewry adhere, among whom family planning is in practice common, though there are official reservations; (c) the Reform and Liberal groups, who are more 'Westernized' and among whom family planning is normally accepted; and (d) those who were not members of synagogues. The last group included both those who explicity stated that they are not members of a synagogue (three-quarters of the group), and the remaining 25 per cent who did not reply to the questions on synagogue adherence; there

seemed little doubt, from other notes on the returns, that the latter were in fact non-members.

TABLE 5. *Comparison of Jewish sub-groups according to proportion of births to mothers married over ten years, and average size of family*

	Size of sample	*Proportion of births to marriages over ten years* %	*Average no. of children per family*[b] %	*Index of completed family size*[c] %
Right-wing Orthodox	78	18·7	2·69	2·44
Central Orthodox	417	4·4	1·74	2·16
Reform and Liberal	57	10·6	1·80	2·11
Non-members	131	—	1·52	1·82
Total Jews[a]	683	4·5	1·72	2·03
England & Wales: general population		13·3	2·16	2·60

Notes: *a.* The figures in the final three columns are based on reweighted totals.
b. See Table 1, note a.
c. See Table 1, note b.

In view of the restricted sample size of the sub-groups, detailed comparisons would not be meaningful. The comparisons made have therefore been confined to the following summary indicators of fertility (discussed in section 2 above): (a) the proportion of births occurring after ten years of marriage; (b) the average family size of mothers giving birth; and (c) the index of completed family size.

These comparisons are set out in Table 5. The Right-wing Orthodox group stands out on all indicators as having a higher fertility than the rest of the Jewish community. On the first two indicators it also shows a higher fertility than the general population, the excess being about a quarter. It may seem surprising that this difference is not greater, but the explanation undoubtedly is that this group contains a relatively large proportion of recent marriages (in the three years 1968–70 there were an average of 86 right-wing marriages a year, which is double the rate in the quinquennium 1961–5, and treble the rate in the decade 1951–60), so that there is at present a relatively high proportion of young families. For this reason, also, the third summary indicator (Hajnal's index of completed family size) shows a misleadingly low figure: since the group is clearly not stationary, this measure cannot be applied.

The lowest family size is found among those who are not members of synagogues. However, this finding may be partly attributable to the fact that there were young families who have not yet taken the decision formally to join a synagogue. The need to do so becomes greater when the children reach school-age, at which point there may be more children in the family.

The size of the sample is too small to attach significance to the difference shown between Reform–Liberal families and Central Orthodox families. The only contrast which is significant, therefore, is that shown by the Right-wing Orthodox group, where large families are still in vogue. One must not, however, jump to the conclusion that the community will necessarily have a more Right-wing Orthodox complexion in a generation's time: a prediction of that kind would require a knowledge of the proportions moving during a generation between the various sub-groups. There are no dogmatic divisions between the various Orthodox groups, and children of Central Orthodox parents may move to the Right-wing as well as vice versa. Such movements are probably more important in predicting the future complexion of the community than are differential birth-rates.

APPENDIX

Questionnaire used in the inquiry

Front of questionnaire

CONFIDENTIAL

Board of Deputies of British Jews
Statistical and Demographic Research Unit

BIRTH-RATE ANALYSIS

To be completed by the mother (or by the Mohel)

We should be grateful for your co-operation in this enquiry which will help in future communal planning. All information is for statistical purposes only and will be treated in complete confidence.

When you have completed this form, please return it to the Research Unit.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP

Back of questionnaire

1. What is the baby's birth-date?

Day	Month	Year
.....	.....	19..

2. Apart from the present child, how many children have been born to you?

.... Boys .... Girls

3. Of which synagogue is your husband a member: (If he is not a member, write 'none')

.....

4. If he attends another synagogue more regularly please state which:
.....

5. What is the date of your marriage?

Month	Year
.....	19..

6. In which synagogue were you married?
.....

NOTES

[1] For example, A. Ruppin's *The Jews in the Modern World*, London, 1934 and *Jewish Fate and Future*, London, 1940.

[2] See U. O. Schmelz and P. Glikson, *Jewish Population Studies 1961–8*, Jerusalem and London, 1970.

[3] See two articles by S. J. Prais and M. Schmool in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, 'Statistics of Jewish Marriages in Great Britain: 1901–65', Vol. 9, no. 2, December 1967, and 'The Size and Structure of the Anglo-Jewish Population, 1960–65', vol. 10, no. 1, June 1968.

[4] See S. J. Prais and M. Schmool, 'Statistics of Milah and the Jewish Birth-Rate in Britain', in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 12, no. 2, December 1970, p.192.

[5] We should like to express our thanks to the Chief Rabbi, Dr. I. Jakobovits, for his encouragement throughout the course of this inquiry, and to the Mohalim for their co-operation. Our thanks are also due to Mrs. Marilyn Hyman and Miss Vivian Korn who assisted us so willingly; and to Mr. J. Hajnal for advice on section 3.

[6] These matters are discussed at greater length in our 'Statistics of Milah and the Jewish Birth-Rate in Britain', op. cit., pp. 187–89. Mohalim are authorized by the Initiation Society; there is a small number of other Mohalim not affiliated to the Society; they refused to participate in our inquiry.

[7] See S. J. Prais and M. Schmool, 'The Size and Structure of the Anglo-Jewish population, 1960–65', op. cit, p. 11.

[8] ibid., p. 17.

[9] See Prais and Schmool, 'Statistics of Jewish Marriages in Great Britain: 1901–65', op. cit., p. 159.

[10] The results of that inquiry are conveniently summarized, and compared with other earlier findings, in a paper by Dr. H. Neustatter, 'Demographic and Other Statistical Aspects of Anglo-Jewry', in M. Freedman, ed., *A Minority in Britain*, London, 1955, especially pp. 85–86.

[11] Myra Woolf, *Family Intentions*, Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, H.M.S.O., London, 1971.

[12] See Woolf, op. cit., p.30. For those marrying since 1960, 'skilled manual' and 'other manual' expected 2·5 children, as did the 'managerial' and 'non-manual' groups combined. For those marrying in the 1950s, the corresponding averages were 2·8 and 2·5. This evidence relates to 'expectations'; differences among social classes in their success in family planning are of course relevant.

[13] M. Woolf, op. cit., p. 16.

[14] See Registrar General's *Statistical Review for 1969*, part II, table PP, pp. 166–67.

[15] J. Hajnal, 'The Estimation of Total Family Size of Occupation Groups from the Distribution of Births by Order and Duration of Marriage', *Population Studies*, vol. 2, part 3, December 1948, p. 305.

[16] See Registrar General, op. cit., p. 8.

[17] A note on a more technical point is in order. There is some evidence of a positive correlation in the sex of successive children to the same mother. Since our sample is based on male births, it might therefore be expected that the previous children in the family would tend to include more boys than is the case in the population. However, the correlation is too weak to account for more than a small fraction of the observed excess in our sample. A. W. F. Edwards, 'Sex-ratio Data Analysed Independently of Family Limitations', in *Annals of Human Genetics*, vol. 29, 1966, p. 337, estimates the correlation at +0·013, which would lead to a male excess of only about a half per cent; this aspect is therefore not of substantial importance.

[18] A few unmarried mothers were also reported, but they are not included in this table, which refers to legitimate births only.

A NOTE ON SOUTHERN RHODESIAN JEWRY, 1890–1936

Barry A. Kosmin

THIS paper traces the development of the Jewish community in Southern Rhodesia, where Jews were (and are) considered an ethnic sub-group of the European population. Jews in Europe came to learn of the new country founded by Cecil Rhodes, which would welcome them, and of the outstanding economic success in Southern Africa of some English, German, and Lithuanian settlers; some Jews from the Cape Colony and the Transvaal were also moving to Rhodesia.[1]

The first official census of Rhodesia took place in 1901; but it was only in 1904 that a religious category was included. However, we know that there were four Jews in the specially recruited Pioneer Column of 1890 and the names of about 30 Jews appear among those on the nominal rolls of the 592 men who took part in the Matabele War of 1893.[2] The Jews were in the vanguard of the early settlers—the *Matabele News* of 21 August 1894 reported the inaugural meeting of the Bulawayo Hebrew Congregation. The first white woman who entered Bulawayo after the conquest of Matabeleland was Jewish, as was the first white child to be born in the town (Lily Tempofsky, 4 April 1894).[3] In the following year, *The Rhodesia Herald* reported (in its issue of 3 June 1895) the meeting held at the Masonic Hotel to establish the Salisbury Congregation; it was attended by 20 men and two women. In 1953 there were 360 pre-1896 pioneers still living and 23 of them, or 6·4 per cent, were identifiable as Jews.[4] Jewish identity was strong among the early immigrants. When the Bulawayo Hebrew Aid and Benevolent Society was established in April 1897 it had 120 members, which probably represented the total number of Jewish adults in the town.[5]

The first set of population data is to be found in Salisbury's unpublished and unofficial householder census of November 1897.[6] A total of 719 white persons were enumerated; 46 were Jews. There were 40 males and six females; three of the females were married women and the other three were girls under 10 years of age. In all, there were only four children. Thus all but one of the Jewish males were adults and nearly all were in the 20–39 age bracket. The records also show that 28 were single,

TABLE 1. *Jews in Salisbury Census of November 1897*

Age	*Males*	*Females*	*Total*
0–9	1	3	4
10–19	—	—	—
20–29	14	1	15
30–39	21	2	23
40–49	3	—	3
50–59	1	—	1
60+	—	—	—
Total	40	6	46

10 were married, and two were widowers. It is reasonable to assume that the seven men who were married (but whose wives were not enumerated) had gone ahead of their families to ascertain the prospects of settlement in Rhodesia; 19 of the Jewish males were born in the United Kingdom, eight in Russia, six in Germany, two in Australia, two in Poland, one in Jamaica, one in America, and one (the youngest) in Rhodesia. Of the six females, two had been born in the United Kingdom (Scotland), one in Germany, and the other three in the Cape Colony, the Transvaal, and Rhodesia.

TABLE 2. *Southern Rhodesia European population, 1904–36*

Census	*Persons*	%	*Males*	*Females*	*Ratio of Females to 100 Males* %	*Mean Average Annual Intercensal* % *Increase in Persons*
1904 Europeans	12,596	100	8,953	3,643	40·7	—
Jews	585	4·6	433	152	38·7	—
1911 Europeans	23,606	100	15,580	8,026	51·5	12·5
Jews	1,283	5·5	892	391	43·8	17·0
1921 Europeans	33,620	100	18,987	14,633	77·1	4·2
Jews	1,289	3·8	801	488	59·5	—
1926 Europeans	39,174	100	21,808	17,366	79·6	3·3
Jews	1,546	4·0	948	598	63·3	4·0
1931 Europeans	49,910	100	27,280	22,630	83·0	5·5
Jews	2,011	4·0	1,200	811	67·6	6·0
1936 Europeans	55,418	100	29,725	25,683	86·4	2·2
Jews	2,220	4·0	1,305	915	70·1	1·0

Table 2 shows that in the period 1904–36 the European population in Rhodesia was predominantly male, and that from 1911 onwards the ratio of males to females was noticeably higher in the case of the Jews than it was in that of the Gentiles. In other words, the Jews were slower to normalize their population and to adopt settled family life. This meant that nearly all the population growth was the result of immigra-

tion rather than of natural increase. The European growth rate of 12·5 per cent per annum in the period 1904–11 owed 11·7 per cent to immigration and 0·8 per cent to natural increase.[7]

It was only in the 1931 Census that data were collected on age, marital status, and birthplace, by religion. Unpublished returns for that year show that all those born in Latvia were Jewish, as were almost all those born in Russia, Poland, and Rumania.[8] Of the total of 585 Jews returned in the 1904 Census, 360 had been born in the territories of the Russian Empire and Rumania;[9] 289 were males and 71 females —a ratio of four to one. On the other hand, for the 225 Jews who were born elsewhere, there was a ratio of two men to a woman (144 to 81); that is not surprising in view of the fact that in Salisbury in 1897 the only family units consisted of immigrants from the United Kingdom and Germany.

Earlier data on birthplace can be gathered from the notices of applications for naturalization published semi-annually in the Government Gazette along with the applicant's name, place of residence, occupation, and birthplace. A man's wife and minor children were naturalized when he was. However, the naturalization was valid only in Rhodesia and was not recognized in other British territories. A system of Imperial naturalization and citizenship was introduced in the 1920s.[10] From 1899 to 1903, aliens were eligible for local naturalization after one year's residence in the territory; but in 1904, five years' residence became necessary.[11] It follows that those who were naturalized in 1909 must have lived in Rhodesia before 1904.

In the period 1899–1909, a total of 164 Jewish applicants were naturalized; 115 came from Russia (mainly from the Baltic provinces, and were collectively referred to by Jews as Litvaks); a further 25 were from Russian Poland; 10 from Rumania; seven from Germany; three from Austria-Hungary; two from Rhodes Island in the Mediterranean (which was under Turkish rule); and the last two from 'other' territories. In the course of the next 14 years (that is by 1923), a further 170 Jewish applicants were naturalized; again the largest group (113) were Russians; but there was a larger proportion of Rumanians (28);[12] there were 18 from Poland, six from Rhodes, two from Austria-Hungary; only one from Germany; and the remaining two from elsewhere. The naturalization returns reflect the shifting pattern of immigration. Ladino-speaking Sephardim from Rhodes Island entered in increasing numbers after 1904; and in later years they were to constitute an important segment of Jewry in the eastern province of Mashonaland; but up to 1911 there was only one female from Rhodes.[13]

Jewish immigration was unfettered throughout the period under review, for Jews were unaffected by the Immigration Ordinances of 1903 and 1904, which were aimed at Asians. In fact, the Immigrants Regulation Ordinance of 1914 (which in Section II demanded literacy

in a European language) followed Cape Colony legislation and included Yiddish in the list of European languages. Only in the years 1915–24 were Jews listed as a separate category in the records of immigration,[14] and only for the period 1919–21 were data kept by sex. In these three years males outnumbered females by more than two to one (167 : 78) among Jewish immigrants. Calculations based on these returns suggest a 50 per cent turnover in the Jewish population between 1911 and 1921; however, the net gain was only six persons.

By 1931 the Jewish population of Rhodesia had risen to 2,011; 1,200 males and 811 females; almost exactly a quarter (502) had been born in Rhodesia. A further 28 per cent had been born in other countries of the British Empire (South Africa, other African territories, the United Kingdom, and Australia); 39 per cent had come from Continental Europe (the total number was 774, made up of 525 men and 249 women); six per cent were from Rhodes (78 males and 41 females); and the remaining two per cent were from Asia and the Americas. For the general European population, however, the 1931 census data revealed that 95 per cent of those returned had been born within the British Empire.

Throughout the period under review (1890–1936), Jews settled mainly in Rhodesian towns. Census returns for 1904 show that 79·9 per cent were recorded in urban centres; in 1911 the percentage was almost identical: 79·6; by 1921 it had declined slightly to 76·9; while in 1931, 66·7 per cent were returned in urban areas. It is relevant to point out in this context that the percentage of Europeans in general in urban areas was much lower in each of these years; it never reached 58 and indeed was as low as 51·1 in 1911 and 52·3 in 1931. Both the general European and Jewish females were far more urban-based than were the males of their group. In 1904, 90 per cent of Jewish females lived in towns; in 1911, 91·9 did so; by 1921, the percentage had declined to 83·6 and in 1931 it had further decreased to 75·4 as the outlying areas became more settled. In 1931, 49·8 per cent of Jewish females but only 38.3 per cent of Jewish males were married; those divorced or separated constituted a negligible percentage: 0·8 for males and 0·2 for females.

The Jewish settlement pattern was rather unsettled; but from 1904 Jews showed a distinct preference for Bulawayo: 57·3 per cent of the total Jewish population were returned in that town and 25·8 per cent in the rest of Matabeleland; 10·2 per cent in Salisbury; and the remaining 6·7 per cent in the rural areas of Mashonaland. In 1911, 42·5 per cent of all Jews were returned in Bulawayo, but Salisbury now attracted more than double the 1904 percentage of Jews: 22·8. Twenty years later, that percentage was virtually unchanged (at 22·4), while more than a third of the total Jewish population (36·6 per cent) lived in Bulawayo. In that year, therefore, well under half of all Jews returned (41 per cent) lived in the smaller towns and rural areas of the

Colony. In 1936, 37·2 per cent lived in Bulawayo and 26·2 per cent in Salisbury; while for other Europeans the percentages were respectively 24 and 24·3.

