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CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION
IN ISRAEL:
THE TRANSFORMATION
OF TRADITION

Elihu Katz

THIS paper is an introduction to a study of what 4,000 Israelis had to say about their leisure, culture, and communication. In a national survey conducted during the spring of 1970, we gathered data on a large variety of cultural activities.[1] With respect to each of them, an effort was made to measure both supply and demand. Thus, we know—for cultural events taking place outside the home—which events were advertised where, and we know who attends which activities. Likewise, we studied the cultural activities that take place inside the home, paying particular attention to the effect of the introduction of television, and to the fate of the book—the newest and oldest media in Israel. We try to do this within two broader contexts. One is behavioural: using the method of time-budget analysis, we have reconstructed the way in which Israelis invest time, that most scarce of human resources, over the 24-hour period of a weekday, a Friday, and a Saturday. The other context is that of attitudes and values: we discuss the functions of cultural activities and communications within the framework of attitudes towards work, leisure, the Sabbath, and holidays, and more generally, in terms of the social and psychological 'needs' that are experienced as salient by Israeli Jews, in their several social roles.

Since facts never speak for themselves, we sought to find a way of presenting this huge array of detailed data as a meaningful whole. Three quite different approaches suggested themselves, of which we rejected two and adopted the third.

Three approaches to ordering the data

One approach would have been to report on Israel as a small state with modest but essentially modern patterns of leisure and culture. We

can demonstrate that Israelis are not very different from the British, for example, in the proportion of the population who are outside their homes on a weekday evening, or in the number of books they read; and not so different from the French in the time they spend caring for children. A good case can be made for the contention that modern societies are becoming homogeneous in their patterns of spending leisure, and that Israel—for all its ostensible difference—is moving in the same general direction.[2]

Another way in which these findings might have been summed up is in terms of changes which are believed by some to be taking place in Israeli society today. Thus, it has become routine for journalists, some of whom are sensitive observers, to find materialism and pleasure-seeking on the increase in Israel; they suggest that officials and business men are more corruptible than before; they find more aimlessness and crime; they say tension among ethnic groups is increasing; they argue that there is a desensitizing to human suffering; and they find that the interdependence of the Jewish people is a matter of decreasing concern to young Israelis.[3]

We have rejected both those approaches. The first seems to us excessively behaviouristic and too matter-of-fact; it ignores nothing less than the long saga from which Israel arose, the short and dramatic history of its nation-building, and the imprint of both of these—Judaism and Zionism—upon its culture. To say, in behaviouristic zeal, that it resembles other small European states is to ignore its idiosyncratic meaning: where it has come from, what it is about, and the choices that lie before it.[4]

We have rejected the second approach because, while it has time perspective and is concerned with values, it is too near-sighted. It is based on a too facile romanticization of the recent past, very selectively recalled. It is based on the behaviour of very small groups and on sensational cases. Perhaps some of these indictments are correct. Indeed, our own data do give some support—though far less dramatically—to some of the allegations; for example, we find that Israeli youth are somewhat less convinced than their parents of the mutual dependence of the Jews in Israel and abroad. But this is a far cry from the radical changes that are alleged, and a finding that is counter-balanced by the essential *similarity* which characterizes the Israel-born generation and its parents even in this matter. Altogether, as we shall argue, we find very little evidence of a generation gap. Perhaps today's exceptional and sensational will at some future time prove to be the rule; perhaps the sensibilities of today's minorities are portents of those of tomorrow's majorities.[5] But for the moment, and in the absence of serious and much-needed longitudinal studies of Israeli values, we demur. We shall be unable to say that we were not warned.

We have chosen a third way. The story in our data, we think, is

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neither one of small-nation normality nor of drastic demoralization, but of the transformation and secularization of tradition. Our thesis, in a word, is that the predominant patterns of leisure and culture in modern Israel are anchored in a set of traditional Jewish values which are undergoing a process of transformation. It might be better to say that these data describe both the ways in which Israeli society has incorporated traditional values in its rapid evolution, and the ways in which those values are transformed in the course of their secularization.[6] Perhaps the end result will be normality and/or demoralization, but in the meantime, it is important to see and understand the process that is at work.

The concept of secularization

Secularization is presumably one of the attributes of modernization. Nowadays, however, some observers are not so sure; others would grant only that life has become more compartmentalized, and that certain institutions are governed by sacred and others by secular, norms.[7] All agree, however, that the concept has been used in a variety of ways and merits clarification; one writer has even pleaded for a moratorium on its use.[8]

To apply the concept of secularization to Judaism is even more problematic because Judaism, from the beginning, was suffused with secular elements. It is, first of all, a national religion, albeit with a universalistic God and a universalistic ethic. It is, moreover, preoccupied with history, making it all the more difficult to decide, for example, which elements of which holidays are sacred or secular. Indeed, its overall strategy is to sanctify the secular, not in the sense of mystification but in the sense of giving religious significance to the round of everyday life. It is a religious culture which emphasizes observance and form, perhaps more than belief. Nevertheless, if the society and values of modern Israel are viewed against the backdrop of the traditional Jewish society of not so long ago, some meaningful comparisons can be made.

It is in this sense that we find the concept of secularization applicable to the situation we want to portray. Sometimes, we refer to the secularization of form but continuity of traditional consciousness—as in the transformation of the age-old longing for a return to Zion into the business of irrigating deserts and electing parliaments.[9] Sometimes, we refer to the secularization of consciousness but continuity of form—as the re-infusion of nationalistic and naturalistic meaning into religious holidays. In either case, there appears (at first glance) considerable continuity with traditional Jewish values. In fact, however, the process of secular transformation, while preserving external forms or internal meanings, is sometimes subversive of that which it purports to maintain.[10]

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The themes which seem central to this framework are the following:

(1) the traditional collectivity-orientation of the Jewish people, as opposed to the primacy of individual self-interest;
(2) the traditional centrality of the nuclear family;
(3) the traditional idea that the content of leisure—and, indeed, the entire round of life—is normatively prescribed rather than that one is free 'to do one's own thing';
(4) the traditional conception of 'the chosen people' and its re-appearance in Zionist thought as a 'spiritual centre' for Jewish and humanistic creativity;
(5) the traditional qualities of asceticism (sobriety) and reality-orientation as opposed to hedonism and free-floating fantasy.

1. *Collectivity-orientation*

It is a nice paradox that the establishment of modern nationhood was probably easier—psychologically speaking—for the Jews than for the embryonic nations that were living on their own soil. Jewish nationalism did not have the difficult task of overcoming loyalties to village and region that stood in the way of the unification of other nations. Jewish loyalties always reached beyond the local community to regional, national, and international alliances with other Jewish communities everywhere, all of which shared the memory of the collective national experience in the past and of its promised renewal in the future. It was easy to adapt this image to the conceptions of European nationalism.

It hardly needs an elaborate empirical study to establish that the materialization of this dream is at hand. 'To feel pride that we have a state' tops a list of 35 personal, social, and other 'needs' presented for evaluation to the sample of respondents.[11] Similarly, of all the holidays about which we enquired, *Yom Haatzmaut* (Independence Day) is the one which holds meaning for everybody—young and old, religious and irreligious, educated and uneducated, Western and Oriental immigrants —while Yom Kippur, by comparison, is alleged to have 'no meaning for me' by 16 per cent of the respondents. Again, the 'readiness to sacrifice oneself for the national ideals'—which was associated in our question with the traditional concept of *kiddush haShem* (sanctification of the Name)—is adjudged one of the most characteristic of contemporary national traits by religious and irreligious alike.

The nation is united not only by the fact of the State and not alone by the memory of the collective experience of long ago, but by more recent experience as well. The Holocaust of European Jewry preoccupies a majority of the population; the extent of reading on this subject is widespread, and there is disquiet lest something like it happen again. It

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is true that this concern is more characteristic of older persons and of Ashkenazim, but it is a matter of no small concern to younger people and Oriental immigrants as well.

The feeling of connexion with Jews abroad is strong. The feeling that those Jews are spiritually dependent upon Israel is shared by all segments of the population. The feeling that Israelis, in turn, are dependent on Diaspora Jewry is also strong, but younger people are less likely than their parents to agree to that.

Israelis see little difference between their identities as Jews and as Israelis. Whereas Professor Herman, in *Israelis and Jews*, finds that religion is a component of Israeli identity only for religious but not for irreligious Israelis, the present study finds that the same holds true for *Jewish* identity.[12] That is, non-religious Israelis find it possible to maintain their identity as Jews (not just as Israelis) without making room for religion. For a significant proportion of the population, in other words, the religious element has been subtracted from both Jewish and Israeli identities, whereas it is present in both sets of identities for religious persons. Indeed, it appears that the two sets of identities are virtually synonymous. For all its contribution to integration of the society, here are first warnings concerning the consequences of a facile transformation of the traditional collectivity orientation of the Jewish people into the typical forms and symbols of nationhood. We shall see the manifestation of this problem again in the discussion of the transformation of traditional holidays.

We find very little evidence of a generation gap. The young hold values and attitudes similar to those of their parents—that is, the statistical distribution of the opinions and attitudes and behaviour of youth with respect to almost any issue is almost exactly like that of the parent generation.[13] Where the young and their parents differ, each party knows exactly where the other stands; there is no confusion about the fact that the parents are somewhat more ascetic and that the young are more present-oriented and say they have a stronger sense of social justice!

The lines along which the population in fact divides are educational and religious. Education is generally much stronger than ethnicity, with people of different ethnic backgrounds acting and thinking similarly, given similar educational attainments. Of course, 'holding education constant', as we say, is easy to do statistically; but it ought not to blind us to the fact that the educational gap is still very wide. Religion stands out as potentially the sharpest dividing line in the society. Religious people—while concentrated in the lower educational groups —not only differ in their outlook and behaviour on many things; they are also more solidary among themselves than is the non-religious population. The educated religious person is in the vanguard in upholding values and practices which have a bearing on the religious outlook.

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Religious identification, however, does not in any way conflict with national identification. The religious groups in our sample (some extremists are under-represented) are, if anything, *more* Zionist than the non-religious.

How are these integrative tendencies represented in the institutions of culture and leisure? For one thing, people rely very heavily on the newspaper, on the radio, and on television to feel close to what is going on. These are the media of involvement with state and society, and they are very heavily used for that purpose. The newspaper is the medium *par excellence* in this respect. Again, the shared experience of the Holocaust and the Six-Day War—both actual events and the reporting of them— symbolize the common fate. The reading of books on those two subjects has cut across all the dividing lines of the society.

Second, we are impressed that internal tourism (the *tiyul*) is a major integrating mechanism. There is a very large amount of travelling within the country—more than two-thirds of the population have visited Caesaria, Hebron, Tsfat, and the Negev: three-quarters have visited a kibbutz, and half have been to the Israel Museum. Even if *tiyul* may not be a Zionist invention (curiously Jacob Katz, in *Tradition and Crisis*, suggests that it was popular even in eastern Europe before emancipation[14]), there seems little doubt that the people meet one another on the road and at historical and national sites.

The holidays are also major integrating events. As we shall note below, most of them are still very alive not only for religious persons, but for the irreligious as well.

Finally, there is a strong trend towards homogenization in the consumption of culture in the country. More explicitly, if one compares a person with eight years' schooling in Dimona with a person of like education in Tel Aviv, the odds are very high that each will have been to the theatre, to the cinema, on a *tiyul*, etc., with about the same frequency. It is also very likely—though we did not investigate this specifically—that they saw the same films and plays and visited the same sites. This is quite remarkable in view of the great disparity of cultural offerings between large and small towns; it does not mean that Dimona or similar towns are content; they are not. Their residents complain of inadequate facilities and 'unsuitable companionship'. Moreover, the proportion of well-educated people is much smaller in the development towns than in Tel Aviv, and one should beware—we caution again—of generalizations based upon 'holding education constant'. Nevertheless, the homogeneity of cultural consumption—education being held constant—is remarkable. And, of course, this homogeneity is further abetted by national radio and television broadcasting and a national press. The two afternoon papers are read by 69 per cent of the population.

2. *Familism*

An equally familiar trait of Jewish civilization is dedication to the family, and to the extended family as well. The data from this study show that the family is at the centre of the society's conception of it-self.[15] The need 'to spend time with my family' is next in importance to the pride in having a state.

These are not mere expressions of values or of attitudes. Familism is expressed in action. Three-quarters of those adults whose parents are alive visit them at least once a week, and parents report visiting their married children with equal frequency![16] Education and social class make almost no difference here; unlike other societies, a higher degree of education, if anything, increases the frequency of visits.

One has the impression that Israelis—despite or because of the up-rooted character of the society—are very sensitive to familial continuity: a large majority of the population feel that they have a good idea of how life was lived in grandfather's house.[17]

Household duties do not seem to be a heavy burden for Israelis; familism is not expressed, apparently, in house-cleaning. On the other hand, the time devoted to care for children is high compared with most other nations.[18]

When people are asked to imagine what they would do with an extra day of leisure if the five-day working-week came to pass, by far the most frequent answer is: 'I would spend the time with my family'. That a man 'should' so spend most of his leisure time is affirmed by 71 per cent of the respondents.

How *does* the family spend its time? What cultural activities bind it together? Of the mass media, television contributes most to family solidarity; households spend an average of about two hours around the television set every night. Television is rather less effective in keeping at home adolescents and young adults, or those of higher education.

Other activities that go on inside the home are more particularized: reading, hobbies, listening to records, study. Radio listening has also become a much more private affair since the advent of the transistor and the introduction of television. All these activities increase with increased education. Indeed, the culture of the home is primarily a function of education (whereas the selection of activities outside the home is governed at least as much by age). The less educated spend more of their leisure sleeping or resting or looking after their home.

Far more important than television as a focus for family solidarity are Saturdays and holidays. The Sabbath is the day which families spend together: it is the day for visiting, for more leisurely meals. For the religious, it is the day of prayer and rest. For the non-religious, it is a day for family trips and house-cleaning.

A clear majority of the population want to preserve the quiet,

homely character of the Sabbath eve as it exists today in Israel. This holds equally true for young and old. On the other hand, when asked more explicitly whether public transport should operate on the Sabbath and whether theatres, concert halls, and cinemas should be open, they are rather less traditional in their response. Still, even here, there is a clear differentiation between more 'cultural' activity—such as community centres and theatres—and the cinema, for example. Far fewer (about 40 per cent) are in favour of opening the cinemas on Friday night. While the scriptural definition of the Sabbath is by no means the guiding ideal, it is obvious that there is a 'cultural' ideal that is shared by a good part of the population. (Only the stoutly irreligious among the well-educated want a drastic change in the character of the Sabbath eve.) Once more it should be said that while there are clear signs of cultural continuity here, one should not make the mistake of assuming that no changes are at work: a drive in the family car, or playing chamber music, or watching television (however cultured the content of those activities) is not what our forbears had in mind for the Sabbath.

Still another sign of the commitment to family and tradition in connexion with the Sabbath is in the preference expressed for Friday, rather than Sunday or another weekday, for the second free day of the desired five-day work-week. The preference for Friday—from the point of view of the quality of the culture—will have very different consequences, if adopted, from that of a Saturday–Sunday weekend. The Friday–Saturday weekend implies a day of 'preparation'—as Friday is today—for the following Holy Day, while the Saturday–Sunday weekend provides for tension-release at the conclusion of the Holy Day. Saturday night is now the popular night for going out, but there is a higher risk of anomie and its accompanying malaise if it is to be followed by a day which is normatively unstructured. The questions of (1) whether an extra day? (2) which day?, and (3) what provisions will be made for cultural activities on the extra day? are major questions for cultural policy-makers.

3. Normative prescriptions for spending leisure

Traditional Jewish culture, like nature, did not tolerate a vacuum. It sanctified activities governing the entire round of life—not merely prayer-time or rites de passage but eating-time, sleeping-time, and leisure-time. It is another one of those nice-sounding paradoxes to say that the Jews invented leisure (in the institution of the Sabbath) and then took it back again (by minute prescriptions on how to spend it). Indeed, leisure was not left at all to the individual's discretion on week-days either; normatively, his every moment—and all the more so if he could free himself from work—was to be devoted to sacred study. Like other norms, this one was not easy to live up to, but people were well

aware of the fact, and they made the attempt. Nor is there reason to think that it was experienced as oppressive; quite the contrary. Moreover, as with other aspects of Jewish religious strategy, certain things that people wanted to do—like getting up parties, for example—were subsumed and legitimated in terms of the *halakha* in the same way as the things they had to do—such as eating. Thus parties could be legitimately given on certain occasions—such as when group-study of a book of the Talmud was completed, or on certain holidays; then the party became a *mitzva* and was not considered mere frivolity organized at the expense of study.[19] And days off from work (and study) were called holidays, and each of them was a legitimation of leisure too.

The modern secular city is at the opposite pole. Its ideal-type, at any rate, makes available the widest variety of individual choice to suit all tastes and proclivities. And modern leisure, the dominant voices say, is a time for individual self-expression.

Israel (like most other countries) is in-between, though it is probably on the more traditional side also here. First of all, there is a six-day working-week—which obviously spares the society the problem of deciding what to do with a non-normatively prescribed leisure day.

Moreover, in so far as people can foresee how they would spend another eventual free day, they do not have very radical ideas. Most would spend more time with their families; some would rest; some would engage in household duties; others would take trips. The main thrust of most of these replies is that people would do more of, or better with, the roles to which they are already committed. Most of the extra leisure would be spent close to, or inside, the home. It is interesting that reading is ahead of any of the arts or the media in the list of things people say they would do with more time.

The need for rest appears to be particularly acute for some elements of the population: the working woman, first of all; then people employed in commerce, workers in building, in industry, and in service occupations. They are all tired; and want a five-day week. Agricultural workers are tired too, but they are not enthusiastic about a shortened week since they would not benefit much from it and might only feel deprived when others were free. Those with low incomes are also tired, and are also unenthusiastic (relatively) about a shortened work-week— perhaps because they fear reduced earnings, or perhaps because they have little idea of the potentialities of leisure. While these groups are the more likely to relate leisure and rest, the equation of leisure and respite and of leisure and privacy (or familism) is predominantly emphasized by almost all groups. It is important to stress that while physical rest certainly figures in the traditional conception of leisure, so do its sacred and public aspects: the Sabbath, in the tradition, is a day of 'rest and sanctity'; and it is a day of assembly—for festive prayer and study. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the idea of spending leisure in public,

and of devoting it to collective rather than private pursuits, also under-
lies the concept of political participation in a democracy. It is not only
Jewish ideals that require the normative and public use of leisure for
their fulfilment. But the trend, overall, is towards privatization.

The preference for normatively prescribed leisure rather than for do-
your-own-thing leisure is shown in the attitudes of Israelis towards public
holidays. The traditional holidays, in general, continue to have meaning
for persons who are not religious. Unlike New Year's Eve or the First of
May, for example, the Holy Days of Purim, Passover, Rosh Hashana,
Hanukka—and even Shavuot or Lag Ba-omer—have retained their
meaningfulness for most people. As in the case of the Sabbath, these are
not the original meanings: the latter have been somewhat transformed
by elevating familial, historical, natural, and other aspects of the
holidays to primary positions. Thus Passover becomes a holiday whose
primary meaning for many is to provide a feeling of connexion with past
generations and with history, while Shavuot connects them to changing
seasons, and so on. They might have answered (as some in fact did) that
the holiday had no meaning for them; or that it was a day for rest or for
doing what they pleased; but they did not so answer. On the other hand,
as many as 16 per cent said that Yom Kippur had 'no meaning for me'
—probably because it is incapable of undergoing secular transformation;
it is not a day on which one can go out for a picnic, or even celebrate
national or social emancipation. It is a Holy Day for which Jewish
tradition provides no other alternative to personal confrontation with
God.

To a certain degree, unprescribed leisure time is made available to
young people. They go out often, and engage in a variety of activities
involving friends, the cinema, and light entertainment. Their going out
is probably more aimless than the outings of their elders. Even in the
case of young people, however, there is an important need to feel that
leisure is being spent constructively.

But what of the classic prescription to employ leisure time for study?
Here again, we have an example of the secular transformation of a
traditional concept. Relatively to other countries, Israelis spend more of
their leisure-time reading books. Compared with the countries of West-
ern Europe, a larger proportion of Israelis read at least one book last
year, and more are 'active readers' (eight books or more per year). The
proportion of 'active readers' among all readers is about as high as in
England and the Scandinavian countries, and is somewhat higher
when looked at as a proportion of the population as a whole.[20]

Perhaps, therefore, the Israelis still deserve the title of the People of
the Book (an appellation given to Jews and Christians by the Prophet
Muhammad). Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between the
classical conception of the People of the Book and the secular transfor-
mation of that concept.

The traditional idea of the Book is that an entire people is simultan-eously—indeed, almost continuously—occupied with the same set of symbols and metaphors in terms of which their society and their per-ception of the world is organized. The Book is the source of rules, and the constitution by which all members—leaders included—are bound. It is an ongoing collective creation, to which each generation contri-butes. The secular transformation of the concept, People of the Book, is people of books, or people of reading; something quite different, obvi-ously. There is nothing shared about the experience any more. Reading is now a private experience and everybody is reading a different book. There is no little irony in the fact that something of the collective experience which once derived from the Book is now to be had from viewing television, for a majority of the population spend their evenings tuned to Israel's one channel. In this sense, television is more like the original conception of the Book than are books! But 'Mission Impossible' is no match for Genesis.

4. *Chosenness*

Book-reading relates, in turn, to the conception of a 'spiritual centre', which is a modern transformation of the concept of 'chosenness'. When asked, 'Do you think Israel should be more actively engaged in culture and learning than other nations?' , 70 per cent said yes. There is some reason to believe that they mean it. Not only are there more readers than in other countries, but there are also more people who study (as many as a third study regularly—on their own, or with teachers). They express a strong interest in the possibility of formal study—and not necessarily for credit or degrees. They say that radio and television might be used for this purpose, even at the expense of prime-time programming. Indeed, judging from the response to this proposal, if television were to devote one night a week to courses in adult education, there is a good likelihood that the new programme would be well received. But the emphasis of adults is not on instrumental career-oriented learning; it is on learning for learning's sake. People say they want that: why not believe them?

The argument that adult education via television requires another channel because the present one is 'full', is based on the assumption that 'Family Affair' and 'Bewitched' and 'The Saint' are the kinds of programme people will not do without—indeed, they say they are satisfied with them—but they do not want more of them. What they do want more of, however, is home-made Israeli programmes—in prefer-ence to the technically superior imported ones. And for the same reason they are enthusiastic about Israeli-made films: the loyalty to the Hebrew-speaking cinema is remarkably high.

That is not the case, however, for original Hebrew books. While

70 per cent of the sample read books in Hebrew almost exclusively, the large majority of these books are translations into Hebrew. Only about 20 per cent say that they read original Hebrew books 'frequently'.

It is clear that we are very far from a spiritual centre if indigenous creativity is taken as the criterion. It is ironic that the spectacular achievement of teaching the Hebrew language to an entire nation should result in the use of that language for translation.[21] Israeli culture —television, films, books—is a culture in translation, or even better, a culture in sub-titles. This is true of television (50 per cent or more of programmes are imported), of the cinema, the theatre, and of books. Another of the great problems in fulfilling the dream of a 'spiritual centre' is how to foster indigenous creativity in the theatre, the cinema, and television. The audience is there waiting.

The idea of 'chosenness' is alive in Israel far beyond the field of adult education and learning. There are a number of other areas in which Israelis feel that their country should set a moral example. The notion of 'national purpose' is still alive in Israel, struggling with the competing idea of 'normality'. This is the schizophrenic aspect of the Zionist dream: to be a nation like all the others, and, at the same time, to rally to the idea of mission.[22] The dilemma is probably more difficult now than it was in ancient Israel.

5. *Reality orientation*

The final concept which is appropriate to our analysis is the Jewish commitment to looking soberly at the world. It is based on an ever-alert concern with what is dangerous in the environment and the need to mobilize to combat it. Israeli culture still partakes of this kind of asceticism and reality orientation. Israelis perceive the mass media as existing more for news than for entertainment. Although there is also demand for more light entertainment the role of the media—even television—is thought to be primarily informative. Probably for the same reason, non-fiction is far more popular than in other countries.

Yet another indication of this same phenomenon is the low importance ascribed to escapist needs—'the need to escape from the harsh realities of everyday life', for example. And at the same time, high importance is ascribed—as has been noted—to the need 'to spend leisure constructively'. Physical activity—sport, for example—is also little engaged in, perhaps as another sign of asceticism.

Our study did not examine the prevalence of other media of 'escape' —alcohol or drugs, for example. Israel is well known for the almost non-existence of the problem of alcoholism, and drugs seem to be making very little headway in the society. Israelis place a great emphasis on the importance of orientation towards the future—at the expense of hedonistic gratification in the present. When asked which was more important

—time spent at work or at leisure, the former out-distanced the latter by far—although the proportion answering that 'both' work and leisure were important is higher still. Altogether, the characterization of Israeli society as 'puritan' seems not too far off the mark. On the other hand, the high percentage who feel that luck is a major component of success, and the high proportion of participation in the several national lotteries argue in another direction. Nor is high productivity or pride in work—attributes which were not explicitly examined by us—especially conspicuous to the observer of this society. Still, orientation to reality and a general sense of sobriety and of purpose appear to be important basic values.

6. *Conclusion*

The threads of continuity are still clearly visible in Israeli culture. The Jewish values of collectivity-orientation, familism, learning, sense of purpose, and orientation to reality are all much in evidence. Some of these values seem to have remained intact. Others are undergoing transformation. Thus, the People of the Book have become the people of reading; the religious festival is transformed in meaning; ethnicity and national identification appear to be dominating religious integration.

In all this, the generation gap does not seem much in evidence— although there are some differences. The young (18–25 years old in our study) feel less dependent on Diaspora Jewry; their thoughts turn less often to the Holocaust; they seek more immediate gratification as compared with the future-orientation of their parents; they may be somewhat less religious. But on the whole they are not very much different—and will be even less so, one suspects, when they grow older.

The big question is whether the transformation will preserve any semblance of the uniqueness of traditional Jewish culture. What will become of Yom Kippur, if secular Jews find difficulty in investing it with a transformed meaning? What will become of religious holidays that have—once again—returned to nature, family, and nation (whence they arose)? What will happen to the tradition of learning if it is oriented towards individualistic rather than collective experience, and to career rather than to learning for its own sake? Will the sense of peoplehood become standardized patriotism? Will chosenness become mere chauvinism? These are some of the major questions raised by this study.

Another set of problems is concerned with artistic and cultural creativity in a small nation bent on reviving an ancient culture in a modern world. Will the satellite leave room for indigenous expression on the airwaves? Will the book written locally and in Hebrew hold its own against the avalanche of translated foreign works? Will the nascent Israeli film have a chance against the sub-titled films of Hollywood?

Indeed, will traditional Holy Days survive the electronic transmission of other people's celebrations? Will Judaism survive Zionism?

All these matters require policy decisions. There is no use evading the fact that the Government *is* actively involved in cultural policy: it subsidizes some theatres; it gives tax rebates to some films; it organizes the Independence Day celebrations; it does not concern itself with the high cost of books; it makes the public performance of Richard Strauss very difficult; and so on. Cultural policy, however, is rarely made explicit. The Ministry of Education and Culture is only now beginning to live up to the latter part of its name. Public discussion of the issues deserves to be encouraged.

At the same time, the education of the consumer of culture needs to be cultivated. Learning how to view a television programme, or how to read a newspaper is one aspect of this; pondering the contemporary meaning of traditional holidays is another. Contemplating how—or whether—to give expression to the national quest for moral purpose is still another. Adult education—in its broadest sense—is the challenge of Israeli culture. It is, potentially, also the most important link with the kind of continuing education which was the most distinctive aspect of traditional Jewish culture. Thought and resources must be made available for its cultivation.

NOTES

[1] The study on which this paper is based was commissioned by the late Zalman Aranne, when Minister of Education and Culture; it was carried out jointly by the Communications Institute of the Hebrew University and the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research. Members of the research group were Elihu Katz and Michael Gurevitch (co-directors), and Hanna Adoni, Gila Brand, Oved Cohen, Hadassah Haas, and Leah Isaac. This paper constitutes the second of two introductory chapters to the report on the study by Katz and Gurevitch which is being published by Faber and Faber (London) and, to the volume in Hebrew, by Am Oved (Tel Aviv). Empirical data referred to here are documented in those works. The present version of the paper was prepared for presentation at the Symposium on 'Israel Society' organized by the Institute of Jewish Affairs in London, 18 March 1973, and benefited from the discussion of participants and panellists. It was written while I was Simon Research Fellow at the University of Manchester.

[2] For a persuasive argument that students of leisure focus too much on national and sub-group differences and too little on the *similar* rhythms of modern societies, see Kenneth Roberts, *Leisure*, London, 1970.

[3] In fact, the collection of our data pre-dates much of this criticism. This is of some import in as much as it is the *relative* decline in concern over security problems which is blamed for some of these alleged changes. This is another possible reason why our data do not reflect them (or why we did not focus on them as directly as we might have done, if our study were being designed

today). It is certainly true that a decline in the preoccupation with security brings the domestic problems of social and economic relations to the fore; Israel will have to grapple with these. It is also true that in circumstances of ostensible calm the newspapers have more room, and more time, to put these problems on society's agenda.

4 This is the objection to all purely behavioural analysis, of course, whether of Kinsey-type studies of human sexual behaviour or of behavioural studies of the uses of time where one kind of act is equated with another so long as they consume the same amount of time. There is much to be learned from such data, however; indeed, as noted above, a considerable part of our own analysis is based on such material. But, clearly, they are not 'sufficient'.

5 Survey research, based on random sampling, gives every respondent an equal vote. It is now well known that radical social change is not usually accomplished by a majority vote. Professor S. J. Gould of Nottingham University, in a private conversation after the Symposium, suggested that our analysis reminded him of sociological analyses of American society on the eve of the violent racial, urban, and student upheavals of the 1960s. Even if such a fate is in store for Israel, it is important to say that, even today, as the smoke is dying down, the vast majority of the American people are not very different from what they were, nor did the much-vaunted generation gap affect more than only a fraction of the college-educated youth. But this is not to gainsay the importance of the social crisis in America. Methodologically, it suggests that several parallel lines of social inquiry must be carried out at the same time, and with different populations, and that each of these lines of investigation must be continued over time.

6 We are sidestepping the question of how Israeli culture and leisure are different from those of Jewish communities in the Diaspora. Clearly, the process of secularization in Judaism did not begin with Israel, or even with Zionism. And the tension between ethnicity and religion has marked the history of modern Jewish thought not only for the irreligious but for the religious as well; indeed, this is part of what Reform Judaism was (is?) all about. We ask forgiveness of those who would have liked us to face this larger question head on. We hope, none the less, that this portrait of Israel will contribute to the larger discussion, in which the role of Israel—as the Jewish state—features so prominently.

7 See, for example, Andrew Greeley, *The Denominational Society*, New York, 1972.

8 David Martin, *The Religious and the Secular*, London, 1969. See especially Chapter 1, 'Towards Eliminating the Concept of Secularisation', and Chapter 4, 'Secularisation: The Range of Meaning'.

9 The distinction between secularization of social structure and of consciousness is Peter Berger's in *The New Reality of Religion*, London, 1968. In discussing 'Israelite religion', Berger tends to see the Jews as demystifiers of primitive religions and hence as having a secularizing influence from the beginning. Our outlook is rather different, as noted above.

10 Here we disagree with writers like Andrew Greeley who argue that secularization is not rampant in modern society and that the sacred and the traditional are holding their own, at least as well as in earlier societies. For the case we reported, the evidence of the continuity of tradition is there to be

seen; indeed, that is the point of this paper. But the process of secularization and its ultimate subversion of the sacred seems equally apparent. One can remember what Passover used to be like in one's parents' home, and, re-enacting its forms, infuse it with secular meanings. But even if the result can be institutionalized, one cannot transmit this *process* to another generation: that is the problem.

[11] These 'needs' or goals or values are derived from the literature on the functions of mass communications for self and society, supplemented by 'needs' which seemed to us particularly characteristic of the Israeli scene. Respondents were asked to say, with respect to each, how 'important' it was.

[12] Simon Herman, *Israelis and Jews*, New York, 1970.

[13] Here we differ with Amos Elon, *The Israelis: Founders and Sons*, New York, 1971. We did not explore attitudes to the stereotype of the Diaspora Jew, though the generation gap in this respect might be more likely to exist between our first generation and their *parents* rather than with their children. As for attitudes to Arabs, we find that the important differences are far better explained by education than age: the better educated, at any age, are more open to friendship with Arabs. Further support for the absence of a conspicuous generation gap can be found: the last elections revealed no differences in the voting patterns of younger and older voters.

[14] Jacob Katz, *Tradition and Crisis*, New York, 1961.

[15] This use of 'centre' is more than rhetorical. Using a technique for the mapping of matrices of inter-correlations (the Guttman–Lingoes method of Smallest Space Analysis), we find family at the centre of the map. This means, essentially, that the magnitude of the correlations between commitment to family and a large variety of otherwise disparate values is equally high.

[16] Cf. Bert Adams, *Kinship in an Urban Setting*, Chicago, 1967, and Michael Young and Peter Wilmott, *Family and Kinship in East London*, London, Penguin edn., 1968. A recomputation of the figures in these volumes on the frequency of meetings between adult parents and married children suggests that the Israeli rate is very high, even when compared with the small Southern city studied by Adams or the family-based networks studied by Young and Wilmott.

[17] This is one of the points at which a comparison between second- and third-generation Israelis and their cousins in the United States might be very revealing. One has the impression that immigrants to America did not give their children much of a picture of what life was like in their parents' home in eastern Europe, whereas Israelis of the same origin have a clearer picture. However, this is just a guess—and eminently worth studying, though the picture grows cloudier with each new fiddler on each romantic roof.

[18] References to the comparative use of time are all based on Alexander Szalai, ed., *The Use of Time*, The Hague, 1972.

[19] See Jacob Katz, op. cit., for a discussion of such phenomena.

[20] Statistics on books and reading abound, but they are not always easily comparable, being based on differing definitions and methods of research. Data in the table below are from the Reader's Digest Association, *Survey of Europe Today*, London, 1970, pp. 120–21; they are from specially com-

missioned sample surveys in each of the countries listed, and the methods employed were similar to ours. For further details on reading in Israel, see Elihu Katz and Hanna Adoni, 'Function of the Book for Society and Self', in *Diogenes* (forthcoming) and in Kalma Yaron, ed., *Lifelong Education in Israel,* Association for Adult Education, Jerusalem 1972, as well as a Master's thesis by Mrs. Adoni submitted to the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew University, 1972 (in Hebrew).

*Readers of books and readers of more than 8 books a year
in Israel and in European countries*

	% who read one book in the last year	the readers of more than 8 books a year	
		% among the entire population	% of all readers
Israel	77	42	55
France	56	33	59
England	63	39	61
Italy	24	9	38
West Germany	52	17	32
Switzerland	69	23	33
Austria	54	14	26
Denmark	67	39	58
Holland	66	35	53
Belgium	42	21	49
Portugal	28	15	53

[21] One of the great 'natural resources' of first-generation Israelis (their multi-linguality) is not being passed on to the next generation.

[22] This psychological struggle, and particularly the anguish over making war, is one of the great problems of Israeli intellectuals. This echoes Amos Elon's discussion, op. cit.

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

ISRAEL'S POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL ISSUES

David Lazar

AN outsider who attempts to understand and assess another country's political system must avoid several obstacles. The first is the tendency to see other societies through the prism of one's own experiences and conceptions. The second (not altogether unrelated to the first) is the natural propensity to draw analogies between the new and the familiar; while the third obstacle is the tenacity of established stereotypes of alien cultures or nations. The stereotypes are often remote from reality. This is particularly so in the case of Israel; it is seen by some as an ideal model, and is often evaluated according to very peculiar—and sometimes irrational—criteria.

I attempt here to analyse Israel's political system in terms of its own specific dynamics and not as a derivative of some other political entity, although that system has been influenced by European models.[1]

My chief aims are, first, to examine the main features of the political system of Israel and their relevance to an understanding of three key cleavages in the society; and, second, to assess the effectiveness and stability of the system as a whole.[2]

Israel, it must be remembered, has only twenty-five years of statehood—but fifty-five years of organized statesmanship, if we take into account the development of political representation and self-governing institutions in the pre-State Yishuv. A unique situation results: still-active founding fathers and mature grandsons are simultaneously grappling for a satisfactory modus operandi in politics. The task is not easy. A solution must be found to very great political, economic, and social problems while the state of siege goes on.