The large turnover of the Jewish population, its urban and masculine bias, low birth-rate, atypical immigration and settlement patterns, were the result of Rhodesian economic conditions combined with Jewish occupational grouping. These features were reinforced over time since much of the settlement was the result of chain migration from a few source areas linked to an unofficial indentureship system in bush stores. As we saw earlier, there were a total of 40 Jewish males and six females in Salisbury in 1897; all the females and only one male were not economically active. Storekeepers accounted for more than a third of the total (14); three were returned as auctioneers, three as company secretaries, four as hotel-keepers, two each as merchants, tobacconists, jewellers, brokers, and 'speculators'; while there was also a dispenser, a tailor, a barman, and a hairdresser.[15] The 1911 Census comments on the difficulties of classification by industry, owing to 'the many individuals who follow a variety of occupations'.[16] A senior Government official noted that this tendency was particularly common among Jews.[17]

> An outstanding quality of the Jews was their adaptability. There was one who, having first tried auctioneering, and then editing a newspaper without making good, started on the strength of a half-completed course at some American institution as a dentist.

Jews continued to be engaged primarily in commercial occupations for several decades. Census returns for 1931 (when there were 896 economically active Jewish males) show that 71·3 per cent were engaged in commerce, 12·7 per cent in manufacture and industry, 6·5 per cent in personal service occupations (which included hotel-keeping), and only 3·3 per cent in the liberal professions. There were two per cent in agriculture, the same proportion in transport and communication, 1·8 per cent in mining, and 0·4 per cent (four) in public service and defence. The contrast with the occupational pattern of other Europeans is striking: 16·7 per cent of the males were engaged in commerce, while 17·2 per cent were in manufacture and industry; thus these two broad categories accounted for 84 per cent of Jews but only 33·9 per cent of other Europeans. The largest percentage of European males was in agriculture—22·6, or 4,132 out of a total of 18,342 gainfully occupied; 12.4 per cent were in public service and defence; 10·2 per cent in mining; 2·4 per cent in personal service; but the percentage in the professions was very similar to the Jewish proportion: 3·8 per cent (Jews 3·3). It is also interesting to note that whereas 56 per cent of Jews were employers or self-employed, only 26·6 per cent of Europeans fell within that category.[18]

The Jewish over-specialization made them particularly vulnerable economically. In times of prosperity they did well, and this was re-

flected in above-average growth rates as in the period 1904–11; but in more difficult periods such as 1911–21 and 1931–36 their immigration was more seriously affected than was the case for the general Europeans. In the years 1904–11 the migration of European settlers gathered momentum as a result of changes in mining legislation which made possible the opening up of small workings for gold mining. Farms were established to feed the increasing population, and permanent commercial undertakings were set up in the growing towns of Bulawayo and Salisbury. The opening of chrome mines and the establishment of the tobacco industry (virginia in Mashonaland and turkish in Matabeleland) led to increasing economic activity, and after 1907 there was a boom. The 1911 Census commented that 'the large increase in the numbers of clerks, tradesmen and bankers indicated the great advancement in the commercial activity of the country.'[19] There was a threefold increase in the number of commercial travellers, salesmen, and commission agents between 1904 and 1911.

The boom ended in 1912. Whereas only nine business undertakings had become insolvent in 1906, 71 were so declared in 1912.[20] High interest rates, attendant on the international situation, had affected the stability and credit of many marginally profitable concerns; there was a lull in mining development, and finally in 1914 a 'catastrophic slump' in the tobacco industry.[21] When the First World War broke out in 1914, there was an increasing number of unemployed Europeans. The war was to result in a slight boom in mining; but after 1919 the economy again became depressed and the farming industry was seriously hit by drought and disease. Thus the decade 1911–21 saw two depressions and a world war; the attendant dislocation seriously dampened the enthusiasm of the European settlers. Many of those engaged in commercial enterprises before 1912 had left the country, and that was reflected in a net loss of Jewish males. The new immigrants settled on the land, and there were very few Jews among them.

There was a slow improvement in economic fortunes until 1926, and the pace quickened owing to the agricultural prosperity of 1927–29, particularly in tobacco. But 1929 saw the second slump in tobacco and the start of the world-wide depression with its low commodity prices and widespread unemployment, which seriously affected mining. In 1927 there were only 10 insolvencies, but by 1930 there were 64.[22] A slight improvement in the economy following the gold premium of 1933 led to an increase in the European labour force, but few Jews were involved. This slight revival did not affect the commercial field to any extent or open the way for new participants.

In the inter-war years the European rural population was mainly composed of a bourgeoisie of farmers and owner-workers of small mines. Traders in the towns catered for their needs and for those of the European artisans and clerical workers. The African market was re-

stricted to the poorly-paid employees of the miners and farmers or the vast mass of impoverished self-employed rural cultivators. The limited markets of these years led to fierce competition among shopkeepers, traders, and hawkers; and in the early thirties the more established segments of the Jewish population moved away from the retail and distributive trades and towards service industries and manufacturing.[23]

We can now see that despite relatively unrestricted entry, the unsettled economic conditions of Rhodesia in the decades under review seriously affected European (including Jewish) immigration. Unfavourable economic circumstances as well as poor living conditions and the threat of tropical diseases, such as malaria, did not encourage Jews to bring out their wives and families. Over the years, immigrants had been increasingly drawn from two main sources, the Baltic states and Rhodes; but the end of the Tsarist regime in those states and of Ottoman rule in Rhodes may have reduced the impetus to emigrate in the 1920s and 1930s.

NOTES

[1] Sir James Sivewright, the Commissioner of Public Works in the Cape Colony, wrote to Cecil Rhodes on 20 May 1897:

'Abner Cohen who carries this letter is a friend of mine. He is leaving the Transvaal and going to Rhodesia; he was a pioneer of Krugersdorp, and I can certify to his being a straight honourable little chap. . . . I know of no-one who, in my opinion, would be a more desirable acquisition to the population of a new country than Mr. Cohen.'

Correspondence and Minutes, Bulawayo Hebrew Congregation, volume II; Archives of Central African Jewish Board of Deputies, Bulawayo.

[2] See National Archives of Rhodesia (N.A.R.), B 4/2/1–4.

[3] See Jeannie M. Boggie, *Experiences of Rhodesia's Pioneer Women*, Bulawayo, 1938, p. 63.

[4] Neville Jones, *Rhodesian Genesis*, Pioneers and Early Settlers Society, Bulawayo, 1953, pp. 149–62.

[5] Minutes of B.H.C., vol. II, 28 April 1897.

[6] N.A.R. C 1/1/1. All figures relating to Jews in Census Returns of Rhodesia are in respect of persons answering the question on religion and identifying themselves as 'Hebrew' or 'Jewish'. In 1897 there were some facetious replies; but all subsequent censuses are reliable with more than 95 per cent of returns answering the religious question; the practice was encouraged by the various religious bodies.

[7] Southern Rhodesia, *Report on Census of European Population 1921*, Salisbury, 1922, p. 9.

[8] Fifty-nine Europeans were born in Latvia, all being Jews; there were 317 born in 'Russia', of whom 295 were Jews; 114 born in Poland, 107 being Jews; 82 in Rumania, 77 being Jews; and 163 in Lithuania, 159 being Jews. The Jewish community had tables of the 1931 census especially prepared by the

statistical office; I am indebted to Mr. M. Wagner of the Central African Jewish Board of Deputies for making the data available to me.

[9] 1904 Census, N.A.R. C 3/2/7, unpublished tables.

[10] For the peculiar position of Rhodesia, see Clive Parry, *The Nationality and Citizenship Laws of the Commonwealth and Republic of Ireland*, London, 1957, pp. 746–87.

[11] In theory, residence in other British territories could be used for the five-year qualification; but the procedure was costly and it was seldom encouraged or used. See N.A.R. Administrator's files, A 3/28/48–9, list of dockets, and correspondence.

[12] An association was established in Rumania in 1900 to help Jews to emigrate to Natal: *Jewish Chronicle* (London), 23 March 1900.

[13] See unpublished tables, N.A.R. C 3/2/2 for 1904 and C 5/11/1 for 1911.

[14] See Commandant-General, British South Africa Police, *Annual Reports on Immigration*, Salisbury, for 1915–24.

[15] N.A.R. C 1/1/1.

[16] *Census 1911*, p. 10.

[17] H. Marshall Hole, *Old Rhodesian Days*, London, 1928, p. 126.

[18] Southern Rhodesia, *Official Yearbook of the Colony No. 3*, Salisbury, 1932, pp. 582–86; and 1931 unpublished returns on Jewish population.

[19] *Census 1911*, p. 19.

[20] See N.A.R. JG 5/1/1, Master of the High Court Bulawayo, Annual Reports and Returns for 1906–30.

[21] Frank Clements and Edward Harben, *Leaf of Gold*, London, 1962, p. 67.

[22] N.A.R. JG 5/1/1.

[23] N.A.R. ZAY 2/2, Economic Development Committee 1938–39, correspondence and evidence.

A NOTE ON THE FUNCTION OF 'THE LAW OF THE KINGDOM IS LAW' IN THE MEDIEVAL JEWISH COMMUNITY

Gerald J. Blidstein

THE Talmudic dictum that 'the law of the kingdom is law' (*dina demalkhuta dina*) has often been seen as the juridical expression of Jewish powerlessness in the diaspora. Unable to control his environment, the Jew eventually agrees—despite the various religious and ethical dilemmas raised by this concession—to shape even his own legal relationships according to the mould of that environment. The impulse for this adjustment was clearly political, not juridical. Thus, our dictum is not primarily an instance of the reception by one legal system of selected forms of a different system, though some of the problems raised by 'the law of the kingdom is law' are best analysed within this latter framework. Certainly, the scope of this dictum was a matter of urgent debate from medieval times (if not earlier) up to the modern period; but again, the basic issue came down to the conflict between integrity and survival and which of these two values was to be given priority, or again, how much ground could be conceded if and when necessary. Nor was the diaspora quality of the dictum changed in its essentials by the fact (clearly demonstrated by Allon and surprisingly ignored by contemporary historians) that Palestinian as well as Babylonian *amora'im* acknowledged this rule, which may go back to Second Commonwealth times. Powerlessness is not a geographical concept, and what is obscured by the term 'diaspora' is rendered quite lucid when called *galut*, which Jewish belief always knew was a condition of Palestinian as well as Babylonian reality. Jewish ideology—which is strikingly realistic here—asserted that *galut* ends with Messianic redemption and persists ubiquitously until then. Roman rule over Palestine created a 'law of the kingdom' no less than Sassanian rule did in Babylon.[1]

A different approach to the dictum has recently been sketched by Salo Baron, as well as by other historians. It is pointed out that the

assertion that 'the law of the kingdom is law' is not only a concession; rather, by recognizing alien rule as a proper element of their own legal system, Jewish legists had now to define its scope and argue its applicability in a variety of situations. What was 'the law'? And what was 'the kingdom'? And most crucially, *when* was 'the law of the kingdom law'? The rule itself must be integrated into an entire system of rules. All this points to a *double* resonance of 'the law of the kingdom': on the one hand, the Jewish community humbles itself before the sovereignty of its dominator; on the other hand, 'the law of the kingdom' (and the kingdom itself!) must be judged by the Jewish community before its will is obeyed.

> Clearly, under the then existing power relationships no king treated such rabbinic qualifications as serious obstacles in the enforcement of his decrees. On its part, the Jewish public was likely to follow its rabbinic leaders' interpretation of the law and to offer at least tacit resistance to royal enactments considered illegal by the rabbinate. To all intents and purposes we have here a clash of rivaling sovereignties . . . Only the sagacity of the rabbis combined with the general restraints imposed by customs upon rulers, prevented most of the theoretical conflicts from degenerating into regular miniature struggles between state and church . . .

Here,[2] rabbinic opinion became a potent counter to the demands of the state. At the same time, such opinion remained mysteriously 'theoretical'. Thus we are left with the pressing question: how, in fact, did the rabbinic concept function in the medieval Jewish community?

A reading of medieval responsa on the scope and substance of 'the law of the kingdom is law' reveals that both question and answer were concerned with the internal workings of the Jewish community, not the relationship of that community to its overlords or hosts. R. Me'ir of Rothenburg declared that virtually all taxes levied upon the Jews of his time (thirteenth century) in Germany were illegal, but no Jew took these words as a signal to refuse to pay, nor was such their intent, as we shall see. Certainly, opinions delivered on intra-Jewish relationships that took their impulse from the Gentile world might reinforce Jewish behaviour consistent with these opinions even in direct relationship with that world. But the fact remains that such reinforcement was mostly after the fact. More accurately, this effect might be called *educative*, but not legal.

The *force* of these discussions and rulings was directed inward, not outward; they usually affected the relationship of Jew with Jew and not with his Gentile ruler. Discussion of the 'law of the kingdom' and its legitimacy generally took place within the context of intra-Jewish adjudication. Could one Jew enforce his ownership of what had once been another's property when the act of alienation had been imposed by the law of the kingdom? Could one segment of the community refuse to honour—as far as the autonomous Jewish community was concerned

—privileges granted to another segment by the law of the kingdom? For with the exception of rare royal incursions into its internal affairs, the Jewish community had self-rule. Jews had to demonstrate their rights and could enjoy them only within the framework recognized by their Jewish brethren, and it is here that the legality of the law of the kingdom in Jewish law became crucial. Thus, these discussions judged the behaviour of the Gentile overlords of Europe in respect of their Jewish clients; but their force was directed to the governance of Jewish society itself. The fact not only explains the reality of this body of law; it also allows us to treat it as a body of legal thought and not merely as a series of impotent responses to outside demands. The Jews usually did accede to such demands, certainly. But they might simultaneously declare them illegal and, within their own society, treat them as such.

The famous declaration of R. Isaac b. Samuel of Dampierre (late twelfth century, France) is a characteristic case in point. Commenting on royal confiscation of the property of Jews fleeing their homes, he wrote:[3]

> This case is not in the nature of the 'law of the kingdom', but rather in that of the 'robbery of the kingdom'. For we have seen in the countries around us that the Jews have had the right to reside wherever they wished, like the nobles, the law of the kingdom being that the ruler should not seize the property of Jews who left his town.
> Therefore, if there is a regime which tries to alter the law and make a new law unto itself, this is not to be considered the 'law of the kingdom', for this is not a proper law at all.

But this scathing remonstrance was not delivered to the king who had confiscated the properties. The immediate target, as E. E. Urbach has stressed,[4] was the Jew who bought the confiscated lands from the king, a Jew who was subject to Jewish law and was being judged by it. As far as *he* was concerned, his title to the land was rejected, for the property still belonged to its original Jewish owner. From the point of view of the Jewish community within its jurisdiction, the law utilized by the king was not 'the law of the kingdom'.

A survey of representative responsa deciding that the law of the kingdom is not law, reveals that such was the standard pattern. Thus, R. Me'ir of Rothenburg declared that the king might not levy a special tax upon the entire community because of the aberrant deeds of one of its members—but the town *did* pay the tax, R. Me'ir rendering his decision as a reply to the purely internal question of whether the community could be sued by individuals who had suffered the king's pique.[5] Similarly, he ruled that the overlord is not allowed to waive payment of taxes by his favourites: this meant that the Jew in question must contribute his share to the community effort. The overlord, R. Me'ir wrote, had no right to declare that one Jew could not become another's competitor in a given town. But again, this decision was

rendered to the two disputing Jews who had placed the case before R. Me'ir; it was not delivered to the overlord.[6] Extortionate taxes need not be paid, for they were not the 'law of the kingdom'. The case in question concerned two groups of Jews, those who did pay and those who successfully evaded the collector, the first group suing the second.[7]

A final responsum—that of R. Hayyim b. R. Yitzhak, *Or Zarua* (fl. c. 1290, Germany)—provides a fine example. The text of the question has not been preserved, but we may infer from the answer that it concerned a levy to be imposed upon the Jews of Regensburg for the building of a new town wall and the proper distribution of this new burden among the Jews of the locality. R. Hayyim declared this levy illegal ('a tax imposed by the burghers upon the city . . . so as to build a wall that is not really necessary, for the city already has a wall and towers, is not *Dina*!'), but the effect of this decision was totally *within* the Jewish community: the tax would of course be paid, but Jews living *outside* the city need not share in the communal burden. All the money must be raised by the Jews living within the wall.[8]

Representative Spanish responsa exhibit the same pattern. R. Solomon ibn Adret (thirteenth century, Spain) declared it illegal for the king to demand that a Jew disclose monies deposited with him: in context, ibn Adret was praising the Jew who in fact refused to obey the demand.[9] R. Isaac b. Shehet (*Ribash;* fourteenth century) declared that the punishment of a community for the action of an individual was not *dina demalkhuta:* the actual result of that decision was that certain actions *taken by the community* in satisfaction of the royal demand were suspended by *Ribash.*[10] He also decided that the confiscation of funds left behind by Jewish émigrés was not *dina demalkhuta:* the decision actually concerned a Jew who had sworn falsely in order to deceive the royal officer and was exonerated by *Ribash* of any religious guilt.[11] A typical case of *dina demalkhuta* in fourteenth century Provence involved the propriety of one community's reliance on a royal privilege in its relationship with another community, especially with regard to trading rights and payment of taxes.[12]

Needless to say, some of these responsa (for example, that of ibn Adret) doubtless contributed to creating a Jewish standard in relation to some of the demands made by the Gentile government. But such was not their primary intent; moreover, resistance to those laws to be resisted was not urged on the basis of the non-applicability of 'the law of the kingdom is law', but upon more basic and affective grounds.