The structure of Israel's political problem

Israel is a multi-party republic with no formal constitution. There are four basic laws (*Huke Yessod*) concerned with the Knesset, the cabinet, the President, and Israel's Lands; two others (on the judiciary and on the rights of the individual) are in preparation. These laws (a few clauses excepted) can be modified by a simple parliamentary majority.

There is a non-political Head of State (the President) and a uni-cameral parliament (the Knesset) which is normally elected every four years by all citizens aged 18 years and over. (If there is a serious cabinet crisis, premature elections may be held; that was the case in 1951 and 1961.) Cabinet members—19 in 1973—are usually members of parliament, but only the Prime Minister must by law be a member of the Knesset (MK). The Prime Minister has, so far, always been the head of the largest political party. A new cabinet must obtain a parliamentary vote of confidence when it presents its 'fundamental policy guidelines'. That document is prepared by the coalition parties and reflects both consensus and the respective bargaining effectiveness of the parties concerned.

The cabinet is answerable to the Knesset. The Prime Minister cannot dissolve parliament; only the Knesset itself may do so, by enacting a special law to that effect. That is the case both when there are scheduled elections and when the latter are premature—as when the largest party faces a cabinet crisis and is unable to ensure an effective parliamentary majority.

Knesset laws are the source of all power and authority. Since there is no formal constitution, no court can invalidate a law passed by parliament. Israel's judiciary originally followed the pattern established during the British Mandate; there are civil (magistrate) courts, district courts, and a Supreme Court. The latter also sits as a High Court of Justice; in that capacity it gives relief to individuals when there is reason to believe that a branch of the executive or of the administration has acted in a manner contrary to the spirit or the letter of a Knesset law, has abused its authority, or has not fulfilled its prescribed obligations.

The basis of Israel's electoral system

British Mandatory administration and Arab hostility to the Jewish national revival made it essential for the organized Jewish community of Palestine (the Yishuv) to mobilize all shades of opinion for the achievement of self-government and eventual national independence. There were many sharply differentiated shades on the broad spectrum of Zionist ideology—from 'pure' Zionist socialism to orthodox Zionism.[3]

In order to overcome the problems posed by the conflicting ideologies of the various parties and interest groups, a very simple and democratic system of representation was devised. The whole Yishuv was treated as a single constituency, and the contending groups were allocated seats on all representative bodies, in direct proportion to the number of votes they had obtained from their adherents. Four general elections were held between 1920 and 1948; at one time, no fewer than twenty-four lists were presented to the electorate, with complete

political platforms in some cases or, in others, special programmes catering for corporate or ethnic groups. Most of these political factions survived the 14th of May 1948, but specifically ethnic representative bodies, such as the Yemenite or the Sephardi Federation, disappeared or found their way into one or other political party 'proper'. Some corporate groups waived their claim to political representation and became economic interest groups—for example, the Farmers' Federation.

When the State of Israel was established, it adopted the same simple system of representation. The whole country was treated as a single constituency returning 120 members of parliament; and a party which obtains at least one per cent of all valid votes in an election may be sure of at least one seat in the Knesset. Thus, tiny parties with a minimum national appeal may have parliamentary representation.

In the general election for the seventh Knesset (1969), there were 1,367,743 valid votes; fewer than 14,000 were therefore necessary to secure a seat in parliament. The seventh Knesset has parliamentarians representing 13 parties; only three marginal lists, which gained fewer than 15,000 votes in their favour, failed to obtain representation in the Knesset. An electoral system of that type is certainly extremely democratic, since the elected parliament reflects most sectors of public opinion.

The political parties

The multi-party structure which emerged from the electoral system perpetuated itself and occasionally fostered the creation of new small parties. The absence of a central government machinery in pre-State days made it necessary for (and enabled) the large political parties to assume social and economic tasks; they sponsored housing projects, schools, youth movements, health services, banks, and various industries; they organized cultural activities and published newspapers and books of all types. Thus they were able to play a major integrative role for the new immigrants before (and even after) 1948, and they acquired very great power over their members and supporters. It is therefore not surprising that the new immigrant, in search of immediate economic and social security, looked to a political party for support, and that those parties with effective resources could count upon the votes of (to them) more or less predictable numbers. (More than 80 per cent of the electorate has gone to the polls in all elections—except in 1951 when 75·1 per cent of the electorate voted.) As a result, almost all the immigrant voters[4] have been integrated into the existing party system; they have neither created viable new parties nor seriously altered the balance between existing parties.

It is now necessary to examine briefly the electoral fluctuations of the parties and to assess their importance in Israel's parliament.[5] One cannot mechanically place Israel's political parties on the familiar

left-right continuum of classical European political terminology; in the Israeli situation, European criteria of right and left overlap: there are no clear demarcation lines. Security problems, international power politics, economic isolation from neighbouring states, and the unique relationship with the Diaspora allow a variety of combinations. For example, Mafdal (the National Religious Party) contains a Labour segment, and right-wing Herut certainly has more than a vague religious inclination; Herut also has its own faction within the Histadrut. Most parties are in favour of a mixed economy. The Independent Liberals (Liberalim Atsmaim) are closer to Labour in their social policies than they are to other parties within their own bloc. Again, a section of Mifleget ha-Avoda (Labour Party)—that section which was formerly known as Ahdut ha-Avoda—has views well to the left of (yet more nationally militant than) the former Mapai.

Nevertheless, it is possible roughly to distinguish three blocs: (A) Gush ha-Avoda, (B) the group of Liberal and Liberalist parties, and (C) the religious parties. To these must be added (D) Ha-Olam ha-Ze, a party standing in a class by itself.

A. Maarach ha-Avoda is an alignment formed in 1969 of Mapam (Mifleget ha-Avoda ha-Poalim ha-Meuhedet, United Workers' Party) and Mifleget ha-Avoda ha-Yisraelit (Labour Party of Israel). The alignment has 56 seats in the present Knesset.

Mapam was created in 1948 by a merger of Ha-Shomer ha-Tsair (the Young Guard), basically a kibbutz movement, and Ahdut Avoda (Labour Unity). The latter became a separate party in 1944 after a split in Mapai, and in 1954 resumed its independence. Mapam has eight seats.

Israel's largest party, Mifleget ha-Avoda ha-Yisraelit, has a long and complex history. Its core is the former Mapai (Mifleget Poale Eretz-Yisrael, the Workers' Party) which was founded in 1930 by a merger of two workers' parties and soon became the leading Jewish party in Palestine. Its more militant wing, Ahdut Avoda, seceded in 1944. Mapai and Ahdut ha-Avoda formed an electoral alignment in 1965, but a Mapai faction led by David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan, and Shimon Peres broke away to form a new party, Rafi (Reshimat Poale Yisrael, List of Workers of Israel). After long negotiations, Mapai, Ahdut Avoda, and Rafi merged. Ben-Gurion and some of his followers were opposed to the merger and presented their own list, Reshima Mamlakhtit (State List), which gained four seats in 1969; but Ben-Gurion's retirement from active politics and the return of Dayan and Peres to Mifleget ha-Avoda have weakened it. It is possible that the Knesset members who now represent Reshima Mamlakhtit will consider joining other parties, to the left or the right, before the next general election, due in autumn 1973.

Kidma u-Fituah (Progress and Development) and Shituf ve-Ahva

TABLE 1. Knesset Members by main parties, 1949–69

Name of party	1st K. 25.1.1949	2nd K. 30.7.1951	3rd K. 26.7.1955	4th K. 3.11.1959	5th K. 15.8.1961	6th K. 2.11.1965	7th K. 28.10.1969
Total valid votes	434,684	687,492	835,219	969,337	1,006,964	1,206,964	1,367,743
Name of party							
Maarakh Avoda–Mapam (1969)							56
Reshima Mamlakhtit							4f
Maarakh Mapai-Ahdut ha-Avoda (1965)						45	
Rafi						10	
Mapam	19c	15c	9	9	9	8	
Mapai	46	45	40	47	42		
Ahdut ha-Avoda			10	7	8		
Mafdal	16 ⎱d	10	11	12	12	11	12
Agudat Yisrael	16 ⎰d	5	6	6	6	4	4
Poale Agudat Yisrael						2	2
Gahal						26	26
Ha-Merkaz ha-Hofshi							2
Liberalim Atsmaim *a*	5	4	5	6	—e	5	4
Liberalim *b*	7	20	13	8	17		
Herut	14	.8	15	17	17		
Miflaga Komunistit Yisraelit	4	5	6	3	5	1	1
Reshima Komunistit Hadasha						3	3
Ha-Olam ha-Ze——Koah Hadash						1	2g
Arab Parties	2	5	5	5	4	4	4
Others	7	3					
Total	120	120	120	120	120	120	120

(a) Named, until 4th K., *Miflaga Progressivit*. (b) Until 4th K., *Tsionim Klalim* (c) *Ahdut Avoda* was until the split in 1954 included in *Mapam*. (d) In the first elections all three religious parties presented themselves as a United Religious Front. (e) In the 5th elections the *Liberalim Atsmaim* were included in the *Liberalim*. (f) Split in 1972 between those who advocate return respectively to Avoda or to Gahal. (g) The faction split in two in 1972.

(Co-operation and Brotherhood) are two Arab parties associated with (and affiliated to) Mifleget ha-Avoda. The leaders of the former are Muslims and Druzes while those of the latter are Muslims and Christians. Both parties have been in politics since 1949; they have four seats in the Knesset.

The original Communist Party of Palestine, Miflaga Komunistit Yisraelit, dates back to 1919. In 1947, that party endorsed the idea of a Jewish State following the support given by Russia to the U.N. Partition Resolution; the party signed the Proclamation of Independence. It had an average of five members in the Knesset until 1965, and derived considerable support from Arab votes, since it was a non-Zionist party. It became increasingly divided, however, both between pro-Nasserites and pro-Ba'athists and (later) over the ideological interpretation of the Middle East conflict. The final split occurred in 1965. The predominantly Jewish and more nationalist sector retained the original name Maki in its abbreviated form, and was represented in the Knesset by Dr. Sneh; after his death, Shmuel Mikunis succeeded him. The opposing wing created a new party, Reshima Komunistit Hadasha (New Communist List—*Rakah*).

This last attracted the bulk of the communist votes at both the 1965 and 1969 elections, when more than 70 per cent of its voters were Arabs. The party has 3 members in the Knesset (2 Arabs and 1 Jew). It is opposed to Maki's views on Israel's sovereignty and the State's special relationship with the Diaspora (including Russian) Jewry; Rakah fully supports Soviet views on the Middle East. Both the Communist factions are opposition parties, but Maki is much closer to the national consensus.

B. The second bloc includes, first, the Liberalim Atsmaim—Independent Liberals, formerly called Miflaga Progressivit (Progressive Party). It was founded in 1948, mainly by people who had come from central Europe. The members are staunch believers in Liberalism; they also support the welfare state and want to consolidate and protect the social achievements of Israel's workers. Consequently, the party has participated in most coalitions. A short-lived merger was attempted with Miflaga Liberalit (see below) in the 1961 elections, but the party resumed its independent existence in 1965. It has four members in the Knesset.

Miflaga Liberalit (Liberals) was formerly known as the 'Tsionim Klaliim' (General Zionists). This moderate middle-class party goes back to the years of the Mandate. Its 1961 merger with Liberalim Atsmaim failed when, in 1965, it entered the electoral bloc with Herut. The party has eleven members in the Knesset.

Herut (Liberty) is a nationalist party which succeeded the political-military Irgun Tsvai Leumi (the National Military Organization of the forties). Under the leadership of Mr. Begin, it became the main

opposition party in Israel; its socio-economic programme is essentially liberal, but it advocates state intervention in industrial relations. Its insistence on Israel's right to both banks of the Jordan (albeit largely theoretical) made it the most nationalist of Israel's parties. In 1965 it created the Gush Herut-Liberalim (Gahal alignment) with the Miflaga Liberalit. Herut has fifteen members in the Knesset out of Gahal's total of 26.

Ha-Merkaz ha-Hofshi (Free Centre) is a small opposition right-wing party formed in 1967 when its members seceded from Herut. It is no less liberal than the other parties in the bloc, but more adamant than Herut in its claim to the preservation of the 'renewed unity of the land of Israel'. It has two members in the Knesset.

C. The first of the religious parties is Miflaga Datit Leumit (National Religious party) known as Mafdal; it is a moderate religious party established under that name in 1956. Its forerunners (Ha-Mizrahi, founded in 1901) and Ha-Poel ha-Mizrahi (its labour wing) merged in that year; they had a long tradition of religious-Zionist activities and they had promoted the establishment of a Jewish National Home. Mafdal has participated in all coalitions and has sought mainly to ensure that public affairs in Israel retain a Jewish character. Its views on foreign affairs tend towards nationalism. It has twelve members in the Knesset.

Agudat Yisrael (literally, the Collectivity of Israel) is an extremely orthodox party, founded in 1912, which had been anti-Zionist until 1947. But it later took part in the fight to attain and preserve independence. It wants the whole religious law (the *halakha*) to be the sole legal code of the State of Israel. It has four members in the Knesset.

Poale Agudat Yisrael, an Orthodox Labour party, is close to Agudat Yisrael in matters pertaining to the *halakha*, but is generally closer to Israel's Labour parties. It has two members in the Knesset.

D. There remains one *sui generis* party: ha-Olam ha-Ze—Koah Hadash (literally, This World—New Force). It was founded in 1965 by the controversial editor-politician of a weekly paper, *Ha-Olam ha-Ze*. It had two members in the 1969 Knesset, but split in 1972. It is a pacifist anti-religious party; it advocates liberalism and favours a federation with a future Palestinian state.

As the state acquired more power, and established a national education system,[6] hospitals and clinics,[7] labour exchanges, and a national housing programme, the parties lost some of the power they had held over the electorate. The civil service has been steadily depoliticized. There is an independent State-Comptroller and Ombudsman (*Mevaker ha-Medina ve Netziv Tlunot ha-Tsibur*) who constantly keeps a check on civil servants, ministries, and all state-controlled enterprises. He is appointed by the Knesset and is directly answerable to its finance committee. Nevertheless, the parties are still the chief means through

which demands for social and political changes are channelled. They are the country's effective Establishment; they have also had, since 1969, financial help from the state for their electoral campaigns.

Each party naturally attempts to secure the largest possible number of registered members; some have succeeded to the extent of boasting of one registered subscribing member out of every four persons who voted in their favour at the elections. In order to co-ordinate its activities and to recruit and mobilize support, a party deploys a permanent machinery which is intensively at work not only before a new parliament is chosen, but in the years between general elections. The leaders of each party are, of course, at the apex of the pyramid; and it is important to examine that peculiar leadership structure, since it has enabled political parties to acquire the very considerable power and prestige they possess. Israel's leaders have, in the first place, been in the saddle for many decades, and in some cases they had also been the acknowledged heads (or the militants) of a party or movement in their country of origin. In the Yishuv, they were executives of the Jewish Agency, the Va'ad Leumi (National Council), the Histadrut, one of the various kibbutz movements, clandestine defence organizations, etc.; their positions enabled them to acquire the training and experience for statesmanship.

A second factor has been the small size of the country, which allowed a centralized system of political recruitment to be established; it also permitted decisions to be quickly made by the national leadership. Furthermore, almost every issue (whether of an economic, political, or military nature) has national implications. Matters relating to population distribution, the extension of the economic infrastructure, the location of a new hospital, a research centre, or even a holiday resort, are all subject to top-level decision-making. Centralization is increasingly evident in the formation of coalitions and even in the case of a tiny party claiming to be a 'party of change', such as Uri Avneri's single-man faction, ha-Olam ha-Ze. Even in larger parties—such as Herut or Mifleget ha-Avoda, nominations to the party's central organs (central committee or bureau, for example), the list of parliamentary candidates, the list of representatives on the Histadrut's executive committee, sometimes the agenda and draft resolutions for party conventions (let alone draft cabinet policies) are debated and resolved by somewhat informal caucuses or by the higher echelons of the party.

There is little inclination on the part of the nation's leaders to abide by the democratic rules of the game, which would require effective 'grassroots' democracy and a flow of demands and candidates from local branches upwards through discussion, 'primary' elections, and delegation of power. These demands have been gradually watered down and the party leadership, although it works in a collegiate spirit, has truly become maker and unmaker of kings. As a result, the party's

parliamentary faction and its representatives elsewhere must submit to rigid party discipline. In this type of power structure, intense activity in the local branch of the party, or in municipal affairs—even when it is successful—can help to obtain but cannot guarantee a seat in parliament. It certainly cannot ensure a seat in the cabinet, since the decision-making bodies may use other criteria for political promotions and 'safe' nominations. The 'confrérie' nature of the veteran leadership brings its members closer, despite their traditional feuds. Only reluctantly and extremely slowly does it open the door to the younger generation of leaders.[8]

Political power relationships between the legislative and executive branches of government

Table 1 shows that no election has resulted in an absolute parliamentary majority; there has always been a large gap between the three or four leading parties and the others. That gap is particularly striking when one compares the total number of seats obtained by the four main parties—Mapai (later Mifleget ha-Avoda, plus the two Arab parties which always vote with Labour in the Knesset); Herut; the Liberalim—later the Gahal alignment; and Mafdal (the religious party)—with the total for all other parties (see Table 2).

TABLE 2. *Knesset seats, by political party and election year*

Election Year	Total for the four main parties	Total for all other parties
1949 (1st Knesset)	85	35 (6 parties)
1951 (2nd ,,)	88	32 (6 ,,)
1955 (3rd ,,)	84	36 (5 ,,)
1959 (4th ,,)	89	31 (5 ,,)
1961 (5th ,,)	93	27 (4 ,,)
1965[a] (6th ,,)	86	34 (7 · ,,)
1969[b] (7th ,,)	98	22 (8 ,,)

a Herut and the Liberals joined forces to present a single list.
b Herut and the Liberals again combined, as did the Labour (Avoda–Mapam).

It can clearly be seen, by referring back to Table 1, that the gap between Mapai (in 1965 the first, and in 1969 the second, labour alignment) and the Gahal alignment was too wide to permit the latter to form a government. Second, the other parties are too small and scattered for them to unite effectively; they cannot agree on a programme, or even join forces to become a 'negative opposition'.[9] At best, they can try to form a 'technical bloc' in order to ensure their own survival: that is their only basis for joint action. Third, not even the

largest party—Mapai, later Avoda—was able on its own to form a stable government, which requires at least some 70 members of the Knesset for it to be effective. Hitherto, Mapai or its successor Avoda has been the major party in all coalitions;[10] it has chosen Mafdal (the National Religious party) as its permanent ally, and made use of liberal or left-wing parties or of a moderate combination of both.[11] All other parties participate in the parliamentary process, but they have no significant influence on the power structure or on decision-making.

Labour has had to pay a political price for the support of its political allies: sometimes it has had to endorse a more radical social policy advocated by the left; at others, it has made economic concessions to the private sector on its right. Almost always it has to promote religious legislation in order to ensure support from Mafdal. In sum, it has had to resort to constant brinkmanship to maintain a delicate (and at times precarious) equilibrium between the positions and pressures of the contending parties, forming coalitions, keeping them going, and changing them.

The social impact of the political system

It would be wrong to infer from what has been stated above that the parties and their leadership are monolithic and all-powerful. Nor is it true that the only check on a party's power is that it has to enter into coalition with others or accept a minor role of furnishing mere protest and opinion feed-back in the Knesset.

As we have seen, the national leadership of Israel's parties has, notwithstanding ideological disagreements within it, some considerable degree of consensus when it comes to modes of action. Politics and decision-making are centralized in the leaders. There is still, in spite of the increasing numbers of sabras emerging in the élite groups, a predominance of Russian- and Polish-born leaders from the third and fourth aliyot.[12] In the main, these persons live in the large cities[13] and, with the exception of the kibbutzim, the rest of the country is under-represented.

However, there are sub-cultures, and undercurrents, in Israel; they are reflected in the political power structure and may (in the long run) affect it even further. These sub-cultures are the real, de facto, constituencies: different kinds of economic and social groups, sometimes connected with specific regions and at others running across the whole country. Examples are kibbutz and moshav movements,[14] development towns, professional and academic groups, factions from business and industry, etc. The parties are obliged to allow group representation, especially since they aim at being 'mass parties'. In many cases, in fact, the representatives are chosen as spokesmen for their group, and not on the basis of their personal popularity or of personal qualities which

might appeal to the electorate. Powerful groups have more latitude in imposing their own chosen representatives, but approval by the party's central authority is still necessary. Few are the cases where personal achievements and merit ensure an appointment which is contrary to the wishes of the veteran leaders. Nevertheless, there are exceptions: for instance, where the ethnic factor comes into play, as in the case of a non-Jewish constituency or of a development town which has a majority of immigrants from the same region (as from North Africa). So far, however, these groups have not been able significantly to curb policies or force the hand of politicians, but they must be taken into consideration. They sometimes foreshadow far-reaching developments which could mature in the long run. To this we shall now briefly turn.

It is sometimes wrongly assumed that the high degree of national consensus springing in part from Israel's permanent concern with survival, security, and foreign affairs, indicates an absence of conflict. In reality, the sometimes latent, sometimes acute, state of emergency merely relegates the cleavages to a secondary role; they cannot be played out of existence. The social divisions are not only there, they are emphasized by (and reflected in) the political system. We may now look at the system through the prism of three basic (but not the only) cleavages.

A. *Young versus old*. Although for many years the general feeling of Israelis has been that those at the helm were committed to democracy, could be trusted, and performed their task adequately, the 'young guard'[15] increasingly resent and question the hegemony of the veteran leadership—so far, admittedly, with little degree of success. The young guard of the Israel Avoda party tried (in vain) to place the problem of State and religion—particularly the matter of civil marriage for those barred from marrying according to Israel's religious law—on the agenda for a general debate at the party's convention in 1972. The subject was relegated to a party forum debate in order not to jeopardize Labour's delicate relationship with its religious ally in the coalition. The same group provoked the Prime Minister's wrath when it openly called on the party to declare that the Palestinians had a right, in principle, to self-determination, subject to the reservation that such a power would be implemented when the Palestinians in turn accept and recognize the right of the Jews to their own self-determination. The motion was not even put on the party convention's agenda. In Herut, Mr. E. Weizmann[16] attempted to rejuvenate the top echelons of the party. During the recent Herut convention he was overruled by the veteran leadership (headed by Mr. Begin) even in his modest proposal for a 60/40 ratio of veteran to younger leaders. He and several of his supporters then resigned from the party executive, and once again the veteran party leaders were in sole command. Clearly, not only those parties which have been in the ruling coalition have suffered from stagnation.

The veteran leaders of Mapam are more or less committed to government policies in the administered territories—with varying degrees of reservation. The old leaders are criticized by the younger generation, especially second-generation kibbutznikim, some of whom are adamantly opposed to settlement policies likely to handicap future negotiations with the neighbouring Arab countries. Young minority groups advocate Mapam's withdrawal from the Alignment and from the coalition in order to preserve the party's ideological purity.[17] Yet again, the majority (led by the veteran leaders) has remained in command.

Mafdal is also bedevilled by its young leadership, which has been more successful than its counterparts in other parties; and which has three outspoken representatives[18] in the Knesset who advocate a more uncompromisingly religious approach to Israel's public life[19] as well as radical change in the party's programme. They want to modify the unidimensional character of their party, which has hitherto had only one entirely independent line: on religion and related spheres (such as education, for example). The 'rebels' demand a complete platform, with a specific stand on all spheres of public policy.

In every party, the issue of the young versus the old is open, and not only academically. In years to come, that issue may affect both the power equilibrium and the entire field of élite recruitment.

B. *Veterans and immigrants.* No society which has had to absorb huge numbers of immigrants in a very few years has been able to do so successfully, without strains and conflicts between the old settlers and the newcomers. In Israel, the divisions are acute. The 'Law of Return' (1950) entitles every Jew to come to Israel; upon his arrival he is automatically a citizen. In practical terms, the implementation of that law has precluded the selection, or regulation of the flow, of immigrants. They have come in unpredictable numbers, very irregularly, and usually over too short a period to allow for smooth absorption. Great friction developed between immigrants from Muslim countries (especially Tunisia and Morocco), the veterans from Europe, and sabras of western origin. The impact was (and is) felt in a wide range of relationships: socio-economic, cultural, ideological, and psychological. Most of the under-privileged groups were unable to voice and publicize political demands, let alone set up an effective political party of their own. Their cadres and élite groups (who might have acted as their leaders and protectors) remained in North Africa or emigrated to other countries—such as France or Canada. Those who came to Israel were inexperienced in the complex process of parliamentary democracy; even if this had not been the case, they would have come up against a formidable streamlined political establishment with an entrenched economic infrastructure. What these groups *could* do was to make the best of their automatic right to active political participation and to put a price on their votes—for example, a better job, sometimes better

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homes or housing in a district of their choice, a new school or indus-
trial enterprise in their district, etc. A token contribution was made by
the establishment; seats were allocated to representatives of the oriental
communities on the Executive of the World Zionist Organization and
in the Knesset, the cabinet, the Histadrut, etc.[20] However, even the
new men were more often than not veteran Oriental Jews and not *new*
immigrants.

The State has done a great deal to help deprived groups, mainly by
diversified educational schemes and by increased social services. Much
more remains to be done; it is still among Oriental Jews that low-
income groups, large families, the less educated, the poorly housed, and
juvenile delinquents predominate.[21]

In recent years, the social workers and the director-general of Israel's
Social Security Services have taken it upon themselves to act as spokes-
men inside the Establishment for the fringe groups, following the pub-
lication of reports on research carried out by the School for Social
Work of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

The détente on the cease-fire lines (after August 1970) gradually
allowed the fundamental problems of Israel's society to emerge to the
surface. In their amateurish and (at first) spontaneous outbursts of
protest through low-profile violence, the Israeli 'Black Panthers' man-
aged to shock the political establishment out of its complacency. Atten-
tion was focused on the fringe groups, and the public as well as the
authorities were made to realize that time plus conventional piecemeal
policies were not enough.[22] The stocktaking and momentary sudden
shock triggered off the allocation of substantial capital expenditure on
various rehabilitation programmes. Pressures and tensions are likely to
persist.

We have seen that the veteran political leadership tries in various
ways to neutralize socio-political pressures or to mitigate them by ad
hoc policies. But there is one sphere, reflecting both the enduring and
the changing aspects of the veteran-immigrant cleavage, in which there
has been progress: local government, which Israeli politicians consider
to be of secondary importance;[23] it is dependent on the central authori-
ties for a major part of its budget. To some extent local government is a
small-scale replica of national politics.[24] But since there are local issues
at stake, it is possible for local leaders to emerge independently of the
remote party establishment. In the long run, these local leaders will
form the nucleus of a new national political élite. The parties originally
planned their social enterprises among immigrants with the aim of
ensuring their votes; one of the results of that policy was the immi-
grants' political socialization. Local leadership gradually asserted itself
at first in relatively 'unsophisticated cells'—such as workers' com-
mittees or a local party branch. Immigrants learned about, and trained
themselves in, politics. Those who were successful were singled out by

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the party machinery and were earmarked for promotion; and they also acquired local prestige. In time, they became the spokesmen for their group, and would no longer be manipulated; indeed, in several cases local leaders were able by increased pressure to influence government decisions. Many municipalities reflect today the demographic structure of Israel.[25]

Not only do the local leaders know their electorate well, but they are an outgrowth of local conditions and needs, and they are closer to the focal problems of their region than is a leader in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv who visits the area occasionally or is briefed by regional representatives. Nevertheless, the immigrants in outlying areas are inadequately represented. That was one of the factors which led various political quarters to demand some modification of the electoral system.[26] The proposed alternative to the existing centralized system is a mixture of the proportional and plurality principles. If implemented, it would safeguard the survival of more than two parties and still allow for those not voting in favour of one of the main parties to elect representatives. All proposals for reform have until recently been rejected. The small parties (on some of which coalitions are now based) might have to face almost total disappearance. Segments of the larger parties are also reluctant to agree because they believe that it would be undemocratic to allow the smaller parties to disappear. Even the main opposition party (Herut), which stands to gain by the proposed modification, fears that the change would ensure that Avoda attain almost a two-thirds majority in the Knesset, and would leave the opposition even weaker than it already is.[27] In brief, the existing political system is in fact capable of altering its policies in response to social pressures. The veteran leadership is no longer entirely immune to demands from its critics.

C. *Religious or secular State*.[28] Israel is above all a national Jewish solution to a Jewish problem—it is the only Jewish state in existence. It is pledged to a special, intricate relationship with the Jewish people the world over. Even though many Jews in Israel do not consider themselves personally bound by Jewish halakhic law, they generally recognize that Jewishness and Jewish history, in a unique way, are a complex interplay of national and religious elements. Modern Jewish nationalism is derived from multiple sources: Jewish religion and mysticism, Biblical history, nineteenth-century European nationalism and liberalism, and lastly, socialism. The majority of Israeli Jews are in varying degrees non-observant. The religious parties, as we have seen, total only 15 per cent of the electorate; surveys show that about one-third of the Jewish population in Israel say that they are 'observant' and there are many more 'traditionalists' of other sorts.

A recent national poll[29] on civil marriage revealed that 27·1 per cent favoured the introduction of civil marriage in all cases; another

26·5 per cent advocated civil marriage for those whom the *halakha* disqualified for religious marriage; 41 per cent objected to civil marriage whatever the circumstances; and there were only 4·5 per cent 'don't knows'. Whatever the degree of practice, an overwhelming percentage of Israelis say (when asked) that their religion is Jewish. There are very numerous definitions of Jewish identity; all but one are rejected by the religious establishment. In politics, the initial 1947 agreement between the ultra-orthodox and the moderate religious and Labour leaders stipulated that:

(a) the Sabbath would be the official day of rest for Jews;
(b) all state kitchens, including the army, would provide kasher food;
(c) freedom of religious education would be guaranteed; and
(d) every effort would be made 'to prevent the division of the House of Israel'—which meant or implied that there would be no civil marriage for Jews.

That was the foundation of the status quo.[30] In 1953 a state law brought marriage and divorce of Jews under the exclusive jurisdiction of rabbinical courts.[31] The politico-religious establishment, mainly Mafdal, maintained a twofold status. On the one hand it enjoyed a high-pressure effectiveness in all coalition negotiations—it has always been the third largest party and flexible on most policy matters excepting religion. On the other hand, Mafdal effectively took over control of the numerous religious agencies and institutions—including religious councils and the budget for religious services (financed by the State). Gradually, in the face of new problems, the status quo has been modified by further laws and regulations bearing clear religious connotations. In the field of personal status, there is a somewhat strict halakhic definition of Jewish identity ('who is a Jew?') with an effect upon problems of conversion and marriage; the validity of Reform marriages and divorces and the bar on the marriage of some Jews[32] has led recently to much controversy. On another level, there is permanent conflict (accompanied by sporadic outbursts of violence), on questions of public transport and entertainment on the Sabbath, autopsies, exemption of students in theological seminaries from active military service, etc. In a wider context, there is a constant striving by the orthodox to prevent Conservative and mainly Reform groups from attaining a practical or statutory foothold in Israel.

Periodically, there is a serious but temporary public outburst centred on a controversial hardship case. The judiciary of Israel has generally avoided clear-cut decisions of principle in such matters on the reasonable grounds that the definition of Jewish identity is not justiciable, but pertains to the realm of ideology.[33] In the absence of a formal constitution, an absence brought about also by the refusal and inability to settle controversial issues once and for all, it has been so far

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the political pressure that the religious parties were able to exert on the main coalition parties which explains the success of the former.[34]

Israel's top leaders sometimes admit the existence of this pressure and adopt an equivocal position on the matter.[35] In the light of the past twenty-five years, prospects for a less painful co-existence in the future are grim. Some speak about an ultimately ineluctable *Kulturkampf* over the separation of synagogue and state.

Conclusions

We have analysed some of the dynamic processes underlying the Israeli political system and examined the impact of the system on the main cleavages inherent in present-day Israel. A question remains to be answered: does the present political system have an adverse and disruptive effect on Israel society? In other words, does the political system deepen the disharmony between Israel's society and its governing institutions? Does it consequently produce instability and discontinuity?

The system has indeed encouraged complacency and self-satisfaction among the ruling parties, disproportionate pressure by some small parties, and a state of political limbo for others. The bulk of the opposition was bound permanently to remain in that limbo, although it has had a fair hearing in plenary sessions and a constructive share in committee work. (Small factions are guaranteed speaking time, can put questions to ministers, can table motions, present private members' bills and initiate votes of non-confidence in the government.) On the other hand, the opposition has often indulged in criticism that might rightly be qualified as 'irresponsible'—it has never been put to the test of action. Coalition politics in Israel have made the discrepancy between electoral programmes and post-electoral policies a permanent phenomenon of the system. A change is necessary; not because the present situation is intolerable, but rather because a more active democracy is called for, that is, the decentralization of politics, the reduction of party numbers, and the rejuvenation of the leadership.

Seen through the prism of nation-building, the first twenty-five years of statehood did not bring about a collapse of the system, despite the many flaws that we have noted. Israel is a nation made up of people who came from scores of traditions and different social, economic, cultural, and political backgrounds. That extreme heterogeneity could be neither ignored nor overcome overnight. Israel's socio-political fragmentation expresses, as we have shown, more than a selfish electoral mechanism. It is essentially the expression of a very widely diversified spectrum of outlooks, some overlapping, some divergent. Diversity of this kind may have been detrimental both to efficiency and to equilibrium, but at the same time it guaranteed a form of pluralism. No

single electoral system could have given entire satisfaction, certainly not at the beginning. Even those who favoured change did not ignore the fact that in a relatively new polity, abrupt upheavals and mechanical changes may have an adverse effect on the very principle of democracy.

This is a lesson of the political history of many developing nations whose governments in the last decades have quickly deteriorated into dictatorships. The existing system is seen by those in favour of it as the lesser evil; for them it is the only alternative to the total disappearance of small parties. It is certainly true that there has been, so far, no significant challenge to the principle of democracy or to the legitimacy of Israel's political institutions. Compromise became the rule.

Israel has no written constitution; that could be dangerous because it would be possible for a party enjoying a temporary majority to make and unmake laws at will. (There can be no parallel with Great Britain, because the latter although it has no written constitution does have the Common Law, laws of equity and, of course, has enjoyed centuries of stability.) However, the flexibility of Israel's political structure has so far allowed piecemeal adjustments. Despite a permanent state of war, the majority has not misused the emergency regulations, the legislative process has never been disrupted, no elections were postponed or manipulated, and the courts have remained independent.

Nation-building has proceeded in spite of such problems as immigrant absorption, security, industrialization and development, education, and social welfare, etc. Western-type societies have not had to face such challenges. Since solutions had to be improvised at an unusual speed, there could not be lengthy debates or the stalemates so characteristic of the Fourth Republic in France. On the other hand, there was often improvisation and muddling through rather than long-term rational planning.

Nevertheless, in spite of social unrest and the need to order priorities in view of increasingly severe defence requirements, there has been no totalitarian pattern of government. This fact has been considered at length by Mordecai Roshwald in a recent article.[36] Indeed, the trend has recently been for various pressure groups to mobilize public opinion against the strict application of ancient and archaic religious laws, against the encroachment of urban sprawls on the countryside, and in favour of more social services for the disadvantaged. There is a clear indication that increasingly vocal segments care about their inarticulate fellow-citizens and that they are not content to wait for the authorities to initiate social reforms.

An independent press has also helped to publicize the concern expressed or felt by pressure groups or by independent-minded individuals.

Finally, Israel's political system has proved no less vulnerable to the inherent weaknesses apparent in many western democracies, including

the decline of idealism and the rise of a technocracy. Survival, the ingathering of the exiles, and the promotion of a welfare state are platforms common to all parties. Former 'ideological polarization' has now given way to policies of 'more' or 'less' of the same medicine. Right and left are tending to converge towards a somewhat indistinct centre. Policies are pursued with varying degrees of pragmatism, even opportunism, with non-partisan reference to quantifiable efficiency and profitability. This might have led to disaffection from democratic politics. Paradoxically, it has not. The younger generation, on the whole, is not interested in small-scale political activities; nor is it involved in the kind of revolt against the established government that Western nations have had to face in the last decade. Nevertheless the degree of personal and intellectual involvement is extremely high.

Israelis are passionately interested in politics, but they take the rough and tumble of political strife in their stride almost as easily as they draw breath.

To conclude. The Israeli political system has many drawbacks: there is perhaps too great a centralization of power and increasing bureau-cratization; ideologies are not as clear-cut as they were before 1948; and a technocracy is becoming entrenched. Thus there is the familiar 'crisis of modern democracy' in Israel—but there is also a stable political system. The State has been in existence for only twenty-five years, and although some of its critics are despondent, many other objective observers within the country and outside it have been im-pressed by the sophistication of Israel's political culture while they are also hopeful that the search for improved patterns will be successful.

NOTES

[1] An abridged version of this paper was presented at a symposium on 'Israel Society' organized by the Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, and held at University College London on 18 March 1973.

[2] There is an abundant literature on the social and political structure of Israel. I have found the following works particularly helpful in the prepara-tion of this article: B. Akzin and Y. Dror, *Israel—High Pressure Planning*, Syracuse, 1968; A. Brichta, 'The Social and Political Characteristics of Members of the Seventh Knesset' in A. Arian, ed., *The Elections in Israel—1969*, Jerusalem, 1972; S. N. Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society*, London, 1967; L. Fein, *Politics in Israel*, Boston, 1967; and E. Guttmann and M. Lissak, eds, *Political Institutions and Processes in Israel, A Reader*, Jerusalem, 1971.

[3] The only two organizations which remained outside the spectrum until just before the establishment of the Jewish State were the ultra-orthodox Agudat Israel and the Palestinian communist Jewish groups.

[4] A total number of 1,365,341 Jewish immigrants settled in Israel between 15 May 1948 and 31 December 1970, according to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics; see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Division, *Facts*

About Israel, 1972, p. 49. There were 97,000 immigrants in 1971 and 1972 (41,000 in 1971, and 56,000 in 1972); see *Zionist Year Book, 1973*, London, 1973, p. 297.

[5] It is worth pointing out here that only the parliamentary composition of the Netherlands, another *Parteienstaat*, is comparable to that of Israel.

[6] Parents are not limited in their choice of schools; they can send their children to a state school which is either 'secular' or 'religious'; or they can opt for an independent Agudat Israel school (which receives some aid from government and is in part under state supervision).

[7] There are various state-subsidized sick funds (*kupot holim*) to which about 85 per cent of the population subscribe. As for the remaining 15 per cent, most of them have recourse to the municipal or national services. In addition, there are State-run welfare agencies, and there are also private charitable and welfare associations.

[8] In Holland and the Scandinavian countries, for example, an increasing number of deputies, and even ministers, are under the age of forty. The youngest Israeli minister is in his late forties, while the middle generation of Labour ministers (like Mr. Dayan and Mr. Allon) are in their mid or late fifties.

[9] No cabinet has ever been overthrown by a vote of non-confidence. All crises have resulted from breakdowns *within* the cabinet, or from a Prime Minister's decision to resign. His or her resignation automatically entails the dissolution of the cabinet—but not necessarily of parliament.

[10] It has kept under its control the key ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Education, Agriculture, and Police.

[11] Until 1967, Mapai had always adhered to Ben-Gurion's historic decision to exclude Herut and the communist parties from any coalition. This is still the case as far as the communists are concerned. The ban was lifted on Herut which, in alignment with the Liberalim, joined the government of National Union shortly before the outbreak of the Six-Day War. It remained in it until August 1970; and although it is now no longer in the majority coalition, it has acquired legitimacy and has become a 'loyal opposition'.

[12] The third and fourth aliyot are the waves of immigrants who came to Palestine roughly between 1918 and 1930.

[13] Recent research on the 1969 elections shows that party leaders and officials account for almost three-quarters of all Jewish members of the Knesset. Interest groups account for about 20 per cent, while representatives of Oriental groups total less than 10 per cent. The geographical distribution of the parliamentarians is as follows: 59 from Tel Aviv and its environs; 26 from Jerusalem; 4 from Haifa; 17 from kibbutzim; 4 from moshavim; and only 3 from development towns. As for country of birth, 62 were born in eastern Europe (36 in Poland, 22 in Russia, and 4 in Rumania); 8 in central Europe, 2 in English-speaking countries, 8 in Asia, 5 in Africa; and there are 27 Sabras. (See A. Brichta, op. cit., p. 119, and Central Bureau of Statistics, *Election Results* (in Hebrew), Publication no. 309, Jerusalem, 1970, p. 15.) There are also seven Arab members in the Knesset.

[14] In 1971 there were 229 kibbutzim accounting for 2·8 per cent of Israel's total population, or 3·3 per cent of the Jewish population. The moshav is a co-operative village where every family is in charge of its own household and works its own plot of land; but marketing and supply are handled

co-operatively. In 1971 there were 347 moshavim; they accounted for 4·2 per cent of the total population of Israel.

15 As stated earlier, 'young' is a relative term, especially in Israel; here it refers essentially to second-generation politicians or to those in their thirties and forties.

16 Former commander-in-chief of Israel's air force, then chief of operations in the general staff, later Minister of Transport in the Government of National Union.

17 Some support a tiny leftist intellectual group which calls itself 'Israel's New Left'. This group considers historical Palestine to be the cradle and fatherland of Jews and Palestinians, who are entitled to their respective homeland; it demands the withdrawal of Israel from all territories brought under its control after the Six-Day War.

18 One of them, Mr. Hammer, even became deputy Minister of Education in January 1973.

19 Including a firm stand on Israel's historic right to Judea and Samaria, in order that the biblical promise may be fulfilled.

20 The main impetus came in 1959. A populist movement developed in a Haifa slum area under the leadership of a Moroccan immigrant, Mr. Ben-Haroche. Several months before the general elections, violent clashes with the police took place. Mr. Ben-Haroche set up a party, the object of which was to eliminate the inequalities whose victims were Oriental Jews. The party did not get the necessary one per cent of valid votes; and an equal fate befell later attempts on a smaller scale to revive 'ethnic' parties. However, the Establishment had to take more note of the serious discontent expressed.

21 See *Report of the Committee on Income Distribution and Social Inequality*, Tel Aviv, 1971, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Division, *Social Problems in Israel—Trends and Policies*, Jerusalem, October 1972.

22 Recent social unrest is aggravated by the conviction on the part of Oriental Jews that the immigrants from the West, and especially from the U.S.S.R., have received excessive preferential treatment; even Sabras and earlier European immigrants have voiced criticism. See Erik Cohen, 'The Black Panthers and Israeli Society', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XIV, no. 1 (June 1972).

23 With few exceptions (for example, the late Mr. Hushi in Haifa or Mr. Kollek in Jerusalem), political parties do not select their more able or popular leaders as their representatives on municipal or local councils.

24 Municipal elections are held on the same day as national elections and following the same electoral principle: the citizen votes for a party list 'en bloc'. The mayor is elected by the municipal council and is dependent upon it. In most cases a coalition is necessary, and in most municipalities one finds the same national parties with a few additional local lists; 'package deals' between parties are not infrequent. A bill is now under discussion to elect mayors directly and thus to reward personal achievements; the power of party politics would then decline. However, the bill is unlikely to become law before the 1973 general election.

25 For a recent concise account of the change in local government élite groups, see Shlomo Avineri, 'Israel: Two Nations?', in *Midstream*, vol. XVIII, no. 5, May 1972.

[26] However, this will be a positive solution only if adequate education allows a competent leadership to emerge in the regions. Otherwise it means that local populist leadership based on specific criteria (such as ethnic origin) will jeopardize the decision-making capacities of national institutions.

[27] After long procrastination, a private member's bill aiming at a modification of the electoral system was presented to the Knesset on 12 July 1972; it was referred by a majority of 61 to 45 (with 3 abstentions) to a preliminary examination by the Constitution and Law Committee. It is doubtful, however, whether it will become law before the next general elections (November 1973); this means, in effect, that the status quo will probably persist for at least another five years.

[28] Only a very brief analysis can be attempted within the framework of the present discussion, since the problem extends far beyond the socio-political realm. It is a rather fundamental ideological issue, at the very core of Israel's existence.

[29] Carried out by the Dahaf Institute; the results were published in the Hebrew daily, *Al Hamishmar*, on 10 October 1972.

[30] The term status quo meant that in all other matters the pre-State regulations or practice concerning public transport, broadcasting, etc., on the Sabbath would be preserved. See Michael Gurevitch and Gila Schwartz, 'Television and the Sabbath Culture in Israel', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XIII, no. 1 (June 1971).

[31] Parallel legislation subjected members of other recognized religions to their respective autonomous religious courts.

[32] Mainly that of a Cohen and a divorcée; and there is an uncompromising refusal to allow Jews born from an adulterous or 'sinful' union to contract marriage in Israel. See Mordecai Roshwald, 'Who is a Jew in Israel?', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XII, no. 2 (December 1970).

[33] Courts have supported individuals or groups who sought injunctions against the authorities when the latter interfered with their freedom of conscience, as in cases of a local authority's refusal to license a place of worship or a non-kasher food shop, although State legislation does not entitle it to do so.

[34] The Israeli religious parties receive active moral support from a part of the Jewish establishment abroad (particularly in the United States). For Diaspora Jewry, religion is a vital focus of Jewish identity.

[35] Mr. Ben-Gurion admitted he had been wrong to incorporate rabbinical exclusive jurisdiction on Jewish marriages and divorces in the 'status quo', but he did so only after he had left office. Mr. Dayan is probably unhappy about the situation, but says little or nothing unless the hardship case concerns a member of the armed forces. Even then, he intervenes very discreetly. Mrs. Meir expresses dismay over the situation but simultaneously claims herself to be bound by coalition agreements (which she and her party had deliberately endorsed).

[36] 'Theocracy in Israel—in Antiquity and Today', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XIV, no. 1 (June 1972).

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SOME STATISTICAL DATA ON THE JEWS AMONG THE SCIENTIFIC ELITE OF THE SOVIET UNION

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IN this survey I use the term 'science' in the sense in which it is employed in the Soviet Union; it corresponds more nearly to the English term 'knowledge' and includes not only the areas defined as science in Western terminology (such as physics, mathematics, chemistry, geology, biology, medicine, etc.), but social studies and humanities as well. In Soviet publications, geography, history, economics, philosophy (which includes political science), law, education, art, architecture, etc., are classed among the latter.

There are only scanty Soviet statistical data for the 1930s and 1940s on 'scientific workers' (*nauchnye rabotniki*) by nationality. When the Soviet Union publishes statistics concerning individuals, the data are listed under four categories: Union Republics (*Soiuznye Respubliki*); Autonomous Republics (*Avtonomnye Respubliki*); Autonomous Regions (*Avtonomnye Oblasti*); and 'others' which have no national administrative unit in the U.S.S.R. Thus, a Ukrainian scientific worker living in Moscow will be listed in the first category under the heading 'Ukrainians'.

Statistical data published in the 1930s and 1940s dealt only with individuals for whose nationality there was a union republic. In the mid-1950s Soviet sources began to publish data on the national distribution of those scientific workers for whose nationality there were autonomous republics or national autonomous regions. Within that framework, the Jews (for whom there is an autonomous region— Birobidzan) were listed as a separate category.

To the best of my knowledge, it was only in 1970 that, for the first time, the authorities published these data, in respect of the year 1950. In that year there were 162,508 scientific workers in the U.S.S.R., including 132,428 (81·5 per cent) members of nationalities for whom there are union republics, while in the 'others' there were 30,080 (18·5 per cent).

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The 30,080 were distributed by nationality as follows:[1]

TABLE I. *Distribution of scientific workers by nationalities having either Autonomous Republics or Autonomous Regions—1950*

Nationality	Absolute Numbers	%
Jews	25,125	83·53
Tatars	1,297	4·31
Ossetins	300	1·00
Chuvashes	301	1·00
Mordvins	155	0·52
Bashkirs	146	0·49
Dagestan nationalities	139	0·46
Komi	121	0·40
Buriats	107	0·36
Udmurts	76	0·25
Marii (Cheremis)	67	0·22
Yakuts	51	0·17
Karels	37	0·12
Kabardins	32	0·11
Kara-Kalpaks	19	0·06
Abkhazians	15	0·05
Adigeys	13	0·04
Khakasses	10	0·03
Altays	4	0·01
All other (unspecified)	2,065	6·87
Total	30,080	100·00

Since the Soviet Union has maintained a constant policy of encouraging the members of small and weak nationalities to enter the ranks of the scientific workers at a faster rate than the general rate of increase,[2] we may state with reasonable assurance that in the preceding years the proportion of Jews among the scientific workers from nationalities without union republics would have been at least similar to that in 1950.

In 1947 there was a total of 145,600 scientific workers in the Soviet Union, of whom 114,250 (78·5 per cent) were from nationalities for whom there are union republics, while the remaining 31,350 (21·5 per cent) were not from such nationalities.[3] If the 1947 percentage of Jews among these 31,350 scientific workers had corresponded to their percentage in 1950, they would have numbered 26,186 in 1947. There are official statistics on the distribution of the Jews among scientific workers for 1955, and these data have been regularly published since 1958.

Table 2 shows two periods in the integration of Jews among scientific workers. Until 1955 there was a marked reduction in the absolute and comparative figures for Jews; it seems that during that period Jews were given practically no opportunity to become scientific workers, while their absolute number in that category decreased as a result of mortality and also, as we know, of dismissals.[6] The figures therefore

confirm the existence of a deliberate anti-Jewish policy characterizing the last years of the Stalin regime.

In the second period (see the figures in Table 2 for 1955–70), there is, first, a constant rise in the absolute number of Jews among scientific

TABLE 2. *Jews among the scientific workers in 1947, 1950, 1955, 1958–61, 1963–70*

Year	Scientific workers (total number)	Jews	Jews as percentage of total
1947	145,600	26,186	17·98
1950	162,508	25,125	15·46
1955	223,893	24,620[4]	11·00
1958	284,038	28,966[5]	10·20
1959	310,022	30,633	9·88
1960	354,158	33,529	9·47
1961	404,126	36,173	8·95
1963	565,958	48,012	8·48
1964	611,964	50,915	8·32
1965	664,584	53,067	7·98
1966	712,419	56,070	7·87
1967	770,013	58,952	7·66
1968	822,910	61,131	7·43
1969	883,420	63,661	7·21
1970	927,709	64,392	6·94

workers and, second, a slow decline in their proportion of the total in that category. In 1955–70, 39,772 Jews became scientific workers—and the figures take no account of those who died during that period and about whom we have no data. During those same years the relative proportion of Jews among scientific workers declined by approximately one-third (from 11 per cent in 1955 to 6·94 per cent in 1970).

Three principal factors have probably been responsible for that slow but constant decline.

(1) There has been a reduction in the Jewish percentage of the general population and particularly that of the urban population. While in the census of 1959 Jews constituted 1·1 per cent of the total population, in the 1970 census they accounted for only 0·9 per cent. Their proportion in the urban population also declined sharply between the two censuses; in 1959 they constituted 2·2 per cent of that population. The 1970 census does not reveal the number of Jews in the urban areas—it merely gives the total number of Jews in the U.S.S.R., but even if we assume that *all* Jews lived in the cities, their percentage of the total urban population would be only 1·6 or three-quarters of the 1959 figure. In the corresponding period (1959–70) the proportion of Jews listed as scientific workers also declined by almost one-quarter (from 9·88 per cent in 1959 to 6·94 in 1970).

(2) If it is true that the average age of the Jewish population is higher than the general average in the Soviet Union or even of the

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European peoples in that country, this difference can affect the rate of entry of young persons into the class of scientific workers and the proportion of Jews within it.

(3) One must, however, take into account the traditional Jewish aspiration to higher learning in general, and in particular their pre-dilection for research work, and also the fact that Jews are concentrated in large towns, as are the principal institutions of research and higher learning. It is, therefore, difficult to regard the constant decline in the proportion of Jews among scientific workers as resulting only from demographic factors. We can reasonably assume the existence of discriminatory policies.

The distribution of scientific workers is not uniform in all regions of the Soviet Union. These workers are generally concentrated in those cities where there are centres of research and institutes of higher learning; most of these cities happen also to be important centres of Jewish population. For instance, in January 1971, 25·2 per cent of the total number of scientific workers in the Soviet Union were living in Moscow alone (233,641 out of 927,709).[7] In that city—where, accord-ing to the 1959 census, approximately 10·6 per cent of the Jews in the Soviet Union then lived (239,246 out of 2,267,841)—there were, at the beginning of 1971, 38·9 per cent Jewish scientific workers (25,023 out of 64,392), who constituted 10·7 per cent of that category of the city's workers.

Despite the constant decline in the relative proportion of Jews among scientific workers, the institutions of research and higher learning (where the large majority of these workers are employed) are still a source of livelihood for a not inconsiderable part of the Jewish population. If we assume that the Jewish household consists of three members, then in 1970 approximately 8–9 per cent of the total number of Jews in the Soviet Union (and about one-quarter of all Jews living in Moscow) were supported by individuals who were gainfully em-ployed in scientific work.

All scientific workers in the Soviet Union cannot be considered as constituting the scientific élite; the definition of the term 'scientific worker' is loose: those thus defined include all members of academies of science and all holders of the title of doctor or 'candidate' (the only two academic titles in the Soviet Union). They also include all those who have graduated from institutions of higher learning and who are engaged in teaching, in research, or even in the administration of institutions of higher learning and of research institutes. Moreover, once an individual has received an academic title, or has been listed as a scientific worker, he remains in that category even when he has gone on to administrative work not connected with institutions of higher learning or research institutes, and even when he has ceased to engage in any scientific activity.[8] In view of the wide use of the term,

it is doubtful whether the nearly one million scientific workers enumerated in 1970 can be regarded as the scientific élite of the Soviet Union. Therefore I think it reasonable to restrict the membership of that élite to those bearing the title of 'doctor' and to the senior staff in educational institutions of higher learning or working in research institutes —whether or not they have been awarded doctorates. That scientific élite therefore constitutes only a small fraction of the total number of scientific workers: in 1969 there were 883,420 scientific workers but only 21,800 (2·5 per cent) of them held the title of doctor. That percentage was higher for Moscow than for the country as a whole, and at the beginning of 1971 rose to 3·4 per cent (8,071 with the title of doctor out of a total of 233,641). The percentage of Jews with the title of doctor among the scientific workers in Moscow was almost double that of the general average (1,559 doctors among the 25,023 Jewish scientific workers, or 6·2 per cent). If the Jews accounted for 10·7 per cent of those workers in Moscow at the beginning of 1971, then their percentage among the 'doctors' in that city was 19·3. While this isolated statistical datum confirms the belief that Jews hold a well-established place in the Soviet scientific élite, it does not indicate the distribution of the Jewish élite in the various areas of scientific activity or its composition according to age, etc.

An examination of the Jews in the scientific élite has been made on the basis of a biographical compendium published in 1968 on the doctors and teachers in educational institutions of higher learning and research institutes in the Ukraine.[9] Since more than one-third of the Jewish population live in that Soviet republic (37 per cent according to the 1959 census and 36·1 per cent according to that of 1970), while over 13 per cent of the total number of doctors in the Soviet Union are to be found there (2,867 out of 21,815 in 1969),[10] we may consider that an analysis of the data on the participation of Jews in the scientific élite of the Ukraine might indicate similar tendencies for other areas of the Soviet Union. The book includes 1,644 biographies; 1,433 are of those holding the title of doctor, and 211 of teachers who do not have the title. In 1968, there were 2,867 persons who had doctorates in the Ukraine. Only 50 per cent of the total number were included in the compendium; the other 50 per cent were evidently working in research institutions which did not in addition train students (either because of an insufficiently high standard or on grounds of security). Thus the compendium cannot give a complete and accurate picture of even the scientific élite in the Ukraine; neither does it specify the nationality of the researchers, and I have therefore had to rely on the method of Distinctive Jewish Names. This might also give rise to some inaccuracies, but since the majority of persons listed were over forty years old, and since generally the full name of the father is given (and as, in most cases, that name cannot be easily altered), we may assume that the

inaccuracies are not likely to be statistically significant. For greater caution, I have not included in these statistics a person whose Jewish nationality appeared doubtful. Despite these limitations, an examination on this basis might conceivably open the way to further surveys of the participation of Jews in the Soviet scientific élite.

Out of 1,644 doctors and teachers employed in 1968 in higher educational institutions in the Ukraine, 214 (13·02 per cent) were Jewish. Of the senior teaching staff, there were 211 (12·8 per cent) teachers without the title of doctor, while among Jews the comparative figure was only 20 (9·3 per cent). Those with the title of doctor were distributed in 17 areas of science, as follows:

TABLE 3. *Distribution of Jews among doctors in 17 areas of 'science'*

| Discipline | Total | | Jews | | |
	Absolute numbers	%	Absolute numbers	% of total in discipline	% of total number of Jews
Medicine	384	26·80	66	17·19	34·02
Technical Sciences	345	24·08	56	16·23	28·86
Physics-mathematics	137	9·56	32	23·36	16·49
Biological sciences	113	7·89	7	6·19	3·61
Agriculture	90	6·28	4	4·44	2·06
Chemistry	81	5·65	12	14·81	6·19
History	74	5·16	2	2·70	1·03
Economics	46	3·21	4	8·70	2·06
Linguistics	45	3·14	3	6·67	1·55
Veterinary science	36	2·51	—	—	—
Geology	33	2·30	—	—	—
Philosophy	16	1·12	2	12·50	1·03
Law	15	1·05	5	33·33	2·58
Geography	7	0·49	—	—	—
Architecture	5	0·34	—	—	—
Education	4	0·28	1	25·00	0·52
Pharmacy	2	0·14	—	—	—
Total	1,433	100·00	194	13·54	100·00

Table 3 shows that 79·37 per cent of the Jewish doctors in the Ukraine are concentrated in three branches of science (medicine, technical sciences, and physics-mathematics), while the general total in these branches is only 60·4 per cent. Moreover, only 8·77 per cent of Jews who are doctors are found in the humanities and the social sciences, while the general percentage in these fields is 14·0.

Three principal factors are probably responsible for this situation: (1) the traditional tendency of Jews to take up medicine; (2) their wish to take up branches of academic work that are less subject to political vicissitudes; and (3) the lesser severity of anti-Jewish discrimination in these branches than in the social sciences and the humanities.

An examination of the age groups in the scientific élite under review

illustrates the extent to which Jews continue to maintain their position in that category.

Table 4 shows that while 30·8 per cent of the total number of doctors and teachers in Ukrainian universities are over 65 years old, the Jews in that age group constitute 37·4 per cent. The situation is clearly reversed in the case of those aged 35–44 years, who constitute 9·18 per cent of the total scientific élite in the universities, while among the Jewish élite that age group accounts for only 4·2 per cent. It is therefore

TABLE 4. *Doctors and teachers in the Ukraine by age group*

	Total			Jews		
Age Group	Absolute numbers	%		Absolute numbers	%	% of Jews in the same age group
75–89	87	5·29		9	4·21	10·34
65–74	419	25·49		71	33·18	16·94
55–64	631	38·38		89	41·59	14·10
45–54	356	21·66		36	16·82	10·11
35–44	151	9·18		9	4·20	5·96
Total	1,644	100·00		214	100·00	

the older Jewish teachers who largely account for the fact that Jews constitute approximately 13 per cent of teachers in institutions of higher learning; as for the younger Jewish age group, its relative absolute number is diminishing. In this context it is worth noting the average age of those with the title of doctor in the various academic fields in 1968, and their average age when they were awarded the title.

Table 5 shows that the average age of all Jewish doctors employed in higher educational institutions in 1968 was higher than that of the general average. The difference is especially marked in the social sciences and the humanities, in which the average Jewish age is in a range above that of the general average from 12·7 years in economics to 4·5 years in linguistics. These data also confirm the statement that there are fewer Jews in the humanities and in social studies than in other fields. In the biological sciences, Jewish doctors are also older than their colleagues in the same discipline by between 2·2 to 6·2 years; the smallest age differences (0·3 to 1·3 years) occur in physics-mathe- matics. That fact is surprising since Jews received their doctorates in the biological sciences and in physics-mathematics at an average age which was lower than that of the general average (by 0·1 year in the technical sciences and 4·4 years in biology). It is also worth noting that of the 1,433 doctors who taught in universities in the Ukraine in 1968, only three became doctors when they were 24 years old, and all of them were Jews (Ilya Mikhaelovitch Lifshitz, Mikhaelo Samuelovitch Lifshitz,

and Solomon Yesakowich Pekar); the three doctorates were in physics-mathematics. Of the two who were granted doctorates at the age of 27, one was a Jew (Danyelo Osievich Alpern—medicine).

Since the age of Jewish doctors employed in the universities of the Ukraine is higher than the general average (while it was lower at the time of the award), it is useful to examine the ages at which doctorates are generally obtained. Such an examination should be preceded by a brief explanation of the special procedure for the award of doctorates in the Soviet Union.

After the October 1917 revolution, all academic titles were officially abolished. On 13 January 1934, an official decree allowed two academic

TABLE 5. *Average age of doctors in 1968, and average age in year of award, by discipline*

Discipline	Average age in 1968		Differences	Average age in year of award		Differences
	Total	Jews		Total	Jews	
Biological sciences						
Medicine	57·7	63·9	6·2	45·5	45·0	—0·5
Biology	60·9	66·4	5·5	47·4	43·0	—4·4
Agriculture	62·6	64·8	2·2	50·9	48·0	—2·9
Physical and Mathe-matical Sciences						
Physics-Mathematics	51·7	53·0	1·3	40·0	37·4	—2·6
Chemistry	59·0	59·7	0·7	47·1	47·1	—
Technical studies	58·0	58·3	0·3	46·5	46·4	—0·1
Social Sciences and the Humanities						
Economics	61·3	74·0	12·7	49·2	60·8	11·6
Law	61·0	70·6	9·6	49·2	57·2	8·0
Philosophy	53·0	62·0	9·0	46·2	52·5	6·3
History	54·5	60·5	6·0	51·1	45·0	—6·1
Education	68·0	73·0	5·0	57·0	57·0	—
Linguistics	55·8	60·3	4·5	52·5	56·3	3·8

titles to be conferred in the country; since academic titles could not be conferred all at once, it was decided that every person with the rank of teacher on the date of publication of the decree should be awarded the title of doctor after publicly defending a thesis. The Higher Awards Committee *Vak (Vysshaia attestatzionnaia komissiia)* was established in 1938, in order to maintain consistency in academic standards and to guide senior academic staff; it was also to provide central supervision in matters of promotion and of the award of degrees. Apart from keeping a general register of all senior academic staff, the *Vak* has 'other duties', which have never been clearly defined; it also has the final say in awarding the title of doctor. After the candidate has completed his research thesis, he defends it publicly, and the *Vak* decides whether or not to confer the title. The *Vak* also acts as chief supervisor of the political and ideological soundness of the doctoral thesis; that

undoubtedly leads the various institutions to examine the theses closely before they are submitted.[11] With such a structure it is clear that political considerations, and in this case national politics, are not among the least important points at issue in the eventual award of doctorates. It is therefore important to look into the figures relating to these awards to Jews at various periods.

Of the 1,433 doctors whose biographies appear in the compendium, the year of conferment of the title is mentioned in 1,419 cases; they are distributed as follows:

TABLE 6. *Jews awarded doctorates by discipline and by years of award*

Years	Biological Sciences			Physics-Mathematics			Social Studies and Humanities		
	Absolute numbers		Jewish %	Absolute numbers		Jewish %	Absolute numbers		Jewish %
	Total	Jews		Total	Jews		Total	Jews	
To 1935	11	8	72·7	2	—	—	3	—	—
1936–41	91	20	22·0	56	14	25·0	4	2	50·0
1942–45	28	8	28·6	28	6	21·4	4	—	—
1946–53	109	9	8·3	129	19	14·7	19	3	15·8
1954–68	383	32	8·4	370	61	16·5	182	12	6·6
Total	622	77		585	100		212	17	

The years 1946–53 show a drastic decline in the proportion of Jews. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that even in the 'black years' (1949–52) it was still possible for Jews to obtain doctorates: during that period the title was conferred upon 18 Jews: medicine, 6; technology, 6; chemistry, 2; biology, 1; physics-mathematics, 1; law, 1; education, 1.

It is interesting that in the fifteen years following Stalin's death the proportion of Jewish doctorates did not rise, except for a slight increase in physics-mathematics. The holding of administrative posts in the Soviet Union, even in the academic sphere, is linked with membership in the Communist Party, and it is thus of interest to examine the proportion of Jews who were members of that party among the teachers and doctors in institutions of higher learning in the Ukraine in 1968.

Among the teachers and doctors who taught in educational institutions of higher learning in the Ukraine in 1968, 62·5 per cent—1,028 out of 1,644—were members of the Communist Party; while among the Jews there were only 43 per cent—92 out of 214 (see totals in Tables 4 and 7). From the period 1944–53 (party seniority, 15–24 years), the percentage of Jews in the party continuously declined. This may stem from the reluctance of Jewish professionals to become intensely involved in political-party matters or from obstacles put in the way of those wishing to join. But whatever the cause, the low percentage of Jewish university teachers within the party (at any rate according

to this sample) probably reduces their chances of obtaining senior administrative posts. Although the sample studied here is drawn from only one Soviet republic, the Ukraine, and although (as we saw) even the Ukrainian data are incomplete, that sample—if it adequately reflects the extent of the Jewish sector within the scientific élite of the whole Soviet Union—shows that Jews constitute a higher percentage among the scientific workers than their proportion in the general

TABLE 7. *Seniority in Communist Party membership among doctors and teachers in institutions of higher learning in the Ukrainian S.S.R., 1968*

Years of Seniority	Total		Jews		
	Absolute numbers	% of total	Absolute numbers	%	% of total Jews
Over 50	1	0·1	—	—	—
45–50	16	1·6	4	25·0	4·3
35–44	110	10·7	10	9·1	10·9
25–34	251	24·4	31	12·4	33·7
15–24	484	47·1	39	8·1	42·4
5–14	133	12·9	7	5·3	7·6
Less than 5	33	3·2	1	3·0	1·1
Total	1,028	100·0	92	8·9	100·0

population would warrant. That high percentage is mainly the result of the fact that Jews were prominent in the scientific élite of the 1930s and of the early 1940s, while their entry into that élite from the mid-1950s onwards reflects their proportion in the ranks of scientific workers. Since the scientific élite discussed here is limited in number, it is difficult to argue that recent trends reflect demographic factors. The steep decline in the Jewish percentage of the scientific élite seems to be due to the increasing attempt made by various nationalities to gain access to that élite as well as to the special policies pursued by the authorities towards Jews who are in that category.

NOTES

I wish to thank one of my students, Miss Maya Crieghel, for her assistance in the preparation of this article.

[1] *Narodnoe Khoziaystvo S.S.S.R. v 1969 g.*, Moscow, 1970, p. 696.

[2] In the years 1950–55 the total number of scientific workers increased by 38 per cent, while the number of Kabardins and Yakuts in that category doubled in the same period; the percentages of other nationalities rose, for Dagestan, by 66; Tatars, 65; Buriats, 57; Komi, 55; Karels, 52; and Bashkirs, 50. *Kul'turnoe Stroitel'stvo S.S.S.R.*, Moscow, 1956, p. 254.

[3] The data for 1947 have been calculated from *Strana Sovetov za 50 let*, Moscow, 1967, p. 284.

[4] *Kulturnoe Stroitelstvo*, p. 254.

[5] The data for 1958–70 are taken from the statistical annual *Narodnoe Khoziaystvo S.S.S.R.* for the years under review.

[6] J. A. Gilboa, in his book *The Black Years of Soviet Jewry* (Boston 1971, pp. 158–86), states that many Jewish scientists were denounced in the Soviet Press and subsequently either dismissed from their jobs or imprisoned. See also Mordecai Namir (Israeli Ambassador to Moscow during that period), *Shelihut Bemoskva*, Tel Aviv, 1971, pp. 270–78; he cites a great number of Jewish scientists who were attacked in the Soviet press. Many memoirs also record that Jewish teachers and scholars were dismissed from universities; see, for example, the reminiscences of a medical student in Moscow, Ben-Horin, *Ma Koreh Sham*, Tel Aviv, 1971, pp. 35–51.

[7] All the data on Moscow are taken from *Moskva v Tzifrakh* (1966–70 gg), Moscow, 1972, p. 140.

[8] For the Soviet definition of 'scientific workers', see *Narodnoe Khoziaystvo S.S.S.R. v 1960 g.*, Moscow, 1961, p. 895.

[9] See *Ucheni vuziv Ukrains'koi R.S.R.*, Kiev, 1968.

[10] *Narodnoe Khoziaystvo, S.S.S.R., 1969 g.*, p. 697.

[11] On this, see Nicholas De Witt, *Education and Professional Employment in the USSR*, Washington, 1961, pp. 373–78.

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RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN NATIVE ORTHODOXY IN LONDON, 1870–1914: THE SYNAGOGUE SERVICE

Stephen Sharot

The London Jewish Community in 1880

IN 1880, on the eve of the beginnings of the mass immigration of eastern European Jews into England, the London Jewish community numbered between 40,000 and 45,000, of whom about half had been born in England. In the early decades of the nineteenth century the community had been composed of a small rich upper class, a small middle class of shopkeepers, and a larger lower class of peddlers, hawkers, and charity recipients; but, by 1880, the middle class had grown considerably and the number of peddlers and hawkers had greatly diminished. The following table, based on statistics gathered by Joseph Jacobs in 1883,[1] gives an approximate idea of the class structure of London Jewry before the effects of the mass immigration were felt.

Class	Numbers	%	Average Yearly Income £
Upper (high income professionals and merchants)	6,600	14·6	367
Middle (shopkeepers and low income professionals and merchants)	19,400	42·2	54
Lower (petty traders, servants, and assistants)	9,000	19·6	26
Pauper (charity recipients and others)	11,000	23·6	12

After 1830, socio-economic mobility had been paralleled by migration from the first area of settlement in the City of London to the West End and the north and north-western suburbs.[2] Thus, in 1880, a large proportion of Anglo-Jewry was native born, a sizable Jewish middle class had grown up, and the majority of the upper and middle classes had migrated from the first area of settlement.

New synagogues were established to cater for the new Jewish residential areas, and in 1870 five of the predominantly native 'orthodox' synagogues combined to form a union of synagogues—the United Synagogue. The high cost of seats in the native 'orthodox' synagogues

restricted membership to the upper class and richer sections of the middle class,[3] and the social stratification within the congregations was clearly visible during services since seats were priced according to their proximity to the Bimah and Ark.[4]

The majority of United Synagogue members were highly acculturated to English values, norms, and patterns of behaviour, but religious changes in the synagogue services had been far less radical than in Germany and America where Reform Judaism was the dominant religion among urban middle-class native Jews.[5] The only religious adjustments in the West End and suburbs of London were a small non-radical Reform congregation and a greater emphasis on decorum in the 'orthodox' synagogues. Non-Jews were, for the most part, only cultural references for English Jews in those spheres defined as 'non-religious', but, in certain limited aspects of the 'religious' sphere, Jews did refer to non-Jewish cultural models. Decorum, for example, was an integral part of upper-class religion in England, and acculturated Jews put an ever-increasing emphasis upon it. It is relevant here that, despite the growth of the Jewish middle class, the government of the synagogues remained in the hands of a small self-recruiting upper-class élite; a few upper-class families continued to monopolize the honorary offices of the London synagogues.[6] These leaders had been accepted into English aristocratic circles, but the upper-class Jew's acculturation to the life-styles of the 'gentleman', which was an essential prerequisite for membership in the English upper class, did not involve accepting the religious beliefs or imitating the religious practices of the Church of England. In the sphere of religion the English upper class was tolerant and pluralistic: the Church of England had a rather vague theology, its teachings extended over a wide area, and it emphasized practice rather than principle or ideology. There was Jewish acculturation in the religious sphere, but it was only in the form, as opposed to the content, of the services. Thus, the synagogue services remained traditional in content, but the Reform and native 'orthodox' congregations followed the Church of England in its increasing emphasis on orderliness, dignity, solemnity, and decorum.

Native 'orthodoxy' (the United Synagogue) in the three areas of settlement, 1870–1914

In the period from 1881 to 1914 the London Jewish population increased from about 40,000 to 180,000. The first area of settlement in London, the East End, was by 1910 a densely populated two square miles. By the turn of the century the proportion of Jews in many streets in Stepney was more than 75 per cent, and in some streets it rose above 95 per cent.[7] On the eve of the First World War, approximately two-thirds of the London Jewish population lived in the East End.