Another example within the Spanish tradition may be found in discussion and responsa concerning the obligation of scholars to share in the burden of taxation. Maimonides, as is well known, declared that scholars were not only exempt from paying their share of taxes that had been levied upon the entire community in lump-sum fashion, but were even to be freed from taxes levied by the government on an

individual basis. Later respondents, for instance, R. Nehemiah b. Yitzhak (fourteenth century, Spain) and R. Moses Alashkar (sixteenth century, Palestine) ruled that even where the king expressly obliged the scholars to pay, the rule of *dina demalkhuta dina* could not be applied. The real import of these rulings, however, was not to direct the scholar to resist the king's edict; rather, they directed the community to reimburse the scholars.[13]

The fact that rulings based on *dina demalkhuta dina* were hammered out within the context of the Jewish community itself carries a number of implications. It is now clear that the historian cannot generalize about the actual relationship of the Jews to their Gentile overlords on the basis of Jewish pronouncements—however rigorously they are worded—concerning the applicability or non-applicability of *dina demalkhuta dina*. Such pronouncements, as we have seen, did not directly concern the non-Jew, though aspects of this relationship are indirectly reflected in the discussions. On the other hand, the pronouncements and their presumed sphere of relevance testify to the discipline and loyalty existing within the Jewish community itself, which was capable, both spiritually and socially, of passing independent and effective judgement upon the demands of its overlords. These rulings thus become quite significant for the historian and sociologist of medieval Jewry. The community, basing itself upon Jewish ethics and law, was able to control the manipulation of non-Jewish power by Jews in its midst.

Finally, and ironically, the existence of this vacuum into which Jewish legists spoke (the partly fictitious quality of the dialogue) gives their discussion and rulings added depth as legal doctrine. In certain ways this body of law becomes analogous to Talmudic penology, about which Judge Haim Cohen has written:[14]

> . . . the penologist is not necessarily either historian or statistician . . . neither his theorization nor his planning is bound by precedent or past experience . . . [but is] largely the product of the preconceived moral convictions of the penologist . . . the philosophy . . . depends for its validity on such concepts of justice or policy which it reflects. It is for this reason that . . . talmudic penology has an appeal and interest which is not only and purely historical . . . it is highly relevant to bear in mind that criminal jurisdiction ceased with the destruction of the Temple in 70 C.E., and the bulk of criminal legislation—and all of the penology—in the Talmud dates from then . . . Here was a penological laboratory which was quite unique: the talmudic penologists . . . acted . . . with the object of providing just laws for an ideal society. . . .

Now, it is obvious that discussions of *dina demalkhuta dina* were not carried on in such isolation from specific historical reality (just as Cohen's description of the state of Talmudic penology is extreme): this is especially so since, as we have seen, the discussions and rulings were applied within the Jewish community. Nonetheless, inasmuch as those

to whom the rulings were primarily addressed were not in actuality touched by them (a fact of which the rabbis were aware from the outset), the doctrines expounded in definition of the proper and legal operation of governmental authority were neither a response nor an accommodation to the realities of the day. In a sense, we have legislation for a State that does not exist, or better, for one that does not recognize the legislators whose work we study. It would be cruel to call such legislation 'utopian', considering its actual context. But it is not far-fetched to suggest that this law may legitimately be mined for its theoretical, systemic, components.[15] If, moreover, one wishes to study the relationship between this body of law and its pragmatic effects (or stimulus), it may well be that internal Jewish communal and economic realities were much more relevant than the external configuration to which the rabbis presumably responded.

NOTES

[1] Nineteenth-century scholars all stressed the Babylonian origins of the rule, which was indeed formulated by the Babylonian *amorah* Samuel, b. *Gittin* 10b and parallels. These presumed Babylonian origins were integrated by L. Ginzberg into a more general pattern in his famous lecture, 'The Significance of the Halachah for Jewish History', *On Jewish Law and Lore*, Philadelphia, 1955, pp. 86–88. Contemporary historians have proceeded along similar—though more judicious—lines: cf. S. W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, 2nd edn. Philadelphia, 1952, II, p. 177; J. Neusner, *A History of the Jews in Babylonia*, Leiden, 1966, II, pp. 64–72. But G. Allon has convincingly shown in his *Toledot HaYehudim BeEretz Yisrael BeTekufat HaMishnah VeHaTalmud* [*History of the Jews in Palestine in the Period of the Mishnah and the Talmud*, [Tel-Aviv, 1959, I, pp. 346–50; II, pp. 118–22, that Palestinian contemporaries of Samuel operated with a similar rubric, which is probably rooted in Tannaitic accommodations to Roman rule in Palestine. Some of the same materials had already been utilized with similar results by I. Abrahams, *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, First Series, Cambridge, 1917, pp. 54–55, 62–65, but his discussion is not free of distortion and inaccuracy.

[2] Baron, *op. cit.*, V, p. 78; note also Baron, 'Some Medieval Jewish Attitudes to the Muslim State', *Ancient and Medieval Jewish History*, New Brunswick, N.J., 1972, pp. 86–87; but here too the supporting evidence is inconclusive. I. Agus, *R. Meir of Rothenburg*, Philadelphia, 1947, I, p. 18, n. 25, speaks of his subject's 'strong spirit of independence displayed in all . . . responsa dealing with the relation of Jews to their overlords'. Cf. also p. 144, n. 89.

[3] *Tosafot*, *Baba Kamma* 58a *s.v. inammi*, translated by Baron, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 63–64.

[4] E. E. Urbach, *Ba'alei HaTosafot* [*The Tosafists*], Jerusalem, 1955, pp. 203–204.

[5] R. Meir of Rothenburg, *Responsa, Prague*, ed. M. Bloch, Budapest, 1895, no. 943, p. 134a.

[6] *ibid.*, Pr. 915, p. 126d; cf. also additional references in Agus, op. cit., II, p. 514.

[7] *Responsa, Lemberg*, ed. N. Rabbinowitz, Lemberg, 1860, no. 381.

[8] *Responsa* (reprinted), Jerusalem, 1960, no. 110, pp. 33b–34d.

[9] *Responsa*, VII (reprinted), Jerusalem 1960, no. 454, p. 62a.

[10] *Teshuvot Ribash HaHadashot* [*New Responsa of Ribash*], Jerusalem, 1960, no. 9, pp. 7a–8a.

[11] *Responsa*, Vilna, 1878, no. 2, p. 1. Note the different impression left by A. Neumann, *The Jews in Spain*, Philadelphia, 1942, I, p. 10.

[12] *Teshuvot Hakhmei Provinzia* [*Responsa of the Sages of Provence*], ed. A. Sofer, Jerusalem, 1967, pp. 419 ff.

[13] Cf. R. Judah son of R. Asher, *Teshuvot Zikhron Yehudah* [*Responsa in Memory of Judah*], Berlin, 1855, no. 92, p. 53b; also, R. Moses Alashkar, *Responsa*, Sadilkow, 1834, no. 19, pp. 9d–10b.

[14] H. H. Cohen, 'The Penology of the Talmud', *Israel Law Review* V, 1, January 1970, pp. 53–55.

[15] S. Shiloh's unpublished dissertation, *Dina DeMalkhuta Dina*, Faculty of Law, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1970 is a good start in this direction. Shiloh systematically reviews the juridical doctrines of the early and late-medieval rabbis. Among the more interesting elements of the rabbinical discussions are considerations of whether the royal law treats all subjects equally; the basis (in Jewish law) of the king's right to legislate for his Jewish subjects and the nature of Jewish residency in the host country; and the possible conflict of religious and moral demands with royal legislation. My essay deliberately skirts all such substantive issues and restricts itself to an analysis of the sociological impact of the rabbinical doctrine in its broadest sense.

ASSIMILATION: A DEVIANT PATTERN AMONG THE JEWS OF INTER-WAR POLAND

Celia Stopnicka Heller

FOLLOWING the last 'anti-Zionist' campaign of 1968—when Jews were encouraged to leave Poland, and only allowed to go on the condition that they 'chose' to give up Poland for Israel—many who left openly changed course in Vienna and refused to go to Israel. Not a few of those who eventually landed in Denmark, Sweden, Italy, etc., stressed that they considered themselves *Poles in exile*. As officials of American Jewish organizations first came in contact with this phenomenon, and as the news of it spread among some American Jews, the reaction was surprise or shock. The acts and declarations of the 'Poles of Jewish descent' (their self-designation) disturbed the widely held image of Polish Jews as hardly touched by the ideology and processes of assimilation, in contrast to the Jews of Western Europe.[1]

And yet conscious assimilation[2] in Poland dates back to the nineteenth century. Admittedly, the Jews of Poland had been among the least acculturated (as well as constituting one of the largest) of all European Jewish Communities. On the other hand, many, especially in the younger generation, were on the road to acculturation when Poland became independent. The members of the group which is the subject of this paper were referred to by Jews in general as 'assimilated' or 'assimilators' but they referred to themselves as *Polacy wyznania mojżeszowego*, Poles of Mosaic faith, or *żydowskiego pochodzenia*, Poles of Jewish descent. They constituted an extreme type, the very opposite of the extreme Orthodox who were devoted to the conservation, without any change, of Jewish religious and cultural distinctiveness. Although they represented a very small portion of the total Jewish population, the very fact of their existence as a social type in Poland is of historical and sociological significance. What must be underlined is that this group differed from the rest of the Jewish population not only in the degree of acculturation (Polonization) and in the advocacy of assimilation, but in their conscious self-identification as Poles. Their human tragedy lies in the fact that with all their efforts to make themselves indistinguishable

from Poles and distinguishable from Jews, they remained subject to the categorical treatment accorded to Jews, and failed to become integrated into Polish society.

To understand this phenomenon—the marginal situation of this group in independent Poland and how it dealt with its marginality—we must go back to its history. I shall refer to the group as *assimilationists*.[3] It can truly be said of them that they bore the deep marks of their origin and their past on their brow.

Historical background

During the inter-war period, the Jews of Poland resembled, in their social status and the treatment accorded to them, a conquered population. And yet one knows that their presence in the country was not due to conquest but to voluntary migration. It is a fact of history that they came in the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries at the invitation of the Kings and Princes of Poland in order to build up Polish commerce and Polish cities.

The history of the growing hostility to the Jews throughout the centuries preceding the final partition of Poland is well documented.[4] It is particularly relevant to note that in the eighteenth century (the time of the enlightenment and liberalism in the West), when the condition of Western Jews was improving, that of Polish Jews was rapidly deteriorating in a declining Poland. This fact throws light on why Jewish assimilation in Poland, in contrast to that in Western Europe, was not an eighteenth century phenomenon. The origin of the group we are concerned with lies largely in the nineteenth century. It is tied to industrialization, which came late to Poland, and to Poland's struggle for independence. Some of the ideologues of Poland's independence, influenced by Western democratic ideas, appealed to their 'Israelite brothers' or 'people of the Old Testament' (*Starozakonni*), for help to resurrect a Poland in which all citizens would be equal irrespective of their religion.[5] Thus, the nineteenth century marks, among the Poles, the beginning of the idea of separation of religious belief from national identity, which never came to fruition in the independent Poland of the twentieth century. But in the nineteenth century some Polish Jews, especially among the rich, responded to the promise and expected its fulfilment in an independent Poland, free of antisemitism.

In contrast to the majority of the Jews, especially those in Russian Poland, who were becoming pauperized in the nineteenth century, a small number became rich. This growth of rich Jewish families was tied to the beginning of industrialization in Poland, in which some Jews played an eminent role. The emergence of a new rich Jewish bourgeoisie in large cities, such as Warsaw and Lodz, reached its peak between the two Polish uprisings of 1831 and 1863.

The assimilationist movement began in the 1820s among some of these bourgeois families—for instance, those of rich merchants and bankers, such as Natanson, Toeplitz, Kronenberg, Wawelberg, etc. Although there were regional differences—in the Russian, Austrian, and German parts of Poland—the overall pattern was very similar. The immediate reference group of those who chose to assimilate, the 'progressives' (*postępowi*), were the rich assimilated Jews of Germany and France. Some of the intellectuals among the progressives aimed at complete religious reform and specially attacked the Talmud as the source of 'superstition'. By 1860, these men were at the height of their activity. Nevertheless, despite their efforts, the religious reform movement did not succeed in becoming institutionalized in Poland. That is an important fact bearing on the pattern of behaviour of the group in the inter-war period.

The assimilationist Jews accepted the definition of the Jewish problem as it was formulated by Polish intellectuals sympathetic to the Jews. These Poles held that the solution lay in the Polonization of the Jews, which was the road to their equality in citizenship. And the small number of Jews who took this view, the progressives, proceeded to assume that Jews could and ought to become Poles of 'Mosaic faith', different from others only in the private realm of religion (which had also to be substantially reformed). By disengaging themselves from traditional Jewishness, they thought that they would enter a more abundant life, for they found the Jewish community narrow and confining. They therefore renounced Jewish separatism in Poland and proclaimed the goal of Polonizing the Jewish population. They began to participate in the major patriotic and cultural activities aimed at promoting Polish culture under foreign rule and reviving Polish independence. Many of the rich Jews gave financial support to the clandestine army, and the young joined as volunteers in the revolts. In the cultural and scientific life of Poland, especially in Warsaw, the sons of these rich bankers, merchants, and industrialists occupied a prominent place. That they were able to do so was in large measure due to subsidies by rich Jews of some of the literary and scientific journals, as well as to their outright ownership of large publishing houses and major Polish newspapers.[6]

In their enthusiasm for Polonization and the zeal with which they pursued it, the rich bourgeois families weathered the first broad reaction that set in against them as the carriers of the ideas of economic positivism. A wave of Polish antisemitism spread in the 1880s; it was an important factor in containing the spread of assimilationism in other strata of the Jewish population, but it did not reverse the process among the rich. They viewed it as a temporary setback on the road to progress through assimilation.[7] And by then they were economically entrenched and secure enough to tide them over. In the remaining years before

independence, some other 'temporary major reversals' occurred such as the anti-Jewish boycott after the Revolution of 1905 and the anti-Jewish excesses of 1912, following the election campaign to the Fourth Imperial Duma. These events led many Jews to refuse to believe in the benign interpretations advocated by the assimilationists.

After independence

Independence was ushered in with a wave of antisemitism. The declaration of Polish independence in 1918 was followed by pogroms in a number of places, including Cracow and Lvov.[8] With some fluctuation in its intensity, antisemitism continued throughout Polish independence and became especially rampant in the 1930s, with the rise of fascism in Europe. Poland was then second only to Nazi Germany in its organized antisemitism. What must be borne in mind is that in independent Poland antisemitism was not a manifestation of the lunatic fringe only, but was respectable, being in the mainstream of national life and in the forefront of political affairs. The conception of the Jews that prevailed was not only that of a people culturally *different* but also of a people *strange, foreign,* and *hostile* to the Polish nation.[9] The common attitude of Poles was that Jews were 'a foreign body in Polish society. They are different from us. They irritate us with their foreignness and distinctness. We do not like them and we do not want them to have any say in Poland'.[10]

The caste position

In independent Poland the *social* position of the Jews was very similar to that of colonial people or blacks in the United States of that period. Theirs was a caste situation. We may recall that Max Weber spoke of caste as a closed status group.[11] The Jews in inter-war Poland were such a group. Both in the ideology and the institutions of independent Poland, the categorical status inferiority of Jews was in most social relations clear. With the lower caste position went the compelling stigmatization: the attribute of being a Jew was perceived in Poland as deeply discrediting and unchangeable. And the lower caste position of the Jews was easily enforceable by their high visibility. Although the visibility was only partially based on phenotypic characteristics, it was nonetheless quite clear.[12]

Cultural assimilation

Those Jews we are concerned with in this paper were the least visible. During the inter-war period, some of the older people still had Jewish cultural characteristics, but most of the assimilationists were thoroughly

acculturated. Quantitatively, therefore, they were least susceptible to antisemitic discrimination and attack, especially in fleeting encounters where their identity was not known. This was a major factor in their distinctive pattern of adjustment. Despite the antisemitic outbreaks that greeted independence, they clung to assimilation when independence was ushered in and still thought that they would become integrated.

But as far as the Jewish population at large was concerned, the antisemitic outbreaks marking independence fully discredited assimilation in Poland as a programme for Jews. One can characterize the inter-war period as a time of the collapse of the *professed* programme and method of assimilation among the general Jewish population (but not among the assimilationists).[13] Assimilation was manifestly rejected as a goal but the process of secularization (and even of acculturation) continued, especially among the young. It was also a period of growing Jewish nationalism in Poland.

This explains why the proportion of the assimilationists (as we have defined them) in the total Jewish population seems to have remained more or less constant. No exact figures exist but one can attempt an estimate on the basis of census data. Thus, I have arrived at the estimate that the assimilationists constituted one-ninth to one-tenth of the Jewish population, which numbered over three million (270,000–300,000 assimilationists).[14] However, this figure has been considered too high by a few historians whom I have consulted; they think that it was between 150,000 and 200,000, but emphasize that there is no way of arriving at an exact figure.

The estimates of what proportion the assimilationists constituted in the various strata of the Jewish population are even looser than the above, for no census or other figures exist as a base. Assimilationists were especially prominent among artists and the top Jewish intellectuals; the latter were among the most prominent intellectuals of Poland.[15] On the basis of the interviews I conducted, I should estimate that as many as 90 per cent of the top Jewish intellectuals were assimilationist. Another stratum in which they were proportionally over-represented was that of the very rich Jews. I should guess that about half of them were assimilationist. But assimilationists were virtually non-existent among the workers,[16] the small traders, and the poor, who were minimally acculturated. Thus the great distance between the assimilationists and the bulk of the Jewish people was both a class and a cultural distance.

One must not forget that by the time Poland became independent, the assimilationists were fully de-Judaized and Polonized. In the inter-war period, they—and especially the younger ones among them (the second, third, and fourth generations of assimilation)—like Poles in general, largely proceeded on the assumption that Jewish culture

(which they seldom graced with the name of culture) was inferior to the Polish one. (Interestingly, that was much less the case with the generation who had originally embarked upon assimilation.) Whether intellectuals or rich bourgeois, they saw little or nothing of value in the Jewish heritage. They held that, as descendants of Jews, they had nothing valuable to contribute to the Polish nation; but they had much to contribute as individuals and as Poles. In so far as they inherited any positive Jewish values, such as the special emphasis on education and intellect, they generally did not recognize them as Jewish but as universal. The other values which they celebrated—mostly feudal and romantic values—they marked as Polish: honour, bravery, love of nature, hospitality, patriotism, and so on.

The general outlook of the assimilationists on things Polish and Jewish is reflected in their contrasting attitudes towards the Polish and Yiddish languages. They tended to perceive the first as beautiful and were often rhapsodic about its graces, while the latter they saw as ugly. Its tones were considered shrill, its rhythm ridiculous. (It is noteworthy that the same people often delighted in some of the harsh consonants of Polish.[17])

Social distance

The assimilationists refused to recognize Yiddish as a language and referred to it as a jargon, using the same depreciatory references as the Poles did: one spoke Polish but one jabbered in Jewish (*szwargotać po żydowsku*). Yiddish to them was the badge of shame, the mark of low caste and low culture, and they took special pride in their failure not only to speak but to understand it. And yet Yiddish was the main language of most of the Jews in Poland and often the only language of the lower strata.[18] There was thus a linguistic separation which is indicative of the social distance between the assimilationists and the rest of the Jews, especially those of the lower strata. Large portions of the Jewish population in the inter-war period still adhered to a Jewish way of life, markedly different from that of the Poles, 'without reservation and without disguise, outside their homes no less than within them'.[19] The assimilationists saw this as an expression of their ignorance and superstition; the overall image they had of Jews and Jewishness was the same as that the Poles had: overwhelmingly negative. They looked down on the Jews as 'primitive', 'backward', strange, ridiculous, and uncouth. They felt that a huge social divide existed.[20] This comes out vividly in the memoirs of M. A. Hartglas, a member of the Polish *Sejm*, who as a young lawyer, after being converted to Zionism, attempted to overcome this distance and mix socially with Jews:[21]

> I was surrounded by people who were not stupid—intelligent, nice and good people—but I was offended by their lack of European culture, lack

> of social graces . . . A sheet of glass separated me from them: I was a willing and sympathetically disposed observer, but I could not live with them. I suffered with them, loved them, was able to sacrifice myself for them, but in everyday social life, I was aloof . . . I went to social gatherings—after a few ineffective attempts—I could no more. The sheet of glass appeared and divided us . . . after a few visits to their homes, I left with a bad taste in my mouth. I was brought up in a certain manner and in a certain culture, and there was the negation of all of it.

And later, when he was a member of the Polish Parliament, he confessed:[22]

> I acted on behalf of the Jewish community: they came to me with their concerns and troubles. Personally I kept aloof from Jews. I was repelled by their lack of culture and European manners.

Identificational assimilation—social definition

Despite the oppressive antisemitic atmosphere which permeated Polish society, the assimilationists were little conscious of an interdependence, in terms of a common destiny, with the Jews. Their conscious orientation was not that of 'I am ultimately bound up with the fate of the Jewish people' but rather, 'I am ultimately bound up with the fate of the Polish people'. From their perspective, the only thing which made them different from the rest of the Polish people was that they were non-Catholic. Note: I did not say that they were Jewish in their religion, for most of them in practice were far removed from it. Reform Judaism did not become established in Poland. Most assimilationists were nominally of the 'Mosaic faith' because they lived in a society where everyone was expected to have a religious designation.

Their identificational assimilation[23] expressed itself in their romantic patriotism, which sometimes bordered on chauvinism. They sang praises to the Polish land, to the valour of Poles, and to the heights of Polish culture, art, and music. This celebration of things Polish is prominently displayed in the writings of Polish novelists, poets, and writers of Jewish background: Klaczko, Tuwim, Witlin, Słonimski, Leśmian. Jews—let alone Jewish themes—hardly figure in their creations and when they do, then it is only fleetingly. The extent of identificational assimilation also came through vividly in my interviews.

And yet their Polishness did not exempt them from the dominant social definition in Poland of being Jews, essentially no different from other Jews, even if in appearance they seemed Polish. To the assimilationist, the situation in which he was placed was flagrantly unjust and especially onerous. He was defined as '*Żyd*', Jew, and treated as a member of the Jewish collectivity, when in fact he was a Pole, with a sense of peoplehood based exclusively on the Polish *ojczyzna*, fatherland. Here Kallen's definition of a Jew comes to mind: 'Anybody is a Jew

who of his own free will calls himself by the name'.[24] By this definition the assimilationists, in sharp contrast to the overwhelming majority of the Jews in inter-war Poland, were not Jews. And their dilemma was that they were so considered. They fought to the very end the social definition which did not distinguish between them and the rest of the Jews.[25] But they did not even succeed in being recognized by the majority as an intermediate status group, as an additional category with their own identity: Poles of Jewish descent (comparable to the mulattoes in Brazil, the Cape Coloured of South Africa, or the Eurasians of India under British rule).[26] As in the case of descendants of Negroes in the United States, prominence and acculturation did not exempt them from their caste situation. The fact that some of them made outstanding contributions to Polish literature, science, and mathematics was often interpreted as a threat to Polish culture. Polish culture was seen as being undermined, Judaized (*zażydzenie*) by their presence.[27] In short, the Polishness of the Polonized 'Jews' was highly suspect to most Poles. They were often seen as strangers, and sometimes as enemies, in disguise. As for politics, the assimilationists like the Jews in general were excluded from the ruling Camp of National Unity which came into power in February 1937.[28]

Thus, in the final analysis, no set of achieved criteria of distinction was sufficient to release the assimilationists from the Jewish caste and to elevate them to the status of Poles. 'To be Polish is to be Catholic', was the prevailing conception among the dominant group. The term 'Pole' was reserved for Christians and seldom, if ever, applied by them to Jews. Even such expressions as 'Jewish Poles' or 'Poles of Jewish faith' failed to take root among the Poles. On the contrary, the assimilationists were also subject to the derogatory caste label of 'mangy Jew' (*parch, parszywy Żyd*, comparable to 'Nigger' in the United States), if seldom to their faces, often behind their backs, or in print. The original aim of the assimilationists before Polish independence to move out of the inferior caste through assimilation, without conversion, ended in failure during Poland's independence.

Mobility through conversion

Historically, conversion to Christianity was in Poland the only avenue of escape from the inferior caste. Under the Elective Kings, both law and custom favoured it. The cases of conversion that occurred then were usually those of rich merchants; they were sponsored by noblemen, were well received, and often even ennobled. In the eighteenth century, the conversion of the Frankists brought many more people of Jewish extraction into the nobility, and this might account for the subsequent less liberal attitude towards converts and their descendants.[29]

When we examine conversion among the assimilationists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we find that among the rich bourgeoisie it was often a two-generational process. The captains of commerce and industry consciously embarked upon acculturation, socializing their children exclusively in the dominant culture. Their children, thus socialized, often became converted when they reached adulthood.[30] That process can be illustrated historically by actual cases of prominent families. To most assimilationists of the inter-war period, conversion was no disaster. Even those who looked down on religion in general as superstition, as a survival from another age, generally did not view Catholic observance with the same disdain they had for the Jewish religion. For the young adults, conversion was often the logical conclusion of a process that began in their childhood.[31] Most had pleasant and warm memories of church attendance with governesses or maids, even if sometimes clandestine because parents were firm agnostics or atheists.

The total number of conversions per year was estimated by Dr. Tartakower to have been between 2,000 to 2,500 in the late twenties and early thirites.[32] No statistics are available as to what proportion of the total conversions were those by assimilationists. However, on the basis of my interviews, I gather that this was the case with most conversions. That being so, the figures would support the impression gained from the interviews and from reports in Jewish newspapers that the rate of conversion was very high among the assimilationists but very low among the Jewish population in general.

Most of the conversions in the inter-war period can be divided into two categories: *a*, pragmatic—it enabled one or one's children to enter positions otherwise closed (or one thought that it would); and *b*, assimilatory—it represented a final step in the process of Polonization, otherwise completed. (Of course, there were the very rare cases of conversion on purely religious grounds, both among the assimilationists and Jews in general.[33] There were also the occasional 'romantic' conversions which figured so prominently in Yiddish folklore.) The eminent and gifted essayist and reporter, Count Ksawery Pruszyński, a noted philosemite, wrote in 1937 in a prestigious literary journal[34] about the great number of assimilatory conversions:

> I regret that many Jews consider assimilation to Polishness inseparable from a change to Christianity. And not being convinced on grounds of faith, they see it as one more tie to Polishness. Adhering to an old faith or admitting the lack of any is worth much more than superficiality, which is in the final analysis hurtful. Of course, the cause of this is the situation where the christened Jew is 'more highly regarded' than the one of Mosaic faith.

On the basis of my interviews, it seems that the greatest number of conversions were pragmatic. Hertz, who knew the assimilationist circles

well, reports that in many cases the rationalization was: 'I am converting for the sake of my children. I would never do it for myself'.[35] However, if we probe further, we discover that the two categories of conversion—pragmatic and assimilatory—represent pure types, and actual cases had features of both, although some may have come closer to the first and some to the second. Moreover, the rationale behind the two types is not so different. As was shown earlier, the assimilationists were not only culturally but identificationally assimilated. Most of them had no desire to transmit a separate Jewish identity to their children. On the contrary, they hoped that their children or grandchildren would merge completely into the Polish nation. (Many of them favoured intermarriage with Poles much more than with people who were culturally and identificationally Jewish.) Being already culturally and identificationally assimilated, those who chose conversion for pragmatic reasons did not see why they had to continue as nominal Jews and see their ambitions frustrated. By means of a perfunctory ceremony, they could just as well achieve the position they desired. Similarly, if only that was needed to prove themselves Poles, why not go through the ceremony? After all, religiously they were just as removed from the Jews as from the Catholics, and perhaps even more so; culturally they were like the rest of the Poles and far different from the Jews. Why then not be nominally Catholic rather than nominally of 'Mosaic religion'?

Moreover, most assimilationists had relatives (with whom they often maintained close contact) who were converts or children of converts. The appropriate question now becomes not why so many assimilationists were converted but rather why more were not. Among the older assimilationists, there were those who felt that precisely because of rising antisemitism, it would be unconscionable or undignified to convert. Another factor was the conscious recognition among some that the stigma of Jewishness was not removed through conversion. (How strong its stigmatic quality was is reflected in the 'unmasking' of the Jewish ancestry of political opponents which was a frequent device on both left and right.)[36]

The assimilationist community

The assimilationists formed a nationwide community of marginal people. Separated in culture, interests, and self-identity from the Jews, they were nevertheless not allowed to integrate into the society to which they felt culturally and identificationally akin. They were both excluded from its public realm and from its wide range of primary social relations. The entrance of assimilationists into cliques, clubs, and institutions of the dominant group, on a primary level—which began in the nineteenth century and levelled off at the beginning of the

twentieth—was blocked after independence.[37] If we follow Gordon's definition, that entrance on so large a scale constitutes structural assimilation, then we can conclude that our group was culturally and identificationally but not structurally assimilated.[38] And it is in this sense that they were marginal.

The assimilationists formed an exclusive community, the centre of primary contact for a group of families, often related by kinship, where 'Polishness', 'good manners', and 'civilized behaviour', were greatly valued. In contrast to their assimilationist fathers and grandfathers of the nineteenth century and of the beginning of the twentieth (who were concerned about not becoming completely estranged from Jews whom they hoped eventually to convert to Polonization), they were estranged and they accepted their estrangement. They faced up to the social reality to the extent that they consciously recognized that it was futile for them to continue to preach the gospel of assimilation to the Jews of Poland. But otherwise, in regard to their social situation, the fully Polonized Jewish bourgeoisie, as viewed from the outside, lived in a world of make-believe which they had constructed. In some of its specific features it may have been different from the one depicted by Franklin Frazier in his *Black Bourgeoisie;* but it was just as removed from the reality in which these 'Poles of Jewish descent' found themselves as was that of the black bourgeoisie from their reality in the United States. If 'social life' or 'society' was one of the main props of the world of make-believe of the latter, *polskość*, Polishness, was that of the first. They adored it, they flaunted it, and vied with one another in manifesting it. Their style of life was characterized by a celebration of Polish ideals and Polish values. In their own circles, they could parade their Polishness without being accused of masquerading. In the outside world, both among Poles and Jews, their Polishness tended to be at least suspect. (To many Poles, the fact that the assimilationists appeared so Polish only demonstrated the perfidiousness of the Jew and the lengths he would go to in order to disguise himself.) Theirs, then, was in many ways a world of make-believe.

Within their own community, the assimilationists, it seems, sought escape from the social deprivation, the psychological derogation, and the humiliation resulting from their position in the larger society. Among their own, they felt most at home and most at ease; they did not have to hide who they were and could take pride in their family history and accomplishments. Further, they managed to a considerable degree to shut out the reality that their Jewishness was an ever-present fact of the racist Polish society.[39] In their own community the assimilationists went to great lengths to shelter their children from that reality. That they were 'of Jewish descent' was gently broken to them, not too early, but at a time when it became necessary for them to learn that painful truth.

Considering that they were living in a society raging with antisemitism, it is noteworthy that the surviving assimilationists claim to have had no (or very little) personal experience of it, especially in their childhood. After much probing, they do recall some incidents, but they interpret them as not significant. Nevertheless, the outside reality was increasingly intruding as antisemitism became more and more organized, political, and vicious. A growing number of newspapers and periodicals were vituperative in their 'exposures' and attacks on prominent assimilationists because they were 'Jewish' and on defenders of Jews whom they accused of being Jews in disguise. (Jewish ancestry was often traced in those exposures). Discriminatory policies were gaining ground in professional organizations, and the assimilationists (no less than Jews in general) were subjected to them. The ranks of the 'integrated' intelligentsia were thinning, as Polish intellectuals who stood by their 'Jewish' friends were insulted, mistreated, and even beaten.[40] (However, one must not forget the moral and physical courage of those few among the Poles who not only continued their associations but spoke out against the 'promoters of brutal methods'.[41])

Where the assimilationists were hit hardest was in their children, who suffered at schools and universities. A stringent Jewish quota was instituted in the thirties, after much agitation which had begun in the twenties. It was accompanied by heckling of, and bodily attacks upon, Jewish students by their Polish fellow students and their helpers from the anti-Jewish terrorist groups outside the university. Through their militant and disruptive tactics, the radical nationalist students succeeded in intimidating the administration and teachers into later introducing such 'reforms' as the seating ghettoes in classrooms which met with the approval of the Minister of Education.

If the assimilationists, as asserted earlier, were less vulnerable to antisemitic discrimination and terror because of their low visibility, in a sense they were psychologically more vulnerable than most Jews, and particularly more than the large orthodox sector. These last were sealed off in their faith and tradition from the psychological effects of lower caste status. In sheer force, but in no other way, did they feel inferior to the dominant Poles. In sharp contrast, the assimilationists were psychologically wounded in their unsuccessful attempts to escape from their inferior caste status and deeply humiliated when personally subjected to prejudice, discrimination, and terror. As one of my informants explained:

> People have strange ideas about the Polish assimilationists. We suffered most. We were Poles, we loved Poland and it was hard for us because of the increasing antisemitism. We were violently anti-Zionist. Poland was our country and we did not see why we should pick ourselves up and go far away. At that time Zionism seemed a preposterous idea to us.