The eastern European immigrants felt little common affiliation with the acculturated and secularized native Jews, and they regarded the decorous and unemotional services of the native synagogues with disdain.[8] The immigrants established their own small *chevrot* and synagogues; very few joined either the Reform and Liberal synagogues or the native 'orthodox' synagogues affiliated to the United Synagogue. The number of constituent synagogues affiliated to the latter increased from the original five in 1870 to seventeen in 1915, but only one of the newly affiliated synagogues, the East London Synagogue, was situated in the first area of settlement. Three of the original five constituent synagogues (the Great, Hambro, and New), were situated in the City of London, but the City was no longer the nucleus of the first area of settlement. The United Synagogue was primarily an organization for native middle-class Jews who resided in the second and third areas of settlement, and its expansion was a consequence of the migration of an increasing number of Jews to the London suburbs (see Table 1). However, a small minority of East London Jews did join the United Synagogue; there were others who wanted to do so but were unable to pay the high cost of membership. One 'working man' wrote, in 1888, that the high seat rentals were beyond the means of the 'genuine, honest and independent working classes . . . I contend that every working man has no desire to join a *chevra*, but wishes to have some status in the community by becoming a member of the United Synagogue.'[9] Another 'poor Jew' wrote in 1874: 'I am a regular attendant at one of our large synagogues. That is, I am what is styled by some of the petty officials a "squatter". I occupy, nearly all the year round, the seat of a gentleman who seldom has occasion to pray . . . I pray for him—my first prayer on entering the synagogue being that he might not come there that day. For, he once had *Jahrzeit* on a Festival and I was terribly put out when he ejected me . . . At the time of *Rosh Hashannah* and *Yom Kippur*, of course, I cannot occupy a seat . . . I am too poor to rent a seat . . . Why, then, should I be shut out entirely from publicly joining in the worship of God at the most solemn time of the year merely because I have the double misfortune to be poor and religious?'[10]

The type of seat allocated to non-seatholders was largely dependent upon their style of dress. At the United Synagogues, the non-seatholding poor were normally relegated to the back, and there were incidents of poor women being refused admission to the ladies' gallery.[11] The 'high-hat' was a sign of respectability and it was a necessity for a worshipper who wished to be called to the Reading of the Law. One Jewish visitor from America found that the beadles sifted the synagogue visitors according to their headgear, and when he wore his 'favourite low hat' he was relegated to the back.[12]

Nearly all the vacant seats in the City synagogues in 1870 were in the

$$\text{TABLE I. } United\ Synagogue\ membership$$

	1873 M	1880 M	1885 M	1890 M	1895 M	1900 M	1900 F	1905 M	1905 F	1910 M	1910 F	1915 M	1915 F
Great	438	400	380	449	443	449	54	419	35	410	97	434	113
Hambro	131	162	157	102	106	199	73	202	77	212	85	214	82
New	345	358	337	294	316	318	57	254	37	204	37	478	262
Bayswater	325	318	350	377	359	365	335	346	314	306	260	331	239
Central	411	380	340	334	328	355	199	363	157	380	160	354	157
Borough (1872)	162	170	173	152	162	167	68	176	80	177	75	194	87
St. John's Wood (1876)		79	192	298	334	373	289	316	275	317	276	340	273
East London (1877)		227	237	272	306	345	39	338	58	340	76	352	91
North London (1878)		252	226	163	181	235	126	175	88	235	90	252	91
West End (1879)		209	251	260	279	322	295	317	306	317	314	314	308
Dalston (1885)			238	269	323	365	262	345	251	368	257	341	237
Hammersmith (1890)				57	117	175	88	215	78	295	85	353	131
Hampstead (1892)					213	384	308	480	402	486	401	476	399
South Hackney (1897)						252	128	337	164	352	147	342	161
Stoke Newington (1903)								307	176	434	215	407	180
Brondesbury (1905)								170	139	316	233	461	312
Brixton (1914)												179	92
Total	1,812	2,555	2,879	3,027	3,467	4,314	2,321	4,760	2,637	5,149	2,808	5,822	3,215
Total (males and females)	2,701	3,926	4,542	4,688	5,377	6,635		7,397		7,957		9,037	

Date joined United Synagogue in brackets
M = Male
F = Female

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high-priced range; the synagogues had not adjusted their prices to the migration of the wealthier Jews and to the increase in the number and proportion of the less wealthy in the area. The *Jewish Chronicle* argued, in 1870, that a synagogue seat 'should not be the exclusive privilege of the rich ... The interests of the respectable middle classes should be considered.'[13] In order to 'increase the annual income of the United Synagogue', the treasurers suggested to the boards of management of the City synagogues that they redistribute their seating arrangements and substitute lower-priced seats for the higher-priced seats. This was done to some extent.[14] If the seat rentals, burial rate, offerings, and other rates and taxes are added together, the average total contribution for each man's seat that was let in these synagogues in the first area of settlement was as follows:[15]

	1875	1880	1890	1900	1910	1915
Great	£7. 1. 5	£7. 8.11	£6.14.10	£5.10. 9	£5.14. 0	£4.13.11
Hambro	£4.17. 1	£4.18.11	£4. 6. 2	£2.11. 1	£2. 5. 2	£1.15. 7
New	£5.19. 2	£5.11. 0	£5. 5. 5	£4. 6. 6	£3.14. 0	£2.11. 6
E. London		£3. 7. 3	£3. 2. 7	£3. 7. 3	£2. 9. 1	£2. 3. 4

Despite the lowering of the price, the cost of membership in the United synagogues was still beyond the means of the majority of immigrants. In the 1890s, the lower-paid employees in tailoring (the biggest immigrant trade) earned between 15 and 20 shillings a week, the middle-grade employees, between 20 and 30 shillings; and the 'well-to-do labour' or 'foreman class' earned about 45 shillings. The profits of the majority of small masters (including the remuneration for their own work) ranged between 35 and 39 shillings a week and did not usually rise above two pounds.[16]

Only the higher paid workers and the lower- and middle-middle classes joined the United synagogues in East London. It is possible to find the approximate class distribution of the members of the United Synagogue at the end of the 1890s by plotting the members' addresses on the 'class' maps in Charles Booth's survey of *London Life and Labour*. The streets in Booth's maps of areas of London were coloured differently according to the numerical predominance of a particular economic class.[17] The plotting of the addresses of a sample of the members of the East London Synagogue suggests that about 20 per cent lived in 'middle-class' streets where the residents kept one or two servants; about 60 per cent lived in streets of 'working-class comfort' where the residents were either comparatively highly paid employees or lower-middle-class small tradesmen; and the remaining 20 per cent lived in streets where 'working-class comfort' was 'mixed with poverty'. The majority of East London Synagogue seatholders were earning between 30 and 50 shillings a week. No members were found in the 'very poor' streets (earning under 18 shillings) or the 'standard poverty' streets (earning between 18 and 21 shillings),[18] although there were probably members of the *chevrot* in those streets.

As the immigrants concentrated in the East End, many of the older Jewish inhabitants in the area migrated out to the second areas of settlement, and, after about a decade of the new immigration, the first of the newcomers joined the migration from the East End. A number moved further east (Bow and Poplar) and to west-central (Soho, St. Pancras), west (Hammersmith, West Kensington, Notting Hill, Shepherds Bush, Ealing), and south London (New Cross, Kew, Brentford, Brixton); but the major second areas of settlement were in north and north-east London (Islington, Hackney, Dalston, Stoke Newington, West Ham, Walthamstow, Leyton, Finsbury Park, and Stamford Hill).[19] The number of Jews in north and north-east London increased from about 3,500 in 1880 to over 25,000 in 1914. Some of the migrants from the East End established their own *chevrot* or joined a synagogue affiliated with the East End-centred Federation of Synagogues, but a greater number joined the United Synagogue.[20]

The majority of Jews who belonged to the United synagogues in the second areas of settlement were from the lower-middle and middle-middle classes. The following table gives the average total contribution for each man's seat that was let in north London and the other second areas of settlement:

	1880	1890	1900	1910	1915
South London					
Borough	£5. 2.10	£5. 5. 7	£4. 6. 5	£3.15. 3	£2. 9.11
West London					
Hammersmith		£1.15. 4	£4.17. 6	£4. 1. 8	£2.19. 4
Brondesbury			£5.12. 2	£6. 2. 2	£3.12. 5
North London					
North London	£7. 1. 8	£7.13. 8	£5.16. 2	£4. 0. 7	£2.19. 2
Dalston		£7. 4.10	£6. 2.11	£5.17.11	£3. 9. 5
South Hackney			£4. 5. 6	£3.10. 9	£2.17. 6
Stoke Newington				£4. 6. 3	£3. 4. 7

The decline in the average contribution in the North London Synagogue reflected the migration of the richer middle-class native Jews from the area and the immigration of the socially mobile but less wealthy from the East End. The average contribution in the north London synagogues in 1910 was about double the contribution in the East London, New, and Hambro synagogues but amounted to about half the average contribution in the synagogues in west and north-west London. In 1898, only two per cent of the members of the North London Synagogue lived in streets where 'working-class comfort' was 'mixed with poverty'; 39 per cent lived in 'working-class comfort' streets containing a large proportion of the 'lower-middle-class of small tradesmen'; 50 per cent lived in 'middle-class' streets where they had one or two servants; and nine per cent lived in 'wealthy' or upper-middle-class streets and kept three or more servants.[21]

As the East End Jews migrated to west-central, south-east, and north London, the more prosperous native Jews left the areas and joined the

prosperous congregations in west and north-west London (Maida Vale, St. John's Wood, and Hampstead). The number of Jews in the north-west London postal area increased from about 1,000 in 1880 to about 9,000 in 1914.

The proportion of adult males who were affiliated to a synagogue in west and north-west London was very high at the end of the Victorian age. For the Victorian middle-class native Jews, affiliation to a synagogue was a sign of respectability, just as affiliation to, or association with, a church was a sign of respectability for middle-class Christians. In 1890, approximately 70 per cent of the 90 per cent affiliated to a synagogue in west, south-west, and north-west London belonged to the United Synagogue. The percentage fell to about 60 (United Synagogue) and 80 (total) in 1900 and to about 40 (United Synagogue) and 60 (total) in 1914.[22] The decline in synagogue affiliation among the middle-class native Jews from about 1890 was paralleled by a decline in church membership among middle-class Christians. For example, the Methodist membership, as a proportion of the population, began to fall quite sharply about 1880, and there was an absolute decline in numbers after 1907.[23]

The following table gives the average total contribution for each man's seat that was let in the United 'native' synagogues:

	1880	1890	1900	1910	1915
Bayswater	£12. 6. 9	£11.11. 1	£11.12. 1	£11.10. 3	£5. 5. 3
Central	£11. 7. 0	£10. 9.11	£ 9.11. 9	£ 9.12. 9	£6.13. 5
St. John's Wood	£ 8. 2. 0	£ 8.10. 6	£ 9.10. 8	£ 8.18. 1	£4.11. 3
New West End	£13.14. 4	£14. 5. 0	£14.11. 4	£14. 9. 2	£7. 4. 4
Hampstead			£ 9.18. 4	£10. 2. 4	£5.12.11

The table suggests that the majority of members were from the middle-middle and upper-middle-classes. The upper middle class predominated in the Bayswater and New West End congregations. In 1898, 0·3 per cent of the male Bayswater seatholders lived in streets where 'working-class comfort' was 'mixed with poverty'; 7 per cent, in upper-lower and lower-middle-class streets; 45 per cent, in middle-class streets where the occupants kept one or two servants; and 47 per cent lived in upper-middle-class streets where the occupants kept three or more servants.[24]

Ritual modifications in native 'orthodoxy'

Only a small minority of United Synagogue seatholders attended synagogue regularly,[25] and only a few seatholders were concerned with the content of the religious services. Few native Jews understood Hebrew, but several members of the rich middle-class congregations were concerned with the meaning of the Hebrew prayers and felt that alterations should be made to reduce and simplify the services and to make them more consistent with the worshippers' beliefs and social situation.

An 'Association for Effecting a Modification in the Liturgy of the German Jews' was formed in 1875 by Walter Josephs. Its object was to obtain the modification or omission of certain portions of the liturgy because of 'the objectionable nature of their contents, unintelligibility of language, repetitious mode of recitation, and the interruption they offer to the continuity of authoritatively prescribed prayers'. The aim of the Association was limited to obtaining alterations which had already been made in orthodox European congregations.[26] The Association appears to have found little support,[27] but, in 1879, a ritual revision committee at the Central Synagogue put forward a number of proposals for changes in the ritual. In addition to a proposal to end the divided Sabbath service, which was peculiar to the Central, the committee's main suggestion was that the *piyuttim* in the Prayer Book should be omitted. The *piyuttim* are a form of synagogue hymn which often deal with Jewish history, doctrine, and ritual law, and they include prayers calling for the slaughter of Jewish martyrs to be avenged. The committee members claimed that they wanted to return to the synagogue service of the 'Talmudic Age' when *piyuttim* were unknown, and as for the prayers for Jewish martyrs, they stated that, 'we have not seen these things, nor are we desirous of revenge'.[28]

The Central Synagogue invited the other surburban synagogues (Bayswater, New West End, St. John's Wood, Borough, North London) to a conference with the object of presenting ritual alterations for sanction to the Chief Rabbi.[29] The North London Synagogue agreed to co-operate only after the invitations to the conference were extended to the East London, New, Hambro, and Great Synagogues.[30] The decision of the Great Synagogue to send representatives led to agitation among several of its members,[31] but finally each of the United synagogues, apart from the more traditionalistic Hambro congregation, sent three representatives to the conference.

The conference of delegates, under the chairmanship of Lionel L. Cohen, issued its report and proposals in March 1880. The report stated that 'the main objects of the Conference . . . were to simplify the ritual, and to improve the performance of the service, without interfering with the natural veneration and reverence felt for the services hitherto in use in our synagogues.' Changes were necessary because

> the circumstances under which our sacred worship is now conducted are in many respects very different from those under which it was carried out in former times. A few centuries ago, in nearly every country of Europe, Jewish worship was barely tolerated, and Jews were regarded as Pariahs. It is consequently not surprising, if prayers first composed under the influence of the feelings of resentment engendered by persecution, reflect traces of these bitter feelings . . . [I]n Germany, Poland, and all countries in which the traces of the passage of the Crusades were felt by the un-

fortunate and wronged Israelites, and where moreover the power of the Jewish intellect was compulsorily restricted, the synagogue service was lengthened by additions, showing signs of the sufferings under which they were composed . . . The present juncture appears opportune for the consideration of a moderate judicious and temperate movement in the direction of simpler services. The nature of the present movement is essentially conservative in its character.

The delegates proposed that with the exception of a number of poetical compositions read on the New Year and Day of Atonement, almost all the *piyuttim* should be removed from the authorized Prayer Book.

Several modifications suggested by the ritual conference reflected the secular nature of the Anglo-Jewish community. The committee proposed the omission of passages in the *Selihot* (penitential prayers) which appeal to angels, the 'Holy Law' and the 'Gates of Heaven' to intercede between the worshipper and God. The low value given to religious knowledge was also reflected in a proposal to omit selections from the Talmud in the Prayer book. The committee stated:[32]

> The Jewish man of business to-day . . . has no taste for those Talmudic studies . . . [He] does not understand the language of those Talmudic extracts. The time has gone by for the study of Talmudic literature in the synagogue. The synagogue, as everybody knows, was once literally the *Shull*, the House of Study. It is now simply and solely the House of Prayer. Passages from the Talmud which were formerly in their place in the prayer book are, consequently, out of place in it now.

The proposals were considered and, for the most part, adopted by the Boards of Management of the synagogues.[33] The proposals were then considered by the Chief Rabbi, Nathan Adler, who sanctioned 'those modifications which do not impair the integrity of our Book of Daily Prayers . . . and which do not infringe upon [the statutes] prescribed in the [*Shulhan Aruch*]'. He sanctioned the omission of most of the *piyuttim* and the passages in the *Selihot* which invoked the intercession of angels, but he refused to sanction several of the other proposals.[34] The modifications passed by the Chief Rabbi were ratified by meetings of the seatholders at the various synagogues.[35] At first, the Board of Management of the Great Synagogue decided not to follow the alterations, and the Chief Rabbi expressed his 'most sincere satisfaction . . . that in the Great Synagogue no alteration of our Ritual will take place.'[36] In January 1881, however, the Great Synagogue did adopt some very slight modifications in the service.[37]

Apart from the Hambro Synagogue, the United synagogues in the first area of settlement did adopt, in part at least, the modifications proposed by the suburban congregations in 1879,[38] but the East London and City synagogues did not join the suburban and West End synagogues in the movement for further ritual changes in the 1890s.

Only a small minority of the first generation joined the United Synagogue, but those who did were more traditionalistic than the congregations in the West End and suburbs. The proposals to alter the ritual in the Great, New, Hambro, and East London synagogues were strongly opposed by many of the members.

A committee which was formed to promote a synagogue in Hampstead submitted in 1889 a number of proposed ritual changes to the Chief Rabbi. He agreed to some of the proposals, but he refused to sanction either the reading of the priestly blessing by the minister in place of the *Cohanim* or the reading of the Decalogue as part of the regular Sabbath service.[39] The members of the Hampstead committee were disappointed with the Chief Rabbi's reply, but they decided to postpone further discussion on ritual changes until after the building of the synagogue.[40]

Proposals similar to those of the Hampstead committee were made by the New West End, Central, and Borough congregations in 1892.[41] The new Chief Rabbi, Hermann Adler, convened a conference of ministers to discuss the suggestions made by the four congregations.[42] The ministers agreed with many of the proposals, but they acted only in a consultative capacity since the final decision in religious matters rested with the Chief Rabbi. In his letter to the wardens of the four synagogues, he wrote that the adoption of the sanctioned modifications were optional and that they should take effect only if a majority in the congregations approved of them.

The Chief Rabbi refused to sanction the replacement of the special blessing for males by a blessing which did not refer to the sex of the worshipper; he said that the blessing was not 'designed to ascribe any inferiority to the female sex, but to express our [the males'] gratitude for being enabled to keep all religious ordinances, including those precepts (such as *Zizith* and *Tefillin*) from which women are exempt . . .' Adler also refused to sanction the omission of excerpts from the Talmud in the Daily Morning Service because the 'Synagogue is not intended exclusively for praise and supplication but also for the study of the Word of God . . .' Other proposals which Adler refused to sanction included the omission of certain psalms and passages; the omission of the regular *Kaddish*; and a blessing by the minister in place of the priestly blessing by the *Cohanim*. He sanctioned the omission of the repetition of the *Amidah* after it had been read silently by the congregation; the reading of the Decalogue by the minister in synagogues on the Sabbath, although he warned the congregants to 'guard against the supposition that the Decalogue . . . is the only portion of the Bible Divinely inspired'; a brief service for children on the Day of Atonement consisting of a Bible reading, an address, and an English Prayer; and English Prayers to be composed by the ministers and to be read by them from the pulpits; a special religious service for the pupils of

religious classes who had concluded their course of instruction and passed the appropriate examination, but the service was not to 'be termed a confirmation, such rite being foreign to our faith'; and a verbal declaration of consent by the bride and bridegroom to the minister's prepared questions before the beginning of the prescribed marriage ceremony. The Chief Rabbi also conceded 'with great reluctance that the Sabbath Morning Service should commence at the late hour of 9.45. I only do so in the hope that this arrangement may induce a larger number of worshippers than heretofore to attend at the commencement. . . .'[43]

Some of the ritual modifications (such as the omissions making for a shorter and simpler service, the reading of the ten commandments, and the later start to the Sabbath service) are indications of secularization; but, unlike the reforms in the contemporary American synagogues, the proposals did not represent a radical acculturation to the environmental forms of Christian practice. The ritual modifications in England were pragmatic and non-ideological; the Oral Law was not questioned. However, the introduction of an English prayer, the 'special services' for children, and the marriage 'questions and answers' do represent some degree of religious acculturation.

The proposal for a 'confirmation' ceremony was made by the Hampstead Synagogue, but the ceremony had already been performed in three other middle-class United synagogues. A 'confirmation' ceremony had been held in the Bayswater Synagogue from 1864, but the congregation had abandoned the practice by the late 1870s.[44] The Central Synagogue began to hold 'confirmations' in 1889, but, in deference to the Chief Rabbi, it changed the name of the ceremony to a 'special service'.[45] The St. John's Wood Synagogue held the 'confirmation' ceremony for the first time in April 1892.[46] The 'confirmation' or 'special' service was held for children of both sexes, but (unlike the case in the Reform synagogues), the ceremony for boys was held in addition to, rather than as a substitute for, the *bar mitzvah* rite.

Neither were the children's services an innovation: they had been performed at the Borough Synagogue in 1878,[47] and at the Central Synagogue from 1880.[48] The New West End Synagogue held its first children's Sabbath service in 1899,[49] and, in 1901, a children's Sabbath service was held at the Great Synagogue.[50]

As for the marriage ceremony, Hermann Adler declared that there was no necessity for the contracting parties to signify verbally their consent, but he saw no objection to the practice, and the questions he prepared were very similar to the Christian form. They were as follows:

Minister: 'You, A.B. and C.D. are about to be wedded according to the law of Moses and of Israel.

'Will you, A.B., take this woman C.D. to be your wedded wife? Will

you be a true and faithful husband unto her? Will you protect and support her? Will you love, honour and cherish her?'
Bridegroom: 'I will.'
Minister: 'Will you, C.D. take this man, A.B., to be your wedded husband? Will you be a true and faithful wife unto him? Will you love, honour and cherish him?'
Bride: 'I will.'

It is significant that a high degree of acculturation occurred in the marriage celebrations since the majority of Jews attended and took part in them at one time or another, even those with little normal involvement in synagogue activities. Choral weddings began at the New West End Synagogue from about 1880,[51] and the other middle-class congregations soon followed. A choral wedding took place at the Great Synagogue in 1882, and the *Jewish Chronicle* commented that 'the custom has taken root among us even in the most orthodox circles'.[52]

There were exceptions to the correlation between the socio-economic class of the congregations and the desire for ritual reforms. Three of the four rich middle- and upper-middle-class congregations sought ritual reforms, but an orthodox group in the Bayswater congregation, which was the second richest after the New West End, succeeded in preventing ritual reforms, while the Borough congregation, which was one of the poorest, joined the movement for modifications in the ritual. The Board of Management of the Bayswater Synagogue proposed to adopt some of the sanctioned modifications, but after a number of seat-holders had expressed their opposition to the changes, the Board decided to retain the unabridged Prayer Book with only some slight re-arrangements in the order of service.[53] In this the Bayswater Synagogue was an exception among the rich suburban congregations.

Attempts to introduce ritual modification in the United synagogues in the first area of settlement met with strong opposition. The East London Synagogue Board of Management introduced a few of the sanctioned modifications in 1893, but they were withdrawn after several seatholders threatened to leave the Synagogue.[54] The minister of the East London Synagogue was sympathetic to ritual reform and he managed to introduce Bible readings in the vernacular, some English prayers, and shorter and 'more decorous' services, but the formation of a mixed choir in the Synagogue in 1896 led to the secession of several members who founded the Stepney Orthodox Synagogue.[55] Conflicts also occurred over a number of ritualistic issues in the Great Synagogue. For example, a proposal to introduce instrumental music for the festival of *Hanukah* was withdrawn after strong protests from several members.[56] A proposal that the grille in front of the ladies' gallery at the Great Synagogue should be removed because 'utterances from the pulpit would have more effect if the preacher could be seen' was

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defeated at a seatholders' meeting despite the support given to the proposal by the wife of the Chief Rabbi.[57]

Very few further ritual modifications were made after 1892. A majority of the Hampstead Synagogue seatholders wanted an organ, but the Chief Rabbi stated in a sermon that instrumental music, if played on the Sabbath, was contrary to Jewish law.[58] Several seatholders of the Hampstead Synagogue suggested, in 1902, that the services should be shorter and that a greater part should be read in English.[59] A committee which was appointed by the Hampstead seatholders recommended that the divided service should be replaced by a shortened continuous service with an abbreviated reading from the Torah and a greater use of English. The Board of Management rejected the suggestion to shorten the reading of the Torah, but it accepted the committee's other suggestions. It was found, however, that the service could not be performed in under two hours.[60] A second Friday evening service, which lasted about an hour, was started at the Hampstead Synagogue in 1903; its special features included a Bible reading, a sermon, and some English prayers, but attendance was poor and it was discontinued after eight weeks.[61] In 1909, the New West End Synagogue began a special choral Sabbath Afternoon Service, with a large part in English, but it also failed to attract worshippers, and was discontinued after a few months.[62] The reading of certain prayers and psalms in the vernacular was introduced at the New West End Synagogue in 1912 and 1914.[63]

Despite the modifications described above, the content of the services remained predominantly traditional, even in the richest congregations of the United Synagogue. However, the form (as opposed to the content) of the services displayed a high degree of religious acculturation.[64] The services at the native middle-class synagogues were decorous compared with those of the lower-class immigrant congregations, but there were frequent complaints that the services were not decorous enough. In 1876, the Chief Rabbi sent a circular letter to the wardens of the United synagogues in which he called attention to the lack of decorum at the conclusion of the services on the Day of Atonement. He suggested that notices be circulated 'requesting all congregants to remain in their places until the Evening Service has been quite concluded'.[65] The *Jewish Chronicle* received many letters from its readers who objected to the talking and movement that went on during the services.[66] One reader compared the 'decorum observable in synagogue and churches'. He wrote:[67] 'In churches, Sir, absolute decorum is regarded as matter of fact, no moving about from pillar to post, no chatting, laughing or shaking hands, but absolute devotion . . . Is it to be only in the Reform Synagogues that we Jews are to be able to see this exemplified?'

The concern with decorum led to the abolition of the *misheberach* (offerings made when worshippers are called to the reading of the Law)

in the majority of the wealthy United synagogues.[68] The only argument put forward against the abolition was that the system provided a large part of the synagogues' revenue; in many cases seat rentals were raised to cover the loss. The acculturated Victorian Jew disliked the practice because he regarded it as a profane introduction of the 'secular' into the 'religious'. When it was suggested at the Borough Synagogue, in 1883, that the system of announcing offerings in Hebrew in the separate *misheberach* should be replaced by an announcement of the offerings in English at the end of the reading of the Law, the *Jewish Chronicle* commented that the proposal was even less desirable than the then prevailing system because it would prevent anybody 'from being ignorant of the wordly business that is in hand'.[69]

The increasing decorum in the middle-class synagogues was related to the decreasing participation of the congregants. S. Singer, the minister of the New West End Synagogue, said (in a sermon in 1884) that decorum had gone too far, for 'the Readers and the choir . . . divide between them the whole service, the congregation remaining for the most part passive, listening to the proceedings . . . In the days before choirs had become a recognised auxiliary of the synagogue service, the whole congregation joined audibly in the appropriate responses . . .'[70] Choirs had been formed in the London synagogues from about 1840,[71] and by the end of the 1840s there was already a noticeable decline in the worshippers' audible responses to the prayers,[72] but congregational participation in the services declined much further in the middle-class suburban synagogues. Editorials in the *Jewish Chronicle* criticized the lack of participation, but the writers did not propose a return to the traditional audible responses. They argued instead for 'congregational singing'. The *Chronicle* deplored, in 1872, the displays of the 'science of harmony' and it suggested that the synagogues adopt 'easily learnt melodies . . . such as [the] beautiful hymns of the Church of England.'[73] In 1891, it expressed the hope 'that the wide gulf between the state of congregational song with us and our fellow-countrymen may rapidly be bridged over', and it suggested that the paid choir should be replaced by a system of volunteers which was 'already most advantageously pursued in many earnest congregations, notably among Presbyterians'.[74]

The paid choirs in the rich suburbs were composed of boys and men from East London. The *Chronicle* commented: 'among other denominations to sing in the Choir of the Church or the chapel is considered an honour . . . With us choral singing is left to the poorer and lower middle classes.'[75] In 1900, the Warden of the St. John's Wood Synagogue dealt with a seatholder's complaint that the choir boys rode to the Synagogue on the Sabbath by pointing out that 'the choir was the chief attraction of the Synagogue and it was quite impossible to get a sufficient number of boys with suitable voices in the neighbourhood'.[76] In

1906, the Board of Management of the Brondesbury Synagogue threatened to resign from the United Synagogue if the Council did not give them an adequate sum for the choir; they refused to accept responsibility 'for the management of the Synagogue which in our opinion *must* be a failure without a Choir'.[77]

It was proposed at the Central Synagogue in 1880, and at the Borough Synagogue in 1883, that females should be included in the choirs; but the Chief Rabbi refused to give his assent and the proposals were not carried out.[78] Females were incorporated into the choirs at the Hampstead Synagogue in 1894,[79] the New West End Synagogue in 1895,[80] and the East London Synagogue in 1896. Twenty-two seatholders of the East London Synagogue wrote to their Board of Management that they objected to a mixed choir and that they intended to resign. The Chief Rabbi said in a letter to the Warden of the East London Synagogue: 'It is true that in two synagogues in the West [End], ladies' voices have been added to the Choir in consequence of the Choirmaster having experienced grave difficulty in obtaining the requisite number of boys' voices. You, however, do not labour under a similar drawback . . .' The Warden replied: 'The Board note with satisfaction that you do not declare the introduction of ladies' voices to be contrary to Jewish law . . . With regard to your suggestion that these ladies should join in the singing from their ordinary seats instead of being grouped together, I am to say that it is essential that they should be so placed as to be under the direction of the Choirmaster, and this has been satisfactorily arranged by the division by means of a grille . . .'[81] The New West End Synagogue also retained the separation of the sexes by putting up a screen to divide the female from the male part of the choir.

Thus, despite the conservative approach to modifications in the Prayer Book, acculturation occurred in a number of religious practices. On occasion, the Nonconformists provided religious models for the rich United Synagogue seatholders, but the most important exemplar was the Church of England. This is illustrated by the very title of Simeon Singer's famous edition of the *siddur* with an English translation, published in 1890: 'The Authorized Daily Prayer Book of the United Hebrew Congregations of the British Empire'.[82] The non-Jewish religious environment of the rich suburban Jews was Anglican rather than Nonconformist. Charles Booth wrote, at the end of the 1890s, that in the prosperous west and north-west areas of London the 'religious cleavage [is] between High and Low Church doctrine rather than between Church and Dissent . . . [A]t one [church], fashion may be the leading attraction; at another, exquisite music; with several it is high ritual.'[83] The middle- and upper-middle-class Jews did not imitate the content of the Church of England services, but they did adopt the emphasis on form and decorum. Israel Zangwill strongly

criticized the adoption of non-Jewish forms of religious behaviour by the wealthy native Jews. He wrote[84]:

> It is a sure sign of decadence when respectability sets in . . . The old Jew enjoyed himself in his *shool*. He sang and he shouted; he danced and he beat his breast, and he was not least happy when he was crying. If he did not always know what he was saying, he always meant it. The new Jew prays . . . without intonation, quietly, as if he were afraid the Deity would overhear him. He has abolished the *Haman-klappings* because they are of dubious morality, and most of the *Simchath Torah* goings-on, because they are unquestionably picturesque. He has grown indifferent to *Purim* because it may be founded on a myth and taken up Christmas which perpetuates one. He has filled the synagogue with rows of incarnate respectability, crowned with the high hat, without which (as the beadle is aware) none are genuine—nay not Elijah himself, if he should stray into a West-End *shool*.

Thus, in contrast with the immigrant services, the native services were orderly and decorous; the majority of worshippers did not participate; they could be best described as spectators of the highly formalized rituals presented by the choir, *hazan*, and minister. The middle-class Jews' concern with decorum was paralleled by similar concerns among Christian Nonconformist groups which also had to adjust to the changing cultural sentiments of their socially mobile membership. For example, as the Methodists became more prosperous and educated, they also put an increasing emphasis on a decorous rigidly-patterned service with a passive audience of worshippers listening to a trained choir and sedate sermon.[85]

The difference between the religious services of the immigrant and native Jews was related to their different social positions and cultural environments. For many of the immigrants, the traditional form of service provided a link with their countries of origin; together with others who had lived in the same town or area in eastern Europe, they found comfort and a stable point of orientation in the maintenance of the traditional services. Although a large proportion adopted many secular and anglicized patterns of behaviour, their social segregation in a voluntary ghetto did not predispose them to acculturate in religious matters. In comparison, the native middle-class Jews lived in predominantly non-Jewish areas and their cultural references veered far more towards anglicized values, norms, and patterns of behaviour. This is illustrated by the following short autobiographical note, written in 1949, in which the author describes his family background in a middle-class native Jewish family living in Canonbury in the first decade of the twentieth century[86]:

> We both envied and despised the Goyim; but we had equally no use for the Jews who were either too *froom* or too *link* by our standards. Ultra-

Orthodox Jews in particular were, we thought, 'vulgar'. Their clothes seemed funny and they paraded their Jewishness.

It was our ambition to convince our Christian friends that, except for the trifling difference that they went to church and we went to synagogue, we were all the same . . . [M]arriage with any of their offspring was unthinkable—yet at the same time we envied their unmistakable Englishry. They had their roots in the country; they were not under the necessity (as we were) of continually proclaiming their loyalty and patriotism. They really liked the things—cricket and so forth—that we only pretended to like.

In Jewish affairs outside our own synagogue we had no interest whatsoever. We had heard vaguely of a Dr. Herzl, and approved mildly of his somewhat visionary plans. Our home was England; but if Zionism would have the effect of diverting 'foreign' Jews to Palestine instead of Canonbury, that seemed a very desirable consummation.

Apart from our rather perfunctory attendances at synagogue, our main assertion of our Jewishness was to eat fried fish and read the Jewish Chronicle every Friday night . . . [A]s I grew up the family Orthodoxy declined appreciably. We even ate bacon, although pork . . . remained taboo. The grown-ups went to synagogue only on *Yomtovim* though I still had to attend every Sabbath.

I suffered agonies of boredom at *shool* largely because I knew very little Hebrew and most of the service was meaningless . . .

Further illustration of the social life and culture of middle-class native Jews is provided by the Anglo-Jewish novelists of the period, particularly Amy Levy, Julia Frankau, and Israel Zangwill.[87] The novels, which were generally set in the rich middle-class areas of west and north-west London (such as Lancaster Gate and Maida Vale), probably gave a biased picture; they tended to stress the materialistic philistine values and ostentatious behaviour of their Jewish characters, although in many of these respects the characters' values and behaviour differed little from the middle-class Victorian Christians portrayed in the novels of John Galsworthy and others. The characters mixed socially with some of their Christian neighbours in parties and dances, but, on the whole, their social life was contained within Jewish circles, and they took a particularly antagonistic attitude towards intermarriage. Israel Zangwill wrote that the Jewish middle class, unlike the Jewish upper class, put restrictions on their social intercourse with Christians in order to avoid awkward situations, and Julia Frankau's characters disliked mixing with Christians because they believed it was not quite respectable. It is possible that many middle-class Jews found that they were only able to associate socially with Christians who were of a somewhat lower socio-economic status than themselves, and they therefore preferred to restrict their social life to Jewish circles. The authors made it clear that their characters' objections to intermarriage had no religious basis, and despite, or perhaps because of, the lack of a

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high rate of assimilation with non-Jewish circles, the middle-class Jews were prone to stress their anglicization and object to religious customs which appeared foreign. In *Reuben Sachs* by Amy Levy, published in 1889, the following conversation takes place between two cousins, one acculturated and the other less so:

' "I was bar-mitz-vah last month."

"I am thirteen if that's what you mean" . . . He considered the introduction of popular tribal phrases very bad form indeed.'

It was considered remarkable and a little odd for someone who had been born into a rich family and had gone to Oxford to remain orthodox and to continue to bind phylacteries—that was the case with Raphael Leon, in Israel Zangwill's *Grandchildren of the Ghetto*.

The characters in these novels invariably went to the synagogue on the High Holy Days, but few attended weekly or were observant (for instance, in matters of *kashrut*). According to a character in Zangwill's novel, 'the very beadles of their [United] synagogues are prone to surreptitious shrimps and unobtrusive oysters'. The synagogue leaders were portrayed as men who had little religious commitment and who either believed their synagogue positions would help their social advancement or wished to gain recognition for their high socio-economic status in the community. The Anglo-Jewish novelists no doubt exaggerated certain facets of middle-class Jewish life, but it is clear that the majority of native middle-class Jews were considerably acculturated and secularized. Only a minority cared enough about ritual to concern themselves with proposed changes in the orthodox form of services.

The ritual adjustments in the United Synagogue served clearly to distinguish its services from the traditional services of the immigrants, but the changes in content were very conservative compared with those of the far smaller Liberal Jewish movements.[88] Of relevance here is the fact that the most important lay leaders of the United Synagogue were from the upper class. Many of them mixed freely and unselfconsciously in upper-class Christian circles and they took the Church of England, rather than the Nonconformists, as their major non-Jewish religious model. The Church of England remained traditionally oriented throughout the period, although a few innovations were made in keeping with the spirit of its Prayer Book. Likewise, the lay leaders of the United Synagogue did not feel it was necessary to make radical changes in the orthodox Jewish Prayer Book. Few upper-class Jews joined the Liberal movement, which appears to have recruited its membership from the mobile but less wealthy middle classes in areas like St. John's Wood and Golders Green. The majority of native Jews preferred the 'decorous' orthodoxy of the high-status United Synagogue whose upper-class leaders provided social and cultural referents for the aspiring middle-class Jews.

NOTES

Abbreviations: *J.C.* = Jewish Chronicle
  M.B. = Minute Books of the United Synagogue

[1] Joseph Jacobs, *Studies in Jewish Statistics*, London, 1891.
[2] V. D. Lipman, 'The Rise of Jewish Suburbia', *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England*, XXI, 1968, pp. 78–102.
[3] In 1870 the *Jewish Chronicle* maintained that a synagogue seat was more expensive than a seat in any English church: *J.C.*, 28 Oct. 1870.
[4] The seating system in the synagogue was similar to the pew system in the Church of England and the Nonconformist churches where pews were rented and appropriated. K. S. Inglis, *Churches and the Working Classes in Victorian England*, London, 1963, pp. 49–57, 96–97, 106–8.
[5] I have attempted an explanation for these differences in my D.Phil. thesis, S. Sharot, *The Social Determinants in the Religious Practices and Organization of English Jewry with Special Reference to the United Synagogue*, unpublished D.Phil., Oxford, 1968, chaps. 3, 4.
[6] ibid., pp. 125–28.
[7] V. D. Lipman, *Social History of the Jews in England: 1850–1950*, London, 1954, p. 104; L. P. Gartner, *The Jewish Immigrant in England 1870–1914*, London, 1960, pp. 144–48.
[8] C. Lewis, *A Soho Address*, London, 1955, p. 57.
[9] *J.C.*, 17 Feb. 1888.
[10] *J.C.*, 4 Sept. 1874.
[11] *J.C.*, 22 Sept. 1882.
[12] *J.C.*, 20 Aug. 1886.
[13] *J.C.*, 28 Oct. 1870.
[14] Treasurer's Report, United Synagogue, 1871, 1872.
[15] Abstracted from the annual accounts of the United Synagogue.
[16] Lipman, *Social History* . . ., op. cit., p. 111, Gartner, op. cit., pp. 95–99.
[17] Charles Booth, *Life and Labour of the People in London, Series 3: Religious Influences*, London, 1902. The colour classification is described in Volume 2, pp. 40–41.
[18] It was possible to plot only a little less than a quarter of the East London Synagogue members because the majority of members lived in areas which were not included in Booth's street survey.
[19] Booth wrote, at the end of the century, that 'Dalston and Canonbury are said to be the first steps upwards of the Whitechapel Jews': Booth, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 152.
[20] In 1914 about 6% to 8% of the adult Jewish males in north London were members of the Federation of Synagogues, while about a third were members of the United Synagogue.
[21] The percentages were obtained by plotting 157 male seatholders on the Booth maps. A further 28 male seatholders were not included either because they lived a long distance from the area or because their streets were not included in the Booth survey.

Colour of street in Booth survey	Criterion of class	Number of North London Synagogue members
Purple	18/– to over 30/– weekly wage	3
Pink	21/– to over 50/– weekly wage	62
Red	Keep one or two servants	78
Yellow	Keep three or more servants	14
Total plotted		157
Unplotted		28
Total male members		185

Where the colours were mixed in a street on the Booth maps, the predominant colour was taken in order to classify the seatholder.

[22] These are only very approximate figures. The number of synagogue members in most areas in London outside the East End is known, but the estimates of the Jewish population in the various districts are only approximate since they are calculated from the number of Jewish deaths in the areas.

[23] Robert Currie, *Methodism Divided*, London, 1968, Chap. 3.

[24]

Colour of street	No. of Bayswater male members
Purple	1
Pink	24
Red	147
Yellow	152
Total	324

[25] The majority of both native and immigrant Jews attended synagogue on the High Holy Days. The proportion of Jews who attended synagogue weekly was very low in all areas, although it was probably a little higher in the first area of settlement, at least among males. Between 10 per cent and 15 per cent of the total Jewish population in west and north-west London attended synagogue on a Sabbath morning in 1886 when the *British Weekly* carried out a religious census: *British Weekly*, 5, 12 and 26 Nov. 1886. For further information on synagogue attendance see S. Sharot, 'Secularization, Judaism and Anglo-Jewry', *A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain*, London, 1971, pp. 133–35.

[26] *J.C.*, 2 April and 30 April 1875.

[27] *J.C.*, 1 Oct. 1875.

[28] *J.C.*, 27 June 1879.

[29] *J.C.*, 4 July 1879.

[30] *J.C.*, 11 July and 8 Aug. 1879.

[31] *J.C.*, 12 and 19 Sept. 1879.

[32] *J.C.*, 5 March 1880.

[33] *J.C.*, 16 April 1880.

[34] *J.C.*, 18 June 1880.

[35] *J.C.*, 23 June 1880 and 13 Aug. 1880.

[36] *J.C.*, 15 Oct. 1880 (Letter dated 3 Oct. 1880). This would appear to show that the Chief Rabbi's role, as that of the religious authority, was an equivocal one; his sanction was required before ritual alterations could be

made, but he had to concede at least some of the demands of the laymen even though he disapproved of them.

[37] *J.C.*, 14 Jan. 1881.

[38] *J.C.*, 8 May 1891.

[39] *J.C.*, 26 July and 1 Nov. 1889. The reading of passages from the Prophets in English had already been introduced at the New West End, St. John's Wood, Dalston, and Bayswater synagogues: *J.C.*, 27 June 1889.

[40] *J.C.*, 15 Nov. 1889.

[41] *J.C.*, 15 Jan., 6 May, 13 May, 11 March, and 22 April 1892.

[42] *J.C.*, 19 Feb. and 20 March 1892.

[43] Chief Rabbi's Letter dated 23 June 5652, and 'Report on the Ritual', Special Supplement to the *Jewish World*, 1 July 1892. Also, *J.C.*, 1 July 1892.

[44] *J.C.*, 5 April 1871 and 15 Nov. 1878.

[45] *J.C.*, 7 June 1889.

[46] *J.C.*, 22 April 1892.

[47] *J.C.*, 18 Oct. 1878.

[48] *J.C.*, 23 July 1880.

[49] *J.C.*, 27 Oct. 1899.

[50] *J.C.*, 20 Dec. 1901.

[51] *J.C.*, 3 Dec. 1880.

[52] *J.C.*, 4 Aug. 1882.

[53] *J.C.*, 29 June, 28 Oct. and 11 Nov. 1892.

[54] *J.C.*, 28 April, 9 June, and 1 Sept. 1893.

[55] *J.C.*, 19 June 1908. .

[56] *J.C.*, 17 May 1889 and 13 May 1892.

[57] *J.C.*, 25 May 1894 and 16 Nov. 1894.

[58] *J.C.*, 9 Nov. 1894; 11 Jan., 22 Feb., 10 May, and 24 May 1895. In a plebiscite held at the Hampstead Synagogue, 113 voted for an organ while 67 voted against it.

[59] *J.C.*, 5 Dec. 1902.

[60] R. Apple, *The Hampstead Synagogue: 1862–1967*, London, 1967.

[61] *J.C.*, 18 Sept. 1903 and 13 May 1904.

[62] *J.C.*, 19 Nov. 1909 and 15 April, 1910.

[63] *J.C.*, 30 Jan 1914.

[64] It is recognized that it is often difficult to distinguish form from content. By content, in this context, is meant the service prescribed in the Authorized Prayer Book.

[65] *J.C.*, 15 Sept. 1876.

[66] *J.C.*, 1 Aug. 1884.

[67] *J.C.*, 8 May 1914.

[68] *M.B.*, 6 Feb. and 6 March, 1882; 4 Jan., 5 April, 7 Jan., 6 and 18 July 1887.

[69] *J.C.*, 10 and 17 Aug. 1883.

[70] *J.C.*, 7 March 1884.

[71] *Voice of Jacob*, 3 Sept. 1842.

[72] *J.C.*, 3 Nov. 1848.

[73] *J.C.*, 15 Nov. 1872.

[74] *J.C.*, 24 July 1891.

[75] *J.C.*, 21 Feb. and 16 May 1879.

[76] *J.C.*, 18 May 1900.

[77] *M.B.*, 6 March 1906.

[78] *J.C.*, 12 March 1880; 20 July 1883; 3, 10, and 17 Aug. 1883.

[79] *J.C.*, 9 Nov. 1894.

[80] *J.C.*, 24 May 1895. By 1911, the Brondesbury Synagogue also had a mixed choir: *J.C.*, 5 May 1911.

[81] *J.C.*, 17 April 1896.

[82] The Prayer Book also illustrated the concentration of power in the Chief Rabbinate.

[83] Booth, op. cit., pp. 208, 210.

[84] *J.C.*, 13 Nov. 1891.

[85] R. Currie, op. cit., Chap. 4; William Pickering, 'Religion—a Leisure-time Pursuit?', *A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain*, London, 1968, pp. 77–93.

[86] Charles Solomon, 'An Anglo-Jewish Background', *J.C.*, 4 Nov. 1949.

[87] Amy Levy, *Reuben Sachs*, London, 1889; Julia Frankau, *Dr. Phillips*, New York, 1889; and Israel Zangwill, *Grandchildren of the Ghetto*, Philadelphia, 1892.

[88] The Liberal movement, formed at the turn of the century, provided highly anglicized services but achieved only a limited success before the First World War. A Liberal Jewish Synagogue was established in St. John's Wood in 1911. The West London Synagogue in Berkeley Street was the only London Reform congregation in this period, and its membership remained fairly static. It made a number of further ritual modifications in its services, but it remained closer to the United Synagogue than to the Liberal movement. See my D.Phil. thesis, op. cit., pp. 241–52.

COMMUNAL COHESION THROUGH POLITICAL STRIFE IN AN ISRAELI NEW TOWN

Myron J. Aronoff

Introduction

IN this paper I analyse one aspect of the building of a community in a new town in Israel. The town (which I call Frontiertown[1]) is one of the newest of the thirty new towns established in Israel since it gained independence in 1948.[2] It was founded in 1962 and lies on a high plateau overlooking the barren landscape of craggy ravines and rolling hills of the Judean Desert. It differs from almost all the other developing towns in Israel in several important respects. In the first place, it was established at a time when the government was not burdened by the pressure of mass immigration, and could therefore devote time and resources to planning it completely before it was actually settled. The planning included not only the physical location, lay-out, and the economic base of the town, but also the social composition of the community. Whereas almost all the other development towns in Israel were initially settled by immigrants newly arrived in the country, an experiment was made (based on experiences in other towns) to restrict the 'pioneers' in the first stage of settlement to the Israeli-born ('Sabras') and to those who had lived many years in Israel (known as *Vatikim*). I emphasize that the planning of Frontiertown was conceived and executed within the frame of reference of the ideological role of the idealistically oriented *voluntary* pioneer, an essentially pre-State conception. This is in sharp contrast with the 'Reluctant Pioneers' (as Weingrod[3] termed them), the new immigrants who were given no choice, but were sent to the new settlements by the Jewish Agency or other government officials.

Great publicity was given to the pioneering role of this new town, and when appeals were made for young Israeli couples to be among the vanguard of settlers, the planners *selected* the first eighty families from more than three hundred and fifty families who applied. The planners hoped that if the town was started by what they considered

'stable' elements with 'firm roots' in the country, they would set the social and cultural tone of the community; and once this tone was firmly established they could then 'absorb' new immigrants in a controlled manner. They hoped in this way to avoid many of the social problems which they believed had plagued other development towns.

The screening process was a social experiment which had a number of significant ramifications. Whereas in other development areas senior officials worked in town and lived elsewhere, everyone who worked in Frontiertown (including the Director of the Administration) was required to live locally with his family. Moreover, the administrative personnel of the planning team, the administration, and the various public agencies which set up branches in the town, did not form an élite which was socially or ethnically distinct and apart from the majority of the population. Because of their general similarity to the people among whom they lived, the administrative stratum assimilated with the other residents and became citizens of the town just like the others. I shall show that this fact had significant consequences in the development of political strife and communal cohesion.

It is clear that, at least initially, the establishment of Frontiertown was given high government priority. Great care was taken in the choice of location, the physical planning, and, as I have indicated, what might be called an experiment in social planning. Long-range provision was made for the physical expansion and economic development of the town based on the exploitation of its natural resources, and its potential as a tourist and health resort. From the outset the area was considered to be different from the other towns since it was viewed within the frame of reference of the pre-State voluntary pioneer. Before the town was settled this positive public image was projected by nation-wide publicity, and the government was generous with development funds. Material inducements were offered to settlers and investors to attract them. Finally, Frontiertown was blessed with something which some of its sister development towns (although certainly not all) sorely lacked: political leadership of a high quality and dedication to the citizens' general welfare. The combination of good leadership and a general public which was actively concerned with the welfare of the community gave a special stamp to the development of the town's local political system.

I suggest that the social strife which developed in the earliest stages of the establishment of Frontiertown played a major role in the formation, definition, and preservation of the main social groups. These groups (by creating and maintaining widespread participation in communal affairs) promoted institutional change and contributed to the development of a community spirit. I also argue that the early development of factional strife set the tone in which social and political relation-

ships were channelled in the formative early years of the town's development.

The initial disputes in the planning team, as we shall see, led to the mobilization of support throughout the community. I analyse the social characteristics which were most effective in determining alignment in the factions, and in so doing I stress the importance of the inter-meshing of social and political leadership which greatly facilitated the mobilization of large numbers of people into political activity. Social strife gave rise to the political factions which effectively mobilized large numbers of townsmen into public activity. The non-corporate nature of the factions required the perpetuation of the strife, which, since it was carried out within the context of a far-ranging consensus of values among the contestants, further contributed to the latter's greater attachment to the community. I attempt to demonstrate how, from this intense but consensual strife, there developed a strong sense of community spirit and attachment to the town.

The social basis of the factions

I begin by outlining some general features of the first settlers. They were highly diversified; they came from all parts of the country, major cities, small towns, and all the various kinds of agricultural settlements in Israel—kibbutzim, *moshavim* (co-operatives), and *moshavot* (old colonies). Those who were not born in Israel had come from every corner of the world. However, until the arrival of the first large group of new immigrants from Romania in the third year of settlement, almost all were veterans of many years' standing in the country.

As in other frontier situations in the past, both in Israel and else-where, people came for many different and frequently mixed reasons. There were a few 'confidence men' whose aim was to get rich quick, and many more settlers who wished to take advantage of the material attractions. The first of these was the availability of good jobs, such as the construction projects on the Dead Sea, where by working hard and long hours and with much 'overtime' it was sometimes possible to earn twice or even three times the national average. A second attraction was very inexpensive housing, special income-tax concessions, and other development incentives, such as priority in jobs and in starting new businesses; there was also the attraction of free plots of land for the building of private houses. For others, particularly the young pro-fessionals, there was the additional attraction of greater responsibilities, and therefore a higher status than they would otherwise have had. In fact, one writer who lived in Frontiertown from the beginning argued in an internationally circulated publication that the first settlers (a few idealists apart) came primarily to advance their personal careers. He commented that 'whereas the old pioneer worked to build a new

nation and a just society, the new pioneer is working for the individual benefits of the affluent society'.[4] One of the men in charge of selecting the first settlers agreed that this was so: 'People did not come for idealism; they came for financial reasons.'

There is no doubt that Israeli society and culture have undergone significant changes since the first pioneers from eastern Europe began the making of the modern state; general societal goals have been replaced by more individualistic and personal aims. It is also true that material incentives were a strong reason for settling in Frontiertown. However, I think it would be inaccurate to limit to 'a few idealists' the number of the first settlers who came, in part at least, because of the challenge of building a new city in the wilderness. It is very difficult to measure the extent to which idealism was a motivating factor in the decision to settle in Frontiertown. In the first place, the young native-born Israeli, unlike his parents, is loath to admit that he does anything for idealistic reasons, which he is likely to dismiss as 'Zionist nonsense'. I would argue that the fact that he does not readily admit to idealistic motivations does not necessarily mean that he is less idealistic than his father, but merely reflects a different cultural attitude towards the expression of his idealism.[5] Moreover, there were technical difficulties in recording in 1968 in a social survey the motivations which had led people six years earlier to settle in Frontiertown. Nevertheless, I believe that an examination of the responses of a representative sample of the residents to the question, 'What would you say was your main reason for settling in Frontiertown?' is instructive. Table 1 shows the responses to that question and also the secondary motivations. I do not show in the table the motives which received a response of less than 10 per cent. These were: (1) 'for reasons of health', 5 per cent average as main motive and 4 per cent average as secondary motive; and (2) 'to give my children a better education', 4 per cent average for both main and secondary motives. I also combined the following two responses into one: (1) 'because it seemed like a nice place to live where one could easily make friends', and (2) 'I didn't want to live in a big place like Tel Aviv; and this was a small place where everyone knows one another.' This combined response is recorded as 'nice small place'.

It is clear that material considerations led a good many people to settle in Frontiertown: about half the sample were drawn to the area either by the employment/business opportunities or by inexpensive housing. However, 22·4 per cent of the sample of those who settled in the first year stated that the idealistic challenge of helping to build a new town in the Negev was their main reason for settling there, and an equal proportion gave it as their second reason. Almost 30 per cent of those who came in the second year of settlement mentioned the idealistic response as their second reason. The third-year sample reflects the high percentage (41·5) of new immigrants who were sent by the

Jewish Agency in that year. In the fourth year of settlement, 15 per cent gave idealism as their main motive, while 15 per cent of those who settled in the following year gave it as their second reason. It seems that approximately half of the early settlers came for idealistic as well as for materialistic reasons; it is likely that a good many of them came for a mixture of the two motives. I think that it can also be concluded from the evidence that a greater number of the first settlers tended to be

TABLE I. *Motives for settling in Frontiertown by length of residence*

Motives		Years in Frontiertown				
		1	2	3	4	5
Job or business	(1)	% 50·9	% 33·3	% 17·4	% 32·4	% 43·4
	(2)	15·1	15·2	10·9	08·8	09·8
Cheaper housing	(1)	11·3	21·2	13·0	11·8	02·6
	(2)	15·1	18·1	04·3	02·9	02·9
Immigrant sent by Jewish Agency	(1)	00·0	12·1	41·5	11·8	01·3
	(2)	00·0	00·0	00·0	02·9	00·0
New start in life	(1)	15·1	03·0	04·3	14·7	10·5
	(2)	11·3	06·1	06·5	05·9	05·3
Help build new town in Negev	(1)	01·9	15·2	04·3	05·9	22·4
	(2)	15·1	09·1	08·7	29·4	22·4
Nice small place	(1)	13·2	06·1	13·0	11·7	11·9
	(2)	18·8	18·2	13·0	14·7	28·9

X^2 77·228 with 20 degrees freedom $P < 0.001$

more idealistically motivated than those who followed them (or at least, they said they had been so motivated).

I argue that there was an inherent contradiction between the recruitment of a specially selected voluntary pioneering vanguard of first settlers who were instilled with the importance of their mission of building a new town in the desert, and the lack of institutional means for their participating in (even symbolically) or influencing the development of the town. The planning was carried out by representatives of government ministries; a senior official of the Ministry of Labour was in charge of the administration of the town and was directly answerable to his Minister and to the inter-ministerial Committee responsible for the area's development.

Furthermore, the widely publicized and highly optimistic plans for

the town's rapid industrialization, growth, and development were not realized at anything like the predicted rate. Some factors (such as the decrease in immigration) were beyond the planners' control. Other unforeseen problems delayed industrialization; for instance, the building of a major chemical complex was postponed for several years because of technical disagreements between the Israeli Government and its American partner, and jurisdictional disputes between ministries also arose over various aspects of the town's development.

All these factors contributed to a feeling of frustration among large numbers of settlers; many of them had staked their future on the smooth development of their town. Table 2 shows the response to the question, 'When you came to Frontiertown, how long did you think, at that time, you would stay here?'; Table 3 shows the answers to the question,

TABLE 2. *Perceived length of stay at the time of settlement*

Perceived length of settlement	Number of years in Frontiertown				
	1 or less N(53)	2 N(33)	3 N(46)	4 N(34)	5 N(76)
Permanent	51·0	51·6	63·1	64·7	53·9
Conditional	7·5	12·1	4·3	2·9	15·8
Temporary	17·0	3·0	2·2	11·8	11·9
Unsure	24·5	33·3	30·4	20·6	18·4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 3. *Perceived future in Frontiertown in 1968*

Perceived future	Number of years in Frontiertown				
	1 or less N(53)	2 N(33)	3 N(46)	4 N(34)	5 N(76)
Definitely permanent	26·4	54·5	52·2	64·7	67
Hoped to be permanent	45·1	30·3	32·6	11·8	24
Division in family	2·0	·0	4·4	2·9	1·3
Temporary	9·5	12·2	4·3	14·7	2·6
Unsure	17·0	3·0	6·5	5·9	5·1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

'How would you describe your future in Frontiertown?' It is perhaps significant that more than 50 per cent of the sample in each year of settlement perceived their settlement as permanent from the outset; they selected the answer, 'I came here to settle permanently, to make my life here.'

There exists a strong positive relationship between the length of residence and the likelihood of expressing an intention permanently to settle in the town. While this may reflect in part the fact that those people who were temporarily settled in the first few years have already left, thereby distorting the picture, in fact Frontiertown has had one of the lowest rates of population exodus of any development town in Israel. The table obviously reflects the fact that the old residents have had a greater chance to become established in their jobs and to settle down; but I think that it may also reflect the fact that most of them had a special commitment to making the town a success. I argue that their initial frustration and disappointment at the slowness of the development were an important factor in the political strife which ensued.

TABLE 4. *Rate of internal migration 1965–68. Frontiertown compared with other new towns*

Town	Entered 1965–68	Left 1965–68	Percent. of exodus
Qiryat Shmona	1,497	3,291	219
Hazor	468	1,000	213
Nazeret Illit	3,636	3,510	96
Qiryat Malakhi	978	1,224	125
Eilat	7,545	5,732	75
Frontiertown	1,952	523	26

That sense of frustration was partly reflected in the responses to the question, 'Are you happy with what Frontiertown has become so far?' The majority (55 per cent) stated, 'Not really, it has not lived up to what it was supposed to have been.' A modest 17 per cent thought the town was 'a real success'; 27 per cent said, 'Under the circumstances it has been relatively successful'; while 1 per cent stated, 'It is a miserable failure.'

The disappointment with the development of the area was highlighted by the attachment to the town felt by most people. In answer to a question whether Frontiertown had a special character as a development town, only 5 per cent felt that it did not; 84 per cent said that they liked the special character of the town; and 11 per cent said that they did not like it. When asked to describe their feelings about the town, 62 per cent commented: 'I feel that it is my home, and I feel something in common with other people who live here', while 25 per cent said that it was their home but that they had no special connexion with their fellow-citizens. A neutral attitude was expressed by 12 per cent, and only 1 per cent (3 individuals) said they hated the town.

These feelings, particularly the frustration at the slow pace of growth, were intensified by the lack of provision for some means of direct

democratic representation of the residents' views and interests in the governance and development of their community. It is highly significant that the first settlers were either Israeli-born or had lived most of their lives in the country; many of them had grown up in the highly democratic kibbutzim and they were not willing to remain the passive subjects of a paternalistic government administration (no matter how benevolent) in which they had no direct representation. The frustration caused by the inability to influence the shape and direction of the development of the community, while strongest at the earliest stage, persisted even after representative local government was granted; the citizens fully realized that their dependence upon government ministries for funds severely curtailed the extent to which they could influence the course of the development. That realization greatly shaped the nature and style of local political strife; it tended to intensify the personalization of politics and led to irresponsibility and bickering. The almost colonial pattern of bureaucratic control and guidance, particularly in the early stages, had been effective with varying degrees of success in other towns populated by new immigrants with little experience of participating in democratic political systems; but it was unacceptable to many of the young pioneering settlers of Frontier-town.

Because he had not been given central authority locally but had had to fight conflicting government Ministries, the popular original director of the planning team resigned at the end of the initial planning stage. He was replaced before the arrival of the first settlers by a senior official of the Ministry of Labour. This new director (Adam), who had been educated at a prominent American university, came to the Ministry after a successful army career. He was a man who believed in discipline and punctuality, who did not make a practice of delegating authority, and who set about organizing the planning team as an administrative bureaucracy. A number of conflicts arose between the new director and various members of his staff. The effect of the change at the particular juncture when the planning team was being re-oriented or transformed into an administrative authority was exaggerated by the personal differences and styles of the directors. Many of the young professionals who had seen themselves as pioneers, and who had enjoyed the informality of the work situation and the equality of their relationship with the former director, resented what they viewed as the down-grading of their pioneering role to that of a clock-punching functionary of a hierarchically structured administration. They also resented what they considered to be the authoritarian manner of their Director, who took all major policy decisions and simply asked his staff to implement them. Considerable strife resulted; initially the conflict was expressed in several personal quarrels, but eventually there was a formal clash between the Workers' Committee and the Administration.

Moreover, the small size of the town enabled people to meet and talk face to face with practically everyone in town. Hence there arose an alliance of interests between discontented workers in the Administration and frustrated elements among the residents, with the former playing a leading role.

Adam was a handsome man in his fifties, with distinguished-looking grey hair and considerable personal charm. He had had, as we have seen, a successful army career and on occasion the authoritarian tendency of his military background showed through in his relationships with his subordinates. Adam's self-image was that of a man who takes on pioneering and difficult tasks because of their challenge. As he once told me: 'Most people don't want to start something from scratch because it is then without prestige, but when it's a going concern, there is no lack of candidates.' His direction of the development of Frontier-town eventually led him to take on additional posts of even greater national importance. In retrospect, his post in the new town appears to have been an important stepping-stone in his new public career. He had unusual powers for a community leader and was able to attract local support; he had the final say in the screening of applicants and in the selection of new residents. He also controlled the allocation of housing (which in the initial stage was all public): housing and employment had to be provided before any newcomer was allowed to settle. There is no evidence that Adam used his powers for personal or political gain; but nevertheless he had direct personal contact with practically every citizen and he wielded considerable influence. For example, he awarded licences and public contracts, allocated shop premises, and selected employees in the public services. His power as head of the local Administration derived from his senior rank in the Ministry of Labour, and he was very well connected with the upper echelons of other government ministries.

Adam had always followed a policy of keeping an open house. He lived in the area of prefabricated asbestos duplexes which had housed the first two hundred pioneering families; but his household occupied a whole duplex, while others were shared between two families. Anyone in town could call at his house at any time and would always be warmly welcomed with coffee and cake; many availed themselves of his hospitality and came to him with their problems, while others just liked to drop in.

Some of Adam's supporters were beholden to him for their jobs, housing, shop licences, etc., and no doubt some (but certainly not all) supported him at least in part for that reason. On the other hand, there is evidence that individuals whose requests had not been granted by him joined the ranks of the opposition. Gluckman has observed, ' . . . As positions of leadership carry high ideals, and as most men are, well, only men, there develops frequently a conflict between the ideals of

leadership and the weakness of the leader.'⁶ This 'frailty to authority', as he calls it, operates even when a leader acts fairly; no matter to whom Adam would have distributed public resources, there were bound to be some whom he could not satisfy and who would express their resentment by political opposition to his rule.

Abel came to Frontiertown soon after graduating from the Haifa Technion as an engineer. He enjoyed the challenge of helping to create a new town and the professional authority which was superior to that he might have had elsewhere. An intelligent, personable, and highly ambitious young man, his involvement in public affairs, like Adam's, was not unrelated to his personal career ambitions. He, like several of his colleagues among the original planning team, could not continue to work with Adam. When he resigned from the Administration, he became the chief engineer and director of the local office of Solel Boneh Construction Company. Through that position he controlled resources such as jobs and the award of sub-contracts; as chairman of the first Residents' Council he also achieved considerable prominence. His father-in-law was a high-ranking government minister, and many people assumed that this connexion made him at least as influential as Adam; others also believed that Abel would eventually attain high office and political power, and no doubt some supported him in the expectation of future rewards over and above those he could dispense here and now. The evidence is that Abel (like Adam) in no way used his personal control of resources to attract supporters; on the other hand, some residents supported him because of privileges he had already given them, or might yet give them.

These two strong and ambitious leaders (who controlled local resources and enjoyed local prestige as well as access to the high echelons of government) became the foci around which support gathered in an intense political struggle which practically split the town into two warring factions. In many instances when business or personal relations broke down, the ex-partners would join opposing socio-political factions. For example, there were a number of unsuccessful attempts at forming various types of economic co-operatives which ended in one group of partners accusing others of cheating, bad faith, and so on; those involved later joined opposing factions and carried their personal grudges into the political arena.

There were many different bases for the recruitment of political support: personal attraction or antagonism to leaders, the granting or rejection of requests for aid/or resources, the breakdown of business or personal relationships, etc. The selected group of pioneers was far from homogeneous. Those who first settled in Frontiertown came to a new social situation in which few people had previously known one another; they each brought with them the social attributes of their previous backgrounds and affiliation with the wider society's social categories and insti-

tutions. Three sociological variables seem to have particular significance for affiliation with the socio-political factions: age; foreign or Israeli birth; and kibbutz or urban background.

TABLE 5. *Age of first adult settlers*

Under 20	20–25	26–30	31–40	41–50	51–60	61–65	65+
1·3%	20·9%	24·1%	38%	9·7%	4·1%	1·4%	0·5%

The screening process eliminated the very old in the first stages of settlement; those selected were almost all married couples; the younger age groups (under forty) were almost all born in Israel or had come to the country in early childhood. The majority had lived in kibbutzim, either because they were born in them or because they had been members of urban youth movements and had done their military service in kibbutzim; in the first two settlement years, one-third of the residents had moved from a kibbutz, while others had once lived in a kibbutz but had gone to live elsewhere before settling in Frontiertown. By 1968, when there was a much lower percentage of kibbutzniks in Frontiertown, a representative sample of the population showed that 47 per cent had lived in a kibbutz for at least two years; and more than half of these had done so for more than five years.

In many ways Frontiertown was an ideal place for a young kibbutznik who had decided to settle elsewhere. Generally he left the kibbutz with few (if any) material possessions, and little or no capital; and despite a good general educational background, he had no specific professional or specialized skill. It was difficult for him to rent or buy an apartment in one of the major cities, where in any case he would find it more difficult to adjust to a vastly different way of life. In Frontiertown he was guaranteed housing at an extremely low rent, and a job (with a wage above the average) in which he could use his past experience, such as driving a tractor; or he could be quickly trained to acquire new skills. The adjustment in terms of style of life was much easier for Frontiertown then closely approximated conditions in a kibbutz. A very important additional factor was that by helping to build a new town in the Negev desert, he was not betraying the pioneering ideology in which he had been reared, a matter of great significance to those who have received an intensive ideological education.

Many of the young kibbutzniks were among those residents most active in the campaign for representation in local government. They were used to participation in the 'general meeting' which is the supreme authority in a kibbutz; and they now were among the organizers of the general town meetings which in many ways resembled kibbutz general meetings. Abel drew much of his support from them. For example, of

his nine closest and most active supporters, five had spent most of their lives, and the other four at least two years (generally on military service), in a kibbutz. On the other hand, only one of Adam's top ten supporters had spent most of his life in a kibbutz; seven came from major cities, one from a *moshav*, and the tenth had been in a kibbutz for some time but had lived for many years in a major city. The majority of Adam's supporters clearly had an urban background.

Age was another important factor. Most of the urban young people had been recently married and could not afford to rent or buy an apartment in the city. Inexpensive housing as well as fairly well-paid employment had drawn them to Frontiertown. Most of the older couples in their forties and fifties had not been born in Israel but had lived in the country since 1948 or earlier; the majority of them were from eastern Europe and many had been unsuccessful in business or marriage. Others had come to Frontiertown because they or someone in their household had asthma and the move had been recommended by their doctor. Most sought 'a new start in life' and valued the image of belonging to a 'pioneering élite' which contrasted so sharply with the anonymity of 'bourgeois' life in a large city.

There was also a general age differential between the leaders and the supporters of the factions. The inner clique of Abel's supporters consisted of a tight-knit group of friends who were in their thirties, with a mean age of 33·6 years. The leaders of Adam's circle (who also met socially—to play bridge, for example) were mainly in their forties and fifties, but such exceptions as a 25-year-old woman pulled the mean age down to 42 years.

There was another differentiating factor—country of birth: almost all Abel's most active supporters had either been Israeli-born or they had lived in the country since infancy or early youth. On the other hand, almost all Adam's leading supporters had immigrated in their young adulthood. Hebrew was generally the mother tongue of Abel's group, who had been educated in the Israeli school system and had served in the Israeli army. Most of the leaders of Adam's faction were foreign-born, had spent their school years abroad where Hebrew was not the language, and they had probably been subjected to discrimination or even Nazi persecution. They had had to adjust to a land, a language, and a culture which were new to them. Such differences in background and experience had shaped their attitudes and aspirations, and these in turn affected their social and political relationships.

In Israel differences in social attributes of that sort carry with them subtle differences in social status. Those born in Israel enjoy high prestige, as do the very early pioneers who came with the 'Second Aliyah'. But the early settlers in Frontiertown did not rank as highly as members of either of these categories; for there, prestige derives from former membership of a kibbutz and such residents are said to be

entitled to the degree of B.K. (Bachelor of Kibbutz). But the genuine
university graduate also enjoys a special status; and most members of
Abel's faction were therefore part of the national élite. That fact was
reluctantly admitted by Adam's Circle; in private conversations with
me, or even in public, they referred to Abel and to his followers as
'snobs' and 'spoiled children' who lacked humility and were reaping
the fruits of a society which older people like them had helped to create
at the cost of much sacrifice. I stress that this was their view and not
my own; I report it since it reflects their resentment at having been
unfairly denied the full rewards of the society to which they had
devoted their lives. The fact that Abel was to many of the Circle leaders
a symbol of the Israeli 'establishment' from which they were in some
ways estranged may partly explain the bitterness expressed in local
political arguments and strife. On the other hand, some members of
Abel's faction would refer to those in Adam's Circle as 'failures' or
'have-beens'. Clearly, the leaders of the two factions had fundamentally
different reactions to authority and to the socio-political establishment
largely as a result of their earlier socialization. Abel and his friends
were secure in their status and position in Israeli society and therefore
had no inhibitions about campaigning against the local authority;
furthermore, such activity could only advance one's political career.
The members of the Circle, on the other hand, felt less secure
personally, and they supported the local authority against those
younger representatives of the Israeli 'establishment', whom they
resented.

It is extremely difficult to identify any clear ideological issues dis-
tinguishing the two factions. Occasionally, a controversy arose about
such matters as the playing of bridge, when the factions took clearly
conflicting stands; Abel's supporters were against the establishment of
a bridge club by Adam's Circle: they claimed that bridge was the
pastime of capitalists. But it would be misleading to conclude from such
an incident that the factions were respectively capitalist and socialist
oriented. It is more likely that the campaign against the bridge club
was mounted because the club was seen as yet another springboard of
political support for Adam.

An attempt to distinguish ideological differences between the two
factions by using Rokeach's test of basic political values proved un-
successful.[7] The interviewees were asked to rank eighteen terminal
values (for example a comfortable life, salvation). Relative ideological
positions (such as liberalism, conservatism) are determined by the
relative positions in which respondents place freedom and equality
within the total of eighteen terminal values. The composite rank of
median scores of the groups was compared by the Druskal-Wallis one-
way analysis of variance as a measure of the ideological differences
based on the ranked values determined by Rokeach's test. There was

no statistically significant difference in the ranking of the key political values of freedom and equality among the top leaders of the two factions in Frontiertown.

TABLE 6. *Political values of faction leaders*

	Adam's Circle (N-10)	Abel Clique (N-9)	P
Equality	13·5	11·0	0·05
Freedom	4·5	7·0	0·05

It may be that it was not possible to distinguish the political values of the faction leaders because of the cultural limitations of the Rokeach test. That is, it is quite likely that while the ranking of freedom and equality enables the identification of Americans on a liberal-conservative continuum, the perception and interpretation of those values may be different in the context of Israeli political culture. However, even if this were true, and if the test could not demonstrate which groups were more liberal and which were more conservative, a distinctly different ranking of such political values would indicate that their ideologies differed. I interpret the lack of significantly different ranking as support for my observation that there were no sharp distinctions between the factions on a basis of liberalism and conservatism. Alignments were a product of the personal and social factors discussed above and were essentially without ideological overtones. In the next section, I set out in more detail the nature and role of Frontiertown's factions.