Self-hatred

Self-hate was a prevalent psychological response to the increasing inner dilemma created by the contradiction of being culturally and self-identificationally Polish and yet being defined as a Jew and treated as a Jew.[42] The assimilationists looked at Jews and at one another with the eyes of Poles who constituted their reference group. Professor Ludwik Hirszfeld, from a prominent assimilationist family, speaks in his memoirs (written during the war) of the aversion that the assimilationists felt from the Jewish masses.[43] They perceived the cultural characteristics of Jews as stigmas, 'deeply discrediting', disqualifying those who had them from full social acceptance. In referring to them, they tended to use *among themselves*, but not in front of Poles, the standard negative terminology for Jews and Jewish characteristics. They followed the common pattern among stigmatized people and made attempts to correct what they saw as the objective basis of their failings. Their home socialization was bent on eradicating such traits. Mothers would pounce upon such 'traits' of Jewishness in their children and try hard to correct the blemishes. For example, 'Do not talk with your hands' was a common admonition; gesticulation was regarded as typically Jewish.

The assimilationists were obsessed with Jewish traits as discrediting symbols. So obsessed were they, that discovering the traits in others was like a game in which they tried to outdo one another. Much gossip among them revolved around the Jewish signs which reappeared in others in unguarded moments, and was about discovering them in people who had been hitherto successful in not revealing them.

It would be more proper for a psychologist than for me to speculate as to whether the self-hatred of the assimilationists represented a loathing of the things which stood in the way of their aspiration to be Polish or a displacement of hostility towards the dominant group for not accepting them as Poles.

Conclusion

Although the marginal situation of the assimilationists may have made them more politically conscious and active than Poles of the same class, the patterns of reaction to Jewishness described and analysed above characterized them irrespectively of political persuasion. Those patterns were evident among members of the Polish Socialist Party and of the Communist Party, and their sympathizers, no less than they were among conservatives or liberals.

Did the antisemitism, which in its crescendo affected even him and his children, bring the assimilationist back to a Jewish self-identity? Did it cause him to 'choose' to call himself a Jew, if not in pride then

in humiliation?[44] After all, Jewish history abounds in cases of turning and returning. There are a few records of assimilationists in Poland 'turning back' to a Jewish identity that have the quality of religious conversion, with elements of past sin and finding a guiding light to lead them back to their people.[45] But in most cases the opposite was true.

NOTES

[1] Paper delivered at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, New York, 29 August 1973. This is part of a larger study on the Jews in inter-war Poland, supported by the National Institute of Mental Health and the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture. The data of this paper consist of ten depth interviews with members of assimilationist families and a few diaries in private possession, in addition to published materials in Polish and Yiddish as well as English.

[2] In this paper, acculturation and assimilation are used as two distinct analytical concepts, although in concrete phenomena they are related. The term 'acculturation' is employed, according to an authoritative definition, to include 'those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures, come into continuous firsthand contact, with subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both groups': Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, and Melville J. Herskovits, 'Memorandum for the Study of Acculturation', *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (January–March, 1936), p. 149. By assimilation is meant 'the adoption by a person or group of the culture of another social group to such a complete extent that the person or group no longer has any characteristics identifying him with his former culture and no longer has any particular loyalties to his former culture': Arnold M. Rose, *Sociology, The Study of Human Relations*, New York, 1956, pp. 557–58.

[3] I call them assimilationists, instead of assimilated, to take cognizance of the fact, stressed by Hertz, that for them assimilation was both a conscious programme and method of solving the Jewish problem. See Aleksander Hertz, *Żydzi w Kulturze Polskiej*, Paris, 1961, pp. 137–38.

[4] S. M. Dubnow, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland*, Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1918.

[5] Feliks Gross, *World Politics and Tension Areas*, New York, 1966, pp. 134–37.

[6] Jacob Shatzky, 'Warsaw Jews in the Polish Cultural Life of the Early 19th Century', *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science*, Vol. 5, New York, 1950, pp. 41–54.

[7] Hilary Nussbaum, *Żydzi w Polsce, Historya Żydow od Mojżesza do Epoki Obecnej*, Vol. 5, Warsaw, 1890, pp. 447–80.

[8] Yakov Shatzky, 'Yiddishe Politik tzvishen di Tzvai Velt Milhumes', *Algemaine Entzyklopedie Yiden*, Vol. 4, p. 214.

[9] Hertz, op. cit., p. 43.

[10] Wiktor Alter, *O Żydach i Antysemityzmie*, Warsaw, 1936, p. 9.

[11] 'A caste is doubtless a closed status group. For all the obligations and barriers that membership in a status group entails also exist in a caste, in

which they are intensified to the utmost degree': H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber, Essays in Sociology*, New York, 1958, p. 405. I do not intend to reopen the debate on the use of the term, 'caste' in a 'racial' context. For a review of this controversy, see Gerald D. Berreman, 'Caste in India and the United States', in Celia S. Heller, ed., *Structured Social Inequality*, New York, 1969, pp. 74–81. My use of the term is in accordance with the broad definition given by Berreman of caste as 'a hierarchy of endogamous divisions in which membership is hereditary and permanent'. Some of the main features of caste stratification as compared with other types are: the norms call for absolute closure of the strata and for exclusive reliance on ascription; the inequality is institutionalized not only by laws and conventions but also by ritualism. See Celia S. Heller, 'Principal Types of Stratification Systems', *ibid.*, pp. 51–62. For a penetrating criticism of those scholars who insist that caste is a social structure confined to the Pan-Indian cultural world, see the article by Gould. He charges that 'their error arises from a failure to make better use of social history, an insufficient appreciation of the conceptual tools that empirical archaeology has made available for studying the evolution of social organization, and a tendency to ignore the principle of saliency in data collection': Harold A. Gould, *Caste and Class: A Comparative View*, Addison-Wesley Modular Publications, No. 11, 1971, p. 4.

[12] Some of the marked cultural characteristics that made them easily distinguishable to the dominant group were: *a*, different names and surnames; *b*, language—the wide use of Yiddish and the characteristic Polish with its Yiddish-influenced intonation, syntax, and expressions; *c*, non-verbal language—dissimilar gestures, facial expressions, body movements, etc.; *d*, typical dress, especially among the older generation; *e*, distinct and openly engaged in religious practices.

[13] Elkana Margalit, 'Social and Intellectual Origins of the Hashomer Hatzair Youth Movement, 1913–20', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 4, No. 2, April 1969, pp. 25–46.

[14] According to the 1921 census (the only census in inter-war Poland with data on nationality as well as religion), 9·8 per cent of Poland's population declared themselves 'of Mosaic faith' but only 8·6 per cent said that they were of Jewish nationality. The 1·2 per cent of Poland's population who considered themselves of 'Mosaic faith' but of Polish nationality probably comprised some others but the majority were assimilationists. *The Polish and non-Polish Populations of Poland*, Institute for the Study of Minority Problems, Warsaw, 1936, p. 7; *Mały Rocznik Statystyczny*, Warsaw, 1939, pp. 23, 24; Jan Szczepanski, *Polish Society*, New York, 1970, p. 27.

[15] Hertz, op. cit., p. 132.

[16] Marian Drozdowski, *Polityka Gospodarcza Rządu Polskiego, 1936–39* Warsaw, 1963, p. 94.

[17] This attitude comes through even in Korczak's children's book, whose protagonists are Jewish children: Mośki, Jośki, and Srule. He was lyrical in his description of the Polish speech of the peasants: 'Polish phrases like Polish field flowers arrange themselves into happy fields or rise clearly and burst into rays like the sun.' But Yiddish is generally 'the screaming and ordinary jargon of quarrelling and name calling': Janusz Korczak, 'Mośki, Jośki, i Srule', in *Na Koloniach Letnich*, Warsaw, 1946, p. 54. Also see Janusz Korczak,

Wybór Pism, Warsaw, 1957. A heroic figure during the Second World War, and the head of a Jewish orphanage, he refused to part from his charges, and went to death with 'his children'.

[18] According to the last census before the Second World War, in 1931, only 12 per cent of all the people who designated their religion as Mosaic registered Polish as their native tongue: *Mały Rocznik Statystyczny*, Warsaw, 1939, pp. 24–25. However, the percentage may have been a little larger, since raging antisemitism, increased Jewish nationalism, and the agitation of Jewish organizations before the census influenced some Jews not to name Polish as their native tongue. See *The Polish and Non-Polish Populations in Poland*, op. cit., note 14 above, p. 7.

[19] Abraham Joshua Heshel, 'The Inner World of the Polish Jew', in Roman Vishniac, *Polish Jews—a Pictorial Record*, New York, 1947, p. 7.

[20] Arie Tartakower, 'W Walce o Pracę Żydowską', *Nasza Trybuna*, Warsaw, 20 Nov. 1937, p. 3; Jerzy Tomaszewski, 'Robotnicy Żydowscy w Polsce w Latach 1921–39, *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instututy Historycznego*, no. 5, August–September 1964, pp. 28–29 and Arie Tartakower, 'Mur Bojkotu', *Nasza Trybuna*, Warsaw, 20 December 1937, p. 4.

[21] M. A. Hartglas, *Na Pograniczu Dwóch Światow—Pamiętniki*, 1952 (unpublished), p. 53. Quoted by kind permission of the Rector of Tel Aviv University.

[22] Hartglas, op. cit., p. 153.

[23] Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life*, New York, 1964, p. 53.

[24] Horace M. Kallen, 'The Foundations of Jewish Spiritual and Cultural Unity', *Judaism*, Vol. 6, Spring 1957, pp. 110–18.

[25] Shatzky, 'Yidishe Politik . . . ', op. cit., p. 239.

[26] See Carl N. Degler, *Neither Black nor White—Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States*, New York, 1971, pp. xii, 107–10.

[27] See S. J. Imber, *Asy Czystej Rasy*, Cracow, 1934, especially p. 25; Mieczysław Wardzinski, 'Antysemityzm-Daltonizmem Państwowym', *Wiadomości Literackie*, 4 August 1937; and Hertz, op. cit., p. 219.

[28] Simon Segal, *The New Poland and the Jews*, New York, 1938, p. 74.

[29] Majer Balaban, *Le Toledot ha-Tenuah haFrankit*, 1934; Aleksander Kraushar, *Franki ỳ Frankiści w Polsce, 1726–1816*, Cracow, 1895; and Hertz, op. cit., pp. 80, 98–129.

[30] See Majer Balaban, *Zabytki Historyczne Żydow w Polsce*, Warsaw, 1931, p. 26.

[31] The maids and governesses were important agents of acculturation. Their close ties and influence are reflected in the interviews I conducted, in the memoirs of assimilationists, and in Yiddish novels. The pattern is depicted in a number of Jewish novels; see, for example, I. J. Singer, *The Brothers Ashkenazi*, New York, 1936, p. 178.

[32] A. Tartakower, 'Stan Liczebny i Rozwój Naturalny Ludności Żydowskieỳ, w Polsce', in I. Schiper *et al.*, *Żydzi w Polsce Ordrodzonej*, Warsaw, 1935, vol. 2, p. 222.

[33] As an example of the latter, see the case of the sculptor, Marek Szwarc, in his daughter's book: Tereska Torres, *The Converts* New York, 1970.

[34] Ksawery Pruszyński, 'W Największym Skrócie', *Wiadomości Literakie* 16 May 1937.

[35] Hertz, op. cit., p. 111.

[36] Hertz, op. cit., p. 151. For the extent to which this phenomenon continued in post-war communist Poland, see Celia Stopnicka Heller, '"Anti-Zionism" and the Political Struggle within the Elite of Poland,' *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XI, No. 2, December 1969, pp. 133–49.

[37] See Feliks Gross, 'A Multiple Ethnic Pattern', in *World Politics and Tension Areas*, New York, 1966, p. 140.

[38] Gordon, op. cit., p. 71.

[39] Jews in Poland were defined as a race, that is, as a group different from Poles because of their innate, immutable characteristics: physical, mental, and emotional.

[40] Gross, op. cit., pp. 141–43.

[41] 'Memoriał Związku Nauczycieli Polskich', *Nowe Życie*, 1 February 1939, p. 6.

[42] Kurt Lewin, 'Self-Hatred among Jews, *Contemporary Jewish Record*, vol. 4, June 1941; Erving Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963; and Eric H. Erikson, 'Autobiographic Notes on Identity Crisis', *Daedalus* Fall 1970, pp. 730–60.

[43] Ludwik Hirszfeld, *Historja jednego życia*, Warsaw, 1946, pp. 256–59.

[44] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, New York, 1965, especially pp. 90, 136–37.

[45] Lucy Dawidowicz, *The Golden Tradition*, New York, 1964.

BOOK REVIEWS

ELAINE BALDWIN, *Differentiation and Co-operation in an Israeli Moshav*, xx + 240 pp., Manchester Univ. Press, Manchester, 1972, £3.60.

Unlike many other book titles this one aptly describes its contents; the book in fact examines the inevitable conflict between the ideal of a harmonious egalitarian rural society and the reality of economic differentiation within the context of an Israeli moshav. The account begins with the historical background of the moshav which Dr. Baldwin calls Kfar Hefer. Historical setting is essential to most anthropological studies; it is even more so for an understanding of present-day Kfar Hefer society. The original settlers came to Palestine from Poland and Russia with the 'third aliya'. They arrived imbued with socialist ideology and determined to make it a reality in a rural setting. The group of immigrants who subsequently settled Kfar Hefer had heated debates on what type of settlement they should adopt: kibbutz or moshav. They decided in favour of a moshav, which seemed to them to combine the advantages of co-operative production and marketing with greater opportunities for the expression of individuality than the kibbutz afforded. After overcoming great difficulties in obtaining the necessary land lease from the J.N.F., Kfar Hefer was established in 1929. The original group of settlers was reasonably homogeneous in terms of social attributes, which justified their assumption that equal opportunities for each farm unit would result in equal performance. However, over time, differential demographic changes reinforced by exogenous economic development resulted in heterogeneously structured farm units: those without second-generation help were unable to cope with dairy activities and consequently parted with all or most of their land, which enabled others to farm more land and monopolize a greater share of the milk quota which Kfar Hefer had been allocated by the Israeli authorities.

This process of economic differentiation, which involved the expansion of the younger and more successful farm units at the expense of the older and less efficient ones within a society deeply committed to the promotion of mutually aiding selfwork farm families without hired labour, festered like a sore in Kfar Hefer. The book unfolds with meticulous detail the way the different factions pursued their conflicting aims by enrolling external support and how the village executive and officials had to walk a tight-rope so as to try to prevent the conflict from openly disrupting village communal life.

Anyone familiar with the process of development in Third World villages will find nothing strange in Dr. Baldwin's analysis of differentiation and political manipulations in Kfar Hefer. What gives the book its peculiarly Israeli flavour is its accounts of men such as Ben-Natan, who in his early sixties was still a hard-working farmer, committed to the moshav as a way of

life and devoted to the study of *history and philosophy*. 'He was inclined to preface his remarks about village affairs with references to early Greece or Rome' (p. 105). Ben-Natan also successfully organized Kfar Hefer's 'non-farming' faction into reclaiming their land and planting alfalfa as a co-operative venture. Accounts like this illustrate the differences between Israeli moshavim on the one hand and most Third World villages on the other. In Kfar Hefer differentiation remained contained within the overall framework of an egalitarian ideology. 'The moshav structure with its basic insistence on equality and co-operation restricts the possibility for a farmer to practise extensive farming and to benefit from economies of scale' (p. 102).

The belief in the existence of an earlier tension-free and truly co-operative Kfar Hefer society held by many of the older generation found reaffirmation during the Six-Day War in 1967. External threats then were such as to submerge intra-village differences and make full harmony reign at least temporarily. 'In this euphoric mood after the war, people said that the differences of the past were over, now they had proved themselves a community and they could begin anew. The feeling was real and warranted. But it was short-lived. As the village returned to normal conditions the "normal" differences re-appeared' (p. 213).

Professor Gluckman points out in his introduction to this book that 'surprisingly . . . this is the first detailed study of a long-established moshav' (p. ix). Indeed there is a dearth of anthropological studies of older Israeli rural settlements. This book helps to remedy this deficiency by giving an extremely competent and objective analysis of the inevitable internal conflicts an old-established moshav like Kfar Hefer has to face under present-day conditions in Israel. Dr. Baldwin writes lucidly. Her book should be of interest not only to professional social scientists but also to a much wider reading public interested in Israel in particular and/or rural development in general.

SCARLETT EPSTEIN

ZEVEDEI BARBU, *Society, Culture and Personality. An Introduction to Social Science*, xxi + 183 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1971, £1.10.