I have said that Adam and Abel and some of their supporters were somewhat ambitious persons who sought to achieve personal goals partly through their political activities; I have also outlined the general social characteristics which influenced their alignment. I now want to stress that both sides were not only competing for political power and the resources that go with it, but that they were also very seriously concerned with one important goal on which there was unanimous agreement: the development of Frontiertown. Every one in both factions worked for that end. Since detailed procedures for the town's development were set out in the master plan and since almost complete dependence upon government grants could not allow for any major deviation from the plan, the only area of real conflict was about the manner in which the common goal could be attained. Who could best implement the plan and who could obtain the necessary funds? Over this rather limited area of disagreement the factions battled in an intensive struggle. Each side was convinced that only it could fend off disaster and ensure success. It was sincere faith in their respective leaders' ability which led the members to have that total allegiance and commitment so characteristic of factions.[8]

Characteristics of the factions

One of the most striking aspects was a very strong 'local ideology': Frontiertown was a unique and special kind of town. The volunteer pioneers who had been 'selected' to settle it felt a special obligation and commitment to contribute to its development, and this idealistic commitment was the primary incentive in their participation in public life. The elements of idealism and voluntarism played a very important role in local ideology. Another major tenet of Frontiertown ideology was that local interests took precedence over affiliation to a political party; that theme was constantly reiterated. From the outset of the first public town meetings, then during the election of the various Residents' Councils, and even later when the first Town Council was elected, the vast majority of residents favoured elections based on personal popularity rather than along the line of affiliation to a national political party. Such a policy was considered essential to the maintenance of Frontiertown's uniqueness. The presence of this strong local ideology is one characteristic which sharply differentiates the factions in Frontiertown from factions elsewhere. If each faction had been motivated only by self-interest (some observers have suggested that to be the characteristic of factions[9]), they could never have commanded the allegiance and emotional involvement which they did in fact enjoy.

The second striking characteristic of the factional strife in Frontiertown was the extent to which it pervaded almost every aspect of social and communal life during the period under discussion. At the height of the conflict, social life was almost completely politicized: almost every resident became associated with one of the factions in some way; nobody was affiliated to both factions simultaneously, although some remained unaffiliated. Membership of a faction determined and reflected friendship, attendance at social events, affiliation to women's organizations, and even in some cases the selection of a nursery school for one's children.

A third major characteristic was the lack of differentiation of social and political leadership roles and activities, a lack which was closely related to the high degree of public involvement in communal affairs. Political mobilization was very effectively implemented through the intermeshing of social and political leadership. For example, the two leaders of the two major women's organizations were the wives of two leading factional rivals, and were important factional figures in their own right. What was true of women's organizations was equally true of many other social and civic organizations, from folk-dance groups to bridge clubs.

In order to test my field observations, I conducted a survey of a representative sample of 248 adults. Using sex, country of birth, length of residence in Israel, length of residence in Frontiertown, kibbutz or

urban background, education, political party membership, political involvement, and a scale of attachment to the community as the independent variables in a multivariate regression, and social involvement as the dependent variable, I tested the significance of each variable by holding constant the other variables in the regression.

In this way I was able to verify the high significance of political involvement for social involvement with a probability derived from the F ratio of 0·1 per cent. Table 7 shows the very close relationship between the political activists and the social activists. As can be seen, there is little difference among the politically inactive, whether or not they belong to political parties, in respect of their social pursuits. This non-linear relationship also highlights the crucial role of the political leaders in social activities.

TABLE 7. *Significance of political involvement for social involvement when the other variables are held constant*

(P < 0·1%)	
Political activists	2·11
Non-active (no party)	3·26
Non-active (party member)	3·27

I must stress that these figures reflect the situation in 1968, when the survey was conducted. High as the significance of political involvement for social involvement was at that time, it was less significant than in the earlier period since the most recent trend had been towards differentiation of social and political leadership. I discuss this trend and its consequences at the conclusion of the paper.

Length of residence in Israel was the second major variable affecting social involvement. Table 8 shows that the longer the period of residence in Israel, the more likely was the person to be socially active. Veterans of twenty years or more (those who had come to Israel before the War of Independence) scored highest in social involvement, with Sabras (Israeli-born) a close second.

TABLE 8. *Significance of length of residence in Israel for social involvement when other variables are held constant*

(0·1% < P < 1%)	
20 years or more	2·67
Israeli-born	2·78
9–19 years	3·27
8 years or less	3·35

When the other factors were held constant, education was found to have secondary statistical significance. Table 9 shows the relationship between higher education and greater social involvement; this correlation partly reflects the important role of the better-educated members of the original planning team and of the administration in social activities.

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TABLE 9. *Significance of education for social involvement*

($1\% < P < 5\%$)

13 years or more education (technical or academic)	2·94
9–12 years	3·27
8 years or less	3·50

These findings were re-affirmed when political involvement was run as the dependent variable on the same multiple regression. Table 10 shows the high significance of social involvement for political involvement with a probability derived from the F ratio of 0·1 per cent. There is a linear relationship with increasing probability of high political involvement, the higher the score on social involvement.

TABLE 10. *Significance of social involvement for political involvement when the other variables are held constant*

($P < 0·1\%$)

Highly involved socially	2·27
Involved socially	2·76
Socially not involved	3·33

Length of residence in Frontiertown was also significant for political activity. Table 11 shows that the longer a person had lived in Frontiertown the more likely he was to be highly active. There is a striking non-linear relationship which demonstrates the special role of the original settlers whose disproportionally high score for political involvement seems to indicate special characteristics quite apart from the longer time lived in the town. This fits with my argument that they felt a special commitment to participate in the city's development.

TABLE 11. *Significance of length of residence in Frontiertown for political involvement*

($1\% < P < 2\frac{1}{2}\%$)

Original settlers	1·34
4–5 years in town	2·62
2–3 years in town	2·76
1 year or less in town	3·16

I also found that there was a tendency for males to be politically more active than females ($1\% < P < 5\%$).

I stress the importance of the intermeshing of social and political leadership and activities for the mobilization of political support, because the discussion of political issues in non-political recreational and social associations reinforced political involvement and helped to recruit those who had been politically apathetic. Blau made an identical observation in his comments on a classic study of an American trade union: 'These non-political associations of printers promote interest in union politics and participation in democratic self-government on a wide scale . . . the recreational associations of printers expose apathetic

union members to discussions that are likely to stimulate increased concern with the union and the way it is managed. Moreover, the large number of voluntary organizations furnishes an opportunity for many union members to acquire the political skills involved in the administration of a democratic group. . . . The widespread active participation in both the political and recreational affairs of the I.T.U., sustains the internal democracy the two-party system makes possible.'[10]

I think the fact that my findings are identical with those quoted tends to give more weight to the hypothesis that the overlapping of membership, and particularly leadership, in the factions' social and political activities was an important factor leading to the high degree of general public involvement in communal affairs. I also stress the voluntary aspect of the leadership since at the time none of the positions of leadership (except the Directorship of the local Administration and later the Mayoralty) carried direct financial reward, although a prominent position in social activities was of course a valuable asset in the mobilization of political support.

The recruitment and mobilization as a result of the intermeshing of social and political leadership and activities were particularly important, given a fourth major characteristic of the factions: their non-corporate nature. Smith stresses set procedures and organization as a characteristic defining a corporate group.[11] Both factions in Frontier-town lacked these features: they had no formal organization, no defined set of procedures; members met informally and membership was not specific. In fact, it would be more accurate to speak of the supporters of factional leaders than of membership in specific groups. Although the factions had a definite identity and leadership, there was fluctuation on specific issues and at different times among the individual supporters.

Participation in factions actively involved people in the community, and there developed a strong community ethos which put a high premium (in terms of social status) on political activity. Within a relatively short time there had arisen a feeling of community, of personal concern for fellow townsmen—probably because large numbers of residents were actively participating in communal affairs. While that strong community spirit was very obvious to anyone living there, it was difficult to document the impression with 'hard data'. However, I attempted to do just that by devising a scale of attachment to the community which I used as the dependent variable on the same multiple regression mentioned earlier. Using the technique of Gutman scaling, I was able to establish the logical ordering of four factors which I considered to be indicators of commitment or attachment to the community. The scale included whether or not the person had tenure (*kavua*) in his job; whether or not he saw himself as being permanently settled in the town; favourable or unfavourable responses to questions about the character of the town; and attitude towards fellow-citizens.

The scale was scored from 1 (very strong attachment) to 5 (very weak attachment), with the assumption that the differences between the scores were of equal importance.

I found that those people who were permanent in their jobs (68 adults or 27½ per cent of my sample of 248) said that they had definitely settled permanently in Frontiertown, and that they felt that Frontiertown had a special character which they liked, that Frontiertown was their home, and that they shared something in common with others who lived there. I gave them a score of 1—greatest attachment to the community. Score 2 was given to those people (82 or 33 per cent of the sample) who did not have tenure in their jobs, but gave the same responses indicating a positive attachment to the community as those in group 1. Score 3 was given to the 50 people (20 per cent) who stated that they did not have tenure and were not definitely settled permanently in the town (mostly because of job insecurity), but gave positive responses showing a liking for the character of the town and their attachment to it. I stress that over 80 per cent of the sample gave the most positive responses possible for feelings of attachment to the community. Those who had neither tenure nor were permanently settled in town, and who expressed negative feelings about the character of the town, but who still said that Frontiertown was their home and they felt something in common with others who lived there (31 people or 12½ per cent), were scored 4. Score 5 was reserved for the 17 individuals (5 per cent) who responded negatively in all the categories. For the purposes of the scale, all neutral responses (for example, 'It is just a place where I happen to live and work and I feel no particular attachment to it') were scored as negative. These five items constituted a scale of reproducibility $= 0.93246$. In this way the dependent variables of social and political involvement and attachment to the community were scored from very high to very low, and it was assumed that the intervals between each score were equal.

As can be seen from Table 12, length of residence was the most highly significant factor relating to attachment to Frontiertown. However, the relationship is not a linear one since the degree of attachment of the first settlers is disproportionately stronger than the increment of attachment accruing to the length of residence of later settlers. Again, it seems that the fact that the first pioneers were the most active participants in the social and political arena was related to the fact that they were significantly more likely to be more attached to the town.

Men were shown to be more likely than women to have a stronger attachment to the community ($P < 0.1$ per cent), probably because they were more actively involved in the community. The regression also revealed that people who had come from an urban background were more likely to become more strongly attached to the community

a

than were those from kibbutzim ($2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent $< P < 5\%$). One possible explanation may be that those who came from the anonymity of large cities were more likely to be favourably impressed by the friendly and intimate character of Frontiertown than were the kibbutzniks who were accustomed to this kind of atmosphere. It is also possible

TABLE 12. *Significance of length of residence in Frontiertown for attachment to the community when the other variables are held constant* ($P < 0.1\%$)

Original settlers	0.37
4-5 years in town	2.00
2-3 years in town	2.20
1 year or less in town	2.75

that they expressed their attachment more clearly than kibbutznikim, who may have taken their attachment for granted and therefore did not express or elaborate on it.

I was surprised to discover that there was no significant statistical difference between the social and political involvement of those with an urban and those with a kibbutz background at the time of the survey. My own impression had been that the latter were more active, but the statistical evidence seems to indicate that there were many people from kibbutzim who were inactive and whom I had not taken into consideration.

The one variable which had absolutely no statistical significance for social activity, political involvement, or attachment to the community was 'country of birth'. That completely corroborated my own field observations that ethnic origin and affiliation played no significant role in Frontiertown's social and political life. This fact also highlights the town's peculiar political development in sharp contrast with other new towns which were settled at first by recent immigrants (primarily from North Africa and the Middle East).[12] The minority of the early settlers in Frontiertown were originally from North Africa and the Middle East; but like their counterparts who came from Europe, they were *vatikim*, old-timers in the country; they did not therefore encounter the many difficult problems of adjustment to Israeli society which new immigrants must surmount; and they were not referred to in the pejorative terms often employed to label new immigrants.

In the early years, almost half of the adult population were born in Israel; although their ethnic origins were different, they were practically indistinguishable. It was the Sabra who was the reference standard for all ethnic groups. Since differences in standard of living and educational background were minimal, and since they had almost identical styles of life, perhaps the differences which elsewhere in Israel have led to tension between ethnic groups were largely unimportant in Frontiertown. In fact, eastern European (Hungarian and Romanian) 'Ashkenazim' who were the most recent immigrants in the town had a lower

status; and pejorative stereotypes were formed about them, even by those from the same country of birth but of longer settlement in Israel. The absolute lack of ethnic strife amidst the very intense factional competition was a source of considerable pride. The rallying cry of local ideology, 'For the good of Frontiertown', specifically excluded narrow ethnic appeals just as it scorned affiliation to national political parties. And it is a striking accomplishment of the factional leadership that in the course of many hotly contested campaigns there was never a recorded attempt to incite or exploit ethnic divisions.

In this section I have tried to show the development of factional strife in a new town by outlining the kinds of social attributes which, based on previous experiences, affiliations, and background, helped to determine the manner in which people dealt with and reacted to one another, and reacted to the new social and political situations. I have argued that the development of this factional rivalry was responsible to a large extent for the involvement of large numbers of the town's residents in direct participation in public affairs, and that this, in turn, played an important role in the emergence of a strong community feeling and loyalty.

Conclusion: The functions of social strife in Frontiertown

The discussion of the social functions of the political factions leads to some general conclusions on the role of social strife in the formation, definition, and preservation of the main social groups in a new environment, in the creation and maintenance of widespread participation in communal affairs, in the contribution to communal cohesion, and in the promotion of institutional change. I am aware that my finding that political strife in Frontiertown led to greater communal cohesion deviates from the findings in much of the literature on interest groups (with the important exception of *Union Democracy*, cited earlier) and in the literature of American pluralist political science in general. However, my finding fits within a general theoretical framework which dates back to Machiavelli and which was systematically formulated by Simmel and developed by Coser, while it was independently developed and formulated by British social anthropologists, most specifically by Gluckman, who applied that theoretical framework to the analysis of African political systems.[13]

It is absolutely essential to distinguish between the different levels of society at which strife occurs and the different levels of legitimacy and value consensus within the society. For example, when Coser argues that conflict is important in defining and maintaining groups, he stresses (as have many political theorists before him) that legitimacy is a crucial variable influencing whether or not feelings of hostility will lead to conflict. As he says, ' . . . when a social structure is no longer

considered legitimate, individuals with similar objective positions will come, through conflict, to constitute themselves into self-conscious groups with common interests.'[14]

The difficulty with such a formulation is that it does not define the level of the social structure or the authority which is considered legitimate. For example, for Abel and his faction the administration appointed by the government in which they had little or no voice was illegitimate, while at the same time the national political authority which appointed the administration was legitimate. Two key points can be drawn from this example. The first is that there were discrepant principles involved; the right of the legally constituted and legitimate government of Israel to establish a new town and provide for its administration, at least initially, conflicted with the well-established democratic principle of responsible representative government, local as well as national. The situation was exacerbated by the lack of any clear timetable for the transfer from a government-appointed administration to a locally representative town council. It is precisely such discrepancies in principles which allow the political actor to choose among them, to reject authority as illegitimate at the local level while maintaining loyalty and belief in the legitimacy of authority at the higher level. In such a manner, limited structural change can be initiated at the local level while maintaining and strengthening the national structures.

The second key point is that while those who came to a new specific social environment in Frontiertown had not been linked by previous social relationships, they shared many aspects of general Israeli norms, customs, affiliations, and identities. Many had been born and brought up in Israel, most had been educated in Israeli schools, some had belonged to Israeli youth movements, kibbutz movements, political parties, social organizations, etc. Most of them had either fought in, or lived through, Israel's War of Independence in 1948 and the Sinai Campaign in 1956. They could be identified with different age and ethnic groups, but all shared common Israeli citizenship. Their previous experience and socialization partly determined the manner in which they interacted with one another in their new social environment. Moreover, they had chosen to come to Frontiertown, and they had been very carefully selected from a wide number of applicants. They had not been directed to live in the new town. Like the founders of modern Israel, they wanted to establish a new society in a new land. They did not have to fight a foreign colonial power; they had government backing.

Coser stresses the group-preserving functions of conflict (strife) and states, 'Continued conflict being a condition of survival for struggle groups, they must perpetually provoke it.'[15] Whereas the institutionalized aspects of corporate groups tend to give them perpetuity even in the relative absence of strife, the non-corporate nature of factions

makes them even more dependent upon strife to maintain their identity and boundaries. Therefore they tend either to search for enemies or to exaggerate the danger represented by the actual enemy. The evolution of the political factions in Frontiertown, with their absence of ideological differences, necessitated the invention and/or exaggeration of contentious issues in order to legitimize the continued existence of the two competing groupings. (However, at a later stage, in 1968, when the factions became incorporated into institutionalized branches of national political parties, there was a marked decline in the extent of general public participation in political affairs.)

Coser makes a very useful distinction between realistic and non-realistic conflict. 'Conflict is realistic . . . in so far as people raise conflicting claims to scarce status, power and resources and adhere to conflicting values. . . . Realistic conflicts arise when men clash in the pursuit of claims based on frustration of demands and expectancies of gains.'[16] Non-realistic conflicts, according to Coser, ' . . . arise from deprivations and frustrations stemming from the socialization process and from later adult role obligations, or they result . . . from a conversion of originally realistic antagonism which is disallowed expression. . . . In this case the choice of the antagonists depends on the determinants not directly related to a contentious issue and is not oriented toward the attainment of specific results.'[17]

Such a conceptual abstraction is particularly useful in identifying realistic and non-realistic aspects of particular situations of conflict. The strife between the two factions in Frontiertown was realistic in that they competed with each other for specific goals of office, power, and status. Membership of the factions was a realistic means by which individuals could achieve goals, and the factions therefore were flexible instruments for the mobilization of political support. When viewed at a different level, factional strife clearly had non-realistic aspects. The struggle could be considered as a non-realistic 'war game'[18]—where full political participation was originally denied by the non-representative nature of the government-appointed administration. It was also an expression of the futility and frustration of the attempt to control the course of the community's development, which was in fact largely out of local hands. In this sense the local strife was sound and fury, signifying nothing—or, at least, very little. However, when one examines the positive contribution the local strife made to the mobilization of the citizenry in local public affairs and to the development of a strong community spirit, it could be judged to be a classic example of successful non-realistic conflict!

How then can we determine when conflict will be cohesive or disruptive? Coser identifies two main variables: (1) the type of issue over which there is conflict, and (2) the type of structure in which the conflict takes place. He states: 'The distinction between conflicts over the

basis of consensus and those taking place within the basic consensus, comprises part of the common ground of political science from Aristotle to modern political theory.'[19] Following Gluckman's terminological refinement, 'conflict' will be reserved for 'oppositions compelled by the very structure of social organization' and contradiction 'for those relationships between discrepant principles and processes in the social structure which must inevitably lead to radical change in the pattern'.[20] Structures are vaguely identified by Coser as being rigid (not allowing the open expression of disagreement with the ruling powers), or loose or flexible (when they allow such expression). Consensual strife taking place in a relatively flexible institutional structure tends to unite, while contradictions in a relatively rigid structure tend to tear apart.

A key to the stability of a system is the multiplicity of cross-cutting affiliations and loyalties. This is a point which Simmel, Kroeber, Gluckman, and Coser have all stressed. Coser expresses it as follows: 'If the members of a society should have mutually reinforcing interests, multiple affiliations, instead of crisscrossing each other, would eventually consolidate into basic cleavages. Only if there are numerous antagonistic yet diversified interests will the likelihood of consolidation in a cluster of affiliations be avoided and segmentation of participation maintained.'[21]

I think this principle of social organization is particularly applicable to the socio-political situation in Frontiertown. While there was a tendency in the early stages for the two main groups to polarize the community along one main political cleavage with the multiplicity of associations reinforcing this cleavage, complete polarization did not take place for a number of reasons. In the first place, the smallness of the town and the closeness of social relationships brought even the most bitter antagonists into close and diverse relationships in which interests, roles, and loyalties sometimes cut across political divisions. Contacts and relationships built through everyday and ordinary social interactions tended to check potentially divisive factional strife.

The fact that the political structure was flexible in that it allowed for the full expression of disagreement with the ruling powers (sometimes even to an extreme degree) and that the strife was most definitely within a basic consensus, made it a major contributory influence in the development of communal solidarity and spirit. There developed a fierce pride in the town and strong loyalties to the community. These findings were substantiated by the sociological survey, and I can therefore validly say that community spirit was highly developed.

The process through which political strife contributed to communal cohesion involved the mutual reinforcement of the strife with consensus among the participants. This consensus not only determined the rules of the game, but also the goal of the game itself. When the first settlers came to the new town they became involved in a rift which had

originated in the planning team and which developed into a demand by a large section of the community for representative local government. *But* the participants in the strife shared the common values and culture of Israeli society and were loyal to its national political institutions. In addition, they were all agreed on the major goal of developing their town within the framework set out in the master plan. Sincere dedication to this common goal, and recognition that their opponents were equally dedicated to a common goal, gave a special character to the competitive strife. Because of this consensus the potentially divisive aspects of the strife were limited and were constructively channelled. Through the process of political strife relationships were established where none had previously existed, friendships were made, groups and norms were established, and a large proportion of the citizens were mobilized into intense involvement in public activity. That involvement helped to create a greater identification with the town, which contributed to the development of a community spirit, which in turn reinforced the consensual nature of the strife. In this way the strife in Frontiertown was kept within the bounds of a 'family fight' and further helped to establish a close-knit community.

Methodological Note

Field work was carried out from January 1967 to May 1968; my family and I lived in the town throughout that period. After approximately a year of participant observation of many facets of social and political life in the community, I drew up a questionnaire of 180 questions with the generous help of Dr. Mark Spivak of the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, who made many helpful suggestions. The questionnaire took an average of an hour and a half to answer. I personally conducted a majority of the interviews, and was aided by three assistants from outside the community. We interviewed a random sample of 248 out of the approximately 1,000 adults living in the town at the time. I was able to verify the representativeness of the sample by comparison with town census data on country of birth, length of residence in Israel, length of residence in town, age, etc.

The number of non-responses to the questions was slight. For example, only one person did not respond to the question about motivation for settling in the town; six non-responses to the questions about perceived length of settlement in town were deleted from Tables 2 and 3; two people did not answer the question whether they were happy with what the town had become; seven had no opinion as to its special character; and two could not, or would not, describe their feelings about the town.

In the analysis of the multivariate regression the dummy variable technique was used on the independent variables, that is, one factor from each variable was eliminated from the regression. At the second

stage of the regressions, each one of the nine independent variables was in turn left out while the others were computed. The statistical significance could then be derived from the F ratio by computing the difference of the sum of squares of the dependent variable obtained when the independent variable in question is left out of the regression.

NOTES

[1] Aronoff, M., *Frontiertown: The Politics of Community Building in Israel*, Manchester University Press (forthcoming).

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[2] Aronoff, M., 'Development Towns in Israel', in Curtis, M., ed., *Israel: Social Structure and Change*, Transactions Press, New Brunswick (in press); Cohen, E., 'Development Towns—The Social Dynamics of "Planted" Urban Communities in Israel', in Eisenstadt, S. N., Bar Yosef, R., and Adler, C., eds., *Integration and Development in Israel*, Jerusalem, 1970; Spiegel, E., *New Towns in Israel*, Stuttgart/Bern, Karl Kramer Verlag, 1966; and E. Marx, 'Some social contexts of personal violence', in Gluckman, M., ed., *The Allocation of Responsibility*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1972.

[3] Weingrod, A., *Reluctant Pioneers*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1966.

[4] In order to protect the anonymity of Frontiertown I cannot give the origin of the quotation; the author identifies the town.

[5] See Elon, A., *The Israelis, Founders and Sons*, New York, 1971, for an outstanding description of the differences between the generations. On p. 18 he mentions that among the Sabras, 'parlance Tzionut (Zionism) had become synonymous with blather'.

[6] Gluckman, M., *Custom and Conflict in Africa*, Oxford, 1956, p. 27.

[7] Rokeach, M., 'A Theory of Organization and Change Within Value Attitude Systems', *Journal of Social Studies*, vol. XXIV, no. 1, 1968, pp. 13–33.

[8] Firth, R., 'Introduction to Factions in Indian and Overseas Indian Societies', *The British Journal of Sociology*, vol. VIII, no. 4, December 1957.

[9] Firth, ibid.; 'Segmentary Factional Political Systems', in Swartz, M., Turner, V., and Tuden, A., eds., *Political Anthropology*, Chicago, 1966; Nicholas, R., 'Factions: A Comparative Analysis', in Swartz, M., ed., *Local-Level Politics*, London, 1969; Shokeid, M. (Minkovitz), 'Immigration and Factionalism: An Analysis of Factions in Rural Israeli Communities of Immigrants', *The British Journal of Sociology*, vol. XIX, no. 4, December 1968, pp. 385–406.

10 Blau, P., *Bureaucracy in Modern Society*, New York, 1967, p. 113.

11 Smith, M. G., 'A Structural Approach to Comparative Politics', in Easton, D., ed., *Varieties of Political Theory*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966.

12 Cf. Shumsky, *The Clash of Cultures in Israel*, New York, 1955; Weingrod, A., *Group Relations in a New Society*, London, 1965; and Deshen, S., *Immigrant Voters in Israel*, Manchester, 1970.

13 Machiavelli, N., *The Discourses*, ch. IV; Coser, L., *The Functions of Social Conflict*, London, 1956; Gluckman, M., *Custom and Conflict in Africa*, op. cit.; Gluckman, M., *Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society*, Oxford, 1965; and Simmel, G., *Soziologie* (1908), English translation by Wolff, K. and Bendix, R., *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*, New York, 1963.

14 Coser, op. cit.

15 ibid., p. 104.

16 ibid., p. 54.

17 ibid., p. 49.

18 Firth, Introduction to 'Factions in Indian and Overseas Indian Societies', pp. 293–97.

19 Coser, op. cit., p. 75.

20 Gluckman, *Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society*, p. 109. For a more recent formulation, see Gluckman, M., 'Inter-Hierarchical Roles: Professional and Party Ethics in Tribal Areas in South and Central Africa', in Swartz, ed., *Local-Level Politics*.

21 Coser, op. cit., p. 78.

ADULT EVALUATION OF THE YOUNG: THE CASE OF ISRAEL'S VICTORIOUS YOUTH IN THE SIX-DAY WAR

Eugene C. Weiner   Aliza Cohen
Esther Pedorowitz

B Y any conceivable standard the behaviour of Israel's youth during the Six-Day War was exemplary. As warriors they were intrepid, redoubtable, and ultimately invincible.[1] As humanitarian victors they were for the most part benevolent, compassionate, and philosophically reflective.[2] And yet, as is generally known in Israel, adult criticism of Israel's youth before the Six-Day War was captious and at times withering.[3] How could adults have so misjudged the qualities and capacities of Israel's youth? That question is often asked.

There are a number of things wrong with this phrasing of it. First, it assumes that the evaluation made by adults is an objective statement about youth's condition, rather than a projection of the adults themselves; it presupposes a correspondence between subjective statements about social realities and the social realities themselves. Second, it assumes that adults were wrong in their initial evaluation of Israel's youth. Perhaps they were correct. Being a 'bad' young person in relative peace may be just the proper preparation for being 'good' in a war situation. The contradiction is assumed rather than. proved. Third, it fails to take into account the possibility that criticism of the young may be necessary for their socialization (the only way to make the young 'good' is to call them bad).

We think it preferable to pose the question in different terms: namely, what kinds of critical statement were made by adults in Israel before and after the Six-Day War? And what, if any, was the impact of the young men and women's laudable war-time performance on these statements? This manner of presenting the problem immediately suggests that we must examine the adults' *statements* rather than the *condition* of the young. We are therefore naturally led to ask the following

questions: (1) What is it about the condition of adults that leads them to speak negatively of the young? (2) What are the specific characteristics that are denigrated by adults? (3) What causes do adults hypothesize for these characteristics? (4) What remedies do they suggest? (5) What can be learned about adults from the characteristics they choose to attribute to the young?

We have taken statements from three Israeli morning newspapers which generally reflect the opinions of adults in three important population groups. They are: *Davar*, the major organ of the labour movement which controls a sizable portion of the state's political power and economic resources; *Ha'aretz*, the most influential semi-independent paper; and *Hatzopheh*, which is directed to the religious community. Using the standard methods of content analysis[4] (which attempt to be objective, systematic, and quantitative), we selected as our unit of analysis sentence fragments and words from essays evaluating the young which were published in the three newspapers between 1965 and 1970.

We selected the essays on the following principles: (1) They must be written by adults. (2) They must be evaluational, containing praise or criticism of the behaviour of the young (who for the purposes of the research were defined as young people in their late teens or early twenties—of high school or university age).[5] We did not include in the sample: (1) articles on specific problems such as juvenile delinquency; (2) reports of sociological or psychological research; (3) interviews with young persons; (4) weekend supplement pieces which have a character of their own; and (5) purely descriptive essays. There were a total of 180 articles which met our criteria, and we selected 43 of them for our sample.

We classified the sentence fragments in the following manner: (*a*) alleged negative characteristics; (*b*) alleged positive characteristics; (*c*) hypothesized causes for the alleged negative characteristics; (*d*) recommended solutions; (*e*) whether the statements were made before or after the Six-Day War; and (*f*) the type of newspaper. Further sub-categories were constructed; they were based on the kinds of statement in each of the manifest categories. For example, in category one (alleged negative characteristics of youth), the statements were further classified by the qualities considered to be negative.[6] Each of the categories was sub-classified in a similar fashion.

Table 1 shows the preponderance of negative evaluations before the Six-Day War in all three newspapers; after the war, the evaluations were evenly divided in *Davar* but positive in the two other newspapers.[7] It also reveals that:

1. Before the war 97 per cent of the descriptive terms used by *Davar* were negative, and only 3 per cent were positive.

2. There was a relatively high degree of criticism in all three news-

papers even in the euphoric period after the war: 51 per cent, 33 per cent, and 21 per cent of the descriptive terms had negative implications; this was so in spite of the unassailably laudable performance of the young in the Six-Day War and in the war of attrition.

1. *Description of youth*

TABLE 1. *Percentage of descriptive terms with negative* implications before and after the Six-Day War*

Newspaper	Before War % N	After War % N	% of Change
Davar (Labour)	97 (716)	51 (300)	46
Ha'aretz (Independent)	71 (840)	33 (258)	38
Hatzopheh† (Religious)	66 (353)	21 (143)	45

* The percentages for the terms with positive implications are the reciprocals of each of the percentages in the cells.
† The referent in the vast majority of cases was secular (i.e. not religious) youth.

3. There was relative consistency in the *degree* of change in opinion after the war (46 per cent, 38 per cent, 45 per cent).

4. *Hatzopheh* published more positive evaluations of the secular Israeli young than did *Davar*.

The particular negative characteristics attributed to the young before the war are set out in Table 2.

Thus, before the war the major shortcomings were said to be non-involvement and detachment. But from what? The three newspapers do not agree. In the case of *Davar*, the young were detached from land and values; for *Ha'aretz* they lacked citizenship and public responsibility, while for *Hatzopheh* they had become estranged from Jewish tradition. In a society requiring the involvement of its youth in defence and settlement, detachment and disengagement are perhaps the most devastating charges that can be levelled. There is a striking correlation between the ownership and readership of each newspaper and the characteristics attributed to the young before the war: each newspaper's evaluation reflected its own particular institutionally supported and dominant *a priori* values. For *Davar* it was important to settle the land and to be guided by labour ideology; for *Ha'aretz*, responsible enlightened citizenship was essential; while for *Hatzopheh* it was commitment to Jewish tradition. Whether or not these dailies were describing the true state of Israeli youth at the time cannot be ascertained, but that they were describing themselves in the process is clear. Social psychological literature is explicit on the issue of *a priori* judgements and their impact on descriptions; most descriptions, even when they

purport to be objective, are very far from being so. The Israeli press is just another case in point. What is curious is the apparent lack of self-awareness of the process on the part of the newspapers[8] (or, if they were in fact conscious of it, they did not comment on it). We have

TABLE 2. *Percentage of alleged negative characteristics before the Six-Day War*

	N	%
Davar		
1. Emigrate from Israel	222	31·0
2. Indifferent to values	194	27·1
3. Estranged from older generation	107	14·9
4. Excessive materialism	70	9·7
5. Rebelliousness	61	8·5
6. Canaanitism*	40	5·5
7. Self-publicity	22	3·3
	716	100·0
Ha'aretz		
1. Irresponsible citizenship	384	45·8
2. Diploma oriented	203	24·1
3. Low cultural level	147	17·5
4. Over-critical	95	11·3
5. Shirking of army service by Yeshiva Students	11	1·3
	840	100·0
Hatzopheh		
1. Canaanitism*	160	45·3
2. Lack of Sabbath observance	53	15·0
3. Don't value tradition	42	11·9
4. Emigrate from Israel	52	14·7
5. Lack of morality	24	6·9
6. Irresponsible citizenship	22	6·2
	353	100·0

* The component elements of Canaanitism are: 1. The denigration of periods of Jewish history when Jews lived outside Israel. 2. Separation between Jewish and Israeli identity. 3. Rejection of ideas of transcendance and noblesse oblige in Jewish peoplehood.

already noted the correspondence between *a priori* values and the characteristics attributed to the young. This consistency[9] is a particularly important feature of Israeli cultural institutions; it was evident not only in the attribution of negative characteristics before the war, but also in the enumeration of positive characteristics after the war (see Table 3).

Table 3 shows again a congruence between the basic ideological and political positions of the newspapers and the characteristics they positively described after the war. The labour paper, *Davar*, perceived the young (now considered good) as spiritual, intellectually constructive, and idealistic; *Ha'aretz* saw them as more conscious of their civic responsibilities and more politically minded; while *Hatzopheh* saw them as open-minded and desirous of contact with tradition. This last characteristic is about the best compliment a religious person can pay to one who is not observant.

After the war, the terms of reference are the same, but the evalua-

tion has become positive. The young are now said to have the very same traits which each newspaper had found lacking in them before the war. It seems that the need for internal consistency is so strong that it defies logic and common sense. In the light of such a 'wrong' earlier evaluation of the young, the natural tendency after the war would have been to discover totally different positive attributes and thus to avoid

TABLE 3. *Percentage of alleged characteristics positively evaluated after the Six-Day War*

	N	%
Davar		
1. Spiritual revival	87	29·7
2. Constructive thinking	66	22·6
3. Realization of ideals of Labour movement	53	18·2
4. Overcoming cynicism	31	10·6
5. Attachment to Diaspora	25	8·6
6. Miscellaneous	30	10·3
	292	100·0
Ha'aretz		
1. Involvement in politics	265	50·2
2. Inner conflict about involvement	107	20·3
3. Spirit of sacrifice	95	17·9
4. Intellectual ability	25	4·7
5. Stable and serious	22	4·1
6. Religious youth intellectually committed to tradition rather than blindly subservient	14	2·8
	528	100·0
Hatzopheh (on secular youth)		
1. Open to Judaism	139	28·0
2. Patriotic and nationalistic	83	18·0
3. Generally good	73	15·0
4. Committed, ready for sacrifice	67	13·0
5. Interested in education, not pioneering	53	10·8
6. Humane, not indiscriminate killers	47	9·6
7. Able to create new world	27	5·6
	489	100·0

the embarrassment of an earlier wrong assessment. But no. After the war, according to the newspapers, the young possessed exactly those qualities that they had previously lacked.

There is another perplexing question. What did the young do in the war to cause such a change in the overall evaluation from negative to positive? They behaved like good soldiers. But what is the connecting link between that conduct and the positive characteristics attributed to them after the war? There is no *necessary* link between fighting the good fight and participating in a 'spiritual revival'. There was in each of the three newspapers an ideological filtering mechanism that picked out aspects of good soldiering behaviour.

However, there was an overall uniformity in one important aspect: all three newspapers praised *involvement*. On the other hand, the kind

of involvement praised was different: for *Davar* it was spiritual and intellectual, for *Ha'aretz* political and moral, and for *Hatzopheh* it was readiness for possible religious involvement.

Summarizing thus far, one can say that in Israel there is a descriptive–evaluational process highly influenced by *a priori* judgements whereby adults characterize the young. This process seems to operate as follows: there is a generalized value that all accept; non-involvement is regarded as a central negative attribute. But that generalized value is qualified by institutionally-linked favoured explanations.

TABLE 4(A). *Youth's behaviour in Israel: hypothesized causes, as formulated by adults: Before the Six-Day War*

	N	%
Davar		
1. Difficult adjustment to peace	293	23·6
2. Spiritual emptiness	261	20·8
3. Standards (low) in adult society	162	13·0
4. Older generation's non-acceptance of new ideas	143	11·5
5. Canaanitism	111	8·9
6. Youth's challenge of basic values	110	8·9
7. Non-co-optation of youth in politics	107	8·6
8. Declining strength in older generation, which results in adopting ideas from outside	59	4·7
	1246	100·0
Ha'aretz		
1. Institutional failure (e.g. family, school, youth group)	1150	49·0
2. Adult hypocrisy, lip-service to ideals	777	33·0
3. Faulty adult evaluations which are internalized by youth	315	13·4
4. The permissive society	111	4·6
	2353	100·0
Hatzopheh		
1. No religious values in secular education	304	49·6
2. Lack of morality	225	36·6
3. Lack of ideals leading to disparagement of law	35	5·7
4. Desire for normal life	40	6·5
5. Defective religious education, therefore poor citizenship	10	1·6
	614	100·0

If the evaluation of youth is negative (young people are viewed as non-involved), then the explanation and its descriptive terms are used negatively; if the evaluation of youth is positive (they are viewed as involved), then the same explanation and its descriptive terms are used positively.[10] Thus the descriptive process that adults engage in when writing for newspapers about Israel's youth is anything but neutral. It can be manipulated in spite of the evidence, but only within certain limits. These limits are roughly determined, first, by the generalized values in the society; and second, by the relevant institutionally sanctioned rhetoric which has a very high degree of consistency in Israel.

2. *Youth's behaviour: hypothesized causes formulated by adults*

Politically minded men are theorists forever concocting plausible reasons for other men's actions. These imputed causes are important clues to the theorizers' own structure of thought;[11] and one of the best clues to the structure of adult consciousness in Israel is to be found in the data we collected on the older age-group's explanations of the behaviour of the young. These hypothesized causes are set out in Tables 4(A) and (B).

TABLE 4(B). *Youth's behaviour in Israel: hypothesized causes, as formulated by adults: After the Six-Day War*

	N	%
Davar		
1. Zionist education spiritually ineffective	145	27·8
2. Search for personal identity and individualism*	118	22·6
3. Tension associated with security situation prevents rebellious- ness such as occurs among youth outside Israel*	84	16·1
4. Co-operation between generations*	76	14·6
5. Problems in judging youth	70	13·4
6. No effective reference group for the future	29	5·5
	522	100·0
Ha'aretz		
1. Reluctance of political leaders to acknowledge change in youth	308	46·1
2. Lack of spiritual content in life of the young	185	27·5
3. Lack of trust between leaders and youth	176	26·4
	669	100·0
Hatzopheh		
1. No religious values in secular education	570	40·7
2. Rampant technology and modernization	229	16·4
3. Lack of traditional values	158	11·2
4. Religious people defined as different by youth	139	9·9
5. Youth's disappointment with values of older generation	122	8·6
6. Desire for participation in important decisions	93	6·6
7. Links with the Diaspora undervalued	66	4·7
8. Miscellaneous	26	1·9
	1403	100·0

* Indicates causes given for positive characteristics.

In the causes given for the behaviour of the young we find the same consistency of explanation as in the negative and positive descriptions analysed above. *Ha'aretz's* causes are for the most part political and institutional, *Davar's* spiritual and ideological, while *Hatzopheh's* are religious. There are, in addition, some interesting facets of the data on causes.

The first of these is the centrality of war and peace as a cause of youth's behaviour in *Davar*. Unlike the other two newspapers (which do not even mention war as a factor in the behaviour of youth), *Davar* gives the 1967 war a central position: before that date comparative peace is listed as the reason for the negative behaviour of the young, indeed as the major reason; but after the war, the tense security situation is seen as a positive restraint on youthful rebelliousness. For *Davar*,

war builds up moral character. But what of *Ha'aretz* and *Hatzopheh*? Why should war and the tense security situation improve the young? The moral impact of the war and the security of the country were not even mentioned as a factor. What then is the connecting link for *Ha'aretz* between good fighting behaviour and assuming more civic responsibility or becoming more receptive religiously for *Hatzopheh*? Since the subject is not spelled out in the sources we have examined in detail, we can only speculate. It seems that although *Ha'aretz* and *Hatzopheh* do not mention the positive moral impact of war, they nevertheless accept it as a fundamental premise. For how else could one account for the connecting link? Although this speculation goes beyond our evidence, it does help to explain a peculiar aspect of Israeli political life. How is it possible for a labour minority to maintain its power over such a long period in spite of strong political opposition? It would appear that although *Davar* is more explicitly nationalistic and militaristic than the other two papers, it voices sentiments that they (and other segments of the population they represent) deeply feel but are inhibited from expressing.

An interesting fact is the overall agreement in all three dailies about the centrality of adults as prime causal agents of the behaviour of the young; they make the assumption that the young are unable freely to generate their own behavioural patterns; they depict them as acted upon rather than as initiators of action. It follows that they cannot be held guilty when they behave badly; the adults must be held responsible. *Davar* is the only newspaper which accounts after the war for positively valued characteristics. Before the war that daily had been most critical of the Israeli young; later, it attempted to find reasons for its changed evaluation.

It is instructive to focus on the specific positively charged causes. Individualism is unexpectedly praised by *Davar*; apparently the war record of individualistic young people impressed its writers. They also noted two other positive factors: the security situation and the close co-operation between the generations. The other two dailies had been less critical before the war and therefore did not feel it incumbent upon them to offer any explanations for the exemplary behaviour during the war.

Finally, in spite of the fact that each newspaper drastically altered its evaluation, the basis of that evaluation was challenged only by *Davar*, perhaps because in its case the shock had been so great. For the other two dailies, the whole process of judging the young was simply taken for granted even after it proved to have been inadequate.

As we can see from Table 5, there are basically two kinds of solution offered for handling youth's alleged negative characteristics. The first is only hortatory, for example, 'Develop the value of humility in young people.' The second specifies the mode of implementation, for example,

'co-opt the youth into positions of leadership'. But we are not told how the young are to be taught to value and develop humility.

All the solutions offered by the three dailies imply that the young are not capable of dealing with their own negative qualities, and that it is the responsibility of adults to educate and guide them.

Moreover, both *Davar* and *Hatzopheh* advocate remedies which

3. *Adult solutions for youth*

TABLE 5(A). *Recommended solutions to deal with the alleged negative characteristics: Before the Six-Day War*

	N	%
Davar		
1. Develop the value of humility in young people	246	34·5
2. Use the cinema to influence them	156	21·7
3. Co-opt the young to cultural and political positions	96	13·4
4. Jewish consciousness	86	12·0
5. Stress spiritual rather than material ends	71	9·9
6. Need to analyse causes for negative qualities	33	4·6
7. Labour Movement Ideology	28	3·9
	716	100·0
Ha'aretz		
1. New type of teacher who can be more active model, with accent on physical fitness	440	48·0
2. Leaders have to free themselves from stereotypes youth have of them	123	13·4
3. Need to develop ethics of war and spirit of self-sacrifice	108	11·8
4. Develop intellectual abilities	67	7·3
5. Develop verbalization skills	63	6·9
6. Stress value of economic independence	41	4·5
7. Need to educate for good character rather than stress external values	37	4·0
8. Yeshiva high schools where tradition and modernity are both stressed	38	4·1
	917	100·0
Hatzopheh		
1. Stress traditional values of Judaism	198	34·7
2. Use the mass media	174	30·5
3. Religious education must permeate the entire system of education	124	21·8
4. Emphasize pioneer settlement	74	13·0
	570	100·0

exhibit a curious combination of belief in both the efficacy of abstract values and the technology of the mass communications industry.[12] *Davar* recommends the use of the cinema and *Hatzopheh* of the mass media. This emphasis on technology was evident only before the war. It is hardly discernible after 1967, when each newspaper puts forward solutions consistent with its own position. *Davar* and *Hatzopheh* (which had earlier stressed the value of humility) now noted appreciatively the individualism of the young, and advocated that they be set challenges. They are no longer to be controlled and disciplined.

In *Ha'aretz* we found it useful to distinguish further between the period of the War of Attrition (June 1967–August 1970) and that which immediately followed it (until the end of 1971). In the earlier period, *Ha'aretz* (looking ahead to a time of peace) stressed spiritual values

and stated, for example, 'Must provide more spiritual content to youth in time of peace', while during the time of relative peace, after the August 1970 ceasefire, the paper stressed the importance of 'intellectual achievement rather than values alone'. Thus it seems that not only do newspapers easily accommodate themselves to the fact that their own

TABLE 5(B). *Recommended solutions to deal with the alleged negative characteristics: After the Six-Day War*

	N	%
Davar		
1. Set challenges; settlement; competitive economy of Israeli world markets; absorb immigrants; settle in non-urban places; Jewish consciousness; education	305	34·8
2. Labour movement (greater involvement in)	186	21·2
3. Emphasis on education of the individual	133	15·2
4. Greater emphasis on intellectual challenges	115	13·1
5. Adopt ideology	74	8·4
6. Greater involvement of adults with youth	64	7·3
	877	100·0
Ha'aretz		
1. (1967–70) must provide more spiritual content to youth in time of peace	88	18·1
2. (After 1970) stress on intellectual achievement rather than on values alone	124	25·5
3. Convince youth that 'the war' is really theirs as well as the adults'	119	24·4
4. Youth must set up their own political organization	109	22·4
5. Stress desire for peace, and utilize every opportunity for promoting it	46	9·6
	486	100·0
Hatzopheh		
1. Important for religious youth movement to supplement secular education	425	26·3
2. Help secular youth to become familiar with religious values	340	21·0
3. Raise the general level of education	285	17·6
4. Return to Torah in order to induce a spiritual revival	128	7·9
5. Religious education within the general education system	117	7·4
6. Work with élites alone	131	8·1
7. Land settlement	65	4·0
8. Love for youth	36	2·2
9. Evil should be punished	35	2·2
10. Attentiveness to youth	31	1·9
11. Adjustment to the needs of the time	23	1·4
	1616	100·0

evaluations have been proven wrong, but that they also easily shift their own ground without apparent misgiving.

Conclusion

We have seen that when Israeli adults evaluate the young in newspaper articles, there is no necessary correlation between their evaluation and the actual behaviour of the young. While we have not demonstrated directly the absence of such a correlation, we have mustered strong evidence to the effect that there is good reason to doubt the objective validity of the adult evaluations. On the other

hand, we have seen that there is a remarkable consistency in the evaluations of adults who are institutionally situated. That consistency is so great that one can predict with a high degree of certainty, when one knows the institutional affiliations of adults, in what terms they will describe youth, the reasons they will advance for their behaviour, and the remedies they will advocate. The predictability of adult responses may serve important functions (such as successful socialization),[13] but the data we have presented raise some grave doubts about whether adults do anything more than describe themselves and their values even when they attempt to be objective about the young.

NOTES

[1] See Aviezer Golan and Ami Shamir, *The Book of Valour* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1968; *51 Medals of Commendation* (in Hebrew), Ramat Gan, 1968; *Stories of Those Awarded Medals of Commendation during the War of Attrition* (in Hebrew), Ramat Gan, 1970; Reuven Avinoam, *Deeds of Courage* (in Hebrew, vols. 1–12), Tel Aviv, 1967; Reuven Avinoam (Compiler and Editor), *Parchments of Fire, An Anthology* (in Hebrew), Volume 5, Tel Aviv, 1970. See also Eugene Weiner, 'The Heroic Dead of Israel', *World View*, January 1973, New York.

[2] See Avraham Shapira, *The Seventh Day*, London, 1970; and especially the issues of the journal *Shdemot* following the Six-Day War, nos. 34 ff. The body of literature known as the Literature of Perpetuation is particularly characterized by these qualities.

[3] For example, see Joseph Sapia, 'Our Youth', in *Ha'aretz*, 20 June 1967.

[4] See O. R. Holsti, *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities*, Boston, Mass., 1969.

[5] See Kenneth Kenniston, 'Youth', *The American Scholar*, New York, Fall 1970.

[6] After running several spot checks on the reliability of the coding, we found it to be sufficiently high for an elaborate reliability check to be dispensed with.

[7] On the relationship between the number of words and intensity of feeling, see Holsti, op. cit., pp. 6–12.

[8] See Table 4(B), *After the Six-Day War, Davar*, item 5.

[9] All the newspapers indicate in one way or another (as can be seen from the analysis of *Causes*) that this consistency has a negative impact on youth.

[10] We are now at work on a content analysis of Israel's other leading newspapers, *Maariv* and *Yediot Ahronot*, to see if the degree of the shift in opinion (the percentage differences between before and after) holds for the other sources.

[11] See Alan F. Blum and Peter McHugh, 'The Social Ascription of Motives', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 36, No. 1, Feb. 1971, pp. 98–109.

[12] See Robert Boguslaw, *The New Utopians*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965, especially pp. 196 ff. for a discussion on the inter-relationship between value dilemma and technology.

[13] See Joseph W. Eaton and Michael Chen, *Influencing the Youth Culture, A Study of Youth Organizations in Israel*, Beverly Hills, California, 1970.

BOOK REVIEWS

JEAN CAZENEUVE, *Lucien Lévy-Bruhl*, trans. Peter Rivière, xviii + 90 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1972, £1.60.

Academic social scientists in the Anglo-Saxon world are generally familiar with a man of straw called Lévy-Bruhl; they find him in examination answers, where he is regularly held up to ridicule for his characterization of primitive mentality and castigated for daring to draw attention to a possible divide between the modes of thinking of the non-civilized and the civilized. Some social scientists know better; for example, Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard sets out a balanced exposition and critique of Lévy-Bruhl in his *Theories of Primitive Religion* (1965); and one welcomes this translation of Professor Cazeneuve's little work (originally published in 1963) as a further instalment of the labour necessary to restore Lévy-Bruhl's reputation to the place it merits. Given the narrow compass within which he works, Professor Cazeneuve cannot do his subject full justice; he devotes, in this translated version, only eight and a half pages to a biographical note and just over 22 pages to an exposition of Lévy-Bruhl's philosophy. The remainder of the slim volume is taken up by extracts from the philosopher's works. A good deal more might have been usefully said (cf. Evans-Pritchard's account), but it would be wrong to give the impression that smallness of scale has robbed this contribution of value. Indeed, it is to be welcomed both for what it can do for students and for the repair of the education of social scientists. The history of sociology and of social anthropology and the philosophical endeavours around their borders is underworked; the author, the translator (a social anthropologist well equipped to interpret French scholarship to the anglophone world), and Professor Philip Rieff and Dr. Bryan Wilson, the general editors of the series, 'Explorations in Interpretative Sociology', in which the book appears, are all to be thanked. (One notes with interest that a later volume in the series is to be the same translator's version of Lévy-Bruhl's posthumous *Carnets*, a work that by its intellectual honesty has endeared the philosopher to many who objected to the books he published in his lifetime.)

Living within the French intellectual and academic world of the Durkheimians, although not himself fully one of them, Lévy-Bruhl, in addition to his more narrowly philosophical pursuits, set himself the task of analysing the differences between the thought taken for granted in modern Europe and that of the peoples whom, for the sake of convenience, we often continue to call primitive. His manipulation of the concepts of 'pre-logical' and 'mystical participation' may in the end leave us in great doubt about their aptness and implications, but even if the whole edifice of the work were to be brought crashing to the ground by destructive criticism, its ruins would still be a landmark in intellectual topography: it is all very well to start from

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the premise that men are everywhere the same in their mental structure and to cling to the doctrine of the unity of mankind, but if we move from there to the conclusion that the 'collective representations' of other societies and times are immediately seizable through our own, we stand in need of a Lévy-Bruhlian corrective. The hardest thing in the social sciences is to gain an understanding of the categories of exotic societies and how those categories fit together. One form of liberalism and largeness of spirit is to strive to understand difference where it exists and to honour it by the effort so made.

MAURICE FREEDMAN

LEONARD DINERSTEIN, ed., *Antisemitism in the United States*, American Problem Studies, 140 pp., Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1971, n.p.

The fifteen extracts or articles in this volume are for the most part predictable selections. Tumin's elementary essay 'What is Antisemitism?' is followed by a quartet on its 'roots': Kallen on Christianity, Fenichel on the unconscious, Munson on poverty, and Rose on city hatred. Then the historians Handlin, Hofstadter, Higham, and Jaher debate when antisemitism first became evident in United States history and its relative importance in Populist thought. Dinerstein describes the 1913 Frank trial in Atlanta, Rosenstock the quota policy proposed for Harvard in 1922, and O'Brien the episode of Father Coughlin. Finally appear articles by Clark, Baldwin, and Gordis on black antisemitism.

The editor contributes an introduction and a few sentences preceding each extract to suggest questions to the reader, who in all probability will reach the end baffled by the many different facets of antisemitism that have been displayed. Here, I feel, the editor does less than his job. Tumin writes of antisemitism's 'major ingredients', i.e. a belief that Jews are different, a fear, social distance, and willingness to discriminate. This is a characterization, but Dinerstein in his introduction quotes it as if it were a definition. The volume is part of the 'History' section of the series, which may in part explain what to the sociologist will seem a blemish. What is lacking is a conceptual analysis relating the various explanations to different aspects of the explicandum.

MICHAEL BANTON

BERNARD GAINER, *The Alien Invasion: The Origins of the Aliens Act of 1905*, 305 pp., Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1972, £3.50.

It is understandable that the new preoccupation with immigration and its consequences should have led to new attention being paid to the Jewish immigration into England after 1880, and to the enactment of the first restrictive legislation. It is unfortunate that Mr. Gainer's book should perforce

cover very much the same ground as Mr. John A. Garrard in his book *The English and Immigration* published too late for Mr. Gainer to make use of, or refer to. (See my review of Mr. Garrard's book in this *Journal*, Vol. XIII, p. 236.) Mr. Gainer's work is perhaps less clear in its handling of the political situation in respect of legislation on immigration, and the whole argument is more repetitive and less taut, than that of Mr. Garrard's book. On the other hand, he is less committed to particular political preferences and attitudes and not so concerned to whitewash working-class prejudices on racial issues.

The most important new contribution made by Mr. Gainer is the much greater detail and depth of his study of the economic and social situation of the immigrants in East London and of the nature of the tensions that developed between them and the host community. Housing and schools were the main areas of friction, not employment or even 'sweating', and the groups most vocally alarmed about the economic consequences of immigration were not groups with whom the immigrants came into direct competition.

Mr. Gainer's attempt to link the problems of the period and their treatment with the issues presented by coloured immigration into Britain in the last two decades does not contribute any notable new insights. The differences are greater than the similarities. The earlier immigrant tide was not of a size to call for a national reaction; it was very much a local problem for a few poor London boroughs. There is some evidence however that it has become easier to overlook the liberal elements in the British tradition on these matters; we are all protectionists now. It is also the case that all our affairs are so much more closely supervised and controlled by the State that administrative difficulties once believed insuperable are now hardly noticed; even to register aliens was thought difficult and oppressive. Mr. Gainer also provides some material—though not in a worked out form—connecting the problem of Jewish immigration to Britain with support for Zionism—notably where Joseph Chamberlain and Balfour are concerned. There are greater ambiguities here than some historians have believed.

MAX BELOFF

JÜRGEN HABERMAS, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro, 356 pp., Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1972, £3.50.

What is Habermas about? Let us regard 'critical' theory as concerned with pointing forward to possibilities at the moment only latent in the status quo. However, science and positivist scientistic sociology have eliminated this dimension in favour of the given: data. Now in Marx's original critical theory, forgotten in the period of positivistic dominance, man's relationship to the world and knowledge of it was derived from his attempts to use it for his own purposes: labour. However, for Habermas there is also the sphere of human interaction, primarily located in such social areas as family and kinship and law. And law, for him, is less a reflection of the instrumental

relations of work and technique than the normative context of interaction within which such relations take place. This makes Habermas look like a left-Parsonian.

Now, let us regard man's capacity for interaction, and above all the emancipation latent in free communication, as subverted by the contemporary dominance of the instrumental, technical mode: rationalization. All problems are then seen as technical, communication is marked off in a separate, private compartment, and society loses its political dimension. This is the contemporary contradiction of capitalist society, and today's critical philosophy must show that the sphere of interaction has potentialities greater than a mere mirroring of the relationships obtaining in the technical sphere. This critical philosophy cannot be based on the purely theoretical approach of the old epistemology, since in any case there is no such 'purity' to be had. Science and technical mastery are characteristically reduced by just this notion of purity, when in fact they derive from our activities in the instrumental sphere. And the social sciences are no better off since their examination of the meaning of one milieu of interaction is understood in terms of the presuppositions of the interpreter's milieu. But critical philosophy takes up the theme of emancipation belonging to the interactive sphere and shows which generalizations are universal and which mere reflections of the status quo. All science is 'interested' but an interest in emancipation leads to objectivity. (Freudianism, as discussed in this book, is an example of an interest in enlightenment rooted in self-reflection which is contaminated by unnecessary scientistic and structuralist models.)

Thus Habermas represents a sort of idealism about social relations which can transcend those relations as they appear by an existential choice of emancipation. This choice makes for objectivity and therefore plays the role of the proletarian 'interest' in traditional Marxism. *Why* it should make for objectivity is no more clear than it is in Marxism: we have no reason to suppose truth so conveniently following on goodness. In general we are in the usual impasse of the sociology of knowledge. It is easy to show the interests affecting the purity of scientific work, whether natural or social, but as to which propositions and interpretations are actually contaminated by these interests we require other criteria, and these are not to be found either by being on the side of the angels or by constructing categories such that one's own position is the convenient, subsuming third which transcends the previous inadequate two.

DAVID MARTIN

DONALD DANIEL LESLIE, *The Survival of the Chinese Jews, The Jewish Community of Kaifeng*, Monographies du T'oung Pao, vol. X, xiv + 270 pp., 37 plates, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1972, 96 guilders.

In vol. XI, no. 2 (December 1969) of this *Journal* Professor Leslie provided a summary of knowledge of the Jewish community of Kaifeng. He had already published a series of studies on Chinese Jewry. And now, in this magnifi-

cently documented book, a remarkable achievement of orientalism, he presents what he announces in the first line of his Preface to be his final summing up. Let me quote the remainder of the first paragraph of the Preface:

> Some details left out here will be found in works by Ch'en Yüan, Tobar, White and Löwenthal, and in my parallel book and articles on the Chinese-Hebrew Memorial Book and the Judaeo-Persian colophons to the Pentateuch; but the present work covers the whole ground, and, I believe, is the first real synthesis, including Chinese, Hebrew, and Western sources. It is based on the primary sources: the inscriptions in Chinese; the 1663b list of the community preserved in Paris (previously unknown); the Memorial Book of the Dead; the Hebrew manuscripts held in Cincinnati; the original Jesuit letters and reports preserved in Paris and Rome; the report of the Protestant delegates, and the letter from the community in 1850; the accounts of other visitors; Chinese local gazetteers and other native sources.

It is difficult to think of any source he could have left untapped, and extremely unlikely (although of course not impossible) that any further body of data will come to light. In a word, this is the book we have been awaiting, and we are able now, with the facts assembled before us, to begin to try to make sense of the fate of a tiny corner of the diaspora in the Far East. The Kaifeng community is the only body of Jews in pre-twentieth century China on whom we have historical evidence of any weight; it draws our attention and teases us with a number of fascinating problems.

Professor Leslie writes as an orientalist and historian, not as a sociologist; but there are two Parts of the work, *Religion* (three chapters) and *Sociology* (again three chapters) in which subjects central to the interests of this *Journal* are treated. They are not, however, treated as penetratingly as they deserve, and one wonders whether a social scientist endowed with an understanding of both Judaism and China could make more of the evidence—or at any rate, submit the data to a closer questioning.

The central question, it seems to me, is the viability of Judaism in, to use a sort of shorthand, the Confucian state. Had Jewish numbers in China been very large, then Judaism might have won for itself a distinct territory where Jewishness was tolerated and the distinctiveness of Jews accorded a *de facto* recognition, as was the case, *mutatis mutandis*, in the more compact Muslim areas. As it was, the Kaifeng community was minute (about a thousand in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries); it had to make its way among non-Jews; and its religion and style of life had of necessity to adapt themselves in order, at the very least, to make existence tolerable. In fact, as we know, Kaifeng Jewry for a long time met its non-Jewish neighbours more than half-way, and in the end collapsed; some of their descendants still exist as Jews in a residual sense, but the community has been swallowed up, perhaps the chief route of assimilation having been through Islam, the more largely represented and recognized version of monotheism. On the modern residue Professor Leslie has a poignant footnote at p. 106: 'I cannot resist pointing out the significance of this for the current (or eternal?) problem of "Who is a Jew?". Not one of these Chinese Jews would be accepted by the orthodox western rabbis as of the Jewish faith, not because of their lack of knowledge or belief, but because the pedigree of their mothers cannot be established. Nevertheless, some of them are

still labelled as Jewish by the Chinese because their male forefathers were Jews of specific surname.'

In its heyday the Kaifeng community was organized about its synagogue. The 'liturgy and prayers were Talmudic (or Rabbinic)' (p. 86), and yet, in a fashion we recognize from other parts of the diaspora, Judaism had also to be expressed in an alien idiom. How to express Judaism in Chinese terms? The commonest word for God (as one might have expected) was *T'ien*, Heaven. But if one speaks Chinese as one's mother tongue and conceives of the Deity as *T'ien* one is committed to views very different from those enshrined in the Hebrew. Jews in Christian and Islamic civilizations have not had to make so drastic a revision of their ideas in speaking the languages of their non-Jewish neighbours. *T'ien* is no creator, nor does he/it claim an allegiance that rules out the worship of other gods. Indeed, his chief characteristic is that he/it is remote. I find it very hard, therefore, to accept Professor Leslie's statement (p. 97) that 'there would have been little difficulty for the Jews to accommodate their theology to Confucianism, for the latter's agnosticism could be countered by an appeal to the more theistic views of the earlier Chinese classics, in particular the *Shu-ching*'. I think he bases himself on a somewhat superficial view of Confucianism. Besides, Confucianism is only part of the story, and when Professor Leslie writes (p. 113) that although many Jews disappeared into Islam, 'some assimilation to Confucianism must have occurred of those successful in Chinese society', we may wonder why he does not refer to the whole complex of Chinese religion (much more than a mere amalgam of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism) and what problems it must have posed to the Jews. I am left with the impression that he has a somewhat Jesuit, eighteenth-century view of Chinese religion and of the possibilities of its reconciliation with monotheism.

In one sense the Confucian state was tolerant, in another not. It did not go out of its way to persecute unorthodoxy (which Judaism certainly was) unless it suspected it capable of political action; but it looked down upon it, and the Jews who rose on the social ladder, as many did, could have done so only by dint of distancing themselves in their religious ideas from the ideas of their ancestors. It would be very dangerous to overlook both the sway of state Confucianism and the pull of 'popular religion' for Jews caught up in the complex social life of a Chinese city, where the relations of neighbourhood and economic activity in addition to those of political allegiance entailed participation in rites.

This brief appraisal of Professor Leslie's book was written before I had come across another work on the subject: Song Nai Rhee, 'Jewish Assimilation: The Case of Chinese Jews', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 15, no. 1, January 1973, pp. 115–26. In it Professor Leslie's earlier writings on Chinese Jewry are taken into account, but his new book had clearly not yet reached the author. It is a matter of very great interest that the article places stress upon social mobility, the conversion of Jewish intellectuals into Confucian literati, and Jewish participation in the civil service.

MAURICE FREEDMAN

WERNER STARK, *The Sociology of Religion*, vol. V. *Types of Religious Culture*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 453 pp., £5.00.

The arrival of Professor Stark's final volume provides an opportunity for the reviewer. His immense work, marked by a range of reference unusual amongst sociologists, is likely to stand as an isolated monument, rarely visited except to scribble pejorative remarks on its too ample surface. It will share the splendid isolation of Joachim Wach. Of course, Professor Stark has laid himself open to this. He is a Catholic traditionalist whose central idea illustrates the inclusive synthesis which the Roman Church has provided over the last two millennia. Let there be two opposed and unbalanced opinions: Professor Stark will show how the Church has gradually welded them into a wider, complementary truth. And in his so doing, the line between a learned sermon using sociological examples and a sociological analysis, exploring the absorbent width of Catholic institutions, requires to be carefully looked for. Moreover, where approved Protestants occur Professor Stark shows that they were, in key aspects, incipient Catholics. Thus Bach, Rembrandt, and—least convincing—Shakespeare. Or again, if Protestantism achieved a remarkable breakthrough into the modern and, in some senses, secular world, Professor Stark disapproves of the exploitation of nature and of men involved in that achievement. For him individualism is well-nigh egoism. Catholicism embodies the archetypal community (like Judaism) and has an ontological root embracing the One and the All conjoined in mutual responsibility, in sin and salvation, through time and eternity. Protestantism provides only fissiparous associations, partially ameliorated by movements like Methodism and Pietism. All in all Professor Stark has about as much sympathy for northern Protestant cultures (or modern America) as has Kenneth Clark in his *Civilization*. Indeed, in his view Catholic Europe *is* civilization, heir to the genuine communities of Greece and Israel, subsuming the polytheism of the one and humanizing the monotheism of the other. Vienna and Paris are the paradigmatic life-enhancing cities, visited sometimes with puzzled hate and often with incipient desire by the tragic exemplars of Calvinist cultures: a Henry James or a Henry Adams. Haydn and Mozart, Austrians like Professor Stark, are by the same token the paradigmatic life-enhancing composers, conscious of the tragic element in life but not remotely dominated by it. C major triumphs over G minor. In them the affirmation of life took precedence over the tragic loneliness of existential man and over his secularist pride in being captain of his soul and—supposedly—conqueror of nature.

Well, if you take this view the rest follows and it is no more prejudiced than most other views put forward in the sociology of religion. If Professor Bellah can be committed why not Professor Stark? But, of course, to be pugnaciously orthodox and to use literature not normally employed by sociologists (as well as ignoring much of the sometimes excellent literature they themselves produce) is not the way to get a good press. And to be a philosophic realist into the bargain, seeing the created world as symbol and intimation of the uncreated world, handling the substance of the unseen in light, water, and wine is further cause for professional distress. To conjoin Platonic idea and Jungian archetype and quietly nudge Freud towards the rubbish dump is pretty offensive in some intellectual circles.

I can see why the critics do not like Professor Stark. He *is* too committed, too irritated with Anglo-Saxons, too eagerly rhetorical, too philosophical: all this seems to me true. Yet the sociological problem and achievement of Catholicism is there and Professor Stark understands both. That he understands from the inside is no more unfortunate than that we also understand the unnoticed credos of our Anglo-Saxon cultures from the inside.

DAVID MARTIN

SCHIFRA STRIZOWER, *The Children of Israel; the Bene Israel of Bombay*, xiii + 176 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1971, £1.25.

Dr. Strizower's most readable account is the first anthropological study of a Jewish minority in India, the Bene Israel of Bombay. She conducted her field investigation over fifteen months in the late 1960s. As a co-religionist she enjoyed a very high degree of acceptance in the community, continues to receive information through correspondents, and has close personal acquaintance with other Jewish communities both in India and elsewhere. Her involvement with the community is greater than what one normally encounters in an anthropological monograph; it adds a valuable dimension to her description but also poses special problems for her analysis.

The entire Bene Israel community numbers 13,000, of whom all but 3,000 live in Bombay city. Until recently they were divided into two endogamous units, the Gora or White Bene Israel, and the Kala or Black Bene Israel. Their mother-tongue is Marathi, one of the main languages of western India; but very many of them also speak English. The author devotes only eight pages of her book to the Bene Israel 'world beyond communal boundaries', although comparisons are made throughout with Jewish communities elsewhere. Dr. Strizower frequently compares the Bene Israel way of life with that of their non-Jewish neighbours, especially in terms of the Hindu caste structure, and less frequently with that of non-Jewish religious minorities. As a matter of pleasant paradox, despite her overwhelming concern with the internal community structure of the Bene Israel, Dr. Strizower maintains that the community's aspirations and the avenues open to its members for fulfilling them lie in the outside world. While the former aspect of Bene Israel community life is depicted in a factual and informative manner, the latter aspect, on account of the involution of the community, is riddled with complications.

Let me explain. However important it may be to her co-religionist informants to seek answers to questions such as 'Are the Bene Israel Jews?' and 'What kind of Jews are they?', it is not altogether clear why Dr. Strizower considers the explanation of this preoccupation to be the central task of her study. From her own efforts it would seem that the problem may well be inexplicable in its entirety, although by isolating this preoccupation as the pivot of conflicts within the community she is aided in her organization of descriptive detail (the synagogue, clubs and cliques, etc.). It does not lead to an illumination of the Bene Israel status as a religious minority having a place in the élite and class structure of a city and a nation.

Without wishing to detract from the merits of a pioneering study of an exclusive though numerically small community of Bombay, I think that the author may have missed an essential point about the Bene Israel's nexus with the outside world, namely, their treatment by the non-Jewish neighbours as a distinct ethnic group who ought to follow their own way of life by being 'excluded'. This tendency is at work in the Vaishya level of the Hindu *varna* hierarchy itself. Their lack of vegetarianism and non-participation in Hindu rituals would keep the Bene Israel distinct, more so than say the Jains, and the absence of reciprocal ritual ties with them (for example, crucial *jajmani* relationships) would set them further apart. On the other side of the divide, the Bene Israel seem always to emphasize the opposition between persecuted and persecuting groups which strikes a non-Jew as a crucial aspect of the Jewish world-view of social relations, and one which is entirely ignored in the Hindu hierarchical world view. This view is so strong in the collective consciousness of the Jewish people that it is the sole element which connects the Bene Israel historian Kehemker, whom the author cites at length, the contemporary Bene Israel intelligentsia, and the anthropologist herself. Had Dr. Strizower stuck to her excellent precept of treating the informants' history as memory she would not have identified the former rural Bene Israel as a caste and would then have brought out the different world views of the Jews and Hindus with greater clarity. Her own ethnography suggests the following.

1. The attribution of 'Saturday Oil-presser' *(shaniwar teli)* status to the former Bene Israel villagers was not a genuinely birth-caste attribution but an occupational-caste one (like the weaver or *jolaha* in Bengal).

2. The incorporation of the Bene Israel/Oil Pressers in the historically known instances is as titled groups, who were rewarded for their services by indigenous rulers.

3. It is mechanical and individual pollution that may have characterized the Bene Israel's ritual relations with caste Hindus without an element of reciprocity entering into them. The attitude to the Bene Israel would thus furnish a good example of the scope within the dominant ideology of their Hindu neighbours for finding an attributional place for the 'excluded'/ 'exlusive' ethnic minorities.

The situation with regard to the Bene Israel's existential status in the structure of Indian society is to be seen as a dialectical one in which the dominant non-Jewish term is explicitly passive (socio-economic backwardness, pluralism) but implicitly active (ritual recognition of exclusion) while the minor Jewish term is explicitly active (socio-economic and geographical mobility) but implicitly passive (being 'exploited' by a dominant Jewish group, the Baghdadis). The hopeful feature in the contemporary state of the Bene Israel community of Bombay is still the one pointed out by Dr. Strizower. There is an institutional network within the community for a situational resolution of internal conflicts, and the religious basis of the community's solidarity is premised on a philosophy of equality which enables its members to compete successfully in a secular and cosmopolitan environment.

R. K. JAIN

The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann. Series A. Letters Vol. III, Sept. 1903–Dec. 1904, 414 pp. Meyer Weisgal, Gen. ed., Oxford University Press, 1972, £3.50.

This period of fifteen months covers a number of critical decisons in the public and private life of Dr. Weizmann. It covers the death of Theodor Herzl in July 1904, the burying of the East African project, and the determination, so far as Weizmann himself is concerned, to concentrate on Palestine, and on some visible action in the country. This marks the period of his own move from student and Russian life in Geneva to senior academic life and wider Jewish contact in England.

The letters themselves are shorter than in the previous volumes, and few are in themselves vital documents. Much of the general tone can be caught from the admirable introduction by Gedalia Yogev. Phrases abound in the descriptions of Weizmann's travels and projects such as 'he returned empty handed', 'this did not come about', 'it was completely fruitless'. The formation of the Democratic Faction was abandoned. The dearly loved project of a Jewish University was found to be impractical. Weizmann then enthusiastically proposed to establish Jewish courses which could act as a temporary and introductory project. He was sure that the lecturers could be found. Then it all faded away. The 'eminent scholars who have been recruited', as he wrote to Moses Gaster, did not materialize.

Letter 67 marks an important stage in Weizmann's thinking and method of action. It is written after his first visit to England. It is full of 'musts' and practical projects. But it led to nothing. Three years were still to go before a working programme combining political and practical activities was to emerge and swing into creative action.

As this volume proceeds one has only to look in the list of letters at the beginning to see how the continual tentative travels and meetings were beginning to give way to the serious business of his own career, professional and matrimonial. He had to begin to make a place for himself in the Department of Chemistry in Manchester University and he was longing to end his personal loneliness by making Vera Khatzman his wife. Of the last hundred and fifty letters, a hundred and twenty are to Vera; and of the rest more than half are to Moses Gaster, the Haham of Bevis Marks and his helper in finding a post in academic life in England.