How does one write a text-book for a subject when one believes that it has largely been misconstrued and the only approach is both personal and interdisciplinary? Professor Barbu is in this plight. He endeavours to provide basic knowledge about the main aspects of social life through linking sociology closely with anthropology and psychology. Sociology itself he sees as a humanistic, not a positivistic discipline. The close alliance of these three disciplines in the service of Professor Barbu's objective, the understanding of man, results in an introduction to an avowedly personal picture of man in society. This befits the author's conviction that if anything practical stems from the study of sociology it is liberal in spirit, rather than socialist or conservative. But is this personal intellectual credo even compatible with the text-book style? One would have thought this represented the kind of scientific sectarianism Barbu deplores.

The text-book format sits uneasily on the topics throughout. The three main sections, Society, Culture, and Personality evoke similar schemata of social life which are highly formal and systematic. But Barbu avoids schematization, since he is more interested in the shifting nuances of concepts over time, less interested in adjudicating between definitions, more concerned to outline contrasting perspectives. Admirable in itself, this leads to surprises. Large sections, with highly generic labels, turn out to be discussions of single theorists. Chapter 7, for instance, 'Culture and Society', is wholly devoted to the work of Lévi-Strauss. Chapter 9, 'Mind and Society', offers the contrast of Durkheim and Weber. Such sections are often lively without being systematic. It is intriguing to read that Weber was much influenced by the Hegelian notion of the objective mind, and the interpretation of Weber which Barbu offers is far less individualistic than is usually the case. Unfortunately the scholarly apparatus is missing, and presumably the introduction to a subject is not the place to give chapter and verse. Sometimes the result is very misleading. For instance, Marx is attributed with two doctrines, dialectical materialism and historical materialism. The former term is Plekhanov's and the latter is attributable first to Engels. This may or may not matter, but if it does not, there is no great virtue in presenting the great themes through the classic writers.

But this is certainly the work of a scholar. How many sociologists are there who would begin a section on Culture with a chapter entitled 'Style and Structure' and devote much of the discussion to Wölfflin and Nietzsche? Very few, I imagine, and the pity is that Barbu hides his light under such a bushel. There are so many passages which cry out for elaboration and distinct presentation. Barbu's sensitivity to the nuances of concepts and his sense of the historical shifts of meaning they undergo are ill-suited to lapidary text-book style. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a publisher's ill-judged enterprise has jeopardized the appearance of a fine series of scholarly papers.

M.C. ALBROW

ARTUR EISENBACH, *Kwestia równouprawnienia Żydów w Królestwie Polskim*, 582 pp., Instytut Historii Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Pracownia Badań Struktur Społecznych, Książka i Wiedza, Warsaw, 1972, 75 zł.

Professor Eisenbach has presented us with a valuable and highly readable study devoted to the problem of Jewish emancipation and of the struggle for equal civil rights in the Kingdom of Poland. Based on rich archival material collected by the author in Poland, Moscow, and Leningrad, on the contemporary press, reports, letters, and memoirs, and even on belles-lettres, the monograph deals exhaustively with the legal, demographic, political, economic, social, and cultural situation of the Jewish population in the Kingdom of Poland between 1815 (when this political entity was established by the Congress of Vienna) until 1862, when on the 5th of June,

Tsar Alexander II signed an ukase revoking numerous disabilities of the Jews and granting them a legal equality. The emphasis is laid on the 1850s, when a fierce discussion was going on around the project prepared by Marquis Alexander Wielopolski and when many of the attitudes towards Jewish emancipation were made explicit within the Polish and Russian administration and within Polish and Jewish society.

The study is divided into four chapters. The first examines the legal status of the Jewish population in the Kingdom of Poland, its dynamic growth (from 243 thousand in 1815, or 8·7 per cent of the total population, to over 719 thousand by 1865, at which time Jews constituted 13·5 per cent of the total population, nearly trebling within a period of fifty years), the fiscal policy of the government with regard to the Jews, their territorial mobility, and the various projects aiming at their social and economic re-stratification. Jews who in the 1850s constituted some 43 per cent of the total urban population of the Kingdom of Poland were subject to many restrictions, barred from many occupations and civic positions, burdened with many humiliating taxes. The second chapter deals with the period when the reforms in Russia itself, following the Crimean war, influenced the course of events in the Kingdom of Poland and when various legal measures were introduced to equalize the position of the Jews throughout the Russian Empire. This was also a period of considerable ideological ferment within Polish society and among the educated and assimilated groups within Jewish society who came to the forefront of the struggle for Jewish emancipation. The last two chapters analyse the revolutionary situation in the Kingdom of Poland which culminated in the January insurrection of 1863. The main champion of the Jewish reform was Marquis Wielopolski who saw in the Jews the future third estate of Polish society. The liberal gentry and the patriotic and democratic intelligentsia influenced by the Polish émigré circles, especially by the veteran historian and spiritual father of Polish democracy, Joachim Lelewel, were on the whole also sympathetic to the Jewish cause. The newly emerged Jewish *haute bourgeoisie* headed by the prominent banker Leopold Kronenberg, became an important force, not only financial but also intellectual in shaping the political developments of that period. The various stages leading to the 1862 decree are critically examined. The enactment did not remove all the traditional restrictions against the Jews. Not all the provisions of the decree were carried out in practice, and indeed, it can be argued that, in their overwhelming majority, Jews were never fully integrated within the Polish body politic, though one has to bear in mind the particular political situation of the period. The January insurrection, which broke out soon after the decree was introduced, was bloodily squashed by the Russian forces, and a wave of political reaction engulfed the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, the decree had tremendous consequences for the future evolution of Polish Jewry and for its social and economic re-stratification.

Professor Eisenbach treats the Jewish problem as 'an integral part of the Polish historical process, as a fragment of the social history of the Kingdom of Poland'. It is, of course, quite a legitimate approach, but it seems to me that Jewish history ought to be seen in a wider Jewish historical context. The course of Jewish emancipation was influenced not only by the indigenous

political and social circumstances in Poland, but also by the developments within Jewish society at large. Thus, for example, when the Provisional Government of the Kingdom of Poland set up in 1815 a special committee to consider the agrarian and the Jewish problem under the chairmanship of Prince Adam Czartoryski, it approached the Jewish reformer David Friedländer, the leading ideologue of the German emancipation, to advise on ways and means to reorganize Jewish life in Poland. Friedländer prepared a memorandum entitled *Ueber die Verbesserung der Israeliten in Königreich Polen*, advocating what Dubnow calls the 'flunkeyish notion of the necessity of *deserving* civil rights' and which influenced to a large degree the official Polish thinking on this problem. The name of Friedländer is not mentioned in Professor Eisenbach's study, nor indeed is Dubnow's, whose *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland* still deserves an honourable mention.

The book is tastefully produced and contains many useful statistical tables, maps, and photographs. It is a pity that there is no summary in English or French (as is customary in most Polish scholarly publications), and that only 1,000 copies of the book were printed, out of which 740 were put on general sale.

PAUL GLIKSON

E. M. EPPEL, ed., *Education for Cultural Pluralism*, 133 pp. Papers from a Conference held in London, December 15–17, 1970, under the auspices of the Cultural Department, World Jewish Congress, as a contribution to United Nations International Education Year, London, 1972, Stencil. £1.75. Obtainable from W. J. C. Cultural Department, 55 New Cavendish Street, London, W1M 8BT.

Children should, I believe, be so educated that they can take pride in their ancestors' culture and respect the cultures of others, but they should also be free to choose their own cultural identification. If educators should assist minority members who wish to maintain their parents' customs, they are also under an obligation to help those who, after due consideration, prefer to assimilate. This problem was not squarely faced at the conference. Horace Kallen is quoted as criticizing the doctrine of the American Melting Pot. 'His main tenet was that the socio-psychological forces of ancestry and history are too strong.' But if this is the case, why worry about assimilation? Before considering policies to protect minority identity we need to understand what influences individuals' choice of identity. A new generation of Soviet Jews is deciding, in spite of their education, that their Jewishness is of great importance to them. Some young Jews in the United States are reacting against their non-practising parents, against their education, to study Hebrew, join orthodox synagogues and reinstitute the rituals of the Sabbath and the holy days. The prospects for cultural pluralism depend primarily on choices at this level. It is therefore difficult to go along with the editor of this volume when he claims that 'the appropriate approach to the problem of minorities' (what problem?) 'no longer lies in attempts to bring about assimilation . . . but rather to foster their health and development . . .'

Minorities must be allowed to disappear or to change if their members wish. New ones must be able to emerge.

Several contributors look to the United States as a society which has permitted white citizens to choose between a kind of assimilation or an identification with an accepted cultural minority. How has this been possible? Martin Kilson finds it curious that so many people should think that the United States acquired its pluralism through the systematic application of pluralist values. He contends that the values were cultivated after a pluralistic structure had been established, and that the main stimulus of the creation of this structure was the intolerance of the dominant white Anglo-Saxon Protestant group. The Protestants wished to be ruled through their own political élites rather than through detestable Irish, Polish, Italian, and Jewish politicians, who were therefore permitted to rule their own enclaves. Nicholas Deakin, writing with his usual percipience about official perspectives on to cultural pluralism in Britain, teaches a similar lesson: the futility of discussing education for cultural pluralism independently of the political scene. It is one which is taken for granted by contributors from regions where power simply has to be shared. Miles Wisenthal describes how the province of Quebec has set about creating a school system which allows for cultural diversity. Veljko Korać describes the ethnic mosaic of Yugoslavia, arguing that the various groups could not survive independently and that pluralism is now the basic condition for their progress. Bruce Gaarder contributes an account of how the revival of Spanish culture in California has forced through far-reaching changes in the school system.

Three essays are concerned with Jewish education in Israel. Ernest Simon writes most lucidly about both political and inter-personal problems. Mahmoud Abassi describes the special difficulties of Arab education and regrets that Arab children should be required to learn so much more about Jewish culture than Jewish children about Arab culture. Quite what Zvi Adar's views are about this is uncertain. He writes hopefully about the prospects of Jewish Day-Schools in the United States, but then claims that in Israel because Jewish education is not aimed at a minority it has no bearing on the problem of cultural pluralism. It is majorities which most need education about the cultures of minorities and on the conditions for productive coexistence.

It is no criticism of a conference to say that its proceedings show the need for a further conference. The idea of cultural pluralism appeals partly because it can mean different things to so many people. Useful discussion requires—as at this meeting—both relatively abstract philosophical analysis and consideration of practical measures adopted in particular departments of education. There are still many gaps to be filled and links to be established.

MICHAEL BANTON

BARNEY G. GLASER AND ANSELM L. STRAUSS, *Status Passage*, vi + 205 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1971, £3.25.

The dissatisfaction Glaser and Strauss expressed in *The Discovery of Grounded Theory* (1967) with widely accepted models of sociological theorizing and the

programme they advocated there for a more solidly based theory have their practical result in this volume. They use the concept of status passage to illustrate what they call grounded theory of a formal kind, dealing with a conceptual area such as authority, deviance, or careers, as opposed to theory in a substantive field such as race relations or education.

To this end they centre their analysis on six 'principal considerations': whether or not the passage is reversible; what temporal expectations are associated with it; its shape, or how time and duration are moulded by parties to the passage; how desirable the passage is; whether passages are made alone or in company; and the case of multiple simultaneous passages for individuals. Propositions are advanced in respect of each of these considerations by reference to data drawn eclectically from several substantive areas, but with heavy emphasis on the authors' previous work and on the fields of medical sociology and deviance. Because, as the authors say, the resultant account is 'dense', they italicize the more significant propositions. Here are a few examples of these:

'The degree to which a passagee can reverse his passage against agential wishes varies with their control and whether the reversals are deemed propitious' (p. 29).

'The rate of a passage is of deep concern to agents and passagees' (p. 41).

'In shaping a passage, a balance of control between agent and passagee tends to be maintained' (p. 62).

'When both the passagee and the agent find the passage desirable, co-operation is its dominant characteristic' (p. 90).

'To get a potential agent to take on a passage requires a process of convincing and negotiating' (p. 112).

'Emergencies develop into true organizational crises if they pose a serious threat to some of the organization's modes of operation' (p. 133).

If the general impression these nuggets convey is of austerity and a pedestrian tone, then they do not inadequately reflect the total effect of the book. Only one section has more gusto, and that is intended to represent the 'application' of formal theory to a substantive area, namely social mobility in the United States. This is puzzling, for it is difficult to see how social mobility is not a 'formal' concept, very closely linked to status passage, and to exemplify theory from one society does not make it more 'substantive' than gaining one's illustrations from the limited fields the authors already use. The outcome is to make the reader realize that there is no necessity for the drabness of the earlier chapters.

A final chapter in which the creation of formal theory is discussed and where comparative analysis is strongly advocated also draws attention to the defects in execution which precede it. Erving Goffman is counted as an exponent of formal theory and his study of *Stigma* (1963) cited as an example. The contrast between *Stigma* and *Status Passage* could not be more striking; stylistic richness as against aridity, moral and political relevance compared with determined irrelevance, and a deeply embedded theoretical structure compared with an explicit refusal to consider logical relations between concepts. Glaser and Strauss have contrived to get the worst of both grand theory and abstracted empiricism. They have produced the same kind of portentous and empty universal propositions as grand theory, but without

the taxonomic rigour which characterizes its better varieties, and the same kind of interminable reportage of 'findings' as abstracted empiricism without the virtue of precise measurement.

M. C. ALBROW

JACOB KATZ, *Out of the Ghetto: The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation, 1770–1870*, vi + 271 pp., Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1973, $12.

The sub-title of this book is slightly misleading. It is clarified, however, in the author's preface as 'the description and analysis of the process through which the Jews, isolated in ghettos on the fringe of society until well near the end of the eighteenth century, made their first steps towards integrating into the mainstream of European life'. We do in fact learn little of the (non-Jewish) *background* to emancipation. The overwhelming intent of the author has rather been to examine what happened to Jewry living in the German States during the period of emancipation. In this light the present work may be regarded as a continuation of Professor Katz's *Tradition and Crisis*. It covers, for example, such topics as the fate of the communities, the departure from traditional religious practice and thinking in Germany, the conversion movement, the development of reform Judaism, the reaction of the rabbis, and Jewish occupational change. Perhaps the last two topics are of most interest. In respect of the conflict between innovators and traditionalists, Professor Katz is most illuminating on the contentious issues of early burial, education, and Mendelssohn's Bible translation. He shows clearly that the rabbis for the most part fought innovation with one arm tied behind their back. They denounced the symptoms of disintegration, yet could not but welcome the very changes that facilitated disintegration, e.g., greater occupational freedom, abolition of certain taxes, and residential freedom. Thus, even such a conservative as R. Ezekiel Landau of Prague hailed Joseph II's Edict of Toleration as a removal of 'the stigma of slavery'.

If, however, the cause of innovation triumphed in matters of culture and religion, tradition dominated in the occupational sphere. The hope of emancipationists, Jewish and non-Jewish, that freer conditions of livelihood would lead to occupational dispersal and diversification, was soon to be abandoned or at least revised. It became clear that, by reason of tradition and social and family ties, Jews continued to cluster in their pre-emancipation occupations. Even when new openings emerged, through economic developments, etc., the 'cluster' phenomenon was repeated, for such new openings again attracted a disproportionately large number of Jews in quest of new opportunities. 'Even where free emancipation had been achieved', Professor Katz writes, 'most of the Jews were still engaged in occupations connected with the investment of capital', surrounded by the newly-emergent groups of professional men. In his concluding chapter 'Profile of Emancipated Jewry', Professor Katz again shows a certain continuity through violent change—he sees Jewry possessed of the characteristics of a sub-group in society, 'recogniz-

able by its ethnic origin, its economic concentration, its comparative social isolation, and by its non-conformist minority religion'. One of the most remarkable things about this book is its unstudied tone of moderation. Professor Katz describes and analyses a truly revolutionary process with admirable detachment, confidence, and insight.

L. KOCHAN

ORRIN E. KLAPP, *Heroes, Villains and Fools, Reflections of the American Character*, 176 pp., Aegis Publishing Company, San Diego, California, 1972, n.p.

Professor Klapp's book surveys major social types in American society which have served as models—heroes, villains, and fools. Part I lists various attributes of heroes, villains, and fools and divides each type into a number of categories, e.g. a hero may be 'a winner' and/or 'a splendid performer' and/or 'a socially acceptable person'. Many examples are then given from among the living and the dead. The same type of categorization is used to divide certain types of Fools from others, e.g. the incompetents from the non-conforming, the ridicule-attracting from the over-conformers who suffer comic rebuke because of their eagerness to comply with group standards. Villains may be those who threaten the social order—outlaws, gunmen, gangsters, etc.; or rogues, e.g. smart guys, wise guys, rabble rousers, muckrakers; or they may be oppressors ranging from Simon Legree to Hitler and Stalin.