Zionism at that time was at a very low ebb. As he wrote on 4 April 1904 from his home near Pinsk, 'the crash is growing menacingly close. The sensible elements here see no possibility of carrying on working in the present state of affairs'. In another letter to Gaster he makes the first mention of one of the ablest of his permanent adversaries, Lucien Wolf (No. 195, p. 216) whose knowledge of the Russian Jewish situation, and his tireless work to improve it, was only exceeded by his disapproval of the whole Zionist conception of the future destiny of the Jewish people.

Like the previous volumes, the present one is admirably produced, indexed, and provided with elucidatory notes.

<div align="right">JAMES PARKES</div>

MARTIN WOLINS AND MEIR GOTTESMAN, eds., *Group Care: an Israeli Approach. The Educational Path of Youth Aliyah*, 437 pp., Gordon & Breach, New York, 1971, n.p.

A collection of conference papers, written for colleagues active and involved in a defined area, does not always offer the general reader a variety of interesting and provocative articles. It is perhaps because the concern for the disadvantaged child transcends disciplinary barriers and cultural limits that this book, edited by Wolins and Gottesman, is one of the successful anthologies of conference reports.

The starting-point is Youth Aliyah, both in the early days when its concern was with saving the children of Europe and today when it is re-educating and supporting children from Arab, African, and Asian families. Wolins himself provides an interesting analysis of the purpose, function, and course of the movement, while separate papers by Rappoport and Rinott assess the educational role and the actual dynamics of Youth Aliyah groups. The workings of various Youth Aliyah groups, both in the absorptive and the therapeutic role, the actual way the movement socializes and with what results, are the subject of a further six papers.

Perhaps the more interesting and relevant papers for the workers, researchers, and policy-makers outside Israel are those which treat specifically the attempts of Youth Aliyah to deal with the disadvantaged Israeli child. The poverty, alienation, and cultural deprivation which form the background to this re-education programme are different from those of the early years of Youth Aliyah activity. They are not too different from some of the problems of the USA and of the United Kingdom referred to by Kellmer–Pringle and others in their contributions.

I read this book at the same time as that by Urie Bronfenbrenner (*The Two Worlds of Childhood*) describing his crosscultural studies on socialization and development; it might be this that led me to recognize the possible benefits of collective socialization. Despite the tone of ideological certainty, and the occasional signs of missionary fervour contained in some of the pages of this book, there seem to be sufficient objective data supporting the benefits of integration into the mainstream of societal activities to allow one to question the family-centred, school-centred socialization patterns of our own children, which so often form the model for the care of the deprived and needy child. The integration of the child into both the economic and decision-making bodies of the social system, which is reflected in many of the types of care reported on in this volume, seems to ease the transition of the disadvantaged into the wider society.

There are further bonuses to be found in this volume. There is an article by Langer which will command the interest of those working with children. The paper by Lawrence Kohlberg on cognitive-developmental theory and the practice of collective moral education is another. In both of these the psychologist and the student will find ideas and data that are rewarding beyond the confines of one's concern for group care.

BERYL A. GEBER

CORRESPONDENCE

Sɪʀ

Erik Cohen's article on Black Panthers in Israel (*J.J.S.*, June 1972) seems to suffer from some flaws which distort the entire picture.

1. Dr. Cohen fails to make a distinction between the Sephardi and the Oriental Jews in Israel. While this is a common popular mistake in Israel to which journalists and, apparently, Black Panthers fall prey, it is inexcusable in a sociologist. By any accepted standards the Sephardi Jews, originating from the Spanish 'exodus', are not to be grouped together with the Jews from various and diverse 'oriental' countries and regions.

2. Dr. Cohen refers to the Oriental Jews as 'second-class citizens of Israel'. This is not only a mistaken notion, but also a harmful and dangerous slogan. What does he mean by it? Are they discriminated against by the law? Obviously not! Are they economically worse off? On the average, yes, but to refer to them as second-class citizens is to apply a legal term to a socio-economic situation. Moreover, some of the Oriental Jews (for example, a section of Jews from Iraq) are well-to-do. Some of the Sephardi families, if one may take advantage of the accepted confusion, are among the wealthiest in Israel.

3. Dr. Cohen contrasts the economic help given to the new immigrants from Western countries and Russia with the hardships which the Oriental Jews had to endure on their arrival. While the generous treatment of new immigrants and neglect of old immigrants are a matter open to criticism and debate, to equate them with 'ethnic' discrimination is a serious accusation. Before such an accusation can be made, a few questions must be answered:

Do those poor Ashkenazim who immigrated a generation ago and who did not succeed in the meantime, receive the help which is given to the new immigrants? Obviously not! Do the Oriental Jews who have just come to Israel receive the same help as Western and Russian Jews are given? (Incidentally, many of the Russian Jews are from 'Oriental' communities in the Caucasus.) I am confident that they do.

4. Last but not least, while Dr. Cohen does not predict a political separation of the Oriental Jews, he seems to predict, welcome, and advocate 'cultural and political pluralism' in Israel—an equal right to be different in contrast to an equal right to be similar. In adopting this line of thinking he consciously transfers recent trends prevailing in other countries (notably the United States) to the Israeli scene. This seems to me to be totally inappropriate. Israel's immigrants, unlike the diverse ethnic groups who settled in the United States, were all Jews: they had a common religion, ritual, sacred language (which was revised as a secular one), the same historical consciousness, and a sense of common destiny. Obviously, they acquired many cultural traits in the diverse countries of the dispersal, but these, by and large, are not the characteristics which they deeply cherish, nor is there any

attempt by the 'establishment' to abolish them. Some Oriental communities have kept their peculiar dress, Oriental cuisine flourishes in many restaurants (with wide Ashkenazi patronage), and the peculiarities of religious ritual (pertaining to insignificant detail) have been kept alive. Even daily newspapers in a dozen foreign languages continue to be published. Admiration and protection are lavished on the folklore of the Oriental communities, although polygyny and child marriage (practised by one or two odd communities) are now legally prohibited. In what other sense does Dr. Cohen expect the Orientals (and others) to express their supposedly ethnic distinction?

The question can be looked at from another point of view. Without our making a fetish out of national unity it would be odd to forget that Jewish national revival is based on Jewish unity in the ancient past, on the significant cultural-religious common denominator in earlier centuries, and on the aspiration to a revived unity in modern Zionism. This, obviously, will not preserve Israel as a paradise for sociologists and anthropologists, but then the aspirations of Zionism were concerned with ordinary Jews.

<div style="text-align: right">MORDECAI ROSHWALD</div>

SIR,

In Note 19 of his paper 'The Black Panthers and Israeli Society' (*J.J.S.*, vol. XIV, No. 1, June 1972, p. 109) Mr. Erik Cohen refers to two of my publications, which he describes as having been 'sponsored' by the Council of the Sephardi Community in Jerusalem. To set the record straight on what is a potentially sensitive subject, I would like to point out that *The Outcasts of Israel* was actually published by the Council; but *The Aryanization of the Jewish State: A Polemic* was published by Black Star as a purely commercial enterprise not in any way associated with, or to my knowledge even endorsed by, the Council.

<div style="text-align: right">MICHAEL SELZER</div>

CHRONICLE

Christian News from Israel, New Series published in vol. XXIII, no. 2, 1972, the following addresses which were delivered on the occasion of the visit to Israel of His Beatitude Pimen, Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia.

1. *Address by his Beatitude Benedictos Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem*

Sunday, 21 May 1972

Most Blessed Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia, Beloved Brother in Christ, Lord Pimen:

Today we sense a deep and unique joy. Here, at one table of common enjoyment, sits Your Beatitude, with the distinguished personages that came with you, the members of our Holy Synod, Their Beatitudes the Patriarchs of the Latin and Armenian Churches, the Vicar of the Custos of the Holy Land, Bishops and other representatives of the Christian Churches here, of the State Ministers, His Worship the Mayor of the Holy City, the Consul-General of Greece, the Consul of Finland, senior civil servants of the state of Israel and officers of its Police.

We thank God for granting us, in His grace, this opportunity to welcome the messenger of the Most Holy Russian Church. From converse with him, we are led to evoke the days of old, when our predecessors of blessed memory, notably Dositheos, Theophanes and Paisios, spared no trouble or effort to teach and, in their wisdom, as leaders of all the Orthodox, direct the life of the entire Orthodox Church and, by their unflagging energy, reaching out in all directions, care for all the Churches of God, and not the Church of Jerusalem alone. Among the Churches which they served was the Russian Church, in their striving, by personal presence, by letters and envoys, to keep Orthodoxy intact. No Church but had the patronage and protection of the Mother of all the Churches. The Russian Church, however, owes its first period of glory, partially at least, to the oldest Church, the Church of Sion, which evinced great interest, and gave guidance, in the systematic ordering of the ecclesiastical affairs of Russia, on a canonical basis, in the solution of problems arising from religious differences there, and in the official recognition of the Russian Patriarchate.

Grateful for this, and out of concern, reverence and love for the Mother of all the Churches, the Russian Church has given abundant aid to our Patriarchate in its struggles for the places of pilgrimage.

Therefore do we magnify the name of God, for, on the solid rock of our pure Orthodox faith, He built links of love in a bond of peace between our two Churches, which, by His grace, they still maintain and develop.

Sion, Mother of all Churches, of whose foundation we shall celebrate, on Pentecost, the nineteen hundred and thirty-ninth anniversary, has, throughout a long history, fought with adversaries in a myriad ways; but God, Who

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loves its gates more than all the dwellings of Jacob, has never abandoned it.

First as a Bishopric, and, since 451 of the Christian Era, a Patriarchate by virtue of a decision of the Council of Chalcedon, Fourth Ecumenical Council of the Church, it has endured many calamities under several and successive overlords—first heathen, then professing its own faith and afterwards professing different religious doctrines and belonging to other nations. It has had to fight for survival. But it has preserved safe and whole the treasure handed down by its Fathers, which it holds in trust in the places of pilgrimage, and it protected the Orthodox Church in the Holy Land, upholding rights and privileges it won by sacrifice of money and blood.

We have not ceased to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are His.

In the long and vexed history of the Church of Jerusalem, we remember the fame of the glorious Byzantine empire, whose unforgettable emperors of piety, from Constantine the Great, Saint Helena and Justinian to Manuel Comnenos, showed much solicitude for the Holy Places, built in them magnificent churches and monasteries, endowed them with rich gifts, and granted the Patriarchs prerogatives that have been respected by following generations.

From the Arab period, the mighty ruler whom we recall is Caliph Omar Ibn El Khattab, a name inseparably connected with our Patriarchate, because of the famous *Akhtiname* which, in 638 AD, he gave to the Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem, Sophronios, in recognition and extension of the rights and privileges gained under the Byzantine empire. Thus, the *firmans* of the Ottoman period issued by the Sultans in 1757, 1852, and 1853 have ever since constituted the fundamental basis of the rights of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem and of the *status quo* in the Holy Places confirmed by the international treaties of Paris and Berlin (1856 and 1878) and by decisions of the United Nations.

Likewise our memory is good of His Majesty King Hussein, who always revealed himself most kindly and favourably disposed to our Patriarchate and took a close interest in the work of strengthening the Church of the Resurrection which had been delayed for many years, discriminating in no way between his subjects, among whom, under royal protection, live many thousands of our spiritual children.

And now we live in the State of Israel. It is our duty to acknowledge that from the very start the State has shown absolute respect for the *status quo* in the Holy Places, for the Holy Places as places of pilgrimage, for the monasteries, the churches, the clergy and the people, for our rights and for our privileges. It shows a readiness to serve diverse interests and to satisfy diverse demands respecting the places of pilgrimage, our Patriarchate, its Christian folk and others.

We, the ninety-fifth Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem and the hundred and thirty-eighth successor of James, Brother of God, first Bishop of Jerusalem, are not departing from the enlightened path charted for us by our ever-remembered predecessors. Walking in their footsteps, we continue, as far as we can, with Divine help, the good fight for preservation of the *status quo*, the recorded privileges and historic and sovereign rights of our

Patriarchate in the Holy Land and in the holy places of pilgrimage. In the completion of the work of strengthening the Church of the Resurrection, alike in the parts which belong to us and those common to us and to the Custody of the Holy Land and the Armenian Patriarchate, and of the Monastery of the Cross, in which the Theological School of that name is soon to function again, and of other monasteries and churches and in the building of a new Patriarchal Residence with the gracious moral and material help of the Greek Government, in the defence of the Christian people entrusted to our care, in the preservation and development of good relations with other religious communities and in the protection of our brotherly relations with the Holy Churches of God, we shall make every endeavour to ensure a mutual approach to those divided and to work for the union of all, so that, with single mouth and heart, the transcendent name of God may be glorified especially in this Holy Land, whence the message of love and peace and of His goodwill to men went forth.

Filled with inexpressible happiness, and in fervent prayer for the peace of this Land and of all the world, we propose a toast: to the health and welfare of Your Beatitude and of all our eminent guests.

2. *From the Address of His Beatitude Pimen*

It is with special pleasure and deep satisfaction that I extend my heartfelt greetings to this gathering of prelates and priests of the Orthodox and sister Churches. In the name of my companions and in my own, let me first take this happy opportunity of expressing my earnest thanks to Patriarch Benedictos for the fraternal kindness and affectionate care that he has lavished upon our pilgrimage.

From the very outset, the friendship between the Jerusalem and the Russian Orthodox Churches has been reciprocal and staunch. The Jerusalem Church has always taken a real interest in the life of its sister Church. In the seventeenth century, its Patriarch, Feofan, visited Russia and took part in the scrutiny of amendments to the Trebnik (the 'Book of Needs', governing the administration of the sacraments) introduced by Archimandrite Dionysius of the Troitse-Sergieva monastery. Feofan also attended the elections that, at the instance of the All-Russian Patriarch, raised Philaret to the high rank of Metropolitan. Patriarch Dositheus II, who showed a lively concern for ecclesiastical education in Russia, sent two distinguished theologians, the brothers Joannes and Sophronius Lichudy, to Moscow, and proved himself a driving force in the establishment of the Greek–Latin–Slavic Academy, which exists to this day as the Moscow Ecclesiastical Academy.

May I mention, as typical of Jerusalem's unbroken remembrance of the sister Russian Church, Your Beatitude's own visit to us in May–June 1968, graciously to celebrate with us the fiftieth anniversary of Moscow's Patriarchal Altar restored? For all of us, your presence there enhanced our jubilation: your loving kindness breathed into us the full measure of the spirit of the Holy Land and of Christ arisen, and conveyed a profounder spiritual contentment to our Church. The many faithful who were privileged to speak with you keep in their hearts an indelible memory of Your Beatitude's loftiness of soul and unique magnanimity.

In turn, our Church has always held the authority of the Mother of all Churches in highest regard and has brought up its flock in that mood. Over the centuries, devotion to the Jerusalem Church and its great shrines has found expression in generous aid extended by us. Russians have gone on pilgrimage to the Holy Land from the dawn of Christianity in Russia. Visiting Palestine in 1106, the Russian Abbot Daniel wrote that, in Jerusalem, he had met numerous groups of Russian pilgrims. It is particularly gratifying that our two Churches have one and the same system of worship: in the fifteenth century, our Church adopted the Jerusalem Statute and its rules prescribe our divine and ceremonial rites.

The founding of the Russian Spiritual Mission in Jerusalem over a hundred years ago was the natural outcome of the true cordiality that prevails between the two Churches, and the Mission was further reinforced by the union of the two Churches, to the advantage of both and of Orthodoxy entire.

The unshaken affinity between the Jerusalem hierarchy and ours was manifested with exceptional clarity in the present century, when our Church was riven by internal schism: the Jerusalem Church, then, categorically declared its recognition of the authority of the Patriarchs alone and its support of decisions of our Church with respect to such schismatics as 'karlovchany' and 'Reformists'. Our Church will always remember this gratefully. We are, above all, thankful that Jerusalem clearly understands the motivations neither divine nor ecclesiastic, not of 'God's' but of 'Caesar's' (Luke 20, 25)—nakedly political, emotional and pseudo-traditional, all unworthy of a Christian.

In my opinion, there is an ever-growing need for more closely concerted efforts by our two Churches, in strong spiritual alliance, to strengthen Orthodox unity, not least by co-operating in the study of theological problems and the fulfilment of practical aims which the contemporary world sets Christianity, by together fostering fraternity with other Christian Churches and sharing vigorously in all aspects of the ecumenical movement.

There is grief in our hearts at the tension and quarrels that we witness in different regions of the world, and we are anguished by the bitterness and suffering which they inflict upon nations. Today, we discern most acutely the problem of restoring and preserving peace among peoples, for, in this century alone, we have lived through two terrible wars, and in the second, in a barbaric invasion by German-Fascist hordes, twenty million Russians perished. We consider it our sacred duty to do our utmost to work for a just and lasting peace on earth.

I 'praise and bless God' (Luke 24, 53) for His mercy, that we have been joined here this day with devout and noble Christians and were vouchsafed the joy of meeting Your Beatitude and your colleagues beneath the canopy of the Church of the Living God.

3. *Address by Dr. Zorah Warhaftig, Minister of Religious Affairs*

I would like to begin by welcoming to Jerusalem, the Holy City, His Beatitude Patriarch Pimen, Head of the Russian Orthodox Church, and his entourage, who have come to visit our city's holy sanctuaries and its myriad

historical sites. In this, our city, whose every part we have succeeded in uniting into one, unified, whole, there live together members of different faiths and of many communities, each according to its religion, each according to its observances and each and every one in absolute freedom, guaranteed by the laws of the State and implemented—in practice—by the various agencies of Government, that they may be able to fulfil their religious precepts and traditions in an atmosphere of brotherhood and mutual respect.

Jerusalem, which King David established as the capital of the people and the nation, has a special place in the consciousness of our people and in our history. It represents, more than any other place on earth, the glorious, heroic and age-old bond which has persisted from ancient times until today between our people and this, our Land, where Judaic civilization arose and flowered, its achievements becoming the foundations of a large part of mankind.

We have been privileged—after many generations of dispersion and suffering and longing and prayer, of a tortured, blood-drenched history, which culminated in the terrible holocaust in our own generation carried out by the Nazis and their helpers, who slaughtered six million of our brethren, one third of our people—to return to our Land and to our city, Jerusalem. Serene and secure, Jerusalem is, as its Hebrew name implies, a city of peace, a precious, holy city, whose gates are wide open before all who wish to enter, before all who are its friends, as are our guests from the Soviet Union.

We are happy that it fell to our lot, sons and descendants of the founders and builders of Jerusalem, to contribute to the creation of an atmosphere of tranquillity and safety in Jerusalem, and to make it, with the help of the Almighty, a true centre of pilgrimage to all of its shrines and churches, for those who come from near and from far. It is good that members of various faiths come to the city and worship there, for, in adhering to their respective persuasions, they are our loyal partners in honouring and expressing awe at the lofty moral and spiritual ideals first made manifest here. Among those ideals are the concepts of love of one's fellow-man and of brotherhood of nations, which were enuniciated in our Scriptures as 'Love thy neighbour as thyself' and 'The wolf shall dwell with the lamb'.

It is always appropriate to cite these verses from Holy Writ, particularly so in our own times, which have witnessed the proliferation of war and hatred among brothers. And what better place on earth to reiterate these everlasting ideals than Jerusalem, the essence of whose destiny is brotherhood and peace?

On this festive occasion, as we greet the very distinguished guests from the Soviet Union, we wish to express as well our deep sense of kinship and brotherly love for those of our people living in Russia. Many of them, we know, yearn to come here: some, as pilgrims, like our honoured guests from Moscow, to visit the holy sites of the nation; others, as immigrants whose sole desire is to dwell in the midst of their people and its culture. We, pray and feel certain that the day will come when we shall be happily privileged to welcome very many of our brother Jews, who are today in the Diaspora of the Soviet Union.

Honoured guests, I note the good and warm relations that have existed all these years between my Ministry and the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission. I am happy that the Heads of the Mission, after returning to their homeland,

to the Soviet Union, rose in the ranks of the Church and today fill key positions in the hierarchy of the Pravoslavic Church. I hope that the friendly relations between us will continue to grow and perhaps will contribute to the advancement of friendly relations between our peoples, the ancient-new people of Israel and the great Russian people. Perhaps, a period of normal relations between our countries will also return.

In this spirit of joy and of longing for understanding among intellectuals and clergy, I propose a toast: a toast to Jerusalem and the distinguished guests who have come within its gates to venerate its shrines: may we all be privileged, speedily in our generation, to witness the brotherhood of peoples and the growth of mutual understanding, so that peace may reign secure forever in this, our city Jerusalem, and everywhere else throughout the world.

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The Sixth World Congress of Jewish Studies will be held in Jerusalem, from 13 to 19 August 1973 (15–21 Av 5733), at the Hebrew University. There will be five major divisions, as at the previous Congress.

Division I: The Ancient Near East as related to the People of Israel and the Land of Israel; Jewish History during the First and Second Temple Periods; the Dead Sea Scrolls; Archaeology—The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha; and Bible Studies.

Division II: Jewish History during the Mishnah and Talmud Periods, the Middle Ages, and in Modern Times; the History of the Jewish Labour Movement; contemporary Jewish History—the Holocaust, Zionism, and the establishment of the State of Israel.

Division III: Jewish thought and creation; Rabbinic literature; Jewish philosophy and Kabbalah; Jewish Law; Yiddish and Hebrew poetry and literature; and Jews in world literature.

Division IV: The Hebrew language; Jewish languages; languages of the Ancient East; Jewish Folklore, music, and art.

Division V: Special Research Projects.

There will be additional inter-divisional sessions on specific subjects.

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The International Sociological Association announces that the Eighth World Congress of Sociology on 'Science and Revolution in Contemporary Societies' will take place in Toronto, Canada, August 18–24, 1974. There will be plenary sessions, working groups, general symposia, and 'round tables'. The plenary sessions (formal presentations with prepared discussants around a central theme) are provisionally announced as: The Scientific and Technological Revolution, Sociologists in a Changing World—Observers or Participants?; Population Changes and Social Development; Poverty and Social Inequality.

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The Department of Sociology, University of Haifa has the following members:

Eugene Weiner, theory (Chairman); Abraham Kaplan, methodology; Tzvi Sobel, religion, minorities; Henry Rosenfeld, anthropology; Raanan

Weitz, regional planning; Theodor Shanin, peasant society; Charles Kamen, methodology; Morris Konopnitsky, co-operative movements; Eliezer Ben Raphael, sociology of the kibbutz; Yosef Shefer, sociology of the family; Morris Freilich, methodology; Karl Heinz Schneider, theory; Shlomo Swirsky, social movements; Gerald Berlin, small groups; Joseph Eaton, evaluational research; Michael Saltman, anthropology; and Dov Freedlander, demography. There are also junior staff members. At the B.A. level the department has 600 students, and at the M.A. level, 35. There is a programme in the applied social sciences in co-operation with the Kibbutz training institute 'Ruppin', under the general supervision of Professor Gerald Berlin. The M.A. Programme of the Department is directed by Dr. Theodor Shanin. The Department publishes *Social Research Review*.

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The information Division of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs published in January 1973 a volume entitled: *Israel—25 Years*, in which the following data appear.

Education 'Sixty per cent of the Jewish population have their origin in Muslim countries. In the kindergartens they are 63 per cent, in primary schools, 60 per cent, in post-primary schools, 43 per cent, and in the universities, 13 per cent. It is obvious that maintenance of the general overall level of education depends on raising the level of this group.

'At present, about 80 per cent of the teachers in primary schools and 60 per cent in post-primary schools are women. To attract more men teachers and more teachers in general, and to raise the standard of the profession, we have inaugurated a five-point programme: gradual academization of teacher-training, beginning with those teacher-training colleges that have three-year courses and are not far below university standard; continual in-service training and re-training on a large scale; equalization of teachers' salaries and working conditions with those of other academic professions; grant of more responsibility to teachers and encouragement of initiative; better public relations and more vigorous recruitment campaigns.'

Israel and the Developing Countries 'Since 1958, Israel's international co-operation programmes have become an integral part of its foreign relations. ... After fifteen years of endeavour, Israel's basic approach—kept within reason and practicability—has been shown to be justified. Israel has not suggested large investments or large demographic transfers beyond its own capabilities or those of the host country. Instead, it has stressed people. About five thousand Israel Government experts, and as many representatives of private firms, have worked in the developing countries since the programme began. More than 17,000 students from those countries have already studied in Israel, and today many of them perform important duties in the growth and prosperity of their own homelands.'

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It was announced last January in Jerusalem that 800 immigrants were employed as teachers in 1972, when Israel had vacancies for 2,500 teachers.

The Ministry of Education took a *Jerusalem Post* reporter on a tour of a residential centre in Netania where 60 immigrant teachers were being trained. There was a residential four-month course; 45 of the men and women were from Russia, and the remainder from the United States, Europe, and South America; most of them were graduates. Nearly half the group (26) were destined to teach English; they included several Russians. Others would teach mathematics, physics, and chemistry.

All of them had already completed a Hebrew course in an *Ulpan*, which had lasted for five months. In Netania, they acquired a knowledge of teaching methods and of Hebrew terminology relating to their particular subject.

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The Ministry of Education in Israel last January announced some of the findings of a recent survey of the teaching of English in elementary schools. Until 1967 English was taught for three years. Then, partly as a result of the influx of English-speaking immigrants after the Six-Day War and of the use of English television programmes, it was possible to expand the teaching of English to four years. New courses were given in teacher-training colleges to provide more staff for elementary schools.

As a result, pupils who have completed their elementary schooling have reached a level of English comparable to that of pupils in the first two years of secondary school. A series of new textbooks were prepared by the English Department of Tel Aviv University; they are based on a phonetic approach and have proved successful. Educational television is provided for 80 per cent of the first and second years of English teaching, either once a week or once a fortnight.

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Last January, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem awarded 526 Bachelor of Arts degrees in the Social Sciences (Economics, Political Science, Psychology, Sociology, and Anthropology). There were 110 more graduates in these fields than in the previous year.

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A spokesman for the Ministry of Welfare of Israel was reported to have said last February that about IL7 million was distributed during the present school year to more than 31,000 needy secondary schoolchildren. The average grant was IL220; the pupils eligible were either members of households maintained by welfare allowances or of these with an average monthly income of less than IL90 per person. The school secretariat usually hands over the money to each pupil individually, as and when required.

The grant programme was introduced three years ago in order to reduce the number of drop-outs from secondary schools. In the current year, 13 per cent (4,000) of those in the matriculation class—grade 12—received an allowance; 6,000 in grade 11 (19 per cent), 9,000 (28 per cent) in grade 10, and 12,500 (41 per cent of all students in that class) did so.

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The Minister of Health in Israel stated in the Knesset last February that there was a great shortage of nurses: 500 nursing posts were vacant, and an additional 5,200 nurses would be required in the next five years. His Ministry planned an increase of nursing schools; its development budget for 1973–74 was 146·5 per cent higher than the previous year's, and the ordinary budget 64 per cent higher.

On the other hand, the country's surplus of doctors would disappear within the next few years: 30 per cent of the 8,442 physicians were already of pensionable age and, moreover, the expansion of the health services would require more doctors. There were three medical schools (in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa), and it was proposed to establish a fourth in the Negev. There was a great demand for general practitioners.

If the present rate of hospital building were maintained, Israel would have nine modern hospitals within the next few years. Overcrowding was most acute in the Tel Aviv area.

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Israel Book World, no. 10, December 1972, states that the organizers of the Jerusalem International Book Fair have decided to expand their exhibition space for the April 1973 Fair. The Fair is held every two years. There has been a steady increase in the number of participating countries since the first Fair was held in 1963: from 22 in that year to 30 in 1971. In 1963, 70 Israelis and 750 foreign publishers participated; by 1971 the numbers had risen to 81 and 902, respectively. Israeli publishing houses exhibited 3,100 books at the first Fair and by 1971 the number had risen to 6,600; while foreign publishers' books rose from 9,400 in 1963 to 12,100 in 1971. There were 40,000 visitors to the Fair in 1971.

Twenty Israeli publishing and printing houses exhibited their books at the Frankfurt Book Fair held in the autumn of 1972. Representatives in Frankfurt of the Israel Programme for Scientific Translations entered into an agreement with a British publishing house for the latter to assume global distribution rights for all IPST books; it is estimated that the agreement will increase IPST's annual sales by about $300,000. Israel Book World adds: 'Agreement in principle was reached with a leading Dutch publisher for a joint venture that will take four or five years to complete. This is a 5-volume international encyclopedia of the social sciences. An international editorial and advisory board has already been formed, and the venture is expected to cost $1.2 m.'

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The Department of African and Asian Affairs, World Jewish Congress, was set up in May 1972. It is headed by Mr. Marcus R. Einfeld, a lawyer from Australia. The Department aims at creating a deeper understanding between the Jewish world and the countries of Africa and Asia. Those working towards this aim feel that the Jewish people cannot content themselves with making their voice heard only in those countries in which they are numerous; instead, they must familiarize themselves, and form ties, with the

countries of the so-called Third World. These countries have no, or at most very tiny, Jewish communities.

By expositions of Jewish history and culture as well as through personal contacts the programme hopes to correct often distorted images held of the Jews. It will try to establish new contacts with academics, students, artists, politicians, and generally with opinion leaders in African and Asian countries.

The first stage of the programme will include seminars on Jewish topics to be held in Japan and India, as well as symposia dealing with Japan and India to be held in North America and Britain; a student conference in either Ethiopia or Kenya; meetings with Chinese scholars in the United States and Britain; and translations of Jewish literary works in several African and Asian languages. Basic pamphlets on Judaism, the Jewish people, and Jewish communities are in preparation.

Committees are being (or have already been) set up in a number of Jewish communities in order to promote contacts between them and African and Asian visitors to their countries.

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According to the Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel, the country's printers and publishers almost doubled their exports in the first half year of 1972—from $3,786,000 in the first six months of 1971 to $6,149,000 in January–June 1972. In May 1972 alone, exports reached $1,134,000 as against $384,000 in May 1971. *Israel Book World* states: 'Israeli publishers who export may now apply for interest-free loans to help them prepare catalogues, dummies and other promotional materials. The loan may not exceed 50 per cent of the total cost of preparing the material. If the materials prepared with the aid of the loan do not result in a sale of the book being promoted, the loan automatically becomes a grant.'

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Jewish Culture in the Soviet Union, Proceedings of the Symposium devoted to the Struggle for Jewish Cultural Survival in the U.S.S.R. (held in Jerusalem, 30–31 January 1972), has been published by the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress, 1, Ben Yehuda St., Jerusalem, Israel, from which copies may be obtained (IL12 or $4 per copy, post free).

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Alperin, Aaron, *Stephen S. Wise, Rabino, Pensador, Luchador por los Derechos Humanos*, 48 pp., Congreso Judio Latinoamericano, Buenos Aires, 1972, n.p.

Baldwin, Elaine, *Differentiation and Co-operation in an Israeli Veteran Moshav*, xxv + 239 pp., Foreword by Max Gluckman, Manchester Univ. Press, Manchester, 1972, £3.60.

Buckley, Mary, *The Aged are People, Too: About William Posner and Social Work with the Old*, 174 pp., Introduction by Arthur S. Farber, National University Publications, Kennikat Press, Port Washington, N.Y./London, 1972, $7.95.

Budd, Susan, *Sociologists and Religion, Themes and Issues in Modern Sociology*, vii + 196 pp., Collier-Macmillan, 1973, £2.00 (paperback, £1.00).

Chouraqui, André, *Letter to an Arab Friend*, trans. William V. Gugli, Preface by Shimon Peres, v + 271 pp., Univ. of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1972, $12.50.

Cross, Malcolm, *The East Indians of Guyana and Trinidad*, Minority Rights Group Report, No. 13, 28 pp., Minority Rights Group, London, 1972, 45p.

Della Pergola, S., *Jewish and Mixed Marriages in Milan 1901–1968. With an Appendix: Frequency of Mixed Marriages among Diaspora Jews*, Jewish Population Studies, 166 pp., The Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University, 1972, n.p.

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Eppel, E. M., ed., *Education for Cultural Pluralism*, 133 pp., Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress, London, 1972, £1.75.

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Fürstenberg, Friedrich, *Die Sozialstruktur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ein soziologischen Überblick*, 2nd rev. edn., 150 pp., Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, 1972, DM12.80.

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Hill, Michael, *A Sociology of Religion*, x + 285 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1973, £3.50.

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Klapp, Orrin E., *Heroes, Villains and Fools: Reflections of the American Character*, xi + 176 pp., Aegis Publishing Company, San Diego, Calif., 1971, n.p.

Klapp, Orrin, E., *Social Types: Process, Structure and Ethos*, vii + 11 pp., Aegis Publishing Company, San Diego, Calif., n.p.

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Kushner, Gilbert, *Immigrants from India in Israel. Planned Change in an Administered Community*, xviii + 151 pp., The University of Arizona Press, Tucson, Arizona, 1972, $6.95 (paperback).

Lipset, Seymour Martin, *Group Life in America. A Task Force Report*, The American Jewish Committee, New York, 1972, $1.50.

Lyman, Stanford M., *The Black American in Sociological Thought: New Perspectives on Black America*, 7 + 220 pp., G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1972, $6.95.

Mayer, Philip, ed., *Socialization: the Approach from Social Anthropology*, A.S.A. Monographs No. 8, xxx + 352 pp., Tavistock Publications, London, 1972, paperback, £1.50.

O'Neill, John, ed., *Modes of Individualism and Collectivism*, x + 358 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1973, £4.75 (paperback £1.90).

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

ALTSHULER, Mordechai; Ph.D., Lecturer at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem and Director of the Centre for Research of Eastern European Jewry. Chief publications: *First steps of the Jewish sections in the communist party of the U.S.S.R.* (Hebrew), Society for Research on Jewish Communities, Jerusalem, 1966; editor, *Russian Publications on Jews and Judaism in the Soviet Union 1917–1967* (Russian and Hebrew), The Historical Society of Israel, Jerusalem, 1970.

ARONOFF, Myron Joel; Ph.D., Lecturer in the Department of Political Science in Tel Aviv University; formerly Research Fellow, Department of Social Anthropology and Sociology, Manchester University. Chief publications: *Frontiertown: The Politics of Community Building in Israel,* Manchester University Press, forthcoming; 'Party Center and Local Branch Relationships: The Israel Labor Party', in Alan Arian, ed., *The Elections in Israel—1969,* Jerusalem, 1972; 'Development Towns in Israel', in Michael Curtis, ed., *Israel: Structure and Change,* in press.

COHEN, Aliza; B.A., registered for M.A. in Department of Sociology, Haifa University; currently engaged in research on problems of poverty in Haifa.

FEDOROWITZ, Esther; B.A., registered for M.A. in Department of Sociology, Haifa University; currently engaged in research on problems of poverty in Haifa.

KATZ, Elihu; Ph.D., Director, the Communications Institute of Israel, and Associate Professor of Sociology, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Simon Research Fellow in the University of Manchester, 1972–73. Formerly, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Chicago and Founding Director, Israel Television. Chief publications: co-author, *Personal Influence,* New York, 1956; *Medical Innovation,* New York, 1966; *Politics of Community Conflict,* New York, 1969; and co-editor, *Bureaucracy and the Public,* New York, 1973. Currently engaged (with Professor George Wedell) in a study of the problems of the introduction of mass media in developing countries, with the aid of grants from the Ford Foundation and the International Broadcasting Institute.

LAZAR, David; Ph.D., Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Visiting Fellow at St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1972–73. Chief publications: *L'Opinion française et la renaissance de l'Etat d'Israel, 1945–1949,* Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1972; 'French Catholics and the Struggle for Israel, 1945–1950', in *Christian Attitudes on Jews and Judaism,* no. 20, October 1971; 'The Genesis of Franco-Israeli Relations' in *State and Government* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, vol. 1, no. 2, autumn 1971.

SHAROT, Stephen; D.Phil., Lecturer in Sociology, University of Leicester. Chief publications: 'A Jewish Christian Adventist Movement', *The*

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WEINER, Eugene; Ph.D., Chairman, Department of Sociology, Haifa University. Formerly Director of the Graduate Studies Program of the Lehman Institute at the Jewish Theological Seminary. Chief publications: 'Passionate Sociology and Reason', *Social Research Review*, the University of Haifa, vol. 2, September 1972; editor, *In War and in Peace: Essays in Memory of Fallen Israeli Soldiers*, Tel Aviv, 1972; 'Israel's Heroic Dead', *Worldview*, vol. 15, no. 1, January 1973; 'Reflections of an Army Recruit', *Shdemot*, vol. 38, no. 2, spring 1973. Currently engaged with the research staff of the Department of Sociology at Haifa University on a variety of projects in the areas of poverty, old age, and communication.