This part of the book is in the main an interesting collection of nouns, adjectives, and names of persons which serves to fix in the reader's mind what characters, alive or dead, Americans use in their typologies. Part II, 'Reflections of the American Character', is of somewhat greater interest to the student of American society. For here we see the part played in the American value system by these differing types and some positive statements are made about them. These statements will not surprise students of American society but then, as is so often said, one of the important functions of sociological inquiry is to measure the accuracy of the man in the street's impressions. Thus we find (pp. 109 f.) that the 'good Joe' is a conformist. We also discover that role-playing is very well understood to be just that—in other words, it is more important to appear to be or to be doing something than actually to be or to be doing it. The late Speaker Rayburn expressed this very well when advising freshmen congressmen on how to advance their careers: 'to get on you go along'. This attitude towards role-playing makes the life of the impostor rather easy. Indeed the impostor who is a highly successful role-player may attract a certain amount of affection and respect.

If we endeavour to extract from Part II some operational rules it becomes fairly clear that the 'do-gooder', the man who is prepared to 'die for dear old Rutgers' and the democratic hero are not highly regarded; the conformist good Joe, the smart operator, the man who goes and gets *his* are apparently still the models which America admires. One of the disturbing aspects of this investigation of the American character would seem to be what it discloses about the sense of community, for it seems that in this area the values of the

community are to be followed, irrespective of whether those values are worthy of acknowledgment and acceptance on the basis of a moral value scale—involvement in any set of on-going values is better than isolation. Professor Klapp uses a good phrase: 'by role playing Americans are pretty good at creating esprit de corps but not morale'—an interesting thought which might well have been expanded and discussed.

My general conclusion about this book is that, interesting as it is, it could have been made more interesting and significant had Part I been reduced in size and Part II and the Epilogue made larger. By far the most interesting part of the book is the first section of Part II, 'Impressions of American Heroes', where American types are described with reference to social values in America. It is a pity that the author did not put more (and more of himself, for his observations are very interesting) into this Part.

R. H. PEAR

PETER Y. MEDDING, *Mapai in Israel: Political Organization and Government in a New Society*, xi + 326 pp., Cambridge Univ. Press, London, 1972, £4.80.

This is an extremely important publication for scholar and layman alike. It is the first major study of an Israel political party to be published in English, or in any other language, in recent years. And the party studied is the one which has dominated and shaped the Israel political system from the early 1930s to the present (as the dominant faction in the Labour Party), and is likely to continue to rule in the future.

The major problem which Dr. Medding sets out to explain is how Mapai has managed to cope with and adapt itself to the many social, economic, and demographic changes which the country has undergone since independence. He analyses the functional relationships among party, polity, and society. In setting out his problem Medding postulates: 'Within a competitive system, the greater a party's social diversity, the greater its need to base decision-making upon bargaining and discussion, and the greater the success of the various mechanisms of follower participation and influence over leaders.' He states this proposition as if it were a self-evident truth, and repeats it in his conclusion. But his own evidence tends to question the ability of the followers to participate meaningfully or to influence leaders.

In the first part of the book, Dr. Medding describes and explains some of the most important mechanisms through which Mapai adapted itself to social change—that is, increasing socio-economic differentation, rapid bureaucraticization, increasing formalization of political and social relations, the decline in ideological ferment, the decreasing significance of formerly dominant groups and the challenge of new ones, and changes in the ethnic structure and cultural ethos. He does so by showing how diverse social forces (agricultural settlements, industrial workers, artisans, professionals, and ethnic, sex, age and religious categories) were integrated into the party. He shows how organizational and institutional penetration and integration

of these groups and social categories assured support for Mapai among the organized interest groups by capturing control of their executive bodies, which then co-ordinated their policies with those of the party. He shows, as in the case of the Artisans Association, how Mapai even organized interest groups which would support it.

Dr. Medding makes an important distinction between 'non-competitive' situations, such as the kibbutz movements (where there is almost a complete identity of interests and organization between the interest group and the party) and 'competitive' situations in which a number of parties vie for the control and direction of the group, such as the Histadrut. In his excellent analysis of the mutually beneficial relationship between kibbutzim and party Medding gives a clear explanation of the continuing over-representation of the kibbutz movements in the party and the Knesset shown in recent research (see, for example, Abraham Brichta's paper in *The Elections in Israel —1969*, edited by Alan Arian, Jerusalem, 1972). Medding shows how Mapai activists penetrated the various bodies of the Histadrut, which enabled the party to direct and co-ordinate Histadrut policies with Mapai interests. Mapai successes in trades union activities are contrasted with their failure to dominate the executives of many professional unions.

In his analysis of the centralized bureaucratic institutions of immigrant absorption, Dr. Medding shows how government, Histadrut, and Jewish Agency officials were also party recruiters who frequently traded services for political support. The party was an important channel of immigrant political socialization, and of social mobility for ethnic leaders. Party and ethnic leaders were important intermediaries bringing masses of immigrants into contact with various government agencies. He accurately states that the mobility of ethnic leaders was greatest at the local level, and decreased as the importance of the institution increased. I have suggested elsewhere that one of the consequences of this situation is that once local ethnic leaders have consolidated their local constituencies, they tend successfully to demand greater local autonomy from the national party headquarters.

Dr. Medding does not stress the fact that most of the so-called ethnic 'representatives' on national institutions were not elected by any ethnic constituency, but were appointed by national party leaders, and that, in fact, many could more accurately be defined as the political clients of the patrons who appointed them.

The second part of the book deals with the formal party organization and very important informal bodies. The discussion of the 'participant ethos' can be summed up in the following statement: 'After 1948 Mapai's local branch organization found it easier to attract members than to give them a sense of participation in party affairs.'

In his discussion of the various experiments with different forms of organizational relationships between party headquarters and the branches, Dr. Medding accurately reports the feelings of political inefficacy on the part of branch activists who felt they had no influence on the centre. However, in his discussion of the Organization and Local Authorities Departments, which are in charge of relations with local branch secretaries and mayors, he overlooks a very important point. It was in the interest of national party leaders to maintain the dependence of the branches on party headquarters.

They were not interested in having autonomous centres of power developing on the periphery, and one of the main jobs of the Organization and Local Authorities Departments was, and is, to control the branches in the interests of these national party leaders. But as new towns develop, and as local leaders consolidate their local positions and gain political experience, this becomes increasingly difficult; and in order to hold on to power at the centre they may have to grant greater local autonomy at the periphery.

Chapter six deals with the 'National Representative Decision-Making Institutions: The Conference, Council and Central Committee'. I question the validity of the label 'representative' and the extent to which the institutions mentioned were actually 'decision-making' institutions. Dr. Medding shows that as diverse social groups demanded representation on these institutions, Mapai simply increased their size to include the new groups. This was particularly blatant in the Central Committee and the Secretariat. With a certain understatement Dr. Medding says, 'But these demands for representation in the context of broad general powers and functions of these bodies brought seriously into question their efficiency and capacity to make decisions'.

He recognizes that there are 'political realities' which 'impinge' on the freedom of the representative or decision-maker and which tend to make him a 'captive'. He notes that certain branch machines, most notably those of Tel Aviv and Haifa, voted monolithically, and says that 'what arouses uneasiness is that the majority was nearly always constituted in the same manner, of the same groups . . . it is the solidarity and the stability of the majority which raises doubts'.

In my analysis of the membership of the last Standing Committee of the 1971 National Conference I found that over 80 per cent of the 135 members were either elected officials of national or local government or were paid officials of the party or institutions affiliated to the party or Histadrut. Thus, they were hardly likely to take stands independent from the national party leadership. The situation is different when the top national leadership is strongly divided in a major power struggle, for example, in 1942 and in 1965 as cited by Dr. Medding. It is significant that in both instances the dissenters split off to form new parties.

Dr. Medding shows that the functions of initiation and leadership on day-to-day policy decisions passed from formal executive institutions, such as the Secretariat and the Political Committee as they grew in size, to smaller informal bodies such as the Leadership Bureau, 'Haverenu' (the party's Knesset Members) and 'Sarenu' (the party's Cabinet Ministers). These bodies frequently reached agreement on policy without consulting or even requesting formal ratification from the so-called constitutionally 'supreme' bodies. The expansion of institutions by the pressure of various groups to be represented led to their losing their decision-making capacity, and to the creation of informal bodies to perform this function. Dr. Medding's analysis is more than of historical interest, since it is just as applicable to the present situation in the Labour Party—which has a Central Committee of more than 600 members, a Secretariat which hardly ever meets, and a Leadership Bureau which does not include the most powerful man in the party and government, Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir.

In an excellent chapter on the party machine, we are given the first account in English of the rise of the two major branch machines, the Haifa machine of Abba Khoushy, and the Tel Aviv 'Gush' (Bloc) of Shraga Netzer. Particularly fascinating is the account of how the Gush expanded from its Tel Aviv base to become the national party machine. The author captures the essence of the Gush by showing that it consisted of people doing the essential day-to-day party work in closest contact with the members and who were in a position to influence and control their votes. Dr. Medding concludes his treatment of the Gush with a discussion of one of the most fascinating and perhaps unique aspects of the Mapai machine. That was the division of labour between the men of the machine and the top party leaders. Netzer was 'Minister' of internal party affairs and Ben-Gurion (then Prime Minister) conducted state policy—one rarely interfering with the work of the other.

Dr. Medding competently examines a number of 'key' decisions on wages and other aspects of economic policy; and he also gives a very good account of the process of depoliticization and state integration in the post-independence period. He discusses the politicization in the pre-state Yishuv and its continuation after 1948, and Ben-Gurion's policy of 'Mamlachtiut'—which, in the context of Ben-Gurion, may be translated as 'stateness' and meant the transfer of certain services and functions from the parties and the Histadrut to the state. He contrasts the depoliticization of the school system and the labour exchanges with the continuing politicization of the health services, parts of the civil service, the Histadrut, the local authorities, and the Jewish Agency. He points out that rather than having lost power by transferring services to the state, Mapai actually gained, since it was the dominant force in the government.

He gives a particularly good account of the internal factional struggles within Mapai which led up to the split in 1965, and a slightly more superficial account of the reunification process which led to the formation of the Labour Party in 1968. He is at best in his discussion of the strife between the Young Guard ('Tze'irim') and the Gush, and in his brief, accurate account of the role of the Lavon Affair in the succession struggle and the intergenerational conflict in Mapai.

In his conclusions Medding sums up the key to Mapai's success: 'The basis of Mapai's continuing ability to gain and retain public support lay in its aggregative and integrative character. Mapai was the opposite of the exclusive political party: it went out of its way to incorporate diverse social forces, however opposed to each other in interest and goal these were.'

I understand the concept of 'representation' differently from Dr. Medding, and I draw slightly different conclusions from the evidence which he presents and I have gathered independently. The key to the differences lies in our contrasting interpretations of 'consensual power relations'. He feels that his analysis of the internal decision-making process 'provides impressive evidence against Michel's theory of political party organization' concerning the 'iron rule of oligarchy', because various groups exercised power in different decision areas, and bargaining and mutual compromise characterized the discussion. I maintain that the issue areas are controlled to a large extent by the political élites; that frequently consensus is forced through the dependence

of the members of the major party institutions on the élites; and that there is strong evidence of a high degree of co-ordination between the élites. In fact, it has been through this co-ordinated and centralized control that Mapai leadership has been able to hold together the many diverse elements of the party and continue to run the affairs of Histadrut and state. It is significant that the other Israel political parties are no less oligarchic, and in many cases more so.

In sum, this book is a most important pioneering work in the field of Israel politics. It provides a wealth of factual information, solid and intelligent interpretation and analysis, and a great deal of food for thought and even argument. It is essential reading for any one wishing to gain a deeper insight into the Israel political process.

MYRON J. ARONOFF

JOHN O'NEILL, ed., *Modes of Individualism and Collectivism*, x + 358 pp. Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1973, £4.75 hard cover or £1.90 paperback.

Sociological theory has become unlike the theory of almost all other subjects. Other subjects have a body of general propositions and fundamental axioms but sociology has a body of general discussions about whether such things are possible and if possible what they would look like. Sociological theory is a disquisition on its own existence: it concerns itself with asserting or denying the ideological character of thought about society and of thought about thought about society. Whereas sociology was once synthetic, encompassing the material of many subjects, it is now introspective and sociologists concern themselves not with material but with one another's meditations on the possibility of having material. An alternative would seem to be the school which concerns itself with life as it is lived and the structure of interaction and interpersonally negotiated social realities, but once again those engaged in this enterprise rarely bother actually to describe these processes. They content themselves with discussing what it would be to engage in the description of such processes.

The holism versus individualism controversy is just another of the bootless controversies that agitate those concerned with current sociological theory. It links up, as the various contributors to this symposium show, with the argument between the subjectivists and the objectivists, the controversy between those supporting the natural science model and those putting forward other models. Its roots lie in Hayek and in Popper and both are represented in this symposium. The principal defenders of methodological individualism are here represented by Professors John Watkins and Joseph Agassi. Mandelbaum is an example on the holist side. A persuasive position is exemplified in Ernest Gellner's contribution which is largely concerned with the fact that people have holistic concepts and act on the basis of holistic concepts, in the way, for example, De Gaulle acted on the basis of his idea of France. Alan Gewirth presents a via media, rebutting the exclusive claims of either side; and he does so with commendable clarity. A. C. Danto sum-

marizes, albeit with far too much logical huffing and puffing, what several of the other contributors (for example, Mandelbaum) have to say.

The merit of this symposium consists in bringing together the varied elements in a debate as they were produced in the actual course of concrete controversy. It is not a collection of incidental variations on a theme. But whether the theme is worth the variations and whether it is not now overplayed is a matter of opinion. Certainly Professor O'Neill's initial essay adds nothing to the issues involved and seems little more than an exercise in studied opacity. Scholars like Watkins, even if wrong, are at least clear; but how could anyone know whether Professor O'Neill is wrong? The shortest way with the present volume is to read Gellner and Gewirth and then turn to the very clear exposition of the whole matter in Steven Lukes's book on *Individualism*. That has the merit of being both clear and (as it seems to me) correct.

DAVID MARTIN

ARUN SAHAY, ed., *Max Weber and Modern Sociology*, 111 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1971, £1.50.

The Annual Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science held at Durham in 1970 was an occasion when the fiftieth anniversary of Max Weber's death was commemorated by the Sociology Section with a series of papers arranged by John Rex. This rather ambitiously entitled volume contains those papers. As is the usual case with conference contributions, the result is a very uneven collection.

If one evaluates these papers in terms of their ability to capture the authentic Weberian spirit, then Alan Dawe's, 'The relevance of values', is in a class of its own. This is a restatement of Weber's account of the problems of value-freedom and objectivity, in which the problems of value-relevance rather than the achievement of objectivity are emphasized, illustrated by an extraordinarily sensitive and judiciously selected set of source quotations. The argument is made more pointed by relating it to contemporary concerns. It is a very happy choice for Dawe to cite British sociology of education as an instance where attention to the Weberian theory of values in sociology would have illuminated a number of moral commitments which for too long remained obscure, and where, as a result, the quality of the empirical work was less adequate than it need have been. This paper alone is sufficient to demonstrate the relevance of Max Weber to modern sociology.

John Rex's 'Typology and objectivity: A comment on Weber's four sociological methods', is of considerable importance to Weberian scholarship. He is rightly concerned to depart from the custom of seeing Max Weber's methodology as monolithic and perfectly coherent. He emphasizes the great gulf that exists between the doctrine of ideal types as elaborated in the early essay, 'Objectivity in social science and social policy', and the array of structural concepts as they are set out in the early chapters of the *Theory of*

Social and Economic Organization. He stresses that these structural concepts are very little akin to the ideal types of the early essay and rightly points out that they owe much to Simmel's theory of formal sociology, which he had earlier on been inclined to discount. This final stage he reached by transcending both the phenomenological and the empiricist philosophies of method, and to this extent, argues Rex, Weber had already proceeded beyond the controversies which concern contemporary sociology. This essay is somewhat impaired by the need to schematize the progress in Weber's thought, and his later discussion of ideal types is considered too cursorily to be of value. But this is definitely a paper for the Weberian scholar.

It would be pleasant to say the same for Arun Sahay's, 'The importance of Weber's methodology in sociological explanation'. But this has none of the qualities of Rex's essay. It is full of hyperbole: 'Weber's is the only methodology in the whole of sociological thought which has *explicitly* solved the practical . . . problems of sociological analysis' (p. 67); 'Not enough tribute has been paid to Mannheim, who was *the* inventor of contemporary sociology' (p. 78). It treats Weber's methodology as monolithic. It includes very rapid considerations of Mannheim and Schutz in what is already very restricted space. The style of writing is clumsy and the theme is never made clearly explicit. Unfortunately, Sahay's 'Introduction' is even more turgid. 'Who edits the editor?', is a variation on the 'Quis custodes custodiet?' theme which is all too pertinent to this volume.

The remaining two papers by Robert Moore, 'History, economics and religion: A review of "The Max Weber Thesis" thesis', and by J. E. T. Eldridge, 'Weber's approach to the sociological study of industrial workers', seem very much pieces for the occasion. Moore takes it on himself to defend the Protestant Ethic thesis against more recent criticism including that by Trevor-Roper and Samuelsson. Unfortunately he fails to grasp the nettle of Weber's ideal type characterizations of Protestantism and Capitalism, on which in essence the whole debate centres. Eldridge concludes the volume with a respectful account of Weber's methodological introduction to the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* survey of industrial workers. This has now been translated into English and is available in the volume Eldridge has edited, *Max Weber: the Interpretation of Social Reality* (1971).

M. C. ALBROW

CHRONICLE

THE YONINA TALMON PRIZE

The Yonina Talmon Fund and The Hebrew University announce that the 1973 Yonina Talmon Prize has been awarded to Dr. Caroline Ifeka-Moller of the University of Birmingham for her paper 'Social Structural Factors in Conversion to Christianity: A Critique of the Intellectualist Theory with Special Reference to Nigeria, 1921–1966'.

The Yonina Talmon Prize is awarded to a scholar for an unpublished essay in one of the three fields in which Yonina Talmon made seminal contributions: kinship and the family, including gerontological aspects of the family; the sociology of the Kibbutz and collective settlements; and the sociology of religion.

This is the third award of the Yonina Talmon Fund. The Selection Committee is composed of Yehoshua Arieli, S. N. Eisenstadt, Meyer Fortes, Max Gluckman, Charlotte Green Schwartz, and Kurt H. Wolff.

*

Bar Ilan University conferred 860 degrees, certificates, and diplomas last June; 375 were in the Social Sciences, 187 in Jewish Studies and Humanities, and 140 in Natural Sciences. In addition, 147 teachers' certificates were awarded as well as 11 diplomas to graduates of the Institute of Local Government at Bar Ilan.

In the course of the ceremony, the Rector of the university announced that the Institute for Advanced Torah Studies had began to function.

*

News from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, nos. 1 & 2, Jan.-Feb. 1973, states that the University had a total of 150 visiting lecturers from 13 countries in the academic year 1972–73. The large majority (112) were from the United States; 15 came from Great Britain, five from Canada, four each from France and Denmark, two each from Australia and Belgium, and one each from Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Ireland, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia.

The University has 27 teachers who are recent immigrants; 15 of them come from the United States, and the remainder are from Australia, France, New Zealand, Poland, the Soviet Union, and South Africa.

*

Last August the Israeli Cabinet unanimously approved the establishment of an open university. The Rothschild Foundation has agreed to provide £2 million for a pilot project over seven years. A number of courses at different levels (ranging from matriculation to Bachelor degrees) will be offered;

there will be television programmes, tuition by correspondence, and direct teaching.

The Minister of Education stated that it was hoped that a permanent headquarters for the university would eventually be built at Zichron Yaacov.

*

Israel's National Centre for Technological and Scientific Information of the National Council for Research and Development of the Prime Minister's Office has published data concerning scientific research projects in Israel. There has been a threefold increase since 1967; in that year there were 3,062 projects and in 1972, 9,070. In the same period, the number of research institutes grew from 137 to 411; while the number of research workers engaged in these projects increased from 2,700 in 1967 to 7,800 in 1972.

Research projects in medicine, physics, and biological sciences accounted for 42·4 per cent of the total, agriculture for 14·6 per cent, while chemistry and chemical engineering accounted for 15·8 per cent, and mathematics, 5·5 per cent.

*

Israel Book World, no. 12, June 1973, gives the following facts and figures.

The 1973 Jerusalem International Book Fair was the sixth. The first Fair took place in 1963 and the others in each alternate year since. In 1963, there were 22 participating countries; in 1973, there were 29. The fair ground area increased from 2,000 square metres at the first event to 3,600 in 1973. There has also been a great increase in the number of books exhibited (15,000 in 1963 to 29,000 in 1973) and in public attendance (21,000 in 1963 to 65,000 in 1973). This year, 88 Israeli and 537 overseas publishing houses were represented.

The export of printed material had increased from U.S.$ 3·9 million in 1968 to U.S.$ 11·9 million in 1972. There has also been a 40 per cent rise in output during that period.

In 1959 the Israel Programme for Scientific Translations signed its first contract with the National Science Foundation of the United States Government. The first contract was for $500 that year. There has since been over $10 million worth of work carried out for the Foundation, including about 2,000 books in all branches of science.

The University of the Negev in Beer Sheva is to have a new library to be named after the late Zalman Aranni, who was Minister of Education for several years. The library now has 125,000 volumes, but there will be space for 500,000 in an area of 11,000 square metres. About 20,000 books are added each year to the library, which subscribes to 2,000 periodicals. Its budget for acquisitions in 1973 was more than IL 1,250,000. The new building will provide for 1,000 readers.

*

Leket, the cultural affairs bulletin of the Embassy of Israel in London, states in its August 1973 issues that in 1971–72, according to the Israeli

Central Bureau of Statistics, there was a total of 3,368 new books published in the country. Fiction and poetry accounted for 37 per cent and Jewish studies for 13 per cent. The majority of all new books—73 per cent—were originally written in Hebrew; 13 per cent were in English, 5 per cent in Russian, 1·5 per cent in Yiddish, and the remaining 7·5 per cent in other languages.

The total number of copies published in Israel in 1971–72 was 9,200,000.

*

It was reported last August that there had been a drop in immigration to Israel from Western countries. In 1971 there were 1,381 immigrants from Britain; in 1972, 1,030; and in the first six months of 1973 there were only 414.

Over 6,000 immigrants came from the United States in 1972; and in the first six months of 1973 only 2,500. As for France, there were more than 3,000 immigrants in 1971, but in the first half of 1973 only 679.

Immigrants from South Africa do not appear to be declining in number this year: there were 605 in 1972, and 374 in the first six months of 1973.

Between 1 January and 31 July 1973 the total number of immigrants from the whole of the Western world was 7,259.

The Chairman of the World Zionist Organization's Immigration Department and the Director of that Department are reported to have attributed the decline in immigration to the high cost of housing in Israel.

*

The acting Chairman of the Jewish Agency is reported to have given the following data last September in London: 19,000 Soviet Jewish immigrants arrived in Israel in the first eight months of 1973; 2,000 came in July and 2,700 in August. He added that in the past two and a half years 68,000 Soviet Jews had come to Israel, and that only 389 of them had left the country.

The Jewish Agency, in co-operation with the Israeli government, has set up a special fund of £1 million to facilitate the absorption of Russian University graduates. About 40 per cent of Soviet immigrants have university degrees, but some 15 per cent of them are still unemployed.

*

It was reported last August that Israel has a four-year plan to rehouse 55,000 households now living in overcrowded conditions. The Director-General of the Ministry of Housing stated that in 1968 almost one-tenth of Israel's families lived three or more to a room; by 1970, the proportion was down to 7·8 per cent; and in 1972 it was 6·7 per cent.

It is hoped that a total of 38,800 apartments will be built (or sponsored) by the government in the course of 1973. That figure includes 17,600 units for new immigrants, and 8,000 for young couples. In addition, provision has been made to rehabilitate and enlarge existing dwellings.

There has been a great expansion in home building: from 24,260 residential units in 1968 to 62,040 in 1972.

*

There are two independent associations of Jews in Czechoslovakia: one in the Czech Socialist Republic and the other in the Slovak Socialist Republic. Each is recognized by the State, which guarantees their freedom of worship. The Ministry of Culture of each republic is responsible for the conduct of religious affairs—whether Jewish or Christian. The appointment of any religious official is subject to the approval of the authorities; salaries are paid by the State. Religious services are not controlled by the State—but any proposal for other activities (cultural, political, or social) must be submitted to the administrative body in control of religious affairs. If a synagogue or church can show that its income is inadequate for the maintenance of its religious services the state must provide financial assistance. Receipt of gifts from abroad is allowed only if approved by the authorities.

The Czech and Slovak Jewish communities each have a Council which is elected for five years.

There is *shehita* only in Slovakia, which supplies kasher meat for the restaurant of the Prague community.

The Jewish population of Czechoslovakia is an aging one, and many of the young are assimilated. However, in Prague there has been some success in organizing social and cultural activities for schoolchildren and university students. There are lectures on Jewish history and literature, for example; the celebration of the festivals of Purim and Hanukah has proved popular among the young, and in some cases has attracted as many as 150 persons; while between 80 and 100 children and students have attended the Communal Seder.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Albrecht, Günter; Daheim, Hansjürgen; and Sack, Fritz, eds., *Soziologie: Sprache Bezug zur Praxis Verhältnis zu anderen Wissenschaften*, Festschrift for René König's 65th birthday, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, 1973, D.M. 125.

Ascher, Abraham, *Pavel Axelrod and the Development of Menshevism*, 420 pp., Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., and Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1972, £9.25.

Centre National des Hautes Etudes Juives, Brussels, and the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, *Démographie et identité juives dans l'Europe contemporaine*, 422 pp., Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, Brussels, 1972, F. B. 700.

Dinnerstein, Leonard and Palsson, Mary Dale, eds., *Jews in the South*, viii + 392 pp., Louisiana State Univ. Press, Baton Rouge, 1973, n.p.

Falk, Ze'ev W., *The Divorce Action by the Wife in Jewish Law* (Hebrew), 128 pp., Institute for Legislative Research and Comparative Law, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1973, n.p.

Franklin, Billy J., and Kohout, Frank J., eds., *Social Psychology and Everyday Life*, xii + 559 pp., David McKay Company, New York, 1973, $5.95.

Glazer, Nathan, *Les Juifs Américains du XVII^e siècle à nos jours*, 290 pp., trans. Eddy Trèves, Collection 'Diaspora' (dirigée par Roger Errera), Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1972, n.p.

Hapanas, Gershom, *Vision and Guidance, A Handbook for Youth Leaders*, 190 pp., 2nd edn., The Hanhala of Ezra and the European Central Office of Poale Agudat Israel, London, 1972, n.p.

Jay, Martin, *The Dialectical Imagination, A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923–1950*, xxi + 382 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1973, £3.50.

Krajzman, Maurice, *L'image des Juifs et du Judaïsme dans les manuels d'histoire de langue française de l'enseignement secondaire officiel en Belgique*, iii + 78 pp., Centre National des Hautes Etudes Juives, Brussels, 1973, n.p.

Larson, Calvin J., *Major Themes in Sociological Theory*, xii + 254 pp., David McKay Company, New York, 1973, $3.95.

Marrus, Michael R., *Les Juifs de France à l'époque de l'affaire Dreyfus, L'assimilation à l'épreuve*, xvii + 348 pp., trans. Micheline Legras, Preface by Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Collection 'Diaspora' (dirigée par Roger Errera), Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1972, n.p.

Medding, Peter Y., ed., *Jews in Australian Society*, xiii + 299 pp., Macmillan, Monash University, 1973, $ Aust. 7.95.

M'Shaughnessy, Hugh, *What Future for the Amerindians of South America?* 32 pp., Minority Rights Group, Report No. 15, London, 1973, 45p.

Proceedings of the Experts Conference on Latin America and the Future of its Jewish

Communities, ix + 158 pp., Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, 1973, £1.25.

Puxon, Grattan, *Rom: Europe's Gypsies*, 24 pp., Minority Rights Group, Report No. 14, London, 1973, 45p.

Reynolds, Larry T., and Henslin, James M., eds., *American Society. A Critical Analysis*, xiv + 337 pp., David McKay Company, New York, 1973, $3.95.

Sabatello, Franco Eitan, *Social and Occupational Trends of the Jews in Italy, 1870–1970*, (Hebrew), 499 pp., PhD. thesis submitted to the Senate of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1972, n.p.

Schmelz, U. O.; Glikson, Paul; and Della Pergola, S., eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography 1969*, Proceedings of the Demographic Sessions held at the Fifth Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, August 1969, 372 pp., World Union of Jewish Studies and Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1973, £3.00.

Talmon, Yonina, *Family and Community in the Kibbutz*, xiii + 266 pp., Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1972, £6.

Wolfe, Alan, *The Seamy Side of Democracy, Repression in America*, vii + 306 pp., David McKay Company, New York, 1973, n.p.

Yivo Bleter, Journal of the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, 350 pp., Yivo Institute for Jewish Research, New York, 1973, n.p.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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HELLER, Celia Stopnicka; Professor of Sociology, Hunter College and Graduate Center of the City University of New York. Formerly, visiting Professor at Tel Aviv and Bar Ilan Universities and Lecturer at Vassar College and at the University of Cartagena, Colombia. Chief publications: *Mexican American Youth*, New York, 1966; *Structured Social Inequality*, New York, 1969; *New Converts to the American Dream?*, New Haven, Conn., 1971; 'The attitudes of Negroes Toward Jews', *Social Forces*, March 1965; 'Anti-Zionism and the Political Struggle within the Elite of Poland', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XI, no. 2, December 1969. Currently engaged in writing a book about the Jewish Community in Poland, 1917–38, to be published by Columbia University Press.

KOSMIN, Barry A; M.A., Postgraduate student in the History Department of the University of Rhodesia and Research Associate at its Centre for Inter-Racial Studies. Formerly, Teaching Fellow, McMaster University, 1969–70. Chief publications: 'On the Imperial Frontier; the Pioneer Population of Salisbury in November 1897', *Rhodesian History*, vol. 11, 1971; 'The Inyoka Tobacco industry of the Shangwe people: a case study of the dislocation of a precolonial economy in Southern Rhodesia 1898–1938', to appear in *African Social Research*, number 17, 1974, Lusaka. Currently engaged on doctoral thesis on ethnic and commercial relations in Rhodesia, a study of the Jewish, Hellenic, and Asian populations; also privately commissioned to write a history of Central African Jewry.

MAYER, Egon; M.A. Instructor in the Department of Sociology at Brooklyn College. Co-author, with Laura Siracuse Kitch 'Identity and Consistency', in *The Human Context* (London), forthcoming. Currently engaged in research on the pattern of the community and identity in the Jewish Orthodox community of Boro Park (Brooklyn, New York).

PRAIS, S. J., M.Com.; Ph.D., Consultant to the Statistical and Demographic Research Unit, Board of Deputies of British Jews; Visiting Professor at the City University, London; and Senior Research Fellow, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London. Formerly, Economist, International Monetary Fund; Adviser to the Government of Israel on economic statistics; Assistant Lecturer in the University of Cambridge. Chief publications: (co-author) *The Analysis of Family Budgets*, Cambridge, 1955 (2nd impression, 1971); 'Measuring Social Mobility', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 1955; 'The Measurement of Changes in the Cost of Living', *J.R.S.S.*, 1958; Contributor to Tew

and Henderson, eds., *Studies in Company Finance*, Cambridge, 1959; 'Statistics of Milah and the Jewish Birth-rate in Britain', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 12, no. 2, December 1970; 'Synagogue Statistics and the Jewish Population of Great Britain, 1900–70', *J.J.S.*, vol. 14, no. 2, December 1972.

SHAROT, Stephen; D.Phil., Lecturer in Sociology, University of Leicester. Chief publications: 'A Jewish Christian Adventist Movement', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 10, no. 1, June 1968; 'Secularization, Judaism and Anglo-Jewry', *A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain*, no. 4, 1971; 'The Three Generations Thesis and the American Jews', *The British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 24, no. 2, June 1973; 'Religious Change in Native Orthodoxy in London, 1870–1914: The Synagogue Service', *J.J.S.*, vol. 15, no. 1, June 1973. Currently engaged in work on the sociology of Judaism and on theoretical approaches in the sociology of religion.

SCHMOOL, Marlena; B.Soc.Sc. (E.P.S.). Formerly Research Officer, Statistical and Demographic Research Unit, Board of Deputies of British Jews, London. Chief publications: co-author, 'Statistics of Jewish Marriages in Great Britain: 1901–1965', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 9, no. 2, December, 1967; co-author, 'The Size and Structure of the Anglo-Jewish Population 1960–65', *J.J.S.*, vol. 10, no. 1, June, 1968; 'Register of Social Research on the Anglo-Jewish Community', *J.J.S.*, vol. 10, no. 2, December, 1968; co-author, 'Synagogue Marriages in Great Britain 1966–8', *J.J.S.*, vol. 12, no. 1, June 1970; co-author, 'Statistics of Milah and the Jewish Birth-Rate in Britain', *J.J.S.*, vol. 12, no. 2, December, 1970; 'Register of Social Research on Anglo-Jewry, 1968–71', *J.J.S.*, vol. 13, no. 2, December, 1971. Currently engaged in research into the structure and role of the Anglo-Jewish Rabbinate.